J-S30033-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DWIGHT WILLIAMS

Appellant No. 2319 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 6, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006351-2011

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED AUGUST 28, 2015

A jury found Dwight Williams guilty of robbery,1conspiracy,2robbery 

of a motor vehicle,3and possession of an instrument of crime.4 The trial 

court sentenced Williams to a total of 81⁄2 - 17 years’ imprisonment. 

Williams filed timely post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied, and 

a timely direct appeal. Both Williams and the trial court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. We affirm.

The trial court accurately summarized the evidence as follows:

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 903.

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 3702.

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 907.
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On May 18, 2011, William Jackson drove his 

girlfriend Jessica Blair and her son to her home. 

Jackson was driving his milk-white, 1976 Chevrolet 

Impala, which was customized with distinctively 

large 26” tires and rims. When Jackson pulled up to 

Blair’s home at 1379 Narragansett Street in 

Philadelphia, he double-parked his vehicle and 

walked Blair and her son to the front door. Blair and 

Jackson talked on the porch for several minutes. 

During their conversation, Jackson noticed two men 

— defendant Scott and co-defendant Williams —

walking down the street. Williams and Scott stopped 

walking when they reached Jackson’s car, and then 

stood there talking for approximately five minutes. 

They were approximately ten to fifteen feet from 

Jackson, who was on the porch. Jackson ended his 

conversation with Blair and then walked down the 

porch steps toward his vehicle. 

As soon as Jackson reached the bottom of the steps, 

[] Williams approached Jackson and pulled out a 

black and silver semi-automatic handgun. [] Scott 

followed close behind. Williams pointed the gun in 

Jackson’s face and told him to get on the ground, lay 

face-down on his stomach, and hand over his 

money. Jackson complied by [lying] on the ground. 

Williams then put the gun to the center of the back 

of Jackson’s head. [] Scott was standing directly 

behind Williams. Williams removed a wallet from 

Jackson’s back pocket, and told [] Scott to jump in 

Jackson’s car and drive off. [Scott] stepped over 

Jackson, entered Jackson’s vehicle, and drove 

toward Stenton Avenue. Even though he was [lying] 

on the ground, Jackson observed [Scott] drive 

Jackon’s Impala down Narragansett Street and turn 

right onto Stenton Avenue. [] Williams told Jackson 

not to move. Williams then walked away in the same 

direction as [] Scott, and then turned right on 

Stenton Avenue.

After [] Williams walked away, Jackson got up off the 

sidewalk and walked inside Blair’s house. Once he 

entered the house, Jackson called police using Blair’s 

phone; the police arrived a few minutes later. 
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Jackson provided descriptions of both men: ‘the one 

gentleman with the gun had on a dark gray hoodie 

and dark pants, light-skinned, goatee, kind of 

stocky. The other person that drove off in the vehicle 

was dark-skinned, slim, maybe a little bit taller.’ 

Jackson testified that he remembered the faces ‘very 

well’ and that there were several street and porch 

lights on in the area. Police conveyed over police 

radio the descriptions of both defendants and a 

description of the stolen car. 

Sergeant Daniel Ayres and Officer Michael Bransfield 

were responding to the police radio call when they 

passed Jackson’s distinctive Impala two blocks away 

from the scene of the crime at the corner of 

Crittenden and Price. The officers observed the 

Impala parked poorly, with the headlights and 

interior lights left on, and the keys on the ground in 

the middle of the street outside of the driver’s side 

door. [] Scott was near the Impala walking away 

from the driver’s side door of the car. The Officers 

stopped [Scott] for investigation pending 

identification by Jackson. 

Officers Justin O’Brien and Fred MacConnell stopped 

[] Williams on the 6500 block of Wister Street, just 

one block from the scene of the crime. Williams was 

walking down Wister Street looking over his 

shoulder. When the Officers turned their car around, 

Williams had stopped walking and was now sitting on 

the steps of a house along Wister Street. Williams 

claimed that he lived there when asked by Officer 

O’Brien, but he did not know the address of the 

house or the name of the street. The Officers held 

Williams for investigation pending identification by 

Jackson. Officers Brandon Bryant and Kevin Cahill 

transported Jackson to a total of three locations to 

make possible identifications. At the first location, 

Jackson identified the Impala stopped by Officers 

O’Brien and MacConnell as his customized Impala. 

He then positively identified [] Scott as the individual 

who stole his Impala. Jackson testified that [Scott]’s 

facial hair stood out, and he remembered ‘his face, 

dark skin, his height, his stature, even the clothing 
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he had on.’ At the second location, Jackson was 

provided the opportunity to make an identification of 

someone the police had stopped in the area. Jackson 

told the officers that this second person was not 

involved in the robbery. Jackson was then taken to a 

third location, where he identified [] Williams as the 

gunman who pointed the gun at his head and took 

his wallet. Jackson testified that he would not forget 

Williams’s face and stature. Approximately ten 

minutes passed from the time he was robbed until he 

identified [] Scott and Williams. Jackson testified that 

he had no doubt about his identifications of [] Scott 

and Williams and that he would never forget the day 

that he was robbed. 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, at 1-4 (citations omitted). 

Williams raises three issues in this appeal:

Is the appellant entitled to an arrest of judgment 

with regard to his conviction[s] for robbery, robbery 

of a motor vehicle, criminal conspiracy and 

possessing instruments of crime since the 

Commonwealth failed to sustain its burden of 

proving the appellant’s guilt of [these crimes] 

beyond a reasonable doubt?

Is the appellant entitled to a new trial with regard to 

his conviction[s] for robbery, robbery of a motor 

vehicle, criminal conspiracy and possessing 

instrument of crime since the verdicts of guilt are 

against the weight of the evidence?

Is the appellant entitled to a new trial since the trial 

court erred when it denied his pretrial motion to 

suppress?

Brief For Appellant, at 5.

Williams’ first argument is a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence. Our standard of review for such challenges is well-settled:
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[W]hether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at 

trial in the light most favorable to the 

[Commonwealth as the] verdict winner, there is 

sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find 

every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not 

weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts 

and circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility 

of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s 

guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a 

matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn 

from the combined circumstances. The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving 

every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 716 (Pa.Super.2015). 

We begin by defining the relevant offenses. The robbery statute 

provides in relevant part that “a person is guilty of robbery if, in the course 

of committing a theft, he: ... threatens another with or intentionally puts him 

in fear of immediate serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii). In 

addition, an individual is guilty of robbery of a motor vehicle “if he steals or 

takes a motor vehicle from another person in the presence of that person or 

any other person in lawful possession of the motor vehicle.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 

3702. A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person to commit a 

crime if, “with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he ... 

agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them 

will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or 

solicitation to commit such crime ...” 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1). Finally, a 
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person is guilty of possession of an instrument of crime “if he possesses any 

instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 

907(a). An instrument of crime is “(1) anything specially made or specially 

adapted for criminal use [or] (2) anything used for criminal purposes and 

possessed by the actor under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for 

lawful uses it may have.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(d). 

Williams argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove Williams’ 

identity as the perpetrator of these crimes. The evidence discussed above –

consisting of Jackson’s positive identifications of Williams and Scott, 

Williams’ possession of a weapon during the incident, and Williams’ 

untruthfulness when confronted by the police, demonstrating his 

consciousness of guilt – was plainly sufficient to prove Williams’ identity as 

one of the robbers. See Commonwealth v. Ragan, 645 A.2d 811, 818 

(Pa.1994) (eyewitness testimony identifying defendant as shooter “was 

clearly sufficient” to sustain his conviction); Commonwealth v. Donnelly, 

653 A.2d 35, 37 (Pa.Super. 1995) (“fabrication of false and contradictory 

statements by the accused is evidence from which a jury may infer that they 

were made with the intent to mislead police and are indicative of guilt”); 

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 539 A.2d 829, 831 (Pa.Super.1988) (single 

witness’s positive identification of appellant sufficient to establish his identity 

as the robber). 

Williams argues that “the Commonwealth did not present any physical 

or scientific evidence in an attempt to connect [him] to the crime,” and 
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“[a]bsolutely no physical evidence was presented to corroborate Jackson’s 

account of the incident.” Brief for Appellant, at 26. The Commonwealth was 

not required to present any physical or scientific evidence connecting 

Williams to the crime, because “it is settled that a positive identification by 

one witness is sufficient for conviction.” Commonwealth v. Wilder, 393 

A.2d 927, 928 (Pa.Super.1978). Williams also points out that Jackson’s 

girlfriend, Jessica Blair, did not make any identification of the robbers. The 

Commonwealth, however, was not required to present any evidence to 

corroborate Jackson’s testimony, because corroboration is not required of 

testimony found credible by the fact finder. See Commonwealth v. 

Connelly, 689 A.2d 950, 953 (Pa.Super.1997) (uncorroborated testimony of 

prosecution witnesses may alone be sufficient to convict if credited by fact 

finder). Jackson’s positive identifications of Wlliams as one of his assailants 

was sufficient, by itself, to prove Williams’ guilt for robbery. Thus, Williams’ 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.

In his second argument on appeal, Williams contends that he is 

entitled to a new trial because the verdict is contrary to the weight of the 

evidence. The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder 

of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to 

determine the credibility of the witnesses. Commonwealth v. Forbes, 867 

A.2d 1268, 1273–74 (Pa.Super.2005). A new trial is not warranted because 

of “a mere conflict in the testimony” and must have a stronger foundation 
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than a reassessment of the credibility of witnesses. Commonwealth v. 

Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 665 (2007). Rather, the role of the trial judge is to 

determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of 

greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the 

facts is to deny justice. Id. On appeal, “our purview is extremely limited 

and is confined to whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that 

the jury verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a 

weight claim consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion, 

not a review of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 732, 738 

(Pa.Super.2012). An appellate court may not reverse a verdict unless it is 

so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. Forbes, 867 

A.2d at 1273–74.

Williams bases his challenge to the weight of the evidence on 

discrepancies between Jackson’s testimony and the testimony of Jackson’s 

girlfriend, Jessica Blair. According to Williams, Jackson’s identification of the 

scene of the robbery as well-lit was undermined by Blair’s inability to identify 

either perpetrator. Williams also emphasizes that Blair was sure that Scott 

had a chipped tooth when in fact he did not. These details certainly were 

fodder for closing argument, but the jury remained free to credit Jackson’s 

account of the events and to return a guilty verdict on this basis. The trial 
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court acted within its discretion by denying Williams’ challenge to the weight 

of the evidence.

In his final argument on appeal, Williams contends that the trial court 

improperly denied his motion to suppress, because the police stopped him 

on the street without reasonable suspicion and the out-of-court identification 

procedure was overly suggestive. The standard of review in an appeal from 

an order denying a motion to suppress is as follows:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to 

the denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the suppression court’s factual 

findings are supported by the record and whether 

the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before

the suppression court, we may consider only the 

evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the 

evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted 

when read in the context of the record as a whole. 

Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, we are bound by these 

findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal 

conclusions are erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa.2010). 

We first address whether the police had reasonable suspicion to stop 

Williams on the street. “It is well established that the Fourth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution allow a police officer to conduct a brief investigatory stop of an 

individual if the officer has reasonable suspicion, based on specific and 

articulable facts, that criminal activity may be afoot.” In re C.C., 780 A.2d 

696, 698 (Pa.Super.2001). To determine whether reasonable suspicion 
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existed, the court must examine the totality of the circumstances, and the 

officer must be able to articulate specific facts that, together with reasonable 

inferences drawn from those facts, led him to reasonably conclude, in light 

of his experience, that criminal activity was afoot. Commonwealth v. 

Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 597 (Pa.Super.2010). The court should consider the 

specificity of the identification information provided to the authorities “in 

conjunction with the offense reported to have been committed, the proximity 

of the crime to the sighting of the suspect and the time when, as well as the 

place where, the confrontation occurs.” Commonwealth v. Whelton, 465 

A.2d 1043, 1047 n.4 (Pa.Super.1983). Also, “[w]hen evaluating the totality 

of circumstances comprising reasonable suspicion ... this Court will not 

ignore the ability of experienced police officers to draw deductions and 

inferences which other persons might not make.” In Interest of B.C., 683 

A.2d 919, 924 (Pa.Super.1996). Reasonable suspicion is a relatively low 

standard. Thus, “[t]he fact that a suspect’s behavior may be consistent with 

innocent behavior does not, standing alone, make detention and limited 

investigation illegal.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 734 A.2d 864, 869 

(Pa.Super.1999). 

Here, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing established 

that at approximately 10:40 p.m., Williams and Scott confronted the victim, 

Jackson, on the street in front of his girlfriend’s house. Pointing a gun at 

Jackson’s head, Williams forced him to the ground and removed his wallet 
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from his pocket. Williams told Scott to drive off in Jackson’s car and then 

walked away in the same direction in which Scott had driven. N.T. 2/4/13, 

13-22. 

After Williams and Scott left, Jackson went inside his girlfriend’s house 

and telephoned the police. Jackson told the police what had happened and 

provided descriptions of Williams and Scott. Police radio broadcasted that 

there had been a gunpoint carjacking, described the stolen car as a 1979 

white Chevy Impala, and described the robbers as two black males, one 

wearing a black “hoodie,” the other wearing a gray “hoodie.” Officers 

responding to the broadcast quickly located the car haphazardly parked on a 

nearby street with its headlights still on. Scott, who was wearing a black 

hoodie, was walking away from the vehicle when officers stopped him for 

investigation. The police transported Jackson to the scene, and he identified 

the car as being his and Scott as being the person who accompanied 

Williams during the robbery and drove off in his vehicle. N.T., 2/4/13, at 23, 

44-54. 

Other police officers responding to the radio broadcast quickly located 

Williams walking at a fast pace down the 6500 block of Wister Street, in the 

same area where the robbery occurred. Williams was wearing a white Tshirt, and the officers believed that he fit the description of one of the 

robbers and had possibly taken his hoodie off. When the officers made a Uturn to approach Williams, he sat down on the steps of one of the houses on 
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the block. The officers exited their car and asked Williams if he lived there, 

and he said yes. They asked him what the address was, but he did not 

know and turned around in an apparent attempt to learn what it was. One 

of the officers asked Williams if he knew the name of the street, and he was 

unable to tell them. The officers asked him again if he lived there. This 

time, he admitted he did not. Besides lying to the officers, Williams also 

acted nervously throughout the encounter. N.T., 2/4/13, at 26, 36, 54-61.

This evidence provided reasonable suspicion to believe that Williams 

may have been one of the robbers. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 73 

A.3d 609, 616 (Pa.Super.2013) (reasonable suspicion existed because 

defendant lied to officer who approached him on the street and gave officer 

false name); Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 380 

(Pa.Super.2013) (reasonable suspicion existed to detain defendant for 

investigation because, among other things, when he spotted the police, he 

ran onto the porch of nearby house, pretended to read a newspaper, and 

when questioned by officer, admitted that he did not live at that address); 

Commonwealth v. Guess, 53 A.2d 895, 901-02 (Pa.Super.2012) 

(reasonable suspicion existed to detain defendant because he and his 

companion matched general description of suspected burglars, they were 

found near where the crimes occurred, defendant appeared nervous when 

approached by police, and he claimed to be in the area to visit a friend but 
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did not provide friend’s name when asked). Therefore, Williams’ stop on the 

street was proper.

We next consider whether the trial court properly denied Williams’ 

motion to suppress his out of court identification. A trial court should 

evaluate the totality of the circumstances when reviewing a motion to 

suppress an out of court identification. Commonwealth v. Freeman, 827 

A.2d 385 (Pa.2003). Although suggestiveness in the identification process is 

relevant, “suggestiveness alone does not warrant exclusion.” 

Commonwealth v. Fulmore, 25 A.3d 340, 346 (Pa.Super.2011). The 

court must also examine the opportunity of the witness to view the 

perpetrator at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the 

accuracy of his prior description of the perpetrator, the level of certainty 

demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and 

confrontation. Commonwealth v. Wade, 33 A.3d 108, 114 

(Pa.Super.2011). The court must weigh these factors against the corrupting 

effect of any suggestiveness. Id. The court should not suppress 

identification evidence unless the facts demonstrate that the identification 

procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very 

substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Fulmore, 25 A.3d at 

346. 

The purpose of a “one on one” identification is to enhance reliability by 

reducing the time elapsed after the commission of the crime. Wade, 33 
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A.3d at 114. Absent some special element of unfairness, a prompt “one on 

one” identification is not so suggestive as to give rise to an irreparable 

likelihood of misidentification. Id. 

In this case, there was no special element of unfairness that rendered 

the one-on-one confrontation unduly suggestive. The evidence at the 

suppression hearing established that Jackson had a good opportunity to 

observe Williams prior to and at the time of the crime. Jackson was 

standing on his girlfriend’s porch when he saw Scott and Williams walk down 

the street in his direction. Scott and Williams stopped near where Jackson 

had parked his car, within ten feet of where Jackson was standing. For the 

next ten minutes, Scott and Williams stood there while Jackson continued to 

speak with his girlfriend. Although it was nighttime, there was lighting from 

street lights and the porch light. N.T. 2/4/13, at 15-17, 29. 

After ten minutes passed, Jackson stepped off of his girlfriend’s porch 

and walked toward his car. Scott and Williams confronted him, and Jackson 

had a face-to-face view of Scott for approximately one minute. Williams 

pointed a gun at Jackson and told him to get onto the ground. Williams 

asked Jackson for his money and his wallet. As Jackson lay on the ground, 

he was only a few feet from Scott and could see his face. Eventually, 

Williams told Scott to get into Jackson’s car and drive away. Williams then 

walked away. Jackson explained that a number of minutes passed from the 

time that Scott and Williams confronted him on the street until Scott finally 
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drove off. During the encounter, Jackson had ample opportunity to observe 

Williams and saw that he had a goatee, was light-skinned and approximately 

six-feet tall, and was wearing a gray “hoodie” and dark pants. N.T. 2/4/13,

at 16-22, 38. Jackson’s observations during the robbery were at least as 

reliable as other cases in which we have found the victim’s observations 

reliable. See, e.g., McElrath v. Commonwealth, 592 A.2d 740, 743 

(Pa.Super.1991) (victim had sufficient opportunity to observe appellant so 

as to make reliable out-of-court identification even though she observed him 

for only five seconds); Commonwealth v. Bell, 562 A.2d 849, 851-52 

(Pa.Super.1989) (victim had sufficient opportunity to observe appellant and 

make out-of-court identification even though he observed him only in 

silhouette for a few seconds). 

Nor was anything at the scene of Scott’s arrest improperly suggestive. 

After the robbery, Jackson telephoned the police, who arrived within a 

matter of minutes. Police officers immediately transported Jackson a couple 

of blocks away to where they had stopped Scott. Scott was not handcuffed 

but was sitting inside a police car. Jackson positively identified Scott as the 

person who had driven away in his car. Jackson clearly remembered Scott’s 

face from the robbery and had no doubt “at all” about his identification, 

which took place just a few minutes after the robbery. N.T. 2/4/13, at 23-

26, 36, 41, 47-48, 52-53. The police then drove Jackson to another 

individual (not Scott or Williams) that they had stopped. Jackson stated that 
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this person was not involved in the robbery, demonstrating that he was not 

simply identifying anyone whom the police presented to him. Finally, the 

police drove Jackson to a third location, where they had stopped Williams. 

There, Jackson positively identified Williams as the gunman because he 

remembered Williams’ face, goatee, and “whole stature.” Jackson was 

“[o]ne-hundred percent” certain that Williams was one of the robbers. His 

identification of defendant took place just a few minutes after the robbery 

occurred. N.T., 2/4/13, at 26-28, 43, 56-58, 62-64. This evidence is at 

least as sturdy as other decisions in which we held that the identification of 

suspects in custody was admissible. See Commonwealth v. Moye, 836 

A.2d 973, 976-78 (Pa.Super.2003) (identification was not unduly suggestive, 

even though it took place while defendant was handcuffed and was lone 

person inside police van, and even though prior to the identification, police 

told witnesses whose house had just been burglarized that they had person 

for witnesses to identify who had been found running down the street 

looking sweaty and tired); Commonwealth v. Brown, 611 A.2d 1318, 

1320-21 (Pa.Super.1992) (victim’s identification of defendant at hospital less 

than two hours after assault not impermissibly suggestive, even though 

victim saw weapon used in the crime prior to making identification and 

defendant was in handcuffs at time of identification); McElrath, 592 A.2d at 

742-43 (victim’s one-on-one identification of defendant who was in police 

custody not unduly suggestive, even though the victim noticed defendant’s 
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gun before focusing on his face at identification procedure, where victim had 

observed defendant for approximately five seconds during crime and made 

identification within thirty minutes of incident); Bell, 562 A.2d at 851-52 

(victim’s one-on-one out-of-court identification not impermissibly 

suggestive, even though defendant was handcuffed in back of police van and 

victim had not gotten good look at his attacker); Commonwealth v. 

Walker, 501 A.2d 1143, 1149-50 (Pa.Super.1985) (robbery victim’s oneon-one identification of defendant fifteen minutes after crime and while 

defendant was in custody not unduly suggestive).

Williams claims that Jackson’s identification of him was suggestive 

because, at the time Jackson identified him, he was not wearing a gray 

hoodie, as Jackson had described earlier, and was not in possession of a gun 

or any proceeds of the robbery. Williams ignores, however, that Jackson 

was able to identify Williams based on his face, goatee and “whole stature”. 

A detailed “facial identification is the strongest identification testimony.” 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 423 A.2d 1296, 1299 (Pa.Super.1981). 

Moreover, Jackson had a lengthy opportunity to view Williams during the 

robbery. We see nothing overly suggestive about Williams’ identification. 

Indeed, the record indicates that Jackson’s identification of Williams was 

quite reliable, given his refusal to identify the second person stopped by 

police as one of the perpetrators.
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For these reasons, the trial court properly denied Williams’ motion to 

suppress.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/28/2015