# Wniteb $fates <!Court ofjf 

# eberal <!Claints

MONROE QUAILES, JR., Plaintiff,

v. No. 18-225C Filed: November 7, 2018

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

ORDERDISMISSING COMPLAINT HODGES, SeniorJudge.
Monroe Quailes Jr., a

### pro se plaintiff, seeks con-ections to his military record. He challenges his 1979 military discharge from the United States Navy and a 1989 adverse disability retirement determination by the Board of Corrections of Naval Records. The Governmentmovedto dismiss for lack ofsubjectmatterjurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which reliefcan be granted. The bases for defendant's motions are that Mr. Quailes' complaint is barred by the statute oflimitations and 

### resjudicata. Plaintifffiled a cross-motion forjudgment on the administrative record.
We grantthe Government's motion to dismiss for lack ofsubjectmatterjurisdiction because Mr. Quailes' claim is time barred. This court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs complaint, so we do not address defendant's additional dispositive motion orMr. Quailes' motion forjudgmenton the administrative record. BACKGROUND
Mr. Quailes servedinthe United States Army from 1969until 1975;thenhe enlisted in the Navy in 1976. Shortly after, the Navy court-martialed him for a period of


### 7D17**145 □** **□□□□** 

### 1346 3226

### unauthorized absence during which he pied guilty to grand larceny and breaking and entering in a civilian court. During those proceedings, his counsel requested a medical and psychiatric board evaluation. The Board noted that plaintiffs psychiatric history began prior to his service and that he suffered from schizophrenia but concluded that he was competent to participate in his defense. Based on this evaluation, the Navy withdrew the charges and referred him to a medical board, which in 1979 diagnosed him with schizophrenia and recommended that his case be referred for a disability determination. In exchange for waiving his right to challenge the discharge, the Navy in 1979 gave him a "general discharge by reason of misconduct" for his conviction during his military service, instead of an "other than honorable" discharge. Eight years after, Mr. Quailes challenged his discharge before the Board of Corrections ofNaval Record alleging that his mental condition was incurred while in the Navy and that the discharge was illegal. He maintained that he was entitled to disability retirement with pay, including all lost time. The BCNR denied his petition in 1989 and denied his application for reconsideration in 1991. He petitioned for reconsideration in 2012 and 2017, butboth petitions were denied. Since the BCNR's initial decision, Ms. Quailes has filed three complaints before this court. He first filed a complaint in 1991 before the Claims Court, which found that he had failed to demonstrate that BCNR's determination was arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence. See Quailes v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 659, 664 (1992), aff'd, 979 F.2d 216 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Hethen filed a second complaintin2012 once more challenging the 1979 discharge and 1989 BCNRdetermination. This court dismissed those claims as time barred. Quailes v. UnitedStates, 109 Fed. Cl. 651 (2013). Plaintiffs third and present complaint, styled as a motion for reconsideration, essentially seeks a declaration that his discharge was illegal and that he should have been acquitted ofhis conviction due to his mental condition. Hemaintains thathe was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder in 2014 and that this diagnosis was inherently unlmowable. He requests back pay, disability retirement benefits and correction to his military record. The Government movedto dismiss, contending that his claim is barred by

- 2 -the statute oflimitations and the doctrine ofresjudicata. Ms. Quailes filed a cross-motion forjudgmenton the administrative record. 1
DISCUSSION Mr. Quailes' claims regarding his 1979 military discharge and 1989 BCNR determination are timebarred. This court's statute oflimitations isjurisdictionaland claims barredbythe statute oflimitations mustbe dismissed for lack ofsubjectmatterjurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(l) ofthe Rules ofthe Court ofFederal Claims.Edwards v. UnitedStates, 92 Fed. Cl. 277, 282 (2010). Every claim ofwhich this courthasjurisdiction must be filed within sixyears after such claim first accrues. 28 U.S.C. § 2501. Backpay claimsundertheMilitaryPay Act, 37 U.S.C. §204, accrue upon discharge from active duty. See Feliciano v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 584, 588 (2014) (citation omitted). Mr. Quailes' back pay claim accrued when he was discharged in 1979, and it expired six years later in 1985. Mr. Quailes' complaint was filed in 2018, clearly beyond the statutory period. Mr. Quailes' claim regarding the BCNR's 1989 determination is likewise time barred. Disability retirement claims generally accrue when an appropriate military board eitherfinally denies the claim orrefuses to hear it. See Chambers v. UnitedStates, 417 F.3d 1218, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The determination by "the first statutorily authorizedboard thathears or refuses to hearthe claim invokes the statutes oflimitations." 

### Id. (citation omitted) (distinguishing between claims for unlawful discharge and disability retirement pay). Mr. Quailes' claim accrued when the BCNR issued its decision in 1989 and expired sixyears later in 1995; his claim is therefore time barred. The BCNR's decisions denying his petitions for reconsideration in 1991, 2012, and 2017 do not affect the accrual ofhis claim. A relatively short or reasonableperiod oftime is generally contemplated for reconsideration ofan administrative decision. Van Allen v. UnitedStates, 70 Fed. Cl. 57, 63 (2006) (citation omitted). Nearly thirty years havepassed since the BCNR's 1989 decision, a period too long to deprive the BCNR's decision ofits finality. Cf Van Allen, 70 Fed. Cl. at 63-64 (finding that a period offour years was too long to deprive the administrative determination offinality). Plaintiffcontends that his diagnosis ofpost-traumatic stress disorder in 2014 was inherently unknowable at the accrual date. This argument is equallyunavailing to suspend

1 Ms. Quailes' complaint and cross-motion are styled as motions for reconsideration and refer to Rule 59 of the RCFC. The Clerk of Court, however, has docketed his filings properly as a new complaintunder case no. 18-225C.

- 3

-the limitations period. As the court's statute oflimitations is jurisdictional, it cannot be equitably tolled. FloorPro, Inc. V UnitedStates, 680 F.3d 1377, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Mr. Quailes' claim, moreover, does not satisfy the requirements ofthe "accrual suspensions doctrine," which requires him to demonstrate that the Government has concealed its acts such that he was unware oftheir existence or that his injury was "inherently unknowable" atthe accrual date. See Martinez v. UnitedStates, 333 F.3d 1295, 1319 (2003) (quoting Welcker v. UnitedStates, 752 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see also Young v. United States, 529 F.3d 1380, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that it is knowledge of the facts of the claim, not their legal consequences, that determines the accrual date). There is no evidence ofwrongful conduct by the Government and the record reveals that Mr. Quailes was aware of his PTSD as early as 1982. Admin. R. at 483. Plaintiff's PTSD therefore cannot suspend the limitations period. Ms. Quailes' claim for disability retirement benefits was filed outside the statutory period and must be dismissed as time barred. Plaintiffalso asks thatwe correcthis military record to show an honorable discharge with a disability retirementrather than a general discharge for misconduct. This court may grant non-monetary reliefonly ifit is "an incident ofand collateral to" an award ofmoney judgment. See Pellegrini v. UnitedStates, 103 Fed. Cl. 47, 53 (2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §

149l(a)(2) (2006)). We must deny that request as well.
CONCLUSION The Government's motionto dismiss plaintiffs complaintfor lack ofsubjectmatter jurisdiction is GRANTED. Defendant's resjudicata claim and plaintiffs motion for judgment on the administrative record are moot. The Clerk ofCourt will DISMISS Mr. Quailes' complaint. No costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 

# 1£~,,:.frv'-

SeniorJudge

- 4

-