[Cite as State v. Armbruster, 2019-Ohio-4965.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

JAMIE M. ARMBRUSTER 

 Appellant 

C.A. Nos. 29370 

 29371 

 29372 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE Nos. CR-2016-08-2979 

CR-2015-03-0794 

CR-2015-09-2902 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: December 4, 2019 

 

HENSAL, Judge. 

{¶1} Jamie Armbruster appeals from the judgment of the Summit County Court of 

Common Pleas. This Court affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} This is a consolidated appeal of three separate criminal cases: CR-2015-03-0794 

(“First Case”), CR-2015-09-2902 (“Second Case”), and CR-2016-08-2979 (“Third Case”). In 

the First Case, a grand jury indicted Ms. Armbruster on counts for possession of heroin in 

violation of Revised Code Section 2925.11(A),(C)(6), illegal use or possession of drug 

paraphernalia in violation of Section 2925.14(C)(1), and possessing drug abuse instruments in 

violation of Section 2925.12. Ms. Armbruster moved for intervention in lieu of conviction 

(“IILC”), which the trial court granted. While in the IILC program, a grand jury indicted Ms. 
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Armbruster in the Second Case on the same three charges as the First Case. The trial court 

terminated Ms. Armbruster from the IILC program and reinstated the First Case. Ms. 

Armbruster then pleaded guilty to all of the charges in the First and Second Cases. 

{¶3} The trial court sentenced Ms. Armbruster to 24 months of community control on 

each of the six counts, which it ordered to be served concurrently. The trial court also indicated 

that, if Ms. Armbruster violated the conditions of her community control, it would impose a total 

of 19 months of imprisonment for the First and Second Case. 

{¶4} Less than one year later, a grand jury indicted Ms. Armbruster in the Third Case 

on the same three charges. Ms. Armbruster pleaded guilty to the possession-of-heroin count, and 

the State dismissed the remaining two charges. The trial court sentenced her to 24 months of 

community control. The trial court advised Ms. Armbruster that if she violated the conditions of 

her community control, it could impose a prison term of 12 months, which it would run 

consecutively to the 19-month sentence from the First and Second Case, for a total of 31 months 

of imprisonment. 

{¶5} Ms. Armbruster later pleaded guilty to community-control violations in the First 

and Second Case. As a result, the trial court extended her community control for an additional 

two years. Shortly thereafter, all three cases were re-assigned to a new trial judge. After that, 

Ms. Armbruster pleaded guilty to community-control violations in all three cases, and the new 

trial judge modified her sentence in each case to 90 days in the Summit County Jail, to be served 

concurrently with each other. The trial court also extended her community control for another 

nine months. 

{¶6} The cases were then re-assigned to another (third) trial judge, and the State moved 

to set aside Ms. Armbruster’s modified sentences. In doing so, the State argued that each case 
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contained a conviction of at least one felony of the fifth degree, which is punishable by 6-12 

months in prison. It argued that the prior trial judge, therefore, erred by imposing a 90-day jail 

term. The trial court granted the State’s motion, holding that the prior orders modifying Ms. 

Armbruster’s sentences were nullities because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify its 

sentences. Ms. Armbruster has appealed, raising one assignment of error for this Court’s review. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE’S MOTION TO 

SET ASIDE APPELLANT’S MODIFIED SENTENCES. 

{¶7} In her assignment of error, Ms. Armbruster argues that the trial court erred by 

granting the State’s motion to set aside her modified sentences. More specifically, she argues 

that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it modified her sentences in all three 

cases and sentenced her to 90 days in jail. She also argues that, since the trial court’s orders 

modifying her sentences were final orders, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to later set aside 

those sentences. Ms. Armbruster further argues that the State should have appealed the trial 

court’s orders that modified her sentences, and that its failure to do so results in its claims being 

barred by res judicata and the law-of-the-case doctrine. Lastly, she argues that any error in the 

trial court’s sentencing was either invited or induced by the State. For the reasons that follow, 

Ms. Armbruster’s arguments lack merit. 

{¶8} “Generally, Ohio trial courts lack the authority to reconsider their own valid final 

judgments in criminal cases.” State v. Gilbert, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-110382, 2013-Ohio238, ¶ 5, citing State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350, 2012-Ohio-5636, paragraph one of the 

syllabus. As this Court has stated, “[o]nce the trial court issue[s] its sentencing judgment * * *, 

it los[es] jurisdiction to substantively modify that final judgment. Any attempt to do so would be 
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a nullity.” State v. Simin, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25309, 2011-Ohio-3198, ¶ 10. Exceptions exist, 

however, in situations involving void judgments or clerical errors. Raber at ¶ 20. 

{¶9} Here, there is no dispute that the trial court’s original sentencing judgments were 

final orders. Then, after the cases were re-assigned to a new trial judge, the new trial judge 

modified those sentences. It did not do so based upon those sentences being void, or to correct a 

clerical error. Instead, it simply disregarded the original sentences and issued new ones. It had 

no jurisdiction to do so. Simin at ¶ 10. Accordingly, the judgments modifying Ms. Armbruster’s 

sentences were nullities, thereby giving the trial court the inherent authority to vacate those 

judgments. Id.; State v. Kirk, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 15CA010896, 2016-Ohio-6970, ¶ 8 (noting 

that courts have the inherent authority to recognize and vacate nullities); see Lingo v. State, 138 

Ohio St.3d 427, 2014-Ohio-1052, paragraph three of the syllabus (“A court has the inherent 

authority to vacate its own void judgments.”); Tucker v. Dennis Baughman Co., Ltd., 9th Dist. 

Summit Nos. 26620, 26635, 2014-Ohio-2040, ¶ 6 (“If a trial court lacks jurisdiction, any order it 

enters is a nullity and is void.”). Because those judgments were nullities based upon the trial 

court’s lack of authority to modify its prior final orders, Ms. Armbruster’s arguments related to 

res judicata and the doctrines of invited error and law of the case lack merit. See State v. Banks, 

10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-653, 2015-Ohio-5372, ¶ 14 (“Void sentences * * * are subject to 

correction at any time irrespective of the principles of res judicata or law of the case doctrine.”);

State v. Minkner, 194 Ohio App.3d 694, 2011-Ohio-3106, ¶ 25 (2d Dist.) (“Parties to an action 

cannot, through invited error, confer jurisdiction where none exists.”). In light of the foregoing, 

Ms. Armbruster’s assignment of error is overruled. 
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III. 

{¶10} Ms. Armbruster’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Summit 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 JENNIFER HENSAL 

 FOR THE COURT 

TEODOSIO, P. J. 

SCHAFER, J. 

CONCUR. 
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APPEARANCES: 

DONALD R. HICKS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JACQUENETTE S. CORGAN, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.