NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ERIC THOMPSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

RIVERSIDE COMMUNITY COLLEGE 

DISTRICT; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 23-55743 

D.C. No. 

5:23-cv-00138-SSS-SHK 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Sunshine Suzanne Sykes, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 6, 2024**

Pasadena, California

Before: M. SMITH and BADE, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,*** District 

Judge.

Plaintiff Eric Thompson appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for 

the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUN 11 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

complaint without leave to amend because the district court determined that 

collateral estoppel barred Thompson’s claims. Because we assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the facts, we do not recite them here. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 

1. The district court appropriately dismissed Thompson’s complaint. Claim 

preclusion bars Thompson from asserting his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

in federal court. Claim preclusion “extend[s] to state administrative adjudications 

of legal as well as factual issues, even if unreviewed, so long as the state 

proceeding satisfies the requirements of fairness outlined” in United States v. Utah 

Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966). Miller v. County of Santa 

Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1032–33 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended (quoting Guild Wineries 

& Distilleries v. Whitehall Co., 853 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1988)). Utah 

Construction requires that (1) “the administrative agency act in a judicial 

capacity,” (2) “the agency resolve disputed issues of fact properly before it,” and 

(3) “the parties have an adequate opportunity to litigate.” Id. at 1033. Thompson’s 

administrative appeal was conducted in an adversary proceeding before an 

arbitrator, where the parties could call witnesses to testify under oath, introduce 

documentary evidence, make opening and closing statements, and hire 

representation. See White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 927–28 (9th Cir. 

2012) (setting forth factors to consider in determining whether an administrative 
3 

proceeding is entitled to preclusive effect). Because the arbitrator issued a written 

opinion, resolving factual questions before him, and because the California state 

courts reviewed that opinion, the administrative decision is subject to preclusive 

effect in this action.

1

 See Miller, 39 F.3d at 1038 (“[W]e reiterate our longstanding 

policy, arising out of concerns of comity and finality, of respecting state court 

systems for review of administrative decisions.”). 

Claim preclusion applies here because the causes of action asserted in the 

complaint filed in federal court would “involve the same injury to [Thompson]” 

and thus “the same primary right” as that asserted in the arbitration. Furnace v. 

Giurbino, 838 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying California law). The 

primary right asserted in the arbitration was Thompson’s right to continued 

employment. See Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 64, 66, 72

(Ct. App. 1992), disapproved of on other grounds in Johnson v. City of Loma 

Linda, 5 P.3d 874, 881 (Cal. 2000).

2

 The district court thus appropriately 

dismissed Thompson’s complaint. See United States v. Charette, 893 F.3d 1169, 

1 The preclusive effect also applies to the individual defendants sued in their 

official capacities. See Miller, 39 F.3d at 1038. 

2 The cases cited by Thompson are either inapposite because they relate to 

arbitration provisions under collective bargaining agreements not at issue here or 

simply do not address claim preclusion. See, e.g., Taylor v. Lockheed Martin 

Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 358, 359 (Ct. App. 2003); Ortega v. Contra Costa Cmty. 

Coll. Dist., 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 2007); Zipes v. Trans World 

Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). 
4 

1175 n.4 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We may affirm on any grounds supported by the 

record.”). 

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend 

the complaint. Nothing in Thompson’s Opening Brief indicates that the Title VII 

claim he wishes to assert in an amended complaint would involve a distinct 

primary right from the right to continued employment. See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 

F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the 

denial of a motion for leave to amend.”). 

AFFIRMED.