NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL- TEXT P UBLICA TION File Name: 11 a03 80n. 06 No. 10 -519 3 UNITED STA

TES COURT OF A PPE A LS FOR THE SIX TH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL T ODD HIGHFILL , Plaint if f -Appe llant,

v

. T HE CIT Y OF MEMPHIS, Def end ant -Appe llee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APP EAL FROM T HE UNIT ED ST AT ES DIST RICT COURT FOR T HE W ES TER N D ISTRICT OF TEN N ES SE E

Bef ore: DAUGHT REY, MOORE, an d CLA Y, Cir cuit Ju dges.

MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTRE Y, Circuit Judge. Plaint if f Michael T odd Hig hf ill
app eals the district court’s gr ant of sum ma ry judgme nt to the City of Memp his in this civ ilrig hts action alleging tha t his term inatio n f rom his positio n a s a Memp his f iref ighter w as racially mo tiv ate d, in v iolation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 198 1 and 198 3. T he City ma intain s tha t Hig hf ill w as term inate d due to his f ailure to com plete his Firef ighter II certif ication w ithin 36

mo nth s, a cond ition of his em ploymen t cont ract. Hig hf ill, w ho is Cauca sian, cont end s tha t Af rican-Am erican f iref ighters w ho also f ailed the ir certif ication exams w ere p rov ided w ith tuto rs and giv en add itiona l time to com plete the ir certif ication s.
Initially, the City challe ng ed the time liness of Hig hf ill’s rev erse-discrimina tion claims, and the dis t rict court held tha t the section 198 3 claims w ere barred by the statu te ofNo. 10-5193

Highfill v. Ci ty of Mem

phis limitat ions. How ever, the c o u rt f oun d tha t the claims base d on section 198 1 jurisdiction

w ere time ly , and the def end ant conce des this poin t on app eal. W e the ref ore p re t e rm it f urthe r rev iew

of this que stion.

T he district cou rt also f oun d th at Highf ill had f ailed to e stab lish a prim a facie case

o f d is c ri m in ation beca use he did not prove, f irst, tha t he w as qualif ied f or cont inue d

em ploymen t at the time of h is term inatio n and , secon d, tha t similarly -situate d Af ricanAm erican f iref ighters w ere treat ed mo re f avorably tha n h e

. T he district court ma de add itiona l rulings belo w but rev iew o f tho se question s – such as the existence of “background circumsta nces” to supp ort this rev erse-discrimina tion claim and the plaint if f ’s allegation of prete x t – beco me s unn ecessa ry in the abse nce of a prim a facie c a s e. W e conclu de tha t the record supp orts the district court’s gr a n t of sum ma ry judgme nt and , the ref ore, af

f irm.

FA CTUA L A ND PROCEDURA L BA CKGROUND
Hig hf ill w as hired as a f iref ighter a n d p a rame dic by the City of Memp his in April 200 1. Unde r the term s of Hig hf ill’s em ploymen t agreem ent , he w as required to com plete his Firef ighter I certi f ic ation w ithin 12 mo nth s of the dat e of his hire and his Firef ighter II certif ication w ithin 36 mo nth s of the dat e of his hire. He successf ully com pl e t e d his Firef ighter I certif ication exam in July 200 1. Altho ugh he passe d the practica l portio n of his Firef ighter II certif ication exam in May 200 3, he f ailed to pass the w ritten portio n desp ite the f act tha t he too k the test tw ice. Hi s p a s s in g score f or the practica l portio n of the - 2 -No. 10-5193

Highfill v. Ci ty of Mem

phis Firef ighter II certif ication exam expired one y ear later, in May 200 4. In August 200 4, Hig hf ill to ok tha t portio n of the Firef ighter II certif ic a t io n e x am again, but this time he did not pa ss it, n or did he com plete the oth er po rtion o f the Firef ighter II e x am

. Hig hf ill w as not dism issed imm edia tely but , f ollowi ng a hea ring on Octob er 11, 200 4, he w as term inate d f rom em ploym e n t with the City on Octob er 22, 200 4, just over three

and -a-half y ears f rom the dat e of his hire. Hig hf ill f iled this action in J u ly 2 0 0 7 , claimin g racial discrimin ation m otivated his dism issal.

DISCUSSIO N

W e rev iew the district court’s gr ant of sum ma ry judgme nt de novo

. See W im bush v. W yeth , 619 F.3d 632 , 636 (6th Cir. 201 0). T he court’s orde r mu st be uph eld if there is

no genuine issue of ma terial f act and the mo v ing party is ent itled to judgme nt as a ma tter of law

. Fed. R. Civ

. P. 56(a ). W e rev iew the evidence in the lig ht mo st f avorable to the

non -moving party, but in orde r to def eat a mo tion f or sum ma ry judgme nt, t hat party is neverthe less required to “come f orw ard w ith ‘specif ic f acts showing tha t the re is a genuine issue f or trial. ’" Matsush ita Elec. Ind us. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 , 587 (198 6), (q uot ing Fed. R . Ci v . P. 56 (e)). "Th e mere existence o f a scin tilla of

evidence i n supp ort of

the plaintif

f 's positio n w ill be insuf f icient; the re m ust b e e v iden ce o n which the jury could reaso nab ly f ind f or the plaint if f ." And erson v. Libe rty Lob by, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242 , 252 (198 6).

- 3 -No. 10-5193

Highfill v. Ci ty of Mem

phis Sect ion 198 1 proscribes discrimina t io n o n t h e b a s is o f ra c e in the ma king or enf orcem ent of

con tracts a nd provides, in pertin ent pa rt:
(a) Sta tem ent of

equal rights

All perso ns w ithin the jurisdiction of the Un it e d Sta tes shall have the sam e rig ht in ev eryState and Territory to ma ke and enf orce co ntract s, to sue , be partie s, giv e e vid e n c e , a nd to the f ull and equal ben ef it of all law s and proce edin gs f or the security of perso ns and prop erty as is enjo y ed by w hite citiz ens, a n d s h a ll be subje ct to like pun ishm ent , pain s, pen alties, taxes, licenses, an d e x action s of every kind, an d to no oth er.
(b) “Make an d e nf orce co ntract s” def ined

For purp oses of this section , the term “make and enf orce cont racts” include s the ma king, perf orma nce, mo dif ication , and term inatio n of cont racts, and the enjo y me nt of all ben ef its, priv ileges, term s, and cond itions of the cont ractua l relation ship.

42 U.S.C. §§ 198 1(a) and (b). Sect ion 198 1 liability atta ches to a mu nicipal def end ant only if the allegedly discrimina tory action s are base d on of f icial mu nicipal policy or custo m. See Jett v. Dallas Ind ep. Sch. Dist. , 491 U.S. 701 , 735 -36 (198 9) (“Thu s to prevail on his claim f or dam ages against the [de f end ant ], pet itione r mu st show tha t the v iolation of his ‘rig ht to

ma ke co ntract s’ prote cted by § 19 81 w as ca used by a cust om or p olicy ”).

In t h is c a s e , the district court gr ant ed the City ’s mo tion f or sum ma ry judgme nt on Hig hf ill’s discrimina tion claims beca use it f oun d tha t Hig hf ill f ailed to esta blish a prim a facie

case of discrimina tion. In orde r to ma ke out a prim a fa cie case of reverse discrimina tion,

- 4 -No. 10-5193

Highfill v. Ci ty of Mem

phis

a litig ant mu st show tha t: (1) he is a me mb er of a prote cted class; (2) he w as qualif ied f or the job; (3) he experience d an adverse em ploymen t action ; and (4) he w as replace d by a perso n out side the p rotect ed class or he w as treat ed dif f eren tly tha n a similarly situat ed

non -protect ed em ployee. See McDonne ll Doug las Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 , 802 (197 3). In a rev erse-discrimina tion case, circuit prece den t add s as an requireme nt tha t the plaint if f must dem onst rate “background circumsta nces [to] supp ort the suspicion that the def end ant is tha t unu sual em ployer w ho discrimina tes against the ma jority .” Lea dbe tter v. Gilley , 385 F. 3 d 6 8 3 , 690 (6th Cir. 200 4) (interna l quotat ion ma rks om itted ). Once a p la in tif f successf ully me ets all the requireme nts f or a prim a facie case, the burd e n o f prod uction the n shif

ts to the def end ant to of f er a legitimate , non -discriminat ory reaso n f or term inatin g the plaint if

f

. See Id. (citing Tex. Dep't of Cm ty. Affa irs v. B u rd in e , 450 U.S. 248 , 253 (198 1)). If the def end ant me ets this burd en, the burd en of prod uction once again shif ts to the plain tif

f to dem onst rate tha t th e p rof f ered reaso n is f alse o r prete x tua l. Id.

T he district court f oun d tha t Hig hf ill f ailed to e stab lish thre e o f the elem ent s of

his prim a facie case: (1) tha t he w as qualif ied f or his positio n, (2) tha t similarly -sit u a t e d f iref ighters w ere t re a t e d mo re f avorably tha n he w as treat ed, and (3) tha t the re existed backgroun d cir cum stan ces suf f icient to supp ort the suspicion tha t the City of M em phis is tha t un usua l em ployer tha t discrimin ate s against the majority. On app eal a nd espe cially at oral argume nt, Hig hf ill’s coun sel argued f orcef u ll y a gainst the “background circumsta nces” requireme nt, cont end ing – as som e of our opin ions have suggested – tha t it “impo s e s a m o re o n e rous stan dard f or plaint if f s w ho are w hite or ma le tha n f or the ir - 5 -No. 10-5193

Highfill v. Ci ty of Mem

phis

non -w hite or f em ale coun terpa rts." Pierce v. Com m onw ealth Life Ins. Co. , 40 F.3d 796 , 801 n. 7 (6th Cir.1994 ); see also Zam bet ti v. Cuyah oga Cm ty. Coll. , 314 F.3d 249 , 257 (6th Cir. 200 2) ("W e share the conc e rn t h a t

. . . the pot ent ial app lication of a heighte ned plea ding stan dard could be the dif f eren ce bet w een gr ant ing and d e n y ing sum ma ry judgme nt." ). In this case, howev er, the prese nce or abse nce of backgroun d circumsta nces

nee d not be det ermin ed, b e c a u s e it is clear tha t the evidence f ully supp orts the district court’s rulings w ith regard to the plaint if f ’s qualif ication f or the p o s it io n a n d the City ’s treat me nt o f

similarly- situat ed min orityf ire-depa rtme nt e mp loyees (“comp arato rs”)

.

In det ermin ating w het he r a pl aintiff has prese nte d suf f icient evidence of qualif ication to supp ort a prim a facie case, only the plaint if f 's obje ctiv e qualif ication s are relevant. See W exler v. W

hite's Fine Furniture , Inc., 317 F.3d 5 6 4 , 5 7 5 -7 6 (6th Cir. 200 3) ( en ban c ) (“The prima f a c ie b u rd en of showing tha t a plaint if f is qualif ied can the ref ore be me t by
prese nting cre d ib le evidence tha t his or her qualif ication s are at least equiv alen t to the min imu m obje ctiv e criteria required f or em ploymen t in the relevant f ield.”). T h e re cord doe s cont ain s everal instan ces of dep osition testim ony tha t suggest tha t Hig hf ill w as a prof icient em ploye e

. T he mo st obje ctiv e state me nt of the required qualif ication s f or Hig hf ill’s positio n, howev er, w as Hig hf ill’s em ploymen t cont ract. See Alexa nde r v. CareSo urce , 576 F.3d 551 , 563 -64 (6th Cir. 200 9) (“[Def end ant ]'s job descript ion am oun ts t o evidence of the min imu m job qualif ication s”). T hat cont ract clearly stat e s t h a t successf ully com pletin g th e Firef ighter II certif icatio n wit h in 3 6 mo nth s of the dat e of his hire w as a requireme nt of Hig hf ill’s positio n. Hence , by f a il in g t o a ttain this certif ication , - 6 -No. 10-5193

Highfill v. Ci ty of Mem

phis Hig hf ill f ailed to “dem onst rate[ ] posse ssion of the required general skills.” W exler, 317 F.3d at 5 76.

T h e brief Hig hf ill f iled on app eal app ears to conce de this poin t, but he co n t e n d s ,
even so, tha t Af rican-Am erican em ployees w ere giv en add itiona l time and tuto ring supp ort in orde r to pass the require d exam. But Hig hf ill has prese nte d no evidence tha t w ith the add itiona l time or supp ort allegedly provided to the Af rican-Am erican f iref ighters, he w ould have bee n able to com plete the certif ication successf ully

. In f act, the record see ms to suggest the opp osite, giv en the f act tha t he f ailed the practica l portio n of the Firef ighter II certif ication exam a year afte r initially passing it.

T he district cou rt also f oun d th at Highf ill did no t satisf y anoth er requireme nt o f his prim a facie case of racial discrimina tion: proo f tha t similarly -situate d A f ri can-Am erican

em ployees w ere treat ed mo re f avorably tha n he. In orde r to be consid ered “similar ly situat ed” f or purp oses of com parison , the em ploymen t situat ion of the com para tor mu st be similar to tha t of the plaint if f in a ll re levant aspe cts. See Ercego vich v. Goo dyea r Tire & Rubb er Co. , 15 4 F.3 d 3 44, 35 2-53 (6th Cir. 199 8).
Hig hf ill prov ides a l engthy list of poten tial co mp arato rs. Howev er, wi th re spect to the crux of his claim, i.e. , tha t Af rican-Am erican em ployees w ere giv en add itiona l time and
supp ort to com plete the Firef ighter certif ication requireme nt, the re w ere only three relevant

com para tors: T orian T hom as, Cassan dra Brown, and Sha w n J a c kson. Altho ugh Hig hf ill
argues tha t Af rican-Am erican em ployees had disciplinary inf raction s t h a t are arguably - 7 -No. 10-5193

Highfill v. Ci ty of Mem

phis

mo re serious tha n f ailure to pass the certif ication exams, his discrimina tion claim rests on the assertio n tha t oth er Af rican-Am erican em ployees w ere treat ed dif f eren tly tha n he w as for purp oses of the certificatio n exams and , thu s, unre lated inf orma tion abo ut oth er types of inf raction s by f ellow e mp loyees is not relevant f or purp oses of com parison

. See Lea dbe tter, 385 F .3d at 691 (“Th e similarities betw een the plaintif f and the [com para tor]

mu st exist in all relevant aspe cts of the ir respe ctiv e em ploymen t c ir c um stan ces. Diff er e nces in job title, respo nsibilities, experience , and w ork record can be used to det ermin e w het her tw o em plo y ee s ar e s i mi l ar ly situat ed. ”) (interna l citation s and quotat ions

om itted ).

T he f irst of the three relevant com para tors w as Tor i an Tho ma s , an African-Am erican f iref ighter w ho w as h ired su bseque nt t o Highf ill’s termina tion. T hom as f ailed to pass his Firef ighter I certif ication exam w ithin the one -y ear limi t, altho ugh this result w as due specif ically to his inab ility to pass t h e Hazardous Materials Aw aren ess portio n of the Firef ighter I exam, an elem ent of the exam tha t w as not required at the time of Hig hf ill too k the Firef ighter I exam. T he record indicat e s t hat T hom as w as of f ered tuto ring to aid in

ma stering the hazardou s ma terials portio n of the exam but tha t such tuto ring never occurred

. T hom as subse quently passe d the exam and w as retain ed as an e mp loyee. Af ter T hom as f ailed to atta in his Firef ighter II certif ication , howev er, he w as term inate d one

mo nth af ter h is three -y ear p roba tion period lapse d.

- 8 -No. 10-5193

Highfill v. Ci ty of Mem

phis T he secon d of th e th r ee , C assan dra Brown, w as an Af rican-Am erican f iref ighter w ho

w as hired in July 200 4. T w o mo nth s later, in Sep tem ber 200 4, she w as dep loyed w ith the military bef ore comp leting her Firef ighter I certif ication . W hen she retu rned f rom military

serv ice in Sep tem ber 200 6 , s h e w as tem pora rily assigned to w ork at the Firef ighter Museu m unt il a new re cruit cla ss began in March 200 7. She subse quently re ceived her Firef ighter I certifica tion in Septe mb er 2007

. She the n had unt il March 201 0 to com plete her Firef ighter II certif ication , but ne it h er the record nor the brief s on app eal indicat e

w het her sh e was successf ul.

T he third and f inal com para tor w as Sha w n Jackson , an Af rican-Am erican f iref ighter

w ho w as giv en a 90-d ay extension in w hich to get his Firef ighter I certif ication

. T he record shows, howev er, tha t af ter he received his Firef ighter I ce rtif ication , he the n rece iv ed his F ire f ighter II certif ication w ith three y ears of the dat e of his hire, as stipula ted in h is

em ploymen t con tract.
Obviously , non e of the com para tors discusse d abo v e w as similar ly s ituat ed to Hig hf ill. Altho ugh ea ch o f the m w as giv en add itiona l time to pass the Firef ighter I exam, the y w ere not giv en extra time o r s u p p o rt in passin g the Firef ighter II certif ication exam. Moreover, the re is not hing in the record to suggest tha t Hig hf ill nee ded extra time to pass his Firef ighter I certif ication or tha t he w ould h a ve b e e n d e n ie d extra time to gain his Firef ighter I certif ication if he had requeste d it. T he only com para tor w ho, like Hig hf ill, f ailed to atta in his Firef ighter II certif ication w ithin three y ears of hire, T orian T hom as, w as

- 9 -No. 10-5193

Highfill v. Ci ty of Mem

phis likew ise termina ted for that r easo n. Furthe r, T hom as w as termina ted approximate ly one

mo nth af ter his three -y ear period expired, w here as Hig hf ill w as not term inate d unt il alm ost six mont hs af

ter his three -y ear prob ation period had expired, suggesting tha t Hig hf ill w as treat ed mo re len iently than T hom as, n ot m ore h arshly.

Moreover, Cassan dra Brown’s f ailure to atta in her Firef ighter I c e rt if ica tion w ithin

one y ear of her initial dat e of hire w as due to intervening military serv ice. Discount ing this time period , the record shows tha t she atta ined her Firef ighter I certif ication w ithin one y ear of restarting her recruit training. As a result, altho ugh she tech nically was a f f o rd e d mo re time to atta in her Firef ighter I certif ication , her in t e rve n in g military serv ice ma kes her an inap prop riate com para tor. See Arend ale v. C ity of Mem phis, 519 F.3d 587 , 604 (6th Cir. 200 8) (“Supe rf icial similarities bet w een a disciplined em ployee and his colleague s are not suf f icient t o sh ow a prim a fa cie case of discrimina tion. ”).

In sum m a ry, n one of the dep artm ent em ployees w ho w ere alleged to be similarly situat ed to Hig hf ill f or purp oses o f the f iref ighter-certif ication requireme nt w ere treat ed

mo re f avorably t h a n w hite f iref ighters. In f act, the record shows tha t Hig hf ill ma y have received specia l consid eratio n w hen he w as kept on f or six mo nth s beyond the expiration of his th ree-year proba tion period

.

Furthe rmore , even if

Highfill cou ld de mo nstrat e that a similarly -situate d e mp loyee had bee n treat ed mo re f avorably tha n he , t h e record is devoid of proo f tha t any const itution al depriv ation that he su f f ered w as a r esult of

a “a custom or policy w ithin the - 10

-No. 10-5193

Highfill v. Ci ty of Mem

phis

me anin g of Mone ll [ v. New York City Depa rtm ent of Socia l Services , 436 U.S. 658 (197 8),] and subse quent cases. ” Jett, 491 at 735 -736

. In orde r to be action able , an alleged dep riv ation of rig hts mu st have resulte d eit h e r f ro m “policies w hich af f irmatively

co mm and [ed ] tha t it occur” or f rom “acquiescen ce in a longstan ding practice or custo m

w hich const itute s the ‘stand ard ope rating proce dure ’ of the local gov ernm ent al ent ity .” Id. at 737 (citation s om itted ). In oth er w ords, the mu nicipality mu st be the “moving f orce” beh ind t he dep riv ation in o rder to be liable f or v iolation s und er § 198 1. See Ken tucky v. Graha m , 47 3 U.S . 15 9, 1 66 (198 5).

In the tw o instan ces in wh ic h A f rican-Am erican f iref ighters w ere giv en short extension s in w hich to atta in the ir Firef ighter I certif ication , the extension s w ere not gr ant ed
pursu ant to a policy tha t the City of Memp his create d, nor w ere the y examp les of a practice

so pervasiv e as to const itute a “custom .” Nevertheless, as f urthe r evidence of a policy or custo m of rev erse discrimina tion, Hig hf ill poin ts to a f ew depose d w itnesse s w ho perso nally believed tha t Af rican-Am er ic a n s w ere treat ed mo re f avorably tha n the ir Cauca sian

coun terpa rts, but the ir testim ony w as v ague and non -specif ic and clearly lacked suf f icient

w eight to serve as e v iden ce o f pe rv asive discriminat ion. See Aren dale , 51 9 F.3d at 6 00 (“In orde r to esta blish tha t the City 's ‘f ailure to act can be said to am oun t to an of f icial policy of inactio n,’ the evidence mu st dem onst rate mo re tha n just ‘a collection of slopp y , or even reckless, o v ersights . . . .’ Ra the r, the record mu st show that the City ‘consciou sly ne v er acte d w hen conf ronte d w ith its em ployees' egregi ous and obvio u s ly unco nstitu tiona l cond uct.’”) (interna l citation s om itted ). Hig hf ill has simp ly not prese nte d evidence suf f icient - 11

-No. 10-5193

Highfill v. Ci ty of Mem

phis to suggest the existence of discrimina tion against w hite f iref ighters, mu ch less esta blish tha t the City of Memp his w as the m o v ing f orce beh ind a policy of discrimina tion or tha t such discrimina tion w ent un add ressed by the City de spite its pe rv asiveness.

CONCLUSION

Beca use the record f ully supp orts the district court’s decision tha t the plaint if f did not esta blish a prim a facie case of discrimina tion, w e AFFIRM the d is trict court’s judgme nt
gr ant ing sum ma ry

judgm ent to the de f end ant

.

- 12

-