Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Hogan, Thor.

Mars wars : the rise and fall of the Space Exploration Initiative /

Thor Hogan.

 p. cm. -- (The NASA history series) (NASA SP-2007-4410)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Space Exploration Initiative (U.S.) 2. Space flight to

Mars--Planning--History--20th century. 3. United States. National

Aeronautics and Space Administration--Management--History--20th century.

4. Astronautics and state--United States--History--20th century. 

5. United States--Politics and government--1989-1993. 

6. Outerspace--Exploration--United States--History--20th century.

7. Organizational change--United States--History--20th century. I. Title. 

TL789.8.U6S62 2007

629.45’530973--dc22

 2007008987
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Chapter 1: Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Policy Stream and Punctuated Equilibrium Models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Why Mars?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Canals on Mars. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Mars in Popular Culture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Mariner and Viking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Chapter 2: The Origins of SEI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Early Mission Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Post-Apollo Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Case for Mars. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

National Commission on Space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

The Ride Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

President Reagan and NASA’s Office of Exploration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Chapter 3: Bush, Quayle, and SEI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Bush-Quayle 1988. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Reagan-Bush Transition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

The Problem Stream: Providing Direction to a Directionless Agency. . . . . . . 47

The Policy Stream: The Ad Hoc Working Group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

The Political Stream: Briefing Key Actors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Joining the Streams: Human Exploration of Mars Reaches the Gov. Agenda. 68

Chapter 4: The 90-Day Study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Waiting for NASA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

SEI Takes Shape. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Mars Wars. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Chapter 5: The Battle to Save SEI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Presidential Decisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

SEI Hits the Road. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

Losing Faith in NASA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

The Augustine and Synthesis Group Reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

SEI Fades Away. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

Chapter 6: SEI, Policy Streams, and Punctuated Equilibrium. . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Policy Streams, SEI, and the Space Policy Community. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Punctuated Equilibrium, Space Policy, and SEI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

Chapter 7: The Lessons of SEI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

NASA History Series. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Acknowledgements

A great many people provided me with assistance during the preparation of this 

book. I am particularly indebted to John Logsdon and Roger Launius for their 

invaluable insights regarding the history of the American space program, the role of 

various actors within the space policy community, and the context in which Mars 

exploration should be viewed. I also owe a great deal to Steve Balla and Jeff Henig, 

who helped me employ the political science and public policy theories that are 

used in this book. I would also like to thank Ray Williamson and Joe Cordes for 

their support and helpful comments. I am also very grateful for all the hard work 

contributed by Steve Dick and Steve Garber getting this book ready for publication. I would like to thank Heidi Pongratz at Maryland Composition, Angela Lane 

and Danny Nowlin at Stennis Space Center, and Jeffrey McLean at NASA Headquarters for handling the copyediting, layout, and printing of the book. Finally, 

I would like to thank the dedicated archivists at both the NASA History Division in Washington, D.C. and the George Bush Presidential Library at Texas A&M 

– they were all crucial to the successful completion of this project. In particular, I 

would like to thank Colin Fries and Jane Odom at the NASA History Division and 

Debbie Carter, Bob Holzweiss, John Laster, Laura Spencer, and Melissa Walker at 

the George Bush Presidential Library.

This book is dedicated to Joe Hogan, for teaching me how to dream big dreams; 

to Ron Beck, for believing in my potential when few others did; and to Kate Kuvalanka, for inspiring me on a daily basis

iii
“Why Mars? Because it is humanity’s destiny to strive, to seek, to 

find. And because it is America’s destiny to lead.”

President George Bush, 20 July 19891

Sitting on the steps of the Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space 

Museum on 20 July 2004, it was difficult to imagine that fifteen years earlier at 

this place the fiercest domestic political conflict of the first space age commenced. 

Bright-eyed children poured off tour buses and hurried to examine the museum’s 

wonders, teachers and parents close behind with digital cameras ready. They lined 

up to touch a four billion year-old lunar rock, clamored around the Apollo 11 Command Module Columbia, and gazed up at an ungainly Lunar Module— monuments 

to past American triumphs in space. It was on a similarly hot and muggy Washington morning that President George Bush had used this location to announce a 

renewed commitment to human exploration beyond Earth orbit. Even before this 

declaration, however, the winds of war had been swirling in the nation’s capital.

On the 20th anniversary of the first human landing on the Moon, President 

Bush had stood atop these very steps and proposed a long-range exploration plan 

that included the successful construction of an orbital space station, a permanent 

return to the Moon, and a human mission to Mars—this enterprise became known 

as the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI). The president charged the newly reestablished National Space Council with providing concrete alternatives for meeting 

these objectives. To provide overall focus for the new initiative, Bush later set a 30-

year goal for a crewed landing on Mars. If met, humans would be walking on the red 

1 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 20 July 1989, Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of 

the Apollo 11 Moon Landing [http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/] (accessed 18 May 2002). 

1

1

Introduction
2

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3

Chapter 1: Introduction

the government agenda and what factors led to its ultimate demise. John Kingdon’s 

Policy Streams Model describes how problems come to the attention of policy makers, 

how agendas are set, how policy alternatives are generated, and why policy windows 

open.3

 This theory will be utilized to develop the story of SEI’s rise and fall, and will 

more specifically be used to assess who the important actors are within the space 

policy community. Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones’s Punctuated Equilibrium 

Model depicts the policy process as comprising long periods of stability, which are 

interrupted by predictable periods of instability that lead to major policy changes.4

This model will be utilized to provide a better understanding of the larger trends 

that led to SEI’s promotion to the government agenda and may explain its eventual 

downfall.5

 These two models contributed a number of descriptive statistics that 

were used to develop a collection of lessons learned from the SEI experience.

In 1972, Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen introduced Garbage 

Can Theory in an article describing what they called “organized anarchies.” The 

authors emphasized the chaotic character of organizations as loose collections of 

ideas as opposed to rational, coherent structures. They found that each, organized 

anarchy was composed of four separate process streams: problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities. They concluded that organizations are “a collection 

of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in 

which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the 

answer, and decision makers looking for work.” Finally, a choice opportunity was:

...a garbage can into which various kinds of problems and solutions 

are dumped by participants as they are generated. The mix of garbage in 

a single can depends on the mix of cans available, on the labels attached to 

the alternative cans, on what garbage is currently being produced, and on 

the speed with which garbage is collected and removed from the scene.

Therefore, the three found that policy outcomes are the result of the garbage available and the process chosen to sift through that garbage.6

3

 John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: HarperCollins College 

Publishers, 1995).

4

 Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: 

University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 3-24.

5

 Wayne Parsons, Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis

(Brookfield, Vermont: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1995), pp. 193-207.

6

 Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen, “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational 

Choice,” Administrative Science Quarterly (March 1972), pp. 1-25; Parsons, Public Policy, pp. 192-193.

planet by 2019, which would be the 50th anniversary of the Apollo 11 lunar landing. Within a few short years after President Bush’s Kennedyesque announcement, 

however, the initiative had faded into history—the victim of a flawed policy process 

and a political war fought on several different fronts. The failure of SEI, combined 

with problems ranging from the Hubble Space Telescope’s flawed mirror to space 

shuttle fuel leaks to space station budget problems, badly damaged the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) image and prompted dramatic 

changes in the American space program.

The rise of SEI and its eventual demise represents one of the landmark episodes 

in the history of the American space program—ranking with the creation of NASA, 

the decision to go to the Moon, the post-Apollo planning process, and the space 

station decision. The story of this failed initiative is one shaped by key protagonists 

and critical battles. It is a tale of organizational, cultural, and personal confrontation. Organizational skirmishes involved the Space Council versus NASA, the 

White House versus congressional appropriators, and the Johnson Space Center 

versus the rest of the space agency—all seeking control of the national space policy 

process. Cultural struggles pitted the increasingly conservative engineering ethos of 

NASA against the “faster, better, cheaper” philosophy of a Space Council looking 

for innovative solutions to technical problems. Personality clashes matched Vice 

President Dan Quayle and Space Council Executive Secretary Mark Albrecht against 

NASA Administrator Dick Truly and Johnson Space Center Director Aaron Cohen. 

In the final analysis, the demise of SEI was a classic example of a defective decision-making process—one that lacked adequate high-level policy guidance, failed to 

address critical fiscal constraints, developed inadequate programmatic alternatives, 

and garnered no congressional support. Some space policy experts have argued that 

SEI was doomed to fail, due primarily to the immense budgetary pressures facing 

the nation during the early 1990s.2

 This book will argue, however, that the failure 

of the initiative was not predetermined; instead, it was the result of a deeply flawed 

policy process that failed to develop (or even consider) policy options that may have 

been politically acceptable given the existing political environment.

The Policy Stream and Punctuated

Equilibrium Models

To make the case that the failure of SEI was not inevitable, this study employs 

two theoretical models to guide the narrative analysis of how the initiative reached 

2

 Dwayne A. Day, “Doomed to Fail: The Birth and Death of the Space Exploration Initiative,” 

Spaceflight (March 1995), pp. 79-83; John Pike, “But what is the True Rationale for Human 

Spaceflight?,” Space Policy (August 1994), pp. 217-222.
4

Mars Wars

5

Chapter 1: Introduction

do issues rise to the top of the government agenda to be dealt with independently. 

At a fundamental level, the punctuated equilibrium model seeks to explain why the 

policy process is largely incremental and conservative, but is also subject to periods 

of radical change.8

Baumgartner and Jones argue that to understand the complexities of the policy 

making process, one must study specific policy problems over extended periods of 

time. To comprehend the policy dynamics of an issue, one must develop indicators 

that explain how the issue is understood. They introduce a new approach to policy 

research that attempts to meld the policy typology literature and the agenda status 

literature—the former based on cross-sectional comparisons of multiple public 

policy issues, the latter focused on longitudinal studies of a single issue over time. 

The new approach concentrates on the long-term trends related to interest in, and 

discussion of, important policy questions. In particular, they are interested in two 

related concepts, whether an issue is on the agenda of a given institution (venue 

access) and whether the tone of activity within that institution is positive or negative (policy image).9

 The two utilize an eclectic group of measures to gauge venue 

access and policy image. Baumgartner and Jones’s model provided a useful method 

for understanding where SEI fits within the history of the American space program. 

More importantly, it provided a means to evaluate whether long-term space policy 

trends predetermined the initiative’s failed outcome.

Why Mars?

Any discussion of human exploration of Mars must begin with a description 

of the reasons why this planetary destination has continually reemerged during 

the post-Apollo period as the “next logical step” for the American space program. 

Understanding the deep-rooted human interest in Mars provides some insight into 

the space program’s recurring focus on it as an objective for both robotic and human 

missions. Crewed Mars exploration has been seriously considered three times during 

the past 35 years, but our fascination with the red planet began a great deal earlier. 

For thousands of years, the human race has been drawn to Mars—our celestial 

neighbor fuels the imagination unlike any other planet in the solar system. Ancient 

humans examined the red planet as they attempted to unlock the mystery of the 

heavens. To primitive humans, the fourth planet from the sun was nothing more 

then a reddish point of light dancing across the night sky. Early civilizations gave 

8

 Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: 

University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 3-24.

9

 Ibid., pp. 39-55.

In his classic tome Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, John Kingdon applies 

the garbage can model to develop a framework for understanding the policy process within the federal government. He found that there were three major process 

streams in federal policy making: problem recognition; the formation and refinement of policy proposals; and politics. Kingdon concludes that these three process streams operate largely independent from one another. Within the first stream, 

various problems come to capture the attention of people in and around government. Within the second stream, a policy community of specialists concentrates on 

generating policy alternatives that may offer a solution to a given problem. Within 

the third stream, phenomena such as changes in administration, shifts in partisan 

or ideological distributions in Congress, and focusing events impact the selection 

of different policy alternatives. Kingdon argues that the key to gaining successful 

policy outcomes within this “organized anarchy” is to seize upon policy windows 

that offer an opportunity for pushing one’s proposals onto the policy agenda. Taking 

advantage of these policy windows requires that a policy entrepreneur expend the 

political capital necessary to join the three process streams at the appropriate time.7

Kingdon’s model provided a useful structure for assessing the role of the policy 

community in placing SEI on the government agenda and formulating alternatives 

to solve a perceived problem—a lack of strategic direction within the American 

space program. Furthermore, it provided benchmarks that were used to evaluate the 

flawed policy making process for the initiative. In particular, it provided an analytic 

tool for understanding why Vice President Quayle and Mark Albrecht were not 

able to successfully join the three process streams when a policy window opened for 

human exploration beyond Earth orbit.

In Agendas and Instability in American Politics, Frank Baumgartner and Bryan 

Jones introduce a punctuated equilibrium model of policy change in American 

politics, based on the emergence and recession of policy issues on the government 

agenda. This theory suggests that the policy process has long periods of equilibrium, 

which are periodically disrupted by some instability that results in dramatic policy 

change. Baumgartner and Jones describe “a political system that displays considerable stability with regard to the manner in which it processes issues, but the stability 

is punctuated with periods of volatile change.” Within this system, they contend, 

the mass public is limited in its ability to process information and remain focused 

on any one issue. As a result, policy subsystems are created so that scores of agenda 

items can be processed simultaneously. Only in times of unique crisis and instability 

7

 John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: HarperCollins College 

Publishers, 1995), pp. 86-89.
6

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7

Chapter 1: Introduction

it many names: the Egyptians called it Har decher (the Red One), the Babylonians 

named it Nergal (the Star of Death), the Greeks designated it Ares and the Romans 

called it Mars (both representing the God of War). While the early Babylonians 

made extensive astronomical observations, it was the Greeks that first categorized 

Ares as one of five wandering “planets” among the fixed stars (the others being 

Mercury, Venus, Jupiter, and Saturn). Greek astronomers observed that Ares did 

not always move from east to west, but sometimes moved in the opposite direction. Due to the existing belief that the Earth was the center of the universe, this 

astronomical oddity would baffle sky watchers for centuries to come. By 250 B.C., 

Aristarchus of Samos had developed a complete heliocentric system that viewed 

Earth as an ordinary planet circling the sun once every year. This theory held the 

key to understanding the unusual movements of Ares. Later Greek and Roman 

astronomers did not follow Aristarchus’s lead, however, choosing to hold onto the 

geocentric system. Claudius Ptolemy made the greatest elaboration of this system 

during the second century A.D.—his geocentric model remained the predominant 

astronomical theory for more than a millennium.10

Seventeen hundred years after Aristarchus first developed it, a Polish canon 

named Nicolaus Copernicus reintroduced the heliocentric model. Like Aristarchus, 

however, Copernicus could not exactly predict the motions of the planets using 

simple circular orbits. As a result, his contemporaries largely ignored his theories. 

While Copernicus had been primarily a theoretician, it would take two dedicated 

observational astronomers to discover the true movements of the planets—their 

names were Tycho Brahe and Johannes Kepler. Starting in 1576, Tycho spent 20 

years studying the motions of the stars and planets, including Mars. In 1600, Kepler 

joined him and began examining the apparent retrograde motion of Mars. When 

Tycho died the next year, Kepler was appointed to succeed him as Imperial Mathematician to the Holy Roman Emperor (although he was Lutheran).11

Using Tycho’s scrupulous observations, Kepler went to work trying to explain 

Mars’ apparent backward motion. Kepler argued that the planets revolved around 

the sun, but at different distances and therefore different speeds. While Earth orbited 

the sun in 365 days, it took Mars 687 days. Thus, the retrograde movement of Mars 

could be explained because the Earth was overtaking the slower-moving Mars. To an 

observer on Earth, it would appear that Mars was slowing down and then reversing 

course. Kepler proved, however, that this was simply an illusion. In 1609, Kepler 

published On the Motion of Mars, which expounded his first two laws of planetary 

10 William Sheehan, The Planet Mars: A History of Observation and Discover (Tucson: The University 

of Arizona Press, 1996), pp. 1-8; John Noble Wilford, Mars Beckons: The Mysteries, the Challenges, the 

Expectations of Our Next Great Adventure in Space (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), pp. 3-17.

11 Ibid.

motion—stating that planetary orbits about the Sun were elliptical (as opposed 

to circular as Aristarchus and Copernicus had assumed) and that a planet’s speed 

increases as it approaches the sun and decreases proportionally as it moves farther 

away. As a result of Tycho and Kepler’s observations and theories, the heliocentric 

system finally overcame Ptolemy’s geocentric model.12

In 1609, the same year that Kepler published On the Motion of Mars, Galileo 

Galilei made the first celestial observations with a telescope. The next year, after 

making observations of the Moon, Jupiter, and Venus, Galileo turned his telescope 

toward Mars. Due to the use of a relatively crude instrument, Galileo’s observations 

of Mars where not particularly informative—other than to suggest that the planet 

was not a perfect sphere. In 1659, Dutch astronomer Christian Huygens, using a 

considerably more advanced telescope, was able to detect the first surface feature on 

Mars. The dark triangular area that he observed over a period of months, which is 

today called Syrtis Major, allowed him to conclude that Mars rotated on its axis like 

the Earth. Seven years later, in 1666, Italian astronomer Giovanni Cassini began a 

series of observations and discovered the planet’s white polar caps.13

In 1783, astronomer William Herschel, who two years earlier had discovered 

the planet Uranus, made a series of observations of Mars and found that the planet 

was tilted at an angle of almost 24 degrees on its axis of rotation. This finding 

showed that like Earth, Mars had seasons; however, considering that a Martian year 

is almost double that of Earth, its seasons are nearly twice as long. Herschel also 

confirmed the existence of Mars’s polar caps, and postulated correctly that they were 

composed of ice. Finally, Herschel found that the planet had “a considerable but 

moderate atmosphere.”14

Canals on Mars

In 1877, Mars came to a perihelic opposition just 35 million miles from Earth. 

That year Asaph Hall, director of the U.S. Naval Observatory, turned that institution’s 26-inch refractor telescope toward the red planet in search of satellites. In 

August, he discovered two small moons orbiting Mars, which he named Phobos 

(fear) and Deimos (flight)—these were Mars’ attendants in Homer’s Iliad. Hall continued his observations for several months, using the data he acquired to make an 

estimate of the mass of Mars. His calculation of 0.1076 times that of Earth proved 

to be quite accurate (the current accepted value being 0.1074).15

12 Ibid.

13 Sheehan, The Planet Mars, pp. 9-15; Wilford, Mars Beckons, pp. 3-17.

14 Sheehan, The Planet Mars, pp. 16-22; Wilford, Mars Beckons, pp. 3-17.

15 Sheehan, The Planet Mars, pp. 23-30. 
8

Mars Wars

9

Chapter 1: Introduction

While the discovery of two Martian moons was a significant astronomical finding, it was not the only important study of the planet that year. In Italy, the director 

of the Milan Observatory, Virginio Schiaparelli, spent the summer observing Mars 

with a fairly small, 8-inch telescope. During his study, he saw what he believed to be 

faint linear markings on the planet. His maps of the planet showed dark areas seemingly connected by a large system of long, straight lines. Schiaparelli called these 

lines canali, which in Italian means “channels” or “grooves.” However, another 

meaning of the word is “canal,” which seemed to indicate that intelligent beings 

may have constructed a water transport system on Mars. Schiaparelli himself tried 

to caution against jumping to this conclusion, but his observations fired the public’s 

imagination. As a result, French astronomer Camille Flammarion was justified in 

stating “[Schiaparelli’s] observations have made Mars the most interesting point for 

us in the entire heavens.”16

Nearly two decades later, an American named Percival Lowell began his famed 

observations of Mars. A Lowell biographer wrote that “of all the men through history who have posed questions and proposed answers about Mars, [he was] the most 

influential and by all odds the most controversial.”17 An amateur astronomer with a 

gift for mathematics, Lowell plunged into the field aspiring to complete Schiaparelli’s earlier work. Using an inherited fortune, he constructed the Lowell Observatory 

(which had 18-inch and 12-inch telescopes) in the Arizona mountains near Flagstaff. During the summer and fall of 1894, Lowell studied Mars every night with 

unbounded enthusiasm. His maps of the planet displayed 184 canals, twice as many 

as Schiaparelli had portrayed. As a result of his observations, he announced to the 

world that there were indeed canals on Mars constructed by intelligent beings. In 

1895, he published Mars, within which he vividly described his theories regarding 

the Martian canals and their builders.18

During the coming years, Lowell continued his observations of Mars. With each 

subsequent opposition, he became increasingly convinced that intelligent beings 

lived on Mars and had built the canals. Lowell also postulated that the shrinking 

of the white polar caps and the expansion of darker regions (which he believed 

to be vegetation) during the Martian summer indicated seasonal renewal. Despite 

his grand pronouncements, most astronomers were not convinced that his theories 

had any merit. Their criticism of Lowell was bolstered by the fact that many other 

astronomers, including Edward Barnard, had studied Mars with far more powerful 

telescopes and found no evidence of canals. Barnard wrote “I see details where some 

16 Wilford, Mars Beckons, pp. 23-24.

17 William Graves Hoyt, Lowell and Mars (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976), p. 12.

18 Wilford, Mars Beckons, pp. 24-30.

of his canals are but they are not straight lines at all.” It is now believed that Lowell’s 

canals were simply optical illusions produced because the human eye attempts to 

arrange scattered spots into a line. Despite the eventual erosion of his theories, however, there is little doubt that Lowell’s declarations about extraterrestrial Martian life 

led to greatly increased public interest in the red planet.19

Mars in Popular Culture

In 1898, just three years after Percival Lowell popularized the vision of a Mars 

threaded by canals and peopled by ancient beings, the first great Martian science 

fiction book was published. The War of the Worlds, written by H.G. Wells, is hailed 

as the greatest alien invasion story in history. The book began with a Martian assault 

just outside of London. While the Martians at first seemed helpless in the heavy 

Earth gravity, they quickly exposed their advanced technology in the form of huge 

death machines that began destroying the surrounding countryside, forcing the 

evacuation of London. The saving grace for the badly overmatched humans turned 

out to be common bacteria that the Martians had no immune system to fight off. 

In 1938, the book was famously adapted for radio by Orson Welles. The retelling of 

the story, portrayed as a news program about a Martian landing in rural New Jersey, 

was so believable that millions of Americans actually thought that Earth was being 

invaded.20

Starting in 1917, author Edgar Rice Burroughs began a highly popular series 

about Mars exploration with the publication of A Princess of Mars. In subsequent 

years, he wrote ten more books tracking the adventures of Captain John Carter on 

Mars. The series was first published as a longer sequence of serials printed in AllStory Magazine, which represented a common strategy for the publication of science 

fiction novels during that period. The Carter books were considered to be more 

fantasy than hard science fiction, which was exhibited by the lack of detail regarding how Carter actually got to the red planet—he was magically taken there in the 

book.21

During the Great Depression and the Second World War, there was a conspicuous absence of popular books regarding Mars exploration. The lull was broken 

when author Robert Heinlein wrote Red Planet. Published in 1949, the book followed teenager Jim Marlowe, his friend Frank, and his Martian “roundhead” pet 

Willis on their travels across the planet to warn a human colony that was the target 

19 Ibid.

20 H.G. Wells, War of the Worlds (1898; reprint, New York: Tor, 1986).

21 Edgar Rice Burroughs, A Princess of Mars (1917; reprint, New York: Ballantine Books, 1990).
10

Mars Wars

11

Chapter 1: Introduction

of a conspiracy by the Martians.22 A year later, Ray Bradbury authored his famous 

book entitled The Martian Chronicles. The book was actually a compilation of 

relatively unrelated short stories about an ancient, dying Martian race. Along with 

Heinlein’s Red Planet, the book borrowed heavily from the observations and theories 

of both Schiaparelli and Lowell—planetary canals were a central accomplishment of 

the Martian civilizations in both books. These were early examples of how scientific 

research pushed science fiction novels.23 In 1956, Robert Heinlein wrote Double 

Star, the most critically acclaimed Martian novel during this time period. The book, 

which won the Hugo Award,24 centered on the emotional predicament of an out of 

work actor, Lorenzo Smythe, who was asked to stand in for an important politician 

who had been kidnapped. His trouble began when he was forced to take part in an 

important ceremony on Mars despite the fact that he hated Martians. The book was 

an interesting rendering of the civil rights struggle going on in the United States at 

the time.25

During this same period, a large number of popular films featured adventures 

involving the red planet. In 1938, Flash Gordon: Mars Attacks the World premiered 

as a feature-length film. In the movie, Flash Gordon blasts off for Mars to destroy 

a mysterious force sucking the nitrogen from Earth’s atmosphere and foil a plot 

by Ming the Merciless to conquer the universe. This was followed in the post-War 

period with the 1950 film Rocketship X-M, the story of five astronauts that set off 

to explore the moon but due to a malfunction ended up on Mars—where they 

find evidence of an advanced civilization nearly destroyed by an atomic holocaust. 

The next year, Flight to Mars chronicled the adventures of a team of scientists and 

a newspaper reporter that fly to Mars and thwart a plan by the Martians (who look 

identical to humans) to conquer Earth. In 1953, Invaders from Mars told the tale 

of small town where all the adults begin acting strangely shortly after young David 

MacLean sees strange lights settling behind a hill near his home. That same year, 

Gene Barry starred in a film adaptation of War of the Worlds. Finally, in 1959, The 

Angry Red Planet followed a group of astronauts that land on Mars and battle aliens, 

a giant amoeba, and the dreaded “Rat-Bat-Spider thing.” By the late-1950s, the 

combination of these best selling books and feature-length films had fixed human 

exploration of the Mars (and the likely inhabitants of that planet) in the popular 

culture of the nation.

22 Robert Heinlein, Red Planet (New York: Ballantine Books, 1949).

23 Ray Bradbury, The Martian Chronicles (New York: Doubleday, 1950).

24 One of the two most prestigious awards for accomplishments in science fiction—the other is 

the Nebula Award.

25 Robert Heinlein, Double Star (New York: Ballantine Books, 1956).

Mariner and Viking

While there was substantial progress made in telescope technology during the 

70 years after Lowell’s sensational observations, it was still beyond the abilities of 

astronomers of the time to unequivocally disprove his theories. In fact, during this 

period there was little sustained interest in planetary astronomy, and as a result, few 

new discoveries were made. In 1957, the Soviet launch of Sputnik opened vast new 

opportunities for scientific investigations. Once the concept of robotic planetary 

exploration was conceived during the coming years, it was taken for granted that 

missions to Mars would be a priority. Several failed attempts by both the Americans 

and Soviets to send spacecraft to Mars during the early 1960s, however, delayed the 

first close up examination of the red planet.26

On 28 December 1964, NASA launched Mariner 4 on a mission to explore 

Mars. About halfway to the planet, the spacecraft experienced technical difficulties 

that greatly concerned ground controllers. The “Great Galactic Ghoul,”27 however, 

was unsuccessful in its efforts at crippling the probe. On 14 July 1965, Mariner 4 

made a flyby to within 6,118 miles of the planet’s surface. It was able to relay 22 

images back to Earth with its single camera before passing out of range. The data 

that was obtained from those images, as well as from the spacecraft’s other instruments,28 were nothing less than stunning. Instead of the living planet that Lowell 

had envisioned, Mariner 4 discovered a surface that was apparently devoid of life 

and seemingly unchanged for billions of years. In addition, results of an S-band 

radio occultation experiment found that the Martian atmospheric density was considerably lower than expected and that its makeup was approximately 95% carbon 

dioxide. Finally, it was discovered that the planet had no discernible magnetic field. 

The information returned by Mariner 4 resulted in a complete revision of human 

thinking about Mars, ending forever Lowellian theories regarding vegetation and 

intelligent beings.29

During the early months of 1969, the Americans and the Soviets each sent two 

more spacecraft towards Mars.30 While the Soviets continued their string of failures, 

both Mariner 6 and Mariner 7 were successful. These spacecraft, like Mariner 4, 

were designed as flyby missions, but they were capable of photographing the planet 

26 Wilford, Mars Beckons, pp. 53-56.

27 A myth developed by flight engineers after earlier missions to Mars failed, which lives on today.

28 Including a magnetometer and a trapped-radiation detector.

29 Sheehan, The Planet Mars, chapter 11.

30 About every 26 months, Mars and Earth reach a position in their respective orbits that offers the 

best trajectory between the two planets. During this time period, the Mariner missions were launched 

to take advantage of these launch windows.
12

Mars Wars

13

Chapter 1: Introduction

at much greater distances. Mariner 6 sent 75 images earthward, while Mariner 7 

produced 126 photographs. In total, the two probes, which passed within 2,120 

miles of the planet, returned data about approximately 20% of the surface. Once 

again, the information obtained showed a largely cratered landscape, although it 

also showed large expanses that were like an exceedingly dry and cold desert.31

As chance would have it, the first three Mariner missions explored some of the 

most geographically lackluster areas of Mars. Launched on 30 May 1971, Mariner 9, the first successful orbiter to reach Mars, finally revealed the topographical 

diversity of the red planet. When the spacecraft arrived in November, however, the 

planet was obscured for weeks by a massive dust storm. Two Soviet landers, Mars 

2 and Mars 3, were lost in the storm, because they were not capable of waiting in 

orbit for it to clear. They did, however, become the first machines to reach the Martian surface. A month after Mariner 9 reached orbit, the dust finally cleared, and it 

was able to begin mapping the planet. The first features that were discovered were 

a series of gigantic shield volcanoes—the largest being Olympus Mons, the largest 

known mountain in the solar system. The second major finding was the immense 

Valles Marineris system, which dwarfed the Grand Canyon and stretched one-quarter of the way around the planet. Finally, the spacecraft detected wide channels 

(reminiscent of river valleys) and the hummocky terrain that is characteristic of the 

south polar regions. In October 1972, when the probe ran out of fuel, it had taken 

7,239 photographs and revealed a truly unique planet.32

After the success of the Mariner program, the next step in the exploration of 

Mars involved sending robotic vehicles to conduct in situ experiments. In the late 

summer of 1975, Viking 1 and Viking 2 were launched to the red planet to carry 

out a search for Martian life, among other scientific objectives. Each spacecraft 

actually had two separate components—an orbiter based on Mariner 9 technologies and a lander equipped with various scientific instruments. On 20 July 1976, 

about a month after it had entered orbit and seven years after the first human landing on the moon, the 1,300-pound Viking 1 lander settled onto the western slopes 

of Chryse Planitia—it was the first probe to safely reach the planet’s surface. The 

lander quickly began photographing its surroundings, including a stunning 300-

degree panorama that showed sand dunes, a large impact crater, low ridges, scattered 

boulders, and a pink sky.33

The Viking 1 lander was outfitted with a large array of sophisticated equipment, 

including: antennas for communicating with ground controllers on Earth; cam31 Wilford, Mars Beckons, pp. 60-61.

32 Sheehan, The Planet Mars, chapter 12.

33 Wilford, Mars Beckons, pp. 86-90.

eras capable of transmitting photographs in black and white, color, and infrared; a 

mechanical arm capable of scooping soil for examination; and a meteorology boom 

for assessing atmospheric humidity, temperature, and wind speed. Eight days after 

landing, the mechanical arm went into action and scooped up its first sample of 

Martian soil. The soil was released through a funnel that automatically separated 

it for chemical and biological analysis. While the findings of the lander’s various 

experiments were initially ambiguous, it is the widely held opinion of most of the 

scientific community that they revealed no signs of Martian life.34 The Viking 2 

lander, which touched down on Utopia Planitia on 3 September 1976, similarly 

revealed a Mars with no visible signs of living organisms. Despite the conclusions 

drawn by mission scientists that Mars was lifeless, however, there is still active debate 

regarding the possibility that the red planet once harbored life. When the durable 

Viking 1 lander finally ceased operations in November 1982, the first phase of 

robotic exploration of the planet officially came to an end. Although many of the 

beliefs that had endured during the first two-thirds of the 20th century had been 

disproved by robotic probes, there remained considerable interest in future journeys 

to Mars. The question at that time was whether this second phase of discovery 

would be centered on robotic or human exploration.

34 Some astrobiologists believe that the Viking Lander’s Labeled Release (LR) experiment proved 

that primitive life does exist on present-day Mars. The LR experiment dropped liquid nutrients onto a 

sample of Martian soil, then measured the gases that were released by the mixture. If Martian bacteria 

had consumed the nutrients and had begun to multiply, certain gases would have been released. When 

the LR experiment was conducted on both Viking Landers, some of the gases emitted seemed to 

suggest that microbes were ingesting the released nutrients. But, overall, the results were ambiguous. 

Many in the scientific community believe that the LR results can be explained non-biologically. One 

such explanation is that the LR experiment showed the surface of Mars to contain oxides. When the 

nutrients mixed with the oxides, a chemical reaction, not a biological one, occurred. Moreover, these 

oxides would actually prevent life from forming on the Martian surface. This remains an open debate 

within the scientific community, although the prevailing belief is that the Viking LR readings did not 

provide evidence of life on Mars. [Staff Writer, “The Viking Files,” Astrobiology Magazine (29 May 

2003)]

First Viking 1 panoramic photograph of Martian surface

(Courtesy NASA/JPL-Caltech, Image #PIA00383)
14

Mars Wars

The ensuing chapters will examine the events leading up to the announcement 

of SEI, including an effort by NASA to garner political support for a crewed mission 

to Mars during post-Apollo planning. The central focus of this story, however, will 

be a detailed account of the agenda setting process that placed SEI on the government agenda and the intense political battles that virtually guaranteed that an actual 

program would not be adopted. Finally, the manuscript will investigate the lessons 

learned from this failed policy process in an effort to provide a tool to current and 

future policy makers attempting to garner continued political and public support 

for human exploration beyond Earth orbit.
“Mars responds to a fundamental need in all of us.

There is a human imperative to explore. People must explore because 

they are human beings with a desire to expand the scope of human 

experience. Exploration adds to our knowledge, satisfies our curiosity, 

and responds to our sense of adventure. We are going to Mars because 

we are alive, and because it reflects something very special inside 

each and every one of us.”

NASA Associate Administrator, Arnold Aldrich, 1 May 1990

During the four decades prior to President Bush’s announcement of SEI, sending humans to Mars had often captured the imagination of the space community 

as the ultimate 20th century goal for the space program.1

 Throughout that time 

period, inspired engineers generated scores of sophisticated mission architectures 

for accomplishing this objective. During the early Nixon administration, NASA’s 

leaders proposed exploration of the red planet as the post-Apollo goal of the American space program. This effort was thwarted, however, by powerful political and 

budgetary forces. In the early 1980s, a group of enthusiasts held several conferences aimed at reviving interest in exploration of Mars. This campaign, combined 

with the recommendations of two important advisory committees, resulted in the 

1

 Howard E. McCurdy, Space and the American Imagination (Washington, DC: Smithsonian 

Institution Press, 1997).

2

15

The Origins of SEI
16

Mars Wars

17

Chapter 2: The Origins of SEI

These paintings by Chesley Bonestell illustrate von Braun’s plan for human exploration of 

Mars, from construction of the spaceships in Earth orbit, to entering Mars orbit, to exploring

the surface itself (Courtesy Chesley Bonestell archives)

completing its three-year journey.3

In the early 1950s, Collier’s magazine approached Wernher von Braun and several other prominent engineers and scientists with an offer to write a series of eight 

articles about space exploration. The publication of these articles in Collier’s, with its 

circulation of almost four million, represented the beginning of a concerted “softening up” process for space exploration in general, and Moon and Mars exploration in particular—with the express purpose of educating the American public.4

 In 

April 1954, von Braun and journalist Cornelius Ryan penned an article for Collier’s 

entitled “Can We Get to Mars?” This piece drew heavily from the mission concept 

found in The Mars Project, but also included an Earth-orbiting space station that 

would be used during the project’s construction phase. In addition, Von Braun 

included a discussion that analyzed the potential physical and psychological difficulties that the astronaut crew would face on the voyage. He concluded, “...we 

have, or will acquire, the basic knowledge to solve all the physical problems of a 

flight to Mars... [but] psychologists undoubtedly will [have] to make careful plans 

to keep up the morale of the voyagers.” In 1956, von Braun collaborated with fellow 

German engineer Willy Ley to expand on the Collier’s articles in a book entitled The 

3

 Wernher von Braun, The Mars Project (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1962); Erik 

Bergaust, Wernher von Braun (Washington, DC: National Space Institute, 1976), pp. 153-159; David 

S. Portree, Humans to Mars: Fifty Years of Mission Planning, 1950-2000 (Washington, DC: NASA 

History Division, 2001), pp. 1-4.

4

 John Kingdon defines “softening up” as a process to pave the way in preparation for opening a 

policy window. In this process, the policy entrepreneur must ask who must be softened up: the general 

public, some specialized public, or the policy community itself. Among the means of softening up or 

educating is conducting and releasing studies or reports relating to the policy, which was the method 

chosen by von Braun (and others) during the 1950s. [John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and 

Public Policies (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995), pp. 127-131.]

Reagan administration officially placing human exploration beyond Earth orbit on 

the space agenda. This chapter highlights the 40-year “softening up” process that laid 

the foundation for President Bush’s announcement of SEI in the summer of 1989. 

This historical background will set the context under which human exploration of 

Mars ultimately reached the government agenda. More important, it will provide 

insights regarding emergent trends that increased the likelihood that Mars exploration would receive favorable consideration within important parts of the space 

policy making community, but also should have forewarned key policy makers that 

there were great challenges to adopting a costly new human spaceflight program 

from other parts of that community.

Early Mission Planning

In 1952, Dr. Wernher von Braun2 published the first detailed mission architecture for human exploration of the red planet in his classic book, The Mars Project. 

The manuscript was actually the appendix of an earlier, unpublished work that 

von Braun had written while interned with his fellow German rocket engineers in

El Paso, Texas after the conclusion of World War II (WWII). Von Braun had a 

sweeping vision for human travel to Mars. His plan called for ten 400-ton spacecraft capable of transporting a crew of 70 to the red planet—almost 1,000 ferry 

flights would be required to assemble this massive “flotilla” in Earth orbit. The strategy incorporated a minimum-energy trajectory that would carry the ships to Mars 

in approximately eight months. Upon arriving in Martian orbit, a glider would 

descend for a sliding landing on one of the planet’s polar ice caps. The crew from 

that ship would then trek 4,000 miles to the equator to build a landing strip for two 

additional gliders, which would transport the remainder of the exploratory team to 

the surface. After setting up an inflatable base camp habitat, the crew would commence a 400-day survey of the planet—which, von Braun assumed, would include 

taking samples of local flora and fauna and exploring the Martian canals—this was 

more than a decade before Mariner 4 returned the first close-up images of Mars 

back to Earth. Following a year of exploration, the crew would return to Earth, 

2

 German engineer who played a prominent role in all aspects of rocketry and space exploration, 

first in Germany (he led the V-2 rocket program) and, after World War II, in the United States. After 

working for the U.S. Army, von Braun became Director of NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center and 

the chief architect of the Saturn V launch vehicle. He began developing ideas for Mars exploration as 

early as 1947, while working at White Sands.
18

Mars Wars

19

Chapter 2: The Origins of SEI

20th century. By the time President Kennedy announced the lunar landing goal, 

however, the majority of Americans viewed it as inevitable. McCurdy asserts that 

the primary reason for this shift in national mood was the introduction of space 

concepts to the mainstream public by von Braun and other visionaries during the 

1950s.7

Building on the clear rise in interest in space exploration following the launch 

of Sputnik (and solidified with President Kennedy’s decision to send humans to the 

Moon), NASA began a series of studies to investigate alternative mission profiles for 

sending humans to Mars—continuing the softening up process that Wernher von 

Braun had initiated in the early 1950s and beginning a long-term alternative generation process within the policy stream. In April 1959, Congress approved funding 

for NASA Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio to conduct the first official 

architecture study for human exploration of Mars. Under the Lewis plan, a crew of 

seven would be propelled toward the red planet by an advanced, high-thrust nuclear 

rocket engine. The strategy called for a 420-day round trip with a 40-day surface 

stay. The ship design provided substantial living space for the crew and a heavily 

shielded cylindrical vault in the hub to protect the crew from radiation exposure. 

This basic model, using nuclear propulsion for the Earth orbit to Mars journey, 

became the standard within NASA for the next decade.8

In 1961, the year in which humans first reached Earth orbit, NASA was largely 

focused on mission plans for sending humans to explore the surface of the moon—

not Mars. However, there was at least one important study of Mars exploration 

that was produced that year. Authored by Ernst Stuhlinger, who directed advanced 

propulsion work at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), the study expanded on 

earlier designs for ion-powered spacecraft. This form of propulsion used an electric 

current to convert a propellant’s (e.g. cesium) atoms into positive ions. The engine 

would then expel these high-speed ions to create a constant low-thrust acceleration. 

The primary benefit of this vehicle type was that it used relatively little propellant, 

drastically reducing the amount of launches required to assemble a ship in Earthorbit. The main drawback, however, was that the low-thrust vehicle would take 

longer to make the trip to Mars and back. Stuhlinger also introduced a new innovation, twirling the spacecraft to generate artificial gravity for the crew. His overall 

mission plan called for five 150-meter long twirling ion ships to take 15 astronauts 

on the voyage to the red planet.9

7

 McCurdy, Space and the American Imagination, pp. 29-82.

8

 Portree, Humans to Mars, pp. 5-6.

9

 Portree, Humans to Mars, pp. 6-8; David S.F. Portree, “The Road to Mars...Is Paved With Good 

Inventions,” Air & Space, February/March 2000, pp. 67-71.

Exploration of Mars. The manuscript introduced a refined, cheaper mission architecture that reduced the number of ships going to Mars from 10 to 2, and the number 

of crew from 70 to 12.5

In the mid-1950s, the Collier’s articles served as the basis for three animated 

films about space exploration produced by Walt Disney. Wernher von Braun served 

as technical advisor for the shows, while Disney provided artistic direction for the 

series. The American Broadcasting Company aired the first episode entitled “Man 

in Space” on 9 April 1955. Disney, introducing the broadcast, stated that the aim of 

the series was to merge “the tools of our trade with the knowledge of the scientists 

to give a factual picture of the latest plans for man’s newest adventure.” The episode introduced fundamental scientific principles and concluded with von Braun’s 

vision for a four-stage orbital rocket ship. The second show, entitled “Man and 

the Moon,” aired on 28 December 1955 and “present[ed] a realistic and believable 

trip to the moon in a rocket ship—not in some far-off fantastic never-never land, 

but in the near foreseeable future.” The final show in the series, entitled “Mars and 

Beyond,” aired almost two years later on 4 December 1957. During this episode, 

von Braun and Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger revealed plans for “atomic electric space ships 

[that] feature[d] a revolutionary new principle that will make possible the long trip 

to Mars with only a small expenditure of fuel.” The Disney technicians provided 

dramatic animations of a 13-month voyage employing these nuclear rocket engines. 

TV Guide stated that “Mars and Beyond” represented “the thinking of the best scientific minds working on space projects today, making the picture more fact than 

fantasy.”6

Howard McCurdy argues in his book Space and the American Imagination that 

von Braun’s collaborations with Collier’s and Disney were part of a larger concerted 

effort to prepare the public for the inevitable conquest of space. He contends that 

scientists, writers, and political leaders sought to construct a romantic vision of 

space exploration laid upon images already rooted in the American culture, such as 

the myth of the frontier. The resulting vision of space exploration had the power 

to excite, entertain, or frighten (i.e. Cold War)—and it was incredibly successful. In 

1949, only 15% of the population believed that we would go to the moon in the 

5

 Portree, Humans to Mars, pp. 1-4; Bergaust, Wernher von Braun, pp. 53-59; Wernher von Braun 

with Cornelius Ryan, “Can We Get to Mars?” Colliers, 30 April 1954, in Exploring the Unknown: 

Organizing for Exploration, ed. Logsdon, et al. (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 1995, 

NASA SP-4407, Volume 1), pp. 195-200; Willy Ley and Wernher von Braun, The Exploration of Mars

(New York: Viking Press, 1956).

6

 Mike Wright, “The Disney-Von Braun Collaboration and Its Influence on Space Exploration” in 

Selected Papers from the 1993 Southern Humanities Conference, ed. Daniel Schenker, Craig Hanks, and 

Susan Kray (Huntsville, AL: Southern Humanities Press, 1993).
20

Mars Wars

21

Chapter 2: The Origins of SEI

In mid-1962, MSFC commenced the Early Manned Planetary Roundtrip Expeditions (EMPIRE) study. Wernher von Braun, now director of Marshall Space Flight 

Center (MSFC) and the leading advocate pushing for exploration of Mars, recognized that his field center would need a post-Apollo goal if it were to survive after 

completion of the Saturn V rocket program. The goal of the EMPIRE study was to 

provide a long-term human exploration strategy. The study participants were tasked 

with creating mission plans that utilized moderate modifications of Apollo technology for Martian flyby and orbiter (but not landing) missions. Three EMPIRE 

contractors submitted reports to MSFC—Lockheed, Ford Aeronutronic, and General Dynamics. The Lockheed and Aeronutronic teams focused primarily on 18 to 

22 month flyby missions conducted by spacecraft that utilized a rotating design to 

create artificial gravity for the crew. The General Dynamics report, on the other 

hand, focused on orbiter missions conducted by convoys of modular spacecraft. 

Krafft Ehricke, the principal author of the General Dynamics study, also included 

options for landing missions. All of the missions proposed under the auspices of the 

EMPIRE study required launch vehicles capable of lifting 2 1⁄2 to 5 times the weight 

of the Saturn V being developed for Project Apollo.10

In 1963, at the same time MSFC was conducting the EMPIRE study, the 

Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) (later renamed the Johnson Space Center—JSC) 

started to conduct its own advanced planning for the future of the space program. 

Assistant Director of MSC, Maxime Faget, favored a phased exploration approach, 

with a space station and lunar base preceding a human mission to Mars. The MSC 

study produced the first detailed designs for a Mars Excursion Module (MEM), a 

piloted craft that would be capable of landing on the Martian surface. The mission plan developed by MSC called for a complicated flyby-rendezvous where two 

separate spacecraft would be sent toward Mars—Direct and Flyby. The Flyby ship 

would depart Earth on a 200-day trip to Mars. The piloted Direct ship would leave 

50 to100 days later on a 120-day trip to Mars. Upon arrival, the Direct ship would 

release the MEM, which would land on the red planet. After completing its mission, the MEM would rendezvous with the Flyby ship as it swung past Mars and 

headed home. This high-risk approach saved propellant because it utilized a free 

return trajectory to return the MEM to Earth.11

In July 1965, Mariner 4 conducted the first flyby of Mars and snapped its 

historic 21 images of the red planet. The photographs revealed a planet with an 

exceptionally thin carbon dioxide atmosphere and an apparently lifeless, cratered 

landscape. These findings had a dramatic impact on planning for planetary explora10 Portree, Humans to Mars, pp. 11-22; Portree, The Road to Mars, pp. 67-71.

11 Ibid.

tion. Researchers had always assumed Mars to be an Earthlike planet that would 

support a human crew. Instead they found a resoundingly hostile environment. As 

a result, the next major Mars study, conducted the following year by the Office of 

Manned Spaceflight at NASA Headquarters, called for humans to orbit the planet 

but counted on robotic landers to conduct actual surface exploration. By 1967, with 

the Vietnam War heating up, Congress eliminated all funding for studying human 

exploration of the red planet.12

Post-Apollo Planning

On 8 January 1969, President-elect Richard Nixon received the “Report of the 

Task Force on Space,” a thirteen-member blue-ribbon panel charged with advising the incoming president regarding options for the American space program. 

Chaired by Nobel Prize winner Charles Townes of the University of California at 

Berkeley, the task force issued a number of recommendations. The board favored a 

more balanced program that promoted expanded utilization of robotic probes and 

satellites for scientific research and exploration, and in a wide variety of applications (e.g., communications, weather, and earth resource surveys). With regard to 

planetary exploration, the task force did not support the immediate adoption of 

a human spaceflight program based on a planetary lander or orbiter. Instead, the 

panel favored continued lunar exploration that built on Apollo technology to allow 

for greater mobility and extended stays on the surface.13

The following month, President Nixon asked Vice President Spiro Agnew to chair 

a Space Task Group (STG) created to provide a definitive recommendation regarding the course the space program should take during the post-Apollo period. The 

other members of the STG were Secretary of the Air Force Robert Seamans, NASA 

Administrator Thomas Paine, and Presidential Science Advisor Lee DuBridge. Joan 

Hoff argues in Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership that the creation 

of the STG was “a mixed blessing for NASA because Paine assumed almost immediately that Agnew’s personal and public support of a ‘manned flight to Mars by the 

end of this century’ would carry the day inside the White House and BOB [Bureau 

12 Ibid.

13 Charles Townes, et al., “Report of the Task Force on Space,” 8 January 1969, in Exploring the 

Unknown: Organizing for Exploration, ed. Logsdon, et al. (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 

1995, NASA SP-4407, Volume 1), pp. 499-512.
22

Mars Wars

23

Chapter 2: The Origins of SEI

of Budget], when nothing could have been further from the truth.”14,15 At an early 

STG meeting, Paine pushed forward based on this incorrect assumption by contending that the space agency needed a new program to rally around. Agnew was 

supportive, stating that NASA needed an “Apollo for the seventies.”16

As the primary policy entrepreneurs supporting a human mission to Mars, Paine 

and Agnew selected an approach for post-Apollo planning that did not mesh with 

either President Nixon’s basic ideology or changes in the national mood regarding 

space exploration. Hoff writes “Nixon was concerned about scientific-technological 

programs that might stress engineering over science, competition over cooperation, 

civilian over military, and adventure over applications...[and his] emphasis on frugality in government spending prompted caution on his part in endorsing any effort 

in space.” Public sentiment toward the space program had also begun to shift, with 

increasing concerns that the government had misplaced priorities. A Gallup Poll 

conducted in July 1969, at the time of the Apollo 11 mission, indicated that only 

39% of Americans were in favor of U.S. government spending to send Americans to 

Mars, while 53% were opposed.17 Thus, Paine and Agnew were pushing for a large 

new Apollo-like commitment despite the fact that there appeared to be little or no 

support for such an undertaking within the White House or the mass public.18

On 16 July, at the launch of Apollo 11, Vice President Agnew told reporters 

that it was his “individual feeling that we should articulate a simple, ambitious, 

optimistic goal of a manned flight to Mars by the end of the century.” Up until 

this point, NASA had been focusing primarily on a large space station as the logical 

post-Apollo program. The space agency had been unsuccessful in gaining political 

support for such a program, however, so Administrator Paine decided that it was the 

appropriate time to make a human Mars mission the center of future planning. On 

4 August, Wernher von Braun came to Washington to brief the STG on options for 

human exploration of Mars by 1982. After the briefing, Paine informed the panel 

14 In fact, Agnew had little influence within the Nixon White House; his strong support for an 

ambitious post-Apollo program was potentially a liability for NASA, not an asset.

15 Joan Hoff, “The Presidency, Congress, and the Deceleration of the US Space Program in the 

1970s,” in Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership, ed. Roger D. Launius and Howard 

McCurdy (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1997), pp. 92-132.

16 Richard Nixon, “Memorandum for the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Acting 

Administrator, NASA, and the Science Advisor,” 13 February 1969, in Exploring the Unknown: 

Organizing for Exploration, ed. Logsdon, et al. (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 1995, 

NASA SP-4407, Volume 1), pp. 512-513.

17 NASA History Division, Compilation of Historical Polling Data, Excel spreadsheet provided 

to author.

18 Hoff, “The Presidency, Congress, and the Deceleration of the US Space Program in the 1970s,” 

pp. 92-132.

that the mission could be accomplished if NASA’s budget was increased to $9 to 

$10 billion by the middle of the decade—at a time when the NASA budget was 

only $4.25 billion.19 This seemed to be contrary to President Nixon’s fiscal philosophy as well as existing budgetary realities.

As it became clear that the STG was seriously considering an early Mars mission, 

widespread criticism of such an undertaking emerged. What was most troublesome 

for NASA was that formerly vigorous supporters of the space program were opposed 

to large new projects. Senator Clinton Anderson, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, stated “now is not the time to commit 

ourselves to the goal of a manned mission to Mars.” Representative George Miller, 

Chairman of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, said “five, perhaps 

ten, years from now we may decide that it would be in the national interest to begin 

a carefully planned program extending over several years to send men to Mars.” The 

Washington Post and New York Times both questioned the validity of the enterprise, 

the latter stating that an early crewed Mars mission was scientifically and technically 

premature.20

In the face of growing opposition to a Mars project, Robert Seamans grew concerned that his colleagues were considering recommending a program that had no 

political support. Seamans, who had been a senior NASA official from 1960 to 

1968, argued that the space agency should utilize its capabilities to address “problems directly affecting men here on Earth.” He contended that new human exploration initiatives should be deferred until their technical feasibility was determined. 

Budget Director Robert Mayo, who had observer status within the STG, agreed 

with this position. He believed that from a budgetary viewpoint an Apollo-like 

program was not practical in the near-term. Due to a lack of consensus regarding 

the exact direction that the post-Apollo program should travel, it was decided that 

the panel would present the White House with several future program alternatives. 

Presidential advisor John Erlichman demanded that the report not include any 

politically infeasible goals, such as a human mission to Mars by 1982.21

On 15 September 1969, the STG report was submitted to President Nixon. The 

panel recommended that “this Nation accept the basic goal of a balanced manned 

and unmanned space program conducted for the benefit of all mankind.” To accomplish this goal, the report stressed five program objectives, including:

19 John M. Logsdon, “The Policy Process and Large-Scale Space Efforts,” Space Humanization Series

(1979): pp. 65-79.

20 Ibid.

21 John M. Logsdon, “The Evolution of US Space Policy and Plans,” in Exploring the Unknown: 

Organizing for Exploration, ed. Logsdon, et al. (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 1995, 

NASA SP-4407, Volume 1), pp. 383-386.
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Chapter 2: The Origins of SEI

• Expansion of space applications

• Enhancement of space technology for national security purposes

• Continuation of earth and space science projects

• Development of a new space transportation capability and a space station

• Promotion of international cooperation in space

Finally, the group recommended that the nation “accept the long-range option or 

goal of manned planetary exploration with a manned Mars mission before the end 

of this century as the first target.” The STG report did not, however, support an 

immediate commitment to any particular future program or initiative. Instead, the 

panel provided President Nixon with several alternatives and left it to him to choose 

the best option.22

On 7 March 1970, six months after the STG report was submitted, President 

Nixon offered his first official comments on the future course of the space program. 

In his statement, the president declared that the space program would be less of a 

government priority during his administration. Nixon rejected the need for a bold 

new exploration initiative, arguing “many critical problems here on this planet make 

high priority demands on our attention and our resources. By no means should we 

allow our space program to stagnate. But—with the entire future and the entire 

universe before us—we should not try to do everything at once. Our approach 

to space must be bold—but it must also be balanced.”23 This statement formally 

ended NASA’s attempts to get approval for a mission to Mars and led to the eventual endorsement of the Space Shuttle program. Joan Hoff argues that there were 

four major reasons for the failure of NASA to gain approval for a bold post-Apollo 

initiative. First, President Nixon never “need[ed] to use the space program to prove 

himself able to deal with the Soviets, as Kennedy and Johnson apparently thought 

they did. NASA administrators and White House science advisors in 1969-72 failed 

to appreciate this important shift....” Second, the Nixon administration inherited 

economic problems generated by immense spending related to the Vietnam War 

and Great Society social programs. Third, an anti-technology mood within the 

American public forced policy makers to question whether large spending for the 

space program was a proper allocation of scarce government funding. As a result, the 

president decided that there was no political downside to supporting budget cuts for 

22 Space Task Group, “The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions for the Future,” September 

1969, in Exploring the Unknown: Organizing for Exploration, ed. Logsdon et al (Washington, DC: 

NASA History Division, 1995, NASA SP-4407, Volume 1), pp. 522-525.

23 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 (Washington, DC: US 

Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 250-253.

NASA. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Hoff contended that “institutional 

obstinacy at NASA when asked to comply with changing government budgeting 

methods and changing public expectations about the meaning of the space program” 

led to a deceleration within the space program.24 John Logsdon agreed with this line 

of reasoning, writing in Exploring the Unknown: Organizing for Exploration, “...the 

results of NASA’s attempt to mobilize support behind the manned Mars objective 

were, from the Agency’s perspective, little short of disastrous.... What happened to 

NASA plans and the STG report is best viewed, not in terms of NASA ‘winning’ 

or ‘losing,’ but in terms of what happens when an agency’s plans are significantly at 

variance with what political leaders judge to be both in the long-term interests of 

the nation and politically feasible.”25 The fact that NASA pushed the Mars initiative 

despite substantial opposition resulted in discussion of sending humans to the red 

planet being a taboo subject within NASA for the next decade.

Case for Mars

Indeed, there was little public dialogue at all regarding a human mission to Mars 

in the decade after the rejection of such an undertaking by the Nixon administration. By the late 1970s, however, the goal of human exploration of Mars reappeared 

within the aerospace community—primarily due to the work of a small group of 

space enthusiasts that became known as the “Mars Underground.” The movement 

began in 1978, during the quiet period between the Skylab and Shuttle programs. 

That year, Chris McKay, an astrogeophysics graduate student at the University of 

Colorado at Boulder, offered an informal seminar on “The Habitability of Mars.” 

Among the roughly 25 participants were fellow doctoral candidates Carol Stoker 

and Penelope Boston, engineer Tom Meyer, and computer scientist Steve Welch. 

The study, which concentrated primarily on the examination of potential Martian 

terraforming,26 continued for several years.27

24 Hoff, “The Presidency, Congress, and the Deceleration of the US Space Program in the 1970s,” 

pp. 93-95.

25 Logsdon, “The Policy Process and Large-Scale Space Efforts,” pp. 74-75.

26 The process of modifying a planet, moon, or other body to a more habitable atmosphere, 

temperature or ecology.

27 Alcestis R. Oberg, “The Grass Roots of the Mars Conference,” in The Case for Mars, ed. Penelope 

Boston (San Diego, CA: American Astronautical Society, 1984), pp. ix-xii; Robert Zubrin and Richard 

Wagner, The Case for Mars: The Plan to Settle the Red Planet and Why We Must (New York: The Free 

Press, 1996), pp. 70-74; Amy Reeves, “Space Oddities: Local Members of the Mars Underground 

Have Come Up for Air,” The Sun, 25 August 1999.
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Chapter 2: The Origins of SEI

In the spring of 1980, McKay and Boston met Leonard David of the National 

Space Institute at an American Astronautical Society meeting in Washington, DC. 

After a lengthy discussion regarding Mars exploration, David suggested that the 

Mars Underground organize a conference to analyze options for near-future human 

exploration of the red planet. The group of twenty-something graduate students 

enthusiastically latched onto the idea and began planning the event for the following year. McKay, Stoker, Boston, Meyer, Welch, and Roger Wilson, another 

University of Colorado graduate student, sketched out the key areas to be investigated, including: propulsion, design, psychology, medicine, finance, life support, 

and materials processing. As the idea progressed, they began putting together lists of 

speakers for what they dubbed the “Case for Mars” conference.28

In late April 1981, the Mars Underground hosted the first “Case for Mars” conference at the University of Colorado. It was a relatively small conference, with 

approximately 100 attendees, but to the organizers it was viewed as an important 

start. Given that no official report on human missions to Mars had been released in 

a decade, the gathering was largely an organized brainstorming session. Over four 

days, workshops and presentations were given on a wide variety of topics. The most 

important outcomes of the conference were “first, that the participants made contact and communicated their ideas to the public, and secondly, [the development 

of] an approach to begin answering the questions of whether or not a manned Mars 

mission was a viable option for our space program.”29

During the four days of the Case for Mars conference, the participants examined 

not only the technologies required to carry out a future human mission, but assessed 

the social, economic, and political impacts of such an enterprise. The general consensus of the conference participants was that the exploration and settlement of 

Mars offered a technically feasible, unifying goal for the American space program 

in the 21st century. The proceedings stated, “this is not only a natural evolutionary 

step of space development, but it can be a new symbol of the pioneering spirit of 

America in the eyes of the public.” Mars was seen as a logical next step for the space 

program because the Martian environment provided resources that could be utilized 

for in situ manufacturing of life support materials. It was assumed at the time that 

the Space Shuttle would provide cheap space transportation services, resulting in a 

Mars expedition that would cost less than the Apollo program.30

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Penelope J. Boston, et al., “Conference Summary,” in The Case for Mars, ed. Penelope Boston 

(San Diego, CA: American Astronautical Society, 1984), pp. xiii-xxi.

The attendees produced a list of four precursor missions that would be required 

before attempting a human landing on Mars. First, to identify a suitable base site, a 

robotic Mars Polar Orbiter would be required to locate water resources to support 

the crew. Second, high resolution maps were needed to provide topographic and 

geological data since the base must be in a safe but scientifically interesting location. 

Third, a sample return mission would be essential to carryout engineering proofof-concept tests. Finally, a mission to either Phobos or Deimos was included as a 

potential launching point for extensive exploration of the Martian surface.31 The 

participants produced interrelated technology options to be used when designing 

the mission profile, which ranged from using a modified Space Shuttle External 

Tank as a Mars transit vehicle to mining the Martian atmosphere for fuel to artificial 

gravity. In conclusion, the conferees produced a list of surface activities that could 

be carried out by the astronaut and scientist crew during its stay. This included 

construction of underground habitats in a region with access to a confirmable water 

supply, establishment of processing facilities to utilize Martian resources (to provide 

air, water, fuel, industrial compounds, building materials, fertilizers, and soil), growing fresh food to supplement stored supplies, and conducting scientific research.32

The Case for Mars conferences, which continued every three years until the mid1990s when the Mars Society was created (this advocacy organization now holds 

an annual conference), were essentially a resurrection of the “softening up” process 

that had been started by the space community during the 1950s. Each conference 

built on those preceding it, spending time studying the fundamentals of spaceflight 

(from payloads to orbital trajectories) and establishing a close-knit community of 

engineers and scientists enthusiastic about sending humans to Mars. In 1984, the 

second conference was utilized to design a complete space system architecture for 

a Mars expedition. More importantly, however, the conference attracted attendees with greater political influence within the space policy community, among 

them former NASA Administrator Thomas Paine. The following year, Paine was 

appointed to lead a blue-ribbon presidential committee tasked with making recommendations for the space agency’s future.

National Commission on Space

In 1981, after the initial flight of the Space Shuttle, NASA began to formulate 

plans for its next large human spaceflight program. During the next two years, the 

space agency laid the foundation for a presidential decision in support of a space 

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.
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Chapter 2: The Origins of SEI

station. NASA Administrator James Beggs regularly justified the station as the “next 

logical step” for the civilian space program. When policy makers outside the space 

agency inquired what an orbiting laboratory was a step toward, NASA officials 

answered that there were a great many missions that a space station could support. 

NASA, however, resisted pressure from President Reagan’s Science Advisor, George 

Keyworth, to link the station with an eventual human mission to Mars. Beggs, 

remembering the negative outcome of the STG’s endorsement of an expedition to 

the red planet, decided that the timing was not right to associate the space station 

with such an undertaking.33

In 1984, Congress adopted legislation requiring President Reagan to appoint a 

National Commission on Space to develop a long-term agenda for the American 

space program. In March of the following year, Reagan chose Thomas Paine to lead 

a commission that included Neil Armstrong, Chuck Yeager, and UN Ambassador 

Jeanne Kirkpatrick. The selection of Paine, who had spent the past 15 years arguing 

in favor of an aggressive space program, almost ensured a report that supported an 

expansive future for NASA. The 15-member commission, which held public hearings to solicit ideas, worked for over a year to prepare its report—which was completed a few days after the 28 January 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger accident. This 

unfortunate coincidence limited any potential short-term impact the report might 

have had. In May 1986, Bantam Books published it in a glossy volume entitled 

Pioneering the Space Frontier.

34 Subtitled “An exciting vision of our next fifty years 

in space,” the report of the National Commission on Space was dedicated to the 

seven astronauts that had died in the tragic Challenger disaster.35 That catastrophe 

had focused much attention on NASA’s shortcomings at the same time the commission was offering a bold new vision for the future of the space program. Despite a 

skeptical reaction to the study from Congress, the media, and the public, the report 

had a significant impact on human spaceflight strategic planning in the years after 

1986.36

The members of the National Commission on Space stated that the primary goal 

of the study was to provide a rationale that would set the American space program 

on a path to “lead the exploration and development of the space frontier, advancing science, technology, and enterprise, and building institutions and systems that 

make accessible vast new resources and support human settlements beyond Earth 

33 John M. Logsdon, “The Evolution of US Space Policy and Plans,” p. 392.

34 Ibid.

35 Francis Scobee, Michael Smith, Judith Resnik, Ellison Onizuka, Ronald McNair, Gregory Jarvis, 

and Christa McAulliffe.

36 National Commission on Space, Pioneering the Space Frontier: An Exciting Vision of Our Next 

Fifty Years in Space (New York: Bantam Books, 1986).

orbit, from the highlands of the Moon to the plains of Mars.” To achieve those 

objectives, the commission put forward specific recommendations that outlined a 

logical approach for the future of the space agency. These proposals supported three 

overarching national goals for the civilian space program: earth and space science; 

human exploration and settlement of the solar system; and the development of 

space commerce.37

The section of the report dealing with exploration, prospecting, and settling the 

solar system set out a coherent phased approach for human spaceflight in the 21st 

century. The first phase entailed sending robotic probes to discover and characterize 

resources that could be used for later voyages to Mars. During the second phase, 

more sophisticated missions would be sent Marsward to obtain and return samples 

to Earth. The third phase would involve robotic and human exploration of the red 

planet. During this final phase, permanent Martian outposts would be established 

to support ongoing exploration. The overall tenor of these recommendations suggested that human extraction of chemical and mineral resources on the red planet 

would be one of the primary long-term goals of the space program.38

To support its bold vision for the future of the space program, the commission recommended the establishment of seven demonstration programs to advance 

key technologies for expansion into the solar system, including: flight research on 

aerospace plane propulsion and aerodynamics; advanced rocket vehicles; aero-braking for orbital transfer; long-duration closed-ecosystems (including water, air, and 

food); electric launch and propulsion systems; nuclear-electric space power; and 

space tethers and artificial gravity. The report further stated that the most important action the government could take to open the space frontier was to drastically 

reduce transportation costs within the inner solar system. The group advocated 

completing a new space transportation architecture—including an aerospace plane, 

cargo vehicle, and space transfer vehicle—that could replace the Shuttle fleet by the 

turn of the century. A next generation aerospace plane would be capable of providing flexible, routine, and economical passenger service into low Earth orbit (LEO). 

A large cargo vehicle would be capable of delivering payloads into LEO at a cost of 

$200 per pound. Finally, a space transfer vehicle would be “developed to initiate a 

‘Bridge Between Worlds.’”39

The National Commission on Space concluded that following its fifty-year strategic plan for the future of the space program would have three tangible benefits, 

“‘pulling-through’ advances in science and technology of critical importance to the 

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.
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Nation’s future economic strength and national security...providing direct economic 

returns from new space-based enterprises that capitalize upon broad, low-cost access 

to space, and...opening new worlds on the space Frontier, with vast resources that 

can free humanity’s aspirations from the limitations of our small planet of birth.”40

The commission calculated that to accomplish the goals its report advocated, the 

annual NASA budget would have to increase threefold—to approximately $20 billion a year. John Noble Wilford wrote in his book Mars Beckons that Pioneering the 

Space Frontier received a frosty reception because “its far-reaching proposals seemed 

to bear too much of a resemblance to science fiction to be embraced by political 

leaders. And the more modest recommendations tended to get lost in the ‘Bridge 

Between Worlds’ imagery of Buck Rogers spaceships.” During the mid-1980s, the 

American public was not highly receptive to long-range, costly space endeavors. As 

a result, both the White House and Congress largely disregarded the report of the 

National Commission on Space.41

Despite the negative reaction to the study, momentum began to build for a 

presidential decision making exploration of Mars the next objective of the human 

spaceflight program. One reason for endorsing this goal was the increased mission 

planning that the Soviets were undertaking to set the stage for an expedition to the 

red planet early in the 21st century. In the coming year, a dozen major publications 

advocated setting Mars exploration as the primary future goal of NASA—ranging 

from the New York Times to The New Republic. Support for Mars exploration was far 

from unanimous, however, with prominent space policy experts arguing for more 

limited programs aimed at better space science, earth science, and a permanent 

return to the Moon. In the face of these conflicting viewpoints, NASA decided to 

conduct its own study of options for the future of the space program.42

The Ride Report

In 1986, NASA Administrator James Fletcher asked former astronaut Dr. Sally 

Ride to chair a task force assigned to respond to the National Commission on Space 

report and to develop focused alternatives for the agency’s future. In August of the 

following year, the committee released its report entitled Leadership and America’s 

Future in Space. In its preface the study suggested that in the aftermath of the Challenger accident there were two conflicting views regarding the proper course for the 

40 Ibid.

41 John Noble Wilford, Mars Beckons: The Mysteries, the Challenges, the Expectations of Our Next 

Great Adventure in Space (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), pp. 145-150.

42 Ibid.

space program. On one hand, many believed that NASA should adopt a major, 

visionary goal. On the other hand, many judged that the agency was already overcommitted and should not take on another major program. The Ride Committee 

sided with the first group, although it concluded that the space program should not 

pursue a single visionary initiative to the exclusion of all others. It contended that 

championing a solitary project was not good science or good policy making, but 

argued that the space program did need a strategy to regain and retain leadership in 

space endeavors.43

The Ride Report identified four candidate initiatives for study, each bold enough 

to restore the United States to a position of leadership in space. Those proposals 

included:

• Mission to Planet Earth: a program designed to obtain a comprehensive scientific understanding of the entire Earth system—particularly 

emphasizing the impact of environmental changes on humanity

• Exploration of the Solar System: a robotic exploration program designed 

to continue the quest to understand our planetary system (including a 

comet rendezvous, a mission to Saturn, and three sample return missions to Mars)

• Outpost on the Moon: a program designed to build upon the Apollo 

legacy with a new phase of lunar exploration and development, concluding with the establishment of a permanent moon base by 2010

• Humans to Mars: a program designed to land a crew of astronauts early 

in the 21st century and eventually develop a permanent outpost on the 

red planet

The panel made clear, however, that the report “was not intended to culminate in 

the selection of one initiative and the elimination of the other three, but rather to 

provide four concrete examples that would catalyze and focus the discussion of the 

objectives of the civilian space program and the efforts required to pursue them.” 

If the Humans to Mars option was pursued, the report recommended a threeprong exploration strategy. During the 1990s, the first prong would involve comprehensive robotic exploration, concluding with a pair of Mars Rover/Sample 

Return missions. The second prong would entail utilizing an orbiting space station 

to perform an assertive life sciences program intended to examine the physiological effects of long-duration spaceflight—the ultimate goal being to decide whether 

43 Sally Ride, Leadership and America’s Future in Space: A Report to the Administrator, (Washington, 

DC: NASA, 1987).
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Chapter 2: The Origins of SEI

Mars-bound spacecraft would require artificial gravity. During the final prong, the 

space agency would “design, prepare for, and perform three fast piloted round-trip 

missions to Mars. These flights would enable the commitment, by 2010, to construct an outpost on Mars.” The panel favored one-year human missions to the 

red planet, with astronauts exploring the planetary surface for 10 to 20 days. The 

plan called for slow, low-energy cargo vehicles to precede and rendezvous with the 

piloted spacecraft in Martian orbit. These cargo ships would take everything needed 

for surface activities, plus the fuel required for the return trip. The Ride Report 

indicated that the ultimate goal of the initiative was to recapture leadership in space 

activities.44

While human exploration of Mars received equal footing with the other three 

initiatives proposed by the committee, the report argued that an expedition to the 

red planet should not be the immediate goal of the space agency. The committee 

wrote, “...settling Mars should be our eventual goal, but it should not be our next 

goal. Understanding the requirements and implications of building and sustaining 

a permanent base on another world is equally important. We should adopt a strategy of natural progression which leads step by step, in an orderly, unhurried way, 

inexorably toward Mars.” This finding seemed to mesh with the general feeling of 

top NASA officials. In fact, Administrator Fletcher stated at the time his belief that 

Americans should return to the Moon before heading on to Mars. On the other 

hand, supporters of human exploration of the red planet argued that developing a 

lunar base would utilize resources that should be applied toward a journey to Mars. 

Thus, in the aftermath of the Ride Report it was still unclear what strategy the 

American space program should adopt as it neared the 21st century—although the 

report had provided policy makers with four well-conceived future alternatives.45

President Reagan and NASA’s Office of Exploration

 During its deliberations, the Ride task force recommended that an organization 

be created to perform systematic planning for the nation’s civil space program. In 

July 1987, Administrator James Fletcher established the NASA Office of Exploration to coordinate the agency’s efforts to promote missions to the Moon and Mars. 

Fletcher appointed John Aaron, a longtime NASA official, as the first Assistant 

Administrator for the bureau. Among Aaron’s first assignments was to conduct a 

study, building on the Paine and Ride reports, looking at options for the long range 

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

human exploration of the solar system. This effort, which involved representatives 

from seven NASA field centers and five headquarters program offices, continued for 

more than a year.46

On 19 December 1988, the Office of Exploration submitted to Fletcher its first 

annual report, Beyond Earth’s Boundaries: Human Exploration of the Solar System 

in the 21st Century—which was the final product of the office’s year-long strategic study. The study team examined two different alternatives for future human 

exploration. First, the space agency could develop a series of expeditions that would 

travel from Earth to new destinations in the solar system. Second, the space agency 

could focus on an evolutionary expansion into the solar system that would concentrate more on permanence and the exploitation of resources. The NASA-wide effort 

utilized a technique called exploration case-studies, whereby a series of technical 

and policy “what if” questions were asked to judge the viability of several mission 

options. Beyond Earth’s Boundaries examined four specific case studies:

• a round-trip human mission from Earth to the Martian moon Phobos, 

which would serve as a stepping stone to a landing on red planet

• a direct human mission to the surface of Mars

• establishment of a human scientific research station on the Moon

• a lunar outpost to Mars outpost plan, which emphasized the use of the 

Moon as a springboard for further exploration of the solar system

The study team concluded that an expedition to Phobos could be a valuable interim 

step to a human landing on the Martian surface, offsetting some of the uncertainties 

that the latter mission could encounter. They also found that utilizing the Moon 

as a springboard for expansion into the solar system had a number of advantages, 

such as learning to construct habitats, extract and process mineral resources, and 

operate and maintain exploratory machinery. It was also believed that using the 

Moon as a fuel depot would appreciably reduce the total Earth launch mass, greatly 

cutting overall programmatic costs. In the end, the report favored establishment of 

a scientific research station on the Moon as a logical stepping-stone to both a permanent lunar outpost and a full-up Mars expedition. The study team did not support a “crash” human exploration program, regardless of the alternative chosen by 

policy makers. Instead, it preferred that NASA conduct long-lead technology and 

46 Howard E. McCurdy, The Decision to Send Humans Back to the Moon and on to Mars (Washington, 

DC: NASA History Division, March 1992); Lyn Ragsdale, “Politics Not Science: The US Space 

Program in the Reagan and Bush Years,” in Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership, ed. 

Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1997), p. 161.
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Chapter 2: The Origins of SEI

life sciences research during the 1990s—including the completion of Space Station 

Freedom. It was contended that this would provide government officials with the 

requisite data to make a decision before the turn of the century regarding the best 

alternative for expansion into the solar system.47

During the period that the Office of Exploration was conducting its study, work 

was going on within the Reagan administration to generate a new national space 

policy. In 1982, the White House had produced a national space policy under the 

auspices of the National Security Council. That document stated the central role of 

the Space Shuttle in the national security and civil space sectors.48 In the interim, 

however, there had been important changes in the American space program—

including the Challenger accident, a greater emphasis on commercial applications, 

and the National Commission on Space report. Throughout the latter half of 1987, 

a Senior Interagency Group (SIG) for Space conducted a comprehensive review that 

reflected those and other changes in the policy environment. On 11 February 1988, 

an unclassified summary of the Presidential Directive on National Space Policy was 

publicly released. The stated goals of the space policy were:

• to strengthen national security

• to obtain scientific, technological, and economic benefits

• to encourage continuing private-sector investment in space related activities

• to promote international cooperation; and, as a long-range goal

• to expand human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit into the

solar system

This presidential directive was the first time since Kennedy’s May 1961 speech 

that human exploration beyond Earth orbit formally made it onto the government 

agenda. To implement this new policy, the document directed NASA to begin the 

systematic development of technologies necessary to enable a range of future human 

missions.49

47 Office of Exploration, Beyond Earth’s Boundaries: Human Exploration of the Solar System in 

the 21st Century (Washington, DC: NASA, 1988); John Aaron, “NASA Press Conference Prepared 

Statement,” 19 December 1988.

48 National Security Council , “National Security Decision Directive Number 42: National Space 

Policy,” 4 July 1982.

49 National Security Council, “Presidential Directive on National Space Policy,” 11 February 

1988.

Despite the appearance that President Reagan had made a momentous commitment to sending humans beyond Earth orbit, many space policy experts question 

the strength of the pledge. American University’s Howard McCurdy argues that the 

policy directive was merely a “gesture designed to please NASA bureaucrats and 

space exploration advocates who were clamoring for an expedition to Mars.” George 

Washington University’s John Logsdon contends that for all intents and purposes 

the policy was meaningless because it committed the administration to no specific new exploration program. Finally, the Congressional Research Service’s Marcia 

Smith makes the case that human exploration outside the Earth system was not 

actually part of the government agenda during the Reagan administration; it was 

simply part of the “space agenda.” Despite the weak commitment to the proposal, 

however, the presidential directive did generate further momentum for the adoption 

a Moon-Mars initiative by the next president.50

50 Howard McCurdy interview via electronic-mail, 16 April 1999; John Logsdon interview via 

electronic-mail, 18 April 1999; Marcia Smith interview via electronic-mail, 19 April 1999.

“There are moments in history when challenges occur of such a

compelling nature that to miss them is to miss the whole meaning of 

an epoch. Space is such a challenge.”

3

37

Bush, Quayle, and SEI

James Michener, 19791

By 1989, the American space program had been in a steady decline for nearly 

two decades. NASA had failed to find its footing in the years following the triumphs 

of the Apollo moon landings. During the intervening period, the space agency had 

become increasingly conservative, risk averse, and bureaucratic. After failing to gain 

support for a robust human exploration program, the agency had retreated and 

become an ever more cautious organization. During this time, the space program 

had no great supporters in the White House, nor great advocates within the Congress. This forced the agency to focus its political energies on protecting its turf (e.g., 

the Space Shuttle and space station programs) and trying to slow the regular reductions in its annual appropriation. The result was a NASA that hardly resembled the 

organization that had taken on the Soviet Union on one of the most prominent 

battlegrounds of the Cold War—an agency that had won a great victory for the 

United States.

Despite this long interlude, there had been stirrings within the space policy community in recent years that seemed to indicate that a return to glory might be achievable. The National Commission on Space had recommended human exploration of 

Mars as the appropriate long-term objective of the space program. The American 

1

 James Michener, testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and 

Transportation, U.S. Civilian Space Policy: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and 

Space, 96th Cong., 1st session, 1979.
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Chapter 3: Bush, Quayle, and SEI

public had rallied around NASA in the wake of the Space Shuttle Challenger accident. President Reagan had placed human exploration beyond Earth orbit back on 

the space agenda for the first time in two decades. Perhaps most importantly, President-elect George Bush was an outspoken supporter of the space program—perhaps 

more supportive then any incoming president in the history of the space age. On 

the larger national stage, however, forces that are more significant were developing that didn’t bode well for the adoption of an overly aggressive or expensive new 

undertaking in human spaceflight. In particular, a struggling economy and rising 

deficits were placing enormous pressure on the federal budget. This political reality 

would be the most important constraint facing adoption of an expanded exploration 

program and attempts to revitalize the national space program. In fact, the situation 

was so grave that it seriously called into question whether the new president should 

support such an endeavor at all. Despite the potential hazards, though, only a few 

short months after taking office, President George Bush and his key space policy 

advisors decided to champion an ill-defined yet exorbitantly expensive exploration 

plan—the Space Exploration Initiative.

George Herbert Walker Bush was born in Milton, Massachusetts on 12 June 

1912, the second child of Dorothy Walker and Prescott Bush, an investment banker 

and later Republican Senator from Connecticut. He grew up a member of the Eastern elite. Biographer John Robert Greene writes that Bush’s parents were “...members of the genteel class—well educated, well pedigreed, well mannered, and well 

connected. They were also wealthy.... The world in which the Bush children were 

raised then was one in which comfort was never an issue, but neither were the 

constant reminders that that comfort could not be taken for granted. Prescott Bush 

used his wealth as a safety net for his children. They were expected to go out, earn 

their own wealth, and do the same.” As befitting one of this social standing, George 

received a private school education—first attending the Greenwich County Day 

School and then moving to prep school at Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts. On his 18th birthday, George graduated from Phillips Academy and enlisted 

in the U.S. Navy. Within a year, he received a commission as an ensign and became 

the youngest pilot in the navy. During World War II, Bush flew 58 combat missions against Japanese forces, survived being shot down on a bombing mission, and 

earned the Distinguished Flying Cross. Upon returning from the war, he entered 

Yale University, where he earned a B.A. in economics in only two years and graduated Phi Beta Kappa. Following college, Bush spent the subsequent two decades 

earning his fortune as an executive in the oil industry.2

2

 John Robert Greene, The Presidency of George Bush (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 

2000), pp. 11-26.

In 1964, George Bush made his first run for elective office when he challenged 

incumbent Democrat Ralph Yarborough for the U.S. Senate. Despite a good showing for a Republican in Texas, a Democratic Party united under the leadership of 

fellow Texan Lyndon Johnson stymied Bush—he only received 43% of the vote in 

the November election. Two years later, however, in 1966, Bush made a successful 

run for a congressional seat in Houston, becoming the first Republican to represent that city. One of the few freshman congressional representatives ever selected 

to serve on the powerful Ways and Means Committee; he was reelected two years 

later without opposition. In 1970, at the behest of President Nixon, Bush made 

another run for the U.S. Senate. This time running against conservative Democrat 

Lloyd Bentsen, who had surprisingly beaten Yarborough in the primary, he lost once 

again, garnering only 46% of the vote.3

On 11 December 1970, President Nixon, who greatly appreciated Bush’s willingness to sacrifice a safe House seat to run for the Senate, appointed him to the post 

of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. He served in this capacity for two years, 

but in early 1973 Nixon asked him to take the reigns of the Republican National 

Committee (RNC) in the aftermath of the Watergate break-in. In that position, 

Bush was an early defender of Nixon. When tapes were released that proved the 

president was guilty of obstruction of justice, however, he changed his stance and 

strongly lobbied the president to resign. In December 1975, after serving as the 

American envoy to China for a year, President Ford appointed Bush as the Director 

of Central Intelligence (DCI). After Jimmy Carter’s election, despite a solid record 

of achievement at the CIA, he became the first DCI to be dismissed by an incoming 

president-elect. He spent the next four years preparing to contend for the Republican presidential nomination. In 1980, despite winning the Iowa caucuses, George 

Bush never recovered from his loss to former California governor Ronald Reagan 

in the New Hampshire primary. After an effort to create a Reagan-Ford “dream 

ticket” collapsed, the conservative Reagan asked Bush to accept the vice presidential 

nomination because he was “the most attractive surviving moderate.” Biographer 

John Robert Greene explains, “Bush’s major task as Vice President was to be the 

administration’s front man on the road. Between 1981 and 1989, Bush put in 1.3 

million miles of travel, visiting the 50 states and 65 different countries.”4

3

 Ibid.

4

 Ibid.
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Bush-Quayle 1988

Before being elected as vice president, despite having served as a naval aviator 

during WWII, George Bush did not exhibit a particular interest in the American 

space program. As vice president, however, Bush became increasingly involved in 

space policy making—particularly in the aftermath of the Space Shuttle Challenger

accident. Bush met with the families of the lost astronauts just hours after the 

tragedy and was deeply moved by both their sorrow and continued dedication to 

NASA. Dr. June Scobee, the wife of the mission commander, told him not to let the 

disaster hurt the agency and to fight to keep the space program alive. On 21 March 

1987, at the dedication of the Challenger memorial at Arlington National Cemetery, 

Bush stated, “the greatest tribute we can pay to the Challenger’s brave crew and their 

families is to remain true to their purpose, and to rededicate ourselves to America’s 

leadership in space.”5

In the summer of 1987, NASA Administrator James Fletcher requested a meeting to brief Vice President Bush on issues relating to the American space program.6

5

 George Bush, “Remarks for the Space Shuttle Challenger Dedication,” 21 March 1987, Bush 

Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

6

 Although Vice President Bush had no formal role in space policy making, he had been involved 

in this issue area in the months after the Challenger accident. One can also conjecture that the briefing 

Specifically, the administrator wanted to talk about the U.S. and U.S.S.R. civil 

space programs, the status of the Space Shuttle’s return to service, and the keys to 

the agency’s future. On 10 August, Fletcher went to the White House to present 

the agency’s vision for the 1990s and beyond. He told Bush that the Soviets were 

beating the Americans in space because of the former nation’s unrelenting expansion of its civil and military capabilities during the prior three decades. The primary 

examples of that preeminence were the permanently occupied Mir space station and 

the massive Energia launch vehicle. Fletcher argued that Space Station Freedom and 

a Shuttle-derived advanced launch vehicle would not be capable of achieving parity 

with the Soviets until the end of the century. He suggested that this disparity in 

technical capabilities gave the U.S.S.R. an advantage in robotic and human exploration of Mars, which was the long-term goal of Soviet space efforts.7

Administrator Fletcher indicated that four important steps needed to be taken 

to reverse the current course of American-Soviet competition. First, NASA needed 

funding to develop a flexible and robust space transportation system to assure access 

to Earth orbit. Second, several critical enabling technologies needed to be tested, 

including: artificial gravity, closed loop life support, aero-braking, orbital transfer 

and maneuver, cryogenic storage and handling, and large scale space operations. 

Third, the U.S. needed the national will to excel. Finally, policy makers needed to 

choose a long-term, post-Space Station goal that would provide a strategic focus 

for the space program. Fletcher argued that human exploration of the solar system 

would provide this direction. He outlined a plan that would commence with a 

return to the Moon, establishment of a scientific outpost, and exploitation of lunar 

resources. Then, in the early 21st century, the space agency would be ready to start 

sending human missions to explore Mars. The meeting with the vice president was 

purely informational in nature and was not aimed at gaining an immediate response. 

The main objective was to lay the groundwork for further lobbying efforts should 

Bush be elected to replace President Reagan.8

On 13 October 1987, speaking at Houston’s Hyatt Regency Hotel, Vice President George Bush announced he would make a second run for the presidency. Just 

weeks after declaring his candidacy, Bush delivered a major policy address on the 

future of the space program at the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama. While space policy was not a hot issue during the election cycle, Bush gave 

was intended to gain support for NASA programs from the likely Republican nominee in the following 

year’s presidential election.

7

 James Fletcher, “Briefing for the Vice President of the United States,” 10 August 1987, Bush 

Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

8

 Ibid.

Vice President Bush meets Shuttle Challenger families (NASA Image 86-HC-181)
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it more attention than any presidential candidate since John Kennedy. He told the 

crowd gathered at the NASA field center, “In very basic ways, our exploration of 

space defines us as a people—our willingness to take great risks for great rewards, 

to challenge the unknown, to reach beyond ourselves, to strive for knowledge and 

innovation and growth. Our commitment to leadership in space is symbolic of 

the role we seek in the world.” Exhibiting his moderate Republican roots, Bush 

spoke eloquently of the environmental problems facing humanity and the role that 

NASA’s Mission to Planet Earth (a planned network of earth science satellites) could 

play in altering “our disastrous course.” He also endorsed aggressive launch vehicle 

developments aimed at replacing the Space Shuttle, assuring access to low-Earth 

orbit and drastically reducing launch costs. Finally, drawing on his briefing from 

Administrator Fletcher two months earlier, Bush argued that the nation “...should 

make a long-term commitment to manned and unmanned exploration of the solar 

system. There is much to be done—further exploration of the Moon, a mission to 

Mars, probes of the outer planets. These are worthwhile objectives, and they should 

not be neglected. They should be pursued in a spirit of both bipartisanship and 

international teamwork.” He stressed the need for international cooperation, stating that the solar system should be explored not as Americans, Soviets, French, or 

Japanese, but as humans. Despite delivering a relatively optimistic address about the 

future of the space program, Bush also openly spoke about the budgetary pressures 

facing the federal government and its impact on the space agency. “We cannot write 

a blank check to NASA ... while our dreams are unlimited, our resources are not, 

and we must choose realistic missions that recognize these constraints.”9

During the course of the next year, the country watched one of the nastiest presidential contests in history unfold. After a slow start with a third place finish in the 

Iowa caucuses, Bush stormed back with a solid win in New Hampshire followed by 

a sweep of the Super Tuesday primaries on 9 March 1988. In August, the Republican Party unanimously nominated Bush. On the morning of 3 October 1988, 

while engaged in a chaotic general election campaign against Governor Michael 

Dukakis of Massachusetts, the nominee was on hand at Edwards Air Force Base for 

the landing of the Space Shuttle Discovery, the first shuttle mission since the Challenger accident. That afternoon, at a campaign stop in Redding, California, Bush 

strayed from his regular stump speech to talk about the space program. He stated 

that if he were elected president, he would have certain strong notions about the 

proper priorities for the space program. Once again drawing upon the NASA briefing he had received the previous year, Bush contended that the logical progression 

9

 George Bush, “Excerpts of Remarks at George C. Marshall Space Flight Center,” 29 October 

1987, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 

of the human spaceflight program would involve completion of the Space Station, 

followed by missions to the Moon and Mars. He stopped short of endorsing the 

adoption of an exploration plan focusing on the red planet, however, stating that 

he was “not completely sure Mars is the next place we ought to go, and I want to 

receive the best thinking on that. But if we decide to go, we’ll have to be ready, and 

a space station is part of that process.”

Vice President Bush meets Discovery STS-26 crew (NASA Image 88-HC-410)
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Still, Bush made it clear that while robotic probes had great benefits he believed 

the future of the American space program should place an emphasis on human 

spaceflight. The primary rationale he gave for human involvement was that missions to explore the solar system were “journeys of discovery and daring, and they 

will lose their impact and their meaning if they are performed only by machines.”10

The following month, George Bush defeated Michael Dukakis—with a supportive 

president-elect ready to take office, this opened a policy window for adoption of a 

long-term human spaceflight initiative. The main question facing the space policy 

community, however, was whether a plan could be formulated that would revitalize 

the space program without requiring a large infusion of budgetary resources.

Reagan-Bush Transition

After his election, President-elect Bush set upon the task of selecting a White 

House staff and appointing a cabinet. During the campaign, President Reagan took 

extraordinary measures to ease the new president’s transition into office. This was 

the first time in six decades that a president of one party was succeeded through 

election by a president of the same party. James Pfiffner argues in Presidential Transitions: The Reagan to Bush Experience, “The fact that the transition to a Bush administration was a ‘friendly takeover’ [meant] there was no rush, as there would be with 

any party-turnover transition, to ensure that the opposition political party was out 

of office as soon as possible.”11 In retrospect, this proved to be a mixed blessing for 

the White House when it came to appointing a new NASA administrator. Changing 

the space agency’s political leadership was not a top priority for the Bush transition 

team. Administrator Fletcher had returned to the space program in the aftermath of 

the Challenger accident to get NASA back on its feet. While it was assumed that he 

would choose to return to the private sector, there was no perceived hurry in finding his replacement. In coming years, this relatively laid-back approach to naming a 

new administrator would come back to haunt the White House.

In December 1988, President-elect Bush received a report from the National 

Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Engineering (NAS/NAE) that provided recommendations for determining the proper role for the civil space program 

with respect to other claims on federal resources. The NAS/NAE team, chaired 

10 George Bush, “Excerpts of Remarks at Redding, California,” 3 October 1988, Bush Presidential 

Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

11 James P. Pfiffner, “The Bush Transition: Symbols and Substance,” in Presidential Transitions: The 

Reagan to Bush Experience, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 

1993), pp. 62-72.

by H. Guyford Stever, decided that the most important policy question that Bush 

needed to address after taking office regarded the future of the space station program. The study found that “a permanently manned space station is needed to 

maintain a viable manned spaceflight capability for the United States. However, 

its primary justification is to establish the feasibility of human exploration beyond 

Earth’s orbit.” Thus, the report argued that final decisions regarding the pace of 

station development and its final configuration should be made in the context of 

long-term goals for the space program. The report contended that attaining space 

leadership required a civil space program with two structural components. First, 

NASA must have a base competency in all forms of space activities to ensure the feasibility of a wide-range of large initiative alternatives. These fundamental capabilities included: assured access to space; a respectable space science and Earth remote 

sensing program; and sufficient funding for advanced technology development. 

The report estimated that this foundational element would cost $10 billion per 

year. Second, NASA should adopt a long-term strategy for major human spaceflight 

initiatives serving scientific, political, cultural, and foreign policy objectives. The 

report argued that these projects should be funded separately from the base program, primarily to avoid the erosion of crucial capabilities. Potential initiatives that 

the study team identified were: the space station; a permanent return to the moon; 

and a human mission to Mars. The report approximated the annual expenditure for 

these endeavors at between $3 and $4 billion. The NAS/NAE team also suggested 

that President-elect Bush should take advantage of opportunities offered by cooperative endeavors with other space faring nations, which would provide costs savings 

and political, scientific, and technical benefits.12 Although this approach seemed to 

match the budgetary realities facing the space program, it was not seriously considered by the incoming administration or NASA.

During the transition period, a four-person team was established within NASA 

and tasked with studying open issues facing the civil space program. Led by Brad 

Mitchell, the team spent the two months before the Bush inauguration preparing a report for whoever would eventually replace Fletcher.13 In mid-January, the 

NASA Transition Office Contact Team submitted its briefing report for the NASA 

Administrator-Designate, who was expected to be appointed sometime in the late 

12 Robert M. White and Frank Press to George Bush, December 1988, Bush Presidential 

Records, George Bush Presidential Library; National Academy of Sciences and National Academy 

of Engineering, Toward a New Era in Space: Realigning Policies to New Realities (Washington, DC: 

National Academy Press, 1988).

13 Ibid.; NASA Transition Office Contact Team, “Briefing Report to the NASA AdministratorDesignate,” 20 January 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
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spring. The transition team concluded that the space agency’s strategic planning 

must be carried out, taking into account the Administration’s concerns about the 

budget deficit. Therefore, it found that an efficient priority-setting mechanism was 

needed to achieve the most value for NASA’s budgeted dollars.14 The briefing report 

further outlined the major space programs and themes that President Bush spoke 

about during the campaign. The transition team argued that one of the most important tasks for the new administrator would be to assist the President in prioritizing 

these programs. The study separated the various space issues into seven categories: 

policy formulation; exploration and scientific research; aeronautics and technology 

development; commercial initiatives; international cooperation; national security; 

and science and mathematics education. With regard to policy formulation, one of 

the first tasks for the new administration would be the creation of a National Space 

Council chaired by Vice President Dan Quayle—Congress had mandated this the 

previous year.15 The primary duty of this organization would be to “set ambitious 

goals for a space comeback and re-establish U.S. preeminence in space.” With relation to human exploration, the study made clear that the primary near-term objective was to develop an operational space station by 1996. While the report mentioned the Reagan administration’s space policy that called for human exploration 

beyond Earth orbit, it did not specifically suggest whether the Bush administration 

should make that same commitment. Instead, the transition team discussed programs that would lay the foundation for such undertakings, including: development 

of an aerospace plane; advancement of pathfinder technologies; and construction of 

heavy-lift launch vehicles.16 Beyond setting out the Bush administration’s basic ideas 

about the space program, the hastily prepared Mitchell Report added little to the 

ongoing debate regarding human exploration beyond Earth orbit. The contact team 

itself implied that the next NASA Administrator and President Bush should make 

strategic policy decisions based on more authoritative studies like the Ride Report 

and Beyond Earth’s Boundaries. Therefore, as the new Bush administration came to 

power, it was still unclear what direction it would take with regard to future human 

exploration of the Moon and Mars. 

14 NASA Transition Office Contact Team, “Briefing Report to the NASA Administrator-Designate,” 

20 January 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

15 In 1988, Congress included language in NASA budget authorization that required the President 

to establish a National Space Council. The President was required to submit by 1 March 1989 a report 

that outlined the composition and functions of the Council, which was to employ not more then seven 

persons (including an executive secretary appointed by the President).

16 NASA Transition Office Contact Team, “Briefing Report to the NASA Administrator-Designate,” 

20 January 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

The Problem Stream: Providing Direction to a Directionless 

Agency

On 20 January 1989, George Bush was sworn in as the nation’s 41st president. 

Although space policy was not a pressing issue for the Bush administration during 

its first few months in office, work did begin relatively early to put a space policy 

team in place. This specifically took the form of establishing the National Space 

Council mandated by Congress. On 9 February, President Bush appeared before 

a joint session of Congress and delivered his first State of the Union address. In 

the oration, he proposed a $1.16 trillion “common sense” budget that would give 

attention to urgent priorities, provide investment in the future, attack the budget 

deficit, and require no new taxes. The space program was prominently placed in the 

speech. Unlike previous presidents, Bush made the space program a significant part 

of the government agenda from the beginning of his presidency. Bush stated efforts 

must be made to extend American leadership in technology, increase long-term 

investment, improve the educational system, and boost productivity. To facilitate 

meeting these goals, the new president stated, “I request funding for NASA and a 

strong space program, an increase of almost $2.4 billion over the current fiscal year. 

We must have a manned Space Station; a vigorous safe Space Shuttle program; and 

more commercial development in space. The space program should always go ‘full 

throttle up.’ And that’s not just our ambition; it’s our destiny....” Despite his strong 

request for an expanded space program, Bush did not specifically declare himself in 

favor of human exploration beyond Earth orbit.17

A week after his state of the union address, Bush received a congratulatory letter 

from Republican Senator Jake Garn of Utah. In April 1985, Garn flew aboard the 

Space Shuttle Discovery as the first public official to travel in space. A former Navy 

pilot and Brigadier General in the Utah Air National Guard, he served as a payload 

specialist on STS 51-D. Garn, a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, 

applauded the president’s emphasis on federal investments in science and technology as crucial to the nation’s economic vitality and future. Garn wrote, “your words 

on science, space, and technology promise the aggressive and ambitious stance that 

your administration will take in pursuing these needed investments for American’s 

future.” Despite his praise of Bush’s leadership, he enunciated the misgivings of the 

space community resulting from the failure of the administration to move quickly 

in appointing a leadership team for the space program. He lauded the proposed creation of the National Space Council under the leadership of Vice President Quayle, 

but suggested that the organization’s “membership and staff must be selected and 

17 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 9 February 1989, Address on Administration 

Goals Before a Joint Session of Congress, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/ (accessed 18 May 2002.)
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Chapter 3: Bush, Quayle, and SEI

mobilized quickly to make a difference in the current budget cycle.” He concluded 

by saying that strong and decisive leadership was needed to counteract the power of 

entrenched political interests that resist new budgetary initiatives.18

A few weeks later, President Bush responded to Senator Garn’s call to action 

regarding the national space policy agenda. On 1 March, press secretary Marlin 

Fitzwater announced in a press release the appointment of “Dr. Mark Albrecht as 

the Director of the staff of the National Space Council which is to be created by 

Executive Order.” The administration’s first choice for the position, a State Department official with military space experience named Henry Cooper, had asked that 

his name be withdrawn after concerns were raised about his ties to former Senator 

John Tower.19 Although Albrecht brought a wealth of Washington experience to his 

post, he was not well known within the civilian space community. “Albrecht was a 

typical Hill rat, a squat, bearded infighter with a Ph.D. from the RAND Corporation who...knew next to nothing about NASA.”20 His background was entirely 

within the national security policy arena. For the previous six years, he had served 

as National Security Advisor to Senator Pete Wilson of California. Prior to that, he 

had worked on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as a Senior Research Analyst 

at the Central Intelligence Agency. In 1988, he was the chief drafter of the defense 

planks for the Republican Party platform—where he caught the attention of Vice 

President Bush. Dr. Albrecht’s background in the national security space program, 

with its preference for clean sheet planning processes and requirements-based program development, would be one of several factors that would eventually contribute 

to a dysfunctional relationship between the Space Council and NASA.

The appointment of a national security and weapons specialist heightened already 

existing concerns among the space community that White House policy would tilt 

toward military interests. John Pike from the Federation of American Scientists said, 

“I can’t see that Albrecht brings much to the table besides ‘Star Wars.’ I’m looking 

for a silver lining here and haven’t seen it yet.”21 Reaction on Capitol Hill was more 

18 Senator Jake Garn to President George Bush, 16 February 1989, Bush Presidential Records, 

George Bush Presidential Library.

19 Former Texas Sen. John Tower was tapped by President Bush to become defense secretary, but the 

nomination quickly ran into trouble as opponents questioned Tower’s business dealings with defense 

contractors. The confirmation hearings also brought Tower’s personal life squarely into the public eye, 

with some critics alleging he drank excessively. At one point, Tower pledged to quit drinking entirely if 

confirmed, but his appointment was rejected 53-47 by the Senate in March 1993.

20 Bryan Burrough, Dragonfly: NASA and the Crisis Aboard Mir (New York, NY: HarperCollins 

Publishers, 1998), p. 239.

21 Sharen Shaw Johnson, “Capital Line,” USA Today, sec. 6A,3 March 1989.

muted. Congressional staffer Stephen Kohashi remembers that those “...responsible 

for civilian space activities [weren’t] familiar with [Albrecht]. I [recall] learning that 

his space background was primarily in the military or intelligence world, and being 

somewhat concerned. [But] I don’t recall considering this appointment [to be] particularly critical relative to the effectiveness of the council.”22 Despite any potential 

misgivings from outside the administration, Albrecht clearly had the support of 

Vice President Quayle—whom he had periodically done work for as a Senate staffer. 

In his vice-presidential memoir Standing Firm, Quayle wrote that NASA at that 

time “was, to a great extent, still living off the glory it had earned in the 1960s, and 

I thought Mark Albrecht was just the sort of guy who could shake it up.” It also 

seemed that Democratic staffers would be willing to work with him. One top aide 

was quoted at the time as saying, “It’s not what Albrecht did before. It’s what he does 

in the future. The important thing is to make this work ... to formulate a policy 

consensus and get some pragmatic policy decisions out of the White House.”23 The 

selection of Albrecht, who would become one of the key policy entrepreneurs supporting human spaceflight beyond Earth orbit, was a major catalyst to assembling a 

dedicated staff committed to providing the space program with a new vision for the 

future. This path, however, would not be without obstacles. As one commentator 

pointed out, the biggest “challenge facing Albrecht...will be to negotiate peace and 

find common ground among the competing interests on the [Space Council].... 

Albrecht is very bright, very competent, but nothing can prepare you for that kind 

of work. It’s like war.”24 It would remain to be seen whether this civil space policy 

neophyte would be able to control the various elements of the space community, 

especially NASA.25

On 9 March, Administrator Fletcher sent a letter to President Bush that would 

prove to be an important stepping-stone on the road to the announcement of SEI. 

The letter addressed the forthcoming 20th anniversary of the first human landing 

on the moon. Fletcher wrote the president that the occasion provided a unique 

22 Stephan Kohashi interview via electronic mail, Washington, DC, 16 November 2004.

23 Kathy Sawyer, “Concern Rises Over Space Council’s Direction,” The Washington Post (9 March 

1989): A23. 

24 Eliot Marshall, “An Arbitrator for Space Policy,” Science (10 March 1989): p. 1283.

25 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, 1 March 1989, Bush Presidential 

Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Dwayne A. Day, “Doomed to Fail: The Birth and Death 

of the Space Exploration Initiative,” Spaceflight (March 1995): pp. 79-83; “National Space Council 

Director Named, Report Sent to Congress,” Aerospace Daily (3 March 1989); Sawyer, “Concern Rises 

Over Space Council’s Direction,” A23; Dan Quayle, Standing Firm: A Vice-Presidential Memoir (New 

York, NY: HarperCollins, 1994), p. 179.
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opportunity to define the administration’s commitment to the exploration of space. 

The administrator suggested that Bush’s participation in an event planned at the 

Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum (to be attended by Apollo 11 astronauts Neil Armstrong, Buzz Aldrin, and Michael Collins) would enhance the significance of the anniversary. Fletcher suggested that, “Taken by itself, an anniversary of 

this sort tends to focus on past glories and a nostalgia for days long gone. Coupled 

with a message of leadership and strong direction for the future, it becomes an integral part of the American space experience; it can reenergize the country by setting 

new challenges and new horizons in the historic context of earlier goals successfully met....” Having received this letter, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft 

wrote that the President “has made it clear that space policy and exploration would 

be a priority of his Administration. This would be a tangible demonstration of his 

commitment.” This letter from Fletcher got the White House thinking about the 

possibility of utilizing the anniversary, only four months away, as a platform for a 

major space policy speech.26

It was clear during the early months of the Bush administration that the president 

had not settled on Mars exploration as the penultimate goal of the American space 

program. On 16 March, while speaking at a Forum Club luncheon in Houston, he 

was asked to comment about his support for the Space Station and a human mission to Mars by the end to the century. Bush replied, “On the Space Station, I am 

strongly for it. We have taken the steps, budgetwise, to go forward on that. I have 

not reached a conclusion on whether the next major mission should be a manned 

mission to Mars... [W]e’re asking the [newly reconstituted] Space Council... to 

come forward with its recommendations. So, no decision is made [regarding] what 

happens beyond the Space Station itself, and I will make that decision when I get 

their recommendation.” Once again, the president cautioned that although his 

Administration had requested a budget increase for NASA, constrained resources 

meant that he was not ready to support the immediate adoption of a human mission 

to Mars. This statement indicated that just four months before announcing a major 

new space initiative, neither President Bush nor his senior space policy advisors had

committed to a costly new human spaceflight program.27/28

26 Letter, James C. Fletcher to President George Bush, 9 March 1989, Bush Presidential Records, 

George Bush Presidential Library; Memorandum, Joseph Hagin to Brent Scowcroft, 3 April 1989, 

Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

27 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 16 March 1989, Remarks at a Luncheon Hosted 

by the Forum Club in Houston, Texas, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/ (accessed 19 August 2003.)

28 Eight days later this theme was confirmed when the White House hosted the crew of STS-28, 

As the Bush administration was beginning to assemble its space policy team, the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think 

tank, released a report analyzing national space policy. Entitled A More Effective 

Civil Space Program, the study was significant because it had been co-chaired by 

Brent Scowcroft before his appointment as the new president’s national security 

advisor. The report suggested that while NASA’s charter was to help maintain American leadership in science and technology, it was far from clear whether the agency 

was meeting that objective in the post-Apollo era. CSIS indicated that a combination of factors, including a declining budget and a short-sited planning process, 

had held the space program back during the prior two decades—while the Soviets, 

Europeans, Japanese, and Chinese were all making significant strides in their space 

programs. The task force contended that to reverse this disturbing trend the civil 

space program should figure more prominently on the national agenda. To accomplish this goal, CSIS recommended that the Bush administration and Congress “set 

solar system exploration by means of automated and piloted spacecraft as a longterm national objective. This should include an important ‘Humans to Mars’ component, with deliberate and orderly preparation.” The report advocated a gradually 

planned buildup of key technologies and skills, rather than an accelerated program 

that overextended current capabilities. Finally, CSIS proposed establishing a twoyear study effort aimed at developing programmatic alternatives for implementing 

this long-term strategy. As Administrator Fletcher had done just weeks earlier, the 

report concluded that 20 July 1989 would be an auspicious date for announcing a 

new initiative because of its symbolic importance.29

By early spring, with momentum growing for a presidential announcement on 

the 20th anniversary of the Apollo 11 lunar landing, Mark Albrecht broached the 

idea of a new human spaceflight initiative with Vice President Dan Quayle. He 

argued that the adoption of a long-term goal would provide focus to a directionless 

space program and a means to prioritize and streamline existing programs, espewhich had successfully landed the shuttle Discovery the previous week at Edwards Air Force Base in 

California—the primary task of the mission had been the deployment of Tracking and Data Relay 

Satellite-4 (TDRS-4). In congratulating the crew, President Bush stated that “the story of Discovery

is as ... timeless as our history ... it says that to Americans—nothing lies beyond our reach.” In his 

brief remarks, the President reaffirmed his commitment to the shuttle program, space science, and 

construction of the Space Station Freedom. He did not, however, mention human exploration beyond 

Earth orbit as one of the goals of his administration. [Press Release, White House Office of the Press 

Secretary, 24 March 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.]

29 John H. McElroy and Brent Scowcroft, A More Effective Civil Space Program (Washington, DC: 

The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1989).
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cially the Space Station. Quayle liked the idea. Although he had not been heavily 

engaged in space policy during his political career, the new vice president would 

become the single most important space policy entrepreneur within the Bush White 

House. Born in 1947, James Danforth Quayle was the grandson of Eugene Pulliam, founder of an empire of conservative newspapers. Although he spent most 

of his childhood in Arizona, Quayle’s political roots were sowed in Indiana. After 

graduating from DePauw University and Indiana State University Law School in 

Indianapolis, he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives at the age of 29. 

Four years later, he became the youngest person ever elected to the U.S. Senate from 

Indiana. During his Senate tenure, Quayle focused his legislative work in the areas 

of national defense, arms control, and labor policy. In August 1988, George Bush 

tapped Dan Quayle to be his running mate. Although this selection was widely criticized because it was felt that Quayle did not have enough experience to be president 

should something happen to Bush, these opinions had little impact on the ultimate 

outcome of the election. As vice president, Quayle became the first Chairperson of 

the National Space Council, which had been statutorily re-established the previous 

year by Congress. Quayle embraced this assignment, telling the media, “for the first 

time in a long time there will be a space advocate in the White House—and that 

will be me.” Within a short period, Quayle came to believe that the Space Council’s 

primary objective was to fix a dysfunctional space agency. The vice president agreed 

with Mark Albrecht that the main rationale for adopting a new human spaceflight 

initiative was to restore NASA to prominence. His main concern, however, was 

achieving this renewal given the existing budgetary and political environment.30

Given his unease regarding the budgetary constraints, Quayle immediately 

scheduled a meeting with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director 

Richard Darman to discuss announcing a new initiative. In his memoirs, Quayle 

stated, “despite his image as a budget cruncher and arm-twister ... Dick Darman 

has his visionary side, and he was a cheerleader for a manned mission to Mars.” This 

became apparent at a meeting in early April attended by Quayle, Albrecht, Darman, 

and OMB Executive Associate Director Bob Grady. Darman was supportive, but 

cautioned that the current budget situation mandated that the administration could 

not serve up an Apollo-like crash program. As a result, three basic tenets emerged 

from this meeting. First, recognizing that there were interest groups in favor of 

both Moon and Mars exploration, President Bush would not come out in favor of 

one over the other. Second, any new initiative for human exploration of the Moon 

30 Mark Albrecht interview, tape recording, Arlington, VA, 3 July 2003; “Quayle Puts Damper 

on Manned Mars/Moon Mission Prospects,” Defense Daily, 5 April 1989, pp. 22-3; Quayle, Standing 

Firm, pp. 177-190.AQ4

and/or Mars would be a long-term commitment—so there would not be any huge 

budgetary impact. Finally, this program would be utilized as the central organizing principle for the entire civil space program—so that everything from the Space 

Station to space transportation to planetary programs would be structured around 

accomplishing this continuing objective.31

On 5 April, with Darman on board, Quayle raised the idea of announcing a 

robust exploration initiative with President Bush at their weekly lunch meeting. 

By the end of the discussion, the first of many on the topic that would occur over 

the coming months, President Bush gave the go-ahead to plan for a 20 July 1989 

announcement. Quayle wrote in Standing Firm that the president wanted to use the 

anniversary “to make a major address on the space program, a speech that didn’t just 

look back toward former glory but ahead to bold new achievement.” Furthermore, 

he viewed this as an opportunity to challenge the long-held belief that only Democratic presidents (e.g., Kennedy and Johnson) had visionary approaches to space. 

Finally, President Bush, who had been criticized for a lack of vision, viewed this as 

a chance to answer his detractors by putting the weight of the White House behind 

a bold human exploration program. The eventual placement of human exploration 

of Mars on the government agenda had its genesis in this meeting.32

Over the coming weeks, the White House began aggressively taking steps to 

finalize its core space policy team. The previous month, Administrator Fletcher 

had formally resigned as NASA Administrator. After receiving his resignation, the 

administration began working to fill the position. During this search, the name of a 

former astronaut rose to the top—Rear Admiral Richard Harrison Truly. Vice President Quayle wrote in his memoirs, “Dick Truly was a friend of [White House Chief 

of Staff John] Sununu and became his candidate; I didn’t have a good candidate of 

my own, and so I went along with Truly’s selection.”33 Truly joined NASA in 1969 

as an astronaut. Prior to that, he spent nearly a decade serving as a naval aviator, 

test pilot, and member of the USAF Manned Orbiting Laboratory program. After 

serving as CAPCOM for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) and Skylab missions, Truly served on one of the astronaut crews that conducted the Space Shuttle 

Enterprise approach and landing test flights. He made two flights into space, the 

first in November 1981 as the pilot of Space Shuttle Columbia and the second in 

31 Quayle, Standing Firm, pp. 177-190; Albrecht interview.

32 Ibid.; Frank J. Murray, “Putting Man on Mars May be Bush’s Goal”, Washington Times, 20 

July 1989, sec. A1; Howard McCurdy, The Decision to Send Humans Back to the Moon and on to Mars

(Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 1992), pp. 4-13; Quayle, Standing Firm, p. 181.

33 Quayle, Standing Firm, p. 181.
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August 1983 as commander of the Space Shuttle Challenger—which was the first 

night launch and landing during the shuttle program. After this mission, he left 

NASA for several years to head the newly formed Naval Space Command. In 1986, 

he returned to NASA as Associate Administrator for Space Flight—he was widely 

credited with guiding the shuttle program back to operational status after the 1986 

Challenger accident. Vice President Quayle wrote in Standing Firm, “as often happens in Washington, Truly got the job by default: he didn’t have the sort of negatives 

that might make news and sink the nomination.” Mark Albrecht recalled that the 

decision to make Truly administrator was made “rapidly, without a great deal of serious discussion or assessment.”34 Over the subsequent three years, this hasty selection 

of a true NASA insider and devoted “Shuttle Hugger” would come back to haunt 

an administration that needed somebody heading the space agency who shared the 

Space Council’s objectives. Although the White House thought it was completing a 

policy triumvirate (including Quayle and Albrecht) capable of transforming NASA, 

Truly saw his job as protecting the space agency from danger. As a result, it eventually became clear that he did not share the Space Council’s reform goals.35

On 12 April, President Bush officially introduced Admiral Truly as his nominee 

to head NASA at a ceremony in the White House Roosevelt Room—attended by 

key members of Congress. The president opened by saying, “this marks the first 

time in its distinguished history that NASA will be led by a hero of its own making, 

an astronaut who had been to space, a man who has uniquely experienced NASA’s 

tremendous teamwork and achievement.” Bush acknowledged that because Truly 

was still an active duty flag-rank officer with the Navy, he would have to attain 

a congressional waiver for his appointment—the National Aeronautics and Space 

Act (NAS Act) of 1958 prohibited military officers from heading the civilian space 

agency. The president then handed the podium over to the nominee, who thanked 

Bush for showing confidence in his ability to guide the space agency. In conclusion, 

Truly stated that he looked forward to working with Vice President Quayle and the 

National Space Council.36

The Washington Post and The New York Times ran articles the next day suggesting 

that news of Truly’s nomination was met with widespread approval on Capitol Hill. 

34 Albrecht interview.

35 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, 12 April 1989, Bush Presidential 

Records, Bush Presidential Library; Quayle, Standing Firm, p. 181; Albrecht interview; Kathy Sawyer, 

“Bush Taps Truly to Head NASA: Former Astronaut Popular on Hill,” The Washington Post (13 April 

1989).

36 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 20 January 1989, Remarks Announcing the 

Nomination of Richard Harrison Truly To Be Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/ (accessed 18 May 2002.)

The Post article explained that Truly had initially expressed doubts regarding the 

post, because he was concerned that it would necessitate the forfeiture of his military 

pension. Despite some congressional wariness related to placing a military officer 

in charge of NASA, it was reported that his military status was not expected to be a 

problem. The newspaper further reported that Democratic Congressman Norman 

Mineta of California, an opponent of military influence in the space agency, was 

nevertheless supporting the appointment due to Truly’s unmatched depth of experience. House appropriation committee staffer Richard Malow remembered thinking 

Truly was a good choice. “Dick Truly always came across as being very honest and 

he was an outstanding head of the Shuttle office.”37 Senate staffer Stephen Kohashi 

recalled feeling that Admiral Truly was a competent individual, with a significant 

technical background and a sincere excitement for the space program. “I...recall 

[feeling relieved] that somebody solid and steady was assuming the helm,” Kohashi 

said, “...although some [people], I suspect, would have preferred someone with 

a...more dynamic image.”38 The only true criticisms of Truly were that he was “too 

much the technocrat to be the combination of diplomat and salesman that his 

new job requires...[and that he is] no fan of developing commercial space enterprises.”39/40

37 Richard Malow interview via tape recording, Washington, DC, 25 October 2004.

38 Kohashi interview.

39 Kathy Sawyer, “Bush Taps Truly to Head NASA: Former Astronaut Popular on Hill,” The 

Washington Post, 13 April 1989; Warren E. Leary, “Bush Chooses Former Astronaut to Head NASA, 

in a First,” The New York Times, 13 April 1989.

40 On 23 June, the U.S. Senate confirmed the nomination of Admiral Truly. Along with the 

confirmation vote, the Senate passed S. 1180, legislation that would allow him to retain his status, rank, 

and grade as a retired military officer and guaranteeing his retirement benefits from his Navy service 

after he retired from civilian life. The bill also provided that Admiral Truly, as the NASA Administrator, 

shall be “subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other 

than would be operative...” if he were not a retired Navy officer. Six days later, OMB Director Darman 

sent a memorandum to President Bush recommending that the latter authorize the appointment of 

Admiral Truly and sign S. 1180—the next day James Cicconi of the Office of Personnel approved that 

recommendation and sent the bill to President Bush for his signature, which was affixed in the normal 

course of business before the deadline of 10 July 1989. [Memorandum, Richard Darman to President 

Bush, 29 June 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.]
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On 20 April, at a White House ceremony in the Old Executive Office President Bush signed an Executive Order establishing the National Space Council.41

He opened his formal remarks by telling the attendees that he was fulfilling the 

promise he had made the previous year to create the legislatively mandated council. 

With Vice President Quayle serving as Chair, Bush stated his belief that, “the Space 

Council will bring coherence and continuity and commitment to our efforts to 

explore, study, and develop space....” The president stated his belief that the space 

program was essential to sparking the American imagination, which inspired young 

people to enter the fields of science, math, and engineering—keys to ensuring the 

nation’s competitiveness in the future. He concluded by saying he was signing the 

executive order with “one objective in mind: to keep America first in space...it’s 

only a matter of time before the world salutes the first men and women on their 

way outward into the solar system. All of us want them to be Americans.”42,43 With 

41 On 15 March, the Office of the Vice President had submitted to OMB Director Richard Darman 

a proposed Executive Order for establishing the National Space Council. The draft executive order 

stated that the goal of the space council was to “provide a coordinated process for developing a national 

space program and for overseeing the implementation of national space policy and related activities....” 

The Vice President, who would act as the primary space policy advisor to the President, would chair the 

council. The remaining members of the body would be the: Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, 

Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Transportation, OMB Director, White House Chief of Staff, 

National Security Advisor, Director of Central Intelligence, and the NASA Administrator. Upon the 

request of the Vice President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Presidential Science 

Advisor, and heads of other executive departments and agencies could also be called upon to participate 

in meetings. The executive order also provided for the creation of the Vice President’s Space Policy 

Advisory Board. This committee would be composed of private citizens appointed to advise the Vice 

President on national space policy issues. Vice Presidential Counselor Diane Weinstein wrote Darman 

that “given the urgent need for the Council to begin exercising its critical responsibilities as soon as 

possible...[the] Vice President recommends that the President sign the enclosed proposed Executive 

Order establishing the National Space Council.” A week later, Darman received a memorandum from 

Bonnie Newman, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, concurring with the 

OMB Director’s recommendation to provide funding to the National Space Council under the auspices 

of Public Law 100-440, which provided budget resources to the Executive Office of the President for 

“Unanticipated Needs.” Darman forwarded the memorandum to President Bush recommending an 

allocation of $181,000, which would allow the Space Council to begin operations in fiscal year 1989. 

[Letter with an attached draft Executive Order, Diane Weinstein to Richard Darman, 15 March 1989, 

Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Memorandum, J. Bonnie Newman to 

Richard G. Darman, 22 March 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; 

Memorandum, Richard G. Darman to President George Bush, 23 March 1989, Bush Presidential 

Records, George Bush Presidential Library.]

42 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 21 April 1989, Remarks on Signing the Executive 

Order Establishing the National Space Council, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/ (accessed 18 May 

2002).

43 The actual executive order had been amended somewhat since its original submittal to OMB the 

previous month. There were two additions made to the full membership of the council—the Secretary 

the Space Council officially created and a core set of policy entrepreneurs in place, 

the administration was organized to begin a concerted effort aimed at shaping an 

initiative for human exploration beyond Earth orbit.44

The Policy Stream: The Ad Hoc Working Group

In the six weeks following the creation of the Space Council, as the administration was concentrating on other more pressing policy matters, no major actions 

were taken with regard to the future course of the space program. By the end of 

May, however, there was a flurry of activity to generate a policy initiative in preparation for the Apollo 11 anniversary. On 25 May, Mark Albrecht called Admiral Truly 

to ask whether NASA could return to the Moon by the end of the century—in 

preparation for a Mars mission early in the next century. Albrecht was stunned by 

Truly’s response. “His first reaction was ‘don’t do it.’ NASA cannot handle this.” The 

NASA Administrator was unsure whether this request was simply Albrecht playing 

‘what if’ games, or whether this was a serious proposition. As a result, he called Vice 

President Quayle, who confirmed that both he and President Bush wanted to know 

whether this was something NASA could accomplish. After consulting with Frank 

Martin, Director of NASA’s Office of Exploration, Truly concluded that there was 

of the Treasury and the President’s Science Advisor. The functions of the council were also fine tuned, 

and were listed in the final order as follows:

A. The Council shall advise and assist the President on national space policy and strategy...

B. The Council is directed to:

1. Review United States Government space policy, including long-range goals, and develop a 

strategy for national space activities;

2. Develop recommendations for the President on space policy and space-related issues;

3. Monitor and coordinate implementation of the objectives of the President’s national space 

policy by executive departments and agencies; and

4. Foster close coordination, cooperation, and technology and information exchange among the 

civil, national security, and commercial space sectors...

C. The creation and operation of the Council shall not interfere with existing lines of authority and 

responsibilities in the departments and agencies. 

The rest of the document was substantively the same as the draft order—including provisions 

detailing: the responsibilities of the chairman, the national space policy planning process, the 

establishment of the Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board, and the requirement to “submit an 

annual report setting forth its assessment of and recommendations for the space policy and strategy of 

the United States Government.” [Executive Order Establishing the National Space Council, 21 April 

1989, Bush Presidential Records, Bush Presidential Library.]

44 One could argue that Admiral Truly was not actually a committed policy entrepreneur for human 

spaceflight beyond Earth orbit, and that in fact he worked against the program. Regardless, he became 

one of the key players in the SEI process and was heavily involved in assembling the administration 

plan and trying to sell it on Capitol Hill. It seems that this qualifies him as a policy entrepreneur for 

the purposes of this manuscript.
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no way he could rebuff a presidential initiative. Albrecht recalled later “his initial 

impulse turned out to be quite revealing, because in the end, NASA couldn’t handle 

it.”45 What is equally revealing, however, is the fact that nobody at the White House 

reconsidered the wisdom of announcing a new initiative given the agency’s reluctance.

After this interaction, the Space Council staff concluded that it needed to get 

a better sense of the correct technical approach to get back to the Moon on a permanent basis and then on to Mars. To this end, Mark Albrecht set up a meeting 

for the end of the month with senior NASA leaders to discuss alternatives. On 31 

May, Truly and Martin met to discuss a potential initiative. A few years later Martin 

recalled the discussion:

The nature of that conversation ...was that going to the Moon [was] not 

the right answer. We have been to the Moon. If we are going to go to the 

Moon, we need to go back to stay. In the process of doing that, if you 

announce that you are going to go to the Moon and then go to Mars with 

humans, you had better be prepared to send robots along in the process.

Although he had signaled to Albrecht just days before that announcing any initiative at all was unwise, Admiral Truly was now supporting a much more aggressive 

(not to mention expensive) long-term exploration strategy. Later in the day, Truly, 

Martin, NASA Deputy Administrator J.R. Thompson, and former NASA Associate 

Deputy Administrator Philip Culbertson met with Albrecht to discuss proposals for 

a potential initiative. At this meeting, Truly told Albrecht that he “believed that the 

real program was Earth, Moon, and Mars as a total program strategy with both man 

and machines working together. It is that program that I think we need to proceed 

with.” Albrecht did not challenge the addition of Mars exploration to the initiative, 

even though his original inquiry had been limited to Moon exploration. By the end 

of the meeting, he had tasked NASA with preparing options and recommendations 

for a presidential decision to take advantage of the unique opportunity of July 20th 

and to achieve significant milestones by the end of the century.46 Albrecht did not 

specifically ask NASA to consider the fiscal repercussions of a Moon-Mars initiative, 

although Admiral Truly made it clear this was not going to be cheap.47

45 McCurdy, The Decision to Send Humans Back to the Moon and on to Mars, pp. 12-13; Albrecht 

interview; Frank Martin interview by Howard E. McCurdy, in The Decision to Send Humans Back to 

the Moon and on to Mars (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 1992).

46 Ibid.

47 Douglas O’Handley interview via electronic mail, Morgan Hill, CA, 22 November 2004.

With official direction from the White House, Admiral Truly moved quickly to 

establish a working group to pull together the alternatives for a Moon-Mars initiative. He immediately called NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Director Aaron 

Cohen and asked him to gather a group of experts to compile program concepts. 

Truly asked Cohen to keep this activity confidential in order to keep the space agency’s efforts a secret. From a technical and programmatic perspective, Dr. Cohen was 

an excellent choice to lead this policy alternative generation process. He had joined 

the space program in 1962, serving as program manager for Project Apollo’s Command and Service Module and the Space Shuttle Orbiter Project. Given his rich 

background with the human exploration program, Cohen was the logical choice 

to lead this effort. Furthermore, he was very enthusiastic about the initiative and 

believed it was a good thing for the entire country. He believed from the start, however, that considerable monetary resources would be required to successfully implement the program—not to mention a long-term commitment from the executive 

branch, the legislative branch, and the American public.48

Cohen assembled a small team that included Frank Martin, John Aaron, Mark 

Craig, Charles Darwin, Mike Duke, and Darrell Branscome—this became known 

as the Ad Hoc Working Group (AHWG).49 On 4 June, just six weeks before the 

president was to deliver his address, the AHWG assembled at Johnson Space Center. 

Mark Craig, Director of the Lunar and Mars Exploration Office at JSC, remembered that because “Admiral Truly wanted to keep this extremely secret, for obvious 

reasons...Aaron Cohen found a building in the back lot of JSC that ... was secure. 

So we set up headquarters back there. It already had computers in it. It was ready 

to move in. It was locked. So we basically set that up as our center of operations.” 

The goal of the team was to pour over the available information from the National 

Commission on Space, Ride Report, and Office of Exploration. Within two weeks, 

the AHWG was to develop a set of briefing charts that scoped out, in terms of cost 

and schedule, what would be required to return humans to the Moon by the year 

2000. Frank Martin recalled that there was no effort to make it cheap, although 

there was some discussion about the feasibility of the initiative in the current political environment. Admiral Truly actually expressed his opinion that it was more 

important to “Do it right. Make sure we can do this. Make sure we understand the 

scope and magnitude of this program.”50 This necessarily meant that the AHWG 

would not provide alternatives with different budget profiles, although Mark Albre48 Aaron Cohen interview via electronic mail, College Station, Texas, 9 December 2004.

49 Martin interview.

50 Ibid.
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cht had implicitly asked for multiple options. Instead, it would provide the Space 

Council with what it believed to be the right answer—regardless of cost. Although 

this didn’t cause considerable friction at this early point in the process, this agency 

approach would eventually lead to an increasingly bitter relationship with Vice President Quayle and the Space Council staff.

The AHWG split up its work to create a long-term exploration strategy—Mark 

Craig led the technical analysis, John Aaron led the cost analysis, Darrel Branscome 

led the future planning analysis, Charles Darwin led the space transportation analysis, and Mike Duke led the science analysis. The vast majority of the work was done 

under Mark Craig’s leadership, utilizing his staff within the Lunar and Mars Exploration Office. The AHWG met as a consulting body, working to shape the various 

inputs from these engineers into a briefing for the White House.51 There was some 

concern within the agency regarding the planning monopoly that had emerged. 

Douglas O’Handley, the Deputy Director of the Office of Exploration and a veteran 

of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in California, remembered that the AHWG 

was a closed group composed almost exclusively of engineers from JSC. There was 

no effort to involve other NASA centers in this initial planning process. The environment within the agency during this period lacked the collegiality that had been 

experienced under the leadership of the Office of Exploration as agency-wide reports 

like “Beyond Earth Boundaries” were being drafted. O’Handley recalled that as the 

AHWG developed its plans, the JSC team clearly wanted as little JPL involvement 

as was possible. He became increasingly concerned as the planning moved forward 

because he felt “there was clearly a naiveté about the impact of life sciences on the 

whole initiative. From my background, I was beginning to see holes in the fabric 

and things that JSC didn’t know much about falling to the side.”52

On 13 June, Mark Craig presented the AHWG program concept to Admiral 

Truly and Associate Administrator for Spaceflight Bill Lenoir at a secret meeting 

held in Washington, DC. The briefing, entitled “A Scenario for Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars,” proposed an approach that would start out with lunar 

activity and robotic missions—which would be precursors to Mars exploration. The 

AHWG approach required a sharp jump in the agency’s yearly appropriation, with 

stable annual investments for the life of the initiative. It was believed that after 

51 Frank Martin interview by Howard E. McCurdy, in The Decision to Send Humans Back to the 

Moon and on to Mars (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 1992); Mark Craig, interview by 

Howard E. McCurdy, in The Decision to Send Humans Back to the Moon and on to Mars (Washington, 

DC: NASA History Division, 1992).

52 O’Handley interview.

successfully establishing a lunar base and completing robotic precursor missions, 

a funding wedge would open providing the resources for Mars exploration.53 The 

plan called for three phases of lunar development: emplacement, consolidation, and 

utilization. During the emplacement phase, extending from 2000 to 2004, a lunar 

station consisting of a base camp and science outpost would be assembled to house 

a crew of four on six-month tours of duty. It was expected that this initial capability 

could be accomplished with only six Shuttle-Cargo (Shuttle-C)54 launches and a 

single crewed Shuttle launch. During the consolidation phase, extending from 2003 

to 2006, a constructible habitat would be added to the lunar base—raising the crew 

size to eight and lengthening tours of duty to one year. During the utilization phase, 

extending from 2006 to 2017, a lunar oxygen production capability would increase 

crew size to 12 and lengthen tours of duty to three years—providing the capacity for 

significant scientific work and certification of Mars exploration hardware. As astronauts constructed and prepared the lunar station to be operational, NASA would 

begin robotic precursor missions to the red planet. These missions would conduct 

high-resolution imaging of the planetary surface, long-range surface roving, and 

return samples to scientists on Earth. The AHWG believed that crewed missions to 

Mars could begin in the 2015 timeframe, with a crew of four reaching the planet 

(after a Venus flyby) for a 100-day nominal stay in the Mars system—50 days on 

the surface. The intent was that successive missions would reach the Martian system 

faster, with longer surface stays up to two years for crews of five.55

The AHWG scenario was founded on a number of fundamental ideas regarding 

available technologies and infrastructure. First, the entire approach was based upon 

the assumption that Space Station Freedom (SSF) would be utilized as the hub for 

assembly work to construct lunar and Martian transfer vehicles. This required that 

a Shuttle-C be developed, capable of launching 68 metric-ton payloads into Earth 

orbit. Second, the strategy would eventually require reusable lunar transfer vehicles 

(LTV) and lunar excursion vehicles (LEV)—capable of conducting five missions 

without major maintenance before mandatory replacement. The LTV would utilize 

aero-braking technology for return to SSF, and a lunar fuel production capability 

would be initiated for LEV return to lunar orbit. Third, Mars exploration spacecraft 

would depart from Earth orbit after being assembled by astronauts stationed at SSF. 

53 Ibid.; Mark Craig, “A Scenario For Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars,” presented to 

Admiral Richard Truly on 13 June 1989.

54 Shuttle-C was a 1980s proposal to use the Shuttle’s infrastructure to create a heavy launch vehicle. 

This vehicle would have used the Space Shuttle’s solid rocket boosters, external tank, and main engines. 

Instead of a crew-carrying orbiter, however, it would have used an expendable cargo carrier.

55 Craig, “A Scenario For Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars.”
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Fourth, production of liquid oxygen (LOX) on the lunar surface would be required 

to open a significant cost wedge for Mars exploration. Douglas O’Handley remembers that at this point the budget estimates for the entire program ranged from a 

low of $85 billion to a high of $365 billion. The $85 billion estimate included a 

lot of risk, while $365 billion incorporated significant redundancy to reduce risk. 

It was felt within the agency that “these costs, compared to the defense budget for 

one year, seemed reasonable for a 20 to 30 year endeavor.”56 Although Bill Lenoir 

raised concerns regarding the necessary acceleration of space station construction to 

meet the objectives of the AHWG plan, the briefing was generally well received. No 

one expressed trepidation regarding the adoption of a program that would require a 

significant increase in the NASA budget, at a time when the federal government was 

in the midst of a serious fiscal crisis. Likewise, senior agency leaders did not question 

the complex and costly three-phase AHWG approach.

Two days later, the AHWG presented its proposal to Mark Albrecht. Mark 

Craig, who had never met Albrecht before, remembered being impressed with him. 

“The meeting...opened up with a monologue on why this was important and the 

problems that civilian space had had and was having, and that this was a way to fix 

them. I thought he was right on the money, having come from [the Space Station 

program, which] was suffering from a lack of definition of a strategic horizon.” The 

briefing highlighted the AHWG approach, which was: lunar base, robotic exploration of Mars, and human exploration of Mars. It also included links to Mission 

to Planet Earth (MTPE), which Albrecht requested be removed from the briefing 

because he feared it would muddle the Moon-Mars focus. Later in the day, Admiral 

Truly, Frank Martin, Craig, and J.R. Thompson traveled across town to brief Vice 

President Quayle in his office in the Old Executive Office Building.57 Frank Martin 

recalled later that Admiral Truly introduced the briefing by stating that Mars was 

“the long-term goal. It wasn’t a program to go to Mars. It was a program to expand 

human presence [and] he talked about why it was important to do that.” After Truly’s introduction, Martin presented the primary elements of the AHWG approach. 

He was forthright with regard to the estimated cost of the exploration program, 

which had risen to $400 billion. This revised budget number was partially driven 

by an Administration request that crew safety be placed at 99.9999%, which meant 

that the probability of an accident occurring that resulted in a loss of crew was once 

every million flights. This high level of safety led to additional cost.58 The AHWG 

plan would require increasing the space agency’s budget by 10% annually until it 

56 O’Handley interview.

57 Ibid.

58 O’Handley interview.

reached $25 to $30 billion—doubling the current appropriation.59 Truly concluded 

the briefing by saying that NASA could not fulfill this mission without an increased 

budget that would provide the resources to hire essential personnel and construct 

new facilities. Frank Martin later remembered that:

[Quayle] was very interested. He was very friendly. He was wide-eyed and 

enthusiastic about it. He asked the kinds of questions you might expect to 

be asked from someone who is a non-technical type...the message I came 

away from that briefing at the White House [with] was the fact that for the 

first time in 20 years, somebody in the White House gave a damn about the 

Moon and Mars. That was what was very profound about it. He was willing 

to take the time and the effort to try to make something happen.

Overall, the NASA participants left the meeting with a very positive feeling that 

both Quayle and Albrecht would be willing to fight the necessary battles to make 

the exploration program work.60

The following day, Admiral Truly returned to the White House to meet with 

Chief of Staff John Sununu. Himself an engineer, Sununu moved through the briefing materials very quickly before signaling his support for the initiative. He told 

Truly that “investing in these kinds of things was good for the country and that 

he didn’t care who made the content of the program. It was the fact that they were 

doing it that was important.”61 He said that he would leave the details to NASA, 

but that it wasn’t feasible for the space agency to get a further 10% increase in the 

FY 1990 budget request. At the end of the meeting, Sununu made three requests. 

First, he wanted NASA to modify the program so that no money was required 

for the upcoming fiscal year. Second, he wanted the plan to be revised to present 

the President with options—not just lunar outpost, robotic Mars exploration, and 

Martian outpost. Many within NASA, most notably those outside JSC, thought 

that asking for additional alternatives “was absolutely the right thing to request.”62

Finally, before the President made his speech, Sununu wanted the benefit of having 

others outside NASA review the proposed exploration program.63

59 This budget estimate had been calculated by OMB cost analyst Norine Noonan, in consultation 

with NASA.

60 Martin interview; Craig interview.

61 Martin interview.

62 O’Handley interview.

63 Martin interview.
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Chapter 3: Bush, Quayle, and SEI

Over the course of several weeks, Truly, Martin, Craig, and Darrell Branscome 

worked to refine the NASA proposal. They developed three different options for 

President Bush to consider:

• Lunar Outpost, then to Mars (NASA’s recommended approach)

– First crewed lunar landing in 2001 (crew of four, 30-day surface stay)

– Expansion to 8 crew capacity by 2005

– Expansion to 12 crew capacity by 2009 (1-year surface stay)

– First crewed Martian landing in 2016

• Direct to Mars

– First crewed Martian landing in 2008 (crew of four, 30-day surface stay)

– Expansion to 8 crew capacity by 2014

– Expansion to 12 crew capacity by 2018 (180-day surface stay)

• Robots Only

Due to the fact they could not expect any funding in FY 1990, the agency slipped 

the deadlines one year—so the Moon landing would not occur until 2001. Interestingly, based on NASA’s analysis, the Direct to Mars option did not entail a significant cost reduction. This option would still require the NASA budget to increase to 

nearly $30 billion annually, with a peak of over $35 billion during the late 1990s. As 

one chart in the final briefing indicated, this would represent a larger federal investment (in real dollar terms) than Project Apollo and would raise the NASA share of 

the federal budget to 2.2%.64 The agency did not provide any human exploration 

options that had significantly cheaper cost profiles.

The Political Stream: Briefing Key Actors

The revision process continued until just before Independence Day, after which 

the White House had arranged briefings for outside interest groups. For three days 

starting on 5 July, the Administration undertook a series of briefings to explain the 

Civil Space Exploration Initiative to four groups from outside the administration. 

The first group, which the White House labeled “Space Advocates,” was composed 

of influential members of the space policy community not affiliated with a particular government agency or private sector company. This group included former 

Apollo 11 astronaut Mike Collins, Cal Tech professor Bruce Murray, former NASA 

Administrator Tom Paine, and President of the Planetary Society Louis Friedman. 

64 NASA, “Civil Space Exploration Initiative,” presented to Vice President Dan Quayle on 15 June 

1989.

The briefing, which was conducted in the Indian Treaty Room of the OEOB, was 

very well received. Mark Albrecht recalled that the group was “obviously excited 

about it, very enthusiastic.” Tom Paine, who had chaired the National Commission on Space, was extremely supportive and stated that this was exactly the kind of 

strategic direction that the American space program needed. There were universal 

strong positive statements; the only thing that the advocates questioned was the 

appropriate balance between Moon and Mars exploration. Both Mike Collins and 

Bruce Murray had previously come out in favor of a direct to Mars approach, so 

they were a little uncomfortable with NASA’s recommendation to start with a return 

to the Moon. The rest of the group was largely in favor of NASA’s strategy.65

The second group was composed of representatives from the science community. 

Frank Martin later remembered that this group was very supportive, “they were 

enthusiastic about it more than I would have imagined. They [agreed that] this is 

the right thing. And doing [the] Moon and then Mars is the right way to do it. It was 

pretty universal.”66 Surprisingly, no one from this group made a strong argument in 

favor of solely robotic exploration, perhaps sensing that Vice President Quayle was 

strongly in favor of the Moon-Mars approach. The third group was composed of 

chief executive officers from major U.S. corporations—many who were important 

NASA contractors. Mark Albrecht recalled that “industry was excited...but they 

were nervous about what [existing] programs could get cut to fund it. Anytime 

you hit the reset button in Washington, you find that everyone gets very nervous.” 

Mark Craig remembered this being the most disappointing of the meetings because 

the level of industry support was not as robust as had been anticipated. The general 

reaction was that if the government wanted to do this, and was willing to put up 

the funding, then industry would get on board.67 Douglas O’Handley recalled that 

the CEO’s were concerned that the U.S. did not have the technical manpower to 

carry SEI off, despite the fact the administration believed the initiative would promote science and engineering education.68 As a result, there were no impassioned 

speeches arguing that this was exactly the kind of bold long-term plan that the 

aerospace industry and national economy needed. Craig stated later, “I felt the Vice 

President was...knocked on his heels. He tried to elicit some kind of emotion and 

response from these people.”69

65 Ibid.; Craig interview; Albrecht interview.

66 Martin interview.

67 Craig interview.

68 O’Handley interview.

69 Ibid.
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Chapter 3: Bush, Quayle, and SEI

The final group, made up of key Congressional staffers, was by far the most 

dynamic. Mark Albrecht contends that during the Reagan administration the 

House “Appropriations Committee and the Appropriations staffers essentially ran 

the space program because NASA got no direction or interest out of the White 

House...the vacuum was filled by the appropriators.” As a result, this was by far the 

most skeptical group—they were doubtful about the White House taking a renewed 

interest in space policy making and were not convinced that selecting an expensive 

new initiative was the best approach for providing the space program with direction. Led by Richard Malow, this group was most concerned about the potential 

budgetary impact of such a large undertaking. Malow was the most powerful staffer 

on the House Appropriations Subcommittee that funded NASA. Senator William 

Proxmire of Wisconsin had recently called him the space agency’s ‘shadow administrator’ because he had so much influence over national space policy.70 Malow had 

been working on space policy issues since 1972, far longer than NASA’s senior leadership, and was well-known for pushing the space agency to emphasize affordable 

space science missions rather than expensive human exploration programs. In fact, 

a week earlier the Wall Street Journal had run a front-page article stating that while 

Malow “would love the U.S. to mount an expedition to the far side of the Moon 

and build a telescope there...such dreams are ‘moot’ because of the budget crunch. 

Instead...NASA [should] focus on more attainable goals.”71

At the White House briefing, Malow remembered his “...initial reaction was 

that maybe this is something that we ought to be doing, but I don’t think I jumped 

in and said ‘that’s the greatest idea in the world.’ And as I started to see the details 

of it, as they unfolded, I became concerned, especially given the budget situation.”72 The reactions of other staffers were much more animated. For example, 

Stephen Kohashi, an aide to Senator Jake Garn, asked the briefers, “have you lost 

your mind?”73 Kohashi said later, “politics is the art of the possible, and so it is with 

budgetary politics. I recall being incredulous at the magnitude of the price tag [for] 

the proposed program...and feared that it would have no credibility or viability 

on Capitol Hill.”74 In the end, no real champions emerged on the Congressional 

side. Instead, the meeting served to generate “a certain tension...between the Space 

70 Bob Davis, “Quiet Clout: How a House Staffer Wields Great Power Over Policy Decisions,” The 

Wall Street Journal (30 June 1989), p. 1.

71 Ibid.

72 Malow interview.

73 Martin interview.

74 Kohashi interview.

Council staff and the staffs of the various committees on the Hill.”75 Malow recalled 

that one reason for this rising animus was the failure of the administration to consult with Congressional leaders as it was formulating a plan for the new human 

exploration program. Malow stated that such discussions would have led to “warnings about the overall budget situation, which is what we were concerned about. 

We may have tried to convince them that they needed to think it through a little 

bit more.”76 Despite this unenthusiastic response from the Congressional staffers, 

who would ultimately have a great deal of influence regarding the actual adoption 

and implementation of SEI, the White House marched forward with its plans to 

announce the initiative.

 Starting on 13 July, just a week before the president’s planned speech, Vice 

President Quayle and Admiral Truly began meeting with key members of Congress. 

These meetings were intended primarily to acquaint the legislators with the initiative before the President announced it nationally. That morning, the two briefed a 

group of Representatives and Senators with responsibility for space policy at a breakfast meeting. As with the Congressional staffers, the reactions were not wholly positive. In particular, House Appropriation Committee Chair Bob Traxler of Michigan 

wondered where the Administration was “coming from, we can’t afford this...we’ve 

got other things on our plate, outside NASA.”77 A few days later, Quayle and Truly 

went to Capitol Hill to personally brief Senator Barbara Mikulski of Maryland, 

Chair of the Appropriations Subcommittee overseeing NASA’s budget—who had 

been unable to attend the breakfast meeting. Frank Martin remembered later, “she 

was very supportive. She said “the budgets are going to be tight [but] I am glad 

the Administration is finally taking an interest in space.” One final briefing was 

given to Senator Ernest Hollings of South Carolina, chair of Commerce, Science 

& Technology committee—once again, the White House received support for the 

program.78 Regardless of the general support that the administration received from 

Mikulski and Hollings, the clear skepticism of Traxler was more important. As chair 

of the House appropriations committee, he would have enormous influence over 

the actual adoption of this program. Therefore, even before it was announced, SEI 

faced a huge uphill battle to gain backing from Congress. As Malow indicated, this 

was at least partially because the White House did not consult with Capitol Hill 

during the formulation of the new plan. More important, however, was the fact that 

there were no great supporters for implementing an expensive new program given 

the fiscal crisis facing the nation.

75 Martin interview.

76 Malow interview.

77 Ibid.

78 Martin interview.
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Chapter 3: Bush, Quayle, and SEI

Joining the Streams:

Human Exploration of Mars Reaches the Government Agenda

As these events were unfolding in Washington, President Bush was in Europe 

on a 10-day trip that included an address before the Polish National Assembly, a 

meeting with Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, a meeting with Hungarian leaders, and 

attendance at a G-7 summit in France. While he was away, Bush had essentially 

delegated decision-making responsibility for the exploration initiative to Vice President Quayle. Over the course of the previous month, Bush had discussed the development of the exploration initiative with Quayle at several of their weekly lunch 

meetings, but the president had essentially let his vice president make all the critical 

decisions with regard to the strategic plan. One important facet of their discussions 

was whether the Administration should set a target date of 2010 for completion of a 

Moon base and 2020 for an expedition to Mars. Although this debate continued up 

until the last moment, the two ultimately decided against specific deadlines because 

they feared it would adversely impact future budget deliberations. By early July, the 

President had fully committed to the program.79

On 14 July, Quayle chaired a meeting of the full Space Council to discuss the 

forthcoming announcement of the exploration initiative. Mark Albrecht recalled 

that “everyone lined up, thought it was a great idea and made a recommendation 

to the President that he go ahead and do this.” Thus, when Bush arrived back in 

Washington two days before the speech, everything was already in place for him to 

announce the new plan.80 Vice President Quayle wrote in his memoirs that if the 

agenda setting process for SEI sounded like a “...somewhat ad hoc, improvisational 

way to think about going to Mars, you’re right. But what was important right then 

was to think big, to put a bit of ‘the vision thing’ back into the program, to get 

people excited about it once again, even if that meant getting ahead of ourselves.” 

Quayle believed the only thing that would enliven the American people was a restoration of wonder in the idea of sending people to explore space, not just orbit 

around the Earth.81

Before the new initiative was officially announced, the 17 July 1989 edition of 

Aviation Week and Space Technology (AW&ST) broke the story that a secret White 

House review was considering a human lunar base and Mars initiative. The article 

opened by stating, “A sharp debate has been sparked within the Bush Administra79 Albrecht interview; Karen Hosler, “Bush Unveils Moon, Mars Plans But Withholds Specifics,” 

The Baltimore Sun, 21 July 1989.

80 Ibid.

81 Quayle, Standing Firm, pp. 177-190.

tion and Congress by Vice President Dan Quayle’s proposal that President Bush 

commit the U.S. this week to developing a manned lunar base as a stepping-stone to 

a manned flight to Mars. Under the proposal, the U.S. could build a lunar outpost 

by 2000-2010 and use the experience gained on the moon to develop that capability 

to mount a manned Mars mission by 2020.” The magazine reported that Quayle 

had been formulating the initiative in secret meetings with a group of NASA officials, Mark Albrecht, and White House Chief of Staff John Sununu. Administration 

officials were quoted as saying that President Bush would not make a Kennedy-style 

call for reaching Mars within a specific timeframe, instead endorsing “the lunar base 

and manned Mars concepts as overall 21st century goals [and deferring] specific 

program and budget decisions on these goals until NASA completes a more intensive assessment of the mission options.” The magazine reported that NASA’s budget 

would have to double within a decade to pay for the initiative. This was at the same 

time that the House Appropriations Committee was planning on cutting NASA’s FY 

1990 appropriation by more than $1 billion, including a 50% decrease in funding 

for technologies key to Mars exploration. While Vice President Quayle recognized 

that the federal government faced serious budgetary limitations, he was quoted as 

saying that “when we have tight budgets, there will be winners and losers, but I am 

convinced a winner will be space.” Craig Covault of AW&ST reported that NASA 

leaders saw a presidential endorsement as an opportunity to seek increased funding 

and begin serious mission planning. Overall, the article was uncannily accurate and 

set the stage for President Bush’s upcoming address.82

On Thursday, 20 July 1989, with the decision in favor of an aggressive program 

for human exploration of the Moon and Mars made, President Bush prepared to 

announce the initiative at the anniversary celebration of Apollo 11’s landing on 

the Moon twenty years earlier. At shortly before 10:00 a.m., President and Mrs. 

Bush, accompanied by Vice President and Mrs. Quayle, departed the White House 

for the short drive across the National Mall to the Smithsonian’s National Air and 

Space Museum. Upon their arrival at the museum, the group was escorted to the 

Lunar Module display, where they were greeted by Admiral Truly, Neil Armstrong, 

Michael Collins, Buzz Aldrin, and Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution Robert 

Adams. After a quick photo opportunity attended only by invited pool photographers, President Bush and his growing entourage were escorted to the museum’s 

front steps, where after a brief hold he was ushered on stage with an obligatory 

rendition of “Hail to the Chief.”

82 Craig Covault, “Manned Lunar Base, Mars Initiative Raised in Secret White House Review,” 

Aviation Week & Space Technology (17 July 1989), pp. 24-26; Michael Mecham, “House Panel Proposes 

$1-Billion Cut for NASA,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (17 July 1989), p. 26.
70

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Chapter 3: Bush, Quayle, and SEI

The first order of business for the event was the unveiling of an Apollo 11 postage stamp by Postmaster General Anthony Franks. The $2.40 stamp depicted Neil 

Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin raising the American flag on the plains of the Sea of 

Tranquility. After brief remarks by Truly, Armstrong, Collins, and Aldrin, Vice 

President Quayle introduced George Bush. President Bush opened his remarks by 

saluting “three of the greatest heroes of this or any other century: the crew of Apollo 

11.” Bush used the first several minutes of his address remembering the remarkable 

accomplishment of that first human landing on the lunar surface. He recounted 

his family’s personal recollections of the landing—his children spread throughout 

North America, each listened in their own way. “Within one lifetime,” the president stated, “the human race traveled from the dunes of Kitty Hawk to the dust of 

another world. Apollo is a monument to our nation’s unparalleled ability to respond 

swiftly and successfully to a clearly stated challenge and to America’s willingness 

to take great risks for great rewards. We had a challenge. We set a goal. And we 

achieved it.”

Celebrating such an important legacy, Bush asserted, was an appropriate time 

to look to the future of the American space program. He proclaimed the inevitability of human exploration and permanent settlement of the solar system in the 

21st century, in the process confirming the United States’s place as the preeminent 

space faring nation on Earth. Based on this rhetorical foundation, Bush unveiled his 

vision for this future exploration and settlement. “In 1961 it took a crisis—the space 

race—to speed things up. Today we don’t have a crisis; we have an opportunity. To 

seize this opportunity, I’m not proposing a 10-year plan like Apollo; I’m proposing 

a long-range, continuing commitment. First, for the coming decade, for the 1990s: 

Space Station Freedom, our critical next step in all our space endeavors. And next, 

for the new century: back to the Moon; back to the future. And this time, back to 

stay. And then a journey into tomorrow, a journey to another planet: a manned mission to Mars.” The President stated these missions would follow one another in a 

logical progression, creating a pathway to the stars. He made clear that while setting 

the nation on this visionary course, the primary focus of his Administration would 

be the completion of Space Station Freedom—a crucial stepping stone for missions 

beyond Earth orbit.

President Bush, Vice President Quayle, and the Apollo 11 crew (NASA Image 89-H-382)

President Bush and Postmaster General Anthony Frank unveil Apollo 11 commemorative 

stamp (NASA Image 89-HC-394)
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Chapter 3: Bush, Quayle, and SEI

President Bush announced that he was tasking Vice President Quayle to “lead 

the National Space Council in determining specifically what’s needed for the next 

round of exploration: the necessary money, manpower, and materials; the feasibility 

of international cooperation; and develop realistic timetables—milestones—along 

the way.” He requested that the Space Council report its findings to him as soon as 

possible, with concrete recommendations regarding the proper course to the Moon, 

Mars, and beyond. As his remarks wound down, Bush explained the one rationale 

for the grand initiative by alluding to the Apollo 1 fire and the Challenger accident, 

stating, “there are many reasons to explore the universe, but ten very special reasons 

why America must never stop seeking distant frontiers; the ten courageous astronauts who made the ultimate sacrifice to further the cause of space exploration. 

They have taken their place in the heavens so that America can take its place in the 

stars. Like them, and like Columbus, we dream of distant shores we’ve not yet seen. 

Why the Moon? Why Mars? Because it is humanity’s destiny to strive, to seek, to 

find. And because it is America’s destiny to lead.” The President opined that humans 

would ultimately reach out to the stars and to new worlds. While he believed that 

this would not happen in his lifetime or that of his children, making this dream a 

reality for future generations must begin with a commitment by his generation. He 

concluded that “we cannot take the next giant leap for mankind tomorrow unless 

we take a single step today.”83

83 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 20 July 1989, Remarks on the 20th Anniversary 

of the Apollo 11 Moon Landing; http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/ (accessed 18 May 2002.)

Shortly after President Bush finished his remarks, Admiral Truly was introduced 

by Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater in the White House Briefing Room to answer 

questions regarding the President’s speech. Truly’s answer to the very first question 

of the press conference was surprising, considering he had been intimately involved 

with the decision-making process for SEI. Asked if there was a proposed date for 

the first human landing on the red planet, he replied, “no...I just, frankly, learned 

this morning what [President Bush’s] direction was.”84 Following this rocky start, 

Truly stumbled through a series of questions regarding the specifics of the plan and 

the political practicality of obtaining Congressional support for such an ambitious 

undertaking. Asked whether the potential budget for the Moon-base portion of 

the President’s plan would top $100 billion, he replied somewhat lamely that it 

would be affordable over the long-term. When pressed on the probable cost of the 

endeavor, Truly admitted that “we don’t have any detailed NASA figures. We have, 

obviously, in the last several weeks, looked in gross terms at what it would cost, 

84 Press Briefing, Admiral Richard H. Truly, 20 July 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush 

Presidential Library.

President Bush signs Space Exploration Day proclamation (NASA Image 89-HC-402).

President Bush announces SEI on steps of National Air and Space Museum

(NASA Image 89-H-380).
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Chapter 3: Bush, Quayle, and SEI

but there was no specific timetable and I have not presented the President with a 

specific and detailed list of budgetary requirements.”85 The press conference continued along this shaky path with a question regarding the timetable for announcing a specific plan and budget for the initiative. Truly was once again unable (or 

unwilling) to provide a specific answer to this question, vaguely answering that it 

would take a number of months. He rallied in the end with his answer to a question 

regarding the necessity to bring in foreign partners, stating, “I think we can afford 

to go it alone, although I think that’s probably in the long run not what’s going to 

happen. The world has changed since the 1960s in space. It’s premature...to know 

where we’re heading, but I would think [SEI will] have an international flavor.”86 In 

retrospect, what is most striking about this press briefing was the lack of specifics 

regarding the Administration’s plans to gain Congressional approval for SEI. Rapid 

decision- making was required to formulate the initiative in time to announce it on 

the Apollo 11 anniversary. Consequently, the White House did not have the time 

to formulate a strategy for winning support on Capitol Hill. Likewise, the Space 

Council had not drafted a top-level policy directive to guide administration activities aimed at further defining the initiative. In the coming months, these shortcomings would derail SEI.

As Admiral Truly’s briefing was ongoing in the pressroom, guests began assembling on the White House South Lawn for a celebration of Apollo 11’s landing on 

the Moon. With picnic tables spread throughout the center of the lawn and a U.S. 

Navy band playing in the background, the guests sat down to partake of a lunch 

that included barbecue pork ribs, barbecue chicken, potato salad, and deep dish 

apple Betty with ice cream. Among the 300 distinguished attendees were 23 Apollo 

astronauts, 26 key members of Congress, and dozens of NASA officials. President 

and Mrs. Bush arrived at noon and were seated at a table near the bandshell with a 

group of special guests.87

After lunch, President Bush walked to the stage to deliver some brief remarks 

to the gathered celebrants. He warmed the crowd up with a little astronaut humor, 

joking that planning the barbecue was hectic because he was unsure whether they 

preferred their food grilled or in a tube. He continued to say that “as you might 

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

87 Residence Event Task Sheet, Barbecue to Commemorate the 20th Anniversary of the Landing on 

the Moon, 7 July 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Menu, Barbecue 

Lunch: 20th Anniversary of the First Moon Walk, 20 July 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George 

Bush Presidential Library.

expect from a former Navy pilot who lived much of his adult life in Houston, I, 

too, am a longtime supporter of the space program.” As an example of this support, 

he pointed to the fact that the single largest percentage increase for any agency in 

his Administration’s first budget proposal was for NASA. He told those assembled, 

“My commitment today to forge ahead with a sustained, manned exploration program, mission by mission—the space station, the Moon, Mars, and beyond—is a 

continuing commitment to ask new questions, to seek new answers, both in the 

heavens and on Earth. James Michener was right when he told Congress: ‘There are 

moments in history when challenges occur of such a compelling nature that to miss 

them is to miss the whole meaning of an epoch. Space is such a challenge,’ he said. 

Well, today’s announcement is our recognition that the challenge was not merely 

one that belonged in the sixties; it’s one that will occupy Americans for generations 

to come ... the American people, I’m convinced, want us back in space—and this 

time, back in space to stay.” Bush concluded by stating that he looked forward to 

the day when a future president addressed, in similar fashion, the first Americans to 

walk on Mars, “now only children, perhaps your children.”88

88 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 20 July 1989, Remarks at a White House 

Barbecue on the 20th Anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon Landing; http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/ 

(accessed 6 June 2002.)

White House picnic celebrating Apollo 11 anniversary (NASA Image 89-H-396).

“We are going to return to the Moon and journey to Mars because 

we must, because the United States needs to challenge itself in order 

to be ready for the new world of the 21st century, now just over ten 

years away.”

NASA Administrator Richard Truly, 26 October 1989

4

77

The 90-Day Study

The public reaction to President Bush’s announcement of SEI was swift, and not 

altogether positive. The following day, the headline on the front page of The New 

York Times read, “President Calls for Mars Mission and a Moon Base: Critics Cite 

High Costs—Bush Offers No Timetable or Budget for Plan, Leaving That to Space 

Council.” The article stated the speech set the stage for “the first full-scale debate 

in years on the nation’s troubled space program.” The piece cited expert opinions 

predicting the initiative would cost at least $100 billion, and could rise to as much 

as $400 billion.1

 The reaction from the Democrat-controlled Congress was largely 

critical. Senator Al Gore of Tennessee, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Space, 

Science, and Technology, stated that “by proposing a return to the Moon and a 

manned base on Mars, with no money, no timetable, and no plan, President Bush 

offers the country not a challenge to inspire us, but a daydream.” His fellow senator 

from Tennessee, James Sasser, concurred, stating “the President took one giant leap 

for starry-eyed political rhetoric, and not even a small step for fiscal responsibility. 

The hard fact is this administration doesn’t even have its space priorities established 

for next year, much less for the next century. We have numerous space and science1

 Bernard Weinraub, “President Call for Mars Mission and a Moon Base,” The New York Times, 21 

July 1989, sec. A1.
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Chapter 4: The 90-Day Study

related programs already on the table, all of them worthy, all of them high-ticket 

and all of them competing for scarce dollars.”2 House Budget Committee Chairman Leon Panetta was quoted saying, “The budget deficit is stealing the resources 

we need to...resume our nation’s mission in space. When this President is ready 

to recognize that we can’t do all he would like to do even on this planet without 

new revenues, then perhaps we can talk about Mars.”3

 Even fellow Republicans 

were wary. Representative Bill Green of New York, the ranking minority member 

on the subcommittee with oversight of the NASA budget, stated that “given the 

federal budget deficit and earthly demands, I don’t see how we can afford expensive 

manned programs in space in the near future.”4

The Baltimore Sun captured the mood very well, writing that the announcement 

of a human mission to Mars “was tempered by the financial worries that took much 

of the thrill out of America’s romance with outer space after the historic flight of 

Apollo 11.”5

 For this very reason, the American public was not terribly supportive of 

the new initiative. A Gallup Poll released shortly after the announcement suggested 

that only 27% of Americans believed space spending should be increased, and only 

51% thought being the first nation to land a human on Mars was a meaningful 

goal.6

 Not surprisingly, The Wall Street Journal reported support from the aerospace 

industry for SEI, although many executives believed a strong lobbying effort would 

be required to get Congressional approval for the expensive undertaking. In a prepared response, Martin Marietta Chairman Norman Augustine stated, “we applaud 

the president’s call for renewed vigor in pursuit of the space frontier and the many 

benefits it implies.” Despite similar supportive statements flowing from other aerospace giants, there remained a sense of pessimism within most corners of the industry—the result of looming questions regarding the source of the billions of dollars 

needed to carry out the ambitious plan. “It’s not the same clarion call that President 

Kennedy gave when he set a moon-landing [goal],” said aerospace analyst Wolfgang 

Demisch.7

2

 Ibid.

3

 David C. Morrison, “To Shoot the Moon, and Mars Beyond,” Government Executive (September 

1989), pp. 12-22.

4

 Weinraub, “President Call for Mars Mission and a Moon Base.”

5

 Ibid.; Karen Hosler, “Bush Unveils Moon, Mars Plans But Withholds Specifics,” The Baltimore 

Sun, 21 July 1989.

6

 Morrison, “To Shoot the Moon, and Mars Beyond.”

7

 Roy Harris Jr., “Firms Rejoice Over Reborn U.S. Space Program,” The Wall Street Journal, 24 

July 1989.

There were somewhat diverse opinions regarding President Bush’s speech 

amongst NASA’s senior leaders. On one hand, many were impressed that Bush was 

able to depart from the written text during his speech, which they felt proved that 

Vice President Quayle really understood NASA’s plan and had effectively briefed the 

president. Douglas O’Handley recalls that this was probably the most positive thing 

ever said about Quayle by NASA officials.8

 On the other hand, some agency officials 

believed the address laid the foundation for a ruinous relationship between the Space 

Council and NASA. Aaron Cohen felt this was the case because neither organization was paying attention to what the other was saying. Top NASA leaders thought 

the speech was a Kennedyesque declaration calling for a large-scale national effort 

to build a lunar base and send humans to Mars. Quayle and Albrecht, in contrast, 

wanted to introduce a new way of doing business within the space program—one 

that involved smaller budgets and more aggressive technology development (which 

they believed would lead to large cost efficiencies). Cohen recalled, “the day that 

the initiative was announced was a day of great elation [at NASA]. It took everyone 

back to the days of Apollo.”9

 For a White House that wanted to change the Apollo 

paradigm, this was not the desired reaction from the space agency.

After the euphoria of the announcement died down, Douglas O’Handley argues 

“Frank Martin and Admiral Truly realized that they needed to back up the skeletal AHWG studies.”10 This effort would include validating data that had been 

presented to the Space Council and assessing the technology readiness levels for 

the equipment needed to carry out the initiative—this review became known as 

the 90-Day Study. Mark Albrecht remembered later that NASA “stepped forward 

and almost demanded to lead this effort, which indicated the beginnings of a little 

friction” between the space agency and the Space Council staff. From the NASA 

perspective, however, the study was initiated because President Bush’s speech had 

provided the agency with a charter to develop a plan for a lunar base and human 

mission to Mars. There was a fundamental belief among senior leaders at the agency 

that this was exactly what the Space Council wanted. In fact, some of Albrecht’s 

public statements at the time seemed to indicate this was the case. He was quoted 

in Government Executive magazine saying that now that a national space policy goal 

had been set, the council would “leave it to the departments and agencies to decide 

how they’re going to achieve that. Once they’ve made that determination, we’ll 

review that to see whether or not it comports with national policy, or whether it’s 

8

 O’Handley interview.

9

 Cohen interview.

10 O’Handley interview.
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realistic or plausible. But in terms of getting into their programs and plans for the 

purposes of ‘We know a better way,’ that’s just not what we’re here to do.”11 Later in 

the process, however, the White House had changed its tune, and both Albrecht and 

Vice President Quayle were arguing that they never wanted NASA to conduct the 

90-Day Study. Aaron Cohen argues this problem arose because the Council didn’t 

have its own ideas regarding how to start the process. Although it had announced 

the initiative, the administration didn’t have a good sense regarding how to proceed 

after the speech. He contends this was the main reason problems emerged between 

the two organizations.12

In the end, Albrecht asked NASA to provide “a variety of different approaches ... 

we want a variety of time frames, we want a variety of cost profiles, we want a variety 

of technologies, so the President can choose among different options rather than 

being told ‘this is how to do it.’”13 This was not the method, however, that Admiral Truly favored. The Administrator simply wanted to pull together the wealth 

of data that had been generated during the preceding five years and draft a report 

that would be ready within three months.14 Over the coming months, Truly was 

warned during two meetings of the full Space Council that his plan “was not the 

approach most members wanted to pursue.”15 The Council members wanted NASA 

to develop options based on innovative new technologies that could potentially 

offer reduced long-term costs.16 Admiral Truly essentially disregarded this direction 

from the Council. At the same time, by allowing the space agency to pursue its own 

course, the Council in effect delegated the authority granted to it by President Bush 

to conduct a review of options for implementing SEI.

A week after President Bush’s speech, Admiral Truly assigned Aaron Cohen to 

lead an agency-wide effort to fashion a plan for establishing a lunar base and exploring Mars, drawing upon existing NASA planning documents. During the remainder of the year, the space agency never wavered from this approach.17 Although 

he was asked to examine both technical and management issues, Cohen chose to 

11 Morrison, “To Shoot the Moon, and Mars Beyond.”

12 Albrecht interview; Cohen interview.

13 Albrecht interview.

14 Martin interview.

15 James Fisher and Andrew Lawler, “NASA, Space Council Split Over Moon-Mars Report,” Space 

News (11 December 1989), p. 10.

16 Ibid.

17 Press Release 89-126, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 27 July 1989, Bush 

Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

ignore questions regarding changes in NASA’s management culture. Some believed 

this decision was fueled by his view that the new initiative was laying out another 

Apollo program—in essence, a reinstitution of Kennedy’s mandate.”18 As a result, 

there was no need to change the management culture that had successfully landed 

humans on the Moon. The only task was to define an aggressive program to 

meet President Bush’s new mandate. In his book Dragonfly: NASA and the Crisis 

Aboard Mir, author Bryan Burrough detailed a revealing conversation between 

Albrecht and Cohen after the latter had been named to lead the 90-Day Study:

“Most of all we want alternatives, plenty of alternatives,” Albrecht told 

Cohen.

“What do you mean, alternatives?” Cohen asked. From the blank look on 

the JSC director’s face, Albrecht could tell he wasn’t getting through.

“Alternatives,” Albrecht repeated. “I mean, there has to be more than one 

way to do this. Give us a Cadillac option, then give us the El Cheapo alternative, with the incumbent risks. Talk about all the different technologies 

that could be learned.”19

Albrecht believed this interaction, and NASA’s reaction over the coming months, was 

the beginning of a never healed rift between the Space Council staff and NASA.20

Cohen later recalled the conversation differently. Although he remembered Albrecht asking for several options, he has no recollection of being asked to provide 

alternatives with significantly different cost profiles. Without this direction, mission 

planners at JSC felt the only course of action was to develop a program plan based 

on the President’s speech.21

Frank Martin believed the cause of this burgeoning conflict was the differing 

approaches of the two organizations. The Space Council staff, with backgrounds 

largely in the national security space sector, wanted NASA to develop alternatives 

starting “with a clean sheet of paper.” The JSC view was that it would be a shame not 

to take advantage of the research that had been conducted during recent years. In 

18 Wendell Mendell interview via electronic-mail, 15 September 2003.

19 Bryan Burrough, Dragonfly: NASA and the Crisis Aboard Mir (New York, NY: HarperCollins 

Publishers, 1998), p. 240.

20 Albrecht interview.

21 Cohen interview.
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fact, Mark Craig remembered later that “there were never any debates about using a 

‘clean sheet.’ Our goal was to find the best approach to meet a set of requirements, 

not to just find something new for its own sake.”22 In the end, NASA employed the 

JSC methodology and began developing an SEI strategy that was highly dependent 

on past studies and didn’t consider multiple alternatives with different budgetary 

requirements.23 Douglas O’Handley contends, “this is where the initiative fell apart, 

when it was taken over by the Johnson Space Center.”24

Waiting for NASA

By late August, the White House was getting gradually more worried about the 

progress NASA was making on the 90-Day Study. Mark Albrecht was concerned 

with the weekly status reports he was receiving from the Technical Study Group 

(TSG), which was the JSC-led team tasked with carrying out the study. “We didn’t 

like the reaction we got from NASA,” he remembered. “It had an ‘uh oh’ quality to 

it. NASA reports seemed to be full of lofty verbiage but few technical outlines or 

alternatives for what a lunar base and a Mars mission would actually look like.”25

Throughout this period, Albrecht kept emphasizing that the President wanted to 

see a lot of technical and budgetary options. Based on the space agency’s responses, 

however, the council staff was beginning to get the strong feeling that it wasn’t 

going to get any alternatives. Although Congress wasn’t heavily engaged during this 

period, there was rising concern because of the increasingly frayed Space CouncilNASA relationship. The feeling on Capitol Hill was that this strain was caused 

largely because NASA was “running their own plan, which wasn’t the same as the 

White House’s plan.”26

As time went on, these stressed relations escalated into an all out war between the 

TSG and the Space Council. NASA’s Douglas O’Handley had actually made a few 

friends among the Space Council staff, and they were pleading with him to provide 

assistance. In the end, however, he was not able to provide any support because 

Admiral Truly and the TSG controlled all information relating to the 90-Day Study. 

Things got so bad that every time senior NASA officials returned from a White 

House meeting, there was another story about “those dumb [expletive] on the Space 

22 Mark Craig interview via electronic-mail, 12 September 2003.

23 Martin interview.

24 O’Handley interview.

25 Bryan Burrough, Dragonfly, p. 240.

26 Malow interview.

Council. I have often thought,” O’Handley stated later, that the conflicting “personalities caused many of the problems. If, instead of fighting with the Space Council, we had tried to work with them, the outcome might have been different.”27

While this external battle was being waged between the Space Council and 

NASA, there was another internal battle being waged within the agency. There was 

rising apprehension regarding JSC’s control of strategic planning for the initiative. 

Although the TSG was to a degree soliciting advice from other field centers, there 

was a feeling that the JSC leadership didn’t really take outside advice very well. 

Douglas O’Handley argued later, “I absolutely think a wider net should have been 

cast within NASA, but JSC deprived the other centers an opportunity to contribute 

to the initiative.”28 The aerospace industry also wanted to play a role in the mission 

development, but weren’t heavily involved. Although there were numerous technical concepts and architectural options floating about, the TSG essentially ignored 

them. JSC became “Fortress NASA” and outside ideas were not welcome.29

Despite ongoing problems between the Space Council and NASA, and misgivings about the initiative on Capitol Hill, the TSG was allowed to continue compiling the 90-Day Study. The study group was staffed with about 450 people led on a 

day-to-day basis by Mark Craig, with an average of 250 people working directly on 

the study on any given day—although the core team was formed by the members 

of the AHWG.30 The study began by decomposing the President’s objectives into 

top level technology requirements. These requirements were then used to develop 

an end-to-end architecture, which included the following features:

• Characterize the environment in which humans and machines must

function with robotic missions

• Launch personnel and equipment from Earth

• Exploit the unique capabilities of human presence aboard the

Space Station Freedom

• Transport crew and cargo from Earth orbit to lunar and Mars orbits

and surfaces

• Conduct scientific studies and investigate in-situ resource development

27 O’Handley interview.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Craig interview, 12 September 2003; Cohen interview, 9 December 2004.
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The TSG assumed the agency would utilize the Space Shuttle and Space Station 

Freedom to implement SEI. This, in essence, meant the group never considered 

whether leveraging these systems was feasible or desirable given the existing fiscal 

environment. The inclusion of the two systems was almost a foregone conclusion 

because JSC wanted to protect the Shuttle and continue Station development—in 

the near term, this meant the ultimate success of SEI was not necessarily the agency’s 

top priority. From the agency’s perspective, completion of an orbital station was 

part of a serial progression that started with the shuttle and would eventually end 

with a human mission to Mars—an idea that dated back to post-Apollo planning. 

This viewpoint was directly influenced by Admiral Truly’s decision to base the 90-

Day Study’s technical analysis on past NASA studies. Douglas O’Handley argues, 

“this is where the Space Council and the agency were on a collision course. NASA 

was documenting the past and the Space Council wanted options and innovative 

thinking. None of the NASA principals knew how to go about” providing those 

alternatives.31

The 90-Day Study alternative generation process was far from optimal. Because 

the TSG was so JSC-centric, technical and architectural concepts from other segments of the space policy community were not solicited. Perhaps more importantly, 

the group considered budgetary constraints last. This should have been the first 

thing that was evaluated, with all programmatic options tailored to the fiscal realities. Instead, the TSG put together a virtual ‘wish list’ for human exploration without taking into account the existing political environment. This eventually became 

an even greater problem because the group never paid “much attention to lowering 

the initiative’s costs by using emergent technologies.”32 There is some indication 

that part of the reason for this was because NASA had been directed to virtually 

guarantee the safety of the astronauts. Based upon the Apollo experience and a contemporary understanding of the life science challenges, the TSG had calculated that 

one member of a seven-person crew may not return. The Space Council staff told 

agency planners they wanted ‘seven out and seven back.’33 This would have required 

99.9999% mission reliability. As much as anything done by the space agency, this 

31 Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars, National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration, 20 November 1989, National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Historical Archives, 2-2 to 2-5; NASA Administrator Richard Truly to Vice President Dan Quayle, 

5 September 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Craig interview, 12 

September 2003; O’Handley interview.

32 O’Handley interview.

33 Ibid.

White House decision drove costs up enormously.34

SEI Takes Shape

In early November, the Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the 

Moon and Mars began circulating at the Space Council.35 The cover letter attached 

to the report stated the purpose of the study was intended as a data source for the 

Space Council to refer to as it considered strategic planning issues related to SEI. 

The document purported not to contain any official recommendations or estimates 

of total mission cost.36 The preface made it abundantly clear that the TSG regarded 

President Bush’s announcement speech as the initiative’s guiding policy directive. 

As a result, the key doctrine that emerged from the report was expressed as follows. 

“The five reference approaches presented reflect the President’s strategy: First, Space 

Station Freedom, and next, back to the Moon, and then a journey to Mars. The destination is, therefore, determined, and with that determination the general mission 

objectives and key program and supporting elements are defined. As a result, regardless of the implementation approach selected, heavy-lift launch vehicles, space-based 

transportation systems, surface vehicles, habitats, and support systems for living and 

working in an extraterrestrial environment are required.” The analytic team did 

not include any alternative paths, but chose to strictly interpret Bush’s announcement speech. This dogmatic approach was carried through the entire report, with 

a predictable outcome—a set of reference approaches requiring a massive in-orbit 

infrastructure and large capital investments.37

34 On 2 November, President Bush signed National Space Policy Directive 1—a slight revision of 

the policy issued by the Reagan Administration 20 months earlier. The expansion of human presence 

and activity “beyond Earth orbit into the solar system” remained one of the nation’s primary goals 

in space. Considering the administration’s desire to have SEI provide a long-term direction for the 

American space program, however, the document didn’t place a great deal of emphasis on the new 

initiative. Within the section dealing directly with civil space policy, human exploration was relegated 

to the bottom of a list of stated objectives for NASA—with Earth science, space science, technology 

development, and space applications at the top of the list. Even when addressing human exploration 

more specifically, the policy highlighted completion of Space Station Freedom and downplayed 

human missions beyond Earth orbit. Finally, the directive provided no specific guidance with regard to 

implementing the Moon-Mars initiative. [National Space Policy Directive 1, National Space Council, 

2 November 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Press Release, The 

White House Office of the Press Secretary, 16 November 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George 

Bush Presidential Library.]

35 It was not officially released until 20 November 1989.

36 Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars, National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration, 20 November 1989, National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Historical Archives, cover letter.

37 Ibid., Preface.
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To achieve the objectives set out in President Bush’s announcement speech, the 

TSG adopted an evolutionary 30-year plan for SEI implementation. As the AHWG 

had done before it, the group put forth a strategic approach that depended on Space 

Station Freedom and followed initial human missions to the Moon and Mars with 

phased development of permanent human outposts on these celestial bodies—starting with emplacement, continuing with consolidation, and finishing with operations. Unlike the briefing that had been prepared during the agenda setting process, the 90-Day Study included a highly detailed description of NASA’s vision 

for the robotic, lunar, and Martian phases of exploration beyond Earth orbit.38

The initiative would begin with precursor robotic missions intended to “obtain 

data to assist in the design and development of subsequent human exploration missions and systems, demonstrate technology and long communication time operation 

concepts, and dramatically advance scientific knowledge of the Moon and Mars.” 

The TSG developed a logical progression of robotic explorers to address specific 

operational and scientific priorities. First, a Lunar Observer program would launch 

two identical flight systems on one-year polar mapping missions. Second, a Mars 

Global Network program would launch two identical flight systems carrying orbiters and multiple landers to provide high-resolution surface data at several locations. 

Third, a Mars Sample Return program would launch two identical flight systems to 

return five kilograms each of Martian rocks, soil, and atmosphere to Earth—this was 

the centerpiece of the robotic sequence. Fourth, a Mars Site Reconnaissance Orbiter 

program would launch two orbiters and two communications satellites to characterize landing sites, assess landing hazards, and provide data for subsequent rover 

navigation. Finally, up to five Mars Rover missions would certify three sites to determine the greatest potential for piloted vehicle landing and outpost establishment.39

38 Ibid., section 3, The Human Exploration Initiative.

39 Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars, section 3, The 

Human Exploration Initiative.

Space Station Freedom

(Source: 90-Day Study)

As robotic exploration of the red planet was ongoing, the TSG strategy called for 

the development of a permanent lunar outpost. The mission concept for achieving 

this goal was highly complicated, relying on a vast in-orbit infrastructure, numerous spacecraft, and multiple resource transfers. The plan called for “two to three 

launches of the lunar payload, crew, transportation vehicles, and propellants from 

Earth to Space Station Freedom. At Freedom, the crew, payloads, and propellants 

are loaded onto the lunar transfer vehicle that will take them to low lunar orbit. 

The lunar transfer vehicle meets in lunar orbit with an excursion vehicle, which will 

either be parked in lunar orbit or will ascend from the lunar surface, and payload, 

crew, and propellants are transferred. [Then] the excursion vehicle descends to the 

lunar surface.” A combination of cargo and piloted flights (with four crew members) would be utilized to construct the lunar outpost. The emplacement phase 

would begin with two cargo flights to deliver the initial habitation facilities, which 

included a habitation module (to be covered with lunar regolith to provide radiation shielding), airlock, power system, unpressurized manned/robotic rover, and 

associated support equipment. Emplacement would prepare the way for extended 

human missions during the consolidation phase, which would include erection of a 

constructible habitat to provide additional living space and experimentation with in 

situ resource utilization.40

The final step in the TSG strategy was the establishment of a human outpost 

on Mars. Similar to the lunar program, the Martian sequence would begin with the 

launch of the crew, surface payload, transportation vehicles, and propellant from 

Earth to Space Station Freedom. In LEO, the transfer and excursion vehicles would 

be inspected before setting out on the long journey toward the red planet. “Upon 

approach to Mars, the transfer and excursion vehicles separate and perform aerobraking maneuvers to enter the Martian atmosphere separately. The vehicles rendez40 Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars, section 3, The 

Human Exploration Initiative.

Lunar Transfer Vehicle would have 

provided transportation between Space 

Station Freedom and lunar orbit

(Source: 90-Day Study)
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vous in Mars orbit, and the crew of four transfers to the excursion vehicle, which 

descends to the surface using the same aero-brake. When their tour of duty is complete, the crew leaves the surface in the ascent module of the Mars excursion vehicle 

to rendezvous with the transfer vehicle in Mars orbit. The transfer vehicle leaves 

Mars orbit and returns the crew to Space Station Freedom.”41 Standard mission 

profiles for crewed flights to Mars would follow two different trajectory classes: one 

for a 500-day roundtrip with surface stays up to 100 days and one for a 1,000-day 

roundtrip with surface stays of approximately 600 days. After initial emplacement, 

the consolidation phase would entail assembly of a constructible habitat and utilization of a pressurized rover for long-range surface exploration.42

As envisioned by the TSG, implementation of SEI would require the construction of a new launch vehicle and multiple spacecraft to travel beyond Earth orbit. 

The study introduced two primary concepts for a heavy launcher, one a Shuttlederived alternative and the other based on the proposed Advanced Launch System.43

As indicated above, the in-space transportation system consisted of transfer and 

excursion vehicles—these systems would utilize chemical propulsion, although 

the report called for research funding to investigate nuclear propulsion. For Mars 

exploration, the transfer vehicle would actually carry the excursion vehicle to the 

red planet utilizing a large trans-Mars injection stage. The transfer vehicle would 

41 For cargo flights, an integrated configuration of two excursion vehicles is launched. Upon 

approach to Mars, the two vehicles separate and enter Mars orbit using aero-brakes. The first cargo 

flight in the Mars outpost mission sequence delivers the habitat facility to the outpost site.

42 Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars, section 3, The 

Human Exploration Initiative.

43 The Advanced Launch System (ALS) emerged in the mid-1980s as the rocket that would be 

used to deploy the space-based elements of the Strategic Defense Initiative program. However, by late 

1989, it had become increasingly apparent that the requirements for the ALS program had largely 

disappeared. The initial phase of SDI would be deployed using existing Titan 4 and Atlas 2 rockets, 

and the launch requirements for subsequent phases of SDI deployment were too vague to require 

immediate development of ALS.

Inflatable lunar habitat would have been 

outpost for up to 12 astronauts

(Source: 90-Day Study)

include a crew module that would be a “single, pressurized structure 7.6 meters 

in diameter and 9 meters in length with...a life support system that recycles water 

and oxygen. The crew is provided private quarters, exercise equipment, and space 

suits that are appropriate for the long mission duration.” The excursion vehicle crew 

module would provide living space during descent, ascent, and for up to 30 days in 

case of problems with the surface habitat.44

 The TSG developed similar planetary surface systems for both Moon and Martian missions. In fact, the main rationale for development of a lunar outpost was 

as a testing ground for subsystem technologies for later missions to the red planet. 

The initial habitats for both outposts would be horizontal Space Station Freedomderived cylinders 4.45 meters in diameter and 8.2 meters long. Laboratory modules 

would be attached to add expanded living volume. Each of these habitats would 

have regenerative life support systems capable of recovering 90% of the oxygen 

from carbon dioxide and potable water from hygiene and waste water. During the 

consolidation phase, an expanded habitat would be required to accommodate large 

crews and longer stays by providing more space. This would be a “constructible [11 

meter] diameter inflatable structure partially buried in a crater or a prepared hole. 

This structure is an order of magnitude lighter than multi-module configurations 

of equivalent volume. Its internal structure includes self-deploying columns that 

44 Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars, section 3, The 

Human Exploration Initiative.

Mars Transfer Vehicle would have propelled 

crew and mars excursion vehicle to Mars orbit 

(Source: 90-Day Study)

Mars Excursion Vehicle would have 

transported four astronauts and 25-tons of 

cargo to Martian surface

(Source: 90 Day Study)
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telescope upward and lock into place when the structure is inflated. When fully 

assembled and outfitted, the constructible habitat provides three levels, and has the 

volume required for expansion of habitat and science facilities. Major subsystems 

of the constructible habitat include the life support and thermal control systems, 

pressure vessels and internal structure, communications and information management systems, and interior outfitting.” During this stage, a 100- kilowatt nuclear 

dynamic power system would begin providing the growing outpost much needed 

electric power (the plan called for ongoing progression of this capability, leading 

to a 550-kilowatt system). Initial surface exploration would be conducted using 

electric powered, unpressurized rovers. These vehicles would only have a range of 

50 kilometers with human occupants, although they could be telerobotically operated for missions up to 1,000 kilometers from the outpost. This provided very limited capacity for long-range human exploration, which was nominally the primary 

reason for making the journey.45

The TSG mission plan was designed as the framework for selection of an 

overall “reference approach.” The 90-Day Study included five different reference 

approaches, which were intended to provide different options (using only one mission strategy) for achieving President Bush’s goals. The report introduced a set of 

metrics (cost, schedule, complexity, and program risk) that could be used by policy 

makers to decide the appropriate timeframe for SEI implementation. The reference 

approaches simply altered these metrics to provide different milestones for a single 

strategic plan. Thus, instead of examining numerous technical, operational, or strategic alternatives, the TSG chose to put forward one basic system architecture with 

slight timeline modifications. The different reference approaches included:

• Reference Approach A: Formulated to establish human presence on the 

Moon in 2001, using the lunar outpost as a learning center to develop 

the capabilities to move on to Mars. An initial expedition to Mars would 

allow a 30-day stay on the surface, with the first 600-day visit in 2018.

• Reference Approach B: A variation of Reference Approach A, which 

advanced the date of the first human Mars landing to 2011. This would 

reduce the ability to use the lunar outpost as a learning center for the 

Mars outpost.

• Reference Approach C: A variation of Reference Approach A, which 

advanced even further the date of the first Mars mission, but maintained 

the same expansion schedule for Mars outpost development.

• Reference Approach D: A variation of Reference Approach A, which 

45 Ibid.

slipped all major milestones two to three years.

• Reference Approach E: Formulated to reduce the scale of lunar outpost 

activity by using only a human-tended mode of operation and limiting 

the flight rate to the Moon to one mission per year. Three expeditionary 

missions to Mars (with 90-day surface stays) would precede the 2027 

establishment of a permanent outpost with 600-day occupancy.

In essence, this set of reference approaches provided two limited alternatives (Reference Approaches A and E). The only difference between the two was the magnitude 

of lunar development and the timing of different milestones. There were no alternatives provided that suggested that it was not feasible from a budgetary perspective 

to attempt both a permanent return to the Moon and human exploration of Mars. 

In addition, as pointed out above, there were no alternatives that were based on significantly different mission profiles or technical systems. This represented a major 

shortcoming of the report, which would come back to haunt the space agency in 

subsequent months and years.46

The 90-Day Study included a cost estimate for the TSG’s vision of SEI. It was 

based on a 30-year planning horizon and employed historical experience to “derive 

the approximate values for supporting development, systems engineering and integration, program management, recurring operations, new facilities, and civil service 

staffing levels.” The TSG performed a parametric cost analysis using three regression 

models developed at different NASA field centers. The Marshall Space Flight Center 

Cost Model consisted of subsystem level data gathered from past human spaceflight 

programs, which was employed to estimate space transportation vehicle costs as a 

function of mass (assigning each reference approach a subjective complexity factor). 

The Johnson Space Center Advanced Mission Cost Model used a broader dataset 

drawing on developmental program statistics from NASA and other technology 

organizations to calculate expected surface system costs. Finally, the Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory Project Cost Model estimated program costs for robotic missions drawing on past analogous mission figures.47

 The study provided funding estimates for reference approaches A and E, appraising expected costs from 1991 to 2025 (in constant fiscal year 1991 dollars). The estimates included reserves that accounted for nearly 55% of predicted expenditures, 

which was intended to allow for programmatic uncertainties. The report included 

tables that detailed the cost estimates for both reference approaches, separated into 

key phases:

46 Ibid., section 4, Reference Approaches.

47 Ibid., Cost Summary.
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• Reference Approach A

– Lunar Outpost: $100 billion (FY 1991-2001)

– Lunar Outpost Emplacement & Operations: $208 billion

 (FY 2002-2025)

– Mars Outpost: $158 billion (FY 1991-2016)

– Mars Outpost Emplacement & Operations: $75 billion

 (FY 2017-2025)

– Total: $541 billion

• Reference Approach E

– Lunar Outpost: $98 billion (FY 1991-2004)

– Lunar Outpost Emplacement & Operations: $137 billion

 (FY 2005-2025)

– Mars Outpost: $160 billion (FY 1991-2016)

– Mars Outpost Emplacement & Operations: $76 billion

 (FY 2017-2025)

– Total: $471 billion

The report also included two startling charts, which illustrated the impact of the 

reference approaches on the overall NASA budget. Starting with a base budget of 

approximately $15 billion, the implementation of both reference approaches would 

require increasing the annual agency appropriation to $30 billion by FY 2000, 

where it would stay for another 25 years.48 In the coming weeks and months, it 

would become increasingly clear that these budgetary requirements were simply 

staggering to all outside observers. Admiral Truly and the TSG clearly believed that 

President Bush was prepared to support a major escalation in annual spending for 

the space program. This judgment was reached despite the fact that the nation was 

facing large budget deficits and almost every other sector of the government was 

expecting significant funding cuts. It proved to be a tremendous miscalculation.

Mars Wars

 Behind closed doors, the White House’s reaction to the 90-Day Study was outright shock. The Space Council staff could not believe the TSG had produced a 

report that essentially had no real alternatives.49 Mark Albrecht recalled later that 

the report included “basically one architecture...different technologies did not exist 

48 Ibid.

49 Bryan Burrough, Dragonfly, p. 241.

at all, it was one plan offered three ways; slow, moderate, and fast. We were just 

stunned, felt completely betrayed. Vice President Quayle was furious. The 90-Day 

Study was the biggest ‘F’ flunk, you could ever get in government. The real problem 

with the NASA plan was not that we didn’t think the technology was right, but 

that it was just the most expensive possible approach. It was just so fabulously unaffordable, it showed no imagination.”50 OMB Director Darman later told Congress, 

“some of us in the administration felt that the NASA report itself was very much 

biased towards what you might think of as the off-the-shelf approach to the Moon and 

Mars, that it didn’t really seek highly divergent new technologies.” When asked about 

the study after he left office, President Bush recalled feeling that “I got set up.”51

The release led to a rapid disintegration in the already tenuous Space Council-NASA relationship. Douglas O’Handley remembers the study “made the situation worse than it was at the beginning. The NASA plan was not what the Space 

Council wanted. Admiral Truly lost all credibility with the Space Council. There 

was clearly a clash of personalities.”52 Although the White House was highly critical 

of NASA, agency officials believed the report was received unfavorably because of 

poor guidance from the Space Council. Admiral Truly and Aaron Cohen felt the 

council staff didn’t really understand the technical complexities involved in going 

to the Moon and Mars. In their opinion, significantly different cost profiles were 

not needed because establishing a permanent human presence on those celestial 

bodies would require approximately the same amount of resources, regardless of the 

strategic architectures that were selected. If the Space Council wanted options with 

different budgetary impacts, they argued, NASA should have been asked to examine 

different mission content—such as eliminating construction of a permanent lunar 

base or a human mission to Mars.

In retrospect, this argument was somewhat disingenuous considering it was 

Admiral Truly who had originally argued that any new initiative should include a 

permanent return to the Moon and human missions to Mars. The White House 

had initially wanted to consider simply returning to the Moon, although Quayle 

and Albrecht went along with the space agency’s revised plan and adopted it for 

President Bush’s announcement speech. In any case, it was NASA’s feeling that short 

of changing mission content, it would be nearly impossible to reduce significantly 

the budgetary requirements. This conclusion was reached at least partially because 

50 Albrecht interview.

51 Warren E. Leary, “Plans for Space Are Realistic, Official Says,” New York Times (17 December 

2003).

52 O’Handley interview.
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the administration was believed to be highly risk averse, which increased programmatic costs. Additionally, the TSG didn’t believe that approaching technological 

changes more aggressively would reduce costs markedly.53

 NASA leaders were actually surprised with the White House reaction to the 

90-Day Study. Even after submitting it, they believed that it was an appropriate 

response to President Bush’s speech. This was particularly true regarding the cost 

estimates for a long-term initiative. The TSG believed that given Quayle’s approval 

of similar budget estimates in June, these new figures were acceptable. Years later, 

Aaron Cohen concluded that the primary reason for this misunderstanding was 

poor communication between the two organizations. He maintained that the primary problem was not that the council staff asked for options, but that “NASA did 

not try to understand what the customer really wanted. That is a very important 

rule in design. Know what the customer really wants. The president’s speech was 

not what they really wanted. We should have tried harder to understand what they 

really wanted.”54 From his point of view, the primary lesson learned from this failure 

of communication was that technical agencies like NASA need to work very closely 

with its customer to understand their policy needs.55

Before the public release of the report, Vice President Quayle and Mark Albrecht 

began preparing a plan to downplay the importance of the 90-Day Study. The Space 

Council staff fashioned a strategy intended to discourage speculation that the TSG 

vision for SEI matched that of President Bush. The Administration would argue the 

study was only one data source within an ongoing alternative generation process 

that would seek inputs from other government agencies, industry, and the scientific 

community. In fact, such a process had not yet been initiated. Regardless, the White 

House would suggest that the TSG report was merely a starting point for identifying ways to minimize risk, maximize performance, keep costs at an affordable level, 

and achieve overall program goals.56 This was clearly an ad hoc effort at damage 

control. It proved to be a near total failure.

The clearest sign that the Space Council staff was on high alert was the decision to ask NASA to remove the cost estimation section from the public report. 

Mark Albrecht recalled this determination was made because “we had only one 

alternative, and it had this $400 billion price tag. We knew right away that this was 

53 Cohen interview.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 Talking Points, NASA Moon/Mars Database Report, National Space Council, 14 November 

1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Albrecht interview.

dead on arrival. Just what you need, to go out and say President Bush’s initiative 

is going to cost $400 billion. Dead. That’s exactly what we didn’t want to happen. 

So, we asked NASA to keep it separate while we began in earnest to look for real 

alternatives.” Regardless, the administration correctly concluded that rumors would 

quickly surface that the agency had indeed conducted an internal cost analysis. To 

counter these stories, the council staff planned to cast doubt on the TSG’s estimation techniques—most importantly challenging the group’s conservative technical 

approach.57

In mid-November, the White House scheduled a meeting of the full Space Council to provide NASA with an opportunity to officially brief the 90-Day Study. This 

meeting would prove to be one of the seminal events in the history of SEI. In the 

days leading up to the meeting, the Space Council staff began searching for alternative approaches for Moon-Mars exploration. In particular, they were interested in 

an architecture developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) by 

a team led by physicist Lowell Wood. The concept was designed to put humans on 

Mars in ten years, for $10 billion, using inflatable modules to build spacecraft and 

Martian bases. Although this option was considered technically risky (and would 

probably cost more than Livermore estimated), Vice President Quayle was eager to 

investigate inventive approaches that differed from those proposed by the TSG. Two 

days before the council meeting, Mark Albrecht called Wood and asked “how fast 

can you get your concept printed up into a document.” The reply was overnight. On 

16 November, Albrecht contacted Kathy Sawyer from The Washington Post and told 

her that two different mission architectures would be briefed at the council meeting 

the following morning—one from NASA and one from LLNL. He made it clear 

that the administration would be searching for additional technical alternatives for 

accomplishing the Moon-Mars mission.58

The next day, The Washington Post ran a story indicating that Vice President 

Quayle had decided to end NASA’s monopoly on developing concepts for space 

exploration. The piece indicated that Quayle was greatly concerned with the agency’s 

big budget approach to SEI and wanted Congress to know that the administration 

would be considering other options. White House aides were quoted saying he had 

directed the Space Council to conduct an “open competition for money-saving ideas 

for human exploration of the Moon and Mars.”59 While this was clearly designed 

57 Ibid.

58 Albrecht interview.

59 Kathy Sawyer, “Quayle to Give NASA Competition on Ideas for Space Exploration,” The 

Washington Post (17 November 1989).
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to assuage Congressional concerns, it was also an admission that the Council had 

initially abdicated this responsibility. The article highlighted the LLNL concept as 

one potential alternative. Douglas O’Handley, who up until that point had generally been sympathetic toward the Space Council, was quoted as saying, “I’m amazed 

it would be taken...seriously. If it is, it’s by an individual that doesn’t understand 

space risks.”60 O’Handley believed the LLNL concept was not even worth discussing because it displayed a fundamental lack of knowledge. Within the space policy 

community, consideration of the Livermore architecture raised serious questions 

regarding the technical credibility of the Space Council staff.61

That morning the Space Council met at the White House. When the members 

entered the room, the LLNL study was on everybody’s seat. A senior White House 

aide who attended the meeting recalled, “the NASA guys were absolutely furious, 

and we were furious because they’d tried to screw us, and we screwed them right 

back.”62 After opening the meeting, Vice President Quayle asked NASA and LLNL 

to brief their respective studies. After the presentations were made, Dick Darman, 

James Watson (Secretary of Energy), and Donald Rice (Secretary of the Air Force) 

asked Admiral Truly a series of pointed technology-related questions. The thrust of 

these queries centered on whether SEI was politically viable or possible given the 

budgetary realities without breakthrough developments in technology. The Council’s position was clearly that NASA needed to aggressively force some technologies 

through the system.63 As a result, the group decided to ask the National Research 

Council to conduct a review of the 90-Day Study and search for possible alternatives.64 With the economy in a rut and a growing budget deficit, the Council felt the 

Administration needed to investigate cheaper options. Thus, the most significant 

outcome of the meeting was the displacement of NASA as the agency responsible 

for developing technical approaches for the initiative. Mark Albrecht recalled, “At 

60 Ibid.

61 O’Handley interview.

62 Senior Administration Official interview via electronic-mail, 5 November 2003.

63 James Fisher and Andrew Lawler, “NASA, Space Council Split Over Moon-Mars Report,” Space 

News (11 December 1989), p. 10.

64 On 4 December, Vice President Quayle sent a letter to Dr. Frank Press, Chairman of the National 

Research Council (NRC), officially requesting that his organization conduct a review of the 90-Day 

Study. Quayle requested that the NRC consider alternative approaches, or a range of options, for 

human exploration of the solar system. He included a list of questions that he hoped the NRC would 

address in its review, focusing on whether the 90-Day Study addressed the widest range of technically 

credible approaches for implementing SEI. The letter concluded by requesting that the NRC complete 

the review by the end of February 1990. [Vice President Quayle to Dr. Frank Press, 4 December 1989, 

Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.]

that meeting, the Space Council basically took over the SEI project.”65 In retrospect, 

however, one must ask why this authority was ever in question.

When the 90-Day Study was released publicly, the Congressional reaction closely 

matched that of the Space Council—which did not bode well for SEI. For Dick 

Malow, one of the key problems with the TSG approach was that it only called for a 

30-day surface stay for initial Martian landings. Based on this short time period for 

scientific exploration, he remembered thinking the costs seemed horrifically high. “I 

think the idea of only spending 30 days on the Martian surface drove me gradually 

to the feeling that SEI was a mistake and that it wouldn’t sell. I couldn’t see how it 

made sense to spend $400 billion for a 30-day stay on Mars.”66 There was a sense 

on Capitol Hill that the study was basically Johnson Space Center’s position on 

how the initiative should be carried out and that it was ultimately doomed. Malow 

recalled thinking even before the study was released that there was “just something 

totally out of whack. When you coupled the cost of the initiative with the problems 

ongoing with the space station, it just seemed like the wrong time and the wrong 

approach. The study only reinforced that view.”67 Fellow staffer Stephen Kohashi 

shared this opinion and felt that the Administration never truly recovered momentum after the report was released. “The biggest problem was the cost of the Space 

Station development, as well as the cost of maintaining development schedules for 

other on-going projects. With on-going projects getting cut back because of overall 

budgetary constraints, initiation of a manned Mars mission, with its enormous runout costs, seemed fanciful at best.”68 As a result, the report lacked all credibility as a 

serious proposal in Congress.

 The timing of the study’s release, combined with its poor reception, could not 

have been worse for the space agency. During this period, the White House was 

working on its fiscal year 1991 budget. NASA had proposed new funding to develop 

the necessary technology base to undertake future missions to the Moon and Mars. 

The initial budget submission included an SEI-specific increase of $450 million. 

There were also SEI-related increases to on-going projects. In late November, in 

the aftermath of NASA’s unveiling of the 90-Day Study, the OMB passback cut 

65 Albrecht interview.

66 Malow interview.

67 Ibid.

68 Kohashi interview.
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nearly $270 million from the SEI-specific request.69 The Administration realized 

that given the Congressional reaction to the report, it had to significantly reign in 

the agency’s efforts to obtain a large budget increase. The hope was that this would 

give the administration time to reorient the initiative and build momentum for its 

implementation among key members of Congress. The $188 million in SEI-specific funds that were ultimately included in the President’s budget were intended to 

commence technology efforts deemed crucial for eventual Moon-Mars missions, 

including:

• Space Transportation Capability Development

– Space Transportation Main Engine: develop a low-cost advanced 

main engine propulsion system critical to any advanced transportation 

system ($40M)

– Heavy-lift Technologies: define advanced transportation technology 

development activities for a heavy-lift launch vehicle to support lunar 

and Mars missions ($10M)

• Space Science

– Mars Observer: extend planned mission duration and upgrade image 

processing capability to provide more detailed topographical data to 

determine potential landing sites for future Mars missions ($15M)

– Lunar Observer: new mission to provide detailed data on the moon’s 

topography, geology, and climatology to assist in determining potential 

landing sites of optimal scientific merit ($15M)

• Space Research & Technology

– Exploration Technology Increment: develop applications such as 

atmospheric aero-braking, advanced automation and robotics, space 

nuclear power, space transfer vehicle propulsion, cryogenic fuel transfer 

and conservation, regenerative life support systems, radiation protection shielding, high-rate optical frequency and Ka-band communications, and science multi-spectral sensors ($88M)

• Space Station

– Advanced Programs Increment: assess and do preliminary designs of 

high-pressure space suit, solar dynamics power, and advanced propulsion system for reaction control ($20M)70

69 Admiral Richard Truly to Richard G. Darman, 27 November 1989, Library of the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration Chief Financial Officer.

70 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Budget Estimates: Fiscal Year 1991, Volume 

1,” Library of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chief Financial Officer.

Combined with approximately $140 million in new funds for ongoing programs, 

these budget augmentations were intended to be the first steps in the development 

of the necessary technology to undertake human exploration beyond Earth orbit.

At the end of November, the Space Council invited a Blue Ribbon Discussion 

Group to the White House to provide it with advice regarding the administration’s 

approach to SEI. Mark Albrecht recalled the council staff was trying to figure out 

how to get what “we asked for, given that NASA has completely flunked the course.”71

The panel included such space policy luminaries as astronomer Carl Sagan, physicist Edward Teller, former astronaut and U.S. Senator Harrison Schmitt, former 

astronaut Michael Collins, former Air Force Secretary Pete Aldridge, and former 

NASA Administrator Thomas Paine. The group spent its first day and a half receiving briefings on a wide variety of topics, ranging from technology to international 

cooperation to program rationales. NASA presented the 90-Day Study. Lowell 

Wood briefed the LLNL plan. Finally, Boeing shared its plans for development of 

heavy-lift expendable launch vehicles and next-generation human spacecraft.72

During the final afternoon of the two-day summit, Dr. Laurel Wilkening of the 

University of Washington provided Vice President Quayle, Budget Director Richard 

Darman, and Science Advisor Allan Bromley with an overview of the group’s findings and recommendations. First, the administration had not outlined an adequate 

rationale for SEI. Without a more compelling justification for the initiative, the 

administration would be unlikely to gain long-term public and congressional support for the undertaking. Second, NASA should be directed to prepare a broad range 

of technical options for presidential consideration, drawing on external and internal 

sources outside JSC. The 90-Day Study reference approaches were seen as “business 

as usual” approaches that did not seek to leverage breakthrough technologies. Third, 

NASA should embark on the rapid development of advanced heavy launch vehicles 

as the most important initial implementation step. Fourth, Tom Paine and others 

argued NASA’s managerial structure was not well suited to carry out the program. 

They suggested that a new ‘exploration agency’ should be created within NASA, 

likely requiring a new field center separate from the existing operational side of the 

organization. Finally, the administration should evaluate opportunities for inter71 Albrecht interview.

72 Schedule Proposal, Mark Albrecht to CeCe Kramer, 9 November 1989, Bush Presidential 

Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Memorandum, Mark Albrecht, 30 November 1989, Bush 

Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Andrew Lawler, “Panel: Rationale Missing for 

Moon-Mars Proposal,” Space News (11 December 1989); Brad Mitchell to Andy Card, 4 December 

1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
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Chapter 4: The 90-Day Study

national cooperation that would not make the space program dependent on other 

nations for mission essential activities.73

By mid-December, the clash underway within the Bush administration regarding the future direction of the American space program had become public knowledge. The Washington Post described this out of sight “Mars Wars,” as an on-going 

conflict between the Space Council and NASA, characterized by communications 

failures, disagreements, and outright turf battles. As had been the case for many 

months, the Council’s continued appeal for a more imaginative technical approach 

for implementing SEI caused friction. The White House position, supported most 

importantly by Vice President Quayle and OBM Director Darman, was that SEI 

should be used as an opportunity to seek economic benefits from directed technology investments. This would have the added benefit, they believed, of dramatically reducing the costs of future Moon-Mars missions. Quayle and Darman were 

clearly disappointed with the 90-Day Study’s failure to cast a wider net in search of 

new technologies. They believed the TSG plan was simply bureaucratic business as 

usual. On 1 December, Admiral Truly and Mark Albrecht had had a private confrontation at NASA headquarters when the latter expressed this White House view. 

Although the meeting was downplayed publicly, there was clearly a heated conversation regarding the appropriate course of action for SEI.74 An article in Space News

captured the essential dilemma SEI posed for both the administration and NASA. 

“Administration officials have privately chastised NASA for preparing a report that 

some felt was unimaginative and did not adequately address new technologies that 

could dramatically cut costs for the venture. NASA officials have blamed the Space 

Council for the problems, saying that direction given to the agency was unclear.”75

Regardless of the ongoing hostilities between the Space Council and NASA, the 

latter was working to salvage SEI. On 14 December, the full council met to discuss 

a staff report drafted after the conclusion of the two-day Blue Ribbon Discussion 

Group meeting. The report suggested that NASA should be instructed to issue a 

call to industry, universities, and research centers for high leverage system concepts 

based on new technology developments—including nuclear propulsion and innovative uses of existing technologies. Following an agency review of all inputs to provide a “sanity check,” these alternatives would be forwarded to the NRC for more 

73 Ibid.

74 Kathy Sawyer, “En Route to Space Goal, Groups Diverge: Friction Between NASA and Quayle’s 

National Council Erupts in “Mars Wars,’” The Washington Post (11 December 1989).

75 James Fisher and Andrew Lawler, “NASA, Space Council Split Over Moon-Mars Report,” Space 

News (11 December 1989).

detailed analysis. This process was expected to take a year.76 The panel also addressed 

the Blue Ribbon Discussion Group’s concern regarding the need for a compelling 

rationale for SEI. The council members decided the space program should be portrayed as an investment that was greater than the sum of its parts, which provided 

the nation with a unique combination of benefits. The group selected the following 

framework to describe the administration’s vision:

The Council believed that NASA should build on its proven track record “for 

calling forth factors which are critical to America’s greatness—pushing the frontier, creating economic opportunity from adversity, and looking over the horizon to 

create a better world for tomorrow’s generation.”77 In retrospect, this rationale was 

more of a propaganda statement than an actual description of the Bush administration’s reasoning for supporting human exploration of the Moon and Mars. The real 

motivation for SEI was quite simple—provide direction to a directionless agency. 

While this justification may have been adequate to force a fundamental redirection 

of existing NASA programs, it was not compelling enough to gain Congressional 

support for an initiative that would require doubling the space agency’s budget. In 

fact, this had never been the administration’s intent. The Space Council’s inability 

to control the alternative generation process, however, led to the release of a NASA 

report that necessitated a massive increase in funding.

76 Simon P. Worden to the National Space Council, “Strategic Planning for the Space Exploration 

Initiative: The How, What, and When?” 14 December 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush 

Presidential Library.

77 Courtney Stadd to Brad Mitchell, Ed McNally, and Joe Heizer, “Space Exploration Initiative,” 

18 December 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

Leadership / Pride

Explore new frontiers

Challenge best and

brightest

Foster standard of

excellence in science

education

Manifest destiny

Economic Impact

Enjoy unanticipated 

benefits

Create new jobs and foster 

aerospace industry

Enhance economic

competitiveness

Promote science and 

medical innovation

Legacy

Create a better world 

for next generation
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Chapter 4: The 90-Day Study

On 19 December, based on the recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Discussion 

Group, Vice President Quayle directed NASA to take the lead in seeking out and 

evaluating technical and policy alternatives for implementing SEI. Quayle wrote 

Admiral Truly saying “America’s space program has always been a recognized source 

of innovation. We need to bring that same innovativeness to bear today [and] ensure 

that all reasonable conceptual space exploration alternatives have been evaluated. 

We need to cast our net widely drawing upon America’s creative potential to ensure 

that we are benefiting from a broad range of promising new technologies, and innovative uses of existing technologies.” Quayle’s position was clearly that not only had 

the 90-Day Study been based on outdated technology, but the TSG had not even 

applied those technologies in innovative ways. This was harsh criticism. The decision to give the space agency competition for strategic planning for human exploration was unprecedented in the history of the space age. It removed a 30-year NASA 

monopoly and signaled a serious lack of confidence in the organization’s ability to 

formulate pioneering mission designs while taking into account the challenges of 

the existing political environment.78

 Two days later, a seemingly humbled Truly announced that “the time has come 

now, not only to continue our analysis of exploration mission alternatives but also 

to begin actual pursuit of the innovative and enabling technologies that have been 

identified as necessary to proceed.” This statement was a very public admission 

that the TSG had not identified innovative approaches for SEI. Nevertheless, Truly 

stated his belief that the Office of Exploration had conducted exceptional work 

setting a foundation for future human missions to the Moon and Mars. This was 

perhaps an indication that NASA still felt that its vision represented the best option 

for exploration of the solar system.79/80

78 Vice President Quayle to Admiral Richard Truly, 19 December 1989, Bush Presidential Records, 

George Bush Presidential Library.

79 Press Release 89-185, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 21 December 1989, 

Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; William J. Broad, “NASA Losing 30-

Year Monopoly In Planning for Moon and Mars,” The New York Times (15 January 1990).

80 Admiral Truly did not formally reply to the White House direction until 31 January 1990. 

In a letter to Vice President Quayle, he provided details of a process for soliciting outside strategic 

approaches for SEI implementation. This process would include the release of a NASA Research 

Announcement. The space agency would specifically seek inputs from professional societies (including 

the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics—AIAA) and other federal agencies. The plan 

also envisioned a national conference that would be jointly sponsored by NASA and AIAA. All of 

these efforts would be coordinated through a newly created Office of Aeronautics, Exploration, and 

Technology. [Admiral Richard Truly to Vice President Quayle, 31 January 1990, Bush Presidential 

Records, George Bush Presidential Library.]

Over the course of the subsequent month, the Space Council began working 

behind the scenes to get SEI back on track. This included Council meetings aimed 

at developing a policy directive for the initiative and conferences with key members 

of Congress. Most importantly, however, the Administration was working on its 

fiscal year 1991 budget. President Bush was set to request a dramatically increased 

space budget, 24% higher than the previous year. This included a significant commitment to Mission to Planet Earth (raised 53%), a considerable boost in funding for Space Station Freedom (raised 39%), and a noteworthy enlargement of the 

space exploration budget (raised 32%). The budget included a new account for the 

Moon-Mars initiative, but the administration intended to make it clear that for the 

next few years SEI-related efforts would focus on pushing emerging and new technologies—those with the greatest potential for achieving the initiative faster, better, 

and cheaper.81 The White House did not intend to lock onto any single program 

design or architecture until a thorough search for innovative technical alternatives 

had been completed.82

In late January, when the budget was officially submitted to Congress, the new 

funding for SEI was grouped together with on-going exploration efforts. Combining 

these budget lines made it appear that the space agency was asking for approximately 

$1.3 billion to support the robotic science missions and research and development 

activities required to push the initiative forward. In reality, only $300 million represented new spending for programs associated with SEI.83 After the budget’s public 

release, The New York Times reported that the proposed 24% increase in the NASA 

budget (a $2.8 billion boost to $15.1 billion) signaled President Bush’s commitment 

to put money behind the exploration initiative. Admiral Truly stated “this is the 

most important budget for us ... it’s going to set our course, if we’re successful, for 

many years to come and over a wide range of programs.”84 The article pointed out 

81 A few years later, NASA Administrator Dan Goldin, who would become the second administrator 

appointed by the Bush administration, made “faster, better, cheaper” the mantra of NASA. The concept 

emerged earlier, however, as the administration was trying to “infuse that kind of SDI mentality” into 

the SEI alternative generation process. [Albrecht interview]

82 Talking Points, Meeting with Republican Members of House Science Committee, National 

Space Council, 22 January 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

83 White House Office of Management and Budget, “Budget of the United States of American, 

Fiscal Year 1991,” 29 January 1990, pp. 49-82.

84 “NASA Budget Press Conference: Statement of Richard H. Truly, NASA Administrator,” NASA 

News (29 January 1990); John Noble Wilford, “Budget for the Space Agency Sets Broader Course in 

Exploration,” The New York Times (2 February 1990), p. 19.
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that although the first year funding for SEI was modest, it would presumably multiply several times over coming years. John Pike from the Federation of American 

Scientists was quoted saying, “There’s a danger with all these big projects just getting started. They could just about devour everything else in the space program.”85

This was clearly a congressional concern and easing this worry would be the focus 

of the administration in the coming months.

 A month later, the National Research Council briefed the findings of its review 

of the 90-Day Study to the full Space Council. The fundamental conclusion of 

the 14-member review panel was that the TSG report had critical flaws and that 

additional options needed to be studied to provide decision-makers with a ‘menu 

of opportunities.’ Former Presidential Science Advisor H. Guyford Stever, who 

chaired the NRC committee, argued SEI warranted “more intense scrutiny and 

evaluation of options must take place before decisions are made regarding mission 

architecture.” This was an apparent criticism of the rushed nature of NASA’s internal 

analysis and the resultant lack of real options for policy makers to choose between. 

The committee also subtly reproved past White House actions, stating that three 

crucial questions needed to be answered before moving on to actual concept development. These questions included: what is the appropriate pace for SEI; what is the 

appropriate scope of SEI; and what level of long-term support will SEI receive.86

These were clearly high-level policy questions under the Space Council’s purview 

that arguably should have been answered before the space agency was allowed to 

embark on the 90-Day Study.

 After examining the reference approaches presented by the TSG, the NRC panel 

concluded that the JSC-led team was overly risk averse in the area of technology 

development. While there is some evidence that this was the result of guidance from 

the White House, the committee believed advanced technologies offered opportunities for more rapid and cost-effective access to and exploration of space. The 

group suggested a balanced technical approach would provide risk reduction and 

management opportunities. To this end, it recommended that early technical work 

should be focused on developments in four areas:

• A new generation of heavy-lift launch vehicles to transport large

cargoes to LEO

• A new, robust, and efficient reusable launch vehicle for transport of 

humans and precious cargo to LEO

85 Ibid.

86 Committee on Human Exploration of Space, Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA’s 90-

Day Study and Alternatives (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1990); Press Release, National 

Research Council, 1 March 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

• Nuclear propulsion technologies for more rapid transport of human 

crews across the solar system

• Nuclear electric power to meet the high energy requirements of lunar 

and Martian outposts

The panel openly criticized NASA’s failure to discuss the eventual phase-out of the 

Shuttle, which it deemed to be a crucial step in providing highly reliable, less laborintensive launch operations. It further expressed its belief that NASA should have 

emphasized the importance of safe nuclear power and propulsion for SEI. The NRC 

found that these technologies were essential to meeting the mission’s substantial 

electricity demands and to reduce weight and travel time to Mars. In conclusion, 

the committee made an appeal to Congress to reserve judgment regarding SEI until 

investigations had been carried out to examine the merits of different technical 

approaches that may prove more feasible in the existing political environment.87

 The White House reaction to the NRC review was extremely positive. Mark 

Albrecht felt “it was independent verification that we’re not dreaming in the search 

for viable and credible alternative architectures.” There was relief among the council staff that the NRC had concurred with their conclusion that there was a limited amount of technical imagination in the 90-Day Study, which made the TSG 

approach very expensive. They were also pleased that the report indicated there were 

additional alternatives that could dramatically decrease the overall cost of implementing SEI. Mark Albrecht recalled the report “was just a huge boost in our credibility around town and inside the White House.”88 Even many at NASA felt the 

report was a fair criticism of the 90-Day Study, but even at this point, the space 

agency had no plans to expand the envelope at all.89

The release of the NRC review was a critical turning point in lifecycle of SEI. 

It represented an authoritative declaration that NASA’s 90-Day Study had serious 

flaws and failed to provide policy makers with an adequate tool to decide the future 

course of the American space program. While it clearly criticized the space agency, 

it also implied that there had been a White House failure to provide necessary guidance with regard to the pace, scope, and long-term commitment to the initiative. 

This public revelation forced the administration to step up an ongoing process 

aimed at saving the program. Over the coming months and years, intensified efforts 

were made to make President Bush’s vision of a permanent return to the Moon and 

human exploration of Mars a reality.

87 Ibid.

88 Albrecht interview.

89 O’Handley interview.

“And so as this century closes, it is in America’s hands

to determine the kind of people, the kind of planet, we will become 

in the next. We will leave the Solar System and travel to the stars. 

Not only because it is democracy’s dream, but because it is

democracy’s destiny.”

President George Bush, 11 May 1990

Throughout the fall of 1989, President Bush had not been heavily engaged in the 

evolution of SEI within his administration. He had largely delegated responsibility 

for the initiative to Vice President Quayle, while he addressed more pressing events 

on the international stage—most importantly, the virtual implosion of communism 

in Eastern Europe. International tensions remained a fact of life during the coming 

months as reunification efforts began in East and West Germany; independence 

movements gained momentum in several Soviet republics; President Gorbachev 

proposed that the Communist Party give up its monopoly on power in the U.S.S.R.; 

and Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega overturned democratic elections 

that had effectively ousted him from power. Regardless, during the early part of 

the new year, President Bush was able to return his attention to domestic matters—including the fate of the American space program.1

1

 John Robert Greene, The Presidency of George Bush (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 

2000), pp. 89-106.

5

The Battle to Save SEI

107
108

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Chapter 5: The Battle to Save SEI

– A baseline program architecture will be selected from these alternatives

• Three agencies will carry out the initiative, with the National Space Council 

coordinating all activities

– NASA will be the principal implementing agency

– DOD and DOE will have major roles in technology development and 

concept definition

Coming eight months after President Bush first announced the initiative, this directive provided the direction that had clearly been needed within a fractious policy 

making community.4

 It was among the most significant documents in the chronicle 

of SEI. It represented an outright skirmish in the battle to gain control of strategic 

space policy planning within the Bush administration. Mark Albrecht said later, “it 

took us almost a year to go where we wanted to go directly and it cost us time, it cost 

confusion on the Hill.”5

 Although this was a criticism of NASA, the Administration 

itself shared equally in the blame for not providing the required direction earlier. It 

is unclear whether the ultimate fate of SEI would have changed even if policy guidance had been provided much earlier, but it seems safe to conclude that the lack of 

administration leadership significantly reduced the initiative’s chances of success. 

By the time the council finally supplied the needed direction, it was probably too 

late to resurrect an undertaking Congress presumed would be outrageously expensive. Dick Malow recalled that even with of a presidential directive providing policy 

guidance for SEI, “the general feeling about the program on the Hill continued to 

weaken.”6

At the end of March, the White House made public a second presidential directive announcing President Bush’s decision to commence discussions with foreign 

nations regarding international cooperation for SEI. This idea had been encouraged the previous summer by Carl Sagan, who sought to take advantage of warmer 

relations between the United States and Soviet Union. The Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee had 

likewise recommended cooperation with the U.S.S.R. The committee’s chairman, 

4

 Presidential Decision on the Space Exploration Initiative, National Space Council, 21 February 

1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Press Release, The White House 

Office of the Press Secretary, 8 March 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential 

Library; “Cold Water on Mars,” The Economist (10 March 1990), pp. 94-95; “Bush Calls for Two 

Proposals for Missions to Moon, Mars,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (12 March 1990), pp. 18-

19; Memorandum, Mark Albrecht to Ed Rogers, 13 March 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George 

Bush Presidential Library.

5

 Albrecht interview.

6

 Malow interview.

Presidential Decisions

During the early months of the new year, the Space Council staff began developing actual policy directives for the implementation of SEI. Based on direction 

provided by the full Council during two meetings on the subject, the staff was 

tasked with drafting two documents. The first would provide general policy guidance, while the second would introduce a course of action for including international partners in Moon-Mars missions. In a sign that the Administration had lost 

complete faith in NASA, the staff turned to the Department of Defense to conduct 

most of the analytical work necessary to develop these documents. Although NASA 

leaders had originally been in favor of re-establishing the Space Council, this view 

had dramatically shifted now that the new organization had turned to the military 

to comment on and critique the space agency’s plans and projects.2

 Regardless, over 

the period of several months, the council staff worked closely with military analysts 

and the ‘deputies committee,’ a group consisting of high-level representatives from 

each of the Council’s member agencies, to gain a consensus on the wording of the 

forthcoming policy statements.3

On 21 February, President Bush signed a Presidential Decision on the Space 

Exploration Initiative. Fully supported by Vice President Quayle and the National 

Space Council, its public unveiling three weeks later was clearly timed to coincide 

with the release of the NRC review of the 90-Day Study. The NRC panels’ findings and recommendations largely validated the policy guidance found within the 

presidential directive. The objective of the document was to provide the American 

space program with near-term guidance for carrying out the long-term SEI vision. 

The policy consisted of the following components:

• The initiative will include both lunar and Mars program elements

• The initiative will include robotic science missions

• Early research will focus on a search for new and innovative approaches and 

technologies

– Research will focus on high leverage technologies with the potential to 

greatly reduce costs

– Mission, concept, and systems analyses will be carried out in parallel with 

technology research

– Research will lead to definition of two or more significantly different 

exploration architectures

2

 Albrecht interview.

3

 Mark Albrecht to National Space Council, 16 January 1990, Bush Presidential Records, 

George Bush Presidential Library; Mark Albrecht to National Space Council, 2 February 1990, Bush 

Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
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ing and eliminating all funding associated with SEI. Chairman Traxler began the 

SEI-related questioning by asking NASA if the net increase in spending associated 

with the initiative was approximately $300 million—if on-going programs such 

as the National Aerospace Plane, Space Station Freedom, and Mars Observer were 

not included. NASA Comptroller Thomas Campbell answered that this was correct. Traxler then asked a series of questions regarding the technologies included in 

the 90-Day Study, which led to a long response from Admiral Truly defending the 

report—he concluded that the $188 million in funding for new technologies were 

dedicated to ascertaining what innovations would be required to efficiently explore 

the Moon and Mars. An undeterred Traxler followed-up by asking whether Truly 

agreed with the NRC report, which concluded that SEI as envisioned in the 90-Day 

Study would be technically challenging and very expensive. After Truly answered 

in the affirmative, Traxler got to the heart of the Congressional concern by asking 

whether fully implementing the TSG plan would require more than doubling the 

NASA budget. Once again answering affirmatively, Truly stated that regardless of 

what technologies or strategies were selected, exploration of the Moon and Mars 

would be an expensive undertaking. Truly suggested that the technological, educational, and spiritual benefits derived from such an endeavor was worth the cost.

After a brief foray into technical details, Traxler returned to budgetary concerns, 

questioning the space agency’s ability to accurately forecast programmatic costs for 

long term projects. He asked whether Truly was confident in NASA’s estimate for 

reference approach A ($541 billion). The administrator simply said it was premature to make this determination, but that he believed the program would be “very 

expensive.” Traxler followed-up by asking when NASA would be able to provide firm 

numbers, to which Truly said it would take three or four years of focused technology 

development to provide a more definitive estimate. In essence, Truly was suggesting 

that Congress should invest billions of dollars in technology development programs 

before the agency could tell it how much the long-term project would cost. During 

the second day of testimony, with many Congressional concerns presumably confirmed, Chairman Traxler only returned to SEI in an attempt to accurately identify 

exactly where new money for SEI could be found within the NASA budget request. 

This was an ominous sign, calling into question whether Congress would provide 

any funding for implementation of the initiative.10

By the end of April, with Congress preparing to eliminate all SEI-related funding 

from the NASA budget, the Space Council set into motion a concentrated lobbying effort aimed at garnering support for the space program and SEI. The first step 

10 House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, “Departments of Veterans Affairs and 

Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1991,” in Hearings 

Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, One Hundred First 

Congress, Second Session: Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies—Part IV: National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 

50-57; pp. 136-143.

Alan Lovelace, said “cooperation with the Soviets is logical given the great desire 

of the administration to take steps to support developments in Eastern Europe.” 

Another potential reason to cooperate was to reduce the U.S. contribution to the 

expensive initiative. It was suggested that the issue should be placed on the table 

for the Bush-Gorbachev summit planned for the summer.7

 The policy document 

itself indicated that the nation should pursue negotiations with Europe, Canada, 

Japan, and the Soviet Union. It was believed that this decision directive would support three important objectives. First, and most importantly, it would expand the 

coalition of initiative supporters by adding a foreign policy rationale. Second, it 

would involve partners capable of contributing financial resources to an expensive 

undertaking. Third, it would involve partners with important technical capabilities—most notably Soviet experience addressing the impacts of prolonged spaceflight and constructing nuclear space systems.8

The Soviet reaction to President Bush’s call for international cooperation was 

extremely positive. Four years earlier, President Gorbachev had asked President 

Reagan to join his nation in a joint mission to the red planet, which would have 

met a long held ambition within the U.S.S.R. for human space exploration focusing 

on a voyage to Mars. After the release of the presidential directive, the spokesman 

for the Soviet embassy in Washington stated, “we have always been for cooperation 

with the United States in this area.” Despite this encouraging response, by the end 

of the month, the NRC panel that had been evaluating SEI publicly warned against 

any cooperative robotic sample return missions to Mars with the Soviets. While the 

NRC did not address human exploration, it found that a highly interdependent 

undertaking could make planetary science “a potential hostage to political events.” 

In the long-run, the potential benefits sought from exploring international cooperation were never realized.9

While the Space Council was working to provide long overdue policy guidance for SEI’s implementation, senior NASA officials were appearing on Capitol 

Hill to defend the proposed increase in the agency’s budget. In late March, the 

House Appropriations subcommittee with authority over the NASA budget held 

two days of hearing on the matter. It became apparent very quickly that the committee, chaired by Representative Bob Traxler (D-MI), was committed to identify7

 “Bush Seen Cooperating with Soviets on Moon-Mars Project,” Dow Jones News Service (18 

January 1990).

8

 “International Cooperation in the President’s Space Exploration Initiative,” The White House, 

Office of the Press Secretary, 30 March 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential 

Library.

9

 William J. Broad, “Bush Open to Space Voyages with Soviet Union,” The New York Times (3 

April 1990), sec.C2; Craig Covault, “White House Approves Soviet Talks on Moon/Mars Exploration 

Initiative,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (9 April 1990), p. 24; James R. Asker, “NRC Warns U.S. 

Against Joint Missions to Mars With Soviets,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (23 April 1990).
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his personal commitment to the American space program, which he believed to be 

of vital importance to the nation’s future. He contended that space leadership was 

crucial to maintaining national leadership in the high tech world—in particular, 

he lauded the launch of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) aboard the Shuttle 

Discovery in late April as an example of U.S. accomplishments in space science. 

He further argued that there were real and tangible benefits derived from investments in the national space program, including revolutions in communications and 

computerization, advances in industrial materials and medical knowledge, the creation of millions of high-tech jobs, and inspiring future generations of scientists and 

engineers. President Bush then appealed for congressional support for his increase 

in civil space spending—which he asserted would put the nation on the path of 

recovery from many years of underinvestment in space. He made the case that Mission to Planet Earth and SEI embodied what the space program was all about—to 

use space to examine Earth from above and to push outward to new frontiers. In 

conclusion to his remarks, Bush acknowledged that Congress was concerned about 

the proposed investment in the Moon-Mars initiative. To address these issues, he 

turned the meeting over to Vice President Quayle.16

Vice President Quayle began by emphasizing the Space Council’s priorities, 

including: a balanced mix of human and robotic, scientific and exploratory missions; pursuit of challenging initiatives; and pushing space innovation designed to 

ensure national leadership in cutting edge technology. He then launched into a 

defense of SEI. Stating that the Council had dedicated significant effort to creating 

a strategy for SEI, Quayle argued that it was fundamentally in the national interest 

to implement a new round of exploration that would produce countless direct and 

indirect benefits. He told the attendees that the council’s approach for SEI was to 

begin a multi-year technology research effort. The administration was asking Congress for the funding ($188 million in FY 1991) and the time to examine alternative 

ways for better, faster, cheaper, safer ways of reaching the Moon and Mars. Quayle 

made clear to the assembled congressional leaders that this should not be considered 

a new program start, but an opportunity to investigate what was involved in achieving the initiative and ultimately to save money. He was adamant on this point, 

stating unequivocally that the White House was not asking Congress to commit to 

a new program. Quayle argued, however, that it was important to start the technology research needed to initiate the program immediately, rather than waiting for the 

program to get bogged down in bipartisan politics during an election year. He also 

suggested that SEI offered an exceptional opportunity to showcase U.S. leadership 

during a time of rapid political change around the globe.

16 Talking Points for the President, Congressional Leadership Meeting on Space, 27 April 1990, 

Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

in the strategy was to hold a “space summit” at the White House. While President 

Bush met weekly with the senior Congressional leadership to discuss selected subjects, this meeting was notable because it was the first time in American history 

that space policy would be the sole topic on the agenda.11 According to an internal 

White House memorandum, the primary purpose of the summit was for Bush to 

show support for the FY 1991 space budget. Secondarily, the gathering provided 

an opportunity to discuss SEI. Not since the initiation of the Apollo program had 

a president given such high priority to the space program. During the intervening 

period, space activities were kept alive by a select group of congressional appropriators and top-level NASA officials. The belief within the administration was that 

this traditional coalition would not be able to deliver on President Bush’s ambitious 

request for a 24% increase in funding for the space agency or obtain approval to 

implement SEI. Senator Barbara Mikulski and Senator Jake Garn (chair and ranking member of the Appropriation Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent 

Agencies) had confirmed this opinion, warning the White House that the MoonMars initiative was particularly vulnerable in the current budgetary environment, 

absent strong intervention by the White House. Based on this advice, the White 

House plan was to have President Bush actively promote the initiative, both publicly and with top congressional powerbrokers.12 

On 1 May, after being delayed in mid-April by the death of Senator Spark Matsunaga (D-HI),13 the summit took place at the Old Executive Office Building. The 

event was attended by sixteen congressional participants14 and nearly twenty members of the White House staff.15 President Bush opened the meeting by affirming 

11 Andrew Lawler, “Space Summit Set for May: Bush, Quayle Invite Members of Congress to Talk 

Space,” Space News (23 April 1990), p. 1.

12 Mark Albrecht to Fred Mcclure, 16 April 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush 

Presidential Library; Jim Cicconi to President Bush, 30 April 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George 

Bush Presidential Library.

13 In 1986, Senator Matsunaga wrote The Mars Project, Journey Beyond the Cold War, an unabashed 

call for a wide-variety of joint space missions with the Soviet Union and other nations. Matsunaga was 

one of the U.S. Senate’s most outspoken proponents of outer space development.

14 The congressional participants included: Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole (R-KS), Senator 

Robert Byrd (D-WV), Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR), Senator John Danforth (R-MO), Senator 

Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), Senator Jake Garn (R-UT), Senator Howell Heflin (D-AL), House 

Speaker Thomas Foley (D-WA), House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO), House Minority 

Whip Newt Gingrich (R-GA), Representative Silvio Conte (R-MA), Representative Robert Traxler 

(D-MI), Representative Bill Green (R-NY), Representative Robert Roe (D-NJ), and Representative 

Robert Walker (R-PA).

15 The White House participants included: Chief of Staff John Sununu, National Security 

Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Deputy Chief of Staff Jim Cicconi, 

Communications Director David Demarest, Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, NSC Executive Secretary 

Mark Albrecht, and Chief of Staff to the Vice President Bill Kristol.
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answered critics that argued he lacked the vision of a great president.20 As he had 

done ten months earlier, he did not speak to the cost of achieving these lofty goals. 

When asked by reporters as he boarded Air Force One where the money would 

come from to fund the initiative he simply said, “Thirty years is a long time.”21

Coming in the wake of months of strategizing within the Space Council regarding 

how to get SEI back on it feet, this answer was most unsatisfying. It left the impression that either Bush was not fully engaged in the decisions that were being made 

with regard to space policy, or that the White House simply couldn’t produce a good 

answer to this fundamental question.

As had been the case with his speech announcing SEI the previous summer, 

the reaction to President Bush’s commencement address was not entirely positive. 

The New York Times complained he “did not give any estimate...of how much the 

program would cost. Nor did he discuss whether the mission would be mounted 

alone or with international partners.”22 The Washington Post quoted Senator Al Gore 

saying, “before the President sets out on his mission to Mars, he should embark on a 

mission to reality by giving us some even faint indication of where the $500 billion 

is going to come from.”23 Dick Malow actually felt that setting a 30-year timeframe 

weakened the initiative on Capitol Hill. It was the “antithesis of the whole Apollo 

idea. How do you spread an initiative like this over so many presidential administrations?”24 These reactions from key Democratic leaders pointed to the difficult 

position the administration still found itself in due to the expensive policy alternative generated within the 90-Day Study. Even some NASA officials felt that setting 

a timetable for the initiative was a mistake, believing it would drive costs up whereas 

a ‘go-as-you-pay’ program would have had a significantly reduced budgetary impact 

on an annual basis.25

Outside the Capitol Beltway, the speech seemed to play even worse. The editorial page of Salem, Oregon’s Statesman Journal contended, “A rocket trip to Mars 

begins on a foundation of common purpose and sound finances at home. A nation 

20 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 11 May 1990, Remarks at the Texas A&I 

University Commencement Ceremony in Kingsville, Texas, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/ (accessed 

2 January 2003).

21 Janet Cawley, “Bush Goal: Man on Mars by 2020,” The Chicago Tribune (12 May 1990); James 

Gerstenzang, “Bush Sets 2019 for Mars Landing,” The Philadelphia Inquirer (12 May 1990).

22 John Noble Wilford, “Bush Sets Target For Mars Landing: He Seeks to Send Astronauts to 

Planet by Year 2020,” The New York Times (12 May 1990).

23 Kathy Sawyer, “Bush Urges Mars Landing By 2019: Democrats Point to Money Problems,” The 

Washington Post (12 May 1990).

24 Malow interview.

25 O’Handley interview.

Mark Albrecht remembered the congressional position during the summit 

“hadn’t changed much, it pretty much remained the same—highly skeptical.” The 

participants indicated that while they were willing to provide money for studies, 

they did not believe there was enough justification for a major new program start. 

Instead, they wanted to see more detail regarding what the actual initiative would 

look like before they got fully behind the program.17 One senior congressional aide 

recalled, “By this time, Chairman Traxler was carrying the message around that ‘we 

can’t afford this given our allocation. We can’t do it.’ He was already negative about 

it, so coming out of there I don’t think he was convinced differently. Congress had 

already pretty much made up its mind.’”18

SEI Hits the Road

In early May, with congressional support still very much in doubt, the Space 

Council staff began preparing for President Bush to make a major space policy 

speech. The intention was that this address would provide some much needed focus 

for the program, and at the same time allay Congressional fears that Bush was committed to a $400 billion, crash program. Mark Albrecht recalled that by this time 

NASA had “leaked their numbers out to everybody on the Hill, attempting the 

crib death of this whole initiative. We still didn’t have the full support of the space 

agency, I don’t believe even at this time NASA was embracing it. I think they were 

more worried about the space station than they were interested in setting a new 

course.” To combat this behind the scenes attack, the White House decided that a 

presidential rebuttal was needed to make it clear that the Administration was not 

talking about a crash program19

On 11 May, ten days after the space summit, President Bush delivered the commencement address at Texas A&I University. He utilized this speech as an opportunity to discuss the role the national space program would play in America’s future. 

Bush told the assembled graduates that SEI formed the cornerstone of his far-reaching plan for investing in America’s future, saying, “Thirty years ago, NASA was 

founded, and the space race began. And 30 years from now I believe man will stand 

on another planet. And so, I am pleased to return to Texas today to announce a new 

Age of Exploration, with not only a goal but also a timetable: I believe that before 

Apollo celebrates the 50th anniversary of its landing on the Moon, the American 

flag should be planted on Mars.” With this speech, Bush set a timetable for SEI and 

17 Ibid.; Albrecht interview.

18 Senior Congressional Aide interview via electronic mail, Washington, DC, 15 December 2004.

19 Albrecht interview.
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In early June, at the fourth Case for Mars conference, an alternative emerged that 

would captivate Mars enthusiasts for years to come—and would work its way into 

NASA planning years later. The most talked about presentation of the symposium 

was delivered by Martin Marietta aerospace engineers Robert Zubrin and David 

Baker. Named ‘Mars Direct,’ their system architecture included several key elements 

designed to reduce mission costs and increase scientific return, including:

• Direct flight to and from the Martian surface (which eliminated the need

to use Space Station Freedom)

• No earth orbit or lunar orbit rendezvous (which eliminated the need for 

multiple spacecraft)

• Fueling of the Earth Return Vehicle using propellant generated on Mars 

from the atmosphere

• Extended operations on the Martian surface (up to 555 days)

Although this approach was considered a high risk alternative to the TSG architecture highlighted in the 90-Day Study, Zubrin and Baker argued Mars Direct would 

only cost $20 billion—approximately one-twentieth the price tag associated with 

the space agency plan. Because it was based on existing technologies packaged in an 

innovative system architecture, many in the space policy community viewed this as 

an option worth serious consideration.30

In mid-June, the Bush administration set in motion a flurry of events intended to 

garner public support for SEI. These activities were commenced largely in response 

to a House Appropriations subcommittee vote to eliminate all spending associated 

with the initiative.31 This lobbying effort began with a series of meetings to brief key 

actors within the space policy community. Held at the White House, the presentations were tailored to the corresponding audiences in a coordinated effort—with 

Vice President Quayle and Admiral Truly as the featured speakers. The message 

conveyed to a group of congressional staffers was that a failure to provide funding 

for SEI would create the impression that the United States lacked the political will to 

take risks to expand humanity’s reach into the solar system. Reporters that regularly 

Exploration Initiative Outreach Program,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 31 

May 1990, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Historical Archives; “Chronology of the 

President’s Space Exploration Initiative,” National Space Council, Bush Presidential Records, George 

Bush Presidential Library.

30 J. Sebastian Sinisi, “Forum Delegates Confident,” Denver Post (11 June 1990), sec.4B.

31 James Gerstenzang, “Bush Denounces NASA Fund Cuts,” The Los Angeles Times (21 June 1990), 

p. 28.

that doesn’t know how to balance its budget, reduce a $3 trillion deficit, and fight 

the decay of its citizens through the effects of drugs, disrupted families and crippled 

schools will never find the money and willpower to visit the heavens. Bush has given 

us an empty challenge. We should ask him to return to Texas and repeat the same 

speech. This time let him add a page at the beginning, one that spells out how this 

country can first get its feet back on the ground. Then we can head for Mars.”26 The 

response was no better in The Seattle Post-Intelligencer, where the opening line of an 

opinion editorial read, “Heigh-ho, heigh-ho, it’s off to space we go!”27 A letter the 

White House received from a local official in Kittery, Maine (just south of President 

Bush’s vacation home in Kennebunkport) suggested, “American pride will best be 

shown by meeting the needs of all the people here on Earth. $500 billion would 

make a good start.”28 Once again, this was not the reaction the administration was 

hoping to elicit from a presidential address on the importance of space exploration.

A few weeks later, Vice President Quayle met briefly with the person the Space 

Council hoped would be able to build confidence in SEI—Lieutenant General Tom 

Stafford (USAF-retired). Stafford was a former astronaut who commanded Apollo 

10, the ‘dress rehearsal’ for the first lunar landing mission, and the U.S. portion of 

the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. He had recently agreed to head the Exploration Outreach Program, which had been created by NASA in response to the Space 

Council request that the agency seek out new technical approaches that might reduce 

SEI’s implementation costs. Under this outreach effort, the space agency expected 

to obtain wide-ranging ideas through public solicitations, which would be evaluated 

by the RAND Corporation—a California-based think tank. The most promising 

of these proposals, and others directly from NASA, DOD, and DOE, would then 

go to a “Synthesis Group” headed by General Stafford. This group’s recommendations would be reviewed by the NRC and reported directly to the Space Council in 

early 1991. At the meeting with Stafford, Vice President Quayle expressed his belief 

that the Synthesis Group would serve as a vehicle for generating enthusiasm and 

support for SEI. He concluded the meeting by conveying his hope that the group 

would identify at least two fundamentally different approaches to carrying out the 

initiative.29

26 Editorial Board, “Empty Rhetoric Fuels Mars Talk,” The Statesman Journal (16 May 1990).

27 Henry Gay, “Reaching For Stars, Er, Mars,” The Seattle Post-Intelligencer (24 May 1990), sec.A15.

28 Maria S. Barth to President George Bush, 24 May 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George 

Bush Presidential Library.

29 Mark Albrecht to Vice President Dan Quayle, “Meeting with Lt. General Tom Stafford,” 

31 May 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Fact Sheet, “Space 
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Following the press conference, the President took the 

stage before a crowd of 4,000 

MSFC employees.35 President 

Bush opened his remarks by 

recalling his campaign speech 

at MSFC two and a half years 

earlier, during which he had 

vowed to launch a dynamic 

new program of exploration. 

“I’m pleased to return to Marshall to report that we have 

made good on these promises,” Bush said, “and we’ve 

done it the old-fashioned way, 

done it the American way—

step by step, program by program, all adding up to the most ambitious and farreaching effort since Marshall and Apollo took America to the Moon.” He criticized 

House Democrats for voting to deny funding for SEI-related concept and technology development, stating that partisan politics had led his opponents to turn their 

backs on progress. He compared them to naysayers in the Court of Queen Isabella 

who argued against Columbus’ voyage that discovered the New World. President 

Bush stated that during the Apollo era, significant funding for the space program 

had fostered a golden age of technology and advancement—one that he hoped 

would be equaled by a permanent return to the Moon and crewed missions to Mars. 

He concluded his remarks with a challenge for Congress “to step forth with the will 

that the moment requires. Don’t postpone greatness. History tells us what happens 

to nations that forget how to dream. The American people want us in space. So, let 

us continue the dream for our students, for ourselves, and for all humankind.”36

The day after President Bush spoke at MSFC, the administration coordinated a 

full day of events aimed at further building support for SEI. Newspapers throughout the nation contained opinion editorials written by supporters of the initiative, 

including: Representative Tom Lewis (R-FL) in the Orlando Sentinel; former astro35 Mark Albrecht to Jim Cicconi, “Background Materials, June 20 Marshall Space Flight Center 

Event,” 19 June 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

36 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 20 June 1990, Remarks to Employees of the 

George C. Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu /papers/ 

(accessed 2 January 2003).

President Bush at MSFC

(NASA History Division, Folder 12601)

covered NASA were told that SEI would produce significant economic, technical, 

and educational benefits for the nation. Finally, industry and academic leaders were 

informed that SEI would be part of an overarching administration strategy designed 

to foster innovation by permanently extending the research and experimentation tax 

credit and reducing regulatory burdens on corporations.32

These briefings were immediately followed by a major presidential address on 

space policy at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama. 

After attending a fundraising luncheon for Governor Guy Hunt, President Bush 

arrived at the center for a tour. This included a visit to the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Orbital Verification Engineering Control Room, where a NASA team 

was coordinating the adjustment and final checkout of the groundbreaking orbital 

observatory.33 Bush then conducted a full press conference on the center grounds. 

Despite the setting, the majority of the event was spent detailing the American 

response to ongoing unrest in the Middle East. However, Bush was asked a few 

questions regarding the national space program, among them one directed at SEI:

Q: A question about space. How serious are you about this lunar base and 

Mars mission proposal? Would you go so far as to veto the bill that contains NASA appropriations if Congress decides to delete all the money?

A: I haven’t even contemplated any veto strategy. I’d like to get what I 

want. I think it’s in the national interest. I think that the United States 

must remain way out front on science and technology; and this broad program that I’ve outlined, seed money that I’ve asked for, should be supported. But I think it’s way too early to discuss a veto strategy. We took 

one on the chops in a House committee the other day, and I’ve got to turn 

around now and fight for what I believe.34

32 Briefing, “White House Briefings on the Space Exploration Initiative,” 8 May 1990, Bush 

Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Charles Bacarisse and Sihan Siv to Fred 

McClure, “Briefing for Key Congressional Staff on NASA’s Space Exploration Initiative,” 10 May 

1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Charles Bacarisse to Bob Grady, 

“Briefings for Key Constituent Groups on the Space Exploration Initiative,” 5 June 1990, Bush 

Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Charles Bacarisse and Sichan Siv to Cece 

Kramer, 23 May 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

33 “Tour of Hubble Space Telescope Orbital Verification Engineering Control Center,” Ede Holiday, 

20 June 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

34 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 20 June 1990, The President’s News Conference 

in Huntsville, Alabama, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/ (accessed 2 January 2003).
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Two days after the HST revelation, NASA was forced to ground the entire space 

shuttle fleet because the Columbia and Atlantis had developed deadly hydrogen 

leaks. NASA was forced to admit that they did not know the cause of the leaks, 

although one possibility was a misalignment between the external tank and the 

orbiter vehicles. Program managers announced that expert teams of engineers were 

working feverishly to solve the problem before at least two missions were postponed 

to make way for the upcoming launch of the Ulysses spacecraft—a probe designed 

to study the sun. Coming on the heels of the HST announcement, this effectively 

killed any energy generated by recent administration activities designed to garner 

support for SEI.42 The Washington Post opined, “the failure of the telescope, which 

two months ago rode into space amid great fanfare in the hold of a Space Shuttle, 

led more than a few Americans to wonder whether their country can get anything 

right anymore. The questioning became even more poignant...when the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration announced that the shuttles, too, would be 

grounded indefinitely because of vexing and dangerous fuel leakages. [These problems] may foster beliefs that the United States is a sunset power, incapable of repeating its technological feats of the past.”43 On Capitol Hill, Dick Malow recalled 

thinking that these problems greatly hampered the administration’s ability to make 

a case for SEI. “There were a lot of other things on NASA’s plate and that hiccup 

certainly was a detractor. Given the budget environment, Hubble became the focus 

and SEI tended to get pushed back” on the congressional agenda.44

During this same period, the House Appropriations Committee released its 

mark-up of NASA’s budget. Although the space agency would receive a significant 

overall increase of $2.1 billion ($800 million less than the president’s request), the 

entire budget for SEI was eliminated. Fears that had been raised during budget 

hearings in April were confirmed. The committee had surgically removed all new 

monies associated with the initiative (see Table on next page).

Instrument in Space is Crippled by Flaw in a Mirror,” The New York Times (27 June 1990), sec.A1; 

Bob Davis, “NASA Finds Hubble Mirror is Defective,” The Wall Street Journal (28 June 1990).

42 Joyce Price, “Chief Calls NASA Funding ‘Crucial for U.S. Survival,” The Washington Times (3 

July 1990).

43 John Burgess, “Can U.S. Get Things Right Anymore? Hubble Telescope, Space Shuttle Problems 

Raise Questions About American Technology,” The Washington Post (3 July 1990).

44 Malow interview.

naut Buzz Aldrin in the Los Angeles Times; Dartmouth University Professor Robert 

Jastrow in the Baltimore Sun; and former astronaut Eugene Cernan in the Houston Chronicle.

37 On Capitol Hill, Representatives Bob Walker and Newt Gingrich 

hosted a press conference praising Bush for his leadership with regard to the American space program. On the Senate floor, Senator Jake Garn formally introduced 

the program and Senators Bob Dole, Phil Gramm, and Malcolm Wallop spoke 

on SEI’s behalf. In the late afternoon Vice President Quayle appeared in a series 

of satellite interviews in targeted states, including California, Florida, Texas, and 

Virginia. Finally, the Republican National Committee released radio actualities in 

key districts around the country.38,39 By mid-June, there was a feeling that “SEI was 

gaining momentum.”40

Losing Faith in NASA

Despite any progress that may have been made during mid-June, the emergence 

of a series of crises at the end of the month halted any momentum the administration had gained. On 26 June, NASA held a press conference to reveal that its engineers had discovered a crippling flaw in the main light gathering mirrors of the $1.5 

billion HST. The space agency reported that this defect would mean the largest and 

most complex civilian orbiting observatory ever launched would not be able to view 

the depths of space until a permanent correction could be made—which would 

likely have to wait two to three years for an astronaut visit with newly manufactured 

parts. Although many of the instruments aboard the HST would still be functional, 

the impacted wide-field and planetary camera would be inoperable (reducing by 

40% the planned scientific work of the platform). Project managers announced they 

suspected the problem was in one of two precisely ground mirrors, although they 

were not sure which one. The two mirrors had tested perfectly on Earth, but once in 

orbit, they failed to perform together as expected—they were not tested together on 

the ground because of the huge potential expense and inability to replicate a zero-g 

environment. Associate Administrator for Space Science Dr. Lennard Fisk disclosed 

that the agency was forming a review board to investigate the problem.41

37 Earlier in the week, Roll Call had dedicated an entire issue to the space program, with opposing 

views expressed on SEI from Senator Jake Garn (pro) and Senator Al Gore (con).

38 A radio actuality is a group of sound bites sent out to radio stations to be used in news reports.

39 “Moon/Mars Initiative,” 19 June 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential 

Library.

40 O’Handley interview.

41 Warren E. Leary, “Hubble Telescope Loses Large Part of Optical Ability: Most Complex 
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seemed to be grounded all the time with fuel leaks; the mirror on the Hubble telescope couldn’t focus; and the agency was pushing a space station design that was so 

overblown it looked as if we were asking to launch a big white elephant. The mood 

at the Space Council was grim.... I was searching for a solution for NASA.”49 On 

11 July, Vice President Quayle invited a group of space experts (including Tom 

Paine, Gene Cernan, Dr. Bruce Murray from the California Institute of Technology, 

and Dr. Hans Mark of the University of Texas) aboard Air Force Two for a meeting 

to discuss the systemic problems with NASA. He asked for opinions regarding the 

appropriate actions, if any, the administration should take. During the meeting, 

an idea emerged to establish a task force to examine how the space program could 

be restructured to better support an era of sustained long-term space operations. 

Quayle liked the idea.

Six days later, Vice President Quayle hosted a second meeting at the White House 

with senior administration officials Bill Kristol, Mark Albrecht, Admiral Truly, and 

Chief of Staff Sununu to discuss procedures to create such a panel. Quayle recalled 

in his memoirs:

I wanted [the study] to get NASA moving again. If that was going to 

happen, then the commission had to have the authority to look into every 

aspect of the space agency. The result was a long negotiation about the 

commission’s scope. Truly’s original position was that it should look only 

at the future management structure of NASA—that is, what would come 

after the space station was built. “No,” I said, “it will look at the current 

management situation.” Truly next tried to exempt programs from review, 

and I said “No, programs will be reviewed as well.” He asked that the space 

station be “off the table” and said that we would all be better served if both 

it and the Moon-Mars missions were off limits to the commission. In other 

words, the commission shouldn’t pay attention to all the most important 

things we were trying to do during the next couple of decades. “I’m sorry,” 

I said to Truly, “but everything is on the table, and let the chips fall where 

they may....” I tried to soothe Truly’s feelings by making the commission 

report through him to me.

By the end of the meeting, Quayle had directed Truly to put together an outside 

task force to consider the future long-term direction of the space program. That 

same afternoon the White House announced the creation of the board. On 25 

49 Quayle, Standing Firm, p. 184.

Space Station (advanced programs) $20M

Advanced Launch System $40M

Heavy-Lift Vehicle $10M

LifeSat/Centrifuge $8M

Lunar Observer $15M

Exploration Mission Studies $37M

Pathfinder Program $154M

Civil Space Technology Initiative $45M

TOTAL $329M

The budget report indicated that the Space Shuttle and Space Station programs 

should remain NASA’s top priorities. It stated that even if additional funds became 

available in the future, they should be directed toward these important programs 

rather than being targeted at SEI.45 Chairman Traxler was quoted in the Washington Post saying, “We didn’t have the money.”46 The Senate Commerce Committee promptly followed suit with the release of an authorization bill that similarly 

eliminated funding for SEI. Senator Al Gore, who authored the legislation, said he 

feared that funding the initiative would endanger on-going efforts, in particular the 

Mission to Planet Earth.47

By early July, NASA was clearly reeling from this series of setbacks—with SEI 

a clear casualty, and in some respects a cause, of the outspoken criticism focused 

on the agency. The view within the White House was that the space program had 

been terribly crippled.48 In his memoirs, Vice President Quayle wrote, “The Shuttle 

45 U.S. House of Representatives, 101st Congress, 2d sess., “Report 101-556: Departments of 

Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations 

Bill, 1991,” 26 June 1990; U.S. House of Representatives, 101st Congress, 2d sess., “H.R. 5158,” 26 

June 1990.

46 Dan Morgan, “Panel Boosts NASA Funds 17 Percent: Moon-Mars Mission Cut $300 Million, 

Higher-Priority Items Backed,” The Washington Post (27 June 1990), sec.A4.

47 James W. Brosnan, “Senate Panel Cuts Funds for Mars Trip From NASA Budget,” The Commercial 

Appeal (28 June 1990), sec.A12.

48 Albrecht interview.

SEI Budget Cuts
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The following month, House-Senate conference report was released, confirming the 

elimination of all funding for the initiative.52 The real world result of these budget 

cuts was the death, at least from a congressional perspective, of SEI.

Dick Malow recalled, “because of the budget crunch SEI was an easy target. By 

that time, it became viewed as a non-starter. We were barely able to fund Station 

and were supporting Shuttle strongly. Given the budget climate we couldn’t spend 

$400 billion. The initiative started to fall off the cliff by the middle of 1990. The 

Administration kept going through the motions, but SEI basically went from birth 

to death in twelve to fifteen months, and was never heard from again. Station, on 

the other hand, was continually pushed by the administration.”53 Stephen Kohashi 

concurred with this assessment, remembering, “the primary concern regarding the 

FY 1991 NASA appropriation was having to deal with the rising cost profile of 

previously initiated projects such as the Space Station, Earth Observation System, 

and space science missions. No one had the stomach to commit to another program 

start, no matter how modest the initial price given the relative magnitude of outyear costs.”54

The only good news during this period was the decision by the House and Senate 

authorization committees to reinstate a small amount of funding for SEI-related 

research. In middle November, the authorizers approved $21 million for exploration mission studies. The purpose of these analyses was to “seek innovative technologies that will make possible advanced human exploration initiatives, such as the 

establishment of a lunar base and the succeeding mission to Mars, and provide high 

yield technology advancements for the national economy....”55 This would prove to 

be the only funding the initiative ever received.

The Augustine and Synthesis Group Reports

In early December, with the Advisory Committee on the Future of U.S. Space 

Policy largely finished with its report, Vice President Quayle held a celebratory 

dinner at his official residence for the panelists. What was planned to be a salutation 

for a job well done, however, quickly became a working session that repackaged 

52 U.S. House of Representatives, 101st Congress, 2d sess., “Report 101-900: Making 

Appropriations for the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and 

for Sundry Independent Agencies, Commissions, Corporations, and Offices for Fiscal Year Ending 

September 30, 1991, and for Other Purposes,” 18 October 1990.

53 Ibid.; “High Hopes Plunge Under an Onslaught of Budget Cuts,” The Associated Press (23 

December 1990); Malow interview.

54 Kohashi interview.

55 U.S. Senate, 101st Congress, 2d sess., “Public Law 101-611,” 16 November 1990.

July, the White House announced that Martin Marietta CEO Norm Augustine 

had been selected to chair the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space 

Program. The 12-member task force was charged with reporting its findings within 

120 days.50 For all intents and purposes, combined with the work being conducted 

by Tom Stafford’s Synthesis Group, this put SEI on hold for the foreseeable future.

Perhaps the final blow for SEI came when final House-Senate budget deliberations began a few months later. In early September, upholding the cuts that appropriators had made earlier, the Senate released a bill that eliminated all funding for 

SEI. The Senate’s intent was to maintain NASA’s core programs and remove any 

funding for new projects. The report accompanying the bill explained the Senate’s 

motivation for eliminating support for SEI:

...the Committee recommendation includes no funds for the Moon-Mars 

initiative because of the very severe limits imposed upon the overall NASA 

budget.... The large increase recommended by the President’s budget...

simply cannot be accommodated within a framework that restrains 

all domestic discretionary programs at the level insisted upon by the 

administration.... The Committee believes that it is premature to proceed 

with an extensive planning and technology program oriented toward 

a manned mission to return to the Moon and then to Mars without a 

clear, sustainable revenue source available for such an undertaking. NASA’s 

preliminary studies on a manned mission to the Moon and Mars estimate a 

total program cost of over $500,000,000,000. The Committee believes that 

these figures will likely underestimate the potential cost of such a mission, 

and believe that moving on such an initiative, in the absence of providing a 

way to pay for it, is ill-advised in an era of enormous fiscal constraint.51

50 Mark Albrecht to Vice President Quayle, “Meeting on Air Force II with Space Experts”, 10 July 

1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Mark Albrecht to Vice President 

Quayle, 13 July 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Press Release, 

The White House, Office of the Vice President, 16 July 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George 

Bush Presidential Library; “White House Considers Inquiry Into NASA: Spokesman Says Panel 

May Redirect Agency,” The Washington Post (15 July 1990); Press Release, The White House, Office 

of the Vice President, 25 July 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; 

Mark Albrecht to Arnold Kanter, 25 July 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential 

Library.

51 U.S. Senate, 101st Congress, 2d sess., “Report 101-474: Departments of Veterans Affairs 

and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Bill, 1991,” 26 

September 1990; David Rogers, “Senate Panel Cuts Most New Funding for NASA Project,” The Wall 

Street Journal (14 September 1990), sec. A16; Helen Dewar, “Budget Vote Disappoints Space Backers,” 

The Washington Post (26 September 1990), sec. A10.
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selected centers to Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 

affiliated with universities, using as a model the Jet Propulsion Laboratory

• Redesigning Space Station Freedom to lessen complexity and reduce cost

• Pursuing a Mission from Planet Earth as a complement to Mission to

Planet Earth, with the former having Mars exploration as its long-term 

goal and adopting a go-as-you-pay funding strategy 

• Reducing dependence on the Space Shuttle by phasing over to a new 

unmanned heavy-lift launch vehicle for all but missions requiring human 

presence.

Although the panel felt it was premature to set a timetable for a crewed mission to 

the red planet, it did believe that Mars exploration was a valuable long-term goal 

for the space program because large organizations operate better when they have a 

challenging objective to guide future planning. The report itself stated that without 

the existence of an enduring aspiration, “we would lose the jewel represented by 

the vision of a seemingly unattainable goal, the technologies engendered, and the 

motivation provided to our nation’s scientists and engineers, its laboratories and 

industries, its students and its citizens.”58

At a press conference following the Space Council meeting, Vice President Quayle 

declared his support for the recommendations. He communicated his intention to 

task the Space Council and OMB staffs to prepare a specific plan for implementing the reports recommendations within 30 days.59 Quayle wrote later, “The report 

the Commission submitted...was, no matter how politely phrased and presented, 

devastating. ‘Among the concerns that have most often been heard,’ it noted, ‘has 

been the suggestion that the civil space program has gradually become afflicted with 

some of the same ailments that are found in many other large, mature institutions, 

particularly those institutions which have no direct and immediate competition to 

stimulate change.’ The Space Council was now the competition, at least when it 

came to making policy, and we wanted the programs to be cheaper, smaller, and 

faster.”60 The Space Council staff actually thought the report wasn’t hard enough on 

NASA. Mark Albrecht recalled the findings were “a little milder than we had hoped 

for and anticipated, but were considered quite strong in the community at large.”61

58 See note above.

59 Talking Points, “Augustine Committee Press Conference,” 10 December 1990, Bush Presidential 

Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

60 Quayle, Standing Firm, pp. 185-186. 

61 Albrecht interview.

the group’s findings. Over dinner, Quayle asked what exciting new projects the 

committee was going to propose. Norm Augustine told him that they had ranked 

five space endeavors in order of priority: space science, technology development, 

Earth science, creation of a new launch vehicle to replace the space shuttle, and 

human exploration of Mars. Following a general discussion, OMB Director Richard Darman lectured the group on how budget priorities worked. Listing something last, he said, was an invitation to eliminate it. He asked rhetorically whether 

the commission really wished to announce to Congress and the public that space 

exploration was so unimportant that it could be scrapped. As the dessert course 

was served, the panel members agreed to recast their report—space science would 

remain the top priority, but the report would articulate the need for a balanced program and would not prioritize the remaining project areas. As Darman left for the 

evening, his farewell to Quayle was, “Thank you for a fine dinner, Dan. Good thing 

I came. I saved your damn report.”56

On 10 December, Norm Augustine presented the findings and recommendations of the advisory panel to the full Space Council. The group’s most important 

finding was that the space program needed to shift its fundamental rationale from 

one dominated by national prestige, national security, and foreign policy (although 

these remained contributing motivations) to one predicated on global economic 

competitiveness and environmental protection. The committee determined that a 

reinvigorated space program would require increases in the NASA budget of 10% 

annually, reaching a peak of $30 billion by the end of the decade. This appropriation level would support science and technology programs, Mission to Planet Earth 

(MTPE), Space Station Freedom, a new heavy-lift launcher, and SEI. The panel 

concluded, however, that if NASA could not obtain authorization from the Administration and Congress at this level, then MTPE and SEI should be scaled back (if 

not eliminated).57 Based on these findings, the advisory committee made five overarching recommendations:

• Sustaining space science programs as the highest priority element of the 

civil space program

• Obtaining exclusions for a portion of NASA's employees from existing 

civil service rules or, failing that, beginning a gradual conversion of 

56 David S. Broder and Bob Woodward, “When the Vice President is Chairman: Debating 

Direction of Space Programs,” The Washington Post (9 January 1992), sec. A16.

57 Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1990); Mark Albrecht to Vice President Quayle, 7 December 1990, 

Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
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chemical in-space propulsion systems, the latter favored nuclear-thermal systems—

this was the fundamental technological difference between the TSG and Synthesis 

Group. The architectural options introduced by Stafford’s panel included:

• Mars Exploration: the major objective of this architecture was to 

conduct scientific exploration of Mars, while the emphasis of activities 

performed on the Moon was primarily to prepare for Mars missions

• Science Emphasis for the Moon and Mars: this architecture’s prime 

focus was balanced scientific return from both the Moon and Mars 

missions, both robotic and human

• Moon to Stay and Mars Exploration: this architecture emphasized 

permanent human presence on the Moon, combined with Mars 

exploration, to promote long term human habitation and exploration in 

space

• Space Resource Utilization: this architecture emphasized the 

development of lunar resources to provide energy for Earth and the 

production of propellants for lunar and solar system exploration.

The first three architectures progressed in both complexity and resource requirements (although no actual budget estimates were provided), with the third being the 

closest to the basic reference approach introduced in the 90-Day Study. After receiving the report, the administration chose to evaluate it for a month before releasing 

it publicly. In early June, 40,000 copies of the colorful 180-page document were 

circulated to the media, industry, educators, government agencies, and international 

organizations.65

Reaction to the Synthesis Group report was decidedly mixed. Some believed it 

provided the alternatives the 90-Day Study had not, while others contended it was 

woefully short on crucial details. Vice President Quayle believed it would serve as a 

valuable tool in making the case for increased funding for space exploration. George 

Washington University’s John Logsdon, on the other hand, argued the report was “a 

validation of NASA’s argument that there aren’t a lot of bright new ideas out there 

that it hasn’t considered.” By far the most verbalized criticism of the report was that 

it provided no cost estimates for the various architectures it introduced. Regardless, 

the study had little chance of positively impacting the implementation of SEI. By 

the time the report came out, the initiative was no longer politically viable. The 

65 America at the Threshold: America’s Space Exploration Initiative, Report of the Synthesis Group on 

American’s Space Exploration Initiative,” May 1991; David S.F. Portree, Romance to Reality: Moon and 

Mars Plans, available from members.aol.com/dsportree/VH11.htm (accessed 10 February 2003).

Press reaction to the Augustine report was relatively muted, mainly because 

everyone seemed to agree that the committee had assembled a thoughtful collection of recommendations. The Administration was content and Congress seemed 

to be equally happy. Dick Malow recalled that it was “generally considered to be an 

excellent study. It was well received, particularly because there was a strong emphasis 

on science.”62 Representative Bill Nelson, Chairman of the House Space Subcommittee, called it “the report of the decade.” Early rumblings within NASA, however, 

signaled that the agency’s engineers and managers were not entirely happy with 

the report—particularly with regard to the Shuttle. While praising the study in 

general terms, Admiral Truly expressed his reluctance to condemn the Shuttle. In 

fact, he urged the administration to consider building a fifth orbiter and to preserve 

the capability to build additional spacecraft. This signaled a continued disconnect 

between the strategic direction of the Space Council and NASA.63

After the report was released, even outspoken supporters of human spaceflight 

were saying that it was time to put plans for lunar and Martian exploration on 

hold. Former NASA Administrator Thomas Paine (a member of the Advisory Committee) was quoted saying “the ’90s are going to be a decade of rethinking and 

regrouping.” Ray Williamson from the Office of Technology Assessment concurred, 

stating “Humans to Mars is much more a question of when than if. But a realization is percolating through the space community that we had better back off. I 

think the budget issues will force rethinking as to the balance between manned and 

unmanned missions.” Former Director General of the European Space Agency Roy 

Gibson opined that “we are quite likely to cause European ministerial support for 

space to decline further if this moment is chosen for a clarion call for a new mammoth [human] space spectacular.” The concern in Europe seemed to be that SEI 

would detract attention from Space Station Freedom, to which the international 

partners had already committed time and resources.64

The following May, with SEI in a basically lifeless state, the Synthesis Group 

submitted its final report to the White House. Unlike the TSG, the panel focused 

its architectures on specific strategic goals—which provided policy makers with a 

somewhat enhanced set of alternatives. Like the TSG, however, the group based all 

of its options on a singe technical approach. While the former group had focused on 

62 Malow interview.

63 Mark Carreau, “Panel Wants to Phase Out Space Shuttle: White House Backs Changes That 

Will Transform NASA,” The Houston Chronicle (11 December 1990), p. 1.

64 Robert C. Cowen, “Manned Space Programs Ger Message: Throttle Back,” Christian Science 

Monitor (19 December 1990), p. 1.
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time it was early February 1992.68

On 10 February, at about five 

o’clock in the afternoon, Truly 

was once again summoned to the 

White House—this time to the 

Oval Office. After a half hour 

with President Bush, he finally 

agreed to submit his resignation. 

As with most other major space 

policy decisions made by the Bush 

administration, there were mixed 

reactions to the decision to fire 

Admiral Truly. Many space policy 

experts were not terribly surprised 

by the White House move. John 

Logsdon (a newly appointed member of the Vice President’s Space Advisory Board) 

told The Washington Post that Truly “did an extremely valuable job in getting the 

Shuttles flying again, and restoring a sense of integrity to the agency...[however], 

Truly’s vision of the future was not compatible with the realities of the world.” 

Others were troubled by the signal this forced resignation sent regarding the future 

course of the space program. Senator Al Gore was quoted saying, “I view this as a 

very troubling sign that...Quayle’s Space Council may have forced Admiral Truly 

to leave this job because of the [Space Council’s] insistence on running NASA from 

the Vice President’s office.”69

The day after Truly stepped down, President Bush stopped Mark Albrecht in 

the hallway as the former was on his way to a meeting. “Your job,” the President 

told him, “is to get me the best NASA Administrator in history, and do it before 

Truly’s resignation is effective.” Truly was to resign effective 1 April, which meant 

that Albrecht only had 45 days to have a replacement in place—which would mean 

a faster confirmation process than anyone during the entire course of the Bush 

presidency. Within a few days, Albrecht had compiled a short list of potential can68 Ibid.

69 Richard H. Truly to President George Bush, 10 February 1992, Bush Presidential Records, 

George Bush Presidential Library; President George Bush to Richard H. Truly, 12 February 1992, 

Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Kathy Sawyer, “Truly Fired as NASA 

Chief, Apparently at Quayle Behest: Ex-Astronaut Feuded With Space Council,” The Washington Post

(13 February 1992), sec. A1; William J. Broad, “NASA Chief Quits in Policy Conflict,” The New York 

Times (13 February 1992), sec. A1; Craig Covault, “White House to Restructure Space Program: Truly 

Fired,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (17 February 1992), p. 18.

Admiral Truly, President Bush, and J.R. Thompson 

(Folder 12601, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Division, Washington, DC)

White House was not focusing on SEI as a means to reform NASA. Instead, the 

Space Council was taking initial actions intended to change the space agency’s leadership.66

SEI Fades Away

In September 1991, two years of White House frustration with Admiral Truly 

came to a head when NASA Deputy Administrator J.R. Thompson tendered his resignation. The job was a presidential appointment and provided the Space Council 

with an opportunity to select someone who would support President Bush’s vision 

for the future. Mark Albrecht was responsible for making the selection, but was surprised to find that no one would take the position as long as Admiral Truly remained 

administrator. Despite being an outspoken critic of the administrator, Albrecht was 

surprised by how widespread anti-Truly feelings were. After briefing Vice President 

Quayle regarding the status of the search, he was asked to assess whether there was 

support for Truly’s removal. In early December, Quayle and Albrecht met with three 

former NASA administrators—Jim Beggs, Thomas Paine, and Jim Fletcher. During 

the course of the meeting each of the three reiterated a common message—Truly 

had to go.67

After conferring with President Bush, Vice President Quayle summoned Admiral Truly to the White House and requested that he step aside as administrator. 

He offered to appoint Truly to any open ambassadorship in the world in exchange 

for his resignation. The administrator said he would consider the proposal. A few 

days later, however, he sent a message to the Quayle stating he would not resign. 

“Then he went into utter radio silence for a week, maybe two weeks,” remembers a 

Quayle staffer. Then, out of the blue, Albrecht received a phone call from the newly 

appointed White House Chief of Staff, Samuel Skinner. Apparently Truly had made 

an appointment with Skinner, in an attempt to plead his case. Quayle and Albrecht 

were outraged at the administrator’s audacity. It was even more startling, however, 

when Truly again refused to resign when Skinner reiterated Quayle’s earlier resignation request. “I want to hear it from the President’s lips,” Truly told Skinner. By this 

66 Warren E. Leary, “Panel Says Much Research is Needed Now to Reach Mars by 2014,” The New 

York Times (12 June 1991), p. 25; Kathy Sawyer, “Build Nuclear-Powered Rocket for Mars Mission, 

Panel Urges: Experts’ Report Offers NASA ‘New Approaches,’” The Washington Post (12 June 1991), 

sec. A2; Edwin Chen, “U.S. Mars Visit by 2014, Station on Moon Urged: Presidential Panel Unveils a 

Controversial Program that Includes Nuclear-Powered Rockets,” The Los Angeles Times (12 June 1991), 

p. 1; Paul Hoversten, “Panel Proposes Paths to Moon, Mars,” Gannet News Service (11 June 1991).

67 Bryan Burrough, Dragonfly: NASA and the Crisis Aboard Mir (New York, NY: HarperCollins 

Publishers, 1998), pp. 239-243.
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One night Goldin mentioned to Albrecht that, by the way, did it matter 

that he was a registered Democrat?

Albrecht nearly choked. “Dan, you are to tell no one this,” he said. “Do you 

understand? No one.”

Albrecht hung up and phoned Quayle. “I’ve got fabulous news, he told the 

Vice President. “Dan Goldin is a registered Democrat.”

“You are kidding me.”

“No, I’m not.”

And then Dan Quayle chuckled and mentioned the obvious. In that case, Goldin 

ought to sail through his confirmation hearings in the Democrat-controlled 

Senate.

On 11 March, with this issue settled, the White House announced that it was putting Dan Goldin forward as its nominee to be the next administrator of NASA.71

Overall, the response to Dan Goldin after he arrived in Washington and began 

making the rounds on Capitol Hill was extremely positive. “The general reaction to 

Goldin,” said one backer, “was, ‘Jesus, who the hell was that guy? He’s great! Where 

did you find him?’” During his senatorial confirmation hearings the panel greeted 

him warmly, but cautioned that he was walking into a budget mess. Goldin told the 

committee he intended to sharpen accountability and control costs in NASA programs in a way that would win more stable funding support in Congress. Responding to concerns that he would simply be a Space Council puppet, Goldin stated, “I 

will be in charge of NASA.” Goldin was approved overwhelmingly with a mandate 

for change from both the White House and Congress. On the afternoon of 1 April, 

Goldin was sworn-in during a brief ceremony in the Oval Office.72 Seven months 

later, President Bush was defeated for reelection by Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton.

While it was initially unclear where President Clinton stood on space, although 

71 Ibid.

72 Burrough, Dragonfly: NASA and the Crisis Aboard Mir, pp.243-245; Lambright, Transforming 

Government: Dan Goldin and the Remaking of NASA, pp. 14-15; Kathy Sawyer, “NASA Nominee 

Praised at Confirmation Hearing: Committee Members Warn Goldin About Likely Budgetary, 

Political Problems Ahead,” The Washington Post (28 March 1992), sec. A6; Ede Holiday to President 

George Bush, “Swearing-in Ceremony for NASA Administrator Dan S. Goldin”, 1 April 1992, Bush 

Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

didates. Everyone on the list was well known within the space policy community, 

except for one name that quickly rose to the top of the heap. Dan Goldin was a 

relatively obscure middle manager at TRW who a few years earlier had pitched an 

idea for a smaller, cheaper version of the NASA Earth Observation System (EOS). A 

mechanical engineer who received his B.S. from City College of New York in 1962, 

Goldin’s first job after graduating was at NASA’s Lewis Research Center—where 

he dreamed of sending humans to Mars. Within five years, however, he left the 

agency to join TRW and work on classified defense programs. He was a rising star 

at the company, and in the mid-1980s became heavily engaged in the nation’s toppriority Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Early in the Bush administration, the 

National Space Council staff took note of Goldin’s dynamic and innovative policies at TRW—particularly his use of very advanced microelectronic technology to 

launch smaller spacecraft. Albrecht and Vice President Quayle believed Goldin was 

exactly what the agency needed, someone willing to shake things up and get results. 

Albrecht recalled having dinner with Goldin and thinking, “this is a keeper, he 

understands the confluence between technology and risk and cost and schedule.” 

Albrecht became Goldin’s biggest champion within the White House. “I always 

wanted Dan to be the guy,” Albrecht remembered, “I kept sending the Vice President lists of names and it always had Dan Goldin on it.”70

The bigger question the administration faced was whether Goldin, or anyone for 

that matter, would want to take on the position of NASA administrator. With President Bush’s approval ratings down in an election year, anyone who chose to take 

the position could easily find themselves out of a job if the Democrats retook the 

White House in November. For Goldin in particular, who had a high paying job in 

industry, there seemed to be a lot of reasons to stay put in California. Regardless, he 

was ready for a move and was flattered by the presidential offer. More importantly, 

he still maintained the love affair with space that he had when he joined NASA in 

the early 1960s—and he still wanted America to go to Mars. Thus, in early March, 

he decided to take his chances and agreed to accept the nomination to head the 

space agency. Just before his nomination was submitted, however, a small problem 

emerged. In his book Dragonfly: NASA and the Crisis Aboard Mir, author Bryan 

Burrough detailed an astonishing interaction between Goldin and his White House 

sponsors in early March.

70 Burrough, Dragonfly: NASA and the Crisis Aboard Mir, pp. 243-245; W. Henry 

Lambright, Transforming Government: Dan Goldin and the Remaking of NASA (Arlington, VA: 

PriceWaterhouseCoopers Endowment for the Business of Government, 2001), pp. 14-15; Albrecht 

interview.
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Chapter 5: The Battle to Save SEI

policy since the end of the Cold War. The policy stated the United States would 

maintain a global leadership role by supporting a strong, stable, and balanced 

national space program. It presented five goals for the space program:

• Enhance knowledge of the Earth, the solar system, and the universe 

through human and robotic exploration; 

• Strengthen and maintain the national security of the United States; 

• Enhance the economic competitiveness, and scientific and technical 

capabilities of the United States; 

• Encourage State, local, and private sector investment in, and use of,

space technologies;

• Promote international cooperation to further U.S. domestic, national 

security, and foreign policies.

Explicitly missing from the document was any mention of human exploration 

beyond Earth orbit. The document simply stated that “the international space station would support future decisions on the feasibility and desirability of conducting 

further human exploration activities.” On a campaign swing through the Pacific 

Northwest the day after the document was released, President Clinton said the 

goal of a human mission to Mars early in the next century was too expensive to 

pursue, and instead affirmed America’s commitment to a series of less expensive 

robotic probes, the first of which was scheduled to land on the planet the following 

summer. White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry told reporters that ambitions 

for human exploration of Mars, which would cost upwards of $100 billion, had met 

with the hard reality of the national budget. “We’re not abandoning that concept,” 

McCurry said. “What we believe is that in the era that we’re managing our space 

exploration resources prudently, we ought to establish sufficient grounds for that 

type of commitment of resources. To commit those kinds of resources now, lacking 

a scientific basis for that, the President doesn’t think is justified.” Thus, in the early 

fall of 1996, human exploration of Mars vanished from the national space policy 

agenda.78

78 The White House, National Science and Technology Council, “Fact Sheet: National Space 

Policy,” 19 September 1996; Brian McGrory, “Clinton Curbs Mars Project: Drops Manned Mission, 

Backs Robotic Probes,” The Boston Globe (20 September 1996), sec. A25; Kathy Sawyer, “White House 

Releasing New National Space Policy: Robots, Not Astronauts, May Travel to Mars,” The Washington 

Post (19 September 1996), sec. A29.

he had supported continuation of space station program during the election, it 

became obvious early in his tenure that the American space program was not a top 

priority on his agenda. Within weeks of taking office, he disbanded the National 

Space Council and tasked Vice President Al Gore with directing national space 

policy. Gore had been very impressed with Dan Goldin during the latter’s confirmation hearings the previous spring, which explains why Goldin was the highest 

ranking Bush appointee to remain in place under the new administration.73 In early 

February 1993, the fate of the American human spaceflight effort became shockingly clear when Goldin was summoned to the White House. During a meeting 

with OMB Director Leon Panetta, the administrator was informed that President 

Clinton’s budget would cut funding for the space agency by 20%. As a result, there 

was no alternative but to kill the Space Station program.74 “The blood drained out 

of my face,” Goldin later remembered. Before the meeting ended, however, Goldin 

had successfully lobbied for a few days to prepare a working budget that would 

maintain a commitment to the Space Station. He believed without the Station, 

NASA had no future—and would certainly never make it to Mars.75

Over the subsequent weekend, Goldin summoned key NASA staffers from 

around the country to a crisis meeting in suburban Virginia. Over the course of a 

sleepless 72-hours, the team generated three alternatives for shrinking the existing 

Station plans. The following Monday, Goldin used a collection of Lego building 

blocks to build primitive models of Plan A and Plan B, and a single cardboard toiletpaper holder for Plan C. That Tuesday, he used the mock-ups at a briefing for President Clinton’s senior staff. He was pleasantly surprised at the end of the meeting to 

get the go-ahead to fully develop the three new options within 90 days in an emergency redesign effort. The space station eventually avoided cancellation, although 

its budget was slashed by $7 billion over five years. The Clinton administration 

later brought the Russians into the program as partners on what was renamed the 

International Space Station—this program became the primary human spaceflight 

initiative for the remainder of the decade.76 It was clear that the Clinton administration had no desire to fund human exploration of the Moon and Mars.77

Over three years later, in September 1996, the White House National Science 

and Technology Council released the first comprehensive revision of national space 

73 Lambright, Transforming Government: Dan Goldin and the Remaking of NASA, p. 17.

74 Panetta had been trying to cancel the station program for years while serving in the House of 

Representatives.

75 Burrough, Dragonfly: NASA and the Crisis Aboard Mir, pp. 262-264.

76 Ibid.

77 Lambright, Transforming Government: Dan Goldin and the Remaking of NASA, p. 20.

“Some say the space program should wait—that we should only go 

forward once the social problems of today are completely solved. But 

history proves that attitude is self-defeating...Many an American 

schoolkid has read the story of Columbus’ doubters, and shook their 

heads in disbelief that these naysayers could have been so

shortsighted. We must not let the schoolchildren of the future

shake their heads at our behavior.”

President George Bush, 20 June 1990

As was discussed in the first chapter of this book, John Kingdon’s Policy Streams 

Model and Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones’s Punctuated Equilibrium Model

epitomize an innovative approach to analyzing agenda setting and policy formation. 

Both models were developed because there was a sense that political scientists and 

policy analysts could benefit from overarching approaches to understanding the 

policy process. The policy sciences had previously been dominated by a proliferation of theories that dealt with specific policy phases (e.g., agenda setting, adoption, 

implementation, and evaluation). The goal of the new models was to provide a more 

comprehensive system to improve policy analysis within large issue areas.1 Policy 

Streams and Punctuated Equilibrium were originally conceived to study social and 

1

 Parsons, Public Policy, pp. 193-207.

6

137

SEI, Policy Streams, and

Punctuated Equilibrium
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Chapter 6: SEI, Policy Streams, and Punctuated Equilibrium

cess, he was the crucial policy entrepreneur advocating for the initiative.

Vice President Quayle was aided in this effort by National Space Council Executive Secretary Mark Albrecht. Within the space policy arena, presidential staffers 

were collectively among the most frequently discussed actors. Ninety-eight percent 

of those surveyed considered the presidential staff very or somewhat important—

very important represented 74%. During the Bush administration, the staff had 

more influence over the space policy agenda than at any time in the history of the 

space program. This was primarily due to the broad role of the Space Council. 

Combined with budget and policy analysts from OMB, OSTP, and the NSC, there 

was arguably more attention given to space issues than under any other presidential 

administration. The centrality of Mark Albrecht and Richard Darman as key policy 

entrepreneurs for SEI provides evidence of staffer influence. Although strong presidential support was a requisite component for pushing the initiative onto the national 

agenda, having a dedicated staff working on these issues was an important factor.

Presidential appointees were also among the most frequently discussed actors in 

the agenda setting process. Ninety-six percent of those surveyed considered presidential appointees very or somewhat important—very important represented 81%. 

As NASA Administrator, Admiral Truly was heavily relied upon to advocate on 

SEI’s behalf. Although several commentators have questioned whether he was ever 

sincerely supportive of the undertaking, he was critically important in shaping the 

proposal that was eventually embraced by Vice President Quayle. The full membership of the Space Council added to the influence of political appointees under the 

Bush administration. With regard to SEI, however, these cabinet-level officials were 

not heavily engaged during the agenda setting process.

Congress is among the most frequently discussed actors within the space policy 

arena, although it was seen as significantly less important than the administration—the opposite of what Kingdon found when looking at social and economic 

policy. Ninety-three percent of those surveyed considered Congress very or somewhat important—but very important only represented 36%. Kingdon found that 

when a presidential administration decides to put forth a proposal, consulting with 

economic policy. One of the objectives of this book, however, is to assess whether 

the models are relevant to the examination of science and technology policy—particularly large space policy initiatives. This evaluation led to the conclusion that the 

models offer useful methodologies that can be applied to further our understanding 

of the space policy community and long-term trends in national space policy.

Policy Streams, SEI, and the Space Policy Community

Although the original intention was to primarily utilize the Policy Streams Model 

to guide the historical analysis of SEI’s failure, in writing this book it became increasingly clear that the theory could also be used to provide insights regarding important 

actors within the space policy community. The methodological core of Kingdon’s 

book were hundreds of interviews conducted over four years with congressional 

staffers, upper-level civil servants, political appointees, presidential staffers, lobbyists, journalists, consultants, academics, and researchers.2

 One objective of these 

interviews was to determine which players were important in a given policy community.3

 Due to resource limitations for this book, it was not possible to conduct a 

large number of comprehensive interviews. Instead, a survey was created to identify 

influential actors within the space policy community. This survey was circulated to 

a population of civil servants, presidential staff, lobbyists, academics, researchers, 

and members of industry. Those surveyed were asked to rate the importance of 

given actors within the community. This direct inquiry allowed for accurate coding 

of responses into one of four categories: very important, somewhat important, little 

importance, or no importance. The goals were twofold. First, to determine who the 

most influential players are within the space arena. Second, to determine whether 

SEI’s policy entrepreneurs effectively engaged key space policy community actors 

during the initiative’s agenda setting and alternative generation processes.

No single actor has the same ability to set the space agenda as the president. 

Eighty-three percent of those surveyed considered the president very or somewhat 

important—very important represented 59% (see Table on next page). Although 

President Bush wasn’t heavily involved in SEI’s development, he endowed Vice President Quayle with the authority to push forward the initiative. Before ascending to 

the presidency, Bush was an outspoken proponent of the American space program 

and was already leaning toward a commitment to human exploration beyond Earth 

orbit. Armed with a presidential mandate to fashion a long-term strategy, Quayle 

was able to force SEI onto the national agenda. Throughout the agenda setting pro2

 These interviews were conducted in an attempt to better understand policy making within two 

issues areas, health care policy and transportation policy.

3

 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, pp. 231-240.

GOVERNMENT ACTORS Very Important

Somewhat

 Important Not Very Important

Not 

Important

President 59% 24% 13% 4%

Presidential Staff 74 24 2 0

Presidential Appointees 81 15 4 0

Civil Servants 28 50 22 0

Congress 36 57 7 0

Congressional Staff 42 50 8 0

Importance of Government Actors in Agenda Setting
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Chapter 6: SEI, Policy Streams, and Punctuated Equilibrium

The president cannot dominate alternative generation in the same way as agenda 

setting. This appears to be particularly true within the space arena, where the scientific and technical options require special training and significant effort. Only 

forty-one percent of those surveyed considered the president very or somewhat 

important—very important represented 13%. This lack of control over alternatives 

was one of the most important factors confronting successful adoption and implementation of SEI. Due to a lack of in-house expertise, President Bush and Vice 

President Quayle were forced to turn to NASA to generate options for the exploration initiative. The agency, however, did not produce actual alternatives. Instead, 

the agency chose to put forward different timelines for the same basic approach. 

The lack of internal technical capability meant Bush and Quayle were largely at the 

mercy of NASA bureaucrats.

The presidential staff is considered to be among the most important actors 

in alternative generation. Eighty-seven percent of those surveyed considered the 

presidential staff very or somewhat important—very important represented 49% 

percent. Kingdon contended that the staff has sway because it is able to “engage 

in the detailed negotiations—with departments, the Hill, and the major interest groups—that will produce the Administration’s proposals and that will clarify 

the Administration’s bargaining positions.”5

 In the case of SEI, the Space Council 

actually abdicated its authority to direct the alternative generation process when it 

allowed NASA to conduct the 90-Day Study in a policy vacuum. Without clear 

direction from the Council regarding key budgetary constraints, the space agency 

was allowed to produce a plan that didn’t match up with political reality.

Political appointees were mentioned as the most influential actors in the space 

sector. Ninety-six percent of those surveyed considered presidential appointees (e.g. 

NASA Administrator) very or somewhat important—very important represented 

5

 Ibid., pp. 26-27.

Congress can be crucial for the eventual adoption of the initiative—although this 

doesn’t necessarily mean it won’t otherwise reach the national agenda. The Bush 

administration overlooked the importance of conferring with Congress when considering SEI. Although Quayle and Truly did brief key members of Congress, this 

was only after the initiative had been formulated and the decision had been made 

to go forward. There was never any effort to create a coalition of congressional supporters or to engage potential congressional policy entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the 

administration did not adjust any of its plans based on the reactions of the Congress—particularly in the case of important staffers. Within the space sector, these 

staffers were equally important as members of Congress. Ninety-two percent of 

those surveyed considered congressional staffers very or somewhat important—very 

important represented 42%. This significant influence is probably due to the fact 

that staffers can spend more time gaining an understanding of the relevant technical 

details. Similar to congressional members, the value of obtaining staffer support 

was overlooked by key policy entrepreneurs within the administration.4

For the most part, non-governmental actors were not considered to be influential 

in agenda setting within the space policy community. The primary exception was the 

aerospace industry and interest groups representing those companies, although even 

this group was considered far less important than government actors. Professional 

and public interest groups, academics and researchers, mass public opinion, and 

the media were all seen as having limited significance. The SEI case study appears 

to be consistent with these general findings. The White House briefed industry 

leaders before launching the initiative, but the less than enthusiastic response did 

not sway the administration from its course. Likewise, although several influential 

academics and researchers were briefed to gauge reaction to the initiative, they did 

not participate in SEI’s development. The media and public opinion played no part 

in bringing SEI to the national agenda.

4

 Ibid., pp. 34-42.

NON-GOVERNMENT 

ACTORS

Very 

Important

Somewhat

 Important

Not Very 

Important

Not 

Important

Interest Groups: Industry 16% 66% 18% 0%

Interest Groups: Professional 2 38 56 4

Interest Groups: Advocacy 4 27 47 22

Academics & Researchers 2 49 42 7

Media 5 46 40 9

Industry 16 62 18 4

Mass Public Opinion 7 38 50 5

GOVERNMENT ACTORS Very 

Important

Somewhat

 Important

Not Very 

Important

Not 

Important

President 13% 28% 42% 17%

Presidential Staff 49 38 11 2

Presidential Appointees 74 22 4 0

Civil Servants 60 33 7 0

Congress 24 49 27 0

Congressional Staff 33 51 16 0

Importance of Non-Government Actors in Agenda Setting

Importance of Government Actors in Alternative Generation
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Chapter 6: SEI, Policy Streams, and Punctuated Equilibrium

74%. Kingdon writes that there are few cases of confrontation between the White 

House and appointees because the latter “finds it prudent to bend with the presidential wind, and the President finds it politically embarrassing to be portrayed as 

being at war with his major advisors.”6

 SEI was a clear exception to this rule. Admiral Truly clearly wasn’t a strong advocate for the initiative. Under his leadership, 

NASA flouted requests from the Space Council to provide President Bush with a 

variety of strategic and technical options. Instead, Truly was committed to carrying out a study that drew heavily on technical approaches that had been developed 

during the past several years by the NASA Office of Exploration—which resulted in 

the selection of a single program alternative.

Career civil servants have much more influence on alternative generation than 

on the space agenda. Ninety-three percent of those surveyed considered career 

civil servants as very or somewhat important—very important represented 60%. 

Without doubt, NASA civil servants played a crucial role in the alternative generation process for SEI. The TSG was the most important actor in producing options 

for the initiative—even though it ultimately developed a single highly expensive 

alternative. The Space Council was highly critical of this result, but was equally to 

blame because it failed to provide the agency with clear, written guidance adequately 

explaining the key constraints facing SEI. Combined with Admiral Truly’s reluctance to fully support the initiative, this ultimately doomed its chances for adoption 

and implementation.

Although Congress is a somewhat important actor for alternative generation in 

the space sector, it is not considered to be among the most influential. Seventy-three 

percent of those surveyed considered Congress very or somewhat important—but 

very important only represented 24% percent. As with the agenda, within the space 

arena it appears that it is crucial to consult with Congress to understand the constraints facing specific program alternatives—as opposed to members of Congress 

actually developing those options. With regard to SEI, Congress was never brought 

into this process. Likewise, congressional staffers were not terribly influential in 

alternative generation. Eighty-four percent of those surveyed considered congressional staffers very or somewhat important—very important represented only 33% 

percent. Unlike in other issue areas, where staffers become heavily involved in drafting legislation and negotiating agreements between interested parties, most Hill 

staffers lack the expertise to develop the very detailed technical plans needed for an 

initiative like SEI. This has often resulted in mission agencies like NASA having an 

inordinate amount of influence over the alternative generation process.

With a few exceptions, the non-government actors examined do not have a great 

deal of impact on the alternative generation process. Interest groups representing the 

6

 Ibid., pp. 27-30.

aerospace industry were considered only somewhat influential—professional and 

advocacy groups were much less important. Academics and researchers affect alternatives more than agendas, primarily because they can match the technical expertise 

enjoyed by civil servants at NASA. For this very reason, the aerospace industry itself 

was deemed to be the most influential non-government actor. This is not surprising 

considering the fact that throughout the history of the space program, government 

contractors have frequently been turned to during the development of technical 

alternatives. In the case of SEI, non-government actors had no discernible impact 

on the initial generation of alternatives. During the course of the 90-Day Study, 

the TSG did not seek inputs from any of the outside actors with the capability to 

generate strategic and technical options for the initiative. Instead, the agency relied 

solely on its own expertise and judgment. In the end, the outcome was a process that 

resulted in the production of a single alternative.

Punctuated Equilibrium, Space Policy, and SEI

The Punctuated Equilibrium Model provides a useful tool for better understanding trends within the space policy arena. In particular, it supplies metrics that can be 

applied to evaluate whether these long-term movements predetermined SEI’s fate. 

A mixture of policy image and venue indicators was drawn upon to conduct this 

assessment. These results provide a mixed picture regarding the potential for human 

exploration of Mars to reach the national agenda and obtain support for successful adoption. During the first 30 years of the space age, backing for both the space 

program and human exploration of Mars fluctuated a great deal within the American public and key institutional venues. Throughout this period, Mars exploration 

never reached the same levels of support that other projects (e.g., Project Apollo, 

Space Shuttle, and Space Station) enjoyed. While several indicators suggest there 

was growing support for the space program in general (and crewed Mars exploration in particular) by the late 1980s, a dramatic 20-year decline in space program 

budgets called into question the viability of a costly new initiative.

NON-GOVERNMENT 

ACTORS

Very 

Important

Somewhat

 Important

Not Very 

Important

Not 

Important

Interest Groups: Industry 36% 42% 22% 0%

Interest Groups: Professional 45 11 40 4

Interest Groups: Advocacy 9 27 46 18

Academics & Researchers 20 46 28 6

Media 4 20 45 31

Industry 47 36 15 2

Mass Public Opinion 6 19 45 30

Importance of Non-Government Actors in Alternative Generation
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Chapter 6: SEI, Policy Streams, and Punctuated Equilibrium

Baumgartner and Jones elected to study media coverage to gauge trends in policy 

image. The primary information source they utilized was The Readers’ Guide to Periodical Literature.

7

 They coded the number and tone of articles written in a given 

year to set the context for the agenda process in a given issue area. The first step in 

this process was to choose the proper keywords to ensure that all of the appropriate 

articles were included. The results were then entered into a spreadsheet, where they 

were further coded by different subtopics. One concern was that looking at only 

one index would not fully capture the nature of public opinion regarding specific 

issues. Baumgartner and Jones found, however, that “when we compare levels and 

tone of coverage in the Readers’ Guide with those of other major news outlets...it 

makes little difference which index one uses.”8

 For this book, the above methodology for monitoring the public agenda was adopted in almost every respect. Articles 

were tabulated from 1957 to 1996, coding them for topic and tone. Due to the 

extraordinarily large number of articles examining different aspects of the space 

program, only articles relating to human exploration were coded. Six broad topics 

were chosen to compare different exploration areas: Moon, Mars, Space Shuttle, 

Space Station, Orbital Flight (non-Shuttle or Station), and an “Other” category that 

encompassed articles relating to other destinations in the solar system or interstellar 

flight. To code each article’s tone, a basic question was asked: would an advocate of 

an American human exploration program, managed by a civilian sector agency, be 

happy or unhappy with the title? Over 6,500 articles were coded in this way.

7

 The New York Times Index was also used to provide supplemental data.

8

 Baumgartner and Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics, pp. 253-259.

During the early years of the space age, while the popular press was clearly focused 

on NASA’s efforts to orbit the first American and send humans to the Moon, Mars 

exploration was largely overlooked. Media coverage for crewed missions to the red 

planet was trivial compared to other space efforts. Although there were only a small 

number of articles, media coverage of Mars exploration during the Apollo era was 

largely supportive, with nearly 90% of the items positive in tone. Coverage slowly 

increased and reached an initial peak of nearly 20 articles in 1969, when postApollo planning was taking place within the federal government. By the 1970s, in 

the aftermath of the failed effort to push crewed missions to Mars onto the national 

agenda, media coverage plummeted to at most one article every couple of years. 

During this period, the majority of media attention focused on Space Shuttle development, the Skylab space station, and the Apollo-Soyuz Test Flight Program. Over 

the course of the 1980s, media coverage of Mars exploration began growing again, 

although it was still dwarfed by the Shuttle and Space Station Freedom programs. 

This increase was the result of “softening up” activities like the Case for Mars conferences, the National Commission on Space, and the Ride Report. By the end of the 

decade, as SEI reached the national agenda, reporting of crewed Mars exploration 

represented a significant portion of total coverage. While the reporting was highly 

supportive, there was no massive increase in attention as there had been for Project 

Apollo. Regardless, coverage of Mars exploration reached all time highs after President Bush announced SEI, with over 20 articles written annually. In the aftermath 

of the initiative’s failure, however, media attention plummeted. By the mid-1990s, 

Space Exploration in the Popular Press—By Program (number of articles)

Based on an analysis of the Readers Guide to Periodical Literature, 1957-1996

Tone of Mars Exploration Coverage (number of articles)

Based on an analysis of the Readers Guide to Periodical Literature, 1957-1996
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Chapter 6: SEI, Policy Streams, and Punctuated Equilibrium

fewer than ten articles were being written per year as the Clinton administration 

focused on completion of the International Space Station.

Baumgartner and Jones found that survey research, if available in a systematic form, is another data resource for observing changes in policy image. Survey 

research has become a progressively more important tool for policy analysts and 

policy makers.9

 The polling data utilized for this book was compiled by the NASA 

History Division and reveals interesting trends in mass public opinions regarding 

the American space program. During the post-Apollo planning period, the vast 

majority of the American public believed that the NASA budget was too large. This 

provides a compelling reason for the failure of human exploration of Mars to garner 

support from President Nixon. Over the next 20 years, however, this attitude toward 

the NASA budget shifted significantly. In the years leading up to the announcement 

of SEI, there was a relatively high level of support for the space program. By the late 

1980s, the majority of Americans believed that NASA spending was either just right 

or needed to be increased. In 1989, the year that SEI was announced, that figure 

reached sixty percent for only the fifth time in the post-Apollo era. Despite this relatively high level of public support for NASA, human exploration of Mars was still 

seen as a lesser priority. Robotic exploration of the solar system and construction of 

a crewed space station consistently received more support from the general public. 

Regardless, when the initiative was announced, more than 60% of the public supported establishment of a human outpost on Mars.

As SEI began experiencing difficulties and NASA was dealing with problems in 

the Hubble and Shuttle programs, however, those numbers began dropping once 

again—falling to below 50% by December 1990. Although these numbers would 

eventually recover slightly, by that time the policy window for Mars exploration had 

already closed.

9

 Polls are designed to provide interested parties with information estimating how the mass 

public would respond to specific closed-ended options, such as “should the government fund human 

trips to Mars?” The fundamental principle of polling is that a sample population can represent the 

entire population if there is a sufficient sample size and the chosen methodology ensures a randomly 

selected sample. Opinion polls are utilized to measure: values, basic beliefs held by individuals that 

are relatively immune to change and perform a vital role in individuals’ lives and choices; opinions, 

judgments about current issues and policy alternatives; and attitudes, a category between values and 

opinions representing well thought out views utilized to evaluate new issues and alternatives. While 

polls measuring values and attitudes are useful because they provide information regarding long-term 

beliefs, the vast majority of polls relevant to policy makers assess opinions regarding contemporary 

policy issues. [Mathew Mendelsohn and Jason Brent, “Understanding Polling Methodology,” ISUMA

(Autumn 2001): pp. 131-136.]

Public Opinion of NASA Spending (as percentage)

Public Support for Space Initiatives (as percentage)
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Chapter 6: SEI, Policy Streams, and Punctuated Equilibrium

While examining media coverage and opinion polls provides information relating to policy image, other measures are needed to evaluate venue access. Four different indicators were selected for this book to monitor changes in venue access 

for space policy issues. The first indicator relied upon an analysis of the Congressional Information Service Abstracts (CIS annual)—a yearly compilation of data 

on Congressional hearings. In the late 1990s, Baumgartner and Jones established 

the Center for American Politics and Public Policy to provide researchers with tools to 

better understand the dynamics of policy change. Under the auspices of the center, 

more than 67,000 congressional hearings were classified using a common policy 

content code to ensure compatibility over time.10 For the purposes of this book, the 

entire CIS annual dataset was downloaded. A separate dataset was created, which 

included only hearings that related to the American space program. This dataset 

included over 550 hearings covering the years from 1958 to 1994.11 The second 

indicator utilized to monitor changes in venue access, which will be discussed in 

concert with the CIS annual, relied upon an analysis of the Public Papers of the Presidents.

12 For this study, a methodology similar to that used for coding the Readers’ 

Guide was employed. Presidential addresses and speeches were coded by topic from 

1957 to 1996. This included all papers relating to the civilian space program. These 

papers were then used to assess trends in venue access for agenda items relating to 

the American space program.

During the 1960s, presidential support for the nation’s space program reached its 

apex. President Kennedy’s decision to send humans to the Moon initiated a decade 

of close White House attention.13 Through the ’60s, Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, 

and Nixon delivered well over 400 addresses and speeches relating to the civilian 

10 Baumgartner and Jones found that the new CD-ROM format of the CIS annual permitted 

for efficient searches of policy issues—primarily because hearings are cross-referenced, reducing the 

possibility of double counting specific hearings, and streamlined selection of keywords. The dataset 

that was produced included a wide variety of information including the year of the hearing, the 

committee holding the hearing, and a summary of the topics discussed.

11 Bryan Jones, John Wilkerson, and Frank Baumgartner, “Policy Agendas Project,” Center 

for American Politics and Public Policy, available from depts.washington.edu/ampol/navresearch/

agendasproject.shtml; (accessed 18 December 2001.)

12 In 1957, the Public Papers series was created to provide an official compilation of Presidential 

letters, addresses, speeches, proclamations, executive orders, and other publicly issued materials. 

Volumes dealing with the Hoover, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, 

Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations are incorporated into the series. In addition, the Clinton 

papers are now available online and there are plans to expand online coverage to include all presidential 

papers. The information included in the Public Papers is indexed in two ways: by subject and by name. 

The index entry for each subject contains a word or phrase that identifies the topic and one or more 

page numbers.

13 Measured by tabulating the number of space-related addresses and speeches delivered (and 

catalogued in the Public Papers of the President series) by the president in a given year.

space program. At the height of interest in Project Apollo, presidential addresses and 

speeches frequently topped 40 per year—and reached as high as 70. This indicated 

significant access to an important policy venue (e.g. The White House). Similarly, 

Congressional interest in space exploration peaked during this period.14 In particular, there was a pronounced spike in congressional interest following the Apollo 1 

fire that killed three astronauts (see Figure on page 152). 

14 Measured by tabulating the number of space-related Congressional hearings held (and catalogued 

by the Congressional Information Service) in a given year.

Trends in Presidential Attention (number of speeches/addresses)

Based on an analysis of the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1958-1996
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Chapter 6: SEI, Policy Streams, and Punctuated Equilibrium

By the mid-1970s, the number of presidential speeches and addresses had plunged 

below ten annually as NASA concentrated on building the Space Shuttle and sending robotic probes to explore the solar system. While Congressional attention dipped 

below Apollo era levels as well, the number of space-related hearings remained relatively stable at about 15 a year. This was primarily due to annual appropriation and 

authorization hearings. As the Space Shuttle began operations during the 1980s, 

presidential addresses and speeches began slowly rising again—with increased interest surrounding the decision to build the Space Station and in the aftermath of the 

Challenger accident. Although Congressional interest remained steady during this 

period, there were noticeable spikes in interest surrounding the first Space Shuttle 

flight and as Congress held hearings following Challenger.

While presidential interest in the space program was relatively high during the 

SEI era, congressional support was not particularly robust. President Bush was 

clearly interested in the space program, as evidenced by his espousal of human missions to the Moon and Mars. During his presidency, he made a number of significant space policy speeches, most directly related to gaining support for SEI. Still, 

compared with presidential attention during the first decade of spaceflight and even 

during the Reagan administration, Bush made fewer annual speeches and addresses 

relating to the space program. On its face, it would appear that Mars exploration 

had only modest access to this important policy venue during the Bush presidency. 

This discounts, however, the important role played by Vice President Quayle and 

the Space Council staff during this period. Combining the involvement of Bush and 

Quayle with a dedicated internal policy staff to work on space issues, this administration was probably more engaged in this arena than any other during the postApollo period. In contrast, Congressional interest was relatively low at this time. 

After a peak following the loss of the Challenger, Congressional attention waned as 

the Bush administration was pushing for SEI. The next peak did not occur until the 

problems with the Hubble and Space Shuttle programs came to the fore. This indicates that during the post-Apollo period, Congress has been highly reactive to problems within the space program. At the same time, it has not been terribly engaged 

during relatively calm periods. The lack of access to this critical venue was likely a 

contributing factor in the eventual failure of SEI.

A third indicator utilized to monitor venue access relied upon an analysis of 

technical strategies for human exploration of the Moon and Mars. This metric provided insight into Mars exploration’s ability to garner attention within a key policy 

venue—the federal bureaucracy (e.g. NASA). In 1996, NASA Johnson Space Center 

Historian David Portree created a website called Romance to Reality: Moon and Mars 

Plans. It was a comprehensive catalog of classic, seminal, and illustrative human 

exploration plans. The majority of these studies were conducted under the auspices 

of government agencies and private sector companies.15 The site included detailed 

summaries and descriptions of reports dating back more than five decades.16 Portree 

emphasized studies that emerged as important to later mission planning, but also 

included reports that helped illustrate essential strategic architectures. For this book, 

the above reports were used to observe trends, both inside and outside the federal 

government, in the generation of Moon-Mars exploration plans. Each report from 

1950 to 1996 was coded using the same three categories Portree employed: Moon 

plan, Mars plan, and Moon/Mars plan. Nearly 300 technical studies were coded in 

this way.17

During the course of the 1950s, eight major studies were conducted by government agencies and aerospace companies as part of the “softening up” process for 

Mars exploration. The following decade, as NASA was working full throttle to meet 

President Kennedy’s lunar landing deadline, more than 50 Mars exploration studies 

were conducted in preparation for a post-Apollo space program. Despite its growing 

15 This database also included a few studies conducted by national commissions (e.g. National 

Commission on Space), academic institutions, and interest groups.

16 Portree’s goals for the Romance to Reality site were fourfold: to educate interested parties about 

the challenges and opportunities of exploring the Moon and Mars; to make the ideas of engineers and 

scientists widely available to the mass public; to provide an exciting glimpse of possible futures by 

looking into the past; and to foster the construction of a future that includes human activity on both 

the moon and Mars.

17 Since this analysis was conducted, Portree has changed the format of the Romance to Reality: 

Moon and Mars Plans website. Thus, my results are based on data taken from the website as it existed 

in March 2002.

Trends in Congressional Attention (number of hearings)

Based on an analysis of the ‘Policy Agendas Project,’ Center for American Politics and Policy
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profile within the space agency, however, Mars exploration had relatively low visibility with the American public. Likewise, it was not supported by President Nixon 

or Congress—which led to its exclusion from post-Apollo planning. In the 1970s, 

NASA’s official interest in crewed exploration of the red planet basically disappeared. 

An illustration of this fact is that the space agency did not conduct one major Marsrelated study from 1972 to 1985. At the same time, however, private actors kept the 

dream alive by generating over 20 reports. These were partially responsible for the 

Reagan administration’s decision to place human exploration beyond Earth orbit on 

the national agenda. By the time President Bush announced SEI, Mars exploration 

had greater access to the bureaucratic venue than at any other time in the first 40 

years of spaceflight. During the four years of the Bush administration, over 35 different studies were conducted. The dilemma for the Space Council, however, was 

that the politically infeasible 90-Day Study became so closely associated with the 

initiative.

While the three preceding venue access indicators suggest that by the late-1980s 

there were favorable trends supporting a major new human spaceflight initiative, a 

final indicator paints a very different picture—the federal budget. At the height of 

Project Apollo, NASA’s budget was $6 billion, or about 4.5% of the entire federal 

budget. This represented an extremely large financial commitment to the American 

space program, which was allocated primarily in an effort to beat the Soviets to the 

Moon. By the time Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin landed in the Sea of Tranquility, NASA’s budget had already begun a rapid decline. Although Congress remained 

engaged in the space program during the next two decades, it was nevertheless 

steadily cutting NASA’s budget from its Apollo peak. The mid-1970s saw a budgetary low of $3.25 billion, with budgets increasing slightly into the early 1980s. 

More significantly, the NASA budget dropped to under 1% of the entire federal 

budget—where it would remain permanently except for a three-year period in the 

early 1990s. Despite the fact that it had experienced steadily decreasing resources, 

NASA continued to conduct its program planning by assuming that it would 

receive future budget increases. This tendency to overcommit itself did not foretell 

a positive result for NASA-led development of another major exploration initiative. 

While the Bush administration increased funding for NASA, the available resources 

were far below those available during the mid-1960s. There was little public or 

congressional support for dramatically increasing the NASA budget. This did not 

bode well for SEI, which as envisioned by the TSG would have required doubling 

or tripling the annual allocation for NASA.

Baumgartner and Jones’s approach to studying agenda change provides an interesting perspective for understanding larger themes within the American space program. Using policy image and venue access indicators not only reveals interesting 

trends, it provides insight into factors that helped SEI reach the national agenda but 

dramatically reduced its chances of gaining Congressional support. As discussed 

above, there have been striking shifts in media coverage over the past four decades. 

During the nine years after President Kennedy announced the Moon decision, over 

Technical Reports Focusing on Mars Exploration (number of studies)

Based on an analysis of Romance to Reality: Moon and Mars Plans, 1957-1996

NASA Budget (In billions)

OMB, “Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004: Historical Tables”
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2,100 human spaceflight-related articles were written (an average of 235 annually). 

During the subsequent nine years, as NASA was developing the Shuttle, under 1,200 

articles were written (125 annually). The ten years after the Shuttle began operations, including those years following the Challenger accident, saw another upward 

shift with nearly 2,200 articles written (220 annually). This included increased coverage of Mars exploration, which was largely positive in tone. Finally, during the 

eight years after President Bush announced SEI, coverage plummeted to fewer than 

1,000 articles (110 annually). This trend suggests that there have been relatively 

extended periods of general excitement about the space program within the general 

public (which resulted in significant media coverage), but that these periods have 

been followed by equally long periods where the public becomes disengaged. These 

declines in overall media attention seem to be correlated with periods of poor economic performance and tightening federal budgets. SEI came to the fore toward the 

end of a cycle of increased media coverage, which enhanced the likelihood it would 

successfully reach the national agenda. At the same time, however, an examination 

of past polling data reveals that economic forces were working against any dramatic 

increase in NASA’s annual appropriation. In the end, these budgetary pressures were 

far more important than any perceived public support for Mars exploration.

An analysis of the Public Papers of the Presidents and the CIS annual reveals that 

the White House and Congress are largely reactive when it comes to addressing 

space policy issues. Past presidents have delivered the majority of their speeches in 

reaction to programmatic successes and failures. Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and 

Nixon gave regular speeches during the triumphant Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo 

programs, while President Reagan spoke out primarily in the aftermath of the Challenger accident.18 The fact that President Bush delivered a relatively large number 

of space-related speeches during his tenure suggests that the space program had 

significant White House access during this period. This is particularly true because 

there were no great successes or failures of a similar magnitude during Bush’s presidency. Combined with Vice President Quayle’s heavy involvement in space policy 

making, this represented one of the most active administrations in this issue area. 

Access to this important institutional venue made possible the elevation of SEI to 

the national agenda. The relative lack of congressional interest, however, tremendously reduced the initiative’s chances of actual adoption. The space program has 

enjoyed relatively stable congressional attention, with significant peaks after major 

failures (i.e., Apollo 1, Challenger, Hubble). When SEI was being considered, there 

was a clear lull in congressional interest as the legislature focused on an imposing 

18 President Reagan’s 1984 State of the Union, where he announced his decision to approve the 

Space Station Program, was the clear exception.

budget crisis. While this did not necessarily preclude adoption of any new human 

spaceflight program, it did indicate that promotion of projects requiring large budgetary increases was ill-conceived.

An examination of past technical reports shows that there were two clear periods 

of interest in Mars exploration, one leading up to post-Apollo planning and another 

leading up to the announcement of SEI. Prior to both attempts to garner support 

for adoption of such a program, NASA and non-government actors conducted a 

steadily increasing number of studies that provided the technical background for 

the eventual policy alternatives that were considered. Particularly in the case of SEI, 

this indicates that significant bureaucratic forces were aligned to force an aggressive 

exploration program onto the national agenda. As discussed above, the fiscal constraints quashed these plans. The federal budget is the single most effective indicator for evaluating the potential for bringing about dramatic programmatic change at 

NASA. Budgetary trends expose Project Apollo as a clear outlier in the history of the 

space program, where a unique political environment led to the program’s adoption. 

Subsequent experience has proven that without the emergence of a similar crisis 

environment, the space program will not receive a large infusion of resources to 

carry out aggressive human spaceflight programs. SEI’s failure is the quintessential 

example of this lesson. Regardless of bureaucratic desires, technical plans for human 

exploration beyond Earth orbit must be fiscally feasible.

The policy image and venue access indicators utilized for this study provide a 

relatively consistent picture regarding the potential for SEI to reach the national 

agenda and to be successfully adopted. With regard to agenda setting, a combination of metrics suggests that Mars exploration would receive favorable consideration 

as the long-term goal of the human spaceflight program. These included increased 

media coverage of Mars exploration, general public support for the establishment 

of a Martian outpost, and a growing number of reports providing the technical 

details for such an undertaking. Combined with strong support from the Bush 

White House, this virtually guaranteed that the initiative would be pushed onto 

the national agenda. With regard to actual adoption, however, a number of other 

indicators suggest that SEI faced an uphill battle. Most important among these were 

fiscal constraints, limited public support for increased NASA budgets, and no congressional backing for expensive new programs. While a less costly Mars exploration 

program may have been able to gain approval under these circumstances, after the 

release of the 90-Day Study, the ultimate failure of SEI was assured.

While the above analysis provides some evidence that both the Policy Streams 

Model and Punctuated Equilibrium Model provide valuable insight into the rise and 

fall of SEI, a concluding discussion is in order to generalize these findings beyond 

this specific case study. This is logically assessed by answering a simple question: Do 

we know something about SEI we wouldn’t have without using these two models? 

There are at least three potential answers—a lot, a little, or nothing at all. It seems 
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like the most defensible answer lies in the middle. To start with, although we may 

instinctively have a sense of who the important actors are within a given policy 

community, Kingdon provides an effective framework for quantifying these beliefs. 

The survey used for this book was designed to determine whether the appropriate 

actors were involved in the policy process for SEI. While we may have come to the 

same conclusion even if we didn’t have the survey results, they provide some actual 

data to back up our assumptions. This survey, or some instrument like it, could just 

as easily be used to better understand the policy community for other science and 

technology issue areas. More importantly, it has the ability to provide policy makers 

with a real world tool for deciding who to engage during the agenda setting and 

alternative generation processes.

The operational indicators introduced by Baumgartner and Jones, and those 

developed specifically for this book, also provide a potentially valuable tool for science and technology researchers. Most of these indicators provide good data for 

large issue areas. For example, the data collected for this book provides revealing 

trends for space policy as a whole. The data is not as good, however, when one 

drills down to the next level of detail. Public opinion polls, presidential speeches, 

and congressional hearings can only be used to gauge large scale trends within an 

entire field. They cannot easily be used to examine specific issues within this area, 

such as interest in Mars exploration or space science or orbiting space stations. 

Although it requires a good amount of effort, it is possible to use data sources like 

media coverage and technical studies to gain some appreciation of interest in these 

more specific issue areas. Overall, however, these indicators are a bit cumbersome 

to use—although this would be made easier if this data, regarding space policy 

issues in particular, were readily available to policy makers. That is not currently the 

case, which makes the use of this set of indicators somewhat impractical in the real 

world.

Therefore, the Policy Streams Model and Punctuated Equilibrium Model have provided an understanding of the failure of SEI that the case study alone may not have 

provided. We have better insight regarding who the important actors are within the 

space policy community, which reveals weaknesses in the agenda setting and alternative generation processes for SEI. We have a better insight regarding larger trends 

within the space policy arena (i.e., public opinion, congressional attention, federal 

budgets) that conspired against the adoption of this costly human spaceflight initiative. This type of data not only informs an academic work like this book, but can 

(and probably should) be used by policy makers in the real world. There does not 

seem to be any reason why these methodologies could not be applied widely within 

the science and technology policy field. While this would clearly require a good 

amount of work, both compiling the data and periodically updating it, the potential 

benefits for successful agenda setting and alternative generation processes would be 

worth the effort.

“The story of the dreams and the unbuilt spaceships for flights to 

Mars should be recorded so that in the future people can examine 

past ideas of space travel just as we can examine the unconsummated 

ideas of Leonardo da Vinci by reading his notebooks. Years from now 

people should be able to decide for themselves whether they want to 

go to Mars or if they prefer to stay earthbound. But let us not destroy 

the dream, simply because we do not wish to pursue it ourselves.”

NASA Historian Edward Ezell, 1979

7

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The Lessons of SEI

During the agenda setting and alternative generation processes for SEI, key 

policy entrepreneurs did not adequately heed the lessons of the past—particularly 

those learned from the unsuccessful attempt to place Mars exploration on the government agenda during post-Apollo planning. At that time, the Space Task Group 

and NASA failed to account for contemporary fiscal and political constraints. This 

led to the STG endorsement of a Mars exploration approach that required doubling 

the space agency’s annual budget. This was contrary to President Nixon’s philosophy and the budgetary environment, which resulted in the eventual failure of the 

initiative to reach the government agenda. In 1989, exploration of the Moon and 

Mars gained vital support from President Bush as his administration sought to provide direction to a directionless agency. The policy process that the Space Council 

nominally directed, however, failed to provide adequate guidance regarding the constraints confronting adoption of the initiative. As a result, NASA’s 90-Day Study 

was significantly at variance with what Congress judged to be in the long-term 
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Chapter 7: The Lessons of SEI

compelling explanation for why NASA was allowed to generate the 90-Day Study 

in virtual isolation with scant direction from the White House.

From the start, the Space Council should have more firmly controlled development of SEI. Given the administration’s goals, after President Bush announced 

the initiative the Council should have commenced technical studies conducted by 

NASA and outside actors (e.g., government contractors, universities, think tanks, 

and national laboratories) based on detailed written guidance. This type of coordinated alternative generation process would have engendered the kind of “clean 

sheet” thinking the White House desired. Instead, the space agency followed a more 

expedient path and developed reference approaches based on past studies. Although 

the Space Council had verbally asked NASA to supply a variety of technical options 

and cost profiles, the top NASA leadership either misunderstood or ignored those 

requests. By the time the 90-Day Study was released, it was probably too late to 

regain control of the initiative. Congress already associated SEI with $500 billion budgetary requirements. Without any other studies initiated to provide real 

alternatives, the Council could not present a compelling argument that cheaper 

options existed. By the time the National Research Council and Synthesis Group 

were brought in to provide this perspective, the damage had already been done. 

Similarly, the presidential directives released in spring 1990 arrived too late to save 

the initiative.

Perhaps the most important lesson learned from the failure of SEI was that 

NASA needs competition for ideas from other space policy community actors. 

Since the post-Apollo deceleration, NASA has not proven itself capable of presenting White House policy makers with a robust suite of policy alternatives for large 

human spaceflight programs. From the earliest stages, the Space Council relied too 

much on the space agency to develop alternative approaches for SEI. There were 

a number of warning signs that should have led the council staff to bring other 

governmental and nongovernmental actors into the process. The most troubling 

of these was the initial $400 billion price tag introduced by the Ad Hoc Working 

Group. Given existing political and budgetary constraints, it is beyond explanation 

why the administration didn’t seek out cheaper options before announcing the initiative. Instead, Vice President Quayle and Mark Albrecht were apparently satisfied 

with NASA’s conclusion that the initiative was technically feasible. They chose not 

to focus on the staggering price tag at that point. Regardless, the political infeasibility of the required cost profile clearly demonstrated the need to include other 

actors in the subsequent alternative generation process. Additional warning signs 

that the alternative generation process had gone awry emerged even before NASA 

began assembling the 90-Day Study. The most obvious example was the conversation between Mark Albrecht and Aaron Cohen, when it became clear the two actors 

interest of the nation. Current policy makers are facing similar issues.1

 Future policy 

makers will surely face them as new policy windows open, providing opportunities 

to shape the national space program. Understanding the lessons of SEI provides a 

chance to avoid sharing SEI’s fate.

One of the primary causes of SEI’s failure was a lack of clear policy guidance from 

the White House. This deficiency began in early spring 1989, when announcing a 

robust human exploration initiative was first contemplated by the Bush administration. While Vice President Quayle and Mark Albrecht clearly believed such an 

undertaking would provide NASA with needed direction, the administration did 

not have well developed substantive ideas for future programs. Consequently, the 

Space Council relied heavily on the space agency to provide the details necessary to 

make an informed decision regarding the technical feasibility of human exploration 

beyond Earth orbit. The problem, however, was that adequate instructions were 

not provided regarding the key constraints that should guide the development of 

a programmatic approach. As a result, the Ad Hoc Working Group assembled a 

scenario for human exploration, based largely on existing technology, which would 

have cost an estimated $400 to $500 billion. Regardless of the potential problems 

represented by this cost profile, the White House decided to go ahead with the 

announcement of SEI—probably assuming that cheaper alternatives could be found 

for the initiative.

On 20 July 1989, during his speech announcing SEI, President Bush directed 

the Space Council to assess technical approaches and budgetary resources required 

to carry out the initiative. After the address, however, the Council largely abdicated this authority to NASA. This took the form of the 90-Day Study. Given the 

outcome of the initial alternative generation process (e.g., selection of a technical 

approach that would require more than doubling the agency’s budget), the decision 

to allow NASA to control the post-announcement alternative generation process 

was clearly a mistake. The decision not to include other actors within the space 

policy community ultimately presented serious problems. This outcome could have 

been avoided if a presidential decision directive with a detailed strategy for implementing SEI had been released concurrently with the president’s speech. Instead, 

this guidance was not provided for nearly eight months. The inability of the Council staff to draft such a directive, given the short period of time available, presents a 

1

 On 14 January 2004, President George W. Bush proposed a long-range plan for the American 

space program that included phasing out the aging Space Shuttle, redefining a partially constructed 

Space Station, and developing a crew exploration vehicle to return humans permanently to the 

Moon.
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Even before he won the presidency, George Bush acknowledged that any new 

human spaceflight program would be significantly constrained by the federal budget. 

During the transition, the NASA Transition Team recommended the establishment 

of an agency priority-setting mechanism to take into account these concerns regarding the budget deficit. On his first day in office, President Bush told Congress his 

top agenda item was deficit reduction. Throughout its early months in office, the 

administration made clear that any decision regarding human spaceflight programs 

beyond Earth orbit would be made taking into account the limited resources available. In April 1989, when Vice President Quayle and Mark Albrecht met with Richard Darman and Bob Grady from OMB, it was agreed that any new initiative could 

not have a major budgetary impact. This body of evidence reveals that the Bush 

administration knew it would not gain congressional support for expensive exploration projects. It is equally clear, however, that NASA did not understand, or chose to 

ignore, this political reality. This is the primary reason why written guidance regarding the formulation of alternatives with favorable cost profiles was needed.

Drawing on the Apollo paradigm, NASA leaders believed President Bush’s 

endorsement of a bold human spaceflight initiative was an opportunity to obtain a 

large funding increase. This was made clear when the AHWG developed a strategic 

architecture that would have required more than doubling the agency’s budget. This 

was exactly what the administration did not want, yet Vice President Quayle and 

the Space Council perplexingly endorsed the review and proceeded with plans to 

announce SEI. Instead, given its desire to keep the space agency’s budget in check, 

the administration should have taken one of two actions. First, it could have postponed the announcement of the initiative on the 20th anniversary of Apollo 11 and 

sought out less expensive options. Second, it could have announced SEI and immediately commenced a competition of ideas to determine what other alternatives 

were available. Rather than take control of the policy making process, the Space 

Council abdicated its authority to NASA. Admiral Truly, in turn, believed there 

was a right way and a wrong way of doing things, and the right way didn’t include 

considering resource constraints. Preparing plans for SEI based on this fundamental 

principle proved to be an enormous political miscalculation.

Admiral Truly’s approach to SEI was not without precedent. Something similar 

happened during post-Apollo planning. During that period, NASA advocated an 

aggressive human spaceflight program based on Vice President Agnew’s support for 

Mars exploration. President Nixon and Congress were not won over. Rather than 

learn from this disappointment, the agency followed essentially the same course 

20 years later. An examination of the record suggests the agency never seriously 

considered using President Bush’s backing to gain support for modest budgetary 

increases that could fund a more limited human exploration program, which would 

not necessarily eliminate Mars missions. Thus, NASA missed a historic opportunity 

had fundamentally different definitions of alternatives. Throughout that period, 

the Space Council staff became increasingly alarmed by the lack of technical details 

being provided by NASA. Despite these growing concerns, however, the administration maintained its “wait and see” approach. By the time the 90-Day Study was 

released, it proved impossible to turn back the clock.

Responsibility for the ultimate demise of SEI should not all land at the White 

House doorstep. NASA missteps shared equally in its failure. Although it was 

directed to develop multiple options with different cost profiles, NASA presented 

only one expensive reference approach. To check the “alternatives” box, the agency 

simply provided slightly varied mission timelines and potential destinations. Even 

without clear written guidance from the administration, Admiral Truly and NASA’s 

senior leadership should have recognized that existing budgetary constraints necessitated consideration of alternatives that could be implemented with modest 

resources. Instead, a plan was developed that never had any hope of gaining congressional support. An examination of the 90-Day Study reveals several factors that 

virtually guaranteed this outcome. First, the TSG selected an aggressive development sequence that called for emplacement, consolidation, and operations phases. 

While this may have been a logical strategy for maintaining permanent human 

presence beyond Earth orbit, it was not politically feasible. Second, making the ultimate objective of both Moon and Mars exploration the establishment of permanent 

outposts dramatically increased the expense of the initiative. Cheaper stand-alone 

missions should have been included. Third, making the Space Shuttle and Space 

Station programs central to the system architecture drove costs up dramatically. 

It also alienated potential supporters on Capitol Hill. Dick Malow said later he 

would have been “more positive if NASA had taken Space Station off the plate and 

focused on going to Mars. The budget envelope that would have opened up would 

have been sufficient to get the initiative going. I never felt space station was critical 

to going to Mars, never made any sense to me, if anything it may even have been 

a detractor.”2

 Fourth, innovative in-space propulsion technologies were not given 

serious consideration. The basic chemical propulsion designs selected could have 

been supplemented with other options ranging from electric propulsion to solar 

sails to nuclear propulsion. Finally, additional strategic approaches should have been 

included. There was no shortage of architectural approaches available. In the end, 

the TSG’s failure to consider a wide-variety of alternatives crippled SEI and exposed 

NASA to wide-ranging criticism. Although the Space Council attempted to find 

other options, the odds were already stacked against the initiative. In the end, the 

failure of the Space Council to coordinate a competition of ideas from the outset 

doomed the initiative.

2

 Malow interview.
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end, this led to his firing and the hiring of Dan Goldin. SEI’s outcome demonstrates 

how important it is for the president and NASA administrator to be on the same 

page when trying to gain approval for a major human spaceflight initiative.

In the absence of a true crisis environment, rapid decision making to meet arbitrary deadlines has not proven to be terribly successfully within the American space 

program. The determination to announce SEI on the 20th anniversary of the Apollo 

11 landing was a perfect example. Although many within the space policy community recommended that NASA embark on an extended evaluation of future options, 

a decision to approve SEI was made in less than four months. As a result, President 

George Bush announced an initiative that had not been thoroughly examined with 

regard to its fiscal and political feasibility. In retrospect, it is unclear what necessitated this rushed process. After the speech, this perceived need for speed carried over 

to the 90-Day Study. An examination of the historical record does not reveal any 

clear rationale for conducting the study in three months, except to include funding for SEI in the fiscal year 1991 budget request. Regardless, the result was that 

the TSG did not have time to adequately evaluate a range of strategic architectures 

with different cost profiles. The NRC study team that reviewed the report criticized 

this quick turnaround as the proximate cause for the lack of real alternatives. This 

outcome virtually eliminated any chance for SEI’s approval.

During the second half of the 20th century, there were a number of seminal 

moments in American space policy. These included the creation of NASA, President 

Kennedy’s Moon decision, and the Space Shuttle and Space Station decisions. Due 

to its influence on the space program’s future course, SEI rightfully belongs on this 

list. It is an anomaly in some respects because it was a failed initiative. Combined 

with the Hubble Space Telescope flaw and Space Shuttle fuel leaks, its demise led 

to significant changes at NASA. Perhaps the most important was the appointment 

of Dan Goldin, the most change-oriented administrator since James Webb.3

 The 

most important change he wrought was forcing NASA to face budgetary reality and 

focus on evolutionary advancement. This arguably wouldn’t have happened absent 

the extraordinary budgetary requirements of NASA’s SEI reference approach and 

the eventual downfall of the initiative.

The demise of SEI was a classic example of a defective decision-making process. 

The decision to conduct the agenda setting process in secret made it difficult to generate support within Congress or the space policy community. The Space Council’s 

inability to provide high-level policy guidance, combined with NASA’s failure to 

3

 W. Henry Lambright, Transforming Government: Dan Goldin and the Remaking of NASA

(Arlington, VA: PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2001), p. 11.

to right itself two decades after the post-Apollo deceleration. Instead, it proposed a 

highly expensive reference approach that would require doubling the agency budget 

because there was no inclination to cancel on-going programs. SEI’s resultant demise 

badly damaged the American space program.

The failure to adequately consult Congress was one of the biggest mistakes made 

by the Bush administration before announcing SEI. Considering both houses were 

controlled by the opposition party, and given the existing budgetary crisis, this 

should have been a crucial part of the policy making process. Congress and congressional staffers are among the most critical actors in any policy community. Despite 

this fact, the administration did not involve legislators in SEI’s agenda setting process. Instead, the Space Council and NASA simply ‘informed’ key members and 

staffers, instead of ‘consulting’ them regarding the initiative’s substance or political 

feasibility. Furthermore, there was no attempt made to build a coalition of supporters for human exploration beyond Earth orbit. This explains why SEI never had any 

true champions on Capitol Hill, even among constituencies usually supportive of 

the space program. This procedural flaw was compounded when the Space Council 

and NASA continued to operate without seeking advice from Congress as alternatives were being generated. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 90-Day Study was 

pronounced ‘dead-on-arrival’ when it reached Capitol Hill. Without Congressional 

buy-in, it was impossible to garner support for SEI after the report was released. The 

Space Council made continual efforts to prove the program could be implemented 

with fewer resources. The space summit held in May 1990 was indicative of this 

struggle, but did not sway any Congressional supporters to come to the fore. By 

the time the Hubble flaw and Space Shuttle leaks were revealed, it was too late to 

save SEI. It is unclear whether broad-based support would have been forthcoming 

even if attempts had been made to build a coalition of congressional supporters, 

but the failure to make the effort clearly contributed to the ultimate failure of the 

initiative.

The philosophical disconnect between Admiral Truly and the Space Council was 

one of the most significant secondary causes of SEI’s demise. After taking office, 

the Bush White House did not take early steps to find a new NASA Administrator. 

Although the administration knew James Fletcher was departing, there was no initial rush to find his replacement. Thus, the eventual decision to appoint Truly was 

made very rapidly. As a result, there was little time to make sure that his vision for 

the agency’s future matched President Bush and Vice President Quayle’s. Over the 

course of the subsequent three years, it became increasingly clear Truly’s priorities 

were at odds with the Space Council’s. In fact, Truly actively fought the Council’s 

efforts to take control of space policy making within the federal government. In the 
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independently consider critical fiscal constraints, derailed the initiative before it 

really got started. Finally, the failure of the Space Council to initiate a competition of ideas after President Bush’s announcement speech removed any possibility 

of gaining congressional support after the devastating release of the 90-Day Study. 

It is far from obvious that the failure of SEI was predetermined given the existing 

budgetary crisis facing the nation in 1989. What is clear, however, is that its failure 

was ensured because options that may have been politically feasible were not considered during a deeply flawed policy process. While this had the benefit of forcing 

some level of change within NASA, it also badly damaged the agency’s reputation as 

a world-class technical organization. To ensure the success of future efforts to send 

humans to Mars, current and future policy makers must learn the lessons of SEI. 

This alone is why its history is so fundamental to understanding what is required to 

gain support for large human spaceflight initiatives.
167

NASA History Series

Reference Works, NASA SP-4000:

Grimwood, James M. Project Mercury: A Chronology. NASA SP-4001, 1963.

Grimwood, James M., and C. Barton Hacker, with Peter J. Vorzimmer. Project 

Gemini Technology and Operations: A Chronology. NASA SP-4002, 1969.

Link, Mae Mills. Space Medicine in Project Mercury. NASA SP-4003, 1965.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1963: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. 

NASA SP-4004, 1964.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1964: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. 

NASA SP-4005, 1965.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. 

NASA SP-4006, 1966.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1966: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. 

NASA SP-4007, 1967.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. 

NASA SP-4008, 1968.

Ertel, Ivan D., and Mary Louise Morse. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume I, Through November 7, 1962. NASA SP-4009, 1969.

Morse, Mary Louise, and Jean Kernahan Bays. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, 

Volume II, November 8, 1962–September 30, 1964. NASA SP-4009, 1973.

Brooks, Courtney G., and Ivan D. Ertel. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology,

Volume III, October 1, 1964–January 20, 1966. NASA SP-4009, 1973.

Ertel, Ivan D., and Roland W. Newkirk, with Courtney G. Brooks. The Apollo 

Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume IV, January 21, 1966–July 13, 1974. 

NASA SP-4009, 1978.
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NASA SP-4019, 1977.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1975: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. 

NASA SP-4020, 1979.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1976: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. 

NASA SP-4021, 1984.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1977: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. 

NASA SP-4022, 1986.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1978: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. 

NASA SP-4023, 1986.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1979–1984: Chronology of Science, Technology, and 

Policy. NASA SP-4024, 1988.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1985: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. 

NASA SP-4025, 1990.

Noordung, Hermann. The Problem of Space Travel: The Rocket Motor. Edited by 

Ernst Stuhlinger and J. D. Hunley, with Jennifer Garland. NASA SP-4026, 1995.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1986–1990: A Chronology. NASA SP-4027, 1997.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1990–1995: A Chronology. NASA SP-2000-4028, 

2000.

Management Histories, NASA SP-4100:

Rosholt, Robert L. An Administrative History of NASA, 1958–1963. NASA SP4101, 1966.

Levine, Arnold S. Managing NASA in the Apollo Era. NASA SP-4102, 1982.

Roland, Alex. Model Research: The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 

1915–1958. NASA SP-4103, 1985.

Fries, Sylvia D. NASA Engineers and the Age of Apollo. NASA SP-4104, 1992.

Glennan, T. Keith. The Birth of NASA: The Diary of T. Keith Glennan. J. D. Hunley, editor. NASA SP-4105, 1993.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1968: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. 

NASA SP-4010, 1969.

Newkirk, Roland W., and Ivan D. Ertel, with Courtney G. Brooks. Skylab: A 

Chronology. NASA SP-4011, 1977.

Van Nimmen, Jane, and Leonard C. Bruno, with Robert L. Rosholt. NASA Historical Data Book, Volume I: NASA Resources, 1958–1968. NASA SP-4012, 1976, 

rep. ed. 1988.

Ezell, Linda Neuman. NASA Historical Data Book, Volume II: Programs and Projects, 1958–1968. NASA SP-4012, 1988.

Ezell, Linda Neuman. NASA Historical Data Book, Volume III: Programs and Projects, 1969–1978. NASA SP-4012, 1988.

Gawdiak, Ihor Y., with Helen Fedor, compilers. NASA Historical Data Book, Volume IV: NASA Resources, 1969–1978. NASA SP-4012, 1994.

Rumerman, Judy A., compiler. NASA Historical Data Book, 1979–1988: Volume V, 

NASA Launch Systems, Space Transportation, Human Spaceflight, and Space Science. 

NASA SP-4012, 1999.

Rumerman, Judy A., compiler. NASA Historical Data Book, Volume VI: NASA 

Space Applications, Aeronautics and Space Research and Technology, Tracking and 

Data Acquisition/Space Operations, Commercial Programs, and Resources, 1979–

1988. NASA SP-2000-4012, 2000.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1969: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. 

NASA SP-4014, 1970.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1970: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. 

NASA SP-4015, 1972.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1971: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. 

NASA SP-4016, 1972.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1972: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. 

NASA SP-4017, 1974.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1973: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. 

NASA SP-4018, 1975.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1974: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. 
170

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SP-4207 not published.

Compton, W. David, and Charles D. Benson. Living and Working in Space: A History of Skylab. NASA SP-4208, 1983.

Ezell, Edward Clinton, and Linda Neuman Ezell. The Partnership: A History of the 

Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. NASA SP-4209, 1978.

Hall, R. Cargill. Lunar Impact: A History of Project Ranger. NASA SP-4210, 1977.

Newell, Homer E. Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science. NASA SP4211, 1980.

Ezell, Edward Clinton, and Linda Neuman Ezell. On Mars: Exploration of the Red 

Planet, 1958–1978. NASA SP-4212, 1984.

Pitts, John A. The Human Factor: Biomedicine in the Manned Space Program to 

1980. NASA SP-4213, 1985.

Compton, W. David. Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Apollo Lunar 

Exploration Missions. NASA SP-4214, 1989.

Naugle, John E. First Among Equals: The Selection of NASA Space Science Experiments. NASA SP-4215, 1991.

Wallace, Lane E. Airborne Trailblazer: Two Decades with NASA Langley’s Boeing 

737 Flying Laboratory. NASA SP-4216, 1994.

Butrica, Andrew J., editor. Beyond the Ionosphere: Fifty Years of Satellite Communication. NASA SP-4217, 1997.

Butrica, Andrew J. To See the Unseen: A History of Planetary Radar Astronomy. 

NASA SP-4218, 1996.

Mack, Pamela E., editor. From Engineering Science to Big Science: The NACA and 

NASA Collier Trophy Research Project Winners. NASA SP-4219, 1998.

Reed, R. Dale, with Darlene Lister. Wingless Flight: The Lifting Body Story. NASA 

SP-4220, 1997.

Heppenheimer, T. A. The Space Shuttle Decision: NASA’s Search for a Reusable Space 

Vehicle. NASA SP-4221, 1999.

Hunley, J. D., editor. Toward Mach 2: The Douglas D-558 Program. 

NASA SP-4222, 1999.

Seamans, Robert C., Jr. Aiming at Targets: The Autobiography of Robert C. Seamans, 

Jr. NASA SP-4106, 1996.

Garber, Stephen J., editor. Looking Backward, Looking Forward: Forty Years of U.S. 

Human Spaceflight Symposium. NASA SP-2002-4107, 2002.

Mallick, Donald L. with Peter W. Merlin. The Smell of Kerosene: A Test Pilot’s Odyssey. NASA SP-4108, 2003. 

Iliff, Kenneth W. and Curtis L. Peebles. From Runway to Orbit: Reflections of a NASA 

Engineer. NASA SP-2004-4109, 2004. 

Chertok, Boris. Rockets and People, Volume 1. NASA SP-2005-4110, 2005. 

Laufer, Alexander, Todd Post, and Edward Hoffman. Shared Voyage: Learning and 

Unlearning from Remarkable Projects. NASA SP-2005-4111, 2005. 

Dawson, Virginia P. and Mark D. Bowles. Realizing the Dream of Flight: Biographical Essays in Honor of the Centennial of Flight, 1903-2003. NASA SP-2005-4112, 

2005.

Project Histories, NASA SP-4200:

Swenson, Loyd S., Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander. This New 

Ocean: A History of Project Mercury. NASA SP-4201, 1966; rep. ed. 1998.

Green, Constance McLaughlin, and Milton Lomask. Vanguard: A History. NASA 

SP-4202, 1970; rep. ed. Smithsonian Institution Press, 1971.

Hacker, Barton C., and James M. Grimwood. On the Shoulders of Titans: A History 

of Project Gemini. NASA SP-4203, 1977.

Benson, Charles D., and William Barnaby Faherty. Moonport: A History of Apollo 

Launch Facilities and Operations. NASA SP-4204, 1978.

Brooks, Courtney G., James M. Grimwood, and Loyd S. Swenson, Jr. Chariots for 

Apollo: A History of Manned Lunar Spacecraft. NASA SP-4205, 1979. 

Bilstein, Roger E. Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the Apollo/Saturn 

Launch Vehicles. NASA SP-4206, 1980, rep. ed. 1997.
172

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173

NASA History Series

Hansen, James R. Spaceflight Revolution: NASA Langley Research Center from Sputnik to Apollo. NASA SP-4308, 1995.

Wallace, Lane E. Flights of Discovery: 50 Years at the NASA Dryden Flight Research 

Center. NASA SP-4309, 1996.

Herring, Mack R. Way Station to Space: A History of the John C. Stennis Space Center. NASA SP-4310, 1997.

Wallace, Harold D., Jr. Wallops Station and the Creation of the American Space 

Program. NASA SP-4311, 1997.

Wallace, Lane E. Dreams, Hopes, Realities: NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, The 

First Forty Years. NASA SP-4312, 1999.

Dunar, Andrew J., and Stephen P. Waring. Power to Explore: A History of the Marshall Space Flight Center. NASA SP-4313, 1999.

Bugos, Glenn E. Atmosphere of Freedom: Sixty Years at the NASA Ames Research 

Center. NASA SP-2000-4314, 2000.

Schultz, James. Crafting Flight: Aircraft Pioneers and the Contributions of the Men 

and Women of NASA Langley Research Center. NASA SP-2003-4316, 2003.

General Histories, NASA SP-4400:

Corliss, William R. NASA Sounding Rockets, 1958–1968: A Historical Summary. 

NASA SP-4401, 1971.

Wells, Helen T., Susan H. Whiteley, and Carrie Karegeannes. Origins of NASA 

Names. NASA SP-4402, 1976.

Anderson, Frank W., Jr. Orders of Magnitude: A History of NACA and NASA, 

1915–1980. NASA SP-4403, 1981.

Sloop, John L. Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel, 1945–1959. NASA SP-4404, 

1978.

Roland, Alex. A Spacefaring People: Perspectives on Early Spaceflight. NASA SP4405, 1985.

Bilstein, Roger E. Orders of Magnitude: A History of the NACA and NASA, 1915–

Swanson, Glen E., editor. “Before this Decade Is Out . . .”: Personal Reflections on the 

Apollo Program. NASA SP-4223, 1999.

Tomayko, James E. Computers Take Flight: A History of NASA’s Pioneering Digital 

Fly-by-Wire Project. NASA SP-2000-4224, 2000.

Morgan, Clay. Shuttle-Mir: The U.S. and Russia Share History’s Highest Stage. 

NASA SP-2001-4225, 2001.

Leary, William M. “We Freeze to Please”: A History of NASA’s Icing Research Tunnel 

and the Quest for Flight Safety. NASA SP-2002-4226, 2002.

Mudgway, Douglas J. Uplink-Downlink: A History of the Deep Space Network 

1957–1997. NASA SP-2001-4227, 2001. 

Dawson, Virginia P. and Mark D. Bowles. Taming Liquid Hydrogen: The Centaur 

Upper Stage Rocket, 1958-2002. NASA SP-2004-4230, 2004.

Meltzer, Michael. Mission to Jupiter: A History of the Galileo Project. NASA SP2007-4231.

Center Histories, NASA SP-4300:

Rosenthal, Alfred. Venture into Space: Early Years of Goddard Space Flight Center. 

NASA SP-4301, 1985.

Hartman, Edwin P. Adventures in Research: A History of Ames Research Center, 

1940–1965. NASA SP-4302, 1970.

Hallion, Richard P. On the Frontier: Flight Research at Dryden, 1946–1981. NASA 

SP-4303, 1984.

Muenger, Elizabeth A. Searching the Horizon: A History of Ames Research Center, 

1940–1976. NASA SP-4304, 1985.

Hansen, James R. Engineer in Charge: A History of the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 1917–1958. NASA SP-4305, 1987.

Dawson, Virginia P. Engines and Innovation: Lewis Laboratory and American Propulsion Technology. NASA SP-4306, 1991.

Dethloff, Henry C. “Suddenly Tomorrow Came . . .”: A History of the Johnson Space 

Center. NASA SP-4307, 1993.
174

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175

NASA History Series

Launius, Roger D. Apollo: A Retrospective Analysis. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 3, 1994.

Hansen, James R. Enchanted Rendezvous: John C. Houbolt and the Genesis of the Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous Concept. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 4, 1995.

Gorn, Michael H. Hugh L. Dryden’s Career in Aviation and Space. Monograph in 

Aerospace History, No. 5, 1996.

Powers, Sheryll Goecke. Women in Flight Research at NASA Dryden Flight Research 

Center, from 1946 to 1995. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 6, 1997. 

Portree, David S. F. and Robert C. Trevino.Walking to Olympus: An EVA Chronology. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 7, 1997.

Logsdon, John M., moderator. Legislative Origins of the National Aeronautics and 

Space Act of 1958: Proceedings of an Oral History Workshop. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 8, 1998.

Rumerman, Judy A., compiler, U.S. Human Spaceflight, A Record of Achievement 

1961–1998. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 9, 1998.

Portree, David S. F. NASA’s Origins and the Dawn of the Space Age. Monograph in 

Aerospace History, No. 10, 1998.

Logsdon, John M. Together in Orbit: The Origins of International Cooperation in the 

Space Station. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 11, 1998. 

Phillips, W. Hewitt. Journey in Aeronautical Research: A Career at NASA Langley 

Research Center. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 12, 1998. 

Braslow, Albert L. A History of Suction-Type Laminar-Flow Control with Emphasis 

on Flight Research. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 13, 1999.

Logsdon, John M., moderator. Managing the Moon Program: Lessons Learned From 

Apollo. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 14, 1999. 

Perminov, V. G. The Difficult Road to Mars: A Brief History of Mars Exploration in 

the Soviet Union. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 15, 1999. 

Tucker, Tom. Touchdown: The Development of Propulsion Controlled Aircraft at 

NASA Dryden. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 16, 1999.

Maisel, Martin D., Demo J. Giulianetti, and Daniel C. Dugan. The History of the XV15 Tilt Rotor Research Aircraft: From Concept to Flight. NASA SP-2000-4517, 2000.

1990. NASA SP-4406, 1989.

Logsdon, John M., editor, with Linda J. Lear, Jannelle Warren-Findley, Ray A. 

Williamson, and Dwayne A. Day. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in 

the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume I, Organizing for Exploration. 

NASA SP-4407, 1995.

Logsdon, John M., editor, with Dwayne A. Day and Roger D. Launius. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, 

Volume II, Relations with Other Organizations. NASA SP-4407, 1996.

Logsdon, John M., editor, with Roger D. Launius, David H. Onkst, and Stephen 

J. Garber. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. 

Civil Space Program, Volume III, Using Space. NASA SP-4407, 1998.

Logsdon, John M., general editor, with Ray A. Williamson, Roger D. Launius, 

Russell J. Acker, Stephen J. Garber, and Jonathan L. Friedman. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume 

IV, Accessing Space. NASA SP-4407, 1999.

Logsdon, John M., general editor, with Amy Paige Snyder, Roger D. Launius, 

Stephen J. Garber, and Regan Anne Newport. Exploring the Unknown: Selected 

Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume V, Exploring the 

Cosmos. NASA SP-2001-4407, 2001.

Siddiqi, Asif A. Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945–

1974. NASA SP-2000-4408, 2000.

Hansen, James R., editor. The Wind and Beyond: Journey into the History of 

Aerodynamics in America, Volume 1, The Ascent of the Airplane. NASA SP-2003-

4409, 2003.

Monographs in Aerospace History, NASA SP-4500:

Launius, Roger D. and Aaron K. Gillette, compilers, Toward a History of the Space 

Shuttle: An Annotated Bibliography. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 1, 1992.

Launius, Roger D., and J. D. Hunley, compilers, An Annotated Bibliography of the 

Apollo Program. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 2, 1994.
176

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177

NASA History Series

Bowles, Mark D. and Robert S. Arrighi. NASA’s Nuclear Frontier: The Plum Brook 

Research Reactor. SP-2004-4533, 2003.

Matranga, Gene J. and C. Wayne Ottinger, Calvin R. Jarvis with D. Christian 

Gelzer. Unconventional, Contrary, and Ugly: The Lunar Landing Research Vehicle. 

NASA SP-2006-4535.

McCurdy, Howard E. Low Cost Innovation in Spaceflight: The History of the Near 

Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR) Mission. NASA SP-2005-4536, 2005.

Seamans, Robert C. Jr. Project Apollo: The Tough Decisions. NASA SP-2005-4537, 

2005.

Lambright, W. Henry. NASA and the Environment: The Case of Ozone Depletion.

NASA SP-2005-4538, 2005.

Chambers, Joseph R. Innovation in Flight: Research of the NASA Langley Research 

Center on Revolutionary Advanced Concepts for Aeronautics. NASA SP-2005-4539, 

2005.

Phillips, W. Hewitt. Journey Into Space Research: Continuation of a Career at NASA 

Langley Research Center. NASA SP-2005-4540, 2005.

Jenkins, Dennis R. Hypersonics Before the Shuttle: A Concise History of the X-15 

Research Airplane. NASA SP-2000-4518, 2000. 

Chambers, Joseph R. Partners in Freedom: Contributions of the Langley Research 

Center to U.S. Military Aircraft in the 1990s. NASA SP-2000-4519, 2000.

Waltman, Gene L. Black Magic and Gremlins: Analog Flight Simulations at NASA’s 

Flight Research Center. NASA SP-2000-4520, 2000.

Portree, David S. F. Humans to Mars: Fifty Years of Mission Planning, 1950–2000.

NASA SP-2001-4521, 2001.

Thompson, Milton O., with J. D. Hunley. Flight Research: Problems Encountered 

and What They Should Teach Us. NASA SP-2000-4522, 2000.

Tucker, Tom. The Eclipse Project. NASA SP-2000-4523, 2000.

Siddiqi, Asif A. Deep Space Chronicle: A Chronology of Deep Space and Planetary 

Probes, 1958–2000. NASA SP-2002-4524, 2002. 

Merlin, Peter W. Mach 3+: NASA/USAF YF-12 Flight Research, 1969–1979. 

NASA SP-2001-4525, 2001.

Anderson, Seth B. Memoirs of an Aeronautical Engineer—Flight Tests at Ames Research Center: 1940–1970. NASA SP-2002-4526, 2002. 

Renstrom, Arthur G. Wilbur and Orville Wright: A Bibliography Commemorating 

the One-Hundredth Anniversary of the First Powered Flight on December 17, 1903. 

NASA SP-2002-4527, 2002.

No monograph 28.

Chambers, Joseph R. Concept to Reality: Contributions of the NASA Langley Research Center to U.S. Civil Aircraft of the 1990s. SP-2003-4529, 2003.

Peebles, Curtis, editor. The Spoken Word: Recollections of Dryden History, The Early 

Years. SP-2003-4530, 2003.

Jenkins, Dennis R., Tony Landis, and Jay Miller. American X-Vehicles: An Inventory-X-1 to X-50. SP-2003-4531, 2003.

Renstrom, Arthur G. Wilbur and Orville Wright: A Chronology Commemorating 

the One-Hundredth Anniversary of the First Powered Flight on December 17, 1903.

NASA SP-2003-4532, 2002.

179

Index

90-Day Study, 79-95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 102, 104-105, 108, 111, 115, 117, 129, 

141, 143, 152, 155, 159, 161-162, 164, 165, 166

A

Aaron, John, 32, 59, 60

Adams, Robert, 69

Ad Hoc Working Group (AHWG), 59-62, 79, 83, 86, 160, 161, 163

Advanced Launch System (ALS), 88, 122

Aerospace plane, 29, 46, 111

Agenda setting, 14, 68, 86, 137, 138-143, 155, 157, 159, 164, 165

Agnew, Spiro, 21-22, 163

Albrecht, Mark, 2, 4, 48-49, 51, 52, 54, 57-58, 62-63, 65-66, 68-69, 79-82, 92-94, 

95, 96, 99, 100, 105, 109, 114, 123, 127, 130-133, 139, 160-161, 163

Aldridge, Pete, 99

Aldrin, Buzz, 50, 69, 70, 120, 152

Alternative generation, 19, 59, 84, 94, 101, 138-143, 156, 159, 160-161

Anderson, Clinton, 23

Apollo, see Project Apollo

Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), 53, 116, 145

Aristarchus of Samos, 6-7

Armstrong, Neil, 28, 50, 69, 70, 152

Astronauts, 10, 17, 19, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 40, 50, 53, 54, 61, 64, 72, 74, 84, 99, 

116, 120, 149

Augustine, Norman, 78, 124, 126, 128

B

Baker, David, 117

Barnard, Edward, 8

Baumgartner, Frank, 3, 4-5, 137, 143-149, 148, 153, 156

Beggs, Jim, 28, 130

Bentsen, Lloyd, 39

Blue Ribbon Discussion Group, 99-102

Boston, Penelope, 25-26
180

Mars Wars

181

Index

Bradbury, Ray, 10

Brahe, Tycho, 6-7

Branscome, Darrell, 59, 60, 64

Bromley, Allan, 99

Burrough, Bryan, 81, 132

Burroughs, Edgar Rice, 9

Bush, George, 38-39, 42, 47, 68, 103, 109, 112, 141, 153, 163

and 1988 presidential election, 40-44

and 1992 presidential election, 132, 133

and announcement of SEI, 1, 2, 15, 49-50, 53, 68-72, 74-5, 79, 138, 164, 165

and Challenger families, 40

and Vice President Dan Quayle, 52, 53, 56, 68, 69, 70, 72, 79, 107, 113, 141, 

150, 164

and international space cooperation, 109-110

and Mark Albrecht, 48, 131

and NASA Administrator James Fletcher, 40-41, 42, 44, 49, 164

and NASA Administrator Richard Truly, 54, 130-31, 164

and National Space Council, 56, 160, 162-163

Reaction to 90-Day Study, 93

Reagan-Bush transition, 44-46

SEI Presidential decision directives, 108-110

Speech at Marshall Space Flight Center, 118-119

Speech at Texas A&I University, 114-115

as supporter of Moon-Mars exploration, 42-44, 46, 47, 50, 92, 155, 159

as supporter of space program, 38, 40, 42-44, 47, 107, 112, 114-115, 118-119, 

138, 141, 150, 155, 159, 163

as supporter of space station, 42-44, 47

and White House space summit, 112-114

Bush, Prescott, 38

C

Campbell, Thomas, 111

Carter, Jimmy, 39

Case for Mars conferences, see Mars exploration

Cassini, Giovanni, 7

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 51

Cernan, Eugene, 120, 123

Clinton, Bill, 133, 134-135, 146 

Cohen, Aaron, 2, 59, 79-81, 93-94, 161

Cohen, Michael, 3

Collier’s magazine, 17-18

Collins, Michael, 50, 64, 65, 69, 70, 99

Columbus, Christopher, 72, 119

Congress, see United States Congress

Cooper, Henry, 48

Copernicus, Nicolaus, 6-7

Covault, Craig, 69

Craig, Mark, 59, 60, 62, 64, 65, 69, 82, 83

Culbertson, Phillip, 58

D

Darman, Richard, 52-53, 93, 96, 99, 100, 126, 139, 163

Darwin, Charles, 59, 60

David, Leonard, 26

Deimos, 7, 27

Demisch, Wolfgang, 78

Department of Energy, 109, 116

Department of Defense, 108-109, 116

Department of Transportation, 109

Disney, Walt, 18

Dole, Bob, 120

DuBridge, Lee, 21

Dukakis, Mike, 42, 44

Duke, Mike, 59, 60

E

Earth Observation System, 125, 132

Ehricke, Krafft, 20

EMPIRE study, 20

Energia launch vehicle, 41

Erlichman, John, 23

F

Faget, Maxime, 20

Fisk, Lennard, 120

Fitzwater, Marlin, 48, 73

Flammarion, Camille, 8

Fletcher, James, 30, 32-33, 40-42, 44, 45, 49-50, 51, 53, 130, 164

Ford Aeronutronic, 20

Ford, Gerald, 39

Franks, Anthony, 70

Friedman, Louis, 64
182

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183

Index

G

Galilei, Galileo, 7

Garbage Can Theory, 3-4

Garn, Jake, 47, 66, 112, 120

General Dynamics, 20

Geocentric model, 6-7

Gibson, Roy, 128

Gingrich, Newt, 120

Goldin, Dan, 132-134, 165

Gorbachev, Mikhail, 109-110

Gore, Al, 77, 115, 122, 131, 134

Grady, Bob, 52, 163

Gramm, Phil, 120

Green, Bill, 78

Greene, John Robert, 38-39

H

Hall, Asaph, 7

Heinlein, Robert, 9-10

Heliocentric model, 6-7

Herschel, William, 7

Hoff, Joan, 21-25

Hollings, Ernest, 67

Hubble Space Telescope, 2, 113, 118, 120-121, 165

Hunt, Guy, 118

Huygens, Christian, 7

J

Jastrow, Robert, 120

Johnson, Lyndon, 24, 39, 53, 148, 154

Jones, Bryan, 3, 4-5, 137, 143-149, 148, 153, 156

K

Kennedy, John, 19, 24, 34, 42, 53, 69, 78, 81, 148, 151, 153, 154, 165

Kepler, Johannes, 6-7

Keyworth, George, 28

Kingdon, John, 3-4, 137, 138-143, 157

Kirkpatrick, Jean, 28

Kohashi, Stephen, 49, 55, 66, 97, 125

Kristol, Bill, 123

L

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 95-96, 99

Lenoir, Bill, 60, 62

Lewis, Tom, 119

Ley, Willy, 17

Lockheed, 20

Logsdon, John, 25, 35, 129, 131

Lovelace, Alan, 110

Lowell, Percival, 8-9, 10, 11

Lunar Observer mission, 86, 98, 122

M

Malow, Richard, 55, 66-67, 97, 109, 115, 121, 125, 128, 162

March, James, 3

Mariner program, 11-13, 16, 20

Mark, Hans, 123

Mars exploration, 15, 37, 42, 43, 45, 46, 50, 68-69, 71, 75, 93, 105, 114, 118-119, 

125, 127, 132, 135, 143, 145, 146, 150, 151, 152, 154, 155, 159, 163

and the Ad Hoc Working Group, 57-64

Astronomical observations, 6-9

and Augustine Commission Report, 126-127

Canals on, 7-9

Case for Mars conferences, 25-27, 117

and competition with Soviet Union, 41, 108, 110

Early mission planning, 16-21

and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 95-6

Lunar and Mars Exploration Office, 59, 60

Mariner missions, 11

Mars Direct concept, 117

Mars Global Network, 86

Mars Observer, 98, 111

Mars Polar Orbiter, 27

Mars Rover, 31, 86

Mars Sample Return, 27, 31, 86, 100

Mars Site Reconnaissance Orbiter, 86

and NASA Office of Exploration, 32-35

in National Commission on Space, 27-30

Office of Exploration, 32-35, 57, 59, 60, 102, 142

in popular culture, 9-10

Post-Apollo planning, 21-25
184

Mars Wars

185

Index

Rationales for exploration, 5-7, 72

in Ride Report, 30-32

as seen by early civilizations, 5-6

and space policy community, 65-67

and Synthesis Group Report, 128-129

and the Technical Study Group, 82-92

Viking missions, 12-13

Mars Society, 27

Mars Underground, 25-26

Martin, Frank, 57-58, 59, 62-64, 65, 67, 79, 81

Matsunaga, Spark, 112

Mayo, Robert, 23

McCurdy, Howard, 18, 19, 35

McCurry, Mike, 135

McKay, Chris, 25-26

Meyer, Tom, 25-26

Michener, James, 75

Mikulski, Barbara, 67, 112

Miller, George, 23

Mineta, Norman, 55

Mir space station, 41, 81, 132

Mission to Planet Earth, 31, 42, 62, 103, 113, 122, 126-127

Mitchell, Brad, 45-46

Moon exploration, 1, 2, 17, 18, 19, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 52, 

57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63-64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71-73, 74, 75, 77, 85-86, 89, 90-91, 

93, 95, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 108, 111, 112, 113, 119, 123, 124, 

129, 134, 144, 145, 148, 150, 151, 159, 162

Murray, Bruce, 64-65, 123

N

NASA, 2, 11, 14, 19, 21, 22, 37, 38, 41, 42, 50, 134

90-Day Study, 82-92

and Ad Hoc Working Group, 57-64, 68-69

and Augustine Commission, 123-124, 127-128

and Blue Ribbon Discussion Group, 99-100

Budget, 23, 30, 42, 46, 47, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 73, 78, 80, 92, 94-95, 97-99, 

103-104, 110-111, 121-122, 124-127, 152-3, 155, 159

and Center for Strategic and International Studies, 51

and Challenger accident, 38, 40, 44

History Division, 146

and Hubble Space Telescope flaw, 120-121

Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 60, 91, 127

Johnson Space Center, 2, 20, 59, 60, 63, 81-84, 91, 97, 99, 104, 151

and lessons learned from SEI, 159-166

Lewis Research Center, 19, 132

Manned Spacecraft Center, 20

Marshall Space Flight Center, 19, 20, 41, 91, 118-119

and Mitchell Report, 45-46

and National Commission on Space, 27-30

and National Research Council, 45, 104-105

and National Space Council, 2, 48, 49, 52, 79-84, 92-105, 108-110, 114, 131

Office of Exploration, 32-35

and Post-Apollo planning, 21-25

and public opinion, 146-147

and Ride Report, 30-32

and space policy community, 64-67, 138-143

and Synthesis Group, 128-130

Technical Study Group, see 90-Day Study

NASA Transition Office Team, 45-46

National Air and Space Museum, 1, 50, 69

National Academy of Sciences, 96, 100, 104-105, 108, 110, 111, 116, 161, 165

National Commission on Space, 27-30, 34, 37, 59, 65, 145

National Research Council, see National Academy of Sciences

National Science and Technology Council, 134

National Security Council, 34

National Space Council, 1, 2, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 54, 56-57, 58, 60, 68, 72, 74, 

77, 79-85, 92-97, 99-101, 103-104, 108-110, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 123, 

126-128, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 139, 141, 142, 150, 152, 159, 160-166

Nelson, Bill, 128

Nixon, Richard, 15, 21-24, 25, 39, 146, 148, 152, 154, 159, 163

O

Office of Science and Technology Policy, 139

Office of Technology Assessment, 128

O’Handley, Douglas, 60, 62, 65, 79, 82, 83, 84, 93, 96

Olsen, Johan, 3

P

Paine, Thomas, 21-22, 27-28, 32, 64-65, 99, 123, 128, 130

Panetta, Leon, 78, 134

Pfiffner, James, 44

Phobos, 7, 27, 33 
186

Mars Wars

187

Index

Pike, John, 48, 104

Policy entrepreneur, 4, 22, 49, 52, 57, 138-140, 159

Policy Streams Model, 3-4, 137, 138-143, 155-156

Policy window, 3, 4, 44, 146, 160

Portree, David, 151

Post-Apollo Planning, see Project Apollo

Project Apollo, 1, 20, 22, 26, 31, 37, 64, 78, 79, 81, 115, 119, 143, 145, 149, 152-

3, 154, 155

Apollo 11 anniversary, 1, 2, 50, 51, 57, 69-75, 163, 165

Post-Apollo Planning, 2, 5, 14, 15, 20, 21-5, 84, 145, 145, 152, 155, 159, 163

Proxmire, William, 66

Ptolemy, Claudius, 6-7

Pulliam, Eugene, 52

Punctuated Equilibrium Model, 3, 4-5, 137, 143-149, 155, 157

Q

Quayle, Dan, 2, 52

and announcement of SEI, 69, 70, 72, 79

as Chair, National Space Council, 46, 47, 49, 52, 56, 60, 62-63, 67, 68-69, 80, 

94-96, 99, 100, 102, 108, 113, 116-117, 120, 122-123, 125, 126-127, 129, 

150, 154, 161, 163, 164

and Dan Goldin, 132-133

and development of SEI, 51-53

and George Bush, 52, 53, 56, 68, 70, 72, 79, 107, 113, 164

and Mark Albrecht, 4, 49, 51, 79, 93, 160-161, 163

and reaction to 90-Day Study, 93

and Richard Truly, 53-54, 57, 67, 117, 130-131

and space policy community, 138-141

R

RAND Corporation, 48, 116

Reagan, Ronald, 16, 28, 34-35, 38, 39, 41, 44, 46, 66, 110, 150, 152, 154

Rice, Donald, 96

Ride, Sally, 30-32

Russia, see Soviet Union

Ryan, Cornelius, 17

S

Sagan, Carl, 99, 109

Sasser, James, 77

Sawyer, Kathy, 95

Schiaparelli, Virginio, 8, 10

Schmitt, Harrison, 99

Scobee, June, 40

Scowcroft, Brent, 50, 51

Seamans, Robert, 21, 23

Senior Interagency Group-Space, 34

Shuttle-C, 61

Skinner, Samuel, 130

Skylab, 25, 53, 145

Smith, Marcia, 35

Smithsonian Institution, see National Air and Space Museum

Softening up process, 16, 17, 19, 27, 145, 151

Soviet Union, 11, 12, 24, 30, 37, 41, 43, 51, 107, 109-110, 134, 152

Space policy community, 3, 27, 37, 44, 64, 84, 96, 117, 132, 138-143, 157, 160-

161, 165

Space shuttle, 2, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 47, 53, 54, 59, 61, 

84, 105, 113, 121, 122, 125, 126, 127, 128, 131, 143, 144, 145, 146, 150, 151, 

154, 162, 164, 165

and Challenger accident, 28, 30, 34, 38, 40, 42, 44, 54, 72, 150-151, 154

Space station, 1, 2, 17, 20, 22, 24, 28, 31, 34, 37, 41, 43, 45, 46, 47, 50, 52, 53, 

61, 62, 71, 75, 83-89, 97, 98, 103, 111, 114, 117, 122-123, 125-127, 134-135, 

143, 144, 145, 146, 150, 156, 162, 165

Space Task Group, 21-25, 28, 159

Sputnik, 11, 19

Stafford, Thomas, 116, 124, 129

Stever, H. Guyford, 44, 104

Stoker, Carol, 25-26

Stategic Defense Initiative, 48, 132

Stuhlinger, Ernst, 18, 19

Sununu, John, 53, 63, 69, 123

T

Technical Study Group, 82-92, 94-95, 97, 100, 102, 104, 105, 111, 117, 128-129, 

142, 143, 153, 162, 165

Teller, Edward, 99

Texas A&I University, 114

Thompson, J.R., 58, 62, 130

Tower, John, 48

Townes, Charles, 21

Traxler, Robert, 67, 110-111, 114, 122

Truly, Richard, 2, 53-55, 57-59, 60, 62-64, 67, 69, 70, 73-74, 79-80, 82, 84, 92, 
188

Mars Wars

93, 96, 100, 102, 103, 111, 117, 123, 128, 130-131, 139-140, 142, 162-163, 

164

U

United States Congress, 4, 19, 21, 23, 28, 30, 37, 39, 46, 47, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 

66, 67, 69, 74, 75, 77, 78, 82, 93, 95, 97, 98, 103, 105, 109, 110, 111, 113, 

114, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 128, 133, 139-140, 142, 

150-151, 152, 154, 159, 161, 163, 164, 165

United States House of Representatives, see United States Congress

United States Naval Observatory, 7

United States Senate, see United States Congress

V

Viking program, 12-13

von Braun, Wernher, 16-20, 22

W

Walker, Dorothy, 38

Walker, Bob, 120

Wallop, Malcolm, 120

Watson, James, 96

Welch, Steve, 25-26

Welles, Orson, 9

Wells, H.G., 9

Wilford, John Noble, 30

Wilkening, Laurel, 99

Williamson, Ray, 128

Wilson, Roger, 26

Wilson, Pete, 48

Wood, Lowell, 95-96, 99

Y

Yarborough, Ralph, 39

Yeager, Chuck, 28

Z

Zubrin, Robert, 117