Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 

Lemons, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 

SHAKEVA QUARLEAT FRAZIER 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 032615 SENIOR JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 

 September 17, 2004 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Background

 In a bench trial, Shakeva Quarleat Frazier was convicted 

under an indictment charging her with feloniously aiding and 

abetting Ampazzio Walleti Warren in his failure to appear in 

court on a felony offense in violation of Code § 19.2-128(B).*

 

Frazier, who was Warren’s girlfriend, was sentenced to a term of 

two years in the penitentiary, with the two years suspended on 

condition that she serve six months in jail. 

 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed Frazier’s 

conviction by published opinion. Frazier v. Commonwealth, 40 

Va. App. 350, 579 S.E.2d 628 (2003). Upon an en banc rehearing, 

the conviction was affirmed in a published order, by an equally 

divided court. Frazier v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 595, 595, 

587 S.E.2d 362, 362 (2003). We awarded Frazier this appeal. 

Finding that Frazier’s conviction was without error, we will 

affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 

 *

 Code § 19.2-128(B) provides in pertinent part that "[a]ny 

person . . . charged with a felony offense . . . who willfully 

fails to appear before any court as required shall be guilty of 

a Class 6 felony." 
2

 The record shows that on June 5, 2000, Warren was on trial 

before a jury in the Circuit Court of the City of Danville on 

three felony indictments charging possession of cocaine with 

intent to distribute, possession of a firearm while possessing 

cocaine, and possession of a concealed weapon, second offense. 

Warren left the courthouse when the jury retired to deliberate, 

and, when the jury returned, he “failed to appear.” Two police 

officers “searched the courtroom, outside area . . . everywhere, 

and couldn’t find him.” 

 Warren was later arrested in Burlington, North Carolina, 

where he was “staying . . . with [Frazier] and [her] father.” 

He was returned to Virginia and, on September 8, 2000, was tried 

in the Circuit Court of the City of Danville on a charge of 

failing to appear, based upon his flight from his June 5, 2000 

trial. In response to a subpoena obtained by Warren’s counsel, 

Frazier appeared as a witness in his behalf. 

 Frazier testified that she was pregnant with Warren’s child 

at the time of his drug/weapons trial on June 5, 2000, and his 

failure-to-appear trial on September 8, 2000. At some point in 

the drug/weapons trial, Frazier overheard three jurors “speakin’ 

about [Warren’s] case.” Then, while the jury was deliberating, 

Frazier talked to Warren in “the hall.” She was “real upset” 

and “concerned about [her] boyfriend and the father of [her] 

child . . . going to prison.” She told Warren that she “didn’t 
3

think he was havin’ a fair trial,” that she “wanted him to leave 

with [her],” and that “if he didn’t ‘[she would] kill [herself] 

and [the] child’ [she was] carryin’.” 

 While on the witness stand, Frazier stated that she “knew 

it was wrong for [Warren] to leave Court” and that she 

“encouraged him to do it anyway.” She said she had come to 

Warren’s trial ready to accept responsibility for what she had 

done and “whatever punishment seems fit for it.” 

 Prior to her own trial, Frazier moved to exclude the 

testimony she had given at Warren’s trial on the ground such 

admission would violate Code § 19.2-270. That section provides 

in pertinent part as follows: 

In a criminal prosecution, other than for perjury, . . . 

evidence shall not be given against the accused of any 

statement made by him as a witness upon a legal 

examination, in a criminal or civil action, unless such 

statement was made when examined as a witness in his own 

behalf. 

 The trial court denied Frazier’s motion to exclude, finding 

that, at Warren’s trial, Frazier “was testifying, in essence, 

not only in Mr. Warren’s behalf, but also in her own behalf.” 

Based upon that testimony, the trial court convicted Frazier of 

aiding and abetting Warren’s failure to appear in court as 

required. 

Discussion
4

On appeal, the sole question for decision is whether the 

trial court’s admission into evidence of Frazier’s earlier 

testimony violated Code § 19.2-270. Frazier emphasizes that, 

under the statute, the prior testimony of an accused is 

inadmissible against her unless it was given when testifying as 

a witness in her own behalf. Frazier maintains that when she 

was a witness at Warren’s trial for his failure to appear, she 

testified in his behalf, not in her own behalf. Hence, Frazier 

concludes, her earlier testimony was inadmissible at her trial 

for aiding and abetting. 

 Frazier acknowledges that in Hansel v. Commonwealth, 118 

Va. 803, 88 S.E. 166 (1916), this Court recognized an exception 

to the statutory bar provided by Code § 19.2-270. There, Hansel 

allegedly forged an option contract for the sale of land under 

which the sellers agreed to pay Robinett, a broker, a commission 

of ten percent for selling the land. Robinett assigned onethird of the commission to Hansel. In an action later brought 

in Robinett’s name against the sellers to collect the 

commission, Hansel testified as a witness in behalf of Robinett. 

Then, in Hansel’s trial for forgery and uttering a forged 

instrument, the trial court admitted into evidence a 

stenographic report of the testimony Hansel had given in the 

action for commissions. Hansel objected to the admission on the 

ground it was “contrary to section 3901 of the Code.” Id. at 
5

809, 88 S.E. at 167. In identical language, section 3901 is now 

Code § 19.2-270. This Court held in Hansel: 

 With respect to this objection, it is sufficient to 

say that though Hansel was called as a witness for the 

plaintiff, Robinett, they had a joint interest in the 

recovery. So that in point of fact he was “examined as a 

witness in his own behalf.” 

Id. 

 Frazier argues that the exception noted in Hansel is 

applicable only when the accused has a joint financial interest 

with the party for whom she has testified at the earlier trial. 

No such interest existed between her and Warren, Frazier 

insists. She says that “being pregnant is not a condition that 

creates a legally recognized interest on the part of the 

expectant mother”; that “Virginia does not recognize [a] common 

law marriage contracted within Virginia, . . . thus the 

relationship between Frazier and Warren would not create any 

legally recognized duty of Warren toward Frazier”; and that the 

“right of child support belongs to the child, not to its 

mother.” 

 While the facts in Hansel differ somewhat from the factual 

situation here, we disagree with Frazier’s argument that the 

exception to Code § 19.2-270 noted in Hansel may be applied only 

when there is present the precise type of financial interest 

that was involved in that earlier decision. The two cases do 

not differ in principle, and nothing said in the Hansel opinion 
6

limits application of the exception as Frazier would have it 

limited. 

 We are of opinion that the exception should also be applied 

when, as here, there exists between the parties interests of a 

personal, familial, and financial nature and the issue is 

whether the accused was testifying in her own behalf at an 

earlier trial. There can be no doubt that a personal and 

familial interest existed between Frazier and Warren. They were 

girlfriend and boyfriend and she was carrying his child, both 

when she urged him to flee from his drug/weapons trial and when 

she testified at his trial for failure to appear. 

 The General Assembly has addressed the personal and 

familial nature of this sort of relationship. In Code § 16.1-

228, the term “ ‘[f]amily or household member,’ ” when used in 

the chapter relating to juvenile and domestic relations district 

courts, includes “(v) any individual who has a child in common 

with [another] person, whether or not the person and that 

individual have been married or have resided together at any 

time.” See also Code §§ 18.2-57.2(D) and 18.2-60.3(F) (in 

prosecutions for domestic assault and battery and for stalking, 

the term "family or household member" shall have the same 

meaning as provided in Code § 16.1-228). 

 Neither can there be any doubt that a financial interest 

existed between Frazier and Warren. The General Assembly has 
7

addressed the financial aspect of the situation in which these 

parties found themselves. Code § 20-61 provides that “any 

parent who deserts or willfully neglects or refuses or fails to 

provide for the support and maintenance of his or her child 

under the age of eighteen years of age . . . shall be guilty of 

a misdemeanor.” (Emphasis added.) 

 We are further of opinion that the personal, familial, and 

financial relationship existing between Frazier and Warren is 

sufficient to serve as a predicate for finding that an earlier 

statement was made in her own behalf as well as in behalf of 

another member of that relationship. As noted supra, the trial 

court found that when Frazier testified at Warren’s failure-toappear trial, she “was testifying, in essence, not only in Mr. 

Warren’s behalf, but also in her own behalf.” The evidence 

supports the trial court’s finding. 

 Regarding the personal and familial aspect of the FrazierWarren relationship, Frazier testified at her own trial that she 

encouraged Warren to flee during his drug/weapons trial because 

she was concerned about her boyfriend and the father of her 

child going to prison. It is reasonable to infer that she had 

the same concern when she testified at Warren’s failure-toappear trial and that her purpose was the same − to keep her 

boyfriend out of prison not only for his sake but also for the 
8

benefit of herself and her child. Frazier just took an unlawful 

course in the way she addressed her concern. 

 On the financial side of the picture, Frazier had cause to 

be concerned about the support of her child. While she may be 

correct in saying that the relationship between her and Warren 

would “not create any legally recognized duty of Warren toward 

Frazier,” Warren certainly would owe the child the duty of 

support, and Frazier had the right to expect Warren would 

perform that duty if not incarcerated. On the other hand, were 

Warren incarcerated, the burden of support would fall upon her. 

But, again, Frazier chose an illegal method of addressing her 

concern. 

 Although Frazier says her testimony at Warren’s failure-toappear trial was in his behalf alone, her concerns were of such 

importance to her that she threatened to kill herself and the 

child she was carrying if Warren did not flee with her. Under 

the circumstances of this case, it would be unrealistic to say 

that Frazier was not testifying in her own behalf as well as 

Warren’s when she served as a witness at his trial for failing 

to appear. 

 But, Frazier argues, she should not be considered as having 

testified in her own behalf at Warren’s trial because she was 

compelled to testify in response to the subpoena obtained by 

Warren’s counsel. However, whether she appeared voluntarily or 
9

in response to a subpoena is irrelevant to the question whether 

she testified in her own behalf. Moreover, in her testimony, 

she disavowed any notion of compulsion when she stated that 

“what [she] came to Court for today [was] to accept . . . 

responsibility” for encouraging Warren “to leave Court.” 

 Frazier also argues that, at the time she testified at 

Warren’s trial, there were no charges pending against her 

and she had not been advised of the possible consequences 

of giving self-incriminating testimony. However, she does 

not cite nor are we aware of any authority requiring that 

she should have been given such advice as a prerequisite to 

the admissibility of her prior testimony. Furthermore, 

while on the witness stand, she admitted that she knew “it 

was wrong for [Warren] to leave Court,” yet she “encouraged 

him to do it anyway.” 

 For the reasons assigned, we will affirm the judgment of 

the Court of Appeals. 

Affirmed.