Texas Pipeline Association

Thure Cannon

President

October 29,2014

Via http://www.regulations.gov

OSWER Docket

EPA Docket Center

Mail Code 2822-1T

Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20460

Re: Docket No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328; Request for Information regarding Risk

Management Programs under Section 112(r)(7) of the Clean Air Act

Dear Sir or Madam:

The Texas Pipeline Association ("TPA") submits the following response to the Request

for Information ("RFI") issued by EPA concerning EPA's Risk Management Programs

("RMP"), published at 79 Fed. Reg. 44604 (July 31, 2014). TPA is an organization composed of

48 members who gather, process, treat, and transport natural gas and hazardous liquids materials

through intrastate pipelines in Texas. TPA's members could be affected by policy decisions and

rules promulgated as a result of EPA's collection of information in this RFI because TPA

members own and operate facilities that are subject to the RMP regulations.

TPA has structured its response as follows. First, we address certain overarching issues

that relate generally to the RFI. Second, we provide our responses to certain specific issues set

forth in the RFI.

1. Overarching comments related to the RFI.

TPA members place the highest priority on ensuring that their facilities are run in a

manner that protects human safety and the environment; the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials

Safety Administration ("PHMSA") has commended the natural gas pipeline industry for its

strong safety record and has noted that pipelines are a practical and safe means of transporting

natural gas and other energy resources.1 This admirable record has in large part been achieved

through the application of sound engineering judgment to the particular design and operation of

specific plant and pipeline sites. The use of such judgment, exercised by personnel who are

See http://opsweb.phmsa.dot.gov/pipelineforum/facts-and-stats/pipeline-101/ (last visited October 27,

2014).

604 West 14th Street, Austin, Texas 78701

phone: (512)478-2871 fax:(512)473-8476 Email: thure.cannon@texaspipelines.com
experts in their fields and familiar with company processes and equipment, has proven to be

effective in maintaining high standards of safety and environmental protection. Prescriptive

federal regulations might have the unintended effect of shifting resources away from efforts to

exercise site-specific engineering judgment toward merely making sure that a federal checklist is

complied with. Accordingly, EPA should ensure that any proposed RMP regulations would not

impair or interfere with the exercise of current safety practices at plant and pipeline sites.

Moreover, many of the issues raised by the RFI are already addressed by existing

statutes, rules, and regulatory programs administered by various federal, state, or local agencies

and/or are the subject of company practices. EPA should take care not to adopt redundant or

possibly conflicting policies.

2. Responses to specific items listed in the RFI.

In the discussion that follows, TPA identifies the specific request for information to

which it is responding and provides its response.

a. Define and Require Evaluation of Updates to Applicable Recognized

and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices ("RAGAGEP")

(79 Fed. Reg. 44617).

EPA requests comment on whether adding a definition for RAGAGEP would improve

understanding of RMP requirements and prevent accidental releases. We do not believe that

there is any merit to the idea of adding a formal definition of RAGAGEP to the RMP rules.

Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a formal definition for RAGAGEP that would amount to

anything more than the use of the words "recognized and generally applicable good engineering

practices." In essence, the term is self-defining for each industry subject to the RMP rules.

Moreover, a practice or procedure that constitutes a "best practice" in the oil refinery

industry or a plastics plant may not be a "best practice" in the midstream pipeline industry or gas

processing industry. Even within the same industry segment, RAGAGEP will vary from one

piece of equipment to another. It is difficult to conceive how a formalized uniform definition of

RAGAGEP could have any real meaning, given the vast differences between appropriate

practices from industry to industry, not to mention the probable need to constantly update any

such regulatory definition due to continuous technological developments.

In addition, the use of industry-specific best practices is already common practice. TPA

members routinely update processes and equipment to ensure that "best practices" are employed,

without the need for additional regulatory provisions. Use of such practices is based on

engineering judgment applied to the particular facility at issue. A regulatory definition of

RAGAGEP would run the risk of causing owners and operators to abandon the use of good

engineering judgment, applied on a case-specific basis, in favor of simply ensuring that federally

defined RAGAGEP were employed.

Finally, enforcement of any new regulatory definition of RAGAGEP would be difficult at

best. Any new definition of RAGAGEP would undoubtedly be vague in order to cover the

breadth of industries and equipment at various plants or sites, leading to serious questions as to
whether a particular company in a particular situation at a particular facility was or was not

employing RAGAGEP. Enforcement of RAGAGEP would be burdensome at best. It is difficult

to imagine how federal enforcement authorities could consistently and fairly enforce a

requirement that an owner or operator employ and properly evaluate updates to RAGAGEP as it

was applied to the owner or operator's specific industry and equipment. It is equally difficult to

imagine a situation in which it was appropriate for a federal regulatory authority to substitute its

judgment as to what is and is not RAGAGEP at a particular facility for that of the engineers who

have great experience and familiarity with the equipment and procedures at issue.

b. Require Owners and Operators to Manage Organizational Changes

(79 Fed. Reg. 44618).

EPA notes that while federal rules already require employers to establish and implement

procedures to manage changes involving equipment, technology, raw materials, and processing

conditions, no similar rules explicitly require employers to follow management-of-change

procedures regarding organizational changes such as changes in management structure, budget

cuts, or personnel changes. 79 Fed. Reg. 44618 (July 31, 2014). Accordingly EPA seeks input

on whether the RMP rules' management of change provisions should be expanded to include

management of organizational changes.

TPA does not believe that any such additional rules are necessary. In our experience,

companies already take steps to ensure that organizational changes do not adversely impact

safety or environmental protection at covered facilities. This is to be expected, since companies

have every incentive to ensure that organizational changes are properly managed so that their

operations continuously run in a safe and environmentally sound manner. Company personnel

who have extensive experience with their own particular operations are in the best position to

develop practices and procedures to manage changes in personnel or organizational structure and

to ensure that such changes are properly managed. Federal micromanagement in this area is not

needed and would not be helpful.

If EPA is inclined to develop new rules in this area, we would urge EPA to survey the

rules of other agencies that already exist to ensure that any new rules are truly necessary and

would not be duplicative of regulations that already exist. We note, for example, that PHMS A

already has rules in place ensuring that there are no lapses in the qualifications of personnel who

operate pipelines transporting natural gas and hazardous liquids and that changes impacting

control rooms are properly managed. See 49 CFR Part 192 Subpart N; 49 CFR Part 195 Subpart

G; 49 CFR § 192.631; 49 CFR § 195.446. Creation of unnecessary or duplicative rules would

simply increase the burden on owners and operators without enhancing the safety or

environmental protections that currently exist through existing regulations and established

industry practices.

c. Require Third-Party Compliance Audits (79 Fed. Reg. 44618).

EPA has raised the issue of required use of third-party compliance auditors. 79 Fed. Reg.

44618 (July 31, 2014). TPA does not believe that EPA should require the use of third-party

compliance auditors. Existing regulations (see, e.g., 40 CFR § 68.58(b)) already require that

compliance audits be conducted by at least one individual who is knowledgeable in the process.
In-house audit personnel are the best choice for the conduct of required audits because they are

the most knowledgeable concerning the day-to-day processes at company facilities. A thirdparty auditor will never be as knowledgeable of the process at a given facility as those directly

involved with the process on a day-to-day basis. Typically, employers complement the use of

plant personnel with other company personnel who are familiar with the company's processes at

the facility being audited or similar facilities but from outside of the facility or process being

audited in order to assure objectivity. While objectivity can also be accomplished through the use

of third-party auditors, there is no evidence that mandating the use of third-party auditors will

enhance environmental protection or reduce worker injuries.

In fact, requiring the use of third-party auditors could actually create conditions that

reduce protection of the environment, or decrease the safety of plant employees. Given the

number of different facilities and processes subject to the RMP standard, a third-party auditor

requirement would likely result in a shortage of qualified auditors leading to the use of external

auditors who are not as qualified company personnel who have an intimate knowledge of the

processes as well as many years of experience in the process. The existing requirement to use at

least one person with knowledge of the process from outside of the facility or process being

audited assures objectivity and has not been shown to be a deficiency.

EPA raises the issue of whether use of a third-party auditor might increase the credibility

of audits. 79 Fed. Reg. 44619 (July 31, 2014). We believe that the credibility of an audit would

not be enhanced by the potential use of less-knowledgeable personnel such as third-party

auditors; rather, the audit's credibility would be diminished because it would rarely be the case

that a third-party auditor would be as knowledgeable as an in-house employee. The only

possible advantage to be gained through the use of a third-party auditor is the appearance of

enhanced objectivity due to independence from the audited company, but there is no indication

that in-house audit personnel have failed to conduct thorough, objective audits. Moreover, any

benefit gained through a supposed increase in objectivity would be far outweighed by the

decreased knowledge and experience of the third-party auditor vs. in-house personnel. Indeed,

there is no indication that a new "cottage industry" of third-party auditors could be counted on to

maintain any standards of expertise or reliability concerning the manner in which they conducted

their audits. Unless and until EPA can demonstrate that the current practice of using expert inhouse personnel has failed, and that there would be some way to ensure that third-party auditors

were qualified and competent under recognized standards of performance, EPA should not create

a new rule that would require use of third-party auditors.

EPA also asks whether the rules should impose a timeframe for addressing the findings

contained in an audit report. 79 Fed. Reg. 44619 (July 31, 2014). TPA believes that mandating

response times to deficiencies discovered in the audit process would be inappropriate. The RMP

rules apply to many different industries, and the time needed to respond to a deficiency in one

industry could be drastically different than the time required in another industry. Even within a

single industry, the required response time could vary from one facility to another depending on

the size of the facility or the complexity of the process at a given facility. Here again, we see no

evidence that the current situation, whereby experienced personnel are allowed to exercise

engineering judgment based on the particular circumstances present at the particular facility at

issue, has been deficient such that new federal rules are needed.
Finally, EPA has raised the issue of requiring a full compliance audit after an incident or

"near-miss." 79 Fed. Reg. 44619 (July 31, 2014). We believe that EPA should not create

additional requirements regarding the conduct of a full compliance audit after a near-miss or an

incident.2 There is no need for a full audit where an incident or near-miss was limited to a

discrete piece of equipment or process. Any audit following such an incident should be limited

to the particular piece of equipment or process involved.

d. Emergency Drills to Test a Source's Emergency Response Program or

Plan (79 Fed. Reg. 44622); Compliance with Emergency Response

Program Requirements in Coordination With Local Responders (79

Fed. Reg. 44625).

EPA is seeking information on whether it should develop rules to require facilities to

perform drills as part of their emergency response programs, and also on whether EPA should

revise its rules related to facilities' compliance with emergency response program requirements

and coordination with local responders. These information requests are stated separately in

EPA's Federal Register notice, see 79 Fed. Reg. 44622 and 44625 (July 31, 2014), but because

the issues are related, we are addressing both requests together in the following response.

To begin with, we note that TPA's members all operate facilities subject to some extent

to the jurisdiction of PFfMSA and/or state agencies exercising authority delegated by PHMSA.

The regulations promulgated by PHMSA already require communication and coordination with

local emergency response personnel. For example, 49 CFR § 192.615 requires pipeline operators

to establish written procedures to minimize the hazard resulting from a gas pipeline emergency,

including establishing and maintaining adequate means of communication with appropriate fire,

police, and other public officials and notifying appropriate fire, police, and other public officials

of gas pipeline emergencies and coordinating with them on both planned responses and actual

responses during an emergency. In addition, the Railroad Commission of Texas requires

pipeline owners and operators to liaison annually with fire, police, and other emergency

responders to ensure proper coordination and response in the event of an emergency. See 16

TAG § 8.235. Before imposing any new requirements for communication and coordination with

local emergency response personnel, EPA should survey existing state and federal regulatory

requirements, not only imposed by PHMSA but also by EPA, OSHA, and the Chemical Facility

Anti-Terrorism Standards. After that survey, if EPA believes that any additional communication

or coordination is needed, it could propose new requirements to fill any identified gaps without

unnecessarily duplicating existing communication and coordination requirements. TPA believes

that EPA will find the existing requirements to be sufficient.3

2 See additional discussion at Section 2(f) infra regarding the inadvisability of attaching regulatory

consequences to a determination that a "near miss" had occurred.

3 EPA seeks input on whether the emergency response provisions in Subpart E of the RMP regulation

need to be revised to state more explicitly that owners/operators must comply with the emergency

response program requirements unless local public responders will respond to releases of regulated

substances at the facility. 79 Fed. Reg. 44625 (July 31, 2014). TPA believes that no revision is necessary

because 40 CFR § 68.90 already makes this clear.
Similarly, there is no need for EPA to clarify or issue requirements regarding what is

necessary for facilities to adequately coordinate their emergency response plans with

community emergency response plans. The efforts that are necessary for a facility to coordinate

response plans with community responders will vary given the particular circumstances of the

facility and the local community. It is highly unlikely that meaningful rules could be developed

that would properly address all of these varying circumstances. New regulations in this area

would not improve emergency response planning but instead could have the opposite effect.

Rather than helping, a federal command-and-control regulatory structure could replace local

experience and good judgment with arbitrary requirements that did not fit the particular

circumstances at a given facility or in a given local community.

e. Automated Detection and Monitoring for Releases of Regulated

Substances (79 Fed. Reg. 44623).

EPA raises the issue of whether new rules should be developed to require facilities to

install automated detection and monitoring devices to detect releases. 79 Fed. Reg. 44623 (July

31, 2014). As EPA notes, the need for and appropriate deployment of automated detection and

monitoring systems is highly site-specific. This being so, it would be inappropriate for EPA to

promulgate a rule requiring the use of such systems across the board. In addition, EPA already

has in place a robust set of requirements, including rules involving the use of detection

methodologies to provide early warning of releases, as part of its comprehensive Process

Hazard Analysis requirements. See 40 CFR § 68.67; see also 49 CFR § 192.613 (pipeline

operators shall have a procedure in place for continuing surveillance of facilities to determine

and take appropriate action concerning, inter alia, unusual operating and maintenance

conditions).

Furthermore, PHMSA already has proposed rulemakings under consideration related to

leak detection systems for hazardous liquids pipelines and to the use of automatic and remotecontrolled valves on natural gas and hazardous liquids pipelines, pursuant to the mandates of the

Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011. There is no need for new

federal rules requiring the use of automated detection and monitoring systems in all cases until

these ongoing federal initiatives are completed. To move forward with new EPA rules at this

time would violate one of the key goals of Executive Order 13563 (Jan. 18, 2011), i.e., to

reduce redundant, inconsistent, or overlapping regulatory requirements, and of Executive Order

13650 (Aug. 1, 2013), which directs agencies in the federal chemical safety and security

working group to "identify and recommend possible changes to streamline and otherwise

improve data collection ... including opportunities to lessen the reporting burden on regulated

industries" and to "minimize the duplicative collection of information while ensuring that

pertinent information is shared with all key entities."4

4 Any such rule that might be developed by EPA should leave it to the owner or operator of a particular

facility to set the appropriate detection threshold, as opposed to having the threshold set by federal

regulation. Company personnel are in the best position to know what is the appropriate detection

threshold for their individual facilities and processes; a one-size-fits-all requirement in this area would

not be appropriate, because a leak of a certain level might not be an issue for some facilities handling

certain substances but could be a serious issue at a different type of facility handling a different type of

substance.
Moreover, there is no indication that owners and operators are currently failing to

employ detection and monitoring systems where appropriate. As EPA acknowledges, facilities

already have appropriate incentives to deploy such systems where they are warranted and costeffective. The use of automated detection and monitoring systems is common in the natural gas

pipeline industry, obviating the need for prescriptive regulatory requirements in this area. For

example, owners and operators in the natural gas pipeline industry commonly employ devices

such as detectors and fire eyes to constantly monitor storage and compression facilities. Gas

detectors will sound an alarm that alerts both onsite and offsite personnel of a possible issue,

and these devices will automatically shut the facility down either immediately or if there is not a

timely response. Similarly, fire eyes automatically shut down a facility if a flame is detected.

Some of these detection systems are required by exiting regulations of other federal agencies.

See, e.g., 49 CFR § 192.736. It is common practice for companies in the natural gas industry to

employ process monitors, which are designed to prevent accidents, not just detect releases.

EPA asks whether an automated mechanism to notify local responders and the

surrounding public of an incident should be a part of any required detection and monitoring

system. 79 Fed. Reg. 44624 (July 31, 2014). We would urge EPA not to create any such

requirement. The most important reason why automatic notification of responders and the

public is not advisable is that it presents the problem of false alarms that would unnecessarily

raise concerns. It is appropriate that initial notifications be limited to company personnel, who

are best trained and best able to respond to conditions at individual facilities and, importantly, to

assess whether the alarm is "real" or "false". Expert human assessment of initial notifications is

essential to determine whether a real threat is presented or not. Once that assessment is made,

additional notification of third-parties such as responders and the public can be made by

company personnel if this is warranted. In those situations where a release or incident could

pose a risk to the public in the immediate vicinity of a facility, existing regulations require the

use of visual and/or auditory alarms which seem to be sufficient to minimize or eliminate any

reasonable risk to the public.

Finally, EPA asks whether there may be specific issues that should be considered

regarding monitoring at unmanned or remote facilities. 79 Fed. Reg. 44624 (July 31, 2014).

Such issues do exist. The most obvious is that remote facilities may not have a reliable source

of electricity. Without a reliable and continuous source of electricity, continuous monitoring is

not possible. Any rules developed by EPA in this area should take this factor into account.

f. Incident Investigation and Accident History Requirements (79 Fed.

Reg. 44626).

EPA requests input on the issue of whether its rules should require owners and operators

to investigate "near misses" and determine the root causes of accidents, "near misses," and

process upsets. 79 Fed. Reg. 44626.

TPA's initial response is that the concept of a "near miss" is inherently vague and should

not form the basis for any required action under federal regulations. What one company may

characterize as a "near miss" may be characterized as something other than a near miss by

another company. If federal regulatory consequences were attached to a company's assessment
of an incident as a near miss, there would be a natural incentive for a company to conclude that

the incident did not meet the vaguely defined term "near miss."

In terms of a possible federal requirement for root-cause analysis, we believe that there is

no need for EPA to broaden incident investigation and accident history requirements to include

regulatory requirements to investigate or determine the root cause of near misses or accidents.

Performance of root-cause analysis of incidents is already common industry practice, and in

Texas, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality ("TCEQ") rules require that the owner

or operator of a facility at which an emission event or excess opacity event occurred must report

to TCEQ explaining the best known cause of the event. Operators' investigation of incidents

pursuant to TCEQ's requirement generally includes the conduct of a root-cause analysis.5

Similarly, the pipeline safety regulations of PHMSA require full investigation and analysis of

incidents to determine cause and minimize the possibility of a recurrence. See 49 CFR § 192.617.

We are not aware of, and EPA has not identified, any deficiencies in the methods

currently used by companies to engage in accident investigation or root-cause analysis, and as

such, agency promulgation of guidance or regulations that would prescribe the methods that

companies would have to use to conduct a root-cause analysis are unnecessary. EPA's

promulgation of prescriptive requirements in this area could interfere with companies' use of

investigative practices tailored specifically to their own individual facilities, because such

requirements could cause companies to shift their focus away from individualized investigative

techniques and toward simply ensuring that regulatory requirements were satisfied. Companies

use various methodologies to thoroughly investigate a broad range of incidents. Those

methodologies used in any particular incident are those deemed by the companies to be

appropriate for the type and severity of the incident at issue. Companies know best how to

identify the systemic cause of an incident at their particular facility and can best tailor their

investigations to the particular systems and processes in place at an individual facility, without

being required to follow generalized requirements promulgated by the federal government that

may not be suited to the individual facility at issue.

Simply put, companies in the pipeline industry place extreme importance on maintaining

safe and environmentally responsible operations, both for workers and for local communities.

Companies routinely investigate processes and prior incidents to ensure that facilities are run in a

safe manner. We see no need for federal rules that would be based on the incorrect assumption

that accidents and near-misses are not currently being taken seriously by industry.6

5 In addition, TCEQ rules require that the owner/operator of a facility at which an "emission event" or

"excess opacity event" occurred must provide a report to TCEQ containing inter alia an identification of

the best known cause of the event. See 30 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 101.201(a)(2)(H); (a)(3)(C); (b)(l)(J);

(b)(2)(J); (e)(9). An "emission event" is any upset event or unscheduled maintenance, startup, or

shutdown activity from a common cause that results in unauthorized emissions of air contaminants; an

"excess opacity event" occurs when an opacity reading is equal or exceeds 15 additional percentage

points above an applicable opacity limit. See id. §§ 101.1(28), (32).

6 We would also note that federal requirements already exist in this area. For example, 49 CFR § 192.617

requires pipeline operators to establish procedures for analyzing accidents and failures in order to

determine the causes of a failure and to minimize the possibility of a recurrence.

8
Finally, EPA seeks input on whether a specific time frame for the completion of incident

investigations would benefit overall safety at covered facilities. 79 Fed. Reg. 44627 (July 31,

2014). We do not believe that specific reporting timeframes should be created by federal rule.

Requiring specific time frames for reporting would be inappropriate because, in a given

situation, it may take a long period of time to fully determine the cause of a particular incident.

It is far better to get the right answer than to get a partial answer by an arbitrary deadline. There

is no one timeframe that would fit all of the individual situations in all of the industries covered

by an RMP. EPA's focus should be on allowing companies to determine to real cause of an

incident, rather than on forcing companies to come up with some answer, which may not tell the

whole story, by a given date.

g. The "Safety Case" Regulatory Model (79 Fed. Reg. 44632).

EPA seeks input on whether it would be appropriate to implement the "safety case"

regulatory model for assuring that risks at facilities are as low as reasonably practicable. 79 Fed.

Reg. 44632 (July 31, 2014). We do not believe that there is any reason to implement the safety

case approach at this time.

The safety case model requires companies to adopt a systematic hazard management

framework, which involves identification of major hazards and development of plans for how

such hazards will be managed. As TPA understands the concept of the safety case, it is intended

to be developed in a holistic manner considering all risks within a particular system or process,

not just a subset of the total risks. The safety case represents an argument made to regulators,

which demonstrates the process that the company has gone through to identify hazards and to

assess risks, as well as the reasoning that led the company to choose one control over another.

The regulatory authority has the option of accepting or rejecting the argument, i.e., the "safety

case." The regulated entity must specify the safety procedures and standards that the company

intends to adopt; and where a proposed plan is deemed by the regulator to be inadequate, the

regulator may require the adoption of more stringent standards. Safety case regulation does not

free the regulated entity from prescriptive requirements; to the contrary, the safety case requires

that technical standards be specified so that regulatory authorities can enforce those standards.

See generally Andrew Hopkins, "Explaining 'Safety Case,'" Working Paper 87 (April 2012),

available at http://www.csb.gov/assets/177 AVorkingPaper_87.pdf. Unless this process

evaluates all risks within a system or process, there is a significant possibility that the safety case

will not result in the optimum safety result.

Institution of the safety case approach would represent a fundamental departure from

current practice and from the existing regulatory scheme for chemical process safety in the

United States, as EPA itself acknowledges. 79 Fed. Reg. 44632 (July 31, 2014). If such a

fundamental change is to be made, there should be a pressing reason why it is necessary, and it

should be done in a comprehensive manner. We do not believe that there is any reason to

believe that current environmental or safety rules are deficient such that a fundamental change in

federal regulatory structure would be appropriate. We believe the current RMP, process safety

management, and pipeline safety programs are sufficient to protect worker safety and

surrounding communities, and we are not aware of any indication that those programs are
ineffective or in need of supplementation. This is an area where federal agencies should focus

their efforts on enforcing and implementing regulations currently in force and coordinating their

respective regulatory programs, rather than implementing a new and more burdensome analytical

approach. Implementing a safety case model in one area of federal regulation without

coordination with all other applicable federal regulatory programs would increase the paperwork

and reporting burden of covered facilities but would not necessarily reduce risks to employees,

the surrounding community, or the environment. In TPA's view, no new rules or analytical

approaches are called for, including implementation of the safety case approach.7

Finally, we note the agency manpower issues that would be raised by widespread

implementation of the safety case approach. Such an approach would require the individualized

involvement of regulatory personnel, who would be called upon to analyze the case being made

by the company, critique it, respond to it, and then re-assess it in one or more subsequent

iterations, until the case had finally been satisfactorily made by the regulated entity and approved

by the regulatory authority. The amount of time that this would take, when spread across newly

proffered safety cases by multiple industries across the country, would be enormous. We recall

EPA's concerns over regulatory paralysis that formed the basis for EPA's decision to alter Clean

Air Act permitting thresholds in the greenhouse gas tailoring rule. See, e.g., 75 Fed. Reg. 31578

(June 3, 2010). Those same concerns would be implicated in large-scale adoption of the safety

case approach.

h. Updating the list of regulated substances (79 Fed. Reg. 44607).

The RFI suggests that EPA may be considering the listing of additional toxic and

flammable substances to the RMP list of covered substances. 79 Fed. Reg. 44607 (July 31,

2014). EPA asks commenters to provide references to acute toxicity studies, sources of

flammability information, or summary results of studies and information that certain substances

meet applicable listing criteria. This approach is a departure from traditional rulemaking

procedures, whereby EPA has first identified a specific hazard or regulatory gap and then has

issued a proposal (including a basis for finding a hazard) for public comment. Here, EPA shifts

this burden to the regulated community. EPA should first determine that there is a specific

shortcoming with the RMP rules before embarking on a major rulemaking. Currently, EPA has

not provided any basis for why the rules should be revised in this area.

3. Conclusion.

Ensuring the safe and environmentally responsible operation of our facilities is the top

priority for the members of TPA. We appreciate EPA's efforts to ensure that federal regulations

pertaining to these issues are kept up to date. As discussed herein, however, we do not see the

need for additional regulatory burdens in these areas.8 We urge EPA to make sure that any rules

7 If a safely case approach were ever adopted by EPA, it certainly should be limited to only a small subset

of industry representing the most high-risk facilities, handling large quantities of extremely hazardous

substances.

8 While Executive Order 13650 (Aug. 1, 2013) specifically directed the Secretary of Labor to issue an

RFI related to modernization of the PSM program, the Executive Order does not contain any comparable

10
that it may develop in the RMP context are truly necessary and that such rules do not have the

effect of forcing owners and operators to substitute rote regulatory compliance for the exercise of

individualized engineering judgment applied to the particular circumstances present at specific

facilities.

We appreciate the opportunity to provide these comments.

Youts-traiv

Thure Cannon

President

direction to EPA. Rather, Section 6(c) of the Executive Order directs EPA only to determine whether the

RMP rules should be expanded to address additional regulated substances and types of hazards. This was

not a direction to expand the entire program, especially into areas already regulated by OSHA.

11