U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

45–134 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–160] 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX 

MODERNIZATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 17, 2008 
(II) 

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

RUDY BARNES, Professional Staff Member 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

ZACH STEACY, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2008 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, July 17, 2008, Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization ................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, July 17, 2008 .......................................................................................... 55 

THURSDAY, JULY 17, 2008 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX MODERNIZATION 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Everett, Hon. Terry, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 2 

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., a Representative from California, Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Aloise, Gene, Director, Natural Resources and Environment Division, Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 39 

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; Dr. George H. Miller, Director, Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory; Dr. Michael R. Anastasio, Laboratory Director, Los Alamos 

National Laboratory; Dr. Thomas O. Hunter, President and Director, 

Sandia National Laboratories; Dr. Stephen M. Younger, President, National 

Security Technologies, LLC; J. Greg Meyer, President and General Manager, Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Pantex, LLC; Vincent L. Trim, 

President, Honeywell Federal Manufacturing & Technologies (FM&T), LLC; 

Darrel P. Kohlhorst, President and General Manager, Babcock & Wilcox 

Technical Services Y–12, LLC; Dennis Hayes, General Manager, Defense 

Programs, Washington Savannah River Company, beginning on page .......... 4 

Kelley, Marylia, Executive Director, Tri-Valley CAREs ....................................... 41 

Robinson, Ambassador C. Paul, President Emeritus of Sandia Corporation 

and Former Laboratories Director, Sandia National Laboratories .................. 45 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Aloise, Gene ...................................................................................................... 120 

Anastasio, Dr. Michael R. ................................................................................ 76 

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P. ............................................................................ 59 

Hayes, Dennis ................................................................................................... 116 

Hunter, Dr. Thomas O. .................................................................................... 82 

Kelley, Marylia ................................................................................................. 133 

Kohlhorst, Darrel P. ......................................................................................... 108 

Meyer, J. Greg .................................................................................................. 95 

Miller, Dr. George H. ....................................................................................... 71 

Robinson, Ambassador C. Paul ....................................................................... 141 
Page

IV 

PREPARED STATEMENTS—Continued 

Trim, Vincent L. ............................................................................................... 103 

Younger, Dr. Stephen M. ................................................................................. 88 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

A Future Vision for NNSA’s National Security Laboratories ....................... 151 

Four charts submitted by Mr. D’Agostino ...................................................... 152 

Tri-Valley CAREs Public Comment and Analysis on Draft Complex 

Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact 

Statement, Parts One and Two ................................................................... 156 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Everett ........................................................................................................ 199 

Mr. Spratt ......................................................................................................... 202 

Ms. Tauscher ..................................................................................................... 199 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Tauscher ..................................................................................................... 205 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 226 
(1) 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX MODERNIZATION 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, July 17, 2008. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ellen Tauscher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Good morning. This hearing of the Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee will come to order. 

Today, we will consider the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, what the NNSA calls its plan for a Complex Transformation. 

I want to welcome our first panel of distinguished witnesses, 

starting with the Administrator of the NNSA, Under Secretary 

Tom D’Agostino. 

It is a pleasure to have you back before the subcommittee, Under 

Secretary, and thank you very much for all the cooperation and all 

the great work you and the thousands of people that you represent 

do every day for the American people. 

Following the Administrator’s testimony, we will be joined at the 

witness table by the team of experts that manage and operate the 

NNSA nuclear weapons complex, whom I will introduce at that 

time. 

This topic has not received the attention it deserves. The maintenance and modernization of the nuclear weapons complex is a prerequisite to the continuing success of the science-based Stockpile 

Stewardship Program. 

For more than a decade, the Stockpile Stewardship Program has 

enabled us to successfully maintain the safety, security and reliability of our Nation’s nuclear deterrent without underground nuclear tests. 

The Nation’s success in this endeavor is a marvelous story and, 

frankly, it is not well enough publicized. But even where there is 

recognition of the effectiveness of the stewardship program, there 

is not always a recognition of the challenges of extending that success. 

With today’s hearing, I want to have a frank discussion of what 

it takes in terms of both fiscal, physical and human capital to sustain and expand the success of the stewardship program. 
2 

The backdrop for this discussion, of course, is the larger debate 

over the United States’ nuclear weapons policy. I am as eager as 

anyone for a 21st century update to our nuclear weapons policies. 

That is why I led the effort last year to create the Congressional 

Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. 

I believe the Commission will foster and frame a national discussion on the role of nuclear weapons in assuring our national security. But as the Chairman of the Commission, the former Secretary 

of Defense Bill Perry, has noted, even as we try to move toward 

a world free of nuclear weapons, we must be realistic about the 

length of that process. 

It will take us decades. And so over that timeframe, we must ensure that the Stockpile Stewardship Program remains viable, 

which means we cannot simply sit on our hands and watch buildings erected during the Manhattan Project crumble, if in their absence, we have no space to do the work that stewardship requires. 

And it means that we cannot lay off thousands of scientists and 

engineers and then expect to do the science and technical work 

that stewardship requires. 

Our responsibilities are greater than that, and that is why we 

have called this hearing today. 

With that, let me turn to my very good friend, our ranking member, the distinguished member from Alabama, for any comments he 

might have. 

And before I turn to Mr. Everett, we don’t have many other hearings planned for the rest of this year. We expect that we may be 

out in September. I am going to begin my process of saying goodbye 

to my friend. 

Mr. Everett is going to be retiring this year. He has had a number of years of distinguished service on this committee. He chaired 

this subcommittee. The little I know about being a chairman, I 

have learned from Mr. Everett. He is a great American and a great 

Alabaman, and I now yield time to the ranking member. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TERRY EVERETT, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. EVERETT. Well, I don’t know quite how to follow that. I appreciate my good friend and chairman’s comments. And what I can 

say is she is one of the brightest people I have ever worked with, 

and I appreciate her dedication to the issues that we face with this 

subcommittee, which are often, frankly, conflicts and sometimes 

controversial—often controversial. 

And you know, we are handling missile defense, all the overhead 

satellites and so forth, and then nuclear weapons. So I very much 

appreciate the partnership that we have had over the years in taking a look at these critical issues for the Nation. So thank you very 

much. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. You are welcome, Mr. Everett. 

Mr. EVERETT. And I would also like to extend a warm welcome 

to our witnesses. We have some exceptional brain trust with us 

today. I thank you for all your service and your dedication to what 

you do. 
3 

We start down this path—we started down this path in April of 

2006 when this subcommittee held a hearing on the Department’s 

future plans for the nuclear complex—weapons complex. I think revisiting this topic is essential, and I thank the chairman for calling 

this meeting, which is critical and important and timely. 

I echo many of the concerns that she has. Our nuclear weapons 

complex is aging and our Nation’s cadre of nuclear experts is aging. 

Without modernizing the infrastructure and fostering a new generation of nuclear experts, we put at risk a key portion of our Nation’s defense, our strategic nuclear deterrent. 

Two years ago, this subcommittee was concerned that despite numerous studies there had been little change and almost no actual 

transformation. Since then, NNSA has put forward a plan for Complex Transformation. 

Its vision is to achieve a smaller, safer, less expensive complex— 

makes a lot of sense. However, there are a lot of questions about 

the particular course of action put forward by NNSA, and many are 

trying to understand how Complex Transformation relates to other 

nuclear policies and program issues being debated in Congress. 

Let me put forward some of the questions now and ask you to 

address them in your testimony. If you don’t have time, then we 

will get to them in the questions and answers, starting with: What 

facility and infrastructure projects should move forward regardless 

of the future—on policy and size of the composition of the stockpile? 

How does the plan ensure long-term health for the stockpile— 

program? 

How does the plan rebuild human capital, as the chairman mentioned, across the nuclear enterprise in manufacturing, design, 

science, et cetera? 

How does the plan meet the military’s need for a more responsive 

infrastructure and its need for weapons that are more reliable, safe 

and secure? 

How would Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) benefit the 

complex, and would it affect our transformation plan? 

How does NNSA fund transformation with a relatively flat budget? 

Last, for our second panel in particular, is there a better business model? 

What questions aren’t we asking that we should be asking? 

Congress has before it some challenging nuclear policy and program issues that we do have—have many implications for the complex, and I am hopeful that the strategic commission that the 

chairman led the way in establishing last year will help to inform 

our decision-making on these issues. 

However, I believe our Nation will continue to maintain a strong 

nuclear deterrent, particularly as long as others maintain or seek 

nuclear capability. And our allies rely on our extended nuclear deterrent. 

A strong deterrent requires a strong infrastructure and workforce, and I fear without moving forward on modernization now, we 

risk weakening the stockpile we have been—that we have and jeopardizing our options for the future. 

Again, thank you all for being here. 
4 

And I thank the chairman for calling this meeting at this time 

and for her leadership in the Commission. Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Everett. 

Under Secretary D’Agostino, the floor is yours. As we have received your prepared statement in advance, it will be entered into 

the record. 

I want to thank you again for delivering, once again, a very comprehensive review of the accomplishments and the challenges facing the complex. We welcome your remarks and the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; 

DR. GEORGE H. MILLER, DIRECTOR, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE 

NATIONAL LABORATORY; DR. MICHAEL R. ANASTASIO, LABORATORY DIRECTOR, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY; 

DR. THOMAS O. HUNTER, PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, 

SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES; DR. STEPHEN M. YOUNGER, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; 

J. GREG MEYER, PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, BABCOCK & WILCOX TECHNICAL SERVICES PANTEX, LLC; VINCENT L. TRIM, PRESIDENT, HONEYWELL FEDERAL MANUFACTURING & TECHNOLOGIES (FM&T), LLC; DARREL P. 

KOHLHORST, PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, BABCOCK & WILCOX TECHNICAL SERVICES Y–12, LLC; DENNIS 

HAYES, GENERAL MANAGER, DEFENSE PROGRAMS, WASHINGTON SAVANNAH RIVER COMPANY 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And Chairman Tauscher, Ranking Member Everett, members of 

the subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity to discuss U.S. nuclear weapons policies and our programs. 

I would also like to take a brief moment as well to thank Ranking Member Everett for his great leadership on NNSA issues. 

I understand this is, in all likelihood, your last testimony—or 

last hearing as members of this important committee, and I want 

to thank you on behalf of the NNSA and all of us out in the field 

for everything you have done for us and for the Nation as a whole. 

We really appreciate your support. 

I would also like to acknowledge the representatives that we assembled behind me. These are the folks that work on our programs 

and our stockpile and our deterrent—not only that, on nonproliferation and counterterrorism issues. 

They spend their days and sometimes evenings and weekends 

working on these programs, worrying about them, and I appreciate 

your opportunity—the opportunity to have them come forward to 

show—talk to you about what they know. 

My written testimony, as you mentioned, goes into considerable 

detail on our vision shift from a 21st century—or from a Cold War 

era nuclear weapons complex to a 21st century national security 

enterprise. Both of those sets of words are different, and they are 

on purpose, but they are different. 

But what I want to convey today is that this vision of a smaller, 

safer but modern nuclear security enterprise is well thought out 

and is first based on requirements that we have received from the 

Department of Defense (DOD). 
5 

Second, based on our ability to retain the human capital that is 

unique and world-class in performing their mission. 

And third, there is an urgency to act now to sustain key infrastructure capabilities necessary to maintain our deterrent. 

As we discuss these issues today, we must remember that the 

transformation of the stockpile and enterprise is, in some effect, already taking place. 

The first chart we have here before us shows the significant reductions in deployed strategic nuclear warheads that have occurred, and as planned for the future. 

As you know, the Moscow Treaty and President Bush’s unilateral 

cuts to the nuclear weapons overall stockpile, which is now half of 

what it was when he took office—we really don’t have a large Cold 

War weapons stockpile anymore. 

And since we don’t have a large Cold War arsenal, we don’t need 

the large Cold War complex that supported that arsenal and was 

so important to our Nation’s security over the many decades in the 

past. 

And we have plans to reduce both the square footage of the complex to be more efficient and to focus on the capabilities needed to 

support future national security needs. 

A question has been raised by some individual—individuals that 

this Administration has not articulated an underlying strategy for 

our strategic posture. 

And in response to that, in March of 2008, just this year, Secretaries Bodman and Gates provided Congress a detailed, classified 

white paper entitled ‘‘National Security and Nuclear Weapons in 

the 21st Century.’’ 

The document describes what type of deterrent strategy is needed; articulates the size and nature of the stockpile to correspond to 

that strategy; and three, articulates the type of infrastructure 

needed to support that stockpile into the future. 

As you know, we are the only declared nuclear state that is not, 

in fact, currently modernizing its infrastructure. 

Over the past three years, we have been aggressive in our efforts 

to analyze, describe and perform environmental studies associated 

with the type of security enterprises needed to meet the future requirements. 

As you can see from the stack of papers here, this isn’t an approach we have taken idly. This is not a PowerPoint analysis. This 

is detailed business-case analyses, environmental analyses as required, and the team spent a couple of years, actually, pulling all 

this together. 

And it is remarkably detailed and thorough, and I am very proud 

of actually the work that they have done on each of these potential 

options. 

The draft ‘‘Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic 

Environmental Impact Statement’’ was published and posted in 

January of this year for public comment, and we are systematically 

in the process of considering well over 100,000 oral and written 

comments on the documents, and those are the bottom 2 documents I have here. 

[The information referred to is retained in the committee files 

and can be viewed upon request.] 
6 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. My intention ultimately is to make a decision 

in 2008 on this three-year effort in order to continue on a viable 

path that will support the next Administration and the recommendations of the Congressional Commission on Strategic Posture, whose origin is from this very subcommittee. 

And I think the idea is to mesh the Record of Decision with the 

recommendations, so that the Commission has the opportunities, 

and I would call the space in order to make the recommendations 

appropriate to Congress and the next Administration. I think actually the synergy is quite nice here. 

As Members of Congress can appreciate, change can be unsettling, and the recent budget-driven dislocations and involuntary 

separations that have impacted this program have been very hard 

on employee morale and retention of younger staff members. 

When I announced the release of the ‘‘Complex Transformation 

Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement,’’ I 

highlighted that scientific and engineering expertise are essential 

for the 21st century mission of our deterrent and nonproliferation 

missions. 

In addition, Secretary of Energy Bodman signed out a lab vision 

paper most recently setting forth the strategic mission of NNSA’s 

three national security laboratories and the Nevada Test Site 

(NTS) to be able to respond to evolving 21st century global security 

threats. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 151.] 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Enabled by our core weapons-related programs, 

these same individuals can and are using their skills in other areas 

of national security importance, such as nonproliferation programs, 

research and development (R&D), nuclear counterterrorism, and 

support to the intelligence community (IC). 

Simply put, it is that understanding of nuclear materials and 

properties, weapons and their effects, that supports these other 

critical national security needs out into the future. 

Regarding the physical transformation of our important plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) capabilities, we need to 

make decisions and investments today in order for the sustainment 

of the strategic deterrent out into the future. 

Key construction projects such as the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at Y–12 and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) project at Los Alamos are critical to sustain the 

uranium and plutonium capability that is necessary for any stockpile configuration and to continue nonproliferation and nuclear 

counterterrorism activities. 

Outside independent entities such as the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) have noted that it is critical that the 

NNSA move quickly to replace uranium processing facilities located 

at Y–12 and the current Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 

(CMR) facility at Los Alamos. 

Over the last three years alone, NNSA has received about a 

dozen letters from the defense board citing concerns with the outdated Cold War-era uranium and plutonium operations. 
7 

The board, as you know, is uniquely qualified to provide sound, 

independent, technical judgment with respect to safety and operations. And let me highlight one example. 

The defense board wrote just this year, in May, that they are 

‘‘concerned about the NNSA’s ability to ensure safe operations of 

the CMR facility at Los Alamos, which may be essential for fulfilling NNSA’s national nuclear security mission. Given the facility’s age and seismic fragility, some upgrades may cost-prohibitive 

or impractical.’’ 

With respect to the relationship between the new facilities and 

the size of our stockpile, our investment in these projects is both 

sound and based on analysis of current and likely future scenarios. 

The reality is neither our workforce numbers nor facility square 

footage scale linearly with the size of the stockpile. In today’s era 

of small stockpiles, the required square footage in a modern, well 

designed facility to provide essential capabilities frequently provides just the sufficient minimum capacity for our work. 

So just being able to maintain the capability is usually enough 

for the capacity that is required. 

This may be best shown on the second chart labeled ‘‘Future 

Uranium Facility Requirements,’’ and I will walk us through the 

chart, if I could. 

The Uranium Processing Facility is a facility that we are currently designing—we are not building it right now; we are going to 

wait—we have to wait for our appropriate authorization, of 

course—to function within various production ranges which are correctly tied to likely future scenarios. 

And we have considered scenarios from 0 up to about 150 units 

per year as a range or so. There is a title here labeled ‘‘Baseline.’’ 

It is the second one from the left—is at the 50 to 80 level, consistent with the white paper, classified white paper, that has been 

up here since March. 

So in the end, this Uranium Processing Facility will replace a series—not just one, but a whole series of 50-year-old buildings, Cold 

War-era buildings, down in Tennessee. 

It is being filled, as I said, to meet the modest requirements consistent with the white paper, 50 to 80, not an MPF-like number 

which could be considerably higher. 

And these are secondary. These are the components. It is actually the production piece. The bottom bar, which as you can see is 

almost two-thirds—or particularly on the column on the left is— 

that blue-shaded area just represents the minimum space required 

just to satisfy—not produce anything, just to take care of our deterrent, due to surveillance work that is needed; in fact, also to do 

work for Naval Reactors, the Naval Nuclear Propulsion program, 

to do the nonproliferation work, because as you know we are 

downblending a lot of highly enriched uranium, and do—and also 

do work for others in isotope production for scientific activities. 

So whether we build—to take the capacity required to build one 

more, one secondary—this is the production part—is that first yellow bar on—on the left there. So you see, just to make one secondary requires an increment of space. 

So whether you build 1 or 50 to 80, it is a very small variance 

in range. And in the end, what it shows is that what we are trying 
8 

to do is make sure that our designs are flexible and such that just 

the required capacity to make one requires a certain amount of capability. 

In the end, this uranium processing facility, just space-wise, will 

be about half of what the Cold War-era space was overall total, 

which was spread out across and, more importantly, will allow us 

to consolidate our security areas. 

Let me just take a minute, if I could, to focus on plutonium. The 

ability to work on and analyze and produce plutonium pits is essential to maintaining a deterrent and cannot be performed outside 

of the NNSA. 

Our current research, surveillance and manufacturing capabilities require and rely right now on old nuclear facilities. Last year, 

after a 10-year effort, we were finally able to reconstitute an interim production capability in a 30-year-old facility. 

But just as important, our current research and analytical building, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility that is essential to maintaining the stockpile, dates back to the early 1950’s. It 

is well beyond its economic lifetime, and it is quickly approaching 

end of safe operations. 

The question is, what will happen if we do not transform and 

just maintain the status quo; I think the short answer is that we 

will reach a point where the NNSA will be unable to maintain our 

deterrent, not produce anything—we are not even getting to that 

point of producing, just unable to maintain the deterrent, because 

of the work that we have to do with the surveillance activities. 

Every year, the costs to maintain and secure and operate our facilities and infrastructures continues to rise, yet our program to 

sustain our infrastructure, to support a reduced stockpile is cut 

through the appropriations process. 

An independent group of scientists that advises the Government, 

the JASONs, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, and the 

Defense Science Board have all issued reports or findings over the 

past several years highlighting the need for NNSA infrastructure 

improvements and modernizations. 

The last two charts that you will see—and we will show—the 

first one will be the Y–12 before and after chart, and then the second one that will follow will be a future capabilities chart—kind of 

give you an idea of our overall approach. 

At Y–12, we are going to consolidate all the highly enriched uranium functions into 2 buildings, and take it from the 80-plus acres 

that we have right now into about 15 acres. 

So the image on the left shows the current image, and it may be 

hard to see from the rostrum—I apologize. The image on the right 

shows how a Y–12 of the future could look. You will notice a lot 

more green space, because we are going to be actually shrinking 

that security footprint down close to 90 percent. 

That will save a lot of money, and it will drive our maintenance 

costs down, and it will make the operations of the Y–12 facility a 

lot more efficient, instead of having activities spread out over a 

much larger area. 

That core strategy—and if I could get the next chart—is going to 

be applied across the complex. This idea of consolidating capabilities—and over the next 10 years, by consolidating capabilities, 
9 

what we are going to have is special nuclear materials (SNM) going 

from 7 sites to 5 sites in the future, with significantly smaller security footprints; consolidating mission functions across the enterprise, since our capacity requirements are no longer at Cold War 

levels; closing or transferring weapons activities from about 600 

buildings or activities, most of those by 2010; and reducing the 

square footage of facilities to supporting—that support weaponsonly mission functions by more than 9 million square feet, so the 

idea of going from about 36 million square feet to 25 million square 

feet or so of space. 

[The charts referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 

152.] 

And ultimately, in the end, as Administrator, I am responsible 

for sustaining our capabilities to support the commitment to maintaining the lowest number of nuclear weapons consistent with our 

security requirements. 

I have taken a long, hard look at the weapons complex over 

many years and where I think it needs to be consistent with our 

future requirements. The need to change is urgent, as you have described. 

We must act now to adapt for the future and stop pouring money 

into an old Cold War weapons complex that is too big and too expensive. 

Assuming we all agree that for the foreseeable future the Nation 

has a need for a credible strategic deterrent, then we will need a 

national security enterprise that is safer for our workers than those 

used during the Cold War, regardless of the configuration of the 

stockpile. 

And perhaps more important, our dedicated workforce is the key 

to transformation and its success. Their expertise constitutes a key 

element of our Nation’s security, and we must work to provide 

them the tools and facilities in order to perform their mission. 

Thank you very much, and I will be happy to take any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. D’Agostino can be found in the 

Appendix on page 59.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much, Tom. 

Now I would like to ask the impressive, hard-working team behind you to join you at the witness table, and I would also like to 

welcome each of them. 

Dr. Michael Anastasio, Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). 

Mr. Dennis Hayes, General Manager, Defense Programs, Washington Savannah River Company (WSRC). 

Dr. Thomas O. Hunter, President and Laboratories Director, 

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). 

Mr. Darrel P. Kohlhorst, President and General Manager, Babcock and Wilcox Technical Services at Y–12. 

Mr. J. Greg Meyer, President and General Manager, Babcock 

and Wilcox Technical Services, Pantex. 

Dr. George H. Miller, Director, Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory (LLNL). 

Mr. Vincent Trim, President, Honeywell Federal Manufacturing 

and Technologies, LLC, which manages and operates the Kansas 

City Plant. 
10 

And Dr. Stephen Younger, President, National Security Technologies, LLC, which manages the Nevada Test Site. 

Thank you, each and every one of you, for being here and for the 

many, many people that you represent, all hard-working Americans. And thank you for working with us on the logistics of this 

hearing, and we look forward to our discussion with you. 

I am going to start with a question for Administrator D’Agostino. 

I commend you for noting the importance of maintaining the 

science and laboratory base of the complex and for announcing the 

laboratory vision for the future. 

At the same time, there have been literally thousands of laid-off 

staff from the national labs over the last two years. What specific 

steps do you plan to take to ensure that the critical human capital 

on which the Stockpile Stewardship Program depends is not permanently undermined? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Okay. Thank you, Madam Chair. There are a 

number of critical steps. The most important one, from my view, 

is exercising with the real work that we have in place right now. 

I think there is real work in the complex that the folks are doing, 

and to keep people focused on that work and make sure that they 

understand that I believe it is important, that the Nation believes 

it is important work. 

Folks out in the field—and I can let them speak for themselves. 

It is my impression, based on talking to a lot of people, that they 

pay attention to what Congress does. They pay attention to what 

we do here. They read our testimony. They listen in on these testimonies. And they read the paper. 

And the thing that worries me the most is the sense that the Nation does not care about this capability that has kept it so safe. So, 

a specific step from my standpoint is to reemphasize that this is 

important. I appreciate the subcommittee’s understanding of their 

responsibilities in this area. 

Most specifically, you mentioned the Secretary putting out the 

lab vision for the future, which addresses the laboratories and the 

Nevada Test Site, and ultimately really extends to the rest of the 

nuclear security enterprise. 

But ultimately, that vision is—vision is important, and that vision described what I have talked about as making sure that we 

can go off and support other agencies as possible. 

But a vision is nothing unless it is implemented, and so the 

view—my view is to implement that vision. This year, what I can 

do is engage in what I have called ‘‘strategic partnership agreements’’ with other federal agencies for commitment of resources 

over multiple years of time that our directors can plan on arriving 

and to do critical work for these other agencies. 

And I hope within the next two months to be able to announce 

such a partnership, specific partnership, that is new and different 

from the past, and that maintains a long-term stability in a particular area. And if that works, we are going to continue to look 

at other areas where we can do more of that. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Let’s talk about the Life Extension Programs, because it has been argued that the LEPs, as they are called, for our 

nuclear weapons have, on occasion, exceeded the limits of simply 
11 

refurbishing them. That is not my understanding, and I would like 

to clarify this for the record. 

Do Life Extension Programs add any new military capabilities to 

our nuclear weapons? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Ma’am, our Life Extension Programs are focused on, of course, first of all, extending the life, because components do change, but focused on safety, security and reliability-type 

functions. 

This is not about making a new weapon at all. The focus in many 

cases on safety and security—maybe a good example is the W76, 

where there—we focused on safety by adding the dual strong link 

mechanism, because we want to make sure that our weapons, 

where we can—make them safer than what we have had. Technology has changed over the last 30 years. 

With respect to reliability, fuses and—our fuses changed a little 

bit on the W76, because the radar technology has changed dramatically over 30 years. So why not put in a 21st century radar instead 

of a 1970’s or 1980’s radar in the system, duplicating exactly that 

it was done? 

But in the end analysis, what we are talking about is, you know, 

the exact same warhead. It has got the same mission that it had 

before. It has got the same yields that it had before to make sure 

it meets the same military characteristics that the Defense Department had originally set out. 

It is carried on the same platform; it is carried on the same delivery vehicle, potentially the same targets. I am sure the target set 

has changed a little bit. But in essence, it is the same warhead. So 

this is not about enhancing performance, or increasing yield, or 

making it a hard and deeply buried type of a thing at all. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. So effectively, Life Extension Programs are what 

they actually are said to be, life extension programs. They are not 

meant—they are not and do not change the performance, change 

the yield, change the military mission. 

Nothing in the Life Extension Program can be constituted as improving the weapon, other than in the sense that you are extending 

the life of the weapon. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. That is right. And other than the fact that, in 

some cases—this probably doesn’t apply to the W76, but some of 

our older systems have vacuum tubes in them. You can’t buy those 

anymore. They don’t exist in many cases. You would probably have 

to go on eBay or something like that. 

We are not going to do that, of course. We are going to use modern technology to replace that. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. There are people in the room that are too young 

to know what vacuum tubes are. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Okay, I apologize. I am dating myself, I guess. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I have a question for Dr. Miller, Director Miller. 

What will the National Ignition Facility (NIF) contribute to the 

Stockpile Stewardship Program? And what specific areas of uncertainty regarding nuclear weapons performance will the NIF help 

resolve? It is the largest laser in the world, isn’t it? 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, ma’am. Thank you very much. When we did nuclear testing, there were several major areas that we did not have 

fundamental scientific understanding of. Many of these have been 
12 

pointed out in a variety of studies and reviews, including the Defense Science Board. 

Let me call these ‘‘the grand challenges of nuclear weapons physics.’’ NIF is the only facility that allows us, in an experimental 

sense, without a nuclear weapon, to address all of the phases of a 

nuclear weapon that occur after the high explosive goes off and it 

goes into what we call the ‘‘nuclear phase.’’ 

So the temperatures and the densities that occur, like occur in 

the center of the sun, would be achievable in NIF. 

And so issues of boosting, which the Defense Science Board 

called the largest challenge in weapons physics energy balance— 

there are about four of them that are addressable by NIF. 

They will allow us validate and understand how to do the simulations accurately so that we will enhance our confidence and 

move further away from the need to do nuclear testing. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller can be found in the Appendix on page 71.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

My final question is for Dr. Anastasio, the Director of Los Alamos lab. 

If CMRR Nuclear Facility is not built, what are the consequences 

to the Stockpile Stewardship Program and to other national security functions, such as nuclear forensics? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Thank you, Madam Chairman. The CMR, as Administrator D’Agostino said in his comments, is a capability that 

we use to—for the country to underwrite our stockpile stewardship 

activities. 

The Chemistry and Metallurgical Research facility is old. It came 

online in 1952. And the capabilities there are essential to carry out 

our mission. One example is in the Stockpile Stewardship Program, 

periodically we bring weapons back from the military, take them 

apart and do forensics on the components in that weapon. 

One of those is we actually take the pits apart and take samples 

out of the pit, take pieces out, and we use our analytic and metallurgical capabilities, our R&D scientific tools in this facility, to 

look at that material and see how is it aging, is it changing, can 

we project and predict its life and the issues that may or may not 

arise. So that surveillance activity is actually done in this facility. 

Of course, it also supports other missions. Besides our stockpile 

stewardship, we do a lot of work to support nonproliferation activities, counterterrorism activities, nuclear forensics, as you identified, and even the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA) space missions are supported by the activities that go on 

in that building. 

So it is an essential capability that must be maintained somehow, but it is getting so old that it is very—and sits on an earthquake fault. It is difficult for us to continue to meet the evolving 

modern standards of safety and security. 

So building a replacement facility for it is a way to sustain that 

capability in a practical sense. 

And then the last point is, of course, it is part, as well, of the 

laboratories’ transformation efforts to get to a smaller, more secure, 

more efficient footprint. 
13 

And as an example, the new facility will be over 100,000 square 

feet smaller. It will be relocated inside a consolidated nuclear area 

at the laboratory which is much more easy to have a security protection perimeter for. And we will be accommodating the activity 

that is going on now at the Lawrence Livermore Lab. 

So it is a way to make us more safe, more efficient and more secure, at the same time continuing to carry out both our stockpile 

stewardship mission and to support many of the other national security activities of the lab. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Anastasio can be found in the 

Appendix on page 76.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Dr. Anastasio. 

I am happy now to yield to the ranking member for such time 

as he may consume. 

After Mr. Everett is finished, we will go to member questions 

under the five-minute rule, and we would expect that we will have 

two rounds because we have such a large panel and we want to be 

able to get as much out of you as we can. 

So I am happy to yield to Mr. Everett. 

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. D’Agostino, you touched on this briefly during your testimony, but what facility and infrastructure projects should move 

forward regardless of future decisions on policy and size and composition of the stockpile? 

You also touched on the ‘‘why,’’ but also re-touch on the ‘‘why.’’ 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. I will kind of answer it in two ways. 

From the large sense, it is important for those projects—all those 

projects that provide the bare minimum capability that is required 

to maintain a deterrent, should go forward regardless of size. 

Now, size should be considered, of course, but if, for example, a— 

to maintain a deterrent, I need to maintain a uranium capability. 

That doesn’t mean I should build multiple uranium capabilities. I 

ought to have at least one good one. If I don’t have one good one, 

I need one good one. 

So I focus it on, is this a matter of capability or capacity? And 

my first priority is to maintain capability, because without capability, I can’t maintain our deterrent. 

The capacity part could come later, whether we need a second 

one or a third one. So I have to have kind of one of everything. And 

then I have to have it sized such that it allows for flexibility based 

on the bipartisan commission—the strategic commission that is reviewing it right now. 

So I am sizing it from like—from the—I am going to need one 

warhead up to where we currently are right now, and it turns out 

that because, in many cases, just having one of something means 

that you can actually build more than one of something, that is 

probably where we are going to end up. 

But specifically, the CMR replacement facility, because our plutonium capability and path forward is not sustainable. 

At Lawrence Livermore, for example, we have a plutonium capability. It is in a multi-decade-old facility, but it is also being surrounded by a community that is just growing right around it. That 

is not a plan that is sustainable. It doesn’t make sense, costs a lot 

of money. 
14 

And as Dr. Anastasio described up at Los Alamos, we are in an 

old facility there. So between the two, I only need one, and that is 

the CMR replacement facility. 

At Y–12, it is about uranium, and I described the idea of getting 

to fewer—consolidating our uranium capability. And that philosophy can be carried forward kind of across the nuclear weapons 

complex. 

But those are the two main ones right now that I am very uneasy about, because we are not on a good path, and we are on a 

very expensive path, and ultimately—you know, unless we fully 

support these functions or these facilities. 

Mr. EVERETT. To what degree would—to what degree would 

NNSA’s Complex Transformation plans be altered based on whether it pursues a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) strategy or 

continues the Life Extension Program strategy? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. If the Nation decided it wanted to pursue that 

strategy, our plans could be altered probably in a couple of main 

areas. 

One is beryllium. Our plans for the future don’t include beryllium, particularly beryllium metal, and then the oxides. But the 

idea of—that is a capability I won’t have to maintain. 

Right now, we don’t have a capability to do a significant amount 

of work with beryllium, and we don’t actually want to do that into 

the future. So a reliable replacement approach that considers getting rid of some of these materials allows me to not have to worry 

about beryllium anymore. 

There is a heavy metal that is produced down and manufactured 

down in Tennessee that we would currently have to maintain. It 

is a mile-long production process stream down at—down there. It 

is in very old buildings, as well. 

It is not highly enriched uranium, but if we didn’t pursue another approach, I would need to maintain that capability and not 

have to rebuild that. 

So these are important, but they are marginal activities, I think. 

At a bare minimum, what I want to do is make sure that the plans 

we have in place sustain a capability to provide options for the 

strategic commission and the next Administration, so they can 

move forward down—down whatever path the Nation ultimately 

decides it wants to go in the long run. 

Mr. EVERETT. How does NNSA propose to fund Complex Transformation, given what many, and perhaps most believe to be a flat 

budget? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Okay. There are a number of steps. I will describe a couple of key ones, and then I could probably provide a 

more—a longer answer. I don’t want to take up too much time. 

But the key couple of steps that we are already putting in place 

is material consolidation. By consolidating material—let’s say, for 

example, the work that we currently have under way at Lawrence 

Livermore to move plutonium, significant quantities of plutonium, 

that require his higher level security out—could save about $30 

million a year. 

So that is real money. That is significant. Those are resources 

that can be put back into infrastructure. And we are not just doing 

it at Livermore. In fact, we have completed that job at Sandia. In 
15 

the past, Sandia required a much larger security force, and most 

recently, within the last 12 months, we finished the job of moving 

those materials out. 

We have opportunities at the Nevada Test Site, because it is a 

very remote location, to do work there that could potentially reduce 

our security costs elsewhere. 

Right now, the NNSA spends over $800 million in security costs. 

It is money well spent, but there is a much more efficient way to 

do that. 

And there are other mechanisms, such as consolidating contracts, 

looking at doing supply chain management in a different way, 

which is already under way right now. We have demonstrated savings of $5 million a year through this concept called reverse auctions, and we are expecting that to grow significantly this upcoming year. 

And so these contractors have saved a lot of money by looking 

at business in a different way and working together more than just 

focusing on being completely independent of each other. 

So there is some good things there, and I am confident that we 

can fund a significant part of this. And we are going to have to balance our workload, there is no question about it, with respect to 

facilities. 

Mr. EVERETT. Largely, the savings from base closure commissions have not necessarily materialized. And I would—when you 

give us—I would ask for a more detailed explanation and the underpinning of why you reached the analysis that you did—— 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Okay. 

Mr. EVERETT [continuing]. On this. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I would be glad to do that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 199.] 

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Ms. Chairman. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Everett. 

We are about to go to five-minute questioning from members. I 

would just like to note for the record that the unfortunate passing 

of former White House Press Secretary Tony Snow—his memorial 

service is now—has led some members obviously to not be here, 

and many of them will submit questions for the record, and obviously we extend to the Snow family our deepest condolences. 

We go to Mr. Loebsack of Iowa for five minutes. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am going to 

pass. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. We go to Mr. Wilson for five minutes. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

And thank all of you for being here today. I am particularly 

happy to see Mr. Hayes. I am very pleased to, along with Congressman Gresham Barrett, to represent the Savannah River Site (SRS). 

And I had the background—I particularly appreciate your service. I was Deputy General Counsel at the Department of Energy 

(DOE) several decades ago, but I appreciate your dedication and 

service for our country. 

And indeed, the Savannah River Site has been located in South 

Carolina for the last—since the early 1950’s, and it has had a ter-
16 

rific record of service. It has been so appreciated by the community. 

There is just strong community support. 

And indeed, I just want to thank Mr. Hayes for his leadership 

to continue the strong feelings that the people of South Carolina 

and Georgia have for the Savannah River Site. 

Mr. D’Agostino, as we are approaching issues, the Senate Energy 

and Water Appropriations Subcommittee included $22 million in 

their bill to expand the Advanced Retirement and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) mission, to bridge the gap between when 

MOX and the disassembly and conversion facility opens. 

Does SRS have the ability to help bridge this gap using existing 

facilities and material currently on or destined for the site? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Wilson, that is—they do. In fact, we are 

evaluating that right now. We are looking at this from a—kind of 

a nuclear security enterprise response. 

We recognize the workforce at Savannah River, at the Savannah 

River Site, is dedicated. They know what they are doing. They have 

worked with plutonium, and they are part of our solution set as we 

look to figure out how do we bridge that gap between the startup 

of the MOX facility and the—and the—you know, bridge that gap 

between the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) 

project and the startup of the facility. 

And my important view is we need to have the oxide material to 

keep MOX running, because I want to—I want to get all of the 

value out of that facility. 

Mr. WILSON. We certainly support your goal. 

The NNSA has determined that there is a need to—has it determined there is a need to expand the mission of ARIES? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. That is right. In other words, right now, our 

current plan doesn’t—because we expected there to be not much of 

a multiyear gap, and the reality is that because of funding profiles, 

there have been some shifts as a result of moving projects back and 

forth and not full funding that have caused the gap to widen. 

So we are going to have to do a little bit more, most likelihood, 

in the ARIES process. But ultimately, in the end, what we are trying to figure out is what makes sense in the long run. 

Mr. WILSON. And on funding, is this additional $22 million appropriation for ARIES necessary at this point? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I actually don’t know the answer to that question, Mr. Wilson. I think it just came out recently. What we are 

trying to do is figure out what is the right thing to do programmatically and then figure out then what are the resources we need 

and where do we need the resources in order to support the ultimate goal of downblending the 34 metric tons (MT) of plutonium. 

And then, of course, just last year the Secretary added nine more 

metric tons of plutonium to the batch, if you will, that is going 

through, and we are looking at ways to continue to add more material to be downblended. 

And so I don’t know if this is the right amount of money. But 

that is something that we are going to analyze and that Bob 

Smolen, who runs Defense Programs—he is the Deputy Administrator there—that is—he has got a team of people, including Savannah River, to look at that. 
17 

Mr. WILSON. And of great importance to the community, how 

does an expanded ARIES mission fit into the—NNSA’s vision for 

the new weapons complex? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Well, I think it really kind of depends on 

whether the expansion of ARIES where it currently exists is the 

right—is the right approach. We haven’t made that determination. 

I think my goal ultimately is to make sure that—I mean, right 

now, ARIES is an activity that is being conducted, but we don’t 

think it has got that pace and rate that is going to actually cover 

the gap. 

So in the end, we want a permanent solution, because what we 

have got is the 34 metric tons, plus 9 metric tons, plus potentially 

another sizeable piece or slice of plutonium that we are going to 

add to the capability. 

And you know, all of that material, whether it is 50 tons or not, 

or more, will be part of the answer, the business-case answer, that 

we will come up with. 

Mr. WILSON. And in conclusion, under DOE Project Management 

Order DOE–0413.3A, a full evaluation of the alternative analysis 

is required before making a decision. Are there plans to initiate a 

full analysis of alternatives? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Absolutely. Right now, the Pit Disassembly and 

Conversion Facility—what we call Critical Decision 2, where we establish our baseline, is scheduled—it is probably going to happen 

January timeframe or early next year. 

That 413 order requires us to reevaluate the previous critical decisions. And the previous critical decision is to reexamine all options, because it is important before we commit resources that we 

know that we are on the right path, and so we will do that as part 

of DOE 413, sir. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. 

Five minutes to Ms. Tsongas of Massachusetts. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. 

And thank you all for your testimony. There is many of you up 

there, but I am going to address this question again to Mr. 

D’Agostino. Sorry. 

In the wake of recent Department of Defense nuclear mishaps, 

select independent reviews have highlighted an erosion across the 

nuclear enterprise. To what extent has this erosion materialized 

within the nuclear weapons complex? And how do NNSA’s Complex 

Transformation plans address this? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Okay. Thank you very much for your question. 

I think that is a great question. It reflects something that I have— 

we have been thinking about for the last number of years, actually. 

We in this business have been—pay close attention to the Defense Department and work closely with them. About two years 

ago, the Defense Science Board wrote a report which described concerns about the infrastructure and attention on strategic issues 

such as these. In that report, there are recommendations for both 

the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense to undertake. 

Secretary Bodman, as part of that, because he was briefed out 

by General Welch, who headed up that report, in fact—he talked 
18 

to the Secretary of Defense at the time and actually had a meeting 

with him, with the Deputy Secretary—took those actions very seriously and made a number of changes to our organizational structure and I think drove a tremendous amount of focus on the Department of Energy side. 

We initiated a program called ‘‘Getting the Job Done,’’ which focused on 10 specific items to restore the capability, to meet Defense 

Department needs. There was a bit of reorganization where the site 

office organizations that had previously reported up in the organization were shifted back down to Defense Programs. 

And in this case, I have got Air Force General, retired, Bob 

Smolen, in that job. He is tightly connected with the new Air Force 

leadership and has showed them what we have done and provided 

recommendations to the Air Force on how to address that. 

One final point is that as a result—Admiral Kirk Donald is dual 

hatted. He reports into the NNSA, to me, as well as to the Department of the Navy. He was the admiral that led the investigation 

for Secretary Gates and had shared what his lessons learned were 

as a result of his investigation. 

And Bob Smolen and I have chartered an independent group led 

by Bill Desmond, who was the former Chief of Defense Nuclear Security, to make sure and evaluate those lessons learned from the 

Defense Department—let’s make sure we bring them back here in 

the National Nuclear Security Administration and make sure that 

we are doing the right thing and that we have covered all our 

bases. 

That review is underway right now and is expected—I expect to 

get some feedback—Bob Smolen and I expect to get some feedback 

in the October timeframe, roughly, this fall, because we want to 

take action, if any is needed, this year on that path forward. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Do you yield back? 

Ms. TSONGAS. I do. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Spratt for five minutes, Mr. Spratt from 

South Carolina. 

Mr. SPRATT. Well, thank you all for your presence and for your 

testimony. 

Is the five-site complex that you now have in mind dependent on 

the RRW? Is it modeled around that particular focal point? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. No, sir. The consolidation of materials to five 

sites—I think is maybe what you are referring to—is independent 

on whether—what approach we use for the future stockpile, whether we maintain a life extension strategy or look to add enhanced 

safety and security via other methods. 

Our view is that we need to consolidate our material for a couple 

of reasons. Efficiency right now is—and cost savings are huge parts 

of that. 

And plus there is the safety and security aspect. If the material 

is in fewer locations it is easier for us to protect, and it is easier 

to make sure that that workforce is trained and know how to work 

on that on a day-to-day basis, versus trying to spread that capability around at too many sites. 
19 

Mr. SPRATT. Since you speak of capital cost, can you give us an 

idea of what the likely capital cost is going to be, the incremental 

costs over and above your typical capital budget? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Right now, we spend on the average of—our 

capital budget in the NNSA averages somewhere between $250 

million to $450 million per year, depending on the year, because it 

goes up and down depending on the projects that we have overall. 

We expect that this modernization effort is probably going to increase that baseline to about $600 million, $650 million per year, 

so on the order of $150 million to $200 million per year more. 

So our focus is to drive down costs through better-business practices, through consolidation of materials across the complex, 

through supply-chain management—— 

Mr. SPRATT. But the incremental cost is $150 million to $200 million a year? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Roughly. And it depends on a couple of things. 

It depends on—there is unknowns out there. One is this Critical 

Decision 2 where we establish a performance baseline. That is kind 

of the—my contract with my contractors, if you will, saying you 

agree to provide this building at this date for this time for this 

amount of money on this rate of expenditure. 

Both the Critical Decision 2’s for the two facilities that we are 

talking about, the UPF and the CMRR—we haven’t reached those 

points yet. 

The CMRR Critical Decision 2 won’t happen until we do a little 

bit more preliminary design work, until the year 2010, and that is 

something that the laboratory is working on fairly aggressively. 

And the UPF is a little bit—is downstream as well. 

When we get those Critical Decision 2’s, we will have to marryup and make sure that our cash flow is supported by our existing 

budget, and that will be—that is the work that will have to happen. 

Mr. SPRATT. You indicate that you would anticipate removing 

about 600 buildings and facilities? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. What we would do—yes. Some of those buildings and facilities are actually just underutilized and not needed 

anymore, so we would take them down. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SPRATT. How many of them have contamination costs, cleanup costs, associated with them? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I don’t have that—I don’t have that accurate 

number on the top of my head. I would like to take that for the 

record, if I could. But what—there are a number of these facilities, 

for example, that have very little contamination and are fairly simple to take down. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 202.] 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. And our fiscal year 2009 request established a 

funding line—requested a funding line for—called Transformation 

Disposition—in other words, dismantling. And this is not heavily 

contaminated buildings. 

There is a smaller subset of facilities that we are going to be 

working with our Environmental Management (EM) organization 

to see, you know, how we are going to do that. And that work— 
20 

it really depends on the alternative. I have a draft plan that is out 

in public right now. 

When we get to the record of decision point, when we have agreement on what we will do, then we are going to sharpen our pencils 

on those particular points and figure out which ends up on which 

side of the line and how we want to move forward. 

Mr. SPRATT. Okay. 

I have a couple more questions that I will come back to. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Spratt. 

I am happy to go to Mr. Reyes for five minutes, Mr. Reyes of 

Texas. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

My questions are along the same lines as Mr. Spratt. Mr. 

D’Agostino, because the consensus is pretty much that we are going 

to be seeing pretty flat budgets in the foreseeable future, probably 

the next decade. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Right. 

Mr. REYES. So I have got some concerns that go back to when 

I was the ranking member and Mr. Everett was the chairman, 

from several perspective. 

Number one, as you go through this process of eliminating these 

buildings that—that aren’t being used, and take into consideration 

the cleanup and all these other things, for me security has to be 

an issue. 

And so I am wondering, given the budget, given the challenge 

and given the transformation, how are you going to be able to reconcile that, or what is the plan to be able to provide and maximize 

security, given the challenges we have seen in the recent past? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. On the security piece of it, within the security 

budget, the Defense Nuclear Security Program, there is a line on 

research and development and technology insertion. In other 

words, it is the idea of doing security differently, not doing it— 

doing less security, but doing it from a different standpoint. 

And there are a number of technologies that are being looked at 

to be implemented—Remotely Operated Weapons systems, for example—that can reduce the overall level of costs, since the cost in 

security is over $800 million a year. 

So this is not about less security. This is about doing it a little 

bit differently, because the biggest costs of security ultimately are 

the costs associated with maintaining a very large workforce. And 

the more guard stations there are that exist out there, the more 

numbers of guards that you have to maintain those and the like. 

There are some activities that are being considered across the 

complex, some of my colleagues may be able to provide some specific examples of security technologies that they have been able to 

actually implement in their areas. We know that we can save $30 million by shifting the Superblock 

facility at Livermore from a Category I/II facility to a Category III/ 

IV facility, because—and that is—that is a pretty significant cost. 

We know in Texas, for example, at the Pantex plant, we can look 

at Zone 4, which is a remote weapons storage site for plutonium 

and the like, and that if we move some of that underground, and 

we have got capabilities across the complex, we can change the security posture dramatically. 
21 

So right now at Pantex, we protect two very large areas, Zone 

4 and Zone 12. If it were reduced down to one, I think the costs 

of security savings there are in the multiple tens of millions of dollars per year. 

And those are the areas that we are going to go aggressively 

after to try to drive that efficiency in the program, because we recognize—I recognize that, you know, there is not a—there is not 

enough room to add, if you will, a large multi-hundred-million-dollar line on top of everything else. It is just not affordable. 

So we have to look at doing business differently, and that is 

one—that is our third strategy, is change the way we do business. 

Mr. REYES. Well, some of the concerns that I have—and again, 

predicated on the experience that I have had in—particularly in 

this committee as a ranking member—is that we don’t cut corners, 

that we don’t—that I guess the—because one of the big issues that 

we identified previously was the culture of some of these facilities 

was that, you know, we are scientists, we don’t have to worry about 

security that much, that is somebody else’s—that is somebody 

else’s concern. 

So cutting corners, the challenge that we have with the budget, 

the understanding that there was a commitment made to this committee, or the subcommittee, that training on an ongoing basis to 

make sure that there is—the workforce is sensitized to security and 

the breaches that we have experienced in the past, that that 

doesn’t fall by the wayside. 

You know, in tough budget times, unfortunately, one of the first 

things that go—that goes is training, and that is an important part 

of this piece, given the track record of some of these facilities. 

So, I hope you keep the subcommittee informed of this ongoing— 

because it sounds like it is an ongoing and fluid plan that is evolving, so that we can, I guess, make sure that those concerns are addressed. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Reyes. 

I am going to go to questions before we go to Mr. Larsen. 

I would like to talk—ask a question of Dr. Hunter from Sandia. 

Following the competitions for the contracts to manage and operate Livermore and Los Alamos laboratories in the last few years, 

some have begun to question whether for-profit entities are ideally 

suited to manage these institutions. 

Should the business model of governance of the national laboratories be a consideration in Complex Transformation? 

Dr. HUNTER. Thank you, Madam Chairman—very important 

question, one that we spend a lot of time thinking about, because 

we—we like to look at our—for instance, our role at Sandia and 

ask, ‘‘What is the best way in which we can support the Government?’’ 

I would like to make just a couple of points about how I feel 

about that and then directly address your question about for-profits. 

I think an essential ingredient which can’t be bought at any price 

but which is critical moving forward is that each of the institutions 

be an institution committed to national service, that their primary 
22 

and fundamental role is we are about national service, and all of 

our decisions and all of our incentives for decisions are about how 

we serve the Nation best. 

Second, it is very important that the incentives and the roles and 

the leadership of the institutions think about how to have both, not 

either, and not a balance, but both excellence in operations, including security, and excellence in science, a quest to try to maximize 

and provide both at the best possible level. 

And then getting more directly to your question, each institution, 

each person who leads and each person who has a responsible position, has to feel accountable for what they do. They have to feel accountable to this value of national service. They have to feel accountable to the fact that they must deliver. 

And with the accountability, and the feeling of accountability 

must go the authority to deal with it and the proper balanced role 

of what—who does what in the institution and who does what with 

respect to the Federal Government. 

And then last, the dominant criteria should be the stewardship 

of its people and the people, as reflecting on other comments, have 

to be felt to be valued and respected and supported. 

You cannot buy, and it is a good thing—you cannot buy people 

who know and care about nuclear weapons. They have to be created. They have to be invested in. They have to be supported. 

If you put all those together, I think it does not matter so much 

about profit or for-profit. What matters is what—what is the ethos 

or the value statement of the institution, how is it supported, and 

how is it managed, and how does the Federal Government then respond by acknowledging the accountability and the incentives that 

go with it. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hunter can be found in the Appendix on page 82.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. That is a great answer. Thank you. 

Dr. Younger, of the Nevada Test Site, in your testimony you suggest that the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada Test 

Site is underutilized. 

What additional Stockpile Stewardship Program or national security activities could be supported there, and what sort of modifications, if any, would be required to enable such work, and what 

would they cost? 

Dr. YOUNGER. Thank you. The Device Assembly Facility is currently being modified to house the Critical Experiments Facility 

that was formerly located at TA–18 at Los Alamos. That will result 

in considerable security savings while providing a full capability for 

the Nation. 

When that modification is complete, we will still have 40,000 

square feet of empty space—the Device Assembly Facility, at a 

time when nuclear capable space costs approximately $65,000 per 

square foot to build. That could be used for a variety of missions. 

We are looking at the possibility of augmenting—not replacing, 

certainly, but augmenting weapons disassembly in the DAF, or 

small lot special case disassemblies. 

There are a variety of plutonium operations that could be conducted in the DAF—business-case warrants, including surveillance, 
23 

including an augmentation to the ARIES process at Los Alamos, 

and including other plutonium operations. 

The typical cost for the modification of the DAF, since it is a fully 

capable nuclear facility today, and since security is already paid for 

by other missions—and I might add that the DAF is considered one 

of, if not the most, secure facilities in the DOE complex. 

The cost of modification for a major mission would be between $100 million and $300 million, which is considerably less than construction of a facility. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Younger can be found in the Appendix on page 88.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Just as an aside, many of our colleagues and I, 

with Administrator D’Agostino, took a tour of many parts of the 

complex a few months ago, and I think one of the most fascinating 

things that the American people don’t understand, which is why 

this narrative that we are building is so important, is when you go 

to the Nevada Test Site, which—I would recommend you change 

your name. 

When you go to the Nevada Test Site, it is a warren of busyness. 

There is so much stuff going on there. You have got so many other 

things that you’re doing that are very important—homeland security, national security—so much going on there. 

And I think that most people think that when you go to the Nevada Test Site you are moving away the cobwebs because it hasn’t 

been used for so long. And the truth is, it is a dynamic facility. 

And I think it is very important that we continue to get the message out of all the other work that is being done there. And I am 

not kidding about changing the name. 

Dr. YOUNGER. I cordially invite—— 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. YOUNGER. I cordially invite all the members of the committee 

to visit the site that is currently in Nevada that will shortly be renamed. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. We will be back. 

And also, we went to Pantex, and we have J. Greg Meyer here, 

who is from Pantex, and we would just like to talk a little bit about 

the operations and workload at Pantex. 

And would it be altered if the decision on Life Extension Programs was life extension programs only, or if we moved to something that was similar to the RRW strategy? What kind of workload would Pantex have? Would it be altered, and the mission that 

you have there at Pantex? 

Mr. MEYER. The exact mission would not change in terms of assembly/disassembly, but the mix of that workload would. But right 

now, if—we do a number of different weapons systems, both lifetime extension programs, as well as dismantlements, as well as 

surveillances. 

If the decision was made to do only LEPs, we would then focus 

very heavily on that and continue to do dismantlements, and then 

surveillances as necessary. 

If we were going to go down the RRW path, on the other hand, 

we would probably not do LEPs or surveillances to the same extent. We would be building one new weapons system, RRW, but 

doing very heavily dismantlement work. 
24 

Bays and cells at Pantex are multifunctional in that sense. They 

don’t wear out. We basically stage the tooling appropriate and do 

the training, so the workforce would be about the same. The training would be slightly different, especially if it is RRW. 

With RRW, since it is—it would be a new design—actually, we 

are working—we have been invited to participate with the laboratories and give some of the actual production input so that design 

would have our inputs in and make the assembly/disassembly process easier for us. 

But the flexibility of the Pantex lab would support either role. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Meyer can be found in the Appendix on page 95.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much. 

And I have got a question for Vincent Trim of the Kansas City 

Plant. 

The decision was made to build a new facility at Kansas City. 

Talk very briefly, if you can, about how—what the process of evaluation was to make that decision? Assumably, the decision to build 

the new facility was—included cost savings, and if you could just 

tell us a little bit about why the decision was to build the facility 

as opposed to consolidation? 

Mr. TRIM. Certainly. The current facility was built in the late 

1940’s and is approximately 3.3 million square feet. We believe the 

mission only requires roughly 1.2 million square feet of manufacturing space, so it is a pretty easy business case when you look at 

the cost of maintaining a Cold War structure, security, maintenance and a whole host of costs that go along with that. 

We had independent groups look at the business case, and primarily, the driver is that maintaining the capability is also about 

maintaining the talent that exists. 

We are more than just assemblers of nuclear—or builders of components. We have engineers, and we bridge that gap between design and manufacturability at the Kansas City Plant. 

But the business case is very compelling and will yield $100 million a year in savings when we hit rate production and get into the 

new facility in 2012. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Trim can be found in the Appendix on page 103.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. I have questions for Mr. Kohlhorst 

and for Mr. Hayes, but I will hold them till after Mr. Larsen of 

Washington asks his questions for five minutes. 

Do you want to pass? 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, I will pass. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Kohlhorst, how are you? The Y–12 plant in 

Tennessee—the planned Uranium Processing Facility is being designed to accommodate potential shifts in our strategic weapons 

policy, I assume. 

Can you tell us a little bit about how that is being done and how 

you are facilitating the kind of flexibility that may be needed? 

Mr. KOHLHORST. Certainly, Madam Chairman. Working through 

the preliminary and concept designs of that facility, we have made 

sure that the maximum flexibility is there for changes in the stockpile, changes in the workload. 
25 

The facility is being designed with all the correct safety systems 

and security systems built into the facility so that if these changes 

come about, we are prepared to move processing equipment, reconfigure the processing lines, add capability where we need it, reduce 

it in other areas. 

It is a general—it is a very general manufacturing facility on the 

inside of the processing area, although it has some—some nuclear 

safety systems that surround it that keep us safe no matter what 

we—so all of those are being taken into consideration as we do the 

design. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kohlhorst can be found in the 

Appendix on page 108.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Hayes, what should the NNSA and Congress do to ensure 

that DOE planning for plutonium disposition at Savannah River 

Site—what do we do to make sure it is synchronized with the 

NNSA’s Complex Transformation plans? 

Mr. HAYES. Good morning. I think the activities that Tom talked 

about before that are currently underway will ensure that the activities going on at Savannah River and with a broader perspective 

the NNSA are accounted for. 

We have several key experts at Savannah River, with years of 

plutonium experience, participating in complex councils to make 

sure that that information is communicated. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hayes can be found in the Appendix on page 116.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. Spratt for a second round for five minutes? 

Mr. SPRATT. You may have answered this before, and I was listening to the testimony and reading the briefing memorandum at 

the same time. But what is the current plan for the location of the 

Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility? Is it slated to go to Savannah River, or will it—is it being considered for location elsewhere? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I will take that, Mr. Spratt. Our current plan 

is to build a Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility at Savannah 

River. 

The activity that we have underway this year is to make sure 

that the MOX Facility that we are also building at Savannah River 

has the material—the feedstock it needs to keep operating, because 

we don’t want to operate it just for a short period of time and then 

have it shut down for a couple years while it waits for the PDCF 

to finish construction. 

So that is, you know, the—this discussion on the ARIES line was 

to—to make sure we fill the gap, if you will, or mind the gap, and 

make sure that that gap gets filled, or that that gap gets filled by 

modifying some facilities at Savannah River to fill the gap. 

Whether it gets done at Los Alamos to fill the gap, or Nevada 

to fill the gap, that business case is under way. But the program 

of record, and our path forward on PDCF is to build it at Savannah 

River. 

Mr. SPRATT. One of the necessary facilities you have indicated 

will be plutonium production. And I have been through TA–55 a 

couple of times, and each time we have been—seen that facility, we 
26 

have been told it has a production capacity of 1 shift and a maintenance shift, I think, of about 50 pits a year. 

Is that not adequate for the stockpile that we are envisioning for 

the future? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Spratt, that is absolutely right. It is adequate for the stockpile we are envisioning, 50 to 80 pits per year. 

And maybe Dr. Anastasio can add on at the end of this to clarify 

my statements, since his—the expertise exists at both—at Los Alamos and Livermore. 

But in order to do what I would call basic surveillance—in other 

words, take care of our current stockpile, do the analytical chemistry and material characterization work, the TA–55 complex, 

which you just described, relies on this other building, which is not 

located there, to do the chemistry work. And it is that other building that is very old that we are very worried about. 

But the 50 to 80 pits per year, which is part of our current requirement in our classified paper—the laboratory believes that 

with changes—it would require some changes internally—glove 

boxes and lathes and things like that—that it could happen. 

Maybe—— 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Yeah, Mr. Spratt, to amplify a little bit, the existing PF–4, which is in the TA–55 that you have visited in the past— 

we believe we had adequate space to support all the stockpile stewardship mission that we have, including up to a production capacity of 50 to 80 pits per year. 

We will have to do some reconfiguration of the glove box lines 

and so forth that is inside that building, but it will not—and of 

course, we have to do normal upgrades to maintain that facility 

over time. But we believe there is—we are convinced that there is 

adequate space and capability for that. 

That gives me the opportunity to also say the replacement building for CMR that we are contemplating, which would be co-located 

there within the same security perimeter, again will give us the opportunity to get more efficiency for security, and more effective. 

But also, that is not a facility that we will use to do pit production, so we will not be doing Pit Protection in the new facility we 

are trying to build. It is just the capability to do the analytic chemistry and the metallurgy that goes along with our surveillance as 

a—and all the other missions that we carry out. 

We believe that that facility is needed regardless of whether we 

make 0 pits per year or 50 to 80 pits per year. That production role 

will go on in the existing PF–4 that you have seen. 

Mr. SPRATT. One final question, if I may. We have talked all 

morning about facilities, bricks and mortar, but the real essence of 

this complex is people, and attracting in the next generation the 

kind of people you have had in prior generations. 

Do you build that concept into the design of this? Are you looking 

for missions you can accommodate with your new facilities complex 

that will be attractive, like the NIF at Livermore? Is this part of 

your planning? And how do you attract in the next generation the 

talent you have been accustomed to? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Spratt, I will start with the federal—the 

answer on the federal side. And I may, if you permit, ask one of— 
27 

somebody to comment on the contractor side, because there is multiple programs. 

On the federal side—in fact, we may even have in the room some 

of—we have a program called the Future Leaders Program, where 

every year we go out and recruit from universities and colleges all 

over the country to bring in top talent in both engineering and 

business practices, about 30-some-odd per class. 

We are into our fourth class right now—did the graduation not 

too long ago. And it is fantastic to have young folks come in with 

different ideas on how to—how to work things. These are people 

that are very smart. 

I have asked them to make sure to not rely on the way we currently do business; if they have got a question, to ask it. And in 

many cases—one gentleman in particular took a look at how we 

look at safety data, and because we compile a tremendous amount 

of data that our—these eight sites pull together—and we have been 

analyzing it for years in a certain fashion. 

And these young folks came in there and say, ‘‘Well, what about 

looking at it this way?’’ And it is amazing what we learn by that— 

just that one experience. So we are very much energized on the 

Federal side to bring in fresh talent on that standpoint. It is pretty 

exciting to see, actually, getting folks in like that. 

If I may, I could ask some of the other panel members to comment on your question. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Briefly. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Sure. I would—— 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Any takers? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Run down the line. 

As an example, some of the new capability that—in place, like 

our new Road Runner computer that is the fastest computer in the 

world now, at Los Alamos, brings in talent because it is—it is the 

same capability that you need to use to do any kind of high-performance computing. 

It enables us to do our global climate modeling and understand 

much better La Nin ̃a, El Nin ̃ o kinds of weather, because of water 

patterns in the Pacific that we can now analyze with much more 

resolution. 

At the same time, just this summer, we have over 1,000 students 

at Los Alamos. We average about 350 postdoctoral students per 

year at the laboratory as our pipeline, and it is still a very highquality set of workforce. 

So it is these other programs that we do that is the window of 

the—for the students to want to come to the laboratory and become 

part of all these other activities. 

Dr. MILLER. Let me just step back a step. I think fundamentally—this is the comment that Tom Hunter made earlier. Fundamentally, people come to the laboratory to serve the Nation. 

They need to know that what they do is valued by the country. 

They also like the laboratory because we are given a set of scientific and technical challenges on behalf of the country that they 

find exciting. And it is a stable work environment. 

All of those things have to do, in a very fundamental way, with 

the way Congress and the Administration look at the laboratory 

and make use of the talents of the laboratory. 
28 

And those underlying issues, or overarching issues if you care to 

think of them that way, are really as fundamental as the particular 

programs that we have. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Tom, did you want to say something? 

Dr. HUNTER. Thank you, Madam Chair, if I may, just briefly. 

This is not a dilemma for these institutions only. This is a dilemma 

for the Nation. 

And one important and, I think, essential way to look at these 

laboratories is we are not a small player now. We are a large player in where the Nation goes on its commitment to science and engineering. 

And these institutions stand at the very forefront of that today. 

We have to make sure that continues to be the case in the future, 

and we promise them just two simple things: If they come to these 

institutions, they can work on the Nation’s security, and they can 

also work at the forefront of their scientific fields. We must maintain that as we go forward. 

Mr. TRIM. Madam Chair, from a plant perspective, I think attracting talent is highly dependent on the impression these graduates have on the commitment to the complex, the recapitalization 

of the complex. And pivotal is the reframing of the mission to encompass a national security mindset. And I think that really resonates with people who want to serve the Nation and be part of the 

mission. 

Mr. MEYER. I would like to add that it is a challenge at—especially in Amarillo. We have got a geographic challenge that some 

of the other sites don’t have, and you have been there, Madam 

Chair and others. 

And it is a relatively modest site, so we recruit very heavily 

among university students and bring them on as interns and actually recruit them at that point and pay for them—their last year’s 

tuition reimbursement. 

Three or four years later, those people have clearances, they 

have good experience, and they are somewhat tired of the Amarillo 

social life, and so they are ready to move on to bigger and better 

things. 

So we do have a retention problem that—and again, we—we are 

keeping up with it, but it is a continual battle, so—but we recognize that that is clearly our legacy. That is where we need to focus. 

Mr. KOHLHORST. Just a quick comment. Y–12 has just kicked off 

an apprentice program. Fifty new apprentices, and we had 2,610 

applicants. We have a manufacturing academy where we reach out 

to high schools, work with high schools; we have an exchange program with a community college. 

So all of us at plants are looking at that critical—making sure 

we have the pipeline full, making sure we have folks ready to step 

in as we see our population moving far more toward—— 

Dr. YOUNGER. I will conclude by saying that the Nevada Test 

Site can help with Amarillo’s social problems. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I was just going to recommend that. [Laughter.] 

Exchange programs. It is, what stays in Las Vegas obviously stays 

in Las Vegas. 

Dr. YOUNGER. But seriously, as Dr. Miller said, it is all about 

mission. And people come to the Nevada Test Site because they be-
29 

lieve they are doing something important for the Nation and they 

are doing technically excellent and interesting work. 

So, so long as there is important mission to be done, I feel confident we will attract the best in the Nation. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Hayes, I assume you concur with all that. 

Thank you, Mr. Spratt. 

Mr. Everett. 

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Ms. Chairman. 

Very interesting conversation. I know that in many of the fields 

that we have advanced science and engineering that we have a lot 

of problems in finding people to go into those fields, young people. 

And I was wondering a couple things. Number one, how many 

of those applicants that you have, or those working for you are foreign born, and what troubles does—what does that present embedding them? And also, in the overall picture, everybody included, are 

you having a lot of trouble getting clearances for them? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I will start off on that. On the federal side, we 

don’t—we don’t have, I think, the same types of a problem. We 

have been recruiting to make sure we get a diverse workforce coming in at that young age. 

That is really important to us, because it is these different backgrounds that people bring to the table that allow us to look at problems in a different way, and ultimately solutions really arise out 

of that. 

We do have a challenge on security clearances. That is ultimately 

a responsibility of the government to grant those, and it has had— 

does have an impact. It ends up being a cost impact. I think both 

the labs and plant directors here could probably give an anecdote 

to describe the type of impact that it has. 

But my sense is that we have started trying to be smarter in how 

we hire to make sure that we do some pre-screening up front so 

we don’t bring people in and then have them sit and do kind of unclassified work for a year while we try to get them a clearance, 

then find out that there was a problem in their background. 

So a lot of it has to do—and we flushed out a lot that, particularly in this organization that is a federal organization called Office 

of Secure Transportation, where we have a number of federal 

agents—these are Government Federal agents that protect the material and the warheads as they move around the country. 

So it has been a challenge. Money fixes it to a certain extent, but 

we don’t want to throw money at something if we can fix it from 

an operational standpoint. 

And it might be worth getting some input from the field on—with 

respect to the other parts of your question, sir. 

Dr. MILLER. I think the fundamental problem is a—is a problem 

at the national level. 

The country is failing to graduate the numbers of scientists and 

engineers, particularly in physical sciences, that it needs to sustain 

its level of economic competitiveness. There was an article in the 

paper just this week about that. 

At the graduate level, in—you know, increasingly large fractions 

of Ph.D.s are foreign-nationals, not that they are not U.S. citizens. 

They are not U.S. citizens, not that they are foreign born. They are 

not U.S. citizens. 
30 

So far, we have been able to sustain our workforce. We have a 

program at Livermore called the Lawrence Fellows, which is a very 

prestigious postdoc program. A large fraction of the very best 

Ph.D.s that we see are foreign-nationals. 

And so it is a—again, it is widely recognized as a fundamental 

problem of the country. We see the impact. It is manageable to 

date, but I think it is something that is of major consequence. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Madam Chair, if I could just add one other comment, please. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Surely. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. That another concern I have with the future of 

science is if you look at the trends that we are already seeing that 

concern me for the future, if we look at NNSA, as we think of the 

budget—I think of it in three pieces—hands on, dealing with the 

stockpile, dealing with the infrastructure—we have talked a lot 

about today—and the science that underpins all the judgment we 

have to make about confidence in our deterrent. 

As the stockpile ages and gets older, it takes more of our handson effort to take care of it and be confident about it. 

We have talked about the investment we need to make to recapitalize the complex. If we have a relatively flat budget, as you 

have—this committee has indicated—if those two elements are 

growing and we have a flat budget, that means that the piece in 

the middle, the science, is going to get squeezed out. 

And that is a big concern of mine, that the workforce understands that. They feel that in a very visceral way. And can we keep 

the workforce we have today and still recruit the very best for the 

future? I am very worried about that trend. 

And as we are sorting through policy decisions on the direction, 

like the Commission you have in place, I really urge Congress to 

make sure that we do whatever we can to sustain that level of 

science we can in the interim so that we don’t lose this quality 

workforce we have today. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Before we go to Mr. Hunter, Mr. Everett, if you 

would yield for a second—— 

Mr. EVERETT. Sure. 

Ms. TAUSCHER [continuing]. Do you have a raw number of what 

the throughput of engineers, for example, or postdocs in physical 

sciences that—that the labs and the complex need in the next five 

years, say, what the throughput is, what number it is? 

Because I think the Congress, and I think this subcommittee 

particularly would be very interested in working with our colleagues in other committees and certainly working with the Secretary of Education to understand exactly what it is we need to do 

to galvanize the forces necessary to begin to increase the number 

of Americans that are going through these classes and taking these 

courses. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Well, I can give you a—just in—but we will 

take that—because I think we want to give you a complete answer. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 199.] 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. An anecdote, if you will. There is 2,500 federal 

employees in the NNSA. We have done surveys and we have 

checked it with our employees: Who is retirement-eligible? There is 
31 

a difference between retirement-eligible and actually retiring, as 

we all recognize. And as economic times change, that has an impact. 

But retirement-eligible employees we have about 40 percent—40 

percent to 43 percent of our workforce, depending on what discipline they are in, whether they are engineers or business, are 

going to be retirement-eligible. And a number of those have indicated that they will actually retire. 

In fact, that is why we have started our Future Leaders Program, which will probably just hope to stem the tide, but it won’t 

change the tide. That tide is going. 

So doing quick math, it is anywhere from 800 to 1,000 people, 

out of 2,500. That is a pretty significant portion that we are worried about. The average age of the workforce is—you know, it is 

about 49 years old, roughly or so. And we are driving that down 

with the younger folks, but it is still a problem. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Hunter, I think I interrupted you. 

Mr. Everett, you still have time. 

Dr. HUNTER. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I will try to respond 

to both questions, if I could. 

First, to the question of numbers, we can always estimate anything as scientists and engineers. But roughly speaking, roughly 

speaking for our institution, we look at our five-year plan. Scientists and engineers, roughly, it is about 300 per year. So you 

could argue maybe similar to Tom’s number, 1,500 or so to 2,000 

people over the next 5-year period would have expected to leave, 

and in—under a stable picture, which we see—if there is a stable 

picture, then it would be replacements. 

Back to the question, though, of the general availability, you 

asked how many specifically were foreign-nationals. In our case, 

very few, just—in only very special cases of international science 

engagement or special fields outside the classified area—you would 

have a few employees. 

We do allow them to be permanent employees under very special 

cases, but very few are actual employees that are not citizens. 

The other issue that—adding on to what Dr. Miller said—was 

not only is the Nation not graduating enough science and engineers 

that are—that are—that are citizens, we do not have an adequate 

representation of both women and minorities in our physical 

sciences graduate programs. 

And so we have to work very—we work very hard in all those 

fields to try to seek out and find the best talent, but the Nation 

needs to do more. 

We have a lot of programs to do that. We are actively engaged 

on campuses all across the country. But it will be a challenge 

under any case, on the best of conditions, for any institution like 

these, who lead the country in the areas of physical sciences. 

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you. 

Michael, I think I detected a subtle—not-so-subtle plea for not a 

flat budget in your answer. [Laughter.] 

For our two directors of Los Alamos and Livermore, how will 

those labs continue to exercise their peer review functions as Complex Transformation, consolidation of missions and functions takes 

place? 
32 

Dr. MILLER. I think this is a very important—very important 

issue, particularly since the country is committed to no further nuclear testing. The best the Government can get is the truly independent answers of—from Livermore and Los Alamos on any particular question. 

So I think it is very—it is very important. It is something that 

Mike and I both spend a lot of time looking at. Through the annual 

assessment process, we do provide input to each other, so the people at Livermore provide input to Mike on the things that Mike is 

responsible for. He provides input to me on things that I am responsible for. 

I personally believe that this process could be strengthened by 

requiring that each laboratory do a complete analysis of the entire 

stockpile every year so this process can be strengthened. I think it 

is vitally important that it be strengthened. 

And the way we—again, the way we do the peer review is—is we 

work very hard at maintaining where it is important—independent 

capabilities in the computer simulations that we do, in many of the 

different kinds of experiments that we do to validate them. 

So, we work very hard at making sure that we maintain that 

independence, because it is so critical to this. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Yeah, I would just say I agree with what he said. 

And actually, your comment to me—I think there is other ways to 

deal with the issue without increasing the budget, but it really relies on having a strategy—a policy strategy for the country. 

Once we have that, I think we can work with the Congress and 

the Administration to come up with an approach to deal with the 

future that, you know, we can do with reasonable cost, but it really 

depends on what that policy direction looks like. 

And my plea was until we have that, let’s hang in there and not 

do anything too detrimental to the science until we get that sorted 

out. 

Mr. EVERETT. Well, we would surely look forward to those savings that—that Director D’Agostino said that are forthcoming. 

And for our two directors that I addressed the question to, I 

won’t take any further time here, but I would really appreciate any 

more specific detail on how you will continue to do that—not the 

fact that you talk to each other and that sort of thing. But thank 

you very much. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. We will be happy to get you something for the 

record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 199.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. If I could engage the ranking member for a second, what I heard Director D’Agostino say was not necessarily 

more money but more predictability. 

Mr. EVERETT. I think that is a fair assessment. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Everett. 

Mr. Franks of Arizona for five minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. I am not getting ahead of anyone here, am I, 

Madam Chair? 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well—— 

Mr. FRANKS. They have already asked questions? 

Ms. TAUSCHER [continuing]. Mr. Larsen—— 
33 

Mr. FRANKS. Okay. All right. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I guess I just first want to suggest that there is not too many 

nuclear physicists up here on the panel, and there may be some 

things about tritium and uranium and plutonium that we still have 

to learn. 

And those of you in the R&D field have done some amazing 

things, and I think that the fact that you are—have been able to 

certify our weapons here for this long, with the supercomputer capabilities and the modeling that you have done, is really nothing 

short of astonishing, in spite of some of the challenges that you 

have laid out here related to getting new recruits into the system. 

And of course, Mr. D’Agostino, your efforts to consolidate work 

and realize efficiencies as we do this transformation to a new complex—I have got to tell you, those are pretty tall orders, so I have 

got two questions, because I know some of you will answer both of 

them. 

How can we on this panel help you in your effort to maintain and 

gain the necessary personnel to do the amazing work that you do? 

I mean, this is a—you guys are the—I have said many times, you 

are the hidden, front line of freedom, because a lot of times people 

don’t see what you do, but it is vital to all of us. So, how can we 

help you with that? 

And secondarily, in terms of the efficiency—or inefficiencies, perhaps I should say, in the old complex that we are trying to transform here, what are the most glaring inefficiencies that you would 

postulate here, and how can we best facilitate or help you in the 

endeavor to correct some of those things? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Okay. I will start off, if I could, Mr. Franks, 

and open it up just a little bit. 

That is a great question. In fact, I think the subcommittee has 

started down the path by helping drive to a national consensus— 

the stability that the lab directors had talked about is actually vitally important. 

The workforce, whether it is federal or contractor workforce, does 

pay close attention. They want to know that the Nation values its 

work. They want to—and—because that is—that is their job. That 

is what motivates them. That is what drives them. 

So being the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, of course, is essentially what we are really talking about here. You are in absolutely 

the right position to send the signal that—that there is a consensus 

on what the Nation should be doing in these areas, and that there 

is a sense of stability, because it does come down to being able to 

bring in the right kind of people. 

We can have the best computers in the world, the best lasers in 

the world, the best experimental sites in the world, but ultimately 

in the end it comes down to getting those A-plus students in here 

to operate those facilities. 

And that is all based on stability, because people make decisions 

that way, as you know, sir. And so the path forward that we have 

right now, the evaluation of the—both Secretaries have sent up a 

classified document describing our security policy and strategy. 

We have got a—the bipartisan commission that is coming forward to take a look at strategic issues. Kind of the melding of those 
34 

two activities—and until we get a broader consensus that carries 

forward for both parties and spreads across, making sure that the 

support to the existing infrastructure, which we consider fragile at 

this point, is maintained. 

And so I appreciate the committee’s support in that area. 

I would ask, are there any other comments? Okay. No? 

Dr. HUNTER. If I could comment—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Sure. 

Dr. HUNTER [continuing]. Just very briefly, I think there are a 

couple areas that you have already begun nicely, Congressman. 

That is, first, to recognize the important—help us recognize the important role that the people and institutions play in this—in national security, and then, wherever possible, encourage and enable 

an objective, fact-based national debate about what needs to happen in terms of policy, as this committee has done so well. 

And then at every possible avenue, encourage the role that we 

might play in support of these broader national agenda themes, 

such as the competitiveness of our scientists and engineers and the 

role we must play in broader national security. 

Mr. FRANKS. Madam Chair, if I might just follow up. 

Then in terms of the greatest insufficient aspects or areas that 

you think our existing complex is falling short, and the areas that 

you hope to address in the transformation process here, what do 

you consider to be your most significant challenges? 

And is there a time—this is not a very fair question, because I 

know your mission, essentially, is to provide a responsive infrastructure that will give the arsenal of freedom a safer, more secure 

and more reliable weapons. 

That said, is there a time that we are approaching in the country 

to where, with the existing aging of the arsenal, that you feel like 

certification is going to be a significant problem? And what can we 

do to head that off in the days that we have now? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Okay. In the near term, I have got the list of 

typically half a dozen to a dozen items that I worry about all the 

time. And it kind of depends on which is number one at the particular time. 

But they are basically—the list is fairly consistent, and I will 

give you a couple of the things that worry me the most right now— 

and that is a sustainable plutonium strategy. I don’t think we—I 

know we are not on a path that provides sustainability. 

We have a plan to de-inventory Lawrence Livermore, which I 

think makes sense in the long run from a cost standpoint. And so 

we are starting to move plutonium out of Livermore. 

At the same time, I don’t have consensus—I will say Congress 

broadly, if you will, I mean, from an appropriations process, that 

this replacement capability at Los Alamos will get built. 

So at some point, either myself or the person that follows me in 

this job will have to decide, do we need to stop consolidating special 

nuclear material, because we don’t—we can’t get consensus to rebuild that plutonium capability at Los Alamos, and therefore I 

have got to go with my next best facility, and that is one in California. 

But that goes against some other things about what is right for— 

from a safety and security standpoint. So plutonium infrastructure 
35 

is one that kind of bubbles—is always in my top five at any given 

point in time. 

You are absolutely right on the continued aging of our stockpile. 

In an unclassified setting, I could—I can say that we—and the lab 

directors will comment on this specifically—but that, you know, 

things do age, and we do have problems that come up every year. 

And right now, we are able to address those, but there will—there 

may come a time that we don’t know if we will be able to address 

all of our problems. 

Right now, we can, and it is actually because of the support this 

committee has given over a number of years that has allowed us 

to bring in the tools and the people to make sure we can do that. 

Mike or George? 

Dr. MILLER. I would just step back to an earlier theme. My biggest concern is sustaining the investment in the science and technology infrastructure, because that underpins everything. 

You know, the people at these three laboratories provide the ability to make decisions about plutonium, or uranium, or facilities, or 

the stockpile. 

Now, that intellectual capability is the fundamental basis. Mike 

and I have both over the last 2 years lost over 2,000 people each. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Each. 

Dr. MILLER. Each. A substantial number of those are people with 

critical skills that are relevant Under Secretary D’Agostino’s mission. That infrastructure, as many infrastructures are, is fragile. 

And so that is my biggest concern, is sustaining that infrastructure because it is the underpinning of the country’s policy, whatever direction it chooses to go. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Could I just add to that, Madam Chairman? 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Yes. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. I agree with what George said completely that 

the premise of stockpile stewardship in the absence of nuclear testing to minimize our need ever to go back was to have a more fundamental science-based understanding to guide our insights and 

judgments. 

And what I fear is the trend, is to move away from that at the 

same time—and this is the part I would like to add—is that if you 

look at the stockpile—and we had a classified discussion with this 

subcommittee some months ago, and I think you got to see some 

of the specifics. 

But as time goes on, as these weapons systems age, as we go and 

act—take action to—to deal with those issues as they come, we are 

moving further and further away. We are making small changes 

that are accumulating. 

Even if we do Life Extension Programs, as that progresses forward, I worry that the stockpile legacy—Cold War stockpile we 

continue to try to refresh will be harder and harder for us, will require more and more science to be able to have that confidence 

when you have systems that were designed to be low-margin. 

And as our uncertainty about the changes we are making starts 

to grow over time and accumulates, I worry that we should be increasing the science focus in that kind of a world, and yet the trend 

feels as if we will be moving in the opposite direction. 
36 

And so it is the two things together, I think, that worry me the 

most. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you all very much. 

And thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I think Tom just wanted to say something quickly. 

Dr. HUNTER. Yes, and I will be very brief. Thank you, Madam 

Chairman. 

I don’t know if there is a time that is predictably, but I know 

there is an indicator of the time when we have passed the point 

when it is due, and that is when we have leadership in the laboratories who do not have the intellectual and intuitive sense about 

what it takes to honestly assess and certify weapons. They do not 

have the incentive or the value-base to make factual, objective 

opinions. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I think Mr. Reyes has some questions. 

Mr. REYES. Yes, just on a couple of issues. 

The first one, just to follow up on Dr. Hunter’s comment in terms 

of diversity and particularly, you know, in STEM fields—science, 

technology, engineering and math—which is a—has been a priority 

for Congress, I am one of the co-chairs of the Diversity Caucus that 

is working to facilitate programs and efforts to get more minorities 

into STEM. 

And I know, having had the opportunity to visit all the labs, that 

you work with historically black colleges (HBCs) and Hispanicserving institutions (HSIs). Are you doing—and this is for the directors—are you doing any more in—by way of outreach to the 

HBCs and HSIs to increase that? 

And second, we are probably going to have some hearings—the 

Tri-Caucus Group, the Asian-American, the Hispanic Caucus and 

the Black Caucus together—on how we can work on this issue. And 

we may ask you to come and testify. So we will be in touch. 

It probably won’t be this year because of the election year and— 

but we have that on the radar scope. 

The other question that I have is—deals with energy. And 

whether we are talking about nuclear, or getting better gas mileage, or whatever, are our labs doing anything in that area? 

And if you would answer, I would appreciate that. 

Dr. HUNTER. Thank you, Congressman. It is a very important 

question, but it gets back to this comment that all of us made earlier about the labs having this inherent science and engineering 

foundation that can contribute in other areas of national security, 

of which energy is a dominant one, I think. 

Yes, we are actively engaged in energy. We anticipate more programs in that area. We are working everything from the details of 

the combustion process and how to make cars more efficient and 

better environmentally compatible, to making engines work better, 

to using sunlight to helping nuclear energy be safe and secure and 

more proliferation-resistant—a broad range of programs. 

But these laboratories are uniquely positioned to contribute in 

many of those areas because of the skillbase that has been developed in nuclear weapons and applied to those other areas. 
37 

Dr. MILLER. Yeah, I think the answer to both of your questions 

is yes. We are continuously expanding our interactions with the 

historically black colleges and Hispanic colleges. 

We bring faculty to the labs for summer—for summer research, 

and so we have a very broad set of problems—projects and outreaches to a wide segment of the university community. 

And as Tom said, we have very, very broad programs in energy, 

again, using supercomputers to design more aerodynamically efficient trucks and cars, all the way to the use of the National Ignition Facility as a source of—as a source of energy, doing the research that would allow us to meet that promise, and essentially 

everything in between. 

So we have a lot of—today they are small programs because the 

government’s investment is typically small. They were very large 

in the 1970’s when there was an energy crisis. 

But the fundamental point is the one that Tom made, which is 

the underlying science and technology is ideally suited to take on 

these broader set of national issues. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. If I could add to those things, and then I would— 

I think Steve Younger has some comments, as well. 

On your first question about the diversity, yes, we are actively 

working with the historically black and Hispanic colleges. In northern New Mexico, we are also doing additional things, like our math 

and science academies as an example. 

We are trying to get to the students when they are younger to 

try to encourage them to consider math and science and engineering as a field. And so for me, a key is to try to get the teachers 

in the middle schools and high schools who teach science and math. 

We have them come—as an example, come to the lab and get engaged with our scientists and to try to get that passion and excitement about what modern science is like and help them come with 

modules that they can use in the classroom to teach students at 

whatever level they are teaching at. I think that is also a fruitful 

way—and again, in northern New Mexico we deal with a very diverse population and are trying to get them interested in these careers—a lot of scholarship programs, et cetera. 

Back to the other question about our participation, I agree with 

my colleagues on that. I would just add another thought, which is 

that I think these laboratories are rather unique in the country in 

another way. 

We have breadth and depth in science and engineering that is 

hard to find anywhere else. But we have one other thing—is we are 

institutions that span discovery, fundamental science, all the way 

through applied science to building demo products that can be 

transferred to industry. 

That full spectrum of activity goes on at these institutions, and 

they are—now that we don’t have a Bell Labs anymore and those 

kinds of places in industry, these are some of the few places left 

in the country that have that kind of capability. 

And so when you are thinking of these ideas of energy or other 

related kinds of things, not only do we have that breadth and 

depth of talent, but we know how to take discovery science and 

translate it all the way into a real product that American industry 

could go use for the advantage of the American people. 
38 

Dr. YOUNGER. Congressman, I created and continue to chair the 

Diversity Council, Nevada Test Site. It is interesting that very 

early on, we focused on education as the dominant concern of diversity. And we have taken a comprehensive approach, starting with 

elementary schools, building science labs in local schools that never 

had them, particularly in impoverished areas. 

We bring high school interns into the company to show them 

what it is like to have a technical job to interest them in going into 

a technical field. 

When they get to college, we provide a large scholarship program 

to the local community and also to the children of our employees. 

And we have also started an employee scholarship program focused on minorities that will help them get the education sometimes they haven’t been able to get because of their economic circumstances. 

We serve on advisory boards of black colleges and universities, 

and those with large Hispanic content. So we go everywhere, from 

kindergarten through graduate school, to encourage people to go 

into fields that are relevant to the national security—focus on. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Tom. 

Dr. HUNTER. Mr. Congressman, I didn’t mean to not respond to 

your other question about—I think your question was about minority engagement. I thought we had closed that topic, but let me just 

say, you ask a very important question. 

And my simple response would be that we are very aware of the 

situation nationally. We are very engaged in the national scene. We 

are doing a lot, but not enough, and we would be happy to support 

your efforts in a broader committee framework. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Under Secretary D’Agostino, thank you for your 

appearance today. 

And, gentlemen, thank you very much for your appearance today. 

Please extend, on behalf of the committee, our thanks to the thousands of people—patriotic, hard-working Americans—that work in 

the complex, our very best thanks, and tell them to continue their 

hard work, please. 

And behind you, many of you, are your staffs that have—that 

provide the committee and the members with constant support 

while you are back at your facilities. We want to thank them very 

much. We know that they had a lot to do with your appearances 

today and the great testimony we had. 

We have a second panel that we are about to see, so thank you 

again very much, Under Secretary. 

We are going to take a strategic pause to change out our folks, 

and if we could ask the second panel to come forward, please. 

Thank you very, very much. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, Madam Chair. I really appreciate 

it. Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Our pleasure. 

We are about to start our second panel. We thank the panel, the 

second panel, for their indulgence. 
39 

We had, as you know, a lot of people on the first panel. But we 

want to make sure that you understand how important we think 

you are, too. And we very much thank you for coming to testify before the committee. 

I want to welcome our expert witnesses on the second panel. We 

have Mr. Gene Aloise, Director of Natural Resources and Environmental Division of the General Accountability Office (GAO). 

My constituent and friend, Marylia Kelley, Executive Director of 

Tri-Valley CAREs. 

And Ambassador Paul Robinson, President Emeritus of the 

Sandia Corporation. 

As this panel demonstrates, the subcommittee is determined that 

our conversations about these critical national issues are inclusive 

and dynamic. 

Mr. Aloise, the floor is yours. We have your prepared statement, 

so we welcome any summary of your remarks that you might have. 

Mr. ALOISE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. The floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF GENE ALOISE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT DIVISION, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. ALOISE. Madam Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss the National 

Nuclear Security Administration’s plans to transform the Nation’s 

nuclear weapons complex. 

Over the past decade, NNSA has invested billions of dollars sustaining the Cold War nuclear weapons stockpile and maintaining 

the aging and outdated facilities that make up the nuclear weapons 

production infrastructure. 

Modernizing the complex to be more responsive to a smaller nuclear deterrent offers NNSA the potential to save billions of dollars 

by consolidating special nuclear material into fewer facilities and 

avoiding operations and maintenance (O&M) costs by vacating 

buildings that are well past their design life. 

Transforming the complex, however, will be a daunting and expensive task. Existing facilities that maintain the current stockpile 

must remain operational during the transition to new facilities. 

NNSA must also take steps to minimize the potential safety, security and environmental impacts of relocating operations and constructing new infrastructure. 

In the face of these challenges, we believe that there are four actions that are critical to successfully transforming the weapons 

complex. 

First, DOD will need to establish clear, long-term requirements 

that define the types and quantities of nuclear weapons needed in 

the stockpile. 

Second, after DOD establishes its requirements, NNSA will need 

to develop accurate estimates of the costs of transformation. 

Third, NNSA will need to develop and implement a transformation plan with measurable milestones. 

And fourth, NNSA’s Office of Transformation must have the authority to enforce its decisions and be held accountable for them. 
40 

With regard to clear requirements for the stockpile, in our view, 

before any plans for a new weapons complex can be finalized, DOD 

and NNSA must determine the number and types of warheads that 

are needed. 

While DOD and NNSA have considered a variety of scenarios for 

the future composition of the stockpile, including new warhead designs, a final decision on the size and composition of the future 

stockpile has not been made. 

With regard to cost estimates for transformation, our work shows 

that NNSA had difficulty developing realistic, defensible cost estimates, especially for large, complicated projects. 

For example, in March 2007 we reported that 8 of the 12 major 

construction projects DOE and NNSA were managing had experienced cost increases ranging from almost $80 million to $8 billion. 

These increases resulted largely from poor management and contractor oversight. 

Regarding a transformation plan, we do not yet know whether 

NNSA will decide to rebuild the complex at its existing sites or to 

consolidate operations at new locations. 

Regardless of its choice, however, NNSA will need to develop a 

plan with clear, specific and realistic milestones that it can use to 

evaluate progress and that the Congress can use to hold NNSA accountable. 

Finally, we have found that a key practice for successfully transforming an organization is to ensure that top leadership sets the 

direction, pace and tone for the transformation. 

Although NNSA has organized an Office of Transformation to 

oversee its efforts, it remains to be seen whether the office has sufficient authority to enforce its decisions. 

In conclusion, Madam Chairman, regardless of the approach chosen to modernize the weapons complex, any attempt to change such 

an extremely complicated enterprise must be based on solid analysis, careful planning and effective leadership. 

Tracking NNSA’s progress in these four critical actions that we 

have identified provides a framework for the Congress to continue 

its vigilant oversight and to hold NNSA accountable for its efforts. 

Madam Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions 

you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aloise can be found in the Appendix on page 120.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Aloise. 

Before I give the floor to Marylia Kelley, I would like to commend you for your leadership on the issues before us today. 

Additionally, you have been a tireless advocate for the former 

Department of Energy workers who seek compensation from the 

Government for the illnesses they contracted in the course of their 

service to the Nation. 

You are, frankly, a force of nature. And at home in Livermore, 

you are someone that I enjoy working with, and I really appreciate 

you being here. It has been a pleasure to work with you on the environmental and quality of life issues that you bring to the floor 

constantly on behalf of my constituents. 

The floor is yours. 
41 

STATEMENT OF MARYLIA KELLEY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

TRI-VALLEY CARES 

Ms. KELLEY. Thank you, Madam Chairperson, and thank you to 

the subcommittee for inviting me here. 

I am Marylia Kelley. As mentioned, I am executive director of 

the Livermore, California-based Tri-Valley CAREs and have been 

since the group was founded in 1983. 

I ask that my written testimony be entered into the record. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Without objection, so ordered. 

Ms. KELLEY. And I am going to attempt to summarize and excerpt here today. 

My testimony will focus on three areas. First, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Preferred Alternative for Complex 

Transformation. 

Second, a stockpile management alternative that will better assure the safety and reliability of the existing nuclear weapons 

stockpile at lower cost, reduced scientific risk and superior nonproliferation benefit. 

And third, some specific alternative and recommendations for the 

future of nuclear materials and specific sites. 

The NNSA has stated that Complex Transformation is the agency’s ‘‘vision for a smaller, safer, more secure and less expensive nuclear weapons complex.’’ 

Beneath the rhetoric, Complex Transformation calls for a significant revitalization of the nuclear weapons complex. The plan’s centerpieces include a new larger plutonium complex at the Los Alamos lab in New Mexico and a new Uranium Processing Facility at 

the Y–12 plant in Tennessee. 

According to the draft 2008 Programmatic Environmental Impact 

Statement (PEIS), Complex Transformation is based—based—on 

the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Yet Congress has already 

mandated that the next Administration prepare a new posture review. 

Thus, the NNSA’s plan, when it is completed will be dead on arrival, based on yesterday’s policy, not forward-looking vision. 

The NNSA calls its Complex Transformation plan ‘‘more secure.’’ 

But as I will discuss in the Livermore lab section that follows, this 

plan keeps thousands of pounds of plutonium and highly enriched 

uranium in a vulnerable, untenable situation at Livermore lab 

until 2012. 

Then NNSA proposes to move the plutonium twice in service of 

Complex Transformation. This is not a plan that appropriately 

prioritizes the security of nuclear materials. 

Finally, the NNSA insists that the plan will be less expensive. 

But as you heard in the previous round of questioning, they don’t 

have a cost estimate. And in fact, the Programmatic Environmental 

Impact Statement does not contain a cost estimate. Independent 

cost estimates begin at about $150 billion and go up from there. 

The NNSA has said that the Reliable Replacement Warhead program, or RRW, ‘‘will be the enabler for stockpile and infrastructure 

transformation.’’ Since Congress has prudently cut the RRW budget 

since then, the NNSA has begun submerging the role of RRW in 

Complex Transformation. 
42 

Make no mistake, however. The development of new and/or significantly modified nuclear weapons remains at the heart of the 

Complex Transformation approach, whether through RRW or a successor design program. 

The plan end-runs both the Commission that this subcommittee 

was instrumental in enabling through the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2008 and the aforementioned new Nuclear Posture Review coming up. 

The NNSA has received between 115,000 and 120,000 public 

comments, spoken comments, comment letters on the draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Complex Transformation. This outpouring of comments represents a public referendum against the Preferred Alternative. 

In sum, Complex Transformation is wrong policy, enabling new 

nuclear weapons programs that run counter to U.S. nonproliferation aims; wrong direction, building unneeded nuclear weapons facilities; wrong priorities, costing $150 billion or more, and failing 

to quickly secure the Nation’s most vulnerable nuclear materials; 

and wrong timing, putting the cart of new bomb-building capabilities before the horse of new policy and posture reviews. 

The public has roundly rejected this plan. Congress has cut funds 

for some of its aspects. And the NNSA tells me it will release the 

final PEIS and execute a record of decision this fall. That is also 

what you heard from Administrator D’Agostino. 

In so doing, the NNSA willfully ignores an alternative approach 

to managing the nuclear weapons stockpile that is technically, politically, environmentally and fiscally superior to the agency’s Preferred Alternative. 

So let me say a few words about curatorship. Curatorship focuses—it is an alternative. It focuses on careful surveillance, analysis and refurbishment of the actual weapons in the arsenal rather 

than pushing the envelope on new research and development, as is 

the case with the present Stockpile Stewardship Program and, to 

an even greater extent, the proposed RRW path. 

Under curatorship, only if NNSA’s surveillance activities demonstrate compelling evidence that a component had degraded or 

would soon degrade, and further analysis indicated that such degradation would cause significant loss of safety or reliability, would 

NNSA replace that affected part. 

The replacement would be remanufactured as closely as possible 

to the original design, so changes to weapons would be minimized 

using the curatorship approach. 

One significant outcome of curatorship is that less uncertainty 

would be introduced into the stockpile over time than is the case 

with the present RRW program—I am sorry, the present Stockpile 

Stewardship Program or with RRW. 

And you heard Los Alamos Lab Director Mike Anastasio say that 

he is worried that the incremental changes that are introduced into 

the weapons with stockpile stewardship over time may cause certification problems. Curatorship would minimize this by minimizing changes. 

The curatorship will reduce the NNSA’s environmental footprint 

and its operating costs. Under curatorship, NNSA would close numerous facilities that use high explosives, tritium and other haz-
43 

ardous materials beyond what is in the Complex Transformation 

Preferred Alternative. 

Curatorship would rein in costs. Right now, if you look at the annual budget, the NNSA spends about 50 percent of the Weapons 

Activities budget each year on R&D. Under curatorship, that would 

drop to about 20 percent. 

The curatorship approach to managing the nuclear weapons 

stockpile builds on an impressive lineage that I want this subcommittee to understand. 

It stands on basic concepts advocated by Norris Bradbury, who 

was the Los Alamos Lab Director from 1945 to 1970; Carson Mark, 

the former head of Los Alamos Lab’s Theoretical Division; Richard 

Garwin, former nuclear weapons designer and current JASON and 

occasional testifier before this and other committees; Ray Kidder, 

senior staff scientist and former weapons designer at Livermore 

lab, and others. 

In recent years, the curatorship approach has been further developed by Dr. Robert Civiak, who some of you know, because he was 

with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) until 1999. 

And it has also been evaluated recently by Livermore lab staff, 

including Dr. Roger Logan, who served as head of the lab’s stockpile work until recently. 

I would further ask that Tri-Valley CAREs’ much more detailed 

42-page comment on curatorship and Complex Transformation be 

entered into the record. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 156.] 

Ms. KELLEY. Thank you. 

I would like to quickly end with a sample of alternative approaches and recommendations for specific sites. And first, Livermore lab. 

As Madam Chairwoman knows, but maybe the rest of you don’t 

know, my community as well, the main site at Livermore sits on 

little more than one square mile, with homes and apartments, including my home, built right up to the fence line. Suburban neighborhoods lie only about 800 yards from the lab’s Superblock and 

thousands of pounds of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. 

Tri-Valley CAREs has long held concerns regarding the safety 

and security of nuclear materials at Livermore lab. This spring, the 

Department of Energy undertook a series of security drills at Livermore lab, including a force-on-force test, in which a tactical security team played the role of an attacking force in order to see how 

the lab’s security would respond. 

The mock terrorist team’s objective was to get to the nuclear material and hold the ground long enough to construct an improvised 

nuclear device. A second scenario involved the would-be attackers 

stealing plutonium for use at a later date. 

While NNSA has yet to respond to Tri-Valley CAREs’ Freedom 

of Information Act request for unclassified records regarding that 

security drill, the information we have gathered from multiple 

sources so far is that the mock terrorists succeeded in both of objectives. 
44 

Remember, you have got 10,000 people on one square mile—that 

the Livermore lab workforce and subcontractors—1,000 or so people across the street at Sandia, and thousands of us in the community right up to the fence line. Imagine what that means. 

Tri-Valley CAREs concludes that the plutonium and highly enriched uranium at Livermore lab is not secure, nor can it be made 

secure due to the compactness of the site, its 600 buildings that are 

cheek-to-jowl, and the close proximity of the densely populated 

neighborhood. 

We oppose the NNSA proposal to leave these materials at Livermore lab through 2012, as outlined in the draft Complex Transformation PEIS. 

Our colleagues at the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) 

have released a report that suggests they should get it out by—and 

can get it out by 2009. Our research shows early 2010 at the earliest in terms of safe packaging and removing that material. 

In addition to removing special nuclear material from the lab, 

any forward-looking plan for the future of the complex would conclude that there is no need to maintain two full-service nuclear 

weapons design labs. It is entirely feasible to transition Livermore 

lab to new missions. 

This is the path, in my organization’s view and in my own, and 

based on the numerous conversations I have had with Livermore 

lab folks, this is the true path to jobs and job security, is diversifying and changing the mission. 

Nonproliferation, research on global climate change, non-polluting renewable energy technologies and other science in the national interest would replace weapons R&D at Livermore. 

Livermore would maintain a small weapons footprint with about 

a two dozen select staff supporting curatorship, about the same 

number, about two dozen, providing that peer review that was discussed in the first panel on certification and doing certification 

tasks. 

The security costs would plummet. This is very necessary in 

making Livermore lab competitive in attracting research projects. 

My understanding is for every $100,000 FTE right now, it costs 

about $400,000 to $450,000. We need to reduce the security footprint in order to make Livermore lab a competitive place to do 

other science in the national interest. And I am convinced that that 

can be done. 

Next, very quickly, Los Alamos lab—Tri-Valley CAREs opposes 

Complex Transformation’s proposal to expand Plutonium Pit Production at Los Alamos lab from the current 20 pits per year to up 

to 80 plutonium bomb cores per year. And in this regard, we note 

that the proposed CMRR nuclear facility portion should not be 

built. If the Nation is doing curatorship for a declining arsenal, no 

additional capability is needed. So likewise, at Y–12, the Uranium 

Processing Facility should not be built. 

I want to conclude—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. You are really over time, so if you can conclude 

soon. 

Ms. KELLEY. Okay. I will conclude with a couple of sentences 

from my paragraph on the Kansas City Plant. 
45 

Here, the NNSA is poised to privatize a key part of the nuclear 

weapons complex which will circumvent the ability of Congress to 

authorize—this committee’s ability to authorize—and also Congress’ ability to appropriate funds. 

The plan is to build and operate a new Kansas City Plant under 

a leaseback arrangement. Alternatives were given short shrift. 

NNSA and the General Services Administration (GSA) have undertaken activities that appear to support a predetermined outcome, 

which is a violation of law. 

It also appears that they have violated the OMB antideficiency 

guidelines, and we ask that Congress ask the GAO to investigate 

the lease arrangement and agency actions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kelley can be found in the Appendix on page 133.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much. 

Ambassador Robinson, President Emeritus of the Sandia Laboratories, thank you so much for being with us again. You have appeared before the subcommittee many times. Your service to the 

American people is significant and very much appreciated. 

Your statement has been submitted for the record, and we would 

appreciate your summation of your statement, since we are about 

to have votes in about 15 minutes and we want to be able to get 

to questions. Thank you very much. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR C. PAUL ROBINSON, PRESIDENT 

EMERITUS OF SANDIA CORPORATION AND FORMER LABORATORIES DIRECTOR, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES 

Ambassador ROBINSON. Madam Chairman, let me just highlight, 

then, a couple of issues. I think we are all three here in agreement 

on one point, and that is the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review does not 

provide good guidance to move ahead with the complex reconfiguration. 

There are some fundamental flaws, I think, in what was done. 

A mixing of conventional forces and nuclear forces, which really 

don’t mix well, was made and it sort of froze our planners in place, 

worrying about how do we do that. 

Nuclear weapons and our deterrent force is something to prevent 

war, not to fight wars. And this confusion of a global strike needs 

to be reconsidered and get us back on the right course of preventing wars as the main reason for this complex. 

The time since I have retired, I have served on a number of government panels, including more in the DOD. I am currently serving 

on the Nuclear Command Control Comprehensive Review. I served 

on the Nuclear Capability Study, which Johnny Foster and General 

Welch chaired. And we had a lot to say then about problems both 

in DOD and DOE, but more in their integration or lack thereof, 

that I believe is a very, very serious issue for us to draw this complex together. It has always been a problem. It has been good at 

times. Then it wanders apart. But we are in a particularly bad disconnect between the agencies at the moment. 

I did want to say to this committee I was present, I believe, at 

the birth of the concept of RRW. And General Welch, who is the 

Chairman of the Strategic Advisory Group for the Commanders 
46 

Strategic Command, had challenged the lab directors at a meeting 

and said, ‘‘Look, we are in an interim state where we are all trying 

to see if we can develop stockpile stewardship so we would not 

have to test weapons, but there is no proof yet that that is going 

to work, and there is a safeguard on the table that says if we go 

into a future President and say, ‘Mr. President, we have got a serious problem with the stockpile, we have had to take systems off 

alert, we believe we are going to have to test to fix whatever problems have been discovered,’ ’’ he said, ‘‘Well, every President in the 

future—have to exist that you might be coming in next week with 

such a conversation.’’ 

And the challenge he then gave was, ‘‘What could you be doing 

now that could lessen that likelihood?’’ And that really began the 

thinking process to give birth to what is the Reliable Replacement 

Warhead concept. 

I was disappointed that there were discussions in the Congress 

saying, ‘‘Well, these people may be trying to do something to force 

nuclear testing.’’ I assure you, it was quite the opposite motivation. 

It is what can we do to forestall the date. 

And I believe the approach is a reasonable one—genetic diversity, so that nothing in one leg of the stockpile is likely to fail, that 

you would have to go in and request permission for a nuclear test. 

It is a very good strategy and one worthwhile for our Nation to be 

pursuing in these circumstances in which we are in today. 

The question of the Preferred Alternative—I said in my testimony I have mixed reaction. They have done some good things. It 

is certainly much improved over the plan of the Complex 2030, but 

still, without specific guidance that only the Defense Department 

can prepare in detail, what stockpile is it we are going to work 

with? 

And then, last place an emphasis on fixing problems that are 

going to arise in the stockpile, whatever we do, whether it is life 

extension, whether it is Reliable Replacement Warheads. These are 

the oldest components in our history of nuclear weapons, the very 

oldest today, and they are only going to continue to age. 

So what can we do to prepare ourselves in the best position? Our 

deterrent does remain the best insurance policy for this Nation 

against a major war, and I am concerned we have got to preserve 

it for the future. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Robinson can be found 

in the Appendix on page 141.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

I am going to reserve my time, and Mr. Larsen, who has not had 

a chance to ask some questions—I will yield him five minutes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

It is Aloise? 

Mr. ALOISE. Aloise, yes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Aloise. Mr. Aloise, your fourth point in the GAO 

study regarding successful transformation requires a strong Office 

of Transformation. Did you make a determination about whether 

NNSA needs an Office of Transformation at all in order to implement any of these changes? 
47 

Mr. ALOISE. Well, yeah, our thinking is we believe it does, but 

our recommendation was that it report directly to the Administrator. Right now, it reports to the Office of Defense. 

Mr. LARSEN. Office of—— 

Mr. ALOISE. Defense Programs. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. DP. 

Mr. LARSEN. DP. 

Mr. ALOISE. And our thinking was it would have to have the authority and the support of the organization to be worthwhile, the 

authority to make decisions and the authority—and the responsibility to be accountable for those decisions. 

Mr. LARSEN. The office itself? 

Mr. ALOISE. Yes. 

Mr. LARSEN. And it currently does not? 

Mr. ALOISE. It remains to be seen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Can you explain that? 

Mr. ALOISE. Well, it doesn’t report directly to the Administrator, 

so once it starts making decisions, we will have to take a look at 

that. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. And it does seem a difficult thing so long as 

policymakers and us in Congress and the Administration, presumably the future Administration—we haven’t set long-term requirements for the weapons stockpile. 

And so I understand the debate we are having here about either 

going the wrong way, as Ms. Kelley has suggested, or getting it 

half right, perhaps, as Ambassador Robinson has suggested. Until 

we decide what we want for a stockpile, it makes it difficult. 

Ms. Kelley, I didn’t gather from your testimony, though, what 

specific comments you had with regards to the sprawling complex 

that we have now. You just said—well, I don’t want to characterize 

it as all negative. 

But it sounded to me like your views, and your group’s views on 

where they are headed was all negative, but none of the issues you 

brought up had to do with the issue that—part of the issue we 

have is consolidating facilities so that we are not spending money 

on things we are not using or to be best—money can be better 

spent if we had things closer together. 

Can you address that issue? 

Ms. KELLEY. Certainly. One of the things I was trying to get 

across, and it was difficult with excerpting, is that if the Nation 

were to go to a strategy that was closer to curatorship, that you 

could have actually much more consolidation than you have with 

the Preferred Alternative under Complex Transformation. 

The Preferred Alternative under Complex Transformation has 

significant numbers of new facilities, and I talked specifically about 

the—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Ms. KELLEY [continuing]. CMRR nuclear facility portion in particular and the Uranium Processing Facility. 

So my group challenges the idea that you actually need to build 

these new facilities with all kinds of flexibility, which you heard in 

the first panel—too expensive, and if you are curating the existing 
48 

arsenal and you are going down in the arsenal numbers, they are 

not needed. 

We certainly do not propose leaving the entire complex, as it now 

exists, in place. So there is a certain starting point agreement that 

we have with, say, Tom D’Agostino. 

But in the name of consolidating, they are moving from eight 

NNSA sites to eight NNSA sites once this is fully implemented. 

You still have eight sites. You have plutonium at a couple less 

sites. You have new facilities. So we are suggesting it is not really 

the consolidation that the country needs. We need a much 

more—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Well, I guess I would also say, moving from eight 

sites to eight sites doesn’t mean there hasn’t been consolidation. It 

is probably not a fair assessment of consolidation. 

If there are eight smaller sites, or five smaller sites within that 

eight, and—and the—and the facilities on those sites are smaller 

as well, it seems to be moving toward consolidation. I would be 

careful about comparing eight to eight. 

Ms. KELLEY. And we think that—that you could get more consolidation if, for example, the Livermore mission could—could 

change—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Change outright. 

Ms. KELLEY [continuing]. Could change outright, although we 

would retain that peer review. We would retain a curatorship force 

of a couple dozen specialists and also—— 

Mr. LARSEN. With the—I am sorry. 

Ms. KELLEY [continuing]. A certification force. 

Mr. LARSEN. With the short time I have left, Ambassador Robinson, can you give me some perspective that you have on consolidation and the curatorship idea? 

Ambassador ROBINSON. Well, the program that was started in 

the early 1990’s with the proposal to go under a test-ban moratorium—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Ambassador ROBINSON [continuing]. Science was at its core. It 

was science-based stockpile stewardship. There are a number of 

things that are empirical in nuclear weapons. 

We do not have an adequate explanation to be able to depend 

upon large supercomputers and modeling codes. And everyone dedicated themselves to trying to develop that science understanding. 

The curatorship approach would throw that out and say, ‘‘Well, 

we just won’t worry about whether we understand it or not. We 

will just try the best we can do to not make any changes and hope 

for the best.’’ I don’t think that is the right approach. 

I think that is not likely to lead to a suitable outcome and make 

it more likely that we would have doubts in our strategic deterrent 

force and more likely that we would be requesting the ability to 

test to prove out the force. 

Mr. LARSEN. Just quickly, Mr. Aloise, in conclusion, have you 

looked at—were you responsible at all for looking at any of the alternatives that NNSA looked at as they prepared their—their impact statement? 

Mr. ALOISE. No, sir, we didn’t. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. All right. 
49 

Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. Everett. 

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Ms. Chairman. 

Dr. Robinson, the military has a—in the world that we live in, 

in the foreseeable future, with almost every country we know getting involved in nuclear weapons, and with many of our allies such 

as Britain, France, others like China, the military continues to 

need a—have a requirement for a more responsive infrastructure 

with more reliable, safe and secure weapons, I believe. 

Let me ask you, if we would like to do something about bringing 

down the stockpile even further—we have done a good job for the 

Moscow Treaty. And if we would like to get to the hedge weapon, 

would it not make sense that we—and I don’t want to put words 

in your mouth. I am asking you the question. 

Would it make sense for us to continue down the path of RRW 

that does—absolutely does not increase yield or anything like that, 

that guarantees a safe weapon? 

Would the military—they don’t want to give up those hedge 

weapons right now, and I can understand why. But if they had 

something like RRW, would this not be a way to further reduce the 

stockpile of hedge weapons? 

Ambassador ROBINSON. I believe that was our intent from the 

first, yes, sir. 

I should have probably added, I had the bitter experience when 

I headed the nuclear weapons program at Los Alamos early in my 

career—I had to make such a call to the commander of then Strategic Air Command to take a certain class of weapons off-alert and 

targeting because of a serious problem that had been uncovered. I 

remember every second of that day and relive it—would not like to 

relive it again. 

We need some alternatives that we can have confidence that we 

are not betting our country on a system we can’t be sure of. I believe having a variety of designs will instill confidence to make 

sure we aren’t taking a full deterrent force off-alert. 

I do have problems about the strategy besides the 2001 Nuclear 

Posture Review. The weapons we developed were for a different 

time and place. The yields of most of our weapons are so high 

today that we are self-deterred from even considering their use. 

And so some of the things you can do with a RRW program—and 

we have done it with the existing weapon force in the past with 

secondaries—is go to lower yields, more appropriate to deter some 

of the rogue states which are now becoming nuclear. 

I think the Cold War stockpile is incredible to consider as a deterrent force for that. But we can do that without having to do nuclear tests. You can go lower in yield. You just can’t go higher. 

Mr. EVERETT. Finally, just a comment. I do worry about the 

rogue states. I also worry about the non-actor—non-actor 

states—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Non-state actors? 

Mr. EVERETT [continuing]. Terrorists, especially when we get to 

a point where we get launch vehicles such as the ones SpaceX is 

working on that—for $7 million to $10 million, and which can 

reach low orbit with a nuclear weapon and destroy basically an 
50 

awful lot that this—the United States in particular depends on 

more than any other country, both—not our—not only our military 

but our economy also. 

I do worry about that, as well as rogue states. And I will have 

some questions for the record. 

Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Everett. 

Mr. Aloise, thank you for your great work. We really appreciate 

it. If one assumes a relatively flat budget line for the NNSA Weapons Activities, are the NNSA’s Complex Transformation plans affordable and executable? 

Mr. ALOISE. Well, if you look at the Preferred Alternative—we 

look at that basically as modernization in place. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Right. 

Mr. ALOISE. And the first thing they are going to have to do is 

get their stockpile requirements. They are going to have to know— 

NNSA has to know what it needs to right-size to before it does anything. 

While it is doing that, it has to maintain the current complex. 

And if there are cost increases and schedule delays in the Life Extension Program, like there has been in the past, that is going to 

affect funding in the future. 

And there are red flags already with the CMRR and the UPF. 

Two years ago when I testified on this subject, it was—the CMRR 

estimate was $840 million. Today, it is $2 billion. We don’t have 

any confidence in those estimates. 

The UPF ranges from $1.4 billion to $3.5 billion. We don’t have 

any confidence in those estimates. So, the NNSA has to come up 

with good, supportable, verifiable cost estimates based on a—stockpile numbers. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I appreciate that. 

Ambassador Robinson, in your statement you state that the primary purpose for nuclear weapons must be for deterring conflicts, 

while the purpose of conventional forces is fighting. I agree with 

that. 

If the mission of the nuclear weapons is limited to deterrence— 

and I agree with it—do you see opportunities to reduce the number 

of deployed weapons below the level specified by the Moscow Treaty? And do you have any idea what those constraints might be? 

Ambassador ROBINSON. The Moscow Treaty only limits a particular class of weapons, and there was a new counting rule put 

into place that strategically deployed systems, or systems that are 

not on alert, and the full class of tactical nuclear weapons, which 

are very, very large—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Very large. 

Ambassador ROBINSON [continuing]. In Russia, are not covered. 

I think we need to look at the whole counting scheme in your question, and we have not done that yet. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I agree with you. 

Ms. Kelley, in your testimony you stated, ‘‘Under curatorship, 

only if the NNSA’s surveillance activities demonstrated compelling 

evidence that a component had degraded or could soon degrade, 

and further analysis indicated that such degradation could cause a 

significant loss of safety or reliability would NNSA replace the af-
51 

fected part. The replacement would be remanufactured as close to 

the original design as possible.’’ 

That sounds like the Life Extension Program to me. If you don’t 

think it is the Life Extension Program, what do you think curatorship is, and why isn’t it the Life Extension Program? 

Ms. KELLEY. We believe that curatorship is the Life Extension 

Program as it should be, not as it presently is. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Tell me the difference. 

Ms. KELLEY. Yes. And I want to start by showing—and I realize 

it is pretty difficult from here—a view graph. This is from the 

Sandia stockpile life study. The curatorship really depends, at its 

heart, on a really good program. 

You said what do I like—a really good program that is 

headquartered at Sandia, Albuquerque, at Livermore, Los Alamos, 

and Pantex also participate in the DOE surveillance and evaluation program, or now NNSA surveillance and evaluation program. 

And this is 30 years worth of actual experience with U.S. nuclear 

weapons in the stockpile. And it shows without a doubt that the 

most problems—and they are called ‘‘actionable defects’’—that is 

the lingo—which are the ones that could impact safety or reliability, and so you do go out and fix them—that you get between 

61 and 29 of them the first 3 years. 

So, any time you make a significant change or put a new design 

in the arsenal, you have to fix a lot of things, because mostly these 

are design flaws or production flaws and not sort of aging flaws. 

And then as the arsenal ages, you are talking about one to seven, 

one to nine per year. And you notice after 30 years, it is not a bathtub curve going back up—so that curatorship would really depend 

much more heavily than the Stockpile Stewardship Program does— 

it includes it but doesn’t really depend on it heavily—the surveillance and evaluation program. 

And it would do the actionable defects. It would—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I still don’t understand. 

Ms. KELLEY. Okay. So—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. The only time a weapon is—is tinkered with, so 

to speak, is when there is something wrong with it. 

Ms. KELLEY. And—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. So if there is only—so you are effectively changing the name. You are saying your program is called curatorship. 

We are saying we have got that. It is called lifetime—Life Extension Program. 

Ms. KELLEY. Okay. And—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. But I don’t understand what—it seems to me you 

are suggesting that life extension—I don’t want to put words in 

your mouth, but it seems you are suggesting that life extension 

does more than what you are characterization curatorship does, 

and what I am telling you is your curatorship is life extension. 

Ms. KELLEY. Administrator D’Agostino sort of briefly, in his answer in the first panel said that there are times when new parts 

are put into a warhead because we are taking advantage of advances in certain kinds of technologies. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What he said was—— 

Ms. KELLEY. And he—— 
52 

Ms. TAUSCHER [continuing]. Because we don’t make vacuum 

tubes anymore—— 

Ms. KELLEY. Yes. 

Ms. TAUSCHER [continuing]. Because we don’t, you know—— 

Ms. KELLEY. And under curatorship you would—you would sort 

of hew to the design—the original design more closely. For example, in the unclassified literature for the W76—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. So you are suggesting that you would keep vacuum tubes in a weapon system. 

Ms. KELLEY. Or you would do something that would—that would 

hew more closely to the original design, for example. In the unclassified literature—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. So answer this question. Vacuum tubes—unavailable. What do you—and so you are going to take them out. 

Ms. KELLEY. And so you are going to look at that and you are 

either going to do vacuum tubes or something more like it. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Can’t get vacuum tubes. 

Ms. KELLEY. In the W76, the unclassified literature suggests that 

they are changing the height of burst. So he said it doesn’t—that 

they are not changing the yield, and that may be, but there are significant changes that are—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. But that is not a performance criteria. That does 

not change the performance of the weapon. It is something that is 

an effect of having to put new machinery in because what is in 

there is obsolete, not available, not reliable, can’t find it, you know, 

whatever. 

Ms. KELLEY. And what I am trying to say is that in the name 

of doing that there are changes that do not need to be made to 

weapons systems as they go through the Life Extension Program. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. But I think that that—— 

Ms. KELLEY. And that curatorship would—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. But that is a mistake. To assert that there are 

things being done to these weapons that are not responsive to some 

obsolescence of a part, some degradation of a part, some question 

of its performance I think is wrong, because that is not what Life 

Extension Programs do. 

And keeping in mind that the fences around life extension are 

pretty enormous—no change to the mission, no change to the platform, no change to the yield, no change to the constitution of the 

weapon—i.e., no change of performance. 

So life extension can’t be—cannot be asserted by anybody to be 

a program that enhances the performance of the weapon. That is 

not what it does. It enhances the reliability of the weapon. 

Ms. KELLEY. I think that if—if you think that changing the 

height of burst of a weapon isn’t changing its performance, that 

that is—you know, it is difficult to talk about these issues, but that 

is debatable. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, let me ask Dr. Robinson, hypothetically. 

Ambassador ROBINSON. Height of burst is something the military 

controls, and it is completely within their control at all times and 

always was. So, it is not an inherent part of the weapon. And we 

haven’t changed the height of burst spectrum. It was all available. 

It is still available today. 
53 

As I listen to this conversation, one of the things that I think 

could help enrich it is the fact that a modern U.S. weapon, nuclear 

weapon, has about the same number of parts as a new Toyota, 

about 3,800—3,800 parts. I can’t give you the exact number here, 

but it is something under 50 parts are with the nuclear system 

itself, the so-called physics package, and the rest are all Sandia responsibilities for the maintenance, the non-nuclear package, the 

arming, fusing, firing and an enormous—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Radar. 

Ambassador ROBINSON [continuing]. Plethora of safety devices to 

make sure they never go off in an accident. 

We do test all of those other parts than the nuclear parts, and 

that is why most of the actions are taken, is when we see a problem we do, indeed, fix it. And that is the bulk of the work that goes 

on in life extension. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. But life extension inherently is not performance 

enhancement. 

Ambassador ROBINSON. Correct. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. It is reliability assurance. 

Ambassador ROBINSON. And safety assurance, yes. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Right. Okay. 

And that is, I think—I think that is an issue where we should— 

we should try to find congruence. You know, I think that what you 

are proposing as curatorship is life extension. 

And I think that if we could agree on that, then there are lots 

of other things where we could work, certainly on removing plutonium and things, where this subcommittee has worked significantly to accelerate, to add money, to make demands and move the 

plutonium, for example, out of Livermore. 

We could work significantly on that. But I don’t think it is productive for us to take life extension, which is the most enormously 

successful program that we have had to maintain the deterrence of 

our nuclear weapons, which is still part of the military requirement 

of this country, as of now and probably into the not-too-distant future, and—and quibble around the edges of it, when I think that 

there is a lot of work that really needs your energy and your attention. 

Ms. KELLEY. Well, part of the difference in the two approaches 

is the—is that the science-based stockpile stewardship approach 

places such a premium on pushing the envelope of nuclear weapons 

science, and curatorship—I mean, we actually said, ‘‘Well, what 

does the weapon need?’’ We understand what the weapons scientists want. What does the weapon need? 

And it is a program that tries to look at that issue, and so that 

you get a program that is based more on the test data, more on 

modeling that has to do with conformance to the test data. It is 

much more focused on the weapons themselves. 

And that distinction, when you play it out in terms of—of what 

kind of new facilities or modernized facilities has an impact. So we 

are not trying to come up with a program that has a different moniker for the same thing. 

We are really trying to look more narrowly at what the weapon 

needs to maintain the existing safety and reliability, to maintain 

it as close as possible to the warhead that was fully tested in Ne-
54 

vada as a method for ensuring that we don’t return to nuclear testing, so you don’t lock the weapons away and also lock the codes 

away, and potentially get into a situation some years down the 

road where they are a bit bollixed up. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, I would join with my comments—with the 

comments of my esteemed and distinguished ranking member that 

he was teasing out of Ambassador Robinson. I think that you have 

to take this to its natural conclusion. 

When we have this military requirement, when we have the moratorium, which I certainly support—I would be supportive of the 

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) being ratified. 

Ms. KELLEY. Right. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Probably not going to happen any time soon. 

But while we have these weapons, and while we are taking them 

down—and I think we are doing a lot of good work in dismantling 

them. We have issues about tactical and what are we going to do 

with the Moscow Treaty. 

While we have this military requirement, and we have this deterrent strategy, which I support, you have to have weapons that 

the military is going to believe are going to do their mission. 

If you are not going to have a science-based program that extends their life while at the same time not enhancing performance, 

but does what we believe stockpile stewardship does, what concerns me is that what you are proposing looks more like a hospice 

program than it does keeping their life going. 

And what worries me is that you are going to find that you are 

going to have a military that stands up and says, ‘‘You better test.’’ 

And that is not where we want to go. 

Ms. KELLEY. And I am worried—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. So there is a sweet spot—there is a sweet spot 

here that—that I think we are trying to find, and once again, I encourage your work. I encourage you to consider, you know, pushing 

the envelope. 

But I think that—I am not sure it is productive, as some of the 

other things that you have done, to quibble about curatorship 

versus life extension, when life extension is the gold standard. 

Right now, we are concerned about in the next generation that 

we are going to be able to maintain without testing, but it has 

worked for a very long time. It is, I think, where most people want 

to be until we make a decision we don’t need weapons. 

We are not going to unilaterally disarm in a multilateral world 

where weapons are proliferating, but I think—I think that this is, 

once again, a very important conversation. 

We have got votes. I apologize that we are going to have to close 

the hearing. Thank you so much for coming. Thank you very much 

for your service. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

Ms. KELLEY. Thank you. I am honored that you invited me, and 

thank you very much. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Of course. Of course. Thank you. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JULY 17, 2008 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 17, 2008 

(59) 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 17, 2008 

(151) 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
172 
173 
174 
175 
176 
177 
178 
179 
180 
181 
182 
183 
184 
185 
186 
187 
188 
189 
190 
191 
192 
193 
194 
195 
196 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JULY 17, 2008 

(199) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The NNSA has not completed a review of what the sites in the 

Complex will need for personnel in five years, but we will have a clearer picture 

after the findings from the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of 

the United States (Section 1062 of the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act) 

are reported, as well as from the FY 2009 Nuclear Posture Review (Section 1070 

of the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act). Based on an assumption of 

steady state requirements, we can make some rough projections about the needs of 

the Complex in five years. We have projections from the sites: 

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) expects about 625 career employee scientist and engineer terminations in the next five years. The number of expected career employee new hires or conversions from pos-doc or limited term positions is 

500. LANL expects to lose about 625 career employee scientist and engineer terminations in the next five years. LANL has historically relied largely on postdocs for 

many of its hires. However, the number of post-doc applications selected for consideration in 2003 was 279, competed with 175 in 2008, a significant decline due to 

budget constraints. From 2006 to 2008, the percentage of LANL post-docs who were 

U.S. citizens has been steady at 39%, compared with 52% in 2000, a significant decline. 

Lawrence-Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has over 6,400 employees of 

which more than 2750 are scientists and engineers. The laboratory expects 1007 career employee scientist and engineer separations in the next five years and a like 

number of hires LLNL’s post-doc population has remained constant from 2004 

through 2000. However rates of conversion to permanent employees dropped from 

an average of 22 percent in 2004 to 3.8 percent in 2008. Almost seventy percent of 

the post-docs are U.S. citizens. Over 75 percent of LLNL’s scientists and engineers 

have a master’s degree or higher, with 50 percent having a PhD. 

Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) projects from a total of almost 4000 scientists 

and engineers a total attrition of approximately 950 scientists and engineers over 

the next five years. The hiring estimate is 150-200 technical staff per year, or 750 

to 1000 engineers and scientists over a five year period. Of these, 40% will have 

PhDs, 35% masters, and 20% bachelors and other degrees. For both attrition and 

hiring, Sandia’s California site is projected to account for 13%. The total number 

of Sandia’s employees is greater than 8400. 

National Security Technologies (NSTec) reports the Nevada Test Site currently 

has 450 scientists and engineers and estimates attrition of 175 and hiring of 200 

over the next five years. One fourth of the engineers have a master’s or PhD, as 

do half of the scientists. 

The Kansas City Plant expects to lose 300 technical workers out of a total of 648 

in the next five years and plans to replace 80-100% (240-300). Most are expected 

to be bachelor-degreed engineers, a third masters, and a few PhDs. 

The Pantex Plant has 524 scientists and engineers and anticipates a 6% annual 

attrition for the next five years. To maintain a static technical workforce, 157 scientists and engineers with bachelors or masters degree must be hired over that period. 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. EVERETT 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The NNSA has diligently worked over the past two years performing technical reviews and business case analyses of transformation alternatives. 

The business case analyses covered costs, risks, and benefits of each major alternative. These studies also included life cycle costs of alternatives; costs of decommissioning, deactivation, and decontamination of closure sites and facilities; and cash 

flow analyses. The selected preferred alternative in the Draft Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (SPEIS) 

was typically the lowest cost and lowest risk option based on both our internal and 

independent business case analyses. These business case analyses were made available for public review on the web at http://www.complextransformationspeis.com in 
200 

January 2008. Updated business case studies will be made available with the Final 

SPEIS. 

In our business case and environmental analyses for each major modernization alternative, an internal Integrated Project Team (IPT) was established to perform a 

business case analysis. Typically, this work proceeded in parallel with an evaluation 

by a non-NNSA independent review team. We evaluated consolidation options that 

could have resulted in closure of up to two major sites (Pantex in Texas and Y–12 

in Tennessee). However, we did not select these consolidation options because extensive internal and independent analyses indicated that of higher lifecycle costs and 

higher risks for time periods extending through 2060. For example, the Department 

of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group reported to me in a January 10, 2008 memo that a ‘‘Consolidated Nuclear Production 

Center (CNPC) proposal is less cost effective than modernizing the existing nuclear 

weapon production facilities.’’ [See page 15.] 

Dr. MILLER. Great care must be taken during the anticipated transformation activities to ensure that foundation of our confidence in the stockpile, achieved 

through the independent scientific approaches to identifying and resolving issues offered by two-Laboratory competition, be sustained and nurtured. Pursuing efficiencies such as a single simulation code system for both Laboratories or dictating 

common approaches to solving complex problems would destroy this foundation. 

Similarly, eliminating Livermore’s expertise in a basic material like plutonium 

would cripple the peer review process. Appropriate consolidation of facilities is a 

valid and important step; however, consolidating expertise would create unacceptable risks. A more general concern is that during complex transformation the 

foundational science and technology of the Laboratories will be squeezed out by the 

large capital investments required for transformation and the work required to 

maintain the existing stockpile. The planned reduction of the Laboratories capabilities by an additional 20 to 30% is a cause for great concern. 

The United States has maintained confidence in the safety, security, and performance of its nuclear deterrent through a scientifically competitive process involving 

Los Alamos and Livermore for over 50 years. This process of managed competition, 

collaboration, and peer review has been essential because it has never been possible 

to fully test the nuclear explosive package in all of its delivery configurations and 

anticipated environments. With the current restrictions on any nuclear testing and 

the potential for ratification of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, this process, which provides the government with independent, expert advice on questions 

of national importance is more essential than ever. 

At its core, this process relies on having truly independent experts—trained people with experimental capabilities and computational simulation codes—who have 

the tools to do independent, hands-on work on particular issues and provide that 

independent scientific judgment to the government. Historically, this independent 

expertise was developed through the design, engineering, production, and maintenance of separate systems that made up the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Each Laboratory 

has its own process, culture, and organization for addressing stockpile challenges. 

These dissimilarities led to truly independent scientific approaches and continue to 

provide critical ‘‘checks and balances’’ in the process of maintaining the nation’s 

stockpile. The cooperative competition between LANL and LLNL has yielded different approaches that gave us different weapons, new technologies, and solutions 

to difficult challenges. Examples of these are the modern, nuclear-safe, small weapon architectures; insensitive high explosives; fire safe designs and materials, and 

modern security features including active protection systems and permissive action 

links. The two laboratories have developed different specializations, resulting in unexpected discoveries, faster troubleshooting of problems, and cost savings. 

Today’s system of peer review proceeds at several levels. 

• Each Laboratory retains responsibility for part of the overall stockpile: LANL 

has responsibility for the B61, W76, W78, and W88. LLNL has responsibility 

for the W62, W80, B83, W84, and W87. During the Annual Assessment process each Laboratory does extensive experiments, evaluations, and calculation 

of the systems for which it is responsible. Within each Laboratory, ‘‘red 

teams’’ review the results of this analysis and provide comments to the Director. The other Laboratory also provides comments based on its expertise, but 

generally a Laboratory without primary responsibility does not provide any 

significant calculations, experiments, or evaluations to the other Laboratory. 

Based on the work done by his own Laboratory and the comments from the 

‘‘red team’’ and the other Laboratory, the responsible Laboratory Director provides his annual assessment. 
201 

• Frequently, when there is a particularly complicated or important Significant 

Finding or manufacturing issue, both Laboratories provide independent assessments based on extensive analysis, experimentation, and calculations. For 

example, assessment of the aging effects in plutonium received this level of 

peer review. 

• Sometimes both Laboratories do extensive analysis, experimentation, calculations, and evaluations of an entire system and provide independent input to 

the government. The W76 Dual Revalidation and the competition for the Reliable Replacement Warhead proceeded along this line. 

The current Annual Assessment process could be significantly strengthened by requiring that each Laboratory do an extensive evaluation—including independent 

calculations and experiments—of the entire U.S. nuclear stockpile. Each Laboratory’s stockpile evaluation would be provided to the responsible Laboratory Director 

for inclusion in his annual assessment of the systems for which he is responsible. 

I believe that adding this more comprehensive peer review process is the single 

most important action that we could take to improve confidence in the nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing. [See page 33.] 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The ability of the United States to sustain a safe, secure and reliable stockpile in the absence of testing rests on the ability of the 2 physics laboratories—Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore—to carry out a comprehensive suite of 

experimental, analytical and computational activities that provide data needed by 

scientists and engineers to determine the overall health of the stockpile. These judgments however must be subject to a robust peer review process. The challenge will 

be to conduct technically credible inter-laboratory peer review. 

The experimental, computational and analytical tools that have evolved with the 

maturation of the Stockpile Stewardship Program are the same tools that are essential to the future conduct of technically credible inter-laboratory peer review. Simple 

reviews of data, technical reports and subject matter expert analyses do not constitute the type of inter-laboratory peer review that is needed to sustain confidence 

in the stockpile in the future. A Laboratory conducting peer review must be able 

to conduct its own experiments, simulate nuclear processes using its own codes and 

models and complete its own analysis of the results unconstrained by the perspectives of the other Laboratory. This will not be easy nor inexpensive, but I believe 

it is the prudent course for the Nation. 

NNSA’s proposal to transform the complex has 4 fundamental objectives: Advance 

the science and technology base that is the cornerstone for long-term national security—nuclear deterrent, nonproliferation, counter terrorism and energy; transform 

the nuclear deterrent-smaller, safer, more secure, reliable without underground nuclear testing; transform to a modernized, cost-effective Complex; and create an integrated, interdependent enterprise that employs best business practices to maximize 

efficiency and minimize costs. NNSA’s proposal creates several centers of excellence 

that directly impact on the ability of the two physics laboratories to carry out their 

challenging peer review functions. Specifically, both Los Alamos and Lawrence 

Livermore are designated as centers of Excellence for Nuclear Design and Engineering; and Supercomputing. 

This consolidation must be accomplished carefully and thoughtfully to avoid unacceptable risk to the Stockpile Stewardship Program and, derivatively, the ability of 

the Laboratories to conduct technically credible inter-laboratory peer review. 

It is critical that the current and anticipated tools of stockpile stewardship are 

available to both Laboratories to enable inter-laboratory peer review. These tools include the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility, the National Ignition Facility (NIF), the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement 

(CMRR) project, Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE), the Los Alamos 

Plutonium Facility, the Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF), supercomputing capabilities (Blue Gene and Road Runner) commensurate with the scale of 

issues that will have to be addressed and the many smaller but no less important 

experimental and analytical capabilities at the Laboratories. And, above all else, 

motivated scientists and engineers will have to be recruited, trained and given challenging, meaningful work to preserve our ability to conduct technically credible 

inter-laboratory peer review. 

Finally, a new approach to inter-laboratory peer review is needed. Director Miller 

and I agree that each Laboratory must provide the necessary teclmical transparency 

that would enable continuous inter-laboratory peer review of each nuclear warhead. 

This fundamentally alters the classic inter-laboratory peer review process, which 

was executed to assess discrete events or decisions. Implementation of such an approach will require leadership, additional resources and careful management, and 
202 

is essential to sustain our long term confidence in the United States’ nuclear deterrent. [See page 33.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SPRATT 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Currently, there are eight facilities within the list of 600 Assets 

which are considered process contaminated and have been proposed for transfer to 

DOE Environmental Management (EM). The eight facilities are located at the Y12 National Security Complex and some of them are still operational. Six of the 

eight facilities have been proposed for transfer within the next five years while the 

remaining two are available for transfer after 2014. 

There are approximately six to eight additional operating facilities in the list of 

600 Assets that are potentially process contaminated. As the plans for transformation of the complex mature and the facilities declared excess become more defined, the facilities will be characterized to determine contamination and scheduled 

for disposition. [See page 19.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 17, 2008 

(205) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Why did NNSA reject the concept of a Consolidated Nuclear Production Center (CNPC), such as proposed in the 2005 SEAB report? If funding were 

not a limiting factor, would that be the preferred option? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. NNSA did not select a Consolidated Nuclear Production Center 

(CNPC) because extensive internal and independent analyses indicated the concept 

of a CNPC as proposed in the 2005 Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB) report was both a higher cost and higher risk approach. The SEAB task force underestimated three important factors: (1) the cost of replacement facilities at a new site, 

(2) the value of infrastructure at existing sites that would have to be replicated at 

a new site, and (3) the cost of transitioning operations to a new site (e.g., workforce 

development at new site). Business case analyses indicated there would be no positive lifecycle cost return on investment before 2060. While near-term budgets would 

have been a challenge, the lack of a lifecycle cost advantage means that a CNPC 

would not be our preferred option even if funding were not a limiting factor. 

The Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group reported to me in a January 10, 2008 memo that a ‘‘Consolidated 

Nuclear Production Center (CNPC) proposal is less cost effective than modernizing 

the existing nuclear weapon production facilities.’’ This is consistent with all our 

analyses of a CNPC. While many individual facilities require modernization, the net 

present value of existing buildings and structures at our eight sites is still measured 

in tens of billions of dollars and thus modernization is the preferred alternative. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Has the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) resolved concerns over the seismic safety of the proposed Chemistry and Metallurgy 

Research Replacement (CMRR) facility? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes. The CMRR design conforms to rigorous modern seismic design requirements for nuclear facilities and its site is fully characterized. The seismic design approach was reviewed and endorsed by external reviewers, including 

the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. The CMRR seismic design requirement 

derives from the recently completed probabilistic ground motion studies (approximately 2 years ago); resulting in setting the CMRR peak vertical acceleration at 

0.52 g (1 g is the acceleration of gravity on the surface of the earth, which is approximately 9.8 meters per second per second). This value is higher than the prior 

acceleration value of 0.31 g used as the site-wide design parameter. The value was 

updated based on recent geological information that reveals that the Los Alamos 

area had been subjected to larger earthquakes in the distant past than had been 

previously understood. 

The CMRR facility is designed to withstand earthquakes. This is a significant improvement compared to the existing CMR structure. CMR was designed to the building code in effect in the late 1940’s before the current rigorous requirements for the 

design and construction of nuclear facilities existed and before the seismicity in the 

area was understood. In particular, CMR is built atop a seismic fault that was not 

discovered until well after the building was erected. Seismic engineers have reached 

a consensus opinion that CMR would not withstand severe but plausible earthquakes. For this and other safety reasons, NNSA has concluded that CMR can not 

be relied upon as a long-term asset in the Complex. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Some have asserted that the CMRR is essentially a plutonium pit 

production facility. Please explain to the subcommittee the stockpile stewardship activities that will be housed in the CMRR, and their relationship, if any, to pit production. Please also describe, for each activity, the analysis conducted that led the 

NNSA to conclude that performing that activity in the CMRR—rather than in any 

other existing or planned NNSA facility—was the most cost-effective alternative. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The Chemical and Metallurgical Research Replacement (CMRR) 

is a support facility for a number of programs requiring analytical chemistry support. Currently, these capabilities are performed in a 60 year old building that has 

numerous safety issues and needs to be replaced. CMRR is not a plutonium pit production or manufacturing facility. Pit manufacturing is conducted and will continue 

to be conducted in the Technical Area 55 Plutonium Facility (TA–55/PF–4). 
206 

The following Stockpile Stewardship activities may or will be supported by the 

CMRR-Nuclear Facility analytical chemistry and material characterization activities: 

Æ Directed Stockpile Work (DSW): 

—Pit Surveillance 

—Milliwatt Radioactive Generators Surveillance 

—Special Recovery Line 

—Plutonium Measurements for Above Ground Experiments 

—Subcritical Experiments 

—Pit Manufacturing 

Æ Campaigns: 

—Material Readiness 

—Enhanced Surveillance 

—Primary Certification 

—Dynamic Materials Properties 

—Advanced Radiography 

—Certification in Hostile Environments 

Æ Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities: 

—Materials Recycle and Recovery 

In addition, the facility will have the capability to provide analytical chemistry 

and material characterization support to other national security programs, including: 

—Pit Disassembly and Conversion 

—Arms Control and Nonproliferation 

—Nuclear Materials Stewardship 

—Nuclear Materials Stabilization 

—Advanced Fuels 

—Waste Isolation Pilot Project Characterization Work 

The CMRR-Nuclear Facility will also provide nuclear materials storage in support 

of all programs. 

The major analytical chemistry and materials characterization processes housed 

in the CMRR-Nuclear facility and supporting all programs are: 

—Assay Measurements 

—Isotropic Mass Spectrometry 

—Trace Element Analysis 

—X-Ray Fluorescence and X-Ray Diffraction 

—Radiochemistry 

—Analytical Chemistry 

—Materials Characterization 

—Sample Management 

—Standards and Quality Control 

—Waste Accountability and Handling 

Pit production uses all the processes above except x-ray diffraction and waste accountability and handling. 

The analysis and rationale for performing activities in CMRR is that no other adequate facility exists at Los Alamos, with the exception of TA–55/PF–4 which does 

not have sufficient floor space nor the facility infrastructure, to provide the large 

and varied amount of chemical activities required to support the myriad programs 

listed above. The current Chemical and Metallurgical Research (CMR) facility is an 

aging facility with operational, seismic, and safety issues which make it cost prohibitive to upgrade to required safety standards. Therefore, building a new CMRR facility was found to be the most cost-effective alternative. A decision to not build CMRR 

will require contingency plans to relocate workloads. This may cause delays in other 

areas of Complex Transformation. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. NNSA has stated a requirement to produce 50 to 80 pits per year. 

Can you explain the rationale for this requirement, and the relationship between 

the sizing of the CMRR facility and the planned pit production rate? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The requirement comes from the Department of Defense, not the 

NNSA. A key factor in a responsive nuclear infrastructure is the rate at which it 

can refurbish existing warheads or produce replacement warheads. Currently, the 

production of plutonium pits is the most constraining limitation on capacity. Needed 

pit production capacity will depend on stockpile size and composition, performance 

margins of warhead types comprising that stockpile, and the viability of pit reuse 

options. Uncertainties in each of these factors make it difficult to assess definitively 

future required pit production capacity. Currently, we have a very small sustainable 
207 

production capacity at the Los Alamos Technical Area 55 (TA–55) facility as supported by the current Chemical and Metallurgical Research (CMR) facility, which 

could be as much as 10 pits per year (ppy) if CMR operates as desired or as little 

as zero if CMR is unavailable for a protracted duration. A rate of 10 ppy, we believe, 

is insufficient to support the stockpile for the long term for several reasons: 

—Our best estimate of minimum pit lifetime is 85–100 years. While this exceeds previous estimates, degradation from plutonium aging still introduces 

uncertainty in overall system performance, particularly for lower margin systems. As the stockpile continues to age, we must plan to replace considerable 

numbers of pits in currently stockpiled weapons. 

—If a future decision is made to field replacement warheads, we will require 

expanded pit production capacity to introduce sufficient numbers of warheads 

into the stockpile. 

—At significantly smaller stockpiles than today, we must anticipate that an adverse change in the geopolitical threat environment or a technical problem in 

the stockpile could require manufacture of additional warheads on a relatively 

short timescale. 

A variety of future pit production alternatives have been evaluated as part of the 

planning for transforming the nuclear weapons complex infrastructure. The best 

economic and technical alternative is to retain and build on the existing production 

facilities at Los Alamos. In light of the uncertainties, the NNSA program, recognizing the range of potential stockpile requirements and differences in pit types, is 

planning on achieving a production capacity of about 50–80 pits per year by 2017. 

This capacity has the potential to support smaller stockpile sizes than today, particularly if coupled with potential reuse of pits. 

In addition to providing required analytical chemistry support to numerous other 

programs, the Chemical and Metallurgical Research Replacement (CMRR) facility 

will provide required analytical chemistry and metallurgical support capacity to enable the manufacture of pits. Additional analytical chemistry and metallurgical support for 50–80 pits per year would come from multiple shifts or selected operations 

being supported out of the TA–55 plutonium facility (PF–4). No pit manufacturing 

would take place in the CMRR-Nuclear Facility. Actual pit manufacturing would be 

accomplished within the current TA–55/PF–4 plutonium facility through the addition of equipment, restructuring of the manufacturing flow, and displacement of 

some other non-pit programs. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Why does the NNSA need an in-house non-nuclear manufacturing 

capability such as the Kansas City Plant? Could such components be acquired via 

commercial outlets? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The Kansas City Plant (KCP) manufactures or procures through 

outsourcing approximately 85% of the parts for modern nuclear weapons. As part 

of transformation of non-nuclear production at KCP, we are already planning to increase outsourcing to commercial outlets from currently less than 50% of components to over 65% of components. However, there are two reasons why we must 

maintain a limited in-house manufacturing capability such as KCP. First, KCP produces highly classified use-control components for nuclear weapons. As such, access 

to information on these parts must be controlled to a limited number of people with 

appropriate security clearances. Second, the quantity of parts produced are so low 

and the quality specifications so rigorous that commercial outlets are not interested 

in producing some of these parts at a price comparable with that of KCP. KCP continuously looks at make-buy options for components to get the best value for NNSA. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What benefits to the Stockpile Stewardship Program can you discern as a result of the recent competitions for the management and operations contracts at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Labs? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. As you are aware the previous contracts were in existence for 

a very long time at these two national laboratories. When we embarked on the recent competitions for new management and operations (M&O) contractors, we fully 

understood there would be a period of transition. During that period we expected 

some extra effort would be required by the new contractors to establish a new culture at these laboratories and clearly there would be some issues that had not been 

anticipated. At this point in the contract transition, we have seen clear signs of a 

refocus by the laboratories in those areas that are also consistent with our Complex 

Transformation. For example, Livermore has put forth considerable effort to meet 

the Secretary’s challenge to accelerate the consolidation and removal of Special Nuclear Materials. In addition, the new M&O contractors at Los Alamos and Livermore have: 
208 

• Focused on identifying infrastructure savings through footprint reductions, replacement of buildings that are long past their economic lifetime and updated 

cost-sharing models for ‘‘work-for-others’’ customers; assurance processes and 

commodity purchase savings through a supply chain management center; and 

• Reduced staff supporting weapons activities through attrition and reassignment to other national security missions, while maintaining proper expertise 

to fully support on-going stockpile missions. 

We expect continued performance improvements as the new contractors mature. 

There have been some challenges at each site and we are working with the M&O 

to work through these to everyone’s benefit. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Please comment on any cost or cost-benefit analyses completed by 

NNSA on its preferred alternative and any other complex modernization alternatives given consideration. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The NNSA has diligently worked over the past two years performing technical reviews and business case analyses (BCAs) of transformation alternatives, including the preferred alternative in the Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (SPEIS). For each major 

modernization alternative, an internal Integrated Project Team (IPT) was established to perform a business case analysis. Typically, this work proceeded in parallel 

with an evaluation by an independent (non-NNSA) review team. These business 

case analyses covered costs, closure costs, life cycle costs of alternatives, cash flow 

analyses, risks, and benefits of each major alternative. The preferred alternative in 

the draft SPEIS was typically the lowest cost and lowest risk option that meets mission needs based on both our internal and independent business case analyses. 

The business case analyses supporting selection of the preferred alternatives in 

the Complex Transformation SPEIS were made available for public review on the 

web at http://www.complextransformationspeis.com/linkslreflpdfs.html in January 2008. Hard copies of the business case analyses are also available to the public 

upon request. We are continuing to update our business case analyses as we prepare 

for release of the Final Complex Transformation SPEIS. We plan to make these latter analyses available to the public as well. 

In addition to the preferred alternatives for restructuring of special nuclear material and research and development facilities covered in the SPEIS, NNSA is pursuing modernization of non-nuclear production at the Kansas City Plant. An environmental assessment and business case analysis has also been completed to support this proposed action. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Does the NNSA see opportunity costs, or risks of incurring greater 

future costs, by deferring infrastructure decisions to a later date? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. NNSA does see higher risks of incurring greater future costs if 

infrastructure decisions are deferred to a later date. This particularly applies to 

major plutonium (e.g., Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) facility at Los Alamos) and uranium (e.g., Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at Y– 

12) facilities. Several existing nuclear facilities that support uranium and plutonium 

research and manufacturing operations are very old (greater than 50 years) and 

cannot cost-effectively meet current facility safety and security standards. By deferring construction of modernized replacement facilities, mitigating actions such as expensive interim facility upgrades will need to be taken. 

The added costs of delay result from the cost of mitigating actions; costs of continuing to operate old, inefficient facilities; construction costs for replacement facilities that have been going up at a faster rate than core inflation; and finally the potential impacts of delayed deliverables to the nuclear stockpile resulting from the 

higher rate of work stoppages in facilities being operated well beyond their economic 

lifetime. We have estimates of many of these costs in various business case analyses 

undertaken as part of the Transformation planning process. The business case analyses can be found on the internet at http://www.complextransformationspeis.com/ 

linkslreflpdfs.html. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. How does NNSA’s preferred alternative, which is heavily focused 

on consolidation and increased efficiency, address the military requirement for a 

more responsive infrastructure and a more reliable safe and secure weapons capability? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. A guiding principle for NNSA’s preferred alternative for Complex Transformation is to achieve more responsive capabilities in key research, design, development, production, and testing areas essential for more reliable and secure weapons. One challenge we face today is that overhead and support costs are 

consuming an increasing fraction of our budgets. Thus, we do want to increase efficiency and consolidate old and outdated facilities in order to maximize the percent-
209 

age of our budget that can be devoted to direct national security mission work in 

a more responsive infrastructure. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What role will advanced simulations and computing at Livermore 

play in the Stockpile Stewardship Program as the complex is transformed? 

Dr. MILLER. Recognizing the advancements in computing pioneered by LLNL in 

support of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, NNSA is proposing LLNL as a center of excellence in computing as an essential component of its transformation plan. 

LLNL will serve as the host site for the ASC Sequoia system which will perform 

complex 3D calculations to explore and resolve weapons physics questions related 

to performance and safety that are currently incompletely understood. This knowledge is necessary to improve codes critical to maintain confidence in stockpile reliability, safety, and security. In addition, Sequoia’s petascale computational capability will be required to run large suites of 3D simulations to quantify the level 

of confidence in the prediction of weapon performance. Sequoia’s capability, combined with LLNL’s best-in-class weapons codes, will then be used to examine technical options both to maintain the stockpile and to improve the security and safety 

features to meet today’s safety standards and threat environment. 

Advanced computational capability becomes increasingly important as the U.S. 

stockpile continues to age beyond the nuclear test base. Current codes calibrated to 

the nuclear test base are becoming increasingly suspect in describing the performance of the stockpile as it exists today. New, more fundamentally accurate and predictive physics and materials models are consequently needed and are being added 

to LLNL (and LANL) weapons codes—for instance, the NNSA boost initiative is part 

of this effort. Boost is the most significant remaining incompletely understood weapons performance process. This lack of understanding inhibits the nation’s ability to 

incorporate improved safety and security features into the stockpile. Sequoia will be 

employed to improve the understanding of this fusion ignition process and to develop better predictive models. These improved, more complex models will require 

increased computing capability, in particular for running large suites of calculations 

to quantify the uncertainty in the predictions of performance. Additional computational challenges will emanate from the potential inclusion of enhanced warhead 

safety and security features in future Life Extension Programs to protect against 

accidents and unauthorized use in a changing worldwide threat environment. It is 

the case that LLNL is particularly well suited to address these challenges, which 

combine to require far faster computers and more advanced design codes. LLNL has 

a stellar track record in developing and employing reliable, production-computing 

systems with world-class user support. LLNL has successfully sited three generations of such systems, all of which have outperformed original expectations. This 

operational advantage, combined with continuously improving LLNL design codes, 

permit LLNL to bring a unique capability to the nation. 

In NNSA’s transformed complex, LLNL will provide highly reliable tri-Laboratory 

access to Sequoia, just as it has with the previous machines sited at LLNL, in particular ASC Purple and White. Tri-Laboratory usage of LLNL-hosted computational 

machines has enabled continued work on the W76 LEP, B61, B83, W87, W80 (as 

well as RRW in the past), Significant Finding Investigation (SFI) resolution, and 

support for experiments on Z, NIF, and DARHT. Purple utilization and availability 

rates have set a standard for the DOE. In providing this tri-Laboratory support, approximately 2/3 of the cycles on LLNL’s Purple machine have been accrued by teams 

from the New Mexico Labs and similar usage rates are expected on Sequoia. 

LLNL’s simulation capability will also be available to meet other national priorities as directed by NNSA. For example, modernizing and sizing the NNSA production complex for future needs will require the development and implementation of 

new manufacturing processes, the elimination of some legacy materials, and the inclusion of new materials. LLNL, using its advanced codes and computers, will develop innovative technologies and determine if these technologies can be safely and 

reliably implemented in the stockpile through rigorous application of Quantification 

of Margins and Uncertainties (QMU). Beyond this, NNSA computational capabilities 

contribute to programs in nuclear attribution, nuclear forensics, and weapon outputs 

and effects. LLNL’s continued leadership in ASC will meet the mounting challenges 

of maintaining an aging stockpile was well as addressing broader 21st century national security issues. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Could Category I and II Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) be removed sooner than 2012 from LLNL? Why or why not? 

Dr. MILLER. LLNL has examined options for completing the de-inventory of Security Category I/II SNM from LLNL sooner than 2012. However, since the rate of 

de-inventory activities under the current plan will utilize the full capacity of all 

available processing equipment, further acceleration is not possible. Additional processing capabilities over those currently available or planned would be required to 
210 

further accelerate the schedule. Due to the time required to procure, assemble, install, commission, and initiate operation, any such additional capabilities would not 

be available until after over 95% of the material is already processed, which precludes the opportunity to substantially impact the de-inventory schedule. 

The current plan ensures the safe and secure removal of all Security Category I/ 

II SNM from LLNL by FY2012. It represents a two-year acceleration from the original plan, which set the completion date in 2014. The timeframe for the safe and 

secure removal of SNM is dictated by several factors governing the requirements for 

the appropriate processing, packaging, and shipment of the material, including (a) 

regulatory, safety, and security requirements for packaging, shipping, and safety 

management; (b) applicable Code of Federal Regulations; (c) DOE orders, standards, 

and manuals; (d) receiver site processing and storage requirements; and (e) DOE 

Model 9975 shipping package Certificate of Compliance requirement; as well as (f) 

the physical processes associated with safe and secure packaging of the material. 

Figure 1 indicates the rate at which SNM can be processed and made available for 

safe shipment to its end location, i.e., Savannah River Site (SRS). 

Figure 1: Percentage of SNM packages complete and ready for shipment to SRS. 

About 33% of the material has already been removed. Under the current plan, additional processing equipment is scheduled to be installed in the first six months 

of FY2009. This additional equipment enables 90% of the material to be removed 

in two years (December 2010). Because of the difficult nature of a small part of the 

inventory, it will take nearly two additional years to process the remaining 10% to 

meet shipping and receiver site requirements. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Why did LLNL seek a waiver from responsibility for meeting the 

2005 Design Basis Threat (DBT) security standards? 

Dr. MILLER. LLNL did not request a waiver from responsibility for meeting the 

2005 Design Basis Threat (DBT) security standards. LLNL received direction from 

NNSA’s Livermore Site Office in November 2007 to suspend expenditure of funds 

to meet the 2005 DBT following NNSA’s designation of LLNL as a ‘‘non-enduring’’ 

site for Security Category I/II Special Nuclear Materials. 

The NNSA Livermore Site Office Manager, Camille Yuan-Soo Hoo, issued a 

memorandum to George H. Miller, President, Lawrence Livermore National Secu-
211 

rity, LLC on November 7, 2007, informing him that based on NNSA’s decision to 

de-inventory the Category I/II facilities at LLNL, he should not expend any funding 

to implement the 2005 DBT plan. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What impacts will the closure of Site 300 have on LLNL stockpile 

stewardship activities? 

Dr. MILLER. Site 300 has several capabilities that are routinely used to support 

stockpile stewardship and support U.S. counterterrorism efforts. These include: 

• The Contained Firing Facility (CFF): a 55,000-square-foot building that 

houses a containment chamber in which high explosives are detonated and 

associated state-of-the-art diagnostics, including radiography. This facility 

provides experimental data relevant to high explosives and weapons performance. 

• High-explosives storage, machining, inspection, and waste treatment facilities: these facilities provide the safe and secure infrastructure to conduct 

high-explosive related stockpile stewardship and advanced conventional munitions development for national security missions. 

These capabilities have enabled the life extension of the W87 and W76 weapons 

as well as critical assessments of the aging stockpile. In addition, LLNL has successfully conducted experiments to assess methods for safe multi-unit processing at 

Pantex. This has helped Pantex increase its dismantlement throughput in recent 

years. 

In addition to supporting CFF, the high-explosives storage, machining, inspection, 

and waste treatment facilities are essential to the operation of the High Explosives 

Applications Facility (HEAF) on the LLNL main site. As a center of excellence, 

HEAF provides critical support to the stockpile assessment and certification program, and it has enabled LLNL to develop new innovative conventional munitions 

for the U.S. armed forces. 

Termination of NNSA’s programmatic activities at Site 300 would force the shutdown of the CFF and associated high-explosives facilities. LLNL’s high explosives 

R&D activities would require a replacement facility, the HEAF annex, to be built 

on LLNL’s main site to provide the machining and inspection capabilities necessary 

to support mission responsibilities at LLNL. Additionally, a new site would have to 

be found for high explosives storage and waste treatment. Initial analysis indicates 

that establishing an alternate high-explosives waste stream is risky and likely infeasible. Without these Site 300 replacement capabilities, LLNL’s on-site high explosives R&D would have to be terminated, jeopardizing LLNL’s stockpile stewardship 

responsibilities. High explosives expertise and capabilities are an essential component of fulfilling the role of a nuclear design laboratory. 

NNSA’s initial complex transformation plans called for all hydrodynamic experiments to be conducted at LANL’s DARHT Facility. While the DARHT Facility has 

the forefront radiography capability, it is not equipped with a large-scale high explosives containment facility; rather, it uses smaller containment vessels. The technical 

approaches taken by the two nuclear design Laboratories at CFF and DARHT are 

unique and complementary. While DARHT can perform many of the experiments 

conducted at CFF, it cannot address all requirements for tests. 

The closure of Site 300 and CFF would result in the forfeiture of the capabilities 

that have been essential to assessing the enduring stockpile. In particular, NNSA 

would no longer be able to execute experiments for all of the enduring stockpile systems that have a particularly large high explosive load. DARHT’s containment vessels are too small to contain all explosive loads. Neither LLNL nor LANL would 

have the capability to execute experiments to address SFIs that arise on warheads 

in this class. The use of containment vessels also limit the types of data that can 

be obtained. There is also one class of experiment, pertinent to all enduring systems, that could not be conducted on DARHT. Historically, these experiments have 

been essential to stockpile assessments. There is a high probability this class of data 

will be required in the future but will not be available if CFF closes with Site 300. 

Beyond Stockpile Stewardship, the potential closure of Site 300 would impact 

LLNL and the nation’s capability to do forensic analysis of radiological, chemical, 

and explosives samples, as Site 300 is one of two facilities in the nation capable of 

receiving large quantities of, or large items contaminated with, these materials for 

analysis. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What Stockpile Stewardship activities are directly supported by 

the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) building at Los Alamos? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Essentially all stockpile stewardship programs that use plutonium 

or other actinides have used, and continue to require, scientific capabilities provided 

by the CMR facility. CMR provides analytical chemistry for purposes of characterizing material for programmatic work as well as basic analytical measurements to 
212 

support material control and accountability and other activities needed to ensure 

safe and secure plutonium building operations. Some specific Stockpile Stewardship 

programs drawing on capabilities in CMR are: stockpile surveillance, manufacturing, annual certification, enhanced surveillance, dynamic materials research, pit 

disassembly & conversion, and test readiness. CMR also supports a broad range of 

national security programs including: power source technology for space and terrestrial applications, nuclear fuels research and development, nuclear non-proliferation, 

nuclear forensics and nuclear materials stabilization. 

The balance of workload among the different program elements that use the capabilities in CMR will vary from year to year depending on the details of program 

plans. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. How old are the lab facilities in the existing Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) Facility? What is the remaining useful life of these labs? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The CMR facility began nuclear operations in 1952 and has been 

operating for 56 years. Maintaining the viability of the aging CMR laboratories to 

maintain the capabilities it provides is an increasingly challenging activity. Significant investments were made a decade ago in facility upgrades and there have been, 

and remain, ongoing efforts in hazard reduction and maintenance, prioritized by urgency and need. For example we have recently performed fire door replacement and 

sprinkler head replacement. That said, the margin against failure is not large in 

this aging facility. To preempt projected failures, we anticipate performing activities 

including ventilation (HVAC) refurbishment, transformer refurbishment, and fire 

suppression upgrades in the near future. The current Basis for Interim Operations 

expires at the end of 2010, but a new Authorization Basis approval is currently 

being pursued. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. If and when the CMR building is deemed unsafe for work, where 

would the stewardship activities currently carried out in CMR be conducted? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. It is important to recognize that the CMR building’s capabilities 

support more than the stockpile stewardship program. If the CMR building were declared unsafe for work today or in the near future (i.e., before the CMRR nuclear 

facility is available), there is no alternative path for the full suite of capabilities and 

the activities they support. Some operations could be conducted in other nuclear facility locations (e.g. PF–4 at TA–55) with significant costs and up to years of time 

required for renovation and retrofit, potentially displacing other operations or requiring compromise in capabilities available for program support. Since appropriate 

nuclear facility space is limited and in significant demand, this would lead to considerable impacts to national security programs that would have to be negotiated. 

The current plan is to: a) reduce the operational risk in CMR by removing material, consolidating operations inside CMR and moving some activities into both PF– 

4 and the CMRR radiological laboratory as appropriate and achievable; b) perform 

a limited set of activities in CMR to maintain the viability of its capabilities until 

the CMRR nuclear facility is available and; c) eventually transfer remaining operations to the CMRR nuclear facility. The proactive approach being pursued with the 

CMR facility is to allow the facility to be operated safely until the CMRR nuclear 

facility is available. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. As construction of the high profile experimental machines to support stockpile stewardship is completed, such as NIF and DARHT, what do the 

NNSA and Congress need to do to ensure the Stockpile Stewardship Program is robust in the coming decades? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The success of stewardship to date has been based on: (1) a sense 

of national commitment to the nuclear deterrent and the Stockpile Stewardship program; (2) sustained investments in leading edge experimental capabilities, modeling 

and simulation, and computational platforms needed by scientists and engineers to 

understand the physics of nuclear performance; and (3) meaningful work to challenge the workforce across the Laboratories and the complex. 

The next Administration and Congress must restore the bipartisan consensus that 

existed on nuclear deterrence policy for the United States during the latter half of 

the 20th century. Without such consensus, U.S. allies and friends will increasingly 

question our Nation’s commitment to security assurances, which could lead to actions to ensure their own security situation including exploration of nuclear options. 

Such a shift could also lead to questions regarding their long-term relationship with 

the United States. Further, our adversaries, including rogue states, could become 

emboldened to take actions counter to U.S. security interests. 

The next administration and Congress must also reach a consensus on an investment strategy to support the nuclear weapons complex and allow it to support whatever stockpile the Nation decides it needs for the 21st Century. The budget uncertainties of the last several years have created much doubt and uncertainty in the 

workforce of the weapons labs, making it difficult for us to retain staff. Over the 
213 

last several years more than 2000 employees have left Los Alamos through a combination of attrition, voluntary separation and reductions in the contractor workforce. It has also greatly complicated our ability to recruit the next generation of 

scientists and engineers. 

The Laboratory’s role is to anticipate, innovate, and deliver leading-edge science 

and technology to meet a broad range of national security challenges. These challenges include maintaining the effectiveness of the nation’s nuclear deterrent, supporting the nation’s nonproliferation and threat reduction priorities, and addressing 

emerging national security issues—including energy security—with urgency and 

agility. Leveraging our capabilities with such broader national security missions will 

help sustain the leading edge capabilities that the weapons program will draw upon 

as needed. A strong basic research capability that interweaves the multidisciplinary 

talents of Laboratory scientists and our unique facilities is also essential to this mission. For Los Alamos, there are several key initiatives including Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) project, Los Alamos Neutron Science 

Center (LANSCE)-R and Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extremes (MaRIE) that 

will ensure the continued scientific and technical excellence of the laboratory for 

decades to come. LANSCE-R is a compilation of facility and infrastructure subprojects focused on renovating and modernizing the LANSCE accelerator and related systems, to ensure reliable operations past 2020 in support of national security 

activities. MaRIE, though still pre-conceptual, will allow scientists and engineers to 

better understand properties of materials in extreme conditions, crucial to predicting their performance in applications and developing new materials and products to address national security challenges. CMRR will provide the nation with a 

state of the art facility for: nuclear fuels research and development, stockpile maintenance and manufacturing support, nonproliferation/threat reduction activities, and 

nuclear forensics. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. If the CMRR facility is not built, what specific stockpile stewardship program activities are at risk of interruption? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. CMRR will support a broad range of national security carried out 

by LANL. All stockpile stewardship programs that use plutonium or other actinides 

are at risk of interruption without continuous support for analytical chemistry, actinide R&D, materials characterization and vault storage. These services are planned 

for operation in the CMRR nuclear facility as Los Alamos transitions out of the 

CMR facility. 

Some Stockpile Stewardship programs supported in CMR are: stockpile surveillance, manufacturing, annual certification, enhanced surveillance, dynamic materials research, pit disassembly & conversion, and test readiness. Though as noted 

above, the balance of demand from different programs varies over time, capabilities 

needed by all these programs would be at risk of interruption. CMR also currently 

supports programs beyond stockpile stewardship including; power source technology 

for space and terrestrial applications, nuclear fuels research and development, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear forensics and nuclear materials stabilization. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. If the CMRR facility is not built, what are the consequences to 

pit manufacturing in particular? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Similar to other programs, the pit manufacturing program in TA– 

55/PF4 will rely on the CMRR nuclear facility for analytical chemistry, materials 

characterization and vault storage. The pit manufacturing program would be interrupted at any level of manufacturing without continuous support in these functional 

areas. That support is presently provided by the CMR facility and in the absence 

of CMRR, CMR would continue to serve that role. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. If the CMRR facility is not built, what are the consequences to 

other national security functions such as nuclear forensics? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The Nuclear Forensics mission requires extensive analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities applicable to plutonium and other 

actinide elements in order to provide timely information concerning domestic and 

foreign nuclear materials and materials of unknown origin that may be obtain by 

U.S. Government agencies or other sources. Not having the analytical and material 

characterization services significantly diminishes our ability to meet technical and 

programmatic needs as those services allow us to ascertain processing signatures inherent to the material. 

Nuclear forensics and materials inventory programs are representative of the 

broader national security missions that can be supported by CMRR and associated 

facilities at Los Alamos. Other national security programs supported by these types 

of facilities include: 
214 

• Schools to train International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors in 

order to strengthen the international nonproliferation regime and meet U.S. 

treaty obligations; 

• Schools to train domestic safeguards inspectors for both the Department of 

Energy (DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); 

• Criticality safety training to maintain U.S. capability to characterize, manipulate, and ensure the safety of critical and super-critical nuclear material assemblies; 

• Training of international safeguards inspectors from other countries in accordance with bilateral or multilateral agreements, including training inspectors from countries such as Russia, Pakistan, Brazil, and Argentina, and 

international organizations other than the IAEA, such as EURATOM; 

• Development of science and technology for safeguards and arms controls functions; 

• Assessment of materials and capabilities of foreign states; 

• Developments of nuclear detection technologies for U.S. Government Agencies 

such as the Department of Defense, DOE, Department of Homeland Security, 

and the Department of Justice that are used to analyze, detect, deter, and act 

against global nuclear and radiological threats. 

Without modern nuclear facilities the long-term viability of our ability to support 

these and related missions is very much in doubt. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. If the CMRR facility is not built, what plans if any does NNSA 

have to mitigate these risks? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The laboratory is not aware of any NNSA plans to assure continuous support for programs other than the baseline plan described above. The 

present planning relies on the construction of the CMRR nuclear facility to replace 

the CMR facility. In the absence of the new facility, the CMR facility would have 

to continue operating indefinitely (with associated investments to extend the lifetime) or the nuclear operations presently in the CMR facility and planned for CMRR 

would have to be transferred into PF–4. Transferring activities into PF–4 is a long 

duration activity, displaces existing programs, requires considerable expense and results in compromises and impacts to both current capabilities and future program 

requirements. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What are the implications of the plan to host supercomputing 

platforms at only Livermore and LANL? Do you believe Sandia’s historic excellence 

in advanced computing architecture design will persist, in spite of the new arrangement? 

Dr. HUNTER. Sandia considers supercomputing to be a vital element in support 

of all major lab programs and missions. Our world-class expertise in supercomputing has helped enable the stockpile stewardship program as well as numerous 

other national security applications. Planned changes in the nuclear weapons complex have presented challenges for retaining our computing expertise. In the near 

term, Sandia has developed a memorandum of understanding with LANL to partner 

in the design and operation of the Zia Computer, a next generation platform to be 

sited at LANL. Work on this machine will help maintain Sandia’s expertise in computer architecture design while also providing a platform on which to run the many 

codes required in support of our missions. Sandia has also partnered to establish 

the Institute for Advanced Architectures and Algorithms with Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory. Funding and support for both of these endeavors is crucial for maintaining our high performance computing expertise. 

We are not yet convinced that the expertise that has provided the foundation for 

much of the nation’s preeminent global position in computing can be maintained 

under these new arrangements. The Sandia/Los Alamos partnership is not without 

risk to both institutions. We will need to demonstrate that this expertise can be 

maintained without the operation of a large capability computer platform at Sandia. 

Historically, this has not been possible. While we are somewhat apprehensive, we 

have agreed to give the new approach a chance. It will be essential for NNSA to 

execute a program strategy that supports the partnership with a platform procurement in fiscal year 2010 that meets the established requirements for maintaining 

and refurbishing the nuclear weapon stockpile. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Sandia has a far higher percentage of work outside of NNSA 

Weapons Activities than either of the other two weapons labs. What lessons can 

LLNL and LANL take from Sandia as they seek to broaden their work scope? 

Dr. HUNTER. Both LLNL and LANL successfully perform extensive programs outside of NNSA, and these programs are very important to our nation’s security. We 

are not in a position to compare the effectiveness of the three laboratories, but can 
215 

offer some insight into why Sandia has been particularly successful. First and foremost, we deliver for our customers. Our non-NNSA customers always have the option to go elsewhere if another organization can provide better performance or if our 

costs become unreasonably high. We have worked hard to develop a reputation 

among our customers as being a place that delivers unique technology solutions and 

meets our commitments. We carefully monitor our program performance and our 

customer satisfaction. Second, we have been working in these areas for decades and 

have always included these activities in our strategic planning. This is not an overnight success story. For example, we have been working in areas such as counterterrorism since the early 1970’s, and as a result were well positioned to respond to the 

nation’s needs after September 11, 2001. Third, in implementing our strategic planning, we have committed significant effort to development of capabilities and technical staff. Finally, we never lose the connectivity to our nuclear weapons program 

and leverage the two program areas for mutual benefit in enhancing our technical 

capabilities and keeping our staff energized. In this manner, we are able to deliver 

advanced technologies that are unique and at a reasonable cost. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Is ‘‘Work For Others’’ a mission area the weapons labs should look 

to grow, particularly as their nuclear missions are consolidated? 

Dr. HUNTER. Sandia views the resources of the national laboratories as assets to 

be applied to the nation’s hardest national security problems. To the extent that our 

capabilities can be applied to solve these problems, we should do so. DOE support 

for national laboratories and their science and technology capabilities to support the 

broader national security missions of other agencies is important. However, these 

other agencies should retain full responsibility to competitively select and directly 

manage specific programs. Maintaining the direct relationships between the laboratories and other Work For Others customers is critical. With these thoughts in 

mind, growth of the programs should not be a goal in and of itself, although that 

may be a logical outcome, given the increasing diversity and complexity of threats 

to the nation. It is important to maintain the character of the laboratories as assets 

to the nation for solving our most challenging problems, rather than businesses with 

revenue targets. In many cases a laboratory has been most successful when it transfers a technology to industry for large-scale implementation, as opposed to developing an in-house revenue stream. That said, the problems facing the nation in energy, terrorism, environmental change, and various emerging global threats is likely 

to lead to growth in Work For Others programs in the future. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What characteristics do you think are needed in the organizations 

that run the national laboratories? What is required of such organizations to ensure 

that the national interest is their paramount concern? 

Dr. HUNTER. A contracting entity needs to understand and value the national laboratories’ missions and unique attributes as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs). National service, through implementation of the federal 

sponsor’s mission, should be the primary motivation of the contracting entity, not 

financial interest. 

A contracting entity’s role should be to support behaviors and processes that will 

facilitate the laboratory’s ability to serve the nation and deliver with excellence. 

Companies or academic institutions contracting to operate an FFRDC should have 

a demonstrated commitment to ethical business practices and values of service that 

are evident in their record of operations. Moreover, they should share with the 

FFRDC a passion for excellence in science or engineering germane to the mission 

of the laboratory. 

The NNSA national laboratories are complex organizations. The operating contractor should also have a history of managing large, complex enterprises successfully and safely. The entity should have a visible record of integrity and ethics and 

an effective, auditable process for avoiding and mitigating organizational conflicts 

of interest. It should know how to provide an assurance system with robust internal 

controls for effective program execution and business management. The NNSA laboratories have a unique role in the independent annual assessment of the nuclear 

deterrent. It is essential that the leadership of these laboratories never be put in 

a position in which an unbiased, objective judgment cannot be provided. A contractor’s value system must support providing this independent judgment without concern for corporate profit, contract performance, or personal gain. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What role should nuclear test readiness play in a transformed and 

modernized complex? 

Dr. YOUNGER. Stockpile Stewardship—maintaining the nuclear weapons stockpile 

without underground testing—should be regarded as an experiment. Scientists and 

engineers have no experience in maintaining complex objects in perpetuity without 

testing them, and there are concerns that the accumulations of small changes in 

weapons, some naturally occurring due to age and others the result of planned re-
216 

furbishments, could affect our ability to accurately predict safety and performance. 

Significant progress has been made in developing sophisticated computer codes for 

describing nuclear explosives. Previously, computer codes had many ‘‘adjustable parameters’’ that could be changed to make code output match the results of nuclear 

tests. This was adequate so long as we were conducting tests that were required, 

since we lacked the computer power to do much better. Today, we have incredibly 

powerful computers that can include vastly greater detail in the description of the 

weapon (down to the threads on the bolts) and in the amount of physics included. 

Progress has also been made on quantifying the accuracy of our predictions via the 

Quantification of Margins and Uncertainty methodology that is part of the stockpile 

stewardship plan. However, two fundamental issues remain that encourage maintenance of a minimal capability to return to nuclear testing. 

First, it is impossible to demonstrate that all of the physics relevant to aging 

weapons is included in our computer codes. Science of any kind—be it a study of 

individual molecules or the description of nuclear weapons—proceeds through a sequence of prediction and experiment, the hypothesis-experiment sequence familiar 

to every student. Without experiments, there is no way to directly check the accuracy of a weapons computer code. Supporting evidence can be assembled, including 

data taken from laboratory experiments, previous nuclear test data, and from fundamental studies, but the question remains whether it is sufficient to accurately describe a weapon. We believe that our current methods are adequate, but we cannot 

prove that they are adequate without an actual test. Hence the issue is one of risk 

analysis and risk assessment. At present we believe that the risk associated with 

not conducting a nuclear test is low, but as we move further from the design lifetime 

of weapons, as changes are introduced, and as our experienced workforce ages and 

leaves the scene, this risk may increase. New capabilities will increase our confidence, but several key processes in nuclear weapons operation cannot be reproduced in any anticipated laboratory experiment. The notion that laboratory experiments and computations are superior to conducting an actual test of a nuclear device is factually incorrect and inconsistent with generally accepted scientific practice. 

The second issue affecting the need to maintain a capability to perform a nuclear 

test relates to the composition of our nuclear weapons stockpile. In contrast to every 

other nuclear nation, the United States does not have a program of regular remanufacture and replacement of our weapons. All other countries regularly remove weapons and either refurbish them or replace them with completely new units. The 

United States has a policy of refurbishing weapons when we have reason to believe 

that they require attention. We assume that the quality controls in place at the time 

of their original manufacture, combined with our occasional surveillance of a small 

number of weapons, will provide adequate confidence in the status of the stockpile. 

Moreover, the decline in the nuclear weapons industrial plant and the much stricter 

regulatory environment that governs the surviving capability limits our capability 

and capacity to refurbish or replace weapons. This might be adequate if the weapons in our stockpile were designed to be maintained for a long period, but they were 

not. The criteria that drove their design were focused on low weight (so that they 

could be carried on smaller aircraft and missiles) and minimal use of then-scarce 

nuclear material. They were highly optimized and, like other highly optimized complex machines, are sensitive to change. 

The fundamental scientific challenge of proving the accuracy of our computer predictions, combined with the highly optimized nature of a stockpile (one that we are 

hard-pressed to remanufacture) suggests that the United States maintain some capability to return to nuclear testing should the need arise. The cost of maintaining 

this capability is very low compared to the overall cost of stewardship—a reasonable 

estimate is $20M per year. This value can be kept low by exercising as many key 

test capabilities as possible in other parts of the stockpile stewardship program. For 

example, gamma and neutron diagnostics capability can be maintained via experiments on the National Ignition Facility. Timing and firing of test devices can be exercised in non-nuclear hydrodynamic tests. However, some skills are unique to nuclear tests and are not maintained elsewhere in the stewardship program. These include the ability to demonstrate containment of a nuclear explosion underground, 

various pieces of special equipment including nuclear-certified cranes, and personnel 

who are familiar with the design of an underground test configuration. 

The potential consequences of not maintaining a nuclear test capability are severe. Given the age of our stockpile and our inability to rapidly remanufacture key 

components, a problem could arise that could severely impact our confidence in our 

nuclear deterrent. In a time of international crisis, such uncertainty could have negative or even disastrous results. Also, other countries, most notably Russia, are actively developing new classes of weapons and delivery vehicles to carry them. These 
217 

new weapons are presumably tailored to the military requirements of the future, in 

contrast to the American weapons, which were designed to meet the requirements 

of the Cold War. Finally, while we have no reason to believe that we have missed 

a fundamental part of nuclear weapons science, there is always the possibility of 

technology surprise, the fielding of a new type of weapon by a foreign power that 

would affect the strategic nuclear balance. 

Most of these motivations for maintaining a minimal capability to return to nuclear testing will remain valid even in a transformed and modernized nuclear weapons complex. We will still worry about the sufficiency of our computer codes to describe objects as complex as nuclear weapons. We will still worry about the effect 

of changes on high-optimized nuclear weapons designs. We will still worry about foreign developments. Absent changes in our stockpile, particularly the introduction of 

more robust and more easily manufactured designs, maintaining some capability to 

perform a nuclear test is necessary. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What are your primary concerns about the proposed complex 

transformation? 

Dr. YOUNGER. Any transformation must start from a set of requirements. For the 

nuclear weapons complex, we must consider three fundamental questions: What 

types of weapons and how many is the nuclear weapons complex expected to maintain? What activities must be performed to sustain them? What physical and human 

infrastructure is required to perform these activities? 

At present, the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is a legacy of the Cold War. Our 

weapons were designed to hold Soviet targets at risk and, to reduce costs, were 

highly optimized to deliver the maximum amount of yield for the minimum weight. 

They were designed to remain in the stockpile for a fixed period of time and then 

to be replaced with fresh units. More consideration was given to performance than 

to longevity, to weight than robustness. These tradeoffs were made palatable by the 

ability to actually test a weapon to assure that it was safe, reliable, and that its 

performance was within acceptable bounds. Today, the requirements for weapons 

are much different. The geopolitical situation has changed fundamentally since the 

end of the Cold War and new technologies have arisen that can perform some of 

the missions formerly assigned to nuclear weapons. Thus the requirements for nuclear weapons, both their type and number, have changed. Partial consideration of 

these changing requirements are accommodated by agreements to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our stockpile, but there has been virtually no willingness 

to change the types of weapons, to reduce their yield, make them safer, and lo improve the reliability by using more robust designs. 

In designing a transformed nuclear weapons complex, we must start with why we 

have nuclear weapons in the first place—in particular the missions that we expect 

them to perform. This mission space spans both military and political realms. Some 

targets simply cannot be destroyed by conventional means and require the energy 

of nuclear weapon for their destruction. Also, possessing a nuclear capability sends 

a strong message to would-be aggressors that the United States has the capability 

to project overwhelming force in the defense of our national interests. A rigorous 

assessment of what targets the United States wishes to hold at risk determines the 

composition of the stockpile required for the future. 

Having identified what types of weapons and how many are required, we can then 

address what actions are required to provide and maintain these weapons. Some capability to manufacture plutonium pits is essential, as is an ability to machine uranium and other unique materials. Scientists and engineers familiar with nuclear 

weapons physics, engineering, and manufacturing must maintain a sufficient set of 

skills, and demonstrate their proficiency on relevant activities, to assure their ability to carry out these tasks. 

Finally, the physical infrastructure required to carry out these activities must be 

provided. This is challenging given that we are not starting from scratch. The country has invested many billions of dollars in the nuclear weapons complex and there 

are significant environmental and political concerns about constructing new facilities or even closing old ones. Before constructing new facilities, especially costly nuclear facilities, I believe we should first fully utilize what already exists. This should 

be done on a national scale rather than a site-by-site basis. The time when the country could afford to build one of each type of capability at multiple sites is over— 

we must operate the nuclear weapons complex as a national enterprise where capabilities are located where they are most cost efficient and in particular where we 

can avoid expensive capital construction. 

Unfortunately, the nation has yet to clearly identify the requirements for its nuclear stockpile. Such ambiguity, combined with strong local interests at each of the 

NNSA sites, has made strategic planning difficult and has impeded much-needed 

consolidation efforts. My principal concern regarding complex transformation re-
218 

mains the lack of a clear requirements case that can drive businesslike planning 

for future capabilities and the migration from our present configuration to a sustainable complex. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. If a decision is made to make further stockpile reductions, would 

infrastructure upgrades be required at Pantex? 

Mr. MEYER. If a strategic decision is made to reduce the total number of units 

in the country’s nuclear arsenal, the Pantex Plant would still need to maintain and 

upgrade the existing infrastructure. 

A decrease in the total number of stockpile units would mean an increase in 

dismantlements and storage requirements in the short term. This would be accomplished by working multiple shifts in existing facilities. Instrumental in meeting 

this increased short term workload will be the ability to sustain and perform essential upgrades to the site infrastructure, e.g. High Pressure Fire Loop Project. 

Once the dismantlement work is completed and the smaller stockpile is in place, 

B&W Pantex has identified out-year infrastructure projects to sustain the mission 

and provide life cycle replacement to Cold-War legacy facilities. These projects are 

required to sustain the Pantex Plant’s capabilities and designated centers of excellence. In addition, these projects will allow the older facilities currently in use to 

be vacated and replaced by newer, smaller, more energy-efficient buildings. This will 

enhance operational efficiency at the Pantex plant. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. How advanced is the planning for the new underground Weapons 

Storage Area? 

Mr. MEYER. B&W Pantex has developed the Program Requirements Document 

and Mission Need Document required to obtain Critical Decision Zero (CD–0) approval for the project. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) approval 

may coincide with the Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (SPEIS) Record of Decision (ROD). This CD–0 approval will authorize B&W Pantex to initiate alternative analysis, conceptual design 

and initial funding for the project. 

On a parallel course Pantex is reviewing a storage facility design developed for 

the Department of Defense and its applicability to the Pantex operations. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Why is such a facility needed? What are the expected benefits of 

the facility? 

Mr. MEYER. The new underground facility will result in safety and security improvements over the current facility. Although a detailed discussion of these benefits 

would require a classified forum, they can be summarized as: 

Æ Reduced operational costs due to a decrease in transportation, handling 

times, and number of security personnel. 

Æ Increased security and safety due to a modern design incorporating contemporary nuclear safety and security standards and configured to better resist 

any possible threats. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What is the current status of the Kansas City Responsive Infrastructure Manufacturing and Sourcing (KCRIMS) initiative? 

Mr. TRIM. The non-facility related aspects of KCRIMS, which include strategic 

sourcing activities, process consolidation, and business system transformation to reduce costs, are being executed as planned. The original GSA solicitation for the new 

facility was cancelled in July and a new solicitation was issued on August 16th with 

revisions made to improve competition and adjust for current market factors. Honeywell FM&T is continuing to work with GSA and NNSA to ensure this important 

project is successful and moves forward in a timely manner. Facility completion is 

now scheduled for FY11 with relocation and the operational transition complete in 

FY13. The final NEPA Environmental Assessment for the new site is complete and 

a Finding of No Significant Impact has been published. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Please describe the analysis of alternatives that was conducted 

prior to the NNSA decision to build a replacement facility for the Kansas City Plant 

(KCP) near the current location, rather than moving the KCP mission to other 

NNSA sites. Please also describe the basis for NNSA’s conclusion that this approach 

is the most cost effective alternative. 

Mr. TRIM. The first analysis of alternatives was performed in conjunction with 

Critical Decision 1, part of the DOE Order 413.3 Acquisition of Capital Assets process. This study was performed in March 2007 by Honeywell FM&T and concluded 

that the additional cost to move operations to either Amarillo, TX or Albuquerque, 

NM was $565M more expensive than the Kansas City option. A second analysis, 

chartered by NNSA–HQ and conducted by an independent third-party (SAIC), was 

completed in October 2007. This study concluded that Albuquerque was the most 

viable option and the additional costs would be $289M more than the Kansas City 

option. Both studies agreed that the major cost drivers of a distant relocation would 
219 

be the transfer or rehire/retraining of a uniquely skilled workforce and additional 

costs associated with extended downtimes and requalification activities that would 

result from a long-distance relocation. Several examples of relatively recent major 

relocations of NNSA missions and capabilities (non-nuclear reconfiguration) served 

to validate both of these studies. The SAIC study was revalidated in conjunction 

with the second GSA solicitation. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Could more aggressively down-blending surplus highly-enriched 

uranium (HEU) reduce the need for storage of such surplus HEU in the HEUMF 

at Y–12? If so, could floor space in the HEUMF be configured for processing activities of the sort the planned UPF is designed to house? 

Mr. KOHLHORST. The HEUMF was designed and built to accommodate HEU for 

all viable stockpile scenarios. Down-blending of surplus HEU is occurring as soon 

as the HEU becomes available. However, should excess space be identified in the 

HEUMF, the facility was designed for storage rather than processing. Key systems 

such as air handling, electrical, and steam could not accommodate the unique operational requirements of wet chemistry, casting, and x-ray operations. The UPF is 

designed as a processing facility with different hazards, operations, deliverables and 

related regulatory requirements. The confinement strategy, fire protection requirements, criticality considerations and supporting infrastructure are all radically different than HEUMF and in many cases they are non-compatible. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. How will changes in the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile 

affect the scale and scope of work to be done in the planned UPF? 

Mr. KOHLHORST. This question has been studied extensively with many scenarios 

modeled and evaluated over the past year. One of the intentional features of the 

UPF design is its flexibility to accommodate a wide range of programs with a very 

limited set of equipment and minimal operating space. Accordingly, its size is driven 

primarily by capability and not capacity. The planned equipment set, combined with 

new technologies, allows for an impressive range of production capacity. The viable 

stockpile ranges being considered do not have a major impact on the scale or scope 

of the UPF design. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What effect would delays in construction of the UPF have on 

stockpile stewardship program work at Y–12? 

Mr. KOHLHORST. First, HEU operations are performed today in 60+ year-old facilities that have exceeded their economic lifetime and must continue to function until 

UPF is operational. Any delay in the construction of UPF will amplify the risk to 

continued operations, incur increased operating costs, and likely require facility investments to remain operational. Second, approximately $200 million per year in 

annual cost savings are projected upon completion and operation of the new UPF. 

In addition, just a one year slip in the UPF schedule would cost up to $100 million 

due to escalation, schedule slippage, and demobilization. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. In your experience auditing National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) project execution and management, do you believe the agency is 

equipped to effectively manage the consolidation of missions, especially among the 

labs, called for in the Preferred Alternative? 

Mr. ALOISE. For the better part of a decade GAO has reported on weaknesses in 

NNSA’s and the Department of Energy’s (DOE) ability to effectively manage large, 

complex projects. Poor project management has contributed to a history of cost overruns and schedule slips on major construction projects, as well as to changes in 

project scope and mission to accommodate cost and schedule constraints. For example, GAO reported in March 2007 (GAO–07–336) that 9 of the 12 major construction 

projects that DOE and NNSA were managing had exceeded their initial cost or 

schedule estimates, including three projects that exceeded initial cost estimates by 

more than 100 percent and four projects that were delayed by five years or more. 

Furthermore, our preliminary results from an ongoing review for this Subcommittee 

on NNSA’s Life Extension Program show that NNSA’s cost estimate for refurbishing 

each B61 bomb has almost doubled since 2002. 

GAO has testified that without clearly defined stockpile requirements to drive decision-making about Complex Transformation (GAO–06–606T, GAO–08–132T), we 

are not confident in NNSA’s ability to effectively implement the Preferred Alternative. The construction project and programmatic examples above represent NNSA 

efforts that began with clearly defined requirements. In contrast, NNSA’s Preferred 

Alternative is not based on clearly defined requirements to drive decisions about the 

scope of proposed facilities’ missions—specifically the size and capacity requirements 

for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility at the Los Alamos 

National Laboratory or the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y–12 Plant—which 

NNSA estimates together will cost as much as $5.5 billion. Further, the absence of 

stockpile requirements calls into question the basis on which the Preferred Alternative consolidates other missions, such as high explosives testing, which is cur-
220 

rently conducted at five sites within the nuclear weapons complex and, under the 

Preferred Alternative, would continue to be conducted at all five sites, though to differing extents. 

Transforming the nuclear weapons complex is a far more demanding task than 

any of the individual construction projects NNSA has managed and executed, and 

the Preferred Alternative for this transformation was crafted without grounding in 

stockpile requirements. For these reasons, GAO is concerned about NNSA’s ability 

to effectively manage and execute the Preferred Alternative. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What elements of the NNSA’s Preferred Alternative would you 

identify as warranting special congressional attention? 

Mr. ALOISE. In our testimony before the Committee, GAO identified three elements of NNSA’s Preferred Alternative that we believe warrant special congressional attention: (1) ensuring that the Preferred Alternative is ultimately implemented to meet specific stockpile requirements; (2) overseeing major projects called 

for in the Preferred Alternative, including the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 

Replacement facility and the Uranium Processing Facility; and (3) holding NNSA 

accountable for meeting detailed schedules and cost estimates for implementation 

of the Preferred Alternative. 

First, because Complex Transformation must be driven by clearly defined stockpile requirements, the Congress should ensure that once stockpile requirements are 

set the Preferred Alternative is systematically adjusted to meet these requirements. 

For example, once NNSA and the Department of Defense settle on a requirement 

for pit manufacturing, the Preferred Alternative should be revisited to ensure that 

the nuclear weapons complex’s plutonium manufacturing capability is correctly 

sized to meet the requirement. 

Second, given NNSA’s historically poor track record in managing major projects, 

the congress should pay special attention to overseeing all major projects associated 

with the Preferred Alternative, particularly construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility and the Uranium Processing Facility. 

Third, the Congress should require NNSA to submit detailed schedules and cost 

estimates for implementation of the Preferred Alternative that the Congress can 

then use to hold NNSA accountable for its management performance. These schedules and cost estimates should be tracked against their original baselines and a review triggered if these schedules and cost estimates are significantly exceeded. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Does Tri-Valley CAREs believe Livermore should meet the 2005 

DBT standards, even though all Category I and II special nuclear material (SNM) 

is expected to be removed by 2012? 

Ms. KELLEY. In theory, all sites with nuclear weapons usable quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium should meet the standards of the most stringent 

and most recent Design Basis Threat (i.e., the 2005 DBT). The potential for a terrorist attack from an outside force, insider ‘‘plants’’ or a disgruntled employee exists 

on any given day and is not limited to dates after 2012. 

That said, the spring 2008 security test that Livermore Lab failed was calibrated 

to the less stringent 2003 DBT. The number of attackers presumed in the 2003 DBT 

is only about half those in the 2005 DBT. Moreover, Livermore Lab did not fail the 

force-on-force drill on a peripheral, minor technicality. The Lab failed the central 

core of the test, in that it allowed mock terrorists to obtain special nuclear material 

and detonate an Improvised Nuclear Device. Moreover, the mock terrorists also succeeded in a second objective; to steal special nuclear material for use at a later date 

and place of their choosing. As a Livermore-based organization, Tri-Valley CAREs 

finds this situation intolerably dangerous. 

As you know, Tri-Valley CAREs has long called on the Dept. of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to initiate a timely, transparent and 

credible analysis of the most safe and secure location for Livermore’s special nuclear 

material. We have advocated that these decisions should not be politicized or tied 

to the Department’s nuclear weapons plans (e.g., Complex Transformation,’’ in 

which the preferred alternative is to move Livermore Lab’s plutonium twice to serve 

expanded pit production at Los Alamos Lab, a location that would not likely to be 

chosen if security were the primary determining factor). 

And, Tri-Valley CAREs has consistently called on Congress to press the Department and Livermore Lab management to prioritize safe packaging of the Lab’s plutonium, in particular. 

Thus, in 2008, we find ourselves understandably frustrated by the seeming conundrum of whether the focus of security activities and funding at Livermore Lab 

should be geared toward compliance with the 2003 and 2005 DBTs or toward getting the material safely and swiftly moved to a more secure location. 

This is a choice that remains only because of DOE’s inaction. However, if choice 

be required of me, I must pick the latter. I have been told by knowledgeable people 
221 

that Livermore Lab’s plutonium could be safely de-inventoried by 2010, two years 

ahead of the DOE’s proposed date of 2012. If the plutonium is de-inventoried by 

2010 instead of 2012, that cuts a 4-year risk in half. This should be the preeminent 

goal. Simply put, Livermore Lab’s special nuclear material is vulnerable every day 

it is left here—and so are we. 

Congress, and this subcommittee in particular, can productively impact this dangerous situation by: 

1. Mandating immediately a scientifically credible and independent analysis of the 

present procedure and schedule for de-inventorying special nuclear material from 

Livermore Lab with the goal of determining strategies to accelerate the schedule. 

2. Ensuring sufficient funds (and application of existing funds) to do the job. In 

this regard, it might be necessary for Congress to specify in legislation that qualified, certified plutonium handlers and packagers at Livermore Lab not be laid off. 

Word on the street is that Livermore Lab management earlier this year laid off 

some of the very workers who are needed to accelerate and complete the job. And, 

3. Passing legislation that mandates a date certain by which all weapons usable 

quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium must leave Livermore Lab. As 

you note in the wording of your question, the DOE ‘‘expects’’ to move the material 

by 2012. We believe it can be accomplished by 2010. But no law at present requires 

any date, including 2012. 

The crux of the problem of the vulnerability of nuclear materials at Livermore 

Lab is that the physical site (about 500 buildings and nearly 10,000 people crowded 

into one square mile), the encroaching community (homes, little league fields and 

apartments crowding up against the site), and the surrounding Bay Area (seven million people within a 50-mile radius) make this an unacceptable location for nuclear 

bomb-making materials. 

Therefore, the solution cannot be found in installing more Gatling guns, which 

also pose a risk to workers and the community if they are ever fired. Instead, the 

only right thing to do is to de-inventory the site by the earliest possible date. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Is Tri-Valley CAREs ‘‘curatorship’’ model compatible with the military’s requirement for a more responsive infrastructure and more reliable, safe, and 

secure weapons capability? 

Ms. KELLEY. Yes! A ‘‘Curatorship’’ approach to managing the arsenal will achieve 

the goals of safety, reliability and security more credibly and at lower cost than either the current Life Extension Programs or the (so-called) Reliable Replacement 

Warhead program. 

Curatorship is designed to better utilize and focus the nation’s stockpile maintenance capability. Minimizing changes to the well-tested warheads in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile keeps them more reliable, safe and secure than either making ‘‘enhancements’’ to them that are not absolutely required to resolve an actionable defect in the warheads or designing new ones without nuclear tests. 

An historical note of importance here: In 1993, the President and the Congress 

established the Stockpile Stewardship Program with the goal of maintaining high 

confidence in the stockpile absent full scale underground nuclear testing. The DOE 

NNSA’s 2003 budget documents revised that goal to read, ‘‘Maintain and ENHANCE [emphasis added] the safety, security, and reliability of the Nation’s nuclear 

weapons stockpile to counter the threats of the 21st Century.’’ The idea of enhancing 

the stockpile was intentionally omitted as a goal in 1993 for two reasons. First, it 

was generally agreed that the existing stockpile was extremely safe and reliable 

and, thus, no changes were needed. Second, it was generally agreed that if major 

changes were made to nuclear weapons, without full scale underground nuclear testing, there would be a significant risk that the modified weapons would be less safe 

and reliable than the well-tested versions they replaced. Neither of those reasons 

is any less true today. 

Adding enhancement of the stockpile as a DOE NNSA goal is the type of major 

policy change that should have triggered significant debate at the time it was proposed. That debate is late in coming, but is no less needed. 

The choice is between ‘‘curating’’ the existing nuclear test pedigree of the arsenal 

or walking further and further away from that pedigree in favor of interesting new 

projects for bomb designers, whether they be RRWs or unnecessary changes 

bootstrapped into Life Extension Programs. 

Additional detail on how a Curatorship approach compares to other methods can 

be found in Tri-Valley CAREs’ 2000 report, ‘‘Managing the U.S. Nuclear Weapons 

Stockpile: A Comparison of 5 Strategies.’’ Further analysis of how to ‘‘modernize’’ 

(this subcommittee’s term) or ‘‘transform’’ (DOE NNSA’s word) the U.S. nuclear 

weapons complex to reflect a Curatorship approach can be found in Tri-Valley 

CAREs’ comments on the Complex Transformation draft Supplemental Pro-
222 

grammatic Environmental Impact Statement, ‘‘Part One: The Nuclear Weapons 

Complex-wide Impacts,’’ April 30, 2008. 

Your question also asks about the requirement for a ‘‘responsive infrastructure,’’ 

which was introduced in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. Congress has already 

mandated that the next administration produce a new posture review. That said, 

Tri-Valley CAREs would like to offer a few observations on the general thrust of 

the question. A nuclear weapons complex with a more clear and narrowly defined 

mission and scope of work focused on the safety, reliability and security of the existing (pedigreed) stockpile will be more responsive to fixing ‘‘actionable defects’’ in the 

stockpile than the Complex Transformation plan, as maintenance will not be competing with other priorities in the DOE NNSA complex—as is presently (and increasingly) the case. 

Furthermore, we find the DOE NNSA poised on the brink of building large new 

production facilities (for example, more plutonium pit production capability at Los 

Alamos Lab in NM and a new uranium processing facility at Y–12 in TN). This approach is not only wasteful and counterproductive to our nation’s global nonproliferation aims, but it locks in the departing administration’s nuclear weapons 

policy for the next 20 years or more. So-called Complex Transformation is neither 

responsive to needed (and likely) changes in U.S. policy nor to prioritizing maintenance of the existing nuclear weapons stockpile as a principal organizing feature of 

the weapons complex. In contrast, Curatorship is more responsive to both. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Does Tri-Valley CAREs imagine that at some point, Life Extension Programs (LEP) for existing nuclear weapons could be riskier than the development of something like the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)? On whose judgment would you rely for such an assessment? 

Ms. KELLEY. First, thank you for asking this question. Tri-Valley CAREs seeks 

to limit and restrain the Life Extension Programs and terminate the RRW program 

in large part to ensure that the U.S. is not forced to the very precipice posited 

above. 

Curatorship is grounded in the principle that staying as close as possible to the 

existing nuclear test base is the best technical approach to maintenance of the arsenal while carrying the least technical risk that there will be future pressure to resume full-scale underground nuclear tests. If this is the goal, then Curatorship has 

distinct advantages over either the current LEPs or the RRW. 

You ask on whose judgment for these assessments Tri-Valley CAREs would rely. 

In general, Tri-Valley CAREs leans toward ensuring that the ‘‘table’’ at which such 

judgments are made includes the broadest spectrum of voices, and that the decisions 

themselves are conducted in the most transparent manner possible. In this regard, 

we have concerns that the new management structures of the Livermore and Los 

Alamos labs may be headed in the misguided direction of enabling not more but 

fewer, and more uniform, voices at the ‘‘table.’’ 

Tri-Valley CAREs supports genuine scientific peer review—which we believe need 

not necessitate and does not justify the continuance of two full service nuclear weapon design labs—along with ‘‘outside’’ independent analysis. Moreover, we support 

the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the Freedom of Information Act and other 

open government laws to ensure that the American people can also participate appropriately in decision-making. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What is your assessment of the NNSA complex transformation 

proposal? Are there other viable alternative approaches to provide a more responsive infrastructure? 

Ambassador ROBINSON. As I said in my testimony, ‘‘My reactions [to the Complex 

Transformation Plan] are mixed. While it is doubtless improved over the previous 

version (Complex 2030), it still does not present a compelling solution to the many 

problems facing the nuclear weapons complex.’’ 

A more viable (and sensible) approach would be to: 

(1) Establish at a national level the purpose and sizing of the US arsenal of nuclear weapons—appropriate to the threats we and our allies must likely face going 

forward. The DoD has not taken up this issue for at least 15 years (under two administrations) but continues to try to preserve a Cold War arsenal that (a) no longer 

fits the world we live in, (b) nor fits the threats we face. The US Strategic Commission you created is one attempt to develop same, but whether it will stall over the 

polarizations (of the left and the right) is yet to be seen. There is no substitute for 

the US uniformed military once again developing its own detailed plans (that would 

implement such a national strategy.) Having DOE move forward to transform the 

Complex without having coordinated plans [with the DoD] is unlikely to succeed. 

The drafters of the current SPEIS were ‘‘flying blind’’ in trying to develop a plan 

to transform the complex without such guidance. 
223 

(2) Reorganize the management structure of the complex to have a nuclear weapons enterprise that is coherently managed and budgeted for. Just look at the DOE 

and NNSA org. chart: there is no direct management of the production complex. The 

overall management—including cohesive day-to-day management of the GOCOs— 

used to be performed by the Albuquerque Operations Office for the entire complex, 

and the AOO depended on the weapons labs to help it establish the technical directions and design and quality acceptance requirements and the labs served as the 

final approval for any deviations. This arrangement worked for 40 years, and no one 

has filled the vacuum left by abolishment of the Albuquerque Operations role. (b) 

The plants mostly exist in an ‘‘every man for himself ’’ environment, and—in that 

vacuum—many plants have sought and achieved close political relationships with 

their own Congressional representatives and Senators. The effect of such actions has 

only increased ‘‘the centrifugal pressures tearing the complex apart.’’ 

(c) There never was effective, cohesive management of the three weapons labs, although in truth it was never possible to ‘‘manage’’ the labs in any traditional sense. 

The fact has been well established that the Federal government is incapable of 

‘‘managing the advancement of science’’ (even though periodically it tries this, 

through civil-service labs, but untarnished by success.) Because of this fact, the 

GOCO system (Government-owned, Contractor-operated) was created. The GOCO 

contractors originally were the nation’s best companies (or universities) in science 

and technology, who brought their business practices and approaches to the labs. 

There are only one or two of these left today, with the rest being mostly small outfits whose main business is ‘‘running the labs for the government’, motivated by fees 

they can earn (which was never the case in the original complex.) Worse yet, the 

bureaucracy of DOE (ERDA, or AEC) has continued to grow and have attempted 

to ‘‘take control’’ of the labs, and the model has deteriorated more and more to a 

‘‘government-owned and operated’’ complex. There are now no longer any barriers 

to preventing the constantly burgeoning government bureaucracy from being imposed on the labs (and plants) and the advantages of having ‘‘private-sector’’ organizations for their functions has long since vanished. The original approach had been 

to have the labs responsible for innovations. The labs would propose their ideas to 

the government and to the military, and once agreement was established between 

them on ‘‘What was to be done’’, the labs took over the process of how it should be 

done and carried the responsibility for achieving the agreed goals. My deeply held 

conviction is that the GOCO model has deteriorated so far, that it must 

now either be eliminated or drastically rejuvenated (with a new agency 

and a ‘‘clean sheet of paper.’’) 

In summary, there is little to suggest that the US weapons complex is a common 

team, smoothly interfacing, with clear guidance to carry out its mission. That is 

what is needed. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Ambassador Robinson, you have witnessed previous efforts to 

modernize or transform the nuclear weapons complex. What lessons have you 

learned from previous efforts? 

Ambassador ROBINSON. The whole issue of budgeting for either facility maintenance or constructing new facilities has never been done well through the process 

of ‘‘annual budgets.’’ One of the helpful improvements was the NNSA requirement 

for a five-year plan, although seldom were the last 3 years of any such plan ever 

realized. Setting priorities should be easy enough in today’s ‘‘shortage environment’’ 

where we no longer have the capability to produce Plutonium pits in sufficient numbers. Reviving a plutonium production capability must have top priority. 

I believe that the organization of the Congress for budgeting has become a serious 

problem. Having two subcommittees in both the House and Senate that provide separate appropriations for DOE and for DoD have left us with little alignment or even 

correlation of these budgets. Personally, and after many years of believing that it 

was important to keep the nuclear weapons design, development, and production 

separate from the Defense Department, I have now reached the point that I believe it is worth considering removing the weapons responsibilities from 

DOE and placing it as a new agency within the DoD. The presence of a uniformed military could provide a continuity that has been lacking as different administrations came and went. The nation’s nuclear deterrent has only suffered from 

these short-term upheavals in what must be a long-term commitment. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. As transformation efforts take shape, what steps can Congress 

take to mitigate against the risk that the vast intellectual capital in the complex— 

the people that make the Stockpile Stewardship Program a success—is not lost or 

permanently impaired? 

Ambassador ROBINSON. I am glad that the Subcommittee does recognize how crucial the bright, highly, trained, and dedicated people are to ensuring the US deterrent. In this regard I am more concerned, than I have ever been, over the more than 
224 

forty years I have worked in this complex, that the morale of these rare people has 

reached an all time low. The recent Chiles study (a DSB Task Force on Nuclear Personnel Expertise) examined the problems of the fractionated management within 

DOE for nuclear weapons, safety, and security and said ‘‘Worker feelings range from 

anger to resigned despair.’’ Note also, that his investigations took place before the 

lay-offs of more than a thousand people at both Los Alamos and Livermore this past 

year. The situation at both of those labs is far worse now. While the labs had always 

been able to attract the best and brightest to come to the laboratories (for somewhat 

less pay than they would have earned in the private sector), the freedom to pursue 

new ideas and the fact that the work was so vitally important to the security of our 

country was reward enough to keep them. However today, it is impossible to make 

these arguments, when the burgeoning bureaucracy suppresses individual voices, 

and it is apparent that most officials within the Executive branch and the Congress 

pay little attention to the nuclear weapons efforts. It is all too obvious that too much 

in government no longer care about its future. 

On an historical basis, one principle that has proven itself to be valid for many 

centuries was well expressed by Edward Gibbon (‘‘The Rise and Fall of the Ancient 

Roman Empire.’’), who wrote ‘That which is not advancing must surely decline.’ 

Thus, until only very recently, the mission to perpetually try to improve the US 

deterrent weapons was a necessary and accepted mission for that intellectual capital 

embodied in the weapons labs. That guiding principle is still uppermost in the Russian and Chinese programs, and in the French program, but it has now been successfully eliminated in the US labs. However, this issue seems to be forbidden from 

discussion, in the badly mistaken view that to hold such a view would stimulate 

other nations to proliferate (in the ridiculous viewpoint that somehow if we—the 

United States—stop striving for a stronger deterrent, the rest of the world will stop 

as well.) The safeguards—that were agreed upon to be in place with the signing of 

the CTBT by the US—state that the US will continue to keep a strong design and 

development capability, but this capability is now well down the path to going out 

of existence. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Do weapons designers need to design and build weapons to exercise their skills? 

Ambassador ROBINSON. This question can only be answered by an understanding 

of what used to happen, and how it has changed over the past 20 years. The driving 

force for new developments was always the Phase 1 and Phase 2 joint projects with 

military Project Officer’s Groups (POG’s) teaming with the labs to evaluate possibilities (which the labs and the POG’s would both suggest), and then jointly settle on 

‘‘Military Characteristics’’ that would guide the next weapon systems. The proposals 

would then move forward through the military chain of command and the DOD 

leaderships and separately through the DOE (ERDA, AEC) chain as well. Finally 

arriving at a Presidential decision, which—if approved—would be passed to the Congress for their approval, or disapproval. 

That process seems to be broken today, with little or no attention having been 

paid to the configuration of the US deterrent arsenal since the end of the Cold War. 

Also, members of the legislative branch have interrupted this process from moving 

forward, by placing specific language in Authorization and Appropriation bills to 

prohibit any work (either Phase 1 or Phase 2 as well), until they have approved any 

proposed systems. The result unfortunately has been a stalemate, with no new systems being approved by the Congress and hence new starts becoming non-existent 

since the end of the Cold War. The labs often, but not always, would work together 

to establish mutual directions which could substitute for lack of guidance on future 

weapons, but depending on personalities at the individual labs (at any point in 

time), these were never really a successful substitute. 

Thus the plain truth is that today the US continues to try to maintain an arsenal 

of weapons for deterrence purposes that no longer matches the threats we face (and 

hence whose ultimate use would be credible), nor the delivery systems which would 

be most likely to succeed, and hence the legacy systems are less likely to deter aggressive behaviors of major adversaries. The very high yields of the legacy systems 

are no longer needed because of the huge improvements that have been made in 

delivery system accuracies over the intervening years. Many of us believe that if 

such high yields remain the only options available, our threats to actually use such 

weapons are hallow and hence our ability to deter war is rapidly vanishing, to a 

point where we will be ‘‘self-deterred.’’ Something must be done to break the current 

stalemate. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. How should the stockpile stewardship program be executed in a 

transformed and modernized complex? Will a transformed complex require changes 

to the stockpile stewardship program? 
225 

Ambassador ROBINSON. My belief is that the following represents the right order 

of things: 

(1) The question of whether the nuclear weapons entities should all be moved to 

become an integral part of the Department of Defense is a critical issue, which 

needs to be faced now. 

(2) Fix the GOCO process (as I discussed earlier) and tailor a stand-alone organization to direct and manage the R&D, design, development, and manufacturing 

processes. 

(3) Pull the complex parts into a cohesive whole (functioning as a single, highperformance team), rather than continuing the current collection of poorly coordinated parts. 

(4) Set a priority order of urgently needed facilities, and prepare a long-range 

budget that puts these in an appropriate budget plan. 

There should be no need to change the Stockpile Stewardship program, other than 

to again free up some activities in advanced science and technology and advanced 

designs, most of which has been curtailed or eliminated in recent years. Of course, 

everyone should ‘‘wake-up’’ to the fact that there is no guarantee that it will yet 

prove possible to replace the confidence that always was provided by nuclear testing, by—instead—relying only on computer calculations and much improved scientific-understanding. We have made excellent progress in developing the supercomputers for the effort, but far less progress on improving the unknown scientific mysteries so that they can be correctly included in the computer codes. Thus, preservation of the ability to test—should it become necessary—is still vital to the US. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What are the highest investment priorities for NNSA’s limited resources? 

Ambassador ROBINSON. A new and effective (i.e. proven) capability to fabricate 

plutonium pits is a critical first priority. The damage done to the US program by 

the closing of the Rocky Flats Production Site (because of environmental issues/protests) has hurt the overall US nuclear weapons production program more than almost anyone realizes. We are the only nation that cannot build a new, modern arsenal of weapons, much less can we reproduce the old designs which now constitute 

our complete stockpile. 

The ultimate priority is of course a realization that the US arsenal of deterrent 

weapons is the only proven factor in preserving the peace in the world and prevent 

world wars or major conflicts. The end of the Cold War was not the ‘‘end of history’’, 

as many suggested, but it does appear that the emergence of nuclear weapons that 

ended the fighting of World War II may yet prove to be ‘‘the end of the history of 

global conflicts.’’ The mindset being advocated in many quarters—that we must now 

embark on a policy of ‘‘eliminating all nuclear weapons from the earth’’—is misguided and premature. It would usher in a state of international affairs where nations are free to return to unlimited global conflicts, and there is little chance that 

even if it were possible (and it is not) to remove all nuclear weapons, they could 

be reproduced by some nations, who could then easily take advantage of the relatively greater power they would have over the US and others. 

I have always believed that there are (at least) two extremely major barriers that 

must be overcome before we could undertake any realistic thinking that ‘‘a world 

free of nuclear weapons would be a better world’’ than the current situation. These 

are: 

(a) the elimination of nation-states. (Anyone who believes that this could be 

achieved in a matter of decades is either hopelessly idealistic or really fooling themselves.), and 

(b) a change in the nature of mankind itself to eschew any acts of major aggression. 

Once again, these are merely ‘‘poetic ideas’’ but there are little grounds to believe 

that this could be achieved even in 100 years, if ever. I would note that there are 

not even any good ideas put forward for how to go about same, nor is anyone actually working on it. The US already began the nuclear weapons era by putting forward a serious proposal (the Baruch Plan) that would have placed all nuclear weapons under a common international control, but this plan was instantly rejected, and 

I feel safe in predicting that a revival of that proposal would be just as quickly rejected today. 

Thus, we should now all join in putting our best efforts to the task of deterring 

war through the threat of retaliation of nuclear weapons, with the best outcome 

being that we would—as a result—never have to use such weapons. But the overarching importance that the US must give sufficient attention to the characteristics, 

numbers, performance, and reliability of its nuclear deterrent arsenal should be ob-
226 

vious to anyone in a senior government position. I urge the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the HASC to step up and demand that the US greatly increase its attention to reverse the decline which now characterizes our deterrent and the complex responsible for it. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. The NNSA has indicated that it must develop an inventory of plutonium oxide feed material to cover the time gap between start-up of the MOX facility 

and the construction of the PDCF. 

What is NNSA’s current planning estimate for the amount of plutonium oxide 

feed material needed to bridge the gap between start-up of the MOX facility and 

completion of PDCF? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. In consideration of the current schedules for both the MOX and 

PDCF facility, NNSA currently estimates up to twelve metric tons of plutonium 

oxide feed material will be required to bridge the gap between start-up of the MOX 

facility and completion of PDCF. This amount is in addition to the two metric tons 

of plutonium oxide currently planned to be received from the Advanced Recovery 

and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. 

Mr. WILSON. What is the current estimate of the amount of available plutonium 

oxide feedstock currently in storage? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. There is currently 4.1 metric tons of plutonium oxide feedstock 

available in storage at the Savannah River Site to support feed for the MOX facility 

that meets the MOX feed specification. 

Mr. WILSON. What is the current estimate of the ‘‘alternate feed stock’’ or nonpit surplus plutonium in the weapons complex that does not rely on PDCF for processing to plutonium oxide? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The current estimate is 7.8 metric tons of ‘‘alternate feed stock’’ 

or non-pit surplus plutonium is available to process into plutonium oxide for feed 

to the MOX facility. This includes the 4.1 metric tons of plutonium oxide currently 

in storage. 

Mr. WILSON. How much of the alternate feed stock could be converted in H-Canyon at the Savannah River Site (SRS)? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The 3.7 metric tons out of 7.8 metric tons of ‘‘alternate feed 

stock’’ plutonium metal yet to be processed, is expected to be processed within the 

K reactor area of SRS. No material to be used for MOX feedstock is currently 

planned to be processed through H-Canyon. However, DOE is evaluating options 

that could provide additional alternative feed stock materials through the use of HCanyon. 

Mr. WILSON. NNSA has indicated that the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) facility at Los Alamos can produce plutonium oxide feedstock for the MOX facility before PDCF comes online. How much plutonium oxide 

does NNSA intend to produce at ARIES with the funding it has requested for FY 

09? How much plutonium oxide has ARIES produced to date, and has any of this 

plutonium oxide been accepted by the MOX program under its quality control regime? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The funding for ARIES in FY 2009 is primarily to conduct final 

demonstration testing of the equipment to support design & operation of the PDCF. 

The ARIES project will then transition to routine oxide production in subsequent 

years. As a result of the demonstration activities, about 40 kilograms of plutonium 

as oxide will be generated in FY 09 and will contribute to the 2 metric tons expected 

to be delivered from Los Alamos through 2018. The ARIES project has produced approximately 300 kilograms of oxide via demonstration programs in prior years. 120 

kilograms of this oxide was accepted by MOX services and is currently being irradiated at the Catawba reactor in lead test assemblies. Los Alamos was designated as 

a qualified vendor for MOX services during earlier production and will re-establish 

vendor certification as a part of the baseline program. 

Mr. WILSON. The Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Report included an 

additional $22 million for ARIES for FY 09. How much additional plutonium oxide 

could be produced with the additional funds? Is the available equipment and hired 

and trained workers at ARIES/Los Alamos capable of safely producing an additional 

$22 million worth of plutonium oxide in FY 09? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The additional $22 million for ARIES in FY 2009 is intended primarily for the procurement and installation of additional ARIES equipment, not for 

the production of additional oxide. The additional equipment will reduce the dose 

to workers and provide for enhanced operating safety and efficiency improvements 
227 

during oxide production in later years. Depending upon the vendor certification 

schedule and when the funding becomes available, it may result in the production 

of a small amount of additional material in FY 2009. 

Mr. WILSON. Your Memorandum dated July 7, 2008 sets forth recommendations 

for the FY 2010–2014 planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluations process. 

Please explain why PDCF funding is zeroed out in the Memorandum. Please also 

explain how you could approve a CD–2 decision on PDCF by January 2009, if 

NNSA’s budget profile set out in the July 7 Memorandum provides no construction 

funding for PDCF. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The Administrator’s Final Recommendations Memorandum 

dated July 7, 2008, by which we conclude our annual internal budget update process, retains construction funding for the PDCF construction project for FY 2010 and 

beyond. The funding was moved within the Weapons Activities appropriation from 

the Directed Stockpile Work (DSW) program to Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) where most Defense Programs construction projects are funded. The 

DOE’s decision to approve the construction baseline, CD–2, is not contingent upon 

a program funding allocation; however, once CD–2 is approved, it is NNSA’s practice 

to allocate funding supporting the baseline schedule. 

Æ