[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 203 (Monday, October 23, 2023)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 72701-72723]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-23449]


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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

31 CFR Part 1010

RIN 1506-AB64


Proposal of Special Measure Regarding Convertible Virtual 
Currency Mixing, as a Class of Transactions of Primary Money Laundering 
Concern

AGENCY: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Treasury.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: FinCEN is issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), 
pursuant to section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, that proposes requiring 
domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies to 
implement certain recordkeeping and reporting requirements relating to 
transactions involving convertible virtual currency (CVC) mixing.

DATES: Written comments on the notice of proposed rulemaking must be 
submitted on or before January 22, 2024.

ADDRESSES: Comments must be submitted by one of the following methods:
    <bullet> Federal E-rulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments. Refer to Docket Number 
FINCEN-2023-0016 in the submission.
    <bullet> Mail: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, P.O. Box 39, 
Vienna, VA 22183. Refer to Docket Number FINCEN-2023-0016 in the 
submission.
    Please submit comments by one method only, and note that comments 
submitted in responses to this NPRM will become a matter of public 
record.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:  The FinCEN Regulatory Support Section 
at 1-800-767-2825 or electronically at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#b4d2c6d7f4d2dddad7d1da9ad3dbc2"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="85e3f7e6c5e3ecebe6e0ebabe2eaf3">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Statutory Provisions

    Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act (section 311), codified at 31 
U.S.C. 5318A, grants the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) 
authority, upon finding that reasonable grounds exist for concluding 
that one or more classes of transactions within or involving a 
jurisdiction outside of the United States is of primary money 
laundering concern, to require domestic financial institutions and 
domestic financial agencies to take certain ``special measures.'' \1\ 
The authority of the Secretary to administer section 311 and the Bank 
Secrecy Act (BSA) has been delegated to FinCEN.\2\
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    \1\ On October 26, 2001, the President signed into law the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Public Law 
107-56 (USA PATRIOT Act). Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act amended 
the anti-money laundering (AML) provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act 
(BSA) to promote the prevention, detection, and prosecution of 
international money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The 
BSA, as amended, is the popular name for a collection of statutory 
authorities that FinCEN administers that is codified at 12 U.S.C. 
1829b, 1951-1960 and 31 U.S.C. 5311-5314, 5316-5336, and includes 
other authorities reflected in notes thereto. Regulations 
implementing the BSA appear at 31 CFR Chapter X.
    \2\ Pursuant to Treasury Order 180-01 (Jan. 14, 2020), the 
authority of the Secretary to administer the BSA, including, but not 
limited to, 31 U.S.C. 5318A, has been delegated to the Director of 
FinCEN.
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    The five special measures set out in section 311 are prophylactic 
safeguards that may be employed to defend the United States financial 
system from money laundering and terrorist financing risks. The 
Secretary may impose one or more of these special measures in order to 
protect the U.S. financial system from such threats. Through special 
measure one, the Secretary may require domestic financial institutions 
and domestic financial agencies to maintain records, file reports, or 
both, concerning the aggregate amount of transactions or individual 
transactions.\3\ Through special measures two through four, the 
Secretary may impose additional recordkeeping, information collection, 
and reporting requirements on covered domestic financial institutions 
and domestic financial agencies.\4\ Through special measure five, the 
Secretary may prohibit, or impose conditions upon, the opening or 
maintaining in the United States of correspondent or payable-through 
accounts for or on behalf of a foreign banking institution, if the 
class of transactions found to be of primary money laundering concern 
may be conducted through such correspondent account or payable-through 
account.\5\
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    \3\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(1).
    \4\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(2)-(b)(4).
    \5\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(5).
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    Before making a finding that reasonable grounds exist for 
concluding that a class of transactions is of primary money laundering 
concern, the Secretary is required to consult with both the Secretary 
of State and the Attorney General.\6\ The Secretary is also required to 
consider such information as the Secretary determines to be relevant, 
including the following potentially relevant factors:
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    \6\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(1).
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    <bullet> The extent to which such class of transactions is used to 
facilitate or promote money laundering in or through a jurisdiction 
outside the United States, including any money laundering activity by 
organized criminal groups, international terrorists, or entities 
involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or 
missiles;
    <bullet> The extent to which such class of transactions is used for 
legitimate business purposes in the jurisdiction; and
    <bullet> The extent to which such action is sufficient to ensure 
that the purposes of section 311 are fulfilled and to guard against 
international money laundering and other financial crimes.\7\
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    \7\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B).
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    Upon finding that a class of transactions is of primary money 
laundering concern, the Secretary may require covered financial 
institutions to take one or more special measures. In selecting one or 
more special measures, the Secretary ``shall consult with the Chairman 
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, any other 
appropriate Federal banking agency (as defined in section 3 of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act), the Secretary of State, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the 
National Credit Union Administration Board, and in the sole discretion 
of the Secretary, such other agencies and interested parties as the 
Secretary may find appropriate.'' \8\
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    \8\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(A).
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    In addition, the Secretary is required to consider the following 
factors when selecting special measures:
    <bullet> Whether similar action has been or is being taken by other 
nations or multilateral groups;
    <bullet> Whether the imposition of any particular special measure 
would create a significant competitive disadvantage, including any 
undue cost or burden associated with compliance, for financial 
institutions organized or licensed in the United States;
    <bullet> The extent to which the action or the timing of the action 
would have a significant adverse systemic impact on the international 
payment, clearance, and settlement system, or on legitimate

[[Page 72702]]

business activities involving the particular jurisdiction, institution, 
class of transactions, or type of account; and
    <bullet> The effect of the action on United States national 
security and foreign policy.\9\
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    \9\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(B).
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II. Summary of NPRM

    Convertible Virtual Currency (CVC) mixing entails the facilitation 
of CVC \10\ transactions in a manner that obfuscates the source, 
destination, or amount involved in one or more transactions.\11\ 
Because CVC mixing is intended to make CVC transactions untraceable and 
anonymous, CVC mixing is ripe for abuse by, and frequently used by, 
illicit foreign actors that threaten the national security of the 
United States and the U.S. financial system. By obscuring the 
connection between the CVC wallet addresses used to receive illicit CVC 
proceeds and the CVC wallet addresses from which illicit CVC is 
transferred to CVC-to-fiat \12\ currency exchangers, other CVC users, 
or CVC exchanges, CVC mixing transactions can play a central role in 
facilitating the laundering of CVC derived from a variety of illicit 
activity.
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    \10\ For the purposes of this NPRM, the term ``CVC'' is defined 
as a medium of exchange that either has an equivalent value as 
currency or acts as a substitute for currency, but lacks legal 
tender status. Although Bitcoin has legal tender status in at least 
two jurisdictions, the term ``CVC'' includes Bitcoin.
    \11\ A more detailed definition of this term is provided in 
Section IX of this NPRM.
    \12\ Fiat currency refers to traditional currency such as the 
U.S. dollar.
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    Indeed, CVC mixing transactions are frequently used by criminals 
and state actors to facilitate a range of illicit activity, including, 
but not limited to, money laundering, sanctions evasion and WMD 
proliferation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or 
North Korea), Russian-associated ransomware attacks,\13\ and illicit 
darknet markets. Further, a recent assessment by FinCEN determined that 
the percentage of CVC transactions processed by CVC mixers that 
originated from likely illicit sources is increasing.\14\ CVC mixing 
often involves foreign jurisdictions because persons who facilitate or 
engage in CVC mixing transactions are often located abroad, including 
notable recent CVC mixing activity involving DPRK-affiliated threat 
actors, Russian ransomware actors, and buyers and sellers on Russian 
darknet markets.
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    \13\ Notwithstanding the use of ``attack'' as a legal term of 
art in certain settings, FinCEN here and throughout intends only the 
colloquial meaning of the term.
    \14\ A more detailed examination of analysis is below in Section 
IV.A.3 of this NPRM.
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    Accordingly, because CVC mixing provides foreign illicit actors 
with enhanced anonymity that allows them to launder their illicit 
proceeds, FinCEN assesses that transactions involving CVC mixing within 
or involving a jurisdiction outside the United States are of primary 
money laundering concern, and, having undertaken the necessary 
consultations, also finds that imposing additional recordkeeping and 
reporting requirements would assist in mitigating the risks posed by 
such transactions. Such reporting will assist law enforcement with 
identifying the perpetrators behind illicit transactions and 
preventing, investigating, and prosecuting illegal activity, as well as 
rendering such transactions--through increased transparency--less 
attractive and useful to illicit actors. This NPRM (1) sets forth 
FinCEN's finding that transactions involving CVC mixing within or 
involving jurisdictions outside the United States are a class of 
transactions that are of primary money laundering concern; and (2) 
proposes, under special measure one, requiring covered financial 
institutions to implement certain recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements on transactions that covered financial institutions know, 
suspect, or have reason to suspect involve CVC mixing within or 
involving jurisdictions outside the United States.

III. Background

    Although the United States supports innovation and advances in 
digital and distributed ledger technology for financial services, it 
must also consider the substantial implications that such technology 
has for national security and mitigate the attendant risks for 
consumers, businesses, national security, and the integrity of the 
broader U.S. financial system.\15\ CVC can be used for legitimate and 
innovative purposes. However, it is not without its risks and, in 
particular, the use of CVC to anonymize illicit activity undermines the 
legitimate and innovative uses of CVC.
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    \15\ White House, Executive Order on Ensuring Responsible 
Development of Digital Assets Fact Sheet, Mar. 9, 2022, available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/09/fact-sheet-president-biden-to-sign-executive-order-on-ensuring-responsible-innovation-in-digital-assets/.
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A. CVC Mixing and Its Mechanisms

    The term ``virtual currency'' refers to a medium of exchange that 
can operate like currency but does not have all the attributes of 
``real,'' or fiat, currency. CVC is a type of virtual currency that 
either has an equivalent value as currency or acts as a substitute for 
currency and is therefore a type of ``value that substitutes for 
currency.'' The label applies to any particular type of CVC, such as 
``digital currency,'' ``cryptocurrency,'' ``cryptoasset,'' and 
``digital asset.'' <SUP>16 17</SUP>
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    \16\ See, e.g., FinCEN, FIN-2019-G001, Application of FinCEN's 
Regulations to Certain Business Models Involving Convertible Virtual 
Currencies, May 9, 2019, available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2019-05/FinCEN%20Guidance%20CVC%20FINAL%20508.pdf 
(FinCEN 2019 CVC Guidance).
    \17\ FinCEN notes that CVC or ``virtual currency'' by itself 
does not meet the definition of a ``currency'' under 31 CFR 
1010.100(m). Additionally, potential characterization of CVC as 
currency, securities, commodities, or derivatives for the purposes 
of any other legal regime, such as the Federal securities laws or 
the Commodity Exchange Act, is outside the scope of this proposed 
rule. However, as described in the FinCEN 2019 CVC Guidance, if 
assets that other regulatory frameworks defined as commodities, 
securities, or futures contracts were to be specifically issued or 
later repurposed to serve as a currency substitute, then the asset 
itself could be a type of value that substitutes for currency and be 
defined as CVC for the purposes of this proposed rule, in addition 
to being subject to other applicable regulatory frameworks.
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    The public nature of most CVC blockchains,\18\ which provide a 
permanent, recorded history of all previous transactions, make it 
possible to know someone's entire financial history on the blockchain. 
Anonymity enhancing tools, including ``mixers,'' are used to avoid 
this. To provide enhanced anonymity, CVC mixers provide a service--CVC 
mixing--that is intended to obfuscate transactional information, 
allowing users to obscure their connection to the CVC.
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    \18\ Blockchain refers to a type of distributed ledger 
technology (DLT) that cryptographically signs transactions that are 
grouped into blocks. For more information on blockchain, see 
National Institute of Science and Technology, Blockchain, available 
at https://www.nist.gov/blockchain.
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    There are a number of ways to conduct CVC mixing transactions--one 
of the most common of which is the use of CVC mixers. CVC mixers can 
accomplish this through a variety of mechanisms, including: pooling or 
aggregating CVC from multiple individuals, wallets, or accounts into a 
single transaction or transactions; splitting an amount into multiple 
amounts and transmitting the CVC as a series of smaller independent 
transactions; or leveraging code to coordinate, manage, or manipulate 
the structure of the transaction; among other methods. Through such 
mechanisms, CVC mixers can functionally simulate a customer depositing 
funds from an anonymous account into a financial institution's omnibus 
account and withdrawing funds into a separate anonymous account.\19\ 
For example, a

[[Page 72703]]

criminal actor could take the illicit proceeds of their crime, send the 
CVC to a CVC mixer, and then on to an account they hold at a virtual 
asset service provider (VASP). At this point, the VASP would take 
custody of the illicitly sourced CVC, thereby allowing illicit funds to 
enter their omnibus account, all while being unaware of the origin of 
the illicit CVC. The critical challenge is that CVC mixing services 
rarely, if ever, provide to regulators or law enforcement the resulting 
transactional chain or information collected as part of the 
transaction.
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    \19\ See U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury), DeFi Risk 
Assessment, Apr. 2023, at p. 19, available at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/DeFi-Risk-Full-Review.pdf 
(Treasury April 2023 Defi Risk Assessment).
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    CVC mixing does not, however, wholly rely on the use of CVC mixers. 
There are certain methods that CVC users--and CVC mixers--often employ 
in an effort to obfuscate their transactions. These methods include:
    a. Pooling or aggregating CVC from multiple persons, wallets, 
addresses, or accounts: This method involves combining CVC from two or 
more persons into a single wallet or smart contract and, by pooling or 
aggregating that CVC, obfuscating the identity of both parties to the 
transaction by decreasing the probability of determining both intended 
persons for each unique transaction.
    b. Splitting CVC for transmittal and transmitting the CVC through a 
series of independent transactions: This method involves splitting a 
single transaction from sender to receiver into multiple, smaller 
transactions, in a manner similar to structuring, to make transactions 
blend in with other, unrelated transactions on the blockchain occurring 
at the same time so as to not stand out, thereby decreasing the 
probability of determining both intended persons for each unique 
transaction.
    c. Using programmatic or algorithmic code to coordinate, manage, or 
manipulate the structure of a transaction: This method involves the use 
of software that coordinates two or more persons' transactions together 
in order to obfuscate the individual unique transactions by providing 
multiple potential outputs from a coordinated input, decreasing the 
probability of determining both intended persons for each unique 
transaction.
    d. Creating and using single-use wallets, addresses, or accounts 
and sending CVC through these wallets, addresses, or accounts in a 
series of transactions: This method involves the use of single-use 
wallets, addresses, or accounts--colloquially known as a ``peel 
chain''--in a series of unnatural transactions that have the purpose or 
effect of obfuscating the source and destination of funds by 
volumetrically increasing the number of involved transactions, thereby 
decreasing the probability of determining both intended persons for 
each unique transaction.
    e. Exchanging between types of CVC, or other digital assets: This 
method involves exchanges between two or more types of CVC or other 
digital assets--colloquially referred to as ``chain hopping''--to 
facilitate transaction obfuscation by converting one CVC into a 
different CVC at least once before moving the funds to another service 
or platform thereby decreasing the probability of determining both 
intended persons for each unique transaction.\20\
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    \20\ FinCEN, Financial Trend Analysis, Ransomware Trends in Bank 
Secrecy Act Data Between January 2021 and June 2021, Oct. 15, 2021, 
at p. 13, available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2021-10/Financial%20Trend%20Analysis_Ransomware%20508%20FINAL.pdf 
(FinCEN October 2021 FTA).
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    f. Facilitating user-initiated delays in transactional activity: 
This method involves the use of software, programs, or other technology 
that programmatically carry out pre-determined timed-delay of 
transactions by delaying the output of a transaction in order to make 
that transaction appear to be unrelated to transactional input, thereby 
decreasing the probability of determining both intended persons for 
each unique transaction.

B. Use of CVC Mixing by Illicit Foreign Actors

    Illicit actors use enhanced anonymity on the blockchain to avoid 
detection by authorities as they launder their illicit proceeds. By 
obfuscating identity and preventing the attribution of ownership of 
CVC,\21\ CVC mixing allows illicit actors, such as cyber threat actors 
carrying out ransomware attacks or cyber heists, to launder their CVC 
and convert it into fiat currency, minimizing the risk of being 
detected by involved financial institutions, including VASPs, or 
relevant authorities. Because wallet addresses are pseudonymous and CVC 
mixing severs the connection between the identity of users sending and 
receiving CVC, illicit actors are able to exploit vulnerabilities in 
anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/
CFT) regulatory frameworks,\22\ threatening the effectiveness of rules 
which require financial institutions to, among other things, know the 
identity of their customers and report suspicious activity to FinCEN.
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    \21\ Users employ digital wallets to hold their CVC. These 
wallets appear on the blockchain as a string of alphanumeric 
characters, but can be created using software at will, and are not 
directly tied to any individual person's identity.
    \22\ See Treasury April 2023 Defi Risk Assessment, at pp. 3-4, 
28.
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    Over the past few years, Treasury has monitored, and expressed 
concern with, the increasing use of CVC mixing by illicit actors, 
including North Korea-affiliated cyber threat actors, ransomware 
actors, and darknet market \23\ participants, to transfer and launder 
their illicit proceeds. In particular, the DPRK--already under pressure 
from robust United States, European Union, United Kingdom, and United 
Nations sanctions--relies upon CVC mixing to launder the proceeds of 
cyber heists in order to finance the DPRK's WMD program.\24\ The Axie 
Infinity Ronin Bridge (Axie Infinity) heist--committed in March 2022, 
worth almost $620 million and carried out by the DPRK-controlled 
Lazarus Group--remains, for instance, the largest cyber heist to 
date,\25\ and made high profile use of at least two mixers to launder 
the proceeds of the theft--Blender.io and Tornado Cash.\26\
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    \23\ ``Darknet'' is a term used to refer to networks that are 
only accessible through the use of specific software or network 
configurations. Darknet content is not indexed by web search 
engines, and is often accessed via anonymized, encrypted systems 
like the software The Onion Router (TOR). Darknet markets are online 
markets only accessible with the use of software like TOR, and 
because they are not indexed, can only be found if the domain name 
and URL are already known to the user. As a result of the inherent 
anonymity of the darknet infrastructure, darknets facilitate 
criminal activity because of the difficulty involved for law 
enforcement in identifying users, infrastructure, and even domains 
associated with the sale of illicit goods and services. FinCEN's 
August 2021 publicly available assessment of a civil money penalty 
against an exchange noted that darknet marketplaces actively promote 
CVC mixers as the primary method for obfuscating CVC transactions.
    \24\ United Nations, UN Panel of Experts Letter, S/2023/171, 
Mar. 7, 2023, at p. 4, available at https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/037/94/PDF/N2303794.pdf?OpenElement (UN March 2023 
Experts Letter); see Wall Street Journal, North Korea Suspected of 
Plundering Crypto to Fund Weapons Programs, July 1, 2022, available 
at https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-suspected-of-plundering-crypto-to-fund-weapons-programs-11656667802.
    \25\ Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), U.S. Treasury 
issues First Ever Sanctions on Virtual Currency Mixer, Targets DPRK 
Cyber Threats, May 6, 2022, available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0768 (U.S. Treasury May 2022 Press Release); 
see Elliptic, North Korea's Lazarus Group Identified as Exploiters 
Behind $540 Million Ronin Bridge Heist, Apr. 14, 2022, available at 
https://www.elliptic.co/blog/540-million-stolen-from-the-ronin-defi-bridge.
    \26\ OFAC, Treasury Designates DPRK Weapons Representative, Nov. 
8, 2022, available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1087 (U.S. Treasury November 2022 Press Release).

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    CVC mixing is also commonly used to obfuscate the source of CVC 
obtained through other illicit activities, such as ransomware attacks 
and the use and operation of darknet markets. For example, between 
January 2021 and June 2021, the top 10 most common ransomware variants 
reported in suspicious activity report (SAR) data, including several 
Russian-affiliated variants, sent approximately $35.2 million to CVC 
mixers and $252 million to darknet markets.\27\ Indeed, darknet 
marketplaces actively promote CVC mixers as the primary method for 
obfuscating related transactions, and, indeed, multiple CVC mixers 
historically interacted with Hydra, the former Russian darknet market 
that accounted for approximately 80 percent of all darknet market CVC 
transactions in 2021 before being shut down by United States and German 
law enforcement.\28\ Because darknet marketplaces are fundamentally 
illicit in nature, FinCEN assesses that illicit actors using darknet 
markets to purchase or sell illicit goods favor the ability to reduce 
the odds of being identified and leverage CVC mixing to enhance 
anonymity to that end. Similarly, ransomware actors also prefer an 
opportunity to successfully launder their illicit funds by using CVC 
mixing to enhance anonymity.
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    \27\ See FinCEN October 2021 FTA, at p. 17.
    \28\ U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Justice Department 
Investigation Leads To Shutdown Of Largest Online Darknet 
Marketplace, Apr. 5, 2022, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/justice-department-investigation-leads-shutdown-largest-online-darknet-marketplace.
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    The multiple U.S. Government actions against CVC mixers, often in 
coordination with international partners, demonstrate that CVC mixing 
provides illicit actors with enhanced anonymity in CVC transactions, 
allowing them to more easily launder their illicit proceeds in CVC.\29\
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    \29\ FinCEN, First Bitcoin ``Mixer'' Penalized by FinCEN for 
Violating Anti-Money Laundering Laws, Oct. 19, 2020, available at 
https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/first-bitcoin-mixer-penalized-fincen-violating-anti-money-laundering-laws (First Bitcoin 
``Mixer'' Penalized by FinCEN, October 19, 2020); DOJ, Ohio Resident 
charged operating darknet based bitcoin mixer laundered over 300 
million, Feb. 13, 2020, available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ohio-resident-charged-operating-darknet-based-bitcoin-mixer-which-laundered-over-300-million; DOJ, Justice Department Investigation 
leads to takedown of Darknet cryptocurrency mixer processed over $3 
billion of unlawful transactions, Mar. 15, 2023, available at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-investigation-leads-takedown-darknet-cryptocurrency-mixer-processed-over-3 (DOJ 
March 2023 Press Release); U.S. Treasury November 2022 Press 
Release.
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IV. Finding That Transactions That Involve CVC Mixing Within or 
Involving a Jurisdiction Outside the United States Are a Class of 
Transactions of Primary Money Laundering Concern

    Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(1), FinCEN finds that reasonable 
grounds exist for concluding that transactions involving CVC mixing 
within or involving a jurisdiction outside the United States are a 
class of transactions that is of primary money laundering concern. In 
making this finding, FinCEN considered the following statutory factors: 
(1) the extent to which the class of transactions is used to facilitate 
or promote money laundering in or through a jurisdiction outside of the 
United States, including money laundering activity with connections to 
international terrorism, organized crime, and proliferation of WMDs and 
missiles; (2) the extent to which a class of transactions is used for 
legitimate business purposes; and (3) the extent to which action by 
FinCEN would guard against international money laundering and other 
financial crimes.

A. The Extent to Which the Class of Transactions Is Used To Facilitate 
or Promote Money Laundering in or Through a Jurisdiction Outside the 
United States, Including Any Money Laundering Activity by Organized 
Criminal Groups, International Terrorists, or Entities Involved in the 
Proliferation of WMD and Missiles

    FinCEN assesses that foreign CVC mixing transactions are used to 
facilitate or promote money laundering in or through jurisdictions 
outside the United States, including by organized criminal groups, 
international terrorists, or entities involved in the proliferation of 
WMD and missiles. FinCEN based this assessment on information available 
to the agency, including both public and non-public reporting, and 
after thorough consideration of each of the following factors: (1) that 
transactions involving CVC mixing often occur within, or involve, 
jurisdictions outside of the United States; (2) that CVC mixing is used 
to launder proceeds of large-scale CVC theft and heists, and support 
the proliferation of WMD, in particular, by the DPRK; and (3) that CVC 
mixing is similarly used by ransomware actors and darknet markets to 
launder illicit proceeds.
1. CVC Mixing Transactions Often Occur Within or Involve Jurisdictions 
Outside the United States
    CVC mixers conduct business with opaque operational structures and 
take steps to avoid the discovery of where they and their users are 
located. CVC mixers commonly obscure their locations, including (1) 
employing The Onion Router (TOR) to conceal the location of their 
servers; \30\ (2) failing to register as a business in any 
jurisdiction; and (3) failing to maintain any activity logs. Based on 
public and non-public information, FinCEN assesses that CVC mixing 
activity often occurs within or involves numerous jurisdictions outside 
the United States and, indeed, throughout the world. The U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and open source reporting identified an 
increase in the use of CVC in terror finance, including by Hamas and 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and the use of CVC mixers 
to obfuscate source of funds to protect the identity of their 
donors.\31\ In addition, FinCEN has identified the use of CVC mixing 
services as a prevalent money laundering typology for the top 10 
ransomware strains identified in BSA data from January 2021 to June 
2021, and, notably, open source analysis of CVC payments indicates that 
up to 74 percent of ransomware activity is associated with Russia.\32\
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    \30\ See DOJ March 2023 Press Release.
    \31\ DOJ, Four Defendants Charged with Conspiring to Provide 
Cryptocurrency to ISIS, Dec. 14, 2022, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/four-defendants-charged-conspiring-provide-cryptocurrency-isis; TRM Labs, Terrorist Financing Six 
Crypto Related Trends to Watch in 2022, Feb. 16, 2023, available at 
https://www.trmlabs.com/post/terrorist-financing-six-crypto-related-trends-to-watch-in-2023.
    \32\ Chainalysis, Russian Cybercriminals Drive Significant 
Ransomware and Cryptocurrency-based Money Laundering Activity, Feb. 
14, 2022, available at https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/2022-crypto-crime-report-preview-russia-ransomware-money-laundering/.
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    The global nature of the problem is further demonstrated by the 
fact that no CVC mixers are currently registered with FinCEN. CVC 
mixers are required to register with FinCEN if they do business as 
money transmitters wholly or in substantial part within the United 
States.\33\ To the extent foreign CVC mixers are operating beyond 
United States jurisdiction, they are not subject to U.S. regulations 
that require financial institutions to, among other things, know the 
identity of their customers and report suspicious activity to FinCEN. 
Nevertheless, FinCEN assesses that other forms of CVC mixing, that do 
not involve the use of CVC mixers, do occur within the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ 31 CFR 1010.100(ff).
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    Recent U.S. and foreign enforcement actions also reflect CVC mixing 
transactions within or involving numerous foreign jurisdictions, 
including DPRK, Russia, Luxembourg,

[[Page 72705]]

the Netherlands, and Vietnam. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) 
actions in 2022, for instance, highlighted the links between the DPRK 
and CVC mixers Blender.io \34\ and Tornado Cash \35\--through their 
respective involvement in the Axie Infinity heist \36\ in March 2022 
and Tornado Cash's involvement in the Harmony Horizon Bridge (Harmony) 
heist \37\ in June 2022.\38\ The coordinated international takedown of 
ChipMixer, a darknet CVC ``mixing'' service operated by Vietnamese 
national Minh Qu)c Nguy(n in Hanoi, Vietnam, by the DOJ and the German 
Federal Criminal Police (Bundeskriminalamt or BKA) on March 15, 2023, 
and shutdown of Bestmixer.io and associated seizure of servers located 
in the Netherlands and Luxembourg by the Dutch Fiscal Information and 
Investigation Service (FIOD), in close cooperation with Europol and 
Luxembourg authorities on May 22, 2019,\39\ similarly demonstrate the 
international character of CVC mixing transactions--spanning 
jurisdictions across Europe and Asia.
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    \34\ See U.S. Treasury May 2022 Press Release.
    \35\ See U.S. Treasury November 2022 Press Release.
    \36\ Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), FBI Statement of 
Attribution of Malicious Cyber Activity Posed by the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, Apr. 14, 2022, available at https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-statement-on-attribution-of-malicious-cyber-activity-posed-by-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea.
    \37\ FBI, FBI Confirms Lazarus Group, APT 38 Cyber Actors 
Responsible for Harmony's Horizon Bridge Currency Theft, Jan. 23, 
2023, available at https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-confirms-lazarus-group-cyber-actors-responsible-for-harmonys-horizon-bridge-currency-theft (FBI January 23, 2023 Press Release).
    \38\ See Dutch Fiscal Information and Investigation Service, 
Arrest of suspected developer of Tornado Cash, Aug. 12, 2022, 
available at https://www.fiod.nl/arrest-of-suspected-developer-of-tornado-cash/; DOJ, Tornado Cash Founders Charged with Money 
Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Aug. 23, 2023, available at 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/tornado-cash-founders-charged-money-laundering-and-sanctions-violations; OFAC, Treasury Designates 
Roman Semenov, Co-Founder of Sanctioned Virtual Currency Mixer 
Tornado Cash,Aug. 23, 2023, available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1702; OFAC, Sanctions List Search, Aug. 24, 
2023, available at https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=44718.
    \39\ The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation 
(Europol), Multi-million euro cryptocurrency laundering service 
Bestmixer.io taken down, May 22, 2019, available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/multi-million-euro-cryptocurrency-laundering-service-bestmixerio-taken-down; DOJ March 
2023 Press Release.
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2. CVC Mixing Is Used To Launder Proceeds of Large-Scale CVC Theft and 
Heists
    FinCEN assesses that CVC mixing is used to launder the proceeds of 
large-scale CVC theft and heists by both state and non-state sponsored 
actors. Whether heists are carried out by state or non-state actors, 
the need for CVC mixing is the same--illicit CVC must be laundered, and 
CVC mixing provides the enhanced anonymity to separate illicitly 
obtained CVC from the underlying illicit activity.
    Non-state-affiliated actors commonly use CVC mixing services to 
launder their proceeds from large scale heists. The proceeds from the 
heists that targeted a CVC exchanger \40\ and cross-chain bridge Nomad 
\41\ were, for instances, laundered using the Tornado Cash CVC mixer.
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    \40\ CoinDesk, Crypto.com's Stolen Ether Being Mixed Through 
Tornado Cash (Updated May 11, 2023), available at https://www.coindesk.com/business/2022/01/18/cryptocoms-stolen-ether-being-laundered-via-tornado-cash/; see Halborn, Explained: the Crypto.com 
Hack (January 2022), Jan. 24, 2022, available at https://halborn.com/explained-the-crypto-com-hack-january-2022/ (accessed 
Nov. 15, 2022).
    \41\ See U.S. Treasury November 2022 Press Release; Reuters, 
U.S. crypto firm Nomad hit by $190 million theft, Aug. 3, 2022, 
available at https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-crypto-firm-nomad-hit-by-190-million-theft-2022-08-02/.
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    In addition to the use of CVC mixing by non-state-affiliated 
actors, FinCEN assesses that, based on public and non-public reporting, 
DPRK state-sponsored or -affiliated cyber threat actors are responsible 
for a substantial portion of illicit or stolen CVC funds sent to CVC 
mixers,\42\ and that the DPRK utilized CVC mixing to launder proceeds 
in an attempt to obfuscate its connection to those funds. The DPRK uses 
the mixed proceeds of these thefts to support its WMD 
program.<SUP>43</SUP> <SUP>44</SUP> A publicly available analysis in 
February 2021 determined that individuals acting for or on behalf of 
the North Korean government laundered more than 65 percent of stolen 
CVC through CVC mixers--an increase from 42 percent in 2020 and 21 
percent in 2019.\45\ Further, publicly available analysis in February 
2022 assessed that the DPRK is a systematic money launderer and that 
its use of multiple CVC mixers is a calculated attempt to obscure the 
origins of its ill-gotten CVCs while converting them into fiat 
currency.\46\ In the same year, there was a notable increase in large 
scale heists carried out by, or in support of, the DPRK, with 
associated use of CVC mixing and CVC mixers. OFAC sanctioned two CVC 
mixers, Blender.io and Tornado Cash, used to launder illicit proceeds 
of the March 2022 Axie Infinity heist and the June 2022 Harmony heist, 
both of which were carried out by North Korea's Lazarus 
Group.<SUP>47</SUP> <SUP>48</SUP> In addition, DOJ has determined that 
ChipMixer processed over $700 million in Bitcoin associated with wallet 
addresses identified as containing stolen CVC, including CVC related to 
the Axie Infinity and the Harmony heists.\49\ The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) has also determined that North Korean cyber actors 
laundered over $60 million worth of Ethereum stolen during the Harmony 
heist through RAILGUN, a United Kingdom-based CVC mixer.<SUP>50</SUP> 
<SUP>51</SUP> <SUP>52</SUP> Importantly, DPRK-sponsored and -affiliated 
actors' desire to rely on CVC mixing appears unlikely to abate. Most 
recently, in August 2023 the FBI attributed the June 2023 Atomic Wallet 
heist to the Lazarus Group, and open-source reporting indicates that 
the Lazarus Group used specific services including Sinbad, a CVC mixer, 
to launder the stolen CVC.<SUP>53</SUP> <SUP>54</SUP>
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    \42\ See Chainalysis, The Crypto Crime Report 2023, available at 
https://go.chainalysis.com/2023-crypto-crime-report.html (The 2023 
Crypto Crime Report).
    \43\ See U.S. Treasury November 2022 Press Release; see also 
FinCEN, Imposition of Special Measure Against North Korea as a 
Jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering Concern, 81 FR 78715, Nov. 
9, 2016, available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/2016-27049.pdf (FinCEN 2016 Imposition of Special Measure 
Against North Korea).
    \44\ See UN March 2023 Experts Letter, at p. 4.
    \45\ Chainalysis, Crypto Money Laundering: Four Exchange Deposit 
Addresses Received Over $1 Billion in Illicit Funds in 2022, Jan. 
26, 2023, available at https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/crypto-money-laundering-2022/. (Crypto Money Laundering: Four Exchange).
    \46\ Chainalysis, The 2022 Crypto Crime Report, Feb. 2022, 
available at https://go.chainalysis.com/2022-crypto-crime-report.html (The 2022 Crypto Crime Report); see Chainalysis, North 
Korean Hackers Have Prolific Year as Their Unlaundered 
Cryptocurrency Holdings Reach All-time High, Jan. 13, 2022, 
available at https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/north-korean-hackers-have-prolific-year-as-their-total-unlaundered-cryptocurrency-holdings-reach-all-time-high/.
    \47\ See U.S. Treasury May 2022 Press Release.
    \48\ See U.S. Treasury November 2022 Press Release.
    \49\ See DOJ March 2023 Press Release.
    \50\ According to open-source reporting, RAILGUN is 
headquartered in London, England.
    \51\ FinCEN assesses that RAILGUN falls under the umbrella of 
CVC mixing, as defined by this NPRM, because it uses its privacy 
protocol to manipulate the structure of the transaction to appear as 
being sent from the RAILGUN contract address, thus obscuring the 
true originator.
    \52\ See FBI January 23, 2023 Press Release.
    \53\ FBI, FBI Identifies Cryptocurrency Funds Stolen by DPRK, 
Aug. 22, 2023, available at https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-identifies-cryptocurrency-funds-stolen-by-dprk.
    \54\ Elliptic, North Korea's Lazarus Group likely responsible 
for $35 Million Atomic Crypto Theft, June 6, 2023, available at 
https://hub.elliptic.co/analysis/north-korea-s-lazarus-group-likely-
responsible-for-35-million-atomic-crypto-theft/
#:~:text=Elliptic's%20analysis%20suggests%20that%20North,with%20five%
20million%20users%20worldwide.
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    In brief, non-state actors and, significantly, DPRK state-sponsored 
or -affiliated cyber threat actors have

[[Page 72706]]

repeatedly used, and continue to use, CVC mixing to launder illicit 
proceeds from large-scale CVC theft and heists.
3. CVC Mixing Is Used by Ransomware and Darknet Markets
    CVC mixing services that obfuscate blockchain trails are attractive 
for cybercriminals looking to launder illegal proceeds from malicious 
cyber-enabled activities, including ransomware attacks.\55\ FinCEN 
assesses that threat actors avoiding reusing wallets, using CVC mixing 
services, and ``chain hopping'' have been prevalent associated money 
laundering typologies.\56\ Open-source analysis in July 2022 reported 
that nearly 10 percent of all CVC sent from addresses tied to illicit 
activity were sent to CVC mixers, while no other service type exceeded 
a 0.3 percent CVC mixer sending share.\57\ FinCEN's analysis of the top 
10 CVC mixers by volume per commercially available data determined that 
approximately 33 percent of all deposits as of August 2022 were 
attributed to high risk sources, with 13 percent of all deposits coming 
from known illicit activities.\58\ More significantly, only a portion 
of the activity in the CVC ecosystem with exposure to CVC mixing is 
captured by BSA reporting. As a result, FinCEN assesses that high-risk 
deposits into CVC mixers are likely underreported, and the percent of 
CVC tied to illicit activity is likely higher.
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    \55\ Europol, One of the darkweb's largest cryptocurrency 
laundromats washed out, Mar. 15, 2023, available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/one-of-darkwebs-largest-cryptocurrency-laundromats-washed-out.
    \56\ See FinCEN October 2021 FTA. FinCEN examined ransomware-
related SARs filed between January 1, 2021, and June 30, 2021, to 
determine trends. The full data set consisted of 635 SARs reporting 
$590 million in suspicious activity. From this data, FinCEN 
identified the top 10 most common ransomware variants and analyzed 
their indicators of compromise through commercially available 
analytics tools. USD figures cited in this analysis are based on the 
value of BTC when the transactions occurred.
    \57\ Chainalysis, Crypto Mixer Usage Reaches All-time Highs in 
2022 With Nation State Actors and Cybercriminals Contributing 
Significant Volume, July 14, 2022, available at https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/cryptocurrency-mixers/.
    \58\ In August 2022, FinCEN analyzed 10 mixers, finding that 
these services processed more than $20 billion in total volume 
between January 2011 and August 2022. The majority of this total 
occurred between January 2021 and August 2022. FinCEN assessed what 
sources constituted high risk and illicit activites based on 
commercial source attributions of entities.
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    The relationship between CVC mixing and malicious cyber-enabled and 
other criminal activities is evident through the reliance of ransomware 
actors on CVC mixing. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified 
this connection, noting in 2022 the ongoing and growing threat of 
criminal misuse of CVC for the receipt and laundering of illicit 
proceeds from ransomware attacks, expressing particular concern that 
ransomware cybercriminals are increasingly using CVC mixers to launder 
their illicit proceeds.\59\ Similarly, between January and June 2021, 
FinCEN observed the use of CVC mixing services (as reflected in BSA 
reporting of suspicious activity) with the top 10 ransomware strains 
identified as sending approximately $35.2 million to CVC mixers. During 
this same time period FinCEN also observed ``chain hopping'' by 
ransomware actors to obfuscate the orgin of their proceeds as well as 
that ransomware actors layered funds through multiple wallet addresses 
and avoided reusing wallet addresses for each attack. The most 
prevalent ransomware variants observed by FinCEN between January and 
June 2021 were Russia-affiliated REvil/Sodinokibi, and Conti,\60\ and 
Russian-speaking DarkSide, Avaddon, and Phobos.<SUP>61 62</SUP>
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    \59\ FATF, Targeted Update On Implementation Of The FATF 
Standards On Virtual Assets And Virtual Asset Service Providers, 
June 2022, p. 24, available at https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/Targeted-Update-Implementation-FATFStandards-VirtualAssets-VASPs.pdf.
    \60\ See U.S. Treasury May 2022 Press Release. OFAC identified 
Conti and Sodinokibi as Russian-linked malign ransomware groups in 
their designation of Blender.io on May 6, 2022.
    \61\ Id.
    \62\ See FinCEN October 2021 FTA.
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    The relationship between CVC mixing and illicit activities is 
likewise prevalent in transactions involving darknet markets. CVC 
mixing services often deliberately operate opaquely and advertise their 
services as a way to pay anonymously for illicit items such as illegal 
narcotics, firearms, and child sexual abuse material.\63\ According to 
DOJ, the mixer Bitcoin Fog--the longest running Bitcoin money 
laundering service on the darknet--laundered CVC from darknet 
marketplaces tied to illegal narcotics, computer fraud and abuse 
activities, and identity theft.\64\ Additionally, according to the 
Government Accountability Office and DOJ, the dismantled darknet market 
Alphabay allegedly not only sold and purchased various illegal drugs, 
illicit goods, and services with CVC, but also allegedly provided 
mixing services, via the CVC mixer Helix, to obfuscate CVC transactions 
on the site.<SUP>65 66</SUP>
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    \63\ See First Bitcoin ``Mixer'' Penalized by FinCEN, October 
19, 2020.
    \64\ DOJ, Individual Arrested and Charged with Operating 
Notorious Darknet Cryptocurrency `Mixer', Apr. 28, 2021, available 
at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/individual-arrested-and-charged-operating-notorious-darknet-cryptocurrency-mixer.
    \65\ United States Government Accountability Office, VIRTUAL 
CURRENCIES Additional Information Could Improve Federal Agency 
Efforts to Counter Human and Drug Trafficking, Dec. 2021, p. 29, 
available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105462.pdf.
    \66\ DOJ, Ohio Resident Pleads Guilty to Operating Darknet-Based 
Bitcoin `Mixer' That Laundered Over $300 Million, Aug. 18, 2021, 
available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ohio-resident-pleads-guilty-operating-darknet-based-bitcoin-mixer-laundered-over-300-million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As these examples demonstrate, illicit actors of all types 
conducting illicit cyber activity, including ransomware attacks and 
transactions on darknet markets, frequently seek out services that mask 
their illicit transactions and favor the enhanced anonymity provided by 
CVC mixing. Furthermore, FinCEN assesses that the percentage of mixing 
activity attributed to illicit activity is increasing. According to 
publicly available analysis reported in January 2023, the total amount 
of CVC sent to CVC mixers fell significantly, likely due to OFAC 
designation of two CVC mixers, Blender.io and Tornado Cash. However, 
the analysis noted the CVC that was sent to CVC mixers in 2022 was more 
likely to come from illicit sources than in previous years--24 percent 
of the $7.8 billion \67\ processed by mixers in 2022 versus 10 percent 
of the $11.5 billion processed by mixers in 2021.\68\ This shift 
constitutes a 62.78 percent increase in the illicit value flowing 
through CVC mixers, year over year.\69\
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    \67\ See The 2023 Crypto Crime Report, p. 46.
    \68\ See Crypto Money Laundering: Four Exchange.
    \69\ Although this analysis assessed only CVC sent to CVC mixers 
without considering other forms of CVC mixing (as identified by this 
NPRM), its findings are nevertheless instructive.
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B. The Extent to Which the Class of Transactions Is Used for Legitimate 
Business Purposes

    FinCEN recognizes that there are legitimate reasons why responsible 
actors might want to conduct financial transactions in a secure and 
private manner given the amount of information available on public 
blockchains. FinCEN also recognizes that, in addition to illicit 
purposes, CVC mixing may be used for legitimate purposes, such as 
privacy enhancement for those who live under repressive regimes or wish 
to conduct licit transactions anonymously.\70\ Still, CVC mixing 
presents an acute money laundering risk because it shields information 
from

[[Page 72707]]

responsible third parties, such as financial institutions and law 
enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ Chainalysis, Crypto Mixers and AML Compliance, August 23, 
2022, available at https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/crypto-mixers/; see Elliptic, What are Bitcoin Mixers & Are They Compliant 
With AML Standards?, May 7, 2018, available at https://elliptic.co/blog/bitcoin-mixers-assessing-risk-bitcoin-transactions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FinCEN is concerned that CVC mixing makes CVC flows untraceable by 
law enforcement and makes potentially suspicious transactions 
unreportable by responsible financial institutions--thereby fostering 
illicit activity as described elsewhere in this document. More 
importantly, FinCEN assesses that the percentage of CVC mixing activity 
attributed to illicit activity is increasing. At the same time, because 
of the lack of available transactional information, FinCEN cannot fully 
assess the extent to which, or quantity thereof, CVC mixing activity is 
attributed to legitimate business purposes.
    Thus, the legitimate applications of CVC mixing must be carefully 
weighed against the exposure of the U.S. financial system to ongoing 
illicit use of CVC mixing. Given the substantial risks posed by CVC 
mixing, the fact that CVC mixing can be used for some legitimate 
business purposes does not alter FinCEN's conclusion that this class of 
transactions is of primary money laundering concern.

C. The Extent to Which Action by FinCEN Would Guard Against 
International Money Laundering and Other Financial Crimes

    Given the threats posed to U.S. national security and the U.S. 
financial system by obfuscation of illicit proceed flows through CVC 
mixing, FinCEN believes that imposing recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements under special measure one would guard against 
international money laundering and other financial crimes by increasing 
transparency in these transactions, and thus render them less 
attractive to illicit actors while also providing additional 
information to support law enforcement investigations.
    This additional transparancy would serve two purposes. First, it 
would enable investigations by law enforcement and regulators to 
support money laundering investigations, including cases against North 
Korean and Russian cybercriminals that pose a threat to U.S national 
security and the U.S. financial system. Second, it would highlight the 
risks and deter illicit actors' use of CVC mixing services, including 
by foreign state-sponsored or -affiliated cyber actors' laundering 
proceeds of CVC theft to facilitate WMD proliferation, ransomware 
attackers' laundering of ransoms, and obfuscation of transactions 
associated with the use of illicit darknet markets.

V. Proposed Enhanced Recordkeeping and Reporting by Covered Financial 
Institutions Where a Covered Financial Institution Knows, Suspects, or 
Has Reason To Suspect a Transaction Involves CVC Mixing Within or 
Involving a Jurisdiction Outside the United States

    Having found that transactions involving CVC mixing within or 
involving a jurisdiction outside the United States are a class of 
transactions that are of primary money laundering concern, FinCEN 
proposes imposing recordkeeping and reporting obligations on covered 
financial institutions under special measure one. Such recordkeeping 
and reporting obligations would require covered financial institutions 
to report certain information when they know, suspect, or have reason 
to suspect a CVC transaction involves the use of CVC mixing within or 
involving a jurisdiction outside the United States.
    FinCEN believes that this special measure is the best available 
tool to mitigate the risks posed by CVC mixing. It would appropriately 
collect information, which will discourage the use of CVC mixing by 
illicit actors, and is necessary to better understand the illicit 
finance risk posed by CVC mixing and investigate those who seek to use 
CVC mixing for illicit ends. At the same time, this special measure 
will minimize the burden upon financial institutions and those who seek 
to use mixing for legitimate purposes. The reporting obligations under 
this special measure apply to covered financial institutions that 
directly engage with CVC transactions, such as exchangers, and do not 
encompass indirect fiat transactions by covered U.S. financial 
institutions, such as a bank sending funds on behalf of a CVC exchanger 
that is acting on behalf of a customer purchasing CVC previously 
processed through a CVC mixer.
    As proposed by FinCEN, special measure one would require 
recordkeeping and reporting of biographical and transactional 
information related to transactions involving CVC mixing, increasing 
transparency and thereby rendering the use of CVC mixing services by 
illicit actors less attractive. Furthermore, the information generated 
by this special measure would support investigations into illicit 
activities by actors who make use of CVC mixing to launder their ill-
gotten CVC by law enforcement. At present, there is no similar or 
equivalent mechanism possessed by law enforcement to readily collect 
such information, depriving investigators of the information necessary 
to more effectively understand, investigate, and hold illicit actors 
accountable. Collectively, the outcomes of the proposed recordkeeping 
and reporting requirement--discouraging the use of CVC mixing by 
illicit actors and closing the information gap in service of increased 
investigation of those illicit actors who continue to make use of CVC 
mixing--will aid in the protection of the U.S. financial system.
    FinCEN has determined that imposition of special measure one would 
most appropriately collect necessary information while limiting the 
burden placed on covered financial institutions and users of CVC 
mixing. As set out further below in Section V.B., FinCEN believes that 
the existing risk-based approach to AML/CFT compliance used by covered 
financial institutions already largely encompasses the information 
FinCEN is requesting. Despite this ready availability of information, 
covered financial institutions do not, and often need not, universally 
report that information to FinCEN at present. The proposed reporting 
requirement would address this reporting gap.
    FinCEN considered the other special measures available under 
section 311. As discussed further in Section V.E. below, it determined 
that none of them would appropriately balance the interests in 
permitting secure and private financial transactions while addressing 
the risks posed by CVC mixing, or were otherwise ill-suited to CVC-
related transactions, and thus incapable of collecting information 
necessary to add transparency to them. Moreover, FinCEN also considered 
the appropriate scope of the proposed recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements, and determined that the proposed approach would best 
capture necessary information and mitigate risks associated with CVC 
mixing and facilitate investigations of illicit actors, while 
preserving legitimate actors' ability to continue conducting secure and 
private financial transactions.
    In proposing this special measure, FinCEN consulted with the 
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Secretary of State, 
certain staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, the National Credit Union Administration 
Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Attorney 
General. These consultations involved obtaining interagency views on 
the imposition of the proposed recordkeeping and reporting

[[Page 72708]]

requirements and the effect that such a recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements would have on the domestic and international financial 
system.
    Below is a discussion of the relevant statutory factors FinCEN 
considered in proposing these recordkeeping and reporting requirements.

A. Whether Similar Action Has Been or Is Being Taken by Other Nations 
or Multilateral Groups

    FinCEN is not aware of any other nation or multilateral group that 
has imposed, or is currently imposing, similar recordkeeping and 
reporting requirements relating to transactions involving CVC mixing. 
However, having likewise identified the significant money laundering 
threat that CVC mixing poses, numerous other nations and certain 
multilateral groups have issued public statements regarding the risks 
presented by CVC mixing, called for appropriate regulation, and/or 
taken action against specific CVC mixers. Several countries--such as 
Australia, Canada, and Seychelles--and multilateral groups, such as 
FATF and Europol, have identified CVC mixing as a risk indicator for 
money laundering or terrorist financing and have found that CVC mixing 
can make it more difficult for law enforcement to trace and attribute 
transactions, complicating investigations.\71\ Japan requires 
information from VASPs on their exposure to CVC mixing services to 
assess their risk exposure and assign risk ratings.\72\ Moreover, as 
discussed above, numerous countries have investigated and prosecuted 
individual CVC mixers and associated persons engaged in or facilitating 
illicit activities. These efforts are generally not as expansive as 
FinCEN's proposed rule would be. However, FinCEN's identification of 
CVC mixing as a class of transactions of primary laundering concern and 
proposed special measure may support efforts of other countries by 
clearly outlining the illicit finance risks associated with CVC mixing 
and demonstrating means of enhancing transparency as well as mitigating 
these risks.
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    \71\ See AUSTRAC, Preventing the Criminal Abuse of Digital 
Currencies Financial Crime Guide, Apr. 2022, pp. 1, 15-17, available 
at https://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/2022-04/AUSTRAC_FCG_PreventingCriminalAbuseOfDigitalCurrencies_FINAL.pdf; 
Government of Canada, Updated Assessment of Inherent Risks of Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing in Canada, Mar. 2023, available 
at https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/programs/financial-sector-policy/updated-assessment-inherent-risks-money-laundering-terrorist-financing-canada.html; Republic of Seychelles, ML/TF 
Overall National Risk Assessment for VA & VASPs, July 2022, pp. 32, 
43, available at https://www.cbs.sc/Downloads/publications/aml/ReportSeychellesONRAML-TFofVAandVASP-26.08.2022.pdf; Europol, 
Seizing the Opportunity: 5 Recommendations For Crypto-Assets Related 
Crime And Money Laundering (2022), p. 6, available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/2022_Recommendations_Joint_Working_Group_on_Criminal_Finances_and_Cryptocurrencies_.pdf; FATF, Updated Guidance for a Risk-Based 
Approach, Oct. 2021.
    \72\ See FATF, Updated Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach, Oct. 
2021, at p. 94.
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B. Whether the Imposition of Any Particular Special Measure Would 
Create a Significant Competitive Disadvantage, Including Any Undue Cost 
or Burden Associated With Compliance, for Financial Institutions 
Organized or Licensed in the United States

    While FinCEN assesses that the recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements proposed in this NPRM will place some cost and burden on 
domestic financial institutions, these burdens are neither undue nor 
inappropriate in view of the threat posed by the obfuscation of illicit 
activity enabled by CVC mixing. The existing risk-based approach to 
AML/CFT compliance used by covered financial institutions already 
largely encompasses the information FinCEN is requesting. While the 
information is available to covered financial institutions, at present 
it is not universally reported to FinCEN. That is to say, FinCEN 
assesses that covered financial institutions already possess customer 
information and can identify when their customers engage in a covered 
transaction. This proposed rule would compel covered financial 
institutions to attribute a covered transaction to the involved 
customer(s) and report this information to FinCEN. Accordingly, the 
collection of the information in question would not create any undue 
costs or burdens on covered financial institutions. Covered domestic 
financial institutions may need to modify or replace the current 
systems in place used to detect other types of illicit activity in 
virtual currency transactions, such as sanctions compliance systems, to 
detect transactions involving CVC mixing. Such burdens are commensurate 
with established AML/CFT protocols.

C. The Extent to Which the Action or the Timing of the Action Would 
Have a Significant Adverse Systemic Impact on the International 
Payment, Clearance, and Settlement System, or on Legitimate Business 
Activities Involving CVC Transactions

    FinCEN assesses that imposition of the proposed special measure 
would have minimal impact upon the international payment, clearance, 
and settlement system, or on legitimate business activities involving 
CVC transactions. As noted in the February 16, 2022, Financial 
Stability Board's Assessment of Risks to Financial Stability, direct 
connections between CVC and systemically important financial 
institutions and core financial markets are limited at present.\73\ 
Volatility and disruptions in the CVC ecosystem have been contained 
within the CVC markets and have not significantly spilled over to 
financial markets and infrastructures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ Financial Stability Board, Assessment of Risks to Financial 
Stability from Crypto-assets, Feb. 16, 2022, at p. 5, available at 
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P160222.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. The Effect of the Proposed Action on United States National Security 
and Foreign Policy

    As described above, CVC mixers are used by DPRK-affiliated and 
Russia-affiliated threat actors, among others, to facilitate illicit 
activities ranging from WMD proliferation to ransomware attacks 
affecting victims in both the United States and around the world, and 
whose interests are adversarial to the national security interests of 
the United States. Imposing recordkeeping and reporting requirements on 
transactions that involve CVC mixing will enhance financial 
intelligence on the identity of illicit users who rely upon mixers to 
obfuscate their identities and sources of CVC, as well as provide 
insight into those CVC mixers that facilitate such illicit activity. 
Such a rule would therefore best serve the national security interests 
of the United States and support efforts to protect the United States 
financial system from illicit finance threats.

E. Consideration of Alternative Special Measures

    In assessing the appropriate special measure to impose, FinCEN 
considered alternatives to imposing recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements under special measure one. However, FinCEN believes that 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements under special measure one 
would most effectively safeguard the U.S. financial system from

[[Page 72709]]

the illicit finance risks posed by CVC mixing.
    In particular, none of the other special measures available under 
section 311 would appropriately balance the interests in permitting 
secure and private financial transactions while addressing the risks 
posed by CVC mixing or would be suited to CVC-related transactions. For 
instance, FinCEN considered special measure two, which is designed to 
obtain beneficial ownership information relating to accounts opened in 
the United States by certain foreign persons or their agents. However, 
FinCEN determined that such a special measure would fail to collect key 
information of interest relating to CVC transactions that involve CVC 
mixing such as the identity of the participants and beneficial owners 
of the CVC involved. FinCEN also considered special measures three 
through five, which are focused upon transactions conducted through 
payable-through accounts and correspondent banking relationships and 
determined that these are less relevant in the context of CVC 
transactions, including those that involve CVC mixing, as CVC 
transactions are conducted outside of the traditional banking system.
    More broadly, FinCEN also considered the appropriate scope of the 
proposed recordkeeping and reporting requirements. Of note, FinCEN 
considered issuing a rule pursuant to section 311 that would have been 
narrowly scoped to address terror finance involving Hamas and ISIS and/
or North Korea-sponsored and -affiliated actors. However, FinCEN 
determined that such a narrow approach would be insufficient to address 
the relevant risks detailed elsewhere in this action. Given the nature 
and use of CVC mixing, covered financial institutions would typically 
have insufficient information to determine whether the CVC transaction 
was initiated North Korean-affiliated actors. FinCEN believes this 
would be true of any similarly narrow approach, regardless of the 
actors involved. Therefore, FinCEN has determined that additional 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements set forth in this proposed 
rule would best mitigate the risks associated with CVC mixing, deter 
illicit actors, facilitate law enforcement investigations into illicit 
activity, and adequately protect the U.S. financial system from the 
illicit financial risk posed by CVC transactions that involve CVC 
mixing, while preserving legitimate actors' ability to conduct secure 
and private financial transactions.

VI. Section-by-Section Analysis of Proposed Regulations

    The goal of this proposed rule is to implement an effective and 
efficient reporting regime to combat and deter money laundering 
associated with CVC mixing and increase transparency in a sector of the 
United States virtual currency ecosystem with identified illicit 
finance risks.

A. Definitions

1. Definition of Convertible Virtual Currency
    The term ``convertible virtual currency'' or CVC, means a medium of 
exchange that either has an equivalent value as currency, or acts as a 
substitute for currency, but lacks legal tender status.\74\ Although 
Bitcoin has legal tender status in at least two jurisdictions, the term 
CVC includes Bitcoin for the purposes of this proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ As noted in note 17, FinCEN notes that CVC or ``virtual 
currency'' by itself does not meet the definition of a ``currency'' 
under 31 CFR 1010.100(m). Additionally, the potential 
characterization of CVC as currency, securities, commodities, or 
derivatives for the purposes of any other legal regime, such as the 
Federal securities laws or the Commodity Exchange Act, is outside 
the scope of this proposed rule. However, as described in the FinCEN 
2019 CVC Guidance, if assets that other regulatory frameworks 
defined as commodities, securities, or futures contracts were to be 
specifically issued or later repurposed to serve as a currency 
substitute, then the asset itself could be a type of value that 
substitutes for currency and be defined as CVC for the purposes of 
this proposed rule, in addition to being subject to other applicable 
regulatory frameworks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Definition of CVC Mixing
    The term ``CVC mixing'' means the facilitation of CVC transactions 
in a manner that obfuscates the source, destination, or amount involved 
in one or more transactions, regardless of the type of protocol or 
service used, such as: (1) pooling or aggregating CVC from multiple 
persons, wallets, addresses, or accounts; (2) using programmatic or 
algorithmic code to coordinate, manage, or manipulate the structure of 
a transaction; (3) splitting CVC for transmittal and transmitting the 
CVC through a series of independent transactions; (4) creating and 
using single-use wallets, addresses, or accounts, and sending CVC 
through such wallets, addresses, or accounts through a series of 
independent transactions; (5) exchanging between types of CVC or other 
digital assets; or (6) facilitating user-initiated delays in 
transactional activity.
    This definition excepts the use of internal protocols or processes 
to execute transactions by banks, broker-dealers, or money services 
businesses, including VASPs, that would otherwise constitute CVC 
mixing, provided that these financial institutions preserve records of 
the source and destination of CVC transactions when using such internal 
protocols and processes, and provide such records to regulators and law 
enforcement, where required by law. This exemption is designed to avoid 
capturing transactions with known VASPs that use these internal 
protocols or processes as part of their business purpose and that are 
positioned to appropriately respond to inquiries by law enforcement and 
other relevant authorities. However, if the covered financial 
institution is unsure if these processes are used as part of a business 
purpose, they should collect the recordkeeping and reporting 
information.
    FinCEN is seeking to address the primary money laundering concern 
posed by CVC mixing. The proposed definition of CVC mixing is designed 
to capture methodologies used by illicit actors to break the 
traceability of their illicit proceeds and create a mechanism on which 
which covered businesses would be required to report when they observe 
CVC mixing transactions. The exception to the definition is crafted to 
avoid imposing undue burden on covered businesses, provided they are 
also taking appropriate steps to ensure information is being retained 
as prescribed by law.
3. Definition of CVC Mixer
    The term ``CVC mixer'' means any person, group, service, code, 
tool, or function that facilitates CVC mixing. FinCEN acknowledges this 
definition is relatively broad; however, given the nature of CVC 
mixing, FinCEN deems the breadth of this definition to be necessary.
4. Definition of Covered Financial Institution
    The proposed rule defines ``covered financial institution'' as the 
term is defined 31 CFR 1010.100(t), which in general includes the 
following:
    <bullet> A bank (except bank credit card systems);
    <bullet> A broker or dealer in securities;
    <bullet> A money services business, as defined in 31 CFR 1010.100 
(ff). This would include VASPs and other persons that provide money 
transmission services, which ``. . . means the acceptance of . . . 
value that substitutes for currency from one person and the 
transmission of . . . value that substitutes for currency to another

[[Page 72710]]

location or person by any means . . .''; \75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ 31 CFR 1010.100(ff)(5)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    <bullet> A telegraph company;
    <bullet> A casino;
    <bullet> A card club;
    <bullet> A person subject to supervision by any state or Federal 
bank supervisory authority;
    <bullet> A futures commission merchant or an introducing broker-
commodities; and
    <bullet> A mutual fund.
5. Definition of Covered Transaction
    The term ``covered transaction'' means a transaction as defined in 
31 CFR 1010.100(bbb)(1) in CVC by, through, or to the covered financial 
institution that the covered financial institution knows, suspects, or 
has reason to suspect involves CVC mixing within or involving a 
jurisdiction outside the United States. The reference to FinCEN's 
definition of ``transaction'' means that a covered transaction includes 
the following: a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, 
delivery, or other disposition, and with respect to a financial 
institution includes a deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts, 
exchange of currency, loan, extension of credit, purchase or sale of 
any stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument, 
security, contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery, option 
on any contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery, option on a 
commodity, purchase or redemption of any money order, payment or order 
for any money remittance or transfer, purchase or redemption of casino 
chips or tokens, or other gaming instruments or any other payment, 
transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution, by 
whatever means effected. To this end, FinCEN would expect covered 
financial institutions to employ a risk-based approach to compliance of 
this proposed rule, and more broadly, the Bank Secrecy Act, including 
by using the variously available free and paid blockchain analytic 
tools commonly available.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ FinCEN is not, at this time, proposing that covered 
financial instutitons would be required to perform a lookback to 
identify covered transactions that occurred prior to issuance of a 
final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The limitation to transactions ``in CVC'' means that the reporting 
obligations under this special measure apply to covered financial 
institutions that directly engage with CVC transactions, such as a CVC 
exchange. It also means that covered transactions do not include 
transactions that are only indirectly related to CVC, such as when a 
CVC exchanger sends the non-CVC proceeds of a sale of CVC that was 
previously processed through a CVC mixer from the CVC exchanger's bank 
account to the bank account of the customer selling CVC.
    It is critical that all financial institutions, including those 
with visibility into CVC flows, such as CVC exchangers--generally 
considered money services businesses (MSBs) under the Bank Secrecy 
Act--identify and quickly report suspicious activity, and conduct 
appropriate risk-based customer due diligence or, where required, 
enhanced due diligence. For example, in appropriately conducting a 
review to identify suspicious activity associated with potential 
sanctions evasion and to comply with existing FinCEN 311s on Iran and 
DPRK, financial institutions must know if transactions originate from 
or are destined to prohibited jurisdictions, such as Iran \77\ or 
DPRK.\78\ Indeed, FinCEN can, and has, assessed civil monetary 
penalties on covered financial institutions that have failed to conduct 
such due diligence, including, recently, in enforcement actions against 
Bittrex \79\ and BitMex.\80\ In light of the existing compliance 
practices of covered financial institutions, FinCEN expects that 
complying with this proposed rule should not add a significant 
additional burden. FinCEN invites public comment on this assessment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ See FinCEN, Imposition of Fifth Special Measure against the 
Islamic Republic of Iran as a Juridiction of Primary Money 
Laundering Concern, 84 FR 59302, Nov. 4, 2019, available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/2019-23697.pdf.
    \78\ See FinCEN 2016 Imposition of Special Measure Against North 
Korea.
    \79\ See FinCEN, FinCEN Announces $29 million Enforcement Action 
Against Virtual Asset Service Provider Bittrex for Willful 
Violations of the Bank Secrecy Act, Oct. 11, 2022, available at 
https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-announces-29-million-enforcement-action-against-virtual-asset-service.
    \80\ See FinCEN, FinCEN Announces $100 Million Enforcement 
Action Against Unregistered Futures Commission Merchant BitMEX for 
Willful Violations of the Bank Secrecy Act, Aug. 10, 2021, available 
at https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-announces-100-
million-enforcement-action-against-unregistered-
futures#:~:text=Despite%20BitMEX's%20public%20representation%20that,t
rading%20platform%20and%20circumvent%20internet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements

1. Information To Be Reported
    Although FinCEN recognizes much of the information that would be 
collected under this proposed rule is already provided to the most 
frequent reporters in the CVC ecosystem, imposing additional 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements is necessary to address the 
money laundering threat posed by CVC mixing because, at present, 
covered financial institutions do not regularly report when their 
customers send or receive CVC in transactions with indicia of CVC 
mixing. Reporting that links customers to the CVC mixing transactions 
will aid law enforcement and national security investigations of 
illicit activity involving CVC. The following addresses the types of 
information the rulemaking proposes to collect.
(i) Reportable Information Regarding the Covered Transaction
    In connection with all covered transactions, FinCEN proposes to 
collect the following information:
    <bullet> The amount of any CVC transferred, in both CVC and its 
U.S. dollar equivalent when the transaction was initiated: The amount 
of CVC transferred would aid in performing analysis using a risk-based 
approach. The proposed rule would require the amount in CVC and U.S. 
dollar equivalent when the transaction was initiated to account for 
volatile CVC prices and aid in consistent monitoring and risk 
management purposes.
    <bullet> CVC type: The proposed rule would require reporting of the 
type of CVC used in a covered transaction. The type of CVC used would 
allow for trend analysis of preferred usage of different types of CVC, 
as well as ensure the correct blockchain analysis can be done given 
each CVC exists on different blockchains. Taken together with the 
amount of any CVC transferred, this information would inform trend 
analysis and allow for an improved understand of laundering typologies.
    <bullet> The CVC mixer used, if known: The proposed rule would 
require reporting of the CVC mixer used in the covered transaction. 
That information would assist in understanding trends of mixing 
activity as well as aid in understanding the quantity of CVC mixers in 
the CVC ecosystem.
    <bullet> CVC wallet address associated with the mixer: The proposed 
rule would require reporting of the CVC wallet address of the CVC 
mixer, if one is used, to aid in understanding of addresses associated 
with each CVC mixer. This information would assist with understanding 
the size, scale, and methodologies of CVC mixers by facilitating 
aggregate analysis of transactional data of CVC mixers.
    <bullet> CVC wallet address associated with the customer: The 
proposed rule would require reporting of the CVC wallet address of the 
customer to assist in the investigation of the covered transaction, 
including blockchain analysis to

[[Page 72711]]

determine if the wallet is associated with illicit activities.
    <bullet> Transaction hash: The proposed rule would require 
reporting of the transaction hash, which will allow an investigation of 
the specific transaction and assist in the identification of specific 
wallet addresses involved in the transaction(s), as well as more 
specific transactional meta data such as the date and time the 
transaction was completed.
    <bullet> Date of transaction: The proposed rule would require 
reporting of the date of transaction, which would assist in enforcing 
the proposed regulation, as well as assist in corroborating other 
reported information.
    <bullet> IP addresses and time stamps associated with the covered 
transaction: The proposed rule would require reporting of the IP 
address to obtain geographical information related to the covered 
transaction, which would assist trend analysis of patterns of covered 
transactions by geographic location.
    <bullet> Narrative: The proposed rule would require a description 
of activity observed by the covered financial institution, including a 
summary of investigative steps taken, provide additional context of the 
behavior, or other such information the covered financial institution 
believes would aid follow on investigations of the activity. As the 
covered financial institution would have insight into the normal 
pattern of its customers' transactions, this narrative would assist 
with understanding if there is an uncharacteristic change in pattern of 
behavior.
    Importantly, under the proposed rule, covered financial 
institutions would continue to have an obligation to file a SAR when 
warranted, regardless of whether the covered financial institutions 
also filed a report required under the proposed rule.
(ii) Reportable Information Regarding the Customer Associated With the 
Covered Transaction
    In respect of customers associated with covered transactions, 
FinCEN proposes to collect the following information:
    <bullet> Customer's full name: The proposed rule would require 
reporting of the full name of the covered financial institution's 
customer, as it appears in the customer's proof of identification and 
related documents, such as passport or driver's license or non-driver 
identification card, used by the customer when they validated their 
identity with the covered financial institution.
    <bullet> Customer's date of birth: The proposed rule would require 
reporting of the full date of birth of the covered financial 
institution's customer, as it appears in the customers onboarding file.
    <bullet> Address: The proposed rule would require reporting of the 
most appropriate address (residential or business) of the customer 
engaged in a covered transaction. Specifically, if the customer is a 
business, the business address would be reported, and, if the customer 
is an individual, the residential address would be reported.
    <bullet> Email Address associated with any and all accounts from 
which or to which the CVC was transferred: The proposed rule would 
require email address(es) used by a customer involved in a covered 
transaction and known to the covered institution.
    <bullet> Unique identifying number: For individuals, the proposed 
rule requires reporting of customers' Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) or, if the individual does not 
have one, a foreign equivalent. If the customer has neither a TIN nor a 
foreign equivalent, the proposed rule would require reporting of a non-
expired United States or foreign passport number or other government-
issued photo identification number, such as a driver's license. For 
entities, the proposed rule would require reporting of the entity's IRS 
TIN or, if the entity does not have one, a foreign equivalent or a 
foreign registration number. TINs and other unique identifying numbers 
provide law enforcement with the most efficient means to identify 
individuals potentially involved in illicit activity.
2. Filing Procedures
    The proposed regulation would require a covered financial 
institution to collect, maintain records of, and report to FinCEN 
within 30 calendar days of initial detection of a covered transaction, 
in the manner that FinCEN may prescribe, certain information regarding 
covered transactions that involve CVC mixing. This includes certain 
information the covered financial institution shall provide with 
respect to each covered transaction which is examined in detail below. 
This proposed reportable information is similar to the information 
already collected by financial institutions to comply with their AML/
CFT obligations; however, at present covered businesses would not 
necessarily report such information. Notably, the proposed regulation 
only requires a covered financial institution to report information in 
its possession, and thus does not require a covered institution to 
reach out to the transactional counterparty to collect additional 
information on the CVC mixing transaction.
3. Recordkeeping Requirements
    Pursuant to the proposed rule, covered financial institutions would 
be required to maintain any records documenting compliance with the 
requirements of this regulation.

VII. Request for Comments

    FinCEN invites comments on all aspects of the proposed rule, 
including the following specific matters:

A. CVC Mixing as a Class of Transactions of Primary Money Laundering 
Concern

    1. What impact would this proposed rule have on legitimate activity 
conducted by persons in the course of conducting financial 
transactions?
    2. What impact would the proposed rule have on blockchain privacy 
or pseudonymity, noting that filings reported to FinCEN are not 
publicly releasable and the similarities of this proposal to the 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements of transactions using the 
traditional financial system, such as with wire or Automated Clearing 
House (ACH) transactions?
    3. Does the impact on privacy and legitimate applications 
identified in Section IV.B potentially outweigh the risks posed by 
illicit activity facilitated by CVC mixing?
    4. What challenges are anticipated with respect to identifying the 
foreign nexus of a CVC mixing transaction?
    5. Are there any other methods that covered financial institutions 
can use to be able to readily determine if covered transactions 
stemming from non-mixer CVC mixing have a foreign nexus?
    6. Are there sufficient tools available, either free or paid, that 
would aid covered financial instutitions to determine if covered 
transactions occurred outside the United States?
    7. Are there any other methods that covered financial institutions 
can use to be able to readily determine if covered transactions 
stemming from non-mixer CVC mixing have a foreign nexus?
    8. Has FinCEN appropriately weighed the legitimate and illicit 
activities associated with the use of CVC mixing? What other factors 
should be considered?

B. Definitions

    1. Please provide suggested revisions to the proposed definitions 
that would better tailor the intended recordkeeping and reporting 
obligations to the objectives and uses described in this proposal. 
Where possible, please

[[Page 72712]]

provide information or examples to illustrate how the recommended 
revisions improve upon the definitions as proposed.
    2. Does the proposed definition of CVC mixing adequately capture 
the activity of concern? If not, please provide suggested revisions to 
the proposed definition that would better capture such activity. Where 
possible, please provide information or examples to illustrate how the 
recommended revisions would improve upon the definition as proposed.
    3. Does the proposed exception to the definition of CVC mixing 
adequately account for legitimate activity conducted by VASPs and other 
financial institutions? If not, please provide suggested revisions to 
the proposed definition that would better capture such activity. Where 
possible, please provide information or examples to illustrate how the 
recommended revisions would improve upon the definition as proposed.

C. Alternatives

    1. Is FinCEN's proposal of enhanced recordkeeping under section 
311's special measure one most appropriate to the objectives of this 
proposed rule? Where possible, please provide suggestions for 
alternative means of achieving the objectives and illustrate how such 
means would work in practice.
    2. Would section 311's special measures two through five be more 
appropriate to apply? If so, please explain why.

D. Recordkeeping and Reporting

    1. Is the scope of the recordkeeping requirement appropriate?
    2. Is the list of information to be collected and reported 
appropriate to address the stated primary money laundering concern?
    3. Is the proposed mechanism for submission appropriate for the 
purpose of this proposed rule?
    4. Are there any alternative methods of submitting reports in an 
efficient and effective manner that FinCEN should consider utilizing?
    5. Are the proposed reporting and recordkeeping requirements 
discussed in Section VI.B.1 and 3 appropriately scoped? Are there 
additional types of information regarding reportable transactions or 
customers that should be collected?
    6. Should the proposed reporting and recordkeeping requirements 
apply to covered financial institutions that are the originator 
institution, the beneficiary institution, or both?
    7. In cases where the customer of a covered financial institution 
is a legal entity, should the implementation of special measure one 
also require the beneficial ownership of that legal entity be reported, 
in addition to the other proposed reporting requirements?

E. Burden and Other Impacts of This Proposed Rule

    1. Does FinCEN accurately account for the burden and impact of this 
proposed rule when a covered financial institution knows, suspects, or 
has reason to suspect a transaction involves CVC mixing?
    2. Is there a less burdensome way of collecting information 
regarding the details of a CVC transaction, which the BSA's AML/CFT 
objectives require financial institutions to collect, including know-
your-customer and customer due diligence?
    3. Would the adoption of special measure one reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, as proposed, impose expected costs to 
covered financial institutions; state, local, or tribal governments; or 
the private sector in excess of $177 million annually? $200 million 
annually? Where possible, please provide data or studies from an 
identifiable source that would support the response or describe why a 
source cannot be identified.
    4. To what extent should FinCEN consider the potential costs to 
currently unregistered or otherwise non-reporting entities that, if 
compliant, would incur costs if special measure one is adopted as 
proposed? If possible, please illustrate either quantitatively or 
qualitatively (by way of example or anecdote) how the recommended level 
of consideration would improve FinCEN's estimate of regulatory impact.
    5. Are there any material facts, data, circumstances, or other 
considerations that, had they been included in FinCEN's regulatory 
impact analysis, would have both improved the precision and accuracy of 
the analysis and substantially altered the assessment of the proposed 
rule's impact? If so, please provide, including attribution to the 
sources of such information, where possible.
    6. Would the adoption of special measure one reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, as proposed, impose significant costs on 
covered financial institutions that are small entities? On other small 
entities that are not covered financial institutions? Where possible, 
please provide data or studies from an identifiable source that would 
support the response or describe why a source cannot be identified.
    7. Are the due diligence requirements appropriately scoped in this 
proposed rule?
    8. What impact will this proposal have on augmenting law 
enforcement's ability to track and trace CVC derived from cyber heists, 
ransomware, or similar illicit activity to aid the return of victim's 
CVC?
    9. Are there any international efforts to address illicit finance 
risks stemming from mixing not addressed in the NPRM?
    10. What effect would the proposed rule have on international 
efforts to address the illicit use of CVC mixing?
    11. Are there specific examples of ``covered transactions'' or 
sample scenarios that FinCEN could have provided to assist financial 
institutions and other affected parties in further understanding the 
intended applicability of the proposed definition of ``covered 
transactions''? Alternatively, are there other clarifications to the 
definitions in this NPRM, or other modifications to the proposed 
regulatory text that would meaningfully clarify when a covered 
transaction occurs that would warrant reporting? If so, please 
describe.
    12. Is FinCEN correct in its assessment that covered financial 
institutions would have access to reasonable and appropriate services 
or tools, whether free or paid, to be able to effectively identify 
covered transactions? If not, what are impediments to accessing such 
tools, and what costs would be associated with gaining access?
    13. To what extent could public guidance or other informational 
materials regarding compliance with the requirements of proposed 
special measure one (such as FAQs, pre-recorded instructional audio-
visual resources, or in-person presentations with industry groups) 
meaningfully reduce costs to covered financial institutions? Please 
describe any preferred method(s), as well as any qualitative or 
quantitive estimates of the extent to which costs are expected to be 
reduced.

VIII. Regulatory Impact Analysis

    FinCEN has analyzed this proposed rule under Executive Orders 
12866, 13563, and 14094, the Regulatory Flexibility Act,\81\ the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act,\82\ and the Paperwork Reduction Act.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ 5 U.S.C. 603.
    \82\ 12 U.S.C. 1532, Public Law 104-4 (Mar. 22, 1995).
    \83\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(a)(1)(D).

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[[Page 72713]]

    As discussed above,\84\ the intended effects of the imposition of 
special measure one to CVC mixing are twofold. The rule is expected to: 
(1) facilitate the investigation and prosecution of illicit activities 
by parties using CVC mixing in furtherance of their unlawful objectives 
\85\ and, in many cases,\86\ consequent private enrichment; and (2) 
disincentivize the use of CVC mixing in connection with money 
laundering and other financial crimes by reducing the likelihood that 
such CVC mixing will adequately insulate the underlying transactions 
from identification and traceability.\87\ In the analysis below, FinCEN 
discusses the economic effects that are expected to accompany adoption 
of the rule as proposed and assess such expectations in more granular 
detail. This discussion includes a detailed explanation of certain ways 
FinCEN's conclusions may be sensitive to methodological choices and 
underlying assumptions made in drawing inferences from available data. 
Throughout, these have been outlined so that the public may review and 
provide comment.\88\
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    \84\ See, specifically discussion supra Section IV. C. See 
generally discussion supra Section II.
    \85\ See, e.g., discussion of Axie Infinity heist supra Section 
III.B.
    \86\ See, e.g., discussion of use in connection with darknet 
market transactions and laundering the proceeds of ransomware 
attacks supra Sections III.B and IV.A.
    \87\ See discussion supra Section IV.C.
    \88\ See Section VII.E.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Assessment of Impact

    By requiring covered financial institutions to implement special 
measure one, the proposed rule would impose additional obligations on 
these institutions to report transactions that they know, suspect, or 
have reason to suspect involve CVC mixing because FinCEN has determined 
that CVC mixing, as a class of transactions, is of primary money 
laundering concern.
    The imposition of this special measure may require a shift in 
reporting practices, particularly with regard to the determination a 
covered financial institution would otherwise first need to make: that 
a transaction involving CVC mixing is suspicious and therefore 
reportable under the applicable SAR Rule.\89\ The reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements under special measure one would instead 
guide a covered financial institution to presume transactions that 
involve CVC mixing are inherently of primary money laundering concern. 
Therefore, under this proposal, the implied burden would shift from 
determining when a CVC transaction is reportable to determining when it 
is not reportable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ See, e.g., FinCEN 2019 CVC Guidance supra note 16 and 
FinCEN, Reporting Suspicious Activity A Quick Reference Guide for 
Money Services Businesses, September, 2007, available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/report_reference.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FinCEN has considered the regulatory impact of the proposed rule 
and the economic consequences these changes would entail. The 
subsequent analysis details FinCEN's finding that, in proportion to the 
thousands of covered financial institutions subject to FinCEN's general 
reporting and recordkeeping requirements, relatively few are exposed to 
CVC mixing and, additionally, proportionally few transactions per 
exposed financial institution covered under the proposed rule are 
likely to trigger the new recordkeeping and reporting requirements, of 
which fewer still may provide actionable information. However, any one 
reportable transaction, by nature of the underlying illicit and 
potentially dangerous activity it facilitates, could provide large 
benefits to FinCEN and law enforcement if identified, or, alternatively 
framed, could impose substantial costs and serious national security 
risks if unreported.\90\
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    \90\ See, e.g., discussion supra Sections III.B and IV.A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Broad Economic Considerations
    At present, in the absence of an obligation to comply with special 
measure one requirements, a covered financial institution may determine 
that a financial transaction exposed, directly \91\ or indirectly,\92\ 
to CVC mixing bears indicia of illicit activity. Given the potential 
link to illicit activity, this financial institution might file a SAR 
in compliance with existing BSA requirements. However, there are a 
number of potential reasons why any one individual institution may not 
file such a report, including that in terms of economic fundamentals, 
such reporting may not be privately optimal. Consequently, the absence 
of the proposed special measure one reporting requirement might 
naturally result in systematic underreporting of CVC mixing-related 
suspicious activity, particularly when the exposure to CVC mixing does 
not involve a CVC mixer. As discussed above, preliminary evidence 
suggests that this underreporting occurs.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ See infra note 121.
    \92\ See infra note 122.
    \93\ See discussion supra Section IV.A.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In terms of economic fundamentals, reporting on transactions 
exposed to CVC mixing produces a positive externality insofar as the 
reporting entity incurs expenses in connection with such reporting that 
are not directly, fully compensated. As such, the marginal social 
benefit of reporting exceeds the private costs. Consequently, in the 
absence of imposing a social (compliance-related) cost to non-
reporting, the entity-specific equilibrium level of reporting will 
always be less than the social optimum. Furthermore, from a 
microeconomic- or a more industrial-organization-level of analysis, 
there are competitive reasons why, absent a uniform reporting 
requirement, no single covered financial institution that knows, 
suspects, or has reason to suspect CVC mixing would benefit from 
competing lower on the perceived level of quality in privacy. In such a 
setting, achieving the socially optimal level of reporting would again 
be unobtainable in the absence of a policy intervention (such as the 
proposed reporting and recordkeeping requirements).
    In this proposal, FinCEN is mindful that certain unintended, 
responsive changes in behavior may reduce the efficacy of this rule or 
otherwise attenuate the intended net benefits by limiting the scope of 
benefits or by increasing the costs of compliance. Additionally, the 
attendant costs and benefits per reported transaction may not be 
uniformly distributed across the affected covered financial 
institutions. There may also be broader programmatic costs or 
repercussions to: (1) the specific framing of CVC mixing and CVC mixers 
as proposed; \94\ (2) the framing of CVC mixing activity as 
categorically foreign-state-operated, -located, or otherwise -adjacent; 
(3) the reporting and recordkeeping requirements being applicable to 
domestic financial institutions only; and (4) allowing an in-the-
course-of-business exemption to covered financial institutions, that 
each remain unquantified in the following impact analysis. 
Nevertheless, FinCEN has made a studied \95\ and advised \96\ 
determination that these considerations are outweighed by the primary 
money laundering concern that animates this proposal and are therefore 
not further incorporated in the subsequent discussion.
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    \94\ See invitation for public comment on potential costs and 
repercussions supra Section VII.B.
    \95\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(B). See discussion supra Section I.
    \96\ See discussion of 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(1) requirements supra 
Section I. See also discussion of 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(A) supra 
Sections I and V.

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[[Page 72714]]

2. Institutional Baseline and Affected Parties
    In proposing this rule, FinCEN considered the incremental impacts 
of imposing special measure one relative to the current state of the 
affected markets and their participants. This baseline analysis of the 
parties that would be affected by the proposed rule, their current 
obligations, and common activities satisfies certain analytical best 
practices \97\ by detailing the implied alternative of not pursuing the 
proposed, or any other, regulatory action. This baseline also forms the 
counterfactual against which the quantifiable effects of the rule are 
measured; therefore, substantive errors in or omissions of relevant 
data, facts, or other information may affect the conclusions formed 
regarding the general and/or economically significant impacts of the 
rule. Additionally, because it is unclear that the imposition of 
special measure one would, independently, alter the registration and 
compliance choices already made by such affected parties, quantitative 
portions of the subsequent analysis have not attempted to estimate the 
number of, or magnitude of effects on, unregistered or otherwise non-
compliant entities that FinCEN qualitatively might expect to be 
affected by the rule. Because both these considerations may have first-
order effects on the expected magnitude of certain outcomes, the public 
is invited to provide further insights or information--particularly, 
data or quantitative studies--that could contribute to a more precise 
or more accurate estimation of impact.\98\
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    \97\ See specifically E.O. 12866 Section 1(a) (``In deciding 
whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess all costs and 
benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the 
alternative of not regulating.'').
    \98\ See, e.g., supra Section VII.E.
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(i) Baseline of Affected Parties
(A) Covered Financial Institutions
    The parties expected to comply with the special measure one include 
any and all domestic covered financial institutions as defined in 31 
CFR 1010.100(t).\99\ Table 1 (below) reports an annual maximum of 
potentially affected entities based on FinCEN's most recent estimates 
of the total number of entities that meet the respective regulatory 
definitions.\100\ Estimates of potentially affected money services 
businesses by subcategories as defined in 31 CFR 1010.100(ff) are 
intended to aid in subsequent discussion, which details our assumptions 
about differences in expected compliance burdens by group. Estimates in 
parentheses reflect the total number of registered money services 
businesses that self-identified their business by the given service 
subcategory as defined in 31 CFR 1010.100(ff), among others.\101\ Money 
services business subcategory estimates outside parentheses represent 
the number of entities that self-identified as registering (and 
reporting) singularly due to the requirements for that subcategory.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ See discussion supra Section VI.A.4; see also proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(a)(4) infra Section IX.
    \100\ Numbers presented here may differ slightly from those 
presented in other, concurrent agency rulemaking because estimates 
in this analysis are rounded to the nearest ten for ease of 
aggregation. Such differences are not expected to be economically 
meaningful.
    \101\ For the full list of non-exclusive subcategories a money 
services business may use to self-identify when submitting a 
registration see msb.fincen.gov/definitions/msbKey.php.

      Table 1--Estimates of Affected Financial Institutions by Type
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Number of
            Financial institution type \a\                  entities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bank \b\..............................................         \c\ 9,850
Broker/Dealer in Securities \d\.......................         \e\ 3,540
Money Services Business \f\...........................        \g\ 25,710
Dealer in Foreign Exchange \h\........................   \i\ 190 (3,000)
Check Casher \j\......................................         \k\ 5,960
                                                                (21,970)
Issuer/Seller of Traveler's Checks/Money Orders \l\...           \m\ 380
Provider of Prepaid Access \n\........................      \o\ 20 (130)
Seller of Prepaid Access \p\..........................    \q\ 40 (2,220)
U.S. Postal Service \r\...............................             \s\ 0
Money Transmitter \t\.................................  \u\ 450 (16,460)
Telegraph Company \v\.................................             \w\ 0
Casino \x\............................................           \y\ 990
Card Club \z\.........................................          \aa\ 270
Person subject to supervision by any State or Federal           \cc\ N/A
 Bank Supervisory Authority \bb\......................
Futures Commission Merchant \dd\......................           \ee\ 60
Introducing Broker in Commodities \ff\................          \gg\ 970
Mutual Fund \hh\......................................        \ii\ 1,380
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ As typographically grouped in 31 CFR X 1010.100(t) and (ff),
  respectively.
\b\ See 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(1); see also 31 CFR 1010.100(d).
\c\ Counts of certain types of banks, savings associations, thrifts, and
  trust companies are from Q1 2023 Federal Financial Institutions
  Examination Council (FFIEC) Call Report data, available at https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/pws/downloadbulkdata.aspx. Data for institutions
  that are not insured, are insured under non-FDIC deposit insurance
  regimes, or do not have a Federal functional regulator are from the
  FDIC's Research Information System, available at https://www.fdic.gov/foia/ris/index.html. Credit union data are from the NCUA for Q1 2023,
  available at https://www.ncua.gov/analysis/credit-union-corporate-call-report-data.
\d\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(2).
\e\ According to the SEC, the number of brokers or dealers in securities
  for the fiscal year 2022 is 3,538. See Securities and Exchange
  Commission, Fiscal Year 2024 Congressional Budget Justification, p.
  32, available at https://www.sec.gov/files/fy-2024-congressional-budget-justification_final-3-10.pdf.
\f\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(3).
\g\ From FinCEN's publicly available MSB data (https://www.fincen.gov/msb-registrant-search) as of September 1, 2023.
\h\ 31 CFR 1010.100(ff)(1).
\i\ Value in parentheses reflects all entries in data downloaded from
  https://www.fincen.gov/msb-registrant-search on August 1, 2023,
  including MSB Activities key 415. Alternative value reflects entries
  with exclusively key 415.
\j\ 31 CFR 1010.100(ff)(2).
\k\ Value in parentheses reflects all entries in data downloaded from
  https://www.fincen.gov/msb-registrant-search on August 1, 2023,
  including MSB Activities key 408. Alternative value reflects entries
  with exclusively key 408.

[[Page 72715]]

 
\l\ 31 CFR 10101.100(ff)(3).
\m\ Value reflects all entries in data downloaded from https://www.fincen.gov/msb-registrant-search on August 1, 2023 with,
  exclusively, one of the MSB Activities keys 401 (Issuer of traveler's
  checks), 402 (Seller of traveler's checks), 404 (Issuer of money
  orders), or 405(Seller of money orders). Because of the numerous (134)
  alternative combinations of at least one of the 4 keys with at least
  one of the other three keys and, in some cases, other keys as self-
  reported by registrants, no suitable alternative combination of key
  values could be determined as most appropriately and uniquely
  representative in light of concerns about multiplicative counting of
  affected parties. FinCEN estimates therefore default to the upper
  bound of all MSB registrants for this category of parties collectively
  incurring a regulatory compliance burden.
\n\ 31 CFR 1010.100(ff)(7)(i)-(ii).
\o\ Value in parentheses reflects all entries in data downloaded from
  https://www.fincen.gov/msb-registrant-search on August 1, 2023
  including MSB Activities key 414(Provider of prepaid access).
  Alternative value reflects entries with exclusively key 414.
\p\ 31 CFR 1010.100(ff)(4)(i)-(iii).
\q\ Value in parentheses reflects all entries in data downloaded from
  https://www.fincen.gov/msb-registrant-search including MSB Activities
  key 413. Alternative value reflects entries with exclusively key 413.
\r\ 31 CFR 1010.100(ff)(6).
\s\ FinCEN does not expect the U.S. Postal Service, as defined in 31 CFR
  1010.100(ff)(6) to incur any recordkeeping or reporting obligations in
  connection with this rule.
\t\ 31 CFR 1010.100(ff)(5).
\u\ Value in parentheses reflects all entries in data downloaded from
  https://www.fincen.gov/msb-registrant-search including MSB Activities
  key 409. Alternative value reflects entries with exclusively key 409.
\v\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(4).
\w\ As an estimate of uniquely registered, potentially affected
  entities, FinCEN expects this category to contain no additional
  persons or organizations not already included in other counts,
  particularly as money transmitters.
\x\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(5)(i)-(iii).
\y\ According to the American Gaming Association (AGA), there are 468
  commercial casinos and 523 tribal casinos as of Dec. 31, 2022. See
  American Gaming Association, State of the States: annual report, May
  2023, available at https://www.americangaming.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/AGA-State-of-the-States-2023.pdf p. 16.
\z\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(6)(i)-(ii).
\aa\ According to the American Gaming Association (AGA), there are 266
  card rooms as of Dec. 31, 2022.
\bb\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(7).
\cc\ It is unclear to FinCEN at this time whether any entities exist in
  this category that for purposes of being counted towards unique
  affected parties incurring burdens associated with the rule, if
  adopted as proposed, are not already captured by concurrent status in
  another category of financial institution under the 31 CFR 1010.100(t)
  definition. To the extent that additional data can better inform this
  estimate, public comment is invited.
\dd\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(8).
\ee\ There are 60 futures commission merchants as of June 30, 2023,
  according to the CFTC website. See Commodity Futures Trading
  Commission, Financial Data for FCMs, available at https://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/financialfcmdata/index.htm.
\ff\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(9).
\gg\ According to CFTC, there are 969 introducing brokers in commodities
  as of April 30, 2023.
\hh\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(10).
\ii\ According to the SEC, as of December 2022 (including filings made
  through Jan 20, 2023) there are 1,378 open-end registered investment
  companies that report on Form N-CEN.

    Based on these estimates, it is possible that up to approximately 
42,800 covered financial institutions could incur new recordkeeping and 
reporting costs in complying with special measure one. However, the 
extent to which any of these institutions is expected to be 
economically impacted is limited insofar as they would need to engage 
in transactions \102\ that involve CVC, and thereby the possibility of 
CVC mixing. This prerequisite \103\ (that a transaction be in CVC) is 
expected to preclude many entities from experiencing any significant 
economic effects from the rule.\104\ For example, FinCEN does not 
anticipate any direct effects to the U.S. Postal Service or to any 
registered telegraph company. Further, FinCEN analysis of public and 
non-public sources of information suggests that, categorically, 
domestic mutual funds, casinos, and card clubs have low exposure to CVC 
transactions. For the same reasons, money services businesses that 
provide services exclusively in one or more of the following 
subcategories are not expected to experience any substantial change to 
compliance burdens: dealer in foreign exchange, check casher, issuer/
seller of traveler's checks or money orders, provider of prepaid 
access, and seller of prepaid access. Thus, FinCEN expects 
approximately 9,300 fewer than the total estimate of potentially 
affected entities to reasonably anticipate any noticeable effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \102\ 31 CFR 1010.100(bbb)(1).
    \103\ See discussion supra Section VI.A.5; see also proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(a)(5) infra Section IX.
    \104\ See discussion of expected economic effects on covered 
financial institutions infra Section VIII.A.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the other hand, the categories of affected parties that include 
the largest proportion of VASPs are expected to face the highest levels 
of potential exposure to CVC mixing. These entities are most 
concentrated in the money transmitter subcategory of money services 
businesses and futures commission merchants. In each case, these VASPs 
are a proper subset of their respective groups, and while they are 
expected to be the most directly affected by the rule because they have 
the highest exposure, the incremental burden of the rule is expected to 
be lowest for these entities because it imposes the least adaptation 
from current compliance practices and processes.
    The covered financial institutions that are expected to face the 
greatest incremental burden as a consequence of the proposed 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements would be those with both 
higher likelihoods of being exposed to CVC mixing and lower tailoring 
of existing compliance programs because, for instance, virtual asset 
service provision has not historically been integral to the entity's 
core business function or model. FinCEN expects that this may 
characterize certain banks, or persons subject to supervision by a 
state or federal bank supervisory authority, broker/dealers, and 
introducing brokers in commodities. However, as these types of 
financial institutions are already heavily regulated and typically 
already feature robust monitoring and compliance programs, even as they 
may face the largest incremental burden, this economic impact might 
still be low.\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ FinCEN is requesting comment on the reasonable bases for 
this expectation. See requests for comment supra Section VII.A and 
Section VII.E.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(B) CVC Mixing Service Providers \106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ In this section, FinCEN uses the term `CVC mixer' as used 
in common parlance, noting this may commonly be understood to refer 
to only a proper subset of the entities/parties that would meet the 
definition of `CVC mixer' as defined in this proposed rule. See 
discussion supra Section VII.A.3; see also proposed amendment 31 CFR 
1010.662(a)(2) infra Section IX.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the proposed application of special measure one does not 
expressly

[[Page 72716]]

impose requirements on CVC mixers that are not covered financial 
institutions or those able to rely on the proposed exemption,\107\ it 
is reasonable to expect that the relative attractiveness of engaging 
with CVC mixers or the number of those who avail themselves of CVC 
mixing services might be affected. As a baseline matter of market 
structure, the centralized mixing services industry is expected to be 
characterized by large network externalities: the value of a CVC mixer 
should increase as the number of users increases, because the greater 
the number of parties that use a particular CVC mixer, the easier it 
becomes for the mixer to anonymize each participant in a mixing 
transaction. This characterization is consistent with observable market 
behavior. Because network externalities generally reinforce high levels 
of market concentration, it may be reasonable to expect that the number 
of CVC mixers that can concurrently achieve and maintain a sustainable 
scale to continue operations is unlikely to grow. It may also imply 
that, to the extent that the demand for CVC mixing services remains 
relatively constant over time, in the event that any one CVC mixing 
service provider ceases to remain active, another active or new CVC 
mixer could greatly benefit from the subsequent increase in demand for 
its services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ At the time of this proposal, FinCEN observes no CVC 
mixers that meet either or both of these criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(C) Clients of Primary Affected Parties
    In the course of compliance with special measure one, covered 
financial institutions may be required to submit reports and retain 
records containing certain unique identifiers \108\ and other personal 
information \109\ of a party, or parties, to a CVC mixing-exposed 
transaction.\110\ Based on a recent report,\111\ this could affect more 
than 300 million users of unhosted CVC wallets insofar as a user's 
personal information may be reported if their wallet is deemed by a 
covered financial institution to be involved in a covered transaction. 
Because there is no restriction on the number of wallets an individual 
may have, this number may overestimate the number of unique individuals 
whose personal information may be required. To the extent that 
previously reported estimates \112\ regarding the distribution of CVC 
mixer users by type--privacy-oriented versus abusers of anonymity--are 
usable for inference, special measure one could require the reporting 
of personal information in connection with up to approximately 66 (87) 
percent of CVC mixer deposits in the absence of any other identifiable 
connection to high risk (illicit) activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \108\ Including name (see proposed amendment 31 CFR 
1010.662(b)(1)(ii)(A) infra Section IX) and government issued 
(alpha)numeric identifier (see proposed amendment 31 CFR 
1010.662(b)(1)(ii)(F) infra Section IX); see also discussion supra 
Section VI.
    \109\ Including a customer's CVC wallet address (see proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(1)(i)(E) infra Section IX), date of 
birth (see proposed amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(1)(ii)(B) infra 
Section IX), address (see proposed amendment 31 CFR 
1010.662(b)(1)(ii)(C) infra Section IX), and email address (see 
proposed amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(1)(ii)(D) infra Section IX); 
see also discussion supra Section VI.
    \110\ See Section VI.B.1.
    \111\ Chainalysis Report, On-Chain User Segmentation for Crypto 
Exchanges, June 22, 2023, available at https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/crypto-exchanges-on-chain-user-segmentation-guide/.
    \112\ See discussion supra Section IV.A.3; see also supra note 
58.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FinCEN has weighed these considerations against the broader 
economic concern of systematic underreporting in the absence of special 
measure one requirements,\113\ and concluded that the associated costs 
to privacy-oriented clients of covered financial institutions and CVC 
mixers are small in both relative \114\ and absolute \115\ terms. 
Further, there is no reason to believe the required records and 
personal information contained therein would be subject to any greater 
risk of improper access, use, or exposure than any other record or 
report filed with a federal agency or maintained by a covered financial 
institution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ See discussion supra Section IV.A.3; see also Section 
VIII.A.1.
    \114\ FinCEN considered costs here proportionally to the value 
of the information collected and reported in connection with illicit 
finance-related transactions. See discussion supra Section VIII.A; 
see also supra note 90.
    \115\ FinCEN considered here the aggregate potential 
informational exposure, which depends jointly on (1) the quanta of 
personal information collected and reported and (2) the expected 
number of instances in which access to that personal information is 
granted in the course of a legitimate investigative or prosecutorial 
activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(D) Other Affected Parties
    FinCEN further anticipates second order economic effects of the 
proposed rule on parties ancillary to transactions between covered 
financial institutions, CVC mixing service providers, and clients of 
either or both, such as counsel, advisors, external forensic firms, 
independent auditors, IT services, and other compliance facilitators or 
third-party service providers. In particular, FinCEN expects the 
proposed requirements may affect the demand for services by third party 
blockchain analytics companies.\116\ Such companies provide transaction 
screening and risk rating services to financial institutions that may 
hire them in lieu of, or to complement, similar functions performed in-
house. Because of the specialized experience and expertise required to 
build a program, reporting in near real time, that not only monitors 
multiple blockchains, but also incorporates a multitude of additional 
data sources to enrich a given blockchain's transaction- and 
transaction party-related information, few such companies exist and the 
market is consequently concentrated to fewer than ten main entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \116\ At present, it is unclear to FinCEN whether, in light of 
the proposed requirements, a covered financial institution would be 
more likely to treat these third party services as a substitute or a 
complement to in-house screening and risk-management activities. 
Therefore while there is an expected change to demand for these 
third party services, the direction of this change remains unsigned.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Separately, because the proposed rule is limited in scope to only 
the mixing of CVC, to the extent that digital token mixing and its 
service providers are considered viable substitutes for CVC mixing or 
could otherwise be employed to obfuscate CVC mixing, the demand for 
token mixing and its service providers may increase as a consequence of 
adopting the rule as proposed.
(ii) Regulatory and Market Baseline
(A) Current Requirements
    The ten categories of financial institutions covered by the 
proposed rule, as defined in 31 CFR 1010.100(t) are expected to already 
be compliant with the required activities as outlined in 31 CFR 1020 
(Banks), 1021 (Casinos and Card Clubs), 1022 (Money Service 
Businesses), 1023 (Brokers or Dealers in Securities), 1024 (Mutual 
Funds), and 1026 (Futures Commission Merchants and Introducing Brokers 
in Commodities), as applicable. These rules include requirements for 
financial institutions to: (1) create and maintain compliance policies, 
procedures, and internal controls; (2) engage in customer 
identification verification; (3) file reports with FinCEN; (4) create 
and retain records; and (5) respond to law enforcement requests, and 
have guided financial institutions' understanding of FinCEN's 
expectations of compliant reporting and recordkeeping activity since 
before the advent of virtual currency. Where the original rules are 
silent on the application of, or compliance with, these requirements 
with respect to CVC, FinCEN and OFAC

[[Page 72717]]

have historically provided successive, iterative guidance \117\ and 
other information \118\ that clarifies expectations with respect to 
required practices. Furthermore, FinCEN has historically issued 
advisories and press releases based on FATF guidance to financial 
institutions,\119\ including VASPs, concerning processes and legal 
obligations that apply to transactions involving high risk and 
sanctioned juridictions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ See FIN-2013-G001, Application of FinCEN's Regulations to 
Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies, Mar. 
18, 2013, available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/guidance/FIN-2013-G001.pdf (2013 Guidance); see also FinCEN 2019 CVC 
Guidance.
    \118\ See generally OFAC, Questions on Virtual Currency, 
available at https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/topic/1626; see, 
specifically OFAC, Sanctions Compliance Guidance for the Virtual 
Currency Industry, Oct. 2021, available at https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/913571/download?inline.
    \119\ See, e.g., FinCEN, Financial Action Task Force Identifies 
Jurisdictions with Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing 
of Terrorism and Counter-Proliferation Deficiencies, June 29, 2023, 
available at https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/financial-action-task-force-identifies-jurisdictions-anti-money-laundering-and-4; FIN-2021-A003 ``Advisory on the Financial Action Task Force-
Identified Jursdictions with Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism and Counter-Proliferations Deficiencies'' 
available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2021-03-11/FATF%20February%202021%20Advisory%20FINAL%20508.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Preliminarily, evidence suggests that at least some covered 
financial institutions have long anticipated and appreciated the 
applicability of SAR and currency transaction reporting requirements to 
transactions involving CVC: the first SAR including language specific 
to a CVC was filed thirteen years ago in 2010, predating FinCEN's 2013 
Guidance, and the first SAR filed by a VASP, approximately two months 
after the 2013 Guidance was issued, is already a decade old. Since the 
issuance of that guidance, FinCEN has received CVC-related SARs from 
approximately 4,500 distinct filers. As such, the reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements that would be introduced by the proposed 
rule may build incrementally onto an existing regulatory compliance 
framework, inclusive of CVC, that is well understood, and where a 
nontrivial proportion of covered financial institutions demonstrate 
willingness and ability to meet existing reporting and recordkeeping 
obligations.
(B) Current Market Practices
    When assessing relevant baseline elements of current market 
practice against which to forecast the regulatory and economic impacts 
of special measure one requirements as proposed, FinCEN--in addition to 
the current regulatory requirements--also considered certain factors of 
current practices including: (1) the extent to which covered financial 
institutions are identifiably exposed to CVC mixing; and (2) the 
availability of reliable tools and methods with which to detect the 
kinds of CVC mixing exposure that would trigger the proposed reporting 
and recordkeeping requirements.
    As a component of this analysis, FinCEN conducted an independent 
historical review of CVC mixing exposure occurring in the ordinary 
course of business at the largest registered CVC exchanges from their 
respective first trade dates until present.\120\ As these are some of 
the affected covered financial institutions with highest expected 
exposure to CVC mixing, their relative volumes of CVC mixing-exposed 
transactions is likely to present a reasonable upper-bound on the 
proportion of currently identifiable transactions that could incur 
additional record-keeping and reporting requirements in connection with 
the imposition of the first special measure. This study found that 
during the period reviewed, mean (median) daily transaction volume with 
observable direct exposure \121\ was approximately 0.010 percent (0.009 
percent), while mean (median) observable indirect exposure \122\ was 
approximately 0.234 percent (0.168 percent) of daily transaction 
volume. The analysis yielded comparable results when proportions were 
based on share of total transactions instead of U.S. Dollar value 
equivalent. It would therefore appear that, to the extent that future 
CVC mixing exposure is consistent with past and current trends, the 
number of transactions that would require reporting and recordkeeping 
as a unique consequence of adopting special measure one as proposed is 
extremely low in relative terms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ This study incorporated both public and non-public data as 
well as certain proprietary and non-proprietary computer programs to 
analyze transactions occurring between calendar year 2010 at the 
earliest (given that each exchange has a unique start date) and the 
date the study was concluded (August 3, 2023).
    \121\ Direct exposure refers to transactions where CVC is sent 
from one CVC wallet address to another CVC wallet address, without 
the use of an intermediary. For example, if a VASP received funds 
from--or sent funds to--a CVC mixer without first going through an 
intermediary, that VASP has direct exposure to CVC mixing.
    \122\ Indirect exposure refers to transactions where CVC is sent 
from a CVC wallet address through at least one other wallet address 
to arrive at the intended recipient. For example, if CVC was sent 
from a CVC mixer to a CVC wallet address and then to a VASP, that 
VASP has indirect exposure to CVC mixing. Similarly, if CVC sent 
from a VASP to a CVC wallet address was subsequently send to a CVC 
mixer, it would be indirectly exposed to CVC mixing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FinCEN also reviewed the availability of tools, other than the use 
of third party blockchain analytics companies, that a financial 
institution currently has the option to employ to detect exposure to 
CVC mixing transactions in the course of complying with existing SAR 
and/or CTR related requirements. CVC mixing exposure can occur 
(directly \123\ or indirectly \124\) in the process of sending CVC to, 
or receiving CVC from, a covered financial institution (such as a CVC 
exchange) and can be detected via a range of free and paid commercial 
software programs.\125\ Free programs, such as common block explorers, 
can easily reveal direct \126\ exposure to a CVC mixer if the CVC mixer 
infrastructure is relatively stable and well known, such as in the case 
of many Ethereum-based CVC mixers. Indirect \127\ exposure may be also 
discoverable using these programs but might require supplementary 
manual investigative work to uncover. Paid commercial programs employ 
suites of heuristics to more comprehensively identify CVC mixers, and 
market themselves on their ability to automatically detect bi-
directional indirect \128\ and direct \129\ exposure to CVC mixing 
activity for any blockchain address supported by the service. On 
blockchains supporting native smart contract capability, these 
automated attribution capabilities can be easily defeated if a user 
routes funds through token contracts or other digital asset entities 
providing on-chain exchange services. In such cases, analysts can still 
perform manual blockchain forensic tracing to identify the origin of 
funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ See definition supra note 121.
    \124\ See definition supra note 122.
    \125\ FinCEN notes that the extent to which exclusive use of any 
of these tools (free or commercial software programs) would fully 
satisfy either existing reporting and recordkeeping requirements, or 
those imposed by the proposed special measure one, is a matter of 
facts and circumstances.
    \126\ Id. at note 121.
    \127\ Id. at note 122.
    \128\ Id. at 122.
    \129\ Id. ar 121.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Description of the Proposed Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements 
of the First Special Measure
    Imposing special measure one as proposed would introduce novel but, 
in many cases, incrementally modest additional recordkeeping and 
reporting obligations, requiring the collection and transmission of 
certain information in its possession when a covered financial 
institution knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect a transaction 
occurred

[[Page 72718]]

that involved the use of CVC mixing within or involving a jurisdiction 
outside the United States.\130\ The affected institution at which a 
covered transaction is conducted or attempted would need to collect 
required information about the covered transaction and, within 30 days 
of initial detection of a covered transaction, provide a report to 
FinCEN containing as much of the reportable required information as 
available to the affected institution--via electronic filing or other 
agency-prescribed manner.\131\
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    \130\ See Section VI. See also Section IX.
    \131\ See discussion supra Section VI.B.2; see also proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(2) infra Section IX.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, for a specified period of time (five years \132\) 
after filing its report, each covered financial institution would 
engage in new recordkeeping activities because it would need to 
document its compliance with the filing procedures and the reporting 
requirements by: (1) maintaining a copy of any records related to CVC 
mixing transactions they have filed; and (2) obtaining and recording 
copies of documentation relating to compliance with the 
regulation.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ 31 CFR 1010.430
    \133\ See discussion supra Section VI.B.3; see also proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(3) infra Section IX.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The required information would identify and describe certain unique 
features and characteristics of both the reportable covered transaction 
and the customer associated with the covered transaction. The required 
informational components concerning the covered transaction pertain to 
the CVC when transferred (currency type,\134\ amount,\135\ and U.S.-
dollar equivalent \136\), the CVC mixer (identity \137\ and/or wallet 
address \138\), and the transaction (hash,\139\ date,\140\ IP addresses 
and timestamps,\141\ and narrative description \142\), while the 
required informational components concerning the associated customer 
include name \143\, date of birth \144\, addresses (physical,\145\ CVC 
wallet,\146\ and associated email \147\), phone number,\148\ and an 
entity-specific government-issued (alpha)numeric identifier.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ See discussion supra Section VI.B.1(i); see also proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(1)(i)(B) infra Section IX.
    \135\ See discussion supra Section VI.B.1(i); see also proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(1)(i)(A) infra Section IX.
    \136\ Id.
    \137\ See discussion supra Section VI.B.1(i); see also proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(1)(i)(C) infra Section IX.
    \138\ See discussion supra Section VI.B.1(i); see also proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(1)(i)(D) infra Section IX.
    \139\ See discussion supra Section VI.B.1(i); see also proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(1)(i)(F) infra Section IX.
    \140\ See discussion supra Section VI.B.1(i); see also proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(1)(i)(G) infra Section IX.
    \141\ See discussion supra Section VI.B.1(i); see also proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(1)(i)(H) infra Section IX.
    \142\ See discussion supra Section VI.B.1(i); see also proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(1)(i)(I) infra Section IX.
    \143\ See discussion supra Section VI.B.1(ii); see also proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(1)(ii)(A) infra Section IX.
    \144\ See discussion supra Section VI.B.1(ii); see also proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(1)(ii)(B) infra Section IX.
    \145\ See discussion supra Section VI.B.1(ii); see also proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(1)(ii)(C) infra Section IX.
    \146\ See discussion supra Section VI.B.1(i); see also proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(1)(i)(E) infra Section IX.
    \147\ See discussion supra Section VI.B.1(ii); see also proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(1)(ii)(D) infra Section IX.
    \148\ See discussion supra Section VI.B.1(ii); see also proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(1)(ii)(E) infra Section IX.
    \149\ See discussion supra Section VI.B.1(ii); see also proposed 
amendment 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(1)(ii)(F) infra Section IX.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Expected Economic Effects on Covered Financial Institutions
    As discussed above, the parties expected to incur an economic 
burden as they comply with the first special measure include all 
financial institutions as defined in 31 CFR 1010.100(t) insofar as they 
engage in CVC transactions that could be exposed to CVC mixing within 
or involving a jurisdiction outside the United States.\150\ In light of 
FinCEN's review of the anticipated differential effects on covered 
financial institutions due to variations in both expected exposure and 
preexisting monitoring and detection infrastructure, as well as 
FinCEN's assessment of current market practices,\151\ FinCEN expects 
that the largest portion of the novel costs incurred in complying with 
the first special measure will be associated with indirect \152\ 
exposure to CVC mixing at financial institutions not currently 
operating primarily in the provision of virtual asset services and 
cases where the jurisdictions involved or under which CVC mixing occurs 
are particularly difficult to ascertain. However, it is unclear whether 
this proportion of expected novel compliance costs would itself be 
large because it would be difficult to uniquely identify expenses 
incurred distinctly as a function of special measure one compliance 
from expenses incurred in the course of pre-existing BSA 
requirements,\153\ as both would largely rely on use of the same 
activities, technology, and services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \150\ See discussion of covered financial transactions 
(clarifying the definitional requirement that a reportable 
transaction must occur in CVC) supra Section VI.A.4,
    \151\ See discussion of anticipated differential effects supra 
Section VIII.A.2(i)(A); see also discussion of current market 
practices supra Section VIII.A.2(ii)(B).
    \152\ Id. at note 122.
    \153\ See discussion of existing BSA requirements regarding 
identification and monitoring of financial transaction associations 
with foreign jurisdictions and geographic locations supra Section 
VI.A.5. See also discussion of FinCEN requirements under FATF 
guidance supra Section VIII.A.2(ii)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is also unclear whether future relative distributions of direct 
\154\ versus indirect \155\ exposure would continue in the same pattern 
as historically observed, but at present do not have empirical evidence 
that would suggest substantial changes are imminent. Detecting indirect 
\156\ exposure may require certain financial institutions to newly 
obtain commercial programs and/or services to facilitate compliance 
with the rule as proposed as CVC mixing practices continue to evolve. 
The cost of these services, based on current market prices, could run 
in excess of tens of thousands of dollars per license and would require 
analysts to remain continually engaged in blockchain tracing to stay up 
to date with emerging trends in the rapidly developing digital asset 
industry. It is unclear at this time whether financial institutions or 
third party service providers would incur the majority of costs 
associated with analytical updating as CVC mixing practices evolve, or 
the extent to which these cost increases may be passed through to a 
financial institution's customers. It is also unclear how these 
compliance-related costs might scale with the proposed increased 
reporting and recordkeeping requirements because it requires 
speculation about how the potential for new entrants to the third party 
mixing detection service market and/or technological advancements (that 
would not occur but for the proposed compliance obligations making them 
economically attractive investments) would affect costs.\157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \154\ Id. at note 121.
    \155\ Id. at note 122.
    \156\ Id.
    \157\ See discussion supra Section VIII.A.2(i)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FinCEN acknowledges to that to the extent that a covered 
transaction might require the filing of both a SAR and special measure 
one related report, concurrent satisfaction of both sets of reporting 
and recordkeeping requirements might result in some duplicative costs 
related to any overlap.

[[Page 72719]]

    To the extent that the forgoing analysis has failed to take into 
consideration any material facts, data, circumstances, or other 
considerations that, had they been considered, would have substantially 
altered the balance of costs and benefits attendant to the proposed 
special measure(s), FinCEN has invited public comment.\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \158\ See Sections VII.A. and VII.E.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Economic Consideration of Available Regulatory Alternatives
    FinCEN has considered a number of alternative policies that could 
have been proposed to accomplish the same objectives.\159\ These 
policies included the selection of one, or a combination of, other 
special measure(s) or, alternatively the selection of the same special 
measure with a narrower scope.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \159\ See discussion supra Section V.E.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(i) Special Measure Two: Beneficial Ownership Information Requirements
    Instead of recordkeeping and reporting requirements, FinCEN could 
have pursued the application of special measure two, which would have 
required domestic financial institutions and agencies to obtain and 
retain the beneficial ownership information of any account at a 
depository institution opened or maintained by a foreign person or 
their representative that the institution or agency knows, suspects, or 
has reason to suspect is involved in a CVC mixing transaction. While 
this information about beneficial ownership related to CVC mixing 
transaction participants could be similar to certain elements required 
under the current proposal and hence of comparable value, the 
alternative focus of special measure two on the ownership of accounts 
instead of the nature of transactions is expected to impose similar 
compliance costs with lower attendant benefits both in quantity of 
useful information obtained and in scope of financial institutions to 
whom the information-gathering requirements would apply. As such, the 
imposition of special measure two instead of special measure one would 
be strictly less efficient in addressing the class of transactions of 
primary money laundering concern.
(ii) Special Measures Three Through Five
    Alternatively, FinCEN could have proposed to impose special measure 
three, four, five, or some combination thereof. Special measures three 
and four would simply require domestic financial institutions and 
agencies to obtain certain identifying information regarding the 
customer or their representative as a condition to open or maintain a 
payable-through \160\ or correspondent \161\ account, respectively, if 
the financial institution or agency knows, suspects, or has reason to 
suspect the account and transactions conducted through it involve CVC 
mixing. More severely, special measure five could have imposed 
prohibitions or conditions \162\ on the opening or maintenance of a 
correspondent or payable-through account if the domestic covered 
financial institution or agency knows, suspects, or has reason to 
suspect that transactions conducted through the account involve CVC 
mixing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \160\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(3)
    \161\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(4)
    \162\ 31 U.S.C. 5318(b)(5)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because the expected results of imposing special measures three, 
four, or both, absent special measure five would likely be similar to 
expectations with respect to special measure two, that analysis is not 
repeated here. Instead, an approach that would impose special measures 
three or four, or both, in conjunction with special measure five is 
considered. As discussed above,\163\ FinCEN determined that these 
special measures are less relevant in the context of CVC transactions, 
including those that involve CVC mixing, as CVC transactions are 
conducted outside of the traditional banking system. Therefore, 
expected benefits would also be lower than under proposed special 
measure one requirements due to the limited intersection between 
transactions in CVC and the foreign use of domestic traditional bank 
accounts. Given these considerations, this alternative approach was 
rejected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \163\ See Section V.E.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(iii) Alternate Specification of Special Measure One: Specified Terror 
Finance-Related Actors and Transactions Only
    Finally, FinCEN considered an alternative that would employ the 
same special measure but with greater specificity of covered 
transactions that would limit the scope of interest in CVC mixing-
exposed transactions to only those identifiably sponsored by or 
affiliated with terror finance by Hamas, ISIS, or the DPRK. This 
alternative is expected to incur higher costs related to, among other 
things, the additional burden a financial institution would have in 
making a determination about a transaction's connection to an 
identifiable source or affiliate of the applicable terrorist 
organization. It would also limit the potential informational benefits 
of the measure by discarding similar reports and records that may be of 
equal or greater value to investigating, prosecuting, or 
disincentivizing CVC mixing supported illicit activities but lack an 
identifiable connection to Hamas, ISIS, or the DPRK. Because of these 
dual inefficiencies, special measure one as proposed is considered to 
strike a more appriopriate balance.

B. Executive Orders

    Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 14094 direct agencies to assess 
costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if 
regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize 
net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public 
health and safety effects, distributive impacts, and equity). Executive 
Order 13563 emphasizes the importance of quantifying both costs and 
benefits, of reducing costs, of harmonizing rules, and of promoting 
flexibility.
    It has been determined that this proposed rule is not a significant 
regulatory action under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866, as 
amended. However, in light of the nature of this proposed rule, FinCEN 
has prepared an economic analysis to help inform its consideration of 
the impacts of the proposed rule.

C. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    When an agency issues a rulemaking proposal, the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act (RFA) requires the agency to ``prepare and make 
available for public comment an initial regulatory flexibility 
analysis''(IRFA) that will ``describe the impact of the proposed rule 
on small entities.'' \164\ However, Section 605 of the RFA allows an 
agency to certify a rule, in lieu of preparing an analysis, if the 
proposed rulemaking is not expected to have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \164\ 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Whom the Proposed Rule 
Will Apply
    The reporting and recordkeeping requirements proposed under the 
first special measure requires certain covered financial institutions 
to report to FinCEN information associated with transactions or 
attempted transactions involving CVC mixing and maintain certain 
related records for a fixed period of time.\165\ Table 2 (below) 
presents FinCEN estimates of the number of affected institutions that 
may be deemed

[[Page 72720]]

small entities. To identify whether a financial institution is small, 
FinCEN generally uses the Small Business Administration's (SBA) latest 
annual size standards for small entities in a given industry, unless 
otherwise noted.\166\ FinCEN also uses the U.S. Census Bureau's 
publicly available 2017 Statistics of U.S. Businesses survey data 
(Census survey data).\167\ FinCEN applies SBA size standards to the 
corresponding industry's receipts in the 2017 Census survey data and 
determines what proportion of a given industry is deemed small, on 
average. FinCEN considers a financial institution to be small if it has 
total annual receipts less than the annual SBA small entity size 
standard for the financial institution's industry. FinCEN applies these 
estimated proportions to FinCEN's current financial institution counts 
for brokers/dealers in securities, money services businesses, casinos, 
card clubs, futures commission merchants, introducing brokers in 
commodities, and mutual funds to determine the proportion of current 
small financial institutions in those industries. Numbers have been 
rounded as in Section VIII.A.2(i)(A) to facilitate aggregation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \165\ See discussion supra Section VIII.A.2-3.
    \166\ See U.S. Small Business Administration's Table of Size 
Standards, available at https://www.sba.gov/sites/sbagov/files/2023-06/Table%20of%20Size%20Standards_Effective%20March%2017%2C%202023%20%282%29.pdf.
    \167\ See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. & states, NAICS, detailed 
employment sizes (U.S., 6-digit and states, NAICS sectors) (2017), 
available at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/susb/2017-susb-annual.html. The Census survey documents the number of firms 
and establishments, employment numbers, and annual payroll by State, 
industry, and enterprise every year. Receipts data, which FinCEN 
uses as a proxy for revenues, is available only once every five 
years, with 2017 being the most recent survey year with receipt 
data.

   Table 2--Estimates of Small Affected Financial Institutions by Type
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Number of
            Financial institution type \a\                  entities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bank \b\..............................................         \c\ 7,970
Broker/Dealer in Securities \d\.......................         \e\ 3,450
Money Services Businesses \f\.........................        \g\ 24,010
Telegraph Company \h\.................................             \i\ 0
Casino \j\............................................           \k\ 930
Card Club \l\.........................................           \m\ 250
Person subject to supervision by any State or Federal            \o\ N/A
 Bank Supervisory Authority \n\.......................
Futures Commission Merchant \p\.......................            \q\ 56
Introducing Broker in Commodities \r\.................           \s\ 900
Mutual Fund \t\.......................................         \u\ 1,380
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ As typographically grouped in 31 CFR 1010.100(t).
\b\ See 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(1); see also 31 CFR 1010.100(d). The SBA
  currently defines small entity size standards for banks as follows:
  less than $850 million in total assets for commercial banks, savings
  institutions, and credit unions.
\c\ Counts of certain types of banks, savings associations, thrifts,
  trust companies are from Q1 2023 Federal Financial Institutions
  Examination Council (FFIEC) Call Report data, available a https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/pws/downloadbulkdata.aspx. Data for institutions
  that are not insured, are insured under non-FDIC deposit insurance
  regimes, or do not have a Federal functional regulator are from the
  FDIC's Research Information System, available at https://www.fdic.gov/foia/ris/index.html. Credit union data are from the NCUA for Q1 2023,
  available at https://www.ncua.gov/analysis/credit-union-corporate-call-report-data. Because data accessed through FFIEC and NCUA Call Report
  data provides information about asset size for banks, trusts, savings
  and loans, credit unions, etc., FinCEN is able to directly determine
  how many banks and credit unions are small by SBA size standards.
  Because the Call Report data does not include institutions that are
  not insured, are insured under non-FDIC deposit insurance regimes, or
  that do not have a Federal financial regulator, FinCEN assumes that
  all such entities listed in the FDIC's Research Information System
  data are small, unless they are controlled by a holding company that
  does not meet the SBA's definition of a small entity, and includes
  them in the count of small banks. Consistent with the SBA's General
  Principles of Affiliation, 13 CFR 121.103(a), FinCEN aggregates the
  assets of affiliated financial institutions using FFIEC financial data
  reported by bank holding companies on forms Y-9C, Y-9LP, and Y-9SP,
  available at https://www.ffiec.gov/npw/FinancialReport/FinancialDataDownload FinancialDataDownload, and ownership data, available at https://www.ffiec.gov/npw/FinancialReport/DataDownload, when determining if an
  institution should be classified as small. FinCEN uses four quarters
  of data reported by holding companies, banks, and credit unions
  because a ``financial institution's assets are determined by averaging
  the assets reported on its four quarterly financial statements for the
  preceding year.'' See U.S. Small Business Administration's Table of
  Size Standards, p. 38 n.8, https://www.sba.gov/sites/sbagov/files/2023-06/Table%20of%20Size%20Standards_Effective%20March%2017%2C%202023%20%282%29.pdf. FinCEN recognizes that using SBA size standards to identify
  small credit unions differs from the size standards applied by the
  NCUA. However, for consistency in this analysis, FinCEN applies the
  SBA-defined size standards.
\d\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(2).
\e\ The SBA currently defines small entity size standards for investment
  banking and securities intermediation as less than $47 million in
  average annual receipts. See paragraph preceding table for details of
  analysis.
\f\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(3).
\g\ The SBA currently defines small entity size standards for financial
  transactions processing, reserve, and clearinghouse activities as less
  than $47 million in average annual receipts. See paragraph preceding
  table for details of analysis.
\h\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(4).
\i\ As an estimate of uniquely registered, potentially affected small
  entities, FinCEN expect this category to contain no additional persons
  or organizations not already included in other counts, particularly as
  money transmitters.
\j\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(5)(i)-(iii).
\k\ The SBA currently defines small entity size standards for casinos as
  less than $34 million in average annual receipts. See paragraph
  preceding table for details of analysis.
\l\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(6)(i)-(ii).
\m\ The SBA currently defines small entity size standards for other
  gambling industries as less than $40 million in average annual
  receipts. See paragraph preceding table for details of analysis.
\n\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(7).
\o\ It is unclear to FinCEN at this time whether any entities exist in
  this category that for purposes of being counted towards unique
  affected parties incurring burdens associated with the rule, if
  adopted as proposed, are not already captured by concurrent status in
  another category of financial institution under the 31 CFR 1010.100(t)
  definition. To the extent that additional data can better inform this
  estimate, public comment is invited.
\p\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(8).
\q\ The SBA currently defines small entity size standards for commodity
  contracts intermediation as less than $47 million in average annual
  receipts. See paragraph preceding table for details of analysis.
\r\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(9).
\s\ Supra note q.

[[Page 72721]]

 
\t\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(10).
\u\ The SBA currently defines small entity size standards for open-end
  investment funds as less than $40 million in average annual receipts.
  See paragraph preceding table for details of analysis.

2. Expectation of Impact
    For the reasons discussed above in Section VIII.A, FinCEN does not 
expect all potentially affected financial institutions to be equally 
affected by the proposed rule.\168\ These expectations of differential 
effects are of first-order relevance because, for the purposes of the 
IRFA, a rulemaking must be jointly impactful in both its breadth 
(substantial number) and depth (significant economic impact) on small 
entities to require additional, tailored analysis. FinCEN's categorical 
analysis of the financial institutions defined in 31 CFR 1010.100(t) 
does not support the need for an initial regulatory flexibility 
analysis because it determined that, in cases where a substantial 
number of financial institutions are small entities, the economic 
impact of the rule is not expected to be significant. Conversely, in 
cases where the economic impact is expected to be its most significant, 
it is not clear that a substantial number of affected institutions 
would meet the criteria to qualify as small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \168\ See discussion supra Section VIII.A.2(i)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To the extent that other small entities that are not financial 
institutions may be economically affected by the proposed 
rulemaking,\169\ FinCEN did not include any estimates of affected 
parties or calculations of effects in this IRFA because those effects, 
for most non-financial institutions, are primarily expected to be 
benefits in the form of potential increases in demands for services. An 
attempt to quantify increased operating costs accompanying these 
increases in demand generally, and for small entities specifically, 
would be so speculative as to be uninformative. In the event that a 
more precise forecast could be reliably formed with available data and 
would alter the conclusions of this analysis, FinCEN is requesting 
information from the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \169\ See, e.g., discussion supra Section VIII.A.2(i)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Certification
    When viewed as a whole, FinCEN does not anticipate that the 
proposals contained in this rulemaking will have a significant impact 
on a substantial number of small financial institutions or other 
potentially affected businesses. Accordingly, FinCEN certifies that 
this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. FinCEN invites comments from members of the 
public who believe there will be a significant economic impact on small 
entities from the imposition of the first special measure regarding CVC 
mixers.\170\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \170\ See Section VII.E.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    Section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 \171\ 
(Unfunded Mandates Reform Act), requires that an agency prepare a 
budgetary impact statement before promulgating a rule that may result 
in expenditure by the state, local, and tribal governments, in the 
aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more in any one 
year, adjusted for inflation.\172\ If a budgetary impact statement is 
required, section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act also requires 
an agency to identify and consider a reasonable number of regulatory 
alternatives before promulgating a rule.\173\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \171\ Public Law 104-4 (March 22, 1995).
    \172\ Id.
    \173\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in the foregoing analysis,\174\ it is unclear if 
either the gross or net cost of compliance to the private sector would 
exceed $177 million annually.\175\ In the event that this is so, FinCEN 
has performed the preliminary analysis above to address the potential 
need to satisfy the requirements of the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act.\176\ FinCEN is additionally soliciting comments--preferably 
including data, studies, or other forms of quantitative analysis--that 
would specifically inform our quantification of expected compliance 
related expenditures by state, local, and tribal governments and/or the 
private sector in the event that such costs would, in light of more 
complete information, be demonstrably expected to exceed the annual 
$100 million threshold, adjusted for inflation ($177 million).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \174\ See Section VIII.A.4.
    \175\ The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act requires an assessment of 
mandates that will result in an annual expenditure of $100 million 
or more, adjusted for inflation. The U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis reports the annual value of the gross domestic product 
(GDP) deflator in 1995, the year of the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act, as 71.823, and as 127.224 in 2022. See U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, ``Table 1.1.9. Implicit Price Deflators for Gross Domestic 
Product'' (accessed Friday, June 2, 2023) available at https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/?reqid=19&step=3&isuri=1&1921=survey&1903=13t. 
Thus, the inflation adjusted estimate for $100 million is 127.224/
71.823 x 100 = $177 million.
    \176\ See generally, discussion supra Section VIII.A; see 
specifically, discussion of alternatives considered supra Section 
V.E. and Section VIII.A.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The recordkeeping and reporting requirements contained in this 
proposed rule will be submitted by FinCEN to the Office of Management 
and Budget for review in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 
1995 \177\ (PRA). Under the PRA, an agency may not conduct or sponsor, 
and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information 
unless it displays a valid control number assigned by OMB. Written 
comments and recommendations for the proposed information collection 
can be submitted by visiting www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain. Find 
this particular document by selecting ``Currently under Review--Open 
for Public Comments'' or by using the search function. Comments are 
welcome and must be received by [90 DAYS AFTER DATE OF PUBLICATION IN 
THE FEDERAL REGISTER]. In accordance with requirements of the PRA and 
its implementing regulations, 5 CFR part 1320, the following 
information concerning the collection of information as required by 31 
CFR 1010.662 is presented to assist those persons wishing to comment on 
the information collections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \177\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The provisions in this proposed rule pertaining to the collection 
of information can be found in section 1010.662(b)(1). The information 
required to be reported in section 1010.662(b)(1) will be used by the 
U.S. Government to monitor the class of transactions of primary money 
laundering concern. The information required to be maintained by 
section 1010.662(b)(3) will be used by federal agencies and certain 
self-regulatory organizations to verify compliance by covered financial 
institutions with the provisions of 31 CFR 1010.662. The class of 
financial transactions affected by the reporting requirement is 
identical to the class of financial transactions affected by the 
recordkeeping requirement. The collection of information is mandatory.
    Frequency: Covered financial institutions would be required to file 
within 30 days of detecting a covered transaction.\178\ As nothing 
prevents a covered financial institution from optimizing with respect 
to scale by

[[Page 72722]]

filing later, while still within the 30-day limit, it is foreseeable 
that despite a distinct filing obligation per covered transaction, some 
entities may elect to file all required reports still within the same 
30-day window at a single time, effectively reducing the frequency of 
filing.
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    \178\ 31 CFR 1010.662(b)(2).
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    Description of Affected Financial Institutions: Only those covered 
financial institutions defined in section 1010.662(a)(4) with 
engagement in the covered financial transactions as defined in section 
1010.662(a)(5) would be affected.
    Estimated Number of Affected Financial Institutions: Approximately 
15,000.\179\
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    \179\ This estimate is informed by public and non-public data 
sources regarding both an expected maximum number of entities that 
may be affected and the number of active, or currently reporting, 
registered financial institutions and takes into consideration the 
possibility of voluntary reporting by certain parties without an 
express obligation to file reports. See Section VIII.A.2(i)(A).
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    Estimated Average Annual Burden in Hours per Affected Financial 
Institution: 98.\180\
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    \180\ Assumes, on average, one full work-day per 30-day period 
is required to complete reporting and recordkeeping related tasks. 
Due to the anticipated skew in expected annual burden hours, this 
average is unlikely to represent a meaningful approximation for most 
covered financial institutions.
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    Estimated Total Annual Burden: 1,470,000 hours.
    FinCEN specifically invites comments on: (a) whether the proposed 
collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of 
the mission of FinCEN, including whether the information would have 
practical utility; (b) the accuracy of FinCEN's estimate of the burden 
of the proposed collection of information; (c) ways to enhance the 
quality, utility, and clarity of the information required to be 
maintained; (d) ways to minimize the burden of the required collection 
of information, including through the use of automated collection 
techniques or other forms of information technology; (e) estimates of 
capital or start-up costs and costs of operation, maintenance, and 
purchase of services to report the information.

IX. Regulatory Text

List of Subjects in 31 CFR Part 1010

    Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Brokers, 
Crime, Foreign banking, Terrorism.

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, FinCEN proposes amending 
31 CFR part 1010 as follows:

PART 1010--GENERAL PROVISIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 1010 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  12 U.S.C. 1829b and 1951-1959; 31 U.S.C.5311-5314, 
5316-5336; title III, sec. 314, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 307; sec. 
2006, Pub. L. 114-41, 129 Stat. 458-459; sec. 701 Pub. L. 114-74, 
129 Stat. 599; sec. 6403, Pub. L. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388.

0
2. Add Sec.  1010.662 to read as follows:


Sec.  1010.662  Special measures regarding CVC mixing transactions.

    (a) Definitions. For purposes of this section, the following terms 
have the following meanings.
    (1) Convertible Virtual Currency (CVC). The term ``convertible 
virtual currency (CVC)'' means a medium of exchange that either has an 
equivalent value as currency, or acts as a substitute for currency, but 
lacks legal tender status. Although Bitcoin has legal tender status in 
at least two jurisdictions, the term CVC includes Bitcoin for the 
purpose of this section.
    (2) CVC Mixer. The term ``CVC mixer'' means any person, group, 
service, code, tool, or function that facilitates CVC mixing.
    (3) CVC mixing. (i) The term ``CVC mixing'' means the facilitation 
of CVC transactions in a manner that obfuscates the source, 
destination, or amount involved in one or more transactions, regardless 
of the type of protocol or service used, such as:
    (A) Pooling or aggregating CVC from multiple persons, wallets, 
addresses, or accounts;
    (B) Using programmatic or algorithmic code to coordinate, manage, 
or manipulate the structure of a transaction;
    (C) Splitting CVC for transmittal and transmitting the CVC through 
a series of independent transactions;
    (D) Creating and using single-use wallets, addresses, or accounts, 
and sending CVC through such wallets, addresses, or accounts through a 
series of independent transactions;
    (E) Exchanging between types of CVC or other digital assets; or
    (F) Facilitating user-initiated delays in transactional activity.
    (ii) Exception. Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(3)(i) of this 
section, CVC mixing does not include the use of internal protocols or 
processes to execute transactions by banks, broker-dealers, or money 
services businesses, including virtual asset service providers that 
would otherwise constitute CVC mixing, provided that these financial 
institutions preserve records of the source and destination of CVC 
transactions when using such internal protocols and processes; and 
provide such records to regulators and law enforcement, where required 
by law.
    (4) Covered financial institution. The term ``covered financial 
institution'' has the same meaning as ``financial institution'' in 31 
CFR 1010.100(t).
    (5) Covered transaction. The term ``covered transaction'' means a 
transaction as defined in 31 CFR 1010.100(bbb)(1) in CVC by, through, 
or to the covered financial institution that the covered financial 
institution knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect involves CVC 
mixing within or involving a jurisdiction outside the United 
States.\181\
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    \181\ This requirement would be independent of any recordkeeping 
requirement pursuant to 31 CFR 1010.410.
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    (b) Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. Covered financial 
institutions are required to report information in accordance with 
paragraph (b)(1) of ths section and maintain records demonstrating 
compliance in accordance with paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
    (1) Reporting--(i) Reportable information regarding the covered 
transaction. The covered financial institution shall provide the 
following reportable information in its possession, with respect to 
each covered transaction, within 30 calendar days of initial detection 
of a covered transaction:
    (A) The amount of any CVC transferred, in both CVC and its U.S. 
dollar equivalent when the transaction was initiated;
    (B) The CVC type;
    (C) The CVC mixer used, if known;
    (D) CVC wallet address associated with the mixer;
    (E) CVC wallet address associated with the customer;
    (F) Transaction hash;
    (G Date of transaction;
    (H) The IP addresses and time stamps associated with the covered 
transaction; and
    (I) Narrative
    (ii) Reportable information regarding the customer associated with 
the covered transaction. The covered financial institution shall 
provide the following reportable information in its possession, 
regarding the customer associated with each covered transaction:
    (A) Customer's full name;
    (B) Customer's date of birth;
    (C) Customer's address;
    (D) Email address associated with any and all accounts from which 
or to which the CVC was transferred;

[[Page 72723]]

    (E) Phone number associated with any and all accounts from which or 
to which the CVC was transferred;
    (F) Internal Revenue Service or foreign tax identification number, 
or if none are available, a non-expired United States or foreign 
passport number or other government-issued photo identification number, 
such as a driver's license; and
    (2) Filing procedures. The reports required under paragraph (b)(1) 
of this section shall be filed with FinCEN 30 calendar days from the 
date of detection in the manner that FinCEN prescribes.
    (3) Recordkeeping. A covered financial institution is required to 
document its compliance with the requirements of this section.

    Dated: October 19, 2023.
Andrea M. Gacki,
Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
[FR Doc. 2023-23449 Filed 10-20-23; 8:45 a.m.]
BILLING CODE 4810-02-P


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