## NO. 12-07-00458-CV IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTRICT

TYLER, TEX AS

§ APPEAL F

ROM THE 307TH IN THE INTERE

ST OF § JUDICIAL DISTRI CT COURT OF T.D.M., A MINOR CHILD § GR EG G C OU NTY, TE XAS

MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION L ind se y M. a pp e a ls t he tr ia l c ourt

or de r t e rm inati ng her pa re nta l r ig hts to h e r s on , T .D .M

. I n h e r s ol e is su e, sh e c on te nd s th a t T e xas F a mil y Cod e Se c tio n 2 63 .4 05 de nie s c on sti tut ion a lly g u ar an t e e d d

u e p r o c e s s o f l aw t o i n d i g e n t p ar e n t s w h o ar e a p p o i n t e d n e w c o u n s e l o n a p p e a l

. We
a ff ir m.

B ACKG ROUND The De partment of Family and P rotec tive Service s filed a petition for protection of a c hild, for c onservatorship, and for termination of the pa rent-c hild relationship four day s after T.D.M.’s birth in September 2006. The Depa rtment was a

ppointed temporar

y sole manag ing c onservator of T.D.M. and he was plac ed in a f oster home. He wa s returne d to L indsey in a monitored plac ement in Marc h 2 0 0 7

. The De partment a g ain re moved T.D.M. fr om L indsey ’s home in J uly . On No v em b er 2 1 , 2 0 0 7 , t h e t ri al co u rt en t er edan o rd er t erm i n at i n g L i n d s ey ’s p ar en t al ri gh t s . T h ro u gh he r a pp e llate a tto rn e y , L ind se y tim e ly fi le d a state me nt o f po int s f

or a pp e a l pu rs ua nt t o T e xas F a mil y Code Section 263.405. On the d ay of the he aring , Dec ember 13, 2007, she filed a

n amende d statement of points for appea l adding a claim that Section 263.405(i) is unconstitutional as applied2

to indigent pa

rents who ha

ve diffe rent a

ppointed counsel for

trial and a

ppeal. After the hear ing, the t r i a l c o u rtf

o u n d t h e a p p e a l i s f r i v o l o u s a s t o t h e l e g a l an d f a c tu a l s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e . It fo u n d L i n d s ey t o b e in d i gen t an d o rd er ed a tr an s cr i p t i o n o f th e r ec o rdo f t h e D ec em b er 1 3 h ea ri n g. Th e c ourt re fu se d to ru le on

L ind se y ’s c on sti tut ion a l c omp la int

.

D U E P R O C ESS I n her sole issue, L indsey asser ts that Section 263.405(b) and ( i) of the Te x as F amily Code violate the F ourtee nth Amendment to the Unit ed S tates C onstitut ion by denying due process of law to indigent pa

rents who a

re a ppointed new c ounsel on appe al. She ar g ues t h at the statutory pr oc e dure s g ov e rn inga

pa re nt’ s a pp e a l f ro m a de c re e that te rm inate s the pa re nt- c hil d r e latio ns hip violates the par ent’s rig ht to pr ocedur al due proce ss. Under the statute, a par ent must file a stateme nt of po int s to b e app eal ed bef or e a re c or d o f t

he tr ia l ha s b e e n p ro du c e d. Th is l imi ts a pp e llate counsel’s a

bility to know t he point s that should be included, thus preve nting him from preser ving t h o s e i s s u es fo r ap p ea l an d i mp ai ri n g h i s ab i l i t y t o ar gu e t h o s e p o i n t s at t h e f ri v o l o u s n es s h ea ri n g, espec ially if appe llate counse l was not involved at t h e t rial leve l. Thus, application of Sec tion 263.405 might re sult in i neff ective a ssistance of c ounsel in addition to waiver of other e rror . Appli cable Law Se c tio n 2 63 .4 05 of

the Te xas F a mil y Cod e a pp lie s to a

pp e a ls fr om fi na l or de rs re nd e re d in pare ntal rig hts termination suits and impos es strict deadlines for the proce ss. See T EX
. F AM
. C ODE ANN . § 263.405 (Ve rnon Supp. 2007) . A par ty intending to a

ppeal a final orde r terminatingpare ntal rig hts must fil e with the trial c ou rt , n o later tha n fiftee n day s after

the final orde r is signe d, a statement of points on which the party intends to appea l. Id. § 263.405(b). An a ppellate c ourt may not consider a

ny issue that was not spe cifica lly prese nted to the trial court in a timely filed statement of points. Id. § 263.405(i). The trial court must hold a hea ring not later than the thirtieth day afte r the date the final orde r is signe d to determine w hether a new trial sho u l d b e g rante d, whether a party ’s claim of indig ence should be sustained, and whether the appea l is frivolous as provided by Texas Civi l Practice and Remedie s Code Section 1 3

. 003(b). Id. § 263.405(d). The test for deter mining if a

party is indigent a

nd there fore entitled to a fre e rec ord is se t f orth in civil practice and re medies code Section 13.003 and re quires, among other thi ng s, a finding that the appe al is not3

frivolous. See T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C ODE ANN . § 13.003(a) (Ve rnon 2002). The ref ore, the determ in ati on by

the tr ia l c ourt

tha t th e a pp e a l of the or de r o f t e rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts is frivolous has the c onsequenc e of de ny ing the indige nt pare nt the ri gh t to a fre e cle rk’s re cord a nd repor ter’s r ecor d of the underlying tr ial. See T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C ODE ANN . § 13.003(a) (2)( A). Discussion L ind se y a sse rt s th a t th e op e ratio n of Se c tio n 26 3. 40 5 is c ir c ula r. She argue s th a t “ it p re ve nts an indig ent par ent from obtaining a re co rd u n t i l afte r the trial c ourt rules on points that require a
re c or d to fo rm

ulate and pr e se nt. ” I n o the r w or ds , a n in dig e nt p are nt c ann ot o bta in a fr e e re c or d unti l the tr ia l c ourt

fi nd s h e r ap pe a l is no t f

ri vo lou s, a

fi nd ingma de a ft e r r e vie wi nghe r p oin ts f or a pp e a l, which re quire a ssessment of the re cord to for mulate. I f t he parent i s able to formulate points without
a re cord a nd prese nts those to the trial court, and if the trial cour t determines that the points pre sented
are frivolous, the indige nt pa rent, as in this case , will not rec eive a fre e re cord, or

presumably

any
rec ord, of the te rmination proce eding and ther efor e ca nnot discover e rror s to be raise d on appea l that would entitle her to a

new tria l. There in lies the rub. We must avoid constitut ional decisions until the issues are prese nted with c larity , prec ision, and ce rtainty

. See Re

sc ue Army v . M un. C ourt , 331 U.S. 549, 576, 67 S. Ct . 1409, 1423, 91 L . Ed. 1666 (1947). Thus, we cannot decide abstract, hy pothetical, or conting ent questions. The subjec t
m atter jurisdiction of c ourts rests, in part, on the r ipeness of the issues. P a tt e r s o n v . Plann ed Parenthood of Houst

on and S e. Te

x., Inc. , 971 S.W .2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998). Ripeness is one of
sever al categ ories of justiciability

. See P e rr y v . D e l R io , 66 S.W .3d 239, 249 (Tex. 2001). Justi c ia bil ity re qu ir e s a

c on c re te in

jur y , a re qu ir e me nt b a se d o n th e jud ic ia l pr oh ibi tio n a g a ins t issuing advisory

opinions. See Patterson , 971 S.W .2d at 442-43. L indsey timely filed a Sec tion 263.405 stat em ent of point s for a ppeal attacking the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence to support the finding s on which the trial c ourt relied in ter minating he r pare ntal rig hts. L indsey

has not included issues in he r brief attacking the trial court’s de termination that those sufficie ncy

points are f

rivolous. L indsey ’s sole complaint on appe al, that Section 263.405 is unconstituti on al, is hy

pothetical rather than de finite and c oncre te. While in som e ca ses, upon study ing t

h e r e c o r d o f th e tr ia l c o u rt p r o c e e d in g s , ana p p e ll a te a tt o r

n e y mi g h t u n c o v e r a d d it io nal issues he would want to pr esent for appellate revie w, we cannot de clar e a statute invalid based on4

a hy pothetical possibility

that th e l aw m ay b e u nrea sonable. See United Stat es v. Coastal Ref. & Mktg., Inc. , 911 F.2d 1036, 1044 ( 5th Cir. 1990). L indsey does not indicate howshe per sonally was ha rmed by application of Sec tion 263.405. That is, she does not sug g est any appellate issue that she was preve nted from r aising as a r esult of Section 263.405 and does n o t s how how any constitutional viol ation resulted in an imprope r judgme nt. See In re J.J. , No. 02-06-333- CV, 2008 Tex. App. L EXI S 1714, at *1 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth March 6, 2008, no pe t. h.). L indsey ’s sole complaint on appe al is hy pothetical rather than definite a nd concr ete. We over

rule L indsey ’s sole issue.

D I S P OS I T I ON Be cause L indsey ’s sole issue is not rip e for revie w, we af

fi rm the trial cour

t’s order of termination.



### S AM GRI FF I T H J ustice

Opinion delivere d May

21, 2008. Pane l co ns i s t ed of

Wor t hen , C. J. , Gri

f f i t h, J. , an d Hoyl e, J.

(PUBL I SH)