RENDERED: APRIL 9, 2021; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2020-CA-0964-WC

ANTOINETTE C. TAYLOR APPELLANT 

v. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION

OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD

ACTION NO. 18-WC-01428

REDWOOD HOLDINGS LLC D/B/A 

HILLCREEK LEASINGS LLC AND 

HILLCREEK REHABILITATION 

AND CARE; AND WORKERS’

COMPENSATION BOARD APPELLEES 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES.

ACREE, JUDGE: Antoinette C. Taylor, proceeding pro se, appeals the July 31, 

2020 opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”) vacating the 

administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) November 26, 2019 order awarding Taylor 

future medical benefits and further finding moot the motion for sanctions filed by 
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Appellee Redwood Holdings, LLC d/b/a Hillcreek Leasing LLC and Hillcreek 

Rehabilitation and Care (“Hillcreek”). Upon careful consideration, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE

Taylor sustained a work-related injury to her right hand and wrist on 

September 12, 2018, in the course of her employment as a certified nursing 

assistant at Hillcreek. Her Form 101, filed September 28, 2018, alleges that 

“[w]hile Plaintiff [was] reaching down facing [a Hillcreek] resident . . . to unlock 

the left side of [resident’s] wheelchair, resident [] crushed Plaintiff’s right hand and 

wrist downward with the wheelchair level on the left side of wheelchair.” 

Hillcreek concedes that a work accident caused the injury.

Taylor first received treatment for her injured hand and wrist on

September 12, 2018, but has been examined by approximately twelve physicians

between that time and August 2019. After this action commenced, Hillcreek 

attempted to have Taylor examined by an independent physician. According to the 

Board, Hillcreek issued an appointment letter to Taylor, scheduling an Independent 

Medical Examination (“IME”) with Dr. J. Rick Lyon for November 20, 2018. 

Taylor said she would be unable to attend the appointment and requested that a taxi 

be provided to her for any future evaluations.1 Hillcreek notified Taylor that the 

 

1 According to the Board, Dr. Lyon’s office is approximately 16.9 to 18 miles from Taylor’s 

residence. 
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IME had been rescheduled for November 29, 2018 and that transportation would 

not be provided. Taylor refused to attend. Hillcreek again rescheduled the 

appointment, this time for December 19, 2018, and promptly notified Taylor. 

Once again, Taylor did not attend. 

In response, Hillcreek filed a “Motion to Suspend Compensation and 

Proceedings” asserting that KRS2 342.205(3) provides that compensation may be 

suspended during any period that a claimant refuses or obstructs an employer’s 

right to an IME. On January 9, 2019, Hillcreek filed a “Supplemental Motion to 

Suspend Compensation and Proceedings,” attaching further evidence of 

obstruction. Hillcreek suspended payment of compensation on February 11, 2019.3 

The ALJ ultimately ordered Taylor to attend an IME scheduled by Hillcreek. 

(Opinion of the Board, at 6-10.) 

A hearing was conducted before the ALJ on September 27, 2019, and 

an Opinion, Award and Order was rendered on November 26, 2019. Among other 

things, Taylor was awarded temporary total disability (“TTD”) benefits from 

September 19, 2018 through October 16, 2018 and future medical benefits. The 

ALJ adjudged Hillcreek’s request for sanctions for obstruction moot because the 

 

2 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

3

It is unclear to this Court what compensation, if any, Hillcreek had been paying to Taylor. 
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period of TTD benefits awarded did not overlap with the time Taylor evaded the 

IMEs.

Hillcreek appealed to the Board, asserting only that the ALJ erred by 

awarding future medical benefits and determining that its request for sanctions was 

moot. Taylor filed a cross-appeal, asserting that substantial evidence supported the 

ALJ’s decision and, accordingly, she had met her burden of proof. 

The Board first addressed the issue of future medical benefits. It 

concluded “the ALJ erroneously premised her award of future medical benefits 

upon a finding Taylor’s injury is not a temporary exacerbation of a pre-existing 

non-work-related condition. While the ALJ has the discretion to award future 

medical benefits, the award must be based upon substantial evidence in the 

record.” Accordingly, this issue was remanded to the ALJ to cite medical evidence 

supporting the award. 

Next, the Board found it was error for the ALJ to conclude the issue 

of sanctions was moot. Instead, it noted that “compensation” is defined as “all 

payments made under the provisions of this chapter representing the sum of 

income benefits and medical and related benefits[.]” (Opinion at 11) (citing Finke 

v. Comair, Inc., 489 S.W.3d 242, 253 (Ky. App. 2016)). And the ALJ could have 

concluded that Taylor forfeited her entitlement to all medical benefits during the 

period of obstruction. 
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Because the Board resolved the only contested issues before it – those 

raised by Hillcreek – it concluded there was nothing left for it to address in 

Taylor’s cross-appeal. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Taylor raises twelve issues for this court to determine. However, 

many of these issues have no legal foundation,

4 while others were not raised before 

the Board5and, therefore, are waived. Accordingly, we limit our discussion to 

those issues properly before us. 

Our review of an opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board is 

limited. We only reverse the Board’s opinion when “the Board has overlooked or 

misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in assessing 

the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice.” W. Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 

827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992). In reviewing the Board’s opinion, we look to 

the ALJ’s opinion. The ALJ’s findings of fact will not be disturbed if supported by 

 

4 For example: “Whether or not the Board’s arguments on behalf of appellees were so far-fetched 

as evidenced by causing this Case to become an unmitigated disaster and stinking to high 

heavens”; “Whether or not the Board’s decision had given the appellees, another bite of the apple 

as evidenced by dismissing efforts and issues contested at the BRC [Benefit Review 

conference].” 

5 For example: “Whether or not the Board overlooked the ALJ ‘ordered Hillcreek to reimburse 

Taylor’s mileage to and from IME’ as evidence by ignoring the fact that Ms. Taylor has not yet 

been reimbursed for mileage to and from the IME. See Case Records.”; “Whether or not the 

Board provided Ms. Taylor equal justice as the employer was entitled to as evidenced by

ignoring Ms. Taylor’s responses and motions and not being paid for travel to IME on record.

See Case Records.”
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substantial evidence. Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. App. 

1984). And, the ALJ, as fact-finder, possesses the discretion to judge the 

credibility of testimony and weight of evidence. Paramount Foods, Inc. v. 

Burkhardt, 695 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Ky. 1985). Our review proceeds accordingly.

Much of Taylor’s brief asserts that the Board acted as an independent

finder of fact, re-weighed the evidence, and reassessed witness credibility. We 

disagree. The Board’s decision is based purely on legal conclusions – the ALJ 

applied the wrong legal standards for determining whether future medical benefits 

were proper and whether the issue of sanctions was moot. Accordingly, the Board 

made no independent findings of fact and neither assessed witness credibility nor 

weighed any of the evidence found by the ALJ. To the extent Taylor is 

challenging the Board’s legal conclusions, again, we disagree. 

The Board correctly determined the ALJ applied the wrong legal 

standard for the award of future medical benefits. According to the Board, the ALJ 

held: “[i]n this case, the injury was not a temporary exacerbation of a pre-existing 

non-work-related condition . . . . Therefore, pursuant to KRS 342.020, Defendant 

Employer is liable for the payment for the cure and relief from the effects of 

Plaintiff’s work-related injury.” We agree that future medical benefits cannot be 

awarded solely on the fact that the injury was not a temporary exacerbation of a 

pre-existing non-work-related condition. Such an award must be supported by 
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substantial evidence. See Mullins v. Mike Catron Constr./Catron Interior Sys.,

Inc., 237 S.W.3d 561, 563 (Ky. App. 2007).

Likewise, the Board was correct that the ALJ erred by concluding the 

issue of sanctions was moot because the period of TTD benefits did not overlap 

with the period of obstruction. KRS 342.0011(13) defines “[c]ompensation” as

“all payments made under the provisions of this chapter representing the sum of 

income benefits and medical and related benefits[.]” Accordingly, 

“[c]ompensation” includes not only TTD benefits, but other medical benefits, for 

example, necessary physical therapy. Thus, the ALJ could have suspended 

payment of any medical benefits that Taylor was entitled to during the period of 

obstruction. 

Taylor next contends the ALJ’s decision to award future medical 

benefits was based on substantial evidence. Taylor refers this Court to no record 

evidence supporting this contention other than referencing an alleged August 31, 

2019 MRI report diagnosing her with carpal tunnel syndrome. However, she does 

not cite where in the record we can find this report.6 Importantly, if this record 

exists, we do not see, and Taylor has not directed us to, where the ALJ’s opinion 

references it. It is not the reviewing court’s function to find support for a party’s 

 

6 Taylor’s citation to this record is very vague: “at Supplemental Notice of Submission of 

Medical Records Re: Family Health Centers Portland, September 12, 2019.” This citation was 

ineffective at directing the Court to its location. 
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argument, and a party’s own failure in that regard justifies the court’s declining to 

entertain the merits of the appellant’s argument. Commonwealth v. Roth, 567 

S.W.3d 591, 594 (Ky. 2019).7 We find no error.

Taylor next shifts her focus to the issue of sanctions. She contends

she did not obstruct Hillside’s right to an IME. She argues that she “might not 

have had access to transportation to the IME doctor on said dates and/or [was] not 

feeling well enough to travel.” As noted above, the Board did not make findings 

regarding obstruction. It merely held that the ALJ applied the wrong legal 

standard in concluding the issue was moot and appropriately remanded for findings 

on whether sanctions were proper.

Finally, Taylor alleges the Board wrongfully ignored her cross-appeal. 

As noted above, however, her cross-appeal merely argued that she had met her 

burden of proof and that the ALJ’s opinion should be affirmed. Therefore, the 

Board’s resolution of the issues raised by Hillcreek necessarily resolved any 

concerns in her cross-appeal. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, the July 31, 2020 opinion of the Workers’

Compensation Board is affirmed. 

 

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“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” United States v. Dunkel, 927 

F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Antoinette C. Taylor, pro se

Shelbyville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE REDWOOD 

HOLDINGS LLC D/B/A 

HILLCREEK LEASINGS LLC AND 

HILLCREEK REHABILITATION 

AND CARE:

Stanley S. Dawson

Louisville, Kentucky