PRESENT: Goodwyn, Mims, McClanahan, Powell, Kelsey, and McCullough, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 

BRIAN WENDALL JORDAN

 OPINION BY

v. Record No. 161527 JUSTICE STEPHEN R. McCULLOUGH

 February 22, 2018 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GRAYSON COUNTY

H. Lee Harrell, Judge 

 Brian Wendall Jordan, an inmate, filed a petition to change his name. The trial court 

denied his petition, and Jordan asks us to reverse this decision. For the reasons stated below, we 

affirm the trial court’s decision.

BACKGROUND

Brian Wendall Jordan was sentenced to a lengthy term of incarceration after he was 

convicted of several serious offenses: malicious wounding, robbery, first degree murder, 

aggravated malicious wounding, and burglary. A stipulation of facts indicates that, in one 

instance, he forced his way into the home of an elderly woman, choked her, and severely beat her 

while demanding her money. He also broke into the home of an elderly couple and badly beat 

them, again to obtain money. One of his victims died from the heavy blows Jordan inflicted 

upon him. 

 After undergoing a religious conversion, he filed a petition in the circuit court to change 

his name to Abdul-Wakeel Mutawakkil Jordan. He added, however, that “he would not be 

hindered from the free exercise of his religion if not allowed to change his name.” The court 

found good cause to accept the petition, Code § 8.01-217(D), and ordered the Commonwealth to 

respond. The Commonwealth’s Attorneys for both Grayson County and the City of Chesapeake 
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opposed the petition.∗ The Commonwealth’s Attorney for the City of Chesapeake opposed the 

petition without elaboration. The Commonwealth’s Attorney for Grayson County argued that 

granting the name change was likely for a fraudulent purpose, would frustrate a legitimate

law-enforcement purpose, and would infringe on the rights of others.

At a hearing conducted by using a live two-way video connection, the petitioner testified 

and offered written exhibits. Following the hearing, the court found the name change was not 

sought for a fraudulent purpose, but observed that “[t]he prism through which the court views the 

request of Mr. Jordan is necessarily different because of his extraordinarily heinous convictions.” 

The court reasoned as follows. 

The punishment of crime is an elementary purpose of lawenforcement. There are four commonly accepted goals of criminal 

punishment: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and 

incapacitation. Changing the name of Mr. Jordan frustrates 

retribution, deterrence and incapacitation. He was convicted of 

these heinous crimes under the name Brian Wend[a]ll Jordan and 

his sentence, as rendered by the Circuit Court of the City of 

Norfolk, should be served and concluded under that name. 

Included in this consideration are the victims of his crime, who 

have the right and the security in the knowledge that he is serving 

his apportioned sentence under that name. Someone so dangerous 

should have his identity fixed, certain and intractable not only with 

the Department of Corrections but with all of society. There 

should never be even a hint of confusion as to who this person is. 

Mr. Jordan pointed out in his materials and argument that the 

Department is equipped to handle name changes. That the 

Department can handle an inmate’s name change does not of itself 

satisfy [Code] § 8.01-217(D). A function of his punishment is that 

he bear the convictions in the name they were ordered by the court, 

and that his victims and society have that assurance.

 ∗

 The Commonwealth’s Attorney for the City of Chesapeake submitted a response on 

behalf of the City of Norfolk because the Norfolk Commonwealth’s Attorney was recused during 

the initial prosecution.
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The court found that the petitioner’s application “frustrates a legitimate law-enforcement 

purpose” and thus the provisions of Code § 8.01-217(D) were not satisfied.

 Jordan filed this pro se appeal and we granted it. In accord with the highest traditions of 

our profession, counsel volunteered to represent him on a pro bono basis. 

ANALYSIS

We review a circuit court’s denial of an application for a name change under an abuse of 

discretion standard. In re Brown, 289 Va. 343, 347, 770 S.E.2d 494, 496 (2015). The statute 

treats probationers, persons required to register on the sex offender registry, and inmates 

differently from other petitioners. For probationers, persons required to register on the sex 

offender registry, and inmates, 

[t]he court . . . may order a change of name if, after receiving and 

considering evidence concerning the circumstances regarding the 

requested change of name, the court determines that the change of 

name (i) would not frustrate a legitimate law-enforcement purpose, 

(ii) is not sought for a fraudulent purpose, and (iii) would not 

otherwise infringe upon the rights of others. Such order shall 

contain written findings stating the court’s basis for granting the 

order.

Code § 8.01-217(D) (emphasis added). For all other applicants, 

the court, shall, unless the evidence shows that the change of name 

is sought for a fraudulent purpose or would otherwise infringe 

upon the rights of others or, in a case involving a minor, that the 

change of name is not in the best interest of the minor, order a 

change of name.

Code § 8.01-217(C) (emphasis added). 

 Under subsection (C) of this statute, the court “shall” order a name change unless certain 

circumstances are present. Code § 8.01-217(C). For inmates, probationers, and persons required 

to register as sex offenders, the statutory language affords far more discretion to the trial court. 

Code § 8.01-217(D). It provides that a court “may” grant the petition. Id. “[W]e must assume 
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that the General Assembly chose, with care, the words it used in enacting the statute, and we are 

bound by those words when we apply the statute.” Halifax Corp. v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 262 

Va. 91, 100, 546 S.E.2d 696, 702 (2001). When the General Assembly employs a specific word 

in one section of a statute, and chooses a different term in another section of the statute, we must 

presume the difference in language was intentional. See, e.g., RGR, LLC v. Settle, 288 Va. 260, 

295-96, 764 S.E.2d 8, 29 (2014) (“When the General Assembly uses two different terms in the 

same act, those terms are presumed to have distinct and different meanings.”) (quoting Industrial 

Dev. Auth. of the City of Roanoke v. Board of Supervisors, 263 Va. 349, 353, 559 S.E.2d 621, 

623 (2002)). See also Brown v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 538, 545, 733 S.E.2d 638, 641 (2012) 

(“When the General Assembly includes specific language in one statute, but omits that language 

from another statute, courts must presume that the exclusion of the language was intentional 

because under these circumstances, it is evident that the General Assembly knows how to 

include such language in a statute to achieve an intended objective; thus the omission of such 

language in another statute represents an unambiguous manifestation of a contrary intention.”) 

(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Halifax Corp. v. Wachovia Bank, 268 

Va. 641, 654, 604 S.E.2d 403, 408 (2004)). 

 For inmates, probationers, and persons required to register as sex offenders, a court must 

find as a threshold matter that the name change would not frustrate a legitimate law-enforcement 

purpose, is not sought for a fraudulent purpose, and would not otherwise infringe on the rights of 

others. Code § 8.01-217(D). If any one of those circumstances is present, the court must deny 

the petition. That, however, is only the beginning of the inquiry. Even when those 

circumstances are absent, the court is not required to grant the petition - it retains broad 

discretion to grant or to deny the petition.
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The parties understandably focus our attention on the question of whether the petition 

was properly denied on the basis that it would frustrate a legitimate law-enforcement purpose. 

The petitioner offers a narrow definition and contends that his name change would not frustrate a 

law-enforcement purpose. For its part, the Commonwealth tenders a broader definition and 

submits that the petitioner’s name change was properly denied under such a definition. 

 We need not define the term “legitimate law-enforcement purpose” under Code § 

8.01-217(D) to resolve this case. Although the trial court cited this provision in its ruling, its 

reasoning is broader than the confines of that provision. We cannot say that the basis articulated 

by the trial court for denying the petition falls outside the scope of its broad discretion. The 

court could conclude that a person who would commit crimes of that gravity and brutality must 

retain his given name, for the peace of mind of the victims and the victims’ families and to avoid 

any possible future confusion about his identity. Although the petitioner faces a lengthy term of 

incarceration, and therefore will not soon return to the communities where he perpetrated his 

crimes, he is eligible for possible release upon reaching the age of sixty-five. See Code § 

53.1-40.01. We, therefore, find no abuse of discretion under these circumstances. 

 We also note, as we observed at the outset of this opinion, that the petitioner expressly 

stated that “he would not be hindered from the free exercise of his religion if not allowed to 

change his name.” This circumstance also contributes to our conclusion that the trial court 

committed no abuse of discretion. 

CONCLUSION

We will affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.