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i 

43–668 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–125] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS 

COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 5, 2008 
(II) 

TERRORISM AND UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS SUBCOMMITTEE 

ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MARK E. UDALL, Colorado 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

WILLIAM H. NATTER, Professional Staff Member 

ALEX KUGAJEVSKY, Professional Staff Member 

ANDREW TABLER, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2008 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 5, 2008, Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request for U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. 

Northern Command ............................................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 5, 2008 ..................................................................................... 19 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 2008 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. 

NORTHERN COMMAND 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, Terrorism, 

Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee ................................. 1 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee .................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Olson, Adm. Eric T., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, 

U.S. Navy .............................................................................................................. 3 

Renuart, Gen. Victor E., Jr., USAF, Commander, NORAD/U.S. Northern 

Command .............................................................................................................. 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Olson, Adm. Eric T. .......................................................................................... 25 

Renuart, Gen. Victor E., Jr. ............................................................................. 49 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 23 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 81 

Mr. Thornberry ................................................................................................. 97 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 5, 2008. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:32 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. SMITH. We will go ahead and get started, call the committee 

to order. 

We never know when votes are going to interrupt us, but we are 

certain that they will. I am sure more members will show up as 

we get going here, but we will go ahead and get started. 

I want to welcome our witnesses. 

Admiral Olson, the commander of Special Operations Command, 

thank you. It has been, as I noted talking to you earlier, a long day 

for you. It started in front of the committee at 10 a.m. We appreciate you being here, both for the full committee and for our subcommittee, and look forward to your testimony. 

And, General Renuart, thank you also, head of Northern Command (NORTHCOM); look forward to your testimony and to your 

comments. 

I just have a brief opening statement, and then we will turn it 

over to Mr. Thornberry for his opening remarks. 

I want to welcome both of you gentlemen here today and appreciate your service. I think both of your areas are incredibly important to our national security and to this committee. 

Focusing first on Special Operations Command (SOCOM), the demands that have been placed on our special operators since 9/11 

have been enormous, more than I think any of us have imagined, 

and you have responded terrifically in every instance, and we appreciate that and all those who serve under you. They are a doing 

a fabulous job for us in Iraq and Afghanistan and in dozens of 

other places that many Americans are unaware of. 

And we, on this committee, firmly believe that going forward the 

Special Operations Command will be a key piece of the global war 

on terror, if not the key piece. We envision the future is going to 

be about counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, fighting off the ide-
2 

ology of al Qaeda in all of the places of the world where it is at, 

and nobody is better qualified to do that kind of counterinsurgency, 

working with local populations than our special operators, and we 

want to give you every bit of assistance that you need to get that 

job done. 

And as we look at the budget, one of the things that we are really going to focus on in this committee is the seven percent reduction in SOCOM’s budget for this cycle over last. 

I know, Admiral, you and I have spoken about that, and you certainly respect the choices of the Pentagon, but we here on the committee are going to advocate for an increase in that and try to get 

you the help you need in the places you need. 

Also, we had a meeting this morning with the general in charge 

of the Air Force, and we are very much aware of the airframe concerns, particularly on transportation, how SOCOM needs to get 

more forces in those areas, and we want to try to help with that 

as well. If we are going to ask this much of our special operators, 

we need to make sure that they have the equipment and the support that they need, and we are going to need to do that. 

And we are also very interested to hear from General Renuart 

today about NORTHCOM, our most recently stood up command, at 

least until the African Command gets stood up, and the challenges 

that you have faced since 2002 in protecting our homeland. And I 

think the thing that we are most interested in that area is how 

NORTHCOM—and you and I have had the opportunity to speak 

about this before—how you have merged in with all the other different pieces. 

In that same timeframe, of course, we created the Department of 

Homeland Security, which has responsibilities in those areas also, 

and then there are a variety of other areas, both within the Pentagon and without, that you have to work with, and I am curious 

how that cooperation is progressing and what we could do to help 

you in those areas. 

With that, I will turn it over to the ranking member in this committee, Mr. Thornberry, for any opening remarks he has, and I 

would also say that any member of the committee can submit opening remarks for the record. I will be doing that myself. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 23.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I agree with your opening comments, and I would just add, as 

I sit here and think about the responsibilities of these two witnesses, I am struck by the fact that after September 11 this country, in many ways, reacted, whether it is airport security or whether it was our actions in Afghanistan, whether it was other things 

we have done to protect the homeland. But as we go along we refine those actions. We try to be smarter about what we do. 

I think that is where we are in fighting this global Islamist terrorist threat. I think that is where we are when it comes to protecting the homeland. How do we need to change, restructure, 
3 

refocus, improve our abilities as we go ahead? Those are things I 

think I am most interested in, and, certainly, these two witnesses 

can help shed a lot of light on that. 

So I look forward to their testimony and yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Thornberry. 

And as I mentioned, all members can submit opening statements 

for the record. 

With that, I will turn it over to Admiral Olson for his opening 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF ADM. ERIC T. OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. 

McIntyre. 

With your permission, I will submit my written statement for the 

record and not repeat my opening statements from the earlier session. I would like to highlight a few things, though. 

First, I would like to thank this committee for all its work and 

all of its success in support of our needs over the last few years. 

I think that nobody understands Special Operations to the extent 

that you do. That is very helpful to us in our discussions. 

And I reiterate how honored I am to be the one who sits before 

this committee today representing the 54,000 active and reserve 

soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and civilians who are assigned to 

the Special Operations Command, many of whom are away from 

home and many of whom are engaged in some very important and 

violent activities. I remain in awe of their dedication and courage, 

and they demonstrate it every day. 

I would like to reiterate my conviction that the expectations on 

this force continue to be very high, as you stated, and that I certainly do not expect that the demand for this force will decrease, 

no matter what the circumstances in Iraq or Afghanistan relative 

to a drawdown of conventional forces. Most of the world is stating 

a deficit of special operations forces in their theatre, and there will 

be a responsibility, I believe, on behalf of my command to return 

to some of those places in which we have been underrepresented 

as we have surged into Iraq and Afghanistan with 80 percent of 

our deployed force over the last few years. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson can be found in the 

Appendix on page 25.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Admiral Olson. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF, 

COMMANDER, NORAD/U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND 

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity 

to be here. 

Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McIntyre, it is good to be here in front of 

this committee. 

It is a committee that is focused, as Admiral Olson, on support 

to the special operations but also one that is focused very clearly 

and very directly on terrorist threat to our homeland, and that is 

one, obviously, that I have a great deal of interest in. 
4 

It is really my privilege to lead the men and women, both of 

United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace 

Defense Command, and it is a treat to sit here next to my friend, 

Eric Olson, to be able to talk about those areas of common interest 

that we have. 

We really do have a unique relationship with U.S. Special Operations Command. We continually watch and assess those potential 

threats to the homeland. In some of my comments later, I will talk 

about a concept of layered defense, and, really, Eric’s team is that 

away layer out there, making sure that we can reach out and touch 

those potential threats to the homeland before they reach our 

shores, but we have to be ready in case they do. 

We collaborate on a variety of plans, on exercises and on operations with U.S. Special Operations Command. Most notably, we 

have made good progress in the maritime domain, and it is an area 

that both the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern 

Command pay close attention to each day. 

As commander of U.S. NORTHCOM, I am assigned, really, two 

distinct and critical missions: That to defend our homeland from 

attack and then to support the Nation with those unique capabilities that Department of Defense (DOD) can bring in a time of crisis. And while we certainly pay very close attention to homeland 

defense, it is hard to prioritize either mission, one over the other, 

because they can happen, either one, almost unannounced, and so 

we have to be prepared in every case. 

Part of the team that does that is an integrated team of National 

Guardsmen, Reservists and active duty, and I am pleased to have 

my National Guard advisor to the commander, Major General 

Steve Villacorta here, seated behind me, as well as our other important team member of the National Guard Bureau, Brigadier 

General Fick is here representing the National Guard Bureau as 

part of our delegation today. 

As always, the men and women who defend our Nation are predominantly our young enlisted corps who put on the cloth of our 

country and serve selflessly around the world, and I am pleased to 

have them represented by our command sergeant, Major Dan 

Wood. 

Final point I would like to make for the record is the burden that 

we place on our families and the demands that we ask of our families, and no one has paid more of that price than my own wife. I 

am pleased to have her with me here today, seated in the second 

row, to represent the families of so many that are separated from 

their loved ones on a day-to-day basis. 

Mr. Chairman, our missions are especially meaningful, because 

really nothing is more important than keeping our citizens safe. It 

is your families and our families that we pay close attention to. 

This requires a culture of anticipation, and we understand that all 

too well and understand also that to the citizens of our country failure is just not an option. 

After I took command about a year ago we rewrote our mission 

statement soon after that point and added the word, ‘‘anticipate,’’ 

to our mission statement. It may seem like a small change, but in 

fact the ability to reach out and look into the future as best we can 

and anticipate the kinds of threats that may affect us is critical to 
5 

our mission. And over the past year, we have substantially increased our focus on planning, integrated planning, on training and 

on readiness. 

We have updated our homeland defense and civil support plans. 

We have ensured our plans are consistent with the national response framework, with the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) support plans and all of those 15 national planning scenarios. All of this is done in close partnership with the Department 

of Homeland Security’s Incident Management Planning Team and 

our friends in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

and many other Federal agencies. 

We successfully completed the maritime domain awareness concept of operations and the interagency investment strategy to support that. These developments improve situation awareness and 

provide a way ahead to rapidly assess and respond to maritime 

threats. 

We train with over 50 federal, state and local partners at all 

operational levels, and just as a couple of examples, we have exercised our chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield 

explosive Consequence Management Response Force during our exercise, Ardent Sentry, last May, and we will do that again this 

year. 

From an operational perspective, we also incorporated this culture of anticipation into our daily battle rhythm. When 

NORTHCOM support is needed, we are ready. 

Specifically, we monitor and assess and evaluate 12 to 20 potentially dangerous events affecting the homeland every day. I would 

use an example, the loss of power in south Florida just a week ago. 

We were in close contact with the state to ensure that if Federal 

military support was needed, we knew what it was, where it was 

and how we would get it to the citizens of south Florida should it 

be required. Fortunately, the state was able to manage the challenge, but we were ready. 

Every day, we see the benefits of this kind of coordination in so 

many ways. On the counterterrorism scene, we work side by side 

with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Joint Terrorism Task Force and in the National Counterterrorism Center to 

ensure we all have the same threat picture and that we share that 

information collaboratively across all of the players, whether they 

be law enforcement or even special operations, should that be required. 

We have built a high degree of confidence among our law enforcement partners, and I am happy with the continued progress 

that we make. 

We also rely on the information and expertise provided by our 

Joint Interagency Coordination Group. This group integrates and 

synchronizes the activities of multiple civil, federal, state and private-sector organizations. It includes 60 full-time individuals, professionals from their individual communities, from 40 different 

Federal and DOD-supported agencies, as well as the private sector. 

They all live in our headquarters, they work in our headquarters, 

and they are integrated into our planning and operational teams. 

Mr. Chairman, before I close, I would like to briefly comment on 

the final report of the Commission on the National Guard and Re-
6 

serves. It is clear that Chairman Punaro and his team have done 

a great deal of work, and a great deal of effort went into that report. In conjunction with the Department of Defense, we are continuing a very detailed, thorough review of each of those recommendations, and the secretary is committed to provide Congress 

a thorough assessment of that report. 

I agree with the commission that we need to increase our support 

to our Nation’s active and reserve components to build and enhance 

that chemical-biological capability that I mentioned just earlier, 

and I am leading the DOD charge to do just that. And I have received strong support from the chairman and the secretary. 

My integrated priority list to the secretary supports recapitalizing and equipping our National Guard to support those domestic 

missions, and I firmly believe that our Nation needs a strong, wellequipped guard and reserve force. 

That said, some of the findings in the report are a bit incomplete 

and, in some cases, misleading. I disagree with the commission’s 

assessment that there is an appalling gap in our capability to respond to a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack. Let me assure you and the members of the committee, there are plans and 

a range of state and Federal capabilities in place today that are 

ready to respond. 

The commission also suggests that governors should have command and control of Title 10 forces in certain situations. I disagree. 

I believe that the current provisions and legislation and law allow 

the governors to have absolutely all the authority to direct operations in their states, and we are supportive of that. 

Upon taking command, I made relationship-building with the 

governors and state adjutants general one of my top priorities, and 

I am proud to report that today I have visited the majority of states 

in our country, and I have met with over 19 governors and lieutenant governors and nearly every state adjutant general and most of 

their emergency management directors. 

My message to the governors is clear and consistent: ‘‘We are 

here to support you, nothing more, nothing less.’’ These governors 

and lieutenant governors who I talk to are confident that their adjutant generals lead state efforts in times of crisis, and they know 

they can count on NORTHCOM for support when it is requested. 

I believe it is important to ask the question, are the governors 

receiving the support they need. 

Let me also set the record straight on the commission’s comments regarding the need for state level experience within 

NORTHCOM. Today, 46 percent of my staff has National Guard 

and Reserve experience. Six of my 13 general and flag officers are 

Guardsmen or Reservists, and I rely on them for advice every day, 

and they are an integral part of my decision team. 

Finally, we are doubling the number of full-time positions for the 

Guard and Reserves in our headquarters. I think these statistics 

are good, we are making them better, and they stand on their own 

two feet. 

Mr. Chairman, in closing, our mission is to protect our fellow citizens and our families and to protect the freedoms that are the 

foundation of our way of life. By anticipating threats, exercising defense capabilities and increasing information sharing with our 
7 

partners, we strengthen our ability to protect you and your families 

and all of our homes. 

Thanks very much for the opportunity to appear today, and I 

look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Renuart can be found in the 

Appendix on page 49.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Admiral Olson, as I mentioned, I met with General Wurster this 

morning, talking about some of your needs in terms of air platforms, and I know there are needs there. Could you give us a little 

bit of specifics in terms of Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance 

(ISR) and also transport and, I guess, an offensive capability to the 

transport as well? What airframes do you need, both for ISR and 

to be able to transport and protect your troops? 

And if you could, what portion of that do you see coming in the 

supplemental or a supplemental versus in the rest of the budget? 

It seems that the supplemental has become very, very important to 

funding your operations, and I wonder if you could break those two 

pieces down for us. What do you need, and which budget do you 

see it coming in? 

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our most immediate 

acquisition needs are recapitalization of our C–130 fleet and increased ISR capability and capacity, followed very closely by our V– 

22 acceleration effort. 

We have 37 C–130 platforms that require recapitalization soon. 

The average age of many of these is close to 40 years old. They are 

really in three types. There is an early model penetration aircraft, 

a tanker aircraft and the AC–130 gunship model, which in total, 

again, add up to 37. 

We are facing a degradation of the fleet because of center wing 

box problems in addition to advancing age. We are reaching the 

point where investing in upgrading those airplanes or sustaining 

those airplanes makes less sense than replacing them. So that is 

our number one pure acquisition need. 

The ISR question is a little bit more complex, because it is not 

just about buying platforms. It is a system of capabilities that has 

to come together to produce real capability where we need it. There 

is the recruiting of the right people to fly and analyze the product 

of overhead systems, and ISR also includes maritime systems and 

ground systems. 

There are airspace issues for training the aircraft, there are 

schoolhouse pipeline issues, there are bandwidth issues, there are 

Military Construction (MILCON) and ramp space issues, all of 

which have to be carefully coordinated and developed simultaneously in order to optimize the production of increased capability. 

So we depend on a mixed fleet of manned and unmanned systems, both at the operational level and at the tactical level for both 

man hunting kinds of missions and force protection kinds of missions. I can provide you separately all of those numbers—— 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. We would be very interested in that. 

Admiral OLSON [continuing]. That add up to that. But it is a matrix kind of a format. If you get more of this, then you need more 

of that kind of format because of the way that this has to be built 

together to produce the full capability. 
8 

And, third, the V–22 fleet, our venerable Pave Low helicopters, 

the MH–53s. The last one of 31 that we had operational is coming 

offline September 30 of this year. They have reached the end of 

their useful life, and accelerating the V–22 in order to replace some 

of that capability is an urgent need for us. 

We have been talking carefully with the Air Force about this. 

The Air Force has included in its supplemental request enough 

funds to purchase an acceleration of V–22s. We have included in 

our supplemental request enough funds to nearly match that with 

respect to special operations modifications. 

You asked specifically about how dependent we are becoming on 

the supplemental or how much the supplemental will contribute to 

this. About two-thirds of our supplemental budget over the last few 

years has gone to operations and maintenance costs, about onethird to the urgent procurement to fund those items most necessary and engaged in the current conflict. 

I don’t believe that there will be a decrease in the operations and 

maintenance requirement anytime soon. My budget request, although down 7 percent from fiscal year 2008, given the top line restrictions that we operated under, does include a $400 million increase in O&M, and that is on top of the supplemental that we 

have come to expect in 2008 and 2009. 

So I believe that our supplemental is now necessary for the continued business of special operations, certainly, now in Iraq and Afghanistan and the broader Central Command (CENTCOM) region 

but in the future more so in terms of funding our global activities. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

General Renuart, if you could help me out a little bit in terms 

of NORTHCOM’s responsibilities in anticipating threats, as you describe. I guess, mentally, I am dividing this up between, sort of, 

specific threats and then planning against general threats. How 

closely do you work with the intel community, how good is that relationship on a daily basis? 

You know, you receive specific threats and you are responding to 

a specific threat, whether it is a person of interest in the U.S. or 

a specific target that is threatened and what your role at 

NORTHCOM is in responding to those threats versus just protecting what we know to be likely targets. Some of those are private facilities as well as public. 

If you could, sort of, explain in those two areas what your responsibilities and challenges are. 

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman, thank you, I would be happy 

to. And, really, your question gets to the construct of integrating 

with our partners, both in terms of developing information and 

then planning for potential activities. 

One of the comments out of the 9/11 Commission and one of the 

comments out of post-Katrina lessons learned that was common, 

that affect us, was there was not sufficient collaborative planning 

among all the partners to understand the nature of the threat and 

then to act on it if it in fact occurred. 

We have worked very hard on that construct of anticipation and 

of collaboration with our intelligence partners. I mentioned we are 

integrated into the National Counterterrorism Center and integrated in with the FBI and the Joint Terrorism Task Force. 
9 

But it really goes beyond that. Our day-to-day, our intel function 

collaborates with all of the intelligence community, focused on 

threats that may be far away from our home and how do they potentially work their way to us in the homeland. 

As you know, we have some very carefully worded constitutional 

limitations on how we collect intelligence, if we can collect intelligence, in the homeland. Our role is really to provide assistance 

to the law enforcement agencies, but we have built a level of confidence with each of those that they share with us freely within the 

constraints of the Constitution the information that may help us 

deter and detect a threat that could be coming from outside the 

country. 

Our focus is on the terrorism nexus, but law enforcement partners have the focus inside the country on acting the potential terrorist leads that we might have at home. 

I would use examples that I think have been made public in the 

last year or two: A cell that was arrested in the vicinity of Fort Dix 

here on the East Coast, some individuals that were arrested in the 

vicinity of Charleston Air Force Base a couple months ago. 

We were aware that the FBI was working that. We shared information that came from outside our shores that pointed to a terrorist nexus here in the country, and then we were collaborative 

partners with the FBI as they began to develop that information. 

That relationship for us has proven to be a very strong one, one 

I am very pleased with. 

Having said that, we have got to be able to take information and 

then prepare ourselves at home for the consequences if one of these 

threats comes true. That, too, relies on a very close collaborative 

effort with the Department of Homeland Security, certainly with 

the law enforcement partners, with DHS’ principal military arm, 

the U.S. Coast Guard, and we are the DOD lead element for the 

contingency planning portion of the integrated planning team that 

DHS has formed. 

Now, we work on a day-to-day basis. We have weekly video teleconferences (VTCs), planning VTCs with each of those organizations so that we are both equally abreast of both threat information 

and then the contingency planning that would be necessary to respond. 

So I think we are, in my view, leap years ahead—light years 

ahead, excuse me, of where we were even after Katrina. We still 

have work to do, and we will continue to keep those bonds close, 

but I think if you were to ask any of those agencies in the government, they would identify their collaborative with NORTHCOM as 

really one of the highlights. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. I have other questions, but I 

will yield to other members. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I would yield to other members 

at this time and reserve my questions for later. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you very much. 

Thanks to both of you gentlemen. 

Thank you for yielding the additional time. 
10 

As I mentioned in this morning’s full committee hearing, Admiral 

Olson, I thoroughly enjoyed my recent trip down to Tampa a couple 

of weeks ago. Thank you for your wonderful hospitality you and 

your lovely wife extended, and thank you for the excellent job that 

you are doing. I was very impressed with what I saw at U.S. Special Operations Command at MacDill and with your work worldwide, literally. 

I also greatly appreciate the work that you do, General, and 

thank you for helping us have what we need here in the Northern 

Command. 

I wanted to ask you each just a couple of questions that I think 

may help clarify some things. 

General, when you mentioned a minute about your constitutional 

requirements or limits on your actions, what would be your understanding of the process needed to flow active military personnel if 

there were a situation that we had to potential waive posse comitatus and have to bring in the military? I know I get asked that 

question a lot back home from folks who have concerns. Can you 

explain to us what is your understanding if such a scenario would 

entail. 

General RENUART. Yes, sir, I would be happy to. 

First, the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act cannot be 

waived. There would have to be an exclusion provided or an exemption provided by the President based on an assessment of whatever 

the event may be, and I would go back in history to the Los Angeles riots as really the last time that the President chose to invoke 

that authority, as I recall. 

And the process would be, obviously, a concern on the part of the 

state that an event like that were occurring or a very unique—for 

example, the theft of a nuclear weapon, which had such substantial 

national impact that the President would feel strongly that the use 

of the military was the best way to work and solve that problem. 

But that authority would be provided to us by the President. It 

would include the exclusion remarks or the exclusion authorities in 

the designation of event and the authority given to the secretary 

to deploy U.S. military forces. The secretary would ask us what 

forces we had positioned, ready to go, and he would then approve 

specifically the kinds of forces that would be used in these circumstances. 

So a very controlled process by which certainly the state, in the 

case of something like riots, would have a part to play, and the 

President would make that determination prior to us deploying 

anyone. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Is it your understanding that would include a 

specific timeline or just for the accomplishment of the assignment, 

not knowing—— 

General RENUART. My understanding it would be for the accomplishment of that mission. It include a timeline, but, sir, I am not 

a legal expert on if that is required in order to give that authority. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Also, I wanted to ask you, General, if you could 

help explain with our close work we all do with state and local authorities, how you would see the command and control relationship 

between NORTHCOM and state and local officials during a crisis, 
11 

such as a terrorist incident, and where you see your interplay to 

make sure there is a coordination of effort. 

General RENUART. Mr. McIntyre, again, this is one of the kinds 

of scenarios that we work in our interactive planning process with 

both the Department of Homeland Security and our friends in the 

National Guard and with the states. 

A terrorist event in the country would certainly be responded to. 

The primary Federal agency to respond would be the Department 

of Homeland Security. At the onset of any event, we establish an 

immediate contact with the state that might be affected or multiple 

states, should that be the case. 

We begin to build a level of situation awareness of their capability to respond, and we begin also coordinating with the Department of Defense on whether or not the Federal Government is 

going to use military to respond in that particular event. 

But some examples of support that we might provide could be in 

the event that were critical infrastructure nodes that were threatened and that the state and private industry was not capable of the 

size of force necessary to protect those, we could be asked to augment Federal agencies or augment state agencies in that defense. 

The command and control will vary with each circumstance, 

frankly. If it is a very small event, it may be something as simple 

as the local law enforcement in that county would be in charge. 

For example, while not a terrorist threat, when the bridge collapsed in Minnesota, if you will, the supported commander was the 

local county sheriff, but the DOD support came from our defense 

coordinating officer who is attached to FEMA region in that area 

and the Navy divers who were assigned there to provide that assistance to recover the remains of those eight casualties. 

And so that is a very clear command and control relationship. 

The DOD folks were under the command of that Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), that officer, but he was there under the tactical control, if you will, or the on-scene support of that sheriff. 

We practice this on a daily basis. We did, for example, in Indiana 

during Ardent Sentry last spring. We simulated the explosion of a 

10-kiloton nuclear weapon. In that case, the governor directed all 

of the activities in support of that event. His adjutant general commanded the Guard forces that were supported there. 

I had a joint task force deployed. That officer maintained the 

command relationship of the title 10 forces that were there, and 

the two worked hand in hand. The tag was the supported commander, and so our forces were there to assist and support the adjutant general as he worked directly for his governor. 

So each event will have a little different nuance, but we worked 

very hard to ensure that no matter what it was we had a unity of 

effort. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Admiral, double thank you for round two here today. 
12 

I want to pick up, Admiral, if I could, perhaps because the Marine Corps was kind enough to let me climb in the cockpit and fly 

an MV–22 last year, I want to explore a little bit further your 

bringing the CV–22s online. Again, I love this book, so I went back 

to it. I know you are familiar with it. 

So I have a couple of questions about the CV–22. On page 14, 

you indicate that in fiscal year 2009, U.S. SOCOM requests funds 

to modify six CV–22s with soft procurer equipment. I thought these 

things were being built from the ground up in Mr. Thornberry’s 

district for you. So can you tell—I know we don’t want to wander 

into classified area, but what does that mean, you are going to 

modify the CV–22s, which were built for you in the first place? 

Can somebody—— 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, as with most of the major platforms that we 

procure, they are purchased under service contracts to service common requirements and then modified with U.S. SOCOM’s budget 

to answer special operations peculiar mission requirements. 

In the case of the CV–22, as compared to the MV–22, those modifications are primarily terrain following, terrain avoidance systems 

and some defensive survivability systems. And it includes also an 

aerial refueling modification. So those are the primary modifications. 

In the end, the Air Force, in the case of the CV–22, is funding 

about three-quarters of the purchase of the CV–22, and U.S. Special Operations Command is funding about one-quarter of it. 

Mr. KLINE. Okay. I think I get it now. 

These modifications that you are talking about you are paying 

for but they are being put in at the production line in Amarillo. 

This isn’t an add-on later or a modification, if you will, to an already produced airframe. This is being modified in production, and 

that is the part that U.S. SOCOM is paying for; is that correct? 

Admiral OLSON. That is correct. 

Mr. KLINE. Okay. 

Admiral OLSON. The production line splits, and those that are 

going to become MV–22s as opposed to CV–22s then go through a 

different production after the basic airframe is rolled down the line. 

Mr. KLINE. Right. Well, I have toured that plant a couple of 

times, and I have watched that split, and I guess that is what 

drove me to the question, because it looked like, clearly, at the 

plant, in Amarillo, there is a difference between the MV–22 and 

the CV–22. It is being, I thought, made from scratch for you and 

what you are saying, it is but the modifications that are in this 

nifty book are the part that you are paying for that makes them 

unique for you. 

Admiral OLSON. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. KLINE. Yes. And you are the only Air Force user right now 

of the V–22. Is that right? 

Admiral OLSON. At this time, that is correct, sir. 

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Great. Thanks very much. 

I will yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Mrs. Gillibrand. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, both, for coming here today and giving your testimony. I am very grateful, and I appreciate your service. 
13 

I want to ask a little bit about the budget. The President’s budget did not fund SOCOM to meet the current and future threat requirements, and there is almost a $700 million shortfall. What do 

you think the risks will be to security to the American public 

should Congress not be able to make up this shortfall? 

Admiral OLSON. Mrs. Gillibrand, thank you. 

First, I would like to be clear that the Department of Defense did 

approve the budget we submitted. We adhered to the guidance as 

we submitted it. So our unfunded requirement (UFR) list that you 

are referring to are those items that didn’t make it into our budget 

request because they either didn’t meet the top priority or because 

we saw opportunities for acceleration of production in certain items 

or because they were submitted and approved within my headquarters after we submitted the President’s budget but before we 

submitted our unfunded requirements list. 

The risk to security is in the capacity of Special Operations Command and some of our high-end capabilities. We are globally engaged, and we are globally engaged without all of the tools that are 

needed for us to meet the combatant commander’s requirements of 

the war. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. I was most concerned because you have shortfalls in research and development and in science and technology, 

and I am very concerned about that in particular, because, obviously, some of the areas where we still need to develop increased 

expertise really require the research and development and the 

science and technology work. 

And, obviously, there is a lot of discussion about roles and missions and allowing special operations forces to expand their mission 

to include certain kinds of security missions that are unique and 

are developing, like, cyber security, being able to respond to cyber 

terrorism. I know the Air Force is recently working on cyberspace 

command. 

So I am concerned that if we are underfunding any area, that 

underfunding research and development and science and technology is probably not the best place, because that is probably 

where we are going to find solutions for these new security demands. 

Would you like to comment for our committee at all on that 

issue? 

Admiral OLSON. I would like to agree with you on that, ma’am. 

I do have authorities as the commander of Special Operations 

Command that are more like a military service. I can do the research and development, I can invest in science and technology, unlike most combatant commanders but more like the service chiefs. 

I am obliged to invest my major force program $11 million on 

those science and technology items that are Special Operations peculiar in their nature and their application, which means that others are not likely to invest in those items. And therefore, if we 

don’t, nobody does. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Well, I would urge you to continue your advocacy on these issues, because I do see the future of our ability to 

protect this country very much in that area of science and technology. 
14 

Particularly, I want to turn and—General, you can comment on 

this for the Air Force—with cyber security as a fundamental issue, 

what have you thought about ways to engage the next generation 

of our greatest minds from engineering, mathematics, science and 

technology to turn to public service and military service as an avenue for the profession? 

And I have asked this question in other context, it may require 

a different kind of recruitment that is not traditional, because you 

are looking for individual that have a certain skill set that may not 

have a typical background in public service or an interest in military interest. But you truly have the skill set we need to protect 

this country. 

If you are doing any particular innovative outreach or recruiting, 

I would love to hear about it. 

General RENUART. Ma’am, thank you for the question, and I am 

a little unprepared to answer that question, but I will certainly 

give you my understanding of where the Air Force is going, even 

though that doesn’t technically fall into my responsibility. 

You make a great point, however, that the recruiting base, if you 

will, is becoming increasingly thin. I think there are some statistics 

that say that less than five of 10 high school graduates meet the 

various criteria for service, not just in military but in other areas 

as well. I think it is important for us to have an ability to reach 

out and expand that level. 

One of the elements that I talk to as the commander of 

NORTHCOM, as it relates to homeland defense, every day with our 

private sector partners as well as our education partners, is our 

ability to develop the technical skills of our students, from local initiatives like working with our local school districts to expand 

science and technology by using our own officers as mentors and 

experts in the high schools to working with, for example, the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs on advanced degree programs in homeland security, not to make a military member better 

educated but to help educate our executives in government and in 

industry on the issues of homeland security and homeland defense. 

So I think we do have to be innovative in that regard. I think 

we do have to commit to helping that next generation of great 

young minds, and national service, public service, service to the 

community a critical element of that. I am blessed with two sons. 

The oldest is a former active duty enlisted and reservist, three combat tours. He was back in Iraq as a contractor. He is now working 

for the State Department. 

My youngest son is a Peace Corps volunteer who has—he is now 

a med student who will go back and help developing countries of 

the world. So we encourage that within our own sons, and I think 

we have to do that as a Nation. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Five minutes are up? 

Mr. SMITH. Five minutes are up, and we have got a couple more 

people in here, but if we have time at the end, we will come back 

and get other folks. 

Mrs. Drake. 

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
15 

Admiral, General, thank you for being here today. 

Admiral Olson, I would like to ask you about the Advance SEAL 

Delivery System (ASDS). You had mentioned in your written testimony that ASDS number one is ready for deployment, and what 

my concern is, is that the capability gap that this program was designed to address still has not been fully met in the two years since 

the program has been canceled. 

Is SOCOM assessing alternative solutions or is this the capability that SOCOM still needs? 

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, Ms. Drake. ASDS, the Advanced 

SEAL Delivery System, certainly much more than that, in fact, I 

compare it to an underwater space shuttle. As the space shuttle 

was designed to do more than take astronauts into space, it was 

designed to enable man to work in an environment in which he 

could loiter for previously unattainable periods. ASDS does that in 

a maritime environment. 

We canceled the program because it was a troubled program. The 

delivery of the first ASDS was way late, way over cost, and it had 

reliability issues that concerned us seriously about the safety of the 

people that we were putting inside. So we canceled the program in 

order to invest with greater focus in enhancing the reliability of the 

one that was in production. 

I believe that we have met the reliability standards, I am convinced that we have. We have declared that one asset operational. 

It is currently aboard a submarine in the Pacific in, sort of, a—I 

am sorry, it is not, but it is preparing to do that for, sort of, a 

shakedown and test opportunity. 

One doesn’t answer our need. We have a standing requirement 

for a small fleet. It is somewhere between four and six. I also am 

convinced that the applicability of the submarine extends beyond 

special operations applications. We are having discussions with the 

Navy about potential Navy employment of ASDS. 

In specific answer to your question about whether or not we are 

analyzing alternatives, the answer is, yes. When we canceled the 

program, we initiated an effort to recommend a way ahead with respect to a material solution to the requirement. I will receive that 

report in about two weeks. 

Mrs. DRAKE. Oh, okay. Thank you. And just one last question for 

you. When Dr. Chu was here the other day, we did ask him about 

whether you had the tools you need to retain our more senior 

SEALS, and I just wanted to know from you if you think you have 

what you need to retain this very, very valuable asset to our military? 

Admiral OLSON. Ma’am, with the support of this committee, we 

were able to institute a retention bonus that is applicable at the 

19-year point for our experienced SEALS. It offers them bonuses to 

stay in through the 25th year point. That has proven successful. It 

was a temporary authority at the time that it was granted. It was 

temporary as it was implemented by the Department of Defense, 

and so we are working with the department to extend that into a 

permanent bonus. But given that, we are in pretty good shape. 

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you. Thank you for being here. 

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 
16 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, we had an issue in this subcommittee last year about 

the civil support teams (CST) and how many we needed where. I 

have a chart in front of me that describes some of the different organizations that are being created, and, frankly, I am a little concerned that there are lots of people who say, ‘‘This is what we do,’’ 

and there is a lot of overlap and so forth that is a little confusing 

to me. 

In addition to civil support teams, there apparently are joint National Guard Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive 

(CBRNE) enhanced response force packages, and there are Chemical-Biological Incident Response Forces, and there are CBRNE 

Consequent Management Response Force. 

I am not exactly clear what everybody does. I want you to reassure me that there are clear lanes in the road, and everybody is 

not coming to the taxpayer for money to do the same thing. 

General RENUART. Mr. Thornberry, that is a superb question, because at first glance, that chart can be very confusing, but, actually, working in that environment every day I think we have really 

created a very good synergy among all the players. And let me try 

to put that in perspective. 

Congress provided funding to allow each state to develop a civil 

support team, and that is a 22-person team that is really designed 

as the quick response force that can go to a chemical or biological 

event and relieve those first responders with people who are 

trained to operate in that kind of environment, a chemical environment, a biological environment or the like. 

They are there to assess the initial scene and to make recommendations back to the state on the size of force that it may 

take to respond. If, in fact, it is a larger event than that small 22- 

person team can manage, then they can go out either to a state to 

bring in a supporting team of similar capabilities or they can go to 

one of the 17 regionally based Enhanced Response Force Packages 

(CERFP) that you mentioned is that second group, about 200 plus 

individuals, again, trained to operate in a chemical environment to 

begin to do consequence management of the site. CST is an assessment team. The CERFP begins to allow you to do consequence 

management. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Excuse me for interrupting. We have got a 

vote called—— 

General RENUART. Understand. 

Mr. THORNBERRY [continuing]. And I am a little concerned. 

You are making me feel better. If you don’t mind, if you could 

get your folks to provide us, what you have started to do, a description and who the traffic cop is. Who says this is an assessment 

team versus—— 

General RENUART. Right. 

Mr. THORNBERRY [continuing]. And then going on down. 

General RENUART. I would be happy to do that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 97.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I think that would be helpful for me, at least, 

to sort through this. 
17 

Admiral Olson, if I could ask just briefly, one of the things that 

your folks do is train other special forces, and we have seen some 

of that as we have traveled around. My understanding is that there 

are those countries that would like to send folks here for us to 

train but there are limitations, financial and otherwise. Can you 

describe—what we are talking about is trying to work through others to increase others’ capabilities so we don’t have to do everything. Is this an area you think Congress should put more emphasis on so that your folks can train others to take care of their security needs for themselves, and what do we need to do to make that 

happen? 

Admiral OLSON. Mr. Thornberry, you are correct, there are limitations, and some of those limitations are funding limitations. In 

many of the countries with which we work there, the lesser developed countries of the world, the high priority and the priority countries in a campaign against terrorism in which we are investing resources for training for the purpose of enabling them to either fight 

with, fight alongside us or enable their own sovereignty through 

governing their own borders and establish their own internal security. These are not the wealthiest nations of the country, in general. 

I met the International Military Education Training Program. It 

is a wonderful program. In my view, it has been underfunded for 

many years. It is the best tool that we have to enable those carefully selected members from other countries to come to schools in 

the United States and train, not just skills training but also to our 

war colleges and graduate schools for education as well. 

When we send people forward, we pick, sort of, the people who 

are regionally oriented, who are in line to go, ensuring that we are 

regionally specializing as we do that and attempting to send the 

same people back to the same places. They hand pick virtually everybody who trains with us. It is a badge of honor and a very prestigious point for them to be selected for training in the United 

States. This is an investment that pays off in many ways. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

I think what we will do—I mean, I have a few more questions. 

I am sure Mr. Thornberry does as well. But rather than have all 

of you sit here for a half hour waiting for five minutes more worth 

of questions, we will submit the ones we have and have not been 

answered for the record and give you the rest of the afternoon off. 

How is that? I am sure you have other things to do. 

But thank you very much, both of you, for your testimony, and, 

again, both of you, for your accessibility to this committee and to 

the full committee. We have had great working relationships with 

both of you and both of your staffs, and we really appreciate the 

work that you do to do that. 

So thanks for being here this afternoon, and we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:23 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 5, 2008 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 5, 2008 

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE 

RECORD 

MARCH 5, 2008 

(81) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, please share your views about the findings and recommendations of the Commission on Guard and Reserves with regards to 

NORTHCOM and the homeland defense/civil support mission. 

General RENUART. The Secretary of Defense has directed a comprehensive review 

of the final Report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. 

USNORTHCOM is actively participating in the DOD Commission on the National 

Guard and Reserves Working Group tasked to evaluate each of the 95 recommendations and propose implementation guidance or alternative approaches for the Secretary of Defense’s consideration. USNORTHCOM is prepared to implement DOD 

guidance as directed. 

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, the Commission criticized NORTHCOM’s contingency planning performance. Please comment. 

General RENUART. I do not agree with the assessment that USNORTHCOM 

CONPLAN 3500, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNET) Consequence Management (CM) is inadequate. CONPLAN 3500 is 

the DOD strategic plan for a CBRNE event, which includes a domestic Weapons of 

Mass Destruction incident, in support of the overall state and federal response. 

USNORTHCOM’s plan accounts for the National Guard CBRNE response capabilities either resident in each state or supplied from other states through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact process. These National Guard response 

forces will operate under the command and control of the Governor. If a catastrophic 

incident exceeds the state’s capabilities, CONPLAN 3500 is designed to quickly deploy thousands of active duty forces to fill capability gaps and support the Governorcontrolled state response. 

USNORTHCOM’s planning process begins with mission analysis and development 

and refinement of a course of action. Our plans undergo a minimum of three rounds 

of coordination within the Command, as well as with interagency representatives 

and the National Guard Bureau. During this development process, Commander, 

USNORTHCOM presents the Secretary of Defense with In-Progress Reviews of the 

Mission Analysis, Course of Action Development and the final plan. 

The most recent version of CONPLAN 3500 was approved by the Secretary of Defense on 11 May 2007. Before the Secretary approved the final version, it was 

staffed through the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC), which includes the Joint Staff, the Services, Combat Support Agencies, and other combatant 

commands. In addition, once the Secretary approved the plan, it began a revision 

cycle in accordance with the DOD Adaptive Planning process to maintain relevant, 

living plans. This includes a complete reassessment of the plan to ensure it remains 

current and consistent with strategic guidance and planning assumptions. As such, 

CONPLAN 3500 for CBRNE Consequence Management has been reviewed by the 

JPEC three times since May 2007, and will undergo a complete reassessment in 

2008. 

In terms of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), USNORTHCOM aggressively plans for catastrophic events such as hurricanes and wildfires by incorporating lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Dean, and most recently 

the Southern California wildfires. We have made significant impact to DSCA planning and execution by manning Defense Coordinating Officer positions with dedicated full-time senior officers who are linked with their civilian counterparts in the 

respective FEMA regions. Through comprehensive lessons learned analysis, exercises, and partnering in gap analysis of local, state, and federal response capabilities, USNORTHCOM makes planning recommendations to improve DOD responsiveness when a request for assistance is received from a primary agency such as 

FEMA. These planning recommendations culminated in revisions to the Joint Staff 

DSCA Execute Order (EXORD), which is reviewed and updated annually by the 

DOD. This important tool ultimately improves our ability to anticipate and respond 

in a timely and effective manner across the spectrum of DSCA events. 

With regards to wild land fire fighting, USNORTHCOM goes to great lengths to 

plan for each wild land fire fighting season. Starting with the USNORTHCOMhosted Post Wild Land Fire Fighting Conference, we work year-round with the U.S. 
82 

Forest Service, the National Interagency Fire Center, the Air National Guard and 

Reserves, as well as a host of other interagency partners to plan and prepare to provide DOD Fire Fighting capabilities when requested. This planning effort culminates each spring with the publication of the USNORTHCOM Wild Land Fire 

Fighting EXORD. Among the DOD capabilities available in this EXORD are the C– 

130 Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System, helicopters capable of using ‘‘Bambi’’ 

buckets for water drops, and personnel to staff ground fire fighting battalions. The 

response to the Southern California Wildfires of 2007 shows that USNORTHCOM’s 

planning is effective, and that we continually assess and improve our response process to aid local, state and federal wild land fire fighting efforts. 

Finally, USNORTHCOM plans are evaluated primarily through yearly exercises. 

In May 2007, USNORTHCOM successfully exercised the first-ever substantial 

CBRNE CM Response Force (CCMRF) deployment during Exercise ARDENT SENTRY-NORTHERN EDGE 07, and will continue annual exercises of these capabilities 

to maintain critical readiness. USNORTHCOM also conducts Chairman, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff-directed plan capability assessments in accordance with the Joint 

Combat Capability Assessment process. These assessments require force providers 

to identify specific forces that would be used to respond to a CBRNE incident. We 

review the forces for adequacy, proficiently, and timely response capability as we assess the level of risk associated with accomplishing the plan’s objectives. We are in 

the process of completing the second such comprehensive assessment for CONPLAN 

3500. 

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, what do you think of the Commission’s recommendation to alter the active-reserve mix at NORTHCOM? 

General RENUART. I believe the Commission’s recommendation regarding 

USNORTHCOM staff qualifications is unnecessary. I am satisfied that 

USNORTHCOM personnel possess sufficient experience levels to provide timely and 

effective support to the states. Currently, 46% of USNORTHCOM service members 

have previous experience working with National Guard and Reservist personnel and 

units. This percentage would increase if the Reserve Component were able to fill existing USNORTHCOM National Guard and Reserve vacancies. I currently have 13 

full time and 324 part-time Reserve Component (comprised of both National Guard 

and Reserve forces) positions unfilled. In general, I believe that a broad policy of 

selecting the most qualified personnel for a position, with the goal of increasing the 

breadth and depth of Reserve Component experience across the board and placing 

Guard and Reserve officers in particular positions when warranted and supportable, 

is appropriate. The Guard and Reserve must adopt a professional development program that grows their officers with the right mix of operational and joint experience 

to make them competitive for these key positions. 

USNORTHCOM is leading an OSD implementation plan working group to implement Recommendation #16 in the Second Report of the Commission on the National 

Guard and Reserves and Sec 1821 of the FY08 National Defense Authorization Act. 

Progress made by this group will influence the overall response to the latest recommendation in the Final Report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves on the same subject. 

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, please explain the command-and-control relationship between NORTHCOM and State and local officials during a crisis, consequent 

management, and/or terrorist incident and provide examples. 

General RENUART. When conducting consequence management in support of state 

and local officials, USNORTHCOM is part of a coordinated federal response under 

the National Response Framework (NRF) and the comprehensive National Incident 

Management System (NIMS). Under this structure, USNORTHCOM provides support requested by state and local officials, through the primary federal agency. The 

scope and focus of each mission is controlled by the state’s initial request to the primary federal agency, and the subsequent request for support from the primary federal agency through DOD to USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM remains, at all 

times, under the command and control (C2) of the Secretary of Defense. Within the 

general parameters of the approved mission and keeping the integrity of its federal 

C2, USNORTHCOM coordinates with the on-site state or local commander, and responds to the developing needs of the situation. 

USNORTHCOM’s support to the collapse of the I–35W Bridge between downtown 

Minneapolis and St. Paul is an example of this process. USNORTHCOM deployed 

its Federal Emergency Management Agency Region V Defense Coordinating Officer, 

who worked closely with federal, state and local officials to determine the type and 

extent of DOD support needed. When state and local officials to determine the type 

and extent of DOD support needed. When state and local officials requested underwater salvage capabilities. USNORTHCOM coordinated with the U.S. Transportation Command and the U.S. Navy to deploy underwater specialists. At the scene, 
83 

while the Defense Coordinating Officer and Navy divers remained under a federal 

C2, they responded to and coordinated with the County Sheriff, who remained in 

control of the on-scene operations. USNORTHCOM responded to the 2007 Southern 

California wildfires using this same structure. For instance, the Incident Awareness 

and Assessment assets USNORTHCOM employed to provide critical imagery to 

local responders remained under federal C2, but were employed only after comprehensive coordination with state and local officials, with the sole objective to provide the precise support local responders needed to effectively fight the fires. 

The Attorney General has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or threats within the United States. When requested by the Attorney 

General and approved by the Secretary of Defense, USNORTHCOM provides support to the Attorney General, remaining under a federal military C2, responding 

typically to the Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent in Charge. 

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, what are among the most stressing scenarios under 

which NORTHCOM personnel have exercised? In other words, which scenarios offer 

the most risk to our Nation? 

General RENUART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, what are the 15 different national planning scenarios? Can you describe them? 

General RENUART. In November 2003, the Homeland Security Council and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began developing the 15 all-hazards National 

Planning Scenarios (NPS). The objective was to develop the minimum number of 

scenarios required to test the range of required prevention, protection, response, and 

recovery resources. They serve as the foundation for the development of homeland 

security tasks, required capabilities, and standards against which capabilities will 

be measured. The scenario-derived standards serve as a basis for assessing national 

preparedness; help guide federal preparedness assistance to state, local, and tribal 

governments; and to develop national exercises and training programs. The scenarios are: 

Scenario 1: Nuclear Detonation—Improvised Nuclear Device 

Scenario 2: Biological Attack—Aerosol Anthrax 

Scenario 3: Biological Disease Outbreak—Pandemic Influenza 

Scenario 4: Biological Attack—Pneumonic Plague 

Scenario 5: Chemical Attack—Blister Agent 

Scenario 6: Chemical Attack—Toxic Industrial Chemicals 

Scenario 7: Chemical Attack—Nerve Agent 

Scenario 8: Chemical Attack—Chlorine Tank Explosion 

Scenario 9: Natural Disaster—Major Earthquake 

Scenario 10: Natural Disaster—Major Hurricane 

Scenario 11: Radiological Attack—Radiological Dispersal Devices 

Scenario 12: Explosives Attack—Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Device 

Scenario 13: Biological Attack—Food Contamination 

Scenario 14: Biological Attack—Foreign Animal Disease 

Scenario 15: Cyber Attack 

The 15 NPS are an integral component of DHS’s capabilities-based approach to 

implementing Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness 

(HSPD–8) (2003) and HSPD 8, Annex 1, National Planning (December 2007). HSPD 

8, Annex 1, directs the Secretary DHS to develop a standardized federal planning 

process by developing an Integrated Planning System. It mandates a unified and 

comprehensive approach to national planning for the 15 NPS with DHS in the lead, 

and DOD, as well as the other federal agencies, in support. DOD’s role is to plan 

to support the DHS overarching national plans. Since November 2007, 

USNORTHCOM planners have coordinated closely and frequently with the DHS Incident Management Planning Team to facilitate success in this effort. 

USNORTHCOM is adding specific appendices to our Concept Plans for the appropriate NPS, which have been aggregated, to improve planning, into eight sets of related scenarios. 

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, please explain the various missions of the National 

Guard Civil Support Teams (CSTs), the CBRNE Emergency Response Force Packages (CERFPs), and the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces 

(CCMRFs). How does NORTHCOM envision employment of such forces during times 

of crises? 

General RENUART. The National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD–CSTs) detect and identify CBRNE agents/substances, assess and 

advise the local authorities on managing the effects of the attack, and assist with 
84 

requests for other forces (i.e. CERFPs). They are a 22-person response unit located 

in each state and territory (55 total, 53 of which are certified) that performs an initial assessment of a CBRNE incident. These units are full time, congressionally authorized, federally funded, and fall under the command and control of the governor. 

CERFPs locate and extract victims from a contaminated environment, perform 

medical triage and treatment, and perform mass patient/casualty decontamination. 

Each of these units is a task force of between 200 and 400 personnel, composed of 

an Army battalion or Air Force equivalent C2 element, an Air National Guard Medical Flight, an Army Chemical Company (-) and an Army Engineer Company (-). The 

17 CERFPs are congressionally authorized, traditional Guard only, with 4–5 full 

time personnel per unit, and are located regionally to provide additional support to 

the WMD–CSTs and the state government. They are capable of decontaminating, 

performing medical triage, and stabilizing 75 non-ambulatory and 225 ambulatory 

personnel per hour. The WMD–CSTs and CERFPs support the local and state response to an incident and are not under the command and control of 

USNORTHCOM. 

A CCMRF provides the DOD capability to support the federal response to a request for assistance from a state. CCMRFs consist of roughly 4,000 people in three 

force packages that are able to respond to a domestic catastrophic CBRNE event. 

This force is pre-identified from within existing DOD force structure and-is under 

Operational Control of the Commander, USNORTHCOM. The following outlines the 

capabilities of the three force packages with additional follow-on forces identified as 

required: 

• Force Package #1 capabilities: Initial C2, Command Assessment Teams, Initial Response Force (Medical, Logistics, Extraction) 

• Force Package #2 capabilities: Medical, Decontamination, C2, Transportation 

and Logistics, Security, Public Affairs 

• Force Package #3 capabilities: C2, Transportation, Logistical Support, Mortuary Affairs 

• Follow-on Forces: Additional C2, Transportation, Logistics 

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, please explain the budgeting and funding processes 

associated with your command. How are requirements established and funding executed? 

General RENUART. USNORTHCOM receives funding primarily from the Air Force, 

our Combatant Command Support Agent, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD). Upon receipt, funds are distributed to USNORTHCOM headquarters staff 

sections and subordinate commands. Execution of federally appropriated dollars occurs in accordance with all applicable laws, regulations, directives, and instructions. 

USNORTHCOM uses a formalized, internal Corporate Deliberative Process to 

evaluate directorates’ and subordinate commands’ near- and long-term funding 

needs against the command mission and strategic guidance. We submit the Commander-approved prioritized requirements—which support mission accomplishment 

across the Command’s entire mission set—to the Combatant Command Support 

Agent for consideration through the DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 

Execution System. 

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, what do you think is the single, most important contribution of your command to the defense of the Nation? 

General RENUART. USNORTHCOM’s most important contribution is the integration of all aspects of homeland defense and support to civil authorities. We are an 

active, engaged Command that pulls together many things that were formerly diffused and scattered in order to prosecute an active layered defense of the homeland 

and provide effective, timely support to civil authorities. We have strong relationships with our federal partners like, but not limited to, DHS and the National 

Guard. These relationships offer the opportunity to create unity of effort in our 

shared national responsibility to defend our homeland against a range of threats— 

both state and nonstate—extending into all domains. 

Additionally, USNORTHCOM is DOD’s single integrating location for state and 

federal response to natural and man-made disasters. We ensure a common picture 

of air, land, space, and maritime operations in defense of our homeland. Bottom line 

is that we defend our families, our friends, our communities, and our way of life 

on the home field 

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, what do you think is the single greatest challenge 

to your command and what additional authorities should Congress consider providing to help you succeed in your mission? 

General RENUART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 
85 

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, how has the high operational tempo of the DOD personnel community affected NORTHCOM planning, training and exercise execution? 

How differently might the command look if such a high number of active and reserve personnel were not regularly deployed overseas? 

General RENUART. Since USNORTHCOM has very few assigned forces, the high 

operational tempo of deployed DOD personnel in support of ongoing operations impacts the Command’s ability to train and exercise our two major missions—homeland defense and civil support—using the forces that we would require for an actual 

event. If the operational tempo of DOD forces decreased, it could potentially result 

in a larger percentage of DOD forces for USNORTHCOM specific exercises. The 

elimination of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM requirements would not reduce our steady-state requirement for forces. 

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, please comment on the relative state of preparedness of the Marines’ CBIRF unit. Reports suggest that this unit is in need of training and modernization funding. 

General RENUART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, please share with the committee your vision of 

CCMRF employment and schedule for the initial operational capability of each. How 

many personnel do you envision being assigned to each? 

General RENUART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, how might our Nation’s response have been different 

on 9/11 and during Hurricane Katrina if NORTHCOM and its current capability 

had been in place? 

General RENUART. I believe that USNORTHCOM contributions and the national 

response would have been much more responsive and synchronized due to the maturation of the National Response Framework, strong relationships between 

USNORTHCOM and our federal and state partners, development of Joint Staff 

Standing Execute Orders (EXORDS), and preparation of prescripted mission assignment lists. 

Since 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, DOD and USNORTHCOM have acted aggressively, in collaboration with our interagency partners, to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report; and the White House, House of Representatives, and Senate reports on Hurricane Katrina. Today, the Command is prepared to anticipate events and respond in accordance with the tenets of the National 

Response Framework. Actions taken include: 

• Established a rapid intelligence and information-sharing network that 

spans DOD and several interagency partners, particularly law enforcement agencies 

• Established and improved proactive military response capabilities across 

a wide spectrum of domestic air, ground, and maritime threats to include: 

• Conducted air patrols and deterrence operations above U.S. cities 

• Enhanced maritime domain awareness and warning 

• Enhanced participation as a primary Maritime Operation Threat Response partner 

• Conducted ground missions to secure U.S. airports, protect selected 

critical infrastructure, and provide support to U.S. Customs and Border Protection to secure the Federal border with Canada 

• Established full-time Defense Coordinating Officers in each of the 10 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions to: 

• Build relationships and partnerships with interagency partners 

• Allow quicker response and knowledge of incidents within each FEMA 

region 

• Established the USNORTHCOM Situational Awareness Team 

• Deploys early to establish linkage with the Defense Coordinating Officer and the FEMA Incident Management Assessment Team to ensure: 

• Interagency information sharing 

• Gaps and capabilities that are to be filled or supported by DOD are 

rapidly identified 

• Interagency unity of effort 
86 

• Expanded USNORTHCOM authorities in the Joint Staff Defense Support of Civil Authorities Standing EXORD 

• Enables USNORTHCOM to lean forward with the most commonly requested capabilities such as medical, aviation, facilities, and communications 

• Developed Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments 

• Reduces staffing time to satisfy Secretary of Defense criteria for legal, 

lethal, readiness, cost, appropriateness, and risk; staffing done up 

front 

• Provides common language; Federal agencies understand DOD capabilities 

• Enables each Defense Coordinating Officer to work more efficiently 

with the FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer 

• Fulfills a statutory requirement; lesson learned from the White House 

report on Hurricane Katrina 

• Improved engagement with the National Guard for unity of effort 

• Improves interoperability through table top exercises and conferences; 

USNORTHCOM and National Guard National Hurricane Conference 

• Improved engagement with other government agencies 

• Improves planning efforts by providing dedicated DOD representatives 

to Department of Homeland Security/FEMA, NGB, select Joint Field 

Offices and Regions 

• Increases exercise participation 

• Establishes a parallel planning relationship with the DHS Incident 

Management Planning Team and FEMA Current Operations Planning 

Unit 

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, what is your understanding of the process needed 

to flow active duty military personnel if a situation requires the potential waiver 

of the Posse Comitatus Act? Under what scenarios might such consideration be necessary? 

General RENUART. Direct military support of civilian law enforcement agencies is 

very narrowly prescribed under federal law and policy. The Posse Comitatus Act 

(PCA) is the principal federal proscription against the use of the federal military to 

provide such direct support (e.g., search, seize, arrest). The PCA is never waived; 

specific exceptions to the Act must be invoked. Some notable exceptions include the 

Insurrection Act, the Presidential Protection Assistance Act, and statutes that authorize the Attorney General to ask for military assistance in the event of crimes 

involving nuclear, chemical or biological materials. 

USNORTHCOM would provide direct military assistance to law enforcement only 

at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, upon a lawful request by the appropriate law enforcement official (often the Attorney General) to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense would direct, through an execute order, 

USNORTHCOM to perform the support mission and would provide the forces necessary for such a mission. Scenarios: 

• Theft of nuclear material, with the Federal Bureau of Investigation assuming jurisdiction. If the Attorney General determines that the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation requires military support, a request is made 

under 18 USC 831. 

• Extensive rioting which exceeds the capability of local, state and federal 

law enforcement to handle. The Los Angeles riot of 1992 is the most recent incident in which the Insurrection Act was invoked. 

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, what additional authorities might you need to better 

prosecute the GWOT and manage your command? 

Admiral OLSON. USSOCOM and the other combatant commands need the additional authorities that would be provided by passage of the 19 provisions in the 

FY09 Building Global Partnerships Act recently submitted to the Hill as draft legislation by Department of Defense. Of particular interest to USSOCOM are the proposals to increase and make permanent the funding authorities for global training 

and equipping (Sect. 1206) and support for special operations to combat terrorism 

(Sect. 1208), as well as the expansion globally of the commanders’ emergency response program (CERP) funding authority. These and the other provisions of the 

Act to enhance training, educating, equipping and other support for willing partner 
87 

nations are essential if we are to succeed in the indirect approach to the global war 

on terror. 

Additionally, the Commander of USSOCOM is responsible for ensuring the combat readiness of assigned forces. With this requirement comes the need for better 

defined personnel management authorities and readiness reporting frameworks. My 

staff is currently exploring whether we are using the full extent of our legislated 

authorities as the Congress and President intended when USSOCOM was established. We are also examining ways to coordinate with the Services in order to better execute our responsibility to maintain readiness in areas to include accessions, 

assignments, compensation, promotions, professional development, retention, 

sustainment and training of all special operations forces. 

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, what are SOCOM’s ISR needs for prosecuting its mission as the overall synchronizer of the GWOT? How much of this requirement is 

related to areas outside of the CENTCOM AOR? Is the SOCOM ISR requirement 

balanced between CENTCOM and non-CENTCOM theaters, or is it CENTCOM-centric? 

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, please speak to the issue of dedicated air and ISR assets for non-special mission units, and other regional SOF units. Do you have plans 

to improve this capability? Could each of the respective services make additional 

contributions in this area? For example, perhaps the Navy could provide additional 

rotary-wing support to SOF from sea-going vessels. 

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, please explain the reasoning for the drop in the FY09 

budget request for SOCOM. Is this decrease caused in part because of a delay in 

baseline service programs on which some SOCOM modernization efforts rely? 

Admiral OLSON. Overall, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 budget request of $5.727 billion is lower than the $6.159 billion 

FY 2008 budget request, but that is due mainly to the funding surge provided to 

the command in FY 2008 to begin building the infrastructure and equipping the increased manpower added by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In total, 

the 2006 QDR added over $9 billion and 13,119 billets to USSOCOM to enhance 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities required to fight the global war on terror, including the standup of a new SOF Component, the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command. While the total growth set forth in the QDR will occur 

through FY 2013, the majority of the Military Construction (MILCON) and equipment requirements were requested as part of the FY 2008 budget. 

• There were 21 MILCON projects requested in FY 2008 for QDR infrastructure, as compared to only four in FY 2009. As a result, the 

MILCON budget request decreased $421 million from FY 2008 to FY 

2009. 

• The procurement request for SOF-peculiar weapons and communications 

equipment required to outfit a large percentage of the SOF growth was 

also requested in FY 2008, resulting in a smaller request in FY 2009. 

Our aviation procurement requests also decreased due to updated cost 

estimates and completion of several modifications in FY 2008; as a result, the procurement request decreased by over $372 million in FY 

2009. 

• A significant portion of USSOCOM’s procurement budget is for modification of service-common platforms and systems to meet mission requirements that are peculiar to special operations. Unless such platforms are 

in the Services’ budget requests, the modification funds are not in 

USSOCOM’s request. 

While this year’s request for the investment accounts has decreased from FY 

2008, the request for Operations and Maintenance (O&M) continues to grow. Almost 

$450 million in additional funding is included to support additional SOF growth 

across the four components; of this increase, $371 million is for program growth, 

and will be utilized by the command to grow additional SOF, expand unit and 

schoolhouse training, and provide additional soldier protection systems such as body 

armor, protective clothing, and survival equipment. 

The Department has been very supportive of SOF since 9/11, and supported all 

of the resources requested by the command for FY 2009. 
88 

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, your command has provided an unfunded requirements list of nearly $700 million. Are the items on this list requirements and needs 

validated by your command? 

Admiral OLSON. The items on this list were reviewed and validated through the 

command, and approved by the Commander. The reason they are on the Unfunded 

Requirement (UFR) list is due to funding constraints, prioritization, or emergent requirements identified too late for inclusion in the FY 2009 President’s Budget. 

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, what are the core missions of SOCOM? How does this 

list compare with the list established in Title 10 more than 20 years ago, and how 

does Irregular Warfare fit into or affect the SOF mission? 

Admiral OLSON. Special Operations core activities today include: 

Direct action 

Special reconnaissance (formerly strategic reconnaissance) 

Unconventional warfare 

Foreign internal defense 

Civil affairs operations 

Counterterrorism 

Psychological operations 

Information operations (add) 

Counter proliferation of WMD (add) 

Security force assistance (add) 

Counterinsurgency operations (add) 

Activities specified by the President or SECDEF 

These have changed slightly from the original charter as defense doctrine and 

definitions have evolved over the last two decades. Additionally, SOCOM Headquarters was given a core activity by the President to synchronize DOD plans and 

planning for the war on terror. 

Irregular Warfare does not affect these core activities. In fact, most of SOF core 

activities fit into the irregular warfare joint operational concept. Many have suggested that Irregular Warfare be added to SOF core activities, but IW is not an activity but a condition of warfare at the opposite end of the spectrum of conflict from 

major conventional war. Therefore, it is not, in and of itself an activity but a state 

of warfare. 

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, please share your views on ‘‘1208’’ or ‘‘1202’’ funding. 

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, what are your views of ‘‘1206’’ funding and general efforts to build partner capacity around the world? 

Admiral OLSON. Section 1206 authority has made a big difference in developing 

carefully selected counterpart forces—it is hard to overstate its importance. Building 

partner nation security capacity is one of the most important strategic requirements 

for the U.S. to promote international security, advance U.S. interests and prevail 

in the global war on terror. Effective partners play a key role in disrupting terrorist 

networks and other transnational threats around the globe, thereby preventing crises that would otherwise require deployment of U.S. forces. The indirect approach 

of enabling partners to combat violent extremist organizations addresses the underlying causes of terrorism and the environments in which terrorism activities occur. 

It requires more time than the direct approach to achieve effects, but ultimately it 

will be the decisive effort in the global war on terror. 

Current legislation allows us to address many issues with respect to training and 

equipping militaries, but this assistance has not kept up with current strategic 

need. In order to maximize U.S. Government flexibility and efficiency, Section 1206 

needs increased funding, expansion to a multi-year appropriation and authority to 

provide assistance to relevant non-military security forces (i.e., police, Gendarmes, 

and Border Guards) would improve the effectiveness of this worthwhile program by 

increasing the U.S. Government’s ability to meet time-sensitive requirements to 

build the capacity of foreign security forces for counterterrorism operations or stability operations in which U.S Armed Forces are a participant. 

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, please discuss the nature of the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa. How are they similar? How are they different? 

What challenges are unique to each location? 

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, what can you tell us in this setting about the AfghanPakistan border region and the cooperation of the respective Pakistani defense and 

intelligence communities? 
89 

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, what are your current views on interagency integration not only in direct action missions but also in environments requiring indirect 

action? 

Admiral OLSON. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has a long 

history of working as a team member with the departments, agencies, bureaus, administrations, and centers of the U.S. government to address mutual problems concerning national security. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, we used this already established relationship to immediately commence actions to counter the 

threat at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. That work has continued and 

expanded each year since 2001. It is now a natural and established way of executing 

our daily work whether we are performing security operations on the streets of Iraq, 

combat operations in the mountains of Afghanistan, or when we are writing and revising our latest strategic plans. 

Our plans revolve around five lines of operation. The direct lines are Disrupting 

Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOS) and Denying access and use of Weapons 

of Mass Destruction by VEOs. Our indirect lines of operation are Enabling partners 

to combat VEOs, Deter tacit and active support for VEOS, and Erode support for 

extremist ideologies. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) is not the lead for the indirect lines and we 

recognize our supporting role to those agencies who are the leaders as designated 

in the President’s National Implementation Plan. We also recognize that we cannot 

accomplish the direct lines all by ourselves either. To support this, we’ve created 

several new initiatives to further our integration with other agencies in the U.S. 

government. One example is our week long Global Synchronization Conference held 

in Tampa, Florida, twice a year and attended by approximately 500 DOD and 100 

U.S. government agency members who discuss and recommend the way ahead for 

numerous aspects of the War on Terrorism. The outbrief for this conference is held 

a week later and attended by senior interagency leaders. 

Another initiative is our Interagency Partnership Program which places 

USSOCOM personnel full-time at the Department of State, Department of Justice, 

Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Treasury, the National 

Counterterrorism Center, the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the 

Department of Energy to coordinate and synchronize the planning for mutual tasks 

in the war on terror. 

A third example is the creation of our Interagency Task Forces which combine 

DOD members and members of other agencies into cohesive full-time organizations 

to fight the war on terror. The successes of these efforts overseas at the tactical to 

operational levels drove us to create similar organizations in the United States to 

address the operational to strategic levels as well. 

Are we at the point of perfection? Not yet, but we are very satisfied with our 

interagency work to date and continue to improve each year. Recent assessments 

of our GWOT plans have led us to increase our emphasis on supporting the indirect 

lines of operation through operations, actions, and activities such as our Joint Combined Exchange Training Teams, Civil Military Support Elements, and Military Information Support Teams—to name a few, while maintaining our close attention to 

the direct lines. As we continue our efforts, we recognize and appreciate the support 

Congress provides. 

Mr. SMITH. Why has our approach not been more productive in defeating AQ and 

Taliban influences in Iraq and Afghanistan and other areas of significant interest 

globally? What could be done differently in terms of force structure, authorities and 

command structures? As the third USSOCOM Commander since 9/11, what will you 

do differently, and why? How do you define success in this war? 

Admiral OLSON. We have not been more productive in defeating al-Qaida (AQ) 

and Taliban influences in Iraq and Afghanistan and other areas of significant interest globally because we have not yet sufficiently met the challenge of effectively and 

efficiently implementing the indirect military actions required to defeat the global 

terrorist threat. The Department of Defense (DOD) needs to increase emphasis on 

the indirect approach at this time. Within this indirect approach, DOD should increase endeavors to enable our Partner Nations (PN) to help us further reshape the 

environment around our enemies to reduce their capacity and popular support. In 

addition, DOD needs to bolster its participation and contributions to the whole-ofgovernment effort, specifically with regard to a reinvigorated strategic communication campaign. 

From a strategic perspective, we need to prevent the emergence of new violent 

extremist threats, particularly those that pose strategic threats to the U.S. and our 

PNs. To date, we have demonstrated success in this endeavor. Yet, existing extrem-
90 

ist groups continue gaining support and now seek to align themselves with better 

known ‘‘brand names,’’ in an effort to increase their legitimacy among their current 

and likely constituency. The creation of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and al-Qaeda in 

Magreb (AQIM) are prime examples of this trend. Increasing our ability to support 

the development of capable governments in countries with at risk populations, and 

the development of a PN-focused network capable of delivering culturally effective 

messages that deter the emergence of new generations of extremist organizations, 

is vital to long term success in this venue. 

Meanwhile we have had mixed results in isolating threats to the regional or local 

levels, as many violent extremist organizations (VEO) remain as strategic threats. 

The outcome of the global effort to deprive terrorist organizations of the assets and 

resources needed to wage war over the long term has been limited. Unfortunately, 

DOD support to United States Government (USG) and PN actions has neither denied a sufficient number of extremists their access to funds nor their freedom to acquire resources and to recruit adherents and operatives in the global market place. 

On the other hand, DOD has been effective in defeating threats once they are isolated, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. VEOs, such as al-Qaeda, have felt the 

effects of DOD action manifested in significant losses and in precipitating their retreat to sanctuaries as opposed to openly operating among the populace. Yet as fast 

as we eliminate or capture enemy leaders and fighters, sufficient numbers of recruits and support flow into these organizations. This reality demonstrates the limitation of the direct approach—eliminating enemy combat elements which can be replaced is not enough to achieve long term victory. We must employ additional indirect actions to nullify the extremist networks’ strategic capability and capacity to 

generate and project power. 

Likewise, we must prevent the reconstitution of VEOs, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan. Success depends on the establishment of a PN network that refuses to 

support extremist organizations or to permit their populations to support terrorism. 

Many nations continue to develop counterterrorism (CT) capabilities. DOD, however, 

has been limited in its progress to enable PN CT programs. 

While DOD deems enabling PNs to combat VEOs as the decisive military effort 

in the ongoing struggle, a comprehensive and integrated strategic communication 

campaign is also critical to countering the appeal of the extremist ideology. DOD 

must continue working with the U.S. Government lead, the Department of State, 

to help develop and implement this program. Still, this effort is complicated by the 

likelihood that almost any publically revealed strategic communication effort linked 

to DOD will lack legitimacy in the eyes of many targeted populations. As such, DOD 

and the U.S. Government must also work with PNs to spread the anti-VEO message 

by amplifying moderate voices that speak out against terrorism. 

Finally, to sufficiently meet the global challenge of implementing those indirect 

military actions required to defeat the terrorist threat, DOD will most likely need 

to realign resources. Operations designed to remove our enemies’ freedom to act and 

move within vulnerable populations may require a more persistent application over 

several years. Due to the less tangible nature, the longer approach and the increased challenge of measuring success in these types of operations, patience will 

be required to reap success. 

This reality ties into what needs to be done differently in terms of force structure, 

authorities and command structures. A major obstacle that needs refinement, especially under the ‘‘irregular warfare’’ umbrella that includes counterterrorism, trainand-assist, stability and reconstruction operations, involves defining roles and missions. Though DOD is the lead in many irregular warfare activities, some of these 

activities, which would not be termed ‘‘warfare’’, are nested under the lead of other 

U.S. Government agencies, with DOD playing a supporting role. Therefore, as to 

roles and missions, we need to clearly define who’s going to do what; who’s going 

to have the lead to do what to include the prioritization in which these activities 

are going to occur and the regions in which they’re going to occur; and what access 

is required, to include access by host nations and our other U.S. Government agencies in order to perform military activities in areas we are not in current conflict 

and may not expect to be in conflict soon. These accesses will require policy decisions, permissions and authorities for military forces to conduct those kinds of activities. 

In the meantime, the continuation of our 1208 (now 1202) authorities for the next 

three years remains essential to fund the training and equipping of counterpart 

forces we are engaged with worldwide, including well away from Afghanistan and 

Iraq. I am also a strong supporter of the 1206 authorities that enable SOCOM to 

do much important work around the authorities and the building partner capacity 

act. 
91 

As USSOCOM Commander, it is evident that global demand for Special Operations Forces (SOF) exceeds supply, and I anticipate no decrease in demand even 

as some other U.S. forces eventually drawdown in Iraq. In fact, I expect an increasing demand for SOF as the local environments transition from a larger conventional 

force presence to smaller train and assist activities, especially considering the continuing deficit of special operations forces in non-U.S. Central Command geographic 

combatant commanders’ areas. 

Therefore, as a result of program decisions of the last few years, I am expanding 

the number of special operators as fast as the command can reasonably absorb the 

growth. In the long term, I estimate that three-to-five percent per year is about 

right for SOF military manpower growth. From an equipment standpoint, since 

much of the equipment used by SOF are initially provided by the Services and then 

modified to meet the peculiar operational demands of special operators, it is apparent that most of USSOCOM’s acquisition programs must be carefully synched with 

the Services. I am committed this year to exploring my options for making our acquisition systems more responsive. 

Finally, to address your question about defining success in this war, upfront I 

must admit I’m not convinced there’s ever going to be a day when we run up the 

victory flag. This is a different kind of an adversary, much more elusive, living and 

fighting among the people, and I don’t anticipate that it will lead to signing a document aboard the USS Missouri. Our success against al-Qaeda is manifested mostly 

in the growth of Iraqi and Afghan security forces, trained and equipped to be responsive to local and regional needs within those nations. Success is also a decrease 

in violent acts, which is a manifestation of a decrease in those who are planning 

every day to conduct those violent acts against us and our allies. Success, furthermore, is a dismantling of the infrastructure, of the funding lines and the training 

facilities that contribute to that and an interruption of the flow of weapons and materials that enable them to conduct those acts. Ultimately, the measure of success 

will be the degree to which those countries facing Islamic extremism can become 

secure and sovereign nations with self-determination and a functioning government 

enabled by a growing economy existing in a stable region. 

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, please explain the typical rotation cycles of SOF personnel deploying to the CENTCOM AOR and elsewhere. What challenges exist with 

respect to sustaining such a pace? Are these deployment cycles based on unit schedules, or those of individual personnel? How common is it for individual personnel 

to experience more frequent deployments? 

Admiral OLSON. Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel rotation cycles vary 

with unit type and mission. Typical rotation cycles for Operations ENDURING 

FREEDOM/IRAQI FREEDOM follow: 

U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) units: 7 months 

Naval Special Warfare (Sea, Air, and Land [SEAL] and Special Boat Units): 

6 months 

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) air crews and support: 3 

to 6 months 

Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) deployments: 6 months 

Active Civil Affairs deployments: 6 months 

Active Psychological Operations (PSYOP) deployments: 6 to 12 months 

U.S. Army Ranger deployments: 4 months 

SOF deployed to Theater Security Cooperation Events (Joint and Combined Exercises for Training, Counter Narco-terrorism, Mobile Training Teams, Exercises) typically vary from 2 weeks to 4 months. 

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, what SOF equipment and resources are experiencing 

the greatest ‘‘wear and tear’’? To what do you attribute this extraordinary aging? 

Do you have some thoughts on how to best address the situation? 

Admiral OLSON. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 

has been engaged in continuous and extensive combat operations since October 

2001. The rapid ‘‘wear and tear’’ of Special Operations Forces (SOF) equipment is 

attributed to the harsh environmental conditions, battle damage, high operational 

tempo, and the extended length of service that the equipment has been employed 

and deployed in. 

USSOCOM’s Rotary Wing (RW) fleet has experienced accelerated aging which can 

be attributed to several factors. SOF RW airframes are typically flown at higher 

gross weights and in tactical environments that require rapid and abrupt flight maneuvers to accomplish the missions. Flying hour operations tempo and deployment 

to extreme environments have also stressed the entire fleet. 
92 

USSOCOM is addressing the aging SOF RW fleet through aircraft retirements, 

modernization and service life extension programs, and increases to the aircraft inventory. Stable funding support for SOF RW aircraft modernization and service life 

extension programs are critical to the success of USSOCOM’s plan to address the 

aging SOF RW fleet and to keep it flying. 

SOF C–130 flying hours have nearly doubled since 2000 due to increased operations tempo. The nature of our SOF Fixed Wing (FW) mission and aircraft weight 

age SOF C–130 aircraft more rapidly than non-SOF C–130s. The average age of our 

SOF C–130s is more than 40 years old. Increased flying hours combined with the 

nature of the SOF mission have accelerated wear and tear on critical wing structural components. 

Increased global requirements for SOF have created a pressing need to recapitalize the older MC–130’s. In addition to this increased demand, future growth in 

the SOF force structure will likely require a corresponding increase in SOF mobility 

and close air support capabilities. 

USSOCOM Ground Mobility Vehicles are suffering extreme wear and tear due to 

extensive combat operations and new mission requirements, specifically, the additional weight of armor and increased payload. We have partially addressed the situation through engineering improvements, establishing a RESET facility in Kuwait, 

and are procuring heavy duty suspension systems. Moreover, injection of new vehicles, such as the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, has been of great assistance to USSOCOM and has already saved lives. 

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, please comment on the use and effectiveness of 12- 

man Operational Detachment-Alpha Teams (ODAs). How and where are they most 

effective? 

Admiral OLSON. The 12-man Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) 

Teams have proven to be one of the greatest force multipliers in history. While they 

are a lethal unit in and of themselves, capable of conducting direct action kinetic 

operations and strategic reconnaissance, they are most effective when they work by, 

with and through indigenous forces to defeat the enemy. Special Forces (SF) are 

trained as warriors and diplomats. U.S. Army SF team’s small size, coupled with 

their diverse capabilities emphasizes the demand for tact and professionalism when 

operating in the global environment. SF also develops and fosters a deeper understanding of the indigenous people due to the extremely close and on-going interaction with the local populations. 

SF ODAs are most effective in situations and locales where the strategic payoff 

for the U.S. Government is high, but the overt presence of U.S. forces must be kept 

to an absolute minimum. ODAs can operate clandestinely if required; their ability 

to train, equip, and if required employ indigenous forces in support of U.S. objectives in either the foreign internal defense or unconventional warfare role, under the 

most austere conditions, in the most remote locations in any environment, is their 

forte’. 

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, please comment on the cooperation and effectiveness 

of the SOF capabilities of our international partners? Is there room for improvement 

on either side of the relationship? 

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. SMITH. What is the best way to ensure appropriate, meaningful interagency 

participation in all phases of operational, contingency, and crisis action planning? 

What is your command doing? What successes have you achieved and what challenges have you identified? 

Admiral OLSON. The best way to ensure such interagency participation is exactly 

what we are doing now, i.e. continuing our established relationships and working 

our plans that revolve around five direct and indirect lines of operation. Initiatives 

such as the Global Synchronization Conference and Interagency Partnership Program establish the daily interaction and interagency participation in our major 

planning events. This strategic work forms the foundation for gaining success during contingency and crisis action planning. 

Our Interagency Task Forces are examples of success in ensuring appropriate, 

meaningful participation in all phases of an action. Our Time Sensitive Planning 

Process (TSP) incorporates interagency participation from the very start of a crisis, 

even at 2:00 am. 

Despite our advances, there is still a challenge in overcoming the bureaucratic inertia to institutionalize lasting change. We may have to accept in the short term 

that some will view current solutions and initiatives as temporary and will try to 

resist any permanent change. I believe needed change will be established slowly and 

patiently over many years, but once done, will be the new ‘‘normal.’’ As you are 

aware, rushing this process is counterproductive, goes against human nature, and 
93 

often causes even more resistance. We are proud to be part of this patient but consistent work to establish meaningful interagency participation. 

Mr. SMITH. The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept identifies eight key 

risks and associated mitigation strategies. One is that the United States government might not develop the interagency integration mechanisms necessary to 

achieve unity of effort at every level. The JOC directs DOD to conduct concept development and experimentation focused on improving interagency integration. What 

actions has the Department of Defense taken to address the need for interagency 

integration mechanisms? 

Admiral OLSON. The Department of Defense continues to integrate the interagency into their processes, but recommend the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

provide definitive information on their actions. At the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), consistent with our authorities under the Unified Command 

Plan and CONPLAN 7500, we have established a standing Interagency Task Force 

(IATF) with USSOCOM members and representatives from 12 interagency partners. 

Additionally, USSOCOM has established the Global Synchronization process which 

brings together over 400 participants among the Interagency, Geographical Combatant Commands and DOD, Service Staffs and defense agencies to integrate GWOT 

efforts. Both of USSOCOM actions are in concert with DOD efforts to support 

NSPD–44 and the new Interagency Management System. 

Mr. SMITH. Please describe the role of Special Forces in fighting Irregular Warfare. Do you perceive a need to enhance interagency coordination for IW at the operational and tactical levels? If so, what type of organizational framework do you 

think would work best? According to the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 

in the future, Irregular Warfare campaigns will increasingly require military general purpose forces to perform missions that in the last few decades have been 

viewed primarily as Special Operation Forces (SOF) activities. How might this 

change the future mission of SOF? 

Admiral OLSON. At the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), we pursue two mutually supporting approaches—direct and indirect. These approaches integrate the requirement to immediately disrupt violent extremist organizations 

while positively impacting the environment in which they operate. 

The direct approach addresses the need to counter the immediate aggression 

caused by an adversary, while the indirect approach addresses the underlying 

causes of terrorism and the relevant population in which terrorism gains its legitimacy, and while this approach requires more time to achieve affects ultimately, will 

be the decisive effort. 

At the operational and tactical level USSOCOM has been successful at integrating 

the interagency through the use of Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) and extensive use of Liaison Officers. While the JIATF framework is effective it is important to maintain some degree of flexibility as we task organize for a specific operation. For broader IW engagement, the Capability Based Assessment (CBA) process 

is still developing nascent initiatives like the TMAAG concept that will help to inform this process. 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) will not change its core tasks or mission focus, 

however the increased use of general purpose forces in the broader Irregular Warfare environment will allow for greater DOD engagement opportunities and focus 

SOF on the most appropriate missions. 

Mr. SMITH. The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept proposes three alternatives for further development and experimentation that would provide models to 

coordinate interagency command and control: (1) extending the Joint Interagency 

Task Force (JIATF) to irregular warfare; (2) establishing IA Advisory Assistance 

Teams at sub-national levels of government; and (3) expanding the use of U.S. Military Groups (MILGRPs) to conduct and support IW. Can you explain the pros and 

cons of each approach? 

Admiral OLSON. The potential approaches identified in the Irregular Warfare IW 

JOC are being explored as part of the concept development and experimentation 

currently underway by the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Joint 

Forces Command and a number of other agencies. Some thoughts are expressed 

below however a thorough analysis has yet to be completed. 

The Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) Model has proved to be a valuable command and control mechanism for integrating civil-military operations in operational 

areas, but have been historically a short term military led organization. JIATF’s operate under the operational control of the Geographic Combatant Commander and 

are by definition not part of the U.S. Mission (Embassy), therefore not part of the 

Country team which could lead to sub-optimization and over-militarization of the 

‘‘whole-of-government’’ approach to solving or managing the political problem in 

question. 
94 

The IA Advisory Assistance Teams at the sub-national levels of government have 

proven to be successful, but more recent Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in 

Iraq have been challenged because of insufficient numbers of them, being asked to 

do too much, inadequate civilian manning, inadequate efforts to integrate them, and 

a relatively lower priority than combat units. 

The expanded MILGRP Model could be a long term solution and organic to the 

U.S. Mission, fully integrated into the Country Team, and much more likely to subordinate its military activities to the broader ‘‘whole-of-government’’ approach led by 

the Chief of Mission. Although a permanent organization would solidify relationships and allow for continuous oversight more effectively, it would require additional 

infrastructure and manning to execute. This model will also likely have to function 

under constraints imposed by both the host nation and our own Country Team. 

Mr. SMITH. Please describe SOCOM’s Interagency Task Force. How does it relate 

to the J–10, which you direct? How does the J–10 interact with SOCOM’s Global 

Synchronization Division, which works with the National Counterterrorism Center 

in the war on terror? 

Admiral OLSON. The Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) serves as a coordinating activity within the Department of Defense (DOD) and across the Inter-Agency (IA). 

The goal is to be a reliable and connected entity that is able to integrate IA efforts 

while solving discrete problem sets that support the global war on terror (GWOT). 

The IATF has developed priorities and focus areas that support US Special Operations Command Center for Special Operations (CSO) and its GWOT synchronization responsibilities. The focus areas were developed through a combination of top 

down guidance, bottom up and horizontal thinking. 

The IATF is functionally organized among two major focus areas and several enduring tasks. Major focus area efforts are combating the foreign terrorist network 

(FTN) and expanding USG document and media exploitation (DOMEX) capacity. 

The IATF’s enduring tasks include counter narco-terrorism, threat finance, persistent surveillance requirements, counterterrorism research and analysis, information operations, support to the inter-agency partnership program (IAPP), and timesensitive planning. 

The IATF is collaborative and always uses an IA approach to solving problems. 

The collaborative nature of problem solving ensures any issues raised are already 

being staffed while the IATF is working the problem. The IATF also leverages other 

knowledge centers for their analysis and input. The IATF embraces competitive 

analysis, as long as it remains focused on solving the problem. Knowledge is the key 

component of synchronization. 

The current organization of the IATF includes a mix of USSOCOM operators and 

intelligence professionals, as well as IA and DOD partners numbering 102 military, 

civilian and contractor personnel. IA personnel include members of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Department of Treasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and the Drug Enforcement Agency. Additionally, the 

IATF has personnel embedded from several DOD agencies, including the Defense 

Intelligence Agency, the Joint Intelligence Task Force—Combating Terrorism, the 

Naval Oceanographic Office, the National Security Agency, and the National 

Geospatial Intelligence Agency. 

The IATF deals with operations, actions, and activities (OAA) across all 7500-series operation and concept plans’ lines of operations (LOO), including those activities 

that fall within the realm of irregular warfare. 

Mr. SMITH. What role has SOCOM played in implementation of National Security 

Presidential Decision (NSPD)–44, given its prepotency for the civil affairs mission? 

Admiral OLSON. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is unique 

amongst the Combatant Commanders in that we do not own battlespace. As a force 

provider, we support the Geographic Combatant Commander’s theater specific plans 

and operations with uniquely trained and equipped Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

forces, including active duty Civil Affairs (CA). 

As the Department of Defense proponent for CA, USSOCOM continues to develop 

stability operations-capable CA forces through individual, unit, and institutional 

training of CA core tasks which are fundamental to stability operations. The U.S. 

Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina, have also incorporated stability, security, transition, and reconstruction 

operations (SSTRO) training blocks into their curricula. USSOCOM continues participation and coordination with the U.S. Joint Forces Command J9 efforts pertaining to stability operations, joint concept development and experimentation, and 

supports Unified Action experiments and war games. 

USSOCOM has incorporated stability operations into the most recent revision of 

Joint Publication 3–57, Civil-Military Operations, which consolidates the previous 

Joint Publications for Civil Affairs and Civil-Military Operations. 
95 

Mr. SMITH. Please describe the nature of SOCOM’s ‘‘global synchronization’’ mission and identify the existing metrics for determining its successful execution. What 

exactly is the focus of SOCOM in this synchronization effort? Do the al Qaeda Execution Order (AQN EXORD) and/or the ‘‘7500’’ Concept Plan (CONPLAN) guide this 

effort? If so, then how? 

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. SMITH. Has SOCOM conducted a strategic assessment of radical Islamic 

media-related and education-related penetrations of DOD or related U.S. Government organizations and critical institutions? If not, is SOCOM familiar with any 

U.S. Government strategic assessment in these areas? 

Admiral OLSON. The answer is ‘‘no’’ on both accounts. 

Mr. SMITH. Has SOCOM conducted a strategic assessment of extremist-Islamic 

threat doctrines in order to define possible enemy course of action (COA)? 

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. SMITH. How precisely does SOCOM’s present strategy and approach consider 

the theological underpinnings of Islamic extremism? 

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. SMITH. How would SOCOM propose to revise the AQN EXORD if directed by 

the Secretary of Defense? What revisions should be considered and why? 

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. SMITH. How is SOCOM coordinating with the law enforcement and intelligence communities to conduct the GWOT, especially in the CENTCOM area of operations (AOR)? What approaches are most fruitful? What are the greatest challenges and limitations? What is the role of INTERPOL? What is the role of local 

indigenous law enforcement personnel and resources? How do these efforts differ in 

mainly high-intensity ‘‘direct action’’ environments from more low-intensity or ‘‘indirect action’’ environments? 

Admiral OLSON. Part 1. The SOCOM Interagency Task Force (IATF) coordinates 

and collaborates with the law enforcement community via department and agency 

LNOs that exist in the IATF and Special Operations Support Team (SOST) military 

personnel that reside within the respective agencies. Specifically there is one LNO 

each from the FBI, DEA, and Treasury within the IATF. When projects or issues 

are identified, the IATF, via agency LNOs and SOST personnel reach back to their 

respective organization and tie into the appropriate sub-directorate. IRT the 

CENTCOM AOR there exist no special framework. Close coordination among agency 

LNOs, SOST personnel, SOCOM IATF and CENTCOM action officers exists via the 

CENTCOM IATF–IW. These relationships are matured via close working relationships and daily/weekly battle rhythm events in which we regularly share effort and 

information. 

Part 2. Approaches most fruitful are as described above. Our ability to include as 

many LEA into the GWOT community interest, and focus them on a specific problem set will enable IATF to serve as a connecting and synchronizing entity for 

SOCOM–CSO. 

Part 3. One of the most significant challenges is the ability to translate intelligence and information acquired from the battlefield and declassify in an expeditious manner so that it can be used in either USG law enforcement cases or in within Partner Nation (PN) jurisprudence/law enforcement framework. 

Part 4. Interpol is an important organization in which there is much dialog among 

DOD, DOJ and OGA. From the IATF perspective we are looking at ways in which 

we can enable Interpol action via information sharing. Information sharing and the 

declassification issue continue to be a significant challenge within the DOD intelligence community. 

Part 5. IRT IATF interface with the Law Enforcement community, local indigenous personnel should be a consideration as we look to build PN capacity as well 

as achieving USG and PN goals by, with, and through the partner nation. 

Part 6. It is difficult to answer this question without knowing specific situational 

factors. The reply to Part 5 above accurately reflects that PN law enforcement personnel and resources are a critical tool/mechanism in which we build partner capacity, enhance PN legitimacy, and execute and achieve both USG and respective nation goals and objectives. 

Mr. SMITH. How might the proposed organizational change in the respective Military Group (MILGROUP) structure affect SOCOM activities in affected AORs? 

Admiral OLSON. USSOCOM is currently assessing the Military Liaison Element 

(MLE) program in direct coordination with each Geographic Combatant Command 
96 

and Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC). LTG David P. Fridovich, Director, Center for Special Operations provided general guidance to TSOC Commanders 

on an MLE roadmap, and in kind received point papers from each Commander. The 

topic was also highlighted at the Sixth Annual Global Synchronization Conference 

(GSC) hosted by USSOCOM from 14—18 April 2008, and will be raised at the 25 

April 2008 GSC Senior Executive Session. Finally, USSOCOM is establishing a 

process by which to assess the total SOF requirements for High Priority and Priority Countries of each GCC; this process will inform each iteration of the MLE review. 

Mr. SMITH. Please identify the resources inherent in the Center for Special Operations responsible for mission support to Unconventional Warfare (UW) long term 

persistent operations as opposed to time-sensitive planning. How are these resources positioned and organized to support each respective AOR as identified in the 

global synchronization mission? 

Admiral OLSON. The intent of long-term persistent operations is to develop capabilities to conduct UW, as authorized, and provide potential capabilities and mechanisms to directly support time sensitive operations conducted as part of Time Sensitive Planning (TSP). Within the CSO (one of six Centers within USSOCOM), J3X 

Special Activities is comprised of global and regional UW desks aligned with their 

respective Global Combatant Commands (GCC) and Theater Special Operations 

Commands (TSOC). This office also provides requisite information and visibility into 

which UW capabilities and mechanisms currently exist in each Area of Operation 

to inform, support or complement operational and/or tactical commanders conducting TSP. 

USSOCOM J3 provides oversight, funding management, manpower resourcing 

and equipping to long-term global Unconventional Warfare/Operational Preparation 

of the Environment (UW/OPE) and coordinates these long-term planning efforts 

with the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC). USSOCOM also prioritizes the 

global distribution of SOF’s long-term resourcing and equipping in each GCC, and 

is currently supporting these operational activities in numerous countries with the 

requisite funding and equipment forward-deployed and distributed through respective Theater Special Operations Commands. 

Mr. SMITH. What is the mission of SOCOM’s new J10, the Irregular Warfare effort? 

Admiral OLSON. The mission of the J10, Irregular Warfare (IW) Directorate, is to 

coordinate the concept implementation, strategy development, and plans integration 

of irregular warfare applications within a collaborative network of Department of 

Defense (DOD) and Interagency (IA) organizations to facilitate and support U.S. national objectives. By Direction of the USSOCOM Commander, the Directorate was 

established 15 June 2007 to maintain the momentum of IW inititatives, synchronize 

IW efforts with the DOD and IA, and serve as the IW Office of Primary Responsibility for the Command. 

Mr. SMITH. SOCOM’s plan to increase the number of Special Forces (SF) Battalions is based in part on a reduction in the size of the SF Squad. Does the planned 

reduction from 9-man to 7-man squads reflect a change in the warfighting requirement facing small units? If so, how? How does SOCOM envision the smaller squads 

to maintain a level of self-sufficiency, especially after experiencing casualties? 

Admiral OLSON. No change has been made to the size of the Special Forces (SF) 

Operational Detachment Alpha’s (ODA) [SF ODA] or to the size of our SF Battalions. We are in the process of adding an SF Battalion to each of our Special Forces 

Groups. 

Within the Companies assigned to each Ranger Battalion in the 75th Ranger 

Regiment, an operational decision was made to reduce the size of a Squad from nine 

to seven men. This restructuring was accomplished after an assessment of operational employment tactics in Afghanistan and Iraq. Associated with this change in 

the size of a Squad, was a task/organization decision to add a Company to each 

Ranger Battalion. While this overall task/organization restructuring is currently 

being executed in FY08, we continue our assessment of on-going combat operations, 

and may continue to adjust our Modified Table of Organization and Equipment 

(MTOE) to best ensure battlefield success. 

Mr. SMITH. What benefit and support is SOCOM receiving from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) and its ‘‘Attack the Network’’ 

efforts? Please provide examples. 

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 
97 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY 

Mr. THORNBERRY. General, we had an issue in this subcommittee last year about 

the civil support teams (CST) and how many we needed where. I have a chart in 

front of me that describes some of the different organizations that are being created, 

and, frankly, I am a little concerned that there are lots of people who say, ‘‘This 

is what we do,’’ and there is a lot of overlap and so forth that is a little confusing 

to me. 

In addition to civil support teams, there apparently are joint National Guard 

(CBRNE) enhanced response force packages, and there are Chemical-Biological Incident Response Forces, and there are CBRNE Consequent Management Response 

Force. 

I am not exactly clear what everybody does. I want you to reassure me that there 

are clear lanes in the road, and everybody is not coming to the taxpayer for money 

to do the same thing. If you don’t mind, if you could get your folks to provide us, 

what you have started to do, a description and who the traffic cop is. Who says this 

is an assessment team versus and then going down. 

General RENUART. The National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) detect and identify CBRNE agents/substances, assess and 

advise the local authorities on managing the effects of the attack, and assist with 

requests for other forces (i.e. CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages 

(CERFPs)). They are a 22-person response unit located in each state and territory 

(55 total, 53 of which are certified) that performs an initial assessment of a CBRNE 

incident. These units are full time, congressionally authorized, federally funded, and 

fall under the command and control of the governor. 

CERFPs locate and extract victims from a contaminated environment, perform 

medical triage and treatment, and perform mass patient/casualty decontamination. 

Each of these units is a task force of between 200 and 400 personnel, composed of 

an Army battalion or Air Force equivalent C2 element, an Air National Guard Medical Flight, an Army Chemical Company (-) and an Army Engineer Company (-). The 

17 CERFPs are congressionally authorized, traditional Guard only, with 4-5 full 

time personnel per unit, and are located regionally to provide additional support to 

the WMD–CSTs and the state government. They are capable of decontaminating, 

performing medical triage, and stabilizing 75 non-ambulatory and 225 ambulatory 

personnel per hour. The WMD–CSTs and CERFPs support the local and state response to an incident and are not under the command and control of 

USNORTHCOM. 

A CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) provides the DOD 

capability to support the federal response to a request for assistance from a state. 

CCMRFs consist of roughly 4,000 people in three force packages that are able to 

respond to a domestic catastrophic CBRNE event. This force is pre-identified from 

within existing DOD force structure and may include the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force. CCMRFs operate under Operational Control of the Commander, USNORTHCOM. 

The following outlines the capabilities of the three force packages with additional 

follow-on forces identified as required: 

• Force Package #1 capabilities: Initial C2, Command Assessment Teams, 

Initial Response Force (Medical, Logistics, Extraction) 

• Force Package #2 capabilities: Medical, Decontamination, C2, Transportation and Logistics, Security, Public Affairs 

• Force Package #3 capabilities: C2, Transportation, Logistical Support, 

Mortuary Affairs 

• Follow-on Forces: Additional C2, Transportation, Logistics 

Æ