DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina Chairman 

JOSE ́ E. SERRANO, New York 

CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas 

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

SAM FARR, California 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

KEN CALVERT, California 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

STEPHANIE GUPTA, JEFF ASHFORD, SHALANDA YOUNG, 

JIM HOLM, WILL PAINTER, and ADAM WILSON, 

Staff Assistants 

PART 4 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Page 

Disaster Response: Is FEMA up to the Challenge? ......... 1 

Interoperable Communications ........................................... 277 

Secret Service Protective Missions and Inaugural 

Security .................................................................................. 431 

Cargo and Container Security Keeping a lid on 

Threats .................................................................................... 595 

U.S. Coast Guard: Measuring Mission Needs ................... 769 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 


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PART 4—DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010 


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina Chairman 

JOSE ́ E. SERRANO, New York 

CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas 

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

SAM FARR, California 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

KEN CALVERT, California 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

STEPHANIE GUPTA, JEFF ASHFORD, SHALANDA YOUNG, 

JIM HOLM, WILL PAINTER, and ADAM WILSON, 

Staff Assistants 

PART 4 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Page 

Disaster Response: Is FEMA up to the Challenge? ......... 1 

Interoperable Communications ........................................... 277 

Secret Service Protective Missions and Inaugural 

Security .................................................................................. 431 

Cargo and Container Security Keeping a lid on 

Threats .................................................................................... 595 

U.S. Coast Guard: Measuring Mission Needs ................... 769 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

52–213 WASHINGTON : 2009 


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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

JOSE ́ E. SERRANO, New York 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts 

ED PASTOR, Arizona 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

SAM FARR, California 

JESSE L. JACKSON, JR., Illinois 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

ADAM SCHIFF, California 

MICHAEL HONDA, California 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

JERRY LEWIS, California 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New 

Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

ZACH WAMP, Tennessee 

TOM LATHAM, Iowa 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

KEN CALVERT, California 

JO BONNER, Alabama 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

BEVERLY PHETO, Clerk and Staff Director 

(II)


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(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2009. 

DISASTER RESPONSE: IS FEMA UP TO THE CHALLENGE? 

WITNESSES 

DAVID GARRATT, ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, FEMA 

EDWARD TONINI, ADJUTANT GENERAL, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY 

Mr. PRICE. The Subcommittee will come to order. Good morning. 

Welcome to the first hearing of the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, House Committee on Appropriations for the 111th Congress. 

Our topic today is Disaster Response: Is FEMA Up to the Challenge? Today’s hearing will probe FEMA’s current level of preparedness for disaster response, assess its performance in recent 

disasters, and hopefully arrive at some of the ways that we can 

work to make FEMA even stronger as we go forward. 

I want to welcome all of our Subcommittee members, new and 

old, and especially welcome back Congressman Hal Rogers as our 

Ranking Member. Hal, as everyone knows, was the founding Chairman of this Subcommittee, and led it with distinction for 4 years. 

And fortunately, he has earned his caucus’s approval—I think that 

is the way to put it—to remain with us as Ranking Member. 

Today our witnesses are Dave Garratt, FEMA’s Acting Deputy 

Administrator, and Adjutant General Edward Tonini from the 

Commonwealth of Kentucky. I appreciate your participation in this 

hearing. I especially want to thank General Tonini for coming, 

given that Kentucky was recently hit by devastating ice storms. We 

asked several other States who had experienced a variety of disasters to participate in this hearing to give us a broad perspective on 

how FEMA is doing, but in a couple of key cases budget constraints 

at the local level prevented their attendance. 

Is FEMA up to the challenge? It is unfortunate that we have to 

ask that question, given that FEMA was once an agency heralded 

by State and local emergency managers as a model of agility and 

responsiveness. In the 1990s, when disaster victims laid eyes on 

those blue jackets with ‘‘FEMA’’ on the back, that meant the cavalry had arrived. But Hurricane Katrina and the confusion created 

by multiple reorganizations, beginning when DHS was formed, left 

us with an agency whose pieces had to be put back together, and 

our purpose here this morning, to put it briefly, is to assess the 

progress that we are making as we bring FEMA back to full 

strength. 


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How are we to know when we succeeded in bringing the Agency 

to full strength? Last year I stressed over and over to the previous 

Administrator that FEMA was going to have to evaluate and measure its progress. We cannot wait until the next disaster to determine FEMA’s capabilities. So, Mr. Garratt, I look forward to your 

highlighting what progress FEMA has made since Hurricane 

Katrina and how you are evaluating the Agency’s ability to respond 

to current and future disasters. We are interested in the benchmarks, the kind of progress that you have made, and your honest 

opinion about where more progress needs to be made. 

The Federal Government should be held to the same standard as 

our States. Through our various State and local programs, we ask 

them to justify and evaluate how Federal investments have made 

them more prepared to respond. So we expect FEMA should do the 

same when it comes to its congressional appropriations. 

FEMA has been the recipient of healthy increases during the 

past 2 years. For example, FEMA’s management budget has increased by 79 percent, from $526 million in fiscal 2007 to $943 million in fiscal 2009. And as I said last year, with that funding comes 

expectations. We expect a FEMA that can provide commodities and 

generators quickly after a disaster. We expect a FEMA that respects the States’ lead role in disaster response, but that can step 

in when States are overwhelmed. We expect a FEMA that has established relationships with State officials prior to a disaster, and 

thereby can coordinate in the most seamless way possible when 

people’s lives and property are on the line. 

I want to stress that last point. Disaster response is a business 

that is driven by customer service and good, productive relationships. FEMA must know its partners prior to the disaster. We cannot afford to have the team meet on the field on game day. The 

Agency has to know the strengths and weaknesses of each State 

and anticipate where Federal assistance will be needed. So FEMA 

has to do what it can to rebuild those State and local relationships 

and empower its regional offices to make critical decisions. 

In 2008, FEMA declared 75 major disasters, 17 emergencies, and 

51 fire emergencies. Those disasters occurred in 39 States and 2 

territories, with many having multiple declarations. There seems to 

be no signs of slowing down. The recent ice storms have resulted 

in major disaster declarations for the States of Kentucky, Arkansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. 

When responding to the recent disasters, FEMA not only had to 

ensure that generators were in place, but they also had to ensure 

that contaminated peanut butter was not in the food given to victims. That is one example of the unknowns the Agency must be 

nimble enough to react to. 

So today we are looking to our witnesses to help us measure 

where FEMA is and to answer the essential question: Is the Agency up to the challenge of its mission? Also we are looking to our 

witnesses this morning to clear up any misconceptions that might 

be out there regarding FEMA’s role, and to elaborate on the States’ 

roles and responsibilities in disaster response. So we look forward 

to an interesting and healthy exchange. 

In a moment we will begin with Mr. Garratt, followed by General 

Tonini. We ask that you summarize your written testimony, and it 


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will be entered in full into the record. And that will limit your oral 

statements to 5 or 6 minutes. 

But before we turn to you, I want to turn to our Ranking Member Mr. Rogers for any statement he wishes to make. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for the 

nice words of ‘‘welcome back’’ onto the Subcommittee. I am thrilled 

about that. As you know, our caucus has a 6-year term limit on 

serving as Chairman or Ranking Member, but I was fortunate 

enough that they saw fit to give me a waiver so that I could continue to work on this Subcommittee. I could have chosen any number of other Ranking slots on the Committee, but this is the one 

I like, and it has sort of got into my pores. And as you have said, 

we started off this Subcommittee, and I have a longtime investment in its success. 

And, I enjoy working with you, Mr. Chairman. You are carrying 

on the tradition, I think, that is necessary in homeland security, 

and that is to be nonpartisan, bipartisan, and see things through 

a clear eye. And I appreciate your cooperation with me. 

I want to welcome our distinguished guests. It was a little over 

3 years ago that FEMA was literally on life support. In the wake 

of Hurricane Katrina, words like broken, dysfunctional, mismanaged all were used to describe what is supposed to be our Nation’s preeminent preparedness and emergency management agency. But now FEMA is undergoing a major recapitalization. Congress has directed improvement through the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act. It also has given the Agency significant means 

by a way of an influx of robust appropriations. Now it is up to the 

men and women of FEMA, as well as the Agency’s new, yet presently unnamed, management to make resurrection a reality. 

We are seeing hints of progress, even in the face of disasters as 

destructive as Hurricane Ike and as challenging as the recent winter storms that devastated parts of Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee, 

and Kentucky; positive signs for sure, but also sobering reminders 

that our Nation is constantly under the threat of natural disasters 

as well as terrorism. And so that brings us to this hearing, which 

poses the question of whether FEMA is up to the challenge. A fair 

question perhaps, but one that may overlook what I have come to 

believe is the most important and fundamental problem confronting FEMA: a persistent lack of understanding of the roles and 

responsibilities of the Federal, State, and local officials when it 

comes to disaster response. 

The country does not yet understand what the division of labor 

is between Federal, State, local, I do not believe. At a FEMA hearing last year, the former Administrator of FEMA, Chief Paulison, 

responded to a series of questions that I asked on this very subject 

by making the following three assertions, and I am quoting him: 

All response is local. It is the local responsibility to handle a disaster. And it all boils down to the local community managing a disaster, end of quote. 

So as we discuss whether FEMA is up to the challenge, I think 

it is paramount that we also discuss whether States and localities 

have the essential minimum capabilities to carry out their preparedness responsibilities. The division of labor for disaster response is not new, and I am sure we are all aware of the Federal 

Government’s role in truly catastrophic disasters. But the postKatrina delineation of roles and responsibilities for response were 

modernized 1 year ago in FEMA’s National Response Framework. 

This doctrine makes clear that while effective emergency manageVerDate Nov 24 2008 02:52 Oct 22, 2009 Jkt 052213 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\52213P2.XXX 52213P2

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ment is a shared responsibility across all levels of government, the 

function of actually responding to incidents, both natural and manmade, begins at the local level. And so today what we need to understand is how FEMA is meeting its share of the disaster response workload, as well as working with the States and localities 

to help them address the gaps in their response capabilities. 

To help us answer these questions, we have before us an experienced, battle-hardened State emergency manager who is in the 

midst of recovery operations from this month’s fierce winter ice 

storms in Kentucky in General Tonini, the Adjutant General of our 

Commonwealth. And I am especially thankful for the general giving us some of his valuable time and wisdom to answer these questions. And fortunately, the State had enough gasoline to fly him 

here. Most States refused because they did not have travel expenses. That is an amazing, amazing situation to be in. Nevertheless, we are here. 

So, General, we sincerely appreciate your being here today. We 

look forward to hearing your candid comments on your work with 

FEMA, and especially in your last exposure to the disaster in Kentucky, which frankly is still ongoing. 

And to Mr. Garratt, I can assure you, sir, that no one wants to 

see FEMA succeed more than the members of this Subcommittee. 

We are your partners in the efforts to support a more capable, 

more effective FEMA. We invest in your work, and therefore we 

want it to succeed. And we thank you for being here today. We look 

forward to your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Garratt, please proceed. 

Mr. GARRATT. Chairman Price, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished members of this Subcommittee, in the interests of allowing 

as much time as possible for discussion and questions, I am satisfied to enter my statement into the record and defer to my colleague, General Tonini. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, that is the most brilliant opening 

statement I have ever heard. 

Mr. PRICE. All right. We will simply anticipate your elaborating 

your thoughts in response to questions. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. PRICE. General Tonini. 

General TONINI. Chairman Price, Ranking Members Rogers, 

members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of Governor Steve 

Beshear, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today 

to address disaster response and the recent ice storms in Kentucky. 

As the Adjutant General of Kentucky, I lead more than 8,500 

Army and Air National Guard members who serve the Commonwealth of Kentucky and this Nation. I also have the responsibility 

for management and oversight of the Kentucky Division of Emergency Management. 

As you know, during the Kentucky ice storms, Governor Beshear 

made extensive use of the Kentucky National Guard to provide a 

spearhead for life-saving missions and to assist in the cleanup and 

relief efforts after an incredibly destructive ice storm. I am here to 

give you a brief overview of those operations, make some recommendations for the future, and to answer your questions. I have 

submitted in writing a more detailed summary for your review. 

The winter storm that moved across the Commonwealth of Kentucky produced the most catastrophic natural disaster since the 

New Madrid earthquake that occurred in December 1811 to February 1812. The January storm persisted for more than 24 hours, 

first freezing rain, followed by snow, then more freezing rain and 

more snow. The unique blend of ice, snow, and strong winds produced scenes that were stunningly beautiful and massively destructive. Vehicles, homes, trees and power lines, everything exposed to 

the outdoors were thickly coated with more than an inch of ice, and 

in some cases as many as 3 inches. 

The effect was immediate. The entire western half of Kentucky 

was effectively paralyzed. The weight of the ice on power lines collapsed steel utility towers carrying major transmission lines, and 

caused miles of wooden utility poles to snap like toothpicks under 

heavy pressure. Virtually every tree of any significant size lost 

multiple branches, and hundreds of thousands of them toppled onto 

trees and residential utility lines, blocking most roads. More than 

769,000 Kentucky households were without power. That number 

represents 36 percent of all the electrical customers in the Commonwealth. 

In much of the State we lost the means to communicate. In the 

hardest-hit areas of western Kentucky, all landlines, microwave, 

cellular, and emergency communications were out of service. In 

many cases the total extent of our emergency eyes and ears were 

a couple of satellite radios and a few ham operators operating on 

batteries. Without power, municipal water plants could no longer 

provide water to more than a quarter of a million customers. That 

included water for fire protection as well. 

Primary and secondary roads were impassable; 102 of Kentucky’s 

120 counties and 87 cities declared states of emergency. That represents a land mass that stretches east to west 387 miles and more 

than 100 miles north to south. And because of the storm, at least 

36 Kentuckians lost their lives, most from fighting the extreme cold 

weather, and through hypothermia, carbon monoxide asphyxiation 

from improper ventilation of makeshift home heating. 

In contrast to hurricanes striking the coastal United States, this 

was a no-notice event, affecting a wide geographic area, and requirVerDate Nov 24 2008 02:52 Oct 22, 2009 Jkt 052213 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\52213P2.XXX 52213P2

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ing massively parallel response. Fortunately for us, just last March 

we rehearsed our plans in dealing with a catastrophic earthquake 

along the New Madrid fault in western Kentucky. It essentially, in 

military operational terms, served as a rehearsal of a battle on the 

ground we would fight on during the ice storm of 2009. 

In keeping with our New Madrid Response Plan, Kentucky State 

Emergency Operations Center was immediately brought to full 

strength, with representatives of all State agencies. Simultaneously, 1,600 members of the Kentucky National Guard, the soldiers of our Rapid Response Force, were dispatched to the hardesthit areas to begin assessing local authorities with rescue operations. This all was within the context of very, very limited communications from the field. 

We knew it was bad. As it turns out, we had no idea how bad. 

In retrospect, our initial reaction was typical of any emergency response force, measured and somewhat tempered. Kentucky’s Division of Emergency Management began an immediate dialogue with 

FEMA for delivery of food, water, and generators to Fort Campbell 

for distribution to two National Guard logistics support areas and 

regional points of distribution. Governor Beshear and I, along with 

other Cabinet secretaries and FEMA’s FCO, flew to the area for a 

firsthand look at the magnitude of the problem and to meet with 

local officials from the region to assess their immediate needs. 

Recognizing the situation required immediate action, on January 

27th Governor Beshear declared a state of emergency, followed by 

the unprecedented activation of all available Kentucky National 

Guard units, along with selected portions of the Air National 

Guard. Within hours of initially notifying the White House, President Obama issued an emergency declaration, and contact with 

FEMA and Homeland Security occurred immediately, in the early 

morning hours just after the storm exited eastern Kentucky. 

In a statement to the media, Governor Beshear set forth the 

guiding philosophy for everything that followed, that, quote, ‘‘the 

primary responsibility of government is the protection of its citizens. We are going to do whatever is necessary to fulfill that solemn obligation, regardless of the cost.’’ 

The Governor’s orders placed an additional 3,000 National Guard 

soldiers and airmen into the effort to address the needs of the people of the Commonwealth. In all, 4,600 National Guard men and 

women were mobilized. This was the largest State call-up of Kentucky National Guard forces in the history of the Commonwealth. 

It represented the strongest possible effort to relieve human suffering and to ensure the safety and well-being of our citizens. It 

was absolutely the right thing to do. 

After the rapid response force moved into the most affected areas 

and could provide situational awareness, in concert with emergency 

management officials, the Kentucky Joint Force Headquarters organized itself for life-saving and life-sustaining operations. Our 

most significant enemy was the cold. The temperature was hovering between zero and 20 degrees, with wind chill making the situation very dangerous. Without communications and without electricity, a huge portion of the Kentucky population was placed in 

imminent danger. 


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National Guard troops cleared routes for emergency response vehicles as well as to help utility crews gain access to damaged power 

transmission lines. They established shelters and points of distribution for supplies provided by FEMA, and used helicopters to 

conduct overflights to determine which roads were impassable and 

identify damaged power transmission lines for our utility companies. 

Through emergency management assistance, through EMAC, National Guard personnel and equipment from Florida, Indiana, Tennessee, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Virginia flowed into Kentucky, bringing vehicles, engineer equipment, and satellite communications capability to assist us with this emergency. And in an expanded mission for the Kentucky National Guard, troops teamed with emergency management agencies, fire departments, rescue squads, and 

law enforcement to conduct wellness checks for all households in 

the affected counties, literally knocking on hundreds of thousands 

of homes. 

In a parallel operation, Kentucky’s Division of Emergency Management immediately set up regional EOCs with power and satellite communications, established or reestablished emergency communications, and provided direct support to AT&T, the primary cell 

phone service in the area, to get power back up to the cell towers. 

We created a Wal-Mart-style hub-and-spoke distribution in 72 

hours to expedite the flow of emergency resources where they were 

needed most. During the disaster, more than 1.3 million meals and 

more than 2.1 million bottles of bottled water were distributed to 

those in need. And once communications were back up, Kentucky 

Emergency Management established a statewide situational awareness, with all 120 counties reporting twice a day every day for the 

duration of the emergency. 

An immediate priority was placed on the restoration of electric 

power to water plants, communications facilities, shelters, and 

nursing homes. To meet this priority, a first ever Joint Power Operations Center was established. In 4 days’ time, representatives of 

FEMA, the U.S. Corps of Engineers worked alongside Kentucky 

Emergency Management and the National Guard to prioritize and 

emplace more than 150 generators in order to energize critical infrastructures such as shelters, nursing homes, hospitals, and water 

plants. By using a dynamic combination of multiple Corps of Engineers teams, Corps contractor teams, and Kentucky-contracted 

electrical engineering teams, we were able to far exceed any emergency power generation effort in recent history. 

We believe the Joint Power Operations Center concept will be 

used as an operational template in future disasters to greatly accelerate the vital restoration of life-saving emergency power. We also 

made EMAC requests for additional critical emergency management support from Tennessee, Indiana, North Carolina, Alabama, 

and Mississippi to our hardest-hit areas. 

Lessons learned. When we look at any operations such as this, 

a heartland no-notice response, there are several key takeaways. 

While the full list is detailed in my written submission, please 

allow me to go over four with you. 

Emergency life saving is absolutely the first priority. It is a situation where life sustaining is equal to life savings in terms of 


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power, heat, cooling, water, and food. Supporting that effort is a 

well established shelter management program. In Kentucky we did 

not have one. 

We believe we must have an emergency response plan and an 

annual disaster exercise that is FEMA-funded. Our Kentucky National Guard-led New Madrid exercise was a Guard-initiated and 

Guard-executed concept. These types of exercises must be part of 

our Homeland Security federally funded program, and should not 

have to compete with or degrade the military resources intended to 

fund training for our units for military combat readiness. 

We require much more realistic emergency response timelines on 

the part of FEMA and the Corps of Engineers geared to meet the 

needs at the local level. The prioritization and timing of the delivery of State and Federal resources must be streamlined and focused on life saving in these events where hours, not days, are the 

objective to save lives. 

There needs to be created a mechanism to provide a more consistent, ready, and predictable source of Federal funding for the 

National Guard to respond under State command to federally declared disasters. Funding for these emergency response missions 

should not come from or degrade already limited resources of the 

National Guard to get ready for military combat. Something like a 

Defense Emergency Response Fund, perhaps administrated by the 

National Guard Bureau, might provide a model for such funding. 

Presidential declarations of an emergency life-saving and/or 

major disaster declaration need to be fully resourced by the Federal 

Government. And the National Guard response should be under 

State command, with Federal funding provided under section 502(f) 

of Title 32. This is superior for several reasons. First, it provides 

our most valuable resource, our soldiers and airmen, with the same 

protection that they would have when mobilized overseas for overseas missions. They deserve the same protection when deployed 

stateside in a homeland security mission. Second, it preserves National Guard speed of response under State control as well as the 

National Guard’s law enforcement capability when needed. 

We reviewed the complete disaster operations with our FEMA 

and Corps of Engineer team members and jointly produced these 

recommendations. There is a need to shift from a recovery mindset typical in most disasters to an emergency response that is dynamic, flexible, resourced, coordinated, and focused on life-saving 

measures. Administrative issues must be set aside or tertiary to 

the immediate process. Our FEMA partners were central to our 

overall success, but we can improve the system by streamlining the 

request and response process. 

As far as Corps of Engineers, life-saving support must be focused 

on delivery and effectiveness, not on efficiency. A well-honed process that is not critically time-sensitive has little value in life-anddeath situations. As far as FEMA and the Corps of Engineers, local 

and State resources can be quickly contracted, such as generators 

and electrical engineers to install them. The contracting effort 

needs to be a critical part of the life-saving effort from the very beginning of the emergency operations. There is no way to predict the 

exact location or magnitude of the next no-notice event, but we 

must anticipate that there will be one. 


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Now I would like to leave you with just a couple of final 

thoughts. In Kentucky, the National Guard and the Division of 

Emergency Management fall under the Department of Military Affairs and the Adjutant General. This arrangement provided an 

ideal unity of command, and resulted in what I believe was a classic example of unity of effort. 

Finally, if you will recall, I spoke of the wellness checks that 

were conducted by the Army and Air Guard personnel. Our soldiers 

and airmen walked mile after mile across the entire State, knocking on door after door to check on their fellow Kentuckians. It 

never has been done before, and it sounds like a major undertaking, and it was. This is one aspect of the operation that received 

quite a bit of attention from local, national and international 

media, and rightfully so. 

It was during this process that Army and Air National Guard 

members were credited with saving at least eight lives. This included identifying and rendering aid to elderly couples overcome by 

carbon monoxide, as well as two other elderly couples who were relying on oxygen to survive and were about to run out. 

In another act of unbridled service, two guardsmen and a local 

firefighter waded into chest-deep water of an icy stream to rescue 

four teenagers whose car had run off a slick road and submerged 

in the creek. It was 10 degrees, with a wind chill of minus 4. When 

found, the four teens were already coated with ice and suffering 

from hypothermia. They were wrapped in blankets and transported 

by ambulance to a hospital. The guardsmen, I am told, changed 

their clothes and immediately went back to work. That typifies the 

spirit of the National Guard and the people of Kentucky in this 

emergency. We consider it a significant victory, and I am very confident the people we serve would concur. 

I am so grateful for the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee today, and I certainly welcome your questions. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. PRICE. Thank you, General. Thank you for that comprehensive account, and also showing us some of the human side of this 

disaster and the work that you did. We commend you for that 

work, you and your colleagues. 

General TONINI. Thank you, sir. 

EMERGENCY DECLARATIONS

Mr. PRICE. It seems to me that a couple of themes run through 

your testimony and also Mr. Garratt’s written testimony. One you 

referred to quite explicitly, and that was the need for realistic 

timelines in terms of emergency declarations, disaster declarations, 

and getting the kind of support out into the community that needs 

to be there. Then you referred several times to the particular challenges of a no-notice event. 

We have put a lot of emphasis in this Subcommittee, and, of 

course, FEMA has put a lot of emphasis, on preparing for predictable events, especially in hurricane areas, for example, the kind of 

improvements that we have strived for in preparedness and 

prestaging and so forth. This, of course, is a different kind of event 

with no warning whatsoever, pretty much unprecedented event, as 

I understand it, in its severity. 

So I would like to ask both of you, maybe starting with you, Mr. 

Garratt, to comment on those two aspects. First of all, maybe you 

could very quickly remind us of how these emergency declarations 

work; which do have some limitations in terms of the kind of assistance rendered, or at least the dollar amounts, and then the 

major disaster declarations, which follow some days later. Is that 

system for declaring emergencies and major disasters working as 

smoothly and in as timely a fashion as it should? And, of course, 

General, we would be interested in your observations on that as 

well since what you say about realistic timelines suggests you 

might have some thoughts about that. 

Mr. GARRATT. I am happy to address that, Chairman. The President has, under the Stafford Act, the ability to make either an 

emergency declaration or major disaster declaration. An emergency 

declaration is different from a major disaster declaration in that it 

can be declared pre-event as well as postevent. And it also has limitations on the types of support that can be provided under an 

emergency declaration. What can be provided under an emergency 

is direct Federal assistance, certain types of assistance under public assistance, emergency protective measures, debris removal, reimbursement, as well as we can provide temporary housing under 

an emergency declaration. It is designed to bring emergency services types of support to a State, jurisdictions that have been affected by an incident, or again are preparing for a potential incident. 

The major disaster allows the full range of potential forms of 

support to be provided. Generally when we have a disaster, we do 

what we call preliminary damage assessments in advance of that. 

These are joint assessments that we do with representatives of the 

State. We will visit each jurisdiction, we will assess, catalogue the 

types and extent of damage, and then that information will inform 

what decisions or recommendations on what types of assistance 

should be authorized for a State. 


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When a State that faces a no-notice event comes in and requests 

a major disaster declaration before we have had a chance to do preliminary damage assessments, we—recognizing that in the past we 

have not moved fast enough or have been able to move fast enough 

to make a declaration—try to allow ourselves time to go out and 

validate through those preliminary damage assessments the 

amount of damage and inform our recommendation. We developed 

a policy a couple of years ago that now allows us, whenever a major 

disaster declaration comes in which includes a request for direct 

Federal assistance, and that is we need the Federal Government to 

provide actual material resources and assets that we are not able 

to provide ourselves to help us respond to this emergency, we will 

pull out that direct Federal assistance request portion of that major 

disaster, and we will forward that on by itself. The procedure allows us to make a recommendation for an emergency declaration 

that allows the provision of direct Federal assistance, and that can 

happen and does happen very quickly. That gives the Federal Government the opportunity to begin applying those material resources 

that are needed by a State, and that includes commodities, that includes generators, that includes teams; provide those material resources to a State to help them deal with that emergency phase of 

this while we continue to conduct our PDAs over time to inform 

whether the recommendation will be made on the reimbursable 

forms of assistance. 

In a nutshell, that is how the two systems are set up and how 

we have made a policy adjustment to allow us to expedite the delivery of direct Federal assistance at the front end of this and do that 

more quickly. 

Mr. PRICE. General. 

General TONINI. My reference is to the immediacy of the needs 

in a no-notice situation like this. Let me start out by saying that 

I went to the hurricane conference earlier last week, and I was 

very much impressed with FEMA’s stance in terms of looking down 

the road, seeing something coming, prepositioning resources, 

prepositioning people, and being ready to respond on an immediate 

basis when you can see it coming. And when you cannot see it coming, I am not sure that the process works as well as it should. 

And I think that we can easily hone into. Mr. Garratt and I both 

are aware of the fact that some of the processes were cumbersome, 

some of the processes were arduously slow, not so much in terms 

of a recovery operation, but in terms of a life-saving operation, specifically in the area of power generation. There was a serious lack 

of communication. There were processes that we needed to basically throw out the window and just get it done. And actually Secretary Napolitano got directly involved in some of the process, and 

eventually the marching order was just get it done, and that represented the key element that was that we cut through some of the 

red tape, if you will, that is typically in place in these kinds of disasters. 

Our biggest, most valuable resource was ourselves, and that was 

being able to contract some of these services that we needed to get 

done locally and just get it done. If we would have done that from 

the very beginning, we would have been a lot better off. But in a 

life-saving situation, you basically need to throw out the book and 


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just get it done. And frankly, Secretary Napolitano really went a 

long way in just basically saying get it done. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Rogers. 

GENERATORS

Mr. ROGERS. Well, thank you for the testimony. And, General 

and Mr. Garratt, thank you for responding to this almost unprecedented emergency in my State. FEMA and the State response and 

local response have generally gotten glowing tributes. It seemed to 

work well. And I had met with the Governor at some length during 

the tail end of the crisis, and he was complimenting you, General, 

and, of course, FEMA for the response. 

This was really a perfect storm. It immediately shut down electrical power. And the big transmission lines were even taken down. 

But it also took out the communications capability of communities. 

No one knew what was going on. The Governor told me that there 

was no communication with many of the counties throughout the 

State. No one knew whether a hospital was without power or a 

nursing home was without power, or who was isolated or suffering 

one way or the other except, as you say, General, for a few HAM 

operators here and there who really saved the day. 

But one interesting aspect I wanted to ask you about. One of the 

immediate problems that you encountered were hospitals, nursing 

homes without power and no generators, which was an immediate 

catastrophic capability. How did you come by the generators? That 

might give us a good example of how mechanically FEMA and 

States and locals worked together. 

General TONINI. Sir, there was a package, a prepositioned package, of generators that FEMA has that flowed from Maryland, was 

it? 

Mr. GARRATT. Cumberland. 

General TONINI. Cumberland, Maryland, that contained generators of all sizes. There was some lacking of clarity, fidelity, if you 

will, of information as to what sizes of generators and trying to figure out our needs and getting the two together, and we decided to 

stage those at Fort Campbell. And we did that. And the problem 

was that from the very beginning, the fidelity on the transportation 

of the generators. 

And then we thought that the generators could immediately flow 

to the affected areas, but what we found out is that they first had 

to be staged. And the word ‘‘staged,’’ I am not sure exactly what 

that meant. It took time, whatever it was. And then the process, 

the formalized process that we have required teams to go out to assess the needs without the generators flowing. And then they 

would call back and flow the generators from the staging area at 

Fort Campbell—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Generally it does not take any brilliant mind to 

know whether or not a hospital needs a generator. 

General TONINI. Absolutely, sir. Now, we would all like to think 

that all hospitals and all nursing homes have emergency power. 

The fact is we learned that they do not. We would also like to think 

that all water companies would have some sort of emergency 

power. They do not. 


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Mr. ROGERS. How long did it take you to get the generators to 

these places where they were needed? 

General TONINI. Sir, in some cases it was as many as 3 and 4 

days, which, again, we considered life saving. And we considered 

it much too long. 

Mr. ROGERS. Did we lose any lives in that period of time because 

of lack of power? 

General TONINI. I think that unquestionably we did. I am not so 

sure we did in nursing homes or in hospitals, but the folks that 

passed away from hypothermia probably can be directly attributed 

to the fact that we did not have power. But that could be in homes. 

I am not sure that we can attribute that to the lack of generators 

being in place. In many cases we had people that refused to leave 

their homes because of pets or a multitude of reasons. So they were 

making do in their own homes and in some cases were using heating sources that were not properly ventilated, and then they died 

from carbon monoxide. 

Mr. ROGERS. What else did you need from FEMA or anyone that 

you did not have at your own disposal in the State? 

General TONINI. Generators. The big generators were the bottom 

line. 

Mr. ROGERS. Besides that. 

General TONINI. When the enemy is the cold, the generation of 

a source of heat is really the bottom line in terms of needs. Obviously, we had needs for food, and we began that flowing immediately. That was an immediate need as well. And we were able, 

once again, to go in some cases to do local resourcing in order to 

expedite the flow. And then, of course, the peanut butter scare 

came, and that caused another disconnect, interruption in the 

FEMA flow of food that we were able to accommodate ourselves. 

But the real speed, the Federal Government is famous, and the 

military is also famous, for doing things based on a process. My 

whole point is that you got to throw that process out the window 

when people’s lives are at stake. You just got to get it done. 

And I will tell you, the FEMA people that were in place, the 

Corps of Engineers people who were in place, they all basically 

came to that conclusion collectively together, and we did get it 

done. And, sir, I think that it was a success story. And I have little 

but praise for the team that we put together that actually got the 

job done. And thank God the weather broke after 7 or 8 days, and 

we had unseasonably warm weather, and that was a huge force 

multiplier. But the reality was that we just did not have the same 

sense of urgency because of process, and that is really my story as 

far as FEMA and the Corps are concerned. 

STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSIBILITY

Mr. ROGERS. My time has expired, but let me just say that the 

national press, I think, mainly has the idea that FEMA’s role is 

dominant; that when there is a disaster, FEMA moves in with everything and gets it done. The truth is that a disaster is a local 

matter. It is the State and locals who have the responsibility to run 

the show and call on FEMA for things like generators, and perhaps 

food supplies or emergency material, but it is the State and the 


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locals that are in charge of the operation. Is that your understanding, both of you, of the way this thing operates? 

General TONINI. That is absolutely right, sir. And the lack of specific resources, and the biggest single element was big generators. 

And the 50-pack of generators—and Mr. Garratt can tell you that 

that 50-pack of generators goes across the spectrum, from very 

large ones to very small ones. Well, we needed a lot of very large 

ones, so we had to adjust. On the fly we had to adjust and get a 

lot more heavy generators in to be able to address some of the 

power generation to the hospitals, the nursing homes. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Garratt. 

Mr. GARRATT. Absolutely concur, sir. FEMA’s role is to support 

the State. They are the customer. And the jurisdictions within that 

State are the State’s customers. So our job is to come in, and, operating within the National Incident Management System incident 

command structure, is to funnel support resources in to support 

their needs. And we should be operating as, again, as if they are 

our customer and supporting what their requirements are. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, Katrina sort of shook up everybody’s understanding of whose role was what. The truth is in Katrina the State 

was inept and made a complete bungle of that normal operation of 

a State being in charge of a local disaster and the locals supporting 

the State, then calling on FEMA for necessary supplies and materiel. But in the Katrina case, the State of Louisiana was vacant, 

the government was inept and did not do its chore. And therefore, 

I think we have got a bad understanding as a result of what the 

proper roles of each of the divisions of labor are. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Rodriguez. 

EMERGENCY DECLARATION THRESHOLDS

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, Major General, let me thank you very much for your 

‘‘get it done’’ approach. And I think that that is the approach that 

ought to be taken when we have a major disaster. And so I want 

to personally thank you for your leadership in that area. 

Mr. Garratt, I also want to thank you. When you do get there, 

your people are great. They are very conscientious and get to the 

point and get the work done. So I do want to thank you for the 

hard work that they do on a daily basis throughout this country 

in terms of the disasters. 

I do want to share some real serious concerns that I have as it 

deals with specific incidents that I have encountered with and that 

I have had extreme difficulty with. One was a major tornado in 

Eagle Pass, Texas, killed 7 people, took the administration 17 days 

to declare it. And I had visited the site a few days after it occurred; 

went across to the Mexican side, and mainly I went over there because they also—it hit them harder. They lost three lives also, we 

lost seven, and the State of Coahuila had sent in a good number 

of troops during Katrina. They were stopped in San Antonio, but 

when they got there, they helped feed some 20,000 Katrina victims 

that arrived in San Antonio from Mexico. 

So on the other side, I would have to tell you that after 17 days 

the Mexican Government called the county judge down there and 


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said, you know, you need any help? Can we help you? I told the 

judge, accept the help. And because they cut to the chase, and on 

our side we had all kinds of difficulties on that particular tornado 

that lost seven lives. 

The other incident I want to share with you is the one that I just 

had in Presidio. Five hundred people got displaced. A major flood 

that occurred was never declared by the previous administration. 

And so I would like to see what kind of documentation, you know, 

and what kind of thresholds we have to go through. 

I am being told now that not only—you know, if the levees had 

broken—you know, you said an emergency, the possibility of even 

a greater disaster was there. I should not say this, but thank God 

the levees on the Mexican side broke, and that really released a lot 

of water. And ours broke a little further down and then came back 

and flooded part of the city, one of the poorest communities in this 

country, probably the most isolated sites in this country in Presidio. The State went out there and did what they could. And I 

wanted to know, and not necessarily now, but what went on with 

the—I guess, FEMA would have to have submitted a report that 

indicated that it did not reach that threshold, I gather. But I also 

wanted to see if that also included what now I am being asked 

from communities down the road such as Redford and others that 

their irrigation, you know, sites are completely destroyed now in 

terms of the resources that are needed to pass that. 

And so the others that I have had, one was 96,000 acres that 

burned down. The only report that I was told that FEMA in terms 

of cost was fence posts. You know, that has been devastating for 

hundreds of people in the farming area and raising—and ranching 

area when you have 96,000, you know, and the possibility of also 

a lot of lives could have been lost. 

And so in terms of responding. And we still had difficulty. We declared it, I think my understanding is the Governor declared it, yet 

we could not get it, you know. So, you know, what—you know, I 

want to see if you might respond, you know, on that. And then but 

later I do want to get some feedback as to I am having to deal right 

now with Redford down, and of course there with that situation 

still at Presidio. And we are going to have some additional fires in 

the future in terms of how do we best respond to those things. 

Mr. GARRATT. I am familiar with a couple of the incidents to 

which you refer, Congressman. I am not familiar, at least based on 

what you said, with the 96,000-acre fire incident, but certainly willing to follow up on that. 

Regarding Presidio, I am aware that region 6 did end up surging 

Federal assets to Presidio to assist in the emergency efforts at the 

beginning of that. There was helicopter support, other support that 

they provided under their authority. Ultimately there was not a 

disaster declaration made. There are specific criteria that we use 

when we develop recommendations for that criteria or for the 

President. That criteria is spelled out in regulation. That criteria 

is partly objective, and it is partly subjective. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Can I ask you just to follow up on that, not now, 

but later, to see if also downstream was taken into consideration? 

Not just Presidio, but also downstream, because it also destroyed 

a lot of, you know, homes as it went down, all the way down. In 


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fact, even after the Army started to let go of water, also there were 

some additional ones. 

Mr. GARRATT. Sir, we would be happy to come to your office and 

provide you a detailed briefing not only on the declaration process, 

but on what transpired regarding these incidents. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. And, you know, as far as I am concerned, some 

serious, you know, items went wrong there, because I have a few 

homes on the Dominion, the richest parts probably in this country 

also, where one home of those might be equivalent to the entire 

value of the Presidio when we put value on economic without considering possible lives. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Garratt will get back with answers to these questions for the record. 

[The information follows:] 

FEMA is working to schedule a meeting with Rep. Rodriquez and going over in 

detail the disaster declaration process as well as reviewing the specific Presidio, 

Texas, flooding incident. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Carter. 

COMMUNICATIONS

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First off, General, great story. I like the ‘‘get it done’’ attitude. 

I think that is the way it ought to be. 

Mr. Garratt, thanks for what you do. We appreciate the hard 

work and the fact that you got to have a thick skin to be in FEMA, 

no doubt about that. 

Start off with the communications effort. You know, we heard in 

the hurricanes in the Gulf Coast, we have heard now on the ice 

storm in the Kentucky area communication seems to be the thing 

that we always say we really were short on communications to 

start off with. Now, surely there is some form of communication 

with satellite phones and so forth that would allow us to have a 

communications system up. Do you have a suggestion on that? Because I know that I heard a story about a Congressman from back 

when they had the problems in Mississippi, a Congressman from 

Nevada brought a load of water to Mississippi and found out the 

satellite phone that he had was the only form of communication in 

a 10–county area, so he gave them the satellite phone. And we 

ought to have fixed that by now. Is there a phone that works? And 

is the satellite phone the solution, or what is the solution? 

General TONINI. Sir, absolutely the satellite phone is the only reliable resource that you can use in the circumstances that we faced. 

We actually within Kentucky at the Bluegrass station have a storage of National Guard satellite phones that we got and deployed 

almost as quickly as we could. Once again, that is just east of Lexington, and the hardest-hit area where the communications was 

out was in far western Kentucky, so that is several hundred miles. 

And with the travel issues it took us some time to get the stuff 

there and then to distribute it. Ideally, obviously, the answer is to 

have enough satellite phones distributed so that you can have eyes 

and ears in this kind of a circumstance. 

Mr. CARTER. Is that something, Mr. Garratt, you think we ought 

to start planning to at least give a State plan or something? I happen to agree with Hal that I view disasters as local issues, but if 


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we are not getting the planning, and communications is the start 

of any response, we ought to figure out some kind of national plan 

for satellite phones. Is there something that we ought to be looking 

at on that? 

Mr. GARRATT. I think that is entirely reasonable. And I do not 

think the issue here was not necessarily that we have not made 

progress in that area. In fact, the Federal Government has made 

progress and the States have made considerable progress in terms 

of not only interoperabilizing, but increasing their capabilities, satellite phone, other types of phone systems. 

In the situation we faced in Kentucky, as the General indicated, 

they had a number of satellite phones, and they began distributing 

them to the folks who needed them. But they had an all-hands-ondeck effort in Kentucky. In other words, they had far more need 

for phones than they had the capability to supply or that we initially had when we began mobilizing and deploying our assets in 

there. We did deploy MERS units in there, and mobile support 

units in there, and they did have assets. They began erecting cell 

towers and distributing these. But the sheer size of the need outweighed what was at least initially available. 

What we could do is a better job, as a joint effort, of prioritizing 

who gets these units that are available at the front end. 

We had a compelling need, as we discovered, to have communications in the hands of the Corps of Engineers, the FEMA, the other 

individuals who are involved in generator assessments. They did 

not have what they needed to effectively be able to communicate. 

A lot of the response elements did have what they needed to be 

able to effectively communicate, but we didn’t have it in the hands 

of them. 

So we either need more units or we need to do a better job of 

prioritizing who gets them at the front end of a disaster, or both. 

The bottom line is, we can make some improvements in that regard. 

GENERATORS

Mr. CARTER. I will ask one more question about the generators. 

We have stories on Hurricane Rita that people went down to WalMart and bought local generators to try to keep things going, a ‘‘get 

it done’’ attitude, and they had real issues with getting reimbursed 

for buying generators to keep people alive. And not personally, 

keep themselves alive, but keep communities alive. Has that issue 

been solved? 

When the people of the community realized there are people 

dying, they rushed down and invested in every generator that was 

available in town to start creating electricity to keep some people 

alive. And then they have issues with either the State or the Federal Government. 

Shouldn’t we streamline something to make that available for 

them? 

Mr. GARRATT. There are restrictions on the conditions under 

which we will reimburse generator purchases in disasters. We will 

reimburse when they are needed for lifesaving requirements. We do 

not reimburse when they are needed for other than lifesaving requirements. 


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But for lifesaving requirements, there are procedures for them to 

be reimbursed, yes, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. Ms. Roybal-Allard. 

CATASTROPHIC PLANNING

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

Mr. Garratt and Major General, for being here today. I have two 

questions. 

My Los Angeles district, as you know, faces the everyday threat 

of a major earthquake. A seismic event on the scale of the 1994 

Northridge quake in downtown Los Angeles, which is part of my 

district, could claim countless lives and, according to projections, 

inflict more than $500 billion in damages. 

Unfortunately, the city appears to be woefully unprepared for 

such a disaster. Were a 7.2-magnitude earthquake to strike Los 

Angeles, the Red Cross predicts that 564,000 people would be in 

need of shelter, while an additional 2.5 million would require food 

and water. However, the metro area has only 341 shelter facilities 

with 84,000 beds. 

Other major U.S. cities are equally vulnerable to catastrophic 

disasters, and the GAO office has reported similar statistics for cities like New York, Washington, D.C., and Miami. 

Could you highlight a little bit what steps FEMA is taking now 

to prepare for the gap between existing resources and the likely 

needs of the populace in the event of a major earthquake in a city 

like Los Angeles? 

Mr. GARRATT. I would be happy to quickly cover some of the key 

things that we are doing in terms of catastrophic planning. We are 

doing catastrophic planning in a number of areas. We have identified them, the New Madrid area, for example. We have been doing 

catastrophic planning in California as well. 

We have hired operational planners, and we are putting operational planners in our regions; and those planners are—the top of 

their priority list is to engage with and address issues facing catastrophic planning. We have developed a catastrophic incident supplement to the catastrophic incident annex in the national response 

framework, and that supplement has an execution schedule that allows us to begin instantly providing resources in support in response to a no-notice catastrophic event. 

We have developed the national shelter system over the last couple of years. This is a shelter system that lists all of the shelters 

that belong to the Red Cross, and we are also populating it with 

shelters that exist outside the Red Cross shelter system. That is 

over 40,000 strong. And we have also been working with States on 

a State-by-State basis to identify what their shelter capabilities are 

and how many shelterees they are willing to take from an affected 

State should that affected State need to begin relocating individuals outside their State because they don’t have the capacity in 

there. 

So we have been identifying, at least from a sheltering management perspective, additional assets that are outside of what may 

be a catastrophically affected State, to be able to take on that particular requirement. 


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Now, obviously it is going to depend on exactly what the scope 

of any event is and the exact characteristics of that event, whether 

what we have identified right now will at the end of the day meet 

what those immediate requirements are. We have made a lot of 

progress, and we have identified literally hundreds of thousands of 

shelters out there that can be available nationally to support what 

may be a very large catastrophe someplace. 

CATASTROPHIC PLANNING CONTINUED

But identifying those assets and then trying to move what may 

be hundreds of thousands of people on very short notice would be 

an immense logistical challenge for us, for the State. So we recognize that. We have contracts in place to help us, help States support the evacuation—bus contracts, rail contracts, aircraft contracts—but it will nevertheless be an immense challenge to pull 

that off and to pull that off in a seamless and nonproblematic way. 

We recognize that we are going to be challenged in a catastrophic 

event, but we think we have laid the groundwork to help us and 

help States at least begin dealing with that at the front end of a 

catastrophe. 

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE GRANT PROGRAM

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. In December, the Government Accounting 

Office issued a report that was highly critical of FEMA’s management of the Public Assistance Grant Program. 

According to GAO, the flow of funds to State and municipal governments has slowed because of problems related to project development, information sharing, and the Agency’s approach to decision-making because, for example, FEMA grants are geared towards reimbursement after construction, so therefore cash-strapped 

local governments have struggled to initiate rebuilding projects. 

In addition, it found that inadequate coordination between officials at all levels of government has made the torturous grant obligation process even more difficult to navigate; and in some cases 

the report found that FEMA managers have approved projects only 

to change their minds and strip municipalities of the promised 

funds after construction had already begun. 

What steps is FEMA taking to improve the management of the 

Public Assistance Grant Program in light of GAO’s findings? 

Mr. PRICE. A very quick response, if you please. 

Mr. GARRATT. A couple of things we have done to improve public 

assistance: Over the last couple of years we have stood up what we 

called EMMIE. It is a brand-new automated system. We began employing that last year, and that essentially allows project worksheets to be automated from the very beginning. They no longer 

have to be done on paper. They no longer have to be submitted; 

they can be input at the local jurisdictional level. And it now allows 

a jurisdiction or an applicant to follow that project worksheet from 

the very moment it is entered in there and to know exactly what 

the status of that project worksheet is. 

Now, the Public Assistance Program is, by nature, designed to 

ensure accountability. It is not a block grant program, it is a 

project-by-project program; and so it requires that the scope of 

work be drawn up, it requires that the eligibility of the funding be 


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determined in advance, and it requires that it go through, each 

project worksheet, a number of steps to include environmental reviews, historical reviews, et cetera. 

So it is not an instant process, it is not a process designed to just 

put a chunk of money in somebody’s hands to go and rebuild something. It is a process designed to validate that, to make sure that 

accountability gauntlets have been met. And it is a reimbursable 

program. 

Now, recognizing, as we did in Katrina and other disasters, that 

applicants may be cashed strapped, we have got some regulatory 

changes in the pipeline right now. Among them is an ability for us 

to advance-fund some portion of a grant to the applicant, and then 

they can continue to draw against that on an advance basis as they 

expend funding. 

So we believe that will be helpful in the future for applicants 

who, in fact, are cash strapped and need an advance to begin moving out on a project. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. So you are moving to correct some of the 

problems? 

Mr. GARRATT. Absolutely. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Farr. 

EMERGENCY DELIBERATION CRITERIA

Mr. FARR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Just one observation on the sheltering. 

My only experience with that is—and I think totally underutilized, you might look at—almost every county in the United States 

has a fairgrounds. And what we found is that they are totally inadequate as infrastructure for sewer and water, but they could be 

readily adjusted to house a lot of people, and they are readily available. And most disaster plans haven’t even thought about them. 

Let me ask a couple of questions. One is, I am sharing a lot of 

the concerns that people on this panel have had that there is a 

major distinction between an emergency declaration and a major 

declaration. And the distinction is, frankly, the emergency declaration helps the public sector. It helps the government get reimbursed on a 75 percent basis, but it does nothing for the civilian 

population that is injured. 

And that criteria is a narrow call, and it seems to me—I really 

appreciate the response on the ice storms, but we had fire, just the 

opposite, heat this summer in California. At one time, 1,000 fires 

started by lightning. It required a response of the national effort; 

and Forest Service said that three-quarters of the total wildland 

firefighting capacity of the United States was sent to California. 

In my district, 250,000 acres burned. It was the largest and longest burning fire in California, and yet it never met the major disaster threshold. And so, therefore, the people never had the ability 

to get reimbursed for costs incurred—rental, and dislocations and 

repairs. 

I really question why that didn’t become a major disaster, and 

perhaps you can come to my office and we can talk more about it. 

But I think we are going to have to think about that. You had a 


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lot—it was $150 million that you spent just putting out the fire in 

my one county, but no help to the civilians. 

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE FEDERAL TRAINING FACILITY

My question is about—and I want to praise you for it and get a 

response for it—is that in the post-Katrina act we made FEMA the 

sponsor of the Nation’s premier education, graduate education institution for homeland security at the Naval Postgraduate Federal 

Facility. That is in my district. And you have done an incredible 

job of educating State, local, and Federal leaders for preparing and 

for disaster preparedness. Dozens of governors and mayors have 

used the center. They have produced a curriculum now which is 

being used all over the United States, and it has been very successful. 

My question to you is, will you ensure that this program remains 

the centerpiece for education of emerging homeland security leaders and—that can grow to meet the challenges of FEMA and the 

Nation that we are confronting not only here but abroad? And obviously the answer is ‘‘yes.’’ 

Mr. GARRATT. Sir, we are very proud of that program as well. 

Mr. FARR. And you are going to continue to fund it? 

Mr. GARRATT. As far as I know, we have every intention of continuing that program. 

HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE NUMBERS 5 AND 8

CHANGES

Mr. FARR. Thank you. The other question I have, which is related to a big question here, is that in the Post-Katrina Emergency 

Management Reform Act, we specified that the FEMA administrator would lead the Nation’s efforts to prepare for, protect 

against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against the risks of 

natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other manmade disasters. 

That change was vital to fix the disaster response problems from 

Hurricane Katrina. Yet, for some reason, the Bush administration 

never responded to the statutory reform by revising two Presidential directives that guide disaster response; that is, the Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 5, and Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive No. 8. 

As the Obama administration reviews the legacy of the HSPDs, 

isn’t it time to change those two directives to reflect one of the 

most critical features of the post-Katrina reform? 

Mr. GARRATT. Sir, I cannot speak for the White House on this, 

but I do know that the White House is relooking—the Homeland 

Security Council—they are relooking at the structure of the Homeland Security Council vis-a-vis the National Security Council; and 

I would expect that as part of this elongated process, they will be 

revisiting all of the HSPDs that have been published to see what 

revisions, if any, are appropriate. 

I am not aware that HSPD 5 or HSPD 8 is necessarily in the 

queue for a revision, but I would be very surprised if they are not 

revisited under the new administration. 

Mr. FARR. If they are not in the queue, how do they get there? 

It is of keen interest to this committee. 


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Mr. GARRATT. I am not aware that they are not in the queue, 

Congressman Farr. Again, it is something that the Homeland Security Council and the White House would have the stick on. 

I am not personally aware of what the status is of either one of 

those documents as part of the engagement that they are making 

to relook at, again, the National Security Council, the Homeland 

Security Council, and how they are going to manage that moving 

into the future. 

My expectation would be, though, or I would—that as part of 

that extended effort, that they would be looking at and revisiting 

HSPDs as just a normal part of doing business. We look at and revisit our policies and regulations on a regular basis, and I would 

expect that the same would be done for those documents. 

Mr. FARR. And both of these are needed to be relooked at. Don’t 

you agree? 

Mr. GARRATT. I think every policy and every regulation ought to 

be looked at on a regular basis, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Calvert. 

COMMUNICATIONS WITH CALIFORNIA ON WILDFIRES

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is your third Californian in a row, so we have it all—earthquakes, wildfires, floods, droughts, pestilence. But I want to talk 

about the State of California’s continuing drought along the Santa 

Ana area. The Santa Ana winds provide a lethal combination. 

As a result, as Mr. Farr mentioned, California had experience 

with fires last year; and we have a very strong, effective fire management system in California, as you know, because we are very 

experienced with fire. For the most part, the State manages wildfire incidents on our own, and we do a good job, but obviously 

sometimes we get overburdened. 

As an example, in 2007, the fires hit nearly every county in 

southern California. And because of this ongoing drought that we 

are having in California, we expect, probably, future incidents in 

the future. 

So my questions, primarily: Does FEMA maintain a communication with State authorities and CAL FIRE in advance of a wildfire 

season to ensure prompt action, when needed? 

Mr. GARRATT. The answer is absolutely yes, sir. Region 9, which 

is located in Oakland, California—Nancy Ward is currently the acting administrator of FEMA; she is, in her regular day job, the regional administrator for Region 9. She and her organization are in 

regular communication with the State of California, and I think 

that they have an exceptionally good working relationship. 

GETTING FIREFIGHTING AIRCRAFT INTO CALIFORNIA

Mr. CALVERT. One of the issues that we had last time—again, it 

seems to be a continuing problem—is coordination of aircraft, getting aircraft into California from various areas; and with the military, also issues of command and control. Do you get involved in 

those issues? 

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tion for air resources. There are often some issues when we are 

transitioning from a nondisaster to a disaster fire management situation where management of air resources is being done by the National Interagency Fire Center. Once there is a disaster and we 

have got a Federal management of that out of FEMA, what we may 

find is, there is a transitional period while we are working out 

management of certain assets or if we are bringing in additional 

assets. The bottom line is, we occasionally run into problems in 

that regard. 

We measure our success, though, by how quickly we fix and resolve those problems. We have never run into any systemic problems that haven’t been fixed quickly. 

Mr. CALVERT. I will just predict, we are going to need additional 

aircraft quickly probably this summer, and that—hopefully, that is 

staged properly. 

One of the problems we did have is an issue with spotters on helicopters and different kinds of aircraft and intercommunication 

with the military. 

And I don’t know, General, if you are aware of that problem we 

had in California. You might want to comment on that, if you can. 

STATE ACTIVE DUTY COMPENSATION

General TONINI. Sir, I spent the last 4 days speaking with my 

fellow adjutant generals. And so, while all disasters are local, I 

dealt with the local aspects of each one of your adjutant generals; 

and I can tell you that there is one element that is absolutely 

‘‘broke,’’ and that is this whole idea of State active duty and how 

an adjutant general addresses that. 

We applied—we requested title 32, 502(f), and that request was 

denied. But it causes a myriad of issues and a myriad of problems 

to an adjutant general. 

The reality of it is that if a soldier is hurt when we called him 

to duty, his injury is not addressed in the same way it would be 

if he was on title 32 status. He becomes a workmen’s comp issue. 

And we put these soldiers in harm’s way; without doubt, a soldier 

with a chainsaw and three inches of bites is in harm’s way. There 

are no bullets flying at him, but he is in harm’s way. 

We have at least 17 instances of M-day soldiers, part-time soldiers, who will lose time from their civilian occupations, and they 

will then be reimbursed only through workmen’s compensation a 

very small fraction of what they would otherwise get. 

They also lose all the benefits from their civilian employers; and 

we have a situation—one situation where a firefighter who was injured and had to have surgery on his leg not only will be getting 

less during the 6 months while he rehabilitates himself—he will be 

getting half the amount of money that he normally would get, and 

loses his insurance coverage for his entire family. And that particular soldier has two daughters that were scheduled for surgery, 

and he now is without insurance. 

On top of that, you have situations where soldiers are on duty, 

they are on duty based on the type of orders that they are on. And 

because of cross-purposes on orders, we have to take key people out 

of the fight. We had OH–58 helicopter pilots that were running the 

lines and determining where roads needed to be cleared; and after 


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72 hours we had to take them off of duty because they were crosspurposed—because their duty was counterdrug, and they weren’t 

doing counterdrug, they were doing emergency management. 

I believe that the system, sir, is broken. And as I talk to all of 

my adjutant generals, everyone agrees that we are better than this. 

As a nation, we are better than this. It is our responsibility as adjutant generals to make sure that we take care of our soldiers and 

airmen, and in fact, in this particular instance, we are not. 

And I know that the system is—Mr. Garratt and I didn’t particularly talk, but I talk to many, many people within FEMA and 

Homeland Security, and the process is not allowing this to happen, 

but the system systemically is broken, and we owe it to our people 

to try to fix it, I believe. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, General. 

We have had a vote called on the floor. We have Members waiting to ask their questions. If I could ask people to be as brief as 

possible, we will try to get the maximum exchange in. We will not 

be able to come back after the vote. 

Mr. Serrano. 

RESPONSE TIME

Mr. SERRANO. Thank you. I will be brief. One of my questions is 

already out, but I would like to make a prefacing comment. 

Every so often we hear about the role of the National Guard. The 

fact of life is that during the last 5 years the National Guard has 

been taxed to go somewhere else overseas. And in many cases, 

those units have not been around. And that is a fact. 

Recent articles on the Kentucky ice storm, for the most part, 

praise the administration for its disaster response while also highlighting the fact that some areas had to wait a week or longer for 

assistance that reached other parts of the State much sooner. 

It is understandable that some areas will naturally be more difficult to serve in times of emergency, but can you provide a framework for what is considered to be a realistic emergency response 

timeline? What steps is FEMA taking to streamline a request and 

response process? And how can FEMA and State and local emergency management agencies better partner the request and response process? 

[The information follows:] 

Answer. Initial disaster response resides with the local/state government; states 

determine requirements that if determined to be beyond its capability are passed 

to the Regional and Federal level for assistance. Given these parameters of request, 

validate, source and deliver, a realistic emergency response timeline is not more 

than 72 hours*, but may be much less, depending on how much advance notice 

FEMA has, and FEMA’s ability to preposition assets (people, equipment, supplies) 

near the threatened area. The Mission Assignment is the vehicle used by FEMA in 

a Stafford Act major disaster or emergency declaration to order immediate, shortterm disaster response assistance from Departments and Agencies to help State, 

local, and tribal governments that are overwhelmed by the event and unable to perform the necessary work. To further streamline and facilitate rapid disaster response, FEMA has also approved a number 236 Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments 

(PSMAs) with 29 Federal Departments and Agencies. 

FEMA can pre-stage assets into an area to provide the strategic resource capability in the form of initial response resources based on anticipated requirements of 

a pending disaster and before a disaster declaration through a network of National 

Logistics Staging Areas (NLSAs). NLSAs are an extension of the national distribution system which includes Distribution Centers as well as positioning sites enaVerDate Nov 24 2008 02:52 Oct 22, 2009 Jkt 052213 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\52213P2.XXX 52213P2

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bling an agile, flexible and adaptable resource management and provisioning capability. This is vital to ensure that resources are in or near the area of disaster impact for immediate distribution upon direction of the appropriate state and federal 

officials. This concept allows FEMA to position in advance for a quick response, but 

actual assistance cannot be provided until the Governor requests and a Presidential 

declaration is made. 

Disaster response support is also coordinated and provided through one or more 

of the NRF’s 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). The ESFs serve as the primary operational-level mechanism supporting FEMA in providing State and local 

disaster assistance in functional areas such as transportation, communications, public works and engineering, firefighting, mass care, housing human services, public 

health and medical services, search and rescue, agriculture, and energy. 

FEMA also manages a network of FEMA operations centers to coordinate and sustain response operations, maintain situational awareness, and provide a common operating picture for DHS and FEMA leadership. This network provides a critical coordination and information sharing mechanism used to accelerate the provision of 

assistance to State and local governments in need. These centers not only facilitate 

information sharing between FEMA, non-FEMA entities, and the State and local 

governments, but help ensure a consolidated, consistent, and accurate status of ongoing incidents, responses, or potential events. The operations centers are also used 

to facilitate information exchange and coordination for impending events, such as 

an approaching hurricane. Also, through future planning capabilities that have been 

developed, FEMA often begins monitoring and preparing for evolving disaster situations that may end up in an emergency or disaster declaration. As well, FEMA 

along with State/Local emergency management agencies should identify local resource capability to better serve their own state. For example, monies could be 

granted to facilities to purchase generators to keep businesses running during power 

outages. A valid gap analysis should be done to identify shortfalls within the state 

and develop an agreed upon action plan on how to support the shortfall. 

*Note: FEMA Logistics was able to respond to Kentucky’s emergency with generators, meals and water within 36 hours from the original request. Blankets and cots 

were delivered within 24 hours once the request was submitted to HQ Logistics. All 

commodities that were requested by the state were turned over to the State National Guard who distributed to the local communities. 

Mr. PRICE. Let me suggest, Mr. Serrano, that we allow the other 

Members to register their questions as well; and then we will take 

as much time as we can for an oral response, starting with yours, 

and then ask responses for the record in other cases. 

INTEROPERABILITY COMMUNICATIONS

But, please, Ms. Lowey. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Great. Thank you. I will try and talk very quickly. 

I want to make one point and then get to the question. 

Several people talked about emergency communications, and as 

the Chairman knows, I am very grateful for his focus on it. I have 

been talking about it since I came to Congress, especially after the 

last disaster. The program has authorized $400 million after hearing another story of communication breakdowns. I think it is absolutely essential, Mr. Chairman, that we continue to adequately provide funding for—Mr. Chairman, all I said of my comment was, 

thank you. Before I get to the question, thank you for your appropriation on emergency communications. This has been an issue— 

interoperability, I have been talking about—and I think we all 

have to work together to continue to increase it. Your story and 

others are just disasters, in addition to the disaster that took place. 

[The information follows:] 

INTEROPERABILITY

In her Senate confirmation hearing, Secretary Napolitano stated that Arizona’s 

key obstacle to first responder interoperable communications was funding. 


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• Mr. Garratt, as FEMA works with OMB on the budget request, could you preview a possible range for the budget request for interoperable communications 

grants? 

Answer. Thank you for the question. However, DHS and FEMA are still working 

with OMB on the budget request for FY 2010. Until those negotiations have been 

finalized, we are unable to comment on this request but will be happy to brief you 

on this at a later date. 

• Mr. Garratt, please describe how FEMA coordinates with OEC to strengthen 

first responder communication networks. 

Answer. FEMA is working to improve disaster emergency communications capabilities and to strengthen the Federal response to incidents in coordination with the 

Office of Emergency Communications (OEC). 

• FEMA is working closely with OEC to identify critical milestones needed to implement the goals in the National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP). The 

NECP requires the demonstration of response-level emergency communications capabilities by all jurisdictions. FEMA continues to coordinate milestone actions with 

OEC. 

• FEMA is coordinating the development of State Disaster Emergency Communications DEC Operational Plans through the Regional Emergency Communications 

Coordination Working Groups (RECCWG), established as a focal point for coordinating disaster emergency communications activities in the FEMA Regions. The 

State DEC Operational Plans provide an integrated Federal, State, local, and tribal 

approach to ensuring effective emergency communications coordination prior to and 

immediately following an incident. In developing these plans, FEMA uses OEC’s 

Statewide Communication Interoperability Plans (SCIP) and its Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan (TICP) to identify State and local emergency communications requirements and strategies to improve response capabilities. 

• OEC participates in FEMA’s RECCWG meetings. 

• FEMA is an active participant in the OEC-led Emergency Communications Preparedness Center (ECPC) working group meetings which provide an opportunity to 

strengthen interoperability among Federal responders. 

• FEMA has invited OEC to participate in the FEMA Regional DEC Coordinator 

Summit scheduled for March 11–12, 2009. 

FEMA’s Disaster Emergency Communications (DEC) is responsible for providing 

the means and method of transmitting and receiving voice, date, and video messages, information, and images critical to the successful management of disaster incident where communications infrastructure has been negatively impacted or lost. 

DEC must be integrated at all levels of government to effectively serve as the backbone of emergency response operations. 

More specifically, DEC is responsible for: 

• Ensuring operable and interoperable communications are available in a disaster. 

• Providing voice, video, and data communications for responders and Federal 

partners. 

• Supporting emergency management across the entire disaster management 

lifecycle—preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation. 

I want to make one other point. While in New York last week, 

Secretary Napolitano stated with regard to grants: We need to be 

giving money based on really very vigorous risk and thinking about 

what targets are. The Secretary is absolutely correct. 

URBAN AREA SECURITY INITIATIVE GRANT RECIPIENTS

Unfortunately, FEMA hasn’t received that message, Mr. Garratt. 

In December, GAO reported that in the final days of the Bush administration, the Department of Homeland Security made a policy 

decision to expand the number of UASI recipients from 60 to 62 

areas, nearly nine times the number of original UAC cities. 

Every area of the country, we know, has different needs. That is 

why we have programs such as the State Homeland Security Grant 

Program, the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program. However, it is imperative that resources for high-risk urban 

area programs are only going to high-risk from urban areas. 


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I know that some decisions had to be made prior to installment 

of the Obama administration so that funds are issued in a timely 

manner, but the Department’s previous grant allocation has been 

quite controversial, and I would think there would be a way to facilitate the expedient release of grants and work with the new administration. 

So the questions are: Mr. Garratt, since increasing the number 

of urban area recipients contradicts the Secretary’s statement last 

week, is it likely that FEMA will not award funding to all 62 areas 

that are eligible to apply? 

[The information follows:] 

Answer. Final funding decisions for the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) 

have not been finalized yet, so the Department cannot speak to the likelihood or 

certainty of specific awards. The UASI program is a risk-based initiative that was 

established to dedicate resources to high-threat, high-density metropolitan areas to 

prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorism. In order to determine eligibility for this program, and be consistent with section 101 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P. L. 110–053), the 

Department analyzes the relative risk of the top 100 Metropolitan areas based on 

population. Given the unpredictable nature of terrorist threat, all areas analyzed 

have some level of risk. In determining the final list of eligible entities for the UASI 

program, the Department must balance the level of risk and the implementation of 

activities that will have a meaningful impact on risk reduction and the enhancement of preparedness capabilities. As such, it is likely all Urban Areas that were 

announced as eligible for the FY 2009 UASI program will receive at least some level 

of funding. 

It is important to note the Department has taken other steps to ensure that 

Urban Areas with the highest risk receive the highest allocations. More than half 

the funding (55%) available has been designated for the top seven (Tier 1) Urban 

Areas, based on the results for the risk assessment. All remaining eligible Urban 

Areas (Tier 2) compete for the remaining 45%. As a result, the addition of the two 

additional Urban Areas in the program for FY 2009 does not have a detrimental 

impact on the highest risk Urban Areas, as 55% of the funding has already been 

designated for them. In FY 2008, 53 Urban Areas competed for the remaining 45% 

of funds; in FY 2009, 55 Urban Areas will compete for the remaining funds. Consistent with prior years, the highest risk Urban Areas will receive the majority of 

the funds. 

I would like to remind you that Congress does not set a floor for 

the number of UASI recipients. In previous years, I have been told 

that the Department’s political leadership has determined the 

number of UASI recipients. Who decided to increase the number of 

fiscal year 2009 UASI recipients from 60 to 62? 

Mr. PRICE. That is a very good question, and we will await the 

answer, probably for the record. Thank you. 

[The information follows:] 

Answer. The final determinations for eligible entities for the UASI program were 

made by the Secretary based on the results of the risk analysis provided by FEMA/ 

GPD, in conjunction with other DHS partners, to include the Office of Intelligence 

and Analysis (I&A) and the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP). 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Ruppersberger. 

LOCAL TRAINING, PLANNING AND EXERCISES

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. We all have issues. I happen to have the 

Chesapeake Bay, had to deal with Isabel. We have California. We 

have New York. 

I was in local government for a long time, and I think one of the 

issues we needed to learn from Katrina is that the locals and State 

were not coordinated and didn’t prepare. If you prepare and eduVerDate Nov 24 2008 02:52 Oct 22, 2009 Jkt 052213 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\52213P2.XXX 52213P2

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cate and have a plan before an event occurs, it happens a lot better. And I feel that is FEMA’s role, to help the coordination. 

And the only other thing: I think you have gotten a lot better. 

I think management starts at the top, I am glad you have been 

there for over 10 years, and that makes a difference to have professionals in that position. 

The one area that I still think needs work on is, after the event 

occurs and people then are out of their homes or whatever, it seems 

that there is still a bureaucratic maze. And that is when it gets 

more difficult; we have to make sure that we plan ahead for that, 

too. 

Now, I know the new law’s direct line to the President, and that 

makes things help; but we have to cut through the bureaucracy 

once the storm or catastrophe hits. 

And those are my only issues. But coordination of State and local 

training, planning, having exercises. 

I happen to be in Maryland and Maryland has one of the best 

trauma systems in the world. They have exercises every year 

where they will go to the Ravens stadium and have an exercise, as 

if there was an attack, and they train. And I would hope that 

FEMA would focus on that, because if you have your supplies, you 

have the people ready, it makes a big difference. 

Thanks for being here. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, Mr. Ruppersberger, and we welcome you 

to the Subcommittee, by the way. We are glad to have you join us. 

Well, let me ask you to take under advisement particularly the 

questions raised by the last three Members, as well as questions 

that all of us will submit in addition to the ones submitted orally, 

and ask you to respond for the record. 

I apologize for the rush, but that is life in this institution, and 

we must go vote. We do appreciate your being here. We appreciate 

your good work, first of all, but also your willingness to come in 

here and help us assess not only the response to these major disasters in Kentucky and nearby States, but also to take some stock 

of the way FEMA is preparing for disasters and the kind of efforts 

to improve capacity that are ongoing there. 

So thank you. It is very helpful. And we will look forward to 

working with you as we put next year’s budget together. 

Mr. Rogers, do you have any closing thoughts? 

Mr. ROGERS. Very briefly, to thank the gentlemen for appearing 

with us and answering the questions, being helpful to us. And I 

want to end quickly by congratulating the General for him and his 

staff and all the Guardsmen in Kentucky. Everyone was called up, 

and they made us all proud, and they saved a lot of lives. And we 

are indebted to you, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. The Subcommittee is adjourned. 


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(277) 

TUESDAY, MARCH 17, 2009. 

INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS 

WITNESSES 

DAVID BOYD, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTEROPERABILITY AND COMPATIBILITY 

CHRIS ESSID, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS 

ROSS ASHLEY, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, FEMA GRANTS PROGRAM 

DIRECTORATE 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PRICE

Mr. PRICE. The subcommittee will come to order. Good morning. 

In the 71⁄2 years since the 9/11 attacks, there has been heightened concern about the ability or inability of our Nation’s emergency responders to communicate with one another during crises. 

The need for firefighters, emergency medical personnel and law enforcement to talk to one another and for Federal emergency workers to be able to communicate with each is all too clear when disasters strike and our citizens require a coordinated government response. While progress has been made promoting interoperability, 

we in Congress hear almost daily about shortcomings preventing 

effective emergency communications. 

The Department of Homeland Security has a threefold approach 

to solving the interoperability puzzle, and we have witnesses from 

each organization within the Department here today. 

Dr. David Boyd is Director of the Office of Interoperability and 

Compatibility, or OIC as it is commonly known. That office conducts interoperability-related research, promulgates technical 

standards and works to develop new communications tools. 

Mr. Chris Essid is Director of the Office of Emergency Communications, or OEC. This office is responsible for coordinating national interoperable communications policy, guiding State planning 

efforts, and providing technical and training assistance to the 

emergency responder community. 

And Mr. Ross Ashley, back with us, welcome, Assistant Administrator of the FEMA Grants Program Directorate, which is responsible for reviewing and awarding State interoperable communications grants. The FEMA Grants Directorate also works with the 

Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration to distribute funds from the Public Safety 

Interoperability Communications Grant Program. 

The fundamental question all of us have is this: Why aren’t we 

making faster progress toward effective interoperability? The Federal Government has a structure at DHS that appears to cover the 

full continuum of interoperability from research and development 

to policy, to acquisition and training. In 2007, 56 Statewide Interoperability Communications Plans were submitted to DHS, which 


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then reviewed and approved them in 2008. Congress has also provided multiple sources of funding to allow States and localities to 

invest in network upgrades and to acquire new equipment. However, one must look only as far as the severe communications problems during the response to Hurricane Katrina or more recent difficulties during last summer’s wildfires, such as those in Big Sur, 

California, to see that the interoperability problem is far from 

being solved. 

This committee directly controls the funding that helps States 

and localities improve their communications and to purchase equipment meeting interoperability standards. In 2009, we appropriated 

$50 million for interoperable communications grants, the same as 

in 2008. Furthermore $1 billion in grant funding was provided by 

Congress for the Public Safety Interoperable Communications 

Grant program in 2007. Mr. Ashley, we are going to need an update on the award of these funds, and whether you think the 

money is being successfully invested to meet State and local needs. 

The research, policy and training programs at OIC and OEC help 

the emergency responder community make effective interoperability decisions. I am pleased that all the States and territories 

now have federally approved interoperable communications plans, 

and I see that as a major accomplishment of which DHS can be 

proud. However, we need to be vigilant that these plans are implemented rapidly and do not gather dust on a shelf. 

Mr. Essid and Dr. Boyd, we need to know how you will make 

sure these plans are turned into reality. You gentlemen know better than anyone else that simply purchasing the right equipment 

does not solve our interoperable communications challenges. There 

need to be workable plans in place to manage the conversion to 

new technology and procedures along with robust training for the 

actual operators of the system. I will be interested to hear about 

your efforts to ensure that the award of Federal grants for equipment is accompanied by serious efforts to train and prepare the 

State and local users. That way we can arrive at successful results 

and not waste money in the process. 

More broadly speaking, we also have to discuss Federal management of the public airwaves. While this committee does not the 

have jurisdiction over the Federal Communications Commission, 

which administers the radio spectrum, decisions that agency makes 

do directly affect DHS’s interoperable communications programs. 

In early 2008, the FCC attempted to auction the D block of the 700 

megahertz band and have the public sector build a national 

broadband network for emergency responders. However, that auction failed, and the FCC Office of the Inspector General reported 

bidders were scared off by the risk that costs for a robust emergency network could exceed revenues from broadband subscriptions. 

Since then many have questioned whether a nationwide emergency network managed by the private sector is necessary for interoperable communications, or even a good idea. An alternative approach would simply allocate spectrum licenses to regional entities 

that could then construct and manage publicly owned networks. I 

would like to hear from all of our witnesses about the advantages 

and disadvantages of such an approach, including how rapidly such 


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networks could be deployed, what costs could or should be shouldered by the Federal Government, and whether such a technological solution is even feasible. 

So clearly we have a full agenda with many interesting and important topics. We thank all of you for appearing before the committee today. We look forward to your testimony. 

As is our usual practice, we will put your written statements in 

the hearing record, the complete statements, and ask you to summarize in 5-minute presentations. We will start with Dr. Boyd, followed by Mr. Essid, and then Mr. Ashley. 

Before that, however, I want to turn to John Carter, sitting in 

for now for our Ranking Member Hal Rogers, and ask Mr. Carter 

for any comments he has. 

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OPENING STATEMENT BY MR. CARTER

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to welcome 

the distinguished guests here today. 

One of the Nation’s foremost preparedness goals since 9/11 has 

been improved interoperable communications for emergency response communities at all levels of government. But despite being 

defined by law, the very term ‘‘interoperability’’ is perhaps one of 

the most abused terms in the field of homeland security. If I asked 

10 people how to define interoperability, I would probably get 10 

different responses. 

Simply put, interoperability is the right people being able to communicate at the right time. Whether it is the Border Patrol trying 

to talk to a local sheriff along the border, or the Coast Guard trying 

to radio a nearby hospital, or even a New York City firefighter trying to yell at a nearby cop, interoperability is an essential goal for 

our Nation’s preparedness. Unfortunately, it is also a goal that has 

eluded the emergency response community for a long time. 

To address this issue, Congress created the Office of Emergency 

Communications, or OEC, and required a National Emergency 

Communication Plan. This plan, which was put into effect last August, provides a strategy for addressing our Nation’s emergency 

communication shortfalls, and it does so by laying out discrete 

milestones over the next 4 years. My question to you is whether we 

are on track to meet those targets. But considering that more than 

$1 billion provided for interoperability grants and public safety 

interoperability communication grants over the last 3 fiscal years 

is still unspent, and given the delays in critical programs like the 

integrated wireless network, it is fairly obvious the Department’s 

interoperability goals face some serious obstacles, obstacles that 

have to be and must be overcome. 

Today, with the help of our panel of witnesses, I hope we can 

learn more about the Department’s progress towards ensuring our 

emergency responders can communicate as needed on demand at 

all levels of government. With such a vital need at stake, failure 

is certainly not an option. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to this discussion. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

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Mr. PRICE. Dr. Boyd, please begin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF DR. BOYD

Mr. BOYD. Good morning, Chairman Price, Mr. Carter, members 

of the subcommittee. 

As the members of this committee are well aware, communications is essential to the success of any emergency response operation. Emergency responders need to share vital data and voice information across disciplines and jurisdictions to successfully respond to day-to-day incidents as well as to large-scale emergencies, 

which means we have to strengthen both operability, a prerequisite, as well as interoperability by developing tools, technologies and methodologies that agencies can use both day to day 

and in emergencies. 

But achieving interoperable communications requires a focus on 

genuine user needs, so we rely on both practitioners and policymakers across disciplines, jurisdictions and levels of government to 

ensure that our work is aligned with actual responders’ needs. We 

do this by piloting new technologies; developing and disseminating 

best practices, lessons learned, case studies and other tools; testing 

and evaluating current technologies; and creating methodologies for 

use by responders. 

Most of the tools in common use across the United States today 

were developed in the Office for Interoperability and Compatibility, 

the communications component of my division. These include the 

Interoperability Continuum, about which you will probably hear a 

great deal; the Public Safety Statement of Requirements for Interoperability, the first such document; the Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning Guide methodology, the first baseline study of interoperability ever conducted in the United States; 

and the Communications Unit Leader Syllabus, which is now used 

for training of communications leaders and many others. Both Canada and the United Kingdom have adopted many of these tools. 

They call it borrowing with pride. 

Working with practitioners, we developed the core strategy for 

improving interoperability for the Nation’s emergency responders, 

which is focused on promoting a system of systems approach, which 

uses standards-based communications equipment. This approach 

gives emergency response agencies the flexibility to select equipment that best meets their unique technical requirements and 

budget constraints. It also allows communications among systems 

owned and operated by different responder agencies that may have 

been developed by different manufacturers. 

Experience shows that the first requirement in introducing any 

new technology or concept is to first establish its credibility by 

proving it really works in an operational environment. We do this 

by initiating a pilot. But a single pilot demonstration in a single 

locality or region rarely generates sufficient information to answer 

the questions about whether it works, whether it works properly 

and whether it works adequately. So we have to do this in a number of places before we can expect to develop a replicable model for 

the Nation, because every jurisdiction, community and geographic 

area in the United States is different and has different needs and 

problems. We conduct these pilots and demonstrations in as many 


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places as possible. These pilot demonstrations affect not just the 

communities in which they are conducted, but also influence their 

neighbors, ultimately speeding adoption of technologies and lessons 

learned across the Nation. 

While governance and other human dimensions of interoperability are critical to any solution, technology remains at the center 

of the issue, making research, development, testing, evaluation 

standards and piloting of new interoperable technologies vital to 

the creation of a comprehensive solution. 

We are also developing key technologies to strengthen communications and information sharing, many of which are currently 

being successfully piloted throughout the Nation. The critical infrastructure inspection management system, which I can demonstrate 

later if anyone is interested, costs less than $3,000 per installation, 

well below initial estimates of at least $100,000 per installation, 

and has been deployed in the State of Maryland, where it has been 

credited with substantial cost savings for the State, and in Los Angeles, and is being implemented in other communities. 

The multiband radio, an affordable, single handheld unit capable 

of interoperating with State, Federal and military radios regardless 

of frequency or mode, is currently being piloted in several communities and even in a cross-border application with Canada. 

Virtual USA is a strategic initiative that builds on our partnership with the State of Alabama. The State asked us to help further 

develop this innovative project to provide critical information in 

whatever form emergency responders need, while also providing 

day-to-day value to local jurisdictions. While this initiative is far 

more than a geographical information system, it does allow critical 

data, such as real-time weather information, the location of fire hydrants, pipelines, and even tax and property data and other information critical to any State in any emergency, to be displayed on 

real-time maps and imagery or as standard reports in any format. 

The only limit to what can be shared and displayed is the imagination of those who use the system. 

Obviously this is a concept with enormous potential. So in the 

coming year we will be working with several other States, Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, Virginia, Georgia, Tennessee 

and others, to broaden this concept and create a set of tools to 

allow disparate State systems to interoperate and exchange data 

with any system and with any device, wired or wireless. Our goal 

is to create technologies and methodologies which are both 

application- and platform-agnostic, and which can enable the exchange of information in whatever form emergency responders 

need, delivered to whatever communications device they have without wasting legacy investments. 

Details regarding additional initiatives we are undertaking to 

improve communications and interoperability across the Nation can 

be found in the submission for the record. I would be happy to answer any questions the committee may have. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

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Mr. PRICE. Mr. Essid. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHRIS ESSID

Mr. ESSID. Thank you, Chairman Price, Ranking Member Rogers 

and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to join my colleagues here today to discuss our collective efforts to improve the 

Nation’s interoperable emergency communications. 

The Office of Emergency Communications was created to assist 

responders with developing the necessary capabilities to communicate with other jurisdictions, disciplines, and levels of government so they can manage incidents and restore essential services. 

OEC became operational less than 2 years ago, on April 1, 2007. 

We have worked hard to stand up an effective organization while 

at the same time executing our mission. The office had just four 

Federal employees when I came on board in December 2007; in 

fact, I was the fourth. Today I am proud to report that we have 

27 Federal employees on board, and we are making great progress 

toward reaching our full staffing level of 47 Federal employees, 

which will include regional coordinators in each of the FEMA regions. 

One of OEC’s major accomplishments is our National Emergency 

Communications Plan, which we developed in partnership with 

over 150 stakeholders from all levels of government and the private 

sector. This national plan is just one example of how we use a 

stakeholder-driven approach to shape our programs, policies and 

projects. 

The Federal Government cannot accomplish this alone, and that 

is why OEC has worked to develop and maintain strong partnerships with organizations that represent an estimated 2.8 million 

public safety first responders from all levels of government 

throughout the Nation, to coordinate planning and implement effective solutions for interoperable emergency communications. This 

plan incorporates everything that Dr. Boyd talked about and a 

whole lot more. We did not start from scratch. It builds upon years 

of work. 

OEC coordinates with these State, local, tribal governments, as 

well as Federal agencies directly and through partnerships that include the SAFECOM Executive Committee, the SAFECOM Emergency Response Council, the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center and the Federal Partnership for Interoperable 

Communications, to name a few. We have worked closely with 

these groups and many others to develop the national plan and get 

it to Congress last July. It is the first nationwide strategic plan of 

its kind and serves as the guiding force behind many of our other 

activities. 

Implementation is off to a great start, and OEC and its Federal, 

State and local partners have already met many of the milestones 

within the plan’s time frames. We feel we are on schedule. 

We recognize that this is a challenging period for all government 

levels due to the economic climate. The national plan sets out to 

eliminate duplicate efforts, to foster partnerships, and streamline 

these limited resources to improve interoperable emergency communications. We appreciate the committee’s continued support for 

the implementation of this national plan. 


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OEC has directly worked to help States and territories update 

their Statewide Interoperable Communications Plans, otherwise 

known as the SCIPs, and implement the initiatives in the plans or 

otherwise turn them into reality by conducting day-long workshops 

in 52 of the 56 States and territories. We are on track to complete 

these workshops by June of this year. 

OEC continues to work closely with FEMA Grants Program Directorate to manage the Interoperable Emergency Communications 

Grant Program. Our goal is to ensure the grant guidance from this 

program is aligned to the priorities and initiatives of the national 

plan and targets the most effective ways to support the States in 

implementing their statewide plans. The fiscal year 2009 grant applications are currently under review, and we expect the funds to 

be awarded within the next 2 months. 

Another important element of OEC’s mission is providing direct 

technical assistance to State, local, territorial and tribal governments. In fact, OEC has supported more than 270 specific requests 

for technical assistance since our creation, and we are providing a 

more targeted technical assistance offering that aligns with the 

gaps and initiatives identified in the statewide and the national 

plans. 

OEC works with our international partners in Mexico and Canada to support improved interoperable communications at the border. We have developed a plan to ensure effective interoperability 

during the 2010 Olympic Games in Vancouver. We are also 

partnering with Public Safety Canada to conduct the inaugural 

U.S.-Canada cross-border interoperable communications workshop 

which will be held in May 2009 in Niagara Falls, New York. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for 

your support for such a vital part of Homeland Security’s mission. 

In OEC’s short 2-year existence, we have developed and delivered 

the national plan to Congress, we have assisted the 56 States and 

territories in developing their statewide plans and conducted workshops to make those plans a reality with their implementation activities, we have prioritized our technical assistance offerings to address the gaps in those statewide plans, and we have worked with 

FEMA Grants Program Directorate to target grant funds at those 

gaps the States themselves have identified. 

While we have accomplished a lot in a short amount of time, we 

still have a lot more to do. OEC looks forward to working with Congress, our colleagues sitting beside me at this table and our partners throughout the Nation at all levels of government, to continue 

our progress. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

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Mr. PRICE. Mr. Ashley. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF W. ROSS ASHLEY

Mr. ASHLEY. Good morning, Chairman Price, Congressman 

Carter, members of the committee. Good to see you all again this 

week. And happy St. Patrick’s Day. It is fun to see all the green 

there. 

I am Ross Ashley. I serve as the Assistant Administrator of the 

Grant Programs Directorate at FEMA. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our efforts to improve 

interoperability communications across the Nation. 

As you know, FEMA is the Department of Homeland Security’s 

lead agency that assists States, local, tribal jurisdictions and regional authorities to prepare, respond to and recover from natural 

disasters, terrorist acts and other catastrophic incidents. As part of 

this mission, the Grants Program Directorate in partnership with 

the Office of Emergency Communications, the Science and Technology Directorate at DHS, as well as the National Telecommunications and Information Administration at the Department of Commerce provides funding to grantees for a variety of initiatives related to interoperable communications. 

These initiatives are a shared priority among the leadership at 

DHS and Commerce, as well as our State and local stakeholders. 

As such, we collaborate to increase the capabilities of State and 

local jurisdictions to communicate during natural and man-made 

disasters. The greatest percentage of funds across all grant programs is for activities related to interoperable communications. 

This is the highest priority for our stakeholders and the highest 

priority item on the 37 target capabilities list. 

These grant programs are yielding positive, real-world results 

today. I would like to share a few examples of how these grant dollars have significantly impacted States and helped improve their 

ability to communicate. 

North Carolina has planned an expansion of the State’s Voice 

Interoperability Project for Emergency Responders. This $25 million investment enables many of North Carolina’s 101 jurisdictions 

to connect to and use a single, uniform communications system. 

Other examples include New York City’s expansion of its communication capabilities within its subway and subterranean environments. This $32 million system provides law enforcement, fire service and Federal and State incident response personnel with a 

shared UHF communications system, facilitating communications 

in the City’s vast underground infrastructure. 

Illinois is using nearly $43 million in public safety interoperability communications funding to link VHF, UHF 800-megahertz 

legacy systems to a statewide platform called STARCOM 21. Illinois’s investment supports 12 regional projects in areas of high risk 

of natural disaster or terrorism. Collectively, these projects executed at the local level provide statewide interoperability to over 

100 public safety agencies protecting more than 11 million Illinois 

residents. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, this concludes my oral 

statement. Thank you for your continued support of FEMA’s Grant 


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Program Directorate and the Department of Homeland Security. I 

am happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Mr. PRICE. Thanks. 

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TRANSITION TO 700-MEGAHERTZ BAND

Mr. PRICE. Thanks to all of you. 

Let me start with you, Mr. Essid, and ask you a very basic question about the systems that you are working with now, and what 

their future is, and the kind of system you envision us moving to. 

Congress has made investments in State and local communications systems for years, both through Homeland Security and 

through the Department of Justice. Just in DHS we estimate that 

we have invested $3.7 billion since 2003 on equipment that can operate in the currently available spectrum. Now the Federal Government plans to make the 700-megahertz spectrum available for public safety agencies, and, of course, use of this spectrum will depend 

on the build-out of adequate infrastructure and the obtaining by individual agencies of equipment that operates on that spectrum. 

Can you explain what will become of the systems currently being 

built and used by localities if we transition to a 700-megahertz solution for emergency responders? That is my very basic question. 

Do we run the risk that existing investments become obsolete once 

the 700-megahertz band is available? And realistically speaking, 

how long is it going to take for this 700-megahertz option to be 

available to the emergency responder community? 

Mr. ESSID. Yes, sir. I will give it a try. 

One of the misnomers or misperceptions is that once new spectrum or new technology is rolled out it will replace a lot of the existing investments. However, as Dr. Boyd mentioned, in the United 

States we have a system of systems. There is not enough capacity 

in any one frequency band for all of public safety to move all their 

communications there, nor is there enough money, so we have to 

operate a system of systems. 

Many localities throughout the Nation—and localities are where 

most of the investments have been made in communications systems, whether it be through grants or through their general 

funds—are all over the place. They are in VHF, UHF, 800 megahertz, 700 megahertz. So a lot of these first responders, as we have 

interacted with them first around the Nation, have identified that 

they have just bought a VHF system, a statewide system, in the 

Commonwealth of Virginia, for example. They paid $350 million for 

this statewide system, using no grant funds. That investment will 

not be obsolete, until that system runs through its whole life cycle. 

And one of the things the first responders told us to put in this national plan is an objective that focuses on system life cycle planning 

to provide better long-term support and planning for the technology 

investments, not just one type, as newer technology comes on 

board. 

And that is where interoperability has been challenging, because 

you have different frequency bands. You have different technologies, and if you spend a certain amount of money on a system, 

it has to run its life cycle. People aren’t going to say, hey, we 

bought a new radio system 5 years ago; now that there is some frequency available, we are going to scrap what we were doing and 

move to this newer system. We have to make them all work together. 


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So we are trying to help localities and their elected officials with 

life-cycle planning and tools to understand when they are making 

these types of decisions on these expensive systems, that a life 

cycle for a system typically runs 10 to 15 to 20 years. They are not 

going to start over right away. There will be a migration. Some 

areas are ready to go and migrate. 

So we are going to see some of this take place. First in urban 

areas where they go through the technologies a little more rapidly. 

But not everyone is just going to switch to 700 megahertz, nor 

could that happen. It will be a gradual migration. And some of 

these older legacy systems will run their life cycles. 

Does that answer your question? 

Mr. PRICE. Yes. Well, let me just move to the obvious question, 

and you and Mr. Boyd both can respond here, the obvious question 

about how we are doing on that transition and the failure of this 

auction. The upcoming digital television transition, of course, is 

supposed to free up spectrum for public safety agencies. And the 

FCC has envisioned that, the private sector buying the D block of 

the 700-megahertz band, which would then build out the system 

and make certain frequencies available for first responders. 

That public-private model doesn’t seem to be too convincing to 

private companies, at least for now. At the auction in early 2008, 

there was only one bid for the D block, which failed to meet the 

FCC’s reserve price. So this possibly puts us years away from 

achieving national broadband interoperability for first responders, 

or does it? That is really what we are asking here. 

Both of you have stressed that we are not going to lose these earlier investments. We are incorporating the legacy systems. But obviously there are a lot of questions about this transition and what 

it would require and how fast it can take place. Even with private 

investment, the FCC allowed up to 15 years to construct a nationwide first responder broadband network. 

So I guess the most basic question is how essential is this? Do 

all of our first responders need to be on the same spectrum channel 

to ensure interoperability, or is that at least the eventual goal? 

And, Dr. Boyd, without a part of the radio spectrum dedicated to 

first responders, can we ever achieve true interoperability? And, of 

course, there have been other proposals by some of the first responder groups that the FCC should simply grant 700 megahertz 

licenses to regional nonprofit entities so that local municipalities 

can build their own networks on these channels. Is that a possible 

model? 

So basically, that is what I am looking for here is some kind of 

assessment of where we are in this transition and really how critical the transition is to the overall goal we are trying to achieve. 

Mr. BOYD. Well, let me explain first that there are two components to the 700-megahertz spectrum issue. One component is the 

D block, which is that piece that was intended by the Public Safety 

Spectrum Trust to support broadband applications only. The other 

half of it is for more ordinary trunked radio, or other digital radio 

communications, the same kind of communications you currently 

have on 800 megahertz, for example. 

Unfortunately, the delay of the release of the television spectrum 

has also delayed these more visual applications, and applications 


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that do not need to wait for the auction. This 12 megahertz, in fact, 

could be applied immediately to system requirements in the field. 

This still falls short of what public safety said they needed for additional spectrum. I guess going on 8 or 9 years ago now, the National Task Force in Interoperability identified about 97-megahertz 

of additional spectrum that public safety still required. 

The D block is intended to provide a ubiquitous broadband capability to public safety. It would be disingenuous of me to suggest 

that broadband is not available simply because the D block hasn’t 

been released because, in fact, broadband is available in a variety 

of ways using existing commercial systems. Those existing commercial systems are not dedicated to public safety, which is the fundamental difference. So public safety is concerned that in an emergency they might not have access to the commercial structures 

which can currently provide broadband access—and, of course, 

there is a cost associated with commercial service as well. 

We demonstrated a project we called ROW–B, which is short for 

Radio Over Wireless Broadband, and we demonstrated it here in 

this building, in fact, I would guess about 2 or 3 months ago. We 

are now transitioning that same capability to NORTHCOM to use 

when they go into places where it would be useful. It is capable of 

tying together all the systems—it doesn’t matter whether it is an 

Internet-based system, or it is an over-the-air system, or it is a regular telephone or a commercial cell phone; it doesn’t make any difference—so that you can create talk groups of all the kinds you do 

in normal emergency communication systems, whether it is a desktop, or a landline telephone, or a handheld or other kind of device. 

So that capability is available now. 

The problem that public safety has is that the commercial wireless piece—and this is part of the reason I think people haven’t bid 

for that 700 megahertz—only provides coverage where they have 

enough subscribers to be able to carry the freight. It is expensive 

to maintain. They are not going to build out more towers than they 

can get a return on. They are not going to provide more coverage 

than they can get a return on. They are not even going to provide 

more capacity than they can get a return on, which is why sometimes during rush hour around here you will get ‘‘service unavailable’’ because it is blocked up with too many callers. 

Right now we provide pretty good coverage to about 85 percent 

of the population, but that other 15 percent, which represents a 

huge piece of the land mass of the United States, is going to be 

very expensive to cover, whether it is in a D block public safety application or we simply work with commercial providers to support 

it. 

Mr. PRICE. Well, it is difficult to predict whether one of these 

major companies is going to step forward in the future. If there is 

not a private partner to pay for this build-out that you are describing, who is left to do it? I mean, what are our options going to be? 

Mr. BOYD. Well, at a technical level, I think the options are 

these: The first option if you are going to build out a system like 

that and there is no private partner, then somebody is going to 

have to subsidize it—either public safety, who I don’t think can afford it, or the Federal Government—but it is very, very expensive. 

I think it would take $15 billion to provide even the kind of covVerDate Nov 24 2008 02:52 Oct 22, 2009 Jkt 052213 PO 00000 Frm 00329 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\52213P2.XXX 52213P2

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erage we are talking about now, which is actually reduced to what 

is the current commercial coverage. It is pretty expensive. 

An other option is to tie together existing systems. You don’t 

have to have two neighbors on the same band. You can have one 

on 700-megahertz, one on 800, another one on 140, and another 

one on 400. In fact, as the New York City firefighters will tell you, 

400 megahertz offers some primary advantages to them in penetration in high-rises. 

BRIDGING TECHNOLOGY

Mr. PRICE. Let me interrupt you and ask you, yes, that is obviously what we are going to have, at least in the near term. Is there 

anything wrong with that or deficient about that for the long term, 

or realistically is that what we are looking at in the foreseeable future, what Mr. Essid called a system of systems that requires 

bridging technology as opposed to a uniform system? 

Mr. BOYD. I don’t believe, frankly, that that is a bad solution. In 

fact, I believe that in many respects it is probably the only viable 

solution that is going to make a difference in less than one or two 

decades, because right now it comes down to trying to tie folks together. 

Let’s look at some of the good news out there that the public 

safety community doesn’t get enough credit for. When we did the 

baseline survey back in 2006, we found that, two-thirds of all the 

responding agencies—and we went out to 22,000 different agencies—were capable of establishing interoperability for major events. 

Interoperability does not mean every officer needs to talk to 

every officer. I find it hard to imagine a case where a patrol officer 

in Beverly Hills needs to talk to a fireman in Miami. I just can’t 

see that happening. What you need are points of connection where 

people are able to talk to each other. Public safety guys are pretty 

good at identifying these points, and they have used a variety of 

approaches—sometimes sharing radios, and sometimes using patch 

solutions so they can operate across these different bands. 

Having multiple bands offers a number of different advantages. 

One is that it is incredibly expensive to change current systems 

out. Our best, conservative estimate based on assessments of new 

systems and what the systems cost going in, is that the current investment in the installed infrastructure exceeds $100 billion. We 

are not going to throw that away. It is just too expensive. And the 

vast majority of that money came from localities, not from the Federal Government. So they are going to be reluctant, as Mr. Essid 

pointed out, to throw away a $350 million investment that still 

works. 

The second advantage to having multiple systems is that because 

they are spread out across spectrum in a variety of places, some 

of the spectrum has different propagation characteristics. If I am 

in a high-rise area like New York City, for example, 400 megahertz 

may be the right kind of approach to me because, as an accidental 

consequence of the building codes, it penetrates buildings better 

than 700 or 800 megahertz does. If I am in a place like Pima County, Arizona, and I have wide open spaces, then the 150-megahertz 

spectrum is probably better because it gives me greater range with 

fewer towers. In a place where I have less population, the last 


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thing I want to build is a lot of towers, because towers tend to be 

the single most expensive piece of the structure. 

The second thing is that even if we were to change to a single 

band and put everybody on it, it is not as simple as retuning the 

radios. There is a tendency a lot of times for vendors to say, well, 

gee, you already have a tower structure up. Well, a tower structure 

that works on 150 megahertz may not work on 700 or 800 megahertz because, for one thing, range is dramatically reduced. They 

are affected much more by terrain. I can tell you that 700 and 800 

megahertz will tend to require lots of towers in Mr. Rogers’ district, 

for example, because eastern Kentucky is very rugged terrain, and 

has lots of shadowing. There are other places in the United States 

that are much like that. So in his State, quite often 150 megahertz 

will offer some advantage because of the way it propagates, but 

there is not much of that spectrum available. So I think we need 

these multiple systems to be in place. 

Then there is a third and really important consideration and that 

is that you eliminate single points of failure when you have multiple systems and multiple networks; that is, taking one network 

out doesn’t take them all out, so that you don’t have the kind of 

thing you have where somebody launches an Internet attack on 

Microsoft servers and takes out all of the Microsoft servers in the 

country. When you have disparate systems, that is much more difficult to do. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Rogers, welcome to our hearing. We will turn to you next. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for 

being late, but I had to introduce a constituent of mine, a blinded 

Iraqi veteran, before the Veterans’ Committee. He was testifying, 

and I deemed that took precedence. But thank you for recognizing 

me. 

And welcome, gentlemen, to the committee. 

I very much appreciate our panel appearing today to discuss this 

particular issue, particularly a University of Kentucky Wildcat Mr. 

Essid. 

And, Mr. Ashley, we meet again. 

Mr. ASHLEY. Yes, sir. 

BACKLOG OF UNEXPENDED FUNDS

Mr. ROGERS. It is deja vu all over again, because just last week 

at our rail and transit security hearing, we were talking about an 

enormous amount of grant money languishing in the coffer and not 

fulfilling the security needs of our Nation. And as I look at the 

funding history data of both the Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program and the Public Safety Interoperable Communications Program, only a pathetic 6.4 percent of the more than 

$1 billion provided for these programs—over the last 3 fiscal years, 

only 6.4 percent has been spent. That means there is more than 

$997 million that could be out on the streets helping our first responders meet their interoperability needs. Instead, it is the same 

old song we heard last week, and that, frankly, is just not going 

to fly. 

So without further ado, and bearing in mind there has been some 

discussion of this issue before I arrived, I am going to turn immeVerDate Nov 24 2008 02:52 Oct 22, 2009 Jkt 052213 PO 00000 Frm 00331 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\52213P2.XXX 52213P2

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diately to Mr. Ashley and ask why has this enormous amount of 

money not been spent? And what are you doing to fix the logjam? 

Mr. ASHLEY. Thank you, Congressman. 

To say that the money is languishing in the Federal coffers, the 

money is available to the States and has been. When we talk about 

the PSIC grants, for over a year now all $968 million minus the 

management and administration is available for the States to draw 

down. So it is not unavailable to them. 

Just because the money is sitting in the Federal Treasury doesn’t 

mean it is not being used. Projects are out there in every State of 

every Member’s jurisdiction that are up there on the panel that are 

being executed today. It does take the States time to draw down 

funding. Some States don’t even draw down except for once a year 

do they actually reconcile their books and then draw the money 

down from the Federal Government. So even if we were in sync 

with every State budget that was out there, you could see the case 

where about—if you miss the cycle, you could be off by as much as 

23 months in actual funds being drawn down from the Federal 

Treasury. 

So I think it is a misnomer to be able to—you know, to cite the 

funds that are in the Treasury not being actually utilized for 

projects in the field. We had reporting back from every one of these 

reporting projects saying what is being accomplished from each 

State jurisdiction on specifically the Public Safety Interoperable 

Communications Program. 

Dr. Boyd, I can give a great explanation when we talk about the 

technology involved with why it takes a long time for States to 

draw these down. This isn’t a statement saying that we are putting 

off our responsibilities to have funding drawn down and blaming 

it on the local governments. Rather, it takes time to implement 

these projects. Some of these interoperability projects can take up 

to 3 to 5 years to implement, which then causes the States to draw 

down. 

One other example of the timing it takes to draw funds down. 

We make the funds available once—or excuse me, funds are available to draw down once a State actually encumbers the funds. They 

don’t have to spend the funds. They could have a $1 million project 

divided into four $250,000 tasks. Once they have encumbered that 

first task, that funding is available to draw down. We can’t, therefore, go and tell them to draw it down; they draw it down on their 

own schedules. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, you know, it has been what, 8 years now since 

9/11, and here we are still trying to decide how to spend the grant 

moneys that we have approved for years and years and years. For 

the life of me, I cannot understand why we don’t get with it. 

Kentucky, for example, just a month ago or so had that terrible 

ice storm from coast to coast. It covered the entire State, huge 

amounts of ice that devastated the State, the worst disaster the 

Governor says that State has ever suffered. But the main initial 

impact was there was no communications. The Governor of the 

State didn’t know whether or not anyone in any part of the State 

was injured. There was just no communications. The towers came 

down. Wires were broke by the falling leaves. The electric power 

was cut off. There was no communications to most of the State, 


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which is unbelievable in this modern day and age. And yet this 

money has been laying here, waiting for the State to pick it up, and 

I don’t understand why, for example, Kentucky hasn’t perfected the 

grant application to the point that you can dish the money out. 

Mr. ASHLEY. I can tell you for Kentucky, they were awarded $15 

million under the PSIC program. They have approximately drawn 

down I want to say—you know, within the first three quarters, 

they didn’t draw anything down of it. And then I think they have 

drawn down a total of about $1.6 million of those dollars over the 

last year that they have actually drawn down. 

Now, that is not to say that Kentucky—they have three main 

projects that are going on out there. They are out there executing 

on those projects, procuring equipment. There is three, one in the 

Louisville area, one in the Kentucky Strategic Mutual Aid System, 

as well as a strategic technology reserve. They are out there procuring those things and putting them in there. Just because they 

haven’t gone into our financial system and electronically transferred the funds into theirs doesn’t mean that it is not getting accomplished. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Essid, your office works with States, does it not, 

to help them perfect their plans, their statewide plans? 

Mr. ESSID. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Tell us what is going on. 

Mr. ESSID. Well, I was going to pipe in to try to help Mr. Ashley 

explain this. A lot of the investments that the larger grants have 

supported are technology investments, buying systems and stuff. It 

takes so much planning, and so much coordination to get the right 

stuff. So it takes a while for States to draw down those dollars. 

We have worked with States on their Statewide Communications 

Interoperability Plans, and we are happy to report to you although 

only eight States had statewide plans in March of 2007; now all of 

the States and territories have a plan based on common criteria. 

So we work with the States to help them better coordinate all types 

of their activities, including large purchases of systems. I am of the 

belief, because the first responders are of the belief, that the interoperability problem is 90 percent coordination, 10 percent technology. The technologies are out there to solve this problem, and 

we have spent a lot of the grant funds on the technologies. What 

is lacking is training and exercises, standard operating procedure 

development, development of MOUs, development of governance, 

everything I call coordination. So the States and locals have told 

us, we need to invest in these coordination activities. 

That is what we do to help the States when we go in. For example, we are doing one on March 19, we are going to be in Kentucky 

doing a SCIP workshop, statewide plan workshop. And they want 

a better understanding—a shared understanding—of funding strategies to implement a lot of the priority initiatives in their statewide 

plan. They also would like awareness of all of our goals and how 

this is working together. So we customize every workshop by what 

the State needs since statewide plans are a little different as far 

as gaps. 

So I think that these governance structures that we have in 

every State now, where we have State folks working with local 

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wide plans, we are going to see improved coordination. These technology purchases are going to speed up because they are going to 

have their act together at the start, versus—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I will tell you what. Three years ago we created your office because States weren’t applying for the grants and 

getting the money out there. And the Congress says, well, I will tell 

you what. Out of frustration and desperation, we said, let’s create 

a one-stop shop where they can come in and tell us what the problem is, and they are not searching around, trying to find the right 

bureaucracy to work with. And out of that grew this office. And 

here we are now 3 years later, and nothing has happened. What 

else can we do, please? 

Mr. ESSID. Well, sir, I think we have had a lot of success. As far 

as drawing down the money faster, we have been working to increase coordination and identify needed governance structures. Before we were created, a lot of these States didn’t have full-time 

interoperability coordinators. They didn’t have governance structures where the States were working with the localities. And then 

those folks weren’t really working with the State Administrative 

Agency, the SAA, which really coordinates with FEMA on spending 

the money. 

We have built these partnerships throughout the Nation. In essence, we are building a kind of highway so that they can coordinate their grant expenditures and draw down faster. We are working as fast as we can on the State plans and those governance 

structures, which are essential to the road forward and the national plan. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I have a slogan that I use frequently and that 

is, plan your work and work your plan. 

Mr. ESSID. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. You are planning your work, but I don’t see nobody 

working the plan. 

Mr. ESSID. Well, a lot of these initiatives are in the national 

plan, sir. Again, we have coordinated the development of this document with those same stakeholders from the States and localities. 

We really are working this plan, the national plan. We have met 

11 of our first milestones, and we are coordinating with FEMA’s 

Grants Program Directorate to do everything we can to inform 

folks of what grants are out there, to give feedback on what could 

be improved in the grant process so the money could be drawn 

down faster. 

But, again, as Mr. Ashley said, and as Dr. Boyd could also explain, some of the projects they are applying for are very technical 

in nature, like procuring a statewide system. For example, I mentioned earlier the system Virginia purchased. Although they didn’t 

spend any grant funds on it. It took them 6 years to move from the 

initial idea to actually purchase equipment. These things are very 

technical in nature, and there are so many factors. Also every 

State’s procurement rules are even different, so it takes a while. I 

am not making excuses, sir, I am just explaining how technical it 

can be. And a lot of the larger grant funds out there, billions of dollars, have been spent on stuff. Those are the types of projects those 

funds are supporting. 


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One of the things we heard from the stakeholders around the 

Nation was, we need help with coordination. And now we have the 

Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program, $50 

million in fiscal year 2008, $50 million in fiscal year 2009. That 

goes for things like training and exercises, SOPs, governance. 

Those are the focus areas, not a lot of equipment. They have been 

drawing down very well on that, and we have gotten excellent feedback from States and locals that it is helping them with the essential activities that will help them make faster and more coordinated equipment purchases. 

INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS GRANT PROGRAM

Mr. ROGERS. My records show that 99.9 percent of those funds 

are still there. 

Mr. ESSID. Sir, they have been made available as soon as their 

statewide plans were approved. I don’t know if Mr. Ashley has an 

answer for that, but they have been able to draw down on the fiscal 

year 2008 funds since their statewide plans were developed. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I will close. My time is up. But in Kentucky 

during the ice storm—and by the way, some people are still without electricity, and that has been almost 6 weeks ago—28 people 

died, some of them because of lack of communications, because they 

did not have interoperable communications. So Kentuckians died 

during that emergency. And other States are similarly afflicted. So 

this is not a matter of debating. 

Mr. ESSID. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. This is a matter of getting that money out there 

and getting interoperable communications in business. And don’t 

tell me it is too complicated. Look at how we built up before World 

War II. We went from nowhere in 4 years to becoming the world’s 

greatest power. They built 296,000 aircraft, for example, and they 

didn’t have one to begin with. And you are telling me you can’t 

build in the States the capability of police and first responders to 

talk to each other. For God’s sake, get with it. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

And we will be picking up on this in various ways. It does seem 

to me we are getting somewhat mixed messages here about this 

complexity. I mean, on the one hand you are saying we have technologies that help us overcome complexity; that we have made a lot 

of advances, and not having to make everything uniform, but in 

being able to talk among systems. And then at the same time it 

appears that complexity is a barrier to getting the money out the 

door. I think we need to understand that better. 

Mr. SERRANO. 

EMERGENCY RESPONDERS ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE

Mr. SERRANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I will try to be brief in my opening comments so that 

you can answer what I think will be a few questions involved in 

that. 

I was not in Washington with my colleagues on September 11. 

I was in New York. It was a primary day, election day in New 

York. No one writes about the fact that maybe one of the targets 

was to disrupt an election and the electoral process. 


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That is where I was that day, and I recall in addition to the people in the street and the screaming and the pain and the anguish 

of what was going on, I recall that everything went down. Radio 

stations for the most part went down, TV stations went down, and 

you couldn’t make a phone call from a cell phone. 

Put that aside for a second. I travel on Amtrak every week to 

New York, and when I get into one of the tunnels, if I am on a 

phone call, that phone call dies. Put that aside for a second also. 

Thirdly, I am Chairman of the committee that oversees the FCC, 

and one of the issues with the FCC is getting satellite radio to 

service the territories, Sirius and XM, now it is one. And they tell 

me that the satellite doesn’t point in that direction. I profoundly or 

jokingly told them to go borrow a satellite from the CIA, but they 

say they can’t reach the territories. Remind you that we got into 

World War II after a territory named Hawaii was attacked. 

So my question to you is, number one, heaven forbid New York 

City was attacked again, will people be able to communicate with 

each other as you understand it now? Will those TV stations continue to give out the information necessary? Will the radio stations 

be able to function? 

Secondly, will firemen and police officers in tunnels throughout 

that city be able to communicate? 

And lastly, heaven forbid they attack us on one of our territories, 

Guam, Samoa. Can we communicate with them, or are we going to 

be hearing from them that somehow the satellites didn’t reach 

them in time? 

I know that is really three questions, but I think it speaks to the 

issue at hand. 

SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

Mr. BOYD. First, I think you are exactly right that a satellite 

ought to be one of the arrows in an emergency manager’s quiver, 

and that is particularly crucial in places like the Hawaiian Islands. 

I was working 3 or 4 months ago in Honolulu with the emergency 

managers, talking about how they would maintain communications 

among their four counties, each of which, as you know, is a separate island. And in fact, for them, while they can use towers in 

some circumstances, satellite communications are really important. 

We have to understand where satellites can pay off. And satellites pay off hugely in places like communicating to some of our 

island territories. They are also very good at communicating among 

operation centers. They are not terribly good for first responders 

who are actually down doing the basic work simply because they 

don’t penetrate well through structures and places where you are 

executing the rescue. They don’t work at all in tunnels. So part of 

the design, I think, of communication systems has to take into account what you have to do to put communications into all of the 

elements of your community. 

New York is a special case because they have got so much underground subway structure. They have been doing some work trying 

to put some special cabling in to allow communication in the subway. Unfortunately, they have had some contracting difficulties, 

contractor performance difficulties in putting some of that into 


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place. But I think they have got the right idea in trying to wire 

the subway. 

Here in the District, some of the tunnel structure allows that, 

but, in fact, Congress itself has that problem because of the nature 

of these buildings. I was asked not too long ago to help the Capitol 

Police develop their new system which is in essence, in tunnels. 

Each of these buildings has thick, thick walls. You also have tunnel 

structures in basements underground. You have many of the same 

kinds of problems as in subways. 

We did not build, as a Nation, communication systems initially 

into our tunnels. We built telephone systems because most police, 

back when we were building these things, didn’t use radios. So we 

are now, in a lot of respects, playing catch up, and that comes back 

to the point I made earlier. 

OPERABILITY VERSUS INTEROPERABILITY

The first priority, the absolute first prerequisite if we are going 

to make a difference is operability, not interoperability. Interoperability matters a great deal, but it is impossible and essentially irrelevant if you can’t communicate to begin with. So the first thing 

we have to do it seems to me, is to think about how we are going 

to strengthen a number of these systems. Unfortunately, in many 

cases, what we have done is jump to interoperability without first 

saying we have got a lot of communications systems out there that 

are very old, very weak, very tired and that don’t perform well in 

massive ice storms or in hurricanes or other disasters. 

And so we need to think about a two-tiered process which says, 

you have got to establish operability, and we need to apply guidance and standards so that they can design in interoperability as 

they are building operability. But we have to start with operability 

first. And that means addressing things like, how do we handle 

communications in tunnels? 

Mr. ESSID. It is not uncommon for many folks out there in the 

public safety world to have redundant systems in case one fails. 

And when we go out and provide our technical assistance throughout the Nation, we see their public safety systems have to be more 

resilient, and they usually have redundant systems in case they 

fail. 

NIMS UMBRELLA COMMUNICATIONS UNIT LEADER TRAINING

But I echo what Dr. Boyd just said about the operability. Some 

of what we have been doing, no matter what type of technology is 

deployed, if those communications can’t be set up in a standardized 

way, you have a lot of chaos in mutual aid situations. And so we 

had some real success stories here. One of the things we have been 

doing is training folks on how to set up communications under the 

NIMS umbrella, the Communications Unit Leader Training that 

Dr. Boyd mentioned in his opening remarks. 

Two recent success stories arise from our training these first responders on how to set up communications in a standardized way 

just recently. In fall 2008, we did COML training in Houston, 

Texas. Shortly after, Hurricane Ike made landfall, and those first 

responders were able to use their skills and their training right 

away to respond to Hurricane Ike. They set up communications 


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just as it would be done in different parts of the country in a standardized way. 

Then in January we did a COML course in Tennessee. As Congressman Rogers mentioned, the ice storm hit Kentucky and parts 

of Tennessee very hard. Those first responders were able to go out 

and use the training they just received to set up communications 

with different systems in a standardized way. So these are some 

of the things that deal with operability, before you move to interoperability. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Carter. 

INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Well, this is a very complicated business here. But I served for 

many years as a district judge, and we had interoperability issues 

going back clear back to the 1980s. And I want to start with the 

frustrations that the local people have. Yes, they don’t draw down 

because they have concerns, for whatever reason. I would be willing to bet that a lot of people don’t draw down because they don’t 

know where the future is. 

And one of the things, just in my county, we got caught in a trap. 

As we started to grow, it was 80,000 when I became a judge; when 

I left as a judge there, we had about 340,000. Now we have got 

about 370,000 people there. The problem was, we bought a phone 

system in 1986 that was supposed to be interoperable with the 

largest town next to us, Austin, and it was for 2 years, until Austin 

bought a new phone system, and then it was not interoperable any 

more, and their solution was for us to spend another $10 million 

to get operable, to get interoperable. And it just, that is just in one 

little bitty part of Texas. We bounced around with interoperability, 

and every time you would try to get even with somebody, some 

salesman would come in and sell somebody something else, and it 

would go away. 

To me, and I just think you have to think outside the box, and 

it may be technically impossible. But, I mean, you you have got a 

scanner that the bad guys can scan every police channel simultaneously, and as soon as they hear something about dope, they can 

push a button and hear what they are talking about. If you have 

got that, there ought to be some kind of system that can collect 

whatever communication is coming in and make it operate with the 

other one. Is anybody working on that kind of technology? 

Mr. BOYD. In fact, we have demonstrated that kind of technology. 

That is what we demonstrated here in the Rayburn Building. What 

we set up here in the District, was ROW–B, and we are now 

transitioning it to NORTHCOM and are also working in some communities in California to put it in place. ROW–B is essentially a 

combination of technologies controlled from a single screen. So, basically, you can think of it as a tower control operator who is managing communications. Let’s say that you have a telephone at your 

desk. You can pick up your telephone, make a call through a commercial telephone system, make a connection then to the station so 

that you can talk to the officer on the beat, and you will both talk 

to each other on the technology you happen to have. 


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You can also connect to a satellite link if there is a satellite link 

available. You could even connect to someone, if you had a device 

that exchanged data, you could do it through a computer desktop, 

or if you had a multi-use device, you could connect to it, or you 

could talk to a cell phone. You can connect all of these things together. That technology exists and, in fact, has been present for a 

while. 

What we have found over the years is that if you want to make 

this happen ultimately, and you want communities to make the 

kinds of decisions it takes to put these together, you have to pilot 

demonstrate these in the field; that is, you actually have to go out 

in the community, work directly with the community, put it in 

place, help them understand how to use it and have them apply it. 

We have had some remarkable success in, for example, a community in California that uses a system they call ICIS, I-C-I-S. And 

I am going to be hard pressed to tell you what the acronym stands 

for, but it is an integrated communications interoperability suite or 

something like that. Basically, what they did was to take our materials on their own with their own money—without federal money 

and build a system which involved seven to nine jurisdictions 

where they can exchange dispatch data from dispatch consoles. 

They can communicate directly with each other, even though they 

are not all on exactly the same kind of system and probably won’t 

be for a while, simply because of the cost. 

Here is another issue, and I once had an opportunity to spend 

some time with Ms. Lowey and explain part of this. If you think 

about how long it takes to build out a system, even if you are incredibly efficient and the money comes in, you have designed the 

system and you have put it to work, what public safety told us in 

a survey is that 50 percent expect to change their systems out over 

the next 5 years. The remaining 50 percent expect to change them 

out by the end of 10 years. Even though we know that the average 

life expectancy of a system in the field is 20 or 30 years, let’s take 

them at their word, and let’s say it is 10 years. That means that 

no matter how we manage the technology, unless we decide we are 

going to prevent any further innovation, the system that goes in at 

the end of 10 years is going to be 10 years newer than the system 

that went in at the beginning of that cycle. That is part of the challenge. 

Let me give you a little different perspective, as a retired Army 

officer, about how involved this can be and how much conscious attention to detail, working directly with locals, I think, takes to 

makes this work. The Department of Defense, I remember, proudly 

announced a few years before I was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Army that it was going to be fully interoperable. The Department of Defense will tell you now they are about 60 percent 

the way there. And I retired from a full military career 17 years 

ago. 

Instead of a single department and four services, we are looking 

at 60,000 jurisdictions in 50 States and six territories and districts. 

So what I would encourage everyone to consider here is that it is 

really frustrating; it is really tough. But at the end of the day, it 

is a human activity. We can achieve emergency level interoperability right now if all of the players are willing to come together 


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and make that happen. In some places, it may be a bit primitive. 

In some places, it will be really state of the art, but we can make 

it happen if we can get everybody to cooperate across the board. 

And we have been very successful in doing just that. 

We have a project we called RapidCom, which is an exercise 

where a few years ago, we went into 10 of the Urban Area Security 

Initiative Cities, and we said, okay, we are here from the Federal 

Government. We are going to help. We are not bringing any money, 

but we just want to work with you with what you have got and see 

if you can create a regional interoperability system using only what 

you have now, do it in 5 months without investing any more 

money. We were successful in doing that in all 10 cities. It is this 

experience that produced the lessons learned that eventually became the foundation of the statewide communications interoperability planning guide and the continuum, which you will note has 

only one lane that has to do with technology. 

It is frustrating to all of us that these things don’t happen very, 

very quickly. But it takes time. Let’s say that we were perfectly efficient, back in 2003 when the Department stood up. We were absolutely and perfectly efficient in S&T, and this at a time when we 

had a cardboard door on the Undersecretary’s door, and there were 

only 16 of us. We had $300 million that Congress moved to the Department of Homeland Security to be used for grants, not all of 

which was for interoperability. Let’s just talk about that $300 million. If we were perfectly efficient at the end of that first year, that 

money would be at the State. If they were perfectly efficient and 

the locality legislature didn’t meet every other year and have to appropriate it, then at the end of year two, the money would be at 

the locality. And if they were perfectly efficient, they would have 

a contract out by the end of year three. And then if they didn’t 

have any not-in-my-backyard or environmental-impact-statement 

problems and they found the space for the tower and they were 

able to put those in place, then in 2 to 5 years, they would have 

something turned on. 

The Department is only 6 years old. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Rodriguez. 

DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS ON SOUTHERN BORDER

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yet, at the same time, I was able to get earmarks directly from DOJ directed to my counties, and Homeland 

Security wasn’t even there, and that is what we have been working 

with through DOJ. And let me, we passed in 9/11 Act, we established an international border community interoperable communication demonstration projects. There were six projects. Can you 

tell me how many of them have been implemented on the southern 

border, and what exactly has taken place with those projects? This 

was, the bill that piloted these programs, was section 302 of title 

three, and in your testimony, you mentioned the Olympic projects 

on the northern border and mentioned some task force with Mexico. Can you tell me a little bit about those six demonstration 

projects that went into effect? 


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And just let me express some concern, Dr. Boyd, that you mentioned, cross-border with Canada and some projects. 

Mr. Essid, you also mentioned Vancouver and Canada. 

I think Mr. Ashley, you mentioned projects in North Carolina; 

$25 million to a particular there; $32 million to New York; $43 million to Illinois. Can you tell me what has been happening on the 

southern border? 

Mr. BOYD. I will defer to Mr. Essid for those projects. 

Mr. ESSID. Well, sir, I will start off with the Border Interoperability Demonstration Project. The money for these projects was 

given to CBP projects and so OCE has been working to transfer 

those funds from CBP— 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Who is CBP? 

Mr. ESSID. I am sorry. The Border Patrol. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. So the funds are with the Border Patrol? 

Mr. ESSID. Yes, sir. Customs and Border Protection. $30 million 

was appropriated for the Border Interoperability Demonstration 

Project. A minimum of three projects are supposed to go on the 

northern border and three on the southern border. So we have been 

working to get those funds transferred to OEC, so we can—— 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. So that means they haven’t been transferred 

yet? 

Mr. ESSID. No, sir, not at this time. We have been working that 

issue. 

In the meantime, my office has been working with the responders to develop the criteria for the grant process. We can’t start the 

grant process until the funding is transferred. But we are ready to 

go as far as the proposed selection criteria. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Why am I able to get money from other agencies 

to do some of that stuff and you guys not moving quick enough? 

Mr. ESSID. Sir, my office is trying to get the funds transferred 

so we can move forward with this. We have drafted a report—— 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Okay. That is one on the southern border. Any 

other on the southern border? 

Mr. ASHLEY. Yes, sir. 

In the PSIC program, there is a $9.11 million program that is 

currently being executed. It is called the Regional Texas Mexico 

Border Interoperable Communications Program. It is a $9.1 million 

out of the $65 million that Texas received. That money is available, 

and they are currently executing on that project. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Do you know what the project is supposed to do 

or demonstrate, or how they are going to work with Mexico? 

Mr. ASHLEY. I don’t have the specifics on the project, but I can 

definitely get those to you. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Any other projects? 

Mr. ESSID. Yes, sir. We have been working with CBP, Customs 

and Border Patrol, on several projects. In addition to the Border 

Interoperability Demonstration Projects I talked about, we are also 

working with them on a High Level Consultative Commission on 

Telecommunications, the HLCC, between U.S. and Mexico and we 

also work with the Southwest Border Communications Working 

Group. Basically to strengthen interoperable communications. 

[The information follows:] 


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IFR #1. Provide specifics on the $9.11 million being spent on the southern border 

through the Regional Texas Mexico Border Interoperable Communications Program 

(from page 58 of the transcript): 

Regional—Texas/Mexico Border Interoperable Communications (T/MBIC) 

Federal Amount: $9,117,464. 

Non-Federal Match Amount: $1,813,493. 

Total Project Cost: $10,930,957. 

99% * Acquisition & Deployment. 

<1% Training & Exercise. 

<1% Planning & Coordination. 

* Percentages include both Federal and non-Federal Match funds. 

The Texas/Mexico Border Interoperable Communications (T/MBIC) Investment 

addresses communications gaps along the International Border with Mexico, such 

as aging infrastructure, disparate radio systems spanning numerous frequency 

bands, limited roaming capability, and radio interference from both sides of the border. The goal for this Invesment is to build out the regional systems with dual-mode 

VHF and/or 800 MHz sites (concentrating on areas with limited or no radio coverage 

first), linking those systems using a P25 overlay, and transitioning public safety 

communications to this digital network of regional systems. This Investment will 

provide continuous roaming capability, interoperability and improved coverage in 

the 14 border counties. 

We are going to be outfitting some CBP sites on the U.S. side 

with microwave shots to increase communications with the localities. On the Mexico side, they are doing the same thing, so we are 

trying to create interoperability. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. We are really having a problem. Even our 

phones right on the Mexican border don’t work. And now that we 

are going to this broadband thing, we are going to cut off Mexico 

completely. So they have always been able to view our televisions. 

They are not going to be able to even do that now. So we have got 

a real serious problem, and I would have assumed that this would 

have also prioritized some of the counties there and some of the 

local first responders there in some form or fashion. And I would 

ask that you kind of look at that in coming up with a program both 

on the Canadian border as well as on the southern border in terms 

of prioritizing some of those communities and those counties. 

And San Antonio, have you all done anything with San Antonio? 

PSIC PROGRAM

Mr. ASHLEY. Yes, sir. As part of PSIC as well, there is the San 

Antonio urban area of P–25, 700 megahertz. This is one of those 

ones where they are investing in that new 700 megahertz technology, the new spectrum I should say. It is a $3 million project 

out of that $60 million. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. You know, the city, local taxpayers came up with about close to $30 million on their own and built a center 

there. And where were you guys? I am serious. They got a system 

there; local taxpayers have had to come up with it and build a system there in San Antonio. And that has been all local effort. You 

know, we should be there in some form or fashion. 

El Paso, you know, are they doing anything there? 

Mr. ASHLEY. It didn’t look like Texas—these are dollars that are 

allocated by the State of Texas, once they get to the State administrator, and it doesn’t look like there is anything in the PSIC program that is dedicated to the El Paso area. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I know Mrs. Lowey is here. She is the chairman 

of the State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee. 


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We really need some better communications with Mexico. I got hit 

with a tornado that killed lives on the other side and on this side. 

We got hit in the flood, both on the Ojinaga side, on the Presidio 

side, on my side, and we really need better communications. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Calvert. 

SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS FOR RURAL AREAS

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Someone mentioned that 90 percent of the problem is coordination; 10 percent of it is technology. And I am from California. I 

guess we may have come up with a lot of technology that 

everybody’s talking about. Of course, that technology changes about 

every 3 years, and that may be one of the problems. 

Another part of the problem may be that I have talked to one of 

these folks that were looking for grants, and he told me, Ken, the 

juice isn’t worth the squeeze from trying to get the money from the 

Feds and the complications that go into this. 

And so, sometimes, as the gentleman from Texas indicated, we 

get involved in the earmark process because it is, quite frankly, 

faster to give money to the locals than anything else. 

And I was listening to Mr. Rogers and the problems in Kentucky, 

and I remember there was a lack of satellite telephones. I think 

that that was an issue there, because no communications took 

place. The only people that could communicate were the people 

that had these phones. And so I am thinking, from the short term, 

because we have this, obviously, the more we get into this, the 

more complicated it becomes. And sometimes I wonder whether it 

needs to be that complicated. 

But just saying that it is for a second, is there anything we can 

do in the short term for areas like Kentucky and throughout the 

United States and the rural areas to disperse, for instance, satellite 

telephones to the counties, the localities for at least with satellite 

communication? It may not work in New York City or areas that 

are subterranean. But it certainly would help in a large part of this 

country. Has there been any talk about that? And get it out quickly? 

Mr. ASHLEY. Congressman, I am, from a grants perspective, not 

really prepared to speak to that. But we do have here with us from 

FEMA, from the Disaster Emergency Communications Part of the 

FEMA, that can speak to how FEMA does respond when communications, when we have an operability issue. 

Mr. CALVERT. Well, the only reason, this happened a number of 

weeks ago in Kentucky, and you look at that as an example. If 

those folks at FEMA are going to do a study to determine how 

much of a problem it is, and 2 years from now, they decide they 

are going to put out satellite phones, in the meantime, the technology has changed completely. It seems to me that we are reacting 

slowly to the problem. 

Coordination, getting back to the coordination issue. I have been 

in Congress now, this is my ninth term. It seems like every time 

I go back to my localities, they talk about interoperability issues 

or operability issues. And we still haven’t got there. And I live in 

an urban area. Of course L.A. is the champion urban area, but we 


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are pretty urban out in Riverside County. We are spending hundreds of thousands of dollars on communication equipment, so I am 

going to ask, are you involved, as the Homeland Security people, 

involved when areas like Los Angeles or Riverside County or San 

Diego County in California put together these hugely expensive 

systems, do they invite you to the table? 

Mr. ESSID. The answer is, sometimes they do. And when they do, 

we want to participate. That is one of the things we provide in our 

technical assistance offerings I talked about earlier. Sometimes 

when they are getting ready to build a system, they ask us to send 

some technical expertise to help them to better understand if they 

are buying a Cadillac when they only need a Chevy. 

FEDERAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Mr. CALVERT. The reason I bring that up, I have received feedback from California’s Emergency Management Agency, CAL EMA, 

that more technical assistance should be made available to the 

States for engineering and planning. CAL EMA’s thought is that 

too often a little simple engineering job is needed that can be done 

much more quickly through the Federal level contracts without 

having to go through multiple months of bidding process at the 

State and local governments. Are there plans to focus more of your 

OEC’s, more of their resources to address technical assistance and 

the need of the States and get involved early on in communicating 

with these folks? Because a lot of times they don’t even know who 

to talk to, and these are urban areas. 

Mr. ESSID. Well, yes, sir. One of the things we did when the Office of Emergency Communications was created, was we looked at 

how technical assistance was done previously. And it wasn’t 

prioritized against statewide plans because there were no statewide 

plans to prioritize against. So now we have the States saying, these 

are our top five technical assistance requests. We have received 

technical assistance requests from 53 of the 56 States and territories throughout the Nation. We received a total of 233 individual 

requests. 

INTEROPERABILITY BETWEEN EQUIPMENT

Mr. CALVERT. But what I, I just want to make a point, that I am 

hearing out there that that is not taking place. 

And one last point. Equipment. 

Just one quick question, Mr. Chairman. 

There is a large contractor out there, I won’t say who their name 

is, and other contractors. Do those contractors or can they work together to make sure that there is interoperability between equipment? Because I hear this problem with the police and fire back 

home that they have got to buy this particular brand of radio, for 

instance, or communications, or it is not going to work with somebody else. 

That is my last question, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BOYD. Let me answer that very quickly. There are a couple 

of things we are doing. One of the reasons for this, which was not 

developed by any of the well known companies, was that we are 

looking for a way to try to break two things. One is a proprietary 

lock on too much of this. And the second one was to make the point 


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that there is no logical reason why this kind of radio couldn’t be 

available now because in fact it has been technologically feasible 

for years. In fact, the amateur radio community has had radios 

that could do this for probably 20 years now. 

But it has tended to be more profitable to sell four single band radios at $4,000 a piece than to sell one radio capable of doing all 

of those things for $4,000. And so part of our strategy in putting 

this together was to build more competitors, and in fact, we are 

told that, in Las Vegas, at the International Wireless Communications Expo, another company is going to be announcing their ability 

to do this as well. That is exactly what we would like to see happen. 

COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM

The second thing that we have done is to create what we call the 

Compliance Assessment Program, because, unfortunately, lots of 

companies thought they were compliant as they read P–25 and designed their own tests. We have now created a system and going 

through all the testing. We expect to start the first set of tests by 

the end of this year, and these tests are intended to see whether 

P–25 systems can really connect to P–25 systems. And one of the 

things we ended up having to do, and I will use a different model 

than just radio, was in disaster management. We had lots of disaster management platforms out there that couldn’t exchange information with each other. 

Part of Virtual USA is intended to address some of that. But one 

of the things we did there was that I went to a meeting of all of 

the manufacturers, and said, here’s the deal. If you guys will work 

together to develop a standard so that you can communicate, then 

I won’t use my office to develop a competitive product that I will 

give to the communities free. That caused them immediately to figure out how to make things work. So, they can now exchange data. 

It is a little tougher with this radio, but I think that is exactly the 

same kind of pressure we are going to have to apply. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Farr. 

Mr. FARR. Thank you. 

Mr. Boyd, in your responsibility, you can look at the whole country and decide or know where the underserved areas are, usually 

in the rural areas. 

Mr. BOYD. As a rule—— 

Mr. FARR. Yes or no. 

Mr. BOYD. I think that is entirely true. 

BROADBAND FOR RURAL AREAS

Mr. FARR. Okay, because the next question is that Congress has 

just appropriated $7.2 billion for broadband for rural areas. Are 

you coordinating with the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the 

national, Commerce’s National Telecommunications, and have you 

been invited to any of those meetings? 

Mr. BOYD. Not that I am aware of. We are aware of this program—— 

Mr. FARR. Is putting all that infrastructure going to help communications in the rural areas, underserved areas? 

Mr. BOYD. Well, it certainly should. 


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FEDERAL INTEROPERABILITY

Mr. FARR. And it certainly should have a benefit to you and to 

getting more communications in the underserved areas, is it not? 

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that our committee has got to figure out how to link this broadband expenditure of $7.2 billion with 

DHS. There has got to be some involvement. 

Let me shift a minute. 

The chairman mentioned in his opening statement about the Big 

Sur fires. I live in that area, and I was, the first job I had was 

working for the Forest Service as a firefighter. The Big Sur has 

burned down in 1978, 1987, 1995, 1997, 2001 and 2008. And it is, 

the big problem in every one of those fires, is communication. And 

yet, nothing has been done about it. 

And last summer’s fire we spent, the Federal Government, $150 

million on that fire, putting it out. And you had everybody there. 

You had BLM. You had different Indian Nations. You had the Forest Service, Reclamation District, FEMA, OES, State Cal Fire, 

State prisons, county fires, city fires, rural fires. We even had to 

have the National Marine Sanctuary show up with their boat because the only way you could communicate was to put a communication systems offshore. It has always happened that way. 

This is a Federal fire in a Federal forest. And at one time when 

we asked for help, they told us that three-quarters of all the Federal capability in the United States was placed in California. And 

still we couldn’t talk to each other. 

What the hell are we doing about it? 

I heard all your statements when you all got up here about how 

great everything is, but even in our own Federal community, we 

are not even operable, not interoperable, not operable. Why aren’t 

areas like that, with lessons learned, year after year, dealt with? 

Mr. BOYD. I wish I had a really good answer for that. The one 

answer I will make is this one: As difficult as it is to deal with all 

the agencies to achieve interoperability, the Federal level is far and 

away the most difficult. 

Mr. FARR. Right. The Federal level are the first responders. They 

have all these, even had the Navy show up. In fact, the Naval Postgraduate School had some intel capabilities they could use with 

satellites, and they wouldn’t release, the military wouldn’t release 

them to help in a civilian operation. It was ridiculous. 

RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNDERSERVED AREAS

But my question is, does that have to come from a State? This 

is an underserved area. There is no operability. There is only a 

phone line in part of it. The rest of it has no phone lines, no electricity lines, nothing. You can’t communicate because there are no 

cell towers. There is no line of sight, because of the mountains and 

the ocean. And most of it is in Federal ownership. Is it the responsibility of the State to come up with a plan for that land? Or is that 

because it is Federal ownership, we can move in our own Federal 

family to just put in operations capabilities? 

Mr. BOYD. Yes. I would have to defer that to the Department of 

Interior and Agriculture, because I, frankly, don’t know what the 

rules are. 


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Mr. FARR. Well, I mean, isn’t that what we are supposed to do? 

I mean, who is in charge? That is the question. Who has to initiate 

that? Your titles all say that this is what you do. Grant programs, 

administrator of grant programs, you are the director of Command 

and Control and Interoperable Division, Department of Homeland 

Security. 

Mr. BOYD. Okay. But I am not in charge of Command and Control. I am in charge of identifying and developing technologies to 

make things easier for those who run the Command and Control 

systems. 

Mr. FARR. But where there is an underserved area and there has 

been proven emergencies that no one can respond to, whose job is 

it to pick up the pieces and try to fix it? There is just a lot of finger 

pointing going on. And I think that is what you have heard from 

all panel members, whether it has been Kentucky or whether it has 

been the border or now out in Big Sur California. 

Mr. ESSID. Sir, if I may. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. PRICE. Please. That is a very good question. 

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS PREPAREDNESS CENTER

Mr. ESSID. One of the things our office was formed to do was 

stand up something called the ECPC, the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center. Now the title is a little misleading. 

Mr. FARR. You guys love your acronyms. But who the hell is on 

the job? 

Mr. ESSID. This preparedness center is not like a preparedness 

center where someone is monitoring 24/7. Instead it is supposed to 

increase the coordination among of all those Federal entities you 

just talked about. One of the things we heard from the States is 

they see the Federal Government—— 

RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING FEDERAL INTEROPERABILITY

Mr. FARR. But you are not doing it. Here is what you did. You 

have gotten radios out there for the rural fire departments. They 

can’t talk to each other. There are mountains in the way. You have 

got to park a boat offshore. You can’t do. The satellites don’t work. 

The canyons are too big. And this always happens. We have accidents on the highway all the time. We have people that get lost in 

the mountains. It is just, it is a difficult place, and everybody 

knows it. 

But the Feds are the, you know, the 800-pound gorilla in the 

room and nowhere to be found when it comes to helping with the 

solution. You can just point to problems; well, you know, maybe it 

is the Forest Service ought to do something about it. 

Mr. BOYD. The first time I testified before any committee in Congress on interoperability, I think 6 years ago, at the risk of sticking 

my neck out here, I took the Homeland Security Act, and I went 

through every other page and pointed out that the responsibility 

for interoperability users in a different agency, in a different organization, in a different department for interoperability. I don’t believe that has really changed yet. 

Mr. PRICE. Well, the establishment of Mr. Essid’s office, what 

was it 2 years ago? 

Mr. ESSID. Yes, sir. 


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Mr. PRICE. Was designed to get at this problem of coordination 

and control. I think Mr. Farr is posing a very good question. His 

time is up, however. 

Mr. FARR. Well, even in the UASI, Monterrey County has been 

applying for those grants and never gotten one. 

Mr. PRICE. Ms. Lowey. 

STREAMLINING DHS COMPONENTS

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, before I get to my question, which is directly 

following up on Sam Farr’s point, I want to make two comments. 

First, I want to thank our witnesses for their work. Much remains 

to be done, but DHS has made progress advancing communications 

in recent years. 

Second, I think it is important that this committee keep in mind 

the enormous expense of communications networks. New York, for 

example, recently cancelled a $2 billion contract to build a statewide network. The State will recoup its money, but I would like to 

reiterate that even with a $2 billion investment, the test system 

was inadequate. And in difficult economic times, many State and 

local governments simply can’t afford to bear the cost on their own. 

So I want to thank the chairman and applaud Chairman Price’s 

actions to fund the grant program the last 2 years when the previous administration didn’t propose any funding. And now more 

than ever, the subcommittee should strongly consider increasing 

funding for the program. 

So, that out of the way, I want to reference and follow up with 

Sam Farr. Most of us would agree that advancing local emergency 

communications capabilities is one of DHS’s core missions. However, Mr. Chairman, the Office of Emergency Communication 

doesn’t even appear on this 25-page organization chart. I have the 

chart right here if anyone wants to see it. It is lumped with the 

Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, which is a component 

of the National Protections and Programs Directorate. So cybersecurity has become more prominent in the last year, and with it now 

being front page news, I am concerned that OEC’s placement, if 

you can even find it, may not maximize its ability to assist first responders. That is why I plan to offer legislation to give OEC greater prominence. 

Mr. Essid, has the new administration discussed moving the Office of Emergency Communications out of the cybersecurity office? 

Because, as is evident from the testimony, there are a variety of 

DHS offices tackling interoperability. I think there is an argument 

that can be made for streamlining the Department’s efforts. And 

for instance, why require local governments to work with OEC on 

strategic planning but then with FEMA Disaster Emergency Communications Office on tactical and operational efforts? 

Therefore, after reviewing this and trying to spend some time figuring it out, knowing the significant number of DHS components 

tackling interoperability, to be more efficient, would each of you 

support streamlining the various components into one prominent 

office? 

Mr. ESSID. Well, thank you for the question, ma’am. In recent 

testimony, Secretary Napolitano did say that DHS is going to focus 

on the role of the Office of Emergency Communication, and that 


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interoperability is a key issue in DHS’s relationship with States 

and locals. And she said that we are going to take a fresh look at 

what is meant by interoperability. It was mentioned earlier that it 

is one of the most overused terms in existence today. Also she said 

to take a fresh look at what technologies we can use and whether 

we can functionally interoperate more quickly in the case of significant events. 

What OEC has done since we have been created is we have to 

try to partner with everybody. We know our mission is to be the 

central point for this issue, so we coordinate with Dr. Boyd’s office. 

We coordinate with FEMA, including disaster emergency communications, and we have been working with the members of the 

Emergency Communications Preparedness Center. And with other 

Federal partners, to try to build relationships. So we are doing the 

best we can with what we have right now. 

Mrs. LOWEY. But would you recommend to Janet Napolitano that 

you streamline the various components into one prominent office? 

In 25 pages, it is not even mentioned here. 

Mr. ESSID. Well, ma’am, I think the Secretary is looking at that 

right now herself, based upon her remarks at anything that can be 

done to increase the coordination with our partners. In the end, I 

think, States and locals look at us, and they say, you either failed 

as a group or you succeeded as a group in helping us. They don’t 

care what the acronyms of the office are so long as we increase our 

partnerships. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Dr. Boyd. 

Mr. BOYD. I think anything, anything that is going to strengthen 

that kind of direction and that kind of coordination is a good thing. 

It is going to be up to the Department to decide where to go. It is 

generally the case that when you have a single point of responsibility, that you have greater transparency and greater accountability. But it is not my call how this is going to be structured by 

the Department. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I am going to introduce legislation and hopefully 

with the chairman on this. But do you have anything to say about 

that, Mr. Ashley? 

Mr. ASHLEY. Yes, ma’am. I think all of us at the table would see 

that, as a recommendation in each of our roles, that would be 

something that we would advise the Secretary on in a positive way. 

But let me add something real quick, and I don’t mean that from 

the standpoint to diminish the role that these two gentlemen at the 

table have done over the last 2 years. When I first showed up a 

little over a year ago, I think I hold the record for the amount of 

time of anybody serving in this position. There wasn’t a consistent 

definition for interoperability across the 19 preparedness grant programs. In all of the different programs, somebody mentioned it earlier, that if you asked one person in DHS, they would say something different about interoperability. In every one of these programs, because of the work of these two gentlemen, in SAFECOM 

and OEC, has made our lives easier in the grants world and having 

a consistent definition and allowable use of funds and planning and 

statewide communications interoperability planning across all the 

programs which are available for interoperable communications. So 

we would support anything to strengthen that further. 


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But I don’t want to diminish from the work that these two gentlemen have done. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I am not diminishing. I am applauding. 

In fact, Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up, but if I am not 

mistaken, Mr. Essid has made considerable progress staffing your 

office from four employees to 27, and there are nearly 50 percent 

of the authorized positions remain vacant. So it might be interesting to follow up at some other points since my time is up. Do 

you have the help you need to reach out and get the job done? 

And I am hoping, Mr. Chairman, we can do something again 

with this chart. Thank you very much. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Ms. Roybal-Allard. 

SEPARATE NETWORKS ON THE BROADBAND SPECTRUM

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Mr. Essid, I would like to go back to the 

issue of the D Block section of the spectrum and FCC’s inability to 

sell it. It has been brought to my attention that cities and States 

are lobbying Congress to break out portions of the broadband spectrum designated for emergency communications and allow them to 

build their own separate networks. And first responders in the Los 

Angeles area have expressed a great deal of concern that if that 

were allowed to happen, we would end up where we were several 

years ago, with disparate communications systems built by different vendors that could not be linked together. 

Could you tell me if you are considering these requests? Or will 

you continue to be committed to pursue the implementation of a 

single interoperable broadband system across the country? 

Mr. ESSID. Well, we have been hearing from a lot of the same 

stakeholders as you about their concerns. It shouldn’t surprise anyone on the subcommittee that the urban areas are ready to jump 

on this type of technology today, but a lot of rural areas aren’t. The 

first responders have told us they don’t really care if there is a national or a regional roll out of such technology, as long as the technology is compatible up front. The reason we have to do a lot of 

work today with coordination and trying to solve problems after the 

fact is because everybody went out and bought whatever they 

wanted. Years ago, they didn’t coordinate with their neighbors, 

other States, other localities. We have to do a better job with this 

technology, or we will be forced to do the same things—trying to 

go back after the fact, saying oh you bought this system and it has 

this standard; you got this system and it has another standard. We 

will have to do a bunch of things to bridge them. 

That is one area our office is working on, and I know Dr. Boyd’s 

office is working as well on those up front coordination aspects. We 

support that the first responder community needs, this say, wireless broadband capability. But it has to be in a standardized manner that is coordinated. It can’t just be, everyone buy whatever you 

want, because then we end up in the same place as the land-mobile 

radio world, where Dr. Boyd and his shop have been working for 

years to develop that little gizmo to bridge these different frequency bands. If we coordinate up front, whether on a regional or 

a national picture, it is going to be much better than on the back 

end. 


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Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. So that would be the only condition then, 

that you would consider cities and States being able to get this 

broadband? 

Mr. BOYD. I think it is important to understand that we don’t 

control in DHS whether or not they can build these systems. If the 

Federal Communications Commission licenses them, then that is 

out of our hands. So the question there is whether the FCC is going 

to allow those things to happen. Right now, they won’t on the D 

Block because the D Block is set aside for this purpose. And so 

what the urban areas really are arguing is not that we in DHS let 

them do it, because for the most part, they would be able to execute 

if they chose to do so. What they are arguing is that they want the 

FCC to allow them to do that. 

If the FCC allows them to do that, then, in fact, you may create 

some of the very complications that you talked about. If the FCC 

does not allow them to do that, then inevitably we will also slow 

some of the broadband implementation in each of those areas. So 

there is a bit of a conundrum here about how this gets applied. 

And at the end of the day, it is really going to have to be up to 

the FCC and whether or not they can sell the D Block and get a 

system built. 

GRANT ADMINISTRATION BY A SINGLE AGENCY

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Mr. Ashley, you have heard the displeasure 

that this committee has with regards to the grant process. Last 

week it was the Transit Security Grants Program and today the 

interoperability grants. And there seems to be some common denominators here. First of all, the grants are administered by two 

agencies, FEMA and TSA, with the transit grants and the National 

Communications and Information Administration For Interoperability grants with FEMA. 

So one question is, would the administration of these grants be 

improved if a single agency was in charge of the entire application 

process, rather than two? 

And then, secondly, another common denominator is that you go 

through the States, and you mentioned last week that you took the 

States out on the transit grants. 

Mr. ASHLEY. The Congress did. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Okay. And it is working a lot better. And 

would you consider doing that with the Interoperable Emergency 

Communication Grants? 

Mr. ASHLEY. Thank you. 

I am glad you asked that question. On the two-agency thing, let’s 

be clear that FEMA is responsible for issuing the grants. Okay? 

But FEMA is not a subject matter expert in all grants programs. 

For transit, we use TSA; for emergency communications, we have 

both our Disaster Emergency Communications Group within 

FEMA as well as Dr. Boyd and Chris Essid’s shops. 

As far as the, would it speed things up if there were one agency, 

I think we always need to have subject matter expertise involved 

in the development of the grant program, both at the Federal level 

as well as at the stakeholder level. So I think that process is a valuable process. When we talk more, week after next, about transit 

grants, we will talk about the process that goes on there and how 


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that could definitely be improved through potentially reworking 

how the program is administered. 

Okay. With the PSIC grants, we are constrained by law on the 

administration of that with NTIA. So NTIA does have to approve 

all of the investment justifications. The Department of Homeland 

Security does not have the ability to approve which ones can or 

cannot get funded. 

Now, that being said, that is ancient history now. They are all 

approved now. So that was a process that took 2 years to do. It is 

done. It is over. All the funding is now available. So PSIC is also 

not one of those recurring annual grant programs. We don’t have 

that issue with the Interoperable Emergency Communication 

Grant Program. FEMA is the sole executing agent on that program. And you can see, from when funding has been made available, it happens very rapidly. 

Chris’s shop and Disaster Emergency Communications provide 

the subject matter expertise, and then Dr. Boyd’s shop from the 

standards, making sure that it is consistent. But they do not by 

any means hold up the process. 

STATE DRAWDOWN OF GRANT FUNDS

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Okay. What about the State issue? 

Mr. ASHLEY. Oh, the State issue? I will tell you and we will talk 

more about this week after next, any time you have subgrantees, 

there are delays in drawdowns in funds. Okay? 

If you look at the assistance to firefighter grant program that has 

been around since 2001 and you look at drawdown rates in that 

program, you do not see drawdown rate problems. Okay? Cash 

problems, if you will. But what you lose is coordination at the State 

level and regional coordination across multiple grants programs. 

There is a tradeoff to be made there, immediacy of funds, potentially not being used for the most optimal plans, or coordination 

across multiple programs with another layer, be it the State, that 

coordinates these programs, but then drawdown doesn’t happen as 

fast. So there is a tradeoff to be made there. 

EXPEDITING THE GRANTS PROCESS

Mr. PRICE. We have limited time. But I want to have a quick 

final round of questions because I think there are a number of 

issues that have been raised here that we can profitably follow up 

on. And so, with your indulgence, we will ask our panelists to be 

very brief in their responses, and we will promise to be brief in our 

questions. 

I want to pick up on Ms. Roybal-Allard’s line of questioning because we are concerned, of course, about the drawdown rate and 

the extent to which these moneys are being spent. Based on the 

latest estimates from the Department, 93 percent of the fiscal year 

2007 PSIC grants remain unspent, as has been said several times 

today. And the Special Emergency Communications Grant Program, which we established through our appropriations bill, 2008 

and 2009, the 2008 funding is still, I think, only 1 percent drawdown. So we clearly do have some significant delays here in getting 

these funds applied on the ground. And we have had various discussions today about the reasons for that. 


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Mr. Ashley, I gather you are suggesting that the work of your fellow panelists here this morning, the work of these offices in DHS, 

has expedited rather than held up this grant process. In other 

words, and that makes a lot of sense, of course that is one thing 

we have been aiming for is to have State plans, to have good technical assistance available, to have various mechanisms in place so 

that the applications that come in from various jurisdictions are 

ready for implementation, are plausible applications that can more 

readily be funded, and that is part of what these offices are doing 

is trying to shape up our process in that respect. 

So one would assume there is a whole lot less second guessing 

that you need to do and a whole lot less sending proposals back for 

review and for refinement because of the work of these offices. Is 

it working that way? I suppose that is one very important question. 

And is it your impression that the kind of technical assistance that 

the State and local agencies need, that they are getting, that these 

applications are coming to you in good form; in other words, not 

just good legal form, but are sound proposals in that they will do 

the job and also will be compatible then with the kind of direction 

in which we want to develop the system? So that is one question. 

The other is, your testimony’s mention of environmental reviews 

as a major aspect in these delays. Now, I suppose that mainly involves questions like tower location, which are of course sensitive 

local issues sometimes. But there, too, one would think, when proposals come to you, a certain amount of local review and local 

clearance has taken place, so that these are, these locations have 

been decided upon with due diligence. So how big really is that 

problem? And do you have the kind of resources you need to do 

these environmental reviews in an expeditious fashion? 

ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS

Mr. ASHLEY. On the first one, for the environmental reviews for 

the PSIC stuff for the interoperable communications, one, it is not 

as big of an issue as it is in transit grants, but it is an issue. The 

towers are pretty straightforward. We are working with, actually 

the Department of Commerce is coordinating this, but putting together a blanket EHP statement. It is out, published on the Federal Register Notice right now, as we speak, which will allow 

projects to move rapidly through there that are contingent upon 

EHP review. But a large part of the PSIC grants is to buy stuff, 

and that stuff, if you will, radios and others, are out there for bid, 

or out there available to be drawn down. 

And again, I want to caution people on looking at cash in the 

United States Treasury as not indicative of what is being accomplished in the community. I think each and every one of you, if you 

would call your jurisdictions, your States, they would tell you that 

they are executing on grant funds. Yes. Will they tell you that it 

took a long time to get to where they are today? Yes, but they are 

executing on them as we speak. They have had the PSIC funds 

available now for over a year to draw down on. So it is not for lack 

of funding. 


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PSIC GRANTS

Now, with the plans, what has happened, when we look at the 

2009 Interoperable Emergency Communication Grant Program, 

this funding will be made available at the earliest it has ever been 

before, largely due to an on-time appropriations bill as well as due 

to the efforts of these gentlemen. 

You are absolutely right, Chairman, when you say there are 

statewide plans now. When I look at a grant or when our peer reviewers look at grant applications for interoperable coms or for the 

State Homeland Security Grant Program, all they have to do is insure that it goes against the DHS approved plan, and that funding 

is deemed valid. 

Mr. PRICE. And that presumably would expedite your approval 

process. 

Mr. ASHLEY. And it has expedited it greatly, sir. For the last 

year, actually 2 years, we have executed the grants out on time per 

the statute that comes from this committee. 

Mr. PRICE. Actually, that is not evident from the figures we have. 

So I would appreciate your figuring out how to document that. 

Maybe by comparing turnaround times before and after or some 

way of putting a little more precision in that claim. 

Mr. ASHLEY. What we could do is compare the amount of time 

from the PSIC, from the original, the Public Safety Interoperability 

Communications Grant Program and the amount of time it has 

taken since that program, both with Chris’s office being in place 

with the Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program, and how quickly those funds were made available to the 

States. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. PRICE. That would be helpful. And of course, that is the idea, 

not to just have quick turnaround but to have better plans that you 

are dealing with in the first place, which then, of course, can be 

more readily approved. 

Mr. Rogers. 

MITOC

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Boyd, or any of the others, are you familiar with 

the term, MITOC? 

Mr. BOYD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Man-Portable Interoperable Tactical Operations 

Center. 

Mr. BOYD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Which is a Department research project that the 

University of Louisville and Western Kentucky University collaborated on to build an interoperable command center for a disaster; 

is that a fairly good description of it? 

Mr. BOYD. Yes, I think that is it. What they were trying to build 

in MITOC is something that didn’t depend, in an emergency, on 

being able to have roads available; something, you might be able 

to fly in that someone could carry and put into place. You might 

think of it as a substitute for something that can fill some of the 

gaps. It may be a bit less capable, say, than a MERS, which goes 

in a vehicle, but it can go places that some of these other things 

can not go. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, they showed it to me some time back when 

it was first built. And by the way, that was money directed by Congress because there was a need and it didn’t exist and the bureaucracy wasn’t doing it, so Congress intervened and said, build it, and 

we did. And the MITOC van, chock full of electronic gear, drove 

during the ice storm into Western Kentucky and there established 

communications amongst the first responders and the State, and it 

worked. Why can’t we do that more? I mean, this thing works. And 

it is all forms of communications. It is verbal. It is data. It is electronic and so on. Is that a good answer for at least emergency operations? 

Mr. BOYD. Yes. The point I was making before when I talked 

about things like ROW–B, and ROW–B is only one example, is that 

there are, in fact, a number of systems that, like MITOC, like the 

MERS, like ROW–B and others, can do these things. The question 

is whether localities can afford them and whether they are built 

into part of their planning. In fact, I believe every major community, in particular rural communities, ought to think about implementing some of these things and using some of the grant money 

to build and deploy them because the infrastructure in rural environments tends to be more fragile than it is in urban environments. 

Mr. ROGERS. Would not the MITOC work in an urban environment as well? 

Mr. BOYD. Yes, it would. In fact, typically a major urban environment is going to have a capability very much like a MITOC. They 

are going to have a major van, probably their own. Some of them 

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cated in very, very large command and control complexes that they 

can drive into place. 

So while the MITOC is, I think, a superb solution and is the kind 

of thing that communities need, there are others that have similar 

capabilities. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, it shows me, it tells me that we are dealing 

with a soluble problem here, because it was solved. And at least 

in the MITOC’s instance where it was set in after the fact, you 

know, it was an emergency operations center, but I don’t know why 

we couldn’t use whatever technology they have for that portable 

unit, why that can’t be duplicated in large. 

Mr. BOYD. I don’t think there is any reason why it can’t be. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why hasn’t it been done? 

Mr. BOYD. We don’t have the money. 

Unfortunately, I don’t get to buy a lot of these. I get to prove one 

of these and I get to put them in place and pilot and demonstrate 

them. Grant funding then goes to the communities who have to decide that that is what they want to put the money into. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Ashley, what do you say about that? 

Mr. ASHLEY. It is an allowable expense. If they so choose to 

spend their dollars that they have been allocated on that technology—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Essid, why aren’t you pushing this as a solution? He says he will make grants for it. Dr. Boyd says, sounds like 

a good idea. Why aren’t you selling this to States and communities? 

Mr. ESSID. In fact, we have been, sir; and, in fact, they are implementing this all over the Nation. Different types of technologies but 

the same principle. Something that can be brought into an area to 

establish communications when they are devastated. 

A lot of States have used part of the PSIC funds to establish 

what is called a strategic technology reserve. Basically, these are 

radio caches or this type of system. 

Some States have been experimenting with their National 

Guard, with the National Guard using helicopters to drop equipment into rural areas to establish communications. That way the 

National Guard gets their training hours in on their flights, too. 

There are all kinds of partnerships to be had. A lot of States are 

for these types of technologies and are developing the standard operating procedures on how you deploy that. When I was in Virginia, we did something very similar. 

Mr. ROGERS. How many grants have you made for this type of 

thing, Mr. Ashley? 

Mr. ASHLEY. For mobile emergency communications systems? 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes. 

Mr. ASHLEY. I don’t have the number in front of me. We have 

run that number before, and I can definitely provide that to staff. 

[The information follows:] 

IFR #3. How many grants has FEMA GPD made for mobile emergency communications systems? (from page 91 of the transcript): 

The attached ‘‘Motor Vehicle Data Call’’ depicts the number of vehicles that States 

and Territories propose to acquire during the PSIC period of performance (October 

1, 2007–September 30, 2010). 


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Mr. ROGERS. Is it few or many? 

Mr. ASHLEY. It is quite a few, sir. Quite a few. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Rodriguez. 

COMMUNICATION WITH THE PUBLIC AND MEXICO

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me go back to what Lucille had mentioned about the 

broadband spectrum. You know, I am really naive about this. But 

I know that we are going to have a problem with communications 

with Mexico when we go into it. But is there some legislation that 

we could look at doing to assure that we would be able to communicate with all Americans when it comes to disasters? I really feel 

that we need to make sure that that happens and not allow for the 

FCC to be able to determine those things and make sure we do 

that. 

Secondly, on the Mexican border, we really need to enhance that 

communication there also on the Mexican side as well, and I presume on the Canadian side, also. And I assume we have had some 

programs also on the Canadian side and see if we can kind of expand on those things. 

We have always had—a car, for example. It does something on 

the U.S. side and then cuts off, and then the policeman is unable 

to call the Customs people on the border and that car, southern 

bound, he just zooms through there. We are unable to catch him 

in some cases. 

So could you respond to those two cases? 

Mr. BOYD. Let me start first with communicating with the public. 

The WARN Act, which was passed, I think, 2 years ago, established a requirement which my office then picked up a few months 

ago to develop a way to provide alert and warning messages to 

every mobile device. It is called the Commercial Mobile Alerting 

System and is intended to allow alerts to go to PDAs and cell 

phones and the rest. 

It uses some of the spectrum auction money. The logic in that 

Act was that most people don’t have their televisions or their radios turned on at night, but they do have their cell phone on. They 

do have a variety of other devices that can be used to launch alerts 

wherever they happen to be. And this has a number of components, 

and I won’t go into lots of detail, but it is intended to be able to 

provide that kind of alert to the entire population. 

So that is part of what we are trying to do in that arena, plus 

the integrated public—— 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Have you prioritized the east coast, west coast, 

Canadian border, Mexican border in moving in that direction in 

that area or the whole country as a whole? 

Mr. BOYD. Because of the way this system works when it is 

turned on, it will be the country as a whole. It won’t be a single 

region. It will be everything. We have had great support from the 

major providers who would be carrying these messages and want 

to do that. And this is a component of the integrated public alert 

warning system which is in FEMA, which is intended to provide 

alerts over all of the traditional systems. This allows all of the 

newer systems to be included as well. 


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On the Canadian side, we are doing a great deal of work directly 

with the Canadian Association of the Chiefs of Police. In fact, both 

Chris and I were up in British Columbia a month ago talking about 

it. They believe we are way ahead of them, in interoperability and 

they want to be able to adopt these tools. 

In fact, the representative from the United Kingdom also told us 

that the UK is in the process of adopting our materials as well because they have a similar problem. So we have work within Canada, and we have a delegation coming down to work with us again 

in April so we can look at how best to set up some real technology 

demonstrations. This is one of the demos that is occurring cross 

border with them. 

And then Chris is working on the southern border. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Chris. 

Mr. ESSID. As Dr. Boyd just said, Canada is really partnering 

with us, and they have been using a lot of things we have developed. When we go up and speak in Canada, they know that some 

disasters in the United States have exposed our communications 

gaps. And the Canadians haven’t had those same types—— 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. What do we need to go to get things going in the 

Mexican side? Do I need to ask questions regarding diversity in 

your staffing? 

Mr. ESSID. No, sir. We are doing a lot on the southern border. 

Those statewide plans I talked about earlier: As you could probably 

predict, most of the states that border Mexico have initiatives in 

their statewide plans to address that cross-border interoperability. 

And we have been sending technical assistance out there to try to 

support them in their needs. 

And we also have been working with the State Department on 

that high-level consultative commission on telecommunications to 

coordinate between the two governments, including spectrum sharing agreements with the FCC, standard operating procedures, and 

the like. So while it is very complex, we are working with the State 

Department on behalf of DHS to better coordinate with the Mexican government across our borders. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Carter. 

INTEROPERABLE EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It seems to me that the mission we have here is to create a system today that is interoperable for all jurisdictions, that incorporates all the technology, all the systems that are out there; and, 

if not, offers of those systems, a buying list of varying companies 

that they can supplement their equipment to get on the interoperable system and then offer them information, ongoing information 

that they can keep it up at every jurisdiction level. Then challenge 

the communications community whenever they come up with a new 

product, make sure it meets our interoperable needs. 

And then, finally, if the Star Wars Corporation 20 years from 

now comes with a whole new system, their challenge has got to be 

that it will attach to our system until such time as we can convert 

over to their Star Wars system. That seems to be the way we ought 

to do this. Now can we do that? 


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Mr. BOYD. In fact, that is exactly the approach we are trying to 

use, where we are working with industry to try to make sure that 

these things are compatible. We are doing things like the compliance assessment program so that we can tell communities what 

really does work, what really does interoperate. We have got a variety of kinds of tools and materials that talk about how to build 

common governance, how to go about thinking about building systems and how to look at the same standards. 

We are also producing standards. In fact, we have dramatically 

accelerated the standards process. It typically takes 8 years for a 

standard. We have produced about four critical standards in this 

arena over just the last 3 years. 

We think you are exactly right. That is exactly the kind of model 

we have got to go to where we provide that kind of information to 

the field. We don’t have the power to prevent a locality from buying 

something that we would recommend they not. What we want to 

do is to persuade them that it is not in their interest to do that. 

So we do a great deal of work to try to communicate with them regularly, involve them in the things we are doing and help them understand why it is in their interest to think about how they work 

with their neighboring communities to do exactly what you talked 

about. 

Mr. CARTER. I think that they will cooperate. But from talking 

to them about their frustration level, their whole frustration level 

is, who do you ask to get the bottom line? Because we are ready 

to spend our money. We want to know what the bottom line is. And 

is this guy selling us the right product? Or is this guy selling us 

the right product? 

And that ought to be part of your task in my way of thinking, 

as we go all the way through this from now until we go into the 

future, when somebody comes up with the Buck Rodgers system or 

something. But, whatever it is, that ought to be the task of our governmental agencies, to make sure the system works. 

Mr. BOYD. We would love to be able to help them do that kind 

of engineering assessment. But there are 60,000 communities and 

only 27 of us and 27 in Mr. Essid’s shop. 

Mr. CARTER. Well, it becomes their problem. 

Mr. BOYD. Yes. 

Mr. CARTER. Thanks Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Farr, please, to close us out. 

FEDERAL INPUT TO STATE AND LOCAL EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENTS

Mr. FARR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I think we have a little interoperability problem developing at 

the Federal level. I think you all represent about $5 billion of expenditure in the communications world; and yet Congress, through 

other departments, has just set up a $7.2 billion economic stimulus 

law for high-speed Internet. And last week Internet entrepreneurs, 

consumer groups, and State officials, probably some who were applying for grants in your office, showed up to find out how they can 

get access to this money. 

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cies on procedure. According to this press release, top officials from 

the three agencies did make it clear that they are in a hurry. Agencies have until September 30, 2010, to complete what officials envision will be three rounds of awards, but the regulators will have 

to inject certainty into a long list of politically charged and technically inadvised gray areas. 

Look, that is going to be a snake pot of vendors, and all these 

local, vulnerable communities are going to go after that pot of 

money, and you are not even at the table. Wouldn’t you have some 

recommendations that if we are going to go out and spend with 

your money and their money $12 billion on communication infrastructure in America that there ought to be some of your input and 

knowledge into that? 

Mr. BOYD. We are always open to provide—— 

Mr. FARR. I think you have got to charge in the room. You are 

a big guy, a former Army tank guy. You ought to just go in there 

and say, we are here. 

Mr. BOYD. But there are 60,000 of them. 

Mr. FARR. But, look, my communities here or out there, they are 

already calling me and saying, how do we get to the broadband 

money? That is the same people who call me and say, oh, there is 

a grant for interoperability money. There must be something where 

the two meet. There are some things that you would advise people 

if you are going to spend all this money, hey, you can do it a little 

bit smarter from lessons learned. 

Mr. ESSID. Yes, sir. There are. 

Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I mean, our committee appropriates 

money in both instances. So can we get these agencies to include 

DHS in the discussion of broadband expansion in America? 

And lastly—I guess the answer is yes, or we will just have to 

stop funding people. 

GETTING MONTEREY COUNTY OPERATIONAL

Who do I talk to? I want to get Monterey County—we are talking 

about an area that is 70 miles long and 70 miles wide. 

Mr. BOYD. I used to live there. 

Mr. FARR. Well, you know it. I want to get South Monterey County and the Los Padres National Forest Big Sur region to be operational. I am not talking about interoperational, because I think 

operations will lead to interoperations. But of you three, who is the 

person I want to talk to on that? And do you have a cap in those 

grants you give out? Do you cap them? 

Mr. ASHLEY. We give the grants to the State. 

Mr. FARR. Just to the State, not to the local communities? 

Mr. ASHLEY. Just to the States. 

Mr. FARR. What about Federal agencies and Federal properties 

that need it? 

Mr. ASHLEY. I am prohibited by law to moving money to Federal 

agencies. 

Mr. FARR. So if we want to wire this area, and a lot of it is Federal, we have to go through State and local? 

Mr. ASHLEY. Either that or you would appropriate the dollars to 

the Federal agency who is the responsible agency for that land, I 

would believe. 


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Mr. FARR. Who do I talk to about trying to make this thing 

work? Because, so far, all these years, nobody is doing anything. 

Mr. ESSID. Sir, you can talk to me. One of the things that make 

folks a little uneasy is the title of my job. I am supposed to kind 

of stick my nose where it doesn’t belong, knock down walls, and 

build bridges where they didn’t exist. We have initiated shared infrastructure projects and ideas all over the country where, instead 

of building towers across the street from other towers, we are trying to get Federal groups to work with State groups and local 

groups to share infrastructure and reduce costs. And it makes common sense. 

Mr. FARR. I totally agree. 

Mr. ESSID. We can also look at our technical assistance offerings 

there and opportunities for shared infrastructure. 

Mr. FARR. I will be calling you. 

Mr. ESSID. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FARR. I am also a big supporter of Mr. Rogers’ MITOC 

project. It was a smart thing to do. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you very much. 

STATE RESPONSIVENESS

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. One quick question. If we find that some States 

are not being responsive or are not addressing our needs in certain 

sectors of the State, at what point do we decide that we will take 

some other alternatives in order to meet some of those needs? 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Ashley, briefly, if you will. 

Mr. ASHLEY. Sure. For the grant programs, you know, DHS does 

walk a fine line there with making sure that it is making the funds 

available to the State. But we don’t want to be overly prescriptive 

to the States and say, you will do the following. You know, the 

number one input we get back on grants is make them flexible. The 

States know better than the Federal Government where the Federal funds ought to be applied. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Let me just share with you, the bureaucracy in 

the State can be just as bad as the bureaucracy at the Federal 

level. 

Mr. ASHLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. At what point—I would hope maybe in the near 

future you start thinking about some assessments for our constituencies that are out there. If we find some of the local communities, 

just like first responders, you are at the mercy of the local responders there. You might have some great ones. You might not have as 

good ones or not well trained. So at what point, you know—so I 

would ask that you kind of consider that. 

Mr. PRICE. One of the functions of technical assistance of the sort 

that Mr. Essid has developed and given is to bring communities 

along that have less capacity to generate their own credible proposals. We assume that is part of the effort. 

Mr. ESSID. Yes, sir, it is. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you all for a very interesting and useful morning. We look forward to working with you as we put our bill together for next year. 

The subcommittee is adjourned. 


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(431) 

JOINT HEARING WITH LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 25, 2009. 

SECRET SERVICE PROTECTIVE MISSIONS AND 

INAUGURAL SECURITY 

WITNESSES 

MARK SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE 

PHILLIP D. MORSE, SR., CHIEF, UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE 

Mr. PRICE. The Subcommittees will come to order, this being a 

joint meeting of the Homeland Security and Legislative Branch Appropriations Subcommittees. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DAVID PRICE

Today we are happy to welcome Director Sullivan and Chief 

Morse to this joint hearing. We will mainly be discussing the roles 

that both the Secret Service and the Capitol Police played in planning and then maintaining security and public safety at the 56th 

Presidential Inauguration. 

First I want to recognize the Secret Service’s recent work and 

provide some context for today’s hearing. The 2008 campaign was 

the longest and most widely attended in Secret Service history. The 

agency started protection for then-candidate Obama much earlier 

than any previous candidate. Throughout the campaign, Senators 

Obama and McCain attracted record crowds. After the election, the 

President-elect continued to lead extraordinarily large rallies and 

meetings. It is a remarkable achievement and the result of the 

hard work and dedication of thousands of agents that the 2008 

campaign and transition functioned smoothly and safely. 

By virtue of North Carolina being a battleground State, I had the 

opportunity to witness the Secret Service in action protecting candidate Obama among the throngs of people at his events. I was 

very impressed by the professionalism and dedication of the men 

and women under your command, Director Sullivan. Thank you for 

everything your agency did to protect our candidates and their families throughout a uniquely challenging election season. 

There was also much about the inaugural celebrations that went 

well. Nearly 2 million people witnessed President Obama’s swearing in, and there was not a single security-related incident, arrest 

or serious injury at the inaugural festivities. Spectators watching 

the festivities on television saw a remarkable event. So therefore, 

I congratulate both of you for a day that required extraordinary 


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preparation and coordination, and in most respects was successful; 

however, not in all respects. 

We are all aware that not everything went well on Inauguration 

Day. Thousands could not enjoy the festivities since they were 

stuck in large, amorphous crowds outside the Capitol Grounds. 

Others were trapped in the tunnel beneath the Capitol Reflecting 

Pool. 

As I am sure other colleagues will attest today, there were constituents from each of our districts who traveled, often at great expense and personal sacrifice, to witness this historic day. And we 

can apologize for what led to their disappointment, but I think we 

owe them more than that. I think we need to review what happened so we have an accurate account, and also so we can prevent 

similar mistakes in the future. 

The Secret Service, which led both security planning for the inaugural and the after-action review of the day’s challenges, has 

made some recommendations for improvements in a report just released, and we look forward to discussing those proposals with you 

today. 

The viewing areas with the worst problems were the blue- and 

purple-ticketed sections, which were behind the seated section on 

the Capitol Grounds. You can see these areas on our monitors. The 

silver section west of the Capitol Reflecting Pool also had problems, 

which appear to have been exacerbated by reducing checkpoints to 

a single entry for the 100,000 people holding silver tickets. 

From the postinaugural report, crowding problems were apparent 

as early as 5 a.m. when people started arriving at the Capitol entry 

gates. However, without clear direction or lane markers, orderly 

lines failed to develop and instead turned into large mobs waiting 

for the gates to open. 

As people continued arriving, additional problems developed. Security barricades, street closures, and dense crowds made for a confusing and frustrating trek. At some point, people waiting to enter 

the purple section went into the northbound tube of the Third 

Street Tunnel, even though this areas was supposed to be closed 

to pedestrians and reserved for emergency vehicles. Thousands of 

people got stuck in the tunnel for hours while no law enforcement 

agency did anything, as far as we can tell, to assist them or clear 

the congestion. 

The after-action report notes how a civil disturbance unit observed conditions in the tunnel, but did not do anything to clear 

the crowd since the people were peacefully waiting. I would like to 

know more about how this decision was made and why it was considered safe for people to stand literally feet away from speeding 

emergency vehicles. 

After the gates opened, it quickly became clear there was no effective system to validate visitors’ tickets, and that entry gates 

were much narrower than the magnetometer screening banks, as 

illustrated by this photo on the monitor. Just look at that mass of 

people behind the prescreening gates. The postinaugural report 

claims that these entry points were adequate to process all 

attendees. You have to ask what reasoning lay behind the creation 

of such bottlenecks, however. 


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As a final point, I would like everyone to look at the satellite 

image on the monitor. The photograph was taken about 40 minutes 

before the actual swearing in. You can see, that the purple, blue 

and silver sections were not anywhere near capacity, and that massive crowds were still awaiting entry at the backed-up checkpoints. 

I want to be clear today that our intent is constructive, to determine what happened, to account for problems and to identify solutions. We have to make sure this doesn’t happen again. 

I am going to ask each of you gentleman to summarize your comments in a 5-minute oral presentation. Of course, we will enter 

your full statements in the record. I will ask Director Sullivan to 

begin, followed by Chief Morse. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. PRICE. Before we start, I want to turn to our distinguished 

Ranking Member of the Homeland Security Subcommittee Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to Director 

Sullivan and Chief Morse. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER HAROLD ROGERS

As I read through the review of the inauguration, I am struck 

by four key facts, and some of these are repetitive to what the 

Chairman has said. 

One, the largest crowd to ever attend an event on the National 

Mall, some 2 million people. No arrests, no injuries, no security incidents of any kind. So from a safety and security point of view, 

the inauguration was unquestionably a remarkable success. 

Now, as many as 10,000 people appeared to have been inadvertently restricted from gaining access to the event, and that is indeed 

an unfortunate and regrettable occurrence. But from my read of 

the inauguration report, the problems with gaining access to the 

standing areas around the Capitol were a result of poor crowd control, poor signage, poor ticketing and poor planning. 

These are issues that can only be partially addressed by today’s 

witnesses because responsibility for many of the decisions that led 

to these problems largely fell under the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies, chaired by Senator Feinstein, 

which is not even represented here today in this hearing. So I 

think we have a number of missing witnesses. 

Having said that, the report also highlights a number of areas 

for improvement, areas I hope to learn more about, and lessons 

learned that I fully expect to be applied to future security events. 

But from my vantage point on the Homeland Security Subcommittee, I am concerned as we review the inauguration, we 

might lose sight of the phenomenally intense year that the Secret 

Service has just endured, not to mention the Capitol Police; the Secret Service from protecting the largest number of protectees in the 

agency’s history, to a protracted Presidential campaign with multiple candidates, record-sized crowds, to a present climate of 

heightened demands on both the protective and investigative missions. The Secret Service is in the midst of what is probably its 

most challenging period since its inception in 1856. 

Director Sullivan, as much as I want to better understand the 

facts surrounding the inauguration, I also want to hear how the Secret Service is adapting to this period of intensifying threats, 

threats to our Nation’s leaders as well as threats to our financial 

system, at a time when our economy is perhaps as fragile as it has 

ever been. 

So I thank the witnesses for appearing with us today as we probe 

into the problems of the inauguration. Do not mistake our concern 

for a lack of appreciation for your agencies’ efforts to protect the 

national leadership and keep visitors to the Capitol safe and secure. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. PRICE. I now recognize Ms. Wasserman Schultz, the Chairwoman of the Legislative Branch Subcommittee. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you, Chairman Price. Let me 

associate myself with your opening remarks which summarize 

many of the basic questions and concerns that this hearing is intended to raise. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN WASSERMAN-SCHULTZ

While it is important to establish some lessons learned, we must 

not forget the thousands of people who had tickets to the inauguration, but were left out of a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to see the 

swearing in of our Nation’s first African American President. 

While we must learn how to avoid the type of problems which 

occurred in the Third Street Tunnel and in the blue, purple and silver ticket-screening areas, it is also important to use this hearing 

as a forum to acknowledge the serious difficulties and disappointments experienced by many of our constituents. 

For thousands of people who came to Washington at great effort 

and expense to celebrate an historic day in American history, January 20th, 2009, is now a traumatic memory of missed opportunity 

and disappointment. For many who were stuck in the aptly named 

‘‘purple tunnel of doom’’ and in similar areas in the general vicinity, this memory is not merely disappointment, but also one of real 

fear and panic. 

We have received statements for the record from some of our constituents who experienced the failures that occurred that day. They 

not only describe in very real terms what they saw, but they raise 

a number of key questions, which the review team report does not 

adequately answer. One of these statements which has been circulated to the committee was submitted by Marisa McNee and 

David Meyer, who are here with us this afternoon, and we appreciate your attendance. 

These two individuals organized a Facebook group of more than 

6,000 individuals who shared their experiences about the events on 

Inauguration Day. Their statement is not an angry attack on the 

system which failed them, but rather a helpful summary of their 

observations and suggestions for questions that we will hope to address this afternoon. 

Mr. Chairman, I seek unanimous consent to read this full statement, which I will then insert into the record, and I ask that our 

witnesses provide a detailed response to the questions which are 

raised. 

Mr. PRICE. Without objection. 

STATEMENT FROM INAUGURAL ATTENDEES

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. We, Marisa McNee and David Meyer, 

have prepared a statement based on our personal experiences on 

Inauguration Day and as organizers of a group formed on Facebook 

to deal with the initial confusion, misinformation and 

misstatements from public officials. We have spent hundreds of 

hours reviewing thousands of stories, photographs and videos from 

purple, blue and silver ticket holders who were unable to get into 

the inaugural ceremony and/or were placed in a dangerous situaVerDate Nov 24 2008 02:52 Oct 22, 2009 Jkt 052213 PO 00000 Frm 00442 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\52213P2.XXX 52213P2

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tion while attempting to get into the ceremony. It is from that perspective that we offer this statement to you today. 

The recommendations outlined in the executive summary of the 

multiagency report seem well considered. They correctly address 

three central problems that contributed to the inaugural difficulties: poor interagency coordination, both during the planning process and on Inauguration Day; poor communication with attendees; 

and questionable assumptions built into the planning process. 

Unfortunately, it is not possible to judge whether the recommendations are adequate to the task of preventing a recurrence 

in 2013. The executive summary does not sufficiently explain 

where the 2008–2009 processes broke down. Some of the difficulties 

can be reconstructed from the specific recommendations, but public 

participation in the planning process should not be contingent on 

speculative leaps. 

Specific recommendations were introduced with brief narrative 

overviews. Those narratives include the observations of many 

attendees. Some specific issues: The crowd management section 

highlights complications caused by unexpectedly large numbers of 

early attendees. The Mall officially opened at 4 a.m., and Metrorail 

began running at the same time. ‘‘Arrive early’’ was a constant refrain in the press and on television, yet most of the major problems 

did not arise until after the Mall officially opened. 

Both the prescreening and the crowd-management sections 

blame overcrowded and uncontrolled lines on the commingling of 

unticketed and ticketed attendees. Very few attendees seemed to 

agree that this was a significant factor. The police frequently used 

bullhorns to inform people in the purple ticket queuing area that 

it was for purple ticket holders only. The crowd would typically respond by waving their tickets in the air. This seems to suggest the 

police continued to operate under the assumption they were communicating with unticketed attendees, despite rather obvious evidence to the contrary. 

The Third Street Tunnel section claims that attendees’ use of the 

Third Street Tunnel was unexpected, yet uniformed officers were 

directing people into the tunnel as early as 5:30, according to eyewitness accounts. Moreover, regardless of the spontaneity of crowd 

accumulation in the tunnel, there is no explanation for why crowds 

were allowed to remain there if they were not supposed to be there. 

The Third Street Tunnel section and the Multiagency Communications Center, MACC, section suggests that responsible officials 

didn’t become fully aware of the magnitude of the tunnel problem 

until after the fact. The MACC section notes that calls from 

attendees were dismissed because of a lack of clarity by the caller, 

yet security officials regularly drove through the tunnel, and there 

were likely security cameras monitoring the situation. 

Attendees have been remarkably public-spirited about the inaugural difficulties. They remained in good spirits under trying circumstances on January 20th. They have remained engaged and 

committed over the last 2 months to ensure that we do not confront 

similar problems in 2013. 

Public participation in the investigation is an asset to those seeking to understand what went wrong. It is crucial that we are alVerDate Nov 24 2008 02:52 Oct 22, 2009 Jkt 052213 PO 00000 Frm 00443 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\52213P2.XXX 52213P2

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lowed to participate in the process. We need more basic factual information to be able to do so. 

We understand the legitimate concerns involved in publicizing 

security-planning information. At a minimum, though, an additional summary account of the findings of the review process 

should be produced. Better yet, a judiciously redacted version of the 

full report should be made available. 

Thank you for your time and attention to this issue. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN WASSERMAN-SCHULTZ, 

CONT’D

Mr. Chairman, I also want to take this opportunity to thank all 

of the security agencies for the extraordinary level of effort which 

they put into the planning for and execution of the inaugural 

event. The 1.8 million people who came to Washington to witness 

the swearing-in ceremonies here at the Capitol is by far the largest 

crowd ever to gather in Washington. While everyone here recognizes that it was far from perfect, the fact that there were no arrests or serious injuries is a remarkable accomplishment. This 

achievement during a period of very real terrorist threat is a testament to the hard work and skill of the security teams which were 

assembled. 

I also want to thank the inauguration review team for the report 

which they prepared. While no plan can provide for every eventuality, this review makes more than 40 specific recommendations, 

which I believe should and will be taken very seriously. 

Mr. Chairman, before closing, I believe that our review must also 

ask questions about the inauguration beyond those associated with 

the ticket-screening and tunnel problems. We must ask our witnesses, based on their experience with the inauguration of Barack 

Obama, the Capitol complex and the National Mall, how we can be 

prepared to handle crowds of 2 million people or more during a period of elevated terrorist threats. How can our regional transportation systems be adequately modified to transport this size crowd? 

What needs to be done to prepare the National Mall to safely hold 

this volume of spectators? What support does the District of Columbia need at the local level to assist with an event of this size? And 

what can be done to accommodate individuals who are less mobile, 

who may not be capable of standing in a security line for hours. 

While it is not always productive to deal in hypotheticals, we 

must look at this from the standpoint of what could have happened. What if, God forbid, there had been some event or circumstance which would have required evacuation of the President, 

the Congress and the public? Could that have been done safely? 

After reading the report and talking to many of my own constituents, I am frankly amazed that there were not bigger problems. We 

are dealing with some fundamentals of democracy at our hearing 

today. We are a very large and open Nation. We believe in and 

want to foster a participatory democracy. The peaceful transfer of 

power from one President to the next may well be the finest single 

example of American democracy. Preserving the American people’s 

ability to participate in this historic event as witnesses is extremely important. 


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While we succeeded in protecting the President and preventing 

injury to the public, we failed as a country in providing access for 

thousands of Americans who should have had the ability to witness 

this historic inauguration. I believe that this hearing should provide us with an opportunity to step back and take a closer look at 

some of the issues that will affect future inaugural and highly attended events. Thank you very much. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. LaTourette. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be mercifully 

brief. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN LATOURETTE

I want to add my voice to commend the Secret Service and the 

Capitol Police for the job they did not only on January 20th, but 

in all the months leading up to January 20th. I took a picture, not 

from the satellite, but from our perch on the West Front of the 

Capitol, of the humanity stretching from the Capitol to the Lincoln 

Memorial. And the fact that that many people were there and it 

went off without a hitch in terms of safety is indeed a reason that 

you gentleman and your agencies should be commended. 

I noticed in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, as you were 

applauding the Secret Service for the protection of Presidential 

candidates, you didn’t indicate you were at any McCain rallies in 

North Carolina, just the Obama ones. I am sure the Secret Service 

did a nice job of protecting Senator McCain as well in North Carolina. 

I also have read the IRT report, and just sort of a heads up when 

it comes time to talk about questions, there is a question about the 

coordination with your agencies and the Joint Committee, as Mr. 

Rogers mentioned, and I would like to explore that. So if you would 

sort of be thinking about that. 

I appreciate it very much, and yield back my time. 

Mr. PRICE. We welcome our Full Committee Chairman Mr. Obey. 

Mr. OBEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just make a few 

offhand remarks about some things that I saw and some things 

that I didn’t see on that date. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DAVID OBEY

I certainly respect every agency before us today, and I recognize 

that you have got difficult jobs and that you are fine public servants. But I was nonetheless extremely disturbed by a number of 

events that occurred on that day, which is why I asked these two 

subcommittees to hold this hearing today. In fact, we could just as 

easily have had other parties testifying here as well; the Park Service, for one, and the D.C. police for another. Let me simply recite 

what I saw that day and then refer to some things I didn’t see, but 

about which I was told. 

We had originally been told by the Sergeant at Arms that for 

Members of Congress to get into the Capitol, if we were coming 

from Virginia, we should arrive at a certain checkpoint on the 

George Washington Parkway hopefully before 6:00 in the morning. 

I did that, and, as a practical matter, no one at that checkpoint had 

the foggiest idea they were supposed to let anybody in. Fortunately, 


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a Park Service superior eventually showed up and cleared up the 

problem, but it was obvious from the first moment there was confusion and lack of adequate communication. 

Then we had been told to take the 14th Street exit onto Independence Avenue, which we did, arriving there very early in the 

morning. We got almost down to the Smithsonian Castle when traffic was blocked, and D.C. police officers began pounding on several 

cars, including mine, simply saying, ‘‘Turn around. Go back, go 

back, go back.’’ When we attempted to find out where we were supposed to go, we were told, ‘‘Never mind, just move it. Just move it. 

Just move it.’’ Again, people were pounding on the car. 

So we went down to the other end of the avenue and were again 

told to turn around and go back the other way. It took some 45 

minutes just sitting there before we were able to finally, thanks to 

Bill Livingood, find an alternate route to the Capitol. 

I can understand a certain amount of confusion, but that was not 

confusion; that was madcap chaos that I saw on that street. I don’t 

know whether the lack of coherence on the part of the people on 

the beat was a result of poor training or something else, but their 

actions certainly left something to be desired. 

That is what I saw. What I didn’t see, but what I was told about 

afterwards, was what happened to numerous constituents of mine, 

some of whom were reduced to tears, because after taking the time 

to come, after spending their money to come, after bringing their 

kids, they didn’t get anywhere near that inaugural. And I heard 

tale after tale of chaos from people who had the correct tickets, 

from people who were stuck in that tunnel. I guess all I could think 

is that if a Member of Congress like myself had been treated the 

way we were treated that morning, I hate to think how an average 

constituent of mine was treated. 

So while I certainly recognize all of the good service that your 

agencies and the other two that I mentioned have provided, it 

nonetheless was a scene of chaos that I certainly don’t want to see 

repeated again. 

I would like to know exactly what measures are being taken to 

see to it that 4 years from now it does not happen again, because 

what was supposed to be a positive experience for my constituents 

turned into an embittering one, and there are scars. These people 

believed in the change that they thought they had voted for. They 

wanted to participate in a great event, and they were denied it because of chaos, lack of planning or just poor organization. I am not 

sure what the root causes were, but it has to be corrected, it has 

to change. 

I think we need in the last analysis to talk not just to your two 

organizations, but also to the D.C. Police, because what I saw on 

their part was not pretty, and, frankly, I did not appreciate the 

dismissive comments of the D.C. Police Chief, who seemed to downplay all of the problems as being just ‘‘minor incidents.’’ They were 

far from minor to the people who experienced them. I would have 

appreciated a different attitude than the one I saw exhibited by 

her. 

Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding 

the hearing. I will not be able to stay for much of the questioning, 

but I appreciate the fact that you are having the hearing today. 


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Mr. PRICE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. PRICE. Director Sullivan, please proceed. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF DIRECTOR SULLIVAN

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Obey, 

Chairman Price, Chairwoman Wasserman Schultz, Ranking Member Rogers and distinguished members of the committee. Thank 

you for the opportunity to be here today. 

Mr. Chairman, with the committee’s permission, I will offer brief 

remarks and ask that my full statement be made part of the 

record. 

When I appeared before the committee last year, the Secret Service was in the middle of an historic Presidential campaign. Some 

of the challenges we faced as an agency included the increased 

travel, staffing and equipment demands associated with the competitive primary contest and massive crowds at campaign rallies 

across the country. In addition, there were numerous international 

travel stops by all of our protectees. 

I would like to recognize the extraordinary personal sacrifice 

made by our special agents, Uniformed Division officers and administrative, professional and technical support staff over the past 2 

years. Whether it was providing candidate protection for 18 

months, or adjusting the security plan for the Democratic National 

Convention to accommodate the use of an 85,000-seat outdoor stadium, or securing Presidential transition offices in two cities, the 

men and women of the U.S. Secret Service rose to meet the challenge. 

In fiscal year 2008, the Secret Service provided protection at over 

5,000 travel stops for our protectees and over 2,000 travel stops for 

visiting heads of state. Candidate nominee travel stops were up 70 

percent over the 2004 Presidential campaign. Uniformed Division 

officers and Transportation Security Administration officers 

screened over 4.2 million people during this period, compared to 2.1 

million people in 2004. 

Although not designated national special security events, or 

NSSEs, the Secret Service led security planning for three Presidential debates, one Vice Presidential debate, the first visit to the 

United States by Pope Benedict XVI, the 63rd United Nations General Assembly, IMF/World Bank meetings, and the North American 

Leaders Summit. At the same time, we continued to perform our 

investigative mission in an exemplary fashion. 

In fiscal year 2008, our field offices closed over 7,000 financial 

crimes and other criminal cases, which resulted in the arrest of 

over 8,000 people. This included disrupting the largest identity 

theft case in our country’s history. In addition, our asset seizures 

were up 200 percent from 2 years ago and up 100 percent from 1 

year ago. Field offices also conducted more than 10,000 protective 

surveys and closed over 3,000 protective intelligence cases. Total 

arrests in fiscal year 2008 were up 22 percent over fiscal year 2007. 

Since January 2008, the Secret Service completed security plans 

for 10 national special security events, or NSSEs. The most recent 

NSSE was the Presidential address to a joint session of Congress 

on February 24, 2009. Other recent NSSEs include the 2008 State 

of the Union Address, the Democratic and Republican National 


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Conventions, the G–20 Economic Summit, and the 56th Presidential Inauguration. 

The 56th Presidential Inauguration was an historic and proud 

moment for our country and one of the proudest moments in my 

career. I know this view is shared by all Secret Service employees 

and our law enforcement partners as well. Events went from January 17th through January 20th and included five separate NSSE 

designations: the preinaugural train trip with rallies in Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore; the Lincoln Memorial concert; 

and the inauguration. 

At the inauguration alone, an estimated 2 million people gathered on the West Front of the U.S. Capitol, the National Mall and 

along Pennsylvania Avenue. While I am proud of the fact that 

there were no arrests or major injuries reported, I would like to 

offer my sincere regret and apologies to ticket holders who were 

unable to get to their designated areas for the swearing-in ceremony at the U.S. Capitol. 

At the request of the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies, the U.S. Secret Service, along with our law enforcement partners, completed a thorough review of this year’s inauguration to identify specific problems and recommend changes to 

ensure that they do not occur again. 

Some of the problems we identified and have already begun to 

incorporate in our planning are the establishment of a crowd control subcommittee; better utilization of signage for ticketed and 

nonticketed guests; for better real-time situational awareness, monitor the Internet social networking sites, such as Twitter, YouTube 

and Facebook; the opening of screening gates earlier; and 

prescreening of ticketed guests much further away from the entry 

gate to assure nonticketed guests or guests with incorrect tickets 

do not unnecessarily interfere and delay the entry of properly 

ticketed guests. These are just a few of the recommendations that 

we have and will utilize at future events. 

The U.S. Secret Service owes a tremendous debt of gratitude to 

our Federal, State and local law enforcement partners and public 

safety officials throughout the country for their support during the 

2008 campaign. 

Our collective goal when it comes to securing NSSEs and similar 

large events is to develop and implement an operational security 

plan that achieves two core objectives: Provide a safe and secure 

environment for Secret Service protectees and other dignatories, 

event participants and the general public; and safeguard people’s 

lawful freedoms of speech, assembly and petition of government. 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, this 

concludes my opening statement. Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today. I will be happy to answer any questions 

at this time. Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

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Mr. PRICE. Chief Morse. 

Chief MORSE. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Madam Chairman, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Obey and distinguished members of the committee. I also would like to make an opening statement as well as 

ask you for your permission to submit a written statement for the 

record. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. We will submit your full statement in the 

record. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF USCP CHIEF MORSE

Chief MORSE. The inauguration of President Barack Obama presented planners with unique challenges associated with an unprecedented 1.8 million people who gathered in Washington, D.C., that 

day to experience the excitement of the inauguration. The primary 

focus was ensuring safety and security of the assembled dignitaries 

and the public while protecting the event from disruption. The 

overall security plan had to balance between security and access. 

On Capitol Hill the number of ticketed guests was consistent 

with prior inaugurations; however, we expected a large percentage 

of ticket holders to attend this inauguration than in the past. For 

this reason overflow areas were identified to handle expected attendants. 

To help guide ticketed guests to the Capitol, police officers and 

civilian staff were posted at various Metro stops and intersections 

along the pedestrian routes leading to the gates. Additionally, elevated signs, banner bridges and variable message boards were used 

throughout the Capitol complex to guide and direct guests. 

The plan to ensure access of all ticketed guests onto the West 

Front was not realized. While we expected and planned for almost 

2 million people to descend on the core area of the city, we had no 

benchmark or historical perspective to forecast the cascading effect 

this size crowd would have on inaugural events, particularly access 

to the swearing-in ceremony, the Mall and the parade route. 

On January 20th, people began arriving at gates on the Mall before 4 a.m. In fact, the Mall between Fourth and Seventh Streets 

filled to capacity by 6:30. This had never happened before in previous inaugurations. 

At the Capitol, all gates for ticketed guests opened between 7:35 

and 8:10 a.m. As we screened the crowds, it became evident that 

both ticketed and nonticketed guests were mixed together in lines 

waiting to be screened. As people continued to enter the city and 

migrate toward the Capitol, crowd management issues compounded, particularly areas around the blue and purple gates 

where crowds with different destinations were merging. 

Due to the resulting congestion, attempts by law enforcement officers to relieve crowd pressure were ineffective or resulted in people being directed to staging areas never intended for pedestrian 

queuing. The northbound tube of the Third Street Tunnel is one example. 

Further, poor up-channeling or miscommunication of information 

from the field to the officials at the various law enforcement command centers hindered situational awareness and led to crowd 

management problems in those areas, and that did not allow us to 

properly address or correct them. 


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We understand the disappointment and the frustrations of those 

who were eager to witness this historic event and were not able to 

access their ticketed locations. As deliberate and thoughtful as the 

planning process was, unanticipated challenges manifested themselves during the execution of the plan on the day of the event. The 

challenges we collectively confronted or later discovered include 

and control unified decisionmaking and positioning of resources to 

react and manage unpredictable actions of large masses of people. 

In the end, the impact of the arrival and movement of almost 2 

million visitors served to strain even the best of plans. Everyone 

who visited Capitol Hill, the Mall, the parade route that day entered and left safely. We do regret that a number of people, 

ticketed guests, were not admitted and left disappointed. 

We will work even harder in the future for future events to ensure that everything humanly possible is done to enhance the experience for all who travel to witness historic events in this Nation’s 

Capital. 

We have jointly conducted a thorough after-action review of the 

56th Inauguration. The critical review resulted in recommendations to improve planning, communication, coordination, crowd 

management and security operations. We will take the lessons 

learned, and we will develop and apply new procedures to improve 

our planning and operations as we continue to balance the requirements of security and accessibility to major events. 

Again, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today, and I will be happy to answer any questions that 

you have. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

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Mr. PRICE. As you have observed, votes have been called on the 

House floor, a series of three votes, we are told. We will go just as 

far as we can in the questions until we have to leave, and then we 

will resume this hearing after we return from the floor. 

CROWD MANAGEMENT AROUND THE CAPITOL

Chief, I would like to address my first question to you, and it has 

to do with the area where many, if not most, of the problems seem 

to have developed, and that is in the huge crowds as we saw on 

the monitor here a while ago, that developed between the Metro 

stops and the prescreening checkpoints around the Capitol 

Grounds. 

Your after-action report or the Secret Service’s after-action report 

is not entirely clear about how many officers were posted there; 

however, it appears that even under the most generous count, 

fewer than 400. That figure is less than 20 percent of your force, 

and appears to have been expected to handle the quarter of a million people who showed up that day and who were entering in 

those areas. 

Let me read you one excerpt from a constituent of mine, and this 

is one of the lucky ones. He got in finally. Here is what he said: 

‘‘We got off at Capitol South and ran into chaos, huge crowds and 

no officials to direct anyone anywhere. It was no crowd control that 

gridlocked the crowd up against the random barricades and choked 

the crowd from entering the security checkpoint. At 11:55, we finally got to security and were told to run in, bypassing metal detectors and screening of any kind. As we entered the area running, 

officers asked us to hold up our tickets as we ran by.’’ 

Now, that raises obvious questions about how many people you 

had deployed, where they were, what their instructions were. We 

have even heard rumors that the Capitol Police turned down an 

offer from the D.C. National Guard to deploy a unit to help with 

crowd management. 

So I want to ask you how many officers were stationed outside 

the security perimeter of the Capitol grounds to manage the 

ticketed attendees at the swearing-in ceremony? How did you determine this was an appropriate staffing level? Was this reviewed 

by anyone, or was this solely your determination? And, Chief, did 

you or your agency decline any offers for assistance with crowd 

management, especially in these areas? 

Chief MORSE. Thank you for your question, sir. 

With regard to personnel, I don’t have the exact page here, but 

it was a little over 300, both sworn and civilian personnel, who 

were specifically assigned to the four Metro stops, the routes to the 

ticketed gates, and at key intersections en route to those gates. 

They were supported by 15 variable message boards, billboard 

signs, as well as posted signs along the route. They were wearing 

visibility or yellow vests, and also they were supporting the fact 

that each ticket would have the directions to the specific gate that 

they were supposed to gain access to. So those 300 personnel were 

only and specifically assigned to the four routes to the gates themselves. 

There were other personnel who were outside the secure perimeter who had other duties and responsibilities related to security 


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and access of vehicles and vehicle control. But the over 300 personnel were directly assigned to facilitate movement from the 

Metro stops that these folks were directed to go in order to access 

their gates. 

Mr. PRICE. That is 300 personnel for what you can estimate to 

be well over 200,000 people converging on these prescreening 

points. How did you arrive at that number, and did you turn down 

any offers of help from other agencies? Did anyone review this? 

Chief MORSE. The way we arrived at that number was previous 

inaugurations and the use of these personnel and how effective it 

was. Some of the things that obviously we have talked about in the 

report that hindered that are numerous. There were crowds merging in those areas not just for the event itself. There were crowds 

that were merging there to utilize the Third Street Tunnel southbound, to either go from the north side of the Mall to the south 

side. There were parade gates in and around the purple gate area, 

the Second and C parade gate. There was another gate for a parade 

gate at Third and C. People who were walking from RFK Stadium 

traversed that, both the north and south sides. So those were the 

combinations of people who were merging at those locations. 

Also, I just need to say that Capitol Hill and the ceremony itself 

was where all the signage and direction was. In the report you will 

see that signage throughout the city and messaging throughout the 

city was not as robust as it was on the Hill; therefore, there was 

a lot of merging of crowds that were going to other areas other 

than the ceremony itself. 

ASSISTANCE OFFERED BY THE NATIONAL GUARD

With regard to your question about the National Guard, yes, we 

did turn down that offer. That offer was not turned down because 

we didn’t anticipate problems. We had requested other law enforcement agencies, Federal law enforcement agencies, to assist us, and 

we gained cooperation through the NSSE structure for Custom and 

Border Protection agents to assist us, as well as the Library of 

Congress Police, the GPO Police and the Supreme Court Police. So 

we felt through the NSSE structure, the number of people that we 

requested, and the assignments and deployment that we had that 

we had an adequate number of people to do the job. 

Mr. PRICE. Do you still feel that way? It doesn’t seem to me that 

any one of those exacerbating factors that you have mentioned 

should have been a surprise. 

Chief MORSE. I think that now after we have reviewed this, I 

think that we all have concluded that more signage throughout the 

city, more messaging throughout the city, more directions throughout the city, as well as more people to deconflict some of the situations as large crowds like this occur, that we can deconflict that as 

well as we can. So, yes, we feel that more people would be a positive thing to have, as well as the communication throughout the 

city, and not just on Capitol Hill and around the ceremony area. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Rogers. 

RESPONSIBILITY FOR SIGNAGE

Mr. ROGERS. Who was responsible for the signage and directions 

and crowd instructions overall? 


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Chief MORSE. With respect to the inaugural ceremony, it would 

be the Joint Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies (JCIC) and the 

Capitol Hill Subcommittee, which is the NSSE committee. 

Mr. ROGERS. And citywide, who was in charge of that, the same? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, that would have been the Metropolitan District Police Department, working with the Department of Transportation, and again working with—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, if I wanted to ask somebody about what went 

wrong with the signage and directions and instructions to the 

crowd about where to go and what to do, neither one of you can 

answer those questions, can you? It has to be the city police or the 

Joint Committee, does it not? 

Chief MORSE. Well, with respect to Capitol Hill and the Capitol 

Subcommittee, I think the Subcommittee as well as JCIC are responsible for ensuring that the tickets display directions to the appropriate gates as well as the logistics of signage. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, we can’t get to the bottom of this if 

we don’t have the relevant parties here. 

Mr. PRICE. Well, I believe Mr. Sullivan and his agency are the 

overall coordinating agency. So while we don’t have every agency 

here, clearly the signage is the responsibility of the Joint Committee. We have established that. We have the Metropolitan Police 

involved, the Park Police and others. But Mr. Sullivan, as the head 

of the agency under this Committee’s jurisdiction, I believe can answer questions about the responsibility of the whole range of agencies, even though he is not personally responsible for those. 

Mr. ROGERS. It was the responsibility, as I understand it, of the 

Joint Committee and the Metropolitan Police on the signage and 

directions, and that seems to be the proximate cause of the difficulties of that day. I don’t know how we can get to the bottom of this 

if those agencies are not here to answer questions. These people 

weren’t responsible for doing the signage and the directions to the 

crowd, so I don’t know what we are doing here with the wrong parties. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. With regards to the Metropolitan Police, I would 

say we can discuss that. They and the Department of Transportation did everything but the Capitol. They were part of the Subcommittees. We were either the Chair or co-Chair of those Committees. I think between myself and Special Agent in Charge O’Connor, who is here, we could give you some answers to those questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. But the Joint Committee is not here, and they are 

the overall responsible organization. I have got questions I would 

like to ask them, as well as the Metropolitan Police Department. 

I appreciate, Mr. Director, you valiantly stepping forward and 

saying that you had overall jurisdiction, which you probably did, 

but the actual doing of the instructions and directions was not in 

your hands. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

We will adjourn as briefly as possible and come back and resume 

after these votes. 

[Recess.] 


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Mr. PRICE. The Subcommittee will come back to order, and we 

will turn to Chairman Wasserman Schultz for her questions. 

INAUGURAL SECURITY PLANNING

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chief Morse, a concern was expressed about the lack of the full 

group that was involved and served on the subcommittee. 

You served on the planning committee as well, correct? And you 

were involved in the coordination and planning for leading up to 

the Inauguration for the Capitol area? 

Chief MORSE. As the Chief of Police, yes, overall in charge of operations security for the Capitol. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you. And so you are able to answer questions related to that planning? 

Chief MORSE. Yes. The planning, we had a director who was reporting to the Assistant Chief of Police, so I was routinely briefed 

on issues—you know, daily briefings on the planning process. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. And the Assistant Chief of Police is 

here with you, so in the event that a question arises—— 

Chief MORSE. Yes, he could answer those. He has more direct 

knowledge of that than I might at a very high level. 

MORE TICKETS ISSUED THAN SPACE AVAILABLE

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Great. One of the concerns that I 

have, and it is one that I have spoken about with the Chief and 

the House Sergeant at Arms before, is, when I was briefed on the 

security plans prior to the Inauguration, one of my concerns was 

that there were more tickets issued than space available in the 

ticketed areas. And when I asked why we would do that for an 

event that was—where unprecedented attendance was expected, 

the answer was unsettling. 

The answer was, ‘‘Well, basically, this is the way we have always 

done it.’’ The Sergeant’s response, on behalf of all of you, was that 

‘‘we know that there are people that do not show up, so we issue 

more tickets than we have space available because we know that 

we will be able to accommodate them.’’ 

Given that this was an expected unprecedented turnout—and I 

know that concern was, from what I understand, expressed during 

your planning—why was that concern dropped and never dealt 

with? 

Chief MORSE. The concern originally came because we did expect 

a higher attendance than previous Inaugurations because of the 

significance and historic event—so when we addressed the issue, 

we had to correct it by adding space within the security perimeter 

on the West Front to accommodate the total of 240,000 people. The 

way you do that is through square footage multiplied by the number of people, and you look for that area within the secure perimeter to establish that as a ticketed area. 

So in previous inaugurations, the square footage that was set 

aside for yellow, orange, purple, blue would not have been sufficient to hold 241,000 people, so we simply added expansion spaces, 

specifically, the kidneys, as we call them, on the West Front and 

the walkways on the northwest and southwest areas on First and 

Penn and First and Maryland Avenues Southwest. And that gave 


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us the ability to facilitate that number of ticket holders within that 

area. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. So the reason that that concern was 

dropped is that you felt by adding the kidneys and the walkways 

that you were going to be able to accommodate the extra number 

of people that you expected to show up? 

Chief MORSE. That is correct. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Do you think that this planning 

proved helpful, or would you do it differently the next time? I cannot imagine that the next time we went through an unprecedented 

anticipated crowd that we would issue more tickets than we have 

space for. 

Chief MORSE. I would say that, yes, you will probably need an 

expanded area. I know that a recommendation in the report is to 

change the recommended 3-square-foot-per-person space allotment 

to the FEMA 5-square-foot. When you do that, obviously the area 

will not be as large, and that could lead to less tickets being issued. 

VOLUNTEER TICKET CHECKERS

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. In reading the report, the people who 

checked tickets, they were Capitol Police for this inauguration, correct—— 

Chief MORSE. Yes. And previous. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. I know I saw that one of the recommendations was that for the 2013 Inauguration and, I guess, Inaugurations forward, that the host committee be asked to provide 

more volunteers, or volunteers to handle that particular service, 

and be able to really significantly increase the number of people 

that you have available so that you can focus on security and the 

magnetometers and the other things that police should be responsible for. 

Chief MORSE. Yes. Let me just clarify that. 

Our police officers, who were screeners, prescreeners, were not 

just looking at validity of ticket, but they were also screening people for suspicious activity or any types of weapons or anything that 

would be adverse to the crowd. So one piece of that is examining 

a ticket, which is fairly quick; and if need be, the validity of that 

ticket can be checked or validated. 

The recommendation, obviously, is in order to free up one of the 

many things that the police officer is responsible for at the gate 

itself. 

PROBLEMS WITH TUNNELS

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. My other question relates to the tunnels. That was the most difficult problem for me to understand. 

Can you tell the Committee how that problem with the tunnels 

evolved and why corrective action was not taken earlier? 

Chief MORSE. Yes, I will speak to this. 

As the report indicates, what happened that morning was, as we 

have testified, the cascading of events, the sheer multitude of people merging to get to different places. We had RFK Stadium, folks 

who were coming from the north and south, we had people from 

the north and south going to the parade route; we also had people 


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traversing the tunnel to get from one side to the other, and there 

was a merge of people. 

With the closing of the Mall very early because of the crowds, 

people began to migrate toward the Capitol, looking for ways to get 

onto the Mall or into the event. One of the things that occurred because of that was people going down into areas that were not 

meant for people, simply as spillover, if you will. 

We saw this on Independence Avenue very early, and Mr. Obey 

had mentioned the number of people that were on Independence 

Avenue. That was simply because they could not get onto the Mall, 

and the officers were working on moving them west as quickly as 

they could to find openings and gates to get them onto the Mall. 

So people pushed down into the tunnel area. 

The southbound tunnel was a pedestrian tube and was supposed 

to be used to flow pedestrians from the north and south. The northbound tube was a vehicular access only; it was never intended for 

people. 

As the two ways that you could get from the north or the south 

were either to go east of the Capitol and cross over at Second 

Street and proceed to whatever location that you were intending to 

go, or you could traverse the southbound tube of the Third Street 

tunnel. So when officers were directing people to use the southbound tube of the tunnel, there were no physical barriers in the 

northbound tunnel to prevent people from going in it. Therefore, 

people who were headed down to the tunnel area to traverse ended 

up in the northbound tunnel. 

The report also indicates that there was a significant effort made 

by civil disturbance units who were sent to that area, responsible 

for tunnel and any emergencies or crowd control issues that may 

occur there. Those units in the report indicate that they found people in the northbound tube. It indicates that the crowd was orderly; 

and at that point they left that area to deal with a more critical 

situation along the D Street corridor, where people were merging. 

Therefore, there was no action to the chain of command, to Director 

Sullivan or myself or our level, that there was an issue or problem 

there that needed immediate attention or correcting. 

Probably about 11 o’clock, the Assistant Chief ordered purple 

ticket holders and blue ticket holders to begin being screened 

through the orange and yellow gates because those crowds had subsided. There was an opportunity to screen people through those 

gates. At that point, by doing so, inadvertently, the tunnel cleared 

because of the relief that was provided by screening the purple 

ticket holders through the yellow gate. So that is how people got 

into the tunnel. They were either directed and there was no barrier 

to prevent them from going into the tube, or they did not know 

where to go, so they went to the path of least resistance, and there 

was no barrier there to prevent them to go and they formed a 

queue or line to the purple ticket gate. 

Mr. PRICE. We may well want to return to this, but let’s turn 

now to Mr. LaTourette. 


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COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN GOVERNING BODY AND NSSE STEERING

COMMITTEE

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you 

both for your testimony. 

And again during my opening remarks, I wanted to focus first on 

something that appears on page 32 of the IRT report. And in paragraph 3, it says during the planning process there were situations 

where JCCIC communicated to the various planners through the 

United States Capitol Police. The report recommends that there be 

direct—and they added some emphasis there, so I guess they really 

meant ‘‘direct’’—communication between the governing bodies and 

the executive steering committee. Director Sullivan, do you know 

the genesis of that recommendation and what it is referring to? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I believe the recommendation on that is based on 

the fact that I think most of the interaction with the JCCIC was 

through the Capitol Police. The whole strength of an NSSE is the 

executive steering committee. This is where we have the main components of the planners, and in this particular event, we neglected 

to include them on that committee. 

We have seen now that it would be best to have them directly 

on the Committee for future events up here. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Chief, do you agree with that recommendation? 

Chief MORSE. Well, as I read that recommendation, I just want 

to be clear that with respect to interaction of Capitol Police with 

these other entities, that is specifically related to security. And as 

I know it, JCCIC does interact with these entities with things such 

as protocol, ceremonial issues, logistics and such. So I believe that 

that is the way we would like to see it: that we as the security experts make recommendations and are a part of the overall planning 

process; and that JCCIC continue to have their relationship with 

these other entities with regard to protocols and logistics and ceremonies and such. 

INVITATIONS TO INAUGURATION

Mr. LATOURETTE. Okay. 

Chairman Wasserman Schultz was talking a little bit about tickets and too many tickets for the space and so forth and so on. 

My mother-in-law called me and was all mad because her sister 

got invited to the Inaugural. And I said what are you talking about 

your sister got invited to the Inaugural? And she had not, in fact, 

been invited to the Inaugural; she did not have a ticket for the 

event. She got this gold embossed thing that said we invite you to 

the Inauguration of the 44th President of the United States. 

Who controls that stuff? I mean, I think that some people 

thought that they, ‘‘Woo-hoo, maybe it came from the President 

himself. Woo-hoo, the President has invited me down to see him 

being sworn in.’’ 

So who initiates that stuff, aside from the tickets? And can we 

not sort of look to word it differently like, you know, ‘‘sample only’’ 

or ‘‘do not present this at the gate’’ or something like that? Chief? 

Chief MORSE. We had mentioned in our testimony about 

unticketed guests. Certainly there were people who had no ticket 

at all. 


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Mr. LATOURETTE. Right. 

Chief MORSE. But there were people who had a very nice commemorative invitation to the swearing in of the President of the 

United States. And they were certainly there to utilize that ticket. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right. 

Chief MORSE. And we were tactfully expending a lot of manpower 

and effort deconflicting that as people came to the gates. So certainly that is something that has to be very cautiously approached, 

especially issuing those prior to the Inauguration or, at the very 

least, giving some sort of direction that that is not, in fact, the ticket that gets you into the event. 

PUSHING BACK THE PERIMETERS

Mr. LATOURETTE. I appreciate that. Maybe we will get it right 

the next time. And maybe, Chief, if you could call my mother-inlaw you would save me a lot of heartache. 

I want to again commend the Capitol Hill Police and the Secret 

Service, but the Capitol Hill Police, my understanding is your officers worked a 16–hour day that day. And while I think it is appropriate to have oversight and figure out what went right and what 

went wrong, I do not want anybody on your force to misconstrue 

the message, at least, that I am trying to convey, and that is that 

that is a long day with a lot of people. And I think that you deserve 

to have our chance. 

My last question, if I may, Mr. Chairman, I do not have a lot of 

experience with crowd control. My only experience occurred one 

day the Ku Klux Klan wanted to come to my hometown, and I was 

the prosecutor at the time. And the crowd was not the KKK, because they were only six fat guys in sheets; it was all the people 

that wanted to come and do harm to them that we had to control. 

And the way that the sheriff’s department handled it at that time 

was to push back the perimeters. 

As I look at these satellite photos and the gates and everything 

else, do you think that pushing back the perimeters to sort of get 

rid of the people like my mother-in-law’s sister that, you know, has 

come with the phony invitation, or the people that just showed up 

and had not heard you needed a ticket, do you think that pushing 

back the perimeters would be in order, based upon this experience, 

or no? 

Chief MORSE. First, we actually pushed the perimeters back from 

previous Inaugurations just for this reason. And while that does 

not really depict the area of the purple gate, but it is in that location. You can see that the areas we picked for screening are the 

most accessible and the largest open space that we could find within the Capitol complex to facilitate screening of this sort. Before, 

they were much closer in and limited that. So we did make an effort. 

The only thing I would caution—and I think we probably need 

to examine it more closely—is, as we push this out, we are simply 

pushing the choke point out. So we need to really examine what 

caused the choke points, which I think the recommendations identify, and really work on limiting the merging of crowds that are 

trying to get to a variety of different locations. The security simply 


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bifurcates the city in a manner that is hard to get 1.8 million people to the areas that they need to be. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Congressman, I would just like to offer a point on 

that, because I think we have to push out where we begin to identify people and where they should be coming from. I think what 

happened here is that a lot of people were allowed to come in too 

close, who did not have a ticket, who had a commemorative ticket, 

who were general public or, quite frankly, may have been lost. 

By using way-finders and, other nonlaw-enforcement people who 

would be out as far as, Union Station; I think you have to go out 

that far to begin to identify where attendees need to go. And that 

is where we have to be better with the signage and better with direction. Because I think when you look at the fence line and you 

look at all those people that could not get in, a lot of them are 

there, quite frankly, because they were intermingled with people 

that were not ticketed. 

So I do think when you look at the evolution of the Inauguration 

over the last three Inaugurations now, the perimeter has gone farther and farther out; and a lot of that is because of the terrorist 

threat. If we are anticipating the type of crowd that we got for this 

inauguration we have to do a better job of figuring out who the 

people are, who should be allowed to come in, and the other people 

that need to be directed to go to other checkpoints. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Rodriguez. 

ASSISTANCE OFFERED BY THE NATIONAL GUARD

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you very much. And once again, I want 

to thank you for the long hours of service performed by your officers on inauguration day. But I also need to let you know that I 

just travelled through my 20 counties in February, and there were 

some constituents that were very pleased, but there were some that 

went through those gates where there were procedural problems 

and it was a nightmare for—some of them who showed up at 5:00 

in the morning, 4:00 in the morning and still could not get in. 

And, Chief, were you responsible for saying ‘‘no’’ to help offered 

by the National Guard? 

Chief MORSE. Yes. 

TIME FOR OPENING GATES

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I just want you to acknowledge that. Knowing 

full well that this was an extraordinary event that was occurring, 

and I told my constituents if you do not have a room, if you have 

accommodations far away, or are actually staying overnight in the 

area; it would be critical to arrive at the entrance gates early. 

Knowing that also, Chief, were you also responsible for determining the hours when the gates were going to be open of who the 

time to open the gates? 

Chief MORSE. Well, we actually opened the gates 2 hours, 21⁄2

hours earlier than they were expected to be open. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. You actually opened them 2 hours earlier? 


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Chief MORSE. The ticket hours were 9:00 a.m., and we opened 

the gates as early as 7:30 and the latest at 8:10. So we opened the 

gates earlier. And, in fact, we also backed up our reporting times 

for our police officers. My police officers spent the night in cars and 

here in the building so that they could be here at 3:00 a.m. And 

they were on post no later than 4:00 a.m. 

GENERATOR MALFUNCTION

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I want to acknowledge that. But knowing that 

full well, I want you to reconsider the fact that you said ‘‘no’’ to the 

National Guard that could have been helpful. 

In addition, I know I looked at one of the areas out here as they 

were coming in, the gates were still closed and I was looking, because I know my daughter was waiting to come in one of the areas, 

you know, and thank God, she was able to get in; but there was 

a large number of others that were not. That could have been extremely helpful for someone to have taken care of that in advance. 

And let me ask you, one of the gates, we had some stories about 

the generator malfunctioning and there was no backup system; is 

that correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Was that at the blue gate? 

Chief MORSE. There was a generator that failed at the beginning 

of our screening at 8:00 a.m. And we corrected that by immediately 

working with the Secret Service, our partners, going to handwanding and purse-checking, baggage checks, et cetera. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. You did not have a backup generator. Is that because of the lack of resources we were giving you or—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, sir, we were back up at 8:10 a.m. That went 

down at—— 

PROBLEMS IN THE BLUE GATE

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. So that went up. 

So then what—in your conclusion, what caused the problems in 

the blue gate, in the silver and purple area because some of the 

others did not have that problem. 

Chief MORSE. Right. As we indicated in the report and our review, there were multiple cascading events, such as people trying 

to get through the southbound tube of the tunnel to get to the 

north and south sides of the Mall. 

The parade route closed at 10:00 a.m. to capacity. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Do we have a responsibility to distinguish the 

people that were coming to those gates, whether they had tickets 

or not? Or is that something, you know, because people are going 

to come, they are going to try to find out where they are going 

through. And is it the responsibility of USCP to communicate to 

the people that have a purple ticket to head them in the right direction. 

Chief MORSE. We, in fact, did that with our way-finders and police officers. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Why did we have trouble on this side and not 

on some of the other sides? Was it the people in charge of those 

sections? 

Chief MORSE. No, it is actually a great analogy, because, for instance, the orange and yellow gates, we did not have significant 


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issues there, and the screening of those people had concluded—by 

about 11:20, the crowds were screened in. That is because there 

was not the converging of crowds trying to get onto the parade 

route, get onto the Mall, and people who were traversing from 

north to south. 

So if you take away the ticketed people, the 241,000 from 1.8 

million, you have got about 1.6 million people trying to get to the 

parade route or the Mall from various locations. 

ISSUANCE OF TICKETS

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. On the tickets, I think you are the one that gave 

us instructions not to hand them out until almost the Friday before 

or the day before. So you knew that those who had the tickets were 

going to be here and showing up. 

Chief MORSE. Absolutely. And as a matter of fact, our officers 

worked through the weekend and on the holiday in order to screen 

those people to get their tickets. 

GUIDELINES FOR VEHICULAR ACCESS

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Because we made it difficult for them also to access their tickets. And I understood that. 

Let me ask you another question. Who set the guidelines as to 

who could come in with cars and who could not? 

Did anybody give that any thought? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Congressman, we did. We met twice with Governor O’Malley, Governor Kaine, and Mayor Fenty. One of the big 

issues, we were very concerned with was the traffic coming in from 

Virginia and Maryland and how we would be able to deal with it 

here in the District. We all concluded that if we did not have some 

type of a traffic plan that we would have more vehicles in the District than they would be able to handle. 

And can I just mention one other item, please? 

Mr. PRICE. Very quickly, please. 

ACCESS TO FOOD AFTER THE EVENT

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I wanted to attend the parade. There was no 

way we could attend the parade, because we either had to go from 

the Inaugural, walk all the way over there, and then basically find 

some way of walking because there was no way of transporting ourselves, so that was another issue. And that is why I think President Obama was seen in the stands by himself and no one else in 

the stands was there watching the parade at all. And part of that 

also was attributed to people trying to get food after the event. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. You know, Mr. Congressman, we tried to be very 

proactive. We had a press conference on what the traffic plan 

would be. I had not heard that regarding the food, because we had 

worked with HHS on that very topic to make sure that there was 

enough water and food for all those that needed it. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I am sure the officers—I apologize—I am sure 

the officers, but for the attendees. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, this was for the attendees, sir. 

They had way stations, as I understand it, for all the attendees. 

We had a subcommittee that dealt with public health issues. They 


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worked hand in hand with our transportation subcommittee to ensure that those with any type of disability would not have to walk 

a long distance, and that they would be accommodated. That was 

something that the Executive Steering Committee and the subcommittees that oversaw those particular issues really paid a lot 

of attention to. 

PLANNING FOR SILVER TICKETED AREA

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. I would like to turn to a couple of examples from the silver gate. And I realize, in reading these accounts, 

that some of this is probably inevitable in the event of a crowd of 

this magnitude. So the challenge is to sort out what could have 

been prevented or facilitated, you know, acknowledging that people 

are going to have to wait in line for a long time probably under any 

circumstances. 

But let’s just think about these accounts from my constituents. 

‘‘When we emerged from the Metro station, there were several redcapped volunteers to point us toward the silver ticket line. During 

the long wait in line, there was no one on the street, no volunteers, 

no security officers to tell us what was going on. No one checked 

our tickets or bags.’’ 

Another account: ‘‘We were in a line that stretched for blocks 

near L’Enfant station when we heard that the ticket checking system had broken down. We then got out of line, that is, the line for 

the silver area, and went directly down Constitution and went 

right through security. A volunteer explained the tickets were not 

being checked.’’ 

Another one says: ‘‘Once they finally got to the gate, no one 

asked to see the tickets.’’ 

A couple of questions, I think, arise from this. One has to do with 

the way the silver—what kind of planning was done for the silver 

ticketed area. Now, that was supposed to hold 100,000 visitors. The 

original plan called for multiple entry gates, both on the north and 

the south sides of the Mall. But after the tickets were printed, the 

plan was changed, so the silver area would have only one entry 

gate on the south side. I just find that inexplicable; I cannot imagine what led to that decision. 

We have learned from the after-action report that the crowds of 

silver ticket holders awaiting entry spilled into crowds awaiting 

entry to other ticketed areas, creating a vast mob in which people 

did not know what line to get in and whether they were actually 

in line at all. So that does lead us to question some of this planning 

and why the number of entries to the largest section of the viewing 

areas was reduced in this way. 

Can either of you explain that decision? And what do you mean 

by your recommendation that this issue ‘‘should be addressed by 

future planners’’? What does that mean? 

And then the second question that I think arises from this has 

to do with the shortage of ticket checkers and line managers before 

the attendees reached the magnetometers. Now, I understand the 

Secret Service and the TSA managed the metal detectors, but the 

Capitol Police were the ones handling line management and ticket 

checking. 


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Chief, how many officers were stationed at each checkpoint to 

validate tickets? How many officers were outside? We have already 

addressed this partially to manage the lines. You already said you 

thought the people performing that latter function were obviously 

not enough. Did the Secret Service ever compare its resource plan 

for staff at the checkpoints with the Capitol Police resource plan? 

And were those resource levels similar? 

So, two questions about the kinds of experiences we recounted 

here. One has to do with the reduction of the number of entry 

gates, the second having to do with the number of people assigned 

to the ticket-checking function. And in the end, I have many reports here that tickets were never checked. But, of course, people 

thought they were going to be checked, and so most of the morning 

they were waiting in line to have that done. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, according to the information I 

have, we had 43 lanes to check those coming through. We had different levels of security. The further out you went, the levels of security were commensurate with what we felt to be the threat. 

At this particular checkpoint, as I understand it, we were not 

putting people through magnetometers. We were doing more of a 

pat-down and a waistband—— 

Mr. PRICE. This is the silver area, which is the farthest ticketed 

area from the platform? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, this would be west of the Reflecting Pool. 

Mr. PRICE. So no magnetometer checking was taking place there 

at all? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, this was more of a pat-down and a waistband 

check. And we had 143 officers there to do that. 

Mr. PRICE. Okay, but one entry point? Is that true? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. It was one entry point; we reduced it. And again, 

that was based on a decision between the U.S. Capitol Police and 

the U.S. Secret Service. 

We felt that we did not want to have the ticketed and 

nonticketed guests sharing a common screening checkpoint. To 

avoid anticipated congestion at Third Street and Constitution Avenue, and commingling of the silver and purple ticket holders and 

nonticketed parade viewers, a decision was made to have all silver 

ticket holders and nonticketed guests going to the National Mall 

enter their viewing areas from the south. 

We wanted everyone going into the silver to come from the south 

and not get congested with those that were going into the purple. 

What we were looking for these people to do was to come through 

the south tunnel and then come up south of the Mall and enter 

from that location. 

We felt that having these other checkpoints open north of that 

location would have just added more congestion. 

Mr. PRICE. Added more congestion to what, to the—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. To the purple. 

Mr. PRICE. The purple points to the east? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Purple, which would have been to the south; purple that would have been to the—I am sorry, would have been to 

the north. 

Mr. PRICE. I am sorry, to the north I mean. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. To the north, yes. 


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As it turned out, I think that we were right on that decision, We 

wanted anybody who was north, to come through that south tunnel 

and come south of the Mall, in order to enter from that location. 

If we had tried to bring these people through, the Third Street 

crossover, which we had to shut down, it would have been an even 

bigger mess. 

So I believe it was the right decision to have the silver ticket 

holders enter from the south, using the tunnel. The tunnel worked 

fine. Anyone coming through the tunnel, had no trouble getting to 

the silver, as I understand it. 

Mr. PRICE. At the time the tickets were printed, though, these 

plans were—there were plans to have multiple entry points? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right. And that was another one of our recommendations why these tickets should not be printed so early. 

Four years ago that plan would have worked perfectly. This year, 

with the historic nature of the election and the number of people 

that were going to come here, that plan that was on the ticket, just 

did not work. 

I believe an addendum went out to clarify that for people, but I 

am just not sure everybody got the word on that. 

Mr. PRICE. I was just looking at the map here. 

[The information follows:] 


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CLOSING SILVER AREA ENTRANCES

Mr. PRICE. I cannot understand for the life of me why a concern 

about congestion in the purple area, which is on the north side of 

the standing area just in front of the reflecting pool, why that 

would have required closing all the entrances to the silver area, 

which is a number of yards farther toward the west. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is why we wanted everyone to come from the 

south. If everyone had come from the north to get to the silver, 

they would have run smack into that crowd. 

I think there was a photo that you showed earlier that showed 

a huge crowd; and those people would have walked right into that 

crowd of people if we had had them come in that way. 

Chief MORSE. If I could, sir, I hope this is helpful, as well: On 

the north side of the Capitol you have the yellow and purple gates, 

which is a level of screening, it is the highest level of screening 

that takes place. 

Mr. PRICE. Yes, sir. 

Chief MORSE. The same level of screening takes place at the parade route. Therefore, if you had silver ticket holders, not only 

would you have additional congestion using the D Street corridor, 

the southbound tube, there would be no way for them to cross over 

the parade route, and they would be screened at a higher level 

than necessary, which would have caused more delays for those 

who were getting onto the parade route and the purple and yellow 

seated areas. 

Mr. PRICE. Well, was your original plan to not have 

magnetometers for people in the silver area, but to check tickets? 

Or was the original plan to not even check tickets for that area? 

People would otherwise indiscriminately go into that area. 

Chief MORSE. The level of screening was decided in advance and, 

certainly, ticket checks. Now, ground situations—could dictate that 

instead of causing an angry crowd, or perhaps holding the line up 

even longer than it should be, that people who were security 

screened, but did not have a ticket, got through. 

But that could be just a situational thing where an officer or our 

screeners do not want to cause any additional chaos or harm to 

anyone. 

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO TICKET CHECKING

Mr. PRICE. All right. What about the personnel assigned to ticket 

checking? What kind of assessment have you made of that, as to 

whether that was a problem or a factor in backing up these lines? 

Chief MORSE. Well, I think that we collectively looked at how 

many lanes we had going in, and we placed a number of people 

there to check tickets to keep those lanes full so that the screeners 

would have people to check. 

There were also Capitol Police officers who maintained, obviously, the perimeter and security within the silver ticketed area. 

And that is well over 100 officers. 

Mr. PRICE. Well, from the data provided in the report, your planning indicated that even under ideal conditions it would have taken 

3 hours and 45 minutes to process all blue and purple ticket holders, and about 3 hours and 10 minutes to process all silver ticket 


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holders. I assume that is the combination of the prescreening and 

the magnetometers. 

The gates were open only for a total of 4 hours. That is cutting 

it pretty close, was it not, even under ideal conditions? 

Chief MORSE. It does. We used a matrix, for instance, to decide 

the width of access points so that we could have the right flow to 

the screeners. And the screeners and the Secret Service, as well as 

the Capitol Police, who have a lot of experience in screening certainly, looked at this from a science. 

And opening the gates earlier than expected helped us alleviate 

any concern with pushing the time too close. So opening it up 21⁄2

hours earlier gave us more time to operate within the time frame 

that we had originally set. 

Mr. PRICE. It still gave you 4 hours, though. And your own planning here says, under ideal conditions it is going to take 3 hours 

and 45 minutes. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Again, those tickets were printed before anyone 

understood the severity of the number of people we were going to 

have; and that is why we made an adjustment and had the 

magnetometers open at 7:30 a.m. So—they were up and running at 

7:30 a.m. and started to take people in. 

But the fact is, Mr. Chairman, that the tickets were already 

printed prior to us coming up with that plan. That is again why 

we made that a recommendation, that there needed to be better coordination there. 

Mr. PRICE. Ms. Wasserman Schultz. 

PURPLE TUNNEL

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to get back to the purple tunnel of doom: What you expressed earlier regarding police directing people into the tunnel, 

there is video of people doing that, of police directing people into 

that tunnel; the clarification that you made, where you said people 

belonged in the southbound tunnel but not in the northbound tunnel and as if everything was fine in terms of the separation, the 

separation is a painted line between the southbound and northbound. 

Chief MORSE. The separation is very distinct. It is a wall. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. It is a full wall? 

Chief MORSE. Yes, it is a full wall. It is a tunnel system as if you 

would go through, for instance, the Baltimore tunnel. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Is it a median or a barrier? It is an 

enclosed wall? 

Chief MORSE. It is a enclosed wall. It is a tube. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. When we say police were directing 

them into the northbound tunnel, which police? MPD? 

Chief MORSE. I believe that the Metropolitan Police Civil Disturbance Unit went to that tunnel to help alleviate pedestrian flow 

in and around the area of D Street, Second and D, First and D, 

and found the people in the northbound tube; and as the report indicates, made some attempts at trying to alleviate that problem, 

but were not successful. And they—— 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Well, Chief, what happened? I know 

barriers did not show up because a truck broke down. What steps 


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were taken, when there were no barriers, to prevent people from 

filling the tunnel? What steps were taken to deal with that? 

MPD was responsible for both ends of the tunnel; is that right? 

Chief MORSE. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. All right. So since people did not belong in there and there were supposed to be barriers to prevent 

them from being in there, did MPD take any action? Once they 

filled the tunnel, that was it? It was not a controllable or fixable 

situation, and that was it? 

Chief MORSE. Yes, ma’am, that is what the report would indicate. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Okay. Well, do you know enough now 

about how and what happened with the filling of that tunnel so 

that we do not have ‘‘son of purple tunnel of doom’’ in 2013? 

Chief MORSE. I think what we all have learned from that is that 

whenever we do—whenever there are areas that we do not want 

people, we must either put physical barriers or police officers there 

to prevent that from happening. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. But in the event of an unanticipated 

problem like this one was, where a truck broke down and barriers 

did not show up, why was there—who was responsible for just deciding that barriers were not going to be replaced? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Madam Chairman, I think a couple of unfortunate 

things happened that really contributed to making this what it 

was: 

Trucks did not show up to put the barriers down. The general 

public began to go into the tunnel. They were very orderly, and 

they started an ad hoc line. I think that when the police found out 

that they were down there—there was very poor communication. I 

think that those officers who went down there went down there 

had every good intention of doing the right thing. They went down 

there to make sure there were no safety issues, but I just do not 

think they were aware of—— 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. I can appreciate that, Director Sullivan. But that is not a situation that was safe, as orderly as that 

crowd was. Because the crowd could just as easily have gotten extremely frustrated. They were trapped in a tunnel with no police 

around them to be able to get them out or move them along; no 

idea—I mean, I can only imagine being trapped in a tunnel that 

you were not supposed to be in. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I agree. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Have you taken steps? How would 

you address this problem and prevent it from happening again in 

the next Inauguration? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, I think a couple of things. 

Number one, we would shut that tunnel down a lot earlier than 

we had originally anticipated shutting it down. People showed up 

there earlier, and I think at this point we would shut that down 

the night before and would have the blockades up the night before. 

I believe that we would make sure that everybody has situational 

awareness of what that tunnel is all about. 

I believe what happened, is that the police and the people that 

were queued in that line felt that the line was going to lead to the 

purple gate. 


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Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Was it MPD’s decision not to replace 

or do something about the barriers not showing up? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think what happened was their vehicle that was 

going to put the barriers up was vandalized. By the time it got 

there, people were already queued, and—they let it go. When people that were in the tunnel called back to the MACC to let them 

know that there were issues in the tunnel, the people in the MACC 

were under the impression they were talking about the south tunnel, because the people in the MACC had believed that the north 

tunnel was not going to be open. 

So when they heard ‘‘tunnel,’’ they called over to the people at 

the south tunnel and said, Can you check that tunnel? We heard 

there are issues there. And they saw there was a perfect flow of 

people. 

Believe it or not, nobody took a look at the north tunnel. And I— 

as I said before, I apologize for that. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. That is a big ball drop. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is a big mistake. That is a big mistake. And 

all of us take responsibility for that mistake. All of us regret it. 

And all of us apologize to those people. 

I think it is something that we could have adjusted to that day, 

and there is no defending it. 

METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Mr. Chairman, before my time expires, I want to suggest that there are a lot of questions—I do not 

know how many rounds we are going to go, but there are a lot of 

questions that have been raised today, some that have been answered. I see Chairman Serrano is here, who is responsible for the 

District of Columbia; and I serve on that Committee as the vice 

chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, from the questions that have been raised today, 

I think we may want to consider having a hearing, at least where 

we have an opportunity to ask the Metro Police Chief some questions about the decision-making that they engaged in on that day 

and that caused so many people to miss the opportunity to see the 

Inauguration. 

I yield back. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. LaTourette. 

COORDINATION WITH TICKET PRINTERS

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would echo 

Chairwoman Wasserman Schultz’s observations. I think it might be 

helpful to have the folks from the JCCIC here as well. 

Because, Director Sullivan, something I wrote down when you 

were talking about the logistics and how long the gates were required to be open based upon your metrics and so forth and so on, 

I wrote down—you said, whoever printed the tickets did not check 

to make sure that the time printed on the tickets coordinated with 

what the metrics were showing. Is that what you meant to say? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. What I meant to say is, when those tickets were 

printed, I do not think any of us truly appreciated the magnitude 

of this event, for example the number of people that were going to 


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come. We had to adjust to those numbers well after the tickets had 

been printed. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. So going back to my first round of questions 

about this recommendation on page 32, do you think that that sort 

of takes better coordination, that the ticket guys know you cannot 

put 9 o’clock on the ticket, you really need to put 7:45 on the ticket? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I will give you an example. 

When we do the DNC and we do the RNC, we have members of 

the DNC and the RNC on our executive steering committee. Again, 

they do not really deal with security issues, but they deal with 

issues that do impact with the logistics of the event. And that is 

why we believe it would be worthwhile for the PIC, for the AFIC, 

and—— 

Mr. LATOURETTE. JCCIC. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right, for the JCCIC all to be on that steering 

committee. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Yes. Me, too. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. And again, those tickets were printed in July of 

2008. 

PUTTING BAR CODES ON TICKETS

Mr. LATOURETTE. Yeah. And I have to agree with Mr. Rodriguez. 

This is my fourth Inauguration since I have been here, I have always gotten 198 tickets. I think I am going to die and I will still 

get 198 tickets. So it was really not a surprise how many tickets 

each Member is going to get. And I assume the Senate runs the 

same way, except they do not seem to have any rules, so maybe it 

does not apply. 

I do not know why we cannot figure it out, when the tickets are 

printed, that here we are going to go and move forward, and why 

it has to be top secret and you know, we cannot get the tickets 

until 3 days before the event. It would be a lot more orderly if I 

could have mailed them back to Ohio, people would have come in 

and picked them up, rather than trying to scramble into the Rayburn Building. 

But let me ask you, has anybody ever thought about the notion 

of coming into the 21st century and putting bar codes on the tickets? That is how I go to the Indians games. Could you put bar 

codes on the tickets? And it would not identify you as your seat, 

but it would say purple, purple, purple, blue, blue, blue. And 

maybe that would help with some of the screening, and then the 

police officers and the Secret Service and everybody else could sort 

of concentrate on looking at threats, which you are highly trained 

do. 

But I think we could get anybody to come and run a bar code 

through a scanner. So were bar codes ever thought about? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think that is a great idea, but again—no matter 

what you use with technology, I still think that what we have to 

do a better job with, is dealing with these large crowds of people 

that do not come ticketed, or that come with what they think is a 

ticket and is not. These people need to be separated further out. 

I think that is where we could have done a much better job. 


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USING THE EAST FRONT OF THE CAPITOL

Mr. LATOURETTE. That is why I asked the perimeter question. 

But I think that you weed those people out further out if you move 

the perimeters back. And if you do bar codes, you know, again, my 

mother-in-law’s sister ain’t getting through with her gold thing because she does not have a bar code, and it is really not a ticket to 

the event. 

As I look at the map that the chairman has provided, the committee has provided, the East Front of the Capitol seems pretty underutilized. And I know there is a big deal about the new President 

and the old President walk out and they shake hands and say 

good-bye and hello. But is there a reason we do not use the East 

Front of the Capitol for egress and ingress? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is where we have the helicopter departure. 

It is an emergency evacuation area. You know, we have a lot of 

protectees. We have our new President, we have our departing 

President, we have other dignitaries in one location. That, is our 

perspective anyway, and I will defer to the Chief for his perspective—— 

Mr. LATOURETTE. I appreciate that. And Chief, before you answer that question, maybe the whole notion of maybe using it on 

the way in, but not as a way out. Because my understanding is, 

when the parade ends the President comes there, and when they 

leave, they leave through the East Front. 

But if you had moved—if you would consider moving your orange 

and your yellow gates up to and creating kidneys up there for people just to walk around the sides of the Capitol to come in, but you 

do not let them back out that way, maybe you free up some space. 

Or you just do not think we should use the East Front at all, 

based on security? 

Chief MORSE. Security, I think, rules in this respect. We do not 

have a fixed location that can protect our dignitaries there. It is 

open air. The ceremonies that take place on the East Front, reviewing of the troops and such, we have to make sure that not only on 

the ground, but at a distance we have that covered. And to put people, more people, in that area for law enforcement to be distracted 

with, or have to deal with, would place a higher level of risk on 

that. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Okay. That is what I figured, but it is a big 

open space that was not used. So for my 2 cents is, push the perimeters back, put bar codes on it, and stop sending out fancy things 

that really are not tickets. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Rodriguez. 

TICKET CHECKING

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you. 

I do want to thank you for your service. And I know the long 

hours that your officers worked. But I want to emphasize we are 

fortunate that no serious incidents occurred. 

I am concerned that if something had happened, I hope we would 

have had some kind of emergency response, because we really did 


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not have that emergency response to the problem that we encountered. I do not know whether there were additional staff ready to 

move if necessary. Otherwise, we would have had a real serious situation on our hands. 

As we look at one of your recommendations, tickets, ticket checking in the future should that be the function of the host committee? 

Are they volunteers or what? Who are they? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The host Committee would be the JCCIC up here 

at the Capitol. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. So were volunteers handling that or what? That 

is one of your recommendations, that ticket checking in the future 

should be the function of the host committee, not the function of 

law enforcement personnel? That is a recommendation, I gather, 

that you are making. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, to use an example of the RNC and the DNC: 

At those conventions tickets are not checked by law enforcement; 

they are checked by the RNC and the DNC, and law enforcement 

performs a law enforcement function. 

My opinion is, ticket checking is not a law enforcement function; 

that is something that should be done by others. And in this particular case, I believe that should be a function handled by the 

JCCIC or whoever they determine. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Which could mean volunteers, which could be 

another mess, you know, if we are not careful in terms of how that 

is handled, if they are people that are not on a salary, and motivated properly to execute specific duties. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Historically, that has been the case at other 

events that we have done. People are given training, they are informed what is expected of them; and my experience has been that 

they perform this duty in a very capable manner. 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COORDINATING AND STAFFING

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Okay. 

In terms of coordination, do you have recommendations in terms 

of coordinating? And any other recommendations in terms of maybe 

additional staffing and resources that we need to consider to help 

you make sure we get the job done and that we are ready to respond to some serious situations? 

Chief MORSE. I think one of the reasons we are under the NSSE 

structure is so we can have the assets and resources that we need 

to perform this level of event. With the recommendations that we 

have, we have learned that our focus on security should be as high 

a focus on the logistics of people. And we need to figure out a way 

to rectify that situation. By some of the recommendations that we 

have made, we believe will do that. 

ATTENDANCE PROJECTIONS

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. You could have figured out that if I—as a Member of Congress, I had close to 1,800 people wanting those 180- 

something tickets. I used a very rigorous process. My staff knew 

how many people were going to show up. We knew that. Why did 

you not know that? 

And I am serious. Why did not you know that? 


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Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, we knew those people were going to show up. 

What we did not know was, for example, we had thousands of people who took a bus to RFK Stadium. And the plan was for them 

to take a shuttle. Many of those people decided that they were not 

going to take the shuttle and they were going to walk. And when 

they walked, they converged with the purple ticket holders. 

We had no way of knowing those people were going to do that. 

We were caught short, and again we are going to have to do better. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Because I knew also, and I was telling people, 

look, even if you are far away in Maryland, you are going to have 

a rough time coming in. And we had a feel that it was going to be 

something extraordinary in terms of the numbers. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Again, a lot of people we dealt with, sir, were not 

people that were just coming to the Capitol. A lot of people that 

came into this flow of other people are people that went to the 

Mall, could not get into the Mall, and then migrated down here 

from—— 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. But that was expected. That was expected. Because I am telling you, I had hundreds of others that were coming 

out here without a ticket, not to mention the ones with a ticket. 

And that is just one Member. So I gather the same applied to every 

single Member. 

So we had some kind of a feel. So my concern is that we all kind 

of knew that now—and you seem to talk as if we did not expect 

this crowd and that kind of thing and this thing to occur. 

If we expect a problem to arise, we have to have a team to respond to it. I am sure if we had a shooting you would have had 

team out there real quickly, right? I would hope so. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We would have. 

I think we could have used more people, and I think we could 

have used more room. I think people were allowed to come in too 

close. By the time all these people came in, that were either 

ticketed or nonticketed, or people with a commemorative ticket, I 

believe it was very difficult to separate them. That is why one of 

the recommendations is that we do begin to separate people out 

further, that we have nonlaw-enforcement people dealing with the 

tickets. People should have better information as they approach, 

and better signage. 

Congressman, I agree with what you are saying. There are some 

things here that should have been done better in the planning, and 

there are some things that we should have done better the day of 

the event to react to what was not going well, either communication-wise or operationally. We know that there were some shortcomings. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank God, everything went okay. And I do 

want to thank you. 

But there were just some experiences where some people spent 

a lot of their money to come up here and did not have that opportunity to participate in the inaugural activities, and that was a 

shame. Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Serrano. 

ERRORS IN PROJECTING ATTENDANCE

Mr. SERRANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


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Gentlemen, thank you for your service and thank you for being 

here today. I think that Mr. Rodriguez’s last point has to be well 

understood. This can’t become a discussion only of how to handle 

a large event. 

This was a historic event. I had people coming from my district 

in the Bronx who were over 90 years old. I honestly told them that 

it was going to be tough standing or sitting for a long time, that 

it was going to be cold. But this was a historic moment that we 

have all well understood and, they were not going to miss it. 

I think as we look forward to the next inauguration or the next 

time we have such a historic moment in our country, that we need 

to take that into consideration. It can’t just be, how do we handle 

this, and what are the logistics of handling it? We also have to prepare for the fact that this was going to be huge, this was going to 

be emotional, this was going to be important. 

The people that did get in, I had a bunch of constituents, a large 

number that couldn’t get in, but those that did get in, all I hear 

from them and read from them is ‘‘I will never, ever, ever forget 

this.’’ In fact, one of the older ones said, ‘‘I can now leave. I have 

seen it.’’ That is the kind of emotion behind this, and that is why 

so many people are concerned that it didn’t go well. 

The other point I would like to make is, and I don’t know if this 

was answered while I was away, Washington, D.C. is known for 

large demonstrations, large gatherings. That is part of what we do 

in this town. Was it that this one was bigger than expected? Was 

it that this one was the largest ever? Or was it that this one didn’t 

work as well as the others? I would think if half a million people 

were showing up to a rock concert and you prepared for it, that the 

same logistics, the same mechanics would apply in larger numbers 

if 1.5 million show up. 

So what was the problem? Was it that it was too big, or people 

didn’t think that that many people would show up? 

Chief MORSE. I think there were several different reasons between our normal events that occur here in the city. For instance, 

when we had the Million Man March, we had 600,000 or 700,000 

people here in the city. But it wasn’t bifurcated by security. We 

didn’t have different areas of security that were fenced off, where 

streets were closed. It was more of a wide open space. Therefore, 

all the transportation systems could be used. The streets were open 

to flow north and south. Traffic continued to flow on the freeways 

and the Third Street Tunnel or through the tunnels that we were 

speaking of earlier. That is the biggest difference, along with the 

fact that it was almost triple that size. All those factors came into 

play on the 20th, and those were the major differences there. 

REPORT ON INAUGURAL DIFFICULTIES

Mr. SERRANO. Also I think that your statements speak to a summary, executive summary of the report coming out. When will the 

full report be available to the American people? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is why we put the executive summary together. We can take a look at the report that we have done, and 

if there is anything in there we believe should be classified, we will 

keep it classified. But we will be more than happy to work with the 

Chairman and the Committee to make that available. 


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Mr. SERRANO. In order to make the full report available, there 

has to be issues of security? Is that what you are saying? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. Right now we have it classified as law 

enforcement sensitive. If you would allow me to take a few days to 

take a look at that and see if there is anything we believe should 

not be released publicly, we would be more than happy to release 

it. 

Mr. SERRANO. All right. 

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METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would like to say one thing, because the Metropolitan Police Department isn’t here, and I know you have oversight for them. I would like to say they did an extraordinary job. 

We talked about the Third Street Tunnel. I want to make it clear 

what went well in this Inauguration was a collective effort, and 

what didn’t go well was a collective effort as well. 

I want to make sure that what went wrong with the Third Street 

Tunnel wasn’t only because of the Metropolitan Police Department. 

It was because of the action or the inaction that all of our agencies 

took. So Chief Lanier is not here, but I have the utmost regard for 

her and the department, and I do want to make sure that I said 

that to you. 

Mr. SERRANO. Well, we are not here as adversaries. We are just 

trying to make sure this never happens again. What happened happened. We have to prepare for it. But when you have a Supreme 

Court Justice messing up the swearing-in, you know that a lot of 

things can go wrong. 

Chief MORSE. If I could also echo Director Sullivan’s remarks, 

Cathy Lanier was up many a night worrying about this Inauguration. The night before the Inauguration, I spent some time with 

her, and she was worried about not only the jurisdiction that she 

was responsible for but also the ones that myself and Director Sullivan were responsible for. We do all take responsibility for the 

shortcomings that happened here, and we regret that. 

The police officers with the Metropolitan Police responded up to 

the Hill that day to assist us with crowd control, especially in the 

silver ticketed area. They were very responsive to that. And I think 

that their actions in the Third Street Tunnel after finding people 

there at the officer and supervisory level, they did what they 

thought was right and all good intention. And once they saw that 

there wasn’t any glaring safety issues or anyone that was in trouble, they attempted to make some direction there and then moved 

on to the E Street corridor to try to help alleviate that. And eventually, we were able to, obviously, unclog the tunnel around 11 

o’clock. 

So, Chief Lanier is a good friend of ours and a good chief, and 

her people deserve a lot of credit for that day as well. 

Mr. SERRANO. Thank you. 

PLANS FOR AN EVALUATION

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

We are nearing the closing hour here, but Chairman Wasserman 

Schultz and I think want to make certain that we pursue one very 

critical matter. Mr. Rodriguez has already broached the subject, 

and let me just take his question a couple of steps further. It has 

to do with what the plans were and what the capacity was had a 

truly disastrous event materialized. So, let me try to frame it this 

way. 

There are a number of things we have heard from your report 

and also from people we have communicated with about what they 

observed. The dearth of officers who couldn’t be seen in the large 

crowds, megaphones not effectively communicating, too few direcVerDate Nov 24 2008 02:52 Oct 22, 2009 Jkt 052213 PO 00000 Frm 00527 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\52213P2.XXX 52213P2

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tions, finding signs, all this created some confusion and chaos just 

with respect to the formation of lines and the entry to the event. 

But also all of these things also have serious implications for the 

capacity to handle a disastrous event, should it arise. 

What kind of thinking have you done about how you would have 

responded, how you could have responded to a catastrophic event 

like a bombing or a manmade or natural event, an explosion of 

some sort, whatever kind of catastrophic event might have really 

caused widespread panic and disruption? 

Director Sullivan, what was the plan for evacuating people out 

of the downtown area if there had been a security event. For example, given the problems getting individuals to the Mall, how could 

we conceive of getting them out of the area in a timely manner? 

You have spoken about the east portion of the Capitol as an 

evacuation area. You might want to expand on that a bit. 

Chief, what kind of responsive evacuation plan did you test or rehearse before the event? What kind of scenarios did you envision? 

I think we are all in awe of the numbers you were dealing with 

here and just the sheer scale and scope of this event. So routine 

crowd management proved to be sometimes beyond our capability. 

But what about this catastrophic scenario? That is really the question we have to ask, I think. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. As I mentioned before, we had an Executive 

Steering Committee, and 23 working groups or subcommittees. One 

of the working groups we had was a transportation subcommittee 

that had 15 agencies, including law enforcement agencies. As part 

of that, they looked at a mass exodus plan for this type of an event. 

We had 30 medical stations within these secure areas, as well as 

a mobile hospital. 

If there was some type of a catastrophic event, there was a walkout plan. We had, I think, 23 jumbotrons that would give direction 

to people, as well as verbal direction by law enforcement. Depending on where that particular event was, people would be instructed 

to walk in a direction that would be going away from the threat 

or from that particular event. 

This was one of the big reasons why we did meet with the Governors from Virginia and with Maryland, as well as with Mayor 

Fenty, to make sure we didn’t have so much vehicular traffic. So 

if we did have to evacuate the city, we wouldn’t have all these vehicles trying to leave at the same time. Now, you can well imagine 

with 1.8 million or 2 million people, we are not going to be able 

to stop on a dime. But there was a lot of work, and we would be 

more than happy to give you a classified briefing on that particular 

plan. 

And as a matter of fact, we did table top that plan. We did several table top exercises leading up to the Inauguration, and many 

of the scenarios we looked at had to do with a catastrophic event. 

So I feel comfortable that we did have a plan in place for that. 

But when I look at the National Mall, for example, 2 hours after 

the Inauguration was over, law enforcement was able to clear that 

area. It took 2 hours to clear that out, in a very orderly fashion. 

But I do want to assure you that there was a plan in place for a 

mass evacuation and I would be more than happy to go into more 

depth with you in a classified briefing. 


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Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Just a very brief follow-up to Chairman Price’s question. So you think it is realistic to expect, in a 

crowd that size, 1.8 million to 2 million, in the event there was 

some type of manmade disaster or terrorist attack, that you had an 

evacuation plan for both the leadership, the President, the Congress and the crowd that would have been effective? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I believe we had the best plan in place. I can’t 

guarantee you that with 2 million people that everything is going 

to go according to plan, but I do think that we tried to look at every 

scenario and do it in the safest way we could. 

INCLUDING THE JCIC AS A STEERING COMMITTEE MEMBER

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. I don’t really feel like this is taboo to 

say, one of the glaring problems beyond the ones we have identified 

here and that you have acknowledged is that JCIC bears some responsibility as well. I think much of their planning was wanting 

and would need to be reevaluated. I am assuming that you worked 

with them as well, or do they make their own decisions on planning for the future? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think that is why we believe that they need to 

be part of the Executive Steering Committee, the same as we do 

with the DNC and RNC. I also believe that the PIC and AFIC, to 

be part of the Executive Steering Committee, so we are hand-inhand. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. And they weren’t before, is that right? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. For this particular event, they were not part of 

the Executive Steering Committee. Again, there was contact with 

them, and we did most of that or all of it through the Capitol Police. I think if we want to improve, they need to be part of the Executive Steering Committee. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you. 

ROLE OF UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

Mr. PRICE. Chief, just to clarify, what was you and your agency’s 

role in the response and evacuation planning? Was that the Secret 

Service’s responsibility mainly, or were you responsible? What kind 

of responsibility did you have, and did you undertake table top exercises and rehearsals, or were you just part of this coordinated effort? 

Chief MORSE. This is a coordinated effort, and as far as the Capitol Hill Subcommittee is concerned, the U.S. Secret Service and 

the Capitol Police coordinate with each other planning for security 

and evacuation and consequence management as it relates to any 

event that occurs. And in fact, we did have a Joint Steering Committee table top exercise on Capitol Hill to address all the possible 

threats and actions that we would take should they occur. 

Mr. PRICE. All right. Well, thanks to both of you. 

Do our other members have remaining questions? 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Let me just once again thank you for the service 

that you do provide for us. I think the Chairman indicated at the 

beginning, one of the things that irritated me was the comments 

that were made initially; it wasn’t you two, I think someone from 

D.C. talked about the fact that everything was okay and there were 

no problems whatsoever, knowing full well that I was already getVerDate Nov 24 2008 02:52 Oct 22, 2009 Jkt 052213 PO 00000 Frm 00529 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\52213P2.XXX 52213P2

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ting called; people had been out there 7 or 8 hours and had never 

had a chance to get in. So hopefully we can learn from this experience. 

Now, as Americans, and I will just close with this, we are unique 

in a lot of ways. When you are in another country, most people 

don’t form a line. We form a line to get on the bus, to do everything, and we are very orderly. So thank God everything went 

okay. Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. Again, thank you. We look forward to working with 

you. Of course, we have much more to talk about. Both of our Subcommittees will have a great deal more to talk about with you as 

we look toward the 2010 budget. 

I think inevitably here today we focused on an area of shared responsibility and an episode that we need to get some clarity on and 

some understanding for future purposes. So we appreciate your cooperation in that and on the many matters in which you serve our 

country. We thank you and look forward to working with you as 

we formulate our spending plans for 2010. 

The Subcommittee is adjourned. 


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(595) 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 1, 2009. 

CARGO AND CONTAINER SECURITY: KEEPING A LID ON 

THREATS 

WITNESSES 

JAYSON P. AHERN, ACTING COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION 

THOMAS WINKOWSKI, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION 

CHARLES R. GALLAWAY, ACTING DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE 

Mr. PRICE. The Subcommittee will come to order. Welcome, everyone, to our hearing on cargo and container security. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DAVID PRICE

The grim scenario of a bomb in a box traversing a U.S. port of 

entry and detonated there or at a subsequent destination has been 

the subject of numerous reports in congressional hearings, including several before this subcommittee. While the consequences of an 

attack could be horrendous in terms of loss of life and property, the 

impact from even a conventional weapon would be to disrupt the 

trade on which our economic well-being depends. 

At the same time, we are mindful that we must always seek a 

careful balance when considering enhanced security requirements 

on trade and transportation sectors. That is the balance between 

the need to reduce risk to the public while also minimizing adverse 

impacts on commerce. 

So we are left with many questions to consider. What level of 

risk can we tolerate? How can we reduce the risk we face? And 

what will it cost? 

Secretary Napolitano last month testified in regard to the deadline for scanning all U.S.-bound cargo overseas as required in the 

9/11 Act that, and I am quoting now, the 2012 deadline is not going 

to work. This was no great surprise. 

From previous testimony before this Subcommittee and our own 

observations from Subcommittee visits to container security and secure freight initiative ports, it has been clear that the sheer scale 

and the technical and diplomatic complexity of the project make 

this 100 percent target very hard to meet. The question is, absent 

a 100 percent solution on the timeline projected, are current programs adequate to mitigate the risk, or to what extent are they 

adequate to mitigate the risk? If not, what needs to be done? For fiscal year 2009, Congress provided over $1 billion in funding 

to CBP and DNDO to address international cargo and container security. This funding covers technology research and deployment, 

international programs and automated screening systems. These 


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programs are now becoming more established with the CSI program in 58 countries, and the secure freight program passed its initial pilot stage but, I must say, without a clear destination. We will 

want to learn how CBP and DNDO plan to ensure these programs 

are optimally focused to reduce present risk and to give us indications of what our future direction can and should be. 

Radiation detection and source identification are key elements of 

cargo security, and they continue to be problematic. We continue 

to await completion of testing and certification of next-generation 

advanced spectroscopic portals, or ASP, which is at least 2 years 

behind schedule. I want to hear today what the Department is intending to do with the funding set-aside to procure and deploy systems in the absence of ASP. I also want to hear how DHS plans 

to implement radiation detection systems in environments that 

have had major vulnerable gaps, such as rail cargo and transshipment. 

Apart from scanning for radiation, security involves knowing the 

participants in the trade process. CBP has grown its CustomsTrade Partnership Against Terrorism program over the last 8 

years. It has implemented advanced manifest requirements and 

has initiatives, such as its FAST program to vet commercial drivers. 

Last year, CBP released its Importer Security Filing Rule, also 

called 10 Plus 2, requiring businesses to supply additional data elements about cargo and carriers as required under the SAFE Port 

Act. Promoted as a way to improve targeting, the rule faced some 

industry opponents who claimed it would impose costly new administrative burdens. I would like to hear how this rule is being implemented, what results it is bearing in terms of greater awareness 

of potential threats as well as increasing the margin for taking preventive or protective action. 

Finally, with the rising concern about violence along the U.S.- 

Mexican border, the Administration has proposed an enhanced outbound inspection process for southbound traffic. We would like to 

understand what witnesses think about the infrastructure, staffing 

and process change that such a southbound initiative entails, outbound initiative entails. Basically, we would like a more detailed 

account of how this initiative will operate in the field, what sort of 

impact the department hopes and expects it to have on this critically important challenge. 

To address these issues, we welcome back Jayson Ahern, the Acting Commissioner for U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Dr. 

Charles Gallaway, the Acting Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DNDO; and Thomas Winkowski, the CBP Assistant 

Commissioner for field operations. We look forward to hearing from 

you today. As is usual practice, your full written statements will 

be entered into the record. We will ask you to limit your oral remarks to 5 minutes each. 

[The information follows:] 


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Before we begin, let me recognize our distinguished ranking 

member, Mr. Rogers, for his comments. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I am going to depart from my prepared remarks 

initially here because I have just learned that the Department has, 

in effect, put into practice de facto amnesty because in the news 

reports, in Seattle, where ICE had raided a company for hiring illegal aliens who were using false documents to obtain employment 

at the plant, now the Department has ordered that those 28 workers have been released. And not only that, they were given permission to return to work by the Department that is supposed to be 

protecting us against illegal aliens entering the country and gaining unlawful employment. 

I don’t know why we need the Customs and Border Protection organization or ICE or any of the others, even the Department if we 

are going to say that it is okay to use false documents, lying to obtain a job and then, on top of that, being illegally in the country. 

Why are we here? 

Now I know this agency is not—this is not their bailiwick but I 

don’t know why we need a Customs and Border Protection if we 

are not going to enforce the laws that are on the books, by people 

using false documents to gain employment while illegally in the 

country and then released to go back to work. I am flabbergasted. 

This is de facto amnesty, de facto amnesty. 

Now, tomorrow, we are going to be hearing from the immigration 

enforcement and employment verification people. And believe you 

me, there will be some hard questions they will be needing to answer on this matter because this is an absolute wholesale change 

in policy that affects every American and every illegal alien in the 

country, and the criminal laws of the country, by lying to gain a 

job while being an illegal alien and then releasing from being held 

without bond and then giving permission to go back to work, a 

work permit. 

Mr. Chairman, what has happened here? Have you seen the reports? 

Mr. PRICE. No, I have not. But I intend to. 

Mr. ROGERS. I will let you read the news accounts. It is absolutely—— 

Mr. PRICE. We will have a range of immigration officials before 

us tomorrow. 

Mr. ROGERS. And they had better come well armed. 

Well, I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for my outburst, 

but this is significant. 

Over the last 6 years, DHS has made tremendous progress at improving the security of the more than 25 million cargo containers 

that enter the country each year. During this time, DHS has 

learned a great deal about allocating scarce resources to address 

our greatest threats and hardening the supply chain from its greatest risks. From the expansion and strengthening of programs like 

CSI C–TPAT and the Secure Freight Initiative to extensive deployments of radiation portal monitors to advancements in targeting, 

DHS has indeed made progress by adding rigor to its risk-based 

approach to cargo security. 


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Because of the scope and complexity of the cargo shipping industry, the Draconian treatment of every aspect of the supply chain is 

simply unworkable. That is why I have consistently supported an 

adaptable layered framework that facilitates an appropriate balance between legitimate trade and security, but just as many of 

CBP’s cargo security programs appear to be reaching a level of 

functional maturity, and the 9/11 Act’s capricious mandates are 

being thoughtfully reconsidered. In-transit vulnerabilities persist, 

and outbound smuggling is apparently growing. 

The export, if you will, of illegal weapons and bulk cash is part 

of the fuel that feeds the treacherous drug war now raging along 

our border with Mexico. This pervasive smuggling is also a stark 

reminder of the value added to security by a tamper-resistant supply chain, integrity that could potentially be assured in high-risk 

trade lanes through a viable container security device. Unfortunately, development of such a device continues to elude DHS, and 

that failure continues to baffle me. 

As part of DHS’s efforts to confront the drug war and support 

Mexico’s noble efforts against the cartels, CBP will reportedly embark on a new $95 million effort to screen 100 percent of the rail 

containers flowing south into Mexico and step up inspections of 

outbound traffic at our ports of entry. These ambitious plans appear to have merit, but they also raise many logistical questions, 

questions that I hope you have answered here today. 

Gentlemen, since the days of Alexander Hamilton and the founding of our customs service, the need for countersmuggling has remained unchanged. What has changed, however, is the combination of threats we now face, a lone radical intent to do harm 

against the long dark shadow of a massive drug war, and this in 

addition to CBP’s traditional efforts to enforce our trade laws and 

ferret out illegally transshipped and fraudulent goods, efforts that 

are vital to American manufacturers and workers who are struggling in the midst of this turbulent economic turndown. 

So perhaps now as much as ever, CBP’s cargo security mission 

matters to our national interests and way of life. For it is CBP, 

armed with tools from DNDO, that we are counting on to be the 

filter within our Homeland Security arsenal, a filter that strives to 

ensnare contraband and threats while allowing for the free and vibrant flow of commerce. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Ahern, we will ask you to go first. And I understand Dr. 

Gallaway also has an oral statement. Mr. Winkowski does not have 

an oral statement, but we will then turn to all three of you for 

questions. 

Please go ahead. 

[The information follows:] 


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OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. AHERN

Mr. AHERN. Good morning, Chairman Price, Ranking Member 

Rogers and other members of this committee. I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today, along with our colleagues from 

DNDO as well as our assistant commissioner for field operations, 

to discuss the work that is being done to both strengthen the security of the containerized cargo entering the United States across 

our borders while with facilitating legitimate travel and trade as 

well. 

Let me begin by expressing my gratitude to this committee for 

your continued support for providing to important initiatives the 

funding needed to be implemented by CBP over the last several 

years. I have appeared before you previously to discuss many of the 

important layers we have in our cargo security protocols that we 

use to manage risk. We continue to strengthen these programs to 

better secure our country, all while not stifling international trade. 

This year CBP has moved forward with the collection of additional importer security data, commonly referred to as 10 Plus 2, 

which will further enhance our targeting and risk-assessment processes. We have continued to deploy radiation detection technology 

and large-scale inspection equipment to our ports of entry. Through 

CSI, we work in partnership with foreign counterparts to examine 

high-risk containers cargo before it is shipped to the United States, 

and we assist our trade community to strengthen their supply 

chain as a benefit of being enrolled in C–TPAT. 

And while we have implemented considerable programs to secure 

our maritime cargo and reduce the risk, threat of a significant nuclear weapon in a maritime container remains remote. While we 

must look to apply our limited resources to multiple areas of threat 

and vulnerability, we should not overemphasize maritime containers at the potential detriment to other threat areas that are in 

the need of resources. 

In my limited time remaining here, I would like to comment on 

the issue of 100 percent scanning and the Secretary’s strategy announced last week with Mexico. CBP continues to go ahead and 

abide by the law passed by Congress regarding 100 percent scanning, but our concern to ensure this focus does not negate the effective layered risk-based strategy that is currently now in place. And 

as you have heard me say before this committee, no one should be 

misled that 100 percent scanning equals 100 percent security. 

But as we plan ahead and get closer to the mandatory date of 

2012, we need to more seriously consider the costs and logistics involved with 100 percent scanning. We have long maintained that 

there will be significant technological, political, legal challenges as 

well as the issue of how to deal with transshipped cargo. And multiple reports have been submitted to the Congress since 2007 outlining what we have learned through the 100 percent security protocols that have been implemented thus far. 

In every location, it has its own infrastructure challenges, technological challenges, environmental issues, political challenges that 

we must overcome and the resource commitment to overcome these 

challenges must be commensurate with the additional security that 

we may gain. We are also challenged to determine who will incur 


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the costs for operating and maintaining the scanning equipment. 

We need to conclude as far as agreements with partnering nations 

and terminal operators. We need to also work out staffing implications for both foreign customs services and terminal operators. 

So while additional data gained from 100 percent scanning can 

be useful, challenges and expenses are significant, even in the limited environments we have currently deployed. And we also must 

balance this with the 11 million trucks that come across our borders as well as 2.7 million railcars in addition to the 10 million 

containers that are coming in the maritime environment. 

Finally, the violence in Mexico related to the drug trafficking is 

a focus of much concern. Three weeks ago, I testified before this 

committee on the Secure Border Initiative, and border violence became the primary topic of discussion. Last week, the Secretary 

mandated more law enforcement personnel along the border and a 

greater emphasis on outbound traffic, especially aimed at interdicting guns and money. With the Secretary’s announcement, certainly CBP will play an important but not an exclusive role in her 

new strategy. We have temporarily redeployed some personnel and 

special technology and K–9 assets to the Mexican border. 

To fund this new level of sustained outbound enforcement action, 

CBP is looking at its existing funds for reallocation from other programs in the organization. But doing so, we must balance these increased outbound activities with significant inbound enforcement 

and facilitation responsibilities. 

Thank you, again, for the opportunity, and I look forward to the 

questions coming. 

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Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF DR. GALLAWAY

Mr. GALLAWAY. Good morning, Chairman Price, Ranking Member Rogers and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. It is 

a pleasure to appear before you with my esteemed colleagues from 

CBP, Acting Commissioner Ahern and Assistant Commissioner 

Winkowski. 

As Acting Director of the Department of Homeland Security’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, I would like to thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to discuss challenges in container security and to highlight the work DNDO is pursuing. I would also 

like to thank the subcommittee for its support of DNDO’s mission, 

which is to reduce the risk of radiological and nuclear terrorism to 

our Nation. 

Since the DNDO was formed almost 4 years ago, we have made 

significant strides in improving the Nation’s capability to detect 

and prevent nuclear terrorism, including major improvements in 

our Nation’s capability to scan cargo containers for rad-nuke 

threats. Our ongoing work with CBP to facilitate continuous security has resulted in the scanning of 98 percent of all incoming containerized cargo at our land and sea ports of entry. 

We are working to finish the remainder of the deployments along 

the northern border by the end of this year, and we are addressing 

other previously unaddressed cargo challenges, which include ondock rail, international rail, and air cargo. At the same time, I 

would like to add that DNDO’s goals extend well beyond deploying 

detection systems to scan cargo containers. 

As we have matured, we have shifted our focus to a wider range 

of issues and challenges and are now dedicating increased time and 

effort to address these other areas of concern. For instance, while 

DNDO has made substantial improvements in rad-nuke detection 

technologies, we have also dedicated significant efforts to integrated rad-nuke detection planning across the Department and 

with our interagency partners. 

Similarly, DNDO has developed a robust operational support capability designed to enhance the effectiveness of a wide variety of 

operational partners, including the states and locals. Much of our 

insight has come from our work on the global nuclear detection architecture which seeks to integrate efforts across the government 

into a single time-phased strategy to improve the Nation’s nuclear 

detection capabilities. 

We have been working with our partners to pursue a range of 

programs to strengthen the architecture by filling gaps, addressing 

vulnerabilities, improving technologies, building necessary infrastructure and raising awareness about rad-nuke threats and the 

role of detection systems in mitigating them. 

To be effective, the defensive countermeasures in each layer, 

international, at the border, and in the interior, along each threat 

pathway, land, air and sea, will require a multifaceted defense indepth approach utilizing a variety of technology and operational capability solutions. Most importantly, no single solution is effective 

to completely address the rad-nuke threat. 


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With that said, given the maturity of technologies and planning 

at the time of DNDO’s formation, securing containerized cargo that 

is coming into the United States has been a measure emphasis to 

date. Working with CBP, we have deployed radiation portal monitors to a majority of the seaports and land border crossings. 

At the same time, we have made substantial investments in the 

deployment of the next generation of portal monitors, known as the 

advanced spectroscopic portal, or ASP. The ASP technology will significantly improve the probability of correctly identifying and interdicting smuggled nuclear material and have the ability to differentiate between threat material and naturally occurring radioactive 

material, thereby reducing the number of alarms due to nonthreat 

sources. 

The ASP units are currently undergoing an extensive test and 

evaluation campaign. The successful completion of this testing will 

result in data that will be provided along with other materials and 

reports, including a cost-benefit analysis and consultation with the 

National Academy of Sciences to inform the Secretary’s certification 

decision of ASP. 

Radiation portal monitors are only part of the solution to detect 

nuclear threats at our ports. Another key DNDO objective is to address the threat of shielded nuclear material that passive detection 

systems, such as PVT, which are currently deployed, or even the 

new ASP portals, are not capable of detecting. DNDO is working 

with CBP on a wide range of technologies to address this concern, 

focussing first on radiography systems that provide the ability to 

automatically detect a nuclear threat or dense material that may 

be used to shield a nuclear threat. 

To address gaps in the global nuclear detection architecture that 

remain unfilled by current technologies or near-term improvements, DNDO has also established a transformational research and 

development program. We reach out to the best in class within the 

national laboratories, industry and academia to conduct these efforts. And I am happy to report these research efforts are already 

yielding impressive results in a number of areas, including the 

identification of promising new detection materials. 

As you can see, the mission of the DNDO reaches far beyond container security. Nuclear detection at our official ports of entry is 

but one layer of the entire global nuclear detection architecture 

which encompasses a broad array of efforts to mitigate the radnuke threat. By working with our DHS and interagency partners, 

DNDO is continuing to assess the best technological and operational solutions for use internationally, at our borders, and domestically. We remain committed to providing cutting-edge detection 

technology that can be used in a variety of environments by federal, state, local, and tribal operators to address identified 

vulnerabilities in the global nuclear detection architecture. 

Detection technologies and strategies are coupled with DNDO’s 

operational support services to ensure that alarms are promptly resolved and detection of threats is seamlessly transitioned to operational responses. In addition, DNDO trained state and local officers to support the rad-nuke detection mission. 

Finally, DNDO stood up the national Technical Nuclear Forensic 

Center as an interagency stewardship office for integrating the NaVerDate Nov 24 2008 02:52 Oct 22, 2009 Jkt 052213 PO 00000 Frm 00622 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\52213P2.XXX 52213P2

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tion’s full spectrum nuclear forensics capability. I look forward to 

continuing to work with components within DHS, other federal departments, state and local agencies and the members of this subcommittee and the Congress to keep the Nation safe from radiological and nuclear terrorism. 

This concludes my prepared statement. Chairman Price, Ranking 

Member Rogers and Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for 

your attention, and I would be happy to answer any questions. 

[The information follows:] 


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OVERSEAS CARGO SCANNING

Mr. PRICE. Thanks to both of you. 

I would like initially to focus, Mr. Ahern, on the major topic of 

cargo scanning, the CSI, the Secure Freight Initiative, the underlying question pertaining to 100 percent overseas cargo scanning 

required by the 9/11 Act, the extent to which that goal is being approached, and whether it is ultimately feasible or wise. I think 

these questions inevitably loom large as we look at the current 

state of play. 

As you know, the new Secretary, on February 25, said that the 

2012 deadline for 100 percent overseas cargo scanning could not be 

met. And she said, ‘‘We are going to have to work on what we do 

beyond that’’. 

Clearly, that is an accurate statement. In your statement today, 

you warned against focussing on overseas scanning to the detriment of other actions that could improve security while not unduly restricting trade. I want to ask you to elaborate on those 

trade-offs. Clearly, the date is being pushed back; targets are being 

adjusted to some subset, I assume, of some 700 foreign ports that 

ship to the U.S. I would like to know to what extent you really are 

rethinking the requirement itself, the requirement for overseas 

scanning itself. Or at least give us some sense of the proportionate 

place you think this should play in the overall scanning picture and 

what you think is feasible or optimal in that regard. Would 100 

percent scanning provide additional security beyond that either already provided by CBP’s existing security programs or that you 

think might already be achieved in a reasonable time frame? 

This Subcommittee has visited some of the pilot SFI ports, 

Salallah and Hong Kong in particular. We have noted that the 

sites chosen have generally been the smaller ports or small areas 

of a port, such as Hong Kong. It does raise the question, is 100 percent screening feasible at any of these ports, let alone the idea of 

doing it at all of them? 

Seven ports were originally intended for the SFI. There were 

three pilot ports, Southhampton, Cortes and Qasim. I would like to 

have an indication of what has been achieved there. And then 

there are four large seaports that volunteered to participate: Hong 

Kong, Busan, Salallah and Singapore. We know that none of them 

screen 100 percent now. What do they do? What percentage of 

U.S.-bound cargo do they scan with both radiation and nonintrusive inspection equipment? What is the state of play here, and 

what does it imply in terms of long-term policy? 

Mr. AHERN. I will try to begin with the opening question you 

asked. It goes back to what the Secretary stated in her hearing a 

few weeks ago, that the 2012 deadline does at this point appear to 

be unattainable. I would also caveat that, as a law enforcement 

agency, as long as there is still a law, we still need to be focused 

on the law. I think that is an issue that needs discussion as we go 

forward. 

In my experience, in my professional opinion as well, that when 

you take a look at identifying a solution to a problem, you have to 

identify what the level of risk is. And then it has been our experience, and it has been also as far as the intelligence information 


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that we continue to receive, that the risk is relatively low, and remote is the possibility for any type of significant device to be put 

in a box to the United States. 

What you then need to take a look at is, what is the level of risk 

reduction that is appropriate for a minimal amount of risk? And I 

believe, as we have continued to lay the strategy in place in a post– 

9/11 environment, beginning with the advanced information that 

we are continuing to strengthen through the 10 Plus 2 implementation this year, as you take a look at continuing to strengthen the 

relationship we have in the CSI locations with our partnerships 

and building the capacity with our host-country counterparts on 

those who actually do pose risk to have the protocol of examining 

each one of those containers that do pose a risk identified in the 

58 ports we are currently deployed, makes sense. 

When you also then take a look at dealing with the significant 

companies and managing and securing their supply chain to reduce 

vulnerability, we continue to make that program much more significant than it was in its early implementation. We have over 

9,000 participants in the C–TPAT program today. That is an important value-added component for the supply chain risk reduction. 

And then also when you take a look at the opportunity to then 

intervene at a level of 98 percent, we still have well over 400 radiation portal monitors deployed at our seaports here in the United 

States for one last opportunity before a container is entered into 

the commerce of the United States. 

I know some have talked and come to this Committee as well as 

others saying, well, what about the possibility for remote detonation? Certainly, there is always a possibility for everything. At 

what point do we have to rely on what the risk assessment is and 

apply some thoughtful risk reduction for the measures that are 

necessary to put in place? And at what point, do we then need to 

turn our attention to greater risks that are facing this country 

versus continuing to add additional layers or actually negating the 

investments that have been made and funded by this committee 

over the last 7 years for risk management and actually moving forward with a 100 percent requirement? 

So I think there is an awful lot of responsibility that I think we 

all share in the U.S. Government, and frankly, I believe that the 

world stage is looking at us to show some leadership on what is 

it we are actually going to be doing as we move forward with this 

issue collectively? Because it continues to turn, even though there 

is the challenge of meeting the 2012 deadline; all of the technological challenges there, the sovereignty issues, the logistical challenges. There is still a significant amount of international churn, 

if you will, on what is going to be the U.S. Government’s position 

on this moving forward? 

I think that is a very serious issue collectively we have to address. 

Mr. PRICE. There is no question it is a serious issue. There is 

also no question, I would think, that while the risk statistically 

might be low, as you describe it, the potential consequences are extremely catastrophic. And of course, your Department is in the 

business of dealing with low-probability, high-consequence events 

and their prospect. And when that involves nuclear materials or 


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weapons, then that potential consequence is heightened. But I do 

think the dilemma, as you pose it, is a compelling one and one that 

no doubt we are going to have to deal with. 

OVERSEAS CARGO SCANNING PILOTS

I want to ask you to fill in now the second part of my inquiry, 

which has to do with the experience we have had with these experiments, these pilots with overseas inspection. Of course, there is 

a very compelling case on paper to be made for screening as much 

as we possibly can at the foreign ports where these ships are loaded. We have gone through this Secure Freight Initiative with the 

seven ports, to some degree. Can you generalize about what we 

have learned? In what ways are we wiser about the feasibility of 

this and what it might take to achieve this goal of 100 percent or 

certainly a large amount of the cargo being screened overseas? 

Mr. AHERN. I will begin, and I will ask Mr. Winkowski to fill in 

any of the blanks that he might like to add as well. But when you 

look at the three locations we began as a pilot, starting with Port 

Cortes in Honduras. We had a willing partner with the government 

of Honduras who already had installed the x-ray capabilities there, 

at their expense and for their own purpose. So we had that capability already in place to build upon for and adding our presence 

there that was there already, again, through the Container Security Initiative. So we had that component there. And then we 

added the additional capability that the Department of Energy 

brought with the radiation portal monitor. 

So that was relatively an easy partnership, if you will, to put 

those component parts together, integrate that, and be able to provide the integrated solution for looking at a relatively small universe of container. The number escapes me at this time, but I think 

it was less than 50,000 or 60,000 containers a year annually that 

are being shipped to the United States. When you aggregate that 

number, it may seem significant. When you go ahead and break 

that down into daily transactions, it is not that significant a volume. 

We then looked at as far as location that we already had got into 

partnership within Pakistan, Port Qasim. We again, we had a willing partner in the government of Pakistan who were willing to donate or provide the land for us to go ahead and build a footprint 

to be able to have a full container protocol, therefore radiation detection X-ray as well as then integrating it. 

Now we did not have the benefit of having our personnel there 

because of the risk that is posed by U.S. personnel outside of the 

embassy or consulate or compound, and being out at the port, we 

were restricted from being there. But we then added the virtual capability there to remote the images to here in the United States. 

So we actually do watch those realtime here in the United States. 

However, volume, less than 3,000 containers come from Port 

Qasim to the United States. But I think here is an example where 

we need to consider going forward. It is a high-risk location, and 

we need to take a look at, is that the right investment to add that 

protocol in place so that we actually can secure that trade lane? 

That makes sense to us. 


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Before I go to Southhampton to talk about that protocol, I would 

just pause and speak about a companion port that is still, you 

know, not given that same coverage and protocol that we have in 

Qasim, the Port of Karachi, very close and approximately nearby 

with the same amount of container traffic coming to the United 

States. There would be a thoughtful approach, which we are already considering in engaging with our counterparts in Pakistan, 

to put a similar screening protocol there, scanning protocol there 

to add that capability. Again, small volume, about 3,000 containers, 

very manageable, into something where we could really add value 

to a location that could be higher risk than some of the other locations we deal with. 

With Southhampton, again, relatively small location, had the 

benefit of a large footprint where we could put all the different 

technology there so it would not impact negatively, put capacity 

through that port and we had a willing partner with the U.K. customs to be part of the initial test, which they no longer state is a 

partnership involvement. They made an investment to say, we are 

part of the partnership, we were a part of the pilot, but it is no 

longer an investment we want to continue to make. So that brings 

into some of the host country counterpart issues that you deal with 

when we are trying to impose a 100 percent requirement in an 

overseas environment. 

CARGO AND CONTAINERS CARRIED BY RAIL INTO MEXICO

Mr. PRICE. We ought to return to this. But let me move on to 

other members and questions, starting with Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Let me ask you about, the Administration has an- nounced a plan that they unveiled I think last week, a new $95 

million initiative to inspect 100 percent of cargo containers carried 

by rail into Mexico as part of its plan to combat the drug cartels. 

Do you know whether or not there has been any known exploitation of southbound rail containers by the drug cartels? 

Mr. AHERN. No. There is no indication that we had as far as with 

particular shipments going south into Mexico or weapons that are 

moving through the rail environment. I would submit though, it is 

one of those environments that we have not focused significant 

amount of attention. We were more concerned post–9/11 with 

things coming into the country and that became our foremost concern. As we now are looking to see what we can do to tighten the 

departure of weapons or moneys going into Mexico to fuel the drug 

wars, that was one of the areas we wanted to take. 

The already deployed technology that was there X-raying railcars 

coming into the United States, to be able to use that same technology that is deployed there, to use it for outbound and again 

build our partnership with the government of Mexico that we do 

so frequently. 

Mr. ROGERS. What do we currently do on railcars coming into the 

U.S. from Mexico? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Mr. Rogers, currently we have been screening 

100 percent coming into the United States with our hidden imagery. With the outbound side, we just started on March 12 doing 

100 percent. So on the inbound side what, we are looking for was 

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Mr. ROGERS. What do you do to physically check an inbound railcar? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. We take images of all of them. We have an operator there that looks at the images and makes a decision on 

whether or not that particular railcar needs to be inspected further. 

Mr. ROGERS. Sometimes these trains are miles long. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. How do you physically go about doing that without 

disrupting the flow of—— 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Well, what happens with the technology that we 

have, we are able to take an image of what is inside that railcar. 

And from there we make a decision on whether or not there is any 

type of—— 

Mr. ROGERS. While the train is moving? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Yes. That is correct. 

Mr. ROGERS. How fast is the train moving? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. About 5 miles per hour. 

Mr. ROGERS. And you X-ray every car? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. What have been the results? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. We have had results from the standpoint of narcotics and illegal aliens coming into the United States. 

Mr. ROGERS. How many and how much? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Not quite—I don’t have the numbers as far as 

how many illegal aliens or narcotics. I would be more than happy 

to get back to the committee on that. 

[The information follows:] 

Rep Rogers to Mr. Winkowski 

1. How many drugs, illegal aliens, and contraband do we have coming into the 

U.S.? 

a. Winkowski responded he would provide that information. 

RESPONSE: In FY 2008, Customs and Border Protection seized a total of 2.97 

million pounds of illegal drugs, and made 2,800 apprehensions at and in between 

the ports of entry for illegal entry. Total agriculture quarantine material interceptions were 1.51 million, and currency seizures were 3,400 totaling $107.98 million. 

Mr. ROGERS. And what about outgoing—trains cars moving 

south, what are you doing about that? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. The same as we are doing on the northbound 

side. Our technology is bidirectional. So when we have a train that 

is coming south, we put that imaging equipment on the southbound 

lane and do our inspection. By the way, since we have started this 

initiative on March 12, we have examined about 24,000 railcars 

and over 300 trains. 

Mr. ROGERS. Exiting into Mexico? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Yes. And we have a very strong partnership 

with our counterparts in Mexico. 

Mr. ROGERS. Did you find anything? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. No, we have not. We had several anomalies 

working with the Mexican government that turned out to be clay 

and things of that nature that came up on our imaging equipment. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, what about guns, illegal guns? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. We have not found any. 

Mr. ROGERS. Illegal cash? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. No. 


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Mr. ROGERS. How would you see cash on as X-ray? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. It would come up. It would be in a void within 

the railcar. And that imaging equipment would pick up that void 

with what package is in it, same as you do on the narcotics sides 

coming in. 

Mr. ROGERS. How long have you been doing the X-rays of outgoing cars? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Outgoing cars we started on a regular-occurring 

basis, eight crossings on the southwest border going into Mexico, 

and we started on a regular-occurring basis doing every car on 

March 11. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, the administration is planning a $95 million 

initiative to inspect 100 percent of containers going south. But you 

are already doing that. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. We are taking images, and those images that 

come up as anomalies—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Why would they announce a new initiative if you 

have been doing it for some time now? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. The new initiative being that we are doing 

southbound trains on a regular-occurring basis. Every southbound 

train is being inspected with our NII equipment. So that is new 

from a standpoint of the sustainability of that. We were not doing 

that on a regular and recurring basis by itself. 

Mr. ROGERS. Where is the $95 million coming from? 

Mr. AHERN. I am not sure of the $95 million. That could be a 

compilation of all the initiatives that we are going to be a part of. 

Because that seems to be approximately the number that we have 

for all of our CBP initiatives, the southbound license plate readers 

for the vehicle lanes that don’t currently have it, the deployment 

of additional Border Patrol agents. We can certainly give you the 

breakdown of all the moneys that we have as part of our southbound initiative. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. ROGERS. When you see something in a railcar that is moving 

5 miles an hour, and it is 2 miles long or whatever, and you see 

something that is suspicious, do you stop the train? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. What takes place is, because our inspection 

point is so close to—just within a matter of feet of the international 

boundary, what we do is we have a protocol with our counterparts 

in Mexico, Mexican customs, and relay to them the anomaly that 

we found, share with them the image. And they do the inspection 

and get back to us. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, last week, U.S. authorities at Arizona’s six 

ports of entry along the border said that you are ill-equipped to 

screen vehicles and trains crossing into Mexico for smuggled weapons and cash. This is dated March 30th in The Washington Post. 

Who is right, or who is wrong here? 

Mr. AHERN. Let me offer a comment on that. That was by our 

field director out in Arizona. 

Mr. ROGERS. David Higgerson. 

Mr. AHERN. That is correct. And as many articles are, they don’t 

give the full context of the interview. I think the point that is clearly made there, and I know Mr. Winkowski spoke to him afterwards, is that we are physically set up on the southwest border, 

and have been for over 40 or 50 years, with the infrastructure 

there to process northbound activity. 

When we actually now start to go ahead and do more southbound 

activity, whether it be in the rail hubs or whether it be in the vehicle lanes or the pedestrian lanes, we do not have the same infrastructure we have northbound, nor do we have the same technology 

deployment that we have northbound. 

Now in the circumstance Mr. Winkowski talked about, we do 

have the ability with the bidirectional X-raying capabilities to use 

that same technology to go ahead and image the containers on the 

railcars—— 

FACILITIES TO SCREEN BORDER CROSSERS INTO MEXICO

Mr. ROGERS. Let me get back to what Higgerson says. He is your 

director of Field operations in Arizona, right? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, he is. 

Mr. ROGERS. I would suspect he knows more about this than 

anybody else having been in charge over there. 

He says that these ports of entry have no facilities to adequately 

screen border crossers, cargo traffic, or freight trains bound for 

Mexico; that these were built and planned and designed and 

staffed and trained for to catch stuff coming out of Mexico into the 

U.S. It was never anticipated that we would need to do the opposite. And he says, we don’t have that kind of facilities. 

What about, I am quoting, what about cargo? We don’t have facilities to check cargo going into Mexico. If you are going to smuggle guns, are you going to smuggle them in a car or in a truck? 

Again, we have nothing in our southbound to check cargo, quote. 

Quote, same with trains going south. If we see an anomaly, all 

we can do is tell Mexican customs because, two seconds later, it is 

in Mexico. They were never designed for going south. The ports 

were never designed to do it. 


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Mr. AHERN. No. I think that is very consistent with the statement I made. These facilities were set up for northbound processing. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Winkowski says that we are X-raying every car 

going south. 

Mr. AHERN. And that is correct. As far as the full facilities to be 

able to do complete unloading, things of that nature for southbound 

trains, that is where we need to rely on our counterparts in Mexico. 

Mr. ROGERS. Higgerson says you don’t have the capability to 

check trains going south. No facilities to adequately screen freight 

trains bound for Mexico, Higgerson. 

Mr. AHERN. Facilities. But as far as to do the imaging, the capability is there. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, you have got me confused. Are you telling me 

that you can X-ray it, but you cannot go into it? 

Mr. AHERN. I think that is exactly what Mr. Winkowski stated, 

and that is why we need that partnership with Mexico. So if we 

identify an anomaly as our officers are looking at the image, they 

then go ahead and make the notification to the Mexican authorities 

themselves at the border. That is the logistical predicament that 

we are facing in this circumstance. So we can choose to do nothing, 

or we can deploy the technology we have to see as far as if there 

is any effective use of it. 

We are not overselling this capability at all. We are trying to see 

what might be an additional capability we could deploy against the 

potential of weapons going out by railcars into Mexico. 

VEHICLES GOING INTO MEXICO

Mr. ROGERS. What about vehicles going through the ports of 

entry south, southbound? What are we doing now about them? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Well, we are doing many more inspections of 

southbound vehicles. While we have some challenges with southbound, the southbound footprint, vehicles are much easier to inspect than, for example, as Director Higgerson was saying, the 

cargo side. So we do have a protocol in place. We do have technology that is deployed down south that enables us to do inspection 

of vehicles. You can take these vehicles and oftentimes—many of 

the footprints, put them off to the side and do our inspections. 

The cargo—the cargo side of it is much more challenging. But if 

Mr. Higgerson were here, he would tell you that what he also stated was that we have the ability on trucks that need to be inspected 

and unloaded to direct that particular truck over to the import lot 

at the port. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I have been to San Ysidro, many of us have, 

and other ports. San Ysidro, what is it 16 lanes each way with vehicles lined up 2 miles to get across that border and never stopping, going through at 35 miles an hour? Are you telling me that 

you are checking every one of those vehicles to be sure it is not 

transporting guns or cash south into Mexico? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. No, going into Mexico, no. You can’t do an outbound operation on a 24-by-7 basis like we do on the import—— 

Mr. ROGERS. And we are not doing anything, we are not checking 

southbound cars or trucks for anything, right? 


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Mr. WINKOWSKI. No, we are. We are doing operations. As a matter of fact, just in March, since we have developed this sustained 

effort, we have seized over $6.2 million going southbound in vehicles. 

Mr. ROGERS. How do you check them? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. We set up roadblocks just by the port of entry 

in the southbound lane. We stop traffic. We do interviews. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is just random stops? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. No. We do our interviews—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Of all vehicles? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. In some cases, yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. I am talking about 16 lanes of traffic going south, 

2 miles long backed up, and you are checking every vehicle? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. I am not checking every vehicle. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is what I am saying—— 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. We are doing it based on threat, based on some 

interviews that we are doing, based on our technology deployment. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, Mr. Chairman—— 

Mr. AHERN. If I just might add one final point, so there is not 

any concern here that is not completely addressed. 

There is a concern with southbound facilities. We have talked for 

years with our northbound facility. I would like everyone to bear 

in mind, we have talked repeatedly about the aged facilities we 

have in the northbound areas coming in from Mexico to the United 

States and our northern border with Canada. I think we talked before, and again, we thank this committee and the Congress for giving us the money that we did receive to modernize some of the facilities under the stimulus package. 

But again, that is only a fraction of the down payment that is 

needed to modernize and expand the northbound facilities. So if we 

are going to do the southbound activity on a sustained effort, on 

the same sustained basis into the future, that has to be now part 

of our planning that we are going to look at for southbound facilities to be able to do a full enforcement operation. Heretofore, we 

have only done on a special operational or on a pulse-and-surge 

type basis. As we are looking to try to ramp that up and do it on 

a more sustained basis to see, what is the level of threat going in 

Mexico for those? 

But I would also state that the government of Mexico recognizes 

they have a responsibility for ramping up inspections to protect the 

sovereignty and to do border enforcement themselves. And I know 

I have met with them in the last couple of weeks about the protocols they are starting to put in place that is going to change and 

revolutionize how they are actually processing cars and people coming into their country. 

Mr. ROGERS. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. 

But obviously, what I am driving at here is, 80 percent, we are 

told, of the cocaine coming into this country transits across that 

border and fuels the God awful things that occur in this country 

with drugs. 

By the same token, the southbound weaponry and cash that fuels 

the war that is going on, on that border, that threatens both our 

countries is also a vital piece of what we are driving at here. So 


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it matters a lot now what goes south as well as what comes north 

on that border. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Mr. Rothman. 

WEAPONS OF MASS EFFECT DELIVERY LOGISTICS

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. I have got a bunch of 

questions. 

Commissioner Ahern, in your written testimony, on page 3, you 

say the logistics movements of that—the risk of a weapon of mass 

effect to be transported in a maritime container involve logistics 

movements which involve multiple hand-offs amongst various parties throughout the supply chain which may, in fact, itself be a deterrent to a terrorist considering using a maritime container. And 

I think that is why you described the risk as being not worth the 

100 percent inspection goal. 

As you may know, I represent the Ninth District of New Jersey, 

which has the 2 mile stretch in northern New Jersey which links 

my district to the Port of Elizabeth. It has been called the most 

dangerous 2 miles in the United States of America in terms of a 

risk of terrorist attack. 

How are the logistics for putting a weapon of mass effect, as you 

call it, in a maritime container different than the logistics for putting a weapon of mass effect in an airplane or a railcar or a truck? 

Mr. AHERN. I think that is one of the points we are trying to emphasize here is that, in the maritime environment, depending as 

far as the transaction, it could have multiple handlers. It could be 

drivers, freight forwarders, consolidators. It would have multiple 

hand-offs before it actually gets to the terminal operator for preparation and then loading on a vessel. And then to have confidence 

it would actually be on that particular vessel. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. But how would you know, for example, if it has 

been put in a package, is it customary for a truck driver to rip open 

each package and see what is in his load for that day? And how 

would it be different than getting some cargo into the hold of an 

aircraft? Aren’t there multiple hand-offs there as well? 

Mr. AHERN. Well, again, there would certainly be multiple handoffs. And it is what I am stating as far as that there is additional 

logistical challenges within the maritime environment. That is not 

to state that there are not logistical challenges in the other environments where there is multiple hand-offs, but I guess the point 

that I wanted to emphasize here is that there are other 

vulnerabilities that are out there that needs our attention—— 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Yes, I know. I understood your testimony. Are you 

able to talk about those greater risks in this open session? 

Mr. AHERN. I think in general terms, because we have talked 

about it before with this Committee in the last year. Certainly 

when we take a look at areas that do not have as much rigor and 

as many layers of risk reduction, although there is some certainly, 

the small boat environment, a lot of small vessels that in south 

Florida and up in the northeastern part of the United States, certainly the Great Lakes the Pacific Northwest, our border, you 

know, to the west of San Diego, certainly there is a challenge in 

those environments where we have, certainly, the Coast Guard. We 


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have our maritime assets. We have intelligence as well as aviation. 

However, there is still a significant volume of legitimate travellers 

and traffic out there in those maritime small boats that we need 

to have a better sorting mechanism, because right now there is no 

rigor out there for the reporting requirements. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. In addition to the small boat environment, anything that you care to mention? 

Mr. AHERN. General aviation. It was certainly something that 

was previously identified and the protocol that we were working on 

internally, and it was started by a previous Secretary Chertoff, 

that that would be something where someone could control a significant weapon from point a to point b. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. I am curious, do you have an inspection regime 

for pleasure ships, the big family cruise ships? 

Mr. AHERN. Commercial cruise lines? 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Yeah. The cargo that goes in there, the baggage, 

et cetera? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, we do. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay. In all of the years since 9/11, if you know, 

in the scanning of maritime containers, have you ever found anything? Dangers? You know what I mean. 

Mr. AHERN. In the maritime environment? 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Yeah. 

Mr. AHERN. We have not found anything that is a significant nuclear weapon or radiological dispersal device or anything of that 

significance. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Have you found an insignificant nuclear weapon? 

Mr. AHERN. No. I stand corrected. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Have you found any weapon of mass effect? 

Mr. AHERN. No. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Any chemical or biological agents? 

Mr. AHERN. No. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Anything I am missing that would be a significant 

threat to the homeland? 

Mr. AHERN. No. Not that I would go into. There has been some 

commercial merchandise. There has certainly been some weapons 

shipments but not of a significant nature, although all weapons 

certainly can pose a significant danger. 

CAREER INCENTIVES FOR PERSONNEL

Mr. ROTHMAN. May I ask a question, Dr. Gallaway? 

In your remarks, Doctor, you say that there are problems in the 

educational pipeline in terms of—I am paraphrasing, obviously—in 

terms of the educational credentials and qualifications necessary to 

give you the personnel, qualified personnel, that you need. 

Is there anything that we can do as individual Members, as Federal legislators, or as a Congress, to assist in creating incentives 

for individuals—for our young people to go into those fields? Or are 

we doing that sufficiently now? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. You have already helped us. One of the programs 

we have under our Transformational Research and Development 

Program is called the Academic Research Initiative. And it is specifically designed to reach out into the academic environment to get 

work done. We are, of course, interested in the work they are 


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doing, but just as importantly, we are interested in developing a 

new cadre of folks. So we are supporting undergraduate and graduate students. 

I mentioned that we are doing work in forensics. Forensics is another area that the scientific population is aging, and so we have 

made an investment in that area to also reach out to the academic 

environments to try to get students. We are sponsoring fellowship 

programs. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Any additional help we can offer, please let us 

know. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Mr. Carter. 

INBOUND CONTAINER INSPECTIONS

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In your testimony, you listed 86 percent of the containers inbound are being inspected, passing through—in the security initiative. The 14 percent that aren’t, is that from a specific area where 

there are—is it missed at ports where we have the container-examining equipment? Or where does that 14 percent come from? 

Mr. AHERN. I think that makes one of the logistical challenges 

we face; that 86 percent of the container traffic flows through our 

58 CSI Container Security Initiative ports. That does not mean 

that they all get inspected. So when you have a volume of 58 ports 

that actually have transiting through there or directly departing 

from those 58 ports, 86 percent of container traffic, the remainder 

of those 14 percent of containers that make their way to the United 

States come from a universe of approximately 700 ports worldwide. 

Mr. CARTER. So have these studies been done to try to determine 

if there seems to be an area of the world that you are getting more 

uninspected containers than other areas of the world. 

Mr. AHERN. There certainly have been studies. I know that our 

team has very precise numbers of where all the containers actually 

originated from. We are into the diminishing returns of well below 

1 percent of container traffic for any country or port that actually 

remains outside of those 58 where we have our presence. 

WEAPONS CROSSING INTO MEXICO

Mr. CARTER. When I woke up this morning there was some guy 

on television saying that he was really unhappy with us about 

something in Pakistan and that he was going to create a significant 

event in the United States Capitol. So I was kind of interested a 

little bit about that. Maybe it’s just current events to me. 

The other thing I have a question about: Have you seized any 

weapons crossing the border into Mexico from the United States? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, we have. 

Mr. CARTER. What is the nature of the weapons? Are they automatic weapons or are they just hunting rifles or what? 

Mr. AHERN. It is a combination. We have seen a lot of small 

arms, handguns that are automatic weapons. We have seen a lot 

of shotguns, a lot of rifles as well that we are seizing. Also what 

the statistics actually show—and this is something that we did get 

into at the last hearing 3 weeks ago—was that about 90 or 95 percent of weapons that go into Mexico, the ones that are actually 


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identified in Mexico, are the ones we seize at the border going into 

Mexico that are traceable back to commercial sources in the United 

States. There is a significant amount of weapons still going into 

Mexico from other locations, from their south or through their maritime environment as well. But what we are seeing is a lot of small 

numbers that actually come across, the ones, the twos. Sometimes—going back about 3 or 4 weeks ago we had one of the larger 

ones, which was 25 weapons. So that is kind of the size that we 

are seeing. 

And we are seeing a lot of what is referred to as straw man purchases that go, whether it be into a commercial gun dealer or to 

a flea market or individual purchases, buying small numbers of 

weapons, and take those across, kind of in very small quantities, 

which makes the challenge even more great. 

Mr. CARTER. The reason I asked the question is because I don’t 

disagree from talking to people who regularly go to gun shows that 

there seem to be people coming into gun shows and buying whole 

tables full of weapons. But they are not AR–15s with fully automatic capability; they are shotguns and handguns. And you may 

call a 45 automatic a fully automatic weapon, but I call it a semiautomatic weapon. 

And what we are seeing on the news is that there seems to be 

some indication that we are smuggling fully automatic weapons 

into Mexico, which to me would mean that somebody in the manufacturing business would have to be doing that, because I don’t 

know of anyone that sells commercially fully automatic weapons 

because you have to have such a huge license in order to do so, and 

you have to have a license to buy them too. So that is the reason 

I was curious if you were seeing fully automatic weapons. 

Mr. AHERN. We are not seeing the quantities you described or 

the types that you described. 

Mr. CARTER. So the argument that all the weapons that are in 

Mexico are the fault of the United States gun dealers is stretching 

the truth a little bit. 

Mr. AHERN. I think it just needs to be put in its full context. 

When that number gets used and particularly when ATF uses it 

from its weapons tracking systems, those are the weapons that are 

recovered in Mexico that are reported back that are traceable to a 

commercial source here in the United States. I think it is readily 

admitted by many that are in the know in this, whether it be the 

Government of Mexico or officials in the U.S. Government, there is 

significant amount that still come from other than the United 

States into Mexico. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Rodriguez. 

FREE AND SECURE TRADE SHIPMENTS

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you very much. 

The way it works on the border, as they are coming in, we check 

them and then they go in, and as we are leaving, we just go by, 

and usually the Mexican side checks us; and that is the way it has 

been. Part of the legislation that I know Chairman Price is looking 

at is for a strategy in terms of southbound and for you guys to let 


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us know what is needed in terms of resources to try to begin to do 

that, because we haven’t done that in the past. It has been sporadic. 

Let me ask you, the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, C–TPAT, my understanding is that C–TPAT, the way it 

has been working is that the investigations are complete—that 

sometimes before the investigation is completed that we just assume that the truck that comes in with dope, that that truck and 

that company is cut off from being able to participate and their 

driver. And it is my understanding that in some cases—according 

to statistics, 98 percent, according to the Customs Border Protection—that investigations find that it was the maquilladoras and 

the people that were filling the trucks, and that usually the driver 

comes in and picks it up and just takes it across and that they are 

taking the hit in most cases for just taking the stuff across when 

the maquilladoras themselves—can I get a clarification on that as 

to why, because we have got to look in terms of who is doing the 

damage here? 

Because if I am the maquilladora, I am going to keep putting the 

drugs in there. The guy who is going to get nailed is the driver and 

the truck company. 

Mr. AHERN. Absolutely. 

I will begin and maybe Mr. Winkowski wants to add to my answer before I leave anything out. 

I think what you are describing are FASTs, are free and secure 

trade shipments that come across the border where you have three 

components: a vetted driver that has gone through a background 

and been issued a FAST card, RFID enabled; and the carrier is actually C–TPAT, meaning the truck; and then the component parts 

could be from a C–TPAT manufacturing maquilladora operation on 

the south side of the border. 

So you have those three distinct parts of the transaction that 

comes across as part of this whole vetted transaction, and these are 

supposed to be our highly trusted travelers or traders coming 

across the border. So when there are drugs that are found in that 

transaction, we try to discern very quickly whether that is something that the driver was complicit and involved in or whether it 

was something the carrier—again, the truck that actually drays it, 

not the tractor that the driver actually drives across the border, or 

if it is embedded into the cargo. 

So we look at each one of its own set of facts and make a 

thoughtful determination of whether we should suspend—initially 

it is suspension, not revoking or actually being removed from the 

program—begin with the suspension as we go ahead, which I think 

is the prudent thing for us to do, to go ahead and do a rapid investigation with ICE to find out who the complicit parties are here, 

so that—— 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Supposedly they lose their business completely. 

They won’t even get any more jobs if that is the case, if somebody 

set them up. 

Mr. AHERN. I would submit that if some individuals are bringing 

drugs across the border that are set up, that is one thing; if there 

are individuals that are actually involved, that is another. And 

again we look at each one of these on their own set of facts. If there 


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is a particular set of circumstances you would like us to look at, 

we would be happy to do that. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I was told that most of them occur at 

maquilladoras, which we seldom go after. How many cases do we 

have where we have gone after and we have found that it is coming 

from the loaders at the maquilladora? 

Mr. AHERN. We have found it in each one of the circumstances 

where it has actually been loaded at the maquilladora operation. 

We have seen it where there has been a diversionary stop after departing from the twin plant operation, and we have seen it in the 

tractor where the driver obviously had knowledge of that. And we 

have also seen where it is actually configured in the truck, the 

trailer itself, before it goes to the particular location. So again—— 

PRESIDIO HOURS OF SERVICE

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Secondly, on the ports of entry, the Presidio port 

of entry, it is supposed to be a 24-hour port of entry; and the reason why that is so important is, if you have a truck on the other 

side it has got to go 300 miles to El Paso or 300 miles the other 

way to the Del Rio in order to cross. They tell me that when they 

find themselves—they are not going there because it is sometimes 

not open 24 hours. And right now they will tell you—and, yes, it 

is a good excuse—the flood that occurred in Ojinaga and there. But 

prior to that, these complaints were coming in that if it is labeled 

24 hours, it should be 24 hours. 

I have testimony by some of my constituents that go drive those 

300 miles all the way to El Paso and wait another 2 hours to cross 

because of the fact that they are never sure whether the port of 

entry at Presidio is going to be open or not. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Congressman, perhaps I can answer that question. 

For vehicles, for private vehicles, it is a 24-by-7 port, as you well 

know. On the cargo side, it is open Monday through Friday, 10:00 

to 6:00. It has been that way for many, many years. 

I was just down in El Paso last week, met with the trade community, as you know. The vast majority of the brokers are out of El 

Paso and we have one broker down there in the Presidio area. 

Nothing has ever come up from the standpoint of expansion of 

hours of service. 

Now, we have expanded on a test basis hours of service in the 

cargo arena in El Paso, Laredo and Otay Mesa and Nogales. We 

don’t see any need from the standpoint of expanding hours from 

the commercial side. We average about 30 trucks a day. Now, we 

do have times when perhaps we are closed and the truck shows up, 

and I have been told by the director that arrangements are made 

to take care of that particular transaction despite the fact that the 

commercial side is closed. 

So I will be more than happy—I do a lot of trips down to Texas, 

and I will be more than happy on my next visit to— 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Is that the only spot, 600 miles between Del Rio 

and—— 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Right. But right now we are talking about 30 

vehicles and the first one actually comes in around 11 o’clock in the 

morning, typically. 


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Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Calvert. 

INSPECTIONS GOING INTO MEXICO

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I live near the border down in California and I used to, before 

all the problems with Mexico, go to Mexico often. And all the times 

I have gone down to Mexico I don’t think I was ever stopped going 

south. 

Maybe I don’t hit the profile of somebody that they are going to 

stop. But I talk to a lot of folks that go to Mexico often, and they 

are not stopped. They don’t inspect, they don’t do interviews, very 

rarely. 

You mentioned that the Mexican Government is going to enact 

some kind of inspection regime. Do you believe that to be the case? 

Mr. AHERN. I actually do believe it to be the case. And I have 

seen evidence of the first implementation that is over in the 

Brownsville-Matamoros corridor. 

Mr. CALVERT. We haven’t seen it in California. I will tell you, in 

San Diego for instance, there is a significant problem with stolen 

vehicles crossing over into Mexico, and we have had very little cooperation from the Mexican Government. I suspect that in a lot of 

the border communities cars disappear, headed across the border, 

and both—in keeping those cars from crossing over, because typically what happens, if a car is stolen, there is an immediate police 

report, especially if you are near the border, and they are supposed 

to inform the Mexican Government of that, and they are supposed 

to stop it. But very rarely have I ever heard of their stopping these 

cars. 

It would be helpful if they are going to do that. But you are confident that the Mexican Government is going to do this? 

MEXICAN BORDER PROTOCOL

Mr. AHERN. I am confident they have begun an initial deployment of having a border protocol with technology to include license 

plate readers. 

Now, one of the things we need to talk with them about is, how 

do we link that into databases where they can be more tactical and 

effective going forward? That is going to be part of the continuing 

dialogue that we are going to offer our assistance on. 

Mr. CALVERT. As you know, when we cross back over, north, virtually everybody is interviewed. If you look suspicious, they inspect 

the automobile to make sure that you are not carrying contraband 

or whatever, buying stuff in Mexico you shouldn’t be buying and 

bringing it back to the United States. 

It would be interesting to see if the Mexican Government is going 

to do that, but I haven’t seen any evidence of that. So I hope you 

keep the committee informed of their progress. I am sure we will 

be interested to see if that happens, because I do think they have 

a responsibility obviously to protect their own sovereignty, and not 

just the United States, to protect their sovereignty. 


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RED TEAM INTO BORDER DETECTION EQUIPMENT

Another issue on this detection issue, obviously it is a significant 

amount of money to put this detection equipment out there; and 

before that happens, do you undergo tests with outside consultants 

or whomever to see if they can defeat that technology before that 

is put into place? 

I guess that is a question for Mr. Gallaway. 

Mr. GALLAWAY. I am sorry. Would you clarify the last part? 

Mr. CALVERT. Do you bring in outside people, who are independent of the United States Government, to see if they can defeat 

your technology? In other words—— 

Mr. GALLAWAY. In other words, do we ‘‘red team’’ the technology? 

Mr. CALVERT. Right. 

Mr. GALLAWAY. I wouldn’t say that—once the technology is actually implemented, we do work with Customs and Border Protection 

to actually ‘‘red-team’’ the operations in the field. So it is ‘‘redteaming’’ not only the technology but the operational protocols that 

go with it. 

Mr. CALVERT. The technology to develop a nuclear weapon is significant. I suspect the technology to defeat the technology to detect 

that is not as significant. 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Well, on these passive detectors, we have done 

an extensive amount of testing where we go out to the Nevada Test 

Site and using real special nuclear material, we will run in front 

of these portals to see if our detection equipment can detect it, in 

fact. 

And as we are developing the new system, one of the things we 

are trying to make sure of is that it meets the specifications that 

we have laid out. The unfortunate thing is passive radiation detection devices can be defeated by putting shielding over the material, 

so the emissions coming off the material—— 

Mr. CALVERT. Wouldn’t one of our enemies think of that? I mean, 

don’t you think if they are going to try to bring in a weapon of 

mass destruction, that they would try to make sure they could get 

it in? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Precisely. And that is why the other half of the 

program then is to use radiography or some type of active interrogation system where we can pick it up. Because now, when you put 

the shielding around it, the shielding material tends to be what we 

call high Z, or very heavy material, and now it comes up essentially 

black on an x-ray or most radiography images. So by putting both 

systems in, we have high confidence that we can, in fact, keep 

someone from smuggling something through. 

Mr. CALVERT. But you test that to make sure? You give somebody the challenge and see if they can defeat it—— 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Definitely. 

Mr. CALVERT [continuing]. Before we spend the money to go out 

there. 

IMPLEMENTATION OF ACE

One other question: This ACE program, obviously modernization 

is important and this new automated commercial environment to 


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process cargo that is coming into the United States, can you update 

us on where you are at with that on the implementation of ACE? 

Mr. AHERN. I would be happy to give you a detailed answer if 

you would like. 

I can give you a very quick overview. 

Mr. CALVERT. Just give us a quick overview and submit to the 

record—— 

Mr. AHERN. Absolutely. 

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A quick overview that we have actually been successful in implementing the truck manifest portion, which was important for our 

cross-border targeting as well as for the commercial protocols. 

Beginning, actually, Easter Sunday we will be having our first 

deployment in Buffalo for the entry summary, which will be the 

first part for getting the entry summary, which is the commercial 

aspect of the border transactions; and we will be doing additional 

deployments right after that in the entry summary environment; 

and then we will begin the vessel manifest and the air manifest 

thereafter. 

We are lagging behind, and I will be happy to give you full, detailed answer on each one of those increments and why we are behind. 

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Ruppersberger. 

OVERSEAS CONTAINER INSPECTION OPERATIONS

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Thank you. 

The first thing: A very difficult job that we all have, especially 

since 9/11. I feel very strongly that we always need goals, but we 

are appropriators and our goal as an appropriator is to create the 

priorities and try to put the money in the best place where it is 

going to work. And the goals of checking every container, it sounds 

like a good goal, but is it realistically helping the issue or the problem or are we addressing an issue that looks good? 

For instance, there was a lot of comparisons made with Hong 

Kong, that they literally somehow inspected every container, but 

could they really determine what we were looking for in those containers because of the volume? 

The other thing I am going to try to address in my period of 

time, I believe strongly that the port of embarkation is something 

that we have to deal with with other countries. We have programs 

that exist, and that is something that I haven’t heard a lot here 

today, but I think is very important, that all the different United 

States agencies whether it be in Homeland Security, whether it be 

CIA, NSA, military, whatever, really need to come together as a 

team from an intelligence point of view and prioritize in that port 

of the embarkation. 

You made a comment that in Pakistan it might be dangerous for 

one of our Americans to be at the port. There are ways to deal with 

that type of issue. And I would like you to address that if you can. 

The other thing is technology. It is another issue that we are 

dealing with as far as making goals about checking every container, but we are really not doing the job. Technology is continually and constantly evolving, but there is some technology out 

there that I think today, that is starting to deal with the issue. 

And, Mr. Gallaway, maybe you can address this, the issue of nuclear weapons. And they are not going to bring a weapon in; they 

are going to bring components of the weapons that come in. An example, I represent the Port of Baltimore. Two-thirds of the population in our country is one overnight drive from that area. So 

there are target areas like New York, like L.A. And those type of 

arenas. But the only way we are going to take this to another level 


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is with technology; and if you could, address where you think the 

technology is. 

And also, do you work with the Department of Energy? I know 

there is a proliferation group there that is very aggressive and literally goes to other parts of the world to see where these components can be made from the very beginning, very beginning stage. 

And I assume that you work closely with them. 

And so I have raised three issues; if you can try to address them 

in my 5 minutes, give it a shot. 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Okay. Let us start with the last one first. We 

work with the entire community, the Department of Defense, the 

Department of Energy, the Department of State, Department of 

Justice, to try to work this problem all the way from the origin of 

the material and its potential movement towards a target here in 

the United States. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Good. 

Mr. GALLAWAY. So we want to be able to put in a layered defense 

so we have an opportunity to interdict that material anywhere during that transfer. And I think it is that layered defense that actually will set us up for success. 

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES

If I can address the issue of technology, we are trying to push 

the boundaries because the detection technology that we have 

today is okay, but I think, to solve the problem long term, we need 

better technology. And that is why we have this transformational 

research program where we are—— 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let me stop you there. What kind of technology? 

To begin with, you are dealing with containers. Your people in 

the port have the handheld. Are we able to get to that level, because if you don’t have the handheld at this point, there is not the 

mechanism, I assume, out there for every port, 539 ports of this 

country, or the ports of embarkation. 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Right. Let us even start smaller than that. The 

Customs and Border Protection folks wear a pager device right now 

that just tells you if there is radiation in the area. We are working 

on a replacement to that that is a spectroscopic device that is actually considerably smarter so that it would be able to tell them, is 

it in fact a threat to worry about or is it some benign material? 

The big breakthrough that we are looking for in the near term 

is improved materials. Unfortunately, the detector materials that 

we have right now are kind of limited in their capability, and they 

tend to be very expensive. So with the new materials that we see 

on the horizon, we think we will be able to increase the sensitivity 

by a factor of two at least. We will be able to reduce the cost by 

maybe a third. And since the detector material is a significant cost 

of the actual detection box, now all of a sudden you have doubled 

the capability and probably cut the cost in half. 

So the handheld that you were just talking about, that would be 

a big improvement now that we can put twice as many out in the 

field and have twice as good a capability. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. There is one component you always have to 

deal with and these are people and probably, Mr. Ahern or Mr. 


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Winkowski, the issue of corruption at a level where you might have 

a handheld but someone has a lot of—maybe a certain driver or 

whatever to check it. 

Do we have checks and balances to countercheck what one individual is responsible for, these screenings. 

Mr. AHERN. I would say that it is a rare circumstance in a maritime environment where there would be one person that would be 

involved with the protocols by themselves. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. That is good. 

Mr. AHERN. And I would also offer—and it would be good for 

Congressman Calvert, if I had the opportunity to mention this before he goes—in addition to the testing that gets done during the 

acquisition cycle prior to the full system qualification and final acceptance testing, what we have actually been doing in Customs and 

Border Protection for close to 3 years now when it was actually 

codified as part of the Safe Port Act is actually do red-teaming of 

our—of our protocols. Beyond just as far as seeing if the technology 

works, do then the officers actually follow through with all the protocols that are appropriate to include the handheld devices, to include, as far as the reach-back that is required, to our laboratory 

and scientific services and here in the Northern Virginia area. 

That is first done with a covert team that goes in. We actually 

set up our own commercial trucking company to go ahead and do 

this and have a source material that actually tests the devices as 

well as the officers and response protocols. And then what we do 

beyond, just as far as the initial covert test in a port, we then test 

the capabilities of all the different technology that is there in the 

environment. 

And I would be happy to provide more detail on that—— 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. One thing on technology, too. 

Is my time up? 

Mr. PRICE. Your time is up, so please wrap up. 

PORT OF DUBAI TECHNOLOGY

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. The Port of Dubai, they are considered, at 

least 6 months ago, to have the best technology in the world. Have 

you looked at their technology now, where they are and as it relates to where we are in the United States? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Yes, sir. I mean, that is one of our functions to 

stay up on top of the technology that is out and about. And when 

you look at this in detail, you find out that the technology is not 

quite as promising as the sales brochures. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Mr. Farr. 

BULK CASH DETECTION

Mr. FARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is interesting listening to these discussions because I think I 

go home to my little community where people still don’t lock their 

door and there are still a lot of places in America where there is 

a lot of trust; and I come to Washington—and we are certainly 

dealing with fear in America—and you just wonder whether we are 

developing a whole new industrial complex based around fear. 


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And I know that is your job to make sure that we are secure, and 

I appreciate the work you do. 

I hope that we can begin talking about a hemispheric security. 

It really seems to me that we need to make sure that all of North 

America is secure and we—I think we put a lot of emphasis on 

knowing that Canada is secure, and therefore, we don’t have to 

worry about Canada and we have to worry about Mexico. And I 

think it is more because of the poverty in Mexico and the pressure 

it puts on undocumented people coming into this country and the 

fact that the cartels coming up from South America have been very 

effective. 

And I wonder in your comments—and I appreciate Mr. Rogers’ 

questions about going south, because I was at a dinner last night 

and the Mexican Ambassador was telling us that of the $8 to $12 

billion—what they think is the drug business, $8 to $12 billion— 

that a lot of this cash is being transported in cash, in sacks of cash. 

And that is the kind—that is laundered money, probably in a 

laundry bag, that we could detect with your kind of equipment, 

couldn’t we, in these railcars and automobile cars going south? 

Mr. AHERN. The technology that we deploy for imaging doesn’t 

discern whether it is a package of cocaine or a package of currency 

or—it will certainly show as far as the outline of a weapon if that 

is the distinct image we are looking at versus a block of weapons 

where you would just see the anomaly that would be inconsistent 

with the rest of that particular conveyance. 

Mr. FARR. So we can or cannot detect sacks of cash. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, you can. 

RISK BASED RESOURCE ALLOCATION

Mr. FARR. So if we are going to try to have this bilateral security, 

then we have got to do our part as a partner in the bi-processes. 

We have got to make sure that activities which are illegal in their 

country, having guns—that is illegal in Mexico; you have no fourth 

amendment right to commit a crime in Mexico by selling weapons 

to people that are taking them into Mexico or by laundering 

money—that we have to do our fair share if we are going to have 

any credibility to crack down on our side that is committing crimes. 

I mean, there is a crime problem on both sides of the border; and 

after going to Hong Kong, I really came away with a different concept about this total 100 percent. It seems to me that it is not cost 

effective. And I wondered—you have made a statement that our 

forces on risk management and security has to be driven by our informed judgment about the totality of the risks. And I wonder if 

you could just give the committee some of your feelings, as a professional, maybe where we have done overkill, where it is not cost 

effective, where we can use our informed judgment to look at the 

real risk. Because this really is about risk management, and I 

think we are looking at things that are big enough to cause a tipping point problem. 

So how would you, if you were on this side, suggest that Congress might better focus its limited resources on your informed 

judgment. 

Mr. AHERN. We did have an opportunity at the beginning of the 

hearing to talk about that, and I will be happy to state it again: 


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that, again, any type—when you put together a law enforcement 

strategy, you have to take a look and first assess what the risk is. 

In this particular circumstance, we think there is a minimal 

amount of risk. 

We then need to take a look at the layers of risk management, 

the risk management that we have put in place. That begins with 

advanced information. We are hardening that this year with the 

10+2 requirement that is going to add to the information we can 

then take and run through our automated targeting systems to go 

ahead and assess risks based on all the different factors that are 

going to be present and now the documentation. And we are getting deeper into the supply chain by not only that information, but 

also through our partnership with some of the most significant 

companies in the world to add more security protocols for the 

transactions. That is another layer of risk reduction. 

In 58 overseas ports, where 86 percent of the container traffic 

comes through, we have close to 200 officers, between CBP and 

ICE, overseas actually trying to go ahead and identify if there is 

additional risk the systems don’t identify and then deal with our 

host country counterparts to mitigate that prior to lading. 

COST EFFECTIVENESS

Mr. FARR. I read that in your testimony and I appreciate that. 

I guess my question goes to, then, are we asked to do things that 

are not cost effective? 

Mr. AHERN. As I stated also when I was—that was going to be 

in my conclusion point, that I believe, with the layers of risk reduction we have in place matched against the minimal risk, that we 

do have more significant vulnerabilities that we should be focusing 

our attention on. 

Mr. FARR. So where are the savings? 

Mr. AHERN. Pardon me? 

Mr. FARR. What do we drop? 

Mr. AHERN. Well, I think clearly as far as given the technological 

challenges, given the financial investment, given the sovereignty 

issues overseas, I think certainly as far as the 100 percent requirement, it needs to be thoughtfully reconsidered. 

Mr. FARR. Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Ms. Roybal-Allard. 

OVERSEAS CONTAINER INSPECTIONS

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I actually want 

to ask about the inspections overseas. 

According to a 2008 GAO report, full cooperation by participating 

foreign governments is sometimes lacking. For example, it is my 

understanding that at overseas ports, CBP agents are not allowed 

to observe inspections of suspicious containers conducted by foreign 

officials. 

So my question is, what can be done to strengthen that relationship so that you can fully participate in the container inspections, 

and if that is not possible, what is or can be done to provide the 

level of security that you are seeking for these inbound containers? 


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Mr. AHERN. Right. And that is certainly a challenge in one particular country, and that is China, where we have challenges as far 

as being able to be there alongside when either the image is taken 

or when an inspection is needed. That is something that we continue to try to work through, but China is a challenge on that particular issue. 

I think, outside of that, we have been able to work through those 

protocols very well. And, again, I think it goes back to the point 

that Congressman Ruppersberger brought up as far as goals. The 

goals are not to look at 100 percent of those at even the current 

CSI ports; it is to look at the 100 percent that pose risk, based on 

the analysis, based on the review of the information, based on the 

host country intelligence as well as our DHS intelligence, to be able 

to focus our resources on those supposed risks and then deploy on 

those. 

And it would be the same with the CSI locations. Even though 

it is roughly 1 percent that actually gets looked at in those CSI locations, those are the ones that pose the most significant risk, 

based on our assessments and intelligence, and that is how we 

should deploy our resources going forward. 

But we do recognize that in certain locations, like China, there 

are still challenges we continue to work through. 

100 PERCENT CONTAINER INSPECTION REQUIREMENT

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. I don’t know if the point had been made 

earlier, Mr. Chairman; I was in another hearing. But I know the 

Port of Los Angeles has expressed similar concerns about the requirement for the 100 percent inspection, and one of the concerns 

is that there may be retaliation by a foreign country who will then 

say, then they want us to inspect 100 percent any cargo that is 

leaving the United States, and that it would increase the cost. And 

what I am hearing is, it is really not that effective, being able to 

do that. 

Was there any comment made about that or could you expand 

just a little bit? And I apologize that I wasn’t here earlier. 

Mr. AHERN. Absolutely. No, that is a critical point. 

I would change the ‘‘R’’ word to a different word; it would not be 

‘‘retaliation,’’ it is ‘‘reciprocity.’’ And we have actually had, in previous hearings brought before this committee and others here in 

Congress, 27 letters that were actually provided by foreign countries saying that if this 100 percent requirement goes forward, they 

expect that there will be reciprocity on containers departing the 

United States to their country. 

We also had two from international organizations, such as the 

WCO, the World Customs Organization, as well as the European 

Union, the European Commission, stating the same concerns that 

they would actually be asking for reciprocity, as well, if we moved 

forward with the full implementation of this in the future. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Do you see that creating a problem at the 

ports where it would be impossible to do that, so that there would 

be this backlog and shipments would be delayed considerably, raising costs? That was another concern that was raised. 

Mr. AHERN. Without question. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Okay. Thank you. 


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PLAN FOR SOUTHBOUND INSPECTIONS ON SW BORDER

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. We will have a quick second round of 

questions with your indulgence. 

We appreciate the chance to circle back around and close a couple of loose ends here and also broach an additional area of questioning or two. 

The previous questioners have gotten into considerable detail on 

this plan for outbound inspections and southbound inspections on 

the Southwest border. I will not go further into that, except to say 

that I would like to supplement the oral testimony this morning 

with a fuller, written account of what this plan looks like. 

We hear that it is going to involve not just more Border Patrol 

agents, but also canine teams, NII systems, license plate readers. 

We have some preliminary indications as to what the appropriations request is likely to contain here, for example, $45 million for 

license plate readers. We know that you will probably spend a good 

bit of the Recovery Act NII money for this, or we assume that that 

is a possibility. We would like to have whatever details you can furnish on that and of course we will await the detailed 2010 budget 

request to get this a little more completely in our sights. 

But for now it would be very helpful for you to give a more detailed account of what this program is going to look like; and of 

course, any follow-up you want to give us on the oral accounts you 

gave us today of what the present capacity looks like. 

[The information follows:] 


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100 PERCENT INSPECTION GOAL SCALABILITY

Secondly, on the question that Mr. Farr was just raising and that 

I raised earlier about the Secure Freight Initiative and this 100 

percent goal. We have had a good discussion here. 

I was not totally clear, Mr. Ahern; I was rushing on a bit as you 

concluded your initial statement. I was not entirely clear on what 

you were saying about these three small pilot ports. Have we, in 

fact, achieved 100 percent screening at the ports of Southampton, 

Cortes and/or Qasim? 

And then, of course, the further question is the question perhaps 

raised by Hong Kong. Now, we visited Hong Kong. I assume some 

of the things you were saying about the rest of China does not 

apply in terms to Hong Kong in terms of the level of cooperation. 

My impression is that Hong Kong is a well-run port, in many ways 

one of the most impressive international ports; that it is a place 

where we have had good cooperation with the local authorities. And 

yet the 100 percent screening that we are talking about applies to 

only one lane of one terminal. 

So I don’t know what lesson we draw from the successes of some 

of these pilots. You know, we have achieved the more comprehensive screening in some very, very limited circumstances, but it 

seems to me they raise as many questions as they answer about 

how scalable this is and how much it—how well it can work even 

at a place like Hong Kong, to say nothing of other ports where 

there are many, many more difficulties. 

Mr. AHERN. And absolutely you did hit on the fine point of that. 

I mean, certainly when I was describing those three small ports, 

we have been able to achieve 100 percent; and that was what was 

reflected in the report that we owed Congress under the SAFE 

Ports Act requirement for 180-day testing that was done there. So 

we did go ahead and affirm that in the report. 

However, when you then now take a look at larger ports, even 

ports that are marginally larger than the ones that we actually 

went out and did the testing protocols in, certainly we start to recognize very clearly the legitimate challenges that are out there. 

And when you take Hong Kong as one example—I also visited 

Hong Kong when the first ICIS, the integrated container inspection 

system, was marketed at that particular point in time, and it was 

misrepresented as far as what its capability was, that it was able 

to scan and do 100 percent. Well, it was one lane in one terminal, 

and certainly there were, as far as—concerns with the capabilities 

of the technology and how the response protocols were going to be 

realized. 

So certainly those are still challenges that are out there, and 

even in a good place like Hong Kong, where we have a tremendous 

port authority to deal with, good host country counterpart support 

as well as the major terminal operators there, it is not without its 

significant challenges. 

ASP MONITORS AND PVT SYSTEMS

Mr. PRICE. All right. Thank you. 


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Let me move on to a new topic, but one I hope we can deal with 

briefly. It has to do with the technology for these ASP monitors and 

where we are on that. 

These ASP radiation portals have been underdeveloped for several years. They are intended to both detect and identify radiation 

sources. That would be a major improvement on the present system, but we know that program is 2 years behind schedule. 

So, Dr. Gallaway, when will you finish field validation testing of 

the two systems that are currently in competition in terms of ASP? 

When will we see a certification that these monitors have met a 

standard of operational effectiveness? And then, finally, what about 

the interim plans? If certification is further delayed, what are you 

going to do with your plans about your plans to acquire 50 ASP 

systems this year and/or to acquire existing technology, PVT systems? 

What is the requirement in the near term? We are covering gaps, 

I suppose. We are replacing older PVTs that have passed their useful life. I understand there is a good bit of money in the budget, 

$120 million for 2009 that could be used to obtain these PVT systems, as needed. 

On the other hand, you are talking about buying machinery that 

we hope is going to be superseded in a very few years. 

So I want to know the state of the ASP program, but I also want 

to know about how many PVT monitors, at what cost, you think 

we are going to need given the time frame we are facing with the 

ASPs. 

Mr. GALLAWAY. If I could start with the last part of your question first, we are continuing to build out the northern border and 

deploy PVTs, so that we have gone to 100 percent scanning opportunities on the northern border. And so that is what we are using 

most—a lot of our 2009 funds to do. 

As far as the status of the ASP system, we are in field validation 

testing, which is done hand in hand with our colleagues from Customs and Border Protection, because we are now out in a real port 

of entry operation. We were in what we call tandem operation 

where we have got the current detection system running at the 

same time that we have an ASP. 

When we looked at the data that we were receiving, we had a 

few concerns that the system may not have been working quite as 

well as we had hoped. And so we have paused the testing for a bit 

while we are analyzing the data. We anticipate that pause is probably going to go for about another month while we decide what to 

make of it. 

I am optimistic that we will be able to solve the issue and then 

we would start up field validation testing again. We would do some 

work back in tandem operation into what we call solo operation, 

where they turn off the existing systems and run exclusively with 

ASP, and that would take several more weeks. 

What all that means to the program is, we are probably looking 

at certification of our first system—we have two competitors right 

now, and the first system would be at a point where we could take 

it to the Secretary for certification sometime about the end of this 

fiscal year. 


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Mr. PRICE. All right. I will leave it at that for now because our 

time is limited, but I am going to ask you to submit for the 

record—and we will expect this as part of the detailed 2010 budget 

submission as well—a more determinative answer than you gave 

me on the PVT point. I would like to have a fuller understanding 

of this ASP timeline that you are projecting and the kind of confidence you have in it. 

But then also what are we talking about with respect to these 

PVT systems and the—you say we are going to fill out the northern 

border stations. Okay, that is the scale, the scope of that? What 

kind of money are we talking about, especially in next year’s budget, given the fact that there is money already sitting unused in— 

not just in 2009, but I think some funds from previous years; and 

given the fact that we clearly need this capability, but we also are 

talking about systems that are hopefully going to be superseded in 

terms of their capabilities. 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Right. As I mentioned, finishing up the northern 

border will be done with the current funding that we have in hand 

today. 

Mr. PRICE. You can definitively state that? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Correct. 

Mr. PRICE. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. Rogers. 

CONTAINER TRANSITS FROM MEXICO TO US

Mr. ROGERS. How many containers come to the U.S. from Mexico 

a year or a month or whatever? 

[The information follows:] 

4. How many containers come to the U.S. from Mexico in a year/a month? 

a. Ahern indicated he did not have the breakdown between Canada and mexico, 

and provided the total number per year. 

RESPONSE: in FY 2008, a total of 2.34 million containers came into the U.S. 

from Mexico. Please see the chart below for the monthly break out: 

Container Arrivals from Mexico (FY 2008) 

Oct-07 ............................................................................................................... 204,167 

Nov-07 ............................................................................................................... 195,957 

Dec-07 ............................................................................................................... 173,097 

Jan-08 ............................................................................................................... 186,014 

Feb-08 ............................................................................................................... 191,571 

Mar-08 .............................................................................................................. 195,366 

Apr-08 ............................................................................................................... 216,541 

May-08 .............................................................................................................. 214,417 

Jun-08 ............................................................................................................... 201,642 

Jul-08 ................................................................................................................ 193,556 

Aug-08 .............................................................................................................. 187,300 

Sep-08 ............................................................................................................... 179,707 

Total .......................................................................................................... 2,339,335 

Mr. AHERN. Off the top of my head, I can’t give you the breakup 

between Canada and Mexico, but I know the number of trucks that 

cross our border is about 11, 11.5 million. 

Mr. ROGERS. Per year? 

Mr. AHERN. Per year. 

Mr. ROGERS. From U.S. to Mexico—— 


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Mr. AHERN. Yes. From U.S. To Mexico and also from Canada to 

U.S. That is our universe of trucks. I just don’t have that breakdown for you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Suffice to say, there is quite a flow of containers by 

truck from Mexico, right? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. And vice versa? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes. 

HISTORY OF CONTAINER INSPECTION

Mr. ROGERS. What has been the history of the searches of those 

containers coming in or going from the U.S. across the border? 

What has been the history of what bad things we have found? 

Mr. AHERN. We have actually found significant amounts of drugs 

in commercial trucks coming from Mexico into the United States. 

Mr. ROGERS. In the containers? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, in commercial trucks coming—— 

Mr. ROGERS. I am interested in containers. 

Mr. AHERN. I think we are saying the same thing. A truck with 

a trailer is what I referred to as that transaction, the functional 

equivalent of a maritime container. 

Mr. ROGERS. And what about those going south? 

Mr. AHERN. Going south as far as—again, we have not put that 

level of energy southbound as we have northbound. 

TAMPER PROOF CONTAINERS

Mr. ROGERS. Well, on either bound, if we had a way to be sure 

that a container was not tampered with in transit from when it 

was loaded at the factory in Mexico until it got to wherever it was 

going in the U.S., if we had a way to know that it had been opened 

and tampered with by a truck driver who had been bought off by 

the cartel, would that not be a major advance? 

Mr. AHERN. That would be an additional layer of security that 

we would be very much interested in. It goes to Congressman 

Rodriguez’s scenario with the FAST trucks coming across, whether 

it happens once it leaves the point of loading at the maquiladora 

and gets diverted along the way, or the driver becomes compromised along the way, if you have a certified container security 

device that we have confidence in that would alarm us if it has 

been tampered with, that would be a critical piece to know at the 

border when it arrives. 

Mr. ROGERS. It would be tremendous; would it not? 

Mr. AHERN. If the device was—if we had high confidence and it 

was functioning well to be able to secure a box from the point it 

was stuffed by people we have confidence with until it arrives at 

the border, that would be a value added, yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. We started working on this when we first started 

this Subcommittee—even before that—and we have been on it now 

for, I don’t know, 7, 8 or 9 years or more. And we invented the 

automobile and airplane in less time than that. What is so difficult 

about making a container security device that we can have faith 

in? Will we have one in my lifetime or your lifetime or the lifetime 

of the country? Will we ever have a gizmo that can tell us whether 

or not a box has been opened or not? 


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Mr. AHERN. I certainly hope so, sir, because we have had this 

discussion many years in a row. And I certainly do look forward to 

being able to sit before you one day and say that the industry has 

been able to provide the solution that is acceptable for the operating agency. 

Mr. ROGERS. It would revolutionize the way that we secure containers coming to us from all over the world. For example, if we 

had a certification by the manufacturer in Hong Kong that he has 

packed a container of his equipment and it has been sealed and we 

have a gizmo that can tell us whether or not it was in transit 

across the ocean and by rail and truck, or wherever it went, that 

it had not been opened or tampered with, think of the savings we 

could engender by not having to x ray or open and search. And 

Congress would be speedily moved along, and we could rest assured that we were not having a box that had been opened and an 

A-bomb placed in it somewhere along the way or drugs or guns or 

what have you. 

I don’t sense an urgency on the part of the Department in the 

slightest to get this done. Can you help me out? 

Mr. AHERN. I certainly can. 

I think one thing we all need to avoid is searching for a single 

solution to the challenge out there. Given your circumstance, that 

you just outlined with an A-bomb, we would not want to go ahead 

and put a container security device on it to be able to ensure that 

its integrity from point of lading, point of stuffing, all the way 

through to point of arrival, if that was all that we were going to 

focus on—whether the integrity of that container was maintained. 

So it has to be part of a whole risk management protocol with 

multiple layers beginning with that point of stuffing to make sure 

that we have confidence that our supply chain security specialists 

have actually gone there and verified that the personnel protocols, 

the operational protocols, are secure enough so that we don’t have 

any concerns about somebody violating the integrity of the box, and 

ensure its safe transit with the device. 

So it will certainly be a value added—— 

TAMPER PROOF CONTAINERS

Mr. ROGERS. My question is, when are you going to get it? What 

is wrong? Why can’t we have one today? I have been saying that 

for 10 years now, and I get the same answers which I can’t fathom 

and don’t understand. 

Mr. AHERN. As the principal operator for CBP, we have asked for 

the same thing and we are certainly interested in it in the future, 

but we don’t build these devices in our organization. We don’t build 

these within the Department of Homeland Security—— 

Mr. ROGERS. If I were you, I would be hammering on the door 

of the person that does make them. 

Mr. AHERN. This would be private industry, and we hope that 

they continue to develop the appropriate solution for our use because, as we have discussed before, there is an appropriate fit for 

a container security device as part of a whole layered protocol. 

Mr. ROGERS. If the Administration would take just a portion of 

that $95 million that they are requesting for further work on the 

border, just a small slice of that money and devote it to a container 


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security device, we could save most of the rest of the $95 million 

by not having to search the railcars or the trucks going to and from 

Mexico—if we had a reliable device that could tell us that it has 

not been tampered with on the way by a corrupted truck driver by 

the cartel. 

I rest my case again, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Rodriguez. 

C–TPAT

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Let me go back to that same question I had before on the C–TPAT. 

My understanding is, the way it operates if I am a truck driver, 

I have my truck and I go pick up the load and go get in line and 

get across, unload it, come back, get back in line, and get another 

load and do that time and time again; and hopefully, as many 

times as I can, go across. If one of those loads has—and your response was appropriate. I just want you to look in terms of how 

practical or how it is being implemented because if those people get 

nailed, they tell me it takes a year for them to be able to go back 

to work in some cases, 6 months to a year. And in most of those 

cases, based on your own data that over 90 percent of those cases 

it is the maquiladora and not the trucker that is involved with 

those—and that is based on your data, so I would ask you to look 

at that, please, and see what we might be able to do. 

SOUTHBOUND CHECKING OF CARGO AND VEHICLES

Now, the other thing, I know that we are all concerned—and, in 

fact, I have the legislation to go southbound and start checking. 

But none of that should take away from the importance of what is 

inbound; to me, that is much more a priority, what is coming into 

this country. And that is why I have the legislation on what is 

going out, because that is also important; but we need to come up 

with those responses, and that should not take away from that. 

But I know we have on this Committee another Chairman, 

Lowey, that handles and is involved with some resources to Mexico, 

and maybe there the Mexican Government might participate in enhancing their capabilities in checking also inbound into Mexico, 

making sure that, you know, since its their laws, that they outlaw 

guns into Mexico. 

And I had been a Member of Congress prior to this. I represented 

a previous district in the south, and we caught a lot of guns going 

in, as well as drugs coming out on 18-wheelers, full; and it is something we need to continue to follow through with the understanding that we don’t lose track that inbound is much more critical to us than southbound, which is also important. 

And let me just share a couple of incidents, and it applies to both 

sides. In Roma-Rio Grande, many times I was there and I saw cars 

involved in traffic violations or did some other things, and they just 

went southbound and we couldn’t catch them, just like a lot of 

Americans that find themselves in Mexico in trouble and cut it this 

way and find themselves in terms of trying to get out of trouble 

from Mexico. 


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And that happens all the time there on the border, and so somehow we do need a response that we could be able to communicate 

quickly and catch those individuals that have either violated traffic 

or maybe even more serious situations. 

Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Farr. 

CANADIAN BORDER APPREHENSIONS

Mr. FARR. Mr. Rogers, I hope we can get that equipment developed because I can’t stand having to give up my bottle of water, 

my shaving cream, shampoo every time I go to the airport because 

a machine can’t tell the difference between what is in those bottles 

and some other things. So I hope technology hurries up. 

I would like to ask a couple of questions. Mexico and Canada are 

our number one trading partners and California is the sixth largest 

economy in the world and our leading trading partner is Mexico. 

We have to get a lot of commerce back and forth very quickly, and 

obviously that speed with which you deliver commerce is really important to the industry. And you in the security business have to 

make sure things are slowed down, checked, and so on. 

I am interested on the Canadian side because I remember in 

some of the other hearings on the risk factor that the Canadian 

border was a higher risk than the Mexican border because known 

terrorists that had entered the United States had come across the 

Canadian border and, in fact, ingredients of weapons systems were 

detected from transshipment across the Canadian border. Has that 

statistic changed now? 

Does the Mexican border have more? There is a lot of thought 

here that it does, but do the statistics show that we are apprehending more known terrorists on the Mexican border than we are 

on the Canadian border? 

Mr. AHERN. I think when we look at the numbers, we look at 

what is referred to as the tied hits, the individuals that we encounter along our borders that are actually were involved with or suspicion that they are involved with potential terrorist activity or associated with a terrorist individual; and those numbers are reflected, that are more significant, on the northern border. The 

numbers on the northern border are, I believe, on the 500 range 

and it is less than 150 on the southern border with those encounters. 

But that does not—that alone cannot be looked at as the indicator of what country poses the greater risk to the United States. 

NORTHERN BORDER

Mr. FARR. But knowing that, from a risk management standpoint, are we providing the same kind of detection and detail to the 

Canadian border as we are to the Mexican border? 

Mr. AHERN. Absolutely. And I would say from an antiterrorism, 

counterterrorism perspective, one of our—or our first deployment 

for radiation detection capability was on the northern border. When 

we started to build our systems under the Western Hemisphere 

Travel Initiative to be able to have full document requirements, 

there was no—nothing more that was required until the 9/11 ComVerDate Nov 24 2008 02:52 Oct 22, 2009 Jkt 052213 PO 00000 Frm 00669 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\52213P2.XXX 52213P2

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mission and the 9/11 Act brought about the required documents. To 

come across the border from Canada to the United States, it just 

could be an oral declaration. 

So those have certainly solidified a lot of the protocols coming 

across the border from Canada into the United States. 

Mr. FARR. Are we building a fence across the northern border? 

Mr. AHERN. No. And there is not one contemplated at this time. 

Mr. FARR. Although Congress, I think, asked for it. 

Mr. AHERN. I think the current requirement under the Secure 

Fence Act was for the southern tier. 

Mr. FARR. I have no further questions. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Ms. Roybal-Allard. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that 

my questions and issues were raised earlier, so I won’t be repetitive. 

Mr. PRICE. All right. Thank you. 

So, with that, we will bring this hearing to a close. I think a 

number of us will have additional questions to submit for the 

record, and we will appreciate your prompt attention to those. 

Mr. PRICE. Meanwhile, on behalf of all of us, let me thank you 

for your good work and for your testimony here this morning. 

The subcommittee is adjourned. 


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(769) 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 22, 2009. 

U.S. COAST GUARD: MEASURING MISSION NEEDS 

WITNESSES 

ADMIRAL THAD W. ALLEN, COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD 

JOHN P. HUTTON, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PRICE

Mr. PRICE. The Subcommittee will come to order. Good morning, 

everyone. Today we are pleased to welcome the Commandant of the 

Coast Guard, Admiral Thad Allen, and Mr. John Hutton, the Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management at the Government 

Accountability Office. 

I want to express this Subcommittee’s and indeed the nation’s 

appreciation for the fine work, Admiral, that you and the men and 

women of the Coast Guard do across the country and around the 

world. We feel strongly that those who serve deserve the right to 

do the job that we have asked them to do, so it is essential that 

we have a clear picture of what the Coast Guard’s mission requirements are now and in the future and how the taxpayer’s investments are being spent to address those requirements. 

While we continue to see improvements in the Coast Guard’s 

management of its resources, the Subcommittee remains concerned 

about the impact of the transition away from the Deepwater contracting structure on current acquisitions and whether the Coast 

Guard’s present successes are sustainable long-term. 

Today we expect the Commandant to address concerns about the 

Coast Guard’s current and future needs and how these are going 

to be met through ongoing procurements. We would like Mr. Hutton to address how he views the viability of the Coast Guard’s key 

acquisitions based on a number of ongoing reviews that GAO is 

conducting. 

Over the past two years, Congress has provided more funding for 

the Coast Guard than requested by the Administration. For example, in the 2009 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress provided $289.7 million more than the President requested in discretionary funds and $787 million more than in 2008. 

Most of these additional resources were directed toward the 

Coast Guard’s acquisition and construction account, including a significant boost for personnel and $97.6 million for the Coast Guard’s 

new headquarters. Furthermore, in the recently enacted American 

Recovery and Reinvestment Act, we provided $240 million for the 

Coast Guard to meet urgent vessel and facility needs, as well as 

to make accelerated bridge investments to reduce hazards to navigation. 


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We have not seen a detailed 2010 budget request yet from the 

Administration. So far, the only information we have on the Coast 

Guard’s 2010 budget is the indication from February’s broad budget outline that the Administration plans to terminate the LORAN– 

C program. 

I am curious as to why this particular item, with a savings esti- mated at $36 million, and I might add some serious questions that 

need to be raised about the merits of the proposal; why that rose 

above all other elements of the Coast Guard’s budget for highlighting in the eyes of OMB given its small size relative to the 

other elements of the Coast Guard’s acquisition program. 

However, the lack of a detailed budget request does not mean 

that we have a shortage of issues to discuss today. Before we see 

the budget, it makes sense for us to understand just where the 

Coast Guard’s acquisition and management plan is taking us. The 

questions I believe are straightforward: have we identified the 

Coast Guard’s requirements for success today and have we planned 

properly so that the Coast Guard is on track for success in the coming years? 

We look forward today to hearing from both of you beginning 

with the Commandant and followed by Mr. Hutton. Gentlemen, as 

is our usual practice, your full written statements will be entered 

in the record, and we will ask you to limit your oral remarks to 

five minute presentations. 

Before we begin, let me recognize our distinguished Ranking 

Member, Mr. Rogers, for his comments. 

[The information follows:] 


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OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER ROGERS

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, gentlemen, to the hearing. 

From the days of the Revenue Cutter Service to the Higgins 

boats at Normandy, riverboats in Vietnam, patrol boats in the Persian Gulf, the Coast Guard has consistently proven to be a truly 

unique instrument of national security, and from the rocky shoals 

of Valdez, Alaska, to heroic rescues during Hurricane Katrina to 

surpassing the milestone of one million lives saved in 2008, the 

Coast Guard has also proven it is our nation’s premier response 

agency. 

Today, new and increasingly complex challenges such as sophisticated smuggling vessels, counterterrorism operations, expanding 

needs in the polar regions and modern piracy are once again putting the Coast Guard to the test. To meet these challenges, the 

Coast Guard has banked on the promise of the Deepwater Program. 

This acquisition effort was supposed to transform the Coast 

Guard fleet from a state of atrophy and antiquated technology to 

a modern, integrated system. Unfortunately, Deepwater has not 

only been slow to deliver the goods; it has also left a wake of turbulence within the Coast Guard’s organization. Just now it seems we 

are starting to see some operational benefits from an investment 

in Deepwater that exceeds $6.2 billion since 1998. 

In this past year, the first National Security Cutter was finally 

delivered. In addition, the operation of improved communication 

systems with several of the new maritime patrol aircraft began to 

eat away at the gap in the Coast Guard’s maritime surveillance 

needs. 

Also in this past year the Coast Guard’s reformed acquisition directorate has taken shape. Gone is the independent Deepwater directorate, gone is the distinction between deepwater and nondeepwater assets, and what has emerged is a more straightforward approach to the acquisition of surface, air, shore and technology assets and systems. 

But while some new assets have been delivered, and it appears 

you have gotten your acquisition house in order, those daunting 

challenges, looming threats and unfilled needs persist. That is why 

no acquisition program has received more scrutiny by this subcommittee over the last few years than Deepwater. 

We recognize the criticality of the Coast Guard’s expanding mission requirements against the deterioration of its fleet’s capabilities, and the widening gap between the two continues to be of great 

concern to this Member of the subcommittee. 

That brings us to today and a hearing that was originally intended to examine how the 2010 budget request would move the 

Coast Guard forward, but since we have not yet received the budget request I can only hope that you have been permitted, gentlemen, to discuss substantive details on what it will take to satisfy 

your mission requirements. Far too much is at stake to waste time 

with anything less than a frank discussion of true operational 

needs and what it is going to take to meet those needs. 


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Now in the face of increasingly complex challenges with more 

needs than Congress can afford to fill, the Coast Guard must once 

again find a way to prove it can live up to its motto of being always 

ready. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Admiral, please proceed. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ALLEN

Admiral ALLEN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Representative 

Rogers and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I am 

pleased to testify today on Coast Guard operations and our acquisition programs, and thank you, sir, for allowing me to submit my 

full written statement for the record. 

[The information follows:] 


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Admiral ALLEN. Three years ago when I became Commandant I 

issued a series of orders which were called Commandant Intent Action Orders. Those orders have virtually become the basis for a 

sweeping modernization of our service, anywhere from improved financial accounting to a broad-based maintenance system that applies to the entire service. 

One of those orders directed the disestablishment of the Deepwater Program Executive Office and integration of Coast Guard acquisition activities into a single organization. From that direction, 

the first Coast Guard blueprint for acquisition reform was issued. 

It is now in its third version and continues to guide our way forward. 

Two years ago, as that new organization was stood up, the Coast 

Guard was at another inflection point, as has been pointed out by 

both Mr. Rogers and the Chairman. The management of acquisition programs, the system of systems approach to Deepwater 

through lead systems integrator, had not produced the desired results and a new approach was needed. 

Leveraging the concepts of the acquisition blueprint and our 

modernization plans, we made the decision to assume the role of 

lead systems integrator not only for Deepwater, but for the entire 

service. I am pleased to report today that we chose the right path. 

We are the lead systems integrator. Acquisition reform is taking 

hold, and we are continuing to implement best practices for bringing new assets and systems on line at the greatest value to the 

public. 

In addition, sweeping changes are taking place in how we maintain and support our assets through new logistics and service centers. A side benefit to these changes has been a marked increase 

in personnel ownership of our organizational goals, and at every 

level we are seeing increased innovation. 

Behind me is Rear Admiral Bloor, our Acquisition Chief supporting me at the hearing today. I want to quote an email that he 

sent me last night, Mr. Chairman. 

‘‘One of the several noticeable changes in our Coast Guard role 

as a lead systems integrator has been an infusion of innovation and 

efficiency. For example, a relatively simple equipment change on 

our aircraft, adding a new direction finder, has increased distress 

signal detection from an average of five to 10 miles to documented 

cases in excess of 150 miles, resulting in 47 more lives saved. I 

have directed that routine use of alternative analysis and business 

case analysis in all of our projects.’’ 

‘‘In order to increase the strength on our bench, our contracting 

workforce, our officer workforce, I am introducing the Military 

Journeyman Program which will complement our three ongoing civilian leadership initiatives, ensuring key contracting officer positions remain filled in the future.’’ 

The changes being made in our acquisition organization and the 

entire service could not be more timely. We face tremendous fiscal 

challenges, as you pointed out. The maritime security regime for 

this country, while improved since 2001, requires much further 

maturation. As we have seen in the last year, transnational threats 

such as piracy and small boat attacks from sea are real. 


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I told the committee last year that the Coast Guard has never 

been more relevant. Today I will tell you we have never been in 

more greater demand. The confluence of globalization, expanding 

maritime trade, energy exploration, security demands at home and 

abroad have placed a premium on our unique capabilities and competencies. 

The interdiction of pirates attempting to attack the motor vessel 

Puma in the Gulf of Aden last week was deterred and the pirates 

were interdicted by a joint boarding team of U.S. Navy and Coast 

Guard personnel. Going forward, we must ensure the Coast Guard 

has the resources, authorities and competencies in place to answer 

the call for our nation. 

Dedication is not enough for our workforce to succeed. They are 

the most dedicated workforce in the world. They require safe, reliable and capable assets to fulfill the Coast Guard’s multi-mission 

requirements. 

Mr. Chairman, as you noted, I appreciate your strong support in 

the fiscal year 2009 appropriations. Rest assured, the funding is 

making a difference and we are moving smartly ahead to recapitalize the service. For example, our new Response Boat-Medium 

has made immediate impacts across our mission profile and continues to roll off the production line on schedule. In fact, it was one 

of the first assets on scene with the ditching of the aircraft in the 

Hudson River. 

The first National Security Cutter Bertholf is receiving high 

praise for impressive capabilities during this period of operational 

test and evaluation, but, perhaps even more important, the Naval 

Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division deemed, and I quote, 

‘‘The structural modifications to the hull girder of Hulls 3 through 

8 are effective and produce fatigue lives of at least 30 years.’’ I believe we have put this problem to rest, Mr. Chairman. 

Validating the structural enhancements to the National Security 

Cutter represents a significant milestone in the project and will facilitate smooth construction processes for the remaining full hulls. 

As I noted earlier, acquisition reform has made us better 

equipped to manage costs, schedules and performance. A prime example of this is the Fast Response Cutter, a project which serves 

as a benchmark for future acquisitions. We are turning the corner. 

That said, much remains to be done as we transition Deepwater 

assets into the new acquisition process with revised acquisition 

baselines and complete the transfer of systems engineering and 

program management functions to the Coast Guard. The beneficiaries of our modernization efforts will be the American public 

who we serve, but our workforce will benefit as well. 

Throughout modernization, we have asked a lot of our workforce 

and we expect a lot of them. The welfare of our workforce during 

modernization is my top priority because mission effectiveness depends on their contributions. We desire to retain all of our civilian 

employees and attract the workforce of the future. 

I have embraced the goal of a geographically distributed workforce that we hope will provide stability for our civilian employees 

so they can continue to do the same superb jobs they have always 

done in an enhanced organizational structure that will improve 

mission execution. 


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I welcome the dialogue we have begun with the unions that represent many of our Coast Guard people and look forward to working together through the transition and into the future. I hope to 

continue forging with them a labor/ management relationship that 

is a model in the federal government. 

Regarding our military personnel who man the boats, operate the 

aircraft and put to sea, we must continue to focus on the maintenance of our aging assets, even as we bring new ones on board, as 

both the Chairman and Mr. Rogers have noted. One of my great 

concerns is the condition of our large cutter fleet. We are experiencing increases in the cost of operating our major cutters as readiness declines. 

As I said in my State of the Coast Guard speech recently, we are 

experts, unfortunately, at managing an aging fleet to meet mission 

requirements. However, time is a merciless thief that steals our 

readiness with each passing year. During the past 12 months, we have spent over $50 million on 

major unanticipated repairs to cutters and aircraft. Two of my 

High Endurance Cutters, the Dallas and the Gallatin, had such severe structural deterioration that they had to be removed from operations for emergency repairs. They are dry docked today in 

Charleston, South Carolina. 

A recent engine room fire on Boutwell operating in the Persian 

Gulf damaged one of its engines beyond repair, requiring a costly 

major maintenance period in Bahrain and resulting in many lost 

cutter days in a region where piracy is a concern. These and other 

casualties have a direct impact on our readiness and our ability to 

execute the missions our nation is relying on. 

Without question, we need to implement our recapitalization 

plans at best speed. New assets cannot come on line fast enough. 

Critical in this effort are stable requirements, stable costs and predictable funding. To that end, we are committed to working with 

the Congress and the Administration to establish multi-year cost 

schedule and performance milestones. 

In closing, I am grateful for your commitment, Mr. Chairman, to 

help address these serious issues. While there will be challenges as 

we move forward, we have the right structure, institutions and 

strategic approach lining our way. If properly funded, I am confident we can deliver the assets and systems needed to meet the 

mission needs of the future. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. PRICE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Hutton. 

Mr. HUTTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting 

me here today to discuss GAO’s ongoing work for this Subcommittee on the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program. Deepwater 

represents about 60 percent of the Coast Guard’s 2009 budget for 

acquisition, construction and improvement. 

As you know, we have been reviewing the planning and execution of the Deepwater Program since the late 1990s, and over the 

years we have informed Congress and others of the problems, uncertainties and progress related to this large, complex acquisition. 

Today I will discuss three areas: Coast Guard management of the 

Deepwater Program, how acquisition program baselines have 

changed since 2007 and Coast Guard’s efforts to manage and build 

its acquisition workforce. 

First, since we testified before you last year, the Coast Guard 

has continued to make fundamental changes in its management 

approach to Deepwater. Foremost has been steps taken to assume 

the role of systems integrator from Integrated Coast Guard Systems, ICGS. The Coast Guard has reduced the scope of work on 

contract on ICGS and has assigned these functions to Coast Guard 

stakeholders. 

The Coast Guard has also undertaken a reassessment of the 

ICGS proposed solution, including the capabilities and the number 

and mix of assets that it needs. Completion of this analysis is expected by the summer of 2009. 

No less important is the Coast Guard’s decision to manage the 

program at the asset level by applying their disciplined program 

management approach found in its Major Systems Acquisition 

Manual, the MSAM. This approach can help increase government 

control and accountability for decision making. Previously the 

Coast Guard exempted the program from the process. 

The Coast Guard established the goal of complete adherence to 

the MSAM process for all Deepwater assets by the second quarter 

of 2009. Despite its efforts, however, the Coast Guard has not yet 

met its goal. Key acquisition management activities such as approved operational requirement documents and test plans are not 

in place for assets with contracts recently awarded or in production, and this makes it difficult for the Coast Guard to determine 

if what it is buying is meeting its needs. 

An improved management approach, however, has increased 

Coast Guard understanding of cost schedule and capability for 

Deepwater since the $24.2 billion baseline was established in 2007, 

the second area of my discussion. As of early April 2009, acquisition baselines approved by DHS indicate a potential cost increase 

of $2.1 billion. 

As more realistic baselines are developed and approved for other 

assets, further cost growth may become apparent, and the Coast 

Guard, through valuation of baselines, has also changed its understanding of delivery schedules and capabilities of Deepwater assets. 

In gaining new levels of understanding in acquiring Deepwater 

assets, the Coast Guard plans to update its budget submissions 

with asset based information. However, the current structure of its 

budget submission to Congress does not provide certain details at 


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the asset level such as estimates of total cost and total numbers 

to be procured, information that could provide decision makers and 

the public greater insight into the program. The Coast Guard has 

included some of this information in other congressional reports, 

but the reports are provided only to the Appropriations Committees. 

Moving to the third area of discussion, one reason the Coast 

Guard contracted for a systems integrator in the first place is because it recognized that it lacked sufficient experienced workforce 

to manage the acquisition. The Coast Guard acknowledges that it 

still faces challenges in hiring and retaining qualified acquisition 

personnel and that the situation poses a risk to the successful execution of its program. 

According to Coast Guard human capital officials, as of April 

2009 16 percent of the Acquisition Branch positions were unfilled, 

including key jobs such as contracting officers and systems engineers. Even as it attempts to fill current vacancies, the Coast 

Guard plans to significantly increase the size of its acquisition 

workforce by the end of fiscal year 2011. While the Coast Guard 

may be hard pressed to fill these positions, it has made progress 

in identifying the broader challenges it faces and working to mitigate them. 

In conclusion, it is important to note that Coast Guard leadership has made significant progress in identifying and addressing 

the challenges and assuming the role of systems integrator for the 

Deepwater Program. The Coast Guard has continued to build on 

this progress by starting to follow a disciplined management approach. 

This approach is improving the Coast Guard’s knowledge of what 

is required to meet its goal and is gaining a better understanding 

of needed capabilities and associated costs, insight that should enable the Coast Guard and the Congress to execute better decision 

making and oversight. 

However, until the Coast Guard gains a thorough understanding 

of what it is buying and how much it will cost and is able to put 

in place the necessary workforce, it will continue to face risk in carrying out this multi-billion dollar acquisition. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. We plan to issue a 

more detailed report later this summer, and I might add we also 

are doing this work for the Senate Appropriations Committee. 

I would be happy to answer any questions you or other Members 

of the subcommittee may have. 

[The information follows:] 


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PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES AND GAPS

Mr. PRICE. Thank you very much. We will now proceed to questions. Admiral, focusing on your current operational needs, how do 

you assess those and what kind of indicators you using in communicating what those needs are? Much of the discussion of Coast 

Guard operations always focuses on what you call ‘‘gaps’’, patrol 

boat mission hour gaps, maritime patrol aircraft mission hour gaps, 

major cutter mission hour gaps and so forth. And of course the idea 

is to reflect a shortfall in the number of mission hours needed by 

a particular boat or aircraft to do a critical job. 

I do not believe we have had an update for over a year now in 

exactly the kind of gaps that you estimate, but assuming that they 

have not changed in great magnitude, it is unclear to me to what 

extent these gaps actually reflect the reality of the Coast Guard’s 

needs. I hope you can understand what these gap estimates are, 

where they stand in relation to your overall assessment of mission 

capability. 

The Coast Guard has acknowledged that it is only able to deploy 

its patrol boats for example and their crews to meet 43 percent of 

the total patrol hour needs. This reflects a 400,000 hour patrol boat 

mission gap so-called. 

The Coast Guard’s assessments, though, of its overall missions 

capability do not seem to reflect these gap assessments, and that 

is what I want to ask you about. The Coast Guard claimed in a response to this Committee that it was nonetheless meeting its program objectives basically for maritime security. The Coast Guard 

indicated that their requirements are being met by taking a layered approach using a number of different resources, but of course 

some of those resources are precisely the ones where the gaps have 

been identified. 

So I would appreciate your helping us understand this. What do 

you mean when you say your objectives are being met and that 

they are being met by using this layered approach? And how congruent is that or how does that measure up alongside the gap numbers that we have been given? How do you assess whether you are 

meeting the performance objectives and how does that relate to the 

way the Coast Guard numbers determines the number of patrol 

hours that it needs? 

Admiral ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, those are all very good questions. 

If I could give you a little bit of a retrospective? 

We were provided a baseline performance level with the Integrated Deepwater System when we awarded the contract. It was 

clear following the events of 9/11 that our operating environment 

had changed. In 2005, the Coast Guard conducted what we called 

a performance gap analysis, and that provided the baseline that we 

have used since then in talking about either aircraft, cutters or patrol boats. 

I agree with you there is ambiguity regarding our performance, 

what it is we are trying to do out there, where these gaps are and 

what they actually mean. Part of that relates to the fact that our 

current performance indicators predate 9/11, and I think a lot of 

them need to be reevaluated. 


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What we need to do is go back and take a look at the 11 missions 

the Coast Guard is statutorily required to conduct right now. It has 

been since 2005. As we all know and as was stated in the opening 

statements, there has been a fundamental change out there in the 

threat environment we are looking at. 

And I am not quite sure that the performance indicators that we 

use right now, whether it is marine safety deaths, lives saved, migrants interdicted, that have been basically in place in the Coast 

Guard since before 9/11, before we went into the Department of 

Homeland Security, are giving us the right calculus to be able to 

reconcile the demand for hours out there versus those performance 

parameters. 

A couple of examples to go with that. While we have lost patrol 

boat hours, the threat in the Straits of Florida of illegal Cuban migration has actually dropped, so while there are fewer hours to be 

devoted to that the threat has decreased. In fact, we see a diversion 

of Cuban migrants now actually entering through the southwest 

border through Mexico. 

Those types of changes in our operating environment are not 

adapted very well to the performance gap analysis or our performance measures. For that reason, we have initiated a fleet mix analysis to try and re-baseline where we are at, and we will be working 

on that through the next year. 

I cannot give you a plain answer right now, but in my view there 

is a disconnect between our performance measures and the baseline that we established in 2005, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. Well, thank you. That does help clarify the possible 

discrepancies that we see sometimes in the assessments of mission 

capabilities. We take these gap figures very seriously. When you 

say that only 43 percent of the total patrol hour needs are being 

met, that is a warning sign, and of course—— 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PRICE [continuing]. The assessment of that underlies a lot of 

the funding that we devote to building up these capabilities. 

Are you saying that these numbers are not all that they appear 

to be? I mean, what kind of major qualifying factors are we talking 

about here when you come in and say that despite these gaps, the 

mission requirements are basically being met or the layered approach that results in their being met? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. What that means is where we might 

have a Medium Endurance Cutter or patrol boat we might be using 

another platform to fill those hours to fill that mission effect. 

For an example, we not routinely, but when we need to, we will 

move a buoy tender into a place where we might have a Medium 

Endurance Cutter or patrol boat and have them actually do a law 

enforcement patrol or activities, whether it is migrant interdiction 

or fisheries, because that is a platform we have to apply to that 

mission set to fill those hour gaps. 

We have on many occasions, especially since the 123s were removed from service, used buoy tenders to do law enforcement operations. That would be one of the coping mechanisms to provide 

those hours, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Hutton, do you have any comment on the kind 

of measures that we are talking about and the way they have been 


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utilized? The Admiral of course has said that the more sophisticated indicators are on the way or a revised system for measuring 

mission capabilities. How does the work you and your agency have 

done reflect on this? 

Mr. HUTTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That particular issue is 

handled by one of my colleagues at GAO. 

I am pretty much focusing on the Deepwater Acquisition Program, but we would certainly be happy to work with you or your 

staff to provide a detailed answer to any particular question you 

might have. 

Mr. PRICE. Well, to the extent the work that you have done is 

relevant and pertinent to this line of questioning, I would appreciate your furnishing that for the record—— 

Mr. HUTTON. Certainly. 

Mr. PRICE [continuing]. And then of course we will follow up. 

Mr. Rogers. 

NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER

Mr. ROGERS. Let me focus on the National Security Cutter, if you 

do not mind. As I understand it, a total of eight of these cutters 

are planned to replace the aging 378 foot High Endurance Cutters. 

I have seen some of the material that depicts the deterioration 

of those cutters, rusting areas where you can see straight through 

to the sea and so on. Some of these are more than 50 years old I 

understand, Admiral. Is that correct? 

Admiral ALLEN. The 1940s. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. So you need a total of eight to replace these old cutters. The first was commissioned August 4, 2008. I am told that 

number two is about 75 percent complete. 

Admiral ALLEN. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. And funding for numbers one through three is almost complete less some post delivery costs, and then the 2009 Act 

that we passed provided $353.7 million for number four, but that 

did not fully support the cost to award a contract for production 

due to overruns attributable to increases in costs of material and 

labor. 

The stimulus bill did not address that shortfall, which is I think 

about $224 million. Correct me if I am wrong on these numbers. 

Admiral ALLEN. Go ahead, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Therefore, you have to rely upon funds in the 2010 

budget to award a contract for number four. Is that right? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Now, the number four costs I am told are estimated 

to be just over $600 million, but apparently what 2010 needs is 

monies to award the contract on number four, and we have to then 

figure out numbers five through eight. 

I am wondering. If you do not get the monies in the 2010 budget 

what impact would that have on your ability to negotiate a reasonable fixed price contract for numbers five through eight? 

I mean, it seems to me like if you can get the monies in 2010 

it would give you a bargaining position with Northrop Grumman 

on the costs at a fixed rate for five through eight. Am I wrong or 

crazy about that? 


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Admiral ALLEN. Mr. Rogers, it is always much preferable to lock 

in a quantity and a price at an earlier date, especially for the purposes of a firm fixed price contract, even one with an economic 

price adjustment. 

It is our intent to put number four on contract in 2010, and depending on the outcome of the budget deliberations we would anticipate trying to achieve the best mix of stabilized requirements, 

stabilized costs and stabilized funding. 

In the best of all possible worlds, you would want to put as many 

hulls under contract under fixed price as you could, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, what would it take in 2010 to keep the cutter 

procurement on track and its cost reasonable? What dollar figure 

would it take? 

Admiral ALLEN. Sir, I would be glad to answer for the record. It 

depends on whether or not you are awarding four or awarding a 

combination of four and five. We can give you that information, sir. 

There are two different numbers because there is a different 

price if you are only ordering for one ship, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. You do not have that available today? 

Admiral ALLEN. I can get it to you. Yes, sir. I do not have it in 

front of me right now. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. I would like to know that today if we can do 

it, if you have it. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. If you would like to confer briefly, I would be willing. 

[Pause.] 

Admiral ALLEN. We will get it for you, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Today? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

[The information follows:] 

Under the latest acquisition program baseline (APB) for the National Security 

Cutter (NSC), finalized on December 8, 2008, the Coast Guard requires $281.5 million to complete National Security Cutter (NSC) #4. The President’s Budget provides 

this funding. The supporting cost estimates for the current APB assume $587 million to procure NSC–5 (including $107.1 million for Long Lead Time Materials and 

$470 million to award a production contract to the shipbuilder). The 2010 Request 

recognized that future procurements will more successfully meet cost and schedule 

milestones if risks and unknowns are reduced by fully completing testing and 

shakedown of the lead ship. Coast Guard anticipates NSC–1 full acceptance in early 

2010, which would trigger procurement of the next cutter (NSC–5) in 2011. 

SOUTHWEST BORDER DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS

Mr. ROGERS. Yes. Let me switch gears quickly. The Mexican drug 

war, the border, the border war, if you will. What role, if any, or 

what role does the Coast Guard play in the drug smuggling operations across the southwest border? 

Admiral ALLEN. A fairly significant role, sir, but when I consider 

the southwest border I not only consider the border with U.S. and 

Mexico. I consider the border between Mexico and Central America. 

We have operations at both ends of the border on our maritime 

boundaries with Mexico, but, sir, quite frankly, when I look at the 

drug flow, and I am speaking now as not only the Commandant of 

the Coast Guard, but the Chairman of the Interdiction Committee. 

Our best course of action is not to allow drugs from South America 


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to get to Central America or Mexico. It is much harder to stop 

them the further north they get. 

It is the Coast Guard’s position and I believe it is the position 

of most of the agencies that are working down with Joint Interagency Task Force South out of Key West that the closer we can 

take down these drugs to the source the more effective and efficient 

we will be. When those drugs enter Mexico, there will be a difficulty in stopping them. It increases astronomically. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I am told that 90 percent or so of the heroin 

entering this country and cocaine and others, that 90 percent of 

that coming into the country comes across the Mexican border. 

If you know, what percent of the drugs coming across that border 

come into Mexico by way of sea versus land? Do you know? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. The most prevalent indicator is the flow 

of cocaine from South America north. 

Somewhere anywhere between—it varies any particular year—85 

up to 95 percent of the cocaine entering Mexico comes by noncommercial maritime means from South America. That would be 

fishing vessels, Go-Fast boats, the recently introduced self-propelled semi-submersibles. 

There is some trafficking via containers and aircraft and other 

routes, but without a doubt the predominance of drugs moving 

from South America to Mexico is on noncommercial maritime 

means, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. And are you involved in the interdiction of those 

drugs on the seas? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. It is a combined partnership, and it is 

very, very effective. 

As a result of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1989, 

the Department of Defense was authorized to do detection and 

monitoring as part of the war on drugs. We work in combination 

with Joint Interagency Task Force South under U.S. Southern 

Command. 

They detect and monitor, and when a vessel is found that requires a law enforcement boarding that asset is shifted to the local 

Coast Guard command, either the one out of Miami or California, 

and the Coast Guard executes what we would call an in-game and 

does the boarding under our law enforcement authority. It is one 

of the most effective operations I have encountered in my career, 

sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. You are maintaining a patrol boat presence both on 

the east and west coasts of Mexico? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir, we are, but I would also add that it is 

not just the United States Coast Guard. It is our Navy partners. 

We also have international coalition partners, and we also are supported by aviation assets from Customs and Border Protection. 

They are critical to our success, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are you getting good cooperation from the Mexican 

Government? 

Admiral ALLEN. We are, sir. They are great partners, and we 

have had some considerable successes. 

In the last year, one of the more noteworthy successes was the 

discovery of a self-propelled semi-submersible several hundred 


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miles off the coast of Mexico that we had no surface assets to respond to. It was located by one of our maritime patrol aircraft. 

We provided that information to the Mexican Government. They 

actually launched a response in less than an hour and had their 

Special Forces fast rope down on a self-propelled semi-submersible 

that was actually moving in an extraordinary operational feat. 

It is indicative of the level of cooperation and their intent to deal 

with this problem, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Ms. Lowey. 

SMALL BOAT THREATS

Ms. LOWEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen. 

Last November a group of terrorists attacked multiple targets in 

Mumbai. The terrorists were believed to have entered the area in 

relatively small speedboats. 

Admiral Allen, does the Coast Guard view the travel methods 

used by the Mumbai terrorists as a potential threat to the United 

States, and what is the Coast Guard doing to prevent a similar illegal entry from occurring in the United States? 

I would think that the response to this potential threat, terrorists using small vessels to enter the United States, has similarities 

to the Coast Guard’s work to prevent drug smugglers in Go-Fast 

boats from entering the United States. 

So when the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection or any 

other agency identifies and pursues a suspicious vessel headed toward the United States, in what percentage of instances are those 

vessels intercepted? If you can just discuss the whole issue and 

what you are doing about it? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, ma’am. Thank you very much for the question. Let me provide some context. 

Internationally—we are talking about international maritime 

traffic right now—most of the regulatory schemes and controls that 

are placed on vessels apply to vessels that are greater than 300 

gross tons. That is pretty much the cutoff for international convention and rulemaking. 

A 300 ton gross vessel, just to give you an idea, would be somewhere between a 60 or an 80 foot vessel. Below that threshold is 

up to the different nations to apply domestic controls over them, although we are talking with the International Maritime Organization about security issues with small vessels less than 300 gross 

tons. 

In this country there are three groups of vessels that predominate that area below 300 gross tons: First are recreational boats, 

the second are fishing vessels, and the third are uninspected tow 

boats and work boats. You have a lower level below that of personal watercraft and boats that are not powered by engines. 

In general, these three classes of vessels are loosely not regulated. They are not required to carry any locating devices, and in 

some cases there is not an equal application of operator licensing 

across all the states. We have a challenge in boarding these vessels 

and identifying who is operating them, the competency to operate 


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them, and in this case it is not only a security issue, but it is a 

safety issue as well. 

I have long regarded, since I became Commandant in 2006, this 

being probably the area where we need to mature the maritime security regime in this country. You asked for facts and figures. It 

would be difficult to give you that because we do not have any persistent radar coverage around the coast of the United States as we 

do with the air traffic control system. 

If you were flying a small plane to the United States and you got 

to 200 miles and you had not checked in and were not emanating 

from a transponder, you would be met with an interceptor and your 

intentions would be questioned. 

We do not have that ubiquitous radar coverage or communication 

system that allows us to do that, and I think that is one of the persistent questions moving forward about where we are going to go 

in this country, ma’am. 

SMALL BOAT SECURITY

Ms. LOWEY. Well, that is pretty depressing news. 

Admiral ALLEN. That is reality. 

Ms. LOWEY. Well, but what do we do with the reality? Putting 

aside the international cooperation, and you mentioned that those 

regulations are not in place, given the Mumbai incident or even 

dealing with the drugs, what do you recommend we do and how 

long does it take and what can this Congress do about it? 

Admiral ALLEN. The steps we have taken since 9/11 are as follows: First of all, we have established advance notice of arrival requirements for shipping, and we have the crew, passenger and 

cargo manifests to see if there are any issues associated with those 

vessels greater than 300 gross tons. We have increased—— 

Ms. LOWEY. No. I am talking about the smaller vessels. 

Admiral ALLEN. We have increased the advance notice of arrival 

requirements for any vessel that is reporting in from a foreign 

country that is a foreign flag vessel. They have to give the same 

requirement now, so we have lowered that down to include almost 

all vessels that are coming in from foreign, but that is a voluntary 

reporting based on regulations that have been issued. 

What we do not have is surveillance so you can reconcile what 

is out there, who you know is there, are there anomalous vessels 

out there that need to be dealt with further offshore that might 

present a threat. To do that you are ultimately going to need a system of radars, in some cases video cameras, anomaly detection devices that can tell you if something is moving where it should not 

be. That has to be centrally watched at one of our sector command 

centers. 

We are in the process of building out integrated operation centers and developing devices that can surveil and then bring in 

automated identification system information from the vessels that 

are transmitting, but it is an incremental process of putting that 

together and we are at the rudimentary stages of doing that, 

ma’am. 

Ms. LOWEY. Mr. Chairman, I would strongly suggest that we get 

an in-depth briefing on this issue. There may be some information 

that you can share with us in another forum. But I think given 


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what happened in Mumbai, this is a major threat to the homeland, 

and I frankly would like to pursue this issue and work with you 

if necessary in another setting to get specifics. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, ma’am. About two years ago we held a 

small boat security conference here in Washington and we looked 

at four scenarios. One of them was the use of small boats as a platform for a standoff weapon, such as a shoulder-held missile. The 

other one was a small boat used as a way to bring a weapon of 

mass destruction to the country. 

The third was use of a small boat for a waterborne provided explosive device. The fourth scenario was the Mumbai scenario where 

a group of terrorists were actually delivered by small boat. 

We looked at ways to increase reporting of U.S. citizens operating on the waterway. We established something called America’s 

Waterway Watch so U.S. citizens can report that. 

But, frankly, until we get to the detection monitoring sorted out 

and are able to identify targets of interest as a fixed regime in this 

country, we are still going to be somewhat at the mercy of a very 

large boating population out there that moves uninhibited. 

Ms. LOWEY. Have you requested that funding from this committee? 

Admiral ALLEN. We have. We have requested funding for interagency operation centers, the National Automated Identification 

System and the build out of our new sector command centers, 

ma’am. That is what that is intended to do. Yes. 

Mr. PRICE. We will certainly work with—— 

Ms. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE [continuing]. The gentlewoman in formulating our 

budget certainly for next year, but also determining what further 

information we need. 

Ms. LOWEY. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Mr. Kirk? 

BALLAST WATER REGULATIONS

Mr. KIRK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have said to Admiral 

Allen quite a bit in the past that I would not be here but for the 

Coast Guard, having been rescued as a 16-year-old from Lake 

Michigan. 

I want to first say to you that we are very proud of what Station 

Wilmette and Air Station Chicago have done in southern Lake 

Michigan. We had about 13 people rescued out of Waukegan, and 

then we had a very dramatic heliborne rescue of the Fin Seeker, 

so seven people were saved. It was really outstanding flying by 

Lieutenant John McWilliams, who is permanently based in Traverse City, but down with us. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KIRK. Also Joe Previk at Waukegan is doing a great job, so 

I wanted you to know about that. 

One of the great concerns we have is alien species in the Great 

Lakes. Canada and the United States jointly operate in the St. 

Lawrence Seaway. We have about 60 percent of the alien species 

in the Great Lakes have been brought in by foreign freighters. 

We now have a set of conflicting and uncoordinated ballast water 

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dering how are we doing in accelerating the Coast Guard sign-off 

or standardization of ballast water regulations so that we can have 

a coordinated federal response so that when we talk to the Canadians we are all speaking with one voice? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. First of all, I thank you for the question, and I agree completely. We need a coordinated response. 

Over the last several years we have been working on a new ballast water standard. One of the issues is you are going to have industry develop equipment that can either treat ballast water or 

however you want to deal with it. You have to establish a standard 

of which how many organisms per milliliters of water—— 

Mr. KIRK. Right. 

Admiral ALLEN [continuing]. That you want it to be able to be 

effective to. We have done environmental impact studies. We are 

ready to move this forward. 

Right now the rule is under review with several other 

rulemakings under the new Administration, and we would hope to 

move that forward as soon as we can, sir. 

Mr. KIRK. Okay. As one Navy guy to one Coast Guard guy, could 

we look lively here and get back to me? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. Full speed. 

CHICAGO SHIP AND SANITARY CANAL

Mr. KIRK. Another concern that we have is the reason why the 

City of Chicago first existed is because we built a canal from Lake 

Michigan into the Mississippi Basin. It is called the Chicago Ship 

& Sanitary Canal. The Mississippi Basin is completely contaminated with the Asian carp, which has not yet hit the Great Lakes 

ecosystem. When it does, if it ever does, we would have a radical 

change in what we have. 

We have an Army Corps barrier that basically electrifies that 

canal, but they are worried a little bit about ships going through 

this electric barrier and so it has just started operation at a rate 

of one volt per inch, which the scientists tell us may not be enough 

to stop the juvenile fish coming through the canal that would then 

radically alter the ecosystem for about—let me speak politically— 

128 congressional districts. 

Admiral ALLEN. Roger, sir. 

Mr. KIRK. Right. So I am wondering if we could have you look 

into having the Coast Guard allow the voltage to go up and just 

tell everybody when you are passing through this one 200-yard 

stretch of the canal stay in the boat, go quickly through, because 

if the Coast Guard forces the voltage to be too low you have a 

world of problems on another end that you did not realize. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. As you may know, the initial operation 

of the barrier is a one volt per inch, and there is an issue about 

whether or not the more frisky juvenile fish may try and get 

through there. 

Mr. KIRK. Yes. 

Admiral ALLEN. As you know, there is a second phase of this that 

would raise the voltage to four. 

Mr. KIRK. Right. 


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Admiral ALLEN. We are looking at a trial on that this summer 

working with the Corps of Engineers. As you know, they are leading the way on this and we are a partner with them. 

As you know, some of the things to look at are the potential personal hazards or the potential that there might be some kind of a 

spark or ignition source for any kind of vapors. We are working 

very close and we understand the threat there, and we will be as 

diligent as we can, sir. 

Mr. KIRK. Everybody that uses this, if you put up a big sign saying this is the Asian carp barrier that you all know about and the 

reason why this is here is to prevent a radical change to the entire 

Great Lakes ecosystem so stay in the damn boat when you are 

going through. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. We are committed to testing at the four 

volts this summer, sir. 

RESCUE 21 IN THE GREAT LAKES

Mr. KIRK. Okay. Last, Rescue 21. You know, obviously this may 

be inaccurate, but this is the Coast Guard’s version of Link 16 and 

the interoperability, and we are all about that. 

Rescue 21 is not coming to the Great Lakes until even if this Administration is re-elected until they are just about packing their 

bags and bolting. I am wondering how we can wait that long in one 

of the most used and recreational areas. We are only talking about 

nine million people on the south Lake Michigan shoreline. Is there 

any way we could accelerate the deployment of Rescue 21 so it is 

not being put in place as even a re-elected President Obama is 

leaving office? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. Well, it is a little sooner than that. 

What we are looking right now is, and the four sectors we are looking at are Detroit, Buffalo, Sault Ste. Marie and Sector Lake Michigan. The first one starts in November 2010. The fourth one will be 

done December 2011 under the current plan. 

Mr. KIRK. Right. 

Admiral ALLEN. Under the original layout of Rescue 21 we went 

out and we assessed gaps all around the country and we identified 

88 gaps where there was not proper coverage with the existing 

VHF FM system. There are 12 of those in the Great Lakes that 

this would address. 

The only barriers to moving the schedule to the left, are funding 

and issues we are running into now with tower placements and the 

environmental issues associated with that. But the only two constraints in accelerating anything in Rescue 21 are funding and environmental reviews, sir. 

Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chair, just to finish, in the 88 gaps I just hope— 

you know, we always want to save the largest number of net Americans. 

My scientific analysis of the southern Lake Michigan in June is 

there is about a gabillion boats out there, so my guess is we have 

a very high number of Americans on the water in this one AOR 

and so I am hoping that it will be quicker. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KIRK. Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Mr. Serrano. 


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CUBAN IMMIGRANTS

Mr. SERRANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony and for your service to our country. 

I have a question to ask you, but before I do that your testimony 

inspires another question. You said that there are folks from Cuba 

coming through Mexico? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SERRANO. Traditionally they would come to Florida. As you 

know, the Cuban Adjustment Act allows Cubans to be the only people to my knowledge in the world that by touching land here can 

stay, are not considered illegal immigrants and can apply for citizenship sooner, earlier than anyone else. 

Does it matter how they get here, to your knowledge? 

Admiral ALLEN. No, sir, it does not. They just have to be present. 

Mr. SERRANO. So as long as they get here. It does not matter if 

they come through Mexico or how else they get here? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. Not to extend past my area of knowledge from the Coast Guard into immigration, but—— 

Mr. SERRANO. Right. 

Admiral ALLEN [continuing]. Once they are present in the country they have the opportunity to be paroled in for a year and then 

have their status adjusted. 

NORTHERN BORDER PRIORITIES

Mr. SERRANO. Okay. Thank you. We spend a lot of time on this 

Committee, and rightfully so, discussing the southern border, but 

there is a lot of work also to be done on the northern border. How 

do your priorities differ on the two borders? We know that the 

northern border has a lot of waterways—— 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SERRANO [continuing]. Whereas the southern border does not 

except for a very famous river, no? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SERRANO. How does that differ? How do those priorities differ? 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, you are correct, sir. There is a lot more 

waterway boundaries on the northern border. 

Some of the things we are doing on the northern border are very 

important. Both borders are important to the Coast Guard. If I 

could take the Great Lakes first, that is a closed transportation 

system. We share the waters with Canada. 

Recently in the last several years we have done a couple things 

to enhance our ability to protect the security of the nation up there. 

We have integrated border enforcement teams. They are called 

IBETs. These are basically multi-agency teams that operate at the 

various nodes, whether it is in Buffalo or Detroit or the other areas 

up there. 

More recently we have started discussions with Customs and 

Border Protection. As we start to look to expand what they need 

to do for border protection to the northern border, we have all 

agreed that to set up a prototype joint Coast Guard CBP operation 

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form us how we need to deploy and conduct operations on the rest 

of the border. 

In addition to that, over the last two to three years we have 

evolved something called a ship rider program with the Canadians. 

This is a program that the Coast Guard has entered into with Canada that allows us to put a boat out there with Coast Guardsmen 

on it and also Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and you basically 

can patrol right down the boundary. If you have a problem on either side of the border it can be attended to with the people that 

are on there. 

It has proven extremely effective. We are looking to put that into 

effect this coming winter for the 2010 Winter Games that are going 

to be going on in Vancouver, which will cause a significant increase 

in traffic through the Straits of Juan de Fuca. 

It is an extraordinary relationship that has really matured over 

the last three years. Are we where we need to be? Probably not, 

but I can tell you the progress has been good so far, and we are 

happy with where we are, sir. 

WINTER OLYMPIC GAMES

Mr. SERRANO. So that relationship for the Games is one that you 

established with Canada? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SERRANO. Now, is there any other involvement from any of 

the countries that would be visiting through the teams that they 

will be bringing there? 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, there is a separate security chief for the 

Olympics that is taking care of the venues themselves. 

What we are concerned with is if you look at the Straits of Juan 

de Fuca the inbound channel is in U.S. waters. The outbound channel is in Canadian waters. We jointly manage that waterway with 

a vessel traffic service in Seattle and a vessel traffic service in 

Tofino, Canada. 

What we are doing is this is a complete multinational joint operation in how we are managing that waterway for the Olympics, sir. 

EXPANSION OF PIRACY

Mr. SERRANO. Right. Another quick question. We have all read 

and it is in the news day in and day out, the whole issue of the 

pirates at the high seas. This will probably spur another 20 Hollywood movies about pirates, you know. 

But are there any signs, without getting into the information 

that I know you cannot give us in public; any signs of this kind of 

action taking hold anywhere else other than in that particular part 

of the world? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir, there are. In past years we did have 

some problems in the Straits of Malaca, which separates Indonesia 

and Singapore and Thailand. It is a critical shipping route. 

The incidence of piracy in the Straits of Malaca have dropped 

dramatically in the last year and half because local regional agreements had been made for doing monitoring and surveillance and 

passing information to the ships that are going through there. 

Those kind of regional constructs need to be developed around 

the Horn of Africa, but there are a lot of challenges associated with 


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that due mostly to the lack of a viable political structure in Somalia, which is the real source there. In this case piracy is a symptom 

of the lack of a stable central government. 

I would tell you there are also issues regarding piracy in the 

Niger delta on the west coast of Africa, and we have had issues involving U.S. flag offshore supply vessels being involved either with 

piracy or just criminal law enforcement—I mean criminal activities—from the gangs and the pirates that operate there, so it is an 

issue, sir. 

Mr. SERRANO. Fine. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Ms. Roybal-Allard. 

SMALL VESSEL THREAT

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Admiral Allen, I would like to follow up just 

a little bit on the issue that was raised by Ms. Lowey regarding the 

small vessel threat. This is something, an issue that was raised by 

the Port of Long Beach. 

They mentioned that a year had passed since the DHS had released the Coast Guard’s document entitled the Small Vessel Security Strategy, yet according to the officials at the Port of Long 

Beach they have seen no concrete action taken to address the vulnerability posed by the small vessels, and they contend that rulemaking on a national level is necessary to mitigate the small boat 

threat. 

Can you elaborate if not now, and I know we are going to have 

another meeting on the small boat threat, but elaborate a little bit 

on what steps are being made to implement this small vessel security strategy, and do you think these national regulations make 

sense? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, ma’am. I will tell you right up front—and 

I will tell you why in a minute—this is a very, very difficult question. 

The strategies that were developed for small vessels as a result 

of our conference have to do with cooperation, information sharing, 

people working together to try and manage the waterway and report what is going on. 

The one issue that we have had trouble addressing, and I will 

try and represent the boating community on this because there is 

not general agreement, is about how far should you drive down a 

carriage requirement for a transponder like piece of equipment so 

you can actually locate where every vessel is at? Should you have 

exclusion zones where you do not want small vessels operating? 

We have an exclusion zone over the national capital for general 

aviation aircraft. And in general the discussion revolves around I 

would say how much of the aviation paradigm can you bring down 

to the water? 

There is a great tradition in this country of autonomy and freedom of movement on the water. There is a great resistance in the 

recreational boating community and the fishing vessel community 

to regulations and having their movements restricted. 

The technologies are there. There are other countries in the 

world that require tracking devices clear down to the jet ski level, 


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and countries like Singapore and Ecuador have more stringent 

transponder carriage requirements than we do. 

I have talked extensively with the boating safety public and the 

boating public for the last three years. This is clearly an issue that 

they have concerns about. To go forward would require an extensive amount of consultation and quite frankly just some open discussion about their risks and the threats that are involved and the 

willingness to move forward on it. 

I would be happy to continue that discussion. It is a very, very 

tough discussion, ma’am. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Okay. Thank you. I would just like to mention that during the break I traveled to Latin America. I was in 

Mexico, Colombia, Panama and Brazil. Everywhere we went, one 

of the issues was national security and drug trafficking, and, in 

every country, they had high praise for the Coast Guard and the 

partnership that they have with the Coast Guard. In fact, they believe it was in Panama, they said, they needed more Coast Guard 

presence. 

So I wanted you to know that you have a very good reputation 

in these countries, and they are very, very grateful for the partnership and the work that you are doing to help them to address the 

problems that they have. 

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you, ma’am. 

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Mr. Hulton, you talked a little bit about the 

fact that only 16 percent of the positions in the Acquisitions Directorate are currently unfilled, and it is my understanding that the 

Coast Guard has projected that it is going to need a significantly 

larger acquisition workforce by the end of 2011. Could you elaborate just a little bit more on what the challenges are that you are 

facing in terms of hiring acquisitions staff and what is being done 

to address those challenges, or is there something that we need to 

do, as a Committee, to help you to address them? 

Mr. HULTON. Thank you. I will start with, first, that acquisition 

workforce is a federal government issue, more broadly. I know that 

DoD is looking to fill a lot of acquisition workforce positions, as 

well as the Coast Guard or the broader DHS. We have done some 

work, for example, last November, just for contracting specialists 

types of positions. While we noted that the Coast Guard had a gap 

of, say, 16 percent, in some of the components in DHS, it is even 

larger. It might be closer to 30 percent. 

So, more broadly, it is an issue that the federal government is 

trying to wrestle with and trying to get more people. 

I know that there are certain authorities out there. Reemployed 

annuitants is one way that some government retirees that have a 

lot of acquisition workforce experience can come in. When we did 

some work—again, I think that report was issued last November— 

I believe there were two or three people that the Coast Guard had 

brought in roughly by that time, sometime in late 2007 or something like that. 

That is one avenue, but I do not think that alone is going to get 

you to where they need to be. They are supplementing, as best they 

can, with some contractor support, and it is not that that is bad 


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because you have to execute your mission, and you need to get that 

kind of support wherever you can, but they also are trying to leverage other federal agencies because the acquisition workforce covers 

many different types of skills, whether it be systems and engineering, logistics, cost estimating. 

So I believe they are looking for ways to supplement and try to 

fill some of those gaps, either with other government agencies arrangements or other use of contractors, but it is an issue, and I 

think, as the Coast Guard moves forward in, say, their Deepwater 

program, and they start working on more additional assets, their 

needs for acquisition workforce are going to increase, and I think 

they are challenged, but I think it is something that they are trying to get ahead of and address. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Is it that there are not people who have the 

qualifications for these positions? Is it the pay level? What is it, especially now, when people need jobs, what specifically is preventing 

the hiring of these? 

Mr. HULTON. Really, anchoring it back to some work we did, 

more broadly, at DHS last November, and some of the things that 

we understand were occurring is that, there is just a genuine lack 

of people with those skills that are trying to apply with the federal 

government. You do have contractors out there. 

We had some say that one would be better served to work for a 

contractor because of the pay. I have not done a study to verify the 

pay rates necessarily in that broad sense, but I think another thing 

that we heard was that, in a way, some people feel they might be 

competing with other agencies because some agencies may have 

different authorities than, say, DHS does to help support those, 

and maybe the commandant might be able to speak to some of the 

specific challenges that he might face with the Coast Guard hiring. 

Mr. PRICE. We have time for the Commandant to respond briefly, 

and we are going to return, I am sure, to this topic. I know I have 

some questions along these lines as well, but please respond briefly, if you will. 

Admiral ALLEN. First of all, I do not have any quarrel with what 

Mr. Hulton said. I think we are in agreement on this. Just a couple 

of comments. 

We are all going after the same labor pool, and acquisition reform is going on all over town right now where people who have 

contracted out services before are trying to build organic capability 

into their organizations. So, again, we are all trying to go after the 

same labor pool. 

I mentioned earlier, in my opening statement, one of the things 

we are looking at is kind of a novel approach that Admiral Blore 

has recommended, where we take senior Coast Guard enlisted persons and warrant officers and get them into an intern program and 

actually take military people and train them to be contracting officers near the end of their careers, and when they retire, then they 

are suitable for hiring as civilians, and we basically take the military force and train them first, and that becomes the seed corn, if 

you will, to increase our contracting officer strength, in addition to 

the issues that Mr. Hulton raised, and also direct hiring authority 

is something that is very, very valuable to us. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Mr. Carter. 


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POLAR OPERATIONS

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, good to see 

you. Mr. Hulton, thank you for being here. 

At our hearing, a year ago, when you discussed, Admiral, the rising water levels near Alaska and the North Pole, this increased sea 

areas means more responsibility for the Coast Guard and more 

challenges, diplomatically and the security of our nation, and we 

read that the Russians have plans to race into the Arctic and claim 

vast regions of the Arctic for petroleum exploration. 

Do we have, with this, our sovereignty, our natural resources, on 

the line? Is the Coast Guard staying ahead of the game? Do you 

have the ships that can bust the ice to get up there to protect 

American interests? How are you acquiring these assets? Are you 

getting them through the Deepwater program, or have you got sufficient assets now? Just tell me about what we see as a potential 

problem. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. Sir, what we are doing right now is, for 

the past two summers, and we will again this summer, is to deploy 

our current assets up to the north slope of Alaska to see how they 

operate in that environment. It is not totally ice free. There are a 

lot of large pieces of ice floating around, and you need an icestrengthened ship, even in the summer, to operate up there. But 

we are finding out that there are limitations to our helicopters, 

small boats, and cutters that are not ice strengthened to operate 

up there. 

Later on this year, we will start producing a series of segments 

of a high-latitude study that will be developing our requirements 

to operate in those environments, including aircraft. There are limited airstrips up there. There are limitations on how you can fly a 

C–130 in certain weather conditions before the fuel starts to solidify in the tanks. 

If you are a vessel of greater draft than 22 feet, the closest refueling station in the United States is Kodiak, which is almost a 

thousand miles from the north slope. So there are issues of sustainability and endurance up there as well. 

The current fleet we do have that is capable of operating up 

there is our ice-breaking fleet. We have two polar ice breakers and 

one ice-strengthened research vessel. The POLAR SEA and the 

POLAR STAR are the ice-breaking vessels. They are nearing the 

end of their service life, 30 years old. They are the most powerful, 

conventionally powered ice breakers in the world, 60,000-shaft 

horsepower, and back-end ramming can break up to 21 feet of ice. 

They are real, real muscle movers up there. 

The HEALY is configured for science, mainly in the Arctic, and 

is a highly desirable asset for the National Science Foundation to 

get science up there, especially related to potential claims on the 

north slope beyond our 200-mile limit for Continental Shelf resources. 

The issue we have, going forward, is the current operation of our 

ice breakers and then, ultimately, what is our presence up there 

going to be required for the Coast Guard to do its 11 statutory missions, whether you are talking about search and rescue, law enforcement, environmental response, whatever. 


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As I have said many times in hearings, there is water where 

there did not used to be, and I am responsible for it now, and the 

question is, how do you create presence up there? Ice breakers can 

do that. We have one ice breaker that is operational. We had funding last year, a little over $30 million, to start repairs to bring the 

POLAR STAR back into service. We will need to continue that at 

some point. 

The Administration put out a National Security Presidential Directive on the Arctic that expands beyond science and looks at 

other issues out there. I think that gives cause for us to take a look 

at ice breaker requirements and have a plan to go forward on what 

we are going to do with the two polar ice breakers, and, eventually, 

we are going to have to talk about recapitalization, sir. 

ICE BREAKERS

Mr. CARTER. Do you have any intelligence as to how our resources in the ice breakers compare to what the Russian fleet has? 

Admiral ALLEN. Not well, sir. The Russians have a number of ice 

breakers. I have got a chart that actually lays out all of the different countries and the numbers that I would be glad to submit 

for the record, but, in addition to conventionally powered ice breakers, the Russians also operate nuclear-powered ice breakers, sir. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you. Yes, I would like to see that, if I could, 

for the record. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CARTER. This issue seems to be one that a lot of people are 

talking about, so I appreciate your answer. Thank you. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

[The information follows.] 


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Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Mr. Ruppersberger. 

DRUG INTERDICTION

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. You have been getting a lot of compliments 

today, and they are well deserved. I think, when the Department 

of Homeland Security was stood up, one of the best things that 

happened to the Coast Guard was to leave the Army, Navy, Air 

Force, and Marines and be independent yourselves, and I think the 

fact that you are in Homeland Security, you have really shown how 

good your men and women and your leadership is. 

With that said, you are getting a lot of compliments, but it has 

been said, maybe in kind of in a joking way, off the record, we are 

getting all of these kudos, but, basically, we need more than just 

a hug from the Hill. I mean, we need to make sure that, from an 

appropriations point of view, that we get the resources we need. 

You have a tremendous amount of responsibility in safety, rescue, the interdiction issues. You were just talking about the ice 

issues, and you have all of the things that are occurring in the 

south. 

One area that I would like to get in first: I know, under your 

leadership, by the way, Admiral, that drug interdiction has done 

better than we have ever done so far. Is that correct? 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, I am not sure if it is due to my leadership, 

but we have had successive record years of seizures, yes, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Well, it is good to be humble, but you can 

take a little credit. Why do you think that is? Are you working with 

other agencies? Where do you think there is a difference? 

Admiral ALLEN. Number one, better intelligence, taking the 

‘‘search’’ out of search and seizure. The intelligence fusion function 

that goes in Joint Interagency Task Force South in Key West is unparalleled, anywhere that I have seen in the world. This is a gold 

standard for interagency operations, whether you are talking about 

drug interdiction or migrant smuggling or whatever. 

They have cracked the code on having our international partners, 

domestic partners, interagency, ensuring information when they 

can with the right partners and getting it into the hands of the operators. That is number one. 

Number two is partnerships. It is not only the Coast Guard; it 

is the Navy, Customs and Border Protection, ICE, and international partners—the French, the Spanish, the Canadians, our 

South American partners, the Colombians, are all players, sir. 

FLEET MAINTENANCE

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I represent Baltimore, and the Coast Guard 

yard where you repair your ships is there. From an appropriations 

point of view, what resources do you need? That is very important 

to your fleet to have your fleet taken care of, maintained, whatever. 

What resources do you need now that you are not getting that 

would help in that regard, to either get your fleet our quicker or 

to make sure you have the safety that is needed? 

Admiral ALLEN. Sir, the key to the operation of the yard is the 

fact that it is an industrial operation. All of the labor hours for the 

work expended in the yard are billed back to the project that the 

yard is doing. In other words, the labor in the yard is not bought 


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out at the beginning of the year; it is paid for by the work that it 

does. 

Because of that, the best thing that we could do to support the 

yard is what I would call ‘‘level loading,’’ being able to project out, 

two, three, four, five years, on what the workload is going to be so 

they can size their workforce and know that the amount of work 

coming in will be adequate to pay for their workforce, and they will 

not have to adjust it either up or down. 

We have been able to achieve that with a mission effectiveness 

program in renovating and repairing the legacy cutters while we 

are waiting for the new cutters to be built through Deepwater. 

Our medium-endurance cutters and our patrol boats are being 

renovated at the yard. They are doing a great job. They are on 

time, on schedule, and sometimes ahead of schedule, and, projecting out three to four years, we have stability at the yard. The 

issue I would have is, somewhere down the line, I would say, 

maybe out to the fifth or sixth year, as we finish that and new assets come on board, is to how to sustain the workload at the yards 

we have level funding, and that would be the challenge, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Well, a figure, softball, what do you need 

in this budget? 

Admiral ALLEN. The yard is okay for the next two or three years 

with what we have got in the budget. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. It is actually okay. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

AIRCRAFT

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. All right. That is good. How about the issue 

of aircraft? 

Admiral ALLEN. We are doing pretty good with aircraft. We got 

our new C–144 Alpha’s. The CASA–235’s are coming online. We are 

going to have operational air stations, and, in a couple of years, we 

will be able to start retiring our old Falcon HU–25 aircraft. These 

new aircraft have terrific sensors, but one thing they have that we 

have never had before is the ability to transmit air-to-surface via 

Cipronet with a classified tactical data picture, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. So the intelligence mechanism is starting 

to work and the integration is really starting to help at this point. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

HUMAN SMUGGLING PROSECUTION

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Do I have any more time? 

The drug interdiction; let us get back to that. We were talking 

about drug interdiction, but there is also an issue of human smuggling, I mean, bringing in bodies, people, individuals, whatever, 

and I know that is difficult. It is harder for you all to get your 

hands on that. 

One of the reasons that I have been told is it is because the actual laws that exist; if you want to indict somebody or charge somebody with a felony, the law basically is difficult. Can you explain 

that, or is that the case? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Okay. 


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Admiral ALLEN. The fact of the matter is, unless we can develop 

a case that there was an intent to bring the migrants in, where you 

have hard evidence that they actually crossed the line, where you 

can establish the intent, and they actually completed the act, it is 

very hard to prosecute this in court. 

We had the same problem with drugs 20 years or so ago, and we 

actually got a law passed that made possession on the high seas 

outside the United States of certain quantities of drugs a de facto 

assertion that there was an attempt to enter them. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. It is kind of like in the United States, 

where if you have a volume, it is possession with intent to distribute. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. For the last several years, we have attempted to get legislation—this is on the authorizing side, not the 

appropriations side, sir—to make having a large number of migrants on board on a vessel offshore of the United States, by the 

fact that you are there with that number of migrants on board, the 

de facto evidence of an attempt to enter and bring them in. 

We would like to have legislation passed that would recognize 

this loophole that would allow us to intercept these boats 

extraterritorially and prosecute them in the United States as a felony. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Where is the status of that legislation now? 

Has any of that been introduced yet? 

Admiral ALLEN. There has been one version passed in the House. 

We would be glad to give you some background on it. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I would like to help you on that. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. We would be happy to give you the 

background, yes, sir. 

[The information follows:] 

To date, no Member of Congress has introduced anti-smuggling legislation that 

is uniquely tailored to the maritime law enforcement environment and specifically 

drafted to address statutory deficiencies that hinder prosecution of this form of maritime smuggling. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Thank you. 

GAO IDENTIFIED MANAGEMENT DEFICIENCIES

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Let me return to the questions that a 

number of our Members have raised about the management capacities of the Coast Guard and also the use of contractors in that regard. 

With the removal of private contractors from the role of system 

integrators for the Deepwater program, the Coast Guard is building its capacity to assume that role itself, and, of course, this Committee has supported that. There do appear to still be serious questions about the Coast Guard’s management capacity with regard to 

key, future acquisitions and programs. I would like to just explore 

that and then bring in the related question of what is being contracted out and what is being developed in house in the way of capacity. 

The GAO points out, in its testimony today, that of the 12 Deepwater assets in the concept-and-technology-development phase or 

later, nine are behind in terms of the major system- acquisition 

process compliance, such as developing key operational requireVerDate Nov 24 2008 02:52 Oct 22, 2009 Jkt 052213 PO 00000 Frm 00848 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\52213P2.XXX 52213P2

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ments and test plans. The GAO goes on to say that, in some cases, 

this situation puts the Coast Guard at risk of cost overruns and 

schedule slips if it turns out that what it is buying does not meet 

requirements. 

So, Admiral and Mr. Hulton as well, I would like to know what 

practical effect that these deficiencies, this lack of operational requirements documents, for example, has on the Coast Guard’s procurement planning. How do you account for these deficiencies? 

We have explored, to some extent, the workforce aspect, but, I 

assume, it is not merely that, and then, of course, the underlying 

question is, what guarantee do we have that we are not simply defaulting to the original contractor’s recommendations for the number and type and specs that we are dealing with with these ships 

and aircraft? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. As Mr. Hulton mentioned earlier, we 

are in the process of what I would call ‘‘disaggregating Deepwater.’’ 

It was originally envisioned as a system of systems with an interlocking network of cutters, sensors, and aircraft. 

What we are doing is, asset by asset, taking an asset out and 

then putting that into the major systems acquisition process in the 

Coast Guard, which means establishing key milestone points for 

approvals, an acquisition project baseline, and revalidating the 

costs and everything associated with it. 

I would like Mr. Hulton to comment as well. I think what happens is, not all of that has been completed yet, so there is uncertainty out there because we have not gone through and vetted 

them into the major systems acquisition process. A good number 

have gone back to the Department but a good number are in 

progress. It is something that we have to do just to be able to make 

the transition from having them aggregated as a system to us 

being able to have the transparency, visibility, and oversight to 

manage them at the asset level. 

There is a workforce component associated with that, but there 

is also just a plain process issue associated with getting the paperwork developed, having it approved at the Department of Homeland Security because they now have a role, where they did not before, and then implementing the guidelines associated in terms of 

costs, schedule, and performance. 

Mr. PRICE. Before we turn to Mr. Hulton, who, of course, we 

want to hear from, how is this related to the earlier challenge with 

respect to the role of system integrators? This clearly goes beyond 

that. 

Admiral ALLEN. Well beyond that, yes sir. The requirements to 

comply with the Major Systems Acquisition Manual and key milestone monitoring at the Department were not present in the original Deepwater construct. 

As you well know, there were decisions that were proposed and, 

in some cases, de facto, delegated to the contractors. Those now 

have to come through milestone screening that we have to submit 

to the Department of Homeland Security, and they have to say that 

the requirements were met; you are authorized to go to the next 

phase of this procurement. What we are doing is, asset by asset, 

moving it into that process. 


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It requires some amount of human activity to make sure that you 

reviewed the plans, the estimates, and you have got it right, and 

then submit it to the Department for approval. We are in the process of doing that. We still have assets that are in the queue, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Hulton. 

Mr. HULTON. Thank you. First, I would like to say, at the outset, 

that the Coast Guard’s initiative and decision to apply their Major 

Systems Acquisition Manual to the Deepwater program, I think, is 

a very key thing, a very important decision, because it is applying 

a knowledge-based approach that is repeatable, and there is key 

documentation at DoD, and looking at it from a best-practices 

standpoint, that is really needed so you really, truly understand 

what your mission need is, how you understand the requirements 

that are going to fill a gap, and then you need to trace that all the 

way through the operational requirement document, very key, from 

the needs to the actual testing and have a testing evaluation plan, 

so, at the end, you know that the requirements that you defined 

that are meeting this gap, and you fully test it, that you have a 

high likelihood that you are going to get something that is going 

to help you meet your mission needs. So that is very key. 

I think, in terms of your question, Mr. Price, when you look at 

it on an asset-by-asset basis, in terms of some of the questions you 

have, it is almost like looking at it on a case-by-case basis, in terms 

of, what is the impact of not having some of these key documents, 

say, approved at the DHS level at the time? I think it depends on 

what the document is but also, what is the status of the Coast 

Guard understanding, say, of an operation requirements document? 

If the Coast Guard has approved an operational requirement document, that is their best insight as to what the operational capability requirements are for the issue, but, I think, having the DHS 

now as part of the process, and that was one of our recommendations, that we thought that DHS’s process should be part of it, you 

have someone that is external to the Coast Guard looking at the 

business case that the Coast Guard has and bringing in their best 

judgment. So I think there is a higher likelihood that, if there are 

issues, they are going to be vetted, so, in terms of actual impact, 

and we noted in our statement, what benefits and what kind of 

power you can get when you apply this disciplined approach. 

As we talked earlier, the Coast Guard really did not have a lot 

of understanding and insight into the capabilities, the mix, and 

whatnot, when the systems integrator provided their proposal. We 

had assets and certain numbers of assets. 

Two things on that, sir. One, the Coast Guard is beginning to do 

a fleet analysis mix, which is going to give them specific insights, 

by asset, what those things are going to do, and it is going to allow 

them to make trade-offs, in terms of numbers of assets. 

The example I wanted to cite, in terms of the ORD, is the MPA 

asset. As we note in our statement, because they had an operational requirements document, they had a better understanding 

as to the requirements. When they married it up against what I 

suggest they had out there as to the requirements, they found that 

the operational availability rates that the systems integrator had 

planned for the asset were exceeding the Coast Guard’s standards. 


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So what the Coast Guard was able to do was take that knowledge and say, Well, maybe if we build this asset to meet our standard, there is a certain capacity that we can take some of that 

money and use elsewhere, in terms of supporting that asset. So 

there are a lot of benefits of it. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Mr. Kirk. 

Mr. KIRK. I just wanted to follow up on pirates. The Coast Guard 

has an eight-person Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET 405) 

team conducting counter-piracy operations aboard the USS VALLA 

GULF and USS MAHAN as part of a multinational task force. I 

understand that the LEDET 405 team has apprehended 16 pirates. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KIRK. And these prisoners were transferred to the Navy’s 

USS LEWIS AND CLARK for temporary holding. John Patch, a 

former naval officer at Newsweek, said that the proper response 

would be to involve the Coast Guard and actual hulls of the Coast 

Guard in this mission because while the Littoral Combat Ship, 55 

units of Littoral Combat Ships, is certainly designed for a mission 

like this, given the fact that the Pentagon is going to build these 

things, it is years away. 

We have a problem here on the Committee that many times, and 

this is bipartisan, many times one part of the subcommittee does 

not talk to another, but with hulls that are entirely appropriate for 

this mission already bought by the U.S. taxpayer—they happen to 

be run by the Coast Guard—it would seem to be up in the O&M 

of the Coast Guard to take this pirate mission. Would it be faster 

and more appropriate than letting 300 pirates continue to rock and 

roll until the LCSs come online, three of four fiscal years from 

now? Comments? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. I would like to talk about legal regimes, 

and I would like to talk about capacity, if I could. 

As I stated earlier, the real problem with piracy in Somalia has 

to do with the lack of a stable central government. This is a symptom of it. That said, any ungoverned space next to water in the 

world has the potential to be a subject of pirate-type operations. 

The Coast Guard’s involvement in this thus far has been fairly 

significant but not that visible. 

Mr. KIRK. Right. 

Admiral ALLEN. Starting well over a year ago, we started working with the International Maritime Organization. I am a competent authority to deal with IMO, and I represent our delegation, 

on behalf of the State Department, to IMO. 

I met with the Secretary General. A lot of our conversations were 

the impetus that led to the U.N. security resolutions that authorize 

entry into the Somalian territorial seas for the purpose of protecting the world food shipments. 

Most recently, Coast Guard and State Department negotiators 

actually negotiated an MOU with Kenya to accept for prosecution 

the pirates who were captured on the VALLA GULF. 

What we believe is there has to be a subsequent delivery regime 

associated with this to change the behavior of the pirates, notwithstanding you have to go to the source and deal with the political 

problem in Somalia. But the fact of having pirates on board and 

do nothing with them is a problem. 


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Mr. KIRK. I guess my point is, right now, VALLA GULF is a 

cruiser. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KIRK. That is about a three-and-a-half-billion-dollar unit, 

whereas a Coast Guard cutter—it seems to me that when you are 

off the coast of Somalia, if you have got a five-inch gun, you are 

the big dude on the block, and you could kill or capture anything 

that you are directed towards. 

But the per-unit cost of that unit, to own, operate, and to maintain, is far less. We have got an LHA and a CG out there, and the 

crew has to maintain all of these exotic weapons. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. If you are saying that the mission could 

be done with a smaller vessel, you are correct, sir. 

Mr. KIRK. Right, but here is the problem where the Defense Subcommittee and our Subcommittee probably would not come forward 

with the common-sense taxpayer solution to just up your budget 

and go ahead and solve this problem with units whose O&M is far 

less than what very exotic, blue-water naval units would cost to do 

and to operate. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. Then you could do initial capacity. 

While we have the competency, and we have unique capabilities to 

do that, we would not have the capacity to stay in there right now, 

with the size of our fleet, sir. 

Mr. KIRK. Right, right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Carter. 

SEMI-SUBMERSIBLES

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am tempted to ask 

you, what happened to the hanging from the yardarms? But I 

guess it is inappropriate. 

There is a lot of talk on the Hill, and you all have been talking 

here when I was not here—I apologize. Unfortunately, we do not 

seem to be able to, in the Appropriations Subcommittee process, 

schedule two or three Subcommittee meetings at the same time. It 

is just kind of amazing. I apologize for that. 

And, of course, being from Texas, I guess if there is anything we 

are worried about, we are worried about what is going on with the 

southern border of Texas. There is a war going on down there in 

Mexico, and we are in the middle of the fight. 

I know they are using these semi-submersibles to haul major 

loads from Colombia, et cetera, down so they can start them on the 

land bridge up to our backyard, and I think you all talked about 

that. I was curious, have you had any better solution on the semisubmersibles? Are you seeing them, now that the Mexicans have 

beefed up the border? 

They are supposedly claiming they have got 45,000 troops on the 

border, so maybe you are going to see more sea activity coming now 

out of Mexico, trying to make a run up to our coast, either ours or 

others in the country. Are you seeing them shifting some of that 

semi-submersible over into the Gulf of Mexico or on the Pacific to 

try to run around the border to get on up into the United States? 

I am kind of interested in, if the sea is as involved in the fight as 

we have got right now, it looks like the Mexican Army is, on the 

border. 


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Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. I stated earlier, most of the cocaine that 

is moving out of South America to the United States goes into Mexico from sea, noncommercial maritime, and the most effective way 

to deal with drugs flowing through Mexico, in my view, is to deal 

with it before it gets to Mexico. 

One of the insidious things that we have been trying to deal with 

for the last two years and before is self-propelled, semisubmersibles, these low-profile vessels. They are capable of carrying anywhere from up to 10 to 12 tons of cocaine and sometimes 

making a transit all the way to the United States. 

Due to the support of the Congress last year, we actually had 

legislation passed that makes operation of a self-propelled, semisubmersible in international waters a violation of U.S. law and a 

felony. 

We recently had our first conviction, a guilty plea, for the operation of a self-propelled, semi-submersible, and the U.S. Sentencing 

Commission, last week, established sentencing guidelines that are 

the same for operating a self-propelled, semi-submersible as if you 

were carrying the load of dope. So, in effect, there is no incentive 

to sink the boat because it is less of a crime, and the punishment 

might be less. 

Those are all very, very good signs that should drastically impact 

the effectiveness of self-propelled, semi-submersibles, but the fact 

remains that the border that I believe we should be equally concerned about is the southern border of Mexico, sir. 

Mr. CARTER. Is there any indication that they are using Gulf or 

Pacific ships to go around the border? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. The predominance of self-propelled, 

semi-submersibles operate in the Pacific, sir. We do see some in the 

Caribbean, but most of the cases we have encountered have been 

on the Pacific side. 

The recent adaptation to our tactics has been to run these small, 

fast boats, staying inside the territorial sea all the way up, hugging 

the coastline, and while we have bilateral agreements that allow us 

to enter the territorial sea to do enforcement, it requires consultation and notification to the countries, and that delay gives them 

some type of an advantage, and that is a series of about four or 

five adaptations they have made over the last five years that we 

are dealing with, sir. 

Mr. CARTER. Is there anything about fully submerged vessels 

that is coming your way, or you are learning about? 

Admiral ALLEN. Sir, we have had a couple of incidents, over the 

last five or six years, where they found what would be legitimate, 

pressured-hull submarines being built in Colombia. 

To my knowledge, and I will go back and check, and if there is 

a difference, I will advise you, we have not encountered one, sir. 

Mr. CARTER. Some people think that a lot of them will start 

using submarines. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. They have been found in partial construction in Colombia, yes, sir. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


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USE OF CONTRACTORS

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Gentlemen, I would like to return to the 

question of reliance on contractors and the related question, of 

course, of the capacities the Coast Guard is developing in house 

and also what the contractors, more generally, are being used for. 

In our Fiscal Year 2009 bill, the Committee identified the Coast 

Guard’s reliance on contractors for technical and programmatic expertise as one of the main challenges the Service faces as it seeks 

to improve acquisition management and oversight. The contracting 

out of management and oversight of other contractors has been a 

special concern, as you well know, and as you have reiterated here 

today. 

I am wondering, Mr. Hulton, if you could clarify for us where we 

stand now in terms of the overall use of contractors, not just how 

it relates to this issue of integration and contract management, but 

how it relates to the broader questions of agency function. 

You note, in your testimony, that there are still 200 contractors 

making up 24 percent of the Coast Guard’s acquisition workforce. 

I do not believe we have a trend line on that, so could you help 

us put that 24-percent figure into context? What are the trends of 

the use of contractors in this aspect and in others that you think 

are significant, the roles they are being used for, and do you think 

there is a sufficient acquisition workforce in place within the Coast 

Guard to manage these support contractors? 

Mr. HULTON. That is a great point, particularly the last aspect 

about the Coast Guard capacity to oversee and manage contractors. 

It is very, very important, particularly when you use contractors 

for certain types of activities. 

For example, if you have contractors helping to do some cost estimating for you, and they provide that product to the government, 

you want to have someone in the government that has good insights and understanding, and they also understand that this is 

coming from a contractor and what contractor and what kind of 

other relationships might be out there, with that kind of real core 

capacity and understanding so that when you take something from 

a contractor, you have good insights. 

I think the Coast Guard, over the last couple of years—I do not 

recall us having any trend data on whether it is going up or 

down—I think it is pretty clear that there is a challenge with the 

Coast Guard’s ability to have a sufficient workforce, and while the 

use of contractors is not a bad thing, it is how you manage that 

and what kind of insights you have. 

I think that, just go back to cost estimating, if you use a contractor for coming up with a cost estimate, and you have someone, 

say, at the project or program level looking at that and making a 

decision and thinking that is good, that may be also sent to another 

part of the acquisition directorate, and if they have a contractor 

coming up with another estimate so that one can compare, you 

want to, obviously, make sure it is not the same contractor, that 

there is not any kind of relationship. You want to understand that 

relationship between contractors. 

But I do think that the Coast Guard, at least since we have been 

doing this work, over the last three years, they get it. I think they 


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understand that they have to make sure that the relationship is 

such that they are not held to what the contractor’s input is without deep understanding of what service they are providing. 

Mr. PRICE. Admiral. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. Just in consultation with Admiral 

Blore, we have a level loading that has not trended up or down recently in the last couple of years of around 200 at any one particular time. 

I would say, though, that it is not the same make-up at any particular time. You may have a contractor on for some six months or 

12 months on a particular project. The next year, that 200 may be 

made up of a different set of contractors. 

There are two things that we do. Number one, there is always 

a Coast Guard person in the lead. No basic decision is ever defaulted to a contractor. Number two, we have established a very 

strong role for technical authorities to support the acquisition managers, so there is a technical issue associated with reviewing a proposal. Whether it is naval engineering or aviation engineering or 

even a human resource issue, the technical authority has the right 

to review that and raise any issues about whether or not they are 

in compliance. 

The third thing I would say is, before we even go to a contractor, 

we would seek to use that type of competency, if it is resident, say, 

in the Navy, and SPWAR for aviation and sensors; the Office of 

Naval Research, Carderock, for vessel testing, and Naval Sea Systems Command. 

Mr. PRICE. Let me ask you, a little more broadly, what kinds of 

criteria you observe or, ideally, would want to observe, in terms of 

these contracting decisions. 

I am familiar with this from work I have done with respect to 

private security contractors in war zones and in the use of contractors for functions that are properly regarded, I believe, as inherently governmental. Of course, that is the legal standard. 

Most of the discussion I have heard of this issue in the Coast 

Guard context has not had to do with that inherently governmental 

standard, although there may be ways in which it applies. That is 

one thing I want to ask you. 

We can think of functions that are inappropriate for contracting. 

Interrogation comes to mind. That should be thought of as an inherently governmental function. 

I assume that is not mainly what is going on here, as you are 

making decisions about what kind of capacity you need in house 

and what it is going to take to manage your operation effectively, 

questions of efficiency and effective manage, and so forth. 

But, nonetheless, I want to pose the broader question: Are there 

some activities that the Coast Guard is simply no longer going to 

ask contractors to perform? How do you determine what is improper to contract out? What kind of application do you make of 

the inherently governmental standard? 

What would you say, backing off a step from our immediate discussion, what would you say about the Coast Guard’s contracting 

practices, the extent to which they now fit the model you think 

they should fit, where you think the Coast Guard should go? 


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Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir, a brief comment first. I think, when you 

are talking about our acquisition directorate, you are talking about 

capacity, not people that are in leadership or management positions making those kinds of decisions. But to move to the broader 

question where you are at, we are doing some things in that regard. 

Since I was a Commander in the Coast Guard, we have wrestled 

with this issue of A–76 contracting out and, recently, the Fair Act 

Inventory, on how we categorize our employees and what kinds of 

activities they are involved in. 

Many years ago, we contracted out a lot of food service operations on our bases. We found out that when we did that, there 

was inadvertent impact, in that, while they could conduct those 

food service operations adequately, we took away a whole bunch of 

shore-based billets for our cook rating and unduly penalized them 

with sea time over their careers that was far in excess of anybody 

else in the Coast Guard. 

So, in the last couple of years now, we are actually buying back 

food service operations at large bases to create military positions 

to give them a more humane rotation policy. 

So if you are talking about things like that, it is not on the scale 

that you would see for private security firms or anything like that, 

but it usually has to do with base operating contracts, food service 

contracts, maintenance contracts, cleaning contracts, and so forth. 

But I would make a comment, because I have been dealing with 

this issue for a number of years, that if there is a sea change coming, I think we would like to know it, and that is the annual inventory where you classify every position in the Coast Guard as being 

governmental or commercial, and, therefore, that might be subject, 

at one point, to some kind of review where you might want to contract it out. 

That is done on an annual basis, and we would be looking for a 

cue on where we are going with the new administration and with 

the Congress on this because we have been conducting an inventory every year and actually classifying every single one of our civilian positions in the Coast Guard as either being governmental 

or commercial. If it is in commercial, then it could be subject to 

some kind of a review, under prior policy, and competition as to 

whether or not it should be sourced from the outside. 

Obviously, I think, with the issues that are being raised, there 

is a time to look at that. I do not think it is a huge issue in the 

Coast Guard, but I think it is an issue across government. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Hulton. 

Mr. HULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is a particular issue. We did some work looking at DHS 

more broadly, and I think you are really raising a good question, 

and the commandant was talking about it in the context of A–76, 

but what I would like to do is talk about it in the context of more 

of the blended workforce. This is where you bring contractors in to 

perform professional-management-support-type activities, for example. 

In our work at DHS, we found that, basically, those that have 

the requirements sometimes may go right to a contractor for expediency, not necessarily sitting back and thinking for a moment, 


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‘‘Geez, we have a requirement here, say, for acquisition support. 

Ideally, do I want to have a government person do it, or do I want 

to have a contractor person do it?’’ 

If the preference is for one or the other, you try to manage it and 

come up with a plan to get there over time, but if the mission demands you have to fill that, you may have to go to a contractor, 

if you really have to accomplish that mission. But the key is, depending on what you are asking that contractor to do, that then 

kicks in the thought process of, ‘‘Do we have the capacity to manage this contractor?’’ And OFPP policy requires, for certain types 

of activities, that as you get more closely to an inherently governmental function, you have to have that kind of insight, you have 

to understand the risk, and you have to properly manage that. 

I think that is a key point and a key difference than maybe 

something that we may be going through in an A–76 process, 

which is more truly commercial. 

To give you a quick anecdote, we did some work at an Army command where they use contractors as contract specialists, and we 

noted several risks that were inherent with that, and we pointed 

also that they were paying the contractors more than they would 

a fairly comparable government employee. But the issue there was, 

when we issued the report, the DoD response was, ‘‘I do not want 

to use contractors as contract specialists,’’ and that is a policy call. 

I think that the DoD official challenged the organizations that 

were using contractors in that function to give me a plan as to how 

you are going to get away with it. It is not against any rule to use 

them in that fashion, but if you have to, you have to be able to be 

in a position to understand the risks and manage them. 

Mr. PRICE. It is not a legal question. 

Mr. HULTON. No. DoD may feel that way, but someone at DHS 

may not. To me, it gets down to each individual decision, understanding what you are asking a contractor to do, and making sure 

that, internally, you have a government capacity that is going to 

be able to perhaps mitigate any potential risks in that decision. 

Mr. PRICE. Well, I do believe that, in some areas, especially the 

use of these security contractors in the military, I do believe a 

bright line needs to be drawn. But, clearly, that is not all we are 

talking about here. In fact, the work that you have done, for years, 

to move these functions in house has had more to do just with effective control, effective management, accountability, the kind of 

managerial virtues that we are looking for and the kind of control 

that the Coast Guard leadership has over its own operations. 

Mr. Carter, do you have an additional question? I have one last 

thing about the supplemental, but, please, I defer. 

Mr. CARTER. It is just a couple of things. I hate to go back to the 

submarines, but I just got told that you do not have sonar on your 

vessels. Is that correct? 

SONAR IN VESSELS

Admiral ALLEN. That is correct, sir, Coast Guard cutters, yes, sir. 

We are not the only ones in the area down there, though. There 

are Navy vessels with sonar. 

Mr. CARTER. So if they should start going to a rudimentary submarine to haul drugs up into the United States, you would have 


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to have the Navy involved for sonar, or we would have to put sonar 

on our new assets that we are building. 

Admiral ALLEN. There are a couple of ways to come at that, sir. 

You can have a Helo-based sonar detection system. You can also 

have a—array off almost any vessel with the proper equipment on 

the vessel, sir. It does not have to be a fixed sonar. 

Mr. CARTER. So if we started to see a lot of this, as a cost of 

doing business, they have got to figure out whether they can afford 

submarines or not, I guess. 

Admiral ALLEN. Sir, you are touching a deep chord with me. I 

was the operations officer on the GALLATIN in 1975, and we had 

sonar on our vessel, and we took them off, so you are hurting me 

bad here today, sir. 

NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTERS

Mr. CARTER. Sorry about that. I think this has been inquired 

into, but the National Security Cutter program, Numbers 4 and 5, 

Fiscal Year 2010; how much money do you need? 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, it is not a matter of Fiscal Year 2010, sir; 

it is more a matter of the total amount of money it would take to 

do what we need to do with the Number 4 and Number 5. Without 

getting into a particular fiscal year, about $282 million to put 

Number 4 under contract and about $107 million for long lead time 

for Number 5 and about $470 million for the production of Number 

5, but that would not be in any specific year; that would be the 

total amount that would be required, sir. 

Mr. CARTER. That is $282 million for NSC four and $470 million 

for NSC five? 

Admiral ALLEN. It would be $107 million for long lead time for 

NSC five and $470 million for production of NSC five, yes, sir. 

Mr. CARTER. Okay. 

Admiral ALLEN. Again, I would not attach that to a specific year. 

That is just the current estimate, sir. 

Mr. CARTER. All right. That is all I have. Thank you. 

IRAQ SUPPLEMENTAL

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Admiral, let me raise one last question 

having to do with the Iraq supplemental and the detailed justification, as I understand, we have just gotten, as to the Coast Guard 

portion of that. 

The supplemental appropriation request in support of overseas 

contingency operations includes $129.5 million for the Coast Guard. 

Now, to what extent does this funding, and, of course, it is funding 

that is in addition to the $112 million in the Iraq supplemental in 

the last Congress, to what extent does that cover all of your anticipated costs for Coast Guard operations in support of Iraq operations? 

Admiral ALLEN. It covers all foreseeable costs, and we are in 

agreement with the numbers, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. My understanding has been that, generally, the 

supplementals have not covered entirely Coast Guard costs; that, 

in fact, a certain amount of this has come out of the base budget, 

for years. 


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Admiral ALLEN. Sir, there has been a change this year between 

supplemental and overseas contingency operations. As you know, 

they are trying to create greater transparency in military operations. Rather than putting them in supplementals it is going to 

be just a different title of the Appropriations Act for DoD to make 

sure that everybody understands the costs of overseas contingency 

operations. 

The criteria by which you request funding for those are established by the Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller. We work 

with him very, very closely on what costs are allowed and what we 

put in there. 

There are certain base costs that we would absorb anyway, and 

then there are incremental costs associated with our operations in 

Iraq. I can give you more clarification on that, if you would like, 

for the record, but we are pretty much abiding by the criteria that 

is established by the Department of Defense, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. I would appreciate that for the record, but let me understand exactly what you are saying, that the ground rules for the 

current supplemental proposal, to some extent, have been altered 

so as to more completely reflect Coast Guard expenses related to 

Iraq. Is that the bottom line? 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, we are in a transition here, sir, from Fiscal 

Year 2009 to 2010, when they are going to shift from supplemental 

funding to overseas contingency operations. 

Mr. PRICE. Yes. 

Admiral ALLEN. At this point, I would almost defer to the DoD 

to answer it. I would just tell you, my best understanding, and 

then we can answer for the record. 

To my knowledge, between the first supplemental and what is 

being proposed right now will adequately cover our costs for Fiscal 

Year 2009. As we move to 2010, we will follow the criteria that the 

DoD establishes on whether or not it is overseas contingency operations or base funding. 

[The information follows:] 

Yes. Annually, the Coast Guard submits a funding request to the Department of 

Defense for supplemental funding requirements to support Navy missions. Each 

year that request is incrementally adjusted to reflect funding required for that 

year’s anticipated Coast Guard operations. For example in FY08 the Coast Guard 

request included an additional $40 million over 2007 funding levels to cover the 

costs associated with new deployment requirements for two Coast Guard Port Security Units. 

Mr. PRICE. I see. Thank you. All right. 

Admiral ALLEN. There could be an issue, for the sake of transparency. As DoD moves operations into their base, and those similar operations are what we would do, and they are no longer covered in overseas contingency operations, there may be an issue of 

whether or not those costs would be covered in Coast Guard base 

operating expenses. I have actually discussed this with the Department. 

We just need to watch, as we move forward, and see what DoD 

does because we take our lead from them, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. And so we would obviously expect that to be reflected 

in the 2010 detailed budget submission. 


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Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. Whether it is in our base, or it is in 

overseas contingency operations, we would follow the same criteria 

that the DoD would use, yes, sir. 

PLAN FOR COAST GUARD VESSELS SUPPORT TO IRAQ

Mr. PRICE. All right. Finally, can you briefly indicate what the 

plan going forward is likely to be for Coast Guard vessels supporting operations in Iraq? How long do you expect this to continue? 

What about the component where you are providing training for 

Iraqi maritime law enforcement as part of your presence there? Are 

there any vessels that are likely to be turned over? What does the 

end game look like here, as we, hopefully, move toward winding 

down the operation? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. I would state, up front, and then if I 

need to revise for the record, I will, this is really General 

Petraeus’s area of responsibility. We respond to requests for forces, 

and, in that case, we are very similar to the Navy, the Army, and 

the Air Force, where we provide forces for General Petraeus. 

As you know, the major ground operations in Iraq are being conducted under the Status of Forces Agreement, and there is a timetable, and that is all being carried out. 

There is no similar framework right now on the water side, although there are some target dates. The operations we are involved 

in over there—this is under Fifth Fleet, and Admiral over there, 

at present, is a point defense of the oil platforms off of Afum 

Khasser, the security zones around them, and the integrity of the 

oil shipments coming out, which constitutes the largest amount of 

revenue for Iraq. 

I can tell you, functionally, the transition will have to be where 

the Iraqis take over the point defense of the oil platforms and then 

have the equipment and the capabilities and competencies to start 

running small boats for the exclusion zones around them, and then, 

in the broader area, patrol boats and larger vessels, to create layered security. 

There are hundreds of local fishing vessels that are not far away, 

these small dhows that fish in the area, and the issue of maintaining the security of those oil platforms is a very, very complicated 

security structure, and, right now, you would see a coalition task 

force flagship up there that would be supervising both Navy and 

Coast Guard patrol boats, and, from those patrol boats, they would 

launch small boats that would actually do intercepts of any dhows 

that might be entering the exclusion zones that are there. 

So the issue is, how would you replicate that function with organic forces? And it is not just Coast Guard; it is Coast Guard, 

Navy, and actually coalition forces that are up there. 

The other forces we have in the area are training team that are 

actually training in the Port of Afum Khasser to help the Iraqi 

Coast Guard and the Iraqi Navy learn how to actually operate the 

small boats. 

We are also involved in foreign military sales and providing 

small boats to Iraq. 


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We also have a port security unit deployed over to Al-Shwaiba 

that is providing security for the in-load and the out-load of military materials coming in and out of there, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. That training component, in particular; has that remained at a fairly constant level for some time? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. We are talking no more than 10 people 

at any particular time, maybe as low as two or three. We have a 

captain on staff in Baghdad that coordinates our role over there. 

It is very small, it is very impactful, but it is very small, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Carter, do you have further questions? 

Mr. CARTER. No. 

Mr. PRICE. Well, thank you. With that, we will wrap up here and 

thank both of you for your very helpful testimony and look forward 

to seeing the detailed budget, in a matter of weeks now, and working with you as we put the 2010 bill together. Thank you for a good 

morning. 

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. The Subcommittee is adjourned. 


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(i) 

W I T N E S S E S 

Page 

Ahern, J. P ............................................................................................................... 595 

Allen, Admiral T. W ................................................................................................ 769 

Ashley, Ross ............................................................................................................. 277 

Boyd, David .............................................................................................................. 277 

Essid, Chris .............................................................................................................. 277 

Gallaway, C. R ......................................................................................................... 595 

Garratt, David .......................................................................................................... 1 

Hutton, J. P .............................................................................................................. 769 

Morse, P. D., Sr ........................................................................................................ 431 

Sullivan, Mark ......................................................................................................... 431 

Tonini, Edward ........................................................................................................ 1 

Winkowski, Thomas ................................................................................................. 595 


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I N D E X 

Page 

DISASTER RESPONSE: IS FEMA UP TO THE CHALLENGE? 

Opening Statement of Chairman David Price ....................................................... 1 

Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers ...................................... 7 

Statement of David Garratt, Acting Deputy Administrator, FEMA ................... 13 

Statement of Edward W. Tonini, Adjutant General, Commonwealth of Kentucky ...................................................................................................................... 23 

Assistance Timeframes ............................................................................................ 269 

Catastrophic Planning ............................................................................................. 49 

Communications with California on Wildfires ...................................................... 53 

Communications ...................................................................................................... 47 

Consistency of FEMA........................................................................................... 268, 272 

Contracts .................................................................................................................. 105

Cost Management Rule ........................................................................................... 266 

Declarations ............................................................................................................. 65 

Disaster Housing ..................................................................................................... 72 

Disaster Relief Fund ................................................................................................ 67 

Economic Crisis ........................................................................................................ 71 

Emergency Declaration Thresholds ........................................................................ 45 

Emergency Declarations .......................................................................................... 41 

Emergency Deliberation Criteria ........................................................................... 51 

Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) ....................................... 66 

Emergency Shelter .................................................................................................. 269 

Exercises ................................................................................................................... 72

FEMA Grants ........................................................................................................... 274 

FEMA Housing ........................................................................................................ 271 

FEMA Personnel ...................................................................................................... 272 

Fire Grants ............................................................................................................... 266 

Generators ................................................................................................................ 43, 48 

Getting Firefighting Aircraft Into California ........................................................ 53 

Gulf Coast Recovery ................................................................................................ 68 

Homeland Security Grant Program ....................................................................... 267 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive Numbers 5 And 8 Changes .............. 52 

Immediate Response of FEMA ............................................................................... 268 

Interoperability Communications ........................................................................... 56 

Local Training, Planning and Exercises ................................................................ 58 

Logistics .................................................................................................................... 72 

Management ............................................................................................................. 74 

Naval Postgraduate Federal Training Facility ..................................................... 52 

Public Assistance Grant Program .......................................................................... 50 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman David Price .......................... 62 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Chet Edwards ............... 268 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Ken Calvert .................. 274 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Nita Lowey ................... 266 

Response Time ......................................................................................................... 55 

State Active Duty Compensation ........................................................................... 54 

State and Local Responsibility ............................................................................... 44 

Urban Area Security Initiative Grant Recipients ................................................. 57 

Vulnerable Populations and Disasters ................................................................... 62 

INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS 

Opening Statement of Chairman David Price ....................................................... 277 

Opening Statement of the Honorable John Carter ............................................... 284 


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iv 

Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers ...................................... 285 

Statement of Dr. David G. Boyd, Director, Office of Interoperability and 

Compatibility ........................................................................................................ 288 

Statement of Chris Essid, Director, Office of Emergency Communications ....... 307 

Statement of W. Ross Ashley, Assistant Administrator, FEMA Grant Programs Directorate ................................................................................................ 317 

ALEC ........................................................................................................................ 417 

Backlog of Unexpended Funds ............................................................................... 331 

Bridging Technology ................................................................................................ 330 

Broadband for Rural Areas ..................................................................................... 345 

Communication with the Public and Mexico ......................................................... 375 

Compliance Assessment Program .......................................................................... 345 

Data/Broadband ....................................................................................................... 388 

Demonstration Projects on Southern Border ......................................................... 340 

Demonstrations Resources ...................................................................................... 392 

DHS Secretarial Directives ..................................................................................... 416 

Emergency Communications Preparedness Center .............................................. 347 

Emergency Responders Ability to Communicate .................................................. 335 

Environmental Reviews .......................................................................................... 353 

Expediting the Grants Process ............................................................................... 352 

Federal Input to State and Local Equipment Procurements ............................... 377 

Federal Interoperability .......................................................................................... 346 

Federal Technical Assistance .................................................................................. 344 

Getting Monterey County Operational .................................................................. 378 

Grant Administration by a Single Agency ............................................................. 351 

Grant Guidance ........................................................................................................ 426 

Grants ....................................................................................................................... 382 

Interoperability Between Equipment ..................................................................... 344 

Interoperable Communications Grant Program .................................................... 335 

Interoperable Communications Technology ........................................................... 338 

Interoperable Equipment and System Requirements ........................................... 376 

Maintaining Operability After Disasters ............................................................... 384 

MITOC ................................................................................................................... 371,421 

Mobile Phone Penetration ....................................................................................... 421 

NACo ......................................................................................................................... 417 

National Emergency Communications Plan .......................................................... 413 

NECP Goals ............................................................................................................. 429 

NIMS Umbrella Communications Unit Leader Training ..................................... 337 

NPPD Contracts ....................................................................................................... 398 

NPPD Facilities and Leases ................................................................................... 412 

NPPD Management ................................................................................................. 393 

OEC Staffing ............................................................................................................ 429 

OEC Training Programs ......................................................................................... 418 

Operability vs. Interoperability........................................................................... 337, 389 

Project 25 (P25) Compliance Assessment Program (CAP) ............... 389, 391, 415, 427 

PSIC Grants ............................................................................................................. 354 

PSIC Program .......................................................................................................... 342 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman David Price .............. 382, 388, 393 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Ranking Member Harold Rogers ......... 421 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable John Carter .................. 430 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Nita Lowey........ 426, 427, 429 

Resilient Communications Capability .................................................................... 430 

Responsibility for Ensuring Federal Interoperability ........................................... 347 

Responsibility for Underserved Areas .................................................................... 346 

Satellite Communications for Rural Areas ............................................................ 343 

Satellite Communications ....................................................................................... 336 

Separate Networks on the Broadband Spectrum .................................................. 350 

State Drawdown of Grant Funds ........................................................................... 352 

State Responsiveness .............................................................................................. 379 

Streamlining DHS components .............................................................................. 348 

Transition to 700-Megahertz Band ........................................................................ 327 


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v 

Warning Systems ..................................................................................................... 414 

JOINT HEARING WITH LEGISLATIVE BRANCH APPROPRIATIONS FOR 

2010: 

SECRET SERVICE PROTECTIVE MISSIONS AND INAUGURAL 

SECURITY 

Opening Statement of Chairman David Price ....................................................... 431 

Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers ...................................... 438 

Opening Statement of Chairwoman Debbie Wasserman-Schultz .................... 442, 444 

Statement from Inaugural Attendees ............................................................. 442 

Opening Statement of the Honorable Steven LaTourette .................................... 445 

Opening Statement of Chairman David Obey ....................................................... 445 

Statement of Mark Sullivan, Director of U.S. Secret Service .............................. 447 

Statement of Phillip D. Morse, Sr., Chief of United States Capitol Police ......... 459 

2009 Inaugural Review (Redacted Version) .......................................................... 492 

Access to Food After the Event .............................................................................. 475 

Assistance Offered by the National Guard ........................................................ 466, 473 

Attendance Projections ............................................................................................ 488 

Closing Silver Area Entrances ................................................................................ 482 

Communications Between Governing Body and NSSE Steering Committee ..... 471 

Coordination with Ticket Printers ......................................................................... 485 

Crowd and Access for Disabled and Elderly .......................................................... 594 

Crowd Control and Emergency Services ................................................................ 593 

Crowd Management Around the Capitol ............................................................... 465 

Errors in Projecting Attendance ............................................................................. 489 

Generator Malfunction ............................................................................................ 474 

Guidelines for Vehicular Access ............................................................................. 475 

Inaugural Security Planning .................................................................................. 468 

Including the JCIC as a Steering Committee Member ........................................ 529 

Investigative Accomplishments .............................................................................. 591 

Investigative Mission and Financial Crimes ......................................................... 592 

Invitations to Inauguration ..................................................................................... 471 

Issuance of Tickets .................................................................................................. 475 

Metropolitan Police Department......................................................................... 485, 527 

More Tickets Issued Than Space Available ........................................................... 468 

Personnel Assigned to Ticket Checking ................................................................. 482 

Planning for Silver Ticketed Area .......................................................................... 476 

Plans for an Evaluation .......................................................................................... 527 

Problems in the Blue Gate ...................................................................................... 474 

Problems with Tunnels ........................................................................................... 469 

Purple Tunnel .......................................................................................................... 483 

Pushing Back the Perimeters ................................................................................. 472 

Putting Bar Codes on Tickets ................................................................................. 486 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman David Price .......................... 533 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Ken Calvert .................. 591 

Recommendations for Coordinating and Staffing ................................................. 488 

Report on Inaugural Difficulties ............................................................................. 490 

Responsibility for Signage ....................................................................................... 466 

Role of United States Capitol Police ...................................................................... 529 

Ticket Checking ....................................................................................................... 487 

Time for Opening Gates .......................................................................................... 473 

Using the East Front of the Capitol ....................................................................... 487 

USSS Contracts ....................................................................................................... 537 

USSS Facilities and Leases .................................................................................... 541 


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USSS Investigations ................................................................................................ 557 

USSS Management .................................................................................................. 533 

USSS Role in 2008 Campaign ................................................................................ 589 

USSS Role in 2009 Presidential Inauguration ...................................................... 589 

USSS Staffing and Training ................................................................................... 574 

Volunteer Ticket Checkers ...................................................................................... 469 

CARGO AND CONTAINER SECURITY: KEEPING A LID ON THREATS 

Opening Statement of Chairman David Price ....................................................... 595 

Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers ...................................... 600 

Statement of Jayson P. Ahern, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection ....................................................................................................... 605 

Biography of Thomas S. Winkowski, Assistant Commissioner, U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection .......................................................................................... 620 

Statement of Dr. Charles R. Gallaway, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office .................................................................................................... 621 

100 Percent Container Inspection Requirement ................................................... 659 

100 Percent Inspection Goal Scalability ................................................................ 663 

2012 Deadline for 100% Cargo Scanning ............................................................... 765 

Air Cargo .................................................................................................................. 684

ASP Monitors and PVT Systems ............................................................................ 663 

Aviation Mission Area ............................................................................................. 740 

Border Patrol Firearm Seizures FY2008 ............................................................... 679 

Border Patrol Narcotic Seizures FY2008 ........................................................... 675, 677 

Bulk Cash Detection ................................................................................................ 656 

Canadian Border Apprehensions ............................................................................ 669 

Canadian Pre-Clearance ......................................................................................... 691 

Career Incentives for Personnel ............................................................................. 644 

Cargo and Containers Carried by Rail Into Mexico .............................................. 635 

Cargo Security Measures ........................................................................................ 765 

Container Security Device ...................................................................................... 762 

Container Security Initiative (CSI) ........................................................................ 685 

Container Transits from Mexico to US .................................................................. 665 

Cost Effectiveness .................................................................................................... 658 

Covert Projects ..................................................................................................... 753, 754 

Crane-Mounted Radiation Detection Technology—Alternatives to Portal Monitors ....................................................................................................................... 695 

Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C–TPAT)...................... 668, 705, 764 

DNDO Research, Development and Operations .................................................... 735 

DNDO Systems Acquisition .................................................................................... 757 

Equipment Integration at Ports ............................................................................. 767 

Facilities to Screen Border Crossers Into Mexico ................................................. 640 

Fee Funded Operations ........................................................................................... 724 

Free and Secure Trade Shipments ......................................................................... 646 

FY 2008 Average Private Vehicle Wait Times ...................................................... 680 

FY 2008 Bonus/QSI Information ............................................................................ 732 

History of Container Inspection ............................................................................. 666 

Implementation of ACE ........................................................................................... 650 

Importer Security Filing (10+2 Rule) ..................................................................... 714 

In-Bond ..................................................................................................................... 683 

Inbound Container Inspections ............................................................................... 645 

Inspection and Detection/Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) Technology ................ 696 

Inspections Going Into Mexico ................................................................................ 649 

Inspections of Other Cargo Modes ......................................................................... 768 


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Integrity Programs .................................................................................................. 725 

International Initiatives .......................................................................................... 694 

International Rail .................................................................................................... 740 

Management and Administration .......................................................................... 729 

Maritime Mission Area ............................................................................................ 738 

Merchandise Seizures Line Item Count (Counterfeit Goods) up to FY2009— 

March .................................................................................................................... 678 

Mexican Border Protocol ......................................................................................... 649 

Mitigation of Credible Threats ............................................................................... 767 

Modeling Projects ................................................................................................. 753, 754 

National Targeting Center ...................................................................................... 689 

NEXUS/SENTRI/FAST ........................................................................................... 720 

Northern Border ...................................................................................................... 669 

Office of Field Operations.................................................................................... 673, 676 

On-Dock Rail ............................................................................................................ 739 

Other Security Requirements ................................................................................. 685 

Overseas Cargo Scanning Pilots ............................................................................. 634 

Overseas Cargo Scanning ....................................................................................... 632 

Overseas Container Inspection Operations ........................................................... 654 

Overseas Container Inspections ............................................................................. 658 

Overt Projects....................................................................................................... 753, 754 

Personnel .................................................................................................................. 726

Plan for Southbound Inspections on SW Border ................................................... 660 

Port of Dubai Technology ........................................................................................ 656 

Presidio Hours of Service ........................................................................................ 648 

Private Aircraft ........................................................................................................ 683 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman David Price....................... 673, 729 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Ranking Member Harold Rogers ......... 762 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Ciro Rodriguez .............. 764 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Ken Calvert .................. 765 

Rail Cargo ................................................................................................................. 694

Rail Containers ........................................................................................................ 762 

Recovery ................................................................................................................... 693

Red Team Into Border Detection Equipment ........................................................ 650 

Risk Based Resource Allocation ............................................................................. 657 

Secure Freight Initiative ......................................................................................... 690 

Securing the Cities .................................................................................................. 759 

Security Gaps ........................................................................................................... 682 

Small Boats .............................................................................................................. 683 

Southbound Checking of Cargo and Vehicles ........................................................ 668 

Statistics and Data .................................................................................................. 673 

Steel Tariff Enforcement ......................................................................................... 728 

Tamper Proof Containers ........................................................................................ 666 

Technology Issues .................................................................................................... 655 

Textile Transshipment Program ............................................................................. 721 

Tracking and Securing In-Bond Shipments .......................................................... 712 

Vacancies .................................................................................................................. 729

Vehicle and Truck Passenger and Driver Clearance at Land Ports of Entry ..... 712 

Vehicles Going Into Mexico ..................................................................................... 641 

Weapons Crossing Into Mexico ............................................................................... 645 

Weapons of Mass Effect Delivery Logistics ........................................................... 643 

U.S. COAST GUARD: MEASURING MISSION NEEDS 

Opening Statement of Chairman David Price ....................................................... 769 


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Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers ...................................... 773 

Statement of Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant, U.S. Coast 

Guard................................................................................................................. 774, 779 

Statement of John P. Hutton, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) ....................................... 803 

Acquisition Workforce ............................................................................................. 839 

Aids to Navigation ................................................................................................... 896 

Airborne Assets and Counter-Drug Mission .......................................................... 922 

Aircraft Maintenance Backlog ................................................................................ 896 

Aircraft ..................................................................................................................... 847 

Alien Migration and Interdiction Operations ........................................................ 922 

Alteration of Bridges ............................................................................................... 912 

Aquatic Invasive Species ......................................................................................... 883 

Automatic Identification System ............................................................................ 897 

Ballast Water Regulations ...................................................................................... 833 

C4ISR ........................................................................................................................ 884 

Chicago Ship and Sanitary Canal .......................................................................... 834 

Coast Guard Reserves ............................................................................................. 900 

Coast Guard Sexual Assault Reporting ................................................................. 880 

Contracts .................................................................................................................. 893

Cuban Immigrants ................................................................................................... 836 

Deepwater and Beyond ........................................................................................... 864 

Drug Interdiction ..................................................................................................... 846 

Environmental Operations ...................................................................................... 882 

Expansion of Piracy ................................................................................................. 837 

Fast Response Cutter .............................................................................................. 918 

Fleet Maintenance ................................................................................................... 846 

Forfeited Leave ........................................................................................................ 918 

FY2008 DHS Financial Statement Audit .............................................................. 870 

GAO Identified Management Deficiencies ............................................................. 848 

Hull Condition of Existing CG Fleet ...................................................................... 874 

Human Smuggling Prosecution .............................................................................. 847 

Ice Breakers ............................................................................................................. 842 

Intelligence Operations ........................................................................................... 884 

Iraq Operations ........................................................................................................ 870 

Iraq Supplemental ................................................................................................... 858 

Law of the Sea Convention ..................................................................................... 872 

Life Jacket Standards and Regulations ................................................................. 916 

LNG .......................................................................................................................... 917 

Management ............................................................................................................. 885 

Military/Civilian Mix ............................................................................................... 899 

National Capital Region Airspace Security ........................................................... 898 

National Security Cutter(s)......................................................................... 828, 858, 879 

Northern Border Priorities ...................................................................................... 836 

Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) ................................................................................. 867 

Other ......................................................................................................................... 912 

Performance Objectives and Gaps .......................................................................... 826 

Plan for Coast Guard Vessels Support to Iraq ...................................................... 860 

Polar Cap Mission and Requirements .................................................................... 921 

Polar Operations .................................................................................................. 841, 871 

Progress on Reforms ................................................................................................ 875 

Proposed Termination of LORAN-C ....................................................................... 872 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman David Price .......................... 864 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Ciro Rodriguez .............. 916 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Ken Calvert .................. 921 


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Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Lucille Roybal-Allard ... 919 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Nita Lowey ................... 917 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Ranking Member Harold Rogers ......... 914 

Reliance on Contractors .......................................................................................... 864 

Rescue 21 in the Great Lakes ................................................................................. 835 

Rescue 21 .................................................................................................................. 876

Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation ................................................. 898 

Semi/Fully-Submerged Vessels ............................................................................... 915 

Semi-Submersibles .................................................................................................. 852 

Shore Maintenance Backlog .................................................................................... 894 

Small Boat Security ................................................................................................. 832 

Small Boat Threats .................................................................................................. 831 

Small Boats .............................................................................................................. 882 

Small Vessel Threat ................................................................................................ 838 

Sonar in Vessels ....................................................................................................... 857 

Southwest Border Drug Control Efforts ................................................................ 829 

Stalled Programs ..................................................................................................... 866 

The Deteriorating Condition of the Coast Guard’s High Endurance Cutters .... 919 

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ........................................................... 919 

Unmanned Aerial Systems ..................................................................................... 914 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) ........................................................................... 867 

Unobligated Balances .............................................................................................. 901 

Use of Contractors ................................................................................................... 854 

Vessel Maintenance Backlog ................................................................................... 895 

Winter Olympic Games ........................................................................................... 837 

Æ 


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