This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains regulatory documents having general

applicability and legal effect, most of which

are keyed to and codified in the Code of

Federal Regulations, which is published under

50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.

The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by

the Superintendent of Documents. Prices of

new books are listed in the first FEDERAL

REGISTER issue of each week.

Rules and Regulations Federal Register

65679 

Vol. 74, No. 237 

Friday, December 11, 2009 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

10 CFR Part 72 

[NRC–2009–0349] 

RIN 3150–AI71 

List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage 

Casks: HI–STORM 100 Revision 7, 

Confirmation of Effective Date 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Direct final rule; confirmation of 

effective date. 

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is confirming the 

effective date of December 28, 2009, for 

the direct final rule that was published 

in the Federal Register on October 13, 

2009. The direct final rule amended the 

NRC’s spent fuel storage regulations in 

10 CFR 72.214 to revise the HI–STORM 

100 dry cask storage system listing to 

include Amendment No. 7 to Certificate 

of Compliance (CoC) Number 1014. 

DATES: Effective Date: The effective date 

of December 28, 2009, is confirmed for 

the direct final rule published October 

13, 2009 (74 FR 52387). 

ADDRESSES: Documents related to this 

rulemaking, including any comments 

received, may be examined at the NRC 

Public Document Room, Room O–1F23, 

11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 

20852. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Neelam Bhalla, Office of Federal and 

State Materials and Environmental 

Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001, telephone (301) 415– 

6843, e-mail Neelam.Bhalla@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On 

October 13, 2009 (74 FR 52387), the 

NRC published a direct final rule 

amending its regulations at 10 CFR 

72.214 to include Amendment No. 7 to 

CoC Number 1014. Amendment No. 7 

modifies the CoC to add the HI–STORM 

100U system to the HI–STORM 100 cask 

systems. The HI–STORM 100U system 

allows for the underground storage of 

dry spent nuclear fuel (SNF) by utilizing 

an underground vertical ventilated 

module (VVM) that can accept certain 

Holtec multipurpose canisters 

previously certified for storage of SNF 

in the aboveground HI–STORM system. 

The amendment also incorporates a 

mandatory radiation protection 

perimeter around the loaded VVMs. In 

addition, the amendment will reinstate 

the decay heat limits for damaged fuel 

and fuel debris in Appendix B, 

Technical Specification (TS) 2.4, for the 

aboveground system that had been 

inadvertently deleted from Amendment 

Nos. 5 and 6; incorporate separate TS 

Appendices A and B for the HI–STORM 

aboveground system, and TS 

Appendices A–100U and B–100U, for 

the HI–STORM 100U underground 

system; revise Appendix B, TS 3.4.5, to 

be consistent with the required system 

thermal boundary conditions, as 

submitted in the applicant’s safety 

analysis report for a fire accident 

condition, and with Holtec’s original 

(i.e., initial certificate application or 

Amendment 0) submittal and the NRC’s 

original safety evaluation report; revise 

and add certain definitions in Appendix 

A, TS 1.1, to include the VVM; and 

incorporate minor editorial corrections 

in the TS for the aboveground system. 

In the direct final rule, NRC stated that 

if no significant adverse comments were 

received, the direct final rule would 

become final on December 28, 2009. The 

NRC did not receive any comments on 

the direct final rule. Therefore, this rule 

will become effective as scheduled. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day 

of December 2009. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Cindy Bladey, 

Acting Branch Chief, Rulemaking and 

Directives Branch, Division of Administrative 

Services, Office of Administration. 

[FR Doc. E9–29554 Filed 12–10–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2009–1089; Directorate 

Identifier 2009–SW–16–AD; Amendment 39– 

16101; AD 2009–09–51] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Eurocopter 

France Model EC225LP Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration, DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: This document publishes in 

the Federal Register an amendment 

adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 

2009–09–51, which was sent previously 

to all known U.S. owners and operators 

of Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) 

Model EC225LP helicopters by 

individual letters. This AD requires, 

before further flight, determining if the 

‘‘CHIP’’ detector light on the instrument 

panel (Vehicle Monitoring System 

Screen) previously illuminated. If the 

‘‘CHIP’’ detector light did illuminate 

and it illuminated because of a metal 

particle on the magnetic plug of the 

epicyclic reduction gear module 

(module) of the main gearbox (MGB), or 

if you cannot determine from the 

maintenance records which chip 

detector caused the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector 

light to illuminate or whether the 

detector light stayed illuminated after 

the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector switch was turned 

to the ‘‘CHIP PULSE’’ setting, replacing 

the module with an airworthy module is 

required before further flight. Also 

required before further flight is 

inspecting the MGB module magnetic 

chip detector electrical circuit and 

determining whether the system is 

functioning properly, including whether 

the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector light annunciates 

on the instrument panel (Vehicle 

Monitoring System Screen). Finally, this 

AD requires replacing the module with 

an airworthy module if the ‘‘CHIP’’ 

detector light illuminates, stays 

illuminated after the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector 

switch is turned to the ‘‘CHIP PULSE’’ 

setting, and you determine that a metal 

particle on the module magnetic plug 

caused that illumination. This 

amendment is prompted by a mandatory 

continuing airworthiness information 

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65680 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 237 / Friday, December 11, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 

(MCAI) AD issued by the European 

Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which 

is the Technical Agent for the Member 

States of the European Community. 

EASA notified us of an accident that 

occurred April 1, 2009 on a Eurocopter 

Model AS332L2 helicopter and EASA 

advises that the ‘‘cause of the accident 

seems to be connected with degradation 

of the epicyclic module of the MGB, the 

root cause of which is still to be 

determined.’’ The actions specified by 

this AD are intended to prevent failure 

of the MGB and subsequent loss of 

control of the helicopter. 

DATES: Effective December 28, 2009, to 

all persons except those persons to 

whom it was made immediately 

effective by Emergency AD 2009–09–51, 

issued on April 17, 2009, which 

contained the requirements of this 

amendment. 

Comments for inclusion in the Rules 

Docket must be received on or before 

February 9, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following 

addresses to submit comments on this 

AD: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

You may get the service information 

identified in this AD from American 

Eurocopter Corporation, 2701 Forum 

Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75053–4005, 

telephone (972) 641–3460, fax (972) 

641–3527, or at http:// 

www.eurocopter.com. 

Examining the Docket: You may 

examine the docket that contains the 

AD, any comments, and other 

information on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov, or in person at the 

Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The Docket 

Operations office (telephone (800) 647– 

5527) is located in Room W12–140 on 

the ground floor of the West Building at 

the street address stated in the 

ADDRESSES section. Comments will be 

available in the AD docket shortly after 

receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary 

Roach, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 

Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations and 

Policy Group, Fort Worth, Texas 76137– 

0111, telephone (817) 222–5130, fax 

(817) 222–5961. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On April 

17, 2009, we issued Emergency AD 

2009–09–51 for the Eurocopter Model 

EC225LP helicopters, which requires, 

before further flight, determining if the 

‘‘CHIP’’ detector light on the instrument 

panel (Vehicle Monitoring System 

Screen) previously illuminated. If the 

‘‘CHIP’’ detector light did illuminate 

and it illuminated because of a metal 

particle on the magnetic plug of the 

MGB module, or if you cannot 

determine from the maintenance records 

which chip detector caused the ‘‘CHIP’’ 

detector light to illuminate or whether 

the detector light stayed illuminated 

after the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector switch was 

turned to the ‘‘CHIP PULSE’’ setting, 

replacing the module with an airworthy 

module is required before further flight. 

The Emergency AD also requires 

inspecting the MGB module magnetic 

chip detector electrical circuit and 

determining whether the system is 

functioning properly, including whether 

the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector light annunciates 

on the instrument panel (Vehicle 

Monitoring System Screen). Finally, the 

Emergency AD requires replacing the 

module with an airworthy module if the 

‘‘CHIP’’ detector light illuminates, stays 

illuminated after the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector 

switch is turned to the ‘‘CHIP PULSE’’ 

setting, and you determine that a metal 

particle on the module magnetic plug 

caused that illumination. That action 

was prompted when EASA, which is the 

Technical Agent for the Member States 

of the European Community, notified us 

of an accident that occurred April 1, 

2009 on a Eurocopter Model AS332L2 

helicopter. Although the cause of the 

accident is still under investigation, 

EASA advises that the ‘‘cause of the 

accident seems to be connected with 

degradation of the epicyclic module of 

the MGB, the root cause of which is still 

to be determined.’’ EASA further 

advises that ‘‘In the light of this 

information, the detection of any 

contamination of the MGB is of utmost 

importance as a precautionary 

measure.’’ EASA issued Emergency AD 

No. 2009–0087–E, dated April 11, 2009, 

to correct an unsafe condition for the 

Eurocopter Model AS332L2 and 

EC225LP helicopters. 

EASA Emergency AD No. 2009–0087– 

E applies to both the Model AS332L2 

helicopters and the Model EC225LP 

helicopters because both helicopter 

models use a similar module. However, 

our AD 2009–09–51 applies only to the 

Model EC225LP helicopters because 

there are currently no Model AS332L2 

helicopters on the U.S. registry. Also, 

AD 2009–09–51 differs from the EASA 

AD in that the EASA AD specifies that 

the module be disassembled, inspected, 

and then reinstalled when particles are 

detected on the magnetic plug of the 

module, allowing flight operations until 

another particle is detected. Our AD 

requires the following before further 

flight: 

• Determining if, within the last 200 

hours time-in-service (TIS), the ‘‘CHIP’’ 

detector light illuminated because of a 

metal particle on the magnetic plug of 

the module, part number 332A32–5021– 

01M, and if so, whether the ‘‘CHIP’’ 

detector light stayed illuminated after 

the chip detector switch was turned to 

the ‘‘CHIP PULSE’’ setting to activate 

the ‘‘fuzz burn-off’’ feature. If the 

‘‘CHIP’’ detector light illuminated 

because of a metal particle on the 

magnetic plug of the module, and the 

‘‘CHIP’’ detector light stayed 

illuminated after the chip detector 

switch was turned to the ‘‘CHIP PULSE’’ 

setting, or if you cannot determine from 

the maintenance records which chip 

detector caused the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector 

light to illuminate or whether the 

detector light stayed illuminated after 

the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector switch was turned 

to the ‘‘CHIP PULSE’’ setting, replacing 

the module with an airworthy module is 

required before further flight. 

• Inspecting the MGB module 

magnetic chip detector electrical circuit 

and determining whether the system is 

functioning properly, including whether 

the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector light annunciates 

on the instrument panel (Vehicle 

Monitoring System Screen). Thereafter, 

the AD requires replacing the module 

with an airworthy module if the ‘‘CHIP’’ 

detector light illuminates, stays 

illuminated after the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector 

switch is turned to the ‘‘CHIP PULSE’’ 

setting, and you determine that a metal 

particle on the module magnetic plug 

(rather than the main reduction gear 

(lower MGB), the flared housing (mast 

assembly), the intermediate gearbox 

(IGB), or the tail rotor gearbox (TGB)) 

caused the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector light to 

illuminate. 

Eurocopter has issued Emergency 

Alert Service Bulletin No. 05A017 

(ASB). The ASB is dated April 10, 2009 

and describes procedures for inspecting 

both the magnetic plug on the MGB 

epicyclic reduction gear module and the 

chip collector, and instructions to 

replace the epicyclic reduction gear 

module if necessary. EASA classified 

this service bulletin as mandatory and 

issued EASA AD No. 2009–0087–E, 

dated April 11, 2009 to ensure the 

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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 237 / Friday, December 11, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 65681 

continued airworthiness of these 

helicopters in France. 

This helicopter model is approved by 

the aviation authority of France, and is 

approved for operation in the United 

States. Pursuant to our bilateral 

agreement with France, EASA has 

notified us of the unsafe condition 

described in the MCAI AD. We are 

issuing this AD because we evaluated 

all information provided by EASA and 

determined the unsafe condition exists 

and is likely to exist or develop on other 

Eurocopter Model EC225LP helicopters 

of the same type design. 

Since the unsafe condition described 

is likely to exist or develop on other 

Eurocopter Model EC225LP helicopters 

of the same type design, the FAA issued 

Emergency AD 2009–09–51 to prevent 

failure of the MGB and subsequent loss 

of control of the helicopter. The AD 

requires the actions described 

previously. The short compliance time 

involved is required because the 

previously described critical unsafe 

condition can adversely affect the 

controllability of the helicopter. 

Therefore, this AD must be issued 

immediately. 

Since it was found that immediate 

corrective action was required, notice 

and opportunity for prior public 

comment thereon were impracticable 

and contrary to the public interest, and 

good cause existed to make the AD 

effective immediately by individual 

letters issued on April 17, 2009 to all 

known U.S. owners and operators of 

Eurocopter Model EC225LP helicopters. 

These conditions still exist, and the AD 

is hereby published in the Federal 

Register as an amendment to 14 CFR 

39.13 to make it effective to all persons. 

This AD is an interim action. We 

anticipate additional rulemaking once 

the cause of the accident is determined 

and the manufacturer develops a 

terminating action. 

We estimate that this AD will affect 2 

helicopters of U.S. registry. It will take 

approximately 10 minutes to inspect the 

module without removal and 10 work 

hours to remove and replace the 

module, if necessary. The average labor 

rate is $80 per work hour. Required 

parts will cost approximately $512,318 

per helicopter. Based on these figures, 

we estimate the total cost impact of the 

AD on U.S. operators to be $513,145, 

assuming that the module on each 

helicopter is inspected once and one of 

the modules is replaced. 

Comments Invited 

This AD is a final rule that involves 

requirements that affect flight safety and 

was not preceded by notice and an 

opportunity for public comment; 

however, we invite you to submit any 

written data, views, or arguments 

regarding this AD. Send your comments 

to an address listed under ADDRESSES. 

Include ‘‘Docket No. FAA–2009–1089; 

Directorate Identifier 2009–SW–16–AD’’ 

at the beginning of your comments. We 

specifically invite comments on the 

overall regulatory, economic, 

environmental, and energy aspects of 

the AD. We will consider all comments 

received by the closing date and may 

amend the AD in light of those 

comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact with FAA 

personnel concerning this AD. Using the 

search function of our docket Web site, 

you can find and read the comments to 

any of our dockets, including the name 

of the individual who sent the 

comment. You may review the DOT’s 

complete Privacy Act Statement in the 

Federal Register published on April 11, 

2000 (65 FR 19477–78). 

Regulatory Findings 

We have determined that this AD will 

not have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national Government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that the regulation: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

3. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared an economic evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this AD. See the AD docket to examine 

the economic evaluation. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

Section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, pursuant to the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the Federal Aviation Administration 

amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding 

a new airworthiness directive to read as 

follows: 

2009–09–51 Eurocopter France: 

Amendment 39–16101. Docket No. 

FAA–2009–1089; Directorate Identifier 

2009–SW–16–AD. 

Applicability: Model EC225LP helicopters 

with an epicyclic reduction gear module 

(module), part number 332A32–5021–01M, 

installed, certificated in any category. 

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless 

accomplished previously. 

To prevent failure of the main gearbox 

(MGB) and subsequent loss of control of the 

helicopter, accomplish the following: 

(a) Before further flight: 

(1) Determine from the maintenance 

records whether, within the last 200 hours 

time-in-service (TIS), the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector 

light illuminated because of a metal particle 

on the magnetic plug of the module, and if 

so, whether the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector light stayed 

illuminated after the chip detector switch 

was turned to the ‘‘CHIP PULSE’’ setting to 

activate the ‘‘fuzz burn-off’’ feature. If those 

records indicate that the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector 

light illuminated because of a metal particle 

on the magnetic plug of the module, and the 

‘‘CHIP’’ detector light stayed illuminated 

after the chip detector switch was turned to 

the ‘‘CHIP PULSE’’ setting, replace the 

module with an airworthy module before 

further flight. If you cannot determine from 

the maintenance records which chip detector 

caused the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector light to 

illuminate or whether the detector light 

stayed illuminated after the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector 

switch was turned to the ‘‘CHIP PULSE’’ 

setting, replace the module with an airworthy 

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65682 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 237 / Friday, December 11, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 

module before further flight. A module with 

a magnetic plug that attracted a metal particle 

which activated the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector light 

within the last 200 hours TIS and was not 

extinguished when the ‘‘CHIP PULSE’’ was 

activated is unairworthy. 

(2) Inspect the MGB module magnetic chip 

detector electrical circuit and determine 

whether the system is functioning properly, 

including whether the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector light 

annunciates on the instrument panel (Vehicle 

Monitoring System Screen). 

(b) Thereafter, if the ‘‘CHIP’’ detector light 

illuminates, stays illuminated after the 

‘‘CHIP’’ detector switch is turned to the 

‘‘CHIP PULSE’’ setting, and you determine 

that a metal particle on the module magnetic 

plug (rather than the main reduction gear 

(lower MGB), the flared housing (mast 

assembly), the intermediate gearbox (IGB), or 

the tail rotor gearbox (TGB)) caused the 

‘‘CHIP’’ detector light to illuminate, replace 

the module with an airworthy module. 

(c) To request a different method of 

compliance or a different compliance time 

for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 

39.19. Contact the Manager, Safety 

Management Group, FAA, ATTN: Gary 

Roach, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 

Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations and Policy 

Group, Fort Worth, Texas 76137–0111, 

telephone (817) 222–5130, fax (817) 222– 

5961, for information about previously 

approved alternative methods of compliance. 

(d) Special flight permits will not be 

issued. 

(e) Copies of the applicable service 

information may be obtained from American 

Eurocopter Corporation, 2701 Forum Drive, 

Grand Prairie, TX 75053–4005, telephone 

(972) 641–3460, fax (972) 641–3527, or at 

http://www.eurocopter.com. 

(f) This amendment becomes effective on 

December 28, 2009, to all persons except 

those persons to whom it was made 

immediately effective by Emergency AD 

2009–09–51, issued April 17, 2009, which 

contained the requirements of this 

amendment. 

Note: The subject of this AD is addressed 

in European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 

AD No. 2009–0087–E, dated April 11, 2009. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on October 23, 

2009. 

Mark R. Schilling, 

Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E9–29425 Filed 12–10–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2009–1118; Directorate 

Identifier 2008–SW–60–AD; Amendment 39– 

16126; AD 2009–25–07] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Eurocopter 

France Model EC120B Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

Eurocopter France (ECF) Model EC120B 

helicopters. This AD results from a 

mandatory continuing airworthiness 

information (MCAI) AD issued by the 

European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Community. The MCAI AD states that 

operators have reported that latching 

push buttons on the Emergency 

Floatation Gear Lighting and Ancillary 

Control Unit (LACU) used to arm the 

emergency floatation gear are unreliable, 

and the ‘FLOAT ARM’ pushbutton does 

not latch in the depressed (LACU 

armed) position. These actions are 

intended to prohibit flight over water if 

a functional test indicates that the 

emergency floatation gear cannot be 

armed, which would preclude 

deployment of the floats in an 

emergency water ditching that could 

result in helicopter damage and a 

fatality. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective on 

December 28, 2009. 

We must receive comments on this 

AD by February 9, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting your 

comments electronically. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

You may get the service information 

identified in this AD from American 

Eurocopter Corporation, 2701 Forum 

Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75053–4005, 

telephone (800) 232–0323, fax (972) 

641–3710, or at http:// 

www.eurocopter.com. 

Examining the Docket: You may 

examine the AD docket on the Internet 

at http://www.regulations.gov or in 

person at the Docket Operations office 

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

The AD docket contains this AD, the 

economic evaluation, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

street address for the Docket Operations 

office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is 

stated in the ADDRESSES section of this 

AD. Comments will be available in the 

AD docket shortly after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

DOT/FAA Southwest Region, J. R. 

Holton, Jr., ASW–112, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, Rotorcraft Directorate, Safety 

Management Group, 2601 Meacham 

Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137, 

telephone (817) 222–4964, fax (817) 

222–5961. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

EASA, which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Community, has issued EASA AD No. 

2008–0177–E, dated September 19, 

2008, to correct an unsafe condition for 

the ECF Model EC120B helicopters. 

The MCAI AD states that operators 

have reported unreliability of the 

latching push buttons on the Emergency 

Floatation LACU including the ‘FLOAT 

ARM’ pushbutton used to arm the 

emergency floatation gear and failure of 

the light to illuminate properly. 

Investigations have revealed the 

anomaly may be due to the bonding of 

these pushbuttons. Design 

improvements for the pushbuttons are 

currently in progress. The MCAI AD 

states that a repetitive in-flight 

functional check of the ‘FLOAT ARM’ 

pushbutton before flying over water is 

necessary. If the pushbutton fails to 

latch in the depressed position, the 

MCAI AD prohibits further flight over 

water until the ‘FLOAT ARM’ 

pushbutton is replaced with an 

airworthy unit. These actions are 

intended to prohibit flight over water if 

a functional test indicates that the 

emergency floatation gear cannot be 

armed, which would preclude 

deployment of the floats in an 

emergency water ditching that could 

result in helicopter damage and a 

fatality. 

You may obtain further information 

by examining the MCAI AD and any 

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