*After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has

determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The

case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

April 3, 2006

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

DELBERT KYLER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

MARK EVERSON, Commissioner of

Internal Revenue, in his personal capacity,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 05-5185

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

(D. Ct. No. 4:05-CV-163-TCK)

Submitted on the briefs:*

Delbert Kyler, pro se.

Eileen J. O’Connor, Assistant Attorney General, Andrea R. Tebbets, Attorney, and

Patricia M. Bowman, Attorney, Tax Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.;

and David E. O’Meilia, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma,

Tulsa, Oklahoma, on the brief for Appellees.

Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, HARTZ, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
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TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge.

I. BACKGROUND

Delbert Kyler, appearing pro se, originally filed this claim for slander of title in

Oklahoma state court against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Mark Everson, after

the Internal Revenue Service filed two federal tax liens against his property. Mr. Kyler

contended that the Commissioner lacked authority to file such liens because no court

order gave him permission to do so. Mr. Kyler asked for $4.5 million in damages for

slander of title, inconvenience, aggravation, and malicious slander. The Government

removed the case to the Northern District of Oklahoma and sought dismissal of the

complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Mr. Kyler filed a motion to remand and numerous motions to strike

the Government’s responses. The District Court denied all Mr. Kyler’s motions and

dismissed the complaint. Mr. Kyler timely appeals. Taking jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, we AFFIRM. In addition, because this appeal is legally frivolous, we GRANT

the Government’s motion for $8,000 in costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1912 and Fed. R. App. P.

38.

II. DISCUSSION

Reviewing de novo, see Martinez v. Garden, 430 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir.

2005), we begin with the substance of Mr. Kyler’s legal contentions. Contrary to Mr.
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Kyler’s assertion, no federal authority stands for the proposition that for a federal tax lien

to be valid, there must be a federal court order signed by a federal judge. Rather, 26

U.S.C. §§ 6321 and 6322 establish that a lien automatically arises upon assessment of a

tax and continues until the taxpayer’s liability is satisfied or becomes unenforceable. 

Moreover, to the extent this suit for damages is against the Commissioner in his official

capacity, it is barred by sovereign immunity, see Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58

(1963) (sovereign immunity extends to agents and officers of the United States when the

acts complained of were undertaken in their official capacities), and to the extent the suit

is against the Commissioner in his personal capacity, he is entitled to qualified immunity,

see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (absent violation of clearly

established law, government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded

from civil liability). Therefore, the District Court properly dismissed this suit.

We next address the substance and spirit of Mr. Kyler’s multiple filings, both at

the District Court and on appeal. At every stage of the proceedings, Mr. Kyler has

accused government officials and court officers of criminal misconduct. Mr. Kyler stated

that the Commissioner “extorts money and property” and files “fraudulent instrument[s]

designed to scare the living daylights out of anyone who would dare to stand up to the

bully-thief [Commissioner].” He further contended that the Commissioner should “be

punished for his felony crimes but the typical Oklahoma County prosecutor would cry and

wet [his] pants at the thought of going up against the ultimate thug—[the
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Commissioner—]who can, albeit illicitly, exploit the powers of the United States for his

criminal thuggery.” Mr. Kyler claimed that the United States Attorney was “obviously

unschooled and untrained in the legal arts . . . [and] expects this court to bend over

backwards and kiss his . . . allegedly royal ass.” Mr. Kyler continued this diatribe on

appeal, stating in his opening brief that the Government and the District Court judge are

“criminals” and declaring his presumption “that this appellate panel will ‘save their

bacon’ by further co-joining in the high-level fraud.” His brief goes on to imply that the

District Court judge’s ruling was drug-induced, arguing that the dismissal of his case

“underscores the compelling need for mandatory random drug testing of federal officers.”

 Further, in addition to the $4.5 million in compensatory damages Mr. Kyler seeks in his

complaint, he also calls for the termination, conviction, and imprisonment of the District

Court judge, the Commissioner, the Magistrate, the United States Attorney, and the

attorney with the Tax Division of the Department of Justice.

Upon receipt of Mr. Kyler’s appellate brief, the Government filed a motion for

sanctions in the amount of $8,000. Undeterred, Mr. Kyler filed a counter-motion for

sanctions against the Government, referring to the Government’s motion as “hate-filled,

anger-driven prattlings.” Mr. Kyler also objected to the Government’s answer brief

which he deemed a “work of fraud,” and he moved for a show cause hearing as to why

the Government’s attorney should not be referred to a special grand jury. Mr. Kyler

claimed that the attorney “will tell any lie, violate any rule, break any law, or commit any
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crime necessary to perfect her schemes of fraud and extortion.”

“Fed. R. App. P. 38 and 28 U.S.C. § 1912 provide that a court of appeals may

award just damages and single or double costs if the court determines that an appeal is

frivolous or brought for purposes of delay.” Id. (quotations and alteration omitted). 

Although this court may require a higher level of responsibility from members of the bar,

see Stelly v. Comm’r, 761 F.2d 1113, 1116 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), pro se litigants

are subject to the same minimum litigation requirements that bind all litigants and counsel

before all federal courts. We emphasize today that we will scrutinize equally all filings

by both pro se and counseled litigants to protect against the abuses identified in § 1912

and Rule 38. We further emphasize that all litigants must demonstrate a level of civility

in pleadings and proceedings that displays a basic understanding of and respect for the

courts and the rule of law in this nation. 

 The Government’s motion for sanctions is well-founded, and we grant it $8,000 in

costs. 

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the District Court is therefore AFFIRMED. The mandate for

sanctions shall issue forthwith. Finally, we deny all Mr. Kyler’s outstanding motions.