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*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

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AMY AMANDA ROCK,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 669 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 18, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-28-CR-0001043-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, WECHT, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED DECEMBER 02, 2015

Amy Amanda Rock (Appellant) appeals from her aggregate judgment 

of sentence of six days to 231⁄2 months of incarceration, followed by seven 

years of probation, entered after she was found guilty of 13 counts of issuing 

bad checks. Appellant’s counsel has filed a petition to withdraw and a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We affirm the 

judgment of sentence and grant the petition to withdraw.

After her boyfriend “got in trouble” and “went upstate,” Appellant was 

“kicked [] out” of her boyfriend’s home by his mother. N.T., 1/22/2015, at 

5. Having nowhere else to go, Appellant moved in with her friend Nicole 

Wagaman, Nicole’s daughter, and Nicole’s girlfriend Dawn Breon. After 

living for a while in the trailer owned by Ms. Breon without contributing 
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financially to the household expenses, Appellant agreed that she would begin 

paying her share, including “all the back rent and stuff.” Id. at 18. 

Between August 22 and August 29, 2013, Appellant, who had a negative 

balance in her account, wrote 13 checks to Ms. Breon totaling over $4,000. 

Ms. Breon deposited or cashed each of the checks at her bank, as Appellant 

indicated that there was no nearby branch of Appellant’s bank. Once the 

insufficiency was discovered, Appellant disappeared and blocked Ms. Breon’s 

attempts to contact her. Ms. Breon ultimately was required to repay the 

amount of the checks to her bank. Because she is disabled and on a fixed 

income, Ms. Breon suffered significant hardship as a result, including the 

loss of electricity for many months.

Following a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty as to each of the 13 

checks. On February 18, 2015, Appellant was given five sentences of one 

day to four months of incarceration for counts one through five, 1 day to 

three and one half months of incarceration for count six, and seven 

sentences of 12 months of probation for counts seven through 13, with all 

sentences to run consecutively.1 Appellant timely filed a motion to modify 

sentence which the trial court granted in part: the trial court provided that 

Appellant may be considered for early release from supervision after five 

years if she complied with all terms of parole and probation and paid fines, 

 

1 Appellant was granted parole effective February 26, 2015. 
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costs, and restitution in full. On April 15, 2015, Appellant timely filed a 

notice of appeal.

In this Court, Appellant’s counsel filed both an Anders brief and a 

petition to withdraw as counsel. Accordingly, the following principles guide 

our review of this matter.

Direct appeal counsel seeking to withdraw under Anders

must file a petition averring that, after a conscientious 

examination of the record, counsel finds the appeal to be wholly 

frivolous. Counsel must also file an Anders brief setting forth 

issues that might arguably support the appeal along with any 

other issues necessary for the effective appellate presentation 

thereof....

Anders counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders

petition and brief to the appellant, advising the appellant of the 

right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any 

additional points worthy of this Court’s attention.

If counsel does not fulfill the aforesaid technical 

requirements of Anders, this Court will deny the petition to 

withdraw and remand the case with appropriate instructions 

(e.g., directing counsel either to comply with Anders or file an 

advocate’s brief on Appellant’s behalf). By contrast, if counsel’s 

petition and brief satisfy Anders, we will then undertake our 

own review of the appeal to determine if it is wholly frivolous. If 

the appeal is frivolous, we will grant the withdrawal petition and 

affirm the judgment of sentence. However, if there are nonfrivolous issues, we will deny the petition and remand for the 

filing of an advocate’s brief. 

Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 720-21 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has clarified portions of the Anders

procedure:
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[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed 

counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a 

summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to 

the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel 

believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s 

reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel 

should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case 

law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that 

the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

Based upon our examination of counsel’s petition to withdraw and 

Anders brief, we conclude that counsel has substantially complied with the 

technical requirements set forth above.2 Therefore, we now have the 

responsibility “‘to make a full examination of the proceedings and make an 

independent judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly 

frivolous.’” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1249 (Pa. Super. 

2015) (quoting Santiago, 978 A.2d at 354 n. 5).

Counsel presented this Court with two issues of arguable merit 

concerning (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain Appellant’s 

convictions and (2) the length of Appellant’s sentence. Anders Brief at 22. 

We begin with the law applicable to the first issue.

As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency 

claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit 

of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 

 

2 Appellant has not responded to counsel’s petition to withdraw.
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Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it 

establishes each material element of the crime charged and the 

commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a 

mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is 

to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact 

can be drawn from the combined circumstances. 

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of 

wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that the 

evidence establishing a defendant's participation in a crime is 

circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where the evidence 

coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 

overcomes the presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may 

not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so 

long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective 

elements of a defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, 

the appellant’s convictions will be upheld. 

Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)

Under the relevant portion of the bad checks statute, “A person 

commits an offense if he issues or passes a check or similar sight order for 

the payment of money, knowing that it will not be honored by the drawee.” 

18 Pa.C.S. § 4105(a)(1). “It is well established that, under 18 Pa.C.S 

§ 4105, ... the legislature intended to denominate the passing of a check for 

which there are insufficient funds, where the insufficiency is within the 

knowledge of the issuer, as a crime regardless of whether the issuer 

possessed a specific intent to defraud.” Commonwealth v. Kyslinger, 484 

A.2d 389, 390 (Pa. 1984). 
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The statute includes the following presumption regarding the requisite 

knowledge: 

An issuer is presumed to know that the check or order (other 

than a post-dated check or order) would not be paid, if:

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(ii) payment was refused by the drawee for lack of funds, 

upon presentation within 30 days after issue, and the 

issuer failed to make good within ten days after receiving 

notice of that refusal.

Notice of refusal may be given to the issuer orally or in writing 

by any person. ...

18 Pa.C.S. § 4105(b)(1)(ii).

Here, Ms. Breon testified that, between August 22 and August 29, 

2013, Appellant wrote the 13 checks for the payment of money to Ms. 

Breon. N.T., 1/22/2015, at 9-13. The Commonwealth introduced into 

evidence copies of the checks, which all have Appellant’s name printed on 

them. The representative of Appellant’s bank testified that Appellant’s 

account had a negative balance from the time the first check was written 

until after the last was written. Id. at 32-33. The jury also heard Ms. 

Breon’s testimony that, when she confronted Appellant about the checks 

having bounced, Appellant acknowledged that she did not have the money in 

her account. Id. at 19. Thereafter, rather than making good, Appellant 

disappeared and avoided Ms. Breon’s attempts to contact her. Id. at 19-20. 
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When this evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, it is sufficient to allow the jury to conclude beyond a 

reasonable doubt that, on 13 separate occasions, Appellant wrote a check to 

Ms. Breon for money knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover 

it. Accordingly, we agree with counsel that a challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence is meritless.3

Counsel also presents an issue concerning the length of Appellant’s 

sentence. The applicable standard of review is as follows. 

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. 

Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, 

that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, 

exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias 

or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

* * *

When imposing sentence, a court is required to consider 

the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of 

the defendant. In considering these factors, the court should 

refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal 

characteristics and potential for rehabilitation. 

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760-61 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

 

3 Appellant’s chief complaint with the verdict is that Ms. Breon’s testimony 

was false, and that the scheme was of Ms. Breon’s creation to get money 

when neither of them had it. N.T., 2/18/2015, at 7-8. That credibility 

determination was for the jury and will not be overturned by this Court. 

Franklin, 69 A.3d at 722-23. 
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An appellant is not entitled to the review of challenges to the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence as of right. Rather, an 

appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence 

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. We determine whether the 

appellant has invoked our jurisdiction by considering the 

following four factors: 

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of 

appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the 

issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a 

motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a 

fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether 

there is a substantial question that the sentence 

appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1006-07 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(some citations omitted). 

Here, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal after preserving the 

issue by filing a motion to modify sentence. We do not have a 2119(f) 

statement before us,4 but note that “[w]here counsel files an Anders brief, 

this Court has reviewed the matter even absent a separate Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) 

statement. Hence, we do not consider counsel’s failure to submit a Rule 

2119(f) statement as precluding review of whether Appellant's issue is 

frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 112 A.3d 656, 661 (Pa. Super. 

2015) (citations omitted). 

 

4 Counsel’s brief notes the requirements of Rule 2119(f), but opines as to 

the lack of any substantial question rather than advocates that one exists. 

Anders Brief at 27-28. 
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In her motion to modify sentence, Appellant argued that, given the 

minor nature of the offenses and her lack of a prior record, the aggregate 

term of supervision created by the imposition of consecutive sentences was 

unduly harsh. Motion to Modify Sentence, 3/2/2015, at unnumbered page 2. 

“Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion to impose its 

sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being imposed at 

the same time or to sentences already imposed. Any challenge to the 

exercise of this discretion ordinarily does not raise a substantial question.” 

Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal 

quotation omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pass, 914 A.2d 442, 446–

47 (Pa. Super. 2006)). “[T]he key to resolving the preliminary substantial 

question inquiry is whether the decision to sentence consecutively raises the 

aggregate sentence to, what appears upon its face to be, an excessive level 

in light of the criminal conduct at issue in the case.” Commonwealth v. 

Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 587 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

The trial court offered the following discussion of the criminal conduct 

at issue, after hearing Appellant use her right to allocution to continue 

blaming the victim and maintaining her untenable version of events rejected 

by the jury: 

You are guilty, factually and legally in the [c]ourt’s mind, 

and this sentence is to reflect what I believe to be a rather 

heinous act considering the financial circumstances of the victim 

in this case. This was not an individual who can absorb the type 
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of money we’re talking about without having significant threats 

to her own welfare and her own ability to care for herself.

You took $4,000 from someone who just doesn’t have the 

money and doesn’t appear to have any prospects of getting the 

money.

N.T., 2/18/2015, at 11-12. The trial court further explained that it made the 

probationary sentences consecutive so that Appellant’s supervision would 

last long enough “to insure that restitution is paid in full.”5 Id. at 12.

We conclude that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences 

in light of the particular circumstances of Appellant’s criminal conduct does 

not create an aggregate sentence that is excessive on its face. Thus, 

Appellant’s claim does not raise a substantial question that the trial court’s 

sentence is the result of an abuse of discretion. 

Therefore, we agree with counsel that Appellant’s issues regarding the 

sufficiency of the evidence and the length of her sentence are frivolous. 

Moreover, we have conducted “a full examination of the proceedings” and 

conclude that “the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” Flowers, 113 A.3d at 

1248. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s 

petition to withdraw.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.

 

5 As the trial court noted in its opinion, it granted Appellant’s motion to 

modify sentence to allow for the early termination of her probation if she 

pays restitution in full. Trial Court Opinion, 6/2/2015, at 8. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/2/2015