January 2001 Major Managem

Challenges and 

Program Risks

Department of Justice

GAO-01-250

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Letter 

Overview 

Major 

Performance 

and 

Accountability 

Challenges

Related GAO 

Products

Performance 

and 

Accountability 

Series
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of th

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United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

January 2001

The President of the Senate

The Speaker of the House of Representati

This report addresses the major performa

accountability challenges facing the Depa

Justice (Justice) as it seeks to enforce law

interest and protect the public from violen

criminal activity. It includes a summary of 

Justice has taken and that are under way 

these challenges. It also outlines further a

GAO believes are needed. This analysis sh

new Congress and administration carry ou

responsibilities and improve government 

of the American people.

This report is part of a special series, first 

January 1999, entitled the Performance an

Accountability Series: Major Management 

and Program Risks. In that series, GAO ad

Congress that it planned to reassess the m

and criteria used to determine which fede

government operations and functions sho

highlighted and which should be designat

risk.” GAO completed the assessment, con

comments provided on a publicly availabl

draft, and published its guidance docume

Determining Performance and Accountab

Challenges and High Risks (GAO-01-159SP

November 2000.

This 2001 Performance and Accountabilit

contains separate reports on 21 agencies—

each cabinet department, most major inde

agencies, and the U.S. Postal Service. The 

includes a governmentwide perspective on 
Page 4 GAO-01-250 Justi

and management challenges across the fede

government. As a companion volume to this 

is issuing an update on those government op

and programs that its work identified as “hig

because of either their greater vulnerabilitie

fraud, abuse, and mismanagement or major c

associated with their economy, efficiency, or 

effectiveness.

David M. Walker

Comptroller General 

of the United States
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As the nation’s chief law enforcement age

Department of Justice is charged with, am

things, enforcing laws in the public intere

a key role in protecting the public from vi

criminal activity, such as drug smuggling a

terrorism. With a budget of over $21 billion 

nearly 110,000, including attorneys, invest

agents, Justice is a multifaceted organizat

functions range from securing the nation’s 

helping state and local agencies improve t

to prevent and control crime. Justice’s res

are divided among a number of major com

including the Immigration and Naturalizat

(INS), the Office of Justice Programs (OJP

Enforcement Administration (DEA), the F

of Investigation (FBI), and the United Sta

Service (USMS). In meeting their mission

components must confront several contem

performance and accountability challenge
Page 7 GAO-01-250 Ju

Immigration Law 

Enforcement and 

Services

With a budget of $4.3 billion and a workfo

33,000 employees, INS faces significant ch

carrying out its dual mission to enforce la

illegal immigration and provide immigrati

naturalization services for aliens who ente

legally in the United States. For example, 

recommendations and proposals to restru

been made as a result of several critics’ co

“mission overload” has impeded INS from 

either of its primary functions. However, t

new organizational structure have not yet 

INS also faces significant challenges in im

several of its programs. Our reviews of th

have resulted in numerous recommendati

INS’ ability to secure the country’s borders

• Improve the enforcement of immigration law

and provision of immigration and naturaliza

services.

• Better manage programs designed to supp

state and local efforts to reduce crime.

• Develop measurable performance targets to

help DEA determine its progress in reducin

availability of illegal drugs.

• Achieve excellence in financial managemen

including, but not limited to, a departmentw

unqualified opinion for fiscal year 2000 and

beyond.

• Improve management and accountability ov

Justice’s asset forfeiture program.
Page 8 GAO-01-250 Justi

smuggling, strengthen interior enforcement 

immigration laws, expedite the removal of c

aliens, and manage its information technolog

INS has taken action to address some of the d

that we identified, it continues to face major 

in each of these areas as it works to develop 

organizational, management, and informatio

infrastructure needed to effectively meet its 

goals.

Support for State and 

Local Crime 

Reduction Efforts

In its role to support state and local efforts t

crime, Justice faces management challenges 

programs that we have reviewed—Weed and 

Police Corps. Weed and Seed is a community

multiagency program whose mission is to he

out” crime in targeted neighborhoods, then “

neighborhood with a variety of programs an

to prevent a resurgence of crime. The Police 

overall objective is to help state and local law 

enforcement agencies fight violent crime by 

the number of officers with advanced educa

training who are assigned to community patr

through the Executive Office for Weed and S

(EOWS), has made some progress in respon

recommendations to develop adequate intern

and improve monitoring of the program. In a

EOWS has begun to address our recommend

develop funding criteria to award various fun

recipients. Less progress, however, has been 

EOWS in developing better performance mea

able to adequately judge Weed and Seed’s su

Separately, the Police Corps program had ex

challenges that related to states’ participatio

program due to inadequate funding to pay th

costs for program administration or recruitm

selection of program participants. OJP has m

progress in addressing this issue, such as ob

funds and establishing interagency agreemen

participating states. However, it is too soon t
Page 9 GAO-01-250 Ju

whether these actions will result in increa

participation.

Reduce Availability of 

Illegal Drugs

The supply and use of illegal drugs remain

national problem that is estimated to cost 

upwards of $100 billion annually. As the le

enforcement agency with responsibilities 

supply reduction portion of the National D

Strategy, DEA faces challenges related to 

progress in reducing the availability of ille

DEA has made some progress in developi

goals and objectives, and its enhanced pro

initiatives during the 1990s have been con

those of the National Strategy. However, D

fully addressed our recommendation to d

measurable performance targets for its pr

initiatives that are consistent with those a

National Strategy. As a result, it is difficul

Justice to assess how effective DEA has b

achieving its strategic goals and how effec

programs and initiatives have been in red

supply of illegal drugs. 
Page 10 GAO-01-250 Justi

Financial 

Management 

Excellence

Justice has made significant progress toward 

an unqualified opinion on its departmentwid

statements. However, to achieve excellence 

management, it is critical that Justice fully a

identified significant internal control weakn

total number of reported weaknesses at Just

reporting components increased from fiscal y

fiscal year 1999, and Justice’s auditors repor

departmentwide material weaknesses1

 in int

controls. The auditors also reported that inte

weaknesses at five of Justice’s components w

significant departures from the requirements 

Federal Financial Management Improvemen

1996 (FFMIA). Two of its key components, IN

DEA, contributed to these departmentwide d

and had additional internal control weaknes

for example, contributed to a qualified opini

and, at DEA, increased the risk that assets w

properly safeguarded from loss or unauthori

Until its components correct the underlying 

these challenges, Justice, regardless of the ty

opinion received, continues to be at risk of er

or noncompliance occurring and not being p

detected.

Justice’s Asset 

Forfeiture Program

The separate but similar asset forfeiture pro

operated by Justice and Treasury were first d

as high risk2

 in 1990 because neither agency 

adequately focused on managing and accoun

1

A material weakness is a condition in which the design 

one or more of the internal control components does no

relatively low level, the risk that errors or irregularities

that would be material to the financial statements, may 

be detected promptly by employees in the normal cours

performing their duties.

2

Since 1990, we have periodically reported on governme

that we have identified as “high risk” because of their g

vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagem
Page 11 GAO-01-250 Ju

seized assets or formed a plan to consolid

programs, as was mandated by Congress. 

September 30, 1999, these programs mana

valued at more than $1 billion, plus large 

nonvalued assets, such as seized drugs and 

reported in 1999 that Justice had made pr

managing its real property. However, we a

continued to report on the program’s inad

information systems and financial manage

weaknesses, including accountability over 

Further, Justice and Treasury have still no

consolidate their two programs. Justice h

plans to take actions to address the inform

and financial management issues, includin

accountability, that were identified in rece

OIG reports. In addition, Justice and Trea

conducting a formal study of opportunitie

cooperation in the administration of their 

which is to result in recommendations for 

effectiveness and efficiency of property m

functions within the federal asset forfeitu

determining whether to remove the high-r

designation for the asset forfeiture progra

future, we will consider the results of this 

including the implementation of any relat

recommendations, as well as the results o

initiatives for resolving Justice’s and Trea

respective financial management and acc

issues. 

Figure 1 summarizes the performance and 

accountability challenges facing Justice a

components. The section that follows pro

detailed discussion of these challenges.
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Figure 1: Summary of the Performance and Accountability Challenges Facing Justic

Components

Source: GAO analysis of INS data.

Performance and

accountability challenges

Improve the enforcement of

immigration laws and

provision of immigration and

naturalization services.

Better manage programs

designed to support state and

local efforts to reduce crime.

Develop measurable performance

targets to help DEA determine its

progress in reducing the

availability of illegal drugs.

Achieve excellence in financial

management, including, but not

limited to, a Department-wide

unqualified opinion for fiscal

year 2000 and beyond.

Improve management and

accountability of Justice's

asset forfeiture program.

INSFBIUSMS

Department of Justice

major components facing challen

OJPDEA
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y g

The Department of Justice faces performa

accountability challenges in a number of a

challenges include enforcing the nation’s 

laws; developing and maintaining accurat

financial and program information; manag

designed to support state and local efforts 

crime; measuring the effect of Justice’s eff

the supply of illegal drugs; and managing 

during drug enforcement operations. Addr

these challenges requires sustained manag

and commitment.

Improve the 

Enforcement of 

Immigration Laws 

and Provision of 

Immigration and 

Naturalization 

Services

INS is faced with the formidable task of d

apprehending, and removing persons who 

immigration laws. At the same time, INS i

providing an array of services and benefit

legally enter and reside in the United Stat

providing employment authorization and 

naturalization applications. Over the past 

Congress has repeatedly expressed conce

ability to carry out its functions and, acco

significantly increased the agency’s resou

fiscal year 2000 budget of $4.3 billion repr

increase of about 187 percent over its fisc

budget. INS’ workforce also increased by 

percent, from 18,000 to nearly 33,000 emp

the same period. 

Despite the significant increase in resourc

continues to face challenges in achieving 

results. Those challenges are related to IN

organizational structure and program imp

efforts, such as controlling the border, red

smuggling and unauthorized alien employ

addressing aliens’ failure to appear for rem

In addition, INS continues to have problem

developing and fielding the information te

is critical to its operations.
Page 14 GAO-01-250 Justi

INS’ Organizational 

Structure Remains 

Undecided

Proposals to restructure INS have been issue

result of several critics’ conclusion that “mis

overload” has impeded INS from succeeding 

its primary functions. For example, in 1997, 

bipartisan Commission on Immigration Refo

that INS’ service and enforcement functions 

incompatible and that tasking one agency wi

out both functions caused problems, such as 

competition for resources, lack of coordinat

cooperation, and personnel practices that cr

confusion regarding mission and responsibil

1998, the administration acknowledged the n

fundamental reform and concluded that orga

problems impeded INS’ ability to carry out it

missions. In 1999, the INS Commissioner sta

mission conflict at the local operational leve

accountability and that the bureaucratic cha

command hampered efficiency. She further 

acknowledged that INS did not uniformly pr

consistent, courteous, and timely services to 

sought INS benefits.

To remedy these problems, the Commission 

Immigration Reform, the Carnegie Endowme

International Peace, INS, and several Membe

Congress have recommended ways to restru

The reorganization proposals have ranged fr

dismantling INS and replacing it with a new 

would handle immigration enforcement func

moving immigration service functions to the 

Departments of State and Labor, to restructu

internally by creating two separate chains of 

command—one for enforcement and the oth

services—and leaving it as a single agency w

Department of Justice. As of October 2000, th

a new structure for carrying out the nation’s i

laws had not been decided. The ability of the 

reorganization to resolve INS’ long-standing 
Page 15 GAO-01-250 Ju

management and program implementatio

remains unclear.

INS Implementing 

Southwest Border 

Strategy, But 

Effectiveness 

Unknown

INS’ Border Patrol is responsible for prev

deterring aliens from illegally entering the 

between ports of entry. The Border Patrol 

the second phase of a four-phase strategy 

deter illegal entry along the southwest bo

strategy calls for first increasing Border P

and resources in San Diego and El Paso a

increasing them in Arizona and south Tex

allocated nearly 75 percent of its new age

Arizona and Texas in fiscal year 1998. 

Although INS generally allocated newly h

Patrol agents in accordance with its strate

not able to meet its goal of increasing its o

strength of Border Patrol agents by at leas

fiscal year 1999, as was congressionally m

Specifically, figure 2 shows that while INS 

goal in fiscal years 1997 and 1998, it saw a

only 369 agents in fiscal year 1999 due to 

and retention problems.

1

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Res

1996 (P.L. 104-208), among other things, directed the 

to increase the number of Border Patrol agents onbo

than 1,000 in each fiscal year, from 1997 through 200
Page 16 GAO-01-250 Justi

Figure 2: Results of INS’ Efforts to Increase Borde

Onboard Strength, Fiscal Years 1997 Through 1999

Source: GAO analysis of INS data.

INS made progress in implementing its south

border strategy, such as building new fencin

California and Arizona, increasing the amoun

Border Patrol agents spent on border enforc

deploying additional technologies such as re

surveillance cameras. In fiscal year 1999, INS 

testing a model to help it determine the right 

staffing, equipment, and technology for its Bo

sectors.

In two reports issued in 1997 and 1999, we n

data on the interim effects of the Attorney G

strategy were limited, although some of the c

1002

1035

369

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1997 1998 1999

INS’ goal to increase its onboard strength o

agents by not less than 1,000 in each fiscal 

Net gain/loss of agents
Page 17 GAO-01-250 Ju

anticipated by the strategy were occurring

illegal alien apprehensions declined in suc

routes of entry as San Diego and El Paso b

elsewhere. An unintended consequence o

was that deaths, resulting from attempted 

remote areas, appeared to increase. 

INS lacks performance information to det

overall impact of its strategy to reduce th

flow across the border, reduce flow to the 

reduce the number of illegal aliens who re

United States. Although INS contracted w

research firms to conduct several geograp

specific studies along the southwest bord

did not meet the intent of our recommend

conduct a systematic, comprehensive eva

southwest border strategy. We believe tha

evaluation could have helped INS determi

and to what extent, its investment of billio

in implementing the strategy produced th

results. The challenge for INS remains in 

how it will know, in an overall sense, whe

strategy has successfully met its objective

Shortcomings in 

Programs to Control 

Alien Smuggling 

This country’s ability to combat the signif

growing problem of alien smuggling is ham

management and operational problems at 

fragmented and uncoordinated investigati

lack of staff to perform intelligence functi

example, INS does not have procedures in 

coordinate its resources for initiating and 

antismuggling cases. In several border are

antismuggling units exist that operate aut

overlap in jurisdiction, and report to diffe

officials. In addition, INS field officials lac

on which cases to investigate, resulting in 

decision-making across locations. In addi

an agencywide automated case tracking a

management system to help it (1) monitor 
Page 18 GAO-01-250 Justi

investigations, (2) determine if multiple antis

units may be investigating the same target in

organization, or (3) know if previous investig

been conducted on a particular target. Furth

antismuggling intelligence efforts have been 

by an inefficient and cumbersome process fo

and analyzing intelligence information and b

clear guidance to INS staff about how to gath

and disseminate intelligence information. 

We reported that limited performance measu

hampered INS’ ability to evaluate the effectiv

antismuggling program. INS’ fiscal year 1999 

performance goals focused mainly on the nu

smugglers presented for prosecution to the U

Attorneys and the number of designated prio

Such indicators measure program outputs, b

not provide information to measure the exte

INS’ antismuggling efforts have helped achie

strategy’s objective of deterring and disrupti

smuggling. INS has not specified how other e

results from the strategy, such as a shift in sm

activity between geographic areas along the 

be measured. We noted that while we recogn

difficulty in directly measuring outcomes su

deterrence and disruption of antismuggling, 

that there are a variety of measures available

information on smuggling fees, usage and ta

shifts in the flow of smuggled alien traffic—t

be used to collect systematic data and devel

composite picture of progress toward achiev

strategy’s objectives. 

We also reported that the above impediments 

it difficult, if not impossible, for INS to meet 

challenges posed by increasingly sophisticat

smuggling organizations. To address these co

recommended that INS (1) establish criteria 

an antismuggling case to help ensure that its 

antismuggling resources are focused on the 
Page 19 GAO-01-250 Ju

priority cases; (2) establish a cost-effective 

and management system of alien smugglin

investigations that is automated, agencyw

readily available to investigative personne

managers to facilitate the sharing of case 

and prevent duplication of effort; (3) esta

performance measures for the antismuggl

intelligence program with which to gauge 

effects; and (4) require that intelligence re

prepared using a database format so that 

information can be systematically analyze

these recommendations, we noted that w

improvements, INS’ ability to disrupt and 

increasingly sophisticated and organized 

smugglers and dismantle their organizatio

continue to be hampered. 

Efforts to Reduce 

Unauthorized 

Employment Face 

Impediments

Although Congress enacted legislation in 

created an employment verification proce

prohibited employers from hiring unautho

significant numbers of unauthorized alien

obtaining employment. The effectiveness 

verification process has been undermined 

of fraudulent documents. In addition, emp

little chance of being investigated by INS, 

because resources for worksite enforcem

relatively small. Figure 3 shows that in fis

INS devoted about 2 percent (slightly ove

workyears) of its enforcement workyears 

enforcement.
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Figure 3: INS Enforcement Program Workyears as a Percentage of Total Enforcemen

Workyears for Fiscal Year 1998

Note: For the major INS enforcement programs, fiscal y

workyears are budget amounts. Actual workyear data f

programs were not available at the time of our review.

a

Includes actual time spent by INS agents and support 

investigations that target employers who are suspected 

unauthorized workers.

b

Includes all other investigations (other than employers

criminal aliens, drug trafficking, fraud, smuggling, and i

status violations.

Source: GAO analysis of INS data.

With these limited worksite enforcement res

conducted about 6,500 investigations of emp

which equated to about 3 percent of the cou

estimated number of employers of unauthor

Border Patrol

Detention and deportation

Inspections

1% Intelligence

Other investigationsb

2% Worksite investigationsa

44%

11%

16%

26%

N = 18,824
Page 21 GAO-01-250 Ju

Even among employers who were investig

not likely to find that they knowingly viola

collect fines from them, or seek to bring c

them. When INS identified and arrested u

workers, it could not determine whether e

replaced them with authorized workers, n

unauthorized workers were placed into d

hearings and removed from the country. 

In 1999, INS was taking several steps to im

employment verification process and mak

susceptible to fraud. For example, INS wa

several programs to make it possible for e

electronically verify an employee’s eligibi

However, INS was having difficulty getting 

enroll in its pilot programs. INS was also t

increase the integrity of the documents it i

in order to reduce fraudulent document u

In addition, INS issued an interior enforce

that called for INS to pursue the criminal 

of employers who are flagrant or grave vio

However, the strategy left unclear what w

flagrant or grave violation, what criteria w

for opening investigations of employers su

criminal activities, and how INS would me

effectiveness of its strategy. We recomme

implementing the interior enforcement st

needed to clarify the criteria for opening i

of employers suspected of criminal activit

that having clear criteria is important if IN

effectively focus its limited staff to achiev

enforcement goals and intended results. 

Released Aliens Not 

Appearing for 

Removal Hearings

By statute, INS is to detain aliens who atte

the United States by engaging in fraud or 

misrepresentation and those who arrive w

improper, or no documents. INS favors re

aliens from detention if an asylum officer 
Page 22 GAO-01-250 Justi

that they have a credible fear of persecution 

and do not pose a risk of flight or danger to t

community. For fiscal year 1999, INS reporte

from detention 78 percent of those aliens fou

a credible fear of persecution or torture. Bet

1, 1997, and September 30, 1999, there were 

who received an immigration judge’s decisio

(immigrants whose claims are denied by an 

officers may appeal that determination to an 

immigration judge). Of the 2,351 aliens, 1,000 

percent) of them had not appeared for their 

hearings. At the time of our review, INS had 

efforts under way to analyze issues associate

low appearance rate. In addition, we recomm

INS analyze the characteristics of those alien

appeared and those who did not appear for t

removal hearing and use the results to reeva

policy for when to release aliens in cases wh

asylum officer determined the aliens to have 

fear of persecution or torture. 

Key Contact Richard M. Stana, Director

Tax Administration and Justice 

(202) 512-8777

stanar@gao.gov

INS’ Information 

Technology 

Management 

Weaknesses

Each year INS invests hundreds of millions o

information technology (IT) systems and act

fiscal year 2000, INS obligated about $327 m

activities and it plans to spend about $226 m

fiscal year 2001. 

However, INS continues to have problems ef

managing its IT resources that are critical to 

operations. Justice’s Office of Inspector Gen

has reported that (1) estimated completion d

some IT projects had been delayed without e

(2) project costs continued to spiral upward 
Page 23 GAO-01-250 Ju

justification for how funds were spent, an

were nearing completion with no assuran

would meet performance and functional r

In August 2000, we reported that INS lack

enterprise architecture—or agencywide b

manage its IT efforts effectively and effici

the fundamental management structures a

needed to effectively develop one. The lac

architecture has hindered INS’ ability to e

hundreds of millions of dollars it spends e

will optimally support its mission needs. I

2000, we reported that INS lacked defined 

disciplined processes to select, control, an

IT investments. Consequently, INS is ham

ability to know whether it is making the rig

decisions, whether it has selected the mix 

investments that best meet its overall mis

business priorities, or whether it is adequa

the risks associated with these investmen

To address these serious weaknesses, we 

series of recommendations to introduce e

management practices at INS, such as (1) 

complete enterprise architecture, and (2) 

and implementing effective IT investment 

processes. INS has begun taking action to 

recommendations. However, until they ar

we also recommended that INS limit requ

IT appropriations to efforts that (1) suppo

operations and maintenance of existing sy

small and represent low technical risk and 

delivered in a short period of time, (3) are 

congressionally mandated, or (4) support 

develop an enterprise architecture and im

investment management processes. We pl

INS’ actions to implement our recommen

Key Contact Randolph C. Hite, Director

Information Technology Systems Issues
Page 24 GAO-01-250 Justi

(202) 512-6204

hiter@gao.gov

Better Manage 

Programs Designed 

to Support State 

and Local Efforts to 

Reduce Crime

Providing leadership and support to state an

efforts is one of Justice’s key roles in further 

the nation’s capacity to prevent and control 

part of this role, Justice attempts to support 

community-based programs aimed at reduci

and violence in U.S. communities through (1

encouraging community-based approaches t

justice at the state and local level by compre

collaborative programs, such as Weed and S

(2) supporting community-policing initiative

providing funding to hire and deploy police o

Weed and Seed and Police Corps are two pro

currently funded by the Department of Justic

support state and local efforts to reduce crim

reviews of both programs have shown that, w

has made some progress toward addressing 

administrative and management weaknesses

remain related to developing better perform

measures at Weed and Seed and increasing s

participation in the Police Corps program. 

Progress Made, but 

Program 

Management 

Weaknesses Still 

Remain in Weed and 

Seed Program

The Weed and Seed program is Justice’s flag

in community-based efforts to prevent and c

violent crime and provide a safe environmen

community residents can live, work, and rais

families. Weed and Seed’s objective is to help 

crime from targeted neighborhoods, then “se

with a variety of programs and resources to 

resurgence of crime. In 1999, we reported th

Executive Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS)

responsible for the national management an

administration of the program, lacked an ade

internal control to require that significant de

related to funding allocations be documente

this control, EOWS could not ensure that it w
Page 25 GAO-01-250 Ju

the best allocation of available funds whe

important program decisions, such as qua

and existing sites for funding. In addition, 

always ensured, through its grant monitor

that site progress reports—a grant require

submitted or that grant monitors docume

visits. We recommended that EOWS deve

adequate internal control to ensure that th

rationale for new and existing site qualific

funding decisions were always fully docum

also recommended that EOWS improve p

monitoring to ensure that sites met the gr

requirement of submitting reports and tha

were documented. 

Since then, EOWS has made progress in im

our recommendations. EOWS issued a po

procedures manual that included criteria 

requirements for site qualification for fun

and Justice indicated that written internal 

procedures for making and documenting 

decisions were being refined. In addition, 

reported that all site monitoring visits we

documented. EOWS also reported that ne

will be explored to ensure that grantees su

progress reports in a timely manner, such 

funding access to grantees that continually 

progress reports in a timely manner. Furth

emphasized the importance of filing timel

reports at its regional training conference

According to EOWS officials, the timeline

submitted progress reports has improved

Our work in 1999 also showed that EOWS 

to determine when sites became self-susta

when to reduce or withdraw Weed and Se

though the objective of sites’ becoming se

was a central program goal. We recomme

EOWS develop criteria for determining w

or withdraw program funding from self-su
Page 26 GAO-01-250 Justi

Subsequently, EOWS announced a policy to 

Weed and Seed grant funds to include a diffe

neighborhood after 5 years of funding. 

Finally, our work showed that although curr

performance measures addressed a variety o

taking place at Weed and Seed sites, those m

were generally not adequate to judge progra

While EOWS had made some changes in the 

measured program effectiveness, those indic

generally tracked activities, not program out

recognize the difficulty involved in precisely 

the results of this type of community-based p

strategy. However, we recommended that EO

develop additional performance measures to 

program outcomes, noting that the indicator

help EOWS make more informed program d

such as whether to continue existing funding

response, EOWS officials recognized the nee

efforts to measure performance, including qu

factors and other program measures. These 

informed us that they sought appropriations 

year 2001 to expand evaluation and perform

measurement efforts to include the use of 

sociodemographic indicators, but that the ad

funds requested for fiscal year 2001 had not 

approved by Congress as of November 2000.

Police Corps 

Program Had a 

Slower Than 

Expected Start, Due 

to Funding and 

Staffing Limitations

The Police Corps program and the Federal O

Police Corps and Law Enforcement Educatio

the Police Corps) were established by the Vi

Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. T

goal of the Police Corps program is to addre

crime by helping state and local law enforce

agencies increase the number of officers wit

education and training assigned to communi

Specifically, the program provides competiti

scholarships to college students who agree t

Bachelor’s Degree and subsequently serve as 
Page 27 GAO-01-250 Ju

officers on community patrol for at least f

area with great need for additional law en

officers and where they will be used most 

The program also provides financial assis

enforcement agencies that hire program p

The Office of the Police Corps provides th

participating states, who in turn provide t

individual program participants, colleges, 

enforcement training providers, and law e

agencies. 

In February 2000, we reported that under 

Community Oriented Policing Services (C

Police Corps program started out slower t

and, as a result, the majority of participan

remained unfilled. According to federal an

officials, one factor contributing to this sl

that the Police Corps statute did not prov

pay states’ costs for program administrati

recruitment and selection of program par

Several states cited this as a reason for no

in the program, and several others cited it 

for the slow growth of their Police Corps 

addition, we noted that COPS’ operation o

Corps as a direct reimbursement program 

determining program status difficult, as it 

rate at which funds were obligated.2

We also reported that according to federa

officials, one factor contributing to the de

COPS dedicated insufficient staff to the p

understaffing led to delays in providing pr

2

Under COPS, the Police Corps program paid schola

directly to the educational institution and payments 

enforcement agencies. In addition, it provided reimb

the prior educational expenses incurred by students 

the Police Corps program until their sophomore year 

and (2) the costs incurred by approved law enforcem

providers.
Page 28 GAO-01-250 Justi

guidance, processing program applications a

payments, and answering participants’ quest

the program.

In December 1998, the Police Corps program 

transferred from COPS to OJP. We reported t

made significant progress in obligating funds 

establishing interagency agreements with th

participating states and providing program g

However, at the time of our review, it was to

tell whether OJP would succeed in filling em

participant slots in a timely manner.

Key Contact Richard M. Stana, Director

Tax Administration and Justice 

(202) 512-8777

stanar@gao.gov

Develop 

Measurable 

Performance 

Targets to Help 

DEA Determine Its 

Progress in 

Reducing the 

Availability of 

Illegal Drugs

The supply and use of illegal drugs remains a 

national problem that is estimated to cost ou

upwards of $100 billion annually. The Office 

Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which has re

for setting federal priorities for drug control 

implementing a National Drug Control Strate

three strategic goals for reducing the supply 

drugs to our nation. Consistent with this stra

Justice’s strategic objectives is to reduce the 

trafficking of illegal drugs by identifying, disr

dismantling drug trafficking organizations th

international, multijurisdictional, or have an 

local impact. 

Although several Justice components share t

responsibility for achieving this objective, D

lead responsibility for enforcing federal drug 

for coordinating and pursuing U.S. drug inves

foreign countries. Accordingly, DEA has a st
Page 29 GAO-01-250 Ju

of identifying, targeting, investigating, dis

dismantling the international, national, sta

drug trafficking organizations that are hav

significant impact on our nation. To achie

and other goals, DEA’s funding significant

over the past few years. For example, DEA

year 2000 budget exceeded $1.5 billion, an 

about 69 percent (in nominal terms) since 

1993. DEA also increased its staff from ab

nearly 8,600 (about 20 percent) over the s

Difficulties in 

Measuring Progress 

in Reducing the 

Availability of Illegal 

Drugs

The seriousness of the nation’s drug probl

growing resources devoted to the “drug w

the importance of Justice’s and DEA’s stra

and performance measurement. Effective 

performance measurement can assist Just

achieving its goal of (1) reducing the natio

supply and related crime and violence by 

dismantling drug trafficking organizations 

ensuring that Justice and DEA are achievi

an efficient and effective manner, as mand

Government Performance and Results Ac

(GPRA). Despite progress that DEA made 

strategic goals and objectives and in enha

programs and initiatives, which are consis

National Drug Control Strategy, limitation

performance measures make it difficult to 

progress in reducing the availability of ille

In 1999, we reported DEA’s process for de

staffing needs and allocating staff within D

consistent with applicable federal laws, re

OMB procedures and took into considera

congressional guidance on staff allocation

reported that DEA’s strategic and annual p

plans, strategic goals and objectives, and 

programs and initiatives in the 1990s were 

with ONDCP’s National Drug Control Stra

blueprint for overall federal drug control 
Page 30 GAO-01-250 Justi

DEA and ONDCP strategies sought to reduce 

drug supply and drug-related violence by dis

dismantling domestic and international drug 

organizations. However, DEA’s performance 

focused generally on outputs such as the am

drugs seized and did not operationally define 

goals such as “disrupt” and “dismantle” majo

trafficking organizations. Thus, it was difficu

DEA’s success in achieving its strategic goals 

objectives and the effect of its programs and 

in reducing the illegal drug supply.

While we recognize that measuring success i

the availability of illegal drugs is difficult, we 

identified inconsistencies and limitations in 

and DEA’s efforts to establish goals and mea

performance relative to its drug enforcemen

For example, Justice’s OIG reported in Marc

Justice’s fiscal year 2000 Summary Performa

generally met the requirements of GPRA and 

of Management and Budget (OMB). Howeve

aspects of the plan, including those dealing w

enforcement, needed improvements to fully 

requirements. Among other things, the OIG f

(1) a discussion on strategies covering all pe

goals was lacking, (2) some performance go

indicators were not measurable, and (3) info

external data sources that could be used to m

performance was missing. Justice generally 

with the OIG’s recommendations for making 

summary performance plans compliant with 

OMB requirements.

One of Justice’s key performance outcomes i

Availability and/or Use of Illegal Drugs.” In J

3

Audit Report: Government Performance and Results A

Department of Justice FY 2000 Summary Performance P

11, Mar. 2000); Office of Inspector General, Department 
Page 31 GAO-01-250 Ju

we reported that Justice’s fiscal year 1999 

Report and fiscal year 2001 Performance 

key measures for this outcome that focus

such as increased amounts of drugs seize

measure can reflect either (1) improved s

reducing drug availability or (2) an increa

amount of drugs that are available for seiz

targets were not set for most of the measu

recurring theme from our 1999 report on D

strategies and operations. We recommend

Attorney General direct the DEA administ

closely with Justice and ONDCP to develo

DEA performance targets for disrupting an

drug trafficking organizations consistent w

performance targets in the National Drug 

Strategy.

In response to our recommendation, DEA 

a new strategic plan, which was approved 

(2) participated with a Department of Jus

group in defining the terms “disrupt” and 

and (3) formed an internal GPRA Work Co

assess and develop a feasible managemen

identify and establish quantifiable perform

Once they have been developed and appro

performance targets are to be reflected in 

annual performance plans and used to ho

accountable.
Page 32 GAO-01-250 Justi

In its November 1999 report4 on DEA’s Natio

Pointer Index System (NDPIX),5

 Justice’s OIG 

the system was adequately planned and deve

not duplicate existing systems, and could be 

tool for improving interagency communicati

However, the report also indicated that DEA 

improve management controls over NDPIX b

enhancing its performance measures to inclu

measures related to the index system’s goals, 

number of cooperative investigations resulti

positive “hits.” DEA agreed with the OIG’s re

recommendation.

Key Contact Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director

Tax Administration and Justice

(202) 512-8777

ekstrandl@gao.gov

4

Audit Report: The Drug Enforcement Administration’s 

Pointer Index System (OIG-00-03, Nov. 1999); Office of 

General, Department of Justice.

5

NDPIX is a computerized pointer system designed to p

information about ongoing drug investigations to partic

state, and local law enforcement agencies nationwide. It

(1) promote information sharing; (2) facilitate drug-rela

investigations; (3) prevent duplicate investigations; (4) 

coordination among federal, state, and local law enforc

agencies; and (5) enhance the personal safety of law en

officers. 
Page 33 GAO-01-250 Ju

Achieve Excellence 

in Financial 

Management, 

Including, But Not 

Limited to, a 

Departmentwide 

Unqualified 

Opinion for Fiscal 

Year 2000 and 

Beyond

Justice has made significant progress tow

an unqualified opinion on its departmentw

statements, which has been one of the Att

General’s foremost priorities. Specifically

improved from receiving a disclaimer of o

fiscal year 1998 departmentwide financial 

receiving a qualified opinion on its fiscal y

departmentwide financial statements. Wh

an unqualified opinion on annual financia

an important objective, it is not an end in 

The key is to take steps to continuously im

control and underlying financial and mana

information systems as a means to ensure 

accountability, increase the economy, imp

efficiency, and enhance the effectiveness o

These systems must generate timely, accu

useful information on an ongoing basis, no

end of the year. To achieve excellence in f

management, it is critical that Justice fully 

significant internal control weaknesses id

10 reporting components.6

 Until its compo

the underlying causes of these weaknesse

regardless of the type of opinion received

be at risk that information generated by th

systems throughout the year is inaccurate 

fraud, or noncompliance could occur and 

promptly detected. A sustained commitme

management will be needed to fully addre

challenges.

6

 For financial statement reporting purposes, Justice

is comprised of 10 components, which are (1) Asset

and Seized Asset Deposit Fund; (2) Working Capital 

Boards, and Divisions; (4) USMS; (5) OJP; (6) DEA; 

(9) Bureau of Prisons; and (10) Federal Prison Indus
Page 34 GAO-01-250 Justi

Significant Internal 

Control Weaknesses 

Exist

For fiscal year 1999, Justice’s auditors summ

material weaknesses7

 and 28 reportable cond

which were reported at the component level

departmentwide material weaknesses in inte

controls—(1) ineffective component financi

management systems and computer controls 

Department’s data centers; (2) lack of policie

procedures for recording financial transactio

accordance with generally accepted account

principles; and (3) ineffective financial state

preparation processes. Further, the auditors 

Justice’s components reported that certain in

control weaknesses identified at these comp

were significant departures from the federal 

requirements of the Federal Financial Manag

Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA). In additi

contributing to these departmentwide defici

of Justice’s key components, INS and DEA, h

additional internal control weaknesses. 

Internal Control Issues 

Reported by 

Component Auditors

Auditors for 9 of the 10 components reporte

weaknesses in financial management system

related computer controls over such system

increase the risk of software programs and d

processed on these systems not being adequ

protected from unauthorized access. For com

that had not implemented new financial man

systems, these weaknesses represented long

7

A material weakness is a condition in which the design 

one or more of the internal control components does no

relatively low level, the risk that errors or irregularities

that would be material to the financial statements, may 

be detected promptly by employees in the normal cours

performing their duties.

8

Reportable conditions are matters coming to the attent

auditors that, in their judgment, should be communicat

management because they represent significant deficien

design or operation of internal control that could adver

organization’s ability to meet the objectives of reliable f

reporting and compliance with applicable laws and regu
Page 35 GAO-01-250 Ju

challenges that had not been adequately a

management. The auditors reported that o

weaknesses noted may have been the resu

insufficient management attention to gene

during the implementation phase of new s

addition to computer control weaknesses 

the component level, the auditors also rep

Justice’s data centers did not have formal

procedures for changes in application sof

comprehensive plan to recover primary sy

exposing the agency to a potential disrupt

operations. Further, departmentwide com

policies and procedures were outdated an

adequately address security responsibiliti

authority. 

The auditors reported that 8 of the 10 com

not have policies or procedures in place o

always following them to ensure that fina

transactions were recorded in accordance 

generally accepted accounting principles. 

Auditors for 6 of the 10 components repor

weaknesses over the financial statement p

process. Because of the weaknesses ident

auditors—insufficient resources, technica

errors, and lack of supervisory review and 

support—many of the components missed 

deadlines for submitting financial stateme

submitted financial statements that result

having to adjust the departmentwide finan

statements. 

Financial Management 

Weaknesses at INS 

Continue to Exist

As reported in our January 1999 report on 

challenges at Justice, INS’ auditors identif

material weaknesses in internal controls, 

continues to experience. INS received a q

opinion on its fiscal year 1999 financial st

because, according to its auditor, INS had 
Page 36 GAO-01-250 Justi

maintained appropriate accounting records a

documentation to support the deferred reven

intragovernmental accounts payable balance

financial statements. These problems also re

qualified opinion on Justice’s departmentwid

statements. The auditor also identified mate

control weaknesses related to (1) computer 

controls, (2) the fund balance with Treasury 

reconciliation process, (3) intragovernmenta

payable, and (4) systems and procedures to 

deferred revenue. 

Recently, Justice’s OIG reported serious con

weaknesses in INS’ fee collection program a

of entry. Specifically, the OIG found that cas

easily steal cash before it is recorded in the c

and conceal the loss by either failing to ring 

transaction or voiding the transaction after i

rung up. Further, port of entry managers cou

account for many of the cash register tapes 

documenting thousands of transactions, and 

staff were not held accountable for cash sho

addition, we reported that INS service cente

processed approximately 75 percent of the im

applications received by INS, generally did n

the related fees collected within Treasury’s r

time frames, resulting in at least $640,000 in i

to the government. We also found that INS la

data necessary to determine how long distric

which processed the remaining 25 percent o

applications, took to deposit the related fees

As reported in our January 1999 report on m

challenges at Justice, INS financial managem

(1) were not integrated, resulting in significa

and burdensome reconciliation efforts; (2) h

significant internal control weaknesses, affe

accuracy and reliability of financial informat

limited, rather than enhanced, effective deci

making. According to INS, it urgently needed 
Page 37 GAO-01-250 Ju

its financial management system, which w

years old and did not have the functionali

to efficiently manage and account for its r

1997, INS selected its new Federal Financ

Management System but continues to exp

in implementing this new system. Instead 

its financial management processes and d

implementing a risk-management plan, as 

recommended, INS tasked its contractor w

ensure that risks associated with impleme

system would be identified and necessary 

mitigate them. Since the new system had 

implemented, INS had to rely on the old s

prepare its fiscal year 1999 financial state

In addition to reassessing the implementa

financial management system, other actio

either taking or has taken to address its fi

management weaknesses are reorganizing 

functions and continuing to reconcile fun

Treasury differences. However, according 

auditors, INS has become heavily depend

contractor resources to support its growin

management needs due to lack of staff res

accounting office in headquarters. The aud

that without sufficient regular staffing, IN

able to ensure the continuity of finance pe

operate effectively or have sufficient reso

ensure adequate oversight over the expan

contractor base. 

Reported Internal 

Control Weaknesses 

Increase at DEA 

Although DEA obtained an unqualified op

fiscal year 1999 financial statements, the n

reported internal control weaknesses at D

from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 1999. T

weaknesses related to (1) information sys

(2) the fund balance with Treasury reconc

process, (3) the lack of a system to accura

completely account for property and equip
Page 38 GAO-01-250 Justi

DEA’s weak financial reporting process. Oth

weaknesses included not fully following gen

accepted accounting principles and deficien

DEA’s ability to prepare accurate and timely 

statements.

In September 1998, we reported that several 

employees had been involved in two differen

embezzling DEA funds. One case involved a 

employee who allegedly embezzled more tha

during a 6-year period. The employee alleged

submitted hundreds of false payment vouche

reimbursement for services never performed 

corporation he established. The second case 

collusion among three DEA employees who 

funds to purchase various electronic and oth

equipment—valued at approximately $2.7 m

was diverted for their own use. DEA’s audito

reported any subsequent embezzlements. Ho

ineffective internal controls over property an

balance with Treasury reconciliations report

auditors increase the risk that assets were n

safeguarded from loss or unauthorized use. 

Actions DEA is either taking or has taken to 

financial management weaknesses are conti

reconcile fund balance with Treasury differe

correcting computer security control deficie

However, according to DEA’s auditor, DEA h

become dependent on contractor resources 

its financial management needs, including ro

accounting functions. The DEA auditor repo

without sufficient regular staffing, DEA may 

to ensure the continuity of properly trained f

personnel to operate effectively. 

Key Contact Gary T. Engel, Director

Financial Management and Assurance
Page 39 GAO-01-250 Ju

(202) 512-3406

engelg@gao.gov

Improve 

Management and 

Accountability Over 

Justice’s Asset 

Forfeiture Program

The Departments of Justice and Treasury 

similar but separate asset forfeiture progr

September 30, 1999, the combined value o

these two programs was more than $1 bill

about $378 million were assets under Just

management. Both programs also hold lar

nonvalued property such as drugs and we

programs have been designated as high-ri

high risk program was initiated in 1990 be

the years, neither Justice nor Treasury ad

focused on managing and accounting for 

forfeited items and (2) Justice and Treasu

formed a plan to consolidate postseizure a

of certain properties to eliminate duplicat

resources and reduce administrative cost

we and others have reported on the progr

continuing inadequate information system

financial management weaknesses, includ

accountability over certain seized propert

In recent years, Justice has taken many ac

improve the management and disposition 

forfeited property. For example, in 1999, w

that Justice had improved its managemen

property, such as cars, boats, and houses, 

locations we visited. Specifically, our repo

that we were able to account for all of the 

included in our review at those four locat

found that the seized assets generally app

9

The asset forfeiture program involves the managem

seized in consequence of a violation of public law, in

instruments, real property, and tangible personal pro

the actual or constructive possession of the custodia

forfeited property or property for which the title has 

Government.
Page 40 GAO-01-250 Justi

good condition and were stored and secured 

accordance with physical security and prope

management provisions in storage and main

contracts. In addition, Treasury and Justice a

undertaking a joint study to examine opport

increased cooperation in the management of 

programs. However, challenges remain to ad

programs’ inadequate information systems a

management weaknesses, including account

seized assets. Further, the results of the joint 

yet to be determined.

Improved 

Management and 

Accountability 

Needed

In September 1998, Justice’s OIG reported w

in the management of seized drugs at most o

Border Patrol stations it visited. In response 

recommendations contained in that report, th

Inspector General for Inspections reported th

has written policies or procedures on handli

storing seized drugs, adhering to proper cha

custody procedures, and specifying an indivi

responsible for evidence. To address the repo

to store seized drugs securely, INS plans to i

drug storage facilities, report on deficiencies 

develop a schedule of short- and long-term f

improvements.

In late 1999, we recommended that DEA and 

several specific actions to address physical s

over drugs and firearm evidence and to stren

accountability over such evidence. The types 

problems reported—such as missing chain-o

documentation, inaccurate recordkeeping of 

weapon evidence, and improper accounting 

weights—increase the risk of theft, misuse, a

compromise of evidence needed for prosecu

purposes. As a result of this work, DEA and 

taking actions to address identified deficienc

to accountability controls over seized prope

example, DEA and FBI policies are currently 
Page 41 GAO-01-250 Ju

modified to address issues of documentin

drug evidence to improve accountability. 

In February 2000, independent auditors fo

reported weaknesses in Justice’s financial 

controls used to report on and account fo

forfeited property. These weaknesses incl

seizing and custodial agencies not taking 

to ensure that corrections to the Consolid

Tracking System inventory records were p

(2) lack of a reliable system at DEA to acc

bulk drugs, seized property, and funds hel

(3) system deficiencies at FBI affecting th

completeness of summary reports on acqu

disposing of evidence, and (4) the need fo

inventory procedures used to validate the 

value of seized property at year-end. 

Although increasing accountability for the 

forfeiture program is not included as a per

in Justice’s Performance Plan as it was in 

Asset Forfeiture Fund component of Justi

Year 2001 Performance Plan stated that as 

enhancements and refinements are made 

Justice’s automated systems, data suppor

and forfeiture activities will be strengthen

automated systems enhancements and Ju

planned corrective actions should help ov

weaknesses identified in its asset forfeitur

individual components must continue to a

concerns noted above, with Justice’s over

continue to monitor Justice’s progress in t

Seized Asset 

Management 

Programs Not Yet 

Consolidated But 

Under Study

Legislation in 1988 required Treasury and 

develop a plan to consolidate their seized 

management functions. In 1991 we recom

consolidate the postseizure management 

disposition of noncash seized properties t

administrative costs. Although the Depart
Page 42 GAO-01-250 Justi

not made plans for consolidating their progr

September 2000, they contracted for a study 

opportunities for increased cooperation and 

agency and contractor resources. The study 

in recommendations for improving the effect

efficiency of property management function

federal asset forfeiture program. While the s

expected to fully embrace the concept of con

the two separate seized asset management a

functions, we believe that taking advantage o

opportunities for cooperation and sharing of 

contractor resources encompasses the spirit 

recommendation designed to reduce the pro

administrative costs.

To determine whether to remove the high ris

designation for the asset forfeiture program 

future, we will consider the results of Justice

Treasury’s study, including the implementati

related recommendations, as well as the resu

ongoing initiatives for resolving Justice and 

respective management and accountability i

Key Contacts Gary T. Engel, Director

Financial Management and Assurance

(202) 512-3406

engelg@gao.gov

Richard M. Stana, Director

Tax Administration and Justice 

(202) 512-8777

stanar@gao.gov
Page 43 GAO-01-250 Ju

Improve the 

Enforcement of 

Immigration Laws 

and Provision of 

Immigration and 

Naturalization 

Services 

Information Technology: INS Needs to Str

Investment Management Capability (GAO

Dec. 29, 2000). 

Illegal Aliens: Opportunities Exist to Impr

Expedited Removal Process (GAO/GGD-0

2000).

Information Technology: INS Needs to Be

the Development of Its Enterprise Archite

(GAO/AIMD-00-212, Aug. 1, 2000).

Alien Smuggling: Management and Operat

Improvements Needed to Address Growin

(GAO/GGD-00-103, May 1, 2000).

Border Patrol Hiring: Despite Recent Initi

Year 1999 Hiring Goal Was Not Met (GAO/

Dec. 17, 1999).

Illegal Immigration: Status of Southwest B

Implementation (GAO/GGD-99-44, May 19

Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Red

Unauthorized Alien Employment Exist

(GAO/GGD-99-33, April 2, 1999).

Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Str

Inconclusive; More Evaluation Needed

(GAO/GGD-98-21, Dec. 11, 1997).
Page 44 GAO-01-250 Justi

Better Manage 

Programs Designed 

to Support State 

and Local Efforts to 

Reduce Crime

Observations on the Department of Justice’s 

1999 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 20

Performance Plan (GAO/GGD-00-155R, June 

Police Corps: Some Problems Resolved, But 

Positions Remain Unfilled (GAO/GGD-00-69, 

2000).

Federal Grants: More Can Be Done to Improv

Seed Program Management (GAO/GGD-99-1

1999).

Develop 

Measurable 

Performance 

Targets to Help 

DEA Determine Its 

Progress in 

Reducing the 

Availability of 

Illegal Drugs

Observations on the Department of Justice’s 

1999 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 20

Performance Plan (GAO/GGD-00-155R, June 

Drug Control: DEA’s Strategies and Operatio

1990s (GAO/GGD-99-108, July 21, 1999).

Achieve Excellence 

in Financial 

Management, 

Including, But Not 

Limited to, a 

Departmentwide 

Unqualified 

Opinion for Fiscal 

Year 2000 and 

Beyond

Immigration Benefits: INS Not Making Timel

of Application Fees (GAO/GGD-00-185, Sept

Financial Management: Control Weaknesses 

the Drug Enforcement Administration

(GAO/AIMD-98-271R, Sept. 11, 1998).
Page 45 GAO-01-250 Ju

Improve 

Management and 

Accountability of 

Justice’s Asset 

Forfeiture Program

Observations on the Department of Justic

1999 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 

Performance Plan (GAO/GGD-00-155R, Ju

Observations on the Department of the Tr

Year 1999 Performance Report and Fiscal 

Performance Plan (GAO/GGD/AIMD-00-23

2000).

Seized Drugs and Firearms: FBI Needs to 

Certain Physical Safeguards and Strength

Accountability (GAO/AIMD-00-18, Dec. 16

FBI Accountability for Drugs Used in Spe

Operations: Deficiencies Identified and Ac

(GAO/AIMD-00-34R, Dec. 2, 1999).

Seized Drugs and Weapons: DEA Needs to 

Certain Physical Safeguards and Strength

Accountability (GAO/AIMD-00-17, Nov. 30

Asset Forfeiture: Marshals Service Contro

Assets (GAO/GGD-99-41, Mar. 26, 1999).

Asset Forfeiture: Noncash Property Shoul

Consolidated Under the Marshals Service

(GAO/GGD-91-97, June 28, 1991).

Letr
Page 46 GAO-01-250 Ju

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Governmentwide Perspective (GAO-01-24

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Department of Agriculture (GAO-01-242)

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Department of Commerce (GAO-01-243)

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Department of Defense (GAO-01-244)

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Department of Education (GAO-01-245)

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Department of Energy (GAO-01-246)

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Department of Health and Human Service

(GAO-01-247)

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Department of Housing and Urban Develo

(GAO-01-248)

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Department of the Interior (GAO-01-249)

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Department of Justice (GAO-01-250)

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Department of Labor (GAO-01-251)

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Department of State (GAO-01-252)
Page 47 GAO-01-250 Ju

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Department of Transportation (GAO-01-25

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Department of the Treasury (GAO-01-254)

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Department of Veterans Affairs (GAO-01-2

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Agency for International Development (G

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Environmental Protection Agency (GAO-0

Major Management Challenges and Progr

National Aeronautics and Space Administ

(GAO-01-258)

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (GAO-01

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Small Business Administration (GAO-01-2

Major Management Challenges and Progr

Social Security Administration (GAO-01-2

Major Management Challenges and Progr

U.S. Postal Service (GAO-01-262)

High-Risk Series: An Update (GAO-01-263

(182108) Letr
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