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HOLDING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY ACCOUNTABLE FOR SECURITY GAPS 

FULL HEARING 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 5, 2007 

Serial No. 110–67 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 


Congress.#13
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin 

Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

AL GREEN, Texas 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

VACANCY 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee 

JESSICA HERRERA-FLANIGAN, Staff Director & General Counsel 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security .. 1 

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security ........ 2 

The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida ..................................................................................................... 66 

The Honorable Paul C. Broun, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Georgia .............................................................................................................. 83 

The Honorable Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Pennsylvania .................................................................................... 78 

The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From the 

U.S. Virgin Islands ............................................................................................... 68 

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Represntative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 60 

The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of North Carolina ................................................................................................. 81 

The Honorable Al Green, a Representative in Congress From the State of 

Texas ..................................................................................................................... 84 

The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California .......................................................................................................... 64 

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Rhode Island ........................................................................................... 88 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 72 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 73 

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York .......................................................................................................... 86 

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California ................................................................................................ 58 

The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Massachusetts ........................................................................................ 56 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 62 

The Honorable David G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 79 

The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Alabama ............................................................................................................ 75 

The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Connecticut ............................................................................................. 59 

The Honorable Ginny Brown-Waite, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida ..................................................................................................... 70 

WITNESS 

The Honorable Michael Chertoff, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 23 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 29 

Page

IV 

FOR THE RECORD: 

CHERTOFF TO-DO-LIST: 

Submitted by Hon. Al Green ............................................................................... 54 

Material Submitted by Hon. Peter T. King ........................................................ 4 

APPENDIX

Additional Questions and Responses: 

Responses from Hon. Michael chertoff ............................................................... 95 

(1) 

HOLDING THE DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY ACCOUNTABLE 

FOR SECURITY GAPS 

Wednesday, September 5, 2007 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 311, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson [chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Thompson, Markey, Dicks, Harman, 

Lowey, Norton, Jackson Lee, Christensen, Etheridge, Langevin, 

Cuellar, Carney, Clarke, Green, King, Shays, Lungren, Rogers, 

Reichert, McCaul, Brown-Waite, Bilirakis and Broun. 

Chairman THOMPSON. The committee on Homeland Security will 

come to order. 

The committee is meeting today to receive testimony from the 

Secretary, Michael Chertoff, to discuss his plans to implement the 

recently enacted H.R. 1, the Implementing Recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission Act. 

Good morning. Mr. Secretary, glad to have you. Secretary 

Chertoff, on behalf of members of the committee, again let me welcome you here today. 

It has been 4 years since the Department of Homeland Security 

was created. Mr. Chertoff, for 2 years now, half of the Department’s operational life, you have been the individual directly and 

primarily responsible for assuring that the Department can fulfill 

its important mission. 

A few weeks ago, this Nation paused to remember the victims of 

Hurricane Katrina and observed a second anniversary of that devastating storm. In a few days, we will again pause to memorialize 

the victims of the September 11th attack and mark the sixth anniversary of that earth-shattering day. As we in this Congress and 

the American people mark these tragic milestones in our Nation’s 

history, we all know—you, me and everyone within the sound of 

my voice—that these events have strengthened our resolve, increased our vigilance and enhanced our commitment to ensuring 

the preparedness response and resiliency of this Nation. 

I am sure that today you will take the opportunity to tell this 

committee and indeed the Nation that our country is better prepared than it was on September 11th to respond to a terrorist attack and that we are ready to meet the challenges of a natural disaster like Hurricane Katrina. I look forward to learning about your 

2 

plans to implement H.R. 1, which statutorily enacted the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. And as I look forward to 

hearing about these new plans, I would be remiss if I did not wonder whether you remain—will remain at the Department long 

enough to carry out what you will discuss today. 

As you know, during the August recess, the media was abuzz 

with the news of the resignation of Attorney General Alberto 

Gonzales. Likewise, many talking heads have suggested that you 

are a prime candidate to accept the position of Attorney General. 

And so before you begin your testimony, Mr. Secretary, I would like 

you to inform us whether you plan to remain Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security for the duration of this administration. I also ask this question not to put you on the spot but rather 

to gain some clarity on the future picture of this Department. 

As you know, in a report, committee staff found that nearly onequarter of the senior leadership positions located in the Department of Homeland Security are vacant. In June, the National Journal found that DHS has added political positions to its rank, giving 

it more political appointees than much larger departments such as 

Department of Veteran Affairs and Department of Defense. 

To make matters worse, Mr. Secretary, the Department has 

failed to provide Congress with programs, plans and reports that 

are absolutely critical to securing the homeland. For instance, 

where is the revised version of the National Response Plan? Why 

has DHS missed its deadlines for inline baggage screening equipment? Where is the Department’s strategic plan for deploying explosive detection equipment at airport checkpoints? Why hasn’t the 

national emergency family registry and locator system been established? And where are the final regulations, Mr. Secretary, for 

TWIC? 

So, Mr. Secretary, if you are going to leave this Cabinet post to 

take a different Cabinet seat, the American people and I need to 

have a clear vision on what remains to be done. 

If you plan on staying in this Cabinet seat until January, 2009, 

the committee needs to make sure that certain things have been 

accomplished before you go. In fact, Mr. Secretary, before you leave 

here today, I will give you a to-do list that specifies each item 

which should be accomplished before your tenure is over. When all 

these things have been done, I will be able to say that we are safer 

now than we are today. 

We owe the American people security; we owe them accountability; and, most importantly, we owe them freedom from fear. So 

as you detail your plan to implement the recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission, I will be listening closely to hear how you also 

plan to fill key vacancies at the Department and your plans for 

completing all of your outstanding responsibilities. 

With that, again, I thank you for being here today; and I look 

forward to your testimony. 

The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for an opening 

statement. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Chairman Thompson. I appreciate you 

calling this hearing. 

3 

I certainly want to thank Secretary Chertoff for testifying once 

again and at the outset to commend him for the job that he has 

done in providing leadership to the Department of Homeland Security, a position which is more important than ever when we see 

again what happened last night and this morning in Germany with 

the arrests of the three alleged terrorists, with the arrests yesterday in Denmark, with the indictments recently of the University of 

South Florida students in South Carolina, this past summer with 

the JFK plot and the constant shadow that is out there and the 

fact that earlier this summer, Secretary Chertoff, even though he 

took flack for it, was sending a very clear signal to the American 

people and to the world that there are dangerous situations going 

on; and I believe the events of the last several weeks have certainly 

justified the warnings that you gave us at that time. 

I also at a parochial level want to thank Secretary Chertoff for 

the distributions this year, especially with the funding that came 

with the supplemental. I really believe that you have the Department on course right now to provide the funding to the areas that 

need it the most and are able to make the best use of it. So I commend you for that. 

I also on a personal level want to thank you for the cooperation 

your staff has given me as far as whenever we reach out to you 

to get details as to different events that are going on. The briefings 

and the data and the information and intelligence you provide to 

us has been very helpful in keeping me up to date. 

We did pass H.R. 1; and it passed, I believe, with the support of 

every member of this committee. Chairman Thompson did a very 

good job, I believe, in consolidating support, mobilizing support and 

getting very much into that bill. 

One concern I do have, though—and it predates Chairman 

Thompson and is probably going to be with us sometime into the 

future, hopefully not forever—and that is the idea of consolidating 

jurisdiction of this committee over the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

Several months ago—this was on May 25th—as ranking member, 

I, along with, I believe, all the Republican members of the committee, sent a letter to you asking you to specify the number of 

committee hearings, subcommittee hearings that you have to attend and members of your Department have to attend, the myriad 

of committees and subcommittees who claim jurisdiction over the 

Department of Homeland Security. Yesterday, you responded to 

that letter in a letter dated September 4, 2007, where you laid out 

again in really almost excruciating detail the amount of time that 

must be spent testifying. 

Now, I agree with Chairman Thompson. We ought to have strong 

oversight. I believe that for the Department to go forward and go 

forward under your leadership, to go forward effectively, it has to 

be strong oversight, constant oversight. That is the way the system 

works. 

However, having this multitude of oversight committees or committees claiming oversight, I believe it becomes very counterproductive; And I would hope that, as we do go forward, no matter 

which party happens to be in control at the time, whether we do 

4 

it through House rules or we do it through legislation, that we do 

consolidate as much jurisdiction as possible into one committee. 

I am not saying this is part of a turf battle. I am just saying it 

is a sense of organization, a sense of responsibility that we get that 

done. So I will ask the chairman if I could introduce into the record 

a letter from the ranking member and Republican members of the 

committee to the Secretary dated May 25th and Secretary 

Chertoff’s response to us dated September 4, 2007, and ask they be 

made part of the record. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Without objection. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

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Mr. KING. Also, Secretary Chertoff, one issue which we have had 

some disagreement on—but the fact is Congress has spoken or not 

spoken—and that is on the issue of immigration; and I—from what 

I can see, certainly in the last month, the Department has dramatically increased enforcement, also is going forward with the construction of the fence along the border at a far more rapid pace 

than before. And in your testimony as you go forward I would ask 

if you could just give us more details on that as to what the intent 

of the Department is as far as completing the fence, whether or not 

it is going to be 370 or whether it is going to be 700 and also what 

timetable you have for that. 

Also, the impact of the recent court ruling on the employers and 

social security and the illegal immigrants. If you could update us 

on that as to the impact you think it is going to have. 

With that, I look forward to your testimony; and I want to again 

thank Chairman Thompson. Whatever disagreements we may have 

on particular issues, the fact is the committee is working in a very 

strong, bipartisan way under his leadership; and I think this hearing is going to be indicative of that. 

With that, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

Other members of the committee are reminded that, under committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

Again, I welcome our witness today. When he was confirmed in 

2005, Secretary Michael Chertoff became the second person to 


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serve as the head of the Department of Homeland Security. Prior 

to his confirmation, Mr.Chertoff served as a United States Circuit 

Judge for the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Prior to that, he 

served as an Assistant Attorney General at the Department of Justice, where he was instrumental in helping to trace the September 

11th terrorist attacks to the al-Qa’ida network. He has served in 

a number of other public service positions. 

Secretary Chertoff, I thank you for your service; and I appreciate 

you agreeing to testify here today. Without objection, the witness’ 

full statement will be inserted into the record. 

Secretary Chertoff, I now recognize you to summarize your statement for 5 minutes; and if you go over, we won’t penalize you. Mr. 

Secretary? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL CHERTOFF, 

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure 

to be back before the committee after the Labor Day recess in what 

has been an eventful summer on a number of fronts. 

Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, other members of 

the committee, I look forward to answering your questions. I don’t 

think I am going to cover all the questions in the 5 minutes or so 

I have to give the summary, but I will certainly be happy to tackle 

more specific questions as they come up. 

We have, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, just passed the second anniversary of Hurricane Katrina; and we now stand on the threshold 

of another notable anniversary, which is the sixth anniversary of 

the infamous attacks on September 11th on this country. On September 11, 2001, of course, as we watched the smoldering remains 

of those attacks, no one would have been bold enough to predict 

that 6 years would pass without a further successful attack on the 

homeland. I underscore the word ‘‘successful’’ because there have 

been attacks on the homeland, they have just not succeeded. That 

goes from—that ranges from the so-called ‘‘shoe bomber’’, Richard 

Reid, in December, 2001, to last summer’s effort in the United 

Kingdom to place bombs on aircraft that were headed for the 

United States. 

Happily and because of the vigilance of those serving here in the 

United States as well as our allies overseas, these attacks have 

been frustrating. But even in the last 36 hours we have seen how 

real the threat remains. Arrests in Denmark and Germany indicate 

that al-Qa’ida continues to carry out acts of war against the West. 

They continue to seek fellow travelers and allies and adherents in 

the West who can be used to carry out attacks whether they be in 

Western Europe or here in the homeland, and American interests 

overseas remain very much at risk. So it is a sobering reminder of 

the fact that, 6 years after 9/11, the intent of al-Qa’ida and its allies to wage war on the west remains very much unabated. 

A question I probably get asked more often than any other question is, are we safer now than we were prior to 9/11? And the answer to that is unequivocally yes. But if you ask me is the job of 

keeping us safe done, the answer is to that is no. It is not done, 

and it may not be done within our lifetimes. The fact is there is 

no such thing as perfect security. We face an enemy with a long 

24 

memory, an enemy that is capable of still getting worked up about 

events that occurred five and six hundred years ago. So we cannot 

afford to relax or relent. 

The enemy will continue to adapt. It will continue to retool itself, 

as the recent National Intelligence Estimate made very clear; and 

because al-Qa’ida does not stand still, we cannot stand still either. 

We have to continue to adapt, to use our technology to our advantage. We have to use randomness as a way of strengthening our 

systems and making it hard for the enemy to detect what we are 

doing. We have to fortify our defenses without clogging them or 

making them so overwhelming that they destroy our way of life, 

and we always have to think outside the box and look at the unpredictable in terms of assessing where the threat may be. 

The job is not done. We cannot back away from what we have 

done so far, and we have to continue to remain determined to protect this country. 

And in this regard I want to commend the members of this committee who have been very active throughout this last 6 years, ever 

since the committee was formed, in working as partners with this 

Department and other elements of the executive branch to see to 

it that we have homeland security in this committee. 

What is our overall strategy? If I was asked to sum it up in a 

nutshell, I would say our strategy is to reduce risk sensibly. That 

doesn’t mean to eliminate risk. There is no way to eliminate risk 

in the world as we live it. But we can reduce risk and we can do 

it in a commonsense way, if we are disciplined about understanding what the risk is and disciplined about how we go about 

tackling that risk. 

One approach is to deal with the threat itself. We have continued 

to reduce the risk against the country by capturing and killing alQa’ida leadership, by sharing intelligence in this country and with 

our allies overseas and by disrupting plots at home and abroad. 

Another way to reduce risk is to decrease vulnerabilities. We do 

that by sensibly building barriers and strengthening the measures 

we have in place to protect our infrastructure if someone should be 

successful in carrying out an attack. 

A third way to reduce risk is to reduce the consequences of an 

attack. We do that by enhancing our ability to respond, dispersing 

assets that could be affected by an attack and by finding ways to 

mitigate damage to human life and to the economy. 

Everything we do at DHS is aimed at the goal of reducing risk 

and balancing these variables in a cost-effective way. This committee’s hard work and passing H.R. 1 is going to be of enormous help 

in continuing along this strategic path. Measures such as those enabling us to strengthen the Visa waiver program, which I previously identified as a potential vulnerability; making sure that 

people who report suspicious activity in good faith are protected 

against legal—possible negative legal consequences; and further 

moving in the direction of risk-based funding. These are very important measures in securing the homeland, and I want to thank 

the committee for its work. 

Let me talk about a few specific areas, without suggesting this 

covers the whole waterfront, in which I think we have made some 

real, measurable progress in keeping the Nation safe. 

25 

First, let me address the issue of border security, a subject on 

which we could have a hearing all by itself. By way of perspective, 

on September 11th, we had about 9,000 Border Patrol agents in 

this country. When the President last year unrolled his strategy to 

regain control of the border in May of 2006, that number had 

grown to 11,740 Border Patrol agents. But, as of today, we now 

have 14,471 Border Patrol agents. We are on track to get 18,300 

Border Patrol agents sworn to duty at the end of calendar year 

2008. That is what we promised last year. That promise will be 

kept. 

We have also put infrastructure in place. Among other things, we 

currently have more than 120 miles of fence in, pedestrian fencing, 

and 112 miles of vehicle barriers along the southern border. We expect to have 145 miles of fencing in place by the end of this month, 

by the end of September, which is again what we promised. That 

promise will be kept. By end of calendar year 2008, again as we 

promised, we are on track to have 370 miles of pedestrian fencing 

in place. 

Another promise we made last year was to abolish the policy of 

catching and releasing non-Mexicans who are apprehended at the 

border. We ended that practice last year and have kept that practice ended for a year that has transpired since last summer. We are 

now in the domain of catch and remove for those who are caught 

at the border. 

And we are continuing to work to deploy 21st century technologies as part of SBInet. We anticipate—and there was some 

delay in this because we were insistent on making sure everything 

works properly. We anticipate beginning acceptance testing on the 

first 28 miles of this high-tech program in Arizona in about a 

month. 

Now, has all this effort had an impact or result? Over the last 

fiscal year, overall apprehensions have fallen by 20 percent. Southwestern border apprehensions have dropped by 21 percent. Border 

Patrol non-Mexican apprehensions are down 39 percent. Yuma sector apprehensions were reduced 68 percent. Del Rio sector apprehensions are down 48 percent and El Paso sector apprehensions by 

40 percent. 

A recently released Pew Research report not only agreed that apprehensions have been declining but looked to other anecdotal information, including interviews with people operating south of the 

border, to conclude that the foreign-born population of illegal immigrants has been increasing at a slower pace than in previous years. 

Other measures of the success we have had in driving down illegal immigration have been reductions in financial remittances 

overseas. I have to say I think our foreign partners will find that 

not happy news, but it happens to be a metric that shows that our 

enforcement measures have bite. 

These are all signs that illegal cross border migration is declining 

and the method is moving in the correct direction. 

I would be remiss if I didn’t express my disappointment in the 

fact that Congress didn’t choose to move forward with comprehensive immigration reform. I think without a temporary worker program we will start to see economic consequences of enforcement, 

26 

but I am sworn to enforce the law as it is and continue to do so 

to the full extent of my power. 

And I also want to observe in the last fiscal year our ICE officers 

removed a record 198,511 illegal aliens in this country. I estimate 

over 3,900 administrative arrests in the last fiscal year; and this 

year we are on track to have over 790 criminal arrests in the work 

site enforcement cases, which builds upon the 740 we had last 

year, both dramatic increases we saw over prior years. 

Of course, we worry not only about people entering between the 

ports of entry but coming through our ports of entry where traditionally we see the terrorist threat focused. One thing we talked 

about last year that we are currently implementing is the deployment of 10-print fingerprint scanning capabilities through our US– 

VISIT program. This means for people who come to the U.S. it is 

no longer going to be simply two fingerprints that we capture and 

read but 10 fingerprints, and the advantage of this is it allows us 

to compare those fingerprints against latent fingerprints that we 

pick up in the course of investigations overseas. So that allows us 

a better ability to determine whether an unknown, unnamed terrorist is entering the country. 

We currently have rolled out 10-print scanning capabilities at 

106 U.S. consulates around the world, which is half of the number 

that we have to do; and we are beginning the process of putting 

this 10-print capability at 10 American airports beginning this fall. 

I can tell you we have already seen results; and, in one case, we 

were able to compare a latent fingerprint from a piece of paper 

found in the course of a search as—in one of the investigations of 

acts of terrorism overseas against the fingerprints taken by somebody who wanted to come into the United States and we found a 

match. Now, in this case, there—it turned out to be an innocent explanation for the fact that that fingerprint was found in the particular safe house. But the point is it was good to know that we 

had that fingerprint, it was good to be able to ask those questions, 

and I think this is an example of the kind of dramatic increase in 

security that 10-print capability gives us. 

Of course, we are continuing to move forward on a matter very 

important to this committee, which is the secure freight initiative, 

which is the initiative to put radiation detection equipment around 

the world to make sure that we can detect radioactive material 

coming into the United States. In compliance with the Safe Port 

Act, we currently have three overseas ports that will be scanning 

100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo into the United States; and we 

have agreements with four other foreign ports to begin somewhat 

more limited scanning in the very near future. 

Here at home, we have deployed more than 1,000 radiation portal monitors at our own ports. By the end of this calendar year, we 

will have the ability to scan almost 100 percent of sea cargo arriving in our major seaports; and by the end of next year, nearly 100 

percent of all ports of entry, including the land ports of entry, will 

have these radiation portal monitors. 

Now, while we have made some very significant steps in securing 

the homeland in these respects, I have to say there are some gaps 

that require our attention; and we are moving forward with those. 

Two of those gaps have to do with general aviation, that is, private 

27 

planes and small boats. The very trait that makes these attractive 

as modes of transportation for people in the private sector also 

make them potential sources of a threat. 

We do worry about the fact that someone could lease or occupy 

a private plane overseas and then use that as a way to smuggle 

in a dirty bomb or weapon of mass destruction to the United 

States. We do worry that, having locked the front door, so to speak, 

against dangerous containers, someone could simply put the dangerous cargo in a private ocean-going vessel and take it into a U.S. 

port. 

Therefore, I will surely be unveiling a plan to tighten security 

standards for general aviation operators coming in from overseas. 

This will involve, among other thing, conducting more screening 

overseas and working with our overseas allies in the private sector 

to enhance security measures to enable us to screen for radiological 

and nuclear material before a private aircraft comes into the 

United States. 

We will begin this process in the very near future by proposing 

a rule that will require private aircraft coming in from overseas to 

send us lists of their passengers and crews before they take off so 

we can vet them before they become airborne. 

With respect to small boats, which I have indicated is a potential 

threat vector, we are beginning a program—pilot program on the 

west coast in the very near future to screen small boats for radiological nuclear material. Our Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

has partnered with Seattle in the State of Washington to equip 

local officials with radiological and nuclear detection equipment 

and to test passive detection equipment at key choke points in the 

Seattle harbor, port of Seattle through which all the traffic, whether it be container traffic or private traffic, has to pass. And as we 

work out the operational details with respect to that program it is 

one that we intend to roll out at other locations, including New 

York, where we have our secure-the-cities effort to bring nuclear 

detection capability into urban areas to make sure we have another 

measure in which we can protect against a dirty bomb in a big city. 

Another initiative, of course, has been the need to protect our infrastructure in the interior of the country. Last year, we released 

our national infrastructure protection plan to provide an overarching framework working with the private sector take make sure 

we are protecting our infrastructure. Through the individual sector 

specific plans we have identified a couple of thousand key assets 

and are working to develop and further implement increased protection for those assets. 

In April of this year, we released a comprehensive regulation to 

secure high-risk chemical facilities across the country. We have 

also looked to protect the security of chemicals in transit by reducing the standstill time for railcars that carry toxic inhalation hazards around the country. 

One example of how this partnership with the private sector has 

been helpful I think can be illustrated by the recent JFK airport 

plot. As part of the investigation leading up to the arrests in that 

case, we worked with the private sector to identify whether there 

were any vulnerabilities in and around the pipelines that were the 

target of that plot to make sure that we didn’t have exposure 

28 

should the plot be successful; and that is an example of a partnership across not only the Federal government but with local authorities in the private sector. 

Finally, before I leave the issue of infrastructure, let me say that 

one very big issue I remain concerned about is cybersecurity. Much 

of what I can say about this is classified and cannot be discussed 

in this setting, but I can assure you that we are working with other 

elements of the Federal government and giving the highest priority 

to putting together an enhanced strategy with respect to cybersecurity that will deal with a threat that has enormous potential to 

damage the United States in the years to come. 

Finally, let me turn to improved response capabilities. In the 

wake of Katrina, I think we recognize the serious deficiencies we 

have had over the last 20 years in planning for and building the 

capabilities necessary to respond to a catastrophic event, whether 

natural or man made. I am happy to say we have dramatically improved our response capabilities in the last couple of years under 

the capable leadership of FEMA. 

I am also pleased to say FEMA is now at better than 95 percent 

staffing and that we have permanent, experienced emergency managers in all 10 FEMA regions who are working closely with their 

State and local counterparts. I think, as we have seen in the runup to some of this year’s natural disasters and natural events, we 

are much quicker, we are moving much more rapidly to put capabilities in place in advance of a storm, and I think planning is beginning to pay off. 

Finally, let me talk a little bit about what you mentioned, Mr. 

Chairman, in terms of where we stand moving forward. I want to 

leave this Department with a legacy of a mature, well-formed organization 5 years after this Congress created what is now the third 

largest department in the United States government; and I am 

pleased to say that as we get into the final lap of the President’s 

term we are very focused on continuing to add personnel, including 

experienced career personnel at all the senior agencies of the Department so that we do have a capable transition team able to 

move into the next administration. 

We are working to reduce to writing many of the lessons learned, 

some of them painfully learned, over the last 2 1/2 years so the 

next team that comes into place under the next President has the 

benefits of the experiences that we have had. 

As far as my own plans, Mr. Chairman, all I can say is, like everybody else in a Senate-confirmed position, I serve at the pleasure 

of the President. So long as it pleases him to have me serve in this 

position—and, of course, God willing—I am happy to continue to do 

this job up until the very last day of the administration. 

For all of the reasons I have laid out here, I believe we are much 

safer than we were prior to 9/11, but we need to continue to work 

with Congress to make sure that we build the tools and resources 

to adapt to new challenges as they come about. Legislation such as 

the recent Protect America Act of 2007, which amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, provides our intelligence professionals with the tools they continue to urgently need to gather information about our enemies and detect and prevent attacks before 

they happen. As you know, the Act is temporary; and building on 

29 

legislation such as this is vital to continue the progress we have 

made so far. 

Finally, I want to thank the 208,000 men and women of the Department of Homeland Security. They deserve our support, moral 

support, material support and our legal support as they carry out 

their tireless commitment to safeguarding our Nation 24 hours a 

day, 365 days a year. And as we approach the sixth year anniversary of September 11th we should not only continue to support everybody in all agencies who work to keep this country safe, we 

should recognize the heroism and dedication of average Americans 

every day. Every month we hear stories about people who see 

something that is suspicious and say something about it, and time 

and again it is that alertness that turns up dangerous threats and 

allows to us frustrate plots. 

I want to thank the committee for inviting me here, and I look 

forward to answering your questions. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. I thank you for 

your testimony. 

[The statement of Secretary Chertoff follows:] 


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Chairman THOMPSON. I remind each member that he or she will 

have 5 minutes to question the Secretary. I will now recognize myself for questions. 

Before I do that, let me again remind, under the committee rules, 

cell phones should be put on vibrate. We love the ring tones, but 

they are quite distracting to the witnesses and the members. And 

I will direct Mr. Twinchek that, if he hears them, to go to the person who is violating committee rules. 

Mr. Secretary, I was glad to hear that you say you plan to serve 

until the end of your term. But I also heard you say you serve at 

the will of the President. Perhaps he will, in addition, promote you 

to another position. Have you—can you share with the committee 

any thoughts on that? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I don’t think, Mr. Chairman—it would be 

presumptuous of me to try to speak for the President. It would be 

presumptuous of me to discuss any conversations that I have had 

with anybody at the White House. 

I think I have stated my position. We all serve at the pleasure 

of the President in the executive branch, at least those who were 

Senate confirmed, and, of course, God has to be willing that we 

complete our service as well. But I have indicated what my intent 

is and, you know, we will move on from there. 


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52 

Chairman THOMPSON. Let us take it a little step lower then. Josh 

Bolten at the White House has indicated that he has requested of 

certain senior members that they provide him with a list of individuals as to whether or not they plan to stay on. Have you been provided that request from the Department? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Are you asking whether I was asked if I 

put—or whether I have asked others? 

Chairman THOMPSON. No. For you to identify other people in the 

Department. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. No, I haven’t been asked to do that. Of 

course, I haven’t formally asked people in the Department whether 

they intend to stay on in the sense of setting a cut-off. I have, however, had discussions with the senior leadership of the Department. 

I am confident that—again subject to the two limitations of Presidential pleasure and God’s willingness—that the senior leadership 

team we have in place does intend to stay on, and I think we will 

shortly be filling the remaining gaps and vacancies, and I look forward to having a continuity through the end of this— 

Chairman THOMPSON. The reason I ask that, Mr. Secretary, one 

of the, as you know, concerns expressed by members of this committee is the inordinate number of vacancies; and if in fact as we 

wind down this administration if that issue is elevated, it creates 

significant vulnerabilities for this country. So I am asking it in the 

spirit of you recognizing that it is a concern and that to some degree you put together some plan should that elevate itself to that 

level. I just put that out, and I am glad to say that you are on top 

of it, and I hope it does not become a problem. 

Moving forward, the national response plan that was due June 

1st, that is now a national response framework. Can you tell me 

at what time we can expect it? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Yes, we circulated—first of all, let me say 

we solicited literally hundreds of people, including many State and 

local responders, to have their input into this next version of the 

old national response plan. We then sat down and tried to distill 

all that advice into a document that would be readable, internally 

consistent and, frankly, somewhat shorter than the original plan 

that existed. We then circulated during the course of the summer 

a draft final version of the plan and received a lot of comments. 

I am envisioning that this month we will be issuing the national 

response framework in its final form. It will not become effective 

immediately, obviously, because we will need to then train people 

to it and exercise people to the new framework; and I don’t think 

we will want to do that in the middle of the hurricane season. But 

we will have it at this month, the month of September. In some 

ways, it will be—it’s not going to be a radical change from the improvements we have already made, but I think what it will do is 

simplify and clarify some of the ambiguities that we discovered 

over the last couple of years. 

Chairman THOMPSON. But you do recognize that it was due at 

the beginning of this hurricane season, and we are not there, and 

that is a major concern of the committee. 

Project 28. You and I have had some discussions about why we 

are 2–1/2 months late from the initial pilot on that project. Can you 

give us any better time frame on Project 28? 

53 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Just to clarify for those members of the 

committee who may not have been part of this discussion, Project 

28 is the first stage of this high-tech SBInet program that we have 

for the board. It was designed to allow us to test in real life—operational real life the way these systems work not only individually 

but as an integrated package. That is the cameras, it is the radar, 

it is the common operating picture and the ability to coordinate all 

of those in an automated fashion. 

We tested various elements of this system, and the original plan 

was in the month of June to have the system at 28 miles of the 

Arizona border, have it fully integrated and beginning acceptance 

testing so we could make a determination that we were satisfied 

with the product and take possession of it the end of July. 

Let me emphasize why the acceptance testing is important. It is 

a little bit like buying a car. We didn’t want to get stuck with a 

lemon. So one of the lessons we learned from watching some of the 

less appealing contracting experiences of the past 10 years is that 

we should not accept something from the contractor and take responsibility for it unless we had really kicked the tires and not only 

taken it for a test drive but really gotten to drive it around for a 

while. 

So we did put this through acceptance testing, and although the 

individual components of the system worked well the system integration was not satisfactory. And, therefore, the customs and border protection operators, the Border Patrol operators, said we are 

not satisfied with the system. 

We then had a series of what I would describe as frank and candid conversations with the contractor, Boeing, including a conversation I had with the CEO of Boeing and the conversations we had 

at lower levels in which we explained our concerns about system 

integration. We said, if this is not going to work, if it is too complicated, we are prepared to go back to the drawing board and do 

something simpler; and they assured us that in fact it is not too 

complicated. This is all proven technology. 

They retooled their team on the ground and replaced some of the 

managers at a very high level. They focused on this, and they are 

now working through the problems of systems integration as we 

speak. In fact, I spoke to the CEO about this yesterday. We are 

now looking to begin acceptance testing in about a month, meaning 

that is the point at which they will say to us we think you can test 

us and we will then kick the tires again. 

Here is my pledge to you. I want to get this thing done quickly, 

but, more important, I want to get it done right. I am not going 

to buy something with U.S. government money unless I am satisfied it works in the real world. And if it can’t be made to work, I 

am prepared to go and find something that will be made to work, 

although I will be disappointed. 

I believe the contractor understands what is at stake in getting 

this to work properly, and I think they put their A team in place 

to do it. But my mandate to the head of the Border Patrol is I want 

to make sure that the people who actually have to operate it are 

satisfied with the way it works, and that is what we are going to 

do. We are going to start acceptance testing in about a month. We 

should get it done well before the end of the year. 

54 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. But, on that point, 

I want to say the day before June 15th rolled out, we were—we 

had a hearing here and we were told the next day it would be 

ready to go. The only thing I share with you is we are concerned 

as well now it will cost the taxpayers more money. Whether or not 

this technology is somehow not proven to be what it is, if it is the 

contractor or whatever, that virtual fence is absolutely important 

to our overall border security mission and I would impress upon 

you that we need to do it. 

Lastly, before I go to the next—the Simone contract, Mr. Secretary, we understand is a sole-source, no-bid contract. The committee staff has been trying to get a copy of that contract. Your testimony said that the Department is going to be transparent. If you 

would for the committee provide us with a copy of that contract. 

We got a copy late last night, and it was a redacted contract. It was 

not what we needed; and, in the interest of just being as transparent as we can in the Department, we need it. 

I call your attention to your to-do list. I am sure James behind 

you has already made a copy of it. He is a good person, and I want 

to compliment him for the job that he does in communicating with 

us. I look forward to it. 

[The information follows:] 

FOR THE RECORD

SUBMITTED BY THE HONORABLE AL GREEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM

THE STATE OF TEXAS

CHERTOFF TO-DO-LIST 

• Critical Vacancies at the Department of Homeland Security—Develop a 

plan for the mass exodus that will occur due to an Administration Change. 

• Containers Security Standards and Procedures (seals)—Draft the regulations as mandated by the SAFE Port Act of 2006 and mandated again by the 

9/11 Bill. 

• National Response Plan (NRP)—release long overdue NRP While ensuring 

adequate input from state and local officials. 

• Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)—Issues the 

TWIC card as mandated by the SAFE Port Act of 2006. 

• Explosives Detection at Passenger Screening Checkpoints—Issue the strategic plan that was required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention act of 2004 and mandated again by the 9/11 Bill. 

• Complete Critical Border Security Initiatives: Complete Critical Border 

Security Initiatives: Implement US–VISIT biometric air exit by the end of 

calendar year 2008 and complete Project 28 

Chairman THOMPSON. I now yield to the ranking member for any 

questions he might have. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, one integral part of H.R. 1 was the reform of the 

Visa waiver program; and, as I understand the provisions we 

adopted, it was to permit you to waive the Visa refusal rate requirements for participating countries provided that the US–VISIT 

exit system for air travel was implemented with a 97 percent rate 

of accuracy and to verify the departure of international travelers. 

What is the status of that? Can you give us a timeline? And any 

other comments you have on the Visa Waiver Program, especially 

55 

based on what happened in Germany and Denmark in the last 2 

days. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Let me begin by saying what happened in 

Germany and Denmark and what happened in the United Kingdom earlier this summer underscores what we have been saying for 

some time, that the Visa Waiver Program, while a wonderful program for the vast majority of people from the Visa waiver countries 

who just want to just come here for tourism purposes or benign 

purposes, does open a vulnerability. Because, by eliminating the 

visa process, we lose one of the barriers to terrorists or criminals 

that we would otherwise have. It means we first encounter the person when they arrive here in the U.S., as opposed to encountering 

them in a consulate overseas. 

What the legislation this Congress passed does that is very important is it allows us to put into place an electronic travel authorization program. That is a program in which everybody, even from 

a Visa Waiver Program, will submit some information on line electronically in advance of travel. If we determine that someone needs 

to be interviewed because they are potential threats, we can direct 

them to get interviewed at a consulate; and the vast majority will 

have an authorization to travel over a period of time, whether it 

be a year or 2 years. It will not be particularly difficult or inconvenient because you can sign up for the program and then you will 

have an authorization that will last for an extended period of time, 

but it will give us something that we haven’t had up to now with 

the Visa Waiver Program, which is an advance ability to check people who want to come into the United States. I think as we see the 

enemy trying to exploit connections in places like Western Europe 

to build a network of operatives, we have to make sure we stay 

ahead of that. 

With respect to US–VISIT exit, we later this year will issue a 

proposed regulation that will cover putting in US–VISIT exit at 

airports. That is obviously under the law of certain required period 

of time for notice and comment, but our plan is to begin the process 

of implementation next year and have it completed by the end of 

next year 2008. 

It is a very simple process as far as airports are concerned. It 

simply requires taking the existing fingerprint readers that we 

have and deploying them at kiosks or at check-in counters for people who leave the country so that instead of merely swiping their 

passports, which is what they do now, they also put their finger 

down there. I will be honest and tell you the airline industry will 

not be happy about it because they will worry that it is an additional requirement or there will be a line or something of that sort. 

So I think it will be one of these issues that will test our commitment to security. Are we prepared to take what I think is really 

a minor inconvenience to give us a real picture of who is leaving 

the country or are we going to back down in the face of fact that 

people will say it is inconvenient? We are committed to getting it 

done, and I appreciate this Congress’ support for that effort. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Secretary, one piece of legislation which Chairman 

Thompson and I had sponsored and then became part of H.R. 1 

was something which basically encourages and allows cooperation 

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nology, Israel, Britain, Singapore, Australia and four other countries that are mentioned. Can you tell the committee what steps 

are being taken to accelerate that level of cooperation and what 

you have in place and how you see that going forward? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think it is very important—a very important measure, Congressman King, because I think it not only allows us to get the benefit and share the benefit of technology with 

our close ally, but it also builds strong relationships. 

I can tell you we are working now with the British on ways in 

which we can further enhance technological exchanges of information as well as general information exchange. I recently signed an 

agreement with the Israelis under which we are going to be able 

to work to get the benefit of some of their expertise as well as giving them the benefit of some of our expertise. So, working with our 

science and technology director, we look to continue to accelerate 

the pace of this kind of information and technology exchange with 

our friends overseas. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Secretary, I yield back. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

The Chair recognizes other members for questions they may wish 

to ask the witness; and, in accordance with our committee rules, 

I recognize members who were present at the start of the hearing 

based on seniority on the committee, alternating between majority 

and minority. Those members coming in later will be recognized in 

the order of their arrival. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts for 5 

minutes, Mr. Markey. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

Welcome, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. Secretary, there is a new report out today from the Inspector 

General of the Department of Homeland Security. It is on the Department’s oversight of passenger aircraft cargo and its conclusion 

is that security faces significant challenges. This is the redacted 

version of this blistering, scalding indictment of the Department’s 

handling of a passenger—of cargo inspection on passenger planes. 

Let me summarize some of quotes from this report. 

I am quoting now, that the current level of oversight does not 

provide assurance that air carriers are meeting congressionally 

mandated goals of tripling the amount of cargo screened for passenger aircraft. 

Quote, TSA information reported to the Congress regarding air 

carrier compliance with legislative and regulatory requirements 

may be inaccurate. 

Quote, TSA security programs are not clearly written. TSA’s 

aviation security inspectors and air carriers to interpret and apply 

the regulations do so differently. 

In other words, Mr. Secretary, your existing program for screening cargo going onto passenger planes is in a shambles. 

Let me read a couple of other quotes. 

It says that TSA is unable to make sure that third parties such 

as air carriers or shippers are following the rules. It calls into question TSA’s ability to monitor and report air carrier compliance and 

screening regulations. It says that aviation security inspectors who 

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ing requirements are poorly trained and lack the resources needed 

to do their important job. 

So, Mr. Secretary, this is under the existing law. Now we just 

passed a new, tougher law that I am the author of; and what we 

have learned over the last week or so is that the TSA intends not 

on physically inspecting all of the cargo which goes onto passenger 

planes, 100 percent of which is required under the law, but instead 

Kip Hawley, who runs TSA at the Department under your leadership, is now saying that they are going to do a modified version of 

what they are already doing, that rather than having real screening for bombs looking inside of cargo. 

So what I want to know, Mr. Secretary, is, is your Department 

going to follow this new law? Are you going to require 100 percent 

screening of the contents of all cargo going onto passenger planes? 

Or are we going to come back in another year and have another 

blistering, scalding indictment of this double standard where all of 

our bags are screened, all of our computers are looked at, all of our 

shoes are taken off but on the same plane goes cargo that has not 

been screened? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. First of all, let me say the report in question, and sometimes as happens with these reports, reflects investigation and accumulation of information, some of which goes back 

well over a year ago. So many of the things that were raised in 

that report had already been corrected by the time the report was 

published. In fact, I think it may be that TSA itself asked for this 

kind of a study so they could begin the process of fixing some of 

these issues themselves. 

By way of example, I think your report talks about the fact that 

there is an exemption for certain cargo being inspected. That exemption was eliminated some time back. 

Some of the hiring issues that are raised in the report were correct. We have many more inspectors. Some of the issues about clarity and protocols have been corrected with new protocols. 

I want to, first of all, ensure the public that many of the issues 

identified there have been happily corrected since the period of 

time the matter was studied. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Now we do have a new law. We are committed to 100 percent screening of air cargo. And you know some 

of the speculation in the papers about what we are going to do or 

not do, I think—— 

Mr. MARKEY. Are you committed to physical screening of the 

cargo that goes on the planes in the same way our bags get a physical screening? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. A combination of either a physical screening either by government inspectors or by certified shippers who 

would have to conduct—— 

Mr. MARKEY. This report says that—in effect, you wouldn’t trust 

a shipper to go onto the passenger section of the plane with their 

bags. Why would you trust a shipper to put cargo on the very same 

plane? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Let me ask you a question, when you flew 

down here from Boston to come to this hearing, you got on a plane 

that was inspected by the private sector. It wasn’t inspected by the 

58 

U.S. Government. Every day, people get on airplanes where safety 

checks are undertaken by airlines or by—— 

Mr. MARKEY. My bags went through screening. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. The plane itself, the engine, the avionics of 

the plane were checked by the private sector. 

Mr. MARKEY. My bags were checked for a bomb. The cargo is not 

checked for a bomb. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. My point is that while I agree with you, we 

have to check all the cargo, I do not agree that government inspectors have to do 100μpercent of the checking themselves. 

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Secretary, my time is running out. All I am 

saying is it sounds to me like the Department of Homeland Security is cooking up a deal with the air cargo industry and the airline 

industry in the same way that they cooperated with them in the 

nonimplementation of the pre-existing law which wasn’t as strong 

as this law. And I am very concerned that passengers in America 

thought that Congress was tightening the laws so that every piece 

of cargo was physically inspected with the same standard for bags. 

And what I am hearing is that you were reserving the right to 

allow the air cargo industry to continue to evade this law, as they 

have for the last 5 years. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I couldn’t disagree more. I don’t think that 

is what I have said. I think what I have said is that we do intend 

to execute the law and hold everybody to the standard of checking. 

The one thing I have said that I guess you may take some issue 

with is, that in much the same way that we direct the airlines to 

check the airplanes themselves to make sure they are airworthy, 

we are going to put into effect a certification program that requires 

shippers to check packages before they are palletized in shrink 

wrap so that we have the same standard of protection. Now if 

philosophically there is a belief where we cannot ever trust the private sector when we tell them to do something, then I have to say, 

frankly, Congressman, you have no business getting on an airplane 

because we do not physically inspect every airplane. 

Mr. MARKEY. No one trusts me to get on the plane without 

checking my bags. That is correct. A Congressman should not be 

trusted in a passenger cabin on the plane. But you should not allow 

a shipper who is standing behind me in line because his cargo is 

going on and you trust him—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Chairman, are we under a 5-minute rule? 

Mr. THOMPSON. I said we are flexible. 

Mr. MARKEY. You are saying you have—you want to think outside the box. That is okay with me, Mr. Secretary, as long as you 

check inside the box. And right now, you do not have a system that 

will check inside these boxes physically to make sure that there are 

no bombs. And the public has to have an expectation or else there 

will be a fire storm that comes from this committee and others in 

congress that you are not putting in place a law that implements 

the expectations of the American people. Thank you. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. I now recognize the gentleman from Connecticut for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. Mr. Secretary I don’t want to 

spend too much more time on this issue. But as the chief Republican cosponsor on this legislation, we first checked carry-on. We 

59 

didn’t check the luggage that went into the belly of the aircraft, 

and then we moved to screening all luggage. It is the intent over 

3 years to do a third, a third, a third. And what we believe is that 

if we don’t check the cargo, it is a huge—a huge flaw in the system. 

So what I am unclear about is if you have paid people to inspect, 

and they aren’t paid by the government but contractors to inspect 

but a disinterested party, then I think you are doing the spirit of 

the law. If you are basically saying the shippers have to check their 

own cargo, then I get a little concerned. And I want to make sure 

if you are saying that, we need to put it on the record. But if you 

are saying something different, then I would like to hear that. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. That is a great opportunity to make sure 

we are clear about this. Now obviously we haven’t written the regulation yet. So I am quite confident as we write the regulation and 

we get into the details, there is going to be a lot of pushback. So 

I don’t want to jump the gun and start to articulate all the fine details of the rule. The concept is this, we do want to set for shippers 

who are prepared to undertake the obligation clear standards for 

what they have to do in terms of checking that which they are 

going to ship themselves, make sure that that is validated by inspection of their activities to make sure they are living up to what 

they are supposed to do, and therefore—and that validation being 

either by the government or by disinterested third parties so that 

we replicate in general terms the system that we rely upon for the 

safety of the aircraft. 

Mr. SHAYS. But it can’t be going back to the known shipper. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. No. It is not the known shipper. 

Mr. SHAYS. Well it seems to me that Mr. Markey raises a concern 

that I think we will want to follow. But I can just tell you, the belief of those who voted for this bill is that we would have a disinterested party doing the inspection. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, I think that—as again, we will see 

the rule as it comes out. And I am sure we will get comments on 

that. I think what we are talking about is a model where we have 

certification of the shippers and disinterested validation of the 

shippers, and that this process works with the same level of security and confidence that we use with respect to other matters of life 

and death, such as checking airplanes themselves. 

Mr. SHAYS. Because I probably won’t be allowed to run over as 

much, let me just get into another area. But I just want to say, you 

have got my attention, Mr. Markey has my attention because we 

know what we passed. And I am a little concerned that it sounds 

too much like known shipper. But I would like to ask you this 

question, we knew during the Cold War what our strategy was. It 

was contain, react, mutually assure destruction. 

Obviously that has gone out the window. I mean, there were 

other aspects to it. It was we weren’t going to let the Russians beat 

us economically and so on. But I would like to have you tell me 

what you think our strategy is, what the 9/11 Commission said. 

And by the way, I think it is a very inconvenient truth that we are 

having to confront Islamist terrorists. In other words, there is not 

just one inconvenient truth in this world about global warming. 

This is an inconvenient truth. What is our strategy? Tell me in 

60 

your own words what our strategy is to deal with Islamist terrorists? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. In a nutshell, to reduce risks and by doing 

it by looking at all elements of chain of risks. It begins by looking 

at where the threat comes from. From the extent it comes from 

overseas, obviously if you kill or incapacitate those who are waging 

war, that reduces the risk. If you keep out people who are dangerous by having secure documentation and intelligence information, that reduces the risk. In terms of homegrown terrorism, our 

ability to detect and disrupt plots reduces the risk. Our ability— 

and maybe this is a longer term issue to counteract radicalization 

reduces the risk. And then it has to do with further layers of defense with respect to the strategy. To the extent that we have targets in this country, and we harden those targets, even if somebody 

penetrates our defenses, we reduce the risk. 

To use the Cold War analogy, if an enemy bomber gets through 

the radar, then we want to have our most precious assets protected 

in bunkers that can’t easily be bombed. And then finally the last 

element is having a vigorous response program that can at least 

mitigate the damage done. And because obviously we prefer there 

be no damage. But the less consequence there is, the less harm 

there is for the United States. So there is a continuum of risk, and 

we simultaneously address all elements of that, some of them in 

my department, some of them frankly are in the Department of Defense or the Department of Justice or the intelligence community. 

But all of them synchronized along that basic strategy. 

Mr. SHAYS. Okay. Let me just close by saying that I think—and 

I appreciate your answer. But I think part of it has to be detect, 

prevent, preempt, and mutually assure—excuse me, and maybe act 

even unilaterally. If a small group of dedicated scientists can create 

an altered biological agent that can wipe out humanity as we know 

it, even Jimmy Carter is not going to wait for permission to deal 

with that threat. But I appreciate your response. Thank you. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. The time of the gentleman has expired. We now recognize the gentleman from Washington, Mr. Dicks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Secretary, we 

welcome you here again. I want to say—first of all, I want to compliment you on moving towards a 10-fingerprint system. This is 

something I advocated with others on this committee. It just 

givings you more accuracy, and it is a much better way to go. The 

2print system is not adequate. The experts at the time said that. 

I was surprised initially that the administration put that in place. 

But I am glad that you are moving in the right direction. 

Now, one thing you also mentioned in your testimony about 

small boats and an initiative out in Seattle, Washington. Can you 

tell us more about that? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I don’t have a map in front of me. But as 

I understand it the way the port is configured in Seattle is, it is 

possible to direct all the traffic through a fairly narrow strait that 

brings you into the port. And the plan is to put passive detection 

equipment, both fixed and mobile, in that area so that we can identify vessels coming in that have radioactivity and then pull them 

over into secondary and have them inspected before they actually 

61 

get into the port itself where they could detonate it. The idea is essentially pushing the perimeter out a little bit. Assuming this 

works operationally, we would then take the concept to other ports 

that are high-risk ports. Some of it is going to be more challenging 

depending on what the geography is. Seattle happens to be configured in a way that makes it a pretty good test bed. 

Mr. DICKS. Good. I want you to also know, we are concerned out 

there. We have the nation’s largest ferry system and we know that 

the ferry system has been surveiled. And we are also concerned 

about the Cole-type incident with either the ferries or we have 

ships you know aircraft carriers like the Stennis that just returned 

where somebody could with a Jet Ski, anhydrous ammonia create 

a major problem. We are putting a much more secure system in 

with our trident submarines as they leave Bangor because of that 

potential threat. 

One of the other issues that I wanted to raise with you, going 

to the US–VISIT Program, US–VISIT is one of the few ways that 

the government can track the entry and exit of foreign travellers, 

but it is not complete. As you remember, four of the terrorists were 

people who overstayed their visas. Now, what are we doing about 

that problem? What can you tell us about that, about checking 

these people who overstay their visas? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We have of course had biographic exit, 

meaning you swipe your passport when you leave. So we do have 

some capability to track people who are overstaying their visas. 

The difficulty has been, how do you hunt those people down? And 

what we tried to do is prioritize people who have overstayed where 

we have some reason to believe they are a threat to the country 

either because they are a terrorist or they have committed a crime 

or they are somehow threatening in some other way. I wish I could 

tell you that we have an automatic way to track down everybody 

who overstays their visa. 

We are a large country. And it may surprise some people to hear 

that 40μpercent of the illegals in the country actually didn’t come 

in over the southwest border between the ports of entry. They came 

in legally and they failed to leave. What we are hoping to do as 

we get US–VISIT automated is make it available as a tool, and increasingly available as a tool to State and local law enforcement so 

they can, when they interact with somebody, identify that person 

as an overstayer and we can get that person removed. 

Mr. DICKS. Are you saying there really isn’t an organized program to check on people who have overstayed their visas? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think there is an organized program, but 

it is prioritized based upon the particular threat. In other words, 

if a student overstays, we will look to see if there is some particular reason we are concerned about that overstay and then we 

will go to find that student. We have done that for example with 

students from certain parts of the world. 

Mr. DICKS. Could you give us a percentage, a number, how many 

of these, of the people who are overstaying their visas are checked 

each year? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I will supply that to you. I don’t have that 

off the top of my head. 

62 

Mr. DICKS. I would like to know that. I think we need to know 

that because this may be another area that we need to strengthen 

in terms of checking on these—— 

I find that in our office, a lot of the people who come and have 

problems are people who have overstayed their visas. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I will say we know—it is not—the difficulty 

here is not hard to know who overstayed. We know who overstayed 

not 100 percent but largely. The difficulty is finding them if they 

have overstayed. Because if you have 100,000 people who, let’s say, 

have overstayed, they are not necessarily staying in the same 

place—— 

Mr. DICKS. Do they have to stay where they are going to be? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. They do. I have some experience dealing 

with fugitives. It is not going to surprise you that many of these 

people flee and hide somewhere else. And it is a big country. So 

the challenge is when we are searching for them is prioritizing to 

search for the people we are most concerned about. 

Mr. DICKS. Just one final comment. I don’t expect an answer. I 

was somewhat taken back again when I looked at these infrastructure lists that some of the key infrastructure in the State of Washington was not on the list. And I made that clear to the State officials and to your people. But it still worries me that some of the 

key infrastructure was not listed. And it is a classified matter so 

I can’t get into it. But I just want to bring that to your attention. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. Mr. Secretary, during the 

9/11 conference, we sought information on visa waiver, and 

overstays. And in light of what Mr. Dicks’ questioning, we basically 

were told that no system exists for identification of individuals who 

overstay. So I look forward to whatever you can get back to us to 

shed some light on that issue. It is a problem, as your office has 

already identified, Mr. Dicks. We now recognize the gentleman 

from Texas, Mr. McCaul, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you, 

Mr. Secretary, for being here today. And let me say it was an honor 

to be with you in the Justice Department when you were assistant 

attorney general. I believe whether you return to the Department 

or stay in your current position, I know that you will serve your 

country well. And you have served your country well. I want to just 

echo the ranking member’s comments on the 9/11 bill. As a conferee, we really tried hard to implement the recommendation. It 

had to do with Congress providing a principal single point of oversight. I know that you have had—you have about 88 different committees and subcommittees. You have had about 4,000 different 

briefings and hearings. And while we have the responsibility of 

oversight, I believe we need to conduct that in a responsible way. 

And I believe that recommendation should have been implemented. 

I am sorry that it was not. Your time is valuable. And I think you 

need to—you need ample time to do what you were supposed to be 

doing, that is tracking the terrorists and protecting the homeland. 

We had a very important debate last month in the Congress. You 

referenced to it. 

But I wanted to get your—just your viewpoints not only as the 

head of the Homeland Security, but as a head Justice Department 

63 

official, and that is the FISA modernization. I worked on these 

FISAs, the national security wiretaps, when I served. You had to 

be an agent of a foreign power in the United States. What we were 

hearing is that even if you are an agent outside the United States 

talking to someone outside the United States in a foreign country, 

that we would still have to go through the FISA court. 

Fortunately after a lot of opposition and a very healthy debate, 

we did pass that measure, and it was signed into law by the President. But the fact of the matter is, intelligence is the first line of 

defense in the war on terror. The old adage, we have to be right 

every time. They only have to be right once. Through your good 

work, we were able to stop the JFK plot, the London arrests, and 

now recently we have heard in Germany and Denmark the success. 

And people tend to forget about these things. 

We all remember 9/11. We tend to forget about the successes we 

have had in stopping this. I don’t know to what extent you can 

comment on these two plots and what was entailed. And also with 

respect to Pakistan, we have a very volatile situation brewing 

where we have the military, Pakistani Army being taken hostage 

by Islamist radicals. Obviously Pakistan has nuclear weapons, and 

the idea of Pakistan being taken over by Islamic extremists is of 

great concern to me and this Congress. So if you could just comment if you will on the impact you believe that this new law that 

we passed in the Congress, what impact that will have with respect 

to your new job. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, first of all, let me echo what you said 

about focussing oversight of the Department and this committee. 

Not only is it a matter of saving time, but I think this committee, 

and of course the appropriators who deal with us, are the two bodies in the House that are best situated to have a holistic view of 

what goes on here. And not to look at the Department as an accumulation of individual components that have, you know, where you 

have a little slice of jurisdiction but where you really have the big 

picture. And oversight is important, but it should obviously be disciplined and coordinated oversight. And anything we can do to help 

support strengthening this committee’s ability to conduct its important mission is something we would be happy to do. 

I think as you know from your own experience, Congressman, the 

best way to stop something bad from happening is to have the intelligence detected so you can intervene. Otherwise, you are relying 

upon your ability to spot something while it is underway. And I 

think in the modern world, the ability to intercept communications, 

both from my own experience doing criminal cases and from what 

I have seen in the national security areas, probably the number 

one tool. To use the analogy Congressman Shays used earlier with 

respect to the Cold War, this is like radar, and not to have this tool 

would be as if in the middle of the Cold War we had said, we are 

going to take our radar system down, and when the enemy bombers come over, you see them over the horizon, then we will launch 

our fighters. You would not have wanted to fight the Cold War that 

way. 

I think it is important that the bill which Congresses passed over 

the summer be extended and made permanent so we can make 

64 

sure that our intelligence community can have the confidence that 

they will they will be able to use this tool going forward. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And to the extent I have a little bit more time, is 

it possible to comment or elaborate on the two plots that were 

foiled? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I will limit myself just to what the foreign 

governments have said. I don’t want to step on their toes. The Danish have confirmed that they saw al-Qa’ida connections with the 

people that they arrested. And I think the Germans have indicated 

that the people they arrested, the three individuals were connected 

with Jihad Islamic union, which is an affiliated group. And both 

countries have confirmed that there was some training activity that 

occurred in South Asia. I do think, as the National Intelligence Estimate said, we are very aware and concerned about training activities in certain parts of Pakistan. I think in the last couple of 

months, the Pakistani Army and government has been more vigorous in pressing on some of those locations where activities are 

taking place. But I don’t think we should underestimate the challenge. You have groups of fighters who are collecting in Pakistan 

and perhaps in other parts of south Asia, and in Iraq, frankly, looking for safe havens in which they can train. And the more space 

they get, the more efforts we are going to see like what we have 

seen in Denmark or in Germany, particularly recruiting foreigners 

coming from western Europe, training them and sending them back 

in order to carry out missions. And it is only a 6-hour plane ride 

from western Europe to the United States. 

That is why we are working not only to build up the—to toughen 

our visa waiver program up but we are working to get more intelligence and more signals intelligence so we can help our friends 

overseas protect themselves. Because that is good for us as well. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. Following up on your 

comment, Mr. McCaul, we will schedule a classified briefing at the 

committee SCIF to talk on this very subject. 

We now yield the gentlelady from California 5 minutes, Ms. Harman. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Mr. Secretary. For my two cents, I hope you stay in this job until the end 

of the Bush administration. I think it has been a tough job for you 

and for the country. I think perhaps we were too ambitious in the 

way we set up the Department. But nonetheless, after the heroic 

effort you have made and the learning curve that you have, I think 

it would be a disappointment if you were to move elsewhere. 

I would also just opine that should you move to the Justice Department, I think you would spend a year and a half digging out 

of a very deep hole. And I am not sure if I were you that that 

would be something I would really want to do. You don’t need to 

respond. But I did want to put it out there. 

I want to thank you on behalf of Los Angeles City and Los Angeles County for enormous effort made to keep that part of the country safer. I appreciate your three trips at my invitation out there 

to look at the port, to look at the fusion center, to talk to key people. I think it has made a big difference. And when I hear you tesVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:31 Nov 23, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-67\48962.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
65 

tify this morning, I hear some of the material that we have discussed in the past and I appreciate the effort that you are making. 

I agree with others, and I certainly agree with Mr. McCaul that 

the world is getting more dangerous. I want to commend the Department for the involvement it had in Denmark and in Germany 

and elsewhere with respect to the takedowns that just occurred. 

And I did appreciate briefings by Charlie Allen on those situations 

in my role as chairman of the Intelligence subcommittee. But now 

let me make a comment and ask a question. 

My comment is that you are right, that it is critical for us to 

intercept conversations and e-mails in real time and to find out 

whether foreigners or Americans are plotting to harm us. But I 

strongly disagree that the best way to do this is through the legislation that Congress just passed. I think that legislation permits 

unfettered executive power, and I would prefer to restore the 

checks and balances that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 

put in place 30 years ago, and which, in my view, could be modernized and be a better way to go to get the same information than 

the way we are going. 

And so I am working on a bipartisan basis to see whether we can 

amend the law we just passed to provide review by an Article 3 

court—and I know you understand very well that Article 3 courts 

are separate from the executive brancH—of the basic scope and parameters of the program to prevent any executive, not just this one, 

but any executive in the future from using what is a very valuable 

tool for the wrong purposes. 

My question is this, in your testimony, you scarcely mentioned 

intelligence, your written system and your oral testimony. You 

mentioned it in response to Mr. McCaul. But the 9/11 bill, H.R.μ1 

spends a lot of time on intelligence. And one of the things that it 

does is to try to improve the way the Department and our Federal 

intelligence community shares information with State and locals. 

In fact, it compels their participation in the National Counterterrorism Center through a means that we have agreed on called the 

Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group, the 

ITACG and with the purpose of making certain that intelligence 

products incorporate their views of what they need and the form 

that would be useful to them. 

So my question to you is, would you like to elaborate your testimony on the importance of information sharing vertically with 

state and locals? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. And I didn’t mean to slight it. Often when 

you get into discussion of intelligence, then you wind up getting 

into classified matters, so you really can’t talk about the value of 

it except in generalities. Let me say that I do think that vertical 

intelligence sharing—I think we have done quite a good job horizontally with intelligence sharing. Unless you want to elaborate on 

that I won’t get into that. Vertical intelligence sharing, particularly 

using fusion centers, is I think the next big step forward. And our 

vision is to have, you know, 20 to 30 fusion centers with our—having some analysts embedded in the fusion center before the end of 

the President’s term. 

Part of what we are trying to do is enable and empower local and 

State law enforcement to use the tools of intelligence themselves in 

66 

order to detect particularly homegrown threats, which they are 

more likely to be able to detect than we are because they are very 

low signature, they are not going to have necessarily international 

communications involved. And in order to do that, we do need to 

have an ability through the ITACG, I guess is the way we would 

say the acronym, to understand what the customer is looking for. 

We have identified some people, some State and local law enforcement people who are currently assigned to DHS, to send over, 

and we are looking to have this stood up this month. I am hoping 

that as we develop the concept we will get greater and greater enthusiasm from more and more State and local law enforcement people for participating in this process. I want to be careful in how I 

say this, but I do want to give you one anecdote that supports this. 

My understanding is that because of the South Carolina fusion center, we were rapidly able to determine after the initial stop of the 

two south Florida students in South Carolina that this was a matter that would be of interest to a broader community than just the 

local traffic police. 

And I think that that is a great example of how a fusion center 

should operate. It should take something that my might ordinarily, 

you know, traffic police might shrug his shoulders, and it gives 

that—creates a vehicle for sharing that information. 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I thank you for that answer. I would commend to you, Mr. Secretary, H.R. 1955, based on your testimony, 

which was unanimously—I believe unanimously reported by this 

full committee on homegrown radicalization. We think that commissions should be set up to study this carefully to understand the 

specific point of which someone who may be radical—being radical 

is permitted under our Constitution. But committing radical violent 

acts is not. We want to understand that the point at which someone changes. And I hope your Department will take a look at it, 

and I also applaud your support of the fusion centers. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to go over my time. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. We now recognize the 

gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. Good 

morning, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. Secretary, last month, two students at the University of 

South Florida, close to my congressional district, were arrested in 

South Carolina, charged with carrying explosive devices. One student has since been indicted by a Federal grand jury with transporting explosives while the other was charged with transporting 

explosives and helping terrorists by aiding, teaching and demonstrating the use of an explosive device in furtherance of an activity that constitutes a Federal crime of violence. I know you can’t 

comment specifically on the case. But there are several questions 

that need to be answered as soon as possible to better understand 

the larger homeland security implications of this matter. And I 

would like to ask these questions. To what extent is DHS working 

in conjunction with DOJ to determine whether this is an isolated 

case or whether there could be connections between these individuals and suspected terrorists or terrorist groups? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. In every case like this, not only DHS and 

DOJ, but the intelligence community from the very moment that 

67 

something is detected, the first priority is to see what are the connections and linkages between the people who are looking at and 

anybody else? So I can guarantee you that from the, you know, literally the day of the arrest, priority number one was to examine 

any connections or linkages between individuals arrested and anybody else that might pose a threat. Now sometimes they turn out 

to be, you know, innocent linkages. But there is nothing that we 

could do that is more important than getting our arms around the 

full scope of a network if we focus on a particular threat. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Does DHS have the ability to monitor 

whether those here on student visas are actually complying with 

the terms of those visas and not simply using them as a way to 

gain entry into the country for other purposes? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We do to a limited extent. We rely upon the 

school. Once someone gets a visa, and they are supposed to enroll 

in a course of study and be attending school for a certain amount 

of time. If someone falls out of that status requirement, the school 

is obliged to notify us, and at that point we will pick up the student 

and deport the student. Many schools live up to that. Some schools 

do not. We have, from time to time, run operations to validate 

whether schools are complying with the rules or not. And in cases 

where we have found people for example out of status and it wasn’t 

reported, we will obviously find the person and deport them. 

Most schools try to honor their obligation. There are some that 

do not, and we have actually I believe yanked the privilege of 

hosting foreign students from some of the schools that are not living up to their end of the bargain. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. I don’t know if you will know the answer to this 

question, but I need to know how many foreign students have entered the U.S. since 9/11 and enrolled in classes but not subsequently attended them? And if you don’t know that question, if you 

could please provide that to us, maybe other members of the committee would be interested as well. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I will get back to you on that. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. Thank you. There are several different Federal agencies that process and monitor the entry of foreign students in the United States. My understanding is that potential foreign students must satisfy the DOS consular officials abroad and 

DHS inspectors upon entry to the United States, that they are not 

eligible for visas under the Immigration and Nationality Acts, 

grounds for inadmissibilities, which include provisions regarding 

one’s past criminal history. 

What criminal acts would preclude the issuance of a visa or deny 

entry into the United States of a nonimmigrant foreign student? 

And I understand that this may apply in this particular case that 

I am speaking of. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I don’t think I could give you a comprehensive list off the top of my head. Obviously felonies would be a disqualifier. I don’t know what misdemeanors would be. And there 

may be some variations in legal systems that make it a little bit 

complicated to categorize something as a felony or a misdemeanor. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Can you please provide that information to me? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Yes. 

68 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. I would appreciate it. Do you believe that there 

is proper coordination and sharing of information between various 

Federal agencies responsible for the admission and monitoring of 

foreign students in the schools which they are attending? And you 

did touch on that. Can you expand upon that? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I believe there is very good sharing among 

Federal agencies. I don’t think it is perfect or flawless. And given 

that you are dealing with thousands and thousands of people coming to the U.S. every year, just human error is going to result in 

problems once in a while. I think the harder issue is in dealing 

with the schools. I think some schools are reluctant to report students who drop below their course requirement or make themselves 

absent because they don’t want to see themselves as enforcement 

tools for the U.S. Government. I think that the danger is that that 

creates a vulnerability in the program. And as a consequence, we 

do have to sanction schools. And I am not hesitant to do so. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. That is good to know. Thank you very much. Appreciate it, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. We now yield 5 minutes 

to the gentlelady from Virgin Islands, Ms. Christensen. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Mr. 

Secretary. Before I ask the question, I just wanted to let you know 

that on a positive note that I see that we have an Office of Health 

Affairs, and we had an opportunity to meet with Dr. Rungy a few 

months ago and see his mission and his jurisdiction becoming 

clearer and they have good goals, measurable objectives. And while 

they have probably still a few vacancies, I think that if all of the 

other directorates and offices were coming together like that, the 

Department would really be in good shape. 

That being said, I still have a health question. And we had a 

hearing on May 15 where FEMA Director Mr. Paulison was here, 

and the chairman asked him then about formaldehyde in travel 

trailers. He had assured us at that hearing that there were no 

problems. Of course now we know differently. The committee also 

wrote to you recently asking if you planned on conducting a health 

assessment to determine whether or not the trailers are a problem 

and whether the people living in them are at risk. Could you tell 

us what you have done on that or how you plan to ensure that the 

trailer occupants are safe? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Let me begin by saying, and I know you 

know formaldehyde is a common building material. There probably 

is formaldehyde in the room here. And there is no—somewhat to 

my surprise, there is no standard for the acceptable level of formaldehyde in travel trailers. People have drawn analogies based on 

OSHA and other standards. The doctors I have talked to say that 

is really an imperfect analogy. So we don’t really have an actual 

standard. 

We have asked the Centers for Disease Control and EPA to put 

together a protocol to test and set a standard to determine what 

would be a safe level. But I didn’t want to wait for the scientists. 

So I very clearly said a few weeks ago in New Orleans, if anybody 

is in a trailer and is concerned about formaldehyde, either because 

they are uncomfortable physically or because they are just because 

they are just anxious about it, we will get you out of the trailers, 

69 

no ifs, ands or buts. We will put you someplace else. We will have 

to find alternative housing, it may not happen immediately. 

Those in greater distress, we will put in a hotel. We got about 

1,000 people out of the total number that are left that requested 

to be moved. Ironically, we also got a significant number of people 

who asked if this meant they wouldn’t be able to buy their trailer 

because they wanted to keep the trailer. 

For the time being, until we get a satisfactory scientific answer, 

we will not sell or give trailers away. And I think for this year, we 

are not going to rely on trailers. I have always be been skeptical 

of trailers certainly as a group housing solution. I think it is a very 

bad solution. So we will err on the side of safety here and look for 

alternative housing if people need to have that in the event of a 

catastrophe. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I do think that in addition to asking what 

EPA and CDC can tell you what a safe level of formaldehyde might 

be, CDC, through their agency for toxic substance and disease registry can do health assessments to see if there is a problem and 

work backward from there, and I think that would be appropriate. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We have a 1–800 number where people can 

call up to get information. And if they have any questions about 

health, they can refer to a CDC person who will answer their questions and help them through the medical process. 

Mr. DICKS. Just for a brief comment. A lot of people—some people have allergies, and the people that react to this have allergies. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I guess it was when you did your second 

stage review you put TSA, Border Patrol and ICE directly under 

you in your reorganization. And I had questions about that at that 

time. Can you tell me how that has or has not improved their collaboration and their operation? And if you plan to continue that 

going forward or are you planning to change that? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. No. I think that has actually worked very 

well. Let me give you a couple of concrete examples. First of all, 

we have created something called viper teams, which started out 

as a mobile TSA security unit, a quick response team that we could 

use to do surge security operations. And it has worked so well that 

we have expanded it to have a DHS viper team so we have Customs and Border Protection, Coast Guard and TSA working together to train and deploy mixed teams, depending on the particular environment. We have done similar kind of cross training 

and cross-exercising with respect to Coast Guard and Customs and 

Border Protection at our seaports where we literally have interoperability between Coast Guardsmen and Customs and Border 

Protection on inspections. All of this is part of a big element of 

what we are trying to do with the departments, which is try to 

build one DHS with interoperable elements. 

Instead of having done it with this middle layer between the Secretary and the Deputy and the component heads, the way we work 

now is we have something we call the gang of seven, which all of 

the operating heads meet once a week either with the deputy or 

with me and we all discuss common policy issues and problems. 

And that is the way in which we actually make sure that the component heads are constantly talking to one another and we are getting the benefit of that collective wisdom. So I have to say I think 

70 

this was a good thing. It flattened the organization, it actually promoted cross fertilization. 

And more and more we see the components themselves seeking 

out opportunities to plan and work together. Last thing, if I can be 

real quick, a big lesson for the Defense Department in GoldwaterNichols was jointness. We have a management directive now that 

basically tells people who want to be SCS that in order to make 

their application more attractive for Senior Executive Service, they 

should plan to spend a rotation out of their component either in a 

joint activity of the Department or in another component to kind 

of build the sense of jointness. So this is what we are doing to kind 

of build that unity. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up, I 

believe. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. We now recognize the 

gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Brown-Waite, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. I can only imagine putting together so many different agencies under one umbrella. It is 

kind of like herding cats. It is not an easy job to do. 

There recently was, I believe, it was a GAO report, and I meant 

to bring it down with me to be able to actually quote it correctly, 

and I left it up in my office. But that said that customs lacks the 

ability to track cargo supposedly going through the United States. 

In other words, it comes into a port and it is then transported supposedly either to Canada or to Mexico, or possibly even over to the 

west coast. So we are losing a lot of Customs money that should 

be collected because these items are actually being dumped in the 

market in the United States. Are you familiar with this report? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I don’t think I have seen that report. I can 

find it and I am sure the head of—the commissioners of Customs 

and Border Protection has seen it if it is out there. 

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Okay. If you could get back to us on what is 

being done to remedy this, number one. And number two, let me 

relate it to the potential dangers of some of the trucks coming in 

from Mexico. And if we can’t track the cargo that is supposed to 

be going through the country, not being dumped into the country, 

I don’t think that a lot of Americans have a lot of warm fuzzy feelings about the trucks coming in through Mexico as to what the contents may very well be. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, this I should make clear. In terms of 

trucks from Mexico, the new rule about trucking doesn’t change 

what has always been the case, which is we inspect the cargo that 

comes in, and we target the cargo for inspection, you know, in the 

same way we do for any other cargo. All that the truck rule does 

is instead of offloading the cargo 25 miles inside the U.S. to a U.S. 

trucker, it allows the trucker to continue on into the interior. I 

know there are issues that are raised about the safety of the drivers, those fought with the domain of the Department of Transportation. But from the standpoint of the security of the cargo, allowing Mexican drivers to drive into the interior does not change, does 

not relax or in any way modify the existing security standards. 

71 

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Do you not see a correlation between the 

cargo that we can’t track that gets dumped into our economy because of a lack of a system there and a problem? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Not having seen the GAO report, and I 

don’t know if they were talking about land ports of entry or sea 

ports of entry, I don’t think the existence of—I don’t think whether 

the trucker is Mexican or if they get a new driver to come in at 

25 miles in necessarily tells you anything about what happens with 

trans-shipments. But I am flying a little in the dark because I don’t 

have the GAO report so I probably will get back to you. 

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. If you could get back to the committee, that 

would be very helpful. Let me ask another question, and that is 

sanctuary cities are an insult to law abiding citizens. If the Federal 

Government cut off any Federal aid to sanctuary cities, do you 

think that this would help stem the illegal flow? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think—you know people use the term 

sanctuary city in different ways. So I am never quite sure what 

people mean. Some cities have a policy that if somebody comes in 

and is the victim of crime, they are not asked about their status. 

Others may go further and not report felons who are illegal to us 

to be removed. I think that is actually very a foolish and counterproductive policy. I am not aware of any city, although I may be 

wrong, that actually interferes with our ability to enforce the law. 

I certainly wouldn’t tolerate interference. 

I will tell you I think there is a proposal in one location to prevent us from using basic pilot in the city, and we are exploring our 

legal options. I intend to take as vigorous legal action as the law 

allows to prevent that from happening, prevent that kind of interference. 

In terms of funding, I don’t have the authority I think—I mean 

let’s assume we have homeland security funds for particular city, 

I don’t know that I have the authority to cut off all homeland security funds if I disagree with a city’s policy on immigration. And of 

course, I have to say that the consequence of that might be to put 

the citizens at risk, you know, in the event of a natural disaster 

or something which—I don’t want to put people’s lives at risk. But 

I do think where the law gives me the power to prevent anybody 

from interfering with our activities, we will use the law to prevent 

that interference. 

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Mr. Secretary, I am not just referring to 

funds through your Department, but say transportation money, 

any Federal funds that would flow into a city that sets itself up as 

a sanctuary city, if that were done, do you think that there would 

be less of a tendency for areas to be considered sanctuaries? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I have to say, honestly, I don’t know what 

the reaction would be depending on what was cut off. I think it 

would depend on the city. I mean I could probably guess there are 

some cities, they would become more stubborn. Others might 

change their policy. It is hard for me to guess in the abstract. 

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. We now recognize the 

gentlelady from Texas for 5 minutes, Ms. Jackson Lee. 

72 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome Secretary 

Chertoff. Let me, first of all, quickly congratulate you for the increased numbers of border patrol. I think we have spoken about 

that over the years post-9/11, and a number of us had comprehensive immigration reform that included adding upwards of 15,000 or 

more border patrol agents. And you are certainly making that particular journey. Let me also acknowledge—and because our time is 

short, the anniversary of Hurricane Katrina. And I imagine that 

FEMA, under your leadership and Director Paulison who, by the 

way, was particularly attentive and responsive during the number 

of threats and continued threats of hurricanes, that it has now 

moved to HUD. 

My simple question, or my simple point on the record is, New Orleans remains a calamity. The gulf coast remains a calamity, and 

pushing it from one agency to another solves no problems. And I 

just want to put that on the record for a possible brief comment. 

But I want to focus on aviation. And I am very glad that Department of Homeland Security has itself recognized that transportation modes remain an attractive and conspicuous target for terrorists. 

The JFK incident, and then, of course, in the last 48 hours, the 

discovery of the German plot. It is comforting that you have discovered that even though general aviators mostly of great means oppose any intervention, it is crucial that we assess the general aviation industry. And I might suggest we go further. I have videotape 

showing the complete penetratable opportunity in small general 

aviation airports across America. And frankly, I look forward to our 

committee and my subcommittee looking at this question very carefully. So I ask you the question about general aviation as a whole, 

the airports which are without security and can be penetrated. I 

would appreciate your response to that. 

Let me finish one or two other points. The TWIC card has been 

difficult. It is about to be rolled out. There are benchmarks. Workers are concerned. They want to know what the procedures are. Are 

we going to remove people from their ability to provide for their 

family simply because they have had a traffic ticket or some other 

infraction? We need to be able to balance the homeland security 

with the civil liberties and civil rights of our workers. Then I know 

that there has been a legal action taken. But let me lay on the 

record for you the difficulty with the progress or the plan for the 

employee verification. I hate for people to mix apples and oranges 

and suggest how the Social Security process of employer 

verification is going to substitute for a comprehensive immigration 

reform and of course catch all the terrorists in America. 

What it is going to do is to put restaurants out of business, it 

is going to put all of these small businesses who really need an extended period of time. So I have written the President asking for 

an extended assessment to see how we can ensure that we have 

homeland security, but we have a verification process that does not 

eliminate huge segments of the business community and not big 

businesses but restaurants and small construction contractors who 

are trying to do their best to answer this question. 

73 

1The terms ‘‘senior leadership and executive resource’’ refers to those positions in the highest 

salary bands of the Federal government. 

So I would appreciate your answers to the questions I have laid 

out, and particularly with the focus on aviation security in the general aviation area. Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for convening this important hearing today regarding 

holding the Department of Homeland Security accountable for security gaps. I would 

also like to welcome our witness today, the Honorable Michael Chertoff, Secretary 

of the Department of Homeland Security. 

The purpose of the hearing today is to receive testimony from Secretary Chertoff 

regarding his tenure as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and 

his plans for the future of the Department during the time remaining in this Administration. Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, The Department of Homeland Security and its Secretary are responsible for preventing and deterring terrorist attacks and protecting against and responding to threats and hazards to the 

nation. In examining the performance of the department, several pressing and critical issues rise to the surface. Along with the progress the Department has made 

under Secretary Chertoff?s leadership I remain very concerned about several critical 

issues which have not yet been resolved. 

First and foremost, no organization with a mission as critical as the DHS with 

a mandate to protect our citizenry from terrorist threats can afford to have a vast 

number of critical vacancies which still exist at DHS. In addition to the high critical 

vacancy rate, an issue of particular concern continues to be the number of important 

programs that have not met their deadlines. Also, recognizing that the need to stay 

ahead of the terrorists requires intelligence capabilities, one of my concerns regarding the Department is that while it develops intelligence and data-sharing capabilities, it should try to stay true to our essential American values such as preserving 

the privacy of our fellow citizens. 

With regards to the critical vacancies continuing to exist at DHS and affecting 

its mission, the July 9, 2007 report of the Majority Staff of the Committee on Homeland Security entitled, ?Critical Leadership Vacancies Impede United States Department of Homeland Security? found that nearly one quarter of the senior leadership 

positions located in the Department of Homeland Security are vacant. 

According to the report as of May 1, 2007 there were 575 senior leadership or ‘‘executive resource’’ positions at DHS1. One-hundred and thirty-eight of these were vacant (24%). 

• 48% leadership vacancies at the Asst. Sec. for Policy 

• 47% leadership vacancies at the Office of Gen. Counsel 

• 36% leadership vacancies at the Asst. Sec. for Intelligence 

• 34% leadership vacancies at US Citizenship and Immigration Services 

• 31% leadership vacancies at FEMA 

• 31% leadership vacancies at ICE 

• 29% leadership vacancies at the Coast Guard 

The report brings to the surface another unsettling pattern by establishing that 

an unusually high number of critical positions at DHS are filled by political appointees rather than career professionals. The quadrennial Plum Book by the Office 

of Personnel Management, states that ?as of September 2004 the 180,000-employee 

Homeland Security Department had more than 360 politically appointed, non-career 

positions. These political appointees serve at the pleasure of this President. Therefore, at the conclusion of this Administration, each of the positions currently filled 

by a political appointee will become vacant. It is possible and in many cases preferable to have employees in career civil service position fill these executive level positions. For instance by way of contrast, the Veterans Affairs Department—the government’s second-largest department, at 235,000 employees—had only 64 executive 

level political appointees. And the Defense Department—far and away the largest 

department in the government, at 2.1 million employees, including military and civilian—counted 283 appointed, non-career positions. That figure includes political 

appointees at the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Inexplicably, instead of seeking to reduce this over-reliance on political appointees, DHS’ own reports show that since 

74 

2 ‘‘Homeland Security could face transition problem’’ by Shane Harris, National Journal June 

1, 2007 

2004, it has often added more political positions to its ranks, and more frequently, 

than other large departments.’’ 2

I should note that the types of jobs filled by political appointees are of a critical 

nature. However, with an eye on the inevitable transition from the current administration to the next, the critical mission of the Department could be secured only if 

the department has a solid foundation consisting of career civil service professionals. 

I am concerned that with such a high ratio of political appointees with deep professional roots in the homeland security field, the American public could be made more 

vulnerable by the heightened disorganization and dysfunction caused by the precipitous departure of the current inordinately high number of political appointees. 

Another issue of great concern to me is the great number of critical DHS programs that have missed their deadline for completion. The inability of DHS to deliver on time with regards to such critical items as providing a strategic plan for 

detection of explosives at airports or missing the February 2007 deadline to create 

the DHS Office of Emergency Communications certainly reveals the Department?s 

security gaps that Congress and this Committee has ht to address. 

Similarly, the inability of DHS to make progress regarding vital homeland protection programs such as SEAL (Container Security and Procedures) and the National 

Response Plan, aimed at all-hazards approach to manage domestic incidents, suggests that the Department is not doing enough to protect the American public from 

very real threats. 

As I have spoken in this Committee and the Committee on the Judiciary, while 

intelligence gathering is a critical tool in our efforts to combat terrorism, we must 

not sacrifice our American values in the process, especially constitutionally protected rights of privacy. 

Given the unprecedented amount of information Americans now transmit electronically and the post-9/11 loosening of regulations governing information sharing, 

the risk of intercepting and disseminating the communications of ordinary Americans is vastly increased, requiring more precise—not looser—standards, closer oversight, new mechanisms for minimization, and limits on retention of inadvertently 

intercepted communications. I have expressed these concerns during our recent debate about FISA and share them with you here now in the context of our discussion 

focused on DHS. The mission of the DHS will not be properly executed, unless all 

safeguards are in place when it comes to preserving our fellow citizens’ fundamental 

rights to privacy which are increasingly encroached upon, I am afraid, by an aggressive expansion of DHS’ intelligence sharing and data-sharing capabilities. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I look forward to Secretary 

Chertoff’s testimony. I yield the balance of our time. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I agree with you, general aviation is a concern. And in particular, we draw a distinction between aircraft that 

are, I think, 12,500 tons and those that are less than that. There 

is a certain cutoff because of the danger that the aircraft itself with 

the fuel could become a much more effective weapon as opposed to 

a smaller thing like a Piper Cup. What we are looking to do is 

begin with the biggest threat, which is a possibility of somebody 

smuggling something in from overseas. 

We do have, through TSA, an ability to use security directives to 

tighten up on security at airports. And we are also looking at the 

possibility of some additional regulations with respect to vetting 

crews and who are flying in private aircraft, particularly in the 

larger private aircraft. Again, I mean, there seems to be a proliferation, particularly in very small light aircraft, and we are going 

to have to draw the line somewhere between aircraft that are a serious threat because of their size and their weight of their jet fuel 

and aircraft that are sufficiently light, like that unfortunate plane 

which had the incident in New York last year with Cory Lidle, 

where if it was a hidden ability, it would be bad, it wouldn’t be a 

catastrophe. 

75 

On the TWIC card, I can assure you traffic tickets are not a disqualifier. The regulation we put out does list the crimes that are 

disqualifying. Some of them are disqualifying for life like treason 

or terrorism. Some of them are disqualifying if you have been convicted or served a sentence within a certain number of years. Some 

of them are not disqualifying. By way of example, there was a recent incident where, I think, a trailer truck overturned on an overpass in San Francisco and caused damage to the bridge. And it 

turned out to the driver had some old drug conviction and then 

some people said well, why did you let this person drive? Why can 

they get a commercial driver’s license? 

Again, I have to say we are going to have to balance. We are not 

going to treat every misdemeanor drug possession as a disqualifier. 

On the other hand, if someone has been a racketeer, they are not 

getting on the docks. So we are going to draw the line somewhere 

between those two. On the no match issue, I actually—obviously we 

have got a legal case here which I think may delay us a little bit. 

I am convinced that this is not going to be a problem for legitimate workers. In fact, for people where there is a clerical error, it 

is going to be to their benefit to find that out and correct it so that 

they don’t wind up 20 years from now not getting benefits they are 

entitled to. The larger question you raise is what is going to happen in those industries where it turns out that there is a lot of 

illegals being employed? And the answer is that is going to be a 

hardship. And I don’t think I have been—I think I have been pretty open in acknowledging that fact. But here is what I can’t do. I 

can’t not enforce the law. We have told—we told Congress frankly 

you ought to find a way to address this issue. 

Congress has not yet acted. The one thing I can’t do, and I think 

this is the root of the problem we have had over the last 20 years 

is for us to simply close our eyes to the problem and get everybody 

off the hook by not enforcing the law. And then what happens is 

people turn to the agencies and they say the agency is derelict in 

its duty, the agency is failing. It is not fair to my agents to put 

them in that position. I have to tell my agents, I am going to support you in enforcing the law 100 percent even if it turns out there 

is going to be some negative consequence. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. In the end, I think we are going to find this 

issue of immigration reform is a matter that has to be revisited, 

and I hope that it can be revisited. I don’t claim to have the perfect 

solution. I hope it can be revisited sooner rather than later. In the 

meantime, we will carry out our oaths to execute the laws. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, my last sentence simply is 

comprehensive immigration reform should be called upon by the 

administration, you should take the lead because what you are 

doing is destroying innocent families caught up in the illegal immigration, undocumented immigration system and probably undermining huge numbers of small businesses. And I yield back. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. We now yield 5 

minutes to the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome back. I am glad to see you. I understand in your earlier 

testimony—I just came from the Armed Services hearing. But I unVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:31 Nov 23, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-67\48962.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
76 

derstand that you had already testified to the border patrol training status. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. We, according to your testimony, now have over 

14,000 trained border patrol agents. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. That is correct. We have sworn in over 

14,471. 

Mr. ROGERS. And I understand further that your testimony was 

that within 16 months, at the end of 2008, we are going to hit the 

threshold of 18,003 that you have been targeting. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Correct. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is admirable. I am pleased to hear that. That 

is an area I paid a lot of attention to and I hope that you are you 

right and you all hit that target. 

But what I want to talk to you more specifically about today is 

canines. You have talked to this committee before about that and 

you have already expressed your respect for that asset and its efficiency and effectiveness. As you are probably aware, in the 9/11 

Commission Act that we passed and was signed into law by the 

President, it requires the establishment of a national explosive detection canine training team and gives you 180 days to get that set 

up and begin producing these dogs. Do you know where that program is at present? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I don’t. I do have to obviously say, as you 

know, money has to be appropriated in the 2008 fiscal year for this. 

So we don’t yet have a bill. So obviously all this is contingent on 

Congress appropriating the money. Other than that, in terms 

where we are in the planning on that I would have to get back to 

you. 

Mr. ROGERS. If you would. One of the things that I found in my 

visits to the various border ports of entry is that we are grossly 

understocked in canine assets. And because of that rotation of the 

dogs on and off, many of the spotters watching folks come across 

the border are able to alert their clients as to when is a good time 

to come across. So that is not acceptable. But we also found recently when I went down to Mississippi for a field hearing that 

they don’t have enough cadaver dogs either in service. 

One of the things I would urge you to consider is in addition to 

explosive detection dogs and of course dogs that can detect drugs 

we could look at cadaver dogs as well. As you know, post-Katrina, 

9/11, the various hurricanes, we always have a need for this and 

we can establish some real partnerships with local governments to 

maintain them, be called into service when necessary. 

From my understanding, these are very inexpensive dogs to 

train. They don’t require the same sophisticated breeds, which 

brings me to the second point. And that is, in touring the various 

facilities around this country and seeing the teams, both in the Department of Defense and in Homeland Security, I find that most 

of the dogs that we have in service are obtained from overseas. We 

don’t have a sufficient level of breeding programs here domestically. These dogs are brought in primarily from Germany and Holland and places such as that. And we urged in the bill that you 

all try to find ways to obtain an adequate source but also look at 

possibly establishing domestic breeding programs. 

77 

Is that something that you would feel comfortable pursuing, 

given that we have an over reliance of foreign sources for these assets? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. First of all, I have a high opinion of the 

dogs and I would be, again subject to appropriations, happy to see 

what we can do to increase the supply. I recognize that not all the 

dogs succeed in training so you have to breed more than you can 

deploy. Time and again they seem to be in terms of reliability, portability and usefulness, about the top of the line on a whole variety 

of functions, human smuggling, as well as explosives and things of 

that sort. 

So I would certainly be interested in pursuing whatever we can 

legally do. Some of this would be the Department of Agriculture, 

to promote breeding of these dogs. 

Mr. ROGERS. Within your TSA organization, you have got some 

pretty sophisticated technology research going on at Lackland and 

there is other research going on domestically. But I am concerned 

about the fact that we are relying so heavily on foreign imported 

dogs and that frankly many of our allies in Europe are also. And 

that is just not prudent in my view. 

I want to change gears. Recently, Chairman Carney and I had 

a field hearing on agriterroism in Pennsylvania and we had the Department’s chief veterinarian testify before us. And we were concerned at the fact that he only had one full-time employee beside 

himself in there and some pretty aggressive planning and policy 

making goals set before him. And I understand that by 2010 he is 

to have 37 people. I know the challenges you have in getting personnel into the Department. But can you speak to this specific instance and what you think you can do to step up that personnel? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. The foundation for setting this up—and let 

me lead by saying we recognized early on that we needed to have 

a focus on health and that involved not only human health but animal health and food safety which tend to be linked together. Now 

obviously the real expertise is in the Department of Agriculture 

and the FDA. But we needed to have our own capability, particularly through a system which is the integration of all of the intelligence. We now have an Office of Health Affairs set up. We put 

a veterinarian as the number two. And again subject to appropriations, and we have asked for a budget for this year that would 

grow that office. We are looking to expand it, not because we want 

to supplant the Department of Agriculture, because in doing our 

planning and coordinating for incidents we want to make sure we 

have enough in-house expertise so we can do it in an intelligent 

way. At the same time through our Operations Coordination Division and the President’s Incident Management Executive order, we 

do have Department of Agriculture and HHS expertise on issues 

like food and animal health participating in our integrated planning and our incident management if we have an incident. So we 

can draw upon those existing resources to supplement what we 

have. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. We now recognize 

the gentleman from Pennsylvania for 5 minutes, Mr. Carney. 

78 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Chertoff. 

Good to see you again. Back in February the Comptroller General 

and the Department’s IG testified to Congress about difficulties 

they were having in getting DHS to cooperate with their work and 

response requests in a timely manner. In fact, my subcommittee investigated these allegations. And Mr. Rogers and I held a hearing 

in April to address these concerns. Your Department committed 

then to rectifying two of the GAO’s primary concerns, the difficulty 

in getting access to documents and to program officials. Yet we are 

here almost 5 months later and the GAO has reported to my subcommittee staff that at the day-to-day level, nothing has improved. 

Even worse, at the senior level DHS appears now to be refusing to 

address the two primary difficulties they had previously committed 

to fixing. In fact, the nonpartisan GAO says of all of the Federal 

agencies and entities it deals with, DHS is by far the worst when 

it comes to cooperation and timeliness. 

Perhaps, Mr. Secretary, when you meet with the Gang of Seven 

on your weekly meetings—I think it is a great idea by the way— 

you could please bring this up. I mean, it is imperative that we do 

our job and you have to help us in that. And timeliness and the 

cooperation is essential. So I would like to ask for your assurance 

that this is going to happen, sir. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I also have to say that if there is a particular issue that they have they are free to bring it to my attention. I am always a little surprised when I hear a complaint that 

comes in a roundabout way as opposed to somebody picking up the 

phone and calling me. 

Mr. CARNEY. We have your phone number. That is good. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. And as far as the Controller General, if he 

has an issue about a particular matter. 

Mr. CARNEY. Good. Okay. We will remind him as well that they 

can call. Also, I was surprised to see no mention in your testimony 

of the upcoming TOPOFF exercises, TOPOFF for—we know that 

large scale exercises like TOPOFF IV generate lots of experiences 

and lots of insights and lessons learned. Certainly from my background in the military we call that—my understanding is that the 

after action report for TOPOFF III was completed about 6 months 

after the exercise; is that correct? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. That sounds about right. 

Mr. CARNEY. Yet it took another year at least for your office to 

review and to approve it for release. I checked with committee staff 

yesterday and they still haven’t received a report. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I will find out where that is. The reason I 

didn’t mention TOPOFF was not because it is not important, it is 

because there is a limit to what you want to read about in my testimony. Not only do we think these are important, but I personally 

participate in these and I encourage my Cabinet colleagues to do 

it and the President encourages them to do that because we do recognize the value of these exercises. I will find out where it is in 

the process. 

Mr. CARNEY. Great. Because TOPOFF IV is right around the corner and we would like to have them in a timely manner, again 

those reports and the insight and the lessons learned, et cetera. We 

79 

all have a job to do and we have to cooperate and make sure we 

protect this Nation, sir. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I agree with you. 

Mr. CARNEY. I appreciate your efforts. I yield back. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. I appreciate you assuming the responsibility of the calls from Members on reports, but 

as you know, most of those come forward with the timeline already 

in existence. And I think it would help us if you would, without the 

extra communication from us, just implore your people under you 

that these timelines are not going away and we have to meet them. 

That is what we are looking for. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I have done that. Let me be clear. We have 

actually put a very focused effort on accelerating the pace of our 

response to congressional reports, and I think we are doing better 

because I have been tracking it. I think this was a much narrower 

issue having to do with GAO feeling that somehow they disagree 

with either how quickly we are responding or whether they agree 

or disagree with whether we are giving them the information they 

want. And as I was beginning to say, if the Controller General has 

an issue with this, he can call me. I am not hiding from him. I do 

direct that we cooperate. And I recognize sometimes GAO wishes 

we didn’t have lawyers present. We feel we need them present and 

that is a disagreement. But I was not aware there was a particular 

problem or general problem with what they perceived as cooperativeness, and if the Comptroller General wants to raise that issue 

he should say to me I have a problem and be specific about it. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Chairman Carney would like to make a 

comment. 

Mr. CARNEY. Just briefly, Mr. Secretary. When we request and 

the committee actually requests from DHS some documents, we are 

told we have to go through a process. I don’t know that we should 

have to do that, sir. We are the oversight committee and we should 

be able to see these documents, in fact, unredacted. I mean, we had 

that earlier. We just brought this up an hour ago or so. But still 

I think this is part and parcel to a larger problem, that you want 

the transparency and so do we certainly and then we must work 

toward that. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I will find out about that issue. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. And we will follow 

up on that because in the interest of transparency, and Mr. Carney 

is chairman of the oversight committee, we need a reasonable time 

frame to get information and once committee staff on the majority 

or minority side request it, it is just like it is coming from the committee. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I understand. 

Chairman THOMPSON. I will now recognize the gentleman from 

Washington for 5 minutes, Mr. Reichert. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, good to 

see you again, thank you for being here. I just want to make a general comment to start out with. 

We had talked about lawyers and laws and policy and reports 

and hearings, all those things that we are all involved in. But really the bottom line is that when it gets down to doing the job the 

80 

people in your organization are the people that we depend upon to 

do the job, and I know early on, a couple of years ago, when we 

began the discussion about Homeland Security in 22 departments 

and almost 200,000 employees, there was a morale issue. And I 

know that has been touched upon a little bit. I think Congress need 

to do a better job. Having you and your department report to 85 

committees and subcommittees is ridiculous, and we need to do 

something about that. How is morale, though, in your organization 

today and are those 22 departments finally coming together and 

looking at themselves as the protector of this Nation? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Let me say, first of all, we have looked at 

the question of morale. It was kind of a negative report out a few 

months back. I asked management to do a more in-depth survey 

and try to understand what was positive and what was negative 

about morale. One positive statistic that came out more recently is 

apparently, putting to one side TSA, our turnover is lower than average of Federal departments and even TSA compares favorably 

with the private sector among those areas of industry that do the 

same kind of work. So that is positive. But I have made a big focus 

for management here to try to understand what we can do to build 

morale. 

As far as unity, though, I think there we have made a lot of 

progress. As I said earlier, we now plan to integrate across the Department. Our intermodal security team, our VIPR teams which 

began as a TSA operation where we brought people together to do 

surge security has now become a DHS-wide operation. Interestingly—since we are talking about the State of Washington—as a 

consequence of some of the issues with the ferry system, we put a 

DHS VIPR team, Coast Guard and TSA and FBI working jointly 

together, planned and executed in the Seattle ferry area. And we 

are—and increasingly the components themselves are finding opportunities to plan and train jointly. Customs and Coast Guard are 

now interoperable in a number of ports with respect to how they 

deal with ship boardings and things of that sort. 

Our airframe platforms for helicopters in Customs and Border 

Protection and Coast Guard are now the same. And through this 

so-called Gang of Seven mechanism, the chief operating officers of 

each of the components, or CEOs of each of the components, meet 

weekly with either the deputy and/or me to talk about common 

issues and common approaches. 

Finally, we have a management directive now that strongly encourages those who want to be applicants for Senior Executive 

Service to serve out of their component, either in a joint activity 

or in another component, as part of building their resume for the 

purpose of becoming an SES. This is a concept we borrowed from 

DOD through Goldwater-Nichols. 

Mr. REICHERT. I am glad to hear that. I sensed that myself as 

I traveled around and visited the different fusion centers across the 

country, and I think there is a partnership that is very strong 

amongst the partners in the fusion center which makes up the Federal agencies, DHS included. You know, we in the King County 

sheriff’s office use the Coast Guard platform for our helicopters. So 

there is a partnership there and I think as we look at the canines 

81 

and further partnerships with locals, I think that would be a great 

opportunity for us. 

But just if I could touch on one more thing, Mr. Chairman. In 

H.R. 1, we allowed the States and localities to use Homeland Security grant funding for hiring intelligence analysts. Is that program 

moving along? Where do you see that today and into the future, 

here in the near future? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, we will allow use of Homeland Security money to hire intelligence analysts and we are also embedding—we are looking ultimately to have between 20 or 30 of our 

own analysts embedded in fusion centers around the country and 

we also we have developed a fellowship where we are bringing law 

enforcement people from State and local government into DHS not 

to simply represent their community, but to actually work here for 

a period of time and get the benefit of the experience and the expertise they develop here before they go back. So I think—I mean, 

the best value we can get in terms of particularly detecting homegrown threats is to enhance the capabilities of State and local intelligence gathering so that they can detect the kind of thing that we 

won’t pick up with a satellite or overseas communications. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. We now recognize 

the gentleman from North Carolina for 5 minutes, Mr. Etheridge. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Secretary. Welcome. With an agency so broad and so diverse and so 

much to take care of, I commend you. It is difficult. But I want to 

shift a little bit because all of the issues are important. We are in 

the midst of hurricane season, another major area of your Department. And right now we just missed Dean hitting Texas and Central America is being devastated again by the second hurricane, 

Felix. 

Can you share with us briefly, Mr. Secretary, as a result of the 

high alert that FEMA went on in DHS as related to Dean in the 

wake of the near miss after the fiasco of 2 years ago where we— 

what our preparedness was then and what gaps do you think still 

remain in our preparedness. Because there is another disturbance 

now churning in the Caribbean that could very well turn into one 

that we might not miss next time. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. This is my least favorite time of year now. 

I think Dean was actually a good exercise in terms of where we are 

and to take us out of the realm of simply planning exercise and 

training and into the realm of actual operations. What we did during the period of time when we thought there was a real risk of 

Dean hitting south Texas is we worked—first of all, the President 

authorized a pre-disaster declaration so we could fund 

prepositioning of items in advance of the hurricane. That was not 

an authority that existed or was exercised 2 years ago during 

Katrina. 

The second thing that we did was we had partly through some 

prior work with the Texas emergency authorities quickly identified 

gaps that they had in terms of capability to evacuate people with 

compromised medical positions, making sure they had adequate 

buses for people who didn’t have transportation, making sure we 

82 

had an airlift plan for people that we wanted to be able to move 

further away. And we actually were able to either preposition or 

have readily at hand the assets necessary to do all of that work. 

And we kept them in place until the point in time it came that we 

were confident that this storm was not going to hit and then we 

released them. 

So that was a good exercise and frankly a pretty dramatic illustration of the benefit of advanced planning which we did not have 

2 years ago. So I think those capabilities are there. We did move 

into place communications equipment as well as interoperable communications equipment, mobile communications, trucks and those, 

of course, have now been returned to where they are typically 

housed, Thomasville, Georgia, or elsewhere. 

So I think it was a good fire drill. No doubt—as they say, no battle plan survives first contact with the enemy. But I think it is a 

much better plan than it has ever been. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. I would like to ask you about the FEMA Reform 

Act which passed Congress overwhelmingly. How would you assess 

the Department’s progress in implementing those reforms, and I 

am particularly interested in the Department’s ability to make 

those changes with—in connection with how DHS is going to implement the 9/11 Commission that the President signed last month? 

Because all of these things coming together at once, I know you 

can, as someone said, you can swim and talk too, but we need to 

make sure this is so critically special when this season is at its 

highest level right now. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. There is no question we had a little bit advance sense of the FEMA Reform Act. So we did put some preparation into effect to do the transition. As I said earlier, we are over 

95 percent fully staffed at now FEMA. We have permanent people 

heading each of the regions. We have got GOG planners in the regions. 

So I do think we have got that implemented. And the 9/11 reforms will be another challenge. We are going to get that implemented too. But I guess underlying the question is you are accurately recognizing that every time we have a reorganization there 

is a cost in money and time. And it is easy to always say every 

time there is a change, oh, let us reorganize again. I think we are 

at the point now where we would benefit greatly from a pause in 

organizational churn to allow us now to not only implement, but 

to really get people acclimated to the current structure, which is 

a good structure. I am not saying it is the best of all, but I think 

it is good and it needs a chance to work. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. I will close, Mr. Secretary, and I will say as you 

look at the number of vacancies across the Department along with 

the political appointee vacancies, I would encourage a lot of attention be paid to that in the months and time to come so that at the 

end of this term of the President there is not a big gaping hole as 

we try to continue to make an agency work in the broad section 

it has to work with. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. We now recognize 

Mr. Brown of Georgia for 5 minutes. 

83 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we 

haven’t had the opportunity to meet yet. I am Paul Broun from 

Georgia. 

A few moments ago you were talking about the illegal aliens. In 

your testimony you said you changed from having a—excuse me— 

You have changed from having a catch and release program for the 

non-Mexican aliens to catch and remove. Now, does that mean that 

you are still doing the catch and release type program for the Mexican aliens? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. No. First of all, as you say this is at the 

border. Mexican aliens—we have always removed them because it 

is really something we do in 24 hours. You catch them, you fingerprint them, you photograph them and you send them back. The 

problem with catch and release came because non-Mexicans—we 

couldn’t just put them back across the border in Mexico. We had 

to send them back to their country of origin. And it took so much 

time to arrange that that we ran out of bed space. So what we did 

was we cut the amount of time to remove people, increased the 

number of beds, we managed the beds more effectively, and that 

allowed us to get to the point that now everybody caught at the 

border who is eligible to be removed is detained until their removal 

occurs. 

Mr. BROUN. So this is all illegal aliens, they are removed immediately? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Right. 

Mr. BROUN. The next question is under the interpretation of the 

14th amendment babies of illegal immigrants that are delivered 

here in this country, the so-called anchor babies, are being given 

citizenship. Do you believe that this amendment is being interpreted correctly? And then second, do you believe that legislation 

like the Birthright Citizens Act that I am a cosponsor of would 

have a measurable impact on decreasing the magnet for these people to come here? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I can’t say I have studied the law enough 

on this to give you a legal opinion. I will say that one of the issues 

when we debated comprehensive immigration reform that we did 

focus in on as part of the proposal was this issue of whether people 

would try to have children in the country in order to bring extended families in. And the suggestion we had was to actually transition the system from one that is based principally on family relationships to one that is based on work or other considerations. 

So as you look at this issue, the question may be not so much 

whether you legally can affect citizenship or people born in the 

U.S., but whether you extend the privilege to someone born in the 

U.S. of the legal parents, whether you extend them the privilege 

of bringing in their family as under the existing immigration laws. 

That isn’t a 14th amendment problem. I think that is just a question of how you write the immigration laws. 

Mr. BROUN. Well, in my opinion, first thing they shouldn’t be 

granted citizenship to begin with. I think this is an improper application of that amendment. And hopefully one of these days we will 

get the Birthright Citizenship Act put into law so that there won’t 

be any question. But I believe it is, at least in my area of Georgia, 

a strong impetus to bring people into this country illegally. And 

84 

these people are draining the health care system. I am a medical 

doctor and I know the health care system is being drained tremendously in our area. The educational system is being drained tremendously. And I hope that the administration will help to promote the Birthright Citizenship Act so we can bring a legal determination of this and stop this flow of these illegal aliens into this 

country. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I yield back. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Brown. We 

now recognize Mr. Green of Texas for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you, of 

course, and the ranking member for hosting this hearing. It is exceedingly important. Mr. Secretary, it is an honor to see you again. 

And I know that you have a tough job and I would like to talk to 

you for a moment, if I may, about some deadlines and timelines. 

In fact, timelines can become deadlines or they can be lifelines and 

I have before me a document that if we were in court I would say 

do you recognize this and can you tell me what it is. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I see it up here. I haven’t gotten my copy 

yet. 

Mr. GREEN. Having an opportunity to see it before, I suppose I 

could share this one with you. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I actually can’t read it. 

Mr. GREEN. May I approach, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman THOMPSON. Please. 

Mr. GREEN. In court I say Your Honor. 

Chairman THOMPSON. You may approach. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. I have checked off items 3, I believe, and 

4. And I would like to as a predicate indicate that there is an adage 

that one must plan one’s work and work one’s plan and a corollary 

of this adage is a failure to plan is a plan to fail. Number 3 on the 

checkoff list which is styled, I believe, the Chertoff checkoff list, 

Number 3 on that list deals with the NPR, National Response 

Plan. And for edification purposes, there was a deadline or timeline 

I believe of initially June 1, 2007 that was extended to July 1st. 

And it is my belief that we still do not have a final National Response Plan in place. The National Response Plan is of vital importance, as you and I will agree, because it coordinates the efforts of 

the State, the local, the tribal governments and the private sector 

if we should have a dastardly deed perpetrated by some human or 

if we should have a national disaster comparable to Katrina, which 

we just celebrated the second anniversary of. 

So the question that we have to embrace, Mr. Secretary, is that 

of the timeline and what assurance do we have that we can have 

a timeline that we can be assured of? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. First, let me say we actually do have a national response plan in effect currently as we speak. We updated 

it and retooled in light of Katrina in 2006. That remains in effect. 

The new national response plan which we actually called the National Response Framework, we completed the draft about a month 

or so ago. We circulated it—this was the product of a lot of work 

among State and local stakeholders. We then wrote it up, circulated a draft, received comments and I expect the final version 

to be circulated this month. It will not immediately become effecVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:31 Nov 23, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-67\48962.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
85 

tive, of course, because once you issue the plan or the framework, 

people have to then train to it and exercise to it and we don’t want 

to actually do that in the middle of hurricane season. So everybody 

has been told if the existing NRP remains in full force and effect 

through this hurricane season, the new framework will come out 

this month and then people can train and exercise to it for 

next—— 

Mr. GREEN. If I may, Mr. Secretary, am I to assume that the end 

of this month, which, of course, is September, at the end of September, we will have the new plan that we were—we were indicated would occur—indicated to us would occur in July and then 

before that June? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Yes. 

Mr. GREEN. Now, moving to another topic if I may. The TWCC 

cards. Some of our friends in labor have some concerns about the 

TWCC card. One concern is the cost, of course, and the second is 

who will bear the cost. But more importantly, the whole concept of 

one accepting the responsibility for the cost and how this will in 

the long run impact one’s commitment made because many times 

we start out anticipating that we will pay an initial cost, but then 

other things are added on to it and what became a cost for a card 

becomes a cost for a number of security measures. Will the TWCC 

card first of all be—the ports be announced to us at any time soon, 

what 10 ports, and will this be just the first of many fees that will 

be imposed upon workers? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I don’t think it will be the first of many 

fees. We are going to start issuing these cards beginning I think 

in Wilmington, Delaware this fall. We should have 10 ports done 

by the end of this calendar year. 

Mr. GREEN. Quickly I will say this. Much is said about the southern border, but much also should be said about the northern border. The 9/11 hijackers did not come in through the southern border. The Millennium bomber did not come in through the southern 

border. Mr. Ressam had his foray into Europe and decided he 

wanted to covertly come back into the country. He did not come in 

through the southern border. Northern border. At some point I 

think we have to make it abundantly clear to the public that the 

southern border, while it is important, it is not the border of paramount importance to the exclusion of the northern border, to the 

exclusion of the Virgin Islands, which is the southernmost border. 

So if you would quickly, tell me how do you plan to handle the 

northern border and how do we plan to let the public know as well 

that the northern border has a great importance to us? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I couldn’t agree more. I think that we do 

have to be mindful of the northern border and I say that recognizing that Canadians have been great partners on law enforcement and intelligence. That is why we have been very aggressive 

with the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, to make sure we 

do have secure documentation for people who are coming through 

our ports of entry. We have put more assets up on the northern 

border. Now, the flow in the northern border tends not to be between the ports of entry but through the ports of entry. But we do 

find that—for example, I think Peace Bridge in Buffalo has the 

highest number of terrorist watch list hits of any land port of 

86 

entry, meaning people that we pick up and we send back. So although I think the strategy in the northern border may be a little 

different than the Southwest because of the flow between the ports 

of entry, the security concern is every bit as important. And that 

is why even though we get pushed back sometimes frankly from 

some of the communities in the north, we are insistent on continuing to raise security measures on the northern border as well. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance 

of my time. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Since you mentioned the Peace Bridge in Buffalo, we are going to 

give the lady who knows more about it than probably anybody else 

here, the gentlelady from New York, Mrs. Lowey, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to as 

this hearing winds down express my appreciation to the chairman 

for holding this hearing and the fortitude of our Secretary and all 

of us who are here to pursue these very important issues. So I 

thank you very much. 

Before I get to my question, which concerns FEMA and Indian 

Point in Westchester County—and we can talk about the Peace 

Bridge another time. I just wanted to review again—and I am glad 

that you have the to-do list, because as an appropriator, I know 

firsthand that all of these items on the list have been funded adequately and we are concerned that there is still critical vacancies 

at the Department that should not exist; two, the container security standards and procedures should be put into place immediately. There is funding for it. There has been mention by my colleague of the National Response Plan or Framework. This is really 

serious because as you know not only do many of the Federal agencies not have the plan, State and locals don’t have a final plan. And 

if you are expecting them to follow certain routines, they should 

have the final plans. And this has been discussed. I won’t go into 

it again. I would hope this can be concluded immediately. 

Also there has been mention of the TWCC cards. I just want to 

say in my contact with current workers at the port they are very 

concerned about bureaucratic problems. They are very concerned as 

to the speed of an appeal process. So I think it important that we 

move ahead on this issue. Again, this has all been funded. And 

there must be a strategic plan for explosives detection at passenger 

screening checkpoints as required by the 9/11 bill. I am very concerned about this issue. My constituents are very concerned about 

this issue. Again, there has been funding for this. 

And lastly, I would hope that you could properly implement the 

US–VISIT programs and Project 28, which has been referenced by 

our Chair. I don’t understand why this is taking so long. But since 

I want to get to FEMA and Indian Point, we can discuss this at 

another meeting. We certainly can’t complain that delay in implementing these programs is for the lack of proper funding. As you 

know, they have been funded. 

So with regard to Indian Point, FEMA, which is under your jurisdiction of course, has a role in reviewing emergency plans for nuclear facilities. And this is of particular interest to me as an incident at the Indian Point nuclear facility located in New York metropolitan area could adversely affect 15 million people living within 

87 

50 miles of the plant. Entergy Nuclear Northeast owns and manages the plant. They missed three deadlines to provide FEMA with 

information to test its warning sirens. And I won’t go into all of the 

other problems at this plant. Most recently the person in charge of 

the command post was found sleeping. There have been leaks, real 

problems there. But this is related to FEMA and the sirens. This 

is just unacceptable. 

Last month I wrote a letter to FEMA Administrator Paulison 

urging an expedited review of operational data related to the emergency notification system at Indian Point after Entergy finally submitted the information. And this is just one recent example of 

FEMA allowing Entergy to operate a nuclear facility without adequate emergency planning. Former FEMA Director James Lee 

Witt, the State of New York and local emergency managers have 

asked FEMA not to certify Entergy’s emergency plan but FEMA 

has inexplicably certified its response plans allowing it to continue 

to operate. 

To me this is a failure of leadership and an utter disregard for 

the safety of the community. FEMA and the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission should not allow a nuclear plant to operate if none of 

the surrounding jurisdictions have confidence in emergency response plans and if the plan has no way of warning its employees 

or the general public of a possible disaster. 

If you can tell me, why does FEMA certify emergency response 

plans for a nuclear plant such as Indian Point when those charged 

with implementing the plant have no confidence that they will be 

affected? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I am going to have to take up with Administrator Paulison exactly what the sequence is with respect to Indian Point. Obviously in certifying plans, the capability of warning 

is an important element of the plan. I don’t know how Indian Point 

satisfied FEMA on that point if they did. I will have to get back 

to you on that. 

I do want to make sure, though, I make one point clear so there 

is no misunderstanding. There is a national response plan that is 

final and in effect as we speak. It is the plan that is currently in 

existence. The new plan which is coming out this month will not 

be effective immediately because we will have to train and exercise 

to it. But I don’t want anybody in the emergency management community to be under any illusion. If tomorrow we had an event there 

is a national response plan which everybody has, has trained to 

and exercised to, and until such time as a new plan becomes effective that is the final plan that is in effect. 

It is the same way as when you pass a new law, you know, the 

old law remains until the new law is effective. So I don’t want anybody to be confused in the community out there. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, if we can get back to FEMA, or if you’d rather 

get back to me on that, that would be fine. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I will on Indian Point. Let me get back to 

you on that. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Again, on the issue of the emergency response plan, 

there seems to be some confusion, certainly in the reports I am getting from State and locals. So thank you for clarifying. I would 

hope the word can get out. 

88 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We will push that word out. 

Mrs. LOWEY. One other point. On September 11th, American Airlines Flight 11 flew over Indian Point en route to the World Trade 

Center. And in 2002, al-Qa’ida stated that a nuclear plant was initially set as a target. In 2003, former FEMA Director James Lee 

Witt wrote an independent report that found major deficiencies in 

the emergency preparedness plans in this facility, Indian Point. 

That is why I have introduced legislation with my Hudson Valley 

colleagues that would grant DHS the authority to declare a no-fly 

zone over Indian Point. Now, this would extend the same authority 

DHS has to implement no-fly zones for special events such as the 

Super Bowl to nuclear facilities. It seems to me if you can do it for 

the Super Bowl, you can do it for the nuclear facility. 

Do you consider the operations of a nuclear facility in the most 

popular region of the country a risk worthy of examination by 

DHS? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think of all the sectors we deal with in 

infrastructure protection, certainly the top tier things to worry 

about are nuclear facilities now. A lot of that work is done through 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission which we treat as the government lead on this, but we—I have had, myself and others, have 

conversations with the NRC leadership to make sure that in terms 

of issues like design and required safety measures, they are constantly upgrading what they do. Because I do agree that—although 

I think it would not be the easy thing to attack or destroy a nuclear 

plant because of the measures already in place, this is an area 

where the consequence is so great we need to be a little more focused than we might be on a movie theater or restaurant. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much. I thank you for your generosity and I thank you for your comments, and I look forward to 

continuing the discussion on the items on the checklist and your 

review of a potential no-fly zone over Indian Point, again which affects 15 million people in a 50-mile radius. And I thank you very 

much again. We are all aware of the tremendous responsibility you 

have, And I do hope you stay here too. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. I also have in my 

district, Mr. Chairman, an Entergy nuclear facility and I think 

Mrs. Lowey has kind of struck something that I would ask that you 

provide the committee with whatever compliance requirements that 

FEMA and DHS has in its authority for all of the nuclear plants 

we have in the country. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We will do that. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. We are now yielding to the 

gentleman from Rhode Island for 5 minutes, Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Secretary, thank you for testifying today, for 

your patience. I know it has been a long morning. I know one thing 

is for certain, you have been waiting to get to my questions. And 

since I am last, I will be brief. I wanted to just say I basically agree 

with your philosophy that rather than trying to eliminate risk, that 

we need to basically try to reduce and manage it—that should be 

our strategy. As the chairman of the Subcommittee on Emerging 

Threats, Cybersecurity, Science and Technology, that has been my 

89 

philosophy. I put it in terms of identifying those clear 

vulnerabilities and to then moving quickly to close those gaps. It 

would be difficult, if not impossible to protect against every contingency. I am pleased that you touched on in your testimony two of 

the things that concern me right now the most, and that is the 

issue of nuclear weapons or nuclear material potentially being 

smuggled into the country, and that is why we need to have the 

radiation portal monitors deployed as quickly as possible, making 

sure that they are operational. Also you addressed the issue of 

cyber security. So those are the two areas that I wanted to focus 

on. 

We have held several hearings in my subcommittee on the deployment of radiation portal monitors. I have great respect for the 

work that Director Oxford is doing. I have had the opportunity to 

travel to California. I have seen the radiation portal monitors in action. I recognize that it is vitally important that we both have the 

detection in place, that we can detect nuclear material if it is being 

smuggled into the country. Equally important, that we are not 

slowing down commerce or interfering with commerce. And it looks 

like we have a good plan in place. We are anxious, of course, to get 

the ASP deployed as quickly as possible, make sure that they obviously can do what they say they can do. 

That is—we wanted to go with my first question. I would like to 

discuss the certification process of DNDO’s advanced spectroscopic 

portal program with you. This program is important to our nuclear 

protection capabilities and we must be assured that the review 

process is conducted with the highest levels of scrutiny. While I am 

supportive certainly of your recent decision to have techno experts 

from outside DHS conduct an independent review of the ASP program, I am concerned about a few aspects. Again as chairman of 

the subcommittee responsible for oversight of the ASP program, let 

me assure you that I don’t intend at all to interfere with the investigation. However, it is essential that Members of Congress have 

information about the members of this panel, I believe, and their 

backgrounds and their qualifications. 

So my question and my comment would be by disclosing the 

makeup of the review panel, I believe you will increase the confidence the American public has in this process, as well as the committee itself. Would you please provide the committee with the list 

of members that make up this review panel? And if you can’t provide the list now, can you assure us that you will do so by the end 

of the week? That is the first question. 

The second thing I wanted to ask is in May I, along with members of this committee, sent a letter to GAO requesting an independent review of the ASP program prior to certification, recognizing that GAO is going to be involved at some point. I am a big 

believer—before we go ahead in spending an enormous amount of 

money, $1.2 billion, let us hear what GAO has to say, let us dot 

our I’s and cross our T’s. As you know, we recently sent a letter 

to your office requesting that you consider GAO’s findings in addition to the third party review that you recently convened. 

So to that point, do you intend to give equal consideration to 

GAO’s findings and those of the third party panel of experts? 

90 

Secretary CHERTOFF. First of all, I am not sure if every member 

of the third party panel has been selected. But as soon as they are 

selected, we will give you the names. I have no problem with that 

in the background. And I will certainly consider any findings from 

GAO along with the findings of the panel before I do a certification. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. That is great news. By the way, for the record, 

we have been assured by GAO that they can do their review within 

a matter of weeks. We are talking in the order of 2 or 3 weeks from 

what they tell us. I will insist that they are held to that because, 

like you, I want to get this ASP equipment deployed as quickly as 

possible. It is the right thing to do to protect America. And I appreciate the work that you are doing. 

The other thing I wanted to get to is the issue of cyber security. 

As you are aware, my subcommittee recently held a hearing on 

cyber security vulnerabilities at DHS. I was extremely disappointed 

at the Department of Homeland Security, the agency charged with 

being the lead in cyber security, had suffered so many significant 

security incidents on its network. In fact, DHS reported to the committee that it experienced 844 cyber security incidents in fiscal 

years 2005 and 2006. Those incidents are occurring everywhere. 

And we have heard recently that yet again forge in hackers have 

infiltrated the systems at the Department of Defense just like they 

have done at virtually every government agency. When I asked if 

the Department’s Chief Information Officer—who I met with in my 

office and we had testified reports—whether he received briefings 

on cyber threats, DHS information networks, particularly including 

cyber security vulnerabilities and penetrations at the Department 

of Defense and Department of State, meeting with his counterparts, his response basically was that you don’t know what you 

don’t know. And the question included cyber attacks by the Chinese. That is where my question was going. I will ask you the same 

question. Have DHS computers ever called or phoned home to Chinese servers, number one? And have you ever requested or received 

intelligence briefings about Chinese hackers penetrating Federal 

networks? And on a scale of 1 to 10, how concerned are you about 

this threat? And do you think that there needs to be more aggressive oversight and leadership in departmental management specifically to address these concerns? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. This is an area which is heavily intertwined with classified information. So I am limited in what I can 

say in this setting. Let me say this. I would say that starting earlier this year or late last year, as we were kind of looking at, you 

know, where we are in the Department, where we made a lot of 

progress, where we have progress that needs to be made in terms 

of our overall mission, the one significant area I was not fully comfortable with was cyber security. It is a very hard area to deal 

with. Since then, I and senior leaders with the Department have 

intensively been in discussion with other agencies in the government at a very high level about this whole issue and how we as 

a government as a whole can deal with it and what our strategy 

ought to be to pursue this, which we are currently in the process 

of developing, and doing it with a considerable amount of urgency. 

I can tell you it is an issue which receives consistent attention at 

the very highest levels of the United States Government. We are, 

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of course, at the same time dealing with the old—the separate but 

not unrelated issue of integrating our own IT into a one-net structure and limiting the number of entry points in different systems, 

which I think will be good for IT management but good from also 

a security standpoint. So we have now within the Directorate of 

National Protection and Programs centered a program office to be 

focused with our Cyber Security Division on how to work with 

other agencies to take necessary steps to increase not only the protection of government computers from intrusions, whatever the 

source, but also to help the private sector with that as well. And 

it is a matter that we are going to focus on as one of the highest 

priorities or the highest priority level of the Department over the 

next 16 months. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I think it is one of those areas that falls into the 

category of clear vulnerabilities and something that we need to address in an aggressive and comprehensive way. And we look forward to working with you on that issue. 

Mr. Chairman, I know I have gone over my time, but since we 

are in the hurricane season, I have one more related to FEMA and 

evacuation plans if you would indulge me with additional time. 

Chairman THOMPSON. The gentleman requests additional time. 

Granted. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, my 

only question. On August 6, 2007, my staff met with FEMA and 

the Office of Civil Rights—Civil Liberties regarding FEMA’s plans 

to provide evacuation plans for special needs communities. During 

this meeting it was revealed the FEMA disabilities coordinator, Ms. 

Cindy Daniel, that I had an opportunity to meet with myself, that 

she has not seen a draft of the National Response Plan that has 

been put together by the Department. First of all, would you make 

sure that she has seen this plan? This is a great concern given that 

we are in the height of this year’s hurricane season right now. Can 

you please tell us the status of the Department’s evacuation plans 

for special needs communities and the status of overall efforts to 

assure that special needs and disabled populations are able to effectively evacuate during a major event? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. First off, I will make sure if she hasn’t already seen it that she sees the most recent annex draft for the new 

plan. We are working under the existing plan. But I will tell you 

this. There is probably no area of evacuation planning that gets 

more focused attention than the issue of special medical needs. I 

was just down at the Gulf last week. Starting September 1, as part 

of our emergency communication system, we now have capability 

to deliver warning messages to people with hearing impaired using 

modern technology on the computer. Every one of the evacuation 

plans has specific attention paid to the method in which people 

who cannot evacuate on their own because of physical impairment 

will be evacuated. And when we did Dean—and I was part of this 

personally—we sat down—not literally in the same room, but virtually in the same room—with the State of Texas talking about 

making sure we had adequate assets, ground ambulances, air ambulances and other transportation vehicles so we could make sure 

people who are disabled have an ability to evacuate or people who 

have special needs of any kind and if they can’t be moved because 

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moving them would itself imperil them, to make sure there are facilities that are capable of withstanding the storm so people can 

shelter in place because that has to be an option as well. 

So we are looking at the whole range of issues relating to special 

medical needs and we will continue to do that. That is a very high 

focus area for FEMA. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. I appreciate your answer and the attention given to this. With that, I just want to thank you for your 

leadership. I know you have a very difficult job to do, and I appreciate your passion and dedication to the Department and to protecting the country. Thank you. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Thank you. And I enjoy working with the 

committee and enjoy appearing here as well. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. We now yield 5 

minutes to the gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank 

you for your testimony, Mr. Secretary. Sorry I had to leave, but we 

had a Judiciary Committee hearing on FISA, which is also rather 

important that we not only keep the law that we passed but that 

we re-enact a law in 6 months. And I know you touched on this, 

but I would like to get into it specifically. I was home in the district 

and just before that I had a teletown hall and three town halls 

back home. And the biggest question I have on immigration has to 

do with the confidence in the Federal Government that we are 

going to do something about securing the border. I share your objective in getting a comprehensive approach. I don’t think the Senate bill in its form was what we needed, but I share your belief 

that we need an overall global approach to it. But we are not going 

to get that unless we have the confidence of the American people 

on security. 

The one thing they kept asking me is the fence, the fence, the 

fence. I know there is a lot more than the fence and I argue that, 

but that has become a symbolic icon and in these presidential debates there is some criticism saying they have only completed 13 

miles of fence and you are laying down on the job and not doing 

it. For the record, can you give us exactly how much fence we have, 

when we will have a significant amount of the fencing done, and 

the Congress authorized 700 miles. As I recall, it is a 1,960-mile 

border on the southern part. 700 miles is what we have asked for. 

Can you give me some figures specifically so I am not just the one 

giving it, I can actually say Secretary Chertoff said this is where 

we are and this is where we will be? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. As of today, we have 120 miles of fencing 

and 112 miles of vehicle barriers along the southern barrier. As of 

the end of this month, September, we will have approximately 145 

miles of fencing in place along the southern border. That is exactly 

what we promised to have at the end of this fiscal year. As of the 

end of the calendar year 2008 we will have 370 miles of fencing 

along the border. I can’t tell you exactly what the amount of vehicle 

barriers will be, between 2—and 300 miles. 

I should observe that just as some people are passionate about 

the fences as an icon, if you go to certain communities in Texas 

people are up in arms saying they don’t want to fence. So we won’t 

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make everybody happy. But I will say we are on track to build the 

fencing and the delta between the 20—120 miles currently in place 

and the 145 miles will be closed rapidly because we have the 

bollards in place along almost the entire border. We are building 

it close to a rate of two miles a day. So if you do the math there 

is about 25 miles we have to do to hit the target and we should 

be able to do that in about 12 to 15 days barring an act of God. 

Mr. LUNGREN. When you say 120 miles of fence is that along the 

border? In some places it is double fencing? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Border miles covered. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. Secondly, with respect to the project of 

what I call the virtual fence, the integrated strategy, you testified 

before with respect to—I will use the word ‘‘disappointment,’’ that 

you couldn’t complete it at this point, you couldn’t take delivery because it wasn’t there. Are we learning things on the southern border with respect to that integrated approach that will help us on 

the northern border? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Yes. The reason we went forth and did it 

with 28 miles first is so we could really experience operationally 

how it worked and take those lessons and take them elsewhere. 

Now, obviously the exact array is going to be different depending 

on where you are geographically, whether the south or the north. 

For example, parts of the northern border are really maritime domain. So that is not going to be an issue for land based radar and 

things of that sort. Parts of the northern border are best really 

handled using unmanned aerial vehicles or air assets. And we are 

going to deploy those along there. There other parts of the northern 

border where some kind of virtual fence or, you know, we do use 

sensors already up there. So whatever we can do to integrate better 

will be helpful. But the idea is to get this right in the 28 miles and 

then deploy those lessons as we extend it along the other parts of 

the southern border and the relevant parts of the northern border. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr.Secretary, two areas. What is the state of the 

cooperation you are getting from the railroad industry on enhanced 

security and the chemical industry? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Both have been very cooperative with us. 

The chemical industry I think has always been cooperative. We always worried a little bit about a few outliers, but I think the regulations we have in place now, you know, once we issue the final appendix that lists the cutoff quantities will give us the authority to 

police people who might not do what is in their own self-interest. 

So I am—I think we have made progress with both industries. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Secretary, I just want to say I echo the comments of the chairman that I am pleased you made a commitment 

to stay through the last day of the administration. As much as I 

think you would be qualified to be Attorney General, I think it 

would be a big mistake to remove you from the position now because I have the sense that the Department of Homeland Security 

is moving in the right direction. You have more than gotten your 

sea legs, you have given it direction. We need follow-through. And 

I would view it as a detriment to the country if you were to be replaced there before the end of your time because we spent a lot of 

time treading water and I think we are now moving in the right 

direction, and I thank you for your service. 

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Secretary CHERTOFF. Thank you. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. On a sad note, we 

have just been notified that a former member of this committee, 

the original select committee, Representative Jennifer Dunn, has 

passed. And as you know, Mr. Reichert replaced her when she left 

Congress. And in addition to that, Representative Gillmor has also 

passed since this hearing has started. So it has been a tough morning for a lot of us. 

Mr. Secretary, we want to thank you. We agreed to 3 hours. We 

have met the timeline on that. You have been most gracious for 

giving us that 3 hours and there will be some follow-up, as you 

know, to the area. But I also ask unanimous consent to insert into 

the record the Secretary Chertoff’s to-do list which we share with 

you. 

I would also like to remind the committee that tomorrow we will 

be holding a hearing on what I hope will be a series of hearings 

on spy satellites, the homeland and related issues. We have invited 

the Department of Homeland Security, privacy and civil liberties 

experts, and the DNI to testify. I know Ranking Member King is 

as interested in this issue as I am and welcome his support for 

these hearings. 

Hearing no further business, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:04 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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Appendix: Additional Questions and Responses 

QUESTIONS FROM THE HONORABLE BENNIE G. THOMPSON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON

HOMELAND SECURITY

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE MICHAEL MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1.: In the 9/11 bill, the expansion of the Visa Waiver Program is closely 

tied to the completion of not only a biometric entry-exit system, but also an electronic travel authorization (ETA) system. The Committee has been briefed by the 

Department that it can have an ETA system online within 6 to 12 months, yet we 

have heard from industry that this timeline might be overly optimistic. What is the 

current status of the ETA? Does the Department have a plan for implementing ETA and, if so, what specific steps will be taken? Which office 

within the Department will be responsible for its implementation? When 

will ETA be operational? 

Response: A working group was established to develop a concept of operations 

and project plan, and to begin the project management process for initiating development and investment. Currently, the initiative requires start up funding to cover 

system development costs and contracted support in the project management area. 

Once funding has been identified, and based on the project plan, which is already 

developed and which outlines the policy decisions and general requirements of the 

system, a Request for Proposal would be issued to solicit industry involvement in 

the development. Approximately 8—12 months after funding is made available, the 

system would be ready to begin operations. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, in 

cooperation and coordination with all stakeholders, will be responsible for implementation. 

Question 2.: In May, the Department announced that it intended to implement 

a new biometric air exit procedure that would be incorporated into the airline checkin process. GAO has questioned the planning documents for this new process and 

it has not even been piloted. How are you going to ensure that the Department will not be handing over an unfinished system to the next Administration? 

Response: Between January 2004 and May 2007, US–VISIT piloted biometric 

exit procedures at 12 airports and two seaports. The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) final evaluation of the pilot program determined that traveler participation was low because exit procedures were not embedded in the existing travel process. 

DHS plans to issue a proposed rule by the end of this year proposing to implement biometric exit procedures at air and sea ports of departure. This regulatory 

action will include a public comment period, and these comments will be considered 

as the final rule is developed. We anticipate issuance of a final rule and implementation of the exit program by December 2008, before the end of the current Administration. 

Question: Mr. Secretary, in your testimony you state that up to 3000 National 

Guardsman will continue to be deployed along the southwest border. This is roughly 

half of what was initially deployed. While I understand that our Guard is already 

stretched very thin with the ongoing war, I am concerned about reports that describe Border Patrol Sector Chiefs asking for volunteers to build fences and to fill 

other non-frontline posts. Can you describe how the loss of 3000 Guardsmen 

will affect Border Patrol operations and why we need to ask for fence 

builders when we are supposed to be bringing nearly 18,000 new agents online in the near future? 

Response: Operation Jump Start was a two year initiative to assist Border Patrol 

in gaining operational control of the border during a period of enhanced hiring of 

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agents and deployment of tactical infrastructure. New hires and the redeployment 

of personnel have offset any reduction in Guard personnel due to the drawdown, 

and approximately 3,000 additional agents are expected to be on board by the end 

of CY07. 

The deployment of Border Patrol Agents to assist in building portions of fence was 

a short term deployment to overcome factors that could have prevented timely completion and address shortfalls to include weather and delays in material deliveries, 

and is not in relation to the OJS drawdown. These agents have been returned to 

border enforcement operations now that the fence building program is back on 

schedule. The tactical infrastructure completed by OJS and the Border Patrol’s temporary augmentation will remain in place far beyond the drawdown to assist in 

gaining operational control of the border. 

Question: In the August/September 2007 issue of the U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement Update there is an article which states, ‘‘In addition to the increase in FOTs, ICE ended the practice of catch and release 

along the border in September 2006.’’ Mr. Secretary, can you please clarify 

if catch and release has ended only the border or if DHS has ended the program in the interior? 

Response: ICE has effectively ended ‘‘catch and release’’ along the Southwest 

Border and Northern Border. This was accomplished by increasing efficiencies within the immigration removal process, including rapid activation of additional detention capacity, expanded use of expedited removal authority, substantial reduction in 

the cycle time required to remove aliens, and increased use of the Justice Prisoner 

and Alien Transportation System (JPATS). 

In an effort to maximize detention capacity supporting the end of ‘‘catch and release,’’ ICE has worked closely with the Department of State and foreign governments to streamline ICE repatriation efforts. ICE has made technological advances, 

such as Video Teleconferencing (VTC) and the Electronic Travel Document (eTD) 

program, available to foreign governments to facilitate their issuance of travel documents used in the removal process, further increasing the efficiency of this process, 

while minimizing the length of stay in detention. 

In order to optimize the use of its nationwide detention capacity, ICE has created 

the Detention Operations Coordination Center (DOCC). The DOCC transfers detainees from field office jurisdictions with detention capacity shortages to jurisdictions 

with surplus capacity, thus ensuring that aliens subject to removal proceedings are 

not released solely due to a lack of detention space. 

Generally all aliens apprehended by ICE’s Office of Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) or turned over to DRO, whether at the border or in the interior of the 

U.S., are taken into DRO custody. Having said this, ICE must also make efforts to 

manage funded and available bed space in support of the DRO mission. In order 

to remain within funded limits, DRO must actively manage its detained population 

using alternatives to continued detention when appropriate. 

Question 4.: Under the SAFE Port Act, the Department was supposed to initiate 

a rulemaking proceeding to establish minimum standards and procedures for securing containers in transit to the United States. This rulemaking was supposed to be 

initiated by January 13, 2007 and the interim final rule was supposed to be completed by April 13, 2007. This deadline was not met. Why was the Department 

unable to meet this mandate? When is the Department going to initiate the 

rulemaking? 

Response: On May 18, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) notified appropriate members of the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives of 

its decision not to initiate a rulemaking proceeding to establish minimum standards 

for securing containers in transit to the United States within the mandated 

timeline. Although DHS readily acknowledges that the process of securing the container is a critical component of a multi-layered strategy to secure the entire supply 

chain, the department does not believe, at the present time, the necessary technology exists for such a comprehensive solution. Accordingly, no date to initiate a 

rulemaking proceeding to establish minimum standards and procedures for securing 

containers in transit to the United States can be established until adequate technology exists. 

Question: Section 201 of the SAFE Port Act required a Strategic Plan to Enhance 

the Security of the International Supply Chain. This plan was supposed to include 

protocols for the expeditious resumption of the flow of trade in the event of a transportation disruption or a transportation security incident. According to GAO, the 

Department did not achieve success with this plan. Secretary Chertoff admitted this 

fact at an August 16, 2007 meeting of the Advisory Committee on Commercial OperVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:31 Nov 23, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-67\48962.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
97 

ations for U.S. Customs and Border Protection. He told COAC members that day 

that the final product ‘‘not a detailed plan.’’ 

When is the Department going to produce a detailed plan? 

Response: The Strategy to Enhance International Supply Chain Security, delivered to Congress on July, 13, 2006, explained how the Department’s layered strategy for cargo security operates, as well as the interplay between multiple initiatives 

and programs. The Department provided this information in satisfaction of Section 

201 of the Act as an initial submission. The final Strategy is due for delivery to Congress in July 2010. 

The plan provides overarching protocols for the prioritization of vessels and cargo, 

identifies incident management practices specific to trade resumption in support of 

the National Response Framework, and describes guidance for the redeployment of 

government resources and personnel. In doing so, the strategy recognizes that there 

exist many different types of incidents which might impact the supply chain, but 

that resumption itself is an ‘‘all hazards’’ requirement. 

The U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection are, under a joint 

Senior Guidance Team, developing both tactical protocols for communications with 

the trade, and agency-specific plans for resumption activities. Further, in keeping 

with the Maritime Transportation and Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), the Area Maritime Security Committees are in the process of developing resumption annexes to 

each of the Area Maritime Security Plans. These revisions to the area plans are 

being conducted within the timelines of the mandated review and update cycle, with 

completion scheduled for mid-2009. 

Question 6.: How much money did the Department spend on this lessthan-successful document? 

Response: The Department expenses associated with this plan were principally 

in the area of staff time. A writing team of roughly 30 individuals from across the 

components and agencies worked on the document over the 270 days of its development. Some individuals contributed greater amounts of time than others, depending 

upon their organizational involvement in the subject matter. At the Department 

headquarters level, the project lead, who conducted the majority of the review, consolidation, and drafting work, was a U.S. Coast Guard O–5 detailee. An estimated 

40% of his time over the development cycle was devoted to the project. 

Question: According to Philip Spayd in an August 27, 2007 article in the Journal 

of Commerce, ‘‘many in the trade community anticipated an operational plan that 

would clearly set out the roles and responsibilities of government officials who 

would manage a trade security incident. What they received was a 128-page plan 

that would receive a high grade as a research project for a graduate school class 

in international logistics, but which lacks any operational grounding.’’ What is your 

response to this critique? 

Response: While we welcome Mr. Spayd’s input, it is clear that he misinterprets 

the intent of the document and the requirements of the Act. The DHS Strategy to 

Enhance International Supply Chain Security, especially in its initial form, is intentionally a high-level strategic document. It is not a detailed plan, as detailed plans 

have been and are being prepared by the specific components with authority and 

jurisdiction over the supply chain. With respect to Mr. Spayd’s opinion that the 

strategy lacks operational grounding, it is worth noting that the writing team which 

developed the document consisted of roughly 30 individuals from the involved agencies, each with decades of field level operational experience. Their operational expertise greatly informed the process. 

Question 8.: It has come to my attention that Colonel Velez, Acting Director of 

the Office of Emergency Communications is expected to resign from her post in the 

next couple of weeks. 

Could you please confirm if there is any truth this? 

Who do you have in place to fill this critical post? 

What are the specific accomplishments of the Office of Emergency Communications to date under the leadership of Colonel Velez as it related to 

the mandates outlined in the Post-Katrina Reform Act? 

Response: Col. Victoria Velez resigned from her position as Acting Director of the 

Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) effective on September 14, 2007. She 

had been on detail from the Air Force to the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) since August 2005. 

A new director has been selected and will be named in the coming weeks. Currently, Mr. Michael Roskind, Deputy Director of OEC, is serving in the role of Acting Director. 

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Colonel Velez led the Department’s efforts to stand up the OEC. Title XVIII of 

the Homeland Security Act, as amended, assigns OEC the critical and difficult mission of advancing interoperable and operable emergency communications through 

collaboration with Federal, State, local, and tribal partners. 

Through Colonel Velez’ efforts and the hard work of the DHS team, OEC became 

operational on April 1, 2007. Since that time, OEC has stayed focused on meeting 

its mission requirements and integrating three interoperability programs that transferred from other DHS entities: the Federal wireless programs under the Integrated 

Wireless Network; the Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program 

(ICTAP); and outreach, guidance, and tool development by the SAFECOM program. 

Col. Velez’ service to the Department and public safety community will ensure 

that OEC’s mission will have lasting effects upon the safety and security of the Nation. 

Key OEC accomplishments include: 

• Worked with key OEC stakeholders at the Federal, State, and local level to 

identify their needs and gain a better understanding of the ever-changing interoperable communications environment—including working to bridge interoperability gaps among Federal, State, and local governments. As an administrator 

of external Federal wireless programs, OEC has begun establishing and implementing projects through the Federal Partnership for Interoperable Communications, a cooperative partnership of Federal, State, and local agencies with 

a public-safety mission, to enhance the operability and interoperability of Federal departments and agencies. 

• Built relationships with our Federal, State, local, and tribal partners as part 

of our extensive stakeholder outreach and engagement mission. OEC participated in and supported several stakeholder forums and initiatives to promote 

awareness and help build consensus among Federal, State, and local entities on 

policy and technical issues affecting interoperable communications. 

• Collaborated with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on 

establishment of the Public Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC) Program and the Fiscal Year 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP). 

Made significant progress in the area of statewide interoperability planning. 

• Laid the groundwork for a partnership with FEMA and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to develop a peer review process for the evaluation of the Statewide Communications Interoperability Plans (SCIPs). This process will enable States and territories to receive 

meaningful feedback from their peers on how to improve their interoperability 

planning efforts. As a result, the Department expects the SCIPs to become living documents that States and territories regularly update and enhance—not a 

one-time commitment that becomes ‘‘shelf-ware.’’ 

• Coordinated the accelerated delivery of communications equipment and training services three months early to several hurricane-prone States in preparation 

for the 2007 hurricane season. This training addressed the use of the equipment 

in its designated communications planning environment, as well as the need for 

coordination, governance, and a regional set of standard operating procedures 

for communications. OEC also provided technical assistance support to 48 of 56 

States and territories for their SCIPs or with the Communications Asset Survey 

and Mapping tool. 

• Participated in the Golden Phoenix Interoperability Joint Training Event, 

which included participation by Los Angeles City and County multi-jurisdictional emergency responders, the California National Guard, and the Department of Defense (DOD). OEC ICTAP provided technical evaluators and planning assistance to measure and evaluate communications interoperability across 

the continuum of first responders, DOD, participating State and local government entities, and Non-Governmental Organizations. The event underscored the 

need for training opportunities among the various response groups and the challenges that might be encountered. 

Question 9.: Section 901 of H.R. 1 says that the Department ‘‘may develop guidance or recommendations and identify best practices’’ to ‘‘foster action’’ by the private sector in order for it to be prepared for a human-made or natural disaster. 

What is the status of the guidance and recommendations? 

How are you working with the private sector to better understand ‘‘best 

practices’’? 

How will these guidance and recommendations encourage the private 

sector to plan to recover from an event in order to resume its operations? 

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Response: Within the Department, FEMA has been assigned the responsibility 

to make recommendations regarding how the Department will implement Section 

901. At this stage, the Department has not decided exactly how it will develop guidance or recommendations and identify best practices as discussed in HR 1. Many 

of the operating elements of the Department, including FEMA, Science and Technology, Infrastructure Protection and others have extensive relations with various 

private sector organizations through which the Department learns and can learn 

about best practices for preparedness. In particular the 17 Critical Infrastructure 

and Key Resource Sector Councils are and will be a source of best practices. 

Until the potential guidance and recommendations are created, it is premature to 

speculate on how they will ‘‘encourage the private sector to plan to recover from an 

event.’’ Given the vast number of mandated taskings that are called for in the 9/ 

11 Act, we are focusing first on what we must do by certain deadlines, and then 

will turn our attention to suggested taskings in the 9/11 Act. 

What is the Infrastructure Data Warehouse (IDW) and how is it different 

from the National Asset Database (NADB)? 

Response: Some functions of the previously existing National Asset Database 

(NADB) will combine with new, advanced capabilities to form the Infrastructure 

Data Warehouse (IDW). Instead of a single database (the NADB), the IDW will establish a distributed IT architecture using a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) to 

integrate existing data sets from Federal, State, and commercial sources through a 

rapid ingest capability that will improve data collection time/cost efficiencies. The 

SOA will virtually eliminate the need to copy and paste information from other data 

stores into a single DHS database (NADB) by providing the capability to link the 

existing data stores through a larger, virtual IT architecture. This architecture will 

reduce duplication of effort and improve the robustness of existing information at 

a lower cost, while facilitating data maintenance and verification by numerous partners and entities within the homeland security community. 

The IDW will require, maintain, and publish comprehensive DHS Enterprise Architecture-compliant metadata on all data products under its control. Metadata will 

include detailed information on the content, provenance, context, precision, and accuracy of all data records. These records will be openly accessible to the SOA 

through a dynamic (live, synchronized) connection between the IDW data stores and 

a metadata catalog service. This service may by operated at the enterprise level or 

maintained locally in synchronization with approved DHS standards for federated 

metadata catalog resources. Role-based access controls will ensure that all appropriate records and products within IDW are transparently accessible to the entire 

DHS SOA user community. 

Will the National Asset Database, codified by the ‘‘Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,’’ be used to inform the 

IDW? If so, to what extent? 

Response: The information previously maintained in the National Asset Database will be incorporated into the Service–Oriented Architecture of the Infrastructure Data Warehouse. This pre-existing information will be coupled with information collected through other means, such as the Automated Critical Asset Management System, which is used by State and local law enforcement partners, or existing 

Federal databases, such as the Army Corps of Engineers’ National Inventory of 

Dams, to offer a robust and more complete data set that all infrastructure protection 

and incident management personnel can use. 

The law requires that the Secretary ‘‘shall use the database established 

under [it] in the development and implementation of Department plans and 

programs as appropriate.’’ What is the status of the construction of the 

data collection guidelines, per the language of the law? 

Response: The Office of Infrastructure Protection’s (IP’s) Infrastructure Information Collection Division (IICD) was established to lead IP’s efforts to provide standardized, relevant, and customer-focused infrastructure information to homeland security partners. A primary focus of the division is to establish a collection-management process to identify and prioritize information requirements and drive data collection efforts. A strategic collection management process was developed in fiscal 

year 07 and is currently being implemented. Request for Information (RFI) templates are being used to outline customer requests for geospatial and informational 

products. In addition, IICD has begun working with various infrastructure protection partners to to identify information requirements. This has been initiated with 

primary IP partners such as those that conduct risk analysis (Infrastructure Analysis and Strategy Division) and incident management (Contingency Planning and 

Incident Management Division). During fiscal year 2008, the coordination on RFI 

templates will expand to other DHS components and the Sector–Specific Agencies 

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(SSAs). Additionally, IP will collaborate with the SSAs to update the Infrastructure 

Taxonomy, which outlines the categories of infrastructure types within each of the 

17 Critical Infrastructure–Key Resources sectors. This effort was initiated in 2005 

and is updated annually to ensure an accurate representation and categorization of 

assets within the sectors. 

How will you engage State homeland security officials in order to acquire 

relevant and appropriate information about assets to inform the National 

Asset Database? 

Response: DHS will continue to work through the State and Territorial Homeland Security Advisors (HSAs) to conduct data calls and requests for information, 

which include requests to verify or validate portions of infrastructure. One such annual data call focuses on the Tier I/II effort to collaboratively work with the HSAs 

to identify infrastructures of highest national significance. Guidance and criteria is 

established to provide awareness and detailed instructions to the State and Territorial HSAs. 

Additionally, HSAs can coordinate through their respective Protective Security 

Advisors to review the infrastructure information within the Infrastructure Data 

Warehouse (IDW) for accuracy and relevance. This can be done at any point, and 

feedback can be provided to IP to update the data store. Once the IDW is operational (Initial Operational Capability is planned for September 2008 and access is 

provided to the HSAs through a Web-based portal, State and local personnel will 

be able to access the IDW holdings directly for review and can provide recommendations for additions, deletions, and updates as needed. These recommendations will 

proceed through a quality control and approval workflow prior to acceptance for all 

users to access. 

In addition to the data calls and verification and validation efforts, HSAs will also 

be requested to identify existing data stores that may be integrated with the IDW 

through the Service Oriented Architecture. This will improve information robustness 

and accuracy, while reducing the collection burden on Federal, State, local, and private-sector entities through more effective and efficient information sharing. 

How will you work with the Homeland Security Advisors from the States? 

Response: DHS will continue to work through the State and Territorial Homeland Security Advisors (HSAs) to conduct data calls and requests for information. 

Homeland Security Advisors will be the primary conduit to all State and territorial 

agencies and organizations, as well as some private-sector owner and operators. IP 

will work with the Department’s Office of Intergovernmental Programs to help ensure proper communication and coordination with the HSAs. 

Under the framework of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), the 

recently established State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal Government Coordination 

Council (SLTTGCC) will be a vital collaborative partner in the establishment or 

processes and guidelines to facilitate effective and efficient information exchange 

and sharing. 

How will you work with the State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council? 

Response: The STTLGCC will serve as the primary strategic level partner for IP 

in national-level policy and program development. 

IP will also work with other State, territorial, tribal, and local organizations such 

as the National Governors’ Association Homeland Security Advisors Council, National Sheriffs’ Association, International Association of Fire Chiefs, National Association of Counties, and American Legislative Exchange Council on national level 

policy and programs. In working with all of these groups, IP’s senior leadership recognizes that the SLTTGCC will remain the primary organization to help IP achieve 

the strategic goal of working collaboratively with its State, territorial, tribal, and 

local partners in the development and implementation of infrastructure-protection 

policies and programs. The SLTTGCC should serve as a means to reach back and 

into many of the above organizations and associations to ensure their full input and 

impact. 

As you know, the private sector owns and operates a large portion of critical infrastructure in this country. What methods will you use to acquire 

relevant information from the private sector to inform the database? How 

will you use the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program? 

Response: The private-sector owners and operators have various options to enable DHS information management and collection. Information for inclusion in the 

Infrastructure Data Warehouse can be collected through the use of the Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection tools, Vulnerability Identification 

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Self–Assessment Tool, and other National Infrastructure Protection Plan-compliant 

methods. This will enable users, whether private-sector owners and operators or 

State and local entities, to assess their infrastructure using common metrics and 

methods that provide comparative results within and across sectors or jurisdictions. 

Private sector owners and operators may also leverage their Local Law Enforcement 

and First Responders to collect and manage infrastructure information. DHS has 

made available the Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS) for use 

by State and Locals to collect and manage infrastructure information. 

Additionally, the private sector can work under the framework established by the 

National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) to provide information through their 

respective Sector Coordinating Council (SCC). The SCCs, which are made up of sector-specific private entities, associations, and owners/operators, are the primary 

method for private sector participation and input. 

IP recognizes that information security is a vital concern. IP will continue efforts 

to ensure that private-sector collection tools are certified by the Protected Critical 

Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program Office and that, as applicable, information is designated and protected as PCII. The Automated Critical Asset Management System exemplifies this effort. This operational tool enables State and local 

law enforcement and first responders to collect information that can be designated 

and protected as PCII by DHS where applicable. The PCII program and designation 

system is vital to the collection of information and detailed coordination between the 

Federal Government and private-sector entities. 

Question 11.: What is the status of the National Infrastructure Protection 

Consortium? Do you have some prospective members? 

If so, then who? 

Response: The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 

granted the Secretary the authority to establish a National Infrastructure Protection Consortium in newly enacted Section 210E(f). I have not yet exercised this authority and no action has been taken. No prospective members have been identified. 

Question: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires that the Department ‘‘carry out comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of the 

key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States, including 

the performance of risk assessments to determine the risks posed by particular types of terrorist attacks. . .’’ Furthermore, the H.R. 1 requires that 

the Department provide Congress with ‘‘a report on the comprehensive assessments’’ for fiscal year 2007 and each subsequent fiscal year. 

How effective have these comprehensive assessments been? 

Response: The Office of Infrastructure Protection’s (IP’s) Protective Security Coordination Division (PSCD) has developed several programs that include vulnerability assessments of critical infrastructure and key resources (CI–KR): the Site Assistance Visit (SAV) and the Comprehensive Review (CR). Both the SAV and CR examine the vulnerabilities of specific CI–KR to attack and the potential consequences 

of such an attack, and ultimately provide recommendations for enhancing the preparedness of the surrounding jurisdiction and the security posture of the site. As 

85 percent of CI–KR throughout the Nation are privately owned and operated, IP 

has designed the SAV and CR programs as holistic, non-regulatory initiatives that 

foster interagency coordination and cooperation among Federal, State, and local governments, and private industry. 

The SAV program is designed to facilitate vulnerability identification and mitigation discussions between the Government and owners and operators of CI–KR sites. 

SAV brings together Federal partners, State and local law enforcement, other emergency responders, and CI–KR owner/operators to conduct an ‘‘inside the fence’’ assessment that identifies critical assets, specific vulnerabilities, and security recommendations. Since 2003, IP has conducted 722 SAV assessments throughout all 

17 CI–KR sectors. 

The CR is a cooperative, regional, IP-led analysis of high-consequence CI–KR. The 

CR considers potential terrorist actions for an attack, the consequences of such an 

attack, and the integrated preparedness and response capabilities of the owner/operator, State and local law enforcement, and emergency response organizations. The 

results are used to enhance the overall security posture of the facilities, their surrounding communities, and the geographic region using short-term improvements 

and long-term risk-based investments in training, processes, procedures, equipment, 

and resources for the community. In July 2007, IP completed Chemical Sector CRs 

for six regions throughout the Nation. The regions selected have significant concentrations of high-consequence chemical facilities. Additionally, in September 2007, 

IP completed Nuclear Sector CRs for all 65 of our Nation’s commercial nuclear 

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power plants. Currently, IP is planning and developing the California Water Project 

CR, the first system approach to a comprehensive assessment. 

The SAVs and CRs have been effective in identifying vulnerabilities of the Nation’s CI–KR and improving the security and preparedness posture of the surrounding jurisdiction. The effectiveness of these assessments is contingent upon the 

collaboration of Federal, State, local, and private-sector owner/operators to identify 

vulnerabilities, capabilities, and potential consequences, and to provide collective 

protective measures to secure the Nation’s CI–KR. Furthermore, the information 

captured in SAVs is used to publish sector-based Common Vulnerabilities (CV), Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activity (PI), and Protective Measures (PM) reports. 

These reports help owners and operators detect and prevent terrorist attacks. CV 

reports provide insight into the common characteristics, general vulnerabilities, and 

likely consequences of an attack for representative facilities in a given sector. PI reports identify possible signs of an attack to better facilitate early detection, reporting, and prevention of terrorist activities on a sector-by-sector basis. PM reports describe likely terrorist objectives, methods of attack, and corresponding protective 

measures and their implementation in accordance with the Homeland Security Advisory System, on a sector-by-sector basis. All of these reports are available for use 

by law enforcement, security professionals, and asset owners and operators upon request. 

Additionally, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has aligned SAVs and 

CRs with the Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP). Results of the SAVs and CRs 

provide substantive justification for the distribution of BZPP grant funding, as 

BZPP grant money is provided to mitigate specific vulnerabilities identified during 

SAVs and CRs. 

Who has carried them out? 

SAVs are conducted by IP and tailored to meet unique requirements of each CI– 

KR, such as the scope of the assessment, State and local involvement, and other requirements from the owner/operator. IP uses a combination of Federal employees 

with contract support to conduct these assessments. Generally, a SAV team consists 

of a Federal team lead, assault planner/physical security specialist, and systems/ 

interdependency specialists. 

The core Federal team tasked to conduct CRs consists of representatives from the 

Federal agencies responsible for security and response efforts of CI–KR. The team 

composition is contingent upon the unique attributes of each CI–KR sector and the 

assets located in the CR footprint. For example, the inter-agency teams for the Nuclear and Chemical sector CRs included representatives from IP, the State, the 

Chemical and Nuclear Sector–Specific Agencies, United States Coast Guard, Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Transportation Security 

Administration, industry-based Sector Coordinating Councils, and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency’s National Preparedness Directorate. IP is currently coordinating a multi-agency CR team for the California Water Project CR. 

To what extent are you receiving cooperation from the private sector and 

State and local governments? 

Private-sector and State and local government partners have been integral in IP’s 

CI–KR assessment activities. Because SAVs and CRs are voluntary, non-regulatory 

assessments, the cooperation of the private sector and the integrated efforts of the 

Government are essential components of these programs. SAVs are conducted at the 

request of the owner/operator or DHS and typically incorporate law enforcement and 

other first responders. Many SAVs have brought together owners/operators and 

emergency responders who have had little to no interaction prior to the assessment. 

The SAV also provides an avenue for open communication among Federal, State, 

local, and private industry security partners, providing the foundation for integrating efforts in the protection of CI–KR. CRs require extensive coordination 

among Federal, State, and local governments, the Sector Coordinating Councils, Sector–Specific Agencies, and numerous private sector owner/operators. 

How have you attempted to encourage their involvement? What difficulties have you found and what measures have you taken to eliminate those 

difficulties? 

The effectiveness of all IP programs is contingent upon the collaboration of Federal, State, local, and private-sector owner/operators to identify vulnerabilities, capabilities, and potential consequences, and to provide collective protective measures 

to secure the Nation’s CI–KR. Such collaboration and cooperation is essential, as IP 

vulnerability assessments are not required; rather, these assessments are conducted 

on a voluntary basis. Significant portions of the most high-consequence CI–KR Sectors are regulated by other organizations that have the capability to impose addiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:31 Nov 23, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-67\48962.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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tional requirements or penalties upon these sites. For this reason, the private sector 

has been (at times) reluctant to host DHS-led assessments. 

IP has 68 Protective Security Advisors (PSAs) deployed across the Nation, covering 60 districts. IP PSAs work daily to establish relationships with Federal, State, 

local, and private-sector partners, and discuss information sharing, coordination, collaboration, and IP programs—including comprehensive assessments of CI–KR. PSAs 

have been deployed to represent DHS at the Federal, State, territorial, local, and 

tribal levels, serving as the Department’s onsite critical infrastructure and vulnerability assessment specialists, and as vital channels of communication among DHS 

officials and private-sector owners and operators of CI–KR assets. 

As a result of their locations throughout the United States, PSAs are often the 

first Department personnel to respond to incidents. Consequently, PSAs are uniquely able to provide early situational awareness to DHS and IP leadership during an 

incident, often performing duties as the Infrastructure Liaison at the Joint Field Office in support of the Principal Federal Official. PSAs also coordinate requests from 

CI–KR asset owners and operators for services and resources, including training, 

SAV scheduling, Buffer Zone Plans, CRs, and verification and technical assistance 

visits. 

Because information sharing is voluntary, the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program, also within IP, is designed to encourage private industry 

to share its sensitive security-related business information with the Federal Government. PCII is an information-protection tool that facilitates information sharing between the Government and the private sector. DHS and other Federal, State and 

local analysts use PCII in pursuit of a more secure homeland, focusing primarily 

on: • Analyzing and securing critical infrastructure and protected systems; • Identifying vulnerabilities and developing risk assessments; and • Enhancing recovery preparedness measures. 

If the information submitted satisfies the requirements of the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002, it is protected from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act and State and local disclosure laws. The information is also 

protected from use in civil litigation. 

Given that the private sector has not provided you a lot of information 

regarding its assets, do you feel that these comprehensive assessments adequately assess the vulnerabilities of the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States? 

Because 85 percent of CI–KR throughout the Nation are privately owned and operated, DHS/IP has designed the SAV and CR programs as holistic, non-regulatory 

initiatives that foster interagency coordination and cooperation among Federal, 

State, and local governments, and private industry. DHS/IP believes that these assessments provide significant value to private sector owner and operators. The findings of IP assessments have been used as short-term improvements and long-term 

risk-based investments, helping secure our Nation’s CI–KR. 

Question 13.: Mr. Secretary: The tragic events of September 11, 2001, the Madrid and London bombings, and Hurricane Katrina each demonstrated the need to 

not only protect against different types of hazards, but to also prepare to recover 

from such events. In fact, the private sector and local levels of government have 

been encouraging the Department to broaden its focus from protection and prevention to recovery and continuity planning. You, too, Mr. Secretary appeared to pick 

up on this theme during a speech at the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of 

Terrorism Events in Los Angeles on July 20, 2007. When speaking about the Strategy to Enhance International Supply Chain Security, you said that 

‘‘. . .importantly, [the strategy] specifically focuses on resumption of trade following 

an incident.’’ Unfortunately, though, this theme of ‘‘resumption’’ following an incident does not seem to manifest itself in many other areas of DHS planning. For instance, it does not appear to be a strong theme in the 17 Sector-Specific Plans that 

were released under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan earlier this year. 

How has DHS been encouraging the private and public sectors to focus 

on the resumption of operations following an incident rather than only focusing on protection and prevention? 

Response: The protective programs for CI–KR identified in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the Sector Specific Plans (SSPs) may include 

actions that mitigate the consequences of an attack or incident, such as recovery. 

Actions under these plans are focused on the following aspects of preparedness: 

• Mitigate: Lessen the potential impacts of an attack, natural disaster, or accident by introducing system redundancy and resiliency, reducing asset dependency, or isolating downstream assets; 

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• Respond: Activities designed to enable rapid reaction and emergency response 

to an incident, such as conducting exercises and having adequate crisis response 

plans, training, and equipment; and 

• Recover: Allow businesses and government organizations to resume operations quickly and efficiently, such as using comprehensive mission and business continuity plans that have been developed through prior planning. 

As a specific example of addressing recovery for CI–KR, DHS released the ‘‘Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources’’ in September 2006 as part of the Department’s pandemic preparedness strategy. The guide supports the efforts of the public—and private-sector CI–KR community to develop and execute their essential pandemic contingency plans and preparedness actions. Working closely with its private-sector 

partners, DHS designed the guide based on the principle that disaster planning and 

preparedness is a fundamental requirement of good business practice. All organizations must ensure that the capability exists to continue essential operations in response to potential operational interruptions, including a pandemic influenza. 

The compounded effects of health impact assumptions, proposed disease mitigation strategies, extended duration, and resultant implications for all businesses 

place a severe pandemic at the extreme end of a disaster continuum. Pandemic influenza has the potential to cause levels of global illness, death, economic disruption, and social disturbance like no other. To date, business continuity plans have 

integrated most of the known disaster scenarios but, until recently, have generally 

not included a pandemic influenza. The CI–KR Pandemic Guide recommends an exhaustive review of all existing continuity of operations (COOP) plans to update and 

address the specific impacts and implications for pandemic influenza, including updates to address the extreme case, called a Continuity of Operations Plan-Essential 

(COP–E). 

DHS designed COP–E as an extension and refinement of current business contingency and COOP planning that fully exploits existing efforts and integrates them 

within the suite of business disaster plans. The COP–E process assumes severe pandemic-specific impacts to enhance and complement existing business continuity 

plans. COP–E integrates the additional actions needed to identify and prioritize essential functions, people, and material within the business, across business sectors, 

and as important for the community and the Nation. It highlights actions and options to protect and sustain these at each pandemic phase from preparation to recovery. In addition, COP–E incorporates a measured approach for ‘‘survival’’ and recovery of operations under distinct COP–E scenarios. 

COP–E planning assumes a major disaster of national significance, like a pandemic, cascades into a national and international catastrophe. It assumes planning 

for degrees of ‘‘essential’’ operational requirements based upon a dramatically worsening situation and the need to sustain not only the business but also the community and the Nation. Thus, the scale and scope of the impacts and possible outcomes 

demand a dedicated level of effort, investment, and planning beyond typical business continuity planning. COP–E expands initial business continuity plans to create 

an agile, actionable plan for responding to and recovering from a potential catastrophic failure on a national or international scale. COP–E scenarios provide business planners a broad yet detailed perspective within which to develop graduated 

response and recovery actions. COP–E assists planners in prioritizing their actions 

and costs in a measured fashion, and it prepares them for the rapid adjustments 

necessary as pandemic impacts evolve. 

In particular, how has DHS used the Sector Partnership Framework to 

encourage continuity planning in the aftermath of a disaster in order for 

systems and assets to be up and running as soon as possible? 

The Sector Partnership Framework is used to achieve the underlying goal of the 

National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP): to build a safer, more secure, and 

more resilient America. To accomplish this, the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) is working with our sector partners to implement a long-term risk-management program. This program includes efforts to encourage continuity planning to 

ensure the resiliency of CI–KR against known threats and hazards in addition to 

planning for rapid CI–KR restoration and recovery for those events that are not preventable. Collaborative work using the sector partnership is evident in the creation 

of the Sector Specific Plans and the National Response Framework, both of which 

address the issue of resiliency. 

Specifically, for example, DHS is currently following up on the CI–KR Pandemic 

Guide by working with each of the 17 CI–KR sectors to develop Sector–Specific Pandemic Guidelines and workshops for the owners and operators throughout each of 

the critical infrastructure sectors. Each of the guidelines, which will act as annexes 

to the main guide, will be developed and endorsed by the sectors themselves. Each 

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Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) and Government Coordinating Council (GCC) 

will have many opportunities to comment upon and edit the guidelines during their 

development. Eventually, each SCC and GCC will be asked to endorse the guidelines. The guidelines are designed not only to plan for the impacts of a severe pandemic outbreak but also to prepare companies and organizations to continue providing their essential products and services throughout a pandemic and its aftermath. The guidelines will outline the seven major areas of vulnerability the sectors 

face and provide actions, supporting actions, and questions to consider in determining the appropriate strategies to employ to recover from a pandemic outbreak. 

How has the Strategy to Enhance International Supply Chain Security 

encouraged stakeholders to focus on resuming operations in the aftermath 

of an incident? 

The Strategy to Enhance International Supply Chain Security was developed in 

response to Sections 201 and 202 of the Security and Accountability For Every Port 

Act and was released in July 2007. It is set within a framework of other national 

strategies including the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Strategy for Maritime Security, the National Response 

Plan/Framework, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the National Maritime Transportation Security Plan, and other strategic plans. As a Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) strategy, it does not replace these documents; rather, it 

seeks to harmonize their goals into a multi-layered, unified approach for further development by Department components. 

Although DHS was the lead Department for the development of the strategy, its 

successful implementation is dependent on stakeholders from across the Federal 

Government, State and local governments, foreign governments and the private sector. Components of the Maritime Government Coordinating Council (GCC) were 

large contributors to the drafting of the strategy, specifically Customs and Border 

Protection and the United States Coast Guard. Coordination between Federal agencies and the private sector is essential, and work continues among all Sector Coordinating Councils and GCCs to address issues of prevention, protection, response, and 

recovery. 

Question 14.: A new school year has recently started. As the former North Carolina schools superintendent, I know that taking care of our children while at school 

is a top priority for educators across the country, and they are doing a great job 

of making our schools safe and secure. However, vigilance is a continuous process 

and requires knowledge and resources. Last May, this Committee held a Full Committee hearing on ‘‘Protecting our Schools: Federal Efforts to Strengthen Community Preparedness and Response.’’ In this hearing and in a GAO report I requested 

with the Chairman, we discovered a lack of coordination by the Federal Government 

to streamline programs and grants to help schools develop and implement emergency management plans. You and I have spoken before about what the Department 

is doing to get information to schools on security and preparedness, and about the 

need for Federal funding to help communities enhance school security. 

I know you have worked with the Department of Education to develop a webbased clearinghouse, but would like to hear more about how you will make sure the 

most relevant and up-to-date information is available to schools. School children are 

at school the majority of the day, and are among our most vulnerable citizens in 

the event of an emergency. What steps is the Department taking to ensure 

that first responders and school administrators are working together to develop emergency management plans and that school administrators get the 

resources they need to implement these plans? 

In your testimony, you speak about changes at FEMA that make it a more nimble 

and better equipped organization, with ten regional offices that work directly with 

state and local emergency management communities. How do you plan to raise 

awareness of school preparedness within this new structure? Can you give 

some examples of regional initiatives that incorporate schools in their 

‘‘management communities’’ through direct interaction or planning? 

Response: FEMA has a number of ways to support State and local efforts to address school preparedness issues including its Citizen Corps Programs, the Emergency Management Institute training programs, and the support provided by its 

Homeland Security Grant Programs. The Citizen Corps Program, for example, is a 

Federal initiative that helps coordinate State and local Citizen Corps Councils. 

Sponsored by local government, and typically involving local emergency management agencies, Citizen Corps Councils bring together representatives from public 

and private sector community groups—including schools—to identify priorities, integrate resources, and learn about and practice response skills. More than 2,200 Citizen Corps Councils are active across the country, with groups in every State and 

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U.S. Territory. It must be understood that the efforts to support school preparedness 

are based on the priorities established at the State and local level for the use of 

the resources available to them. 

Preparing and securing school communities—faculty, staff, students, parents, visitors, and academic facilities—is a critical part of Citizen Corps’ mission. The Councils’ school representatives play key roles of integrating school emergency plans with 

community plans, coordinating alert systems, and helping the academic community 

learn about and exercise disaster preparedness. 

In addition to helping schools get involved in local preparedness plans, Citizen 

Corps also has several national initiatives and local-led initiatives that address 

school issues. 

On the national level, Citizen Corps has partnered with the U.S. Department of 

Education to enhance the relationship between schools and Citizen Corps Councils. 

The Department of Education is one of Citizen Corps’ 25 national affiliates that expand the number of emergency responders and nongovernmental resources and materials available to States and local communities. In an effort to enhance public 

alerts and warnings for schools, one national initiative distributed about 97,000 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Public Alert Radios to all 

K–12 public schools in 2005 and 2006. The ‘‘America is Safer when our Schools are 

Safer’’ NOAA Public Alert Radio Distribution Program is a collaborative effort of 

NOAA at the Department of Commerce, FEMA’s Citizen Corps at the Department 

of Homeland Security, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Education. In cooperation with Citizen Corps, the Department of Education, and Department of Health and Human Services, NOAA maintains a radio 

distribution website with resources and tools to connect schools, emergency managers, and Citizen Corps Councils. The website’s materials encourage Citizen Corps 

Councils to work with their local schools and school administrative officials, and encourage schools to take an active role in their community’s alerts and warnings systems and emergency operations planning. 

Citizen Corps and the Department of Education also collaborate on preparedness 

resource materials for emergency managers and schools. Citizen Corps, for example, 

has provided presentations for the Department of Education at national conferences 

and meetings. This fall, Citizen Corps and the Department of Education were featured on the Department of Homeland Security’s Town Hall Meeting on School Preparedness Webinar. The webinar, designed for schools and emergency personnel 

across the country, highlighted resources for schools from several agencies: the Department of Education’s Office for Safe and Drug–Free Schools offered educational 

materials and grant programs for school preparedness; FEMA’s National Preparedness Directorate offered ways to tap into the Homeland Security Grant Program; 

FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute highlighted free training available to 

schools for emergency preparedness; and the Citizen Corps Program discussed the 

importance of school participation on Citizen Corps Councils. 

Many programs are organized at the State and local level. Through the Citizen 

Corps national affiliates program, those State and local efforts are able to partner 

with national organizations that offer a number of services, including public education, outreach, and training; representation for volunteers interested in helping to 

make their community safer; and volunteer service opportunities to support first responders, disaster relief activities, and community safety efforts. Many Citizen 

Corps affiliates provide age- and grade-appropriate preparedness curricula for 

schools. For example, the Home Safety Council’s Get Ready with Freddie and Literacy Project introduces children to the importance of both safety and reading; Operation Hope introduces students, teachers, and parents to the importance of financial preparedness and banking basics; and the Red Cross’ ‘‘Masters of Disaster’’ and 

First Aid programs teach students how to prepare for, respond to, and recover from 

a disaster. 

Schools also may access resources to learn about grant funding. Citizen Corps continues to build partnerships with school representatives to participate in coordinated State, Urban Area, and local efforts to apply for community preparedness 

funding through Citizen Corps and other grant programs. It is important for school 

administrators to recognize that school participation on Citizen Corps Councils 

helps ‘‘leverage’’ grant funding for school and community preparedness. At the State 

level, school administrators and State Citizen Corps Programs have worked together 

on funding initiatives in schools. One such example includes the facilitation of Teen 

Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) Train the Trainer courses. 

Administered by DHS, the CERT program educates people about disaster preparedness and trains them in basic disaster response skills, such as fire safety, light 

search and rescue, and disaster medical operations. Using their training, CERT 

members assist others in their neighborhoods and workplaces following events, and 

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they take more active overall roles in preparing their communities. In addition to 

Teen CERT, this program has expanded in recent years to include Campus CERT, 

which offers CERT training to America’s teenagers and young adults. 

At the local level, schools and local emergency managers and/or Citizen Corps 

Council leaders have collaborated on preparedness outreach efforts to include students, parents, and faculty. Some examples are: 

• DeSoto County, Mississippi, and the State of Mississippi: The State of 

Mississippi has made working with schools a priority for its Citizen Corps Program. In DeSoto County, emergency management officers work with the local 

school system on emergency planning and provide CERT training to school faculty. Also in DeSoto, Citizen Corps volunteers and professional responders help 

schools develop emergency plans according to the hazards they face and design 

exercises to test the plans. Statewide, the Mississippi Citizen Corps Council has 

focused on the delivery of CERT training for educators in elementary and secondary schools, as well as universities and colleges. Last year, DeSoto’s Citizen 

Corps Council began providing CERT training to faculty at all 26 elementary 

and secondary schools in the district. 

• Eugene, Oregon, Police Department: Through the department’s School 

Resource Team, police officers volunteer to mentor students by having lunch 

with them, assist with crime prevention class presentations and development of 

social skills classes, tutor students in after school homework clubs, and interact 

with students, staff, and administrators. 

• Hillsborough County School Board (Tampa, Florida) and Sarasota 

County School District’s North Port High School (North Port, Florida): 

The Hillsborough County School Board and North Port High School offer CERT 

training to students, teachers, and safety professionals. They are currently offering basic CERT training, as well as advanced/refresher training in Terrorism, 

Fire Scene Rehab Support, Mass Casualty Scenarios, and Bio-readiness for 

Safety Professionals. Hillsborough County is on track to train 150 students and 

Sarasota County plans on training 300 participants. 

Four Citizen Corps Partner Programs may be of interest to local schools, first responders and others who are interested in education, training, and preparedness activities for the community: 

• An expanded Neighborhood Watch Program (NWP) incorporates terrorism awareness education into its existing crime prevention mission, while 

also serving as a way to bring together residents to focus on emergency preparedness and emergency response training. Funded by the Department of Justice, Neighborhood Watch is administered by the National Sheriffs’ Association. 

• The Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) program strengthens communities by 

helping medical, public health, and other volunteers offer their expertise 

throughout the year as well as during local emergencies and other times of community need. MRC volunteers work in coordination with existing local emergency response programs and also supplement existing community public health 

initiatives, such as outreach and prevention, immunization programs, blood 

drives, case management, care planning, and other efforts. The MRC program 

is administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 

• Volunteers in Police Service (VIPS) works to enhance the capacity of 

State and local law enforcement to engage volunteers. VIPS serves as a gateway 

to information for and about law enforcement volunteer programs, including 

programs geared toward young people. For example, VIPS has produced a 10- 

minute video on ‘‘Engaging Youth through Volunteerism.’’ VIPS also sponsors 

a Police Explorers program for teens and young adults ages 15 to 21. 

• The Fire Corps promotes the use of citizen advocates to enhance the capacity of resource-constrained fire and rescue departments at all levels: volunteer, 

combination, and career. Citizen advocates assist local fire departments in a 

range of activities including fire safety outreach, youth programs such as its Explorers program, and administrative support. Fire Corps provides resources to 

help fire and rescue departments create opportunities for citizen advocates and 

promote citizen participation. Fire Corps is funded through DHS and is managed and implemented through a partnership among the National Volunteer 

Fire Council, the International Association of Fire Fighters, and the International Association of Fire Chiefs. 

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