U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

35–263 PDF 2009

BORDER SECURITY: INFRASTRUCTURE, 

TECHNOLOGY, AND THE HUMAN ELEMENT 

PART I AND II 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, 

AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 13, 2007 AND MARCH 8, 2007 

Serial No. 110–4 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 


Congress.#13
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin 

Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

AL GREEN, Texas 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

VACANCY 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee 

JESSICA HERRERA-FLANIGAN, Staff Director & General Counsel 

TODD GEE, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, Chairwoman 

JANE HARMAN, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

AL GREEN, Texas 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex 

Officio) 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

ALISON ROSSO, Director 

DENISE KREPP, Counsel 

CARLA ZAMUDIO-DOLAN, Clerk 

MANDY BOWERS, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, 

and Global Counterterrorism .............................................................................. 1 

The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Indiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism .................................................................... 2 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida ..................................................................................................... 25 

The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas ................................................................................................................. 27 

The Honorable Al Green, a Representative in Congress From the State of 

Texas ..................................................................................................................... 29 

The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California .......................................................................................................... 105 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 34 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 35 

The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California .......................................................................................................... 32 

WITNESSES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2007 

David V. Aguilar, Chief, Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

David Pekoske, Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2007 

Dr. Jeffrey Scott McIllwain, Co-Director, Homeland Security Program, San 

Diego State University: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 45 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 47 

Mr. Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 57 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 59 

Page

IV 

Mr. Andrew M. Ramirez, Chairman, Friends of the Border Patrol: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 74 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 76 

Mr. Michael Wermuth, Director, RAND Homeland Security Program: 

Accompanied by Mr. Jack Riley: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 88 

Prepared Statment ............................................................................................... 70 

(1) 

BORDER SECURITY: INFRASTRUCTURE, 

TECHNOLOGY, AND THE HUMAN ELEMENT 

PART I 

Tuesday, February 13, 2007 

U.S.HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, 

AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Loretta Sanchez [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Sanchez, Lofgren, Jackson Lee, Cuellar, 

Green, Thompson, Souder, and Bilirakis. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. [Presiding.] The subcommittee will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on border security, infrastructure, technology and the human element. 

And I want to begin by thanking the witnesses, Chief Aguilar 

and Rear Admiral David Pekoske, who are joining us today at this 

important hearing on border security, infrastructure, technology 

and the human element. 

This is the first hearing in the Border, Maritime and Global 

Counterterrorism Terrorism Subcommittee, and I hope today’s discussion will be the first of many useful discussions between this 

committee and the department. And I look forward to a very productive Congress this year. 

One of the top issues that this subcommittee will focus on is border security. And today, we have the opportunity to explore broadly 

the challenges we face in securing our borders and the ways in 

which infrastructure, technology and personnel can be used to secure our country. 

To begin with, I am interested in discussing the diversity of the 

issues that we face on the northern, the southern and the coastal 

borders, and how Customs and Border Protection and the Coast 

Guard work independently and how you work jointly to get this 

done. 

In addition, I would like to learn more about the various mix of 

the infrastructure, the technology and the personnel resources that 

are used to address the different challenges at the different borders, and to sort of get a best practices or some idea from you on 

how this works, what is working well, and what we need to do to 

improve, and what kind of resources you need, because I believe— 

and I think most of us realize now—that a one-size-fits-all doesn’t 

2 

work with respect to securing our borders, and because we have 

limited resources, we are trying to figure out how to prioritize 

those resources and use them effectively. 

I also want to hear about the fencing and the barrier situation, 

because there have been many misinterpretations, I think, in particular in the press, about what the new 700 miles of wall or fence 

would be and what that looks like. My interpretation of the language is that it could be technology sensors; it could be personnel; 

it doesn’t necessarily have to be a physical barrier. So I hope you 

will give us or enlighten us on what you think works effectively 

with respect to that. 

And, of course, the SBInet technology project, I look forward to 

seeing the Project 28 pilot when it is complete. And I want to let 

our members know that we will have ample time to review this 

project. And today I hope we will discuss the technology currently 

being used at both Customs and Border Protection and the Coast 

Guard. 

And in terms of the human element, I would like to hear about, 

not just the plans for increasing the Border Patrol, because I know 

we have challenges in recruitment, in training, and retention, but 

also, again, how do we use them to maximize what we are doing 

at our border? 

Given the variety and the complexity of the issues, I am sure 

that we will hold additional hearings on these topics. And today’s 

hearing is really just a starting point for this subcommittee, so that 

hopefully we can get this right. With this looming issue of whether 

we do a comprehensive immigration reform or not, you know, I just 

want to be on record saying that we want to get this part of this 

reform correct in order for the rest of it to work. 

So I would like to thank my ranking member for his interest in 

this topic, and I look forward to working with him on this and on 

other issues of importance in the future. 

And the chair now recognizes the ranking member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Indiana, for an opening statement. 

Mr. SOUDER. I thank the chairlady, and I appreciate her leadership and interest. And I look forward to working with her on a 

complex issue that probably never will be solved and on how we 

totally protect our borders that clearly we have. 

And the challenges here are mixed. And those of us who have 

worked with it realized their mixed, because you have the people 

problem, which would be terrorists, smugglers, as well as probably 

2 million illegal aliens coming across. And it is hard to tell when 

somebody is coming whether they are initially a drug smuggler, a 

people smuggler, or a terrorist, or just somebody coming to work 

in Indiana. 

The second part is contraband, whether it is chemical, biological, 

nuclear, or narcotics, which up to this point, since 9/11, we have 

had 20,000 people a year die from illegal narcotics in the United 

States or, at this point, 100,000 since 9/11, that is a continuing 

form of terrorism in the United States, or protection, where China, 

India, other countries send things in that are stolen and can put 

different industries out. 

3 

So you have both on the Border Patrol and in the Coast Guard 

multitask missions that are huge challenges. My questions—reflect 

two concerns. 

One as is the stated goal of the President, and many of us in 

Congress realize we need some type of, at some point, comprehensive immigration reform, but what has to be in place before that 

occurs? How secure does the border have to be? How secure does 

our exit visa program have to be? And how secure do our IDs need 

to be, prior to implementation of that? 

Because the general consensus is, is the failure of Simpson–Mazzoli was that there was amnesty with no enforcement, so the American people believe that, when we come forward and say, ‘‘Oh, we 

are going to do comprehensive immigration reform, but the other 

things aren’t in place,’’ that they are fearful that there is going to 

be another sleight of hand, that we agree for some type of work 

permit amnesty, but there is no real commitment to finishing off 

border security. And that is why many of us feel we need to show 

more progress there before we do immigration reform. 

The second part of this is much more complex; not more complex 

overall, but more in particular policies. In Colombia, the only way 

we could tell we were making progress on eliminating coca is if 

they shoot. Because if they never fight back, it means it is just cost 

of goods, you know, it is a bad debt. 

So if they don’t shoot at your spray planes, if they don’t shoot 

at the Coast Guard ships, if they don’t fire at our Border Patrol, 

it means so many narcotics are pouring across the border and so 

much is being grown that they don’t even feel a need to protect 

their asset. 

So as we get better at sealing the border, and one measure of 

some success to me, rather than just the stacks that the Border Patrol shows or the Coast Guard claims each year of how many narcotics we are getting or how many people we are interdicting—because we know the numerator. We don’t know the denominator. 

We know how much we are seizing, but we don’t know how much 

is coming, that when you look at that statistic, that, quite frankly, 

if there is no conflict, it means so much is coming through that 

what we interdicted is irrelevant. What we are seeing on the border is more violence right now. That suggests that there is some 

success right now in the drug smuggling area and in the people 

smuggling area. 

However, that, I believe, means we need to look at other policies 

such as the two Border Patrol agents who admittedly committed 

some doctoring of evidence crimes. The question is, what policy underneath that led them to be fearful of prosecution? Has there been 

a chilling effect on the Border Patrol for their willingness to defend 

our borders? 

Similarly, the National Guard, from my district, as they go to the 

border, can’t have bullets if they are working on the fence. Well, 

if our deterrent in between the ports of entry are, in effect, have 

to wait until shot at, which is one of the problems we have had in 

Iraq, do we really have border security at a time when we are continuing to clamp down and the pressure for violence is increasing? 

Similarly, if we don’t have adequate boats, if we don’t have 

HITRON helicopters, if we don’t have the ability to defend ourVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
4 

selves and to keep up with the go-fast boats and take them, it isn’t 

going to work. 

So a lot of my questions are going to be related to those type of 

things. I thank you both for your service. I look forward to continuing to work with you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes the chairman of the full committee, the 

gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for an opening statement. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. And 

I, too, am looking forward to the testimony of our two witnesses 

today. Hearing their testimony, I am looking forward to seeing 

where infrastructure, technology and personnel will be needed to 

strengthen America’s border security. 

For decades, our men and women on the Border Patrol have done 

a wonderful job. But at this point after 9/11, we all know that they 

have taken on additional responsibilities in the fight against terror. 

One of the things I want to know is, now that we are getting 

6,000 new agents, can we really bring them on line in a reasonable 

period of time? If so, how do we plan to do that over the next year, 

year and a half? 

With respect to the Coast Guard, I thank you for what you did 

during Katrina. You made all of us feel that some part of government really works. And because of that, Deepwater is a vital program for us. If we can’t get the ships redone, there is only so much 

life left in them. But in doing that, I want to make sure that we 

get a product. 

The National Security Cutter and the 123-foot cutters are real 

problems for us. We can’t spend $700 million on a ship and it not 

perform the duties for which it was designed. And that is a real 

problem. I have shared it with the commandant and others, but we 

will have hearings on that later. 

The other thing is whether or not, given the substantial miles 

from a maritime standpoint that the Coast Guard is charged with 

guarding, whether or not the present personnel is sufficient to do 

the job, or have we taxed the Coast Guard with new missions that 

stretches them beyond their capacity? 

But I look forward to this hearing and the testimony. And I yield 

back the rest of my time, Madam Chairman. 

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 

Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson 

‘‘Border Security: Infrastructure, 

Technology, and the Human Element’’ 

February 13, 2007 (WASHINGTON)—Today, Committee on Homeland security 

Chairman Bennie G. Thompson (D-MS) delivered the following prepared remarks 

for the Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism Subcommittee Hearing entitled ‘‘Border Security: Infrastructure, Technology, and the Human Element’’: 

For decades, the men and women of the United States Border Patrol have been 

on the front lines of our border security efforts. In the wake of the attacks of 9/11, 

they have taken on added responsibilities in the fight against terror. I know I join 

my colleagues in thanking the approximately 13,000 Border patrol agents who work 

hard every day to help keep the American people safe. 

5 

I have also long supported increasing the size of the Border Patrol, so we have 

the personnel required to manage our borders effectively. President Bush has made 

a commitment to doubling the size of the Border Patrol during his term in office., 

which would mean adding an additional 6,000 agents over the next two years. This 

is an ambitious goal, and I am looking forward to hearing more about Border Patrol’s plans to recruit, hire, train, and retain these agents. 

In addition, I am a strong proponent of providing Border Patrol with the technology in infrastructure they need to get their job done. At the same time, any such 

initiatives need careful oversight to ensure that we are making the best possible use 

of our homeland security funding. 

As Chairman, I can assure you that the Homeland Security Committee will provide such oversight this year. 

As we strengthen our security along the northern and southern borders with more 

manpower and other resources, it is likely that our maritime borders will become 

an increasingly attractive target for those seeking to enter the United States illegally or to bring drugs or other contraband into the country. Therefore, securing our 

nation’s maritime borders is also vitally important to our homeland security. 

About 95 percent of goods coming into the United States arrive by ship, and our 

economy depends on a continuous flow of commerce. Also, though our maritime borders are 12,400 miles long, there are actually 95,000 miles of coastline in the United 

States and 3.4 million square miles within the United States Exclusive Economic 

Zone. Facilitating legitimate trade and travel while also addressing threats across 

this vast area is no easy task. 

It is up to 40,150 active duty Coast Guard men and women to protect this immense area. It is essential that these men and women have the necessary tools to 

be successful. Recently, however, we learned about structural problems with the National Security Cutters and the 123 foot cutters. 

I am deeply concerned about these problems. The valiant men and women of the 

Coast Guard, who risk their lives each, must be able to depend on Coast Guard assets. 

As Chairman of this Committee, I intend to work closely with the Coast Guard 

to ensure that similar problems do not occur in the future. I am also committed to 

working with the Commandant to ensure that he has an adequate number of personnel to meet the Coast Guard’s mission. 

We can not afford for maritime security to be the weak link in the fight against 

terrorism. I look forward to continuing to work with my congressional colleagues 

and the Department of Homeland Security on these and many other important border security issues in the 110th Congress. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Other members of the subcommittee are reminded that, under 

the committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the 

record. 

And so, I welcome our panel of witnesses. 

Our first witness, Chief David V. Aguilar, is the chief of the 

United States Border Patrol, a position that he has held since June 

of 2004. And his career in the Border Patrol spans nearly three 

decades and includes service as the chief patrol agent of Border Patrol’s Tucson sector, which is one of the most active areas of the 

border region, and a great area, I might add. It is the home of my 

father. 

And our second witness, Rear Admiral David Pekoske—it is a 

difficult one to pronounce—was assigned as the Coast Guard’s assistant commandant for response in July of 2006. And his responsibilities include management, oversight of a wide range of Coast 

Guard programs essential to public safety, to national and to homeland security. 

So, without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted in the record. And I now ask each witness to summarize his 

or her statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Chief Aguilar. 

6 

STATEMENT OF CHIEF DAVID V. AGUILAR, BORDER PATROL, 

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Chief AGUILAR. Good morning. 

Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder and Committee 

Chairman Thompson, it is a pleasure and an honor to be here this 

morning to be able to speak to you and answer any questions that 

you might have, relative to Border Patrol, Border Patrol operations, 

and our activities along our nation’s borders with the Canada, Mexico and, of course, the coastal borders that we share responsibility 

with our partners, the U.S. Coast Guard. 

I would like to cover just a little bit about what we do, how we 

do it, and where we do it, which summarizes my statement. 

The Border Patrol is responsible for over 6,000 miles of land border with Canada and Mexico. Last year, we apprehended over 1.1 

million apprehensions between the ports of entry. In addition to 

that, we apprehended over 1.3 million pounds of narcotics, again, 

between the ports of entry. We apprehended over 98,000 other than 

Mexicans, within that group of 1.1 million apprehensions that we 

apprehended between the ports of entry. 

Now, there were several initiatives that were undertaken last 

year that made a world of difference, in my opinion, from an enforcement activity for the Border Patrol, the commencement of Operation Jump Start. 

Operation Jump Start began about July 15th. We deployed up to 

6,000 National Guard personnel. These citizen-soldiers are doing a 

tremendous job for us. 

As an example, I will state that, by implementing these National 

Guard personnel, one of the very important things that they did for 

us was entry identification teams, whereby they literally gave us 

an additional eyes and ears subset of our operations, over 300 

miles of border, that we just didn’t have in the past. So we had a 

tremendous increase in our surveillance capability. 

We commenced Operation Streamline in Del Rio sector, a very 

specific operation that we worked in conjunction with our ICE partners, with the judiciary down there in the Del Rio sector of operation, the U.S. attorney’s office, and the U.S. magistrates, whereby 

we basically concentrated our joint efforts in prosecuting every 

entry that occurred within a specific area of that piece of the border. 

We commenced with an area no larger than four miles of that 

border. Within about eight months, we expanded to over 200 miles 

of that entire border. As a result of that collaborative effort and 

partnership with the state, local, tribal and federal entities, we reduced the levels of activities by over 66 percent, tremendous increase in operational effectiveness. 

We had additional bed space given to the Border Patrol. We are 

literally in the process and have ended what was known as catch 

and release. We are now basically applying catch and return, 

where all OTMs that are being apprehended are now being placed 

in detention. There are some that are being released only for humanitarian purposes. An example would be a female who is pregnant, for example, that cannot and probably should not be detained. 

7 

But other than, upwards of 95 percent of all OTM apprehension 

by the United States Border Patrol are, in fact, being detained and 

returned to their country of origin. To date, on a national level, we 

have reduced the levels of OTMs coming into this country by over 

52 percent. In past years, we were releasing on own recognizance 

over 90 percent; today, we are holding the vast majority, over 95 

percent of all OTMs. 

Border violence protocols. We have instituted with the government of Mexico, where we are working with them in order for them 

to be responsive on the south side, in order to address what Congressman Souder just spoke to. We actually use within the Border 

Patrol as a measure of our success and a measure of our effectiveness the levels of violence and assaults against our officers. 

Simply stated, the way I put is that, when the smugglers are reluctant to give up areas that they have built historically, that they 

have owned and operated with impunity, they are reluctant to give 

up those areas. They fight us for that piece of the border. Violence 

escalates. It is critical that the government of Mexico work with 

us—and they are working with us—in order to be responsive on the 

south side. 

SBInet. SBInet is something that, September of last year, the 

contract was let. We will probably be speaking more about this, 

but, succinctly, it is a system of systems, technology-based, as a 

backbone to the system that will maximize the effectiveness of Border Patrol agents on the ground. 

Today, as we speak, we have over 12,500 agents on the ground, 

6,000 to be added by the end of calendar year 2008. I feel confident 

that we are on track to do that. We will hire 2,500 this year, 3,000 

next year, and 500 by the end of calendar year 2008, to get us at 

6,000 net new. 

I would like to address just very succinctly the fence issue. We 

are on track this year to build 70 miles of additional fence, in addition to the already existing 70, 72 miles that we have. We are on 

track to build 225 miles of fence next year, that will get us to the 

370 miles that we are looking to build. 

Fence is absolutely a critical part of our enforcement initiatives, 

but I will summarize by saying that the fence is important where 

it makes sense. Where it makes sense is specifically in our urban 

areas and some rural and remote areas that will specifically give 

us the latitude to operate more efficiently and maximize our Border 

Patrol agents. Technology, the virtual fence, 21st-century fence is 

where we look to expand our infrastructure in the out years. 

With that, I will close out my oral summary. I thank you for the 

opportunity, and I look forward to answering any questions that 

you might have. 

[The statement of Chief Aguilar follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID AGUILAR

Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, and distinguished Subcommittee 

Members, it is my honor to have the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the successes and challenges of border security, as demonstrated by the operations and law enforcement initiatives of the United States Border Patrol, a component of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP). My name is David Aguilar, and I am the Chief of the U.S. Border 

Patrol. I would like to begin by giving you a brief overview of our agency and mission. 

8 

CBP, as the guardian of the Nation’s borders, safeguards the homeland—foremost, 

by protecting the American public against terrorists and the instruments of terror, 

while at the same time enforcing the laws of the United States and fostering the 

Nation’s economic security through lawful travel and trade. Since 1924, the Border 

Patrol has grown from a handful of mounted agents patrolling desolate areas along 

U.S. borders to today’s highly-trained, dynamic work force of almost 13,000 men and 

women supported by sophisticated technology, vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment. Contributing to all this is the Border Patrol’s time-honored duty of interdicting illegal aliens and narcotics and those who attempt to smuggle them across 

our borders. We cannot protect against the entry of terrorists and the instruments 

of terror without also reducing the clutter that is caused by illegal migration across 

our borders. 

To most effectively secure the border, we must reform our immigration system to 

relieve this pressure. We need comprehensive immigration reform that increases 

border security, establishes a robust interior enforcement program, and creates a 

temporary worker program. The Administration is dedicated to comprehensive reform of America’s immigration laws by increasing border security, while maintaining the Nation’s tradition of welcoming immigrants who enter the country legally. 

For immigration reform to succeed, it must be based on five pillars: 1) strengthening 

security at the borders; 2) substantially increasing enforcement in the interior to remove those who are here illegally, and to prevent employers from deliberately or 

inadvertently hiring illegal immigrants; 3) implementing a Temporary Worker Program to provide a legal channel for employers to hire foreign workers to do jobs 

Americans are unwilling to do; 4) addressing the millions of illegal immigrants already in the country; and 5) helping new immigrants assimilate into American society. The Administration’s plan will deter and apprehend migrants attempting to 

enter the country illegally and decrease crime rates along the border. The plan also 

will serve the needs of the economy by allowing employers to hire legal foreign 

workers on a temporary basis when no American is willing to take the job, bring 

illegal immigrants out of the shadows without providing amnesty, and restore public 

confidence in the Federal Government’s ability to enforce immigration laws. 

The Border Patrol’s national strategy is an ‘‘all threats’’ strategy with anti-terrorism as our main priority. This strategy has made the centralized chain of command a priority and has increased the effectiveness of our agents by using a riskmanagement approach to deploy our resources. The strategy recognizes that border 

awareness and cooperation with our law enforcement partners are critical. Partnerships with the Department of the Interior; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 

Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal Bureau of Investigation; State, local, 

and tribal law enforcement agencies; and State Homeland Security offices play a 

vital role in sharing and disseminating information and tactical intelligence that assists our ability to rapidly respond to an identified threat or intrusion, which is essential to mission success. 

Recognizing that we cannot control our borders by merely enforcing the law at the 

‘‘line,’’ our strategy incorporates a ‘‘defense in depth’’ component, to include transportation checks away from the physical border. Traffic checkpoints are critical to 

our enforcement efforts, for they deny major routes of egress from the borders to 

smugglers intent on delivering people, drugs, and other contraband into the interior 

of the United States. Permanent traffic checkpoints allow the Border Patrol to establish an important second layer of defense and help deter illegal entries through 

improved enforcement. 

To carry out its mission, the Border Patrol has a clear strategic goal: to establish 

and maintain effective control of the border of the United States. Effective control 

is defined in the Border Patrol’s strategy as the ability to detect, respond, and interdict border penetrations in areas deemed a high priority for threat potential or other 

national security objectives. In order to establish effective control in a given geographical area, we must be able to consistently: 

• Detect an illegal entry; 

• Identify/Classify the entry and determine the level of threat involved; 

• Respond to the entry; and 

• Bring the event to a satisfactory law enforcement resolution. 

Gaining, maintaining, and expanding a strong enforcement posture with sufficient 

flexibility to address potential exigent enforcement challenges is critical in bringing 

effective control to the borders. Guidance at the national level for planning and implementation ensures resources are initially targeted to gain and maintain effective 

control in the most vulnerable, highest-risk border areas, and then to expand this 

level of border control to all Border Patrol Sectors. 

Crucial to our mission is SBInet. Through SBInet, the technological component of 

the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), the Border Patrol will continue to assess, deVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
9 

velop, and deploy the appropriate mix of technology, personnel, and infrastructure 

to gain, maintain, and expand coverage of the border in an effort to use our resources in the most efficient fashion. The expansion of a system of cameras, biometrics, sensors, air assets, improved communications systems, and new technology 

will provide the force multiplier that the Border Patrol needs to perform its mission 

in the safest and most effective manner. 

While it is key that the right combination of personnel, infrastructure, and technology be achieved, it must be coupled with improved rapid response capability and 

organizational mobility. Each of these components is inter-dependent and is critical 

to the success of the Border Patrol’s strategy. We are fully engaged with the DHS 

Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate in our efforts to identify, develop and acquire technology to help us gain enhanced awareness and control of our borders. 

Our participation in S&T’s Integrated Process Team on Border Security, for example, will help us use S&T resources to develop technology that will better secure our 

borders. Systems with the technological ability to predict, detect, and identify illegal 

entries and other criminal activity, but lacking the capacity for a rapid response or 

reaction, cannot complete the enforcement mission. Conversely, enforcement personnel with inadequate intelligence or poor technological support to provide situational awareness, access, and adequate transportation or equipment necessary to 

conduct enforcement activity are much less likely to be effective in today’s dynamic 

border environment. 

There is no stretch of border in the United States that can be considered completely inaccessible or lacking in the potential to provide an entry point for a terrorist or terrorist weapon. Therefore, securing every mile of diverse terrain is an important and complex task that cannot be resolved by a single solution, such as installing fence alone. To secure each unique mile of the border requires a balance 

of technology, infrastructure and personnel that maximizes the government’s return 

on investment and is tailored to each specific environment. Some of the components 

included by the Border Patrol and SBInet in evaluating tactical infrastructure needs 

are border access (the existence of all-weather roads), border barriers (vehicle and 

pedestrian), and the lack of non-intrusive inspections equipment at checkpoint facilities. 

The hiring and training of agents present both a challenge and an opportunity 

for the Border Patrol. CBP expects all training directed at achieving the President’s 

target of 18,000 Border Patrol agents on board by December 31, 2008, to be conducted at the Border Patrol Academy in Artesia, New Mexico. CBP and the Federal 

Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) have agreed upon a plan to train a minimum of 3,600 new trainees in fiscal year 2007, 4,350 trainees in fiscal year 2008, 

and 850 trainees in the first quarter of fiscal year 2009. The Academy has increased 

the number of permanent instructors, detailed instructors, and rehired annuitants 

to meet the increased training load. Advanced Instructor Training to ensure that instructors have appropriate technical and teaching skills is being conducted at the 

FLETC facility in Charleston, South Carolina. CBP and FLETC have agreed to do 

everything possible to ensure that the Artesia facility is fully prepared for the Border Patrol training requirements, and with the addition of infrastructure, it is anticipated that the facility will meet the need. However, both CBP and FLETC have 

committed to exploring other options should there be a need for a contingency. 

The proper mix of personnel, technology, and infrastructure will vary with differing border environments and enforcement challenges. The Border Patrol operates 

in three basic geographical environments: urban, rural, and remote. Each of these 

environments requires a different mix of resources. 

In an urban environment, enforcement personnel generally have only minutes, or 

sometimes seconds, to identify an illegal entry and to bring the situation to resolution. This dynamic is a result of the fact that significant infrastructure exists to facilitate an illegal entrant’s approach to the border and entry and to permit the violator to escape within moments of effecting the entry by blending in with the legitimate traffic in the community. Typically, smugglers and potential illegal entrants 

prefer urban areas due to the available infrastructure. 

In urban areas, the deployment mix will lean heavily on SBInet-provided tactical 

infrastructure, such as lights and fences, supported by sufficient personnel to quickly respond to intrusions. The deployment tends to be of high visibility in that a potential intruder actually sees the barriers, lights, detection capability, and patrols 

occurring on or near the immediate border. The goal of deployment in an urban area 

is to deter and/or divert potential illegal traffic into areas where the routes of egress 

are not immediately accessible and enforcement personnel have a greater tactical 

advantage. 

In a rural environment, response time to an incursion can be greater, as the time 

from the point of entry to assimilation into the local infrastructure may be minutes 

10 

or hours, exposing the violator for a longer period of time and allowing for a more 

calculated enforcement response. Deployment in a rural area will be less dependent 

upon such things as pedestrian fences and stadium lighting and more dependent 

upon SBInet solution sets involving detection technology, rapid access, and barriers 

designed to limit the speed and carrying capability of the violators. 

In remote terrain it may take a violator hours or even days to transit from the 

point of entry to a location where the entry may be considered successful. This allows for a significantly more deliberate response capability geared toward fully exploiting the terrain and environmental advantages. Deployments in remote areas 

will lean very heavily on detection technology and will include infrastructure geared 

toward gaining access to permit enforcement personnel to confront and resolve the 

event at a time and location that are most tactically and strategically advantageous. 

Other infrastructure/facilities that may be employed in a remote area include remote operating bases to provide for full enforcement coverage in areas that are difficult to access on a shift-to-shift basis. 

Historically, major Border Patrol initiatives, such as Operation Hold the Line in 

the El Paso Sector, Operation Gatekeeper in the San Diego Sector, Operation Rio 

Grande in Rio Grande Valley Sector, and the Arizona Border Control Initiatives in 

Tucson and Yuma Sectors, respectively, have had great border enforcement impact 

on illegal migration patterns along the Southwest border, proving that with the 

proper resources, a measure of control is possible. Collectively, they have laid the 

foundation for newer strategies and enforcement objectives and an ambitious goal 

to gain effective control of our Nation’s borders, particularly our borders with Mexico. 

These initiatives will significantly affect illegal migration as we seek to bring the 

proper balance of personnel, equipment, technology, and infrastructure into areas 

experiencing the greatest level of cross-border illegal activity along our Nation’s borders. The most recent example of these initiatives is the Arizona Border Control Initiative, currently in its fourth phase. In this effort, we partner with other DHS components and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies and the Government of Mexico, bringing together resources and fused intelligence into a geographical area that has been heavily impacted by illicit smuggling activity. Our efforts include building on partnerships with the Government of Mexico to create a 

safer and more secure border through the Border Safety Initiative, Expedited Removal, and Interior Repatriation programs. In doing so, we continue to have a significant positive effect on fighting terrorism, illegal migration, and crime in that 

border area. 

On the Northern border, the vastness and remoteness of the area and the unique 

socio-economic ties between the U.S. and Canada are significant factors in implementing the Border Patrol’s national strategy. Severe weather conditions on the 

Northern border during winter intensify the need to expand ‘‘force-multiplying’’ 

technology to meet our enforcement needs. The number of actual illegal border penetrations along the U.S.-Canada border is small in comparison to the daily arrests 

along the U.S.-Mexico border. The threat along the Northern border results from the 

fact that over ninety percent of Canada’s population of 30 million live within one 

hundred miles of the U.S.-Canada border. It is most likely that potential threats to 

U.S. security posed by individuals or organizations present in Canada would also 

be located near the border. While manpower on the U.S.-Canada border has significantly increased since 9/11, the Border Patrol’s ability to detect, respond to, and 

interdict illegal cross-border penetrations there remains limited. Continued testing, 

acquisition, and deployment of sensing and monitoring platforms will be key to the 

Border Patrol’s ability to effectively address the Northern border threat situation. 

Nationally, the Border Patrol is tasked with a very complex, sensitive, and difficult job, which historically has presented immense challenges. We face those challenges every day with vigilance, dedication to service, and integrity as we work to 

strengthen national security and protect America and its citizens. I would like to 

thank both Chairwoman Sanchez, and the Subcommittee, for the opportunity to 

present this testimony today and for your support of CBP and DHS. I would be 

pleased to respond to any questions that you might have at this time. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you for you testimony. 

I now recognize the rear admiral for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID PEKOSKE, REAR ADMIRAL, U.S. COAST 

GUARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Admiral PEKOSKE. Thank you. And good morning, Madam Chairwoman, and Representative Souder, Ranking Member and memVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
11 

bers of the committee. It is a privilege for me to appear before the 

subcommittee as your very first Coast Guard witness. 

It is also a privilege to share this table with Chief Aguilar, one 

of my colleagues at the Department of Homeland Security. I very 

much appreciate the subcommittee’s leadership, and we very much 

value your oversight of our operations. 

In my oral summary, I will briefly describe why the maritime 

border is unique and then, given the nature of the borders that I 

describe, I will discuss our strategy to provide for maritime security. And then, finally, I will describe our plans to increase our capability to achieve the strategy’s objectives. 

The maritime border is quite different than the land border. And 

I would just like to highlight a couple of aspects of the maritime 

border that make it unique and make our border security operations different. 

First off, it is longer than the land border. The chief testified that 

the land border is about 6,000 miles long. The maritime border, if 

you just go in a straight line, is about 12,400 miles long. But if you 

account for all the bays, the inlets, and go around the islands, 

count for Puerto Rico, Guam and Alaska, the maritime border is 

about 95,000 miles long. And so the task is enormous. 

And then when you think about the maritime border, rather than 

thinking of a line in the sand, you really need to think in two dimensions, because the border extends outward from the United 

States. And if you include the United States’ 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, the size of our maritime border is about 3.3 

million square miles. 

And within this border, in addition to its size, it is made additionally complex by the different regimes that are in place as you 

move from the inlet waters of the United States, out into the territorial sea, into the United States contiguous zone, out into the exclusive economic zone, going further off-shore, and then onto the 

high seas. The laws, the regulations, the regimes that operate in 

each one of those is different. 

The other aspects of the maritime border and maritime border 

security operations that make it exceedingly complex are the pure 

logistics and pure communications challenges that occur at sea that 

don’t occur on land. At sea, you can’t pick up a landline telephone 

and talk to somebody reliably. It is all by either satellite or radio 

communications at sea. 

The other aspect of maritime border security is, its very nature 

makes it more expensive. And certainly there is a weather impact, 

a weather factor, not just on our ability to operate at sea, but importantly our ability to surveil and detect targets of interest on the 

water. 

Another important and final distinction I will make between the 

land border and the maritime border is, the land border is essentially shared with two countries, Canada and Mexico. Our maritime border really is shared with all coastal nations. 

Now, our strategy—and I have placed a copy of our brand-new 

‘‘U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security and 

Stewardship’’ at each one of your chairs—our strategy reflects the 

uniqueness of this border. And essentially what our strategy calls 

for, for border security, is a defense in depth. 

12 

We want to not make the ports our last line of defense; we want 

to be able to move our security operations as far off shore as we 

can to be able to handle all security issues at sea. Our strategic priorities are awareness, regimes, partnerships, and unity of effort. 

And I would like to take this opportunity to highlight our partnerships with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which I consider to be at an all-time high and truly outstanding. 

The commissioner of customs and the commandant of the Coast 

Guard have commissioned workgroups that regularly meet and 

look at issues like joint boardings, joint operation centers. One of 

the issues that was raised in opening statements was joint professional exchanges, so that our people are familiar with each other 

and we adopt standard procedures as we have worked together, 

and, importantly, common platforms. 

The final topic that I would like to highlight in my opening statement is our capability to be able to implement the strategy. We 

have a project, the biggest project in the history of the Coast 

Guard, called the Deepwater project. When this project is done, it 

will be a $24 billion over the course of 25 years. 

That means that this project won’t be complete until the year 

2030. But when it is complete, we will have doubled the number 

of maritime patrol aircraft in the Coast Guard inventory, and will 

have doubled the number of patrol boats that patrol in our coastal 

regions. 

And I would just like to highlight one aspect. It just happened 

last week, last Thursday, to illustrate to you the importance of getting on with the Deepwater project. We just decommissioned the 

older commissioned Coast Guard cutter in service, the Coast Guard 

Cutter Storis, 65 years old. It was first commissioned in 1942. So, 

clearly, we need to move on with this project. 

One other aspect that I would like to briefly highlight is, we have 

worked a proof of concept, along with Customs and Border Protection and the U.S. Attorney’s Office, in the Mona Pass, which is between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. This biometrics 

project allows us to identify through fingerprints individuals that 

we intercept at sea. 

Over the course of this proof of concept, which has been going on 

since November, we have intercepted 500 persons. Of those 500 

people, 22 percent have had some criminal history in their background. And we have importantly achieved, through the cooperation of the U.S. attorney, 16 prosecutions already, where there 

were none last year. And prosecutions are very important to a deterrent effect. 

Madam Chairman, that concludes my oral statement. I think 

that, in my opinion, we are making good progress. Our efforts are 

well-coordinated within the Department of Homeland Security. 

Again, I appreciate your interest and your oversight, and thank 

you very much for the opportunity to testify today. 

I would be happy to answer any questions. 

[The statement of Admiral Pekoske follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RADM DAVID P. PEKOSKE ASSISTANT, COMMMANDANT FOR

OPERATIONS, U. S. COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Introduction 

13 

Good morning Madam Chair, Ranking Member Souder, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the Coast 

Guard’s role in border security. 

When most Americans think of border security, they often think of a line in the 

desert sand along the Southwest border. There has understandably been much emphasis placed on the need to secure this and other U.S. land borders. There have 

also been considerable efforts to secure America’s air borders. The fact that you 

have called the Coast Guard to testify at this hearing is a testament to the priority 

this Subcommittee places on all border security domains — air, land and sea. America’s vast maritime borders and approaches must be protected as part of an effective 

approach to border security efforts. 

Effective Border Security Depends on Cooperative Relationships 

The U.S. maritime border extends as far as 200 miles offshore, protecting our national sovereignty and resources. Inside this border are relatively open ports and 

coastlines that present an attractive avenue for entering illegally, conducting terrorist attacks, trafficking contraband, smuggling aliens or conducted other illicit activities. As the United States improves control over its air and land borders, the nation’s expansive maritime borders could become a less risky alternative for illegally 

bringing people and materials into the country. The key to an effective, layered system of border controls, then, is balance and coverage across the air, land and maritime domains. Just as there are controls for the nation’s airspace and land crossings, there is an essential ‘‘wet’’ component to securing the nation’s borders. 

The thick blue line in figure 1 shows the expanse of our maritime borders. 

A fundamental responsibility of national government is to protect its citizens and 

maintain sovereign control of its land, air and sea borders. In the maritime domain, 

this means exerting and safeguarding sovereignty in the nation’s internal waters, 

ports, waterways and the littorals, as well as protecting vital national interests on 

the high seas. 

The U.S. maritime border, like the land and air borders, is integral to the global 

system of trade. Securing the maritime border is an international activity that requires developing a layered approach to border security—through U.S. waters, onto 

a well governed ocean commons, then seamlessly joining the secure maritime domain of foreign partners. It also requires extensive partnerships that integrate and 

build unity of effort among governments, agencies, and private-sector stakeholders 

around the world. 

Coast Guard’s Relationship with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

Leveraging its longstanding partnerships and unique maritime authorities and capabilities, the Coast Guard and CBP have significantly enhanced nationwide mariVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE

35263-1.eps
14 

time security. Significant challenges remain and much more work needs to be done, 

but we’re focused on the right priorities. 

The Coast Guard and CBP are working closely and collaboratively in areas of 

shared responsibility. Just this past year, ADM Allen and Commissioner Basham 

reported to Secretary Chertoff on a number of cooperative ventures undertaken by 

the two agencies. As a result, numerous Coast Guard/CBP Working Groups were 

formed to address such issues as: • KJoint boardings; • Joint operation centers; • Cooperative development of a Small Vessel Security Strategy; • Container security; • International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code compliance initiatives; 

• Information sharing and professional exchange; and • Maritime recovery. 

In addition, the Coast Guard and CBP currently work together daily through the 

following initiatives: • KIntegrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET)—The Coast Guard, CBP 

and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) are the core U.S. partners, 

and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Canada Border Services Agency 

represent the core Canadian partners. This includes eight maritime IBET regions (one on the west coast, one on the east coast, and six on the Great Lakes) 

where CBP/Office of Border Patrol (OBP) and the Coast Guard conduct joint 

inter-agency operations. The maritime threats in these regions are many, including migrant smuggling vessels, stowaways, absconders, international vessels arriving from high-risk countries, containers arriving from high-risk countries, ferry services (international and domestic), use of busy marinas and harbors by recreational vessel operators and fishermen to conceal illicit activities, 

and the use of remote marine locations along coastlines for illicit purposes. 

Some of the criminal acts prosecuted include human, drug, currency, and weapons smuggling. Drug smuggling continues to be the most prevalent illicit activity in the IBET regions. 

• The Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center and CBP’s National Targeting Center (NTC) have exchanged liaison representatives and 

work closely together to facilitate information exchange on any passenger or 

crew member of interest aboard commercial vessel to enhance and coordinate 

enforcement efforts with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components working at the national level 

• In Fiscal Year 2006, the Coast Guard’s Intelligence Coordination Center 

(ICC) COASTWATCH processed 270,702 Notice of Arrivals (NOAs), an increase of approximately 140 percent from Fiscal Year 2005, and 41.5 million 

crew and passenger records, a ten-fold increase from Fiscal Year 2005. One 

hundred percent (100%) of the crew and passengers onboard foreign and U.S.- 

flagged merchant vessels over 300 gross tons, are checked by the Coast Guard 

against intelligence and law enforcement databases. Cruise ships crews are 

checked by COASTWATCH on law enforcement databases; passengers are 

checked on law enforcement databases by CBP. 

• USCG/CBP/OBP patrol assets are now co-located at Station Bellingham, 

Station Alexandria Bay, Station Washington, DC, Sector New York, Sector 

Miami, Sector Key West, Sector South Padre Island, Sector San Diego and Sector San Juan. CBP/OBP Massena, NY will soon have space for a Coast Guard 

detachment and we have new Joint Operations Center for Puget Sound. 

• CBP/OBP is using an existing USCG contract to purchase the 25’ safe 

boat and 33’ Special Purpose Craft—Law Enforcement, enabling them to 

obtain proven assets, ensures interoperability through use of a common platform while leveraging economies of scale. 

• In Florida, the USCG and CBP have joint standard operating procedures (SOP) for maritime law enforcement (MLE) operations in Counterdrug 

and migrant interdiction. In recent years there has been in illegal migrant 

smuggling across the Caribbean and southern border; USCG/CBP/OBP have 

worked together to adapt tactics, techniques and procedures to more effectively 

execute the illegal migrant smuggling interdiction mission. 

• In Texas and California the USCG turns over illegal migrants from Mexico 

to CBP for repatriation via the expedited removal process. 

• Joint patrols, boardings and inspections are commonplace. Examples can be 

found anywhere both agencies operate. 

• CBP/OBP supports USCG Search and Rescue (SAR) efforts throughout the 

U.S. as needed 

15 

• CBP/Air and Marine Operations (AMO) and the Coast Guard provide the bulk 

of the Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) support for JIATF-South in the Transit 

Zone. 

•Joint design and procurement of proof of concept Manned Covert Surveillance 

Aircraft. 

Finally, in the event that a significant incident occurs the USCG and CBP are 

working extremely close and focused on collaboration on marine transportation system (MTS) recovery, including resumption of commerce. This effort will result in the 

development of protocols and communications mechanisms to ensure rapid resumption of maritime trade and limit negative economic ramifications to the nation following a significant disruption to the MTS. 

Coast Guard’s Role in Securing the Maritime Border 

The Coast Guard’s overarching strategy is to, through a layered security architecture, ‘‘push out our borders.’’ The National Strategy for Maritime Security emphasizes the need to patrol, monitor and exert control over our maritime borders and 

maritime approaches. It goes on to emphasize that at-sea presence reassures U.S. 

citizens, deters adversaries and lawbreakers, provides better mobile surveillance 

coverage, adds to the warning time, allows seizing the initiative to influence events 

at a distance, and facilitates the capability to surprise and engage adversaries well 

before they can cause harm to the United States. Our unambiguous goal is to meet 

threats far offshore in order to avoid hostile persons, vessels or cargoes entering our 

ports or coastal regions. The Coast Guard operates in every maritime layer in anticipation of, or in response to, changing threats, adversary tactics and operational conditions. During the course of routine operations, as well as specified security missions, Coast Guard cutters and aircraft operate in the offshore waters of the Atlantic 

and Pacific Oceans, and in the Caribbean Sea, to provide Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), command and control and capability to respond to maritime threats. 

In the maritime realm, a goal line defense is no defense at all. This principle is 

exemplified daily as we intercept drug and migrant laden vessels as far away as 

the Galapagos Islands. Last year, Coast Guard units, working with an interagency 

team, intercepted a suspect cargo ship over 900 miles east of Cape Hatteras, NC. 

In this case the threat was determined to be benign, but we demonstrated that our 

ability to push the borders out is an essential element in protecting our homeland. 

Admiral Allen’s has directed the establishment of a Deployable Operations Group 

(DOG) to provide adaptable force packages for a myriad of contingencies, ranging 

from environmental clean up to counterterrorism events. The DOG will provide organized, equipped, and trained deployable, specialized forces (DSF) to Coast Guard, 

DHS and interagency operational and tactical commanders. These forces will deploy 

in support of national requirements as tailored, integrated force packages, throughout the United States and to other high interest areas. Organizing these units into 

a single command maintains a national focus, enhances inherent unit capabilities 

for execution of daily Coast Guard missions and rounds out the nation’s ‘‘tool kit’’ 

for maritime disaster and threat response. Under a unified command structure, 

these units are better positioned to integrate with the Department of Defense 

(DOD), DHS and other Federal entities. The DOG is not an operational commander, 

but rather the sole DSF force provider and force manager for operational commanders. 

Improving Maritime Security—Coast Guard Equipment 

The centerpiece of the Coast Guard’s future capability is the Integrated Deepwater System. This 25-year $24 billion acquisition program reflects post-9/11 mission requirements, Deepwater assets are the first layer in a defense-in-depth strategy to push out our nations borders and intercept threats further from our shores. 

For example, figure 2 shows the current gap in Coast Guard patrol boat hours; 

it is affected most adversely by the difficulties encountered in the 123-foot patrol 

boats conversion program. This project has not provided the bridge to the future 

Fast Response Cutter (FRC) that we had hoped. As a result, we have taken steps 

to advance the design and construction of the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) in order 

to restore this critical capacity as quickly as possible and have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the U.S. Navy for use of three 179-foot patrol 

coastal (WPC) to mitigate this gap in the near term. 

16 

FIGURE 2 

Similarly, figure 3 shows the pre-existing Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) gap. 

The revised Deepwater implementation plan strives to mitigate this gap by keeping 

more legacy HC–130H aircraft in service longer, while concurrently adding new 

HC–144A Maritime Patrol Aircraft (CASA–235’s) to the Coast Guard’s aviation 

fleet. Additionally, the USCG and Customs and Border Protection are working together to fill the gap with a Manned Covert Surveillance Aircraft, currently under 

joint development projected to serve as a surveillance platform in the Caribbean risk 

vectors. 


35263-01.eps
17 

FIGURE 3 

Improving Maritime Security - Coast Guard Technology 

Vessel Tracking: Securing our vast maritime borders requires improved awareness of the people, vessels and cargo approaching and moving throughout U.S. ports, 

coasts and inland waterways. The most pressing challenges we now face involve 

tracking the vast population of vessels operating in and around the approaches to 

the United States, and detecting and intercepting the small vessels used for migrant 

and drug smuggling; such vessels can easily be used by terrorists seeking to do us 

harm. It is against this threat that we need to continually improve, and we are taking significant steps in the right direction. The Coast Guard needs as much information as possible about vessels operating in the maritime domain, particularly their 

location and identity, in order to enable effective and timely decisions and identify 

friend from foe. In support of this requirement, the Coast Guard has: 

• Established the Automatic Identification System (AIS) to provide continuous, 

real-time information on the identity, location, speed and course of vessels in 

ports that are equipped with AIS receivers. AIS is currently operational in several major U.S. ports for vessels greater than 300 gross tons, and the Coast 

Guard’s Nationwide Automatic Identification (NAIS) project will expand AIS capabilities to ports nationwide; and 

• Initiated development of a long-range vessel tracking system to receive information on vessels beyond the scope of the existing and planned AIS system. 

Long-range vessel tracking systems are designed to extend tracking capabilities 

up to 2,000 nautical miles offshore. 

• In partnership with US-VISIT, CBP/OBP and the U.S. Attorney in San Juan, 

the Coast Guard has deployed mobile biometrics collection equipment on our 

cutters operating in the Mona Passage between the Dominican Republic and 

Puerto Rico as a proof of concept. Since implementing this operation in mid-November, we have found that 22 percent (103 of 464) of the interdicted undocumented migrants attempting illegal entry into Puerto Rico, were enrolled in the 

U.S. VISIT database as prior felons, prior violators of U.S. immigration laws or 

other persons of interest. 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Detection and Response: The Coast 

Guard is an active partner and ardent supporter of the Department’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). As part of this cooperative arrangement, we have 


35263-02.eps
18 

initiated and implemented a Joint Acquisition Strategy Plan with the DNDO for the 

development, procurement and deployment of next generation radiation detection 

equipment. This plan includes the development of ‘‘stand-off’’ detection capability 

and the use of transformational technology to counter the ‘‘small vessel’’ threat. 

Similarly, we are working diligently with the Department’s Science & Technology 

Directorate and the Interagency Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) to enhance and expand our capabilities in the detection and interdiction of chemical and/ 

or biological agents, specifically with the WMD threat in mind. We are fully aware 

of the trauma that infiltration of WMD could cause our nation, and remain determined and vigilant in preventing this from ever happening. 

Since 9/11, the Coast Guard is outfitting all of its boarding and inspection teams 

with personal radiation detectors, and we are deploying hand-held isotope detectors 

and other equipment that can be used to identify illicit radiological material and 

Special Nuclear Materials, as well as to transmit critical related information to appropriate agencies for action. We have effectively deployed such equipment throughout the Coast Guard to include: 212 Cutters, 189 Boat Stations, 35 Sectors, 12 Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST), 1 Maritime Security Response Team 

(MSRT), 2 Tactical Law Enforcement Teams (TACLET), and 3 National Strike Force 

(NSF) Teams. This effort encompassing the fielding of over 3,000 gamma/neutron 

radiation pagers; 560 handheld isotope detectors and 140 wide-area search gamma/ 

neutron Backpacks. We have established a resident radiation detection operator 

course at the Maritime Law Enforcement Academy in Charleston, SC, with a 

throughput of 510 students annually. We continue to work closely with the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), CBP, and the Department of Energy (DOE) to respond immediately to any indications of radiation encountered aboard a vessel at 

sea or in port. 

In the area of WMD response, the Coast Guard continues to train for and equip 

its NSF, MSST and MSRT personnel with the capabilities they need to respond to 

all types of WMD incidents. As part of this process, we are developing a ‘‘First Responder’’ capability to address WMD incidents. The purpose of this program is to 

address the time-gap that exists from the onset of an event until the arrival of fully 

mission capable units (e.g., MSSTs, MSRT, NSF). Aspects of this program include 

training; detection equipment; personal protective equipment; and tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

Personnel security and credentialing. The Coast Guard has made a number 

of critical improvements to the security and vetting procedures surrounding the 

issuance of merchant mariner credentials. This effort has been bolstered with funding provided in fiscal year 2006 to restructure the merchant mariner licensing and 

documentation program by centralizing security and vetting functions in a new, enhanced National Maritime Center. Future efforts will focus on: • Working on an accelerated schedule with the Transportation Security Administration to implement the Transportation Worker Identification Credential 

(TWIC). A final rule was published on January 25, 2007, establishing application and enrollment requirements for the credential. TSA and the Coast Guard 

are currently working on a second rulemaking project regarding the technology 

requirements for the card readers pursuant to the SAFE Port Act. A contract 

has been awarded by TSA to Lockheed Martin for TWIC enrollment, which is 

expected to begin soon. 

• Streamlining the credential application process. Simultaneously with the 

TWIC final rule, the Coast Guard published a Supplementary Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposing the consolidation of the four current Coast Guardissued credentials into a single credential called the Merchant Mariner Credential (MMC). This proposed rule works with the TWIC rule, and is intended to 

streamline the application process, speed application review time and lessen 

burdens placed on mariners. 

• Continuing to explore technologies that will allow Coast Guard boarding 

teams to access existing databases and information sources such as US VISIT. 

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR): C4ISR systems and operational concepts 

must be re-oriented and integrated with current and emerging sensor capabilities 

and applicable procedures. Similar to the nation’s air space security regime, the 

maritime security regime must integrate existing C4ISR systems with new technologies and national command and control systems and processes. For example: 

• The Common Operating Picture (COP) and corresponding Command Intelligence Picture (CIP) must continue to grow and expand to federal, state, and 

local agencies with maritime interests and responsibilities. The COP provides 

a shared display of friendly, enemy/suspect and neutral tracks on a map with 

applicable geographically referenced overlays and data enhancements. The COP 

19 

is also a central element of the Deepwater solution, tying Deepwater assets and 

operational commanders together with dynamic, real-time maritime domain information. This link is essential to ensure effective command and control of all 

available Coast Guard assets responding to a myriad of border security threats. 

• Our ability to coordinate responses and provide the correct response to the 

myriad of maritime and border threats has improved greatly. The Coast Guard 

was instrumental in drafting the Maritime Operational Threat Response plan 

(MOTR) for use by all government agencies charged with responding to threats 

within the maritime regions. The plan was signed by the President and ensures 

threat response is fully coordinated both inside DHS and outside with our partner agencies such as Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of State 

(DOS). We use the MOTR coordination process on a daily basis to prosecute illegal migration and drug smuggling cases, as well as the resolution of radiation 

alarms and response to intelligence reports of suspicious people. It has proven 

to be a model process to coordinate U.S. government response across all agencies 

• An expansive and interoperable communications network is critical for maritime security operations and safety of life at sea. In the coastal environment, 

the Coast Guard’s Rescue 21 system will provide the United States with an advanced maritime distress and response communications system that bridges 

interoperability gaps, saves lives and improves maritime security. 

• Hurricanes Katrina and Rita demonstrated the need for robust and resilient 

port and coastal command and control. Through test-beds at command centers 

in Miami, FL, Charleston, SC and elsewhere; and joint harbor operations centers established with the U.S Navy in Hampton Roads, VA, and San Diego, CA; 

the power of partnership, technology and co-location has been proven. The Coast 

Guard will continue working to expand on these successes and export them to 

other ports nationwide. 

Conclusion 

Madam Chair, we are proud of the great strides we have made to enhance maritime security. I credit the innovation, resourcefulness and devoted service of the 

American people for much of our progress to date. The United States Coast Guard 

has a clear strategy with well understood goals and we continue to refine our tactics, techniques and procedures to attain those goals. We are actively pursing acquisition strategies that will deliver more capable and reliable operational assets and 

systems to the men and women of the Coast Guard. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I thank both witnesses. 

And I will remind each member that he or she will have 5 minutes to question the panel. And with that, I will recognize myself 

for the questions I have. 

Admiral about a year ago, I was in Miami, and I had the opportunity on a recreational boat with friends, and they were telling me 

that, if they would go off—I think it was to Bermuda for the weekend, and come back in, what they are technically supposed to do 

when they come back to Miami is motor up—now, they are one of 

these people that has one of those little slips on some condo right 

on the coast in Miami, that they would motor up one of the rivers 

and go to a certain point, maybe about a mile or two miles up, get 

out, make a phone call, talk to officials they said would be at the 

airport, the Miami Airport, tell them they had come back in, and 

that then they were requested to photocopy their passports and 

send that by mail, you know, the next Monday or what have you. 

They said, however, nobody does it. I mean, the reality is, people 

go out, and they come back, and they go straight to their slips. And 

they don’t motor up the riverway. They don’t make the phone call. 

They don’t go back into the office on Monday morning with all their 

passports, and photocopy them, and send them off to the people at 

the airport. 

20 

And they said, you know, you can just as easily go to Bermuda, 

and pick somebody up there, and bring them in, and nobody will 

ever know. So my question to you is: Is that true? Is that the way 

it works? And is that happening in other areas? 

I mean, if somebody gets into Catalina, do they have a free ride 

into California because that is just, you know, 16 miles away from 

where I live? And what kind of resources do you need? Or what do 

you envision you need to do in order to get this under control? Because it seems to me like that is a big hole in our border. 

Admiral PEKOSKE. Yes, Madam Chairman. You have identified a 

very significant issue for us. If you look at the global maritime security regimes in place right now, the only vessels that are required to give us advanced notice of arrival before they come into 

the United States are those that are 300 gross tons and larger, basically our largest commercial ships calling in our ports. 

We recognize that the vast number of smaller vessels, recreational vessels, small passenger vessels, fishing vessels, that operate in our ports, that operate internationally, as you described, 

that operate in our fishing grounds just off our country, do not 

have the same reporting requirements. 

We are looking very carefully at that issue. In fact, we plan to 

hold a seminar in June to discuss what the various interest groups, 

from the fishermen, to the recreational boaters, to the organizations that represent their interests. What we might do, to be able 

to provide a greater degree of awareness of those vessels, move 

right now—and I mentioned in my opening statement that one of 

our strategic priorities is to improve our awareness. 

We do not have the level of awareness that we desire for all the 

vessels that operate in the maritime arena. We clearly need to do 

that. So you have identified an issue that we are working very 

hard on, and I think you will see more on that over the course of 

the next several months. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Now, these friends of mine also said that there is 

a Coast Guard patrol boat, about one, in the port during the weekend, where there are many, many vessels, you can imagine. It was 

pretty interesting. And they said you may, you know, once in a 

while get stopped, but it is incredibly rare, and that is why they 

thought anybody could really get into our country this way. 

What is the process for handling people trying to enter the country illegally when they are picked up by the Coast Guard? 

Admiral PEKOSKE. When they are picked up by the Coast Guard, 

Madam Chairman, we pick up. As I mentioned in our project with 

biometrics in the Mona Pass, if we have the capability—and we 

will, over the course of time, be able to move this biometric project 

to other parts of the country—we identify them, and then we work 

closely with our counterparts in Customs and Border Protection, 

the Border Patrol, citizenship and immigration services, to come to 

a mutual agreement as to what the disposition of those persons 

would be. 

One of the other issues that you highlighted—I mentioned that 

we need to improve our awareness. What is also very important for 

us is to improve and increase our presence on the water. The Coast 

Guard, as you know, has a very limited number of vessels on the 

water. Those vessels are awareness platforms in and of themselves, 

21 

but they are also presence platforms that deter illegal behavior, 

and certainly response platforms, when you do detect it, to be able 

to prosecute it. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So in Miami, if you boarded a recreational boat, 

and you found people whose documents didn’t coincide with being 

into the country, you would land, where—you would take them, 

what, to the airport, would be the nearest place to take them to 

somebody to take them in custody? Or do you have a place there? 

Or what is the process there? 

Admiral PEKOSKE. Ma’am, the process is that we deal with it on 

a case-by-case basis. It depends on where we interdict the individuals and then what, either Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

customs and border patrol, or the Border Patrol want to do with 

those individuals. And what we do is we coordinate with them over 

the radio, make those arrangements before we come into port. 

Oftentimes, we will come right into our base in Miami Beach. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you very much. And I see my time is up. 

And I now recognize the ranking member from Indiana for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. SOUDER. I thank the chairwoman. 

I want to make a brief comment for the Coast Guard. I know we 

will be following this up as we go into future hearings, because, as 

we have success in the land border, presumably more of this is 

going to move to the water. In narcotics, the Bahamas, the upper 

gulf, where we have historically not focused very much. British Columbia has become a narco-province. If we could control the north 

border there, it is going to move into the San Juan. 

On terrorism, if indeed, we do increasingly, and we have had tremendous improvement on OTMs, its greatest potential is through 

the north border. And that means Saint Lawrence River. It means 

the Lake Huron islands, where you can literally swim for 2 minutes and be from one island to the other. 

And the challenges of the Coast Guard are to ramp up, because, 

as we focus on southwest border, the question is: Are you ramping 

up to prepare for the movement? So we don’t go, ‘‘Oh, what happened over here?’’ And we don’t do a balloon effect, moving it to 

water, and the north border is going to become vulnerable as we 

do the south border. 

You can’t put all of your eggs in any one place. Just like fixing 

eastern Arizona is good, but it isn’t the only—not that it is fixed 

yet, but making progress in eastern Arizona moves it along the border. That has been one of my concerns with the Boeing project, is 

that you have a ‘‘A.’’ But while you are doing ‘‘A,’’ you are doing 

‘‘B,’’ and you are preparing for ‘‘C,’’ because overall we need a holistic strategy. 

So I presume that pressure is going to get even greater on the 

water, which is why we have a little bit of lead time to work 

through Deepwater, but it is absolutely essential—not to mention 

the whole eastern Pacific question. 

But I wanted to get to Chief Aguilar, if I could, for a couple of 

questions. 

First, I remember when you were stringing together your own 

portable cameras, putting together in the Tucson sector, wich BoeVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
22 

ing is getting lots of millions to do. You were a very innovative 

leader early on in trying to figure out how to do this. 

But part of my concern, as I mentioned in my opening statement, 

about this escalating level of violence and what your response is 

going to be, and I feel that right now we have sent a double chilling 

message. One is, to our own Border Patrol agents, they are afraid 

of being prosecuted, what actions they can take. We have more or 

less told the other side that they can only shoot when fired upon 

and that our Guard isn’t armed. 

How do you propose to deal with this? And what message can we 

send to our agents? Let me ask a particular thing in the case of 

the two agents that are imprisoned. Had that been chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, and this person was trying to flee the 

border, and his capture may have taken down a whole cell that was 

going to blow up thousands of people, were they prohibited from 

shooting unless fired upon? 

Chief AGUILAR. The men in which you pose a question, Congressman, is kind of difficult to answer, and for the following reason. 

Our officers are not constrained in any matter of firing upon an individual when that individual is posing a threat to the officer or 

an innocent third party. 

Mr. SOUDER. What about to the nation? 

Chief AGUILAR. Absolutely. Absolutely. Had we known that that 

was a WMD in that van, then the actions of those officers should 

have been and would have been, I assure you, very different. 

In the case of these officers, they did not know what was in the 

van. They had made a stop with an individual. The individual was 

running. 

Mr. SOUDER. Presumably he is not bringing a van over and running because he is innocent. The question here is, if you know 

there is nothing—in other words, if one individual is walking 

across and doesn’t appear to have anything on them, which even 

itself is an assumption—why does the assumption go to the person 

who has committed a violation of the law? 

I am not proposing shoot to kill, by the way. I am proposing disable so they can’t escape, which is a normal law enforcement technique that you would use in domestic situations. 

Chief AGUILAR. Well, Congressman, I hope I understood your 

question correctly. But if I did, I do not know of any one law enforcement agency that would shoot to disable in the situation such 

as what these officers faced. We make all attempts to apprehend, 

given the situation that we are facing. Our officers are very familiar with the policy. 

If there is a threat against the officers, an innocent third party, 

or, as you stated, against the nation, absolutely, they are authorized to take deadly force. An escalation of force is what our officers 

encounter everyday. Our people, day in and day out, perform a 

very, very dangerous job, a very volatile job, and a job that demands split-second decisions. 

One of the things I looked at, Congressman—for example, I received the invitation to come to this hearing on February the 7th. 

Since February the 7th, there have been 12 assaults on our officers. 

There has been a very serious shooting against our officers, and we 

23 

have apprehended over 34,488 pounds of marijuana. That is just 

since I received the invitation. 

In all of those, the potential for violence was there. In none of 

those instances were our officers in any way constrained to take 

deadly force had the need been identified by those officers. This is 

the border, volatile, dangerous. 

Our people are trained; our people are equipped. And they had 

the intermediary weapons to do what they needed to do before they 

take deadly force actions, if, in fact, that is the determination made 

by the officer at the point that the incident is occurring. 

Mr. SOUDER. The problem is the uncertainty. 

Chief AGUILAR. I am sorry? 

Mr. SOUDER. The problem is the uncertainty, what you don’t— 

Chief AGUILAR. Absolutely, yes, sir. And unfortunately, that is a 

part of our job. That is a part of our job. 

Congressman if you don’t mind, I will just address one other 

thing, because I think it is very important that you brought up, 

and that is the morale of the agents, the impacts on the agents. 

I travel our border quite a bit, because I am very interested in 

what our officers are feeling, what they are reading, what they are 

seeing from the media, from the American public. 

I can assure that the agency population understands the situation that we are facing as an organization with these two officers. 

Criminal actions were identified by a jury. Prosecutorial actions 

were taken by our United States attorney. And our officers on the 

line understand this. They do not feel constrained. They do not feel 

as if they will be prosecuted for taking the appropriate action. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I will now recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I appreciate the testimony of our two witnesses. 

Chief, can you tell me if we now have the capacity to bring the 

6,000 agents online within 2 years? 

Chief AGUILAR. Yes, sir. I feel certain about that. We have a very 

professional staff that is actually recruiting, hiring, and in the 

process of training the 6,000 net new agents that we will bring on 

board by the end of calendar year 2008. Of course, they will be 

hired over that 2 1/4-year period. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Now, is that the stack and level that you feel you 

need? Or do you feel that we need more than 6,000 agents? 

Chief AGUILAR. At the present time, Congressman, the target 

level we are shooting for is 18,319. We feel that that is appropriate 

because of the technology and the infrastructure that we are getting as a part of SBInet. That force multiplication effect of technology and infrastructure is such that we feel that 18,319—we 

have got an exact figure? 

Mr. THOMPSON. So, excuse me, would the 6,000 bring you up to 

18,000? 

Chief AGUILAR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Okay. 

Chief AGUILAR. Yes, sir. We will be at 18,000 by the end of calendar year 2008. That, in combination with the technology and infrastructure, should suffice. 

24 

Mr. THOMPSON. All right. Two things, then. Can you provide the 

committee with your timetable for bringing those 6,000 people on 

board? 

Chief AGUILAR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Can you also provide us with how much it will 

cost us to train each agent, each of those 6,000 people? There has 

been some discussion in the past about how much the training actually costs. 

Chief AGUILAR. We can provide you with that, yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. And if you can break it out, not the lump sum, 

but the sum total. 

Chief AGUILAR. I understand. Yes, sir, we will provide you with 

it. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Admiral I mentioned our National Security Cutter. What should 

the Coast Guard have done differently to prevent that situation 

from occurring? And if something we didn’t do, have we instituted 

a plan that would not let it occur again? I hope you understand 

where I am going. 

Admiral PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. And we are focused on ensuring that 

this never happens again. In fact, the commandant has a blueprint 

for acquisition reform that we hope and we are convinced will ensure that these problems will not reoccur in the Deepwater fleet or 

in any other of the major acquisitions that we are doing. 

In looking back, some of the things that perhaps we should have 

done that we didn’t do—and we have since done these things—is, 

one, designate our chief engineer as the technical authority for the 

project. That has since been done. 

I am the sponsor for the Deepwater project; one of my colleagues 

is the technical authority. We meet on a regular basis with the program executive officer. So that high-level interaction is occurring 

on a regular basis, and those conversations are very frank. 

The other thing, sir, that we recognize and we are working very 

hard to address is, we need to improve the size and the professionalism of our acquisition staff. This is a very, very complex acquisition. It was originally conceived as a system of systems approach. 

We think that that idea at the beginning was the right idea, but 

now that we are in the production phase of this project, we need 

to take an approach that looks at the prime vendor that we are 

dealing with to produce those assets and have a better discussion, 

a franker discussion with them, a clear discussion with them. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, I think one of the things that some of us 

are concerned about is that the Coast Guard could not even, in this 

situation, when they identified something that was gone wrong, 

under the procurement, they really didn’t have the authority to 

change it or stop it. And so what you are telling me is, we have 

now put someone in place with the authority to stop construction 

or anything if there is a question from the Coast Guard perspective? 

Admiral PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. When that person raises his or her 

hand and says, ‘‘This is not right,’’ we stop, and we go back and 

reassess. And it goes all the way up to the commandant. So it is 

25 

not resolved at some lower level; it goes up to the boss. And then 

he makes a judgment as to how we should proceed. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Chief, one last thing. You mentioned SBInet— Chief AGUILAR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. —giving you the force multiplier. Can you share 

with the committee how much actual involvement that you have or 

your department have in this procurement? 

Chief AGUILAR. Yes, sir. SBInet is a part of Customs and Border 

Protection. It is actually a component of CBP. It is headed by Mr. 

Greg Giddens, who is a director for purchase for the acquisition 

portion of SBInet and working with Boeing. 

But very importantly, the actual stand-up director before Mr. 

Greg Giddens was my full deputy, Deputy Chief Stevens, who actually stood up this department. We handed off to the professional in 

the area of acquisition. He is now managing. His full deputy is now 

one of my chiefs in the field, so that we give the operational input 

into that very important acquisition project. 

The program management office, which is a subset component of 

the overall SBInet, also has one of my Border Patrol agents, very 

high-ranking division chief within headquarters Border Patrol, as 

a full deputy. So the inclusion of the operators is absolutely essential. 

We have learned. We have learned from the Coast Guard. We 

have learned on the acquisition portion of this. And I feel very confident that the operators will be at the helm, if you will, of this effort. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. And my time is gone, but I look forward to more discussion around SBInet as we go forward, because 

we are just beginning the process, Madam Chairman. And I am 

sure at some point we will kind of zero in on that project specifically, but it is a big project. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I think we specifically have it as an item of this 

subcommittee’s jurisdiction that we want to take a look at. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The chair will now recognize other members for 

questions they may wish to ask the witnesses. And in accordance 

with our committee rules and practice, I will recognize members 

who were present at the start of the hearing, based on seniority on 

the subcommittee, alternating between the majority and the minority. And those members coming in later will be recognized in the 

order of their arrival. 

With that said, I would now like to recognize the gentleman from 

Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I appreciate it 

very much. 

Chief, how far away are we from, as you refer to in your written 

statement, the ambitious goal of gaining effective control of our nation’s borders? 

Chief AGUILAR. SBInet, Congressman, is basically moving forward at a rate that we feel that, by 2012, we will have the southwest border. This does not mean that this will be to the exclusion 

of the northern border, because, of course, we will be working on 

the northern border, also, but that is the objective of SBInet, to get 

us that operational control of the southwest border. 

26 

We will commence on the northern border. I will share with you 

that, on the northern border, SBInet will also be concentrating. 

And the backbone up there, more so than the southern border, will 

be heavy technology, because of the vastness and the remoteness 

of our northern border with Canada. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Is securing the southwest border simply a question of providing increased funding to hire more Border 

Patrol agents? 

Chief AGUILAR. No, sir. What we have always put forth, as operators within the Border Patrol, is that to bring operational control 

to any section of our nation’s borders is a proper mix of technology, 

personnel and infrastructure. Now, personnel is absolutely key, because tactical infrastructure and technology wouldn’t do us any 

good if we couldn’t be responsive to any kind of incursion that occurs. 

It is that proper mix that we need to literally design for every 

piece of that border that we are approaching. Area of operation, for 

example, that proper mix would be very different from what we 

would be doing in California, because of the terrain that we are addressing, the infrastructure that is on the south side. So it is a very 

specific system that we apply, specific to the area of where we are 

focusing on. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. With regard to the Border Patrol agents, what is 

the average salary of the rank-and-file Border Patrol agent? 

Chief AGUILAR. At the journeyman level, our Border Patrol 

agents are GS–11s. Of course, they are GS–11s and earning uncontrollable overtime, administrative and uncontrollable overtime. At 

the present time, we do assign them overtime. 

Congressman I would rather get back to you on the average time. 

Because of those overtime applicabilities, I would rather get you 

and accurate number. So if you don’t mind, I will get that for you. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Sure. Are you having difficulty retaining and recruiting agents? 

Chief AGUILAR. Recruiting is a little bit of a challenge, but we 

are on track to get us to where we need to get for the 6,000 net 

new. That we feel very confident about. Because of the enhanced 

recruiting requirements, we are looking to areas that we have 

never looked at before and conducting our recruitment processes. 

Let me give you an example. We are looking at places such as 

NASCAR. We are looking at places such as a rodeo circuit. We 

have got a chief, for example, on the northern border, Chief Harris 

from Spokane, who is actually a bull-rider. We are using him as 

a means of reaching out to this population, if you will, of individuals that are a sturdy breed that we feel they need to be in order 

to survive on the border out there. 

So, yes, but we are going the extra mile, and we feel confident 

that we can do it and we will do it. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. Two more questions. Do you agree with the 

comments of Secretary Chertoff that he made before our committee 

last Friday, that Border Patrol agents have the necessary authority 

and resources to do their job effectively? 

Chief AGUILAR. Absolutely, yes, sir. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Do you think the average Border Patrol agent 

feels that way, as well? 

27 

Chief AGUILAR. I believe so. Does everybody have the system, if 

you will, of SBInet that Tucson is experiencing right now? No, because that is evolving. We are incrementally adding that. But as 

far as tools such as weaponry, such as vehicles and things of that 

nature, yes, sir. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I appreciate it. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I had a question with respect to your recruitment. 

Chief AGUILAR. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What I find with my law enforcement officers, especially with the war in Iraq, and the recruitment that is going on 

by our military, and the inability for us to graduate from our high 

schools, high school graduates who can actually pass academies 

and the tasks, that there is a lot of lateral movement going on between law enforcement, at least in California, meaning people are 

stealing from each other. 

Do you find that in any case that you are trying to take from 

other law enforcement agencies, which are already impacted? 

Chief AGUILAR. We are not doing it intentionally, but that is, unfortunately, happening, yes. We are recruiting some of—the state, 

municipal and county law enforcement entities are, unfortunately, 

losing their officers to us. 

Now, that also happens in our case, where DEA, FBI, CIA, everybody else is looking at our pool of very well-trained officers that 

they can go to and take into their ranks. ICE, for example, is going 

to grow this coming year. We fully expect that some of our officers 

will go over to the ICE ranks, which is not a bad thing. That is 

actually a good thing. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And are you finding that, in particular, the lateral 

movements that you are seeing are of more seasoned personnel 

coming over? Or are you seeing that you are taking entry-level people? 

I am just asking, because you are growing so fast that, not only 

do you have to worry about coming in from the bottom, but you 

have to worry about what you have got at the management layers 

and the seasoned people in between. 

Chief AGUILAR. You have hit on something that is of very, very 

high interest to me and my executive staff within the Border Patrol, because we have one band of officers, if you will?this is what 

we refer to the band of first-line supervisors, that is absolutely critical to the United States Border Patrol. 

That is the critical link between that agent in the ground that 

finds himself or herself out in the middle of the night, in the middle of nowhere, having to make a decision. And that supervisor is 

the one that is going to give the input and the clarity to how that 

officer conducts his or her job. 

We are finding ourselves promoting people that have been in 

service at a younger rate. When I came into the Border Patrol, if 

you were promoted to first-line supervisor anywhere below 9 years, 

you were considered a riser. Today, we are promoting people with 

3 years, 4 years of service. 

And we are also digging into that band and promoting into the 

upper echelons of the Border Patrol, but we are taking some actions to mitigate that situation. As an example, OMB has given us 

the ability to now bring back rehired annuitants, individuals that 

28 

have retired that we now bring back, not as full officers, but as 

mentors for that band of officers. We are bringing back retired 

trainers or retired Border Patrol agents as trainers to assist us 

with that kind of a situation. 

So it is a challenge. We are looking at it. And we are working 

with a situation, and we feel that we are doing everything that we 

can to mitigate that potential for a situation where our balance of 

supervisors to agents is not enough. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Chief. 

I would like to recognize now the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 

Cuellar, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And to both of you, thank you very much. 

Being from Laredo, being from the border, let me go ahead and 

focus on the fence issue. As you know, the issue of the border fence 

has been a subject of debate, not only in Congress, but in, I think, 

a lot of members’ districts that we have. Let me go ahead and just 

focus on what you said. 

Fencing is necessary if it makes sense, I believe you said something like that. Let me focus on what makes sense. 

Under what circumstances is fencing useful to the Border Patrol 

mission? What are the specific circumstances? 

Chief AGUILAR. Specifically, to the Border Patrol mission, a fence 

becomes very critical in the urban area of operation. The reason for 

that is it serves two purposes. One is a deterrent for those people 

looking to cross into the United States, whether they are illegal immigrants or people trying to bring narcotics into the United States. 

It creates a deterrent situation. 

In addition to that, it also acts as an obstacle, so that people that 

are going to move into our country have to cross that fence. We literally slow them down. It gives us a greater opportunity to make 

the apprehension. 

Very quickly, in an urban environment, Laredo, River Drive 

Mall, for example, I worked it many, many years ago. In the absence of a fence—and we are not saying we need one there—but 

in the absence of a fence, they will cross a river and go up to River 

Drive Mall. They are there literally within minutes. Under 3 minutes, they can go onto River Drive Mall. 

Would a fence make sense there? It may, but one of the things 

that we are looking at is this virtual fence that we are talking 

about, whereas opposed to a physical pedestrian fence, we have 

ground surveillance radar, which is being actually used right now 

in Tucson, Arizona, whereby an officer sitting behind a screen will 

actually be able to identify that an incursion across that river has 

occurred, be able to tag and track that individual as he or she 

moves towards River Drive Mall. 

That kind of fence is the kind of technology we are looking to potentially implement. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Or if you get rid of the carrizo— 

Chief AGUILAR. The carrizo, yes, sir— 

Mr. CUELLAR. And what is the status on that? I know that I 

added some language to the last homeland security bill that we 

had. What is the status? I know there was an issue of what herbicide to use to make sure that we keep the Rio Grande safe, and 

29 

I am in full agreement with that. But my understanding, talking 

to Carlos Marin from International Boundary Commission, that 

you all have reached an agreement. 

Because, I mean, if you get rid of that carrizo—and I know it is— 

you know, you find it some areas of the border, in some areas, but 

I know that, in the Laredo area, for example, if you get rid of that, 

you provide a line of sight that would be tremendous to your men 

and women working there. 

Chief AGUILAR. Absolutely. Yes, sir. And we are very appreciative 

of the fact that you put that into language, because it has now 

given us the ability to take a look at actually taking actions on 

that. Of course, because of the environment and the sensitivities 

associated with it, we need to be very careful. 

Our science and technology branch of DHS is actually looking at 

what is known as a biological agent. It is a little animal that actually eats away this non-indigenous carrizo cane. It is going through 

the study and through the research right now. 

If we can do that, that will be a tremendous solution. In the absence of that, we have moved forth, as we have at the gravel pit 

in Laredo—and, by the way, I know Laredo, because that is where 

I started off my career— 

Mr. CUELLAR. 1978? 

Chief AGUILAR. Yes, sir. And I know that carrizo very well. At 

that gravel pit area, we actually cleared that carrizo out of that 

point there, and it is helped tremendously. 

So we will continue moving in that direction of clearing the 

carrizo cane as much as we can, until we get the solution, such as 

possibly that biological agent that we are referring to. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Going back to your circumstances, urban 

area is one. What is another circumstance that would be good? You 

can just list them. 

Chief AGUILAR. Yes, sir. Well, an urban area is more than likely 

where we are going to apply it. That is where most of our fencing 

is right now. If there is an area where infrastructure is being built 

up on the south side, new ports of entry, things of that nature, 

where there are some areas, especially in Texas, we would look to 

basically build fence around the immediate ports of entry areas. 

There is another more important utility of vehicle barrier to keep 

vehicles from driving. As you know, in Placido, vehicles actually 

drive across the Rio Grande, and they go straight into our highways of egress. They keep them from driving across the Rio Grande 

in very remote areas. 

So fencing is actually going to be a small portion of the 2,000 

miles that is operationally required. Does it add up to 700 miles? 

Potentially could, 370 right now. We know it absolutely makes 

sense, and that is what we are building towards. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Do you have— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Oh, I am sorry. 

Mr. CUELLAR. I have 7 seconds. But could you give me, in the 

last 7 seconds, can you turn in the specific—I still want to know 

the specific circumstances where you think a fence is required. If 

you can just turn that into me and the committee, I would really 

appreciate it. 

30 

Chief AGUILAR. Yes, sir. Definitely. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I will give you more time on the second round. 

How is that? 

We will recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And I also thank the chairman of the full committee for being 

with us today. 

Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member, as well. 

And I thank the two outstanding witnesses who are here. 

If I may, I would like to ask—well, let me start with a comment 

for the admiral. Our records indicate that, on a average day, you 

save 15 lives, assist 114 people in distress, protect $4.9 million in 

property, interdict 26 illegal immigrants at sea, conduct 82 search 

and rescue missions, seize $2.4 million worth of illegal drugs, conduct 23 waterfront facility safety or security inspections, respond to 

11 oil and hazardous chemical spills, and you board 202 vessels. 

I think you should be commended, if that is a typical day for you, 

because I think that is outstanding work. And the record ought to 

reflect that we salute you for this. 

A question for you—and I ask that you not answer right now, but 

at the end of my comments and questions. But the question for you 

will deal with the fleet that you have of 123-foot cutters, 15 percent 

of the cutter fleet, as I understand it, and it is right now drydocked. So I would like for you to, if you would, give a comment 

on what the situation is with those cutters. 

To Chief Aguilar, I compliment you, as well. You have 12,000 

agents, and you are about to double in size at some point, and you 

have a very large border that you are patrolling. 

But I ask, if you would, to shed some additional ocularity on this 

concern, with reference to the agents that are involved in the 

shooting. And my first question to you, sir, is: Is there a policy that 

prohibits you from defending your officers if you believe that they 

are right? 

Chief AGUILAR. That prohibits us? 

Mr. GREEN. You. You. 

Chief AGUILAR. Or the organization— 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, sir. 

Chief AGUILAR. —defending our officers? No, sir. 

Mr. GREEN. And would you defend your officers if you thought 

they were right? 

Chief AGUILAR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GREEN. Were you briefed on this case of the shooting? 

Chief AGUILAR. Of the Compean–Ramos case? 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, sir. Were you briefed? 

Chief AGUILAR. Personally, no. 

Mr. GREEN. Did you receive any information concerning this 

case, such that you can claim that you have some understanding 

of what occurred? 

Chief AGUILAR. Yes, sir. Every time that we have a high-profile 

instance such as this, we receive what are known as significant incident reports. We depend on our chiefs on the ground to actually 

handle and manage those situations. 

31 

Mr. GREEN. And pursuant to your briefing and your understanding, if you had thought the officers were right, would you 

speak up on behalf of the officers? 

Chief AGUILAR. Yes, sir, as we have in the past. 

Mr. GREEN. And in this case, have you made comments with reference to your believing that these two officers were right in doing 

what they did? 

Chief AGUILAR. No, sir, we have not. 

Mr. GREEN. May I assume that, because you have not made comments, that you think that the finding of the court is an appropriate finding? 

Chief AGUILAR. The assumption that can be made, Congressman, 

by yourself and the American public is that I am confident in the 

investigation. I am confident that the investigation that was handled by the Department of Homeland Security inspector general. I 

am confident in the judicial system and the trial that was held and 

the outcome, yes, sir. 

Mr. GREEN. And if you discovered that something improprietous 

took place that changed your opinion, would you then call that to 

our attention? 

Chief AGUILAR. I would call it to the immediate attention of the 

proper authorities in order for a follow-up, yes, sir. 

Mr. GREEN. Have you at any point discovered anything that 

would cause you to report to the proper authorities that your opinion has in some way changed? 

Chief AGUILAR. No, sir. 

Mr. GREEN. Now, with reference to the case itself, were the only 

witnesses to this persons who were not citizens of the United 

States? Or did we have some United States citizens to witness this 

incident? Citizens would include Border Patrol agents. 

Chief AGUILAR. Right. Congressman, let me just say, of course, 

that I was not there, and that is a given. What I can give you is 

my understanding on the case on the readings of the incident that 

I received. 

Mr. GREEN. I would like for you to do that. And then, Admiral, 

I would like for you to answer the question that I posed, and I will 

yield back the balance of time that I have afterwards. Please do. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The gentleman has no time, so as expeditiously as 

you may answer his question. 

Chief AGUILAR. Answer the question? As I understand the situation, and as was discovered in court, the two officers were by themselves. One illegal alien, Mr. Aldrete, the individual that was shot. 

Response to the situation was such that at least three other officers 

found it post-incident. That I know of, there is no other witness at 

the time of the shooting. 

Admiral PEKOSKE. Thank you, sir, for your question on the 123- 

foot patrol boats. As you know, sir, we had eight of those vessels 

home-ported in Key West, Florida. I flew with the commandant 

down to Key West to talk with every single one of those crews, 

when the commandant made the decision to take them out of service. 

The reason he took them out of service was a very simple fact 

that those vessels we didn’t feel could any longer safely operate in 

the very same conditions as the vessels they were trying to interVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
32 

dict. And so we were very concerned that we would have to lower 

their operating parameters to the extent where they would be operationally, totally ineffective. 

They have all been taken out of service. They are all up at our 

yard in Curtis Bay, Maryland, in storage. What we have done to 

bridge that gap in the near term is all the crews are still assigned 

to those cutters. And what we have done with each one of those 

eight crews is we have married them up with another crew on another patrol boat in Florida. 

And so all of these patrol boats are now running dual-crew operations. So we have gotten the full benefit of having all of those people still assigned to those ships still able to serve, using existing 

platforms. That is clearly a temporary measure, because we cannot 

run these cutters at that pace for the long term. 

One of the other things that we did immediately was—we have 

been privileged to have five of the Navy 179-foot Patrol Coastals 

in the Coast Guard inventory for several years. We were due to return those to the Navy in 2008. 

The commandant asked the chief of naval operations if we could 

retain three of those five vessels, and the CNO agreed to that. So 

we have a three-year extension on three of those five vessels, which 

will bring it to 2011. 

Another remediation effort that we have undertaken is, we have 

looked at other vessels we have in the Coast Guard inventory that 

are of larger size, that can perform the same function that these 

patrol boats performed, and we are asking them to perform that 

mission. 

But that has other mission impacts throughout the rest of the 

service, which we don’t want to incur over the long term, because 

it will affect our other mission performance. 

What all of this highlights is?and one of the questions before 

was, how long will it take you to have adequate resources for your 

required border security? The answer from the Coast Guard is, that 

will take us until 2030. And that is why the Deepwater project is 

so very important to us, and that is why we need, inside the Coast 

Guard, to ensure we get this right. 

Thank you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The chair will recognize the gentlewoman from 

California, Ms. Lofgren, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

And let me start by thanking both of you for your service to our 

country. It is a difficult job, and clearly you have made our country 

proud of your service. 

And I hope, also, that you will pass on our thanks to the men 

and women in your service. It is a tough job that they do, and our 

job is oversight. But I think it is important to also remember how 

much we appreciate what they are doing. 

Chief, I know that you needed to summarize within 5 minutes, 

but I wanted to specifically thank you for your written statement, 

and specifically your statement that, to effectively secure the border, we must reform our immigration system, and that we need 

comprehensive immigration reform, in order to make your job more 

viable. 

33 

And I think the Congress is going to take that advice very seriously and try and put that comprehensive reform measure in place, 

while certainly continuing to support your very important efforts at 

the border and the brave work that your men and women do. 

I was interested, Admiral, in your comment about the biometrics 

that you are using. And I am wondering, Chief, is that biometrics 

system available to your agents when you apprehend and return? 

Are you routinely taking the biometric information from everybody 

you apprehend? 

Chief AGUILAR. Yes, ma’am. In fact, I believe it is the exact same 

system that we are procuring, yes. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Very good. 

Chief AGUILAR. Upwards of 95 percent, 96 percent of all the 1.1 

million apprehensions that we make are, in fact, captured biometrically on our— 

Ms. LOFGREN. And that is all 10 fingerprints? 

Chief AGUILAR. Yes, ma’am, now it is. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Very good. Thank you very much. 

I am interested, I am sure, Chief, that you are aware that the 

bipartisan U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 

issued a report just last week, saying that the department is falling 

short in the protection of asylum-seekers under the expedited removal procedures and also expressed concern that asylum-seekers 

are housed with criminals. 

I am wondering—clearly, you have a very difficult task ahead of 

you, but I am wondering if you can share with us what efforts you 

are making to address the issues raised by the commission last 

week, in terms of who makes the decision, what kind of training 

is being provided to your agents so that they can separate the 

scammers from the real asylum-seekers. 

Chief AGUILAR. Yes, ma’am, a very important point. And I would 

like to begin, first of all, by addressing the national report. And I 

read about it in The Washington Post over the weekend, also. 

As we know, some reports are written, and the terminology 

leaves a little bit to be desired. I would like to point out that the 

report that was written and was actually in The Washington Post 

related to ports of entry. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Not to your agency? 

Chief AGUILAR. Not to Border Patrol. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I thank you for that clarification. 

Chief AGUILAR. There are several here. And, in fact, one of the 

footnotes actually says, ‘‘Our file samples were drawn from periods 

prior to August 2004, so this report analyzes only the actions of inspectors, not Border Patrol agents.’’ 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, I will reserve my question for the inspectors 

at the port of entry at a later date then. 

Chief AGUILAR. But we do deal with credible fear, and I would 

just like very briefly to touch on that. Our officers engaged in processing of aliens coming in from countries where they may be a 

credible fear follow a very stringent processing guideline. And they 

are required to go through training. 

At the moment that there is any kind of indication of credible 

fear for political asylum, they are then handed off to experts within 

34 

the asylum program, that then take on that for the rest of the credible fear and asylum process. 

Ms. LOFGREN. One final question before my time expires. In the 

last Congress, we were advised in this committee that there was 

a problem in repatriating illegal entrants to certain countries, for 

example, to China and to others. Can you update us on the status 

of that issue now? 

Chief AGUILAR. Yes, on some of them, because some of them we 

are still working on. For example, China, the Secretary is working 

very aggressively and working with China to get them to accept 

their repatriated citizens back into those countries. 

In other areas, we have been very successful in working with 

South Central American countries that in the past were not very 

efficient in issuing travel documents back into their country. We 

have actually been very successful in that. 

As an average example, I will tell you that we used to return 

OTMs on an average of about 89 days, 86 to 89 days. We have now 

reduced that on the average to about 16 to 19 days from the point 

of apprehension. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, that is very interesting. And I wonder if, 

subsequent to this, if you could just provide me in writing or the 

committee in writing the list of those countries that you consider 

still outstanding, so that we might spend some attention on that 

diplomatic effort. 

And, again, I just want to thank you and the men and women 

for putting your lives on the line and really, from what you are telling us, making significant process in securing the border. And I 

give you much credit, both of you, for that. 

Thank you very much. 

Chief AGUILAR. Thank you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Chief, I would assume that that does not include 

people who have criminal backgrounds that you have stopped, with 

these countries taking them back so quickly. Is that correct? 

Chief AGUILAR. I want to make sure I understand the question 

correctly, ma’am. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. When you apprehend and you are trying to return 

these people to their country, what happens is they have had some 

sort of a criminal background, either in their home country or our 

country? Those are much more difficult to return, I would assume, 

to these countries? 

Chief AGUILAR. They present a bigger challenge than just your 

run-of-the-mill illegal entrant into the United States, yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. 

I now recognize the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, 

for 5 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the distinguished chairwoman, and I 

thank my full committee for this hearing and this subcommittee, 

as well. 

As all of the members have said, let me thank both of you distinguished gentlemen for your service. 

And, Admiral, might I acknowledge again, as we have done over 

and over again, the work of the Coast Guard during Hurricane 

Katrina. 

35 

Though this is not the appropriate place to talk about movies, 

but ‘‘The Guardian’’ captures the intensity of your work. And I 

hope a lot of schoolchildren will see it, because it certainly commends your men and women very well. 

I happen to have had the opportunity to speak at one of the 

Texas A&M graduating classes down in Galveston and met a number of young recruits there. So I thank you. 

Let me, if I might, to Chief Aguilar, just a follow-up on my colleague’s comments—and thank you for what has been an improved 

service at the border. But could you tell me, what are your direct 

needs? 

Noticing that you may be absorbing 6,000 agents, are you going 

to be able to absorb them with equipment, such as power boats, 

and helicopters, and laptops, and night goggles? Do you have 

enough equipment and enough funding for professional training of 

these new agents as they come in? 

CONGRESSWOMAN SHEILA JACKSON LEE, OF TEXAS

STATEMENT BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL

COUNTERTERRORISM

Border Security: Infrastructure, Technology, and the Human Element 

FEBRUARY 13, 2007 

I thank Chairwoman Sanchez for convening this important hearing examining the 

infrastructure, technology, and the human element of our border security. I welcome 

Chief David Aguilar of the U.S. Border Patrol and Rear Admiral David Pekoske of 

the U.S. Coast Guard to this hearing, and I look forward to both of your testimony. 

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the American people became painfully 

aware of the difference between feeling secure and actually being secure. The Committee on Homeland Security was created to ensure that the American people were 

fully protected and safe from terrorist attacks. The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony from Chief Aguilar and Rear Admiral Pekoske on the state of their 

respective agencies’ border security activities and to assess the infrastructure, technology, and personnel requirements necessary to strengthening America’s border security. 

It is of paramount importance for us to convene to discuss the critical issues currently facing our nation’s border security. The U.S. Border Patrol is charged with 

enforcing U.S. immigration law and other federal laws along the border, between 

the ports of entry. Its integral mission is to detect and prevent the entry of terrorists, drug smugglers, other criminals, and unauthorized aliens, along with weapons 

of mass destruction into the country. Despite only slightly more than 12,000 border 

patrol agents, the Border Patrol must guard and protect over 6,000 miles of our 

international land borders with Mexico and Canada. 

President Bush has committed to doubling the size of the Border Patrol during 

his term in office. I welcome this commitment, especially because in previous Congresses I have introduced both bills and amendments calling for similar increases 

in the size of the border patrol. I hope President Bush lives up to his commitment 

to add an addition 6,000 agents over the next two years, and I hope that the Border 

Patrol will be able to recruit, hire, train, and retain a sufficient number of agents 

to meet this goal in a short time. I also look forward to hearing from Chief Aguilar 

how he and the Border Patrol propose to recruit, hire, train, and retain such a high 

number of agents. Currently, it does not appear that the Border Patrol is meeting 

these goals. 

In order for the Border Patrol to succeed, we must work together to create, authorize, and implement the policies and incentives necessary to ensure the effective 

recruitment and retention of Border Patrol agents. I know that much is needed to 

deal effectively with the substantial retention and recruitment issues the Border Patrol faces. 

In addition, we also need to provide the Border Patrol with the equipment and 

resources they need to secure the border. In the last Congress, I introduced H.R. 

4044, the Rapid Response Border Protection Act of 2005, that would provide the 

36 

Border Patrol with the equipment and resources they need. I plan to reintroduce 

this legislation in the 110th Congress. This legislation calls for an additional 15,000 

Border Patrol agents over the next five years and has provisions for equipping them 

with body armor, special weapons, and night vision equipment. H.R. 4044 was 

strongly endorsed by the National Border Patrol Council and the National Homeland Security Council, organizations that represent the front-line employees who enforce our immigration and customs laws. 

In order for our Border Patrol agents to effectively secure our border, we need a 

Border Patrol with enough adequately trained agents to patrol the entire border efficiently with the weapons and other equipment that is necessary for confrontations 

with heavily armed drug smugglers and the other dangerous criminals who cross 

the border illegally. In light of the recent controversial prosecutions of former Border Agents Igancio Ramos and Jose Compean, this hearing and the issue of how effectively our border patrol are trained, equipped, managed, and staffed could not be 

convened at a more important time. Former agents Ramos and Compean are currently serving 11 and 12 year terms respectively in federal prison for shooting an 

unarmed Mexican national who was running drugs across the border near El Paso, 

Texas in February 2005. However, it appears that 3 other agents who participated 

in this incident were not prosecuted, but rather faced administrative penalties resulting in terminations. I would like to hear more from Chief Aguilar regarding this 

case, whether you agree with the way the prosecution was handled, and whether 

you feel like administrative remedies were exhausted. I would also like to hear from 

Chief Aguilar regarding what factors contributed to the occurrence of this incident, 

especially as it relates to the role played by a lack of sufficiently trained personnel 

and mangers on duty. 

I also look forward to hearing more about DHS’ Secure Border Initiative (SBI), 

which is a multi-year plan aimed at securing our borders and reducing illegal immigration by implementing new border security technology such as constructing additional border infrastructure including material and virtual fencing, adding more 

agents to patrol our borders, better securing the ports of entry, ending the ‘‘catch 

and release’’ policy through expedited removal and additional detention space, and 

increasing the enforcement of immigration laws inside the U.S. 

I especially would like to hear about SBInet, which represents the technology and 

infrastructure component of SBI, whose goal is to create a virtual fence along the 

nation’s borders using cameras, sensors, and other equipment. DHS Inspector General Richard Skinner has raised serious concerns with SBInet, including DHS lacking the capacity to properly oversee implementation of the program and granting 

too much discretion to the contractor. Inspector General Skinner has also warned 

that SBInet is a costly program which could reach $8 billion on the southwest border alone, while some have estimated that the entire project could exceed $30 billion. A serious and detailed discussion of SBInet’s cost and implementation is both 

necessary and long overdue. 

I also look forward to hearing from Rear Admiral Pekoske regarding the Coast 

Guard’s mission of protecting the public, the environment, and our maritime economic and security interests, especially at our ports. On behalf of the thousands of 

Katrina evacuees that live in my district of Houston, Texas, I would like to thank 

you Rear Admiral Pekoske and the entire U.S. Coast Guard for their heroism, which 

saved countless innocent lives during the aftermath to Hurricane Katrina. 

The Coast Guard’s 40,150 men and women are entrusted with protecting 95,000 

miles of coastline, 12, 400 miles of our nation’s maritime border, and 3.4 million 

square miles of the Exclusive Economic Zones. Our nation’s maritime border is composed of relatively open ports and coastlines that present an attractive venue for 

illegal entry, potential terrorist attacks, trafficking contraband, and other criminal 

activities. 

I look forward to hearing from Rear Admiral Pekoske regarding the implementation and enforcement of two key pieces of legislation passed by this Committee to 

improve the security of our nation’s maritime border—namely, the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, which requires all vessels, facilities, and 

ports within the U.S. to complete security plans, and the SAFE Port Act, which was 

signed into law last year. I would also like to hear from you regarding the feasibility 

and efficacy of 100% scanning of contents bound for U.S. borders, which was not 

a provision of the SAFE Port Act, but which nonetheless is an important step in 

better securing our ports. 

I would also like to hear from Rear Admiral Pekoske regarding the DHS Inspector 

General’s recently released report regarding the Coast Guard’s Legend-class National Security Cutter (NSC). The NSC, which is the largest and most technically 

advanced class of the Deepwater Program’s three classes of cutters, was designed 

to be the flagship of the U.S. Coast Guard’s fleet, capable of executing the most 

37 

challenging maritime security missions. However, the Inspector General’s audit determined that the NSC, as designed and constructed, would not meet the performance specifications described in the original Deepwater contract. Moreover, the Inspector General report found that the NSC’s design and performance deficiencies are 

the result of the Coast Guard’s failure to exercise technical oversight over the design 

and construction of its Deepwater assets, which for National Security Cutters 1 and 

2 has gone over $250 million over budget. Rear Admiral Pekoske, I eagerly look forward to further elucidation on this critical matter. 

I again thank both of our witnesses for their testimony and eagerly look forward 

to further discussion of today’s issues. I thank you Madam Chairwoman, and I yield 

back the balance of my time. 

Chief AGUILAR. Let me take that piece by piece. 

As far as the equipping of the agents, I feel very confident that 

we—Congress gives us what we refer to as a modular cost. So everything from uniforms, to weaponry, a bullet-proof vest, vehicles, 

things of that nature, I feel very confident that that will continue 

at the rate that it has in the past. 

And, in fact, it has been improving. So, from that aspect, absolutely I feel confident that we will get the equipment that we need. 

As far as aircraft are concerned, my colleague, General 

Kostelnik, who heads up the air and marine portion of CBP, is also 

working very diligently. As we speak, there is a procurement ongoing—additional procurement of UAVs, for example. We will have 

four by the end of this calendar year. An additional two will be 

coming by 2008. 

Additional platforms, such as AS350s, helicopters that are of absolute essence to us on the southwest border and on the coastal 

borders, also. Black Hawks that we will utilize over water and on 

the northern border are also being looked at for procurement purposes. 

I will state—and I am not the expert here, but my colleague, 

General Kostelnik, one of his concerns is, is the production timeline 

to actually procure these and get them on the ground, if you will. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. If I might, because my time is short, I have 

got the sense of it. Are you a supporter of the fence? Or do you believe that we can secure the border with increased personnel and 

technology? 

Chief AGUILAR. There are going to have— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. A 700-mile fence, can you just say yes or no? 

Chief AGUILAR. Seven-hundred-mile fence? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes. 

Chief AGUILAR. We are building towards that. Three hundred 

and seventy, absolutely. Seven hundred, will we get to that? It all 

depends on the technology— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you support a 700-mile fence? 

Chief AGUILAR. I support a 370-mile fence. And as we progress 

to 700—I don’t necessarily think we will get to that. But if we need 

to get to that, we have got the— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me pose the question, also. I don’t believe 

that we have all the facts, even with a judicial decision, on the two 

Border Patrol agents. One of the problems I understand is that the 

shooter of a weapon does not fill out paperwork. It is the manager 

that fills out paperwork. 

But the real question is, are there administrative procedures in 

place, one, for grievance of the Border Patrol agents? Do they have 

a union? Is there a grievance procedure? Is there procedure where 

38 

the employees could have been reprimanded by administrative procedure, as opposed to putting them in a judicial process? 

I think we are not having all the facts, members don’t have all 

the facts. But I would argue that the actions were excessive, not 

questioning the DHS investigation. We had the inspector general 

here. But I do believe that there are questions that undermine the 

morale of the Border Patrol agents. 

And my question to you, is that not true? 

Chief AGUILAR. Your questions were a grievance procedure? Yes. 

Union, yes. Is this situation undermining morale? I answered part 

of the question a few minutes ago. I don’t believe so. I think there 

is a clear understanding of the Border Patrol agent population in 

the field of what is available to them. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You would not be opposed to an expanded investigation? 

Chief AGUILAR. No. No, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The gentlewoman’s time has expired. 

We have some votes coming up on the floor, supposedly beginning about 11:30. I would like to try to get another round of questioning in, but maybe we can hold it down to 3 minutes per person, 

and that way, if anybody has some leftover questions they have, we 

can do that, if that would be okay with the ranking member. 

So I have a question, back to Admiral. In terms of increasing the 

Coast Guard’s maritime awareness, does the Coast Guard have the 

capacity, either internally or working with the private sector, to 

implement right now a voluntary, long-range vessel tracking program, in order to meet the requirements set by Congress in the 

SAFE Port Act? 

And in particular, what is the Coast Guard doing to meet upcoming International Maritime Organization requirements on longrange vessel tracking? And will the Coast Guard consider using existing vessel-tracking systems to meet requirements set by Congress and the International Maritime Organization? 

Admiral PEKOSKE. Yes, ma’am. I will take the last question first. 

We will consider using existing programs and will meet the 1 April 

deadline set by Congress in the SAFE Port Act in that regard. 

As you know, there is an international agreement for long-range 

tracking that comes into force the 1st of January, 2008, and then 

everybody has to be in full compliance by December 2008. We anticipate that we will be able to fully participate in that process 

internationally, as well, and are working very hard in that endeavor. 

It is critical important. Long-range tracking is very, very important to awareness to us. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Great. And I would yield back the remainder of my 

time, and I will my ranking member from Indiana ask his questions. 

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. I am going to—submit some additional 

questions for the record. Some here I have wrote out that I would 

like to put on the record and make sure we get answers. 

On the OTMs, which I believe, Mr. Aguilar, you said were over 

100,000, how many of those were from countries of interest? I know 

39 

at San Ysidro at one point we had, in one month hundreds that 

were OTMs. 

Then there were, I think, 38 from countries of interest and a 

number of those on the watch list, so we get an idea of how much 

that is varying. And, also, if we could have that for the north border. 

Two is, I talked to the distinguished ambassador from Mexico. 

And I believe President Calderon is committed to the border. I 

don’t believe they have control of Nueva Laredo or other areas. 

But what I would like to know is: Has the bulldozer been removed from across from Neely’s Crossing? Because one of the assumptions that you stated in your testimony was is that the Mexican government would be responsible and work with us on trying 

to control the opposite side. 

One test here is, is in the area across from the Marfa sector 

where the cartels control it. It is not even clear the Mexican government can enter that zone. And they have a bulldozer that 

knocks down everything we do. 

One test of this is, is that bulldozer gone? And that is my question. I have been raising the question now for roughly eight 

months, and I would like to know if the bulldozer is gone. 

Three, whether you said, in 2012, you believed that the southwest border would be secure, at least between the ports of entry— 

obviously, visa-jumpers is a whole another question that you 

wouldn’t have any control over—did that presume a compromise 

immigration bill? 

And, if so, what kind of compromise immigration bill? Was that 

part of your assumption, that we were going to be able to control 

the southwest border? 

Maybe you could give me a yes or no on that, because you don’t 

need to answer it if it is no. Did you assume an immigration bill 

in saying that you would control the southwest border? 

Chief AGUILAR. No. With the proper technology, infrastructure 

and personnel. 

Mr. SOUDER. Okay. Then you don’t need to answer that question. 

Chief AGUILAR. I will just clarify that they are going to get hit 

hard. 

Mr. SOUDER. In other words, it will move? 

Chief AGUILAR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SOUDER. A third question, then. You stated that real fencing, 

as opposed to virtual fencing, at least other than vehicle barriers, 

was not needed in the rural areas, that it would be concentrated 

in the urban areas. You also granted that real fencing slows people 

down. 

Clearly, east of San Ysidro, we have lots of fencing in semi-rural 

areas, as well. Why wouldn’t fencing almost be as critical in rural 

areas, where our agents are more sparsely distributed, to buy time? 

I mean, it isn’t like it takes a lot of time to go over, and you certainly need something strong enough to do vehicle barriers. I am 

a big supporter of vehicle barriers, like in New Mexico. 

But part of the challenge here is, how do you, in these areas, buy 

enough time for agents to get there, particularly if they are trying 

to load contraband over the top? At the very least, you force them 

40 

to cut fences, which becomes another challenge. And I would like 

some additional comment on that. 

Then lastly, on the case—and I just want to make these comments and you have stated again today, that the only people who 

actually saw the shooting included a drug smuggler and our 

agents. And T.J. Bonner, who represents the union, believes that, 

in effect, the word of a drug smuggler was taken, as opposed to our 

agents, which admittedly were contradictory at times. 

And I understand the difficulty. And the question comes, why 

were they? What were they afraid of? Why did they become—and 

that is what the union is asking. That is what the American people 

are asking. It is anybody who looks at the case realizes there was 

contradictory evidence. The question is, why? 

And why would the presumption have gone to the drug dealer? 

We don’t know whether he had a gun. He fled. So there is a dispute 

on even whether he was armed or whether he was pulling a gun. 

It is not provable, because he got away. 

Furthermore, as anybody who has looked the case knows, there 

was certain evidence excluded from the case, which is debatable 

whether it would have impacted the case, but certainly will come 

up in any retrial. 

Another question is—one of these agents has apparently been 

beaten up. The question is, do we have a bail process for federal 

law enforcement officers that enables them to not have to go to 

prison while a case is still being appealed? Because they become 

sitting targets. 

And I would also like to put in the record that this isn’t the only 

case that this has happened, and that is why some of us are worried about the chilling effect. There have been other cases, and we 

will put that in, both with you and other law enforcement officials. 

And this is a very troubling process. As the violence escalates I 

am worried that we are going to have a repeat of San Diego, after 

what we saw in these covered-head guys beating up other smugglers. It wasn’t even our agents that were necessarily in the middle 

of this. 

But the violence along the border is escalating, and we have to 

know what the ground rules are for our guys, in uncertain circumstances, whether somebody has got a gun, not a gun. Are they 

pulling it? Where are they going? What do they have? It is a very, 

very difficult process, and it is one we will continue to discuss. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Chief, if you will submit those in writing. 

Chief AGUILAR. I will be glad to, yes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

And I would like to now recognize Mr. Green from Texas. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you again, Madam Chair. 

For you, please, Chief, and for the admiral, as well, we know of 

the 9/11 hijackers, and we know of the millennium bomber. 

Are there other circumstances that we are not aware of that you 

can discuss with us, with reference to persons who were actually 

trying to enter the country for terroristic purposes, especially as it 

relates to the southern border? Have we had any encroachments 

that you can share with us? 

Chief AGUILAR. On the southern border, there have been arrests—one that I can speak to, because it was in the media, in 

41 

McAllen, Texas, by Border Patrol agents, of an individual, a female, that crossed into the United States, across the Rio Grande 

River, with a nexus to an incident—not to 9/11—but an incident in 

one of our embassies foreign. 

I can submit to the committee other instances of encounters of 

potential. Anything of substance that I can give you today? No. 

Mr. GREEN. I would await your response. 

Admiral? 

Admiral PEKOSKE. Mr. Green, we have had encounters with individuals that were of interest to us from an intelligence perspective 

and from a law enforcement, criminal history perspective. And 

these individuals are on vessels, they are on recreational vessels, 

on board fishing vessels, and also on board large commercial vessels that we could become aware when they are 2,000 miles offshore. 

And that is why that reach for us into the high seas, literally 

hundreds of miles, 900 miles offshore, is important. 

I would just highlight for you, sir, the importance of biometrics 

in this regard. You get a positive identity on an individual—oftentimes, people we encounter are not able or refuse to identify themselves, and we have no way to figure out who they are at times. 

This biometric project has proven to be incredibly useful to us. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. 

I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I have one last question for you gentlemen. Last 

week, we were informed by the department that the apprehension 

numbers for 2006 were 98,000 people on the southern border and 

2,800 people on the northern border. How many people were apprehended at maritime borders in 2006? 

Admiral PEKOSKE. Madam Chairman, I would like to get that answer for you on the record. I don’t have it off the top of my head. 

In fiscal year 2006, 7,886 migrants were interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coast 

Guard. 

But I would note, to follow up on a comment Mr. Souder made 

earlier, is that, as you squeeze in one area of operations, you see 

that balloon effect. The people either take the sea or take a different land route. We are watching that very closely with the 

counter-drug movements in both the eastern Pacific and the Caribbean. 

One other aspect, with respect to the northern border, is the 

work we are doing right now with the Canada government. We 

have in place, along with Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Border Patrol, integrated 

border enforcement teams, where we work together to enforce our 

border with the Canadian government. 

And, also, we are working very hard with the Canadians to 

achieve a shiprider agreement, wherein Coast Guard officers could 

be aboard Canadian ships underway in the Great Lakes, and Canadian officers, RCMP officers, aboard our vessels, so that we can 

jointly enforce our security requirements. So these are— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are you sharing intelligence with what is going on, 

on the northern border, and these teams that are working together, 

between the Canadians and our people? 

42 

And the reason I asked is because there was a big uproar?I don’t 

know, maybe about six or eight months ago?with the sharing of intelligence or the supposed sharing of intelligence on the southern 

border with the Mexican government officials, or the federales, or 

whoever it is that is handling it from that end. 

Do we do that on the northern border with the Canadians? 

Admiral PEKOSKE. We do share intelligence information with the 

Canadians. And part of what we found in our discussions with 

them is that it is not so much the policies, necessarily, that inhibit 

that, but sometimes it is the mere practice of how we do things. 

For example, some of the default settings on classified traffic 

automatically add the label to the classification that prohibits sharing with foreign entities. What we have done inside the Coast 

Guard is asked our people to make sure that we don’t automatically hit those default settings, because to undo it is very, very difficult and takes?it takes longer than the information is actionable. 

So we are working very hard on that. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And, Chief, I have one last question. The number 

of apprehensions on the northern border for 2006, 2,800, do you 

think that is really reflective of what is going on there? Or is it because we have less resources, really, stationed? 

I mean, we did a hearing, I think, on immigration and border in 

Seattle, back in August. And your Border Patrol people who were 

there talking to us said, you know, they get very little coverage up 

there, and they have very little assets, and they really need more 

help on the northern border. It was pretty apparent. 

Do you think that one of the reasons why we are not getting so 

many is that there might be a lot slipping through? Because, you 

know, that is such a big border, much more than the southern border, and yet we have so little assets. 

Chief AGUILAR. It is a vast and very rural border out there. But 

as the admiral spoke, we have worked very closely with our—and 

it is a different environment on the Canadian border—I am proud 

to say, is that we worked very closely with our Canadian neighbors. 

We share information, especially tactical information. We also 

have the IBETs. We have 15 across the northern border that we 

work with the Canadian partners. We work very closely up there 

as a force multiplier, with state, local and tribal entities on both 

sides of the border. 

The Border Patrol, for example, has what we refer to as BSET 

teams, border security enforcement teams, where even though the 

small nature of our Border Patrol stations are such that we can’t 

deploy along the entire border, but what we do is we make intelligence runs with the communities on both sides of the border to 

check with them on an ongoing basis what it is that they are seeing. 

Are they seeing activity? Are they sensing anything that is different in those areas? Things of this nature that we are working 

very closely with. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Great. Well, that would be the end of my questions. 

I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony before us 

today and the members, of course, for their questions. The members of this subcommittee may have additional questions for the 

43 

witnesses, and we will ask you to respond expeditiously in writing 

to those questions. 

And hearing no further business before the subcommittee, it 

stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(45) 

BORDER SECURITY: INFRASTRUCTURE, 

TECHNOLOGY, AND THE HUMAN ELEMENT, 

PART II 

Thursday, March 8, 2007 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, 

AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:06 p.m., in Room 

1539, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Loretta Sanchez 

[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Sanchez, Harman, Langevin, Cuellar, 

Green, Souder, McCaul, and Bilirakis. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. [Presiding.] Good afternoon. The subcommittee 

will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on ‘‘Border Security: Infrastructure, Technology, and the Human Element, 

Part II. So this is our second hearing. 

And I want to thank our witnesses—let’s see if I get these names 

right; it is a great array of American names here: Dr. Jeffrey 

McIllwain, Mr. Wermuth, Dr. O’Hanlon, and Mr. Ramirez—got 

that one right—for joining us today for the second hearing of our 

subcommittee that we are holding on ‘‘Border Security: Infrastructure, Technology, and the Human Element.’’ 

In the previous hearing on this topic, we heard from Border Patrol Chief Aguilar and Coast Guard Rear Admiral Pekoske about 

the border security challenges our nation faces on the northern, the 

southern and the maritime borders and the plans to use infrastructure, technology and personnel to address those challenges. 

Today I am looking forward to hearing from the academic, thinktank and the nongovernmental communities about the perspectives 

on our border security, our challenges and how we can best address 

them. 

And I am interested in the witnesses’ thoughts on the border security efforts currently in place, the ones that we have planned for 

the future by our government, and if there are ways to strengthen 

and improve those plans. 

Specifically, how should the Border Patrol structure and place 

fencing and barriers to get the most return? How effective is the 

technology currently in use on the border, and how will the 

planned SBInet initiative change that situation on the border? And 

how will the planned increase in Border Patrol agents be affected 

46 

by challenges in recruitment, training, retention, and how the Border Patrol can best maximize the impact of each marginal agent as 

we bring him or her on? 

In addition, I am very concerned about the Coast Guard and the 

Border Patrol and how they work together in order to get these 

border security issues done, because I was concerned to learn in 

our last hearing that there is no set process on how the Coast 

Guard transfers people when they have been turned over to the 

Border Patrol or detention facilities. 

And another issue that deserves, I think, attention is how the 

three countries are working together—meaning Canada, Mexico 

and the United States—with respect to border security. And I 

would also be interested to hear the witnesses’ thoughts on what 

we can do to maximize our positive returns from those relationships with the other two countries. 

And, obviously, these are very complex issues. I know you are 

going to provide us with your best professional and analytical analysis of the situation. 

And I would like to thank my ranking member, Member Souder, 

for his interest in this topic. And I look forward to working with 

him to really make America secure and know who is coming in and 

out of our country. 

And now I will turn it over to our ranking member. 

Mr. SOUDER. I thank you. I thank the chairwoman, chairlady, for 

her leadership and continuing hearings on this subject. 

Clearly, as Congress both looks at how to secure America and 

how to look at comprehensive immigration reform, one of the fundamental questions is, is the border actually secure? And if that 

isn’t answered in a favorable way, it is hard to see how either the 

country can be secure or we can move ahead on immigration reform. 

So I don’t have a formal statement this morning. And I have 

been working this issue since I have been elected to Congress, 

through the narcotics area in particular, which is smuggling of people, smuggling of contraband—basically all the same subject, just 

different types and different approaches depending on the high 

value of the asset. 

And I look forward to hearing your ongoing testimony and assume this is just a start, not an end. 

Thank you very much. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The chair now recognizes—oh, I already did that. 

The chair now recognizes—the chairman of the full committee is 

not here. 

Other members of the subcommittee are reminded that, under 

the committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the 

record. 

So I welcome our panel of witnesses. 

Our first witness is Jeffrey McIllwain, Ph.D., of San Diego State 

University, of course in the great state of California. And the doctor is the associate director and the co-founder of the interdisciplinary graduate degree program in homeland security at SDSU, the 

first of its kind in the United States. And as part of his work with 

the Homeland Security Program, the doctor works extensively with 

his homeland security colleagues in the College of Sciences at 

47 

SDSU to help meet the technological and scientific needs of community partners in the public and private sectors. 

Our second witness is Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institute, where he specializes 

in U.S. defense strategy, homeland security, and American foreign 

policy. He is a visiting lecturer at Princeton University and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the 

Council on Foreign Relations. And in 2002, O’Hanlon and several 

colleagues wrote ‘‘Protecting the American Homeland,’’ a book updated in 2003 and 2006. 

And our third witness is Michael—oh, forgive me here— 

Wermuth, the director of the RAND Homeland Security Program, 

which addresses issues pertaining to critical infrastructure protection, emergency management and response, terrorism risk management, border control, domestic intelligence and threat assessments, 

and manpower. 

You are doing a lot over there. 

Since joining RAND in the summer of 1999, Mr. Wermuth has 

directed numerous projects dealing with homeland security. And 

for the past 2 years, he has been manager of domestic counterterrorism programs in the National Security Research Division at 

RAND. He also has over 30 years of military experience, including 

both active and reserve duty, with the U.S. Army and is retired as 

a Reserve colonel. 

And our final witness is Mr. Andy Ramirez, chairman of Friends 

of the Border Patrol, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization that was 

created in 2004. And Mr. Ramirez has repeatedly testified before 

Congress and the California state legislature on border security, illegal immigration, and U.S.-Mexico relations. He has also appeared 

frequently as a guest on news programs like CNN’s ‘‘Lou Dobbs,’’ 

Fox News Channel, and nationally syndicated radio talkshows. Additionally, Mr. Ramirez was nominated for the California State Assembly’s 60th District in 1994 and 1995. 

So, without objection, the witnesses’ full statements, which you 

submitted, are inserted into the record. And I now ask each witness to summarize his statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Dr. 

McIllwain. 

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY McILLWAIN, CO-DIRECTOR, 

HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRAM, SAN DIEGO STATE 

UNIVERSITY 

Mr. MCILLWAIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Good afternoon, Madam Chair, Ranking Member Souder and distinguished subcommittee members. My name is Jeffrey McIllwain, 

and I am the co-director of the graduate program in homeland security at San Diego State University. 

It is my honor to provide you with an assessment of border security from an interdisciplinary academic perspective. It is also my 

purpose to inform you about some of the intersections between the 

human element, technology, and infrastructure that create and respond to these challenges, relying heavily on the San Diego-Tijuana 

border region as a case study. 

Before moving forward, please allow me a moment to look back. 

48 

During the Second World War, my grandfather, Enrique Estrada, 

was serving as a sergeant in the United States Air Corps when he 

was approached by his superiors to serve as a liaison and translator for members of the Mexican military. 

The U.S. military was working with the Mexican military to create the Mexican Air Force, so that Mexico could finally shed its 

international isolationism and take a small but crucial step onto 

the world’s stage by wielding a military unit in support of the Allied campaign in the Pacific theater. 

Working in solidarity with Mexico, the United States was able to 

overcome language and cultural differences and a history of mutual 

distrust to tackle the predominant security challenge of that day. 

Years later, the U.S. and Mexico find themselves jointly facing 

new security challenges of global significance—challenges that are 

not confined to faraway shores but to both our shared border and 

the combined borders of the U.S., Mexico and Canada. 

The challenges are numerous. Combating powerful 

narcotraficantes, weapon smugglers, transnational street gangs, 

human traffickers, corruption, intellectual property theft, and environmental health and sustainability traditionally come to mind. 

Since 9/11, the most tangible challenge is that posed by terrorist 

organizations bent on attacking the U.S., Canada and Mexico as a 

means of undermining our collective political will to thwart their 

authoritarian ideologies. 

For example, last month, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula 

stated, ‘‘It was imperative that we strike petroleum interests in all 

regions that the United States benefits from,’’ specifically naming 

Canada and Mexico, the first and second largest crude oil suppliers 

to the U.S., as possible targets. 

This has serious implications for binational energy infrastructures and national security, given the U.S. exchanges major 

amounts of energy via extensive oil and gas pipelines with Canada 

and Mexico. 

The United States cannot respond effectively and efficiently to 

border security challenges like terrorism, drug smuggling and 

human trafficking alone. Such challenges require strong binational 

and trinational cooperation and coordination. It also requires an 

approach that emphasizes the intersection of infrastructure, technology, and the human element. 

My written testimony provides a number of examples illustrating 

these two approaches. 

One of them concerns the challenges and opportunities inherent 

to the coming mega-port and rail complex at Punta Colonet, 150 

miles south of the border on Baja, California’s Pacific coast. Punta 

Colonet will rival, if not exceed, the size and capacity of the combined ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles, which account for almost 44 percent of the foreign containers coming into U.S. ports 

last year. 

Consequently, there will be massive new infrastructure, technology, and security needs for these containers crossing into the 

U.S. from Baja, California, that will ensure the secure, effective 

and efficient flows of goods and people across the border. 

Another example of how massive new infrastructure is being 

built that links the countries together in physical character but 

49 

also in symbiotic business ventures is the construction of a large 

liquefied natural gas facility on the coast 50 miles south of San 

Diego. This facility will process and ship most of the natural gas 

imported from Indonesia, Australia and Russia north to the Southern California energy market. 

The footprint of these pipelines will likely also contain telecommunications infrastructure, linking energy and information 

technology as a collaboration between the two countries. 

These two examples illustrate how infrastructure development 

can actually assist with homeland security, as corporations, governments and agencies link to each other for cost-effective uses of 

technology for dual purposes. 

Yet the long-term planning to make homeland security a 

foundational design principle of this effort does not seem to be a 

currently critical THS task given other pressing concerns. 

However, U.S., Mexican and Canadian universities can help in 

the design, testing and analyses of various technologies and policy 

and governance issues, all the while identifying and assessing how 

dual-purpose technology and infrastructure, linked to economic development and human capital, can simultaneously assist both countries in meeting their security challenges. 

In order to be successful, dual-use approaches must take advantage of the existing foundations of U.S.–Mexican cooperation and 

coordination, as well as the limitless human capital offered by the 

citizens of border regions. Such trust-building initiatives are simply 

in our national interest and will go a long way toward providing 

short-and long-term security for our borders. 

While infrastructure and technology are important for border security, the collaboration and coordination of people in the U.S. and 

across our borders is critical. By encouraging and supporting the 

effective and efficient interoperability of these three elements, Congress will take a major step in furthering our security goals. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to present my testimony to 

the subcommittee. I appreciate it. 

[The statement of Mr. McIllwain follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JEFFREY SCOTT MCILLWAIN

Good afternoon Madam Chair, Ranking Member Souder, and distinguished subcommittee members. My name is Jeffrey McIllwain and I am the Co-Director of the 

Graduate Program in Homeland Security and an Associate Professor of Public Affairs and Criminal Justice at San Diego State University. It is my honor to provide 

you with an assessment of border security from an interdisciplinary academic perspective. I provide this assessment at a time when the need for border security has 

been underscored by recent events. For example, 

Last month al-Qa’ida’s Committee in the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia) 

stated it was ‘‘imperative that we strike petroleum interests in all regions that 

the United States benefits from. . .,’’ specifically naming Canada and Mexico, the 

first and second largest crude oil suppliers to the U.S., as possible targets.This 

has serious implications for binational energy infrastructures and national security given the U.S. exchanges major amounts of via extensive oil and gas pipelines with Canada ii and Mexico,iii and companies like ExxonMobil are making 

major contributions to the recent major discoveries of oil off the Gulf coast of 

Mexico.iv Add to this the fact that in many oil pipeline right-of-ways, fiber-optic 

cables are also laid, as the continuous rights-of-way needed for pipelines also 

provide pathway for communication infrastructure.v Critical information for 

business and banking are thus passed along these same routes and would negatively impact both countries as well as many other global trading partners if 

truncated. Because of the difficulty of getting permits to cross the border, the 

50 

number of fiber and pipeline crossings is very limited, making a small number 

of high-value targets. 

•Last week Operation Imperial Emperor resulted in the arrest of approximately 

400 alleged members of the drug cartel run by cartel kingpin Victor Emilio 

Cazares-Gastellum, a cartel responsible for smuggling metric tons of drugs from 

Colombia and Venezuela to the U.S.vi

• Also last week Attorney General Gonzales highlighted the transnational nature of many of the violent street gangs in cities like Los Angeles, gangs with 

established pipelines between the U.S. and counties like Mexico, Guatemala, 

and El Salvador.vii

• The summer 2006 bomb plot thwarted in Toronto illustrates the ‘‘homegrown’’ 

nature of the suspects.viii This plot is linked directly to two American ‘‘homegrown’’ terrorist suspects arrested in Georgia who stand accused of making ‘‘casing videos’’ of the U.S. Capitol Building and other Washington, D.C. landmarks.ix Both cases, in addition to the arrest of two men at the Buffalo/Fort 

Erie border crossing who are also allegedly related to the plot, illustrate the relative ease with which some of these suspects had traveled across the U.S./Canadian border.x

These examples represent the breadth and complexity of the border security challenges faced by the American people. It is my purpose to inform you about some 

of the intersections between the human element, technology, and infrastructure that 

create and respond to these challenges, relying heavily on the San Diego/Tijuana 

border region as a case study. Specifically, I will: 

• Illustrate the complexity of border security as it impacts various stakeholders 

living in border communities; 

• Assess the role of human capital in aiding network-centric strategies countering the efforts of criminal networks operating in the border region; 

• Discuss the role of regional cooperation and integration as a means of effectively and efficiently marshalling resources for a more secure border that also 

facilitates the flow of people and goods; 

• Point to areas of binational cooperation as models of trust building that allow 

for more effective and efficient border governance; and 

• Provide suggestions that would tap the underutilized resources and the intellectual capital of universities and other sources that could supplement current 

efforts to provide effective and efficient border security. 

Background 

As the Co-Director of the Graduate Program in Homeland Security at San Diego 

State University, I have the privilege of working with a number of scholars and 

practitioners in the U.S., Mexico, and Canada who focus on these varied and complex border security problems on a daily basis. Living in San Diego, I have the additional privilege of working in what is arguably one of the most significant ‘‘living 

l aboratories’’ for border security research in the world, the greater San Diego/Tijuana border region. 

As such, I have come to recognize that the term ‘‘border’’ has as many different 

meanings as there are stakeholders on the issue. For example, ‘‘border’’ can mean 

a wall or a fence; a place of interaction; a marketplace for goods and services; a community of people; a way of life; arbitrary lines on a map; interdependence; a revenue 

source; an ecosystem; or a line of defense or defensible space. Therefore, when applying theoretical and manifested concepts of security to the term ‘‘order,’’ these 

meanings are impacted in a number of varied and substantive ways. 

In a sense, the border becomes a vibrant ecosystem that is impacted by the laws, 

policies, procedures, practices, and people that define its use on a daily basis. For 

example, on average more than 136,000 cars and 6,200 trucks, and nearly 340,000 

people, travel between the U.S. and Mexico via the San Ysidro, Otay Mesa, and 

Tecate border crossings each day, making the San Diego-Baja California Point of 

Entry (POE) the busiest in the world. The Otay Mesa-Mesa de Otay POE is the 

busiest commercial border crossing between California and Mexico. In 2004, this 

POE handled more than 1.4 million trucks and $22.2 billion worth of goods in both 

directions, which represents the third highest dollar value of trade among all land 

border crossings between the United States and Mexico. Another $1 billion in goods 

and more than 139,000 trucks crossed at the Tecate-Tecate POE, numbers that will 

grow exponentially in years to come.xi

Currently, there are about 4.5 million people living in the greater San Diego-Tijuana region and by 2020 the total regional population will be approximately 6 million, with most living in a large transborder contiguously urbanized metropolitan 

area separated by the international border. This binational region is increasingly 

interdependent through trade flows, labor flows (40,000 workers commute from TiVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
51 

juana to San Diego each day), family ties (30% of San Diego’s population is Mexican 

in origin), transportation and infrastructure planning, energy and resource management, and crime fighting. When working cooperatively, U.S. and Mexican authorities do a good job solving these problems for mutual benefit. 

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the border crossing points between San 

Diego and Tijuana were shut down as a precautionary measure. The permanent 

changes to border security policies that followed have had substantial, long-standing 

implications for the region. A study commissioned by the San Diego Association of 

Governments (SANDAG) found that the increased border wait time for personal 

trips and freight movements cost the U.S. and Mexican economies an estimated $6 

billion in gross output and 51,325 jobs (tied to this output) in 2005. This projects 

to almost $14 billion in economic output and 123,682 jobs by 2014.xii These future 

forecasts do not take into account the massive new deep-water port to be built south 

of Ensenada at Punta Colonet.xiii This port will be larger than the combined Ports 

of Long Beach/Los Angeles (San Pedro), which accounted for almost 44% of foreign 

containers coming into U.S. ports last year.xiv Consequently, there will be massive 

new infrastructure and security needs for these containers crossing into the U.S. 

from Baja California. 

This example is not meant to suggest current security mechanisms are less important than the flow of people and trade goods. It only serves to show the symbiotic 

nature of the border and how border security policies can have both intended and 

unintended consequences. These consequences are realized and interpreted in different ways depending on the stakeholder that is impacted by them and how these 

stakeholders construct their particular meaning of the border (i.e., a defensible 

space, a marketplace for goods and services, a revenue source, etc.). It is from the 

multi-faceted meanings of the term ‘‘border,’’ and the functions these meanings entail, that our border security challenges and opportunities derive. I will now share 

with you some of the challenges faced and lessons learned, many from the San 

Diego/Tijuana border region, as examples of the complexities that impact our border 

communities and our nation. 

Criminal Networks, Human Capital, and Network-Centric Approaches to 

Security 

The San Diego/Tijuana border region is an economically robust region for the very 

reason that a vast amount of people and goods flow between two sovereign states 

on a daily basis.xv This flow largely occurs through formal, legal channels. For example, many Americans ride their off-road vehicles in Baja California deserts; automobile parts are manufactured in maquiladoras and shipped to the U.S. for assembly; American retirees spend their golden years living in Mexican beach communities, including one owned by the Trump Corporation;xvi and soon computer chips 

will be sent to the U.S. from the ‘‘Silicon Border’’ development in Mexicali.xvii This 

list can go on and on. 

Shadowing these legal, formal channels is a major illicit economy that exploits the 

opportunities for financial gain borders create. This illicit economy has been around 

for well over a century.xviii The premise behind these opportunities is quite simple. 

Sovereign states establish rules and regulations that reflect value systems that may 

not coincide with those of a neighboring sovereign state. This creates structural 

holes in which inherent asymmetries develop around differential access to resources 

and opportunities.xix These inherent asymmetries create the opportunity for profit 

for those willing and able to assume the risk and marshal the networks and resources to do so.xx

For example, Mexico has strict laws covering the importation of firearms. The 

U.S., which has relatively liberal firearm laws, has a steady supply of firearms 

available that can be smuggled into Mexico for a substantial profit. Conversely, the 

U.S. has strict laws and regulations regarding the importation of labor. Mexico has 

an abundance of labor. Criminal entrepreneurs step into this breach, smuggling undocumented laborers (and others) by the thousands into the U.S. for a substantial 

profit. The wages from this labor traveling south to Mexico obviously have a significant impact on Mexico’s economy. The economic impact on the U.S. is much more 

controversial. 

The creation of such illegal markets is unavoidable and it is not unique to the 

U.S./Mexico border. Such practices are the norm in border communities around the 

world. In all of these cases, extensive social networks develop to ensure that supply 

meets demand, regardless of what legal and technological weapons the state musters against them. Indeed these networks—composed of criminal entrepreneurs, enforcers, and the upper-world institutions and individuals that benefit from the illegal market (i.e., corrupt officials, etc.)—remain remarkably resilient in the face of 

such challenges and may even make more profit per transaction as a result of the 

52 

increased risk.xxi This resiliency is evident in the construction of tunnels burrowed 

under the U.S./Mexico border for the purposes of smuggling drugs, people, and other 

items.xxii Indeed, over twenty have been found linking Mexico to the United States 

since 9/11.xxiii The U.S./Canadian border has been breached in such a manner as 

well.xxiv

U.S. border security policy has reasonably emphasized its national strengths, focusing on using infrastructure, technology, and manpower at the border to counter 

such activities. These policies have arguably proven relatively effective in disrupting 

the flow of people and goods in some areas (for example, the border fence, manpower 

surge, and sensor networks used on the westernmost portion of the urban border 

between San Diego County and Tijuana during Operation Gatekeeper). However, for 

every countermeasure the U.S. provides, criminal organizations devise a response. 

In the case of Operation Gatekeeper, which secured the coastal portion of the border 

through infrastructure and increased patrols, smugglers moved to more rural, 

mountainous, and desert routes east of San Diego or used tunnels, corruption, and 

other means of moving people and goods across the border, often with deadly results.xxv Smuggling operations are a moving target for DHS. After all, the red tape, 

laws and regulations, human rights and environmental concerns, bureaucratic turf 

wars, and budget and appropriations battles that are the every day concerns of our 

government agencies do not encumber these criminal networks. These criminal organizations can remain flexible and respond in near real time, whereas our agencies 

are often constrained and must be reactive in nature, if they can react at all. 

Given the constraints that exist on the U.S. vis-a`-vis border security, it is imperative that the U.S. complements its current responses with an increased emphasis on 

human capital.xxvi As mentioned before, borders are not just defensible spaces. They 

are also a community of people and a way of life. Just like in other border communities, people in Tijuana and San Diego live, work, and play on both sides of the 

border. Business relationships, families, and friendships readily thrive in this condition. As such, at a given moment, there are literally thousands of potential sources 

of information regarding criminal activities and security threats going untapped. 

Indeed, the physical security of many areas of San Diego is dependent upon the 

physical security of adjacent areas of Tijuana: an earthquake, flood, catastrophic 

fire, chemical spill, or terrorist incident requires a coordinated response by Mexican 

and U.S. authorities. However, the governmental linkages, personal ties, and resources are not in place for adequate regional, binational emergency response. The 

investment in transborder human infrastructure needs to improve to help rectify 

this. 

To paraphrase the words of two well-known proponents of network-centric warfare 

strategies in the military realm, what is needed here is a detailed understanding 

of the appropriate competitive space, the close linkage among actors in the illicit 

market’s social system. If border security professionals can produce and analyze 

more real-time information drawn from non-traditional forms of human intelligence, 

they can more readily mirror the linkages, interactions, and the environment of 

their criminal adversaries. This would improve response time to rapidly evolving security risks and would potentially provide a much stronger return on our border security investments.xxvii

The effectiveness of current network-centric strategies that rely on technical and 

human intelligence flows can be augmented significantly with a concerted effort to 

tap into non-traditional information flows. I cannot begin to tell you how common 

these information flows are in a border community. For example, the family of one 

of my students grew up next door to the family of a major drug cartel enforcer; another worked as a receptionist for a shipping company in Tijuana that shipped more 

than the legal goods listed on its manifests; a close friend went to high school with 

the children of a major Mexican crime family; another friend is related to a senior 

prosecutor responsible for uprooting police corruption. Other students have shown 

me Spanish language blogs, web sites, and audio and video media hosting sites that 

provide very valuable information about the goings on in the border underworld (remarkably similar to, but on a smaller scale than, what we see in the Islamic extremist community).xxviii These connections have been valuable to me in my research, allowing me to navigate what is actually a very easily identified social system of organized crime.xxix Such connections working for border security professionals can help reverse current asymmetries in information flows that favor the underworld. 

The relative ease with which I, a university-based researcher and educator, can 

learn such things has always amazed me. I asked contacts in the American and 

Mexican criminal justice and security communities why it seemed so difficult to tap 

into the same information. The answers I received were reasonable ones: concern 

for the safety of informants, admissibility in court, possibility of disinformation, poVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
53 

litical and diplomatic concerns, and issues of trust routinely take center stage. Yet 

I am still left with the belief that a more concerted effort must be made to tap into 

the human capital at our disposal, not just for information flows but for establishing 

a substantial cadre of bilingual public servants with a functional understanding of 

the many nuances of border community life. This cadre can make immediate contributions in the production and analyses of the intelligence that is crucial to network-centric responses to border security challenges. Border universities like San 

Diego State University can take a major role in helping recruit such public servants 

while at the same time work with border security agencies to develop educational 

and research opportunities that will substantively reinforce and contextualize their 

border life experiences. 

Dual-Use Infrastructure and Technology and Binational Collaboration 

One way of looking at the border in a manner that reflects its daily reality is to 

view it as an opportunity for dual-use technologies, especially in infrastructure, 

which can assist in joining different countries together for their mutual benefit and 

security. We are historically, economically, culturally, and morally linked to others 

around us; we cannot exist in isolation from others. Shared infrastructure is an excellent physical demonstration of this. One of the most powerful ways to ensure U.S. 

interests across the border is to innovatively link to multiple groups to share the 

responsibilities, opportunities, and impacts of the border, which is what shared infrastructure does. A few general thoughts may help flesh out such innovative approaches to border security, approaches we at San Diego State University are using 

to train and educate public and private sector officials and first responders who bear 

the daily burden of dealing with the practical realities of securing and governing 

the border. As we shall see, linking infrastructure and technology to the human element is key. 

It is important to recognize that though Canada and Mexico both have land borders with the U.S., they are profoundly different in many ways. Simply treating 

them as the same with laws, regulations, and policies is a major over simplification 

that does not serve either well. Canadian groups, such as those presenting at the 

recent ComDef Border security conference in Tucson,xxx emphatically emphasized 

over and over how the border needs to be open for rapid trade and passage of goods 

from one country to the other. Canada is the single biggest trading partner of the 

U.S. How that trade can be nurtured and enhanced has a different reality than the 

same effort with Mexico, let alone more than 100 other countries via air and water 

borders. One size cannot fit all, for it creates a larger challenge for developing effective and efficient laws, regulations, policies. 

Canada and its infrastructure for oil and gas, electricity, communications, and 

transportation have a profoundly positive impact on the U.S. Security efforts to protect this infrastructure both assist in the normal business processes of making a 

profit, but can also assist in security. Thus applying dual-use technologies for enhanced security of infrastructure and at the same time assisting with profit generation is an attractive linkage. Oil-and-gas pipelines are an excellent example, where 

ensuring the appropriate flow, temperature, and pressure, and guarding against disruption, clearly aid and can optimize the business aspect of the infrastructure. Most 

of this can be done by sensors along the pipeline and infrastructure, with the sensors fused into actionable, real-time intelligence just as is done on the power grid. 

Technology-assisted security guarding infrastructure can thus help assist in facilitating business processes. 

A specific example from the San Diego-Tijuana area where massive new infrastructure is being built that links the countries together in physical character, but 

also in symbiotic business ventures, is the construction of a large liquefied natural 

gas (LNG) facility on the coast 50 miles south of San Diego.xxxi This facility will 

process and ship most of the natural gas imported from Indonesia, Australia, and 

Russia north to the Southern California market. When fully functioning this facility 

will be directly linked to the energy infrastructure of Southern California. Consequently, the pipelines that carry the gas north will also be a security concern 

The footprint of these pipelines will likely also contain telecommunications infrastructure—linking energy and information technology as a collaboration between the 

two countries. Trans-oceanic fiber coming in at these ports can connect the world 

to Mexico and then to the U.S. along the same routes that the energy travels. Linking economic incentives for security and infrastructure, as well as providing energy 

and IT assets to the Baja population, will assist with infrastructure security using 

technology to cross the border and assist Southern California in its energy and communications challenges. Infrastructure development then can actually assist with 

homeland security as corporations, governments, and agencies link to each other for 

cost-effective uses of technology for dual purposes. Universities can help in the deVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
54 

sign and testing of sensor networks, communication technologies, data fusion techniques, policy and governance issues, and design and permitting studies to assist 

this dual-use. Given the importance of these developments to U.S. energy needs, it 

should come as no surprise that al-Qa’ida’s Committee in the Arabian Peninsula has 

placed Mexico on notice. 

In much the same way, consider the aforementioned massive new deep-water port 

being planned for the Punta Colonet region south of Ensenada. This will be the largest port development on the west coast of North America and is planned to handle 

more containers than are currently being shipped through the Long Beach/Los Angeles ports (currently 43.9% of all foreign containers coming into the U.S. in FY 

06).xxxii The infrastructure needed to move these containers by truck and rail into 

the U.S. will be staggering in some ways. Yet the long-term planning to make homeland security a foundational design principle of the effort does not seem to be a currently critical DHS task given other pressing concerns. By helping design and test 

sensors, transportation corridors, inspection sites, monitoring sites, and public benefits, U.S. and Mexican universities can provide research-based examples of how 

technology and infrastructure linked to economic development and human capital 

could simultaneously assist both countries in meeting their security challenges. 

Epidemics and natural disasters like wild fires, hurricanes, and earthquakes are 

another example of cross-border collaboration that has technology and infrastructure connection. Without the communications infrastructure in place to communicate with first responders, most efforts to immediately respond during and after 

a disaster are extremely limited. Physical infrastructure such as towers on mountaintops to provide coverage to fire and law enforcement are obvious, but are also 

obviously disconnected from each other. Less obvious is the radio spectrum that is 

used by first responders, which is regulated by both countries. If a Mexican agency 

uses a specific radio frequency, this usage eliminates that frequency from being useful in the U.S. spectrum along the border. Thus only about half of the spectrum that 

other first responders in the U.S. can use is available. Collaboration across the border, both to eliminate interference, and also to enhance interoperability during 

shared emergencies like wild fires, is a major challenge to both countries. Yet it is 

an opportunity for collaboration that universities in both countries, serving as honest and neutral brokers and facilitators, can assist in solving. 

San Diego State University is helping with these issues on the U.S. side of the 

border. Mexican universities could do likewise on the southern side of the border, 

as international interoperability and collaboration is significantly more elusive than 

interoperability is in the U.S. Mutual aid between Mexican and U.S. firefighters and 

law enforcement personnel is far from being solved, both because of technical issues 

and matters of trust. Isolation rarely enhances trust, however, and universities that 

already work well together can help facilitate the building of trust and therefore capability when it is needed during and after disasters. Without a communications infrastructure or technologies to link together for mutual aid, epidemics and disasters 

will have much more of a negative impact than if the two countries could communicate. To help with this, university-based, non-tactical communications that can 

link both countries together could offer assistance to both countries, while perhaps 

being primarily used as educational, environmental, and health-related networks 

outside the time of disasters. 

Security and Border Cooperation and Coordination 

Oftentimes we hear of the numerous issues that serve as impediments to binational approaches towards border security. We hear stories of the corruption, nationalism, and turf battles that make the idea of border governance, let alone border 

security, a seemingly unobtainable goal. These issues are very real and very 

daunting. Yet they are not insurmountable, as other areas of border governance and 

coordination that were once thought impossible are now being overcome.xxxiii

For example, the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) has a Borders 

Committee that brings together elected officials and representatives from San Diego, 

Imperial, Riverside, and Orange Counties, and Baja California/Mexico with the goal 

to create a regional community where San Diego, neighboring counties, tribal governments, and northern Baja California mutually benefit from their varied resources and international location.xxxv Even the local office of the Customs and Border Patrol joined SANDAG’s efforts last year and a strong, constructive relationship 

between both parties has emerged. The Borders Planning and Coordination Division 

of the Borders Committee identified six critical planning areas around which to 

focus its collaborative efforts: jobs/housing accessibility; transportation; energy and 

water supply; environment; economic development; and homeland security. Subsequent opportunities have been identified, conferences held, strategies developed, research reports and plans written, and agreements reached.xxxvi Indeed, since 2004 

55 

homeland security concerns have been formally part of the regional decision-making 

process under SANDAG’s auspices. 

Another example is the Southwest Consortium for Environmental Research & Policy (SCERP). SCERP is a collaboration five Mexican universities and five American 

universities located in all ten border states. It assists U.S.-Mexican border peoples 

and their environments by applying research information, insights, and innovations. 

SCERP was created in 1989 and was first funded by Congress in 1990 to address 

environmental issues of the U.S./Mexico border region and to ‘‘initiate a comprehensive analysis of possible solutions to acute air, water and hazardous waste problems 

that plague the U.S./Mexico border region.’’ Since then SCERP has implemented 

about 400 projects involving as many as a thousand individuals. SCERP has the 

multi-fold mission of applied research, outreach, education, policy development, and 

regional capacity building for border communities. SCERP informs the decisionmaking process in both the U.S. and Mexico without advocating for or against a particular position. By interpreting the results of unbiased scientific inquiry it provides 

motivation to adopt comprehensive, regional, and long-term policies, solution sets, 

and environmental security.xxxii

Thanks to organizations like SANDAG and SCERP, institutional and individual 

trust relationships are built, relationships that lead to higher levels of trust which, 

in turn, lead to even more cooperation and coordination. Of course it is trust building that is an important step towards creating a secure border. Yet sharing information from one side of the border to the other reasonably remains a challenge. When 

it comes to security concerns, trust wrongly placed can, and has, lead to the loss 

of life, fortunes, and careers. However, areas for trust building in the border security realm do exist. For example, Mexican police would like to have access to stolen 

car records from the U.S., as they recognize that cars in Mexico with valid California plates may well be stolen, but they have no way to check this. They see these 

cars as a potential gold mine (insurance companies pay handsome rewards for the 

return of stolen vehicles). This is in addition to gaining the substantial revenue from 

the thousands of stolen cars currently operating in Mexico that are not paying any 

licensing fees. Similarly, Mexican police would like to provide intelligence to U.S. 

police forces on terrorist suspects—many of who would be a threat to Mexico as 

well—but the information provided to them is limited at best. Mexican police have 

significant capabilities (including state-of-the-art public surveillance, biometric, and 

facial-recognition technologies), but the ability to share such information across 

international boundaries is very limited. During events such as wild fires, flooding, 

or public health concerns such as avian influenza or a bioterrorism attack, this challenged shared operational picture may well produce disastrous results. Obviously 

many things cannot be shared, but some can. The architecture of such sharing both 

physically (fiber) and via agreement are significant opportunities to assist in shared 

border and homeland security. 

Recommendations on How Congress Can Further Promote Border Security 

In the context of this hearing about infrastructure, technology, and the human 

element, Congress can actually take some specific actions that would significantly 

assist the nation using the expertise of universities like San Diego State University, 

of which hundreds would likely be interested in assisting DHS and its member 

agencies. Many universities would like to help shoulder the load with DHS and Congress, helping discover policy, technology, and infrastructure solutions in ways that 

we can uniquely do. 

Lessons learned from Canada can be very useful for assisting with Mexico in 

terms of the border and trade. Linking efforts for monitoring the northern and 

southern land borders is a fruitful endeavor, as the same things do not need 

to be discovered over and over again. Drawing together even U.S. groups working on one border with those on the other border is not as common as would 

be fruitful, as the challenge of each border is so overwhelming that people simply cannot integrate an even more difficult reality of different borders with different needs and opportunities. Universities in all three countries could be of 

significant assistance in providing this integration. 

The DHS Center of Excellence idea with its new view of deliverables to the nation in the near term is very commendable, but the problem is enormously 

greater than the proposed solution. As an example, DHS is proposing to fund 

a single center for focusing on Border Security and Immigration for the whole 

nation, yet likely more than 100 universities are competing in different teams 

with their varied expertise to land that one, single center. With funding at $3 

million per year to look at the legal and illegal transport of people and goods 

across the border worth hundreds of billions of dollars yearly, it seems that 

DHS could be greatly assisted by enabling the intellectual creativity and wideVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
56 

spread focus of numerous universities on finding real answers. The challenge 

to DHS is profoundly overwhelming. The challenge to efforts like SBINet alone 

is staggering; they are trying to find answers to profoundly difficult problems 

and against thousands of adversaries who are actively seeking to counteract any 

technology that is deployed. Yet the U.S. is not engaging university expertise 

or creativity at anything like the level that universities would like to be engaged to positively assist DHS and the nation. In some ways, this is much like 

deciding that the U.S. will have one center to study cancer, thereby leaving a 

number of ‘‘have not’’ universities who willingly want to bring a variety of different skills, resources, regional expertise, intellectual capital, and creativity 

unable to do so. 

• A similar example would be the Center of Excellence on Maritime, Island and 

Extreme/Remote Environment Security. This is unquestionably a positive step 

forward and we certainly applaud DHS in holding this competition. Nevertheless, I am again struck by the huge breadth of subject matter from ocean and 

river ports to islands such as Hawaii and Guam to remote environments like 

Alaska. Many groups within dozens of universities are interested in actually 

helping be part of the solution and not just throwing academic stones at DHS 

or the U.S. government as some are wont to do. Yet at this time there will be 

only one group in the entire nation trying to assist DHS with this, when clearly 

dozens of university groups could be helping and covering different aspects of 

the problem in support of the complex DHS mandates. Aggressively tapping 

into universities with diverse resources and proximate access to research sites, 

comprehensive expertise of regional environments, and the pre-existing personal 

and institutional relationships to make things work, just makes sense. 

• As a specific example of this dual-use view of the problems DHS agencies are 

tasked with addressing, consider the ports that are a significant lifeline for the 

economic well being of the U.S. and its trading partners. These ports are revenue centers and revenue generators and DHS agencies are tasked with trying 

to securely enhance this trade for the benefit of the nation and its people. The 

adjacent ports of Long Beach/Los Angeles (LB/LA), for example, had cargo valued at nearly $200 billion flow through them during FY 06. This generated $6.7 

billion dollars in direct FY 06 revenue for the U.S. 

In the six-year life of each of the proposed DHS Centers of Excellence, likely more than $40 billion dollars in revenue will be generated directly to the U.S. government 

from the LB/LA port complex, as part of the likely more than $200 billion collected 

by CBP over the next 6 years, based on a simple extrapolation of last year’s figures. 

Yet, DHS plans to invest $18 million over 6 years, or less than 0.05% of the actual 

direct revenue collected by CBP from the LB/LA ports alone for the U.S. government, and less than 0.01% of CBP revenues on all ports alone for that same period. 

There is certainly no assurance that groups focusing on the LB/LA ports will win 

the Centers for Excellence competition; indeed no group of universities can easily 

address the unique challenges faced by several hundred active ports in the U.S., especially for a grand total of $3 million a year. Still, hundreds of university researchers in policy and technology are anxious to help. Assisting DHS by perhaps linking 

incoming revenue with research dollars to assist DHS in a port-by-port (or even regional) basis is something Congress could do. This might be something like port revenue rebate to a port region to foster innovation and encourage even higher port 

revenues This rebate could be linked to individual ports or port regions have preexisting relationships with regional research universities that will provide tailored 

assistance and appropriate deliverables to them. There is major interest from U.S. 

and international partner universities in assisting DHS with this awesome task, yet 

linking income to research assistance is not a policy of the government. This seems 

like something that Congress could address as it appropriates funds in the national 

interest. 

• Universities and university researchers can assist DHS and its agencies in 

many other ways, yet the interface between the academic community and homeland security efforts is still in its infancy. Universities can assist with studies 

on organized crime and corruption, the milieu from which many border security 

threats emanate, and violent political movements, which often operate within 

the milieu created by organized criminals and corrupt officials (drug and weapons trafficking, immigrant smuggling, money laundering, fraudulent documents, 

intellectual property theft, etc.). Supporting homeland and national security 

programs, border studies programs, and programs that emphasize language and 

cultural education would help provide cohorts of public servants who can not 

only help with border security, but with our future military, intelligence, trade, 

and diplomatic professions as well. Attendant to this goal is the need for expanded and vigorous support of international study abroad initiatives (like 

57 

grants or tax breaks) that would allow secondary and higher education students 

to learn new languages and cultures and develop a more sophisticated, nuanced, 

and socially responsible view of life in a globalized world. Universities with computing, communication, data mining, sensor fusion, and intelligence gathering 

tools around the world could be of significant assistance to law enforcement and 

security personnel who are tasked with actually providing border security and 

do not have the luxury of real time research and discovery as is possible at universities (including universities in dozens of allied countries that could significantly assist their own security and that of the U.S. from their knowledge 

gained from their own worlds). Universities can also assist in rapid prototyping 

and predicting using commodity technologies and generally assisting those who 

are literally putting their lives on the line to provide security. 

• I would also encourage Congress to tap into the expertise of other governments from around the world who are experiencing border security challenges. 

For example, the European Union has concerted multinational policy efforts and 

significant research expenditures in areas like the security of transport and energy infrastructure, transnational policing, intelligence sharing, data fusion and 

management, human trafficking, drug smuggling, and organized crime and 

counterterrorism policies, just to mention a few.xxxix I have visited European 

ports to study the balance between the movement of goods and people and security, established U.S./European border security technology collaborations, and 

participated in European organized crime policy symposia. As a result of these 

experiences, I have learned that our allies have much to teach us and we can 

benefit from their experiences. I have also learned that cooperation and coordination is possible between states, even when history, language, and culture 

present substantive obstacles to overcome. Encouraging state-level dialogue that 

respects traditional state sovereignty, like that stemming from the Security and 

Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), the trilateral effort to increase 

security and enhance prosperity among the U.S., Canada and Mexico through 

greater cooperation and information sharing, is a positive step.xl 

• Finally, trade flows, economic interdependence, the presence of large binational metropolitan urban areas, and the linkages of families all suggest that 

security efforts of the U.S. must extend beyond the physical international 

boundary to include these border regions. While infrastructure and technology 

are important for border security, the collaboration and coordination of people 

in the U.S., across the border, and abroad is critical. By encouraging and supporting the effective and efficient interoperability of these three elements, Congress will take a major step in furthering our security goals. 

Concluding Remarks 

Thank you again for this opportunity to present my views and the views of some 

of my colleagues at San Diego State University. It is our hope that you will continue 

to view our University and the California State University System as a resource as 

grapple with the pressing security challenges that face our nation. 

Attachment I: Notes 

i Adeeb al-Bassam (representing Al-Qaida’s Committee in the Arabian Peninsula), 

‘‘Bin Laden and the Oil Weapon,’’ Sawt al-Jihad (‘‘The Voice of Jihad’’) Magazine, 

Issue 30 (February 8, 2007), as found on www.globalterroralert.com; ‘‘Al Qaeda 

Group Calls for Attacks on U.S. Oil Sources,’’ CNN (February 14, 2007). iiTechnological developments in heavy oil technology will only add to this amount 

in the future. See ‘‘Harnessing Heavy Oil Technology,’’ The Lamp 87:2 (2005); National Energy Board, Conventional Heavy Oil Resources of the Western Canada Sedimentary Basin (August 2001); and National Energy Board, Canada’s Oil Sands-Opportunities and Challenges to 2015: An Update (June 2006). iii A discussion of this infrastructure can be found in The North American Energy 

Working Group, ‘‘The Energy Picture’’ (June 2002), as found on http:// 

www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/northamerica/enginfr1.htm#lVPIDl1. iv ‘‘Energy Means Business in Mexico,’’ The Lamp 86:1 (2004). v CANARIE, 2005—2006 Annual Report (2006), as found on http://www.canarie.ca/ 

press/publications.html; CANARIE, ‘‘Canada’s Research and Education Network’’ 

(nd), as found on http://www.canarie.ca/about/downloads/c4map—national.png. vi ‘‘Investigation of Major Mexican Drug Trafficking Organization Results in Hundreds of Arrests Nationwide,’’ Press Release, Department of Justice (February 28, 

2007); ‘‘Drug Ring Busted: ‘Operation Imperial Condor’ Seizes Cash, Drugs,’’ ABC 

News (February 28, 2007); and ‘‘Nationwide Sting Nets $45 Million in Drugs,’’ Houston Chronicle (February 28, 2007). 

58 

vii ‘‘Los Angeles Summit Seeks to Stop Spread of Gangs into Central America,’’ 

International Herald Tribune (February 7, 2007); ‘‘Attorney General Gonzales Highlights Department Efforts to Fight Gang Violence in Los Angeles,’’ Press Release, 

Department of Justice (March 2, 2007). viii ‘‘Overview: Toronto Bomb Plot,’’ CBC News Online (August 4, 2006); ‘‘Homegrown Extremism: Toronto Bomb Plot,’’ CBC News Online (June 4, 2006); ‘‘Profiles 

of the Suspects: Toronto Bomb Plot,’’ CBC News Online (June 12, 2006). ix ‘‘Atlanta Men Met with Extremists in Toronto: FBI,’’ CTV (April 21, 2006); 

‘‘Prosecutors Allege Terror Suspects Shot ‘Casing Video,’ ’’ Fox News (April 29, 

2006); ‘‘Atlanta Man Indicted for Material Support of Terrorism,’’ Press Release-Atlanta Field Division, Department of Justice (April 20, 2006). x ‘‘School Ties Link Alleged Plotters,’’ Washington Post (June 11, 2006); ‘‘Timeline: 

Probe into Alleged Plot Began in 2004,’’ CTV (June 5, 2006). xiSANDAG, ‘‘Economic Impacts of Border Wait Times at the San Diego-Baja California Border Region: Key Findings,’’ as found on http://www.sandag.org/ 

index.asp?projectid=253&fuseaction=projects.detail. xiiSANDAG, ‘‘Economic Impacts of Wait Times at the San Diego-Baja California 

Border: Final Report’’ (January 19, 2006): vii, ix. xiii ‘‘New Port on Horizon,’’ The San Diego Union-Tribune (August 14, 2005); 

‘‘Major Seaport Proposed for Baja California Norte,’’ BajaInsider (nd). xiv U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ‘‘The Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach and 

CBP: The Giant of the Pacific Rim’’ (January 25, 2007), as found on http:// 

www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fullltextlarticles/tourslcbplfacilities/ 

giantlpacificlrim.xml xvFor more on the need for the free trade ‘‘circuit’’ to flow smoothly, see Lawrence 

Herzog, Cross-border Flows and the Future of the California-Baja California Border 

Region, California Economic Policy Report (San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of 

California, 2007—08 forthcoming). xvi ‘‘Trump Ocean Resort Baja Mexico,’’ http://www.trump-baja.com. xvii ‘‘Silicon Border: Science Park of the Americas,’’ http://www.siborder.com/. xviiiFor example, see Jeffrey Scott McIllwain, ‘‘An Equal Opportunity Employer: 

Chinese Opium Smuggling Syndicates in and around San Diego during the 1910s,’’ 

Transnational Organized Crime 4:2 (1999); Jeffrey Scott McIllwain, ‘‘Bureaucracy, 

Corruption, and Organized Crime: Enforcing Chinese Exclusion in San Diego, 

1897—1902,’’ Western Legal History 17:1 (2004); Ethan Nadlemann, Cops across 

Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement (Penn State 

University Press, 1993); James Sandos, ‘‘Northern Separatism during the Mexican 

Revolution: An Inquiry into the Role of Drug Trafficking, 1910—1920,’’ The Americas 41:2 (1984); James Sandos, Rebellion in the Borderlands: Anarchism and the 

Plan of San Diego, 1904—1923 (University of Oklahoma Press, 1992); George E. 

Paulsen, ‘‘The Yellow Peril at Nogales: The Ordeal of Collector William M. Hoey,’’ 

Arizona and the West 13 (1971); Lawrence D. Taylor, ‘‘The Wild Frontier Moves 

South: U.S. Entrepreneurs and the Growth of Tijuana’s Vice Industry, 1908—1935,’’ 

The Journal of San Diego History 48:3 (Summer 2002). xix Carlo Morselli, Contacts, Opportunities, and Criminal Enterprise (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005): 22. xx Jeffrey Scott McIllwain, ‘‘Organized Crime: A Social Network Approach,’’ Crime, 

Law & Social Change: An International Journal 32:4 (1999): 301—323. xxiPeter Reuter, Disorganized Crime: Illegal Markets and the Mafia (M.I.T. Press, 

1986). xxii ‘‘Unfilled Tunnels a Weak Link at Border,’’ Los Angeles Times (January 30, 

2007); ‘‘2 Tons of Pot Found Inside Mexico-U.S. Border Tunnel,’’ The San Diego 

Union-Tribune (January 26, 2007); ‘‘Feds Smoke Out Largest Drug Tunnel Yet,’’ 

CNN (January 26, 2006); ‘‘Two Tunnels Found Under U.S. Border,’’ BBC (January 

12, 2006); ‘‘Anti-Drug Efforts Have Taken a Hit as the Fight against Terrorism Has 

Siphoned Away Money and Personnel,’’ San Diego Union-Tribune (July 31, 2005); 

‘‘New Drug Tunnel Discovered under Arizona-Mexico Border,’’ CNN (February 28, 

2001). xxiii ‘‘Tunnel Found on Mexican Border,’’ Washington Post (January 27. 2006). xxiv ‘‘Drug Tunnel Found Under Canada Border,’’ CNN (July 22, 2005). xxvThis eastward shift has created substantive human rights concerns due to the 

hazardous and often deadly nature of the terrain and climate through which much 

of the smuggling occurs, concerns that have compelled the CBP to create and extensive search and rescue capability. These concerns are continuously and fervently expressed by Mexican officials, media, academics, and students whenever I lecture on 

the subjects of, or simply discussed, border and homeland security. 

59 

xxviFor a general discussion on constraints faced by democracies against asymmetrical threats, see Roger W. Barnett, Asymmetrical Warfare: Today’s Challenge to 

U.S. Military Power (Potomac Books, 2003). xxvii Arthur K. Cebrowski and John Garstka, ‘‘Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin 

and Future,’’ Proceedings (January 1998). xxviii ‘‘Terrorists Take Recruitment Efforts Online,’’ 60 Minutes, CBS News (March 

4, 2007). xxixFor more on social systems of organized crime and the social networks that 

form them, see Jeffrey Scott McIllwain, ‘‘Organized Crime: A Social Network Approach,’’ Crime, Law & Social Change: An International Journal 32:4 (1999): 301— 

323. xxx Conference itinerary and speakers can be found at http://www.ideea.com/ 

comdef06tucson/. xxxi ‘‘ChevronTexaco Announces Plans for an Offshore LNG Terminal in Baja California,’’ Press Release, Chevron Texaco (October 30, 2003), as found on http:// 

www.chevron.com/news/press/2003/2003–10–30.asp; ‘‘Sempra’s Gas Venture Gathering Steam at Baja Site,’’ The San Diego Union Tribune (October 24, 2005). xxxii U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ‘‘The Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach and 

CBP: The Giant of the Pacific Rim’’ (January 25, 2007), as found on http:// 

www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fullltextlarticles/tourslcbplfacilities/ 

giantlpacificlrim.xml. xxxiiiFor example, see Lawrence Herzog, Cross-border Flows and the Future of the 

California-Baja California Border Region, California Economic Policy Report (Public 

Policy Institute of California, 2007—08 forthcoming); Lawrence A. Herzog (ed.), 

Shared Space: Rethinking The Mexico-United States Border Environment (Center for 

U.S.-Mexican Studies, UC San Diego, 2000); and Lawrence A. Herzog, Where North 

Meets South: Cities, Space and Politics on the U.S.-Mexico Border (CMAS/ILAS/University of Texas Press, 1990). xxxivSANDAG, ‘‘Borders Coordination,’’ as found on http://www.sandag.org/ 

index.asp?classid=19&fuseaction=home.classhome. xxxvSANDAG, ‘‘Border Coordination: Comprehensive Borders Coordination 

Projects,’’ as found on http://www.sandag.org/ 

index.asp?projectid=234&fuseaction=projects.detail. xxxvi A list of current projects can be found at SANDAG, ‘‘Borders Coordination: Binational Projects,’’ as found on http://www.sandag.org/ 

index.asp?subclassid=104&fuseaction=home.subclasshome. xxxviiMore information on SCERP can be found at http://www.scerp.org/. xxxviii U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ‘‘The Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach 

and CBP: The Giant of the Pacific Rim’’ (January 25, 2007), as found on http:// 

www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fullltextlarticles/tourslcbplfacilities/ 

giantlpacificlrim.xml. xxxixThese and other border security related initiatives are linked from ‘‘The European Commission—A to Z,’’ as found at http://ec.europa.eu/atozlen.htm. 

xl ‘‘Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America,’’ as found on http:// 

www.spp.gov/. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

Dr. O’Hanlon? 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL O’HANLON, SENIOR FELLOW, 

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Mr. O’HANLON. Thank you, Congresswoman. It is an honor to be 

here. 

I want to talk briefly about some of the work we have done at 

Brookings, along with Jim Steinberg and others, on the importance 

of information technology and intelligence-gathering in the counterterrorism mission and how this question today of the border relates 

to that. 

And I want to do it in a fairly general way, recognizing others 

on the committee I think have more technical expertise on the Secure Border Initiative. 

The point I want to make is that, in our Brookings work that you 

kindly mentioned earlier, Congresswoman, we have really emphaVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
60 

sized that prevention has to be seen as the most important tier in 

homeland security. 

Not everyone agrees with this. There are a lot of people who talk 

about consequence management and response. We certainly acknowledge the importance of those sorts of efforts as well. But we 

believe that stopping actions as they are being hatched or as people 

are trying to get in position has to be seen as the most important 

approach. 

What that means for today’s subject is that you need to know 

who you are dealing with. You need to know who is in the country, 

who is trying to get in the country. You have to use the opportunity 

that you have at the border and other places to spotlight attention 

on individuals if you are going to be effective in counterterrorism. 

You cannot wait for people to get within a few hundred yards of 

a building and figure out then what they are trying to attack. And 

you cannot wait for them to have done the attack and then do consequence management. 

Some of the ideas that are out there with other advocates of new 

homeland security initiatives—to spend $20 billion a year, for example, on additional consequence management and response capability—we don’t really agree with in the Brookings analysis. We 

want to focus on prevention. 

A lot of the steps we recommend, such as further tightening of 

terror watch lists; creating a Google-like capability to look at, if you 

are a policeman in one city, you see some kind of suspicious behavior, you want to know if it has been detected elsewhere, so you 

want to go Google computer records of other police departments to 

know what they have seen; creating more cells in police units, like 

New York City’s, where you have a counterterrorism unit. 

A lot of these sorts of efforts only work if you have good databases and you know who you are dealing with. You have to be able 

to get information on the people who might be troublesome to you. 

You have to know who they are. I also am a strong supporter of 

biometric robust indicators on driver’s licenses and passports for 

this same sort of reason. 

But all these different kinds of efforts that we try to emphasize 

in the Brookings work and which are a little bit tangential to your 

focus today still come back to today’s topic, and they tell you, if you 

don’t know who is coming in the country, these methods probably 

won’t work. You have to get a good handle on the border to do everything else correctly in counterterrorism, especially if you have 

the prevention focus that we argue is necessary in the Brookings 

analysis. 

And so, this is really not a specific assessment of the Secure Border Initiative or any other particular program, but I certainly want 

to applaud the emphasis on this question. 

And I think the magnitude of expense that is envisioned for the 

Secure Border Initiative of about $10 billion is the right kind of 

magnitude of numbers that we should be talking about. If you are 

going to make that kind of an additional investment in homeland 

security, we argue, it should be at the level of intelligence-gathering and of knowing who you are dealing with, rather than waiting to protect buildings and protect—or clean up after an attack, 

61 

1Much of this comes from Kurt Campbell and Michael O’Hanlon, Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security (Basic, 2006); and Michael d’Arcy, Michael O’Hanlon, Peter Orszag, Jeremy Shapiro, and James Steinberg, Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007 (Brookings, 2006). 2See President George W. Bush, ‘‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American 

People,’’ September 20, 2001, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/ 

20010920–8.html; President George W. Bush, ‘‘State of the Union Address,’’ January 29, 2002, 

available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129–11.html; and President George W. Bush, ‘‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America,’’ September 

17, 2002, available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html. 

which is important, which requires some attention, but it is not the 

best expenditure of your dollar. 

So, from a straight counterterrorism perspective, a Secure Border 

Initiative-like program is paramount in importance. 

Thanks for the chance to make that argument. 

[The statement of Mr. O’Hanlon follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL O’HANLON, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION1

A critical issue in any national security agenda for the United States is how to 

protect America against the most immediate and direct threat to U.S. security the 

possibility that future attacks like those of September 11, 2001 will again kill large 

numbers of American citizens here in the homeland. If they able to obtain weapons 

of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons or advanced biological agents, the 

toll could easily be 10 or even 100 times worse. Politically, the issue of counterterrorism and homeland security is of manifest importance too. The Bush administration achieved a greater advantage over Democrats in general and Senator John 

Kerry in particular on this issue than on any other in the 2004 presidential race. 

Homeland security is a matter on which this Congress as well as the next Congress and administration will have to make great progress because much remains 

to be done. That said, the arguments of critics are often too harsh and sweeping. 

Much remains to be accomplished, to be sure, in protecting the United States 

against al Qaeda and related groups. And on some questions, such as the long-term 

battle of ideas and the execution of the Iraq war, the Bush Administration’s record 

should indeed be subject to severe criticism. But it is misleading to suggest that the 

Bush administration has been weak on what might be termed the hard power aspects of the homeland security agenda improving the country’s defenses against 

their aspirations for further attacks. Democrats and moderate Republicans who 

would challenge the Bush legacy and chart a future path for the country of their 

own need to develop a clearer sense of what has been achieved, and of what must 

still be done. More important than the politics of it, of course, America’s security 

and the well-being of its citizens depend on such a clear-headed assessment and 

sound policy agenda from their future political leaders. 

The war on terror has been a hot subject in American politics at least since President Bush broadened the scope of his definition of the effort to include the doctrine 

of military preemption and the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime. In fact, 

it has been controversial even longer. Mr. Bush’s State of the Union speech of January 29, 2002 also known as the ‘‘axis of evil’’ speech signaled a broader scope for 

the war on terror than originally described by the president in his address to another joint session of Congress the previous September 20, just nine days after the 

September 11 attacks.2 The debate over the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security was central in the Congressional midterm elections of 2002, in which 

President Bush campaigned more actively than presidents typically do at such 

points in the political cycle. Mr. Bush had originally opposed the idea of a new department, which in fact was initially Senator Joseph Lieberman’s idea. But after accepting the notion in the spring of 2002, and proposing a bill to create it that year, 

the president argued that Democrats were placing their political interests in defending unions ahead of their obligations to help defend the American people. Democrats 

countered that protecting workers remains a critically important goal for the country itself, and that a federal workforce deprived of core rights and protections might 

suffer weaker morale and as a result perform suboptimally in trying to protect the 

country. But Mr. Bush’s argument seemed to resonate with voters, helping Republican candidates win several tight races and take back the Senate. 

Democrats have responded by arguing that the Bush Administration has tolerated 

glaring gaps in the nation’s protection against terrorism here at home even as it 

has prosecuted wars abroad with vigor. For example, they point to the very slow 

integration of terrorist watchlists during Mr. Bush’s first term, and to the adminisVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
62 

3For more on some of these issues, see Richard A. Falkenrath, The 9/11 Commission Report: 

A Review Essay, International Security, vol. 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004/05), p. 184. 4Mark Mazzetti, Spymaster Tells Secret of Size of Spy Force, New York Times, April 21, 2006. 

tration’s weak efforts to help states and localities improve their counterterror capabilities. 

The president has weathered sharp critiques in part because his critics have been 

less than skilful. That said, Democrats have arguably often raised the wrong issues 

or done so in the wrong way on both policy and political grounds. In the 2004 presidential race, for example, Senator Kerry and President Bush competed to see which 

could more quickly and convincingly align himself with the recommendations of the 

9/11 commission on matters such as reform and restructuring of America’s intelligence community, with Kerry often criticizing Bush for delay. But many of the key 

changes to intelligence that were most needed to break down stovepipes in the system had already been fixed prior to the release of that report. Critics of the Bush 

Administration from both parties have also argued that the Patriot Act did not give 

proper due to the civil liberties of American citizens just as detention policies at 

Guantanamo Bay and prison policies at Abu Ghraib have hurt America’s reputation 

for fairness and created even more hatred of this country that has helped al Qaeda 

with its recruiting worldwide. These criticisms of the latter policies have generally 

been appropriate and fair. But the Patriot Act, which updated surveillance methods 

for the era of computers and cell phones, broke down barriers to sharing of intelligence across agencies, and strengthened standards on documents such as passports 

was far better legislation than critics often allowed. By so strongly condemning it, 

many Democrats therefore set themselves up for Bush Administration counterattack. 

Finally, Democrats and other administration critics have often purported that the 

Bush Administration did not do enough to train and equip first responders around 

the country to deal with possible attacks. In some ways that charge is correct, but 

it would have been expensive folly to invest tens of billions of dollars in protective 

gear and rudimentary training for all the nation’s first responders, as often proposed. A more targeted set of investments focused on the most likely terror targets 

in the country geographically, as well as on the types of technologies and training 

that provide the most capability per dollar makes a good deal more sense.3

I argue here for several specific policy initiatives on homeland security, and somewhat greater spending by the federal government as well as the private sector, but 

not for a kitchen-sink approach to the problem or any radical increase in resources. 

In dealing with this huge set of challenges, clear priorities and a clear conceptual 

framework for guiding investments are essential. Otherwise costs can be exorbitant, 

and less-important tasks may distract attention from more important ones. 

Specifically, I advocate new initiatives to encourage the private sector to protect 

itself more effectively, especially in sectors such as the chemical industry and highrise buildings; to develop a more comprehensive system for cargo security on airplanes and in shipping containers entering the country and in trucks and trains carrying toxic materials domestically; to create national standards for driver’s licenses 

with biometric indicators (not photos) and, similarly, improvement of the biometric 

indicators used on US passports; to encourage more large-city police departments 

to build dedicated counterterror cells as New York has done; and to develop a quickmanufacture capacity for vaccines and antidotes to new pathogens that it does not 

now possess. 

Before developing the logic behind these prescriptions, however, it is first important to assess where we stand in the war on terror. (Those not wishing this background can certainly feel free to skip ahead a section.) 

A Status Report for the War on Terror 

In developing their policies and positions on counterterrorism strategy for the 

coming years, candidates need to begin with a clear sense of the facts. While much 

is still undone, the fact is that much has also been accomplished in the last five 

years. Much of that increase in safety has come from offensive operations abroad 

the military overthrow of the Taliban and associated attacks against al Qa’eda, as 

well as the intelligence and covert operations conducted by the United States in conjunction with key allies such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. 

Homeland security spending is up by at least 300 percent hardly fitting the 

charge that its funding is on ‘‘life support’’ that some critics have offered. U.S. intelligence spending is now reportedly up to $44 billion a year, as much as $10 billion 

more than estimated levels from the 1990s, with nearly 100,000 individuals working 

for American intelligence agencies.4 There is more debate in the analytic process, 

and a clearer emphasis in finished reports on the uncertainties of various types of 

assessments (to avoid the mistakes not only of 9/11, but of the Iraqi WMD experiVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
63 

5 John A. Kringen, How We’ve Improved Intelligence, Washington Post, April 3, 2006, p. 19. 6 Charles Doyle, The USA Patriot Act: A Sketch, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: 

Congressional Research Service, April 18, 2002). 7 Richard A. Posner, A New Surveillance Act, Wall Street Journal, February 15, 2006, p. 16; 

and Philip Bobbitt, Why We Listen, New York Times, January 30, 2006, p. A27. 8 Jim VandeHei, Rift Between Parties Over NSA Wiretapping Grows, Washington Post, January 26, 2006, p. 4. 

ence).5 Terror watch lists are now integrated, perhaps belatedly; domestic and foreign intelligence operations no longer have strong ‘‘firewalls’’ between them, and 

that change was made quickly. 

The Patriot Act, whatever its problems in insufficiently protecting civil liberties, 

or its possible over-exuberance in allowing subpoenas of library records and the like, 

on balance has been good legislation. Democrats and other Bush administration critics need to acknowledge that updating wiretap authority for the era of the internet, 

allowing ‘‘roving wiretaps’’ not fixed to one phone or location, breaking down barriers between the FBI and CIA, making banks report suspicious money transfers, 

requiring visa-waiver countries to have biometric indicators on their passports, prohibiting possession of dangerous biological materials without good research or medicinal reasons, and similar measures were overdue and prudent.6 There is room for 

debate about specific provisions of the Patriot Act, but it is neither sound policy nor 

sound politics to rail against it categorically as critics have sometimes done. 

Similarly, in the debate over domestic eavesdropping, Democrats and many Republicans have been right to expect Mr. Bush not to disobey the law (or push it all 

the way to the breaking point). Asserting greater executive privilege should not extend to flouting existing legislation or claiming to find incredulous loopholes within 

it. But Democrats should also recognize that obtaining warrants in advance for all 

eavesdropping, even from a court set up to do so quickly and secretly, is neither 

practical nor prudent, as argued convincingly by law professors and judges with experience in the field such as Philip Bobbitt and Richard Posner.7

On Guantanamo, critics have again been largely right to criticize as un-American 

and counterproductive the willingness of the administration to hold detainees indefinitely without charges or any type of due process. This has been a huge policy mistake of the United States. It reflects some partially correct observations that terrorists are not like soldiers, that introducing the cases of detainees into normal American criminal courts is not practical given the kinds of classified information, including sources and methods on how we monitor possible terrorists, that would then 

have to be discussed openly. On the whole, however, the Bush administration’s 

treatment of terrorist detainees has caused far more damage to the United States 

than any of the policy’s authors seem to appreciate and far more damage than can 

be easily or quickly repaired. 

Yet critics must themselves be careful. Tone matters when critiquing such policies, for Bush administration critics will not succeed when they sound as if they fear 

a hypothetical executive threat to civil liberties more than they fear another al 

Qaeda attack. So does any suggestion that the country is now safe enough that we 

can always place every last hypothetical civil liberties concern ahead of confronting 

al Qaeda. In this regard, a recent quote by a senior Democratic political strategist, 

reflective of a good deal of ongoing thinking, is in our view wrongheaded. In regard 

to the eavesdropping issue, he stated early in 2006 that ‘‘I don’t think the national 

security attack works this time we have a politically weakened president whose poll 

numbers are down and whose credibility is under increased scrutiny.’’8 This is exactly the wrong kind of political thinking to engage in for anyone wishing to win 

an election. 

Guantanamo has been a travesty. A smarter policy would recognize the need for 

special legal procedures for suspected terrorists but create a legal firewall inside the 

government between those charged with arresting and holding terrorists, on the one 

hand, and those determining their fate on the other. In particular, the administration should have moved far more quickly to create an independent authority inside 

the executive branch with the binding power to release detainees it deemed no 

longer a threat, and it should have set up a regularized hearing process to assess 

the status of detainees promptly and fairly. But it is also perfectly clear that trying 

terrorist cases in normal criminal courts would have been unworkable. 

The United States now processes and shares information about specific individuals suspected of ties to terrorism much more efficiently throughout the federal government. It does so through increased integration of databases (even if that process 

took longer than it should have after 9/11), and greater collaboration between the 

FBI and the intelligence community (which began to occur shortly after 9/11). These 

initial efforts have now been reinforced by the passage of the Intelligence Reform 

64 

9 Vicky O’Hara, ‘‘Terrorist Funding,’’ National Public Radio, Morning Edition, November 20, 

2003; Speech of George W. Bush at the FBI Academy, Quantico, VA, September 10, 2003; and 

Philip Shenon, ‘‘U.S. Reaches Deal to Limit Transfers of Portable Missiles,’’ New York Times, 

October 21, 2003, p. A1. 10 Tom Ridge, ‘‘Since That Day,’’ Washington Post, September 11, 2003, p. 23. 11 Martin Enserink, ‘‘Facing a Security Deadline, Labs Get a ‘Provisional’ Pass,’’ Science, November 7, 2003, p. 962. 12 There may be some gaps in these types of protective measures to date, but the overall level 

of security is generally good. See Statement of Jim Wells, General Accounting Office, ‘‘Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Improve Security at Nuclear 

Power Plants,’’ GAO-04-1064T, September 14, 2004. 13John Moteff, ‘‘Computer Security: A Summary of Selected Federal Laws, Executive Orders, 

and Presidential Directives,’’ Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL32357, 

April 16, 2004, p. 2. 14 David Johnston and Andrew C. Revkin, ‘‘Officials Say Their Focus Is on Car and Truck 

Bombs,’’ New York Times, August 2, 2004, p. A13. 15 President George W. Bush, Speech on Terrorism at the National Endowment for Democracy, October 6, 2005, available at www.whitehouse.gov [accessed October 6, 2005]. 16 Eric Lichtblau, ‘‘Finance Centers Are Said to Be the Targets,’’ New York Times, August 2, 

2004, p. 1. 

and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 that restructured the intelligence community 

and created the position of director of national intelligence. These linked databases 

enable more effective offensive operations abroad and homeland security operations 

within American borders. 

The share of FBI resources devoted to counterterrorism has doubled, and the combined CIA/FBI personnel working on terrorist financing alone have increased from 

less than a dozen to more than 300 since September, 2001.9 International cooperation in sharing information on suspected terrorists has improved. Many close allies, 

such as France and Britain, have been helpful for many years, but intelligence sharing on known al Qaeda threats has also become reasonably good with states such 

as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in part because some such states now take the 

jihadist threat to their own interests more seriously than they used to. 

Air travel is also much safer today than before 9/11. The United States now conducts screening of all passenger luggage, requires hardened cockpit doors on all 

large American commercial aircraft, deploys thousands of air marshals on commercial carriers, and allows armed pilots on commercial and cargo flights. 

Suspicious ships entering U.S. waters are now screened more frequently, and containers coming into the United States are two to three times more likely to be inspected than before. Hundreds of millions of doses of antibiotics and enough smallpox vaccine for every man, woman, and child in the United States have been stockpiled.10 Oversight rules have been tightened on labs working with biological materials (including background checks on lab employees).11 Terrorism insurance is 

backstopped by a new federal program, recently renewed in 2005. 

Well-known bridges and tunnels are protected by police and National Guard 

forces during terrorism alerts. Nuclear reactor sites have better perimeter protection 

than before.12 Federal agencies are required to have security programs for their information technology networks. Many private firms have backed up their headquarters and their databanks so that operations and information systems could survive the catastrophic loss of a main site.13

What all of these efforts amount to, in short, is this: we have prepared fairly well 

to fight the last war that is, to stop the kinds of attacks that the United States has 

already experienced. Importantly, the United States has also gotten much better at 

trying to prevent attacks by tracking suspected terrorists more assertively. Since 

prevention should be seen as the most crucial stage of the homeland security effort, 

more important for example than hardening most individual targets, this is real 

progress. 

The United States cannot be complacent, however. We have done much less than 

we should in the way of detailed preparation to thwart other kinds of plausible 

strikes. It made sense to move quickly to prevent al Qa’eda, with its longstanding 

interest in airplanes, from easily repeating the 9/11 attacks. But it is high time to 

do a more comprehensive and forward-looking job of protecting the American people. 

Al Qa’eda may not be as capable as before of ‘‘spectacular’’ attacks in coming 

years. It is, however, certainly still capable of using explosives and small arms, with 

considerable lethality.14 There have not been more attacks within the United States. 

But according to an October, 2005 speech by President Bush, the United States has 

disrupted three attempted al Qa’eda strikes inside the United States, and intercepted at least five plots to case targets or infiltrate terrorists into this country.15

There were serious worries that al Qa’eda would use truck bombs to destroy key 

financial institutions in New York, Newark, and Washington in 2004.16 The ‘‘shoe 

65 

17 Shaun Waterman, ‘‘Al Qa’eda Warns of Threat to Water Supply,’’ Washington Times, May 

29, 2003, p. 6; and Eric Lichtblau, ‘‘U.S. Cites al Qa’eda in Plan to Destroy Brooklyn Bridge,’’ 

New York Times, June 20, 2003, p. 1.??? 18 Eric Lichtblau, ‘‘Government Report on U.S. Aviation Warns of Security Holes,’’ New York 

Times, March 14, 2005, p. A1. 19 Matthew Brzezinski, Fortress America (New York: Bantam Books, 2004), pp. 16–17. 20 See Gilmore Commission (Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction), Fifth Annual Report, Forging America’s New 

Normalcy: Securing Our Homeland, Preserving Our Liberty (Arlington, Va.: RAND Corporation, 

December 15, 2003), p. 1; Alan B. Krueger and David D. Laitin, ‘‘‘Misunderestimating’ Terrorism,’’ Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no. 5 (September/October 2004), p. 9; and Susan B. Glasser, 

‘‘U.S. Figures Show Sharp Global Rise in Terrorism,’’ Washington Post, April 27, 2005, p. 1. 21 Warren P. Strobel, U.S.: Terrorist Attacks Increased Last Year, Philadelphia Inquirer, 

April 21, 2006. 22 Richard Benedetto, Americans Expect Attacks, Poll Finds, USA Today, July 12, 2005, p. 

1. 23 Will Marshall and Jeremy Rosner, Introduction: A Progressive Answer to Jihadist Terror, 

in Will Marshall, ed., With All Our Might: A Progressive Strategy for Defeating Jihadism and 

Defending Liberty (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), p. 2. 24 See Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 25 The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commission), Implementing the National Strategy (December 2002), p. 11; and Douglas Farah and Peter Finn, ‘‘Terrorism, Inc.,’’ Washington Post, 

November 21, 2003, p. 33. On the assertion that modern terrorist groups watch and learn from 

each other, see Bruce Hoffman, ‘‘Terrorism Trends and Prospects,’’ in Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, Countering the New Terrorism (Santa 

Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), pp. 8—28; and on the nature of al Qa’eda and affiliated as well 

as sympathetic organizations, see Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2001), pp. 54—55. 26 Cited in Daniel L. Byman, ‘‘Homeland Security: We’re Safer Than You Think,’’ Slate, August 2, 2004. 27 Leyla Linton, ‘‘Al-Qa’eda, Taliban Can Still Launch Attacks, Report Says,’’ Philadelphia Inquirer, February 16, 2005. 

bomber,’’ Richard Reid, attempted to destroy an airplane headed to the United 

States in 2002.17 U.S. intelligence reports in early 2005 suggested the possibility of 

attacks using private aircraft or helicopters.18 Al Qa’eda prisoner interviewers and 

confiscated documents suggest other possible attacks ranging from blowing up gas 

stations to poisoning water supplies to using crop dusters to spread biological weapons to detonating radioactive dirty bombs.19

The years 2002, 2003, and 2004 were among the most lethal in the history of global terrorism, with attacks afflicting a wide swath of countries from Spain to Morocco 

to Tunisia to Saudi Arabia to Pakistan to Indonesia and of course Iraq.20 The pattern continued in 2005, a year during which the number of global terrorist attacks 

again grew relative to the year before (though new counting methods and limits 

upon the public release of data make it somewhat difficult to compare precisely from 

year to year).21 The July 7 London attacks that year should have vividly reminded 

westerners in general of their continued vulnerability.22 According to Hillary Peck 

of the RAND Corporation, even though fewer Americans were the victims, global fatalities from terrorist action exceeded the 2001 total of 4,555 in both 2004 and 2005 

(the death toll exceeded 5,000 in each of those latter two years).23

Al Qa’eda has clearly been weakened at the top since 9/11. That said, it remains 

extremely dangerous, and not just because bin Laden and al-Zawahiri remain at 

large. 24 Al Qaeda is now less of a vertical organization than an ideology or a method used by collection of loosely affiliated local groups that share similar goals. They 

also watch and learn from each other, through television and the internet and extended family connections and other social networks.25 Former CIA Director Tenet 

put it succinctly in 2004: ‘‘Successive blows to al Qa’eda’s central leadership have 

transformed the organization into a loose collection of regional networks that operate more autonomously.’’26

There are benefits from dispersing al Qa’eda in this way; the near-term risk of 

sophisticated catastrophic attacks has probably declined as a result. But the risk of 

smaller and sometimes quite deadly strikes clearly has not and the possibility of 

further catastrophic attacks may well increase again in the future. To underscore 

the enduring risks, a U.N. study in early 2005 argued that al Qa’eda continues to 

have easy access to financial resources and bomb-making materials.27

Great benefits were gained by depriving al Qa’eda of its sanctuary in Afghanistan 

in Operating Enduring Freedom. Al Qa’eda may learn to reconstitute itself with a 

less formal and more virtual and horizontal network, however. It could also avoid 

terrorist watch lists with some effectiveness, for example by using new recruits including possibly women, non-Arabs, and European passport holders to conduct fuVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
66 

28 Washington in Brief, Washington Post, July 17, 2004, p. A5. 29 Byman, ‘‘Homeland Security,’’ Slate, August 2, 2004; and ABC News, ‘‘No ’True’ Al Qa’eda 

Sleeper Agents Have Been Found in U.S.,’’ abcnews.com, March 9, 2005. 30 Bill Gertz, ‘‘Goss Fears WMD Attack in U.S. ‘A Matter of Time,’’’ Washington Times, February 17, 2005, p. 3. 31 Dana Priest and Josh White, ‘‘War Helps Recruit Terrorists, Hill Told,’’ Washington Post, 

February 17, 2005, p. 1. 32 National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future (December 2004), p. 94. 33 Richard K. Betts, ‘‘The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror,’’ Political Science Quarterly, vol. 117, no. 1 (Spring 2002), p. 30. 34 On jamming, see ‘‘U.S. Homeland Defense Strategists,’’ Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 6, 2004, p. 20. 35 Peter D. Zimmerman with Cheryl Loeb, ‘‘Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited,’’ Defense Horizons, no. 38 (January 2004). 

ture attacks against Western countries.28 The United States is fortunate not to 

have, as far as we know, many al Qa’eda cells presently on its soil, as several European countries do. It is not a foregone conclusion that things will stay this way, 

however.29 For all these reasons, it is hard to disagree with former CIA Director 

Porter Goss, who told Congress in February 2005 that ‘‘It may be only a matter of 

time before al Qa’eda or another group attempts to use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.’’30

The Iraq war, whatever its other merits, has probably not alleviated the global 

terrorism problem. Indeed, it may have worsened it, by aiding al Qa’eda’s recruiting 

efforts and providing jihadists a focal point to practice their crafts and establish new 

networks. To quote Goss again, ‘‘Islamic extremists are exploiting the Iraqi conflict 

to recruit new anti-U.S. jihadists. These jihadists who survive will leave Iraq experienced and focused on acts of urban terrorism.’’31 The National Intelligence Council 

reached a similar conclusion in its 2004 report, Mapping the Global Future.32

The Agenda for this Congress and the Next 

Of course, it is not possible to defend a large, open, advanced society from all possible types of terrorism. The United States contains more than half a million 

bridges, nearly 500 skyscrapers, nearly 200,000 miles of natural gas pipelines, more 

than 2,800 power plants the list of critical infrastructure alone is far too long to protect everything, to say nothing of subways, restaurants and movie theaters and 

schools and malls.33 Certain special measures, such as providing extremely tight security around the nation’s 104 nuclear power plants, clearly cannot be extended to 

all possible targets.34

But by focusing on the worst possible attacks, the United States can establish priorities and make further progress in protecting the country. Several guidelines 

should inform future efforts, and politicians’ efforts to speak to the American people 

about what broad principles should guide next steps in enhancing homeland security: 

First, while it was correct to focus initially on preventing al Qaeda from carrying 

out attacks similar to those of 9/11, we have prepared a bit too exclusively to fight 

‘‘the last war.’’ Heeding the counsel of the 9/11 commission, we now need to stretch 

our imaginations a bit to identify other key national vulnerabilities, such as possible 

attacks on chemical plants or skyscrapers or the air circulation systems of stadiums 

Second, we should focus first and foremost on prevention that is, on obtaining 

good intelligence on terrorists, and impeding their movements and their financial 

transactions and their communications, rather than focusing on point defense of the 

nation’s key assets or on mitigating the consequences of successful attacks (the latter tasks are important but are not as optimal as preventive efforts). 

Third, since we cannot protect everything, we should worry most about possible 

terrorist strikes that would cause large numbers of casualties. Only slightly less 

critically, we should focus intensively on preventing attacks that might cause only 

a relatively few casualties, but huge economic ripple effects, such as episodes of attempted smuggling that revealed gaping holes in shipping container security. 

Here is another example of the latter type of scenario. If a shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile took down an airplane, casualties might be relatively modest dozens or hundreds a tragedy for those involved to be sure, but in and of itself not debilitating to the nation. The effects on the nation’s air travel could be devastating, 

however. They also could endure much longer than those of September 11, 2001, 

since it would take a good deal of time to figure out a workable response to avoid 

future SAM attacks. Another example could be the use of a radiological weapon, 

which uses conventional explosive to disperse radioactive material, in an urban 

area. It would not kill many people, but would likely cause mass panic. It would 

also probably require a very costly and time-consuming cleanup as well as implementation of disruptive security measures throughout the country.35

67 

36 Lawrence M. Wein and Edward H. Kaplan, ‘‘Unready for Anthrax,’’ Washington Post, July 

28, 2003, p. A21. 37 Statement of Richard Falkenrath before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, January 26, 2005, pp. 14-15. 38 Statement of Richard Falkenrath before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, January 26, 2005, pp. 12-14. 39 Statement of Richard Falkenrath before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, January 26, 2005, pp. 2, 7. 40 For a similar critique of Congress’s role, see 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report 

(New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2004), pp. 420—422. 41 See Statement of Richard Falkenrath before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs, January 26, 2005, p. 4. 

There are also general areas of homeland security where important progress has 

occurred in some ways but where key shortcomings remain. Consider America’s vulnerability to biological attack. Although antibiotic stocks for addressing any anthrax 

attack are now fairly robust, means of quickly delivering the antibiotics are not.36

Longer-term worries about biological attacks remain acute, since there could be 

many types of infectious agents for which antidotes and vaccines prove unavailable 

(or non-existent) when they are most needed. 

As for air travel, most passengers are still not screened for explosives, cargo carried on commercial jets is usually not inspected either, and private planes face minimal security scrutiny. For all the security improvements that have been made for 

U.S. carriers, moreover, fewer have been made to many foreign carriers that transport large numbers of Americans to and from the United States. 

More generally, the U.S. private sector has done very little to protect itself.37

From chemical plants to trucking carrying hazardous shipping to skyscrapers, 

vulnerabilities are often acute and not far different from how they presented themselves prior to 2001.38 Owners of private infrastructure know that the chances of 

any one facility they own being attacked are miniscule, so they are not apt to incur 

added costs and concede to shareholders and neighbors that their facilities might 

vulnerable on their own volition. Yet viewed from a national perspective, these 

means that certain systemic vulnerabilities remain unaddressed. 

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security has not automatically led 

to better protection against such threats, as the hapless response to Hurricane 

Katrina revealed. DHS has many capable and dedicated individuals serving within 

it. However, reorganizations can distract attention from efforts to identify remaining 

key American vulnerabilities and then mitigate them.39 Carrying out a major governmental overhaul during what is essentially a time of war is a risky proposition. 

It is also not the way the country has typically responded to national crises. The 

Department of Defense was not created during World War II, but afterwards. The 

Goldwater-Nichols Pentagon reorganization in 1986 was carried out during a time 

of relative international peace. 

Congress has improved its ability to address homeland security issues by creating 

dedicated authorization committees and appropriations subcommittees in both 

houses somewhat. Yet it has not gone far enough. These dedicated committees and 

subcommittees must share jurisdiction with many other committees and subcommittees that insist on a share of the decision-making power.40 This approach breeds parochialism among the individual committees and subcommittees about the particular dimensions of homeland security they address. It can also reinforce the tendency for Congressmen to allocate precious homeland security to dollars to their districts rather than to where they might do the most good.41 Congress should ensure 

that homeland security committees and subcommittees should generally have exclusive jurisdiction over funding that is found within the homeland security realm. 

In sum, then, much has been done in homeland security, and much remains to 

be done. That message, with that balanced tone, may be less appealing to politicians 

seeking to excoriate the Bush administration’s record, but it is a fairer reflection of 

reality. In tone and temperament, it also conveys a seriousness of purpose Americans may appreciate more than the wanton partisanship of recent years. A candidate offering specific critiques not only can come across as more affable, but sends 

a message that he or she is seeking concrete, specific improvements in policy rather 

than opportunities for partisan attack that are of little use once in office. 

The organizing philosophy of our future efforts on homeland security should be 

to protect against attacks with potentially catastrophic impact on the country, in 

human or economic or political terms. In the interest of cost effectiveness, where 

possible action should focus on prevention of attacks rather than site defense of potential targets or consequence mitigation after attacks have occurred. But a blend 

of all approaches will be needed: 

68 

42 Kendall Hoyt, Bird Flu Won’t Wait, New York Times, March 3, 2006. 43 Michael d’Arcy, Michael O’Hanlon, Peter Orszag, Jeremy Shapiro, and James Steinberg, 

Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2006), pp. 122—124. 44 James Steinberg, Intelligence Reform, in Michael d’Arcy, Michael O’Hanlon, Peter Orszag, 

Jeremy Shapiro, and James Steinberg, Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007 (Washington, D.C.: 

Brookings Institution, 2006),pp. 27-30; and Jeremy Shapiro, ‘‘International Cooperation on 

Homeland Security,’’ in d’Arcy, O’Hanlon, Orszag, Shapiro, and Steinberg, Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007, pp. 58-69. 45 Michael d’Arcy, Technology Development and Transportation Security,’’ in d’Arcy, 

O’Hanlon, Orszag, Shapiro, and Steinberg, Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007, pp. 135-39. 

•creating incentives for the private sector to protect itself more effectively, especially in sectors such as the chemical industry and high-rise buildings 

•developing a better and much more rigorous security system for container 

cargo 

•greatly expanding screening of cargo on airplanes 

•creation of national standards for driver’s licenses with biometric indicators 

(not photos) and, similarly, improvement of the biometric indicators used on US 

passports 

•encouragement to more large-city police departments to build dedicated 

counterterror cells as New York has done 

•with terror watch lists now largely integrated, movement to the next step in 

using information technology in the war on terror creation of a ‘‘google-like’’ 

search capacity across different police and intelligence databases for correlations of suspicious behavior 

•examination of how the country can develop a quick-manufacture capacity for 

vaccines and antidotes to new pathogens that it does not now possess. This 

could also be of great importance in addressing such scenarios as a possible mutation of the bird flu H5N1 virus to a form highly dangerous to humans.42

It is always sound to begin discussion of a new homeland security agenda by focusing on intelligence the front lines in the effort, and the most important type of 

homeland security effort since an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure (or 

consequence management). Since there is too much to protect in this country, the 

only way to make homeland security successful is to stop most terrorists before they 

can even get in position to attempt an attack. 

One key area of needed improvement in this domain is coordination between the 

federal government on the one hand and state and local governments on the other. 

Today, although the FBI runs the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) in major cities, and is beginning to help state and local police forces more effectively, it is very 

small compared with police forces. That means it can have nothing like the same 

presence on the ground. In addition, while changes have occurred, it has been slow 

to change its traditional focus on solving criminal cases. An approach recommended 

recently by a team of Brookings scholars would use federal funds to expand local 

police intelligence and counterterrorism units in America’s larger cities.43 Today, 

only New York really takes this task seriously. The use of federal funds to recruit 

an extra 10,000 police officers for this purpose would cost around $1 billion a year. 

Other steps are needed too. Notably, despite the opposition of a number of states, 

federal standards for driving licenses must be mandated. U.S. security agencies 

should also create ‘‘data czars’’—to protect information, and also to facilitate its 

timely exchange when appropriate. 

As Brookings scholar Jeremy Shapiro and Dean of the LBJ School of Public Policy 

James Steinberg have recently argued, the transatlantic homeland security agenda 

requires further work as well. For example, an assistance and extradition treaty 

was signed between the U.S. and E.U. in June 2003. But there is still a need for 

measures on both sides of the Atlantic that allow the admission of intelligence information as evidence in court while protecting against its disclosure.44

There are also some areas where existing European efforts at homeland security 

exceed those of the United States. In particular, as Michael d’Arcy of King’s College 

in London has argued, the U.S. choice of using just a facial image as the biometric 

indicator in its passports is unwise. Photographs are inherently unreliable. The U.S. 

should follow the E.U. in incorporating fingerprints data, and ideally both sides of 

the Atlantic will move to using iris data in time.45

Foreign airliners should also be expected to meet tighter security standards within short order. This problem is of particular concern outside the European Union. 

Deployments of hardened aircraft doors and air marshals are imperative. They are 

also overdue. 

Considerable progress has been made in the US-VISIT program, which requires 

most people entering the United States to submit fingerprints and a digital photograph. These biometrics can then be checked against the DHS IDENT database and 

69 

46 Stephen E. Flynn and James M. Loy, A Port in the Storm Over Dubai, New York Times, 

February 28, 2006, p. A19. 

the records of visa holders. The United States should also speed up efforts to track 

the exits of visa holders. This is important to prevent people who have managed to 

get into the country on visa to overstay their legally allowed stay, with the possibility of conducting terror attacks over a long period of time. 

There are also still major problems at the U.S. borders, which remain porous despite major improvements. The PATRIOT Act increased the number of patrol agents 

at the U.S.-Canadian border to 1,000, but more are needed, as evidenced by the continued high flow of people across the border. The SBI is appears to be an initiative 

that in scale and scope is commensurate with the seriousness of this challenge. In 

this context, the United States and its neighbors should continue to move to a regime in which all people who cross the border, including passengers in cars, are individually screened. This is not standard practice today. 

Those who have traveled by plane from certain airports in the United States in 

recent months may have undergone the straightforward process of explosives ‘‘sniffing.’’ This should become standard practice at all U.S. airports as quickly as possible. A national trace detector network would cost about $250 million. Just as importantly, this country needs a comprehensive means of either screening cargo carried on airplanes or hardening aircraft cargo holds. And private aircraft are still insufficiently monitored. To prevent plane-based suicide attacks, there should be 

greater screening of private aircraft pilots by the federal government. 

The threat to aircraft from surface-to-air missiles is real. Unfortunately, the technology to counter them is not yet ready for deployment. A sustained and serious 

R&D program is appropriate and might be expanded, but on this issue, available 

technology does not yet offer a good enough option to warrant the effort and expense 

of deployment. After a shootdown of a civilian aircraft, however, that assessment 

could quickly change. 

The container trade is another area of major potential vulnerability. As with 

many issues considered above, perfect solutions are elusive, and brute-force methods 

of providing comprehensive security could be hugely expensive. But there are still 

practical steps that could be taken to substantially improve American security. Over 

the period 2001 to 2004 the number of cargo inspectors in the United States grew 

by 40 percent and the number of inspections by 60 percent. Even so, only 6 percent 

of seaborne cargo containers are inspected. To have a good chance of inspecting any 

suspicious container that is not being shipped by a company and port with strong 

security records, it would be safer according to informal conversations with experts 

to aim for inspecting 10 to 15 percent of all traffic. Over the longer term, a new 

type of system might provide positive confidence in virtually all containers and such 

a system is now in use in Hong Kong.46

As for state and local governments, in addition to the greater prevention efforts 

noted above, they do need the right kinds of improved consequence management capabilities. For example, a major city could purchase several dozen mobile interoperable communications systems, at a cost of perhaps $1 million each, to facilitate communication between different first responders. The idea is that not every police 

radio need have the capacity to talk with every fire or rescue radio but interfaces 

are needed that can go to the scene of an incident and facilitate the cross-communications that are required. Huge additional expenditures are not needed, but targeted additional investments make sense in such cases. Technologies are available, 

and procedures already have been tested, to make these interlinkages work (through 

some first responder communities, as well as the militiary’s Joint Forces Command 

and Northern Command). But procurement practices need to be standardized and 

concrete plans need to be devised and implemented. 

Since 9/11, as noted, key parts of the private sector have done relatively little to 

protect themselves. And Washington needs to spur them to do so. The role of the 

government is not to regulate onerous security standards everywhere, but to catalyze the private sector to protect itself. As suggested by Peter Orszag, an appealing 

approach would make use of the nation’s insurance system, coupled with some minimal regulation of safety standards. By this concept, terrorism coverage would be 

mandatory on all commercial policies above some minimum threshold (such as several million dollars). The government would play the role of a financial backstop, 

as indeed it already is given the renewal of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act in 

2005 but with the modifications that only extreme, catastrophic losses should be 

covered. A graduated rate structure in the insurance market, rather than government regulation, would then encourage best practices when there were affordable 

and reasonably effective. 

70 

As for some specific private sector initiatives: chemical and nuclear plants are potential targets for low-tech attacks with massive consequences. The U.S. chemical 

industry still has no legal framework guiding its security measures (which so far 

have been taken voluntarily). In this case, direct regulation is appropriate. Legislation to rectify this, including periodic safety assessments and common-sense solutions, should be a priority. There are also numerous cases where dangerous chemicals should be routed around large cities, and also where substitutes for them 

should be found when possible, as with chlorine for purifying water. 

Nuclear power plants are now relatively well protected. However, areas where 

low-grade waste is stored are often not. This increases the likelihood of a radiological attack, and so the level of security must be improved. 

Large buildings should have better security provisions too. Again, common sense, 

the use of the market, and a degree of patience can make such measures affordable. 

For example, when built or renovate, buildings should be fitted with air filtration 

and circulation systems that would minimize the permeation of chemical or biological agents. Other steps can be taken to protect buildings against bombs and infrastructure attacks, and should be reflected in new building codes. These could include 

elevators that descend to the nearest floor in the event of a power outage, building 

important buildings back from roadways, using shatterproof glass in their lower 

floors, and controlling access for entry and for parking. 

There is an important homeland security agenda that the next president and future leaders in the Congress will need to pursue. Some key vulnerable sites such 

as chemical plants are unprotected. So are most skyscrapers. Police forces in most 

cities have scant capacity to conduct counterterror work and depend excessively on 

a small national FBI capacity. Container shipping remains very lightly monitored; 

much air travel remains unsafe; international collaboration on homeland security 

has not progressed very far beyond sharing of names on terror watch lists. The 

progress we have seen to date has been significant, and the country has become 

much more secure. Yet a great deal remains to be done. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

And we will hear from Mr. Wermuth. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL WERMUTH, DIRECTOR, RAND 

HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRAM 

Mr. WERMUTH. Madam Chair, Ranking Member, distinguished 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for giving RAND the opportunity to address this hearing. 

I am joined today by my colleague Dr. Jack Riley, who is the associate director for RAND’s Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment Division. 

And effective approach to border security must have risk as the 

common metric. And risk, in our view, is a function of three components: a credible threat of an attack on a vulnerable target that 

would result in unwanted consequences. 

And while much of the maritime focus on border security from 

terrorist attacks is on containers, there are other parts of the maritime arena that are at risk—cruise ships and ferries, as examples—that should not be overlooked. 

The main point I would like to make is that individual border 

programs have not been integrated into and measured against a 

comprehensive risk-reduction framework or evaluated against a 

clear set of metrics or viewed as part of a comprehensive, systematic approach to border security. 

We do not yet have the comprehensive, risk-based, fully integrated, national border control strategy that we suggest is an imperative. As a result, it is hard to answer basic questions about investment overall or for individual aspects of border security. 

So we suggest that Congress should ensure that the grand strategy on border security and the ability to measure progress against 

71 

it be put in place, with relatively less emphasis on mandating specific programs until the urgent issue of the overall architecture is 

addressed. 

Congressional entities with jurisdiction over DHS and other relevant agencies should push toward a consensus with DHS and the 

other stakeholders on the development of this national border control strategy. 

And Congress should seriously consider the establishment of a 

high-level policy position at DHS, a person with the responsibility 

for taking the long view in helping DHS develop strategic policies 

that integrate across the different operational elements of the department and with other federal agencies, international governments, the private sector, and state and local entities. 

We suggest that an effective national border control strategy will 

include at least six key elements. 

First, the establishment of quantified benchmarks and performance and effectiveness metrics. True measures of effectiveness cannot simply be an enumeration of outputs. In my written statement, 

I cite several RAND studies that emphasize that point, and I will 

be happy to provide more detail in the question-and-answer session. 

Number two, the development of a comprehensive border technology roadmap. We should develop a technology roadmap that 

identifies pressing border security issues to allow both the public 

and private sectors to structure investments that will yield high 

payoffs. But we need robust systems of both technological and nontechnology needs. 

Number three, the integration of planning and coordination 

among border security entities. Given the numerous entities both 

inside and outside DHS with border responsibilities, there needs to 

be better interoperable current planning and better long-range 

planning, programming and budgeting processes for major elements of DHS. 

Our work for decades for entities in the Department of Defense 

suggest that attempts to improve similar processes for that department could have application in DHS, including something akin to 

a Quadrennial Defense Review. 

These processes are essential to meeting dynamic and emerging 

threats. As we improve one aspect of border security, increased security concerns may shift to another sector. For example, if initiatives to stem illegal activity across our land borders become more 

successful, the threat could shift to the maritime domain. 

Number four, the creation of plans for managing the border during crisis. An overlooked but important aspect of border security is 

how we will manage the consequences of the shutdown and reopening of the border, especially maritime ports of entry. 

Number five, the coordination of border security with comprehensive immigration and border management policies to understand 

better the effects that these policies have on our economy and our 

society. 

And six and last, upfront consideration in program development 

of critical privacy and other civil rights implications. 

Thank you, again, for the opportunity. And I look forward to your 

questions. 

72 

1The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should 

not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. this 

product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony 

presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that 

address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. 

[The statement of Mr. Wermuth follows:] 

Michael A. Wermuth 1

Accompanied by K. Jack Riley 

The RAND Corporation 

The Streategic Challenge of Border Security 

Before the Committee on Homeland Security 

Subcommittee on border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism 

United States House of Representatives 

March 8, 2007 

Introduction 

Madam Chair, and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for giving RAND the 

opportunity to address the critical issue of securing our borders as part of the broader effort to secure the U.S. homeland. I have here with me today Jack Riley, Associate Director for RAND’s Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment research unit. 

We have been asked to focus our remarks today on the maritime aspect of border 

security. We should, however, note at the outset that no single piece of border security air, land, or sea; people or cargo; transportation modes; technology; intelligence; 

law enforcement; trade and other economic considerations; and more can truly be 

addressed separately. 

And while issues of security from terrorist attacks is certainly a major concern 

that drives many border security considerations, there are other critical, ‘‘daily’’ 

issues involving criminal activities, including trafficking in drugs, the smuggling of 

weapons and other illegal contraband, and human trafficking. In addition, as we improve one aspect of border security, increased security concerns may shift to another 

aspect. For example, if initiatives to stem illegal activity across our land borders become more successful, we could see a decided shift in security threats to the maritime domain. Those issues must form an integral part of border security programs. 

Moreover, all must be considered in the context of a strategic security framework, 

of which border security is only one part. 

The maritime challenges to border security are enormous. Every day, over 30,000 

maritime cargo containers pass through U.S. ports. In addition, more than 4 million 

automobiles imported annually enter U.S. ports along with other bulk and breakbulk cargo not carried in containers, such as oil, natural gas, hundreds of cruise 

ships annually. 

The people and cargo that cross our borders are the economic lifeblood of the nation. Decisions about security at the border have the potential to affect the livelihood of millions of Americans and a significant portion of the U.S. economy. More 

than $2 trillion of goods annually over $1.3 billion a day pass in and out of U.S. 

ports, representing almost 25 per cent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product. 

Some specific questions that arose in the most recent hearing of this subcommittee included the value of the proposed 700 mile fence along the US-Mexican 

border and whether 6000 new Border Patrol agents (for a total of 18,000) is sufficient for the task of guarding the nation’s borders. In addition, there have been repeated attempts to require the screening of each container entering a U.S. port. 

These kinds of questions address important pieces of the overall picture of border 

security, but they do not address the comprehensive question with which we believe 

the Congress and the public is most concerned: do we have adequate border security? An honest answer to that question would be ‘‘we don’t know.’’ 

Managing Border Security Risk 

73 

2 Our approach to terrorism risk management, especially as it applies to the allocation of resources, is contained in Henry Willis, et al., Estimating Terrorism Risk, MG–388, RAND, 2005, 

available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RANDlMG388.pdf. 3 See Michael Greenberg, et al., Maritime Terrorism, Risk and Liability, MG–520, RAND, 

2006, available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG520/. 4 Public Law 107–292, November 25, 2002. 5 See Susan Martonosi, et al., Evaluating the Viability of 100 Per Cent Container Inspection 

at America’s Ports, reprinted with permission from The Economic Impacts of Terrorist Attacks, 

edited by Harry W. Richardson, Peter Gordon, James E. Moore II, pp. 218–241, Copyright ©

2005 Edward Elgar Publishing, available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1220/; and 

Henry Willis, et al., Evaluating the Security of the Global Containerized Supply Chain, TR–214, 

RAND, 2004, available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technicallreports/TR214/. 

Our overarching objective should be to manage the risks associated with our borders effectively and efficiently. Risk has to be the common metric, otherwise we are 

comparing unlike concepts, and we therefore cannot choose rationally among options. What, then, do we mean by risk? Risk is function of three components: a credible threat of attack on a vulnerable target that would result in unwanted con- sequences. Risk only exists if terrorists want to launch an attack, if they have the 

means to do so successfully, and if the attack exploits a vulnerable target in ways 

that result in deaths, injuries, disruptions, or other outcomes that adversely affect 

U.S. society.2 And while much of the focus on border security from terrorist attacks 

is on containers, there are other issues in the maritime arena cruise ships and ferries, as examples that should not be overlooked.3

Since 9/11, we have developed numerous innovative approaches to border security 

in securing the borders. Key innovations include: the Container Security Initiative 

(CSI), which increases container inspections at foreign ports; the Customs-Trade 

Partnership Against Terrorism program, the CBP voluntary government-business 

initiative to build collaborative relationships between border agencies and those private sector elements in the global supply chain; the 24-Hour Advance Cargo Manifest Rule, which requires carriers to submit a complete cargo manifest to CBP at 

least 24 hours prior to cargo loading if that vessel is calling directly on a U.S. port; 

the REAL ID Act and the emerging implementation of a Transportation Worker 

Identification Credential Program (a joint effort of the Transportation Security Administration and the U.S. Coast Guard), which should help to limit the ability of 

terrorists to procure and use false identification; and the development of fast lane 

programs that let certain shippers participate in special security activities, which 

allow them to move commerce rapidly over international borders. 

As well intentioned as these and other programs are, however, individual programs have not been integrated into, and measured against, a comprehensive risk 

reduction framework. Many have not been evaluated against a clear set of metrics, 

and have not been viewed as part of a comprehensive, systematic approach even to 

border security much less to the broader security equation. Despite the passage of 

the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002,4 the promulgation of a National 

Strategy for Maritime Security, and numerous Presidential directives with implications for border security (including Homeland Security Presidential Directives 3, 4, 

6, 7, 11, 14 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13, specifically on maritime security), we do not yet have the comprehensive, risk-based, fully integrated 

national border control strategy. As a result, we cannot answer basic questions 

about where investment in border security overall or for specific aspects of border 

security is most urgently needed and how large those investments should be. 

To illustrate more concretely the need for a national border control strategy, consider one proposed activity mandatory—inspection of all cargo containers entering 

the U.S.—that Congress has repeatedly made efforts to have implemented. RAND’s 

research has shown that such a program could be expensive and add to congestion 

at the ports if not implemented with innovative application of technologies and processes that allow learning and improvement as the extent of container inspections 

increase.5

These findings do not mean that a program of 100 percent container inspection 

is totally without merit, only that before adoption it should be compared to the merits of other policies, such as adding an additional 6,000 Border Patrol agents, or putting up a 700 mile fence, or the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and other technologies. Unfortunately, we cannot draw conclusions about the relative worth of 

such programs for three reasons. First, most of the alternative investments to the 

policy of 100 percent container inspection have not been evaluated. Thus, there is 

very little evidentiary basis about which policies to pursue and at what levels of investment. Second, virtually no work has been done to understand the degree to 

which individual programmatic or policy options mutually reinforce—or undermine—other individual policy options. In other words, we need to know the degree 

74 

6LaTourrette, et al., Reducing Terrorism Risk at Shopping Centers: An Analysis of Potential 

Security Options, TR–401, RAND, 2007, available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technicallreports/TR401/. 7 James Chow, et al., Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the Shoulder-Fired Missile 

Threat, OP–106–RC, RAND, 2005, available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasionallpapers/ 

OP106/. 8 See, for example, Brian A. Jackson, et al., Breaching the Fortress Wall: Understanding Terrorist Efforts to Overcome Defensive Technologies, MG–481–DHS, RAND, 2007, available at 

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG481/. 

to which our policies work together to provide robust, defense-in-depth at the border. Third, and most importantly, we have very little understanding of how individual policies and suites of policies combine to affect risk reduction. Thus, even 

though the individual policy of 100 percent screening may logically target the vulnerability of cargo containers, we still need to understand how—or if—it contributes 

to overall risk reduction (taking into consideration the threat and consequence com- ponents) before investing in it. 

Toward a National Border Control Strategy 

Thus, the task of establishing a national border control strategy is urgent. What 

would an effective national border control strategy look like? An effective strategy 

will include the following: 

The establishment of quantified benchmarks, and performance and effectiveness metrics. Benchmarks and metrics will help us understand which programs are working, which ones merit additional investment, and which ones should 

be deemphasized. It is important that there be true measures of effectiveness and 

not simply an enumeration of outputs. As an example, RAND staff recently completed an analysis on security at shopping malls that identified specific steps that 

mall owners and operators could take to improve their security against terrorism.6

These security measures were arrayed in order of their cost-effectiveness where the 

metric used was the number of lives saved by the security measure in a hypothetical 

attack scenario. That same methodology could be used to measure the costs and 

benefit of each component of a border security system, as well as the cumulative 

costs and benefits of the system as a whole. 

RAND staff also studied the costs and effectiveness of arming civilian airliners 

with defensive mechanisms to counter the use of shoulder-fired missiles also known 

as MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defense Systems). That comprehensive analysis 

determined that it was premature deploy a missile defense system without further, 

in-depth analysis, including an examination of alternative technologies and missile 

control strategies.7 As it becomes more difficult to increase homeland security 

spending in real terms, it becomes increasingly important to invest in programs that 

fill critical security gaps in a cost-effective manner. 

The development of a comprehensive border technology roadmap. There 

is no shortage of new and potentially useful technologies for use in border security. 

Technologies exist, for example, to combat the threat that surface-to-air missiles 

pose to civilian aircraft. RAND’s 2005 evaluation found, however, that current technologies could be evaded easily, were relatively costly compared to the overall threat 

and consequences of such an attack, and offered little protection against future generations of such missiles that terrorists might acquire over the near term. One way 

to ensure that we are producing technologies that better meet our needs is to develop a technology roadmap that identifies the pressing border security challenges 

that need to be resolved. With this roadmap, the public and private sectors can 

structure their investment in technologies that will yield high payoffs, address mission-relevant functions, provide essential capabilities and over a policy-relevant time 

horizon. When building the technology roadmap, we should be careful not to prescribe technology as the most critical component of a national border control strategy. 

The potential for failures in technological systems, including the possibility that 

terrorists or other criminal elements could find ways to defeat or avoid them, argues 

strongly for robust systems of technological and non-technology means. RAND has 

just completed a set of studies for the S&T Directorate of DHS that explored the 

ways terrorist groups have overcome defensive measures in the past highlighting 

the danger of relying on technology alone for protection.8 And technologies that are 

used must be able to be integrated into a unified border security system so they 

do not result in technological stovepipes that complicate rather than improve overall 

security. 

The integration of planning and coordination among border security entities. Numerous entities in DHS have border security responsibilities and capabilities, including TSA, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs EnVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
75 

9Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, http://www.dod.mil/policy/index.html, 

accessed March 3, 2007. 

forcement, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Further evaluation is necessary in order to 

determine how effectively those organizations are operating and can operate collectively. In addition, other DHS entities have responsibilities that must be part of a 

comprehensive, department-wide approach to effective border security, including the 

Assistant Secretariat for Intelligence and Analysis, the Under Secretariat for 

Science and Technology; the Under Secretariat for Preparedness (as that entity may 

be reorganized or renamed); and the Under Secretary for Administration. DHS 

should develop comprehensive operational plans that clearly articulate the roles, 

missions, responsibilities, coordination and communications line among the various 

players. There is an analog to the process by which combating commands in the department of defense develop comprehensive operational plans. In addition, there are 

numerous entities outside DHS that have some stake in or cognizance over border 

security, including the maritime aspect: The FBI and other Department of Justice 

entities; the Departments of Agriculture, of State, and of Commerce; the Department of Defense; the Director of National Intelligence; and others. Moreover, there 

needs to be a better long-range planning, programming, and budgeting process for 

major elements of DHS. Our work for decades for entities in the Department of Defense suggests that attempts to improve similar processes for that department could 

have application in DHS, including something akin to the Quadrennial Defense Review. 

The creation of plans for managing the border during crises. Numerous games and 

exercises, including our own simulation of a nuclear incident at the Port of Long 

Beach, have demonstrated that border security incidents have great potential to significantly disrupt border activity. When—and it is probably when, not if—border security fails, the borders will almost certainly be closed. An overlooked but important 

aspect of border security is how we will manage the consequences of the shutdown 

and, more importantly, how we will manage the reopening of the border. This is no 

academic exercise. The attacks of 9/11 resulted in lengthy closings of U.S. land, air 

and sea borders. 

The coordination of border security with comprehensive immigration 

and border management policies. Effective border management requires more 

than capability to intercept illicit cargo and people. It also requires understanding 

how measures put in place for security affect how goods and people move across our 

borders. The effects that these policies have on our population have the potential 

to affect dramatically our economy and the fabric of our society. 

Privacy and other civil rights implications. Nothing we are suggesting would 

necessarily impinge on the privacy or civil liberties of Americans. Programs for border security must always consider the effects of implementation on these critical 

issues. 

Role for the Congress 

The most critical role for Congress at this juncture is to focus on ensuring that 

the grand strategy on border security—and the ability to measure progress against 

it—is in place. Congress should place relatively less emphasis on mandating specific 

programs in the realm of border security until the urgent issue of the overall architecture is addressed. To that end, this subcommittee, the full committee and others 

with jurisdiction over DHS and other relevant agencies activities and funding 

should push toward a consensus with the Department and other stakeholders on the 

development of a national border security strategy. 

There is no denying that in other aspects of major policy planning—especially in 

the establishment of a national transportation security policy—the Department has 

been relatively slow in responding. One reason that the Department struggles with 

developing these strategic frameworks is that it has no high-level leadership dedicated to policy development across the diverse and sprawling empire of DHS and 

with the other entities that have border security responsibilities and interests. In 

other cabinet agencies, such as the Department of Defense (DoD), there is an Under 

Secretary for Policy. At DoD the Under Secretary is charged to ‘‘consistently provide 

responsive, forward-thinking, and insightful policy advice and support to the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of Defense, in alignment with national security objectives.’’ 9

Congress should give serious consideration to supporting the establishment of a 

similar high-level position at the Department of Homeland Security, one that vests 

that person with the responsibility for taking the ‘‘long view’’ and helping DHS develop strategic policies that integrate across the different operational elements of 

the Department and with other agencies, including international governments and 

76 

private sector interests. Not insignificantly, such an under secretary would also be 

a critical point of interaction with the academic, research and development communities. These communities—of which RAND is a part—often struggle to interact 

with the operational elements of DHS. The operational elements are focused on getting things done, while the academic and research communities are often focused 

on longer-term challenges such as evaluating, measuring, and assessing. That said, 

deeper integration of these communities into the DHS strategy-setting process is 

vital, and the establishment of a position with these responsibilities is perhaps the 

most effective way to make this happen. 

Summary 

We have significantly underinvested in developing, evaluating, and refining a 

comprehensive and integrated border security strategy. We have invested in numerous border security programs and initiatives but the impacts and cost effectiveness 

of virtually all of these initiatives is poorly understood. A truly comprehensive strategy—one that can guide the effective implementation of its key national goals— 

must include the essential elements that we have described: a robust system of 

metrics and evaluation; a forward-thinking technology roadmap; better planning 

and coordination, including border management during crises; and a comprehensive 

approach to border management and immigration issues. Only through such an approach are we likely to avoid ‘‘single points of failure’’ in our border security. We 

are, at this point, far from having such an overarching strategy. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you so much. 

And now Mr. Ramirez. 

STATEMENT OF ANDREW RAMIREZ, CHAIRMAN, FRIENDS OF 

THE BORDER PATROL 

Mr. RAMIREZ. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Souder and distinguished members of the committee. 

For the past 3 years, I have been specifically working and investigating, going back to 2004, with the agents who implement what 

my distinguished colleagues on this panel have been talking about: 

infrastructure, technology, and the human side. 

‘‘Border Security: Infrastructure, Technology, and the Human 

Element,’’ individually and as a whole, are but one aspect of issues 

that I am prepared to discuss today. 

And I guarantee everyone that what is officially being 

prescripted by DHS and stated to members of Congress is not what 

the agents on the front lines report or those who plan and build 

that infrastructure. 

Ultimately there is no escaping the fact that the current administration has compromised its citizens through treaties and agreements and has demonstrated itself to be more interest in commerce 

than national security. 

Need proof? Chief George Carpenter issued an internal memo to 

CBP agents regarding documentation requirements at the El Paso 

port of entry on January 16, 2007. The critical point states as follows: ‘‘Anytime that an officer feels that a permit should not be 

granted for whatever reason, the supervisor should be advised. 

Again, we do not refuse a permit or send an applicant back for documentation or proof. They are not required to present proof of employment, residence or solvency in Mexico.’’ 

This type of memo, which I personally saw and read, is proof beyond any shadow of a doubt as to the lack of concern for public 

safety and that officials at DHS are more concerned with commerce 

than national security. 

77 

I was told that this type of written standing order is the recipe 

for a sleeper cell to get through our ports of entry and leaves us 

vulnerable to attack. 

I will also discuss the war on law enforcement and how the government of the United States has prosecute maliciously a number 

of federal law enforcement officers. 

Madam Chairman, these cases must be investigated and hearings must be held by the Congress, because it is clear that in some 

of these cases the prosecutions were pushed by foreign governments, including Mexico and the People’s Republic of China. 

Having brought up the case of U.S. v. Compean & Ramos to the 

attention of the nation, I have discovered that a pattern of prosecutorial and in-house abuse at DHS exists in each of these cases involving illegal aliens who are breaking a number of laws, all of 

which were ignored by the government, who all ignored a U.S. Supreme Court ruling, U.S. v. Verdugo–Urquidez, 1990, by the 

Rehnquist court. 

I am certain there are many more cases out there, and I hope 

to discuss some of these cases today, as they do involve our Border 

Patrol agents, Customs agents and other agents. 

I caution everyone to consider that the government ignored the 

fact that a doper violated a number of laws, and this was ignored 

by our government, who chose to prosecute two agents who committed mere administrative violations and may have violated policies that continue to prevent them from doing their jobs, some of 

which I call to the attention of this committee today. 

One example of this is the pursuit policy, which prevents agents 

from pursuing anyone that the trained agent may believe to be in 

violation of our laws. 

Let me point out why agents are often directed to break off: Because the leadership at DHS and the Border Patrol are more worried about lawsuits than they are about apprehension, which, by 

the way, are manipulated by the very agencies. 

And this comes to me from sources that are managerial, that 

hold chief patrol agent and deputy chief patrol agent, assistant 

chief patrol agent, such titles, as well as other agents in all the 

services. 

Another example is the federal firearms policy, as followed by the 

U.S. Border Patrol. In this policy, rank-and-file agents below supervisory level are not allowed to file a written report on shooting incidents. That responsibility is left to supervisors who can suddenly 

develop a case of amnesia or be internally ordered to develop a case 

of amnesia, and that leaves agents hung out to dry, as Agents 

Compean and Ramos were. 

This brings me back to the smugglers and terrorists who know 

that, with cases such as these on record, that this government will 

protect them regardless of the crimes they commit. And, as a result, our law enforcement officers, many of whom you have direct 

oversight for, have had their safety compromised. 

In the third section of my testimony, I have provided numerous 

statements as told directly to me by a law enforcement officer 

tasked with the dangerous responsibility of securing our nation’s 

borders. Those that tell you that people with a badge and a gun 

in that sense are correct. But they are not telling you the entire 

78 

story, one of which is begging to be told, of high corruption in El 

Paso. 

During a recent field investigation, a senior federal law enforcement agent stated the following to me that only reinforces what I 

just said: ‘‘Mexico does not know what corruption is. They have to 

come to El Paso to learn.’’ And that should be a disturbing fact to 

every member here today. 

We also have assistant U.S. attorneys who question Border Patrol agents as to why they have attempted to stop narcotic interdiction. In the Ramos & Compean case, Assistant U.S. Attorney Debra 

Kanof actually asked why Agent Ramos didn’t join the DEA or ICE 

if he wanted to catch dopers, instead of joining the Border Patrol. 

I must remind everyone that narcotic interdiction and seizure is a 

specific goal of the U.S. Border Patrol, as stated in the National 

Border Patrol Strategy. 

I have also provided updated reports on the Border Patrol RVS 

camera systems and other items involving infrastructure, technology, and the human element. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Ramirez follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANDY RAMIREZ

Introduction 

Good morning Madame Chairman, Ranking Member Souder, members of the committee, distinguished fellow panelists, and guests. 

Thank you for calling me to testify today on behalf of Friends of the Border Patrol 

and for calling this important hearing as the growing threat of terrorism focuses national attention to the vulnerability of our borders. I must emphasize borders because this includes the Northern and Southern borders. While the southern border 

in the words of a Texas Sheriff goes western after dark, the northern border is just 

as vulnerable. The reason for this is not the Congress though this August body in 

talking about things such as Amnesty continues to provide the incentive that brings 

people here. 

I must caution the Congress that the American people are not interested in hearing political partisanship and the blame game. The Congress while partially responsible also sought to assist the Department of Homeland Security by removing endless layers of red-tape and bureaucracy that prevented enforcement of our federal 

immigration laws. Officials at DHS and inside the Border Patrol used this gaping 

opening to carry out an agenda that did not continue the highest traditions such 

as ‘‘Honor First’’ that they were known for, and instead have contributed to the high 

level of instability, fear, mistrust, and corruption that exists today. 

Ultimately, there is no escaping the fact that the current administration has compromised its citizens through treaties and agreements and has demonstrated itself 

to be more interested in commerce than national security. 

Need proof? Chief George Carpenter issued an internal memo to CBP agents regarding documentation requirements at the El Paso Port of Entry on January 16, 

2007. The critical point states as follows, ‘‘Anytime that an officer feels that a permit should not be granted for whatever reason, the supervisor should be advised. 

Again, we do not refuse a permit or send applicant back for more documentation 

or proof. They are not required to present proof of employment, residence, or solvency, in Mexico.’’ 

This type of memo is proof beyond any shadow of a doubt as to the lack of concern 

for public safety, and that officials at DHS are more concerned with commerce than 

national security. I have personally read the in-house memo that I am mentioning 

here and was told that ‘‘this’’ type of written, standing order ‘‘is the recipe for a 

Sleeper Cell.’’ 

For all the billions of dollars that have been appropriated by the Congress since 

9-11-2001 Attack on America by terrorists, this administration has failed American’s 

here at home by not employing the most simple of tactics and securing America’s 

borders, seaports, and waterways. 

79 

Ironically, while most Americans are not aware of the details that I am prepared 

to provide you today, they are well known to the drug smugglers, human traffickers, 

and terrorists around the world. They all know our weaknesses. 

‘‘Border Security: Infrastructure, Technology, and the Human Element’’ individually and as a whole are but one aspect of issues that I am prepared to discuss 

today and I guarantee everyone that what is being officially pre-scripted by DHS 

and stated to Members is not what the agents on the front line report. 

I am prepared to discuss examples of obstruction and misinformation by the Department of Homeland Security, and the truth from line agents and border residents. I have also provided our reports on the Border Patrol, RVSS camera systems, 

and other items involving infrastructure, technology, and the human element. 

During my recent field investigation a federal law enforcement agent stated the 

following to me: ‘‘Mexico does not know what corruption is. They have to come to 

El Paso to learn.’’ 

This statement tells it as it is, and was from a senior federal agent, who shall 

remain anonymous as this administration has no qualms about ordering U.S. Attorneys to prosecute agents even when it means protecting narcotic and human traffickers who assault, brandish firearms, or use a vehicle as a weapon again law enforcement while attempting to evade and escape apprehension and capture. 

The Managers of the Border Patrol continue to mislead the nation and the Congress as to Mexican Military Incursions that I have been informed directly by federal agents as well as state and local law enforcement officers as to having taken 

place, some of which resulted in casualties. 

To substantiate what I just stated. In the Tucson Border Patrol Sector going back 

to Chief David Aguilar’s tenure as Sector Chief, their Public Information Office provided to agents a ‘‘Military Incursion Card that states, ‘‘REMEMBER, Mexican Military are trained to escape, evade, and counter-ambush if it will effect their escape. 

You will find the full text of this card in Section 2D. 

In the 3rd Section of my testimony, I have provided statements as told directly 

to me by our law enforcement officers tasked with the dangerous responsibility of 

security our nation along America’s borders. 

I am prepared to discuss ‘‘The War On Law Enforcement’’ and how the government of the United States has maliciously prosecuted a number of federal law enforcement officers including in this order: 

Border Patrol Agent David Sipe 

KSt. Georges County (MD) Police Officer Stephanie Mohr 

Border Patrol Agent David Brugman 

KBorder Patrol Agent Ignacio Ramos 

KBorder Patrol Agent Jose Alonso Compean 

CBP Customs Agent Robert Rhodes 

Edwards County (TX) Deputy Sheriff Gilmer Hernandez 

Madame Chairman, these cases must be investigated and hearings must be held 

by the Congress because it is clear that in some of these cases prosecutions were 

pushed by foreign governments including Mexico and the People’s Republic of 

China. 

Regarding the Compean and Ramos case, I want to make one thing clear today. 

There are many trying to prevent this case from being investigated by the Congress 

and prevent hearings being held due to it being the proverbial opening of ‘‘Pandora’s 

Box’’ this case provides. Everything wrong about the practices and policies of this 

administration will be opened up for everyone to see. DHS will be exposed for it’s 

incompetent leadership and the culture of corruption and power-mongers that have 

consumed it. There is no question in my mind, or in the minds of the agents who 

serve at DHS that we must overhaul and reform it today. It is clear too, that Agents 

Compean and Ramos were hung out to dry by their own agency. 

Osbaldo Aldrete-Davila was protected in the professional estimation of a number 

of law enforcement officers, though not a confidential informant, or CI, as AldreteDavila leads to someone and our government has protected that individual, or group 

while ignoring the facts of the doper’s actions in multiple incidents. 

Having brought the case of U.S. v. Compean & Ramos to the attention of the nation, I have discovered that a pattern of prosecutorial abuse exists in each of these 

cases involving illegal aliens who were breaking a number of laws, all of which were 

ignored by the government, who all ignored a U.S. Supreme Court Ruling, U.S. v. 

Verdugo-Urquidez 1990. I am certain there are many more cases out there, and I 

hope to discuss some of these cases today. 

I must also inform you that there have been other cases prosecuted by the Office 

of Johnny Sutton that I have personally investigated that also require greater scrutiny and review, these being the U.S. v. Hardrick Crawford, FBI Special Agent InCharge of El Paso (Retired), and U.S. v. Noe Aleman, U.S. Border Patrol Agent, 

80 

both of whom were personally targeted and victimized by our own government. The 

players in these particular cases are the same that were involved in U.S. v. Ramos. 

I caution everyone to consider that the government ignored the fact that a career 

narcotic smuggler violated a number of laws, and this was ignored by our government who chose to prosecute two respected agents who committed mere administrative violations. Some of the policies they may or may not have violated, are detrimental to the safety of the agents in enforcing their duties some of which I call this 

committee to overhaul. 

One example of this is the pursuit policy, which prevents agents from pursuing 

anyone that the pursuing trained agent may believe to be in violation of our laws. 

Let me point out why agents are often directed to break off, because the leadership 

of DHS and the U.S. Border Patrol are more worried about civil lawsuits than they 

are about apprehensions, which by the way are manipulated by the very agencies 

and Mexico. 

Another example is the federal firearms policy as followed by the U.S. Border Patrol. In this policy rank and file agents below supervisory level are not allowed to 

file a written report on shooting incidents. That responsibility is left to supervisors, 

who can suddenly develop a case of amnesia or be internally ordered to develop a 

case of amnesia, and that leaves agents hung out to dry as Compean and Ramos 

were. 

Both of these policies must be overhauled today, so that our agents will not have 

their safety or ours compromised, which will greatly assist them in doing their job 

and enforce our laws, the same laws enforced globally by every other nation on this 

planet. 

This brings me back to the smugglers and terrorists who know that with cases 

such as these on record, that this government will protect them regardless of the 

crimes they commit. As a result our law enforcement officers, many of whom you 

have direct oversight over, have had their safety compromised. 

Before moving onto the human impact, I have to continue to address the impact 

of smugglers and terrorists. They know now that with the National Guard and Border Patrol backing off in the face of smugglers, bandits, and Mexican military personnel, the policy of the United States is one of non-confrontation and to cede the 

position instead. Can you imagine the impact on a soldier just back from fighting 

in Iraq or Afghanistan who may have watched their fellow soldiers blown up in 

front of their very eyes? We must question the national leadership who issues such 

orders, and it is imperative that you understand that the National Guard is under 

the operational control of the Border Patrol during Operation Jumpstart. 

Rank and file Border Patrol agents report that USBP stations and sector offices 

are subject to regular visits by Mexican Government officials. However, this is nothing new with this administration as the Mexican Military has official liaison representation at the highly sensitive North-Comm facility according to sources that 

have actually seen and spoken with the officers. 

I need to make another thing clear. To the law enforcement agent working along 

the border they do not see Mexico as a law enforcement partner unlike their managers. Before anyone jumps to an unfair conclusion, this is not about race, or discrimination against a foreign national here illegally. This is about national security 

and enforcing the laws we have. Some believe that real reform can only happen 

through so-called comprehensive immigration reform. There is absolutely nothing 

wrong with the laws on the books. No, instead the only real immigration reform begins with the federal agencies responsible for enforcing them as they are all following an administrative policy that is based on commerce, not enforcement and 

certainly not concerned with national security. 

I’ll tell you why this has happened, it’s because this administration has grown out 

of control and the only way to address this is by the Congress putting partisanship 

and race aside in the interest of national security and supporting our federal agents. 

I have discussed with current and former retired leaders of numerous law enforcement agencies such as the Texas Border Sheriffs and most recently, I met with and 

discussed this case with retired NY City Police Commissioner Bernie Kerik who has 

released a statement, which I have provided today’’ 

‘‘If this drug runner was, instead, trying to smuggle explosives or a dirty bomb, 

would the two agents then be hailed as heroes? Yes, and probably presented with 

a presidential medal, because border security is a vital element in our continuing 

effort to keep America safe from terrorist attacks. Remember that the 19 hijackers 

of September 11th passed through U.S. border security checkpoints a total of 68 

times, leaving and entering this country as they planned their murderous plot. Consider also, in testimony before the U.S. Senate in 2005, James Loy, deputy secretary 

of the Department of Homeland Security, stated; ‘‘several al-Qa’ida leaders believe 

81 

operatives can pay their way into the country through Mexico and also believe illegal entry is more advantageous than legal entry for operational security reasons.’’ 

And one has to ask what kind of message this trial and conviction sends to the 

thousands of dedicated local and state police, and federal agents from the CIA, FBI 

and DHS who risk danger every day to ensure our safety.’’ 

As you will see in his commentary Commissioner Kerik has called for a presidential pardon for the agents. 

There has been a big public propaganda campaign to mislead the public and 

Members of Congress as that doper who entered America on multiple occasions and 

was protected and his very crimes hidden from the jury has led to compromising 

the safety of both the public and law enforcement officers. Part of the propaganda 

campaign by the administration has led to the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Office of Inspector General to mislead Congress in a meeting with four Members 

representing the Texas Delegation with one goal, to get Congress to back off this 

case by besmirching Agents Compean and Ramos with allegations that they confessed to knowingly shooting an unarmed man, and had set out that day wanting 

to shoot a Mexican. OIG provided no proof and admitted last month while under 

oath that they misled the Members. It was a preposterous allegation without any 

substantiation that is indicative of the type of case Sutton’s office tried to build 

against the agents who were accused by the government of turning on one of their 

own. In my opinion, this is obstruction of justice, plain and simple and DHS and 

OIG should be held accountable. 

But here, you might not be aware that OIG has not been effective or accountable 

since former Inspector General Clark Kent Irvin left his office after his recess appointment expired. He was holding agencies accountable and reporting such things 

as a financial award program, in which Border Patrol managers and sectors were 

rewarded for staying in budget, which in layman terms means for not doing their 

jobs and enforcing the law. 

But there are other types of obvious corruption along our southern border. In the 

modern DHS agencies of today, individuals blatantly approach federal agents of all 

ranks who offer them sacks of money, in exchange for turning the other way. When 

that does not work, they threaten family members as many agents have ties across 

the southern border. 

OIG/OIA is something all agents fear, but not because they are doing their jobs 

with complete integrity, but as the Compean & Ramos case has magnified, and numerous agents have reported to me these offices are used to enforce political objections. 

This brings to mind the critical problem faced by agents and I cannot state it 

enough. Border Patrol managers undermine their own agents for trying to do their 

job. One day an agent such as one I know of in Texas performs what is known as 

a turn-back, where the illegal alien is returned to Mexico without apprehension and 

is placed on the ‘‘rubber gun squad.’’ Yet, the next day, a ‘‘monkey boy’’ for the brass 

does the same thing, and receives no discipline and gets away with it. This statement is based on an actual incident in El Paso Sector. The agent faces termination 

for a turn-back, though after his suspension proposal was issued by sector, the sector chief actually issued a policy clarification. 

Look at a statement by Agent Compean to his then Sector Chief Luis Barker, 

which says it best, ‘‘the way everything it’s been at the station the last two, three 

years. . . I mean everything always comes down to the alien. The agents are as 

soon as anything comes up it is always the agents fault. The agents have always 

been cleared but with management, it’s always been the agent’s fault. We’re the 

ones that get in trouble.’’ 

We also have Assistant U.S. Attorneys who question Border Patrol Agents at to 

why they have attempted to stop narcotic interdiction: 

In the Compean & Ramos case, Assistant U.S. Attorney Debra Kanof did just that 

in asking Agent Ramos why he didn’t join the DEA or ICE if he wanted to catch 

dopers instead of the Border Patrol. I must remind everyone that narcotic interdiction and seizure is a specific goal of the U.S. Border Patrol as stated in the National 

Border Patrol Strategy and in an Inter-Agency Memorandum of Understanding. 

Here brings another problem, which I previously mentioned that being the ‘‘rubber gun squad,’’ which is where agents are placed on administrative duties and lose 

their badges and guns for anything that a superior officer decides violates a policy. 

It is the most shameful and humiliating form of discipline in the Border Patrol and 

agents are treated as though they were a dirty agent. This form of discipline goes 

on for lengthy time periods and the impact on agents and their families alike is 

something no Member of Congress can imagine. If a person is placed on administrative duty, place them on paid leave, give them non-field duties for a stated time peVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
82 

riod, but don’t treat them like an un-indicted criminal. I implore you to take action 

and outlaw this policy today. 

Those that tell you that people with a badge and a gun should be held to a higher 

standard in that sense are correct, but they are not telling you the entire story, one 

which is begging to be told of high corruption in El Paso. I have a number of agents 

who need whistleblower protection in order to do their duty and report to Congress 

as they have me do on their behalf for oversight as this involves our national security. This administration has placed a gag order on them and prevented them from 

doing their duty, and they have received no help when filing complaints with their 

local elected representatives. 

Consider that at the Office of Border Patrol the impact of the mass retirements 

of Chief Patrol Agents including Paul Blocker of Miami, Darryl Griffen of San Diego, 

Carl McClafferty of El Centro, Mike Nicely of Tucson, Lynne Underdown of 

McAllen/Rio Grande Valley, and the National Deputy Chief of the Border Patrol 

Kevin Stevens. In Griffen’s case, his is an early retirement well before his mandatory 57. This is not an accident that so many are choosing to retire right now. Operationally speaking, this means that the entire southern border will not have a sector 

chief with experience of two years in any sector. The chief of Yuma Sector will be 

the closest with nearly two years, while the El Paso Chief is being re-detailed to 

Tucson after 1° years. In the professional opinion of many of my friends and sources 

of active-duty and retired agents, this is not an accident or mere coincidence. Many 

other senior managers over the past two years also chose early retirement rather 

than hanging on until they reached mandatory 57. 

In the Border Patrol, agents used to think of the names Newton & Azrak, which 

is an award given to agents and was named in honor of two agents murdered in 

cold blood in the line of duty. 

Today all law enforcement officers along our borders think that no matter what 

they do, they (the agents) are wrong and the aliens will be protected regardless of 

the crime, and this has directly impacted not only our national security, but the morale of each agent in federal law enforcement along our borders. Even more alarming is that our own Border Patrol will hang agents out to dry as happened to 

Compean and Ramos. Agents fear becoming the next Compean & Ramos, the first 

agents to go to prison for doing their job. 

Take the stream of reports from agents who report that younger, less experienced 

agents ask what they are supposed to do if someone pulls a firearm on them, ‘‘do 

we wait for them to draw and shoot first?’’ Many a senior agent has responded ‘‘if 

you wait, the next think you’ll know if that a bullet will be removed from your body 

at the morgue.’’ 

I myself have not been able to escape this as I, too was contacted by an agent, 

my sources referred to as a managerial ‘‘monkey boy’’ though I cannot discuss it further in open session after consulting with sources and friends in law enforcement, 

who instructed me to treat it as a threat, and bribe attempt. I will provide this information in closed session due to continued security concerns. 

Agents feel they are not backed by many here in Washington who like the administration appear to be more interested in race, and commerce, while paying lip service to the agents and their real needs. 

What are their needs you ask? That is what I am here to say on their behalf, 

they want genuine support, and you to hold their managers and this administration 

accountable. They want Congress, Democrats and Republicans alike to put the partisanship aside and support them. Defend them from corruption, conduct open hearings, subpoena witnesses, and demand the truth. Appoint an independent counsel 

and give the counsel prosecutorial powers so we can finally get to the bottom of this 

whole mess. This is administration is up to their eyeballs in their involvement and 

cannot be trusted to conduct a proper, let alone independent review of any of the 

cases mentioned above. This is the job of Congress to provide and maintain oversight on this out of control administration. 

Agents and officers from a wide array of agencies have informed me that they are 

more afraid of our own government, the crocodiles behind them, then they are of 

the dangerous criminals in front of them as they can easily see the regular bad 

guys, unlike the hidden one’s that wear the disguise of a uniform similar to their 

own. It is only a matter of time before our government gets our own agents killed, 

and in order to prevent that, I’d just as soon see DHS disbanded. But you can overhaul this disaster today and prevent further heartache for agents and their families, 

such as what has been experienced by agents such as Compean and Ramos. 

Madame Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to appear as a witness today 

and look forward to not only answering the questions of you and your fellow committee members, but also working with the committee in the future. 

83 

TECHNOLOGY, INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE HUMAN ELEMENT 

Technology and Infrastructure—The Facts Undermining It 

One of the biggest topics when it comes to the subjects of technology, and infrastructure is the money pit known as SBI, the highly touted contact awarded to Boeing last year for virtual technology on the border. Now don’t get me wrong, Boeing 

knows how to build an aircraft and all that, but agents tell us that Boeing is providing the technology to identify where the illegal alien traffic is. However, we already know where they are. We’re not able to slow them down enough to apprehend 

them or get to them for lack of border fences and roads. A camera and PDA in an 

agent’s hand is worth nothing if we can’t get to them to apprehend them. 

Over two billion dollars is being spent on a program that provides no benefit to 

the taxpayer. It does not deter or apprehend. It only identified where they are crossing. We already know where they cross and how to cut sign. 

That same money that is being spent could be better used for a reasonable 

amount of appropriate border infrastructure of multiple types of fences, lights, cameras, roads, ground-radar, and the appropriate balance of agents. Through this 

method will come Chief Aguilar’s long-established goal of bringing balance, which 

is how you can control our borders. You cannot have one individual component or 

part, without the others. 

For months there have been rumors of competition and analysis for different types 

of border fencing and roads. As of yet, nothing has been looked at by DHS or Boeing. Contract awards have been given to vendors and the vendors that have been 

excluded could provide the same product for 30% less. 

Also, the current vendor, one of the reasons they are providing their service so 

cheaply is that they are using materials purchased from the People’s Republic of 

China, and Taiwan. Currently, one of the vendors is looking into a purchase of material manufactured in Mexico. The disturbing principle here is we are using foreign 

manufactured materials for infrastructure that is for national security. Both may 

be legally correct, but is this the intention of the Congress? What does this say to 

the sovereignty and national security of our nation by this administration? Is our 

security and sovereignty for sale to the lowest bidder? 

The Border Patrol and DHS plan, re-plan, and continue to re-plan when it comes 

to infrastructure but the fact is, that’s all they do is plan. Nothing is every implemented. In each sector are comprehensive enforcement plans that are responsible, 

effective, and within a reasonable budget to provide security along our borders. Oftentimes these plans are trumped by high level bureaucrats that have no idea what 

it takes to secure a border, but because of partisan politics nix everything. Some 

only seek to serve the temporary masters elected every four years to the Executive 

Branch. Their achieved goal is to stay employed and do not do anything that may 

jeopardize their standing with a future administration. These are the career bureaucrats who have long been in business to be in business and just want to collect a 

paycheck. How grand would it be if these employees could provide the truth and 

provide the security that this nation so sorely needs? 

The greatest problem is that the federal government refuses to work with the 

local border communities, officers, and residents, and solely rely on corporate America to provide an unqualified answer at huge, exorbitant cost with minimal benefit 

to the public. 

The Project that worked by Aguilar rejected—Project Athena 

Madame Chairman I would also like to address an item known in the Border Patrol as Project Athena, developed by the Raytheon Corporation. In Project Athena, 

the Border Patrol has proven that they can monitor shipping traffic as it approached 

the U.S. coastline, and along our international waterways. The cost was minimal 

compared to other systems currently being utilized such as ‘‘remote video surveillance’’ (RVS) cameras and other items that have provided a virtual wall that has 

been proven to be a bottomless, and ineffective money-pit. I can use the name 

Project Athena, as it is in the public domain and can be looked up on the internet. 

The operational names I learned that Project Athena has been called in USBP testing are Operation Lake View and Gulf View. Chief Aguilar would be a better respondent, as I am certain that he has been properly debriefed. 

Local Border Patrol Sector Chiefs requested to Chief Aguilar and Headquarters 

Office of Border Patrol that ‘‘Project Athena’’ or subsequent generations of similar 

capabilities be funded and provided to meet the goal of secure our coastlines, lakes 

and waterways. 

This program, which can monitor maritime traffic up to 95–100% capability, including the unexpected result of low-flying aircraft will not be implemented. Clearly 

our having such technology available, but not implemented though the testing ran 

one and one half years ago is definitive proof that DHS and HQ–OBP under Chief 

84 

Aguilar lack the intent regardless of the requests by local Sectors for those very 

needed items that ensure their mission, and are leaving us vulnerable. Instead they 

continue to tell Congress that everything is fine, and improving when I am demonstrating in the words of the front line agents the facts in their own words and 

as we have investigated. 

Facts about RVS Cameras and Tunnel Detection, what Congress and the 

public aren’t being told 

Friends of the Border Patrol has developed and offered technology that we call 

FREEDOM (Free Electronic Domestic Observation and Monitoring) border surveillance cameras. We have also developed tunnel detection equipment. We have provided a few facts for committee members to review. We would be happy to provide 

our paper on the FREEDOM Camera System to committee members upon request. 

I personally have discussed our technology at all levels of SDC Sector and was 

informed that our technology was superior to anything that they had, including 

their own security cameras. To me this states the obvious, regardless of their dire 

need in an ‘‘attempt’’ to gain operational control of the border, OBP headquarters, 

and the Bush Administration will continue to talk about, not provide what’s needed 

in the field to improve their chances, and will continue to pay lip-service by blatantly lying to the public about our improving border in-security, while the clock 

continues to tick on our lives. In addition, insiders who are retired managers within 

the Border Patrol, or people associated or related to them will continue to gain contracts, some of which are to provide technology already acknowledged in DHS testimony as ineffective. These facts that I have presented here are beyond any shred 

of doubt. Period. 

When describing the fiscal, managerial and national security catastrophe—which 

is DHS—it is sometimes good to use local examples. It’s good to be able to talk 

about things right outside this room’s door rather than in abstruse, ethereal, and 

abstract concepts. 

The Border Patrol has just installed its latest and most modern technological wonders right along San Diego’s border with Mexico. These new Monuments to Border 

Security are to assist in illegal alien detection and apprehension 

This technology consists of tall poles topped with video cameras. Most of these 

poles are mounted within the very narrow ‘‘no man’s land’’ between the primary and 

secondary border fences separating our two ‘‘Great Nations.’’ 

Installed at immense cost (present real-dollar estimates are $800,000 per camera 

pole), these cameras offer the Border Patrol technology not seen since about 1986. 

Total cost since implementation are at $429 million since 1997, and the cameras 

take 20 months to install according to testimony by DHS Inspector General Richard 

Skinner presented to a Congressional Homeland Security Subcommittee last December 16, 2005. 

Twenty year old technology might seem anachronistic in a world of Burt Rutan 

and actual space ports being built across our Midwest, but to the Border Patrol it 

is still better than what they had before which was nothing. 

The problem is that these cameras look at the border just as you would if you 

were peering through a toilet paper tube. You can look to the east through that toilet paper tube and you can look west through that toilet paper tube but God help 

you if while you are looking one place as there’s a stampede north just a few feet 

from where you are looking because you won’t see it. 

But it gets worse. 

Half of their new cameras are touted as ‘‘night vision’’ cameras. The problem with 

them is that many nights you can’t see anything. Further, it is child’s play to blind 

them even permanently. It would be a breach of National Security to say what happens naturally or what can be done purposely to make these incredibly expensive 

cameras worthless, so I won’t except in closed session. I know you’d be overwhelmed 

by how simple it is. 

What these people really need are ‘‘staring eye’’ cameras taking in wide swaths 

of the border all at one time and then other cameras that can even get mug shots 

of the border perpetrators. 

Further, the cameras should not be mounted right along the border but north of 

it so that a wide swath of border can be viewed all at one time and so border crossers aren’t just flickering points of light flittering across the camera field but instead 

are to the cameras like the US Marine Corp Band marching in lock step in the Rose 

Parade. 

If you mount the cameras on the border you see crossers usually for not more 

than 30 seconds and that is only if you happen to have your toilet paper tube looking at them at the very moment they decide to cross. 

85 

If you mount the cameras north of the border then you can watch them even for 

30 minutes as they trudge north; with or without their musical instruments. 

Lastly, we have a truly serious threat to our national security that is being purposely ignored. That threat is border tunnels. It would be the height of stupidity 

to believe that campesinos are digging tunnels even 80 feet below ground and 2,500 

ft long just so that they can go pick strawberries in Fresno, make a right turn on 

I–40 (where San Diego based Border Patrol agents have been beached for running 

traffic operations) and go cut meat in Kansas City, or pick tomatoes in Florida. 

The people and things crossing through those tunnels are the most dangerous and 

violent possible. 

A 2,500 ft long tunnel is not fantasy. Such a tunnel was handed to the Border 

Patrol on a phoned in tip. 

That tunnel took the removal of about 300 full sized dump trucks of earth or 

about 2,000 pickup truck loads. Technology of even 1972 would have detected the 

change in seismic activity south of the border as those trucks of dirt were hauled 

away. 

That simple hardware exists to find such tunnels is—by now you should know it’s 

all true already available. But instead of funding people who will do something, the 

organization tasked with a solution—JTF-6 (now known as JTF-North)—only have 

jobs so long as they seek an answer rather than actually solving the problem. So 

nothing is actually accomplished because if it was. . . then they would be out of a 

job. 

Of course, the politicians launch themselves into the fray with inane legislation 

telling us that now all will be well. Gloriously, California Senators Diane Feinstein 

and Barbara Boxer have actually made it illegal to dig a tunnel into the USA. Now, 

we all are safe. 

Please notice that they have no interest or intention to actually stop the tunnels, 

they just added another few years to the life sentence the perpetrators will already 

be facing for drug smuggling, WMD smuggling, and terrorist smuggling. 

It took a local 12-year old child to demonstrate a working tunnel detection system. 

Yes, he did it in San Diego. While certainly the child is some kind of little genius, 

the fact is that anyone can do a Google search on tunnel detection and discover that 

20 years ago the US Army proved a simple and effective technology to find tunnels. 

All that kid did was implement what the US Army already proved works a decade 

before he was even born. I have attached the Aberdeen Proving Ground research 

document for you and a video of the child and his tunnel detector. 

The child’s technology was covered by the major news outlets. The day after the 

news event that 2,500 ft tunnel was reported to the DEA. Somebody should understand that while DHS might not think what the kid has works.. there’s a good 

chance that the drug cartels do: 

http://www.kfmb.com/features/crimefighters/story.php?id=35277 

The Human Element within the U.S. Border Patrol 

The latest method used to maintain silence among former Border Patrol managers 

is the annuities plan, which brings back retired managers and supervisors with a 

ridiculously high paycheck to bring them back into the fold and be used as hush 

money to keep these former employees from telling the truth. This was the very reason these employees left the agency in the first place, so they could tell the truth 

and not have to lie anymore. 

Last year David V. Aguilar, Chief of the Border Patrol claimed we did not have 

Mexican Military incursions, other than by accident or impersonators (testimony before then-Chairman McCall’s Homeland Security Subcommittee on Investigations), 

and that the Southwestern border is secure. But that was a blatant falsehood and 

this is well known within the Border Patrol. Otherwise, how does one explain Mexican Military incursion cards when they continue to be provided to agents in Tucson 

Sector, the very sector that Mr. Aguilar was the Chief Patrol Agent of, prior to ascending to his current appointment as national chief? We must keep in mind, that 

if we cannot admit to the Mexican Military incursions, though we provide agents 

instructions in the event of an incursion, and we cannot prevent millions of illegal 

aliens consisting of Mexicans, and OTMs (or Other Than Mexican), I guarantee we 

cannot prevent Special Interest Aliens, which potentially include terrorists who 

have obtained IDs and are portraying themselves as Mexican or other aliens from 

Latin American nations. 

Last year, I received a copy of an Officer Safety Report released to some Border 

Patrol agents by the Department of Homeland Security, based on FBI reports, dated 

December 21, 2005, warning ‘‘Unidentified Mexican Alien Smugglers Plan To Hire 

MS–13 (Gang) Members To Kill U.S. Border Patrol Agents. However, many Border 

Patrol agents and other law enforcement agencies were unaware of the existence of 

the document. 

86 

That Officer Safety Report follows a card issued for several years by the Tucson 

Sector that addressed Military Incursions. It states: Remember S.A.L.U.T.E. This 

is based on the long-used Army border policy of the same name and intention. On 

this double-sided card, the following is stated: 

Immediately communicate the following: 

Size of the unit (Number of personnel) 

Activity 

Location and direction of travel 

Unit (Identify if possible) 

Time (If reporting an earlier encounter) 

Equipment of the personnel 

The other side states: 

REMEMBER: 

Mexican Military are trained to escape, evade, and counter-ambush if it will effect 

their escape. • Secure detainees and pat down immediately. • Separate leaders from the group. • Remove all personnel from proximity of the border. • Once scene is secure, search for documents. 

Additional Tips: 

• Keep a low profile • Use cover and concealment • Don’t move excessively or abruptly. • Use shadows and camouflage to conceal yourself. • Stay as quiet as possible but communicate! • Hiding near landmarks is easier to locate. 

Avoid it! 

So clearly the Border Patrol has identified that the Mexican Military will counterambush our agents and citizens, and that violent MS–13 gang members, drug cartels, and zetas that have been recruited to move the drugs and engage Border Patrol 

agents. 

I would be remiss if I did not bring to your attention the following information, 

which numerous sources have provided during the course of our investigation. 

We cannot get a straight answer when it comes to how many Special Interest 

Aliens have been apprehended by CBP or ICE, other than a standard response of 

‘‘Pending Investigation’’ Yet, the Border Patrol knows how many teddy bears it gives 

away, how many cheese crackers it has in reserve (I would bet down to the individual 

cracker), diapers, etc., so the fact that it keeps absolutely no statistics on the people 

caught from terrorist countries as a mere accident defies all credibility. Obviously, 

the BP does not keep these statistics as a matter of policy and the reason is pretty 

transparent. Let me also add that the media has attempted to gain those very figures 

as well as the dispositions of apprehensions of SIAs that they learn about through 

sources. However, those results are seldom, if ever released, so the public has no way 

to learn if there is any information beyond what has been reported by sources. 

Madame Chairman, here are some facts about a few Border Patrol Sectors from 

well-placed sources who asked me to present this information to the committee 

today on their behalf. The reason that those sources are unable to do so themselves 

would be to place their careers at risk for retribution by Border Patrol and DHS 

managers at Headquarters in Washington, DC. The reason for their’ fears is well 

established and acknowledged as the Compean—Ramos case has demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt. 

The Congress and the American public have been completely misled by Border Patrol’s managers at Headquarters in DC. The northern border is nowhere near secure 

though Chief of the Border Patrol David Aguilar would inform you otherwise. Chief 

Aguilar was quoted in several newspapers, both Canadian and U.S. that ‘‘measures 

have been taken to bolster agent strength in the affected areas to include overtime 

payments.’’ According to my sources, the statement by Mr. Aguilar was inaccurate 

and never happened. There was no high alert, no overtime and no additional bodies. 

It is nothing but business as usual, and the policy of misinformation regardless of 

national security. 

As a matter of fact, several networks, both cable and broadcast, stated that there 

are 1,000 agents on the Northern Border. Wrong again. No detailers, nada. One Sector on the northern border has not received agent attrition replacements in about 

2 years now. This same sector is currently authorized at 147 agents and, because 

of details (mandated), sick leave, maternity leave, rubber gun squad, etc. etc. This 

sector last I heard was at an actual strength of just over 100. Though, as I understand it, this sector has been traditionally ignored for agent and support personnel 

87 

staffing. If you want to put this in percentage terms, this sector’s personnel, agentwise is down 31%. 

Let me add that at one particular station in this sector bordered by water, they 

are lucky to have two agents on during a 24-hour period. It takes two agents to run 

a boat. Previously, they have had a total of 5 agents, with 8 vacancies, obviously 

not enough to monitor boat traffic. Keep in mind that the Canadian City of Toronto 

was named last year as a possible terrorist target and is on the other side of that 

very station’s area of responsibility. 

According to sources, Chief Aguilar, and retired Deputy National Chiefs Barker 

and Stevens were personally and repeatedly warned about potential threats, and ignored such information. Of course that would not be the first time HQ–OBP has 

ignored intel requests, or that the chief’s office remained silent on challenges to his 

inaccurate public statements. This type of action is not unprecedented when one recalls that one year ago, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff stated that reports on 

Mexican Military incursions were being overblown. However, I know of other incidents including one that took place on Saturday, July 1, 2006 at 13:10 hours, according to a civilian source in Tucson Sector. This incursion included a drug load. 

In 2004, I personally challenged a statement Chief Aguilar made to The Daily 

Sentinel on August 31, 2004, regarding border security, in which he declared the 

southwest border to be secure. His statement was countered by numerous sources 

including Michael Shelby, U.S. Attorney from the Southern District of Texas. 

Additionally, in a Washington Times article published October 13, 2004, entitled 

‘‘Chechen terrorists probed’’ The article stated,‘‘U.S. security officials are investigating a recent intelligence report that a group of 25 Chechen terrorists illegally 

entered the United States from Mexico in July. . . . Members of the group, said to 

be wearing backpacks, secretly traveled to northern Mexico and crossed into a 

mountainous part of Arizona that is difficult for U.S. border security agents to monitor, said officials speaking on the condition of anonymity.’’ 

In fact, the Border Patrol Sector Chiefs have also been informed that they would 

receive additional agents to fill their numerous vacancies and technology holes. I understand that the agents and technology often mentioned is to be used to implement 

a ‘‘virtual wall’’ would be provided by Secure Border Initiative funding. It is our 

opinion that this is yet another empty promise, or if you will, ‘‘fool’s gold’’ to those 

sector chiefs, and I look forward to elaborating on why RVS Camera Systems and 

Tunnel Detection are ineffective during this hearing, leaving our nation wide-open, 

and also why we will not get those boots on the ground promised by the administration and DHS. 

They know as we do how the 30:1 ratio it takes to come up with one recruit for 

the Border Patrol, screening process, academy capacity, which is grossly inadequate, 

and difficulties of graduating due to the Spanish language requirement, and the tenmonth exam that takes place after the academy. They also know the actual attrition 

rate. The reports of the high numbers of agents throughout the service seeking employment opportunities elsewhere are not just rumors but are fact. Even more so 

today due to the well-publicized Compean & Ramos case as well as the others. 

In fact, I’d be remiss if I did not share that each time I speak with an agent, Border Patrol and otherwise, they inform me of their concern and outright fear as a 

result of these convictions. I know the Border Patrol, and over the past few years, 

the highest complement an agent gives is that they’d take a bullet for this agent 

or that agent. Today, that esprit de corps has been replaced with fear and mistrust 

and everyone looking out for them selves. The Border Patrol is filled with stories 

of tradition but that is the old and honored ‘‘Legacy INS Patrol’’ not the new patrol 

of today. 

Many BP Agents deserve an opportunity to tell their facts, and expose the truth, 

which is how DHS has ordered agents to stand down, and not report all the facts 

in order to prevent Congress from learning the truth. Outside of an extremely limited few, Border Patrol Agents’ voices have been silenced. All statements provided, 

and Congressional tours are pre-scripted and approved by Mr. Aguilar’s office, as 

he is the ultimate micro-manager. Any Sector Chief you speak with, including my 

friend my friends in management know as I do that they have to answer to Mr. 

Aguilar, as he is the top agent in the chain of command. I am certain you would 

hear the reality if they were authorized to provide it, on their own without retribution from Mr. Aguilar. Yet, the fact is, under regulations implemented in 2004 by 

the Department of Homeland Security, you will never get anything that strays from 

the official approved script. That is why it is important you have witnesses who do 

not have to worry about being retired by DHS or detailed from what is considered 

a good managerial detail to an outpost such as Ramey. 

If you do not believe the extent of the mistrust of many law enforcement agencies 

with the federal government and the Border Patrol, then you must not be paying 

88 

attention to what many border sheriffs have been stating for months. Like me, 

they’re not doing it for publicity or electoral reasons, they are telling the truth and 

standing by it because they are concerned about our nation’s being compromised 

and vulnerable to terrorists entering our borders. In March 2006, I witnessed an 

incident that took place in El Paso Texas during a break between meetings of the 

Border Sheriffs Coalition and Border Patrol. It defines the mistrust many have with 

the Border Patrol, and the administration. 

Madame Chairman, if we are to discuss vulnerability along our borders, we must 

not forget the clearly forgotten Ramey Border Patrol Sector, located at Aquadilla, 

Puerto Rico. As badly undermanned as the northern border is, our greatest strategic 

weakness is Ramey due to its strategic proximity in the Caribbean Sea near Venezuela, Columbia, and Cuba. Here I must thank Congressman Ted Poe who immediately took action and took DHS to task when I first informed him about Ramey 

and what agents there confront. While Ramey agents face a better situation today, 

we have a long road to go. 

DHS has begun planning to increase manpower levels, which I cannot identify 

here, due to national security, but there mission will continue to be compromised 

as long as the agency is more concerned about appearance than it’s mission of protecting the homeland as stated in the National Border Patrol Strategy. For the level 

of staffing being planned, it is illogical to call this a Border Patrol Sector, so that 

it will have increases in managerial staffing, when the same command structure can 

be achieved by detailing a Patrol Agent In-Charge (PAIC), and would be better 

served by attaching Ramey as a Border Patrol Station to the Miami Sector. This 

action would save money for Ramey consists of one solitary station, not several unlike the other sectors. Furthermore, what a waste of taxpayer dollars to pay for 

these additional managers, while agents are still restricted from performing enforcement duty beyond Search and Rescue when agents are requested to literally ‘‘pickup’’ illegal aliens attempting to incur by sea who land on Mona Island, and when 

their area of operation remains restricted to the northwest corner of Puerto Rico. 

Last year the Inland Valley Daily Bulletin of Ontario, CA published a number of 

reports indicating the vulnerability of this strategic island, which has dealt with sea 

incursions using Yola boats for years. Their manpower level is so grossly understrength that it defies all logic. I understand that many of the agents want to leave 

the island for other duties or agencies, and regularly see their agents detailed to 

southwestern border sectors or the academy, without being replaced. 

Yet, the irony is that they have nearly as many managers as agents. Their manpower is so under strength that they are limited to one corner of the island, and 

has to completely eliminate one shift for lack of available personnel. One thing 

agents have reported is that OTMs, or Other Than Mexican illegal aliens actually 

self-report with their flight tickets already in their possession for CONUS (Continental U.S.) destinations as the word is out in the region that after receiving their 

documents requesting a return for court appearance they will be free to leave the 

island for other destinations. For the record, the USBP agents do not have access 

to San Juan, where illegal aliens, which could include Special Interest Aliens, acquire phony identification documents. That is ICE-turf. 

It’s obvious that while countless agents have their complaints about ‘‘Legacy INS, 

the current state of the Border Patrol is in dire need of the Congress to engage in 

an immediate overhaul without delay. 

On the northern border, numerous sources have reported that ICE regularly requests Border Patrol assistance, as they do not have the manpower or resources to 

apprehend or detain on their own. It is to the degree that the Border Patrol is often 

requested to provide transport for illegal aliens detained, and that the Border Patrol 

can provide agents depending on availability due to operations and on a priority 

level. 

Madame Chairman, it is well documented as to the level of compliance by Border 

Patrol managers in Washington, DC with the policies and requests by the Mexican 

Government. Consider the parrot-like statements of our own government when it 

comes to Mexico. For anything and everything, Mexico provides a declaratory conclusion to a matter before even convening more than a surface investigation followed 

by concurrence by our own government. After that, come the so-called investigation 

and more discrediting info. 

Consider that Tucson Sector agents represented by Local 2544 of the National 

Border Patrol Council has gone on record by posting on their website as to the level 

of access and control by the Mexican Government, which has placed agents along 

the southwestern border often in dangerous, compromised situations. Also, consider 

that Border Patrol Headquarters continues to deny that Mexican Military incursions 

regularly occur, and that Sector Chiefs provided information about civilian border 

observation locations to the Mexican Government though clearly lacking CongresVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
89 

sional authority, and clearly exceeding the Vienna Convention Treaty. While the 

Border Patrol denied the Inland Valley Daily Bulletin’s published report, and attempted to discredit reporter Sara Carter after Agent Mario Martinez, their PIO 

who responded to her inquiry, after he initially admitted that such info was shared. 

I met with a Border Patrol Sector Chief Patrol Agent one year ago who took responsibility, and apologized for the disclosure of a property our organization used 

as a base-camp for border observations last summer as he understood my outrage, 

that our ‘‘secret’’ location I had personally provided to law enforcement, was provided to the Mexican Government. My meetings with a number of Chief Patrol 

Agents have been the only ones between civilians and Border Patrol managers to 

my knowledge. However, the Mexican Government and DHS have both expended 

great energy in attempting to discredit the news coverage in their denials and by 

stating that such locations were self-provided on websites, which was not the case 

of our location, including lying in numerous written responses to Congress and news 

interviews before the nation. 

It is interesting to note that Chief Patrol Agent Darryl Griffen of the San Diego 

Border Patrol Sector, a person that I consider to be a personal friend, was the sole 

chief patrol agent mentioned on their website though I understand several sectors 

provided similar information about activities and locations of lawful civilian border 

observations to Mexico. The Mexican Government endangered U.S. citizens by publishing such information on their website where drug cartels, their enforcers, military personnel, and violent gangs could have gathered such intel and plotted to 

harm, or even murder concerned citizens, including me. Yet, not one Congressional 

hearing has been conducted by any committee of either the House or Senate to look 

into that serious issue. 

The Mexican Government also attempted to undermine the chief personally by 

solely publishing his name and no others, as he has been quite proactive in the fight 

to secure our portion of the border and quite creative. I am certain that by damaging his name and reputation, they felt Congress would have seen him removed 

or reassigned. To me, this action demonstrates the level of cooperation by the Border Patrol managers at HQ, which undermines their very mission to secure America’s borders; especially considering that the Mexican Government is long identified 

by its corruption. 

When did the Congress relinquish authorization or control of the Border Patrol 

to Mexico City? Is this why Grupo Beta, previously an effective Mexican agency, was 

reduced to less than security guards, as they have been replaced by our own taxpayer financed Border Patrol? These are questions that must be answered before 

we even think to consider reconciling bills. Consider that I’ve scarcely even mentioned the failure known as ICE, a completely ineffective agency that should be absorbed into the Border Patrol, or Customs whose managers believe the best way to 

secure the border is by securing the ports of entry, which has been the mentality 

of CBP while leaving the borders wide open to incursion by violent terrorists, smugglers, and Mexican Military personnel. 

Madame Chairman, it is outrageous that there is such coordination and cooperation, lest any of us forget about the maps and comic books they provide to illegal 

aliens, which include terrorists. Perhaps the Members are unaware but the State 

Department provided the funding for our Border Patrol to train personnel of Grupo 

Beta and other Mexican Government entities along their southern border such as 

sign-tracking and other tactics used by the patrol. With Mexico’s record, how can 

this government continue to see them as a partner, when they have done absolutely 

nothing to prevent terrorism? 

Madame Chairman, I would be completely remiss if I did not mention to the committee today that such behavior by the Mexican Government would not be unprecedented as border residents for years have been terrorized for years by violent gangs, 

bandits, drug cartels, smugglers, local Mexican law enforcement officials and even 

personnel of the Mexican Military who assist with smuggling operations. 

Allow me to share a couple of stories with you today about local border residents, 

who are our fellow U.S., citizens. Victoria Hope lived in San Diego’s East County 

region. She did what many of us do for our neighbors. She was looking after her 

neighbor’s property while her neighbors were away. When you live in the border region, it is imperative that you work with your neighbors as livestock gets out, or 

bandits and smugglers often trespass your property, which endangers one’s family 

and neighbors. Mrs. Hope was viciously murdered by illegal aliens who, as if this 

heinous crime was not nearly enough, these same individuals stole her car. 

Madame Chairman, my friends who live along the border and face this form of 

terrorism 24/7 have long concluded that due to the presence of the organized crime 

cartels and gangs who orchestrate the majority of the smuggling of drugs, people 

and contraband here in San Diego, that they do not believe that such individuals 

90 

would hesitate to smuggle items that would be used to cause harm to America and 

her citizens—especially if the price was right. A concern that many law enforcement 

agencies concur with, as do we. 

However, this is not an isolated story. Over the past two years, I have met with 

and earned the trust, support, and friendship of many San Diego border area residents, which is not given, but earned. They have dealt with wrong-way drivers of 

load vehicles, which involve narcotic, or human smuggling loads, sometimes both. 

The load drivers when spotted, or they think they’ve been spotted by law enforcement officers including Border Patrol agents cross to the wrong side of the road. 

This practice utilized to evade and escape Border Patrol agents, CHP officers, and 

Deputy Sheriffs happens often along the border. This is yet another type of terrorism our fellow citizens face. Imagine the day that the load vehicle hits a busload 

of school children on the way to or from school. Deaths have occurred as a result 

of wrong-way drivers and it is completely avoidable if we secure our borders and 

protect our citizens. 

That’s a critical point we hope everyone here today considers. Terrorism is not 

limited to people that are members of violent terrorist organizations with bombs, 

sniper rifles, or detonators. Terrorism includes those very types of groups and individuals I mentioned above that have not been dealt with for far too long. We have 

no business calling groups gangs when they bring chaos, mayhem, violence, mayhem, and murder to our cities, neighborhoods, parks, and schools. It is pure and 

simple, they are terrorists, too, and must also be broken up and brought to justice 

for those are the most obvious people to recruit here within our own nation and entering our Swiss-cheese borders. Or does calling people that are terrorizing and 

murdering our fellow citizens terrorists not happen because of the propaganda that 

the War on Terror is in Iraq and Afghanistan and does not include our own borders? 

That is something that this committee and the House of Representatives must 

recognize as fact, publicly acknowledge. The supporters of open borders in the House 

and Senate as well as the Bush Administration know this, which is why we are inundated with fancy slogans or politically correct terminology, the dog and pony 

press events, and the smoke and mirrors about willing workers doing jobs Americans won’t, which continues to exclude Americans being displaced from the labor 

force. By campaigning in such a way, this is why our borders remain vulnerable and 

why we get such absurd proposals from Washington. It is why many people within 

the Border Patrol and other agencies felt it imperative that I appear as a witness, 

to discuss these items publicly that are being hidden from the Congress and public. 

Far too many people today are in this nation, and we do not know who they are, 

or their backgrounds, and Mexico will never cooperate with U.S. law enforcement 

requests, though they’ll make every demand on us to adhere to their demands 

though they continue to plan protests, monitor civilians and public figures alike, and 

undermine our sovereignty. 

This happens because our government does not tell the Mexican Government to 

back off, and mind their’ own store. Instead, our government parrots their lies, endangers law enforcement officers and civilians alike, and allows such behavior to 

continue, which I consider to be open espionage against the United States. 

My active duty sources in the Border Patrol have risked their careers and futures 

in order to provide me the truth, which I, in turn, have forwarded to Congressional 

leaders, and shared with other law enforcement agencies or Members of Congress. 

Each of them deserves an opportunity to tell their facts, and expose the truth, which 

is how this administration through DHS has ordered agents to stand down, and 

even lie in order to prevent Congress from learning the truth. But their voices, outside of a handful others are being squelched as this administration and Chief 

Aguilar rules his fiefdom with an iron fist. All statements and tours Members take 

are pre-scripted and approved by his office. He is the ultimate micro-manager. Any 

Sector Chief you speak with, including my friend Chief Griffen knows as I do that 

he has to answer to Mr. Aguilar, as he is the top agent in the chain of command. 

I am certain you would hear the reality if they were authorized to provide it, on 

their own without retribution from Mr. Aguilar. Yet, the fact is, under the new rules 

and regulations implemented since 2004 by the Department of Homeland In-Security, you will never get anything that strays from the official approved script. That 

is why it is important you have witnesses who do not have to worry about being 

retired by DHS or detailed from what is considered a good managerial detail to an 

outpost such as Ramey. 

Border Patrol agents want to provide info to Congress but cannot make themselves vulnerable to what our sources and many news outlets have reported as the 

‘‘culture of corruption’’ at HQ–OBP that has led to such fear and retribution within 

the agency. As a result, the Mexican Government continues to undermine our nation, and people, while assisting terrorists. This is how the Chief of the Border PaVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
91 

trol continues to put his agents at risk, because nobody under his command trusts 

our Congress to fight for them so they can step forward and tell the truth, beyond 

citizens such as myself who have earned their trust and the trust of key leaders 

here within the Congress knowing that we will present the truth on their behalf 

to Congress. I don’t represent a corporation or think-tank. I represent real law enforcement agents and officers who cannot speak for themselves. 

In 2005, agents were pleased that civilians took action and went to the borders 

to see what was happening themselves. It is a shame that we have to depend on 

civilians staging publicity stunts to take cameras out to the desert under horrible 

conditions in the hopes that something will happen in front of the news media so 

that the truth gets out. 

As I was informed during meetings along the northern border, it is a shame that 

civilians have to provide technology that DHS can easily provide for themselves, but 

refuse to do. But someone has to do it, and this particular official as well as numerous others were pleased that someone was willing to step forward and do so. Instead 

we are reduced to watching the continuation of the sham being perpetrated by our 

own government who each day looks more like a two-bit dictatorship, as they constantly mislead and hide the truth from our citizens. 

If you do not believe the extent of the mistrust that many law enforcement agencies with the federal government and the Border Patrol, then you must not be paying attention to what many border sheriffs have been stating for a couple of years 

now. Like me, they’re not doing it for publicity or electoral reasons, they are telling 

the truth and standing by it because they are concerned about our nation’s being 

compromised and vulnerable to terrorists entering our borders. 

I encourage the Members to review an interview I did with the New American 

Magazine published in May 2006 in which I discussed an incident that took place 

in El Paso Texas during a break between meetings of the Border Sheriffs Coalition 

and Border Patrol. It underscores and exemplifies the mistrust many have with the 

Border Patrol. Sheriff Arvin West and others can tell volumes of stories about this 

problem. 

Until Congress steps up to the plate and fixes by overhauling DHS, CBP, ICE, 

CIS and the Border Patrol, the invasion of our nation will continue without anyone 

to stop it. As a result the quality of life of our fellow Americans residing along the 

borders will continue to deteriorate as will the threat against our lives throughout 

the nation for if we ignore terrorists, how long will it take for the next 9-11, and 

as everyone knows, our nation’s leaders were targets of that tragic days attack, including the Pentagon, World Trade Center, and even you, our nation’s leaders in 

Washington, D.C. For the fact remains, the only effective agency remaining in the 

Department of Homeland Security is the very one responsible for the protection of 

the President and Vice President of the United States, while the rest of us depend 

on the agents and officers being outgunned and out-manned on our borders and in 

our cities. 

THE IMPACT ON AMERICA’S AGENTS—IN THEIR OWN WORDS 

Here is a statement taken from the National Border Patrol Council’s Local 2544 

website. This local represents agents in the Tucson Sector. 

‘‘After the recent shooting incident in Naco, managers and investigators failed to 

separate the witnesses, and allowed them to ‘‘get their stories straight’’ before 

speaking to the Mexican Consulate. ‘‘Investigation 10’’ mandates that you immediately separate ALL witnesses so that they can’t conspire. You transport them separately. Then, if separated witnesses give wildly diverse stories about what happened you know that someone is not being truthful. In this case, the Mexican Consulate’s star witnesses are all related to the alleged ‘‘victim’’. Further, while 

management claims they have completed a ‘‘thorough investigation’’ into the matter 

of the Mexican Consulate improperly gaining access to witnesses prior to anyone 

from law enforcement, they inexplicably failed to speak with either of the 

rank-and-file agents present that day. The only people they interviewed that 

we’re aware of are managers. Again, ‘‘investigation 101’’ mandates that you speak 

with all available witnesses, not just those who are likely to support your preferred 

version of events. A short written statement from the agents is insufficient in this 

case. Other questions have arisen since the agents originally submitted their statements. Those questions require clarification. This isn’t brain surgery. Isn’t it ironic 

that if management is trying to pin something on an agent, they start with ordering 

the agent and any witnesses to write memoranda, then ask for more information, 

followed by exhaustive ‘‘interviews’’. If they’re trying to exonerate a manager, they 

suddenly don’t need anything other than the original short written statements to 

complete their ‘‘thorough’’ investigation. No follow-up necessary.’’ 

From a retired Border Patrol manager. . . 

92 

I still get sick thinking about what those idiots in DC have done to the outfit. The 

BP is just a bad dream to me. (Name redacted) is one of them, I had serious problems with a Chief, brought it to his attention and he ignored me, along with (Name 

redacted). 

Seriously, I still get sick thinking about the outfit, can’t believe how Aguilar mentally controls the field leaders..I have no respect for them either...they do not have 

b***s anymore. 

Why doesn’t anyone complain? Maybe I just have (had) a bad attitude because I 

couldn’t see the big picture. 

Also, from another anonymous Border Patrol agent: 

Maybe the people out there do care? They may not care to hear about border 

security, but their response to the two jailed agents makes me feel good for 

once! The Border Patrol leaders didn’t support the agents and wonder why 

they can’t recruit enough agents? This coverage will not help recruit quality 

agents, it will help recruit the wrong people (ie racists and wackos). 

Yeah the agents didn’t report the shooting, but shootings are so common and the 

reporting SOP is so overwhelming that if we reported every shooting, you would be 

in the office most of your career just typing. The guys in the field are learning from 

the best, the leaders in HQ, hell they hire their buddies without any shame. No more 

job competition within EEO guidelines anymore. They just do what they 

want. . .and the arrogance is spilling down to the field. From yet another anonymous Border Patrol agent. . . 

Not only is everything we do wrong, right or wrong is determined by inconsistency. 

What’s wrong for one manager or sup is right with the next one that comes along 

moments later. If I had it to do over, I’d have stayed a policeman for less money then 

go through the BS that I do here. 

From an agent’s spouse: 

Screw up, move up. To get along, you have to go along. 

From an anonymous Customs agent: 

My Senior manager at our Port of Entry tells me and my fellow agents, I’m 

proud to work for Mexico. How did this guy ever get to be a high-ranking agent 

if that’s his belief? He does not allow us to perform secondary inspections at our 

port and tells us we are Customer Service, not Law Enforcement. The standing 

order is you will move everyone. You won’t check everyone. 

Another agent points out the following: 

They took away our ability to vet our own applications for the designated commuter 

lane, which now goes through Vermont, due to the level of corruption involved at our 

ports of entry. Dopers have been able to use the DCL, which is how we lost control 

of the vetting process in the first place. 

From yet another agent: 

Every doper tied to the Crawford witch-hunt case is a DCL applicant in El Paso. 

How does Crawford get convicted, yet these publicly identified dopers can get through 

the port while claim to be meeting my own boss for lunch? 

From another agent: 

As bad as the Ports of Entry in San Diego and Laredo are, the corruption is nowhere 

near as bad as it is here in El Paso. All a person has to do is say they’re a Friend 

Of (Name redacted) and they get no inspection and are not stopped at all. We get 

yelled at for even talking to them and threatened with our job. 

Yet, another agent: 

We once had a student try to cross the bridge with explosives minus the detonator. 

Our managers told us to ignore it and let the person pass. We told El Paso PD as 

the City owns the bridge, and EPPD and the FBI showed up, took over the investigation and detonated the explosive on the bridge in place. Yah, real improvement in 

Homeland Security here. 

From a final agent. . . 

Incompetent and unqualified cronies of certain leaders run our Ports of Entry and 

the Border Patrol. They moved us to a different Department, got rid of everyone, and 

even got rid of the agency. The reality is we’re still there, just wearing a different 

disguise. 

Statement from Commissioner Bernie Kerik on U.S. v. Compean & Ramos 

Case 

The criminal prosecution and harsh sentencing last year of two border patrol 

agents convicted of wounding an illegal immigrant trying to smuggle some 700 

pounds of marijuana over the border has ignited a controversy that has people on 

both the right and left calling for an investigation. Well, let the investigation begin. 

And let’s hope that it results in a presidential pardon for agents Ignacio Ramos and 

Jose Alonso Compean. 

93 

Yes, the actions of the agents after the shooting in failing to report the incident— 

the suspect ran over the Mexican border and kept running, and the agents’ say they 

were unaware that he was hit—merit discipline. But the agents’ initial actions of 

challenging the suspect and firing when then they thought they were about to come 

under fire themselves, does not warrant the 11 and 12 year sentences each received, 

respectively, at sentencing. 

Why? Because they were doing their jobs protecting the security of this country. 

Consider the fact that since the attacks of 9/11 more than 6 million people have 

been stopped at the borders trying to enter the country illegally. Yes, most were 

likely entering to get work. But surely not all and certainly not the illegal immigrant involved in this case, who, by his own admission, was hired to run drugs over 

the border to a stash house. 

If this drug runner was, instead, trying to smuggle explosives or a dirty bomb, 

would the two agents then be hailed as heroes? Yes, and probably presented with 

a presidential medal, because border security is a vital element in our continuing 

effort to keep America safe from terrorist attacks. Remember that the 19 hijackers 

of September 11th passed through U.S. border security checkpoints a total of 68 

times, leaving and entering this country as they planned their murderous plot. Consider also, in testimony before the U.S. Senate in 2005, James Loy, deputy secretary 

of the Department of Homeland Security, stated; ‘‘several al-Qa’ida leaders believe 

operatives can pay their way into the country through Mexico and also believe illegal entry is more advantageous than legal entry for operational security reasons.’’ 

And one has to ask what kind of message this trial and conviction sends to the 

thousands of dedicated local and state police, and federal agents from the CIA, FBI 

and DHS who risk danger every day to ensure our safety. It’s not as if the two 

agents prosecuted in this case have bad records. They are good agents with no disciplinary history. In fact, Agent Ramos was nominated for Border Patrol Agent of 

the year in 2005. Instead, he sits in jail while the illegal drug runner is suing the 

U.S. Government for millions. 

Prior to their trial last March, the agents were each offered, and declined, a oneyear plea deal. Had they accepted, they would be out of jail today with time served. 

But that is not the point, because although the plea carried less time, it was still 

recognition that their actions were criminal. And that is the real travesty here. 

And now a new furor has erupted over the recent beating of Agent Ramos in prison at the hand of other inmates. Investigations are being requested, questions are 

being asked about the type of protection, or lack thereof, that was afforded this 

former federal agent in prison, and some are calling for the resignation of the warden of the federal facility in Mississippi . 

Questions do need to be asked about the beating. But that should not cloud the 

real question that needs to be asked here. And that question is when will Agents 

Ramos and Compean be freed to return to their families and have their conviction 

wiped clean? Their only guilt is that of doing their job defending our country. 

This injustice at the border needs to be righted. 

BERNARD B. KERIK 

40th Police Commissioner (Retired) 

City of New York 

FBP Calls for Independent Counsel to Investigate Pattern of Abuse by U.S. 

Attorney 

Friends of the Border Patrol continues our call for the terminations of U.S. Attorney Johnny Sutton along with AUSAs Kanof, Gardes, Gonzales, and Gregory for 

their malicious prosecution of Border Patrol Agents Jose Compean and Ignacio 

Ramos. Also, for hiding key evidence from, and lying to, the American people, as 

well as harboring, aiding, and providing comfort to a known drug smuggler— 

Osbaldo Aldrete-Davila who illegally entered the U.S. from Mexico, assaulted Agent 

Compean, brandished a firearm towards two federal agents, resisted arrest, and 

transported narcotics across international boundaries on multiple occasions. 

Additionally, we continue to call for the resignation of Judge Kathleen Cardone 

who did everything possible to aid the prosecution in this witch-hunt, including sealing evidence and testimony that clearly would have damaged the credibility of the 

government’s case and their alleged ‘‘victim.’’ Furthermore, when Aldrete-Davila 

withheld information though given immunity under the terms of his agreement the 

Court should have ordered him taken into custody immediately and charged for both 

narcotic incidents, while immediately ordering Agents Compean and Ramos released 

and terminating the trial. 

It is clear that Judge Cardone abused her power to ensure the conviction of 

Agents Compean and Ramos. Her rulings before, during, and after the trial clearly 

identify this as demonstrated by not only the recently released transcripts, but also 

94 

continuing news coverage. This includes her Feb. 13, 2006 ruling that border violence, including military incursions, assaults, etc would be taken on a case by case 

basis further denying Agents Compean and Ramos of a fair and just trial, and instead chose to provide the type of justice found in the courtrooms of Mexico, and 

the former Soviet Union, while violating the civil rights of Agents Compean and 

Ramos who were not given a fair trial. 

Furthermore, we continue our call for all sealed information, testimony, and documents including the October 2005 indictment against admitted narcotic trafficker 

Osbaldo Aldrete-Davila to be unsealed and publicly provided to the Congress and 

American people without redaction. This includes the testimony of BP Agent Nolan 

Blanchette as listed on Transcript 14 in the index. 

We maintain our call for an independent counsel to be authorized with full prosecutorial powers to investigate this case and other similar cases in order to determine what other misconduct by the government has taken place and has led to innocent officers being imprisoned. This administration cannot be trusted to further 

manage, or review this case as they are tainted by the actions of their subordinates 

in multiple departments and agencies. 

FBP’s Recommendation to Congress 

Madame Chairman, we have several recommendations to make to the Congress 

today, and these are but the beginning. 

First, we call on the Congress to investigate and conduct full committee oversight 

hearings on the War On Law Enforcement perpetrated against our agents and officers by the administration starting with Compean and Ramos. The pattern of abuse 

is there and DOJ and DHS officials must be held accountable. Each case I mentioned in my testimony must be looked at as one case maybe, two well. . .but approaching 10 is more than a mere coincidence and demands oversight. When you 

cannot trust justice to get it right, and instead they repeatedly withhold evidence 

by sealing and preventing law enforcement from a fair and just trial, we become 

another two-bit 3rd world dictatorship in the worst traditions of the former Soviet 

Union, or what people originally left behind when they came to America. 

Second, we call on this very committee to overhaul the Firearms and Pursuit Policies used by the Border Patrol so that the travesty that took place in the Compean 

& Ramos case will never happen again. 

Third, that this committee bans the humiliation tactic known in the Border Patrol 

as the Rubber Gun Squad. It serves no purpose other than to get people in line and 

trains monkey boys and robots, as they are known in the patrol. 

Fourth, don’t just accept the pre-scripted guided tour approved by HQ–OBP, do 

what Congressman Steve King did and go out and see it for yourselves, or call me, 

and we’ll give you a tour of Southern California so you can see it for yourself, just 

as Mr. Poe did. 

There are many others, but I’ll close on this critical point as this Congress plans 

on addressing so-called Comprehensive Immigration Reform. 

Based on our information via numerous sources in law enforcement and from numerous citizens residing along our borders, the worst thing the Congress can do 

would be to compromise and assent to the Senate’s amnesty bill. DHS would 

promptly certify that the border is under control. DHS is the fox guarding the henhouse considering agreements now in place, and the fact that Border Patrol Sector 

Chief Patrol Agents along the Mexican border overstepped Vienna Convention mandates for co-signers by providing the location of civilian border observations to the 

Mexican Government, though that’s been justified in the name of a good neighbor 

policy, and by agreements not made public between the Department of Homeland 

Security and Mexico’s Secretariat of Governance, which was signed on March 3, 

2006. 

Sources of ours report that DHS and CBP have been informing the public through 

the media that the Border Patrol has achieved ‘‘operational control’’ of the borders 

and that crossers had a ‘‘substantial probability of apprehension’’. If the House falls 

for this type of conditional provision, DHS will immediately certify that the border 

is secure, which ensures that amnesty can go ahead. DHS is, after all, run by the 

most incompetent group of handpicked bureaucrats our government has ever seen 

rise to such positions. We, at Friends of the Border Patrol, often refer to this as a 

FEMA syndrome. In one case, one such agency head is the most unqualified choice 

of them all whom could not even pronounce Nuevo Laredo at her first press conference. Of course she recommended herself to the president though numerous leaders were both qualified and available. 

It is our position after investigating the insecurity of our nation and regular contact with our law enforcement sources that we are vulnerable to Mexican Military 

incursion, smugglers, drug cartels, and violent gangs. To be perfectly honest, the 

95 

only thing that DHS and the Border Patrol have excelled at is convincing America 

that the border is secured and they certainly wouldn’t suddenly decide to tell the 

truth with so much at stake. Hopefully Congress recognizes what a con game this 

would be and declines any amnesty. 

Ask Chief Patrol Agent Bill King (USBP retired), a mentor, friend and the sole 

living director who administered the previous amnesty of 1986. He and other friends 

including retired Agent Michael Cutler who worked the fraud squad for over 30 

years will tell you it cannot work and would be an even greater failure than it was 

in 1986. 

I respectfully will remind the committee that it is impossible to even talk about 

such things as amnesty/guest worker programs as no bill authored over the past few 

years addresses the greater problem. 

I am declaring the Border Patrol to be a broken organization in dire need of an 

overhaul. This was an agency whose headquarters motto used to be ‘‘serving the 

field.’’ Now you have over 200 personnel at HQ, when we need boots in the field. 

It is imperative that Congress overhauls the Border Patrol, remove the manager 

who rules by fear and you’ll find countless witnesses who will appear before you and 

provide the facts, upon which you’ll know the truth and begin to win the war on 

terror. Want to stop terrorists? Fix DHS and the USBP first and tell Mexico to fix 

their own house and stop exporting terrorists, criminals, and narcotics illegally 

across our borders while conducting espionage in our house. 

The Bush Administration needs to cease and desist from providing an incentive 

for illegal aliens to come to America. They need to put the American worker first, 

not those whose nations of origin are responsible for providing for their own people. 

President Bush repeatedly speaks of ‘‘good hearted people doing jobs that Americans 

no longer do.’’ Since when do Americans not work in construction, fast food, and 

other service industries? The fact remains that Americans do every last one of those 

jobs that are no longer being offered to Americans, and especially not at slave 

wages, which is also why so many employers have outsourced jobs to other parts 

of the planet. It’s all about cheap labor, and profits, over American citizens, jobs, 

and public safety. 

The American people are opposed to guest worker/amnesty and have made that 

point very clear though it’s not needed as the Border Patrol are currently prohibited 

from interior enforcement operations under 2004’s National Border Patrol Strategy 

and Memo of Understanding between Customs and Border Protection and ICE released to the agencies on November 16, 2004. It’s time to put America and our security first, by restoring funding, cutting off the job magnet, and letting the agents 

enforce the laws. Elected officials from both parties primary job is to support and 

defend the Constitution, not undermine immigration laws as they have done, and 

continued to do. 

This administration is noted for its slogans, so I’ve got one for them. How about 

calling this attempt to ‘‘reform immigration’’ by the Bush Administration what it 

really is, ‘‘No backroom deal with Mexico (or good hearted-doper reduced to trafficking drugs to help buy medicine for his poor sick mother)—left behind. . .’’ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Ramirez. 

And I thank all the witnesses for their testimony. 

And I will remind each of the members that he or she will have 

5 minutes to question the panel. 

And I will now recognize myself for such questions. 

First, the doctor from San Diego, thank you for traveling from 

California to appear at this hearing. 

In this testimony, you made the case for enhanced collaboration 

with the federal government, Canada and Mexico and collaboration 

between local entities on border communities. 

What type of leadership have you seen coming out of the federal 

agencies or the federal government to do this type of collaboration? 

And what do you think we could do to improve that collaboration 

so that we do catch more bad guys at the border, we do stop more 

drugs from being smuggled in, or people, et cetera? 

What do you see that is good? Are we taking the lead? And what 

can we do to improve that? 

Mr. MCILLWAIN. Thank you, ma’am. 

96 

I can speak authoritatively with regard to what is going on in 

San Diego. In San Diego, we have a very unique environment, in 

that we have what is called the San Diego Association of Governments, which works very well in terms of working across jurisdictions; not just local and county level governments, in Orange County and Imperial County and others, but also with tribal governments and also with representatives of the Mexican government as 

well. 

These relationships are things that took a long time to put together and took a long time to build. A lot of it dealt with interpersonal and institutional collaborations on the individual level or 

the institutional level that have then now branched out into the 

larger regional task forces that deal with things like infrastructure 

development or environmental concerns or public safety. 

Customs and Border Patrol have actually now joined that entity 

as of this last November, and so— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So those federal agencies are now part of 

SanDAG? 

Mr. MCILLWAIN. They are now actually working with SanDAG, 

exactly. And so, they are now part of that structure. So they are 

attending the meetings. And it is actually a very positive—I just 

spoke with the coordinator of the borders committee there for the 

San Diego Association of Governments. My testimony will have 

links to their Web sites and other reports that they have put together. 

But in all of these areas, homeland security, if it is infrastructure, if it is environmental or other issues, homeland security is actually mandated to be part of the proactive thinking that goes into 

the regional collaboration between the entities on both sides of the 

border. 

Border Patrol and Customs has their role in that process as well. 

I cannot speak as to whether or not they have similar arrangements in other parts of the country, but I know at least in San 

Diego there is a very positive environment that has taken place. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Wermuth, you stressed the need for long-term planning at 

the Department of Homeland Security. What are the essential 

items we need to have in order to structure that at the Department 

of Homeland Security? Why do you believe it is not really in place, 

this long-term view? 

Mr. WERMUTH. Well, the biggest problem for the department 

since its formation just a little over 4 years ago now, almost 4 

years to the day, has been in what we would call dealing with the 

inbox, or dealing with the current crisis. 

And not a lot of thought has yet been given, perhaps understandably, bringing so many entities together into this new department, 

not a lot of emphasis has been placed on long-term planning: planning for all of the operational entities within DHS, long-term planning with the other entities—and there are a number of other federal agencies, as I am sure all of you know: Department of Justice, 

Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, Department of 

Agriculture. So many different parts of our federal government 

have some piece of border responsibility. 

97 

So something akin to the long-term planning that the Department of Defense does in their combatant commands may be a good 

approach. I mentioned the Quadrennial Defense Review and taking 

into consideration long-term investment strategies, longer-term 

operational plans, longer-term plans for cooperation with our border friends in Canada and Mexico and, for that matter, other international partners, because this is not just something that is peculiar to the United States. 

We also have competing interests, of course, between the security 

issue and economic considerations. Having the right amount of security but trying not to impede the flow of commerce that is so 

vital to our economy. 

So all of these issues need to be addressed in a more strategic, 

more long-term mean than is currently being accomplished, as the 

department simply tries to deal with what a good friend and colleague of mine calls the crisis du jour. 

So we have to move beyond that and at least have a component 

in the Department of Homeland Security that is looking over the 

horizon at all of these various issues that have some impact on border security. 

I want to ask you gentlemen one last question. It really has to 

do with all this information management or databases, because one 

of you brought it up in particular. 

I am just always astounded at how much information we really 

do collect. And somebody talked about having a database that you 

could punch in, Google in, and you could look at what the other police departments might have on a particular person. 

I have a database of, I don’t know, maybe 15,000 donors in my 

campaign, and it took me 4 years and 15 different vendors to be 

able to figure out how to finally be able to pull up a simple report 

of the way I wanted it whenever. 

So it just seems like every database takes such an effort, to continue to update it, to continue to put into it, and to be able to pull 

off what you want. 

I mean, why is it that we can’t—aside from some of the privacy 

issues that might occur, why is it that we can’t seem to have these 

types of systems work in a government where we are spending billions sometimes to make a new database and a new system? 

Do any of you have thoughts on this? 

Mr. O’HANLON. I will give a couple of quick thoughts. 

I am not sure I understand, myself. But I do think that when you 

recognize the difficulty of building information systems that really 

are effective on the first try or anytime soon, you should be wary 

of trying to create the giant perfect database for all time. 

And, in general, in homeland security and on intelligence, what 

you want to do is allow different databases to speak with each 

other and be cross-searched, rather than trying to create the one 

perfect new system that is going to solve all the problems. Because 

that hardly ever happens, and, of course, there is a several-year 

time lag involved in even trying. 

So that is the one conclusion I would draw, not explaining the 

problem that you mentioned, Congresswoman, but agreeing with 

you and then saying, well, what do we do about it in a practical 

sense. 

98 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Anyone else? Yes? 

Mr. MCILLWAIN. Actually, there are some areas where we can actually see examples of this occurring, once again occurring largely 

on the regional level. San Diego, for example, has a strong model 

for regional cooperation and for data fusion related to the Sector 

Command Center–Joint, otherwise known as JHOC, which is based 

in the San Diego Bay. 

In that facility, you would have members of the United States 

Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, Border Patrol and other entities that are 

engaged in securing the borders and the port facilities. Some of 

them maintain their stovepipes in terms of intelligence and what 

is coming in there, as they rightfully should to make sure that certain information doesn’t get out. 

But by keeping people in this same facility and keeping them 

wired and having the physical infrastructure of being able to look 

at imagery and visualize certain problems, see what is going on in 

the port and the border in real-time using aerial-, land-and seabased assets, that is a very positive step in the right direction. 

Additionally, we have the federal law enforcement coordination 

centers that are popping up. In San Diego, San Diego State University has been heavily involved, the lab that I work with at my university, in helping wire these things so that the data that does 

come in from the fusion capacity is actually done more efficiency 

and handled more efficiently and also visualized in such a way that 

makes it easier for the decision-maker to sit back and actually 

make decisions that are making the best use out of that data. 

So I think there are some examples going on out there. It is just 

a matter of basically trying to build upon those examples on a national level. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Did you have a comment on— 

Mr. WERMUTH. I agree with both of my colleagues. The problem 

here is that we have so much data that people at the local level— 

the sheriff of Orange County—can’t possibly determine on his own 

how to go and find particular pieces of data that might be useful 

in the law enforcement arena. 

We have to find ways—and the technology is here; it is just 

something that somebody needs to take on as a program, as a 

project—to segment the data in ways that, regardless of who the 

particular official is—it could be public health, it could be fire, it 

could be law enforcement—can find information easily, find current 

information, hopefully real-time or near-real-time information, in a 

relatively user-friendly way. 

I like Michael’s idea of Google. Perhaps there are other ways to 

actually display—buttons that you can push that will take you to 

information that is particularly applicable to your discipline, regardless of what level you are, whether you are government or private sector or ordinary citizens, for that matter. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Great. Thank you. 

Mr. RAMIREZ. On the general terms, I absolutely agree with my 

fellow panelists. But when it comes to the internal side—and we 

are talking the law enforcement side—you can’t share a lot of those 

details. 

For example, Border Patrol in El Paso hadn’t, for the longest 

time, detailed agents to EPIC, the El Paso Intel Center. Border 

99 

sheriffs report that they basically had to come together as an organization in order to find the information, because it wasn’t being 

shared by the Border Patrol. 

And there were a number of issues I could cite but I wouldn’t be 

able to do it publicly. 

But that is a lot of the problem: They can’t talk about everything 

with that. And some of it becomes so cumbersome that it doesn’t 

work for agents in-house. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay, we have four votes on the floor. There is a 

10-minute bill. I would love to have the ranking member ask his 

questions. I think then we will recess, go over and take the four 

votes, and come back and start with Ms. Harman I believe. 

No, was Mr. Green here first? Okay, great. 

Mr. SOUDER. First I would like to say to Dr. O’Hanlon, I agree 

with what you said basically. If you don’t have a secure I.D., if you 

don’t have an entry-exit program, then you get visa overstay questions. If you don’t have a secure border, everything else is just 

chatter. And that we need to understand that that is fundamental, 

and if you can’t get the border secure, it is pretty tough to do the 

rest of it. 

I also want to say, with Mr. Wermuth, part of the reason that 

we are moving ahead without a comprehensive plan is we can’t sit 

around and wait until there is a comprehensive plan. So we are 

putting fences up, we are hiring more agents, knowing that will be 

part of any comprehensive plan that is there. 

But it is so frustrating, working with narcotics over the last few 

years, in the reauthorization of ONDCP last December when we finally got the bill through, we mandated that they have a southwest 

border strategy for narcotics. It is inconceivable that we have never 

had a southwest border policy, even for a sub-category of narcotics. 

So, to some degree, we have to keep moving. And we micromanage because we can’t sit here and diddle around forever, but 

it would be helpful and absolutely essential to have a full plan. 

But I want to make sure I get a question in to Mr. Ramirez, because I have been increasingly concerned that as we achieve increasing, not full success, but marginal success along the border, 

it is only logical that violence is going to increase. I just talked to 

our National Guard commander. In Indiana we have soldiers along 

the border who aren’t allowed to have guns. Well, they are not on 

the border, but they are working on the road right near the border. 

As the narcotics groups come through, as we put any real tension—I mean, one way we can tell, quite frankly, whether we are 

being successful is whether violence increases. The cost of whether 

it is illegal contraband of any kind—chemical, biological, nuclear, 

narcotics, stolen goods, whether it is high-value people—that if you 

are successful, one way you measure, in Colombia and elsewhere, 

is whether violence increases. 

The question to you is, we understand from our staff that the 

Border Patrol hasn’t changed their force policy since they have become part of DHS—whether you agree, from what you have seen 

on the ground, that violence is increasing; what the Department of 

Homeland Security is doing in relation to the Border Patrol, other 

than, ‘‘If you see somebody armed, get out of their way.’’ 

100 

Mr. RAMIREZ. I am glad you asked that because that is one of 

the biggest problems. 

Again, we look at Ramos & Compean as the example. Since that 

case happened, violence against not only agents but the National 

Guard—and I don’t know if members are aware, but the National 

Guard on the border is under the operational control of the U.S. 

Border Patrol and Chief Aguilar. That is not a recipe that is going 

to work. 

Violence has increased. The bandits, the dopers, the cartels, even 

the Zetas, they will come across our border. They will tear after 

Border Patrol agents. They will have standoffs, if you will, with 

firearms raised. They will chase after our Guardsmen. There have 

been at least six to eight incidents that I am personally aware of 

involving Guardsmen just sitting there, on duty, being approached 

by bandits, and then engaging in a chase to get away, to escape 

with their lives, because they are not being allowed to engage. 

Now, think of how frustrating that is for soldiers who have just 

been in Iraq and Afghanistan and know that they have to stand 

down and cede territory to armed bandits. 

Violence has increased. When I travel anywhere through the 

southern border—in fact, I will recount a personal story. We took 

Congressman Ted Poe out to the San Diego area; Colonial Libertad 

was what we were overlooking. Within 20 minutes, 15 minutes, 

shot rang out. We had to get him out of the vicinity, because we 

weren’t going to allow a member of Congress to be there in danger. 

On our side of the border we have to fear taking members of 

Congress out there because it is too dangerous. And I would invite 

members, if they are interested, we will provide a border tour so 

you can see for yourselves what we find is happening. Violence has 

increased, and agents are absolutely terrified. 

I have had a number of agents call me and tell me, as firearms 

instructors, ‘‘Andy, I have had trainees ask me a question, and the 

question is, ’Sir, what do I do if a bandit pulls out a gun or picks 

up a rock to throw it at me? Am I allowed to take out my gun and 

defend myself?’ ’’ This is the question that our Border Patrol agents 

and Customs agents are now asking. 

Mr. SOUDER. And won’t the violence increase if they know they 

are supposed to not engage or to back up? Doesn’t that just increase the risk of people coming in armed? Because it is, in effect, 

saying the message, ‘‘If you come after us, we just back off. So 

whatever you have, whoever you are protecting, whatever you are 

smuggling, come on in.’’ 

Mr. RAMIREZ. That is absolutely the case. And Ramos & 

Compean only exemplified it. Because as soon as they heard about 

that south of the line—and we are talking the cartels, the smugglers, both human and narcotic, and other types of traffickers— 

they heard this, they got the word, and the violence increased. 

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Wermuth was going to say something earlier on 

the plan. 

Mr. WERMUTH. Recognizing the frustration that Congress has 

with not having a strategy against which to measure progress, we 

still suggest that is it an appropriate time now for Congress to act 

and require such a plan. 

101 

An additional element of that process could be Congress considering establishing a national commission, and one, in this case, 

that would bring in some of our other partners in this process— 

representatives of state governors, representatives of the private 

sector, people who are operators or who have been operators in 

ports and along the border—and help to inform a process of establishing this comprehensive border control strategy. We should have 

it. 

And I fully recognize what you were saying about not having a 

southwest border strategy for drug control. Back in the days when 

I did drugs in the Pentagon— 

[Laughter.] 

I always pause at this. I always laugh at that. 

I was the first deputy assistant secretary of defense for drug enforcement policy back in the late 1980s and early 1990s, at a time 

when so many of these federal agencies were butting heads. 

And you are exactly right, some of the same issues apply here. 

We need to get on with that kind of discussion. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

And thank you to the ranking member. 

I would just remind the committee members, I just asked staff, 

and in fact, if you are a law enforcement officer on the southern 

border and you believe your life is in immediate danger, of course 

you can draw your gun. 

We have four votes on the floor. I am told that one of them is 

a recommittal, which means, gentlemen, that it will probably take 

at least 50 minutes before we come back and finish those four 

votes. So I will recess this committee. 

The subcommittee stands in recess, and maybe you will go get 

something to eat or drink. And I hope you can all make it back in 

about 50 minutes or so, and we will try to make it back ourselves. 

Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The committee is back. 

The chair will now recognize other members for questions that 

they may wish to ask of the witnesses. And in accordance with our 

committee rules and practice, I will recognize members who were 

present at the start of the hearing based on seniority on this subcommittee, alternating between majority and minority. And those 

members coming in later will be recognized in the order of their arrival. 

And I believe, at this point, I will recognize Mr. Green for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And I thank the witnesses for appearing today. 

Mr. Wermuth, sir, you mentioned a comprehensive security plan, 

I believe. And I tend to believe that this is the correct approach, 

because, without a comprehensive security plan, the superficial security analyst will have the opportunity to make meaningful minor 

security issues of paramount importance. 

A fence is important. So let me just ask a few questions, if I may, 

of the panel. 

If you believe that we should fence the entire southern border, 

as opposed to 850 miles—that would be 2,000 miles—would you 

102 

kindly just raise your hand? This way, I won’t have to go to each 

person. 

If you think that we should fence the entire southern border. The 

entire southern border. 

If you think that we should fence the 850 miles of the southern 

border that has been proposed, would you raise your hand if you 

think so? The 850 miles. 

Mr. RAMIREZ. Where physically possible. 

Mr. GREEN. Eight-hundred-and-fifty, okay. 

Now, Mr. Ramirez, let me ask you this: Would you fence the 

northern border? 

Mr. RAMIREZ. Well, that is something that— 

Mr. GREEN. Excuse me, Mr. Ramirez, sometimes when people 

finish I don’t know whether they have said yes or no. 

[Laughter.] 

And so, if you would be so kind just to cooperate with me and 

start with ‘‘yes,’’ and perhaps we will go into some greater detail. 

But would you fence the northern border? 

Mr. RAMIREZ. I would review it, certainly. 

Mr. GREEN. You have not drawn conclusions about the northern 

border? 

Mr. RAMIREZ. I have met with Border Patrol sector chiefs along 

the northern border. For example, you can’t put a fence along the 

waterways— 

Mr. GREEN. Where you can fence the southern border, you would 

fence it. When you can fence the northern border, would you fence 

it? 

Mr. RAMIREZ. If, after taking a look at it to see that it is going 

to prevent a type of traffic— 

Mr. GREEN. Let me go to my next question, if I may. 

Mr. RAMIREZ. Sure. 

Mr. GREEN. With reference to persons who want to hurt us, that 

we have empirical evidence of their intent, the 9/11 hijackers, did 

they come in through the southern border? 

Mr. RAMIREZ. No. 

Mr. GREEN. The so-called millennium bomber, Ahmed Ressam, 

did he come in through the southern border? 

Mr. RAMIREZ. No, sir. 

Mr. GREEN. Do we, by focusing to the extent that we do on the 

southern border, cause persons to develop a false sense of security 

from terrorism to the extent that they believe that fencing the 

southern border is going to do what was not done to prevent the 

9/11 hijackers, the millennium bomber, and others who are sophisticated enough to enter the country without crossing the Rio 

Grande? 

Mr. Ramirez? 

Mr. RAMIREZ. Well, sir, first, it has been my experience—and I 

have seen the intel reports—where they are coming through both 

the northern and the southern border— 

Mr. GREEN. Excuse me, Mr. Ramirez, let me share this with you 

now. We would like, if we can, to have empirical data, not speculation. We know how the 9/11 folk got in. We know how the millennium bomber got in. I have heard the rumors of documents found 

103 

on the ground which can lead to speculation. I have heard the rumors of possible entry. 

But what I am interested in is empirical evidence that has been 

substantiated by credible intelligence agencies. Do you have any 

empirical data of this type? 

Mr. RAMIREZ. If you are referring to specific numbers— 

Mr. GREEN. Specific incidents. 

Mr. RAMIREZ. Yes. I don’t have any of those documents with me. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. 

Now, here is where we are, it seems to me. A comprehensive 

plan—Mr. Wermuth, I would like for you to comment, if I may— 

seems to provide the best opportunity to prioritize and utilize resources most efficaciously. Would you comment on this, please? 

Mr. WERMUTH. You are absolutely right, Congressman. 

As I said in the written testimony and hopefully reinforced in the 

oral remarks, no single security measure by itself is likely to be the 

silver bullet that we are looking for, if you will. And unless we consider a suite of security options as part of a comprehensive plan, 

our own personal opinion is that a border fence by itself may do 

nothing more than you suggest, give people a false sense of security. 

As I said in the testimony, you can put up barriers at one point, 

and the likelihood is that people who want to come here, whether 

they are intent on doing us harm or whether it is just the masses 

of people that we have seen coming here for economic reasons, are 

just going to find a way to go around the fence. 

The fence itself is not necessarily a bad thing. There are other 

examples you could give. But unless you can consider all of these 

options, fully analyzed for the cost benefit, looking at the entire 

suite of security options in a comprehensive way, I don’t know how 

we could make the kinds of judgments that we are suggesting 

about the prioritization of resources. 

Mr. GREEN. Madam Chair, I thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

And, Madam Chair, may I be excused? I have persons waiting on 

me in my office. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Certainly, of course— 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. —Mr. Green. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Bilirakis for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it very 

much. 

Dr. O’Hanlon, you stated the United States should speed up efforts ‘‘to track exits of visa holders,’’ a statement which I completely agree with. 

In that regard, do you believe that implementing a functioning 

entry and exit system is a prerequisite to establishing a temporary 

guest worker program? 

Mr. O’HANLON. Congressman, I think it is a prerequisite to doing 

a number of things. I think you are probably right in the guest 

worker program area. My focus is really on counterterrorism. And, 

in that sense, that was the context in which I endorsed the idea. 

104 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Can we enforce time limitations on such guest 

workers or for other visa holders in the absence of such an exit program, in your opinion? 

Mr. O’HANLON. There is a huge loophole. I don’t know to what 

extent it is currently being exploited. I am not sure it is our most 

important current problem, but it could become an increasing problem over time, especially if we plug other loopholes. So for that reason, I would like to get ahead of the game and build a better system now. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

Mr. Ramirez, thank you for coming and testifying today. 

According to your written testimony, you did not agree with the 

comments of the secretary, Secretary Chertoff, or Chief Aguilar, 

made before this committee several weeks ago, that Border Patrol 

agents have the necessary authority and resources to do their job 

safely and effectively. Is that correct? 

Mr. RAMIREZ. Yes, that is absolutely correct. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. How do you believe the Border Patrol policies on 

pursuit and the use of force are hindering the ability of agents to 

do their jobs? I know you touched on it a little bit earlier. Elaborate, please. 

Mr. RAMIREZ. Well, as an example, the firearms policy. One of 

the biggest problems they have—and, again, Ramos & Compean, 

the case, really shows this blaring problem. Agents are only allowed to submit an oral report to their supervisor, not a written report. 

Now, let’s say, for instance, you have a supervisor who suddenly 

develops a case of amnesia or is ordered to develop a case of amnesia. If that happens, that agent who may have reported is hung out 

to dry. And that is a big problem. 

The only way we can fix this problem is by agents being able to 

submit that report. Yes, it adds more paperwork. Yes, agents may 

or may not like it. But it also could protect them from a problem 

that Ramos & Compean clearly identifies. By being able to submit 

that written report, now it is not on Supervisor Richards, as an example in this case, to corroborate an oral report. Now the onus is 

on the agent. And in doing that, we are able to better assist them. 

Pursuit policy: You have agents who are trained for 19 weeks at 

FLETS. In every which variety, it is the most strenuous academy 

that is out there. Of course they are trained in many other facets. 

Well, when you have an agent who has been out in the field 2 

years, 5 years, 10 years, 20 years, I think that agent, between his 

training and his experience, is more than able to make a call about 

a pursuit in the field, rather than a supervisor who hasn’t been in 

the field for maybe 2 years, 5 years, 10 years. 

You know, you have a lot of sector chiefs, and I have a lot of respect for them, but they are sitting in sectors, they are meeting 

with other commanders of other agencies. When is the last time 

any of them have been able to go out there in a vehicle and just 

talk to the agents out in the line, let alone engage in a pursuit? 

They are not in a position to determine that public safety. Only the 

agent that is out in the field. 

I think if we are able to give that back to the agents in the 

field—but, unfortunately, what agents report, retired and active 

105 

duty, is the agency seems to be more concerned with civil actions 

rather than that aspect of safety. 

And I have had an agent, a retired assistant chief, who had told 

me a year ago that they have the training, as an a-chief, that their 

line agent in the field doesn’t have, because it is the additional professional training. 

I think the agent in the field can make a better assessment than 

somebody at headquarters. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. How long does it take to get authorization to pursue a fleeing vehicle— 

Mr. RAMIREZ. You call— 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. —the agent? 

Mr. RAMIREZ. Well, you call it in, and it depends on the sup. 

Some sups will immediately tell you to break off. I have heard incidents where agents will call other agencies on their cell phones, 

such as sheriffs and what have you. In fact, I had a county sheriff 

in Texas report to me that he gets calls from Border Patrol because 

his sups aren’t allowing him—but he is not engaged in a pursuit. 

The Border Patrol agent who is following closely behind, he calls 

the sheriff so that the sheriff can continue with the pursuit. And 

they are just there as backup. 

They have been prevented from enforcing the laws. And this is 

coming directly from headquarters, from their command, from their 

supervisors. You can be out on the line, have one sup tell you one 

thing. He leaves the scene; 5 minutes later, the next sup is telling 

you the complete opposite that you were just ordered. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. In your opinion, could these policies be—oh, okay. 

All right, okay. I can talk to him privately. Thank you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you very much. 

The chair now recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman from 

Texas, Mr. Cuellar. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

What is the role of universities and researchers in helping Homeland Security come up with strategies and ideas on how we can 

protect our border? 

Because, personally, I think it is an area that we need to work 

more with our universities. I mean, there is a certain sphere of influence that universities have, especially the ones that have experience with border dynamics. 

Mr. MCILLWAIN. I guess that would be me. 

Once again, I will go from a case study standpoint, and I will 

share with you, kind of, the approach we have taken at San Diego 

State. 

Border universities in general have a very unique relationship, 

given the fact that many of their students and many of the community members that they serve of course live on both sides of the 

border and consider themselves citizens of a border region. 

San Diego State University, its approach has always been to support our local stakeholders in terms of dealing with the actual 

ground-level problems that are coming along, with regard to homeland security. 

One of the problems that we tend to find is that, because of the 

way the budget process works and because of the way technologies 

are slow to be implemented in the field, people who are actually 

106 

in the business of doing the deliverables of that service, of providing that security, do not have, in a sense, a chance to act in 

real-time against the various challenges that they are facing. 

But those that are working on the criminal side or the terrorist 

side or other sides have that ability. They have more resources, 

they have more—their organizational capabilities are better, because they are more diffuse. They can take advantage of these 

things. 

The university, then, can become, in a sense, an R&D function, 

to work on the ground, particularly on a regional level, because different problems occur in different regional areas. The questions 

about the Canadian border, the questions about the Mexican border—El Paso is different than, you know, San Diego; there are different concerns. 

Local universities are in a position to capitalize upon the human 

capital at their own disposal. They have existing relationships with 

port officials, border authorities, et cetera. They have the relationships with Mexican authorities particularly, or Canadian authorities on the northern border. So I think they are strategically placed 

to deal with these things very well. 

The problem deals with, in a sense, the way the existing structure goes toward research in the area of homeland security. The 

centers for excellence idea is a good start. However, as I say in my 

written testimony, it would be like trying to go on a war against 

HIV or a war against cancer and dedicating $3 million to one institution that subcontracts with other universities. 

Mr. CUELLAR. What suggestions would you have to get the universities—because I am a big supporter of that and think we ought 

to use our universities, because every university has that little, 

what I call, sphere of influence and understands the dynamics. 

So what would be your thoughts— 

Mr. MCILLWAIN. There are many approaches one can take to 

this. The one I talk about in my written testimony is the idea, for 

example, of tying the research expenditures perhaps to the funds 

that are coming in through a certain port. 

For example, Los Angeles–Long Beach, you know, how many billions of dollars come through, in terms of real revenue to the U.S. 

Treasury? In a sense, you have this major port with over 44 percent—is it 44 or 46 percent?—of the actual containers coming into 

this country. There are no guarantees, not a single university in 

that local area with local contacts has any revenue fund to help 

those local clients that they have as universities to actually achieve 

these objectives. 

There needs to be a way of basically trying to find a structure 

in which that can be done. And if those monies do exist, to make 

sure they are getting to those organizations, universities and others, that are in the business of providing those deliverables on a 

local, regional basis. 

Mr. CUELLAR. I don’t want to go over my time, but could you provide the committee some sort of structure of how we can use the 

universities more effectively, how Homeland can use the universities— 

Mr. MCILLWAIN. Absolutely, sir. I would be happy to follow up. 

Part of that is in my testimony, but what I can maybe do is talk 

107 

to you or a member of your staff afterwards to find specifically 

what you would like, and I would be happy to get that to you and 

to the committee. 

Mr. CUELLAR. All right. 

Mr. MCILLWAIN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The chair now recognizes a fellow Californian, Ms. 

Jane Harman. 

Ms. HARMAN. I thank the chair. And I think this is an excellent 

hearing. And I just want to make a couple of personal comments 

about two of the witnesses and then ask a question. 

First of all, I have been channeling Michael O’Hanlon for years. 

He speaks out, I think, brilliantly on this subject but many others, 

and I would commend to everyone his recent book on ‘‘Hard 

Power,’’ co-authored with Kurt Campbell, formerly of CSIS. 

It is also the case, for me, that the RAND Corporation, which is 

about 100 feet outside my congressional district—I know Ms. Sanchez knows it well too—is an amazing place for work on security 

subjects. And homeland security is one of its best, at the moment, 

products. And I want to commend Michael Wermuth and Jack 

Riley, who is hiding behind a post, for the work that they have 

done a variety of homeland-related subjects. 

Both of you said very important things today. 

Michael number-one was talking about the role of prevention; it 

is much better than consequence management. He is right. And he 

talked about tightening terrorist watch lists, the Google-like capability, more C.T. cells, biometric I.D.s and so forth. 

Michael number-two talked about the need for a risk-based strategy. We can’t do this just on an individual basis. We really have 

to know what we are going to target and hopefully find the bad 

guys before they cross the border and also find the homegrown cells 

inside. 

But here is my question, and it is for the whole panel, and it is: 

How do we do this effectively and protect our civil liberties? 

Michael Wermuth mentioned in his top six things to do that 

there are critical privacy considerations. I think there are too. And 

I agree with Ben Franklin, who said basically, to paraphrase, we 

either get more security and liberty or we get less. It is not a zerosum game. It is a positive-sum game or a negative-sum game. 

So I think there is a broad, law-abiding community out there 

wanting us to catch bad guys but not wanting us to surrender our 

Constitution and our core values. And I would like to put this question to the panel, maybe starting with the two Michaels, but I 

would ask the other witnesses to comment: How do we get both? 

Mr. WERMUTH. As I mentioned in the oral remarks and in written testimony, these issues really are critical. And what we should 

learn to do, and unfortunately we haven’t in other programs, even 

some specific ones related to border security, particularly in the 

commercial airline industry, is that we don’t start thinking about 

these issues until after the fact. 

That is why we tried to make the point very clear that this needs 

to be an upfront part of the checklist when you are developing a 

program. What are the key privacy and other civil rights implicaVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
108 

tions of a program like this? We are seen too many false starts on 

programs. We have got to build it in upfront. 

We all know that we can handle people who are not U.S. persons, 

in that legal definition, who are coming into country, we can handle them differently than we do U.S. persons. But we ought to 

strive toward handling everybody the same to the extent that we 

can. 

And most importantly, applying the prevention techniques, particularly intelligence, as far out as we can get it, to identify the bad 

guys and be able to segregate them from the good folks. 

Mr. O’HANLON. Thank you, Congresswoman. Just a couple of 

quick thoughts. And here, of course, I am again borrowing from my 

friend Jim Steinberg, who was the lead person on intelligence and 

civil liberties in our work. And, again, this is familiar kind of 

thinking to you. 

One principle is that there have to be ways to know who has 

accessed databases within the federal government, and you have to 

have rules on who gets access to what information, and electronic 

records, essentially, of who has accessed. In other words, you have 

to have a way to both limit access and then, where there are violations, to go back and punish people for infringements. 

So this is beyond my expertise to map out in detail, but a lot of 

the new developments in data security and in recording access to 

various databases are the way you do this. 

And, in fact, we could actually improve, Jim argues, we can improve protection of civil liberties, because right now we have done 

so little of this sort of thing that most organizations don’t have 

data czars and don’t have clear rules on how they limit access. So 

if something is in a database, you can go look at it. And if it is not, 

of course you can’t. But it is sort of a free-for-all. 

And if you increase the ability of one agency to look at another’s 

database, you have to have rules on who gets to see what, and you 

have to have some way of knowing who has accessed. And that becomes, then, your basis for enforcing. 

I think that is the main answer. 

Another answer I would quickly offer, though, on the specific 

issue of driver’s licenses, which I know is so important right now 

in the debate, with apologies to those who want to argue that civil 

liberties are the only real priority here, I would simply remind people of the obvious: that driving is a privilege, it is not a constitutional right. They didn’t have cars back in the 18th century. 

And if the state is going to grant you the right to operate a vehicle that can hurt people and yourself on the roads, there is potentially a bargain there being established between the citizen and the 

state. And if the state is asking you, for the good of national security, to allow us to verify your identity through a biometric, I don’t 

think there is any constitutional issue with that whatsoever. The 

argument is squarely on the side of the state having the right to 

do that, in my judgment. 

Ms. HARMAN. My time is up, Madam Chair, but I would welcome 

the opportunity to let the other two witnesses comment. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Of course. We will be asking a couple more questions here. You can certainly finish yours. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

109 

Do you two have something to add? 

Mr. RAMIREZ. One of the problems—and then this is dealing with 

a lot of investigators in a multitude of agencies. For example, what 

may work in ICE is not compatible at the Border Patrol. None of 

that stuff is easily transferred over. 

One of the things we learned through Ramos & Compean, as an 

example, where you have an agent from Arizona trying to access 

information, it just doesn’t work. We need to find a way to be able 

to do that, but then that leads to the problem that has come up 

when it comes to some of the agencies, of the corruption issues. 

Like my colleague said, you have to have protocols. 

And, of course, you also have to make sure that local law enforcement is able to access, because, at least at the sheriff level or the 

chief deputy or the under-sheriff, if they can access some of this 

intel, it will help all of them be able to share the same information. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. MCILLWAIN. Couple thoughts. 

In speaking about this issue with regard to practitioners, one of 

the things that becomes clear is in the priority in terms of training 

and education for people in this field, in terms of ethical training. 

This is something I know Chief Bratton in L.A. and other folks 

have constantly talked about. 

But it is very important to show the intersection between one’s 

professional responsibility and one’s ability to take care of their 

community. And that, in a sense, has the positive aspect of bringing back information flows to the policing structures or the other 

structures that are dealing with this. 

The idea of an ombudsman: This is being done on local levels in 

police departments. I used to do a lot of work on use-of-force cases 

and other things for police. The idea of an ombudsman that is basically set up by a jurisdiction—a city, a state, or somewhere else— 

that is responsible for investigating those complaints free of the 

normal procedures, that is something that has, from a research 

standpoint, been shown to meet the interests not only of the unions 

that are engaged in this but the citizens and the management. 

And then finally, the idea of accountability for state actors if they 

do abuse this authority, that there is, in a sense, that accountability that can exist. The idea of having a data czar is an excellent 

idea, having people that are in charge of knowing where those 

flows are. 

But your Achilles’ heel in all these cases will always be the 

human element. And you have got a second Achilles’ heel, which 

is the technological element. The same information that states will 

have pales in comparison, oftentimes, to what is available in the 

private sector. 

So, in a sense, we have seen cases where, you know, bad guys 

have better intel on the eating habits of, you know, our officers, 

based upon their credit card records, than we do of any possible 

terrorists that might be out there ourselves. 

Ms. HARMAN. I thank you for that answer. 

I know I have gone over time. I won’t ask any more questions. 

If I could just sum up by saying we have got to get this right on 

the front end; I agree with that comment. Because if we don’t, 

there won’t be protection left, should we have another attack. 

110 

Second point, we have got to have databases with all the material we need in them, but they can’t be abused. And that is your 

point. We need training and protocols. And they exist. Something 

I hope we can do in this committee is to provide more funds for 

local law enforcement to train people on how to put together and 

use these databases. 

And finally, there is a lot of learning on just the compilation of 

bases. The Markle Foundation, based in New York, has done enormous, ground-breaking work on this. And when we passed the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, they were helpful to us in a lot of 

what that law says, which builds databases and keys to databases 

that have just the right information on them, and they converge at 

a point and then they disperse, so that we don’t create a Big Brother with information on our eating habits rather than on whether 

or not we are terrorists. 

So I thank you for letting me go over my time. I think this panel 

is really a very valuable panel. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. It has been very instructive. And I thank my colleague from California. 

I guess I have one question left that I would really like to ask 

of you all. 

You know, it is not because my name is Sanchez or because my 

parents came from Mexico, but I think we concentrate a lot of our 

efforts on the southern border. And I think that there is a real outrage going on in our nation with respect to people coming without 

the right documents to our country. Unfortunately, it seems to really be slanted at people coming from Mexico. And I think that is one 

of the bigger reasons why we spend so much time, at least politically, worrying about the southern border. 

But, you know, it is my feeling that we are a sovereign nation 

and we should have a say in who comes in and out of our country. 

And it has been my experience over time, my lifetime, that when 

you plug one hole, the water goes to wherever it is not plugged up. 

And, you know, our country is a big country. It has a long border 

at the northern border that doesn’t have much fencing or many 

agents up there to watch who is coming across. And we have coastal access, not only to our continent but Puerto Rico or some of our 

territories. We have a lot of coasts where people can come in 

through. Once you get to Puerto Rico, there you come. 

So my question is—and I have all the statistics about how many 

border patrols we have at the northern border, et cetera. And we 

were up at the northern border this past August, taking a look and 

talking to the Border Patrol agents there. 

But my real question is, you know, I am worried about this, because I believe we need to close the entire circle. I don’t mean fence 

everything. I live on the California beach. I don’t want a fence running there either. But close it, so we can have a pretty high level 

of confidence that we do have a say in who is coming in and going 

out. 

And I think that is one of the things that America’s people really 

want. They want to believe that we have control, that we have a 

say in who is coming in and going out. 

So my question for you is, one, what do you think about the 

northern border? Are we really ignoring it? If we really put these 

111 

miles at the southern border in particular, will we see more people 

coming in from the north? Are a lot more coming in but since we 

are not there—you know, if the tree falls but no one is in the forest, did it really fall, or did someone hear it fall? 

And lastly, do you believe that our Coast Guard and other agencies who work the coastline have enough resources for the future? 

Because if we clamp down someplace, they will come in another 

way. 

And why don’t we just go down the line and finish up here. 

Mr. MCILLWAIN. Beginning with the topic of the northern border, 

there has been a lot of academic research looking at the history of 

the issue of smuggling as it deals with both the southern and the 

northern frontier—not just contemporary research, but historical 

research. 

One of the big conclusions that comes out of that is something 

I am sure the committee, this subcommittee in particular, is familiar with, which is, the issue is Canada is not Mexico. So there is 

a consistent rule of law, there are different standards and other 

issues that are going on there that, in a sense, allow for a full partnership to be realized, where the cooperation has a tangible result. 

The challenge is much more severe in Mexico itself. 

The problem that we have with our northern border deals with 

the one that we saw evident in the recent Toronto arrest that occurred with the possible bombings up in Canada, where you had 

people going back and forth across the border as part of that conspiracy. A couple of the members of that conspiracy were actually 

stopped on the Friendship Bridge going back up into Canada. Two 

other members were caught in the Georgia area, alleged members, 

that were part of this larger conspiracy. 

We, in a sense, have that homegrown aspect, both in Canada and 

the United States, where individuals, in a sense, can already be 

within our borders, can go back and forth meeting with like-minded 

people. And that is a difficult thing, particularly when they are 

homegrown. They were either born in this country or they came 

here at an early age. They have their citizenship. There is nothing 

on their records. 

Canada has another issue, as well, which is the fact that, as part 

of the former British empire, people from other countries, as part 

of that empire, have direct access into Canada. I have been to Canada many times, and my Canadian colleagues at the University of 

Montreal and other universities, this is something that their whole 

nation is struggling with, in terms of how to handle their own immigration procedures. 

And I guess the best way of looking at this is in the same model 

I talk about in my written testimony. There are good people trying 

to work on these problems in these countries, both Mexico and in 

Canada. The idea of identifying who these people are, the processes 

that they are trying to get heard in their own country, as other 

people here are doing good jobs of trying to work really hard, how 

do they find ways to deal with these same issues? There is common 

ground here. Mexico is dealing with the same thing. I have many 

of my friends that have received death threats, they have lost 

members of their family because of the fight they had against the 

cartels. I mean, these are real-world things. 

112 

Being able to identify those people, capitalize upon that human 

capital, that human element that you are talking about, provides 

a tremendous amount of—I don’t want to use the word ‘‘intelligence’’; I don’t think that is the right word—but provides us with 

a lot of intelligence in terms of how to use our limited resources 

in such a way that we don’t have to have a mutually exclusive view 

of, you know, what comes, in terms of trade flows or people flows. 

If we use it smarter, more effectively, by tapping into that 

human resource, we are doing a service to all our constituencies. 

The Mexican government is doing it for theirs, the Canadian for 

theirs, and we for ours. 

And I think that that is a very strong structure. And there are 

models for doing this. And so, we just need to basically talk about 

what those models are. And I have some of them listed in my testimony. I would be happy to give a lot more to the committee as well. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Great. 

Doctor? 

Mr. O’HANLON. Very quickly, Congresswoman, I think what I try 

to think about is, what is the likelihood that a Mohamed Atta 

would come through Mexico or Canada? You know, bring it back 

to that kind of a scenario. 

And I think, on balance, I wind up concluding that that kind of 

a person is not too likely to go through either place, thankfully, because of the risk of having to get into the country in the first place, 

go across hundreds of miles of open territory, great across the land 

border, and then re-establish himself in the United States before 

being able to carry out a terrorist attack. 

As you know, I am in favor of a much tighter before because I 

worry about that scenario some. But I don’t think it is super-likely, 

especially in Canada where you do have relatively good procedure 

for visas and so forth. 

But they are not airtight. They are not as good as ours. The Canadians do have this commonwealth issue. There are a lot of 

would-be terrorists who live in Britain, not to mention Pakistan 

and south Asia. And so I do think we have to be at least a little 

nervous. 

So if I am creating a spectrum of nervousness, in terms of the 

terrorism problem, the overall issue we are addressing today, the 

border, causes me some level of nervousness. And I think we 

should tighten things up quite a bit. 

I am not losing sleep over it, but I think there is a chance that 

Al Qaida could try to use our borders in the future in a way they 

probably haven’t attempted so far. So I am very happy the committee is focused on this. And so, I have a certain amount of worry 

about the Mexican border. A little less about the Canadian border, 

but not zero. 

So that is a long way of saying that we should improve it even 

if it is not our top priority. And we should always keep an eye on 

what the Canadians are doing with their immigration controls and 

their visa policies. Because if they get sloppy or their civil liberties 

concerns get even more paramount in their own thinking, we may 

need to worry about tightening up that border even more. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Right. 

Mr. Wermuth? 

113 

Mr. WERMUTH. The two borders are different, and fairly dramatically different in the dynamics that apply to the border, and particularly to border security. 

Of course, a lot of focus on the southwest border has to do with 

sheer numbers, the vast number of people who come across the 

southern border, many of them illegally. The flow of drug traffic 

across that border for a long time now that has caused additional 

focus on that border for law enforcement purposes has probably 

brought the southern border more attention because of that. 

But the northern border does have to be a concern. The simple 

fact that so much international trade with Canada is so important 

to both our economy and theirs, and if there were any incidents 

that were to disrupt that trade, it would have huge economic implications. 

So we can’t ignore the northern border. I don’t think we are ignoring it. It is just a different set of dynamics. 

And finally, on your last question, clearly the waterways, the 

international ports, all of those huge numbers of places between 

major commercial ports where bad guys could enter our country, on 

the Pacific coast, on the Atlanta coast, across the Great Lakes, in 

the Gulf of Mexico. 

As we get better with security along land borders, I said in the 

testimony it is probably going to move out around the edges. And 

that is why we have got to be cognizant of the dynamics of changing threats, of emerging threats, and recognize, as we implement 

other security procedures, that the mission of the Coast Guard 

could, for example, get dramatically bigger if, in fact, some of the 

efforts on the land borders actually do start to show some real success. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Ramirez? 

Mr. RAMIREZ. I recently had a chance to discuss this with Commissioner Bernie Kerik, the retired commissioner of the New York 

City Police Department, and of course we all know the impact that 

his department felt because of 9/11. One of the things in the correspondence he reminded me was that, in 2005, James Loy, then 

deputy secretary of DHS, stated, ‘‘Several al-Qa’ida leaders believe 

operatives can pay their way into the country through Mexico and 

also believe illegal entry is more advantageous than legal entry for 

operational security reasons. Knowing that, that is something we 

can’t ignore.’’ 

When you look at the Canadian border, it is vulnerable. It is extremely vulnerable. You have between 200 and 240 agents on duty 

at any time. You have to look at rubber gun squad, people that are 

on leave, people that are on vacation, people that have been detailed elsewhere around the country, to cover 4,000 miles. 

You have projects, such as Project Athena, which is a Raytheondeveloped project which proved that you could monitor at least the 

Great Lakes and all water entries along the northern border. The 

chiefs of Detroit and Buffalo sectors begged Chief Aguilar to implement this type of operational program that worked. It was ignored 

by the headquarters office of Border Patrol. 

You have senior managers who have told me that they have contacted Chief Aguilar repeatedly and other senior managers at headVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00117 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
114 

quarters, pointing out operational issues of concerns. Chief Stevens 

was notified, Chief Barker—numerous chiefs of headquarters have 

been notified; it was ignored. 

In my testimony you will find some examples of this. We talk 

about the maritimes. Ramey Border Patrol Sector was the most ignored sector in the entire U.S. Border Patrol. You had X amount 

of agents, which was very small. You have a whole sector there, 

when you can have a PAIC agent running it, patrol agent in 

charge. 

And instead, when you look at the drug trade that comes through 

that region, Border Patrol agents are operationally restricted to a 

small corner of the island. They are not allowed to do much. They 

are basically there for show. 

So you look at some of the operational problems that are part of 

your question. You can look at Ramey as the glaring example of 

what is wrong. You could look at the northern border. We are ignoring the northern border. 

Yes, we need to focus on the southern border because of a card 

that I would like to point out and share for the record. This was 

given to me by a Border Patrol agent who served in the Tucson 

Sector, and it goes back and it was given out to agents during 

Chief Aguilar’s tenure as sector chief. And it states, ‘‘Remember, 

Mexican military are trained to escape, evade, and counter-ambush 

if it will effect their escape.’’ And this card was given to agents 

along the Tucson Sector. Yet we hear reports from DHS that we 

don’t have Mexican military incursions and that such reports by 

the media and public have been overblown. 

Well, we don’t have those issues along the Canadian border. The 

Canadian military doesn’t engage in incursions and support the 

cartels as they are bringing narcotics into this country. 

So when we look at the northern border, that is one of the glaring differences. But we have equal dangers on both borders that 

must be addressed, starting with this committee. 

Thank you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Ramirez. 

And I think my ranking member has a question to ask of you all 

before we finish this hearing. 

Mr. SOUDER. I have a couple of questions that, if the answers can 

be relatively short, may be things we can pursue a little later. 

But I want to make a couple of notes on the north border. 

Clearly, south border is mass and quantity; north border is a little bit different challenge. On the other hand, British Columbia is 

starting to take on variations of the south border, with the B.C. 

bud. We have the first officials arrested who were corrupted by the 

amount of dollars, the sheer quantity of guns and cocaine going 

back across the other direction. That is now their number-one export is marijuana, not timber, not even tourism. And so, we have 

signs that this can happen even in Canada, and they need to be 

on top of it. 

I think that there are—another challenge is the meth precursors 

and the Canadian pharmacies. We don’t know whether they are 

really Canadian or not. But clearly this is—FedEx, UPS, DHL—a 

challenge in how this type of thing moves. If you can move drugs, 

you can move pieces of chem, bio, all sorts of things. It is the same 

115 

trafficking networks that can be used. And we have to watch the 

north border. 

Yes, the cooperation is different, the pay levels are different, the 

legal system is different, but these are the challenges. 

Now, first question for Dr. O’Hanlon. I am just curious, because 

I should know this answer. Maybe I have heard you say it before, 

but if you don’t think it is the borders, what are you most afraid 

of? Latent cells, people who are being converted, or outside attack? 

Mr. O’HANLON. Well, I will be quick. I do think the borders are 

an issue. But I think I am still most worried, for example, about 

the British citizen who wants to do something like they were trying 

to do last August, whether on the airliners as they are coming 

across the ocean or sneaking in with a legitimate British passport. 

Mr. SOUDER. Then let me get to my next question. I am exasperated at the slow pace that we are moving to the I.D.s and the 

resistance that we are running into on the borders, which, to me— 

look, if this is a low-income problem, then let’s address tax credits 

for the cost of it, some kind of an economic address. Because, clearly, entrance and exit and having a secure I.D. with fingerprints is 

essential. 

My understanding is that we are looking at 2009 for airports, 

2014—ports maybe it is, and 2014 for airports. And there is not 

even a plan to have this fully at the borders. 

How can we be discussing all these other bills? What do you 

think the resistance here is, that why we aren’t accelerating this? 

Because it is the linchpin of a secure border strategy, of you just 

described of visa overstays and manipulation of people who have 

E.U. passes or Canadian citizen immigration. 

It is the linchpin, because if you don’t know who the person is— 

not to mention, if anybody goes to an immigration desk at the Pakistani Embassy, there are like 15 names of people there, whether 

they are State Department or DHS, they are having a terrible time 

figuring out whether it is exactly the person. 

Why isn’t this the number-one focus? 

Mr. O’HANLON. My quick answer, or an attempt at an answer, 

would be that we have been a little too confused in—’’we,’’ the 

broader community of security specialists and elected officials—on 

what the top priorities are. 

And you do hear people out there writing books or making 

speeches about how either we have made no progress at all since 

9/11—and that creates a sense of fatalism among the public—or 

how we have to spend many tens of billions of dollars in all these 

different areas, including preparing every first responder with a 

chemical protective suit and a new radio. And the number of things 

that are mentioned in the context of ‘‘unmet homeland security 

challenges’’ is so great the public gets swamped by this. 

And even our fellow members of Congress and fellow members 

of think-tanks get overwhelmed by homeland security. It is a hard 

thing to get your arms around. I think that is why we want to really focus, in our Brookings work, on prevention as the key thing. 

Mr. SOUDER. Because we talk about getting information to local 

cops, but even if they pick up somebody we don’t know whether it 

is really the person. I mean, it is like step one is to know that who 

116 

you have is who you were trying to get. It just dumbfounds me, and 

I know that part of this is civil liberties. 

Mr. Wermuth, you made an allusion in your testimony to the fact 

that you had some skepticism about screening every piece of cargo 

and suggested there were other innovative technologies. What 

would some of those be? Were you thinking of Singapore or what? 

I mean, Long Beach–Los Angeles, we are already screening for nuclear. 

Mr. WERMUTH. We are focused, you know, right now on containers and trying to do screening on nothing but cargo containers. 

A lot of things come into this country every day that don’t come 

in containers. We have got, of course, oil and natural gas imports 

that come in in tankers. You have still got huge amounts of breakbulk cargo that don’t get stuffed in containers, depending on where 

they come from. 

Beyond that, the idea that terrorists who might be able to develop some kind of radiological device—and I am not talking about 

necessarily a thermonuclear device, but just a dirty bomb device or 

a set of materials—aren’t likely to put it in a container. 

So shouldn’t we be worried about something other than containers? And if we invest all of our security resources in 100 percent cargo-container inspections, are we missing perhaps other 

measures that should be taken to provide security against smaller 

vessels or different kinds of vessels or different means of bringing 

something into this country other than containers. 

It is easy to think about containers as being the solution to security problems when you talk about nuclear or radiological material. 

But I would guess that the bad guys are not going to want to put 

something in a container and let it move through commerce without any control over it. They are going to want to keep their hands 

on it. And that means it is probably not going to come in in a container. 

Mr. SOUDER. Dr. McIllwain, Mr. Ramirez, do you have any comments on my questions? 

Mr. MCILLWAIN. I was trying to get my thoughts together. 

You mentioned the issue with regard to identifications, which I 

think is a positive step, particularly as it is tied to biometrics and 

other issues, the civil liberties concerns which of course have to be 

ironed out. 

The other issue, though, is the human intelligence side of that. 

Because, as you mentioned before, if you have somebody coming 

from Europe—I mean, when the bombings went off in London, I 

spent a heck of a lot of time on that subject. I was actually in one 

of the same tube stations, the Underground stations, right before 

that, and left a couple weeks before. 

And so, right when it happened, I was like, ‘‘Okay, Finsbury 

Mosque, oh yeah,’’ and then my mind goes through the list of folks 

who are attending those things. And then, how does one couple 

that information with that identification? These are things, obviously of major diplomatic import between the United States and its 

allies abroad. 

And then you go to the European Union and look at what they 

are dealing with, in terms of privacy issues and how privacy comVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:41 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00120 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-4\35263.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
117 

missions bureaucratically have now intervened in the security aspect, with no expertise in the security concerns. 

So these are some serious issues that need to be dealt with, 

largely from a diplomatic issue, because without those intelligence 

in-flows, those identifications, with somebody with a clean record 

you know nothing about, they are still going to be able to pass 

through day or night. 

So, in my mind, that is something that—I don’t know what 

Congress’s role would be in this, given that it is the role of the executive, in a sense, to be negotiating those treaties and those protocols— 

Mr. SOUDER. Do you agree that if you don’t know the persons— 

Mr. MCILLWAIN. Oh, yes. Oh, I am not disagreeing with that. 

Mr. SOUDER. —any intel questions become huge. 

Mr. MCILLWAIN. Oh, yes. 

Mr. SOUDER. What do you do? What do you have? Do you stop 

them? Do you watch them? Is it privacy? How do you match up, 

you know, they gave money to a cousin, they were at a mosque, but 

does that mean they were actually guilty of anything? 

Mr. MCILLWAIN. And those information flows—and you are 

right— 

Mr. SOUDER. You don’t know who it is. All that is wasted. 

Mr. MCILLWAIN. Those information flows go both ways. 

I will give you a perfect example. A few weeks ago, we were in 

Tijuana, meeting with the police chief down there. And you would 

be amazed at how technologically advanced their capabilities are, 

in terms of things like public surveillance as well as biometric, facial recognition, et cetera. 

They asked a question, they said, ‘‘We have been trying to get 

basic information on what the people on your terrorist watch list 

look like.’’ Because if we have our resources here, if you know folks 

that have been at training camps in Sudan or somewhere else, if 

you have information like that, we can process that, because we 

don’t want these guys here either. 

And basically we can have these things at our airports and other 

facilities, not that, you know, like I said, al-Qa’ida gives—Atta or 

somebody else would not be going across the border, but the lowerlevel functionaries that are currently off the radar may. But yet, 

we don’t have that information flow going the other way as well. 

So, you know, we need to consider ways that we can probably do 

business better, getting information to allies who want to help us 

in this area, just as I think they need to be doing a better job of 

trying to help us be able to prevent these sort of threats from 

emerging on our own shores. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Ramirez, you will have a short response. 

Mr. RAMIREZ. Okay, and I will be as brief as possible. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. You are very long-winded sometimes, so— 

Mr. RAMIREZ. I haven’t heard that since— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. —I will gavel you. 

Mr. RAMIREZ. I haven’t heard that since my grandmother was 

alive. 

No, but to get to the three biggest things here, corruption is one, 

because you have corruption going on at the ports of entry, you 

118 

have a number of port directors who are now serving in prison because, of course, somebody got to them. 

As bad as, you know, they say the San Diego port and the Laredo 

port is, look at El Paso, and go back to what I said at the beginning. You have planning and re-planning, but no implementation 

by the Department of Homeland Security. They plan everything— 

they have great things that are set and ready to go but will never 

be implemented. 

And finally, Congress is being run around in circles. DHS tells 

them one thing. Then they come back and tell them something else. 

Often is it the truth? That is a question many people have to answer for themselves. You need to talk to the agents in the field. 

This is what I have done for 4 years. So basically nothing gets 

done, as a result. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Great. Thank you, Mr. Ramirez. 

And I thank the witnesses for all of their valuable testimony and 

the members for their questions. 

And the members of the subcommittee may have additional questions for you all, and we will ask you to respond, quickly I hope, 

in writing back to those questions. 

And, hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank you, again. 

[Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

Æ