[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State

v. Burroughs, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2146.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-2146

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BURROUGHS, APPELLANT.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State v. Burroughs, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2146.]

Fourth Amendment—Warrantless search—Single-purpose-container exception to 

the warrant requirement applies only when the illegal nature of the contents 

of a package are readily apparent because of the distinctive characteristics 

of the package—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed, conviction vacated, 

and cause remanded to the trial court.

(No. 2020-1304—Submitted October 27, 2021—Decided June 28, 2022.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Marion County,

No. 9-19-91, 2020-Ohio-4417.

_________________

DEWINE, J.

{¶ 1} While executing an arrest warrant, police discovered a closed 

bookbag with a plastic baggie stuck in its zipper. Without obtaining a search 
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2

warrant, they opened the bookbag and discovered illegal drugs. The question for 

us is whether the warrantless search comports with the Fourth Amendment under 

the “single-purpose-container exception” to the warrant requirement. We hold that 

it does not. The exception applies only when the illegal nature of the contents of a 

package are readily apparent because of the distinctive characteristics of the

package. A bookbag could hold a variety of items—some illegal, some not.

{¶ 2} Because there was no valid basis to search the bookbag without a 

warrant, the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion to suppress the evidence. 

The court of appeals held otherwise, so we reverse its judgment.

I. Background

A. A warrantless search of a bookbag and a possession charge

{¶ 3} Early on a January morning, Officer Chris Coburn knocked on 

Kennedy Burroughs’s door. He and two other officers had come to arrest 

Burroughs for obstruction of justice. Eventually the door cracked open.

{¶ 4} When Officer Coburn told Burroughs he had a warrant for her arrest, 

she shut the door. Through the closed door, Burroughs implored the officer to give 

her a second. Officer Coburn refused, but when he turned the knob, he found that 

the door had been locked. He threatened to kick down the door; Burroughs

answered that she was coming.

{¶ 5} Officer Coburn walked to a window and looked in. He saw Burroughs 

grab some baggies off a table and head toward the back of the house. Fearing that 

Burroughs was attempting to get rid of drugs, he kicked in the door and rushed into 

the house. In one bedroom, he found Burroughs and a teenager. On a plate beside 

the bed were marijuana-cigarette butts and residue. And on the floor of an attached

bathroom, he found a closed bookbag with part of a plastic baggie caught in the 

zipper. Officer Coburn suspected that Burroughs had taken the bookbag into the 

bathroom to flush drugs. But believing that he needed a search warrant to open the 

bookbag, he left it zipped.
January Term, 2022

3

{¶ 6} Burroughs was placed under arrest and removed to the squad car; 

meanwhile officers questioned the teenager and conducted a protective sweep of 

the house. Another police officer, Lieutenant Mark Elliott, arrived on the scene

and opened the bookbag, ostensibly to make sure it did not contain weapons. He 

found marijuana inside, leading to Burroughs being charged with illegal possession

of drugs.

B. Burroughs challenges the constitutionality of the search

{¶ 7} Burroughs moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the 

warrantless search of the bookbag violated her right to be free from unreasonable 

searches under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied Burroughs’s motion. 

It reasoned that the warrantless search was lawful because the bookbag was in plain 

view and the lieutenant had probable cause to suspect it contained contraband.

{¶ 8} On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeals rejected the trial 

court’s reasoning but affirmed the judgment on other grounds. The court of appeals

opined that the plain-view exception could justify only the seizure of the bookbag, 

not its search. 2020-Ohio-4417, 158 N.E.3d 699, ¶ 19. Nonetheless, it concluded 

that the search was justified based on the single-purpose-container exception to the 

warrant requirement. Id. at ¶ 26.

{¶ 9} Burroughs appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction to 

decide the validity of the search.

II. Analysis

A. Absent exigent circumstances, the search of a closed container requires a 

warrant

{¶ 10} Burroughs argues that the search of a bookbag inside a home without 

a warrant is unreasonable absent exigent circumstances that were not present in her 

case. Burroughs does not argue that the officers’ seizure of the bookbag was 

unlawful. Nor does she contend that the officers lacked probable cause to believe 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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that the bookbag contained marijuana. Instead, Burroughs argues that the officers 

should have obtained a search warrant before they opened the bookbag.

{¶ 11} In briefing to this court, Burroughs relies upon the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution, but she also references Article I, 

Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. She fails, however, to make any argument 

based on the text, history, or tradition of the Ohio Constitution. Nor did Burroughs 

advance any argument below relating to the Ohio Constitution. Because Burroughs 

has failed to develop any argument under the Ohio Constitution, we are constrained 

to analyze this case under the Fourth Amendment only.

{¶ 12} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution commands

that the “right of the people to be secure in their * * * effects, against unreasonable 

searches * * * shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 

cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 

searched * * *.”

{¶ 13} It is the rule, not the exception, that police must obtain a warrant to 

conduct a search. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 

L.Ed.2d 430 (2014). The warrant requirement ensures that the lawfulness of a 

search is determined “by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged 

by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). “In 

the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific 

exception to the warrant requirement.” Riley at 382.

B. The state argues that the single-purpose-container exception applies

{¶ 14} The state contends that no warrant was required because the search 

fell under the single-purpose-container exception to the warrant requirement. That 

exception can be traced to a footnote in Arkansas v. Sanders, a United States 

Supreme Court case involving the warrantless search of luggage in a car based on 

an anonymous tip. 442 U.S. 753, 755, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979), 
January Term, 2022

5

abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 

619 (1991); see id. at 764, fn. 13. When considering whether the search required a 

warrant, the Supreme Court observed that “some containers (for example a kit of 

burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable 

expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward 

appearance.” Id. at 764, fn. 13. Because the luggage in Sanders was not a singlepurpose container of this sort, the court held that a warrant was required, id. at 766.

{¶ 15} The single-purpose-container exception is best understood as an 

offshoot of the plain-view doctrine. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 427, 

101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981) (plurality) overruled on other grounds,

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). 

Under the Fourth Amendment’s plain-view doctrine, an officer may seize an object 

in plain view without a warrant if (1) the officer did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be viewed, (2) 

the object’s incriminating nature is immediately apparent, and (3) the officer has a 

right to access the object where it is located. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 

128, 136-137, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). There is simply no 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the outward appearance of an object that has 

been left in plain view. See id. at 133.

{¶ 16} Ordinarily, when the requirements of the plain-view doctrine are 

satisfied, police may seize a closed container but must obtain a warrant to search 

the container. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 

77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). The reason the police may seize, but not open, the closed 

container has to do with the two distinct interests protected by the Fourth 

Amendment—“the interest in retaining possession of property and the interest in 

maintaining personal privacy,” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 

75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). When there is 

probable cause to believe that the closed container holds evidence of criminal 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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activity, the owner’s interest in possession is outweighed by the risk that the 

contents may disappear or be put to their intended use before a warrant may be 

obtained, see Place at 701-702. Thus, police may seize the container. On the other 

hand, once the container has been seized, those risks disappear. There is no 

justification for allowing the officer to forego a warrant before opening the closed 

container. This limitation protects the owner’s privacy interest.

{¶ 17} The single-purpose-container exception is premised on the notion 

that when “the distinctive configuration of a container proclaims its contents, the 

contents cannot fairly be said to have been removed from a searching officer’s 

view,” Robbins at 427. “The same would be true, of course, if the container were 

transparent, or otherwise clearly revealed its contents.” Id. A warrant is 

unnecessary in such a case because the outward appearance of the container has 

already made evident the container’s contents; there is no privacy interest left to 

protect. See Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235, fn. 13.

{¶ 18} The single-purpose-container exception is a particularly narrow 

exception to the warrant requirement. Indeed, neither this court nor the United 

States Supreme Court has ever used the exception to authorize a warrantless search. 

While the court has made clear that there are circumstances in which the exception 

will apply, such are limited to only the rare, obvious case. See Brown at 750 

(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Robbins, 453 U.S. at 428-429, 

101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744.

{¶ 19} To meet the requirements of the single-purpose-container exception, 

the container’s contents must be sufficiently obvious that they could be said to be 

in plain view. Robbins at 427. In Robbins, officers found two packages wrapped 

in green opaque plastic in the recessed luggage compartment of a car; upon 

unwrapping the packages, they discovered marijuana. Id. at 422. In holding that 

the officers needed a warrant to search the packages, the court rejected the argument 

that the single-purpose-container exception applied. Id. at 427-428. The court
January Term, 2022

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explained that to fall within that exception, “a container must so clearly announce 

its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, 

that its contents are obvious to an observer.” Id. at 428.

{¶ 20} We are concerned with a bookbag, an object commonly used to carry 

a wide variety of items. As the name suggests, a bookbag may carry books. It may 

also carry lunch, private letters, or as Lieutenant Elliott ostensibly believed, 

weapons. The bookbag at issue is not transparent, it did not silhouette a distinctive 

shape, and its illicit contents could not be observed without opening it. The 

bookbag did have part of a baggie stuck in the zipper, but the visible part of the 

baggie was empty. It therefore announced only that the bookbag contained a 

baggie. Under these circumstances, the contents of the bookbag cannot be said to 

have been so obvious that they may as well have been in plain view.

{¶ 21} The state seeks to broaden the single-purpose-container exception 

beyond single-purpose containers to include situations in which, based on a totality 

of the circumstances, the contents of a container are a foregone conclusion. We 

cannot square such a far-reaching exception—one essentially allowing searches of 

containers based on a super-probable-cause showing—with traditional Fourth 

Amendment principles. To allow container searches based on a totality-of-thecircumstances test would, in essence, have the exception swallow the rule, enabling 

officers “to conduct warrantless searches of indistinct and innocuous containers 

based solely on probable cause derived from the officers’ subjective knowledge and 

the circumstances,” United States v. Gust, 405 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir.2005). A 

broad exception of this sort could not easily exist alongside the long-held principle 

that “no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent 

‘exigent circumstances,’ ” Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443, 468, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 

L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

{¶ 22} Thus, we see no reason to extend the single-purpose-container 

exception beyond its rationale: that when a container by its very nature makes its 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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contents clear, its owner has no expectation of privacy in those contents. When the 

container does not do so, a warrant is required. That’s true, no matter how confident 

an officer is about what he thinks is inside.

{¶ 23} The single-purpose-container exception, as the name makes clear, 

applies to single-purpose containers. A bookbag is not a single-purpose drug 

container. Lacking an exigent circumstance, Lieutenant Elliott was required to 

obtain a warrant before searching the bookbag.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 24} The single-purpose-container exception did not authorize the police 

to search Burroughs’s bookbag. When police search a bookbag in a home under 

circumstances that do not give rise to any exigency, they must follow the command 

of the Fourth Amendment: get a warrant. The judgment of the court of appeals is 

reversed, Burroughs’s conviction is vacated, and this case is remanded to the court 

of common pleas with instructions to enter judgment suppressing the evidence 

found in the bookbag.

Judgment reversed

and cause remanded.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DONNELLY, STEWART, and 

BRUNNER, JJ., concur.

_________________

Raymond A. Grogan Jr., Marion County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nathan 

R. Heiser, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Craig M. Jaquith, Assistant 

State Public Defender, for appellant.

_________________