Opinion issued April 3 0 , 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

————————————

NO. 01
- 14
- 00808
- C V

——————————— ARLEAN GREEN , Appellant V. CITY OF HOUSTON , Appellee
On Appeal from the 269 th District Court Harris County , Texas Trial Court Ca u se No. 2014
- 13489

MEMORANDUM OPINION This case arises from a trip and fall accident at an airport. Arlean Green

sues the City of Houston, claiming that the City’s negligence caused her knee injury . The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction and moved to dismiss the case,2 responding that Green had not met her burden to show that the City had received timely notice of her claim. The trial cour t granted the City’s plea

. On appeal, Green contends that the City received actual notice of her claim through its agent, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Finding no error, we affirm. Background Green allege s that she tripped over an exposed metal strip and fell at the George Bush Inter continental Airport in May 2012

. She injured her knee and received medical treatment. Green spoke with a TSA agent immediately after she fell

. In July 2012, Green also notified the TSA that she had slipped on a steel strip and fallen in the airport

. In a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, Green requested that the TSA produce any statements submitted by TSA employees about the incident

. Her traveling companion, who witnesse d Green’s fall , wrote a letter to the TSA manager of the airport , stating that Green had tripped on a steel strip in the airport, injuring her knee. Green does not claim that she communicated with any City of Houston emplo yees within 90 days of the incide nt. Green sued the City and United Airlines, Inc. The trial court granted the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the suit against the City. Green then moved for non

- suit of her claim against United Airlines.3 Discussion Standard of Review and Applicable Law Governmental immunity from suit defeats a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction; thus, a ci ty may raise immunity from suit in a plea to the jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 225

– 26 (Tex. 2004). Whether a court ha s subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law. Id. at 226. In reviewing a trial court’s jurisdictional ruling, we construe the pleadings in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. The Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) provides a li mited waiver of governmental immunity. Id. at 224 (citing T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. §§ 101.001

– .109 ) . A plaintiff bears the burden to allege facts affirmatively demonstrating the trial court’s jurisdiction to hear the case. Dallas Area Rapid
Tran sit v. Whitley , 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003). We consider only the plaintiff’s pleadings and evidence relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. Id. (citing Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. White , 46 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex. 2001)).
Notice Green bears the burden to allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction, including notice. See T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. § 311.034 (West 2013) ; Whitley , 104 S.W.3d at 542. The Texas Government Code provides,4 “Statutory prerequisit es to a suit, including the provision of notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a governmental entity.” T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. § 311.034

. Relevant to this appeal, t he City of Houston requires notice of a personal injury claim within 90 days of the injury

. C ITY OF H OUSTON C HARTER art. IX, § 11 ; see T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 101.101 (b) (“A city’s charter and ordinance provisions requiring notice within a charter period permitted by law are ratified and approved.”)

. In additi on to formal notice of the injury and claim, a cla imant may rely on actual notice to meet this jurisdictional requirement “if the governmental unit has actual notice that death has occurred, that the claimant has received so me injury, or that the claimant’ s property has been damaged.” T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 101.101(c)

. A ctual notice “ requires knowledge of (1) a death, injury , or property damage; (2) the governmental unit’s alleged fault producing or contributing to the death, injury, or property damage; and (3) the identity of the parties involved. ” Tex. Dep’t of Crim

. Justice v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 344 (Tex. 2004) (citing Cathey v. Booth , 900 S .W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) )

. Actual notice is a fact question when the evidence is disputed , but can be determined as a matter of law if no disputed fact issue exists

. Simons , 140 S.W.3d at 348; Harris Cnty. v. Luna

– Prudencio , 294 S.W.3d 690, 697 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.)

. Actual notice requires more than knowledge of5 the accident or injury; in addition , a governmental unit must have subjective awareness that its fault produced or contributed to the claimed injury. Un iv. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v. Estate of Arancibia ex rel. Vasquez

– Arancibia , 324 S.W.3d 544, 548

– 49 (Tex. 2010). When an agent or representative of a governme ntal unit receives notice of an incident and has a duty to gather facts and report it , actual notice may be imputed to the governmental unit

. Guadalupe Blanco River Auth. v. Schneider , 392 S.W.3d 321, 325 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (citing Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio v. Stevens , 330 S.W.3d 335, 339 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2010, no pet.)); see Dinh v. Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. , 896 S.W.2d 248, 253 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (“Actual notice . . . may be imputed to the government by an agent or representative who has a duty to gather facts and investigate.”). Analysis Green concedes that she did not directly notify the City of her claim under section 101.101(a). S ee T EX
. C I V
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 101.101 (a). She instead contends that the City had actual notice of her fall within 90 days of the incident b ecause she promptly notified TSA agents on duty and followed up with the TSA in email exchanges

. She further contends that the TSA employees on duty in the airport were the agents or representatives of the City. The City6 responds that notice to a federal governmental unit cannot be imputed to it, and proffered evidence that the TSA is not an agency of the City

. We agree with the City’s position and with the trial court. Absent evidence of an affiliation, notice to one governmental unit does not impute notice to another. City of Houston v. McGowe n , No. 14

- 13

- 00415

- CV, 2014 WL 2039856, at *6 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] May 15, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that notice to Texas Department of Transportation not imputed to City of Houston); Reese v. Tex. State Dep’t of Hw ys . & Pub. Transp. , 831 S.W.2d 529, 530 (Tex. App.

— Tyler 1992, writ denied) (holding that notice to Texas Department of Public Safety not imputed to Texas State Department of Highways and Public Transportation)

. Because Green did not adduce evidence in response to the plea that the TSA is an agent or representative of the City , she did no t demonstrate actual notice that can be imputed to the City

. See Arancibia , 324 S.W.3d at 548

– 49; Simons, 140 S.W.3d at 344, 348; Whitley , 104 S.W.3d at 542; Schneider , 392 S.W.3d at 325. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the plea.7 Conclusion We hold that Green did not adduce evidence that the City was notified of her claim under the TTCA and thus failed to meet the jurisdictional prerequisite for a waiver of governmental immunity

. We therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal order

.

Jane Bland Justice Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Massengale.