U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

50–293PDF 2009

GUATEMALA AT A CROSSROADS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 9, 2009

Serial No. 111–34

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

ENI F. H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JASON STEINBAUM, Subcommittee Staff Director 

ERIC JACOBSTEIN, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member 

FRANCIS GIBBS, Republican Professional Staff Member 

JULIE SCHOENTHALER, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

His Excellency Eduardo Stein Barillas, Former Vice President, Republic of 

Guatemala ............................................................................................................ 4

Anita Isaacs, Ph.D., Benjamin R. Collins Professor of Social Science, Associate 

Professor of Political Science, Haverford College .............................................. 10

The Honorable Mark Schneider, Senior Vice President, Special Adviser on 

Latin America, International Crisis Group (former Director of the Peace 

Corps) .................................................................................................................... 21

Mr. Stephen Johnson (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, for 

Western Hemisphere Policy) ............................................................................... 35

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: 

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 3

His Excellency Eduardo Stein Barillas: Prepared statement .............................. 7

Anita Isaacs, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .............................................................. 12

The Honorable Mark Schneider: Prepared statement .......................................... 24

Mr. Stephen Johnson: Prepared statement ........................................................... 37

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 64

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 65

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana: Prepared statement .......................................................................... 66

(1)

GUATEMALA AT A CROSSROADS 

TUESDAY, JUNE 9, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:21 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot L. Engel (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ENGEL. The subcommittee will come to order. I am told that 

Mr. Burton is on his way and will be here. He is filling in for Mr. 

Mack who is away this week from Congress. And when Mr. Burton 

comes I will give him his due accolades, because he used to be the 

ranking member of the subcommittee and, indeed, even the chairman of the subcommittee, and we have always worked together 

very well. 

So I am pleased to welcome everyone to today’s hearing on Guatemala and I am very glad that Ambassador Villagran is here. So 

welcome, Mr. Ambassador. 

Recent media attention in Latin America has focused overwhelmingly on Mexican President Calderon’s battle against Mexico’s drug 

cartels. Meanwhile, Mexican cartels have moved more aggressively 

than ever into Guatemala, a country with weaker institutions than 

its neighbor to the north. Last Thursday, 3,800 bullets and 563 grenades that were seized from Mexican cartels in Guatemala in April 

were determined to have originally been the property of the Guatemalan army. In the April seizure, police also found 8 antipersonnel 

mines, 11 M60 machine guns, bulletproof vests and two armored 

cars. 

Drug-related violence in Guatemala unfortunately complicates an 

already difficult situation. Guatemala has a long history of violence 

and one of the highest murder rates in Latin America. In a report 

to the Guatemalan Congress, the country’s Human Rights Ombudsman noted that 2008 was, and I quote, ‘‘the bloodiest year of our 

history,’’ with 6,292 homicide victims. Illegally armed groups, drug 

cartels and youth gangs are contributing to spiraling violence. On 

May 18th, a priest from the United States living in Guatemala, 

Lorenzo Rosebaugh, was brutally killed during a robbery. I believe 

it is time to say enough is enough. 

Last month, I sent a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 

urging her to focus greater attention and resources on Guatemala. 

While I am pleased that the Merida Initiative includes funding for 

Central America, at my insistence, I believe that much more must 

2

be done to support our partners in Central America, and particularly Guatemala. 

In my letter, I outlined three key areas where the United States 

can intensify our support for Guatemala. First of all, we must continue to focus Merida Initiative efforts on police training and reform. This should include an increase in the number of U.S. Government permanent staff and detailees offering police training in 

areas such as crime-scene protection and evidence collection. 

Secondly, since its creation in 2007, I have been one of Congress’ 

strongest supporters of the U.N. International Commission against 

Impunity in Guatemala, known as CICIG, an independent body 

created with the support of the Guatemalan Government to investigate the country’s serious problems of organized crime and clandestine security networks. We need to build on current U.S. support to the CICIG. This means providing details to the CICIG from 

the FBI and other U.S. agencies on a case-by-case basis, to offer 

investigatory expertise, as well as helping the CICIG to build up 

its witness and victim protection programs. 

Thirdly, there needs to be a greater focus in my opinion on the 

prevention side of youth gang violence. 

My hope is that today’s hearing will serve as a call to action for 

all of us to help our friends in Guatemala to emerge from the current cycle of violence and impunity. 

The challenges that Guatemala faces should serve as a stark reminder that we must develop a more holistic strategy to combat 

drugs and violence in the Western Hemisphere than currently exists. As we focus more intensely on Guatemala, let us not lose sight 

of history. Each time we work with our partners in the Americas 

to go after drug cartels and drug-related violence, the cartels inevitably move on to the next country. A more holistic approach means 

not simply fighting yesterday’s battles but also looking ahead to 

vulnerable countries like Honduras. I just was in Honduras last 

week with Hillary Clinton at the OAS meeting. Finally, as I have 

said time and time again, a more holistic approach means doing 

more within our own borders to curb our own country’s demand for 

drugs and to stop the illegal trafficking of guns and weapons down 

south from the United States that fuel violence throughout the region. 

I would be remiss not to mention the tragic May 10th murder of 

Guatemalan lawyer Rodrigo Rosenberg. For those of us in the 

international community, the murder of Rodrigo Rosenberg and the 

allegations surrounding his death should not become an exercise in 

finger pointing. Instead we must support the CICIG as it carries 

out its investigation. Rosenberg’s murder and the political chaos 

that it has created only reinforces the need for a stronger justice 

system and an end to impunity in Guatemala. Particularly the 

Rosenberg murder, where he had written something on paper saying that if I am murdered, this is who murdered me; I certainly 

think that needs to be investigated very carefully. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Engel follows:]

3


50293a-1.eps
4

Mr. ENGEL. I would like to, before I introduce our witnesses, give 

our members who are here, if they desire—they don’t have to—a 

chance to make an opening statement. 

Ms. Lee declines. 

Mr. Sires. 

Okay, everyone is cooperating today. 

So I am pleased to introduce our witnesses. Eduardo Stein is the 

former Vice President and Foreign Minister of Guatemala. Anita 

Isaacs is the Benjamin R. Collins Professor of Social Science at 

Haverford College. Mark Schneider is the Senior Vice President of 

the International Crisis Group and a former Director of the Peace 

Corps. And last, but certainly not least, Stephen Johnson is a 

former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Policy. 

And so why don’t we start with testimony. Why don’t we start 

with Mr. Stein. 

STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY EDUARDO STEIN BARILLAS, 

FORMER VICE PRESIDENT, REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA 

Mr. STEIN. Thank you very much for the invitation and thank 

you very much as well for the interest in my country. As an expression of that solidarity I think your introduction, Mr. Chairman, 


50293a-2.eps
5

gave a very good panoramic view of what we are up against and 

what we are undergoing in Guatemala. 

We have indeed reached a critical point in unveiling the weaknesses of our institutional scaffolding within the criminal justice 

system, as well as the barriers of impunity that have been brewing 

for years since the internal armed conflict, and which have grown 

to intolerable proportions in recent years due to the deep penetration of our public and private institutions by power structures 

which compromise not only the most basic public services to Guatemalan society but which truly menace to impede the very existence 

and functioning of a democratic state. The tightening of the overall 

fight against an eradication of the narcotic-related criminal organizations in Colombia and Mexico have triggered a dangerous migration to the drug cartels into Central American countries which 

have resulted in portions of our territory under their control. The 

country is indeed in an immediate risk of being overtaken by the 

cartels. 

The commotion created in Guatemala by the International Commission against Impunity in recent months is a natural sequence 

of its mandate, a natural evolution of its investigative work, and 

the result of the very obstacles found in some people within the institutions responsible for providing an equitable and efficient criminal justice system. The extreme weakness and the penetration of 

our institutions have become evident. But this commotion has 

helped to clarify the picture and sift through the complex national 

and regional agenda to pinpoint the most urgent and transcendental objectives to pursue in the next few months and years. That 

is, in strengthening our justice system and, through this route, to 

demand our justice system to redeem the Guatemalan state with 

the involvement of all other branches of government and organized 

sectors of society. The executive branch cannot do it alone. 

So as a Guatemalan citizen and as a former government official 

who has been distinguished with the invitation to appear before 

this committee, and under whose administration the CICIG was 

promoted and created, I make a plea to the U.S. Congress, and, 

through you, to the U.S. Government to keep up the support of the 

revamping of our institutions and the support of CICIG. 

The new U.S. administration and the new U.S. Congress have to 

renew their commitment to help strengthen our democratic institutions and help CICIG in its second term of its extended mandate. 

We cannot expect to get different results by doing the same things 

we have been doing in the past. There might be a need as well to 

touch up the Merida Plan in this regard, widen and diversify the 

strategic vision, focus the scope in the case of the so-called northern triangle of Central America—that is, Honduras, El Salvador 

and Guatemala—and maybe beef up the institutional strengthening elements of the plan which are there—and very intelligently 

drafted, by the way. But we will need the participation of U.S. institutions that have the experience, the dexterities and the knowhow of criminal investigation and prosecution. We need the participation of the Department of Justice. 

We have heard rumors, Mr. Chairman, that some instances 

would like to take down CICIG to a lower profile and reduce its 

scope and agenda to mere technical training activities for judges, 

6

prosecutors, and police investigators and detectives. We have had 

that for years, without any substantial changes in our justice system. The true innovation of CICIG is that they can implement 

criminal investigations to support the General Attorney’s Office 

and our District Attorneys, and can become an associate part of the 

prosecution throughout the full length of a trial; that they can help 

our state authorities in deciphering, spelling out, and dismantling 

the cists of impunity embedded in our public institutions. That is 

what we requested from the U.N. That is what we agreed upon. 

That is the mandate that we have extended. To back away from 

that would be to betray and violate the mandate of CICIG. 

This is no time for doubting and weakness, Mr. Chairman. This 

is the time when the weaknesses of our system are exposed, and 

we need to act together to overcome the obstacles, remedy the 

shortcomings, strengthen our justice system and fortify our democratic state. This is the time to acknowledge what has been accomplished and to renew and invigorate the commitment. This is the 

time when the U.S. and the international community, both bilaterally as well as through the OAS and the U.N., can help us constructively to eradicate impunity and put up a fight which is truly 

transnational. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stein follows:]

7


50293b-1.eps
8


50293b-2.eps
9


50293b-3.eps
10

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you Mr. Stein. 

Dr. Isaacs. And let me just say that if people would want to summarize their testimony, we would put the official written testimony 

into the record as well. Dr. Isaacs. 

STATEMENT OF ANITA ISAACS, PH.D., BENJAMIN R. COLLINS 

PROFESSOR OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR 

OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, HAVERFORD COLLEGE 

Ms. ISAACS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am summarizing the 

testimony and would request that it be submitted for the written 

record. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee today to contextualize the current situation in Guatemala and also suggest how Congress might craft future U.S. policy. 

As a political science professor at Haverford College, I bring an 

outside-the-Beltway and outside-Guatemala perspective. For the 

past 12 years I have analyzed Guatemala’s efforts to build durable 

peace and democracy, following 36 years of war which claimed over 

200,000 lives and which the country’s Truth Commission declared 

a genocide against the country’s Maya population. 

My research takes me to Guatemala roughly five times a year, 

where I divide my time equally between poor rural communities, 

hard hit by the conflict, and the capital city. I was there, a week 

after the assassination of lawyer Rodrigo Rosenberg, to observe the 

popular protests his murder sparked and to speak with analysts, 

opponents and supporters of the government. Had I appeared before you 2 months ago, I would have described how Mexican traffickers, pushed into neighboring Guatemala, are establishing an 

operation center in regions already destabilized by conflict pitting 

foreign mining corporations against rural indigenous communities. 

These communities claimed the right to consultation guaranteed by 

international treaties. The companies were press community leaders and the government continues to grant concessions, turns a 

blind eye to the escalating violence, and brands peaceful protestors 

‘‘terrorists.’’ Drug lords step into the mix, promising to defend communities whose resistance to violence borne of 36 years of hard 

conflict is now eroding. 

This conflict, however, has been overshadowed by the more dramatic events surrounding the Rosenberg assassination. The posthumous release of a video in which the lawyer forecasted his murder and accused the President, his wife and his inner circle of the 

homicide and of acts of corruption have thrown the country into 

turmoil. It has generated sustained mobilization involving two 

sharply polarized sides, characterized in an oversimplified way as 


50293b-4.eps
11

pro- and anti-government. The so-called anti-government protest I 

observed rallied a crowd of some 30,000. Distinguished by its urban 

white and predominantly wealthy makeup, joined by political opposition members, these protestors demanded peace and justice and 

called alternatively for the President’s resignation, a general strike 

and even military intervention. 

A 5-minute drive away but a world apart, I also observed the 

government’s mobilization of several hundred thousand supporters. 

Bussed in from its political base in less affluent parts of the capital 

and rural areas that have benefited from cash transfer programs, 

these marchers were largely poor and indigenous. Their banners 

and the official speeches that day angrily warned of sustained mobilization to protect the regime from elite sectors intent on destabilization. 

Let me be blunt. Guatemala faces its most serious political crisis 

since the December 1996 signing of peace. The two conflicts I have 

mentioned bring into sharp relief key challenges and fault lines of 

democratic governance that, left unattended, could generate renewed civil strife; briefly, startling levels of violence and citizen insecurity: The numbers of homicides have hovered around 6,000 a 

year since 2006; a judicial system in which 98 percent of all crimes 

go unsolved, and society is rightly cynical about the capacity of 

their institutions and the will of their leaders to ensure the administration of justice; a leadership that, instead of channeling protests 

through political institutions, calculates the advantages to be 

gained by either weakening or propping up a regime through street 

mobilization and appeals for extra systemic action. A fragmented 

civil society and a polarized citizenry in which divisions are layered 

and politicized and the indigenous majority face discrimination, 

comprises the bulk of Guatemala’s poor and politically excluded 

and/or manipulated. 

By including Guatemala in the Merida Initiative in supporting 

the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, the 

CICIG, U.S. policy acknowledges the challenges posed by insecurity 

and impunity. 

Summarizing the recommendations I lay out more fully in my 

written statement, U.S. policy as it looks forward should: One, 

stand firm in support of police reform and against a policy of remilitarization; two, secure rural and indigenous buy-in for justice 

reform by focusing diplomatic attention on the repression of peaceful protestors, providing information and resources for the investigation of war crimes and enhancing access to justice; three, apply 

a mix of pressure and support for an ample political and civil society dialogue on democratic preservation and strengthening; and 

four, promote the citizenship rights of indigenous Guatemalans to 

income generating and educational programs. These are ambitious 

and comprehensive proposals designed to address the symptoms as 

well as the manifestations and consequences of the current violence. 

Regional security and the future of Guatemala democracy together hang in the balance. Thank you for your time, and I would 

be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Isaacs follows:]

12


50293c-1.eps
13


50293c-2.eps
14


50293c-3.eps
15


50293c-4.eps
16


50293c-5.eps
17


50293c-6.eps
18


50293c-7.eps
19


50293c-8.eps
20


50293c-9.eps
21

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much Dr. Isaacs. 

Director Schneider. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARK SCHNEIDER, SENIOR 

VICE PRESIDENT, SPECIAL ADVISER ON LATIN AMERICA, 

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (FORMER DIRECTOR OF 

THE PEACE CORPS) 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank 

the committee for the opportunity to appear here today and to 

speak on the current crisis of insecurity in Guatemala. You have 

my full testimony and some slides that I have prepared, and I hope 

they will be included in the record. 

Mr. ENGEL. Without objection. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I want to applaud the committee’s renewed focus 

on Central America and the recommendations in your letter to the 

administration that you outlined in your statement today. 

I appear here on behalf of the International Crisis Group. Our 

work extends from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe in attempting to prevent conflict and resolve conflict. In the Americas, while we focus 

on the Andes and Haiti, the board of trustees has asked us to assess conditions in Guatemala. For that reason I traveled to Guatemala 3 months ago, after a hiatus of a few years, although I have 

visited frequently during periods of military rule, civil conflict, 

peace negotiations and the immediate post-conflict reconstruction 

years when I was at AID. 

On this trip I have to say that I was simply stunned by the magnitude of drug trafficking crime and impunity and the expressions 

of government officials and former officials of being overwhelmed 

by these threats to the rule of law. 

Essentially, you have drug cartels that have taken up residence 

in a broad swath of Guatemalan territory, and they now dominate 

perhaps 40 percent of rural Guatemala. They control or intimidate 

local authorities and municipalities that extend from the northern 

provinces which border Mexico down through the center of the 

country, through Coban to the Caribbean coast. The same holds 

true in the Peten and along the Pacific coast. In an increasing 

number of these cases, we are told that they are the municipal authorities. Hundreds of small landing strips, many on private property, dot the countryside throughout those areas and provide easy 

access to traffickers. Go-fast boats land on the Pacific coast and 

fishing boats along the Caribbean coast, undaunted by Guatemala’s 

limited naval capacity. 

These same well-financed, well-armed networks of traffickers 

also penetrated into the high echelons of law enforcement institutions. More of the cocaine coming to the United States is stopping 

first on the Guatemalan coast, Caribbean and Pacific sides, repacked and reshifted into the hands of the cartels going north. In 

Guatemala there has been an increase of 47 percent in cocaine 

transiting the country over the past 2 years. 

Another important amount, probably far more than currently estimated, stops in another Central American country and then travels on to Guatemala before entering Mexico. 

For many years the Sinaloa cartel essentially was unchallenged 

until the arrival of the Gulf cartel a very few years ago with its 

22

paid assassins, the Zetas. The results are reflected in what you 

have already heard: A 50-percent increase in homicides in Guatemala between 2004 and 2006 and maintaining that level. 

The exact amount of cocaine passing through Central America 

and the Mexican corridor to the United States is subject to much 

debate. What is not debated is that about 85 percent of the cocaine 

coming from South America uses that corridor. And what is not debated now is that the first stop of entry for cocaine leaving South 

America is no longer Mexico. It is Central America. And the single 

largest transit country in Central America undoubtedly is Guatemala. 

Can I have the second slide. 

You have different estimates of the volume of cocaine flowing toward the U.S. based on different calculations. The State Department in its annual report stated that 400 metric tons of cocaine 

flowed across Guatemala and Mexico to the United States. That is 

probably a very low figure. It is based on cultivation and production figures in the Andes, and that is their estimate of transit activity based on that. 

The Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM) 

hosted by the Defense Intelligence Agency reported a high degree 

of confidence in a figure of 545 metric tons of cocaine in 2007 passing through Central America and Mexico toward the United States. 

What you see on the board there is a much higher estimate but 

also agreed to by the same interagency committee of 1,174 metric 

tons transiting the region in 2008. 

The Joint Interagency Task Force South in Key West which operates radar, tracking, intelligence, air and sea interdiction, described this as the best transit analysis of the interagency community of the actual documented movement of cocaine departing Central America in 2008 and headed mostly for the United States 

through Mexico and Central America. 

What these estimates show, regardless of which one you use, is 

that U.S. counterdrug policies are not stopping the flow of great 

volumes of cocaine toward the United States. Clearly, given these 

figures, and the next slide, which essentially shows in blue the 

amount of cocaine that stops first in Mexico; in red, the bar shows 

the amount of cocaine stopping first in Central America. Now, as 

you can see, last year there was a fundamental shift. Interdiction 

ideally should take place before cocaine enters Mexico, not after. 

Now, traveling with that illicit commerce are the killers who 

murdered most of the 6,300 Guatemalan victims of homicide last 

year, as many homicides as in Mexico, a country nine times larger. 

The amount of money involved is also huge. At wholesale prices 

in Guatemala in 2006 according to the U.N., the 180 metric tons 

of drugs that I indicated earlier passing through Guatemala has a 

value of $2.4 billion. And if you think about just 10 percent of that 

being used for expenses, it is clear that they have huge resources 

to pay for bribery, corruption and murder. 

Now, for many Guatemalans it is not just drug traffickers who 

produce the violence. There are other threats, particularly in urban 

areas. In Guatemala City, as you may know, taking a bus is a calculated risk; 171 bus drivers were murdered last year and some 60 

this year as part of organized crime efforts to extort money from 

23

both bus companies and unions. Not surprisingly, polls show the 

Guatemalans see themselves as having a culture of violence and as 

a nation of impunity, since 98 percent of the killings go 

unpunished, and, in most cases, uncharged. 

Reform of the police, but not just the police, the judiciary as well, 

all institutions of the rule of law, is fundamental. And while there 

has been a start, more decisive action is required from the Guatemalan authorities and more support is required from the United 

States and the international community. 

First we would argue that Guatemalans must make the decision 

to end impunity, and build effective, independent and competent 

law enforcement institutions. In the past several days we have 

seen 30,000 protestors demanding an investigation and prosecution 

and conviction in the murder of well-known attorney Rodrigo 

Rosenberg. Hopefully that will mark an historic public turn to demand respect for the rule of law. 

Second, as you know, Guatemala has requested and the U.N. has 

extended for 2 years, to 2011, the mandate of CICIG, the International Commission against Impunity, but they need more help. 

Judge Carlos Castresana who heads CICIG has indicated that he 

needs additional support for investigators, prosecutors, and there 

are a couple of specific things. The United States should detail FBI 

agents, Spanish-speaking prosecutors and forensic specialists, not 

just helping to bring the murderers of Rosenberg to justice, but to 

help CICIG help Guatemala build institutions of the rule of law. 

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Schneider, could I ask you to please sum up? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes. The other is that they really do need to provide support for high-impact courts, protect witnesses, protect the 

judges, protect the prosecutors. 

And finally, simply let me say, Mr. Chairman, that there is a 

need for fundamental changes in U.S. drug policy. Your bill to create a Western Hemisphere drug policy commission hopefully will 

produce a more effective policy to reduce the demand here, supply 

in South America, and transit through Central America and the 

Caribbean. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]

24


50293d-1.eps
25


50293d-2.eps
26


50293d-3.eps
27


50293d-4.eps
28


50293d-5.eps
29


50293d-6.eps
30


50293d-7.eps
31


50293f-1.eps
32


50293f-2.eps
33


50293f-3.eps
34


50293f-4.eps
35

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much. 

Secretary Johnson. 

STATEMENT OF MR. STEPHEN JOHNSON (FORMER DEPUTY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE POLICY) 

Mr. JOHNSON. Chairman Engel, Representative Burton, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to 

testify on this important subject. You have my full statement before you, but I just would like to summarize that statement right 

now. 

Transnational crime affects all of us and it is perhaps the most 

imminent security threat in the hemisphere. That is the one that 

affects the most people in their daily lives and currently poses the 

most danger to all of our governments. 

Guatemala is one of the most vulnerable countries in Central 

America, as you have heard before in other testimony. It is in the 

middle of a massive drug trafficking route from the Andes to the 

North American markets. And besides that, its 36-year civil war, 

legacy of impunity, and attendant problems with human rights 

abuse imposed a decades-long moratorium on assisting its security 

forces that now struggle with outdated equipment and meager 

training. 

Guatemala’s immediate neighbors cannot supply very much aid. 

Some have experienced similar political turmoil and all have tiny 

economies comparable to small towns in the United States so that 

the scope of the problem is much greater than the resources that 

are available, at least among our allies and our partners. 

Now, violent drug cartels in Mexico are extending their reach 

southward, taking over territory once controlled by Colombian and 

local traffickers. Ill prepared for the challenge, Guatemala offers a 

path of very little resistance. 

Guatemala is not the only country struggling against 

transnational crime in the hemisphere. Public statements from the 

U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy suggests that narcotics 

and arms trafficking extend north toward Canada and south toward Argentina. Drugs also move east from Colombia through Venezuela to Africa and Europe. Caribbean airspace and sea lanes 

from Venezuela to Hispaniola represent another huge corridor for 

illicit transport. 

If the situation continues to spin out of control in Guatemala, 

however, it will weaken police efforts in neighboring countries and 

harm Mexico’s campaign to reign in violent criminal cartels, potentially destabilizing that country of 100 billion persons on our southern border. 

Although your hearing is focused on Guatemala’s problems, we 

should bear in mind that drug trafficking is actually a global criminal enterprise involving hundreds of billions of dollars. Ultimately 

efforts to reduce its impact will be successful if as many neighboring countries as possible can work together contributing what 

special expertise each has according to the resources that each can 

reasonably apply. 

Guatemala’s leaders and leading citizens must be encouraged 

and supported in organizing their government better to reduce imVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:44 Oct 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\WH\060909\50293.000 HFA PsN: SHIRL
36

punity, curb corruption, improve tax collection and strengthen law 

enforcement. Elites must exchange simple concern for individual 

well-being for communitarian values. Only Guatemalans can decide 

to fund a larger, more professional police force. Only Guatemalans 

can put more youths in schools and out of harm’s way. And only 

they can encourage sons and daughters to study for careers in public service where expertise is sorely needed. 

For our part, the United States should help Guatemala analyze 

all that it needs to do to attack the problem, not necessarily in 

terms of off-the-shelf solutions which we have used up to this point, 

but by engaging in new creative thinking. And the United States 

must be realistic about financing or donating equipment. The entire Fiscal Year 2009 Merida funding request for Guatemala, about 

$18 million, would buy just one helicopter. That is clearly not 

enough to make a difference. Interdicting smugglers, especially 

when you take a look at the maps that Mark presented, requires 

surveillance, intelligence collection, mobility, technical devices and 

a proper legal framework for law enforcement to stay ahead of 

criminals and not prey on innocent citizens. Progress is ongoing, 

but the rate may not be fast enough to overcome serious challenges. 

I would be happy to answer any questions you might have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

37


50293e-1.eps
38


50293e-2.eps
39


50293e-3.eps
40


50293e-4.eps
41


50293e-5.eps
42


50293e-6.eps
43


50293e-7.eps
44

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much. 

And thank all of you for very good testimony. 

Mr. Burton has joined us, and I would like to at this time give 

him an opportunity to make any remarks that he might wish to 

make. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I won’t make any remarks right 

now. I would like to have my statement included in the record. But 

I would like to ask some questions of our panel after you ask yours. 

Mr. ENGEL. All right. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BURTON. And I apologize for my tardiness. I had an unexpected problem in my office. Thank you. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, let me just say it is nice to have you back 

again. 

Mr. BURTON. My old buddy. 

Mr. ENGEL. Let me ask the panelists, anyone who cares to answer can answer. Recent news reports about the heavy-duty weapons that Mexican drug cartels are using in Guatemala make clear 

the challenge that these cartels pose to the Guatemalan state itself. 

Some in Guatemala and in the international community would 

argue that the challenges posted by these cartels serve as a call to 

action for the Guatemalan military. Many others, however, argue 

that given the brutal role of a country’s military in its 36-year civil 

war, it makes much more sense to utilize the country’s police forces 

in going after drug cartels. 

So let me ask you these questions. How would you evaluate the 

need for military versus police action to directly combat drug cartels operating in Guatemala? Let me just ask that question first. 

Anyone who cares to answer, I would be grateful. Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think that one of the fundamental needs in 

Guatemala is clearly on civilian law enforcement. It would be a 

major mistake to believe that the way to respond to the threat of 

drug trafficking and to organized crime is by bringing the military 

back into essentially internal police functions. What needs to be 

done is to strengthen the civilian police. There is one area where 

it seems to me that you do have the need, and that is in the area 

of Coast Guard, where there does need to be some additional capability. I believe, though, that the fundamental requirement is to do 

everything possible to reform, vet, train and support civilian law 

enforcement—police and judges. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, let me ask you in conjunction with that, because you said in your testimony that drug cartels dominate—I 

think you said 40 percent of national territory in Guatemala. So if 

that is accurate, what can the government do to regain control of 

its territory and to ensure that the cartels don’t continue to deepen 

their presence in the countryside? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think in fact what 

you need is to reinforce CICIG, the International Commission 

against Impunity. Together with the international community, including the United States, CICIG representatives need to sit down 

with a vetted and determined Guatemalan civil law enforcement 

and identify those communities. We are talking about essentially 

sparsely populated rural areas. But Guatemalan officials know 

where those municipalities are, they know which ones are controlled and they know which ones essentially are under the control 

45

of traffickers. They need to develop a plan to go one by one and 

to go in and to prosecute and to—they may need support, but they 

need to go after them with the idea of apprehending and bringing 

them to justice. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, many of you—I will give Dr. Isaacs a chance 

to answer. Go ahead. 

Ms. ISAACS. I just wanted to answer the question about police 

versus military, and to suggest that it is a tougher nut than simply 

avoiding a remilitarization, as I stated in the summary of my written statement. And what I would like to underscore here is that in 

rural communities in particular, the distinction between the police 

and the military, that is clear to us, one being a civilian law enforcement institution and the other not, is actually far less apparent. And individual citizens in rural communities are really frightened of an abusive, corrupt, and inefficient police force. 

So the challenge is not just strengthening the police force and 

not just community policing, but a challenge that remains—and I 

believe, as I said, that one should not remilitarize Guatemala, that 

there is a legacy that is very dangerous—but is to find a way of 

building trust in a police force that citizens feel that they can access and will actually deliver the security. The distinction that they 

see—there is no distinction in their minds virtually between the 

police and the military, just to underscore that, that we draw so 

clearly. And that is a challenge that needs to be addressed in the 

context of police reform. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Mr. Vice President. 

Mr. STEIN. Your question, Mr. Chairman, opens up a Pandora’s 

box in Guatemalan politics and places myself in an awkward position, because during our administration we went ahead in reducing 

the numbers and the budget of the Guatemalan army, even beyond 

the numbers and percentages called for by the Peace Accords. We 

were convinced that there was a need to downsize the Guatemalan 

army and transform it into an agile and highly moveable modern 

professional army rather than a territorial control outfit. And that 

is why we opted for the strengthening of civilian organizations, not 

only the police, but the strengthening of our justice system. 

Unfortunately, the actual Guatemalan President, Alvaro Colom, 

is of a different opinion, which poses serious contradictions even 

within the social democratic doctrine that this government professes. They decided to beef up the army again and increase their 

budget because they feel that civilian police forces are not capable 

of dealing with such a formidable challenge as that one posed by 

the drug cartels and their weaponry. 

But I would revert to your statement, your opening statement, 

where there is a need for a holistic approach. And I would argue 

strongly in favor of going back to the strengthening of our civilian 

institutions. I am of the opinion, as many Guatemalans are, that 

just beefing up the army is not going to solve the problem. And the 

case that you alluded of the arms found under CICIG’s control in 

Mexico, that came from Guatemalan arsenals, is a case in point. 

We wanted to downsize the army in Guatemala to prevent things 

like that from happening. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much. Mr. Johnson, did you want to 

say anything? 

46

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to add that in 

many ways it is a question of roles and responsibilities. And there 

are some things that the police can do and should be doing better 

than the military, and there are some things that the military can 

offer, particularly in their constitutional role of providing border 

defense and airspace and maritime domain defense. That doesn’t 

mean that the military needs to be involved in apprehensions. 

But one of the weaknesses that the civilian defense has, or at 

least the police has, is that they don’t have the mobility to be able 

to get to areas when operations are going down. For instance, the 

entire northern half of the country is pretty much difficult territory 

for them because they can’t get to some of these strips and some 

of these areas where airplanes come in, crash land and then cruise, 

and people on board and people waiting for them take the drug cargos away and head for the Usumacinta River and then to Mexican 

territory. You have to be able to move very fast. 

So in some ways there has to be some kind of cooperation between military and police, and the roles need to be established. 

There needs to be a legal framework for it. And there needs to be 

adequate funding so that they have the kind of equipment that 

they need. 

There was one propeller-driven airplane that I saw on my last 

visit that was available for tracking, patrol, and interdiction. The 

helicopter fleet seems to be doing well. But if you are going to catch 

some of the airborne traffic in the north, you have to be able to 

travel fast. And in the south there is a lack of air patrol capability; 

and, overall in Guatemalan territory, very little radar coverage. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much. Let me just ask one question 

which has some parts to it, but I want to raise it and then I am 

going to turn it over to Mr. Burton. 

Many of you, I had mentioned CICIG in my opening statement 

and many of you mentioned it. And as I had mentioned, the U.N. 

International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala has 

widespread support both in Guatemala and throughout the international community. 

So let me ask you specifically with regard to CICIG, how effective has the CICIG been? What constrains their ability to investigate and help prosecute crimes? To what extent are the various 

elements of the Guatemalan Government cooperating with the 

CICIG? As you know, they are not able to formally prosecute cases 

and need to rely on its partnership with the public prosecutor’s office. 

So has the public prosecutor’s office proven to be a good partner 

for the CICIG? And besides continuing to assist the CICIG financially, what else can the Obama administration and Congress do to 

help ensure that the CICIG is able to successfully fulfill its mandate? 

And let me add, Carlos Castresana, who is the head of the 

CICIG, he is leading the investigation into the murder of Guatemalan lawyer Rodrigo Rosenberg. And even Castresana has expressed doubts about his ability to resolve the case. The quote I 

have for him says, ‘‘I still have no wiretaps, no maximum security 

prisons, no far-reaching courts, so how do you expect us to resolve 

47

the Rosenberg case or any other?’’ That is a quote from Carlos 

Castresana. 

So, coupled with that what are the prospects for the successful 

prosecution of those responsible for the murder of Mr. Rosenberg 

and what are the real stakes in the Rosenberg case, how much does 

Guatemala’s long-term stability depend on the case being successfully resolved? I know I have thrown out a lot there, but they are 

all connected. And any one of you who would like to take a shot 

at it, I would be grateful. Okay, Mr. Stein. Thank you. 

Mr. STEIN. Mr. Chairman, those of us who are involved in promoting the creation of CICIG had a very complex set of legal questions to be solved before it came into being. And you mentioned one 

of them. The commission has no capacity to prosecute on their own. 

The idea of the commission was precisely to help strengthen the capacity of our own prosecutorial abilities within the general prosecutor’s office, et cetera. 

To the best of our knowledge, CICIG has been very successful in 

the half-dozen or so emblematic cases that they have put together 

for the General Attorney’s Office to present to the court system. 

But we are weary and we are afraid that the penetration that I alluded to in my statement has weakened or has impeded our own 

institutions to comply with the kind of partnership that is needed. 

Not a single detention has been materialized in any of the cases 

of the emblematic cases that CICIG has presented. There is evidence or there are signs of complicity between personnel of the 

prosecutor’s office and personnel of the court system to try to make 

CICIG fail in the cases that they are putting together. 

So I think that CICIG would need not only a boost in resources 

in this second phase of the extension of their mandate, but also the 

technical capacities that other witnesses have mentioned. 

But there is also a political commitment needed from top-level 

Guatemalan authorities in the three branches of government. We 

have seen, suddenly, like lights going off in the middle of investigations. And you mentioned some of the requests that Mr. Castresana 

has made to public authorities that do not materialize or take ages 

to materialize. Paying lip service to how well CICIG is doing is not 

enough. There is a need for institutional production of results within the Guatemalan Government. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Dr. Isaacs. 

Ms. ISAACS. I wanted to second what Eddie Stein just said, and 

say that the CICIG was chugging along quite happily until the 

Rosenberg murder, in fact. And people were kind of watching. I 

mean, there were these problems. But there was a sense of 

progress being made and sort of things being on the right track. 

And then a curious set of things happened which I think reflect 

one of the thorniest challenges also that we face. First of all, there 

was a tremendous embrace. In the atmosphere after the Rosenberg 

assassination, there was a kind of general sigh of relief, which was 

thank God we have the CICIG, and now the CICIG can save us 

and save democracy in the country, save our institutions, et cetera, 

solve this crime. 

Then a few weeks passed and a curious thing happened as the 

CICIG actually seemed to be ready to move forward and do this, 

to perform its task to kind of work forward toward resolving the 

48

crime. And we see the evidence, sort of a very apparent trippingup of the CICIG; an effort to undermine, an effort to block, an effort to stop the process. 

This speaks to me to underscore that it is both a question of resources and a question of political will and commitment. And I 

think that where the U.S. can make a difference is in the area of 

sort of diplomatic pressure and sort of not letting up on that. And 

Ambassador McFarland in Guatemala has been very outspoken 

and effective on that front. 

But I want to second, in particular to what has been said here, 

is that I would caution against saying CICIG is doing a good job, 

et cetera, et cetera, but would instead alert to the worries of tripping up and undermining the CICIG and paying attention to the 

ways in which its investigations are being blocked at the moment. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. If I could, there is no question that CICIG has 

begun to come up against a structure of impunity that has in a 

sense corrupted much of the Guatemalan law enforcement establishment. Remember last year alone, there were 1,700 police who 

were thrown out because of corruption, including 50 police commissioners and the deputy director of the National Police. The CICIG 

indicated that it was not getting cooperation with the Attorney 

General. Ultimately, the Attorney General resigned, and ten public 

prosecutors as well. One would hope that the U.S.—not just the 

United States, but the international ‘‘Friends of Guatemala’’ in the 

diplomatic community would get together with CICIG and essentially establish these are the things that are needed for CICIG to 

do its job. And its job is not merely helping to solve the Rosenberg 

case. Its job is to dismantle the illegal armed groups and to help 

the Government of Guatemala establish a clean police force and judiciary in order to deal with the problems of organized crime. 

And here your letter, Mr. Chairman, goes I think much of the 

way. If CICIG has, in fact, better capabilities in terms of FBI investigators, in terms of prosecutors. If the members of CICIG who are 

Guatemalans, and very brave Guatemalans—they don’t have the 

same immunities and protections as international employees of 

CICIG—that needs to be done. That is a decision of Guatemala. At 

the same time it seems to me that one has to establish at least 

some, what the CICIG calls, high-impact courts; that is, courts 

where you have vetted the judges, vetted the prosecutors, protected 

them, protected the witnesses and then go after those who are most 

responsible for a lot of the corruption and crimes. That has not yet 

been done. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much. Mr. Johnson, no need if you—

okay. 

I will now with pleasure turn over the questioning to Mr. Burton. 

Mr. BURTON. You know, it is kind of troubling, you said that 

there appears to be collusion between the prosecutors and the 

judges. And according to what I have here in front of me, Mr. 

Rosenberg did a taping before he was killed and he accused the 

President and his wife and other close associates of having authorized a murder of one of the lawyer’s clients concerned, and he 

would reveal their involvement and corruption in the partially 

state-owned rural development bank, Banrural. How in the world 

49

are you going to get justice if the President was involved in this 

murder or murders, and his wife was, and if the prosecutor and the 

judges are working together? It sounds like to me you have got a 

real cabal that you have to deal with. 

I mean, you are telling us here today that we ought to do this, 

we ought to do that, we ought to do this. But I mean, if you have 

got the top executive in the country and the prosecutorial staff and 

the judges all saying they are not going to do anything, they are 

going to cover this thing up, how do you anticipate changing that? 

While you are thinking about that, let me ask another question. 

You know, we give Guatemala, according to my records here in 

front of me, they received $51.3 million in U.S. assistance in Fiscal 

Year 2007; $62.9 million in Fiscal Year 2008; and the total funding 

requested for 2009 is $77.4 million and $103.2 million. You know, 

that is a lot of money. And it seems to me that in addition to diplomacy, Mr. Chairman, we ought to be talking about maybe putting 

a hold on some of this money until they change things. 

I mean, we had before this committee, I think when I was chairman or you were Ranking, women from down there that talked 

about women being taken off the streets, raped, killed, left in vacant lots, and there wasn’t much being done about that. I presume 

there is a lot of that still going on; is that right? So that is still 

going on. 

We have got a government, according to what we have heard 

here and what Mr. Rosenberg put in his videotape before he died, 

that they were involved—the President and his wife and others 

were involved in the murder, his murder, as well as others. And 

then you have got the prosecutorial staff and the judges that are 

working in cahoots with one another to stop justice from being 

meted out. 

And so if we can’t do anything, we ought to bring this to the attention of the Congress and the Appropriations Committee and say, 

hey, listen, we are giving these people a lot of money, and they 

want another $103.2 million next year, they are getting $77.4 million this year, and say, you know, until we see some manifest 

changes down there, we are going to try to put a hold on part of 

this. You know, money talks and baloney walks, and I think that 

might be one of the ways to bring about some positive changes, if 

anything will. 

And with that, if you have any comments I would like to hear 

them. Mr. Vice President, I don’t know if you are in a position to 

say anything because you might get shot next. 

Mr. STEIN. First of all, I apologize if my choice of words was not 

precise enough, but I spoke of some judges and some prosecutors. 

Fortunately, not all of our justice system shows these signs of corruption. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, let me interrupt you right there, Mr. Vice 

President. The President must have enormous power down there. 

And if he is trying to put the kibosh on this, quiet it down, and 

he has some political sway over the prosecutors involved in this 

case or the judges that he may or may not have had anything to 

do with getting elected or appointed, can he keep this thing under 

wraps, keep it under the covers? 

50

Mr. STEIN. You are referring to four different political problems 

in one. I would like to set aside the Rosenberg case because you 

cannot argue with a dead person. And I know that there is an ongoing investigation by CICIG that is dealing deeply within the 

echelons of government to try to put some light on the accusations 

of Mr. Rosenberg, whom I knew personally. 

Secondly, part of the problem, Mr. Burton, is precisely that the 

generalized weakness of the institutional scaffolding gives little leverage to any head authorities of any of the three branches of government. And one of the worries of the Guatemalan people is precisely if after what Mr. Rosenberg revealed in his state before he 

was murdered and after the alleged involvement of such high-level 

authorities, this government will be able to function for the 21⁄2

years that still remain in their mandate and what they will be able 

to do in the 21⁄2 years still running. 

And in this regard, I think that CICIG has worked with competent prosecutors and has found some judges who are willing to 

do the justice work that needs to be done. But I mentioned purposely that there are indeed some judges and some prosecutors and 

some lawyer offices that are indeed working in conjunction to try 

to block the investigations. 

So what the investigations might yield in terms of a solid case 

to be presented to a court system needs to be accompanied by other 

strengthening in other areas of the administration. 

Mr. BURTON. I will let the rest of you comment, and then I will 

yield the floor. 

The corruption level down there is pretty high. There are over 

6,000 murders a year. And there is going to be 6,200 and some this 

year; at least that is what they estimate. We have got women who 

have been gang-raped and killed and thrown in vacant lots and everything else. That continues to go on. You have got a fellow who 

accused the President and his wife of a murder and possibly his 

own murder, and we have had testimony today that there are prosecutors, maybe not all, and there are judges, maybe not all, who 

are trying to block this. 

And with the political climate being the way it is right down 

there and with the maras, the gangs down there having so much 

influence and the drug trafficking, is there any way that this is 

going to be handled; is there going to be justice? And are we supporting a corrupt government down there by sending all of our 

money? And is there any possibility of a positive change or outcome? 

Go ahead, Doctor. 

Ms. ISAACS. In my testimony I make a strong plea, which I would 

like to underline again today, highlight, which is that there are—

I think the diagnosis that you make, I think I largely agree with 

it, but I think that one solution or one alternative that could be 

pursued is to find ways to support the strengthening of civil society 

that is fragmented, and many segments of civil society are totally 

excluded. And it is by looking underneath and supporting those actors that would be able to bring pressure to bear to hold their government accountable that might provide the beginning of a resolution to the kind of challenge that you very correctly lay out. 

51

So I wouldn’t argue for stopping funding; I would argue for a 

more comprehensive approach that tries to empower domestic actors who haven’t traditionally been part of the political landscape 

or who have been marginal to the political landscape, so that they 

can bring their influence to bear and try to preserve, deepen, 

strengthen a very fragile democracy. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, the chairman and I and others who have 

worked on the Western Hemisphere for a long time, we understand 

what you are talking about, what they are up against down there. 

It just seems to me that there ought to be some way to put some 

pressure on the government to bring about change, and if you are 

talking about civil government or civil society there being able to 

put pressure on the government to bring about change, I would like 

to, as a former chairman and as a member of this subcommittee, 

I would like to have your recommendations, and I think the chairman would as well, so that we can take a hard look at them and 

see if we can implement some of those to bring about change, because we are having a heck of a time right now, as the chairman 

knows, with the economy of the United States and the money that 

we spending. And we are going to spend a couple, $3 trillion or $4 

trillion in the next 3, few years. And you know, this may seem like 

an insignificant amount of money, but if we can’t straighten out a 

friend, a neighbor down there, and the governmental corruption 

that is taking place, then why not save that money and use it here. 

Ms. ISAACS. Just to, can I quickly in 2 seconds just say that what 

I think the most effective, and I would be happy to assist in any 

way possible, but I think that the diplomatic pressure that the U.S. 

could bring to bear from above and coupled with mobilizing, galvanizing and empowering groups from below would actually go a 

long way to strengthening Guatemalan democracy. And I have all 

kinds of ideas about how to do that. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you very much. 

I am going to give Mr. Schneider a chance to be quick and answer, and then I am going to turn it over to Mr. Sires for questions. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. If I could, Mr. Burton, it seems to me that you 

can’t do only one thing. Yes, support civil society. There was recently, the government agreed with the archdiocese and the university on a national accord for security and justice, about 100 good 

things, in terms of commitments and priorities. Yes, we should figure out a way how to support them using civil society as a mechanism. 

But I don’t think you can turn away from the work that CICIG 

has done. Remember, among their attorneys are very brave Guatemalans who are taking a risk in going after the corruption within 

the system. At the same time, there are some of those within the 

system who are trying to get rid of what remains, if you will, the 

stain from drug traffickers. So I don’t think it is a question of either/or. But I agree with you that you need to be clear and focused 

in the message. And if anybody who is a significant power holder, 

whoever it is, is blocking that, the message from the U.S. needs to 

be quite clear. 

But there is also, remember, there has been nothing yet that has 

proven that the statements or accusations in that video with respect to the President are accurate. 

52

What I think you do have to do, though, is make sure that we 

provide the support to CICIG to go after whoever is responsible for 

that murder, as well as the others. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I sit here and listen to your comments, I just want to follow 

up on what Mr. Burton said. You know, we are looking at a country that is controlled 40 percent by the cartel. That is what somebody said before, 40 percent of the country is controlled by the drug 

lords. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Territorial. 

Mr. SIRES. Territorial. 

You are looking at ineffective police. You are looking at corrupt 

officials. 

You are not asking for the army to step in and try to do something about the situation. You feel that we should empower the police, but yet the police is not effective. 

You talk about brave Guatemalans. How long are these brave 

Guatemalans going to be there if all of this is happening around 

them? 

What I am getting at is, there is no one way of straightening this 

out. How do you straighten this out without the army getting involved, because the police are ineffective? Believe me, I am not a 

proponent of the army getting involved, but how do you fix the police? How do you fix the corrupt officials without a stronger arm? 

I am looking at Colombia because Colombia a few years ago was 

going to be overrun, and I see the success that they have had. 

Mr. STEIN. Mr. Sires, I think that what Mr. Johnson mentioned 

here is the correct approach. There is a role for each institution. 

What we are afraid of is that if Guatemala, as Dr. Isaacs mentioned, is remilitarized and we assign an overbearing responsibility 

to the generals and to the military, we are substituting some distortions for another set of distortions. 

Mr. SIRES. But Mr. Vice President, I look at the situation in Mexico; you know, the police are part of the problem. 

Mr. STEIN. And who guarantees that the army is made up of angels? 

Mr. SIRES. Oh, no, believe me, that is not what I am thinking. 

Mr. STEIN. Well, what I am saying, Mr. Sires, is that each institution should have a strategic role to play and a set of very clearcut responsibilities under the proper oversight, which is another 

part of the problem. To strengthen that oversight capacity, Dr. 

Isaacs as well as Mr. Schneider have mentioned the strengthening 

of civilian institutions as overseers. So we need to work with our 

own congress as well. 

A second set of questions that I think are in order is, how can 

we transmit to not only U.S. legislators but to other friends, congresses, the set of very delicate balancing acts within these weakened institutions in the face of colossal amounts of money which 

are many times over what the United States provides as a yearly 

aid package? 

I know this is a big responsibility for each and every one of you 

to decide, not only on the aid for countries like Guatemala, but for 

53

internal purposes as well, but the amounts of money that the drug 

cartels can put into service in corrupting private and public structures is of such a nature that we feel it is a typical transnational 

effort and that if we don’t deal with it through a network of countries and governments, it will be impossible to really begin to solve 

those issues. 

Mr. SIRES. So, just to get away from that, the border between 

Guatemala and Mexico, they basically work, the drug cartels, with 

impunity, right? There is nothing that stops them? 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Representative Sires, it is not to say that there is 

nothing going on on the borders. There is a lot going on in terms 

of patrols, and both the police and the military are involved. And 

the Mexican police and military are involved as well. In fact, Mexico provides a lot of air interdiction for Guatemala, so there is cooperation. 

The question is, how much is there? Is it enough to attack the 

problem? And it really isn’t because it is a resource question. 

When you look at traffickers that are so well off that they are 

able to operate jets and turboprops, a lot of them stolen, grant you, 

but at the same time, if they are able to operate airplanes like that 

for one-time use, crash land them, and take the cargo across the 

river, or use semi-submersibles or mother ships out in the Pacific 

Ocean and then transfer cargos that way, you have got quite a 

problem. 

And it soaks up resources for a country like Guatemala, which has a $5 billion national budget, of which the police get about $100 

million and the military gets $150 million. So what they have to 

do to even begin to approach the problem is, they go back to their 

congress and say, how much money can you raise in taxes? And 

they are hearing from their constituents that they don’t want to do 

that. There has to be a meeting of the minds, a consensus, to begin 

to attack problems like this; otherwise, they are going to be overwhelmed. 

The other thing is, as we have seen with Colombia, we withdrew, 

and I know it is frustrating because there are not many tools to 

deal with it, but we withdrew from Colombia in terms of engagement in the mid-1990s, and then we had to come back on strong 

in 1999 and 2000 by supporting Plan Colombia, and it cost us a 

whole lot more. 

The problem is, now, is that we have got Mexico and other countries on Guatemala’s border that are also part of the overall equation. 

Mr. SIRES. That was going to be my next question. What is the 

situation on the other borders El Salvador and Belize? Is that the 

other borders? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Honduras. 

Mr. SIRES. Honduras. 

Mr. JOHNSON. El Salvador and Belize. And Belize is a country 

that has three light airplanes, a Cessna and two Britten-Norman 

aircraft, one of which crashed last year, to be able to use in interdiction. It has a long coastline, very little coast guard capability. 

A lot of the air traffic comes over Belize, and they can’t do anything 

about it, and it goes right into Guatemala. 

54

And then you have got Honduras. It has got the GDP of about 

Fort Collins, Colorado, to deal with this. 

You have got El Salvador, they are doing a little better. But, 

again, they are hard-pressed just to take care of the situation in 

their own country. So it is a matter of resources. And when we are 

talking about that, we are not even getting into the other equation, 

which is just as important, and that is the administration of justice, civil society, and mending the divisions in society which are 

going to allow Guatemala and its government to function more effectively. 

Mr. SIRES. So you need, in essence, a Plan Colombia for Guatemala? 

Mr. JOHNSON. What I am saying is that the Plan Colombia model 

of comprehensive assistance seems to work a lot better than something that is just a silver bullet here, a silver bullet there. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Isaacs, would you like to comment? 

Ms. ISAACS. I want to comment on the range of issues that you 

have raised. 

I think that Guatemala is quite different from Colombia because 

the history of the military and the history of the country is different. And we have a history of brutal repressive armed conflict 

perpetrated by the military, which is actually very recent. We also 

have a military that looks like the police. It suffers from all of the 

same faults as the police. It is repressive. It is corrupt. It is abusive, and it also resorts to strong arm tactics. 

The problem is, for these programs and policies to be actually effective, it also needs to engage the cooperation of communities, and 

that won’t happen. 

The other issue that I also want to raise is that drugs aren’t the 

only form of violence in much of rural Guatemala. It overlays a 

combustible mix that already exists there. And so you need both a 

Plan Colombia type of approach, perhaps, I mean I have to think 

that one through, but you need a comprehensive policy that understands the various rural conflicts that exist and the ways in which 

the military or the police might play into those. 

I am thinking in particular of the conflict that I mentioned in my 

statement about the conflict between mining companies and hydroelectric dams and indigenous communities and the ways in which 

drug lords have been able to come in and take advantage, or are 

taking advantage. That, I think, is as a significant problem, nut to 

crack as it is to figure out who is going to provide the security. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Green. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our panels. I have a district in Houston, and so 

we have a number of Colombian Americans who actually live in our 

area, and the relationship between our area and Guatemala is a 

great deal. It is interesting because about 2 years ago, some members from Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees went to 

Mexico to talk about, at that time, it was right after Merida was 

announced between President Calderon and President Bush, and 

we were requested to go there by the Congreso in Mexico, because 

of the concern that our two Presidents decided this, and now they 

55

are coming to both the U.S. Congress and the Chamber of Deputies 

and the Senate in Mexico and without any forewarning or any negotiations or discussions with us. 

To a person, the members from all three of the major parties in 

Mexico, the PRI, the PAN and the PRD, said we don’t want Plan 

Colombia. We want something that is much different because of the 

same concern that I am hearing from our panelists about the army. 

What we have now, in fact President Calderon has made the decision that, because of the problems with the police and literally 

the murders of police chiefs, literally hundreds of them, to utilize 

the army in Mexico, not just on the West Coast but on the border 

with the United States, particularly with Texas. And that is not 

popular in Mexico either any more than Guatemala, and they don’t 

have the history of the military running the government, as in 

Guatemala. 

But you need something different than Merida because, frankly, 

the amount of money for Central America is very small. In fact, we 

didn’t get what we wanted for Mexico in the technology and things 

like that that we are trying to do. 

It sounds like you are saying we need something like Plan Colombia but for the police forces. And the police forces can often be 

as brutal as an army, but you need to professionalize them and 

with that assistance. 

Of course, here I am saying that here with Guatemala; we have 

that same problem with Afghanistan that we found out, although 

our country needs to learn, and we have learned it in Iraq and Afghanistan, and our closest friends and neighbors to the south, that 

the best way you can do it is ensure the secure and control for the 

crime, but also show how people can earn a living and support 

their families other than being displaced and the cities growing 

larger because of the displacement from the rural area, so you create poverty in the cities away from the rural area. 

The military assistance in Guatemala is conditioned on Guatemala investigating the crimes and the allegations from earlier governments. Do you think that is a hindrance or a benefit to try and 

deal with some of the past problems, you know, because that is 

conditioned on the military assistance? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Green, thank you very much for the question. 

There are two parts, I think, to the answer. One is I think that 

the conditions do make sense. It is something the Guatemalans 

themselves in their own commission on historical clarification have 

asked for. 

But your other point I think is even more important. A Plan Colombia that is overwhelmingly aimed at strengthening the military 

is simply not what Guatemala’s history or the threats that Guatemala faces would call for. 

In the case of Colombia, you had a major insurgency and not the 

same kind of threat to civil law from drug traffickers alone. So 

there was a combination that prompted an effort to provide more 

support to the military. 

You don’t have that in Guatemala. In Guatemala, you have a 

fundamental failure of civilian law enforcement and capability to 

prosecute and to bring to justice those who commit crimes. And 

56

that needs to be where you start. You may need additional support, 

as you suggest, much more attention and much more resources and 

much more effort aimed at strengthening those institutions, that I 

would agree with. 

And I also agree with your other point, that there needs to be 

an integrated process that deals with the other side, the prevention 

side, in terms of providing additional support for the rising number 

of young people who have no jobs, no education and no hope and 

are easily recruited, if you will, by the maras and by organized 

crime. 

Ms. ISAACS. I think that the way you phrased it is actually terrific just now and the question that you posed. Maybe because it 

is music to my ears, and it is what I work on, but I want to say 

a resounding ‘‘yes’’ to the last part, that I think the connections between the two are central. And I would say they are central. As 

a political scientist, we talk about it in terms of something we call 

political learning. 

And I see sort of the need to bring about a change in attitudes, 

and a change in the way that the institution behaves, and a change 

in the understanding of what is legitimate and illegitimate and acceptable and unacceptable patterns of behavior. It is one way in 

which the past connects to the present and the future in terms of 

the role of the military in society. 

I would say it has two additional benefits. One is a more institutional version of reform that goes beyond attitudes to restructuring 

the roles of the institution in light of what we learn from prosecution of wrongdoing. 

And the third element would be the purging of wrong-doers who 

still exist within military ranks. 

I would also just, since I have this mike here, say that in terms 

of preventing sort of the recourse to violence, people joining gangs, 

people becoming involved with organized crime, I would say that 

there are two questions. One is poverty, which you rightly signal, 

and finding ways and alternatives out of that poverty. The other 

issue is political inclusion and political participation. For me, it is 

both social and economic, but it is also gaining political access. 

Guatemala is really a society in which the majority of the population are effectively politically excluded. 

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, if I could just ask, my concern is that 

sometimes we impose restrictions on military assistance and other 

things that actually is a hindrance to our country. I have heard 

that many times from the Department of Defense, but Vice President Barillas, that is not a problem in Guatemala? 

Mr. STEIN. We have a long history of dealing with U.S. conditions in Latin America, not only toward aid packages but toward 

other kinds of packages. 

As a Vice President in office, I visited Washington at least three 

times to try to convince legislators to change that and to allow for 

a fresher vision to sift through these impediments and allow for 

new technology and know-how to be able to be disbursed not only 

as dollars but know-how, really, in terms of the training of a new 

type of law enforcement people and the training of a new type of 

Army. 

57

Sometimes these impediments are really the only way in which 

U.S. legislators find, through just stopping the disbursement of 

funds to a particular institution in one country, like the army in 

Guatemala, as a way to call for action in other areas within the 

Guatemalan state. We understand that. 

But the nature, the scope, the depth and the gravity of the challenges that we are facing in security issues for all of Guatemalan 

society, I honestly think that they do call for a revision of those impediments, as long as they are dealt with in the kind of proposals 

that we have heard from the panel or the witnesses today. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, maybe we need to look at that. I know on military assistance, but if we went past the military and went directly 

to local law enforcement, maybe those same conditions wouldn’t 

apply, except oversight over that. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Green. 

Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this 

very important hearing, and it is certainly interesting listening to 

the witnesses. 

I just have a question in the write-up we got from the Congressional Research Service. They mentioned that Guatemala has one 

of the highest murder rates in Latin America and that, by the end 

of 2008, even though the rate of murder decreased in the first 3 

months of Colom’s tenure, that the murder rate in 2008 increased 

8.3 percent; and 2009, 15 percent above that. However, we did note 

that the election of the current President was more of a person that 

the poor, the rural poor, and others who were able to vote this time 

sort of unimpeded, sort of elected him. 

So I am wondering, is there anyone who can explain to me, why 

do you feel there has been an increase? Do you think it is because 

of the drug cartel? Is it opposition to the current government? Does 

anybody have a fix on what might be attributed to the increase in 

murders? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. There is no question that the increasing encroachment of the cartels into Guatemala over recent years has 

been the major factor in increasing the number of homicides within 

the country. If you look at the trend line, in terms of the increase 

of homicides, it basically does follow the arrival of the Gulf Cartel 

to challenge the Sinaloa Cartel for territorial control, and an increase in the use of Guatemala as a transit point in moving drugs 

from South America north. It is not the only, but it is the major 

factor, I would say. 

Mr. STEIN. Undoubtedly, organized crime plays a major role in 

this increase. But there is a much more complex grid of dynamics 

playing in the Guatemala situation. And as a matter of fact, in all 

of Latin America, where we have seen a considerable and dramatic 

increase of citizen violence over the last 12 or 13 years; in the case 

of Guatemala, where we have 18 homicides per day as an average, 

most of which are young males, what we are up against is a state 

of extreme inequality within Guatemalan society and extreme impunity, which none of those crimes are being properly investigated 

and prosecuted with the exception, according to this study that 

with Swedish funds that was made 4 years ago, only 2 percent of 

58

the homicides get investigated enough to go to court and just 1 percent does ever merit a sanction. 

So Guatemalan society has grown accustomed, throughout the 36 

years of internal armed conflict and then the 13 years of democratic life after the conflict was over, to this generalized atmosphere of impunity in which, because crimes are not dealt with 

through the proper channels of authority, are not prosecuted and 

do not receive the proper legal punishment, then the population at 

large has resorted in this system of high inequality to other means 

of settling disputes, other means of securing their own well-being 

or the resources they need. Or if you have the look through the demographics of Guatemala in which 70 percent of the population out 

of 13 million inhabitants are below 30 years of age, it is an extremely young country. A quarter of a million youngsters go to the 

labor market every year, and the economy cannot absorb them. So 

they either migrate illegally to the north, or they have to become 

part of this illegal economic system that prevails. 

Ms. ISAACS. I looked up a few statistics just to give you a sense 

of this, some of the most recent ones. And just to support what has 

been said here and then to say two other things, one is that the 

top 20 percent of the population in Guatemala gets two-thirds of 

all of the income of the country. So that gives you a sense of the 

degree of inequality that prevails. 

The other thing I would say is that, in the context of impunity, 

impunity generates more crime. And in the case of Guatemala, it 

tends to generate more crime also because people tend to find their 

own violent ways of resolving, of solving conflicts. And they in turn, 

violence breeds more violence in the presence of impunity and the 

absence of a judicial system that you can either trust or access. So 

these are additional problems that Guatemala faces. 

The other legacy of the armed conflict, which again is very, very 

recent, so this is coming in the context of this, is that there is a 

lack of respect for human life, which is a system that is very tolerant of violence, strikingly so if one goes to Guatemala. 

Mr. PAYNE. Well, let me thank you very much. 

From what I understand, Guatemala has one of the most inequitable distributions of wealth in the world, and it is kind of shocking. And I agree, when the authorities really have very little regard 

for people at the bottom, that is what they do, and you go about 

your business, which is unfortunate—well, hopefully we will be 

able to come up with some constructive ways to perhaps assist the 

new government. 

At least we see that evidently the person elected President intends to, wants to, alleviate the problems of the poor. Of course, it 

is a gigantic task that it seems like he has before him. But we will 

certainly try to see whatever we can do to assist the situation. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Payne. 

Let me ask one last question which doesn’t have much to do with 

everything we have talked about. I think we have covered all of the 

important issues very, very quickly; very, very thoroughly I should 

say, and I appreciate that very much. 

In his inaugural address, President Colom vowed to put what he 

called a Mayan face on his government in a country in which the 

59

indigenous majority has often been excluded from the political 

mainstream. 

Mr. Payne, of course, was referring to that. 

Has the President lived up to his promise? And what more needs 

to be done? We find that we have this problem in many of the 

countries in the hemisphere where the indigenous population is 

pushed aside and taken for granted and not in the political mainstream at all. 

Does anyone want to give that question a shot? Is a Mayan face 

on the government of President Colom? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I mean, I think the answer from all of us is, not 

enough has been done. When you look at the disparity between access to education, and access to health care, access to jobs, access 

to justice, between the Mayan population and the general population, it is clear from every study, and the World Bank just did 

a study on poverty in Guatemala about 2 or 3 years ago, and it 

showed huge disparities in everything, including access to prenatal 

care. There is no area where there is anywhere near a similar access for the Mayan population to services as for the general population. 

And while the government has begun to do certain things in the 

rural areas, much more needs to be done. And part of the response 

should be finding ways to engage the Mayan community itself in 

helping to define which programs are needed, which ones are most 

successful. 

One of the ways we have argued, in response to the fiscal crisis 

now, is that Guatemala needs to look at the same thing that Brazil 

has had, a conditional cash transfer, that would go to the individual. That would provide additional resources to the poor and 

particularly to the most vulnerable, in this case the Mayan population. That kind of cash transfer would be somewhat of a safety 

net for the vulnerable populations. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Dr. Isaacs. 

Ms. ISAACS. The answer here is also a resounding no. It is actually quite shameful, the distortion between the campaign promises 

and what has been delivered in the first year and a half. So there 

is one Mayan cabinet minister. There are 18 indigenous deputies 

in a chamber of 158, which is about 11 percent of the chamber, although the Mayans represent over half of the population. 

As Mark Schneider said, we see the socioeconomic disparities 

that the Mayan community faces. There have been cash transfer 

programs that have been introduced, and the challenge remains, 

and I want to underscore what Mark said toward the end, is to find 

a way to empower Mayan communities so that somebody nonMayan or somebody can purport to speak and to claim a Mayan 

face. The challenge, and I think U.S. policy can make a considerable difference there, is enabling Mayans with a Mayan face to 

speak for themselves. 

And in the segment of my written statement where I talk about 

citizenship rights and access to education and higher educational 

opportunities, that Mayan communities, Mayan individuals desperately need so that they can find an entree into leadership positions in a variety of fields which will enable somebody else not to 

60

assume that face but for them with a Mayan face to speak in concert with others. 

I would also like to say that the election of Obama has proven 

a tremendous inspiration for Mayans in Guatemala. And they 

have, in fact, many of the people, my colleagues whom I know and 

have worked with for years, have done an about face in the past 

2 years or so as they have watched the U.S. electoral campaign and 

the election of Obama. And they have moved from a vision of political power that was much closer to following in the footsteps of Evo 

Morales in Bolivia, to embracing a kind of post-racial order that 

Obama has so inspirationally put forward here in the United 

States. 

So I think that if there was some way to encourage that, to enable that to come about in Guatemala, we would be looking at a 

society that would finally have overcome the historical divisions 

and historical polarization that has been the source of armed conflict for 36 years and long before. So I think it is a challenge that 

the United States is well suited to pursue in the Guatemalan case. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, Dr. Isaacs, I think we will let that be the last 

word, unless somebody has a great urge to talk, because I think 

that was—Mr. Stein, I don’t know if your hand is up or not. I can’t 

tell. 

It is. Okay, we will let you have the last word. 

Mr. STEIN. I am not perhaps the appropriate person to speak 

about President Colom’s promise to give a Mayan face to his government because part of my responsibility as a Vice President was 

precisely to open up opportunities of participation to the Mayan 

people as well as the Xinca and Garifuna people in my country. 

But going beyond the face, I think it is important to open up options for a voice and a thinking of those communities, and we have 

an enormous baggage of cultural and deep-rooted religious thinking 

in those communities that we have to learn from. Perhaps part of 

the divisions and part of the different sharp ravines that have existed could be bridged rather easily if we start looking at it from 

a different perspective, Mr. Chairman. 

If you look at local governments, more than half of the mayors 

of the country are from indigenous origin. So it is just a matter of 

strengthening those opportunities for indigenous leaders to participate in decision-making decisions, but on their own right, not as 

a condescending position from the non-indigenous population. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much. We will let that be the last 

word from the panel. 

First of all, I want to thank all four of you for very excellent testimony. And you know, I have been doing this for a while now. And 

I was really struck by the fact that there was virtually no disagreement among the four of you. A little here and there, but not really. 

I think that speaks volumes for what really needs to be done in 

Guatemala. 

The purpose of this hearing is for the subcommittee to obviously 

find out and explore and have expert witnesses come and tell us 

what they think. But it seems to me that we pretty much know 

what the problems are and what really could or should be done to 

get at the problems. I just was very taken by the fact that all of 

you not only contributed but all were in agreement. I think this is 

61

a very good step in letting the Congress see the problem with Guatemala. 

Obviously we haven’t had hearings for each country in the hemisphere, and the fact that we singled out Guatemala, we did it because we know it is important. We know that while we are on the 

northern border of Mexico, they are on the southern border of Mexico. And, therefore, we know what happens in Guatemala affects 

the United States. There is no way that we can put our head in 

the sand and pretend that it is over there and doesn’t affect us or 

touch our borders and therefore we can think about it as something 

that is far away. It is not far away. I think you all made that very, 

very clear. We need to do something about it. 

I hope that the administration will take heed, and we will be 

working with them to coordinate policy, U.S. policy, for the region. 

I thank the witnesses for excellent testimony. 

The subcommittee hearing is now closed. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(63)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

64


50293n.eps
65


50293m.eps
66


50293g-1.eps
67

Æ


50293g-2.eps