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52–880 PDF 2009

S. HRG. 111–118 

DEVELOPING A COORDINATED AND SUSTAINABLE 

STRATEGY FOR SOMALIA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 20, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

Republican Leader designee 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Carson, Hon. Johnnie, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department 

of State, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, opening statement ... 1 

Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from Georgia, opening statement .............. 3 

Menkhaus, Dr. Ken, professor of political science, Davidson College, Charlotte, NC ................................................................................................................ 14 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 16 

Scribner, Shannon, senior policy advisor on humanitarian response, Oxfam 

America, Washington, DC ................................................................................... 19 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 21 

(III)

(1) 

DEVELOPING A COORDINATED AND 

SUSTAINABLE STRATEGY FOR SOMALIA 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:03 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D. Feingold 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Feingold, Kaufman, Isakson, and Risch. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. This hearing will come to order. On behalf of 

the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, I 

welcome all of you to this hearing entitled ‘‘Developing a Coordinated and Sustainable U.S. Strategy for Somalia.’’ I’m honored that 

I will be joined by the ranking member of this subcommittee, Senator Isakson, and I’ll invite him to deliver some opening remarks 

in just a moment when he arrives. 

Last month the problem of piracy off Somalia’s coast hit home for 

a lot of Americans with the attack on the Maersk Alabama and the 

capture of Capt. Richard Phillips after his courageous actions to 

ensure the safety of his crew. I was pleased that Chairman Kerry 

of the full committee quickly organized a full committee hearing to 

examine this growing problem and in addition several other committees held hearings to assess this problem and also potential 

U.S. responses to it. 

Now, this heightened level of attention to the Horn of Africa is 

long overdue. But in order to truly understand and address the 

piracy problem we need to know what’s behind it. We cannot ignore 

the conditions on land that have made the waters off Somalia a 

haven for pirates. The recent spike in piracy is an outgrowth of the 

state collapse and lawlessness and economic desperation that have 

plagued that country for well over a decade. 

That’s why I decided to hold this hearing today. I’ve held many 

hearings over the years to examine how we can best address the 

crises in Somalia and am hopeful that today’s hearing will look at 

the situation in Somalia from a new light, ensuring any short-term 

measures we may take to eliminate the problem of piracy are sustainable and coordinated with broader efforts to establish stability 

and the rule of law. 

2 

We also cannot and should not isolate piracy from the many challenges the United States faces in Somalia. These challenges include 

the growth of the terrorist group al-Shabaab, some of whose leaders have links to al-Qaeda, the staggering humanitarian crisis in 

the country, and the standing problems of instability and the lack 

of a central government. 

In addition, I’ve been greatly troubled by reports over the last 2 

weeks of intensified fighting in and around Mogadishu that has left 

hundreds of people dead and displaced tens of thousands of people. 

Over the weekend there were reports that al-Shabaab and their 

allies are gaining momentum and had overtaken Jowhar, a strategic town in central Somalia. They pledge to overthrow the government and their ranks reportedly now include hundreds of foreign fighters. 

More recently, the press has reported that some Ethiopian military forces have crossed back into Somalia. Although the Ethiopian 

Government has denied these allegations, the prospect of a return 

of Ethiopian forces into Somalia is very alarming and would greatly 

change the dynamics of the situation. 

For months now I have encouraged the Obama administration to 

engage at the highest possible level to help establish stability and 

inclusive governance in Somalia. But if these recent events continue, we may miss a major opportunity. I’ve called on the President to personally call Somali President Sheikh Sharif and to indicate a clear commitment to work with the new government on 

security and governance issues. To my knowledge, though, neither 

he nor Secretary Clinton have yet made that call or issued such a 

statement. 

We must take steps now to seriously and consistently engage at 

senior levels with the transitional government in Mogadishu. Now, 

while I recognize, of course, the fragile nature of this government, 

I am concerned by some reports that the government is losing both 

popular support and momentum. Helping to build stable institutions, expand effective, inclusive governance, and provide economic 

opportunities must be at the heart of any truly comprehensive 

strategy toward Somalia. At the same time, engagement and support for the government alone does not constitute a comprehensive 

strategy. We need a more sustained diplomatic push to communicate regularly with a wide range of nongovernmental actors within Somalia and help bring more groups into the political process. 

We also need to engage with stakeholders and partners in the 

wider region, both across the Horn of Africa and in the Middle 

East. It is impossible to separate Somalia’s situation from wider 

regional dynamics, especially the historic tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the instability in Yemen. To that end, I have 

proposed that the administration consider appointing a senior 

envoy for the Horn of Africa. I, of course, appreciate that the administration has many pressing priorities and also know there’s an 

interagency policy review process under way, which I look forward 

to receiving an update about today. 

Now, of course all this is an awful lot to ask for our first witness 

today, who has only been on the job as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs for 2 weeks. Of course I want to first congratulate you, 

sir, on your confirmation. But while he may have only had this 

3 

position through 2 weeks, I know that Assistant Secretary Carson 

has been thinking about, and working on, these issues for a very 

long time. In his testimony for his confirmation hearing he wrote 

about the need for a comprehensive U.S. strategy toward Somalia. 

So I’m very eager to hear what he sees as the key components for 

such a strategy, where the interagency strategy review stands, and 

how the administration and the Congress can work together. 

Then on our second panel we’ll hear from two nongovernmental 

experts on the latest developments in Somalia and how the United 

States can address the many challenges there in coordination. We 

will hear from Dr. Ken Menkhaus, a professor of political science 

at Davidson College and arguably the most prolific U.S. scholar on 

Somalia. Dr. Menkhaus is also a former special adviser to the 

United Nations in Somalia. He has testified before this committee 

before and I welcome him back. 

We will also hear from Shannon Scribner, the senior policy adviser on humanitarian issues at Oxfam America. Ms. Scribner has 

worked on several humanitarian emergencies on behalf of Oxfam 

programs as staff on the ground, including in Liberia, the DRC, 

Iraq, Ethiopia, and areas affected by the tsunami. She currently 

serves as the cochair of the Interaction Somalia Working Group. 

So I want to thank all of you for being here. I look forward to 

hearing your brief testimony and ask that you do keep your oral 

testimony to 5 minutes so we can have plenty of time for questions 

and discussions. 

But it’s now my pleasure to turn to the distinguished ranking 

member, Senator Isakson, for his opening comments. Not only is he 

a superb ranking member, but his timing is exquisite. 

Senator Isakson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I apologize for being late. I never want 

to be late for anybody named Johnnie Carson, I can tell you that. 

Mr. Carson, welcome. We are glad to have you here today and look 

forward to meeting with you later today preceding our trip to 

Africa. 

My opening remarks will simply be this, Mr. Chairman. Somalia, 

as I heard you saying as I came in, is a critical issue before us. It 

is important that we develop a strategy with regard to Somalia 

and, in fact, with regard to the larger region of Africa in which 

Somalia lies. 

So I am looking forward to hearing from our witnesses today. I 

appreciate your allowing me a statement, and I would rather go on 

and get to the testimony. So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 

and thank you, Johnnie. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, sir. 

All right, Secretary Carson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. CARSON. Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Isakson, 

members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting me 

4 

to testify at this important hearing to discuss the development of 

a coordinated and sustainable strategy toward Somalia. I do have 

written testimony which will be longer than my brief statement, 

which I will submit for the record. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection. 

Mr. CARSON. This is my first appearance before you as Assistant 

Secretary of State for African Affairs and I want to take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Isakson, again for 

showing your strong support for my nomination and rushing my 

hearings through to completion. I look forward to working closely 

with this subcommittee on the various issues that fall under your 

jurisdiction. 

Mr. Chairman, you have consistently raised interest in Somalia 

and the greater Horn of Africa and the importance of the health 

of our relationship with the countries and peoples in the region. I 

know also, Mr. Chairman, that you’ve traveled in the Horn of 

Africa extensively and that Ranking Member Isakson has also visited Djibouti, one of the key capitals in the Horn of Africa. 

Somalia is located in one of the most turbulent, violent, and complex regions in the world and finds itself embroiled in a cycle of 

violence and instability, despite promising efforts in recent years by 

the international community and Somali leadership to create an 

inclusive and stable government. In the past 2 weeks, the Somali 

Government has come under intense military and political pressure. Despite the best efforts of the violent extremists to overthrow 

the Transitional Federal Government, the TFG, by force, the TFG 

remains standing and determined to move forward. 

This latest round of fighting occurs as we enter into a new chapter in the recent history of international efforts to assist Somalia 

in solving its longstanding crisis. Since the overthrow of the Siad 

Barre regime in 1991, there have been several distinct approaches 

taken by the international community to address the many crises 

that have enveloped Somalia. 

In 1992, the international community authorized the United 

Nations Operation in Somalia known as UNOSOM I, in an effort 

to prevent starvation and a wider humanitarian crisis caused by a 

civil war. This effort proved ineffective and a second U.N. operation 

entered Somalia in December 1992. It was called UNITAF. While 

this operation successfully restored some order, UNITAF was eventually replaced by a third mission, also known as United Nations 

Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II. It was during the United 

States participation in UNOSOM II in October 1993 that the tragic 

events described in ‘‘Blackhawk Down’’ occurred, leading to an 

eventual withdrawal of United States forces and the ultimate withdrawal of the majority of the international community from 

Somalia. 

To be very blunt, the international community pulled down the 

shades, turned out the lights, closed the door, and walked away 

from Somalia. United States reengagement with Somalia did not 

begin again until 1996, when our policy shifted to one of containment. For the next decade, United States policy focused on managing or containing Somalia’s problems within the country’s borders so that the instability did not further destabilize the region. 

5 

In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union—ICU—defeated an alliance of 

militias known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and 

Counter-Terrorism and became the first entity since the collapse of 

the Siad Barre regime to exert control over most of south-central 

Somalia. This change in the balance of power in Somalia was significant, as we faced a government in Somalia that was unfriendly 

to the United States and provided sanctuary to a number of known 

terrorists. 

Ethiopia’s intervention in late 2006 was another turning point 

that resulted in increased American interest in Somalia. Given the 

threats posed by the ICU’s harboring of terrorists, the U.S. Government’s Somali strategy focused on immediate terrorist threats. 

The Djibouti Peace Process began in 2008 and led to the formation of the current Transitional Federal Government, an expanded 

Transitional Federal Parliament that includes members of the 

Djibouti faction of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, and 

the election by Parliament of President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed. 

These are all significant steps forward for Somalia. Somalia now 

has at least the start of a government that is broadly representative of the Somali clan and societal landscape. 

However, Somalia is clearly in crisis today. Approximately 43 

percent of the Somali population relies on humanitarian assistance 

to survive and nearly 500,000 Somalis have fled the country and 

now live in overcrowded refugee camps throughout the region. The 

TFG controls only a small portion of the territory and the vast 

majority of Somalia is controlled by militias, clans, warlords, or terrorist organizations. 

The blight of piracy off the coast of Somalia is without question 

a symptom of the instability and insecurity within Somalia. Without stability in Somalia, there can be no long-term resolution of the 

piracy problem. Furthermore, al-Shabaab, a designated foreign terrorist organization—FTO—continues to harbor terrorists, target 

civilians and humanitarian workers, and threatens to overthrow 

the TFG through violent means. 

The resolution of these problems calls for a comprehensive solution that provides stability and promotes reconciliation, economic 

opportunity, and hope for the Somali people. 

The Obama administration is working to address these challenges. The National Security Council has brought together the 

Department of State, the Department of Defense, USAID, the intelligence community, and a variety of other agencies to work to 

develop a strategy that is both comprehensible and sustainable. 

Such a strategy must be built around our work with international 

partners, including the United Nations, the African Union, the 

European Union, the International Authority on Development, 

IGAD, and the International Contact Group on Somalia. 

Our effort is to achieve our foreign policy goals, which are to 

establish political and economic stability, eliminate the terrorist 

threat, address the dire humanitarian situation, and eliminate the 

threat of piracy. We’re also working with other states in the region 

as Somalia’s challenges are intertwined with other regional conflicts throughout the Horn. But to make it clear, our comprehensive 

strategy is to promote a stable and peaceful Somalia, to support 

regional peacekeeping efforts, to create a functioning and effective 

6 

central government capable of delivering services to Somalia’s citizens, administering its territory, and providing security to its people, and finally to create a country that is at peace with its neighbors and does not harbor rebel groups from neighboring countries 

or regional or international terrorists. 

The core of this policy effort is based on internal political reconciliation. The United States continues to assist the TFG in the 

development of a Somali security sector, which is crucial for the 

success of governance efforts throughout Somalia. With Congress’s 

assistance, we are already committed to providing $10 million to 

support the creation of a national security force in Somalia, and we 

are also working to strengthen the TFG’s capacity so the United 

States and others in the international community can provide additional assistance. 

We’re also the largest supporter of the African Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, which facilitates the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, protects key installations in Mogadishu, and provides political space for a Somali-led reconciliation process. 

Since the deployment of AMISOM in 2007, the United States has provided $130 million for logistical and equipment support and 

predeployment training for Burundian and Ugandan forces on the 

ground. We plan to continue this level of support in the future. 

Additionally, the United States remains the largest bilateral donor 

of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, having provided more than 

$137 million in emergency food and nonfood assistance to date. 

Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of time in Somalia. In 

the past 2 weeks, violent extremists, including al-Shabaab and a 

loose coalition of forces under the banner of Hizbul al-Islam have 

been attacking TFG forces and other moderates in Mogadishu in an 

attempt to forcefully overthrow the transitional government. We 

have clear evidence that Eritrea is supporting these extremist elements, including credible reports that the government of Eritrea 

continues to supply weapons and munitions to extremists and terrorist elements. We have publicly warned Eritrea to desist and stop 

its illegal arming of terrorists immediately, as such support threatens the stability of Somalia and the wider region. 

There is also clear evidence that there is an al-Qaeda presence 

in Somalia. In 2008, East African al-Qaeda operative Saleh 

al-Nabhan distributed a video showing training camp activity in 

Somalia and inviting foreign fighters to travel there for training. 

A small number of senior al-Qaeda operatives have worked closely 

with al-Shabaab leaders in Somalia, where they have enjoyed 

safe haven. We have credible reports of foreign fighters with 

al-Shabaab. This further underscores the importance of urgent and 

decisive support to the TFG and engagement with states across the 

region and beyond to help stabilize Somalia. 

The collapse of the TFG would be detrimental to the long-term 

stability of Somalia and it would negate the tremendous progress 

that has been made to date in the Djibouti Peace Process and in 

restoring a semblance of normalcy and peace in Somalia. The 

administration is considering ways in which we and other international partners can continue to help and support and bolster the 

Transitional Federal Government, and we will continue to support 

AMISOM. 

7 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my testimony. I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNNIE CARSON, BUREAU OF

AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Isakson, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify at this important hearing to discuss the development of a coordinated and sustainable strategy toward Somalia. 

This is my first appearance before you as the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. I thank you for expeditiously holding a hearing on my nomination and 

for supporting my full Senate confirmation. I look forward to working closely with 

this subcommittee on the various issues that fall under this one subcommittee’s 

oversight. Of these numerous concerns, Mr. Chairman, you have consistently raised 

our interests in Somalia and the greater Horn of Africa and the importance of the 

health of our relationship with the countries and peoples in the region. I also note 

that Senator Isakson’s first trip to Africa as the ranking member included Djibouti. 

I join this subcommittee in its interest. 

As you know, Somalia finds itself embroiled in a cycle of violence and instability 

despite promising efforts in recent years by the international community and Somali 

leadership to create an inclusive and stable government. I would like to note, 

though, that despite the best efforts of violent extremists to overthrow the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) by force, the TFG remains standing and determined to move forward. 

This latest round of fighting occurs as we enter a new chapter in the recent history of international efforts to assist Somalia in solving its longstanding crisis. Since 

the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, there have been several distinct 

approaches taken by the international community to address the many crises that 

have enveloped Somalia. In 1992, the international community authorized the 

United Nations Operation in Somalia, or UNOSOM I, in an effort to stave off starvation and a wider humanitarian crisis caused by civil war. This effort proved ineffective, and a second U.N. operation, the Unified Task Force, or UNITAF, entered 

Somalia in December 1992 under the name Operation Restore Hope. While this operation successfully restored some order, UNITAF was eventually replaced by a 

third mission, also known as the United Nations Operation in Somalia, or UNOSOM 

II. It was during the United States participation in UNOSOM II, in October 1993, 

that the tragic events described in ‘‘Black Hawk Down’’ occurred, leading to an 

eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces, and ultimately, the withdrawal of the majority 

of the international community from Somalia. 

United States reengagement with Somalia did not begin again until 1996, when 

our policy shifted to one of containment. For the next decade, United States policy 

focused on containing Somalia’s problems within the country’s borders so the instability did not further destabilize the region. 

In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) defeated an alliance of militias known 

as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism and became the 

first entity since the collapse of the Barre regime to exert control over most of 

South-Central Somalia. This change in the balance of power in Somalia was significant, as we faced a government in Somalia that was unfriendly to the United States 

and harbored and provided sanctuary to a number of known terrorists. Ethiopia’s 

intervention in late 2006 was another turning point that resulted in increased 

American interest in Somalia. Given the threats posed by the ICU’s harboring of 

terrorists, the USG’s Somalia strategy focused on the immediate terrorist threats. 

The Djibouti Peace Process began in 2008 and led to the formation of the current 

Transitional Federal Government, an expanded Transitional Federal Parliament 

that includes members of the Djibouti faction of the Alliance for the Re-liberation 

of Somalia, and the election by Parliament of President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh 

Ahmed. These are all significant steps forward for Somalia. Somalia now has at 

least the start of a government that is broadly representative of the Somali clan and 

societal landscape. 

However, Somalia is clearly in crisis. Approximately 43 percent of the population 

of Somalia relies on humanitarian assistance to survive, and nearly 500,000 Somalis 

have fled their country and now live in overcrowded refugee camps throughout the 

region. The TFG controls only a small portion of the territory and the vast majority 

of Somalia is controlled by militias, clans, or terrorist organizations. The blight of 

piracy off the coast of Somalia is without question a symptom of the instability and 

insecurity within Somalia; without stability in Somalia, there can be no long-term 

8 

resolution of the piracy problem. Furthermore, al-Shabaab, a designated Foreign 

Terrorist Organization (FTO), continues to harbor terrorists, target civilians and 

humanitarian workers, and attempt to overthrow the TFG through violent means. 

The resolution of these problems calls for a comprehensive solution that provides 

stability and promotes reconciliation, economic opportunity and hope for the Somali 

people. 

The Obama administration is working to address these challenges. The National 

Security Council (NSC) has brought together the Department of State, the Department of Defense, USAID, the intelligence community, and a variety of other agencies to work to develop a strategy that is both comprehensive and sustainable. Such 

a strategy must be built around our work with international partners, including the 

United Nations, African Union, the European Union, Inter-Governmental Authority 

on Development (IGAD), International Contact Group on Somalia (ICG), and the 

Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, among others, to achieve our foreign policy goals in Somalia of political and economic stability, eliminating the terrorist threat, addressing the dire humanitarian situation, and eliminating the 

threat of piracy. We are also working with other states in the region, as Somalia’s 

challenges are intertwined with other conflicts and issues throughout the Horn of 

Africa. 

The United States continues to assist the TFG in the development of a Somali 

security sector, which is crucial for the success of governance efforts in Somalia. 

With Congress’ assistance, we have already committed to providing $10 million to 

support the creation of a National Security Force as part of this effort, and we are 

also working to strengthen the TFG’s capacity so the United States and others in 

the international community can provide additional assistance. We are also the largest supporter of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which facilitates 

the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, protects key installations in 

Mogadishu, and provides political space for a Somali-led reconciliation process. 

Since the deployment of AMISOM in 2007, the United States has provided $135 million for logistical and equipment support and predeployment training for the Burundian and Ugandan forces on the ground. We plan to continue this level of support 

in the future. Furthermore, the United States remains the largest bilateral donor 

of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, having provided more than $137 million in 

emergency food and nonfood assistance to date in fiscal year 2010. 

Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of time in Somalia. In the past 2 weeks, 

violent extremists, including al-Shabaab and a loose coalition of forces under the 

banner of Hizbul al-Islam, have been attacking TFG forces and other moderates in 

Mogadishu in an attempt to forcefully overthrow the transitional government. We 

have clear evidence that Eritrea is supporting these extremist elements, including 

credible reports that the Government of Eritrea continues to supply weapons and 

munitions to extremists and terrorist elements. We have publicly warned Eritrea to 

stop its illegal arming of terrorists immediately, as such support threatens the stability of Somalia and of the wider region, as well as creates a serious obstacle to 

the possibility of a new Eritrean relationship with the United States. 

There is also clear evidence of an al-Qaeda presence in Somalia. In 2008, East 

Africa al-Qaeda operative Saleh al-Nabhan distributed a video showing training 

camp activity in Somalia and inviting foreigners to travel there for training. A small 

number of senior al-Qaeda operatives have worked closely with al-Shabaab leaders 

in Somalia, where they enjoy safe haven. We have credible reports of foreigners 

fighting with al-Shabaab. This further underscores the importance of urgent and 

decisive support to the TFG, and engagement with states across the region and 

beyond. 

The collapse of the TFG would be detrimental to the long-term stability of Somalia, and it would negate the tremendous progress that has been made to date in the 

Djibouti Peace Process and in restoring a semblance of normalcy and peace in Somalia. The administration is considering ways in which we and our international partners can help to support and bolster the TFG, and we will continue to support 

AMISOM. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, sir. We’ll do 7-minute rounds. 

Thank you for your testimony. I wanted first to ask you about 

our public diplomacy efforts in Somalia. As you know, there’s a 

growing mistrust and even resentment of U.S. intentions that has 

developed among Somalis over the last 2 years. In my view this lingering mistrust undermines our ability to engage constructively 

with different parties there and of course can be easily manipuVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:07 Oct 20, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\SOMALIA.TXT BETTY
9 

lated by al-Shabaab. I have encouraged, as I said, the President to 

consider some kind of public statement to indicate his intention to 

break from past policies toward Somalia, a move which I believe 

could make a tremendous positive impression on ordinary Somalis. 

In your thinking, how serious is this mistrust of U.S. intentions 

in Somalia and what public diplomacy efforts are being made or 

could be made to address this problem? 

Mr. CARSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your question. There 

is no doubt that al-Shabaab and others have helped to generate the 

distrust that some Somalis have of the United States. We are 

working very hard to improve our image and to give Somalis a 

more comprehensive understanding of what the United States is 

doing and wants to do in Somalia. 

I have myself spoken to a number of media groups that have 

access to Somalia in order to indicate to them that our primary 

goal is to promote political reconciliation, peace, and stability, and 

that our desire is to see a strong, stable Somalia that we can work 

with. 

Through our public diplomacy efforts we continued to reach out 

to the media to talk to people, to issue press statements. I certainly 

will take into account and consult with whether it is feasible for 

the Secretary of State to make a statement that can be used on 

VOA, can be used on Al Jazeera and other media groups in Somalia. That sounds like a good idea and something that we should certainly consider. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate that and look forward to the 

results. I appreciate the efforts you’ve described, but what I’m also 

talking about here, in addition to what you’ve said, is high-level 

public diplomacy. My sense is that well-timed statements and 

phone calls and engagement from senior government officials, be it 

the President, Secretary of State, or even Members of Congress, 

could help bolster ongoing United States efforts in Somalia. 

I wrote the President about this. I spoke directly to the Secretary 

of State about this. I spoke directly to the Ambassador to the 

United Nations about this. No one has given me a reason why this 

wouldn’t be a good idea, nor suggested anything with regard to any 

intelligence which suggests this would be a bad idea. I’ve seen 

nothing in my work on the Intelligence Committee suggesting this 

isn’t a good idea. 

So I’m wondering what the holdup is in terms of reaching out to 

this government that is trying to stabilize Somalia and that is 

under siege. 

Mr. CARSON. Mr. Chairman, I think those are all good suggestions and I certainly will pursue them. But let me also say that we 

are in contact with President Sheikh Sharif’s government, have reassured him of our support. We have underlined this to others. Our 

Ambassador in Nairobi, Mike Ranneberger, has been in regular 

contact with Sheikh Sharif. I myself last week met with the TFG 

Foreign Minister, who was in town. One of my deputies met with 

him on Monday of this week. I have been in direct consultation 

with the U.N. Secretary General Special Representative Ould 

Abdallah to reaffirm our commitment to support the TFG. We have 

provided financial assistance in the last 2 weeks to the TFG and 

10 

we continue to do as much as we can to assure governments in the 

region that we support them. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Have you spoken to Sheikh Sharif? 

Mr. CARSON. I have not spoken directly with Sheikh Sharif. 

Senator FEINGOLD. If you do, I think obviously that would be one 

step. I’ve spoken to him. Ambassador Ranneberger, who I have 

enormous regard for, has spoken to him. But there are actually 

people at higher pay grade than all of us who I’m talking about, 

and I believe not only do you need to reach out, but people at that 

level as well. 

Secretary Clinton has announced several new measures to combat piracy off Somalia’s coast, which I strongly support. However, 

how can we ensure that these measures are coordinated within the 

overall Somalia strategy and do not somehow exist in a vacuum? 

Mr. CARSON. I think that’s excellent. I think in my statement I 

noted that the National Security Council is undertaking a comprehensive review of Somali policy. That review has not been completed, but I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the issue of 

Somali piracy has been folded into that review and does not in fact 

stand out alone. It is subsumed under a broader strategy toward 

Somalia. 

I underscore that our overall policy efforts are aimed at promoting political reconciliation in Somalia, political stability in that 

country, which will generate a functioning and effective government capable of delivering services to its people, administering the 

central government, and providing security. 

We don’t have a separate strategy on piracy that is distinct from 

the issue of where we’re going on Somalia. It is being wrapped into 

the review that is under way. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. 

As part of a comprehensive strategy for Somalia, I know you and 

I agree that we have to reexamine our relationships with regional 

players. These press reports of Ethiopian troops crossing back into 

Somalia are very alarming to me and I’ve been concerned for quite 

some time by Eritrea’s unconstructive behavior in the Horn, 

whether it’s in Somalia or along the Djiboutian border. How can we 

better engage the Ethiopians so they play a constructive role in 

Somalia and what about our relationship with Eritrea? What direction do you see that moving in? 

Mr. CARSON. First of all with respect to the presence of Ethiopian 

troops, we have no formal confirmation that Ethiopian troops have 

actually gone across the border. There have been a number of press 

reports suggesting a small incursion. We are asking our Embassy 

in Addis to determine what the Ethiopians are doing there. 

We agree with you, Senator, that the return of Ethiopian troops 

inside of Somalia will only inflame and worsen the situation, rather 

than lead to an early resolution of the problem. We hope that the 

Ethiopian Government will not in fact do anything which will further complicate the effort to find a solution to Somalia’s problems. 

We are engaged actively in Ethiopia and our Ambassador is in constant contact with Prime Minister Meles, warning and expressing 

our concerns about the possible repercussions of Ethiopia’s action 

inside Somalia. 

11 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I’m going to turn 

it over to Senator Isakson now, but I’ll have a couple more questions for you. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since you mentioned that subject, I traveled to Ethiopia in 2002 and spent a good 

deal of time in both Addis Ababa as well as Awasa, south of there. 

Do the terrorist-related organizations or terrorist-supported organizations in Somalia pose a threat to the Ethiopians? Is one of 

the reasons for the Ethiopian concern the fact that there are 

terrorist organizations in Somalia which they fear might come into 

Ethiopia? 

Mr. CARSON. No question that one of Ethiopia’s concerns is support that Somalia or Somali groups might provide to groups in the 

Ogaden. They are concerned that weapons and support might flow 

from Somalia into the Ogaden. 

Senator ISAKSON. My experience there, if you look at a map for 

a second, is that between Eritrea, the Sudan, and Somalia, Ethiopia is in a very difficult neighborhood. The country has tried for 

improvements and over the last decade has made many. So I am 

sure part of the Ethiopian concern is that they do not want to regress, nor do they want to experience what happened in Somalia, 

in terms of the breakdown of the countryside. 

In terms of Sheikh Sharif, is he as strong a leader as we perceive 

him to be, or is he kind of battened down in Mogadishu with the 

Parliament trying to protect itself? 

Mr. CARSON. Sheikh Sharif was elected as the President of Somalia through the Djibouti Process. We think that he was a compromise candidate who represented the views of the largest number 

of clan participants in that election. We think that he offers the 

best chance for possible reconciliation and peace in Somalia that 

we have seen over the last decade. He is not a warlord. He is not 

a militia man. He is from a rather humble background, an educator, and is a man who has sought to unite the various clans in 

Somalia in a more inclusive government. 

We believe that it is important to do as much as we possibly can 

to support this TFG government as one of the last opportunities for 

bringing about stability in that country. 

Senator ISAKSON. And he was elected by the Parliament, not by 

the people. 

Mr. CARSON. That’s correct. 

Senator ISAKSON. But the Parliament was elected by the people, 

is that correct? 

Mr. CARSON. Yes. 

Senator ISAKSON. So you believe him to be a pretty representative compromise candidate between all the factions? 

Mr. CARSON. Yes. But, sir, it is a very divided society and divided 

deeply along clan lines. The success of any leader is based on his 

or her ability to bring in clans and subclans into the central government. 

Senator ISAKSON. In your testimony you made reference to the 

fact that we have credible reports of foreign fighters fighting with 

al-Shabaab, is that correct? 

Mr. CARSON. Yes, sir. 

12 

Senator ISAKSON. Are those foreign fighters by chance Iranian or 

in any way affiliated with Hezbollah or Hamas? 

Mr. CARSON. We don’t know the precise nationalities of these foreign fighters. We don’t know their political affiliations. But we do 

have a growing body of information passed on to us that there 

clearly are foreign fighters operating in Somalia. This information 

comes to us via the Ugandan military, which is a part of AMISOM. 

It comes to us via the U.N. It comes to us via Sheikh Sharif’s government. It comes to us via observations by the media. 

But yes, a growing body of information. We do not know how 

many people, how many foreign fighters there are. There have been 

claims of upward of 400 people. We think that these are probably 

a significant exaggeration, but there are clearly non-Somalis who 

are there. 

Senator ISAKSON. We do have evidence that al-Qaeda is there as 

well, correct? 

Mr. CARSON. We know that individuals who are directly affiliated 

with al-Qaeda have been in Somalia. These individuals are principally Fizul Harun and Nabhan Mohamed. These are individuals 

who were responsible for the destruction of the U.S. Embassies in 

Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998 and the destruction of the Paradise Hotel in 2002. They clearly are the leaders of the East Africa 

al-Qaeda cell. They have been in Somalia, but they have also been 

in and along the northeastern coast of Kenya as well. 

Senator ISAKSON. We are assisting the African Union troops at 

AMISOM with regard to the distribution of humanitarian aid into 

Somalia’s countryside, is that correct? 

Mr. CARSON. Yes. 

Senator ISAKSON. We are doing the same thing in the Sudan, but 

we have had great difficulty. A month ago, two NGO workers were 

killed in the Sudan. What is the activity against AMISOM troops 

and the humanitarian aid personnel? Are the troops, the African 

Union troops, able to protect those NGOs? 

Mr. CARSON. No. Let me just correct. The AMISOM troops are 

there to carry out several missions. The first is to protect key 

installations, the airport and the harbor in Mogadishu; to provide 

security to key government buildings, the Presidential palace and 

the Parliament; third, to protect key TFG government ministers; 

and last, to do limited training of TFG security forces. 

Senator ISAKSON. So there is no protection effort for the NGOs 

that are there? 

Mr. CARSON. No, there is not. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Isakson. 

I’ll start another round. Mr. Assistant Secretary, when can we 

expect the interagency review to be completed, and will Congress 

be notified when that happens? 

Mr. CARSON. I can’t predict a precise time. I know that the process is being carried out in an expeditious manner. I would hope 

that we would see something in the next 30 to 60 days. And yes, 

I would recommend that we brief you and other members of the 

committee once that review is completed and carried out. You have 

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13 

ing what it is. I think that we will share that with you, and I will 

certainly encourage it. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Assistant Secretary. 

Just to add a point to the very effective questions by the ranking 

member, fleshing out the background of Sheikh Sharif, I certainly 

can’t vouch for this man nor would I attempt to, but to have an 

accurate picture, this is the man who was the head of the Islamic 

Courts, which we identified as being obviously a problematic entity, 

who has now taken on the task of trying to unify the various elements within Somalia at enormous risk, because al-Shabaab is, I’m 

sure, outraged that he has done this. 

So it’s an interesting aspect of what he’s done that I think should 

help inform our view of him and our willingness to work with him. 

The State Department’s report issued this month on the implementation of our strategy toward Somalia describes the importance 

of providing operational support to Somali security forces loyal to 

the transitional government, and I agree that building the security 

sector is important and the United States should have a role in 

this. We have to ensure that steps are taken to improve accountability and the human rights record of the security forces. Obviously, the past record of those forces is pretty appalling. 

How can we ensure such steps are taken as we provide any 

assistance to a security sector in Somalia? 

Mr. CARSON. We are doing as much as we can to vet the individuals who are a part of the Somali security force leadership. This 

is an ongoing process. It is a difficult process given the fact that 

we are not present on the ground. But we consider this to be extremely important and we are attentive to it and trying to do as 

best we can to ensure that any assistance that we give is given to 

individuals who have not, in fact, engaged in atrocities, war crimes, 

or any violations of civil rights. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I’m also very concerned by these reports that 

al-Shabaab and its allied militias are gaining momentum and territory, including strategic towns in central Somalia. Beyond simply 

arming them, are there specific ways we can help the transitional 

government to peel off moderates and fracture the insurgency? And 

what about the foreign fighters that Senator Isakson was talking 

about that are being reported? What can be done to confront their 

role in the insurgency? 

Mr. CARSON. Well, with respect to foreign fighters, we are working with neighboring countries to encourage them to make sure 

that their capitals and their airports, are not used as a conduit for 

foreign fighters going in. We have strongly encouraged the Eritrean 

Government to cease providing any support to al-Shabaab, to stop 

foreign fighters from coming through their territory to enter Somalia, and to play a more constructive role in trying to find a solution 

to Somalia’s problems. 

We will continue to work with neighboring states, including 

countries like Kenya, to make sure that they are not unwittingly 

used as way stations for people coming in from outside, transiting 

their airports, going into Somalia to work for al-Shabaab. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. 

Anything further, Senator Isakson? 

14 

Senator ISAKSON. Just a question out of curiosity. We talk about 

a coordinated policy for us to support the temporary government 

that has been formed in Somalia. Is there a coordination of all the 

factions outside of Mogadishu? You referred to the clans, you referred to al-Shabaab, and you referred to some al-Qaeda influence 

and foreign fighters. Do these people have different and separate 

interests in the country, all of which are disruptive, or is there 

some degree of coordination between them against the government? 

Mr. CARSON. Well, over the last 2 weeks and certainly beginning 

around May 8 and 9, there appeared to be a concerted effort by 

al-Shabaab and a number of groups to work together to unseat the 

TFG. That degree of coordination seems to be fading away as the 

TFG has been able to maintain its control over most of Mogadishu. 

The core element of unity inside of Somalia is clan and subclan. 

Clan and subclan interests over time appear to trump everything 

else in terms of loyalty. It’s more important than religion. It’s more 

important than politics. It is frequently more important than the 

central government and the state. 

What we have seen over time is that some issues will bring clans 

together, groups together, to work against an issue, and then they 

will fall apart once that threat and issue has been resolved. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Johnnie. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Isakson. 

Mr. Assistant Secretary, thank you. It’s a pleasure to be working 

with you. We can now go to the second panel. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Menkhaus, would you like to begin. Again, I’d ask that these 

witnesses limit your remarks, oral remarks, to 5 minutes. Of 

course, we will put your full statement in the record. Go ahead, 

doctor. 

STATEMENT OF DR. KEN MENKHAUS, PROFESSOR OF 

POLITICAL SCIENCE, DAVIDSON COLLEGE, CHARLOTTE, NC 

Dr. MENKHAUS. Good morning, Senator Feingold, Senator Isakson. Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this discussion 

on United States policy in Somalia. 

This hearing has been convened at a moment when Somalia is 

undergoing yet another dramatic political crisis, the latest in a long 

20-year history of state collapse, warfare, and human suffering. 

Whatever the outcome of this latest round of fighting, Somalia will 

very likely remain a front-burner foreign policy challenge for the 

Obama administration. 

We’re very fortunate to have the experienced leadership of Ambassador Johnnie Carson, the new Assistant Secretary for African 

Affairs, at this time of crisis in Somalia. He understands the intricacies of the Horn of Africa better than anyone in or out of the U.S. 

Government, possesses invaluable diplomatic experience in the 

region, and has the leadership skills to help forge and maintain 

interagency consensus, which is essential for a coordinated United 

States strategy toward Somalia. 

In recent years the United States and its regional and global 

allies have struggled to forge a coherent and effective strategy for 

15 

Somalia. In part, this has been a function of the uniquely complex 

problems associated with the Somali crisis. As the crisis has 

lengthened, the difficulties have grown. Reliable information on 

which to build policy is scarce. The resilience of internal spoilers 

has increased while many of the country’s most dedicated civic 

leaders and peace-builders have been silenced, killed, or forced to 

flee the country. External actors have created additional impasses 

by playing out proxy wars in Somalia or funding jihadist violence. 

In this increasingly complex environment, external state-building, peace-building, and counterterrorism initiatives have at times 

been based on flawed analysis and have produced unintended consequences which have left Somalia and its regional neighbors even 

more insecure. 

The United States also faces the challenge of deconflicting its 

multiple objectives in Somalia. Over the past decade, American 

counterterrorism, state-building, and humanitarian initiatives have 

generally been unintegrated and have at times worked at crosspurposes. 

The impact of the 2007–08 Ethiopian military occupation of 

southern Somalia has created still more challenges. That occupation and the destructive insurgency and counterinsurgency violence 

that it triggered helped to fuel an unprecedented level of radicalism 

in Somali society. Because the United States is widely blamed by 

Somalis for backing the Ethiopian occupation, anti-Americanism 

has been very high in the country and trust of American motives 

and policies low. 

This has been ameliorated somewhat by the January 2009 Ethiopian withdrawal, the establishment of a more broad-based transitional government, and Somali expectations of a shift in United 

States policy under the Obama administration. But there is still a 

high level of mistrust of American policies and residual anger at 

the United States. 

In addition, formulation of a coherent strategy toward Somalia is 

complicated by the fact that the Somali crisis is entangled in a 

regional conflict complex which includes the Ethiopian-Eritrean 

impasse, the insurgency and counter-insurgency in Ethiopia’s 

Somali region, and the long-running tensions between Ethiopian 

and Somali security interests and territorial claims. Stand-alone 

strategies to deal with Somalia have been repeatedly undermined 

by these other regional dynamics. 

A final challenge to creating an effective and coherent strategy 

is the fact that Somalia is currently in the midst of a major crisis 

which could result in one of several very different scenarios. The 

U.S. Government can and must prioritize its broad objectives and 

desired outcomes in Somalia, but in the face of considerable uncertainty about the political trajectory of the country in the weeks and 

months ahead a fully developed country or regional strategy may 

currently be beyond reach. 

In weeks and months to come, one of several scenarios could 

emerge. In a best case outcome, the TFG will succeed in rallying 

support and pushing back the Islamist insurgency, negotiating 

with some insurgents and marginalizing or defeating the rest. This 

outcome would open the door to a U.S. strategy privileging timely 

and well-targeted state-building support to the TFG as a means of 

16 

consolidating those gains. It would also produce improved security 

for delivery of badly needed humanitarian assistance. 

In a worst case outcome, the Shabaab and Hizbul al-Islamiya 

defeat the TFG and take control over most or all of south-central 

Somalia and the capital. Because of Shabaab’s ties to al-Qaeda and 

the presence of foreign advisers and fighters in Shabaab, this scenario promises to draw Ethiopian forces back into Somalia and will 

create pressure for the United States to privilege counterterrorism 

interventions into Somalia as well. Somalia could then become the 

site of regional or even globalized armed conflict. 

An insurgency victory over the TFG could also produce a different outcome, one in which two rival Islamist groups begin fighting among themselves. There are sharp tensions over leadership, 

ideology, foreign patronage, clan interests, and tactics both between 

and within Shabaab and Hizbul al-Islamiya and many Somalis 

anticipate a battle between them. Armed clashes pitting Shabaab 

and Hizbul al-Islamiya would present the United States with no 

obvious protagonist to support and would instead place emphasis 

on the need to avoid taking actions which would bring the two warring parties’ hard-line groups together. 

A final scenario is the reversion to status quo ante, in which no 

one side consolidates control over the country, which is left divided 

up into a variety of warring fiefdoms, some controlled by the TFG, 

others held by Shabaab, Hizbul al-Islamiya, clan militia, warlords, 

armed business groups, independent city-states, and others. This 

outcome would pose a major problem for U.S. state-building initiatives and would tempt counterterrorism operations to forge alliances with local nonstate actors, as was the practice in the past. 

That policy came at some cost and was in many respects counterproductive, however, and would need careful scrutiny. 

In the interest of time, I won’t share some of the remarks that 

I had which I hoped would contribute toward a discussion of 

United States strategy toward Somalia, but I refer you to my written remarks. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Menkhaus follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KEN MENKHAUS, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 

DAVIDSON COLLEGE, DAVIDSON, NC 

INTRODUCTION

Senator Feingold, subcommittee chairman, and Senator Isakson, ranking member, 

I thank you for the opportunity to participate in this discussion of United States 

policy on Somalia. This hearing has been convened at a moment when Somalia is 

undergoing yet another dramatic political crisis, the latest in a long 20-year history 

of state collapse, warfare, and human suffering. Whatever the outcome of this latest 

round of fighting, Somalia will very likely remain a front-burner foreign policy challenge for the Obama administration. 

We are very fortunate to have the experienced leadership of Ambassador Johnnie 

Carson, the new Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, at this time of crisis in 

Somalia. Ambassador Carson understands the intricacies of the Horn of Africa better than anyone in or out of the United States Government, possesses invaluable 

diplomatic experience in the region, and has the leadership skills to help forge and 

maintain interagency consensus which is essential for a coordinated United States 

strategy toward Somalia. Ambassador Carson and his colleagues may face only poor 

options in Somalia, but I feel confident that the administration has assembled an 

excellent team on Africa policy. 

17 

CHALLENGES

In recent years, the United States and its regional and global allies have struggled to forge a coherent and effective strategy for Somalia. In part this has been 

a function of the uniquely complex problems associated with the Somali crisis, which 

has proven impervious to two decades of external efforts to bring an end to its state 

of collapse and armed conflict. As the crisis has lengthened, the difficulties have 

grown. Reliable information on which to build policy is scarce, a function of extraordinarily high levels of insecurity in the country. The resilience of internal spoilers 

has increased, while many of the country’s most dedicated civic leaders and peacebuilders have been silenced, killed, or forced to flee the country. External actors 

have created additional impasses by playing out proxy wars in Somalia, or funding 

jihadist violence. In this increasingly complex environment, external state-building, 

peace-building, and counterterrorism initiatives have at times been based on flawed 

analysis and have produced unintended consequences which have left Somalia and 

its regional neighbors even more insecure. 

The United States also faces the challenge of deconflicting its multiple objectives 

in Somalia. Over the past decade, American counterterrorism, state-building, and 

humanitarian initiatives have generally been un-integrated and have at times 

worked at cross-purposes. 

The impact of the 2007–08 Ethiopian military occupation of southern Somalia has 

created still more challenges for effective strategy. That occupation, and the destructive insurgency and counterinsurgency violence it triggered, helped to fuel an 

unprecedented level of radicalism in Somali society. Because the United States is 

widely blamed by Somalis for backing the Ethiopian occupation, anti-Americanism 

has been very high in the country, and trust of American motives and policies low. 

This has been ameliorated somewhat by the January 2009 Ethiopian withdrawal, 

the establishment of a more broad-based transitional government, and Somali expectations of a shift in United States policy under the Obama administration. But 

there is still a high level of mistrust of American policies and residual anger at the 

United States that poses additional obstacles to effective strategies. 

In addition, formulation of a coherent strategy toward Somalia is complicated by 

the fact that the Somali crisis is entangled in a regional conflict complex which includes the Ethiopian-Eritrean impasse, the insurgency and counterinsurgency in 

Ethiopia’s Somali region, and the long-running tensions between Ethiopian and 

Somali security interests and territorial claims. Stand-alone strategies to deal with 

Somalia have been repeatedly undermined by these other regional dynamics. 

SCENARIOS

A final challenge to creating an effective and coherent strategy is the fact that 

Somalia is currently in the midst of a major crisis which could result in one of several very different scenarios. The United States Government can and must prioritize 

its broad objectives and desired outcomes in Somalia, but in the face of considerable 

uncertainty about the political trajectory of the country in the weeks and months 

ahead, a fully developed country or regional strategy may be beyond reach. 

At present, the U.N.-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is under 

siege by a loose coalition of hard-line Islamist insurgencies, most notably Shabaab 

and Hisbul Islamiyya (the latter led by Hassan Dahir Aweys, a designated terror 

suspect). Several months ago, when Ethiopian forces departed and a new government in the TFG was formed featuring moderate Islamist leadership, there was real 

hope that Shabaab was in trouble. It had thrived mainly as a resistance movement 

against Ethiopian occupation and the unpopular leadership of then-TFG president 

Abdullahi Yusuf. With those two nemeses out of the picture, Shabaab had much less 

appeal to Somalis, who find its radical application of sharia law, its desecration of 

sufi tombs, and its close links to al-Qaeda very disturbing. The hope was that 

Somali communities, clans, and factions would rally in support of the new TFG. But 

the TFG’s ability to stand up a government has been disappointing, and Shabaab 

and Hisbul Islamiyya have drawn on external support from al-Qaeda, Eritrea, and 

other sources to launch an offensive that has captured strategic real estate in 

Mogadishu and southern Somalia and which threatens to drive the TFG out of the 

capital. 

In coming weeks and months, one of several scenarios could emerge: 

1. In a best-case outcome, the TFG will succeed in rallying support and pushing 

back the Islamist insurgency, negotiating with some insurgents and marginalizing 

or defeating the rest. This outcome would open the door to a U.S. strategy privileging timely and well-targeted state-building support to the TFG as a means of consolidating those gains, and would produce improved security for delivery of badly 

needed humanitarian assistance. 

18 

2. In a worst-case outcome, the Shabaab and Hisbul Islamiyya defeat the TFG 

and take control over most or all of south-central Somalia and the capital. Because 

of Shabaab’s ties to al-Qaeda and the presence of foreign advisors and fighters in 

Shabaab, this scenario promises to draw Ethiopian forces back into Somalia and will 

create pressure for the United States to privilege counterterrorism interventions 

into Somalia. Somalia could then become the site of regional or even globalized 

armed conflict. 

3. An insurgency victory over the TFG could also produce a different outcome, one 

in which the two rival Islamist groups begin fighting among themselves. There are 

sharp tensions over leadership, ideology, foreign patronage, clan interests, and tactics between and within Shabaab and Hisbul Islamiyya and many Somalis anticipate a battle between them. Armed clashes pitting Shabaab and Hisbul Islamiyya 

would present the United States with no obvious protagonist to support, and would 

instead place emphasis on the need to avoid taking actions which would bring the 

two warring hard-line groups together. 

4. A final scenario is a reversion to status quo ante, in which no one side consolidates control over the country, which is left divided up into a variety of warring 

fiefdoms—some controlled by the TFG, others held by Shabaab, Hisbul Islamiyya, 

clan militias, warlords, armed business groups, independent city-states, and others. 

This outcome would pose a major problem for U.S. state-building initiatives and 

would tempt counterterrorism operations to forge alliances with local nonstate 

actors, as was the practice in years past. That policy came at some cost and was 

in many respects counterproductive, however, and would need careful scrutiny. 

TOWARD A SOMALIA STRATEGY

I would like end my remarks by sharing several observations and recommendations toward the development of a Somalia strategy: 

• In the short run, there is little the United States can do to shape the outcome 

of the current fighting between Islamist insurgents and the TFG. This ball is 

in play, and while some timely financial support to the TFG could help shore 

it up, direct external military interventions are likely to play into the hands of 

Shabaab and undermine rather than strengthen the credibility of the TFG. 

• A regional rather than country-based strategy is more difficult to devise but 

ultimately more likely to bear fruit. This must include close scrutiny of the 

points of convergence and divergence in U.S. interests and the interests of regional allies, and a willingness to address those points of divergence frankly. 

• U.S. strategy in the region must harmonize to the maximum extent possible its 

counterterrorism, state-building, and humanitarian objectives and programs. 

And harmonization must not come to be synonymous with counterterrorism 

objectives simply subsuming other policies. 

• United States strategy must be informed by more accurate, nuanced assessment 

of both Somali actors and foreign interests in the country. Oversimplified analyses have at times led to serious errors by external actors. The fact that Somalia is a very complex crisis it is not a license to simplify, it is an obligation to 

take the time to understand. 

• The United States currently enjoys a good position in the Somali political 

debate. We support the moderate Islamist governance of the TFG, a broadbased and inclusive government coalition, a negotiated end to the current fighting, an end to foreign interference in Somalia’s internal affairs, peaceful coexistence with regional neighbors, and peace. These are very much shared values 

with the vast majority of Somali people. By contrast, al-Qaeda is urging Somalis 

to kill one another in the name of a radical, Wahhabist interpretation of Islam, 

and because the current government is too willing to seek coexistence with Ethiopia and the West. Al-Qaeda’s position is quite unpopular with Somalis, who 

deeply resent foreigners imposing their ideological wars on the Somali people. 

This is a big advantage for the United States and one we must not squander. 

• United States interests are best served by maximizing the extent to which the 

current conflict in Somalia is defined as an internal Somali affair. By contrast, 

Shabaab and Hisbul Islamiyya’s interests are served when the conflict can be 

regionalized or globalized, framed as a ‘‘Somali versus foreigner’’ clash. This 

puts a premium on strategies which work to keep the Ethiopian military out 

of Somalia. 

• Piracy off the coast of Somalia must be understood and treated as a second 

order security threat, one that international shipping companies consider manageable. Antipiracy efforts must not be allowed to compromise policies designed 

to address the first order security concern in the country, which is the increased 

activity of al-Qaeda in support of Shabaab in southern Somalia. Antipiracy iniVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:07 Oct 20, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\SOMALIA.TXT BETTY
19 

tiatives which feature capturing or killing of Somali youth risk inflaming antiAmericanism in Somalia, which will play into the hands of the Shabaab. • United States policies which maximize political space for Somalis to negotiate— 

especially the space for the TFG to reach deals with more pragmatic elements 

of the Islamist insurgents—will be of great assistance in promoting an end to 

the crisis. Conversely, United States policies which ‘‘redline’’ Somali groups and 

movements as terrorist reduce negotiating space for the moderates. Somali political affiliations are much more fluid and pragmatic than we usually presume. • In the event of a worst-case outcome, in which the capital, Mogadishu, and most 

of Somalia falls into the hands of hard-line Islamists with ties to al-Qaeda, the 

most effective short-term policy may simply be to wait rather than rush to a 

military or political response. Somalis have a long history of using, and then 

discarding, foreigners and their ideologies once they are no longer of use, and 

there are reasons to anticipate sharp differences between al-Qaeda and its 

globalist agenda and the more nationalist agenda of the Somali hard-line 

Islamists. Somalia’s hard-line Islamists will face the country’s many faultlines— 

clan tensions, leadership rivalries, and ideological splits—and could well be 

pulled down by those centrifugal forces. Put another way, in the face of a worstcase scenario, Somali society may possess its own self-correcting mechanisms to 

deal with foreign and local radicals, and those mechanisms should be given a 

chance before we rush into risky military solutions. It is worth recalling that 

in the early 1990s al-Qaeda attempted to make inroads into Somali-inhabited 

East Africa and, like so many foreigners bringing ambitious political projects to 

Somalia, got its fingers burnt. If al-Qaeda does attempt to exploit Somalia as 

a new base or safe haven, we should work to ensure that the country becomes 

as much a quagmire for al-Qaeda as it has been for everyone else. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, doctor. 

Ms. Scribner. 

STATEMENT OF SHANNON SCRIBNER, SENIOR POLICY ADVISOR ON HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE, OXFAM AMERICA, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. SCRIBNER. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Senator Isakson, and thank you for the opportunity to testify today on developing a coordinated and sustainable United States strategy toward 

Somalia. Oxfam is grateful for the work this committee has done 

and in particular you, Senator Feingold, for your leadership in 

drawing attention to the humanitarian situation affecting almost 

half of the country. 

Oxfam has been working in Somalia since the 1960s. Since the 

start of 2008, we delivered aid—we have been delivering aid to over 

400,000 Somalis. Through a network of Somali partner organizations, we provide over 80,000 hot meals a day to people in Mogadishu, water and sanitation services to over 200,000 people in the 

Afgooye Corridor, which is about 181⁄2 miles southwest of 

Mogadishu, and we are helping 70,000 people rebuild their livelihoods in central and southern Somalia. 

In my testimony today, I will be focusing on the humanitarian 

situation and making recommendations on steps the U.S. Government can take to address the situation as part of a coordinated 

U.S. strategy. 

Somalia is the site of world’s worst humanitarian crisis. The 

combination of conflict and drought has led to the displacement of 

up to 1.8 million Somalis and more than 3 million people are dependent on aid. Somalia is also one of the world’s most challenging 

environments for aid workers. Forty aid workers have been killed 

since the beginning of 2008 and most of them have been Somalis. 

Half a million Somalis are finding refuge outside Somalia’s borders and approximately 250,000 of these refugees now inhabit the 

20 

overcrowded Dadaab camps in northern Kenya. The withdrawal of 

Ethiopian troops at the beginning of this year initially improved 

civilian safety in some areas, evidenced by the tentative return of 

up to 65,000 people to Mogadishu, and marginally improved access 

for aid workers. But over the last few weeks, as we have heard, recent fighting between the Transitional Federal Unity Government 

and opposition groups in Mogadishu has claimed civilian lives and 

sparked a new wave of displacement. 

Beyond the obvious humanitarian impact of the ongoing conflict, 

the country faces drought conditions unseen since the 1991 famine, 

which is killing livestock at an alarming rate. Despite the many 

operational challenges and the shrinking operational space, Oxfam 

is still responsibly delivering aid programs. We work through proven and trusted local Somali NGOs, which come from the beneficiary communities, making them accountable not only to us, but 

also to their communities. These communities are often involved in 

the design, implementation, and monitoring of programs and as a 

result they protect their programs from third parties vying for control over territory. 

It is critical to underscore that in order to successfully continue 

our work aid agencies must be perceived by communities and the 

warring parties as neutral and impartial. As the United States sets 

out a new strategy for Somalia, it is important that the strategy 

does not undermine aid operations and preserves at a minimum 

the limited operating space that we have. In the past, air strikes 

in Somalia have negatively impacted humanitarian access by casting suspicion on aid workers, which is often followed by threats 

and retributions. Likewise, restrictive Office of Foreign Asset Control licensing could slow down the delivery of urgently needed aid. 

It is important to note that there are a range of actors— 

al-Shabaab, which there are many factions within al-Shabaab; the 

foreign fighters that have been mentioned; clan militias and criminal groups—fighting for control of territory. While conflict over who 

is in control is negatively impacting aid operations, the control over 

day-to-day administration of aid is to the most part done through 

local clan structures. 

My submitted testimony touches on other issues affecting 

humanitarian response, such as widespread abuses by all parties, 

security sector reform, peacekeeping, and the importance of a 

regional approach. But with the minute I have remaining I would 

just like to make six recommendations on how a coordinated and 

sustainable United States strategy toward Somalia can improve the 

humanitarian situation. 

As mentioned, it must preserve the limited humanitarian operating space. It should address the serious public health crisis unfolding in Dadaab by pressing the Kenyan Government to authorize 

UNHCR to start work on a new refugee camp and ensure that the 

border remains open to those that are fleeing the conflict. 

We need to hold parties accountable for abuses. All parties have 

committed abuses and acted with impunity on the ground. 

It must prevent security sector reform and peace-building from 

becoming part of the problem. While efforts to bolster security are 

necessary, support to security forces must be transparent and 

accountable to prevent abuses. 

21 

And any U.N. peacekeeping force should have wide acceptance by 

Somalis and a peace to actually keep. Otherwise they risk being 

drawn into the conflict. 

It should foster credible Somali-led political and governance processes. This means doing things the Somali way with their consensus-building and power-sharing. The United States should not 

support specific individuals or factions. 

Finally, ensure that any strategy for Somalia has a regional 

approach. Somalia shouldn’t be dealt with in isolation, as peace in 

Somalia means engaging and resolving issues with the neighboring 

countries. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I’m happy to take 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Scribner follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHANNON SCRIBNER, SENIOR POLICY ADVISOR ON

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE, OXFAM AMERICA, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Isakson, and members of the committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to testify today on the humanitarian situation in Somalia and the importance of a coordinated and sustainable United States strategy. Oxfam is extremely grateful for the work this committee has done, in particular you, Senator 

Feingold, in drawing attention to the humanitarian situation affecting almost half 

of the country. 

Oxfam America is an international development and relief agency committed to 

developing lasting solutions to poverty, hunger, and social injustice. We are part of 

a confederation of 13 Oxfam organizations working together in more than 100 countries with over 3,000 local partners around the globe. 

OXFAM’S RESPONSE IN SOMALIA

We have been working in Somalia since the 1960s, providing humanitarian and 

capacity-building assistance. Since the start of 2008, we have spent more than $7 

million on emergency programs delivering aid to over 400,000 Somalis with a network of Somali partner organizations. In Mogadishu, we are part of a consortium 

working with a local partner to provide over 80,000 hot meals a day to the most 

vulnerable people. Together with the same partner, we have just finalized the 

design phase of a community therapeutic care program for severely malnourished 

children. In the Afgooye Corridor, about 18.5 miles southwest of Mogadishu, we are 

providing water and sanitation services to over 200,000 people displaced from 

Mogadishu and the surrounding areas. In central and southern Somalia, we are 

assisting 70,000 people to rebuild the livelihoods they have lost as a result of the 

crisis in their country. 

In my testimony today, I will be focusing on the humanitarian situation inside 

the country and in the region and making recommendations on steps the U.S. Government can take to address the situation as part of a coordinated U.S. strategy. 

CURRENT HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

Somalia remains the site of the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. The combination of conflict and drought have led to more than 3 million Somalis dependent on 

aid within the country and the displacement of up to 1.8 million. Somalia is also 

one of the world’s most challenging environments for aid workers and 40 of them, 

mostly Somalis, have been killed since the beginning of 2008. Half a million Somalis 

are finding refuge outside Somalia’s borders in Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and 

Yemen. Over 250,000 of these refugees now inhabit the overcrowded Dadaab camps 

in northern Kenya. While the northern regions of Puntland and Somaliland have 

both achieved relative degrees of stability and security, the south and central 

regions in Somalia remain unstable and access for aid organizations extremely 

difficult. 

LATEST HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENT

The withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in January 2009 initially improved civilian 

safety in some areas—evidenced by the tentative return of up to 65,000 people to 

Mogadishu between January and April of this year. This marginally improved the 

22 

ability of humanitarian actors to access people in need with the removal of roadblocks on major axes. But, over the last few weeks, recent fighting between the 

Transitional Federal Unity Government (TFG) and opposition groups erupted in the 

Somali capital of Mogadishu claiming the lives of civilians, and sparking a new 

wave of displacement. Hospitals in central Mogadishu are overwhelmed and among 

the newly displaced are families that had recently returned home following a period 

of relative peace in Mogadishu. Many of the displaced are heading toward the 

Afgooye Corridor. As of yesterday, it has been reported that there are close to 60,000 

new displacements into the corridor. 

Beyond the obvious humanitarian impact of the ongoing conflict, the country faces 

drought conditions unseen since the 1991 famine and meteorologists are warning of 

an 80-percent chance of drier than normal conditions in the Horn of Africa through 

2009. Drought conditions continue to ravage livelihoods, particularly among pastoralist populations as livestock are dying and wasting at an alarming rate. 

Despite the operational challenges, it remains possible to responsibly implement 

aid programs, and it is crucial that aid operations continue, and even expand where 

possible. Being able to operate within an insecure environment is largely based 

upon the perceptions of communities and warring parties as to whether we are operating neutrally and impartially. Oxfam works with proven and trusted local Somali 

NGOs which come from the beneficiary communities so they are accountable not 

only to us but to their communities. We also have a team of high-qualified Somali 

engineers and other technical experts who visit and monitor the programs we are 

funding. 

HUMANITARIAN OBSTACLES

While our reach is limited due to security, aid is saving lives and livelihoods in 

Somalia. Aid agencies have access at the neighborhood, district and camp levels but 

this access must be protected. As the United States sets out a new strategy for 

Somalia, it is critical that the strategy does not undermine aid operations and preserves the limited operating space. In the past, United States airstrikes in Somalia 

have negatively impacted humanitarian access by casting suspicion on aid workers, 

followed by threats and retributions. Likewise, restrictive Office of Foreign Asset 

Control (OFAC) licensing could slow down the delivery of urgently needed aid, and 

so it is important that a workable middle ground be found on the OFAC issue that 

enables exemptions for those aid agenices working in al-Shabaab controlled territory 

(similar to the OFAC exemption granted to organizations working in Hezbollah territory in Lebanon). It is important to note that no matter who is in control of areas 

where we work, Oxfam’s partners work directly within local clan structures, which 

continue to exercise effective control over day-to-day administration of aid. 

It is also important to point out that there are a range of actors—al-Shabaab, foreign fighters, militias, and criminal groups—impacting our work on the ground. In 

Oxfam’s case, it is our community-based approach that allows our partners to 

deliver aid because they involve the communities in the design, implementation, 

monitoring and evaluation of programs and as a result, the communities protect the 

program from parties vying for control of territory. 

REFUGEE FLOWS TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

The humanitarian challenges are not limited to Somalia. Kenya’s northeastern 

province, Dadaab, is host to three refugee camps established in 1991. Originally designed to accommodate 90,000 refugees, Dadaab now constitutes the largest refugee 

site in the world with 250,000 mostly Somali residents. In January 2007, the Kenyan Government closed its border with Somalia but more than 100,000 have nonetheless arrived in Dadaab over the past 2 years, mostly from the conflict-affected 

areas of Mogadishu and Lower Juba. The high number of refugees in recent months 

has stretched resources and infrastructure beyond capacity and there is a lack of 

space on which to build a new camp unless the Kenyan Government authorizes new 

land to build an additional camp. In March, an Oxfam assessment report showed 

a lack of basic services, severe overcrowding leading to more than 20 cases of cholera, and a lack of funding. Half of the people in the camps do not have access to 

enough water and women and children—who make up over half Dadaab’s population—rarely have accesss to adequate latrines. 

THE NEED FOR ACCOUNTABILITY

Since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 there have been widespread abuses 

against civilians. The lack of accountability for past and current crimes, reinforce 

a sense of impunity and further fuels conflict. 

23 

Since early 2007, there have been reports of widespread and systematic attacks 

on civilians, journalists, aid workers and human rights activists by all of the warring parties. The failure of the international community to hold these parties 

accountable for serious breaches of international humanitarian and human rights 

laws has contributed to a climate of impunity in Somalia. 

Somalia is at a pivotal transitional moment and there is an opportunity for the 

new Transitional Federal Unity Government to draw a line with the past, demonstrate genuine willingness to end the prevailing climate of impunity, and gain the 

confidence of the Somali people. 

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND PEACEKEEPING

At the donors’ conference last month in Brussels, the United States and others 

pledged increased resources for the TFG and more than $250 million for security 

efforts to bring order to the country. While efforts to bolster security are necessary, 

there needs to be recognition that recent international interventions in Somalia’s 

security sector have exacerbated problems rather than eased them. For example, the 

United Nations Development Program gave direct financial support for police 

salaries and some of these police were implicated in serious human rights abuses. 

A key component of the international community’s engagement in Somalia is the 

African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM’s mandate is 

to protect key TFG officials and infrastructure, support the training of Somali security forces, and create security conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian 

assistance. The force has never been adequately staffed or resourced but in January 

2009, the United Nations Security Council authorized the use of U.N. assessed 

peacekeeping contributions to fund a U.N. support package, including medical and 

communications support, and the creation of a trust fund to marshal voluntary contributions to the force. Discussion has been underway of deploying a multidimensional peacekeeping operation. 

REGIONAL STABILITY

The situation in Somalia acts as a destabilizing force within the greater Horn region. Until there is some level of peace in Somalia, more Somalis will cross over the 

Somalia-Kenya border into Dadaab and piracy will continue. The major supply ports 

in Mogadishu, Kismayu, and Merka are major supply ports for the rest of the Horn 

of Africa. As these ports are disrupted, so is the distribution of aid and commercial 

traffic all up and down the roads that criss-cross from these ports. Somali-Ethiopian 

tensions continue to simmer as ethnic Somali rebels battle the Ethiopian Government in the Ogaden and Somalia serves a proxy battlefield for ongoing tensions 

between Ethiopia and Eritrea. All of these problems are symptoms of the same 

underlying cause—the perpetual challenge of weak governance in Somalia. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Following are steps Congress and the Obama administration should take to address the humanitarian situation in a new comprehensive and sustainable strategy 

toward Somalia: 

1. Preserve the limited humanitarian operating space—humanitarian needs remain paramount and of such scale that anything that jeopardizes the humanitarian 

relief operations will by extension threaten regional stability. 

2. Take urgent steps to deal with the serious public health crisis unfolding in 

Dadaab—press the Kenyan Government to authorize UNHCR to start work on a 

new refugee camp at Dadaab and ensure that its border remains open to those fleeing the conflict. 

3. Hold parties accountable for abuses—the international community should use 

their diplomatic, financial, and political leverage with all parties to demonstrate 

that violations of international humanitarian and human rights law will not be tolerated, and that perpetrators will be held accountable. 

4. Prevent security sector reform and peacekeeping from becoming part of the problem—any support to security forces must be transparent and accountable and any 

U.N. peacekeeping force should have wide acceptance by Somalis and a peace to 

keep. Otherwise they risk being drawn into the conflict. 

5. Foster a credible, Somali-led political and governance process—this includes 

consensus-building, power-sharing, and moderation, but not supporting specific individuals or factions. 

6. Ensure any strategy for Somalia has a regional approach—Somalia shouldn’t 

be dealt with in isolation as peace in Somalia means engaging and resolving issues 

with neighboring countries. 

24 

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank both of you. 

I thank Senator Kaufman for his attendance. Also Senator Risch 

has joined us, members of the subcommittee. 

Let me start a 7-minute round for this panel. Dr. Menkhaus, I’ll 

start with you. No one will dispute, I don’t think, that the situation 

in Somalia is far worse than it was 2 or 3 years ago, and that the 

threat posed by terrorism as well as piracy is far greater now. 

Looking at the previous administration’s approach, as well as that 

of the international community, what lessons do you believe can 

and should be learned so we don’t repeat the same mistakes again? 

Dr. MENKHAUS. First, I would argue for a more nuanced analysis 

and understanding of the political dynamics in Somalia. I think 

there’s a great temptation on the part of decisionmakers across the 

world, when confronted with the extraordinary complexities of 

Somalia, to oversimplify them, and that usually comes at a cost in 

terms of effectiveness of policy. 

Second, I would caution against careless use of state-building initiatives to a transitional government in the context of a war. This 

needs to be very calibrated assistance. To the extent that security 

forces of the Transitional Federal Government are controlled by the 

transitional government authorities, to the extent that there is a 

local ownership of those security forces, and to the extent that 

those local security forces are accountable to both the people and 

the government, that opens the door toward external assistance. 

But in conditions where the security forces are essentially a 

paramilitary, a law unto themselves, and are a source of insecurity 

and predation against the local community, our assistance—‘‘our’’ 

meaning international assistance—in the past essentially meant we 

were taking sides in an open civil war. That was one of the reasons 

why the U.N. and international aid agencies became targets in this 

insurgency and counterinsurgency. 

Senator FEINGOLD. As you know, I’m very concerned that the 

fledgling transitional government is losing support, as well as 

losing ground with this recent fighting I described. In your view, 

Doctor, what specifically does the government need to regain support and momentum toward uniting the country? Are there important groups or clans or constituencies that should be engaged more 

and who would make a big difference if they were brought into the 

government? 

Dr. MENKHAUS. I share your concern about the loss of ground 

that the TFG has experienced. The insurgents’ offensive in recent 

weeks has been alarming. I don’t know that there is a lot that the 

international community can do to shape the outcome of this current crisis at this time. There may be some calibrated financial 

support, there may be some diplomatic initiatives, that would 

facilitate the TFG’s current effort to negotiate with some elements 

of the armed insurgency, those that we consider groups that are 

not in any serious way indoctrinated, committed jihadists. Bringing 

as many of those into the TFG is certainly a viable strategy on 

their part, and if there are things we can do to facilitate that we 

should. 

I would caution against an impulse to provide direct military 

support at this time because that would play into the hands of the 

Shabaab. The Shabaab have every interest in framing this current 

25 

fight as Somalis versus foreigners. They would love to attract Ethiopia back in. They would benefit enormously from U.S. air strikes 

were that to happen. 

To the extent that this is a Somali internal political struggle, 

Shabaab actually faces real challenges, because what they stand 

for is very unappealing for the vast majority of Somalis. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Your view specifically about a sort of pivotal 

figure here, Sheikh Hassan Aweys, who recently returned to Somalia? How do you assess his role in all of this and what are his 

intentions? 

Dr. MENKHAUS. Hassan Dahir Aweys is on our list of designated 

terrorist suspects, and that’s very problematic when it comes to 

efforts on the part of the Transitional Federal Government to dialogue with him as a potential partner in this government. He is 

actually of greater concern to Ethiopia than he is to us, because he 

was in the group al-Itihaad al-Islamiya in the mid-1990s when 

al-Itihaad launched several terrorist attacks against the Ethiopian 

Government. That may well make him a nonstarter for Ethiopia 

were he to be brought into discussions. 

He is currently leading—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. A nonstarter for Somalia? 

Dr. MENKHAUS. For Ethiopia. Ethiopia would reject—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Would reject it out of hand. 

Dr. MENKHAUS. Exactly. And we have to take careful account of 

Ethiopia’s legitimate security concerns in this. 

Aweys is currently heading up the Hizbul al-Islamiya faction, 

which is a hard-line Islamist group, but which tends to embrace 

more nationalist, rather than globalist, agendas, and therein lies 

the tension, I think, between Hizbul al-Islamiya and Shabaab, 

Shabaab having forged closer links to al-Qaeda. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Ms. Scribner, I’m glad you’re here to give the 

humanitarian perspective and to highlight the great constraints 

which agencies like Oxfam are facing. As the U.S. Government considers a new strategy for Somalia, how can we ensure that we’re 

not further impeding humanitarian access and independence? In 

your view how should addressing the humanitarian situation in 

Somalia connect with the efforts we’ve been talking about to support political reconciliation and governance? 

Ms. SCRIBNER. I think in terms of things I mentioned in my testimony that one thing would be air strikes on the ground have really 

impacted aid operations on the ground, because that only casts suspicion on NGOs in terms of their alliance with the West, with the 

government, or with the U.S. military. And we’ve had aid organizations that had to suspend operations in some of those areas. So 

that would be really—that is one thing that’s very critical for operating space on the ground. 

Then the other thing is just holding parties accountable on the 

ground. There is really lack of holding anyone accountable for 

abuses that have been documented by human rights organizations 

and groups on the ground. So if we could somehow start holding 

people accountable that would be helpful to our access on the 

ground as well. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. 

Senator Isakson. 

26 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Menkhaus, you include bullet points toward the end of your 

printed remarks, which you did not really discuss. The one I am 

reading seems to sum up everything we have been talking about. 

It is on the next to the last page. You write: ‘‘U.S. interests are 

best served by maximizing the extent to which the current conflict 

in Somalia is defined as an internal Somalian affair. By contrast, 

Shabaab and Hizbul al-Islamiya’s interests are best served when 

the conflict is regionalized or globalized, framed as a Somali versus 

foreign fighter situation.’’ 

I am going to get to Ms. Scribner on the issue in a second. She 

has a statement that’s interesting. 

So I take it when we talk about a coordinated effort in Somalia 

that this effort must be coordinated in part with Ethiopia and with 

Ethiopian cooperation, is that correct? 

Dr. MENKHAUS. That’s correct. We’ve spent a lot of time this 

morning talking about coordinated strategy just within the U.S. 

Government, and that’s not an easy thing to do. When you add all 

of the external actors whose interests matter, including western 

states, Islamic and Arab states, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Kenya, this 

gets to be even a greater challenge. 

The key with bringing Ethiopia in as a full partner to a solution 

in Somalia is, first, the very high levels of distrust between Somalis 

and Ethiopia. This is a long historical issue. Yet they do have common ground. When you talk to them privately, they do see opportunities for coexistence. Somali business people would benefit enormously from access to such a large internal market. Ethiopia would 

benefit, obviously, enormously from having a stable country on its 

long border. 

But they haven’t gotten to that point yet. So trust-building, confidence-building measures are really critical. 

The other aspect of bringing Ethiopia more fully into these discussions is recognizing that, while our interests overlap closely 

with Ethiopia’s and we are allies with them, our interests are not 

identical. They have different sets of security concerns and different ways of going about them, and we have to be frank with one 

another about those differences. 

Senator ISAKSON. Ethiopia’s difficulty with Eritrea was primarily 

over their border, if I’m not mistaken. Is there a border dispute 

between Somalia and Ethiopia? 

Dr. MENKHAUS. Yes. That border has never been formally recognized by Somalia. It was the source of a major war, the Ogaden 

war in 1977–78. Periodically Somali groups, including al-Itihaad 

al-Islamiya, embrace irredentist claims, territorial claims, on the 

Somali region in Ethiopia, where about 4 million ethnic Somalis 

live. So this remains a source of enduring concern for Ethiopia. 

Senator ISAKSON. So would a coordinated strategy require some 

settlement of that border dispute? 

Dr. MENKHAUS. Absolutely. At a minimum, what we would have 

to start off with by way of confidence-building measures would be 

to ensure that any new government in Somalia and any partner in 

a new government in Somalia accept the premise of peaceful coexistence with Somalia’s neighbors. That is a bitter pill to swallow for 

some Somali nationalists who continue to embrace the notion of a 

27 

greater Somalia. But under the circumstances, that’s going to have 

to be one of the things they’re willing to concede on the table if 

Somalia is going to get out of this 20-year impasse. 

Senator ISAKSON. Ms. Scribner, in point six, you said, ‘‘Ensure 

any strategy for Somalia has a regional approach. Somalia 

shouldn’t be dealt with in isolation, as peace in Somalia means engaging and resolving issues with its neighbors.’’ 

So I am getting the drift that you both agree, from two different 

perspectives which ultimately arrive at the same conclusion, that 

a coordinated strategy must be coordinated with Ethiopia and with 

Somalia. Is there another bordering country with which coordination is needed, or is it primarily the Ethiopian-Somalian difficulty? 

Ms. SCRIBNER. Definitely the Ethiopians, the Eritreans, but also 

the Kenyans as well, and that has to do a lot with the refugee 

flows into Kenya and the Dadaab camps, and also the closing of the 

border off and on, but the Liboy reception center, which is where 

refugees go to be registered. That center has been shut down, so 

there’s no process to register Somalis that are fleeing into Kenya 

at this point. So Kenya is also a very important country in terms 

of coordinated strategy. 

Senator ISAKSON. Is the Transitional Federal Government actually stable enough to sit down at the table with those two neighbors, Kenya and Ethiopia, in order to reach an agreement, in your 

judgment? 

Ms. SCRIBNER. I think that there is an effort by the new President to reach out to all parties on the ground. I think right now 

the focus has been on parties within Somalia, so the different warring parties. But I think as a next step definitely reaching out to 

the other, to Kenya and to Ethiopia. But I think right now on his 

plate is reaching out to the different groups on the ground. 

Senator ISAKSON. I take it that the two organizations—the two 

terrorist organizations, al-Shabaab and the other that you mentioned—really play on the nationalist pride of the Somali people. 

And, in doing so, they create an ‘‘it’s us versus Ethiopia’’ mentality, 

in order to whip up the locals and to keep the uncertainty going 

on. Is that correct? 

Dr. MENKHAUS. That’s exactly what Shabaab’s successful formula 

was in 2007–08. They conflated a radical Islamist ideology with a 

nationalist, anti-imperialist, liberation ideology against the Ethiopian occupation, and that won them a lot of support, at least passive support, from Somalis who didn’t accept some of the elements 

of their Islamist agenda, but who saw them as a legitimate leading 

freedom fighter force against the Ethiopian occupation. 

Now that the Ethiopians are out and now that there is a new, 

more broad-based government that’s actually led by their former 

leader and a moderate Islamist, Sheikh Sharif, Shabaab doesn’t 

have anything to fight against. They have been trying to use the 

African Union forces and their presence in Mogadishu as the one 

remaining rallying point of the Somalis versus the foreigners, but 

that doesn’t have as much traction in Somali society. 

Senator ISAKSON. Is al-Shabaab’s ultimate goal sharia law and 

control of Somalia? Is that what they really want? 

Dr. MENKHAUS. It’s difficult to say what Shabaab wants because 

it’s actually quite internally divided. 

28 

Senator ISAKSON. Shabaab is? 

Dr. MENKHAUS. Yes. What it certainly wants is to block and prevent the Transitional Federal Government from becoming operational. It wants to take control. It is definitely a power-seeker in 

that sense. What its policies would be beyond that we can only 

speculate. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you both very much for being here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Ms. Scribner, you made reference to the fact that 

you—I think you said that you would like to see those who have 

committed human rights violations or other violations held 

accountable. How do you do that under present circumstances? 

Certainly everyone would agree with that, but pragmatically that 

seems like a difficult thing. 

Ms. SCRIBNER. What a lot of human rights organizations have 

been calling for is a commission of inquiry. You could do that 

through the U.N., where you have people going in to investigate 

abuses on the ground. A lot of those investigations could be done 

in the bordering countries where refugees have flown, so talking to 

people in Dadaab camps. Most of those people in the camps are 

from Somalia. So you could actually get a lot of information. 

Then when the situation or security on the ground allowed, go 

into the country and do some of the investigation, which would be 

helpful in terms of moving toward reconciliation, holding parties 

accountable, and also looking ahead at any further abuses that are 

committed, set up a system on the ground. 

Senator RISCH. I guess I apologize for my parochial view of holding people accountable, but to me holding people accountable is 

dragging them into court and inflicting punishment on them for 

what they’ve done. I gather that’s not what you were referring to. 

You’re more of a—you’re referring more to an inquiry and then a 

publication of the bad things that someone did, but not necessarily 

a punishment or something along those lines. 

Ms. SCRIBNER. I don’t think we can get to that yet. But yes, exactly, something similar to what’s been done in Burundi or Rwanda 

or East Timor even, where it’s more of a publication of kind of the 

wrongdoers on the ground, just to give people a sense that you cannot act with complete impunity, that people are watching, that people do care about the abuses being committed on civilians and aid 

workers, journalists, and human rights defenders. 

Senator RISCH. I guess it depends on your point of view, but from 

my point of view it’s almost counterproductive. If you do publish 

this and say, look, this is what these bad guys did, and then don’t 

do anything about it, it doesn’t—it’s not the kind of thing that 

helps in the future. That is, people say, who cares? They discovered 

all this and then did absolutely nothing about it. These people did 

act with impunity. They’re still walking down the street. They’re 

still doing whatever. 

So I guess that—I just need help here understanding this. I understand what you’re saying and I think the frustration is you 

want to do something about it, but yet just investigating it and 

then publishing the results of the investigation it would seem to 

29 

me is not a good deterrent, either individually or from a general 

deterrence standpoint. 

Ms. SCRIBNER. But it does set up a system for people to feel like 

their concerns are being heard, they’re taken into consideration. It 

also depends on who is committing the abuses. If it’s within the 

police that are part of the Transitional Federal Government—and 

that’s something we talked about with security sector reform—in 

terms of holding people accountable, you can hold those people 

accountable because you can fire them. 

So there are certain parties that will be held more accountable 

than others and that actions could be taken. But in places where 

there is conflict it does serve as a forum for people to have grievances and also just to have their voices heard and the problems 

that they’ve experienced at the hands of different parties heard as 

well. But again, very complicated and not an easy thing to do, but 

a first step toward actually holding people accountable. More needs 

to be done in the future, but we need to take that first step. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Menkhaus, I was fascinated by your comment about some 

people have a vision for a greater Somalia. Could you expand on 

what you meant by that? 

Dr. MENKHAUS. This is part of an old Somali desire to re-unify 

ethnic Somalis who were divided by colonialism into five different 

colonies in the Horn of Africa, Djibouti, British Somaliland, Italian 

Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Two of those five did unite, British 

Somaliland and Italian Somalia, at independence. Now, of course, 

Somaliland has issued a unilateral secession or a termination of 

the unity between the two. 

But it’s a core belief in Somali nationalism, which is, paradoxically, very, very strong despite the fact that they’re internally 

riven by clan and other divisions. 

Senator RISCH. Does that go away over a period of time or does 

it get worse? 

Dr. MENKHAUS. It’s been around since the 1950s. It’s far less significant today than it has been in the past, when it drove wars in 

the 1970s, but it’s still there, not so much for the Somali Kenyans, 

who really have no interest in re-uniting with Somalia, nor with 

Somali Djiboutians, who are enjoying all of the fruits of having an 

independent state. But it’s the Somali Ethiopians, who are treated 

as second class citizens in Ethiopia, frankly, and who are currently 

bearing the brunt of a very heavy-handed counterinsurgency campaign by the Ethiopian Government. 

Senator RISCH. What percentage of the population is that in 

Ethiopia? 

Dr. MENKHAUS. It’s about 4 million of a population of roughly 80 

million in Ethiopia, if I’m remembering my numbers correctly. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Risch. 

I’ll ask some more questions. Ms. Scribner, I’m glad that you 

raise the problem of refugee flows to neighboring countries. I’ve 

been worried specifically about the overcrowding and lack of adequate resources in Dadaab, which you mentioned, in Kenya, one of 

the world’s oldest, largest, and most congested refugee sites. EarVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:07 Oct 20, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\SOMALIA.TXT BETTY
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lier this week Doctors Without Borders said that hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees at this camp are finding the camp conditions so unbearable that some are considering returning home. 

I know that there’s been an effort over the last year to work with 

the Kenyan Government to secure some new land to accommodate 

the refugees, but it’s my understanding that a solution still hasn’t 

been reached. What is a workable solution to this situation and 

what’s the greatest obstacle? Lack of leadership, resources, or 

something else? 

Ms. SCRIBNER. In terms of the Dadaab camps, there are three 

camps—existing camps right now. The negotiation right now is to 

build a fourth camp. While the Kenyan Government has agreed 

with UNHCR in principle, they’ve announced that they would actually authorize land for this fourth camp, they haven’t officially 

authorized it. They haven’t given it up to them as of yet. 

It’s going to take about 6 months to construct that fourth camp. 

So in the mean time, as Doctors Without Borders and even Oxfam 

did an assessment report of the camps, we’re finding there’s not 

enough latrines, the latrines aren’t separate between women and 

men, so a lot of the women and children aren’t using the latrines 

because of cultural sensitivities of using the same latrine. There’s 

not enough water for people. 

So those demands need to be immediately met. Then that fourth 

camp needs to be up and running as quickly as possible. There’s 

also an appeal—I believe it’s $91 million UNHCR appeal—and 

that’s really important to get funding for the existing camps and 

then this fourth camp as well. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Do you expect this fourth camp will be available in 6 months or is that not clear? 

Ms. SCRIBNER. It’s going to be 6 months from the time the Kenyan Government actually authorizes the land. As we hope—they’ve 

agreed in principle, but again they haven’t given that specific 

authorization as of yet. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Doctor, in terms of the piracy off Somalia’s 

coast, you said previously that naval operations might help, but 

they cannot possibly stop this piracy when ‘‘the risks are so low, 

the rewards so high, and alternatives,’’ in your words, ‘‘so bleak in 

desolate Somalia.’’ That was very well put and I want to ask you 

specifically about possible alternatives and the importance of economic opportunities and, thinking about United States and international assistance to Somalia, how important is economic revitalization in promoting livelihoods? 

Obviously, some of this is very difficult with combat violence 

going on in some regions of Somalia. But I’m thinking here also 

about Puntland or even Somaliland. 

Dr. MENKHAUS. In the long term, economic revitalization to provide opportunities, alternative opportunities for pirates and their 

financial backers are the solution. In the short to medium term, 

though, the on-land solution can also and must also come from political authorities that are both willing and able to stop the piracy, 

which I would add is a second order security threat for us compared to what’s going on in Mogadishu. I think we have to be careful not to allow any of our antipiracy efforts to compromise our 

policies toward counterterrorism and state-building in the south. 

31 

We do have two instances in Somalia where piracy has been prevented or stopped by local political authorities because they had a 

political interest in demonstrating their utility to the international 

community. One is Somaliland. Somaliland has the ideal coast 

along the Gulf of Aden for pirate lairs, and yet when pirates have 

attempted to use those shores Somaliland has prevented it, and 

that’s again because they are trying to demonstrate their legitimacy and their utility to the international community in a bid for 

international recognition. 

The other instance was the Islamic Courts Union in 2006, which 

put a quick end to piracy along the Indian Ocean coast. Again, that 

was in part because the pirates and their financial backers were 

political rivals of the Islamists, so they had incentive to put an end 

to it, but also because they wanted to demonstrate that they were 

a source of rule of law, someone that we would want to work with. 

For me that’s instructive. It means that they don’t have to have 

a large coast guard. It means that they don’t have to have the 

immediate economic revitalization. What they have to have is the 

political interest, the will, to put an end to it on shore, and if they 

have that they will do it. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Doctor, I particularly appreciate your candor 

and your directness. It’s exactly what you said, the piracy, as important as it is, is not the first order security risk here. Of course, 

we don’t have a full room here, just a few weeks after the piracy. 

We don’t have the heroes here who saved the people. So we revert 

back to the sort of, OK, Somalia’s a terribly difficult place, and we 

forget the most elemental thing, which is that the pirates do not 

live in the water; they live on the land. 

And if we’re foolish enough to just let this go and move on to 

other things, the next crisis of the day, we will seriously involve 

ourselves in, I think, one of the greatest crises in the world. There’s 

a tendency for people to say, well, the President’s got so many 

things on his plate, how can he possibly have Somalia be at this 

level? Well, the fact is it may well be at that level, and it requires 

that kind of attention. It requires that attention now. So I greatly 

appreciate your comments. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have just one question for Ms. Scribner. I am going to be in 

Kenya next week, so I need a little education. From what I understand, the Dadaab camp is there under the auspices of the Kenyan 

Government allowing it to be there. Who operates he camp? 

Ms. SCRIBNER. UNHCR does, so the U.N. 

Senator ISAKSON. So it’s under the auspices of the U.N? 

Ms. SCRIBNER. I believe it is under the auspices of the U.N. 

They’re the ones in charge and operating those camps there, but 

with the permission of the Kenyan Government. 

Senator ISAKSON. And there are half a million refugees, you said, 

in that camp? 

Ms. SCRIBNER. There are 250,000 refugees in three camps. 

Senator ISAKSON. In three camps? 

Ms. SCRIBNER. Yes. So there are 500,000 refugees in surrounding 

countries and half of those, 250,000, are in the Dadaab camps. 

32 

Senator ISAKSON. Which U.S.-based NGOs are providing assistance in that camp? 

Ms. SCRIBNER. I believe Doctors Without Borders; International 

Rescue Committee is also in the camps. And Oxfam has done 

assessments in the camps and we’ve agreed with the government 

that if a fourth camp is opened that we would provide water and 

sanitation for that fourth camp. 

Senator ISAKSON. The Kenyan Government? 

Ms. SCRIBNER. Yes. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you very much. Thanks to both of you 

for your testimony today. 

Ms. SCRIBNER. Thanks. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. In the camps themselves, who provides the security? Is it the Kenyan Government or the U.N. that provides security in the camps, local policing, if you would? 

Ms. SCRIBNER. I think it’s the Kenyan police. But there have 

been some allegations of abuse by the police on the population 

within the camps, and I think it was Human Rights Watch in particular did a very detailed report of abuses within the camps and 

the problems, not just with the humanitarian situation, but with 

the security situation. 

Senator RISCH. Is it the result of ethnic prejudice or that sort of 

thing? What’s the source of that? 

Ms. SCRIBNER. I think it’s many issues, many different issues. 

Part of it is maybe the police not making enough money, so it’s 

preying on the population. It may be that they are Somalis and not 

Kenyans. But I don’t know specifically all the different issues of it, 

but I know that there has been a lot of reports and concerns about 

the treatment. 

Half of those 250,000 people are women and children, so that’s 

really important to point out. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I want to thank the panel very much. I particularly want to thank my colleagues for their diligence on this 

and other issues relating to Africa. It really has made the work on 

the subcommittee so far this year a pleasure. I want to thank 

everybody who was involved in the hearing. That concludes it. 

[Whereupon, at 10:27 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

Æ