inss.dodlive.mil dh No. 77 1 

On June 29, 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS, also 

known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or the Islamic 

State),1 a Sunni jihadist group with the capability of a paramilitary, 

established an Islamic caliphate. With 10,000 militants, the group took territory 

and achieved a goal that rival terrorist group al Qaeda has pursued for decades. 

Yet how did a group with relatively few fighters accomplish so much?

ISIS and its caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, have learned lessons from past 

insurgents and leaders. In the implementation of its campaign, the group has 

used strategic tools to project military, economic, political, and informational 

power to the local, regional, and global community. From exploiting the sectarian divide to gain support, to manipulating political and social media to inflate 

its appearance of strength, to recruiting disaffected Sunnis and Muslim youth of 

the world through social media, ISIS has proved to be a new class of insurgency.

ISIS, however, has projected the most power and shown the most innovation with technology and media. It demonstrates a masterful understanding of 

effective propaganda and social media use, producing a multidimensional global 

campaign across multiple platforms. ISIS has used these platforms to exhibit 

intimidation, networking, recruitment, justice, and justification. It continues to 

spread its anti-Western, pro-jihadi messages to vulnerable populations using viral videos made to look like video games. Yet its skill is best displayed on Twitter 

where it has garnered tens of thousands of followers across dozens of accounts, 

eliciting feedback from average supporters.

The deterioration of the Syrian and Iraqi states further enabled ISIS’s expansion of power. With the civil war in Syria and the inflamed sectarian tensions 

A Time to Tweet, as Well 

as a Time to Kill: ISIS’s 

Projection of Power in Iraq 

and Syria 

by Heather Marie Vitale and James M. Keagle

Defense Horizons

National Defense University

Center for 

T

e

chnology and 

National Se

curity Poli

c

y

About the Authors

Heather Marie Vitale is an 

International Security graduate 

student at George Mason University 

and a Research Intern at the National 

Defense University (NDU). Dr. James 

M. Keagle is Deputy Director of the 

Center for Technology and National 

Security Policy, Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, at NDU. He is also a 

Professor and former Provost at NDU.

Key Points

◆ The Islamic State of Iraq and alSham (ISIS) uses a combination 

of intimidation, military might, 

and digital propaganda to project 

power militarily, economically, 

politically, and informationally.

◆ ISIS runs a sophisticated and multidimensional social media campaign, exploiting it as a weapon of 

war to intimidate, spread official 

messages, recruit, fundraise, 

network, and justify its gruesome 

acts.

◆ ISIS has been emboldened by the 

borderless nature of the region 

and the clash of religious and secular sub-identities in Iraq.

◆ The United States needs to 

develop a comprehensive digital 

strategy that is slicker, faster, and 

more nimble than ISIS’s to fight 

the insurgency.

October 2014
2 dh No. 77 inss.dodlive.mil

in Iraq, ISIS had little to exploit in order to assert itself. 

Given the lack of strong state leadership, increases in sectarian violence, and the abundance of porous borders, an 

insurgent uprising was inevitable.

 ISIS currently threatens the United States. As the 

group continues to focus on recruiting foreign fighters 

from the West, the U.S. homeland, its assets abroad, and 

those of its allies remain at risk. The United States thus 

must do what it can to counteract ISIS’s projections of 

power and propaganda. By launching a slicker and proactive digital campaign to draw attention and followers 

away from ISIS, the United States could help prevent 

more people from joining the fight. 

Chronology and Background

In the 1970s, the United States pursued a policy 

known as “dual containment” in an attempt to achieve 

stability in the Gulf region. The end chapter of that included the pursuit, capture, and subsequent execution of 

Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Since then, the United 

States has been wrestling with options that can restore a 

balance of power in the region. This task includes finding 

some adequate check on Iranian power. Part of the dilemma has been reconstructing Iraq economically, militarily, and politically. We must understand the Syria of 

today in this context.

The current conflict is complex due to the interconnected nature of the region. Iraq, Syria, and Iran all have 

long and contentious histories with one another. Arguably, the current conflict in al-Sham can be traced back to 

the declining days of the Ottoman Empire. Toward the 

end of World War I, Great Britain and France secretly 

devised a plan to partition the empire. This produced the 

infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement (officially known as 

the Asia Minor Agreement), which divided the greater 

Arab region (including modern day Iraq, Syria, Jordan, 

and Lebanon) into neocolonial spheres of influence. The 

United States initially opposed this agreement based on 

its Allies’ furtive diplomacy, as well as a stated belief in 

the right to national self-determination. Great Britain 

and France attempted to impose their views of political 

legitimacy on the region with Sykes-Picot.2

 This was opposed by President Woodrow Wilson, and ever since the 

United States has been reluctantly supporting borders 

that are increasingly maligned with ethnic, religious, and 

other factional forces. To many Arabs, the Sykes-Picot 

Agreement represents a Western betrayal and the first in 

a series of intrusions.

 Many saw the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 

as another Western intrusion, one that dramatically 

increased sectarian tensions. Iraq had been a Shia 

majority country led by Saddam, a Sunni Ba’athist. 

The Sunnis were marginalized politically, socially, 

and economically once Saddam was overthrown. 

This increased the insurgency as disaffected sheikhs 

and tribespeople resented the new political order and 

foreign occupation of lands. This insurgency grew to 

become al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), led by Abu Musab 

al-Zarqawi. Sectarian violence came to a head in 2006, 

where 30 to 40 attacks occurred daily in the western 

Al Anbar Province.3

In early 2007, the Bush administration deployed an 

additional 20,000 to 30,000 troops to Iraq—a decision 

Figure 1. Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916

RUSSIA

PERSIA

ARABIA

A ZONE

B ZONE

RED ZONE

EGYPT

ANATOLIA

BLUE ZONE

Tabriz

Baghdad

Basra

Kuwait

Amman

Jerusalem Gaza Direct British

Control

British Influence

Damascus

Beirut

Adana

Aleppo Mosul

French Influence

Direct French Control

0 100 200 300 km
inss.dodlive.mil dh No. 77 3 

commonly referred to as “the surge.” The troop surge 

managed the increase in sectarian violence. The Anbar 

Awakening, the preexisting U.S. operation in Anbar, ran 

in tandem with the surge. U.S. forces worked with the 

Sunni tribes of the province to fight against AQI. These 

coalitions of local security forces, known as the Sahwa 

or the Sons of Iraq, stood more for the rejection of AQI 

than the reception of U.S. objectives. The Sahwa proved 

crucial to the sharp reduction in sectarian violence after 

March 2007. Anbar Province was officially transferred 

back to the Iraqi government on September 1, 2008.

The region started to erupt again in December 2010 

as the Arab Spring movement spread from Tunisia to 

Egypt and beyond. Civil protests against the regime of 

Syrian President Bashar al-Asad began in March 2011, 

but after violent government crackdowns, devolved 

into civil war. The opposition was initially comprised of 

groups such as the al-Nusra Front and the Free Syrian 

Army. However, members of the AQI regrouped and regained strength in Syria and mounted an independent 

offensive of both sides. AQI became the Islamic State 

of Iraq and al-Sham in 2012. ISIS grew more powerful 

due to the porous border between Syria and Iraq and the 

spillover from the civil war. 

Identity

The issue of self-identity in the Middle East complicates the situation due to the sociopolitical and ethnic 

structures within the region. One’s identity informs allegiances to country, institutions, and norms. Within the 

Middle East, individuals typically avow a layered identity 

of pan-national, national, and subnational. For example, 

an Iraqi may view himself or herself as simultaneously 

Arab, Iraqi, and Sunni. The complicated nature manifests 

when questioning which sub-identity becomes the individuals’ primary identity and driving force.

Relating to a primary identity at a higher level, pannational or national, could bring greater unity. Believing oneself to be Iraqi or Arab first highlights the general similarities over the base differences that primary 

subnational identities accentuate. However, in practice, 

connections to national identity, and its subsequent institutions, tend to be flimsy at best.4

 Whether privately 

or publicly, many people in the region tend to primarily 

identify with their subnational identity, be it Sunni, Shia, 

Christian, or Kurd.5 This practice features predominantly 

in Syria and Iraq. 

 Strong subnational identities tend to be divisive 

and lead to violence and conflict. These divisions correspond with the crisis in Syria and Iraq, a crisis largely 

fueled by sectarian tensions. ISIS, a Sunni jihadist organization, actively targets Shia in its military campaign 

to avenge its feelings of marginalization. The subnational divide instills ISIS with more power, one of the 

group’s greatest tools.

The Islamic State of Iraq and

al-Sham

Background. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham 

is a violent offshoot of al Qaeda known for its brutal 

tactics and crimes against civilians. Ayman al-Zawahiri, 

head of al Qaeda Central, distanced himself from the organization as early as 2007 because of these tactics. Instead of following Zawahiri’s prescribed slow strategies 

of societal embeddedness to rally support, ISIS does the 

opposite by pushing a harsher strategy of violence and 

risking the loss of public approval.

ISIS (or AQI) initially manifested out of the turmoil surrounding the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 

and grew as the sectarian tensions mounted. The insurgent 

group opposed foreign occupation and integrated highprofile attacks of civilian contractors and aid workers into 

whether privately or publicly, 

many people in the region tend 

to primarily identify with their 

subnational identity, be it Sunni, 

Shia, Christian, or Kurd
4 dh No. 77 inss.dodlive.mil

its strategy. Its targeting of Shi’ites was a major contributing factor in the Iraqi sectarian civil war that peaked 

in 2007. The group’s ranks greatly diminished from the 

U.S. troop surge and the Sahwa’s counterterrorism efforts. 

However, ISIS mounted a comeback due to the institutional marginalization of Sunnis by the government of 

Nouri al-Maliki, and the civil uprising in Syria. Sectarian 

attacks increased again in Iraq in 2012 after the United 

States had fully withdrawn from the country.6

Instruments of Power. ISIS’s campaigns in Syria 

and Iraq have been remarkable for the group’s application of four instruments of power: military, economic, 

political, and informational. Under the direction of 

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS advanced common jihadist ideas in a short period to achieve what no other insurgency has been able to do: establish an Islamic caliphate. Combining innovative technological strategies 

with strong force, intimidation, and financial resources, 

ISIS projects power.

Military Power. ISIS’s surge through northern Iraq 

greatly affected its projection of power on global, regional, and local communities. This surge became notable for 

several reasons: its short length, the relative number of 

forces in comparison to the Iraqi forces, and the ability 

to adapt on the battlefield. ISIS made great gains in a 

short time with about 10,000 troops using intimidation 

and traditional and social media to inflate its power. Its 

gains came somewhat easily due to the ineffectiveness of 

the Iraqi army, as 4 of 14 divisions “virtually abandoned 

their posts, stripped off their uniforms and fled when 

confronted in cities such as Mosul and Tikrit by militant 

groups.”7

 Although the problems with the national army 

are representative of a larger endemic problem of broken 

leadership, morale, and systems, ISIS could still take advantage of the situation.

After the Iraqi troops abandoned their weapons, the 

insurgents were able to retrieve many American- and 

Western-made weapons. ISIS held several parades and 

made propaganda videos to show off its spoils as a way 

to further project military power and to humiliate the 

United States and its allies for its past efforts in Iraq. The 

insurgents transformed into more than a terrorist group, 

but a full-blown military. As Washington Post foreign affairs writer Terrence McCoy wrote, “What was recently 

Figure 2. Sunni and Shia Muslim Distribution
inss.dodlive.mil dh No. 77 5 

a ragtag cadre of former al-Qaeda operatives has now 

morphed into a transnational, fully militarized and very 

rich operation. . . . It makes al-Qaeda look like a bunch of 

wannabe jihadists.”8 This is in part due to a covert Central 

Intelligence Agency train-and-equip program in Jordan 

where the U.S. Government believed that it was secretly 

ramping up aid to the “moderate” Syrian rebels. Only the 

truly prescient saw that this training would produce a 

cadre that might ultimately join the ISIS fighting force.9

The group’s gains in the northern Iraqi towns of 

Sinjar, Wana, and Zumar, as well as its advances into 

Kurdistan and Lebanon, demonstrate ISIS’s military 

might. The ability to push back the Kurdish peshmerga 

stands as a significant example due to the strong training and substantial weaponry of the latter forces. The 

recent seizure of the hydroelectric dam in northern 

Iraq highlights the inadequacies of the Iraqi army in 

the matchup with ISIS militarily. This calls into question any U.S. military action to address options on the 

ground. Even General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, most recently warned against 

“‘precipitous’ military action and said that the United 

States ‘should take the longer view’ on how to roll back 

the Islamic State fighters.”10

Economic Power. ISIS’s main forms of economic 

power come from its other types of power. The group 

took control of some facets of oil production and supply through force and actively fundraises through social 

media. Currently, ISIS loots oil from pipelines, fields, 

and storage tanks within its Iraqi territory and sells it 

to smugglers and intermediaries in Iraqi Kurdistan for 

$26 a barrel. Some Kurds then refine it and sell it for 

$63 a barrel. These operations are lucrative, providing 

the insurgent group with a million dollars per day. The 

group also sells oil and liquid gas from Syrian fields, 

but more for internal purposes as Syrian oil is lower in 

overall quality.11

ISIS uses force to extort funds through taxes from 

local businesses and, as of late, has threatened Iraqi 

Christians and other religious minorities who refuse to 

convert to Islam with a nonconversion tax. It also sells 

electricity from its captured power plants in Syria. While 

these current practices bolster its bottom line, they do 

not do much to rally support from the local community. 

Only the sale of electricity helps to provide services in its 

controlled territory, but likely not enough to counterbalance the other projections of economic power through 

force. The black market and limited effectiveness of the 

U.S. sanctioned regime toward Iran suggest that this instrument will be circumscribed in its application toward 

a nonstate such as ISIS.

Political Power. ISIS’s ultimate political power to 

date comes from its ability to assert its claims for an 

Islamic caliphate under sharia law in its occupied territories. Although it took the area with military might 

and technological savviness, its political power and 

ability to work with local Sunni tribes and militants 

strengthened its aims to install the caliphate. Experts 

say that there are as many as 16 Sunni Arab groups 

working in Mosul beside ISIS, including former 

Ba’athists. These base alliances, however, are unlikely 

to last; ISIS does not want to share power, and each 

faction does not hold the same objective. Some of the 

groups have already started to splinter in response to 

the radicalism engendered by ISIS.12

The challenge to the continued power projection 

will be the Islamic State’s transition into a bureaucratic 

institution. Although governing in Syria, providing some 

services and implementing a sharia-based government, 

there are many barriers to sustainability. Fractions to the 

Sunni base, a rise in an Iranian-backed Shia militancy, 

the black market and limited 

effectiveness of the U.S. sanctioned 

regime toward Iran suggest that this 

instrument will be circumscribed 

in its application toward a nonstate 

such as ISIS
6 dh No. 77 inss.dodlive.mil

and the demand to provide continual and improved services for local communities could and likely will challenge ISIS. A fraction or rise of a Shia militancy may 

cause more violence or upheaval, whereas a failure to 

provide adequate services will precipitate the loss of support. Both or either could be a blow to ISIS’s mid- to 

long-term power or general structures.

The weakness of the Nouri al-Maliki government 

was, and uncertainty regarding the Haider al-Abadi government is all about inclusiveness, or lack thereof. This 

has made channeling military support problematic, but 

also calls into question whether such an instrument of 

power can have any effectiveness whatsoever.

Informational Power. ISIS’s handle on the dissemination of information and propaganda is perhaps 

its greatest strength, and strongest contribution to its 

growth in power. The group has embraced social media 

as a weapon of war, using it to spread official messages, 

recruit, fundraise, and network.13 Its campaigns have the 

benefit of being widespread and multidimensional, bearing a massive effect. Other revolutionary or insurgent 

campaigns have not been quite as global or allowed for 

the same level of popular feedback or interaction. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini built revolutionary fervor in 

the 1970s by recording speeches on cassette tapes and 

distributing them widely throughout the mosques and 

bazaars in Iran, but spouted a unidirectional message. 

Other local jihadist movements have grown through 

meetings in mosques, but despite the opportunities for 

multidimensional input, they fail to make an impact outside of their immediate communities. Even in the digital 

age, insurgent groups such as al Qaeda have not adopted 

social media to the same extent that ISIS has. In the past, 

groups used closed, password-protected online forums 

that do not foster growth or power in the same way. 

Instead, ISIS uses its propaganda machine to enhance its power projection by instilling fear, lauding 

objectives, glorifying jihad, and even exaggerating themselves in traditional media. Its chosen platforms and viral 

style of messaging have a broad reach and enable multidimensional communication, exponentially spreading 

and enhancing its aims.

Masters of Messaging, 

Technology, and Social Media

ISIS employs its communications and social media 

campaigns in an exceptionally professional and sophisticated manner. Its propaganda, recruitment, and information operations are well conceived, slickly produced, and 

strategically circulated. The group has constructed interdependent networks for fast, real-time responses, and 

learned to adapt readily to adverse events, such as online 

account closures. ISIS displays a clever understanding of 

the media, allowing for innovation, manipulation, and 

exploitation of the message. The group’s immensely effective digital jihadist campaign set the new precedent 

for Islamic groups worldwide.

Messaging. ISIS’s aims are not unique. It sought to 

establish an Islamic caliphate across the region based on 

an extreme interpretation of sharia law for all Muslims. 

It partially accomplished this objective in a majority of 

Syria and Iraq, but still seeks to expand its territory. 

The group called for an official holy war, and demanded 

that Muslims worldwide pledge their allegiance to the 

caliphate and to al-Baghdadi. Despite the rhetoric supporting all Muslims, however, ISIS’s central leadership 

continues to speak ill of the Shia, deeming them heretics 

and deserving of death. The group opted to transcend 

nationalism in an effort to attract global support, but 

continues to push the sectarian divide. This contradictory sentiment appears prevalently in official statements 

from the Islamic State. In an early release from official 

spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, he calls for 

unity, speaking highly of abandoning nationalism for 

ISIS has embraced social media as 

a weapon of war, using it to spread 

official messages, recruit, fundraise, 

and network
inss.dodlive.mil dh No. 77 7 

the cause, yet still mentions the general humiliation of 

the Shia. In the statement, al-Adnani concludes, “We 

ask Allah [the Exalted] to make [Ramadan] a month of 

victory, honor, and consolidation for the Muslims, and 

make its days and nights a curse for the rafidah [Shia], 

the sahwat [Awakening councils, Sons of Iraq], and the 

murtaddin [apostates].”14 He makes it evident that the 

Islamic caliphate is not for all Muslims but those who 

follow the teachings of ISIS’s version of sharia, further 

illustrating the stark divide along subnational identity 

lines in Syria and Iraq.

ISIS’s other primary anti-Western messages are 

similarly not unique, but are tried and true. Given the 

role of the United States and its allies in Iraq and the 

region as a whole, the West makes an easy target of derision and common rallying point in recruitment. For ISIS, 

the West is a collection of oppressors: those who impose 

colonial borders, those who do not believe in Allah, and 

those who fight Islam. In this framing, it becomes easy 

to increase forces with the levels of disaffected Sunnis 

in the region and alienated Muslim youth in the world.

Technology Innovation. “Dawn of Glad Tidings,” a 

Twitter application, has been ISIS’s primary technological innovation to date. The app connected a supporter with 

the group’s main communication arm as it posts tweets 

on a user’s behalf. Before the Android store removed it 

for violating terms of service, at its height the app posted 

40,000 tweets in 1 day from the battlefield using countless users’ accounts. Many organizations use this type of 

app to tweet on a user’s behalf to rally support for campaigns frequently. However, the innovation comes from 

ISIS’s intense usage of the app in such a calculated way. 

Its strategic use of hashtags in these tweets caused each 

to trend on Twitter, promoting further engagement of 

the topic and bringing more notice to the cause.15 It can 

seamlessly draw more fighters to its movement by showing deaths, explosions, arrests, and perceived injustices to 

an instant worldwide audience. Dawn of Glad Tidings 

represented a tool that allowed ISIS to streamline and 

broaden its online communication as it built its movement. The removal of the app from the Android market 

did not hamper its digital and social media efforts—it 

just forced further strategic innovation.

Social Media Communication and Recruitment.

Arguably, ISIS makes the largest impact on Twitter. It 

holds about a dozen accounts from central leadership, all 

focused on different aspects: official messages from leaders, recruitment, networking, intimidation, or religious 

themes. The al-Hayat Media Center maintains half of 

the pages and focuses on recruiting Westerners. The pages provide content in English, German, Danish, French, 

and Russian. The al-Battar Media Group pages centers 

on mobilization, and ISIS also maintains local pages to 

curry favor at home.16

The main benefit of social media is the democratization of the messaging. Previously, other groups’ jihadist 

messages only disseminated through official channels 

and by designated leaders. Now average supporters can 

positively contribute to this campaign by adding their 

own content, retweeting official tweets, or using popular 

hashtags. It enables the recruitment to be more sincere 

and the message to be richer as it comes from mujahideen on the battlefield instead of an isolated leader. Yet 

democratization has a downside; it also allows for the 

corruption or faction of ISIS’s official messaging by activists with their own agendas, or by people co-opting 

and repurposing the content and hashtags for their own 

objectives. The group’s campaigns have not been co-opted yet as its networks and online presence is strong. An 

effective faction or counter-campaign would require a 

groundswell of popular support.17

 Social media analytics of past hashtag campaigns, 

particularly #AllEyesOnISIS, indicate that about 20 

ISIS’s strategic use of hashtags in 

these tweets caused each to trend 

on Twitter, promoting further 

engagement of the topic and 

bringing more notice to the cause
8 dh No. 77 inss.dodlive.mil

percent of the tweet volume in a given period belongs 

to a base number of users. Therefore, a small number of 

people are driving the core of the output, which suggests 

that ISIS’s communications are not completely grassroots or horizontal. However, this reinforces the group’s 

high level of comprehensive strategy, as only about onefifth of its Twitter audience drives the campaign with the 

remainder helping it to spread.

ISIS also attempted to repurpose established and 

innocuous hashtags to assert its power and expand 

its audience in untouched markets. It co-opted some 

of the World Cup hashtags, such as #Brazil2014 or 

#WC2014, in a strategic move to intimidate and recruit 

Westerners. Any Twitter user browsing those hashtags 

could find ISIS’s tweets of brutality among the normal World Cup tweets. ISIS attempted to make the 

hashtags about them instead of the World Cup. The 

group seized the opportunity to release a video (accompanied by World Cup hashtags) called There is No Life 

without Jihad, depicting British jihadists already on the 

frontlines, in hopes of inspiring more to join them.18

It also notoriously tweeted a picture of a severed head, 

saying, “This is our ball . . . it is made of skin. #WorldCup #WorldCup2014.” The grotesque image went viral, and led to several account closures, but not before 

ISIS spread its image.

The group also uses the social photosharing platform 

Instagram as a means to share visually its message of injustice and jihad with the world. Instagram allows foreign 

jihadists to narrate personal stories or details of their daily 

lives. Among the plethora of photos of weapons, bullets, 

or consequences of battle, there are images of jihadists 

enjoying food, adapting to life on the frontlines. There 

are even cat photos. These users represent the success of 

ISIS’s campaign: recruited young foreign fighters, ready 

for combat, used as pieces of propaganda and intimidation 

to spread further the word of jihad.

Ground soldiers recruit through the relatively new 

platform Ask.fm. Geared toward teenagers, the site enables users to ask questions of other users anonymously. 

The tool becomes useful in its anonymity and allows 

would-be Western jihadists the chance to ask pertinent 

logistical questions, such as what they should bring, what 

kind of artillery they will receive upon arrival, and the 

best route to enter Syria. Fellow Western jihadists answer their questions, but when the answers require specificity, the soldiers transfer over to Kik, an anonymous 

instant messaging service.19 Abu Abdullah al-Brittani 

(@AbuDujanaBritani) has been one of the primary 

contributors, but an American, Abu Turab (@abumuhajir1), and another Briton Abu Uthman al-Britani (@

Uthaman) have been very active on the site as of this 

writing. The anonymity of Ask.fm and Kik deters undercover agents from finding the jihadists and adds personal 

touches for recruitment. Instead of waiting for foreign 

fighters to heed a general call, this gives those interested 

a chance to ask questions in a safe space. Moreover, the 

group’s presence on Ask.fm, a platform primarily used 

by teenagers, reinforces the idea that young men are the 

target audience, and the key to winning the fight.

ISIS’s social media accounts across all platforms (especially Twitter) are deleted only after they upload particularly gruesome posts. As a policy, the social networking 

companies do not proactively monitor user content and 

instead ask users to report instances of abuse or offensive 

matter. Any account closure, particularly on Twitter, does 

not amount to a loss; ISIS creates a new group with a 

similar user handle and regains its tens of thousands of 

followers within days. Its networks are so well connected 

and content interdependent that users do not have to 

work hard to discover new accounts. Trying to close every account would be time consuming, ineffective, and 

ISIS’s presence on Ask.fm, a platform 

primarily used by teenagers, 

reinforces the idea that young men 

are the target audience, and the key 

to winning the fight
inss.dodlive.mil dh No. 77 9 

fruitless.20 In this way, the insurgents would always be able 

to stay ahead and control the message. Moreover, analysts 

in the Intelligence Community have stated that they want 

the accounts to remain online as they serve as the best tool 

for them to understand the group’s motivations, strengths, 

tactics, networks, and hierarchies.21 However, this leaves 

open the possibility that more Western jihadists will be recruited, reinforcing the threat to the United States. Therefore, the United States must proactively combat this with 

an even stronger, slicker, and faster counter-campaign to 

prevent this from happening.

ISIS’s use of video represents its other effective form 

of propaganda and recruitment. Historically, jihadist 

movements adopted video content as an important part 

of their strategy, but ISIS’s embrace of social media and 

youth culture gave these videos a new videogame-like 

quality. As with Twitter, ISIS uses YouTube and other 

video platforms to spread visual and often graphic messages of intimidation, religious justification, and recruitment. It used a video to show al-Baghdadi giving a public sermon soon after the establishment of the Islamic 

caliphate. It enhanced his profile and brought him out 

of the shadows. It also used video to decry the “imperial” 

Sykes-Picot Agreement by touring the now nonexistent 

borders to highlight its power.

Clanging of the Swords IV, a subtitled hour-long violent video, best exemplifies ISIS’s use of video propaganda. It aims to ennoble the fight and bring in Western recruits. The well-produced video graphically depicts Shia 

deaths from gun battles, instant replays of explosions, 

and “earned justice” from targeted killings of Sahwa or 

Iraqi military officers. The explosions of buildings and 

vehicles, played on repeat and in slow motion, appear to 

be something from a Hollywood action film or a videogame such as Call of Duty. An exclamation of “Allahu 

Akbar!” (“God is great!”) accompanies each death and 

explosion, repeating every instant replay. This further instills its message and objectives by creating a Pavlovianlike response of praising Allah for every violent action.

These repeated images do nothing but glorify ISIS’s 

brutal acts, helping to make the group more appealing 

to younger people through the shine of editing and 

production. Current neuroscientific research suggests 

that teenagers’ brains are wired differently than those 

of adults, as younger people lack the adult capacity for 

complex reasoning—and are thus more susceptible to 

emotional appeals. Similarly, teenagers’ frontal lobes, 

the portion of the brain responsible for measuring consequences and morality of choices, do not fully form 

until one’s 20s.22 These differences indicate that younger people are less able to distinguish right from wrong 

and are more susceptible to coercion and suggestion 

than adults. While it may be a reach to suggest youth 

lack such basic capacities to discern right from wrong, 

current research would cause one to pause about the 

messaging and its target audience’s receptivity. Given 

Western involvement in the region, and general global 

Islamophobia, there exists a higher incidence of disaffected Muslim youth who could be more attracted to 

these messages. The design of Clanging of the Swords IV

and similar videos further underscores ISIS’s targeting 

of young people to ensure its sustainability and longterm goals.

The video also prominently features imagery consistent 

with major messaging themes: foreign fighters ripping up 

passports while decrying borders, broad humiliation and 

brutalization of Shias and secularists, forced repentance and 

integration of Sahwa forces to avoid death, and veneration 

of al-Baghdadi and his leadership. These portions of the 

video are less to excite viscerally potential recruits but to entice, justify, and glorify further acts in the name of jihad and 

Allah. The forced repentance particularly bolsters its power, 

historically, jihadist movements 

adopted video content as an 

important part of their strategy, but 

ISIS’s embrace of social media and 

youth culture gave these videos a 

new videogame-like quality
10 dh No. 77 inss.dodlive.mil

as it depicts the “willing” conversion of many “traitors”; otherwise, they face death. Moreover, few jihadists mention 

dying or sacrificing oneself for the cause. For those disaffected youth, these images, paired with the soaring rhetoric 

of extremists, would be a powerful draw as they are nearly 

promised supremacy over the Shia, the unfaithful, and traitors. For those considering joining the jihad, pious appeals 

to Allah in the name of justice and victory in Clanging of the 

Swords IV become a draw: “Through [fighting], my religion 

has been strengthened and the tyrants have been humiliated. So rise up . . . to the path of the courageous.”23

Aside from long-form videos, the al-Hayat Media 

Center creates the increasingly popular spate of short 

propaganda videos, mujatweets. These high-quality morsels average a minute in length and aim to portray the 

softer side of ISIS. One depicts ISIS fighters handing 

out ice cream and candy to overjoyed children (and ends 

with the kids yelling a jihadist chant); a restaurant owner 

in al-Raqqa affirming the improvement to the community’s safety and general welfare since ISIS’s arrival; a 

jihadi visiting the wounded in the hospital; a personal 

invitation to join from a French ISIS fighter; and an informal parade through a thriving market in al-Raqqa, 

where the soldiers brandish guns to the delight of children. The videos are short and well made, speaking to the 

youthful target audience. Some feature Western fighters, 

adjusted and flourishing in their new environs. They also 

show how prosperous al-Raqqa, the caliphate’s de facto 

capital, remained under its leadership and government. 

Aside from appealing to Westerners for recruitment purposes, the mujatweets also serve to represent the caliphate’s stability, prosperity, and strength of leadership. They 

attempt to counteract the gruesome content and press 

by proving the group’s kindness and popularity and convince skeptics of its strength. If anything, ISIS seeks to 

prove that it is not a sinking ship and well in control of 

its current territory. 

New and Old Borders

Currently, the Islamic caliphate and its immediate 

vicinity represent a borderless region. Even the Turkish 

border appears largely porous, despite the lack of complete ISIS control. This enables supplies, funds, and most 

importantly, jihadists from entering (or exiting) the territory with relative ease. Many have wondered what the 

map of the new region will look like, whether it will return to the Sykes-Picot status quo, adapt to the new lines 

of the Islamic caliphate as it stands, or perhaps follow 

ethno-religious lines.

The situation in al-Sham compares to the story 

of Humpty Dumpty: a fragile circumstance prone to 

fracture that cannot easily be repaired, despite everyone’s best efforts. Therefore, one must consider 

how best to manage the situation in order to avoid 

refracture.

There are three possible scenarios of what a new 

regional map will look like: perfect, manageable, and 

a disaster. The perfect map remains unknown, but a 

disaster map likely resembles the Sykes-Picot status 

quo. After all this turmoil, no change will just lead 

to more jihadist upheaval in the future. A manageable map endures as a question as well. Many have 

advocated for a partitioned map based on sectarian 

lines. Although this might solve basic problems, this 

will only likely further enflame the sectarian divide 

and force a primary subnational identity as a national 

identity. This would be more complicated in mixed 

cities such as Baghdad, where partition would be difficult, if not impossible.

Recommendations

ISIS finds its main source of power through its projections. It manipulates social and mainstream media to 

appear more powerful militarily, economically, politically, 

and informationally. With a slick and proactive digital 

propaganda campaign, it will only continue to attract 

more followers if left unabated.

ISIS does remain a threat to the United States due 

to its appeal to Westerners. People with Western passports continue to arrive in Syria to train on a regular 

basis, and then could return to their home countries to 

spread jihad. While we cannot always prevent this from 
inss.dodlive.mil dh No. 77 11 

happening, we can ramp up our efforts to try to dissuade 

these young men and women from going in the first place.

Launch a Strategic Counterpropaganda Campaign.

Our recommendations focus on counterbalancing ISIS’s 

power projections. ISIS revolutionized the usage of messaging; therefore, we must embrace these technologies and 

similarly exploit them. The United States needs a slicker, 

faster counterpropaganda campaign, not hokey or reactive 

but a step ahead or similarly attractive to the target audience. Our defense agencies must seize the initiative with 

our own powerful and focused narrative broadcast on these 

new communication mediums. Former press secretary and 

Fox News correspondent Dana Perino reinforced the idea 

of honing a digital strategy to combat this recruitment 

challenge on August 20, 2014, on The Five.

24

The State Department already started a similar program on Twitter called “Think AgainTurn Away” (@ThinkAgain_DOS) that responds directly to users who tweet projihadist content. Those behind the Think Again program 

respond with realistic information about the actions of the 

groups, ensuring those users understand the true gravity of 

their words. In a recent reply to a tweet about the ummah

standing up for the oppressed Muslims and uniting to fight 

the enemies of Allah, Think Again wrote: “[N]o one in recent history has oppressed Muslims like #ISIS—That’s why 

the majority of Muslims are united against its barbarism.” 

While a strong step in the right direction, it remains reactive.

The Think Again campaign, or any similar campaign, 

should expand on its proactive content, similar to the mujatweets made by ISIS. It should target the same audience, 

developing its content to highlight more than the negative 

aspects of jihad and insurgent groups: the high probability 

of death, grave consequences, legal ramifications, brutality, 

and other stark realities glossed over by ISIS messaging. 

The messaging must strike a balance between condemnation and placidity to avoid sounding too much like a lecture. Excessive castigation would turn people off and not 

allow for engagement. The campaign should subtly promote Western values and efforts, and any videos should 

look like a videogame. The United States could enhance 

the use of frank photos and depictions of dead jihadists by 

creating memes that could go viral and speak to a younger 

audience. It could also borrow imagery from a recent Iraqi 

television propaganda commercial where lions and eagles 

fight rats (the Americans and Iraqi forces battling the 

invading ISIS)25 to make a symbolic and lighter meme. 

The content and form must be multidirectional so users 

engage with it instead of ignore it. The #No2ISIS hashtag 

campaign used by civilian activists could be an established 

platform to build on. The campaign should also expand its 

practice onto other platforms, including Facebook and Instagram, to ensure that it reaches as many youths as possible.

To accomplish this, the campaign will have to step outside of formal bureaucratic channels. The State Department 

has already begun this process by awarding a half-million 

dollar contract to a Virginia-based firm to run Think Again. 

This should be enhanced. With agency oversight, the campaign should be able to move forward to react in near real-time. The United States must be as nimble, if not more 

nimble, than ISIS’s communications arm to deter and attract 

would-be jihadists from deploying to Syria.

Invest in Open Source Resources. Secondly, we recommend a greater investment in open source programs and 

social media tracking systems for intelligence services. The 

current crisis highlights the changing tide of warfare where a 

good deal of the battle has been fought online and in public. 

Intelligence analysts have been able to use the Internet and 

social media platforms to gather data about its targets on 

a grand scale. We will require greater investment in understanding social media analytics, platforms, and messaging. 

These expanded resources will best enable our defense forces 

to fight crises like these now and in the future. 

These two steps could launch an approach that addresses terrorism at its roots—its message and recruitment 

messaging must strike a balance 

between condemnation and 

placidity to avoid sounding too 

much like a lecture
12 dh No. 77 inss.dodlive.mil

methods. While lethal force against known terrorists has 

a purpose, it comes too late to serve as the cornerstone of 

a winning strategy. Our values demand an increase focus 

on telling our story.

Notes

1 The insurgent group most recently changed its name to Islamic 

State or IS; however, in this paper we refer to the group by its most 

common and colloquial name of ISIS.

2 David Ignatius, “Rethinking Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points,” The 

Washington Post, July 8, 2014.

3 Jeff Seiken, “Anbar Awakening,” in The Iraq War Encyclopedia, ed. 

Thomas R. Mockaitis, 13–16 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2013).

4 Jonathan Spyer, Syria Futures Roundtable, National Defense 

University, Washington, DC, July 14, 2014.

5 Prominent Iraqi pollster Munqith al-Dagher found in a recent 

poll that both Sunni and Shia identify as Iraqi first, whereas the Kurdish 

do not. Anecdotal evidence finds the opposite to be true of Sunnis and 

Shia. This begs the question of public versus private identity. Munqith alDagher, “ISIL in Iraq: A disease or just the symptoms? A public opinion 

analysis,” lecture at Freedom House, Washington, DC, June 26, 2014.

6 Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, Islamic State in Iraq 

and Greater Syria (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 

Updated June 12, 2014). 

7 Eric Schmitt and Michael R. Gordon, “The Iraqi Army Was 

Crumbling Long Before Its Collapse, U.S. Officials Say,” The New York 

Times, June 12, 2014. 

8 Terrence McCoy, “Islamic State ‘now controls resources and territory unmatched in history of extremist organizations,’” The Washington 

Post, August 4, 2014. 

9 See Greg Miller, “CIA Ramping Up Covert Training Program 

for Moderate Syrian Rebels,” The Washington Post, October 2, 2013; and 

Tom Bowman and Alice Fordham, “CIA Is Quietly Ramping Up Aid 

To Syrian Rebels, Sources Say,” National Public Radio, April 23, 2014. 

See also for further discussion Barry Donegan, “Did the US Train ISIS 

Rebels to Fight Against Syria?” BenSwann.com, June 18, 2014, available 

at <http://benswann.com/did-the-us-train-isis-rebels-to-fight-againstassad-in-syria/>; Garth Kant, “Dems, GOP Blast Obama War Plan,” 

WND.com, September 18, 2014, available at <www.wnd.com/2014/09/

dems-gop-blast-obama-war-plan/>; Melissa Melton, “You Do Realize 

that the US Funded and Trained ISIS, Right?” FreedomOutpost.com, August 23, 2014, available at <http://freedomoutpost.com/2014/08/you-dorealize-that-the-us-funded-and-trained-isis-right/>; and Aaron Klein, 

“Blowback! U.S. Trained Islamists Who Joined ISIS,” FreedomOutpost.

com, June 17, 2014, available at <http://freedomoutpost.com/2014/08/

you-do-realize-that-the-us-funded-and-trained-isis-right/>.

10 David Ignatius, “Red alert on the Islamic State,” The Washington 

Post, August 1, 2014. 

11 Gregory Gause III, Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle 

East Cold War, Analysis Paper No. 11 (Doha, Qatar: Brookings Doha 

Center, July 2014). 

12 Denise Natali, Iraq’s Fragmentation and the Islamic State Threat, 

Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) Trip Report (Washington, DC: INSS, July 23, 2014).

13 Rita Katz, “Follow ISIS on Twitter: A Special Report on the 

Use of Social Media by Jihadists,” Insite Blog on Terrorism & Extremism, SITE Intelligence Group, June 26, 2014, available at <https://news.

siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/entry/192-follow-isis-on-twitter>.

14 Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, “This is the Promise of Allah,” 

SITE Intel Group, available at <https://news.siteintelgroup.com/

Jihadist-News/isis-spokesman-declares-caliphate-rebrands-group-asislamic-state.html>.

15 J.M. Berger, “How ISIS Games Twitter,” The Atlantic, June 16, 2014. 

16 Katz.

17 Shiraz Maher and Joseph Carter, “Analyzing the ISIS ‘Twitter 

Storm,’” War on the Rocks, June 24, 2014, available at <http://warontherocks.com/2014/06/analyzing-the-isis-twitter-storm/>.

18 Cahal Milmo, “Isis jihadists using World Cup and Premier 

League hashtags to promote extremist propaganda on Twitter,” The 

Independent (UK), June 22, 2014. 

19 John Hall, “’Come and get your AK47, your grenades and your 

vest pack’: British ISIS fighter lured underage jihadist away from his 

parents with travel advice on reaching Middle East,” The Daily Mail

(UK), June 24, 2014.

20 Ronan Farrow, “Like. Share. Kill.” The Washington Post, July 13, 2014. 

21 Colin Daileda and Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, “U.S. Intelligence Officials Want ISIL Fighters to Keep Tweeting,” Mashable.

com, July 11, 2014, available at <http://mashable.com/2014/07/11/uswants-iraq-radicals-to-tweet/>.

22 Jack Dickey, “The Antisocial Network,” Time, June 26, 2014.

23 Clanging of the Swords IV, LiveLeak video, 1:02:22, English 

subtitles.

24 Dana Perino, “Reaction to savage murder of American journalist James Foley,” The Five, Fox News, August 20, 2014, available at 

<www.foxnews.com/on-air/the-five/transcript/2014/08/20/reactionsavage-murder-american-journalist-james-foley>.

25 Anti-ISIS Propaganda on Iraqi television, Al-Furat television 

via MEMRI, 00:56, English subtitles, available at <www.memritv.org/

clip/en/4450.htm>.

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