No. 03-15-00222-CR

In the

COURT OF APPEALS

For the

THIRD SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT

at Austin

______________________________________

On Appeal from the 277th Judicial District Court of

Williamson County, Texas

Cause Number 13-1923-K277

______________________________________

MONTE KEN ROSS, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

_____________________________________

ANDERS BRIEF IN SUPPORT

OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW

_____________________________________

Counsel for Appellant KRISTEN JERNIGAN

Monte Ken Ross ATTORNEY AT LAW

STATE BAR NUMBER 90001898

207 S. AUSTIN AVE.

GEORGETOWN, TEXAS 78626

(512) 904-0123

(512) 931-3650 (FAX)

Kristen@txcrimapp.com

ACCEPTED

03-15-00222-CR

7547866

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

10/26/2015 6:04:32 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 10/26/2015 6:04:32 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
ii

IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1, a complete list of the 

names of all interested parties is provided below so the members of this Honorable 

Court may at once determine whether they are disqualified to serve or should 

recuse themselves from participating in the decision of this case.

Appellant:

Monte Ken Ross

Counsel for Appellant:

Cesar Rodriguez (at trial) Marc Ranc (at trial)

812 San Antonio 1307 Nueces Street

Austin, Texas 78701 Austin, Texas 78701

Kristen Jernigan (on appeal)

207 S. Austin Ave.

Georgetown, Texas 78626

Counsel for Appellee, The State of Texas:

Lytza Rojas (at trial)

Josh Reno (at trial)

John Prezas (on appeal)

Williamson County

Assistant District Attorneys

405 Martin Luther King

Georgetown, Texas 78626

Trial Court Judge:

The Honorable Stacey Mathews

277th Judicial District Court
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iv

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

ISSUE PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

PROFESSIONAL EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

POTENTIAL ERRORS CONSIDERED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

NOTICE TO APPELLANT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

PRAYER FOR RELIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
iv

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASES

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7, 8

McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District I, 486 U.S. 429 (1988). . . . . . . .8

TEXAS CASES 

Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Gaines v. State, 479 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 2003) . . . . . . . . . . 9

Jordan v. State, 495 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Mitchell v. State, 931 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Samuel v. State, 477 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Wilson v. State, 40 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

STATUTES AND RULES

TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. 37.07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. 57.02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6

TEX. PENAL CODE § 3.03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9, 10

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

TEX. R. APP. P. 39.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
v

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 39.1, Oral argument is not 

applicable in the present case.
1

No. 03-15-00222-CR

In the

COURT OF APPEALS

for the

THIRD SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT

at Austin

______________________________________

On Appeal from the 277th Judicial District Court of

Williamson County, Texas

Cause Number 13-1923-K277

______________________________________

MONTE KEN ROSS, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

_____________________________________

ANDERS BRIEF IN SUPPORT

OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL

_____________________________________

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On January 22, 2014, Appellant was indicted for two counts of the felony 

offense of possession of child pornography.

1

 (CR: 13). On January 6, 2015,

Appellant was re-indicted on thirteen counts of possession of child pornography. 

(CR: 51-55). On March 23, 2015, Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the 

allegations in the indictment and on March 24, 2015, a jury found Appellant guilty 

 1 Appellant was re-indicted on September 25, 2014. (CR: 105, 108). The indictment included 

more specific language regarding the manner and means of the commission of the offense. 

(CR: 87). 
2

of those offenses. (CR: 81-94); (RR7: 15). The jury assessed Appellant’s

punishment at ten years in prison on each count. (CR: 101-126). The trial court 

“stacked” five of Appellant’s ten-year sentences and ordered them to run 

consecutively. (CR: 131-154). Appellant timely filed notice of appeal on April 

9, 2015. (CR: 181). This appeal results.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

After voir dire, Appellant made the decision to enter a plea of guilty and 

have the jury assess punishment on all thirteen counts of the offense of possession 

of child pornography as alleged in the indictment. (RR7: 15). After determining 

Appellant was a United States citizen, that he reads and writes the English 

language, and that he has no history of mental illness, the Court advised Appellant 

as to the proper range of punishment. (RR7: 15-16, 19-20). Appellant was 

admonished regarding sex offender registration requirements and the fact that his 

sentences could be ordered to run consecutively. (RR7: 20-24). Appellant then 

knowingly and voluntarily entered guilty pleas in front of the jury after 

arraignment. (RR7: 37-38). The jury found Appellant guilty on all counts and

the punishment phase of the trial commenced. (RR7: 51). 

At the punishment phase of trial, Paul Horn, a detective investigator with the 

Texas Attorney General’s Office testified that on October 29, 2013, a search 
3

warrant was executed at Appellant’s apartment and numerous SD cards, flash 

drives, CDs, DVDs, a cell phone, a web camera, a modem, and computers were 

seized. (RR7: 70-77, 81-85).

Dave Szyperski, a computer forensics analyst with the Texas Attorney 

General’s Office testified that he was assigned to this case in January 2014 and he 

analyzed a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a thumb drive, and a cell phone. 

(RR7: 112-14, 117). During his review of those items, which were entered into 

evidence as items seized pursuant to the search warrant in this case, Szyperski 

discovered eighty-nine images of child pornography. (RR7: 117-18). Those 

images were then showed to the jury. (RR7: 118-142). 

Wesley Hensley, an investigator with the Texas Attorney General’s Office, 

testified that based on his investigation in this case, he obtained a search warrant 

for Appellant’s home. (RR7: 164). When the search warrant was executed, 

Hensley took Appellant out to his Hensley’s vehicle and videotaped a conversation 

between himself and Appellant. (RR7: 168). Hensley stated that Appellant was 

not under arrest, but Hensley read him his Miranda2 warnings anyway and 

Appellant cooperated in giving a statement. (RR7: 168). That statement was 

then played before the jury. (RR7: 171). Hensley and his team then reviewed 

 2

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4

digital media obtained from Appellant’s home which contained images of child 

pornography including images of children engaged in actual and simulated sexual 

intercourse, deviant sexual intercourse, masturbation, and lewd exhibition of 

genitals. (RR7: 171-74). The jury was shown videos, obtained from 

Appellant’s home, in which a ten to twelve year-old girl masturbates and is 

sexually assaulted by an adult male. (RR7: 177-81). The jury was also shown 

photographs, also collected from Appellant’s home, which depict young, nude 

girls. (RR7: 183-90). In two of the photographs, the girls are being sexually 

assaulted by an adult male. (RR7: 183-90).

Darrell Boydston, a retired police officer from the Austin Police 

Department, testified that in August of 1989 he was an investigator of crimes 

against children. (RR8: 15-16). The manager of a Fox Photo lab contacted the 

police and reported that a man had dropped off some film for processing which 

contained images of nude children. (RR8: 16-17). Boydston waited for the man 

to return to pick up the photographs and when he did, Appellant was identified as 

the man who dropped off the film. (RR8: 18). Boydston then arrested 

Appellant who told Boydston who the children in the photographs were. (RR8: 

18-20). There were four children in the photographs who were fourteen, ten, 

eight, and five years old. (RR8: 20-21). 
5

M.L.G.T.3 testified that in 1989, she was either ten or eleven years old and 

lived with her mother, stepfather, and six siblings. (RR8: 28-29). They lived 

approximately one mile from Appellant in Burnet County. (RR8: 30-31). 

Appellant told M.L.G.T. and her family that he was a photographer and once took 

a family picture of them. (RR8: 31). Appellant had a large home and bought 

clothes for the children, took them to church and let them play at his home. 

(RR8: 31-32). Eventually, Appellant began showing slides of his nudist lifestyle 

to the older children. (RR8: 35-36). Appellant even took M.L.G.T. and two of 

her siblings camping at a nudist campsite. (RR8: 37). Appellant then began 

taking pictures of M.L.G.T. and her siblings in the nude. (RR8: 39). 

E.B.4 testified that she is M.L.G.T.’s sister and would also go to Appellant’s 

home to play. (RR8: 51-52). She and her siblings would ride Appellant’s 

horses and do other “fun activities” in the nude at Appellant’s direction. (RR8: 

51-52). Appellant also took E.B. to the nudist camp with some of her siblings. 

(RR8: 53). 

 3

 Since the witness was a child at the time of the alleged extraneous conduct in this case, she 

will be referred to by her initials pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 57.02.

4 Since the witness was a child at the time of the alleged extraneous conduct in this case, she 

will be referred to by her initials pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 57.02.
6

K.S.5 testified that Appellant is her father and that when she was a child, she 

went on a camping trip with her father and some friends from church. (RR8: 78). 

K.S. was eight or nine years old and instructed K.S. to walk around nude. (RR8: 

80). After the camping trip, Appellant began exposing himself to K.S., showing 

her nude pictures of himself, and taking nude pictures of her. (RR8: 82-83). On 

one occasion, Appellant kissed her and touched her vagina. (RR8: 84-85). 

Appellant’s behavior continued until K.S. was a teenager and rejected him. 

(RR8: 92-94). In retaliation, Appellant ran over K.S.’s pet goat with his truck. 

(RR4: 93-94). At the close of K.S.’s testimony, the State rested its case on 

punishment. (RR8: 109-10). 

Dr. Aaron Pierce, a licensed professional counselor and licensed sex 

offender treatment provider, testified that he conducted an evaluation on Appellant 

to determine his risk for committing future sexual offenses, his risk for committing 

general and/or violent offenses, and his prognosis. (RR8: 115). Using 

peer-reviewed, established testing methods, Dr. Pierce determined that Appellant 

was at low risk for committing any general or violent offenses. (RR8: 117-18). 

Dr. Pierce determined Appellant was at moderate risk for committing future sexual 

offenses, but shared that the risk could be lowered with treatment such as 

 

5 Since the witness was a child at the time of the alleged extraneous conduct in this case, she 

will be referred to by her initials pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 57.02.
7

psychotherapy. (RR8: 119-20, 129-30). Dr. Pierce explained that a person 

sentenced to prison would not receive treatment until right before release whereas 

a person on probation would receive treatment immediately. (RR8: 123-24). 

Michael Vohs, a probation officer assigned to the 277th District Court in 

Williamson County, explained to the jury the numerous conditions of probation for 

regular probationers as well as probationers placed in the sex offender treatment 

program. (RR8: 159-60). At the close of Vohs’s testimony, Appellant rested his 

case on punishment. (RR8: 184). 

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether the Instant Appeal Is Frivolous and Without Merit, Such That 

the Undersigned Should Withdraw as Counsel.

A criminal defense attorney’s duty is to zealously represent the interests of 

his or her client on appeal. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). If 

the appointed attorney finds the “case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious 

examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to 

withdraw.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. 

Both retained and appointed appellate attorneys have a “duty to withdraw” 

as counsel when they conclude that an appeal would be frivolous, but appointed 

counsel “is presented with a dilemma because withdrawal is not possible without 

leave of court, and advising the court of counsel’s opinion that the appeal is 
8

frivolous would appear to conflict with the advocate’s duty to the client.” McCoy 

v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District I, 486 U.S. 429, 437 (1988). “It is well 

settled, however, that this dilemma must be resolved by informing the court of 

counsel’s conclusion.” Id. “Under Anders and its progeny, if an appointed 

attorney concludes that his client’s appeal is without merit, he or she must (1) so 

inform the court, (2) seek permission to withdraw, and (3) file a brief ‘referring to 

anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.’” Wilson v. State, 

40 S.W.3d 192, 196 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 2001).

As the Supreme Court explained, the attorney’s motion to withdraw must,

however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might

arguably support the appeal. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. A copy of counsel’s brief 

should be provided to the Appellant and time should be allowed for him to raise 

any points that he chooses. Id. Then, the Court, and not counsel, decides, after 

a full examination of all the proceedings, whether the case is wholly frivolous. 

Id. If it so finds, it may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and dismiss the 

appeal insofar as federal requirements are concerned, or proceed to a decision on 

the merits, if state law so requires. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. In Texas, an Anders

brief need not specifically advance “arguable” points of error if counsel finds none, 

but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out 
9

pertinent legal authorities. See Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343-344 (Tex. 

App.–Corpus Christi 2003). The attorney’s duty to withdraw is based upon his or 

her professional and ethical responsibilities as an officer of the court not to burden 

the judicial system with false claims, frivolous pleadings, or burdensome time 

demands. McCoy, 486 U.S. at 436. The Supreme Court instructs: “Neither paid 

nor appointed counsel may deliberately mislead the court with respect to either the 

facts or the law, or consume the time and the energies of the court or the opposing 

party by advancing frivolous arguments. An attorney, whether appointed or paid, 

is therefore under an ethical obligation to refuse to prosecute a frivolous appeal.” 

Id.

PROFESSONAL EVALUATION

Counsel would respectfully show the Court of Appeals that the instant 

appeal is frivolous and without merit, for the following reasons:

The trial court had jurisdiction over the present felony case and venue was 

proper in Williamson County, where the offenses were alleged to have occurred. 

Appellant pleaded guilty to all thirteen offenses alleged in the indictment, namely: 

possession of child pornography. TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.26(a). The 

punishment for those offenses, as alleged in the indictment, is two to ten years in 

prison. TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.26(d). The jury sentenced Appellant to ten years 
10

in prison for each count which is within the statutory range of punishment. TEX.

PENAL CODE § 43.26(d). The Court was within its statutory authority to cumulate 

five of Appellant’s sentences pursuant to Texas Penal Code Section 3.03.

POTENTIAL ERRORS CONSIDERED BY COUNSEL

Counsel considered the following point of errors on appeal:

(1) Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction

for possession of child pornography.

It is counsel’s opinion that the evidence in this case was sufficient to support 

Appellant’s conviction because Appellant entered a guilty plea to the offenses 

alleged in the indictment before the jury. It is well-settled that a judicial 

confession, standing alone, is sufficient to support a defendant’s conviction. 

Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).

(2) Whether images of child pornography extraneous to the allegations in 

this indictment were admitted without notice.

It is counsel’s opinion that Appellant did not preserve error with respect to 

his contention that he did not receive notice of extraneous offense evidence. 

Appellant objected that the State’s 404(b) notice did not contain approximately 

eighty images of child pornography seized from Appellant’s home and therefore, 

the images should not have been admitted before the jury. (RR7: 125-26). The 

State responded that those images were included within the original case report 
11

which was tendered to defense counsel and counsel was shown the photographs in 

a meeting with prosecutors. (RR7: 125-27). Defense counsel responded, “I did 

have notice of the report. I did –.” (RR7: 126). Appellant conceded that he did 

have notice of the evidence he originally contended he did not have notice of. 

Therefore, no objection was preserved for appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(h). 

(3) Whether extraneous offense evidence was admissible at the 

punishment phase of trial.

It is counsel’s opinion that extraneous offense evidence was admissible at 

the punishment phase of trial pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 

Article 37.07, Section 3(a). The State attempted to admit evidence of a judgment 

from 1990 in which Appellant was placed on deferred adjudication probation for 

the offense of indecency with a child. (RR8: 3-8). The trial court ruled that 

since the judgment was never a final conviction, and because of the remoteness, 

the judgment was inadmissible. (RR8: 8). The Court ruled, however, that the 

officer involved in the extraneous conduct, as well as the victims of the extraneous 

conduct could testify since the extraneous conduct in question was child 

pornography, the same offense for which Appellant pled guilty to in this cause. 

Appellant objected but stated, “I mean, understand if the Court is going to let the 

children testify because it’s an extraneous conduct that they feel is necessary. I 

would still object to that . . .” (RR8: 9). Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 
12

Article 37.07 Section 3(a)(1) states: 

Regardless of the plea and whether the punishment be assessed by the 

judge or the jury, evidence may be offered by the state and the 

defendant as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing, 

including but not limited to the prior criminal record of the defendant, 

his general reputation, his character, an opinion regarding his 

character, the circumstances of the offense for which he is being tried, 

and, notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Evidence, 

any other evidence of an extraneous crime or bad act that is shown 

beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence to have been committed by 

the defendant or for which he could be held criminally responsible, 

regardless of whether he has previously been charged with or finally 

convicted of the crime or act. 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. Art. 37.07. 

Here, the Court made a determination that the extraneous evidence in 

question was relevant because it involved the same exact offense alleged in the 

present case. The Court’s decision is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. 

See Mitchell v. State, 931 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). As long as 

the trial court’s ruling was at least within the zone of reasonable disagreement, a 

reviewing Court cannot intercede. See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 

391 (1990). Counsel cannot proffer to this Court that that the trial judge’s ruling 

was an abuse of discretion outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.
13

(4) Whether Appellant’s sentence exceeded the proper range of 

punishment.

It is counsel’s opinion that the punishment assessed was not excessive 

because Appellant’s punishment fell within the statutory punishment range for the

offense alleged. In addition, the trial court was within its statutory authority to 

cumulate five of Appellant’s thirteen sentences. TEX. PENAL CODE § 3.03. A 

punishment which falls within the statutory range is not excessive, cruel, or 

unusual. Gaines v. State, 479 S.W.2d 678, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). See also

Jordan v. State 495 S.W.2d 949, 952 Tex. Crim. App. 1973; Samuel v. State, 477 

S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).

CONCLUSION

There are no points of error, which, in good conscience, could be raised in 

this appeal.

NOTICE TO APPELLANT

The undersigned has forwarded a copy of this motion to withdraw and a 

letter explaining Appellant’s rights, as well as the procedures to be followed when 

a brief is filed by counsel indicating that the appeal is frivolous and without merit, 

to Appellant. The letter also informs Appellant of his right to file a pro se

petition for discretionary review. In addition to the letter, the undersigned has 

also forwarded to Appellant a Motion for Pro Se Access to the Appellate Record 
14

so that Appellant can obtain the necessary records to file a brief, should he choose

to do so. A true and correct copy of such letter is attached hereto.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Kristen Jernigan, 

court-appointed counsel for Appellant in the above styled and numbered cause 

respectfully prays that, after providing Appellant an opportunity to submit a pro se

brief, this Honorable Court of Appeals will review the appellate record to make an 

independent determination of whether there are grounds upon which to appeal. The 

undersigned also prays that the Court will grant this motion to withdraw.

Respectfully submitted,

____/s/ Kristen Jernigan___________

KRISTEN JERNIGAN

State Bar Number 90001898

207 S. Austin Ave.

Georgetown, Texas 78626

(512) 904-0123

(512) 931-3650 (fax)

Kristen@txcrimapp.com
15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the 

foregoing Anders Brief in Support of Motion to Withdraw as Counsel has been 

emailed to the Appellate Attorney for the Williamson County District Attorney’s 

Office, John Prezas, at jprezas@wilco.org on October 26, 2015.

______/s/ Kristen Jernigan_____________

Kristen Jernigan

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing document consists of 

4,327 words in compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4.

______/s/ Kristen Jernigan______________

Kristen Jernigan
16

No. 03-15-00222-CR

In the

COURT OF APPEALS

For the

THIRD SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT

at Austin

______________________________________

On Appeal from the 277th Judicial District Court of

Williamson County, Texas

Cause Number 13-1923-K277

______________________________________

MONTE KEN ROSS, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

_____________________________________

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

_____________________________________

In compliance with the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 378 

(1967), I, Kristen Jernigan, court-appointed counsel for appellant, Monte Ken 

Ross, in the above-referenced appeal, do hereby verify, in writing, to the Court that 

I have:

1. notified appellant that I filed a motion to withdraw as counsel with an 

accompanying Anders brief, and provided a copy of each to appellant;

2. informed appellant of his right to file a pro se response identifying what 

he believes to be meritorious grounds to be raised in his appeal, should he so 
17

desire;

3. advised appellant of his right to review the appellate record, should he 

wish to do so, preparatory to filing that response;

4. explained the process for obtaining the appellate record, provided a 

Motion for Pro Se Access to the Appellate Record lacking only appellant’s 

signature and the date, and provided the mailing address for this Court; and

5. informed appellant of his right to seek discretionary review pro se should 

this Court declare his appeal frivolous.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Kristen Jernigan

___________________________

Kristen Jernigan
KRISTEN JERNIGAN

ATTORNEY AT LAW

207 S. AUSTIN AVE., GEORGETOWN, TEXAS 78626

(512) 904-0123 (OFFICE) (512) 931-3650 (FAX)

KRISTEN@TXCRIMAPP.COM

October 26, 2015

Monte Ken Ross

TDCJ ID No. 01990706

Pack I Unit

2400 Wallace Pack Road

Navasota, Texas 77868

VIA CERTIFIED MAIL

Dear Mr. Ross:

Enclosed, please find a copy of the Anders Brief and Motion to Withdraw as 

Counsel I have prepared and filed in your case. After a diligent search of both the 

Clerk’s Record and the Reporter’s Record in your case and the applicable law, it is 

my opinion that no reversible error occurred during your trial. 

Whenever appellate counsel files a motion such as this, the law provides the 

Appellant the right to review the record of the proceedings and file any brief which 

he or she deems necessary. Because I have submitted such a brief, you now have 

the right to review the record of your trial and file any brief which you deem 

necessary.

In order to obtain the appellate record to prepare your brief, I have attached a 

Motion for Pro Se Access to the Appellate Record for you to file. You must sign 

and date the motion and mail it to the Court of Appeals within ten days of the date 

of this letter to this address:
Third Court of Appeals:

Jeffrey D. Kyle

Clerk, Third Court of Appeals

Post Office Box 12547

Austin, Texas 78711

Should the Court of Appeals ultimately rule your appeal was frivolous, and 

affirm your conviction and sentence, you may file a Pro Se Petition for 

Discretionary Review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The address to 

file your petition is:

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals:

Hon. Abel Acosta

Clerk of The Court

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

P.O. Box 12308

Austin, Texas 78711

You must file your petition within thirty days of the date of the Court of 

Appeals’ opinion or request an extension of time to file your petition. Be sure to 

attach a copy of the Court’s opinion to your petition should you choose to file one. 

Feel free to write me if you have any questions. I will do my best to answer 

any questions you may have.

Sincerely,

/s/ Kristen Jernigan

Kristen Jernigan
No. 03-15-00222-CR

In the

COURT OF APPEALS

For the

THIRD SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT

at Austin

______________________________________

On Appeal from the 277th Judicial District Court of

Williamson County, Texas

Cause Number 13-1923-277

______________________________________

MONTE KEN ROSS, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

_____________________________________

MOTION FOR PRO SE ACCESS TO APPELLATE RECORD

______________________________

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE THIRD COURT OF 

APPEALS:

COMES NOW, Monte Ken Ross, Appellant herein, and files this, his 

Motion for Pro Se Access to Appellate Record. In support of said motion, 

Appellant would show the Court the following:

Appointed Counsel for Appellant has filed an Anders Brief and Motion to 

Withdraw. Pursuant to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ recent decision in 

Kelly v. State, No. PD-0702-13 (Delivered June 25, 2014), Appellant now requests 

access to the appellate record for the preparation of his pro se response.
PRAYER

 WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant respectfully 

requests that this Court grant his Motion for Pro Se Access to the Appellate 

Record.

Respectfully submitted,

____________________________

Monte Ken Ross

DATE:___________