11-0316-c v

Caro nia v. Phi lip Mo rr is U SA

1 UN I TE D ST AT ES C OU RT O F APP EA L S 2 FOR THE SECOND CI RCUI T 3 - - - - - - 4 August Term, 2011 5 (Argued: Marc h 1, 2012 Dec ided: May 1, 2013) 6 Docke t No. 11-0316-c v 7

_________________________________________________________ 8 MARCI A L . CARONI A, L I NDA Mc AUL EY, and A RL ENE F EL DMAN, 9 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 10 - v. - 11 PHI L I P MORR I S USA, I NC., 12 Def endant- Appellee

. 13

_________________________________________________________ 14 Be fore : KEARSE, L OHI ER, and DRONEY, Circ uit J udg es. 15 Appea l f rom a judg ment of the United States District Court for the Easter

n District of 16 New Y ork, Carol B ag ley Amon, J udg e, dismissing plaintiffs' claims ag ainst cig are tte manufa cture r 17 for neg lige nce, stric t liabilit y , brea ch of w arr anty , and medica l monitoring with respe ct to incre ased 18 risk of ca

ncer , see 2010 WL520558; 2011 WL 338425. 19 AFF I RMED in part; C ERTI FI ED i n part to the C ourt of Appeals for the State of New 20 York. 2 1 V IC T O R IA E

. P H IL L IP S , N e w Y o r k , N e w Y o r

k ( S t e v e n J

. P h i l l i p s , S t an l e y 22 J

. Levy , J erom e H. Bloc k, Am ber R. L on g, L is a W . Davi s, L evy P hi l l i p s & 23 Konig sberg , New Y ork, Ne w York, on the brief) , for Plaintiffs-Appe llants.2

- - 1 SHEI LA B I RNBAU M, New Y ork, Ne w York (J o h n H. B eisner, 2 J essica D . Miller, Geof fre y M. Wy att, Skadden, Ar

ps, Slate, Meag her 3 & F lom W ashing ton, D.C.; Gary R. L ong , J ohn K. Sherk, I I I , Shook, 4 Har dy & B acon, K ansas City , Missouri; T am my B. Webb, Shook, 5 Har dy & B acon, San F ranc isco, California, on t h e b rief) , for 6 Def endant- Appellee

. 7

8 KE AR SE, Cir c uit Judg e : 9 P l ai n t iffs Marc ia L

. Caronia, L inda McAuley , and Arlene Fe ldman appea l f rom a 1 0 j u d g m e n to f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s tr i c tC o urtf

o r th e E a s t e r

nD i s tr i c to f

N e w Y o r

k , C ar o l B a g l e y 11 Amon, J udg e, dismissing their tort c laims alleg ing ne g lige nce, stric t pr oducts liability , and bre ach of 12 the Uniform Commercial Code (" UCC") implied wa rra nty of merc hantability

in connec tion with the 13 de sig n, manu fa c tur e , a nd sa le by de fe nd ant Phi lip Mo rr is USA , Inc . (" Phi lip Mo rr is" ), of c ig are tte s 14 that alleg edly

contain unnece ssarily dang erous leve ls of car cinog ens whe n smoked by humans, and 15 the ir

ind e pe nd e nt e qu ita

ble c la im s e e kin g to r e qu ire P hi li p M or ri s to fu nd a pr og ra m of me dic a l 16 monitoring for

longtime smoker s of Marlbor o cig are ttes who have not been dia g nosed with, but are 17 a t ri sk fo r, lun g c anc e r. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d Phi lip Mo rr is' s mot ion s for su mm ary jud g me nt 18 dismiss ing plaintiffs' neg lige nce and s trict liability claims on the g round that they wer e untimely , and 19 dis mis sin g the br e a c h- of -i mpl ie d- wa

rr anty c la ims on

the g ro un ds that pl a int if

fs ' e arl ie st s uc h c la ims 20 wer e unti mely , see Car onia v. Philip M orris USA, Inc., No. 06- CV-224, 2010 WL520558 (E.D.N.Y

. 21 F e b. 11 , 2 01 0) (" Caro nia I " ), and that th e ti mely

wa rr anty c la ims we re no t su

pp or te d b y su ff ic ie nt 22 evidenc e of br eac h, see Car onia v. Philip M orr i s USA, Inc., No. 06- CV-224, 2011 WL3384253

- - 1 (E.D.N.Y . J an. 13, 2011) ( "Ca ronia I I ")

. Pursuant to Fe d. R. Civ. P. 12(b)( 6), t he court g rante d Phili p 2 Mo rr is' s mo tio n to dis mis s p la int i f f s ' fr e e -s tand ingc la im f

or me dic a l mo nit or ingof

Marl bo ro smo ke rs 3 who lack sy

mptoms of smoking-r elated disease, ruling that plaintiffs failed to state a claim on which 4 relief

can be g rante d beca

use they could not sufficie ntly plead that their i njuries--i.e ., their incre ased 5 risk of ca

ncer from smoking Marlboro c iga rettes- -we re pr ox im a

te ly c a u s e d b y Ph il ip M o r

r is's c onduct. 6 S e e C ar o n i a

II

. O na p p e a l , p l a i n t i f

f s c o n t e n d p r i n c i p a l l y th a tth e i r n e g l i g e n c e an d

p r o d u c t s l i a b i l i ty 7 claims are timely and that they

adequately

pleade d proxi mate ca

use in their cla ims for brea ch of 8 implied warra

nty and in their independent claim for medical m onitoring. For the re asons that follow, 9 we affirm the dismiss al of plaintiffs' neg lige nce, strict liability , and breac h-of- war ranty claims; with 10 respe ct to plaintiff' s fre e-s ta n d in g e q u it a b lec la im f o r me d ic al monitoring, w e ce rtify sever al questions, 11 d etailed in P art I I Ibelow, to the Court of Appe als for the State of Ne w York w ith respec t to t h e 12 exis tence of such a claim under

New Y ork S t at e law, a

nd, if such a c laim is recog nized, as to the 13 elements a

nd acc rual of suc h a cla im.4

- - 1 I . BA CKGROUND 5 2 A. Plaintiffs' Neg lige nce, Strict L iability , and Warra nty Claims 5 3 B. The Relief Reque sted 7 4 C. Phi lip Morris's F irst Motion for Summ ary J udg ment 8 5 1. The Strict Products L iability and Ne g lige nce 6 C l a i m s 9 7 2. The B rea ch-of -Warra nty Claims 12 8 D. Plaintiffs' Four th Amended Complaint 13 9 I I . DI SMI SSAL OF T HE COMMON-LAW AND UCC CL AI MS 16 10 A. Un tim e lin e ss o f t he Ne g lig e nc e and

Str ic t 11 L iability Claims 18 12 1. The Continuing Exposure Theor y 21 13 2. The Ne wly -Ava ilable Relief The ory 24 14 B. Summary Dismissal of the Br eac h of Implied 15 Warranty Claims 27 16 I I I . MEDI CALMONI TORI NG AS AN I

NDEPENDEN T CL AI M 29 17 A. Dec isions of New Yor k State Courts 30 18 B. D ecisions by Fe dera l District Courts in New York 33 19 C. Decisions by Other States' Hig hest Courts 36 2 0 D. E l em en t s o f a nI n d ep en d en tM ed i ca +l M o n i t o ri n g 21 Cause of A ction 48 22 E. Certification of Questions to the New Y ork 23 Court of Appea ls 52

2 4 C O N C LU S I O N 5 5 7 65

- - 1 I . BA CKGROUND

2 Plaintiffs, who commence d this action on J anuar y 19, 2006, seekingto pursue it as a 3 class ac tion, are r esidents of Ne w York State ( "State" ) who, within t h e S tate, smoked Mar lboro 4 c i g ar e t t e s - - d e f

i n e d i np l a i n t i f

f s ' p l e a d i n g s a s th e e n t i r e l i n e o f c i g ar e t t e s m anu f

a c tur e d an d s o l d b y 5 Phili p Morris under the "M ar l boro" brand. The claims at issue on this appea l are those asser ted in 6 plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint (or "3r d Am. Comp.") and Four th A mended Complaint (or "4th 7 Am. Comp.") ( collectively the " Complaints").

8 A. Pla int if

fs ' Ne g lig e nc e , Stri c t L ia

bil ity , a nd War ra nty Cla ims 9 Plaintiffs are pe rsons ag e 50 y ear s or older who curr ently smoke Marlboro c iga

rettes, 10 or ce ased smokingthem within one y ear prior to the commenc ement of this l aw s u i t , and smoked 11 Marlboro c iga

rettes f or at lea st 20 pack-year s. (See 4th Am. Comp. ¶¶ 22-27; 3r d Am

. Comp. 12 ¶¶ 23- 28.) A " pack[-]y ear " is de fined in t he Complaints as "the number of pa cks of c iga rettes smoked 13 per da

y multipl ied by

the number of

y ear s," e .g ., one pac k of cig are ttes per da y for one y ear

equals one 14 pack- y ear , and two pac ks per da y equal two pack- y ear s. (4th Am. Comp. ¶ 26, n.2; 3rd Am. Comp. 15 ¶ 27, n.2.) " None of the plaintiffs is prese ntly diag nosed wit h lung canc er" (4th Am. Comp. ¶ 28; 3rd 16 Am . Co mp. ¶ 2 9) " or un de r i nv e sti g a tio n b y

a phy si cia n for su sp e c te d lu ngc anc e r" (C omp la int s 17 ¶ 1(e ).) Plaintiffs conte nd, howeve r, that lungcanc er is the l ea d i n g cause of ca ncer deaths in the 18 United S tates and is responsible for the deaths of 160,000 Americ ans annually (see id. ¶ 4); that more 19 tha

n 8 0 p e rcen t of th os e deaths re su lt f ro m c ig are tte smo ke (s e e id. ¶ 5 ); and that pl a int if

fs " are a t 20 signific antly

incre ased r isk for deve loping lungcanc er a s a conse quence of their use of Mar lboro6

- - 1 c i g ar e t t e s . . . s p e c i f i c a l l y a s a c o n s e qu e n c e o f th e e x c e s s qu an t i t i e s o f

c ar c i n o g e n s d e l i v e r e d

b y 2 Marlboro c iga

rettes" (4th Am. Comp. ¶ 29; 3rd Am. Comp. ¶ 30). 3 Th e Com pla int s a lle g e d th a t, d

ur ingthe re le va

nt t ime pe ri od , M arl bo ro c ig are tte s 4 re g ula

rl y de liv e re d b e tw e e n 6 and 17 mil lig ra

ms o f t ar ( se e Com

pla in ts ¶ 53 ), a

su bs tanc e that 5 " c on ta ins c arc ino g e ns wh ic h c a us e lun g c a

n c e r " ( id. ¶ 4 7) , d e sp ite the e xiste nc e of fe a sib le a lte rn a tiv e s 6 fo r t

he manu fa c tur e of

c ig are tte s de liv e ri ng on e mil lig ra m of tar or le ss (s e e id. ¶ 6 1) . T he Com pla int s 7 alleg ed that Philip Morris had the ability to employ

"f easible alternative de signs whic h would have 8 dra s t i ca l l y

re d u ce d t h e c an ce r c au s i n g co n t en to f M ar l b o ro ci gar et t es " ( i d

. ¶ 1 8 ), s u ch as b y s wi t ch i n g 9 to a tobacc o blend that would reduc e or eliminate the quantity of " Bur ley " toba cco- -known to conta in 10 high le vels of ca ncer -ca using nitrosamines--used in Philip Morris cig are ttes (id. ¶¶ 64- 67). 11 Th e Com pla int s a lso a lle ged that

a lth ou g h s mok e rs ha d b e e n f ound by ind e pe nd e nt 1 2 a g e n c i e s t o h av e a t e n d e n c y t o " c o mp e n s a t e " f o r l o w e r t ar an d n i c o t i n e l e v e l s i n " l i g h t " c i g ar e t t e s b y 13 taking "de eper , more intense" puffs (C o m plaints ¶ 56; see id. ¶ 57) , Phili p Morris had the 14 te c hn olo g ic a l a

bil ity to use a fi lte r that wou ld thw art su c h te nd e nc ie s a

nd de liv e r l owov e ra ll l e ve ls 15 of ca

rcinog ens simply

by incre as i n g i t s ci gare ttes' "' resistanc e to dra w' " ( id. ¶ 60; see id. ¶¶

61-64). 16 Phili p Morris nonetheless alleg edly chose to ma rket Marlboro "L ight" cig are ttes th at were 17 " int e nti on a lly

de sig ne d to pe rm it fu ll co mpe ns a tio n" (i d. ¶ 6 0; s e e a lso id. ¶¶ 58 -5 9) , a llo wi ngsmo ke rs 18 of Mar lboro L ight cig are ttes to inha le "a pproxi mately the same amount of tar a s delivere d by regular 19 Marlboro ' Full Flavor' cig are ttes" ( id. ¶ 59). 20 I n s um, the Com pla int s a lle g e d that a lth ou g h Phi lip Mo rr is k ne w at a ll r e le va

nt t ime s 21 that it was fea sible to lower the c arc inoge nic content of its ciga rettes ( see, e .g ., Complaints ¶¶ 62-65), 22 it " purp os e ly

de sig ne d a ll o f i ts M arlbo ro c ig are tte s to de liv e r a n e xce ssi ve amou

nt o f c arc ino g e ns7

- - 1 when smoked by humans" (id. ¶ 54; see also id. ¶¶ 63, 65-66)

. 2 Pl a in ti f f s a ll e g e d that as a r esult of Philip M orris' s voluntary , neg lige nt, rec kles s , a n d /o r 3 intentional desig n of Mar lboro cig are ttes to deliver excessive amounts of ca rcinog ens (se e, e.g ., 3rd 4 Am. Comp. ¶¶ 86, 94), whe n it knew or should have known that such cig are ttes cause d lung c ance r 5 or incre ased the risk of lung canc er a nd thus were defe ctive produc ts not reasona bly safe for their 6 int e nd e d u se (s e e id. ¶¶ 84 -8 5) , pla int if fs and me mbe rs of the pr op os e d c la ss- -" c omp os e d o f at le a st 7 t en s of thousands of persons" (Complaints ¶ 35)-- wer e place d at signific antly incre ased ri s ko f 8 de ve lop inglun g c anc e r ( se e 4th Am . Com p. ¶ 29 ; 3r d A m. C omp . ¶ 30 ). Pla int if

fs c on te nd e d th a t 9 Phili p Morris was ( a) stric tly liable for distri b u t i n g its defec tive products (se e 3rd A m. Comp. 10 ¶¶ 80- 90); (b) liable for neg lige nce in failing to properly desig n, test, and inspect Ma rlboro cig are ttes, 1 1 t h e r e b y v i o l a t i n g i t s " l e g a l d u t y t o c r e a t e a r e a s o n a

b l y ' s a f e r ' c i g ar e t t e w h i c hd e l i v e r e d s u b s t an t i a l l y 12 less car cinog ens whe n smoked by a human" (3rd Am. Comp. ¶ 93; see id. ¶¶ 92-99); and ( c) liable for 13 brea ch of the UCC implied war ranty of merc hantability , as Mar lboro cig are ttes were not safe f or the 14 ordinary

purposes intende d by

Phili p Morris and used by Marlboro smoker s (see 4th Am. Comp. 15 ¶¶ 105- 107; 3rd Am. Comp. ¶¶ 101, 112-113).

16 B. The Relief Reque sted 17 A s r e l ie f f or the ir c la ims of ne g lig e nc e , s tr ic t li a

bil ity , a nd br e a c h o f w arr ant

y , p l a i nt i f f s 18 stated t h at t h ey did not seek compe nsatory or punitive damag es but instead soug ht to have Philip 19 Morris provide funding for a court-supe rvised program of me dical monitoring for c lass members who 20 are at incre ased r isk of lung c ance r fr om smoking Marlboro cigar ettes (se e, e.g ., 3rd Am. Comp. ¶ 19). 2 1 P l a i n t i f f s a l l e g e d t h a tw h e nl un g c a n c e r i s d i a g n o s e d a tane ar l y s t a g e , i ti s u s u a l l y8

- - 1 cura

ble. (See Complaints ¶ 6.) B ut, the y alleg ed, conve ntional forms of medica l surveillance such 2 as che st x -ra

y s and sputum c y

tology are poor tools for identifying lung canc er at an ea rly stag e (se e 3 id. ¶ 9 ); he nc e , in the pa st, by

the tim e the c anc e r w a s d ia g no sa ble , pro sp e c ts fo r c ur e we re us ua lly dim 4 (see id. ¶ 7). The Complaints allege d that a re cently established (se e id. ¶ 10 ) m edica l surveillance 5 technique known as L ow Dose CT Sca nning of the che st ("' L DCT' ") , "is a safe, eff icac ious and 6 i n ex p en s i v e t e ch n i qu e, wh i ch , fo r t h e f i rs tt i m e, p ro v i d es a m ea n s t o i d en t i fy an d d i agn o s e l u n g 7 ca n ce rs at an ea rl y stag e, whe n they

are still cura

ble" (id. ¶ 3). L DCT can ide ntify and lea d to the 8 diag nosis of S tag e I lung c ance rs that pre viously would have r emained undia g nosed until the canc er 9 h a d

r e a c h e d ana dv an c e d , an d

l i k e l y i n c u r ab l e , s t a g e . ( S e e i d

. ¶ 1 0

. ) L D C T s c r e e n i n g i s c u r r e n t l y 10 un ava ila

ble a s a be ne fi t in mos t, if no t all, pr ivate or pu bli c he a lthins ur anc e pr og ra ms ( se e id. ¶ 1 5) ; 11 the c os t of

L DC T i s " a

mod e st annu a l expe ns e [of ]le ss tha n fiv e hund

re d ( $5 00 ) d oll ars pe r p a tie nt 12 per y ear[ ] " and i nv ol ves "a lo wer dos e of radi ati on th an is ass oci ate d wi th an an nu al m amm ogram " 13 (3rd Am. Comp. ¶ 11).

14 C. Ph ili p M or

ri s' s F ir st M oti on

fo r S umm ary

Judg me nt 15 After plaintiffs had filed the ir Third Amende d Complaint and discovery had bee n 16 c omp le te d, Phi lip Mo rr is m ov e d f or summa ry ju d gm e nt d i s m i s s i n g

t h e a c t i o n o n s tatut e -o f- lim itatio ns 17 and/or c ausation g rounds. Plaintiffs opposed the motion and cr oss-moved for cer tif i ca t i o n of their 18 proposed cl as s . The district cour t in Caronia I

g rante d Phili p Morris' s motion t o the extent of 19 dismiss ing a s untimely the neg lige nce a

nd strict liability

claims in their entiret y an d t he bre ach- of20 wa

rr anty c la ims in p art . T he c ourt de nie d Phili p Mor ri s' s motio n to the e xten t th a t th e mot ion so ug ht 21 dis mis sa l of

the br e a c h- of

-w arr anty c la ims ba se d o n la c k o f e vid e nc e of pr oximate c a

us a tio n, and

it9

- - 1 rese rved de cision on the motion for class c ertification.

2 1. Th e Str ic t Pr od uc ts L ia bil ity and Ne g lig e nc e Cla ims 3 Phili p Morris contende d that plaintiffs' strict liabili t y and neg lige nce c laims were 4 e s s e n t i a l l y c l a i m s f o r d am a g e s an d thu s w e r e b ar r e d b y th e th r e e - ye ar

l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d

p r o v i d e d b y 5 New Y ork Civil Practice L aw & Rules (" CPL R") § 214-c( 2), which applies to, inter alia, " an ac tion 6 to rec over da

mag es for persona l injury

. . . cause d by the latent eff ects of e x posure to any

substance 7 or combination of substances, in a ny form." Plaintiffs argued, inter a lia, that their cla ims were not f or 8 damag es but for e quitable re lief, and that the applicable statute of limitations was thus the six -y ear 9 period provide d by CPL R § 213(1), which g ener ally applies to ac tions seeki n g eq u i table re lief, 10 including injunctive r elief, se e, e.g ., 2004 Commentary CPL R 213(1), or to ac tio n s for whic h no 11 limit ations period is specif ied. 12 The district cour t, noting that "[b] oth parties a g ree that the injury in this action is the 13 incre ased risk of deve loping lungcanc er a s a re sult of smoking Mar lboro cig are ttes for twe ntypack14 y ear s," c oncluded that plaintiffs' strict liability and neg lige nce c lai m s we re untimely "unde r either 15 statute." Caronia I , 2010 WL 520558, at *3. Under § 214-c( 2), assuming that plaintiffs' claims wer e 16 proper ly

char acte rized as claims for damag es, the statute of limit ations would have be g un "to r un upon 17 the ' date of

discovery ' of the injury ," Ca ro nia I , 2010 WL520558, at *3, i.e., the dates on which 18 pla int if

fs dis c ov e re d th a t smok ing Ma rl bo ro c ig are tte s inc re a se d the ir ri sk of lun g c anc e r. Th e c ourt 19 no ted th at th e re c or d r e ve a le d th a t e a c h o f t he pla int if

fs wa s o ve r t

he a g e of 50 wh e n th is s uit

was 20 c omm e nc e d in

20 06 , s e e id. a t * 1; that e a c h h a d b e g un smo kin g a s a

te e na g e r, se e id. ; th a t it

wa s 2 1 " u n d i s p u t e d t h a t e a c h o f t h e n am e d p l a i n t i f f s i n th i s a c t i o n r e a c h e d

tw e n ty p a c k

- ye ar s o f

s m o k i n g b y10

- - 1 the mid 1990s," Fel d man by 1992, McAuley

by approximately

1980, and Caronia

by , at the latest, 2 1996, see id. at *5; and that the deposition "te stimony of ea ch plaintiff e stablishe[d her] aware ness of 3 an in c re a se d r isk of c anc e r we ll be fo re Janu ary 19 , 200 3, " id. a t *3; se e a lso id. a t *6 n. 10 (" Pla int if fs 4 do not, and ca

nnot, argue that they

did not know smoking cig are ttes was the c ause of their incre ased 5 risk of l u n g cancer .") . Acc ording ly , the cour t concluded that if the three -y ear limit ations period of 6 § 214-c( 2) applied, pla intiffs' strict liability and neg lige nce c laims were time-barr ed. 7 T h e d i s t r i c tc o u rta l s o r e j e c t e d p l a i n t i f f s ' c o n t e n t i o n th a tt h o s e c l a i m s w o u l d b e t i m e l y 8 u n d e r

C P L R § 2 1 3 ( 1 ) ' s s i x - ye ar

l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d , i

. e . , th a tth e i r c l a i m s a c c r

u e d o no r a f t e r J anu ar y 9 19, 2000. The court pointed out that unlike the three -y ear statute of limit ations provided in § 214-c (2), 10 "the six -y ear

statute of limitations under 213(1) be g ins to run" not on the date the i njury is discovere d 11 b u t on the date the cause of action acc rues, to w it, " ' when all of the fac ts ne cessa ry to the cause o f 1 2 a c t i o nh av e o c c u r r e d s o t h a tt h e p art y

w o u l d b e e n t i t l e d

t o o b t a i nr e l i e f

i nc o urt , ' " C ar o n i a I, 2 0 1 0 W L 13 520558, at *3 (quoti ng Aetna L ife & C asualty Co. v. Nelson, 67 N.Y.2d 169, 175, 501 N .Y.S.2d 313, 14 316 (1986)) , "' i.e., when all elements of the tort ca n be truthfully

alleg ed in a c omplaint,'" Caronia I , 15 2010 WL 520558, at *3 (quoting Sny der v. Town Insulation, I n c., 81 N.Y.2d 429, 432-33, 599 16 N.Y.S.2d 515, 516-17 (1993) ). 17 The c ourt descr ibed the ele ments of claims for strict liabili t y an dneg lige nce. A 18 plaintiff asser

ting a claim of strict liability

must be able to show that she w as i njured, that the 19 defe ndan t p ro d u ce d a produc t that was not " ' rea sonably safe ' " f or its intended use, a

nd that the 2 0 p ro d

u ct 's "'d ef ec twa s t h e p ro x i m at e c au s e o f t h e i n j ury . '" C ar o n i a I , 2 0 1 0 W L5 2 0 5 5 8 , at* 4 (q u o t i n g 21 Voss v. Bla ck & Dec ker Ma nufac turing Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 107, 109, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398, 402, 403 22 (1983)) . A plaintiff asse rting a neg lige nce c laim must be able to show that "the defe ndant owed the11

- - 1 plaintiff a c og nizable duty of ca re," that "the defe ndant fa iled to exercise that duty , " an d t h at " the 2 plaintiff suffe red injury as a pr ox imate re sult of that failure." Caronia I , 2010 WL520558, at *4; see, 3 e .g ., Ak ins v. Gl e n F a lls City Sc ho ol D istri c t, 5 3 N.Y .2 d 32 5, 33 3, 44 1 N .Y .S. 2d 64 4, 64 8 ( 19 81 ); 4 Be cker

v. Schwar

tz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 410, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 899 (1978). 5 I n light of pla intiffs' asser tions that their injuries consisted o f b ei n g subjected to 6 incre ased r isk of lung c ance r by rea son of havings m o k ed M ar l boro cig are ttes for at least 20 pac k7 y ea rs , an d

gi v en t h at i twa s u n d i s p u t edth at ea ch p l ai n t i f f h adre ac h ed2 0 p ac k -y ea rs o f s m o k i n g 8 Marlboro c iga

rettes by the mid-1990s, the court rea soned that plaintiffs could have truthfully alleg ed 9 all of the e lements of their c laims for strict liability and neg lige nce by

then. I t concluded that those 10 cla im s t hu s acc rued"well ou ts id e of t he s ix -y ear s tat ut e of l im it ati on s av ail abl e un der 2 13 (1) ," 11 Caronia I , 2010 WL 520558, at *5. 12 The district cour t rejec ted plaintiffs' contentions that their strict liabi li ty a n d n e g li g ence 13 claims wer e timely under § 213( 1) either

(a) on the theory

that such cla ims accr

ue ane w with eac h 14 newly injurious e x posure, or (b) beca use the reme dy they soug ht--medica l monitoring vi a LDCT 15 scanning --ha d only becom e an a

vailable a nd acc epted sc ree ning tool for lung c ance r within a y ear 16 prior to the commenc ement of this a ction. The court found the former theory untenable be cause it had 17 been r ejec ted by the New York Court of Appe als in Sny der v . Town Insulation, I nc., 81 N.Y.2d 18 at 433-35, 599 N.Y .S.2d at 517-18. The c ourt reje cted plaintiffs' newly -ava ilable-re medy theory of 19 timeliness on the gr ound that, "a s is readily appar ent from a

revie w of the eleme nts of both cause s of 20 action, neither

claim is depende nt upon the availability of a spe cific r emedy ," a nd t h er efore the 2 1 av a i l a

b i l i t y o f LD C T a s a r e m e dy " i s i r

r e l e v an t t o th e a c c r

u a l " o f th o s e c l a i m s . C ar o n i a I, 2 0 1 0 W L 22 520558, at *4.12

- - 1 2. Th e B re a c h- of -Wa rr anty Cla ims 2 Plaintiffs did not di spute that their bre ach- of-wa rra nt y cl ai m s wer e g overne d by the 3 fo ur -ye ar s tatut e of lim itatio ns se t out in N. Y. U. C.C

. § 2- 72 5 and we re tim e ly on ly to t he e xtent th a t 4 they arose from purchases of Marlboro cig are ttes on or af ter January

19, 2002. See Caronia

I , 2010 5 WL52 05 58 , at *6 . Ph ili p M or ri s so ug ht summa

ry jud g me nt dis mis sin g the tim e ly wa rr anty c la ims 6 on the g round that, even assuming that Marlboro c iga rettes boug ht on or afte r January 19, 2002, wer e 7 not rea sonably

fit for their intended pur

pose, plaintiffs could not esta blish that those ciga

rettes we re 8 the proxim ate c ause of their injuries bec ause the y fac ed an inc rea sed risk of lung c ance r we ll before 9 J anuar

y 19, 2002. The district cour t denied this motion, finding that plaintiffs had a dduced e vidence 1 0 t h at t h e s m o k i n g o f Ma rl b o ro ci gar et t es af t er th at d at e wo u l d h av e fu rt h er i n cr ea s ed th e ri s k o f l u n g 11 canc er, a

nd that "[i]n l ight of

such evide nce, summar y judgme nt is not warran t ed on causation 12 g rounds." See id. at *7. 13 The c ourt stated, howev er , that Phili p Morris had r aised a n additional challeng e to 14 plaintiffs' war

ranty claims to which plaintiffs had not ha d an appr opriate oppor tunity to respond. The 15 court invited supplementar y briefing as to that cha lleng e, to wit, Phili p Morris' s cont en tion that the 16 claims for breac h of t he im plied war ranty of m erc hantability of Marlboro cig are ttes purcha sed af ter 17 J anuar

y 19, 2002, wer e bar

red by plaintiffs' knowledg e of the risks and dang ers of tobacc o use, or the 18 common knowledg e of smoking -re lated hea lth effe cts, tog ether with the war

nings on al l packs of 19 cig are ttes. See id. at *8.13

- - 1 D. Pla int if

fs ' F ourt h A me nd e d Co mpl a int 2 The district cour t noted that plaintiffs had soug ht me dical monitoring as a r emedy for 3 their tort claims of strict l i ab i l i t y , n egli g ence , and bre ach of war ranty but had not soug ht to plead a 4 fre e-standingequitable c laim for medica l monitoring , and neither side had brie fed the prec ise issue 5 of whe ther Ne w York rec og nizes such a ca use of a ction. See Caronia I , 2010 WL 520558, at *8-*9. 6 The c ourt co n cl u ded that plaintiffs should be a llowed to file a f urther a mended c omplaint in the 7 interests of justice. 8 I n th e ir F ourt h A me nd e d Co mpl ain t, pl aintif fs re pe a te d v ir

tua lly a ll o f t he fa c tua l 9 all egati on s o f t he T hi rd A men dedCo mp lai nt andadd ed a n ew "EQU I TABL E C AUS E OF A CT I ON" 10 for medic al monitoring. Plaintiffs re iterate d their a s s er t i o n s that Phil ip Morris had " desig ned, 11 produce d, manufa ctur ed , and sold cig are ttes, which, eve n if used prope rly , substantially and 12 unnece ssarily

elevated Plaintiffs' and the c lass members' likelihood of developing lung c ance r" (4th 13 Am. Comp. ¶ 110), that plaintiffs' injuries cannot be reme died by an awa rd of money

damag es (se e 14 id. ¶ 115), and that there exis ts a medical test for ear ly detec tion having the potential for a lteringthe 15 c ours e of

the dis e a se , b ut i t is ava ila ble on ly thr ou g h a

pr og ra m of me dic a l mo nit or ing(i d. ). Pla int if fs 16 added that Phil ip Morris, 17 motivated by extreme g ree d, and a rec kless and depra ved disreg ar do f t he 18 virtual ce rtainty that the sale of

its ad d i ct i v e and deadly products would 1 9 co n d em n h u n dre d s o f th o u s an d s o f i t s cu s t o m er s t o aw fu l d i s ea s e an d l i n ger i n g 20 deaths, . . . set out to s el l i t s defe ctive and de adly products to childre n and 21 others. For instance , Plaintiffs in thi s case commence d smoking at the ag es of 22 fiftee n (Car o n ia), sixt een ( Fe ldman) and a pproxi mately

fiftee n or six teen 23 (McCaule y [si c]). 24 112. To the extent that there i s n o t a leg al re medy available to 25 Pla int if fs , D e fe nd ant' s e g re g iou s c on du c t and its de va sta

tin g c on se qu e nc e s 2 6 impose a du ty o nth e Co urt u

n d e r N e w Y o r

k L aw to f a s h io nana

p p r o p r iate14

- - 1 equitable r emedy to redre ss the g rave eff

ects of Phili p Morris' [s] misconduct. 2 1 1 3

. T h e p r o g r am m a t i c m e d i c a l m o n i t o r i n g th r o u g hL D C T s o u g h tb y 3 Plaintiffs in the instant action is a reme d y appropr iately

tailored to both the 4 nature of Philip Morris' misconduct, and the injuries that it has inflicted on the 5 class member s. 6 (4th Am. Comp. ¶¶ 111-113.) Plaintiffs a lso renew ed their motion for c lass cer tification. 7 Phili p Morris moved under Fe d. R. Civ. P. 12(b)( 6) t o dismiss this independent ca use 8 of

a c tio n f or fa ilu re to s tate a

c la im, argui ng th at N e w Y or k w ou ld n ot r e c og nize su c h a c la im. I t 9 argued that eve n if the State would approve of order ing medical monitoring as a re medy , it would do 10 so only

as a r emedy

for a n exis ting tort. The district court re jected the se conte ntions. 11 The district c o u rt ex plored c ases de cided by New Y ork cour

ts and other c ourts, see 12 Caronia I I , 2011 WL 338425, at *5-*6, a nd predic ted 13 that the New York Court of Appea ls would recognize an independe nt claim for 14 me dic a l mo ni to ri ng , a nd

. . . f ur the r p re dic t[e d] th a t th e Cou rt of Ap pe a ls 15 would conclude that the statute of limit ations for such a claim beg ins to run on 16 the first date t h at s o me medica l monitoring prog ram is ac cepte d within the 17 medical community as an eff ective method of lung canc er scre ening or 18 surveillance

. 19 Caronia I I , 2011 WL 338 4 2 5 , at *3. The c ourt also hy pothesized that to establish such a claim a 20 pla int if

f w ou ld b e re qu ir e d to ple a d th e fo llo wi nge le me nts : 21 (1 ) e xpos ur e a t g re a te r tha n ba c kg ro un d le ve ls; (2 ) to a pr ov en h az ard ou s 22 su bs tanc e ; (3) c a

us e d by de fe nd ant' s to rt iou s c on du c t; ( 4) a s a pr oximate re su lt 23 of the e xpos ur e , p la int if

f f a c e s an e le vate d r isk

of c on tr a c tin g a se ri ou s late nt 24 dis e a se ; ( 5) a mon ito ri ngpr oc e dure e xists that make s e arl y de te c tio n p os sib le ; 25 (6) the monitoring prog ram is diff ere nt than the prog ram norma lly presc ribed 2 6 i nt h e a b s e n c e o f e x p o s ur e ; a n d ( 7 ) th e m o n i t o r i n g p r o g r ami s r e a s o n a b l y 27 nece ssary acc ording to contempora ry scientific pr inciples. 28 I d. at *7. 29 Howeve r, the c ourt co n cluded that plaintiffs' medical monitoringclaim must be15

- - 1 d i s m i s s e d

f o r f a i l u r e " t o p l e a d t h a t P h i l i p M o r r i s ' s a l l e g e d l y t o rt i o u s c o n d u c ti s t h e r e a s o nth a tth e y 2 mus t no w s e c ur e a mon ito ri ngpr og ra

m th a t in c lud e s L DC T s c ans ." I d. a t *3 . It st a te d th a t 3 the pl aintiffs m ust plead and prove that Phili p Morris' s failure to produce and 4 marke t a non-de fec tive cig are t t e is the rea son that the plaintiffs must now 5 s ec u re m ed i ca l m o n i t o ri n g th at i n cl u d es L DC T s ca n s . T h i s p l ea d i n g 6 re qu i re m en ti s m o s to b v i o u s l y em b o d i edb y

el em en t(6 ) o f t h e m o n i t o ri n g 7 c la im, wh ic h r e qu ir e s th a t th e pla int if fs ple a d a

nd pr ov e that th e me dic a l 8 mon ito ri ng the y no w re qu ir e is dif fe re nt f[r o]m the mon ito ri ngtha t phy sic ians 9 would presc ribe for individuals who have not bee n tortious ly exposed to 10 defe ctive Mar lboro cig are ttes. 11 I d. a t *1 0. Th e c ourt c on c lud e d th a t pl a int if

fs fa ile d to me e t th is p le a din g re qu ir e me nt 12 beca use th e fo u rt h amende d complaint contains no alleg ation that, if Phili p 13 Morris had c onformed its conduc t to the law and de signe d an d marke ted a 14 re du c e d ta r c ig are tte , th e pla int if

fs wo uld no t require the same me dic a l 15 mon ito ri ng that the y are se e kin g in thi s su it. No wh e re have the plai nt if fs 16 plead ed that if Phili p Morris had mar keted a nd desig ned the non- defe ctive 17 cig are tte they descr ibe, they would not ha ve been exposed to harmful levels of 18 tar. 19 I d. at *11. The c ourt thus gr anted Philip Morris's Rule 12( b)(6) motion to di smiss t he stand-a lone 20 medical monitoring claim. 2 1 P h i l i p M o r r i s a l s o m o v e d f

o r s u m m ar

y j u d g m e n t d i s m i s s i n g th e b r e a c h

- o f

- w ar r an ty 22 c la ims tha

t ha d s ur viv e d it s f

ir st s um mary

jud g me nt m oti on , p re ssi ngthe c on te nti on , a s th e dis tr ic t 23 court de scribed it, that a " product ne ed only provide ' for a

minimal leve l of quality ' and mee t 'the 2 4 e x p e c t a t i o n s f

o r t h e p e r f o r m an c e o f t h e p r o d u c tw h e nu s e d

i nth e c u s t o m ar

y, u s u a l an d

r e a s o n a b l y 25 fore seea

ble manner ,' " Ca

ronia I I , 2011 WL 338425, at *12 (quotingDenny v . Fo rd Motor Co., 87 26 N.Y.2d 248, 258-59, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250, 256 (1995)) , and "that under this ' consumer e x pectations' test, 27 the plaintiffs ca nnot prove bre ach of

impli ed wa rr an t y

beca use eve ryone knew , at the time that the 28 Marlboros at issue in this litigation wer e sold, that cig are ttes, when used nor mally , put people at r isk16

- - 1 of

de ve lop inglung can cer, " Caro nia I I , 2 01 1 WL

33 84 25 , at *1 2. Th e c ourt fo un d th is a

rgume nt 2 pe rs ua siv e : 3 The plaintiffs do not conte nd that, i n the y ear s releva nt to this complaint, 4 c on sume rs , in c lud ingthe pla int if fs , th ou g ht t hat s mok ingtob a c c o w a s 5 g ener ally safe and did not expose the m t o a sig nificantly elevated risk of 6 de ve lop ingc anc e r. (S e e De f. Ex. F .) Rath er, th e y argue , c on sume rs did

no t 7 know that Phili p Morris could easily have produce d a safe r cig are tte. (Pl. R. 8 5 6

. 1 ¶ ¶ 1 1 , 3 2

. ) A s cl ar i fi edb y co un s el at o ra l ar gu m en t , t h e p l ai n t i ff s ' 9 c on te nti on is that c on sume rs g e ne ra lly did no t kn owtha

t Ma rl bo ro c ig are tte s 10 we re de fe c tiv e (i .e . unn e c e ssa ri ly da ng e ro us ), no t th a t th e y

did no t kn owthat 11 the y we re da ng e ro us , ind e e d ve ry da

ng e ro us . Th is c on te nti on fa ils be c a

us e it 12 confla t es wh at New York c onsiders two distinct theories of liability and 13 improperly inserts ri s k-utility

considerations int o the law of war ranty . See 14 Den ny , 87 N. Y. 2d a t 25 8, 63 9 N. Y. S.2 d 25 0, 66 2 N. E. 2d 73 0 (" I t is t hi s 15 ne g lig e nc e -l ike ri sk /be n e f i t c o m p o n e nt o f t

he de fe c t e le me nt t

hat di ff e re nti a te s 1 6 s t r i c tp r o d u c t s l i a b i l i ty c l a i m s f

r o m U C C [

- ] b a s e d b r e a c h o f i mp l i e d w ar r an ty 17 c la ims in c a se s invo lvi ng de sig n de fe c ts. " )

. . . . I nd e e d, the Court be lie ve s th a t 18 the plaintiffs conc ede this point about conflation whe n they argue that they

"a re 19 not require d by law to prove the exist ence of a f easible a lternative de sign in 20 order to preva il at trial on a wa rra nty theory ." ( Pl. S .J . Opp. at 8.) 21 Be cause the plaintiffs conc ede the ir knowl ed ge of the da ng ers of 22 cig are ttes, and the Court thinks it irrelevant whe ther the plaintiffs thought their 23 c ig are tte s c ou ld n ot b e any sa fe r, the Cou rt re je c ts the argume nt t

hat Ma rl bo ro s 24 contained a n implied warra

nty that Phili p Morris bre ache d. 25 Caronia I I , 2011 WL 338425, at *12-*13. 2 6 J u d g m e n t wa s en t er edd i s m i s s i n g th e a ct i o ni ni t s en t i re ty an d d en yi n g p l a i n t i f

f s ' 27 motion for class ce rtification as moot.

28 I I . D I SMI SSA LOF TH E CO MMO N- L AW A ND UC C CLAI MS

2 9 Plaintiffs contend that the distri ct co urt erre d i ngra n t i n g s u m m ary

j u d gm en td i s m i s s i ng 30 their cla ims for neg lige nce, stric t products liability , and br ea ch o f t he implied war ranty of17

- - 1 merc hantab il it

y , a r g u ing pr incipally

(1) that their

neg lige nce a

nd strict liability

claims are timely

under 2 CPL R § 213( 1 ) ei t h er beca use the limitations period beg an ane w with eac h harmful e x posure to 3 M ar l b o r o c i g ar e t t e s o r b e c a u s e p l a i n t i f

f s c o u l d n o ta s s e rtt h o s e c l a i m s un t i l t h e L D C T r e m e dy t h e y 4 reque st became ava ilable, and ( 2) that their br eac h-of- war ranty claims could no t p r o perly be dismissed 5 a s a

matte r of law b e c a us e the re we re g e nu ine iss ue s to be tr ie d a s to wh e the r M arl bo ro c ig are tte s 6 could have been ma de saf er f or their intende d purpose. 7 S u m m ar y j u d g m e n ti s a

p p r o p r i a t e o n l y w h e r e " th e r e i s n o g e nu i n e d i s p u t e a s t o an y 8 materia l fac t and the movant is enti tled to judgment a s a matter of law." Fe d. R. Civ. P . 56(a) . I n 9 deter

mining whe ther that standa rd is met, the cour

t must draw all re asonab le fa ctual infe renc es in 10 favor

of the pa rty ag ainst whom summary

judgme nt is sought. S ee, e .g ., Ander son v. L iberty L obby , 11 I nc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); L y ons v. L ance r Insuranc e Co., 681 F.3d 50, 56 ( 2d Cir. 2012). The 12 same standa

rd g overns our revie w of the g ranting of summary judgme nt. See, e.g ., Kay tor v. Electr ic 13 Boat Corp., 609 F .3d 537, 546 (2d Cir. 2010); Petrosino v. Be ll Atlantic, 385 F.3d 210, 219 (2d Cir. 14 20 04 ); Di sta sio v. Pe rk in Elm e r Cor p. , 157 F .3 d 55, 61 (2 d Cir. 19 98 ). We " wi ll c on str ue the fa c ts 15 in t

he lig ht m os t f

avo ra ble to t he no n- mov ingpa

rt y and mus t r e so lve a ll ambi g uit ie s and dr aw a ll 16 rea sonable infe renc es ag ai nst the movant," B rod v. Omy a, Inc., 653 F .3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2011) 17 (i nt erna l q uo tat io n m arks om it ted ); we revi ew th e "di st ri ct cou rt 's in ter pret ati on of law

. . . d e no vo ," 18 id. 19 Ap ply ingthe se sta

nd ard s- -a nd a pp ly ing pr inc ipl e s o f N e w Y or

k la w, wh ic h g ov e rn s 20 thi s c a se in whic h f e de ra l juri sd ic tio n is pr e mis e d o n d ive rs ity of c iti zen sh ip- -w e con clu de th a t 21 summa

ry jud g me nt d ism iss ingpla int if fs ' ne g lig e nc e , s t

r i c t l i a b i l i t y , a n d b re a c h o f w arr anty

c la ims wa s 22 appropr iate.18

- - 1 A. Un tim e lin e ss o f t he Ne g lig e nc e and

Str ic t L ia bil ity Cla ims 2 Un de r N e w Y or k law, in or de r t o r e c ov e r o n a c la im f or ne g lig e nc e , a

pla int if f m us t 3 show "( 1) t he ex istence of a duty on defe ndant' s part as to plaintiff; (2) a bre ach of this duty ; and (3) 4 injury to the plaintiff as a result there of." Akins v. Glens Fa lls Ci ty School District, 53 N.Y.2d 325, 5 3 3 3 , 4 4 1 N

. Y

. S

. 2 d 6 4 4 , 6 4 8 ( 1 9 8 1 )

. " In o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h a p r i m a f

a c i e c a s e i ns tr i c tp r o d

u c t s l i a b i l i ty 6 for de sign de fec ts, the plaintiff must show that the manufac turer br eac hed its duty to market saf

e 7 products whe n it marketed a product de signe d so that it was not rea sonably safe and that the de fec tive 8 d es i gnwa s a s u

b s t an t i al fa ct o r i ncau s i n g p l ai n t i ff 's i n j ury . " Vo s s v . Bl ac k

& D ec k er

M an u fa ct u ri n g 9 Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 107, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398, 402 (1983); see id. at 109, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 403 (" the 10 pla int if

f i s r e qu ir e d to show that the de fe c tiv e ly de sig ne d pro du c t ca us e d h is i nju

ry and tha t th e de fe c t 11 wa s th e pr oximate c a us e of the inj ur y " ). Pla inl y , to re c ov e r o n e ith e r t y pe of c la im, a

pla int if f m us t 12 prove injury

. 13 Pr e lim ina ri ly , w e no te that pl a i nt i f

f s , d e s p i t e h a

v i n g a r g u e d b e fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt that 14 the six -y ear

limit ations period provide d in CPL R § 213(1) applied, appea r to argue on appe al that their 15 ne g lig e nc e and

str ic t li a bil ity c la ims are no t su

bje c t to any statut e of lim itatio ns . Th e y po int out th a t 16 the three -y ear l imitations period provide d in CP L R §§ 214(5) and 214- c(2) apply , respe ctively , to 17 a c tio ns to r e c ov e r d ama g e s f or pe rs on a l in

jur y and to a cti on s see kin g dama g e s f or late nt i nju

ri e s 18 c a

us e d b y e xpos ur e to t oxic su

bs tanc e s ( Pla int if

fs ' br ie f o n a

pp e a l at 24 ); the y

state , inte r a lia , th a t 19 "Plaintiffs do not alleg e per sonal injury in this case " (id. (empha sis a dded)) ; a nd they state that " [i ]f 20 a provision of the C PL R applied to [pl aintiffs' ] claims, it would be the six -y ear catc h all provision of 21 N.Y. C.P.L .R. § 213(1) (Plaintiffs' brief on a ppeal at 25 (emphasis adde d)). 22 Although the ab s en ce o f an a lleg ation of injury in a tort claim could indee d pose a19

- - 1 conundrum for

id e ntifying the commence ment of the limitations period, see, e .g ., Kronos, Inc. v. AVX 2 Corp., 8 1 N. Y. 2 d 9 0 , 94, 595 N.Y.S.2d 931, 934 (1993) ( "a s a g ener al proposition, a tort ca use of 3 action ca

nnot acc rue until an injury is sustained") ; Ac k erma

n v. Price Waterhouse , 84 N.Y.2d 535, 4 541, 620 N.Y.S.2d 318, 321 (1994) ( "it is upon injury that a leg al rig ht to relief a rises in a tort ac tion 5 and

the Statut e of

L imi tatio ns be gins to run . . . . " ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) , th e inq uir y wo uld lik e ly no t 6 rea ch the a ffirmative defe nse stag e, for if the complaint failed to alleg e injury , it would be dismiss able 7 for f

ailure to state a

claim. 8 Her e, howe ver, pla intiffs h ad al l eged that eac h plaintiff--a nd eac h member of

the 9 proposed cl ass--had smoked a minimum of 146,000 Marlboro c iga rettes a nd as a r esult had bee n 10 "e x posed to an e x cessive a mount of car cinogen s " (T h i rd Amende d Complaint ¶ 68); that the 11 neg lige nce, de s i g n defe cts, and other misconduct attributed to Philip M orris in its manufac ture a nd 12 sale of those cig are ttes "c aus[ed] plaintiffs to be at incre ased r isk of developinglung c ance r" (e.g ., id. 1 3 ¶

¶ 9 0 , 9 9 , 1 1 3 ) ; an d th a t " Pl a inti f f s an d th e Cl a s s h av e s u f

f e r e d

. . . h ar

m a s a r e s u lt o f d e f e n d an ts ' [s ic ] 14 wrong ful conduc t" ( id. ¶ 38). At oral argument of P hilip Morris's fir st summary judgme nt motion, t he 15 dis tr ic t c ourt

so ug ht a nd re c e ive d e xplic it c lari fi c a tio n th a t pl a int if fs we re c la imi nginj ur

y in t he fo rm 16 of

the ir inc re a se d r isk

of de ve lop inglun g c anc e r: 17 "THE C OU RT: So the e le me nts of y our c la im are that it was 18 defe ctively desig ned and that defe ctive desig n was the pr ox imate ca use of a n 19 injury , that injury beingan incr ease d risk of g etting lungcanc er. 20 Mr. BL OCK [counsel f or plaintiffs]: That' s absolutely ri gh t , y our 21 Hon or. " 22 Caronia I , 2010 WL520558, at *5 (quoting Transc ript of ora l argument of summary judgme nt motion, 23 Febru ary 7, 20 08 , a t 51 ) (e mph a se s ours ). Ac c or din g ly , we se e no e rr or in the dis tr ic t cour t's20

- - 1 co n cl u s i o nt h at "[ b ] o t hp art i es agr ee [ d ] th at th e i n j ury i nth i s ac t i o n i s th e i n cr ea s ed ri s k o f d ev el o p i n g 2 lung c anc e r a s a re su lt of smo kin g Ma rl bo ro c ig are tte s fo r tw e nty pa c k- y e ars ," id. a t *3 (em ph asi s 3 added)

. 4 Whil e pla int if fs c on te nd

that th e ir c la ims are tim e ly

un der th e six- y e ar l imi tatio ns 5 period a

nd that the three -y ear

limit ations period provide d in CP L R § 214(5) is inapplica ble bec ause 6 i tgo v ern s a c t i o n s t o re co v er "d am age s , " w h er ea s t h ey ar e s ee k i n g a r em ed y

o f m ed i ca l m o n i t o ri n g 7 rathe r than damag es (Plaintiffs' brief on appea l at 24) , Phili p Morris argues that plaintiffs' claims are 8 unt i m el y even under the six-y ear limit ations period. Howe ver, Philip Morris contends that those 9 c la ims are su

bje c t to the thr e e -ye ar l imi tatio ns pe ri od be c a us e in r e a lity th e re qu e st f or me dic a l 1 0 m o n i t o ri n g i s a r equ es t fo r "'co n s equ en t i al d am age s '" (P h i l i p M o rr i s b ri ef o n ap p ea l at 1 7 n . 6 ) ( qu o t i n g 11 Askey

v. Occ idental Chemical Corp., 102 A.D .2d 130, 135, 477 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (4th Dep' t 1984) 12 (" Askey ") ). 13 W e, l i k e the district cour t, need not re solve the question of whe ther the a ppli ca b l e 1 4 s t a tu t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s i s t h r e e ye ar s o r s i x ye ar s . A l th o u g hth e c h o i c e b e tw e e nl i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d s m ay 15 depend on whether the re lief soug ht by the plaintiff is le g al or equitable, see, e.g ., L oeng ard v. Santa 1 6 F e In d

u s t r i e s , In c . , 7 0 N

. Y

. 2 d

2 6 2 , 2 6 6 , 5 1 9 N

. Y

. S

. 2 d

8 0 1 , 8 0 3 ( 1 9 8 7 ) , th e d i s tr i c tc o urtp r o p e r l y 17 conclude d that plaintiffs' claims are time-barr ed under either statute. 18 I n c ha lle ng ingthe dis tr ic t c ourt ' s r uli ngthat th e ir

ne g lig e nc e and

str ic t lia bil ity c la ims 19 wer e untimely

beca use the injury

they alleg ed-- the incre ased r isk of lung c ance r r esul ting f rom 20 20 pa c k- y e ars of

smo kin g Ma

rl bo ro c ig are tte s- -a

ro se in the mid -1 99 0s , pla int if fs re ne w t he ir argume nts 21 (a ) t

hat Ph ili p M or

ri s' s c on tin

uin g c ours e of

c on du c t in

manu fa c tur ingand

se lli ngMarl bo ro c ig are tte s 22 " inf

lic t[e d] ne w a

nd c on tin uin g inj ur y , o r a g g ra

vate [d] ol d in

jur y ," thereb y c a

us ingthe lim itatio ns21

- - 1 period to beg in anew with eac h new ex posure (Plainti ffs' brief on appea l at 29-30), and (b) that their 2 claims did not acc rue until approximately one y ear befor e they commence d this a ction, when the re lief 3 they

soug ht--L DCT--be came available (see id. at 27-28). B oth contentions are contra ry to New Yor

k 4 law.

5 1

. T h e C o n t i nu i n g E x p o s u r e T h e o r y 6 N e w Y o r k ' s C P L R pr ov ide s th a t " e xce pt a s o the rw ise e xpre s s l y p r e s c r i b e d , " l i m i t a

t i o n s 7 p e r i o d s " s h a l l b e c o mp u t e d f r o m t h e t i m e th e c a

u s e o f a c t i o na c c r

u e d

. " C P L R

§ 2 0 3 ( a ) ( M c K i n n e y 8 2003). A c ause of action has a ccr

ued " when a ll of the fac ts nece ssary to the ca use of a ction have 9 occur

red so that the pa

rty would be entitl ed to obtain relief in court." Aetna L ife a nd Casualty

Co. v. 10 Nelson, 67 N.Y.2d 169, 175, 501 N .Y.S.2d 313, 316 (1986). 11 I n Sny der v. Town Insulation, I nc., 81 N.Y.2d 429, 599 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1 9 9 3 ) 12 (" Sny der" ), the Ne w York Court of A ppeals c onsidered the question of when a cause of action ac crue d 13 fo r " dama g e s f

or [re sp ir a tor

y ] inj ur ie s [th a t the pla int if fs ] al le g e dly

su sta ine d a s a

re su lt o f e mis sio ns 14 from ure afor

maldehyde foa

m insulation i nstalled in their home in 1977. " I d

. at 431, 599 N.Y.S.2d 15 at 515. As the l awsuit soug ht damag es (a nd the date- of-discove ry

rule wa s not at issue, see id., 599 16 N.Y.S.2d at 516) , t h e three -y ear limit ations period provide d by CPL R § 214 applied; howeve r, the 17 c la im wa s fi rs t a sse rt e d mor e tha n fi ve y e ars a ft e r the pla int if fs ha d be g un inh a lin g the i njur iou s 18 e mis sio ns . Re so lut ion of the tim e li nes s qu est ion

tur ne d o n " wh e the r a c c ru a l un de r C PL R 21 4 is 19 measure d from the date of injury or fr om the date of

last exposure." I d., 599 N.Y.S .2d at 516 20 (empha sis added). The court c oncluded that the c laim was bar red be cause it had acc rued on the date 21 of

inj ur y :22

- - 1 An ac tion to recove r dama g es for persona l injuries mu s t b e commenc ed 2 within three y ear s from the date of a ccr ual (CPL R 203 [ a] ; 214 [5] ; but see, 3 214-c)

. As a g ener al proposition, the cause of ac tion does not acc rue until an 4 injur y is su sta ine d

. . . . State d ano the r wa y , a c c ru a l oc c ur s wh e n the cla im 5 b e c o m e s e n f o r c e a b l e , i

. e . , w h e na l l e l e m e n t s o f th e t o rtc anb e tr

u th f u l l y 6 a lle g e d in a com pla int

. . . . Th e str a ig htf

or wa rd a pp lic a tio n o f t

he se pr inc ipl e s 7 l e a d s t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n th a t p l a i n t i f f s ' c a u s e s o f a c t i o n a c c r

u e d o nth e d a t e th e y 8 w e r e f i r s ti n j u r e d

. A t th a tm o m e n t , a l l e l e m e n t s o f th e t o rtc o u l d

b e tr u th f u l l y 9 alleg ed, and the y had a c olorable c laim ag ainst defe ndants. 10 81 N.Y.2d at 432- 33, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 516-17 (e mphases adde d). 11 The c ourt reje cted the Sny ders' contention t hat t he New York Court of Appeals ha d, 12 "in so-c alled ' tox ic tort' case s, where the i n j u ry results from injec tion, ingestion, or inhalation of a 13 substance," established a da te-of- last -e x p o s ure r

ule. 81 N.Y.2d at 433, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 517. The 14 court stated that no Court of Appea ls c ase stood f or such a r

ule. I t noted, for e x ample, that in a c ase 15 in which a wor

ker ha d "c ommenced a neglig ence action aga inst his employ er, alleg ing that inhalation 16 of

du st o n th e job re su lte d in lun g dis e a se se ve ra l y e ars late r, " and ha d argue d th a t th e a c c ru a l of his 17 cause of action should be "the date of the onset of the dise ase," the New York Court of Appe als had 18 "r ejec ted that proposition and re stat ed t h e t ra d itional rule: ' There can be no doubt that a ca use of 19 action ac crue s only when the f

orce s wrong fully put in motion produce injury ,' " 81 N .Y.2d at 433, 599 20 N.Y.S.2d at 517 (quoting Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transpor tation Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 300-01, 21 200 N.E. 824, 827 (1936) ). The Snyder c ourt noted that the lungdisease was not the injury : "Dise ase 22 [i]s a

c on se qu e nc e of

the inj ur y , . . . no t the inj ur

y its e lf , a nd the inj ur y wa s c omp le te a t th e mom e nt 23 the dust was inhaled even though plaintiff may not have been awar e of it then .

. . ." 81 N.Y.2d at 433, 24 599 N.Y.S.2d at 517. 25 Thus, the New York Court of Appe als in Sny der obse rved that "[f]or more than a half 26 a centur

y , our case s have uniformly held that such cause s of action acc rue upon injury ." I d.; se e, e.g .,23

- - 1 Rothstein v. Tennessee Gas Pipelin e C o . , 8 7 N. Y.2d 90, 93, 637 N.Y.S.2d 674, 675 (1995) ( "T he 2 long- standi n g rule in tox ic tort ca ses in New Y ork has be en that whe n chemica l compounds are 3 injected into a person' s body , the i njury occur s upon the drugs['] introduction, not when the a lleg ed 4 delet er i o u s ef

fe ct s o f i t s co mp o n en tch em i ca l s b ec o m e ap p ar en t

. ") (i n t ern al qu o t at i o nm ark s o m i t t ed ). 5 The Sny der Court pointed out that " [d] eter mining whe n limit atio ns beg in to run 6 require s a bala

ncingof policy

considerations." 81 N.Y.2d at 435, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 518. 7 On one side of the sca le ar e t h e intere sts of injured par ties. Unquestionably , 8 a Statute of L imitations can ha ve a se vere impact on their rig hts when, for 9 instance, a n injury is not discovered until y ear s later. The L eg islature has ac ted 10 to amelio rate the rule in such c ases in re cent y ear s (see , CPL R 214-c). 11 Conve rs e ly , d e fe nd ants are e nti tled to a fa ir op po rt un ity to d e fe nd

c la ims 12 ag ainst them befor e their a bility to do so has deter iorated . . . . 13 I d. Th e c ourt

thu s r e je c te d th e c on te nti on of Mr s. Snyde r that her su it wa s time ly be c a us e sh e wa s st ill 14 living in the house a nd was c ontin u i n g t o suffe r exposure to the insulation. The cour t declined to 15 adopt a r

ule that wo u l d gi v e "a p l aint iff . . . the powe r to put off the r unning of the Statute of 16 L imitations indefinitely ." I d. Cf. Adamo v. B rown & W i l l i am son Tobacc o Corp., 11 N.Y.3d 545, 17 55 1, 872 N.Y .S .2 d 4 15 , 4 18 (2 00 8) (s tatin g , o n a n is su e oth e r t

ha n a c c ru a l, t

hat " [t]o h old

. . . th a t 18 e ve ry

sa le of re g ula r c ig are tte s e xpos e s th e manu fa c tur e r t o to rt lia bil ity wo uld amou

nt t o a jud ic ia l 19 ban on the pr oduct" ). 20 We c on c lud e tha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

in t he pr e se nt ca se c or

re c tly int e rp re te d Sny de r a s 21 e sta

bli sh ingtha

t a c la im f or inj ur y c a us e d b y ha rm fu l e xpos ur e to t oxic su bs tanc e s a c c ru e s w he n th a t 22 exposure occur s, and does not, as pla intiffs in the prese nt case argue, repeatedly acc rue w ith each ne w 23 inh a latio n. As thi s a c tio n w a s c omm e nc e d i n 200 6, and pla int if fs ' de po sit ion s e sta

bli sh e d th a t 24 plaintiffs had known more than three y ear s ear lier t h at s m o k i n g cig are ttes was the c ause of their24

- - 1 incre ased r isk of lung c ance r, and that eac h plaintiff had rea ched the 20-pac k-y ear level bythe mid2 1990s at the l atest, t he dis trict court properly ruled that their injuries occ urre d prior to the applica ble 3 limit ations period, whe ther that pe riod was thre e y ear s or six

.

4 2

. T h e N e w l y- A v a i l a b l e R e l i e f T h e o r y 5 No t wi t h s t an d i n g t h e o cc urr en ce o f t h e i n j ury o f " i n cr ea s edri s k

o f d ev el o p i n g l u n g 6 canc er" (Third Ame nded Complaint ¶¶ 90, 9 9 , 1 1 3 ) m ore tha n six y ear s prior to their 2006 7 commence ment of this action, plaintiffs contend that their claims did not acc rue until 2006, bec ause 8 "pri or t o t he i ns tan t s ui t 's c o m m e n cem ent , n o eff ica cio us rel ief

," i .e. , L DC T, "was av ail abl e" 9 (P la int if

fs ' br ie f o n a

pp e a l at 28 ). Thus , pla int if fs c on te nd that a ca

us e of a c tio n d oe s n ot a c c ru e un til 10 a for

m of relief

that an injured pe rson pre fer s has bec ome technolog ically fea sible. 11 I n support of this contentio n , plaintiffs quote snippets from a number of c ases; but none 12 of t hem s tands for such a propositi on. For example, plaintiffs cite L aB ello v. Albany Medica l Center 13 Hospital, 85 N.Y.2d 701, 706, 6 2 8 N. Y. S

. 2 d 40, 42 (1995), f or its statement that " the ' [s] tatute of 14 L imi tatio ns do e s n ot r un un til the re is a

le g a l r ig ht t o r e lie f' and 'accrual occur s w he n th e c la im 15 become s enfor cea ble' " ( Plaintiffs' br ief on a ppeal at 2 6 ). T h at case , howeve r, involved a c laim for 16 prenatal injury , and the court sim ply ruled that the claim did not acc rue until the child was bor n. See 17 85 N.Y.2d at 708, 628 N.Y .S.2d at 44. In Aetna L ife & Casualty Co. v. Nelson, 67 N.Y.2d 169, 175, 18 501 N.Y.S.2d 313, 316 (1986), cited for its statement that " ' [t ]he St atute of L imitations beg ins to run 19 . . . when a ll of the fac ts nece ssary t o t h e ca u s e of ac tion have occ urre d so that the party would be 20 entitled to obtain relief in c ourt' " ( Plaintiffs' br ief on a ppeal at 26) , the court mere ly held that wher e 21 an in sure r h a s p a id i ts i ns ur e d f or a los s and

the ins ur e d r e c ov e rs c omp e ns a tio n f or that lo ss f

ro m25

- - 1 ano the r s ourc e , th e in sure r' s r ig ht t o r e c ou p " any [suc h] r e c ov e ry

ob ta ine d b y

the ins ur e d" do e s n ot 2 a c c ru e un til that r e c ov e ry ha s in fa c t be e n o bta ine d, 67 N. Y. 2d a t 176, 50 1 N.Y .S. 2d a t 31 7 ( int e rn a l 3 quotation marks omitted). In J acobus v. Colgate, 217 N.Y. 235, 245, 111 N.E. 837, 840 (1916) , cited 4 for it s st ateme nt t hat " ' [a] c a

us e of a c tio n d oe s n ot a c c ru e un til its e nf or c e me nt b e c ome s p os sib le ' " 5 (P la int if

fs ' br ie f o n a

pp e a l a t 29 ), the c ourt wa s dis c us sin g the fa c t that un til 19 13 no Ne w Y or k c ourt 6 had jurisdiction to e ntertain a suit for injury to rea l property that was outside of the State, see 217 N .Y. 7 at 239, 111 N.E. at 838. I n Vig ilant I nsuranc e Co. v. Housin g Au t h o ri t y o f t h e City of El Paso, 87 8 N. Y. 2d

36 , 4 3, 63 7 N. Y. S.2 d 34 2, 34 6 (1 99 5) , c ite d fo r its state me nt that a c la im c ann ot a c c ru e un til 9 "'al l o f t h e facts nece ssary to sustain the cause of ac tion have occ urre d, so that a par ty could obtain 10 relief

in court' " ( Plaintiffs' brief on appea l at 25) , the court was discussingthe unre marka ble principle 11 th at t he "ri ght t o sue on [ a] bo nd 's pri nci pal deb t does no t accrue unt il th e deb t i s 'du e andpay abl e,'" 12 87 N.Y.2d at 44, 637 N.Y .S.2d at 346. 13 Pla int if fs re c og nize , h ow e ve r, that mor e tha n tw o d e c a de s p ri or

to t he c omm e nc e me nt 14 of t hi s act io n i t w as "cl ear t hat New Y ork 's cou rt s l oo k wi th favo r on cla im s fo r m edi cal mo ni to ri ng" 15 (Plaintiffs' brief on a ppeal at 35-36 (citing , inter alia, A skey , 102 A. D.2d at 135, 477 N.Y.S.2d 16 at 246)), a

nd on medical m o n i t oring reque sts by plaintiffs who had be en exposed to car cinog enic 17 substances a

nd fea red the y would develop canc er (Plaintiffs' brief on a ppeal a t 36 (citing , inter alia, 18 Dang ler v. Town of Whit estown, 241 A.D.2d 290, 2 9 4 , 6 7 2 N.Y.S .2d 188, 190 (4th Dep' t 1998) 19 (" Dang ler" ), and Abusio v. Consolidated Edison Co., 238 A.D.2d 454, 454, 656 N.Y.S.2d 371, 372 20 (2d De p' t 1997) (" Abusio") ). 21 I n Abusio, alth o u gh the cour t upheld the dismissal of canc erphobia claims on the 22 g round that the plai n tiffs had not pre sented suff icient evidenc e to pre vail, it noted, citing c ases, the26

- - 1 ava ila

bil ity of a c tio ns fo r r e c ov e ry

of the c os t of futur e me dic a l mo nit or inga s r e lie f f or c anc e rp ho bia : 2 Under the pre vailing c ase la

w, in order

to maintain a ca

u s e of action for f

ear 3 o f d ev el o p i n g ca n c e r o r f o r f u ture m ed i ca l m o n i t o ri n g co s t s fo l l o wi n g 4 exposure to a tox ic substance like poly chlorinate d biphenyl s (hereinaf ter 5 PCBs), a plaintiff must establish both that he or she was in fa ct exposed to the 6 disease- causingag ent and that ther e is a " rational ba sis" for his or her

fea r of 7 contra cting the disease

. . . . This "r ational basis" has bee n construed to mea n 8 the clinically demonstrable presenc e of PC Bs in the plaintiff' s body , or some 9 in di cat io n of PC B-in du ced di seas e, i .e. , s om e ph y si cal man if est ati on of P CB 10 contamination . . . . 11 238 A.D.2d at 454- 55, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 372 (e mphasis added)

. 12 I n Dang ler, the appellate court reve rsed the dismiss al of canc erphobia claims that wer e 13 ba se d o n e ff

luv ium e manatin g fr om a

c on tamin a te d la

nd fi ll, and

state d: 1 4 I t i s w e ll s e tt le d th a t, to ma inta in

a c a u se o f a c ti o nf o r c an c e r p h o b ia , " [a ] 1 5 p l ai n t i ff mu s tes t ab l i s hb o tht h at h e wa s i n fa ct ex p o s edt o t h e d i s ea s e- cau s i n g 16 agentandth at t here is a 'rati on al b asi s' for hi s fe ar of con tr act in g the d is ease " 17 . . . . "[W] hen the c i rc u m s t ances of the c ase pr ovide a guara ntee of the 18 g enuinene ss of the cla im", a pla intiff may rec over f o r n eg lige nt infliction of 19 purely mental suffe ring

. . . . 20 241 A.D.2d at 293, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 190. The Da ng ler c ourt stated that the tria l court had " err ed in 21 striking the te stimony of plaintiffs' experts reg arding

. . . future me dical monitoring ." I d. at 294, 672 22 N.Y.S.2d at 190 (c iting Aske y , 102 A.D.2d at 135, 477 N.Y .S.2d at 246). 23 Th e Da ng le r c ourt

a lso , in dis c us sin g a ssumpt ion

of r i s k , n o t e d

t h a t " s m o k i n g " i nv o l v e s 24 "voluntar

y exposure to car cinog ens," 241 A.D.2d at 294, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 191 (emphasis adde d), an 25 observation co n fi rm i n g t hat the dang ers of smoking we re c ommon knowledg e. And the c ourt in 26 I nzerilla v. America n Tobac co Co., No. 11754/96, 2000 WL34016364 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 27, 2000), 27 no tedth at "[ t] he car cin ogeni c dan ger from c i ga r e t t e s w as co mm on kn owl edge fro m at lea st19 69 ." 28 I d. at *14.27

- - 1 I t is clea r, from Askey and it s prog eny , that plaintiffs in the present action, by the time 2 their injuries ar ose i n or before the mid-1990s, could have broug ht suit to seek relief in the N ew Yor k 3 courts. Plaintiffs have not called to our attention any case --nor are we a war e of a ny --holdingthat a 4 c a

us e of a c tio n f or inj ur y that is c og niza

ble in the Ne w Yo rk c ourt s do e s no t a c c ru e un til a re me dy that 5 the injured pe rson would pre fer become s available

. 6 We c onclude that the district c ourt proper ly dismiss ed plaintiffs' claims for ne g lige nce 7 and strict produc ts liabili ty as bar red by the applica

ble statute of limitations.

8 B . Summa

ry Di smi ssa l of

the B re a c h o f Impl ie d Wa rr anty Cla ims 9 Plaintiffs contend that t he dis trict court erre d in dismi ssing their claims for br eac h of 10 the UCC impli ed wa rra nty of merc hantability , arguing that they raised a g enuine issue of

fac t to be 11 tried as to whether Marlboro cig are ttes could have been made safe r for their intended purpose . The 12 district court g rante d summary judgme nt dismi ssing these claims on the g round t h at , beca use the 13 dang ers of

cig are tte smoking wer e well known long befor e plaintiffs re ache d the 20-pa ck-year mark 14 in o r b e fo re the mid -1 99 0s , p la int if fs c ou ld n ot h ave re lie d o n a ny wa rr anty that Ma rl bo ro c ig are tte s 15 wer e saf

e. Plaintiffs conc ede that they "ha d knowledg e that Mar lboros wer e dang erous a nd 16 c arc ino g e nic ," but the y a sse rt that "[w ]hat [th e y ] did no t kn ow , a

nd wh a t Ph ili p M or

ri s c on c e a le d f

ro m 17 th em, was th at [ Mar lb oro cigaret tes ] were u nn ec e s s a r i l y carci no genic by

ord ers of m agnit ud e." 18 (Plai ntiffs' brief on a ppeal at 40 (emphasis adde d).) Citing a n expert repor

t that they

submitt ed in 19 opposition t o summary judgme nt, "de scrib[ing] in detai l a m u l t i t ude of w ay s in which Marlboro 20 ci gar et t es could have been de signe d to reduc e the pr oduct' s excessive ca rcinog enicity " ( id. at 41), 21 pla int if

fs argue that " [a] d e fe nd ant wh o s e lls a pr od uc t th a t is unne c e ssa

ri ly and c ov e rt ly da ng e ro us28

- - 1 wi ll b e lia

ble fo r b re a c h o f i mp lied wa rr anty de sp ite the c on sumin g pu bli c ' s o r p la int if

f' s g e ne ra l 2 knowledg e of the product' s dang ers" (id. at 39). We ar e unper suaded that the district court er red. 3 "T he implied warra nty of merc hantability

is a g uara ntee by the seller that its goods ar e 4 fi t for the i nte nd e d p ur po se fo r whic h th e y

are us e d a

nd that th e y wi ll p a ss i n th e tr a de with ou t 5 objection." Saratog a S pa & Bath, I nc. v. Be eche Sy stems Corp., 230 A.D.2d 326, 330, 656 N.Y.S.2d 6 787, 789 (3d Dep' t 1997). Unde r Ne w York state ' s version of the U CC, thi s g uara ntee is " implied in 7 a contr act f

or . . . sale if the seller is a merc hant," N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) --that is, if the seller, inter 8 a l i a , " d e a l s i n " t h e t yp e o f g o o d s s o l d , i d

. § 2

- 1 0 4 ( 1 )

. A m e r c h an tb r e a c h e s th e U C C i mp l i e d w ar r an ty 9 of merc hantability if it sells goods that ar e not "fit for the or dinary purposes for

which such g oods are 10 used," N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314(2) (c) . This standard doe s not require that the g oods be per fec t , see 11 Saratog a

Spa & B a th, I nc . v . B e e c h Sy ste ms Cor p. , 230 A. D. 2d a t 330, 65 6 N.Y .S. 2d a t 79 0, or that 12 t h ey

"fulfill [a] buy er' s ever

y expectation," Denny v. For d Motor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248, 258 n.4, 6 3 9 13 N.Y.S.2d 250, 256 n.4 (1995) ( "D enny ") (interna l quotation marks omitted); it require s only that the 1 4 g o o d s s o l d

b e o f " a m i n i m a l l e v e l o f

qu a l i ty, " i d

. ( i n t e r

n a l qu o t a t i o nm ar

k s o m i t t e d )

. T h e i n qu i r

y 15 focuse s on the expectations for the pe rfor mance of the produc t when used in 16 the customary , usual and re asonably fore seea ble manner s. The ca

use of a ction 17 is one involving true "stric t" liability , since re cover y m ay be had upon a 18 showing that the produc t was n ot minim ally safe for its expected purpose

-- 19 wi tho ut re g ard to the fe a sib ili ty of a lte rn a tiv e de sig ns or the manu factur e r' s 20 "r easona bleness" in marketingit in that unsafe condition. 21 Denny , 87 N.Y.2d at 258- 59, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 256 (e mphases adde d). 22 As the De nny quote indicates, the New Y ork Court of A p p ea l s h as taken c are to 2 3 d i s t i n g u i s ht h i s m e r c h an t a b i l i t y- r e l a t e d

s tr i c tl i a b i l i ty f r o mth e l i a

b i l i ty th a t i s m o r e typ i c a l l y 24 a sso c iate d w ithc la ims fo r d e fe c tiv e pr od uc ts. Th e str ic t pro du c ts lia bil ity c a us e of a c tio n " or ig inate s29

- - 1 in t or

t la w, wh ic h tr a dit ion a lly

ha s c on c e rn e d it se lf

wi th s oc ia l po lic y

and ri sk a lloc a tio n, " wh e re a s 2 the bre ach of

implied warra

nty cause of ac tion "orig inates in contra ct law, whic h direc ts its attention 3 to the purcha ser' s disappointed expectations." I d. at 259, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 256. As a result, "the c ore 4 element of

' defe ct' is subtly

differ ent in the two ca

uses o f ac t i o n ." I d. at 256, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 255. 5 I n products liability case s, the NewYork c ourts will inquire whether , "if the desig n defe ct wer e known 6 a t th e tim e of manu fa c tur e , a re a so na ble pe rs on

wo uld c on c lud e that th e uti lity

of the pr od uc t di d n ot 7 outweig h the risk inhere nt in mar keting a product desig ned in that manner." I d. at 257, 639 N.Y.S.2d 8 a t 25 5 ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) . B y

c on tr a st, " the UC C' s con c e pt o f a ' de fe c tiv e ' pr od

uc t 9 require s an inquiry only into whether t h e p ro d u ct i n question was fit for the ordinar

y purposes for 10 whi ch such g oods are used." I d. at 258, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 256 (inter nal quotation marks omit t ed ). 11 Products liability ' s "ne g lige nce- like risk/utili ty approa ch is fore ign to the rea lm of contract law." I d. 12 at 262, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 258. 13 The issue of f act rai s ed b y

plaintiffs as to whethe r Philip Morris could have made 14 Marlboro c iga

rettes sa fer , there fore , is not an issue that is material to the cla im of brea ch of implied 1 5 w ar

r an t y o f m e r c h an t a

b i l i t y. T h a t i mp l i e d w ar

r an ty i s n o t b r e a c h e d

i f th e c i g ar e t t e s w e r e m i n i m a l l y 16 sa fe whe n us e d in the c us tom ary , u su a l, a

nd re a so na bly fo re se e a ble mann e r. We c on c lud e that 17 summary

judgme nt dismi ssing these claims was a ppropriate

.

18 I I I . M ED I CA LMO NI TO RI NGAS A N I ND EPEND EN T CLAI M

19 The que stion of whether a plainti ff may maintain an independent ca use of a ction for 20 medical monitoring under N ew Yor k law has not be en addr essed by the New York Court of Appe als.30

- - 1 And a lt

h o u g hth e matt e r

h a s b e e nd e a lt

w it hin N e w Y o r

k ' s inte r me d iate a p p e ll a te c o u rts , in

th e 2 fe de ra l di str ict c ourt s in Ne w Y or k, and in t he highe st c ourt s o f s e ve ra l ot he r s tate s, the tr e a tme nts 3 have va

ried.

4 A. De c isi on s o f N e w Y or k St a te Court s 5 I n 1984 , t h e Ap p el late Division in Askey , dealingwith claims of exposure to tox ic 6 discharg es fr om a landfill, considere d whether the pl aintiffs could rec over for anticipated nee ds for 7 medical monit oring

. The procedur al question befor e that cour t was whe ther the pla intiffs' motion for 8 class ac tion certification had been properly denied; an underly ing substantive question conce rned the 9 cog nizabili ty

of cla ims for damag es or injunctive relief by those plaintiffs who had not y et exhibit ed 10 ph y sic a l in

jur y : 11 The nove l issue presente d is whether those persons who ha ve an increa sed risk 12 of ca ncer , g enetic damag e and other illnesses by rea son of their exposure to the 13 tox ic che micals emanating f rom the landfill, but whose phy sical injuries ar e 14 not evident, should be cer tified as a c lass for the pur pose of de termining their 15 rig ht to recove r the c osts of future med i ca l m o n itoring se rvice s to diag nose 16 war ning sig ns of the deve lopment of disease

. 1 7 1 0 2 A

. D

. 2 d

a t1 3 1 , 4 7 7 N

. Y

. S

. 2 d

a t2 4 4

. T h e c o urtn o t e d

th a to n e g r o u

p o f p l a i n t i f f s w a s s o l e l y 18 c on c e rn e d w ithinj ur ie s w hic h h ave no t surf a c e d b ut whic h ma

y a ff lic t th e m 19 in the future. T hey alleg e that their e x posure ha s increa sed their ri s k of 20 developingcanc er a nd other c hemically i n d uced dise ases, a nd in their 21 complaint s ee k as a reme dy the impositi on of a c onstructive trust upon the 22 proper ty owned by

defe ndants in an amount suff i cient to pay

for the c ost of 2 3 m ed i ca l d et ec t i o ns erv i ce s m ad e n ec es s ary b y th e i n cr ea s edh az ar d s , re s erv i n g 24 the rig ht to seek dama g es for such enha

nced r isks. 25 I d. at 133, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 245. The c ourt stated that " damag es re sulting fr om the enhanc ed risk of 26 canc er a

nd the threat of future harm not y et realized are not compensa ble in a tort ac tion." I d. at 135,31

- - 1 47 7 N .Y .S. 2d

a t 246 (em ph asi s a dd e d) . H ow e ve r, the c ourt c on c lud e d th a t r e c ov e ry

" fo r m e dic a l 2 monitoring" was available " as an e lement of c onsequential damag e." I d. (empha sis added). 3 [A] plaintiff ha s a ca u s e of a ction immediately upon exposure to a fore ign 4 substance a nd can r ecove r all damag es which he can showresulted or would 5 re su lt the re fr om, e ve n th ou g h at th e tim e the a c tio n is c omm e nc e d n o s e ri ou s 6 damag e to the plaintiff has develope d. The theory of liability g rows out of the 7 inv a sio n o f t he bo dy by the fo re ig n s ub sta nc e , w iththe a ssumpt ion

be ingthat 8 the su bs tanc e a c ts i mme diate ly up on the bo dy se tti ngin m oti on

the f or c e s 9 w h i c he v e n tu a l l y r e s u l ti nd i s e a s e . . . . T h e d e f e n d an ti s l i a

b l e f o r " r e a s o n a b l y 10 anticipated" conseque ntial damag es which may flow l ater from that invasion 11 a lth ou g h th e inv a sio n it se lf is a n in jur y too sli g ht to be no tic e d at the tim e it i s 12 inflicted. 13 I d. at 136, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 247 (othe r interna l quotation marks omitted). 14 Th e c ourt we nt o n to no te that 15 [t ]he proof problems a re, of course , formidable. In order to rec over f or 16 appre hended conseque nces not prese ntly manifest, ther e must be such a deg ree 17 of pr ob a bil ity of th eir oc c ur

re nc e a s to amou

nt t o a re a so na ble c e rt a int

y tha t 18 the y wi ll r e su lt .

. . . Da

ma g e s for the pr os pe c tiv e c on se qu e nc e s o f a tor tio us 19 injury are rec overa

ble only if th e p rospec tive conseque nces ma y with 20 re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity be e xpe c te d to fl owfr om t he pa st h arm . Co ns e qu e nc e s 2 1 w h i c har e c o n t i n g e n t , s p e c u l a t i v e , o r m e r e l y p o s s i b l e a r e n o tp r o p e r l y 22 c on sid e re d in a sc e rt a ini ngdama g e s . . . . I f a pla int if f s e e ks future me dic a l 23 ex p en ses as a n element of

conseque ntial damag e, he must establish with a 24 deg ree of re asonable medical c erta inty throu gh ex p ert testimony that such 25 expenses will be incurre d . . . . 26 I d. at 136-37, 477 N.Y .S.2d at 247. 27 W h i l e t h e Askey court ultimately

ruled that ther e we re a

number of individualized 28 issues that warr anted upholdingthe denial of class ce rtification, it conclude d that the re cord suf fice d 29 to indicate that the 30 persons e x posed to tox ic che micals emanating f rom the land fi l l have a

n 31 incre ased r isk of i n v i s i b l e g enetic da mag e and a

prese nt cause of ac tion for 32 the ir inj ur y , a nd may re c ov e r a ll " re a so na

bly anti c ipate d" c on se qu e ntia l 33 damag es. The f ut u re ex p ense of

medical monitoring could be a rec overa ble32

- - 1 conseque ntial da mag e provided that plaintiffs can establish with a re asonable 2 degree o f medi cal cert ain ty th at su ch ex pen di tu res are "reas on abl y ant ici pat ed" 3 to be incu rred by rea son of their e x posure. The re is no doubt that such a 4 re me dy wo uld pe rm it the e arl y de te c tio n and tr e a tme nt o f m a la die s a nd that a s 5 a matter of public policy

the tort-fe asor should bea r its cost. 6 I d. at 137, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 247 (e mphasis added)

. 7 Although A skey also opined that the statute of limit ations had begun to r un from the 8 date of

the plaintiffs' last exposure to the tox ic substance s, a view that, as discussed in P ar t I I .A.1. 9 a bo ve , w a s su

bs e qu e ntl y

re jected by th e NewYo rk Cou rt of Ap pe a ls i n Sny de r, Snyde r d id n ot 10 purport to dea l with Askey ' s views of the availability of dama g es or of

equitable r elief in the f

orm of 11 me dic a l mo nit or ing . N or are we awa

re of any oth e r N e w Y or

k Co ur t of Ap pe a ls c a se th at ha s 12 addre ssed this issue. 13 FollowingAskey , New York i ntermediate appe llate cour ts and trial-leve l courts have 14 continued to rule that plaintiffs who have been tortiously exposed to tox ic substance s and ca n show 15 that the y have a ratio na l ba sis fo r t he ir fe ar o f d e ve lop ingc anc e r m ay be a llo we d to re c ov e r t

he c os t 16 of medica l monitoring as a n element of

rea sonably

anticipated c onsequential d am age s . See, e.g ., 17 Os arc zuk

v. As so c iate d U niv e rs ities , Inc ., 36 A. D. 3d 87 2, 87 7, 83 0 N .Y .S. 2d 71 1, 71 5 ( 2d

De p' t 18 2007) (holding"me dical monitoring and other injunctive relief

" available a s remedie s for c laims of 19 neg lige nce a

nd g ross neg lige nce in c ausing exposure to hazardous non-nuc lear chemi ca l s and 20 substances)

. 21 As indicated in P art I I .A.2. above, the "' rational basis'" element means there must be 22 a " clinically

demonstrable pr esenc e of [the tox ic substance ] i n the plaintiff' s body , or some indication 23 of [tox in] -induce d disease, i.e ., some phy sical manife station of [t ox ic] contamination." Abusio, 238 24 A. D. 2d

a t 45 5, 65 6 N .Y .S. 2d

a t 37 2 ( up ho ldingdis mis sa l of c la ims fo r f

utu re c os t of

me dic a l33

- - 1 monitoring for

canc er " [b] eca

us e the a ppellants failed to show a ' rational ba sis' f

or their f ear of 2 developingthe disease ") ; s ee , e. g., Allen v. Gene ral Elec tric Co., 32 A.D.3d 1163, 1164-65, 821 3 N. Y. S.2 d 6 92 , 6 93 -95 (4 th D e p' t 20 06 ) ( " Al le n" ) ( ov e rt ur nin g a jud g me nt t

hat di smi sse d me dic a l 4 m o n i t o r i n g c l a i m s b y p l a i n t i f f s w h o " w e r e e x p o s e d t o th e t o x i n s b u te x h i b i tn o p r e s e n ti l l n e s s o r i n j u r y 5 as a r esult of that exposure" ); Dang ler, 241 A.D .2d at 294, 6 7 2 N. Y.S.2d at 190 (findingthat, as to 6 claims of ca

ncer phobia re sulting fr om expos ure to toxi c emissions from landf ill, trial court err ed in 7 excluding evide nce a s to plaintiffs' ne ed for medical monitoring and in not submitt ing that issue to the 8 jury

); Ger ardi v. Nuc lear

Utility Se rvice s, I nc., 149 Misc.2d 657, 657-59, 566 N .Y.S.2d 1002, 1003-04 9 (Sup. Ct. W es t

. Co. 1991) (" Ger ardi" ) (a lthough statingthat "da mag es re sulting fr om the enhanc ed 10 ri s k o f d i s e a s e andth e th reatof f uture h arm no t y et r eal iz ed ar e no t co mp ens abl e in a to rtact io n, " 11 ru lin g tha

t " plai nt iff

s h ave state d a

c a us e of a c tio n f or bo th r e a so na

bly anti c ipate d c on se qu e nti a l 12 dama g e s, to i nc lud e futur e me dic a l e xpe ns e s f or lif e tim e me dic a l moni tor ing and dia g no sti c tr e a tme nt 13 a s a

re su lt o f t he ne g lig e nc e of

de fe nd ants in c a

us ing , or su ff e ri ngto b e c a

us e d, e xpos ur e of

pla int if fs 14 to tox ic asbe stos contamination and for ne g lige nt infliction of emotional distress")

.

15 B. D ecisions by Fe dera l District Courts in New York 16 I n a dd iti on , mo st o f t he fe de ra l dis tr ic t c ourt s sittin g in Ne w Yo rk State have ru le d th a t 17 medical monitoring is available as a reme dy for tortious exposure to car cinog enic substances eve n if 18 the pla int if

fs have no t exhib ite d sy

mpt oms of c anc e r, c on c lud ing that the Ne w Yo rk Cou rt of Ap pe a ls 19 would rec og nize such a cla im. I n Gibbs v. E.I

. Du P o n t de Nemour s & Co., 876 F . Supp. 475 20 (W .D. N.Y. 1 99 5) (" Gi bb s" ), the pla int if fs a lle g e d th a t th e ir

job dutie s e xpos e d th e m to c he mic al 2 1 c o mp o u n d s t h a t w e r e d e f e c t i v e an d un r e a s o n a

b l y d an g e r o u s w h e nu s e d

i na f o r e s e e a b l e m an n e r ; t h e y34

- - 1 co mp l ai n edt h at e x p o s u re t o t h o s e s u b s t an ce s s u

b j ec t edth em t o an ex ce s s i v e r i s k o f d ev el o p i n g 2 bla dd e r c anc e r. Se e id. a t 47 6. Th e pla int if fs ha d n ot b e e n d ia g no se d w ith bla dd e r c anc e r and so ug ht 3 "injunctive r elief in the form of a court-a dminist ere d fund paid for by defe ndants which would c over 4 the re asonably

anticipated c osts of a medica l monitoring prog ram for bladder canc er for the lifetime 5 of

the c la ss m e mbe rs ." I d. a t 47 7. Th e de fe nd ants mov e d to di sm is s on the g ro un d, int e r a lia , th a t 6 New Y ork State does not re cog nize a cause of action for medic al monitoring da mag es in the abse nce 7 of pre sent phy sical i njury

. Relying on Askey and on two dec isions of the fede ral c ourt of appe als for 8 the Third Circuit in I n re Paoli R.R. Yar d PCB L itigation, 916 F.2d 829 (3d C ir. 1990) ("Paoli I ") , and 9 35 F .3 d 7 17 (3 d Ci r. 19 94 ) ( " Pa oli I I " ), the dis tr ic t c ourt re je c te d d efe nd ants ' argume nt, statin g a s 10 fo llo ws : 1 1 A l t h o u g ht h e N e w Y o r k c o urt s h av e n o tc o n c l u s i v e l y r u l e d o nth e av a i l a

b i l i ty 12 o f a c laim for medica l monitoring in the abse nce of prese nt injury , Ibeli ev e 13 t h at As k ey acc urate ly

repr esents a growingnational ac cepta nce of a such a 14 claim

. . . and would be embra ced by the New York Court of Appea ls. Thus, 15 the medica l monitoring cla im shall stand. 1 6 Gi b b s , 8 7 6 F. S u p p . at 4 7 9 ; s ee al s o P ao l i I , 9 1 6 F. 2 d at 8 5 0 (" [ t ] h e in j ury i n a m e d i c a l m o n i t o ri n g 17 claim is the cost" ). T h e Gibbs court also conclude d that the re quest for a "c ourt-administere d fund 18 which g oes beyond pay ment of the c osts of monitoring an individual plaintiff' s health to establish 19 pooled resource s for the e arly detec tion and advanc es in treatment of the disease " is a reque st for re lief 20 that "is injunctive in nature rathe r than ' predominantly [for] m oney

damag es.' " I d. at 481. 21 The district cour t in Abbatiello v. Monsanto Co., 522 F.Supp.2d 524, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 22 20 07 ) ( " Ab batie llo " ), sim ila rl y re je c te d a de fe ns e c on te nti on

that me dic a l mo nit or ingc la ims are no t 23 cog nizable under Ne w York la w. 24 " Me dica l mo nit or ingis o ne of a g ro wi ngnumbe r o f n on -t ra dit ion a l35

- - 1 torts that have de veloped in the c ommon law to compensat e p l aintiffs who 2 hav e been ex po sedto vari ou s t ox ic s ub s t a n ces. " In re P aol i R .R . Ya rd P CB 3 L i t i [ g ]

. , 9 1 6 F

. 2 d 8 2 9 , 8 4 9 ( 3 d

C i r . 1 9 9 0 )

. . . . T h e i n j ur i e s c a u s e d b y 4 exposure to tox ic substance s may take y ear s to manifest themselve s phy sically , 5 and duringthis latency period, plaintiffs a

re bur dened w ith t h e ex pense of 6 regular medic al testing . This medical monitoring is intended to detec t the 7 onset of latent injuries or diseases a n d t o fac ilitate ear ly diag nosis and 8 tr e a tme nt. Ho we ve r, pla int if fs may be un a

ble to re c ov e r un de r tr a dit ion a l to rt 9 l aw , wh i ch gen er al l y re qu i re s a p re s en tly

exis ting p h y s i ca l i n

j ury . R ec o gn i z i n g 10 this diff iculty , a number of states have a llowed plaintiffs to bringclaims for the 11 costs of per iodic medical monitoring

. 12 Abbatiello, 522 F.Supp.2d at 536. Thoug h noting that there was not unif ormity in the views of other 13 states or the f

eder al district court s , t h e Ab b atiello court, c iting princ ipally Askey , Allen, Abusio, 1 4 Ge ra rd i , an d

Gi b b s , s ee , e. g. , Ab b at i el l o , 5 2 2 F. S u p p . 2 d at 5 3 7 -3 9 , co n cl u d edth at "i nca s es i n v o l v i n g 15 exposure to tox ic mater ials, the NewYork Court of Appe als would rec og nize an independe nt cause 16 o f ac t ion for medica l monitoring" even " wher e the pr esent damag e is not a phy sical injury but t h e 17 financ ial burden a ssociated with pe riodic medical monitoring," id. at 538. As to the eleme nts of such 18 a ca

use of a ction, the cour

t predicte d that the New

York Court of Appe als would requir e proof of 19 (1 ) e xpos ur e g re a te r t ha n nor ma l bac kg ro un d lev e ls; (2 ) t o a pr ov e n h a zar do us 20 substance; ( 3 ) caused by the def endant' s tortious conduct; (4) a s a proximate 2 1 re s u l to f t h e e x p o s u re , p l ai n t i ff h as a s i gn i fi ca n t l y i n cr ea s ed ri s k o f c o n tra ct i n g 2 2 a s e r i o u s l a t e n td i s e a s e ; ( 5 ) a m o n i t o r i n g p r o c e d

ur e e x i s t s t h a tm ak e s t h e e ar l y 23 de te c tio n o f t he dis e a se po ssi ble ; ( 6) the pr e sc ri be d mo ni to ringre g ime is 24 differ ent from that nor mally rec ommended in the abse nce of the exposure; and 25 (7) th e presc ribed monitoring reg ime is reasona bly nece ssary

acc ording to 26 contempora ry scientific pr inciples. 27 I d. at 539; see, e .g ., Sorrentino v. ASN R oosevelt C enter , 579 F.Supp.2d 387, 390 (E.D.N.Y . 2008) 28 (conc luding that the inter mediate a ppellate courts had " expressly rec og nized an independe nt cause of 29 a c tio n f

or me dic a l mo nit or ing ," c iti ngDa ng le r, Ab us io, and

Al le n, and

deny in g m otion

to d ism iss 30 claims for e x posure to mold wher e tenants other than the plaintiffs had " develope d exposure-re lated36

- - 1 health conditions ") ; S wearing en v. L ong , 889 F. Supp. 587, 590 (N.D .N.Y. 1995) ( denying motion 2 to a

me nd c omp la int

wi th r e sp e c t to a c la im fo r me dic a l mon ito ri ngwh e re the pr of fe r f e ll " fa r s ho rt 3 of the standa

rds ar ticulated in Askey ")

. 4 See also B eckle y v. United States, No. 92 Civ. 8137, 199 5 WL 590658, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 5 1995) (" I n New York, courts rec og nize a separ ate cause of action, with a relax ed standard of proof, 6 for medic al monitoring e x penses due to exposure to tox ic che micals when the plaintiff ca nnot show 7 with rea sonable c erta inty that he will contra ct a d i s ea s e as a re sult of the exposure.") ; but see In re 8 World Trade Cente r Disaster Site, No. 21-MC-100, 2006 WL 3627760, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. De c. 12, 9 2006) (in ac tions for, inter alia, r espirator y "injurie s suffer ed by wo rk er s perf orming the clea

n-up 10 functions at the World Trade Center site and near by locations in the afte rmath of the te rror ist-relate d 11 airc raf

t cra shes," reque sts for re lief in the for m of " medical monitoring " o rdered stricke n from the 12 complaints on the g round that al t h o u gh "suc h relief may perha ps be consider ed as [an] equitable 13 reme d[y ], i f ca

uses of a ction are otherwise pr oved and if the reme dies are held to be appr opriate a nd 14 in acc ordanc e with the law," "[t]hey do not constitute independent c auses of action" ).

15 C. D e c isi on s b y Othe r S tate s' Hi g he st C ourt s 16 Courts in other states considering whether claims for medical monitorin g are 17 cog nizable under their r espec tive state l aws have reache d vary ing results. Some have r ecognized an 18 ind e pe nd e nt c a

us e of a c tio n f or me dic a l mo nit or ing ; mo st o f t ho se c ourt s h ave la id out th e e le me nts 19 of such a

claim, see Part I I I .D. below. Other courts have treate d medical monit oring as a r emedy for 20 a tra ditional tort claim in which the risk of disea se is considere d the injury ; and others have re fused 21 to rec og nize any tort claim wher e ther e is no claim of pr esent injury

.37

- - 1 I n a ca se par alleling the prese nt a ction, Donovan v. Phili p Morris USA, Inc., 455 Mass. 2 215, 914 N.E.2d 891 (2009) (" Donovan" ), the plaintiffs were smokers who had rea ched the ag e of 50 3 y ear s or older, ha d smoked Marlboro cig are ttes within the Comm onwea lth of Massachuse tts, and had 4 smo ke d fo r a t le a st 20 pa c k- y e ars . Th e y ha d " no t [be e n] di a g no se d w ithlun g c anc e r" and we re no t 5 "unde r inves t i gation by a phy sician for

suspected lungcanc er." I d. at 216-17, 914 N.E.2d at 895. 6 "T he sole remedy " they soug ht was a court-supe rvised "medica l surveillance prog ram that utiliz es a 7 specific technolog y , L DC T s cr eening, whic h will advise them, at an e arly stag e, whe ther they

have 8 develope d lung c ance r." I d. at 219, 914 N.E.2d at 287. Answer ing two questions cer tified to it by

a 9 fede ral district cour t with respec t to injuries that are " subclinical," i

. e. , d en oting the pr esenc e of a 10 disease w ithout manifest sy mptoms, t he Massa chusetts Supreme Judicial Cou rt h el d (1) that "the 11 plaintiffs' suit for medica l monitoring, base d on subclinical ef fec ts of ex posure to cig are tte smoke and 12 incre ased r isk of lung c ance r, state[s] a cognizable claim and/or pe rmi t [ s ] a re medy under 13 Massac husetts state law," id. at 215-1 6 , 2 2 1 , 9 1 4 N.E.2d at 894, 898, and (2) such a claim will be 1 4 c o n s i d e r e d

t i m e l y a s s e rt e d

i f , p r i o r t o ano th e r

w i s e a p p l i c a b l e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d , th e r e w a s " a b s o l u t e l y 15 no reme dy " a

vailable, id. at 229, 914 N.E .2d at 904. 16 Th e Do no va n c ourt re je c te d th e de fe ns e c on te nti on that me dic a l mo nit or ingc ou ld n ot 17 be orde red w ithout a sh o wi n g by the plaintiffs of " phy sical har m manifested by

objective 18 sy

mptomology ," id. at 224, 914 N.E.2d at 901. 19 Modern living has exposed pe ople to a varie ty of tox ic s ubstance s. 20 I lln e ss a nd dis e a se fr om e xpos ur e to t he se su bs tanc e s are oft en late nt, no t 21 manifestingthemselves for y ear s or even d ec ad es afte r the e x posure. Some 22 people so e x posed may never d ev el o p an illness or disease , but some will. 23 Su b c e llu la r or other phy siologica l chang es may occur which, in themselv e s , a

r e 24 not sy mptoms of any

illness or disease, but a re w arningsigns to a tr ained 25 ph y sic ian th a t th e patie nt ha s dev e lop e d a con dit ion that indi c a te s a su bs tanti a l38

- - 1 inc re a se in ri sk of c on tr a c tin g a se ri ou s il lne ss o r d ise a se and thu s th e patie nt 2 wi ll r e qu ir e pe ri od ic mon ito ri ng . N ot a ll c a se s w ill inv olv e phy sio log ic a l 3 chang e manife sting a known illness, b u t s u ch ca ses should be allowe d to 4 proce ed whe n a plaintiff' s rea sonable medic al ex penses have increase d (or a re 5 lik e ly to i nc re a se , in

the e xer c ise of

du e c are ) a s a re su lt of

the se phy sio log ic a l 6 change s. We leave f or anothe r day

consideration of case s that involve 7 exposure to levels of che micals or radiation known to cause canc er, f or which 8 immediate medica l monitori n g m ay be medica lly

nece ssary

althoug h no 9 sy mpt oms or

su bc lin ic a l c ha

ng e s h ave o c c ur

re d. He re , th e phy sio log ic a l 10 chang es with the atten d an t s ubstantial increa se in risk of ca ncer , and the 1 1 m e d i c a l n e c e s s i t y o f m o n i t o r i n g w i th i t s a t t e n d an t c o s t , m a y a d e q u a t e l y 12 establish the eleme nts of injury and dama g es. 13 Our tort law de veloped in the l at e Ninete enth and e arly Twentieth 14 c e ntu ri e s, wh e n th e va st m a

jor ity of tor tio us in ju rie s w e re c a

us e d b y blu nt 15 tr a uma and me c ha

nic a l fo rc e s. We mus t a da pt to t he g ro wi ngre c og nit ion

that 16 exposure to tox ic substances and radiation may cause substantial injury

which 17 should be compensa ble eve n if the full effe cts are not immediately appar ent. 18 S ee Hansen v. Mountain F uel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 977 (Utah 1993). 19 Whe n c omp e te nt m e dic a l te sti mony e sta bli sh e s th a t me dical mo nitor ingis 20 nece ssary to detect the pote ntial onset of a se riou s illness or disease due to 21 ph y sio log ic a l c ha ng e s in dic a tin g a

su bs tanti a l in c re a se in ri sk of ha rm fr om 22 exposure to a known hazardous substance, the element of injury and dama g e 23 will have been satisfied and the cost of that monitoring is re cover able in tort. 24 No particula r leve l or quantification of increa se in risk of har m is n ec es s ar y , 25 so long a s it is s ubstantial and so long as there has bee n at l ea s t a 2 6 c o r r e s p o n d i n g s u

b c e l l u l ar c h a n g e . I d

. a t9 7 9

- 9 8 0

. T h i s s h o u l d a d dr e s s an y 27 conce rn over false c laims, . . . y et per

mit a ge nuinely

injured per son to recove r 28 leg itimate expenses without having to over come insurmountable problems of 29 proof in this difficult and complex are a. I n this respec t, medical expenses ar e 30 rec overa ble not only

for dire ct treatment and diag nosis of a p re s ent i njury or 3 1 ani n j u r y l i k e l y t o o c c ur , b u t f

o r d i a g n o s t i c t e s t s n e e d e d t o m o n i t o r m e d i c a l l y 32 a pe rs on wh o h a s b e e n s ub sta

nti a lly e xpos e d to a

toxic su bs tanc e that ha s 33 cre ated phy siologica l chang es indicatinga substantial incre ase in risk that the 34 pe rs on wi ll con tra c t a

se ri ou s il lne ss o r d ise a se . T he e xpe ns e of me dic a l 35 mon ito ri ng is thu s a fo rm of futur e me dic a l e xpe ns e and sh ou ld b e tr e a te d a s 36 such. 37 Donovan, 455 Ma ss. at 225-26, 914 N.E.2d at 901 (emphasis in orig inal). 38 I n setting out the elements of such a n independe nt claim for medic al monitoring, se e 39 Part I I I .D. below, the D onovan cour t stated that there must ex ist a n "e ffe ctive medica l test for re liable39

- - 1 ear ly

detec tion " o f the disease . 455 Mass. at 226, 914 N.E.2d at 902. Thus, the court re jected the 2 defe nse conte ntion that the c ause of action ac crue d when the pla intiffs discovere d their incre ased r isk 3 o f c an ce r, an d

ac ce p t edt h e p l ai n t i ff

s ' co n t en t i o nth at th ei r c au s e o f a ct i o nfo r m ed i c a l m o n i t o ri n g 4 could not acc rue until such a te st ex isted. 5 I n thi s case , it i s n ot m e re ly the ri sk of c anc e r o f whic h th e pla int if fs 6 h av e n otice, but the substantial inc rea se in the risk of canc er, as ref lected i n 7 the ir c omp la int . B e c a

us e the ha rm inv olv e s su

bc lin ic a l c ha

ng e s th a t on ly

wi ll 8 be discove red by a phy sician, notice most likely wi l l take the f orm of advic e 9 b y a p h y s i ci an , t o get h er

wi tha r ec o m m en d at i o n f o rd i agn o s t i c t es t i n g 10 confor mably with the medical standa

rd of c are . In short, the statute beg ins to 11 run whe n (1) there is a phy siologica l c hang e resulting in a substantial increa se 12 in t he ri sk of c anc e r, and

(2 ) t hat in c re a se , un de r the sta nd ard of c are , tr ig g e rs 13 the ne e d f or ava ila ble dia g no sti c te sti ngthat ha s b e e n a c c e pte d in the me dic a l 14 community as an eff icac ious me thod of lung canc er sc ree ning or surveillance

. 1 5 As p re v i o u s l y d i s cu s s ed , m ed i ca l m o n i t o ri n g ex p en s e i s th e p l ai n t i ff s ' 16 only arguably provable dam age s . They could not have sue d for pa in and 17 suffe ring or lost ear ning c apac ity . This is not a case wher e plainti ffs re cover ed 18 dama g e s f or pa in a nd su ff e ri ng , los t e arn ing c a

pa c ity , but on ly

so me me dic a l 1 9 e x p e n s e s b a s e d o ne x i s t i n g m e d i c a l t e c h n o l o g y. T h e s e p l a i n t i f f s , o r s o th e y 20 alleg e, had a bsolutely no reme dy

until L DCT technolog y appea red. I f they

can 21 establish these c ircumstance s, which ar e unusual a nd per h aps unique to 22 me dic a l mo nit or ingc la ims , th e n th e ir c la ims are tim e ly . T his is a qu e sti on that 23 cannot be resolved on the rec ord befor e us; it must be resolved on a motion for 24 summary judgme nt or, if g enuine issues of material fa ct re main, by a jury . The 25 plaintiffs also must show that the standard of car e of the re asonable phy sician 26 did not call for monitoring of any prec ance rous condition pri o r t o the statute 27 of l imitations period, not just that the t echnolog y at t hat time was less e ffe ctive 28 for monitoring

. 29 I d. at 228-29, 914 N.E.2d a t 903-04 (empha ses adde d). 30 I n dealingwith claims of expos u re to ha zardous substances othe r than by smoking, 31 other states too have recog nized independe nt cause s of action for medica l monitoring in the abse nce 32 of evide nt phy sical injury . I n Ay ers v. Township of J ackson, N ew Jersey , 106 N.J . 557, 565, 525 A.2d 33 287, 290 (1987) ( "A y ers" ), the c ourt dea lt with claims by plaintiffs who had inge sted water from their40

- - 1 we lls , w hic h ha d be e n co nta min a te d b y

toxic po llutants le a c hin g int o a n a qu if e r f ro m th e de fe nd ant' s 2 land fi ll. Th e pla int if fs did no t se e k r e c ov e ry

fo r s pe c if ic ill ne sse s; r a the r, the y

re qu e ste d " the e xpe ns e s 3 of annua l me dical examinations t o monitor their phy sical hea lth and detec t sy mptoms of disease at the 4 ear liest possibl e opportunity ." 106 N.J

. at 577, 525 A.2d 297. A jury awa rd to the plaintiffs of some 5 $8 .2 mil lio n f

or me dic a l mo nit or inge xpe ns e s had be e n set a sid e by the int e rm e diate a

pp e llate c ourt 6 as too speculative to warr ant recog nition under the state' s tort claims ac t. The Ne w J erse y Supreme 7 Court reinstated that a war d. See id. at 606-07, 525 A .2d at 313. 8 Qu oti ngAs ke y ' s st a te me nt t hat th e c os t of p res c ri be d me dic a l mo nit or ingis 9 re c ov e ra

ble a s c on se qu e nti a l dama g e s, se e id. a t 60 3, 52 5 A. 2d a t 31 1, the Aye rs c ourt a lso no te d th a t 10 [c]o mpe ns a tio n f or re ason a ble and ne c e ssa ry me dic a l e xpe ns e s is 11 consistent with w ell-ac cepte d leg al principles. See C. McCormick, Ha ndbook 12 on the L aw of Da m age s § 9 0 at 323-27 (1935) . I t is also consistent with the 13 important public health intere st in fosteri ng acc ess to medical testingfor 14 individuals whose exposure to tox ic che micals cre ates a n enhanc ed r isk of 15 disease. The value of ear ly diag nosis a nd treatment for ca

ncerpatients is well16 documented. 17 Aye rs , 1 06 N. J. at 60 3- 04 , 5 25 A. 2d

a t 31 1. Th e c ourt

state d: 1 8 H ar mi nt h e f o r mo f i n c r e a s e d r i s k o f f u tur e c an c e r

a t tr i b u t a b l e t o d e l ay 19 in d ia g no sis and tr e a tme nt has be c ome so wi de ly a c c e pte d b y

the me dic a l 20 c omm un ity that the e xiste nc e of su c h h arm c ou ld b e re a so na

bly inf e rr e d f ro m 21 this professional common knowledg e. A surve y of th e m ed i ca l literature 2 2 i n d i c a t e s t h a ti ti s u n i v e r s a l l y a g r e e d w i th i n th e m e d i c a l c o m mun i ty th a td e l ay 23 in canc er dia g nosis and treatment usually incre ases the r isk of metastasis. 24 10 6 N .J. at 60 4, 52 5 A .2 d at 31 1 ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) . T he c ourt

c on c lud e d th a t 25 [a] n application of tort law that allows post-injury , pre- sy mptom recove ry

in 2 6 t o x i c t o rtl i t i g a t i o nf o r r e a s o n a b l e m e d i c a l s ur

v e i l l an c e c o s t s i s m an i f

e s t l y 27 consistent with the publ ic i ntere st in ear ly detec tion and treatment of disease

. 28 I d.41

- - 1 I n Hanse n v. Mountain Fue l Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 972 ( Utah 1993) ( "H ansen" ), 2 the cour

t vacated a lower court' s summary dismiss al of medic al monitoring f or per sons whose work 3 had exposed them to asbestos but who did not curre ntly suffe r fr om any

asbestos-r elated dise ase. The 4 c ourt

state d in pa rt a s f oll ow s: 5 Allowing r ecove ry for such expenses avoids the potential injustice of 6 forc ing an economica lly disadvantag ed person to pa y for expensive diag nostic 7 examinations necessi t ated by another ' s neg lige nce. I

ndeed, in many

case s a 8 pe rs on wi ll n ot b e a

ble to a ff or d s uc h te sts , a

nd re fu sin g to allow

me dic a l 9 monitoring damag es would in eff ect deny him or her a cce ss to potentiallylife10 saving treatment. I t also aff ords tox ic-tort victims, for whom other sorts of 1 1 re co v ery m ay p ro v e d i ff

i cu l t , i m m ed i at e c omp en s at i o nfo r m ed i ca l m o n i t o ri n g 12 neede d as a result of exposure. Additionally , it furthers the de terre nt function 13 of the tor t sy ste m by c omp e lli ng tho se wh o expo se oth e rs to t oxic su bs tanc e s 14 to minim i z e risks and costs of exposure. . . . Allowing suc h rec overy is also 15 in harmo n y wi t h "the important public health intere st in fostering acc ess to 16 medical testingfor individuals whose e x posure to tox ic chemicals cre ates a n 17 enh ancedri skof d is ease ." 18 858 P.2d at 976-77 (quoting Ay ers, 106 N.J. at 603, 525 A.2d at 311) ( footnote omitted). 19 I n Potter v. Fire stone Tire & Rubber Co

. , 6 C al

. 4th 965, 863 P.2d 795 (1993) 20 (" Potter") , the cour t ruled that " medical monitoring costs[]

. . . are a compe nsable item of damag es in 21 a neg lige nce a ction wher e the proofs demonstrate, thr oug h reliable medical e x pert testimony , that the 22 need f

or future monitoring is a r easona bly cer tain consequence of the plaintiff' s tox ic exposure and 23 that the re c omm e nd e d moni tor ing is re a so na ble ." I d. a t 97 4, 86 3 P. 2d

a t 55 5- 56 . T he c ourt

state d th a t 24 rec overy of medica l monitoring costs is supported by a number of sound public 25 policy considerations. Firs t , there is an important public health intere st in 26 fosteringacces s t o medical testingfor individuals whose e x posure to toxi c 27 chemica ls crea tes an enhance d risk of disease , particula rly in light of the va lue 28 of ea rly diag nosis a

nd treatment f

or many canc er patients. (Ay ers, supra , 525 29 A. 2d a t p. 31 1 .

. . .) Se c on d, the re is a de te rr e nc e va lue in re c og nizi ngme dic a l 30 surv e ill anc e c la ims

-- " [a]ll ow ingpla int if fs to r e c o v e r t

he c os t of thi s c are de te rs 31 irresponsible discha rge o f t o x i c chemica ls by defe ndants. . . ." (In re Paoli, 32 supra, 916 F .2d at p. 852; . . . Ay ers, supra , 5 2 5 A.2d at pp. 311-312; c f.42

- - 1 F r ie n d s F o r A ll Ch il dr e n [, In c . v . L o c kh e e d A ir c r a f t C o r p . ], 7 4 6 F

. 2 d

[8 1 6 , ] 2 8 2 5 [ ( D

. C

. C i r . 1 9 8 4 ) ]

. ) T h i r d , " [ t ] h e av a i l a b i l i ty o f a s u b s t an t i a l r e m e dy 3 befor e the c onsequenc es of the pla intiffs' exposure are manifest may also have 4 the benef icial eff ect of preve nting or mitigating serious future illnesse s and 5 thus r educe the overa ll c osts to the responsible parties." (Ay ers, su p ra , 5 25 6 A.2d at p. 312 . . . .) In this reg ard, the ear ly detec tion of canc er ma y improve 7 the prospec ts for cur e, tre atment, prolong ation of life a nd minimi zation of pain 8 and dis ability . Finally , societal notions of fa irness and e lemental justice a re 9 be tte r s e rv e d b y a llo wi ngre c ov e ry

of me dical mo ni to ringc os ts. Th a t is , it 10 wo uld be ine qu ita ble fo r an ind ivi du a l wr on g fu lly e xpos e d t o dang e ro us 11 tox ins, but unable to pr ove that ca ncer or disease is likely , to have to pay the 12 expense of medica l monitoring whe n such interve ntion is clearly rea sonable 13 and nec essar y . (Ay ers, supra , 525 A.2d at p. 312 . . . .) 14 Potte r, 6 Ca l.4 th at 10 08 , 8 63 P.2 d at 82 4. Th e Potte r c ourt 15 e mph a siz[e d] th a t a llo wi ngc omp e ns a tio n f or me dic a l mo nit or ing c os ts " do e s 1 6 n o tr e qu i r e c o u rt s t o s p e c u l a t e a b o u tt h e p r o b a

b i l i ty o f f u tur e i n j ur y. It m e r e l y 17 re q u ires courts to a scer tain the probability that the far less costly reme d y o f 18 medical supervision is appropriate." (In re Paoli, supra , 916 F.2d at p. 852.) 19 I ndeed, [s]cience ma y well counse l medical interve n t i o n with respec t to a 20 known hea lth risk long before it rea ches the point wher e the law would reg ard 21 its oc c ur re nc e a s r e a sonab ly

c e rt a in.

. . . We are the re fo re pe rs ua de d th a t 22 rec overy of medica l monitoring damag es should not be depe ndent upon a 23 showing that a particula r canc er or disease is r easona bly cer tain to oc cur in the 24 future. 25 P ott e r, 6 Ca l.4 th at 11 07 -0 8, 86 3 P. 2d a t 82 4 ( oth e r i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) . T he c ourt 26 c on c lud e d th a t " [r]e c og nit ion tha t a de fe nd ant 's con du ct ha s c re a te d th e ne e d f or futur e me dic a l 27 mo ni to ri ng do es n otcreat e a new to rt "; s uch mo ni to ri ng "is si mp ly a compen sab le i tem of d ama ge" 28 that " may be cal led for as a re su lt o f a

de fe nd ant' s to rt iou s c on du c t, e ve n in the a bs e nc e of a c tua l 29 phy sical injury ." I d. at 1007, 863 P.2d at 823. 3 0 Ac co rd M ey er v . Fl u o r C o rp . , 2 2 0 S

. W

. 3 d 7 1 2 , 7 1 7 (M o . 2 0 0 7 ) (" m ed i ca l m o n i t o ri n g 31 costs are rec overa ble beca use compensation f

or nece ssary medical expenses rea sonably cer tain to be 32 incurre d in the future r ests on well-a cce pted leg al pr i n cipl es" of Missouri law that " provide that a43

- - 1 plaintiff i s entitled to rec over f or the prospe ctive conse quence s of the def endant' s tortious conduct if 2 the inj ur

y is r e a so na

bly c e rt a in to oc c ur " ); se e id. a t 71 8 (" Ev e n tho ug h a pla int if f m ay no t ha ve y e t 3 de ve lop e d a dia g no sa ble ph y sic a l inj ur

y , it is no t a c c ur a te to c on c lud e that no c omp e ns a ble inj ur y ha s 4 been sustaine d.") ; id. (declining to impose a p hy sical-injury require ment as " inconsistent with the 5 r e a l i t y o f

l a t e n t i n j u r y an d w i t h t h e f

a c t th a t th e p ur

p o s e o f m e d i c a l m o n i t o r i n g i s t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e e ar l y 6 diag nosis a n d t re atment of late nt injuries cause d by exposure to tox ins"); B ower v. Westinghouse 7 El e c tr ic Cor

p. , 2 06 W.V a . 133 , 138 , 141 , 5 22 S.E .2 d 4 24 , 4 29 , 4 32 (1 99 9) (r uli ngtha t " un de r We st 8 Virg inia law, a pla intiff who does n o t al l ege a prese nt phy sical injury

can a ssert a c laim for the 9 recovery of future medical monitoring costs wher e such damag es are the proxi mate res u l t o f 10 defe ndant' s tortious conduct" ); Redland S occe r C lub, Inc. v. Depa rtment of the Ar

my , 548 Pa. 178, 11 194-95, 696 A.2d 137, 145 (1997) (" Redland" ) (c iting Ayers a nd Hanse n , an d approving acourt12 supervised f

und for medic al monitoring of plaintiffs who did not alleg e ac tual injury from exposure 13 to hazardous subst ance s disposed of i n a landfill); Day v. NL O, Inc., 144 F .R.D. 330, 336 (S.D. Ohio 14 1992) (" I n the ca se at ba r, the de fenda

nts alleg edly

cause d all of the potential c l as s m ember s to be 15 overe x posed to radioa ctive mater ials throug h neg lige nt or intentional misconduc t. I f the plaintiffs in 16 this case ultimately prove the ir alleg ations, the class membe rs will be entitled to injunctive re lief in 17 the fo rm

of an e xten siv e c ourt -s up e rv ise d me dic a l mo ni to ri ng pr og ra m." ); Coo k v . Ro c kw e ll 18 I nternational Corp., 778 F. Supp. 512, 514 (D. Colo. 1991) (pre dicting that "the Colorado Supreme 19 Court

wo uld pr ob a bly re c og nize , in

an a pp ro pr iate c a se , a

tor t c la im fo r m e dic a l mo nit or ing " (i nte rn a l 20 quotation marks omitted)). 21 Othe r c ourt s h ave re je c te d th e pr op os iti on

that a pla int if f m ay re c ov e r m e dic a l 22 monitoring c osts in the absenc e of a curr ent phy sical injury

. In Paz v. Brush Eng ineer ed Mate rials,44

- - 1 949 So.2d 1 (Miss. 2007) (en banc ), the c ourt held that cur rent Mississippi l aw doe s not "re cog nize 2 a cla im for medica l monitor i n g allowing a plaintiff to re cover medical monitoring costs for mer e 3 e xpos ur e to a

ha rm fu l su bs tanc e wi tho ut p ro of

of c ur re nt p hy sic a l or

e mot ion a l in

jur y fr om that 4 exposure." I d. at 5-6. 5 The United St at es Supreme Court has e x amined the c ommon law for the 6 a llo wa nc e of re c ov e ry fo r n e g lig e ntl y

c a us e d e xpos ur e by a pla int if f who ha s 7 y et to suf fer from a disease. [Metro-North Commut er R.R. Co. v. ] Bu ck l ey , 8 521 U.S. [ 424,] 432 . .

. [(1997)] (holding that an employ ee could not rec over 9 d am a g e s an d m e d i c a l m o n i t o r i n g c o s t s un d e r t h e F e d e r a l E mp l o ye r s ' L i a b i l i ty 10 Act unless or until he manife sted sy mptoms of a d i s ea se). The Court found 11 that with few e x ceptions, " common law cour ts have de nied re cover

y to those 12 who ar e disea se and sy mptom free." I d. The Court conc luded that to rec og nize 13 me dic a l mo nit or ingc os ts a lon e a s a se pa rate inj ur y is t o g o " be y on d th e bo un ds 14 of c ur re ntl y e vo lvi ngc omm on

law. " I d. a t 43 9 .

. . . A c c or din g ly , a s p la int if fs 15 invite this [ Paz] Court to r ecognize a medical monitoring cause of ac tion, an 16 act whic h would require an unpre cede nted and unf ounded depa

rture f rom the 17 lon g -s tand ingtr a dit ion a l e le me nts of a tor t a c tio n, thi s Co ur

t de c lin e s th a t 18 invitation. 19 Paz, 949 S o.2d at 6 (footnote omitted). 20 The possibility of a f uture injury is insuff

icient to ma intain a tort claim. 21 Recog nizi ng a medica l monitoring ca use of a ction would be akin to 22 rec og nizi ng a ca use of a ction for f

ear of future illness. Each ba ses a c laim for 23 dama g e s o n th e po ssi bil ity of inc ur ri ngan il ln e ss w ithno pr e se nt m anif e st 24 injury . There is no tort cause of action in Missi ssippi without some identifiable 25 injury , either phy sical or e motional. 26 I d. at 5; see id. at 9 (" This Court ha s continuously reje cted the proposition that within t ort law ther e 27 exis ts a ca

use of action or a g ener al categ ory of i njury consisting solely

of potential future injury .")

. 28 I n Wood v. W y et h -A y erst L aboratories Division of Americ an Home Produc ts, 82 29 S.W. 3d

84 9 (K y . 200 2) (" Woo d" ), the c ourt state d that unde r Ke ntu c ky law " a c a us e of a c tio n in tor t 30 require s a pre sent phy sical injury to the plaintiff," 82 S.W .3d at 852, and that " a plaintiff must have 31 sustained some phy sical injury befor e a c ause of

action ca n acc rue," id. at 853-54.45

- - 1 N o c a u s e o f a c t i o na c c r

u e s un t i l th e p o t e n t i a l l y h ar m f u l e x p o s ur e a c tu a l l y 2 cause s injury that produce s loss or

damag e. . . . With no inj ury there can be no 3 c a us e of a c tio n, and wi th no c a

us e of a c tio n the re c an be no re c ov e ry . I t is no t 4 the re me dy that su pp or ts t he c a us e of a c tio n, but r a the r t

he c a us e of a c tio n th a t 5 supports a re medy

. 6 I d. at 855 (interna l quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in Wood). 7 Th e c ourt ru le d th a t " me re ing e sti on of a toxic su bs tanc e do e s n ot c on sti tut e su ff ic ie nt 8 phy sical har

m upon which to base a claim for damag es." I d. at 856 (interna l quotation mar ks omitt ed). 9 Be cause Appellant has shown no prese nt phy sical injury , her cause of 10 action under theories of

neg lige nce and strict liability have y et to a ccr ue. Thus, 11 Appellant' s complaint was cor rec tly dismiss ed for failure to state a c laim upon 12 which re lief ca n be g rante d. For

the same rea sons, the class ac tion must fail. 13 Whe re the re is no in jury , th e re c an b e no re dr e ss. I f a nd wh e n App e lla

nt 14 manifests an injury resulting from [the defe ndant' s] conduct, only then will she 15 have a reme dy under the law. 16 I d. at 859. 17 I n H e nr y v. Do w Che mic a l Co., 47 3 Mic h. 63 , 701 N. W.2 d 6 84 (M ic h. 20 05 ), the c ourt 18 held that a claim mere ly for "a n ' equitable reme dy ' of a me dical monitoring prog ram not in order to 19 redr es s actua l or prese nt injury to their persons but instead to scr een f or possible future injury ," id. 20 at 78, 701 N.W.2d at 691, "do[es] not present a via ble neg lige nce claim under Michig an' s common 21 law," id. at 68, 701 N.W.2d at 687. 22 I f plaintiffs' claim is for injuries they may suffe r in the future, their 23 claim is prec luded as a matter of la

w, bec ause Mich i gan law require s more 24 th an a merely speculative injury . This Court has previously rec og nized the 25 require ment of a pr esent phy sical injury in the tox ic tort context. 26 I d. at 72, 701 N.W.2d at 688. 27 Howeve r, if plaintiffs' claim is that by virtue of their

potential exposure 28 to diox in they have suf fer ed an "injury ," in that a ny person so exposed would 29 incur the a dditional ex pense of medical monitoring , then their cl ai m is also 3 0 p r e c l u d e d a s a m a t t e r o f l aw , b e c a

u s e M i c h i g an l aw r e qu i r e s ana c tu a l i n j u r y46

- - 1 to person or pr operty as a precondition to rec overy under a neg lige nce the ory . 2 I d. at 73, 701 N.W.2d at 689. 3 I t is no answer to a rgue, as pla intiffs have, that the need to pay for 4 medical monitoring is itself a prese nt injury sufficie nt to sustain a cause of 5 actionf o r n e g li g e n c e . Ins o d o in g , p la inti f f s a tt e mp t t o b lu

r th e d is ti n c ti o n 6 between "injury " a nd "da mag es." Whil e plaintiffs a rguably demonstrate 7 economic losses that would otherwise s atisfy the " damag es" element of a 8 t r a d i t i o n a l t o rtc l a i m , th e f a c tr e m a i n s th a tth e s e e c o n o m i c l o s s e s ar e w h o l l y 9 derivative of a possible, futur e injury rathe r than a

n actua l, present injury . A 10 fi na nc ia l " inj ur

y " is s imp ly

no t a pr e se nt p hy sic a l in

jury , and thu s n ot 11 c og niza ble un de r o ur

tor t sy ste m. B e c a

us e pla int if

fs have no t a lle g e d a

pr e se nt 12 ph y sic a l in jur y , b ut r a ther, " ba

re " dama g e s, the me dic a l e xpe ns e s p la int if fs 13 claim to have suf fer ed (a nd will suffer in the f

uture) a re not c ompensable. 14 I d. at 78, 701 N.W.2d at 691 (empha ses in orig inal). 15 Ac c or d H int on v. Mo ns anto Co. , 8 13 So. 2d 82 7, 82 8- 29 (A la . 2 00 1) (Ac omplai nt 16 a sse rt ingc la ims of ne g lig e nc e , w anto nn e ss, a nd str ic t pr od

uc ts l ia bil ity and a lle g ingthat " me dic a l 1 7 m o n i t o r i n g ( o r

m e d i c a l s u r

v e i l l an c e )

. . . i s n e c e s s ar

y i n o r d e r t o d e t e c ti n

j ur i e s o r i l l n e s s e s t h a tm ay 18 arise in the f

uture a s a re sult of the exposure" to the toxic substance, but " n o t alleg [i ng ] any past or 19 prese nt personal injury to the plaintiff" does not state a c ause of action for m ed i ca l monitoring. 20 " Al a

bama law h a s long re qu ir e d a

manif e st, pr e se nt i nju

ry be fo re a pla int if f m ay re c ov e r i n to rt ." ); 2 1 L o we v . P h i l i p M o rr i s US A, I n c. , 3 4 4 Or

. 4 0 3 , 4 1 0 , 1 8 3 P

. 3 d 1 8 1 , 1 8 4 (2 0 0 8 ) ( "O re go nl aw h as l o n g 22 re c og nize d th a t th e fa c t th a t a de fe nd ant' s n e g lig e nc e po se s a thr e a t of futur e phy sic a l harm is not 23 su ff

ic ie nt, sta nd ing a lon e , to c on sti tut e an a c tio na ble inj ur y " ); id. a t 41 5, 18 3 P. 3d

a t 18 7 ( " ne g lig e nt 24 c on du c t th a t r e su lts on ly in a sig nif ic antl y inc re a se d r isk

of futur e inj ur

y that requ ir es med ic a l 25 monitoring doe s not give rise to a c laim for neg lige nce" ). 26 I n Henr y , the Mich i gan Supreme Court viewed the que stion of whether a ca use of 27 action should be rec og nized f or medical monitoring in the absenc e of prese nt phy sical injury as one47

- - 1 more suitable f

or re solution by

the leg islative branc h. 2 Pla int if fs have as ked us to r e c og nize a c a us e of a c tio n th a t de pa

rt s 3 drastica lly from our tra diti o n al notions of a valid neg lige nce c laim. Be y ond 4 t h i s en o rm o u s s h i ft i no ur t o rt j uri s p ru d en ce , j u d i ci al re co gn i t i o no f p l ai n t i ff s ' 5 claim may also have undesirable ef fe ct s that neither we nor the pa rties ca n 6 s a t i s f a c t o r i l y p r e d i c t

. F o r

e x amp l e , r e c o g n i z i n g a

c a u s e o f a c t i o nb a s e d

s o l e l y 7 on expo s u re -- o n e without a re quirement of a prese nt injury --would c reate a 8 po te nti a lly lim itl e ss p oo l of

pla int if fs

. . . . [ ] On c e a

sh ow ingof

pr e se nt 9 phy sical injury is eliminated, as is the ca se in awa rds for me dical monitoring , 10 attorney s repr esenting plaintiffs could virtually beg in r ecr uiting people of

f the 11 street to ser ve as me dical monitoring claimants. . . . L itigati o n of these 12 preinjury claims could drain resour ces neede d to c ompensate t h o s e w i th 13 manif e st p hy sic a l inj ur ie s and a mor e imm e diate ne e d f

or me dic a l c are . It is 14 less than obvious, there fore , that the benef its of a medical monitoring cause of 15 a c tio n w ou ld o utw e ig h th e burd e ns imp os e d o n p la int if fs w ithmanif

e st 16 injuries, our judicial sy stem, and t h ose re sponsible for administeringand 1 7 f i n an c i n g m e d i c a l c ar e . B e c a u s e s u c h a

b a l an c i n g p r o c e s s w o u l d n e c e s s ar i l y 18 re qu ir e e xten siv e fa c t- fi nd ingand the we ig hin g of

imp or tant, and so me tim e s 19 conflicting , policy conce rns, and be cause here we lac k sufficie nt information 20 to assess int ellige ntly and fully the pot ential consequence s of our decision, we 21 do not believe t h at t he instant question is one suitable for r esolution by the 22 judicial branc h. 23 I d. at 83-84, 701 N.W.2d at 694-95 ( emphasis in orig inal) (f ootnote omitted); see id. at 84 n.13, 701 24 N.W.2d at 695 n.13 (" whether and how to rec og nize a medical monitoring c ause of action should be 25 made by

the people' s repr esentatives in the leg islative branc h of our g overnme nt")

. 26 I n Ba dillo v. American B rands, Inc., 117 Ne v. 34, 16 P.3d 435 (2001) ( en banc ), the 27 p l aintiffs and the proposed class members included g roups of smokers and g roups o f " ca s i n o 28 employ ees ( both n o n s m o k ers a nd former

smokers) who c laim expos ure to e nvironmental or 29 secondha

nd tobacc o smoke at work." I d. at 38, 16 P.3d at 438. After exploring the fa ctual, scie ntific, 30 and

le g a l la nd sc a pe , th e c ourt

ru le d th a t " Ne vada com mo n law d oe s n ot r e c og nize a me dic a l 31 m o n i t o ri n g ca u se of a ction but the reme dy of medica l monitoring may be ava ilable." I d., 16 P.3 d 32 a t 43 7. Th e c ourt re a c he d th is c on c lu si on aft e r t akin g int o a c c ount, int e r a lia , " the c omp le x fa c t48

- - 1 pattern of

tobacc o litigation and c ausality ," the lack of a consensus in other jurisdi ctions as to " whether 2 prese nt phy sical injury is require d for a

medical monitoring claim," and the lack of uniformity

as to 3 "the elements of medical monitoring as a cause of action[, which vary] fr om one jurisdiction to 4 an o t h er . " I d

. at 4 3 -4 4 , 1 6 P

. 3 d at 4 4 1

. T h e B ad i l l o co urt d i d n o tco n s i d er

wh et h er m ed i ca l m o n i t o ri n g 5 costs could be rec overe d as an item of conseque ntial da mag es beca

use that question had no t been 6 briefe d. See id. at 44, 16 P.3d at 441.

7 D. Elements of a n I ndepende nt Medical Monitoring Cause of A ction 8 Mo st o f t he c ourt s that ha

ve c on c lud e d th a t a

pla int if f who ha s n ot s uf

fe re d p hy sic a l 9 inj ur

y fr om t or tio us e xpos ur e to h a zar do us su bs tanc e s ma

y ma int a in a

c a us e of a c tio n f or medi cal 10 monitoring have ela borate d o n t h e el em en t s nece ssary to preva il on such a cla im. The lists of 11 e le me nts are sim ila r, but no t id e nti c a l. I

n A y e rs , th e c ourt 12 h[e ]ld that th e c os t of me dic a l sur

ve ill anc e is a

c omp e ns a

ble ite m of

dama g e s 13 wher e the pr oofs demonstrate , throug h reliable expert testi m o n y predic ated 14 upon the sig nificanc e and extent of exposure to c hemicals, the tox icity of the 15 chemica ls, the seriousness of the diseases for which individuals are at risk, the 16 relative incre ase in the c hance of onset of disea se i n t h o s e ex posed, and the 17 value of ear ly d i agn osis, that such surveillance to monitor the effe ct of 18 exposure to tox ic che micals is rea sonable a nd nece ssary . 19 10 6 N .J. at 60 6, 52 5 A .2 d at 31 2. Th e c ourt ind ic a te d that "th e me dic a l surv e ill anc e c la im s e e ks 2 0 r e i m b u r s e m e n tf o r t h e s p e c i f

i c d o l l ar c o s t s o f p e r i o d i c e x am i n a t i o n s t h a tar e m e d i c a l l y n e c e s s ar y 21 notwithstanding the f act that the ext ent of plaintiffs' impaired health is unquantified." I d., 525 A.2d 22 at 313. 23 The c ourt in Pott er se t out a five-f actor test for " determining the re asonable ness and 24 ne c e ssi ty

of mon ito ri ng " :49

- - 1 (1) the sig nificanc e and e x tent of t he plaintiff' s exposure to chemica ls; (2) the 2 tox icity of the c hemicals; (3) the re lative incre ase in the c hance of on s et of 3 disease in the e x posed plaintiff a s a result of the exposure, when c ompare d to 4 (a) the plaintiff' s chanc es of de veloping the disease had he or she not bee n 5 ex p osed, and (b) the chanc es of the members of the public at large o f 6 developingthe disease ; (4) the se riousness of the disea se for which the plaintiff 7 is at risk ; and (5 ) the c lin ic a l val ue of e arl y de te c tio n an d dia g no sis . U nd e r t his 8 ho ldi ng , it is f or the tr ie r o f f

a c t to de c ide , o n the ba sis of c omp e te nt m e dic a l 9 testimony , whether and to what e x tent the par ticular plaintiff' s exposure to 10 toxic c he mic a ls in a g ive n sit uatio n jus tif

ie s futur e pe ri od ic med ic a l 11 monitoring. 12 6 Cal.4th at 1009, 863 P.2d at 824-25. 13 I n D on ov an, the Ma ssa c hu se tts court state d th a t a

pla int if f a sse rt inga

me dic a l 14 mon ito ri ngc a

us e of a c tio n mu st s ho w that 15 (1) [t] he def endant' s neg lige nce ( 2) ca used (3) the pl aintiff to become exposed 16 to a ha zar do us subst anc e that pr od uc e d, a t le a st, su

bc e llu lar c ha

ng e s th a t 17 substantially incre ased the risk of ser ious disease, illness, or injury (4) for 1 8 w h i c h an e f f e c t i v e m e d i c a l t e s t f

o r r e l i a b l e e ar l y d e t e c t i o ne x i s t s , ( 5 ) an d e ar l y 1 9 d e t e c t i o n , c o m b i n e d w i thp r o m

p tan d e f f e c t i v e tr e a t m e n t , w i l l s i g n i f i c an t l y 20 decr ease the risk of de ath or the se verity of the disea se, illness or i njury , and 21 (6) suc h diag no s t ic medica l examinations are rea sonably (and pe riodically

) 22 nece ssary , confor mably with the standard of

car e, and ( 7) the pre sent value of 23 t h e re asonable cost of such tests a nd car e, as of the date of the fil i n g o f t h e 24 complaint. 25 455 Mass. at 226, 914 N.E.2d at 902. 26 The c ourt in Hansen se t out the following standa rd for Utah co u rts to follow in 27 deter

mining whe ther to aw ard me dical monitoring costs, a standa rd that include s the re quirement-- 28 somewhat like the f ifth element described by Donovan- -that t here exis t some eff ective tr eatment f

or 29 the disease whose e arly detec tion is sought. The c ourt stated that a pla intiff must prove 30 (1) e x posure 31 (2) to a toxic substance,50

- - 1 (3) whic h exposure was c aused by the def endant' s neg lige nce, 2 (4) r esulting in a n incre ased r isk 3 ( 5 ) o f a s e r i o u s d i s e a s e , i l l n e s s , o r i n j ur y 4 (6 ) f or wh ic h a me dic a l te st f

or e a rl y de te c tio n e xists 5 (7 ) a nd fo r whic h earl y de te c tio n is be ne fi c ia l, m e anin g that a tr e a tme nt 6 exis ts that can a lter the c ourse of the illness, 7 (8) a nd which te s t has bee n presc ribed by a qualifie d phy sician 8 acc ording to contempora ry scientific pr inciples. 9 858 P.2d at 979; see also id. at 979-80 ( elabor ating on eac h element)

. As to its six th element, which-

- 10 like the fourth e lement desc ribed by Donovan- -re quires proof

of an a vailable e ffe ctive test, the Ha nsen 11 court stated 12 the pla int if f m us t pr ov e that a te st e xists fo r de te c tin g the on se t of the ill ne ss 13 befor e it would be appa rent to the lay

person . I f n o such test exist s, then 1 4 p er i o d i c m o n i t o ri n g i s p o i n t l es s an d n o cau s e o f a c t i o nfo r m o n i t o ri n g 15 exis ts.FN12 I n such a situation, the pote ntial plaintiff is not harmed until the 16 on se t of the a c tua l il lne ss. At

that ti me , h e or

sh e c an b ri ngan a c tio n f

or a c tua l 17 injury .FN13 18 F N1 2. Of c ou rs e , if a te st i s late r d e velop ed that w ill 19 detect t h e disease, a plaintiff would re tain the rig ht to 20 demonstrate at some later date t he effec tiveness of the te st and 21 be compe nsated fo r u t i l izi ng it, if all other eleme nts of the 22 cause of ac tion are pr esent. 23 FN13. The statute of limit ations cer tainly will not run 24 on a ca use of a ction when a

critica l el em en t of that ca use, 25 actua l injury , has y et to evidenc e itself. 26 979 & nn.12 a

nd 13. 27 I n Re dla nd , th e c ourt

state d that in or de r to p re va il o n a c omm on law c la im f

or me dic a l 28 mon ito ri ng , a

pla int if f m us t pr ov e the fo llo wi ng :51

- - 1 (1 ) e xpos ur e g re a te r t ha n n or ma l ba c kg ro un d le ve ls; 2 (2 ) t o a pr ov e n h a zar do us su

bs tanc e ; 3 (3 ) c a us e d b y the de fe nd ant' s n e g lig e nc e ; 4 ( 4 ) a s a p r o x i m a t e r e s u l to f

th e e x p o s ur e , p l a i n t i f

f h a s a s i g n i f i c an t l y 5 inc re a se d r isk of c on tr a c tin g a

se ri ou s late nt d ise a se ; 6 (5) a monitoring proc edure exis ts that makes the ear ly detec tion of the 7 dis e a se po ssi ble ; 8 ( 6 ) t h e p r e s c r i b e d m o n i t o r i n g r e g i m e i s d i f f e r e n tf r o mth a tn o r

m a l l y 9 rec ommended in the abse nce of the exposure; and 1 0 (7 ) t h e p re s cr i b edm o n i t oring re gi m e i s re as o n ab l y

n ec es s ary ac co rd i n g 11 to contempora ry scientific pr inciples. 12 54 8 Pa . at 19 5- 96 , 6 96 A. 2d a t 14 5- 46 . Se e a lso Ab batie llo , 5 22 F .Su pp .2 d at 53 8- 39 (p re dic tin g that 13 the New

York Court of Appe als would adopt the e lements set out in Redland). 14 As to Redland' s six th element, i.e., the need for differe ntiation betwee n the proposed 15 med ic a l m o n it o r ingand other medical monitoring , the Pennsylvania cour t stated that if cour

ts imposed 16 me dic a l mo nit or inglia bil ity wi tho ut r e qu ir inga

sh ow ingthat e xpos e d p la int if fs requi re a d if

fe re nt 17 monitoring re g ime than unexposed persons, polluters would become "he alth car e insurer[s]." 548 Pa. 18 at 193, 696 A.2d at 144 (interna l quotation marks omitted). The Redland c ourt also noted that, unlike 19 Utah law a s descr ibed by the Hanse n court, Pennsylvania law doe s not require that a plaintiff prove 20 that an ef

fec tive "tr eatment" be ava ilable. I d. at 196 n.8, 696 A.2d at 146 n.8. 21 Al l of the a bo ve state s th a t r e c og nize d a med ic a l moni tor ing c a us e of a c tio n n ote d th a t 22 such a c laim cannot be e stablished without reliable expert testimony

. See, e.g., Ay ers, 106 N.J. at 606, 23 525 A.2d at 312 (r equiring"r eliable e x pert testimony predic ated upon the sig nificanc e and e x tent of 24 exposure to chemi ca l s , t h e t ox icity of the c hemicals, the se riousness of the disea ses for which52

- - 1 individuals are at risk, the relative incre ase in the chance of onset of disease in those exposed, and the 2 va lue of

e arl y dia g no sis , th a t su c h sur

ve ill anc e to mon ito r the e ff e c t of expo sure to t oxic c he mic a ls 3 is reasona

ble and ne cessa

ry ") ; Donovan, 45 5 M as s . at 227, 914 N.E.2d at 902; Hansen, 858 P.2d 4 at 980; Redland, 548 Pa. at 196, 696 A.2d at 146; Pot ter, 6 Cal.4th at 1009, 863 P.2d at 824. 5 S o m e o f t h e c a s e s h av e a l s o i n d i c a t e d th a t a m e d i c a l m o n i t o r i n g c a u s e o f a c t i o nm ay 6 be subjec t to normal tort defe nses such a s as s u m p t ion of risk and c ontributory neg lige nce. See 7 Donovan, 455 Ma ss. at 22 6 n . 1 1 , 9 14 N.E.2d at 901 n.11 (" [a] plaintiff[ smoker]'s claim would, of 8 course , rema in subject to a ll available a ffirmative defe nses, such a s contributory neg lige nce" ); Potter, 9 6 Cal.4 t h at 974, 863 P.2d at 801 (" when a defe ndant in a [tox ic landfill] neglig ence action 10 demonstrates that a plaintiff' s smoking is neg lige nt and that a portion of the plaintiff' s fea r of c ance r 11 is attributable t o the smoking, c omparative fault principles ma y be applied to r educe the amount of 12 rec overy

for e motional distress damag es based on such fe ar" ). See a lso Dang ler, 241 A.D .2d at 294, 13 672 N.Y.S.2d at 191 (in a c ance rphobia c ase involvinga toxi c landf ill, a jury may

proper ly consider 14 the plaintiffs' "voluntar y exposure to car cinog ens, for example, by

smoking" ).

15 E. Ce rt if

ic a tio n o f Q ue sti on s to the Ne w Y or k Co ur t of Ap pe a ls 16 I n case s such as this one, in which state law contr ols and the g overningprinciples ar e 17 uncer

tain or ambiguous, we attempt to pre d i ct how the hig hest court of the state would re solve the 18 uncer

tainty or ambiguity

. See, e.g., Trave lers Insuranc e Co. v. 633 Third Associates, 14 F.3d 114, 119 19 (2d Cir. 1994). I n so doing, we g ive full weig ht to the decisions of the state' s highe st c ourt, and we 20 gi v e d u e re g ard to the de cisions of the state' s lower c ourts. See, e.g ., Phansalkar v. Andersen 21 Weinroth & Co., 344 F.3d 184, 199 (2d Cir. 2003); Michalski v. Home De pot, I nc., 225 F .3d 113, 11653

- - 1 (2d Cir. 2000). We also re main "f ree to consider all of t he resource s to which the hig hest court of the 2 state c ou ld l oo k, inc lud ing de c isi on s in oth e r j ur isd ic tio ns on

the same or

ana log ou s is su e s, " L e on ' s 3 Ba

kery , I nc. v. Gr innell Corp., 990 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1993). 4 As the dis c us sio n in Part s I I I .A ., B ., C., and

D. a bo ve ind icates , whe re the pla int if fs 5 have a lle g e d to rt iou s e xpos ur e to t oxic su bs tanc e s b ut h ave no t a lle g e d th a t th e y su ff e re d p hy sic a l 6 i n

j u r y, t h e N e w Y o r

k i n t e r m e d i a t e a p p e l l a t e c o urt s h av e r

u l e d th a tth e c o s to f

m e d i c a l m o n i t o r i n g m ay 7 be awa

rded as an item of conseque ntial da mag es, most of the fede ral district c ourts sitti ng i n Ne w 8 York have opined that Ne w York w ould rec og nize an independe nt claim for medic al monitoring, a nd 9 the hig hest courts of othe r states have divided as to whe ther or not the p l ai n t i ff m ay maintain an 10 independe nt medical monitoring cause of ac tion. 11 None of the New York c ourts has di rec tly addre ssed t he question of whether the State 12 recog nizes an independe nt cause of ac tion for medica l monitoring, and the answe r to this questi o n , 13 wh ic h h a s th e c a pacit y to res ol ve th is l iti g a tio n, is u nc le ar. Th e qu e sti on

is m a te ri a l in

the pr e se nt 14 a c ti o n

beca use the statute of

limit ations bars plaintiffs' pursuit of their tra ditional claims for neg lig e n c e 15 and strict produc ts liability ; the principle evince d in case s such as Aske y , Allen, and Abusio, that the 16 cost o f m ed i cal monit oring may be re cover ed as a

n element of

conseque ntial damag es, would be 17 immaterial to claims that ar e time-ba rre d. 18 I f, ho we ve r, Ne w Y or k r e c og nize s an in de pe nd e nt c a us e of a c tio n f or me dic a l 19 mon ito ri ng , a

nd if , a s r e c og nize d, that cla im is vie we d as ac c ru ing wh e n ane ff e c tiv e mon ito ri ngte st 20 become s available --a nd if plaintiffs' alleg ations as to the availability and eff ectivene ss of L DCT and 21 as to the lac k of effec tiveness of prior tests are proven- -the statute of limit ations likely

will not have 22 run on that indep endent cause of action. We also note our unc erta inty as to how Ne w York w ould54

- - 1 reg ard c laim acc rual in the e vent of fur ther tec hnologic al advances that may from ti me t o time improve 2 on the ef

fec tiveness of e x isting tests. We frame the ce rtified questions as we have in or der to fa cilitate 3 the weig hing of

competingpolicy

considerations, including var ious gr adations of he alth conce rns and 4 the potential for pr eventive or ear ly -dete ction measure s, in light of the scope of plaintiffs' c laims on 5 behalf

of a putative class of pe rsons wh o n o t o nly have not be en diag nosed with a smoking -re lated 6 disease but a lso are not unde r investig ation by a phy sician for

such a suspe cted disea se. 7 T h is Court' s L ocal Rule 27.2 allows cer tification of such questions " wher e the Ne w 8 York Court of Appe als has not spoken c lear ly on an is sue and we are unable t o predic t, based on othe r 9 decisions by New York courts, how t he C ourt of Appeals would answe r a cer tain question." G iordano 10 v. Marke t America , I nc., 599 F .3d 87, 100 (2d Cir. 2010). Certifica tion is particularly

desirable wher e 11 a " decision reflec ts value judgments and important public policy choice s that the New York Court of 12 Appea ls is better situated th an we ar e to make," id. at 101; see, e .g ., Hall v. United Parc el Service , 1 3 In c . , 7 6 N

. Y

. 2 d 2 7 , 3 3 , 5 5 6 N

. Y

. S

. 2 d 2 1 , 2 5 ( 1 9 9 0 ) ( " W h e th e r w e s h o u l d

. . . r e c o g n i z [ e ] a

r e m e dy 1 4 i nt o rti s a

qu e s t i o nt h a ti s b e s tr e s o l v e d b y r e f e r e n c e t o th e r e l e v an tj u d i c i a l an d s o c i a l p o l i c y 15 considerations."). The L ocal Rules of the New York Court of Appe als permit ce rtification of 16 questions by

this Court whe n we encounte r "de terminative questions of New York law . . . for which 17 no controlling prec eden t o f the Court of Appe als exist s." N .Y. Court of Appe als L ocal Rule 18 500.27(a)

. 19 I n light of ( a) the lack of controlling prec edent of the New York Court of Appe als, (b) 20 the abse nce of

clea r guidance by

New Y ork' s intermediate appellate courts, (c ) the importanc e of the 21 questions presente d as to the availability of medical monitoring as an independe nt c ause of action, and 22 (d) the va lue judg ments and important policy considerations that must be balanc ed in resolving these55

- - 1 questions, we conc lude that the New Yo rk C o u rt of Appe als is better suited than this Court to 2 deter

mine whether

New Y ork re cog nizes such a ca use o f action. Ac cording ly , we c ertify the 3 fo llo wi ngqu e sti on s o f N e w Y or k la w: 4 ( 1 ) U n d e r N e w Y o r k l aw , m ay a c ur

r e n t o r f o r m e r l o n g t i m e h e a v y 5 smoker who ha s not been diag nosed with a smoking -re lated disea se, and who 6 is not under investigation by a phy sician for such a suspected disease, pur sue 7 an indepe ndent equitab l e cause of a ction for medic al monitoring f or such a 8 d i s e a s e ? 9 (2) I f N e w Y o r k r e c o g n iz e s s u c hanin d e p e n d e n t c a u s e o f a c ti o nf o r 10 medical monitoring , 1 1 ( A ) W h a tar e th e e l e m e n t s o f th a tc a u s e o f a c t i o n ? 12 (B ) Wh a t is the a pp lic a ble statut e of

lim itatio ns , an d w he n d oe s 1 3 t h a tc a u s e o f a c t i o na c c r

u e ? 14 We do not intend this articulation of the above specifie d questions to lim it the scope 15 of the analy sis by the Court of Appea ls, a nd we invite the Court of Appea ls to e x pand upon or a lter 16 these que stions as it deems appropriate.

17 CONCL USI ON

18 We h a v e c onsidered a ll of the plaintiffs' rema ining a rguments on appe a l a

n d h a v e f o u n d 19 the m to be wi tho ut me ri t. A c c or din g ly , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

to t he e xtent th a t 20 i t d i smissed pla intiffs' claims of neg lige nce, strict liability , and brea ch of the implied wa rra n t y o f 21 merc hantability

.56

- - 1 Wit h respe ct to t h e plaintiffs' independe nt claim seekingmedical monitoring , we 2 h er eby instruct the Clerk of Court f or the Second Circuit to transmit to the Clerk of t h e N ew Yo rk 3 Court

of Ap pe a ls this op ini on a s our c e rt if ic ate , tog e the r wit

h a com ple te se t of all fi lin g s in th is C ourt 4 by

the par ties. This pa

nel will r etain jurisdiction of the prese nt a ppeal f or re solution after disposition 5 of the c ertified que stions by the New York Court of Appe als.