Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed March 15, 2023.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D22-793

Lower Tribunal Nos. 18-180, 18-445

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Raul Parisi, et al.,

Appellants,

vs.

Maria Isabel Quadri de Kingston, etc.,

Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Milton 

Hirsch, Judge.

Barakat + Bossa, PLLC, and Jocelyne A. Macelloni, Brian Barakat,

and Matthew Akiba, for appellants.

Chepenik Trushin LLP, and Joshua R. Williams, Daniel F. Bachman,

and Danielle Birman, for appellees.

Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and HENDON and GORDO, JJ. 

HENDON, J.
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Raul Parisi (“Parisi”), Oscar E. Piccolo (“Piccolo”), and Oxen Group, 

LLC (“Oxen Group”) (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal from the (1) Order 

on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment entered on April 5, 2022, granting 

summary judgment as to Counts I (quiet title) and II (declaratory relief), but 

denying summary judgment as to Count VII (ejectment), of the Second 

Amended Complaint (“Operative Complaint”) filed by Maria Isabel Quadri 

de Kingston, as personal representative of the Estate of Maria Cecilia 

Quadri (“Estate”); and (2) Partial Final Summary Judgment entered on April 

19, 2022. This appeal addresses the validity of an unwitnessed Special 

Power of Attorney (“POA”) executed by Maria Cecilia Quadri (“Decedent”) 

in Argentina approximately two weeks prior to her death, and whether the 

quitclaim deed executed by Piccolo, as “attorney in fact” of the POA, three 

days prior to the Decedent’s death, transferring property located in Miami, 

Florida, to Parisi, for no monetary consideration, is void. For the reasons 

that follow, we affirm the orders on review.

FACTS AND PRODECURAL BACKGROUND

Maria Isabel Quadri de Kingston (“Maria Isabel”) and the Decedent 

are sisters, and Maria Isabel is the personal representative of the 

Decedent’s Estate. At the time of the Decedent’s death on November 7, 

2016, Parisi and the Decedent were in a relationship and had lived together
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for approximately fourteen years, but were not married. Oxen Group is a 

corporation wholly owned by Parisi. 

In 2011, the Decedent purchased Unit 203 of Brickell Key II 

Condominium (“Property”). After the Decedent purchased the Property, 

Piccolo managed the Property for a fee.

In 2016, the Decedent had cancer and was living with Parisi in 

Argentina. In August 2016, Piccolo contacted a law firm that he, the 

Decedent, and Parisi had dealt with in the past. Piccolo obtained from a 

paralegal at the law firm language to be included in a power of attorney that 

would allow Piccolo, as the Decedent’s agent, to sell the Decedent’s 

Property. The information was then provided to Parisi and an Argentine 

notary (“Notary”). 

On October 25, 2016, the Decedent executed the subject POA in 

Argentina, which contained the language provided by the paralegal, and 

provides in relevant part as follows:

THIS SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY IS GIVEN TO 

OSCAR E. PICCOLO . . . TO EXECUTE ALL 

DOCUMENTATION TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMIT[ED] TO A 

DEED, BILL OF SALE, CLOSING STATEMENT, AFFIDAVITS, 

AND ANY OTHER ANCILIARY DOCUMENTATION WHICH 

ARE AND MAY BE REQUIRED TO CONVEY THE PROPERTY 

LOCATED AT: 540 Brickell Key Drive Apt. 203, Miami, FL 

33131. . . . 

The POA was notarized by the Argentine Notary and apostilled, but there 
4

were no subscribing witnesses to the POA. Although there were no 

subscribing witnesses, the Decedent’s execution of the POA was allegedly 

witnessed by the Notary, the Notary’s wife, and Parisi. After the POA was 

executed, Parisi hand delivered it to Piccolo in Argentina. 

Piccolo returned to the United States with the POA, and he contacted 

a realtor because the Decedent wanted to sell the Property. The realtor 

informed the Decedent that the Property could probably be sold for 

$260,000, but the Decedent decided to continue renting the Property 

because she was expecting to sell the Property for $300,000. Piccolo 

continued to manage the Property for the Decedent.

It is undisputed that Piccolo had two individuals, who were in the 

United States when the Decedent executed the POA in Argentina, sign the 

POA as so-called “subscribing witnesses.”1

 The Decedent’s health 

continued to deteriorate. On November 4, 2016, Piccolo executed a 

quitclaim deed prepared by the law firm, in which Piccolo, as “attorney in 

1 On October 31, 2016, Piccolo e-mailed a copy of the POA to the 

paralegal at the law firm. According to Piccolo, the paralegal informed him 

that the POA was not valid because it did not have two subscribing 

witnesses, and instructed Piccolo to have the POA signed by “subscribing 

witnesses.” The paralegal testified in a deposition that she must not have 

opened the attachment because she did not see the POA without 

subscribing witnesses, and did not instruct Piccolo to obtain “subscribing 

witnesses.”
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fact” for the Decedent, conveyed the Property to Oxen Group for no 

monetary consideration. Both the quitclaim deed and the POA were later 

recorded in the public records on December 9, 2016. Following the 

conveyance, Piccolo continued to manage the Property for Oxen Group.

Three days after the quitclaim deed was executed, the Decedent died 

intestate on November 7, 2016. Under Argentine law, as the Decedent died 

intestate, her mother was entitled to inherit the Decedent’s property.2 

On January 31, 2018, the Estate filed a complaint, and thereafter, in 

March 2021, filed the Operative Complaint against the Appellants, the law 

firm, and an attorney at the law firm, asserting eleven counts. As relevant 

to this appeal, the Estate sought to quiet title to the Property (Count I), a 

declaration that the POA was invalid and that the conveyance to Oxen 

Group was void (Count II), and ejectment of Oxen Group and Parisi from 

the Property (Count VII).

In April 2021, the Appellants moved to dismiss the Operative 

Complaint, asserting that it failed to state a cause of action, arguing that the 

POA was properly executed, and therefore valid, because section 

709.2105(2) of the Florida Statutes does not require that a power of 

2 Parisi was the named beneficiary of one of the Decedent’s bank

accounts, and therefore, the Decedent’s mother was not entitled to the 

funds in that account. 
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attorney have two subscribing witnesses. The trial court denied the 

Appellants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the Florida Power of Attorney Act

(sections 709.2101-.2402, Florida Statutes) does require that a power of 

attorney have two subscribing witnesses.

In January 2022, the Estate filed a Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment Regarding Invalidity of Power of Attorney and Property 

Conveyance (“Motion for Partial Summary Judgment”), seeking to quiet title 

to the Property, a declaration that the POA is invalid and the quitclaim deed 

is void, and to eject Parisi and Oxen Group from the Property. Following a 

response from the Appellants and a hearing, the trial court granted the 

Estate’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the quiet title count 

and the declaratory judgment count, but denied the motion as to the 

ejectment count. The trial court thereafter entered Partial Final Summary 

Judgment, declaring that the Estate “is the sole rightful holder of title to the 

[Property].” This appeal followed.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

An order entering summary judgment is reviewed de novo. See

Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 

(Fla. 2000). “Where not ambiguous, the interpretation of a power of 

attorney . . . is a question of law, subject to de novo review.” Manor Oaks, 
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Inc. v. Campbell, 276 So. 3d 830, 832-33 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019). A power of 

attorney must be strictly construed, and it only grants those powers that are 

specified. See All Seasons Condo. Ass’n v. Patrician Hotel, LLC, 274 So. 

3d 438, 449 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). A trial court’s legal conclusions and

interpretation of a statute are reviewed de novo. See Musi v. Credo, LLC, 

273 So. 3d 93, 96 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The Appellants contend the trial court erred by determining that 

section 709.2105, Florida Statutes (2013), requires extraterritorial powers 

of attorney to have signatures of two subscribing witnesses to be valid. We 

disagree.

Section 709.2105, Florida Statutes (2013), sets forth the 

requirements for the execution of a power of attorney. As relevant in this 

appeal, subsection (2) provides in part as follows: “A power of attorney 

must be signed by the principal and by two subscribing witnesses and be 

acknowledged by the principal before a notary public or as otherwise 

provided in s. 695.03.” Based on this clear and unambiguous language, 

the power of attorney must be: (1) signed by the principal; (2) signed by 

two subscribing witnesses; and (3) acknowledged by the principal (a) 

before a notary public or (b) as otherwise provided in s. 695.03. Thus, 
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because the POA at issue lacks the signatures of the two required 

subscribing witnesses, it was not executed in strict compliance with section 

709.2105.

The Appellants asserted below that the manner in which the POA 

was executed by the Decedent in Argentina complied with the execution 

requirements in Argentina. This, however, does not validate the subject 

POA pertaining to Property located in Florida.

Section 709.2106(3), Florida Statutes (2013), provides in relevant 

part: “A power of attorney executed in another state which does not 

comply with the execution requirements of this part is valid in this state if, 

when the power of attorney was executed, the power of attorney and its 

execution complied with the law of the state of execution. . . .” (emphasis 

added). This section allows for the portability of powers of attorney 

between states. Section 709.2102(2), Florida Statutes (2013), defines 

“another state” as “a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, 

Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular 

possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” As Argentina 

does not fall within this definition, section 709.2106(3) does not apply in the 

instant case. Accordingly, based on the above analysis, the POA was not 

executed in strict compliance with section 709.2105 because it did not have
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the signatures of two subscribing witnesses.

Next, the Appellants argue that the trial court erred by determining 

that strict compliance, as opposed to only substantial compliance, of the 

execution requirements set forth in section 709.2105 is required. We 

disagree.

The Florida Power of Attorney Act became effective on October 1, 

2011, and it was later amended effective May 30, 2013.

3 The Florida 

Senate Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement relating to the 2011 

enactment of the Florida Power of Attorney Act prepared by The 

Professional Staff of the Rules Committee recognizes that “[t]he power of 

attorney is an important document because it allows one person to legally 

act for another, and it benefits and binds the principal as if the principal had 

done the act himself or herself.”4

In arguing that the execution of the POA must strictly comply with the 

statutory requirements, the Estate primarily relies on cases dealing with the 

execution of wills. See Allen v. Dalk, 826 So. 2d 245, 247 (Fla. 2002) 

(holding that “testator must strictly comply” with the execution requirements 

3 The 2013 version has not been subsequently amended, and it is the 

version that applies in the instant case because the POA was executed in 

2016.

4https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2011/670/Analyses/2011s0670.rc.P

DF.
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set forth in section 732.502, Florida Statutes (2000), “in order to create a 

valid will”); Jordan v. Fehr, 902 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (“To 

create a valid will, a testator must strictly comply with the requirements of 

section 732.502. An improperly attested will may not be admitted to 

probate.”). The Florida Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he obvious intent 

of the statute requiring the attestation of a will by at least two witnesses . . . 

is to assure its authenticity and to avoid fraud and imposition.” Allen, 826 

So. 2d at 248 (quoting In re Estate of Olson, 181 So. 2d 642, 643 (Fla. 

1966)) (alteration and ellipsis added in Allen). Similarly, this Court noted 

that “[t]he purpose of the statute is to assure not only that the signature on 

the will is that of the testator, but to provide reasonable assurance of the 

circumstances under which the signature was affixed to the document.” 

Manson v. Hayes, 539 So. 2d 27, 28 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); see also

Jordan, 902 So. 2d at 201 (same).

The Estate also relies on cases pertaining to the execution of a trust 

and/or an amendment to a trust. In Kelly v. Lindenau, 223 So. 3d 1074 

(Fla. 2d DCA 2017), Ralph Falkenthal (“Ralph”) executed a revocable trust 

while residing in Illinois, which was validly executed pursuant to Illinois law. 

Kelly, 223 So. 3d at 1075. Thereafter, while residing in Florida, Ralph 

executed a first and second amendment to the trust, modifying his 
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revocable trust. The first and second amendments were prepared by his 

Illinois attorney pursuant to Illinois law, and Ralph executed both 

amendments in front of two witnesses, but only one witness signed the 

amendments as an attesting witness. Id. The second amendment, which 

was the amendment at issue, provided for, among other things, a specific 

devise of his residence in Bradenton, Florida, to the woman he had been 

residing with for a few years, Donna Lindenau (“Lindenau”). Id.

Following Ralph’s death, Ralph’s children, including Judy, as 

successor trustee, filed a petition for declaratory judgment to determine the 

validity of the first and second amendments. Id. Lindenau filed an 

amended counterclaim, seeking a reformation of the second amendment 

pursuant to section 736.0415, Florida Statutes (2016), asserting that the 

error in failing to have two attesting witnesses sign the second amendment 

was a mistake at law. Id. at 1076. In the alternative, Lindenau sought a 

constructive trust in her favor as to the Bradenton house. Id. Following a 

bench trial, the trial court granted Lindenau’s request to reform the second 

amendment pursuant to section 736.0415, and ordered Judy, as successor 

trustee, to transfer the Bradenton property to Lindenau. As the trial court 

found in favor of Lindenau, it did not rule on Lindenau’s alternative request 

for a constructive trust. Judy, as successor trustee, and Ralph’s other 
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children appealed. Id.

On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal noted that “[i]n 

Florida, the testamentary aspects of a revocable trust are invalid unless the 

trust document is executed by the settlor of the trust with the same 

formalities as are required for the execution of a will. Id. (citing § 

736.0403(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2014)). As such, the settlor, Ralph, was 

required to execute the trust or trust amendments in the presence of two 

attesting witness, and the two attesting witnesses must sign the trust or 

trust amendment in the presence of the settlor and each other. Id. 

Importantly, the Second District concluded that the execution “requirements 

are strictly construed.” Id. at 1076-77. As such, when a settlor “fails to 

strictly comply with the statutory requirements for valid execution,” the trust 

“remains invalid and unenforceable.” Id. at 1077. 

The Second District concluded that an improperly executed trust 

amendment cannot be validated through reformation pursuant to section 

736.0415 because under that statute, a trust can only be reformed to 

conform to the settlor’s intent, noting that the statute focuses “on the terms 

of the trust, not the execution of it.” Id. (emphasis in original). The Second 

District noted that the terms of the second amendment were clear—Ralph 

intended to leave the Bradenton house to Lindenau—however, there were 
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no terms in the second amendment that needed reformation. Id. Thus, the 

Second District disagreed with the trial court’s determination that the 

second amendment could be reformed under the circumstances. 

As an alternative basis for affirmance, Lindenau requested that the 

Second District apply the tipsy coachman doctrine and should conclude 

that a constructive trust can be imposed on the Bradenton house, relying 

on In re Estate of Tolin, 622 So. 2d 988, 990-91 (Fla. 1993), and Allen v. 

Dalk, 826 So. 2d 245, 247 (Fla. 2002). Id. at 1078. The Second District, 

however, rejected the argument, stating: 

Read in conjunction, Tolin and Allen make it clear that while the 

imposition of a constructive trust might be appropriate where a 

will (and thus a trust) has been validly executed, that remedy is 

not appropriate where there is an error in the execution of the 

document. We conclude that that distinction should be 

extended to cases such as this one where an amendment to a 

trust was not validly executed. Because there was no valid, 

enforceable amendment, the imposition of a constructive trust 

on the Bradenton house “would only serve to validate an 

invalid” amendment. 

Kelly, 223 So. 3d at 1078-79 (quoting Allen, 826 So. 2d at 248).

Although these cases do not relate to the execution of a power of 

attorney, the same concerns and needed assurances pertain to the 

execution of a power of attorney, such as the non-durable POA in the 

instant case which allows an agent (Piccolo) to act in the place of the 

principal (Decedent) to convey real property. We recognize that the 
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notarization may allay concerns as to whether the POA was signed by the 

principal (Decedent), but the subscribing witnesses provide additional 

assurances, such as the circumstances under which the POA was signed 

by the principal. Thus, the trial court correctly determined that the 

execution requirements set forth in section 709.2105 must be strictly 

construed. As strict compliance is required, the POA in the instant case is 

invalid, and any action taken by Piccolo (agent) pursuant to the invalid POA 

is void.5 As such, the trial court correctly entered partial summary 

5 The Appellants have relied on several cases in support of their argument 

that only substantial compliance is necessary. However, the cases are 

factually different. See, e.g., In re: Estate of Litzky, 296 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 

3d DCA 1974) (relating to section 741.211, which invalidates common law 

marriage, and where this Court stated: “We are in accord with the able 

probate judge’s opinion that the law of Florida now provides for only one 

kind of marriage, one which is entered into by the parties in good faith and 

in substantial compliance with Chapter 741.”); Metro. Dade Cnty. v. 

Shelton, 375 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (relating to three-day waiting 

period for marriage license); Bradley v. Bradley, 371 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 3d 

DCA 1979) (noting that section 732.502(1), Florida Statutes (1975), 

provides that the testator must sign will “At the end”; testatrix, Louise M. 

Bradley, used “Ramco Form 455,” with a single sheet that has printing on 

both sides, and on the front or first page, Mrs. Bradley handwrote her 

intended disposition of her estate, and on the reverse or second page, the 

notary signed where Mrs. Bradley was supposed to sign, and underneath 

the witnesses’ signature, which was underneath where the notary signed, 

there was a vertical printed section that that provides, “Will OF,” and in the 

blank line, the testatrix in cursive handwriting, wrote “Louise M. Bradley”; 

reversing trial court’s admission of will to probate, and remanding for 

hearing, stating, “Is that place ‘at the end’ of this will? We hold that this 

question should not have been answered below without holding a formal 

hearing on the issue.”).
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judgment in favor of the Estate as to Counts I (quiet title) and II (declaratory 

relief), and by declaring that the Estate “is the sole rightful holder of title to 

the [Property].” 

The remaining arguments raised by the Appellants lack merit and do 

not warrant discussion.

Affirmed.