Report of the 

Defense Science Board 

Task Force on the 

Fulfillment of Urgent 

Operational Needs

July 2009 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140 
This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). 

The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to 

the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions and recommendations in this 

report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense. 

The DSB Task Force on the Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs completed its 

information gathering in June 2009. 

This report is Unclassified and cleared for public release. 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON 

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140 

	


MEMORANDUM TO THE CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD 

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Fulfillment of 

Urgent Operational Needs 

The accelerated pace of change in the tactics, techniques, and procedures 

used by adversaries of the United States has heightened the need for a rapid response 

to new threats. Fielding systems in response to urgent operational needs over the 

past half decade has revealed that DOD lacks the ability to rapidly field new 

capabilities for the warfighter in a systematic and effective way. 

 The final report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Fulfilling Urgent 

Operational Needs is attached. The task force identified several key elements that can 

inhibit efficient rapid acquisition and fielding. The primary finding of the task force 

is that all of DOD’s needs cannot be met by the same acquisition processes, and that 

the degree of urgency and technology readiness can be used to differentiate “rapid” 

and “deliberate” acquisitions. An integrated triage process is needed to determine the 

appropriate process, and the task force noted that any rapid response must be based 

on proven technology. Current approaches to implement rapid responses to urgent 

needs were found to be unsustainable, and institutional barrierspeople, funding, 

and processesare powerful inhibitors to successful rapid acquisition and fielding of 

new capabilities.

 The task force identified a number of critical actions to address the situation: 

• Most importantly, the Secretary of Defense should formalize a dual 

acquisition path that separates “rapid” and “deliberate” acquisitions. A rapid 

process should be based on proven technology and is aimed at delivering a 

capability as quickly as two months, and no longer than 24 months after the 

need is identified. Deliberate processes should be used for more complex 

needs that require development efforts. 

• To implement this separation, the Secretary of Defense should establish a 

new agency: the Rapid Acquisition and Fielding Agency (RAFA). The task 

force recommends that this agency should employ a streamlined, integrated 

approach for rapid acquisition. RAFA should be focused on acquiring new 

solutions to joint urgent operational needs and should work with the 
combatant commands to anticipate future needs. RAFA should also oversee 

and coordinate tracking of all urgent need statements in conjunction with the 

Services and components. 

• Because urgent operational needs may arise both during wartime and when 

threats are imminent, executive and legislative branches should establish a 

separate and flexible fund for rapid acquisition and fielding today. The initial 

funding and billets for RAFA should be based on absorbing and integrating 

some of the existing ad hoc programs and organizations that are currently 

addressing urgent operational needs. 

I believe that implementing these recommendations is imperative to 

supplying the warfighter with the capabilities needed for success. Urgent needs 

remain waiting to be fulfilled today with evermore limited resources while we 

anticipate new and even more devastating capabilities from adversaries. The men 

and women of the Armed Forces in harm’s way deserve this support. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS I v

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary................................................................................................vii

Chapter 1. Introduction ............................................................................................ 1

Charter .............................................................................................................. 1 

The Evolving Response to Urgent Needs .........................................................2 

The Problem at Hand .......................................................................................4 

Roadmap of the Report ....................................................................................6 

Chapter 2. Addressing Urgent Needs Today............................................................8

Processes and Organizations to Address Urgent Needs ..................................9

Current Understanding of “Urgent Need” ..................................................... 16

Rapid Response Organizations and Processes............................................... 17

Tracking How Urgent Needs Have Been Addressed..................................... 20

Chapter 3. Shortfalls in the Current Process .........................................................24

Overall Findings..............................................................................................24 

Attributes of a Solution...................................................................................29 

Chapter 4. A New Way Ahead: Recommendations ............................................... 31

Appendix A. Normalized Data for Time to Resolve Need Statements .................. 41

Appendix B. Process Visualizations for Fulfilling Urgent 

Operational Needs ......................................................................................... 43

Terms of Reference.................................................................................................47

Task Force Membership ......................................................................................... 51

Presentations to the Task Force .............................................................................53

Glossary .................................................................................................................. 57
vi I TABLE OF CONTENTS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I vii

Executive Summary 

Today’s adversaries are changing their tactics, techniques, and procedures at 

an accelerated pace, heightening the need for U.S. forces to respond rapidly to 

new threats. Perhaps the most well-publicized example of such adversarial 

capabilities is the use of improvised explosive devices in Iraq—a threat that 

created urgent demands from forces in the field to develop capabilities to counter 

such attacks. Fielding systems in response to these needs over the past half 

decade has revealed that the Department of Defense (DOD) lacks the ability to 

rapidly field new capabilities for the warfighter in a systematic and effective way.

In response to this situation, the Defense Science Board Task Force on the 

Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs was chartered to evaluate: 

 the effectiveness of the procedures to generate, validate, and fulfill 

warfighting requirements through the urgent operational need (UON) 

and joint urgent operational need (JUON) processes 

 the extent to which joint urgent operational needs statements are used to 

avoid Service-specific urgent operational needs and acquisition processes 

or to document non-urgent capability 

 the extent to which joint acquisition entities maintain oversight, once a 

military department or defense agency has been designated responsibility 

for executing and fielding a capability in response to a joint urgent 

operational need statement. 

This oversight includes 1) responsiveness in execution, 2) field performance 

of the capability delivered, and 3) concurrent development of a long-term 

acquisition and sustainment strategy. 

Over the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it became apparent that 

U.S. forces were not adequately equipped for ongoing stability or 

counterinsurgency operations. The combatant commands eventually submitted 

more than 7,000 need statements for urgent solutions through command 

channels to the Joint Staff and the Services. The Services and the acquisition 

community scrambled to respond to these needs, standing up more than 20 ad 

hoc offices, agencies, task forces, funds, and other organizations to respond and 

fulfill these diverse needs. A process for joint urgent operational need statements 
viii I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

was created in 2004 to facilitate effective tracking and fulfillment of joint 

combatant command needs. 

Over the past five years there have been many success stories and lessons 

learned. The Joint Staff, combatant commands, and the Services have all codified 

in directives new processes to identify urgent needs and provide rapid responses. 

However, in the larger picture, the DOD has not made major, institutional 

changes in its budgeting and acquisition processes essential to posture itself for 

the ongoing hybrid warfare reality. 

The essence of the problem is the need to field militarily useful solutions 

faster. The reality is that the Department is not geared to acquire and field 

capabilities in a rapidly shifting threat environment. Current long standing 

business practices and regulations are poorly suited to these dynamics. Today, 

the DOD is saddled with processes and oversight built up over decades, and 

managers leading them who are often rewarded for risk aversion. 

The task force recognizes that satisfying an urgent need statement for a 

specific item or a narrowly specified solution may be a logistics function rather 

than acquisition. Consequently, a very necessary step is to perform triage on 

incoming urgent need statements to differentiate between the two. Fulfilling 

urgent logistics requests is very important, and any urgent responseespecially 

one that involves commercial equipmentshould consider doctrine, 

organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and 

facilities (DOTMLPF) in order to trade off short-term benefits and long-term 

costs. In some cases, triage may reveal that acquisition of a different solution 

than originally proposed better fits the need, or it may identify the need to 

acquire a more developmental solution. 

Evaluating a true capability gap in an effective and systematic way will also 

involve operations research and system analysis (ORSA) and analysis of 

alternatives in addition to DOTMLPF. This ORSA step, during the triage process 

as well as during solution development, is missing in many current rapid 

acquisition processes. Addressing urgent need statements that describe a mission 

need or capability gap rather than a specific solution is critical to mission success. 

Findings of the Task Force 

All of DOD’s needs cannot be met by the same acquisition 

processes. Desired systems, capabilities, and materiel may have major 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I ix

variations in urgency, technology maturity, and life cycle considerations. 

Collectively, these will dictate the appropriate procedures needed for effective 

acquisition and timely delivery. To facilitate these goals, DOD needs to codify and 

institutionalize “rapid” acquisition processes and practices that can be tailored to 

expedite delivery of capabilities that meet urgent warfighter needs. 

“Rapid” is countercultural and will be undersupported in 

traditional organizations. Rapid acquisition often challenges traditional 

systems, practices, and cultures. The current defense acquisition workforce is 

rewarded for following complex procedures with accuracy and precision and is 

punished for bypassing them. Rapid responses necessitate creativity and 

workarounds that go against these norms. Sustaining an effective “rapid” 

acquisition capability within DOD will require the active support of the testing, 

resourcing, and requirements communities. All of these communities must 

acknowledge that rapid processes to meet urgent needs can function concurrently 

with the deliberate and more comprehensive acquisition process for systems 

relying on new technology development. 

Any rapid response must be based on proven technology and 

robust manufacturing processes. Attempting to squeeze new technology 

development into an urgent timeframe creates risks for delays and ultimately 

may not adequately address an existing capability gap. While there may be 

instances in which early fielding of prototypes with contractor logistics support is 

appropriate, the risks must be well understood and parallel efforts should be in 

place to mature the technology and to ensure that training and logistics are 

adequate for the system life cycle. An assessment of capabilities and limitations 

should be an integral part of the warfighter’s acceptance of the system for 

operational use. 

Current approaches to implement rapid responses to urgent needs 

are not sustainable. The DOD has done little to adopt urgent needs and rapid 

acquisition as a critical, ongoing DOD institutional capability essential to 

addressing future threats. While many ad hoc processes are being formalized, 

these processes do not encompass the breadth or depth needed to ensure rapid 

response to future challenges. Further they are not being incorporated into 

Service budgeting processes. The ad hoc task forces and programs do not have 

the impetus or adequate advocacy beyond the war; they will not stand up to longterm budget battles with Service programs of record. 
x I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

An integrated triage process is needed. A combatant command may 

identify an urgent need for several different reasons. To be most effective, the 

solution to this need should not be presumed without a higher level view of all 

needs and a wider view of potential solutions. Responding to all must involve 

proven technology and be schedule driven, but because all are different and 

resources are limited, triage is an important step. 

Institutional barrierspeople, funding, and processesare 

powerful inhibitors to successful rapid acquisition and fielding of new 

capabilities. For success, these barriers must be addressed with explicit 

solutions. 

Recommendations of the Task Force 

RECOMMENDATION 1. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SHOULD FORMALIZE 

A DUAL ACQUISITION PATH

“Deliberate” and “rapid” acquisition are incompatible processes as currently 

configured in DOD, and the task force concluded that these would be better 

handled in separate organizational elements and with separate budgeting 

guidance. Solutions may start as either rapid or deliberate acquisitions, 

depending on the urgency as well as on technology availability and maturity. In 

the proposed process, rapid acquisition would be basically consistent with the 

DOD 5000 series, but carried out in an integrated and compressed manner. 

Figure ES-1 depicts the envisioned architecture of this separation. 

RECOMMENDATION 2. EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES MUST 

ESTABLISH A FUND FOR RAPID ACQUISITION AND FIELDING

To fund incremental contingency costs (for conflicts such as in the Balkans), 

Congress established the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund to 

address stability and reconstruction costs incurred as a result of military 

operations. A similar approach is proposed to respond to urgent needs from any 

combatant command as a result of on-going action or an imminent threat. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I xi

RECOMMENDATION 3 . THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SHOULD ESTABLISH A 

NEW AGENCY: THE RAPID ACQUISITION AND FIELDING AGENCY

The proposed organizational home for the rapid acquisition path is a new agency 

within the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics (USD (AT&L)). The new agency, with a proposed name of the Rapid 

Acquisition and Fielding Agency (RAFA) will be focused on speed, utilizing 

existing technologies, and acquisition flexibilities to achieve a 75 percent 

solutioninitially “good enough” to address the urgent needs of the warfighter. 

Such an organization is necessarily joint and could be organizationally similar to 

other defense agencies, including the National Security Agency or the Defense 

Logistics Agency. It should be headed by a 3-star-level officer who reports 

directly to USD (AT&L) for high-level support and visibility, and who operates 

with a dotted line to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The agency 

works in partnership with the Services’ acquisition, doctrine, training, and 

sustainment elements. Ideally, each Service would also establish their own 

“rapid” acquisition organization within the Service Acquisition Executive’s 

purview that would work in close collaboration with the RAFA. 

Figure ES-1. A dual acquisition path is envisioned. 
xii I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

RECOMMENDATION 4. INITIAL FUNDING AND BILLETS FOR RAFA WILL BE 

BASED ON ABSORBING AND INTEGRATING EXISTING PROGRAMS AND 

ORGANIZATIONS

The task force recommends easing the transition to the new organization by 

drawing initial billets and budgets from the current ad hoc efforts in the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense. 

RECOMMENDATION 5 . DOD SHOULD ESTABLISH A STREAMLINED,

INTEGRATED APPROACH FOR RAPID ACQUISITION

In this framework, needs, acquisition, and funding steps are tightly coordinated. 

Capability needs are generated, certified, and validated quickly, and then 

acquisition carries out an analysis of alternatives in conjunction with initial 

analysis of funding needs. Once a solution is identified, is it approved, assigned to 

an acquisition organization, and funding is applied. Execution is concurrently 

tracked while DOTMLPF considerations are evaluated and an initial operating 

capability is approved. Successful completion of these steps leads directly to 

production and fielding of an initial operating capability and a transition to 

production or operations and maintenance funding. 

Next Steps 

It is imperative that the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

the Service leaders start now to implement all five of these recommendations. 

Existing urgent needs remain waiting to be fulfilled with ever more limited 

resources, and the potential for new and even more devastating capabilities from 

adversaries loom large. The men and women of the Armed Forces in harm’s way 

deserve this support. 
INTRODUCTION I 1

Chapter 1. Introduction 

Today’s adversaries are changing their tactics, techniques, and procedures at 

an accelerated pace, heightening the need for U.S. forces to respond rapidly to 

new threats. Perhaps the most well publicized example of such adversarial 

capabilities is the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq—a threat 

that created urgent demands from forces in the field to develop capabilities to 

counter such attacks. Further, while systems were fielded in response to these 

needs, the experiences of the past half decade point to the fact that the 

Department of Defense (DOD) lacks the ability to rapidly field new 

capabilities to the warfighter in a systematic and effective way. 

Not surprisingly, reports of delays in fielding capabilities, lack of training and 

support, and other shortcomings have drawn attention, particularly on Capitol 

Hill. In June 2007, Senators Joe Biden and Kit Bond, in a letter to Secretary of 

Defense Gates, stated: “We are concerned that the Department is failing to 

respond to urgent warfighter requirements because of unconscionable 

bureaucratic delays in Washington.” This and other criticisms from the Congress 

subsequently led to a congressional request for an independent review of DOD 

responses to urgent needs submitted by combatant commands (COCOMs).1

Charter 

In response to this request, the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on 

the Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs was chartered in December 2008. 

The task force was charged to evaluate the following: 

 the effectiveness of the procedures to generate, validate, and fulfill 

warfighting requirements through the urgent operational need and joint 

urgent operational need processes 

 the extent to which joint urgent operational needs statements are used to 

avoid Service-specific urgent operational needs and acquisition processes 

or to document non-urgent capability 

 the extent to which joint acquisition entities maintain oversight, once a 

military department or defense agency has been designated responsibility 



1. Section 801, 2009 National Defense Authorization Act. 
2 I CHAPTER 1 

for executing and fielding a capability in response to a joint urgent 

operational need statement 

This oversight includes: 1) responsiveness in execution, 2) field performance 

of the capability delivered, and 3) concurrent development of a long-term 

acquisition and sustainment strategy. 

In addition, the task force was asked to make recommendations in the 

following areas: 

 best practices and process improvements to ensure that urgent 

operational needs statements and joint urgent operational needs 

statements are presented to appropriate authorities for review and 

validation not later than 60 days after the documents are submitted 

 common definitions and standards for urgent operational needs 

statements and joint urgent operational needs statements 

 best practices and process improvements for the creation, evaluation, 

prioritization, and fulfillment of urgent operational needs statements and 

joint urgent operational needs statements 

 the extent to which rapid acquisition processes should be consolidated or 

expanded 

The Evolving Response to Urgent Needs 

Over the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it became apparent that 

U.S. forces were not adequately equipped for ongoing stability or 

counterinsurgency operations. When enemy elements exploited capability gaps, 

U.S. forces responded initially by locally changing tactics, techniques, and 

procedures. At first, because these needs were so urgent, some resourceful units 

in the field began to purchase equipment locally, such as commercial radios and 

fabricated armor panels for tactical vehicles, e.g., high mobility multipurpose 

wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). 

More complex operational needs emerged quickly, including the need for 

additional equipment (e.g., uparmored vehicles), for new capabilities (e.g., 

human terrain knowledge), and new tactics to counter IEDs (e.g., 

communications jammers). Beginning in 2005, various organizations and 

processes were organized within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the 

Joint Staff, and the Services to respond to “urgent operational need statements.” 
INTRODUCTION I 3

The combatant commands eventually submitted more than 7,000 need 

statements for urgent solutions through command channels to the Joint Staff and 

the Services. The Services and the acquisition community scrambled to respond 

to these needs, standing up more than 20 ad hoc offices, agencies, task forces, 

funds, and other organizations to respond and fulfill these diverse needs. A 

process for joint urgent operational need statements (JUONS) was created in 

2004 to facilitate effective tracking and fulfillment of joint combatant command 

needs. 

Over the past five years there have been many success stories and lessons 

learned. The Joint Staff, COCOMs, and the Services have all codified in directives 

new processes to identify urgent needs and provide rapid responses. Recent 

progress includes a detailed urgent needs process memorandum circulated by the 

Secretary of the Navy in March 2009. The Army Asymmetric Warfare Group has 

also made significant contributions by identifying and assessing capability gaps, 

and then rapidly developing solutions to fill these gaps. 

However, in the larger picture, the DOD has not made major, institutional 

changes in budgeting and acquisition essential to posture itself for the ongoing 

hybrid warfare reality. DOD is not systematically prepared to anticipate and 

respond to urgent and dynamically changing needs that will be a permanent part 

of 21st century operations. The global landscape has changed the national 

security environment, demanding the ability to rapidly access and field 

capabilities from any source. Agile adversaries are taking advantage of important, 

globally available technologies by rapidly creating and fielding highly effective 

weapons. Moreover, the nation faces a vast range of potential contingencies 

around the world. In many cases, our adversaries’ goal is to act politically rather 

than militarily, and sometimes even a “25 percent solution” achieves this. Finally, 

the rapid cycle of measure/counter-measure/counter-counter-measure will 

continue to add complexity to hybrid warfare operations, including cyber 

warfare. 

As a result, it is neither possible to plan for nor to fund for all possibilities. 

This set of circumstances calls for rapid adaptation on the part of the United 

States as well—adaptation of tactics, techniques, and procedures as well as the 

ability to field new capabilities on a timeframe unfamiliar to the bureaucratic 

processes that dominate acquisition in the Department of Defense today. 
4 I CHAPTER 1 

The Problem at Hand 

The reality is that the Department is not geared to acquire and field 

capabilities in a rapidly shifting threat environment. Current long-standing 

business practices and regulations are poorly suited to these dynamics. Today, 

the DOD is saddled with processes and oversight built up over decades, with 

managers leading them who are often trained to be risk averse. The “normal 

acquisition” system is a long chain of demanding, disciplined tasks that take 

years and only respond by exception to rapid changes: Joint Capabilities 

Integration and Development System (JCIDS) for requirements, the Planning, 

Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) for funding, and the DOD 5000 

series for acquisition. Planning is insufficiently anticipatory. The process is too 

inward-looking. It does not sufficiently leverage the commercial or global market, 

nor does it sufficiently leverage the public sector—coordinating with other 

agencies for solutions to needed capabilities. 

In general, DOD acquisition personnel have limited visibility of emerging 

commercial technologies, fostering an insular nature of DOD acquisition 

processes. Even within the Department, there is no real acquisition community; 

instead, the acquisition process is stove-piped with departments and agencies 

operating within their individual silos, with attention centered on major 

platforms rather than capabilities—despite the advent of capability-based 

planning. Further, the stove-piped nature of the community does not well serve 

the needs of the combatant commanders, organizations that are by definition 

“joint.” 

The essence of the problem at hand is the need to field militarily useful 

solutions faster. As Secretary Gates wrote in Foreign Affairs earlier this year, 

“The Department of Defense’s conventional modernization programs seek a 99 

percent solution over a period of years. Stability and counterinsurgency missions 

require 75 percent solutions over a period of months. The challenge is whether 

these two different paradigms can be made to coexist in the U.S. military’s 

mindset and bureaucracy .... Given the types of situations the United States is 

likely to face ... it is time to think hard about how to institutionalize the 

procurement of [critical] capabilities and get them fielded quickly.”2

Criticisms of the DOD acquisition system are not new. It is an arduous and 

disciplined process that seeks to minimize risks and ensure detailed cost 



2. Robert M. Gates. “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” 

Foreign Affairs, January-February 2009. 
INTRODUCTION I 5

oversight. It has been studied and modified for decades. In recent years, however, 

increasing emphasis has been given to the challenges associated with meeting 

urgent operational needs and, in particular, how ill-suited to that task is the 

current DOD acquisition processes. For the past several years, numerous studies 

have examined this problem, all of which have made similar recommendations 

for change focused on developing the ability for rapid acquisition and fielding of 

needed equipment. These studies include the following: 

 21st Century Strategic Technology Vectors, Defense Science Board 

(2006) 

 Defense Industrial Structure for Transformation, Defense Science Board 

(2007-2008) 

 Venture Capital and IT Acquisition: Managing Uncertainty, MITRE 

(2008)

 Institutionalization of Innovative Army Organizations, Army Science 

Board (2008)

 Buying Commercial: Gaining the Cost/Schedule Benefits for Defense 

Systems, Defense Science Board (2009)

 Perspectives on Potential Changes to Department of Defense Acquisition 

Management Framework, Government Accountability Office (2009) 

 Creating a DOD Strategic Acquisition Platform, Defense Science Board 

(2009) 

 Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise 

(forthcoming) 

As well, Congress has requested numerous examinations of the DOD 

acquisition system over the years. Most recently, in addition to this DSB study, 

the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act calls for assessment of technology 

transition programs and repeal of reporting requirements (Section 253) and 

transfer of sections of title 10 in relation to Milestone A and Milestone B, for 

clarity (Section 813).3 

Thus, the imperative to coherently address rapid fielding in the 21st century 

security environment is widely recognized. The Department lacks a robust, 

enduring process to identify novel or emergent threats and rapidly devise and 

field capability solutions. Today’s traditional programming and acquisition 



3. The task force received briefings on each of these efforts. 
6 I CHAPTER 1 

processes make it difficult to respond quickly or to access the full range of 

globally available technology approaches. In today’s war fighting environment, 

acquisition delays do not lead merely to schedule and cost overruns—important 

though they may be. In hybrid warfare, delays lead to loss of life on the battlefield 

as soldiers wait for a solution to unanticipated threats. DOD’s traditional 

processes were designed for major system acquisitions with significant 

technology development. They rely on many business practices and traditional 

requirements that are outdated and need to be updated to a 21st century model. 

They are focused on micromanaging risk and achieving the “100 percent” 

solution. They are simply not designed for rapid response. 

As a result of the bureaucratic nature of these processes, numerous rapid 

reaction programs and organizations have been established in recent years to 

respond to combatant commander needs—processes that work within and 

around the traditional system to get solutions into the field. While these 

programs have produced significant successes, their ad-hoc, one-of-a-kind nature 

has created a different set of problems. They rely on learning on-the-job with 

little emphasis on support, training, and sustainment. Because they were started 

during the war and outside the normal acquisition programs and PPBE cycle, 

nearly all these program activities have been funded from warfighting 

supplemental budgets. 

While there has been progress, we observe that five years later, DOD’s ad hoc

“rapid” processes still experience unnecessary and bureaucratic delays in needs 

generation, vetting, fulfillment, and fielding. As of today, these programs 

continue to lack serious institutional commitment and very little is being built 

into the Service or other DOD budgets for these programs. It is hard to criticize 

the industrious nature of those in the Department who have made something 

happen when urgent needs have been presented; however, these approaches do 

not offer a long-term solution to circumstances that will not go away once current 

contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan abate. As there is little doubt that the 

urgent needs from combatant commanders will continue, the bottom line is 

that the ability to field critical war fighting needs requires a new 

approach—a standing acquisition and fielding capability that can 

fulfill these requirements in a timely way. 

Roadmap of the Report 

This report begins in Chapter 2 with a discussion of the current way of doing 

business in DOD—how urgent operational needs are met today. It also provides 
INTRODUCTION I 7

an overview of both the requirements and acquisition processes as they relate to 

urgent needs. Chapter 3 details the task force’s principal findings, including some 

of the key reasons why the process is ineffective, the nature of its shortcomings, 

and the type of changes that are needed in devising a new approach. The report 

concludes in Chapter 4 with a summary of recommendations that offer a new 

approach for the future, and identify the key elements critical to its success. 
8 I CHAPTER 2 

Chapter 2. Addressing Urgent Needs Today 

Traditional defense acquisition is comprised of three principal decisionmaking processes. 

1. The JCIDS process assesses gaps in warfighting capabilities and develops 

requirements to resolve those gaps. This process is owned by the Joint 

Staff. 

2. The Defense Acquisition System (DAS) manages the development and 

procurement of weapon systems and other equipment. This process is 

owned by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics (USD (AT&L)). 

3. The PPBE process allocates resources, and is owned by two organizations 

in the Office of the Secretary of Defensethe Office of Program Analysis 

and Evaluation (PA&E) and the Comptroller.4 

Today, when an urgent operational need is identified by a combatant 

command, a number of alternatives are available to fill it. At the first order is 

local identification and fulfillment of the need by the field commanders. The 

resources for this may be the use of a unit commander’s operations and 

maintenance (O&M) funds. These operating funds are available to be used for 

expenses while in garrison and during exercises, deployments, and military 

operations. These funds fall under the necessary expense rule stipulating that 

any expense must be for a particular statutory purpose, or necessary or incidental 

to proper execution of the general purpose of the appropriation; must not be 

prohibited by law; and must not otherwise be provided for by some other 

appropriation.5 Currently, these funds have various ceilings applied by Congress 

for military construction and other uses. The funds can also be accessed in 

limited amounts via government-issued credit cards. In all of these cases, 

signature authority is at a low level and there is limited oversight or coordination 

of such purchases. 

When a need is both urgent and too costly or complex to address using 

available local operating funds, multiple paths are available as next steps. These 



4. The entire process is described in detail, both graphically and in text, at the Defense 

Acquisition University website, available at https://acc.dau.mil/IFC/index.htm. Accessed June 

2009. 

5. Decision of the Comptroller General. B-213137, June 22, 1984, 63 Comp. Gen. 422. Available 

at http://redbook.gao.gov/14/fl0067733.php. Accessed June 2009.
ADDRESSING URGENT NEEDS TODAY I 9

more complex or costly needs go into one of two needs fulfillment paths: to the 

Service or to the Joint Staff processes, depending on the nature and source of the 

need. For needs that are clearly Service-specific and originate within the Service 

combat units, each Service has a process to accept urgent need statements. For 

example, if the need is for an Army field unit for an Army solution, the Army unit 

would submit a need via Army command chains and approval processes. 

For needs that are clearly Joint, a combat unit submits a need through a 

combatant command to the proper signatory level using the JUONS process, 

initiated in November 2004. Because these are the most difficult and costly 

needs, signature approvals and authorities for these are at the highest levels. A 

JUONS is sent to J8, the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Capability 

Development Directorate for validation, and then the J8 forwards this validated 

requirement to the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC). The JRAC then finds a 

resource and acquisition home in the Services or DOD agencies to address the 

requirement. 

Processes and Organizations to Address Urgent 

Needs 

Over 20 different ad hoc organizations within the Joint Staff, the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, and each Service now have urgent need processes. The 

procedures these organizations have developed to generate, validate, and fulfill 

warfighting requirements vary across the DOD.6 The definitions and regulations 

that apply to these processes vary, and the words “immediate,” “urgent,” 

“contingency,” and “rapid” are sometimes used in conflicting and overlapping 

ways. Similarly, the names and acronyms for similar processes also vary. 

The variations in these processes reflect unique aspects of the Services and 

agencies, and there are many features that are common. Needs are generated in 

the combatant commands; then validation is a multi-step processes with highlevel approvals; and those needs are fulfilled, primarily using acquisition 

processes in the Services. Implementation of these processes has evolved over the 

past five years to a current state that yields significant improvements in 

effectiveness; many have websites to collect “good ideas” as well as urgent needs. 



6. Visual representations for several major stakeholder processes are included in Appendix B. 

These represent the organizations and the accelerated timelines that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(JCS), U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Services, JRAC, and the Joint Improvised 

Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) have adopted and institutionalized over the 

past several years. 
10 I CHAPTER 2 

In aggregate, they have reached a plateau from which further improvements can 

be made across the defense acquisition enterprise by leveraging best practices 

and lessons learned. 

Urgent needs may arise from joint combatant commands, Service warfighting 

units, or other defense components. A JUON or Service urgent operational need 

(UON) is a need prioritized by a combatant commander and is defined as a need 

requiring a solution that, if left unfilled, could result in the loss of life and/or 

prevent the successful completion of a near-term military mission. The military 

departments, in their own vernacular, may use a different name for an UON—

such as a combat-mission need statement (CMNS) or an urgent universal need 

statement (UUNS).7 

Joint Urgent Operational Need 

A JUON is an urgent operation need identified by a combatant commander 

involved in an ongoing named operation. A JUON’s main purpose is to identify 

and subsequently gain Joint Staff validation and resourcing of a solution, usually 

desired within days or weeks, to meet a specific high-priority combatant 

commander need. The scope of a combatant commander JUON will be limited to 

addressing urgent operational needs that: (1) fall outside of the established 

Service processes; and (2) most importantly, if not addressed immediately, will 

seriously endanger personnel or pose a major threat to ongoing operations. They 

should not involve the development of a new technology or capability; however, 

the acceleration of an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration or minor 

modification of an existing system to adapt to a new or similar mission is within 

the scope of the JUON validation and resourcing process.8 

The allocation of funding for joint needs is shown in Figure 1. As is evident, 

more than 70 percent of the funding was used to fund two programs, the Mine 

Resistant Ambush Protected (vehicle) Task Force (MRAP TF) and the Joint 

Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). Both of these 

programs were focused on solutions associated with one adversarial weapon 

systemimprovised explosive devices (IEDs). 



7. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, "Meeting Immediate Warfighter Needs 

(IWNs)," memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et. al., November 15, 

2004, p. 3. 

8. U.S. Department of Defense, Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational 

Needs (JUONS) in the Year of Execution, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 

(CJCSI) 3470.01, July 15, 2005, p. GL-1. 
ADDRESSING URGENT NEEDS TODAY I 11

Immediate Warfighter Need 

A subset of JUONs, so designated as immediate warfighter needs (IWNs) by 

the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC). An IWN is a need statement requiring a 

timely (120 days or less) materiel or logistics solution that, if left unfulfilled, 

could result in the loss of life and/or prevent the successful completion of a nearterm military mission.9 This special category was created by the Deputy Secretary 

of Defense in 2004 to bring added emphasis on the timely resolution of an urgent 

operation need and to ensure enhanced visibility to OSD and the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense.10 

Figure 1. Allocation of funding for joint urgent operational needs, from 2005 

through May 2009 totals more than $50 billion. 

ISR Task Force Directed Urgent Requirement 

The Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force uses a 

directed urgent requirement (DUR) process. This can be initiated by any senior 

leader and is intended to capture requirements that have not gone through any 

other urgent need process or are listed on the integrated priority list (IPL).11



9. Wolfowitz, p. 3 

10. CJCSI 3470.01, p. Gl-1. 

11. LTG Richard P. Zahner, "ISR Task Force Process Manual," information memorandum for 

ISR Task Force, February 4, 2009. 
12 I CHAPTER 2 

U.S. Army 

Army field commanders and combatant commanders are directed to identify 

urgent operational needs that jeopardize soldiers’ lives or mission 

accomplishment in an operational need statement (ONS).12

Operational field commanders use an ONS to document the urgent need for a 

materiel solution to correct a deficiency or to improve a capability that impacts 

upon mission accomplishment. The ONS provides an opportunity to the field 

commander, outside of the acquisition and combat development and training 

development communities, to initiate the requirements determination process. 

Although Army regulations discourage field commanders from using an ONS for 

distribution and redistribution of inventory items, the ONS and JUONS 

processes have become the tool of choice to supply additional equipment needed 

to support changing missions.13 Since 2003, this type of use was reported to 

describe more than 90 percent of Army ONS supporting the warfighters in Iraq 

and Afghanistan.14 

The operational definition of ONS is to meet an urgent need for a material 

solution “to correct a deficiency, improve a capability, or request Headquarters, 

Department of the Army (HQDA) to procure a new or emerging capability that 

enhances mission accomplishment.”15 An ONS is a request for HQDA validation, 

authorization, and source of a perceived requirement. Currently, an ONS is not 

intended to request equipment already authorized. 

The current operational definition includes other qualifiers such as: 

“commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) not authorized”; “additional quantities above 

approved [authorization]”; “not on [approved authorization] in any quantity”; 

“HQDA controlled equipment that ... unit does not have authorization or 

validation”; “any ... managed equipment requiring additional authorization”; and 

“equipment listed in validated [approved authorization] but specific item 

requested is either in lieu of the validated item or is a newer version not specified 

in the [approved authorization].”16 



12. U.S. Department of the Army, Material Development, Army Regulation 71-9, April 30, 

1997, p. 7. 

13. For example, artillery units now needing infantry equipment, soldiers assigned to guard 

duty now needing side arms, units creating sniper teams now needing sniper rifles or scopes, 

and so on. 

14. COL Steve Sliwa, US Army. Presentation to the Task Force. February 12, 2009. 

15. U.S. Army, Equipment Common Operating Picture (ECOP) User’s Guide. February 20, 

2007, p. 5. [Available at http://www.ecop.army.smil.mil/ecop/login.aspx] 

16. U.S. Army, ECOP User’s Guide, various pages. 
ADDRESSING URGENT NEEDS TODAY I 13

In addition, a “10-line capability gap” statement can be sent directly to the 

Army’s Rapid Equipping Force (REF) to begin the process, and is followed up 

with an ONS. The “10-liner” resembles the standard operational need statement 

and provides a variety of information related to warfighter needs.17 The 10 lines 

are as follows: 

1. problem 

2. justification 

3. system characteristics 

4. operational concept 

5. organizational concept 

6. procurement objective 

7. support requirements 

8. availability 

9. recommendation 

10. coordination accomplished 

The REF differentiates between “equipping” and “fielding” as follows. 

Equipping is “a timely and evolvable rapid solution meeting or exceeding 

minimum doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and 

facilities (DOTMLPF) issues focused on the needs of a specific unit or theater” 

and has a goal to provide a 51 percent solution. Fielding, conversely, is described 

as “a complete and detailed DOTMLPF approach focused on a general solution 

for the entire Army.”18

Solutions delivered through the ONS and JUONS process typically take three 

to six months for COTS and existing systems, and 12 to 18 months for new 

technologies. The deliberate acquisition process is expected to deliver a capability 

in 3 to 5 years. Capabilities delivered in response to ONS documents that 

required significant research and development efforts included armor solutions, 

such as body armor and HMMWV fragmentation kits; modular protection 

systems for buildings; electronic warfare systems; counter-rocket, artillery, and 

mortar systems; night vision and optics devices; biometrics systems; increased 



17. U.S Army Audit Agency, Rapid Equipping Force Initiative, Audit Report A-2007-0121-ALA, 

May 18, 2007, p. 6. 

18. Rapid Equipping Force. Strength of a Nation: Rapid Equipping of our Soldiers at War. 

December 10, 2008. 
14 I CHAPTER 2 

lethality capabilities; unmanned systems and sensors; and power generation 

capabilities. 

U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps 

In this context, an urgent operational need statement is an exceptional 

request from a Navy component commander “for an additional warfighting 

capability critically needed by operating forces conducting combat or contingency 

operations. Failure to deliver the capability requested is likely to result in the 

inability of units to accomplish their missions or increases the probability of 

casualties and loss of life.”19 

The solution strategy for a Navy UONS may be a mix of interim and longerterm solutions that include materiel and non-materiel elements. The 

recommended executive strategy may contain a mix of COTS, government offthe-shelf (GOTS), and nondevelopmental items (NDIs); products of a rapid 

deployment capability, targeted at slight modifications to materiel with a 

technology readiness level (TRL) 8 to 9; rapid development and deployment of 

prototypes, targeted at a TRL of 6 to 7; other research programs; and deliberate, 

or traditional, capability development processes.20

An urgent universal need statement (U-UNS or UUNS) “is an exceptional 

request from a Marine Corps component commander for an additional 

warfighting capability critically needed by operating forces conducting combat or 

contingency operations. Failure to deliver the capability requested is likely to 

result in the inability of units to accomplish their missions or increases the 

probability of casualties and loss of life.”21 An UUNS may be originated only by 

units that are deployed to or awaiting imminent deployment to combat or 

contingency operations. 

U.S. Air Force 

The Air Force rapid response process (RRP) is intended “to satisfy [the] 

warfighters’ urgent and compelling requirements ... [and to provide] the 

warfighter with a means of obtaining a limited number of needed systems/ 



19. U.S. Navy, Department of the Navy Urgent Needs Process, SecNavNote 5000, March 12, 

2009, p. 2. 

20. U.S. Navy, p. 4-5. 

21. U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Development System, Marine 

Corps Order 3900.15B, Enclosure 7: “Urgent Universal Need Statement Processing,” March 10, 

2008, p. 1. 
ADDRESSING URGENT NEEDS TODAY I 15

capabilities in a combat theater during an ongoing conflict or crisis to address a 

critical capability gap/shortfall that could result in “loss of life” and/or prevent 

mission accomplishment.”22 An Air Force combat capability document (CCD) is 

intended to “support fielding an interim solution to a warfighter’s urgent 

capability needs.”23

Urgent operational needs may be answered by the lead Air Force major 

command using any one of several different processes, of which the CCD and the 

RRP is only one. A CCD is used when the command requires assistance from the 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force “for the reprogramming or identification of funds 

and/or program management directive actions.”24

Special Operations Command 

The default method used by the U.S. Special Operations Command 

(USSOCOM) capability is used “when materiel or non-materiel requirements are 

peculiar to the special operations forces (SOF) ... is compatible with [Joint 

Capabilities Integration Development System].”25

USSOCOM is unique among Combatant Commands in that it can not only 

generate needs but also can perform acquisitions to provide solutions to its 

needs. The Special Operations Forces Capabilities and Development SystemUrgent (SOFCIDS-U) may be used “when a SOF unit, either deployed or during 

pre-deployment, identifies an urgent and compelling capability gap or 

requirement derived from combat survivability deficiency or risk to operational 

success.” Sponsors initiate the process by submitting a CMNS. Abbreviated 

procedures are then used to staff, validate, approve, and resolve the requirement. 

Each CMNS undergoes analysis and scrutiny to ensure it meets the required 

criteria for unacceptable force protection risk and/or mission failure.26

In addition, a 9-line capability validation message is available for use by 

USSOCOM component commanders under the limited delegated authorities 

granted by the Commander of USSOCOM. This is an alternative mechanism for 

components to satisfy material solutions that do not require significant 



22. U.S. Air Force, Rapid Response Process, U.S. Air Force Instruction 63-114, June 12, 2008, 

p. 1. 

23. U.S. Air Force, p. 17. 

24. U.S. Air Force, p. 3. 

25. U.S. Special Operations Command, Special Operations Forces (SOF) Capabilities and 

Development System (SOFCIDS), USSOCOM Directive 71-4 (draft), June 2009, § 1-4b. 

26. USSOCOM Directive 74-1, § 1-4b, p.5. 
16 I CHAPTER 2 

development and represents a streamlined process that can be used for COTS, 

GOTS, and NDI solutions. The 9-line message may be chosen as the capability 

document to formalize sustainment of a materiel solution delivered by an 

approved CMNS, to include “expanding the basis of issue, provided it is an 

NDI/COTS/GOTS solution and will be funded by the component.”27

Current Understanding of “Urgent Need” 

As part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2005, the Congress 

passed the rapid acquisition authority to respond to combat emergencies. This 

provides for any equipment that, as determined in writing by the Secretary of 

Defense without delegation, is urgently needed to eliminate a combat capability 

deficiency that has resulted in combat fatalities. In this case, the Secretary may 

use the procedures developed in this legislation in order to accomplish the rapid 

acquisition and deployment of the needed equipment.28 The requirements to 

address needs that have “resulted in combat fatalities” and only for “equipment 

[that] is urgently needed” is reflected in many of the definitions described here, 

and thereby limits the ability to use current rapid acquisition authorities. 

 Some component definitions use similar limitations. Specifically, the 

USSOCOM definition specifies that needs identified during preparation for

combat may be addressed in addition to those incurred during active combat, 

and all allow for a non-materiel approach if analysis shows it as the most effective 

solution. The task force found that a standard, clear and more inclusive 

definition of “urgent need” is needed across the Department of 

Defense.

The intent and processing of urgent need statements has varied, both over 

time and among organizations. The task force believes that the intent of an 

urgent need statement was envisioned as a method to document gaps in required 

capabilities that may be met by new tactics, techniques, or procedures that may 

or may not be accompanied by new equipment. During the past five years, urgent 

need processes have been used to fill both materiel and operational capability 

gaps. In some cases, operational need statements were used for rapid 

redistribution of inventory; it was estimated that approximately 6,400 of 

6,700 Army ONS were for this purpose. 



27. SOCOM Directive 74-1, § 3-4a(3)(e) 

28. Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Public Law 

108–375, 108th Congress, October 28, 2004, Section 811, “Rapid Acquisition Authority to 

Respond To Combat Emergencies.” 
ADDRESSING URGENT NEEDS TODAY I 17

A key characteristic of many urgent need statements is that they describe 

both a needa capability gapand a proposed solution. The guidance for the 

REF 10-liner demonstrates the reasons for this well, in that it not only asks for 

system characteristics, but the requester must also supply support requirements 

and the availability of the proposed solution. While the task force was unable to 

search the text of all of the fulfilled need statements, some were clearly used to 

request specific acquisition outcomes (such as “1,169 MRAP-type vehicles” for 

use in Iraq29) and others were reported to request brand-name systems or 

equipment from specified contractors. 

The task force recognizes that satisfying an urgent need statement for a 

specific item or a narrowly specified solution may be a logistics function rather 

than acquisition. Consequently, a very necessary step is to perform triage on 

incoming urgent need statements to differentiate between the two. Fulfilling 

urgent logistics requests is very important, and any urgent responseespecially 

one that involves commercial equipmentshould include DOTMLPF 

considerations in order to trade off short-term benefits and long-term costs. In 

some cases, triage may reveal that acquisition of a different solution than 

originally proposed better fits the need, or it may identify the need to acquire a 

more developmental solution. 

Evaluating a true capability gap in an effective and systematic way will also 

involve operations research and system analysis (ORSA) and analysis of 

alternatives in addition to DOTMLPF. This ORSA step, during the triage process 

as well as during solution development, is missing in many current rapid 

acquisition processes. Addressing urgent need statements that describe a 

mission need or capability gap rather than a specific solution is 

critical to mission success.

Rapid Response Organizations and Processes 

The task force identified more than 20 organizations, processes, and funds 

with the purpose to address warfighter needs rapidly. Arrayed in Figure 2, they 

are listed alphabetically here: 



29. DOD Inspector General, “Marine Corps Implementation of the Urgent Universal Needs 

Process for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles,” Report No. D-2009-030. 
18 I CHAPTER 2 

 Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) 

 Base Expeditionary Targeting & Surveillance Sensors-Combined Task 

Force (BETSS-C TF) 

 Biometrics Task Force (BTF) 

 Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF) 

 Capabilities Development Directorate (CDD) 

 Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) 

 Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) 

 Human Terrain System (HTS) 

 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Task Force (ISR TF) 

 Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) 

 Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) 

 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (vehicle) Task Force (MRAP TF) 

 Quick Reaction Fund (QRF) 

 Rapid Acquisition Teams (RAT) 

 Rapid Development and Deployment (RDD) 

 Rapid Equipping Force (REF) 

 Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) 

 Rapid Reaction Fund (RRF) 

 Rapid Response Process (RRP) 

 Rapid Reaction Technology Office (RRTO) 

 Task Force Observe, Detect, Identify, Neutralize (TF ODIN) 

While not intended, the multiple organizations and processes available may 

allow simultaneous pursuit of different paths to access the funding allocated by 

Congress to respond to the uncertainty of wartime needs. These resources reside 

in a variety of special accounts that provide additional acquisition flexibility, 

including the Iraqi Freedom Fund, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 

Fund, and the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Transfer Account. These 
ADDRESSING URGENT NEEDS TODAY I 19

“transfer funds” have higher levels of authority that allow DOD to move funds 

into different accounts after enactment.30,31 

Figure 2. More than 20 different organizations, processes, and funds in DOD 

are aimed at urgent or rapid acquisition. 

Extensive (and in some cases, mandated) oversight of major programs exists, 

for these and others, but there is no consistent system in place that documents 

total time and cost to satisfy each need statement. In general, the task force 

observed uneven tracking of field performance of the capability implemented or 

materiel delivered, and only ad hoc assessment of how original need was 

addressed. Further, there was little coordination among the Services to determine 

if needs were shared and solutions could be more widely applied. Most 

importantly, methods to assess sustainment needs or future-year costs have 

lagged implementation, with alarming consequences for future DOD budgets. 



30. Amy Belasco, Congressional Research Service. The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other 

Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11. RL33110. May 15, 2009. 

31. General Accountability Office. Defense Budget: Need for Continued Visibility Over Use of 

Contingency Funds. GAO-01-829. July 2001. 
20 I CHAPTER 2 

There is an increasing need for formal or informal transition paths from rapid 

solutions to enduring acquisition. One effort in this area is the Army’s capabilities 

development for rapid transition (CDRT) effort.32 CDRT identifies new 

technologies and capabilities in use in theater, evaluates their applicability to the 

Army at large, and makes recommendations for transitioning these technologies 

for Army-wide application and sustainment. 

Tracking How Urgent Needs Have Been Addressed 

In any wartime situation, it is clear that the first priority is to develop and 

deliver solutions to the warfighter in order to reduce casualties and improve 

mission success. In many cases, urgent needs demanded that new capabilities or 

technologies be envisioned, developed, manufactured, and shipped to units in the 

field without any testing or trainingand in many cases this was justified as a 

quick reaction. Such an approach is, however, only effective if testing and 

training are done in parallel in an expedited fashion. When urgent needs were 

submitted by operational forces during the early years of the wars in Afghanistan 

and Iraq, long-term tracking systems that included support after fielding were 

not in place. As a result, when the task force searched for historical data, 

normative data were reported as unavailable for any data set through 2009, and 

only a few sparse data sets were available for the period 2002 through 2007. 

The task force attempted to determine and analyze the time each 

organization used to generate, validate, and resource urgent need statements, 

and to implement both initial and final capabilities. Unfortunately, the 

organizations were unable to provide the task force with data, either in native 

format or in response to queries, indicating their own lack of visibility into the 

management process. 

Issues in reporting data according to the separate phases of generation, 

validation, resourcing, implementation, and so on, was attributable to several 

factors. First, an urgent need may be initiated at several levels; by an initial entry 

into the online system by a unit in the field, by the staff of the combatant 

command, or at any headquarters in between. Times will appropriately vary in 

each case and do not support direct comparisons. Fulfillments also followed a 

number of different paths. Wherever possible, the data represent the time 



32. Spiral Technology and Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition to the Army. 

Available at http://www.army.mil/aps/08/information_papers/transform/ 

Spiral_Technology_and_Capabilities.html. Accessed June 2009. 
ADDRESSING URGENT NEEDS TODAY I 21

between the initial entry, at whatever level, and a final signature or decision by an 

oversight organization, such as the Marine Requirements Oversight Council. 

Further, the times to validate and resource are performed in parallel 

wherever possible. USSOCOM, for example, stated that CMNS will not be 

approved without funds committed. In many cases, resources are provided by 

below-threshold O&M funding, which is at the discretion of the Service or 

command, and the need is satisfied without further tracking. The Marine Corps 

also reported that in a few, very early cases, supplemental funds were requested 

to resource a solution. 

Overall, the tracking data available for the urgent need statements were not 

useful as a department-level management tool. The Marine Corps provided data 

for only 16 UUNS initiated after implementation of their “Virtual Urgent 

Universal Need Statement” system in October 2008, but indicated that more 

than 480 UUNS have been submitted since 2001. JIEDDO provided data only 

since 2008. The Navy provided some data for 20 UONS, and the Air Force 

reported only three UONS. 

The Army system for handling ONS (the ECOP) was designed for the user in 

the field, and early versions of the system did not gather information for tracking. 

Owing to this lack of data, the Army provided only a single timeline that reflected 

an average over all 6,700 ONS. They also revealed that their ECOP system 

tracked both urgently needed solutions for capability gaps as well as urgently 

needed inventory redistribution, thereby skewing average responses to shorter 

times. More than 94 percent of Army ONS were for redistribution, e.g., artillery 

units now needing infantry equipment, soldiers assigned to guard duty now 

needing side arms, or units creating sniper teams now needing sniper rifles and 

scopes. The average reported data is shown graphically in Figure 3, and 

maximums and minimums show the range and variation of the data in Table 1. 

Additional information on times to implement each solution in the Services are 

provided in Appendix A. 
22 I CHAPTER 2 

* Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of need statements evaluated. 

** More than 94 percent of Army ONS (~6,400) were for redistribution of inventory, which 

skews data to shorter times (e.g., Artillery units now needing infantry equipment, soldiers 

assigned to guard duty now needing side arms, units creating sniper teams now needing sniper 

rifles, scopes). 

Figure 3. Estimated average time in days to generate, validate, and implement 

initial operating capabilities in response to urgent need statements. 

The most complete data was provided for the 288 candidate JUONS 

submitted by COCOMs from 2005 through May 2009. Of these, 61 were sent to 

rapid Service processes or JIEDDO. Another 9 were merged with existing JUONS 

or other need statements. Five were rejected, for reasons including infeasible 

technology, safety concerns, and in three cases, these were a request for forces. 

Eight are currently deferred, awaiting questions related to approach, technology 

or policy. Of those remaining, 33 are validated, and implementation is underway 

or pending resources. An addition 49 have had initial operating capability (IOC) 

delivered, and assessments and additional delivery is in process. The final 110 are 

satisfied JUONs, with operational capability delivered and accepted by the 

combatant command. 
ADDRESSING URGENT NEEDS TODAY I 23

Table 1. Times for generation, validation, and initial implementation of urgent 

need solutions.

Phase of Process Median Time 

(Days) 

Minimum Time 

(Days) 

Maximum Time 

(Days) 

Generation 

Joint Need 58 2 277 

US Marine Corps 103 52 199 

USSOCOM 70 1 575 

US Navy 107 12 435 

US Air Force 118 45 240 

Validation 

Joint Need 38 1 255 

US Marine Corps 90 44 168 

USSOCOM 49 1 575 

US Navy 78 21 176 

US Air Force 32 8 75 

Initial Operating Capability 

Joint Need 341 72 969 

US Marine Corps 142 27 252 

USSOCOM 177 5 552 

US Navy 206 112 385 

US Air Force 120 59 180 

The lack of management tracking data points again to the lack of 

institutionalization of the urgent needs and rapid response processes. These 

many hundreds of urgent needs requests were evidently treated as exceptions for 

hand management or extraordinary tracking and reporting. Commanders and 

leaders clearly must have been demanding insight to these same kinds of urgent 

needs data elements requested by this task force. How long is it taking to process 

an urgent need? Was it fulfilled? While some reporting must have occurred, 

clearly these data do not reflect an efficient, controlled management process for a 

long-term DOD capability. 
24 I CHAPTER 3 

Chapter 3. Shortfalls in the Current Process 

In examining the past and future fulfillment of urgent operational needs, the 

task force found first and foremost that the Services and the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense must be commended for stepping up to meet overwhelming 

challenges and urgent needs generated during a time of unanticipated and 

evolving warfighting situations. However, the following six findings document 

the shortfalls that were identified that could improve the process significantly. 

Overall Findings 

1. Multiple Acquisition Goals 

All of DOD’s needs cannot be met by the same acquisition 

processes. Desired systems, capabilities, and materiel may have major 

variations in urgency, technology maturity, and life cycle considerations. 

Collectively, these will dictate the appropriate procedures needed for 

effective acquisition and timely delivery. To facilitate these goals, DOD 

needs to codify and institutionalize “rapid” acquisition processes and 

practices that can be tailored to expedite delivery of capabilities that meet 

urgent warfighter needs.

Urgent needs expressed by the combatant commands require an extremely 

fast response. An extensive JCIDS process is not necessary, and an initial solution 

may be adequateeven if the solution is less than 75 percent satisfactory, the 

speed of response may be more important than delivering a 99 percent solution. 

By contrast, new major weapons systems, while capabilities-based on paper, 

carry the obligation that the requirements be approved by the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the JCIDS processes must be fully 

satisfied. 

As opposed to traditional acquisition, in which better equipment is often 

perceived as the only solution, an urgent need may be met with new tactics, new 

capabilities, new materielbased on proven technologiesor a combination of 

these. Also in contrast to traditional acquisition, test and evaluation should not 

be a pass or fail test, but rather should be used to determine capabilities and 

limitationsan approach the Army has successfully used to decide whether 

potential solutions to urgent requirements are good enough to be deployed. 
SHORTFALLS IN THE CURRENT PROCESS I 25

Risk in traditional acquisition is perceived to be a show stopper if not 

minimized. Conversely, solutions that respond to urgent needs may carry risk, 

but the risk must be transparent, acknowledged, understood, and weighed 

against the attendant risk of proceeding along a more deliberate route. 

Traditional acquisition must meet a number of mandatory milestones and 

reviews, and must fit into the PPBE schedule. Such acquisitions are consistently 

aimed at a 99 percent solution. While the same DOTMLPF considerations are 

important for rapid acquisitions, they can be approached incrementally. For 

example, while support must be part of the plan, it can be initially performed by a 

contractor. 

2. “Rapid” is Counter to the Traditional Acquisition Culture 

“Rapid” is countercultural and will be undersupported in 

traditional organizations. Rapid acquisition often challenges 

traditional systems, practices, and cultures. The current defense 

acquisition workforce is rewarded for following complex procedures with 

accuracy and precision and is punished for bypassing them. Rapid 

responses necessitate creativity and workarounds that go against these 

norms. Sustaining an effective rapid acquisition capability within DOD 

will require the active support of the testing, resourcing and requirements 

communities. The entire team must acknowledge that there is a place for 

rapid processes to meet urgent needs that functions concurrently with the 

deliberate and more comprehensive acquisition process for systems 

relying on new technology development. 

“Rapid” is often perceived as a threat to a risk-averse DOD acquisition 

culture. The traditional system holds requirements sacred, whereas rapid 

requires the developer to question detailed requirements to meet the schedule for 

an initial fielding. Further, rapid innovation may be perceived to threaten 

personal credibility or the standing of a programs of record, resulting in a lack of 

support and resources for the innovation. Such perceptions may be an underlying 

reason that flexible and agile acquisition tools are rarely used, poorly understood, 

and generally considered to be risky. This all suggests some kind of dual 

acquisition process is needed. 

Enabling a parallel acquisition option as a component of the mainstream 

process has not worked in other countercultural cases. History has established 

that a separate organization is required. A relevant example of this is the 
26 I CHAPTER 3 

establishment of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). 

DARPA was established to address disruptive technologies in a separate yet 

parallel manner to the Service acquisitions focused on more traditional, 

incremental developments. Similarly, IBM separated its personal computer 

division from its mainframe division. Other examples include unmanned aerial 

vehicles and cruise missiles, and more recently, MRAPs, JIEDDO, and the ISR 

task force. 

As supplemental funds diminish, resistance by the traditional system will 

increase and priority of urgent needs from the combatant commands will 

decrease. This leads to the hope that, over time, the DOD acquisition community 

will understand the benefits of the rapid approach—and the countercultural 

stigma will dissolve. Only then can more flexible and agile processes be 

incorporated into mainstream practices. 

3. Use of Proven Technology is Essential to Rapid Response 

Any rapid response must be based on proven technology and 

robust manufacturing processes. Attempting to squeeze new 

technology development into an urgent timeframe creates risks for delays 

and not adequately addressing an existing capability gap. While there 

may be instances in which early fielding of prototypes with contractor 

logistics support is appropriate, the risks must be well understood and 

parallel efforts should be in place to mature the technology and to ensure 

that training and logistics are adequate for the system life cycle. An 

assessment of capabilities and limitations should be an integral part of 

the warfighter’s acceptance of the system for operational use.

Initial deployment must be quick—a spiral development “Block I” solution 

delivered in weeks to months—to demonstrate the value of the solution to an 

urgent need established by a combatant command. To achieve such a timeframe, 

technology must be sufficiently mature, and likely will be filled by COTS/GOTS or 

a foreign government source. 

Needs that cannot be met with mature technologywith a technology 

readiness level (TRL) greater than 6should be handed to the defense science 

and technology (S&T) community as a high priority. The solution can further 

evolve (via spiral development) to a program of record if implementation is 

successful and the need remains persistent. 
SHORTFALLS IN THE CURRENT PROCESS I 27

4. Ad Hoc Organizations 

Current approaches to implement rapid responses to urgent 

needs are not sustainable. The DOD has done little to really adopt 

urgent needs and rapid acquisition as a critical, ongoing DOD 

institutional capability essential to addressing future threats. While many 

ad hoc processes are being formalized, these processes do not encompass 

the breadth or depth needed to ensure rapid response to future 

challenges. Further they are not being incorporated into Service budgets. 

These missions and programs that grew from the war do not have the 

impetus or adequate advocacy beyond the war; they will not stand up to 

long-term budget battles with Service programs of record.

The task force found more than 20 ad hoc, independent, and quasiinstitutionalized organizations currently addressing urgent warfighter needs. All 

of these are attempting to achieveand some are achievingrapid capability. All 

also utilize workarounds, with senior-level support, to sidestep traditional 

acquisition and fielding processes, but these are generally disjointed. They 

sometimes fall short in needed outreach to Services and combatant commands, 

as well as to the commercial and global industry that could supply needed 

solutions. There was little evidence of useful institutional memory or tracking of 

lessons learned. Some were stood up to address specific limited needs sets and 

yet none had organizational sunset provisions. There was, however, evidence that 

some organizations are becoming bureaucratized with ballooning staffs and rules 

over time and these ad hoc flexible processes are growing more like the larger 

system they first sought to work around. Their light speed and urgent 

workaround techniques depend on the extraordinary push of wartime needs; as 

these ease up so will their ability to be rapid. 

It is clear that urgent needs will endure beyond today’s conflicts, and this 

points to the need to stand up a sustainable organizational capability for rapid 

acquisition and fielding. This capability needs to build on the advantages of 

current ad hoc processes that have found relief from the rigors of the formal, 

deliberate acquisition bureaucracy. 

5. Lack of Integrated Triage 

An integrated triage process is needed. A combatant command 

may identify a joint urgent need for several different reasons. To be most 

effective, the solution to this need should not be presumed without a 
28 I CHAPTER 3 

higher level view of all needs and a wider view of potential solutions. 

Responding to all must involve proven technology and be scheduledriven, but because all are different and resources are limited, triage is an 

important step. 

All urgent needs are not alike, and the task force observed a wide continuum 

ranging from ill-defined capability gaps to requests for additional supplies of 

standard equipment. One of the most surprising facts the task force discovered 

was that more than 90 percent of submitted Army ONS were urgent requests for 

more or additional equipment needed from existing inventory. While important, 

the task force found that processing these requests in the same way as a need for 

a new and unique capability to be counterproductive. 

Today, urgent needs submitted by a combatant command for a new capability 

are addressed by joint or Service-specific urgent need statement 

processesJUONS, ONS, UONS, UUNS, and CMNS. The task force observed a 

related category: that of a perceived urgent opportunityan innovative idea that 

can be a “game changer” and should be tried as soon as practical. This typically 

embodies an emergent capability. 

An additional urgent need may be for a technology demonstration to 

demonstrate the value of a different (but proven) technology or approach. An 

example of these are how Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs) 

were used to demonstrate the utility of Predator and Global Hawk in 1995. 

6. Institutional Barriers

Institutional barrierspeople, funding, and processesare 

powerful inhibitors to successful rapid acquisition and fielding 

of new capabilities. For success, these barriers must be addressed with 

explicit solutions.

The most formidable barrier to rapid and effective solutions to urgent needs 

is available, dedicated, flexible funds. This was the primary issue raised by every 

witness before the task force. Further, current acquisition and fielding processes 

are too complex to respond to urgent needs. Bureaucratic inertia prevents rapid 

response, and also does not access the full range of commercial options available 

to resourceful 21st century adversaries 
SHORTFALLS IN THE CURRENT PROCESS I 29

Another priority issue is people, including program managers, systems 

analysts and engineers, operations researchers, and relevant and experienced 

procurement people. This includes people both in the field and in the Pentagon, 

and requires everyone to work in integrated teams to support the warfighter’s 

needs. Success is not envisioned without the best and brightest innovative 

thinkers who are solution-oriented, creative, and uninhibited by bureaucracy. 

Attributes of a Solution 

In addition to identifying the shortfalls, the task force also identified the 

attributes needed for successful rapid acquisition and fielding. These begin with 

an institutionalized capability to rapidly and efficiently deliver joint capabilities 

and extend to senior leadership priority and unwavering support. 

The need for global marketplace awareness was also noted as critical, 

including welcoming solutions and ideas from anywhere, including commercial 

and foreign sources. Development of the MRAP vehicle was cited as an example. 

While this remains a very impressive response to a need, it is important to 

recognize the reliance on foreign technologiesthe V-shaped chassis from South 

Africa, a European suspension system, Asian electronics, reactive armor from 

Israel, and so onas key to successfully meeting a capability gap in a timely 

manner. 

Increased use of all available contracting authoritiesand the possible 

addition of somewere cited to enable speed and access to non-traditional 

suppliers. A funding model is needed that remains flexible while respecting DOD 

obligation and expenditure targets. 

A radically different culture is also needed, one that is nurtured to be 

anticipatory, agile, schedule-driven, and capability-oriented. The people enacting 

such a process should be the best and brightest, and the workforce should be very 

lean and without a bureaucratic mindset. Personnel should operate in integrated 

teams involving the warfighter, acquisition, finance, technology, logistics, and 

training communities to enable speed and anticipatory thinking. The teams need 

to focus on delivering true solutions, with no “drive-by fieldings” that result in 

boxes of unused equipment stored away in warehouses owing to a lack of logistics 

support and operational training, leaving capability gaps unfilled. Leveraging 

commercial sector personnel can be a way to change the culture; rapid access to 

on call specialized capabilities may be available through pre-arranged contracting 

routes. 
30 I CHAPTER 3 

In searching for ways to make this happen, the task force evaluated current 

practices in the rapid acquisition community. The members found that while 

some good practices exist today, few are best practices deserving replication 

across the DOD. Some places where good practices worthy of further evaluation 

are listed in Table 2. 

Table 2. Some good practices exist today, but few are “best practices.”

Best Practices Needed Where it’s Good Today 

For involving the warfighter from beginning to end of 

process JCTD, AWG, USSOCOM 

For obtaining agile/flexible funding JIEDDO, MRAP 

To coordinate status and resolution for each need 

statement SOCOM 

For coordinating technology development DDR&E, USAF Big Safari 

To evaluate effectiveness of the implemented solution USSOCOM, AWG 

For test and evaluation Army 

To determine whether to end or to transition each 

implementation -- 

For a knowledgeable workforce for all rapid acquisitions USAF Big Safari 

For business approaches that use existing flexibilities DDR&E, DARPA, USAF Big 

Safari, MRAP 

For institutionalizing the rapid response process Navy/USMC 

For collaborative innovation Private sector 
RECOMMENDATIONS I 31

Chapter 4. A New Way Ahead: 

Recommendations 

The task force puts forth the following five recommendations for 

consideration by the DOD. 

RECOMMENDATION 1. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SHOULD FORMALIZE A 

DUAL ACQUISITION PATH

“Deliberate” and “rapid” acquisition are incompatible processes as currently 

configured in DOD, and have different acquisition goals, as described in Finding 1 

in Chapter 3 of this report. The task force concluded that these would be better 

handled in separate organizational elements and with separate budgeting 

guidance. Solutions may start as either rapid or deliberate acquisitions, 

depending on the urgency as well as the technology availability and maturity. In 

the proposed process, rapid acquisition would basically be consistent with the 

DOD 5000 series, but carried out in an integrated and compressed manner. 

Figure 4 depicts the envisioned architecture of this separation. 

In the traditional, or deliberate, acquisition process, the goal is a 99 percent 

solution, which translates to delivery in 3 to 11 years or more. A rapid acquisition 

process, conversely, is satisfied with at a 75 percent solution or sometimes less, 

with the major focus on delivery within 24 months. 

Deliberate acquisition is optimized for delivery of complex systems, and is 

scalable to very large military solutions. As such, it uses detailed, extensive, and 

large-scale oversight and synchronization to ensure success. It includes resources 

for sustainment, and is well adapted to individual Service cultures. Owing to the 

long-time frame, this process often begins by pushing the state of the art of the 

underlying technologies. 

Rapid acquisition operates quite differently. To be responsive to combatant 

command timelines, execution is decentralized. Participation by small and 

nontraditional businesses is sought. Risk is mitigated through the use of proven 

technology that is rapidly transitioned via competitive prototyping. More 

advanced or extensive capabilities are provided in subsequent builds through 

spiral development. Resources for sustainment and training are integrated and 

delivered in parallel with initial operating capability. 
32 I CHAPTER 4 

Figure 4. A dual acquisition path is proposed.

An effective triage step that determines the path an acquisition will take 

requires that a standard, DOD-wide definition be established for the rapid 

acquisition path. This definition should state that an urgent need is one that if left 

unfulfilled, will seriously endanger personnel and/or pose a major threat to 

ongoing or imminent operations. 

Further, the triage process should determine quickly whether the need can be 

addressed through a logistics process. This describes a need that can be filled 

with additional inventory items, for example, or with commercial materiel with 

adequate commercial support, sustainment, and training. When this is 

determined to be the case, the urgent need should be referred to the appropriate 

service acquisition organization. 

RECOMMENDATION 2. EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES MUST 

ESTABLISH A FUND FOR RAPID ACQUISITION AND FIELDING

To fund incremental contingency costs (for conflicts such as in the Balkans), 

Congress established the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund to 

address stability and reconstruction costs incurred as a result of military 
RECOMMENDATIONS I 33

operations. A similar approach is proposed to respond to urgent needs from any 

combatant command as a result of on-going action or an imminent threat. 

An appropriate amount for such a fund is difficult to determine, considering 

the lack of knowledge of future urgent needs. In light of this uncertainty, the task 

force suggests 0.5 percent of the DOD budget is appropriate in the current 

environment. This investment mechanism is similar to the appropriation for 

small business innovative research (SBIR); it would be replenished annually with 

a proposed cap of approximately $3 billion plus inflation. As a point of reference, 

the response to the IED threat approached $10 billion per year. To be fully 

responsive to the types of urgent needs in the recent past and anticipated in the 

future, the funding should not expire, nor should the funds be limited to certain 

spending classifications, e.g., for materiel, for modeling, or for tactics. 

This fund would not be contingent on an on-going war. It is intended to 

operate with different acquisition goals as compared to “deliberate” acquisition, 

based on Finding 2 in Chapter 3 of this report, that “rapid” is counter to the 

traditional acquisition culture. 

To be effective in such a rapidly changing environment, the fund should 

operate with high transparency, including quarterly summary reports to 

Congress, with additional notification as needed. An oversight group would hold 

periodic meetings to aid in prioritization. The co-chairs of such are group are 

proposed to be the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS). 

Representatives from the combatant commands and the Services would serve as 

members, and Congressional appropriators may be included as permanent 

observers. 

RECOMMENDATION 3. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SHOULD ESTABLISH A 

NEW AGENCY: THE RAPID ACQUISITION AND FIELDING AGENCY (RAFA)

The task force evaluated a number of alternatives to address the issue of ad 

hoc organization raised in Finding 4 of this report. The result is a proposed 

organizational home for the rapid acquisition alternative in a new agency within 

the office of the USD (AT&L). The new agency, with a proposed name of the 

Rapid Acquisition and Fielding Agency (RAFA), will be focused on speed, 

utilizing existing technologies and acquisition flexibilities to get a 75 percent 

solutioninitially adequate to address the urgent needs of the warfighter. 
34 I CHAPTER 4 

Such an organization is necessarily joint and could be organizationally similar 

to other defense agencies, including the National Security Agency or the Defense 

Logistics Agency. It should be headed by a 3-star-level officer who reports 

directly to USD (AT&L) for high-level support and visibility, and who operates 

with a dotted line to the VCJCS. The agency works in partnership with the 

Services’ acquisition, doctrine, training, and sustainment elements. Ideally, each 

Service would also establish their own rapid acquisition organization within the 

Service Acquisition Executive’s purview that would work in close collaboration 

with the RAFA. 

It is important to note that RAFA would not overlap with DARPA’s function 

to carry out disruptive technology developments and demonstrations within a 3- 

to 5-year time frame. As well, it does not overlap with the major role of the 

Director for Defense Research and Evaluation (DDR&E), which focuses on next 

generation systems, and subsystems, and technologies. See Figure 5 for a 

comparison of these missions. 

Figure 5. A notional comparison of organizational responsibilities according to 

outcome timelines.

One successful approach to a similar challenge is that taken by the USAF “Big 

Safari” program, which operates 40 programs, including 25 large ones with 

individual program officers. Big Safari has approximately 280 people, many 

hand-picked by the director. The program maintains agreements with longstanding suppliers, and has justification and approval authority for less than full 

and open competition, which is carried out through limited competition among 
RECOMMENDATIONS I 35

demonstrated suppliers. The Big Safari budget averages just over $1 billion per 

year. 

RAFA is designed to operate with a new mission and culture. RAFA’s 

mission is to rapidly address combatant command needs with proven 

and emerging technologies in 2 to 24 months. The need to use proven 

technology to achieve rapid response is Finding 3 in Chapter 3 of this report. To 

accomplish this mission, RAFA personnel will do the following: 

 Utilize Service acquisition offices to the maximum extent possible for 

execution, but also maintain internal contracting and finance surge 

capabilities. 

 Recommend both materiel and non-materiel solutions. 

 Facilitate spiral development and modular open systems architecture 

(MOSA) to develop and field initial new capabilities (Block I prototypes) 

in two months to no more than 24 months. 

 Reach out to COTS/GOTS, commercial, and foreign sources via an “Open 

Business Cell” and take full use of flexible procurement options, e.g., 

competitive prototyping, Other Transactions Authority, and 

congressional waivers. 

 Provide oversight, milestone planning, tracking, and transition of 

execution of solutions for urgent needs and advocate within OSD to 

expedite rapid acquisition programs managed by the Services. 

 Track fielding to include DOTMLPF (especially training, sustainment, 

and support) in coordination with Services and combatant commands. 

 Actively capture lessons learned, share experiences, and promulgate best 

practices. 

 Scan for intelligence input and development of new technologies that are 

less than TRL 7 to respond to future needs. 

The workforce for RAFA is intended to be small enough to be effective, but 

large enough to accomplish the tasks. The capabilities needed in RAFA include 

solid acquisition knowledge and experience across the DOD Services and 

components; understanding of current operational tactics, techniques, and 

procedures; knowledge of rapid manufacturing processes and supply chains; 

familiarity with commercial acquisition, foreign sources, and flexible contracting 

and finance tools; capability for scanning and sorting new technologies; 

operations research and systems analysis; and net assessment skills. Given the 
36 I CHAPTER 4 

breadth of this portfolio, a staff of approximately 250 military and civil servant 

personnel is envisioned. 

An important function for RAFA is to provide integrated triage for 

incoming needs from combatant commands. The organization will work 

closely with the Joint Staff to coordinate prioritization, work with the OSD 

Comptroller and the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation on resourcing, 

and will coordinate with the supporting Services on the DOTMLPF aspects of 

implementation. The task force envisions that RAFA will form and dissolve task 

forces or capability teams as needed. Working with the teams and an internal 

operations research and systems analysis capability (with appropriate “hot base” 

expertise), RAFA will carry out rapid analysis of alternatives and cost and 

performance systems engineering. Once the technology maturity is assessed 

(ensuring it is TRL 6 or higher) RAFA will propose appropriate solutions and 

alternatives. In this way, RAFA will determine whether the acquisition should be 

carried out using a rapid or deliberate approach. 

As part of their operations research and system analysis function, RAFA will 

also commission independent red teaming. Finally, RAFA will coordinate with 

interagency urgent needs for homeland defense, intelligence community, and 

others. 

People are the key to the success of RAFA. Strong military and civilian 

personnel with relevant experience are needed. To get the right people, flexible 

hiring authority is needed and the RAFA director must be able to hand-pick some 

employees. The importance of flexible staffing is delineated in Finding 6 in 

Chapter 3 of this report, describing the institutional barriers to rapid acquisition. 

The benefits associated with this are multiplied when people rotate and carry the 

RAFA culture back to other organizations in the DOD. 

Incentives are needed to enable the military to attract and retain the best and 

brightest. Methods include making “nominative assignments,” targeting Service 

personnel with high promotion potential (to include former program managers 

with high potential for selection as acquisition general officers) and identifying 

positions as “key development positions.” RAFA service will also give an 

individual joint credit, and could be made part of precepts by Service secretaries. 

A consideration is to code only some billets as acquisition billets in order to get a 

mix of military operators and acquisition personnel on the staff. 

It is equally important to get the best and brightest in RAFA’s civilian 

workforce. Identifying positions as “key development positions” and advertising 
RECOMMENDATIONS I 37

to individuals who “love a challenge” and “want to make an impact,” are 

suggested strategies. Giving these individuals the authority and responsibility to 

make a difference can be a powerful incentive. In addition, RAFA should target 

10 percent of its workforce from outside the Department of Defense. Several 

programs provide flexibility for DOD to attract and retain talented men and 

women with expertise and corporate knowledge to fill critical positions. These 

programs include: 

 Highly Qualified Experts (HQE). Section 9903 of title 5, U.S.C. within the 

FY04 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) gives the Secretary of 

Defense the authority to establish a DOD program to attract HQEs with 

state-of-the-art knowledge in fields of importance to the mission of DOD. 

HQEs can be employed for five years with the potential for a one-year 

extension. Compensation packages that are competitive with the private 

sector can be offered to HQEs. 

 Presidential Management Fellows (PMFs). The PMF program is a 2-year 

paid government fellowship to attract to federal service outstanding men 

and women from a variety of academic disciplines and career paths. 

PMFs are hired at GS-9/11/12 levels and are eligible for conversion to 

career or career conditional at the end of two years. 

 Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) Assignment. The IPA provides 

the government the ability to noncompetitively hire an employee with 

specific expertise from academia, national laboratories, and state or local 

governments for a limited time. Assignments can be made for up to two 

years, can be intermittent, part-time, or full-time and may be extended an 

additional two years. 

 Section 1101 Authority. Section 1101 of the FY99 NDAA grants the 

Secretary of Defense special authority to facilitate recruitment of eminent 

experts in science or engineering outside normal civil service procedures. 

These employees may be offered rates of pay and pay increases and 

annual bonuses bounded by the limits established for senior level 

positions. This authority is designed to attract individuals from private 

industry. 
38 I CHAPTER 4 

RECOMMENDATION 4. INITIAL FUNDING AND BILLETS FOR RAFA WILL BE 

BASED ON ABSORBING AND INTEGRATING EXISTING PROGRAMS AND 

ORGANIZATIONS

The task force recommends easing the transition to the new organization by 

drawing initial billets and budgets from the current ad hoc efforts in the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense. 

Depending on the persistence of the need addressed, the task force 

recommends some ad hoc organizations would become programs of record and 

transition to Services. These transitioned organizations would continue to act and 

staff jointly, similar to how the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and 

Biological Defense (JPEO Chem-Bio) and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) office 

operate. This follows the example of the Counter Remote Control Improvised 

Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (CREW) Block 3 that has become a joint 

program of record. Billets that remain in OSD can be assigned to RAFA, and 

additional billets can be assigned from the ongoing expansion of the acquisition 

workforce. 

Another category of organization would be absorbed, with both billets and 

budgets, into RAFA once it is established. Existing budgets will provide 

approximately $500 million starting capital for RAFA. These organizations and 

programs include: 

 Two demonstration programs: the Coalition Warrior Interoperability 

Demonstration (CWID) and the JCTD program. 

 The RRTO, a future-looking organization. 

 Two relevant funds in the RRTO: the Quick Reaction Fund and the Rapid 

Reaction Fund. 

 Other relevant programs in RRTO are the Open Business Cell, the Office 

of Force Transformation, and the JRAC. 

RECOMMENDATION 5. DOD SHOULD ESTABLISH A STREAMLINED,

INTEGRATED APPROACH FOR RAPID ACQUISITION

RAFA should follow an essentials only timeline for satisfying urgent 

operational needs from the combatant commands. The outline of such a timeline 

is shown in Figure 6. 
RECOMMENDATIONS I 39

Figure 6. An integrated, streamlined approach for joint rapid acquisition.

In this framework, needs, acquisition, and funding steps are tightly 

coordinated. Capability needs are generated, certified, and validated quickly, and 

then acquisition personnel analyze alternatives in conjunction with an initial 

analysis of funding needs and availability. This integrated triage step is critical, as 

described in Finding 5 in Chapter 3 of this report. Once a solution is identified, it 

is approved, assigned to an acquisition organization, and funding is applied. 

Execution is concurrently tracked while DOTMLPF considerations are evaluated 

and an initial operating capability is approved. Successful completion of these 

steps leads directly to production and fielding of an initial operating capability 

and a transition to production or O&M funding. 

RAFA provides continuous oversight of all steps in the urgent needs process 

and also provides a liaison to the combatant command who authored the urgent 

need statement. The RAFA director has acquisition and funding decision 

responsibility, and RAFA and the combatant command jointly approve and 

validate the need, concept of operations (CONOPs), and the proposed IOC. 

The timeline is intended to provide maximum flexibility to minimize time; for 

example, funding may be initially allotted for analysis, and if not fully used then 

transferred to development or low rate initial production. In other cases, it may 

be clear that no research is needed at all, and funding should immediately be 

applied to the purchase of existing equipment from a foreign government source. 

Such decisions must be made routinely within RAFA to meet short time targets. 
40 I CHAPTER 4 

For these reasons, funding cannot be tagged for only one use or another. This is 

typically referred to as “no color” money. 

To execute the program, RAFA and each Service would jointly manage 

production (as appropriate), and RAFA would work with each Service to integrate 

DOTMLPF and life cycle issues. Thus, if this process were in place when the need 

for mine-resistant vehicles arose, a much more efficient timeline could be 

envisioned to validate the requirement, analyze alternatives, and fulfill this 

urgent operational need with consideration for training, support, and 

sustainment. 

It is imperative that the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

the Service leaders start now to implement all five of these recommendations. 

Existing urgent needs remain waiting to be fulfilled with ever more limited 

resources, and the potential for new and even more devastating capabilities from 

adversaries loom large. The men and women of the Armed Forces in harm’s way 

deserve this support.
NORMALIZED DATA I 41

Appendix A. Normalized Data for Time to 

Resolve Need Statements 

The following figures, A-1 through A-3, present distributions of time in days 

needed to resolve joint urgent operational need statements (JUONS) by the Joint 

Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC), urgent operational need statements (UONS) by 

the U.S. Navy, urgent universal need statements (UUNS) by the U.S. Marine 

Corps, and combat mission need statements (CMNS) by the U.S. Special Forces 

Command (USSOCOM). For comparison purposes, the data have been 

normalized to one-hundred percent and do not include missing data. Numbers of 

need statements are grouped in 30-day increments. Maximum, minimum, and 

median days to complete each process are included in Table 1 in Chapter 2 of this 

report. 

No data for individual need statements was received from the Army, so it was 

not possible to examine a distribution. Because data was provided for only three 

Air Force need statements, those are not included. 

Figure A-1. Normalized time in days required to generate urgent operational 

need statements. 
42 I APPENDIX A 

Figure A-2. Normalized time in days required to validate urgent operational 

need statements. 

Figure A-3. Normalized time in days required to implement initial capability. 
PROCESS VISUALIZATIONS I 43

Appendix B. Process Visualizations for 

Fulfilling Urgent Operational Needs 

For comparison purposes, the following process flow charts are included that 

depict processes used to generate, review, validate, assign resources, and (in 

some cases) fulfill warfighting requirements through the urgent operational 

needs and joint urgent operational needs processes. The figures B-1 through B-7 

include the rapid acquisition processes of the military departments, as well as the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, 

and the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. This information was provided to the task 

force as part of briefings on the dates noted for each figure. 

Figure B-1. Process used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Rapid 

Acquisition Cell to review, validate, and fulfill joint urgent operational needs. 

Presented to the task force on February 12, 2009. 
44 I APPENDIX B 

Figure B-2. Process used by the U.S. Central Command to review, validate, and 

assign resources for joint urgent operational needs. Presented to the task force 

on February 12, 2009. 

Figure B-3. Process used by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 

Organization (JIEDDO) for assessing joint urgent operational needs. Presented 

to the task force on May 28, 2009. 
PROCESS VISUALIZATIONS I 45

Figure B-4. Process used by the U.S. Army to review, validate, and assign 

resources for operational need statements. Presented to the task force on 

February 12, 2009.

Figure B-5. Process used by the U.S. Navy to review, validate, and fulfill urgent 

operational needs. Presented to the task force on February 12, 2009.
46 I APPENDIX B 

Figure B-6. Process used by the U.S. Marine Corps to fulfill urgent universal 

needs. Presented to the task force on February 12, 2009.

Figure B-7. Process used by the U.S. Air Force to review, validate, and assign 

resources to urgent operational needs. Presented to the task force on February 

12, 2009. 
TERMS OF REFERENCE I 47

Terms of Reference
48 I TERMS OF REFERENCE 
TERMS OF REFERENCE I 49
50 I TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP 
TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP I 51

Task Force Membership 

Name Affiliation 

CHAIR 

HON Jacques Gansler University of Maryland 

MEMBERS 

LTG William Campbell (USA, ret) BAE Systems 

Mr Richard Dunn Private Consultant 

Ms Christine Fisher Private Consultant 

Ms Kathleen Harger Private Consultant 

Dr William Howard Private Consultant 

LtGen Jan Huly (USMC, ret) EOD Technology, Inc. 

HON Noel Longuemare Private Consultant 

Dr Michael McGrath ANSER 

RADM David Oliver (USN, ret) EADS North America 

Ms Leigh Warner Private Consultant 

HON Dov Zakheim Booz Allen Hamilton 

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS 

Mr Kevin Arnwine Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller) for Investment 

Mr Tom Dee Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 

CAPT Michael Ford Joint Capability Development Directorate 

Mr Brian Kiviat Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Navy for Expeditionary Warfare 

CDR Mike Moore Joint Capability Development Directorate 

Mr Thomas Simoes Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller) for Investment 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

Mr William Beasley Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 
52 I TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP 

DSB REPRESENTATIVE 

Lt Col Chad Lominac, USAF Defense Science Board 

STAFF 

Ms Kelly Frere Strategic Analysis, Inc 

Mr Brian C Keller Private Consultant 

Dr Toni Marechaux Strategic Analysis, Inc 
PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE I 53

Presentations to the Task Force 

Name Topic 

FEBRUARY 12–13, 2009 

LTG Richard Zahner, Director, ISR Task Force 

Dr Robin Keesee, Vice Director of the Joint IED 

Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) 

Mr. William Beasley, Director (Acting) Joint 

Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) 

Ms. Barbara Sisson, Director, Resources and 

Analysis, USCENTCOM J8 

BG Glenn Walters, Deputy Director for 

Resources and Acquisition, Joint Staff J8

Resolving Joint Urgent Operations 

Needs/Immediate Warfighter Needs: What is the 

Joint Perspective? 

COL Steven Sliwa, Division Chief, Current and 

Future Warfighter Capabilities, Integration 

Prioritization and Analysis Directorate, G3/5/7, US Army 

Brigadier General Andrew O’Donnell, Director, 

Capabilities Development Directorate, 

USMC 

RDML Dan Cloyd, Associate Director, 

Assessments Division, Chief of Naval 

Operations, US Navy 

Mr. Blaise Durante, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for Acquisition Integration, US Air Force

Resolving Service and Joint Urgent Operational 

Needs: What are the Service Perspectives? 

Mr. Terry Mitchell, Integration and 

Synchronization Office, G-2, Human 

Terrain Teams, US Army 

Mr. Mike Van Rassen, Program Manager, 

Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar 

(C-RAM) 

 Col Perry Smith, Counter Remote-Radio 

Controlled Electronic Warfare (CREW), US 

Army 

 CAPT Mark Kavenaugh, PMS-408, CREW, US 

Navy 

Col Ted Jennings, Program Manager, 

Biometrics, US Army 

Col Linda Herbert, Program Manager, Night 

Vision/Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and 

Target Acquisition, US Army 

Meeting Immediate Warfighter Needs, Program 

Manager Perspective: Are we getting capability to 

the warfighter in a timely manner? 
54 I PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE 

Mr. William Beasley, Director (Acting) Joint 

Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) 

Lean Six Sigma Cross Functional Team on Urgent

Needs/Rapid Acquisition - Study Results 

FEBRUARY 24–25, 2009 

Mr. Steve Daly and Dr Vic Ramdass, U.S. Army Army Test and Evaluation Command 

Mr. Skip Hawthorne, Office of Defense 

Procurement and Acquisition Policy 5000 Series Overview 

Mr. J.M. “Raleigh” Durham 

Director, Joint Advanced Concepts Time-Defined Acquisition 

Mr. Brad Berkson 

Director, Defense Program Analysis and 

Evaluation 

Planning & Programming for Urgent Needs 

Dr. Bruce Jette, President, Synovision (former 

Director, US Army Rapid Equipping Force) Rapid Acquisition of Urgent Needs 

Maj Gen Michael Basla 

JCS J6, VJ6 Net-Centric Functional Capability Board 

Mr. Ben Riley 

Director, Rapid Reaction Technology Office Rapid Reaction Technology Office 

RADM Archer M. Macy 

JCS J8 Joint Integrated Air and Missile 

Defense Organization 

Force Protection, Functional Capability Board 

Col Michael Garrett, Senior Military Fellow, 

Center for a New American Security 

Urgent Operational Needs: 

A Warfighter’s Perspective 

MARCH 5–6, 2009 

Ms. Teresa Smith, Northrop Grumman 

Mr Bruce Jette, Synovision Army Science Board Innovation Task Force Study 

Mr. Roberto Rodriguez, OUSD(C) (Investment) 

CAPT Douglas Borrebach, Comptroller, 

JIEDDO 

CDR Phil Walker, Joint Staff Program & Budget 

Analysis Division (Resources) 

Ms. Judy Guenther, Army Budget Office 

(Investment) 

Financial Panel on Funding Urgent Needs 

Mr. Ed Harrington, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of the Army for Procurement 

Procurement Challenges in Resolving Urgent 

Needs 

CAPT Mike Ford, US Navy, Joint Staff J8 

(Requirements) Joint Staff Metrics for Urgent Needs 

Mr. Alan Shaffer, Principal Deputy, DDR&E and 

Ms Edie Williams, DDR&E 

Various Topics: The MRAP Task Force, the 253 

Report and the S&T Budget 
PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE I 55

Col Kevin Peterson, Program Manager, 

US Army 

Mr Paul Mann, Program Manager USMC 

MRAP Program Successes and Challenges 

Mr. Dyke Weatherington, Deputy Director, 

Unmanned Warfare, USD (AT&L) 

Unmanned Aerial Systems - Fulfilling an Urgent 

Need 

MARCH 26–27, 2009 

Gen. Montgomery Meigs, former Commanding 

General of U.S. Army Europe and former 

JIEDDO Director 

Fulfilling Urgent Warfighter Needs 

Mr. Tim Freihofer, Director The Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office 

Mr. Shay Assad, Director of the Defense 

Procurement Acquisition Policy and 

Strategic Sourcing 

FAR Part 18 and other Rapid Acquisition 

Authorities 

Col. Robert Hoffmann, Commander, 645 

Aeronautical Systems Group 

Wide Area Aerial Surveillance Program and the 

Air Force’s Safari Program 

Dr Nancy L. Spruill, Director, Acquisition 

Resources & Analysis Defense Procurement 

Maj Gen (R) Claude Bolton, USAF, Former 

Assistant Secretary of the Army Insights on Fulfilling Urgent Needs 

LTG Stephen Speakes 

Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8 Fulfilling Army Urgent Needs 

Ms Latisha Rourke, Director Electronic Warfare 

Programs and Sensors, Lockheed Martin 

The Symphony SystemFulfilling an Urgent 

Operational Need 

APRIL 7–8, 2009 

Mr. Eddie Bair, Former Program Executive 

Officer, US Army Communications and 

Electronics 

Meeting Urgent Needs 

Brig Gen Michael Brogan, Commander, Marine 

Corps Systems Command USMC Efforts to Fulfill Urgent Needs 

Mr. Tony Lisuzzo, Army Materiel Command, 

Intelligence and Information Warfare 

Directorate 

Fulfilling Urgent Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance Needs 

Dr Paul Kaminski Perspectives on the Rapid Reaction Technology 

Office 

RDML David Dunaway, Commander, 

Operational Testing and Evaluation Force Navy Operational Test and Evaluation 
56 I PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE 

APRIL 22, 2009 

Mr. Alexander Lovett, Assistant Deputy Under 

Sectary of Defense Director, JCTD 

Programs (Acting) 

On Advanced Concept Technology 

Demonstrations and Joint Concept Technology 

Demonstrations 

Ms. Edie Williams and Mr. Mo Schriber 

2007 NDAA, Section 253 requirement to “assess 

the feasibility of consolidating various technology 

transition programs into a unified effort managed 

by a senior DOD official” 

MAY 27–28, 2009 

Mr. William M. Shepherd, Senior Advisor 

S&T/Director S&T, USSOCOM 

US Special Forces Command Science and 

Technology Efforts in Meeting Warfighter Needs 

Mr. John Young, Former Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics 

Perspectives on Fulfilling Urgent Operational 

Needs 

Brig Gen Mark O. Schissler, Director of Cyber 

Operations, US Air Force The USAF’s Cyber Command 

LTG Thomas Metz, Director JIEDDO 

LTG Steve Boutelle (ret.), Former Army Chief 

Information Officer 

Panel discussion on Meeting Warfighter 

Requirements 
GLOSSARY I 57

Glossary 

3 Kings Army Lieutenant General from G3/5/7, G8, and ASA (ALT) 

3WM Army Colonel from G3/5/7, G8, and ASA (ALT) 

ACOM Army Command 

AF Air Force 

AF/A5R Air Force, Director, Operational Capability Requirements 

AMC Army Material Command 

AR2B Army Requirements and Resourcing Board 

ARCENT U.S. Army Component U.S. Central Command 

ARFOR Army Forces 

ARSTAF Army Staff 

ASA (ALT) Assistant Secretary of the Army Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

ASCC Army Service Component Command 

ATEC Army Test and Evaluation Command 

AWG Asymmetric Warfare Group 

BETSS-C Base Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance System-Combined 

BTF Biometrics Task Force 

CAD Capabilities and Acquisition Division 

CC United States Central Command 

CCD Combat Capability Document 

CCIF Combatant Commander Initiative Fund 

CDD Capabilities Development Directorate 

CDIB Combat Development Integration Board 

CDRT capabilities development for rapid transition 

CENTCOM United Stated Central Command 
58 I GLOSSARY 

CERP Commanders’ Emergency Response Program 

CFSOCC Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Of Staff Instruction 

CJTF Combined Joint Task Force 

CMNS combat-mission need statement 

COA Course of Action 

CoC Council of Colonels 

COCOM combatant command 

COMARFOR Commander Marine Corps Forces 

CONOPs concept of operations 

CoS Chief of Staff 

COTS commercial off the shelf 

C-RAM Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar 

CREW Counter Remote Control Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare 

CSAF Chief of Staff of the Air Force 

CWID Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration 

DAMO-CIC Office of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff G3/5/7, Future Warfighting 

Capabilities Division 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DAS Defense Acquisition System 

DC CD&I Deputy Commandant Combat Development and Integration 

DDR&E Director, Defense Research and Engineering 

DDRA Deputy Director Resources and Acquisition 

DepSecDef Deputy Secretary of Defense 

DM Decision Memorandum 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOTMLPF doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 

personnel, and facilities 
GLOSSARY I 59

DRU Direct Reporting Unit 

DSB Defense Science Board 

DUR directed urgent requirement 

ECOP equipment common operating picture 

FCBs Functional Capability Boards 

FD Force Development 

FORSCOM United States Army Forces Command 

GOSC General Officer Steering Committee 

GOTS government off the shelf 

HMMWV high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle 

HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army 

HQE highly qualified expert 

HTS Human Terrain System 

IED improvised explosive device 

IOC initial operating capability 

IPA Intergovernmental Personnel Act 

IPL integrated priority list 

IPT Integrated Product Team 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

IT information technology 

IWN immediate warfighter need 

J8 Force Structure, Resources and Assessment Directorate 

JCAAMP Joint IED Defeat Capability and Acquisition Management Process 

JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JCTD Joint Capability Technology Demonstration 

JIEDDO Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization 
60 I GLOSSARY 

JPEO Chem-Bio Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense 

J2RAB JIEDDO Joint Urgent Operational Needs Review Board 

JRAC Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

JS Joint Staff 

JUONS joint urgent operational need statement 

MAJCOM Major Command 

MARCENT U.S. Marine Corps Component U.S. Central Command 

MNC-I Multi-National Corps - Iraq 

MOSA modular open systems architecture 

MRAP Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (vehicle) 

MROC Marine Requirements Oversight Council 

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act 

NDI nondevelopmental item 

NGB National Guard Bureau 

O&M operations and maintenance 

OCAR Office of the Chief Army Reserve 

ODIN observe, detect, identify, neutralize 

ONS operational need statement 

ORSA operations research and systems analysis 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

PA&E program analysis and evaluation 

PMF presidential management fellow 

PPBE planning, programming, budgeting, and execution 

QRF Quick Reaction Fund 

RAFA Rapid Acquisition and Fielding Agency 

RAT Rapid Acquisition Teams 
GLOSSARY I 61

RDC Rapid Deployment Capability 

RDD Rapid Development and Deployment 

REF Rapid Equipping Force 

RFI Rapid Fielding Initiative 

RRF Rapid Reaction Fund 

RRP Rapid Response Process 

RRPC Rapid Response Process Council 

RRTO Rapid Reaction Technology Office 

S&T science and technology 

SBIR small business innovative research 

SOF special operations forces 

SOFCIDS-U special operations forces capabilities and development system-urgent 

SRSG Senior Resource Steering Group 

TF task force 

TRL technology readiness level 

UONS urgent operational need statement 

USAF United States Air Force 

USAREUR United States Army Europe 

USARPAC United States Army Pacific 

USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command 

USCENTCOM United States Central Command 

USD Under Secretary of Defense 

USD (AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

USMC United States Marine Corps 

USSOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command 

UUNS urgent universal need statement 

VCJCS Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff