i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 8- 00 71 1- CV TEX AS D EP AR TM EN T OF P UB LIC SAF ETY ,

Appellant
v . J ay Alan DISHMAN , Appellee Fr om the County

Court at L aw, Medina County , Texas Trial Court No. 2340 Honora ble Vivian Torr es, Judge Pre siding Opinion by : Catherine Stone, Chief Justice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Rebec ca Simmons, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: May 6, 2009 REVERSE AND RENDER J UDGMENT J ay Al an Dishman’s driver ’s license was suspende d following his failure of an alc ohol
conce ntration test. Dishman ch al l en ged his license suspe nsion at an administrative he aring ; the Administrative L aw Judge (AL J ) sustained the suspe nsion. Dishman appealed the a dminist rative de c isi on to t he tr ia l c ourt , a

nd the tr ia l c ourt

re ve rs e d th e de c isi on . T he Te xas D e pa rtme nt o f P ub lic Safety (T DP S) appea ls the trial court’s de cision, and ra ises issues reg arding1) the number of04

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- 2- continuance s that an AL J is authorized to gra n t, and 2) the tria l court’s re view of the AL J ’s evidentiar y ruling s. We r ever se the judgme nt of the trial court a nd rende r judg ment reinstating the AL J ’s orde r suspending Dishman’s driver ’s license
. B ACKG ROUND Trooper Robert E. Russell observed D ishman failing to stop at a stop sign, a nd trave ling at
a sp e e d tw e nty mil e s ov e r the sp e e d lim it. Af te r Tr oo pe r Rus se ll sto pp e d D ish man, qu e sti on e d h im about whether

he had be en drinking , and conduc ted field sobrie ty tests, he ar

rested D ishman for driving while intox icated. D ishman provided a br eath spe ci m en s h owing his breath a lcohol
conce ntration to be 0.177; his license wa s subsequently suspende d
. Di s h man re quested a n administrative hea

ring to contest the suspension. Afte r hea ring testimony

and consi d er i n g the evidenc e, the AL J rende red a decision sustaining Dishman’s driver ’s license suspension. Dishman appe aled the A L J ’s dec ision to t he trial c ourt. The tria l court re verse d the administrative dec ision, specifica lly finding that: 1) a se cond continuanc e g rante d by the AL J was outside the AL J ’s authority ; 2) the court co u l d n o t deter mine if a video of

the enc ounter wa s
a dmi tte d in to e vid e nc e ; 3) the c ourt c ou ld n ot d e te rm ine if

the vid e o w a s r e vie we d b y the AL J or i f it w a s p art

of the re c or d o f t

he a dmi ni st rat iv e law he ari ng ; 4) Di sh man w a s d e nie d th e ri g ht t o examine the trooper using the video; 5) Dishman was denied introduction of the portab l e testi ng device as evide nce a

nd the opportunity

to examine the trooper r eg ardingit; 6) Dishman was de nied due proc ess of law; and 7) the admini strative decision was iss ued in violation of section 2001.174 of the Administrative Procedur es Act. TDPS a ppeals the trial court’ s reve rsal of the administrative decision.04

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- 3- S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW A re view of an administrative l icense suspension is conducted unde r the substantial evidenc e standard of

revie w. Se e Mi re le

s v . Tex . De

p’ t of Pu b. Sa

fe ty , 9 S.W .3d 128, 131 (Tex. 1999). Under this standard, the revie wing court c annot re place the AL J ’s judg ment with its own. S e e R

. R

. Co m m 'n of Tex. v. Torch Ope rating Co. , 9 12 S .W .2 d 79 0, 79 2 ( Te x. 19 95 ). I f t he AL J’s d e c isi on

is
s u p p o rt ed by

more than a

scintilla of evidenc e, that dec ision must be upheld. See id. at 792-93. Howeve r, a tria l court may reve rse a n AL J ’s deter

mination if a substantial r ight of the appellant ha s be e n p re jud ic e d b e c a

us e the AL J’s fin din g s, inf e re nc e s, c on c lus ion s, or

de c isi on s are no t r e a so na

bly supported by

substantial evidence consideringthe rec ord as a w hole. See T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE ANN . 2001.174(2)( E) (V ernon 2008)
. The c ourt of appe als revie ws the trial cour t’s substan t i al ev i d en ce reviewde novo. Tex. Dep’ t of Pub. Safety v. Valdez , 9 5 6 S
. W
. 2 d 7 6 7 , 7 6 9 ( T e x . A p p . — S an A n t o n i o 1 9 9 7 , n o p e t
. )
. In de te rm ini ngwh e the r t

he AL J’s d e c isi on

wa s su pp or te d b y su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e , this c ourt is g overne d by

the following principles: 1) the tria l court will hear and conside r evide nce to de termine whether rea sonable support for

the AL J ’s orde r exists , but the AL J rema ins the primary fac t finding bo dy , and the qu e sti on fo r the tr ia l c ourt is str ic tly on e of law; 2) the tr ia l c ourt may no t su bs tit ute its judgment for

that of the AL J on controve rted issues of f act; 3) if the AL J hear d substantial evidenc e that would support either an af firmative or neg ative finding, t he trial court must allow the AL J ’s orde r to stand, eve n if the court would have differ ed with the result; 4) the trial court may not set aside the AL J ’s ruling mere ly beca use there was c onflicting or disputed testimony ; and 5) the tria l
c ourt is c on c e rn e d o nly

wi th t he re a so na

ble ne ss o f t

he AL J’s o rd e r n ot i ts c or re c tne ss. Tex. De

p’t of Pub. Safety v. Fe cci , 989 S.W .2d 135, 139 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied)
.04

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- 4- C ON TI N U A N C ES I n its first issue, TDPS claims the trial cour t erre d in ruling that the AL J was not authorized to gr ant a se cond continuanc e on the a dminist rative he aring . Dishm an ’s o ri g inal hear ing w as schedule d for Ma

rch 3, 2008. TD PS requested a c ontinuance be cause Troop er R u s s ell was not
a v a il a b le o n th a t d a te , an d th e A L J r e s e t th e h e ar in g f o r M ar c h 1 7 , 2 0 0 8
. T D PS then re quested a
se c on d c on tin

ua nc e , a s th e te c hn ic a l su

pe rv iso r r e sp on sib le fo r m a int a ini ngthe ins tr ume nt u se d to test Dishman was not ava ilable on that date; the A L J ag ain re set the hea ri n g fo r M arc h 31, 2008. Dishma n ar g u e d T D PS w a s a ll o w e d o n ly o n e c o n ti n u an c e , an d o n a p p e a l th e tr ia l c o u rt ag ree d, h o ld in g th e s e c o n d

c o n ti n u an c e w a s g r an te d

o u ts id e o f

s tatuto r y o r a d mi n is tr a ti v e la

w a u th o r it y . We dis a g re e wi th t

he tr ia l c ourt
. TDPS arg ues that under Transpor tation Code section 524.039(b), an AL J has to allow one
c on tin ua nc e pe r w itn e ss, bu t is a lso a uth or ize d to a llo w o the r c on tin ua nc e s f or g oo d c a us e . I t a lso notes that while the trooper and technicia n wer e conside red TD PS wit nesses, they wer e subpoena ed
a t Dish man’ s re qu e st. Di sh man, ho we ve r, argue s the fi rs t c on tin ua nc e g ra nte d b y the AL J wa s in violation of section 159.11 of t he Tex as Admi nistrative C ode because there was no showing Troope r Russell was not available or could not appea

r; rathe r, the reque st simply stated Troope r Russell was unable to leave his duty station. I n addition, D ishman contends the second c ontinuance should not have be en g rante d beca

use sec tion 159.11 allows for only one continuanc e. We ag ree with TDPS’s arg ument that the AL J acte d within its discretion in g ranting more than one c ontinuance. Sec tion 524.039(a) pr ovides the proc edure to be used by a def endant “re questing the p resence at the hear ing of the bre ath test operator who took the spec imen of the person’ s breath to deter

mine alcohol concentration or t he certified breath test technical super visor04

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- 5- r e s p o n s ib le f

o r ma in ta in in g an d

d ir e c ti n g th e o p e r a ti o no f th e b r e a th te s t in s tr u me n t us e d

to an a ly ze the spec imen of the pe rson’s bre ath . . . .” T EX . T RA N SP . C ODE ANN . § 524.039(a) (Ve rnon 2008). Section 524.039(b) notes that “[ t ] he depa rtment may

resc hedule a

hear ing onc e not less than 48 ho ur s b e fo re the he ari ngif the pe rs on

re qu e ste d to a tte nd

un de r S ub se c tio n ( a ) i s unava ila ble ;” howeve r, it also provides that the de partment can resc hedule a hear ing on “showing g ood cause that the per son reque sted under Subsec tion ( a) i s n o t available at the time of the he aring .” Id. § 524.039(b). Courts have rec og nized the discretion g iven to an AL J to gr ant continuanc es. 1 T EX . A D M IN . C ODE § 1 59 .1 1( e ) ( 20 08 ) ( State Of fi c e of Ad min ist rativ e He ari ng s) ; see, e .g., State v. Crank , 666 S.W .2d 91, 94 (Tex. 1984); Texas De p ’t of Public Safety v. Struve , 9 S. W. 3 d 7 9 6 , 8 0 1 ( T e x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 20 02 , p e t. d e nie d) ; Te x as De p’ t of Pu b. Sa fe ty v . Ca ntu , 944 S.W .2d 493, 496 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1997, no pet.). Cons equently , the j udg e did not err in g ranting more than one continuance due to the unava ilability of witnesses. Di sh man a lso argue s th e AL J er re d in g ra nti ngTD PS’ s c on tin

ua nc e re qu e sts be c a

us e TD PS did not p r o v id e w it

h in it s r e qu e s ts th e r e qu ir e d thr e e d a te s d u r in g w h ic h th e p arti e s would be
av ai l ab l e for

resc heduling of the he aring , a ce rtificate of ser vice, or cer tificate of confe renc e per
se c tio n 1 59 .1 1( e ). Th e re fe re nc e d r ule state s: . . . . A par

ty reque st i n g a continuance sha ll supply three dates duringwhich the p ar t i es wo u l d

b e a v ai l ab l e f

o r r es ch edu l i n g o f t h e h ea ri n g, wh i ch d at es , t h e J u d ge will consid er in resetting the ca se. F ailure to include a ce rtificate of ser vice, a c e rt if ic a te of c on fe re nc e , o r s up ply thr e e a lte rn a tiv e date s m ayr e sult in de nia l of t he continuan ce r equest or subseque nt continuance reque sts in the same ca se. 1 T EX . A D M IN . C ODE § 159 .1 1( e ) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . Wh ile the ru le state s th e re qu e sti ngpa rt y “ sh a ll supply ” either

a ce rtificate of service , cer tificate of confe renc e, or three alternative dates, it provides a perm i s s ive rather than ma ndatory reme dy for nonc ompliance. De nial of the re quest was at the04

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- 6- AL J’s d isc re tio n, and

the re fo re the AL J did n ot e rr in g ra nti ngthe con ti nu anc e re qu e st r e g a rd le ss of the missing infor

mation. The trial c ourt err ed in holding the s ec ond continuance by the AL J was g rante d outside of statutory or administrative lawauthority . TDPS’s first issue is sust ained. V I DE O E VI DE NCE I n its second issue, TDPS arg ues the tri al cour t erre d in finding the video of the e ncounter was not prope rly

admitted and that Dishman’s r ights we re pr ejudiced by h i s i n ab i lity to question Trooper Russell about the video. At the hea ring , Trooper

Russell announced he had broug ht a copy of the video o f t h e encounte r pursua nt to a subpoena duc es tec um, but he was prohibited f rom leavingit with the court. The AL J g rante d a re cess so TDPS could either produce t h e video or provide a written explanation for why it should not be re quired t o d o so. When the hear ing
re c on ve ne d at a

la te r d a te, Tr oo pe r R

us se ll d id n ot a

pp e ar a s h e ha d b e e n r e le a se d f ro m hi s subpoena, a

nd the video wa s not produced
. T h e ALJ o rder ed produc tion of the video within five day s, and TDPS produce d a copy for the a dminist rative r ecor d. After the evidenc e wa s rec eived, the AL J rende red a

decision sustaining the suspension of Dishman’s dr iver’s lice nse. On appea l to the trial court, the tr ial court found it wa s not clear if the AL J admitted the video, and Dishman was denied the oppor

tunity to cross-e x amine Troope r Russell after the video wa s produce d. TDPS arg ues the video w as admitted into eviden ce , n o t i ng that it is l isted in the table of contents of the administrative rec ord as a defe nse exhibi t, a nd that the AL J ’s fi n d i n gs o f f act included information that c ould ha ve been g ather ed only

by viewing the video. While this m ight be the ca se, re view of the rec ord re veals nothing more than inc lusion of the video in the listing of04

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- 7- defe nse exhibit s, and that duringthe last hea ring the AL J stated the v i d eo wa s t o be produc ed for inclusion in the recor d. “Appe llate cour

ts have re peate dly

held t hat evidence that is not objected to and that the trial court a nd the par

ties treat a s admitted is, for all pra ct i ca l p u rposes, admitt ed.” Te x as He alt

h En te rp ris es, In c . v . Te

x as De p’t of H um an Se rv ic es, 949 S.W .2d 313, 314 (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted). Here , beca

use the e vidence was not pre sented duringa hearing , the parties did not have any chanc e to object to its admission. Cons equently , we c onclude the vide o was not admitted as
e vid e nc e duri ngDi sh man’ s li c e ns e su sp e ns ion pr oc e e din g s. Although w e conc lude the video wa s not admitted i n t o ev i d en ce, this in itself does not
nece ssarily

war rant reve rsal by the trial court. Reversible err or does not usually occur in connec tion with rulings on que stions of evidence unless the party contesting its admissi on can de monstrate that the whole c ase turns on the particula r evide nce that was admitted or e x cluded; conse quently , if the AL J took the vid e o in to c on sid e ratio n when mak in g his de c isi on , th e e rr or is h arm le ss i f i t is cumulative of othe r evide nce that was admi t t ed on the same issue. T EX . R. A PP . P. 44 .1 (a ); see Pitman v. Lightfoot , 937 S.W .2d 496, 518 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, w rit denied ) (c itations omitted). TDPS acknowledg es that eve n if the video was admitted into e vidence , the only part of the video that was not c umulative of Troope r Russell’s tes t i mony , and which w as re fer ence d in the AL J ’s finding s of fa ct, had to do with hear ing the defe ndant over dispatch chatter, and a

statement that th e te s t w a s d o n e a t n ig h t, in a r u r a l ar e a , w it

h o u t an y il lumi n a ti o n o th e r th an the trooper ’s vehicle’ s lights and his flashlig ht. I n revie wing the ag ency rec ord, the e x istence of

substantial evidenc e turns on the que stion of rea sonablene ss. Te x as De p’ t of Pu bli c Sa fe ty v . P ru itt , 75 S.W .3d04

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- 8- 634, 639 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.). The f indings a nd conclusions of the ag ency are presumed va lid. Id. I f ther e i s ev i d ence to support either a ffirmative or neg ative finding s on a specific matter, the a dminist rative de cision must be upheld. Id. (citations omitted). Ba sed on the
rema ining e vidence introduced by Trooper Russell during Dishman’s hear ing, there was substantial
e vid e nc e int

ro du c e d to su

pp or t th e AL J’s f

ind ing s. W e n o t e t h at al t h o u gh Di s h m an s o u gh tad m i s s i o no f t h e v i d eo d u ri n g t h e i n i t i al h ea ri n g,
no tin g that he tho ug ht i t c on ta ine d inf or ma tio n that mig ht he lp his c a se , he did no t fi le a fo rm a l bi ll of ex ception outl ining what that evidenc e mi g ht have be en. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.2; Barr v. Texas De p’ t of Pu blic Sa

fe ty , N o. 04 -0 2- 00 88 0- CV , 2 00 3 WL 22 04 76 15 , * 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 20 03 , n o pe t.) (m e m. op .) (n ot de sig nate d fo r p ub lic a tio n) (“ B e c a us e a pp e lla nt d id n ot m a ke a

bil l of e xce pti on s th a t sh ow e d w hat th e e x clu ded te sti mony

wo uld have be e n, he did

no t pr e se rv e his complaint for our revie w.”)
. I n addition, D ishman’s brief to this cour t did not ex plain what probative
e vid e nc e mig ht h a ve be e n r e ve a le d h a d th e vid e o b e e n in tr od uc e d d ur ing a he ari ng so that he c ou ld
c ro ss- e xami ne Tr oo pe r R us se ll r e g ard ingits c on te nts
. Ba sed on the a

bove, TDPS’s second issue is sustained.

P OR TABLE B RE AT H T ESTER I n its thi rd issue, TDPS claims the trial cour t erre d in holding the AL J denied Dishman the op po rt un ity to i ntr od uc e the po rt a

ble te sti ng de vic e a s e vid e nc e and to e xami ne the po rt a

ble br e a th te ste r. Durin g T roop e r R us se ll’ s te sti mony , D ish man a sk e d h im i f h e ha d b ro ug ht t he po rt a ble testing device used to test Dishman’s breath the night of the ar rest. Troope r Russell responded that the device was in his vehicle. D ishman then s tated that he had subpoenae d the device , but did not enter any objection or obtain a

ruling from the AL J . On appe al, the trial court found Dishman was04

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- 9- de nie d th e po rt a

ble br e a th t e sti ngde vic e and th e ab ili ty to c ro ss- e xami ne Tr oo pe r R us se ll i n
v i o l at i o no f t h e s u

b p o en a du ce s t ec u m . W e d i s agr ee wi t h t h e t ri al co u rt s ’s fi n d i n g. Review of the subpoena revea ls that the portable testing device was not included as part of the re qu e ste d it e ms; in f

a c t, t he su bp oe na sim ply re qu e ste d “ any

and a ll m anu a ls, bo ok s . . . a s to Rob e rt E. Rus se ll’ s tr a ini nga nd

pe rt a ini ngto .
. . Rob e rt E. Rus se ll’ s op e ra tio n of the po rt a

ble br e a th testing de vice/mac hing/instrument . . . used on Jay Alan Dishman .
. . .” The device itself was not subpoenae d. Even if the de vice ha d been inc luded in the subpo en a, Di s hman waive d this matter when he failed to e nter a

proper objection and r ece ive a r uling on the matter. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a) . TDPS’s third issue is sus tained. B A SI S OF R E VE RS AL I n its fourth issue, TDPS contends the trial cour t er re d i n impliedly

reve rsing the administrative dec isions on som e basis n o t specified in its order . I n its judgment, the trial c ourt stated Dishman wa s denied due proce ss of law, and that the administrative dec ision was in violation of sec tion 2001.174 of the Administrative Procedur es Ac t. The trial c ourt’s due pr ocess f inding appea

rs to or iginate from Dishman’s complaint that the evidenc e g ained throug h Trooper Russell during his questioning and field testing of Dishman was inadmissible. Dishman complained that he ne ver r ece ived Miranda war nings be fore being questioned, and did not know his answers a nd test results could be use d ag ainst him. See M iranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (holding that when a n individual is subjected to que stioning wh ile in c us tod

y wi tho ut b e ingfi rst warn e d o f h is r ig hts and wi tho ut v olu

nta ri ly wa ivi ngtho se ri g hts , a ny e vid e nc e ob ta ine d a s p art of that qu e sti on ing may no t be us e d a g a ins t hi m a t tr ia l) ; see als o T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 38.22 (V ernon 2005) . Howeve r, we find this arg ument04

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- 10- unconvincing
. Miranda and ar ticle 38.22 apply

only to custodial interrog ations. Do wth itt v . S tat e , 931 S.W .2d 244, 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). As we have pre viously held: Be ing in c ustody

is disti ng uishable fr om bei n g h el d as par t of a tempora

ry investigative detention. An officer who lacks pr obable c ause but whose observations l ea d t o a r ea s o n ab l e s u s p i ci o nt h at a p ar t i cu l ar p er s o nh as co m m i t t ed , i s co m m i t t i n g, or is a bo ut t o c omm it a

c ri me , ma

y de ta in that pe rs on

br ie fl y in o rd e r t o inve sti g a te the c ir c ums tanc e s th a t pr ov ok e the su sp ic ion
. Th e of fi c e r m ay a sk a mod e rate number of questions to determine the person’ s identity and to try

to gather inf or ma tio n to c on fi rm

or dis pe l th e of

fi c e r’ s su sp ic ion s. L ike a tempor ary

investigative detention, a tra ffic stop d o es not exert “upon a d et ai n edp er s o np re s s ure s t h at s u ff i ci en t l y i mp ai r h i s fr ee ex er ci s e o f h i s p ri v i l ege ag ainst self-incr imination to require that he be war ned of his c onstitut ional rig hts.” This is for two rea sons: traffic stops tend to be brief, so dr ivers expect to answe r a fe w qu estion s and

be on the ir wa y sh or tly . A lso , tr a ff

ic sto ps te nd

to b e in p ub lic rathe r th a n a t a s tati o n h o u s e , s o dr iv e r s d o n o t f e e l c o mp le te ly a t th e me r c y of the police. I n deter mining whe ther an individual was in custody , a court must examine all of the c ir c ums tanc e s, bu t th e ult imate inq uir y is simp ly wh e the r t

he re wa s a

fo rm a l arr e st or re str a int on fr e e do m of

mov e me nt t o th e de g re e a sso c iated wi th a fo rm a l arr e st. The re levant question is not the office r’s subjec tive intent, but r at h er h o w a rea sonable pe rson in the suspect’ s position would have understood the situation. The “re asonable person” standard assumes an innoce nt person. The office r’s subjec tive view that the individual under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, is irre levant to the question of whethe r an individual is in custody for Miranda purp os e s. Hernande z v. State, 107 S.W .3d 41, 47 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. ref ’d). The tra ffic stop in this case wa s an investig ative dete ntion based on a r easona ble suspicion that a crime was being committed. Specifica lly , Trooper Russell obser ved Dishman failing to stop at a s t o p s i gn , and spee ding mor e than twe nty miles per hour ove r the spee d limit . Once Trooper Russell s t o p ped him, it took Dishm an more than twenty seconds to g et his door open a nd exit the
car . When Dishman exi ted the ca r, Troope r Russell observed that he was swaying, ha d red, bloodshot ey es, an d h ad a strong odor of alc ohol coming f

rom his mouth. W hen aske d, Dishman tol d T ro op e r R

us se ll h e wa s c omi ngfr om a ba r a nd a dm it te d to havin g e ig ht o r n ine dr ink s w hil e04

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- 11- there . Dishman then fa iled sever al field sobrie ty tests. On these fa cts, Dishman was not in custody for Miranda purp os e s unti l T ro op e r R us se ll f or ma lly arr e sted hi m, a

nd the re fo re his du e pr oc e ss rig hts were not violated. Finally , the trial cour

t found the AL J ’s dec ision was in violation of section 2001.174 of the Ad min istrativ e Pr oc e dure s A c t. S e c tio n 2 00 1. 17 4 s ta te s: [Th e re vie wi ngc ourt ] sha ll r e ve rs e or re mand the c a se fo r f

ur the r p roce edi ngs if substantial rig hts of the appe llant h av e b een prejudice d beca use the a dminist rative fi nd ing s, inf

e re nc e s, c on c lus ion s, or

de c isi on s a

re : (A ) i n v iol a tio n o f a

c on sti tut ion a l or

statut or y pr ov isi on ; (B ) i n e xce ss o f t

he a g e nc y ’s statut or

y a uth or ity ; (C ) m a de thr ou g h unla

wf ul p ro c e dure ; (D ) a ff e c te d b y oth e r e rr or

of law; (E) not re asonably

supported by

substantial evidenc e considering the re liable and probative e vidence in the rec ord as a whole; or (F ) a rb itr ary or c a pr ic iou s o r c ha

ra c te ri zed by a bu se of dis c ret ion

or c le arl y unwar rante d exercise of

discretion. T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE ANN . § 2001.174 (2) ( Ver non 2008). We disag ree with the trial court’s finding. Base d on the issues discussed above , the AL J ’s decision wa s not made in violation of section 2001.174, and was rea sonably supported by

substantial evidenc e. TDPS’s fourth issue is sustained. C ONCL US I ON The trial c ourt’s judg ment is rever sed and judg ment is render ed re instating the A L J ’s decision suspending Dishman’s driver ’s license
. Catherine Stone, Chief Justice