### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00422- CR

Sam ue l T. Ja c kso n, A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. 699,38 7, HO NORAB LE J. DAVID PH ILLIP S, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Samuel T. J ackson w as convic ted of the of fense of unlawf

ully driving on an improve d s h o u l der to the r ight of the main trave led portion of the r oadwa y . See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.058 (West 1999). J ackson was fined $150.00. I n five iss ues on appe al, J ackson
asser ts that: (1) the complaint did not confe r j urisdiction upon the t rial court beca use it did not “meet t he minimum requirements of a n aff idavit by identifying the source of the a lleg ations”; (2) the
wa ive r p ro vis ion of a

rt ic le 45 .0 19 (f

) o f t he c od e of

c ri min a l pr oc e dure do e s n ot a pp ly to jurisdictional issues; (3) eve n if he wa ived er ror pur suant to artic l e 45.019(f ), the trial c ourt’s “assumption of jurisdiction without a valid complaint is f undamental err or which ma y be ra ised for the first time on appea l”; (4) a rticle 45.019(f

) of the c ode of c riminal proce dure is unconstitutional
on its fa c e and

a s a pp lie d “ be c a

us e it a ut ho ri z es th e tr ia l c ourt

to p ro c e e d to tr ia l on

a vo idAr tic le 45 .0 19 (f

) p ro vid e s: 1 I f the de fenda

nt does not o b

j ec t t o a def

ect, e rror , or irre g ularity

of for m or substance in a

char g ing instrument be fore the date on which the trial on the merits commence s, the defen d an t waives a nd forf eits the rig ht to object to the defe ct, e rr o r, or irre g ularity . Nothing in this article prohibits a trial court f rom requiringthat an objec tion to a char g ing instrument be made at an ea rlier time. Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 45.019(f ) (West Supp. 2005). 2 complaint”; and ( 5) ar

ticle 45.019(f) is f

acia lly unconstitutional be cause it violates the Separation of Powers Clause of the Te x as Constitut ion. We will affirm the judg ment of the c ounty court at law.
BACK GR OUND A misdemeanor

complaint was filed ag ainst J ackson alleg ing that on J uly 29, 2002, he drove a m o t o r v eh i cl e on an improve d shoulder to the rig ht of the main trave led portion of a public highw ay . T wo d ay s prior to trial, J ackson f iled a motion to dism iss alleg ing that the complaint was fa

tally defe ctive bec ause it “c ontains information and fac ts not asce rtainable from the fa c e of the c itatio n” and

wa s si g ne d b y

“ a pe rs on no t ha vingpe rs on a l kn ow le dg e of the fa c ts resulting in issuance of

the citation.” Jackson was a d v i s ed b y t he cour t that his objection to the complaint had bee n waived be cause it was not filed at lea st 14 day s p ri o r to trial as re quired by Cha pte r 7 .3 of

the L oc a l Ru le s o f t

he City of Au sti n M un ic ipa l Co ur

t. Af te r Ja c ks on

wa s c on vic te d and fi ne d $ 15 0. 00 , h e fi le d a mot ion fo r n e w tri a l a g a in alleg ing that the complaint was fa tally defe ctive. The court de nied J ackson’ s motion, finding that J ac k s o n ’s objection was untimely filed pursua

nt to article 45.019(f

) of the c ode of c riminal proce dure and that the c omplaint did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. The municipal court’ s

1 judgme nt was af

firmed by Travis County

Court at L aw Numbe r One . This appea l followed.We would not have jurisdiction over this appe al if Ja ck s o n ’s fine ha d not exceeded 2 $100.00. See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . 4 .0 3 ( Wes t 20 05 ); Me isn e r v . S tate , 907 S.W .2d 664, 666 (T e x. Ap p. —Wa c o 199 5, no pe t.) ; see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 30.00027(a) (West 2004) (“T he appellant ha s the rig ht to appeal to the c ourt of appe als if the fine assessed a g ainst the defe ndant exceeds $100 a

nd if the judg ment is affirme d by the appe llate cour

t”). 3 DI SCU SSIO N Jurisdi ction Be fore proce edingto the merits of Jackson’s appe al, the State asse rts that we a re without jurisdiction t o hear this appeal be cause J ackson did not timely file his appea l bond. See T e x. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. ar

t. 45.0426(b) (West Supp. 2005) (“I f an a ppeal bond is not timely

filed, the appellate court doe s not have jurisdiction over the case and shall remand the case to the justice or municipal court for execution of the sentenc e”)
. Article 45.0426 applies to a ppeals fr om municipal courts to county

courts. Se e id
. art. 45.042 (West Supp. 2005) (“ Appea ls from a justice or municipal
c ourt
. . . s ha ll b e he ard

by the c ounty

c ourt ” ); see also Te x. Go v’ t Code Ann. § 3 0. 00 73 1( b) (We st 2004) (“ I n this subchapter, ‘ appellate courts’ me ans the county courts at law of Travis County that have c riminal appellate jurisdiction”).

Jac ks on is n ot c ur

re ntl y a pp e a lin g fr om a ju dgme nt o f t he mun ic ipa l c ourt . H e is appea ling to this Court from a judg ment of the county court at law aff irming the municipal court’s jud g me nt. Ap pe a ls t o th e court s o f a pp e a ls a re g ov e rn e d b y

the Te xas R

ule s o f A

pp e llate 2 Procedur e. See Tex. R. App. P
. 1.1, 3.1. The judgment of the county court at law was rende red on June 22 , 2 00 5. Jac ks on

fi le d h is n oti c e of

a pp e a l on July 6, 20 05
. Jac ks on ’s no tic e of a pp e a l to thi sWe also note that J ackson’ s appea l f rom the municipal court to the county court at law was 3 timely
. The City

of Austin’s municipal cour t is a municipal court of r ecor d. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 30.00731(a ) (West 2004). Appea ls from muni cipal cour ts of rec ord ar e g overne d by sections 30.00014 and 30.00015 of the g overnme nt code. To pe rfe ct an ap p eal, the a ppellant must file a written motion for newtrial with the municipal cler k not later th an t h e 1 0 t h d ay afte r the date on which judg ment is render ed, g ive notice of appea l, and file a

n appea l bond with the municipal court of rec ord not later than the 10th da y afte r the date on whic h the motion for new tr ial is overrule d. See id . § 30 .0 00 14 (c ), (d ); § 3 0. 00 01 5( a ). Th e re c or d r e fl e c ts t hat Jac ks on

satis fi e d th e se re qu ir e me nts
. 4 C o u rtw a s t i m e l y. See Tex. R. App. P
. 26.2(a)
. We have jurisdiction over J ackson’ s appea l, and 3
no w t ur n to its me ri ts.
The c om pla int

I n his first issue, J ackson co n t en d s that the complaint is void beca use it did not identify the s ource of t he allegations ag ainst him. He compare s complaints to affidavits supporting
arr est or sear ch war

rants, and asser

ts that a “valid af

fidavit must revea l its sources” a nd cannot be “conc lusory .” Th e c omp la int a g a ins t Jac ks on

re a ds , in re le va nt p art :
I N THE NA ME AND B Y THE AU THORI TY OF THE STATE OF TEXAS I , THE UND ERSI GNED A FF I ANT, D O SOL EMNL Y SWEAR THAT IHAVE GOOD REASON T O B EL I EVE AND DO B EL I EVE THA T ONE SAMUELT. JACK SONONOR

AB OU T THE 29 TH DAYOF JUL Y, 20 02 , A ND B EF OR E THE MAKI

NG AND FI L I

NG OF THI S COMPL AI NT, WITH I

N T HE TE RRI TO RI AL

L I MI TS O F TH E CI TYOF AU STI N, TE XA S. Di d th e n an d th e re dr ive a mot or ve hic le , n ot a

n a uth or ize d e me rg e nc y

ve hic le respondingto a ca ll, a police patr ol, or bicy cle, on an improved shoulder to the rig ht of the main tra

veled por tion of a public hig hway , t o wit: 5400 BL OCK ED BL UESTEI N when the operation of said v eh i cl e was not nec essar y and not done safe ly , and not done only : to stop, st and or park ; to acc eler ate be fore enter ing the main-trave led lane of traff ic; to dece lerate bef

ore making a

rig ht turn; to pass another v e h i c l e t h a tw a s s l o w i n g o r s t o p p e d o nt h e m a i nt r a v e l e d

p o rt i o no f

t h e h i g h w ay,5

dis a ble d, or pr e pa ri ngto m ake a

le ft tur n; to a llo w a

no the r v e hic le tr ave lin g fa ste r t o pass; to avoid a collision; o r as permitted or r equire d by an off icial traf fic c ontrol device
. AGAI NST THE PEACE AND DI GNI TY OF THE STATE.
Ar tic le 45 .0 19 pr ov ide s, in r e le va nt p art : (a) A complaint is sufficie nt, w ithout re g ard to its form, if it substantially satisfies the fo llo wi ngre qu isi te s: (1 ) i tm u s tb e i nwr i t i n g; (2) it must commence “In the name and by the authority of t he S tate of Te x as”; (3 ) it mus t st a te the name of the a c c us e d, if

kn ow n, or if un kn ow n, mus t include a r easona

bly definite de scription of the a ccuse d; (4) it must show that the ac cused has committed an offe nse ag ainst the law of this state, or state that the a ffiant ha s go o d re ason to believe and does be lie ve that th e a c c us e d h a s c omm itt e d a n o ff e ns e a g a ins t th e law o f t

his state; (5) it must state the date the off ense was commi tted as definitely as the a ffiant is able to provide; (6) it must bear

the sig nature or mark of

the af fiant; and (7) it must conc l u d e with the words “A g ainst the pea ce a nd dignity

of the State” and, if

the offe nse cha

rg ed is an off

ense only under a munici p al or din anc e , it

may als o con c lud e wi th t he wo rd s “ Con tr ary

to t he sa id ordinanc e”.
Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 45.019(a ) (West Supp. 2005).All of the ca ses J ackson c ites t o co n ce rn aff idavits or “complaints” suppor ting a rre st or 4 sear ch wa rra nts and are not applicable he re. 6 The c omplaint ag ainst J ackson satisfies all of the above require ments. We c an find no authority

for Jackson’s asse rtion that a complaint must satisfy more string ent requirements. For 4 at least 40 y ear s, the rule in T exas ha s been that “a complaint must state fac ts suf ficient to show the
c o mm is s io n o f an o f

f e n s e c h ar g e d b u t th e s ame p arti c u la r it y is n o t r e qu ir e d a s is n e c essary in an indictment or information.” Va lle jo v . S tate , 40 8 S.W. 2d 11 3, 11 4 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 66 ); Sc hm itz
v . S tate , 952 S.W .2d 922, 924 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1997, pet. ref’d). J ackson asks this C ourt to “re visit and overrule ” Va lle jo but, as an interme diate appellate court, we are in no position t o do
so. McKinney

v. State, 177 S.W .3d 186, 192 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2005, pet. g rante d) (“A s an intermediate appe llate cour t, we must follow binding pr ece dent of the Court of Criminal Ap pe a ls” ); see Pe tco Animal Supplies, Inc. v . Schuster , 1 44 S.W. 3d 55 4, 56 4- 65 (T e x. A

p p . — Au s t in 20 04 , n o p e t.) (“ As an inte rm e diate a pp e llate c ourt , we are no t fr e e to m old Te xas l aw a s w e se e fi t but must i nstead follow the precede nts of t he Tex as S upreme Court unless and until the high c ourt
overr ules them or the Te x as L eg islature super sedes them by statute”). We c on c lud e tha

t Jac ks on , “ fr om r e a din g the c omp la int , c ould as c e rt a in w ith
rea sonable c erta int y wi t h what he w as beingchar g ed so as to prope rly prepa re a defe nse.” See Va lle jo , 408 S.W .2d at 114. We overr ule J ackson’ s first issue.Ordinar ily , we woul d have f irst decided whether

J ackson w aived his cha lleng e to the 5 complaint pursuant to article 45.019(f) and dete rmined if that issue disposed of the appea l. See T e x. R. App. P. 47.1 (“The c ourt of appe als must hand down a wr itten opinion that is as brief as prac ticable but that addr esses e very issue raised a nd nece ssary

to final dispositi on of the a ppeal” ). Ho we ve r, in t

his c a se Jac ks on

c on te sts the c on sti tut ion a lity of the wa ive r p ro vis ion . T he re fo re , if we we re to f

ir st c on c lud e that Jac ks on wa ive d h is c ha lle ng e to the c omp la int purs ua nt t o a rt ic le 45 .0 19 (f ), we wo uld

ne xt have to d e c ide if

art ic le 45 .0 19 (f

) w a s c on sti tut ion a l. B e c a us e we sh ou ld not decide constitutional issues unless require d to do so for disposition of the case , se e Pe na v . S tate , 191 S.W .3d 133, 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“‘ I f there is one doctrine mor e dee ply rooted than a

ny other in t he proc ess of c onstitut ional adjudication, it is that we oug ht not to pass on questions of co n s t i tu t i o n al i t y

. . . u n l es s s u ch ad

j u d i ca t i o ni s u n av o i d ab l e’ ”) (q u o t i n g Clint on v. Jone s , 5 20 U. S. 681, 690 (1997)) , we have assumed f or the purpose s of this appea l that J ackson satisfied the require ments of ar

ticle 45.019(f)
. 7 Havingaddre ssed the mer its of J ackson’ s challeng e to t h e co m p laint, we nee d not addre ss his rema ining issues, as they are based on the assumption that J ackson w aived e rror pursuant to article 45.019( f). We overrule J ackson’ s second, third, four th, and fifth issues. 5
CO NC LU SION Ha vin g ov e rr

ule d Jac ks on ’s iss ue s o n a pp e a l, we a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he c ounty court at law.

____________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pembe rton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: August 18, 2006 Do No t Pu

bli sh