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i 

45–254 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–136] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, SOUTHERN COMMAND, 

AND AFRICA COMMAND 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 13, 2008 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

MARK E. UDALL, Colorado 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

ANDREW HYDE, Professional Staff Member 

STEPHANIE SANOK, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2008 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, March 13, 2008, Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request from the U.S. European Command, Southern Command, and Africa Command ............................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, March 13, 2008 ...................................................................................... 41 

THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 2008 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, SOUTHERN 

COMMAND, AND AFRICA COMMAND 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Committee on Armed 

Services ................................................................................................................. 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Craddock, Gen. Bantz J., USA, Commander, U.S. European Command ............ 4 

Stavridis, Adm. James G., USN, Commander, U.S. Southern Command .......... 6 

Ward, Gen. William E., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command ..................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Craddock, Gen. Bantz J. .................................................................................. 45 

Stavridis, Adm. James G. ................................................................................ 97 

Ward, Gen. William E. ..................................................................................... 131 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Cummings .................................................................................................. 155 

Mr. Skelton ....................................................................................................... 155 

Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... 155 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mrs. Boyda ........................................................................................................ 159 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, SOUTHERN COMMAND, AND AFRICA 

COMMAND 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 13, 2008. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:17 p.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the 

committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good day. 

The committee will come to order. 

We will address the posture of three commands representing significant geographic diversity: the U.S. European Command 

(EUCOM), the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the 

new Africa Command (AFRICOM). Our witnesses are General John 

Craddock, Admiral James Stavridis and General Kip Ward. 

It is great to have each of you here, and we thank you each for 

the work that you do as well as for the young men and young 

women within your command. 

General Craddock, I remain deeply concerned about our efforts 

in Afghanistan. There has been a great deal of discussion about the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) ability to lead the 

fight there, hampered in part by the caveats that many of our 

NATO allies have placed on their troops. 

Recently you said, ‘‘These caveats, like shortfalls, increase the 

risk to every soldier, sailor, airman and marine employed in theatre.’’ 

General, I couldn’t agree with you more. I am seriously concerned about these caveats and NATO’s unfulfilled commitments. 

I also believe the United States can and must demonstrate better 

leadership in Afghanistan. We are deploying an additional 3,400 

marines to shore up the fight in the south and train and equip the 

Afghan national security forces. But when our military and civilian 

leadership says that in Afghanistan we do what we can, rather 

than do what we must, I think that sends a strong signal to Europe 

that we ourselves are not completely committed to a successful outcome. And I would have you address that. 

General Ward, Admiral Stavridis, our committee has given a 

great deal of thought recently to your roles in the missions of the 

armed forces, and the weakness in the interagency system and note 
2 

that both of you in your commands are undertaking 

groundbreaking work to integrate the interagency partners. I commend you for that. And I hope we will hear something more from 

each of you on that. 

Combatant commands, particularly SOUTHCOM, have excelled 

in providing short-term humanitarian emergency assistance after 

natural disasters. I am interested in the example that 

SOUTHCOM and emerging AFRICOM are placing on the promotion of internal security, trade, and economic prosperity within 

your areas of responsibility. 

Let me say a word about strategic risks. Our attention is so focused on Iraq, we are hard-pressed to devote the necessary attention to emerging security issues in other parts of the world. Within 

the last month, we saw a serious effort to topple the government 

of Chad and a brief but potentially serious border dispute between 

Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. We must re-balance our military to be prepared for these sorts of unexpected challenges in the 

event that they turn into truly serious contingencies. 

Before I recognize any of you gentlemen for your testimony, I ask 

my friend serving as ranking member today, Jim Saxton, the gentleman from New Jersey, for any statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

NEW JERSEY, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Today this committee will consider the challenges and opportunities that face the U.S. European Command, the U.S. Southern 

Command and the newly-formed U.S. Africa Command. These combined areas of responsibility of these commands include over 120 

countries and cover almost 40 million square miles. In fact, the 

range of possible topics today is broad as it reaches throughout 

these commands. 

I would like to thank General Craddock, Admiral Stavridis and 

General Ward for appearing before us today to provide their unique 

insights and assessments and to explain how the President’s fiscal 

year 2009 budget request reflects these operations, exercises and 

initiatives within their respective Areas of Responsibility (AORs). 

General Craddock, I would like to begin by highlighting a concern that Ranking Member Hunter has, who of course regrets that 

he is not able to be with us today. He discussed it at the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) hearing last week, and that raises 

some questions regarding NATO and associated issues. 

In the coming weeks, the United States will deploy 3,200 additional marines to Afghanistan and over 2,000 of these men and 

women will bolster the NATO-led International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) presence in the southern part of the country. 

Yet there appears to be some ambiguity about the command and 

these additional forces. From your perspective, Mr. Hunter would 

like to ask, will these marines fall under NATO ISAF or 

CENTCOM operational control? What will be the missions of these 

forces? Under which rules of engages will these forces operate, 

under ISAF’s or the United States? 
3 

More broadly, does the current ISAF and CENTCOM division of 

labor make sense and does it maximize the effectiveness of the capabilities provided by U.S. forces? 

The division of labor in Afghanistan also leads to a number of 

NATO-specific questions regarding our European allies’ military capabilities and ability to operate in a combat environment. 

I note that despite NATO’s minimum military requirement, that 

allies spend at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product 

(GDP) on their militaries, fewer than half of the 26 allies actually 

do so. I didn’t know that. It seems that the alliance’s emphasis on 

transformation coupled with the European Union’s (EU) nations’ 

growing focus on security and defense has not resulted in noticeable increases in expenditures and capabilities. 

For example, NATO nations have long recognized a significant 

shortfall in strategic airlift. Yet these nations’ combined acquisition 

of C–17s relies in large part on U.S. contributions. 

So, Mr. Hunter wonders how can we persuade our friends to 

transform and modernize their militaries so that we can effectively 

participate in these combat operations? And at the outset, let me 

say that I know General Craddock is very mindful of these issues 

because he and I talked about them I believe just yesterday. 

Developing our partners’ military capabilities is also a common 

theme within the new Africa Command, especially given the potential of the vast ungoverned spaces on the continent to become safe 

havens for terrorists. I call them hot spots. There is little argument 

that partnering with African nations can result in more secure borders, more responsibility, and more capable military forces and security institutions that are more responsive to national governments and can help to close the doors of any safe havens located 

there. 

However, we do understand that the European Command has 

long worked with those nations and there remains some skepticism 

that the creation of the new geographic combatant command is necessary or even politically acceptable to the African national governments and the African Union (AU). 

General Ward, please provide your perspective on why the creation of the African command is in the U.S. national security interest and how your command will expand on those partnering efforts 

traditionally undertaken by the European Command. 

Finally, Admiral, if you would—we understand the focus on 

transnational security challenges in your area of responsibility. The 

challenge of combating illegal drug production and trafficking continues to require the cooperation of our regional and interagency 

partners. Drug dealers in the region are adaptive and creative, 

using self-propelled semi-submersibles to move drugs as well as 

traditional overland and oversea methods. 

I am interested in learning about SOUTHCOM’s efforts against 

narcotrafficking, especially the use of semi-submarines and its 

work with partner nations to address counterdrug challenges. 

In particular, some experts have noted that as a result of U.S. 

assistance Colombia has been emerging as a regional leader in democracy and as a counterbalance to the socialist movement led by 

Venezuela President Hugo Chavez and his left-leaning supporters 

in Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Cuba. However, I understand 
4 

that despite Cuban officials’ repeated request of his neighbors to 

deny safe havens to terrorists, it was necessary for Colombia to 

raid the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) terrorist 

base more than a mile into Ecuador earlier this month. 

Also, it is reported that documents found in several FARC computers may indicate possible complicity of senior Ecuadorian and 

Venezuelan officials. 

Admiral, please provide your insights into these tensions caused 

by narcotrafficking and terrorism in the region and how your command is addressing the military and security needs of our partners 

there. I am also interested in your perspective on Colombia’s role 

as a regional democratic leader and the future outlook for the U.S. 

military presence and support both in Colombia and within the region as a whole. 

Chairman Skelton, thank you again for permitting me to make 

this statement. And I will look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman from New Jersey. 

We will ask the witnesses to testify. 

General Craddock, you are up at bat. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. BANTZ J. CRADDOCK, USA, COMMANDER, 

U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND 

General CRADDOCK. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the 

committee, it is indeed my privilege to appear today as the commander of the United States European Command. 

Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a written statement and I ask 

that it be made a part of the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let the written statements of each of the witnesses be admitted without objection. 

General CRADDOCK. Thank you. 

And I am also privileged to be here today with two gifted combatant commanders and long-time friends and I indeed could not ask 

for a more capable wingmen than Admiral Jim Stavridis and General Kip Ward. 

Over the past 15 months, I have had the honor of commanding 

the men and women of the European Command and I am here to 

report that they remain absolutely committed to our mission. The 

Nation is well-served by these remarkably talented, dedicated and 

enthusiastic soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and coastguardsmen 

and the families that support and sustain them. 

And if you would permit me, I would like to introduce my senior 

noncommissioned officer (NCO) in the European Command, Command Sergeant Major Mark Farley. 

Mark, would you please stand up. 

It is important that he is here today, because he represents all 

members of the EUCOM force, the officers and the enlisted, and he 

is continually out and about across the command checking on the 

quality of life, the training conditions and the morale. 

He and his fellow noncommissioned officers are essential to what 

we do every day. Their deeds embody the warrior spirit. 

Thank you, Sergeant Major. 

[Applause.] 
5 

General CRADDOCK. American forces, those of the NATO alliance 

and 16 other nations, are now serving together in operations on 

three continents. The more than 60,000 troops currently deployed 

under my command as the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe 

are a visible and effective demonstration of our continuing resolve 

to project stability and to deter, disrupt and defend against threats 

to the alliance wherever they occur. 

As you know, every day European Command forces are also deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The service 

members assigned to EUCOM are included in our global force pool 

and stand available for missions as required. 

While support for the global war on terror is our overarching priority, EUCOM is also focused on sustaining Europe as a global 

partner in furthering U.S. security relationships. Our objectives include promoting lasting security and stability, maintaining the 

ability to employ the full range of capabilities across the spectrum 

of conflict and fostering the growth of partner nation capacity and 

capability. 

Our forward-based and rotational forces are powerful and visible 

instruments of national influence and our international commitment. Central to EUCOM’s efforts is the completion of our strategic 

theatre transformation plan. Our transformation plan is synchronized with the Department of Defense (DOD), the joint staff, 

individual services and NATO to ensure that our efforts are mutually supportive. 

A key development over the past year was the initiation of the 

United States Africa Command, created in recognition of the growing importance of Africa. The establishment of AFRICOM remains 

a work in progress. European Command has provided and will continue to make available personnel, subject matter expertise, and resources to ensure AFRICOM’s future success. 

NATO remains committed to collective security and increasingly 

to a broader and more comprehensive view of security in an interdependent world. It has taken the lead for security and stability in 

Afghanistan and now has over 47,000 troops deployed to the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF. This effort remains 

NATO’s most important and challenging mission. 

NATO’s Kosovo mission will continue following that country’s 

declaration of independence. KFOR, the Kosovo force, is welltrained, well-prepared and committed to providing a safe and secure environment. The European Command fully supports this effort. Approximately 10 percent of the 16,000 international troops 

currently in Kosovo are United States forces largely from the Army 

National Guard. 

In summary, the dedicated men and women of the United States 

European Command remain steadfast in their commitment to our 

Nation and to our mission. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. I look forward 

to answering the committee’s questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Craddock can be found in 

the Appendix on page 45.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Admiral. 
6 

STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, 

COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member, all the 

members of the committee, thank you very much for taking the 

time to come and listen, to ask us questions and to have this dialogue and discussion. 

I have to echo John Craddock. I feel very blessed to be here with 

John Craddock and Kip Ward, two fine professionals. In fact, I feel 

very safe as a Navy guy to have two Army four-stars on either side 

of me. 

I am often told that, ‘‘Admiral, what you are doing is important 

because this part of the world is America’s backyard.’’ I don’t think 

that is quite the right expression. It is not our backyard. It is a 

home that we share together here in the Americas. And so in this vibrant and diverse part of the world, where $1.2 

trillion of U.S. trade and economy goes, where there are many challenges, I think it is important that we focus as a nation and that 

I, at SOUTHCOM, focus as your senior military commander in the 

region, on an area of the world that I believe will be of increasing 

importance as days go by. 

There are enormous challenges, starting with poverty, but also 

drugs and illegal trafficking, which the chairman alluded to. Terrorism, we see both narcoterrorism on the part of the FARC in Colombia, as well as nascent, the beginnings of Islamic radical terrorism. 

We see violence in crime. Cuba continues as a problem in that 

it is the last remaining dictatorship in the Americas. Every nation 

in this region is a democracy, save one, and that is Cuba. 

Haiti continues to be a nation that is trying to overcome extreme 

challenges of poverty, and today a United Nations (UN) force is 

there, and I hope to talk about some of their successes. 

And last, we are all aware of the regional tensions that have riddled this region over recent years, most recently, as the chairman 

alluded to, tensions between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. 

Thankfully, those appear to be diminished, but I am happy to talk 

about them today. 

At SOUTHCOM, we approach our military-to-military role in 

ways that try and address some of these unique challenges in this 

region. Responding to natural disasters, working on the counternarcotics problem but in an interagency way, with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), with the Coast Guard, with other 

interagency partners. We conduct large exercises, like PANAMAX, 

which focus on defending the important Panama Canal from potential terrorist attack. That is an exercise with 20 partners. It is in 

every sense an international and an interagency sort of event. 

We are also very focused on human rights and we have a large 

human rights division that works with partners throughout the region to try to inculcate good practices, and we work very hard at 

that. 

And finally, we focus at SOUTHCOM on issues of language and 

culture, trying to understand the region so we can better interact 

with our partners. 

So we are doing, I think, a reasonable job for you. I would like 

to talk about that today and take your questions. 
7 

Again, I thank this committee for its support to SOUTHCOM, to 

the Department of Defense, and, above all, to the men and women 

who serve our Nation at sea, shore, and in the air. Thank you very 

much. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis can be found in 

the Appendix on page 97.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you very much. 

General Ward, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM E. WARD, USA, COMMANDER, 

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND 

General WARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Hunter, and distinguished members of the committee. 

It is an honor as commander of the United States Africa Command to present to Congress our first posture statement and also 

to be here with my teammates to the right, Admiral Jim Stavridis 

and General Jim Craddock, who I am personally thankful for their 

personal commitment to my efforts in standing up this command, 

and my thanks goes to you. 

Also, as was pointed out by General Craddock, the importance of 

our enlisted force, I have with me my senior enlisted leader, Command Sergeant Major Mark Ripka and all the things—Mark, would 

you stand up? 

All of the things that General Craddock said about Sergeant 

Major Farley certain apply here. And as importantly, with what we 

want to do, providing our partner nations to help increase their capacity, the role of the noncommissioned officer in that endeavor is 

essential. 

Command Sergeant Major Ripka is an excellent example, as well 

as leader, in helping us promote those interests that we have as 

we deal with our partner nations. 

Thanks, Sergeant Major. 

[Applause.] 

General WARD. The creation of this command signals a new focus 

on United States strategic interests for Africa and its island nations. Working with our African partners, interagency friends and 

others, we are building a new organization that will benefit the 

citizens of the United States and the peoples of Africa and provide 

a model that advances interagency cooperation in conducting security assistance. 

We look forward to pioneering the Department of Defense’s vision for a joint interagency command. Africa Command will optimize the military’s contribution to achieving U.S. national security 

objectives in Africa. We will move forward in a deliberate and sustained way, committed to partnering with the people and nations 

of Africa to help create a secure and encouraging future. 

Our goals for African security as well as the work that this command will oversee are a continuance of established United States 

activities. This will not preclude some new ideas of our own to add 

value to existing programs, but sets the stage for continuous improvement. 

The United States has provided security assistance through a variety of programs to build capacity in African militaries and their 

security organizations. In my face-to-face meetings, African mili-
8 

tary and political leaders have made it clear that they want these 

programs to continue. We will sustain our current efforts, and 

through Africa Command will improve military programs through 

our strategy of active security. 

We will orient our programs on stability in order to prevent conflict. We will seek to enhance capacity building and those efforts 

that we carry out with African militaries and their standby forces. 

Our intent is to enable them to provide for their own security. 

Active security includes sustained support to our U.S. interagency 

partners such as the State Department’s Africa Contingency Operations and Training Assistance, the ACOTA program, which has 

helped prepare thousands of African military personnel for international peacekeeping operations. 

ACOTA-trained forces participate in United Nations and African 

Union peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Darfur and other areas 

of conflict. U.S. Army and Marine Corps personnel conduct military-to-military training and professional development at the individual and unit level. Active security includes U.S. Air Force assistance in terms of airlift and logistics support to African peacekeepers and support to programs to assist in air domain safety and 

awareness. 

We also provide special operations counterterrorism training 

teams to strengthen national capabilities and enhance multinational cooperation. Our force also supports humanitarian efforts. 

U.S. military programs complement the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). We have conducted de-mining in 

former conflict areas as well as promoted HIV/AIDS relief awareness programs in African militaries. 

Additionally, the U.S. Navy’s Africa partnership station and U.S. 

Coast Guard activities are helping African nations increase their 

maritime safety and security through training activities and programs that enhance maritime awareness. 

It is my honor to serve with our uniformed men and women as 

well as our interagency partners who are making this new command a reality. 

Again, thank you for your support, and I too look forward to taking your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Ward can be found in the 

Appendix on page 131.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you. 

Before I ask there to be any questions, Mr. Saxton has a comment. 

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

It is my pleasure and in fact an honor to welcome a new member 

to the committee, Mr. Rob Wittman. Rob is here with us this morning, sitting in the front row. Rob is from Montross, Virginia. He is 

taking the place of our great friend, the late Jo Ann Davis in the 

First Congressional District of Virginia. He will be serving on the 

Seapower and Readiness Subcommittees. 

Rob’s wife is Kathryn, and he has two children, a son named 

Josh and a daughter named Devon. 

So, welcome aboard. 

[Applause.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 
9 

I will just ask one quick question and save my questions for 

later. 

General Ward, what is the genesis of your command? Who came 

up with it? Would you tell us about it, since you are brand new. 

General WARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The idea of an Africa Command is not a new idea. It has been 

talked about for many years within the Department of Defense as 

a way of looking at the continent of Africa as Africans look at Africa. 

About two years ago, this discussion was continuing, and I was 

not a part of it. But as I understand it, Chairman, the Secretary 

of Defense made a recommendation to the President that, as we 

look at how we conduct our business in providing military assistance to the continent of Africa, and recognizing the growing strategic importance of the continent, to focus our efforts in a more effective way in working with the various partners who are responsible for doing the work that they do on behalf of our Nation on 

the continent. An organizational construct within the Department 

of Defense that recognizes the totality of Africa as Africans see it 

was in our best interest, as far as how we focus the delivery of our 

security assistance programs, and how we, as the Department of 

Defense, look at the continent of Africa. 

That recommendation was made to the President December of 

2006 and in early 2007 President Bush signed the directive announcing the stand-up of United States Africa Command with an 

initial operational capability effective 1 October 2007 with a full 

operational capability to occur in October of this calendar year. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you very much. 

Mr. Saxton. 

Mr. SAXTON. General Craddock, let me just turn to a subject that 

you and I have talked about before. 

In the coming weeks, the United States, as I said in my opening 

statement, will deploy over 3,000 men and women to Afghanistan. 

There appears to some to be ambiguity about the command of these 

additional forces. 

From your perspective, will these marines fall under NATO or 

ISAF or CENTCOM operational control? And also, what will the 

missions of these—what will their missions be? And under what 

rules of engagement will these forces operate, ISAF’s or those of 

the United States? 

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Congressman. 

With regard to the question of the marines, 3,200 of which 1,000 

will be under U.S. command, Central Command, for training purposes. The remainder, 2,200, will be assigned by transfer of authority to ISAF. They will be under the operational control of the commander of ISAF, General McNeill. And he has the authority, then, 

to leave them under his command or either provide them to regional commanders under an operational control assignment or a 

tactical assignment. 

I have talked to Com ISAF. He said that will depend upon the 

mission and the task that those marines are given. The missions 

will be largely in regional command south. They can expect to be 

out and about in patrols and come in contact with the opposition 
10 

militant forces, the insurgents, and they will be in a combat role. 

They will operate under NATO rules of engagement. 

And I specifically got that authority for the ISAF commitment 

from the Secretary of Defense. I asked him, ‘‘Will they be sent 

under ISAF or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),’’ and he said 

they will come under ISAF, transfer of authority to ISAF, the term 

we use in NATO, and they will work for Com ISAF. 

Mr. SAXTON. With regard to the question you asked earlier from 

Ranking Member Hunter, does the command and control laid down 

make sense? This is one of these I think unique situations, that it 

briefs terribly, but in reality on the ground it works well. It is hard 

to explain, but because over several years in application and because this is largely a combat situation and lives are at risk, commanders have been able to work through processes and agreements 

to do so. 

The fact that Com ISAF is a U.S. commander also is I think a 

leveling factor in the command and control apparatus. 

So at this time, and this is my judgment between NATO, ISAF, 

the United States coalition, Operation Enduring Freedom, it is 

functional. I have asked Com ISAF that. He said it is working fine 

with him and he sees no reason at this time to make a change. 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. 

Let me just ask you the other NATO question with regard to the 

level of commitment of our NATO allies relative to NATO’s minimum military requirement and the seeming failure of roughly half 

the 26 allies to meet that requirement. 

General CRADDOCK. Thank you. There are two points here I 

think. 

First of all is the commitment in Afghanistan. NATO gave allied 

command operations, my headquarters and all my subordinate 

headquarters, a task. We told them what we needed in terms of the 

numbers of organizations, military capability to do that, and the 

NATO nations have yet to provide that full capability. 

We are still short maneuver units. We are short of functional capability, what we call key enablers, rotary wing aviation, heavy 

medium-lift helicopters. We are short intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance capability. 

So they are continually I guess I would use the term ‘‘tin cupping’’ our nation’s back again and again and again to try to get a 

political commitment to provide that capability. It exists in the alliance. 

When I talk to my counterparts, they acknowledge it. There is 

an understanding that they could provide, but the issues are political in nature. 

Now, the second part, the level of commitment to the NATO nations to their defense establishments. NATO has set a benchmark 

of two percent of GDP against the defense sector as an objective. 

It is my understanding today based on my accounting and there is 

a little bit—nations have a different perspective. But the way we 

are looking at it, of the 26 NATO nations, 7 have met the 2 percent 

benchmark. 

The trends for those seven are not positive. Some of those seven 

we find the commitment, the percent, going down. And of the 19 

remaining, we find a mixed bag. But I would say overall we do not 
11 

see a general trend of increasing of the commitment to the security 

sector to get to the two percent across the board. 

Mr. SAXTON. I guess that would be fairly troubling to someone 

in your position. Is there an effort through your interaction with 

the commanders and the political structures in the 26 countries to 

try to rectify the situation? 

General CRADDOCK. Indeed there is, at various levels. I interface 

routinely with chiefs of defense, encourage them, one, to contribute 

more capability to Afghanistan and ISAF; second, to work with 

their political leaders to increase the level of budget authority 

given to the defense sector. 

I have taken this argument, if you will, this dilemma, to the defense ministers repeatedly, administrators, and also to the foreign 

ministers. I have appeared before the North Atlantic Council several times with the same appeal. They need to continue to increase 

the budget share, the GDP share, so that several things can happen. One, they can support operations, which are costly. Two, they 

can then support transformation of their forces to 21st century expeditionary deployable capable forces. 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. 

Let me just ask General Ward, General Ward, you have got a 

unique set of challenges, I am sure, in your new job. And I am just 

wondering if you could just kind of tick off the top three challenges 

that you have for us. What makes your job particularly difficult? 

And if you like, tell us about some of the successes that you have 

had so far. 

General WARD. Thank you, Congressman. 

As you know, the command is just standing up, and so clearly 

the challenge of forming a brand new organization is there. I attribute success on any given week when I make a phone call and 

the same number that I used to contact one of my staff’s offices is 

still in effect, or I walk down the hallway and the office that I 

think someone is in, they are still in that same office over a week’s 

period of time. 

We are building a team. We are bringing together a diverse mix 

of civilians and military personnel that will come together and 

cause us to be more effective and comprehensive as we plan the activities that we will conduct in helping our nations who we partner 

with on the continent of Africa and their supporting organizations 

be more capable of providing for their security. 

As we do that, we are dealing with nations who are in varying 

stages of democracy. Their maturing levels are at varying stages. 

And so therefore we have to do it very cognizant of the fact that 

one size does not fit all. We have to be very understanding of our 

partners, cultural appreciation, understanding of historical relationships, so that we deliver a program that in fact does what they 

want to do, what we want to do, and our combined interest of 

building capacity in ways that provide for long-term stability on 

the continent of Africa. 

This is a long-term endeavor. I am not known as being a very 

patient individual, but I know I have to be, because this is something that we realize, quite frankly, not in days and weeks, but 

over time. 
12 

So as we build this command, sir, causing the expectations to be 

metered or checked in a way that one keeps the enthusiasm for 

what we want to do present but at the same time recognizing the 

realities of the situation so that we in fact do bring value added 

and do no harm to a very important part of the world through programs that mean a lot for our own internal stability as well as our 

national security and, importantly, the security of the African continent. 

So working through that, putting programs in place, putting 

campaign plans, if you will, in place, that are well-understood, so 

that our intent is better understood, so that it is not misrepresented. So we have a challenge in our strategic communications. 

We are working that aspect of it. So we don’t confuse our true intent and when we do that, it is in fact met with positive results. 

The challenge is that is a time-consuming endeavor as well, and 

it is one that we must repeat over and over again. 

And so it is those sorts of things that we are doing that we have 

to be focused, we have to remain dedicated as we do them. 

The aspect of this entire endeavor, Congressman, and I will tell 

you remains very encouraging for me as I travel around the continent, and my senior staff, my two deputies, one of whom is a senior member of the Department of State, the ministerial counselor, 

my deputy for civil military affairs, we receive good support for our 

efforts of helping them be more capable of providing for their own 

security. 

They appreciate that attention and focus and the recognition that 

this command illustrates of their importance is something that is 

well-received. 

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, I have some questions about 

SOUTHCOM which I will hold for a little bit later and give some 

other people a chance here. 

The CHAIRMAN. We will have a second round. 

Mr. Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Stavridis, good to see you, sir. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, good to see you. Thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Welcome to our witnesses today. 

I was just wondering if you have any concerns about any increased presence of Islamic radicalism in the Southern Command 

region? And what is your assessment on any current terrorist 

training activity that might be being conducted in the region or 

funded through illegal drug trafficking? And does the relationship 

that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has developed with Iran 

concern you? 

The other day, we had the commandant of the Marine Corps, and 

I asked him about what was happening then, breaking relations 

with Colombia. Another question is, we don’t know what type of 

equipment he has bought, unless maybe we do have the intelligence. I know he has been buying equipment from many, many 

places. 

I know I put a lot of questions there, but maybe you can at least 

touch on some of them, Admiral. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I certainly can, sir. 
13 

Let me start with terrorism in the region, and I think it is important to recognize there are sort of two levels or two forms of terrorism in this part of the world. There is narcoterrorism, which we 

think of most clearly associated with the FARC in Colombia and 

the Sendero Luminoso, the Shining Path, in Peru. 

These are groups that have Marxist-Leninist views, and are 

using narcotics and kidnapping as a means of raising funds. So 

they are using terrorist methods for political upheaval that they 

are attempting to direct against democratically-elected governments. 

So that is narcoterrorism, and that is a force that must be contended with, and I am very encouraged by how our friends in Colombia are responding to the FARC, who has been reduced from a 

high of about 18,000 members down to somewhere around 8,000 or 

9,000. So that is narcoterrorism. It is a constant struggle, and it 

is one that is going fairly well in Colombia. 

Islamic radical terrorism is a much less immediate force in the 

region, but it has the potential to become of greater concern to us. 

At the moment, I would say at an unclassified level it is largely 

centered on proselytizing, recruiting, money laundering. It is 

hooked somewhat into the narcotics trade. And above all, it is a 

means of generation of revenue, largely for the Hezbollah Islamic 

radical organization. Moneys are garnered here in Latin America 

and go back to Hezbollah. So that is of concern. 

Iran, as we know, is a state sponsor of terrorism, has links to 

Hezbollah, and so I am concerned about linkages between the Iranian state and nascent Islamic radical terrorism in this region. 

Now, sir, you asked also about the issues in Venezuela, Ecuador 

and Colombia. As I think most of us know, about two weeks ago 

there was a flare-up there involving a border incursion by the Colombian military and an attack against a FARC leader. Diplomatic 

relations were broken or about to be broken among several of those 

states. 

There was some movement of troops toward borders. I am happy 

to report that the leaders in the region, and this is an important 

and positive thing, that the leaders in the region have settled that 

amongst themselves at a summit that was convened in the Dominican Republic last week. 

In addition to the good work by the leaders of the states involved, there were also the good offices, President Lula of Brazil, 

President Bachelet of Chile, and other regional important actors. 

So the region came together to solve that problem, and that is 

very encouraging. 

Now, finally, sir, you asked about the equipment that the Venezuelans are obtaining, the military equipment, and I will tell you, 

as I did last year, I am concerned about it. It seems like a high 

level of weapons purchases. Let me give you some examples: 25 

high-performance aircraft, 50 new attack helicopters, over 100,000 

AK103 very advanced automatic rifles, military transports, diesel 

submarines, very advanced technology. 

I personally have difficulty understanding why that level of 

weapons would be needed by the Venezuelan state, because as we 

have just seen, this is a region that is not prone to going to war, 

but has the capacity to solve peacefully disputes. 
14 

So I think I have tripped along through a whole series of questions there, but hopefully I got to where you wanted to go, sir. 

Mr. ORTIZ. You answered them well, but before my time runs 

out, General Ward, we are happy to be in Africa, but sometimes 

our country goes to places where maybe we are imposing or maybe 

they don’t want us to be there. But I think that in your opening 

statement you mentioned that we were welcome there, that you 

talked to the political leaders and the community. 

Are we going to be welcome there? The first question I must ask 

is do they want us there? 

General WARD. Thank you, Congressman. 

They want what we can offer them in assistance as they work 

to build their capacity. How we do that is a very important—and 

your point is one that we pay strict attention to—the notion of 

being there insofar as how we deliver security assistance. 

Yes, sir. They do want us there. They want us there to assist 

them as they help increase their own capacity as they be more proficient, as they cause their transforming militaries to be militaries 

that are respectful of human rights, that are responsive to elected 

civil authorities, that also abide by the rule of law. 

Our example, our relationship with them, helps them move in 

that direction. 

The presence issue with respect to where we go and how we go, 

is an issue that is a bit more complicated, and the deliberateness 

of anything that we do is taken with that in mind. 

And so at this point in time, there are no intentions from the 

standpoint of rushing through the continent in the traditional form 

of establishing a headquarters or bases or things of that sort. 

As we continue to deliver programs, as these programs are desired by the Africans, as these programs are in keeping with our 

foreign policy objectives, our national security objectives, and if it 

is determined that a presence will be something that will be more 

supportive of that, then that would be pursued when those conditions are there with our African partners, with obviously our government here, and full transparency of the fact that what we do 

is something that we all want to occur. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. My time just ran out. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

John McHugh. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, you were are all very gracious to each other in your 

opening comments, appropriately so. 

I should tell you, we are all very fortunate to have three such 

distinguished gentlemen in service to this Nation and we thank 

you all for that. 

General Craddock, you wrote in your written statement about 

the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. Could you tell us 

a little bit more about that? Obviously, terrorism is a concern we 

all have. We just heard Admiral Stavridis talk about SOUTHCOM 

and the dangers that exist there. 

But as we look across the globe, certainly up in the Maghreb and 

certainly throughout the Horn, et cetera, is a very troubling spot. 

And I would be interested in exactly how the partnership is work-
15 

ing and how, if at all, you are working with General Ward to kind 

of bring that big continent together in that initiative. 

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Congressman. 

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Program is a program originally initiated with the Department of State and Department of 

Defense, so there are two components to this. 

The overarching program Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Program, and that is a State lead. And that is bringing many of the 

civil aspects of building institutions, enhancing infrastructure, to 

that area. And then the other side of that is Operation Enduring 

Freedom Trans-Sahara (OEF–TS), the DOD side, where we are 

working with the nations there in the Maghreb area, to build their 

capabilities, security capabilities and capacities, for better control 

and self-defense in their own interest. 

I would tell you that the OEF–TS side of that is fully funded. My 

assessment is it is working well. We have used the SOCEUR, the 

Special Operations Command of Europe, personnel through the 

Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCETs) over the last couple of 

years to great extent and great advantage. And we are working 

very well with our partner nation militaries there to enhance their 

capability. 

I would tell you that the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Program is working. But it has not been funded to that same level 

that the OEF–TS is. So we are hoping to be able to get that up 

and move that along a little faster. 

The threat, as you know, I am sure, is the affiliation now of Islamic terrorists in that region with al Qaeda. The al Qaeda, AQIM, 

al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, now has become, if you will, a 

franchise. We are seeing linkages and we are seeing financial and 

logistic support and training support also. 

It is becoming bolder in terms of its attacks and increasingly a 

greater threat to the nations of that region. 

Now at this time, the OEF–TS, Trans-Sahara, the DOD part of 

the effort there, is still in the hands of European Command, because AFRICOM has not stood up to the extent that we can transfer that function. We are in the process, a very complex but amazing effort by two staffs, particularly the AFRICOM transition team, 

to identify all the missions, activities, programs, operations and exercises, and it is an enormous undertaking. And then timeline a 

transfer of that authority and responsibility to AFRICOM. 

So the OEF–TS has yet to transfer. We are working to ensure 

that Kip Ward’s folks are onboard, trained, and then ready to 

transfer that over. So we all have it, I think, for the next several 

months; obviously, the objective, by the end of the fiscal year. 

But I am, again, encouraged with the military-to-military effort 

that is ongoing. We are working with our State Department colleagues to enhance the capability of the Trans-Sahara program 

from their aspect. 

Mr. MCHUGH. We all look forward to that, to Kip Ward getting 

both feet and both hands, as I know he can do, on that as well. 

Let me ask you, I am going to give you your choice because we 

have got very short time here. You also mentioned in that regard 

your concerns about some of the lack of interoperability of foreign 

military sales and also the concerns you have with military sat-
16 

ellite (MILSAT) architecture. Pick one of those and tell us what the 

problems are. 

General CRADDOCK. Let me deal with the interoperability. I 

think what we have to do is have a—and it is not just, I don’t 

think, EUCOM or AFRICOM. We have to have a more coherent approach to our capabilities, if you will. 

Working with nations, determining what it is they think they 

need, and then understanding what it is we want them to achieve, 

what capabilities are needed in today’s world, and then working 

with the security cooperation folks and Office of Secretary of Defense to provide coherent packages so that we apply the same 

equipment, if you will, capabilities, particularly in some of these 

high tech electronics, to all the nations as opposed to randomly selecting certain types for each nation and then they never work together when we need them. 

And we just haven’t done a good job, and we have got to get a 

more coherent approach. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to ask how information flows and what you all’s roles 

are. 

Admiral Fallon was here on March 5 testifying as the combatant 

commander for Central Command—and by the way, I consider the 

five of you geographical combatant commanders just the pinnacle 

of what is good about America. We greatly value your service and 

your expertise. You are a combination of soldier, diplomat and wise 

people, and we appreciate you. 

Admiral Fallon, in response somewhat to Ms. Sanchez’s question 

and Mr. Thornberry’s, I believe, at some point said that he needed 

2,000 additional troops, primarily trainers, in Afghanistan. Now, he 

didn’t talk about NATO troops. He was talking about he needed 

2,000 more U.S. troops in Afghanistan. He didn’t mince any words 

about it. 

The following day we had the commandant of the Marine Corps, 

and I asked him if he could provide the 2,000 troops and he said, 

no, not without changing the dwell time issues and the whole issue 

of the frequency of deployment. 

On March 12, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) was here, Admiral Keating, and I asked him—he had expressed some reservations in the press about he was down 30,000 troops overall. I asked 

him, what if somebody asked him for 2,000 more troops now, and 

he said he could provide them. He repeated and emphasized he had 

280,000 troops and he had the ability of coming up with 2,000 

troops. 

So my question is, we are a nation at war in two places, one of 

them being Afghanistan. There is no controversy, I don’t think, in 

the minds of the American people or the Congress, about Afghanistan. 

We have the combatant commander, Admiral Fallon, testifying 

publicly he needs 2,000 more troops. We have another one of your 

colleagues, Admiral Keating, testifying that he can provide the 

2,000 troops. What am I missing here? Why is that, given the incredible respect that we all have for you and I think the Pentagon 
17 

and the military has for you, where is the disconnect in the flow 

of information? 

General CRADDOCK. Let me start, if I could, Congressman. 

I am surprised also. Look, if I were asked, if you are asking me, 

can I provide 2,000 out of European Command, the answer is no, 

because my forces are in the global force pool. My forces are rotating into Iraq and into Afghanistan, and my forces are managed by 

the joint staff and they are available for assignments as required. 

So in our global—— 

Dr. SNYDER. So you are what we call a force receiver, not a force 

provider. 

General CRADDOCK. I am a force provider to OIF and OEF, from 

my assigned forces in European Command. I do not receive forces 

unless I go back with a request for forces for a specific purpose and 

ask for them. 

Dr. SNYDER. Right. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think I’ll probably be in the same position 

as General Ward, but in my personal situation, sir, first of all, we 

have only at any given time less than 4,000 troops deployed 

throughout this region of the world. I am not a heavy demand in 

any sense. 

I have no assigned troops. I simply go to the pool that General 

Craddock is talking about. 

So my needs are met. I don’t have any excess. And in terms of 

the specific question you have about Admiral Fallon and Admiral 

Keating, I am sorry. I just can’t address that. 

I am a satisfied user of what I think is a sensible system. 

Dr. SNYDER. And I assume, General Ward, you are in that 

same—— 

General WARD. That is correct, Congressman. 

Dr. SNYDER. You understand our confusion. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I do. 

Dr. SNYDER. I mean, we want to win these wars. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. 

Dr. SNYDER. Regardless of people’s views about how we got into 

Iraq, we want the best outcome we can have. And we have somebody at your level saying I need 2,000 troops. It is concerning. It 

is very, very concerning. 

I wanted to ask the same question I asked Admiral Keating 

about Admiral Fallon, which is, because of my great respect for you 

all and the information that you provide both privately and in 

these public settings, while you all can be replaced tomorrow, there 

is always concern created when something happens like what has 

gone on the last week with Admiral Fallon. 

My question is, do we have to have any reservations that the 

wrong signal is going to be sent to the three of you that the information you are going to provide us, both publicly and privately, is 

somehow going to be constrained by what has occurred in the last 

few days with Admiral Fallon’s resignation? 

General CRADDOCK. Congressman, when I took this job, as I have 

previous assignments, I will be forthright and answer your questions without any hesitation. I have no reservation or concern with 

that regard. 
18 

So in terms of what has happened here recently, today I know 

what I read in the papers, and that is probably not enough. But 

I will continue to respond as I always have, to the best of my ability, to answer the questions where they lie. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. As I think we say on Capitol Hill, I want to 

associate myself with General Craddock’s remarks. I agree completely. 

The essence of all these jobs is honest and integrity, and I will 

continue to answer all questions put to me honestly and with integrity. 

General WARD. Representative, that has been my way of doing 

business for 36-plus years and I will not change. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country. 

There is an old Indian saying that you shouldn’t criticize a person until you have walked a day in their moccasins. We are unsympathetic when Russia complains about the enlargement of NATO 

into countries that were once a part of the Soviet Union and when 

they complain about the installation of military facilities in those 

countries. 

General Craddock, I would like you to image for a moment that 

we had lost the Cold War. NATO is gone, but the Warsaw Pact is 

alive and growing. And from time to time, new countries are added 

to the Warsaw Pact. This time, the countries that are being added 

to the Warsaw Pact are Mexico and Canada. 

How do you think you would feel, sir, in that situation? 

General CRADDOCK. As a citizen in a democracy, I would be concerned. 

Mr. BARTLETT. You see, I have some trouble understanding how 

it is in our long-term national security interest to antagonize Russia by extending NATO, which was set up specifically to counter 

the Warsaw Pact, by enlarging NATO into countries that are directly on their border and then putting military facilities there. 

I am all for a European goodwill society. I just think that naming 

it NATO is inherently threatening to Russia. 

I know this is primarily a State Department issue, but the State 

Department is not sitting in the witness chairs. And I know that 

our military has a role to play in this because we make recommendations relative to where our military ought to be placed 

and where our military facilities ought to be placed. And I remember that Indian observation that you shouldn’t criticize a person 

until you have walked a day in his moccasins. 

And when I put myself in the position of Russia, imagining that 

NATO is gone, the Warsaw Pact is enlarging and the next two 

member nations joining it would be Canada and Mexico. 

I really don’t need a response sir, I just wanted to get this on 

the record. Just one member’s observation, trying to sit in another 

person’s seat and see how they see the world from that position. 

Thank you all again, very, very much, for your service. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Sanchez, please. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
19 

Thank you, gentlemen, once again, for being before us. 

I have a couple of questions. I think the majority of my other 

question with respect to the troops in Afghanistan and the information we had from Admiral Fallon and others I think was taken up 

by Mr. Snyder, so I appreciate you following up on that, Mr. Snyder. 

I have a question for Admiral Stavridis. In your written testimony you articulate that your command facilitates military and defense exchanges, numerous defense seminars and mobile training 

teams throughout the region, and you go on to say that training 

at the security institutions continues to be very popular and beneficial toward the partners in the region and access to funded billets 

as a U.S. school significantly diminishes the draw of extra-hemispheric military influence. 

So I would like to ask you about a specific security institution 

since I didn’t see it mentioned in your 47 pages of written testimony. As you know, each year the House of Representatives votes 

on whether to cut funding for the Western Hemisphere Institute 

for Security Cooperation, or WHINSEC. And as you know, I am on 

the board of visitors of that institution for this committee. It is at 

Ft. Benning. 

And last year the House had a very close vote on whether to 

eliminate the funding for WHINSEC, a vote of 203 to 214. So, Admiral, is WHINSEC a priority for your command? And if so, how 

do you rank its importance within the other priorities of your posture statement? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. WHINSEC is our premiere opportunity for 

high-volume, high-quality training for military officers and senior 

enlisted from the entirety of Latin America. And it is important to 

say it is not just the students, ma’am. There are also 200 on the 

faculty, including representatives from 18 different countries, on 

the faculty, as you know from your time on the board of visitors. 

About 1,000 students at any given time, so the throughput is 

very high. It represents about 60 percent of our total available 

methodology for bringing our military partners from throughout 

Latin America, the Caribbean and Central America. 

I want to hit a bell that is very important and that, again, as 

you know from being on the board of visitors, is absolutely central 

to this is the human rights curriculum there. And that is about 35 

percent of the total curriculum that any given student receives. 

And to have that centralized is very, very important and powerful 

for us. 

So I would put WHINSEC very near the top, if not the top, of 

this particular segment of our outreach and ability to get into the 

region. And I continue to be very supportive of it. 

I should also mention, if I could, ma’am, that Mexico is not formally part of SOUTHCOM. It is part of U.S. Northern Command 

(NORTHCOM). But I have had many conversations with General 

Renuart, my opposite number at NORTHCOM, and he is equally 

strong a supporter of WHINSEC as I am. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And, Admiral, how does having graduates of 

WHINSEC, I don’t know how many they would number at this 

point, but we have had the school for a long time now—— 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thousands. 
20 

Ms. SANCHEZ [continuing]. As you know, former School of the 

Americas. We had some problems with that. We changed it over. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Right. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How does that affect your cooperative posture with 

respect to your counterparts or people under you who deal with 

these different countries as we try to figure out what the security 

situation should be for the western hemisphere? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, as you can imagine, it is just a powerful human linkage. If we think about how we in the United States 

try and send our message into the world, there are a lot of ways 

to do that. You can do it with film, you can do it with television, 

you can do it with radio, you can do it with publication. But human 

contact trumps all other forms in the transfer of information. 

So that human-to-human dimension that occurs when 1,000 students a year come, live in a beautiful place like Georgia and are 

welcomed into the homes of the families who are sponsoring them. 

It creates an absolutely indelible bond that then pays off in the 

sense that if you think what we are doing in the U.S. military is 

right, generally, and we sure make our mistakes, but generally you 

think what we are doing is right, I think you should feel good that 

we are attempting to transfer some of that value system into our 

partners and neighbors. 

And also I have to say we learn a lot from them. We learn an 

enormous amount about the region from having students from 13, 

20, 25 countries, come through that course. We learn about their 

culture, their language, their approach, what they value, what they 

don’t value. 

So that exchange becomes very powerful as you get into a situation where, for example, there are regional tensions, and yet there 

are students, former students from each of the countries, who have 

served, who know each other, who know people in the United 

States. It allows us to help defuse tension, as simply one example 

of the payout of WHINSEC. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Admiral. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the gentlelady’s inquiry on that 

school. 

Admiral, as you know, there have been in years and years past 

complaints about graduates from that school, or its predecessor. To 

your knowledge, have there been any problems or complaints or 

such, human rights violations, of graduates in recent years? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No, sir. 

And I would like to add that first of all it is utterly transparent. 

We are happy to have any Member of Congress, any reporter, come 

any time. And we also have an open house day when any member 

of the public can come. Last year we had 1,000 people come, including some people who disagreed with the former school, the old 

School of the Americas. 

And we simply are trying to show that this is not the School of 

the Americas. This is a new institution that is absolutely centered 

on human rights and the exchange of information with Members 

of Congress, such as Congresswoman Sanchez, Senator Levin, and 

others who are on the board of visitors, to help make sure it fulfills 

the correct ambitions that we all have for it. 
21 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. Hayes. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And gentlemen, again, let me echo my thanks to all of you and 

the men and women who serve under your command. 

General Ward, in your command, I know special forces will play 

a very important role in terms of helping with training, indirect action, and other supporting activities. Would you comment for the 

committee on how that is working out and just talk about the positive aspects of our participation there? 

General WARD. Thank you, Congressman. 

As General Craddock pointed out, at the current time the activities on the continent are still being conducted under the auspices 

of U.S. European Command and General Craddock’s Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) still is in charge of those activities where special operation forces are doing work in Africa. 

U.S. Africa Command does envision a theatre of special operations command. That command is being formed now, as is my 

headquarters, to be doing similar work that is being done by 

SOCEUR on the continent. 

Those activities include military-to-military training activities, 

basic unit tactics techniques, and procedures in conducting security 

operations that helps those nations provide for their own internal 

defense as well as the capability and capacity to participate in likeminded activities that help counter the terrorist threats that exist 

in their regions. 

And so there will be a theatre of special operations command as 

a part of U.S. Africa Command that will have the mission of providing for extremist response should that be required, as is currently the case through SOCEUR. And this theatre of special operations command will exist with capabilities similar to the capabilities that exist in any geographic combatant headquarters as it pertains to their special operations command and its capabilities. 

Mr. HAYES. Thanks to those comments, I think we are all appreciative of the role that they play there. And given the emerging status of Africa as it relates to oil and other resources, again, they are 

even more important. 

General Craddock, would you like to comment as the general in 

charge at the moment as well? 

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Congressman. 

I can only endorse what General Ward said and what you just 

said. They are very important. 

Because they are out and about in these JCETs, these exchange 

training activities, let me give you an example. Recently there was 

some instability in Chad and it was very fast paced and actually 

was a bit unanticipated. Because we had JCETs in the region 

training counterparts, we were able to quickly put them in the 

right position with some fixed-wing lift capability and to assist the 

ambassador with a communications capability with the opportunity 

then to provide him a command and control capacity that he would 

not have had, and to quickly work the ordered departure that was 

implemented by the State Department for the embassy there. 

Now, that happens because we have got those forces, those Operational Detachment-Alpha Teams (A-teams) and those JCETs en-
22 

gaged in the theatre with small capability. But again, it is a little 

bit in a large theatre that goes a long way. 

So I will tell you that SOCEUR, Special Operations Command 

Europe, is extraordinarily high tempo engagement in Africa that 

will transition to Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF) at 

the appropriate time. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you for those comments. 

I think it is important for the public to know how much of a role 

those forces—and all our forces are special, make no mistake about 

that—but in prevention of conflicts and other things. 

General Craddock, drug flow from South America through Africa 

to Europe, what is AFRICOM, and I’ll pass it on to you, too, General Ward, mission in that regard? We know that is happening as 

well. 

General CRADDOCK. At this time, with regard to EUCOM, since 

we still have that mission and we are watching closely in West Africa, and the lines of communication, both for smuggling of drugs 

and actual persons and arms also, through West Africa, up through 

the North Africa Maghreb, and into the southern part of Europe. 

There is great concern that that is also a potential foreign fighter 

flow through that area and onward movement toward the Middle 

East. 

There is concern in Europe also. I won’t say we partner, but we 

coordinate closely with SOUTHCOM. There is a new counterdrug 

office organization set up in Spain, I believe. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. That is in Lisbon, Portugal. 

General CRADDOCK. That we are monitoring, SOUTHCOM is 

working closely with, so we can enhance the picture that we have, 

it is ongoing, increase the intelligence gathering means in that region, and then be able to have a common operating picture across 

the combatant commands (COCOMs). 

Now, when AFRICOM comes onboard, again, we transition that 

to them. But we are seeing more and more great concern and sensitivity of the European nations, and they are participating in this 

to a greater extent, and that is a good thing. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

We have, it appears, I am told, two votes. One is the Lee amendment and the other is a quorum call for the purposes of swearing 

in a new member. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to all of you for your long-standing service to our 

country. It has been exceptional. We appreciate it. 

I wonder if you could turn specifically, General Craddock, to talking about the 1207 authority and the use of funds from the DOD 

to the stabilization efforts but nonmilitary efforts through the State 

Department. Have you been able to use that authority? And has 

the response been what you would expect? 

I know that this is relatively new, but we are going to be looking 

at that authority again. 

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Congresswoman. I appreciate 

that. 
23 

The 1206, 1207, and 1208 authorities indeed are relatively new, 

but they have been in this short time, in my judgment, very powerful. The title 22 funding through the Department of State into regions for the purposes then of foreign military financing (FMF) and 

International Military Education and Training (IMET) is all very 

helpful, but here is another opportunity with authority from State 

Department, funding from the Department of Defense, to be able 

to provide another avenue for building partner nation capability 

and capacity in counterterrorism activities. 

And we are finding throughout Africa and I think also in Eastern 

Europe, the Caucasus, if you will, this is helpful because these terrorist organizations are embedding themselves into criminal organizations and using centuries-old lines of smuggling, if you will, to 

move back and forth, not only persons but weapons, arms and 

other contraband that they use, obviously, to gain financial advantage. 

So this authority provides us, 1207 particularly, some infrastructure capability to assist partner nations to come onboard and increase their capacities to deal with this. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. When do you think is a fair time to 

assess the extent to which they have been able to really capitalize 

on that, to be able to bring those individuals forward? 

General CRADDOCK. Well, I don’t think it is right now. First of 

all, the 1206 we got first, and we are using it now to greater advantage. The 1207 has come onboard. Quite frankly, in this huge 

system we have, it takes a while to understand what we can do to 

work through the legal framework of what the limits of the authority is and then apply it. We have to get it out to our offices of defense cooperation. 

I think it will take a couple to three years to really see the value. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Is there anything that we can do to 

be more helpful in that regard? 

General CRADDOCK. I think that enhancement of the 1206; I 

think we are limited now. We have asked for more. It would be 

helpful. And then second, watch that and continue to cascade that 

into the 1207, as we come back and give you positive results. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Can I just add a comment to that from the 

SOUTHCOM perspective? 

First of all, I believe General Craddock is on point in everything 

he said. I would only add to it, it is important to know, it is kind 

of a dual-key approach. It is both State Department, as in the ambassador, as well as the combatant commander, who sort of close 

that switch together. So it is a real example of sensible interagency 

partnering and, thus, I think is a powerful tool. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

Do you think it could also stimulate our European allies or our 

allies generally in NATO to be engaging in similar efforts? Is it 

something that we see on their part, and does it define in any way 

the threats as they see them in the region? 

General CRADDOCK. Let me provide two responses and I hope 

they are not flip. 

One is, if it costs money, they probably are not interested. Second, when we talk counterterrorism, they view it as a public secu-
24 

rity issue, not as a national security issue. And that will be difficult. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

General Ward, could I just quickly—when I happened to take a 

trip to several of the African countries, I wondered to what extent 

are we using contractors, military contractors, to train our African 

military there in Africa? 

General WARD. Congresswoman, the ACOTA program, the Africa 

Contingency for Operations and Training Assistance, a State Department program, is a program that is implemented through contractors. This program is supplemented where we can by uniform 

military members as well, to help provide a current and living example of those attributes through a uniform serving member. 

But that ACOTA program is a State Department program and it 

is implemented through contracts. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. If we had the personnel available, 

would we prefer to have that done through the Department of Defense? 

General WARD. I think the example that is provided by uniform 

members, there is none any more powerful. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. And thank the gentlelady. 

We will recess for the two votes and return. 

When we do, Mr. Wilson, you will be up. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the witnesses’ indulgence. We not surprisingly may have additional votes soon. But we will forge on. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And Generals, Admiral, thank you for being here today. 

I have the perspective of being a Member of Congress representing Parris Island, representing Ft. Jackson, the Beaufort Marine Air Station, the Naval Hospital at Beaufort. Additionally, I am 

a veteran, 31 years. But more importantly, I have got four sons 

serving in the military, three in the Army Guard, one a Navy doctor who has served in Iraq. And so I am very proud of our military. 

I am very appreciative as a parent of your service. I have never 

been prouder of the American military and I want to thank you. 

General Craddock, this is such an exciting time, with victory in 

the Cold War, with the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe. 

I have worked very closely with the Republic of Bulgaria. I am the 

co-chair, along with Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher. 

This developing free-market democracy two years ago for the 

first time in their 1,225 years of existence, their national assembly 

voted for NATO bases, American bases, to be located in their country. 

Can you tell us what the status is of the new bases in Bulgaria? 

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Congressman. 

First of all, let me just thank you for your support and those of 

your sons. We appreciate that, their service and your support for 

their service, and all the service members. 

With regard to Bulgaria, Joint Task Force East, as you know, is 

the name given to the construct to put a joint task force head-
25 

quarters stationed in Bulgaria, Romania and some of their facilities 

there and then rotate forces through that. 

We have received the funding required for the projects, in order 

to put the brick and mortar together to accomplish that. We are almost complete now with the finalizing for both countries, Romania 

and Bulgaria, of the technical agreements. I think 11 of 12 at the 

last time I checked, which was a few weeks ago, have been completed and are in place. 

My deputy went down to sign off on several of those recently. 

So I think that we are well on our way to reaching agreement 

with the how of what we are going to do, the brick and mortar is 

going in to provide the structures that we all need. 

And then the last part, the forces available to do the rotation, 

and then jointly with the Bulgarians and the Romanians, accomplish the, one, the engagement, and, two, the training for us as 

well as them. 

Now, we are a bit short on the forces. We are using forces out 

of European Command to do that, because of the intensity and the 

requirements of OIF and OEF. Our request for forces is yet unfilled. 

We all continue to do that. I have talked to the commander of 

European Command and we are confident we can put together the 

required forces. The key here is engagement. 

Mr. WILSON. Additionally, I have visited Russia a number of 

times and I am still hopeful for a positive relationship with that 

country. We have shared interest of fighting terrorism, of also the 

threat of nuclear proliferation. 

What has been our contact, inter-military contact, with Russia? 

General CRADDOCK. European Command meets regularly at the 

staff brigadier, major general, one- and two-star level, with Russian 

counterparts. They do that to work through work plans for exercises, engagements, where we will exchange type units for a period 

of two or three years. 

Recently we finished that for the coming years. That was brought 

back. And that document, the work plan, was signed by the chairman of the joint chiefs with his counterpart, the Russian chief of 

defense. 

So we have an ongoing engagement. This year, we completed in 

December Torgau, which is an annual exercise. A bit more robust 

this year, we were encouraged, than in years past. We are hoping 

to be able to increase that for the future. 

The engagement between EUCOM and the Russian forces, I 

would characterize as difficult. We have not lost any ground, but 

we are not gaining ground because of the political influence rolling 

into the military engagement. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

In lieu of the last question, I just want to extend, every time I 

see General Ward, my open invitation for a home for him, for he 

and his command, in Charleston, South Carolina, on behalf of the 

Charleston Metro Chamber of Commerce. Indeed, we have a whole 

list of reasons why Charleston would be perfectly situated for 

AFRICOM. 

Thank you and congratulations. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is out of order. 
26 

Mr. WILSON. We have got a home for you, too, in a condo, Mr. 

Chairman. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I have lost my train of thought. 

Mr. Johnson, please. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good afternoon, gentlemen. Thank you for your service to the 

Nation. 

Admiral Stavridis, is Cuba a threat to the United States’ security? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I do not believe that in today’s environment 

Cuba is a military threat to the United States. 

I think the unfortunate aspect of Cuba is that it is a dictatorship. 

Three months ago, 614 seats in their legislature were filled by 614 

candidates who ran for office. Power passed at the fiat of Fidel Castro to his brother, Raul, without changing anything, without improving human rights, without improving conditions for dissidents 

and without opening economically, without anything that would relieve the oppression of decades. 

So I think of Cuba not as a military threat but as a threat to 

democracy in that they are the last remaining nation in this region 

that does not follow the rule of democracy, and I think that is deeply unfortunate. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. 

General Ward, AFRICOM’s mission requires it to work with both 

non-DOD and non-U.S. Government organizations. Can you describe your experience so far in establishing relationships and partnerships with non-U.S. Government organizations conducting stabilization and reconstruction activities within the area of operations of AFRICOM? 

General WARD. Thank you, Congressman. 

As was pointed out, we have not taken over those missions just 

yet from U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, and 

U.S. Pacific Command. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Are those operations that are ongoing? 

General WARD. The operations that are ongoing are being done 

through mechanisms that we have been using. What I have attempted to do is reinforce the fact with these nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and agencies that it is not our intent to do 

their work. What we want to do, quite frankly, is to have a better 

understanding of their activities and where we can, through our actions, be supportive of them, we want to understand and do that. 

I have met with representatives of various NGOs as well as other 

international organizations. I have met with USAID. USAID has 

hosted several of these meetings that I have conducted with nongovernmental organizations so that we can understand more clearly, firstly, what they are doing; second, where there are common 

lines of mutual support, where we can pursue those. And then 

working in ways that we can achieve that mutual benefit. 

I think as I have done that quite frankly, Congressman, there 

has been receptivity to the approach. There has been a welcomed 

appreciation for the outreach that we have extended and wanting 

to know better. And I think the important thing—another important thing is, where we see a contact line that just isn’t appropriate, then we certainly would honor that and stay away. 
27 

Mr. JOHNSON. Typically, what are some of the things that the 

NGOs and other potential partners value about American involvement in that region of the world? What is it that they want from 

us? 

General WARD. The NGOs that are working there that we have 

been in contact with, some of them, see our ability to get into the 

environment, the sustained nature of our presence in building relationships. 

As an example, we have conducted exercises whereby NGOs, and 

I’ll use one to cite one, Project Hope has been a part of the exercises. We have gone in and worked with a Hope nation in addressing their medical capacity requirements. We then also have done 

partnering with NGOs. 

Mr. JOHNSON. But these are not military operations. These are 

more soft-power type operations. 

General WARD. Correct. It is a blending of the soft power with 

what we do. Exactly correct, sir. 

Mr. JOHNSON. If you could, describe for us the overall Department of Defense involvement in stabilization and reconstruction activities in Africa, including activities funded by DOD, State, USAID 

and other agencies where DOD plays a lead or supporting role. 

General WARD. Sir, the Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTRs) are projects that are operated under the auspices 

of our foreign policy, State Department, established through those 

programs. Where we are involved is in the transformation and 

modernization of armed forces of those nations. And we do that 

through our military-to-military training. We do that through the 

administration of various programs, the International Military 

Education and Training Program, whereby the professionalization, 

the NCO leadership, officer leadership, the professionalization of 

their militaries, is a part of the SSTR, we have a role in doing 

those sorts of activities. And we do that in greater support of the 

greater programs of stabilization and reconstruction within a particular nation and its military’s uniform services. 

Mr. JOHNSON. What has been your experience so far in the development of a workable interagency process? And in particular, how 

closely are the State Department and Department of Defense coordinating on plans for the command and on U.S. military efforts 

in Africa in general? 

General WARD. There has been a very close level of cooperation 

and coordination with the State Department. The State Department was involved in the planning of the command, during the 

transition team activities. They remain involved with the input of 

my deputy to the commander for military activities, who is a senior 

State Department ambassador, who is one of my two deputies. And 

the planning that we do is done in very close coordination with the 

Department of State, both at my headquarters as well as main 

State here in Washington. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Georgia, Dr. Gingrey. 

Dr. GINGREY. Chairman Skelton, thank you. 

In a way, I am going to continue on, really, the line of questioning from my friend from Georgia, Representative Johnson. 
28 

I am going to direct most of my questions, though, to Admiral 

Stavridis. 

But General Ward, what you were just saying in response to 

Congressman Johnson is, I think, this interagency approach, soft 

power, combined, of course, with the traditional military command, 

that you so ably are tasked to do now with this Africa Command. 

I think we are all pleased with what we have heard from you and 

General Craddock as well in the European Command. 

Admiral Stavridis, in your written testimony to us, I’ll make attention to page 35, where you describe pretty much what we were 

just talking about, an interagency approach in Southern Command, 

in Central Command, indeed, and Africa Command. 

The chairman was kind enough to create an ad hoc committee on 

roles and missions that Jim Cooper from Tennessee chaired and I 

was the ranking member, co-chair. And we are right now looking 

at that. And very possibly we are talking about a—maybe this is 

an overstatement, but a Goldwater-Nichols two type approach to 

speak softly but of course, indeed, always carrying a big stick. 

So I am very pleased, Admiral, in regard to what you talk about 

in these three or four pages. In my five minutes I don’t have time 

to go through that, but I really like that. I like that very much. 

I did want to go back to my colleague from California, Ms. Sanchez, who serves with me on WHINSEC board of visitors, as you 

know, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. 

I think it is hugely important, and you described to her some of the 

things that are done. You called it, I think, that school at Ft. 

Benning, WHINSEC, a premiere volume opportunity for training 

1,000 students at any one time. Eighteen to 25 different countries, 

mainly in the area of the Southern Command, 60 percent of our 

training opportunity with them for that region. Thirty-five percent 

of the curriculum based on human rights. 

You went on to say that WHINSEC is a powerful force, creating 

an indelible bond in the region. 

I want to ask you this specific question: if we lost that, and unfortunately 201 members of our House of Representatives voted to 

make WHINSEC go away last year, and I don’t know how many 

maybe, one, have taken the opportunity, your invitation to come 

visit and see the good work that is being done down there and the 

great instruction. 

But if we lost that vote this year, who would fill that void? What 

would be the scenario, if we didn’t have that, when we are looking 

at, we mentioned about Cuba not being a military threat, but, you 

know, Hugo Chavez and others. Elaborate on that for us a little bit, 

if you would. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Again, there would be no quick way to reconstruct the capability for close, integrated cooperation with the 

many, many nations of this hemisphere who want serious, honorable human rights oriented, military-to-military connectivity, training and exercising together. There simply would be no way to rapidly reconstruct that. 

And I would argue that if our primary concern is in fact militaries in the region who are responsible members of their societies, 

who are subject to civilian rule, where admirals and generals come 

and testify before civilian politicians, the way we do so appro-
29 

priately here in the United States. If that is our goal, then we 

should be very pleased with the kind of instruction that goes on at 

WHINSEC. 

And again, I can only reiterate my invitation, not only to Members of Congress, but to other concerned citizens who are interested 

in coming and spending a day at WHINSEC. We will accommodate 

that. I believe in showing people what is going on. 

People are concerned about things that happened decades ago. It 

is not an institution that we should be anything other than extraordinarily proud of today. 

Dr. GINGREY. Admiral, thank you. 

And in my concluding seconds, let me also thank General 

Craddock and General Ward. This committee has been honored to 

hear from you on a number of occasions and you do us proud. We 

thank you so very much for your service. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Ms. Shea-Porter, please. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. 

And I would like to thank you for being here. 

I would like to state that I realize we need to be involved with 

the continent, with the countries of Africa, and that there is a role 

to play. But I am not comfortable with the role that we are choosing to play right now. And I would like to read, General Ward, 

something from your statement. 

It says, ‘‘Building regional stability and security will take many 

years of sustained and dedicated effort. There is no conspicuous finish line. Therefore, enduring Congressional support is indispensable.’’ 

That sounds an awful lot like Iraq, you know, the same kind of 

logic, that it is going to take us many, many years to build stability 

and security. And I am not sure that we can play on different continents at the level that we have been, and to finance the way we 

have been financing, and clearly you are asking for financial support here. And as you go on read, you all see that you will. 

And I am looking at other areas of the world, and I am concerned. So I am going to ask you a series of questions because, as 

you know, we are limited in terms of money—time and money. 

First of all, you referred to our partners. Could you please name 

our partners in Africa who are—— 

General WARD. There are nations in Africa that have very willingly asked that we assist them in increasing their capacity. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Can you name them? 

General WARD. I can. Senegal, Ghana, South Africa, Liberia, 

Gabon, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Morocco. There are many nations. There are security organizations. The African Union, the regional economic communities of the African Union, especially the 

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have all 

said, can you help us in increasing our capacity. And that is who 

I am referring to as I say partners. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And they want us to actually have a physical 

presence? 

General WARD. They want us to be present with them as they 

are increasing their capacity. Yes, ma’am. 
30 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. Because last time, we said there was 

only one country that could be named publicly. 

General WARD. What I wouldn’t put into that—that refers to a 

headquarters presence, different from the activities that we conduct with them. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Are these countries that you just named 

wanting us to have a headquarters on the continent and would be 

willing to host us or have us in their particular nation? 

General WARD. Liberia has. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. So just one. 

All right. The other thing is, you mentioned terrorist threat. Do 

you have any idea how many al Qaeda are on the continent or in 

northern Africa right now? Do you have a guess that you could 

say? Is this a big problem or something that you are looking out? 

General WARD. It is a problem. General Craddock pointed to the 

flow of foreign fighters from North Africa that go from North Africa 

into the Middle East. The nations of North Africa, in addition to 

being concerned about that, are also concerned that these foreign 

fighters who flow into the Middle East and do whatever they do, 

those who survive that and then return to their home nations, 

them foment discontent within their nations as well. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Are they al Qaeda? 

General WARD. They are al Qaeda. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Do you have any idea how many? 

General WARD. I can’t put a number on it. No, ma’am. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. Would you say small, large, you 

know—— 

General WARD. It is a disturbing number. It is more than a few. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. One would be disturbing, obviously. I think 

we could agree on that. 

You mentioned that they want us to enable them to provide for 

their own security. Is that the same number of countries you 

named before? And what are they looking for? The last time we 

talked, it was that they were actually looking for some weapons as 

well as some advice. 

General WARD. It is not weapons, per se. It is professionalization 

of their military. It is causing them to be able to plan, conduct, and 

sustain things in a very legitimate way. As Admiral Stavridis 

pointed out, doing things in accordance with respect for human dignity, human rights, respect for the rule of law. 

It its those sorts of professionalization activities that they seek 

our assistance, so that they can become more professional in the 

conduct of their security operations. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. Well, my worry, again, is because there 

is a lot of instability there, and if we do provide weapons and they 

do have a conflict, that they will use the weapons that we have provided. Do you have some concern about that? 

General WARD. Congresswoman, the provision of weapons is not 

what we are talking about. We are talking about, quite frankly, 

sustaining a level of interaction that causes their professionalism 

to be such that those weapons will not be turned to use against 

their own populations. And that is where we seek to increase our 

active security with them. 
31 

And that doesn’t happen with—we run a risk of the situation 

that you just described being there when we aren’t engaged with 

them on a sustained basis. This long-term point that I made is the 

fact that if we build our relations with them over time, sustain our 

contact, quite frankly, cause a way of doing business and ethos if 

you go to emerge that is less likely to lead to the situation that you 

just described. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. But we have seen that in other areas of the 

world, where when they have conflict it turns out they have U.S. 

weapons, and this is my concern, that if we don’t succeed at the 

vision that you have of stabilizing it, that we all have that. 

And the last question is contractors. Any contractors involved? 

General WARD. Contractors are involved. Contractors are being 

under the auspices of the State Department, the ACOTA program 

that we have in place. But there are contractors involved. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And you will be using them? 

General WARD. Not for those missions that we are responsible 

for. We seek to use through the request for forces process uniformed members to do the mission, to help us as we perform our 

security assistance. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Lamborn is next on the list. 

Pardon me. Mr. Franks is next on the list. 

Thank you. Then Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. My apologies to 

Mr. Lamborn here. 

I always want to thank the leadership of the U.S. military for 

their courage and for their sacrificial commitment to human freedom. None of what we have in America could be possible apart 

from your noble courage and commitment to those things, and I 

hope I never miss a moment when I get to address some of you to 

express that. 

With that said, General Craddock, on page 21 of your testimony 

you express the growing threat of ballistic missile. And, of course, 

this is something that I am extremely concerned about and agree 

with you completely. 

You indicate that Iran might deploy Intercontinental Ballistic 

Missiles (ICBMs) that can reach Europe and the U.S. as early as 

potentially 2015. And of course the President’s budget asks for 

$241 million for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to conduct both 

the interceptor field and the expand radar site for the European 

site and a total of $720 million for the hardware and construction. 

Without asking you any question related to the budget itself, my 

question is would a delay in the deployment of this site put the 

onus on you to assume some increased risks, some increased level 

of risk to U.S. forces forward in our NATO allies? 

Let me make sure you hear the question right. I am saying, you 

know, we recognize the ballistic missile threat. We have got funds 

that the President has asked to put in place for that. If for whatever reason the deployment of this site is delayed, does that potentially increase the risks for some of the forward deployed forces and 

the United States, in your opinion? 
32 

General CRADDOCK. If the timelines as they are correlated for development of a ballistic missile capability from Iran is in any way 

accelerated, the answer would be a delay in placement of a third 

site would increase the risk. 

I don’t know where they crossover, but indeed a delay, given 

what we project would in my judgment potentially increase the risk 

to our forces deployed. 

Mr. FRANKS. Obviously I think you are absolutely right, and I 

still quote from one of my colleagues here. I know that question 

gets the blooming obvious award. But I appreciate you being forthright about it. 

And so let me, if I could do something a little bit unusual and 

ask the chair, just in terms of what may happen if the Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee perhaps should mark up a portion of the National Defense Authorization, if there is a cut in the European site, 

much as there was last year, and as you know, Mr. Chairman, I 

tried to restore funding to ensure that General Craddock’s area of 

AOR is sufficiently defended against ballistic missiles. 

If I offered an amendment to increase that funding after it had 

been cut in the Strategic Forces Committee, if I offered the amendment here, would that be considered advocating for an earmark? 

The CHAIRMAN. I don’t know what the future earmark rules will 

be. I am waiting with great anticipation, as I know you are. 

That is a good question, though. 

Mr. FRANKS. I think it is a very important one, and I hate to redirect the focus here of the meeting, but some of us find it extremely important, because being totally aware of the earmark 

abuse, I understand all of that. But, you know, we don’t want to 

be in the process of rewriting the Constitution here. 

Some of the challenges that you face are very, very real. And the 

Constitution of the United States says in Article 1 Section 8, and 

Section 8 may be just a sad corollary there, I know that some of 

you know what Section 8 is in the manual, ‘‘The Congress shall 

have power to provide for the common defense and general welfare 

of the United States and to do this in part by raising and supporting armies and providing and maintaining a navy.’’ 

If we do exactly that in this committee by offering amendments 

that we think are important, and that is somehow tangled up in 

this whole earmark thing, and I may not have the opinion you 

think I do on earmarks, Mr. Chairman, I am not sure. But that is 

not the point. My fear is letting the constitutional duties of this 

committee and the Congress get tangled up in that. And if we are 

not careful and if we don’t make very specific definitions of what 

an earmark is, we will be rewriting the Constitution. 

And so I am hoping the chairman will consider that, given the 

gravity of what we are dealing with in making sure that these folks 

have enough to defend us. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman for his advice. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, gentlemen, for everything. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate you gentlemen being here. 

Admiral, I am curious, what is the status of negotiations with 

the Ecuadorian government as to our forward operating base in 
33 

Manta? Have we been given a drop-dead departure date? Is it still 

under negotiations? What are the alternative sites you are looking 

at? That would be one thing. 

The second thing is, I fear one of the unintended consequences 

of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that we have been ignoring 

our neighbors to the south. Prior to these conflicts, we have a very 

active—and even during the Bosnian conflict, we had a very active 

program of building one-room schoolhouses, water wells for people 

whose children were dying of contaminated water, and a lot of 

things to build goodwill in a region of the world where we had a 

lot of goodwill. 

I suspect that has been put on hold, and I would take it a step 

further. I would be curious, in your budget, how much of your 

budget goes toward paying the pilots of DynCorp to fly the eradication missions over Colombia at the same time when American 

troops are apparently providing security for President Karzai’s 

brother, who is reported to be one of the largest drug dealers in Afghanistan, and whether in your conversations with the other commanders you don’t find that inconsistent. Because I do, that on one 

hand we are spending hundreds of millions of dollars a year to 

DynCorp and others to eradicate drugs in Colombia, while we are 

apparently turning a blind eye to allies in Afghanistan who are up 

to their noses in the drug business? Wouldn’t that money that we 

are spending on DynCorp to fly those eradication missions be better spent going back to our traditional approach of the one-room 

school house, water well and the medical clinics. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you for that question, sir. 

Let me catch up on Manta. The lease expires in late 2009. We 

have not at this time to my knowledge been formally asked to leave 

at the end of that lease, and the negotiation to attempt to stay, 

which we would like to stay, is being conducted by our ambassador 

with the government of Ecuador. She continues to work that. 

I would say that based on the public statements of the president 

of Ecuador, which have been clear, it seems unlikely to me that we 

will be permitted to extend that lease, despite the fact that I think 

it would be very desirable, both for Ecuador and for the United 

States and for the nations of the region. 

So we are looking at alternative sites in other friendly countries 

through the region, and I wouldn’t want to get into specifics of 

that, but it is still a very open process, and we would be interested 

in—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Without you getting into specifics, could I make a 

request for the record that you supply to me or even better to the 

committee—— 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Happy to. 

Mr. TAYLOR [continuing]. What sites you are looking at and the 

cost associated with those other sites to take the place should we 

lose Manta. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I will be happy to do so, sir. Thank you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 155.] 

On the second part of your question about DynCorp eradication 

flights, those fall under the State Department budget as part of the 
34 

State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) moneys. 

Mr. TAYLOR. To the best of your knowledge, what is the dollar 

amount associated with that? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I would be guessing, and I would—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Can I ask that for the record? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir, you certainly can. And I will provide 

that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 155.] 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. And as to the Afghanistan piece, I don’t really know anything about that aspect of it. Perhaps General 

Craddock does. I do not. 

General CRADDOCK. Congressman, with regard to security for 

President Karzai’s brother, I do not know that that is provided by 

NATO ISAF. If it is, within 24 hours I will direct it not be. I cannot 

speak for U.S. forces, because they belong to CENTCOM. 

Mr. TAYLOR. But, General, again, this is coming from people who 

live within Afghanistan. And when our ambassador to Afghanistan 

appeared before this committee and I posed that question to him, 

is the president’s brother one of the biggest drug dealers in Afghanistan, he did not deny it. He had every opportunity to say it is not 

true. 

So again, doesn’t that, considering that we have to the best of 

our knowledge at least three Americans in captivity in Colombia, 

captured on a counterdrug mission—am I the only person who 

finds this somewhat inconsistent, that we are spending a heck of 

a lot of money in Colombia, trying to eradicate drugs, and have 

taken what is at best a blind eye toward the drug problem in Afghanistan. 

General CRADDOCK. Well, Congressman, I would, with all due respect, disagree about the blind eye. There is much activity. More 

is needed. The drugs in Afghanistan go to Europe. It is heroin. And 

the drugs in Colombia go to the United States. 

Mr. TAYLOR. With a straight face, General, and I have heard this 

said before, would you like to tell your NATO and my NATO allies 

that what goes on in Afghanistan is okay because the drugs go 

there? 

General CRADDOCK. I didn’t say that, Congressman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. No, sir, but you said the drugs go to Europe. 

General CRADDOCK. That is a fact. 

Mr. TAYLOR. So does that make it okay? 

General CRADDOCK. I didn’t say that. It does not make it okay. 

That is why we are trying to stop it. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Lamborn, now. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am always happy to defer to Mr. Franks, happily so. 

I would like to ask you, Mr. Craddock, General Craddock, about 

some statements on page 21 of your report, just to follow up on 

what Representative Franks introduced a few minutes ago. 
35 

You said there that the Iranians may have an intercontinental 

ballistic missile capability by 2015. Is there any plausible defensive 

reason they have for that kind of capability? 

General CRADDOCK. Congressman, to my knowledge that is not 

a defensive weapon. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. And then my next question then is, even if 

it is true, as the recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) said, 

which I am skeptical about, that their nuclear weaponization is on 

hold, given the fact that they are still proceeding with nuclear enrichment 100 percent, as fast as they can, how difficult is it for 

them to take that capability and knowledge and progress and 

transfer that over to weaponization if they choose to do so in the 

future? 

General CRADDOCK. Well, if the weaponization is on hold, it 

wouldn’t be transferred. But if they decided to change the 

weaponization decision, and the enrichment continues and proceeds, then it would be easier rather than harder and take less 

time. 

But an intercontinental ballistic missile does not necessarily 

have to have a nuclear warhead. It can have a conventional, and 

it could still yield quite a destructive capability. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Is there anything in the budget request that you think—and as was said earlier, there is about $720 million to put 

a radar antenna interceptors in Poland and Czechoslovakia, or 

Czech Republic. Could you elaborate on the risk we would have if 

we start cutting into that $720 million, as some may try to do because we know some tried to do that last year? 

General CRADDOCK. Based on the assumption that there is a 

threat, if the development of the third site is delayed and the 

threat continues, based upon projections and the intelligence community, the risk would increase, because we would not have a site 

in place at a time when we would need it if there are delays in implementation. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Are there any capabilities whose development 

and/or fielding you would like to see accelerated? 

General CRADDOCK. I probably am not qualified to answer that 

because it is a technical question and the Missile Defense Agency 

still controls the program. I think the key here is that as a risk 

develops and becomes apparent, which influences our security, we 

would like to have a countermeasure in place in time. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And then as I finish up here, in the same statement, on page 21, you talk about efforts to reach out to the Russians and explain and demonstrate and show them that these are 

defensive efforts. How is that effort going and is there anything 

more we can do along those lines? 

General CRADDOCK. Over the last couple of years, Missile Defense Agency, along with EUCOM in military-to-military talks, has 

done that, we thought with some progress. But unfortunately the 

receptivity militarily has probably been stymied by the political developments. 

It is ongoing. We are hopeful that there might be a breakthrough 

to where there could be some accommodation and a realization that 

this is no threat to the strategic nuclear force of Russia. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you very much. 
36 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Conaway, please. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Generals and Admiral, thank you all for being here this morning; 

or this afternoon, I guess. 

Admiral Stavridis, the Colombia Free Trade Agreement might 

not be intuitively be something we would think we would talk 

about this afternoon, but it is going to come up on the Hill, it may 

have already come up on the Hill. Can you talk to us about your 

view of its importance, either in passing or failing, would have on 

our impact and relations within Colombia? 

The Defense Minister Santos was here this week and is obviously 

keenly interested in this thing passing, both as a, kind of a pat on 

the back to Uribe and his colleagues who in my view have done a 

particularly good job of turning that circumstance around from a 

country headed to a narco-controlled failed state to one that has 

made great strides addressing some grievous issues that they have 

had. 

So would you mind spending a couple of minutes visiting about 

your perspective on the Colombia Free Trade Agreement? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I’ll be glad to. 

I think to have any conversation about Colombia, you need to go 

back 10 years and look at Colombia of 1997. And Colombia 1997 

as, as you just alluded to, sir, a country on the brink, really on the 

edge of the abyss of falling into narcoterrorism. 

In the 10 years since then, with a relatively modest level of U.S. 

assistance, the Colombians have reduced murders in their country 

80 percent, have reduced kidnapping 70 percent, have reduced killing of trade unionists, very important statistic, 80 percent. Their 

economy has grown every year by an additional 1 percent and this 

year will hit 7 percent. 

President Uribe, the leader, enjoys an 84 percent popularity rate. 

The FARC has been reduced from 18,000 members to 9,000 members. Thirty thousand rightwing militants have been demobilized. 

By every objective measure, there has been enormous progress in 

Colombia. Are there still problems in Colombia surrounding human 

rights? Yes. However, the Colombians are dealing with them with 

extraordinary forthrightness. And I believe that when you look at 

that span of improvement, you look at a nation that has stood with 

the United States in a wide variety of circumstances, and you look 

at the countervailing forces in the region who are watching this debate very closely, I will tell you from a national security perspective, and I would not begin to talk about the economics of the issue 

or the politics of the issue, but as your national security observer 

in that region, I will tell you that it is very important that the free 

trade agreement be passed, from a national security perspective. 

And I hear that not just from senior people in Colombia, but 

from my interlocutors throughout the region. They are watching 

closely to see what happens to a nation that stands with the 

United States for a decade or more. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you. 

You may have already covered this in your opening testimony, 

and I apologize, but a couple of sentences on Chavez’s bullying tactics earlier last week with moving troops, or purportedly moving 

troops, and Colombia’s response. 
37 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, as I mentioned in my remarks, but I am 

happy to embellish slightly, the events of 10 days ago in which 

three nations were breaking diplomatic relations, in which troops 

were being moved toward borders, I am pleased to tell you that 

that situation has largely been resolved through the good efforts of 

the nations themselves. And I feel both the Colombians, the Ecuadorians and indeed the Venezuelans have walked back from a very 

tense situation. 

In terms of Venezuela, I am, as I mentioned in response to an 

earlier question, we are concerned about the level of arms purchases in Venezuela. Naturally, we are concerned about anti-U.S. 

rhetoric that emanates from that government. It is unfortunate. 

The United States has historically enjoyed an excellent relationship 

with Venezuela. They are a strong trading partner. I would for one 

hope that we could work our way to a better relationship. But at 

the moment, it is a very difficult relationship. It is the only country 

in the hemisphere with the exception of Cuba with which we do not 

enjoy very good military-to-military relations at this time. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, General. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman from Texas. 

General Craddock, you stated that the caveats have been impediments on our operations in Afghanistan. I think we have a classified list of the caveats or the limitations on the various NATO nations’ troops, but would you be kind enough to give us an updated 

list of them as they now stand? They hopefully might have 

changed—— 

General CRADDOCK [continuing]. Could I provide that for the 

record? 

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything that we could do, the United 

States could do, to demonstrate more leadership to urge the various nations that have those caveats, that have those limitations on 

what their troops may do? Is there anything more that we can do 

to urge them to eliminate those or to change those caveats or limitations? This is very bothersome to those of us on this committee. 

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Chairman. 

I will provide that updated list, the recent list that we have got, 

for the record, if I may. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 155.] 

General CRADDOCK. With regard to what can we do, I think what 

has to happen is that we have to provide consequences of those caveats. The impacts of those caveats on day-to-day operations on the 

ground, in stark terms, not only to military leadership in the nations that hold those caveats, but also it has got to transition into 

the political arena. 

I think that many of you are on parliamentary committees with 

NATO parliamentarians, and that is an outreach opportunity. 

Whenever there are heads of state here at the Congress visiting, 

another opportunity to talk about it in a way that it makes the reality of the constraint real world. And what it means to the service 

members, the soldiers, the marines, the airmen, on the ground in 

Afghanistan in that it increases the risk to them every day in their 
38 

operation because of these functional and geographical constraints 

known as caveats. 

The CHAIRMAN. So what can we do to better urge them to eliminate those caveats? 

General CRADDOCK. Well, as I said, I think it is an engagement 

at every level and opportunity, whether it be counterpart here or 

another means. 

I think that there is a recognition by the chiefs of defense, the 

military leadership of the nations that have those caveats declared, 

that they understand the impacts. That needs to be relayed with 

a compelling, irrefutable argument into the political arena, because 

essentially those caveats are mandated from governments. 

So I think that is the key. There has to be increased emphasis 

and increased energy applied in that area. 

The CHAIRMAN. For the record, what countries within the NATO 

community do not have caveats or limitations on their troops in Afghanistan? 

General CRADDOCK. I don’t have, Chairman, the list in front of 

me. I can provide that for the record, but I don’t have the list here. 

There are several, but I don’t have them offhand. 

The CHAIRMAN. That would not be classified. 

General CRADDOCK. Not to my knowledge, no. 

The CHAIRMAN. We would appreciate that very much. 

General CRADDOCK. Certainly. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 155.] 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. 

Well, General Craddock, Admiral Stavridis and General Ward, 

thank you so much for—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman? Congressman Cummings has asked 

that we have a question for the record, if I may, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Please proceed. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Generals, this is from Congressman Cummings, who 

is at another meeting. 

The question is, as you are aware, President Sarkozy addressed 

Congress in November. In his address, he stated that the European 

Union emerges from 10 years of discussions on its institutions. 

They will still have a stable presence, a more powerful high representative for foreign and security policy. With that development, 

President Sarkozy concluded that the European Union must have 

the proper construction of a military capacity. Specifically, he noted 

that there are—and I am quoting—‘‘There are more crises than 

there are capacities to face them. NATO cannot be everywhere. The 

EU must be able to act, as it did in the Balkans or in the Congo, 

as it will in the future on the border of Sudan and Chad.’’ 

General Ward, General Craddock, what are your thoughts on 

this? Do you believe the development of the EU military could 

change the dynamics of NATO, the European Command or the development of AFRICOM? 

In addition, what should we expect to hear about the interactions 

between the European Union along with its associated military 

headquarters and defense acquisition agency and NATO as a result 

of the upcoming summit? 
39 

If you are comfortable now, or if you would like to answer it for 

the record, whatever you prefer. 

General CRADDOCK. That is a very comprehensive question. First 

of all, with regard to President Sarkozy’s statement, I would not 

want to judge his statement, but I think the time is right now for 

there to be engagement to find opportunities to cooperate, not continuing to have the reality of competition between NATO and the 

European Union. 

NATO is essentially a military organization with a political component. The European Union is largely political, economic with a 

military component. We have to find the—if those are two circles, 

we have to find the overlap and then diagram where we can engage 

and leverage each other’s capabilities to a greater extent, and I 

think that is where the effort must lie. 

It is not about dual-hatting formations. The fact is, NATO can’t 

fulfill its requirements today with its formations. If those formations are dual-hatted with an EU hat, then we have compounded 

the problem. We are in competition. We can’t have that. 

We need to look for, where capabilities exist that are complementary, as I said, not competing. That is I think where we must head 

for the future. 

General WARD. And just briefly, Congressman, as it pertains to 

AFRICOM, right now the formal procedure that would cause 

AFRICOM to work with the European Union does not exist. Obviously it is the U.S. European Command with NATO. 

But I will tell you, the nations of the European Command have 

expressed a willingness to work with AFRICOM in pursuit of common objectives on the continent of Africa, and we do that on a bilateral basis. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Did either one of you wish to furnish Mr. Cummings’ question 

further on the record? 

General CRADDOCK. Yes. Chairman, I will follow up with probably a more comprehensive response. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 155.] 

The CHAIRMAN. We would appreciate that. 

If there are no further questions, we again appreciate you being 

with us, your testimony, and we look forward to seeing you again 

soon. 

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 13, 2008 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 13, 2008 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 13, 2008 

(155) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON 

General CRADDOCK. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] [See pages 37 and 38.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] [See pages 33 and 34.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CUMMINGS 

General CRADDOCK. Development of robust EU Security capabilities would be a 

welcome and positive contribution to the Trans-Atlantic community. The EU will 

not replace NATO and NATO will not replace the EU. It is in our national interest 

to encourage our European Allies to strengthen and build the complimentary Security Defense capacities of the European Union to share in the risk and responsibility 

for protecting and advancing our common interests and freedom. The EU brings development aid, human rights standards, anti-corruption programs, police trainers, 

election monitors, and most importantly, the capacity to put these capabilities together in the right combination for the task at hand—especially financial resources—when working together, NATO and the EU can combine the best of both 

organizations for a truly comprehensive and complimentary approach to our shared 

security and defense challenges. We will, in any case, continue to pursue bilateral 

engagement with NATO allies and EU member states, 21 of whom are members of 

both NATO and the EU, in order to continue to develop and to coordinate our approaches in both forums. European Command and Africa Command both play a key 

role in our bilateral engagement. This will not change. In the end, NATO and the 

EU are tools of their memberships. Both bring potentially complementary and mutually reinforcing comparative advantages. Our combatant commanders play an important role in harmonizing the actions of all our international partners and in focusing them on the tasks at hand. As for the EU’s development of a military headquarters and an acquisition agency, they are not quite there and so on these two 

aspects, the EU Military Staff and the European Defense Agency; I would not expect 

to hear anything about them in the upcoming summit. [See page 39.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 13, 2008 

(159) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. BOYDA 

Mrs. BOYDA. Admiral Stavridis, SOUTHCOM’s 10-year usage rights for Ecuador’s 

Manta air base expires in November 2009, they can expect to be evicted in favor 

of China based company named Hutchison Port Holding (HPH). HPH is the world’s 

leading port developer and operator as well as an industry leader in the application 

of technologies to strengthen the entire transportation and logistics chain. It mentioned that the Manta base is not geopolitically important for US national security, 

but SOUTHCOM currently uses it to combat illegal cocaine trade in the ‘‘source 

zone’’ of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. The Air base also shares a common runway 

with the International Airport and currently houses 475 US Military Personnel. 

What operational impacts does this have on your organization? Is there a plan to 

perform the same functions in another South American country? Is so, where? If 

not, why not? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Æ