PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 18-1868

___________

TROY LAMONT MOORE, SR.,

 Appellant

v.

C.O. SAAJIDA WALTON

_______________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2-14-cv-03873)

District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno

______________

Argued: November 8, 2023

Before: RESTREPO, SCIRICA, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: March 21, 2024)

Jonathan Dame

Regina Wang [ARGUED]

Yiyang Wang

Brian S. Wolfman
2

Georgetown University Law Center

Appellate Courts Immersion Clinic

600 New Jersey Avenue NW

Suite 312

Washington, DC 20001

 Counsel for Appellant

Elise M. Bruhl

Meghan Byrnes [ARGUED]

City of Philadelphia

Law Department

1515 Arch Street

17th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19102

 Counsel for Appellee

_________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_________________

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge

This case involves the relation back doctrine and 

whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C)’s 

reference to “the period provided by Rule 4(m)” includes any 

“good cause” extensions granted under that rule.

After the toilet in plaintiff Troy Moore, Sr.’s prison cell 

exploded, covering him and the entire cell in human sewage, 

defendant Correctional Officer Saajida Walton refused to let 
3

Moore out of his cell to clean up for over eight hours. Initially 

proceeding pro se, Moore sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

arguing Walton violated his Eighth Amendment rights. 

However, through no fault of his own, Moore’s original 

complaint misspelled Walton’s name as “Walden,” and despite 

the District Court finding “good cause for the delay in service 

in this case,” J.A. 265, Moore was unable to correct the error 

until well after the statute of limitations on his claim expired.

On the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, 

the District Court denied Moore’s motion and granted 

Walton’s motion on statute of limitations grounds, reasoning 

“[t]here is no evidence in the record that Walton knew or 

should have known of this action before the statute of 

limitations had run,” Add. 10, and so Moore’s amended 

complaint did not relate back to his original complaint under 

Rule 15(c)(1)(C). In doing so, however, we believe the District 

Court misapplied the relation back analysis by failing to look 

to the period for service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

4(m) in assessing notice, as required by Rule 15(c)(1)(C). 

Consequently, the District Court did not have occasion to 

consider whether that notice period incorporates the service 

extension it previously granted to Moore for good cause under 

Rule 4(m). Because we hold that Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s reference 

to “the period provided by Rule 4(m)” includes any extensions 

for service granted under that rule for good cause, we will 

vacate the District Court’s order.
4

I.

The following facts are undisputed. See, e.g., Dkt.1 39 

at 6-7; Appellee Br. 45 (conceding “Walton did not specifically 

contest the facts set forth in [Moore’s] summary judgment 

motion”).

A.

At approximately 11:15 p.m. on September 16, 2013, 

while incarcerated in the Philadelphia Industrial Correctional 

Center (“PICC”), Moore was sitting in his prison cell when 

“the water in the toilet absolutely exploded covering [him] in 

raw sewage.” J.A. 172. “[T]he burst out of the toilet was so 

violent there was defecation four feet high [up] the walls,” as 

well as contaminant in Moore’s eyes and mouth. Id. at 172-73. 

He immediately vomited and experienced shortness of breath 

and chest pain.

Five minutes later, Walton—the correctional officer on 

duty that night—walked by Moore’s cell. Moore avers that 

despite calling out to her for help, Walton “looked at me, 

acknowledged me, turned her head and proceeded with her 

rounds.” Id. at 242. When, for the next hour, Moore stood in 

the flood of sewage banging on his cell door and pleading for 

Walton’s assistance, Walton “act[ed] like she couldn’t hear” 

him. Id. at 176-77; accord id. at 247, 249. Instead, Walton let 

a neighboring inmate out of his cell to mop the floor outside of 

Moore’s door and then released additional inmates in 

1

“Dkt.” citations refer to the docket before the District 

Court, Troy Lamont Moore, Sr. v. C.O. Saajida Walton, No. 14 

Civ. 3873 (ER) (E.D. Pa.).
5

neighboring cells—but not Moore—to bathe and clean their 

unit. Eventually, Moore stopped his cries for help because he 

was in such “distress” and “had to . . . lay down.” Id. at 177. 

He remained trapped in his cell until approximately 7:30 a.m. 

the next morning and was released only after Walton ended her 

shift.

B.

The next day, Moore filed an Inmate Grievance Form 

with the Philadelphia Prison System. The Grievance referred 

only to “[t]he c/o” without specifying Walton by name. Id. at 

24. 

Prior to initiating this action, Moore attempted to 

ascertain Walton’s identity from prison authorities. PICC

eventually provided Walton’s name orally, and based on how 

it sounded, Moore believed it was spelled “Walden.” When 

Moore filed his initial complaint on June 23, 2014, he named 

“Walden, Correctional Officer” as one of the defendants. Id.

at 15; see Dkt. 3 (the “Original Complaint”). Suing under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, Moore alleged he was subjected to 

unconstitutional conditions of confinement. On June 26, 2014, 

the District Court approved Moore’s application to proceed in 

forma pauperis and directed the U.S. Marshals Service to serve 

the defendants. The summons issued to “Walden” was 

returned unexecuted on October 22, 2014. 

The District Court held a status conference on 

December 14, 2014, at which an attorney for the City of 

Philadelphia (the “City”) appeared. The City represented that

it had been unable to identify anyone named “Walden”

working at PICC. When asked to provide any information that 

“may be helpful,” Moore explained that “CO Walden” was “an 
6

older female” who “works the graveyard shift” “on G2 of PICC

Prison in Philadelphia” and was “on duty when the incident 

happened.” Dkt. 44 at 9. In response, the District Court asked 

whether the City was “tak[ing] into account those [employees] 

who may have retired,” to which the City replied that “the 

process is looking through who was working at the time of the 

incident.” Id. at 10. 

In addition, the District Court granted in part Moore’s 

motion to compel video footage and various repair and medical 

reports concerning the incident and ordered the evidence be 

preserved. The District Court subsequently ordered the City to 

produce those records to Moore on April 6, 2015. One of the 

records provided was a log of events from the night of the 

incident with numerous entries by “WALTON_S.” J.A. 51. 

As for the video evidence, however, the City submitted a 

declaration from PICC’s warden claiming that despite 

“conduct[ing] an exhaustive search,” “any video of Plaintiff’s 

cell and the area surrounding it has been destroyed.” Dkt. 31 

¶¶ 3, 6. 

When, by December 17, 2015, the City had still failed

to identify “Walden,” the District Court dismissed Moore’s 

claim against her without prejudice given his failure to serve a 

summons and the Original Complaint. Moore filed an 

amended complaint shortly thereafter.

2 See Dkt. 46 

2 The Amended Complaint was dated December 31, 

2015, the “Certificate of Service” attached to it states that 

Moore “caused [the Amended Complaint] to be served” on 

December 30, 2015, J.A. 121, the envelope in which Moore 

mailed the Amended Complaint to the District Court is 
7

(“Amended Complaint”). The Amended Complaint contained

the same factual and legal allegations as the Original 

Complaint but renamed the defendant as “Corrections Officer 

S. Walton.” Id. 

Despite correcting this spelling error, challenges to 

serving Walton persisted. The summons issued to “C.O. S. 

Walton” on February 10, 2016 was never returned (executed 

or otherwise). J.A. 7. On June 17, 2016, the District Court 

extended Moore’s deadline to serve for an additional sixty 

days. A second summons was finally returned unexecuted on 

October 24, 2016, with the City claiming only that it “need[ed] 

more info” in order to accept service on Walton’s behalf. Dkt. 

48. On November 2, 2016, the District Court ordered Moore 

to provide “S. Walton’s” first name, and informed Moore for 

the first time that “[t]he City of Philadelphia has indicated that 

[the] only individual with a similar name is Saajida Walton 

who was employed as a correctional officer from July 7, 2008 

to April 5, 2014.” Dkt. 49.3 Moore responded less than two 

weeks later—on November 15, 2016—confirming that 

“Saajida Walton” was the person he intended to serve. The 

District Court again extended Moore’s service deadline, and 

Walton was finally served on May 2, 2017. 

That same month, Walton moved to dismiss the 

Amended Complaint. She argued the statute of limitations had 

run on Moore’s claim before he filed the Amended Complaint,

stamped January 15, 2016, and the Amended Complaint was 

docketed on February 10, 2016.

3 The record does not indicate how or when the District 

Court learned Walton’s full name. 
8

and the Amended Complaint did not relate back to the Original 

Complaint because Moore “did not in any way notify [her] of 

this lawsuit within the timeframe provided by Rule 4(m) – 90 

days.” Dkt. 59 at 6. At a hearing to resolve Walton’s motion, 

Moore, still pro se, maintained he had “pursued all avenues to 

serve the defendant in a timely manner,” including seeking 

information from the “prison,” the “human resources 

department,” and the “right-to-know office.” J.A. 256. He also 

claimed he only learned the correct spelling of Walton’s full 

name in November 2016, after the City provided him with the 

preserved discovery, even though the City and the prison 

“knew exactly who [Moore] was referring to” throughout. Id.

at 262-63.

The District Court denied Walton’s motion to dismiss, 

concluding Moore “has shown good cause for the delay in 

service in this case.” Id. at 265. The District Court reasoned

it is credible that the plaintiff made a number of 

attempts, through court administrators, to 

straighten out the name. This is a matter that 

went through the grievance process and the 

authorities. And it is likely that the correctional 

officer knew of the nature of this grievance. And 

what we had here is simply a spelling error; an 

error that the defendants provided no assistance 

in correcting, until the time had run out. 

So I find that the plaintiff made good faith 

efforts to learn the proper spelling of the 

defendant’s name; and that, for no fault of his 

own, he was unable to do so within the time 

provided for in the rule. That justifies the 

Court’s finding of good cause in this case for 
9

service to have occurred outside of the 90 days. 

Id. at 266.

At the District Court’s direction, the parties

subsequently cross-moved for summary judgment. Moore 

argued he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his 

Eighth Amendment claim, the facts of which were undisputed. 

Walton again argued inter alia that Moore’s claim was barred 

by the statute of limitations and that the Amended Complaint 

did not relate back to the Original Complaint. The District 

Court granted Walton’s motion and denied Moore’s motion on 

statute of limitations grounds. Without acknowledging its 

earlier relation back holding, the District Court found Moore 

was not entitled to rely on the relation back doctrine because 

“[t]here is no evidence in the record that Walton knew or 

should have known of this action before the statute of 

limitations had run,” Add. 10, and Moore “failed to show that 

Walton had either actual notice or constructive notice within 

the required 120 day period under Rule 15(c),” id. at 12. 

Moore timely appealed. 

II.4

Our review of the parties’ cross-motions for summary 

judgment is plenary, and we apply the same standard as the 

lower court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. AutoOwners Ins. Co. v. Stevens & Ricci Inc., 835 F.3d 388, 402 (3d 

4 The District Court had original jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. 
10

Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate only if “there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

A genuine dispute exists when “the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party,” and a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of 

the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

We review the District Court’s interpretation of the 

relation back doctrine de novo, Hodge v. United States, 554 

F.3d 372, 377 (3d Cir. 2009), and its embedded good cause 

determination for abuse of discretion, see Ayres v. Jacobs & 

Crumplar, P.A., 99 F.3d 565, 568 (3d Cir. 1996). 

III.

A civil rights action under section 1983 is subject to the 

personal injury statute of limitations of the state in which the 

cause of action accrued. See O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 

F.3d 125, 126 (3d Cir. 2006). In Pennsylvania, where Moore’s 

cause of action accrued, the statute of limitations for personal 

injury actions is two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(7). No 

one disputes Moore filed the Original Complaint within the 

applicable statute of limitations; Moore’s claim accrued on 

September 16, 2013—the date of the incident, and he filed the 

Original Complaint on June 26, 2014—less than two years 

later. Nor do the parties dispute Moore filed and served Walton 

with the Amended Complaint, where he correctly named 

Walton as a defendant for the first time, after the statute of 

limitations elapsed. Accordingly, Moore’s claim appears to be 

time-barred. 

That said, “the relation-back doctrine under Rule 15(c)
11

allows a court to treat a later-filed amended pleading as if it 

had been filed at the time of the initial pleading.” Se. Pa. 

Transp. Auth. v. Orrstown Fin. Servs. Inc., 12 F.4th 337, 344 

(3d Cir. 2021). It thus “ameliorate[s] the running of the statute 

of limitations.” Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186,

193 (3d Cir. 2001). In particular, Rule 15(c)(1)(C) permits 

relation back when an amendment to a pleading “changes the 

party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is 

asserted.” To do so, three requirements must be satisfied: first, 

the claim against the newly added defendant must arise “out of 

the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out . . . in the 

original pleading,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B); accord Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C) (requiring satisfaction of Rule 15(c)(1)(B)); 

second, the newly named party must have “received such 

notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending 

on the merits,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(i); and third, the 

newly named party must have or should have known that “but 

for a mistake” made by the plaintiff concerning the newly 

named party’s identity, “the action would have been brought 

against” the newly named party in the first place, Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). See also Singletary, 266 F.3d at 193-94. 

Critically, the second and third requirements must be satisfied 

“within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the 

summons and complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C); see also 

Urrutia v. Harrisburg Cnty. Police Dep’t, 91 F.3d 451, 458 & 

n.10 (3d Cir. 1996). 

Walton does not dispute the first and third conditions 

are satisfied. That leaves the second condition, which itself has 

two components each of which must be satisfied: notice and 
12

the absence of prejudice.5 See Urrutia, 91 F.3d at 458.

A.

In assessing whether Walton “received such notice of 

the action,” Rule 15(c)(1)(C) directs us to “the period provided 

by Rule 4(m).” Rule 4(m), in turn, states

[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after 

the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or 

on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must 

dismiss the action without prejudice against that 

defendant or order that service be made within a 

specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good 

cause for the failure, the court must extend the 

time for service for an appropriate period. 

Because Rule 4(m) sets a default period for service of 90 days,

6

we would ordinarily ask whether Walton received notice of 

Moore’s action within 90 days of the filing of the Original 

Complaint. See Urrutia, 91 F.3d at 458. But here, Moore does 

not contend Walton received such notice of the action within 

the default Rule 4(m) service period. Rather, he argues the 

notice requirement was satisfied when Walton was served with 

the Amended Complaint—on May 2, 2017. While this is well5 Because we conclude the District Court erred in its 

application of the notice requirement and remand for further 

consideration of that issue, we need not address the parties’ 

arguments on prejudice.

6 At the time this action was being litigated before the 

District Court, the default period for service was 120 days.
13

outside the default period under Rule 4(m)—by 924 days—

Moore argues the District Court extended his deadline to serve 

Walton under Rule 4(m)’s “good cause” extension provision

until that date, and such an extension is included in the notice 

period set by Rule 15(c)(1)(C). 

The appropriate place to begin is with the text of the 

rule. As previously noted, Rule 15(c)(1)(C) requires, in 

relevant part, that a newly added defendant receive “notice of 

the action” “within the period provided by Rule 4(m).” Rule 

4(m) sets this period as 90 days unless “the plaintiff shows 

good cause for the failure” to serve. In such a case, Rule 4(m)’s 

service period is enlarged because the district court “must

extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 4(m) (emphasis added). By referencing only “the 

period provided by Rule 4(m),” and not “the initial” or “default

period provided by Rule 4(m),” the plain text of Rule 

15(c)(1)(C) means to include the entire Rule 4(m) service 

period, which includes any mandatory extensions granted for 

good cause. Indeed, Rule 4(m) is written as one provision, 

without a subdivision for the good cause extension mandate. 

Consequently, Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s reference to “the period 

provided by Rule 4(m)” is not limited to just the default 90 

days since Rule 4(m) also encompasses the mandatory good 

cause extension provision.

The Advisory Committee’s note to Rule 15(c)(1)(C)

confirms this reading. The Committee explained that “[i]n 

allowing a name-correcting amendment within the time 

allowed by Rule 4(m), [Rule 15(c)(1)(C)] allows not only the 

[90] days specified in that rule, but also any additional time 

resulting from any extension ordered by the court pursuant to 

that rule.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 advisory committee’s note to the 

1991 amendment (emphasis added). While not binding, “the 
14

Advisory Committee’s notes on the federal rules are ‘of 

weight’ in interpreting the meaning of the rules.” In re Nat’l 

Football League Players Concussion Inj. Litig., 775 F.3d 570, 

577 n.6 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Torres v. Oakland Scavenger 

Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316 (1988)); see also Krupski v. Costa 

Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 550-51, 554 n.5 (2010) 

(considering the Advisory Committee’s notes in interpreting 

Rule 15(c)(1)(C)). In this case, the note indicates Rule 

15(c)(1)(C) was specifically drafted to incorporate extensions 

to service deadlines for good cause, such as the extension

granted to Moore. 

We also do not write on a blank slate. Our sister circuits 

that have addressed this issue have all concluded that Rule 

15(c)(1)(C)’s reference to Rule 4(m) incorporates Rule 4(m)’s 

“good cause” extension provision. See McGraw v. Gore, 31 

F.4th 844, 849 (4th Cir. 2022) (“Relation back is allowed, in 

other words, so long as the added defendant had notice within

the 90 days – or any ‘good cause’ extension – allowed under 

Rule 4(m).” (quoting Robinson v. Clipse, 602 F.3d 605, 608 

(4th Cir. 2010))); Rodriguez v. McCloughen, 49 F.4th 1120, 

1122-23 (7th Cir. 2022) (faulting the district court’s relation 

back analysis for failing to consider whether the delay in 

service fits within the “good cause” exception under Rule 

4(m)); Lee v. Airgas Mid-S., Inc., 793 F.3d 894, 897 & n.3 (8th 

Cir. 2015) (noting Rule 15(c)’s requirement that defendant 

“receiv[e] notice of [the] lawsuit within [90] days after the 

complaint was filed” “also can be extended by any service-ofprocess extensions the district court might grant for ‘good 

cause’” (internal brackets omitted)); Jackson v. Herrington, 

393 F. App’x 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e see no reason 

for incorporating Rule 4(m)’s [90]-day baseline into Rule 15 

without also incorporating Rule 4(m)’s good-cause baseline 
15

exception.”); McGuire v. Turnbo, 137 F.3d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 

1998) (holding “a complaint will relate back under Rule 15(c) 

when the district court has enlarged Rule 4(m)’s notice 

period”); see also 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, 

& Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1498.1 

n.10 (3d ed. 2023) (collecting cases). 

And while we have yet to explicitly address this issue, 

we have previously recognized another circumstance where the 

notice period set by Rule 15(c)(1)(C) may be enlarged beyond 

the baseline set by Rule 4(m). In Urrutia v. Harrisburg County 

Police Department, we held the deadline for satisfying the 

requirements of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) for plaintiffs proceeding in 

forma pauperis is suspended pending the district court’s

mandatory screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 91 F.3d at 453-

54. And in Lundy v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., we noted, in 

dicta, that because plaintiffs asserted they satisfied the 

requirements for Rule 15(c) relation back within the default 

period set by Rule 4(m), “[t]his case . . . does not involve the 

issue of the circumstances under which the period for applying 

the [notice] requirements [of Rule 15(c)] may be longer than 

[90] days” such as when the district court extends the period to 

serve under Rule 4(m). 34 F.3d 1173, 1181 & n.12 (3d Cir. 

1994) (citing the advisory committee note discussed supra). 

Walton fails to point to any authority—district court or 

circuit—endorsing a contrary reading of Rule 15(c)(1)(C). 

Instead, she urges us to “reserve the benefit of an expanded 

notice period only for plaintiffs who can demonstrate a delay 

beyond their control.” Appellee Br. 34. In addition, Walton 

would limit our holding in Urrutia and the holdings in the cases 

from our sister circuits to situations where the delay in service 

was caused by mandatory screening, such as under section

1915 or the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 
16

§ 1997e(a). But such limitations would be contrary to the plain 

text of the rule. See Krupski, 560 U.S. at 553 (Rule 15(c)(1)(C) 

“plainly sets forth an exclusive list of requirements for relation 

back, and the amending party’s diligence is not among them.”

(emphasis added)). Again, Rule 15(c)(1)(C) refers to only the 

“period provided by Rule 4(m),” and Rule 4(m) provides that 

its default 90-day period must be extended whenever the 

district court finds “good cause”—not “delay beyond 

plaintiff’s control,” or “delay caused by mandatory district 

court screening.” 

Finally, Walton warns that Rule 4(m)’s good cause 

standard is not a “sufficient limiting principle” for relation 

back because it is too “lenient.” Appellee Br. 41. Even if that 

were true, the Advisory Committee note explicitly indicates 

that the drafters of the rule believed differently; Rule 

15(c)(1)(C) was drafted to include in its notice period “any

additional time resulting from any extension ordered by the 

court pursuant to” Rule 4(m). Advisory Committee Note, 

supra (emphasis added). But more to the point, we feel that 

Walton’s concerns are overstated. District courts retain plenty 

of tools to account for unreasonable delay, and we still review 

a district court’s good cause determination for abuse of 

discretion. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, 

Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995) (district court abused 

its discretion in finding good cause to excuse late service where 

the record was devoid of any explanation for plaintiff’s lack of 

diligence and failure to move to enlarge the time to serve); see 

also Boley v. Kaymark, 123 F.3d 756, 758 (3d Cir. 1997) 

(district court did not abuse its discretion in finding no good 

cause to extend plaintiff’s time to serve when “[n]othing in the 

record . . . justified Boley’s ineffective attempts at service and 

his failure to make a timely motion for an extension of time”); 
17

Green v. Humphrey Elevator and Truck Co., 816 F.2d 877, 884 

(3d Cir. 1987) (plaintiff failed to demonstrate good cause when 

he “waited until the eve of the service deadline” to mail a 

summons, failed to serve the defendants before the cutoff, and 

did not “present facts that would justify” the belated service 

attempt).

Accordingly, we hold that Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s notice 

period incorporates mandatory extensions granted for “good 

cause” under Rule 4(m).

B.

Having concluded Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s reference to Rule 

4(m) incorporates any good cause extensions granted under 

that rule, we now evaluate the District Court’s analysis. In 

resolving the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, 

the District Court found the Amended Complaint did not relate 

back to the Original Complaint because “[t]here is no evidence 

in the record that Walton knew or should have known of this 

action before the statute of limitations had run.” Add. 10. This 

reasoning is erroneous because “the limitation period for 

purposes of analyzing whether [a] newly added defendant 

received notice and should have had knowledge of the action 

as required for relation back under Rule 15(c) is not the statute 

of limitations for the underlying claim, but instead the [Rule] 

4(m) service period.” McGraw, 31 F.4th at 849 (first alteration 

in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Garvin

v. City of Phila., 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2003). The District 

Court therefore erred to the extent it looked to the statute of 

limitations rather than the period for service under Rule 4(m) 

to assess notice.

But even to the extent the District Court properly looked
18

to the Rule 4(m) service period to assess notice,7it failed to 

account for the good cause extension it previously granted 

Moore in denying Walton’s motion to dismiss the Amended 

Complaint. As noted above, the District Court previously 

concluded that Moore “has shown good cause for the delay in 

service in this case.” J.A. 265. Moore argues this ruling 

“extended the Rule 4(m) period for service up to the day 

[Walton] was served” with the Amended Complaint, and so 

“[i]t necessarily follows that she received notice within the 

Rule 4(m) period.” Appellant Br. 20 (citing Urrutia, 91 F.3d 

at 460-61); accord id. at 17. Based on our analysis above, we 

agree the District Court’s good cause service extension 

enlarged the relation back notice period beyond the initial 120 

days. The problem with Moore’s argument, however, is that it 

conflates the Rule 4(m) service period for the Original 

Complaint with the Rule 4(m) service period for the Amended 

Complaint. 

It is blackletter law that “[f]iling an amended complaint 

does not toll the Rule 4(m) service period” for an original 

complaint. 4B Wright & Miller, supra, § 1137; see also 

Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1148 (10th Cir. 2006) 

(“[T]he . . . period provided by Rule 4(m) is not restarted by 

the filing of an amended complaint . . . .”). “[A]t best, adding 

7 Although the District Court initially referred to the 

statute of limitations as the relevant notice period for relation 

back, it later referred to the default period under Rule 4(m)—

then 120 days. See Add. 12 (“Because Plaintiff has failed to 

show that Walton had either actual notice or constructive 

notice within the required 120 day period under Rule 15(c), 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not relate back to the date 

of the [I]nitial Complaint.”).
19

a new party through an amended complaint initiates a 

new . . . timetable for service upon the added defendant.” Lee, 

793 F.3d at 898 (internal quotation marks and emphasis

omitted). Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s notice requirement “looks to the 

Rule 4(m) period for serving the original complaint” not an 

amended complaint. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Garvin, 

354 F.3d at 220 (noting the newly added defendants “must 

have received notice of the institution of the action within 120 

days following the filing of the action” (emphasis added)); 

Urrutia, 91 F.3d at 459 n.14 (In “a situation where the court 

orders service of an original complaint . . . and sometime later 

orders service of an amended complaint[,] . . . . the 120 day 

period specified by Rule 15(c)[(1)(C)] begins to run on the date 

service of the original complaint was ordered.”). Accordingly, 

any good cause extension to the service period for the 

Amended Complaint would not be included in Rule 

15(c)(1)(C)’s notice period.

While not entirely clear, we interpret the District 

Court’s ruling that there was “good cause for the delay in 

service in this case,” J.A. 265 (emphasis added), as applying to 

the Rule 4(m) service period for both the Amended and the 

Original Complaints. In support of its good cause finding, the 

District Court pointed to the “number of attempts, through 

court administrators, to straighten out [Walton’s] name.” Id. at

266. As recounted above, those “attempts” primarily occurred 

between 2014 and 2015—prior to the filing of the Amended 

Complaint, see supra II.B—and so they naturally justify good 

cause for delayed service of the Original Complaint, not the 

Amended Complaint. However, despite being extended past 

the initial 120 days for good cause, the Rule 4(m) service 

period for the Original Complaint necessarily ended when the 

Original Complaint was dismissed—on December 17, 2015. 
20

Accordingly, the notice period for Rule 15(c)(1)(C) ended on 

that date as well. 

Apart from unsworn statements from the City in its 

briefing in support of Walton’s motion to dismiss the Amended 

Complaint and motion for summary judgment that Moore “did 

not in any way notify Saajida Walton of this lawsuit within the 

timeframe provided by Rule 4(m),” Dkt. 59 at 6; accord Dkt. 

65 at 8, the parties and the District Court have not addressed, 

and the current record contains no evidence concerning 

whether Walton received notice of the action before December 

17, 2015. However, as the District Court recognized, “[t]his is 

a matter that went through [PICC’s internal] grievance 

process” and “it is likely that [Walton] knew of the nature of 

this grievance.” J.A. 266.8 We will therefore vacate and 

remand to the District Court to determine, in the first instance, 

whether Walton received actual or constructive notice of the 

8 We note, however, that notice of the administrative 

grievance proceeding alone would not be sufficient to 

demonstrate notice for the purposes of relation back. Rule 

15(c)(1)(C) refers to “notice of the action,” but the 

administrative grievance proceeding occurred almost nine 

months prior to the initiation of the action, or the “filing of the 

original complaint.” Garvin, 354 F.3d at 220; see also 

Singletary, 266 F.3d at 195 (“[T]he notice received must be 

more than notice of the event that gave rise to the cause of 

action; it must be notice that the plaintiff has instituted the 

action.”). 
21

action by December 17, 2015.9

C.

Walton tries to avoid this outcome by arguing that the 

District Court abused its discretion when it determined good 

cause existed to extend Moore’s service deadline.10 We 

disagree. To demonstrate good cause, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate “good faith” and “some reasonable basis for 

noncompliance within the time specified in the rules.” MCI, 

71 F.3d at 1097 (internal quotation marks omitted). Good 

cause is thus akin to “excusable neglect.” Id.

In this case, the District Court found good cause because 

Moore “made a number of attempts, through court 

administrators, to straighten out [Walton’s] name” and his 

failure to timely serve essentially boiled down to “a spelling 

error; an error that the defendants provided no assistance in 

correcting, until the time had run out.” J.A. 266; see also id.

9

In doing so, the District Court may exercise its 

discretion as to whether to permit additional discovery on the 

issue of notice and/or whether to hold an evidentiary hearing,

as well as whether to appoint Moore pro bono counsel.

10 Walton also contends the District Court abused its 

discretion in permitting Moore to file the Amended Complaint 

in the first place. But Walton failed to raise this argument 

before that Court. Rather than opposing the amendment under 

Rule 15(a), Walton moved to dismiss under 12(b), raising the 

same statute of limitations arguments addressed above. The 

argument is therefore waived on appeal. See In re Ins. 

Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 261 (3d Cir. 2009). 
22

(“I find that the plaintiff made good faith efforts to learn the 

proper spelling of the defendant’s name; and that, for no fault 

of his own, he was unable to do so within the time provided for 

in the rule.”). This ruling was reasonable, and certainly not an 

abuse of discretion. While Moore may have known the correct 

spelling of Walton’s name for over five months prior to filing 

the Amended Complaint, we find this did not constitute “undue 

delay,” particularly in light of Moore’s then-pro se status, the 

many attempts he made to ascertain Walton’s identity, and the 

City’s willful failure to provide assistance until after the statute 

of limitations elapsed.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 

Court’s order granting Walton’s motion for summary judgment 

and denying Moore’s motion for summary judgment and will 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In 

particular, the District Court should address (1) whether 

Walton received notice of the action by December 17, 2015, 

and if so (2) whether Moore can demonstrate the absence of 

prejudice—the final element necessary to satisfy the relation 

back inquiry, and if so (3) the merits of Moore’s Eighth 

Amendment claim.