NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0105n.06 F iled: F ebruary 19, 2008 No. 07-1079 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
TERRANCE L OMBA RD, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. CHROME CRAFT CORPORATI ON, Def endant- Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

B e fo re : SU HRHE I

NR I CH , SU TT ON , a

nd GR I F F I N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. SUTTON, Circuit J udg e. Af ter Chrome Cra ft Corporation fire d Terr ance L ombard a nd afte r his union withdrew his g rieva nce a g ainst the company , L ombard did t wo things: F irst, he pursued an interna l union appeal, a nd later he filed t h i s hy

brid ac tion claiming that Chrome Cra ft violated § 3 01 of the L a bo r M ana g e me nt R e la tio ns Act in dis c ha rg inghim and that th e un ion

br e a c he d it s duty of fair repr esentation in ini tially ref using to support his g rieva nce. Conc luding that L ombard’s § 3 01 c la im w a s ti me -b arr e d, the dis tr ic t cou rt g ra nte d summ ary jud g me nt in f a vo r o f C hr ome Cr a ft
. B e c a us e the c ourt

pe rm iss ibl y

c on c lud e d th a t L omb ard ’s int e rn a l unio n ap pe a l did not tol l th e statut e of limitations for his claim ag ainst Chrome Craft, we aff irm.
I.No. 07-1079

Lom ba rd v . Ch ro meCra

ft

- 2 - Chrome Craf

t discharg ed L ombard in Aug ust 2003, afte r L ombard alleg edly violated a shop rule in the re levant collec tive barg aining ag ree ment (CBA ). Consistent with the CBA’s g rieva nce proce dures, L ombard’s union filed a grie vance on his behalf , seeking reinstateme nt of L ombard’s employ ment and askingthat L ombard be “made whole in all way s.” At stag e four of the five -step g ri e va nc e pr oc e ss, the un ion

and Chr ome Cr a ft

me diate d th e dis pu te and pr op os e d a se ttl e me nt t o L ombard, off

eringhim severa

nce pa y and a c hang e in the natur e of his discha rg e fr om a termination to a lay off. L ombard re

jected the proposed se ttlement, and on Fe bruar y 24, 2004, the union notified L ombard that his g rieva

nce “has be en withdra

wn at the F ourth Step of mediation” a nd that “the Union will not pursue this g rieva nce to Step Five of arbitration.” The union notified Chrome Craf t of its decision to withdraw L ombard’s g rieva nce on A pril 20, 2004.
I n a c c or da

nc e wi th h is unio n’ s c on sti tut ion , L omb ard a pp e a le d the loc a l un ion ’s de c isi on to wi thd ra w h is g ri e va

nc e on Marc h 1 8, 20 04 . O n Jan ua ry 3, 20 05 , th e nat io nal un ion g ra nte d h is appea l beca

use t he local union’s “dec ision to settl e [the] grieva nce . . . w as not proper ly

investigated in order to ma

ke a rational decision.” On J anuar y 11, the union’s pre sident “re manded” L ombard’s g rieva nce to the loc al union “with instructions to reinstate the g rieva nce at the step in which it was withdrawn.” Two we eks l ater , the uni on asked Chrome Craft to re instate the g rieva nce at “Step 5, Arbitration.” O n Fe bruar y 7, Chrom e C ra ft denied the union’ s reque st beca use “the Company
c le arl y ha d jus t c a

us e fo r the te rm inatio n” and be c a us e , “ [a]s [the un ion ] kno w[s ], Ch ro me Cr a ft is under no oblig ation to [ reinstate a g rieva nce] under the terms of the c ollective bar g aining ag ree ment betwee n the par

ties.” The union notified L ombard of Chrome Craft’s de nial on Fe bruar y 14.No. 07-1079

Lom ba rd v . Ch ro meCra

ft

- 3 - L o mb ar d s o u g h t a na d d it io n a l u

n io na p p e a l i n A p r il , to w h ic h th e u n io n r e s p o n d e d th a t “ th e r e is n o [] further reme dy available ” bec ause, “ [a] bsent a re instate[ment] ag ree ment[,] the Union is without power to force the Company

to reinstate the g rieva

nce.”
On M ay 24, 2005, while s till pursuing his internal union appea l, L ombard filed a complaint ag ainst Chrome Craft and the union in Michiga n state cour

t, alleg ing that Chrome Craft discha rg ed him wi tho ut g oo d c a

us e in v iol a tio n o f t

he CB A a

nd that th e un ion

br e a c he d it s d

uty of fa ir repr esentation “by

withdrawing

his gr ievanc e and r efusingto demand ar bitration without a rational basis.” Af

ter Chrome Cra ft and the union re moved the ac tion to federa l court, they moved for
su mma ry jud g me nt. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d the un ion ’s mot ion be c a us e L omb ard

“ ha s f a ile d to exhaust h i s i n t erna l union remedies.” And it gr anted the c ompany ’s motion because L ombard’s “cla ims a g ainst it a

re barr ed by the applicable statute of limitations,” rejec ting L ombard’s a rg ument that hi s in te rn a l un ion

a pp e a l toll ed th e stat

ute of lim itatio ns a g a ins t Ch ro me Cr a ft . O n a pp e a l, L omb ard c ha lle ng e s o nly

the su mma

ry -j ud g me nt d e c isi on

in f a vo r o f C hr ome Cr a ft
. II.
To dec ide whether the a

pplicable six-month s tatute of limitations, see D elCostello v. Int’l Bh d. of T e am ste rs , 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983), bars L ombard’s claim, we must de termine (1) whe n the ca use of a ction acc rued a

nd (2) whe ther a

ny thing tolled the limitations period, see Robinson v. Cent. Brass Mfg. Co. , 9 87 F .2 d 1 23 5, 12 39 (6 th Cir . 199 3)
. A h y br id § 30 1/f

a ir re pr e se ntatio n c la im
acc rues a g ainst both the union and the employ er w hen the e mploy ee kne w or should have known ofNo. 07-1079

Lom ba rd v . Ch ro meCra

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- 4 - the ac ts constituti ng either the employ er’ s alleg ed violation or the union’s alleg ed bre ach, w hicheve r
occur s later. Id. L ombard doe s not challeng e the district cour t’s holding that his ca

use of a ction
a c c ru e d o n F e br

ua ry 24 , 2 00 4. An d w ithg oo d r e a so n: t hat is wh e n the un ion no tif ie d him that hi s g rieva nce “has been withdrawn” and that it “ will not pursue th[ e] g rieva nce to .
. . ar b i t ra tion,” gi v i n g L o m b a r d e v e r y

t h i n g h e n ee d edt o k

n o w t o d i s co v er

o r a tl ea s tb e ab l e t o d i s co v er t h ro u gh “re asonable diligenc e . . . the acts constituting t he [ union’s] alleg ed violation,” id. (interna l quotation
mark s o mit te d) ; see also Noble v. Chrysler Mo t o r s Corp. , 32 F.3d 997, 1001 ( 6th Cir. 1994); McCree dy v. L ocal Union No. 971, UAW , 809 F.2d 1232, 1236 ( 6th Cir. 1987); Pl un k e tt v . S mu rfi tStone Container Corp. , 247 F. App’ x 604, 606 (6th Cir. J une 20, 2007).
What matters then is tolli ng . Did L ombard’s inter nal union a

ppeal, which beg an on Mar ch 18, 2004, and wa s still pending when h e fi l ed his complaint on May 24, 2005, toll the lim itations period? I n Robinson v. Central Brass Manufacturing Co. , 987 F.2d 1235, we addre ssed “whe ther the statute of limitations should be toll ed if a discharg ed employ ee ch o s e t o p ursue the [union]
a p p e a ls p r o c e s s b e f

o r e f il in g a h y b r id § 3 0 1 /f

a ir r e p r e s e n tati o nclaim.” Id. at 1240. We said two things o f p ertinenc e: “F irst, in order f or the statute of

limit ations to be tolled, the internal union appea l mu s t be able to affor d the claimant some r elief from the defendant ”; and, “[s] econd, . . . w hether

to toll t he limitations period is a question within the di scre tion of the district
co u rt
. . . [ t hat] must be ana ly zed” on a c ase- by -ca se basis. Id. at 1242 (e mphasis omitt ed and
a dd e d) ; see also id. a t 1240 –4 2 (di sc us sin g fa c tor s for dis tr ic t cou rt s to c on sid e r i n e xer c isi ngthe ir discretion, including whether the interna l un i o n ap peal would be adequate to rea ctivate theNo. 07-1079

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ft

- 5 - employ ee’ s g rieva

nce or to awar d him the relief soug ht under § 301, whether e x haustion of interna l proce dures would unr easona bly delay the employ ee’ s opportunity to obtain a judicial hea ring on the merits of his claim and whe ther it was diff icult for the employ ee to de termine that the inter nal union
re me die s w e re com pl etely futil e ); Garrish v. UAW

, 417 F.3d 590, 595 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (applying Robinson and “r eview[ing ] a district court’s dec ision re garding e quitable tolling for an abuse of discretion”) (interna l quotation marks omitted).
Robinson held that the claimant’s internal union a ppeal did not toll the statute of limit ations
a g a ins t hi s f

or me r e mpl oy e r b e c a

use a “ su c c e ssf

ul i nte rn a l un ion

a pp e a l c [oul d] no t le a d to reinstateme nt of [his ] employ ee [status] or rea ctivation of [hi s] g rieva nce.” 987 F.2d at 1243. Put differ ently , beca

use Robinson’s internal union appe al “c ould only provide r e li e f

f r o m t he Union” a

nd “could not provide any relief from [ Robinson’s former e mploy er]”—which “ was not a pa rty to th[ e] internal a ppeal, ha d not sanctioned or acknow ledg ed the inter

nal appe als proce ss, and was not bound by any ensuing judgme nt”—that appe al did not toll t he limitations period ag ainst the employ er. Id.
a t 12 43 –4 4; cf. id. at 1244 (holdi ng that the interna l appea ls process did toll the statute of limitations with respec t to Robi nson’s claim ag ainst the union beca use t he “internal appeals process could have provided Robinson with partial re lief fr om the Union”).
Robinson controls us here . Although “ [s] ome employ ers a nd unions have, throug h collective b ar g a in in g , a g r e e d to a ll o w th e r e in s tate me n t o f w it h dr aw n g r ie v an c e s w h e r e a u n io n tribunal
reve rses the union’s initial dec ision,” Clayton v. UAW , 451 U. S. 6 79 , 6 91 n. 18 (1 98 1) (a lte ra tio n in
or ig ina l and

int e rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mit te d) , Ch ro me Cr a ft and its un ion , li ke the p art ie s inNo. 07-1079

Lom ba rd v . Ch ro meCra

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- 6 - Robinson , did not enter into any such ag ree ment. Nor should this have been a surprise to anyone. Chrome Craf

t made the point when it de nied the union’s reque st to re instate L ombard’s g rieva nce voluntarily
. See JA 27 8 ( “ As y ou kn ow , Ch ro me Cr a ft

is un der no ob lig a tio n to [re ins ta te L ombard’s g rieva

nce] under the terms of the c ollective bar g aining ag ree ment betwee n the par ties.”). And t he union made the same point in its letter to L ombard. See D. Ct. Doc. 23, Ex. 20 (“Absent
a re instate[ment] ag ree ment the Union is without po we r t o fo rce the Company to reinstate the g rieva nce. Ac co rd i n gly , there is no[ ] further re medy available .”). O nce the union withdrew L ombard’s g rieva

n c e , “ th e inte rnal a

ppeals proc ess could not provide any re lie f f ro m” Chr ome Cr a ft , and that proc ess ac cording ly did not toll the statute of limitations ag ainst the company
. Robinson , 987 F.2d at 1244.
L ombard re sponds to Robinson with two relate d points: (1) hi s i n t er nal union appea l was
no t f uti le a t th e tim e it be g an sinc e the un ion did no t with dr aw h is g ri e va nc e un til a ft e r h e fi le d h is appea l; and (2) Chrome Cra ft’s C BA , unlike Robinson ’s CBA, doe s not lim it the time when the union c o u ld d e ma

n d ar b it r a ti o n . T h e s e d is ti n c ti o n s d o n o t r e le a s e L o mb ar d f r o m th e pull of Robinson
. F ir st, we a g re e wi th L omb ard that his int e rn a l a pp e a l be c a me futil e wi th r e sp e c t to Chr ome Craft only

afte r the union notified the c ompany of its decision to withdraw his g rieva nce. But we fail to see how

this helps him. L ombard a dmittedly filed hi s internal union appeal with the mistaken understandingthat the union had alr eady withdrawn his gr ievanc e—the union’s F ebrua ry 24 letter,
re c a ll, inf or me d L omb ard

tha t hi s g ri e va

nc e “ ha s be e n wi thd

ra wn ,” and he tho ug ht u

nti l so me tim eNo. 07-1079

Lom ba rd v . Ch ro meCra

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- 7 - in 2006 that the union had in fac t withdrawn his g rieva nce on or prior to Fe bruar

y 24. That understanding , though inc orre ct at the time L ombard filed his inter nal union appea l, became cor rec t
on April 20, when the union notified Chrome Craft that L ombard’s g rieva nce “ is hereby

withdrawn at the mediation step a

nd is closed.” I n other words, beg inning no later than April 20—over a y ear befor e he f

iled his complaint in thi s case —L ombard c orrectly understood that his union had withdrawn his g rieva

nce. E ven if we assume that the statute of limit ations was tolled until April 20, L ombard’s c laim remains time-ba rre d by the six -month limi tations period.
Se c on d, it d oe s n ot c ha

ng e ma tte rs that Robinson ’s CBA “made clear . . . that a succ essful inte r n a l u n io n a

p p e a l [c o u ld ] n o t le a d to r e in s tate me n t o f an e mp lo y e e o r r e a c ti v a ti o n of a g rieva nce,” id. at 1243, while Chrome Cra ft’s CBAis silent on the point. To the extent L ombard was oblivious to the fac t that the internal union appea l could not g ive him relief f rom his employ er, he had a mple rea son to know about it beca use “a union member is re sp onsible for knowingthe contents of [hi s] collective barg aining ag ree ment.” Id. ; c f. Monroe v . UAW

, 723 F.2d 22, 26 ( 6th Cir. 19 83 ) ( “ Th e ba lanc e of effi cie nc y re qu ir e s th e un ion

me mbe r t o d e te rm ine wh e the r t he re me dy

is futile.”). A nd “ther e is no provision in the C BA that could even arguably g ive the Union the r ight to r e ins ta te a

g ri e va nc e on c e it i s w ith drawn, ” a s th e dis tr ic t c ourt c or re c tly ob se rv e d, makin g it “cle ar to [L ombard] that when the Un i o n [ wi t hdrewhis gr ievanc e], the only pr ivate dis pu te mecha nism that could have provide d [hi m] with relief f rom [C hrome Cra ft] was exhausted and the limit ations period beg an to run,” Robinson , 9 87 F .2 d at 12 43 ; cf. Clayton , 451 U.S. at 693 (“[W] here
an a g g ri e ve d e mpl oy e e c ann ot ob ta in e ith e r t he su bs tanti ve re lie f h e se e ks or re a c tiv a tio n o f h isNo. 07-1079

Lom ba rd v . Ch ro meCra

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- 8 - g ri e va nc e , n a tio na l la

bo r p oli c y wo uld no t be se rv e d b y re qu ir inge xha

us tio n o f i nte rn a l r e me die s. I n such ca ses, exhaustion would be a useless gest ure . . . [beca use t]he employ ee w ould stil l be require d to pursue judicial mea ns to obtain the relief

he see ks under § 301.” ). More over, to the extent L ombard “ misunderstood the nature o f p o s s i ble interna l remedie s and thoug ht that they inc lud e d r e ins ta te me nt[, ] . . . thi s mi sund e rs tand ing
. . . c ann ot b e lin ke d to [Chr ome Cr a ft ’s ] ac tio ns , statements, or policies.” Robinson , 987 F.2d at 1243. On this re cord, we c annot conc lude that the district court abuse d its discretion in rejec ting L ombard’s a rg ument that his internal union appe al tolled the statute of limitations aga inst Chrome Craft.
III
. F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m.