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STATUTORY AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF 

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 14, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate 

(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio 

MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

ANDREW W. JOHNSON, Staff Director 

LOUIS B. TUCKER, Minority Staff Director 

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

CONTENTS 

FEBRUARY 14, 2008 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from West Virginia .... 1 

Hon. Christopher S. Bond, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Missouri ........ 3 

WITNESS 

Hon. J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence ............................ 5 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Hon. Russell D. Feingold, a U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 28 

Prepared Statement of Hon. J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence ................................................................................................................... 29 

Turner, Kathleen, Director of Legislative Affairs, Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence, letters transmitting responses to questions from Committee Members, July 3, 2008 and July 24, 2008 ............................................. 41 

(1) 

STATUTORY AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR 

OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:42 p.m., in room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Jay Rockefeller, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Rockefeller, Feinstein, 

Wyden, Feingold, Whitehouse, Bond, Warner, and Snowe. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. My apologies to the Director and to my 

colleagues for being late. Our witness today appears to be the Director of National Intelligence, Admiral Mike McConnell. And seated behind the Director, a number of his key staff, and we’ve made 

space for a least three of them in case anybody wants to leap forward to give answers, make a point during the hearing. 

Director MCCONNELL. To save the Director. [Laughter.] 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I would say that would be at your discretion. 

Congress created the position of Director of National Intelligence, 

or the DNI, because most of us felt that it was no longer practical 

to expect the head of CIA to manage the entire U.S. intelligence 

community; in fact, it was self-evident. It was a very glum period, 

in fact, in terms of intelligence organization and it seems like a 

long time ago but it really wasn’t. 

Additionally, we believe that the leader of the intelligence community needs to have more authorities than those possessed by the 

Director of Central Intelligence in order to effectively manage and 

direct resources against the intelligence priorities, and we don’t 

know that we put everything out right, or did it right, which is the 

point of this today. 

And so the bill passed in 2004. It was a product of months of 

heated debate. Many aspects of it are a product of compromise 

rather than consensus. There were several points about which the 

House and the Senate could not agree. So rather than let negotiations collapse, certain issues were left ambiguous or unresolved, 

which is often not helpful. 

2 

Some of us worry that Congress may not have given the DNI 

enough authority to match his enormous responsibilities. I count 

myself in that group. This is not to say that the authorities assigned to the position under the reform law do not give you a great 

deal of power; they do. The DNI determines the budget of the intelligence community; he has the authority to transfer money and positions from one intelligence agency to another. But then that sentence needs to be explored. How easily can that happen; what road 

blocks are thrown up. 

Additionally, the DNI directly operates many critical elements of 

the intelligence community such as the National Counterterrorism 

Center, the National Counterproliferation Center, the National Intelligence Council, which puts out the NIEs. 

The Senate Intelligence Committee is responsible for conducting 

oversight of the intelligence community, and we take that responsibility very seriously, and I think that the Director and others in 

the intelligence community are coming to understand that, that 

we’re very oriented toward oversight, and we feel that this has not 

been the case in the past. And the Vice Chairman and I have very 

strong ideas about that. 

But this means that we have an obligation to monitor your activities in a constructive sense and evaluate whether you have all 

of the appropriate tools and authorities that you need in order to 

succeed. With 3 years of experience under our belt, I think it’s time 

for the committee to assess whether the reform legislation has fulfilled its promise, or whether it has not, and we need to make 

changes or whatever. 

For example, one issue before the Committee is the proper relationship of the DNI to the various elements of the intelligence community. Most of these elements are located in different cabinet departments, and it is the DNI’s job to make sure that they are all 

working together in a unified effort, including those agencies such 

as NSA and NRO, which reside within the Department of Defense. 

The Committee must also consider whether the budget and the 

personnel authorities that Congress has given the DNI are in fact 

sufficient. The Intelligence Reform Act gives the DNI significant 

power to move resources from one intelligence agency to another, 

but if bureaucratic roadblocks cause every transfer to take 6 

months, then maybe we haven’t done that at all, and at least we 

need to discuss that. 

In sum, the DNI exists because Congress and the American people wanted the intelligence community to function as a unified 

whole, and because we wanted somebody to be accountable for the 

intelligence community’s collective effectiveness, both its successes 

and its failures. I firmly believe that Admiral Mike McConnell, the 

current DNI, is the absolutely right person for the job. So if his 

ability to lead and to manage the intelligence community is somehow being hampered or compromised or undermined in ways that 

may not be visible to this Committee, we need to know about it and 

consider options for eliminating those roadblocks, and we want to. 

If, on the other hand, you are able to do your job efficiently and 

effectively, then that’s an encouraging sign that the authorities 

may be aligned properly. So, again, that’s the point of the hearing. 

So before I turn to the Director for his testimony, which I’ve read, 

3 

I recognize Chairman Bond for any opening statement that he 

wishes to make. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Vice Chairman BOND. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I’m 

not going to pass up this opportunity to share a few views. Admiral 

McConnell, we thank you once again for appearing before this 

Committee. You’ve been spending so much time up on the Hill, it 

looks like you’re camping out, but there are many major issues that 

we have discussed with you, as we will again at this hearing. 

Today we meet again in one of our occasional public forums to 

discuss the authorities you in your office need to do your job to protect our Nation. At the outset, I highly commend your leadership 

in attempting to bring the community together. Your efforts to reform the FISA, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, to increase 

information sharing in collection, coordinate intelligence collection, 

strengthen analysis, and reform human capital management are 

particularly laudable. 

I also, once again, publicly commend the tremendous work of the 

individual members of the intelligence community—military troops, 

civilians, contractors, all of them working together keep us safe. 

We’re grateful for them, indebted to them, and very proud of the 

excellent work they do. Sound intelligence work, however, is not 

easy; it’s always difficult. It requires exceptional skill, dedication, 

and sometimes exceptional courage in the face of danger. 

Your service is greatly appreciated, and we see the results of 

your efforts every day. 

This hearing is a rare chance to take stock of intelligence reform 

as it has emerged from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004, and decide where to go from here. We asked 

when you first came into office to take a year to formulate for us 

legislative recommendations so that we can institutionalize what is 

best working now in the intelligence community, and that we can 

improve upon intelligence reform, which, as I have mentioned to 

you many times, I believe was at best half-baked. I voted against 

IRTPA because I thought it gave you all of the responsibility but 

not enough authority to go with the responsibility. 

I’ve also stated numerous times and repeat how impressed we all 

are with the working relationship that you have with Secretary 

Gates, Under Secretary Clapper, Directors Hayden, Mueller, 

Maples and others. 

But I well remember not so long ago when the relationships in 

those offices were not as synergistic as today, and we charged you 

with providing to us your thoughts on legislative recommendations 

to institutionalize what we can in the relationships you’ve developed informally. 

Now, I’m well aware that relationships cannot be institutionalized, and that with good people it doesn’t matter what you institutionalize; they find a way to get the job done, and vice versa. But 

it certainly facilities cooperation to make sure that the institutional 

structure is synergistic and functional as it can be. And your recommendations today will be very important. 

4 

While I’ve been a staunch supporter of your office, I mentioned 

I didn’t vote for the Act due to the major compromises contained 

in the bill. The Act denied your office the full authorities required 

truly to direct the intelligence community, not just coordinate its 

activities, as did your predecessor and the community management 

staff within the CIA. Without exceptionally strong firm direction, 

the intelligence community cannot act as one body, and we cannot 

achieve true unity of purpose required to combat terror and prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction against us and our allies. 

There’s an historical precedent to intelligence reform that can be 

drawn in our experience with defense reform. The landmark National Security Act of 1947 that created the Department of Defense, 

the Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security 

Council nonetheless contain serious organizational birth defects. 

These defects were evident in the inter-service rivalries it suffered 

in Vietnam, the failed hostage rescue attempt in Iran, and in poorly coordinated operations in Grenada. It took congressional leadership in the form of Goldwater-Nichols, of 1986, 40 years after the 

National Security Act, to create that unity of purpose that enabled 

the well-orchestrated effective joint operations of our forces over 

the last two decades. 

Mr. Director, I wish we had 40 years to get intelligence reform 

right, but the harsh reality is we do not. The threat we face today 

is shadowy, unpredictable, and immediate, putting the lives and 

livelihoods of our citizens on the line here and abroad. Timely, actionable, accurate intelligence is the key to prevailing against that 

threat. And quality intelligence, in turn, requires that all elements 

of the community act together as one. 

Strong DNI central direction and authority is required for efficient management of the substantial resources of the IC. Without 

it, each agency could go its own way, creating its own data centers, 

its own networks, its own financial and personnel systems, on and 

on, resulting in gross inefficiencies, making collaboration and information-sharing even more difficult. 

As the next administration decides how to grapple with large 

near-term budget deficits and even larger ones as baby boomers retire, your budget may well come under greater strain. Your own 

program management plan, which we recently received, acknowledges this strain and concludes it will require tough program 

tradeoffs and achievements of greater efficiencies if the community 

is to deliver the intelligence capabilities that the Nation needs. 

Mr. Director, this is your chance to tell us what additional authorities you and you office need to be effective, both within the 

500 days of your current tenure and well beyond that 500 days 

when I hope you may be able to and wish to continue to serve. I’m 

particularly interested in what authorities are needed in the 

realms of tasking and operational direction, personnel accountability, and acquisition. And I know this expectation puts you in a 

difficult spot, particularly in public, because you would not want to 

appear in any way to be in dissonance with the administration and 

the Secretary of Defense. 

But you’re a tough guy in a tough job and we know you’re up to 

the assignment. If we can’t get candid answers from you, then 

5 

we’re all in trouble. I trust you will deliver us your candid position 

today, and if it would help to move into a closed session at a later 

time to discuss sensitive aspects of the relationship in closed session so that you may speak more freely, I would certainly be amenable to that and I would urge the Chairman and the full committee to give you that opportunity. 

But now, we look forward to your public testimony. We thank 

you for coming and look forward to your testimony and to your responses to our questions. We place great stock in your views, as the 

Chairman has indicated. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Mr. Director? 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL J. MICHAEL McCONNELL, USN 

(RET.), DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Director MCCONNELL. Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman Bond, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear today. Members of the 

Committee, I am pleased to be here. 

Before I start, I want to thank you, Chairman Rockefeller and 

Ranking Member Bond and members of the Committee and the 

staff sitting behind you. And the reason for that thanks is all the 

effort over many months to get the FISA legislation passed through 

the Senate with an overwhelming majority. It passed 2 days ago 

with bipartisan support, and I think it is commendable. I believe, 

under this Committee’s leadership, we now have a bill that is essential for our community to do its job in protecting the country. 

The Senate bill needs to be enacted now into law. If it is not, 

whether the Protect America Act is extended or expires, either 

way, it will do grave damage to our capabilities to protect the Nation if we don’t have your bill passed. 

Why I might make that statement? The simple fact of the matter 

is, we must rely on the private sector to be effective. Without liability protection for the private sector, they are less willing to help if 

the cost for that help is huge lawsuits. As you know from your 

months of review, liability protection does not exist in the current 

law—retroactive liability protection does not exist in current law. 

It would not exist in an extension and certainly would not exist if 

the law were allowed to expire. Therefore, we must get the new bill 

passed immediately if we are to maintain our capabilities to stop 

terrorist attacks against the Nation. 

Turning to today’s topic, as you’ve noted, I’m joined by an array 

of experts. And you’re going to ask some technical questions, I’m 

sure, and I won’t hesitate to call them to the table to help me in 

answering. 

We in the intelligence community have a solemn mandate and 

responsibility to provide relevant and objective analysis to customers across the government from law enforcement officials, to 

warfighters, to the President, and of course to the Congress. Our 

mission is to create decision advantage for our leadership. By decision advantage, we mean the ability to prevent strategic surprise, 

provide warning, understand emerging threats, track and prevent 

known threats, while adapting to a changing world. In these activities in some circumstances, as is known to this Committee, we also 

have an operational role to confront or help reduce foreign threats 

to the Nation. 

6 

This is not, as some have surmised, a passive community sitting 

in an office merely conducting analysis. We are in the field, as you 

noted, conducting aggressive collection operations, actively engaged 

to create that decision advantage that I mentioned earlier. There 

are a variety of views, as you also mentioned, about how to structure this community. There are four basic options. 

The first is overseer, probably the weakest form. Second would 

be a coordinator; third, an integrator; and fourth, a director, someone who actually directs all of the community’s intelligence activities. I currently have the title of Director, but the authorities created in statute and executive order put me more in the middle of 

that range of options—coordinator and integrator, rather than director with directive authority. 

This is because, of the 16 agencies that make up this community, 

15 of them work for a cabinet secretary in his or her department. 

For decades, the community was led in a decentralized fashion 

with various elements of the intelligence community being directed 

largely by their department heads, with limited direction from the 

Director of Central Intelligence. Until the creation of the DNI, the 

Director of Central Intelligence doubled as the Director of CIA, as 

you mentioned, and was more of an overseer, the weakest form, for 

the dozen or so intelligence agencies that existed at that time. 

It was apparent that managing the day-to-day activities of the 

CIA while effectively overseeing a community composed of organizations serving other cabinet-level departments was a significant 

challenge for any single person. With the passage of the reform act 

that you’ve mentioned in December 2004, the DNI inherited a divided community that required greater coordination and integration to be effective in meeting the new threats. 

Over 40 serious studies have been conducted since the 1947 National Security Act that recommended that the intelligence community integrate its efforts under a single, empowered leader. But it 

took two events—the trauma of September 11th and the failure of 

intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction National Intelligence Estimate—to spur dramatic reform of the community. 

Today, we are building on that 50–year legacy. Our mandate is 

to lead this community of 16 agencies and components, of which 

the DNI has direct reporting responsibility for only one, the CIA. 

As mentioned, the remaining components are operating under independent department heads. Our current structure charts a middle 

path between a department of Intelligence with line control over all 

elements and a confederated model, which provides resources but 

not day-to-day direction of the subordinate elements. This was the 

design of the 2004 Act that created this office. 

Often said, the intelligence community needs legislation like the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act of the eighties for DOD. I would note Goldwater-Nichols worked and is working well today. But it was for a 

single department with all decision authority flowing to the Secretary of Defense. We do not have a department of Intelligence. 

Our current model empowers an intelligence community leader, 

the DNI, who manages strategic planning, policy, budgets, but does 

not have direct operational control over elements of the community. 

The DNI does not have direct authority over the personnel in all 

of the 16 agencies in the community. 

7 

As part of our 500–day plan, we have focused the DNI’s role as 

the integrator of the community. We seek to create efficiencies and 

improved effectiveness in shared services like security clearances, 

information-sharing, information technology, and communications, 

but still promote an environment where the elements of the community serve their departmental responsibilities. This integration 

model of governance across the departments is still being defined 

because, quite frankly, we are in new territory for U.S. intelligence, 

something that has never been tried before, balanced with the need 

to have strong departmental intelligence elements in each department. 

This middle ground creates healthy tension—tension that obliges 

us to take on big issues within the community while at the same 

time doing so with the support and collaboration of not only the 16 

community members but in cooperation with the cabinet department heads. The legislation of 2004 directed specific responsibilities and tasks for the DNI and the office of the DNI. We believe 

a limited corporate headquarters is required to carry out our strategic tasks, such as the following: analytic and collection leadership; integration and prioritization; community-wide science and 

technology; budget development and oversight; information technology integration; information-sharing enhancement; human resources policy and direction; equal opportunity and diversity direction and management; and civil liberties and privacy protection 

leadership and advocacy. 

In addition, the office I’m responsible for operates the following 

mission management-related centers and staff elements: the National Intelligence Council, which produces our National Intelligence Estimates; the National Counterterrorism Center; the National Counterproliferation Center; the National Counterintelligence Executive; the Office of Analytic Mission Management; and 

the National Intelligence Coordination Center to coordinate collection activities across the Federal Government. This organizational 

structure enables the office to implement the coordination and integration required by the 2004 Act and ensures that the community’s 

collective efforts are effective and efficient to some degree. 

This arrangement has seen significant successes in the past 3 

years. It’s made an impact on how we do our business and our contribution to the Nation’s security. Let me provide a few examples. 

We have significantly enhanced intelligence collaboration across 

the community for collection, analysis, and dissemination; improved analytic tradecraft by setting more rigorous standards, promoting alternative analysis and enabling greater analytic collaboration; resourced the National Counterterrorism Center to ensure 

integration of all levels of information relevant to counterterrorism 

as well as to promote all-source intelligence collection collaboration 

and tasking deconfliction; established an executive committee. 

The Executive Committee is composed of the heads of the various 

agencies and the principal customers that receive our information. 

The executive committee is designed to take on the tough issues to 

help the DNI with decisionmaking support when we have to make 

hard decisions. We focused exclusively on guiding the intelligence 

community at large, allowing the CIA Director to give his agency 

the full attention that it requires. 

8 

And of course, we worked with the Congress to update the things 

like the FISA legislation; played a key role in the interagency effort 

to enhance security for the Federal IT networks, and hopefully for 

the IT networks of the Nation; established a joint-duty program, 

which requires our future leaders to have joint-duty for a promotion; greatly enhanced classified information-sharing among our 

foreign partners. We launched security clearance transformation. 

The purpose of that is to save time and money and make us more 

efficient. And we integrated and coordinated the intelligence community-wide budget to ensure that we are making hard choices 

now to prepare the community for the future. 

I have just described where we were and where we are. I’ll take 

just a couple of moments to comment on where we want to go. To 

further intelligence transformation, we have launched a reform initiative aligned to our longer-term vision, which I will profile briefly 

here. We must develop a workforce that knows, understands, and 

trusts one another, and regularly shares information to better develop intelligence products. Initiatives such as the joint-duty effort 

are critical to transforming that culture. We’re also developing uniform compensation policies across the community appropriate to a 

highly performing workforce for the 21st century. This will also 

serve as an incentive to bring our community closer together. 

We want to create a culture of intelligence analysts who understand that they have a responsibility to provide the needed information to the right customer in time to be useful. Such a culture 

puts great pressure on our analysts. They must know their customers better, they must understand how all the collection systems 

work better, and they must meet their obligations to protect 

sources and methods. 

We need a seamless flow of information to be effective. We cannot continue to maintain multiple, non-interoperable networks 

within the community or operate with archaic information-sharing 

regimes. Initiatives such as our single information environment 

and modernizing our intelligence-sharing policies and procedures 

will help us accomplish that goal. By transforming how we identify 

and address collection gaps, we will produce fused intelligence, creating better situational awareness. 

We must also unify the community around priority missions, not 

around specific intelligence disciplines. Our mission manager approach allows leaders in the community to bring best solutions to 

solving a problem using multi-disciplinary teams across the community. It’s worked well for us and we look forward to expanding 

that as we go forward. 

We will gain influence over our potential adversaries by exploiting America’s advantage in technology and systems management. 

This will require us to radically rethink the way we identify, develop, and field promising new technologies. The current approach 

is too slow. It’s too slow to counter the rapidly evolving threat. Specifically, this will require acquisition reform, streamlining the procurement process, and achieving greater synergies among our 

science and technology communities. 

It will be difficult to accomplish any of our objectives with the 

antiquated business practices of our systems today. We are working to deploy an integrated planning, programming, budgeting, and 

9 

performance management process that aligns strategy to budget, 

budget to capabilities, and capabilities to performance. This requires timely, accurate, reliable financial systems with the ability 

to provide a quality financial statement. 

Where are we today on the question of DNI authorities? We seek 

national intelligence authority that can focus, guide, and coordinate 

the agencies of the community to ensure that our customers get the 

service they need. We have some successes so far, but there are impediments that slow our ability to take rapid action. We will continue to address these impediments forcefully, exercising our current authorities. 

We are working as a member of an interagency process to update 

current executive guidance on the operation of the community. One 

of the main focus areas of this interagency process is recommendations to the President for changing the executive orders that govern 

our community. However, while we work this interagency process, 

there are a few areas in which your support is needed. 

Personnel policies can be both transformational and serve to create a common culture. We request that you act on the recommendations that we have identified to build and support a unified civilian workforce across the community. This includes proposals to allow us to implement modern compensation practices for 

all of our civilian employees; place all civilian employees in the excepted service; and provide for critical-pay positions. We also request relief from rigid civilian end-strength ceilings. These reforms 

would provide the community with flexibility to most effectively implement our joint-duty program, create a performance culture, reward and retain our best employees, and generally improve the 

strategic management of the workforce. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, with your support, we’re on the 

right path. We’ve got a lot of work left to do. But we’re working 

hard to create that decision advantage to serve the leaders of our 

Nation, to protect our citizens, our values, and our way of life. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Director McConnell appears on page 

29.] 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Director McConnell. The 

Senate, in its constant effort to be helpful to hearings, witnesses, 

and Members, has a vote about half the way through. After that, 

there is one more. And so, to my regret, I must ask that you be 

patient, which you have learned to be, and that we go vote and 

come back quickly after we’ve voted on the second vote. I apologize. 

[Whereupon, from 3:11 p.m. until 3:44 p.m., the Committee recessed.] 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. The hearing will resume, with all appropriate apologies to a very busy man. 

If you gave an order, as DNI, to the CIA or the DIA or NSA or 

somebody else, and they decided they wanted to ignore your order 

in full or in part, what would you do? 

Director MCCONNELL. It would depend on the circumstances, of 

course. If I considered it appropriate and reasonable, then I would 

insist on getting it corrected, and that they would do what I asked 

them to do. And there are a variety of ways to do that. Fifteen 

agencies work for another cabinet officer, so one option is to work 

10 

it out with the cabinet officer. I always have recourse to fall back 

to the President if necessary; it’s something I would not want to 

do and would make every effort to work around, but that is the option that I could exhaust if I had to. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. But you wouldn’t have any lack of confidence that what you saw to be what should be done would be 

done? 

Director MCCONNELL. No, sir. One of the things that the bill created was something called the JICC, and I don’t remember how it 

expands, but it’s Joint Intelligence Community Council. That’s the 

cabinet officers and interestingly, I chair it; I have cabinet rank 

but, as you know, I’m not a cabinet officer. So this is the Secretary 

of Defense, Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, Energy and 

so on. We meet three times a year; we talk about priorities and so 

on. And since I’m a member of the Principals Committee in the 

White House I am at all of those decision bodies, so I know these 

people and we work with them on a regular basis. 

So I think, if it was something in extremis that had to be done 

immediately, there’s a path to get that done; if there’s something 

more of a policy nature, there’s a path to get that worked out. So 

it’s not like having a department of intelligence—I mean, for sure, 

that’s clear hire-fire directive authority. I have more of a coordinating role, but if I felt strongly about it as a professional in the 

interest of protecting the country, for whatever reason, I think I 

could prevail in the debate and dialogue and always have the 

President to go to if necessary. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I want to come back to you on that. 

Mr. Director, I want to ask a question which some will take as 

political but I take as policy. The House has left; I’m meeting with 

Chairman Reyes of the House Intelligence Committee tomorrow 

morning at 10 because he’s concerned, and I think that John Conyers and Pat Leahy are going to meet, I’m not sure, but I know I’m 

going to meet with him to figure out what’s down the path for 

FISA. There’s no question the President had what he wanted in 

our bill and he made it very clear on 1 day, and then on the next 

day he proceeded to make it very clear that this was a terrible 

thing that the House was doing and that intelligence collection 

would stop and that they should be in danger to terrorists from, 

you know, sort of from Sunday morning. 

So I want to ask this question: You and I both don’t want to see 

the Protect America Act expire on Saturday. You’re clear about 

that; we’re all clear about that. I believe the best way to handle 

the fact that the Senate sent the House a bill only a few days before the expiration of the Protect America Act and this, for the second time, does in fact give them reason to be upset with us, pushed 

around by us. 

I look at it differently. I think that it’d be great if we agreed on 

a short-term extension, but that isn’t going to happen. Be that as 

it may, I believe it would be responsible for us to help the American people—and I’m doing this hoping that people will be listening—understand what the government’s anti-terrorism capabilities 

will be in the days ahead. 

In other words, if the Protect America Act is expiring on Saturday night, the natural inclination is to feel that that’s the end of 

11 

collection and so Usama, when are you coming. Isn’t it true that 

the intelligence collection gap, which was discussed a great deal at 

the end of last July, you described that last summer with respect 

to the coverage of international terrorists, has been closed? 

Director MCCONNELL. We’ve significantly improved our posture 

since last July, yes, sir, because of the Act that you all passed last 

August, the Protect America Act. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Right, right. 

Isn’t it true that the targeting and collection of communications 

of foreign terrorists now underway, pursuant to the Protect America Act, will continue even after the sunset of the Protect America 

Act? 

Director MCCONNELL. The provisions of the bill allow us, once we 

had submitted to the FISA court the procedures and so on were approved and we are loaded—from the date that’s approved we get 

a year. So at some level the collection will go forward if it, in fact, 

expires on Saturday. 

But now, that said, it’s very important that I highlight for this 

Committee what else happened, what else. One, we lose the ability 

to compel the carriers to help us; two, there is no liability protection for the carriers, therefore they’re thinking twice about helping 

us, making it much more difficult; and three, this is a very dynamic situation. While we may have something on some key targets that we’re working, recruitment, training, different names, different personalities will pop up. 

Under the Protect America Act, that was manageable. So if it expires, that new dynamic would put us back in a position under the 

old FISA legislation, in which we would have to satisfy a probable 

cause standard if collection were obtained in this country, meaning 

a wire in United States. 

So there is some level of protection but it’s not where we need 

to be. One, we don’t have the carriers willingly participating with 

us and a way to compel them, and it’s a pretty dynamic situation. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Yes, but there the bulk part of the answer is that intelligence would continue to be collected—— 

Director MCCONNELL. What is pre-loaded. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER [CONTINUING]. —With worries, legitimate worries on your part about the withdrawal or whatever it 

might be. 

Director MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. What’s pre-loaded and for where 

we still have continuing cooperation of the private sector. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Right. 

Isn’t it true that no vital intelligence collection now going on 

under the authority of the Protect America Act will be shut off on 

Saturday? 

Director MCCONNELL. It would not be turned off. The issue becomes compelling—private sector cooperation and then the things 

that change, yes sir, that’s correct. The way you stated it is correct. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Didn’t the Congress specifically provide 

the Protect America Act authorizations continue in effect until 

their expiration? 

Director MCCONNELL. The way that you’ve framed it is true, but 

my response is also true. I mean, there is some provision for carryover but it has—— 

12 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I understand. 

Director MCCONNELL. It has issues, yes sir. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. And it is also not true that if we come 

to August, which is when it technically would expire, that there are 

relatively easy ways for that to be continued if we have not worked 

out—— 

Director MCCONNELL. No, sir, I wouldn’t agree with that. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. You would not agree with that. 

Director MCCONNELL. I wouldn’t, and the reason is we’d find ourselves in a situation that we found ourselves last July. Remember 

when this was returned to the FISA court in January 1907, the initial response on the FISA court, we had fairly broad capability to 

do what we needed to do. But as subsequent judges looked at the 

situation and interpreted the words in the law going back to 1978, 

over time capability was subtracted from us and so, when we went 

into July 1907, we had lost about two-thirds of our capability. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Right, last year. 

Director MCCONNELL. Last year. So my point is, going into the 

way you framed your question, if we got to July or to August 2008 

and the things we on coverage under the Protect America Act expire, we would be back in that same situation. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I apologize to my colleagues but I’ve got 

to ask this last question. 

If you have any uncertainties about this—and you do and I do— 

would it not have made sense for the President, in that there were 

reasons that we jammed the House because we were clogged in the 

Senate—we’re not able to operate on amendments for a number of 

days—the House has been through this experience before and they 

don’t like it and they’re angry about it and you can see that in the 

results of the extension vote last night, that an extension of the 

Protect America Act, in order to allow these things to work out, 

which they surely would have been, would have been a good idea? 

Director MCCONNELL. Sir, when I went through this experience 

last summer one of your Members quoted that in the political context, I was a little over my head. I admit that was absolutely correct. This is a political process; I am a professional officer with professional responsibilities. So when I’m advising my committee, both 

committees, anyone that’ll listen on the Hill or in the executive 

branch, I will advise on our intelligence condition. Now, this is a 

political process and so all I can do is tell you that if we extend 

the Act or the Act expires we’re at a disadvantage. And so how it’s 

worked out in the political process, that’s going to be to those of 

you who are elected to those positions. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Well, yes, it will be. And I thank you 

very much, and Senator Bond. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will offer a 

political suggestion and not ask you to comment since you are a 

professional officer. 

The House passed a bill. It was very different from our bill; it 

was clear that the President said he would not sign it because you 

said it would not work. There is nothing in the rules of the House 

or any other body that prevent them from looking at that, understanding what’s coming. They knew what we reported out in October; they knew that was the form that they would be dealing with 

13 

in the House. So it is not a question of when we got it there so 

much as the inability of the House to deal with it. And I’ll just 

leave that out there for no comment. 

I do want to ask you one thing on which you can comment and 

I think the important thing—and I appreciated the Chairman’s 

question. The key point that you brought out was that, without the 

power to compel, without protection or retroactive protection, the 

carriers which may be involved in this program realize that they 

are suffering serious threats to their business livelihood and perhaps even their facilities and personnel if we don’t give them retroactive immunity for the work that they’ve done. And thus, it is my 

assumption that general counsels of the carriers would be telling 

you, you show us a court order or we’re not going to cooperate on 

anything which is not covered by a court order. Is that a fair assumption? 

Director MCCONNELL. Sir, it is fair and I would take it a step 

further. This has to be willing relationship, partnership, and so 

where we find ourselves now, even with a court order, some are 

saying we’ll take it to court to verify. 

And what I want to highlight to you is for us to do this job it 

requires this willing cooperation. And if you think about this technology area, the United States industry dominates it; it’s a strategic advantage for us. And so we’re putting ourselves in a position 

that we can’t capitalize on it and I would suggest even perhaps 

putting it at risk. 

What do I mean by that? It’s very easy for competition in a foreign country to point to a company here and say you’re being sued 

for spying on its citizens or whatever. Even if those allegations are 

totally out of order it could damage your brand. And so with Sarbanes-Oxley, fiduciary responsibility to shareholders and so on, 

we’ve put these companies in a position where they feel like they’re 

being punished for trying to help. So that’s the mitigation that 

we’ve got to get through to get this protection for them. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you for that explanation, Mr. Director. This hearing is one I’ve wanted to have for a long time, and 

I hate to be taking up questions that are of more immediate import, but I found the debate yesterday on the floor, and particularly 

the news coverage of it, somewhat troubling. The floor adopted the 

intel authorization bill, approved in conference with what I consider to be one very bad provision requiring that the CIA be limited 

only to those techniques approved in the Army field manual. 

I’d ask you to comment on that in a second, but I want to ask 

you to address specifically some of the charges and allegations that 

I think were either badly misinformed or irresponsible, that we 

heard on the floor and that were covered in the media. I spoke 

today with an international broadcast group asking me questions 

to be fed back into the Middle East. They picked up statements 

that were made on the floor that I believe to be absolutely false. 

So first, I would like to ask you, the eight prohibited techniques 

that the Army field manual specifically prohibits, they are repugnant; I believe they probably violate treaty obligations. I want to 

know whether there is any intent or whether there’s any chance 

the CIA would use those or use torture, or use waterboarding. 

14 

I believe that the argument is appropriately separate from the 

discussion we heard on the floor, saying this bill outlaws torture, 

outlaws waterboarding. I do not believe that we need any more legislation. I believe that is outlawed; I believe it is not used. I would 

like your comments specifically on that and your comments on 

what would happen to the CIA’s interrogation of high-value detainees were they to be limited to the unclassified and thus published 

techniques in the Army field manual. 

Two-part question. 

Director MCCONNELL. Sir, let me define sort of the boundaries of 

law as this imaginary box I’m outlining with my hands. That box 

is a result of the American political process; it defines our rules, 

that’s our law. The Army field manual in the context of this box 

is a small circle in the middle of it. It’s designed for a specific purpose, for men in uniform, generally younger, less experienced and 

less trained, for a specific purpose. So the question becomes, do you 

limit the CIA and its interrogation program to that small circle? 

Now, the President stated what his intentions are, but the question is what’s inside that box and is it lawful. If it’s lawful as determined by the American political process, then CIA would use those 

lawful techniques in certain prescribed circumstances. 

Now, as you’ve alluded to there are enhanced interrogation techniques currently; waterboarding is not included in that. If it were 

ever decided, for any reason, that waterboarding should be included in that, there’s a process to make that determination, to determine if it’s legal. The law has changed since waterboarding was 

last used some 5 years ago, so I don’t know if I’m answering your 

question but it’s—— 

Vice Chairman BOND. The eight techniques that are specifically 

prohibited in the Army field manual, burning and electric shocks, 

those—— 

Director MCCONNELL. Those clearly are illegal and are not appropriate for anyone, to include the CIA certainly. The ones that are 

specifically—the things that you just mentioned, yes sir. 

Vice Chairman BOND. And the final question was what would 

happen to the CIA interrogation program if they were limited to 

that small circle in the big box of permissible techniques? 

Director MCCONNELL. It could not be as effective as they have 

been in certain circumstances, and what I would describe as—it’s 

a point in time. When those techniques were used, we knew little 

about an organization that had just attacked the World Trade Centers and we had captured some hardened terrorists, and so there 

were some interrogation techniques used that resulted in useful information. 

So is that something that’s exercised every day on anyone that’s 

captured? No. Would it be done today the way it was done back 

then? Probably not. One of the main reasons is we know so much 

more. It’s very easy to have an interrogation if you have lots of answers that you can use to test and probe and establish a relationship. Anyone would prefer a non-confrontational approach if possible, but still what’s in the box, so long as it’s not torture as defined in the American political process as being legal, then the CIA 

would be capable of using some of those techniques. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you. 

15 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I would like to say to my colleagues 

that the hearing is not about the question I asked or the questions 

the Vice Chairman asked, although they have their interest, but 

it’s about the condition and the authorities and the ability to maneuver and to lead of the Director of National Intelligence in a way 

that is most efficacious. So I would ask that questions would reflect 

on that matter, and Senator Whitehouse is next. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you. 

Admiral, first let me ask you to comment on this assertion, if you 

could tell me if it’s true or false: Your surveillance of anyone affiliated with al-Qa’ida or any organization affiliated with al-Qa’ida, or 

any person affiliated with any organization affiliated with alQa’ida, will continue unimpeded through any period in which the 

so-called Protect America Act is not in effect, at least until August 

of this year. Is that correct? 

Director MCCONNELL. I don’t think that’s correct, sir, but let me 

ask for some legal help. Let me tell you my understanding. We 

have certain procedures that are sort of loaded, been approved by 

the court and so on. In a dynamic situation, if there was someone 

outside that, I—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Someone outside al-Qa’ida or an organization affiliated with al-Qa’ida? 

Director MCCONNELL. I’m using known to us or outside a specific 

list of identifiers or that sort of thing. I think if the Protect America Act expires it would put us back in a situation of probable 

cause if the collection was done in the United States on a wire. And 

I think that’s the answer but let me get some—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Unless they were affiliated. 

Director MCCONNELL. No, if it’s done—if PAA expires and it’s 

done in this country, it would require you to have a warrant, I believe. But let me get someone who actually knows the answer. Ben, 

are you here? 

Mr. POWELL. To the extent someone is covered under an existing 

authorization—an authorization for an acquisition signed by the 

Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence and 

that has been issued, those continue for up to 1 year even beyond 

the expiration of the Protect America Act. Directives issued under 

those authorizations may also continue under those also. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And those authorizations may include organizational authorizations so that new individuals who are affiliated with the organization can nevertheless be surveilled, correct? 

Mr. POWELL. We would certainly take that position, Senator. 

What we could not do is the issues that are raised in the Attorney 

General and DNI’s letter are if we need to modify or issue new directives pursuant to those authorizations to different electronic 

communication service providers or different methods than what 

are covered in existing directives, or modify those authorizations 

and directives, which we have done over the past 6 months, then, 

there’s also a substantial question in the wording of the Act—although we hope we have good arguments but it may be litigated— 

of whether the liability protection continues on because that is in 

the wording of what actually continues on. So as the AG laid out 

there’s uncertainty in all those different areas. 

16 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. But not as to your ability to surveil people 

who are affiliated with al-Qa’ida. 

Mr. POWELL. Certainly the authorization, if it covers the authorization for the acquisition, then it would continue. It’s the implementation of it that creates concern with the private sector. 

Director MCCONNELL. Also, there’s an issue of compelling. If you 

have assistance and it expires, can you now compel? That could be 

challenged. And so our worry is we’re much better with certainty 

so we know what the rules are; if it changes, you never know how 

it might be ruled. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. There was an incident recently in which 

the Director of National Intelligence, then John Negroponte, instructed the head of the CIA, then Porter Goss, that CIA interrogation tapes were not to be destroyed. As it turned out, they were in 

fact destroyed. 

Is there anything out of that circumstance that bears on the authority of the DNI versus the Director of the CIA? Do we need to 

strengthen the authority of the DNI so that when the DNI makes 

a statement like that to a CIA Director it becomes clear that it is, 

in fact, a decision that the agency must comply with? There’s a 

command gap between DNI Negroponte making that statement 

and the action that took place in contravention of the statement, 

and where is that command gap. 

Director MCCONNELL. It’s being investigated now and I haven’t 

talked to Ambassador Negroponte, and I don’t know all the circumstances. But if it were an order and if it were violated—two big 

ifs—then I would agree with the way you outlined it. But what I’ve 

heard just in people talking about it, it wasn’t a direct order, it was 

an opinion; I don’t know. But if the way you described it, it was 

an order and it—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Do you not see it as part of your DNI authority? 

Director MCCONNELL. I do, indeed. If it was an order and violated, then you’d have to deal with that situation. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. One last, just quick reaction. You said 

that the Army field manual was designed for young men, generally 

less experienced, less well-trained. 

Director MCCONNELL. In uniform. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. In uniform. 

I frankly don’t think that’s true, and I would challenge it and 

urge you to maybe reconsider it because what I understand is that 

the military has very significant and very experienced intelligence 

operatives. Men who I’ve spoken to have 22 years of interrogation 

experience. They run military intelligence and interrogation schools 

of 10-, 18-weeks’ duration; they have, I guess you’d call it, sort of 

graduate-level courses. This is a matter—you have, you know, special-ops individuals, you have DIA folks. You have some of the very 

best intelligence and interrogation operators in the country in the 

United States military, and they are the ones who are telling us 

that they work very well within the confines of the Army field 

manual. 

And I think it’s fair to have the discussion as to whether or not, 

at that level, the Army field manual is the right restriction or not. 

17 

What is not fair, I don’t think, is to take the military interrogation and intelligence operation and denigrate it, as if it’s a bunch 

of 18-year-olds running around who have got no experience doing 

this and the Army field manual has to protect them from their naivete and their ignorance because it’s the same field manual that 

applies to highly trained, highly professional, highly experienced 

individuals, many of whom have a lot more interrogation experience, it appears, than the folks in the CIA. 

Director MCCONNELL. Sir, what you’re referring to—— 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Please react to that. 

Director MCCONNELL [continuing]. Is coercive techniques. And if 

you ask the FBI their opinion—and we just did this recently in a 

hearing up here—you get pretty much the same answer the way 

you just described it. The way I think of the Army field manual is 

primarily the lowest common denominator to protect the Nation 

from what happened—the heinous behavior at Abu Ghraib. So it is 

a course of action that was taken by this body and the executive 

branch to agree to how we’re going to do that in the future, so that 

circle closed to be a smaller circle. 

What you say is true; they’re very experienced people, but now 

they live within that circle. The question is, do we want to make 

the same circle apply to all parties, and that’s the question that 

you all have to wrestle with. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I would say to my colleagues the following: It may be that—and Senator Whitehouse did ask one question which was directly on point of the purpose of this hearing. It 

may be that my colleagues don’t have an enormous interest in the 

powers and the authorities of the Director of National Intelligence 

and they wish to talk about other matters, which are much more 

fun to talk about, but they were not the point of this hearing; they 

were not the point of this hearing. That’s partly my fault, and 

that’s partly the Vice Chairman’s point because we started out with 

two such matters. 

But the point is, does he have the authority that he needs? And 

if people feel that they are disinclined to engage in that subject, 

then I of course will be very happy to hear about that, but I’ll be 

very disappointed, even to the point of maybe adjourning the hearing. Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Chairman, I would not allow that to happen. My questions are exactly about the topic of this hearing. But 

I want to first say how valuable your questions were, and how important it was that you brought us to some clarity on the issue of 

what really happens if the PAA expires. 

Director MCCONNELL. And I agree with that. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Which, by the way, I oppose, letting that happen. And I also feel that way about Senator Whitehouse’s about the 

Army field manual. These things are critical but I happen to find 

the topic of this hearing fun, as you say, or important. And let me 

just say, a little over a year ago, the Committee held another hearing on intelligence reform in which ODNI testified to its ability to 

lift and shift—‘‘Lift and shift collection resources to address current 

crises such as Darfur and Somalia.’’ 

The problem, however, I think you might agree, is that lifting 

and shifting almost inherently means that it doesn’t help us anticiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:51 Jun 18, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48099.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
18 

pate crises before they happen. It does not help the intelligence 

community develop experience or expertise on these threats, and it 

does not represent an ongoing commitment to long-term challenges. 

In fact, the Deputy DNI for collection acknowledged at our hearing 

that there is a ‘‘need to get the intelligence community back to 

what I grew up calling ‘global reach.’ We don’t have that today.’’ 

She further testified that with Congress’ help, the intelligence 

community can ‘‘get back to a place where we can do global reach 

and pay attention to places that are not perhaps high on the list 

today.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, that is what we should be doing, pushing the intelligence community to allocate its resources in accordance with 

our national security needs and providing the DNI the authorities 

he needs to make that happen. And I’d ask that my full statement 

be placed in the record, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. And it will be. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold appears on page 

28.] 

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Director, do you agree with the statement 

in the most recent annual report of the U.S. intelligence community that ‘‘one challenge to improving the coverage of emerging and 

strategic issues across the intelligence community has been the diversion of resources to current crisis support.’’ 

Director MCCONNELL. Certainly current crisis support takes a 

disproportionate share, but let me just offer how we try to mitigate 

that. We have a thing we call the national intelligence priorities 

framework, and we make that dynamic. Every 6 months we go 

through a process leading up to the signature by the President, and 

the way we get to closure is the cabinet officers sit and we take 

them through a dialogue. What are we, the intelligence community, 

looking at, what are we not looking at. And we have added some 

dynamics to that in the last cycle because cabinet officers tend to 

focus on the here and now. 

And it was to get at your question. What about those areas that 

we don’t have as much focus on and how do we do that. So they’ve 

engaged in a very positive way, so we’re trying to get back to addressing your question. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I think with regard to that, last year 

your office testified about its authorities to lift and shift collection 

resources to address crises. Does what you just said mean that the 

ODNI has moved beyond lift and shift to ensure that sustained attention is paid to regions that are traditionally underserved by our 

intelligence community, or is it not a fair—— 

Director MCCONNELL. No, that is fair. I personally don’t like the 

term ‘‘lift and shift.’’ That’s crisis management in a collection situation. But the whole nature of the priorities framework, national intelligence priorities framework, was to force focus on the areas that 

were not getting as much attention. 

And it’s changed quite a bit, what we’re looking at, how we’re 

doing it, and the resources we’re dedicating to it. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I think about this a lot, especially in 

trips and my work in Africa with regard to the Foreign Relations 

Committee. And last week you testified that, ‘‘Kenya is likely to 

enter a period of increased social tension and instability which 

19 

could affect its willingness and ability to cooperate with the United 

States on regional, diplomatic, and counterterrorism matters.’’ 

This is exactly the kind of strategic challenge to the United 

States that we need to anticipate rather than just respond to. It 

also demonstrates clearly how issues like political repression and 

corruption, ethnic tensions and the destabilizing pressures of poverty and marginalization directly affect our national security. 

So Mr. Director, what are you doing to direct collection resources 

toward these sorts of issues, so that we don’t find ourselves unprepared for crises that directly threaten our diplomatic and counterterrorism efforts. I mean, I just think about how I went to Kenya 

so we can talk about Somalia and Sudan and then, all of a sudden, 

we have this just extreme political crisis in Kenya and what an impact it has on us as well as on the Kenyan people. 

Director MCCONNELL. Part of the way we do this, as I mentioned 

in my remarks about mission managers. A mission manager took 

on a political context because if you have one, then the Nation that 

it focuses or the region it focuses on gets—there’s a reaction. So 

what I’m looking at is how do I get the benefits of mission management in the construct of how we currently operate. 

And as you know, we have National Intelligence Council, which 

consists of National Intelligence Officers. Those are our most senior 

officers in the community for a region. What I want to do is empower them to work across the disciplines—HUMINT, SIGINT, imagery, whatever—and get real focus. And then there is a constituency for every region of the world, Department of State, Defense, 

or wherever, and have active dialogue with them to understand 

more their needs and so on. 

And we’re starting to have some traction. There’s been particular 

focus on Africa because of Kenya, because of Chad, because of Somalia. So we’re better—not where I would like to be but we’re better—and it’s making us more sensitive in a global context. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Director. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Feingold, and 

thank you for your interest in these matters which are important. 

Senator WYDEN. Mr. Director, out of deference to the Chairman 

I admire very much, I’m going to set aside questions that I had 

planned to ask about the last couple of days, and let me start then 

with respect on the authority question, just in matters of fiscal responsibility. 

What I’ve long been concerned about is that there’s a habit in the 

intelligence community of beginning these very large acquisition 

programs, and nobody’s really quite sure how to pay for them down 

the road. I think you’ve been concerned about this as well, and 

you’ve talked about a variety of strategies that you’ve been interested in, including auditable financial statements and a variety of 

things. 

But what have you been able to accomplish thus far to make 

sure that the intelligence community doesn’t spend these huge 

sums of money on these major acquisitions that are going to later 

have to be canceled on the grounds that they’re unaffordable and 

in effect don’t give you value for the dollar that you’re allocating? 

20 

Director MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. Excellent question, something I’m 

very concerned about and focused on. Let me capture sort of three 

areas of interest with acquisition where we get ourselves in trouble. The first is requirements creep. We’re going to design something, build something, whatever. And then as we go through the 

process, everybody wants to add another capability, another capability. So all of a sudden, it becomes unaffordable. The schedule 

slips or we have a major problem. So we have to do a better job 

in containing requirements creep. 

The second thing is we lost a generation of program managers. 

When the dot boom occurred in the nineties, many of the people 

with the skill sets that built large systems were attracted to the 

private sector and they left. So we suffered from an inadequate 

supply of professional program managers. So we recognized that, 

and we’re trying to rebuild that capability. 

Another part of it is having realistic cost estimating. The idea is 

don’t start something you can’t afford. Now, if we can do that—and 

we established the new deputy on our staff, deputy for acquisition, 

someone experienced—more than 30 years in industry—to work 

through these issues, and now hard decisions. 

As you’re aware, we had a program that was multibillion dollars 

that was putting us in a position of being a one-point failure. And 

so we took that on as a community. In my Executive Committee 

I mentioned earlier, we took it to all of the parties that had to 

make a decision and finally took it to the President for a decision 

for coordination with the Hill. 

Now, that I think gets us back into focusing in an area looking 

at the architecture, what’s affordable, how would you manage it. 

We started a process we call ICA, Intelligence Collection Architecture, that’s to force us to look at the discipline, the cost, and the 

schedule so that we will choose things that are affordable in the 

best interest of the Nation. 

So I feel like we’re making progress. But one of the things that 

I would ask your support on—currently your bill or the bill for this 

office gave me authorities for streamlined acquisition. The problem 

is, you didn’t give me the authority to delegate them to anybody 

that spends money. So while the DNI and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency have special authorities to do special 

things—can take risks, can go fast—and you gave it to me, it’s only 

for my staff and not for the rest of the community. I need that authority for the rest of the community. 

Senator WYDEN. And I’m sympathetic to that. Let me ask you 

about something that came up in an open hearing not long ago that 

my constituents just were kind of slack-jawed when they heard 

about it, and it goes to, again, the question of your authorities with 

respect to the problem. At one of the open hearings we had last 

fall, Willie Hulan, a senior FBI official, acknowledged that a large 

number of FBI agents and analysts don’t have access to the Internet at their desk. 

And Committee staff have found that there were similar access 

problems existing for the FBI’s top-secret system, particularly for 

the offices overseas. You and I have talked about technology in the 

past, and I know you have a great interest in this. What can you 

21 

do with your authorities to in effect address something that I think 

just defies common sense? 

Director MCCONNELL. In this case, I can offer to help, and we’ve 

done that. We’ve put technical people into the process to help to 

think it through and do requirements and that sort of thing. And 

I have some budget authority. 

Now, it’s much more clearly defined, understood, and in action 

for the agencies that are in the Defense Department. It’s less clearly defined for agencies outside the Defense Department. So that’s 

something we recognize and we’re working through it. 

And let me just make one other point so you capture this. On the 

executive committee that we’ve established to run the community, 

the Director of the FBI is now a member of that. He participates 

actively and he is now benefiting from some of this deliberative 

process. So I think that will make a difference. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you very much. I annoyed the 

former owner of the meager territories of West Virginia, the honorable senior Senator from West Virginia, by pointing out that we’re 

having more votes at 4:30 and that’s not much time. So now we 

have three more people who wish to speak and they’re probably not 

even going to get a full 5 minutes. So Senator Feinstein—— 

Senator WARNER. I also asked you to take judicial notice that it’s 

Valentine’s night and some of us have some responsibilities. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FEINSTEIN. We’re all in favor of that. 

Senator WARNER. I know your wife is expecting you for the first 

time for dinner in a long time. 

Director MCCONNELL. That’s exactly true, yes, sir. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. If I may, Admiral, in addition to what Senator Wyden’s point was and your response to it, are you saying that 

you believe you have adequate budgetary authority at this time? 

We had a conversation about a year ago. It was a personal conversation. And you said you hoped to work this out internally. You 

told us earlier about some of the ways you would work it out. And 

so I guess my question to you is, without specific additional budgetary authority, do you think you have what it takes to do what 

is necessary to correct many of the big problems within the intelligence community? 

Director MCCONNELL. Ma’am, partially. And let me tell you exactly what the issue is. The law says that if it’s an acquisition by 

a defense agency, which is where most of the acquisition is done, 

and it’s funded by the National Intelligence Program, then I must 

share jointly with the Department of Defense what’s called MDA, 

Milestone Decision Authority. 

It is silent on any program where the Department of Defense is 

also contributing money, military-intelligence program, into a 

major buy. And what’s happened over the last, say, six or 8 years 

is major systems have moved all into defense, all into the national 

program or a hybrid, where they are split-funded. So it’s mixed. 

There’s been a lot of to-ing and fro-ing between staffs about we’ll 

use these procedures or those procedures. The poor guy is trying 

to buy things. We’re getting double reviewed and two sets of procedures and so on. 

22 

So I sat down with Secretary Gates and said, this is untenable. 

He’s agreed to a process. Where we are now is in interagency coordination for the directive. This is interagency; it will go to the 

principals within 2 weeks, and what we’ll do is make recommendations to the President. So we hope to have this clearly defined and 

resolved. I would say it’s scheduled for signature by the 15th of 

April. If it doesn’t happen, then I have an obligation to come back 

to tell you it didn’t happen and I need some help. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Okay, good, because I think it’s our intent 

that you have that authority, at least it certainly is mine, so I want 

to help with that any way I can. 

One of my concerns has been the growth of contractors within 

the agency and there’s been difficulty in getting any clear understanding of how many contractors are really within the intelligence 

community. If you exclude the construction of satellites, which is 

necessarily done by contractors, how many contractors are there in 

the intelligence community? 

Director MCCONNELL. Ma’am, I think—well, two things. We’ve 

done a report, so we can make that available to you, and I think 

it’s a classified number, but let me just verify that. 

It’s a classified number but it breaks it out—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I’ll bet it’s huge. 

Director MCCONNELL. It’s a large number. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Is it? Go ahead. 

Director MCCONNELL. And we’ll just bring it up to let you look 

at it and then you can ask detailed questions on why this and why 

that, and so on. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. All right. Now, your office is now up to 1,750 

people. I gather 40 percent of that is the Counterterrorism Center, 

which you inherited, but the remaining 60 percent is not. Is that 

a stable size at this point or is it going to continue to expand? 

Director MCCONNELL. Ma’am, what I would like to do is cap my 

office at a level like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, just cap it at a reasonable place, whatever that is, and I’d like to get help from you 

to do that. 

Now, that said, this is what I need you to also help me do. The 

Joint Chiefs of Staff is capped; the services or our defense agencies, 

can grow or contract depending on the mission. So I need to have 

the Counterterrorism Center, the Counterproliferation Center, the 

Counterintelligence Executive; you know, all these little things, 

they need to be treated as second echelon command so they can do 

whatever they need to do. And I’ve got a staff that’s capped at a 

set level. You can see it; we can manage it and we can live within 

our cap. That’ll let me manage it, because I don’t have a profit motive like I would have in industry, so I’m looking for a way to force 

us to deal with a given size, just the way the Joint Chiefs work. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Let me just say I think that would be very 

good and very positive because I think it’s kind of Never-Never 

Land for you the way it is now, so that would be very useful, thank 

you. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Notice it’s only a yellow line. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I know. You have thirteen seconds left. 

23 

Senator Snowe, and then the most esteemed Senator Warner. 

And our votes start in 3 minutes. 

Senator SNOWE. Okay, I’ll be very quick, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Director, I appreciate you being here today, and your 

straightforwardness and forthrightness and I know you’ve faced 

considerable challenges as you assumed your position. 

I was just curious. In reading your statement, you mentioned 

that you had focused the DNI’s role as the integrator of the intelligence community. And I’d like to have you clarify that in terms 

of exactly what are the natures and dimensions of your power, because when this Act became law 4 years ago, the President was referring to it as a single, unified enterprise for the entire intelligence community. It was certainly understood that you would 

have unified command over the intelligence agency. So how do you 

view your role now as an integrator as opposed to a director, one 

who obviously should be taking charge of the responsibilities within those agencies—not day-to-day control but certainly being able 

to direct. I know you’ve chosen a middle ground in all of this and 

yet, how does that dovetail with the original intent of the law? 

Director MCCONNELL. Ma’am, as you know, if you’re director you 

have line authority, and there are 16 agencies, and, of the 16, 15 

of them work for another cabinet officer. So as a practical matter, 

I’m in a situation where it’s someone in a department with a different set of personnel standards and a different set of hiring and 

firing policies and so on. So it’s not that I can give direct orders 

to someone else’s organization. There’s a cabinet secretary between 

me and the process. 

So what we’ve worked out is to operate in a sense as a unified 

community, and we use this executive board to do that, and we 

have the cooperation so far of the cabinet officers. The only way I 

could see to change that dynamic significantly would be to create 

a Department of Intelligence, and then it would be operated like 

other departments where you have line authority. So right now 

there is some level of cooperation and integration and management 

skills that are involved in keeping this community unified. 

Senator SNOWE. Do you think that is consistent with the original 

Act? 

Director MCCONNELL. Ma’am, those are the words from the original Act. I mean, you well know the debate was the Department of 

Intelligence or a coordinator, although it’s labeled director, across 

the community. And the words in the Act left it, the position, without authority for line-direction capability. 

Now, in this interagency process we’re going through now, it’s 

been recognized. We’re trying to get an executive order that will 

help us make this a stronger position. 

Senator SNOWE. I guess it gets back to the original question and 

premise of whether or not you’re seeking additional statutory authority. 

Director MCCONNELL. We have to go through this executive order 

process first.—— 

Senator SNOWE. And then you’re going to because I think it’s absolutely critical. I mean, you can go back to this point about time 

is of the essence because it has been 4 years and I think that the 

time has come to make a decision so we can create the culture 

24 

that’s still under way, which is also disturbing about creating a culture of collaboration; you know, the need to share that information. 

And that obviously still is not being truly embedded in the culture and that’s disturbing, and so we need to move to a point. I 

think that we should have a timeline and if we have to change the 

law then I think we need to do that in order to make sure it happens. Otherwise we’re going to be in the same situation, and who 

knows if we don’t understand the nature of the consequences as a 

result of our inability to do that. 

And so it’s clear that the Director does need strong authority, 

and the question is whether or not we should be prepared to undertake that. And frankly, I think it has to happen in order to ensure—I don’t think we view the role of Director as being just an 

integrator but also a unifier, and this issue you’re dealing within 

the limitations of the law—— 

Director MCCONNELL. Right, that’s the issue. 

Senator SNOWE [continuing]. And that’s what we have to recognize, our responsibilities. I think you’re doing everything you can 

within your prerogatives, and we appreciate what you are doing. 

Thank you. 

Director MCCONNELL. Thank you, ma’am. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. The former Secretary of the Navy. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank colleagues 

for shortening the questions. 

I’m a strong proponent, as you well know and perhaps you’ve followed some of our debates on the floor. I’ve joined my two colleagues on this FISA issue, but I think we’re losing sight of one aspect of the urgency of getting this into a final form of legislation 

and on the President’s desk, and that is that part of your collection 

under FISA goes, either directly or indirectly, or both, right down 

to the tactical level and operating level of the United States military wherever they are in the world, namely in Afghanistan and 

in Iraq. Am I not correct on that? 

Director MCCONNELL. Yes, sir, you’re absolutely correct. 

Senator WARNER. Well, we’ve got to drive that point home, that 

the very men and women of the armed forces, who we all adore and 

love here at home—I’ve never seen greater support for the uniformed people than there is today—they may not be entirely sympathetic with some of the goals that were staked out in these two 

campaigns but they’re behind their people, that’s for sure, and the 

safety of these people, their ability to operate and perform the missions that they’re performing today, are dependent on FISA collection. 

Director MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. The change of the global communications system has made what you said exactly correct. There 

was a time when it was mostly tactical, push-to-talk, line-of-sight 

sort of things, but today it’s not unusual for communications to 

move around the globe and back to the battlefield, and our ability 

to capture that information for direct tactical support can be impacted. 

Senator WARNER. Well, I mentioned that on the floor of the Senate yesterday, in a speech that I gave on this question. 

I’ve listened to my good friend over here, the Senator from Rhode 

Island, question you about your authority and the orders that were 

25 

given and were they followed, but let me try and recast the question. And that is—I think you may have answered it in the context 

of my good friend here from Maine—you don’t have that line authority that we somehow felt that we were intending to give you. 

Director MCCONNELL. No, sir, I do not. 

Senator WARNER. And, for instance, if there were tapes today in 

the possession of one of these numerous agencies that you have coordinate responsibility over, you can’t order them not to destroy 

them. 

Director MCCONNELL. In one case I could, CIA; I have line authority there. But in the others there’s a Cabinet secretary that 

could have a different—— 

Senator WARNER. Well, you do have that absolute line authority 

right down to all entities in the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Director MCCONNELL. Central Intelligence Agency, yes sir. But 

that’s the only one. 

Senator WARNER. That’s the old DO as well as the—— 

Director MCCONNELL. No, they would want to negotiate. I mean, 

as you know this is a strong, proud organization. But in the final 

analysis in the law, I have that authority, yes sir. 

Senator WARNER. Well, that clarifies that, and I thank the chair 

for the cooperation. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. No, I thank the senior Senator from 

Virginia, our former oppressors—— 

Senator WARNER. I offered to you to unite the two states if you 

want to; I mean, I’m retiring, a vacancy occurs, and therefore you 

can keep your slot. [Laughter.] 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Well, we’ve got a couple of counties 

that’d probably like to come over and join you. 

That being said, Mr. Director, you have a way about you with 

words and diplomacy that you give us a lot more information, I 

think, quite knowingly, than you lay out on the record to be picked 

up in a broader way, and I think we want to be responsive to you. 

You laid out some major issues today. You have to have authority, 

you have to have a hammer, and it’s delicate, and large agencies 

are terribly difficult to get to change. 

But in any event, with a few exceptions, I thought this was an 

extremely valuable hearing and I greatly appreciate the fact that 

you came, and I less appreciate the fact that we have to go vote. 

Director MCCONNELL. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:38 p.m., the Committee adjourned.] 

(27) 

Submissions for the Record 

28 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL FEINGOLD, A U.S. SENATOR FROM

WISCONSIN

Mr. Chairman, the question of the DNI’s authorities is too often discussed in abstract terms, in part because the underlying bureaucratic tensions are often opaque. 

But we should not forget that there are real issues at stake, including whether the 

ODNI has the ability to redirect intelligence resources to meet our national security 

needs. That means not just responding to the latest threat or crisis, but committing 

to a long-term, strategic collection strategy that seeks to anticipate threats and crises before they happen. It also means allocating collection resources toward 

transnational threats that appear in regions of the world traditionally underserved 

by our Intelligence Community. 

The most recent National Intelligence Strategy published last year acknowledges 

the problem. The strategy identified five major missions of the Intelligence Community, the first two of which—defeating terrorism and preventing and countering the 

spread of weapons of mass destruction—are global and transnational in nature. And 

the third—bolstering the growth of democracy and sustaining peaceful democratic 

states—also requires global commitment of intelligence resources. The strategy goes 

on to describe the need to ‘‘anticipate developments of strategic concern and identify 

opportunities as well as vulnerabilities for decisionmakers.’’ 

Yet the most recent Annual Report of the United States Intelligence Community 

warned that ‘‘one challenge to improving the coverage of emerging and strategic 

issues across the Intelligence Community has been the diversion of resources to current crisis support.’’ And one look no further than the current crisis in Kenya to 

understand why sustained attention to issues such as political repression and ethnic 

tensions are critical to our national security. As the DNI testified last week, ‘‘Kenya 

is likely to enter a period of increased social tension and instability, which could 

affect its willingness and ability to cooperate with the U.S. on regional diplomatic 

and counterterrorist matters.’’ 

A little over a year ago, I raised my concerns during another hearing of this Committee. At that time, the ODNI testified that it had used ‘‘lift and shift’’ authorities 

to respond to collection needs related to Darfur and Somalia. The problem, however, 

is that the use of these authorities do not help us anticipate crises. They do not help 

the Intelligence Community develop experience or expertise on these threats. And 

they do not represent an ongoing commitment to long-term challenges. In fact, the 

Deputy DNI for Collection acknowledged that we have not yet committed to longterm, global collection strategies. At our hearing, she testified that there is a ‘‘need 

to get the Intelligence Community back to what I grew up calling global reach,’’ adding that ‘‘we don’t have that today.’’ She further testified that ‘‘our challenge is, 

until we reach that point—with [Congress’s] help—of getting back to a place where 

we can do global reach, and pay attention to places that we are not—perhaps, high 

on the list today.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, that was more than a year ago. We cannot accept inertia. Nor can 

we assume that the DNI will, or can fix this problem on his own. As the former 

Deputy DNI testified, Congress needs to be involved, pressing the Intelligence Community to allocate its resources in accordance with our national security needs and 

providing the DNI the authorities he needs to make it happen. 

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Question 1: (U) Please define the difference between the NIP and the MIP. Is 

there any ambiguity in the definition? If so, what are the consequences of this ambiguity—does it cloud the DNI’s authorities in any way? 

(U) The Intelligence Reform Act gave the DNI new authority to move money and 

people among the different agencies of the intelligence community, with the consent 

of the Office of Management and Budget and notification to the Congress. In practice, however, these authorities have rarely been used, and Committee staff members have been told that getting approval for a medium-sized reprogramming can 

often take several months. How long does it typically take to get a reprogramming 

through the Congress. How long does it take OMB to approve? Why does it take 

so long for these reprogrammings to happen? Which part of the process takes the 

longest? 

(U) The DNI has realigned NIP funds between Departments during the budget 

build process. To date, there has not been a pressing need to reprogram funds between Departments. The average timeframe to process and receive approval for a 

NIP reprogramming action is approximately 2 months after the ODNI receives a 

complete reprogramming package request from the NIP component. This 2–month 

window includes: an ODNI approval process (approximately 7 business days), Defense Department consultations (7 business days), OMB approval (approximately 7 

business days), and Congressional notification (30 days). 

Question 2: (U) Some advocates of intelligence reform argue that we need to 

bring a version of Congress’ landmark ‘‘Goldwater-Nichols’’ reform of Defense to the 

Intelligence Community. . For instance, the ODNI might exercise ‘‘CINC-like’’ operational control through much-enhanced Mission Managers, while the current Intelligence Agencies would take on ‘‘train and equip’’ responsibilities. This would put 

the DNI squarely in the driver’s seat and it may be what is necessary to foster true 

unity of purpose for the Community. Have you thought about such an arrangement? 

How would you structure such reform? What lessons are there for the Intelligence 

Community in Defense’s Goldwater-Nichols experience? 

Answer: (U) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) continues 

to experiment with different concepts for Mission Management, much like the Defense Department experimented for over a decade with the Unified and Specified 

Commands before settling on the current Combatant Command structure. 

(U) Currently we have three very different centers: the National Counterterrorism 

Center (NCTC); the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) and the National 

Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX). NCTC has a very broad leadership and planning mandate that transcends the Community (i.e., Strategic-Operational Planning). 

NCPC is more narrowly designed to provide strategic leadership to the IC’s 

Counterproliferation Community. NCIX also has a very broad mandate that encompasses the entire U.S. Government, predates intelligence reform, produces the National Counterintelligence Strategy and other substantive products, and oversees CI 

priorities and policies for the Community. We also have three distinct country-specific mission managers for North Korea, Iran, and Cuba/Venezuela. These offices are 

small and focused, and provide strategic leadership, analytical and collection integration, focused policymaker outreach and warfighter support, and day to day oversight and coordination of the IC’s efforts against their targets. They enhance analyst-collector and interagency collaboration across the Community, but do not exert 

operational control of those activities. 

(U) There is no need at this point in time to select one form of Mission Management. The Community clearly needs a mechanism to institutionalize the ‘‘jointness’’ 

that occurs on the operational end of our activities. Many Community leaders and 

some outside observers note the mission focus and joint spirit which exists among 

our operationally deployed elements, and how that contrasts with activities ‘‘within 

the Beltway.’’ We must remember that the bulk of the almost 20,000 analysts in 

the IC are located within other Departments; any mission management model must 

keep this in mind. That said, the Goldwater-Nichols model remains relevant to IC 

reform efforts. 

(U) In December 2007, the ODNI Office of Strategy Plans, and Policy hosted a 

conference entitled ‘‘Building a Dynamic Enterprise: Lessons from Goldwater-Nichols.’’ This conference included Intelligence Community leaders, DOD leaders involved with the Goldwater-Nichols reforms, outside experts and academics. The participants found several instances where the DOD experience was directly applicable, 

but also noted many cautions in the comparison. 

a. (U) Among the similarities, the conference report noted that ‘‘acculturation is 

key to developing a workforce’’ and the Community must ‘‘establish a single intelligence culture.’’ Both DOD and the Community face ‘‘tremendous resistance’’ and 

44 

‘‘transformation must be both top-down and bottom-up.’’ We have instituted a Joint 

duty Program, modeled largely on Goldwater-Nichols. The challenge the IC faces is 

that we do not have Combatant Command equivalents where our staff can gain joint 

duty experience; although we do have ODNI centers like NCTC, NCPC, and NCIX, 

along with other mission managers, where Joint Duty credit is available. 

b. (U) The differences noted included the fact that the Community is a more complex and overlapping entity than the Defense Department was, it lacks a clear 

chain-of-command to the DNI (with the exception of the Central Intelligence Agency), and it has little common culture upon which to rely. Furthermore, the Community lacks ‘‘an elite educational and training system to promote jointness.’’ 

(U) The common culture and joint training systems in DOD took time to create. 

In addition to the reforms and initiatives discussed above, the ODNI has made a 

good start on the culture and education systems as well. It is too early in the overall 

reform effort to declare victory or defeat. 

Question 3: (U) In some peoples’ view, your incomplete authorities, especially 

with respect to the Intelligence Agency heads, really render you the ‘‘Coordinator’’ 

of National Intelligence—not its ‘‘Director’’. What additional personnel authorities 

do you need with respect to the heads of the NIP Intelligence Agencies to make 

them more accountable to you and more accountable for the results you seek? 

Answer: (U) I do not require any additional personnel authorities with respect 

to the heads of the NIP Intelligence Agencies to make them more accountable. As 

you know, section 1014 of the 1RTPA provides the DNI with a role in the selection 

of senior officers across the IC. In addition, I require each of the heads of the IC 

elements to sign a Personal Performance Agreement (PPA), describing specific results that are demonstrable and measurable, contribute to the overall National Intelligence Strategy (NIS), and represent a ‘‘stretch’’ for senior leaders. The IC element heads also are required to submit a mid-year review report on their PPA accomplishments made in relation to their performance objectives, and we meet oneon-one to discuss their progress. I also have asked the heads of IC elements to review and revise as necessary the annual performance plans for their senior executives and professionals to ensure that they align with the NIS. Finally, I believe the 

rewrite of Executive Order 12333, which is currently underway, will further clarify 

the relationship between the DNI and the heads of the NIP Intelligence Agencies 

in a manner that ensures accountability. 

Question 4: (U) The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act required 

that the DNI share with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) the ‘‘milestone 

decision authority’’ on NIP programs that are executed within DoD (This means you 

and the Secretary of Defense jointly determine how, what, and when to buy for big 

programs, like satellites). We understand that the ODNI and OSD are working out 

an agreement on how to share this critical authority. However, that seems to be a 

half measure at best, since the DM has complete budgetary responsibility for the 

NIP, but he can’t control big program management. When are you and the SecDef 

going to finish your agreement on sharing acquisition authority? Any big issues left 

with it? Why shouldn’t the DNI be the sole decisionmaker on these acquisitions— 

at least in cases where most of the funding for an acquisition is contained in the 

NIP budget (for which you are sole responsible)? 

Answer: (U) The DNI and the SecDef signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) 

on 25 March 2008 concerning the ‘‘Management of Acquisition Programs Executed 

at the Department of Defense Intelligence Community Elements’’. The MOA reflects 

the needs of both the DNI and the SecDef in the conduct of these acquisitions and 

no issues remain. In addition to the definition of the interaction between the Offices 

of the DNI (ODNI) and the Department of Defense (DoD) when a major system acquisition (MSA) is funded in whole or majority by the National Intelligence Program 

(NIP), the MOA also provides for inclusion of the ODNI staff in the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) process when an intelligence related MSA is funded in majority 

by the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). 

(U) While it might be more efficient if the DNI had sole milestone decision authority (MDA) for all NIP acquisitions rather than sharing it with the SecDef, the compromise that Congress arrived at recognizes the significant defense equities in many 

of these major system acquisitions executed in the Department of Defense that support not only national intelligence needs and missions but also critical Department 

of Defense needs and missions. 

Question 5: (U) We believe that one of the areas where the Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Protection Act did provide the DNI ample authorities was in the 

budget arena. You seem to have sufficient budget authorities over the National InVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:51 Jun 18, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\48099.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
45 

telligence Program (NIP), but your ability to help shape and influence Military Intelligence program (MIP) budgets is less clear. Do you agree that you have sufficient 

budget authorities for the NIP? What about for the MIP? Do you see any definitional problems in separating NIP and MIP that cloud your authorities or unnecessarily get in the way of business? 

Answer: (U) The DNI’s NIP budget authorities are sufficient. The law provides 

sufficient authority to plan and program NIP resources, but the DNI’s flexibility to 

manage NIP resources is limited by the revised reprogramming thresholds in the 

Classified Annex to the Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 Defense Appropriations Act that 

changes the reprogramming level from the Expenditure Center to the Project level. 

This limits the DNI’s and Program Managers’ ability to realign funds quickly and 

react to unforeseen requirements in a timely manner. 

(U) DNI budget authorities are sufficient for the MT. The ODNI staff works closely with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (OUSD(I)) to review major system acquisitions, budgets and personnel. The ODNI staff also contributed to the fiscal year 2009 Defense Intelligence Guidance, participated on Office 

of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) budget issue teams, is a member on DoD senior 

budget councils, and coordinates on the final resolution of the MIP budget In addition, the DNI meets regularly with the Secretary of Defense, and the USD(I) is a 

member of the DNI’s Executive Committee. 

(U) There are no definitional problems between NIP and MT as long as there is 

a clear distinction of requirements. 

Question 6: (U) There appears to be a disconnect between the IC’s appetite for 

big new programs and its ability to fund them—especially when costs ultimately 

soar far above original estimates, and must be canceled after billions of dollars have 

been wasted. This problem exists, in part, because the community does not look realistically at budget affordability of big programs beyond its ‘‘Five Year Defense 

Plans (FYDPs)’’—even though most of their costs are incurred beyond this 5 year 

timeframe. 

(U) A study you worked on for the ODNI just before you left Booz-Allen placed 

part of the blame on a broken requirements process. Specifically, your own study 

found that the requirements process in the Community is not effectively linked to 

budget decisions and instead is used to justify programs that already have significant momentum. In other words, we ‘‘require’’ that which we cannot afford. What 

have you done to keep from funding expensive new programs now that your successors will later be forced to terminate? Why don’t your acquisition and budget processes factor in realistic, long-term affordability—not just what you fit within your 

budget year or Five Year Plan? Do you have sufficient authorities to deal with this 

problem? What remains to be done to fix this problem? 

(U) We are taking direct action to improve the situation. DNI acquisition policy 

(ICD 105), policy guidance (ICPG 105.1), and the Acquisition Crosscutting Emphasis 

Area to the National Intelligence Strategy include the following tenets: 

a. (U) Do not start acquisitions you can not afford 

b. (U) Fully fund all acquisitions you undertake 

c. (U) Require appropriate levels of domain knowledge for all acquisition participants 

d. (U) Use only mature technology, or include and fully fund technology maturity 

before proceeding with development efforts 

e. (U) Utilize independent reviews and oversight of all acquisitions 

f. (U) Settle for no less than excellence in achieving cost, schedule and performance 

g. (U) Ensure accountability at all levels 

The implementation of these guidelines and requirements will help address the 

long-term affordability of major acquisitions. 

(U) The DNI needs authority for NIP acquisitions commensurate with his responsibility. Sole milestone decision authority (MDA) vested in the DNI for all acquisitions funded in majority by the NIP, together with authority to direct use of DNI 

acquisition policies, would greatly increase the speed at which the IC achieves acquisition excellence. The DNI has two legislative initiatives in coordination with the 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for consideration in the fiscal year 2009 

legislative timeframe. 

Question 7: (U) The IRTPA gave the Intelligence Community Chief Information 

Officer, currently Gen. Myerose, broad authority to set standards for IT and to manage IT resources. Nonetheless, the Committee understands that CIOs from elements 

of the IC do not accept his authority, instead citing their own authorities under the 

46 

Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, which they believe is undiminished by IRTPA. The Committee would be open to means of clarifying this situation in favor of strengthening 

your office. Do you believe we need to resolve purported legal ambiguities to 

strengthen the authority of your CIO as intended by IRTPA? 

Answer: (U) We believe it helpful to resolve legal ambiguities to clarify the authority of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) as intended by the Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. We would be happy to meet and discuss this topic to determine appropriate and useful ways to clarify these authorities. 

Question 8: (U) The Committee understands that many DoD airborne imagery 

collectors use data dissemination means that are incompatible with existing NIP exploitation and dissemination architectures. This is operationally problematic but it 

also has fiscal drawbacks as large investments are required to ‘‘back engineer’’ the 

supporting infrastructure. Nonetheless, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

(NGA) has long been required by statute and by DoD directives to provide standards 

to which all imagery collection systems to be built. Given NGA’s role why are so 

many imagery systems fielded that are incompatible with one another and with the 

existing supporting architectures? Does the Director of NGA, in his role as functional manager, have the authorities needed to enforce—not just recommend—imagery standards? If so, why do these problems persist? 

Answer: (U) The NGA Director, in his role as Functional Manager for GEOINT, 

adjudicates and mandates GEOINT standards for DoD use through the GEOINT 

Standards Working Group (GWG). Prior to the stand up of the GWG in January 

2003, the GEOINT standards baseline for imagery systems was not as comprehensive as needed to ensure consistent development of GEOINT, not just imagery, systems. 

(U) NGA established the GWG in January 2003. Through the work of the GWG, 

the requisite inventory of necessary standards that guide GEOINT systems development has grown to achieve critical mass and is being augmented as driven by both 

mission and industry. This standards baseline is codified within the DoD IT Standards Registry (DISR) and is being codified by the DNI in the Intelligence Community Standards Registry (ICSR). In addition to mandating specific standards within 

the DISR, the GWG has produced two guidance documents related to imagery systems development: the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) Acquisition 

Standards Handbook—Imagery (DASH—I), and the Sensor Standards Acquisition 

Guide (S2AG). Both documents will be included in the DISR as guidance documents, 

and will further enhance the ability of GEOINT systems developers to ensure consistent, interoperable development. 

(U) NGA has instituted the NGA Interoperability Action Team (NIAT). NIAT 

works across the NSG with airborne and imagery systems Program Managers to ensure early insertion of appropriate standards into acquisition baselines. Response to 

the initial NIAT efforts have been extremely positive, and NGA anticipates that continued interaction with Program Managers through the NIAT activity will result in 

substantial improvement in the interoperability of fielded systems. 

(U) As the National System for Geospatial Intelligence (NSG) Functional Manager, NGA is fulfilling its standards-related responsibilities. Regarding the end-toend GEOINT standards adoption and compliance management chain, NGA’s role is 

not exclusive. Beyond the NSG Functional Manager, all affected program managers, 

program executive officers (PEO’s), chief information officers (CIO’s), and milestone 

decision authorities (MDA’s) have equally important responsibilities to insure that: 

a. (U) NSG-approved GEOINT standards are indeed incorporated into experimental, acquisition, and operational programs, 

b. (U) Transition to standards compliance is accounted for within programmatic 

total ownership cost (TOC) budget submissions and execution baselines, and 

c. (U) Requisite robust standards compliance testing, reporting, and certification 

is executed within programs prior to operational transition. 

d. (U) All of the aforementioned events must be executed with due diligence in 

order to mitigate the risk of, if not eliminate, fielding GEOINT systems that are incompatible with one another as well as with existing supporting architectures. 

(U) The NGA Director has indicated that he has all the authorities necessary to 

execute defined mission responsibilities. The D/NGA approach has focused on building a GEOINT community from the ground up and addressing those issues upon 

which there is an agreed upon course of action. 

(U) We are currently working with the DNI and USD(I) to modify our existing 

DoD directive (charter) and Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) and to 

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ligence Program (NIP) and Military Intelligence Program (MIP) and as such, provide some ‘‘de jure’’ mechanisms to ensure that GEOINT Program Manager guidance is complied with on community activities/initiatives ranging from unified 

geospatial operations to systems R&D and acquisition. 

(U) With respect to GEOINT standards, the D/NGA is executing his responsibilities to mandate GEOINT standards for DoD use in acquisition actions. It is incumbent upon all DoD entities to follow approved acquisition procedure and use the indicated standards where appropriate, or seek a waiver defining rationale for deviating from the standards baseline. 

(U) While progress has been significant, it will take time for the entire community 

to implement the full standards baseline. NGA will continue to work aggressively 

through the GWG and the NIAT to develop and propagate standards and foster 

standards implementation through early interaction with Program Managers. NGA 

will continue to work with the DNI to leverage DNI authority to move the community toward standards implementation through development of appropriate community Policy Guides. 

(U) As stated previously, NGA’s role is not exclusive regarding the end-to-end 

GEOINT standards adoption and compliance management chain. All affected program managers, program executive officers (PEO’s), chief information officers 

(CIO’s), and milestone decision authorities (MDA’s) have equally important responsibilities. 

Question 9: (U) The leadership of the National Clandestine Service (NCS) is 

dominated by CIA officers. Other HUMINT agencies, FBI, and DoD entities are less 

than fully invested in the NCS. As a result, we do not have unity of effort. Standards are not uniformly enforced, and governance among agencies is by a series of 

memoranda of understanding, tantamount to treaties between competing powers. 

Symptomatic of this problem is the apparently deadlocked negotiations over Intelligence Community Directive 304, which would establish the procedures, principles, 

and guidelines for the conduct of HUMINT across the Community. We can all agree 

this area needs true unity of effort. We don’t want HUMINT officers stepping on 

each others’ toes; at the same time, we want to encourage innovation and healthy 

competition—without wasting resources. Do you favor, as some do, elevating the National HUMINT Manager authority to the ODNI and also ensuring broader agency 

representation (beyond CIA)—perhaps by making the National HUMINT Manager 

a non-CIA officer, but one who knows the clandestine HUMINT business? What are 

your views on this problem and what is your proposed solution? 

(U) While progress in HUMINT transformation has been significant, it will take 

time to fully develop and implement policies, standards, best practices, and services 

of common concern. The DNI and the National HUMINT Manager will continue to 

pursue initiatives to gain greater efficiency, agility, flexibility and integration across 

the national HUMINT enterprise. 

Question 10: (U) During your confirmation hearing, you said that you believed 

that the authorities of the DNI needed to be ‘‘cleaned up’’ with regard to how the 

intelligence community is managed. You noted, on several occasions, to Members of 

this Committee that you would examine the ODNI and its role in the intelligence 

community and would return to the Committee to outline specific areas in which 

new or additional authorities were needed. The Committee even postponed a Committee hearing on this issue after your request for more time to formulate such a 

proposal. At that Committee hearing, you said that you were seeking to focus, guide 

and coordinate agencies by ‘‘exercising [your] current authorities.’’ You also noted 

that you were working as a member of the interagency process to make necessary 

changes to the executive order governing the organization of the intelligence community. It appears, based on this testimony and on the fact that no major authorities related legislation have been requested by your office, that you are satisfied 

with current authorities of the ODNI. Do you believe there are any remaining authority issues that need to be addressed with legislation? If so, what are they? Are 

your requests for additional authorities adequate to ensure that your successors 

have the necessary authorities to manage the intelligence community in the future 

when the leadership of the ODNI, CIA, and the Department of Defense may not 

have as collegial a relationship as does the current leadership? When will the revisions to executive order 12333 be completed? When will these revisions be briefed 

to the Committee? 

Question 11: (U) At the hearing, in response to a question from Senator Bayh, 

the DNI stated that the eight interrogation techniques prohibited by the Army Field 

Manual ‘‘clearly are illegal and not appropriate for anyone, to include the CIA cerVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:51 Jun 18, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\48099.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
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tainly.’’ Is this correct? Are these techniques clearly illegal? Could any of them ever 

be appropriate for use by the CIA, under any circumstances?