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i 

44–780 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–124] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND THE U.S. SPECIAL 

OPERATIONS COMMAND 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 5, 2008 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

MARK E. UDALL, Colorado 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

STEPHANIE SANOK, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2008 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 5, 2008, Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request from the U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Special 

Operations Command .......................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 5, 2008 ..................................................................................... 51 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 2008 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND THE U.S. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 3 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Fallon, Adm. William J., USN, Commander, U.S. Central Command ................ 5 

Olson, Adm. Eric T., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command .... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Fallon, Adm. William J. ................................................................................... 55 

Olson, Adm. Eric T. .......................................................................................... 89 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

United States Special Operations Command FY 2009 Budget Highlights .. 115 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Skelton ....................................................................................................... 10 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS 

COMMAND 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 5, 2008. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, this is a very important 

meeting of the House Armed Services Committee to take testimony 

on the posture of our two most important combat commands, the 

Central Command and the Special Operations Command. 

But first a couple of administrative items. 

This hearing will stop promptly at one o’clock because our witnesses have other commitments, and we will do our best to stay 

within the five-minute rule, and that way we want to get as many, 

if not all, of the members the opportunity to ask questions within 

the five minutes. And you have been very, very good in the past 

on that, and I would hope that would continue. 

I gave notice at the last hearing, but again let me say that the 

hearing on March 12 with the Pacific Command (PACOM), we will 

begin the questioning on the bomb rule by reverse seniority based 

upon, of course, who is here at the falling of the gavel. 

And with those two, we should proceed and welcome Admiral 

William Fallon, commander of Central Command (CENTCOM); Admiral Eric Olson, command of Special Operations Command 

(SOCOM), to be with us today. 

And welcome, both of you, and thank you for the excellent work 

that you do, and thank you for the men and women that you lead. 

Those who serve with you are truly in the lead of America’s efforts, 

both militarily and as we face the Nation in critical parts of the 

world. We couldn’t be more proud of you or the people you have in 

your commands. 

Admiral Keating, the combatant commander for the Pacific Command, was recently quoted as saying, ‘‘The readiness of our forces 

is affected by combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.’’ Admiral 

Keating added that ‘‘We are a higher-risk state,’’ and I suspect he 

was engaging an understatement when he said that PACOM—his 

command—had only to adjust his strategic plans a little bit since 
2 

30,000 of the troops assigned to him are deployed in the Central 

Command. 

This is just the latest signal that we are facing increased strategic risk. Admiral Mullen sat at the same table you are, gentlemen, not all that long ago and called the level of risk significant. 

Anyone who has been paying attention knows that aren’t many, if 

any, units at home in the United States that are ready to conduct 

full-spectrum combat operations. And it is interesting to note General Casey’s answer to a question regarding readiness and the 

timeliness within which it would take to respond to call for the unexpected. 

And the only reason we can’t refer to the Army as stressed and 

not broken, in my opinion, is because of the commitment and sense 

of duty demonstrated by our troops, as well as their families, and, 

of course, this concerns me. And I don’t need to list all the potential 

flash points in the world we could be called on to deal with. But 

as you know from recent news accounts, the brewing crisis in the 

Andean region—Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador—provides a rather 

clear example. Because of our involvement in Iraq, we are accepting more risk than we should then we won’t be able to do those 

risks. 

And I am afraid we are also shortchanging our commitment in 

Afghanistan, which is a primary front against those who attacked 

us, as we all know, on September 11. 

Admiral Fallon, I understand you are conducting a review of 

military operations in Afghanistan and hope that, based on that review, you can reassure us. And I am being pessimistic when I say 

that we face potential failure in Afghanistan if we cannot reallocate 

some resources to that front—to that war. 

We should also expect our North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) allies to step up and do more. That is a disappointment. 

But we should also take the lead in demonstrating an additional 

commitment. 

These are serious issues facing our country, and it will make the 

decisions made about Iraq during the spring and the summer particularly important, and we cannot address our level of risk or rebuild our Army to reinforce our effort in Afghanistan if we keep 15 

brigades in Iraq. Iraq must be viewed in this context and not taken 

in isolation. 

And, Admiral Fallon, I saw in your written statement the recommendation to the President regarding the pace and scope of redeployments from Iraq would include the recommendations from 

you and others in the chain of command. I hope these inputs will 

include the context of strategic risk and the strain on the Army 

and our needs in that other country of Afghanistan. 

Now, Admiral Olson, let me say a word about Special Operations, 

if I may. 

The demand for Special Operation Forces will continue to be 

high, even after we are able to redeploy many combat forces from 

Iraq. And I hope you will share with our committee your plans and 

challenges for keeping a highly trained, culturally attuned force 

over the long term. 

I look forward to hearing your thoughts on how we measure success in the overall campaign plan for the war on terror and how 
3 

we track our progress over time in shaping the environment so that 

the number of terrorists who must be taken off the battlefield decreases over time and what lessons should we and others learn 

from your work with other partners in the interagency efforts, 

which all of us on this committee have a great deal of concern 

about. 

And a special thanks to each one of you for your commitment, 

your expertise, your hard work, your wisdom and your judgment. 

We are blessed in this country to have people like you in such responsible positions, and we thank you for being with us and sharing your thoughts and recommendations with us. 

So with that, Admiral Fallon. 

Oh, excuse me. Duncan Hunter, then Admiral Fallon. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks for holding this hearing. What a critical hearing for us 

to hold today, and I really appreciate you teeing this one up for us 

here. 

And, Admiral Fallon, Admiral Olson, thank you for your service. 

And let me go over just a couple of things that I think are important for us to know and to work on. 

First, in the Iraqi theater, we are seeing lots of successes. The 

last figures I saw were 131 Iraqi battalions trained and equipped 

and, obviously, operating with varying levels of effectiveness. 

But my question was this: We had great success in rotating in— 

and I think we all agree that the key to a successful transition or 

handoff of the security burden in Iraq is going to be a function of 

one thing: reliable Iraqi military. That is, an Iraqi military that 

can move in, fill in, take the handoff from us and hold. Show up 

when they are supposed to, be effective in what they do and be able 

to provide the security shield for that country as the political process matures. 

So question here: We had a rotational policy here in Baghdad. 

We were rotating in Iraqi brigades. They were taking place—they 

were moving out, others were coming in. I thought that that gave 

us—in the Baghdad area—I thought that that had a salutary effect 

on the Iraqi forces overall because it made them play what you 

would call ‘‘away games.’’ That is, a brigade that would have to 

stand up, saddle up, move out from their home area, where they 

may have had a certain comfort level and they may or may not 

have been involved in substantial fighting, move into another area, 

move into a battle zone, deploy and operate and then rotate back. 

And I thought that a professional army should manifest that ability, the ability to saddle up, move out, undertake a mission, complete the mission, and then rotate out of the area of operation (AO). 

I understand they are not doing that anymore, that we are going 

to have a permanent force there in Baghdad. 

But my question to you and one thing I would like you to comment you on, as we go down the line here, Admiral Fallon, is 

whether we have in place—or working with the Iraqi armed 

forces—a plan that will allow all of their battalions to get into the 
4 

fight. That is, even the battalions that are in benign areas of Iraq, 

where you don’t have any activity taking place. The one way to 

make sure that those battalions are reliable and will fight when 

called on is to operate them, is to give them missions, move them 

out, have them undertake those missions, be able to examine them, 

rate them, figure out what their deficiencies are with respect to 

personnel and equipment, fix them, and then you know you have 

got somebody who will come when called. 

And so my question—I would like you to comment at some point 

on whether we have a plan to rotate all the Iraqi armed forces into 

at least enough operations that they will be able to figure out 

whether they in fact are going to be reliable when the U.S. leaves. 

Another important issue, I think, for this committee and for the 

defense structure in general is this: As you talk to the Guard guys 

especially—but a lot of our active-duty leaders too—we move units 

over to the theater, they often taken on new equipment in theater, 

sometimes they come with new equipment—especially the Guard 

guys—and they unhorse that equipment before they leave, a lot of 

it stays behind. 

We have also had evolutions of certain equipment, like the uparmored vehicles, where we had at one time, for example, we had 

basically nonprotected vehicles going in with slight protection, and 

we put on thicker armor on the Humvees, and we came with Marine Armor Kits (MAK) for the Marines, for example, and then we 

went to up-armored Humvees, and, finally, we are going now to 

more Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs) and 

more use of heavy vehicles, like armored trucks because they have 

got a much more protective capability with our troops. 

But the question is, with all the equipment that we have purchased, especially in these supplementals, going into the war-fighting theater, what I am worried about in the back of my mind is 

that we have got like places at al Taqqadum, where we discovered 

1,800 MAK-kitted Humvees parked, that we have got a lot of 

equipment the U.S. taxpayers paid for, which could be used now 

at least to full up the Guard units that are back here that came 

back bare. And in the back of your mind, you are always worried 

that at some point we are going to be selling those off in a foreign 

military sales to somebody for 10 cents on the dollar. We are keeping big traunches of stuff behind that we actually could bring back 

and full up some of the units that are here in Kona. 

So whether or not we have got a good inventory on what we 

have, do we know what we have got, I think, is an important issue 

for the active and Reserve and Guard forces. 

With respect to Afghanistan, you know, we just gave this massive contract on the new tanker for the aircraft—a $35 billion-plus 

contract to a European firm—which will do, at least according to 

their own statistics, more than half the work—more than half the 

jobs—looks like 100,000 jobs going over to Europe—and yet we are 

sending 3,200 Marines into Iraq, partly to prepare for what we 

think may be a spring offensive in that southern area. And we 

couldn’t extract an average of 100 soldiers apiece—maybe a few 

more than that—maybe 115 soldiers apiece—out of the 26 allies. 

And so, as a result, we are going to send in and are deploying 3,200 

Marines to undertake that mission. 
5 

Now, I think we have got an interest in training our European 

allies to fight and to be able to operate and, Admiral Olson, especially to be to operate with effective Special Forces. 

And so I think, Admiral, it would be good if you could explain— 

Admiral Fallon, if you could talk to us today a little bit about how 

we are going to ensure in the long term that we have a coherent 

leadership structure in Iraq—understanding this division between 

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Armed Forces 

(IAF)—that we have a coherent leadership structure in Afghanistan. 

But beyond that, that we employ and motivate the European allies who are involved in that theater to take on the fight. And how 

we get some, like the Germans, who, I understand, will not leave 

garrison, to get into the fight, and that we don’t end up with what, 

I think, Secretary Gates described as a situation in which some 

folks go on the battlefield and some folks don’t—an unhealthy relationship to have with our European allies, who at some point might 

have to fight in a big war alongside of the United States. 

So just a couple of questions. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like unanimous consent to put my written statement into the record, if I could. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. 

And thank you very much for being with us, gentlemen. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, your statement is put in the 

record. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

The CHAIRMAN. And now, Admiral Fallon, we will ask for your 

testimony, to be followed by Admiral Olson. 

Thank you. 

Thank you, both, again. 

STATEMENT OF ADM. WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN, COMMANDER, 

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

Admiral FALLON. Thanks. 

Chairman, Mr. Hunter, distinguished members of the panel, it is 

a great pleasure and honor to be back with you again this morning 

and to be sitting alongside my colleague, Admiral Olson. The Navy 

has kind of taken over Tampa temporarily, but there is a lot of 

water down there so we feel right at home, and we have been 

warmly welcomed in the neighborhood. 

I would like to submit my written testimony for the record, if you 

would be so kind. 

And without wasting a lot of your time, because I know you want 

to ask questions, I will tell you that we have many challenges, certainly in the Central Command region. As I look through the 29 

countries there, there isn’t a day that goes by that there aren’t several issues, frictions, conflicts or instabilities that are in front of my 

and my staff’s attention. We are working all of these to the best 

of our ability. 

I can tell you that the number-one issue is still Iraq. We are 

making substantial progress, certainly in security. Be happy to 
6 

field your questions in that regard, but without a doubt, the performance of our men and women out there has been just spectacular. 

Speaking of people, I would like to highlight for you—and I know 

this committee certainly knows better than about anyone else in 

this city or the country—how well served we are by our men and 

women in uniform. They are doing just a fantastic job. If you think 

of the amount of time, we are six years now working in Iraq. Many 

of these people have been back several times. The good news is 

they are really, really good. They know the territory. It is astounding how readily they fit back in and adapt and can give us really 

good advice in dealing with people. 

The other side of the coin, of course, is that these repeated deployments are certainly a strain on them and their families. But 

they are performing just in a spectacular manner, whether it is 

Iraq, Afghanistan or the many other places in the theater, and I 

know you join me in appreciation for their good work. 

If I could move to Afghanistan, we are making progress. I don’t 

think there is going to be a spring offensive by the Taliban. The 

spring offensive is going to be by our security people as they move 

out and take advantage of the situation that they helped to create 

through their good works here in the fall of last year. 

There has been a heavy winter in Afghanistan, a lot of snow in 

some areas. That has caused some personal problems for many people. A lot of—not a lot—but several hundred people, we understand, were lost, particularly in the west, but it has also served to 

keep activity levels down. The snow is starting to melt now, and 

as our Marine infusion begins to arrive in the country, it puts us 

in a position in the south to give General McNeil, the maneuver 

unit that he has been asking for. And I couldn’t imagine one that 

is better equipped with all the enablers to give him the shot in the 

arm that he needs to really go after the security, particularly in the 

south, which is where he intends to begin employing those forces. 

The other piece of this is just as important, if not more so, in my 

mind; that is, a battalion of Marines dedicated to training. To bring 

in the Afghan army, which is really coming along in a manner that 

would please you, those of you who have seen them. And those who 

have not, I would encourage you to go take a look at them. I am 

sure you will be as impressed as I am with their leadership and 

the capabilities and, particularly, their willingness and strong desire to get out there and take care of business on their own, and 

that is going to be where we want them to go. So the Marines 

ought to be very helpful in working with the Afghan security forces 

this spring. 

In Pakistan, across the border, it has been a troubled country 

with a series of stability issues for the duration of its existence. 

There is a political process that is in progress now, as you know, 

and that is good, and it has been generally a lot more peaceful than 

some might have thought. We are anxiously watching to see how 

they deal with this situation because we cannot, from my view, separate activities in Afghanistan from Pakistan. The reality of life is 

that the Pashtun tribal overlay covers both countries and we just 

have to deal with the whole picture. We have been getting a lot of 
7 

help in Pakistan. I would be happy to field your questions in that 

regard. 

There are some other signs of goodness in the region. 

The recent peace agreement in Kenya that was brokered by Kofi 

Annan is a really good sign, and we are grateful for his intervention and for the leadership—their decision to actually try to fix 

things in another troubled area. 

Regional stability is the last point I would make. It is a priority 

with me. It is not just these individual countries, but trying to create the conditions throughout the Gulf area, the Horn of Africa, 

Central Asia so that people will work together. We are there encouraging them, trying by the example of our people to show them 

how things could be and should be better and to help them in every 

way we can. 

With that, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to be 

here, and I will look forward to receiving your questions after Admiral Olson. 

Thanks very much, Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Fallon can be found in the 

Appendix on page 55.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Fallon, thank you very much. 

Admiral Olson. 

STATEMENT OF ADM. ERIC T. OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

Admiral OLSON. Morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hunter, distinguished members, and I, too, thank you for the opportunity to be 

here with you this morning to report on the Special Operations 

Command and the Special Operations Forces. 

I am honored to represent the 54,000 active and Reserve soldiers, 

sailors, airmen, Marines, civilians who are assigned to Special Operations Forces, and I am pleased to be here this morning with my 

friend and colleague, Admiral Fallon, with whom our Special Operations Forces are now so heavily engaged. 

And with your permission, sir, I will submit my written statement for the record and limit my opening remarks. 

The strong and steady interest of the Congress, and particularly 

this committee, has helped Special Operations Forces achieve a 

global capability and a global effectiveness since we were created 

by legislation, now, almost 21 years ago. We have proven ourselves 

in many well-known and lesser-known operations around the world 

throughout that time, and we have been a strong and steady presence with friends and allies. The command’s strength is clearly in 

its people, enabled by unique authorities and a dedicated budget. 

As you well know, we are charged by legislation to perform many 

specific activities, including counterterrorism; counterproliferation 

of weapons of mass destruction; direct action; unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense, which is training our friends and allies; a special reconnaissance; psychological operations; information 

operations. And I am tasked, as well, by the President to serve as 

the lead combatant commander for synchronizing Department of 

Defense planning in the global campaign against terrorism. 

In aggregate, these doctrinal terms define a complex set of tasks 

that are best accomplished by specially selected, trained, and 
8 

equipped force with special skills, discipline, courage and wisdom. 

It is a force that must operate with equal confidence and equal capability across a spectrum of conflict, from precrisis activities 

through intense combat into stabilization and reconstruction activities, and such a force must be carefully managed in order to optimize its readiness. 

When deployed outside the United States, Special Operations 

Forces are almost always in support of geographic combatant commanders. They are present in 58 countries today. About 80 percent 

of our force deployed outside the United States today, though, is 

under Admiral Fallon’s combatant command deployed in the Central Command area of responsibility focused on a balance of direct 

and indirect actions, working to kill and capture terrorists and 

those who wish to do us harm as they contribute to local stability. 

Operational commanders have learned over the last several years 

that no other force can accomplish such a broad scope of missions 

in such diverse operational environments as the Special Operations 

Forces. And so global demand for such a force does exceed supply, 

and I anticipate no decrease in demand, even as other forces do 

begin to draw down, especially from Iraq. 

In fact, I expect an increasing demand for Special Operations 

Forces as the local environments transition from environments of 

large force occupation and combat to smaller footprints of trainand-assist activities, which are a specialization of Special Operations Forces. And this is especially considering the continuing deficit of Special Operations Forces in the regions of the other geographic combatant commanders of the world. 

To answer this is a result of program decisions made in the last 

few years, we are expanding as fast as we can reasonably absorb 

the growth. In fact, the Program Objective Memorandum 2008 

(POM–08) cycle has programmed for us an increase of about 13,000 

forces that we are continuing to work into our force now and in the 

next few years. 

In the long term, I estimate that a three to five percent growth 

rate in military manpower across Special Operations Forces is 

about right. And if we need to expand our organic enablers, like 

cordon-and-search forces and their field control and quick-reaction 

forces and interrogators and linguists, aviation capability and the 

like, then we will need to expand it at a greater rate. 

Most of the mobility platforms and much of the equipment used 

by Special Operations are initially procured by the services and 

then modified for their Special Operations peculiar missions by the 

budget provided to me, and, therefore, most of U.S. Special Operations Command’s acquisition programs are dependent upon service budgets and decisions. 

Recapitalizing our fixed-wing transport fleet and acquiring additional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, not 

just platforms, are our most critical needs. And for these and other 

items that deliver Special Operations peculiar capabilities, speed of 

process is essential, and I am committed this year to exploring my 

authorities for making our acquisition systems more responsive. 

In any case, I am convinced that U.S. SOCOM will be required 

to at least sustain—and likely grow—its levels of both operational 

effort and funding for the foreseeable future. 
9 

I remain humbled to command such a capable and versatile force 

at this most important time, and I remain in awe of the dedication 

and courage demonstrated by our great men and women every day. 

I thank this committee for its continued support of Special Operations, and I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson can be found in the 

Appendix on page 89.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you. 

Without objection, each of the statements of the witnesses will be 

placed into the record. 

Admiral Fallon, please define for us what victory means in the 

war in Iraq? In that war, we can’t measure progress by territory, 

as we were able to do in the Second World War by islands taken 

in the Southwest Pacific or territory taken in France and Germany 

and Europe. 

So how do we measure—and it is not just security either. So 

what is our goal? How do we measure, A, progress, and how do we 

measure victory that America—people at home ask about? 

Admiral. 

Admiral FALLON. Thank you, Chairman. 

No easy answer. It is certainly not as simple—if that is the right 

word—as watching the front move on a map as it covers geography. 

I can tell you what I look at and how I measure success, and it is 

much more than just the security area. 

Of course, I look at the level of violence, the level of activity day 

to day in the country, and I am really happy to tell you that those 

indices are all continuing to move in a very, very positive direction. 

When I was here before you last year, the number of violent incidents a day in the country of Iraq was averaging over 150. I can 

tell you that today those numbers are down in the low 30’s a day. 

There are places in the country, such as Anbar, which was exceedingly violent last year, in which there are many days in the past 

couple of months where there have been no reported incidents of 

violence. 

That is a good indicator for me to start, and then beyond that, 

I look at other things: how the country is coming, how it is developing, how fast we can turn over security to the Iraqi army and 

the other Iraqi security forces. I watch with interest the south, 

where most of those provinces have been—the vernacular is PIC’d 

or under provincial Iraqi control, where the Iraqis themselves are 

responsible for security and watching with interest how they do 

that. 

An interesting measure for me was just these past couple weeks 

with the annual Arbaeen pilgrimage, in which the estimate was 

about 8,000 pilgrims were on the roads moving to the shrine cities 

in the south. The Iraqis drew up the plan, moved units around. To 

get to Chairman Hunter’s—one of his questions—they did move 

people from other areas to take care of security affairs. They executed the plan. We watched, provided very, very little in the way 

of support and they pulled it off with the smallest number of casualties. Regrettably, there were some. Twenty-some people were 

killed in a bombing attack. But compared to prior years, a remarkable difference. 
10 

I look at economic activity. Things are beginning to change in a 

dramatic way. Just a couple of months ago, back in December, the 

first private investment in the country—about $3 billion—took over 

three of the old state-run industries, a mix of Iraqi and outside 

folks, to get those things up and running. 

So to sum up, I don’t have any simple answers. What I am looking for is not just the level of violence going down, which is pretty 

easy for us to tell; not just the level of casualties on our side, which 

are continuing to fall, thank God; but to see the amount of activity 

on the Iraqi side; to see their governance taking over and making 

this place a country that is viable. 

I would be happy, if you wanted to for the record, come back and 

give you a number of things that I look at every day to try to give 

me a sense of where we are. 

The CHAIRMAN. That would be very helpful to us if you would do 

that, Admiral. 

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Olson, in the same vein, how would you 

define victory on the war against al Qaeda, and how do you measure progress that we have been killing them for some seven years 

and the war doesn’t end and people seem to still support them in 

some areas? How do we measure progress? What is our goal? When 

do we say—when do we run up the victory flag? 

Admiral OLSON. Mr. Chairman, I am not convinced there is ever 

going to be a day when we run up the victory flag. This is a different kind of an adversary, much more elusive, living and fighting 

among the people, and I don’t anticipate that it will lead to the 

signing of a document aboard the USS Missouri. 

Our success against al Qaeda is manifested mostly in the growth 

of Iraqi and Afghan security forces, trained and equipped to be responsive to local and regional needs within those nations. It is a 

decrease in violent acts, which is a manifestation of a decrease in 

those who are planning every day to conduct those violent acts 

against us. It is a dismantling of the infrastructure, of the funding 

lines and the training facilities that contribute to that and interruption of the flow of weapons and materials that enable them to 

conduct those acts against us. 

As does Admiral Fallon, we have a series of metrics that we 

track. I am happy to provide those separately to you for the record. 

But I agree with Admiral Fallon completely that—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Yes, if you would do that. 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. 

[The information referred to is classified.] 

Admiral OLSON. I agree with Admiral Fallon completely that, ultimately, the measure of success is a secure and sovereign nation 

in a stable region with self-determination and a functioning government enabled by a growing economy. And when we reach that 

point, then it will lead, certainly, to a withdrawal of our forces 

there. But, again, I will be surprised if it does lead to the raising 

of a victory flag. I think that we will creep into success. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
11 

And, first, Admiral Olson, I just wanted to take a chance to publicly thank Special Operations, because I had never had a chance 

to do it, for what you folks did a couple of years ago. We had a congressional delegation in Fallujah during the time when Fallujah 

was pretty hot, and we asked General Mattis what he needed for 

his Marine command there, and he said he needed Advanced Combat Optical Gunsights (ACOGs), that great, very effective riflescope 

that they are using on the M4s. He said he had Marines actually 

coming out of Fallujah, putting on their new ACOGs, going back 

into the fight and being very effective, but he needed them. 

Well, when we got back with that congressional delegation, we 

called up—I forget who I talked to in your command, but we gave 

you guys a phone call on the way back, and the next morning—it 

was 7:30 in the morning—we had one of your fellows come in with 

a poncho, and he unwrapped it in the office, and he had a ton of 

ACOGs and other stuff, and he said, ‘‘We will give you whatever 

we got.’’ And you guys pulled, I think, several hundred of them off 

your shelves because you had some extras, and you got them over 

to the Marines. 

That prompted an outcry of protest from the acquisition bureaucracy that claimed that those were your ACOGs, by God, and that 

they should be back on the shelf someplace in Florida. But I wanted to thank you for, what I saw, was the fastest interservice equipment transfer I have ever seen. And I know they were effectively 

used. 

So one great aspect of your service is you guys move quick, you 

have got lots of flexibility, and it looks to me like you support the 

other services very effectively. 

Admiral Fallon, let me go back to this flipped jurisdiction of 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Operation 

Enduring Freedom (OEF) forces in Afghanistan and kind of try to 

get it right. 

I know we have got a total of about 54,000 total forces, U.S. and 

allied, in country in Afghanistan. Roughly half of those are American. Is that right? 

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. About half of them are American, and about how 

many of them are attached to the ISAF mission? 

Admiral FALLON. About half of those. 

Mr. HUNTER. And about half to the OEF mission of our people? 

It is about 50–50? 

Admiral FALLON. It is close. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. I thought it was a little bit more for ISAF, 

but, anyway, pretty close to a split. 

When you are putting together your military missions for ISAF, 

you are constructing the missions, who constructs the missions? 

Admiral FALLON. If they are ISAF missions, General McNeil has 

got the responsibility for them. But the reality is that this is not 

an issue, in my mind. When I got in this job last year, there was 

a lot of hubbub about this, and a couple of steps that I took. 

One was to go back and look at the authorities that had been 

issued from CENTCOM relating to all of the command’s subordinate commands. We wrote those, streamlined them, cleaned them 

up and reissued that operational guidance. I then went to NATO 
12 

to ask the Secretary General and the chairman of the military committee what their beef was, and most of it was historical. Since 

then—since last fall—we haven’t had an issue. 

The reality is that, when missions are planned, they have to be 

coordinated pretty very well between these forces. There are some 

U.S.-only forces that operate in close conjunction with the ISAF 

forces. And the key thing is the training and equipping of the Afghan security forces that are a part of these combined forces that 

are used pretty much all over the country. We are in charge of 

that. We help them set them up and work closely with ISAF. So 

it is very well coordinated. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Well, okay. Well, I am just trying to understand the chain of command, if you will, and the division responsibilities. In Iraq, for example, you have got General Petraeus commands all coalition forces; General Odierno, the U.S. forces. Is General O’Neil—he commands the OEF forces in Iraq? 

Admiral FALLON. General McNeil has the NATO forces. He is the 

ISAF commander. 

Mr. HUNTER. But does he also have any command of the OEF 

forces? 

Admiral FALLON. No, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. Who is the OEF commander in—— 

Admiral FALLON. I have that command. I have that responsibility. 

The confusion may be that there are U.S. forces—General Rodriguez, who is the commander of the 82nd in his U.S. hat, is also the 

NATO commander of Regional Command East (RC East). He works 

for General McNeil in the tactical execution—operational execution 

of his duties. He also works for me in the responsibility that I have 

for the care and well being of all U.S. men and women in uniform 

in that region. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So if you are putting together a mission, you 

have got the various—in the ISAF mission you have got the various 

European participants all with their separate varying policies. For 

example, I understand it—and tell me if I am wrong—that the Germans do not involve themselves in what you would call ‘‘kinetic 

missions.’’ They stay in garrison, they do some nation-building jobs, 

but they don’t involve themselves in the military operation. 

So if General O’Neil is putting together a military operation, how 

does he build that operation? He brings in the various countries 

and asks them what they would like to do or what they are able 

to do as a result of their national policy? 

Admiral FALLON. No, sir. First, to the key point, it is General 

McNeil, and he—— 

Mr. HUNTER. I am sorry. McNeil. 

Admiral FALLON [continuing]. He is the guy that has to deal with 

this, not me. He has got responsibility for all the NATO forces. The 

way he has the country organized in regions, and, frankly, most of 

the kinetic activity is going on in the east, where it is all U.S. 

forces so far with a few exceptions. We have got some Polish units 

out there for us. In the south, where it is some U.S. but mostly European NATO. 

General McNeil, through his regional commanders, puts together 

his operations, and they are executed down at the regional-com-
13 

mand level. He is the guy, unfortunately, from my perspective, that 

has to deal with all these caveats, and there are many of them, and 

it makes life very difficult, very challenging for him, but he does 

it and figures out how to do it. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Last question. 

In your leadership role, is it your responsibility to talk to the 

military commanders of the various European components of the 

ISAF command to bring them into the fight, so to speak? If you 

have nations that you think are not participating in a robust way 

or in a way that really helps the operation and you would like to 

adjust that, do you communicate with them, or is that strictly a 

matter of their national policy and it flows down from their leadership and basically you and your commanders and General McNeil 

are left to basically accept the restrictions and the caveats as they 

arrive with the foreign troops? 

Admiral FALLON. No, sir. I am not in the chain of command. It 

goes from General McNeil back through German General Ramms 

in Brunssum headquarters—that is the NATO operational headquarters—back to General John Craddock, U.S. four-star, who has 

all the NATO forces, and that is how they deal with those individual challenges. So John Craddock is the man to ask that question of. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. I guess I lied. I guess last, last question. 

Do you think we should be getting more and we should be trying 

to get more in terms of support from the allies? 

Admiral FALLON. Well, we would certainly like to have more robust support and—no secret—less restrictions, less caveats so that 

people can do the job that they have, by word, signed up for. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Smith from Washington. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen. 

First of all, I want to thank Admiral Olson. He does a great deal 

of work with the subcommittee that I chair on terrorism. Both you 

and all of the folks at SOCOM have been just terrific to our committee. You have kept us very informed of the issues. You have 

been here, you have met with us. It has been a very open relationship. And with everything else you have got to do, I really appreciate that working relationship and your leadership down at 

SOCOM, particularly your emphasis on the counterinsurgency and 

indirect-action issues that you are really beefing up there, which I 

appreciate. I enjoy that working relationship a great deal. 

Admiral Fallon, thank you very much for your service as well in 

a very, very difficult part of the world. 

I wanted to ask some questions about Afghanistan and, specifically, sort of where we are at in the struggle. I think there is some 

concern from the last couple of years that we have started to lose 

ground in some areas, and the way I want to sort of focus that is, 

if the issue is hearts and minds sort of winning over territory, we 

seem to be losing some areas, in eastern Afghanistan and in southern. And by ‘‘losing areas,’’ I mean the local population basically is 

siding more with the Taliban and the insurgents than with us. And 
14 

it is a very difficult situation. You know, we have to target the insurgents, we don’t always know who they are, there is accusations 

of civilian casualties, even if it is not the case. 

It seems to have, in certain areas, have turned the population 

against us, from what I can read and from the briefings I have received. I wonder if you could give me some idea where those areas 

are, how many there are, and what we are doing to try to reverse 

that as we try to balance the need to hit the insurgents as hard 

as possible while at the same time not alienating the local population? How do you see that struggle going at this point? 

Admiral FALLON. Mr. Smith, you have highlighted the general 

challenge, and that is, it is complex. 

First, to the business of who is in charge, there are no provinces 

and no districts that are ‘‘in the hands of the Taliban.’’ We have 

maintained the initiative throughout the country. We, that is, U.S., 

ISAF, the Afghan security forces. Nonetheless, there are lots of 

challenges, and most of them are local issues. 

This is a very checkered country with lots of tribal affinities. It 

is an isolated country. As you are aware, there is only one major 

road in the entire nation, and it is this ring road, which is not 

quite completely paved yet, but we are working on it. And so there 

is certainly a lot of tension and ebb and flow. 

What we are trying to do is to work with the Afghan security 

forces to put in place a framework of stability so that the business 

of moving forward in governance and in economic development and 

nation building can take place. There are a lot of actors on the 

playing field, and that is a challenge for us to deal with, not just 

in a security area but in the redevelopment and assistance area. 

My sense is that we are working hard and we are gaining 

ground. There certainly was an uptick in kinetic activity last year, 

as there was the previous year. The relative increase last year was 

not nearly as great as it was forecast, and our intention this year 

is to get that and to keep that from growing in any appreciable 

way. 

We are providing time and space for the Afghan governance part 

of this to be effective in the country. 

Mr. SMITH. And how confident are you in our counterinsurgency 

ability because that seems to be—this is not, you know, a big, traditional, conventional fight—— 

Admiral FALLON. Correct. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. This is sort of Admiral Olson’s territory, 

if you will, in terms of it is as important to make sure that you 

are working with the local population in a diplomatic way as it is 

to make sure that you have got the military hardware necessary 

to kill the bad guys. And that is a tough thing to do, particularly 

following up on what Mr. Hunter talked about, in terms of all the 

different pieces. 

Do we have the people with the skill sets necessary to do that 

job? 

Admiral FALLON. Yes. Short answer, yes. We have got a lot of experience from Iraq, and particularly from Afghanistan, and our 

people are doing a terrific job in that regard. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you. 
15 

I have many more questions, but my time is almost out so I will 

probably submit some for the record, and I appreciate both you 

gentlemen being here this morning. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. A quick question, Admiral Fallon, before I call on 

Mr. McHugh. 

We all know the unfortunate experience that Great Britain had 

with the entire Middle East 1914, 1922. Do you think we understand the culture any better than they did at that time? 

Admiral FALLON. We are learning. I am not going to sit here and 

tell you that we have got it all figured out. I know that our people 

have a much better appreciation for this than they did a few years 

ago. I have watched them work down at the troop level in Afghanistan. I have been amazed at how quickly our people pick it up and 

how good they have been at passing this down. I am not going to 

tell you that everybody gets it to the same extent. But I have been 

very impressed with the way that our people are operating. 

In several of the provinces, they are not leading with their weapons, they are leading with their brains, and they are engaging with 

people, and those that are doing that are really having terrific success. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Olson, cultural awareness is a major 

part of what you do. Can I ask you the same question? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, we, too, are learning rapidly. With so much 

of our force now in Central Command (CENTCOM), it is a steeper 

learning curve for some than others. Some of our groups regionally 

oriented to other parts of the world are now working in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. We do have the advantage in force management of 

being able to rotate, primarily two of our Special Forces groups, in 

and out of Iraq and two of our Special Forces groups in and out 

of Afghanistan. And as they rotate in and out, we try to make sure 

that they go not only back to the same country but back to the 

same fire base so that they are working with the same people over 

and over and over again over time. So that knowledge and those 

cultural sensitivities are growing every day, but we, too, still have 

a long ways to go. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. McHugh. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you, as always, for the great work 

that you and those terrific people you lead do on our behalf. 

Admiral Fallon, you talked a bit about, perhaps not how to precisely how to define victory, but what the factors are that lead us 

toward a better or more successful outcome. One of those components has to be the political reconciliation in Iraq. 

Recently there has been some movement made with regard to socalled benchmarks—a couple of steps forward, a step back. They 

had the provincial laws passed but then vetoed to have passed the 

de-Baathification law, so-called, that has some questionable components to it, an 2008 budget and such. 

How do you assess the political reconciliation and growth of the 

national government? I think there is probably more success at the 

provincial level, but in Baghdad, how are things going there? 
16 

Admiral FALLON. They are learning, Mr. McHugh. Quite a steep 

learning curve, but they are picking it up. 

Nine, 10 months ago, I went out and met most of the senior Iraqi 

leaders, and I found them to be, my opinion, uneasy in their positions, certainly without a lot of experience. They are coming from 

narrow political or party or some other very distinctly inwardly focused orientation. Now they have got bigger responsibilities. They 

are growing into it. 

If I could give you one example: This recent passage of the three 

pieces of legislation—simultaneously the budget and the amnesty 

and the provincial council’s business—they had struggled for a couple of months with these. Individually, just not getting there, everybody had a piece of the action, everybody wanted something, 

couldn’t agree. And somehow the light went on, they came up with 

another idea: What if we bundle these things together? Maybe, collectively, there enough things that people could feel that there is 

enough goodness here to move it forward—it is a political process 

that I am sure you understand a lot better than I—and all of a 

sudden, in a half day’s time, bingo, it is passed. Not by overwhelming numbers, but it got passed. 

Now there is another part of their process that has taken place. 

They have this presidency council. The way the legislation works, 

they get to review it. These are kind of the godfathers, if you 

would. They take a look and see what they like, don’t like, and one 

of them, Hashemi decided he didn’t like an aspect of the bill and 

kicked it back, and so now it is in for reconsideration in the Council of Representatives (COR). Meanwhile, the other the other two 

bills are proceeding at pace. I think that is pretty indicative of a 

maturing political process. 

So is it going to be lightning quick? You could look around here 

and see that some things take a while to get through your institution as well. They are making progress, and I am happy to see, not 

just the way they have been able to get some of these pieces across 

the board, but the way that they are consulting with one another, 

the way that they actually, behind the scenes, get down there and 

rub elbows and roll up their sleeves and get moving. So they are 

making progress. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, sir. When it comes to Congress, our 

message to the Iraqi parliament ought to be ‘‘Do as we say, not as 

we do,’’ I suspect, but I appreciate your assessment. 

Recently, Muqtada al-Sadr issued a continuation of the ceasefire. It is certainly in the early days the stand down of Jaysh al 

Mahdi (JAM) and the decreasing violence was a critical part. Is his 

word going to be able to hold that cease-fire, or what do you read 

there? 

Admiral FALLON. I don’t know, to be very blunt with you, but I 

do know that any steps like that that generally send a message of 

moderation and to not answer the call to arms is helpful. It has got 

to be helpful. And I think we have benefited from that. 

There is clearly dissention within the ranks, from our view of 

what is going on Jaysh al Mahdi, but the results are speaking for 

themselves. There are many days now in which there is little to no 

violence in areas that we know have a significant JAM presence, 

and that is really good. What we are focused on and what General 
17 

Petraeus is focused on right now is those special groups—those bad 

actors or criminal elements—that just continue to wreak havoc. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Got a few seconds left so I will throw out an easy 

one. 

You want to give us your opinion on the so-called potential for 

a summer pause in the drawdown of U.S. forces? Take all the time 

you need. 

Admiral FALLON. Okay. Just to say that General Petraeus will 

come back to me within a matter of days with his recommendations 

on what he thinks in response to some questions I have sent him 

on various scenarios. We will be happy to consider that and pass 

it up the chain of command. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Sanchez, please. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being before our committee today. 

You know, sometimes this job is a very frustrating one. I just 

had a colleague walk out very frustrated with some of the lack of 

answers that we are really getting out of this panel this morning. 

So I am going to try this again. 

This has to do with Afghanistan because I think many of us here 

are very, very concerned about what is going on in Afghanistan. 

And the study report that General Jones and Ambassador Pickering turned into us about February 1 of this year, it said, ‘‘The 

year 2007 has been the deadliest for American and international 

troops in Afghanistan since the U.S.-led coalition forces invaded Afghanistan in 2001.’’ 

And it went on to say that the progress achieved after six years 

of international engagement was under serious threat and that the 

United States and the international community have tried to win 

the struggle in Afghanistan with too few military forces and insufficient economic aid. Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that we have spent about $127 billion in Afghanistan compared to almost $500 billion for Iraq. 

And when Chairman Mullen was before us on February 6, he 

pointed out that in Afghanistan we are seeing a growing insurgency, increasing violence, a burgeoning drug trade fueled by widespread poppy cultivation, and, in response, more U.S. forces will 

deploy to Afghanistan. 

So my question to you is, aside from the 3,200 Marines who are 

destined to Afghanistan in April, what is the status of additional 

U.S. forces being deployed to Afghanistan? 

Admiral FALLON. Those Marine forces that have been announced 

are the sum of the additional increase forces. There are certainly 

rotational forces going in, and behind the scenes, in the small 

print, some of these forces are actually larger this year than the 

forces that they are replacing. 

There has been for sometime an outstanding requirement from 

General McNeil to the NATO hierarchy to provide two maneuver 

brigades for his use in ISAF. We have not seen that to be forthcoming and so have recommended that we have a Marine Air 

Ground Task Force (MAGTAF) deploy, and I think that is going to 

be a substantial assistance to General McNeil. 
18 

We have also a standing requirement for a couple of thousand 

personnel to do training in the OEF area. I am pleased that we are 

going to have a battalion. It is about half of the number that we 

have asked for. I think that is going to be substantially helpful to 

us. But that is the sum of the U.S. forces that are going to be additionally sent to Afghanistan. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And given the small number of resources and personnel that we devoted to Afghanistan, are you surprised at the 

current state of insurgency, violence and drug trade that is occurring? 

Admiral FALLON. That is a very complex question, and I certainly 

am not going to dispute the fact that there are more incidents of 

violence, more improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and more casualties this year. But when I go back and look at the history of the 

U.S. engagement alone in Afghanistan from 2001 to now, there was 

a big hump of activity until 2002 and then a time in which there 

was not as much engagement. That engagement has been substantially ramped up, and there is an awful lot of progress going on. 

So there is a lot of stuff that has happened, a lot of numbers that 

are certainly negative rather than positive, but as I look at my responsibility for the region, the total of activity in Afghanistan compared to Iraq, for example, they are just not in the same range of 

metrics. 

That said, we have set ourselves up for what, I think, is going 

to be substantial progress this year in Afghanistan, and most of 

that is going to be directed in the area that, I believe, is really the 

most appropriate way, and that is to have the Afghans picking up 

more and more responsibility for security and stability in that 

country, and that is where we are really focused. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Admiral, what would be the ideal number of U.S. 

troops for mission in Afghanistan, and if we weren’t in Iraq, would 

we be devoting the right resources to Afghanistan? 

Admiral FALLON. Well, the number of forces that have been requested through NATO, and two maneuver brigades, and I could 

put to good work another 1,500 or so trainers there. We have a lot 

of requirements and a lot of demands on our system. I think that 

we have done our best to balance those competing demands. I feel 

confident that, with the forces we have this year, we are going to 

make significant progress. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And if we were not in Iraq? You wouldn’t change 

what we are doing in Afghanistan? 

Admiral FALLON. As far as changing the way we are going about 

this and the way we are doing it? 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Number of troops, what we deploy, what we are 

doing? 

Admiral FALLON. The plan that we have is, I believe, the appropriate plan in Afghanistan. It would be nice to have more resources. Our commanders always want more resources. I have to 

deal with that, I have to do my best to adjudicate those demands, 

but as far as the strategy, what we are doing, how we are doing 

it, I think we are on the right track, and I think you are going to 

see some success this year. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
19 

The CHAIRMAN. To clarify your answer to Ms. Sanchez, there will 

be 3,200 Marines going in since NATO is not coming forward with 

3,500; is that correct? 

Admiral FALLON. Three thousand two hundred is about the right 

number, and that is split between maneuver force and then the 

folks that are headed in specifically for training. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is my question. You said about a battalion-size Marine contingent is going to do training. Does that 

come out of the 3,200 hide or—— 

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir. A sum total of 3,200. 

The CHAIRMAN. Not in addition thereto? 

Admiral FALLON. No, sir. That is the sum total of all the U.S. 

troops that are going in. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Olson, you talk in your written statement about indirect 

warfare, about irregular warfare, and you make the statement that 

in a world characterized by protracted struggles, emerging irregular warfare doctrine calls for a suite of capabilities to prevail 

against those who threaten us. 

Just as most of us tend to think of success and warfare as that 

front moving across a map—like you all talked about earlier—most 

of us tend to think of warfare in more traditional terms: in tanks, 

in ships, in airplanes and so forth. And this suite of capabilities 

you talk about for irregular warfare is not something that most of 

us are used to thinking of when we think about our military. 

I think it would be helpful for us if you would take just a moment—because SOCOM has done more work in this area, more 

thought, more experience in this area than most of us. Take just 

a moment and from a national perspective—not a SOCOM perspective—from a national perspective, talk about why this suite of capabilities you mention is important. And I am especially interested 

in what obstacles you see to this country developing that suite of 

capabilities for irregular warfare. 

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, Mr. Thornberry. 

‘‘Irregular warfare’’ is a term that has emerged just in the last 

couple of years, and it has become an umbrella term that describes 

a number of diverse activities of direct and indirect nature. So 

many irregular warfare activities are conducted by handfuls of people in remote regions in face-to-face activities, but manhunting and 

terrorist killing is also an irregular warfare activity. It has come 

to include counterinsurgency and counterterrorism and counterguerrilla warfare and train-and-assist missions, and stability and 

reconstruction. 

Many irregular warfare activities are activities in which the Department of Defense has the lead. Many irregular warfare activities would not be termed ‘‘warfare’’ but are related activities in 

which other agencies of government have the lead and Department 

of Defense is in support. 

It does require cultural attunement. It requires language skills. 

It requires sustained presence. At sort of the low-density, low-technology region, it also requires the ability to sense what is occurring 
20 

in very high-tech ways and be able to respond to that with violence 

when that is required. 

Special Operations does many things across that suite of military 

activities. So do the rest of the conventional forces. There are irregular warfare centers of excellence and irregular warfare units and 

commands that are being developed within the services in order to 

answer that need. 

And I think the obstacle—in specific answer to that, the obstacles are in defining roles and missions—who is going to do what, 

who is going to have the lead to do what—the prioritization in 

which these activities are going to occur and the regions in which 

they are going to occur—and then the access that is required to do 

this—access by host nations and access by our own other agencies 

of government in order to perform military activities in areas 

where we are not in conflict and may not expect to be in conflict 

soon, which requires policy decisions and permissions for military 

forces to conduct those kinds of activities. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. If you had to give the Nation a grade—A 

through F—on where we are with irregular warfare capabilities, 

what would you give us today? 

Admiral OLSON. We are in the B to C range, I would give us, and 

growing. But much of this has to do with how we are organized and 

whether or not we are going to be able to apply discreet units in 

remote places, outside the normal organizational structure of our 

large conventional forces. And each of the services is working to do 

that with varying degrees of energy and success. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I appreciate it. 

Admiral Fallon, just briefly, talking about how many soldiers are 

in Afghanistan, do you recall how many soldiers the Soviets had 

when they tried to occupy Afghanistan? 

Admiral FALLON. Number 100,000 comes to mind, but—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I would say it is more like 3- to 400,000 that 

they had trying to subdue that country unsuccessfully. It is a matter of bodies, or is it a matter of something else? 

Admiral FALLON. It is not a matter of bodies. If I could go back 

to—Congresswoman Sanchez has left—okay. 

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and answer the question. 

Admiral FALLON. We could use some more people. I don’t believe 

we need large numbers. We could use some more folks to help with 

the training and to give General McNeil a little bit more of a boost. 

Last summer, last fall we chopped a battalion of U.S. troops to go 

in the south and help them out. They were very, very helpful to 

him, and he was able to do very well with them. 

A couple thousand more troops, I think, would pretty much give 

us all the flexibility we need to wrap this thing up pretty quickly, 

to expand stability in a way that would really be meaningful. 

But I don’t think we ought to be contemplating large numbers of 

troops. I have seen in some places that, you know, we roll tens of 

thousands of troops out of Iraq and Afghanistan. I don’t think it 

is appropriate at all. It is a very different situation. I think we 

have got the right idea, we have got the counterinsurgency strategy, and our emphasis is really on training the Afghans to pick this 

up and not in staggering the large numbers. 

Thank you, sir. 
21 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thanks, Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. So you would boost the numbers from 3,200 

roughly to 4,200? 

Admiral FALLON. We could use a couple thousand more—some 

troops actually do work down there. 

The CHAIRMAN. That would be 5,200. 

Admiral FALLON. Sorry, sir? 

The CHAIRMAN. That would be 5,200; is that correct? 2,000 on top 

of 3,200—— 

Admiral FALLON. If we are at about 3,200—I have lost the dot 

here on total numbers. We have got about 25,000 or so of our 

troops. A couple thousand more of anybody’s that are willing to 

really get out there and do the things that need doing would help 

us immensely. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Snyder, please. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate your clarification to Ms. Sanchez’ question because 

I thought the first go-round was not as satisfactory as we would 

like. You know, we are here to help you, the country wants to help 

you, and I think an acknowledgment that—— 

Admiral FALLON. There is no doubt we have given the priority 

to Iraq, and I think that is most appropriate given where we were, 

certainly from the time I have been in here. But we have not neglected Afghanistan, and we are taking a round turn on this, in 

Navy parlance, to get us where, I think, we need to be as quickly 

as we can. 

Dr. SNYDER. And then the question for us is you have expressed 

a need for an additional 2,000 troops. Are the things that we need 

to be doing as a Congress reflecting the will of the American people 

to help you get to where you think you need to go, and that is the 

purpose of this hearing today. 

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir. 

Dr. SNYDER. I wanted to ask, Admiral—and I did not have your 

biography in the packet we had—and I saw you sitting there, I 

thought, this looks like a guy who was a tough guy in his young 

days and is still tough today. And so I have got your biography 

now, and that confirms that judgment, and I appreciate your service. 

I wanted to ask, kind of in following up on Mr. Thornberry’s 

question, the issue in terms of the roles of the Special Ops Forces 

versus, what I call, the general-purpose forces. And in your statement you talk about the Foreign Internal Defense is something 

that you all participate in a lot. 

Now, is it not correct that, according to joint doctrine, that that 

is to be a role also of the general-purpose forces? And would you 

give me an update on where we are at with regard to is it a numbers issue, or do we still have some flux and debate going on about 

exactly who is going to do what with regard to general-purpose 

forces and Special Ops forces? 

Admiral OLSON. Mr. Snyder, we are still having the debate about 

who is going to do precisely what and who is going to lead what 

with respect to development and application of forces globally in an 

irregular warfare kind of environment. Foreign Internal Defense is 

training and assisting alongside foreign counterparts. We get train-
22 

ing from that; they get training from that. This is not about a oneway transfer of skills. It is about relationship building and mutual 

benefit, that kind of interaction, best conducted by forces that can 

go to the same place repeatedly over the course of a career. 

Dr. SNYDER. Right. So when you earlier said—I think you said— 

in terms of the augmentation of your force, didn’t you say three to 

four percent per year? 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. 

Dr. SNYDER. I would think that until this debate is resolved—I 

mean, if you and General Casey and others and the secretary and 

maybe this debate is going to go on to the next Administration— 

say, no, all this is going to go to Special Ops Command, three to 

four percent may be terribly inadequate. Is that a fair statement? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I actually said 3 to 5 percent, and that is 

on the order of—we are about a 50-, 55,000-person force depending 

on how we count the Reserves into it. And so 5 percent growth on 

that is about 2,500 people a year. That is about what we are experiencing now through the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and 

the POM–08 process, a growth of 13,000-plus over 5 or 6 years. 

Dr. SNYDER. But how does that relate—my time is going to run 

out. How does that relate to this debate going on? If it is resolved 

that the general-purpose forces have their hands full, they are not 

going to do any Foreign Internal Defense anymore, it is all going 

to be Special Ops, will that impact on the numbers that you all 

need to grow into? 

Admiral OLSON. It would impact on the ultimate numbers that 

we would need to reach. It wouldn’t directly impact the rate at 

which we can absorb the growth. We still have a limited ability to 

produce the quality of Special Forces soldiers, Navy SEALs, 

etcetera, who go out and conduct this activity. And it is something 

that doesn’t scale up rapidly and massively very well. We have to 

work our way into it. 

Dr. SNYDER. Now, is that—and my time is about up. Is that issue 

of ramping up—is that something that we ought—on this side of 

the table ought to be working on? Do we need additional training 

capacity for your command? Is that part of the issue? Recognizing 

that these are very sophisticated skill sets we are talking about 

and all kinds of factors. But is training capacity something that we 

should be worrying about so that you can ramp up faster—— 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, there is an element of training capacity in 

it, and that would be helpful, and we haven’t worked all the numbers on that. We are working now to absorb the growth that we 

have been given with our current capacity. And, frankly, our capacity in Special Forces—soldiers, as an example—has grown from 

producing less than 300 a year a few years ago to producing more 

than 800 a year this year. So we have invested in that. Quality is 

up. Everything is up. 

Dr. SNYDER. When do you anticipate this debate will come to an 

end, and is that going to be the result of—are we going to get some 

kind of formal study, or will there be an announcement in terms 

of the general-purpose forces versus Special Ops Forces in the Foreign Internal Defense? 

Admiral OLSON. I don’t think it is a formal study, but it will be 

a serious discussion about roles and missions, who is going to do 
23 

what and whether or not Special Operations Forces can hand off 

some of the tasks they are currently performing to the rising capabilities of conventional forces. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you for your service, both of you. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hayes. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you for being here and to your service 

and what all the wonderful people under you are doing every day. 

Couple of quick comments and then two questions for Admiral 

Olson. 

Based on the publication you and I were discussing, there is no 

word in the Arabic language for ‘‘reconciliation.’’ So as we look at, 

from our perspective, what is going on over there, we need to kind 

of factor that in. 

The other thing is theirs is a religion that allows for government. 

Ours is a government that allows for religion. And therein there is 

some very subtle but important distinctions we need to work with 

as we wrap up this military victory that you and your forces have 

won. 

Admiral Olson, with my allegiance and knowledge of Fort Bragg, 

I would like for you to speak about what additional authorities you 

need to assist you in executing the long war against terrorists. 

And then the second question, with a reduction in the SOCOM 

budget for this year compared with previous years and the size of 

your unfunded requirements list, I am concerned, and I know this 

committee wants to do everything that it can to ensure that you 

have what you need in the fight. What equipment or other shortfalls are there that we can help with, and what challenges are you 

encountering with sustaining such a high ops tempo? 

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, Mr. Hayes. 

First, about the authorities, I would like to thank this committee 

for its continuation of our 1208 and now 1202 authorities for another three years. That is an essential authority for us to fund the 

training and equipping of counterpart forces with which we are engaged around the world, including well away from Afghanistan and 

Iraq. That is a $25 million authority without an appropriation, and 

it works well for us. We find that, once in, we can’t get out, and 

so this is going to have to be an ever-increasing top-line amount 

of that authority as we approach $25 million for the first time this 

year. 

And I am a strong supporter of the 1206 authorities that also enable us to do important work around the authorities and the billing 

partner capacity act. 

I am exploring seriously my authorities with respect to the readiness of my force. The language that created United States Special 

Operations Command gives me head of agency acquisition authorities and a dedicated budget. I find myself beholding in many ways 

to service processes and certifications in order to exercise my authorities. I am convinced that I am operating comfortably within 

the middle of my authorities, not on the edge, and so I am working 

to explore those aggressively. 
24 

The same thing goes with certain manpower and management 

authorities. My authority under the law now is to monitor the 

management of Special Operations Forces personnel, which gives 

me the opportunity to observe and report on how Special Operations Forces personnel—for whom I am accountable—are managed 

by the services. So I am exploring how to approach that, and, of 

course, much of what I seek ultimately will be within the authorities of the services and the Department to grant should they choose 

to, and some may drift into legislative requests. 

And the second piece was—— 

Mr. HAYES. About the Unfunded Requirement (UFR) request. 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. 

Our budget request this year was below what it was the previous 

year. Fundamentally, we worked within the top-line guidance provided to us by the Office of the Secretary of Defense prior to submitting our 2009 budget. Then the things that we wanted to put 

within that top line we were unable to, those went to the top of 

our unfunded requirements list. Those are requirements by Special 

Operations Command submitted, approved, validated, vetted within the command but without room in our top-line budget guidance 

to squeeze them into the budget that we submitted to the Department. 

The budget we did submit was not challenged. It was approved 

and moved on. But, clearly, within our UFR request are those 

things that didn’t make the priority cut, those things for which we 

saw opportunity for acceleration, and those things which became 

submitted and validated requirements in the several months between when we submitted our budget request and when we submitted the UFR list. 

And along the way, fiscal year 2008 was a surge year for us as 

a result of the QDR. We had military construction (MILCON) at almost twice the rate we had ever had it, we had growth of the force 

at a rate that we had never had before, we had completion of many 

of our equipment modification actions in 2008, which is, in fact, 

what led to the lower top-line guidance for 2009. 

Mr. HAYES. Don’t be guilty of not asking for enough. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. McIntyre of North Carolina. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Admiral Fallon and Admiral Olson, for your 

leadership. I greatly enjoyed my recent visit just a couple weeks 

ago down to Tampa to U.S. Special Operations Command and also 

to CENTCOM. 

And, Admiral Olson, thank you particularly for your hospitality. 

Enjoyed being with you also at Camp Lejeune for the 

groundbreaking of the new Marine Special Operations Command. 

We are quite excited about what that will mean on the other end 

of my district from Fort Bragg, where we have joint Special Operations Command that I share with Congressman Hayes. 

I wanted to ask you to follow up on Congressman Hayes’ question. If you can tell us, in particular, what the wear and tear—and 

the being the tip of the spear that Special Operations are—what 

equipment and resources are experiencing the greatest wear and 
25 

tear that you see as the greatest priority for replacement or for 

augmentation. 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, in terms of sort of non-human platforms, 

our greatest wear and tear is being experienced by our aviation 

fleet. Our C–130’s, upon which we depend for medium lift, are 

wearing out at an accelerated rate. We have a recapitalization program in place, and much of our budget request addresses that recapitalization. It is not coming as rapidly as I would like to see it, 

and we are going to see a degradation of that fleet because of center-wing box problems and other things with which this committee 

is familiar over the next few years. 

We have had to retire our MH–53 Pave Low helicopter program. 

That is at the end of its service life. We had intended that the V– 

22 would be able to replace that almost airframe for airframe, but 

delayed delivery of the V–22 is an issue for us. We have included 

in our request—in the supplemental—an acceleration of the V–22 

program. 

The rest of our helicopter fleet—our Chinooks and our Black 

Hawks—are experiencing wear and tear at an accelerated rate, but 

we are pretty okay with those programs as we are currently programmed. 

And our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) fleet, 

which goes way beyond platforms into systems and people and 

training opportunities and all of that, has proven insufficient for 

the environment in which we are operating. We are growing into 

the knowledge that that has become an absolutely essential extension of our force. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, sir. 

Admiral Fallon, if I could ask you—switching gears—on Turkey. 

We know there is a recent Turkish invasion—or incursion into Iraq 

in pursuit of the Partiya Karker Kurdistan (Kurdistan Worker’s 

Party) (PKK). Can you tell us whether that was done with any U.S. 

assistance or with any U.S. cooperation and whether or not you felt 

like that successfully put down the PKK? 

Admiral FALLON. We provided indirect support to the Turkish 

military intelligence to help the incursion achieve some tactical 

success, it is my understanding. But I think the real key issue here 

is figuring out a way to have the Turks come to grips with the People’s Congress of Kurdistan (KGK) and to not just try to eliminate 

them militarily. They certainly have instigated lots of trouble, and 

they have had a lot of casualties in Turkey, but the real solution 

here, to me, is that there is some kind of an accommodation 

reached with this group and with the Turks inside of Turkey to 

knock this off. 

Any kind of instability like that—kinetic activity—up there in 

Kurdistan is potentially very destabilizing and harmful to our operations in Iraq. And so we have really tried to come at this in a 

measured way. We certainly recognize the pain the Turks have felt 

from this outlaw and terrorist activities of this group, but we know 

that the long-term solution is some kind of an accommodation to 

scratch some of the itches of the KGK. And so we will give them 

the help that we can, but we are really strongly encouraging them 

to figure out a political solution here. 
26 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Would it be your opinion, consistent with the 

other recommendations that this committee has heard from independent study group headed by General Jones and others, that we 

would not have a permanent American base in Northern Iraq? 

Admiral FALLON. I don’t believe we are interested in permanent 

bases anywhere. What we are trying to do in Iraq is to provide 

enough stability and security to allow the government to grow, to 

allow the Iraqi security forces to take over responsibility and for us 

to continue to withdraw our combat forces. We want to be engaged 

with Iraq for the long term but not in the business of maintaining 

a large force in Iraq. 

Thank you, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Randy Forbes, Virginia, please. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Fallon, Admiral Olson, thank you so much for your service and for being here today, and I am going to talk quick because 

I have only got five minutes. I am going to ask you each just two 

questions. 

First of all, I believe that words do matter, and when I hear suggestions of a broken Army, that our troops are demoralized, that 

fighting the challenges we face makes us weaker, these words take 

a toll. I remember in the early 1960’s hiding under my desk, cowering in the hallway because we were afraid we might have a nuclear attack in the United States. And there were some who argued 

we ought not to be in that fight. We ought to be weaker then. I 

am glad those voices lost. 

In the 1970’s, I remember hearing how we were afraid we would 

have mutual annihilation because we were in an arms race with 

the Soviet Union. We were concerned about that and some that 

said we ought not to be in the fight. We ought to be weaker. I am 

glad those voices lost. 

In the 1990’s, some of our leaders forgot that giving our enemies 

time to rest doesn’t reduce the challenges we face, but rather sometimes increases those challenges. 

I also know the challenge that you have because, if you fight a 

challenge in one part of the world, there is always going to be 

voices that point to you and say why aren’t you fighting a challenge 

in another part of the globe. Then they will spin the globe when 

you go there, and say why aren’t you in another part of the globe. 

If you went to all the challenges, they would be saying you were 

stretched too thin and you needed to focus on one challenge, and 

the whole thing would start over again. 

And so the two questions I have for you were these: We have had 

witnesses come before this committee—and they have stated this 

unequivocally and Secretary Garing and General Casey have confirmed it—that the force we currently have today in Iraq is the 

most experienced, the most adaptive, the most professional and the 

most capable force we have ever fielded. That means more than 

last year, more than the year before that, more than the year before that, and more than the year 2000 or anytime before that. 

My question to each of you is do you agree that the force under 

your command is currently today the most experienced, adaptive, 

professional and capable that you have ever seen? 
27 

And, second, while it may be difficult to define victory—because 

that question was asked to you—my question to each of you is this: 

Admiral Fallon, can you tell me what failure would look like in 

Iraq? If we loaded our troops on your ships tomorrow and brought 

them home, what would that look like? 

And, Admiral Olson, if we loaded them on the Admiral’s ships 

and brought them home tomorrow, what would that do to our fight 

against al Qaeda? 

My two questions for both of you. 

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, Admiral Fallon, for the opportunity 

to speak first. 

Regarding the capability and the experience of the force, I will 

talk only about the United States Special Operations Forces, with 

which I interact every day, and the quality of the force is, in my 

view, better than it has ever been. They are harder, smarter, fitter, 

stronger, at least as motivated coming in as ever in history. They 

have the advantage of knowing what it is they are coming in for 

and how hard it is going to be for them, and this force is serving 

magnificently. 

They are more experienced every year and every day than they 

were the day before, but they are more experienced in a narrower 

set of skills. The Special Forces image of a grizzled John Wayne 

and a small team of stubble-faced, grizzled veterans who are roaming around the world training foreign counterparts is really shifting 

into a much younger, much less-experienced force in terms of the 

ways of the world and the kind of international wisdom that it 

takes to operate it. And a primary reason for the growth in our 

force is to get us back out into the rest of the world, in which we 

have been underrepresented and underexperienced as a Special 

Operations Forces for the last few years. 

Clearly, a rapid withdrawal of Special Operations Forces with respect to al Qaeda would be devastating in terms of the impact that 

we are having on them. There is an absolute dwindling of al 

Qaeda’s capability in the places where we are able to work directly 

against them, and I think the decrease in violence in Iraq is directly attributed to that kind of activity. 

Admiral FALLON. Yes, and failure would be regression of Iraq 

back into the kind of chaos and sectarian strife that we saw back 

in 2006. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, both. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR [presiding]. Chair thanks the gentleman. 

Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from California Ms. Tauscher. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Admirals. It is good to have you here. 

Thank you for your service, and, certainly, I want to thank the men 

and women under your commands and thank them for their service. 

I like and respect my colleague from Virginia, and I want to 

make it very clear that there is something about what he said that 

I agree with. I think we have the most professional force in the 

world. I think we have the best trained and, certainly, perhaps the 

most qualified volunteer force in the world. 
28 

But I hope he wasn’t suggesting that they are not bone tired, and 

I hope he wasn’t suggesting that they are not overdeployed. I think 

everybody understands that. And I think everybody understands 

that we went into this war in Iraq without enough ground forces, 

that the painful truth is that, seven years later, we now know that 

counterinsurgency is pretty labor intensive. 

And I would hope that you both will quickly agree with me that 

qualifications and their strength and their training is not mutually 

exclusive to the fact that they have been overused, overdeployed 

and that we have a readiness crisis in our military. Do you agree? 

Admiral OLSON. There is clear stress on the force, in my view, 

that has not yet manifested in the data. Our recruiting is up, our 

retention is up, the morale of the Special Operations Force is up 

as manifested in many ways. The data does not support my instincts—and clearly yours—that there is a future fragility that we 

have to get ahead of. We don’t have good metrics in our services 

for being predictive and preventive. We have great programs for responding to manifested trauma, whether physical or psychological. 

We aren’t as good at getting ahead of the problem in order to preempt it. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. We do know that suicide attempts are up dramatically and suicides are up, and that says to me that there is 

something very wrong. 

Admiral Fallon. 

Admiral FALLON. Ma’am, I would not say that we are in a readiness crisis at all, but I will certainly tell you that I think that our 

troops are in need of a change in the deployment cycle. We have 

had too many, from my experience, of several of our key segments 

of the troop population—senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs), 

mid to junior officers—on multiple rotations. I look at my commanders, and some of them have logged more months in Iraq in 

the last decade than they have at home by a significant amount. 

We recognize this. 

Our troops are doing a magnificent job, and they are—God bless 

them—they are willing to shoulder the responsibilities we ask. We 

know we need to change these rotation cycles. That is what is a 

key factor in the decision making that is going to be upcoming this 

year. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Can we switch gears and talk about the poppy 

crop cultivation in Afghanistan, which is, unfortunately, up again— 

a 17 percent increase over recent years. And we have a basic strategy that is not unlike what we did in Colombia—or are trying to 

do in Colombia—which is to create alternative livelihoods for farmers, eradicate poppy crops, create counternarcotics units. 

General Fallon, are you satisfied that the Iraqi security forces, 

where we have areas of questions about corruption, that there is 

enough being done to be sure that the Iraqi security forces don’t 

become an enabler for the kinds of poppy crop drug trafficking that 

we see and that we are not creating a long-term problem with the 

kind of corruption we see in the government of Afghanistan and in 

the security forces? 

Admiral FALLON. Congresswoman, the data, I think, that we 

have available is for 2007. It remains to be seen. We are anxious 

to see how things really are this year because I have gotten assur-
29 

ances from several of the governors in Afghanistan that they have 

put in place measures last fall during the planting season to reduce 

that crop. We will see how it works out, but it is a complex issue. 

There is a history of cultivation here, as you know, goes back for 

hundreds of years, and it is going to be tough to break. We have 

a lot of responsibilities we have given our forces out there, and I 

would have to be honest in telling you that the first one is security 

and stability. We are certainly aware of the problem with poppies, 

and we are asking them to help as they can. There are some dedicated forces in the field, mostly from the Afghan government. 

I will tell you one new initiative that has just been started, and 

that is the Afghan army has decided to dedicate a battalion—a 

Kandak, if you would—now to just drug eradication. They are 

about midway through their training now. Just talked to our commanders, we are going to ensure they have the right equipment to 

go out there and actually start plowing stuff under. And that is a 

good sign, an indication of dedication. 

Now, there is corruption, there is no doubt about it. And I think 

one of the challenges that the Karzai government has to deal with 

is, frankly, balancing some of this, going after these guys that they 

know probably have their fingers dirty in here, at the same time 

trying to get stability and to get the kind of leadership that is necessary to move us forward. 

So we are well aware of it, we know it is a real problem, it is 

a plague, we have got to stop it, we could use some more help from 

the international community in a concerted way to approach this. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. TAYLOR [presiding]. The chair recognizes the gentleman from 

Minnesota, Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, for your testimony, for 

your many years of service and for all of those things. 

Couple of quick questions. 

Admiral Olson, I am looking at this pretty nifty document here, 

and I noticed that, picking up on the comments earlier, that your 

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC)—your Air Force 

component—is decreasing in personnel because, as you said, you 

are retiring the MH–53s. You have got the CV–22s coming online. 

As you know, the MV–22s are now deployed in Admiral Fallon’s 

area in Iraq, and I trust that your folks are looking at that deployment, as we all are. 

Is there anything we can do here—this committee, this Congress—to help speed up your employment, deployment, acquisition 

and so forth of the CV–22? Is it money, or are there other constraints that we cannot help with? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, it is in part money in terms of accelerating 

the delivery of the platforms. We are at seven now. We will be at 

eight by the end of this year. We intend to deploy our first four not 

later than January of 2009. We are working to accelerate that by 

a few weeks, if we can. And we do, by the way, have some people 

from AFSOC fully deployed with the Marine Corps so that we are 

drawing from their lessons learned from their first deployment. 

Ultimately, an acceleration of the program will help us reach our 

initial operational capability, and that will require increased fund-
30 

ing for an acceleration of the program. But, again, I only fund with 

my budget about a quarter of the cost of a V–22. The rest of it is 

in the Air Force budget. 

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Thank you very much. 

And I think we should be looking at that in this committee. That 

is a shortfall in our premiere force that, it seems to me, we ought 

to be moving quickly to correct. 

Admiral Fallon, I would like to say that I was in Afghanistan a 

couple weeks ago, and I just think our troops there, as everywhere, 

are doing absolutely magnificently. The progress that I saw in RC 

East—and particularly Khost province—very, very encouraging. A 

couple of questions did come up, though, and I would like to just 

sort of throw those out. 

One is the issue that Mr. Hunter was addressing, the ‘‘who is in 

charge’’ question. I know there has been some discussion about 

dual hatting—General McNeil or his replacement—to cover both 

the American OEF force and the ISAF force. Is that something that 

you are considering that you can talk about, or is that simply off 

the table? 

Admiral FALLON. I don’t think there is an active discussion right 

now. When I got into this job, there was a lot of noise about this 

subject, dove into it, addressed a couple of issues I thought that 

needed attention. Since then, I have not been aware of a problem 

with this. I would much rather get activity in Afghanistan focused 

on fixing some of the things that really need correcting that are 

pretty obvious, like getting the right number of forces with the 

right equipment in the field, and so it is not anywhere near the top 

of my do list. 

Mr. KLINE. Fair enough. I am not suggesting that there is a 

problem right now, but I am concerned that we have something 

that is set up that is largely dependent upon the personalities. I 

don’t like the wiring diagram that I am looking at, and I hope that 

we continue to have the right personalities in place and it works 

out. But, if so, it is sort of in spite of the way that it is set up, 

again, following up on what Mr. Hunter said. 

Admiral FALLON. Again, I don’t think it is personalities. We have 

a chain of command, reporting responsibilities, directives in place 

to tell people what to do, how to do it. I think they are doing their 

job. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. KLINE. Good enough. Thank you, Admiral. 

Now, on the issue of troop numbers, I hope that we are not going 

to try to get in the business here—unfortunately, I am afraid that 

we will—of us deciding in this committee and this Congress what 

the troop strength ought to be day by day in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia or anyplace else. That is something that is in your purview, 

and I have some confidence that you are looking at that in the way 

that you should be. 

There is no question, though, that Secretary Gates and others 

have talked about the lack of the support from some of our NATO 

allies, and I trust that you are doing everything you can, and I 

know he is, and we should be pushing to get the rest of those 

NATO allies involved because you have got a balancing act here. 

How much do you want American troops versus NATO troops 
31 

versus the Afghan national army, which is the most respected institution in Afghanistan? And so it is not, I think, in my judgment, 

just a matter of how many more U.S. troops that we put in there. 

Anyway, thank you very much for your excellent service and 

good work. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mrs. Davis from California. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Admiral Fallon, Admiral Olson, good to have you with us. 

Thank you for your extraordinary service and, certainly, all the 

men and women that you command. 

I wanted to follow up briefly on the question of training for the 

3,200 Marines that are going into Afghanistan. And I am wondering, Admiral Fallon, are you aware of or have there been internal discussions about the extent of interagency planning and training that will go into that effort? 

Admiral FALLON. Two aspects here, ma’am. First one is the maneuver unit. It is a coherent Marine air-ground task group that has 

actually been formed for some time. It is coming out of Camp 

Lejeune, North Carolina. It has been trained. They had a headsup that they were going to be employed over there. 

When they get into the country, they are going to be—their function is a maneuver unit, and General McNeil will use those folks 

as he sees fit. They will be, as they get into country—and they are 

getting this exposure to this now—there are other aspects of the 

mission over there that they are going to have to become familiar 

with. 

Again, this is really General McNeil’s business, but how he uses 

them and to what extent, they are actually engaged in the other 

activities that would help the nation-building and stability and economic business. I tend to think this going to be his response force 

for security more than the others, but he has got those pieces, and 

I am sure he will fit them in. 

The other troops are going to be closer to the business of building 

institutions for the Afghan government. And this—I will be frank 

with you—it presents some challenges because the Marine maneuver battalion is not their first line—mission focus is not really nation-building, it is doing combat operations. The way that General 

Cone, who is going to employ these folks, is coming at this is to 

try to use them as an integrative unit, not break them up, keep 

them in platoon and company-size units and to use them as a good 

example in their mentoring for the Afghan security forces. These 

folks will—by the very nature of their tasks—have to use more of 

these interagency and international elements, and I am sure he 

has got that in mind. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Given that, I would certainly hope 

that, if there are opportunities there to bring in the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID) or the State Department to 

help plan for that mission, it seems like we talk a lot about this, 

and it would be an opportunity, I think, to really put it into play 

so that people have that opportunity prior to actually even being 

in country to take—— 
32 

Admiral FALLON. I agree. If I could, just to set the picture here. 

This is not a unit that is now going to take on a new responsibility 

in a new area. They are going to be a plug, if you would, that falls 

in an arrangement that is already set, including all those things 

that you mentioned here, and they are going to help execute it. So 

they will be arriving in a situation that has these pieces already 

on the chessboard. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Do you believe that there is any new 

authority from the Congress that is needed to continue to do everything possible, even at this time prior to new legislation, to give 

you that authority to engage these forces in that way? 

Admiral FALLON. Well, since you bring it up, there is a proposal 

that would try to pull together to give us, in our view and Department of Defense view, more flexibility in the execution of those authorities that you have been generous enough—like 1206, 1207, 

things like that—the proposals, the building global partnership capacity—tongue twister—but that would give us, I think, more flexibility to blend the 1206, 1207, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) authorities, which have been so useful to 

our troops on the ground to give those commanders a little more 

help there. We are very grateful for the individual authorities. If 

you consider maybe ways in which you might put this in a package 

that gives them the flexibility to move the resource around, that 

would probably be helpful. 

Thanks. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentle lady. 

Dr. Gingrey from Georgia, please. 

Let me add that, before we go vote, I hope we can ask two other 

members to ask questions. We will break for the vote and return 

immediately and pick up the questioning, and you will be out of 

here by 1:00 p.m. 

Dr. Gingrey. 

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Admiral Fallon, Admiral Olson, thank you for being with us this 

morning. I think that, in your present command positions, these 

probably are two of the most important, certainly in regard to 

asymmetric warfare, Central Command and Special Operations 

Command. So we are comforted knowing that you are in that leadership position. 

Two quick questions. 

In regard to the planned drawdown and getting back to pre-surge 

levels in July of 2008 and at the same time Mahdi al-Sadr says, 

well, they will do a six-month additional cease-fire of his militia. 

It concerns me a little bit the timing that this cease-fire on his part 

will end about the time that we draw back down to pre-surge levels. So I am concerned about what might happen at that point if 

all of a sudden this restless militia decides that they are tired of 

sitting down and they are ready to stand up again. So I would like 

for both of you to discuss that a little bit, if you share my concerns. 

The other thing, the recent trip by Ahmadinejad into Iraq. Of 

course, there was a lot of posturing over domestic cooperation and 

trade and that sort of thing. From that perspective, I guess, that 

is good. But Ahmadinejad, obviously, took the opportunity to blast 
33 

us once again and give his best Hugo Chavez-type rhetoric directed 

toward the United States, and I wonder what your feeling is in regard to this so-called new best friendship that we are seeing between Iraq and Iran and how that will possibly adversely affect 

what we are trying to do? 

So either one of you can start. 

Admiral FALLON. Sure. Regarding the drawdown of our forces 

and Muqtada, he is on his own timeline, and he will do what he 

does. From my view, the longer the Iraqi people get the experience 

of less violence and more stability in their lives, the less likely it 

is going to be that Muqtada is going to be able to encourage his 

militias, if you would, to revert to that kind of behavior. 

And what we are seeing right now is that, I think, one of the 

major factors in the increase in stability is that people have just 

gotten sick of it. They got tired of it, and they recognize that this 

sectarian violence was just a never-ending cycle of bad news for 

them, and they pushed back. And so the longer this goes on, the 

more chance they have to enjoy a more normal life, the less chance 

there is. 

Regarding Ahmadinejad’s show, if you would, in the last couple 

of days, clearly posturing, maybe their new best friend in his view, 

I doubt that is the case in the view of most Iraqis, certainly not 

mine. I think people are astute enough to realize and recognize 

what is going on. 

The Iraqis have to deal with him. He is their next-door neighbor. 

They have a huge border, almost 1,000 miles, that they share with 

this country, and, frankly, there is a lot of potential benefit to 

interaction, as there is right now. I was on the border a couple of 

weeks ago and watched a very robust level of trade coming across. 

There is a lot of good news there. There is also bad news. As Minister Bulani, the interior minister, said the other day, we like the 

tomatoes, the potatoes, and the mattresses and the other things. 

What we don’t like are the IEDs and the guns and the money and 

the stuff that is going to fuel the insurgency. So enough is enough. 

Our expectation was—and it will be interesting to see the cables—that the Iraqi leadership passed that message to 

Ahmadinejad and said we have had enough of that good stuff, you 

want to be our buddy, show us by your actions that this is what 

you mean. 

Dr. GINGREY. Admiral Olson. 

Admiral OLSON. I would certainly disagree with the theatrics of 

it, but regional stability is important. Iraq is going to have to live 

in that neighborhood after we leave. I support what Admiral Fallon 

said completely about border issues and economic issues and families that live on both sides of the border, and at some level they 

have got to have some kind of a state-to-state relationship. 

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

We will call on Mr. Larsen, and then we will break for the vote 

and return. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admirals, thanks for helping us out today. 
34 

First question for Admiral Fallon—give you a heads up beforehand, I am going to ask this—I am chairing electronic warfare 

(EW) working group project with a couple other members. We are 

looking at EW and looking at trying to how to institutionalize support for that. But I wanted to get your perspective on the role of 

electronic warfare, the use of it, and maybe some of the challenges 

that you face in CENTCOM using it and perhaps a direction that 

we can point to to help you out to fix some of those challenges. 

Admiral FALLON. Probably the number-one challenge, from my 

view, is the complexity and the density of the electromagnetic environment, and the challenges are people have with trying to integrate the specific systems that they are using and not interfere, 

step on, or otherwise negate other activities. That, to me, is the 

biggest challenge I see day to day in the theater. 

Mr. LARSEN. In terms of that, it is not just—you are saying it is 

not just a matter of people using different systems for these and 

different systems for totally different purposes as well? 

Admiral FALLON. Yes, exactly. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Admiral FALLON. Everybody is working hard to solve tactical 

problems, and that is terrific. There is an avalanche of proposed solutions out there. The problem is, when they end up being dumped 

into the same box over there, General Petraeus and his team have 

a challenge to sort them all out and try to get a coherent—— 

Mr. LARSEN. And my understanding, as well, it goes beyond the 

IED issue. 

Admiral FALLON. Sure. It is the whole thing. You are trying to 

do intelligence collection, surveillance, reconnaissance, support the 

tactical arena, just do regular daily comms, and it is pretty dense 

in there. 

Mr. LARSEN. Second question has to do with this operational 

pause or pause or whatever it is going to be called officially. Do you 

have a personal view on whether or not the pause would delay the 

Army’s ability to move to 12-month versus 15-month deployments, 

as General Casey has argued for? 

Admiral FALLON. What I would like to do is, first, make a comment. As I have already said, General Petraeus is going to come 

back here in the next week or two with his recommendations, and 

we will see how that sorts out. 

I think the term ‘‘pause’’ is probably misused—misunderstood. It 

seems to me that, with all of the activity that is about to get underway—four brigade combat teams (BCTs) coming out without replacement is the plan plus some regular rotations going in, that is 

an awful lot of activity. General Petraeus is going to have manage 

his pieces, if you could envision this, as a chessboard. He has got 

them all arranged in a way that has been very, very effective right 

now, takes a number of pieces off the table, redistributes responsibilities. All of these pieces going on at the same time, seems to 

me, that it would be prudent to assess kind of where we are for 

a bit and then decide what we do next. So that is what is going 

to be teed up. 

Mr. LARSEN. That is happening, but with regard to the 15-month 

deployment to 12-month deployment? 
35 

Admiral FALLON. There is no doubt that we want to continue to 

draw down our forces and have the Iraqis maintain the security 

and stability, and we know that the faster we can do that, the 

quicker we are going to be able to get the Army back on the kind 

of rotation it wants to do. So I think General Casey is on record 

saying that, from his view, if we are able to execute the drawdown 

as currently planned, that should enable him to, later on this year, 

go back to 12. That sounds good to me. We would like to help him 

out in any way we can. 

Mr. LARSEN. Finally, there is a lot of folks that believe that with 

over four million Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons— 

about half and half between refugees and internally displaced—resetting and reintegrating those folks is going to be a long-term 

issue. And can you discuss CENTCOM’s role and what your plans 

are for resettlement and reintegration, what kind of role you all 

have and that we all have in that? 

Admiral FALLON. I will tell you that I recently had a meeting 

with the U.N. special representatives to Iraq, His Excellence de 

Mistura—Staffan de Mistura—and really impressed. The guy has 

got it. He understands what he needs to do. They have taken that 

on as one of the U.N. As we look at all the things that could be 

done by somebody, who is going to primacy on things, and that is 

one of the things he has undertaken as a major focus for the U.N. 

So they are working that one. We will support them in any way 

we can. 

Mr. LARSEN. Good. Do you anticipate CENTCOM providing platform assets to move people or anything like that? 

Admiral FALLON. Not now. We haven’t been asked for any of that 

stuff, and I don’t believe so. I think they have plenty of assets. For 

example, the Iraqi government recently sent a convoy of buses to 

Jordan to bring back—they did it all on their own, and we found 

out about it after it was in execution. Sounds good to me. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

We will now recess for the three votes and return. 

And, gentlemen, we will be right back. 

[Recess.] 

Dr. SNYDER [presiding]. Hearing will resume. 

Mr. Skelton is speaking on a bill on the floor and asked that we 

go ahead and get back to our questions and get you all on the road. 

We apologize for the inconvenience. 

Mr. Wilson for five minutes. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Admiral Fallon, Admiral Olson, thank you very much for 

your service. I have a special appreciation for the success that you 

have in that I have had a son serve under your command, the 

Navy—son serving in Iraq. And so I am just very, very grateful for 

the strategy you are pursuing, for the success, for the equipment, 

the training, the personnel. 

Additionally, I want you to know that, over the weekend I saw 

firsthand that freedom is winning and, as you said, Admiral, at the 

troop level. We had the opportunity to visit in Afghanistan, and I 

visited with the 218th Brigade of the South Carolina Army Na-
36 

tional Guard, General Bob Livingston and the troops of that brigade that I served with for 28 years. And they are just very, very 

proud, as they conclude their service there, of training the Afghan 

police and army, and they feel like they are making a difference, 

and I believe they are. And I am very grateful that 3,200 Marines 

will be now joining that effort. That really—on what they have 

done—will be so helpful. 

Additionally, I had the opportunity to meet with President 

Karzai. It was wonderful to meet again with General McNeil. He 

was very understanding of us coming back. What a great leader he 

is. And to learn from them that the number of districts that have 

violence out of nearly 400 in Afghanistan has been reduced to almost just 10 percent of the districts across the country. And the 

American people need to know that the people of Afghanistan are 

very supportive in the success of our troops. 

Additionally, in Iraq we had the opportunity to meet with General Petraeus, to meet with Ambassador Crocker, to learn of the 

over 60 percent reduction in violence in the last year. We went by 

MV–22 to Kurdistan, met with government officials there. We visited in Fallujah and actually were able to walk the Sukh street 

area of Haditha, and we shook hands with citizens of Iraq, who, 

through interpreters, explained their appreciation for the service of 

the American military, the verification that al Qaeda has been removed and that they would fully resist any return of the terrorists. 

And so I want you to know that, as we go to thank the young 

people serving our country, and the best way to protect American 

families is to stop terrorism there. We go to inspire them; they inspire us. And we have the new greatest generation. 

Again, we were not alone—and Dr. Gingrey brought this up. 

Over the weekend President Ahmadinejad came, and, as I believe 

you correctly stated, there needs to be a good relationship between 

Iran and Iraq by trade. But I am concerned that the actions of 

President Ahmadinejad are not positive. 

Can you tell us what you can about the providing of explosives 

or rockets to terrorists in Iraq from Iran? 

Admiral FALLON. We have no doubt that Iran has provided both 

rockets of a certain type and these improvised explosive devices, socalled Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs), to the militias inside of Iraq. I can’t tell you how much of it is still coming. I just 

don’t have a sense of whether any of this has really slowed down. 

We know the level of attacks has decreased. Again, how much of 

that is Muqtada’s freeze, how much of it is the very effective work 

of our own people and so forth, I just don’t have a balance. 

But to the bigger issue of, if he is going to be a neighbor—and 

a potential friendly neighbor—they need to get their act together, 

in my opinion, and be helpful. And I think the Iraqi people, by and 

large, understand that and are pretty wary of the overtures. They 

like the good part. They don’t want any more of the kinetic stuff. 

Mr. WILSON. Another crucial country, Pakistan—we have worked 

very closely with their military. With the elections, what do you anticipate in terms of our continued working with the military and 

government of Pakistan? 

Admiral FALLON. We certainly intend to make ourselves available and to try in every way to help them as they—there is a polit-
37 

ical process underway, as you know, now. We will let that sort out. 

We have given strong assurances to the Pakistan military 

(PACMIL) that we will do everything we can to assist them to 

make them more effective and more competent. They are helping 

us immensely along the border with Afghanistan, in my opinion. 

That is one of the reasons that the level of attacks is way down 

in eastern provinces because they have put pressure on the bad actors out there, and now they have got to worry about our people 

in the west and the Afghans in the west, as well as the PACMIL. 

So I think they are squeezed, and it has been overall helpful. There 

is a lot more that needs to be done, though. 

Dr. SNYDER [presiding]. Mr. Courtney for five minutes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you both witnesses for their endurance and testimony today. 

I just want to follow up on Mr. Wilson’s inquiry regarding Iran 

because, in your testimony in chief, Admiral Fallon, I mean, again, 

you identified Iran as a source of finance, weapons and training 

supports to lawless militia groups in Iraq. And, to me, to characterize the Iraqi government’s actions last week as just bad theatrics is far too generous to that government, as far as I am concerned, and I think a lot of people watching that are just wondering whether we have a coherent policy. 

I mean, if on the one hand we have identified Iran as a source 

of weapons that are killing American soldiers, and on the other 

hand those same soldiers are propping up—or supporting—I 

shouldn’t use propping up—but supporting a government that is 

treating Iran like they are literally kissing cousins—I mean, there 

was hugs and kisses—that is very troublesome. And I just think 

that—well, let me ask a specific question. 

Right now we are in the middle of apparently negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the government of Iraq. I 

hope—and maybe you can comment on this—is that, as we enter 

into that agreement, that one of the conditions that is hopefully 

being discussed is that that government, which is asking our troops 

to provide security for them, are not treating Iran as just a normal 

neighbor, that there has got to be some expectation from them that 

they are not going to countenance that type of activity by the Iranian government. So maybe you could comment on the SOFA negotiations that are going on now and, again, in particular, the events 

of last week? 

Admiral FALLON. The SOFA will be between Iraq and ourselves—— 

Mr. COURTNEY. That is correct. 

Admiral FALLON [continuing]. And not Iran. I would certainly 

hope personally that they convey these exact same messages to the 

Iranians. I do recognize that, in addition to being their next-door 

neighbor, there is a lot of history here of a different type. During 

the Saddam era, many of the Iraqi folks and leaders, particularly 

from the south, took refuge in Iran, and so they are beholden to 

the Iranians for some support and for protection in some ways. 

I believe this is a developing relationship that is in development. 

A year ago my view was that the Iranians were covering every bet 

they could inside Iraq, throwing money at every group to try to 
38 

make sure they had support and influence. I can understand that 

from a strategic perspective, you want to have influence on your 

next-door neighbors, but shipping the lethal weapons in and really 

going after us, using this as an opportunity to come after us, certainly not tolerated. We have sent some pretty strong messages, I 

think, to the Iranians on ground we are not going to put up with 

it, we catch you, you are—enough said on that one. 

We have tried to stiffen the Iraqis on this issue too. And I think 

that they have figured it out. They know they have got to figure 

out some way to present themselves to the Iranians, but I will be 

anxious to hear exactly what the discussions are. 

I view this last week’s thing as a theater. This is acting. There 

could have been other ways to do it. Maybe they might have considered not extending the invitation until certain things were accomplished. Again, they are struggling to come up with their own 

identity. But I share your concerns that the demonstrated behavior 

of the president of Iran and the actions that they have taken publicly are not helping us in the region. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And really I am not against negotiations with 

people who—I mean, your basic point is correct that, in the long 

term this is a region that is going to have to coexist and countries 

that are going to have to coexist. It just seemed for the Iraqi prime 

minister to be standing there mute while this guy is carrying on 

about how the Americans are the problem in Iraq is really—that 

is a bitter pill, I think, for a lot of people who have suffered loss 

to sit there and watch. 

Admiral FALLON. I agree. 

Mr. COURTNEY. So real quick, Pakistan—is there a working relationship starting to get functioning between the NATO and the 

Pakistan army about the border as far as having some kind of real 

system for tracking the bad guys? 

Admiral FALLON. Afghanistan or Pakistan? 

Mr. COURTNEY. I am sorry. In Afghanistan, as it relates to, you 

know, Taliban coming in and out of Pakistan into Afghanistan. Is 

there, again, systems that are being developed so that there is real 

tracking and pursuit? 

Admiral FALLON. There is a lot of things going on. The U.S. has 

most of—the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is in the 

U.S. area of responsibility. So we are on top of this and in the middle. 

There are a number of things that are in play. Probably the most 

productive to date is a tripartite group—ourselves, Afghan military, 

PACMIL—regularly get together and have come up with a series 

of functional guidance to the troops that actually work on the border to help them to cooperate more. There has been significant improvement. 

Dr. SNYDER [presiding]. Mr. Jones for five minutes. 

Admiral FALLON. So the answer is it is improving and the results 

are very positive. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Jones for five minutes. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

And I want to say to Admiral Olson thank you very much for 

coming down to Camp Lejeune a week ago for the groundbreaking 

for Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) and bringing 
39 

your lovely wife with you. Very much appreciated your comments 

as well. 

Admiral Fallon, I appreciate everything that you have done and 

said, as well as Admiral Olson. You know, as I think Ranking 

Member Hunter brought this up a couple hours ago about NATO, 

and this is an issue that many people—I represent the 3rd District—Camp Lejeune, Cherry Point Marine, Seymour Johnson Air 

Force Base. 

The issue is this: I was so—not upset because, I mean, I didn’t 

know—but before the Personnel Subcommittee we had Secretary 

Chu, and I asked him a question—they are going to get me the answer—of the 3,200 Marines going into Afghanistan, what is their 

previous deployment history? And I didn’t really expect to know 

Marine by Marine, but I want to get that information. 

If NATO does not step it up—and I know that Secretary Gates 

went to Germany a couple weeks ago trying to encourage the 

NATO countries to, you know, give us more of your manpower, 

help us out. What is going to be the condition of our troops in Afghanistan, if you are sitting before—or whoever replaces you—the 

Congress three to four years from now, and we have got the same 

situation where we are having to battle the Taliban and yet we are 

doing it with more and more Americans? 

My concern is—I mean, we have got to fight it—there is no question about it—but my concern is that the manpower—I have talked 

to a lot of these Marines. The commitment is still there. I mean, 

they will go today if you ask them to go. But there is not but so 

much that a person can take physically before they just wear out, 

and then that jeopardizes the mission there on. 

So if we don’t get the help from NATO, are you concerned, as a 

military leader of this country, that, if we have got the same situation three years from now that we have today, that this country is 

going to be in a situation where we really have to push to replace? 

Admiral FALLON. Congressman Jones, I would hope that in three 

years, there are a lot of things that are different. I would certainly 

expect that we will have continued to build on our success in Iraq 

and have security and stability remain and our forces generally reduced from the levels they are now. 

I would expect to continue to make progress in Afghanistan to 

the point that we don’t need additional U.S. forces, that the Afghans are in a position to take care of security and we don’t have 

to worry about that. 

And I am acutely aware of the fact that we have in those Marine 

units mid-level officers and NCOs that have done repeated tours. 

The good news about the Marine Corps is there is, as you know, 

continuous turnover of the young Marines, and if history is, about 

40 percent of these will be probably in their first tour. Notwithstanding that, I am very sensitive to the fact that the leaders just 

can’t keep doing this. We are going to have to get them a break. 

So we are working this one to the best of our ability. I know that 

by me going to the Secretary and asking for this deployment, there 

is no free lunch here, that there is a cost in doing this, I am aware 

of that. It seemed to me that part of my rationale in requesting the 

forces right now is that I think we are in a position to really build 

on the success we had in the past summer and fall in Afghanistan 
40 

and to try to move this ball far enough down the road that we really pick up momentum. 

So it is best I can tell you. I recognize the pressures and hopefully—and not just hope based on the good work that is being done 

by our people—we are going to be in a position here a couple years 

down the road. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, I am going to try one quick question. 

I know my time is about up. 

Admiral, do you see Iraq becoming a nation in the next 10 to 15 

years as we would describe America as a nation? And let me real 

quickly—and my time is going to end—and you give me a yes or 

no. 

But I met with a captain in the Marine Corps that just got back 

three weeks ago from Iraq, and I asked him, I said, ‘‘Captain Lane, 

do you think that we will ever see Iraq as a nation?’’ And his honest answer was probably not. He said we are having great success 

as we are dealing with the tribal chiefs, we are making great success. He said, but, congressman, he said it is just like Raleigh, 

North Carolina, is our capital, Jacksonville is our city where Camp 

Lejeune is, and that, quite frankly, the mayor of Jacksonville—the 

way I see it in Iraq—that the mayor of Jacksonville doesn’t need 

to deal with Raleigh, North Carolina, capital. He has got his own 

responsibilities, own town and city. Is that really what is going to 

probably end up being the success. 

Admiral FALLON. It is going to be Iraq and not America, and it 

is going to be different for a host of reasons. I do believe they have 

the basics to be able to make themselves an entity that can take 

care of its people and function in a manner that people can accept 

as appropriate for their culture and the situation there in. It is not 

going to look like—— 

Mr. JONES. I understand. I understand. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Sestak, the gentleman from Pennsylvania. 

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good afternoon. Two quick questions, and then really the ones I 

wanted to ask. 

Just wanted the admiral to follow up on your readiness. Have we 

deployed at full strength in the past year or two? Have we always 

deployed our Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) teams—operation attachment ones—and our SEAL teams at full strength, respectively 12 and 16, every time? Just a yes or no. 

Admiral OLSON. The answer is three years ago we were not, and 

now we are. 

Mr. SESTAK. Yes, sir. In the last year or two, we are not now; 

right? 

Admiral OLSON. We are now. 

Mr. SESTAK. Okay. And three years ago we weren’t? 

Admiral OLSON. Three years ago we weren’t. As I said, we grew 

the capacity of our school—— 

Mr. SESTAK. In the last year or two? In the last year have we 

always? 

Admiral OLSON. Our ODAs have been at full strength for at least 

a year. 
41 

Mr. SESTAK. SEALs? 

Admiral OLSON. SEALs are not at full—the platoons that we deploy are full strength—— 

Mr. SESTAK. But I am asking SEAL teams? 

Admiral OLSON [continuing]. But we take the risk in the back of 

those that aren’t deploying. 

Mr. SESTAK. Okay. So SEAL teams aren’t there yet? 

Admiral OLSON. SEAL teams are not at full strength. 

Mr. SESTAK. All right. 

Admiral, and when you testified here about a year ago, I asked 

you about the readiness, as you were Pacific commander, and the 

fact that no Army unit at home is in a state of readiness, which 

hasn’t changed, to deploy to Korea to back them up. And your answer was but we will rely upon the Air Force and the Navy. And, 

in fact, we deeper probed whether the precision guy and munitions 

were really there. They are not quite funded at all what they needed to be. 

I bring this up because I have no doubt we have the best military 

today, but can we do—it is not whether the question is whether we 

are best, it is whether can we do what is required. Are our SEAL 

teams able to actually deploy at full strength? Are we able to, Admiral, meet the timelines in the Pacific and elsewhere? 

I bring this up, Admiral, because ISAF has a U.S. requirement 

from NATO that we have not met for trainers and mentors in the 

Afghanistan army and police. We are 2,400 troops less. Why do we 

point at NATO, the other countries, when we have not met our own 

training requirement? 

And I bring that up because I think the question about Iraq people are asking is how long do we do this without a change in strategy? When the Taliban have changed their method of operating in 

Afghanistan, no longer frontal assaults, yet we see the first surface-to-air missile being used recently. And they are back in the 

ungoverned regions, where it all began, protecting al Qaeda. 

So why haven’t we met our requirement for ISAF for trainers 

and mentors if that is where it all began? 

Admiral. 

Admiral FALLON. Congressman, I think what you are referring to 

is not really an ISAF requirement. This is the Combined Security 

Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A), the Combined Support Training activity on the U.S. side. And they have, in fact, a 

signal in for a couple thousand trainers. We are going to meet some 

of that requirement with this Marine brigade that is going in. 

Mr. SESTAK. About half of it. 

Admiral FALLON. But the fact is that we have provided significant amount of force to ISAF to meet the NATO requirements. 

Mr. SESTAK. But we still haven’t met ours. Correct? 

Admiral FALLON. We have addressed ours. We have to make decisions. What is the priority of the forces—— 

Mr. SESTAK. Can I switch then to Iraq, because we haven’t met 

our requirement, nor can we get our SEALs going, nor can we protect our army in Southern Korea with 5027 how it asked us to. 

My next question is what is your coalition strategy in Iraq for 

the south? In a sense we are going to come to a pause. We have 

limited U.S. presence in the south of Iraq. Hakim and al-Sadr are 
42 

trying to get the power. The federalism law has been on hold for 

18 months. It expires in April. All this is about power down there. 

The coalition is leaving the south. You are pulling our troops down, 

but now have you stopped it because of security concerns. 

How are you going to address and what is your strategy for the 

south, like when that April deadline happens, that the regionalization process can now proceed, and yet we can’t meet our requirements throughout the world of what we are being asked to do? I 

mean, you can only so long continue to say, I believe, Admiral, we 

are just balancing the different requirements. But sometimes it is 

not enough to do what is best. We have to do what is required. 

What is our strategy with these limited resources you have for the 

south? 

Admiral FALLON. Specifically in the south, since these provinces 

have been picked and sent to Iraqi control, what has been happening here in the last five to six months is that, as challenges 

arise, the Iraqis have been addressing them. On a couple of occasions, we have supported the Iraqi forces with enablers and with 

other specific assistance—Special Forces folks have been prominent 

in that role—but, by and large, the Iraqis are meeting their demand signal for forces. 

And they have had some challenges, and they have dealt with 

them. Nasiriyah, for example, there have been a couple of—and 

Diwaniyah—have had challenges in the past several months. I 

watched with interest to see if we were going to have to pull a fire 

brigade to help. They have been able to deal with it with a little 

bit of assistance, and that has been encouraging to us. 

And we have watched a couple of things on the Iraqi side. They 

have decided to put a new division down there. They decided to create an operational command and put a good guy that actually really has his act together in charge of it, they have been responsive, 

and so this is the strategy for the future. And as we withdraw more 

and more of our troops, the fact is we are going to have to rely on 

them to be able to do it. I think so far it is a pretty good demonstration of their willingness and ability to pick it up. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

This does remind me of the Sun Tzu advice: We should never 

have more than one enemy at a time. 

Ms. Shea-Porter. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. 

I would like to thank you both for being here. I know it has been 

a long time and tough questions, but you understand our responsibility. 

Therefore, I would like to go back to Iraq right now and the behavior of Maliki and Ahmadinejad and our response. And I don’t 

think our response saying that it was theater is strong enough. It 

is absolutely outrageous. Iraq has won our dollars—$10 to $12 billion a month—we have sent our brave men and women there, we 

have given their lives to Iraq, and we have borrowed ourselves into 

debt—the greatest deficits in history—and this is what we get? 

They have won our dollars, but we did not win their hearts and 

minds, which has been the conversation that we have been having 

for a long time now about winning their hearts and minds here. 
43 

So if we can’t get the leader of Iraq to stand there and at least 

say what people would say in a bar brawl, which is, ‘‘Hey, leave 

my buddy alone,’’ what are we doing there? And I have to ask you 

again, if we can’t even get the leader, the one who picks up the 

checks, who understands the money that we have given and the effort and the blood and the sweat and the toil, what about the rest 

of them? 

Admiral FALLON. I haven’t seen the reporting yet from our ambassador, and really this is his lane. He deals with the political 

leadership in that country. But I can tell you that, if we didn’t have 

the support of many people in Iraq, we would have not been able 

to make the gains on the ground that we have made this year. It 

just wouldn’t happen. The reality is, from my perspective, in trying 

to help get security and stability in most of this country, the people 

are helping. They do get it. 

And that is why I say—you know, I can’t speak for all the Iraqi 

people. I can tell you that we would not have been successful in 

many of the places, including Baghdad, this past six or eight 

months if we didn’t have support. I have been there and talked to 

people. I have asked them what they think. They have changed 

their minds in many cases. They didn’t like the instability. When 

I was there in Baghdad, the last couple of trips, no questions about 

security, it was just other things—we are happy to have you here, 

don’t leave in a hurry, help out these other things, help our government to provide those things that we need, and we will like it. 

So I am not going to apologize for any of the behavior of the leaders, but I can tell you that we are getting some significant support 

from the people. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And I would say that all the success really is 

because of our terrific military’s effort, and you talk about biting 

the hand that feeds you. If we can’t have the leadership stand up 

and say the very simple statements in our support, it is pretty hard 

to go out and justify the burden that this country has carried. So 

I just wanted to say that. 

And that leads me to Africa Command (AFRICOM), and I realize 

that the African nations will be switched over to AFRICOM. But 

I worry about how we look there as well because we have lost some 

standing in the world, as you know, and people are concerned 

about our role in the Middle East and now in Africa. And when I 

talked to some people, I was told that long term we probably will 

be helping the various African nations build up a military and perhaps supplying. 

Is that what you see in the game plan? Because what I worry 

about is the instability in that region, where we see nation against 

nation, and to arm them or to help arm them in any way, when 

they are already at war often, it seems pretty frightening. 

Admiral FALLON. My part of Africa that I have in my area of responsibility is the Horn of Africa, the northeastern—eastern part. 

And in that area, I have a subordinate command, Joint Task 

Force—Horn of Africa, that is out there every day with a staff that 

engages these countries directly. We are trying to build their capacity for their abilities to have stability and security in this region. 

I can’t address the rest of Africa. Frankly, I haven’t looked at it 

all, but I do know that the focus of AFRICOM is not as nearly as 
44 

much in the military domain as Central Command or some of our 

other regional commands. This is more in the business of nation 

building, it is more of helping them grow their capacities to be better countries, as opposed to building militaries. Other than that, I 

think I will stick to my own domain. 

In Horn of Africa, my intention is to work as hard as we can to 

transfer what we think is a really effective engagement tool for getting these countries to work with us and amongst themselves and 

transfer it to AFRICOM—— 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Well, let me state that I do recognize that we 

have a role to play there and that soft power certainly is helpful 

in helping them build economic advantages, etc., is a good thing. 

I just am concerned that we could possibly do that through our embassies versus having a military—— 

Admiral FALLON. The vast majority of our activities, even in the 

Horn of Africa, are in those nation-building areas and helping people. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to be able to finish on time, gentlemen. It looks like Mr. Sestak has one more question. I will then 

yield to Mr. Hunter, and I will have one more question, and we 

may go over a couple of minutes, but we are going to make it. 

Mr. Sestak. 

Mr. SESTAK. Admiral, may I ask again a readiness issue—global 

strategic readiness. 

To your point, sir, now the Army is recruiting and making close 

to its goal, but 42 percent of all our recruits are in the below-mental category—first time in decades—which will feed throughout the 

force for years to come. You even said that we need to be more engaged around the world, like Special Forces did. It is an intangible, 

but it is a risk not being out there. 

Admiral, then in your testimony—written statement—you said 

conditions on the ground will be a major determinant in Iraq. By 

definition, that is an open-ended commitment. How do you know 

when the stop is? It is condition based. 

How do you then signal the Iraqis—besides jaw-boning and 

watching—because that is what it sounded like your strategy was 

now for the south is ‘‘We will watch. They call us in.’’ But how do 

you motivate them to assume greater responsibility in something 

that you will know is a place where they are as interested in the 

personal fiefdoms of those 32 agencies in controlling everything to 

do something? 

And my other part of that is, therefore, are there also nations out 

there that say to us, ‘‘Not only I am worried about Iran, but can’t 

you United States engage with them also much more to bring 

about a peaceful resolution?’’ 

Admiral FALLON. In Iraq we are focusing on the Iraqi army as 

a priority and trying to encourage this institution to be representative of the whole country, and we are seeing significant progress. 

There was no doubt that a year ago many of the considerations for 

appointment of leaders were based on identity cards and where 

they came from and what they believed in terms of their religion 
45 

or place in the country. Increasingly, they are making good decisions to put the best leaders in place. 

The army is generally representative of the country. They are 

undertaking some of these—to Chairman Hunter’s comment earlier. They are getting smarter about it. They are deploying these 

folks in different parts of the country specifically to give them the 

experience of operating in different areas. You have got to start 

somewhere, and this one institution, which we think is most important for stability and security, is making progress in the business 

of neutralizing these sectarian things. That is our focus. 

And we are not just sitting on this. Every day our Army and Marine units in country are more and more sliding back and giving 

responsibility to these Iraqi units and flying close wing on them to 

bring them. Some are doing a lot better than others, but that process is in work all over the country, and it is not a template. You 

can’t say, ‘‘Five of these, this division,’’ whatever, but it is in 

progress. 

The rest of the region, we are trying to engage everywhere, as 

you know, doing the best we can, and I think we are doing pretty 

well in a lot of countries. 

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you very much. 

I just wanted to say at how long and at what cost to that longerterm readiness. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for presiding over this very important day here. 

And, gentlemen, thank you for your endurance. 

Going back to my original question at the beginning of the hearing, Admiral, it is clear that you have really got two overlapping 

combatant commands in Afghanistan. Makes this a somewhat unusual war-fighting theater. You have got the combatant command 

European Command (EUCOM) under General Craddock’s command, and you have got CENTCOM under your command. 

Your command, the chain of command drives down through General Rodriguez and the American forces that are under Rodriguez, 

which is primarily—as I understand, he is the commander of all 

American forces in Afghanistan, but that is primarily that southeast sector, where the Americans are more heavily present. 

The ISAF command, which drives down to General McNeil from 

EUCOM—from General Craddock—under its chain of command 

drives through General McNeil and includes, for example, the place 

where they have had a lot of contact and a lot of—and the European countries that are engaged there, and I think the Brits and 

the Canadians and the Danes have taken some casualties there in 

that southern sector where the Marines are going. That is under 

EUCOM. 

So this is an unusual scenario. You have got a battlefield 

which—and I can’t think of any similar situations which really has 

two separate American combatant commander chains of command. 

And so my question would be would it be better for a General 

McNeil, for example, to wear two hats? To be the commander of the 

ISAF forces and to also be the commander of the American forces 
46 

in the same theater, thereby, obviously, allowing for a much better, 

I would think, integration of the operations that emerge from those 

two chains of command? 

Admiral FALLON. Congressman, if I could take a stab at this one 

more time. 

The key issue here is missions. NATO has accepted responsibility 

for one mission, and that is counterinsurgency. There are two other 

missions that, as the U.S. combatant commander, I have responsibility for. One is counterterrorism, our battle against al Qaeda and 

their affiliated terrorist groups worldwide but specifically in Afghanistan. Second is the nation-building mission. 

It seems incongruous, but these same NATO nations that have 

troops on the ground in most cases—and there are other countries 

there as well—are contributing to Afghan reconstruction and nation building, but they are doing it in a bilateral basis and not taking up this mission. 

If I could clarify something, General Rodriguez, the commander 

of RC East, works for General McNeil in the ISAF chain of command, which goes back to not EUCOM but to the NATO Supreme 

Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) headquarters in Belgium. It is strictly NATO; it is not U.S. 

Mr. HUNTER. But isn’t that headed at the top by General 

Craddock as supreme allied commander? 

Admiral FALLON. In his NATO hat, not in his U.S. hat. 

Mr. HUNTER. His what? 

Admiral FALLON. In his NATO hat, not in his U.S. hat. 

Mr. HUNTER. Right, but the same person? 

Admiral FALLON. Same person, but it is a NATO responsibility, 

NATO rules, NATO everything. 

As the U.S. person, in our system we have one person someplace 

in the world responsible for every soldier, sailor, airman and Marine—that is me. I deal with that for the troops that are assigned 

to NATO through General Rodriguez as the senior U.S. military 

designated officer on the ground. And if I have an issue dealing 

with the safety, security of our people—not the tactical employment, operational employment—I deal with him. 

There are other commanders, though, who work directly for me 

in Afghanistan. General Cone is the commander of our combined 

support and assistance team, responsibility for a lot of things, most 

importantly the training of the Afghan security forces. Reports directly to me. He has to work and coordinate with General McNeil, 

Rodriguez, everybody else out there, but he works for me. 

General McChrystal, who is a Special Forces commander with responsibilities worldwide, reports to me for his assignments in Afghanistan. Those things also have to be coordinated with other 

commanders. 

I have another commander, General Mulholland, Special Forces 

man, who works another piece of the problem in growing Afghan 

security forces with his Special Forces separate from McChrystal. 

He reports to me as well. 

So these mission commanders that report directly to me. The 

ISAF NATO counterinsurgency mission is all in the NATO chain 

of command, they all report through McNeil, General Ramms and 

General Craddock in his NATO hat. 
47 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So the 3,200 Marines that are coming in— 

the 2,000-plus that are going to move into that AO that heretofore 

has been occupied by the Danes, Brits, Canadians, where there is 

some fighting that is taken place, who will they be under? 

Admiral FALLON. The answer is two different people, not the 

same folks. The MAGTAF, the maneuver unit, is going to work for 

ISAF. They will work for General McNeil. The other people—the 

other battalion—the trainers are going to work for General Cone 

back up through me. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Will the chain of command for the Marines 

who are maneuver battalion, meaning they are going to be in contact, they are going to be undertaking military missions, they are 

going to have a chain of command up to McNeil—— 

Admiral FALLON. In NATO. 

Mr. HUNTER. In NATO? So their immediate commander could be 

a Brit? 

Admiral FALLON. Could be a Canadian. 

Mr. HUNTER. Could be a Canadian? 

Admiral FALLON. There will be chopped—tactical, I understand— 

General McNeil’s business, but I would expect he would probably 

chop tactical control forces to the Canadian commander if they operate in the south. Right now there is a Canadian general in 

charge down there. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So the Marines could be chopped to Canadian—— 

Admiral FALLON. Tactically, yes. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Now in your estimation, this scenario you 

have just explained is—you think is efficient as it could be? 

Admiral FALLON. No. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. What would you do to make it more efficient? 

Admiral FALLON. Is it workable? Again, priorities. This is not the 

top priority in Afghanistan. The top priority is coordinating those 

nation-building things that are, in my opinion, all over the map. 

The second priority is to get the people that are on the ground 

in the NATO chain of command all pulling on the oars to the same 

extent that others are, and so removing these caveats and removing these restrictions and letting them actually be effective in the 

full range of their capabilities are the priorities. 

We can figure out—and we have done—and I think it is reasonably, well, always open to—— 

Mr. HUNTER. But, now, you told me that you are not in the business of trying to remove caveats, that is General Craddock’s thing. 

Admiral FALLON. They are all in the NATO chain of command. 

Mr. HUNTER. Well, I guess to some degree I think that defines 

the problem that I have just tried to outline. If that is the case and 

it is important to remove those caveats but you are not in a position to do it, that is—although you are running a big piece of the 

operation there in Afghanistan. Why is that effective? Why is that 

good? 

Admiral FALLON. I have, I believe, been effective in getting the 

results from the commanders who work for me in the field. I think 

we are making progress in those areas. I think there has been 

progress made in the ISAF responsibilities, but it could be a lot 
48 

better, in my opinion, if that chain of command could get those restrictions modified so that they had the full range of their capabilities. 

That doesn’t impinge on me other than as a taxpayer, and as a 

commander looking at this, it could be done more effectively, but 

it has nothing to do with whether McNeil has 1 hat or 50 hats. It 

has everything to do with whether those nations are willing to remove those caveats and let him effectively use—he has got every 

authority in the world to run that battlefield, but he doesn’t have 

the individual authorities to employ those forces as he would like 

to. 

Mr. HUNTER. I think that is true except I think that the fact that 

you, for example, can’t weigh in to this fight to try to get more 

NATO participation—I mean, my gosh, Admiral, we are talking 

about an average of 100 people apiece per country, if you average 

it out, for the 26 NATO nations. And because we couldn’t extract 

100 people, even though we just moved 100,000 jobs to them of 

American taxpayer, paid-for tanker aircraft—couldn’t extract 100 

people per country, we are deploying those Marines. 

So in terms of leadership—if leadership is getting people to sign 

up and find common ground with your cause, which is what we are 

trying to do in this war against terror, we have been pretty poor 

in leadership. And the fact that they are able to deflect this question to a different chain of command because it is not your job— 

it is not your baby—I think, allows them to avoid these moments 

of truth when we might be able to get the Europeans to sign up 

for these things. 

So I think the proof is in the pudding. And not being able to extract a few more personnel from nations that have lots of money, 

robust industrial base, and presumably common cause in this war 

against terror, I think that denotes failure in that particular area, 

and I think part of that is because they can deflect these requests. 

It is still a little difficult for me to understand about how we put 

the question to them in terms of getting more people out there. But 

we will try to run that dog down and figure out, eventually, how 

that happens. But we are obviously—they have been able to sidestep the question, and I can see the day when in that southern AO, 

where we have got lots of contact being made, we may end up with 

an Arizona shift taking place, where in the end, the American Marine contingent gets followed with another contingent and our other 

allies extract themselves from that position and it ends up with 

Americans being the only guys that are in strong contact in that 

AO. 

Admiral Olson, do you have any comments on that? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I can limit my comments to the Special Operations participation in ISAF, which is growing, and it is not a 

good-news story yet, but it may be on the way there. 

General Craddock has taken the step of establishing a NATO 

Special Operations coordination center and establish that around 

an American commander as the framework nation. We are less 

than half of the headquarters, and we are less than half of the 

forces assigned to ISAF within Special Operations, and it is becoming a little bit of a rallying point around which some of our NATO 

Special Operations forces are beginning to gel. 
49 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the extended hearing. I 

appreciate it. 

The CHAIRMAN. You bet. 

Thank you. 

Admiral Fallon, let me ask a final question, if I may. 

You seem to be suggesting that training and equipping the Afghan national security force is a key to success in the country of 

Afghanistan. Yet there has been a chronic shortage of trainers and 

mentors for those Afghan forces. 

Secretary Gates recently told our committee that we are short 

about 3,000 trainers and mentors. As a result of this shortage, the 

completion date for training and equipment the Afghan forces is, 

frankly, uncertain. 

And at a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee 

on February 27 the Director of National Intelligence Michael 

McConnell testified that the Afghan forces remain hampered by insufficient training and equipment, corruption and absenteeism. 

Are we doing enough to address the problems? What should we 

be doing? 

Admiral FALLON. Chairman, there is an outstanding requirement 

for, I think, the number is about 2,600 trainers that has been on 

the books here for at least the 10 months or so I have been here. 

We are going to meet about half of that requirement in another 

couple of months with those Marines. There is substantial progress 

addressing each of these woes and ills that are cited in the various 

list of shortcomings. 

I am particularly encouraged by the results and the progress 

that I have seen in the Afghan army, in particular. The police, we 

have a longer way to go, and, frankly, we are directing most of this 

attention to the police now. The army is coming along. They are 

growing. They are anxious to take over. 

I could give you lots of examples of things that I have seen in 

the past year where they have demonstrated an ability. They are 

growing. They are picking it up. Each of these shortcomings has 

been addressed, and there is progress in virtually every area, and 

I think it is coming together, and I think that it is, in my opinion— 

ought to be a continuing area of focus because this is the numberone issue in the security that is going to make progress in Afghanistan. 

Notwithstanding the bigger issue, and that is governance, and it 

is the ability of President Karzai now and that government to pull 

together and to represent the people and the country to be able to 

do the things to make it a nation. 

But I think we are definitely making progress in the security 

area. Could we use a few more troops? Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral Olson, Admiral Fallon. This 

has been an excellent hearing. We appreciate you being with us 

and staying with us through the vote, and with that, you have our 

gratitude, and we will dismiss. 

[Whereupon, at 1:16 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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