UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

2014 MSPB 73

Docket No. SF-0752-13-0283-I-1

David R. Ellis,

Appellant,

v.

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

September 9, 2014

Michael Stichler, Santa Barbara, California, for the appellant.

Michael R. Tita, Esquire, Seattle, Washington, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

OPINION AND ORDER

¶1 The appellant petitioned for review of the initial decision that affirmed the 

agency’s action demoting him from the position of Supervisor, Customer Service, 

EAS-17, to his former craft position of City Letter Carrier, based on a charge of 

unacceptable conduct. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the 

appellant’s petition for review, AFFIRM the initial decision insofar as it found 

that the agency proved its charge by preponderant evidence, and MITIGATE the 

penalty to a letter of warning and a geographic reassignment. 
2

BACKGROUND

¶2 The agency demoted the appellant and reassigned him to a different duty

station based on one charge of “Unacceptable Conduct – Misrepresentation of 

Mail Volume Reports.” Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 13-15, 26-29. The 

agency alleged that the appellant intentionally and artificially inflated mail 

volumes on specified routes on six dates in September and October 2012. Id. at 

26-27. Among the administrative judge’s findings were that: an essential 

function of a supervisor’s duty is to properly calculate and input carriers’ 

caseable mail volume, i.e., mail that a carrier must “work” or “case” by taking the 

raw mail and putting it into the delivery sequence, the Daily Operations 

Information System (DOIS), and the agency’s electronic database; the category of 

mail volume the appellant allegedly inflated in DOIS was “flats,” which are 

pieces of mail that are larger than a letter but which are not parcels; the number 

of flats inputted into DOIS is a function of two sources of information, an 

automated number and a manual number; it is the duty of a supervisor, such as 

the appellant, to do a manual count of flats; and “catching” a supervisor inflating 

caseable flat mail volumes is extremely difficult because there is no independent 

recordation of the number of caseable flats that flow through a post office on any 

given day. IAF, Tab 20, Initial Decision (ID) at 2-5.

1

 Following a hearing, the 

administrative judge found that the appellant intentionally misrepresented mail 

volume reports for the dates referenced in the agency’s proposal notice. ID at 9. 

In so finding, the administrative judge relied on the agency’s documentary 

evidence and witness testimony that the mail volumes recorded and the resulting 

carrier performance reported by the appellant were “absolutely not plausible,” 

“unheard of,” and “out of this world.” ID at 5-8. 

 

1 None of these findings appear to be in dispute. 
3

¶3 The appellant has filed a timely petition for review.

2

 He contends that he 

was denied a full and fair adjudication process, challenges the administrative 

judge’s finding that the agency proved that he intentionally misrepresented mail 

volumes in DOIS and claims to have new and material evidence to support that 

challenge, and contends that he was subjected to a disparate penalty compared to 

other similarly-situated supervisors. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. 

Although we find that the appellant has not demonstrated reversible error 

regarding his first two contentions, we find that the agency’s penalty must be 

mitigated because the evidence indicates that the appellant was punished 

disparately compared to a similarly-situated supervisor. 

ANALYSIS

The appellant has failed to show that he was denied a full and fair adjudication

process.

¶4 A petition for review will be granted when, among other reasons, the 

administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial 

decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of 

discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case. 5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.115(c). The appellant makes a number of allegations in this regard, 

namely, that the administrative judge: was sick prior to and during the hearing; 

did not want to come to Portland, Oregon, for the hearing or stay there long 

because of his illness; and closed the hearing after a single day and ordered the 

parties to summarize their case in no more than 10 pages. 3

 PFR File, Tab 1 at 

5-6. None of these allegations demonstrates that the administrative judge failed 

 

2 The agency has responded to the appellant’s petition for review and he has replied to 

the agency’s response. Petition for Review File, Tabs 3, 4.

3 The appellant also alleged unethical conduct by agency officials during settlement or 

mediation discussions. See PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. These allegations do not provide any 

basis for reversing, modifying, or vacating the initial decision. 
4

to comply with required procedures or abused his discretion. For example, it was 

the appellant’s representative who suggested that there be a 10-page limit on the 

length of written closing arguments. Hearing Compact Disc (HCD), 15:54 file at 

52:25-53:45.

4

 

The Operating Instructions attached to the appellant’s petition for review are 

neither new nor material. 

¶5 On review, the appellant has attached the Portland District’s Operating 

Instructions for Piece Count Recording System and Required Delivery Handling, 

which were not part of the record below. PFR File, Tab 1 at 35-43. The 

appellant claims that this case is all about the proper counting of flat mail and 

that the Operating Instructions show that the charge against him was without

merit. Id. at 6. He contends that the agency asserted, and the administrative 

judge believed, that the only proper way to count flats was by linear 

measurement, i.e., one foot of flats is equal to 115 pieces of mail. Id. at 7. He 

argues that the Operating Instructions show a preference for a piece count of flat

mail and has attached several additional exhibits showing how linear 

measurement of flat mail, particularly mailings in political campaigns, can result

in wildly inaccurate mail counts. Id. at 8-16, 45-54. 

¶6 The Board’s regulations provide that it will grant a petition for review

when, among other reasons, new and material evidence is available that, despite 

the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. 5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.115(d). Evidence is “material” when it is of sufficient weight to warrant 

an outcome different from that of the initial decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(a)(1). 

The appellant claims that the Operating Instructions were difficult to obtain from 

 

4 The Hearing Compact Disc contains 10 sound (.wma) files, which include the starting 

time in the file name. For example, the first file includes “10:26” in the file name, the 

fourth file includes “12:58” in the file name, and the eighth file includes “14:52” in the 

file name. 
5

the agency, despite his use of the Privacy and Freedom of Information Acts, as 

the agency was reluctant to give them to him. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8. It was not 

necessary, however, for the appellant to use the Privacy and Freedom of 

Information Acts to obtain the Operating Instructions. He could have used the 

Board’s discovery procedures to request them and, if the agency failed to provide 

them, could have filed a motion to compel. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.73-1201.74. 

We conclude that the appellant has made no showing that the Operating 

Instructions concerning the proper method of counting flat mail were unavailable 

despite his due diligence during the regional office proceeding. 

¶7 Even if the Operating Instructions could be considered “new,” they are not 

material, i.e., they do not warrant a different outcome. Neither the administrative 

judge nor the agency stated that linear measurement was the only appropriate way 

to count flats. The proposing official testified that it was proper to use a piece 

count instead of a linear measurement and conversion when the mailer provided a 

piece count. See HCD, 10:44 file at 35:40-36:30. The administrative judge

acknowledged the appellant’s statement that he used a piece count when one was 

available, and used a linear measurement and conversion when a piece count was 

not available, and stated that counting flat mail “is primarily done by taking a 

linear measurement of mail and converting the linear measurement to a piece 

count.” ID at 4, 6 (emphasis added). The dispute was thus not about how to 

count the flat mail but whether the appellant had accurately counted the flat mail. 

It was not possible to establish whether the appellant had accurately counted the 

flat mail with objective documentary evidence because he did not retain the slips 

of paper on which he says he recorded the piece counts. See HCD, 14:52 file at 

38:35-41:15 (the appellant’s testimony). Accordingly, the administrative judge

relied on circumstantial evidence in concluding that the appellant intentionally 

misrepresented mail volume reports for the dates referenced in the proposal 

notice. 
6

The agency was required to prove that the appellant knowingly inputted incorrect 

information into DOIS with an intent to deceive. 

¶8 The agency charged the appellant with “Unacceptable 

Conduct - Misrepresentation of Mail Volume Reports.” IAF, Tab 5 at 26. After 

describing the alleged misconduct, the proposal notice stated that the appellant’s

actions violated several sections of the Employee and Labor Relations Manual, 

including a provision that states that 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which it characterized as 

prohibiting fraud or false statements in a government matter, applies to U.S.

Postal Service employees. Id. at 27-28. 

¶9 The Board has stated that the criteria for proving misrepresentation are the 

same as those for proving falsification. See Guerrero v. Department of Veterans 

Affairs, 105 M.S.P.R. 617, ¶ 9 (2007); Gustave-Schmidt v. Department of Labor, 

87 M.S.P.R. 667, ¶ 9 n.2 (2001). Considering that the agency cited 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1001, which makes it a criminal offense to knowingly and willingly make any 

materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation as to any 

federal government matter, the agency was required to prove the elements of 

falsification. To sustain a falsification charge, the agency must prove by 

preponderant evidence that the employee knowingly supplied incorrect 

information with the intention of defrauding, deceiving, or misleading the 

agency. Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

Because there is seldom direct evidence on the issue, circumstantial evidence 

must generally be relied upon to establish intent. Naekel v. Department of 

Transportation, 782 F.2d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Although the Board may 

consider plausible explanations for an appellant’s provision of incorrect 

information in determining whether a misrepresentation was intentional, the 

absence of a credible explanation for the misrepresentation can constitute 

circumstantial evidence of an intent to deceive. Crump v. Department of 

Veterans Affairs, 114 M.S.P.R. 224, ¶ 6 (2010). After considering the pertinent 

evidence, the administrative judge concluded that “the appellant intentionally 
7

misrepresented mail volume reports for the dates referenced in the proposal 

notice.” ID at 9. 

The appellant has failed to show that the administrative judge erred in finding 

that he intentionally misrepresented mail volumes. 

¶10 The Board will grant a petition for review when, among other reasons, it is 

shown that the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact. 

5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(a). The Board will not disturb an administrative judge’s 

findings when the administrative judge considered the evidence as a whole, drew 

appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions on issues of credibility. 

See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997); Broughton v. 

Department of Health & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987). The 

Board must give deference to an administrative judge’s credibility determinations 

when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on the observation of the demeanor 

of witnesses testifying at a hearing, and can overturn such determinations only 

when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so. Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301. 

Our review shows that the administrative judge complied with the requirements 

of Crosby and Broughton in making detailed findings of fact and credibility

determinations and that he implicitly relied on the demeanor of the witnesses, and 

we discern no reason to disturb those findings. 

The demotion penalty must be mitigated because the appellant showed that he

was punished more harshly than a similarly-situated supervisor. 

¶11 The Board will review an agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the 

agency considered all the relevant factors and exercised management discretion 

within tolerable limits of reasonableness. Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 

5 M.S.P.R. 280, 306 (1981). One of the relevant factors is the consistency of the 

penalty with those imposed on other employees for the same or similar offenses. 

Id. at 305. If an appellant shows that there is enough similarity between both the 

nature of the misconduct and other factors to lead a reasonable person to 

conclude that the agency treated similarly-situated employees differently, then 
8

the agency must prove a legitimate reason for the difference in treatment by a 

preponderance of the evidence before the penalty can be upheld. Boucher v. U.S. 

Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 640, ¶ 20 (2012); Lewis v. Department of Veterans 

Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 657, ¶ 15 (2010). If the agency fails to meet its burden, the 

Board will not automatically reduce the penalty to the same penalty imposed on 

the comparator employee(s). Lewis, 113 M.S.P.R. 657, ¶¶ 17-18. If the 

circumstances cited by the agency justify a harsher penalty on the appellant than 

on the comparator(s), but not the penalty imposed by the agency on the appellant, 

the Board will mitigate the penalty to the maximum reasonable penalty. Id.

¶12 In his petition for review, the appellant reiterates his contention that he was 

treated disparately compared to other EAS supervisors, including RLB, 5 who had

engaged in the same misconduct. PFR File, Tab 1 at 24-27. The record reflects 

that the circumstances surrounding the appellant’s offense and disciplinary 

process and those of RLB are almost identical. Both were EAS supervisors

charged with essentially the same offense, the appellant with “Misrepresentation 

of Mail Volume Reports” and RLB with “Misrepresentation of Employee Work 

Records”; both were accused of intentionally entering incorrect information into 

the DOIS database so as to make their employees appear more productive than 

they were and thereby bolster their own image as supervisors; the deciding 

official was the same in both cases; and the demotion/reassignment penalty 

imposed on the appellant occurred just a few months after the letter of 

warning/reassignment imposed on RLB. Compare IAF, Tab 5 at 13-15, with Tab 

12 at 11-15. Accordingly, it was the agency’s burden to prove by preponderant 

evidence that it had a legitimate reason for the difference in treatment. 

¶13 If we considered only the testimony of the agency witnesses at the hearing, 

then we might conclude that the agency had met its burden of justifying the 

 

5 We are using this employee’s initials rather than the employee’s full name. 
9

difference in penalties. The appellant’s second-level supervisor, and the 

“concurring official” in his adverse action, testified that the misconduct 

committed by RLB and three other supervisors in RLB’s office was “completely 

different” from the appellant’s misconduct. 6

 HCD, 13:12 file at 5:35-10:15. He 

said that they noticed a “tab” in DOIS with a drop-down menu that appeared to 

allow them to give time credit to carriers for various time-consuming things that 

occurred during their routes. Id. He said that the supervisors’ intent was to give 

an accurate picture of what happened on the carriers’ routes, and that they did not 

realize that inputting this information into DOIS was wrong. Id. He likened the 

difference between the misconduct by those supervisors and the appellant’s 

misconduct as akin to the difference between manslaughter and murder. Id. 

Similarly, the deciding official testified that RLB believed that RLB was properly 

giving credit to the carriers and that, although RLB later understood that what 

RLB had done was wrong, RLB had not understood this at the time of the 

misconduct. HCD, 13:55 file at 9:10-10:45. 

¶14 This hearing testimony cannot be squared with the deciding official’s letter 

of decision in RLB’s case and the underlying proposal notice, which, like the 

appellant’s, charged RLB with “Misrepresentation” and cited 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 

the statute that criminalizes intentional falsification of government records. See

IAF, Tab 12 at 11-15. That the deciding official sustained the Misrepresentation 

charge against RLB necessarily meant that she was finding that RLB had an 

intent to deceive.

 

6 The administrative judge declined to treat the other supervisors in RLB’s office as 

comparators because their cases were resolved by settlement. ID at 11 n.7; see Hulett v. 

Department of the Navy, 120 M.S.P.R. 54, ¶ 7 (2013) (except when there are allegations 

of discrimination in settlement practices, the Board will not compare a penalty resolved 

through settlement to other actions). 
10

¶15 In rejecting the appellant’s assertion of disparate penalties, the 

administrative judge cited the appellant’s “‘arrogant’ denial of all responsibility 

and lack of remorse for having recorded wholesale inflated mail volumes that did 

not actually exist.” ID at 11. As above, however, this comparison of the 

appellant to RLB is not consistent with the deciding official’s decision letter, in 

which she wrote that RLB “did not accept responsibility for having 

misrepresented the time allotted for carrier duties when given the opportunity 

during questioning.” IAF, Tab 12 at 11. 

¶16 We find that the description of RLB’s misconduct in the decision letter, 

rather than the agency’s post hoc re-characterization, more accurately reflects the 

nature of the charged offense in RLB’s case. The decision letter concludes, 

contrary to the cited testimony, that RLB intentionally falsified official records 

regarding RLB’s carriers’ job performance and that RLB failed to acknowledge 

and express remorse for that misconduct. See id. Accordingly, we find that the 

agency failed to prove by preponderant evidence that it had legitimate reasons for 

punishing the appellant more harshly than it punished RLB. Moreover, we see no 

justification for punishing the appellant significantly more harshly than RLB was 

punished. We therefore conclude that the maximum reasonable penalty in this 

case is the same type of punishment imposed on RLB—a letter of warning, in lieu 

of a 14-day suspension, and a geographic reassignment within the local 

commuting area. 

ORDER

¶17 We ORDER the agency to reinstate the appellant to his EAS-17 position 

and to restore him effective February 23, 2013, and to substitute a letter of 

warning in lieu of a 14-day suspension for the reduction in grade.

7

 See Kerr v. 

 

7 As discussed above, the agency may impose a geographic reassignment within the 

local commuting area, but is not required to do so. 
11

National Endowment for the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency 

must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this decision.

¶18 We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of 

back pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Back Pay Act and/or 

Postal Service Regulations, as appropriate, no later than 60 calendar days after 

the date of this decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in 

the agency's efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits 

due, and to provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry 

out the Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest 

due, and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the 

undisputed amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision. 

¶19 We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing 

when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and to describe the 

actions it took to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, 

should ask the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).

¶20 No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully 

carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement 

with the office that issued the initial decision in this appeal if the appellant 

believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition 

should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not 

fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of 

any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a). 

¶21 For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance 

Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation 

necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision 

are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all 

documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the 
12

Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be 

made within the 60-day period set forth above.

¶22 This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this 

appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113(c) (5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.113(c)). 

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT

REGARDING YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney 

fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set out at Title 5 of 

the United States Code (U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), 1214(g) or 3330c(b); 

or 38 U.S.C. § 4324(c)(4). The regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. 

§§ 1201.201, 1202.202, and 1201.203. If you believe you meet these 

requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees WITHIN 60 CALENDAR 

DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION. You must file your attorney fees 

motion with the office that issued the initial decision on your appeal.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request review of this final decision by the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to 

the court at the following address:

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, DC 20439

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar days 

after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27, 

2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has held 

that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline and 
13

that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See Pinat v. 

Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to 

court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in 

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff. 

Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United 

States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode/htm. 

Additional information is available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. 

Of particular relevance is the court's "Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and 

Appellants," which is contained within the court's Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 

6, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for your court 

appeal, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for a list of 

attorneys who have expressed interest in providing pro bono representation for 

Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the court. The Merit Systems 

Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor 

warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

FOR THE BOARD:

______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.
DFAS CHECKLIST

INFORMATION REQUIRED BY DFAS IN 

ORDER TO PROCESS PAYMENTS AGREED 

UPON IN SETTLEMENT CASES OR AS 

ORDERED BY THE MERIT SYSTEMS 

PROTECTION BOARD

AS CHECKLIST: INFORMATION REQUIRED BY IN ORDER TO PROCESS PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN SETTLEMENT 

CASES 

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OFFICE MUST NOTIFY CIVILIAN PAYROLL 

OFFICE VIA COMMAND LETTER WITH THE FOLLOWING:

1. Statement if Unemployment Benefits are to be deducted, with dollar amount, 

address and POC to send.

2. Statement that employee was counseled concerning Health Benefits and TSP 

and the election forms if necessary.

3. Statement concerning entitlement to overtime, night differential, shift 

premium, Sunday Premium, etc, with number of hours and dates for each 

entitlement.

4. If Back Pay Settlement was prior to conversion to DCPS (Defense Civilian Pay 

System), a statement certifying any lump sum payment with number of 

hours and amount paid and/or any severance pay that was paid with dollar 

amount.

5. Statement if interest is payable with beginning date of accrual.

6. Corrected Time and Attendance if applicable.

ATTACHMENTS TO THE LETTER SHOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:

1. Copy of Settlement Agreement and/or the MSPB Order. 

2. Corrected or cancelled SF 50's. 

3. Election forms for Health Benefits and/or TSP if applicable. 

4. Statement certified to be accurate by the employee which includes: 

 a. Outside earnings with copies of W2's or statement from employer.

b. Statement that employee was ready, willing and able to work during the period. 

c. Statement of erroneous payments employee received such as; lump sum leave, 

severance pay, VERA/VSIP, retirement annuity payments (if applicable) and if 

employee withdrew Retirement Funds.

5. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification 

of the type of leave to be charged and number of hours.
NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES

Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process 

payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as 

ordered by the Merit Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts. 

1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise 

information describing what to do in accordance with decision. 

2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration: 

 a. Employee name and social security number. 

 b. Detailed explanation of request. 

 c. Valid agency accounting. 

 d. Authorized signature (Table 63) 

 e. If interest is to be included. 

 f. Check mailing address. 

 g. Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached. 

 h. Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to 

be collected. (if applicable) 

Attachments to AD-343 

1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday

Premium, etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement. (if applicable) 

2. Copies of SF-50's (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and 

amounts. 

3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency. 

4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address 

to return monies. 

5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)

6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of 

the type of leave to be charged and number of hours.

7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual 

Leave to be paid.

NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay 

Period and required data in 1-7 above. 

The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump 

Sum Payment, Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.) 

 a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above. 

 b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided. 

 c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable. 

If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s 

Payroll/Personnel Operations at 504-255-4630.