U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

69–753 CC WASHINGTON : 2001

S. HRG. 106–883

A REVIEW OF GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN DIPLOMACY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND

SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

OCTOBER 25, 2000

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

ROD GRAMS, Minnesota

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming

JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri

BILL FRIST, Tennessee

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

BARBARA BOXER, California

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

STEPHEN E. BIEGUN, Staff Director

EDWIN K. HALL, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon, Chairman

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman

JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

ROD GRAMS, Minnesota

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Barker, John P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation

Controls and Joseph M. DeThomas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

for Regional Nonproliferation, Department of State; accompanied by: Newell

L. Highsmith, Attorney Adviser, Office of Legal Adviser for Political Military Affairs, and Robert D. Dalton, Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty

Affairs, Office of Legal Adviser, Department of State, Washington, DC ......... 17

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 24

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared statement . 7

‘‘Iranian Arms Transfers: The Facts,’’ a study by Anthony H. Cordesman,

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC ................... 33

News release by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee entitled ‘‘Former

Officials ‘Deeply Disturbed’ by Gore Deal With Russians,’’ October 24, 2000 14

(III)

(1)

A REVIEW OF GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN

DIPLOMACY

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2000

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN

AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:39 a.m. in

room SD–419, Hon. Gordon Smith (chairman of the Subcommittee

on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs) and Hon. Sam

Brownback (chairman of the Subcommittee on European Affairs)

presiding.

Members Present: Senators Smith, Brownback, Hagel, and

Biden.

Other Senator Present: Orrin Hatch.

Senator SMITH. I will call this subcommittee hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to order. I welcome Senator

Biden, the ranking member of the full committee. Senator

Brownback will be with us shortly. We welcome Senator Hatch,

who has had an interest in this issue as it relates to a statute. I

invited him to be here. The majority leader encouraged him to be

here because of the interest of his committee.

We will proceed with opening statements. In U.S. foreign policy

there is no greater imperative for the President than ensuring that

his initiatives are consistent with America’s interests and laws. If

a political consensus is unobtainable, in limited circumstances the

President can impose a policy as long as it is consistent with U.S.

law. But he must be forthright with the American people and their

elected representatives, the U.S. Congress.

Just over a week ago the New York Times revealed that in 1995

Vice President Al Gore and then-Russian Premier Victor

Chernomyrdin signed a secret agreement that appears to violate

each of these important principles. In this agreement the United

States reportedly dropped its objections to Russia’s transfer of sophisticated weapons to Iran and promised not to impose sanctions

mandated by U.S. law as a response to those transfers. In return,

Russia committed not to sell Iran more weapons after December

31, 1999. As we now know, Russia continues to provide Iran not

only powerful conventional weaponry, but also provides technology

and know-how that benefits Iran’s missile and nuclear weapons

programs.

2

That the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement was not shared with

Congress raises disquieting questions about the administration’s

commitment to forging a foreign policy. Such bipartisanship cannot

be achieved when the President develops and implements an initiative in secret and keeps hidden crucial details from the American

people and their representatives in Congress. When Congressmen

and Senators have to turn to newspapers, as opposed to the White

House, to be fully informed on U.S. foreign policy, this is not right.

What we do know about the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement and

its implications for our interests abroad is disturbing. This agreement reportedly may have limited our response to Russia’s arms

sales to Iran, a country which is a significant sponsor of international terrorism directed against the West and its allies.

Since the signing of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement, Russia

delivered to Iran one advanced Kilo submarine for a total of three,

long-range torpedoes, and also anti-ship mines and other weapons.

Simply put, these are dangerous weapons in a dangerous part of

the world.

Press reports also indicate that in the Gore-Chernomyrdin document the United States agreed to ensure that U.S. customers in

the Middle East would not transfer American-made weapons to

countries along Russia’s periphery. This sort of deal-making must

re-awaken fears among the newly free States of Central Europe,

the Caucasus, and Central Asia that they may become once again

the objects of secret agreements between great powers. It is hardly

likely to increase their confidence in the United States.

Every American should know that our request of Russia that it

not export high-caliber conventional and nuclear weapons to terrorist states bent on killing Americans is not made without consideration. Last year alone, we sent 180 million tax dollars to Russia

to aid that country’s transition to Western democracy, not to subsidize Russian arms manufacturing and sales.

Finally, there remain grave questions concerning whether the administration’s handling of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement conforms to United States statutory and constitutional law. It is difficult for me to understand how this agreement is consistent with

the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, a bill that the

Vice President himself introduced during his years in the Senate.

This law, also known as the Gore-McCain Act, requires the imposition of sanctions against countries that transfer ‘‘destabilizing

numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons to Iran.’’

How could the executive branch not see a Kilo-class submarine as

such a weapon? It was designed to destroy U.S. Navy ships.

Congress passed the bill overwhelmingly and on a bipartisan

basis, in large part due to concern about Tehran’s acquisition of

Russian Kilo-class submarines. It is an understatement to say that

the secrecy with which the administration has handled the GoreChernomyrdin agreement and the legalisms employed to justify it

over the last week, indeed over the last 5 years, has fostered a

measure of distrust between the executive and legislative branches

of government.

I hope that this hearing will yield consultation between the administration and Congress that has been so acutely lacking in the

Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement thus far. It is imperative that we

3

emerge from this dialog fully cognizant of how the agreement has

affected the full range of U.S. national security interests abroad. It

is imperative that we work together to ensure that the administration’s policy initiatives are fully consistent with U.S. law.

Allow me to close by noting that President Woodrow Wilson once

called for ‘‘open covenants, openly arrived at.’’ Only in the rarest

of circumstances should secrecy impinge upon Wilson’s sage advice,

and when done so consultation between the President and Congress should follow respectfully and naturally, not from the reporting of the New York Times. Only when this principle is fully respected by the President and his administration can the American

people be confident that U.S. foreign policy is consistent with our

Constitution and the values and interests it embodies.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me

begin by saying thank you for calling this hearing and, as much as

I love my friend from Utah, I assume he is not going to be asking

questions in this hearing. It is very important that this be viewed

not as a political event. I am sure the majority leader did ask for

the distinguished chairman of the Judiciary Committee to be here,

but, with all due respect, I welcome him being here, but I hope this

is not going to turn into something that is more political than substantive.

My friend from Utah is an extremely substantive person, but, as

we both know, it is highly unusual to have another member of a

committee here to question on a subject that is so politically

charged. But I guess we will get to that when you decide we will

get to that.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased, notwithstanding what I just said,

that we are having this hearing today. It is all too easy for press

leaks and innuendo to crowd out rational discussion on the many

foreign policy challenges that face our country. Today we have a

chance to actually learn some facts and also to set the record

straight.

We should let the American people know the truth about the

Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement of 1995: One, that it was a good,

sensible agreement that did not give Russia any relief from U.S.

law; and two, that it kept the lid on Russian arms flows from Iran,

in fact, Russia’s actual arms deals with Iran during the Clinton administration were only one-tenth of what they were during the

Bush administration; that there were no legal requirements to give

Congress formal notice of the Gore-Chernomyrdin deal, but at least

one, at least one, of the House committees was briefed. Although

I cannot find the data, I am told that the offer was made to brief

this committee in 1995. But the House committee was briefed in

1995 on this agreement, which I think should lay rest to the notion

that this was an attempt on the part of the administration to pull

the wool over Congress’ eyes.

But let us review a few points. First, what was this deal? This

deal—quote, unquote, ‘‘deal’’—was a followup to the Clinton-Yeltsin

summit of September 1994 and May 1995 where President Yeltsin

promised not to enter into any new arms contracts with Iran, emphasis on ‘‘new’’. That is a pretty good idea.

4

Vice President Gore’s job in June 1995 was to nail down the details of that Clinton-Yeltsin agreement so that Russia could not

readily get out from under President Yeltsin’s promise. He got

Chernomyrdin to agree in writing that Yeltsin’s promise covered

not only weapons themselves, but also arms-related technologies.

In other words, Russia would not be able to sell Iran technology to

manufacture the weapons that it was agreeing not to sell.

According to the fact sheet provided to this committee after the

Gore-Chernomyrdin talks, Russia also agreed that arms delivery

under the old contract with Iran ‘‘will be ended within a few years

and will not provide Iran with new weapons capabilities or alter

the military balance in the region.’’ Vice President Gore added that

Russia had provided details on those existing contracts.

OK, so far so good. So why all the excitement now, 5 years later?

Well, it seems that somebody gave the press a copy of the text that

Gore and Chernomyrdin signed and alleged that the United States

had promised to let Russia violate U.S. law. Then some people

began wondering whether this text was what we call an executive

agreement. If it were, then it would have to notify the Congress.

For example, it explains how the White House could say that

Russia will not give Iran new weapons capabilities. Apparently

there was an attached annex that ‘‘represents the totality of the existing obligations that Russia reserves the right to fulfil pursuant

to its undertakings.’’ That means that we not only got details from

Chernomyrdin, we also got agreement that there could be no other

details. We got the list and, like Regis Philbin, when he asked, ‘‘is

this your final answer,’’ Chernomyrdin said: ‘‘Yes, this is my final

answer.’’ He attached it.

In addition, point two of the document says: ‘‘This undertaking

also precludes the renegotiation or modification of existing contracts so as to increase the type or quantity of arms-related transfers for which Russia is currently obligated.’’ That plugs another

loophole.

Now, what did the United States give in return? We agreed to

invite Russia to help develop a new arms export control regime,

what was later called—how do you pronounce it—Wassenaar; I do

not want to mispronounce it: Wassenaar agreement. Actually,

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin had already agreed on it at the

summit of 1994.

It makes sense, too. We cannot control arms sales to areas of

concern if we do not include Russia in that regime. After all, Russia has lots of weapons to sell and they need the money. We apparently also told Russia what arms we had sold to Saudi Arabia since

1992 and what arms we were planning to sell. I do not see any

promise to limit those arms, so we are not giving away anything.

We just told them what in fact we sold or planned on selling.

Maybe we were reassuring Russia that we were not giving the

Saudis fancy warheads for long-range missiles that they had

bought from China. We had objected loudly to the missile sale once

it was discovered, so these reassurances would be perfectly consistent with our publicly declared nonproliferation policy.

Finally, we said: ‘‘The United States is prepared to take appropriate steps to avoid any penalties to Russia that might otherwise

arise under domestic law with respect to the completion of the

5

transfers disclosed in the annex for so long as the Russian Federation acts in accordance with these commitments. This assurance is

premised upon the assumption that Russia’s disclosures in the

annex are complete and fully accurate.’’

Now let us look at that statement: ‘‘The United States is prepared to take—’’ We did not say ‘‘the United States is committed.’’

Indeed, we called this only an ‘‘assurance,’’ not a ‘‘promise.’’ We

also say that it only holds if the Russian annex is ‘‘complete and

fully accurate.’’ That sounds like a pretty good job of protecting our

position to me.

So what actions is the United States prepared to take? We give

assurance of ‘‘appropriate steps’’ to avoid penalizing Russia under

domestic laws. What are those ‘‘appropriate steps’’? I can guarantee

you one thing: They are steps within the law. This document does

not simply say you get a ‘‘Get Out of Jail Free’’ card, Russia. Russia gets out of jail only if the steps that are taken are appropriate

under American law.

What penalties might otherwise arise under domestic law with

respect to the completion of transfers disclosed in the annex? One

relevant law was the Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act of 1992, the

so-called McCain-Gore act. That law requires sanctions against

governments that transfer ‘‘destabilizing numbers and types’’ of

‘‘advanced conventional weapons’’ to Iran or Iraq.

Thus, you must find both the sale of advanced conventional

weapons to Iran and that these are of a number and type so as to

tip the balance of power in the region. Now, what is ‘‘advanced conventional weapons’’? Section 1608(1) of the law defines them to include such weapons as ‘‘long-range precision-guided munitions,

fuel-air explosives, cruise missiles, low observability aircraft, military satellites, laser weapons, and electronic warfare systems.’’

Russia has not sold any of that to Iran since the GoreChernomyrdin agreement.

The determination also includes ‘‘such other items or systems as

the Pentagon may determine necessary.’’ But the law leaves it to

the President to determine—let me read it again. The definition

also includes the following phrase: ‘‘such other items or systems as

the President may determine necessary.’’ The law leaves it to the

President to determine.

Only one specified weapon type might apply here, and that is advanced military aircraft. Note there is no mention of submarines in

this law, despite some people’s posturing on this issue, and nobody

says that some MiG’s and a few Su–27 aircraft were enough to be

‘‘destabilizing.’’ According to Sandy Berger, the Pentagon analyzed

the Russian arms sales at the time and concluded that they were

not ‘‘destabilizing.’’

But we do not have to trust the government on this. Anthony

Cordesman, who holds the Arleigh Burke Chair at the Center for

Strategic and International Studies, wrote recently: ‘‘Iran has not

received destabilizing transfers of advanced conventional weapons.’’

And guess what, folks. For those of you who do not know Tony

Cordesman, back in 1992 he was John McCain’s national security

assistant, working on the McCain-Gore bill. If anybody knows what

they meant by the law, he does. He says, and let me quote again:

6

‘‘Iran has not received destabilizing transfers of advanced conventional weapons.’’ Like his former boss, Tony tells it like it is, and here is his general comment on the current excitement: ‘‘Political campaigns are

a poor time to debate complex military issues, particularly when

the debate is based upon press reports that are skewed to stress

the importance of a story at the expense of objective perspectives

and the facts.’’ That is not my quote, that is not the administration’s quote; that is Gore’s former national security—excuse me,

McCain’s former national security adviser’s quote, who now heads

a prestigious institute that deals with this issue.

Another law dealt with countries, like Russia, that transfer

weapons to states that support international terrorism like Iran.

But that law applies only to ‘‘lethal military equipment provided

under contract entered into after the date of this act.’’ There was

no such contract, so there was nothing to trigger a ban on assistance to Russia under this provision.

Now to me, the laws are pretty clear. So is the fact, in my view,

that they did not require any sanctioning of Russia for its conventional arms shipments to Iran after the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement went into effect. But there is a second leak: a secret State Department cable containing the text of a letter from Secretary

Albright to Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov, that some people

point to as a sign of something awful.

What does the letter say? As with the memorandum I referenced

earlier, I have not seen the letter. But let us look at the more cited

paragraph that was leaked from the letter, so I am not confirming

anything except laying out what was already in the press: ‘‘Without

aide memoire, Russia’s conventional arms sales to Iran would have

been subject to sanctions based upon various provisions of our

laws. This possibility still exists in the event of continued Russian

transfers after December 31, 1999, termination date.’’ Now, I see two ways to interpret the paragraph. One is that Secretary Albright is saying, if you had not obeyed the aide memoire

you would have gotten in trouble. And that is true. If Russia had

signed new deals to sell ‘‘lethal military equipment’’ to Iran or if

it had sold lots of ‘‘advanced conventional weapons’’ to Iran, it

would have forced us to invoke sanctions under our law.

But they basically did obey the aide memoire and stayed out of

trouble in this regard. We know that Russia failed to meet the December 31, 1999, deadline for completing its arms deliveries and I

suspect that the Secretary was trying to keep Russia on the reservation.

The other responsibility interpretation is that the Secretary was

overstating her case in order to use U.S. law as a ‘‘club’’ with which

to beat the Russians. I know that we are all dedicated to the truth,

but is there some rule that the United States cannot try to frighten

the Russians? Does anybody here think that the Boy Scout’s Oath

applies to secret diplomatic notes?

Of course, partisans have said that Secretary Albright’s letter

proves that Russia had already broken the law. But we already

saw that there is no independent factual basis for that assertion.

OK, so we all know that the Gore-Chernomyrdin arrangement

was perfectly legal. Was it, however, something that had to be reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:49 Mar 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 69753 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
7

ported to the Congress? The answer to that is no. Now, why do I

say that? The Case-Zablocki act of 1972 requires any ‘‘international

agreement’’ other than a treaty must be submitted to the Congress

within 60 days after it enters into force. Section (d) of the act

states: ‘‘’The Secretary of State shall determine for and within the

executive branch whether an agreement constitutes an international agreement within the meaning of this section.’’

So what is an ‘‘international agreement’’? That term signifies a

legally binding agreement, one that can be enforced under international law. The question of whether an agreement is binding or

is a nonbinding political agreement was codified in the 1981 State

Department regulation. According to the Reagan-era regulation,

the key question is the intent of the parties: Do the two sides intend to legally bind one another by agreement and does this document reflect that statement?

Let us go back to that picture in the paper of the leaked document. Judging from that text, Russia’s obligation was fairly clear.

But remember what we found regarding the United States. All we

gave was an ‘‘assurance’’ that ‘‘the United States is prepared’’—I

am quoting—‘‘The United States is prepared to take appropriate

steps.’’ Does that sound to you like a legally binding commitment?

It certainly does not to me. I might add parenthetically, there is

a question of whether or not—and I will end with this—there is a

question whether or not the Case-Zablocki act is even constitutional and whether or not it violates the separation of powers doctrine. But that is a separate issue I will not take up.

I would like to ask unanimous consent the remainder of my

statement be placed in the record, with this final closing comment,

if I may.

Senator SMITH. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased that this hearing was called. It’s

all too easy for press leaks and innuendo to crowd out rational discussion of the

many foreign policy challenges that our country faces. Today we have a chance to

actually learn some facts—and also to set the record straight.

We should let the American people know the truth about the Gore-Chernomyrdin

agreement of 1995:

• that it was a good, sensible arrangement that did not give Russia any relief

from U.S. law;

• that it kept the lid on Russian arms flows to Iran—in fact, Russia’s annual

arms deals with Iran during the Clinton administration were only a tenth of

what they were during the Bush administration; and

• that there was no legal requirement to give Congress formal notice of the GoreChernomyrdin deal, but at least one House committee was briefed.

Let’s review those points. First, what was this deal? It was a follow-up to the

Clinton-Yeltsin summits of September 1994 and May 1995, where President Yeltsin

promised not to enter into any new arms contracts with Iran. That was a pretty

good deal.

Vice President Gore’s job, in June 1995, was to nail down the details, so that Russia could not readily get out from under President Yeltsin’s promise. He got

Chernomyrdin to agree in writing that Yeltsin’s promise covered not only weapons

themselves, but also arms-related technologies. In other words, Russia would not be

able to sell Iran the technology to manufacture the weapons that it was agreeing

not to sell.

That’s a famous loophole that the Chinese love to exploit. ‘‘Oh, we’re not selling

them weapons, we’re only selling them the technology to make weapons.’’ Al Gore

8

plugged that loophole regarding Russian conventional arms for Iran, right at the

start.

According to a fact sheet provided to this committee after the Gore-Chernomyrdin

talks, Russia also agreed that arms deliveries under its old contracts with Iran ‘‘will

be ended within a few years and will not provide Iran with new weapon capabilities

or alter the military balance in the region.’’ Vice President Gore added that Russia

had provided details on those existing contracts.

OK, so far so good. So why all the excitement now, five years later? Well, it seems

that somebody gave the press a copy of the text that Gore and Chernomyrdin

signed, and alleged that the United States had promised to let Russia violate U.S.

law.

Then some people began wondering whether this text was what we call an ‘‘executive agreement.’’ If it were, then it would have to be notified to Congress.

As I will explain in a moment, these concerns are a bunch of what President

Dwight Eisenhower used to call ‘‘poppycock.’’ Let me make clear, however, that I

don’t expect the press to be experts on the legal implications of an aide memoire

signed by a Vice President and a Prime Minister. They don’t see those every day.

What I do recommend is that the Senate take a deep breath and count to 10 before giving credence to every accusation that accompanies such a leak. Let’s look

carefully at this document, and at the allegations.

Now, I haven’t seen the document that was leaked, but one newspaper printed

a picture of much of it. The picture shows a page marked ‘‘SECRET,’’ so I don’t expect the White House to say, ‘‘that’s our memo.’’

But somehow I suspect that if it were a fake, we would have heard by now. So

let’s assume that the leaked document is genuine.

What does it tell us? Mainly, it confirms all those things that the White House

told us back in 1995. For example, it explains how the White House could say that

Russia will not give Iran ‘‘new weapon capabilities.’’ Apparently there was an ‘‘attached Annex’’ that ‘‘represents the totality of the existing obligations that Russia

reserves the right to fulfill pursuant to its undertakings.’’

That means that we not only got details from Chernomyrdin, we also got agreement that there could be no other details. We got a list and, like Regis Philbin, we

asked, ‘‘Is that your final answer?’’ Chernomyrdin said, ‘‘yes, that’s my final answer.’’

In addition, point 2 of the document says: ‘‘This undertaking also precludes the

renegotiation or modification of existing contracts so as to increase the type or quantity of arms-related transfers for which Russia is currently obligated.’’ That’s plugging another loophole.

Point 4 of the document says: ‘‘Russia will terminate all arms-related transfers

to Iran not later than 31 December 1999.’’ OK, the White House said the Russian

contracts ‘‘will be ended within a few years,’’ but actually we got a specific date.

That’s even better.

Now, how strong are all these assurances from Russia? Well, for what it’s worth,

point one calls them ‘‘Russia’s obligation’’ and point six calls them ‘‘commitments.’’

Not bad; those are good words.

What did the United States give in return? We agreed to invite Russia to help

develop a new arms export control regime—what was later called the Wassenaar Arrangement. Actually, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin had already agreed on that at

a summit in September 1994. It made sense, too; you can’t control arms sales to

areas of concern if you don’t include Russia in the regime. After all, Russia has lots

of weapons to sell, and they need the money.

We apparently also told Russia what arms we had sold to Saudi Arabia since

1992, and what arms we were planning to sell. I don’t see any promise to limit those

arms, so we weren’t giving anything away. Maybe we were reassuring Russia that

we were not giving the Saudis fancy warheads for the long-range missiles that they

had bought from China. We had objected loudly to that missile sale once we discovered it, so those reassurances would be perfectly consistent with our publicly declared non-proliferation policy.

Finally, we said: ‘‘the United States is prepared to take appropriate steps to avoid

any penalties to Russia that might otherwise arise under domestic law with respect

to the completion of the transfers disclosed in the Annex for so long as the Russian

Federation acts in accordance with these commitments. This assurance is premised

on the assumption that the Russian disclosures in the Annex are complete and fully

accurate.’’

Let’s look at that statement. ‘‘The United States is prepared to take . . .’’ We

didn’t say ‘‘the United States is committed.’’ Indeed, we call this only an ‘‘assurance,’’ not even ‘‘a promise.’’ We also say that it only holds if that Russian Annex

9

is ‘‘complete and fully accurate.’’ That sounds like a good job of protecting our position.

So, what action is the United States ‘‘prepared to take?’’ We give assurance of ‘‘appropriate steps’’ to avoid penalizing Russia under domestic law. What are ‘‘appropriate steps?’’ I can guarantee you one thing: they are steps within the law. This

document does not simply say, ‘‘get out of jail free.’’ Russia gets out of jail only if

that ‘‘step’’ is ‘‘appropriate.’’

What ‘‘penalties . . . might otherwise arise under domestic law with respect to the

completion of the transfers disclosed in the Annex?’’ One relevant law was the IranIraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, the so-called ‘‘McCain-Gore Act.’’

That law requires sanctions against governments that transfer ‘‘destabilizing

numbers and types’’ of ‘‘advanced conventional weapons’’ to Iran or Iraq. Thus, you

must find both the sale of advanced conventional weapons to Iran, and that these

are of a number and type so as to tip the balance of power in the region.

Now, what are ‘‘advanced conventional weapons?’’ Section 1608(1) of the law defines them to include such weapons as ‘‘long-range precision-guided munitions, fuel

air explosives, cruise missiles, low observability aircraft, . . . military satellites, laser

weapons, . . . electronic warfare systems.’’ Russia hasn’t sold any of that to Iran

since the Gore-Chernomyrdin arrangement.

The definition also includes ‘‘such other items or systems as the President may

. . . determine necessary.’’ But the law leaves that to the President to determine.

Only one specified weapons type might apply here, ‘‘advanced military aircraft.’’

Note that there is no mention of submarines in this law, despite some people’s posturing on that issue. And nobody says that some MiG’s and a few Su-27 aircraft

were enough to be ‘‘destabilizing.’’ According to Sandy Berger, the Pentagon analyzed the Russian arms sales at the time and concluded that they would not be ‘‘destabilizing.’’

But we don’t have to trust the Government on this. Anthony Cordesman, who

holds the Arleigh Burke chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,

wrote recently: ‘‘Iran . . . has not . . . received destabilizing transfers of advanced

conventional weapons.’’

And guess what, folks? For those of you who don’t know Tony Cordesman, back

in 1992, he was John McCain’s national security assistant, working on the McCainGore bill. If anybody knows that law, he does.

Like his former boss, Tony tells it like it is. Here is his general comment on the

current excitement:

Political campaigns are a poor time to debate complex military issues,

particularly when the debate is based on press reports that are skewed to

stress the importance of the story at the expense of objective perspective

and the facts.

Another law dealt with countries (like Russia) that transfer weapons to states

that support international terrorism (like Iran). But that law applies only to ‘‘lethal

military equipment provided under a contract entered into after the date of enactment of this Act.’’ There was no such contract, so there was nothing to trigger a

ban on assistance to Russia under this provision.

Now to me, the laws are pretty clear. So is the fact that they did not require any

sanctioning of Russia for its conventional arms shipments to Iran after the GoreChernomyrdin arrangement went into effect. But there was a second leak—of a ‘‘Secret’’ State Department cable containing the text of a letter from Secretary of State

Albright to Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov—that some people point to as a

sign of something awful.

What does the letter say? As with the Aide Memoire, I haven’t seen it. But let’s

look at the more cited paragraph in that leaked letter:

Without the Aide Memoire, Russia’s conventional arms sales to Iran

would have been subject to sanctions based on various provisions of our

laws. This possibility still exists in the event of continued Russian transfers

after the December 31 [1999] termination date.

Now, I see two ways to interpret this paragraph. One is that Secretary Albright

is saying, ‘‘if you hadn’t obeyed the Aide Memoire, you would have gotten in trouble.’’ And that’s true. If Russia had signed new deals to sell ‘‘lethal military equipment’’ to Iran, or if it had sold lots of ‘‘advanced conventional weapons’’ to Iran, it

would have forced us to invoke sanctions under our law.

But they basically did obey the Aide Memoire, and stayed out of trouble in this

regard. We know that Russia failed to meet the December 31, 1999, deadline for

completing its arms deliveries, and I suspect that the Secretary was trying to keep

Russia on the reservation.

10

The other reasonable interpretation is that the Secretary was overstating her

case, in order to use U.S. law as a ‘‘club’’ with which to beat the Russians. I know

that we are all dedicated to the truth, but is there some rule that the United States

can’t try to frighten the Russians? Does anybody here think the Boy Scout’s Oath

applies to secret diplomatic notes?

Of course, partisans have said that Secretary Albright’s letter proves that Russia

had already broken the law. But we already saw that there is no independent factual basis for that assertion.

OK, so we all know that the Gore-Chernomyrdin arrangement was perfectly legal.

Was it, however, something that had to be reported to Congress? No. Now, why do

I say that?

The ‘‘Case-Zablocki Act’’ of 1972 requires that any ‘‘international agreement’’ other

than a treaty must be submitted to Congress within 60 days after it enters into

force. Subsection (d) of the Act states: ‘‘The Secretary of State shall determine for

and within the executive branch whether an arrangement constitutes an international agreement within the meaning of this section.’’

So what is an ‘‘international agreement?’’ That term signifies a legally binding

agreement, one that can be enforced under international law. The question of

whether an agreement is binding (or is a non-binding political agreement) was codified in a 1981 State Department Regulation. According to that Reagan-era regulation, the key question is the intent of the parties. Do the two sides intend to be legally bound by the agreement? Does the document reflect that?

Let’s go back to that picture in the paper of the leaked document. Judging from

that text, Russia’s obligations are fairly clear.

But remember what we found regarding the United States. All we gave was an

‘‘assurance’’ that ‘‘the United States is prepared to take appropriate steps.’’ Does

that sound to you like a legally binding commitment? It certainly doesn’t to me.

Now, there was a political commitment, on both sides. Such an agreement is not

uncommon. For example, President Ford signed the Helsinki Final Act, an important and famous multilateral agreement, but it was not an ‘‘executive agreement’’

under the law.

In the case of the Gore-Chernomyrdin arrangement, the executive branch did brief

the staff and members of the House International Relations Committee. There was

no oral briefing on the Senate side, but I am sure we could have gotten one if we

had asked. And remember, the broad outlines of what we got were already known.

In short, then, both the deal and the handling of the deal were perfectly legal.

If anybody pretends otherwise, remind them of that lovely Dwight Eisenhower word:

‘‘poppycock.’’

That leaves us with the real question: was this a good deal? It certainly looks like

a good deal. Russia commits to stop its arms transfers to Iran once its current deals

are done, they give us a definitive list of the current deals, they agree that they

won’t modify those deals, and they give us a time certain for the end of deliveries.

All we give them is an ‘‘assurance’’ that the deals on that list aren’t enough to trigger sanctions under U.S. law.

But what actually happened? Did this deal work? Let’s see what Tony Cordesman

has to say. He writes:

Iran has made major cuts in its new arms agreements with Russia since

1996, and has increasing[ly] had to rely on lower quality suppliers like

China. . . .

The drop in new arms agreements with Russia reflected both Iran’s financial problems and the result of U.S. pressures that had led President

Yeltsin not to make major new arms sales to Iran.’’ [Emphasis added.]

I ask you, folks, is that a deal, or is that a deal? The Gore-Chernomyrdin arrangement was not only a good deal on paper, it was a good deal in practice as well.

How good was that deal? Let’s look at the data from Tony Cordesman’s analysis.

Here’s a chart of new arms sale agreements with the Middle East since the GoreChernomyrdin deal. Russia’s agreements are just the tip of that little Iran column

at the lower left, worth $200 million.

Cordesman calls those deals ‘‘minor, . . . [with] little military meaning, and . .

. more technical than substantive.’’ By comparison, in an earlier study, he reported

that from 1987 through 1990, Russia and Iran signed $2.5 billion in arms sale

agreements.

What about those arms deliveries under the old contracts? On this second chart,

those are the middle part of the little Iran column at the lower left, worth $700 million. By comparison, the United States alone delivered to Saudi Arabia 22 times

what Russia delivered to Iran.

11

This third chart shows the trends in arms deliveries over time. With the end of

the Cold War, and after the Gulf War, deliveries to Iraq and Yemen go to ground.

World-wide deliveries to Iran go down more gradually. By 1997, even Kuwait and

the United Arab Emirates are getting more arms than Iran—and Saudi Arabia is

getting 10 or 20 times what Iran is getting.

How does Mr. Cordesman evaluate Iran’s use of these new arms? He writes:

Iran’s procurements to date cannot compensate for the steady decay of

Iran’s older equipment. . . .

Iran is too weak to seek a direct conflict that involves the U.S., or to risk

another war with [Iraq]. It will also be years before Iranian arms imports

and military production efforts can give it enough capability to deliberately

initiate a conflict or reveal whether it has aggressive intentions.

So now we have the substantive data, as well as the legal explanations, and—

surprise!—the Gore-Chernomyrdin deal was legal, it was a good deal, and it worked.

That leaves us one final question. Why are we here? My answer is that we are

here to see, largely or wholly in closed session, whether the case is as clear-cut in

favor of the Gore-Chernomyrdin deal as I believe it is. For that I truly thank our

chairmen. Given the swirl of accusations over the last couple of weeks, we need this

hearing.

Mr. Chairman, I ask that the text of Tony Cordesman’s study, Iranian Arms

Transfers: The Facts, be made a part of the record of this hearing. I have some copies for my colleagues and for the press, and I urge our audience to download it from

the CSIS website at www.csis.org. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. It certainly looks like to me this is a pretty good

deal. Russia commits to stop arms transfers to Iran once its current deals are done, they give us a definitive list of the current

deals, they agree that they will not modify those deals, and they

give us time certain for the end of the deliveries. All we gave them

was an assurance that the deals on that list are not enough to trigger sanctions under U.S. law.

But what actually happened? Did the deal work? Let us see

again what Tony Cordesman says. He writes: ‘‘Iran has made

major cuts in its new arms agreements with the Russians since

1996 and has increasingly had to rely on lower quality suppliers

like China.’’ Cordesman goes on: ‘‘The drop in new arms agreements with Russia reflected both Iran’s financial problems and the

result of U.S. pressure that had led President Yeltsin not to make

major new arms sales to Iran.’’

I ask you, folks: Is that a deal or is that a deal? The GoreChernomyrdin agreement was not only a good deal on paper, it was

a good deal in practice as well. That leaves us one final question:

Why are we here? My answer is that we are here to see, largely

or wholly in closed session, whether the case is as clear-cut in favor

of the Gore-Chernomyrdin deal as I believe it is. What I truly think

is that it was.

I want to thank our chairman. Given the swirl of accusations

over the last couple of weeks, we need this hearing.

Mr. Chairman, I ask the text of Tony Cordesman’s study, ‘‘Iran

Arms Transfers: The Facts,’’ be made part of the record of this

hearing, and I have some copies for my colleagues and for the

press, and I urge our audience to download it from the CSIS Web

site at www.csis.org.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Senator Biden. Without objection, we

will include that.

[The study referred to begins on page 33.]

Senator SMITH. Senator Brownback.

12

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your holding this hearing.

Before I proceed with my statement, I think a couple things

ought to be set straight here. I know that if Chairman Helms were

here, he would want me to set some of the facts straight. I have

a statement here from him that ‘‘in 1995 neither Chairman Helms

nor Senator Pell,’’ who was ranking member, ‘‘nor any of their staff

were briefed on the existence of a legally binding international

agreement with the Russians.’’ ‘‘Make no mistake about it.’’ This is further from Senator Helms: ‘‘This agreement is intended to serve as a legally binding document. The administration admitted last week that this was their

intent going into the negotiations and last week a senior Russian

official from the embassy told the Foreign Relations Committee

staff that Russia regarded the document as legally binding. ‘‘This agreement is chockful of specific commitments by the

United States and Russia: The U.S. will do this, Russia will do

this. As such, it is either a secret treaty or an agreement covered

by Case-Zablocki. In either case, it was not submitted as the law

requires. It was instead concealed from Congress. In various briefings, this deal on armaments to Iran that was negotiated with the

Russians was attributed to President Clinton and President

Yeltsin. ‘‘Al Gore, the administration claimed, merely clarified in 1995

with Victor Chernomyrdin what Yeltsin had already pledged to do.

It turns out that this was not true. Al Gore did far more than pursue clarification of an understanding with the Russians. No mention was ever made that the Vice President has signed a secret

agreement that included far-ranging obligations. Certainly no mention was made that the Vice President had pledged to avoid various

U.S. laws. Finally, no mention was made that the administration

had decided to withhold from Congress a document that it legally

was required to submit.’’ Now, none of us can definitively speak about what the House

was told, but I understand that they were similarly misled. Certainly the Senate was never appraised of the true facts surrounding this matter.

With that clarification, that is a statement from Chairman

Helms.

I want to also answer the question, too—well, let me do that in

a little bit.

I think it is good that we are here to finally clear the air over

the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement which allowed Russia to continue to sell conventional weapons to Iran and at the same time

to continue to receive many millions of dollars of United States assistance. I certainly hope that the administration witnesses here

today have come, not only to explain the agreement, but to provide

us with the copies of the aide memoire, the annexes, the exchanges

of letters, and other documents which the Foreign Relations Committee has formally requested. If you had provided that previously,

we might not be here today.

Let me state at the outset why we are meeting here today, at

this late date in the final days of the 106th Congress. We are here

today because exactly 13 days ago the New York Times revealed

13

that Vice President Gore had signed a secret agreement with Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin in which the Vice President made commitments to the Russian Government that the Clinton-Gore administration would ignore U.S. nonproliferation laws.

Frankly, I would prefer not to be holding this hearing today. I

would have preferred that the Congress had been provided with a

copy of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement 5 years ago. I would

have preferred that the Congress had had a chance back then to

thoroughly review the legality of Vice President Gore’s commitment

to Mr. Chernomyrdin, as well as his promise in writing to—and I

am quoting from the document from the press—‘‘avoid any penalties to Russia that might otherwise arise under domestic law’’ for

their weapons transfers to Iran.

Unfortunately, until the New York Times broke the story 13 days

ago, Congress had not seen this written, signed agreement between

the Vice President and the Russian Prime Minister. I hope that we

will hear why the administration failed to disclose its existence and

why the Vice President felt he had the legal authority to make a

commitment on behalf of the United States not to implement U.S.

sanctions law.

This Gore-Chernomyrdin deal has broad foreign policy ramifications. The decision to allow Russia to escape the consequences of

providing Iran with conventional weapons is one which affects not

only the security of American military personnel in the gulf, but

also the security of our allies in the region. This is not the type of

agreement which should have been kept from the American people,

and it is certainly not something that Members of Congress should

have learned about from the press.

Now, there are assertions here that, well, so what, it was a good

deal. I think that is certainly up for question. I have a letter here

that I want to submit for the record, signed by former Secretary

of State Henry Kissinger, Dr. Brzezinski, former National Security

Adviser, Mr. Woolsey, former Director of the CIA, where they question highly whether this was a good deal or not. They state this:

‘‘The President’s most important job is safeguarding our Nation’s

security and our ability to protect our interests, our citizens, and

our allies and friends. The military balance in regions of vital interest to America and our allies, including the Persian Gulf, which

is a critical source of the world’s energy supplies, is the essential

underpinning for a strong foreign policy. This is why we are deeply

disturbed by the agreement made by Vice President Gore and thenRussian Premier Chernomyrdin, in which America acquiesced in

the sale by Russia to Iran of highly threatening military equipment, such as modern submarines, fighter planes, and wake-homing torpedoes. ‘‘We also find it incomprehensible that this agreement was not fully disclosed even to those committees of Congress

charged with receiving highly classified briefings, apparently at the

request of the Russian Premier. But agreement to this request is

even more disturbing since the Russian sales could have brought

about sanctions against Russia in accordance with the 1992 U.S.

law sponsored by Senator John McCain and then-Senator Al Gore.’’

Mr. Chairman, I ask that this statement be included in the

record.

Senator SMITH. Without objection.

14

[The material referred to follows:]

For Immediate Release—October 24, 2000—Committee on Foreign Relations

FORMER OFFICIALS ‘‘DEEPLY DISTURBED’’ BY GORE DEAL WITH RUSSIA

Bipartisan Group, Supporters of Both Bush and Gore, Say Failure to Disclose Deal

to Congress ‘‘Incomprehensible’’

WASHINGTON, DC.—A bi-partisan group of former secretaries of state, secretaries

of defense, national security advisors and CIA directors have issued a statement declaring they are ‘‘deeply disturbed by the agreement made between Vice President

Gore and then Russian Premier Chernomyrdin in which America acquiesced in the

sale by Russia to Iran of highly threatening military equipment . . .’’

The statement—signed by supporters of both Gov. Bush and Vice President

Gore—also called the Administration’s failure to disclose the agreement to Congress

‘‘incomprehensible.’’

The statement was signed by: George Shultz, James Baker, Zbigniew Brzezinski,

Frank Carlucci, Lawrence Eagleburger, Henry Kissinger, Donald Rumsfeld, James

Schlesinger, Brent Scowcroft, Caspar Weinberger and James Woolsey.

‘‘We . . . find it incomprehensible that this agreement was not fully disclosed even

to those committees of Congress charged with receiving highly classified briefings—

apparently at the request of the Russian Premier,’’ the statement declares.

A copy of the full statement follows.

STATEMENT BY FORMER SECRETARIES OF STATE, DEFENSE, DIRECTORS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORS ON THE SALE OF RUSSIAN WEAPONS

TO IRAN

October 24, 2000

The following individuals, who include supporters of both Governor George W.

Bush and Vice President Al Gore, believe strongly that:

‘‘The President’s most important job is safeguarding our nation’s security and

our ability to protect our interests, our citizens and our allies and friends. The

military balance in regions of vital interest to America and her allies—including

the Persian Gulf, which is a critical source of the world’s energy supplies—is

the essential underpinning for a strong foreign policy.

‘‘This is why we are deeply disturbed by the agreement made between Vice

President Gore and then Russian Premier Chernomyrdin in which America acquiesced in the sale by Russia to Iran of highly threatening military equipment

such as modern submarines, fighter planes, and wake-homing torpedoes.

‘‘We also find incomprehensible that this agreement was not fully disclosed

even to those committees of Congress charged with receiving highly classified

briefings—apparently at the request of the Russian Premier. But agreement to

his request is even more disturbing since the Russian sales could have brought

about sanctions against Russia in accordance with a 1992 U.S. law sponsored

by Senator John McCain and then Senator Al Gore.’’

George P. Shultz, former Secretary of State.

James A. Baker, III, former Secretary of State.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Frank C. Carlucci, former Secretary of Defense and former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Lawrence S. Eagleburger, former Secretary of State.

Henry A. Kissinger, former Secretary of State and former Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs.

Donald H. Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense.

James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and former Director of Central

Intelligence.

Brent Scowcroft, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Caspar W. Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense.

R. James Woolsey, Attorney and former Director of Central Intelligence.

Senator BROWNBACK. I note again, signed by former National Security Adviser Dr. Brzezinski, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,

15

and Mr. Woolsey, amongst others that find this a highly questionable deal.

Senator SMITH. Without objection.

Senator BROWNBACK. I hope we will hear from the administration how this agreement is not a violation of the 1992 Gore-McCain

act and how having a world leader in state-sponsored terrorism

armed with Kilo-class submarines, advanced mines, and torpedoes,

and other such weapons is not destabilizing.

The Vice President and senior administration officials have vigorously denied that Mr. Gore made a secret commitment to Russia

to ignore any U.S. sanctions laws. A Gore spokesman told the New

York Times that: ‘‘None of the weapons included in the agreement

met the standard for triggering sanctions under the Gore-McCain

law.’’ This assertion is explicitly contradicted by another secret document, a letter sent January 13 by Secretary of State Madeleine

Albright to Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and revealed last

week by the Washington Times, another press source. We have

that posted over here to my right. I hope our witnesses have

brought us a copy of this letter so that we can have the benefit of

the entire text and context.

In the meantime, I want to quote from that letter at some length.

In it Secretary Albright declares: ‘‘We have also upheld our commitment not to impose sanctions for these transfers disclosed in the

annex to the aide memoire.’’ Skipping on down: ‘‘Without the aide

memoire, Russia’s conventional arms sales to Iran would have been

subject to sanctions based on various provisions of our laws.’’ Still

further: ‘‘This possibility still exists in the event of continued Russian transfers after the December 31 termination date.’’ In her letter, at least those parts of it that I have seen, courtesy

of the Washington Times publication of it, Secretary Albright is

crystal-clear. She declares that Russia’s arms sales to Iran were in

fact subject under U.S. law to sanctions, but that those sanctions

were never imposed because of Vice President Gore’s agreement

with Mr. Chernomyrdin.

I see no other way to read Secretary Albright’s letter except as

a blatant admission that this administration concluded a secret

agreement with Russia in which it promised to ignore U.S. nonproliferation laws. I would be very interested in learning if the administration can explain to the American people this morning before we go into closed session why they should not reach precisely

that same conclusion.

There are other concerns as well related to this matter. Withholding information from Congress may itself be a violation of the

law. As previously stated by Senator Biden, the Case-Zablocki act

states that ‘‘any international agreement must be transmitted to

Congress within 60 days of its negotiation.’’ Now, this law was specifically enacted in order to protect American democracy by holding

the President and his people accountable for their international

agreements. But that law appears to have been broken.

The administration argues that this does not fall under Case-Zablocki because they say that the Gore-Chernomyrdin deal is a ‘‘understanding’’ and not a ‘‘agreement.’’ Now, this kind of legal hairsplitting causes the American people to question the honesty and

integrity of their elected officials. Once the administration has proVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:49 Mar 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 69753 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
16

vided us with all the relevant documents, perhaps we can understand their side of this agreement.

As you can see, there is a broad range of issues to cover at this

hearing this morning. I look forward to hearing our witnesses exploring not only the legality of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement,

but also the ramifications of this agreement and whether it and the

secrecy in which it is shrouded was in fact in the best interests of

our Nation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Senator Brownback.

Senator Hagel, welcome, sir.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have no statement.

I am interested in hearing our witnesses.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

Senator Biden, do you have another comment?

Senator BIDEN. No. I really hope we focus on the facts raised, the

issues raised by you and Senator Brownback. I just hope we focus

on it, because what may happen is, for example, if the Democrats

chaired this committee I hope they would not be holding a hearing

on ‘‘Europeans Say Bush Pledge to Pull Out of Balkans Could Split

NATO.’’ I mean, this is a political season and we should be very

careful here.

Senator SMITH. I agree with that.

We want to thank our witnesses from the State Department. I

want to publicly thank Assistant Secretary Strobe Talbott for the

cooperation that he has given to this committee since he and I

began visiting late last week. We have, at his direction: Mr. John

P. Barker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation

Controls; Mr. Joseph M. DeThomas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of

State for Regional Nonproliferation; Mr. Newell L. Highsmith, Attorney Adviser, the Office of Legal Adviser for Political Military Affairs, the Department of State; Mr. Robert E. Dalton, Assistant

Legal Adviser for the Treaty Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser,

Department of State.

My agreement with Secretary Talbott is that there would be

opening statements by Senators, opening statements by State Department witnesses if they choose to make them, and no other testimony from other witnesses either for or against the position that

they are going to present to us. These understandings I reached

with Secretary Talbott and also with Senator Brownback, Senator

Biden, in order to as much as is possible, in a hyperpolitical season

in an always political town, to try and de-politicize what is a very

serious substantive issue.

In that spirit, we welcome our witnesses and we turn to you, Mr.

Barker, for your statement.

17

STATEMENT OF JOHN P. BARKER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NONPROLIFERATION CONTROLS,

AND JOSEPH M. DE THOMAS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR REGIONAL NONPROLIFERATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY: NEWELL L.

HIGHSMITH, ATTORNEY ADVISER, OFFICE OF LEGAL ADVISER FOR POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS, AND ROBERT E.

DALTON, ASSISTANT LEGAL ADVISER FOR TREATY AFFAIRS,

OFFICE OF LEGAL ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BARKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank

you, Senators.

We are here today under very difficult and very unhappy circumstances. Serious accusations have been leveled, classified documents are appearing in the press as photo inserts, and our negotiating strategy with Russia on sensitive national security matters is

being compromised by discussing these matters in public.

Senator SMITH. Could you pull that microphone up a little closer.

It is not carrying very well.

Mr. BARKER. Is that a little better, sir?

Senator SMITH. Yes; thank you.

Mr. BARKER. This will put the next administration——

Senator BIDEN. Now you have got to turn it.

Senator BROWNBACK. Low tech equipment.

Senator BIDEN. As Senator Thurmond says, ‘‘these machines are

not very good.’’

Mr. BARKER. Let me repeat the last sentence to make sure that

all of you got that. Our negotiating strategy with Russia on sensitive national security matters is being compromised by discussing

these matters in public. This will put the next administration, no

matter who wins the election, in a very difficult position for future

diplomacy.

We are here to review what the administration has done over the

last 7 years to address what we all agree is a serious national security problem, Iran’s quest to acquire advanced conventional and nuclear weapons, as well as the means to deliver them. I will first review the matters involving conventional arms and my colleague Joe

DeThomas will discuss briefly nuclear matters.

We also want to address directly the allegations we have heard

about violations of laws and agreements purportedly kept secret

from Congress. We will address what we can in this statement, but

we are sure you understand that unauthorized disclosure of classified information does not mean it has been declassified. That is

why we appreciate the fact that we will be able to go into executive

session after this to discuss this in more detail.

I did not participate personally in the negotiations of the understanding for Russia to close out its arms sales to Iran. I will provide you with answers to the best of my knowledge and ability

based on a review of the records, the negotiating history, and

speaking with some of the participants who were directly involved

in the negotiations.

But based on that review, I am convinced that Congress was

properly informed, that the broad outlines of the understandings

were discussed in public and in testimony before the Senate, that

18

the U.S. effectively used the nonproliferation sanctions laws as leverage to gain advantage for U.S. national security, and that diplomacy, including by the Secretary of State, was reinforced in a manner that was fully consistent with U.S. national law and U.S. national security.

Let us turn now to the facts. In 1991 Russia concluded a large,

multi-year conventional arms contract with Iran. In 1992 it concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran. It is these two

agreements, which pre-date the Clinton administration, that the

administration had to contain and reverse. Our prepared statement, which we ask be included for the record, reviews our overall

strategy and what we achieved.

Russia promised that it would not conclude contracts for conventional weapons to Iran and it agreed not to provide to Iran most

of the nuclear technology, including all the most dangerous types

of technology, that it was proposing to sell. Frankly, one measure

of the success in restraining Russian arms exports might be the

many complaints we have received from Russia directly and in the

Russian press that Russia has lost billions of dollars of conventional arms sales to Iran and hundreds of millions of dollars of sensitive nuclear technology sales, this all specifically due to our efforts. We know these understandings were a good deal for the

United States in part because of the Russian media commentators

and politicians who argued that they were not in Russia’s interests.

Let me address the issues on conventional armaments as best I

can in this session. First, we kept both the public and the Congress

fully informed. During the 1994 summit, Presidents Clinton and

Yeltsin reached an understanding that Russia would not undertake

new contracts or other agreements to transfer conventional arms to

Iran, but that existing contracts would be fulfilled. This was announced publicly.

This matter was again on the agenda for the May 1995 summit

and the subject of public discussion even before the summit by Secretary Christopher and Secretary Perry. At the May 1995 summit,

the actions were discussed publicly in even greater detail, as was

the fact that Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister

Chernomyrdin would resolve the details and record the understanding.

That understanding between the Vice President and Russian

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin on conventional arms was announced publicly in a fact sheet, that was also widely distributed—

indeed, I believe Mr. Biden noted that it was distributed to this

committee—and immediately after the commission meeting in

1995. These matters were also briefed to Congress.

We referred to this understanding frequently, often in open testimony, often before this committee. Indeed, I personally referred to

this understanding by Russia and other countries in open Senate

testimony before the Senate Banking Committee just last year.

Of course, certain sensitive documents were classified and were

closely held in the executive branch, that is before they were published in the newspaper. This is a common practice for all administrations on very sensitive diplomatic negotiations, but the thrust of

these documents was widely telegraphed to both the Congress and

the American people.

19

We also used the law to buttress our nonproliferation policy.

There was no promise to evade the law. We agreed to provide assurances that we would take ‘‘appropriate steps’’ to avoid penalties

on arms transfers in the pipeline, but only after a careful review

to ensure that they did not in fact trigger mandatory sanctions

under the Iran-Iraq Act or other potentially applicable sanctions

laws. We made no promises that we would not impose the law, and

indeed we have provided information to Congress on sanctions determinations involving Russia and Iran that we have made.

State Department lawyers reviewed these matters thoroughly at

the time, including applicable statutes that govern transfers of lethal military equipment to Iran, and were satisfied that these statutes did not apply to the arms transfers identified in the understanding. The conclusion of non-sanctionability was reached only

after careful review by the State Department, the intelligence community, the Defense Department, and the Joint Staff.

Some have cited a sentence in a recently leaked classified letter

of the Secretary of State as being inconsistent with this statement.

The fact is that Secretary Albright’s letter was intended to deliver

a stern warning that failure to abide by the restrictions embodied

in the aide memoire regarding arms sales to Iran could have serious consequences, including the possibility of sanctions. Her letter

did not go into the nuances of U.S. sanctions law, but it is entirely

consistent with the purposes of the aide memoire and the Iran-Iraq

act.

In that letter we were seeking clarifications from the Russians

regarding their compliance with the aide memoire. At the time of

the letter those clarifications had not been received. Because it was

essential that the United States obtain this information, we felt it

appropriate to stress the maximum consequences they might face

depending on further disclosures about Russian export activities.

We had available to us at the time a variety of discretionary

sanctions under various other provisions of our law other than the

Iran-Iraq act and lethal military equipment laws, for example the

cutting off of licenses under the Arms Export Control Act. We felt

this approach would be most effective in persuading the Russians

to provide the needed information, and indeed this approach succeeded in obtaining a reaffirmation of the Russian commitment to

limit the scope of the conventional weapons transfers to those

items covered by the aide memoire. We would have been criticized,

frankly, if we did not take this to senior levels, to address our concerns about Russia fulfilling these commitments.

It has always been the case that the transfers subject to the aide

memoire do not trigger U.S. sanctions laws. There were no sanctions to impose. So in fact we have never taken any steps to avoid

penalties against the Russians for transfers in the pipeline. That

was our conclusion in 1995. It still stands today.

A key part of the process to resolve the issues addressed in the

joint statement and the aide memoire: We insisted on the exchange

of information on these pre-existing contracts. The impact of all the

arms transferred or to be transferred, including the Kilo submarine

that had not yet been delivered, was reviewed by senior military

and Defense officials. It was their judgment, along with ours, that

transfers under those pre-existing contracts would not provide Iran

20

with new military capabilities, alter the regional balance, nor compromise the ability of the United States and our allies to protect

our mutual security interests. They judged that the declared pipeline contained no destabilizing types of advanced conventional

weapons as defined under the applicable statute.

Much has been written about the three Kilo-class submarines.

Let us be clear on the facts. From open sources, we know that the

contract for these submarines was signed in 1988. We know that

the first submarine was launched in 1991. We know that it was delivered in 1992. The only one that was left to be dealt with at the

time of the signing of the understanding in 1995 was the third submarine, the process for which building it was well under way before negotiations even commenced.

Our military judged that, while one additional submarine represented an added threat to U.S. forces in the gulf, it was a manageable threat. As Dr. Perry noted publicly at the time in summing

up the Department of Defense position on this, the Department of

Defense did not see cause for concern on the level and the nature

of conventional arms being transferred, and that it was far better

to obtain the commitment from Russia to forego future sales of advanced conventional weapons or destabilizing quantities of other

types of military equipment.

Again, these submarines were not within the definition of advanced conventional weapons covered by the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act. I assume that the past administration must have

reached the same conclusion since the first submarine was delivered in 1992.

Both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House

International Relations Committee were informed about the understanding with Russia in 1995, and we have made no secret of this.

Indeed, we brought this to the attention of the committee in public

hearing. For example, my current boss, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Einhorn, noted in open testimony in June 1997 before this committee that Russia informed us that ‘‘one Kilo-class

submarine was expected to be delivered to Iran and that tanks

were also to be delivered under pre-existing contracts.’’ He also

noted that ‘‘prior to concluding the 1995 agreement we made certain that the contracts in the pipeline did not involve any new

weapons systems and would not alter the regional balance nor compromise the ability of the United States and our allies to protect

our mutual interests.’’

We told the Congress and the American people that the transfer

had occurred. We outlined to them why we did not believe it was

sanctionable, and it is only now that these issues are being brought

to our attention.

Let me address one new comment that has also been circulating,

that Russia transferred advanced fighter aircraft to Iran as part of

the understanding. I believe a statement was read by a number of

former Secretaries of State, Defense, and the Director of Central

Intelligence earlier today that had those facts in it. Let me first say

that actually—several of those people on that list are my personal

heroes that I have spent a lot of time reading about and I look up

to them quite dramatically. So I do not really want to talk about

their conclusions.

21

But I would like to talk about some of the facts that are outlined

in the beginning of the statement. It noted, for example, that there

was a transfer of fighter planes that was undertaken under this

aide memoire. We believe that Iran’s Russian aircraft were supplied before 1995.

It noted that modern submarines were transferred. That is true,

there was one that was transferred after this understanding was

reached. There was also one that was transferred during the time

that some of the people were in office.

In addition, it notes that there was a request from the Russian

Premier to keep these briefings classified. In all of your opening

statements you have not mentioned any of that and that is actually

the first I have heard of that.

Mr. Chairman, it is important to recognize that Russia would

have sold arms to Iran no matter what the United States did. We

had little direct leverage. We were essentially asking Russia to

forego billions of dollars in arms sales in exchange for membership

in a multilateral group that would only further constrain those

arms sales. But we worked with the leverage that we had and,

through the dogged determination of senior officials, Russia agreed

to close out its existing contracts within a few years and agreed not

to sign new contracts for the sale of arms to Iran.

Frankly, in looking back over the record of the decisions that

were made, these were very tough calls. But we made an informed

decision, with the best advice available, with the involvement of

our senior military and with the concurrence of the Secretary of

Defense. We judged that we could best protect our security interests by constraining future sales of Russian advanced conventional

weapons rather than not entering into the agreement and watching

Russia proceed with sales of the most threatening weapons.

Had not the United States secured this commitment, Russia

would have been free to provide Iran with advanced conventional

weapons and greater overall quantities of advanced conventional

weapons. It would have been able to sell Iran items such as surface-to-air missiles, items that we know the Iranians still are interested in acquiring. Instead, we were able to get Russia to commit

not to sign any new arms contracts with Iran, thus precluding the

sales of weapons that could create a serious threat to U.S. forces,

to our allies in the region, and to stability worldwide.

Mr. Chairman, confidentiality is crucial to many diplomatic negotiations. As a result of breaches of confidentiality, these understandings are now at risk. Playing this out in public can only have

a chilling effect on the ability of any administration, this administration and any future administrations, to continue this process,

and could seriously undermine U.S. national security.

Of course we would have preferred to stop the sale of all conventional arms to Iran. But this deal precluded the most advanced

conventional weapons from reaching Iran after 1995, the very

weapons that would have provided the greatest risk to our security.

If the United States had failed to respond to this leadership challenge and had stood by while Russia pursued sales to Iran of the

most destabilizing conventional weapons, the Middle East would be

even more explosive than it is now. Seven years of patient and high

level diplomacy have resulted in Iran obtaining fewer weapons. Of

22

course we wish we could have stopped more, but it is only as a result of our efforts that there has been any downturn in Iranian acquisitions.

The approach outlined by this aide memoire and the overall administration approach advance U.S. security interests and those of

our friends and our allies by constraining future Russian behavior.

Without these commitments, the world would have been more dangerous.

Thank you, and I would now like to turn to Mr. DeThomas.

Senator SMITH. Mr. DeThomas.

Mr. DETHOMAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let us do a sound

check at the start. Am I audible?

I will speak very briefly and far less eloquently than anybody

today. I want to discuss a little bit one of the ancillary press moments that we have had at the same time as the leaks have come

out about the aide memoire, and that involves arrangements that

we have with Russia on nuclear technology. We want to get this

all out on the table now. We do not want to have a dribbling set

of controversies.

First, the executive branch’s policy on blocking nuclear technology to Iran is essentially unchanged since 1985. We have opposed the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran, even under international safeguards, because of our concerns about its nuclear

weapons ambitions. Iran lacks the technical wherewithal to go it

alone on producing nuclear weapons. Since 1992 the key to constraining Iran’s nuclear ambition is to deny it for technology, and

that technology’s principal source since 1992, our principal area of

concern, is Russia.

The collapse of the Soviet Union deprived Russia and its massive

nuclear industry of its entire foreign market and a significant fraction of its previous domestic market. Economic imperatives drove

Russia to market its nuclear technology in places where it did not

face Western competition. As a result, Iran became one of the areas

that the Russian nuclear industry became interested in.

It concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran in 1992.

In 1994 the Russians and Iranians announced their intention to

finish a power reactor that had initially been started by the Germans in Iran. It is called the Bushehr reactor because of its location. We were and are opposed to that reactor; we were opposed to

it at the time. It is not because we thought the reactor itself under

safeguards was a proliferation threat, but because the Bushehr

project could be used by Iran as a cover for engaging in more sensitive forms of cooperation with more direct links to nuclear weapons.

This agreement between Russia and Iran contained other provisions for additional power reactors and other technology far more

significant for Iran’s nuclear weapons ambition. We know that elements of the Russian Government were considering the transfer of

centrifuge uranium enrichment technology that would permit the

production of highly enriched uranium, and they were interested in

providing a powerful research reactor sufficient to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. We knew there were plans for other key

technologies.

23

This package put together would have greatly advanced Iran’s

ability to go for the full nuclear fuel cycle. The Clinton administration embarked at the beginning of 1995 and in 1994 on a high-level

diplomatic campaign to halt this project. Following a series of exchanges between the President and President Yeltsin, the Russians

agreed to scale back their cooperation with Iran very significantly

in 1995.

President Yeltsin first agreed not to supply a powerful natural

uranium-fueled research reactor. He subsequently agreed not to

supply Iran with any technology that would put at risk the international nonproliferation regime. This included the supply of uranium enrichment technology or the supply of reactors suited for the

production of plutonium.

The culmination of this difficult diplomatic campaign was the letter from Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to Vice President Gore

which was cited recently in the press. Much of the substance of the

arrangements made were announced in the May summit in Moscow

in 1995. This culmination did not give us everything we wanted,

but it did eliminate those aspects of cooperation with Iran that presented a clear and present danger to our national security.

Without those limits, the Russian Government could have supplied to Iran hundreds of millions of dollars of sensitive nuclear

technology and Iran would be well on the way today to mastering

the nuclear fuel cycle.

Mr. Chairman, I will leave for the written testimony in the

record the remainder of my oral statement, except to sum up the

testimony of Mr. Barker and myself. Russia is key to achieving our

objectives both in the conventional and nuclear fields in Iran. We

have no alternative but to continue an active strategy of seeking

to thwart Iranian efforts to procure the material and technologies

they need for their programs.

This is a step by step incremental process. There is no silver bullet. It is going to have to be worked at many levels and worked continuously. We think our policies have been effective. Since the signing of the aide memoire, Russia has not concluded new agreements

to export arms to Iran. It has not exported advanced conventional

arms to Iran. And in fact, even today it has not completed the

original shipments from 1991. Iran’s efforts to acquire the types

and quantities of arms that would threaten regional stability have

been thwarted.

We see a similar story in the nuclear field. We have succeeded

in slowing and complicating Iran’s programs and driving up their

costs. We have closed off many of the world’s best sources of advanced technology to Iranian procurement efforts and forced Iran

to rely on technologies less sophisticated and reliable than would

otherwise be the case. Critically, we have bought time. We have

bought time for our process.

I want to conclude my remarks today on a personal note. I have

served as a nonproliferation expert for Secretaries of State in administrations of both parties for nearly 20 years. The arrangements

discussed here today are manifestly in the interests of the United

States and of the effort to halt proliferation. But they have powerful opponents in Moscow. A partisan brawl that drags legitimately

classified material into the newspapers as photo insets can only

24

1 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iranian Arms Transfers: The Facts, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, revised October 15, 2000, p.2.

benefit Iran and those forces in Moscow most hostile to our objectives.

If these arrangements are not in place, Iran will be in position

to acquire new weapons and a wide array of sensitive nuclear technology. That will not be in the interest of future administrations

of either party or of the American people.

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Messrs. Barker and DeThomas follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN P. BARKER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR NONPROLIFERATION CONTROLS

AND

JOSEPH M. DETHOMAS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR REGIONAL

NONPROLIFERATION

Mr. Chairman, we are here today under difficult and unhappy circumstances. Serious accusations have been leveled. Classified documents are appearing in the

press as photo insets, and our negotiating strategy with Russia on sensitive national

security matters is being compromised by discussing these matters in public. Anthony Cordesman, a respected and very independent authority on national security

matters, and the Near East in particular, has recently summarized the issues we

will address today:

Political campaigns are a poor time to debate complex military issues, particularly when the debate is based on press reports that are skewed to

stress the importance of the story at the expense of objective perspective

and the facts. Iran does represent a potential threat to U.S. interests, but

it has not had a major conventional arms build-up or received destabilizing

transfers of advanced conventional weapons. The violations of U.S. and

Russian agreements have been minor, have had little military meaning,

and been more technical than substantive.1

We are appearing today to say what the Administration has done over the past

seven years to address what we agree is a serious national security problem: Iran’s quest to acquire advanced conventional and nuclear weapons as well as the means

to deliver them. But, we also want to address directly the allegations we have heard

about violations of laws and agreements purportedly kept secret from Congress. We

will address what we can in this statement, but we are sure you understand that

unauthorized disclosure of classified information does not mean it has been declassified. We still have an obligation to protect classified national security information.

We are prepared to address detailed questions in closed session.

Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, the means to deliver them, as

well as advanced conventional weapons, has been a top foreign policy and national

security objective throughout this and previous administrations. Most Western nuclear and arms exporters were by early 1995 in broad agreement on these matters,

but Russia was clearly central to success. How to keep the collapse of the Soviet

Union from opening up a huge opportunity for Iran to acquire these items by purchase or theft was one of the most complex and challenging problems the Administration confronted as it took office.

We needed to address three separate challenges. First, we had to ensure that political and economic collapse did not open the gates to the loss of control of Russia’s expertise, equipment and technology. Second, we had to ensure Russia had the legal

and enforcement tools to control its capabilities. But most of all we needed to convince the Russian government that serious and firm constraints on what it exported,

and to whom, were critical to Russia’s own national and security interests.

The Soviet Union had been a primary exporter of conventional arms and nuclear

technology, but the end of the Cold War deprived it of its foreign markets, and domestic military requirements were shrinking at the same time. In 1991 and 1992,

Russia began to pursue the Iranian conventional arms and nuclear market in earnest. In 1991 Russia concluded a large, multi-year conventional arms contract. In

1992 it concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran. It is these two agreements—which predate the Clinton Administration—that the Administration had to

25

contain and reverse. At the same time, Iran began to try to exploit the economic

chaos and a lack of effective regulation to end-run the Russian government even

when it did want to block particular transactions.

To achieve these three critical objectives, the Administration has pursued a complex and long-term strategy. We put innovative assistance programs in place to control technology and prevent the ‘‘brain drain’’ of Russian scientists and their expertise to other states. We used diplomacy to build consensus on the importance of restraint in exports and effective controls to implement policy. We provided training

and advice on sound export controls. Most important of all, we engaged all levels

of the Russian government repeatedly and relentlessly to persuade them to walk

back from arrangements with Tehran that were threatening not only to our security, but in the end to Russia’s own interests. Where necessary, we used the threat

of sanctions, and on occasion we imposed sanctions. This is not a strategy of immediate gratification.

It has been a long and difficult effort, but it has produced significant successes.

We have substantially constrained the types and quantities of conventional military equipment Iran is able to obtain. And we have slowed Iran’s acquisition of

WMD and delivery systems. Let me give you a one sentence summary of what we

achieved: Russia promised that it would not conclude new contracts for conventional

weapons to Iran and it agreed not to provide to Iran most of the nuclear technology—including all the most dangerous types of that technology—that it was proposing to sell. One measure of our success in restraining Russian export behavior

might be the many complaints from Russians directly, and in the Russian press,

that Russia has lost billions of dollars of conventional arms sales to Iran, and hundreds of millions of dollars of sensitive nuclear technology sales, due specifically to

our efforts. We know that these understandings were a good deal for the U.S., in

part because of the Russian media commentators and politicians who argue that

they are not in Russia’s interests.

We will discuss in detail the efforts we made on the conventional and nuclear

front, but first we want to address headon the accusations that have been circulating. The first accusation is that we kept these actions secret from you and the

public. That is incorrect. Our actions both in the conventional field and the nuclear

field in 1995 were discussed publicly at the May Moscow summit in extensive detail,

as was the fact that the Vice President and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin

would resolve the details. That understanding between the Vice President and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin on conventional arms was announced publicly

in a fact sheet, also widely distributed, immediately after the June 1995 GoreChernomyrdin Commission meeting. The understandings the Vice President reached

in 1995 on both nuclear and conventional matters were briefed to Congress. Of

course, certain sensitive documents were classified, and were closely held in the Executive Branch. This is the common practice for all Administrations on very sensitive diplomatic negotiations, but the thrust of those documents has been conveyed

to both Congress and the American people.

The second accusation is that we reached a deal with Moscow to evade our own

law. This is not true. We agreed to provide assurances that we would take ‘‘appropriate steps’’ to avoid penalties on transfers in the pipeline, but only after careful

review to ensure that they did not in fact trigger mandatory sanctions under the

Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act or other potentially applicable laws. We will be

prepared to discuss this in considerable detail, but it is important to state in this

open session that the conclusion of non-sanctionability was reached only after careful review and detailed analysis by the State Department, the intelligence community, the Defense Department, and senior levels of the Joint Staff.

Some have cited a sentence in a recently leaked classified letter of the Secretary

of State as being inconsistent with this statement. The fact is that Secretary

Albright’s letter was intended to deliver a stern warning that failure to abide by

the restrictions embodied in the Aide Memoire regarding arms sales to Iran could

have serious consequences, including the possibility of sanctions. Her letter did not

go into the nuances of U.S. sanctions law. We can address this issue in detail in

closed session.

The third accusation is that understandings we reached with the Russians should

have been formally submitted to Congress under the Case Act because, it is alleged,

they are legally binding. We did discuss with Russia whether to negotiate an agreement that would be binding under international law, and after consulting agreed

instead to address these matters in an understanding, a political promise by Russia

documented first in a public joint statement. This understanding was elaborated in

more detail in the Aide Memoire. Under this understanding, Russia has not concluded new contracts for new weapons. It has not even delivered all the weapons

it said it would. It has certainly foregone billions in sales.

26

While important elements of our diplomatic efforts have required confidentiality,

key to our success has been the fact that we have engaged Russia’s leadership at

the most senior levels to make authoritative and public statements. Key commitments were made in joint statements or press conferences after Summits between

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in 1994 and 1995. Additional Russian commitments

were articulated in public at the conclusion of meetings between Vice President

Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.

While the substance of these understandings has been public since 1995, some details were kept confidential. Confidentiality is crucial to many diplomatic negotiations. The diplomatic process on conventional arms transfers has fortunately not

come to a halt because of recent leaks. But playing this out in the press can only

have a chilling effect on our ability to continue the process, and could seriously undermine the U.S. national security interests that are at stake in these discussions.

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

The understanding that the U.S. reached with Russia in 1995 to limit the sale

of conventional weapons to Iran was an important gain for U.S. security, as well

as for our friends and allies. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the

rapid opening of new markets for conventional arms. Russia was quick to sign a

contract with Iran for the sale of a broad range of conventional arms. This Administration inherited the situation of an expanding arms relationship between Russia

and Iran. The question was how to constrain it.

The 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act urged the President to ‘‘urgently

seek the agreement of other nations’’ to constrain arms sales to Iran and Iraq. We

did just that, securing important commitments from all countries that joined the

Wassenaar Arrangement. They agreed not to supply arms and related technologies

to ‘‘countries of concern,’’ understood to include Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea.

Our ability to hold these other major supplier states to these commitments has

always depended on maintaining a united front. If one key supplier were to resume

sales to Iran, it could be difficult to persuade others to continue foregoing these

highly lucrative sales. It was with this in mind that we sought the commitment of

Russia to curtail arms sales to Iran.

During their September 1994 Summit, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton reached an

understanding that Russia would not undertake new contracts or other agreements

to transfer conventional arms to Iran, but that existing contracts could be fulfilled.

President Yeltsin announced this understanding publicly. This matter was again on

the agenda for the May 1995 Summit, and the subject of public discussion even before the Summit. In a pre-Summit press briefing, Secretary of State Christopher expressed hope that Russia would join the new multilateral regime to control exports

of conventional weapons and related dual-use technologies, stating that ‘‘the only

thing that stands between Russia joining . . . is working out the arrangements with

respect to their sales to Iran, those negotiations are going forward.’’ Secretary of Defense Perry, when asked about whether Russia’s arms sales to Iran were a reason

for alarm, spoke first of the submarines, noting that two had been delivered and

one remained to be delivered, and then spoke to the more general issue:

We do not see cause for concern on the level and the nature of conventional

arms being transferred. We would prefer they not be transferred, but

we’re—quite satisfied with the agreement not to continue transfer. The

Russians have a very, very substantial capability in conventional arms and

conventional arms technology. And it would give us a very substantial problem if they were to make a free transfer of those to the Iranians. So I’d

like to focus on the positive side of that, which is their agreement to cut

that off after those present contracts.

The May 1995 Summit resolved the outstanding issues, and a Joint Statement

dated May 10, 1995 reaffirmed that Russia would ‘‘undertake no new contracts or

other agreements to transfer arms to Iran. This commitment is comprehensive and

covers both arms and associated items.’’ The Joint Statement also reaffirmed U.S.

support for Russia’s participation as a founding member in a new international export control regime for the control of arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies. It was also announced that same day that the Presidents had asked Vice

President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin ‘‘to record the details in an agreement no later than their meeting in June.’’ The Aide Memoire recording those understandings was signed the following month.

The U.S. had little direct leverage; we were essentially asking Russia to forego

billions of dollars in arms sales in exchange for membership in a multilateral group

that would only further constrain their arms sales. But we worked with the leverage

that we did have, and through the dogged determination of our senior officials, RusVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:49 Mar 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 69753 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
27

sia agreed to close out its existing contracts within a few years and agreed not to

sign new contracts for the sale of arms to Iran. Had not the U.S. secured this commitment, Russia would have been free to provide Iran with advanced conventional

arms, and greater overall quantities of conventional arms. It would have been able

to sell Iran items such as surface-to-air missiles, items we know that the Iranians

sought to acquire. Instead we were able to get Russia to commit not to sign any

new arms contracts with Iran, thus precluding the sale of weapons that could provide great threats to U.S. forces, to our allies including Israel, and to stability in

the region.

Of course we would have preferred to have stopped the sale of all conventional

arms to Iran. But this deal precluded the most advanced conventional weapons from

reaching Iran—the very weapons that would have provided the greatest risks to

U.S. interests and those of our friends and allies (and the very weapons targeted

by the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act).

Much has been made in the press recently about whether the arms covered under

the contract signed in 1991 would adversely affect U.S. security. There have also

been accusations that the 1995 understanding was not consistent with, or even violated, U.S. sanctions laws, and in particular, that a commitment was made to ignore

U.S. sanctions law. A further accusation is that the understandings reached are legally binding obligations, and that all this was kept from Congress. Let me address

each of these allegations in turn.

Was U.S. Security or Regional Stability Jeopardized?

As a key part of the process to resolve the issues addressed in the Joint Statement and the Aide Memoire, we insisted on an exchange of information on these

pre-existing contracts. The impact of all of the arms transferred or to be transferred,

including the Kilo submarine, was reviewed by senior military and defense officials,

including senior levels of the Joint Staff. It was their judgment that transfers under

those pre-existing contracts would not provide Iran with new military capabilities,

alter the regional military balance, or compromise the ability of the U.S. and our

allies to protect our mutual security interests. They judged that the declared pipeline contained no destabilizing types of advanced conventional weapons. This judgment extended to the third Kilo-class submarine that Russia delivered in 1996. Our

military judged that while the submarine represented an added threat to U.S. forces

in the Gulf, it was judged to be manageable. As Dr. Perry noted publicly at the time,

it was far better to obtain the commitment from Russia to forego future sales of advanced conventional weapons or destabilizing quantities of other types of military

equipment.

Both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee were informed about the understanding in 1995. Then Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Einhorn revisited this issue in open testimony June 5, 1997

before this Committee, noting that ‘‘Russia informed us that one Kilo-class submarine was expected to be delivered to Iran’’ and that tanks were also to be delivered under the pre-existing contracts. ‘‘Prior to concluding the 1995 agreement we

made certain that the contracts in the pipeline . . . did not involve any new weapons

systems and would not alter the regional balance or compromise the ability of the

U.S. and our allies to protect our mutual interests.’’

Frankly, these were hard calls—but we made an informed decision with the best

advice available, and with the involvement of our senior military. We judged that

we could best protect our security interests by constraining future sales of Russian

advanced conventional weapons, rather than not entering into the agreement and

watching Russia proceed with sales of the most threatening weapons.

Were Sanctions Laws Ignored?

The 1995 understanding was fully consistent with U.S. law. The transfers covered

under the Aide Memoire were not sanctionable.

The applicability of U.S. sanctions laws was explicitly addressed within the Executive Branch before we completed the 1995 understanding. After a review of the

facts, and with specific input from and concurrence of the Defense Department and

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we concluded that sanctions under the Iran-Iraq act would

not be triggered because the items did not meet the definition of ‘‘advanced conventional weapons’’ under the Act, as explained above, nor would the types and quantities of arms to be transferred be destabilizing to the region. These conclusions are

supported by the terms of the Act and its legislative history.

In addition, before we concluded the Aide Memoire, State legal counsel reviewed

other applicable statutes that govern transfers of lethal military equipment to Iran,

and determined that these statutes did not apply to the arms transfers identified

28

under the agreement because the contracts had been entered into before the effective date specified in the legislation.

Some have alleged that the U.S. has not applied the sanctions laws to Russian

transfers of conventional arms to Iran. That is not true, and indeed the Committee

has been previously informed of this in writing. We can review this for you in detail

in a classified setting.

Furthermore, the Aide Memoire does not commit the U.S. not to enforce the sanctions laws, as has been erroneously suggested. The Aide Memoire notes that the

United States is prepared to take appropriate steps to avoid any penalties to Russia

that might otherwise arise under domestic law with respect to the completion of the

transfers disclosed in the Annex for so long as the Russian Federation acts in accordance with these commitments.

The phrase ‘‘appropriate steps’’ in a non-legally binding document clearly would

not compel the Executive Branch to ignore domestic law. It was drafted this way

specifically to allow us to enforce the law, bearing in mind the Executive Branch

in fact had legal means available to ‘‘avoid penalties’’—the waiver provisions in both

of the potentially applicable statutes. As noted above, we have never had to take

any steps pursuant to this pledge, for after reviewing the list of transfers that would

be grand-fathered, we determined (before signing the Aide Memoire) that then existing sanctions laws would not be triggered by the transfers.

Secretary Albright’s January letter to Foreign Minister Ivanov is entirely consistent with the purposes of the Aide Memoire and the Iran-Iraq Act. Secretary

Albright delivered a stern warning that failure to abide by the restrictions embodied

in the Aide Memoire regarding arms sales to Iran could have serious consequences,

including the possibility of sanctions. In that letter, we were still seeking clarifications from the Russians regarding the numbers and types of transfers that they

wished to continue beyond the December 31, 1999 deadline. At the time of the letter, those clarifications had not yet been received. Because it was essential that the

U.S. obtain this information, we felt that it was appropriate to stress the maximum

consequences they might face, depending on further disclosures about Russian export activity. A variety of discretionary sanctions were available to us under legal

authorities other than the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act and the lethal military equipment laws, (e.g., cutting off licenses under the Arms Export Control Act).

We felt this approach would be most effective in persuading the Russians to provide the needed information. And, indeed, this approach succeeded in obtaining a

reaffirmation of the Russian commitment to limit the scope of the conventional

weapons transfers to those items covered by the Aide Memoire.

It has always been the case that the transfers subject to the Aide Memoire do

not trigger U.S. sanctions laws. That was our conclusion in 1995, and it has never

changed.

Any transfers that are outside of the scope of the Aide Memoire could of course

trigger the sanctions laws, including the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act and

the lethal military equipment laws. We continue to monitor this closely, and we will

apply the law to Russia, as we have in the past, if Russia completes transactions

that trigger sanctions.

Did We Make Legally-Binding Commitments?

As indicated in public statements from that period, we were prepared in 1994 to

enter into a formal agreement providing legally binding commitments. After consulting with Russia on how to reflect our discussions, we instead chose to proceed

with political statements and understandings. Insisting on a formal legal approach

would not have furthered our purpose to stop Russia from signing new arms contracts with Iran, nor would it have prevented Russia from making sales that were

significant threats to U.S. interests and U.S. security.

The 1995 Summit statements were clearly political undertakings made by each

side. The 1995 Aide Memoire recorded details of those political undertakings.

Contrary to speculation in the press, a document is not legally binding solely because it deals with an important matter and there are commitments made by both

sides. The two sides must intend for the document to be legally binding. That was

not the case here—as amply demonstrated in the text and the negotiating record.

Was Congress Informed of These Understandings?

At no time did we attempt to keep the substance or existence of these understandings hidden from Congress. They were the subject of White House press conferences both before and after the 1995 Summit, and the subject of a Joint Statement from the Summit.

We also briefed Congress on these understandings and accomplishments. The

House International Relations Committee staff was briefed in July, 1995. Certain

29

interested House Members, including Chairman Gilman, were briefed in August,

1995. As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has noted, it was briefed in mid1995. And the understandings were recounted in open public testimony before Senate committees several times, including twice in 1997.

NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AND COOPERATION

The Executive Branch’s policy on blocking nuclear cooperation with Iran is essentially unchanged since 1985. We have opposed the transfer of nuclear technology to

Iran even under international safeguards, because of our concerns about its nuclear

weapon ambitions. Iran has lacked the technical wherewithal to succeed in producing nuclear weapons. Key to constraining Iran’s nuclear ambition is to deny it

foreign technology. Since 1992, the greatest challenge to that policy has been from

Russia.

The collapse of the Soviet Union deprived Russia’s massive nuclear industry of its

entire foreign market and a significant fraction of its previous domestic market.

Economic imperatives drove Russia to market its nuclear technology in places where

it did not face Western competition. As a result of the successful informal international embargo on nuclear transfers to Iran that we had crafted, Iran was such

a market.

Based on an agreement concluded in 1992, the Russians and Iranians announced

in 1994 and early 1995 their intentions to finish a power reactor originally started

by the Germans in Bushehr. We were and still are opposed to this reactor, not because we believe such a light-water power reactor under International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards itself poses a serious proliferation threat, but because of our

concern that the Bushehr project would be used by Iran as a cover for maintaining

wide-ranging contacts with Russian nuclear entities and for engaging in more sensitive forms of cooperation with more direct applicability to a nuclear weapons program.

This agreement between Russia and Iran also contained provisions for additional

power reactors, as well as other technology far more significant for Iran’s nuclear

weapons ambitions. We know that elements of the Russian govermnent were considering the transfer of centrifuge enrichment technology that would permit production

of highly-enriched uranium, and a research reactor of sufficient power to produce

plutonium for nuclear weapons. We knew there were plans to supply other key nuclear technologies. Altogether, this package of items would have greatly advanced

Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons usable material.

The Clinton Administration embarked on a high-level diplomatic campaign to halt

this project. Following a series of exchanges between the President and President

Yeltsin, the Russians agreed to scale back their cooperation with Iran very significantly in 1995. The results of that effort were reported in The Nonproliferation

Primer—A Majority Report of the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs:

Although Moscow was unwilling to cancel the Bushehr project, in 1995 the

Administration did persuade President Yeltsin to limit the scope of Russian

nuclear assistance. Yeltsin approved the sale of nuclear reactors, but ordered Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy to drop plans to provide equipment and advice to Iran’s effort to mine uranium ore and process it to use

as reactor fuel—assistance that would have given Iran an independent

source of fissile material for nuclear weapons. (p. 18)

In fact, President Yeltsin agreed not to supply Iran with any technology that

would put at risk the international nonproliferation regime. This included the supply of uranium enrichment technology or the supply of reactors suited for the production of plutonium. The culmination of this difficult diplomatic campaign was the

letter from Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to Vice President Gore. That letter codified the limits Russia would impose on itself in cooperating with Iran. Much of the

substance was briefed to the press before and especially after the May 1995 Moscow

Summit. That substance has been described to Congress through open testimony

and a series of classified briefings.

It did not give us everything we wanted, but it did eliminate those aspects of cooperation with Iran that presented a clear and present danger to our national security. Without the limits the Russian government did impose, Iran today would have

received hundreds of millions of dollars worth of sensitive nuclear technology and

would be well on the way to mastering the nuclear fuel cycle.

That is what the Chernomyrdin letter is. Now, let me say what it is not.

It is not a secret agreement hidden from Congress. The text of the letter was and

is classified, just as have been many other confidential exchanges undertaken by

this and past Administrations. This was a highly sensitive diplomatic negotiation

30

and publicity could well have brought it down. The letter is still classified. We cannot discuss its contents in detail in an open session.

We want to be clear on a critical point. Confidentiality is crucial to many diplomatic negotiations. The diplomatic process on these matters fortunately has not

come to a halt because of recent leaks. But playing this out in the press can only

have a chilling effect on our ability to continue the process, and could seriously undermine the U.S. national security interests that are at stake in these discussions.

There is in fact a sentence in a letter—quoted in the press—that indicates the

Russians did not want us to brief Congress. That sentence had no effect. We informed the Russians before the letter was sent that we would brief Congress, and

we informed the Russians immediately upon its receipt that we would brief the matter to Congress. The Russians accepted this. We agreed that we would do this in

a confidential manner as we do for many sensitive negotiations. Briefings were offered to key Senate and House Members in the spring of 1996. Representatives of

the National Security Council, the Office of the Vice President and the Department

of State did the briefings. Subsequently, we have updated this Committee and others on the state-of-play of our efforts, both in open testimony and in classified briefings.

The Administration did not give up its opposition to the Bushehr reactor. We still

oppose it. Our actions in persuading other countries not to participate in the project

have slowed it down. But only a decision by the Russian government could stop it.

The Russian government has not been prepared to give up the reactor project, at

least in part because of its big price tag.

The Administration has not turned a blind eye to Russian activities. Recently Russian entities—some of them associated with the Ministry of Atomic Energy—have

pursued cooperation with Iran that is not consistent with the Chernomyrdin assurances. We sanctioned two Russian entities in January of 1999 as a result. We have

also been unstinting in our day-to-day diplomacy with the Russians to block any

transfers. The Administration has made a major effort over the past few months to

bring Russian behavior back into line with the assurance. We cannot report complete success, but last month the Russians did suspend the activities of an institute

in St. Petersburg that planned to transfer equipment related to a sophisticated

means of uranium enrichment.

I do not want to downplay the current problems we are facing on the nuclear

front, but they are considerably less than what we would be facing today without

the Chernomyrdin assurance. Faced with the choice of pursuing this at times frustrating diplomatic effort and the alternative of unconstrained Russian assistance to

Iran, we would choose the former.

I want to conclude my remarks on a personal note. I have served as a nonproliferation expert for Secretaries of State and Administrations of both parties for

nearly twenty years. The arrangements discussed here today are manifestly in the

interests of the United States and of the effort to halt nuclear proliferation. But,

they have powerful opponents in Moscow. A partisan brawl that drags legitimately

classified material into the newspapers as photo insets can only benefit Iran. If

these arrangements are not in place, Iran will be in position to acquire new reactors

and a wide array of sensitive nuclear technology. That will not be in the interest

of future Administrations of either party or of the American people.

IN CONCLUSION

Impeding Iran’s WMD and missile delivery systems will remain at the top of the

U.S. national security agenda. Ensuring that Iran does not acquire destabilizing

types and quantities of advanced conventional weapons is also critical.

Russia is key to both those objectives. We have no alternative but to continue an

active strategy of seeking to thwart Iranian efforts to procure the material and technologies they need for their non-conventional programs. That means engaging Russia directly and actively; working with them to strengthen resolve; assisting them

in strengthening export control laws and regulations; and helping to make the implementation of those policies, laws, and regulations more effective. This is a stepby-step, incremental process. There is no silver bullet, it is a problem that must be

worked at many levels, from many directions, and worked continuously.

By any reasonable standard, our policies have been effective. Since the signing of

the Aide Memoire, Russia has not concluded new agreements to export arms to Iran,

it has not exported advanced conventional arms to Iran, and in fact it has not even

to date completed shipments under the original 1991 agreement. Iran’s efforts to acquire the types and quantities of arms that would threaten regional stability have

been thwarted.

31

On the nuclear and missile programs, we see a similar story. We have succeeded

in slowing and complicating Iran’s programs and driving up their costs. We have

closed off many of the world’s best sources of advanced technology to Iranian procurement efforts, and forced Iran to rely on technologies less sophisticated and reliable than would otherwise be the case. And critically, we have bought additional

time. As Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation Robert Einhorn testified before

this Committee just last month: despite the gains Iran has made, we do not consider

it inevitable that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons deliverable by long-range missiles.

But avoiding that highly destabilizing outcome, or the threat of advanced conventional weapons in the region, will require continued leadership by the United States

and the concerted efforts of the international community, including the active commitment and cooperation of Russia. We have made important steps. This will continue to be a key national security priority for this Administration, and we will

leave a vastly different situation than would have been the case had we failed to

limit Russia’s nuclear and conventional arms exports to Iran.

Senator SMITH. Thank you both.

Per my understanding with Secretary Talbott, this now concludes

the open portion of this hearing, so we will——

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, before you go into closed session,

I am not going to ask a question. I would like to ask us a question,

if I may. If I understand it correctly, the two questions that we are

attempting to answer, get an answer to, are: One, whether or not

this administration made a legally binding agreement with the

Russians that under American law would require the administration to have fully informed the Congress of the nature and the detailed agreement. That is one question, correct?

Senator SMITH. I believe that is the first question, and I think

their answer was——

Senator BIDEN. No, I am not even looking for their answer. I just

want to make sure that I understand what we are trying to seek.

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, no, I want to make sure that we are

laying out as well—we are having this hearing to get what is the

deal.

Senator BIDEN. Right.

Senator BROWNBACK. So that we can understand what that was,

what it was in writing. There is a question about whether this

should have been submitted under Case-Zablocki——

Senator BIDEN. Right.

Senator BROWNBACK [continuing]. That we have had previously.

And there is also question about was this an international agreement that sidestepped required sanctions to be put.

Senator BIDEN. I got that. So we are in agreement on the first

score. The first score is that, did the administration violate U.S.

law that requires any administration to submit to the U.S. Congress the details of any legally binding agreement that would

amount to an executive agreement or amount to a binding legal

agreement. That is the first question.

The second question is whether or not—whatever the answer to

that is, the second question is were there transfers made to Iran

that would have violated—that did violate U.S. law sanction policy,

requiring the administration to sanction Russia for having made

the transfers. That is the second question, correct?

So I just want to make sure as we go in we understand what we

are asking here, because this can get very confusing for folks.

32

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, if I could too, I want to submit here,

I want to see the agreement.

Senator BIDEN. I got that, I got that. But if the agreement is not

a legally binding agreement under the terms of Case-Zablocki, then

there is no requirement to submit it to us, No. 1. Even though we

may want to know it, there is no requirement to submit it to us.

No. 2, if the transfers that were made within the timeframe we

are talking about here did not violate sanctions law of the U.S.

Congress, then no assertion, whatever it was, was of any relevance

here made by the administration. You either violate the law or you

are not violating the law in the transfer.

So they are the two questions that we should be looking at here.

I just want to make sure we do not—then if we want to look at

other things that do not relate to any violation—I assume this is

so urgent to have this hearing 13 or 12 or 10 days or 9 days before

the election is because there is the assertion that there was a violation of U.S. law, not whether the judgment was right or judgment

was wrong about whether we should have done what we have done:

Was there a violation of U.S. law, because if there was not then

we should be holding hearings on judgments about what each of

the candidates say about foreign policy. That is a different deal. I

just want to make sure we know what we are looking at here.

Senator SMITH. Senator Biden, what I have heard today are a

number of assertions that they are certainly free to make, but

which are not supported by the intelligence information I have

seen. If they have other information that they can show us that

will substantiate what has been asserted, then that is what I am

after.

And yes, I do think we need to know if laws have been violated.

These are assertions not made by Republicans, but by the New

York Times.

Senator BIDEN. I am not suggesting anything about who made

the assertions. I just want to make sure we know what we are

looking at, because this will be used as precedent. I do not want— if there were no assertions of a violation of U.S. law, then it would

not be a very good precedent to set to hold 12 days before an election, or however many days it is, a debate in this committee on

American foreign policy and what is a good idea and a bad idea.

Senator SMITH. I just want to say that they have used the words

that they ‘‘telegraphed’’ to Congress what it is we are supposed to

know. I hope there is a precedent that comes out of this that

telegraphing through the media is not enough to comply with U.S.

law, that there are other ways in which this is supposed to happen.

Those are the words they use.

Senator BIDEN. No, I understand. I will cease with this. I used

to, a hundred years ago, practice law and I was one of those people

that, they are not very much in vogue these days, a trial lawyer.

I actually tried cases. I learned from a guy named Sid Bailick and

he used to always say to the jury before it began, heard the opening statement and-or began its deliberations, at either end, he

would say: Keep your eye on the ball, keep your eye on the ball.

The question is did my client kill Cock Robin, not is he a nice guy,

not would you want to take him home for dinner, not would you

want your daughter dating him; did he kill Cock Robin?

33

* Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved.

The question here is did the administration violate the law either

in that it signed an agreement requiring under the law submission

to the U.S. Congress or, did it violate the law in not imposing sanctions that should have been imposed under U.S. law? That is keeping your eye on the ball.

Senator BROWNBACK. I want to make sure we get from—in the

closed session, if that is what we are trying to outline here, that

we will need to know and to have the documents, the annexes, and

what was conveyed from Russia to Iran to be able to make the sort

of judgments of the charges that have been put forward here, so

that I hope that we can get that all covered and disclosed to us in

a private session so we will know those matters to be able to make

the judgment on.

Senator SMITH. With that, ladies and gentlemen, the public hearing is now adjourned and we shall reconvene in 5 minutes in closed

session.

[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

IRANIAN ARMS TRANSFERS: THE FACTS*

ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN

ARLEIGH A. BURKE CHAIR IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL

STUDIES

Revised October 15, 2000

Political campaigns are a poor time to debate complex military issues, particularly

when the debate is based on press reports that are skewed to stress the importance

of the story at the expense of objective perspective and the facts. Iran does represent

a potential threat to US interests, but it has not had a major conventional arms

build-up or received destabilizing transfers of advanced conventional weapons. The

violations of US and Russian agreements have been minor, have had little military

meaning, and been more technical than substantive.

In fact, Iran faces major military problems because of its lack of conventional

modernization. The real threat it poses is one driven by its efforts to proliferate,

rather than conventional arms transfers.

IRANIAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES

Iran has cut its military expenditures since the Iran-Iraq War, and it has done

so in spite of the fact it lost some 40-60% of its holdings of major land weapons during the climatic battles of the war in 1988, and much of its military inventory is

becoming obsolete. US government estimates indicate that Iran’s real defense

spending is now less than one-half of the level it reached during the Iran-Iraq war,

but that Iranian military expenditures still average over $4.0 billion a year.

Measured in constant 1997, dollars, Iran’s military expenditures peaked in 1986,

at a cost of well $15 billion. They dropped from $8.3 billion to $6.8 billion immediately after the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War, when Iran clearly made a decision

not to try to pay to recoup its losses during that war. They then dropped from $7.2

billion in 1990 to $4.2 billion in 1992 after Iran assessed the degree to which the

UN Coalition destroyed much of Iraq’s military capability in the Gulf War. They

were $5.0 billion in 1993, $4.8 billion in 1994, $3.6 billion in 1995, $3.9 billion in

1996, and $4.7 billion in 1998. Ironically, they rose after the US imposed sanctions

in an effort to cut them.1

To put such spending levels in context, Egypt’s total spending during 1990-1995

averaged around $1.7 to $2.7 billion. Iraq’s expenditures averaged around $10 billion during 1988-1991, but no firm recent figures are available. Kuwait’s spending

reached peaks of $15 billion a year during 1990-1992, but dropped to $3.2 to $3.6

billion from 1993-1995. Turkey has recently spent between $6 billion and $7 billion.

The UAE spends around $1.8 to $2.2 billion annually, and Saudi Arabia spends

$17.2 to $20 billion.2

34

There are differences of opinion within the US government over the size of these

Iranian military expenditures. For example, US intelligence experts felt in 1994

that Iran had spent up to $8 billion on military forces in 1993, while ACDA estimated only $4.9 billion. The CIA issued revised estimates in 1995 that stated it

could not make accurate conversions of expenditures in Iranian Rials to dollars, but

indicated that Iran had reported it had spent 1,785 billion Rials on defense in 1992,

including $808 million in hard currency, and 2,507 billion Rials in 1993, including

$850 million in hard currency.3

The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) has also produced different

figures. It estimates that Iran’s economic problems and defeat in 1988 reduced

Iran’s defense spending from $9.9 billion in 1987/88, to $5.8 billion in 1989/90, $3.2 billion in 1990, $5.8 billion in 1991, $1.8-2.3 billion in 1992, $4.86 billion in 1993,

$2.3 billion in 1994, $2.5 billion in 1995, $3.6 billion in 1996, $4.7 billion in 1997,

$5.8 billion in 1998, and $5.7 billion in 1999.4 The IISS estimates that Iran spent only $1.3 billion on procurement in both 1995 and 1996.5

There is little debate, however, that the average level of Iranian defense spending

dropped sharply after the end of the Iran-Iraq War and remains relatively low. At

some point in the mid-1980s, Iran chose to make major cuts in its total military

spending in spite of the fact that it was still fighting the Iran-Iraq War. The most

likely explanation is that it no longer felt that Iraq could succeed in winning the

war, but it may also have been unable to sustain the peak level of spending it

reached in 1986.

IRANIAN ARMS TRANSFERS

These trends in total military spending inevitably affect Iran’s arms imports and

military modernization efforts. They help explain why Iran faces major problems in

modernizing and expanding its forces, and continues to have problems with interoperability, standardization, and quality. At the same time, declassified US intelligence data on Iranian arms transfers reveal patterns that follow indicate the reasons for Iran’s actions are more complex than the economics of Iranian military

spending.

• Chart One compares Iranian and Iraqi arms deliveries and shows that Iran

faced a far less serious threat after the arms embargo the UN placed on Iraq

in mid-1990.

• Chart Two shows that Iran seems to have made a strategic decision after its

defeat in the Iran-Iraq War not to engage in a major conventional arms buildup and to concentrate on economic development. It then made much more serious cuts in its arms buys after the UN’s shattering defeat of Iraq in 1991, and

could sustain these cuts because Iraq has remained under an arms embargo

ever since. Ironically, the US efforts to sanction Iran coincided with the first

real rise in Iranian arms deliveries since the end of the Iran-Iraq War.

• Chart Three shows that Iran has made major cuts in its new arms agreements

with Russia since 1996, and has increasing had to rely on lower quality suppliers like China.

• Chart Four—and Charts Five through Ten at the end of this analysis—show the

trends in Iranian conventional arms transfers relative to those of the rest of the

Gulf states. They make it clear that Iran’s arms transfers have been very limited by the standards set by the Southern Gulf states.

The more detailed patterns in Iranian arms transfers over time reinforce the

points made in these charts. These trends in total military spending inevitably affect Iran’s arms imports and military modernization efforts. They help explain why

Iran faces major problems in modernizing and expanding its forces, and continues

to have problems with interoperability, standardization, and quality. At the same

time, declassified US intelligence data on Iranian arms transfers reveal patterns

that follow indicate the reasons for Iran’s actions are more complex than the economics of Iranian military spending.

• Figure V-2 compares Iranian and Iraqi arms deliveries and shows that Iran

faced a far less serious threat after the arms embargo the UN placed on Iraq

in mid-1990.

• Figure V-3 shows that Iran seems to have made a strategic decision after its

defeat in the Iran-Iraq War not to engage in a major conventional arms buildup and to concentrate on economic development. It then made much more serious cuts in its arms buys after the UN’s shattering defeat of Iraq in 1991, and

could sustain these cuts because Iraq has remained under an arms embargo

ever since. Ironically, the US efforts to sanction Iran coincided with the first

real rise in Iranian arms deliveries since the end of the Iran-Iraq War.

35

• Figure V-4 shows that Iran has shows that Iran has made major cuts in its new

arms agreements with Russia since 1996, and has increasing had to rely on

lower quality suppliers like China.

• Table V-1 shows the trends in Iranian conventional arms transfers relative to

those of the rest of the Gulf states. They make it clear that Iran’s arms transfers have been very limited by the standards set by the Southern Gulf states.

(Graphic comparisons are shown in Chapter V.)

The more detailed patterns in Iranian arms transfers over time reinforce the

points made in Figures V-2 to V-3 and Table V-1. During the mid-period in the IranIraq War, Iran was unable to obtain arms from the US, Russia, or the major West

European powers—its former major suppliers. It signed only $10 million worth of

agreements with the FSU, only made covert arms purchases from the US as part

of the Iran-Contra deal, and bought $865 million worth of relatively unsophisticated

weapons from the major West European powers. It did, however, buy $3,835 million

from other European powers, most in Eastern Europe. It bought $1,845 million from

China, and $2,385 million from other states. These included large buys of arms from

North Korea, and buys of parts and surplus US equipment from Vietnam.6

Iran made a major effort to acquire most sophisticated arms from the FSU in the

years that followed. It signed $10.2 billion worth of new arms agreements during

the four year period between 1987-1990—the time between the final years of the

Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War. It signed $2.5 billion worth of agreements with

Russia, $3.4 billion with China, $200 million with Western Europe, $2.1 billion with

other European states (mostly Eastern Europe), and $2.1 billion with other countries (mostly North Korea). It is also clear that Iran began to concentrate its limited

resources on higher quality arms following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and cut

back on the purchases of large amounts of towed artillery, munitions, and low quality weapons it had needed for a war of attrition with Iraq.7

Iran’s new arms agreements dropped sharply, however, during the four year period following the Gulf War. They totaled only $4.8 billion during 1991-1994.8 Despite some reports of massive Iranian military build-ups, new agreements during

1991-1994 totaled only a quarter of the value of the agreements that Iran had

signed during the previous four years. It signed $1.2 billion in new agreements with

Russia, but only $400 million with China, $100 million from other European states

(mostly Eastern Europe), and $900 million from other countries (mostly North

Korea). Iran got no new orders from the US and only $100 million from Western

Europe.9

It is difficult to discuss trends precisely because the US government only declassifies data for blocks of several years, and these blocks are not always comparable.

However, the US estimates that Iran signed only $1.3 billion worth of new arms

agreements during 1993-1996—a period heavily influenced by an economic crisis inside Iran, low oil revenues, and problems in repaying foreign debt. Iran ordered

$200 million from Russia, $300 million from China, $100 million with other European states (mostly Eastern Europe), and $600 million from other countries (mostly

North Korea).10 The drop in agreements with Russia reflected both Iran’s financial

problems and the result of US pressure that had led President Yeltsin not to make

major new arms sales to Russia. Iran’s new agreements with China and North

Korea heavily emphasized missiles and missile production technology.

If one looks at deliveries over the period from 1992-1995, Iran took delivery on

a total of $3 billion worth of arms, versus only $1.1 billion worth of new orders. The

difference is explained by Iran’s large backlog of orders that can take one to five

years to deliver. It obtained $1.7 billion worth of arms from Russia, $700 million

from China, $100 million from major West European states, $200 million from other

European states, and $300 million from other powers.11

Iran signed $1.1 billion worth of new arms agreements during 1996-1999—a period still heavily influenced by an economic crisis inside Iran, low oil revenues, and

problems in repaying foreign debt. Iran ordered only $200 million worth of new

arms agreements from Russia, $800 million from China, and $100 million from

other countries.12 The drop in new arms agreements with Russia reflected both

Iran’s financial problems and the result of US pressures that had led President

Yeltsin not to make major new arms sales to Iran. Iran’s new agreements with

China and North Korea heavily emphasized missiles and missile production technology.

Arms deliveries followed a different pattern, again reflecting the delay between

orders and deliveries. The US State Department reports that Iran took delivery on

$1.6 billion worth of arms in 1991, $859 million in 1992, $1.4 billion in 1993, $390

million in 1994, $330 million in 1995, $350 million in 1996, and $850 million in

36

1997, as measured in current dollars.13 Once again, it is interesting to note that Iranian arms import efforts actually increased after the US imposed sanctions.

If one looks at the source of recent deliveries during this period, Russia delivered

$700 million worth of arms between 1996 and 1999. This largely reflected the backlog of orders from the period before the US and Russia reached an agreement that

Russia would not provide destablizing transfers of conventional weapons. Iran also

took delivery on $700 million worth of arms from China and $300 million from other

sources.14 However, declassified US estimates of new Iranian arms purchases during 1998-1999 do indicate that Iran signed a total of $500 million worth of new arms

agreements with Russia between 1998 and 1999. Unfortunately, the US data do not

explain what it bought.15

If one looks at the entire period between 1992 and 1999, Iran signed only $2.2

billion worth of new arms agreements, but took delivery on $$4,700 worth. Iran ordered a total of $400 million in new arms agreements from Russia, $1000 million

from China, $500 million with other European states (mostly Eastern Europe), and

$300 million from other countries (mostly North Korea).16

In short, the overall patterns in Iranian arms transfers reflect what seem to be

clear strategic decisions by Iran that it did not have to cripple its economy to buy

new arms after its defeat by Iraq in 1988, and that it could then afford to make

further cuts in arms buys after Iraq’s conventional forces were shattered in the Gulf

War in 1991. At the same time, Iran was driven to cut its arms buys by severe internal economic problems, and by the fact the US had considerable success in limiting Iran’s access to advanced arms from Europe and Russia between 1995 and

1998.

These patterns do not mean that Iran’s military efforts were crippled, or that it

did not make some important arms buys. Its carefully focused arms purchases as

discussed by service in the sections that follow and more broadly in Chapter VII.

It is also clear that the effectiveness of the US-Russian agreement to limit arms

transfers that was signed in 1995 may be eroding. Most important, such figures on

conventional arms transfers do not include the costs of Iran’s efforts to proliferate,

which are discussed in detail in Chapter IX. Iran seems to have made a strategic

decision to emphasize weapons of mass destruction over conventional arms. It is

also one of the ironies of US efforts to sanction Iran that Iran increases its expenditures on both proliferation and conventional arms after the Clinton Administration

signed Executive Orders sanctioning Iran and the US Congress passed ILSA.

Finally, while Iran has not yet mass produced any major modern weapons systems, it is also important to note that it has made major efforts to reduce its dependence on imports, and has demonstrated a number of key weapons prototypes:

• Showed prototype of a main battle tank called the Zulfiqar (Zolfaqar) in 1994.

Tank has undergone field trials ever since the Velayat military exercises of May

1996. Its drive train and suspension seems to be modeled on the US-designed

M-48A5 and M-60A1 series of tanks and to have either a 105mm or 125mm rifled gun. Reports differ as to the Zulfiqar’s production status. One report indicates that Iran announced on July 8, 1997, that President Rafsanjani opened

the ‘‘first phase’’ of a plant to produce the tank in Dorud, some 300 kilometers

southwest of Tehran. Another report indicates that it will be produced at the

Shahdid Industrial Complex.

• Claims ready to produce light tank for ‘‘unconventional warfare’’ called the

Towan (Wild Horse) with 90mm gun.

• Developed Iranian-made modification of the Chinese Type WZ 501/503 armored

infantry fighting vehicle which Iran calls the Boragh. The WZ 501/503 is itself

a Chinese copy of the Russian BMP, and is 30 year old technology.

• Displayed APC called the Cobra or BMT-2, which seems to be an indigenous

design armed with a 30mm gun or the ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft gun— a light automatic weapons system that Iran has been manufacturing for some years. Like

the Zulfiqar, the Cobra has been undergoing field trials in Iranian military exercises since May, 1996.

• Iran now makes a copy of the Russian AT-3 9M14M (Sagger or Ra’ad) anti-tank

guided missile.

• Claimed in May 1996, to have produced a self-propelled version of a Russian

122mm gun that it called the Thunder-1, with a firing range of 15,200 meters

and a road speed of 65 kilometers per hour.17

• Makes military radios and low-technology RPVs like the 22006, Baz, and

Shahin.

• Claims to have built its first Iranian-designed helicopter, and to have tested a

locally-built fighter plane. Brigadier General Arasteh, a deputy head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (serving under Major General Ali Shahbazi, the

37

joint chief of staff) stated in April, 1997 that the ‘‘production line of this aircraft

will begin work in the near future.’’

• Defense Industries Organization has claimed that Iran was soon going to start

producing two trainers, a jet-powered Dorna (Lark) and propeller-driven Partsu

(Swallow).

• Iranian military has claimed that Iran has begun mass production of a jet

strike aircraft, the Azarakhsh (Lightning), which reportedly resembles the F-4

Phantom (JDW 4 November 1998: 20). Iran has reportedly developed a TV-guided missile for carriage on F-4 Phantoms.

• Iran claims to have deployed an air-to-air adapted variant of the SMI Standard

missile for its fleet of F-4D/E Phantom II fighter bombers. (JDW 29 April 1998:

17).

• President Rafsanjani announced on October 11, 1997, that Iran had testlaunched a major new surface-to-air missile system with a range of 250 kilometers, although he gave no further details. The description of the missile

sounded vaguely like the Russian SA-5, which is deployed in Iran. Reports has

acquired four HQ-23/2B (CSA-1) launchers and 45-48 missiles, plus 25 SA-6,

and 10-15 SA-5 launchers.

• Claims to produce advanced electronic warfare systems.

• Claims will soon start producing 6 multi-purpose destroyers, with initial production run of three.

• Iran claims to be developing non-magnetic, acoustic, free-floating and remote

controlled mines. It may have also acquired non-magnetic mines, influence

mines and mines with sophisticated timing devices.

• Iran is developing FL-10 anti-ship cruise missile which is copy of Chinese FL2 or FL-7.

• Reportedly assembled domestic variants the YJ-1 (C-801) solid-propellant antiship missile under the local name of Karus, and the YJ-2 (C-802) turbojet-powered anti-ship missile under the local name of Tondar (JDW 9 December 1998).

38

39

40

41

Chart Four—Gulf Arms Buys by Supplier:1987-1999

(New Arms Agreements in Current US $millions)

Buyer Country

Supplier Country

U.S. Russia China

Major

West

European

Other

European All Others Total

Iran

1987-90 ........... 0 3,500 2,300 200 1,200 1,600 8,800

1991-94 ........... 0 200 200 100 100 1,200

1995-98 ........... 0 200 800 0 300 100 1,400

1996-99 ........... 0 200 800 0 100 0 1,100

Iraq

1987-90 ........... 0 300 700 500 500 1,000 3,000

1991-94 ........... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1995-98 ........... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1996-99 ........... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Bahrain

1987-90 ........... 300 0 0 0 0 0 300

1991-94 ........... 200 0 0 0 0 0 200

1995-98 ........... 500 0 0 0 0 0 500

1996-99 ........... 500 0 0 0 0 0 500

Kuwait

1987-90 ........... 2,500 200 0 200 200 200 3,300

1991-94 ........... 3,500 800 0 1,800 0 100 6,200

1995-98 ........... 900 0 200 700 100 0 1,900

1996-98 ........... 800 0 200 100 0 0 1,100

Oman

1987-90 ........... 100 0 0 600 0 0 700

1991-94 ........... 0 0 0 500 0 100 600

1995-98 ........... 0 0 0 300 100 100 500

1996-99 ........... 0 0 0 300 100 0 400

Qatar

1987-90 ........... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1991-94 ........... 0 0 0 2,000 0 0 2,000

1995-98 ........... 0 0 0 900 0 0 900

1996-99 ........... 0 0 0 800 0 0 800

Saudi Arabia

1987-90 ........... 18,800 200 300 23,000 2,300 200 44,800

1991-94 ........... 15,600 0 0 6,600 100 0 22,300

1995-98 ........... 5,100 0 0 1,700 800 300 7,900

1996-99 ........... 5,500 0 0 400 900 300 7,100

UAE

1987-90 ........... 300 0 0 300 0 400 1,000

1991-94 ........... 300 500 0 3,900 100 0 4,800

1995-98 ........... 100 400 0 6,000 800 100 7,400

1996-99 ........... 300 400 0 6,000 800 200 7,700

0 = less than $50 million or nil, and all data rounded to the nearest $100 million.

Source: Richard F. Grimmett, ‘‘Conventional Arms Transfers to the Develoing Nations,’’ Congressional Research Service, various editions.

FOCUSED POVERTY AND ASYMMETRIC THREATS

Iran’s low expenditures on arms do not mean that it has not increased some aspects of its military capabilities. Iran is clearly aware of the threat posed by US

technology and war fighting methods, and of the need to modernize its forces. While

it has never published detailed force plans, Iranian military literature reflects a

keen interest in major force modernization plans and in the advanced weapons and

technologies that support the ‘‘revolution in military affairs.’’

At various times, Iran has sought to procure a wide variety of advanced weapons,

and been able to take advantage of some aspects of technology diffusion. On the

other hand, Iran’s revolutionary economy has remained weak, and Iran’s mismanagement of its budget, development, and foreign debt has reduced Iran’s access

to military technology and arms. ‘‘Sanctions’’ on arms purchases in the form of diplomacy and supplier regimes have been far for effective than economic sanctions. The

US and its allies have blocked many transfers of advanced arms to Iran, particularly from Europe and Russia, although such efforts have scarcely been leakproof.

42

Iran’s has attempted to deal with these problems by focusing on acquiring weapons of mass destruction, enough advanced armored and air weapons to give its some

defensive or deterrent capability, and on making larger purchases of systems that

can threaten tanker traffic and the Southern Gulf. Iran has bought enough arms

to rebuild its army to the point where it can defend effectively against a weakened

Iraq. It has begun to rebuild its air force and land-based air defenses, and can put

up a far more effective defense than in 1988.

It has restructured its regular forces and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps

to improve the defense of its Southern Gulf coast and develop a far more effective

ability to attack naval forces, tanker traffic, offshore facilities, and targets along the

Southern Gulf coast. It is this ‘‘focused poverty’’ that makes Iran potentially dangerous in spite of its relatively low level of arms imports and the obsolescence or

low quality of much of its order of battle.

RECENT IRANIAN PURCHASES AND PURCHASING EFFORTS

Iran’s key purchases and procurement efforts reflect these priorities. Although

Iran’s imports have been severely limited relative to Iran’s overall needs, they do

include the following arms imports and Iranian development and military production efforts:

Land

• Russian, and Polish T-72 Exports. Reports indicate Iran has procured about 380

T-72Ss from Russia, and 100 T-72M1s from Poland since 1990. Inventory of

about 480 T-72s. • Claims to be producing the Iranian-made Zolfaqar MBT, an M-481M-60-like

tank. • Has upgraded to T-54/T-54 called ‘‘Safir-74.’’ Claims to have upgraded Iraqi T54s captured in Iran-Iraq War. Has 400 T-54/55 in inventory. Number of upgrades unknown. • Purchased Russian BMPs. Inventory of 300 BMP-1s and 1400 BMP-2s 2000. • Russia may be licensing Iranian production of T-72 and BMP-2. • Claims domestic production of a Chinese version of the BMP called the Boragh. • Claims domestic production of an APC called the BMT-2 or Cobra. • Possible purchase of 100 M-46 and 300 D-30 artillery weapons from Russia. • Testing prototype of 122mm self-propelled gun called Thunder. • Has shown a modified heavy equipment transporter called the ‘‘Babr 400.’’ • Russian and Asian AT-2s, AT-3s, and AT-4s. Does not seems to include 100 Chinese Red Arrows. • Chinese and 15+ North Korean 146mm self-propelled weapons. • Has 60 Russian 2S1 122mm self-propelled howitzers in inventory. • Growing numbers of BM-24 240mm, BM-21 122mm and Chinese Type 63

107mm MRLs. • Iranian Hadid 122mm—40 round MRL. • Manufacturing Iranian Arash and Noor rockets (variants of Chinese and Russian 122mm rockets). • Manufacturing Iranian Haseb rockets (variants of Chinese 107mm rocket). • Manufacturing Iranian Shahin 1 and 2, Oghab, Nazeat 5 and 10 (may be additional versions), and Fajr battlefield rockets.

Air/Air Defense

• Keeping up to 115 combat aircraft that Iraq sent to Iran during Gulf War. Seem

to include 24 Su-4s and four MiG-29s. • Has 30 MiG-29s with refueling in inventory, may be receiving 15-20 more from

Russia. • Has 30 Su-24s in inventory (probably Su-24D version), may be receiving 6 to

9 more from Russia. • May be negotiating purchase of AS-10, AS-11, AS-12, AS-14/16s from Russia. • Has Su-25s (formerly Iraqi), although has not deployed. • May be trying to purchase more Su-25s, as well as MiG-31s, Su-27s and Tu22Ms. • Considering imports of Chinese F-8 fighter and Jian Hong bomber. • Has 25 Chinese F-7M fighters with PL-2, PL2A, and PL-7 AAMs. • Has purchased 25 Brazilian Tucano trainers and 25 Pakistani MiG-17 trainers.

Uncertain report has bought 12 MiG-29UB trainers from Russia.

• Has bought 12 Italian AB-212, 20 German BK-117A-3, and 12 Russian Mi-17

support and utility helicopters.

• Iran claims to have fitted F-14s with I-Hawk missiles adapted to the air-to-air

role.

43

• Claims to produce advanced electronic warfare systems.

• IRGC claims to be ready to mass produce gliders.

Land-Based Air Defense

• May be negotiating purchase of S-300 and more SA-14/16s from Russia.

• Has acquired four HQ-23/2B (CSA-1) launchers and 45-48 missiles, plus 25 SA6, and 10 SA-5 launchers.

• Has acquired Chinese FM-8O launchers and a few RBS-70s.

• More SA-7s and HN-5s man-portable missiles; may have acquired 100-200

Strelas.

• Reports is seeking to modernize Rapier and 10-15 Tigercat fire units.

• May be modifying and/or producing ZSU-23-4 radar-guided anti-aircraft guns.

• Claims to produce advanced electronic warfare systems.

Sea

• Claims will soon start producing 6 multi-purpose destroyers.

• Has taken delivery on three Russian Type 877EKM Kilo-class submarines, possibly with 1,000 modern magnetic, acoustic, and pressure sensitive mines.

• Reports has North Korean midget submarines have never been confirmed.

• Has obtained 10 Hudong-class Chinese missile patrol boats with CS-802.

• US Mark 65 and Russian AND 500, AMAG-1, KRAB anti-ship mines.

• Reports that Iran is negotiating to buy Chinese EM-52 rocket-propelled mine.

• Iran claims to be developing non-magnetic, acoustic, free-floating and remote

controlled mines. It may have also acquired non-magnetic mines, influence

mines and mines with sophisticated timing devices.

• Wake-homing and wire-guided Russian torpedoes.

• Seersucker (HY-2) sites with 50-60 missiles—Iran working to extend range to

400 km.

• Has 60-100 Chinese CS-801 (Ying Jai-1 SY-2) and CS-8O2 (YF-6) SSMs.

• Iran is developing FL-10 anti-ship cruise missile which is copy of Chinese FL2 or FL-7.

• Boghammer fast interceptor craft.

Missiles

• Obtained up to 250-300 Scud Bs with 8-15 launchers.

• Up to 150 Chinese CSS-8 surface-to-surface missiles with 25-30 launchers.

• Reports that China is giving Iran technology to produce long-range solid fuel

missile.

• Iran-130 missile (?).

• Has bought North Korean Scud Cs with 5-14 launchers.

• South Korea reports Iran has bought total of 100 Scud Bs and 100 Scud Cs from

North Korea.

• May be developing the Zelzal-3 missile with a range of 900 kilometers with Chinese and North Korean support.

• Iran may be planning to purchase North Korean No-Dong 1/2s.

• Iran also interested in North Korea’s developmental Tapeo Dong 1 or Tapeo

Dong 2.

• Claims will launch its first experimental satellite by 2000 with Russian aid.

• Reports of tunnels for hardened deployment of Scuds and SAMs.

CBW

• Chemical weapons (sulfur mustard gas, hydrogen cyanide, phosgene and/or

chlorine; possibly Sarin and Tabun).

• Biological weapons (possibly Anthrax, hoof and mouth disease, and other biotoxins).

• Nuclear weapons development (Russian and Chinese reactors).

IRAN’S PROBLEMS WITH OBSOLESCENCE

At the same time, neither Iran’s arms imports or production efforts have come

close to offsetting the impact of its underspending on military modernization, and

its relative ‘‘poverty’’ in arms imports. Iran still has a force structure filled with obsolete and obsolescent military equipment. Iran’s procurements to date cannot compensate for the steady decay of Iran’s older equipment. Its Western equipment is

now at least two decades old and received hard use during the Iran-Iraq War. Most

of the arms that Iran bought during the Iran-Iraq War consisted of relatively low

grade North Korean and Chinese equipment and few of its indigenous production

efforts have yet gone beyond the prototype stage.

Iran’s holdings of aging and obsolete equipment include:

44

Land Forces

Chieftain tank ......... 140 Worn, under-armored, underarmed, and underpowered. Fire control and sighting system

now obsolete. Cooling problems.

M-47/M-48 ............... 150 Worn, under-armored, underarmed, and underpowered. Fire control and sighting system

now obsolete.

M-6OA1 .................... 150-160 Worn, under-armored, underarmed, and underpowered. Fire control and sighting system

now obsolete.

Scorpion AFV .......... 70-80 Worn, light armor, underarmed, and underpowered.

M-114s ..................... 70-80 Worn, light armor, and underarmed, and underpowered.

M-109 155mm SP ... 150-160 Worn, fire control system now obsolete. Growing

reliability problems due to lack of updates and

parts.

M-1O7 175mm SP ... 20-30 Worn, fire control system now obsolete. Growing

reliability problems due to lack of parts.

M-110 203mm SP ... 25-30 Worn, fire control system now obsolete. Growing

reliability problems due to lack of parts.

AH-1J Attack helicopter.100 Worn, avionics and weapons suite now obsolete.

Growing reliability problems due to lack of

updates and parts.

CH-47 Transport

helicopter.

35-40 Worn, avionics now obsolete. Growing reliability

problems due to lack of updates and parts.

Bell, Hughes, Boeing, Agusta, Sikorsky, helicopters.350-445 Worn, growing reliability problems due to lack

of updates and parts.

Air Force

F-4D/E FGA ............. 35-50 Worn, avionics now obsolete. Critical problems

due to lack of updates and parts.

60 F-5/IFII FGA ...... 50-60 Worn, avionics now obsolete. Serious problems

due to lack of updates and parts.

F-5A/B ...................... 10-20 Worn, avionics now obsolete. Serious problems

due to lack of updates and parts.

RF-4E ....................... 8-15 Worn, avionics now obsolete. Serious problems

due to lack of updates and parts.

RF-5E ....................... 0-5 Worn, avionics now obsolete. Serious problems

due to lack of updates and parts. (May be in

storage).

F-14 AWX ................ 60 Worn, avionics now obsolete. Critical problems

due to lack of updates and parts. Cannot operate some radars at long ranges. Phoenix missile capability cannot be used.

P-3F MPA ................ 5 Worn, avionics and sensors now obsolete. Many

sensors and weapons cannot be used. Critical

problems due to lack of updates and parts.

Key PGMs ................ — Remaining Mavericks, Aim-7s, Aim-9s, Aim-54s

are all long past rated shelf life. Many or most

are unreliable or inoperable.

I-Hawk SAM ........... 100 Worn, electronics, software, and some aspects of

sensors now obsolete. Critical problems due to

lack of updates and parts.

Rapier SAM ............. 30 Worn, electronics, software, and some aspects of

sensors now obsolete. Critical problems due to

lack of updates and parts.

Tigercat SAM .......... 15 Worn, electronics, software, and some aspects of

sensors now obsolete. Critical problems due to

lack of updates and parts.

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Navy

Alvand FFG ............. 3 Worn, weapons and electronics suite obsolete,

many systems inoperable or partly dysfunctional due to Critical problems due to lack of

updates and parts.

Bayandor FF ........... 2 Obsolete, critical problems due to lack of updates and parts.

Hengeman LST ....... 4 Worn, needs full scale refit.

IRAN AND CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING

Iran is too weak to seek a direct conflict that involves the US, or to risk another

war with Iran. It will also be years before Iranian arms imports and military production efforts can give it enough capability to deliberately initiate a conflict or reveal whether it has aggressive intentions. Iran can threaten shipping traffic in the

Gulf, but its acquisitions do not give it any hope of winning a naval-air battle

against US forces in the Gulf, and it has little chance of doing so in the foreseeable

future.

Iran would have to rebuild and modernize both its regular navy and air force at

levels of strength and capability it simply cannot hope to achieve in the next decade.

Alternatively, it would need to develop its capabilities to deliver weapons of mass

destruction to the point where it could back its conventional military capabilities

with a threat that might seriously inhibit US military action and/or the willingness

of Southern Gulf states to support the US and provide air and naval facilities.

The ‘‘wild cards’’ determining the outcome of such contingencies are the US determination to act, the size of the US presence in the Gulf and US power projection

capabilities at the time of a given crisis, Southern Gulf support for the US and willingness to provide the US with suitable facilities, and the political liabilities the US

would face—if any—in terms of the response from nations outside the region. Far

more is involved in a confrontation in the Gulf than military capability, and Iran

would have far more contingency capability if the US could not respond for political

or budgetary reasons.

Iran could also try to threaten US interests indirectly and through asymmetric

wars. Iran has a major capability to engage in asymmetric warfare in the Gulf. It

could covertly lay free floating mines, launch hit and run attacks against offshore

oil platforms and shipping with its missile patrol boats, and invade and occupy offshore facilities with the naval branch of its Revolutionary Guards. At the same

time, it cannot project power across in the Gulf in the face of US opposition, and

has never really exercised large-scale over-the-beach amphibious operations. Furthermore, there is little present near-term prospect that Iran will develop enough

power projection capability—and supporting power from its navy and air force—to

win a conflict in the Southern Gulf that involves US forces, or to force its way in

support of a coup or uprising.

At the same time, the US might still have problems in exploiting its military superiority and the ‘‘revolution in military affairs’’ to counter Iranian military involvement in the Southern Gulf:

• Iran might seek to exploit the fracture lines and political unrest within and between the Southern Gulf states. This is particularly true of the Shi’ite in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, but it might also prove true of future confrontations between Bahrain and Qatar and Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

• The US would face serious problems in responding to any change of government

in a Southern Gulf state that resulted in a pro-Iranian regime and which

sought Iranian military advice or an Iranian military presence. The US cannot

save a Gulf regime from its own people or (openly) endorse such action by other

Southern Gulf countries.

• Iran’s process of creeping proliferation is making enough progress that the US

and the Southern Gulf states must reach some degree of agreement on taking

suitable counter-proliferation measures. A power vacuum in which Iran proliferates, the Southern Gulf states grow steadily more vulnerable, and US resolve seems progressively more questionable could give Iran far more capability

to directly or indirectly intervene in Southern Gulf affairs.

• Iran might threaten regional stability by exploiting internal unrest and divisions in Iraq that are serious enough to split the Iraqi armed forces, and/or lead

to a new Shi’ite uprising. Similarly, a major Kurdish uprising would greatly

complicate Iraq’s ability to concentrate its forces to defend against an Iranian

46

attack on Iraq’s center and south. At the same time, any Iranian victory over

Iraq might prove to be more apparent than real. It would be dependent on US

toleration of such an Iranian victory that did more than depose the present

Iraqi regime. Further, the split between Persian, Arab, and Kurd seems likely

to remain so great that Iraqi independence would rapidly reassert itself if Iran

attempted to occupy or dominate a substantial part of Iraq.

The previous contingencies assume that Iran will take offensive action. If it does,

it may well be confronted with a US-led attack on Iran. If this attack is confined

to naval and coastal targets, particularly those Iranian military capabilities that potentially threaten Gulf shipping, there is little Iran can do militarily to resist US

power other than try to ride out the attack by dispersing and hiding its smaller

boats, anti-ship missiles, etc.

If a US-led attack includes strategic conventional missile strikes and bombings,

there also is little Iran can do in immediate response other than escalate by using

weapons of mass destruction. Such an escalation now would almost certainly end

in increasing the risk and damage to Iran than deter or damage US forces.

Iran, however, does have potential countermeasures to US conventional superiority and ability to exploit the revolution in military affairs. It can respond over

time with terrorism, unconventional warfare, and proxy wars. It is much easier for

air and missile power to inflict major damage on Iran than it is to predict or control

the political and military aftermath. The resulting casualties and damage will be

extremely difficult to translate into an ‘‘end game.’’

Attacks on the Iranian mainland that went beyond a punitive raid would also be

much more costly to the US, in spite of the ‘‘revolution in military affairs.’’ A USled coalition could defeat Iran’s regular forces, but would have to be at least corps

level in size, and occupying Iran would be impractical without massive land forces

of several entire corps. Even limited amphibious and land attacks on the mainland

would expose the invading forces to a much higher risk of low intensity and guerrilla combat with Iranian forces that would constantly receive reinforcement and resupply. Further, Iran’s use of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction would be

politically easier to justify in a defensive conflict than an offensive one. Such attacks

would probably end in futility, and in creating a revanchist Iran.

IRAN AND ASYMMETRIC WARS

Iran may be able to counter US capabilities and achieve some of its objectives

through intimidation and direct and indirect threats. Iran’s ability to provide such

threats and conduct ‘‘wars of intimidation,’’ will improve steadily in the near to midterm, in spite of its military weakness. In many cases, its neighbors may be willing

to react to such intimidation by accommodating Iran to some degree. This is particularly true of those Southern Gulf states whose gas and oil resources are most exposed—like Qatar—or which see Iraq as a more serious threat—like Kuwait.

Iran has steadily improved the capabilities of the IRGC and the Quds Force for

unconventional warfare, including the potential use of chemical and biological weapons. Iran has also demonstrated that it is steadily improving its ability to conduct

‘‘proxy wars’’ by training, arming, and funding movements like the Hezbollah.Iran

also is steadily improving capabilities for information warfare and cyberterrorism,

although it seems unlikely that it is capable of advanced attacks on protected US

military and US government computer, information, and battle management systems. Iran probably has more capability to attack the US private sector and the systems of Gulf states. It also is almost certainly improving the defense of its own systems, which often are land-based and require little more than isolation from netted

or open systems to provide a first line of defense.

These capabilities allow Iran to conduct the kind of low-level and/or covert asymmetric warfare where the ‘‘revolution in military affairs’’ as of yet has only limited

value. At the same time, any use of such forces is unlikely to drive the US out of

the Gulf, and would risk alienating the Southern Gulf or states without defeating

them. The bombing of Al Khobar Towers may have demonstrated American

vulnerabilities, but it is far from clear that it provided anyone with strategic benefits. As for proxy wars, it is unclear what terrorist movements are willing to accept

such Iranian support and pay the probable political price tag.

IRAN AND PROLIFERATION

Iran’s effort to acquire chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons—and suitable

long-range strike systems—are a serious threat to US interests and regional peace.

They also reveal far more important technology transfers from Russia and other

states than the transfers in conventional weapons:

47

Delivery Systems

• Iran has shorter missile range systems:

In 1990, Iran bought CSS-8 surface-to-surface missiles (converted SA-2s) from

China with ranges of 130-150 kilometers.

Has Chinese sea and land-based anti-ship cruise missiles. Iran fired 10 such missiles at Kuwait during Iran Iraq War, hitting one US-flagged tanker. • The Soviet-designed Scud B (17E) guided missile currently forms the core of

Iran’s ballistic missile forces.

Iran acquired its Scuds in response to Iraq’s invasion. It obtained a limited number from Libya and then obtained larger numbers from North Korea. It deployed

these units with a special Khatam ol-Anbya force attached to the air element of the

Pasdaran. Iran fired its first Scuds in March, 1985. It fired as many as 14 Scuds

in 1985, 8 in 1986, 18 in 1987, and 77 in 1988. Iran fired 77 Scud missiles during

a 52 day period in 1988, during what came to be known as the ‘‘war of the cites.’’ Sixty-one were fired at Baghdad, nine at Mosul, five at Kirkuk, one at Takrit, and

one at Kuwait. Iran fired as many as five missiles on a single day, and once fired

three missiles within 30 minutes. This still, however, worked out to an average of

only about one missile a day, and Iran was down to only 10-20 Scuds when the war

of the cities ended.

Iran’s missile attacks were initially more effective than Iraq’s attacks. This was

largely a matter of geography. Many of Iraq’s major cities were comparatively close

to its border with Iran, but Tehran and most of Iran’s major cities that had not already been targets in the war were outside the range of Iraqi Scud attacks. Iran’s missiles, in contrast, could hit key Iraqi cities like Baghdad. This advantage ended

when Iraq deployed extended range Scuds.

The Scud B is a relatively old Soviet design which first became operational in

1967, designated as the R-17E or R-300E. The Scud B has a range of 290-300 kilometers with its normal conventional payload. The export version of the missile is

about 11 meters long, 85-90 centimeters in diameter, and weighs 6,300 kilograms.

It has a nominal CEP of 1,000 meters. The Russian versions can be equipped with

conventional high explosive, fuel air explosive, runway penetrator, submunition,

chemical, and nuclear warheads.

The export version of the Scud B comes with a conventional high explosive warhead weighing about 1,000 kilograms, of which 800 kilograms are the high explosive

payload and 200 are the warhead structure and fusing system. It has a single stage

storable liquid rocket engine and is usually deployed on the MAZ-543 eight wheel

transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). It has a strap-down inertial guidance, using

three gyros to correct its ballistic trajectory, and uses internal graphite jet vane

steering. The warhead hits at a velocity above Mach 1.5.

Most estimates indicate that Iran now has 6-12 Scud launchers and up to 200

Scud B (R-17E) missiles with 230-310 KM range.

Some estimates give higher figures. They estimate Iran bought 200-300 Scud Bs

from North Korea between 1987 and 1992, and may have continued to buy such

missiles after that time. Israeli experts estimate that Iran had at least 250-300 Scud

B missiles, and at least 8-15 launchers on hand in 1997.

US experts also believe that Iran can now manufacture virtually all of the Scud

B, with the possible exception of the most sophisticated components of its guidance

system and rocket motors. This makes it difficult to estimate how many missiles

Iran has in inventory and can acquire over time, as well as to estimate the precise

performance characteristics of Iran’s missiles, since it can alter the weight of the

warhead and adjust the burn time and improve the efficiency of the rocket motors. • Iran has new long range North Korean Scuds—with ranges near 500 kilometers.

The North Korean missile system is often referred to as a ‘‘Scud C.’’ Typically,

Iran formally denied the fact it had such systems long after the transfer of these

missiles became a reality. Hassan Taherian, an Iranian foreign ministry official,

stated in February, 1995, ‘‘There is no missile cooperation between Iran and North

Korea whatsoever. We deny this.’’ In fact, a senior North Korean delegation traveled to Tehran to close the deal on

November 29, 1990, and met with Mohsen Rezaei, the former commander of the

IRGC. Iran either bought the missile then, or placed its order shortly thereafter.

North Korea then exported the missile through its Lyongaksan Import Corporation.

Iran imported some of these North Korean missile assemblies using its B-747s, and

seems to have used ships to import others.

Iran probably had more than 60 of the longer range North Korean missiles by

1998, although other sources report 100, and one source reports 170.

Iran may have 5-10 Scud C launchers, each with several missiles. This total

seems likely to include four new North Korean TELs received in 1995.

48

Iran seems to want enough missiles and launchers to make its missile force highly

dispersible.

Iran has begun to test its new North Korean missiles. There are reports it has

fired them from mobile launchers at a test site near Qom about 310 miles (500 kilometers) to a target area south of Shahroud. There are also reports that units

equipped with such missiles have been deployed as part of Iranian exercises like the

Saeqer-3 (Thunderbolt 3) exercise in late October, 1993.

The missile is more advanced than the Scud B, although many aspects of its performance are unclear. North Korea seems to have completed development of the

missile in 1987, after obtaining technical support from the People’s Republic of

China. While it is often called a ‘‘Scud C,’’ it seems to differ substantially in detail

from the original Soviet Scud B. It seems to be based more on the Chinese-made

DF-61 than on a direct copy of the Soviet weapon.

Experts estimate that the North Korean missiles have a range of around 310

miles (500 kilometers), a warhead with a high explosive payload of 700 kilograms,

and relatively good accuracy and reliability. While this payload is a bit limited for

the effective delivery of chemical agents, Iran might modify the warhead to increase

payload at the expense of range and restrict the using of chemical munitions to the

most lethal agents such as persistent nerve gas. It might also concentrate its development efforts on arming its Scud C forces with more lethal biological agents. In

any case, such missiles are likely to have enough range-payload to give Iran the

ability to strike all targets on the southern coast of the Gulf and all of the populated

areas in Iraq, although not the West. Iran could also reach targets in part of eastern

Syria, the eastern third of Turkey, and cover targets in the border area of the

former Soviet Union, western Afghanistan, and western Pakistan.

Accuracy and reliability remain major uncertainties, as does operational CEP.

Much would also depend on the precise level of technology Iran deployed in the warhead. Neither Russia nor the People’s Republic of China seem to have transferred

the warhead technology for biological and chemical weapons to Iran or Iraq when

they sold them the Scud B missile and CSS-8. However, North Korea may have sold

Iran such technology as part of the Scud C sale. If it did so, such a technology transfer would save Iran years of development and testing in obtaining highly lethal biological and chemical warheads. In fact, Iran would probably be able to deploy far

more effective biological and chemical warheads than Iraq had at the time of the

Gulf War.

Iran may be working with Syria in such development efforts, although Middle

Eastern nations rarely cooperate in such sensitive areas. Iran served as a transshipment point for North Korean missile deliveries during 1992 and 1993. Some of

this transshipment took place using the same Iranian B-747s that brought missile

parts to Iran. Others moved by sea. For example, a North Korean vessel called the

Des Hung Ho, bringing missile parts for Syria, docked at Bandar Abbas in May,

1992. Iran then flew these parts to Syria. An Iranian ship coming from North Korea

and a second North Korean ship followed, carrying missiles and machine tools for

both Syria and Iran. At least 20 of the North Korean missiles have gone to Syria

from Iran, and production equipment seems to have been transferred to Iran and

to Syrian plants near Hama and Aleppo.

• Iran can now assemble Scud and Scud C missiles using foreign-made components. It may soon be able to make entire missile systems and warhead packages

in Iran.

• A US examination of Iran’s dispersal, sheltering, and hardening programs for

its anti-ship missiles and other missile systems indicate that Iran has developed effective programs to ensure that they would survive a limited number of air strikes

and that Iran had reason to believe that the limited number of preemptive strikes

Israel could conduct against targets in the lower Gulf could not be effective in denying Iran the capability to deploy its missiles.

• Iran is developing an indigenous missile production capability with both solid

and liquid fueled missiles.

The present scale of Iran’s production and assembly efforts is unclear. Iran seems

to have a design center, at least two rocket and missile assembly plants, a missile

test range and monitoring complex, and a wide range of smaller design and refit

facilities.

The design center is said to located at the Defense Technology and Science Research Center, which is a branch of Iran’s Defense Industry Organization, and located outside Karaj—near Tehran. This center directs a number of other research

efforts. Some experts believe it has support from Russian and Chinese scientists.

Iran’s largest missile assembly and production plant is said to be a North Koreanbuilt facility near Isfahan, although this plant may use Chinese equipment and

technology. There are no confirmations of these reports, but this region is the center

49

of much of Iran’s advanced defense industry, including plants for munitions, tank

overhaul, and helicopter and fixed wing aircraft maintenance. Some reports say the

local industrial complex can produce liquid fuels and missile parts from a local steel

mill.

A second missile plant is said to be located 175 kilometers east of Tehran, near

Semnan. Some sources indicate this plant is Chinese-built and began rocket production as early as 1987. It is supposed to be able to build 600-1,000 Oghab rockets

per year, if Iran can import key ingredients for solid fuel motors like ammonium

perchlorate. The plant is also supposed to produce the Iran-130.

Another facility may exist near Bandar Abbas for the assembly of the Seersucker.

China is said to have built this facility in 1987, and is believed to be helping the

naval branch of the Guards to modify the Seersucker to extend its range to 400 kilometers. It is possible that China is also helping Iran develop solid fuel rocket motors

and produce or assemble missiles like the CS-80l and CS-802. There have, however,

been reports that Iran is developing extended range Scuds with the support of Russian experts, and of a missile called the Tondar 68, with a range of 700 kilometers.

Still other reports claim that Iran has split its manufacturing facilities into plants

near Pairzan, Seman, Shiraz, Maghdad, and Islaker. These reports indicate that the

companies involved in building the Scuds are also involved in Iran’s production of

poison gas and include Defense Industries, Shahid, Bagheri Industrial Group, and

Shahid Hemat Industrial Group.

Iran’s main missile test range is said to be further east, near Shahroud, along the

Tehran-Mashhad railway. A telemetry station is supposed to be 350 kilometers to

the south at Taba, along the Mashhad-Isfahan road. All of these facilities are reportedly under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.

There were many reports during the late 1980s and early 1990s that Iran had

ordered the North Korean No Dong missile, which was planned to have the capability to carry nuclear and biological missile ranges of up to 900 kilometers. This

range would allow the missile could reach virtually any target in Gulf, Turkey, and

Israel. The status of the No Dong program has since become increasingly uncertain,

although North Korea deployed some developmental types at test facilities in 1997.

The No-Dong underwent flight tests at ranges of 310 miles (500 kilometers) on

May 29, 1993. Some sources indicate that Iranians were present at these tests. Extensive further propulsion tests began in August 1994, and some reports indicate

operational training began for test crews in May 1995. Missile storage facilities

began to be built in July 1995, and four launch sites were completed in October

1995.

The progress of the program has been slow since that time, and may reflect development problems. However, mobile launchers were seen deployed in northeast

North Korea on March 24, 1997. According to some reports, a further seven launcher units were seen at a facility about 100 kilometers from Pyongyang.

The No-Dong 1 is a single-stage liquid-fueled missile, with a range of up to 1,000

to 1,300 kilometers (810 miles), although longer ranges may be possible with a reduced warhead and maximum burn. There are also indications that there may be

a No-Dong 2, using the same rocket motor, but with an improved fuel supply system

that allows the fuel to burn for a longer period.

The missile is about 15.2 meters long—four meters longer than the Scud B—and

1.2 meters in diameter. The warhead is estimated to weigh 770 kilograms (1,200-

1,750 pounds) and a warhead manufacturing facility exists near Pyongyang. The

No-Dong has an estimated theoretical CEP of 700 meters at maximum range, versus

900 meters for the Scud B, although its practical accuracy could be as wide as 3,000-

4,000 meters. It has an estimated terminal velocity of Mach 3.5, versus 2.5 for the

Scud B, which presents added problems for tactical missile defense. The missile is

to be transportable on a modified copy of the MAZ-543P TEL that has been lengthened with a fifth axle and which is roughly 40 meters long. The added support stand

for the vertical launch modes brings the overall length to 60 meters, and some experts questioned whether a unit this big is practical.

• These developments may help explain the background to Iran’s new Shahab

system:

Some US experts believe that Iran tested booster engines in 1997 capable of driving a missile ranges of 1,500 kilometers. Virtually all US experts believe that Iran

is rapidly approaching the point where it will be able to manufacture missiles with

much longer ranges than the Scud B.

Eitan Ben Eliyahu—the commander of the Israeli Air Force—reported on April

14, 1997 that Iran had tested a missile capable of reaching Israel. The background

briefings to his statement implied that Russia was assisting Iran in developing two

missiles—with ranges of 620 and 780 miles Follow-on intelligence briefings that

Israel provided in September, 1997, indicated that Russia was helping Iran develop

50

four missiles. US intelligence reports indicate that China has also been helping Iran

with some aspects of these missile efforts.

These missiles included the Shahab (‘‘meteor’’) missiles, with performance similar

to those previously identified with Iranian missiles adapted from North Korean designs.

The Israeli reports indicated that the Shahab 3 was a liquid-fueled missile with

a range of 810 miles (1,200-1,500 kilometers) and a payload of 1550 pounds (700

kilometers).

Israel claimed the Shahab might be ready for deployment as early as 1999.

Iran tested the Shahab 3 on July 21, 1998, claiming that it was a defensive action

to deal with potential threats from Israel.

The missile flew for a distance of up to 620 miles, before it exploded about 100

seconds after launch. US intelligence sources could not confirm whether the explosion was deliberate, but indicated that the final system might have a range of 800-

940 miles (a maximum of 1,240 kilometers), depending on its payload. The test confirmed the fact the missile was a liquid fueled system.

Gen. Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards

Corps’ air wing publicly reported on August 2, 1998 that the Shahab-3 is 53-footlong ballistic missile that can travel at 4,300 mph and carry a one-ton warhead at

an altitude of nearly 82,000 feet. He claimed that the weapon was guided by an Iranian-made system that gives it great accuracy: ‘‘The final test of every weapon is

in a real war situation but, given its warhead and size, the Shahab-3 is a very accurate weapon.’’ Other Iranian sources reported that the missile had a range of 800 miles. President Mohammad Khatami on August 1, 1998 stated that Iran was determined to

continue to strengthen its armed forces, regardless of international concerns: ‘‘Iran

will not seek permission from anyone for strengthening its defense capability.’’ Martin Indyck, the US Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs testified on July

28, that the US estimated that the system needed further refinement but might be

deployed in its initial operational form between September, 1998 and March, 1999.

Iran publicly displayed the Shahab 3 on its launcher during a parade on September 25, 1998. The missile carrier bore signs saying, ‘‘The US can do nothing’’ and ‘‘Israel would be wiped from the map.’’ There are some reports of a Shahab-3B missile with extended range and a larger

booster.

The resulting system seems to be close to both the No-Dong and Pakistani Ghauri

or Haff-5 missile, first tested in April 1998, raising questions about Iranian-North

Korean-Pakistani cooperation.

North Korean parades exhibiting the Tapeo Dong in September 1999 exhibited a

missile with rocket motor and nozzle characteristics similar to those of the Sahab

3.

The Shahab 3 was tested in a launch from a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL)

from a new air base of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards at Mashad on February

20, 2000, and successfully demonstrated the integration of the engine and missile

subsystems. It tested the system again in July 2000, with a nominal range of 810

miles.18

Iran tested a solid state missile it called the Shahab D on September 20, 2000.

The Iranian Deputy Defense Minister, Vice Admiral Ali Shamkani, claimed that it

was part of a peaceful program for launching satellites.19

Iranian sources indicate that the missile has a inertial navigation system with a

CEP of 3 kilometers, making it so inaccurate that it can only be lethal against area

targets using a weapon of mass destruction.

Jane’s Defense Weekly claimed on March 22, 2000 that US and Israeli intelligence

officials felt the Shahab 3 was now ready for deployment.

Iran announced on July 15, 2000 that it had successfully test-fired an upgraded

version of its medium-range Shahab missile. An Iranian defence ministry source

was quoted by state media as saying that the missile was test-fired to ensure it conforms to the latest technological standards. It was first tested in 1998. ‘‘This missile

is part of our program for the defence industry and it would in no way threaten

other countries.’’ Iran announced that the Shahab-3 is a ballistic missile, with a

range of 800 miles, and could travel at a speed of 4,320 mph with a 1-ton warhead.

Iran’s Defence Minister Admiral Ali Shamkhani has said a larger missile, Shahab

4, was in production as a vehicle for launching satellites into space.20

US experts indicated that they estimated the missile had a range of 1,300 km

(800 miles), making it capable of hitting Israel, and that the Shahab-3 was modeled

mainly on North Korea’s No Dong-1, but has been improved with Russian technology. The US intelligence community is divided whether Iran will sustain its current programs, and actually deploy a system capable of striking the US. US experts

51

indicated that they estimated the missile had a range of 1,300 km (800 miles), making it capable of hitting Israel, and that the Shahab-3 was modeled mainly on North

Korea’s No Dong-1, but has been improved with Russian technology.21

Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated that,22 ‘‘This does not come as a surprise . . . I have pointed to Iran and the testing of the Shahab-3 and what I assume

will be the testing of the 4 in the future and beyond that, as one of the reasons

why it is important for the United States to undertake to research, develop and potentially deploy an NMD (national missile defense) system that would provide protection against countries such as Iran posing a threat to the United States . . . This

represents a continuation of their testing program, whether it was scheduled to coincide with the discussions in Washington is a matter only the Iranians can determine, we don’t have any information pertaining to that . . . We accept it for what

it is, we know that they will continue to test it, they will continue to develop a

longer-range missile capability and that is one of the reasons why we believe it is

important that the United States continue its research and testing and the development program for the NMD, precisely to deal with countries such as North Korea,

Iran, Iraq and others. Anytime you have success in a particular missile system, that

gives you confidence to move forward with more tests, with greater capability . . .

So I think there is obviously a potential to accelerate development with each successful test . . . we have discussed this in the past, we believe that North Korea,

Iran, potentially Iraq in the future and others will develop long-range missile capability. This is what we anticipate, this confirms our anticipation, and so this is a

factor that will have to be taken into account in terms of what the time frame will

be when Iran will have the capability of striking US territory or that of European

nations. . . . Only the president can decide whether we should go forward at this

point,’’ Cohen said. ‘‘But I think this is an issue that is not going to go away with

the elections, and if there is any delay in the program, that another president will

have to face it at some point because the threat will continue to expand.’’ Israeli expressed its own concerns. Amos Yaron, director-general of the Defence

Ministry, told Israel Radio that, ‘‘We are looking at this matter for the moment with

some concern because in any event they have the ability. We don’t believe they have

any intention whatsoever to attack the state of Israel for the moment . . . It must

be remembered that Iran developed these capabilities as a result of the lessons they

had from the wars of the past, which is to say from its big war against Iraq. Iran

didn’t develop this missile against the state of Israel . . . Now the Iranians have

this ability. Between the ability and the intention, there is a great distance.’’ A senior Israeli military source did predict, however, that by 2005, Iran would, with Russian help, achieve a military nuclear capability by 2005 with Russian help. Israel’s army chief, Lieutenant-General Shaul Mofaz, told Israel Radio that the combined

development of the missile and a non-conventional capacity posed a threat not only

to Israel, but also to any country within range of the missile.23

In spite of these developments, a number of US intelligence officials feel the NIC

report was politicized by pressure from the policy level to support the NMD program, and to not disagree with the results of the Rumsfeld Commission. They feel

that Iran still faces problems in in its program to build the Shahab-3, which some

feel is a missile with a range of only 780 miles. At least one official has been quoted

on backround as stating that, ‘‘There is an Iranian threat to U.S. forces in the region, not to the continental United States.’’

US officials agree that Iran is considering developing a rocket that can put satellites in orbit, but note that that the development of such a booster would give Iran

significantly enhanced capabilities to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile.24

U.S. Defence Department spokesman Ken Bacon stated that, ‘‘From everything we

can tell, it was a successful firing. It is another sign they are determined to build

longer-range weapons of mass destruction. 25

In short, it is impossible to dismiss the possibility that Iran might continue to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles in spite of its agreements not to do

so. At the same time, there is no way to predict that Iran will definitely pose such

a threat, or the size, timing, and effectiveness, of any forces it may deploy. The justification for an NMD system can be built around the possibility of an Iranian threat

but—as is the case with North Korea—there is no way that the justification for an

NMD system can be based on the certainty of an Iranian missile threat or that the

US can now tailor the architecture of its NMD system to a clear concept of what

that threat will be. There equally is no way that the need for an NMD system can

be dismissed because of the lack of a valid potential threat.

It is still unclear when Iran will be able to bring such programs to the final development stage, carry out a full range of suitable test firings, develop highly lethal

warheads, and deploy actual units. Much may still depends on the level of foreign

assistance.

52

• In September 1999, the Revolutionary Guard exhibited another missile called

the Zelzal, which it stated was ‘‘now in mass production.’’ The missile was said to

have taken four and one-half years to develop and to be derived from the Zelzal 2,

which the IRGC had exhibited earlier. Some estimates indicate that it can carry a

warhead of 500 kilograms for up to 900 kilometers. However, the missile exhibited

in Tehran was a rocket on a truck-mounted launch rail that seemed more likely to

have a range of 150-200 kilometers. • Iranian Defense Minister Shamkhani has confirmed the development of a ‘‘more capable’’ missile called the Shahab 4. Although he later called it a space booster.

He has also mentioned a Shahab 5.

Israeli and US intelligence sources have reported that Iran is developing the

Shahab 4, with a range of 2,000 kilometers (1,250 miles), a payload of around 2,000

pounds, and a CEP of around 2,400 meters. Some estimates indicate that this system could be operational in 2-5 years.

US Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs testified on July 28, 1998, that the

US estimated that the system still needed added foreign assistance to improve its

motors and guidance system.

Some reports indicate that the Shahab 4 is based on the Soviet SS-4 missile. Others that there is a longer range Shahab 5, based on the SS-4 or Tapeo Dong missile.

Reports saying the Shahab is based on the SS-4 say it has a range of up to 4,000

kilometers and a payload in excess of one ton.

Iran may have two other missile programs include longer-range systems, variously reported as having maximum ranges of 3,650, 4,500-5,000, 6,250, or 10,000

kilometers.

There have been reports that Iran might be using Russian technology to develop

long-range missiles with ranges from 2,000 to 6,250 kilometers.

It seems clear that Iran has obtained some of the technology and design details

of the Russian SS-4. The SS-4 (also known as the R-12 or ‘‘Sandal’’) is an aging Russian liquid fuel designed that first went into service in 1959, and which was supposedly destroyed as part of the IRBM Treaty. It is a very large missile, with technology dating back to the early 1950s, although it was evidently updated at least

twice during the period between 1959 and 1980. It has a CEP of 2-4 kilometers and

a maximum range 2,000 kilometers, which means it can only be lethal with a nuclear warhead or a biological weapon with near-nuclear lethality.

At the same time, the SS-4’s overall technology is relatively simple and it has a

throwweight of nearly 1,400 kilograms (3,000 pounds). It is one of the few missile

designs that a nation with a limited technology base could hope to manufacture or

adapt, and its throwweight and range would allow Iran to use a relatively unsophisticated nuclear device or biological warhead. As a result, an updated version of the

SS-4 might be a suitable design for a developing country. • Iran is reported to have carried out the test of a sea-launched ballistic missile

in 1998.

• Russia has been a key supplier of missile technology.

Russia agreed in 1994 that it would adhere to the terms of the Missile Technology

Control Regime and would place suitable limits on the sale or transfer of rocket engines and technology. Nevertheless, the CIA has identified Russia as a leading

source of Iranian missile technology, and the State Department has indicated that

President Clinton expressed US concerns over this cooperation to President Yeltsin.

This transfer is one reason the President appointed former Ambassador Frank Wisner, and then Robert Galluci, as his special representatives to try to persuade Russia to put a firm halt to aid support of the Iran.

These programs are reported to have continuing support from North Korea, and

from Russian and Chinese firms and technicians. One such Chinese firm is Great

Wall Industries. The Russian firms include the Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic

Institute, which has provided Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) with

wind tunnels for missile design, equipment for manufacturing missile models, and

the software for testing launch and reentry performance. They may also include

Rosvoorouzhenie, a major Russian arms-export agency; NPO Trud, a rocket motor

manufacturer; a leading research center called the Bauman Institute, and Polyus

(Northstar), a major laser test and manufacturing equipment firm.

Some sources have indicated that Russian military industries have signed contracts with Iran to help produce liquid fueled missiles and provide specialized wind

tunnels, manufacture model missiles, and develop specialized computer software.

For example, these reports indicate that the Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute is cooperating with Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and the

DIO’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). The Russian State Corporation for

Export and Import or Armament and Military Equipment (Rosvoorouzhenie) and

Infor are also reported to be involved in deals with the SHIG. These deals are also

53

said to include specialized laser equipment, mirrors, tungsten-coast graphite material, and maraging steel for missile development and production. They could play

a major role in helping Iran develop long range versions of the Scud B and C, and

more accurate variations of a missile similar to the No Dong.

The Israeli press reported in August, 1997 that Israeli had evidence that Iran was

receiving Russian support. In September, 1997, Israel urged the US to step up its

pressure on Iran, and leaked reported indicating that private and state-owned Russian firms had provided gyroscopes, electronic components, wind tunnels, guidance

and propulsion systems, and the components needed to build such systems to Iran.

President Yeltsin and the Russian Foreign Ministry initially categorically denied

that such charges were true. Following a meeting with Vice President Gore, President Yeltsin stated on September 26, 1997 that, ‘‘We are being accused of supplying

Iran with nuclear or ballistic missile technologies. There is nothing further from the

truth. I again and again categorically deny such rumors.’’

Russia agreed, however, that Ambassador Wisner and Yuri Koptyev, the head of

the Russian space program, should jointly examine the US intelligence and draft a

report on Russian transfers to Iran. This report reached a very different conclusion

from President Yeltsin and concluded that Russia had provided such aid to Iran.

Further, on October 1, 1997—roughly a week after Yeltsin issued his denial—the

Russian security service issued a statement that it had ‘‘thwarted’’ an Iranian attempt to have parts for liquid fuel rocket motors manufactured in Russia, disguised

as gas compressors and pumps.

Russian firms said to be helping Iran included the Russian Central

Aerohydrodynamic Institute which developed a special wind tunnel;

Rosvoorouzhenie, a major Russian arms-export agency; Kutznetzov (formerly NPO

Trud) a rocket motor manufacturer in Samara; a leading research center called the

Bauman National Technical University in Moscow, involved in developing rocket

propulsion systems; the Tsagi Research Institute for rocket propulsion development;

and the Polyus (Northstar) Research Institute in Moscow, a major laser test and

manufacturing equipment firm. Iranians were also found to be studying rocket engineering at the Baltic State University in St. Petersburg and the Bauman State University.

Russia was also found to have sold Iran high strength steel and special foil for

its long-range missile program. The Russian Scientific and Production Center Inor

concluded an agreement as late as September, 1997 to sell Iran a factory to produce

four special metal alloys used in long-range missiles. Inor’s director, L. P Chromova

worked out a deal with A. Asgharzadeh, the director of an Iranian factory, to sell

620 kilograms of special alloy called 21HKMT, and provide Iran with the capability

to thermally treat the alloy for missile bodies. Iran had previously bought 240 kilograms of the alloy. Inor was also selling alloy foils called 49K2F, CUBE2, and 50N

in sheets 0.2-0.4 millimeters thick for the outer body of missiles. The alloy 21HKMT

was particularly interesting because North Korea also uses it in missile designs.

Inor had previously brokered deals with the Shahid Hemat Industrial Group in Iran

to supply maraging steel for missile cases, composite graphite-tungsten material,

laser equipment, and special mirrors used in missile tests.

The result was a new and often tense set of conversations between the US and

Russia in January, 1998. The US again sent Ambassador Frank Wisner to Moscow,

Vice President Gore called Prime Minster Viktor Chernomyrdin, and Secretary of

State Madeleine Albright made an indirect threat that the Congress might apply

sanctions. Sergi Yastrzhembsky, a Kremlin spokesman, initially responded by denying that any transfer of technology had taken place.

This Russian denial was too categorical to have much credibility. Russia had previously announced the arrest of an Iranian diplomat on November 14, 1997, that

it caught attempting to buy missile technology. The Iranian was seeking to buy

blueprints and recruit Russian scientists to go to Iran. Yuri Koptev, the head of the

Russian Space Agency, explained this, however, by stating that that, ‘‘There have

been several cases where some Russian organizations, desperately struggling to

make ends meet and lacking responsibility, have embarked on some ambiguous

projects . . . they were stopped long before they got to the point where any technology got out.’’

The end result of these talks was an agreement by Gore and Chemrnmyrdin to

strengthen controls over transfer technology, but it was scarcely clear that it put

an end to the problem. As Koptev has said, ‘‘There have been several cases where

some Russian organizations, desperately struggling to make ends meet and lacking

responsibility, have embarked on some ambiguous projects.’’ Conditions in Russia

are getting worse, not better, and the desperation that drives sales has scarcely diminished.

54

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin again promised to strengthen his efforts to restrict

technology transfer to Iran in a meeting with Gore on March 12, 1998. The US informed Russia of 13 cases of possible Russian aid to Iran at the meeting and offered

to increase the number of Russian commercial satellite launches it would license for

US firms as an incentive.

New arrests of smugglers took place on April 9, 1998. The smugglers had attempted to ship 22 tons of specialized steel to Iran via Azerbaijan, using several

Russia shell corporations as a cover.

On April 16, 1998, the State Department declared 20 Russian agencies and research facilities were ineligible to receive US aid because of their role in transferring missile technology to Iran.

The CIA reported in June 1997 that Iran obtained major new transfers of new

long-range missile technology from Russian and Chinese firms during 1996. Since

that time, there have been many additional reports of technology transfer from Russia.

The Rumsfeld Commission heard evidence that Iran had obtained engines or designs for the RD-214 rocket engine used in the SS-4 and SL-7 space launch vehicle.

• Reports on Chinese transfers of ballistic missile technology provide less detail:

There have been past reports that Iran placed orders for PRC-made M-9 (CSS6/DF-15) missile (280-620 kilometers range, launch weight of 6,000 kilograms).

It is more likely, however, that PRC firms are giving assistance in developing indigenous missile R&D and production facilities for the production of an Iranian solid

fueled missile.

The US offered to provide China with added missile technology if it would agree

to fully implement an end of technology transfer to Iran and Pakistan during meetings in Beijing on March 25-26, 1998.

• Iran has, however, acquired much of the technology necessary to build longrange cruise missile systems from China:

Such missiles would cost only 10% to 25% as much as ballistic missiles of similar

range, and both the HY-2 Seersucker and CS-802 could be modified relatively quickly for land attacks against area targets.

Iran reported in December, 1995 that it had already fired a domestically built

anti-ship missile called the Saeqe-4 (Thunderbolt) during exercises in the Strait of

Hormuz and Gulf of Oman. Other reports indicate that China is helping Iran build

copies of the Chinese CS-801/CS-802 and the Chinese FL-2 or F-7 anti-ship cruise

missiles. These missiles have relatively limited range. The range of the CS-801 is

8-40 kilometers, the range of the CS-802 is 15-120 kilometers, the maximum range

of the F-7 is 30 kilometers, and the maximum range of the FL-10 is 50 kilometers.

Even a range of 120 kilometers would barely cover targets in the Southern Gulf

from launch points on Iran’s Gulf coast. These missiles also have relatively small

high explosive warheads. As a result, Iran may well be seeking anti-ship capabilities, rather than platforms for delivering weapons of mass destruction.

A platform like the CS-802 might, however, provide enough design data to develop

a scaled-up, longer-range cruise missile for other purposes, and the Gulf is a relatively small area where most urban areas and critical facilities are near the coast.

Aircraft or ships could launch cruise missiles with chemical or biological warheads

from outside the normal defense perimeter of the Southern Gulf states, and it is at

least possible that Iran might modify anti-ship missiles with chemical weapons to

attack tankers—ships which are too large for most regular anti-ship missiles to be

highly lethal.

Building an entire cruise missile would be more difficult. The technology for fusing CBW and cluster warheads would be within Iran’s grasp. Navigation systems

and jet engines, however, would still be a major potential problem. Current inertial

navigation systems (INS) would introduce errors of at least several kilometers at

ranges of 1,000 kilometers and would carry a severe risk of total guidance failure—

probably exceeding two-thirds of the missiles fired. A differential global positioning

system (GPS) integrated with the inertial navigation system (INS) and a radar altimeter, however, might produce an accuracy of 15 meters. Some existing remotely

piloted vehicles (RPVs), such as the South African Skua claim such performance.

Commercial technology is becoming available for differential global positioning system (GPS) guidance with accuracies of 2 to 5 meters.

There are commercially available reciprocating and gas turbine engines that Iran

could adapt for use in a cruise missile, although finding a reliable and efficient turbofan engine for a specific design application might be difficult. An extremely efficient engine would have to be matched to a specific airframe. It is doubtful that Iran

could design and build such an engine, but there are over 20 other countries with

the necessary design and manufacturing skills.

55

While airframe-engine-warhead integration and testing would present a challenge

and might be beyond Iran’s manufacturing skills, it is inherently easier to integrate

and test a cruise missile than a long-range ballistic missile. Further, such developments would be far less detectable than developing a ballistic system if the program

used coded or low altitude directional telemetry.

Iran could bypass much of the problems inherent in developing its own cruise missile by modifying the HY-2 Seersucker for use as a land attack weapon and extending its range beyond 80 kilometers, or by modifying and improving the CS-801 (Ying

Jai-l) anti-ship missile. There are reports that the Revolutionary Guards are working on such developments at a facility near Bandar Abbas. • The CIA reported in January 1999 that entities in Russia and China continue

to supply missile-related goods and technology to Iran. Tehran is using these goods

and technologies to achieve its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of

MRBMs. The July flight test of the Shahab-3 MRBM demonstrates the success Iran

has achieved in realizing that goal. Iran already is producing Scud SRBMs with

North Korean help and has begun production of the Shahab-3. In addition, Iran’s Defense Minister has publicly acknowledged the development of the Shahab-4 ballistic missile, with a ‘‘longer range and heavier payload than the 1,300-km Shahab3.’’

Iran’s earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian companies

accelerated Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, which was first flight tested in July 1998.

The CIA report on missile proliferation in September 1999 estimated that Iran

is the next hostile country most capable of testing an ICBM capable of delivering

a weapon to the United States during the next 15 years.

Iran could test an ICBM that could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload

to many parts of the United States in the latter half of the next decade, using Russian technology and assistance.

Iran could pursue a Taepo Dong-type ICBM. Most analysts believe it could test

a three-stage ICBM patterned after the Taepo Dong-1 SLV or a three-stage Taepo

Dong-2-type ICBM, possibly with North Korean assistance, in the next few years.

Iran is likely to test an SLV by 2010 that—once developed—could be converted

into an ICBM capable of delivering a several-hundred kilogram payload to the

United States.

Analysts differ on the likely timing of Iran’s first flight test of an ICBM that could

threaten the United States. Assessments include:

• likely before 2010 and very likely before 2015 (noting that an SLV with ICBM

capabilities will probably be tested within the next few years);

• no more than an even chance by 2010 and a better than even chance by 2015;

• and less than an even chance by 2015.

• The DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) reported in February 2000 that entities

in Russia and China continued to supply a considerable amount and a wide variety

of ballistic missile-related goods and technology to Iran. Tehran is using these goods

and technologies to support current production programs and to achieve its goal of

becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. Iran already is producing Scud short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and has built and publicly displayed prototypes for the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), which

had its initial flight test in July 1998 and probably has achieved ‘‘emergency operational capability’’—i.e., Tehran could deploy a limited number of the Shahab-3 prototype missiles in an operational mode during a perceived crisis situation. In addition, Iran’s Defense Minister last year publicly acknowledged the development of the

Shahab-4, originally calling it a more capable ballistic missile than the Shahab-3,

but later categorizing it as solely a space launch vehicle with no military applications. Iran’s Defense Minister also has publicly mentioned plans for a ‘‘Shahab 5.’’

It also stated that:

Finns in China provided missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance

to several countries of proliferation concern-such as Iran.

Russian entities continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods

and technical know-how to Iran and were expanding missile-related assistance to

Syria and India. For example, Iran’s earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian companies accelerated Iranian development of the Shahab-3

MRBM, which was first flight-tested in July 1998. Russian entities during the first

six months of 1999 have provided substantial missile-related technology, training,

and expertise to Iran that almost certainly will continue to accelerate Iranian efforts

to build new indigenous ballistic missile systems . . . the government’s commitment,

willingness, and ability to curb proliferation-related transfers remain uncertain.

Moreover, economic conditions in Russia continued to deteriorate, putting more

56

pressure on Russian entities to circumvent export controls. Despite some examples

of restraint, Russian businesses continue to be major suppliers of WMD equipment,

materials, and technology to Iran. Monitoring Russian proliferation behavior, therefore, will remain a very high priority.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza stated on February 3, 2000 that

Iran had no intention of seeking missiles with the range to reach the US, and that

the CIA was only making such charges to distract the world for Israel’s nuclear

weapons program. • A CIA report in August 2000 summarized the state of missile proliferation in

Iran as follows: 26

• For the second half of 1999, entities in Russia, North Korea, and China continued to supply the largest amount of ballistic missile-related goods, technology, and

expertise to Iran. Tehran is using this assistance to support current production programs and to achieve its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic

missiles. Iran already is producing Scud short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and

has built and publicly displayed prototypes for the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic

missile (MRBM), which had its initial flight test in July 1998. In addition, Iran’s Defense Minister last year publicly acknowledged the development of the Shahab4, originally calling it a more capable ballistic missile than the Shahab-3, but later

categorizing it as solely a space launch vehicle with no military applications. Iran’s Defense Minister also has publicly mentioned plans for a ‘‘Shahab 5.’’ Such statements, made against the backdrop of sustained cooperation with Russian, North Korean, and Chinese entities, strongly suggest that Tehran intends to develop a

longer-range ballistic missile capability in the near future.

• Beginning in January 1998, the Russian Government took a number of steps

to increase its oversight of entities involved in dealings with Iran and other states

of proliferation concern. In 1999, it pushed a new export control law through the

Duma. Russian firms, however, faced economic pressures to circumvent these controls and did so in some cases. The Russian Government, moreover, failed in some

cases regarding Iran to enforce its export controls. Following repeated warnings, the

US Government in January 1998 and January 1999 imposed administrative measures against Russian entities that had engaged in nuclear- and missile-related cooperation with Iran. The measures imposed on these and other Russian entities

(which were penalized in 1998) remain in effect, although sanctions against two entities—Polyus and Inor—are being lifted.

• On the ACW side, Iran (which has acknowledged a need for Western military

equipment and spare parts) continues to acquire Western equipment, such as attack

helicopters, but also is developing indigenous production capabilities with assistance

from countries such as Russia, China, and North Korea. Indigenous efforts involve

such systems as tanks, TOW missiles, fighter aircraft, Chinese-designed SAMs and

anti-ship missiles, and attack helicopters.

• . . . Russian entities (have) continued to supply a variety of ballistic missilerelated goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India, and Libya.

Iran’s earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian entities accelerated Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, which was first flight-tested

in July 1998. Russian entities during the second six months of 1999 have provided

substantial missile-related technology, training, and expertise to Iran that almost

certainly will continue to accelerate Iranian efforts to develop new ballistic missile

systems.

• Throughout the second half of 1999, North Korea continued to export significant

ballistic missile-related equipment and missile components, materials, and technical

expertise to countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. P’yongyang

attaches a high priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment,

and related technology. Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology are one

of the North’s major sources of hard currency, which fuel continued missile development and production.

• . . . Chinese missile-related technical assistance to Pakistan increased during

this reporting period. In addition, firms in China provided missile-related items, raw

materials, and/or assistance to several countries of proliferation concern—such as

Iran, North Korea, and Libya. . . . China’s 1997 pledge not to engage in any new

nuclear cooperation with Iran has apparently held, but work associated with two remaining nuclear projects—a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility—continues. The Intelligence Community will continue to monitor carefully Chinese nuclear cooperation with Iran.

Chemical Weapons

• Iran purchased large amounts of chemical defense gear from the mid-1980s onwards. Iran also obtained stocks of non-lethal CS gas, although it quickly found

57

such agents had very limited military impact since they could only be used effectively in closed areas or very small open areas. • Acquiring poisonous chemical agents was more difficult. Iran did not have any

internal capacity to manufacture poisonous chemical agents when Iraq first

launched its attacks with such weapons. While Iran seems to have made limited use

of chemical mortar and artillery rounds as early as 1985—and possibly as early as

1984—these rounds were almost certainly captured from Iraq. • Iran had to covertly import the necessary equipment and supplies, and it took

several years to get substantial amounts of production equipment, and the necessary feedstocks. Iran sought aid from European firms like Lurgi to produce large

‘‘pesticide’’ plants, and began to try to obtain the needed feedstock from a wide

range of sources, relying heavily on its Embassy in Bonn to manage the necessary

deals. While Lurgi did not provide the pesticide plant Iran sought, Iran did obtain

substantial support from other European firms and feedstocks from many other

Western sources. • By 1986-1987, Iran developed the capability to produce enough lethal agents to

load its own weapons. The Director of the CIA, and informed observers in the Gulf,

made it clear that Iran could produce blood agents like hydrogen cyanide, phosgene

gas, and/or chlorine gas. Iran was also able to weaponize limited quantities of blister

(sulfur mustard) and blood (cyanide) agents beginning in 1987, and had some capability to weaponize phosgene gas, and/or chlorine gas. These chemical agents were

produced in small batches, and evidently under laboratory scale conditions, which

enabled Iran to load small numbers of weapons before any of its new major production plants went into full operation. • These gas agents were loaded into bombs and artillery shells, and were used

sporadically against Iraq in 1987 and 1988. • Reports regarding Iran’s production and research facilities are highly uncertain:

Iran seems to have completed completion of a major poison gas plant at Qazvin,

about 150 kilometers west of Tehran. This plant is reported to have been completed

between November 1987 and January 1988. While supposedly a pesticide plant, the

facility’s true purpose seems to have been poison gas production using

organophosphorous compounds.

It is impossible to trace all the sources of the major components and technology

Iran used in its chemical weapons program during this period. Mujahideen sources

claim Iran also set up a chemical bomb and warhead plant operated by the Zakaria

Al-Razi chemical company near Mahshar in southern Iran, but it is unclear whether

these reports are true.

Reports that Iran had chemical weapons plants at Damghan and Parchin that

began operation as early as March, 1988, and may have begun to test fire Scuds

with chemical warheads as early as 1988-1989, are equally uncertain.

Iran established at least one large research and development center under the

control of the Engineering Research Centre of the Construction Crusade (Jahad eSazandegi), had established a significant chemical weapons production capability by

mid-1989.

• Debates took place in the Iranian parliament or Majlis in late 1988 over the

safety of Pasdaran gas plants located near Iranian towns, and that Rafsanjani described chemical weapons as follows: ‘‘Chemical and biological weapons are poor

man’s atomic bombs and can easily be produced. We should at least consider them

for our defense. Although the use of such weapons is inhuman, the war taught us

that international laws are only scraps of paper.’’

• Post Iran-Iraq War estimates of Iran chemical weapons production are extremely uncertain:

US experts believe Iran was beginning to produce significant mustard gas and

nerve gas by the time of the August 1988 cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War, although

its use of chemical weapons remained limited and had little impact on the fighting.

Iran’s efforts to equip plants to produce V-agent nerve gases seem to have been

delayed by US, British, and German efforts to limit technology transfers to Iran,

but Iran may have acquired the capability to produce persistent nerve gas during

the mid 1990s.

Production of nerve gas weapons started no later than 1994.

Began to stockpile of cyanide (cyanogen chloride), phosgene, and mustard gas

weapons after 1985. Recent CIA testimony indicates that production capacity may

approach 1,000 tons annually.

• Weapons include bombs and artillery. Shells include 155mm artillery and mortar rounds. Iran also has chemical bombs and mines. It may have developmental

chemical warheads for its Scuds, and may have a chemical package for its 22006

RPV (doubtful).

• There are reports that Iran has deployed chemical weapons on some of its ships.

58

• Iran has increased chemical defensive and offensive warfare training since

1993. • Iran is seeking to buy more advanced chemical defense equipment, and has

sought to buy specialized equipment on world market to develop indigenous capability to produce advanced feedstocks for nerve weapons.

CIA sources indicated in late 1996, that China might have supplied Iran with up

to 400 tons of chemicals for the production of nerve gas.

One report indicated in 1996, that Iran obtained 400 metric tons of chemical for

use in nerve gas weapons from China—including carbon sulfide.

Another report indicated that China supplied Iran with roughly two tons of calcium-hypochlorate in 1996, and loaded another 40,000 barrels in January or February of 1997. Calcium-hypochlorate is used for decontamination in chemical warfare.

Iran placed several significant orders from China that were not delivered. Razak

Industries in Tehran, and Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries in Tabriz ordered 49 metric tons of alkyl dimethylamine, a chemical used in making detergents,

and 17 tons of sodium sulfide, a chemical used in making mustard gas. The orders

were never delivered, but they were brokered by Iran’s International Movalled Industries Corporation (Imaco) and China’s North Chemical Industries Co. (Nocinco).

Both brokers have been linked to other transactions affecting Iran’s chemical weapons program since early 1995, and Nocinco has supplied Iran with several hundred

tons of carbon disulfide, a chemical uses in nerve gas.

Another Chinese firm, only publicly identified as Q. Chen, seems to have supplied

glass vessels for chemical weapons.

The US imposed sanctions on seven Chinese firms in May, 1997, for selling precursors for nerve gas and equipment for making nerve gas—although the US made

it clear that it had, ‘‘no evidence that the Chinese government was involved.’’ The

Chinese firms were the Nanjing Chemical Industries Group and Jiangsu Yongli

Chemical Engineering and Import/Export Corporation. Cheong Yee Ltd., a Hong

Kong firm, was also involved. The precursors included tiorryl chloride, dimethylamine, and ethylene chlorohydril. The equipment included special glass lined vessels, and Nanjing Chemical and Industrial Group completed construction of a production plant to manufacture such vessels in Iran in June, 1997.

Iran sought to obtain impregnated Alumina, which is used to make phosphorousoxychloride—a major component of VX and GB—from the US.

It has obtained some equipment from Israelis. Nahum Manbar, an Israeli national

living in France, was convicted in an Israeli court in May 1997 for providing Iran

with $16 million worth of production equipment for mustard and nerve gas during

the period from 1990 to 1995.

CIA reported in June 1997 that Iran had obtained new chemical weapons equipment technology from China and India in 1996.

India is assisting in the construction of a major new plant at Qazvim, near

Tehran, to manufacture phosphorous pentasulfide, a major precursor for nerve gas.

The plant is fronted by Meli Agrochemicals, and the program was negotiated by Dr.

Mejid Tehrani Abbaspour, a chief security advisor to Rafsanjani.

A recent report by German intelligence indicates that Iran has made major efforts

to acquire the equipment necessary to produce Sarin and Tabun, using the same

cover of purchasing equipment for pesticide plants that Iraq used for its Sa’ad 16

plant in the 1980s. German sources note that three Indian companies—Tata Consulting Engineering, Transpek, and Rallis India—have approached German pharmaceutical and engineering concerns for such equipment and technology under conditions where German intelligence was able to trace the end user to Iran.

• Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in June 1997.

It submitted a statement in Farsi to the CWC secretariat in 1998, but this consisted only of questions in Farsi as to the nature of the required compliance.

It has not provided the CWC with any data on its chemical weapons program.

• The CIA estimated in January 1999 that Iran obtained material related to

chemical warfare (CW) from various sources during the first half of 1998. It already

has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons, including blister, blood, and

choking agents and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering them. However,

Tehran is seeking foreign equipment and expertise to create a more advanced and

self-sufficient CW infrastructure.

• The CIA stated that Chinese entities sought to supply Iran with CW-related

chemicals during 1997-1998 period. The US sanctions imposed in May 1997 on

seven Chinese entities for knowingly and materially contributing to Iran’s CW program remain in effect.

• The DCI Nonfroliferation Center (NPC) reported in February 2000 that Iran,

a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) party, already has manufactured and stockVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:49 Mar 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 69753 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
59

piled chemical weapons, including blister, blood, and choking agents and the bombs

and artillery shells for delivering them. During the first half of 1999, Tehran continued to seek production technology, expertise, and chemicals that could be used as

precursor agents in its chemical warfare (CW) program from entities in Russia and

China. It also acquired or attempted to acquire indirectly through intermediaries in

other countries equipment and material that could be used to create a more advanced and self-sufficient CW infrastructure. It also stated that:

Russian entities remain a significant source of biotechnology and chemicals for

Iran. Russia’s world-leading expertise in biological and chemical weapons would

make it an attractive target for Iranians seeking technical information and training

on BW and CW agent production processes.

Chinese firms had supplied CW-related production equipment and technology to

Iran. The US sanctions imposed in May 1997 on seven Chinese entities for knowingly and materially contributing to Iran’s CW program remain in effect. In June

1998, China announced that it had expanded its chemical export controls to include

10 of the 20 Australia Group chemicals not listed on the CWC schedules.

• A CIA report in August 2000 summarized the state of chemical weapons proliferation in Iran as follows: 27

Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire WMD and ACW

technology from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is attempting to develop an indigenous

capability to produce various types of weapons—nuclear, chemical, and biological—

and their delivery systems. During the reporting period, the evidence indicates increased reflections of Iranian efforts to acquire WMD- and ACW-related equipment,

materials, and technology primarily on entities in Russia, China, North Korea and

Western Europe.

Iran, a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) party, already has manufactured

and stockpiled chemical weapons, including blister, blood, and choking agents and

the bombs and artillery shells for delivering them. During the second half of 1999,

Tehran continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, and chemicals

that could be used as precursor agents in its chemical warfare (CW) program from

entities in Russia and China. It also acquired or attempted to acquire indirectly

through intermediaries in other countries equipment and material that could be

used to create a more advanced and self-sufficient CW infrastructure.

Russian entities remain a significant source of biotechnology and chemicals for

Iran. Russia’s world-leading expertise in biological and chemical weapons would

make it an attractive target for Iranians seeking technical information and training

on BW and CW agent production processes. Russia (along with its sister republics

in the FSU) also remains an important source of conventional weapons and spare

parts for Iran, which is seeking to upgrade and replace its existing conventional

weapons inventories.

Throughout the second half of 1999, North Korea continued to export significant

ballistic missile-related equipment and missile components, materials, and technical

expertise to countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. P’yongyang

attaches a high priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment,

and related technology. Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology are one

of the North’s major sources of hard currency, which fuel continued missile development and production.

Prior to the the second half of 1999, Chinese firms had supplied CW-related production equipment and technology to Iran. The US sanctions imposed in May 1997

on seven Chinese entities for knowingly and materially contributing to Iran’s CW

program remain in effect. Evidence during the current reporting period suggests

Iran continues to seek such assistance from Chinese entities, but it is unclear to

what extent these efforts have succeeded. In June 1998, China announced that it

had expanded its chemical export controls to include 10 of the 20 Australia Group

chemicals not listed on the CWC schedules.

Biological Weapons

• Weapons effort documented as early as 1982. Reports surfaced that Iran had

imported suitable type cultures from Europe and was working on the production of

Mycotoxins—a relatively simple family of biological agents that require only limited

laboratory facilities for small scale production.

• US intelligence sources reported in August 1989, that Iran was trying to buy

two new strains of fungus from Canada and the Netherlands that can be used to

produce Mycotoxins. German sources indicated that Iran had successfully purchased

such cultures several years earlier.

• The Imam Rem Medical Center at Mashhad Medical Sciences University and

the Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology were identified as

60

the end users for this purchasing effort, but it is likely that the true end user was

an Iranian government agency specializing in biological warfare. • Many experts believe that the Iranian biological weapons effort was placed

under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which is known to

have tried to purchase suitable production equipment for such weapons. • Since the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has conducted research on more lethal active

agents like Anthrax, hoof and mouth disease, and biotoxins. In addition, Iranian

groups have repeatedly approached various European firms for the equipment and

technology necessary to work with these diseases and toxins.

Unclassified sources of uncertain reliability have identified a facility at Damghan

as working on both biological and chemical weapons research and production, and

believe that Iran may be producing biological weapons at a pesticide facility near

Tehran.

Some universities and research centers may be linked to biological weapons program.

Reports surfaced in the spring of 1993 that Iran had succeeded in obtaining advanced biological weapons technology in Switzerland and containment equipment

and technology from Germany. According to these reports, this led to serious damage to computer facilities in a Swiss biological research facility by unidentified

agents. Similar reports indicated that agents had destroyed German bio-containment equipment destined for Iran.

More credible reports by US experts indicate that Iran has begun to stockpile Anthrax and Botulinum in a facility near Tabriz, can now mass manufacture such

agents, and has them in an aerosol form. None of these reports, however, can be

verified.

The CIA has reported that Iran has, ‘‘sought dual-use biotech equipment from Europe and Asia, ostensibly for civilian use.’’ It also reported in 1996 that Iran might

be ready to deploy biological weapons. Beyond this point, little unclassified information exists regarding the details of Iran’s effort to ‘‘weaponize’’ and produce biological weapons. • Iran may have the production technology to make dry storable and aerosol

weapons. This would allow it to develop suitable missile warheads and bombs and

covert devices. • Iran may have begun active weapons production in 1996, but probably only at

limited scale suitable for advanced testing and development. • CIA testimony indicates that Iran is believed to have weaponized both live

agents and toxins for artillery and bombs and may be pursuing biological warheads

for its missiles. The CIA reported in 1996 that, ‘‘We believe that Iran holds some

stocks of biological agents and weapons. Tehran probably has investigated both toxins and live organisms as biological warfare agents. Iran has the technical infrastructure to support a significant biological weapons program with little foreign assistance.

• CIA reported in June 1997 that Iran had obtained new dual use technology

from China and India during 1996.

• Iran announced in June 1997 that it would not produce or employ chemical

weapons including toxins.

• The CIA estimated in January 1999 that Iran continued to pursue purchasing

dual-use biotechnical equipment from Russia and other countries, ostensibly for civilian uses. Its biological warfare (BW) program began during the Iran-Iraq war,

and Iran may have some limited capability for BW deployment. Outside assistance

is both important and difficult to prevent, given the dual-use nature of the materials

and equipment being sought and the many legitimate end uses for these items.

• Russia remains a key source of biotechnology for Iran. Russia’s world-leading

expertise in biological weapons makes it an attractive target for Iranians seeking

technical information and training on BW agent production processes.

• The DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) reported in February 2000 that Tehran

continued to seek considerable dual-use biotechnical equipment from entities in Russia and Western Europe, ostensibly for civilian uses. Iran began a biological warfare

(BW) program during the Iran-Iraq war, and it may have some limited capability

for BW deployment. Outside assistance is both important and difficult to prevent,

given the dual-use nature of the materials, the equipment being sought, and the

many legitimate end uses for these items.

• A CIA report in August 2000 summarized the state of biological weapons proliferation in Iran as follows: 28

For the reporting period, Tehran expanded its efforts to seek considerable dualuse biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise from abroad—primarily from

entities in Russia and Western Europe—ostensibly for civilian uses. Iran began a

biological warfare (BW) program during the Iran-Iraq war, and it may have some

61

limited capability for BW deployment. Outside assistance is both important and difficult to prevent, given the dual-use nature of the materials, the equipment being

sought, and the many legitimate end uses for these items.

Russian entities remain a significant source of biotechnology and chemicals for

Iran. Russia’s world-leading expertise in biological and chemical weapons would

make it an attractive target for Iranians seeking technical information and training

on BW and CW agent production processes. Russia (along with its sister republics

in the FSU) also remains an important source of conventional weapons and spare

parts for Iran, which is seeking to upgrade and replace its existing conventional

weapons inventories.

Nuclear Weapons

• By the time the Shah fell in January, 1979, he had six reactors under contract,

and was attempting to purchase a total of 12 nuclear power plants from Germany,

France, and the US. Two 1,300 megawatt German nuclear power plants at Bushehr

were already 60% and 75% completed, and site preparation work had begun on the

first of two 935 megawatt French plants at Darkhouin that were to be supplied by

Framatome.

The Shah also started a nuclear weapons program in the early to mid-1970s,

building upon his major reactor projects, investment in URENCO, and smuggling

of nuclear enrichment and weapons related technology from US and Europe.

5 megawatt light-water research reactor operating in Tehran.

27 kilowatt neutron-source reactor operating in Isfahan.

Started two massive 1300 megawatt reactor complexes.

The Shah attempted to covertly import controlled technology from the US/.

US experts believe that Shah began a low-level nuclear weapons research program, centered at the Amirabad Nuclear Research Center. This research effort included studies of weapons designs and plutonium recovery from spent reactor fuel.

It also involved a laser enrichment program which began in 1975, and led to a

complex and highly illegal effort to obtain laser separation technology from the US.

This latter effort, which does not seems to have had any success, continued from

1976 until the Shah’s fall, and four lasers operating in the critical 16 micron band

were shipped to Iran in October, 1978.

At the same time, Iran worked on other ways to obtain plutonium, created a secret reprocessing research effort to use enriched uranium, and set up a small nuclear weapons design team.

In 1976, Iran signed a secret contract to buy $700 million worth of yellow cake

from South Africa, and appears to have reached an agreement to buy up to 1,000

metric tons a year. It is unclear how much of this ore South Africa shipped before

it agreed to adopt IAEA export restrictions in 1984, and whether South Africa really

honored such export restrictions. Some sources indicate that South Africa still made

major deliveries as late as 1988-1989.

Iran also tried to purchase 26.2 kilograms of highly enriched uranium; the application to the US for this purchase was pending when the Shah fell.

The Shah did eventually accept full IAEA safeguards but there value is uncertain.

In 1984, Khomeini revived nuclear weapons program begun under Shah.

Received significant West German and Argentine corporate support in some aspects of nuclear technology during the Iran-Iraq War.

Limited transfers of centrifuge and other weapons related technology from PRC,

possibly Pakistan.

It has a Chinese-supplied heavy-water, zero-power research reactor at Isfahan

Nuclear Research Center, and two-Chinese supplied sub-critical assemblies—a light

water and graphite design.

It has stockpiles of uranium and mines in Yazd area. It may have had a uraniumore concentration facility at University of Tehran, but status unclear.

Some experts feel that the IRGC moved experts and equipment from the

Amirabad Nuclear Research Center to a new nuclear weapons research facility near

Isfahan in the mid-1980s, and formed a new nuclear research center at the University of Isfahan in 1984—with French assistance. Unlike many Iranian facilities, the

center at Isfahan was not declared to the IAEA until February 1992, when the

IAEA was allowed to make a cursory inspection of six sites that various reports had

claimed were the location of Iran’s nuclear weapons efforts.

(Bushehr I & II), on the Gulf Coast just southwest of Isfahan, were partially completed at the time of the Shah’s fall. Iran attempted to revive the program and

sought German and Argentine support, but the reactors were damaged by Iraqi air

strikes in 1987 and 1988.

Iran may also have opened a new uranium ore processing plant close to its

Shagand uranium mine in March, 1990, and it seems to have extended its search

62

for uranium ore into three additional areas. Iran may have also begun to exploit

stocks of yellow cake that the Shah had obtained from South Africa in the late

1970s while obtaining uranium dioxide from Argentina by purchasing it through Algeria.

Iran began to show a renewed interest in laser isotope separation (LIS) in the

mid-1980s, and held a conference on LIS in September, 1987.

Iran opened a new nuclear research center in Isfahan in 1984, located about four

kilometers outside the city and between the villages of Shahrida and Fulashans.

This facility was built at a scale far beyond the needs of peaceful research, and Iran

sought French and Pakistani help for a new research reactor for this center.

The Khomeini government may also have obtained several thousand pounds of

uranium dioxide from Argentina by purchasing it through Algeria. Uranium dioxide

is considerably more refined than yellow cake, and is easier to use in irradiating

material in a reactor to produce plutonium.

The status of Iran’s nuclear program since the Iran-Iraq War is highly controversial, and Iran has denied the existence of such a program.

On February 7, 1990, the speaker of the Majlis publicly toured the Atomic Energy

Organization of Iran and opened the new Jabir Ibn al Hayyan laboratory to train

Iranian nuclear technicians. Reports then surfaced that Iran had at least 200 scientists and a work force of about 2,000 devoted to nuclear research.

Iran’s Deputy President Ayatollah Mohajerani stated in October, 1991, that Iran

should work with other Islamic states to create an ‘‘Islamic bomb.’’ The Iranian government has repeatedly made proposals to create a nuclear-free

zone in the Middle East. For example, President Rafsanjani was asked if Iran had

a nuclear weapons program in an interview in the CBS program 60 Minutes in February 1997. He replied, ‘‘Definitely not. I hate this weapon.’’ Other senior Iranian leaders, including President Khatami have made similar categorical denials. Iran’s new Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharrazi, stated on October 5,

1997, that, ‘‘We are certainly not developing an atomic bomb, because we do not believe in nuclear weapons . . . We believe in and promote the idea of the Middle East

as a region free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. But why

are we interested to develop nuclear technology? We need to diversify our energy

sources. In a matter of a few decades, our oil and gas reserves would be finished

and therefore, we need access to other sources of energy . . . Furthermore, nuclear

technology has many other utilities in medicine and agriculture. The case of the

United States in terms of oil reserve is not different from Iran’s The United States

also has large oil resources, but at the same time they have nuclear power plants.

So there is nothing wrong with having access to nuclear technology if it is for peaceful purposes . . .’’ The IAEA reports that Iran has fully complied with its present requirements, and

that it has found no indications of nuclear weapons effort, but IAEA only inspects

Iran’s small research reactors.

The IAEA visits to other Iranian sites are not inspections, and do not use instruments, cameras, seals, etc. The are informal walk-throughs.

The IAEA visited five suspect Iranian facilities in 1992 and 1993 in this manner,

but did not conduct full inspections.

Iran has not had any 93+2 inspections and its position on improved inspections

is that it will not be either the first or the last to have them.

Iranian officials have repeatedly complained that the West tolerated Iraqi use of

chemical weapons and its nuclear and biological build-up during the Iran-Iraq War,

and has a dual standard where it does not demand inspections of Israel or that

Israel sign the NPT.

These are reasons to assume that Iran still has a nuclear program:

Iran attempted to buy highly enriched fissile material from Khazakstan. The US

paid between $20 million and $30 million to buy 1,300 pounds of highly enriched

uranium from the Ust-Kamenogorsk facility in Khazakstan that Iran may have

sought to acquire in 1992. A total of 120 pounds of the material—enough for two

bombs—cannot be fully accounted for.

Iran has imported maraging steel, sometimes used for centrifuges, by smuggling

it in through dummy fronts. Britain intercepted 110 pound (50 kilo) shipment in August 1996. Seems to have centrifuge research program at Sharif University of Technology in Tehran. IAEA ‘‘visit’’ did not confirm.

Those aspects of Iran’s program that are visible indicate that Iran has had only

uncertain success. Argentina agreed to train Iranian technicians at its Jose

Balaseiro Nuclear Institute, and sold Iran $5.5 million worth of uranium for its

small Amirabad Nuclear Research Center reactor in May 1987. A CENA team visited Iran in late 1987 and early 1988, and seems to have discussed selling Iran the

technology necessary to operate its reactor with 20% enriched uranium as a subVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:49 Mar 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 69753 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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stitute for the highly enriched core provided by the US, and possibly uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology as well. Changes in Argentina’s government, however, made it much less willing to support proliferation. The Argentine government announced in February, 1992, that it was canceling an $18 million

nuclear technology sale to Iran because it had not signed a nuclear safeguards arrangement. Argentine press sources suggested, however, that Argentina was reacting to US pressure.

In February 1990 a Spanish paper reported that Associated Enterprises of Spain

was negotiating the completion of the two nuclear power plants at Bushehr. Another

Spanish firm called ENUSA (National Uranium Enterprises) was to provide the

fuel, and Kraftwerke Union (KWU) would be involved. Later reports indicated that

a 10 man delegation from Iran’s Ministry of Industry was in Madrid negotiating

with the Director of Associated Enterprises, Adolofo Garcia Rodriguez.

Iran negotiated with Kraftwerke Union and CENA of Germany in the late 1980s

and early 1990s. Iran attempted to import reactor parts from Siemens in Germany

and Skoda in Czechoslovakia. None of these efforts solved Iran’s problems in rebuilding its reactor program, but all demonstrate the depth of its interest.

Iran took other measures to strengthen its nuclear program during the early

1990s. It installed a cyclotron from Ion Beam Applications in Belgium at a facility

in Karzaj in 1991.

Iran conducted experiments in uranium enrichment and centrifuge technology at

its Sharif University of Technology in Tehran. Sharif University was also linked to

efforts to import cylinders of fluorine suitable for processing enriched material, and

attempts to import specialized magnets that can be used for centrifuges, from

Thyssen in Germany in 1991.

In 1992, Iran attempted to buy beryllium from a storage site in Kazakhstan that

also was storing 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. These contacts then

seem to have expanded to an attempt to try the material, In 1994, they helped lead

the US to buy the enriched material and fly it out of the country.

It is clear from Iran’s imports that it has sought centrifuge technology ever since.

Although many of Iran’s efforts have never been made public, British customs officials seized 110 pounds of maraging steel being shipped to Iran in July 1996.

Iran seems to have conducted research into plutonium separation and Iranians

published research on uses of tritium that had applications to nuclear weapons

boosting. Iran also obtained a wide range of US and other nuclear literature with

applications for weapons designs. Italian inspectors seized eight steam condensers

bound for Iran that could be used in a covert reactor program in 1993, and high

technology ultrasound equipment suitable for reactor testing at the port of Bari in

January, 1994.

Other aspects of Iran’s nuclear research effort had potential weapons applications.

Iran continued to operate an Argentine-fueled five megawatt light water highly enriched uranium reactor at the University of Tehran. It is operated by a Chinesesupplied neutron source research reactor, and subcritical assemblies with 900 grams

of highly enriched uranium, at its Isfahan Nuclear Research Center. This Center

has experimented with a heavy water zero-power reactor, a light water sub-critical

reactor, and a graphite sub-critical reactor. In addition, it may have experimented

with some aspects of nuclear weapons design.

The German Ministry of Economics has circulated a wide list of such Iranian

fronts which are known to have imported or attempted to import controlled items.

These fronts include the:

Bonyad e-Mostazafan;

Defense Industries Organization (Sazemane Sanaye Defa);

Pars Garma Company, the Sadadja Industrial Group (Sadadja Sanaye Daryaee);

Iran Telecommunications Industry (Sanaye Mokhaberet Iran);

Shahid Hemat Industrial Group, the State Purchasing Organization, Education Research Institute (ERI);

Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (IAI);

Iran Fair Deal Company, Iran Group of Surveyors;

Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Industries (IHI);

Iran Navy Technical Supply Center;

Iran Tehran Kohakd Daftar Nezarat, Industrial Development Group;

Ministry of Defense (Vezerate Defa).

• Iran claims it eventually needs to build enough nuclear reactors to provide 20%

of its electric power. This Iranian nuclear power program presents serious problems

in terms of proliferation. Although the reactors are scarcely ideal for irradiating material to produce Plutonium or cannibalizing the core, they do provide Iran with the

technology base to make its own reactors, have involved other technology transfer

64

helpful to Iran in proliferating and can be used to produce weapons if Iran rejects

IAEA safeguards.

Russian has agreed to build up to four reactors, beginning with a complex at

Bushehr—with two 1,000-1,200 megawatt reactors and two 465 megawatt reactors,

and provide significant nuclear technology.

Russia has consistently claimed the light water reactor designs for Bushehr cannot be used to produce weapons grade Plutonium and are similar to the reactors

the US is providing to North Korea.

The US has claimed, however, that Victor Mikhaliov, the head of Russia’s Atomic

Energy Ministry, proposed the sale of a centrifuge plant in April, 1995. The US also

indicated that it had persuaded Russia not to sell Iran centrifuge technology as part

of the reactor deal during the summit meeting between President’s Clinton and

Yeltsin in May, 1995.

It was only after US pressure that Russia publicly stated that it never planned

to sell centrifuge and advanced enrichment technology to Iran, and Iran denied that

it had ever been interested in such technology. For example, the statement of Mohammed Sadegh Ayatollahi, Iran’s representative to the IAEA, stated that, ‘‘We’ve

had contracts before for the Bushehr plant in which we agreed that the spent fuel

would go back to the supplier. For our contract with the Russians and Chinese, it

is the same.’’ According to some reports, Russia was to reprocess the fuel at its

Mayak plant near Chelyabinsk in the Urals, and could store it at an existing facility, at Krasnoyarsk-26 in southern Siberia.

The CIA reported in June 1997 that Iran had obtained new nuclear technology

from Russia during 1996.

A nuclear accident at plant at Rasht, six miles north of Gilan, exposed about 50

people to radiation in July, 1996.

Russian Nuclear Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov and Russian Deputy Prime

Minister Vladimir Bulgak visited in March, 1998. and Iran and dismissed US complaints about the risk the reactors would be used to proliferate.

Russia indicated that it would go ahead with selling two more reactors for

construction at Bushehr within the next five years.

The first 1,000 megawatt reactor at Bushehr has experienced serious construction

delays. In March, 1998, Russia and Iran agreed to turn the construction project into

a turn key plant because the Iranian firms working on infrastructure had fallen

well behind schedule. In February, Iran had agreed to fund improved safety systems. The reactor is reported to be on a 30-month completion cycle.

The US persuaded the Ukraine not to sell Iran $45 million worth of turbines for

its nuclear plant in early March 1998, and to strengthen its controls on Ukrainian

missile technology under the MTCR.

• The CIA reported in January 1999 that Russia remained a key supplier for civilian nuclear programs in Iran and, to a lesser extent, India. With respect to Iran’s

nuclear infrastructure, Russian assistance would enhance Iran’s ability to support

a nuclear weapons development effort. Such assistance is less likely to significantly

advance India’s effort, given that India’s nuclear weapons program is more mature.

By its very nature, even the transfer of civilian technology may be of use in the nuclear weapons programs of these countries.

• Following intense and continuing engagement with the United States, Russian

officials have taken some positive steps. Russia has committed to observe certain

limits on its nuclear cooperation with Iran, such as not providing militarily useful

nuclear technology.

• In January 1998, the Russian Government issued a broad decree prohibiting

Russian companies from exporting items known or believed to be used for developing WMD or related delivery systems, whether or not these items are on Russia’s

export control list. In May 1998, Russia announced a decree intended to strengthen

compliance of Russian businesses with existing export controls on proliferation-related items. These actions, if enforced, could help to counter the proliferation of

WMD and their delivery systems.

• However, there are signs that Russian entities have continued to engage in behavior inconsistent with these steps. Monitoring Russian proliferation behavior,

therefore, will have to remain a very high priority for some time to come.

• On January 14, 2000, Russia’s Minister of Defense Igor Ivanavov met with Hassan Rowhani, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, and promised that Russia would maintain defense cooperation, and that Russia, ‘‘intends to

fulfill its obligations under the agrements made in 1989-1990.’’

• The same day, Vice Minister Ilya Klebanov met with Hassan Rowhani, and announced that Iran might order three additional Russian reactors.

65

• The CIA warned in January 2000 that Russia might have sold Iran heavy water

and graphite technology.

China is reported to have agreed to provide significant nuclear technology transfer

and possible sale of two 300 megawatt pressurized water reactors in the early

1990s, but then to have agreed to halt nuclear assistance to Iran after pressure from

the US.

Iran signed an agreement with China’s Commission on Science, Technology, and

Industry for National Defense on January 21, 1991, to build a small 27-kilowatt research reactor at Iran’s nuclear weapons research facility at Isfahan. On November

4, 1991, China stated that it had signed commercial cooperation agreements with

Iran in 1989 and 1991, and that it would transfer an electromagnetic isotope separator (Calutron) and a smaller nuclear reactor, for ‘‘peaceful and commercial’’ purposes.

The Chinese reactor and Calutron were small research-scale systems and had no

direct value in producing fissile material. They did, however, give Iran more knowledge of reactor and enrichment technology, and US experts believe that China provided Iran with additional data on chemical separation, other enrichment technology, the design for facilities to convert uranium to uranium hexaflouride to make

reactor fuel, and help in processing yellowcake.

The US put intense pressure on China to halt such transfers. President Clinton

and Chinese President Jiang Zemin reached an agreement at an October, 1997 summit. China strengthened this pledge in negations with the US in February, 1998.

In March, 1998, the US found that the China Nuclear Energy Corporation was

negotiating to sell Iran several hundred tons of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF)

to Isfahan Nuclear Research Corporation in central Iran, a site where some experts

believe Iran is working on the development of nuclear weapons. AHF can be used

to separate plutonium, help refine yellow cake into uranium hexaflouride to produce

U-235, and as a feedstock for Sarin. It is on two nuclear control lists. China agreed

to halt the sale.

Iran denied that China had halted nuclear cooperation on March 15, 1998.

Even so, the US acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs stated that China was keeping its pledge not to aid Iran

on March 26, 1998. • The CIA reported in January 1999 that China continued to take steps to

strengthen its control over nuclear exports. China promulgated new export control

regulations in June 1998 that cover the sale of dual-use nuclear equipment. This

follows on the heels of the September 1997 promulgation of controls covering the

export of equipment and materials associated exclusively with nuclear applications.

These export controls should give the Chinese Government greater accounting and

control of the transfer of equipment, materials, and technology to nuclear programs

in countries of concern.

• China pledged in late 1997 not to engage in any new nuclear cooperation with

Iran and to complete work on two remaining nuclear projects—a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility—in a relatively short period of time. During the first half of 1998, Beijing appears to have implemented this pledge. The Intelligence Community will continue to monitor carefully Chinese nuclear cooperation

with Iran.

• During the reporting period, Chinese entities provided a variety of missile-related items and assistance to several countries of proliferation concern. China also

was an important supplier of ACW to Iran through the first half of 1998.

• The control of fissile material in the FSU remains a major problem:

US estimates indicate the FSU left a legacy of some 1,485 tons of nuclear material. This include 770 tons in some 27,000 weapons, including 816 strategic bombs,

5,434 missile warheads, and about 20,000 theater and tactical weapons. In addition,

there were 715 tons of fissile or near-fissile material in eight countries of the FSU

in over 50 sites: enough to make 35,000-40,000 bombs.

There are large numbers of experienced FSU technicians, including those at the

Russian weapons design center at Arzamas, and at nuclear production complexes at

Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Tomsk.

These factors led the US to conduct Operation Sapphire in 1994, where the US

removed 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from the Ulba Metallurgy Plant

in Kazakhstan at a time Iran was negotiating for the material.

They also led to Britain and the US cooperating in Auburn Endeavor, and airlifting fissile material out of a nuclear research facility in Tiblisi, Georgia. There

were 10 pounds of material at the institute, and 8.8 pounds were HEU. (It takes

about 35 pounds to make a bomb.) This operation was reported in the New York

Times on April 21, 1998. The British government confirmed it took place, but would

not give the date.

66

The Jerusalem Post reported on April 9, 1998 that Iran had purchased four tactical nuclear weapons from Russian smugglers for $25 million in the early 1990s,

that the weapons had been obtained from Kazakhstan in 1991, and that Argentine

technicians were helping to activate the weapon.

It quoted what it claimed was an Iranian report, dated December 26, 1991, of a

meeting between Brigadier General Rahim Safavi, the Deputy Commander of the

Revolutionary Guards and Reza Amrohalli, then head of the Iranian atomic energy

organization.

It also quoted a second document—dated January 2, 1992—saying the Iranians

were awaiting the arrival of Russian technicians to show them how to disarm the

protection systems that would otherwise inactivate the weapons if anyone attempted

to use them.

The documents implied the weapons were flawed by did not indicate whether Iran

had succeeded in activating them.

The US intelligence community denied any evidence that such a transfer had

taken place.

The most detailed reports of Iran’s nuclear weapons program are the least reliable, and come from the People’s Mujahideen, a violent, anti-regime, terrorist group.

Such claims are very doubtful, but the People’s Mujahideen has reported that:

Iran’s facilities include a weapons site called Ma’allem Kelayah, near Qazvin on

the Caspian. This is said to be an IRGC-run facility established in 1987, which has

involved an Iranian investment of $300 million. Supposedly, the site was to house

the 10 megawatt reactor Iran tried to buy from India.

Two Soviet reactors were to be installed at a large site at Gorgan on the Caspian,

under the direction of Russian physicists.

The People’s Republic of China provided uranium enrichment equipment and

technicians for the site at Darkhouin, where Iran once planned to build a French

reactor.

A nuclear reactor was being constructed at Karaj; and that another nuclear weapons facility exists in the south central part of Iran, near the Iraqi border.

The ammonia and urea plant that the British firm M. W. Kellog was building at

Borujerd in Khorassan province, near the border with Turkestan, might be adapted

to produce heavy water.

The Amir Kabar Technical University, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran

(AEOI) (also known as the Organization for Atomic Energy of Iran or AEOI), Dor

Argham Ltd., the Education and Research Institute, GAM Iranian Communications,

Ghoods Research Center, Iran Argham Co., Iran Electronic Industries, Iranian Research Organization, Ministry of Sepah, Research and Development Group,

Sezemane Sanaye Defa, the Sharif University of Technology, Taradis Iran Computer

Company, and Zakaria Al-Razi Chemical Company are all participants in the Iranian nuclear weapons effort.

Other sources based on opposition data have listed the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, the Laser Research Center and Ibn-e Heysam Research and Laboratory

Complex, the Bonab Atomic Energy Research Center (East Azerbaijan), the Imam

Hussein University of the Revolutionary Guards, the Jabit bin al-Hayyan Laboratory, the Khoshomi uranium mine (Yazd), a possible site at Moallem Kalayeh, the

Nuclear Research Center at Tehran University, the Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine (Karaj), the Nuclear Research Center of Technology

(Isfahan), the Saghand Uranium mine (Yazd), the Sharif University (Tehran) and

its Physics Research Center.

The CIA estimated in January 1999 that Iran remains one of the most active

countries seeking to acquire WMD technology and ACW. During the reporting period, Iran focused its efforts to acquire WMD-related equipment, materials, and

technology primarily on two countries: Russia and China. Iran is seeking to develop

an indigenous capability to produce various types of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems. It also stated that:

• Russian entities continued to market and support a variety of nuclear-related

projects in Iran during the first half of 1998, ranging from the sale of laboratory

equipment for nuclear research institutes to the construction of a 1,000-megawatt

nuclear power reactor in Bushehr, Iran, that will be subject to International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. These projects, along with other nuclear-related

purchases, will help Iran augment its nuclear technology infrastructure, which in

turn would be useful in supporting nuclear weapons research and development.

• Russia has committed to observe certain limits on its nuclear cooperation with

Iran. For example, President Yeltsin has stated publicly that Russia will not provide

militarily useful nuclear technology to Iran. Beginning in January this year, the

Russian Government has taken a number of steps. For example, in May 1998, RusVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:49 Mar 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 69753 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
67

sia announced a decree intended to strengthen compliance of Russian businesses

with existing export controls on proliferation-related items.

• China continued to work on one of its two remaining projects—to supply Iran’s

civil nuclear program with a zirconium production facility. This facility will be used

by Iran to produce cladding for reactor fuel. As a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Iran is required to apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear fuel, but safeguards are not required for the zirconium plant or its products. During the USChina October 1997 Summit, China pledged not to engage in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran and to complete cooperation on two ongoing nuclear projects in

a relatively short time. This pledge appears to be holding. In addition, China promulgated new export regulations in June 1998 that cover the sale of dual-use nuclear equipment. The regulations took effect immediately and were intended to

strengthen control over equipment and material that would contribute to proliferation. Promulgation of these regulations fulfills Jiang Zemin’s commitment to the

United States last fall to implement such controls by the middle of 1998.

• Iran claims to desire the establishment of a complete nuclear fuel cycle for its

civilian energy program. In that guise, it seeks to obtain whole facilities, such as

a uranium conversion facility, that, in fact, could be used in any number of ways

in support of efforts to produce fissile material needed for a nuclear weapon. Despite

outside efforts to curtail the flow of critical technologies and equipment, Tehran continues to seek fissile material and technology for weapons development and has set

up an elaborate system of military and civilian organizations to support its effort.

The DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) reported in February 2000 that Iran

sought nuclear-related equipment, material, and technical expertise from a variety

of sources, especially in Russia, during the first half of 1999. Work continues on the

construction of a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power reactor in Bushehr, Iran, that will

be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. In addition,

Russian entities continued to interact with Iranian research centers on various activities. These projects will help Iran augment its nuclear technology infrastructure,

which in turn would be useful in supporting nuclear weapons research and development. The expertise and technology gained, along with the commercial channels and

contacts established-even from cooperation that appears strictly civilian in naturecould be used to advance Iran’s nuclear weapons research and developmental program. It also reported that:

Russia has committed to observe certain limits on its nuclear cooperation with

Iran. For example, President Yeltsin has stated publicly that Russia will not provide

militarily useful nuclear technology to Iran. Beginning in January 1998, the Russian

Government took a number of steps to increase its oversight of entities involved in

dealings with Iran and other states of proliferation concern. In 1999, it pushed a

new export control law through the Duma. Russian firms, however, faced economic

pressures to circumvent these controls and did so in some cases. The Russian Government, moreover, failed in some cases regarding Iran to enforce its export controls. Following repeated warnings, the US Government in January 1999 imposed

administrative measures against Russian entities that had engaged in nuclear- and

missile-related cooperation with Iran. The measures imposed on these and other

Russian entities (which were identified in 1998) remain in effect.

Following intense and continuing engagement with the US, Russian officials took

some positive steps to enhance oversight of Russian entities and their interaction

with countries of concern. Russia has reiterated previous commitments to observe

certain limits on its nuclear cooperation with Iran, such as not providing militarily

useful nuclear technology, although-as indicated above-Russia continues to provide

Iran with nuclear technology that could be applied to Iran’s weapons program.

President Yeltsin in July 1999 signed a federal export control law; which formally

makes WMD-related transfers a violation of law and codifies several existing decrees-including catch-all controls-yet may lessen punishment for violators.

China pledged in October 1997 not to engage in any new nuclear cooperation with

Iran but said it would complete cooperation on two ongoing nuclear projects, a small

research reactor and a zirconium production facility at Esfahan that Iran will use

to produce cladding for reactor fuel. The pledge appears to be holding. As a party

to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is required to apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear fuel, but safeguards are not required for the zirconium plant or

its products.

Iran is attempting to establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle for its civilian energy

program. In that guise, it seeks to obtain whole facilities, such as a uranium conversion facility, that, in fact, could be used in any number of ways in support of efforts

to produce fissile material needed for a nuclear weapon. Despite international efforts to curtail the flow of critical technologies and equipment, Tehran continues to

68

seek fissile material and technology for weapons development and has set up an

elaborate system of military and civilian organizations to support its effort. • The Washington Times reported on June 30, 2000, that a June 8th U.S. intelligence report by the National Security Agency, had stated that Russia is sending

tritium gas to a nuclear weapons research center in Tehran. • The Iranian Ministry of Defense stated on January 18, 2000 that, ‘‘The Islamic

Republic of Iran, which has taken the initiative to launch a dialogue of civilizations

does not need to resort to nuclear weapons . . . or violence.’’ • On May 17, 2000, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy

Organization told the visting Director General of the IAEA, Mohammed Elbaradei,

that Iran was seeking IAEA help in running a nuclear research center west of Teheran studying nuclear applications in medicine and agriculture. He again stated that

Iran opposed the use of nuclear technology in weapons, and claimed that Iran’s nu- clear power program had suffered because of US efforts to block technology transfer. • A CIA report in August 2000 summarized the state of nuclear weapons proliferation in Iran as follows: 29

Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire WMD and ACW

technology from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is attempting to develop an indigenous

capability to produce various types of weapons—nuclear, chemical, and biological— and their delivery systems. During the reporting period, the evidence indicates increased reflections of Iranian efforts to acquire WMD- and ACW-related equiprhent,

materials, and technology primarily on entities in Russia, China, North Korea and

Western Europe.

Iran sought nuclear-related equipment, material, and technical expertise from a

variety of sources, especially in Russia, during the second half of 1999. Work continues on the construction of a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power reactor in Bushehr,

Iran, that will be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

In addition, Russian entities continued to interact with Iranian research centers on

various activities. These projects will help Iran augment its nuclear technology infrastructure, which in turn would be useful in supporting nuclear weapons research

and development. The expertise and technology gained, along with the commercial

channels and contacts established—even from cooperation that appears strictly civilian in nature—could be used to advance Iran’s nuclear weapons research and developmental program.

Beginning in January 1998, the Russian Government took a number of steps to

increase its oversight of entities involved in dealings with Iran and other states of

proliferation concern. In 1999, it pushed a new export control law through the

Duma. Russian firms, however, faced economic pressures to circumvent these controls and did so in some cases. The Russian Government, moreover, failed in some

cases regarding Iran to enforce its export controls. Following repeated warnings, the

US Government in January 1998 and January 1999 imposed administrative measures against Russian entities that had engaged in nuclear- and missile-related cooperation with Iran. The measures imposed on these and other Russian entities

(which were penalized in 1998) remain in effect, although sanctions against two entities—Polyus and Inor—are being lifted.

China pledged in October 1997 not to engage in any new nuclear cooperation with

Iran but said it would complete cooperation on two ongoing nuclear projects, a small

research reactor and a zirconium production facility at Esfahan that Iran will use

to produce cladding for reactor fuel. The pledge appears to be holding. As a party

to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is required to apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear fuel, but safeguards are not required for the zirconium plant or

its products.

Iran claims that it is attempting to establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle for its

civilian energy program. In that guise, it seeks to obtain whole facilities, such as

a uranium conversion facility, that, in fact, could be used in any number of ways

in support of efforts to produce fissile material needed for a nuclear weapon. Despite

international efforts to curtail the flow of critical technologies and equipment,

Tehran continues to seek fissile material and technology for weapons development

and has set up an elaborate system of military and civilian organizations to support

its effort.

During the second half of 1999, Russia also remained a key supplier for civilian

nuclear programs in Iran, primarily focused on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant

project. With respect to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, Russian assistance enhances

Iran’s ability to support a nuclear weapons development effort. By its very nature,

even the transfer of civilian technology may be of use in Iran’s nuclear weapons program. We remain concerned that Tehran is seeking more than a buildup of its civilian infratructure, and the IC will be closely monitoring the relationship with Moscow for any direct assistance in support of a military program. In addition, Russia

69

supplied India with material for its civilian nuclear program during this reporting

period.

Following intense and continuing engagement with the US, Russian officials took

some positive steps to strengthen the legal basis of export controls. President

Yeltsin in July 1999 signed a federal export control law, which formally makes

WMD-related transfers a violation of law and codifies several existing decrees—including catch-all controls—yet may lessen punishment for violators. Russian export

enforcement and prosecution still remains weak, however. The export law is still

awaiting completion of implementing decrees and its legal status is unclear. Public

comments by the head of Russia’s security council indicate that Russia obtained

only three convictions for export control violations involving WMD and missile technology during 1998-99.

Nonetheless, the Russian government’s commitment, willingness, and ability to

curb proliferation-related transfers remain uncertain. Moreover, economic conditions

in Russia continued to deteriorate, putting more pressure on Russian entities to circumvent export controls. Despite some examples of restraint, Russian businesses

continue to be major suppliers of WMD equipment, materials, and technology to

Iran. Specifically, Russia continues to provide Iran with nuclear technology that

could be applied to Iran’s weapons program. Monitoring Russian proliferation behavior, therefore, will remain a very high priority.

. . . Chinese missile-related technical assistance to Pakistan increased during this

reporting period. In addition, firms in China provided missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several countries of proliferation concern—such as Iran,

North Korea, and Libya. . . . China’s 1997 pledge not to engage in any new nuclear

cooperation with Iran has apparently held, but work associated with two remaining

nuclear projects—a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility—continues. The Intelligence Community will continue to monitor carefully Chinese nuclear cooperation with Iran.

• US estimates of Iran’s progress in acquiring nuclear weapons have changed

over time.

In 1992, the CIA estimated that Iran would have the bomb by the year 2000. In

1995, John Holum testified that Iran could have the bomb by 2003.

In 1997, after two years in which Iran might have made progress, he testified that

Iran could have the bomb by 2005-2007.

In 1999, the NIE on proliferation estimated that Iran could test a missile that

could reach the US by 2010, but did not change the 1997 estimate or when Iran

might acquire a bomb.

In early 2000, the New York Time reported that the CIA had warned that Iran

might now be able to maker a nuclear weapon. The assessment stated that the CIA

could not monitor Iran closely enough to be certain whether Iran had acquired

fissile material from an outside source.

US experts increasingly refer to Iran’s efforts as ‘‘creeping proliferation’’ and there

is no way to tell when or if Iranian current efforts will produce a weapon, and unclassified lists of potential facilities have little credibility.

Timing of weapons acquisition depends heavily on whether Iran can buy fissile

material—if so it has the design capability and can produce weapons in 1-2 years—

or must develop the capability to process Plutonium or enrich Uranium—in which

case, it is likely to be 5-10 years.

Iran’s current success in proliferating does give Iran a post-Gulf War edge over

Iraq. It also inevitably affects US, British, Israeli and Southern Gulf perceptions of

the risks inherent in attacking Iran. However, ‘‘weapons of mass destruction’’ have

not yet made radical changes in Iran’s contingency capabilities.

Much depends upon any potential opponent’s perceptions of the risk in engaging

Iran, refusing its demands, and dealing with Iranian escalation and/or retaliation.

It seems unlikely that Iran’s ‘‘creeping proliferation’’ will reach the point in the near

term where Iran’s capabilities are great enough to change US, British, Israeli and/

or Southern Gulf perceptions of risk to the point where they would limit or paralyze

outside military action. Further, it seems unlikely that Iran can continue to build

up its capabilities without provoking even stronger US counter-proliferation programs, including retaliatory strike capabilities. The same is true of a response from

Iraq and the Southern Gulf states. As a result, Iran’s ‘‘creeping proliferation’’ may

end simply in provoking a ‘‘creeping arms race.’’

There are, however, at least four contingencies that could challenge US regional

influence:

• A successful Iranian attempt to buy significant amounts of weapons grade material that suddenly shifted proliferation from ‘‘creeping’’ to an active and reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:49 Mar 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 69753 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
70

gionally destabilizing threat and potential counter to US conventional capabilities.

• Iranian acquisition of highly lethal biological weapons and/or change in the US

and regional perception of biological weapons.

• A case of lateral escalation in which Iraq found a way to end UN sanctions and/

or reveal a substantial break-out capability of its own, creating the risk of a

new Iran-Iraq War using weapons of mass destruction that could affect two

countries with over 15% of the world’s oil reserves and which could spillover

into other Gulf states.

• Iranian use of such weapons through proxies or in covert attacks where it had

some degree of plausible deniability.

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NOTES

1Table One, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditures

and Arms Transfers, 1996, Washington, GPO, 1997, and Bureau of Arms Control, US State Department, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1998, Washington, GPO, 2000. 2Table One, ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1993-1994, Washington, GPO, 1995; Table One, ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995,

Washington, GPO, 1996; and Table One, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA),

World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996, Washington, GPO, 1997. 3 British sources quoted in Jane’s Defense Weekly, February 1, 1992, p. 158. The Egyptian Ga- zette projected expenditures of $5 billion per year in 1992, 1993, and 1994 in its January 29, 1992, issue; The Jaffee Center estimated expenditures of $8.5 billion in 189 and $8.6 billion in

1990. Andrew Duncan of the IISS estimated expenditures of $10 billion annually in 1992, 1993,

and 1994 in Defense News, January 27, 1992. The CIA estimate is taken from CIA, World

Factbook, 1992, ‘‘Iran;’’ CIA, World Factbook, 1993, ‘‘Iran;’’ CIA, World Factbook, 1994, ‘‘Iran;’’ and CIA, World Factbook, 1995, ‘‘Iran.’’ It is extremely difficult to relate any Iranian statistics

to dollar figures because Iran uses multiple exchange rates, and often reports inaccurate statistics. See Patrick Clawson, Iran’s Challenge to the West, How, When, and Why, Washington, The

Washington Institute Policy Papers, Number Thirty Three, 1993. P. 58. 4 IISS, Military Balance, various editions.

76

5 IISS, Military Balance, 1997-1998, p. 132. Other IISS estimates indicate that Iran’s expenditures in constant 1995 US dollars totaled $19.4 million in 1985, $3 billion in 1995, and $3.3

billion in 1996. Middle East Economic Digest, October 24, 1997, p. 16. 6 Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1983-1990, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-91-578F, August 2, 1991, p. 53. 7 Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1986-1993, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-94-612F, July 29, 1994, p. 57, and Richard F.

Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1987-1995, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-95-862F, August 4, 1995, pp. 57-58, 67-69. 8 Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1987-1995, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-95-862F, August 4, 1995, pp. 57-58, 67-69. 9 Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1986-1993, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-94-612F, July 29, 1994, p. 57, and Richard F.

Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1987-1995, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-95-862F, August 4, 1995, pp. 57-58, 67-69. 10 Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1983-1990, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-91-578F, August 2, 1991, Conventional Arms

Transfers to the Third World, 1984-1991, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-92-

577F, July 20, 1991,Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1987-1994, Washington,

Congressional Research Service, CRS-95-862F, August 4, 1995; Conventional Arms Transfers to

the Third World, 1988-1956, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-96-667F, August

15, 1996; and Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1989-1996, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-97-778F, August 13, 1997. O = data less than $50 million or

nil. All data are rounded to the nearest $100 million. Major West European includes Britian,

France, Germany, and Italy. 11 Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World. 1992-1999, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-RL30275, August 18, 2000. 12 Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1991-1998, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-91-578F, August 2, 1991; and Conventional Arms

Transfers to the Third World, 1992-1999, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRSRL30275, August 18, 2000. Expenditures less than $50 million are not reported. All data are

rounded to the nearest $100 million. Major West European includes Britain, France, Germany,

and Italy. 13Table II in Bureau of Arms Control, US State Department, World Military Expenditures

and Arms Transfers, 1998, Washington, GPO, 2000. 14 Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1991-1998, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-91-578F, August 2, 1991, Richard F. Grimmett,

Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1991-1998, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS 91-578F, August 2, 1991; and Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third

World, 1992-1999, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-RL30275, August 18,

2000. Expenditures less than $50 million are not reported. All data are rounded to the nearest

$100 million. Major West European includes Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. 15 Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1991-1998, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-91-578F, August 2, 1991, p. 52; and Conventional

Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1992-1999, Washington, Congressional Research Service,

CRS-RL30275, August 18, 2000, p. 47. 16 Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1991-1998, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-91-578F, August 2, 1991, Richard F. Grimmett,

Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1991-1998, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-91-578F, August 2, 1991; and Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third

World, 1992-1999, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-RL30275, August 18,

2000. Expenditures less than $50 million are not reported. All data are rounded to the nearest

$100 million. Major West European includes Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. 17Jane’s Defense Weekly, June 5, 1996, p. 15. 18 Associated Press, September 21, 2000, 1930; Reuters, September 28, 2000, 1236. 19 Associated Press, September 21, 2000, 1930; Reuters, September 28, 2000, 1236. 20 Associated Press, July 15, 2000, 0935; Reuters, July 15, 2000, 0714. 21 Associated Press, July 15, 2000, 0935; Reuters, July 15, 2000, 0714. 22 Reuters, July 17, 2000, 1257. 23 Reuters, July 15, 2000, 2158. 24 Elaine Sciolino and Steven Lee Myers, ‘‘U.S. Study Reopens Division Over Nuclear Missile

Threat,’’ New York Times, July 4, 2000. 25 July 16, 2000, 0826. 26 CIA, August 10, 2000, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through

31 December 1999 internet edition. 27 CIA, August 10, 2000, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through

31 December 1999 internet edition. 28 CIA, August 10, 2000, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through

31 December 1999 internet edition. 29 CIA, August 10, 2000, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through

31 December 1999 internet edition.

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