J-A09011-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

N.S.G. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

C.L.O.

Appellee No. 1093 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered June 10, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Civil Division at No(s): 2011-CV-4775-CU

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JUNE 05, 2017

N.S.G. (“Father”) appeals pro se from the June 10, 2016 order denying 

his emergency petition for special relief. Upon careful review, we quash the 

appeal.

On June 10, 2016, Father filed an emergency petition for special relief 

requesting that his then five-year-old daughter, E.G. (“Child”), be returned 

from the home of her maternal grandparents in East Stroudsburg, 

Pennsylvania, where she was staying overnight from June 6, 2016, to June 

11, 2016, to the home of C.L.O. (“Mother”). Further, Father requested that 

if Mother “is unable to fulfill her custodial obligations that [he] be granted 

physical custody of [Child] [until] [Mother] is able to fulfill her custodial 

obligations.” Emergency Petition for Special Relief, 6/10/16, at 2 

(unpaginated).
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By order dated and entered on June 10, 2016, the trial court denied 

Father’s petition without an evidentiary hearing. Father timely filed pro se a 

notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). 

On appeal, Father presents one issue for our review, as follows:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying Father’s 

emergency petition for special relief asking that his minor 

daughter be brought back to Dauphin County and placed in his 

care [until] [M]other was able to resume physical custody of the 

child? This petition was caused by Mother voluntarily 

relinquishing physical custody of the parties’ minor child for 

weeks at a time to people who have been granted no physical 

custody of the parties’ minor child and causing parties’ minor 

child to relocate from her house in Dauphin County to a location 

in East Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania which is two hours away by 

road for such period.

Father’s brief at 6.

Before reaching the merits of Father’s issue, we must first consider 

whether the June 10, 2016 order was appealable. “‘[S]ince we lack 

jurisdiction over an unappealable order it is incumbent on us to determine, 

sua sponte when necessary, whether the appeal is taken from an appealable 

order.’” Gunn v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, Connecticut, 971 

A.2d 505, 508 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting Kulp v. Hrivnak, 765 A.2d 796, 

798 (Pa. Super. 2000)). 

“An appeal lies only from a final order, unless permitted by rule or 

statute.” Stewart v. Foxworth, 65 A.3d 468, 471 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Generally, a final order is one that disposes of all claims and all parties. See 
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Pa.R.A.P. 341(b). “[A] custody order will be considered final and appealable 

only if it is both: 1) entered after the court has completed its hearings on 

the merits; and 2) intended by the court to constitute a complete resolution 

of the custody claims pending between the parties.” G.B. v. M.M.B., 670 

A.2d 714, 720 (Pa. Super. 1996). 

Instantly, after careful review, we conclude that the trial court did not 

enter the June 10, 2016 order after completing its custody hearing on the 

merits, and the order was not intended to completely resolve the custody 

claims pending between the parties. The certified docket reveals that Father 

filed petitions for modification of the existing custody order on April 10, 

2015, and July 28, 2015, and those petitions remain pending. When the 

custody hearing occurs, Father may raise any issue related to Child spending 

overnights somewhere other than her primary residence. As such, we 

conclude that the subject order is not final.

In addition, we observe that the June 10, 2016 order is not appealable 

pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. See Pa.R.A.P. 313(a) (providing 

that an appeal may be taken as of right from a collateral order of the lower 

court). “A collateral order is an order separable from and collateral to the 

main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied 

review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until 

final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 

313(b). In this case, the order does not meet the second and third prongs 
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of the collateral order doctrine. Father’s assertion that Child was overnight 

with her maternal grandparents in East Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, from 

June 6 through June 11, 2016, is not too important to be denied review at 

this juncture. Further, Father’s claim related to Child spending overnights 

with her maternal grandparents in East Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, will not 

be irreparably lost.

Accordingly, we hold that the June 10, 2016 order is not a final order, 

nor is it appealable as a collateral order.1 Because we are without 

jurisdiction to address this order, Father’s appeal must be quashed.

Appeal quashed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/5/2017

____________________________________________

1 We also observe that the order is not an interlocutory order appealable as 

of right, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311, and that Father did not attempt to bring 

this appeal before this Court as an interlocutory appeal by permission 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1311 and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702.