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PETER LEE v. RICHARD H. STANZIALE

(AC 36519)

Gruendel, Lavine and Bishop, Js.

Argued September 25—officially released December 1, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, Woods, J.)

Robert Shluger, for the appellant (defendant).

Adam J, Teller, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

GRUENDEL, J. In this landlord-tenant case, the

defendant, Richard H. Stanziale, appeals from the judgment of the trial court awarding the plaintiff, Peter

Lee, a total of $18,122.50 in attorney’s fees and costs

pursuant to General Statutes § 52-251a. The defendant

contends that the court abused its discretion in so

doing. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In its memorandum of decision, the court found the

following facts. The defendant is the owner of residential rental property known as 56 Brace Road in West

Hartford (property). In April, 2010, the plaintiff entered

into a written agreement to lease the property from the

defendant from May 1, 2010, to April 30, 2011, at a rate

of $2500 per month. At that time, the plaintiff paid a

$5000 security deposit to the defendant.

During his tenancy, the plaintiff notified the defendant of various problems he claimed to have encountered with the property. Those problems included

inadequate heat on the third floor of the residence,

electrical wiring issues, and an asbestos wrapped

furnace.

In early September, 2010, the plaintiff informed the

defendant of his intention to vacate the property before

the lease expired. The parties thereafter discussed the

termination of the lease agreement. On November 12,

2010, the defendant listed the property with a realtor,

and soon received multiple offers from prospective tenants. On December 15, 2010, the defendant entered into

a lease agreement with a new tenant for a term of two

years commencing on January 1, 2011, at a monthly

rate of $2500.

Although he paid rent to the defendant through

December 31, 2010, the plaintiff vacated the property

on December 19, 2010. On that date, he completed a

walk-through of the property with the defendant’s realtor, who found the property to be in clean condition.1

At the defendant’s request, the plaintiff topped off the

oil tank and returned the keys to the property.

On December 20, 2010, the plaintiff requested the

return of his $5000 security deposit. In early January,

2011, the defendant sent the plaintiff a ‘‘preliminary

deposit accounting’’ alleging that, beyond exhausting

that security deposit, the plaintiff owed him $1518.50.

Nine days later, the defendant sent the plaintiff a second

accounting, claiming that the plaintiff owed him

$2405.57 due to, inter alia, certain repairs for damages

to the property allegedly caused by the plaintiff, a $5000

realtor fee incurred by the defendant in renting the

property to new tenants, and $720 in legal fees for an

initial consultation with the defendant’s attorney.

A small claims action ensued. On May 19, 2011, the
plaintiff, who at the time was self-represented, commenced this action in the small claims session of the

Superior Court to recover his security deposit. The

small claims writ and notice of suit filed by the plaintiff

specified that the amount claimed was $10,000.2

It further alleged: ‘‘You did not provide a final complete

accounting for keeping our entire $5000 security deposit

plus interest. The damages and expenses on your ‘preliminary accounting’ are not reasonable, e.g., realtor

fees ($5000), legal fees, damages, etc. At your request,

I vacated on December 19, 2010, despite paying full rent

through December 31, 2010. You owe me $967.74 for

rent paid from December 20, 2010 through December

31, 2010. You failed to repair multiple items including

but not limited to lack of heat on the third floor.’’

The defendant, through his legal counsel, responded

by filing a motion to transfer the matter to the regular

docket of the Superior Court pursuant to Practice Book

§ 24-21. The plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion,

in which he argued that the substance of the controversy between the parties properly was within the purview of the small claims court. The plaintiff also

represented that ‘‘[i]t would be a financial burden to

pursue this case in regular civil court, as I planned to

represent myself in small claims court, and most likely

will not be able to do so in regular civil court.’’ Despite

that opposition, the matter was transferred to the regular docket of the Superior Court. The notice of that

transfer provided to the parties by the court stated in

relevant part that ‘‘[i]f the plaintiff hires a lawyer and

the court rules in his or her favor after a case has been

transferred to the regular civil docket at the request of

a defendant, the court may allow the plaintiff a reasonable lawyer’s fee as part of the costs to be paid by

the defendant.’’

The defendant then filed a counterclaim predicated

on the plaintiff’s anticipatory breach of the lease

agreement, which sought a setoff of $7468.07 in damages.3

In response, the plaintiff retained an attorney and

filed his answer to the defendant’s counterclaim, as

well as an amended complaint. As the court noted in

a subsequent articulation of its decision, ‘‘the complexity of the case increased when it was transferred to the

regular civil docket, by the defendant’s motion . . . .

The parties conducted discovery, filed pretrial memoranda pursuant to a pretrial management order . . .

and filed other pretrial motions and requests. Trial

spanned five days and almost eight months. The parties

submitted almost one hundred exhibits, and the court

took testimony from a variety of witnesses. Posttrial

briefs were subsequently submitted by the parties

. . . . On August 9, 2013, after more than two years

since the case was commenced in small claims court,

the plaintiff obtained judgment in his favor.’’

In its August 9, 2013 memorandum of decision, the
court found in relevant part that ‘‘the plaintiff is the

prevailing party in this action for return of his security

deposit. . . . The plaintiff tenant has established, by a

fair preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled

to a portion of his security deposit, plus interest.’’ At

the same time, the court found that the defendant was

entitled to a setoff of $1320.78 for certain damages

sustained as a result of the plaintiff’s breach of the lease

agreement. The court thus rendered judgment in favor

of the plaintiff in the amount of $4788.01, as well as an

award of ‘‘reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, pending

the submission of the plaintiff’s affidavit.’’ The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court

denied on December 13, 2013.

At the court’s behest, the plaintiff’s counsel filed a

sworn affidavit stating that her hourly rate for services

rendered in the case was $250 and that she had spent

approximately sixty-three hours on the matter over the

course of more than twenty-five months. She thus

averred that the attorney’s fees and costs expended in

the matter totaled $15,975. Following an objection by

the defendant, the court, on January 17, 2014, awarded

the plaintiff $14,750 in attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to § 52-251a.

On February 6, 2014, the defendant appealed to this

court. His appeal form indicated that he was appealing

from not only the court’s January 17, 2014 judgment

awarding attorney’s fees to the plaintiff, but also from

the court’s August 9, 2013 judgment on the merits of

the underlying litigation and its December 13, 2013 judgment denying his motion for reconsideration. In

response, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal in

part as untimely. By order dated April 10, 2014, this

court granted the motion to dismiss the defendant’s

appeal ‘‘as it relates to the August 9, 2013 judgment and

the December 13, 2013 denial of the defendant’s motion

for reconsideration. The appeal remains pending as it

relates to the January 17, 2014 award of attorney’s fees.’’

Approximately one month later, the plaintiff, pursuant to § 52-251a, filed with the trial court a motion ‘‘for

an award of additional attorney’s fees as the ‘prevailing

party’ in connection with the successful defense of the

defendant’s untimely appeal of the judgment of August

9, 2013, in this matter.’’ Appended to that motion was

an affidavit of attorney’s fees, in which the plaintiff’s

appellate counsel, Attorney Adam J. Teller, averred that

the ‘‘total expense related to obtaining dismissal of the

appeal as to the August 2013 judgment’’ was $3372.50.

Following a hearing, the court granted that motion. The

defendant thereafter amended his appeal with this court

to include a challenge to that additional award of attorney’s fees.

On April 30, 2014, the defendant filed with this court

a motion for review, in which he sought, inter alia,

an order that the trial court articulate the basis of its
determination that the plaintiff was the prevailing party

in this action and what portion of the $14,750 in attorney’s fees and costs originally awarded to the plaintiff

was for work expended on successful claims. This court

granted that motion by order dated June 25, 2014. One

month later, the trial court issued a memorandum articulating the basis of its decision. The court first noted

that it had found in favor of the plaintiff on his action

to recover his security deposit. As it explained: ‘‘The

plaintiff is the prevailing party because the court found

that he was entitled to the return of his security deposit.

The defendant alleged that he was entitled to retain the

security deposit and collect additional funds from the

plaintiff. However, [the] court did not find that the

defendant was entitled to any amount in addition to

the security deposit. In fact, [the] court found that the

defendant owed the plaintiff a majority of the security

deposit, plus interest.’’ With regard to the apportionment of legal fees awarded for what this court in its

order had termed ‘‘successful’’ versus ‘‘unsuccessful’’

claims, the trial court stated that it was ‘‘unaware of

any authority requiring the court to discern between

successful and unsuccessful claims when determining

the reasonableness of attorney’s fees.’’ The court also

emphasized that the plaintiff initially commenced the

action as a self-represented party in the small claims

court and that the complexity and duration of the case

increased dramatically when it was transferred to the

regular docket on the motion of the defendant.

One week later, the defendant filed with this court

another motion for review that sought to have the trial

court articulate ‘‘whether any portion of the amount

awarded for attorney’s fees was for hours worked solely

on the prosecution of wholly unsuccessful claims,’’

which this court granted by order dated September

10, 2014. In its subsequent articulation, the trial court

clarified that ‘‘the amount awarded for attorney’s fees

was strictly for the prosecution of successful claims.

. . . The trial court reviewed the presentation of evidence, the effort expended by the plaintiff’s counsel,

as well as the complexity of the legal issues in the

case. Counsel was awarded reasonable attorney’s fees

specifically for the prosecution of successful claims.’’

Before considering the specific claims of error

alleged by the defendant in this appeal, we first note

what is not in dispute. In its August 9, 2013 memorandum of decision, the court expressly found that the

plaintiff was the prevailing party in this action to

recover a security deposit. The court further explained

the basis for that finding in its July 23, 2014 articulation.

In this appeal, the defendant does not challenge the

propriety of that determination. To the contrary, he

concedes in his appellate brief that ‘‘the Appellate Court

is not able to reverse the findings of the court to correct

who the prevailing party was, for purposes of this

appeal of the discretionary award of § 52-251a attor-
ney’s fees . . . .’’ We therefore do not revisit the court’s

determination that the plaintiff was the prevailing party

in the proceeding below.

I

The defendant’s principal claim concerns the proper

application of § 52-251a. He maintains that the court

improperly awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees and

costs pursuant to that statute. We do not agree.

‘‘[T]he common law rule in Connecticut, also known

as the American Rule, is that attorney’s fees and ordinary expenses and burdens of litigation are not allowed

to the successful party absent a contractual or statutory

exception.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Berzins v. Berzins, 306 Conn. 651, 661, 51 A.3d 941 (2012).

Section 52-251a is such an exception, permitting ‘‘the

imposition of costs and fees, including attorney’s fees,

to be imposed on a defendant who has transferred the

case from small claims to the regular docket of the

Superior Court and has not prevailed in the action.’’

Welch v. Stonybrook Gardens Cooperative, Inc., 158

Conn. App. 185, 191 n.6, 118 A.3d 675, cert. denied, 318

Conn. 905, A.3d (2015).

In their respective appellate briefs, the parties misconstrue that statute. The defendant posits that a prevailing party may recover attorney’s fees and costs

thereunder only if the trial court first makes ‘‘a finding

that the defendant, in the transfer of this case to the

regular docket, engaged in some identifiable misconduct sufficient enough to be punished by the penalty

of attorney’s fees.’’ The plaintiff, by contrast, submits

that a trial court ‘‘arguably would have abused its discretion if it had awarded the plaintiff no attorney’s fees’’

under § 52-251a once it found the plaintiff to be the

prevailing party. Both claims are wide of the mark.

The proper construction of § 52-251a presents a question of law over which our review is plenary. See Spears

v. Elder, 156 Conn. App. 778, 785, 115 A.3d 482 (2015).

‘‘In making such determinations, we are guided by fundamental principles of statutory construction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ulbrich v. Groth, 310

Conn. 375, 448, 78 A.3d 76 (2013); see General Statutes

§ 1-2z (statutory interpretation process). We therefore

begin with the language of the statute.

Section 52-251a provides: ‘‘Wheneverthe plaintiff prevails in a small claims matter which was transferred to

the regular docket in the Superior Court on the motion

of the defendant, the court may allow to the plaintiff

his costs, together with reasonable attorney’s fees to

be taxed by the court.’’ (Emphasis added.) The statute

plainly sets forth the following essential elements: (1)

that the action originally was commenced in the small

claims docket of the Superior Court; (2) that the defendant moved to transfer the action to the regular docket

of the Superior Court; (3) that the action was so trans-
ferred; (4) that the plaintiff prevailed in the action; and

(5) that the trial court deemed an award of attorney’s

fees and costs appropriate.

Distilled to its essence, the defendant’s claim asks

this court to expand the statutory requirements of § 52-

251a to require ‘‘a finding . . . [of] some identifiable

misconduct’’ warranting application thereof. The defendant maintains that because he presented good faith

claims and defenses—on which he prevailed in part

when the court awarded him a setoff of $1320.78—

rather than frivolous ones, the court could not justifiably render an award under § 52-251a. He further claims

that the court failed to considerthe purposes underlying

that statute. For multiple reasons, we disagree.

First, and most significantly, § 52-251a contains no

such requirement. It is fundamental that this court is

obligated to ‘‘construe a statute as written. . . . Courts

may not by construction supply omissions . . . or add

exceptions . . . . The intent of the legislature . . . is

to be found not in what the legislature meant to say,

but in the meaning of what it did say. . . . It is axiomatic that the court itself cannot rewrite a statute . . . .

That is a function of the legislature.’’(Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 279 Conn. 207, 216, 901 A.2d 673 (2006); see

also Lucarelli v. State, 16 Conn. App. 65, 70, 546 A.2d

940 (1988) (‘‘[c]ourts must interpret statutes as they are

written . . . and cannot, by judicial construction, read

into them provisions which are not clearly stated’’ [citation omitted]). In addition, when the General Assembly

wants to depart from a broad grant of discretion to

our trial judges in awarding attorney’s fees, it certainly

knows how to do so. See, e.g., General Statutes § 52-

240a (authorizing court to award reasonable attorney’s

fees in product liability action only ‘‘[i]f the court determines that the claim or defense is frivolous’’); accord

Fedus v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn.

751, 770–71 n.17, 900 A.2d 1 (2006) (noting that legislature knows how to enact legislation consistent with its

intent); Genesky v. East Lyme, 275 Conn. 246, 258, 881

A.2d 114 (2005) (‘‘if the legislature wants to [engage in

a certain action], it knows how to do so’’).

Furthermore, in construing § 52-251a, ‘‘we do not

write on a clean slate, but are bound by our previous

judicial interpretations of this language and the purpose

of the statute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 312 Conn. 513, 527, 93 A.3d 1142

(2014). Our courts have rejected attempts by litigants

to graft additional requirements onto that legislative

enactment. For example, in Forastiere v. Higbie, 95

Conn. App. 652, 657, 897 A.2d 722, cert. denied, 280

Conn. 902, 907 A.2d 89 (2006), the defendant argued

that the court improperly awarded attorney’s fees under

§ 52-251a because the parties were ‘‘equally sophisti-
cated litigants’’ and because the court had ruled in favor

of the defendant on one of the counts of the plaintiffs’

complaint. This court disagreed, emphasizing that the

statute ‘‘does not require a party to be more sophisticated than the opposing party or that a party must

prevail as to every claim. The court’s discretion to

award attorney’s fees under § 52-251a . . . is not limited by the relative sophistication of the parties or the

number of counts on which the plaintiffs prevail.’’ Id.

Similarly, in Petti v. Balance Rock Associates, 12 Conn.

App. 353, 363, 530 A.2d 1083 (1987), this court rejected

a claim that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover

under § 52-251a because her attorney had filed an

appearance and had begun work on the case prior to

its transfer to the regular docket of the Superior Court.

After noting that ‘‘no such limitation’’ is contained in

§ 52-251a, this court declined to engage in a ‘‘judicial

expansion of the statutory requirements of § 52-251a.’’

Id. To the extent that the defendant invites this court

to rewrite the parameters of § 52-251a, we decline to

do so, as that remains properly the province of our

General Assembly.

Second, we note that the policy underlying § 52-251a

is broader than the question of frivolity. Although, as

this court has noted, one purpose of § 52-251a is to

provide ‘‘a substantial and effective disincentive for a

defendant who might otherwise raise defenses bordering on the frivolous’’; Burns v. Bennett, 220 Conn. 162,

169, 595 A.2d 877 (1991); the larger aim ‘‘is to deter

. . . defendants from transferring a case from the small

claims session and turning a relatively clear-cut case

into a pitched legal battle.’’ Krack v. Action Motors

Corp., 87 Conn. App. 687, 697, 867 A.2d 86, cert. denied,

273 Conn. 926, 871 A.2d 1031 (2005). That aim serves

to protect not only the interests of litigants who often

proceed on a self-represented basis; see id., 697 (noting

the ‘‘undesirability to attorneys’’ in small claims cases);

and over whom a defendant often possesses ‘‘superior

economic resources’’; id., 695; but also the interests

of judicial economy by not clogging our courts with

noncomplex litigation in which modest sums are

sought.

The present case involves an action to recover a $5000

security deposit. The trial court ultimately concluded

that the plaintiff had demonstrated his entitlement

thereto, less a $1320.78 setoff to the defendant.

Although the court did not specifically reference a

‘‘pitched legal battle,’’ its December 19, 2014 articulation

of its memorandum of decision portrays exactly that.

As the court recounted: ‘‘[T]he plaintiff, as a pro se

party, initially filed this matter in small claims court on

May 19, 2011. However, the complexity of the case

increased when it was transferred to the regular civil

docket, by the defendant’s motion . . . . The parties

conducted discovery, filed pretrial memoranda pursuant to a pretrial management order . . . and filed other
pretrial motions and requests. Trial spanned five days

and almost eight months. The parties submitted almost

one hundred exhibits, and the court took testimony

from a variety of witnesses. Posttrial briefs were subsequently submitted by the parties . . . . On August 9,

2013 . . . more than two years since the case was commenced in small claims court, the plaintiff obtained

judgment in his favor.’’4 Such protracted litigation is

precisely what § 52-251a is intended to deter. See Rana

v. Terdjanian, 136 Conn. App. 99, 117, 46 A.3d 175,

cert. denied, 305 Conn. 926, 47 A.3d 886 (2012).

Third, the record does not substantiate the defendant’s assertion that the trial court failed to consider

those underlying purposes in this case. In his appellate

brief, the defendant contends that ‘‘[i]t is clear from

[the court’s] articulation that the trial court never considered the purposes behind the statute.’’ We disagree.

Despite filing a motion forreconsideration, an objection

to the award of attorney’s fees and costs, and multiple

requests for articulation, at no time did the defendant

raise that distinct claim before the trial court. ‘‘It is

fundamental that claims of error must be distinctly

raised and decided in the trial court.’’ State v. Faison,

112 Conn. App. 373, 379, 962 A.2d 860, cert. denied, 291

Conn. 903, 967 A.2d 507 (2009). Our rules of practice

require a party, as a prerequisite to appellate review,

to distinctly raise such claims before the trial court.

See Practice Book § 5-2 (‘‘[a]ny party intending to raise

any question of law which may be the subject of an

appeal must . . . state the question distinctly to the

judicial authority’’); see also Practice Book § 60-5

(‘‘[t]he court shall not be bound to consider a claim

unless it was distinctly raised at trial or arose subsequent to trial’’); accord Remillard v. Remillard, 297

Conn. 345, 351, 999 A.2d 713 (2010) (raised distinctly

means party must bring to attention of trial court precise matter on which decision is being asked). As our

Supreme Court has explained, ‘‘[t]he reason for the rule

is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal

that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for

the trial court or the opposing party to address the

claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is

unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Netherlands Ins. Co.,

312 Conn. 714, 761–62, 95 A.3d 1031 (2014). For that

reason, Connecticut appellate courts generally ‘‘will not

address issues not decided by the trial court.’’ Willow

Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT

Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 52, 717 A.2d 77 (1998);

see also Crest Pontiac Cadillac, Inc. v. Hadley, 239

Conn. 437, 444 n.10, 685 A.2d 670 (1996)(claims ‘‘neither

addressed nor decided’’ by trial court are not properly

before appellate tribunal).

The record before us nonetheless belies the defendant’s claim. ‘‘In Connecticut, our appellate courts do
not presume error on the part of the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jalbert v. Mulligan, 153

Conn. App. 124, 145, 101 A.3d 279, cert. denied, 315

Conn. 901, 104 A.3d 107 (2014). Rather, absent a showing to the contrary, we presume that the court properly

considered all relevant criteria in awarding the plaintiff

attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to § 52-251a. See

Kaczynski v. Kaczynski, 294 Conn. 121, 129–30, 981

A.2d 1068 (2009) (presume court undertook proper

analysis of law and facts and acted properly in rendering

judgment). As we read the court’s articulations of its

memorandum of decision, it was indeed cognizant of

the policies underlying § 52-251a, and fashioned its

award mindful that a relatively straightforward small

claims action to recover a security deposit was transformed into a pitched legal battle once it was transferred to the regular docket of the Superior Court. We

therefore reject the defendant’s bald assertion that the

court failed to consider those policies.5

At that same time, we also cannot agree with the

plaintiff’s suggestion that a trial court abuses its discretion if it declines to award a plaintiff attorney’s fees

and costs under § 52-251a when that plaintiff is the

prevailing party. That statute specifically provides that

a trial court ‘‘may allow’’ a prevailing plaintiff to recover

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs when a small

claims matter was transferred to the regular docket on

the motion of the defendant. Accordingly, our courts

consistently have interpreted that grant of authority as

discretionary in nature. As this court has held, ‘‘[a]n

award of attorney’s fees is not a matter ofright. Whether

any award is to be made and the amount thereof lie

within the discretion of the trial court, which is in the

best position to evaluate the particular circumstances

of a case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) LaMontagne v. Musano, Inc., 61 Conn. App. 60, 63–64, 762

A.2d 508 (2000); see also Krack v. Action Motors Corp.,

supra, 87 Conn. App. 694 (‘‘[w]e review the award of

attorney’s fees [pursuant to § 52-251a] for a clear abuse

of discretion’’); Petti v. Balance Rock Associates, supra,

12 Conn. App. 363 (language of § 52-251a ‘‘allows the

court discretion in whether attorney’s fees should be

awarded’’). That precedent is consistent with the precept that the use of the term ‘‘may’’ in a statute generally

is construed as ‘‘directory rather than mandatory. . . .

The word may, unless the context in which it is

employed requires otherwise, ordinarily does not connote a command. Rather, the word generally imports

permissive conduct and the conferral of discretion.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Office of Consumer Counsel v. Dept. of Public Utility

Control, 252 Conn. 115, 122, 742 A.2d 1257 (2000). We

adhere to that precedent, and conclude that whether

to award attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to § 52-

251a is a matter left to the sound discretion of the

trial court.
II

The remaining question is whether the court abused

its discretion in awarding the plaintiff attorney’s fees

and costs in the present case. ‘‘A court has few duties

of a more delicate nature than that of fixing counsel

fees. The issue grows even more delicate on appeal;

we may not alter an award of attorney’s fees unless the

trial court has clearly abused its discretion . . . .

Because the trial court is in the best position to evaluate

the circumstances of each case, we will not substitute

our opinion concerning counsel fees or alter an award

of attorney’s fees [pursuant to § 52-251a] unless the

trial court has clearly abused its discretion.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) LaMontagne v. Musano, Inc., supra, 61 Conn. App. 64.

In its first articulation of its decision, the court

detailed how a relatively minor dispute over a security

deposit became a protracted legal battle once the matter, on the defendant’s motion, was transferred from

the small claims session to the regular docket of the

Superior Court. The court explained that, following that

transfer, both the complexity and the duration of the

case dramatically increased. In its second articulation,

the court, citing relevant case law, emphasized that ‘‘the

fact-finding function is vested in the trial court with its

unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in

a totality of the circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses

and parties. . . . Nothing in our law is more elementary than that the trier [of fact] is the final judge of the

credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded

to the testimony.’’(Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) The court then stated that it ‘‘reviewed

the presentation of evidence, the effort expended by

the plaintiff’s counsel, as well as the complexity of the

legal issues in the case’’ in deciding whether to award

attorney’s fees and costs to the plaintiff. In addition,

the court clarified that ‘‘[t]he amount awarded . . .

was strictly for the prosecution of successful claims.’’6

Having presided over a five day trial over the course

of eight months, the trial court was in the best position

to evaluate the particular circumstances of this case,

as well as the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees

requested by the plaintiff. Given the nature of the plaintiff’s initial action before the small claims court, the

years of litigation that followed its transfer to the regular docket, and the court’s specific findings of fact as

detailed in its memorandum of decision and two subsequent articulations, we cannot conclude that the court

clearly abused its discretion in awarding reasonable

attorney’s fees and costs to the plaintiff as the prevailing

party pursuant to § 52-251a.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.
1 At trial, an e-mail dated December 19, 2010, from the defendant’s realtor,

Abbe Friedman, to the defendant was admitted into evidence. In that correspondence, Friedman stated that ‘‘[t]he house is in pristine condition, with

the exception of a leaking pipe in the master bedroom sink. . . . The house

will not need to be cleaned for the new tenants as it is very clean.’’ Friedman

also indicated that, during the walk-through earlier that day, the plaintiff

attempted to surrender his keys to the residence, but she refused. As Friedman stated: ‘‘I refused to sign anything today acknowledging receipt of [the

keys]. I did not know if by signing anything it would be harmful to your

future action, so I decided not to sign. He will mail them by registered mail.’’

2 Although the jurisdiction of the small claims court generally is confined

to actions in which a party claims ‘‘money damages not in excess of five

thousand dollars’’; General Statutes § 51-15 (d); our General Statutes permit

a plaintiff tenant seeking the return of a security deposit from a landlord

to recover twice the amount thereof. See General Statutes §§ 47a-21 (d) and

51-15 (d).

3 General Statutes § 52-139 (a) provides: ‘‘In any action brought for the

recovery of a debt, if there are mutual debts between the plaintiff or plaintiffs,

or any of them, and the defendant or defendants, or any of them, one debt

may be set off against the other.’’

4 The docket summary in this case contains more than 100 entries subsequent to its transfer to the regular docket of the Superior Court.

5 Costanzo v. Mulshine, 94 Conn. App 655, 893 A.2d 905, cert. denied, 279

Conn. 911, 902 A.2d 1070 (2006), therefore is distinguishable from the present

case. In Constanzo, this court held that the trial court abused its discretion

in failing to award the plaintiff a larger amount of attorney’s fees and costs

pursuant to § 52-251a due to, inter alia, ‘‘the court’s apparentlack of consideration’’ of the policies underlying that statute. Id., 663. Constanzo thus

instructs that consideration of those policies is not a prerequisite to the

court’s exercise of discretion pursuant to § 52-251a, but rather constitutes

a factor in that discretionary determination.

6 We note that the court did not award the plaintiff the full amount of

attorney’s fees and costs requested, butratherreduced that amount by $1225.