alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[No. 14276.

Department One.

April 2, 1918.]

#### Pittock & Leadbetter Company, *Appellant,*v. Clarke County, *Respondent.**1*

Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Clarke county, Back, J., entered March 19, 1917, upon findings in favor of the defendant, in an action to secure a reduction of taxes, tried to the court.

Affirmed.

*Henry Grass,*for'appellant.

*James 0. Blair,*for respondent.

1

Reported in 171 Pac. 741.

Parker, J.

The plaintiff seeks a decree reducing the assessed valuations for taxation purposes placed upon certain of its lands in Clarke county for the year 1915 by the assessing officers of that county, and permitting it to pay taxes thereon computed upon assessed valuations of approximately one-half of those fixed by the assessor and board of equalization of that county. A trial upon the merits in the superior court for Clarke county resulted in judgment in favor of the county, denying the relief prayed for by the plaintiff, from which it has appealed to this court.

It would be quite impossible to review the facts presented in this voluminous record within the reasonable limits of a written opinion, and it would be equally unprofitable to do so. We deem it sufficient to assure counsel for the respective parties that we have painstakingly read all the evidence as presented to us in the necessarily lengthy abstract thereof prepared by counsel for appellant, and have become quite convinced therefrom that we would not be justified in disturbing the judgment of the trial court. There is evidence in the record which may seem to lend strong support to the view that some of appellant’s lands have, in a measure, been as*700sessed at excessive valuations. However, the evidence points to a difference between the lands in question and adjoining lands with which it is sought to compare their assessed valuations, which difference we cannot say does not justify the larger assessment made upon them. The trial court not only heard and saw the witnesses testify, but viewed the lands in question attended by a representative of each of the parties. There is practically no evidence in this record pointing to arbitrary action on the part of the assessor or the board of equalization in fixing the values complained of, other than the fact that the assessed valuations are too high as compared with the assessed valuations of adjoining lands, in the opinion of certain witnesses. The evidence as a whole, looked at in cold typewriting, as we are compelled to view it, is not of such convincing character in support of appellant’s contentions as to enable us to say that the conclusions of the county assessor, the county board of equalization, and the trial court were wrong.

The judgment is affirmed.

Eelis, C. J., Fuelebton, Main, and Webster, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit      32.2**

|  | (1) | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the                Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|--|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|  | (2) | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the                Company. |
|--|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

*This      certification accompanies the Form 10-Q to which it relates, is not deemed      filed      with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated by      reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933 or      Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (whether made before or after the date of the      Form 10-Q), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in      such      filing.*

|                                                                                                                                               |   |   |   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| /s/                  Veronica A. Lubatkin                                                                                                          |   |   |   |
| Veronica                    A. LubatkinExecutive                    Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerNovember                    21, 2007 |   |   |        |

----
No. 62899.

#### H. Rosenhirsch Co., Inc. *v.*United States,

protest 58/13123 (New York).

*333Opinion by

Ford, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of monofilament fishing lines the same in all material respects as those the subject of Abstract 60183, the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 220 Introduced in House (IH)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 220

  Expressing the sense of the Congress that a postage stamp should be 
         issued recognizing the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            November 4, 1999

 Mr. Davis of Virginia (for himself and Mr. Rohrabacher) submitted the 
following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on 
                           Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
  Expressing the sense of the Congress that a postage stamp should be 
         issued recognizing the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.

Whereas there are more than five million practicing Muslims in the United 
        States, who represent one of the fastest growing segments of American 
        society;
Whereas those who follow the Islamic faith are a diverse community comprised of 
        all races, colors, and political opinions, who make important and 
        valuable contributions to American society and culture;
Whereas Ramadan is an Islamic holy month which follows the lunar cycle and is 
        observed by Muslims around the world;
Whereas Muslims in the United States fast during the month of Ramadan, from 
        sunrise until sunset, abstaining from food, drink, and sexual contact;
Whereas Ramadan lasts for 29 or 30 days, depending on the cycle of the new Moon;
Whereas Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are the three monotheistic religions of 
        the world; and
Whereas Jewish and Christian holidays have been recognized on United States 
        postage stamps, but no Islamic observance is similarly commemorated: 
        Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That it is the sense of the Congress that--
            (1) the United States Postal Service should issue a postage 
        stamp recognizing the Islamic holy month of Ramadan; and
            (2) the Citizens' Stamp Advisory Committee should recommend 
        to the Postmaster General that such a stamp be issued.
                                 <all>
```
Before Judge Watson,

May 15, 1967

No. R67/74.

#### Kurt Orban Company, Inc. *v.*United States,

reappraisement R61/4848 (Galveston).

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the issues of fact and law are the same in all material respects as those in *Kurt Orban*Company, *Inc.*v. *United States*(52 CCPA 20, C.A.D. 851)', the court found and held that export value, as that value is defined in section 402 (b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Customs Simplification Act of 1956, is the proper basis of value for the galvanized wire and round steel wire in issue and that said value is the appraised value, less inland freight and f.o.b. charges of $8 per metric ton.
#### Catherine Hart *vs.*Ruth P. Wright.

Suffolk.

March 1, 1920.

March 3, 1920.

Present: Rugg, C. J., Braley, Crosby, Carroll, & Jennet, JJ.

*Negligence,*Of owner of real estate. *Snow and Ice. Way,*Public. *Municipal Corporations,*By-laws and ordinances.

Personal injuries sustained by falling on ice on a sidewalk in front of vacant land will not render the person in control of the real estate liable therefor in damages where it does not appear that the ice resulted from an artificial collection of water by spout or otherwise, although the person in control of the premises violated a municipal ordinance in failing to remove the ice or to render walking over it safe by scattering ashes, sand or other material.

Tort for personal injuries sustained on January 23, 1917, alleged to have been caused by slipping upon an accumulation of ice on the sidewalk in front of and adjoining vacant land owned by the defendant on A Street in South Boston. Writ dated May 25> 1917.

In the Superior Court the case was tried before *Fessenden,*J. The plaintiff introduced evidence that at about 8:30 p.m. on January 23, 1917, while walking on the sidewalk in front of the defendant’s land she slipped on the ice and fell, breaking her arm, and that the entire surface of the sidewalk at the time was a glare of ice about three inches thick, without sand, ashes or other material to prevent slipping. The defendant admitted that, since February 27, 1916, when she became owner of the land, she had never removed nor caused to be removed any snow or ice from the sidewalk, nor placed nor spread any ashes, sand, sawdust or other material to cover any ice or snow on the sidewalk.

There was evidence that there was no structure other than a billboard on the defendant’s land. At the close of the plaintiff’s evidence the defendant asked the judge to rule that on all the evidence the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The judge so ruled and ordered a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff alleged exceptions.

*A. J. Connell,*for the plaintiff, submitted a brief.

*H. P. L. Partridge,*for the defendant.

*244By the Court.

This is an action of tort wherein the plaintiff seeks to recover compensation for personal injuries sustained by her while a traveller upon a highway, by slipping upon natural ice on the sidewalk adjacent to land owned by the defendant. There was no evidence of artificial collection of water by spout or otherwise. The record utterly fails to disclose any ground of liability. This is equally so, even if it be assumed that the defendant violated some ordinance in failing to remove the ice or to render walking over it safe by scattering ashes, sand or other material. The case is covered by the authority of numerous decisions. *Kirby*v. *Boylston Market Association,*14 Gray, 249, 252. *Sanborn*v. *McKeagney, 229*Mass. 300, and cases collected.

*Exceptions overruled.*
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SURJIT SINGH, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 17-70733 

Agency No. A096-152-558 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 11, 2018**

Before: SILVERMAN, PAEZ, and OWENS, Circuit Judges. 

Surjit Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board 

of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal 

proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of 

discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 13 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-70733 

986 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as 

untimely where the motion was filed more than twelve years after the BIA’s final 

order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Singh failed to establish a material 

change in circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time 

limitation for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also

Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 990-91 (petitioner failed to show evidence was 

“qualitatively different” to warrant reopening); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 

996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence immaterial in light of prior adverse credibility 

determination). We reject Singh’s contentions that the BIA failed to consider 

evidence.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 97-4300EA

_____________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Eastern

v. * District of Arkansas.

*

Gina Lee Patton, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

_____________

 Submitted: April 23, 1998

Filed: April 27, 1998 

_____________

Before FAGG, BEAM, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

_____________

PER CURIAM.

Gina Lee Patton appeals her guidelines sentence for possessing with intent to

distribute cocaine base (crack). On appeal, Patton renews her constitutional challenge

to the 100-to-1 ratio used in establishing the guidelines range for powder and crack

cocaine. Patton contends Congress acted with a discriminatory purpose when it

rejected the Sentencing Commission's proposed amendment to equalize the sentencing

ranges for powder and crack cocaine offenses. Patton's contention, however, is

foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Carter, 91 F.3d 1196, 1197-99 (8th Cir.

1996). We thus affirm Patton's sentence. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
-2-

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Michael J. Thorne, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of DynCorp International LLC, (the Company), certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1) the Annual Report of the Company on Form 10-K for the period ended April 2, 2010 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Annual Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) the information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.



/s/ Michael J. ThorneMichael J. ThorneSenior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer


Date: June 15, 2010
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-50513

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

DIANNA DENISE TORRES,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:16-CR-1979-1

Before REAVLEY, PRADO, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Dianna Denise Torres appeals her 24-month below-guidelines sentence 

imposed following her guilty plea to importation of marijuana and possession 

with intent to distribute marijuana. She argues that her sentence is 

substantively unreasonable because the district court imposed a sentence 

greater than necessary based on an improper evaluation of the seriousness of 

her offense. Her contention is that she was entitled to a further downward 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 28, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 17-50513 Document: 00514367075 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/28/2018
No. 17-50513

2

variance because she waived her constitutional rights when she was arrested 

by disclosing her relevant conduct, which resulted in a substantial increase in 

her base offense level.

A properly preserved challenge to the substantive reasonableness of a 

sentence will be reviewed by this court for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The record reflects that the district court 

considered the arguments of the parties, the aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances, and Torres’s allocution. Further, the district court identified 

the basis for its findings that the preponderance of evidence supported the drug 

quantity attributed to Torres and also provided specific reasons for increasing 

the base offense level for her use of her minor children.

Torres’s disagreement with the propriety of the sentence or the weight 

given to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors by the district court does not suffice to 

rebut the presumption of reasonableness that applies to her below-guidelines 

sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; United States v. Simpson, 796 F.3d 548, 

557 & n.51 (5th Cir. 2015). She has failed to show that her sentence does not 

account for a factor that should receive significant weight, gives significant 

weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or represents a clear error of 

judgment in balancing sentencing factors. See United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 

173, 186 (5th Cir. 2009). The sentence is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 17-50513 Document: 00514367075 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/28/2018
DECEMBER 30, 1946

No. 51501.

Suits 4534/5.

#### United *States*v. *Edward I. Petow & Son and Edward I. Petow & Son*v. *United States.*

C. D. 933 reversed November 4, 1946. C. A. D. 343.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, David O'Neill, President, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Global Electronic Recovery Corp., hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)	the amended annual report on Form 10-KSB/A of Global Electronic Recovery Corp. for the year ended January 31, 2006 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)	the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Global Electronic Recovery Corp.

Dated: March 7, 2007

/s/ David O'NeillDavid O'Neill
President, Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer) Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer)
EXHIBIT
32.1
 
 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO
 18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 
 In
connection with the Annual Report of Resource Capital Corp. (the "Company") on
Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jonathan Z. Cohen,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:
 
 (1)
              The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and
 
 (2)
              The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.
 
 
 March
      16, 2009
              /s/
      Jonathan Z. CohenJonathan
      Z. CohenChief
      Executive Officer
Exhibit
99.7





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Annual Report of Penn West Energy Trust (the “Trust”) on
Form 40-F for the year ended December 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, William E. Andrew,
Chief Executive Officer of Penn West Petroleum Ltd., who performs the same
function for the Trust, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of
my knowledge:




1.
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and




2.
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.




By:
            /s/
      William E. AndrewWilliam
      E. AndrewChief
      Executive Officer of Penn West Petroleum
Ltd.





March 18,
2010
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                         334,816
<SECURITIES>                                   130,839
<RECEIVABLES>                                  264,423
<ALLOWANCES>                                     9,030
<INVENTORY>                                    177,941
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,062,971
<PP&E>                                         492,467
<DEPRECIATION>                                 244,463
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,552,562
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          322,800
<BONDS>                                        110,055
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,973
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,117,734
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,552,562
<SALES>                                      1,037,191
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,037,191
<CGS>                                          534,791
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  534,791
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               123,523
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,977
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (143,735)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    23,524
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (167,259)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (167,259)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.88)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.88)
        

</TABLE>
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED JUNE 3, 2022

NO. 03-21-00108-CV

Luminant Energy Company LLC, Appellant

v.

Public Utility Commission of Texas, Appellee

ON DIRECT APPEAL FROM THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF TEXAS

PROJECT NO. 51812

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE BYRNE, JUSTICES KELLY AND SMITH

DISMISSED ON APPELLANT’S MOTION -- OPINION BY JUSTICE SMITH

This is a direct appeal from project number 51812 of the Public Utility Commission of Texas.

Luminant Energy Company LLC has filed an unopposed joint motion to dismiss the appeal, and 

having considered the motion, the Court agrees that the motion should be granted. Therefore, the 

Court grants the motion and dismisses the appeal. The appellant shall pay all costs relating to 

this appeal.