J-A11025-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ADIEL SANCHEZ-FROMETA 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1573 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 14, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County 

Criminal Division at No: CP-28-CR-0002072-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 10, 2024

Appellant, Adiel Sanchez-Frometa, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County imposed on October 

13, 2021. On appeal, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. Upon review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant background as follows.

On October 10, 2019, following a four-day jury trial, [Appellant] 

was found guilty of second-degree murder, robbery of a motor 

vehicle, and theft in connection to the carjacking and stabbing 

death of a fellow teenager. On December 13, 2019, [the trial 

court] held a sentencing hearing where both parties presented 

expert testimony and oral argument on the issue of whether a 

sentence of life imprisonment without parole was authorized and 

warranted. At the conclusion of the hearing, [the trial court] 

sentenced [Appellant] on the count of second-degree murder to 

life imprisonment in a State Correctional Institution without the 

possibility of parole.

On December 23, 2019, [Appellant] filed optional post-sentence 

motions pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B), arguing that the trial 
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court erred in sentencing [Appellant] to a life sentence without 

parole. A hearing was held on [Appellant]’s post-sentence 

motions on March 9, 2020. On April 20, 2020, [the trial court] 

denied [Appellant]’s post-sentence motions.

[Appellant] filed a timely notice of appeal from the order of court 

denying his post-sentence motions on May 15, 2020. The 

Superior Court of Pennsylvania issued a decision on May 25, 2021 

vacating [Appellant]’s sentence of life without parole and 

remanding the case back to the trial court for resentencing in 

accordance with the Superior Court’s decision. [See 

Commonwealth v. Sanchez-Frometa, 256 A.3d 440 (Pa. 

Super. May 25, 2021)].

[The trial court]’s held a resentencing hearing on October 14, 

2021. At the conclusion of the hearing, [the trial court] 

resentenced [Appellant] to a term of 40 years to life on the count 

of second-degree murder, and 7 to 14 years on the count of 

robbery of a motor vehicle, to be served concurrently. [Appellant] 

did not file timely post-sentence motions or direct appeal, but did 

file a Post-Conviction Relief Act petition on November 3, 2022, 

claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.

[The trial court] granted [Appellant]’s petition for post-conviction 

relief on June 20, 2023, reinstating [Appellant]’s direct and postsentence motion rights and allowing [Appellant] to file a counseled 

post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc within 10 days. [Appellant] 

timely filed post-sentence motions on June 27, 2023.[1] Following 

multiple continuances, and the [trial] court granting a 30-day

extension of the 120-day disposition period for adjudicating an 

optional post-sentence motion, a hearing on [Appellant]’s postsentence motions was finally held on October 24, 2023. On 

October 27, 2023, [the trial court] filed an order denying 

[Appellant]’s post-sentence motions. 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/18/23, at 1-3 (cleaned up).

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1

In his post-sentence motions, Appellant raised two issues: (1) Whether the 

sentence imposed was unreasonable and excessive in view of sentencing 

considerations set forth by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) and (2) Whether the trial 

court properly considered and weighed the sentencing considerations set forth 

in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). 
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This appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant essentially argues that the sentencing court 

abused its discretion in applying 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)2 by: (i) focusing 

exclusively on the seriousness of the offense, and (ii) failing to adequately

consider the other sentencing factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). See

Appellant’s Brief at 16. As presented, therefore, Appellant’s claim challenges 

the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Cartrette,

83 A.3d 1030, 1041 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“A sentencing court’s failure to follow 

the pertinent aspects of § 9721(b) do not result in an illegal sentence, but 

pertain to discretionary sentencing matters.”)3

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2 Section 9721(b), which governs sentencing generally, provides that the 

sentencing court must “follow the general principle that the sentence imposed 

should call for total confinement that is consistent . . . [with] the protection of 

the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of 

the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the 

defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).

3

In resentencing Appellant for second-degree murder that he committed as a 

17-year-old juvenile, the sentencing court is required to apply traditional 

sentencing considerations under the Sentencing Code, rather than sentencing 

factors set forth in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and codified in 

the Sentencing Code, where Commonwealth did not request LWOP sentence. 

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Shabazz-Davis, 2022 WL 17175, unpublished 

memorandum at *6 (Pa. Super. filed January 3, 2022) (petition for allowance 

of appeal denied, 280 A.3d 869 (Pa. 2022); Commonwealth v. Miller, 275 

A.3d 530, 535 (Pa. Super. 2022); Commonwealth v. Summers, 245 A.3d 

686 (Pa. Super. 2021).
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Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing are not entitled to 

appellate review as a matter of right. Commonwealth v. Clemat, 218 A.3d 

944, 959 (Pa. Super. 2019). Rather, such challenges are considered petitions 

for allowance of appeal. Id. Thus, an appellant must invoke our jurisdiction 

by satisfying a four-part test: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice 

of appeal; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a 

motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) whether appellant’s brief has 

a fatal defect pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under 

the Sentencing Code. Id.

Here, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, properly preserved the 

issue in a motion for reconsideration/modify sentence and his appellate brief 

included a Rule 2119(f) statement. Finally, Appellant raised a substantial 

question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 776 

(Pa. Super. 2009) (internal citations omitted) (“[A]n averment that the court 

sentenced based solely on the seriousness of the offense and failed to consider 

all relevant factors raises a substantial question”); Commonwealth v. Riggs, 

63 A.3d 780, 786 (Pa. Super. 2012) (An averment that “the trial court failed 

to consider relevant sentencing criteria, including the protection of the public, 

the gravity of the underlying offense and the rehabilitative needs of Appellant, 

as 42 PA.C.S.A. § 9721(b) requires[,]” presents a substantial question for our 
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review in typical cases). Accordingly, we can proceed to reviewing the merits 

of his claim.

As noted above, the gravamen of Appellant’s sentencing argument is 

that the trial court weighed the seriousness of the crimes “to an extent that it 

entirely excluded meaningful consideration of the other statutory sentencing 

factors.” Appellant’s Brief at 16. Appellant concludes that we should vacate 

the current sentence (40 years to life) and remand to the trial court for the 

imposition of the statutory minimum sentence (30 years). As noted above, 

the claim involves the discretionary aspects of his sentence. 

Our standard of review regarding challenges to the discretionary aspects 

of sentencing is well-settled:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill[-]will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 731 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation 

omitted).

[A] sentencing court abuses its discretion when it considers the 

criminal act, but not the criminal himself. The Sentencing Code 

prescribes individualized sentencing by requiring the sentencing 

court to consider the protection of the public, the gravity of the 

offense in relation to its impact on the victim and the community, 

and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, [ ] and prohibiting 

a sentence of total confinement without consideration of “the 

nature and circumstances of the crime[,] and the history, 
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character, and condition of the defendant[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 

9725.

Commonwealth v. Luketic, 162 A.3d 1149, 1160-61 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(some internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Subsection 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code provides that the 

court shall fashion a sentence “that is consistent with the 

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to 

the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and 

the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). 

On appeal, a sentence that is within the sentencing guidelines will 

not be vacated unless it is “clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9781(c). We consider (1) the nature and circumstances of the

offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) 

the opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the defendant, 

including any presentence investigation; (3) the findings upon 

which the sentence was based; and (4) the sentencing guidelines. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).

Shabazz-Davis, 2022 WL 17175, at *6.

4

The balancing of the sentencing factors is the sole province of the 

sentencing court. Commonwealth v. Bricker, 41 A.3d 872, 876 

(Pa. Super. 2012). Further, we recognize that the sentencing 

court, which is present at the hearing and observes all witnesses 

and the defendant firsthand, “is in a superior position to review 

the defendant's character, defiance or indifference, and the overall 

effect and nature of the crime.” Commonwealth v. Lekka, 210 

A.3d 343, 353 (Pa. Super. 2019). Notably, where a sentencing 

court is informed by a PSI, “it is presumed that the court is aware 

of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that 

where the court has been so informed, its discretion should not be 

disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 

(Pa. Super. 2009).

Miller, 275 A.3d at 535. 

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4 Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 126, unpublished, nonprecedential memorandum decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 

2019, may be cited for their persuasive value. Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).
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On appeal, a sentence that is within the sentencing guidelines will not 

be vacated unless it is clearly unreasonable. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c). We 

consider: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant; (2) the opportunity of the sentencing court 

to observe the defendant, including any presentence investigation; (3) the 

findings upon which the sentence was based; and (4) the sentencing 

guidelines. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d).

Our review of the record in this case reveals the resentencing court did 

not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant to a term of 40 years to life. 

The same judge sentenced Appellant at both the original sentencing and 

resentencing hearings. At sentencing, the trial court considered the 

presentence investigation report, and specifically acknowledged it addressed 

the severity of the crime, the impact of the offenses on the victim, the impact 

on the community, the threat to the safety of the public or any individual 

posed by Appellant, and the nature and circumstances of the offense 

committed by Appellant. See N.T. Sentencing, 9/13/2019, at 191. At 

sentencing, the Commonwealth presented six witnesses, in addition to a 

detective and an expert. Appellant presented the testimony of his own expert 

and addressed the court himself. 

At the resentencing, the trial court took no additional evidence, and it 

incorporated “the entirety of the evidence in the trial, the entirety of the 

evidence that has been presented in prior proceedings taking into account 
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then the directives of the appellate decision in this case”. N.T. Resentencing, 

at 8. Furthermore, the court acknowledged it presided over the prior 

sentencing proceeding and that it had been presented evidence relating to 

Appellant’s education, sophistication, and mental development. N.T. 

Resentencing, 10/14/21, at 6. 

Regarding the unreasonableness and excessiveness claims, the trial 

court first noted that Appellant’s sentence (40 years to life) is within the 

standard range, and then explained its imposition, noting that 

at the time of resentencing the [trial court] declined to sentence

at the statutory minimum due to the level of violence, and the 

callousness of [Appellant]’s disregard for life on the night of the 

victim’s murder. As the [trial court] explained, “there is evidence 

in this case to suggest that [Appellant] could appreciate what was 

happening, did appreciate what was happening, and callously 

chose to attack and kill [the victim] and it’s just – it’s something 

that [the trial court] thinks that to suggest that [Appellant] in this 

particular case should be sentenced merely to the at least 30 

years or no less than 30 years for [the trial court] still goes to the 

idea that there’s just seemingly [a] lack of appreciation for the 

consequences of such actions before they would be a 

consideration on parole.” [(quoting N.T. Resentencing Hearing,

10/14/21, at 7:3-12)]. The [trial court] considered Appellant’s 

circumstances, age, mental development, evidence at trial, and 

evidence at the prior sentencing proceeding[.] [citing Id. at 6:5-

12]. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/27/23, at 5 (footnotes omitted). 

Finally, the trial court, quoting from Summers, noted that “it was within 

the resentencing court’s discretion to place emphasis on the serious nature of 

this crime. Second-degree murder is a serious crime; serious enough that our 

legislature deemed it warranted a mandatory minimum of 30 years’ 
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incarceration even for juveniles convicted after [Miller v. Alabama].” 

Summers, 245 A.3d at 696. 

Regarding the claim that the trial court did not properly consider and/or

weigh the sentencing consideration set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b), the 

trial court noted:

The [trial c]ourt accepts that this criminal act may very well be 

the sole criminal act committed by [Appellant] in his lifetime, and 

that presumably [Appellant] would be capable of rehabilitation. 

The Commonwealth’s expert, Dr. Larry Rotenberg, a forensic 

psychiatrist, diagnosed [Appellant] with antisocial personality 

disorder, stating that typically these types of disorders “burn out” 

when individuals are in their fifties or sixties. [Appellant]’s expert, 

Dr. Jeffrey Lensbower, a licensed psychologist, stated that 

individuals with antisocial personality disorder tend to see a 

significant change in their forties. [Appellant] argues that this 

shows that [Appellant] should be free of his antisocial personality 

disorder well before the minimum sentence imposed upon him by 

the [trial court] has elapsed, and as such, the [trial court]’s 

determination of sentence beyond the statutory minimum was 

excessive. However, the consideration of rehabilitative needs 

must be viewed along with others, and nowhere does the statute 

tell us that the considerations must be weighed equally. The 

statute only requires that, the “court shall make as a part of the 

record, and disclose in open court at the time of sentencing, a 

statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence imposed.”

[quoting 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)]

In consideration of public safety, the lack of justification and lack 

of remorse demonstrated by [Appellant] suggests the protection 

of the public would be best served by means of incarceration. It 

is to be noted that [Appellant]’s own expert, Dr. Lensbower, after 

clinical examination of [Appellant], described him as “lacking 

empathy, lacking remorse” and described the murder as simply “a

consequence of [...] him trying to take the car.” As the testimony 

of Dr. Lensbower indicates, [Appellant]’s view of his rationale for 

murdering the victim was a mere consequence of his desire to 

commit a robbery. [The trial court] does not find the public 

interest is best served by allowing the integration of this individual 

– who simply lacks impulse control, remorse, and empathy – into 
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the community any earlier than the minimum of his imposed 

sentence.

 

Finally, there is simply no denying the brutality of this murder and 

the impact this tragedy has had on the victim’s family. In order 

to ensure the consequences are fully adequate and represent what 

the [the trial court] and jury have observed, the [trial court] finds 

it appropriate to sentence [Appellant] to a proportional 

punishment within the [trial court]’s discretion. The judicial 

system possesses the unique capability to express society’s 

disapproval of wrongdoings through the imposition of 

incarceration as punishment. This form of retribution may 

potentially serve as a deterrent for future crimes, but also, the 

goal of imposing a sentence is to provide a consequence that 

reflects the severity of the offense and acknowledges the harm 

suffered.

These consequences are recognized by the legislature and the 

sentencing commission by statute, rule, and policy. A lesser 

sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime 

committed by [Appellant] and the impact this death has had on 

the Franklin County community, and most importantly, the 

victim’s family. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/27/23, at 6-8 (footnotes omitted).

Upon review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning Appellant’s sentence. 

Based on the trial court’s consideration of the PSI and the other evidence 

presented, and the trial court’s reasons for the sentence imposed, we conclude 

that Appellant’s sentence of 40 years to life imprisonment is not clearly
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unreasonable. See Miller, supra,

5 Commonwealth v. Harper, 273 A.3d

1089 (Pa. Super. 2022).

6

 

Additionally, as noted above, it was solely within the province of the 

sentencing court to weigh the evidence and balance the sentencing factors. 

See also Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957 (Pa. 2007) (in Walls our 

Supreme Court “specifically admonished that the weighing of factors under 

[Section] 9721(b) was exclusively for the sentencing court, and an appellate 

court could not substitute its own weighing of those factors.” Commonwealth

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5

In Miller, Appellant argued that the sentencing court abused its sentencing 

discretion by “focus[ing] solely on the nature of the crimes” and “pa[ying] no 

more tha[n] lip service to [appellant’s] strides toward rehabilitation and 

reform.” Miller, 275 A.3d at 534. He further contended that his sentence of 

55 years to life imprisonment [for first-degree murder] was manifestly 

excessive in violation of “both 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2) and fundamental norms 

under the sentencing process.” Id. Upon review, we rejected the 

excessiveness/unreasonableness claim, noting “it was solely within the 

province of the sentencing court to weigh the evidence and balance the 

sentencing factors. Based on the [trial] court’s consideration of the PSI and 

the other evidence presented, we conclude that Appellant’s sentence of 55 

years to life imprisonment is not manifestly unreasonable.” Id. at 536.

6

In Harper, Appellant, who was sentenced to 35 years to life for seconddegree murder, challenged, inter alia, the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. Specifically, he argued that the trial court based his sentence 

mainly upon the serious nature of the crime and its impact upon the victim’s 

family, ignoring, on the other hand, his rehabilitative needs. We affirmed the 

judgment of sentence, noting that a review of the record showed that the trial 

court considered all relevant factors, the presentence report, and adequately 

explained the reasons for the sentence imposed. Accordingly, we concluded 

that Harper’s claim that the trial court failed to consider the appropriate factors 

in imposing the sentence lacked merit.
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v. Bowen, 975 A.2d 1120, 1123-24 (Pa. Super. 2009) (emphasis added), 

citing Walls, supra, at 966).

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 09/10/2024