Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack,

 Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh

Elizabeth M. Welch,

Justices

Order 

June 11, 2021

161017

THOMAS HAAN, CONNIE HAAN, KRISTIN

BROOKS, and JILL RHODES,

Plaintiffs/CounterdefendantsAppellees,

and

WILLIAM RHODES, CASEY ALLEN, LAURA

ALLEN, TRAVIS STEPHENSON, MARCIANN

STEPHENSON, KEVIN MARCY, and SUSAN

MARCY,

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,

v SC: 161017

COA: 345282

Allegan CC: 17-057955-CH

LAKE DOSTER LAKE ASSOCIATION,

Defendant/CounterplaintiffAppellant. 

_________________________________________/

On May 5, 2021, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to 

appeal the January 16, 2020 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, 

the application is again considered. MCR 7.305(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to 

appeal, we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals and REINSTATE the 

Allegan Circuit Court’s August 17, 2018 opinion and order granting summary disposition 

to defendant. We agree with dissenting Chief Judge MURRAY that plaintiffs’ use and 

maintenance of their docks is subject to the oversight and regulation of the Lake Doster 

Lake Association (the LDLA) and is not a permanent and irrevocable property interest. 

“An easement is an interest in land that is subject to the statute of frauds.” Forge v Smith, 

458 Mich 198, 205 (1998). Plaintiffs can point to no written conveyance manifesting a 

clear intent to create an easement granting dock rights. See id. Rather, plaintiffs argue 

that a property interest was created when (1) the Lake Doster Development Corporation 

(the LDDC) orally approved plaintiffs’ request or a predecessor’s request to install a dock 

and (2) the LDLA agreed, as a benefit of membership, that it would agree to allow the 

continuance of “all past permitted rights.” Neither of these bases, whether considered

separately or in tandem, satisfies the requirements for establishing a permanent interest in 

realty.

Assuming the LDDC intended to convey an interest in real estate when it orally
I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 

June 11, 2021

t0608

2

Clerk

approved plaintiffs’ or their predecessors’ requests for dock installation, and absent any 

indication of fraud, an attempted conveyance of an interest in real estate is void if it is not 

in writing. See Kitchen v Kitchen, 465 Mich 654, 660 (2002). When there was no 

observance of the formalities required for creating an express easement, only a mere 

license was created. See Morrill v Mackman, 24 Mich 279, 283 (1872); 1 Cameron, 

Michigan Real Property Law (3d ed), Easements, § 6.2, p 212 (“A license may be created 

when the kind of interest that would normally be the subject of an easement is granted but 

the formal requirements for the creation of an easement are not met.”). Although a 

license may grant permission to be on the land of the licensor, unlike easements, they are 

not interests in real estate and are generally revocable at will by the licensor. Forge, 458 

Mich at 210. It makes no difference that plaintiffs or their predecessors might have relied 

on the oral approvals over the course of many years. Michigan does not recognize 

“irrevocable licenses” or “easements by estoppel” stemming from a licensee’s 

expenditures made in reliance on representations about the duration of a license. See 

Kitchen, 465 Mich at 660.

Assuming the LDLA membership application is enforceable as a contract, it also 

cannot support the creation of a permanent and irrevocable property interest in the 

erection and maintenance of docks. Rather, the contractual agreement states only that the 

LDLA will allow the LDLA member and their successors-in-interest to continue “past 

permitted rights.” The inclusion of this “past permitted rights” language, which is 

conditioned on plaintiffs and all future owners abiding by the LDLA’s overall 

governance and control, is consistent with our conclusion that the prior oral approval 

process created a revocable license, i.e., “a permission to do some act or series of acts on 

the land of the licensor without having any permanent interest in it.” Morrill, 24 Mich at 

282 (citations omitted). The membership application manifests no clear intent to create 

an easement granting dock rights. See Forge, 458 Mich at 205 (“Any ambiguities are 

resolved in favor of use of the land free of easements.”).