IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-50602

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

JOHN RAY EDWARD TERRELL, also known as John Ray Terrell,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

Before BENAVIDES, OWEN, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is Defendant John Ray Edward Terrell’s (“DefendantAppellant Terrell”) appeal of his conviction for one count of producing child

pornography and sexually exploiting a child, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)

& (e), and one count of knowingly possessing child pornography, in violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), 2252A(b)(2), and 2256(8)(A). We AFFIRM. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 12, 2007, a federal indictment charged Defendant-Appellant

Terrell with producing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (a) and

(e) and with knowing possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2252(a)(5)(B), 2252A(b)(2), and 2256(8)(A). The trial testimony established

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 5, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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the following: The victim was ST, the daughter of Suzanne Terrell and John Ray

Doby Terrell (“John Terrell”). Defendant-Appellant Terrell is John Terrell’s

father and ST’s grandfather. During the summer of 2003, Defendant-Appellant

Terrell took pornographic photos of ST while she was left in his care. When ST

later reported the abuse to her mother, Suzanne Terrell contacted Child

Protective Services. An investigation was launched, and police conducted a

search of Defendant-Appellant Terrell’s property. A floppy disk was recovered

with files related to Defendant-Appellant Terrell’s business, and a file referring

to “Young Strawberry Blondes, Young Lolitas, TV, Underage Models, Preteen X,

[and] Lolita Virgins.”

Following the initial search, John Terrell went to his father’s home to hide

weapons he knew were on the property. John Terrell had access to his father’s

home because he assisted his father in his father’s business. In attempting to

hide a gun in a concealed compartment, John Terrell discovered a laptop located

therein. John Terrell discovered pornographic images of ST on the computer, as

well as other child pornography. He informed police, who performed a second

search and seized the laptop. John Terrell also provided the police with a second

laptop he recovered from a trailer on the property. 

In 2005, police learned that Defendant-Appellant Terrell had fled the

country. The police located him in Ecuador and he was arrested in September

2010. He was thereafter returned to the United States and placed in the custody

of United States marshals at the airport. 

At trial, John Terrell identified the location of the photos as DefendantAppellant Terrell’s bedroom. He testified that he, John Terrell, had not taken

the photographs or put those photographs on the laptop. He further testified

that he did not use Defendant-Appellant Terrell’s laptops prior to discovering

them. ST testified about the photographs, identifying herself therein and

Defendant-Appellant Terrell as the photographer. She further testified that she

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had asked Defendant-Appellant Terrell about the photographs and that he had

informed her that he had deleted them. A Secret Service Agent who had

conducted a forensic examination of the laptops testified that he found the

images of ST in the computer’s “trash can,” and that they had been put there

soon after the photos of ST had been taken. The Agent further testified that, in

addition to the images of ST, he found 751 images of child pornography on the

first laptop, and 137 images of child pornography on the second laptop. The

Agent opined that the images were likely obtained from the internet, and he

testified that the laptops had been used to visit sites that advertised or allowed

users to download child pornography. Evidence also established that the laptops

were manufactured outside of Texas.

At the close of the prosecution, Defendant-Appellant Terrell moved for a

judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied. A jury convicted

Defendant-Appellant Terrell on both counts. The district court sentenced

Defendant-Appellant Terrell to 360 months of imprisonment on Count One and

120 months of imprisonment on Count Two, the sentences to be served

consecutively. This timely appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Defendant-Appellant Terrell raises a number of challenges to his

conviction. First, he argues that the government must, and did not, show that

he knew or should have known the laptop which contained the images of ST

traveled in interstate commerce. Second, he argues that the district court

wrongly denied his motion for acquittal because there was no evidence that he

transferred the images of ST to the laptop, and that a jury instruction stating

the government did not need to prove the identify of the individual who placed

the images on the computer was erroneous. Third, he argues that the

government introduced insufficient evidence to show he knowingly possessed

child pornography. For the reasons stated below, his arguments are unavailing. 

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I. Knowledge of Interstate Commerce

First, Defendant-Appellant Terrell argues that the district court erred in

denying his motion for acquittal because the government failed to introduce

evidence showing that he knew or should have known that the pornographic

images of ST were produced on a camera or computer that traveled in interstate

commerce. The government argues that it is not necessary to prove knowledge

of this particular interstate commerce element under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). This

court reviews a district court’s denial of a motion for acquittal de novo. United

States v. Bennett, 664 F.3d 997, 1011–12 (5th Cir. 2011). The Court finds the

government’s reading more persuasive and holds that § 2251(a) does not require

knowledge of the interstate nature of the materials used to produce the images

of ST.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), the government must prove that the defendant

(1) employed, used, persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced a minor to engage in

sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such

conduct; and (2) a jurisdictional nexus. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (West 2003). As to

the jurisdictional nexus element, it may be satisfied: 

[(a)] if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual

depiction will be transported in interstate or foreign commerce or

mailed, [(b)] if that visual depiction was produced using materials

that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or

foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or [(c)] if

such visual depiction has actually been transported in interstate or

foreign commerce or mailed. 

Id. The Defendant-Appellant argues that the knowledge element—“knows or

has reason to know”—applies to each of the three possible ways that the element

can be satisfied.1

Defendant-Appellant Terrell concedes thatthe evidence demonstrated thatthe laptop 1

had indeed traveled in interstate commerce. 

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Nevertheless, the more natural reading of this statute is that knowledge

must be proven only as to the first jurisdictional hook. See Flores-Figueroa v.

United States, 556 U.S. 646, 652 (2009) (“The manner in which the courts

ordinarily interpret criminal statutes [should be] fully consistent with . . .

ordinary English usage.”); see also United States v. Betancourt, 586 F.3d 303,

308–09 (5th Cir. 2009)(applyingFlores-Figueora and adopting a “common-sense,

natural reading” of a statute). Here, the statute’s repetition of “if” indicates that

each clause following the “if” is distinct. The phrase “knows or has reason to

know” follows the first “if,” implying that the phrase is only to be applied to the

first clause and not to the latter two. Finally, the use of the disjunctive “or”

further indicates that the “knows or has reason to know” applies only to the first

item in the list. 

The Defendant-Appellant cites no authority for his argument that the

“knowledge” requirement applies to allthree jurisdictional elements, and indeed,

an identical argument was rejected by the Eleventh Circuit. In United States v.

Smith, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the “most natural reading of this

provision” is that “[o]nly the first basis for jurisdiction requires any proof of

mental state.” See 459 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2009).

Moreover, and importantly, courts have been consistent in not applying

the mens rea of statutes to federal jurisdictional elements, unless the language

of the statute requires such a result. For example, in United States v. Yermian,

in a prosecution for making false statements to a federal officer in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1001, the Supreme Court held that the “knowingly” and “willfully”

intent requirements did not apply to the federal jurisdictional element—i.e., that

the false statement was made to a federal officer. See 468 U.S. 63, 74–75 (1984);

see also United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693–96 (1975) (finding that federal

conspiracy statute did not require knowledge that intended victim of conspiracy

was a federal officer because conduct is not “any less blameworthy . . . because

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the participants are unaware which body of law they intend to violate”). These

holdings have been consistently reaffirmed in a variety of contexts. See, e.g.,

United States v. Jimenez, 256 F.3d 330, 338 n.9 (5th Cir. 2001) (defendant not

required to have knowledge of building’s effect on interstate commerce under

federal arson statute); United States v. Jackson, 978 F.2d 903, 909–11 (5th Cir.

1992) (defendant did not need to know victim was transported across state lines

under federal kidnaping statute); United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81 (5th

Cir. 1988) (in felon in possession of a firearm prosecution, defendant not

required to know that firearm traveled in interstate commerce); United States

v. Driggers, 559 F.3d 1021, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2009) (mens rea does not apply to

interstate travel element of federal murder for hire statute); United States v.

Campa, 529 F.3d 980, 1006–07 (11th Cir. 2008) (no mens rea for jurisdictional

element in federal conspiracy to murder statute); United States v. Cooper, 482

F.3d 658, 664–65 (4th Cir. 2007) (intent element did not apply to requirement

that pollution be into navigable waters to sustain conviction); United States v.

Wright, 363 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2004) (no requirement that defendant know

stolen check crossed state lines); United States v. Quarrell, 310 F.3d 664, 670–74

(10th Cir. 2002) (defendant convicted for digging for archaeological artifacts did

not need to know he was excavating on federal land).

Accordingly, § 2251 does not require that a defendant know the interstate

nature of an instrument on which a depiction of child pornography is produced. 

Consequently, the district court did not err in refusing to grant his motion for

acquittal on this ground.

II. Transferring Images to the Computer (Count One)

Next, Defendant-Appellant Terrell presents a pair of arguments related

to his conviction under Count One for sexual exploitation of a child, under 28

U.S.C. § 2251(a), which both turn on the same issue of statutory interpretation.

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1. Motion for Acquittal

First, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the district court erred in

denying his motion for acquittal because there is insufficient evidence showing

that he produced or reproduced the images of ST using materials that traveled

in interstate commerce. He argues that the government failed to show that the

camera used to take the photos traveled in interstate commerce and that the

government also failed to prove that he was the person who reproduced the

images on his laptop. In response, the government argues that it is unnecessary

under 28 U.S.C. § 2251(a) to prove that the Defendant-Appellant personally

transferred the images of ST to the laptop, or alternatively, that there is

sufficient evidence showing that he actually transferred the images.

The Court reviews a district court’s denial of a motion for acquittal de

novo. Bennett, 664 F.3d at 1011–12. On motion of a defendant, a court “must

enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient

to sustain a conviction.” FED.R.CRIM.P. 29(a). “When reviewing the sufficiency

of the evidence, this Court views all evidence, whether circumstantial or direct,

in the light most favorable to the [g]overnment[,] with all reasonable inferences

to be made in support of the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Moser, 123 F.3d

813, 819 (5th Cir. 1997). The Court must ask “whether any reasonable trier of

fact could have found that the evidence established the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Ortega Reyna, 148 F.3d 540,

543 (5th Cir. 1998). The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis

of innocence or be completely inconsistent with every conclusion except guilt, so

long as a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745, 768 (5th Cir.

1994). However, where the evidence tends to give “equal or nearly equal

circumstantial support” to guilt and to innocence, reversal is required. United

States v. Lopez, 74 F.3d 575, 577 (5th Cir. 1996). 

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As described above, § 2251 requires the government to prove that a

defendant (1) employed, used, persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced a minor

to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purposes of producing a visual

depiction of such conduct; and (2) a jurisdictional nexus. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). 

The jurisdictional nexus is satisfied :

[(a)] if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual

depiction will be transported in interstate or foreign commerce or

mailed, [(b)] if that visual depiction was produced using materials

that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or

foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or [(c)] if

such visual depiction has actually been transported in interstate or

foreign commerce or mailed. 

Id.

Similar to the phrase “knows or has reason to know,” the phrase “such

person” appears only in the first clause. Accordingly, the same reading that

compels the conclusion that “knows or has reason to know” does not apply to the

final two clauses also compels the conclusion that “such person” similarly applies

only to the first clause, and not the latter two. Accordingly, the language of the

statute indicates that there is no requirementthatthe individual who directs the

minor be the same person who produces the image on the item that has traveled

in interstate commerce. 

In an unpublished case, the Sixth Circuit adopted a similar position while

evaluating § 2251(a)’s last jurisdictional hook: that the depiction be transported

in interstate commerce. In United States v. Tidwell, while comparing § 2251 and

§ 2252 for purposes of a Blockburger double jeopardy analysis, the court stated

that under § 2251(a) the government need not prove that the defendant who is

charged with production of child pornography also be the same person who

transported it in interstate commerce. See 917 F.2d 1305, at *2 (6th Cir. 1990).2

See also United States v. Fuller, 77 F. App’x 371, 380 n.10 (6th Cir. 2003) (restating 2

holding from Tidwell).

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Nevertheless, even under the Defendant-Appellant’s interpretation of the

statute—where the defendant who exploited the child must also be the person

who produced the images on the computer—at the time of the defendant’s

motion, a “reasonable trier of fact could have found that the evidence established

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ortega Reyna,

148 F.3d at 543. The Defendant-Appellant does not seriously contest that the

government proved that he persuaded and coerced ST into sexually explicit

conduct for the purpose of producing visual depictions of that conduct. Nor does 3

he dispute that the laptop that contained the images of ST traveled in interstate

commerce. It is also undisputed that production of child pornography for

purposes of this statute includes copying the images onto a computer hard drive

or other digital storage device. See United States v. Dickson, 632 F.3d 186,

188–90 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding that production included copying images onto a

CD in prosecution for possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. §

2252(a)(4)(b)). Thus, if the Defendant-Appellant transferred the images onto the

laptop, his conduct satisfies the jurisdictional nexus even under the

interpretation of the statute most favorable to him.

 He does accuse his son, John Terrell, of actually being the person who molested and 3

took the photographs of ST, bizarrely in reliance on ST’s statement that she posed with a “onelegged dog,” which the Defendant-Appellant asserts belonged to John Terrell. Nevertheless,

overwhelming evidence supports the jury’s finding that Defendant-Appellant Terrell took the

photos of ST. ST testified that Defendant-Appellant Terrell persuaded her to take off her

clothing and act in a sexual manner while he photographed her. ST identified the photographs

found on the Defendant-Appellant’s computer as the same photos she remembers him taking

of her. Dr. Ann Sims, a specialist in sexual abuse exams on children who examined ST in

2004, testified that she believed ST’s story was credible and that it did not seem coached or

falsified. In convicting the defendant under Section 2251(a),the jury apparently believed ST’s

testimony about the sexual abuse, a credibility determination that cannot be questioned on

appeal. See United States v. Millsaps, 157 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is the sole

province of the jury, and not within the power of this Court, to weigh conflicting evidence and

evaluate the credibility of witnesses.”); United States v. Sanchez, 961 F.2d 1169, 1173 (5th Cir.

1992) (stating that the “assessment of the weight of the evidence and the determination of the

credibility of the witnesses is solely within the province of the jury”).

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Although ownership alone is not sufficient to prove that the DefendantAppellant transferred the images to the laptop, there is no evidence in the record

showing that any other individuals had access to the computer in 2003 when the

images of ST were undisputably stored on his computer. Compare United States

v. Winkler, 639 F.3d 692, 695–701 (5th Cir. 2011) (affirming conviction for

possession of child pornography where there was no evidence of third-party

access and where circumstantial evidence supported finding that defendant

knowingly possessed images), with United States v. Moreland, 665 F.3d 137 &

n.7, 151–54 (5th Cir. 2011) (reversing conviction for possession of child

pornography where evidence showed a third party accessed computer around

time of pornography download). It is undisputed that the laptop belonged to

Defendant-Appellant Terrell and that it was found hidden under a bookshelf in

an area he had control over. The laptop was registered solely to DefendantAppellant Terrell, and there is no evidence in the record showing that anyone

else ever had access to the laptop, aside from John Terrell when he found it and

contacted the police. John Terrell also testified that he had seen the DefendantAppellant using the laptop. 

The strongest evidence in favor of the jury’s verdict is ST’s testimony,

which is corroborated by the forensic evidence. During her testimony, ST stated

that the Defendant-Appellant told her soon after he took pictures of her in the

summer of 2003 that she should not worry because he had deleted them. 

According to the forensic examiner, the images of ST were placed in the laptop’s

trash folder on June 7, 2003. Again, the Defendant-Appellant offers no

explanation for how the images of ST, which ST testifies that he took, ended up

on his laptop computer within days of him taking the photos, and how he would

know the items had been deleted, if he had not transferred the photos and

deleted them himself. Although John Terrell had access to both laptops during

the period between finding them and returning them to the

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Defendant-Appellant’s house, the images of ST had been transferred nearly a

year earlier. Further, John Terrell testified that he did not take the images of

ST or transfer them to the computer, and that he found the images of ST on the

computer. It is pure speculation to think that John Terrell put the images on

the computer. See Faulkner, 17 F.3d at 768 (stating that the evidence need not

exclude every hypothesis of innocence). The jury seemingly rejected this

argument in convicting Defendant-Appellant Terrell on Count Two for

possession of child pornography, and it would be reasonable to think that the

jury would have rejected the argument as to Count One as well. See United

States v. Pruitt, 638 F.3d 763, 767 (11th Cir. 2011) (jury free to reject alternative

reasons for presence of child pornography on computer); United States v. Kain,

589 F.3d 945, 949–50 (8th Cir. 2009) (affirming conviction although testimony

showed that a Trojan virus may have been responsible for child pornography

files).4

Other evidence found on the Defendant-Appellant’s laptop computers and

in his desk supports the conclusion thatthe Defendant-Appellanttransferred the

images of ST. As explained later, the evidence supporting Count

Two—possession of child pornography—is very strong, and the fact that the

Defendant-Appellant transferred those other images of child pornography to his

laptops increases the likelihood that he also transferred the images of ST. See

United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375, 378–84 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that other

evidence of sexual interest in children is “highly relevant” to guilt in prosecution

under Section 2251(a), but denying admission of evidence due to prejudice);

United States v. Wilder, 526 F.3d 1, 6–10 (1st Cir. 2008) (discussing how

See also Schene, 543 F.3d at 639–40 (affirming conviction for possession of child 4

pornography where only defendant and his wife had access to computer); United States v.

Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting argument that a third party may have

downloaded images where defendant unable to offer any evidence showing third party had

regular access to computer).

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evidence that defendant used computer for other child pornography-related

conduct increased likelihood that defendant knowingly possessed images on

computer). The first laptop contained an additional 751 images of child

pornography, beyond those of ST, and it had also visited 283 websites marketing

child pornography. The second laptop also contained 137 images of child

pornography and it had visited a large number of websites marketing child

pornography. Finally, a floppy disk found in the Defendant-Appellant’s desk

contained letters written by the Defendant-Appellant and files referring to child

pornography. Thus, the evidence strongly pointed to the Defendant-Appellant

using his computers to store other images of child pornography.

Accordingly, the Court finds that § 2251(a) does not require that the

individual who induces the minor to engage in sexually explicit activities for the

purposes of producing depictions of such be the same individual who produces

the depictions on an item that has traveled in interstate commerce. Further,

even if § 2251(a) did require such unity of person, the government presented

sufficient evidence upon which a jury could find Defendant-Appellant Terrell

produced the depictions of ST on the laptop. Consequently, the Court finds no

error in the district court’s denial of the Defendant-Appellant’s motion for

acquittal on this ground. 

2. Jury Instructions

Second, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the district court erred by

instructing the jury in response to the jury’s third note (“Jury Note 3”) that the

government did not need to prove who produced the images of ST found on the

laptop computer. Because the Court finds that the statute does not require that

Defendant-Appellant Terrell have produced the images to the laptop, the Court

finds no error in the district court’s response to Jury Note 3.5

 In addition, Defendant-Appellant Terrell concedes that he must show plain error in 5

the district court’s instruction, due to his failure to timely object to the jury instructions. See 

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III. Possession of Child Pornography (Count Two)

Finally, Defendant-Appellant Terrell offers two arguments related to his

conviction in Count Two for possession of child pornography, under 18 U.S.C.

§ 2252A(a)(5)(B). First, he argues that there was insufficient evidence presented

at trial showing that he knowingly possessed images of child pornography. 

Second, he argues that the district court’s response to Jury Note 3 was an

incorrect statement of the law. 

1. Motion for Acquittal

Count Two of the indictment charges Defendant-Appellant Terrell with

possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). 

Under this provision, a “person who . . . knowingly possesses any . . . computer

disk . . . that contains an image of child pornography that has been . . .

transported in interstate . . . commerce by any means, including by computer,

or that was produced using materials that have been . . . transported in

interstate . . . commerce by any means, including by computer, . . . shall be

punished . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (West 2003). Thus, the government

must prove that a defendant (1) “knowingly possessed material that contained

United States v. Diaz, 637 F.3d 592, 601 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Where a party fails to offer a timely

objection to jury instructions, claims of error are reviewed for plain error.”). He cannot meet

that burden, even if the instruction was erroneous. First, the statute does not clearly require

that same individual induce the minor as produce the depiction to an item in interstate

commerce. See United States v. Carrillo, 660 F.3d 914, 930 (5th Cir. 2011) (potential error,

not plain error where law is unclear). Second, for the reasons stated above, the weight of the

evidence strongly supports an inference that Defendant-Appellant Terrell transferred the

images of ST to the laptop, and thus he cannot show that the purported error “affected the

outcome of the district court proceedings.” See United States v. Mudekunye, 646 F.3d 281, 289

(5th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1999)

(“[W]e have recognized that improperly omitting an element from the jury can easily be

analogized to improperly instructing the jury on an element of the offense, an error which is

subject to harmless-error analysis.”). Finally, Defendant-Appellant Terrell’s argument that

the response to the jury note constituted a directed verdict is without merit. See, e.g., United

States v. Simkanin, 420 F.3d 397, 403–09 (5th Cir. 2005) (concluding a response to jury note

is not a directed verdict where the court “did not explicitly direct a verdict on an essential

element of the offense”).

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an image of child pornography” and (2) a jurisdictional nexus. Moreland, 665

F.3d at 149 (stating elements of offense). This jurisdictional nexus may be

shown if the images are contained on materials that traveled in interstate

commerce or if the images themselves were transported in interstate commerce. 

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B); United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir.

2002). 

The Defendant-Appellant argues that the district court erred in denying

his motion for acquittal on this count. This Court reviews the district court’s

denial of a motion for acquittal de novo, Bennett, 664 F.3d at 1011–12, and “all

evidence, whether circumstantial or direct, [is viewed] in the light most

favorable to the [g]overnment[,] with all reasonable inferences to be made in

support of the jury’s verdict,” Moser, 123 F.3d at 819. 

As to the elements of the crime, first, it is not disputed that the images on

the computer were of child pornography, or that a person viewing those images

would understand them to be child pornography. Second, Defendant-Appellant

Terrell concedes that the government proved the jurisdictional nexus because 

it showed that the images were downloaded from the internet or were contained

on a computer that traveled in interstate commerce. The evidence indicates that

many—if not all—of the images (with the exception of those of ST) were

downloaded from the internet, which is sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional

requirement. See Runyan, 290 F.3d at 239 (holding that transmission of images

over the internet satisfies interstate commerce element). Additionally, the

images were produced on a computer made in California. As noted earlier, it is

accepted law that production of an image includes copying the image onto a

computer hard drive. See Dickson, 632 F.3d at 188–90. Thus, copying the

images onto the laptops satisfies the interstate commerce requirement as well.

Therefore, the only disputed element is whether Defendant-Appellant

Terrell “knowingly possessed” the images of child pornography that were found

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on his laptop computers. As explained by this Court in Moreland when

analyzing Section 2252(a)(5)(b), the term “knowingly possesses” is interpreted

based on its “ordinary, everyday meaning.” See 665 F.3d at 141–42 (quotation

marks omitted). “Possession [of child pornography] may be either actual or

constructive.” Id. at 149. Because the Defendant-Appellant did not have actual

possession of the images, the government must show constructive possession. 

Id. at 150. “Constructive possession is the ownership, dominion or control over

an illegal item itself or dominion or control over the premises in which the item

is found.” Id. at 150 (quotation marks omitted). Where a residence is jointly

occupied—as here—the discovery of contraband alone is insufficient to prove

possession, and instead, the government “must present additional evidence of

the defendant’s knowing dominion or control of the contraband, besides the mere

joint occupancy of the premises, in order to prove the defendant’s constructive

possession.” Id. at 150. Thus, as Moreland explains, “[a] conviction based upon

constructive possession will be upheld only where the prosecution has proven

that there is something else (e.g., some circumstantial indicium of possession)

[ ] besides mere joint occupancy that supports at least a plausible inference that

the defendant had knowledge of and access to the [ ] contraband.” Id. at 150

(quotation marks omitted).

Here, that standard is plainly met. The laptop computers were found in

an area over which Defendant-Appellant Terrell had control and a number of

pieces of circumstantial evidence indicate that his possession was knowing. The

first laptop contained 751 images of child pornography in an encrypted zip

folder, four naked photos of ST that had been moved to the trash folder in June

2003, and an internet browser history showing that the computer had visited

283 websites that market or sell child pornography. The second laptop contained

137 images of child pornography, many of which contained website addresses on

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them, and the internet history on that computer also showed that it had browsed

a large number of websites advertising or selling child pornography.

The first laptop was registered only to Defendant-Appellant Terrell and

the second laptop was registered to him, to his wife, and to John Terrell (his

son). John Terrell testified that both laptops belonged to the DefendantAppellant and other evidence supported this assertion. John Terrell testified

that he had seen the Defendant-Appellant using the first laptop and that he had

helped the Defendant-Appellant purchase the second laptop online many years

earlier. There is no evidence in the record that other individuals ever used these

laptops or exercised any control over them, aside from John Terrell when he

discovered them in 2004.

Again, the only factual argument that Defendant-Appellant Terrell offers

is speculation that John Terrell actually was responsible for downloading all of

the images of child pornography to his computer. He also argues that because

John Terrell is skilled at computers, his son could have planted the photos.6

John Terrell undisputably had access to both laptops during the period

between finding them and the police instructing him to return them to the

Defendant-Appellant’s house. John Terrell testified, however, that he placed no

child pornography on the computers and that he did not take the images of ST

or transfer them to the computer. Further, he testified that the computers

already contained the images of child pornography when he found them,

including the images of ST. It is pure speculation that John Terrell put the

images on the computers, and the jury was entitled to credit John Terrell’s

testimony that he found the files on the computer. See Sanchez, 961 F.2d at

1173 (the “assessment of the weight of the evidence and the determination of

the credibility of the witnesses is solely within the province of the jury”). It

Defendant-Appellant Terrell also argues that his son actually took the photos of ST, 6

an argument the Court rejects for the reason stated above.

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seems highly unlikely that John Terrell could have visited hundreds of child

pornography websites on the Defendant-Appellant’s computer, even taking into

account of the time the computers were in his possession in 2004. Indeed, it is

even more unlikely that he would do so, and then voluntarily turn the laptops

into police after the police failed to locate them during their initial search of the

property. The jury was free to disregard such a hypothesis.7

Additionally, software had been installed on the first laptop that cloaked

the internet history, which shows that Defendant-Appellant Terrell was

attempting to prevent other people from seeing his internet activity. Testimony

at trial indicated that such software is common among individuals who view

child pornography and that it is often available for download on websites that

sell child pornography. Similar software has been held to support an inference

that a defendant has knowledge of the existence of child pornography on his

computer. See United States v. Bass, 411 F.3d 1198, 1202 (10th Cir. 2005)

(existence of file scrubbing programs supported conviction); United States v.

Koegel, 777 F. Supp.2d 1014, 1022 (E.D. Va. 2011) (same).8

One of the strongest pieces of evidence is the fact that ST testified that

Defendant-Appellant Terrell molested her and took the photos of her that were

found on his first laptop. This establishes two important points. First, as

discussed above, it is almost impossible to think that the Defendant-Appellant

was not responsible for transferring the images to his personal laptop given that

ST testified he took them. Second, it establishes that he is sexually interested

in children, increasing the likelihood that the other pictures on the laptops were

his. Both this Court and others have held that evidence showing that a

See Pruitt, 638 F.3d at 767; Kain, 589 F.3d at 949–50; Schene, 543 F.3d at 639–40; 7

Irving, 452 F.3d at 122 (2d Cir. 2006).

Again, the Defendant-Appellant claims his son, John Terrell, downloaded this 8

software, but he offers absolutely no evidence to support this assertion.

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defendant previously committed sexual crimes against children is relevant in a

case where a defendant is charged with a sexual crime against a child. See

United States v. Goff, 155 F. App’x 773, 776 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)

(admitting evidence showing defendant had a “knowing interest in child

pornography” to support conviction for possession of child pornography due to

its probative value); United States v. Julian, 427 F.3d 471, 485–88 (7th Cir.

2005) (admitting evidence of prior sexual assault crimes against minor due to its

probative value in sex trafficking prosecution); United States v. Carter, 410 F.3d

1017, 1022 (8th Cir. 2005) (admitting evidence of prior sexual crime against

minor in prosecution for sexual assault on a minor); United States v. Bentley, 475

F. Supp. 2d 852, 858 (N.D. Iowa 2007) (explaining that evidence of “sexual

interest in children” is highly relevant to determining propensity to commit

other sex crimes against children).

Also supporting the verdict was other evidence found in DefendantAppellant Terrell’s house. In his desk, police officers found a floppy disk

containing a number of business letters written by the Defendant-Appellant, as

well as additional files referring to child pornography. This evidence further

supports the view that the Defendant-Appellant is sexually interested in

children and has an interest in child pornography.

Finally, Defendant-Appellant-Terrell fled the country in 2005, and was

not taken into custody until 2010. This Court has previously held that evidence

of flight creates an inference of guilt. See United States v. Templeton, 624 F.3d

215, 225 (5th Cir. 2010) (stating that evidence of flight is admissible and

probative as to guilt); United States v. Lopez, 979 F.2d 1024, 1030 (5th Cir. 1992)

(although flight insufficient alone “to support a guilty verdict, it is relevant and

admissible”).

The evidence in this case is much stronger than in Moreland, where this

Court found that there was insufficient evidence showing that the defendant had

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knowledge of the images of pornography found on his computer. In that case

there was strong evidence that another individual had accessed the images using

the defendant’s email account, and there, all of the images were deleted and

stored in a way that made them inaccessible. See Moreland, 665 F.3d at 151–52

& n.7. These facts raised the strong possibility that another individual

downloaded and deleted the images without the defendant ever knowing of their

presence on his computer. See id.; see also United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d

853, 862 (9th Cir. 2006) (overturning conviction where there was no evidence

defendant knew images were saved in internet cache). By contrast, the images

of ST were in the trash can on the desktop and the other images were stored in

an encrypted zip folder. Both of these file types indicate that DefendantAppellant Terrell was aware of the presence of the images—for example, he

would have needed to encrypt the zip file and the images of ST had been

manually deleted. See Winkler, 639 F.3d at 699 (ruling that similar evidence of

manually hiding pornographic files supported finding that receipt and possession

were knowing).

On appeal, we must take all of the facts in a light most favorable to the

jury’s verdict. Moser, 123 F.3d at 819. In light of the facts stated above, there

is sufficient evidence of guilt to reject the Defendant-Appellant’s argument. See

United States v. McArthur, 573 F.3d 608, 614–15 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that

a jury’s verdict should not be disturbed where it chooses one plausible scenario

for how child pornography was downloaded onto computer). 

2. Jury Instructions

Lastly, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the district court’s response

to Jury Note 3 was an incorrect jury instruction as to Count Two. This

argument is meritless. The jury’s note expressly limited itself to Count One, and

the question and district court’s answer had nothing to do with Count Two.

Thus, it is pure speculation to think that an instruction regarding Count One

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somehow affected the jury’s analysis as to Count Two, especially when the

language of the note indicates that the jury was properly considering the counts

separately. See Simkanin, 420 F.3d at 407 (holding that a district court’s

response to a jury note on good-faith instruction would not affect willfulness

instruction where response did not relate to willfulness). 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED. 

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