United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Secretary of Defense

June 1997 ARMY ARMORED

SYSTEMS

Meeting Crusader

Requirements Will Be

A Technical Challenge

GAO/NSIAD-97-121

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-276453 

June 6, 1997

The Honorable William S. Cohen

The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Army is developing its next generation field artillery system, called the

Crusader, to support its fast moving maneuver forces. The Crusader

system consists of a self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer and a resupply

vehicle. We reviewed selected aspects of the Crusader program to

determine (1) what the status of the program was and (2) whether there

are any alternative howitzer systems that could meet the Crusader

requirements.

Background The Crusader was to be developed with an advanced technology, liquid

propellant cannon; however, in March 1996, the Army decided to develop

the system with an advanced technology solid propellant cannon because

of escalating developmental costs and chronic technical problems

associated with the liquid propellant cannon. The Army plans to replace its

current self-propelled artillery system—the M109A6 Paladin and the M992

Field Artillery Ammunition Support Vehicle (FAASV)—with the Crusader

system in the rapidly deployable and forward deployed forces. The Army

estimates it will cost over $12 billion (in fiscal year 1995 constant dollars)

to design and procure 824 Crusader howitzers and 824 Crusader resupply

vehicles.1

 The Crusader system unit cost is estimated to be $14.7 million

(in fiscal year 1995 constant dollars)—$7.5 million for the howitzer,

$5.8 million for the resupply vehicle, and $1.4 million that the Army could

not divide between the two vehicles.

The system is being designed under its program definition and risk

reduction phase, with the first prototype scheduled for delivery in October

1999. The Crusader program is using the integrated product development

philosophy with a Crusader development team consisting of the Army and

a contractor team led by United Defense Limited Partnership. Department

of Defense (DOD) regulations require that decision criteria be established

for each major decision point in a major defense acquisition program.2

 In

1

The Crusader costs are program acquisition costs and consist of research and development,

procurement, and military construction costs that are in direct support of the system.

2

DOD Regulation 5000.2-R “Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPS)

and Major Automated Information System (MAIS) Acquisition Programs,” dated March 15, 1996.

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August 2003, the Army plans to decide whether the program should be

allowed to enter the low-rate initial production.

DOD determined that the primary threat future U.S. artillery systems would

encounter is target acquisition radars and other reconnaissance and

surveillance systems that would enable an enemy to quickly locate and

return fire once a howitzer starts firing. To be successful against this

threat, the Army determined that it would need an artillery system that

could provide accurate and lethal fire from longer ranges than the current

systems and that could move and generate combat firepower quickly to

evade enemy counterfire. In addition, some foreign howitzers currently

have greater range than the Army’s current system, the Paladin, and

Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that current U.S. howitzers were

unable to keep up with the maneuver force.

The Crusader system’s five key requirements, called key performance

parameters, call for improved performance in these areas over existing

systems. System lethality and survivability are expected to be improved by

meeting the requirements that the Crusader cannon have a range of 40 to

50 kilometers, a maximum rate of fire of 10 to 12 rounds per minute for 

3 to 5 minutes, and the ability to rearm the howitzer with 60 complete

rounds in less than 12 minutes. Mobility is expected to be improved by

meeting requirements for both vehicles to be capable of sustained cross

country speeds of 39 to 48 kilometers per hour and sustained highway

speeds of 67 to 78 kilometers per hour.

Results in Brief The Army believes that the Crusader system, using advanced technologies,

has the potential to revolutionize field artillery operations. According to

Army analyses, the system could increase force effectiveness—in terms of

rounds fired, missions completed, and enemy systems destroyed and

reduce U.S. losses—up to 52 percent.

However, developing and integrating the Crusader system to meet all the

Army’s requirements will be technically challenging because it depends

heavily upon the accomplishment of many technological firsts for U.S.

field artillery systems. These include the automated ammunition loading

and handling system, automated ammunition and fuel transfer system, and

actively cooled cannon barrel. Not meeting some requirements could have

an adverse effect on system potential. For example, the system needs to

achieve a 10-rounds-per-minute firing rate because the Army’s force

effectiveness analyses showed that an 8-round rate would cause the U.S.

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force to lose in some battlefield scenarios. Also, as currently designed,

some subsystems have no backup capabilities; therefore, if the system

does not meet its reliability requirement, it may not be able to perform its

mission. For example, the Crusader’s autoloader has no backup. If the

autoloader fails, the Crusader howitzer will be unable to fire because the

cannon cannot be hand loaded.

In response to funding reductions, the Army is making critical program

scheduling decisions that will compress the program’s schedule beyond its

already-compressed schedule under the streamlined acquisition process.

In the past, such schedule adjustments have resulted in reduced testing

and/or concurrent testing, allowing programs to enter low-rate initial

production before they were ready. Allowing programs to enter low-rate

initial production before they were ready has often resulted in

procurement of substantial inventories of unsatisfactory weapon systems

that required costly modifications or, in some cases, substandard weapon

systems being procured for combat forces.

No existing alternative artillery system meets all of the Army’s projected

artillery requirements. However, if the Crusader cannot meet its

requirements, other artillery systems, such as an improved Paladin or the

German PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzer, may provide an alternative to

improve the Army’s current artillery capabilities.

Army Believes

Crusader Could

Revolutionize Field

Artillery Operations

According to the Army, the Crusader system could revolutionize Army

field artillery operations. It is expected to be the Army’s first fully

automated and computerized, tracked combat vehicle system. Also, it is

expected to be the first tracked vehicle system designed for the digital

battlefield. The Army expects these features to change the way it uses

artillery.

The system is expected to eliminate repetitive, time-consuming,

labor-intensive tasks traditionally performed by artillery system crews.

Currently, the Paladin’s crew manually loads and fires the cannon.

Likewise, Army officials said that the FAASV crew generally carries the

projectiles and propellant between vehicles during resupply because it is

faster than using the FAASV shuttle arm—a small conveyor belt—to move

projectiles between the vehicles. However, in the Crusader system’s

current design, all cannon loading, firing, and resupply tasks will be fully

automated, controlled by crewmembers seated at their computerized crew

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stations. The resupply vehicle will require some manual effort for

replenishing its load.

The Army plans to use the Crusader howitzer in more flexible ways than

traditional artillery. Unlike the Paladin, the Army expects the Crusader

howitzer to be capable of operating independent of a fire control center on

missions such as raids and ambushes. In the digital environment, the crew

is expected to receive up-to-date intelligence on their crew station displays

that allows them to be aware of the battlefield situation and to make

tactical decisions. Also, the Army expects a single howitzer to be capable

of firing from four to eight artillery rounds, depending on range to the

target, fast enough and on different trajectories, so that they all impact

close together and at the same time. One Paladin cannot perform this

mission. It would require from two to four Paladins to fire an equivalent

number of rounds to impact close together and at the same time.

Also, the Army expects the Crusader resupply vehicle to be capable of

independent operations and resupplying and refueling more than one

howitzer. Currently, a FAASV must remain close to its assigned Paladin and

has no refueling capability. The Paladin howitzer must leave its firing

position and go to a separate refueling point.

Army Analyses Show

Crusader More

Effective

In support of the Crusader design effort, the Army has performed detailed

force effectiveness and other analyses, using computer modeling. The

Army based its analyses on a Crusader system that met its minimum

requirements. The analyses indicated that such a Crusader system would

be more operationally effective than the Paladin and resupply vehicle or

improved versions of the two vehicles. Also, they indicated that the

Crusader system would be able to engage the enemy at longer ranges and

for a longer time, would be more available for firing missions, and would

have more rounds readily available for firing missions.

The analyses simulated battle in 2006 using four scenarios—both

defensive and offensive operations in both southwest and northeast

Asia—and concluded that the Crusader system would best meet the

Army’s needs. In one analysis during a simulated 4-hour counter battery

artillery mission, the computer model indicated the Crusader howitzer

could reduce U.S. losses by 34 percent and could fire 215 percent more

rounds, could fire 145 percent more missions, and could kill 175 percent

more targets than the Paladin. The analyses suggested that the Crusader

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system would increase force effectiveness by up to 52 percent and defeat

the future threat.

Crusader Must Meet

Its Requirements to

Achieve Its Full

Potential

Development and integration of the Crusader system are challenging

because the system incorporates many new technologies. Moreover, the

Crusader system must meet its minimum requirements if it is to provide

the benefits described in the Army’s analyses.

Developing and Integrating

the Crusader Are

Technically Challenging

The many new subsystems make developing and integrating the Crusader

system a challenge technically. The technology is mostly driven by three

key requirements—the rate of fire, the resupply rate, and the cannon

range. Most of this technology has never been fielded in an Army artillery

system and is currently in various stages of development.

To meet the 10- to 12-rounds-per-minute firing rate, the current Crusader

howitzer design incorporates the following new subsystems:

• A computer controlled, fully automated autoloader that will identify,

select, and load projectiles and propellant.

• A solid propellant system, called the Modular Artillery Charge System, to

enable propellant autoloading.

• A fuze, called the Multi-Option Fuze for Artillery, that can be set remotely.

• An actively cooled cannon tube and recoil mechanism to dissipate the heat

generated by firing at the required rate.

• A laser ignition system to electronically fire the cannon.

The Army is developing the new propellant system and the new fuze for

use in all its artillery fleet, not just the Crusader system. The new

propellant system consists of two different propelling charges contained in

combustible cases that the Army expects will replace the cloth bags of

propellant currently used in artillery operations. The remaining

subsystems are being developed specifically for the Crusader system,

although the laser ignition system may later be applied to the Paladin.

The Army believes that the Crusader howitzer and resupply vehicle will

need to interface with each other and will require computer controlled,

fully automated ammunition handling and refueling systems to meet the

less than 12-minute resupply requirement. The current resupply vehicle

design incorporates a telescoping transfer boom to dock with the howitzer

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so that the crews can remain in the vehicles during the transfer of

ammunition and fuel. The Army expects the vehicles’ computers will

interface with each other and transfer information on what needs to be

resupplied and what is being supplied such as projectile type, weight, and

fuze type. In the current design concept, the howitzer’s autoloading system

also functions as its automatic ammunition handling system.

Because of the range requirement, the Army believes that the Crusader

howitzer will need a 54-caliber cannon, which will be significantly longer

than the Paladin’s 39-caliber cannon. Developing a 54-caliber cannon that

also meets the Crusader’s durability requirement is challenging because

longer cannons wear out faster than shorter ones. The Crusader’s

durability requirement is that the cannon have a 30-day battlefield life.

Recently, the Army made this requirement more stringent by reducing the

artillery battery from eight to six howitzers without changing the battery’s

mission. Now, six howitzers must do the firing formerly planned for eight

howitzers. If the battery contained eight howitzers, each Crusader

howitzer would have to fire 10,500 rounds to meet the cannon durability

requirement. However, with the reduction to six howitzers, each Crusader

howitzer will have to fire 13,800 rounds to meet the requirement. A

program official said that the cannon’s durability will also be adversely

affected because the six howitzers will have to fire more rounds at longer

ranges. The Army is exploring different coatings for the inside of the

cannon and possible improvements to artillery projectiles to increase the

cannon’s life.

Also, the current Crusader system design includes other new technologies.

Preeminent among these technologies are (1) advanced automated crew

stations; (2) advanced fire control; (3) embedded command, control,

communications, and intelligence, and training; (4) improved navigation

systems, signature management, defensive systems, and nuclear, chemical,

and biological protection; and (5) state-of-the-art mobility systems,

including drive-by-wire, external hydropneumatic suspension, improved

tracks, and an improved diesel power train.3

 The Army expects that the

Crusader system will be the first tracked vehicles driven by wire with their

movement, engine speed, transmissions, breaking, and steering, controlled

through the vehicles’ computers.

3

A drive-by-wire system replaces mechanical linkages and controls with electrical impulses through a

wire to operate the vehicle’s transmission, engine, and steering.

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Achieving Projected Force

Effectiveness Requires the

Crusader to Meet Minimum

Requirements

As previously mentioned, the Army’s force effectiveness analyses were

based on a Crusader system that met its minimum requirements.

Therefore, to reach its full potential, as described in the Army’s analyses,

the Crusader system needs to meet its minimum requirements. The Army’s

force effectiveness analyses indicated that the system would be more

operationally effective than existing artillery systems because of its

advantages in rate of fire, resupply capability, and system reliability.

However, the system’s advantages can be quickly eroded if its

requirements are not met.

For example, a Crusader project official said that Army’s analyses

indicated that if the Crusader howitzer could only fire 8 rounds per minute

instead of 10, the Army would lose in some battlefield scenarios. Also, an

Army’s analysis showed significant improvement in the number of rounds

available to the howitzer if it could be resupplied within 12 minutes.

However, during the time the howitzer and resupply vehicle are close

together or docked during resupply and the howitzer is unable to fire, they

are more vulnerable. Therefore, missing the required resupply time

increases the vehicles’ vulnerability and reduces the howitzer’s availability

for firing missions.

The Crusader system needs to meet its reliability requirement because its

advantage in system reliability was one of the main reasons the Crusader

was determined to be more effective than the Army’s existing artillery

system. The Crusader howitzer and resupply vehicle have different

reliability requirements. The howitzer is required to have at least 34 hours

mean time between essential function failures and at least 62 hours mean

time between system aborts. The resupply vehicle is required to have at

least 62 hours mean time between essential function failures and at least

104 hours mean time between system aborts. An Army official said that an

essential function failure allows the vehicle to complete its mission in a

degraded capacity while a system abort ends the mission.

Additionally, the Crusader system must achieve high reliability because

many of its subsystems will not have a backup, and a failure in one of

those subsystems could cause the Crusader to be unable to complete its

mission. For example, the Crusader howitzer only has one autoloader, and

the current howitzer design will not allow the crew to hand load the

cannon if the autoloader fails. Therefore, the Crusader howitzer cannot

fire if the autoloader fails. Likewise, the cannon will not be able to fire at

sustained high rates if the cannon cooling or recoil cooling fails. In this

case, the howitzer could still fire but at a 10-rounds-per-minute rate for 

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1 minute, after which it could only fire at a one- to two-rounds-per-minute

rate.

As currently designed, the two Crusader vehicles each will possess only

one automated ammunition handling system. The automated systems

allow Crusader crews to remain in the crew compartments, under armor,

while performing the resupply. This increases crew survivability by

minimizing exposure to counterfire and contaminated air. However, if

either handling system breaks down, the crews must dismount and

perform the resupply by a time-consuming, hand process, making them

more vulnerable to counterfire and contaminates.

The current Crusader computer concept contains some redundancy in that

each crewmember will have a computer control display that can perform

all the crew functions and the computer system itself will have three

central processing units. However, the transmission and the engine each

will have only one microprocessor linked to the central processors. A

project office official said that failure of one of these microprocessors

would be a mission-ending failure because the crew could not drive the

vehicle without the unit.

Army Is Making

Critical Crusader

Program Scheduling

Decisions

In response to funding reductions, the Army is making critical program

scheduling decisions that will compress the Crusader program’s schedule

beyond its already compressed schedule under the streamlined acquisition

process. In the past, such schedule adjustments have resulted in reduced

testing and/or concurrent testing, allowing programs to enter low-rate

initial production before they were ready. This has often resulted in

procurement of substantial inventories of unsatisfactory weapon systems

that required costly modifications or, in some cases, substandard weapon

systems being procured for combat forces.4

The Crusader program is using a streamlined acquisition approach

consisting of a single, three-phased developmental cycle from milestone I

to milestone III. This approach is designed to reduce the time needed to

develop, produce, and equip the first artillery unit with the Crusader

system by 12 to 15 months. This approach eliminates milestone II by

replacing the formal Defense Acquisition Board Review with a less formal

Defense Acquisition Executive in-process review, which is scheduled for

April 2000. While it is unclear what this review will entail, the current

4

Weapons Acquisition: Low-Rate Initial Production Used to Buy Weapon Systems Prematurely

(GAO/NSIAD-95-18, Nov. 21, 1994).

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Crusader acquisition plan states that this approach intends to meet “the

spirit of all regulatory guidance for milestone II content.”

The Crusader is being designed under its program definition and risk

reduction phase (previously called demonstration and validation phase) of

the streamlined acquisition cycle. Up to this point, the development team

has been involved in further defining the Crusader system’s basic design,

demonstrating potential Crusader technologies, and developing potential

Crusader components using models, simulations, and advanced

technology demonstrators. For example, the cannon tube is being safety

tested using a combination of actual and simulated firings.

The first Crusader system prototype is scheduled for delivery in October

1999. The Army expects the contractor to produce 10 prototype

systems—10 howitzers and 10 resupply vehicles—during the development

cycle. Only the last four prototype systems are expected to be fully

functional. The current schedule shows that the Army plans to make the

low-rate initial production decision in August 2003, with the full-rate

production decision following 2 years later, in October 2005. In addition,

the Army expects the contractor to produce 115 Crusader systems—

230 vehicles—during the low-rate initial production phase. Army officials

informed us that they realized that this quantity exceeds 10 percent of the

planned Crusader production; however, they believe this quantity will

allow the contractor to build up to full-rate production by producing 

80 vehicles in the first year and another 150 in the second year.5

 Full-rate

production is planned at 240 vehicles a year.

The Army is planning for a full test schedule to demonstrate the Crusader

system’s capabilities. It expected to use the prototypes in various tests,

including the preproduction qualification test, which was scheduled to end

in July 2003. According to the project manager, the preproduction

qualification test results will be considered in the low-rate initial

production decision scheduled for August 2003. The Crusader test master

plan states the purpose of this test is to demonstrate that the prototypes

can meet all the Crusader technical requirements. However, Army

program officials said that if the system does not demonstrate all its

requirements, they will assess the significance of the short comings to

determine whether the program should enter low-rate initial production.

While the Army has not established specific criteria for making this

5

If the system’s low-rate initial production quantities, as determined at milestone II, exceeds 10 percent

of the system’s planned total production, 10 U.S.C. 2400 requires the Secretary of Defense to include

the reasons for such quantities in a statement in the system’s next Selected Acquisition Report.

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determination, project office officials said they plan to do so before the

decision date.

On January 30, 1997, the Crusader project manager informed the Defense

Acquisition Executive that the in-process review—the decision to allow

the Crusader program to enter its full system development and

preproduction phase (previously called the engineering and manufacturing

development phase) would be delayed in excess of 6 months due to

funding reductions. In the most recent Selected Acquisition Report, the

Army reported to the Congress that most of the Crusader program,

including the in-process review and the first artillery unit deliveries, would

experience an 11-month delay. However, a project official said that the

project office is now developing a schedule that delays the in-process

review at least 6 months but not the date that the first Crusader artillery

unit is fully equipped. Project officials said that they are aware of the

problems that could result from compressed schedules and that they are

working with the testing community to assure that these problems will not

occur in the Crusader program. They added that they are planning to

revise the program schedule to maintain the full test schedule. The project

office is planning to submit the latest schedule for headquarters approval

on July 18, 1997.

No Alternative Meets

All Crusader

Requirements

No existing artillery system meets all of the Crusader requirements.

However, if the Crusader system cannot meet its requirements, other

howitzer/resupply vehicles may provide an alternative means to improve

the Army’s current artillery capabilities.

No existing artillery system has an automated resupply vehicle; therefore,

most cannot meet the Crusader key performance parameter for a less than

12-minute resupply and all systems do not have the survivability

advantages of being able to resupply without the crew leaving the vehicles.

All of the alternative howitzers depend on resupply vehicles where the

crews must manually handle and transfer the ammunition between

vehicles. As previously discussed, the Crusader’s resupply advantage was

one of the main reasons the Army concluded that the system would be

more effective than alternative systems. While none of the existing

self-propelled howitzers can meet all of the Crusader howitzer

requirements, an Army study assessed the German PzH 2000 as the most

capable foreign howitzer. The PzH 2000 is Germany’s next generation

155-millimeter self-propelled howitzer and is scheduled to begin fielding in

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1998. As can be seen in table 1, the PzH 2000 is an improvement over the

Paladin, but it does not meet all of the Crusader’s requirements.

Table 1: Comparison of the Crusader

requirements to Paladin and PzH 2000

capabilities Description

Crusader

requirement Paladin capability PzH 2000 capability

Maximum rate of fire

(rounds per minute)

10 to 12 (for 3 to 5

minutes)

4 (for 3 minutes) 10 (for 1 minute)a

8 (for 3 minutes)a

Sustained rate of fire

(rounds per minute

until system is out of

ammunition)

3 to 6 1 to 2 3b

Maximum range

(kilometers)

40 to 50 30 40c

Multiple round

simultaneous impact

(rounds impacting)

4 to 8 (between 8

and 36 kilometers)

2 (between 10 and

20 kilometers)

•d

Rearm time (minutes) Less than 12 22 less than 11 minutes

Cross-country speed

(kilometers per hour)

39 to 48 30 45

Highway speed

(kilometers per hour)

67 to 78 67 61

Combat loaded weight

(tons)

55 32 60

90-second survival

dash speed (meters)

750 560 750

aPreparing the propellant charge is not included in the time. The PzH 2000 could not fire at this

rate at targets located in the longer third of its range because it lacks active cannon cooling.

bThe PzH 2000 could not fire at this rate at targets located in the longer sixth of its range because

it lacks active cannon cooling.

cHas not been demonstrated.

dAs this is not a German requirement, the PzH 2000 has not attempted to fire such a mission.

However, contractor officials believe that if the PzH 2000 had a propellant autoloader, it would

have the same capability as the Crusader howitzer.

Source: Army data for the first two columns and PzH 2000 contractor data for the third column.

In addition to the differences shown in the table, the PzH 2000’s

survivability and availability for firing missions would be less than the

Crusader’s. First, without an automated resupply vehicle, PzH 2000

crewmembers would have to leave the protection of their vehicle to

physically carry the projectiles and powder charges between vehicles. This

would make them more vulnerable than Crusader crewmembers, who can

remain protected in their vehicles to conduct resupply operations. Further,

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the PzH 2000’s availability for firing missions would suffer because the

PzH 2000 would have to leave the battle whenever it needed resupply or

refueling.

Second, the location of the crewmembers within the PzH 2000 would

adversely affect their survivability. The PzH 2000 is configured as a typical

howitzer, with the majority of the crew located in the weapons

compartment. As currently designed, the Crusader vehicles have separate

crew and weapons compartments, which allows additional armor to be

placed around the crew compartment and provides better protection from

hits in the weapons compartment.

PzH 2000 contractor officials said that they could develop an automated

resupply vehicle based on the PzH 2000 chassis and modify the PzH 2000

howitzer to meet all of the Crusader key requirements and many of the

other Crusader requirements. Also, they believed that they could field

these vehicles within 6 years of the start of development, assuming that

U.S. government-furnished material, such as the actively cooled cannon,

was available when needed.

The Army did not perform a detailed assessment of possible modifications

to the PzH 2000 to improve its performance. Army program officials said

that a detailed analysis was not required because an Army cost analysis

had determined that the basic PzH 2000’s life-cycle costs were more than

the Crusader’s and that modifying the PzH 2000 would only increase these

costs. However, this reasoning overlooks the possibility that the

modifications that would fully automate the firing and resupply processes

would likely reduce the PzH 2000’s crew requirements. The PzH 2000’s

crew size, five, was a major factor in its life-cycle costs being more than

those of the Crusader howitzer.

PzH 2000 contractor officials said that a modified PzH 2000 howitzer and

an automated PzH 2000-based resupply vehicle each would require a crew

of three—the same crew size as the Crusader vehicles are expected to

require. However, a modified PzH 2000 howitzer would still have crew

located in the weapons compartment and the associated adverse impact

on survivability. Also, the modified PzH 2000 howitzer would not have

interchangeable crew stations at which all crew tasks could be performed.

Because the current PzH 2000 howitzer does not meet the Crusader

combat loaded weight requirement, the PzH 2000 contractor would have to

look for opportunities to reduce the modified PzH 2000 howitzer’s weight.

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However, the Crusader contractor is projecting that the Crusader

howitzer, as currently designed, will not meet its weight requirement. The

Crusader contractor also is looking for opportunities to reduce the

Crusader’s weight.

The Crusader project manager said that if it became necessary to choose

an alternative to the Crusader system, the Army would likely choose an

improved Paladin. The Paladin, based on a 1950s design, was first

delivered to the Army in 1963 and, over the past 34 years, has been

produced in six different models. Paladin project officials believe that

some modifications could be made to the Paladin, which would increase

its cannon range to the Crusader requirement, its rate of fire to six rounds

per minute, and its speed. However, these officials stated that the Paladin’s

cross-country mobility could not be improved without a major redesign of

its chassis. Further, an improved Paladin would maintain the current

configuration with most of the crew in the weapons compartment and

with the associated adverse impact on survivability. Finally, the Paladin

and FAASV could not be automated to allow the crews to remain in the

vehicles during resupply.

Recommendations According to the Army, the Crusader system has the potential for

revolutionizing artillery operations. However, the program faces

considerable programmatic risks due to the technical challenges faced in

developing and integrating advanced technologies, the potential

compression of the program’s schedule, the use of a streamlined

acquisition approach, and the absence of defined criteria for entering into

low-rate initial production. Consequently, to minimize the risk of

prematurely entering production, we recommend that the Secretary of

Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to establish criteria specifying, at

a minimum, that the Crusader system demonstrate that it meets all key

requirements and is on schedule for meeting its reliability requirement

before entering low-rate initial production and is operationally effective

and suitable before entering full-rate production. If, at either point, the

Crusader system does not demonstrate that it meets its requirements, then

the Secretary of the Army should determine whether an alternative

artillery system may be a better way to improve the Army’s artillery

capabilities.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD concurred with our report and noted that in accordance with its

acquisition management policies and controls, the criteria for entering

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low-rate initial production will be established for the Crusader system at

milestone II. According to DOD, typical criteria for entering low-rate initial

production are that the system meet all key performance requirements and

show satisfactory progress toward demonstration of reliability

requirements. In addition, DOD commented that its policy requires that

should a system fail to meet its key performance requirements, the system

requirements and all reasonable options to meet those requirements will

be investigated.

While we are aware of DOD’s acquisition policies and controls for the

normal milestone II review, the Crusader program, as previously noted, is

using a streamlined acquisition approach that eliminates the normal

milestone II review. In its place is an in-process review by the Defense

Acquisition Executive that will authorize the program’s transition into the

full system development and preproduction phase. The intent of our

recommendations is to make sure that this review process ensures that, at

a minimum, the Crusader system meets its rate of fire, range, mobility, and

resupply requirements and is capable of meeting its reliability requirement

before it enters production. If it does not demonstrate these capabilities,

then serious consideration should be given to program termination in

favor of an alternative system. Also, we have changed the title of the

report to more accurately reflect the report’s message.

DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix I. DOD also has provided some

technical and editorial comments, and we have incorporated them in the

text where appropriate.

Scope and

Methodology

To evaluate the status of the Crusader program, we interviewed DOD,

Army, and contractor officials and reviewed various program documents,

including the program acquisition strategy, the system threat assessment

report, operational requirements documents, the acquisition program

baseline, the test and evaluation master plan, and the results of force

effectiveness and other studies. We also observed and operated the

contractor’s Crusader crew simulator and the Army’s Paladin Artillery

System to understand the improvements the Army expects to gain from

the Crusader. In addition, we discussed the potential threat to artillery

systems with officials of the National Ground Intelligence Center,

Charlottesville, Virginia.

To determine whether alternative howitzers could meet Crusader

requirements, we interviewed DOD, Army, and contractor officials and

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-97-121 Army Armored Systems
B-276453 

reviewed various program documents, including the engineering trade-off

study, the cost and operational effectiveness study, other evaluation

reports, and operational requirements documents. We also compared

Crusader requirements with other current artillery systems. In addition,

we discussed the capabilities of and possible improvements to the German

PzH 2000 howitzer with officials of both the Army and its prime developer,

the Wegmann & Company, GmbH, Kassel, Germany. We did not validate

the Crusader requirements.

We performed our work at DOD and the Army headquarters, Washington,

D.C.; Crusader and Paladin project offices, and U.S. Army Armament

Research, Development, and Engineering Center, Picatinny Arsenal, New

Jersey; U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma;

and United Defense Limited Partnership’s Armament Systems Division,

Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Paladin Production Division, Chambersburg,

Pennsylvania.

We conducted our review from June 1996 to April 1997 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.

As you know, the head of a federal agency is required by 31 U.S.C. 720 to

submit a written statement of actions taken on our recommendations to

the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee

on Government Reform and Oversight not later than 60 days after the date

of this report. A written statement also must be submitted to the Senate

and House Committees on Appropriations with the agency’s first request

for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking

Minority Members, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations,

Senate Committees on Armed Services and Governmental Affairs, House

Committees on National Security and Government Reform and Oversight;

the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the Secretary of the

Army. We will also provide copies to others upon request.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-97-121 Army Armored Systems
B-276453 

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were 

Robert J. Stolba, Lawrence Gaston, Jr., and John P. Swain.

Sincerely yours,

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-97-121 Army Armored Systems
Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-97-121 Army Armored Systems
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-97-121 Army Armored Systems
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

(707180) Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-97-121 Army Armored Systems
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