MIND-SETS AND MISSILES:

A FIRST HAND ACCOUNT OF THE CUBAN 

MISSILE CRISIS

Kenneth Michael Absher

September 2009

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*****

I am indebted to Ambassador David Abshire, former U.S. 

Ambassador to NATO, for his encouragement and interest in 

the importance of identifying and understanding the role of 

mindsets in the analysis of foreign intelligence and the formation 

and implementation of foreign policy. As the first Research 

Fellow with the Scowcroft Institute at the George Bush School of 

Government and Public Service, I am indebted to Brent Scowcroft 

for the privilege of serving in his institute. I thank Dr. Jeff Engel, 

the Director of the Scowcroft Institute, and Dr. Joe Cerami of the 

Bush School for their encouragement and support. I thank Dr. 

Sam Kirkpatrick, former President of the University of Texas at 

San Antonio (UTSA), and Denis Clift, President of the National 

Defense Intelligence College (NDIC), for the privilege of teaching 

as an Adjunct Professor at UTSA from 1994 to 1997 and at NDIC 

from 1997 to 2002. I am also very much indebted to Dr. David 

Robarge, the Chief Historian at the Central Intelligence Agency’s 

Center for the Study of Intelligence, who is an acknowledged 

expert on the Cuban Missile Crisis, for his encouragement and his 

excellent editorial guidance and wisdom. Finally, I am indebted 

to Dr. Sherman Kent for the privilege of serving in the Office of 

National Estimates during this historic crisis of the Cold War.

*****

This manuscript is lovingly dedicated to my wife, Cindy, 

whose constant love and support enabled me to continue 

researching and writing this paper over a period of many years.

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forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. 

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iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword .............................................................................v

Summary ....................................................................vii

Mind-Sets and Missiles: A First Hand Account 

of the Cuban Missile Crisis ......................................................1

Introduction—Failed Mind-Sets ........................................1

The Seeds of Crisis—1961 .................................................5

Soviet Deception.....................................................8

The Vienna Summit.............................................................8

Technical Collection Versus Espionage................................12

Khrushchev Pushes the Envelope..........................................17

Intelligence Used to War Khrushchev...................................18

Kennedy Launches Operation MONGOOSE.......................19

Khrushchev Decides to Put Missiles in Cuba...................... 22

Khrushchev Explains His Decision........................................24

The Soviet Plan.........................................................................26

Crisis Without Our Best Espionage Agent...........................27

Soviet Weapons and DCI Warnings......................................28

More Soviet Deception............................................................32

Final Communication with Penkovsky.................................33

Additional Soviet Nuclear Weapons.....................................34

Rapid Construction of Missile Sites...................................... 35

The DCI Honeymoon Cables..................................................35

Aerial Reconnaissance and “The Photo Cap”......................36

Opposition to U-2 Flights....................................................... 37

The Failed Estimate..................................................................40

Sherman Kent Reflects.............................................................42

McCone Forces Approval of Overflights..............................44

The Deception Continues........................................................47

Intelligence Not Disseminated...............................................47

Missiles Discovered..................................................................48

Crisis Management............................................................54

Soviet Deception and Presidential Warning........................57

Estimates Lead to Policy Decisions........................................57

The President Decides to Blockade........................................60
v

Military Strike Reviewed.........................................................62

Briefing Ike, LBJ, and Allies....................................................63

The President’s Address and DEFCON 3 ............................65

DEFCON 2............................................................... 68

Initial Reaction ......................................................69

Official Soviet Reaction.....................................................70

The Darkest Day......................................................................72

The Final Warning...................................................................74

Aftermath .........................................................................75

Missiles in Caves......................................................................77

The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board........78

Khrushchev Resigns.................................................................85

Lessons Learned.......................................................................85

Endnotes....................................................................................88

Bibliography........................................................................... 100

About the Author...................................................................103

Annex A..................................................................................104

Annex B...................................................................................105

Endnotes...........................................................................107

Annex C...................................................................................104

Endnotes............................................................................110

vii

FOREWORD

This Letort Paper provides a detailed chronology 

and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes 

of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The author, Mr. Kenneth 

Absher, contends that, when our national security is at 

stake, the United States should not hesitate to undertake 

risky intelligence collection operations, including 

espionage, to penetrate our adversary’s deceptions. At 

the same time, the United States must also understand 

that our adversary may not believe the gravity of our 

policy warnings or may not allow its own agenda to be 

influenced by U.S. diplomatic pressure.

As both a student of and key participant in the 

events of the crisis, the author is able to provide in-depth 

analysis of the failures and successes of the national 

intelligence community and executive leadership 

during the buildup to the confrontation, and the 

risky but successful actions which led to its peaceful 

settlement. From his analysis, the author suggests 

considerations relevant to the collection, analysis, and 

use of intelligence which have continuing application.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

ix

SUMMARY

This Letort Paper provides a detailed chronology 

and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of 

the Cuban Missile Crisis, and suggests the applicability 

of lessons learned to the collection, analysis, and 

use of intelligence in strategic decisionmaking. The 

author was assigned to Sherman Kent’s Office of 

National Estimates (ONE) after completing his Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA) Junior Officer Training 

Program in June 1962. He was one of two analysts for 

Latin America in Kent’s ONE. He was a participant in 

the drafting of every National Intelligence Estimate 

(NIE) and Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE)

on Cuba and the Soviet military build-up from June 

1962 to February 1963. This paper describes how the 

crisis unfolded using the author’s personal recollection, 

declassified documents, and many memoirs written by 

senior CIA officers and others who were participants. 

Lessons learned include the need to avoid having 

our political, analytical and intelligence collection 

mind-sets prevent us from acquiring and accurately 

analyzing intelligence about our adversaries true plans 

and intentions. When our national security is at stake, 

we should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence 

collection operations including espionage, to penetrate 

our adversary’s deceptions. We must also understand 

that our adversaries may not believe the gravity of 

our policy warnings or allow their own agendas to be 

influenced by diplomatic pressure. When Soviet leader 

Nikita Khrushchev decided secretly to place offensive 

missiles in Cuba, he clearly did not believe President 

John Kennedy would use military action to enforce 

U.S. policy warnings against such a deployment. 
x

Lacking hard intelligence to the contrary, the 

American Intelligence Community (IC) also issued a 

failed SNIE on September 19, 1962, stating Khrushchev 

would not place offensive missiles in Cuba. The Soviets 

had never before placed such missiles outside the Union 

of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Warsaw 

Pact and the IC believed that Khrushchev certainly 

would not run the risk of a U.S. military response to such 

a provocation. Thanks to the leadership of the Director 

of Central Intelligence and the President, the United 

States overcame a political mind-set against scheduling 

U-2 flights directly over Cuba where they risked being 

shot down by Soviet surface-to-air missiles. Intelligence 

from an espionage agent was used by the historic U-2 

flight to photograph the SS-4 medium range missiles 

being installed in western Cuba. An analysis of this and 

subsequent U-2 photography utilizing the operational 

manuals of the Soviet offensive missiles provided 

clandestinely enabled the IC to tell the President how 

much time he had prior to each missile site becoming 

operational. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev finally 

agreed to withdraw the missiles, bombers, and nuclear 

weapons after being convinced that the United States 

was preparing to launch a massive bombing and 

invasion of Cuba. The author concluded that such 

U.S. military operations were within 48-72 hours of 

being launched when Khrushchev publicly said the 

missiles would be withdrawn. There was a last minute 

understanding that Jupiter missiles would probably 

be withdrawn later from Turkey if Soviet missiles 

were first withdrawn from Cuba. But imminent U.S. 

military action was what convinced Khrushchev that 

the missiles had to be withdrawn.
1

MIND-SETS AND MISSILES:

A FIRST HAND ACCOUNT OF THE CUBAN 

MISSILE CRISIS

INTRODUCTION—FAILED MIND-SETS

Policy and intelligence failures laid the groundwork 

for the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the most dangerous 

crisis of the Cold War. This monograph will discuss 

and analyze the different mind-sets, or fixed mental 

attitudes, which policymakers and other officials 

brought to the task of analyzing intelligence and 

making foreign policy decisions. Soviet leader Nikita 

Khrushchev’s secret policy decision to place SS-4 

medium and SS-5 intermediate range missiles in Cuba 

was based on an erroneous assessment that once the 

missiles had secretly been emplaced, President John 

F. Kennedy would accept them as a fait accompli. 

Kennedy’s perceived lack of confidence during the 

failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April 1961, was 

one reason Khrushchev thought he could get away with 

placing the offensive missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev 

also had an ideological mind-set that believed history 

was on the side of socialism and communism, and that 

capitalism and constitutional democracy were weak 

and would ultimately be defeated by communism 

and the Soviet Union. In Khrushchev’s mind-set, the 

extra-human forces of “history” were major drivers 

of political, economic, and foreign policy decisions, 

and he demonstrated that he was prepared to be an 

obedient agent of these forces, regardless of the risk of 

war and bloodshed. As an agent of forces that promote 

violent change, he nonetheless realized the utility of 

engaging in diplomacy as a means of possibly buying 

time to prepare for violent change, and even to acquire 
2

allies in his efforts to have outside forces achieve their 

objectives. 

For its part, the American Intelligence Community 

(IC) had a status quo mind-set that concluded 

Khrushchev would not place such missiles in Cuba 

because the Soviets had never before placed such 

offensive missiles outside the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics (USSR) and the Warsaw Pact. American 

Intelligence also thought that Khrushchev would not 

risk provoking the strong U.S. reaction which would 

certainly be generated by placing such missiles (with 

their nuclear warheads) in Cuba. Khrushchev, however, 

did not see it the way we thought he would, or the 

way we thought he should. Kennedy was unsuccessful 

in the 16-month aftermath of the failed June 1961 

Vienna Summit in efforts to disabuse Khrushchev 

of his erroneous mind-sets about the weakness of 

Kennedy and the superiority of history and communist 

ideology. 

President Kennedy activated U.S. military reserves 

and issued strongly worded warnings to Khrushchev 

emphasizing U.S. military and nuclear superiority 

over the USSR. But Khrushchev remained convinced 

that Kennedy was weak, and the United States, as a 

capitalist state, was doomed by history to be defeated 

by socialism and ultimately by communism. Only when 

confronted by the growing certainty of a U.S. bombing 

and invasion of Cuba, and the predictable obliteration 

of life in the Soviet Union by U.S. missiles and bombers 

should he choose general nuclear war, did Khrushchev 

step back from the precipice. 

There was also a mind-set of American intelligence 

and policy officials that favored intelligence from 

technical sources, while downgrading information from 

human sources such as clandestine espionage agents 
3

and refugee debriefings. This mind-set was formed in 

part by the larger volume and greater familiarity with 

intelligence collected from overt technical platforms 

such as vehicles, ships, aircraft, and satellites. One 

example of this mind-set was the U.S. Air Force’s use 

of inflated assessments of Soviet nuclear and missile 

strength to defend its budget. When these erroneous 

assessments were contradicted by intelligence from a 

highly valuable and reliable espionage agent, Colonel 

Oleg Penkovsky, a Soviet Military Intelligence officer 

jointly run by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 

and British intelligence (MI-6), this information 

was not given the credibility it deserved until it was 

subsequently confirmed by our first generation Corona 

satellite reconnaissance.

There was also a U.S. policy mind-set that caused 

a delay in authorizing critical U-2 flights over the 

interior of Cuba. This mind-set was fearful of the 

political and diplomatic consequences of Soviet 

surface to air missiles shooting down a U-2 on the 

eve of the 1962 U.S. mid-term elections. This mindset was finally overcome at the insistence of Director 

of Central Intelligence (DCI) John McCone who, as 

leader of the IC, obtained the President’s approval to 

resume such flights in time to discover the missiles 

before they had become operational. Using earlier 

Corona photography of missiles inside the USSR and 

the top secret operating manuals of the SS-4 and SS-5 

missiles which had been clandestinely photographed 

by Penkovsky and provided to the CIA and MI-6, 

photographic interpreters were able to identify the 

missiles being installed and determine when each 

missile site would become operational. The President 

thus knew how much time he had to formulate and 

implement a policy to convince Khrushchev to remove 
4

the missiles before having to take direct military 

action. 

There was also a U.S. policy mind-set which 

sought revenge for the April 1961 defeat of the Bay 

of Pigs operation aimed at overthrowing Castro. The 

Kennedy administration mounted a second covert 

action to remove Castro, Operation MONGOOSE. This 

operation was pursued vigorously despite intelligence 

indicating that efforts to create an internal opposition 

strong enough to overthrow Castro were just not 

working. This mind-set even led to some consideration 

of assassinating Castro. 

 Once the missiles were discovered, it was clear to 

the author and others in the Office of National Estimates 

(ONE) that President Kennedy was unwavering in his 

policy commitment to remove the missiles from Cuba, 

either by diplomacy backed by a show of military force, 

or direct U.S. military action. The President announced 

this policy to the world in a remarkable crisis speech on 

October 22, 1962. All of the information and feedback 

the ONE staff received as a result of White House 

briefings attended by senior intelligence officials 

clearly indicated that it had been decided the missiles 

must be removed. Based on the evidence discussed 

in this monograph and the author’s recollection, a 

U.S. bombardment and airborne invasion of Cuba 

were within 48 to 72 hours of being launched when 

Khrushchev announced publicly on October 28, 1962, 

that he would remove the missiles. On November 20, 

1962, he also announced that he would withdraw the 

Soviet IL-28 bombers and the tactical nuclear weapons 

that had also been sent to Cuba. (Nuclear warheads for 

the missiles and nuclear bombs for the IL-28 bombers 

were also removed.)

 In the end, faulty intelligence assessments and 

erroneous policy mind-sets were overcome when at 
5

the insistence of the DCI, U-2 reconnaissance flights 

resumed over the interior of Cuba. Using intelligence 

provided clandestinely by an on-island espionage 

agent, the U-2 photographed the first SS-4 missile site 

on October 14. (Annex C contains information on some 

of the Soviet and U.S. intelligence sources that were 

operational during the crisis; and basic definitions of 

clandestine operations.)

THE SEEDS OF CRISIS—1961

The year 1961 was not a good year for the United 

States in the Cold War. On April 12, Soviet Cosmonaut 

Major Yuri Gagarin was the first person to orbit the 

earth in outer space. This event fueled speculation 

that the Soviets were ahead of the United States in the 

development of ballistic missiles.1

A counterintelligence failure came to light when 

British intelligence officer George Blake was arrested 

for espionage on April 4. He had been working for the 

Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) since 1953. 

There was also the tragic failure at the Bay of Pigs, as 

CIA-trained and equipped Cuban exiles invaded Cuba 

in an attempt to overthrow Castro. Planning for this 

operation began in 1960, with President Eisenhower’s 

concurrence, and President Kennedy approved it. 

Castro announced the defeat of this operation on April 

20, 1961. 

Other threatening events included the failure of 

the June 1961 summit with Khrushchev in Vienna; 

the building of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961; 

Khrushchev’s threat to turn over access to West 

Berlin to the Communist East German regime; and 

Khrushchev’s unilateral resumption of nuclear testing 

in the atmosphere in early September contrary to the 

promise he made to Kennedy at the Vienna summit.2
6

Despite all of these negative events, there was 

a good, albeit secret, development. Colonel Oleg 

Penkovsky was a Soviet army officer assigned to the 

Glavnoe Razvedyvatelnoe Upravlenie (GRU), the chief 

intelligence directorate of the general staff. On April 

20, 1961, he arrived in London as the head of a sixman Soviet delegation from the State Committee for 

the Coordination of Scientific Research Work. This 

committee served as a cover for KGB and GRU officers 

who were conducting espionage to steal Western 

technology. However, Penkovsky had the intent of 

volunteering his services to the CIA and MI-6, and 

he was successful with the help of his host, British 

businessman Greville Wynne, who was cooperating 

with British Intelligence.3

The information received from Penkovsky was 

tightly held. There is no evidence that either Attorney 

General Robert Kennedy or the Assistant to the President 

for National Security Affairs (i.e., National Security 

Advisor) McGeorge Bundy knew about Penkovsky or 

the importance of his information. The President knew 

of Penkovsky, however, and took a personal interest in 

the “Soviet colonel’s work.” DCI Allen Dulles showed 

the President copies of Penkovsky’s information, 

including verbatim transcripts of clandestine meetings 

with him. Dulles’s successor, John McCone, continued 

to keep the President informed of the status of this case 

after he became DCI in November 1961.4

 CIA and MI-6 officers met with Penkovsky for 

about 140 hours during his two trips to London and 

one to Paris. About 1,200 pages of transcripts were 

produced. He supplied 111 exposed rolls of film, 99 

percent of which were legible. An estimated 10,000 

pages or more of intelligence reports were produced 

from his information, which included the top secret 

operating manuals for the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. The 
7

manuals had been clandestinely photographed by 

Penkovsky in Moscow and passed to the CIA and MI-6 

in clandestine meetings in London in 1961. 

By comparing the U-2 photography with information in the manuals provided by Penkovsky, analysts 

were able to identify positively the specific missiles 

being placed in Cuba and to determine on a daily basis 

the stage of construction of each missile site. They 

were, therefore, able to tell President Kennedy when 

each site would become operational. This information 

was critical in enabling the President to know how 

much time he had to determine and apply a policy of 

diplomatic and military pressure against Khrushchev 

before having to take direct military action.5

Penkovsky was one of the most important 

espionage agents of the Cold War. During his brief yet 

remarkable career, he was run jointly by the CIA and 

the British MI-6. Wynne served as a principal agent in 

contacting Penkovsky on behalf of both agencies. He 

arranged clandestine meetings with Penkovsky in both 

London and Paris in 1961 and was used to pass and 

receive information from Penkovsky during visits to 

Moscow. Brush contacts for exchanging messages with 

Penkovsky in Moscow were also arranged utilizing the 

wife of an MI-6 officer stationed in Moscow. Penkovsky 

came under suspicion by the KGB in about January 1962 

and was never allowed to visit the West again. He also 

lost his access to high level Soviet military and political 

leaders. Pravda announced his arrest on December 12, 

1962. The KGB would later claim that the actual date 

of his arrest was October 22, 1962. After a show trial 

in Moscow, Penkovsky’s execution was announced on 

May 17, 1963.6
8

Soviet Deception.

In May 1961, an American journalist introduced 

Georgi Nikitovich Bolshakov to Attorney General 

Robert Kennedy. Bolshakov claimed a direct channel 

to Khrushchev. Bolshakov was, in fact, a Soviet GRU 

officer in Washington under cover as information 

counselor and editor of the magazine, Soviet Life. There 

is evidence of at least 51 meetings between Kennedy 

and Bolshakov between May 1961 and December 

1962.7

Robert Kennedy ignored warnings from the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the CIA that 

Bolshakov was a Soviet intelligence officer and thought 

that he had an authentic friendship with Bolshakov. He 

regarded Bolshakov as Khrushchev’s representative 

but failed to realize that Bolshakov was being used to 

pass disinformation to the President.

Using the Bolshakov channel, the President was led 

to believe that Khrushchev would be willing to make 

concessions on nuclear testing and on Laos if Kennedy 

were to agree to a summit meeting. Kennedy agreed 

to a summit meeting in Vienna on June 3-4, 1961. 

Although Khrushchev and Kennedy agreed to make a 

cease-fire in Laos a priority, nothing else was resolved 

in Vienna. Khrushchev promised to end testing of 

nuclear weapons in the atmosphere but violated this 

pledge by unilaterally resuming atmospheric testing in 

early September 1961. 

The Vienna Summit.

The Vienna Summit failed when Khrushchev 

threatened to sign a separate peace treaty with 

East Germany which would cancel all existing 
9

commitments among the four Allied powers of World 

War II, including occupation rights, administrative 

institutions, and rights of access to East and West 

Berlin. Khrushchev’s treaty would establish the “free” 

city of West Berlin. There would be no interference 

with its internal affairs or its communications, but an 

agreement on access would have to be reached with the 

German Democratic Republic (the GDR or Communist 

East Germany). Western troops would be acceptable in 

West Berlin under certain conditions—and, of course, 

with Soviet troops, too. “And if there is any attempt to 

interfere with these plans,” Khrushchev added, “there 

will be war.” Kennedy looked straight at Khrushchev 

and said, “Then, Mr. Chairman, there will be war. It 

will be a cold winter.”8

Kennedy met privately with James “Scotty” Reston, 

Washington bureau chief of the New York Times, in 

the American embassy in Vienna immediately after 

the summit to discuss what happened. Concerning 

Khrushchev’s threats of war, he told Reston, 

I think he did it because of the Bay of Pigs. . . . I think he 

thought that anyone who was so young and inexperienced 

as to get into that mess could be taken, and anyone who 

got into it and didn’t see it through had no guts. So he 

just beat hell out of me. So I’ve got a terrible problem. If 

he thinks I’m inexperienced and have no guts, until we 

remove those ideas we won’t get anywhere with him. So 

we have to act. 

Reston did not publish Kennedy’s remarks until 

well after the missile crisis. The author also has no 

recollection that Kennedy’s assessment of Khrushchev 

as expressed to Reston was ever shared with the Board 

or ONE. Had Kennedy’s own personal assessment of 

Khrushchev’s behavior been published or disseminated 
10

to the American IC sooner, the IC might have gotten 

an early sense of the dangerous mind-set which led 

Khrushchev to conclude that he could get away with 

placing offensive missiles in Cuba without triggering a 

U.S. military response.9

Former President Eisenhower tried to warn 

Kennedy during a conversation after the Bay of Pigs. 

Eisenhower asked Kennedy why he had failed to 

provide air cover for the landing of the CIA-trained 

Cuban exile force in Cuba. Kennedy responded that 

he had been worried the Soviets would make trouble 

in Berlin. Eisenhower replied, “That is exactly the 

opposite of what would really happen. The Soviets 

follow their own plans, and if they see us show any 

weakness, then is when they press the hardest. . . . The 

failure of the Bay of Pigs will embolden the Soviets to 

do something that they would otherwise not do.” Later, 

Arkady Shevchenko of the Soviet Foreign Ministry 

reported that the Bay of Pigs “gave Khrushchev and 

the other leaders the impression that Kennedy was 

indecisive.”10

Khrushchev’s assessment of Kennedy at the 

Vienna Summit was shared by other Soviets. Fyodor 

Burlatsky, one of Khrushchev’s assistants, was present 

at Khrushchev’s debriefing after the Vienna Summit. 

Burlatsky thought that Kennedy seemed to Khrushchev 

more like “an adviser, not a political decisionmaker or 

president. Maybe in a crisis he would be an adviser, but 

not even the most influential.” He thought Khrushchev 

looked down on Kennedy as a self-made man looks 

down on a rich man to whom all has been handed. At 

a conference in 1988, Burlatsky said that “Khrushchev 

thought Kennedy too young, intellectual, not prepared 

well for decision making in crisis situations . . . too 

intelligent and too weak.”11
11

 Khrushchev’s superiority mind-set was further 

illustrated during a meeting on September 7, 1962, 

between Khrushchev and American poet Robert 

Frost. Construction had already secretly begun on 

SS-5 intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) 

sites in Guanajay, Cuba. From September 15-20, 

1962, construction would begin at San Cristobal on 

SS-4 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) sites. 

Khrushchev told Frost that the Western democracies 

were “too liberal to fight.” President Kennedy’s 

perceived lack of confidence during the failed Bay 

of Pigs invasion had convinced Khrushchev that 

Kennedy was “wishy-washy. . . . I know for certain 

that Kennedy doesn’t have a strong backbone, nor, 

generally speaking, does he have the courage to stand 

up to a serious challenge.”12

But Khrushchev’s remarks to Frost reveal more than 

just a mind-set formed by Kennedy’s handling of the 

Bay of Pigs, Kennedy’s behavior at the Vienna Summit 

in June 1961, and the failure of the Western allies to 

react strongly to erecting the Berlin Wall on August 

13, 1961. Khrushchev’s assessment of Kennedy and 

the West was at least partially formed by communist 

ideology. The statement that the Western democracies 

are too liberal to fight is a communist tenet derived 

from the belief that history is on the side of socialism 

and communism and that the noncommunist capitalist 

West was weak and decadent. To a certain extent, 

Khrushchev was a true believer, and this mind-set 

influenced his assessment of events and other political 

leaders.13

Some of the people close to Kennedy had the 

same understanding of Khrushchev’s assessment 

of Kennedy. Looking back in 1987, George Ball said 

“we all thought that Khrushchev saw him as young 

and weak.” General Maxwell Taylor recalled that “the 
12

meeting of Khrushchev with President Kennedy in 

Vienna had so impressed him [Khrushchev] with the 

unreadiness of this young man to head a great country 

like the United States, plus the experience that he had 

seen in the Bay of Pigs [led him to believe that] he could 

shove this young man around any place he wanted.”14

Following the Vienna Summit, Kennedy did, in 

fact, take a series of actions in an effort to disabuse 

Khrushchev of this assessment. But none of these 

actions succeeded in changing Khrushchev’s personal 

mind-set toward Kennedy or his ideological superiority 

mind-set toward the United States. In a revelation 

of its own mind-set, the IC issued a Special National 

Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on September 19, 1962, 

which concluded that Khrushchev would not run the 

risk of placing offensive missiles in Cuba because this 

“would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date 

and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It 

would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the 

level of risk in U.S.-Soviet relations than the USSR has 

displayed thus far.” But this mind-set persisted even 

though Khrushchev had already increased the level 

of risk in U.S. Soviet relations by his conduct at the 

June 1961 summit in Vienna; his threat to turn over 

the administration of Berlin to East Germany; erecting 

the Berlin Wall; and his testing nuclear weapons in 

the atmosphere contrary to his promise to Kennedy in 

Vienna.15

TECHNICAL COLLECTION VERSUS ESPIONAGE 

In June 1961, an NIE concluded that the Soviets had 

50-100 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on 

launchers. But Edward W. Proctor, chief of the ad hoc 

Guided Missile Task Force in the the CIA’s Directorate 
13

of Intelligence, prepared a June 2, 1961, memorandum 

in which he stated that, based on the implications of a 

Clandestine Service report dated May 16, 1961 entitled 

“The Soviet ICBM Program,” the previous NIE should 

be withdrawn and its conclusions reversed.

Proctor’s memorandum was based on information 

Penkovsky had clandestinely provided the CIA and 

MI-6. Proctor argued that based on this Clandestine 

Service report, the Soviets had not been conducting a 

generally successful ICBM program, and that they did 

not have 50-100 operational ICBM launchers at present. 

They probably had 25 or fewer ICBMs on launchers. 

By mid-1962 they would have only 25-50 ICBMs on 

launchers versus the 100-200 that were projected in the 

June 1961 NIE.16

But Proctor also stated that there was a need 

for more information about the unknown source’s 

credentials “because acceptance of his report as an 

accurate reflection of the status of the Soviet ICBM 

program will modify substantially our estimate and 

could cause important changes in U.S. policy. It is 

necessary that we who are assessing this program have 

access to almost all the information available so that 

we can make an independent judgment of the validity 

of this report.” But after serious consideration by Dick 

Helms, CIA Chief of Operations for the Directorate 

of Plans; and Jack Maury, the CIA Chief of the Soviet 

Division in the Directorate of Plans, the decision was 

made against revealing further details that might point 

to the source of the report.17

No revision of the estimated number of Soviet 

strategic missiles was made to this June 1961 updated 

NIE. Although Penkovsky’s information was included 

in the information given to the U.S. Intelligence Board 

(USIB) for its June 1961 update, only a brief mention was 
14

made of the report in a footnote. Members of the USIB 

did not argue with the Clandestine Service’s evaluation 

of the source (Penkovsky). But a USIB member told 

Jack Maury that no matter how good the source was, 

the sub-source was unknown to consumers and was 

given no evaluation in the dissemination. Because of 

this, the sub-source “would have to be considered ‘F’. 

The community was unwilling to accord an ‘F’ source 

any consideration in changing a National Estimate.” 

An “F” in this case meant unsubstantiated information. 

The sub-source from whom Penkovsky acquired 

the information was Marshal Sergei Sergeyevitch 

Varentsov, Chief Marshal of Artillery and a mentor of 

Penkovsky. Varentsov was not named in the report for 

security reasons.18

A member of the USIB also recalled that “nobody 

wanted to accept it [Penkovsky’s information] because 

it was so contrary to their established views and political 

positions, especially the Air Force. A revision would 

mean a change in their budget.” This is a good example 

of how the power of government budgets can create 

and sustain status quo mind-sets. It also illustrates 

how a budgetary mind-set then worked to downgrade 

intelligence that contradicted and threatened the basis 

for the budget.19

Howard Stoertz, the Board of National Estimates 

officer in charge of estimating the Soviet strategic 

missile program, recalled in a 1989 interview that:

[Though] we had a lot of technical information . . . it was 

incomplete. [It was] in some respects contradictory, and 

it was difficult to interpret. The Penkovsky information 

was the only piece of inside information that I can recall 

about Soviet thinking and planning about intercontinental 

missiles. His information said the Soviet Union did have 

a big program—like our other information indicated—
15

but that it was proceeding much more slowly than we 

had forecast. That was the critical explanation.20

Stoertz said that the CIA had told him that the source 

and his material were authentic. But he had no basis 

for making a judgment. 

If I had a photo taken by a U-2, I knew what it was. There 

was an interpreter who could tell me what was being 

seen. I could never talk to this source [Penkovsky] and 

could never find out anything about who he was. That 

was protecting his life, but to that extent it somewhat 

diminished the utility of it to me. I accepted their word, 

but I was looking for other confirmation.21

This explanation by Stoertz is an excellent illustration of the analytic mind-set that favors intelligence 

collected by technical means versus intelligence 

acquired from human espionage sources. Even if the 

source and sub-source had been revealed to Stoertz and 

other senior analysts, it is doubtful that the espionage 

of Penkovsky would have changed the mind-set that 

produced the June 1961 NIE without confirmation by 

U-2 or other technical collection operations.

All U-2 flights over the USSR had ceased following 

the shoot-down on May 1, 1960, of the U-2 flown by 

Francis Gary Powers. But the CIA Discoverer Satellite 

Reconnaissance Program, also known as Corona, 

had begun in 1958. After a series of failures, it began 

to produce photos of the USSR in August 1960. On 

September 6, 1961, the CIA issued a report which 

stated “we now believe that our present estimate of 

50-100 operational ICBM launchers as of mid-1961 is 

probably too high.” Thus Penkovsky’s intelligence was 

correct but accepted only after confirmation by satellite 

photography. This again illustrates the dilemma of how 
16

properly to assess and evaluate limited, albeit likely 

accurate, intelligence from espionage sources, when 

information from other sources including technical 

collection is not yet available to confirm it.22

But it was also the information supplied by 

Penkovsky that enabled the photographs to be 

evaluated in detail and the precise capability of the 

SS-5 MRBMs and other missiles to be made known to 

the President. Without this information, the President 

would not have known how much time he had to 

negotiate before taking military action to destroy the 

missiles.23

The information that Penkovsky provided on film 

and in written and oral form was consistently highly 

evaluated up to and including the last material received 

from him on August 27, 1962. As of August 1963, the 

Penkovsky operation was described (by the CIA) as 

“the most productive classic clandestine operation 

ever conducted by the CIA or MI-6 against the Soviet 

target.” According to authors Schecter and Deriabin, 

30 years later, that judgment still holds.24

The purpose of espionage is to recruit foreign agents 

who have access to and report highly sensitive and 

protected intelligence, often prior to such information 

being available from other sources. Espionage 

information might be high level such as the missile 

manuals provided by Penkovsky or critical order of 

battle of information such as that provided by our 

espionage agent in Cuba who provided the location of 

an SS-4 missile site, which was then confirmed by U-2 

photography. It is important, therefore, to find ways to 

share with senior analysts additional information about 

espionage sources and sub-sources to strengthen the 

credibility of their intelligence. Such information is now 

being shared extensively with analysts, particularly 
17

within centers such as the National Intelligence 

Council and the National Counterterrorism Center. 

Nevertheless, analysts must still understand that 

information from espionage agents with significant 

access may not be as abundant as intelligence from 

technical sources, but may well be acquired first and 

be just as accurate. The challenge for analysts and 

policymakers is to overcome previous mind-sets. 

They must be prepared to assess accurately and utilize 

espionage intelligence to preempt or mitigate crisis or 

disaster prior to receiving additional information from 

technical sources.25

KHRUSHCHEV PUSHES THE ENVELOPE 

After the failed Vienna Summit with Khrushchev, 

President Kennedy gave a major speech on July 25, 1961, 

in which he outlined a significant increase in American 

nuclear forces, an increase in conventional forces in 

West Germany, and a call-up of military reservists in 

the United States. These steps had been recommended 

by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson at a National 

Security Council (NSC) meeting on June 29, 1961. They 

were also in line with Kennedy’s recognition that he 

had to act to correct Khrushchev’s assessment of him 

at the Vienna Summit. But Kennedy’s hard-line speech 

and actions did not work. The Berlin Wall went up on 

August 13, 1961.26

The construction of the Berlin Wall was an 

intelligence failure. The United States and its allies 

were caught by surprise. Penkovsky told the CIA and 

MI-6 officers during a clandestine meeting in Paris in 

September 1961 that he had learned of plans to erect 

the wall 4 days before it went up; however, he had 

no secure way of communicating this information 

to us in Moscow. If President Kennedy had known 
18

of Khrushchev’s intentions, he could have exposed 

the plan and possibly forced the Soviets to abort the 

mission. At the very least, the West Germans could 

have been alerted. Once the wall went up, the United 

States and its allies accepted it as a fait accompli. This 

lack of action certainly played into Khrushchev’s 

mind-set that Western democracies were “too liberal 

to fight,” as he was to state to Robert Frost over a year 

later.27

Khrushchev unilaterally resumed nuclear testing 

in the atmosphere on September 1, 1961. This violated 

the commitment Khrushchev made to Kennedy at the 

Vienna Summit that he would not be the first to resume 

such nuclear testing. A new NIE issued on September 

21, 1961, based on Penkovsky’s intelligence and 

photographs from the first generation Corona satellite, 

projected that the Soviets had fewer than 35 ICBMs. 

The NIE concluded that there was no missile gap. The 

United States had nuclear superiority over the USSR.28

INTELLIGENCE USED TO WARN KHRUSHCHEV

On October 17, 1961, the 22d Congress of the 

Communist Party of the Soviet Union opened in 

Moscow. On October 21, 1961, while that Congress was 

still in session, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell 

Gilpatric gave a speech to the Business Council at 

White Sulfur Springs, West Virginia. The speech was 

coordinated by McGeorge Bundy, Assistant to the 

President for National Security Affairs, and approved 

by President Kennedy. It called Khrushchev’s bluff 

concerning alleged Soviet nuclear superiority. Gilpatric 

said, “In short, we have a second-strike capability 

which is at least as extensive as what the Soviets can 

deliver by striking first. Therefore, we are confident 
19

that the Soviets will not provoke a major nuclear 

attack.” Khrushchev did back down from his threat 

to Kennedy at the Vienna Summit, to sign “one way 

or another before this year is out,” a separate peace 

treaty with East Germany. He said that the timing of 

an agreement “was no longer important.”29

But at this same 22d Party Congress in October 

1961, Soviet Defense Minister Rodian Malinovsky 

stated that Khrushchev’s 1960 speech to the Supreme 

Soviet was now the basis of Soviet military doctrine. 

Malinovsky made it clear that because nuclear missiles 

were now central to Soviet doctrine, all other services 

had to be shaped to prepare for nuclear war. According 

to Khrushchev’s 1960 speech, the Soviet Union was 

prepared to fight a nuclear war, to survive the inevitable 

heavy casualties, and to win. The West, on the other 

hand, would not survive: for them nuclear war would 

mean the end of capitalism. In Khrushchev’s mind, 

the end of capitalism and the victory of socialism were 

inevitable. 

This 1960 speech was to be the beginning of a new 

era for Soviet policy, which favored nuclear missiles. 

At the same time, Khrushchev announced a plan to 

reduce Soviet troops by 1.2 million men.30

KENNEDY LAUNCHES OPERATION 

MONGOOSE

At the end of November 1961, President Kennedy 

issued a top secret order launching what became known 

as Operation MONGOOSE, “to use our available assets 

. . . to help Cuba overthrow the communist regime.” The 

head of operations for MONGOOSE, General Edward 

Lansdale, reported to a new Special Group 5412 

(augmented), under the direction of Attorney General 
20

Robert Kennedy. President Kennedy constantly pushed 

the CIA to devise new schemes for undermining the 

Castro regime. MONGOOSE also included a series 

of plans to assassinate Castro. It was a governmentwide operation involving almost all executive branch 

agencies. The MONGOOSE operations undertaken by 

the CIA were entrusted to a newly formed “Task Force 

W” in the CIA. Although the CIA officers assumed that 

the President knew of the assassination plans, there is 

no surviving documentary proof of this.31

The Special Group was initially conceived to 

provide authorization for every significant CIA covert 

action operation as specified by National Security 

Directive 5412/2. Under President Kennedy, members 

of the Special Group included the Deputy Secretary 

of Defense; the Under Secretary of State for Political 

Affairs; General Maxwell Taylor, the President’s 

military advisor; National Security Advisor McGeorge 

Bundy; and the DCI. Once this group became the center 

of all policy and operational activity concerning Cuba, 

Robert Kennedy added himself to this list.32

In November 1961, new DCI John McCone 

appointed Richard Helms to be the DCI’s “man for 

Cuba.” Helms, then the acting Deputy Director for 

Plans (DDP), was subsequently fully appointed the 

DDP in February 1962. As DDP, Helms was the head of 

the CIA’s clandestine service. Helms placed all Cuban 

operations in Task Force W under the command of Bill 

Harvey who reported directly to him. In January 1962, 

at a meeting in the attorney general’s office, Robert 

Kennedy informed the senior representatives of the 

various agencies supporting MONGOOSE that Castro’s 

removal from office and a change in government in 

Cuba were then the primary foreign policy objectives of 

the Kennedy administration. Repeated blunt references 

to “eliminating” Castro raised the question of political 
21

assassination in peace time. According to Helms, “None 

of these efforts, which were first considered under the 

Eisenhower administration, offered anything but the 

slightest promise and, predictably, none went more 

than a step beyond the initial proposals.” 

Helms related that under relentless pressure from 

Robert Kennedy, the CIA effort under Operation 

MONGOOSE eventually involved some 600 CIA 

staff employees and between 4,000 and 5,000 contract 

personnel. The CIA activity ranged from establishing a 

refugee interrogation center to a variety of sabotage and 

collection operations. The steady flow of intelligence 

showed that Castro’s military and internal security and 

foreign intelligence services continued to gain strength, 

but did not lessen the determination of the President 

and Robert Kennedy to even the score with Castro 

over the Bay of Pigs. According to Helms, “However 

ambitious, our sabotage efforts never amounted to 

more than pinpricks. The notion than an underground 

resistance might be created on the island remained a 

remote, romantic myth.”

At the annual review of MONGOOSE by Robert 

Kennedy on October 15, 1962, he expressed the 

President’s general dissatisfaction with the operation. 

The results were very discouraging. There had been 

no successful acts of sabotage, and one such effort 

had failed twice. The President had acknowledged 

that there had been “a noticeable improvement . . . in 

the collection of intelligence but that other action had 

failed to influence significantly the course of events in 

Cuba.” According to Helms, the attorney general went 

on to point out that “despite the fact that secretaries 

Rusk and McNamara, DCI McCone, General Maxwell 

Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, and he [Robert Kennedy] 

personally had been charged by President Kennedy 
22

with finding a solution, only small accomplishments 

had been made.” 

The following day, October 16, 1962, the President 

was briefed on the U-2 photography of Sunday, October 

14, which showed that the Soviets were placing MRBMs 

known as SS-4s at three different sites in western Cuba. 

MONGOOSE was temporarily overtaken by the Cuban 

Missile Crisis.33

KHRUSHCHEV DECIDES TO PUT MISSILES IN 

CUBA 

In March 1962, Castro dismantled the Cuban 

Communist Party and was, at his request, given a new 

Soviet ambassador, Ambassador Aleksandr Ivanovich 

Shitov (alias Alekseev), who was the KGB chief, or 

resident, in Havana.34

Shortly thereafter, in the spring of 1962, Khrushchev 

decided to place offensive missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev 

said he made the decision during a vacation trip to 

Bulgaria on May 14-20, 1962. Former Chief of Staff 

of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces General Anatoly 

Gribkov said he received orders in Moscow on May 18, 

1962, to prepare a document proposing the placement 

of MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba. On May 20, 1962, 

Khrushchev returned to Moscow, and on May 24, 1962, 

the Soviet Politburo and the Soviet Defense Council 

met and approved the proposal in principle.35

In May of 1962, two advisors warned Khrushchev 

against putting offensive missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev 

told First Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan 

that he would secretly install missiles in September 

and October, but would not reveal this until after the 

November 1962 U.S. elections. At that time, Soviet 

Ambassador Dobrynin would deliver a letter to 
23

President Kennedy announcing the existence of the 

missiles in Cuba. He expected Kennedy to accept the 

situation, as the Soviets had accepted U.S. missiles in 

Turkey. Mikoyan doubted the operation could be kept 

secret, he doubted that Castro would agree, and he 

doubted that the Americans would accept the missiles. 

Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko told Khrushchev 

that “putting missiles into Cuba would cause a 

political explosion in the United States. I am absolutely 

certain of that, and this should be taken into account.” 

Khrushchev did not heed these warnings.36

Thus Khrushchev decided to place offensive missiles 

in Cuba not only in spite of Kennedy’s actions since the 

June 1961 Vienna summit, but also despite warnings 

from two senior advisors. In retrospect, it is difficult 

to imagine under these circumstances what the United 

States could have done to cause Khrushchev to change 

his mind. His mind-set embraced the supremacy of 

communist ideology, supported by the perceived 

weakness of Kennedy to such an extent that he even 

ignored the blunt advice of both his Foreign Minister 

and his First Deputy Prime Minister.37

On May 29, 1962, a high-level Soviet delegation 

arrived in Cuba posing as agricultural specialists 

to discuss the decision with Castro. The delegation 

included Commander of Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces 

Marshal Sergei S. Biryuzov. The Soviets classified 

strategic missiles as those with a range of over 1,000 

kilometers, or about 600 miles. Mobile tactical missiles 

with nuclear warheads had a range of under 600 miles, 

and were controlled by Marshal Sergei Sergeyevitch 

Varentsov, Chief Marshal of Artillery. According to 

intelligence provided by Penkovsky, these tactical 

nuclear warheads were always kept in special storage 

depots guarded by elite KGB troops and could be 
24

distributed only after a decision by the Military Council 

headed by Khrushchev.38

 At first, Castro refused to say whether he agreed 

with Khrushchev’s offer to place the missiles in Cuba. 

After consulting with his inner circle the next day, 

Castro agreed with the plan as a gesture to improve the 

position of the Socialist Camp in the international arena, 

and not as a desperate ploy to prevent a U.S. attack. 

Castro did not want the Cuban people or the world to 

believe that Cuba could not defend itself. The Soviet 

delegation returned to Moscow. Final Soviet approval 

was given at a meeting of the Soviet Presidium on June 

10, 1962. Troops for the Soviet surface-to-air missiles 

(SAMs) were sent to Cuba first.39

KHRUSHCHEV EXPLAINS HIS DECISION

Khrushchev recounted in his memoirs that 

he decided to place offensive missiles in Cuba 

for three reasons: to protect Cuba from a second 

“counterrevolutionary invasion” by the United States 

(the first was the Bay of Pigs in April 1961); to equalize 

“what the West calls ‘the balance of power’,” and to 

protect “Soviet prestige” in Latin America. Khrushchev 

worried that “if we lose Cuba . . . it would be a terrible 

blow to Marxism-Leninism. It would gravely diminish 

our stature throughout the world, but especially in 

Latin America.”40

One can argue which of these three motives was the 

most important to Khrushchev. The author believes that 

the prospect of closing the missile gap with the United 

States by installing missiles in Cuba only 90 miles 

from it was the overriding strategic consideration for 

Khrushchev. Khrushchev discourses at length about 

the American missiles which “were aimed against us in 

Turkey and Italy, to say nothing of West Germany.”41
25

Yet in a written message to President Kennedy 

during the crisis, Khrushchev insisted that “we had 

installed the missiles with the goal of defending 

Cuba and that we were not pursuing any other aims 

except to deter an invasion of Cuba.” But Khrushchev 

also admits elsewhere, “I’m not saying we had any 

documentary proof that the Americans were preparing 

a second invasion; we didn’t need documentary proof. 

We knew the class affiliation, the class blindness, of 

the United States, and that was enough to make us 

expect the worst.” This is an excellent example of how 

Khrushchev’s own words revealed his ideological 

mind-set, which even dismissed the need for intelligence 

and “documentary proof” about actual U.S. plans and 

intentions.

The only “second invasion,” however, about 

which the author acquired any knowledge during his 

assignment in ONE and his work on the missile crisis, 

was the U.S. plan to bomb and invade Cuba to remove 

the missiles Khrushchev had installed there in the first 

place.42 Some historians have written that “frightened 

by U.S. belligerency,” Castro asked Khrushchev for 

military help, and Khrushchev responded by sending 

a large amount of sophisticated weaponry including 

offensive missiles to Cuba in the summer of 1962. The 

erroneous implication here is that it was Castro who 

was forced by “U.S. belligerency” to seek the missiles, 

and therefore, the United States was responsible for 

the Cuban Missile Crisis.43

But Khrushchev makes it very clear that the decision 

to put the missiles in Cuba was his and his alone. He 

states that during his vacation to Bulgaria that spring, 

he “had the idea of installing missiles with nuclear 

warheads in Cuba. . . . I knew that first we’d have to 

talk to Castro and explain our strategy to him in order 

to get the agreement of the Cuban government.” In 
26

fact, Khrushchev recounts how he had arguments with 

Castro over this plan, but in the end Castro agreed to 

go along with placing missiles in Cuba.44

THE SOVIET PLAN

Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky’s 

presentation to the Presidium on June 10, 1962, made 

it clear that the Soviet military viewed the Cuban 

operation (code named ANADYR) as much an 

opportunity to project Soviet power into the Western 

Hemisphere as a rescue mission for Castro. The 

Presidium voted unanimously to accept the plan as 

put forth by Malinovsky. Under the plan, the Soviets 

would deploy 24 MRBMs and 16 IRBMs and would 

put half that many of each in reserve. The 40 missiles 

would be taken from units in the Ukraine and European 

Russia. Once installed in Cuba, they would double the 

number of Soviet nuclear missiles that could reach the 

U.S. mainland.

The Soviets would also send two cruise missile 

regiments which also carried nuclear warheads. They 

planned to send 80 of these missiles (16 launchers with 

five rockets each) to defend the Cuban shoreline and the 

region neighboring the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo. 

Each of these missiles had a range of about 90 miles 

and a nuclear charge equivalent to between 5.6 and 12 

kilotons of TNT. The Soviets called these cruise missiles 

“frontoviye krilatiye raketi” or FKR.

The Soviets would also send to Cuba four motorized 

regiments, two tank battalions, a MiG-21 fighter 

wing, 42 IL-28 light bombers, 12 SA-2 units (with 

144 launchers), and some antiaircraft gun batteries. 

Each motorized regiment had 2,500 men, and the 

two battalions would be outfitted with the T-55, the 
27

newest Soviet tank. The plan envisaged sending a total 

of 50,874 military personnel to Cuba. This structure 

would be an innovation for the Soviet military, which 

had never before included ballistic missiles in an army 

group.

The Soviet navy would also build a submarine base 

in Cuba, complete with facilities for the new Soviet 

ballistic missile submarine. To defend Cuba’s shores, 

the Soviets would send two cruisers, four destroyers, 

and 12 Komar patrol boats each with two conventional 

R-15 missiles with a range of 10 miles. They would send 

11 submarines, including seven that carried nucleartipped missiles, to patrol the East Coast of the United 

States.45

CRISIS WITHOUT OUR BEST ESPIONAGE 

AGENT

In July 1962, the KGB Second Chief Directorate 

(counterintelligence) broke out recorded conversations 

between Penkovsky and Wynne in a Moscow hotel 

room. (Penkovsky had turned on the radio and 

bathroom taps in an effort to defeat audio surveillance.) 

Wynne had been operating as a cutout and courier 

between Penkovsky and his CIA and MI-6 case officers. 

The hotel room conversation revealed that Penkovsky 

was an espionage agent for the West. The KGB placed 

Penkovsky’s apartment under surveillance.

A camera was secretly placed in an adjacent 

apartment, and a pinhead camera was placed in the 

apartment above his flat. The KGB then placed poison 

on his chair to create a medical reason for sending 

Penkovsky and family away for medical recuperation. 

They searched his apartment and found spy gear; 

however, the KGB did not arrest Penkovsky. They 
28

kept him under surveillance in an effort to identify 

other persons who might be involved. Penkovsky also 

lost his access to senior Soviet military officials such as 

Varentsov just when the United States most needed that 

access and the intelligence it could have produced.46

SOVIET WEAPONS AND DCI WARNINGS 

As it became increasingly clear that Soviet-supplied 

arms were flowing into Cuba, Soviet merchant shipping 

came under close scrutiny. Photographs of ships en 

route to Cuba were taken by a variety of organizations 

from various vantage points: from shore, from other 

ships, and from aircraft flying at low, intermediate, 

and high altitudes. The Soviets attempted to conceal 

and protect these shipments by covering the weapons 

with packing crates or by placing them in shipping 

containers. All of this photography was sent to the 

National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) 

for analysis. The science of measuring, identifying, 

and cataloguing the crates and their contents became 

known as “cratology” and had been firmly established 

as an intelligence technique by the time of the Cuban 

Missile Crisis.47 From July 25-31, 1962, a surge of Soviet 

arms shipments began to arrive in western Cuban 

ports. Then from August 1-5, construction began on 

SA-2 SAM sites in Matanzas, Havana, Mariel, Bahia 

Honda, Santa Lucia, San Julian, and La Coloma.48

Soviet military equipment and personnel were 

being sent to Cuba under an extensive denial and 

deception plan (known as Maskirovka in Russian). 

Soviets traveled to Cuba posing as machine operators, 

irrigation specialists, and agricultural specialists. Radio 

Moscow claimed that the Soviets were only giving Cuba 

“machine tools, wheat, and agricultural machinery,” 

along with “some 7,000 tons of fertilizers.” But because 
29

there was such secrecy surrounding the shipment of 

equipment concealed in crates and the movement at 

night of Soviet personnel and equipment from Cuban 

ports, no one in the ONE ever believed that the buildup was only agricultural. Maskirovka may have been 

effective in fooling persons in the Soviet government, 

including many of those actually involved in the 

shipment of the weapons. But no one whom the author 

knew in ONE ever doubted that a military build-up 

was underway. 

Once we detected the installation of the SA-2 SAM 

sites in early August, the agricultural specialist cover 

of the Soviets streaming into Cuba was irretrievably 

blown. Moreover, the claim that the CIA paid no 

attention to information on the build-up that was 

allowed by the Cuban Government to flood Miami 

exile circles or that was obtained from debriefing Cuban 

refugees was just not true. In fact, some of the best 

human intelligence (HUMINT) reports we received 

were from exile and refugee sources. Two such reports 

are discussed later in this paper. But what we did not 

know from the beginning was just how extensive the 

military build-up would eventually become. The key 

question which ONE debated from the beginning 

was whether the build-up eventually would include 

offensive missiles that would pose a threat to our 

national security.49

On August 1, 1962, President Kennedy announced 

that the United States was willing to agree to a system 

of national control posts, subject to international 

supervision, for monitoring a nuclear test ban, which 

was a significant U.S. concession. Then 4 days later, 

on August 5, 1962, Khrushchev again resumed testing 

nuclear weapons in the atmosphere by detonating a 

40-megaton explosion in the Arctic.50

From August 10-23, 1962, DCI McCone warned 
30

President Kennedy a total of four times that he thought 

the Soviets intended to place offensive missiles in 

Cuba. On August 10, McCone attended a meeting 

with Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense 

McNamara, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Taylor, Special Assistant to the President for National 

Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and others. McCone 

speculated that the influx of military equipment into 

Cuba could be used as support for the MRBMs.51

On that same day, McCone dictated a memo 

to President Kennedy expressing the belief that 

“installations for the launching of offensive missiles 

were being constructed on the island.”52 Then on 

August 17, 1962, McCone attended an NSC meeting 

that President Kennedy also attended. McCone again 

argued that the Soviets must be placing surface-tosurface missiles in Cuba. According to McCone, Rusk 

and McNamara expressed the view that the buildup 

was purely defensive.53

On August 21, 1962, DCI McCone attended another 

meeting with the same group that attended the August 

10 meeting. He reported definite information on the 

installation of SAMs in Cuba. He again speculated 

on the probability of MRBMs being installed in Cuba. 

McCone gave this same information in memo form 

to President Kennedy the following day. On August 

23, 1962, in a meeting with President Kennedy, Rusk, 

McNamara, General Taylor, Bundy, and others, 

McCone again reviewed the situation and questioned 

the need for the extensive SAM installations unless 

they were to “conceal” MRBMs.54

McCone’s argument was based on what he called 

“a judgment factor.” He had no hard intelligence on 

Soviet placement of offensive missiles in Cuba. But 

Penkovsky had told his American and British case 

officers in London in 1961 about Soviet plans to send 
31

SAMs to Cuba and had provided a copy of the detailed 

manual on the capabilities of the SA-2. McCone asked 

himself what the SAMs were protecting because they 

were not protecting airfields, and he deduced that 

there had to be strategic offensive missiles in Cuba. 

The obvious purpose of the SAMs was to blind us so 

we could not see what was going on there. There they 

were with 16,000 men with all their ordnance equipment 

and then came the ships. There was nothing else to ship 

to Cuba but missiles. That was my argument. Other 

reporting was received from clandestine agents and the 

debriefing of refugees.

But as McCone said in a 1988 interview, “We didn’t 

see the offensive missiles. They were on the ships, 

and we had no agents on the ships. We really didn’t 

know what was on the ships, but some things you can 

deduce. That was one of them.”55

McCone departed Washington on August 23, 1962, 

for his wedding in Seattle on August 29. He did not 

return to Washington until after his honeymoon in 

southern France on September 23.56 However, U-2 

photography on the wedding date confirmed extensive 

Soviet military deliveries to Cuba in recent weeks. 

Included were at least eight Komar-class guided 

missile patrol boats. These PT-like boats carry two 

missile launchers each, with the radar-guided missile 

effective against surface targets at ranges of between 

15 and 17 miles. The missile carries a 2,000 pound high 

explosive warhead.57

A more detailed readout of the August 29 

photography revealed the existence of another kind of 

missile site at Banes. It was concluded that the Banes 

site was a facility for launching cruise missiles against 

ship targets at fairly close range.58
32

MORE SOVIET DECEPTION

On September 1, 1962, the USSR announced publicly 

an agreement to supply arms and military technicians 

to Cuba. At a press conference, reporters asked President 

Kennedy for a comment on this announcement. He 

said that the United States would employ “whatever 

means may be necessary” to prevent aggression by 

Cuba against any part of the Western Hemisphere. The 

President added that “the evidence of Cuba’s military 

buildup showed no significant offensive capability.”59

Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin met with 

Attorney General Robert Kennedy on September 4,

1962. Robert Kennedy informed Dobrynin “of President 

Kennedy’s deep concern about what was happening” 

in Cuba. Dobrynin informed the attorney general 

that he should not be concerned. Dobrynin said he 

had been instructed by Khrushchev to assure President Kennedy that there would be no ground-to-ground 

missiles or offensive weapons placed in Cuba. Kennedy 

replied that it “would be of the gravest consequence if 

the Soviet Union placed missiles in Cuba. That would 

never happen, he [Dobrynin] assured me, and left.” 

That same day, the President, after being briefed by 

his brother, issued a public statement that there was 

no evidence of “offensive ground-to-ground missiles” 

or of “other significant offensive capability” in Cuba. 

“Were it to be otherwise,” he warned, “the gravest 

issues would arise.”60

A readout of U-2 photography taken on the next 

day, September 5, revealed for the first time the 

presence of MiG-21 jet aircraft in Cuba. One MiG-21 

was spotted at Santa Clara airfield along with crates 

for an additional 19 MiG-21s. The MiG-21 is a 1,000 
33

mile per hour jet, with an altitude capability of 60,000 

feet, equipped with two air-to-air infrared missiles as 

well as standard rockets and cannons. Cuba already 

had about 60 MiG-15, -17, and -19 jet aircraft.61

FINAL COMMUNICATION WITH PENKOVSKY

On August 27, 1962, Penkovsky exchanged packages 

with a CIA officer during a reception in the Moscow 

apartment of an American agricultural attaché. The 

exchange took place in a bathroom. Penkovsky’s 

letter to the CIA described surveillance of himself 

and of Wynne. He alleged that Wynne had invited 

a Soviet boy and girl to his Moscow hotel room. He 

also complained that Wynne never exchanged British 

pounds for rubles as a normal businessman would 

and said that Wynne actually took rubles from him. 

Penkovsky then asked for a bigger resettlement bonus 

and promised to continue to work for the CIA and MI6. The package he received from the CIA contained a 

false Soviet internal passport with his photo, but in 

the name of Vladimir Grigoryevich Butov. This was 

for Penkovsky’s use should he want to make a run for 

it.62

Penkovsky subsequently appeared at an American 

embassy reception on September 5, 1962. There was 

no opportunity to exchange messages. The next 

day, Penkovsky appeared at the British Science and 

Cultural Attaché offices for a film showing. Penkovsky 

made eye contact with MI-6 Officer Gervase Cowell. 

Cowell’s wife, Pamela, who was to be his new contact, 

was not present. There was no exchange. This was the 

last sighting of Penkovsky prior to his arrest.63
34

ADDITIONAL SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Khrushchev began to secretly add to the nuclear 

build-up in Cuba. The Soviets had planned to put 

only one kind of tactical nuclear missile in Cuba, the 

FKR cruise missile for coastal defense. But as tension 

built, Soviet military leaders gave Khrushchev a list of 

additional battlefield nuclear weapons which could be 

used to counter a U.S. military invasion of Cuba. On 

September 7, 1962, Khrushchev authorized sending six 

atomic bombs for IL-28 bombers and three detachments 

of LUNA tactical missiles. The North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) name for these tactical missiles 

was FROG. This missile was solid-fueled and had a 

range of 20-25 miles. Of the 36 LUNA missiles to be 

sent to Cuba, 24 had conventional warheads. Twokiloton nuclear warheads would be sent for the other 

12 missiles. 

The next day, September 8, 1962, the Ministry 

of Defense drafted an order delegating the Soviet 

commander in Cuba, General Issa Pliyev, the authority 

to use these tactical battlefield nuclear weapons should 

communications with Moscow be cut and a U.S.-led 

invasion be underway. However, Khrushchev had 

already given Pliyev this authority orally during a 

meeting in July. Malinovsky decided not to sign or 

send the instructions to Pliyev in writing. According to 

Gribkov, even this oral authority was later withdrawn 

by Moscow in a cable sent to Pliyev hours before 

Kennedy’s October 22, 1962, crisis speech, which 

ordered Pliyev to use “all the power of the Soviet forces” 

to repel an invasion, except nuclear weapons.64
35

RAPID CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE SITES 

During September the Soviets began construction 

of offensive missile sites. From September 1-5, 1962, 

construction secretly began on SS-5 IRBM sites in 

Guanajay. In the following 5 days, a Soviet armored 

group arrived at Remedios. Then from September 15-

20, construction began at San Cristobal on the SS-4 

MRBM sites. Construction also began at the Remedios 

IRBM site. Another Soviet armored group also arrived 

at Holguin during this same time period.

From September 20-25, 1962, construction began 

on SAM sites at Los Angeles, Chaparra, and Jiguani. 

In the next 5 days, construction began at the Sagua La 

Grande MRBM sites. Construction also began on SAM 

sites at Manati, Senado, and Manzanillo.65

THE DCI HONEYMOON CABLES 

On September 6, 1962, McCone met with McGeorge 

Bundy and Roswell Gilpatric in Paris to warn them 

that he believed the Soviets would place offensive 

missiles in Cuba. In a series of cables between McCone 

in France and acting DCI Lieutenant General Marshall 

S. Carter in Washington (which became known as the 

honeymoon cables), McCone continued to warn about 

the possibility that the Soviets would place offensive 

missiles in Cuba.

In a cable dated September 7, 1962, McCone urged 

“frequent repeat missions of recent reconnaissance 

operations which [Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Roswell] Gilpatric advises informative. Also I support 

use of R-101 if necessary.” McCone also suggested that 

the Board of National Estimates study the motives 

“behind these defensive measures which even seem 
36

to exceed those provided most satellites.” Three days 

later, McCone cabled “difficult for me to rationalize 

extensive costly defenses being established in Cuba. . . . 

appears to me quite possible measures now being taken 

are for purpose of insuring secrecy of some offensive 

capability such as MRBMs to be installed by Soviets 

after present phase completed and country secured 

from overflights.”66

AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND “THE PHOTO 

GAP”

Before leaving for his wedding and honeymoon, 

McCone said that he “left orders to overfly Cuba every 

day and the ship had hardly left the dock when my 

order was canceled by Rusk and McNamara, especially 

Rusk who feared a U.S. plane with a civilian pilot 

would be shot down and create a hell of a mess.”67

But according to Sam Halpern, the DCI did not, in 

fact, have the authority to order U-2 flights. The CIA 

had to get approval of the Committee on Overhead 

Reconnaissance (COMOR) for U-2 overflights. But 

McCone’s continued urging of overhead flights was 

conveyed to senior administration officials by the 

Deputy DCI (DDCI).

Later, in its post crisis review of intelligence, the 

President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 

(PFIAB) noted that in September 1962 inclement 

weather delayed some of the scheduled U-2 missions. 

It also noted that from “September 8 to September 16, 

U-2 missions over Cuba were suspended apparently 

because of the loss of a Chinese Nationalist U-2 over 

the China mainland on September 8.”

The PFIAB report noted that the next successful U-2 

mission was not flown until September 26, 1962. No low 

level flights were flown over Cuba until October 23. 
37

The PFIAB concluded that “although we were unable 

to establish the existence of a policy which prevented 

overflying areas of Cuba where surface-to-air missile 

installations were present, the Central Intelligence 

Agency and others believed that such a restriction did 

in fact prevail.”68

OPPOSITION TO U-2 FLIGHTS

In his book, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the 

Cuban Missile Crisis, Dino Brugioni clearly describes 

the continued opposition of Rusk and Bundy to any 

overflights in the wake of the shoot down of the Chinese 

Nationalist U-2 over China. One can understand how 

the CIA and others thought there was a policy against 

such flights over Cuba when proposals for such 

overflights were continually opposed by these two 

senior-level foreign policy officials. 

In the wake of this shoot down, a Special Group 

meeting was scheduled on September 10 in the Bundy’s 

office to discuss aerial reconnaissance over Cuba. At 

that meeting, both Rusk and Bundy questioned the 

need to overfly Cuba. Rusk was concerned that a U-2 

being shot down over Cuba would generate a crisis 

similar to the Francis Gary Powers shoot down over 

the Soviet Union in May 1960. Rusk, supported by 

Bundy, said that the Kennedy administration faced 

a number of problems concerning the continued use 

of the U-2. The United Nations (UN) had convened in 

September, and congressional elections were coming 

up in November 1962. The downing of a U-2 could 

have dramatic repercussions. Couldn’t intelligence 

objectives be met by peripheral reconnaissance flights 

using oblique photography? The reconnaissance 

experts at this meeting tried to point out to Rusk that 
38

slant photography to avoid SAMs would produce poor 

results.69

It is important to note that Brugioni was one of 

the original 12 who, under the direction of Arthur 

C. Lundahl, organized the NPIC. During the missile 

crisis, Brugioni was the chief of a unit responsible for 

providing all-source collateral information to photo 

interpreters. Every morning, Lundahl would review 

the all-source intelligence before taking it to the USIB 

and the Executive Committee (EXCOM) of the NSC.

Returning from these briefings, Lundahl would inform 

his staff chiefs, who included Brugioni, of the recipients’ 

reactions and their continuing intelligence needs. 

Lundahl was an astute observer, and Brugioni made 

detailed notes of what Lundahl had seen and heard so 

that the NPIC might better respond to the concerns and 

needs of policymakers. The CIA photo-exploitation 

shop was founded in the early 1950s and had invited 

other organizations to join. Two days before President 

Eisenhower left office in January 1961, it was renamed 

the NPIC. This NPIC continued as a joint CIA-military 

organization until the late 1990s.70

Brugioni noted that during the September 10 

meeting, Attorney General Robert Kennedy became 

impatient with Rusk, stating at one point, “Let’s sustain 

the overflights and the hell with the international 

issues.” Robert Kennedy supported a CIA proposal, 

which had McCone’s strong support, to conduct a 

single high level U-2 flight to cover the Banes cruise 

missile area as well as the areas not covered during the 

August 29 and September 5 missions. Rusk was still 

concerned about so much time over Cuban territory. 

He thought the mission would be too exposed. Finally, 

Kennedy looked at Rusk and said, “What’s the matter, 

Dean, you chicken?”71
39

The next day, Rusk, still fearful of a U-2 loss, even 

asked the State Department Legal Officer to investigate 

the possibility of having U-2 flights conducted under 

the auspices of the Organization of American States 

(OAS). He made a similar request to the Department 

of Defense (DoD). Given the need to provide at least 

6 months training to OAS pilots, it was doubtful that 

U-2 overflights would ever be resumed if pilots had 

to be non-Americans. The DoD General Counsel then 

responded to Rusk on September 12 that the transfer 

of U-2 flights would not be legally permissible either 

under the UN or OAS charters.72

A compromise was reached. Four short flights 

would be substituted for one long overflight. It was 

not clear what sort of missions these were to be. On 

September 17, a U-2 peripheral mission was authorized 

by the President. By the time the U-2 reached the 

Cuban coast, the weather forced the abortion of the 

mission. Under the new rules for peripheral flights, 

all reconnaissance aircraft were to fly no closer than 

25 miles from the Cuban shore, the slant range of the 

SA-2 SAMs. Peripheral flights by aircraft other than 

the U-2 produced photography that was not usable. 

The first successful U-2 peripheral flight was flown 

on September 26, 1962. Its targets were areas that had 

been covered before. The second successful peripheral 

U-2 mission was flown on September 29 and covered 

the Isle of Pines and the Bay of Pigs area. A new SA-2 

and a cruise missile site were discovered. Two other 

peripheral U-2 flights were flown on October 5 and 

7, 1962. Their photography revealed more SA-2 SAM 

sites, but no offensive strategic missiles.73
40

THE FAILED ESTIMATE

 On September 13, 1962, President Kennedy 

again issued a public warning to the Soviets against 

placing offensive missiles in Cuba.74 After issuing 

two warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13, 

President Kennedy called for a SNIE. On September 

19, this SNIE was approved by the USIB and sent to the 

President. It concluded the following: 

[T]he USSR could derive considerable military 

advantage from the establishment of Soviet medium 

and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or 

from the establishment of a submarine base there. As 

between the two, the establishment of a submarine base 

would be the more likely. Either development, however, 

would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and 

with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would 

indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of 

risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed 

thus far, and consequently would have important policy 

implications with respect to other areas and other 

problems in East-West relations.75

Just prior to forwarding this estimate to the USIB for 

final approval and dissemination to the President, 

Sherman Kent called a meeting of his entire staff and 

all members of the Board of National Estimates. At this 

meeting, Kent summarized the situation as follows: The 

DCI thinks the Soviets are placing offensive missiles in 

Cuba. He doesn’t have any information we don’t have, 

but he is convinced that the Soviets will or are doing 

so. The estimate at hand says that we think they aren’t 

and that they won’t. (The estimate had already been 

worked over by the rest of the American IC, including 

the U.S. military.) There is no hard evidence that 

they will. Most importantly there was no overhead 

photography proving that they are.
41

Kent asked everyone in the room to express his or 

her opinion on this subject. He went around the room 

calling everyone by name. No one was left out, not 

even the junior Cuban analyst.76 Kent wanted to know 

who supported the DCI’s view, who did not, and why. 

The author supported the view of one of the Board 

Members who thought that the Soviets were certainly 

willing and able to place offensive missiles in Cuba, but 

would take a “salami slice” approach before doing so. 

According to this view, the Soviets would first place a 

submarine base in Cuba. Then, depending on the U.S. 

reaction, they would move to place offensive missiles 

in Cuba. The author recalls that no one at the meeting 

took or supported the DCI’s position. The consensus 

was that there was not enough convincing information 

or evidence to support the DCI’s view. As Sherman 

Kent put it with characteristic exasperation and flair, 

“We can’t just tell the President that we think the 

Soviets will put missiles in Cuba because Khrushchev 

is a son-of-a-bitch. The President knows he’s a son of a 

bitch.” He added that as an intelligence organization, 

we are supposed to have the necessary evidence. And 

we didn’t.77

With the stakes so high, great emphasis was placed 

on aerial reconnaissance. A few recent reports from 

human sources had indicated that offensive missiles 

were being placed in Cuba, but the reports were not 

enough in quantity or detail to overcome doubts 

which arose in the absence of photographic proof. In 

retrospect, the author wonders how many staff and 

Board Members were unaware, as was he, that there had 

been no successful U-2 flights over or even around the 

periphery of Cuba from September 5 until September 

26. The author does not recall this fact being mentioned 

at all during that critical all-hands meeting of the staff 

and Board Members just prior to the release of the 
42

estimate on September 19. Brugioni had personally 

informed Kent that there had been no U-2 coverage 

of Cuba’s interior since the September 5 mission. But 

Kent immediately interrupted and said “that’s another 

ball game that we are not to get involved in.” He was 

probably thinking about Rusk and Bundy’s continuing 

opposition to overhead coverage of the interior.78

SHERMAN KENT REFLECTS

In an essay entitled “A Crucial Estimate Relived” 

written in 1964 and declassified and published in 

1994 by the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Kent 

recounts the lack of human source reporting that had 

been received by the time the SNIE was published 

on September 19, 1961. This is true. Several excellent 

reports were acquired during the first week of 

September, but not received by clandestine means or 

acquired by debriefings until after September 19. Kent 

also pointed out that “nor did the aerial photography 

of September dissipate the uncertainty. Not only 

did it fail to spot the ominous indicators of missile 

emplacement, but over and over again it made fools of 

ground observers by proving their reports inaccurate 

or wrong.”79

But there were no U-2 flights over western and 

central Cuba from September 5 until early October. 

There were no flights of any kind, even peripheral, 

from September 5 until September 26. There was, 

therefore, no way aerial photography could have 

played a role in proving or disproving human source 

reporting during that critical time prior the SNIE being 

disseminated on September 19. It would appear that 

notwithstanding Brugioni’s briefing, Kent simply did 

not know the full extent of the lack of reconnaissance 
43

flights. The author recalls that among the ONE staff, 

there was the assumption, even mind-set, that the lack 

of reconnaissance intelligence meant that the U-2 had 

flown but not found any missile sites. But the lesson is 

that a lack of intelligence is not intelligence. It is just 

that—a lack of information.80

Kent had reviewed the five reports which in 

hindsight indicated that the Soviets might be placing 

offensive missiles in Cuba. Sidney Graybeal, the CIA 

offensive missile expert, reviewed these same reports 

and concluded that there were errors in them. Graybeal 

affirmed that all of the reported information and sites 

had been checked against aerial photography. Kent 

was satisfied and reviewed the estimate for a final time. 

But there simply was no aerial photography against 

which these reports could be checked. There were no 

flights over the interior of Cuba from September 5 until 

October 14—a total of 39 days.

The peripheral flight scheduled for September 17 

was cancelled due to bad weather. The peripheral flights 

that were made on September 26 and 29 and October 

5 and 7 revealed more SAM sites but no offensive 

missiles. There were, therefore, no flights of any kind, 

peripheral or over the interior, from September 5 until 

September 26—7 days after the estimate was released. 

It would appear that Graybeal, like Kent, may not 

have fully understood this absence of reconnaissance 

photography.81

In addition to an understandable overemphasis 

on technical collection, there was also an overreliance 

on the credibility and effectiveness of U.S. policy in 

convincing Khrushchev not to place offensive missiles 

in Cuba. Those of us in ONE knew how determined 

the President and his administration were to prevent 

the Soviets from placing offensive missiles in Cuba. 
44

We got a feel for the heat of that policy determination 

from senior CIA officials who dealt with the White 

House and from the strength of the President’s public 

warnings. Underlying our deliberations, therefore, was 

our own mind-set that surely Khrushchev must have 

understood the strength of the President’s policy resolve 

the way we did. He did not. There were miscalculations 

on both sides. By September 19, however,it is doubtful 

that Khrushchev could have convinced the Presidium 

that it was necessary to reverse the gears of Operation 

ANADYR based solely on President Kennedy’s public 

warnings.82

According to John T. Hughes, Special Assistant 

to DIA Director Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll 

during the missile crisis, strategic warning is the most 

important element of effective intelligence. But perhaps 

the greatest barrier to developing strategic warning 

for policymakers is “the tendency of the human mind 

to assume that the status quo will continue.” Hughes 

said that several crises and conflicts after World War 

II, including the Cuban Missile Crisis, confirm that 

“nations do not credit their potential opponents with 

the will to take unexpected acts. We did not believe the 

Soviets would do so in 1962.”83

MCCONE FORCES APPROVAL OF 

OVERFLIGHTS 

When McCone returned to Washington from his 

honeymoon in late September, he asked for a map 

showing the actual U-2 coverage of Cuba since the 

September 5 mission. That map showed that outside 

of coastal areas, very little information about Cuba’s 

interior had been obtained. According to Lundahl who 

was present at that meeting, “McCone nearly came out 

of his chair when he saw the map.” McCone then called 
45

for a special meeting of the Special Group for October 

3, at which he took Secretaries Rusk and McNamara 

to task. He was very concerned with statements being 

made by spokesmen from the Departments of State and 

Defense to the effect that there were no offensive missiles 

in Cuba. McCone pointed out that there had been no 

aerial reconnaissance over central or western Cuba for 

over a month, and that all flights since September 5 

had been of limited penetration or peripheral. McCone 

said that as the President’s leader of the American IC, 

he could make no definitive statement that there were 

no offensive missiles in Cuba. He then said he would 

so inform the President.84

Rusk still objected to the overflights because 

a U-2 shot down over Cuba would be difficult 

for the administration to explain. Bundy also still 

insisted that the United States should try to achieve 

its reconnaissance objectives by flying peripheral 

missions. McCone then provided information clearly 

showing that peripheral missions could not confirm 

or deny the presence of offensive missiles. McCone 

said he would seek permission for a number of short 

flights over Cuba to cover the entire island based on 

targets with intelligence priorities. These plans would 

be presented to the Special Group on October 9.85

At this meeting, the COMOR Committee agreed 

to conduct U-2 overflights from south to north. The 

highest priority was the western portion of the island, 

especially over the trapezoidal area reported in secret 

writing by an espionage agent as being located near 

San Cristobal in Pinar Del Rio Province. This area 

was heavily guarded by Soviets where “very secret 

and important work is in progress, believed to be 

concerned with missiles.” That same day the Special 

Group approved the COMOR recommendation 
46

for four U-2 south-to-north overflights that would 

cover most of Cuba. The group also recommended 

transferring reconnaissance responsibilities for Cuba to 

the Strategic Air Command (SAC). The SA-2 sites were 

by then mostly operational, and further overflights 

had to be considered dangerous. McCone agreed. The 

President approved the four overflights, and the stage 

was finally set for the fateful October 14 U-2 mission 

#3101. This was the flight over western Cuba that first 

discovered Soviet SS-4 MRBMs being installed.86

The insistence of the DCI on overflights as opposed 

to continued peripheral flights was a critical factor 

in obtaining the President’s approval for the October 

14 flight. McCone was correct in his assessment that 

the SA-2 sites had been established “to blind our 

reconnaissance eye.” But ironically the SA-2 had 

been effective in a way that possibly even McCone 

had not anticipated. Their discovery combined with 

the fear caused by the shoot-down of the Chinese 

Nationalist U-2, led Rusk and Bundy to undertake 

self-induced blindness by opposing flights over the 

interior. It was blindness achieved without firing a 

shot. McCone deserves the major credit for pushing 

the administration out of what was a politically “safe” 

mind-set of peripheral flights and into overdue U-2 

coverage of the interior of Cuba. (The lesson here is 

that potential risks and dangers to national security 

often require dangerous and high-risk intelligence 

collection operations. A policy mind-set that avoids 

such intelligence collection when the stakes are as high 

as they were in Cuba can produce even greater threats 

to our national security.)87
47

THE DECEPTION CONTINUES

On October 6, 1962, Bolshakov told Robert Kennedy 

that he had met with Khrushchev and Mikoyan during 

a vacation on the Black Sea in mid-September 1962, and 

that Khrushchev told Bolshakov to assure President 

Kennedy that “no missile capable of reaching the 

United States will be placed in Cuba.” Mikoyan added 

that only SAMs were being installed in Cuba.

The following day, American journalist Charles 

Bartlett invited Bolshakov to lunch to ask for his 

message in writing on behalf of President Kennedy. 

This message was repeated and passed to Kennedy 

again. Theodore Sorensen later recalled that “President 

Kennedy had come to rely on the Bolshakov channel for 

direct private information from Khrushchev, and he felt 

personally deceived. He was personally deceived.”88

INTELLIGENCE NOT DISSEMINATED

On October 11, 1962, McCone showed President 

Kennedy photographs of crates loaded on the deck 

of a ship which arrived in Havana in early October. 

These crates were presumably carrying IL-28 Soviet 

medium range bombers. President Kennedy requested 

that such information be withheld until after the U.S. 

elections. McCone replied that this was not possible. 

This information had been disseminated to the IC and 

several military commands. President Kennedy then 

asked that the report state the probability that the 

crates contained the bombers because no bomber had 

yet been seen. McCone agreed. 

The President then asked that all future information 

be suppressed to which McCone replied that this would 

be dangerous. It was agreed that such information 
48

would be disseminated to members of the USIB with 

instructions that only those responsible for giving the 

President advice be given the information. A minimum 

number of experts within the CIA would also be 

informed.89

In its post-crisis report, the PFIAB stated that the DCI 

instructed the CIA analysts in May 1962 to check any 

report with NPIC that was susceptible to photographic 

verification. Although the purpose of this instruction 

was to establish by all available means the authenticity 

of refugee and agent reports, it was interpreted by 

the CIA analysts as a restriction against publishing 

anything, including espionage and refugee debriefing 

information, that could not be verified by the NPIC 

from aerial reconnaissance. Although this analytical 

mind-set was formed by an incorrect interpretation 

of the DCI’s instructions, it did result in delaying the 

dissemination of human source information pending 

the receipt of U-2 photography.

The President also contributed to the delay in 

disseminating intelligence concerning possible Soviet 

missiles by instituting the tightest possible control of 

all information concerning offensive weapons in Cuba. 

He wanted such information collected, analyzed, and 

reported to officials with a real need to know. The USIB 

interpreted this Presidential instruction as an injunction 

against printing any information on offensive weapons 

in Cuba in any intelligence publication.90

MISSILES DISCOVERED

On Sunday, October 14, 1962, a U-2 took the first 

photos of a SS-4 MRBM site at San Cristobal, Cuba. 

The U-2 photos, plus copies of the top secret Soviet 

manuals for the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles clandestinely 
49

photographed by Penkovsky during 1961 in Moscow, 

would enable the Guided Missile and Astronautics 

Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) and the Joint Atomic 

Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) to determine 

the stage of construction of each missile site on a daily 

basis. The IC could tell Kennedy when each site would 

become operational.91

The author remembers receiving and disseminating 

within ONE, three very specific reports that have since 

been declassified and which led to the fateful U-2 flight 

on October 14. One was a report from an espionage 

agent in Cuba who reported a conversation with the 

personal pilot of Fidel Castro. The pilot confided on 

September 9, 1962, that “we have 40-mile range guided 

missiles, both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air, 

and we have a radar system which covers, sector by 

sector, all of the Cuban air space and (beyond) as far 

as Florida. There are also many mobile ramps for 

intermediate range rockets. They don’t know what is 

awaiting them.” But this report was not disseminated 

to the IC until September 20, the day after the Special 

National Intelligence Estimate was disseminated. This 

delay was most likely due to the time required for the 

agent to securely transmit the information to the CIA 

case officers.92

The author recalls quickly passing this report to the 

ONE staff and board. The source was directly quoting 

Castro’s pilot, who would have been in a position to 

have acquired the information from traveling with 

and being in the presence of Castro, and overhearing 

privileged conversations. It was this access to Castro, 

and the source’s directly quoting the pilot, that gave 

this intelligence report particular significance. This 

report was enough to convince the author that the 

Soviets were placing offensive missiles in Cuba.
50

 Another report contained information from a 

refugee debriefing. The refugee saw 20 trucks with long 

trailers driven by Soviets during the night of September 

12, 1962, in the Mariano district of Havana. The refugee 

described a long object under wood and canvas 

extending beyond the end of the trailers. The source 

described the fins of the object and even drew a picture 

of the missile silhouette and tail fin silhouette. Then 

using photographs, he identified the object as a Soviet 

SS-4 SHYSTER MRBM missile. But this report was not 

disseminated until September 27, eight days after the 

SNIE was disseminated. The author distinctly recalls 

that this report was highly convincing, particularly 

since the refugee drew an accurate picture of the 

SS-4 missile, including its tail fin! He then identified 

the missile from photographs. This was an excellent 

detailed debriefing that contained information which 

appeared to be accurate.93

Another important agent report was distributed 

on September 18, 1962, the day before the SNIE was 

disseminated. It reported that as of September 7, there 

was a large restricted military zone in Pinar del Rio 

Province. The report provided the coordinates of the 

four cities that bounded this restricted area. These cities 

were San Cristobal, San Diego de los Banos, Consolacion 

del Norte, and Las Pozas. The report also described 

strict security to prevent access to the finca (farm) of a 

Dr. Corina, where “very secret and important work is 

in progress, believed to be concerned with missiles.”

The coordinates were also given for the location of 

this finca. A refugee also separately reported seeing a 

convoy of Soviet flat-bed trailers carrying large tubes 

extending over the end of the trailers, heading toward 

Pinar del Rio province on September 17. This report 

was distributed on October 1.94
51

The above agent report, which contained the 

coordinates in Pinar del Rio Province, was never 

adequately credited for helping find the missiles. On 

September 15, the agent conveyed the information 

in secret writing in a letter mailed from Cuba via 

international mail to an accommodation address in 

a foreign city. It was the trapezoid formed by these 

four cities that became the photographic target of the 

U-2 flight on October 14 that first photographed the 

Soviet SS-4 missiles. Prior to that date, the area of Cuba 

described by the agent had not been photographed by 

a U-2 flight since August 29. As previously mentioned, 

operational control of the U-2 flights over Cuba was 

officially transferred from the CIA to the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff/SAC on October 12, 1962. On October 13, 

the CIA U-2 detachment at Edwards Air Force Base 

was transferred to McCoy Air Force Base in Orlando, 

Florida, which would become the U-2 operating 

base.95

 Former DCI Richard Helms, in his memoir, A Look 

Over My Shoulder,” stated that it was the agent report 

concerning the large restricted zone in Pinar del Rio 

province that convinced the White House to request 

a U-2 flight over the San Cristobal area. It was 4 days 

before the weather cooperated, but just before midnight 

on October 13, a U-2 piloted by U.S. Air Force Major 

Richard S. Heyser took off from Edwards Air Force 

base in California and headed for San Cristobal, Cuba. 

This flight first photographed the construction of 

MRBM sites near San Cristobal. Major Heyser landed 

at McCoy Air Base in Orlando, Florida. He described 

it as a “milk run,” but it might also be counted as one 

of the most significant reconnaissance missions in 

history.96
52

The film of this mission (an entire roll was 5,000 feet 

long) was then rushed to waiting aircraft for transfer 

to the Naval Photographic Intelligence Center in 

Suitland, Maryland. The photo-analysts identified an 

SS-4 MRBM launching site, and two SS-5 intermediate 

range missile sites under construction. The latter 

weapons had a range of over 2,000 miles and could 

reach many major U.S. cities, much of eastern Canada 

and northern South America. After the crisis, Ray Cline 

asked both Robert Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy if 

they would assess “how much that single evaluated 

piece of photographic evidence [the San Cristobal SS-4 

sites] was worth. . . . [T]hey each said it fully justified 

all that the CIA had cost the country in all its preceding 

years.”97

Much has been written about the above Cuban 

agent report. One author, Max Holland, refers to the 

report as coming from “a Cuban observer agent, the 

lowest rank in the intelligence pecking order, who had 

been recruited under MONGOOSE.” But in the world 

of espionage, the value of an agent’s information is 

determined by his or her access to priority intelligence 

and the agent’s history of reporting reliability, not 

necessarily the agent’s rank in a government hierarchy. 

If the priority collection requirement is order of battle 

information, as it was in Cuba during the Soviet military 

build-up, then a reliable observer on the ground who 

has visual access to important military activity can 

be just as important as overhead photography or a 

senior espionage agent inside the Cuban or Soviet 

Government. This “observer agent” was actually 

even more important than our Soviet espionage agent 

Penkovsky, who by then had come under suspicion by 

the Soviets and had lost his access.98

The above human source reports, two from espionage agents and one from a refugee, were not received 
53

in time to have any effect on the SNIE of September 19. 

But after that date, intelligence analysts and especially 

the ONE should have considered what to do with 

this new information which seemed to contradict the 

finding of the SNIE. In retrospect, it would seem that 

perhaps ONE should have issued a brief statement 

summarizing this new information and the reliability 

of the three sources, thus alerting the White House and 

the IC to the possibility that the estimate was wrong. 

We did not issue such a statement.

If anything, the tendency in ONE generally was 

to react to new human source intelligence by simply 

waiting and assuming that U-2 aerial reconnaissance 

would follow-up and prove or disprove it. But 

unknown to the author, and presumably other ONE 

and the CIA analysts, domestic political concerns 

of the administration would prevent meaningful 

overflight coverage of Cuba until the DCI returned 

from his honeymoon and insisted that such coverage 

be reinstated. This would, therefore, turn out to be 

an example of a political mind-set which prevented 

overhead U-2 reconnaissance, while a separate mindset simultaneously required such technical intelligence 

before believing and disseminating important human 

source intelligence. The perennial challenge for 

intelligence analysts and policymakers will remain 

how to analyze and evaluate correctly espionage and 

other human source intelligence in the absence of 

technical confirmation. (In an era characterized by the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [WMD], 

particularly nuclear weapons, our national security, 

and indeed our very survival, may well depend on 

whether we learn how better to handle this challenge 

in the future.)99
54

Crisis Management.

On the evening of Monday, October 15, 1962, Bundy 

was briefed on the discovery of the missiles by Ray 

Cline, the CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence. Bundy 

decided not to brief the President until the following 

morning. He thought that a hastily-called meeting that 

same evening could give away the secret of the missile 

discovery. In any event, nothing could be done until 

the following morning. He thought that the best course 

for the President was for him to get a good night’s sleep 

after a strenuous campaign weekend.100

On Tuesday morning, October 16, 1962, President 

Kennedy was briefed on the discovery. The 

President established an EXCOM of the NSC, by 

NSC Memorandum 195 (which he actually signed on 

October 22, 1962). The EXCOM met secretly beginning 

on October 16 to advise him on how to respond to the 

crisis.101

The following were members of the EXCOM: 

Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Secretary of State 

Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, 

Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, National 

Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor, President’s Special 

Counsel Theodore Sorensen, Under Secretary of State 

George Ball, DCI John McCone, and Soviet specialist 

from the State Department Llewellyn Thompson. In 

addition, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, John 

McCloy, Robert Lovett, and others were consulted. 

The President tape recorded the meetings without 

the participants’ knowledge, and transcripts are now 

available.102

Others who participated in the EXCOM either 

as experts or in place of their superiors were Latin 
55

America Assistant Secretary of State Edwin M. Martin, 

Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs 

U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Roswell Gilpatric, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

International Security Affairs Paul H. Nitze, Deputy 

Director of the CIA General Marshall Carter, Kenneth 

O’Donnell, Adlai Stevenson, and U.S. Information 

Agency Deputy Director Donald Wilson. Dean Rusk 

recommended that Dean Acheson become a member 

of the EXCOM because of his quick grasp of complex 

issues. The President approved.103

Although a member of the EXCOM, Vice President 

Johnson was not present for EXCOM meetings during 

the first week of the crisis. He returned to Washington 

from a campaign trip to Hawaii on October 21 and 

was briefed that day by McCone and Lundahl on the 

discovery of the missiles.104

According to General Taylor, after being briefed at 

the October 16 White House meeting on the discovery 

of the missiles in Cuba, President Kennedy “gave no 

evidence of shock or trepidation resulting from the 

threat to the nation implicit in the discovery of the 

missile sites but rather a deep but controlled anger at 

the duplicity of the Soviet officials who had tried to 

deceive him.” According to Lundahl, the President 

said he wanted the whole island covered, he didn’t care 

how many missions it took. “I want the photography 

interpreted and the findings from the readouts as soon 

as possible.”105

At a follow-up meeting in Secretary McNamara’s 

office, McNamara was told that the maximum number 

of U-2 missions that could be flown daily with existing 

assets would be six, flying from early morning to late 

in the evening. It was decided that both SAC and 

the CIA U-2 pilots would cover all of Cuba. The CIA 

pilots would be used only in “extreme circumstances,” 
56

and they would be recommissioned into the Air Force 

and given Air Force credentials. The U.S. Navy’s Light 

Photographic Squadron No. 62 was selected to conduct 

low-altitude reconnaissance over Cuba. Hurricane Ella 

delayed additional flights over Cuba until October 17 

when a total of six U-2 missions were flown, along with 

a massive electronic intelligence (ELINT) collection 

effort on the part of the military services and the 

National Security Agency (NSA).106

On the morning of Wednesday, October 17, the 

staff of ONE was informed about the missile discovery. 

The impact was one of shock and anger. We had all 

been worried and concerned about this possibility 

given the espionage and refugee source reporting that 

had been received. The lid was clamped down tight 

on any further dissemination of this knowledge to 

anyone outside of ONE. The EXCOM met three times 

during the day to discuss what action the United States 

should take. Different views and alternatives were 

discussed but in the end, there was a firm agreement 

that the missiles had to be removed from Cuba. The 

author recalls no retreat from that unshakable policy 

commitment throughout the crisis.107

Also on October 17, DCI McCone went to 

Gettysburg to brief former President Eisenhower and 

to get his views on what to do. Eisenhower leaned 

toward military action which would cut off Havana 

and therefore take over the heart of the government. 

He thought this might be done by airborne divisions, 

but was not familiar with the size of the Cuban forces 

in the immediate area or their equipment.108
57

SOVIET DECEPTION AND PRESIDENTIAL 

WARNING

 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko made a previously planned visit to the White House on Thursday, 

October 18, accompanied by Soviet Ambassador 

Dobrynin. Gromyko assured President Kennedy 

that offensive missiles would not be placed in Cuba. 

President Kennedy repeated his public warning and 

again pointed out the serious consequences that would 

arise if the Soviet Union placed missiles or offensive 

weapons in Cuba. Gromyko assured him this would 

never be done, and that the United States should not 

be concerned. Kennedy displayed a remarkable calm 

during the TV and photo coverage of that White House 

visit, as he listened to the Soviets lie to him 2 days after 

he received the U-2 photos of the MRBM site in western 

Cuba.109

ESTIMATES LEAD TO POLICY DECISIONS 

The President departed Washington on Friday, 

October 19, for campaign appearances in Chicago. 

That same day, a SNIE was written to evaluate the 

probable Soviet reactions to certain U.S. courses of 

action in Cuba. The SNIE concluded that “a major 

Soviet objective of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba 

was to demonstrate that the world balance of forces 

has shifted so far in their favor that the U.S. can no 

longer prevent the advance of Soviet offensive power 

even into its own hemisphere.” It also concluded that, 

if the U.S. takes direct military action against Cuba, 

the Soviet Union would not attack the U.S., either from 

Soviet bases or with its missiles in Cuba, even if the 

latter were operational and not put out of action before 
58

they could be readied for firing. Since the USSR would 

not dare to resort to general war and could not hope 

to prevail locally, the Soviets would almost certainly 

consider retaliatory actions outside Cuba. . . . We believe 

that whatever course of retaliation the USSR elected, the 

Soviet leaders would not deliberately initiate general 

war or take military measures, which in their calculation, 

would run the gravest risk of general war.110

Also on October 19, a joint evaluation of the Soviet 

missile threat was prepared by GMAIC, JAEIC, and the 

NPIC. This evaluation of the MRBM (NATO designation 

SS-4) and the IRBM (NATO designation SS-5) missile 

sites drew heavily on Penkovsky’s information. Based 

on U-2 photography and this documentary information 

from Penkovsky, one of the SS-4 regiments which has a 

total of eight launchers and 16 missiles was considered 

operational. Two SS-5 sites with a total of eight 

launchers were under construction near Havana. One 

site would be operational in six weeks, and the other 

could be operational between December 15-30, 1962. 

Although the evaluation stated that one nuclear 

warhead storage facility was under construction near 

the SS-5 sites, it also stated “there is no evidence of 

currently operational nuclear storage facilities in Cuba. 

Nevertheless, one must assume that nuclear weapons 

could now be in Cuba to support the operational missile 

capability as it becomes available.” The evaluation also 

said that “There are several refugee reports indicating 

the presence of tactical [FROG] missiles in Cuba, 

although there is no photographic confirmation thus 

far.” As noted earlier, FROG is the NATO designation 

for the Soviet LUNA Tactical Missile. It is interesting 

to note that only after U-2 photography confirmed the 

presence of offensive missiles in Cuba, was reporting 

on the Soviet military build-up from human sources 
59

such as espionage agents and refugees given serious 

credibility.111

Another SNIE was written on Saturday, October 20, 

to assess the major consequences of certain U.S. courses 

of action with respect to Cuba. The estimate stated 

that any naval blockade of Cuba would not place the 

Soviets under immediate pressure to choose a military 

response. Should the United States use force against 

Cuba, the likelihood of a Soviet response by force, 

either locally or elsewhere, would be greater than in the 

case of blockade. This estimate repeated the conclusion 

that the Soviets would not attack the United States in 

response to military action against Cuba, even if the 

Soviet missiles in Cuba were operational and not put 

out of action. While acknowledging the possibility that 

the Soviets might miscalculate, the estimate repeated 

that the USSR would almost certainly not resort to 

general war, but would consider retaliation outside of 

Cuba. The estimate added that “a rapid occupation of 

Cuba would be more likely to make the Soviets pause 

in opening new theaters of conflict than limited action 

or action which drags out.” 

The estimate concluded that there were four 

MRBM and two IRBM sites under various stages of 

construction. The MRBM had a range of about 1,100 

nm and the IRBM a range of about 2,200 nm. Sixteen 

launchers for MRBMs must be considered operational 

now. In addition, the inventory of other weapons then 

included 22 IL-28 jet light bombers, one of which was 

assembled and three others which were uncrated. 

 According to this estimate, the inventory also 

included 39 MiG-21 jet fighters, of which 35 were 

assembled and four still in crates; and 62 other jet 

fighters of less advanced types. There were 24 SA-2 

sites, of which 16 were believed to be individually 

operational with some missiles on launchers. There 
60

were three cruise missile sites for coastal defense, of 

which two were operational. The estimate also reported 

12 Komar cruise missile patrol boats; all were probably 

operational or nearly so.112

The IL-28 had a combat radius of about 750 miles. 

There was considerable discussion within the staff and 

the Board of National Estimates as to whether the IL28 should be considered an offensive weapon. These 

bombers could strike parts of the southeastern United 

States and were eventually included with the missiles 

as offensive weapons which were removed from Cuba. 

It is interesting that Secretary McNamara expressed 

his opinion at an EXCOM meeting on October 17 that 

if nuclear warheads were supplied to the MRBMs, 

then the Soviets would also supply nuclear bombs for 

bombers with offensive capability.113

THE PRESIDENT DECIDES TO BLOCKADE

After a telephone call from Robert Kennedy, the 

President returned to Washington that Saturday from 

a campaign trip to the mid-west feigning a cold. The 

afternoon meeting began with an intelligence briefing 

by McCone and Ray Cline, the Deputy Director of 

Intelligence. Cline covered the points made in the 

October 20 SNIE discussed previously. Secretary 

McNamara specifically referred to this estimate and 

its conclusion that the Soviets would not use force to 

push their ships through a blockade. After additional 

discussion, the President decided to implement a 

naval blockade or quarantine as a first step. Air strikes 

and invasion could follow if the quarantine was not 

successful in forcing the Soviets to remove the missiles. 

The President decided to delay the quarantine to permit 

consultation with our allies.114
61

During this critical meeting, General Taylor and 

National Security Advisor Bundy wanted to start with 

an air strike while everyone else wanted to start with a 

blockade. Robert Kennedy argued that a surprise attack 

could not be undertaken if the Unites States were to 

maintain its moral position at home and around the 

globe. 

During the meeting, lines were clearly drawn 

between the groups that would later be labeled 

“doves” and “hawks.” Doves included McNamara, 

Stevenson, Rusk, and apparently Sorensen, who were 

against following up the blockade with an air strike. 

They preferred negotiations with the Soviets over 

U.S. missiles in Turkey, Italy, and the U.S. base in 

Guantanamo, Cuba. The President sharply rejected the 

thought of surrendering Guantanamo in the present 

situation. Rusk wanted to delay a decision on the next 

step until after a blockade, which he preferred to call a 

“quarantine.” Joining Taylor and Bundy as hawks were 

Robert Kennedy, Dillon, and McCone who wanted the 

blockade to serve as an ultimatum to be followed by an 

air strike. 

This meeting was not tape recorded because it 

was held in the Oval Room on the second floor of 

the Executive Mansion and not in the West Wing of 

the White House. Based on the notes of participants, 

however, President Kennedy approved the blockade 

as well as actions necessary to put the United States in 

a position to undertake an air strike on the missiles and 

missile sites by Monday or Tuesday. He also said that 

he was prepared to authorize the military to take those 

preparatory actions which they would have to take 

in anticipation of the military invasion of Cuba. The 

President stated flatly that the Soviet bombers in Cuba 

did not concern him particularly. He said we must be 
62

prepared to live with the Soviet threat as represented 

by these bombers. They did not affect the balance 

of power, but the missiles already in Cuba were an 

entirely different matter. 

When General Taylor returned to the Pentagon 

after the meeting, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “This 

was not one of our better days.” He added that the 

President had said, “I know you and your colleagues 

are unhappy with the decision, but I trust that you 

will support me in this decision.” Taylor said he had 

assured the President they would. General Earle G. 

Wheeler, Chief of Staff of the Army, remarked: “I never 

thought I’d live to see the day when I would want to go 

to war.”115

MILITARY STRIKE REVIEWED

At a meeting on Sunday, October 21, with President 

Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Secretary 

McNamara, General Taylor, and DCI McCone, the 

plans were reviewed in considerable detail for an air 

strike against the missile bases, the air fields, and a few 

SAM sites in critical locations, as well as for an invasion. 

General Taylor was instructed to plan for the necessary 

air strike. There was complete agreement that military 

action must include an invasion and occupation of 

Cuba. 

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor told the 

President that an air strike could not provide absolute 

assurance that all missiles would be destroyed. They 

indicated a 90 percent probability. They also stated 

that any warning would probably cause missiles 

to be moved to unknown locations. General Taylor 

therefore recommended that the air strike be conducted 

immediately, suggesting the next morning, and without 
63

warning. Secretary McNamara confirmed the above 

military appraisal but made no recommendation as to 

policy.

In response to direct questioning from the President, 

the attorney general and DCI McCone advised against 

a surprise attack “for the reasons discussed at previous 

meetings.” The attorney general did not make an 

absolute recommendation about future military action, 

indicating action could be decided as the situation 

developed. Only preparatory steps should be taken 

now. McCone urged the President to indicate publicly 

the intention to remove the missiles and other weapons 

by “means and at a time of his own choosing,” if 

surveillance proved that the Soviets and Cubans were 

not removing them.116

BRIEFING IKE, LBJ, AND ALLIES

On Sunday, October 21, 1962, the DCI briefed 

Eisenhower a second time, at McCone’s residence. 

Lundahl accompanied the DCI to explain the 

photography. Eisenhower went along with the 

“suggested plan of initiating a blockade, conducting 

intense surveillance, and announcing the intention of 

taking military action if the Soviets and the Cubans 

either maintained the status quo of their missile 

installations or continued the construction of their 

missile bases. The military actions he [Eisenhower] 

envisaged would be air strikes and invasion.”117

Also on that Sunday, at the request of the President, 

McGeorge Bundy, the DCI, and Lundahl briefed Vice 

President Johnson. Johnson “favored an unannounced 

strike rather than the agreed plan which involved 

blockade and strike and invasion later if conditions 

warranted.” However, the Vice President agreed 
64

reluctantly to a blockade after learning of Eisenhower’s 

support.118

Also on Sunday, teams traveled abroad to brief our 

allies: Prime Minister John Diefenbaker in Canada, 

Prime Minister Harold MacMillan in Britain, and 

West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. All were 

supportive. French President Charles de Gaulle was 

briefed at mid-day on Monday, October 22, by Acheson 

and Kent. Kent recalled that de Gaulle asked, “Are you 

here to consult with or to inform me?” “I am here to 

inform you,” replied Acheson. Despite this rather cool 

beginning, Kent felt “delighted at the great interest 

de Gaulle showed in these photographs. When told 

that the photographs had been taken from a height 

of 14 miles, de Gaulle exclaimed ‘C’est formidable! 

C’est formidable!’” The general asked if Kennedy had 

considered the possibility that the Russians might move 

in Berlin. Acheson replied that it had been considered, 

but should the Russians move, it would mean war. De 

Gaulle assured Acheson that it would not come to war. 

He then assured Acheson that Kennedy could count 

on his support. “It’s exactly what I would have done,” 

he added.119

Upon his return, Kent briefed the staff and the 

Board of the ONE. At a packed meeting, Kent said 

that he and Acheson had been prepared for a difficult 

meeting with the French President. Kent recounted de 

Gaulle’s question about being consulted or informed 

and that de Gaulle was told quite frankly by Acheson 

that he was being informed. But overall Kent said he 

was pleasantly surprised at how well the briefing of 

de Gaulle had gone. According to Kent, de Gaulle 

was both satisfied and supportive of the intelligence 

briefing and of President Kennedy’s decision.120
65

On Monday October 22, 1962, the President briefed 

leaders from Congress, and the American Embassy 

in Moscow delivered a copy of Kennedy’s speech 

to Khrushchev 1 hour before the President went on 

national television.121

THE PRESIDENT’S ADDRESS AND DEFCON 3

President Kennedy made a television address to 

the nation that Monday evening, October 22, 1962. This 

was one of the best and most powerful crisis speeches 

of the 20th century. 

But this secret, swift, and extraordinary build-up of 

communist missiles—in an area well known to have a 

special and historical relationship to the United States 

and the nations of the western hemisphere, in violation 

of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and 

hemispheric policy—this sudden, clandestine decision 

to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of 

Soviet soil—is a deliberately provocative and unjustified 

change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by 

this country if our courage and our commitments are 

ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.122

The staff in ONE were relieved that the awful secret 

they had been carrying around and guarding for the 

previous 6 days was finally public knowledge. There 

had been no leaks. We could now acknowledge and 

discuss the crisis with other Agency officers. We could 

acknowledge to spouses and families that the crisis 

explained at least in part our recent grim countenances 

and late working hours, although long tense days 

were not all that unusual in ONE. After the President’s 

speech had ended, we knew that we had successfully 

kept the secret. We were now ready as a government 

and as a people to unite in confronting this nuclear 
66

threat to the security and the existence of our nation 

and potentially to all other nations of the free world.123

On that same day, the Pentagon placed the entire 

U.S. military establishment on Defense Condition 

(DEFCON) 3, an increased state of alert. This was the 

greatest mobilization since World War II. SAC B-47 

bombers were dispersed to over 30 civilian airfields 

in the United States. At SAC bases in Spain, Morocco, 

and England, B-47 bombers were loaded with nuclear 

weapons. A massive airborne alert was begun by U.S.-

based B-52 bombers which were loaded with nuclear 

weapons and by KC-135 tankers. Most communications 

between headquarters and the B-52 bombers were 

in the clear. The Soviets would intercept these 

communications and would thus fully understand the 

scope and seriousness of the growing U.S. military 

response.124

The alert lasted for 30 days of continuous flight 

operations—2,088 sorties in 48,532 continuous hours 

of flying time, in which 20,022,000 miles were flown 

without a fatality. Over 70 million gallons of fuel were 

transferred in flight by the KC-135 tankers.125

Just as the Germans thought that General George 

Patton was the best commander the Allies had in World 

War II (and Patton agreed), so General Curtis Lemay 

was perhaps the American leader most feared by the 

Soviets during the Cuban Missile Crisis. General Lemay 

was Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, whose command 

responsibilities included the bombers of the Strategic 

Air Command. He was perhaps the ultimate “cold 

warrior,” and the Soviets knew it. In one of his talks to 

SAC crews, he was quoted as saying, “There are only 

two things in this world, SAC bases and SAC targets.” 

Khrushchev knew that the SAC had targeted specific 

Soviet cities for immediate destruction in the event of 
67

war and that “city busting” was being advocated by 

General Lemay to bring the USSR quickly to its knees. 

This Soviet fear of General Lemay, coupled with their 

ability to listen to SAC communications which were 

deliberately not enciphered, may well have been an 

important factor in Khrushchev’s ultimate decision 

to back down and withdraw offensive weapons from 

Cuba. General Lemay may well have been one of the 

most important and most under-rated players in the 

missile crisis.126

Secretary McNamara received word in the evening 

of October 22 that 91 Atlas and 41 Titan liquid-fueled 

ICBMs were being readied for firing. The solid-fuel 

Minuteman ICBM would enter the inventory during 

the late days of the crisis. Polaris submarines took up 

positions in the North Atlantic with enough nuclear 

missiles to destroy all of Russia’s principal cities. 

Matador and MACE tactical cruise missiles in West 

Germany were brought to combat-alert status.127

Also on October 22, the Pentagon asked the 

Association of American Railroads for 375 flatcars 

immediately to move air-defense and air-warning 

units to Florida. Later, the Pentagon would ask for 

3,600 flatcars, 180 gondola cars, 40 boxcars, and 200 

passenger coaches to move the over 15,000 men and 

equipment of the 1st Armored Division from Texas to 

Georgia. Some elements of the division would move 

to southern Florida where they would bivouac at the 

Gulf Stream Park Race Course at Hallandale, Florida. 

Parking lots became motor pools. Some soldiers slept 

in the grandstands; others picnicked or played touch 

football in the infield. Although no racing program 

was going on at Gulf Stream, troops enjoyed lining up 

along the rails to watch the thoroughbreds work out 

during the early morning hours.128
68

The presence and activities of the troops from the 

1st Armored Division at the race course were clearly 

visible to the population in the area and to motorists 

on the adjacent public highways and roads. This public 

build-up of ground forces was one more method of 

getting the message to the Soviets that the United 

States was preparing not only to bomb, but also to 

invade Cuba. This would add further credibility to the 

stated U.S. policy of not allowing offensive missiles to 

be established in Cuba.129

DEFCON 2

President Kennedy signed the order for the naval 

quarantine on Tuesday, October 23, 1962. That same 

day, Secretary of State Rusk obtained a unanimous 

concurrence from the OAS to support the naval 

quarantine of Cuba.130

Also on October 23, Soviet Defense Minister 

Malinovsky, following an emergency meeting with 

Khrushchev and the Soviet Council of Ministers, placed 

the Soviet armed forces on a war footing. Marshal 

Andrei Grechko, Commander of the Warsaw Treaty 

Forces, increased the combat readiness of these forces. 

But there were no threatening moves by the Soviet 

army in Berlin or by the Soviet naval forces in the 

Mediterranean. According to Sam Halpern, the Soviets 

never called up their reserves, there were no conscript 

classes called up, and there was no assembling of 

aircraft, trains, or ships. In short, there was no Soviet 

mobilization.131 Later on that Tuesday evening, NSA 

flashed word to the CIA watch office that its directionfinding efforts indicated that Soviet ships bound for 

Cuba that were suspected of carrying missiles, had not 

only changed course, but were probably on their way 

back to Russia.132
69

The next day, Wednesday, October 24, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff issued DEFCON 2, a maximum alert 

with the optimum posture to strike either Cuba or 

the USSR or both. With DEFCON 2, a total of 1,436 

bombers and 134 ICBMs were on constant alert. The 

missiles were ready for launching and one-eighth of 

the bombers were in the air at all times. The rest of the 

air crews were waiting near their bombers, ready to 

take off at a moment’s notice. That evening, a Pentagon 

spokesman confirmed that “at least a dozen Soviet 

vessels have turned back, presumably because, to the 

best of our information, they might have been carrying 

offensive materials.” Other vessels still proceeded 

toward Cuba.133

Late that Wednesday evening, President Kennedy 

called Secretary McNamara to confirm when our forces 

would be ready to invade Cuba. McNamara replied, “In 

7 days.” When the President pressed whether all the 

forces would be well prepared, McNamara replied that 

they would be “ready in every respect in 7 days.”134

Initial Reaction.

On Wednesday, October 24, Bartlett showed the 

U-2 photos of missiles in Cuba to Bolshakov over 

lunch at the National Press Club. Bolshakov denied 

any knowledge of offensive missiles in Cuba.135

That same day, the official world reaction showed 

a generally favorable response to the U.S. action, 

particularly in Latin America. On Tuesday, October 

23, the OAS representatives had approved a resolution 

endorsing the naval quarantine without opposition. 

One abstention was due to a lack of home government 

instructions. There were no indications of any Soviet 

aircraft movement to Cuba. Measures to achieve a 
70

higher degree of action readiness for Soviet and Bloc 

forces were not being taken on a crash basis. But 

existing MRBM and IRBM sites in Cuba were being 

rapidly completed, as were buildings believed to 

provide storage for nuclear warheads.136

Aerial photography of Cuba on October 24 and 

25 clearly showed that work on the missile sites was 

moving ahead rapidly, even faster than before. The 

nuclear warhead storage building at San Cristobal site 

No. 1 had been completely assembled in 2 days. Two 

IL-28 Beagle bombers had been assembled, three more 

were in the process, and crates for an additional 20 

bombers were at San Julian airfield.137

DCI McCone reported that as of 6 o’clock Thursday 

morning, October 25, at least 14 of the 22 Soviet ships 

that were known to be en route to Cuba had turned 

back. Those that turned back had a history of carrying 

military cargo.138 On that same day, U.S. Ambassador 

to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, displayed the U-2 

photos to the UN Security Council, winning a major 

public relations victory for the United States. Soviet 

Ambassador Valerian Zorin replied only that, “We 

shall not look at your photographs.”139

Official Soviet Reaction.

At 7 o’clock on Friday morning, October 26, the first 

vessel was stopped and boarded under the quarantine. 

It was the Marucla, an American-built liberty ship, 

Panamanian-owned, registered from Lebanon, and 

bound for Cuba under a Soviet charter from the 

Baltic port of Riga. The vessel was found to contain 

no weapons and was allowed to sail on. The Marucla

was carefully and personally chosen by President 

Kennedy to be the first ship stopped and boarded. It 
71

demonstrated that the United States was indeed going 

to enforce the quarantine. But because the ship was not 

Soviet-owned, this action did not represent a direct 

threat to the Soviets requiring a response. This gave the 

Soviets more time, but simultaneously demonstrated 

that the United States meant business.140

That same day, Aleksandr Semyonovich Feklisov 

(alias “Fomin”), the KGB resident in Washington, 

replaced Bolshakov as the conduit between Khrushchev 

and Kennedy. He asked for a meeting with John Scali 

of the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) and 

asked if the United States would accept a deal whereby 

the USSR withdraws all offensive missiles under UN 

supervision and the United States agrees not to invade 

Cuba. This would, in fact, be the primary basis for an 

eventual agreement.141 Also on October 26, Khrushchev 

sent a long emotional message to Kennedy with the 

same offer as was conveyed by Feklisov to Scali. The 

following day, Saturday, October 27, a Soviet SA-2 

missile shot down a U-2 aircraft over Cuba, killing 

the pilot, U.S. Air Force Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr. 

The U-2 was shot down using Moscow’s order dated 

October 22 authorizing Pliyev to use all defensive 

means against the United States, except for nuclear 

weapons. Pliyev’s deputy had authorized the downing 

of the U-2 by SAMs.142

Khrushchev sent a second message on Saturday, 

October 27, broadcast publicly on radio, adding the 

condition that the United States withdraw Jupiter 

missiles from Turkey. Based on the suggestion of 

his brother Robert, and supported by Sorensen, the 

President decided to ignore the second message and 

accept the first. Robert Kennedy and Sorensen then 

drafted the reply. It stated that if the Soviet missiles 

and offensive weapons were removed from Cuba 
72

under UN inspection and verification, the United States 

would agree with the rest of the Western Hemisphere 

not to invade Cuba.143

THE DARKEST DAY

Saturday, October 27, 1962, was the darkest day of 

the crisis. The Soviets continued the rapid construction 

of missile sites and had shot down and killed U-2 pilot 

Major Anderson. The State Department analyst assigned to ONE for Latin America informed the author 

that the two of them had been assigned the responsibility 

of drafting a new SNIE. The subject was the probable 

reaction of governments in Central and South America 

to U.S. air strikes followed by an invasion of Cuba. 

The OAS had previously unanimously approved a 

U.S. naval blockade of Cuba, but a bombardment and 

invasion of Cuba was a different matter. 

The earlier August 1, 1962, NIE on the situation and 

prospects in Cuba stated that there was widespread 

disillusionment in Latin America regarding the Cuban 

Revolution. We did not think that any Latin American 

government (other than Cuba) was truly comfortable 

with the presence of Soviet strategic nuclear missiles 

in the Western Hemisphere particularly because these 

same missiles could reach much of Latin America, as 

well as the United States. We thought that most Latin 

American governments were relieved that President 

Kennedy in his October 22 speech had placed the 

entire hemisphere under the protective umbrella of 

U.S. conventional and strategic forces. We, therefore, 

concluded in our draft that should diplomacy and the 

naval quarantine fail to force the Soviets to remove their 

offensive missiles from Cuba, most Latin American 

governments would support a U.S. bombardment and 
73

invasion of Cuba. A few would probably criticize such 

military action publicly, but would most likely support 

it privately.144

That we had been asked on such short notice to 

draft this SNIE was another strong indicator that 

the United States was indeed preparing to bomb 

and invade Cuba. U-2 coverage continued to show 

accelerated construction of the missiles sites in Cuba. 

Some were becoming operational. This, plus the 

shoot-down of Major Anderson, led the two of us to 

speculate that military action would probably begin 

on or about Tuesday, October 30. This speculation was 

based on recent events and the policy firmness of the 

White House that the missiles must be withdrawn. The 

author was not aware of the October 24 conversation 

between President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara 

in which McNamara twice assured the President that 

the U.S. military would be ready “in every respect” 

to bomb and invade Cuba in 7 days, i.e., on October 

31. This draft SNIE was never finished. The next day, 

Sunday, October 28, Khrushchev announced publicly 

that he would withdraw the missiles from Cuba.145

On Saturday, five of the six MRBM sites were 

believed to have a full operational capability. The sixth 

was estimated to become operational on Sunday, which 

meant that the Soviets would then have the ability to 

coordinate the launching of up to 24 MRBM missiles 

within 6 to 8 hours of a decision to do so. There would 

be a refire capability of up to 24 additional missiles 

within 4 to 6 hours. At that point, 33 MRBM missiles 

had actually been observed. No IRBM missiles had yet 

been observed. The probable nuclear bunkers adjacent 

to the MRBM sites were not yet ready for storage, 

assembly, or checkout. Aerial photography from 

October 25 confirmed the presence of a FROG missile 

launcher in a vehicle park near Remedios.146
74

THE FINAL WARNING

On Saturday evening, October 27, Robert 

Kennedy met with Soviet Ambassador to the United 

States Anatoly Dobrynin in Kennedy’s Justice 

Department office. He delivered the President’s reply 

to Khrushchev’s message from the previous day. 

Kennedy told Dobrynin that the President must have 

a commitment by the following day, October 28, that 

the offensive missile bases would be removed. “I was 

not giving them an ultimatum but a statement of fact. 

He [Dobrynin] should understand that if they did not 

remove those bases, we would remove them.” 

Dobrynin raised the question of the Jupiter missiles 

in Turkey. Kennedy said there could be no quid pro quo 

under the current threat and that ultimately this was 

a decision which would have to be made by NATO. 

However, President Kennedy had wanted to remove 

those missiles for some time, and it was his judgment 

that they would be removed within a short time after 

the current crisis was over. That same evening, the 

President ordered 24 troop-carrier squadrons of the Air 

Force Reserve to active duty. They would be necessary 

to support an invasion.147

On Sunday, October 28, the CIA published a 

memorandum, “The Crisis, USSR/Cuba,” prepared 

for the EXCOM. “All 24 MRBM launchers now appear 

to have reached full operational readiness. One nuclear 

storage facility is essentially complete, but none of the 

bunkers observed is yet believed to be in operation.” 

No significant redeployment of major Soviet 

ground, air, or naval forces had been noted. The 

general posture of Soviet ground forces in forward 

areas was one of precautionary defensive readiness. 
75

Khrushchev’s attempt to get reciprocal withdrawal of 

offensive weapons from Cuba and Turkey appeared 

to be the first step in Soviet efforts to negotiate a 

solution. Soviet spokesmen continued to play down 

the possibility that the Cuban crisis could lead to 

general war. There was so far only fragmentary mixed 

reaction to the President’s rejection of Khrushchev’s 

Cuba-Turkey proposal.148

Khrushchev publicly agreed on Sunday, October 

28, to remove the missiles in return for a U.S. pledge 

not to invade Cuba. There was an implicit promise to 

remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey later.149

AFTERMATH

The Special Group (5412 Augmented) called a halt to 

the sabotage component of Operation MONGOOSE on 

October 30. This Special Group was abolished. Covert 

action against Cuba, however, did not end. At the end 

of 1962, the EXCOM was renamed the Standing Group 

and reduced in size to five members: McNamara, 

McCone, Bundy, Sorensen, and Robert Kennedy.150

On November 2, 1962, two voiceless telephone calls 

were made in Moscow to a telephone number given 

by the CIA to Penkovsky for his use to indicate that 

he had loaded a dead drop. The telephone pole had 

the signal of a letter X in chalk indicating the drop had 

been loaded. Richard Jacob, the U.S. Embassy archivist, 

was sent to unload the drop. He was ambushed and 

arrested by the KGB. The man in charge of his arrest 

was Lieutenant General Oleg Gribanov, head of the 

KGB Second Chief Directorate (responsible for internal 

security and counterintelligence). Gribanov had also 

supervised the earlier search and arrest of Penkovsky. 

Jacob was declared persona non grata and departed 
76

the Soviet Union on November 6.151 Wynne was also 

arrested in Budapest on November 2. The following 

day, DCI McCone briefed President Kennedy on the 

ambush of Jacob and Penkovsky’s probable arrest.152

On November 20, 1962, the Soviets decided on their 

own to withdraw the IL-28 bombers, their six nuclear 

bombs, and the tactical nuclear weapons. Castro was 

unhappy: He had hoped to keep the tactical weapons 

in Cuba.153

The CIA published a memorandum on November 

29 concerning the deployment and withdrawal of Soviet 

missiles and other weapons in Cuba. The Soviet claim 

that they had actually delivered only 42 missiles to Cuba 

and had now withdrawn them was consistent with 

the CIA evidence. Available evidence also indicated 

that the Soviets were preparing to withdraw the IL28 bombers, no more than 42 of which were delivered 

before the quarantine began. The Soviets could easily 

ship out all of these aircraft by mid-December 1962.

Other Soviet weapons systems in Cuba included 

SAMs, coastal defense missiles, Komar missile boats, 

and fighter aircraft. In addition, the equipment for 

four armored combat groups (including possibly 

6-10,000 men) remained on the island. The CIA had 

no evidence of any preparations in Cuba to withdraw 

these elements.154

Nuclear warheads were not actually seen in Cuba 

until the post-crisis review of aerial photography taken 

during the crisis period. Photo coverage from October 

14 revealed a nuclear warhead processing facility at the 

western end of the runway at the Mariel Naval Airfield. 

On October 23, one of the warhead vans at the San 

Cristobal MRBM launch site had its rails extended and 

appeared to be transferring a warhead to a truck that 

had parallel rails in its beds. The post-crisis review of 
77

photography also indicated that the Soviets had fueled 

and mated the warheads and had practiced moving 

the missiles to the erectors.

At a January 1989 conference of American and Soviet 

leaders in Moscow, Soviet General Dmitri Volkogonov 

said that during the crisis 20 nuclear warheads arrived 

in Cuba and 20 more were aboard the Soviet merchant 

ship Poltava, which turned back when the blockade 

was announced. Sergei N. Khrushchev, son of Nikita 

Khrushchev, said that the 20 nuclear warheads in Cuba 

were never mated to the missiles but easily could have 

been.155

MISSILES IN CAVES

There was a surge of intelligence reporting after 

the crisis, mostly from refugees, that the Soviets 

had secreted some of the offensive missiles in caves. 

None of these reports was judged to be accurate. 

On February 5, 1963, DCI McCone issued a formal 

unclassified statement in the name of the USIB. In it, he 

said, “We are convinced beyond reasonable doubt, as 

has been stated by the Department of Defense, that all 

offensive missiles and bombers known to be in Cuba 

were withdrawn soon thereafter. . . . [R]econnaissance 

has not detected the presence of offensive missiles 

or bombers in Cuba since that time.” Concerning the 

alleged storage of missiles in caves, McCone said, “All 

statements alleging the presence of offensive weapons 

are meticulously checked. So far, the findings have 

been negative. Absolute assurance on these matters, 

however, could only come from continuing penetrating 

on-site inspections.” Such inspections, however, were 

never agreed to or permitted by Castro.156

On February 6, 1963, Secretary McNamara 

introduced an unclassified briefing in the State 
78

Department auditorium. He said, “In recent days 

questions have been raised in the press and elsewhere 

regarding the presence of offensive weapons systems 

in Cuba. I believe beyond any reasonable doubt that 

all such weapons systems have been removed from 

the island and none have been reintroduced. It is our 

purpose to show you this afternoon the evidence on 

which we base that conclusion.” After this introduction, 

John Hughes, the Special Assistant to the Director 

of DIA, presented a detailed photographic review 

of the introduction of Soviet military personnel and 

equipment into Cuba, and of the removal of offensive 

weapons systems.157

THE PRESIDENT’S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 

ADVISORY BOARD

In its February 4, 1963, memorandum to the 

President, the PFIAB stated: 

In the course of our review, we sought to determine 

whether there were lessons to be learned from an 

objective appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses 

of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort as disclosed by 

the Cuba experience. We directed particular attention 

to those areas of the intelligence process which are 

concerned with such matters as (1) the acquisition of 

intelligence, (2) the analysis of intelligence, and (3) the 

production and dissemination of intelligence reports 

and estimates in support of national policy formulation 

and operational requirements.

The Board reviewed the performance of our 

intelligence prior to the October 14, 1962, discovery of 

offensive missiles. There was inadequate clandestine 

agent coverage within Cuba, and full use was not 

made of aerial photographic surveillance, particularly 
79

during September and October. Pointing to the failed 

NIE from September 19, 1962, the Board concluded 

that there was a malfunction of the analytic process 

by which intelligence indicators are assessed and 

reported. The manner in which intelligence indicators 

were handled may well have been the most serious 

flaw in our intelligence system which, if not corrected, 

“could lead to the gravest consequences.”

Concerning espionage, the PFIAB concluded the 

following: Clandestine agent coverage within Cuba was 

inadequate. Although the limited agent assets of the 

CIA and Army intelligence did produce some valuable 

reports on developments in Cuba, we believe that the 

absence of more effective clandestine agent coverage, 

as an essential adjunct to other intelligence collection 

operations, contributed substantially to the inability 

of our government to recognize at an earlier date the 

danger of the Soviet move in Cuba. It would appear that 

over the years there has been a lack of foresight in the 

long-term planning for the installation of these agents.

The PFIAB also concluded that:

full use was not made of aerial photographic surveillance, 

particularly during September and October when the 

influx of Soviet military personnel and armaments 

had reached major proportions. We recognize that in 

September inclement weather delayed some of the 

scheduled U-2 missions. However, we note that from 

September 8 to September 16, U-2 missions over Cuba 

were suspended apparently because of the loss of a 

Chinese nationalist U-2 over the China mainland on 

September 8. We also note with concern that during 

the period of increasing emergency, as pointed up by 

intelligence indicators, there was not a corresponding 

intensification of the scheduling of U-2 missions over 

the island.
80

The Board concluded that although they were 

“unable to establish the existence of a policy which 

prevented overflying areas of Cuba where surfaceto-air missile installations were present, the Central 

Intelligence Agency and others believed that such a 

restriction did in fact prevail.” As we now know, “full 

use was not made of aerial photographic surveillance” 

due to the opposition of Rusk and Bundy to flights over 

the interior of the island. This opposition was based 

on their concern about the political and diplomatic 

repercussions if a U-2 had been shot down over Cuba. 

The lack of “intensification of the scheduling of U-2 

missions over the island” was due to this opposition 

and not to a failure of the DCI or the CIA to seek 

such intensification. In fact, we have seen how the 

DCI consistently warned about the Soviets placing 

offensive missiles in Cuba and continually pushed for 

increased U-2 coverage over Cuba. The PFIAB report, 

however, fails to note this and leaves the reader with the 

impression that somehow the CIA and the American 

IC were responsible for this “lack of intensification.”

Apparently the Special Group responsible for 

authorizing U-2 flights was also not made fully aware 

of the delay in the acquisition of aerial intelligence and 

neither was most of the American IC. Delays were not 

only due to weather, but also to the decision of senior 

administration officials to fly only peripheral flights. 

The Special Group should have been informed of the 

delay in overflights and should have had a mechanism 

to discover automatically such reporting omissions.158

On March 7, Bundy sent a copy of the PFIAB report 

and the DCI’s February 28, 1963, memo response to the 

President to President Kennedy’s secretary for filing. 

He noted that, “These are explosive documents, and 

their existence is not being widely discussed.” It is not 
81

clear what Bundy meant by “explosive documents,” 

but he was certainly aware that it was his and Secretary 

Rusk’s opposition that prevented U-2 flights over Cuba, 

rather than a failure of the IC or the DCI. There is one 

PFIAB document dated March 11, which indicated 

McCone thought that unless the report was changed, 

the top five people in the CIA, including the DCI, 

would have to resign. We have no indication the report 

was changed, and there were no resignations.159

But McCone’s February 28 memo has been 

declassified. It is remarkably low key and noninflammatory. In his February 28, 1963, memorandum 

to the President, McCone said that while he agreed 

with some of the PFIAB’s findings, he thought 

that his own study of the crisis reflected a “more 

reasonable judgment” of the IC’s performance. 

Concerning the failure to exercise urgency in conducting U-2 missions over Cuba, he demonstrated 

sympathy and understanding for Rusk and Bundy’s 

actions by stating one “must first carefully weigh 

the serious considerations that enter into a decision 

to overfly a denied territory.” Concerning the failed 

September 19, 1962, SNIE, he noted that everyone 

got it wrong, “including the State Department.” 

Concerning espionage agent reports, none that had 

significant information on offensive missiles reached 

the IC or policymakers until after mid-September. 

“When received they were used in directing aerial 

photograpy.”

The Board also criticized the failed September 19 

SNIE as due to:

A lack of adequate intelligence coverage of Cuba; the 

rigor with which the view was held that the Soviet Union 

would not assume the risks entailed in establishing 

nuclear striking forces on Cuban soil; and the absence 
82

of an imaginative appraisal of the intelligence indicators 

which, although limited in number, were contained 

in reports disseminated by our intelligence agencies. 

(We reach this conclusion even though we recognize 

the absence at the time of any conclusive photographic 

intelligence.)160

The PFIAB concluded: 

We believe that the near-total intelligence surprise 

experienced by the United States with respect to the 

introduction and deployment of Soviet strategic missiles 

in Cuba resulted in large part from a malfunction of the 

analytic process by which intelligence indicators are 

assessed and reported. This malfunction diminished 

the effectiveness of policy advisers, national intelligence 

estimators, and civilian and military officers having 

command responsibilities. 161

 The Board attached 35 examples of such indicators 

as an annex to its report. “We urge that the annexed 

illustrations be read not only for their individual content but also for the purpose of noting the cumulative 

significance of the information being received. These 

indicators were acquired from a variety of individual 

sources, such as refugees, clandestine agents, and 

friendly foreign diplomats.” As previously noted, 

the Board concluded that the way these intelligence 

indicators were handled may well be the most serious 

flaw in our intelligence system, which, if not corrected, 

“could lead to the gravest consequences.”162

As was previously noted, the Board discovered that 

the CIA analysts had interpreted the DCI’s instruction 

to check with NPIC on any report susceptible to 

photographic verification as a restriction against 

publishing anything that could not be verified by 

NPIC. The President also imposed another limitation 
83

as discussed before. He made it clear that he wanted no 

limitation on the collection and analysis of intelligence 

relating to offensive weapons and all such information 

was to be collected, analyzed, and promptly reported 

to those officials who had a real need to know. He 

wanted the tightest possible control of all information 

concerning offensive weapons. The USIB, however, 

interpreted the presidential instructions as an injunction not to print any information on offensive weapons 

in Cuba in any intelligence publication. After this 

injunction, even the President’s Intelligence Checklist 

prepared by the CIA failed to include information from 

any of the refugee or agent reports on the sightings of 

offensive missiles in Cuba.163

The Board noted, however, that the photographic 

evidence from the October 14 and subsequent 

overflights was promptly processed and submitted 

to the President in time for decisive action before 

the Soviet MRBM and IRBM systems became fully 

operational. In commending the high performance 

achieved by “our foreign intelligence agencies during 

the post-October 14 period, we recognize that it would 

be difficult for the IC to operate with the same intensity 

and efficiency under less critical conditions. Thus one 

of our major problems remains the achievement of 

very high performance between crises.”164

 In commenting on lessons learned from the crisis, 

Robert Kennedy wrote: 

The time that was available to the President and his 

advisers to work secretly, quietly, privately, developing a 

course of action and recommendations for the President, 

was essential. If our deliberations had been publicized, if 

we had had to make a decision in 24 hours, I believe the 

course that we ultimately would have taken would have 

been quite different and filled with far greater risks.165
84

McNamara has written: 

The performance of the U.S. Government during that 

critical period [of the Cuban missile crisis] was more 

effective than at any other time during my 7 years’ service 

as Secretary of Defense. The agencies of the government: 

the State Department, the civilian and military leaders 

of the Defense Department, the CIA, the White House 

staff, the UN Mission, worked together smoothly and 

harmoniously. 166

While McNamara gives Robert Kennedy much of 

the credit for this performance, the President made 

no statement attempting to take credit for himself 

or for the administration. He instructed all members 

of the EXCOM and government that, “no interview 

should be given, no statement made, which would 

claim any kind of victory. . . . [I]f it was a triumph, it 

was a triumph for the next generation and not for any 

particular government or people.”167

As previously mentioned, after the crisis the CIA’s 

Deputy Director of Intelligence Cline asked Robert 

Kennedy and Bundy how much they thought the 

single evaluated U-2 photograph of the MRBM site on 

October 14, 1962, was worth. They both replied, “It had 

fully justified all that the CIA had cost the country in 

its preceding years.” But without espionage and DCI 

leadership, there would have been no photograph. The 

prior cost of the CIA would not have been justified. 

This U-2 photograph was the result of intelligence 

from an espionage agent who described probable 

MRBM sites in a trapezoidal area of western Cuba. 

This combined with the unwavering insistence by the 

DCI as the President’s leader of American Intelligence 

that reconnaissance flights over the interior of Cuba 
85

be resumed, led President Kennedy to reverse the 

previous opposition to such flights within his own 

administration. 

For a brief yet momentous time in our history, DCI 

and Presidential leadership successfully combined to 

produce accurate intelligence. Our national security 

system worked and possible disaster was avoided. It 

may not be possible in future crises to ensure the same 

high quality of national security leadership. For its part, 

however, the American IC can and must always strive 

to improve the collection and analysis of all source 

intelligence, particularly intelligence from espionage. 

This will alway be one of the keys to successful national 

security leadership.168

KHRUSHCHEV RESIGNS 

On October 13, 1964, 2 years after the missile crisis, 

Khrushchev resigned all of his party and government 

offices. By 1964, Khrushchev had alienated a majority of 

the Presidium. Although the main source of discontent 

had been his continual reorganization of the party and 

the state apparatus, the Cuban missile crisis played 

a role in his downfall. It was resented as a Soviet 

humiliation, not as a victory as Khrushchev had earlier 

proclaimed.169

LESSONS LEARNED

A number of lessons can be learned from the 

collection, analysis, and use of intelligence in the 

Cuban Missile Crisis which have broad and continuing 

applicability. First, we must realize the danger of 

allowing a predetermined mind-set to blind intelligence 

analysts and policymakers to evidence of the probable 
86

or ongoing actions of an adversary. Khrushchev’s 

conviction that the West, in general, and the young 

U.S. President, in particular, were weak and indecisive 

led him to discount how far the U.S. leadership would 

go to stop a new and dangerous threat to its security. 

This mind-set was further bolstered by Khrushchev’s 

ideological conviction that Communism was destined 

to defeat capitalism. Conversely, the mind-set of U.S. 

leaders led them to conclude that the Soviets would 

certainly realize the seriousness of their actions, and 

would believe and heed the seriousness of President 

Kennedy’s warnings about the missiles. 

The crisis also illustrated that almost all forms of 

intelligence collection can have serious diplomatic 

consequences if compromised. Had a U-2 been shot 

down over Cuba without gaining clear evidence 

of the Soviet missiles, it would have been a major 

embarrassment to the United States, both internationally 

and domestically. The President must take into account 

the concerns of the State Department as well as the 

Intelligence Community in deciding how much risk is 

worth taking to gain the information needed to make 

wise policy in dangerous situations. There is no silver 

bullet formula for use in weighing the policy options in 

such scenarios. But it is clear that the potential danger 

to our national security of allowing Soviet missiles 

with nuclear warheads to be established secretly in 

Cuba warranted great diplomatic risks.

Another sometimes dangerous mind-set illustrated 

by the crisis is the general tendency of intelligence 

analysts and policymakers to give greater credence to 

electronic and photographic intelligence than to human 

source intelligence. This tendency has been exacerbated 

by the need within the intelligence community to protect 

the individuals and tradecraft involved in espionage, 
87

thus making intelligence leaders reluctant to release 

beyond a very narrow circle information about the 

source(s) of human intelligence. This, in turn, has made 

it difficult for analysts and policymakers to weigh the 

credibility of the information. Put simply, electronic 

and photographic intelligence is comparatively “hard” 

and thus comparatively easy to evaluate and use, 

whereas human intelligence is more problematic. 

Nonetheless, threats to our national security can often 

only be fully and timely understood by conducting 

espionage against our adversaries. Today information 

collected by espionage and counterespionage 

operations is shared more widely within the 

intelligence community, particularly with the Director 

of National Intelligence (DNI) and the DNI analytical 

components. The objective is to help the DNI evaluate 

more realistically the importance and accuracy of such 

information. 

We must increase our capability to conduct all 

source intelligence collection operations against 

governments and organizations that pose a risk to our 

national security. This includes close cooperation with 

allied intelligence services. Espionage has been, and 

always will be, an important source of information for 

our security. To support our future national defense, it 

is essential that our government and our nation develop 

a better understanding of the long-term necessity to 

conduct espionage and other clandestine operations, 

and that our analysts learn how to give appropriate 

weight and credence to such intelligence. There will 

never be enough information from espionage agents, 

certainly not in the same quantity as intelligence 

acquired from technical platforms. Analysts must look 

at espionage as a vital but limited means of acquiring 

critical intelligence. You cannot turn espionage off and 
88

on like you can with technical collection assets. We 

should follow through on the commitment of outgoing 

President George Bush to increase our capability for 

HUMINT/Espionage by 50 percent. 

The American operations officers who recruit 

and run these clandestine operations do so often at 

considerable risk to their own safety and the safety 

of their families overseas. It is essential that we as a 

nation develop a better appreciation for the integrity, 

skill, dedication, and courage of the men and women 

of America’s National Clandestine Service. It is for 

this purpose and to these men and women that this 

monograph is dedicated.

ENDNOTES

1. Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter Deriabin, The Spy Who 

Saved the World, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1992, p. 46.

2. Ibid., pp. 43, 44, 46.

3. See Ibid., p. 14, for the full name and translation of the 

GRU. Also see Ibid., chap. 3, pp. 46-65. In 1965, the aforementioned 

committee was renamed the State Committee for Science and 

Technology.

4. Ibid., pp. 204-205, 222-223, 346-350.

5. The above two paragraphs are from Mary S. McAuliffe 

and the CIA History Staff, Cuban Missile Crisis, CIA Documents, 

Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, October 1992, pp. 

139-145; Schecter and Deriabin, pp. 334, 351-352.

6. Schecter and Deriabin, summary of chaps 3, 10, 11, and 

16.

7. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothey Naftali, One Hell of 

a Gamble. The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis, New York 

and London, UK: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997, p. 184n3.
89

8. The above three paragraphs are from Schecter and 

Deriabin, pp. 180-184, 222-224, 232, 330; Christopher Andrew and 

Oleg Gordievsky, KGB—The Inside Story, London, UK: Hodder 

and Stoughton Ltd., 1990, pp. 470-473. Note: Both of these books 

refer to Bolshakov as a KGB officer, but subsequent documentary 

information has shown that he was, in fact, a GRU officer. See 

Fursenko and Naftali, pp. 184, n3; 252, n30.) 

9. Schecter and Deriabin, pp. 180-183; and the author.

10. Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War, New York: 

Doubleday, 1995. pp. 463, 466.

11. Ibid., p. 476.

12. Andrew and Gordievsky, p. 469.

13. Kagan, p. 456; and the author.

14. Kagan, p. 476.

15. Sherman Kent and The Board Of National Estimates, 

Collected Essays By Sherman Kent, Sherman Kent and Donald P. 

Steury, eds., Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center 

for the Study Of Intelligence, 1994, pp. 173-174; and the author.

16. See Schecter and Derabin, pp. 273-280.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p. 276; and the author.

20. Schecter and Deriabin, pp. 278-279.

21. Ibid.

22. Above two paragraphs from the author; Schecter and 

Deriabin, pp. 279-280. 

23. Richard Helms with William Hood, A Look Over My 
90

Shoulder, New York, Random House, 2003, p. 216.

24. Schecter and Deriabin, pp. 351-352.

25. This paragraph is from the author. Historians can also 

undervalue intelligence from espionage. Donald Kagan, in his 1995 

book On the Origins of War, ignores the above memo from Proctor 

as well as the transcripts of clandestine meetings with Penkovsky, 

all of which were declassified by the CIA and published by Schecter 

and Deriabin in 1992. Kagan erroneously states that Penkovsky’s 

information supported the inflated Soviet ICBM numbers. Quite 

the contrary, Penkovsky’s information accurately contradicted the 

inflated numbers that were in the June 1961 NIE. Kagan, p. 490; 

and the author. See Annex C for discussion of intelligence sources 

used by the Soviets and the United States during the missile crisis 

and for definitions of clandestine operations. 

26. Kagan, pp. 478-479.

27. Schecter and Deriabin, p. 226.

28. Ibid., p. 280.

29. Ibid., pp. 271-273.

30. Kagan, pp. 448-449.

31. Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, New 

York: Harpercollins, 1995, pp. 275-276; Sam Halpern, Lecture To 

JMIC, April 15, 1998. Mr. Halpern was the executive officer to the 

Chief of Task Force “W,” which was the CIA’s Cuban Task Force 

during the missile crisis. I am indebted to the late Mr. Halpern for 

his editing of this paper on several subsequent occasions.

32. Helms, pp. 196-197, 200-203, 206-207.

33. The above four paragraphs are from ibid.; and Dino A. 

Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball—The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile 

Crisis, New York: Random House, 1991, p. 215.

34. Andrew and Gordievsky, p. 468.
91

35. General Anatoli I. Gribkov, Seminar at the Woodrow 

Wilson Center in Washington, DC, May 4, 1994, covered by 

C-Span 2.

36. Ibid. 

37. Author.

38. Gribkov, Seminar; Fusenko and Naftali, p. 186; 

Schecter and Deriabin, pp. 68, 79, 100, 112, 140, 150, 266. 

39. Gribkov, Seminar; Fusenko and Naftali, pp. 187-188.

40. Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, Strobe 

Talbott, trans. and ed., Boston, MA, and Toronto, Canada: Little, 

Brown and Company, 1970, pp. 491, 493, 494.

41. The author; Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, p. 

493.

42. Above two paragraphs from Khrushchev, Khrushchev 

Remembers, p. 499; Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers—

The Last Testament, Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed., Boston, MA, and 

Toronto, Canada: Little, Brown and Company, 1974, p. 511; and 

the author’s recollection.

43. John Mack Faragher et al., Out of Many—A History of 

the American People, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2nd 

Ed., 1997, pp. 892-893.

44. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, p. 493; 

Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers—The Last Testament, p. 511.

45. The above four paragraphs are from Fursenko and 

Naftali, pp. 188-189. Also see General Anatoli I. Gribkov and 

General William Y. Smith, Operation Anadyr—U.S. and Soviet 

Generals Recount The Cuban Missile Crisis, Chicago, Berlin, Tokyo 

and Moscow: Edition Q, Inc., 1994, p. 4, for information on the 

FKR.

46. The above two paragraphs are from Schecter and 

Deriabin, pp. 312 and 412; Andrew and Gordievsky, p. 475.
92

47. Brugioni, pp. 72-73.

48. McAuliffe, p. 7.

49. The above two paragraphs are from James H. Hansen, 

“Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Unclassified 

Article, Studies In Intelligence, Vol. 46, No. 1., Washington, DC: 

Central Intelligence Agency, 2002; and from the author’s personal 

recollection.

50. Schecter and Deriabin, pp. 225, 319.

51. McAuliffe, p. 13.

52. Schecter and Deriabin, p. 331, p. 466n 13, and p. 466n 

14; Author Interview with McCone, August 28, 1988.

53. Schecter and Deriabin, p. 331, 466n 14; Author 

Interview with McCone, August 29, 1988.

54. Above infomation on DCI McCone’s warnings during 

August 10, 17, 21, and 23 meetings and his two memoranda 

to the President on August 10 and 22 are also contained in a 

memorandum for the record from McCone dated October 31, 

1962. See McAuliffe, pp. 13-17.

55. The above two paragraphs are from the interview 

with McCone, August 29 1988; Schecter and Deriabin, pp. 331 and 

466n 15.

56. Schecter and Deriabin, p. 332-333; Andrew, For the 

President’s Eyes Only, pp. 282-284.

57. McAuliffe, pp. 35-37, 45.

58. Ibid., pp. 40, 71. FKR cruise missiles were discussed 

earlier.

59. Schecter and Deriabin, pp. 325.
93

60. Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days—A Memoir of the 

Cuban Missile Crisis, New York: W. W. Norton, 1st Ed., 1969, pp. 

25-26; and Schecter and Deriabin, p. 330.

61. McAuliffe, p. 55.

62. Schecter and Deriabin, pp. 319-321.

63. Ibid., pp. 325-327.

64. The above two paragraphs are from Fursenko and 

Naftali, pp. 211-212. See also Gribkov and Smith, pp. 4-7.

65. The above data on the Soviet build-up are from 

McAuliffe, pp. 7-8.

66. Above two paragraphs are from ibid., pp. 39-98. Also 

see Schecter and Deriabin, pp. 332 and 333. The R-101 aircraft was 

used in low-level reconnaissance.

67. Schecter and Deriabin, p. 332.

68. Halpern and McAuliffe, pp. 364-365.

69. Brugioni, pp. 135-137.

70. Ibid., note to reader on p. xi; Douglas F. Garthoff, 

Directors Of Central Intelligence As Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence 

Community 1946-2005, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence 

Agency, Center For The Study Of Intelligence, 2005, p. 32.

71. Brugioni, pp. 136-138.

72. Ibid., pp. 139-140.

73. Ibid., pp. 144, 151-152, 158-159, 165-167.

74. Kennedy, pp. 163-164. See President Kennedy’s public 

address on October 22, 1962.

75. Brugioni, p. 144; McAuliffe, pp. 92-93.
94

76. Kent was the professor in full charge of the class, and 

he was not afraid to use salty language to make his point. He was 

an Ivy Leaguer who usually wore a loud necktie with the knot 

loosened below an open shirt collar, and who chewed tobacco 

in class. Kent earned a Ph.D. in history from Yale, and taught at 

Yale prior to World War II. During the war, he worked in the 

Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Service 

(OSS), becoming chief of the Branch’s Europe-Africa Division.

77. The above two paragraphs are from author’s 

recollection; and Kent and Steury, Introduction, p. x.

78. The author; and Brugioni, pp. 144-145.

79. Kent and Steury, p. 179.

80. The author.

81. Brugioni, pp. 144-145; McAuliffe, pp. 1-3; and the 

author.

82. Author’s recollections and opinion, p. 62.

83. A. Denis Clift, Clift Notes: Intelligence and the Nation’s 

Security, 2nd Ed., James S. Major, ed., Washington, DC: Joint 

Military Intelligence College (JMIC), August 2002, p. 17. In 

December 2006, the JMIC was re-named the National Defense 

Intelligence College. 

84. Brugioni, pp. 159-160.

85. Ibid., p. 160.

86. Ibid., p. 160 and 215; McAuliffe, pp. 103-104.

87. Author’s opinion; Brugioni, p. 105.

88. The above two paragraphs from Schecter and Deriabin, 

pp. 330-331.

89. The above two paragraphs are from a declassified 

memo from McCone, October 11, 1962; McAuliffe, pp. 123-125.
95

90. The above two paragraphs from McAuliffe, pp. 366-

370.

91. McAuliffe p. 139-145, Schecter and Deriabin, p. 334.

92. McAuliffe, p. 105; and the author.

93. The above two paragraphs from the author, and 

McAuliffe, pp. 107-108.

94. McAuliffe, p. 103-104.

95. Brugioni, pp. 164-165, 181.

96. Helms, pp. 213-215.

97. Ibid., p. 216. 

98. Max Holland, “The ‘Photo Gap’ That Delayed 

Discovery of Missiles in Cuba,” Unclassified Article, Studies In 

Intelligence, Vol. 49, No. 4, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence 

Agency, 2005; and the author.

99. The author.

100. Brugioni, p. 208.

101. Ibid., p. 239.

102. Kagan, pp. 507-508.

103. Brugioni, pp. 239-240.

104. McAuliffe, p. 245; Brugioni, pp. 336-338.

105. Brugioni, p. 232.

106. Ibid., p. 234-237, p. 251.

107. McAuliffe, pp. xv, 159-160, 169-173; and the 

author’s recollection. A special information channel using code 
96

word “Psalm” was established to restrict the dissemination of 

information concerning Soviet missiles in Cuba.

108. McAuliffe, pp. 167-168.

109. Kennedy, pp. 40-41; and the author.

110. Above two paragraphs from McAuliffe, pp. 197-202.

111. Ibid., pp. 203-208; and the author. 

112. For the above three paragraphs, see McAuliffe, pp. 

211-220.

113. Ibid., pp. 159, 237; and the author.

114. Kennedy, pp. 37-38, 47-48; Brugioni, p. 315; Ernest 

R. May and Philip D. Zelikov, The Kennedy Tapes. Inside the White 

House During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Cambridge, MA, and 

London, UK: The Belknap Press Of Harvard University Press, 

1997, pp. 191-193.

115. The above four paragraphs are from May and 

Zelikov, pp. 189-203.

116. The above three paragraphs are from the 

memorandum from McCone giving his account of this meeting. 

See McAuliffe, pp. 241-242.

117. Memorandum on McCone’s briefing of Eisenhower, 

see ibid., pp. 243-244.

118. McCone’s memorandum, see ibid., p. 245.

119. The above paragraph is from Andrew, For the 

President’s Eyes Only, pp. 292-293; also Brugioni, p. 332.

120. Author’s recollection. For a list of other diplomatic 

steps taken by the U.S. State Department during October 20-22, 

1962, see May and Zelikov, pp. 214-215.

121. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 294; 

Kennedy, pp. 53-55; and Brugioni, p. 363.
97

122. Kennedy, pp. 163-171; and from the author. It was 

ironic that on the same day President Kennedy made his speech 

to the nation, Colonel Penkovsky was reportedly arrested in 

Moscow. His arrest was not announced publicly until Pravda did 

so on December 12, 1962.

123. Ibid.

124. Halpern Lecture. See also Brugioni, pp. 366-367.

125. Brugioni, pp. 367.

126. Brugioni, pp. 75 and 265, Stephen E. Ambrose with 

Richard H. Immerman, Ike’s Spies, Garden City, NY: Doubleday 

and Co., 1981, p. 85; and the author.

127. Brugioni, pp. 366-368.

128. Ibid., pp. 371, 409-410.

129. Author, p. 63.

130. Kennedy, pp. 57, 60.

131. Halpern.

132. Brugioni, p. 391.

133. Ibid., pp. 398, 400-401.

134. Ibid., p. 401.

135. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, p. 297.

136. Excerpt from CIA memorandum, “The Crisis, USSR/

Cuba,” October 24 1962. See McAuliffe, pp. 295-296.

137. Brugioni, p. 423.

138. Excerpt from CIA memorandum, “Crisis, USSR/

Cuba.” See McAuliffe, pp. 303-304; Brugioni, pp. 423-424.
98

139. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, p. 298.

140. Kennedy, pp. 81-83.

141. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, p. 299.

142. Fursenko and Naftali, pp. 271-274; Kennedy, pp. 97-

99; Gribkov and Smith, p. 7.

143. Kennedy, pp. 15-16, 101-104; May and Zelikov, pp. 

560, 603-604.

144. Above two paragraphs from the author’s recollection; 

and McAuliffe, pp. 9-12. 

145. The author’s recollection.

146. For Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba, 

see McAuliffe, pp. 323-325.

147. The above two paragraphs from Kennedy, pp. 107-

109.

148. The above two paragraphs are from the CIA 

memorandum. See McAuliffe, pp. 341-343.

149. Kennedy, p. 110.

150. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, p. 302-308; 

Halpern from personal recollection.

151. Schecter and Deriabin, pp. 337-348. 

152. Ibid., pp. 346-350.

153. Fursenko and Naftali, pp. 309-313.

154. The above two paragraphs from the CIA 

memorandum; see McAuliffe, pp. 357-360.

155. Above two paragraphs from Brugioni, pp. 543, 546-

548.
99

156. Clift, pp. 30-32.

157. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

158. The above six paragraphs are from McAuliffe, pp. 

362-371; and the author.

159. Memorandum, McGeorge Bundy to Evelyn 

Lincoln, March 7, 1963, “Killian, James R. 2/4-3/7/63” folder, 

President’s Office Files, Special Correspondence, Box 31, JFKL. 

President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, March 11, 1963. 

Memorandum for the file: “March 8 and 9 Meeting of the PFIAB.” 

Assassination Records Review Board, Record 206-10001-10012, p. 

1; and the author.

160. McAuliffe, p. 366.

161. Ibid., pp. 367-368.

162. Ibid.

163. Ibid., pp. 367-369.

164. Ibid., pp. 361-371.

165. Kennedy, p. 111.

166. Ibid., pp. 14, 127-128.

167. Above two paragraphs from Schecter and Deriabin, 

p. 336; Helms, p. 216; and the author. 

168. Ibid.

169. Andrew and Gordievsky, pp. 477-478. 
100

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Stephen E. Ambrose with Richard H. Immerman, Ike’s Spies. 

(Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1981.) 

Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only. (New York: 

Harpercollins, 1995.)

Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB—The Inside 

Story. (London, UK: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1990.)

Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball—The Inside Story of the Cuban 

Missile Crisis. (New York: Random House, 1991.)

Denis Clift, James S. Major, ed., Clift Notes: Intelligence and The 

Nation’s Security, 2nd Ed. (Washington, DC: Joint Military 

Intelligence College, August 2002.) Mr. Clift was president of 

the JMIC, a part of DIA, in 2002. He is currently president 

of JMIC which in December 2006 was renamed the National 

Defense Intelligence College.

John Mack Faragher, Mari Jo Buhle, Daniel Czitrom, and Susan 

H. Armitage, Out of Many—A History of the American People. 

(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2nd Ed., 1997.) 

Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothey Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble. 

The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis. (New York and 

London, UK: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997.)

Douglas F. Garthoff, Directors Of Central Intelligence As Leaders 

of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946-2005. (Washington, 

DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center For The Study Of 

Intelligence, 2005.)

General Anatoli I. Gribkov and General William Y. Smith, 

Operation Anadyr—U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount The Cuban 

Missile Crisis. (Chicago, Berlin, Tokyo and Moscow: Edition 

Q, Inc., 1994.)

Sam Halpern, Lecture To JMIC, April 15, 1998. Mr. Halpern was 

the executive officer to the Chief of Task Force “W,” which 

was the CIA’s Cuban Task Force during the missile crisis. I 
101

am indebted to the late Mr. Halpern for his editing of this 

paper on several subsequent occasions. 

James H. Hansen, “Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis.” 

Unclassified Article, Studies In Intelligence, Vol. 46, No. 1. 

(Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2002.)

Richard Helms with William Hood, A Look Over My Shoulder. 

(New York, Random House, 2003).

Max Holland, “The ‘Photo Gap’ that Delayed Discovery of Missiles 

in Cuba,” Unclassified Article, Studies In Intelligence, Vol. 49, 

No. 4. (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2005.) 

Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War. (New York: Doubleday, 

1995.)

Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days—A Memoir of the Cuban Missile 

Crisis. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1st Ed., 1969.)

Sherman Kent, Donald P. Steury, ed., Sherman Kent and The 

Board Of National Estimates, Collected Essays By Sherman Kent. 

Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the 

Study Of Intelligence, 1994.)

Nikita Khrushchev, Introduction, Commentary, and Notes by 

Edward Crankshaw, Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed., Khrushchev 

Remembers. (Boston, MA, and Toronto, Canada: Little, Brown 

and Company, 1970.)

Nikita Khrushchev, Introduction by Jerrold L. Schecter; Foreword 

by Edward Crankshaw; Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed., 

Khrushchev Remembers—The Last Testament. (Boston, MA, and 

Toronto, Canada: Little, Brown and Company, 1974.)

Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes. Inside the 

White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Cambridge, MA, 

and London, UK: The Belknap Press Of Harvard University 

Press, 1997.)
102

Mary S. McAuliffe and the CIA History Staff, Cuban Missile Crisis, 

the CIA Documents. (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence 

Agency, October 1992.)

Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the 

World. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1992.)
103

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

KENNETH MICHAEL ABSHER currently is a Fellow 

with the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, 

the Bush School of Government and Public Service, at 

Texas A&M University. He retired from the Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA) as a member of the Senior 

Intelligence Service, having served over 31 years in the 

clandestine service. Mr. Absher was Chief of Station 

in two different field assignments, and Chief of Base 

in two others. He had four tours in CIA Headquarters 

managing foreign intelligence operations. Mr. Absher 

also served in Western Europe, the Caribbean, and 

Indochina. He provided direct intelligence support to 

the U.S. handling of major Cold War events such as the 

1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, the 1983 

military and rescue operation in Grenada (Operation 

URGENT FURY), and the break-up of the Soviet Union 

and the Warsaw Pact. Mr. Absher has taught at the 

University of Texas at San Antonio, and from 1997 to 

2002 at the Joint Military Intelligence College (now 

known as the National Defense Intelligence College) in 

Washington, DC. From January 2003 to February 2005, 

Mr. Absher served on the Joint Terrorism Task Force 

in San Antonio, Texas. During 2005, Secretary of State 

Condoleezza Rice appointed Mr. Absher as the DCI 

representative to three Accountability Review Boards 

to investigate terrorist attacks in Iraq. Mr. Absher 

graduated from Phillips Exeter Academy and holds a 

B.A. in Philosophy from Princeton University.
104

ANNEX A

THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES1

The predecessor of the Office of National Estimates 

(ONE) was the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), 

which was part of the new the CIA created by the 

National Security Act of 1947. After the ORE failed 

to foresee the North Korean invasion of South Korea 

on June 25, 1950, President Truman chose Lieutenant 

General Walter Bedell Smith to replace Admiral Roscoe 

Hillenkoetter as the DCI. In November 1950, Smith 

brought Harvard diplomatic historian William L. 

Langer and Yale historian Sherman Kent into the CIA. 

Both were veteran analysts of the Office of Strategic 

Services (OSS), which was the U.S. clandestine foreign 

intelligence and paramilitary service during World 

War II. ORE was then replaced by the new ONE. 

Henceforth, NIEs were to be produced by a Board 

of National Estimates, which was a part of the ONE. 

Langer became the head of the ONE and Chairman 

of the Board of National Estimates, with Kent as his 

deputy. After Langer returned to Harvard in 1952, 

Kent took over both positions where he remained until 

he retired on December 29, 1967, after more than 30 

years of government service. 

During the 1960s, the IC expanded in size and 

capabilities. In 1961, the Defense Intelligence Agency 

(DIA) was created. In 1973, DCI William Colby 

abolished ONE. He replaced it with a system of National 

Intelligence Officers which exists today, known as the 

National Intelligence Council. 

1. Donald P. Steury, “Introduction,” Donald P. Steury, ed., 

Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates, Collected Essays 

by Sherman Kent, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 

Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994, pp. xi, xii, xxiv.
105

ANNEX B

THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

The U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) was created by 

President Eisenhower by National Security Council 

Intelligence Directive (NSCID) 1, issued in April 

1958 and reissued in September that same year, to 

account for the creation of the new USIB. Eisenhower 

had a strong desire to force greater integration in the 

American IC. This new NSCID 1 gave the DCI an 

explicit formal mandate “to coordinate the foreign 

intelligence effort of the United States, in accordance 

with the principles established by statute and pertinent 

National Security Council directives.” This was an 

even stronger formulation than was contained in the 

1947 National Security Act. Yet the DCI at the time, 

Allen Dulles, continued to urge and persuade rather 

than force management of the intelligence community. 

Eisenhower backed off and accepted Dulles’ collegial 

style of management rather than replace him.1

 The USIB was initially comprised of 12 persons with 

mixed backgrounds: academics, retired diplomats, 

senior military officers, business executives, and 

lawyers. Once an NIE had been drafted and reviewed 

by the Board of National Estimates, it was submitted to 

the USIB which was comprised of representatives from 

all of the members of the Intelligence Community. The 

USIB was chaired by the DCI in his role as the leader 

of the Intelligence Community. Once an estimate 

was approved by the USIB, the DCI then had the 

responsibility to disseminate it to the White House and 

to the National Security Council.2

In the opening sentence of the January 16, 1962, 

memorandum from President Kennedy to the new 
106

DCI John McCone, the President said that “In carrying 

out your newly assigned duties as Director of Central 

Intelligence, it is my wish that . . . you undertake, as an 

integral part of your responsibility, the coordination 

and effective guidance of the total United States 

Foreign Intelligence effort.” Unlike Dulles, McCone 

enthusiastically welcomed his role as community 

leader. He particularly wanted to enhance the nation’s 

intelligence capabilities by applying modern science and 

technology. The President’s memo instructed McCone 

to work closely with the “heads of all departments 

and agencies having responsibilities in the foreign 

intelligence field.” This meant that the DCI outranked 

the other intelligence chiefs, and was expected to deal 

directly with their superiors. The President also said 

that he expected the DCI would delegate much of 

the task of running the CIA to the Deputy Director of 

Central Intelligence (DDCI), permitting him to focus on 

his “primary task as Director of Central Intelligence.”3

Until January 1962, the DCI presided as Chairman 

of the USIB and acted as the CIA representative on 

the USIB. Based on the President’s memo, McCone 

decided that he could be more impartial if he served 

as Chairman of the USIB with the DDCI serving as the 

CIA representative on the Board. McCone did this to 

emphasize his role as a broad leader of the American 

IC, not necessarily tied to the CIA positions. To 

improve even further his ability to guide and manage 

the intelligence community, McCone considered 

separating himself entirely from the direct management 

of the CIA. Although this would also have been in line 

with President Kennedy’s memorandum, McCone was 

not able to implement this additional step. Moreover, 

during the missile crisis, McCone further decided 

that he could not serve as chairman of the USIB 
107

while simultaneously functioning as a member of the 

EXCOM. He asked DDCI General Carter to chair the 

USIB during the crisis.4

ENDNOTES

1. Douglas F. Garthoff, Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders 

of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946-2005, Washington, DC: 

Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 

2005, pp. 34–36.

2. Richard Helms, with William Hood, A Look Over My 

Shoulder, New York: Random House, 2003, pp. 234-235.

3. Garthoff, pp. 41-42, 48. 

4. Ibid.; Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball—The Inside Story 

Of The Cuban Missile Crisis, New York: Random House, 1991, p. 

283.
108

ANNEX C

MAJOR INTELLIGENCE SOURCES USED 

DURING THE CRISIS

Soviet Intelligence Sources.1

SIGINT - (GRU telephone intercepts in Washington).

KGB penetration of NSA and U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

“Sasha” - U.S. military intelligence officer recruited 

by the KGB in Germany in 1959. He was stationed in 

Washington during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, 

but could only supply low level intelligence during the 

crisis.

U.S. Intelligence Sources.

Penkovsky - Soviet GRU officer who provided the 

CIA and British MI-6 with voluminous intelligence 

beginning in April 1961, but who lost his access to 

senior Soviet military officers in July 1962 just when 

we needed this access the most. Our last operational 

contact with him was August 27, 1962, at a reception 

in the apartment of the American Agricultural Attaché 

in Moscow. Documents were clandestinely exchanged. 

He was sighted again on September 5 at an American 

embassy reception; and on September 6 at a British 

film showing. His arrest was announced on December 

12, 1962. Penkovsky was tried, and his execution was 

announced in May 1963.2
109

U-2 photos – After U-2 flights resumed over the interior 

of Cuba on October 14, 1962, this photography in 

“triangulation” with Corona photos of missile sites in 

the USSR, and manuals for the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles 

which were provided by Penkovsky’s espionage gave 

the U.S. excellent intelligence coverage of the status of 

missile site construction and readiness. 

NSA SIGINT

CIA espionage agents in Cuba. 

Cuban refugee debriefings - some 1,500 to 2,000 Cuban 

refugees were debriefed every week in Miami. 

Clandestine Operations.3

The Clandestine Service within the CIA conducts 

espionage, counterespionage and covert action. It 

was initially known as the Directorate of Plans. It was 

subsequently renamed the Directorate of Operations. 

It is now known as the National Clandestine Service 

and is under the direction of the DCIA. 

Espionage is still not understood by many persons in 

government, journalism and academe. Espionage is the 

clandestine collection of information about the plans, 

intentions, and activities of foreign governments, 

organizations, and persons, by human or technical 

means. Human espionage involves the recruiting, 

training and running in place of an agent who serves 

and reports to us as a clandestine source. Espionage 

conducted by technical means is not the collection of 

intelligence by overt platforms such as aircraft and 
110

satellites. An example of espionage by technical means 

would be the clandestine installation of an audio 

device in a conference room used by senior officials of 

a foreign government.

Counterespionage is the clandestine collection of 

information by human or technical means about the 

plans, intentions, and activities of foreign governments, 

organizations, and persons to conduct espionage, 

sabotage, assassination, and acts of terrorism. 

Counterespionage operations may also be operations 

designed to counter or protect against espionage, 

sabotage, assassination, and terrorism—not just to 

collect information. 

Covert action is a third category of clandestine operations. 

It is designed to influence foreign governments, events, 

organizations, or persons in support of U.S. policy 

objectives. Covert action operations are normally 

conducted in a manner to conceal the identity of, or to 

permit plausible denial by the sponsor. Such operations 

may include political, economic, propaganda, or 

paramilitary activities.

ENDNOTES

1. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB—The 

Inside Story, London, UK: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1990, pp. 

475-476.

2. Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the 

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3. Kenneth Michael Absher, Defining Intelligence, Washington, 

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