In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-19-00348-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from the 355th District Court

Hood County, Texas

Trial Court No. CR13883

Before Birdwell, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Wallach, J.

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

ERIN MICHELLE HOLDERBY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Erin Michelle Holderby appeals the trial court’s judgment revoking her 

community supervision, adjudicating her guilt for possession of methamphetamine, 

sentencing her to two years’ confinement, and ordering her to pay court costs. We 

modify the judgment to delete from the court costs a $15 fee that was assessed without 

statutory authorization, and we affirm the judgment as modified.

Holderby’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as 

counsel and a brief in support of that motion. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the 

requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation of the record 

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 

S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). In compliance with Kelly v. State, counsel provided Holderby 

with a copy of the motion to withdraw, provided her a copy of the brief, informed her 

of her right to file a pro se response, informed her of her right to seek discretionary 

review pro se should this court deny relief, and took concrete measures to facilitate 

Holderby’s review of the appellate record. 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 

This court afforded Holderby the opportunity to file a response on her own behalf, but 

she did not file a brief.

In the Anders context, we must conduct an independent evaluation of the record 

to determine whether counsel is correct in determining that the appeal is frivolous. See 

Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Jury v. State, 472 S.W.3d 

880, 880 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). Only then may we grant 
3

counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 

351 (1988).

We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief and the record. After reviewing the 

itemized bill of costs, we conclude that there is no statutory authority authorizing the 

$15 assessed as a “Motion to Proceed/Revoke Fee.”1 See Ethridge v. State, No. 02-19-

00146-CR, 2019 WL 5792661, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 7, 2019, no pet.) 

(per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Thiebaud v. State, No. 02-18-

00173-CR, 2019 WL 983747, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 28, 2019, no pet.) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication). Because only statutorily authorized court 

costs may be assessed against a criminal defendant, we modify the judgment, the 

incorporated order to withdraw funds, and the bill of costs to delete this $15 fee, leaving 

$1,090.13 as the total balance due. See Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 389 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2014); Thiebaud, 2019 WL 983747, at *2.

Except for the improperly imposed fee, we agree with counsel that this appeal is 

wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the record that might arguably 

support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 

1

To the extent that there are any other cost discrepancies in connection with the 

imposition of community supervision, Holderby could not challenge these costs on 

appeal from revocation, see Riles v. State, 452 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), 

and we need not put her in a better position simply because her attorney filed an Anders 

brief. See Eubank v. State, No. 02-18-00351-CR, 2019 WL 2635564, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth June 27, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
4

Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm, as modified, the trial 

court’s judgment and incorporated order to withdraw funds.

Per Curiam

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: March 12, 2020