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File Name: 15a0182n.06

Case No. 14-1366

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DEON ARCHIE POWELL,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

Before: KEITH, MERRITT, and BOGGS, Circuit Judges

DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge.

The central issue in this case is whether the district court erred in denying the defendant’s 

motion to suppress guns and ammunition seized pursuant to an allegedly stale search warrant. 

Because the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to the government’s search and 

seizure, we AFFIRM. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 6, 2011, a magistrate judge in the Eastern District of Michigan issued a search 

warrant. Special Agent James Koss of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency submitted an 
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affidavit to support the search warrant application. See R. at 62.1The affidavit details a drug 

trafficking enterprise led by Anthony Edwards and Clarence Williamson. The warrant sought 

documentary and physical (but non-narcotic) evidence of drug and firearm offenses, including 

guns and ammunition. R. at 62, 73. 

On May 17, 2011, pursuant to the issued search warrant, law enforcement agents 

searched a residence located at 7324 Grandmont Avenue in Detroit, Michigan. The agents found 

firearms and ammunition. See R. at 409. According to the affidavit, Powell resided at the 

Grandmont address. 

The United States charged Powell with one count of being a felon in possession of 

firearms and one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

922(g)(1). Powell filed a motion to suppress. See R. at 51. In his motion to suppress, Powell 

argued that the government lacked probable cause to search the Grandmont residence. The 

district court denied Powell’s motion to suppress. See R. at 545. The district court declined to 

decide whether probable cause supported the search warrant, characterizing this question as 

“very close.” R. at 561. However, the district court held that the evidence seized pursuant to the 

search warrant was admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See R. at 

561–62. 

Powell went to trial. The United States entered the guns and ammunition into evidence. 

On September 25, 2013, the jury convicted Powell on both counts. R. at 112. The district court 

entered final judgment in March of 2014. R. at 154. Powell appealed the district court’s 

judgment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

 

1

“R.” designates citations to the paginated record of the proceedings below. Thus, “R. at 62” refers to 

PageID 62.
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II. ANALYSIS

Powell argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because 

probable cause did not support the search warrant. Powell further argues that the good-faith 

exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply because the affidavit supporting the search 

warrant was so lacking in probable cause that no reasonable officer could have considered it 

valid. We disagree with Powell’s second argument and hold that the good-faith exception to the 

exclusionary rule applies in this case. Based on this disposition, we decline to consider whether 

probable cause supported the search warrant. United States v. McCraven, 401 F.3d 693, 698 (6th 

Cir. 2005). 

Probable cause must support a search warrant. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Probable cause 

supports a search warrant when the underlying affidavit creates “a fair probability that 

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 

213, 238 (1983). Where the affidavit underlying the search warrant fails to create such a fair 

probability, courts ordinarily must suppress evidence obtained pursuant to the invalid search 

warrant. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011). This rule is called the 

“exclusionary rule.” 

The Supreme Court has created a “good-faith exception” to the exclusionary rule. Under 

the good-faith exception, “[w]hen police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of probable 

cause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted in objectively reasonable reliance 

on the subsequently invalidated search warrant. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 142 

(2009) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review de novo the district 

court’s legal conclusion that the good-faith exception applies. United States v. Helton, 314 F.3d 

812, 824 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
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The Supreme Court has identified at least four situations in which the government’s 

reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant is objectively unreasonable: (1) where “the 

magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant 

knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth”; 

(2) “where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his [neutral and detached] judicial role”; 

(3) where the warrant is “based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 

render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; and (4) where the warrant is so 

“facially deficient . . . that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” 

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

The good-faith standard is “less demanding” than the “threshold required to prove the 

existence of probable cause.” United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2004) (en 

banc) (citation omitted). Thus, the good-faith exception applies where “the affidavit contain[s] a 

minimally sufficient nexus between the illegal activity and the place to be searched to support an 

officer’s good-faith belief in the warrant’s validity.” Id. at 596 (citations omitted); see also 

United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that the good-faith 

exception applies when the affidavit underlying the warrant provides “some connection, 

regardless of how remote it may have been, between the criminal activity at issue and the place 

to be searched”). 

The good-faith exception applies in this case. The affidavit created a minimally sufficient 

nexus between the drug and firearm activity and the Grandmont residence for the executing 

agents to reasonably believe that the residence contained evidence of drug and firearm offenses. 

First, the agents had reason to believe that Powell resided at the Grandmont property because he 
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listed it as his address, maintained its electric service in his name, and frequently parked two of 

his cars there. R. at 70. Also, the affidavit states that a controlled buy transpired between 

Edwards and a confidential informant at that address on September 30, 2010. During this 

transaction, Edwards briefly entered the Grandmont residence and, upon exiting, supplied the 

confidential informant with two ounces of heroin. R. at 68; see also United States v. Ellison, 

632 F.3d 347, 349 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Commission of a drug transaction outside of a house and one 

participant’s walking back into the house . . . plainly demonstrate[s] a sufficient nexus with the 

house.”). Further, the affidavit states that Powell discussed both selling heroin to Edwards on 

September 21, 2010 and buying marijuana from Edwards on September 25, 2010. R. at 66–67. 

Thus, because the facts indicated that Powell lived at the Grandmont property, the agents could 

have reasonably believed that he was using his “home[] to store drugs and otherwise further [his]

drug trafficking.” United States v. Williams, 544 F.3d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 2008). Additionally, the 

affidavit states that, during a conversation on December 6, 2010, Williamson told Edwards that 

he wanted to retrieve a bag of guns that Edwards was storing at “that house,” which Special 

Agent Koss understood as a potential reference to the Grandmont property. See R. at 68–70; see 

also United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo, 346 F.3d 637, 644 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted) 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (“The issuing judge or magistrate may give considerable 

weight to the conclusion of experienced law enforcement officers regarding where evidence of a 

crime is likely to be found and is entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is 

likely to be kept.”). Also, we have recognized that “firearms are often used by narcotics 

traffickers for protection, and people generally store their firearms at home.” United States v. 

Chapman, 112 F. App’x 469, 472 (6th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, it was objectively reasonable for 
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the agents to believe that the Grandmont residence contained evidence of drug and firearm 

offenses. 

Powell argues that the affidavit failed to create a minimally sufficient nexus with the 

Grandmont residence because it had gone stale by the time the agents executed the search. To 

support this argument, Powell notes that the agents executed the search warrant approximately 

eight months after some of the key drug activity detailed in the affidavit. 

We consider four factors when analyzing whether an affidavit is stale: (1) whether the 

crime is transitory or continuing; (2) whether the criminal is nomadic or stationary; (3) whether 

the thing to be seized is perishable or durable; and (4) whether the place to be searched is a 

forum of convenience or a secure operational base. See United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 

572–73 (6th Cir. 2006). 

Here, the balance of the staleness factors weighs in the United States’ favor. The first 

factor may favor Powell somewhat. Although the affidavit purports to describe a continuing drug 

ring, the vast bulk of the activity relating to the Grandmont residence took place in the fall of 

2010. See R. at 65–67. Factor two, however, favors the United States. The affidavit’s averments 

support a reasonable belief that Powell was a stable resident at the Grandmont property. As for 

factor three, the warrant targeted documentary and physical evidence of drug activity, including 

firearms and ammunition. Although firearms are transferrable, we have nevertheless stated that 

they “are durable goods and might well be expected to remain in a criminal’s possession for a 

long period of time.” United States v. Pritchett, 40 F. App’x 901, 906 (6th Cir. 2002); see also 

United States v. Vanderweele, 545 F. App’x 465, 469–70 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that a sevenmonth delay in executing a search warrant for a silencer did not render it stale, partly because “a 

silencer is like a gun, easily transferrable, but more commonly kept by its owner for a long 
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time”). The final factor also favors the United States. The agents searched Powell’s home, which 

is more like a secure operational base than a mere forum of convenience. See United States v. 

Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 481 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(“The place to be searched was the defendant’s home, suggesting that there was some 

permanence to the defendant’s base of operation.”). Accordingly, despite the eight-month time 

lag, the affidavit was not sufficiently stale to vitiate the minimally sufficient nexus between the 

Grandmont residence and the drug and firearm activity the affidavit outlines. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.