III

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. RES. 75

To advise and consent to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons

Convention, subject to certain conditions.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 17, 1997

Mr. HELMS submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on Foreign Relations

APRIL 23, 1997

Committee discharged pursuant to the order of April 17, 1997

APRIL 24, 1997

Considered, amended, and agreed to

EXECUTIVE RESOLUTION

To advise and consent to the ratification of the Chemical

Weapons Convention, subject to certain conditions.

1 Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concur2 ring therein),

3 SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO

4 CONDITIONS.

5 The Senate advises and consents to the ratification

6 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (as defined in sec-
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1 tion 3 of this resolution), subject to the conditions in sec2 tion 2.

3 SEC. 2. CONDITIONS.

4 The Senate’s advice and consent to the ratification

5 of the Chemical Weapons Convention is subject to the fol6 lowing conditions, which shall be binding upon the Presi7 dent:

8 (1) EFFECT OF ARTICLE XXII.—Upon the de9 posit of the United States instrument of ratification,

10 the President shall certify to the Congress that the

11 United States has informed all other States Parties

12 to the Convention that the Senate reserves the right,

13 pursuant to the Constitution of the United States,

14 to give its advice and consent to ratification of the

15 Convention subject to reservations, notwithstanding

16 Article XXII of the Convention.

17 (2) FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS.—Notwith18 standing any provision of the Convention, no funds

19 may be drawn from the Treasury of the United

20 States for any payment or assistance (including the

21 transfer of in-kind items) under paragraph 16 of Ar22 ticle IV, paragraph 19 of Article V, paragraph 7 of

23 Article VIII, paragraph 23 of Article IX, Article X,

24 or any other provision of the Convention, without

25 statutory authorization and appropriation.
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1 (3) ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNAL OVER2 SIGHT OFFICE.—

3 (A) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 240

4 days after the deposit of the United States in5 strument of ratification, the President shall cer6 tify to the Congress that the current internal

7 audit office of the Preparatory Commission has

8 been expanded into an independent internal

9 oversight office whose functions will be trans10 ferred to the Organization for the Prohibition

11 of Chemical Weapons upon the establishment of

12 the Organization. The independent internal

13 oversight office shall be obligated to protect

14 confidential information pursuant to the obliga15 tions of the Confidentiality Annex. The inde16 pendent internal oversight office shall—

17 (i) make investigations and reports re18 lating to all programs of the Organization;

19 (ii) undertake both management and

20 financial audits, including—

21 (I) an annual assessment verify22 ing that classified and confidential in23 formation is stored and handled se24 curely pursuant to the general obliga25 tions set forth in Article VIII and in
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1 accordance with all provisions of the

2 Annex on the Protection of Confiden3 tial Information; and

4 (II) an annual assessment of lab5 oratories established pursuant to

6 paragraph 55 of Part II of the Ver7 ification Annex to ensure that the Di8 rector General of the Technical Sec9 retariat is carrying out his functions

10 pursuant to paragraph 56 of Part II

11 of the Verification Annex;

12 (iii) undertake performance evalua13 tions annually to ensure the Organization

14 has complied to the extent practicable with

15 the recommendations of the independent

16 internal oversight office;

17 (iv) have access to all records relating

18 to the programs and operations of the Or19 ganization;

20 (v) have direct and prompt access to

21 any official of the Organization; and

22 (vi) be required to protect the identity

23 of, and prevent reprisals against, all com24 plainants.
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1 (B) COMPLIANCE WITH RECOMMENDA2 TIONS.—The Organization shall ensure, to the

3 extent practicable, compliance with rec4 ommendations of the independent internal over5 sight office, and shall ensure that annual and

6 other relevant reports by the independent inter7 nal oversight office are made available to all

8 member states pursuant to the requirements es9 tablished in the Confidentiality Annex.

10 (C) WITHHOLDING A PORTION OF CON11 TRIBUTIONS.—Until a certification is made

12 under subparagraph (A), 50 percent of the

13 amount of United States contributions to the

14 regular budget of the Organization assessed

15 pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII shall

16 be withheld from disbursement, in addition to

17 any other amounts required to be withheld from

18 disbursement by any other provision of law.

19 (D) ASSESSMENT OF FIRST YEAR CON20 TRIBUTIONS.—Notwithstanding the require21 ments of this paragraph, for the first year of

22 the Organization’s operation, ending on April

23 29, 1998, the United States shall make its full

24 contribution to the regular budget of the Orga-
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1 nization assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of

2 Article VIII.

3 (E) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this

4 paragraph, the term ‘‘internal oversight office’’

5 means an independent office (or other inde6 pendent entity) established by the Organization

7 to conduct and supervise objective audits, in8 spections, and investigations relating to the pro9 grams and operations of the Organization.

10 (4) COST SHARING ARRANGEMENTS.—

11 (A) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Prior to the de12 posit of the United States instrument of ratifi13 cation, and annually thereafter, the President

14 shall submit a report to Congress identifying all

15 cost-sharing arrangements with the Organiza16 tion.

17 (B) COST-SHARING ARRANGEMENT RE18 QUIRED.—The United States shall not under19 take any new research or development expendi20 tures for the primary purpose of refining or im21 proving the Organization’s regime for verifica22 tion of compliance under the Convention, in23 cluding the training of inspectors and the provi24 sion of detection equipment and on-site analysis

25 sampling and analysis techniques, or share the
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1 articles, items, or services resulting from any

2 research and development undertaken pre3 viously, without first having concluded and sub4 mitted to the Congress a cost-sharing arrange5 ment with the Organization.

6 (C) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this

7 paragraph may be construed as limiting or con8 stricting in any way the ability of the United

9 States to pursue unilaterally any project under10 taken solely to increase the capability of the

11 United States means for monitoring compliance

12 with the Convention.

13 (5) INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND SAFE14 GUARDS.—

15 (A) PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE INFOR16 MATION TO THE ORGANIZATION.—

17 (i) IN GENERAL.—No United States

18 intelligence information may be provided to

19 the Organization or any organization affili20 ated with the Organization, or to any offi21 cial or employee thereof, unless the Presi22 dent certifies to the appropriate commit23 tees of Congress that the Director of

24 Central Intelligence, in consultation with

25 the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
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1 Defense, has established and implemented

2 procedures, and has worked with the Orga3 nization or such other organization, as the

4 case may be, to ensure implementation of

5 procedures, for protecting from unauthor6 ized disclosure United States intelligence

7 sources and methods connected to such in8 formation. These procedures shall include

9 the requirement of—

10 (I) the offer and provision, if ac11 cepted, of advice and assistance to the

12 Organization or the affiliated organi13 zation in establishing and maintaining

14 the necessary measures to ensure that

15 inspectors and other staff members of

16 the Technical Secretariat meet the

17 highest standards of efficiency, com18 petence, and integrity, pursuant to

19 paragraph 1(b) of the Confidentiality

20 Annex, and in establishing and main21 taining a stringent regime governing

22 the handling of confidential informa23 tion by the Technical Secretariat, pur24 suant to paragraph 2 of the Confiden25 tiality Annex;
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1 (II) a determination that any un2 authorized disclosure of United States

3 intelligence information to be provided

4 to the Organization or any organiza5 tion affiliated with the Organization,

6 or any official or employee thereof,

7 would result in no more than minimal

8 damage to United States national se9 curity, in light of the risks of the un10 authorized disclosure of such informa11 tion;

12 (III) sanitization of intelligence

13 information that is to be provided to

14 the Organization or the affiliated or15 ganization to remove all information

16 that could betray intelligence sources

17 and methods; and

18 (IV) interagency United States

19 intelligence community approval for

20 any release of intelligence information

21 to the Organization or the affiliated

22 organization, no matter how thor23 oughly it has been sanitized.

24 (ii) WAIVER AUTHORITY.—
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1 (I) IN GENERAL.—The Director

2 of Central Intelligence may waive the

3 application of clause (i) if the Director

4 of Central Intelligence certifies in

5 writing to the appropriate committees

6 of Congress that providing such infor7 mation to the Organization or an or8 ganization affiliated with the Organi9 zation, or to any official or employee

10 thereof, is in the vital national secu11 rity interests of the United States and

12 that all possible measures to protect

13 such information have been taken, ex14 cept that such waiver must be made

15 for each instance such information is

16 provided, or for each such document

17 provided. In the event that multiple

18 waivers are issued within a single

19 week, a single certification to the ap20 propriate committees of Congress may

21 be submitted, specifying each waiver

22 issued during that week.

23 (II) DELEGATION OF DUTIES.—

24 The Director of Central Intelligence
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1 may not delegate any duty of the Di2 rector under this paragraph.

3 (B) PERIODIC AND SPECIAL REPORTS.—

4 (i) IN GENERAL.—The President shall

5 report periodically, but not less frequently

6 than semiannually, to the Select Commit7 tee on Intelligence of the Senate and the

8 Permanent Select Committee on Intel9 ligence of the House of Representatives on

10 the types and volume of intelligence infor11 mation provided to the Organization or af12 filiated organizations and the purposes for

13 which it was provided during the period

14 covered by the report.

15 (ii) EXEMPTION.—For purposes of

16 this subparagraph, intelligence information

17 provided to the Organization or affiliated

18 organizations does not cover information

19 that is provided only to, and only for the

20 use of, appropriately cleared United States

21 Government personnel serving with the Or22 ganization or an affiliated organization.

23 (C) SPECIAL REPORTS.—

24 (i) REPORT ON PROCEDURES.—Ac25 companying the certification provided pur-
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1 suant to subparagraph (A)(i), the Presi2 dent shall provide a detailed report to the

3 Select Committee on Intelligence of the

4 Senate and the Permanent Select Commit5 tee on Intelligence of the House of Rep6 resentatives identifying the procedures es7 tablished for protecting intelligence sources

8 and methods when intelligence information

9 is provided pursuant to this section.

10 (ii) REPORTS ON UNAUTHORIZED DIS11 CLOSURES.—The President shall submit a

12 report to the Select Committee on Intel13 ligence of the Senate and the Permanent

14 Select Committee on Intelligence of the

15 House of Representatives within 15 days

16 after it has become known to the United

17 States Government regarding any unau18 thorized disclosure of intelligence provided

19 by the United States to the Organization.

20 (D) DELEGATION OF DUTIES.—The Presi21 dent may not delegate or assign the duties of

22 the President under this section.

23 (E) RELATIONSHIP TO EXISTING LAW.—

24 Nothing in this paragraph may be construed

25 to—
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1 (i) impair or otherwise affect the au2 thority of the Director of Central Intel3 ligence to protect intelligence sources and

4 methods from unauthorized disclosure pur5 suant to section 103(c)(5) of the National

6 Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–

7 3(c)(5)); or

8 (ii) supersede or otherwise affect the

9 provisions of title V of the National Secu10 rity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.).

11 (F) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

12 (i) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF

13 CONGRESS.—The term ‘‘appropriate com14 mittees of Congress’’ means the Committee

15 on Foreign Relations and the Select Com16 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate and

17 the Committee on International Relations

18 and the Permanent Select Committee on

19 Intelligence of the House of Representa20 tives.

21 (ii) ORGANIZATION.—The term ‘‘Or22 ganization’’ means the Organization for

23 the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons es24 tablished under the Convention and in25 cludes any organ of that Organization and
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1 any board or working group, such as the

2 Scientific Advisory Board, that may be es3 tablished by it, and any official or em4 ployee thereof.

5 (iii) ORGANIZATION AFFILIATED WITH

6 THE ORGANIZATION.—The terms ‘‘organi7 zation affiliated with the Organization’’

8 and ‘‘affiliated organizations’’ include the

9 Provisional Technical Secretariat under the

10 Convention and any laboratory certified by

11 the Director-General of the Technical Sec12 retariat as designated to perform analytical

13 or other functions, and any official or em14 ployee thereof.

15 (6) AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION.—

16 (A) VOTING REPRESENTATION OF THE

17 UNITED STATES.—A United States representa18 tive will be present at all Amendment Con19 ferences and will cast a vote, either affirmative

20 or negative, on all proposed amendments made

21 at such conferences.

22 (B) SUBMISSION OF AMENDMENTS AS

23 TREATIES.—The President shall submit to the

24 Senate for its advice and consent to ratification

25 under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
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1 Constitution of the United States any amend2 ment to the Convention adopted by an Amend3 ment Conference.

4 (7) CONTINUING VITALITY OF THE AUSTRALIA

5 GROUP AND NATIONAL EXPORT CONTROLS.—

6 (A) DECLARATION.—The Senate declares

7 that the collapse of the informal forum of states

8 known as the ‘‘Australia Group,’’ either

9 through changes in membership or lack of com10 pliance with common export controls, or the

11 substantial weakening of common Australia

12 Group export controls and non-proliferation

13 measures in force on the date of United States

14 ratification of the Convention, would constitute

15 a fundamental change in circumstances affect16 ing the object and purpose of the Convention.

17 (B) CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—Prior

18 to the deposit of the United States instrument

19 of ratification, the President shall certify to

20 Congress that—

21 (i) nothing in the Convention obligates

22 the United States to accept any modifica23 tion, change in scope, or weakening of its

24 national export controls;
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1 (ii) the United States understands

2 that the maintenance of national restric3 tions on trade in chemicals and chemical

4 production technology is fully compatible

5 with the provisions of the Convention, in6 cluding Article XI(2), and solely within the

7 sovereign jurisdiction of the United States;

8 (iii) the Convention preserves the

9 right of State Parties, unilaterally or col10 lectively, to maintain or impose export con11 trols on chemicals and related chemical

12 production technology for foreign policy or

13 national security reasons, notwithstanding

14 Article XI(2); and

15 (iv) each Australia Group member, at

16 the highest diplomatic levels, has officially

17 communicated to the United States Gov18 ernment its understanding and agreement

19 that export control and nonproliferation

20 measures which the Australia Group has

21 undertaken are fully compatible with the

22 provisions of the Convention, including Ar23 ticle XI(2), and its commitment to main24 tain in the future such export controls and
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1 nonproliferation measures against non2 Australia Group members.

3 (C) ANNUAL CERTIFICATION.—

4 (i) EFFECTIVENESS OF AUSTRALIA

5 GROUP.—The President shall certify to

6 Congress on an annual basis that—

7 (I) Australia Group members

8 continue to maintain an equally effec9 tive or more comprehensive control

10 over the export of toxic chemicals and

11 their precursors, dual-use processing

12 equipment, human, animal and plant

13 pathogens and toxins with potential

14 biological weapons application, and

15 dual-use biological equipment, as that

16 afforded by the Australia Group as of

17 the date of ratification of the Conven18 tion by the United States; and

19 (II) the Australia Group remains

20 a viable mechanism for limiting the

21 spread of chemical and biological

22 weapons-related materials and tech23 nology, and that the effectiveness of

24 the Australia Group has not been un25 dermined by changes in membership,
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1 lack of compliance with common ex2 port controls and nonproliferation

3 measures, or the weakening of com4 mon controls and nonproliferation

5 measures, in force as of the date of

6 ratification of the Convention by the

7 United States.

8 (ii) CONSULTATION WITH SENATE RE9 QUIRED.—In the event that the President

10 is, at any time, unable to make the certifi11 cations described in clause (i), the Presi12 dent shall consult with the Senate for the

13 purposes of obtaining a resolution of sup14 port for continued adherence to the Con15 vention, notwithstanding the fundamental

16 change in circumstance.

17 (D) PERIODIC CONSULTATION WITH CON18 GRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The President

19 shall consult periodically, but not less fre20 quently than twice a year, with the Committee

21 on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the

22 Committee on International Relations of the

23 House of Representatives, on Australia Group

24 export control and nonproliferation measures. If

25 any Australia Group member adopts a position
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1 at variance with the certifications and under2 standings provided under subparagraph (B), or

3 should seek to gain Australia Group acquies4 cence or approval for an interpretation that var5 ious provisions of the Convention require it to

6 remove chemical-weapons related export con7 trols against any State Party to the Conven8 tion, the President shall block any effort by

9 that Australia Group member to secure Aus10 tralia Group approval of such a position or in11 terpretation.

12 (E) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph:

13 (i) AUSTRALIA GROUP.—The term

14 ‘‘Australia Group’’ means the informal

15 forum of states, chaired by Australia,

16 whose goal is to discourage and impede

17 chemical and biological weapons prolifera18 tion by harmonizing national export con19 trols chemical weapons precursor chemi20 cals, biological weapons pathogens, and

21 dual-use production equipment, and

22 through other measures.

23 (ii) HIGHEST DIPLOMATIC LEVELS.—

24 The term ‘‘highest diplomatic levels’’

25 means at the levels of senior officials with
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1 the power to authoritatively represent their

2 governments, and does not include diplo3 matic representatives of those governments

4 to the United States.

5 (8) NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES.—

6 (A) REEVALUATION.—In forswearing

7 under the Convention the possession of a chemi8 cal weapons retaliatory capability, the Senate

9 understands that deterrence of attack by chemi10 cal weapons requires a reevaluation of the nega11 tive security assurances extended to non-nu12 clear-weapon states.

13 (B) CLASSIFIED REPORT.—Accordingly,

14 180 days after the deposit of the United States

15 instrument of ratification, the President shall

16 submit to the Congress a classified report set17 ting forth the findings of a detailed review of

18 United States policy on negative security assur19 ances, including a determination of the appro20 priate responses to the use of chemical or bio21 logical weapons against the Armed Forces of

22 the United States, United States citizens and

23 allies, and third parties.

24 (9) PROTECTION OF ADVANCED BIO25 TECHNOLOGY.—Prior to the deposit of the United
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1 States instrument of ratification, and on January 1

2 of every year thereafter, the President shall certify

3 to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the

4 Speaker of the House of Representatives that the le5 gitimate commercial activities and interests of chem6 ical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms in the

7 United States are not being significantly harmed by

8 the limitations of the Convention on access to, and

9 production of, those chemicals and toxins listed in

10 Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals.

11 (10) MONITORING AND VERIFICATION OF COM12 PLIANCE.—

13 (A) DECLARATION.—The Senate declares

14 that—

15 (i) the Convention is in the interests

16 of the United States only if all State Par17 ties are in strict compliance with the terms

18 of the Convention as submitted to the Sen19 ate for its advice and consent to ratifica20 tion, such compliance being measured by

21 performance and not by efforts, intentions,

22 or commitments to comply; and

23 (ii) the Senate expects all State Par24 ties to be in strict compliance with their

25 obligations under the terms of the Conven-
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1 tion, as submitted to the Senate for its ad2 vice and consent to ratification;

3 (B) BRIEFINGS ON COMPLIANCE.—Given

4 its concern about the intelligence community’s

5 low level of confidence in its ability to monitor

6 compliance with the Convention, the Senate ex7 pects the executive branch of the Government

8 to offer regular briefings, not less than four

9 times a year, to the Committee on Foreign Re10 lations of the Senate and the Committee on

11 International Relations of the House of Rep12 resentatives on compliance issues related to the

13 Convention. Such briefings shall include a de14 scription of all United States efforts in bilateral

15 and multilateral diplomatic channels and fo16 rums to resolve compliance issues and shall in17 clude a complete description of—

18 (i) any compliance issues the United

19 States plans to raise at meetings of the

20 Organization, in advance of such meetings;

21 (ii) any compliance issues raised at

22 meetings of the Organization, within 30

23 days of such meeting;

24 (iii) any determination by the Presi25 dent that a State Party is in noncompli-
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1 ance with or is otherwise acting in a man2 ner inconsistent with the object or purpose

3 of the Convention, within 30 days of such

4 a determination.

5 (C) ANNUAL REPORTS ON COMPLIANCE.—

6 The President shall submit on January 1 of

7 each year to the Committee on Foreign Rela8 tions of the Senate and the Committee on

9 International Relations of the House of Rep10 resentatives a full and complete classified and

11 unclassified report setting forth—

12 (i) a certification of those countries

13 included in the Intelligence Community’s

14 Monitoring Strategy, as set forth by the

15 Director of Central Intelligence’s Arms

16 Control Staff and the National Intelligence

17 Council (or any successor document setting

18 forth intelligence priorities in the field of

19 the proliferation of weapons of mass de20 struction) that are determined to be in

21 compliance with the Convention, on a

22 country-by-country basis;

23 (ii) for those countries not certified

24 pursuant to clause (i), an identification

25 and assessment of all compliance issues
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1 arising with regard to the adherence of the

2 country to its obligations under the Con3 vention;

4 (iii) the steps the United States has

5 taken, either unilaterally or in conjunction

6 with another State Party—

7 (I) to initiate challenge inspec8 tions of the noncompliant party with

9 the objective of demonstrating to the

10 international community the act of

11 noncompliance;

12 (II) to call attention publicly to

13 the activity in question; and

14 (III) to seek on an urgent basis

15 a meeting at the highest diplomatic

16 level with the noncompliant party with

17 the objective of bringing the non18 compliant party into compliance;

19 (iv) a determination of the military

20 significance and broader security risks

21 arising from any compliance issue identi22 fied pursuant to clause (ii); and

23 (v) a detailed assessment of the re24 sponses of the noncompliant party in ques-
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1 tion to action undertaken by the United

2 States described in clause (iii).

3 (D) COUNTRIES PREVIOUSLY INCLUDED IN

4 COMPLIANCE REPORTS.—For any country that

5 was previously included in a report submitted

6 under subparagraph (C), but which subse7 quently is not included in the Intelligence Com8 munity’s Monitoring Strategy (or successor doc9 ument), such country shall continue to be in10 cluded in the report submitted under subpara11 graph (C) unless the country has been certified

12 under subparagraph (C)(i) for each of the pre13 vious two years.

14 (E) FORM OF CERTIFICATIONS.—For those

15 countries that have been publicly and officially

16 identified by a representative of the intelligence

17 community as possessing or seeking to develop

18 chemical weapons, the certification described in

19 subparagraph (C)(i) shall be in unclassified

20 form.

21 (F) ANNUAL REPORTS ON INTEL22 LIGENCE.—On January 1, 1998, and annually

23 thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence

24 shall submit to the Committees on Foreign Re25 lations, Armed Services, and the Select Com-
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1 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate and to the

2 Committees on International Relations, Na3 tional Security, and Permanent Select Commit4 tee on Intelligence of the House of Representa5 tives a full and complete classified and unclassi6 fied report regarding—

7 (i) the status of chemical weapons de8 velopment, production, stockpiling, and

9 use, within the meanings of those terms

10 under the Convention, on a country-by11 country basis;

12 (ii) any information made available to

13 the United States Government concerning

14 the development, production, acquisition,

15 stockpiling, retention, use, or direct or in16 direct transfer of novel agents, including

17 any unitary or binary chemical weapon

18 comprised of chemical components not

19 identified on the schedules of the Annex on

20 Chemicals, on a country-by-country basis;

21 (iii) the extent of trade in chemicals

22 potentially relevant to chemical weapons

23 programs, including all Australia Group

24 chemicals and chemicals identified on the
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1 schedules of the Annex on Chemicals, on a

2 country-by-country basis;

3 (iv) the monitoring responsibilities,

4 practices, and strategies of the intelligence

5 community (as defined in section 3(4) of

6 the National Security Act of 1947) and a

7 determination of the level of confidence of

8 the intelligence community with respect to

9 each specific monitoring task undertaken,

10 including an assessment by the intelligence

11 community of the national aggregate data

12 provided by State Parties to the Organiza13 tion, on a country-by-country basis;

14 (v) an identification of how United

15 States national intelligence means, includ16 ing national technical means and human

17 intelligence, are being marshaled together

18 with the Convention’s verification provi19 sions to monitor compliance with the Con20 vention; and

21 (vi) the identification of chemical

22 weapons development, production, stock23 piling, or use, within the meanings of those

24 terms under the Convention, by sub-
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1 national groups, including terrorist and

2 paramilitary organizations.

3 (G) REPORTS ON RESOURCES FOR MON4 ITORING.—Each report required under subpara5 graph (F) shall include a full and complete clas6 sified annex submitted solely to the Select Com7 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate and to the

8 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of

9 the House of Representatives regarding—

10 (i) a detailed and specific identifica11 tion of all United States resources devoted

12 to monitoring the Convention, including in13 formation on all expenditures associated

14 with the monitoring of the Convention; and

15 (ii) an identification of the priorities

16 of the executive branch of Government for

17 the development of new resources relating

18 to detection and monitoring capabilities

19 with respect to chemical and biological

20 weapons, including a description of the

21 steps being taken and resources being de22 voted to strengthening United States mon23 itoring capabilities.

24 (11) ENHANCEMENTS TO ROBUST CHEMICAL

25 AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSES.—
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1 (A) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the

2 sense of the Senate that—

3 (i) chemical and biological threats to

4 deployed United States Armed Forces will

5 continue to grow in regions of concern

6 around the world, and pose serious threats

7 to United States power projection and for8 ward deployment strategies;

9 (ii) chemical weapons or biological

10 weapons use is a potential element of fu11 ture conflicts in regions of concern;

12 (iii) it is essential for the United

13 States and key regional allies to preserve

14 and further develop robust chemical and

15 biological defenses;

16 (iv) the United States Armed Forces

17 are inadequately equipped, organized,

18 trained and exercised for chemical and bio19 logical defense against current and ex20 pected threats, and that too much reliance

21 is placed on non-active duty forces, which

22 receive less training and less modern

23 equipment, for critical chemical and bio24 logical defense capabilities;
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1 (v) the lack of readiness stems from a

2 de-emphasis of chemical and biological de3 fenses within the executive branch of Gov4 ernment and the United States Armed

5 Forces;

6 (vi) the armed forces of key regional

7 allies and likely coalition partners, as well

8 as civilians necessary to support United

9 States military operations, are inad10 equately prepared and equipped to carry

11 out essential missions in chemically and

12 biologically contaminated environments;

13 (vii) congressional direction contained

14 in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass

15 Destruction Act of 1996 (title XIV of Pub16 lic Law 104–201) should lead to enhanced

17 domestic preparedness to protect against

18 chemical and biological weapons threats;

19 and

20 (viii) the United States Armed Forces

21 should place increased emphasis on poten22 tial threats to forces deployed abroad and,

23 in particular, make countering chemical

24 and biological weapons use an organizing

25 principle for United States defense strat-
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1 egy and development of force structure,

2 doctrine, planning, training, and exercising

3 policies of the United States Armed

4 Forces.

5 (B) ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN DEFENSE

6 CAPABILITIES.—The Secretary of Defense shall

7 take those actions necessary to ensure that the

8 United States Armed Forces are capable of car9 rying out required military missions in United

10 States regional contingency plans, despite the

11 threat or use of chemical or biological weapons.

12 In particular, the Secretary of Defense shall en13 sure that the United States Armed Forces are

14 effectively equipped, organized, trained, and ex15 ercised (including at the large unit and theater

16 level) to conduct operations in a chemically or

17 biologically contaminated environment that are

18 critical to the success of the United States mili19 tary plans in regional conflicts, including—

20 (i) deployment, logistics, and rein21 forcement operations at key ports and air22 fields;

23 (ii) sustained combat aircraft sortie

24 generation at critical regional airbases; and
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1 (iii) ground force maneuvers of large

2 units and divisions.

3 (C) DISCUSSIONS WITH REGIONAL ALLIES

4 AND LIKELY COALITION PARTNERS.—

5 (i) IN GENERAL.—The Secretaries of

6 Defense and State shall, as a priority mat7 ter, initiate discussions with key regional

8 allies and likely regional coalition partners,

9 including those countries where the United

10 States currently deploys forces, where

11 United States forces would likely operate

12 during regional conflicts, or which would

13 provide civilians necessary to support Unit14 ed States military operations, to determine

15 what steps are necessary to ensure that al16 lied and coalition forces and other critical

17 civilians are adequately equipped and pre18 pared to operate in chemically and bio19 logically contaminated environments.

20 (ii) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not

21 later than one year after deposit of the

22 United States instrument of ratification,

23 the Secretaries of Defense and State shall

24 submit a report to the Committees on For25 eign Relations and Armed Services of the
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1 Senate and to the Speaker of the House of

2 Representatives on the result of these dis3 cussions, plans for future discussions,

4 measures agreed to improve the prepared5 ness of foreign forces and civilians, and

6 proposals for increased military assistance,

7 including through the Foreign Military

8 Sales and Foreign Military Financing

9 under the Arms Export Control Act and

10 the International Military Education and

11 Training programs pursuant to the For12 eign Assistance Act of 1961.

13 (D) UNITED STATES ARMY CHEMICAL

14 SCHOOL.—The Secretary of Defense shall take

15 those actions necessary to ensure that the Unit16 ed States Army Chemical School remains under

17 the oversight of a general officer of the United

18 States Army.

19 (E) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—Given its

20 concerns about the present state of chemical

21 and biological defense readiness and training, it

22 is the sense of the Senate that—

23 (i) in the transfer, consolidation, and

24 reorganization of the United States Army

25 Chemical School, the Army should not dis-
34

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1 rupt or diminish the training and readiness

2 of the United States Armed Forces to fight

3 in a chemical-biological warfare environ4 ment;

5 (ii) the Army should continue to oper6 ate the Chemical Defense Training Facility

7 at Fort McClellan until such time as the

8 replacement training facility at Fort Leon9 ard Wood is functional.

10 (F) ANNUAL REPORTS ON CHEMICAL AND

11 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DEFENSE ACTIVITIES.—

12 On January 1, 1998, and annually thereafter,

13 the President shall submit a report to the Com14 mittees on Foreign Relations, Appropriations,

15 and Armed Services of the Senate and the

16 Committees on International Relations, Na17 tional Security, and Appropriations of the

18 House of Representatives, and the Speaker of

19 the House of Representatives on previous, cur20 rent, and planned chemical and biological weap21 ons defense activities. The report shall contain

22 for the previous fiscal year and for the next

23 three fiscal years—

24 (i) proposed solutions to each of the

25 deficiencies in chemical and biological war-
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1 fare defenses identified in the March 1996

2 report of the General Accounting Office

3 entitled ‘‘Chemical and Biological Defense:

4 Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve

5 Continuing Problems’’, and steps being

6 taken pursuant to subparagraph (B) to en7 sure that the United States Armed Forces

8 are capable of conducting required military

9 operations to ensure the success of United

10 States regional contingency plans despite

11 the threat or use of chemical or biological

12 weapons;

13 (ii) identification of the priorities of

14 the executive branch of Government in the

15 development of both active and passive

16 chemical and biological defenses;

17 (iii) a detailed summary of all budget

18 activities associated with the research, de19 velopment, testing, and evaluation of chem20 ical and biological defense programs;

21 (iv) a detailed summary of expendi22 tures on research, development, testing,

23 and evaluation, and procurement of chemi24 cal and biological defenses by fiscal years

25 defense programs, department, and agency;
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1 (v) a detailed assessment of current

2 and projected vaccine production capabili3 ties and vaccine stocks, including progress

4 in researching and developing a multi5 valent vaccine;

6 (vi) a detailed assessment of proce7 dures and capabilities necessary to protect

8 and decontaminate infrastructure to rein9 force United States power-projection

10 forces, including progress in developing a

11 nonaqueous chemical decontamination ca12 pability;

13 (vii) a description of progress made in

14 procuring light-weight personal protective

15 gear and steps being taken to ensure that

16 programmed procurement quantities are

17 sufficient to replace expiring battle-dress

18 overgarments and chemical protective over19 garments to maintain required wartime in20 ventory levels;

21 (viii) a description of progress made

22 in developing long-range standoff detection

23 and identification capabilities and other

24 battlefield surveillance capabilities for bio25 logical and chemical weapons, including
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1 progress on developing a multi-chemical

2 agent detector, unmanned aerial vehicles,

3 and unmanned ground sensors;

4 (ix) a description of progress made in

5 developing and deploying layered theater

6 missile defenses for deployed United States

7 Armed Forces which will provide greater

8 geographic coverage against current and

9 expected ballistic missile threats and will

10 assist in mitigating chemical and biological

11 contamination through higher altitude

12 intercepts and boost-phase intercepts;

13 (x) an assessment of—

14 (I) the training and readiness of

15 the United States Armed Forces to

16 operate in a chemically or biologically

17 contaminated environment; and

18 (II) actions taken to sustain

19 training and readiness, including

20 training and readiness carried out at

21 national combat training centers;

22 (xi) a description of progress made in

23 incorporating chemical and biological con24 siderations into service and joint exercises

25 as well as simulations, models, and war
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1 games, and the conclusions drawn from

2 these efforts about the United States capa3 bility to carry out required missions, in4 cluding missions with coalition partners, in

5 military contingencies;

6 (xii) a description of progress made in

7 developing and implementing service and

8 joint doctrine for combat and non-combat

9 operations involving adversaries armed

10 with chemical or biological weapons, in11 cluding efforts to update the range of serv12 ice and joint doctrine to better address the

13 wide range of military activities, including

14 deployment, reinforcement, and logistics

15 operations in support of combat oper16 ations, and for the conduct of such oper17 ations in concert with coalition forces; and

18 (xiii) a description of progress made

19 in resolving issues relating to the protec20 tion of United States population centers

21 from chemical and biological attack, in22 cluding plans for inoculation of popu23 lations, consequence management, and a

24 description of progress made in developing

25 and deploying effective cruise missile de-
39

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1 fenses and a national ballistic missile de2 fense.

3 (12) PRIMACY OF THE UNITED STATES CON4 STITUTION.—Nothing in the Convention requires or

5 authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United

6 States prohibited by the Constitution of the United

7 States, as interpreted by the United States.

8 (13) NONCOMPLIANCE.—

9 (A) IN GENERAL.—If the President deter10 mines that persuasive information exists that a

11 State Party to the Convention is maintaining a

12 chemical weapons production or production mo13 bilization capability, is developing new chemical

14 agents, or is in violation of the Convention in

15 any other manner so as to threaten the national

16 security interests of the United States, then the

17 President shall—

18 (i) consult with the Senate, and

19 promptly submit to it, a report detailing

20 the effect of such actions;

21 (ii) seek on an urgent basis a chal22 lenge inspection of the facilities of the rel23 evant party in accordance with the provi24 sions of the Convention with the objective
40

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1 of demonstrating to the international com2 munity the act of noncompliance;

3 (iii) seek, or encourage, on an urgent

4 basis a meeting at the highest diplomatic

5 level with the relevant party with the objec6 tive of bringing the noncompliant party

7 into compliance;

8 (iv) implement prohibitions and sanc9 tions against the relevant party as required

10 by law;

11 (v) if noncompliance has been deter12 mined, seek on an urgent basis within the

13 Security Council of the United Nations a

14 multilateral imposition of sanctions against

15 the noncompliant party for the purposes of

16 bringing the noncompliant party into com17 pliance; and

18 (vi) in the event that the noncompli19 ance continues for a period of longer than

20 one year after the date of the determina21 tion made pursuant to subparagraph (A),

22 promptly consult with the Senate for the

23 purposes of obtaining a resolution of sup24 port for continued adherence to the Con25 vention, notwithstanding the changed cir-
41

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1 cumstances affecting the object and pur2 pose of the Convention.

3 (B) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec4 tion may be construed to impair or otherwise

5 affect the authority of the Director of Central

6 Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and

7 methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant

8 to section 103(c)(5) of the National Security

9 Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–3(c)(5)).

10 (C) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATIONS.—If

11 the President determines that an action other12 wise required under subparagraph (A) would

13 impair or otherwise affect the authority of the

14 Director of Central Intelligence to protect intel15 ligence sources and methods from unauthorized

16 disclosure, the President shall report that deter17 mination, together with a detailed written ex18 planation of the basis for that determination, to

19 the chairmen of the Senate Select Committee

20 on Intelligence and the House Permanent Se21 lect Committee on Intelligence not later than 15

22 days after making such determination.

23 (14) FINANCING RUSSIAN IMPLEMENTATION.—

24 The United States understands that, in order to be

25 assured of the Russian commitment to a reduction
42

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1 in chemical weapons stockpiles, Russia must main2 tain a substantial stake in financing the implementa3 tion of both the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agree4 ment and the Convention. The United States shall

5 not accept any effort by Russia to make deposit of

6 Russia’s instrument of ratification of the Convention

7 contingent upon the United States providing finan8 cial guarantees to pay for implementation of com9 mitments by Russia under the 1990 Bilateral De10 struction Agreement or the Convention.

11 (15) ASSISTANCE UNDER ARTICLE X.—

12 (A) IN GENERAL.—Prior to the deposit of

13 the United States instrument of ratification, the

14 President shall certify to the Congress that the

15 United States shall not provide assistance

16 under paragraph 7(a) of Article X.

17 (B) COUNTRIES INELIGIBLE FOR CERTAIN

18 ASSISTANCE UNDER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

19 ACT.—Prior to the deposit of the United States

20 instrument of ratification, the President shall

21 certify to the Congress that for any State Party

22 the government of which is not eligible for as23 sistance under chapter 2 of part II (relating to

24 military assistance) or chapter 4 of part II (re-
43

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1 lating to economic support assistance) of the

2 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961—

3 (i) no assistance under paragraph

4 7(b) of Article X will be provided to the

5 State Party; and

6 (ii) no assistance under paragraph

7 7(c) of Article X other than medical anti8 dotes and treatment will be provided to the

9 State Party.

10 (16) PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMA11 TION.—

12 (A) UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF UNIT13 ED STATES BUSINESS INFORMATION.—When14 ever the President determines that persuasive

15 information is available indicating that—

16 (i) an officer or employee of the Orga17 nization has willfully published, divulged,

18 disclosed, or made known in any manner

19 or to any extent not authorized by the

20 Convention any United States confidential

21 business information coming to him in the

22 course of his employment or official duties

23 or by reason of any examination or inves24 tigation of any return, report, or record
44

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1 made to or filed with the Organization, or

2 any officer or employee thereof, and

3 (ii) such practice or disclosure has re4 sulted in financial losses or damages to a

5 United States person,

6 the President shall, within 30 days after the re7 ceipt of such information by the executive

8 branch of Government, notify the Congress in

9 writing of such determination.

10 (B) WAIVER OF IMMUNITY FROM JURIS11 DICTION.—

12 (i) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than

13 270 days after notification of Congress

14 under subparagraph (A), the President

15 shall certify to Congress that the immunity

16 from jurisdiction of such foreign person

17 has been waived by the Director-General of

18 the Technical Secretariat.

19 (ii) WITHHOLDING OF PORTION OF

20 CONTRIBUTIONS.—If the President is un21 able to make the certification described

22 under clause (i), then 50 percent of the

23 amount of each annual United States con24 tribution to the regular budget of the Or25 ganization that is assessed pursuant to
45

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1 paragraph 7 of Article VIII shall be with2 held from disbursement, in addition to any

3 other amounts required to be withheld

4 from disbursement by any other provision

5 of law, until—

6 (I) the President makes such cer7 tification, or

8 (II) the President certifies to

9 Congress that the situation has been

10 resolved in a manner satisfactory to

11 the United States person who has suf12 fered the damages due to the disclo13 sure of United States confidential

14 business information.

15 (C) BREACHES OF CONFIDENTIALITY.—

16 (i) CERTIFICATION.—In the case of

17 any breach of confidentiality involving both

18 a State Party and the Organization, in19 cluding any officer or employee thereof, the

20 President shall, within 270 days after pro21 viding written notification to Congress pur22 suant to subparagraph (A), certify to Con23 gress that the Commission described under

24 paragraph 23 of the Confidentiality Annex
46

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1 has been established to consider the

2 breach.

3 (ii) WITHHOLDING OF PORTION OF

4 CONTRIBUTIONS.—If the President is un5 able to make the certification described

6 under clause (i), then 50 percent of the

7 amount of each annual United States con8 tribution to the regular budget of the Or9 ganization that is assessed pursuant to

10 paragraph 7 of Article VIII shall be with11 held from disbursement, in addition to any

12 other amounts required to be withheld

13 from disbursement by any other provision

14 of law, until—

15 (I) the President makes such cer16 tification, or

17 (II) the President certifies to

18 Congress that the situation has been

19 resolved in a manner satisfactory to

20 the United States person who has suf21 fered the damages due to the disclo22 sure of United States confidential

23 business information.

24 (D) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph:
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1 (i) UNITED STATES CONFIDENTIAL

2 BUSINESS INFORMATION.—The term

3 ‘‘United States confidential business infor4 mation’’ means any trade secrets or com5 mercial or financial information that is

6 privileged and confidential, as described in

7 section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United States

8 Code, and that is obtained—

9 (I) from a United States person;

10 and

11 (II) through the United States

12 National Authority or the conduct of

13 an inspection on United States terri14 tory under the Convention.

15 (ii) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The

16 term ‘‘United States person’’ means any

17 natural person or any corporation, partner18 ship, or other juridical entity organized

19 under the laws of the United States.

20 (iii) UNITED STATES.—The term

21 ‘‘United States’’ means the several States,

22 the District of Columbia, and the common23 wealths, territories, and possessions of the

24 United States.

25 (17) CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVES.—
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1 (A) FINDINGS.—The Senate makes the fol2 lowing findings:

3 (i) Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of

4 the United States Constitution states that

5 the President ‘‘shall have Power, by and

6 with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,

7 to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of

8 the Senators present concur’’.

9 (ii) At the turn of the century, Sen10 ator Henry Cabot Lodge took the position

11 that the giving of advice and consent to

12 the ratification of treaties constitutes a

13 stage in negotiation on the treaties and

14 that Senate amendments or reservations to

15 a treaty are propositions ‘‘offered at a

16 later stage of the negotiation by the other

17 part of the American treaty making power

18 in the only manner in which they could

19 then be offered’’.

20 (iii) The executive branch of Govern21 ment has begun a practice of negotiating

22 and submitting to the Senate treaties

23 which include provisions that have the pur24 ported effect of—
49

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1 (I) inhibiting the Senate from at2 taching reservations that the Senate

3 considers necessary in the national in4 terest; or

5 (II) preventing the Senate from

6 exercising its constitutional duty to

7 give its advice and consent to treaty

8 commitments before ratification of the

9 treaties.

10 (iv) During the 85th Congress, and

11 again during the 102d Congress, the Com12 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate

13 made its position on this issue clear when

14 stating that ‘‘the President’s agreement to

15 such a prohibition cannot constrain the

16 Senate’s constitutional right and obligation

17 to give its advice and consent to a treaty

18 subject to any reservation it might deter19 mine is required by the national interest’’.

20 (B) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the

21 sense of the Senate that—

22 (i) the advice and consent given by

23 the Senate in the past to ratification of

24 treaties containing provisions which pro25 hibit amendments or reservations should
50

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1 not be construed as a precedent for such

2 provisions in future treaties;

3 (ii) United States negotiators to a

4 treaty should not agree to any provision

5 that has the effect of inhibiting the Senate

6 from attaching reservations or offering

7 amendments to the treaty; and

8 (iii) the Senate should not consent in

9 the future to any article or other provision

10 of any treaty that would prohibit the Sen11 ate from giving its advice and consent to

12 ratification of the treaty subject to amend13 ment or reservation.

14 (18) LABORATORY SAMPLE ANALYSIS.—Prior to

15 the deposit of the United States instrument of ratifi16 cation, the President shall certify to the Senate that

17 no sample collected in the United States pursuant to

18 the Convention will be transferred for analysis to

19 any laboratory outside the territory of the United

20 States.

21 (19) EFFECT ON TERRORISM.—The Senate

22 finds that—

23 (A) without regard to whether the Conven24 tion enters into force, terrorists will likely view
51

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1 chemical weapons as a means to gain greater

2 publicity and instill widespread fear; and

3 (B) the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack

4 by the Aum Shinrikyo would not have been pre5 vented by the Convention.

6 (20) CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION OF POW7 ERS.—

8 (A) FINDINGS.—The Senate makes the fol9 lowing findings:

10 (i) Article VIII(8) of the Convention

11 allows a State Party to vote in the Organi12 zation if the State Party is in arrears in

13 the payment of financial contributions and

14 the Organization is satisfied that such non15 payment is due to conditions beyond the

16 control of the State Party.

17 (ii) Article I, Section 8 of the United

18 States Constitution vests in Congress the

19 exclusive authority to ‘‘pay the Debts’’ of

20 the United States.

21 (iii) Financial contributions to the Or22 ganization may be appropriated only by

23 Congress.

24 (B) SENSE OF SENATE.—It is therefore

25 the sense of the Senate that—
52

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1 (i) such contributions thus should be

2 considered, for purposes of Article VIII(8)

3 of the Convention, beyond the control of

4 the executive branch of the United States

5 Government; and

6 (ii) the United States vote in the Or7 ganization should not be denied in the

8 event that Congress does not appropriate

9 the full amount of funds assessed for the

10 United States financial contribution to the

11 Organization.

12 (21) ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY.—It is the

13 sense of the Senate that the On-Site Inspection

14 Agency of the Department of Defense should have

15 the authority to provide assistance in advance of any

16 inspection to any facility in the United States that

17 is subject to a routine inspection under the Conven18 tion, or to any facility in the United States that is

19 the object of a challenge inspection conducted pursu20 ant to Article IX, if the consent of the owner or op21 erator of the facility has first been obtained.

22 (22) LIMITATION ON THE SCALE OF ASSESS23 MENT.—

24 (A) LIMITATION ON ANNUAL ASSESS25 MENT.—Notwithstanding any provision of the
53

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1 Convention, and subject to the requirements of

2 subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D), the United

3 States shall pay as a total annual assessment of

4 the costs of the Organization pursuant to para5 graph 7 of Article VIII not more than

6 $25,000,000.

7 (B) RECALCULATION OF LIMITATION.—On

8 January 1, 2000, and at each 3-year interval

9 thereafter, the amount specified in subpara10 graph (A) is to be recalculated by the Adminis11 trator of General Services, in consultation with

12 the Secretary of State, to reflect changes in the

13 consumer price index for the immediately pre14 ceding 3-year period.

15 (C) ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS REQUIR16 ING CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.—

17 (i) AUTHORITY.—Notwithstanding

18 subparagraph (A), the President may fur19 nish additional contributions which would

20 otherwise be prohibited under subpara21 graph (A) if—

22 (I) the President determines and

23 certifies in writing to the Speaker of

24 the House of Representatives and the

25 Committee on Foreign Relations of
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1 the Senate that the failure to provide

2 such contributions would result in the

3 inability of the Organization to con4 duct challenge inspections pursuant to

5 Article IX or would otherwise jeopard6 ize the national security interests of

7 the United States; and

8 (II) Congress enacts a joint reso9 lution approving the certification of

10 the President.

11 (ii) STATEMENT OF REASONS.—The

12 President shall transmit with such certifi13 cation a detailed statement setting forth

14 the specific reasons therefor and the spe15 cific uses to which the additional contribu16 tions provided to the Organization would

17 be applied.

18 (D) ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS FOR

19 VERIFICATION.—Notwithstanding subparagraph

20 (A), for a period of not more than ten years,

21 the President may furnish additional contribu22 tions to the Organization for the purposes of

23 meeting the costs of verification under Articles

24 IV and V.
55

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1 (23) ADDITIONS TO THE ANNEX ON CHEMI2 CALS.—

3 (A) PRESIDENTIAL NOTIFICATION.—Not

4 later than 10 days after the Director-General of

5 the Technical Secretariat communicates infor6 mation to all States Parties pursuant to Article

7 XV(5)(a) of a proposal for the addition of a

8 chemical or biological substance to a schedule of

9 the Annex on Chemicals, the President shall no10 tify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the

11 Senate of the proposed addition.

12 (B) PRESIDENTIAL REPORT.—Not later

13 than 60 days after the Director-General of the

14 Technical Secretariat communicates informa15 tion of such a proposal pursuant to Article

16 XV(5)(a) or not later than 30 days after a posi17 tive recommendation by the Executive Council

18 pursuant to Article XV(5)(c), whichever is

19 sooner, the President shall submit to the Com20 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a re21 port, in classified and unclassified form, detail22 ing the likely impact of the proposed addition to

23 a schedule of the Annex on Chemicals. Such re24 port shall include—
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1 (i) an assessment of the likely impact

2 on United States industry of the proposed

3 addition of the chemical or biological sub4 stance to a schedule of the Annex on

5 Chemicals;

6 (ii) a description of the likely costs

7 and benefits, if any, to United States na8 tional security of the proposed addition of

9 such chemical or biological substance to a

10 schedule of the Annex on Chemicals; and

11 (iii) a detailed assessment of the ef12 fect of the proposed addition on United

13 States obligations under the Verification

14 Annex.

15 (C) PRESIDENTIAL CONSULTATION.—The

16 President shall, after the submission of the no17 tification required under subparagraph (A) and

18 prior to any action on the proposal by the Exec19 utive Council under Article XV(5)(c), consult

20 promptly with the Senate as to whether the

21 United States should object to the proposed ad22 dition of a chemical or biological substance pur23 suant to Article XV(5)(c).

24 (24) TREATY INTERPRETATION.—The Senate

25 affirms the applicability to all treaties of the Con-
57

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1 stitutionally based principles of treaty interpretation

2 set forth in Condition (1) of the resolution of ratifi3 cation with respect to the INF Treaty. For purposes

4 of this declaration, the term ‘‘INF Treaty’’ refers to

5 the Treaty Between the United States of America

6 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the

7 Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Short8 er Range Missiles, together with the related memo9 randum of understanding and protocols, approved by

10 the Senate on May 27, 1988.

11 (25) FURTHER ARMS REDUCTIONS OBLIGA12 TIONS.—The Senate declares its intention to con13 sider for approval international agreements that

14 would obligate the United States to reduce or limit

15 the Armed Forces or armaments of the United

16 States in a militarily significant manner only pursu17 ant to the treaty power as set forth in Article II,

18 section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution.

19 (26) RIOT CONTROL AGENTS.—

20 (A) PERMITTED USES.—Prior to the de21 posit of the United States instrument of ratifi22 cation, the President shall certify to Congress

23 that the United States is not restricted by the

24 Convention in its use of riot control agents, in25 cluding the use against combatants who are
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1 parties to a conflict, in any of the following

2 cases:

3 (i) UNITED STATES NOT A PARTY.—

4 The conduct of peacetime military oper5 ations within an area of ongoing armed

6 conflict when the United States is not a

7 party to the conflict (such as recent use of

8 the United States Armed Forces in Soma9 lia, Bosnia, and Rwanda).

10 (ii) CONSENSUAL PEACEKEEPING.—

11 Consensual peacekeeping operations when

12 the use of force is authorized by the receiv13 ing state, including operations pursuant to

14 Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.

15 (iii) CHAPTER VII PEACEKEEPING.—

16 Peacekeeping operations when force is au17 thorized by the Security Council under

18 Chapter VII of the United Nations Char19 ter.

20 (B) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President

21 shall take no measure, and prescribe no rule or

22 regulation, which would alter or eliminate Exec23 utive Order 11850 of April 8, 1975.

24 (C) DEFINITION.—In this paragraph, the

25 term ‘‘riot control agent’’ has the meaning
59

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1 given the term in Article II(7) of the Conven2 tion.

3 (27) CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION.—

4 Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument

5 of ratification of the Convention, the President shall

6 certify to the Congress that all of the following con7 ditions are satisfied:

8 (A) EXPLORATION OF ALTERNATIVE

9 TECHNOLOGIES.—The President has

10 agreed to explore alternative technologies

11 for the destruction of the United States

12 stockpile of chemical weapons in order to

13 ensure that the United States has the

14 safest, most effective and environmentally

15 sound plans and programs for meeting its

16 obligations under the Convention for the

17 destruction of chemical weapons.

18 (B) CONVENTION EXTENDS DESTRUC19 TION DEADLINE.—The requirement in sec20 tion 1412 of Public Law 99–145 (50

21 U.S.C. 1521) for completion of the de22 struction of the United States stockpile of

23 chemical weapons by December 31, 2004,

24 will be superseded upon the date the Con25 vention enters into force with respect to
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1 the United States by the deadline required

2 by the Convention of April 29, 2007.

3 (C) AUTHORITY TO EMPLOY A DIF4 FERENT DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY.—

5 The requirement in Article III(1)(a)(v) of

6 the Convention for a declaration by each

7 State Party not later than 30 days after

8 the date the Convention enters into force

9 with respect to that Party on general plans

10 of the State Party for destruction of its

11 chemical weapons does not preclude in any

12 way the United States from deciding in the

13 future to employ a technology for the de14 struction of chemical weapons different

15 than that declared under that Article.

16 (D) PROCEDURES FOR EXTENSION OF

17 DEADLINE.—The President will consult with

18 Congress on whether to submit a request to the

19 Executive Council of the Organization for an

20 extension of the deadline for the destruction of

21 chemical weapons under the Convention, as pro22 vided under part IV(A) of the Annex on Imple23 mentation and Verification to the Convention,

24 if, as a result of the program of alternative

25 technologies for the destruction of chemical mu-
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1 nitions carried out under section 8065 of the

2 Department of Defense Appropriations Act,

3 1997 (as contained in Public Law 104–208),

4 the President determines that alternatives to

5 the incineration of chemical weapons are avail6 able that are safer and more environmentally

7 sound but whose use would preclude the United

8 States from meeting the deadlines of the Con9 vention.

10 (28) CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AGAINST

11 UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE.—

12 (A) IN GENERAL.—In order to protect

13 United States citizens against unreasonable

14 searches and seizures, prior to the deposit of

15 the United States instrument of ratification, the

16 President shall certify to Congress that—

17 (i) for any challenge inspection con18 ducted on the territory of the United

19 States pursuant to Article IX, where con20 sent has been withheld, the United States

21 National Authority will first obtain a

22 criminal search warrant based upon prob23 able cause, supported by oath or affirma24 tion, and describing with particularity the
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1 place to be searched and the persons or

2 things to be seized; and

3 (ii) for any routine inspection of a de4 clared facility under the Convention that is

5 conducted on the territory of the United

6 States, where consent has been withheld,

7 the United States National Authority first

8 will obtain an administrative search war9 rant from a United States magistrate

10 judge.

11 (B) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this

12 resolution, the term ‘‘National Authority’’

13 means the agency or office of the United States

14 Government designated by the United States

15 pursuant to Article VII(4) of the Convention.

16 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

17 As used in this resolution:

18 (1) CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION OR CON19 VENTION.—The terms ‘‘Chemical Weapons Conven20 tion’’ and ‘‘Convention’’ mean the Convention on the

21 Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling

22 and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their De23 struction, Opened for Signature and Signed by the

24 United States at Paris on January 13, 1993, includ25 ing the following protocols and memorandum of un-
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SRES 75 ATS

1 derstanding, all such documents being integral parts

2 of and collectively referred to as the ‘‘Chemical

3 Weapons Convention’’ or the ‘‘Convention’’ (con4 tained in Treaty Document 103–21):

5 (A) The Annex on Chemicals.

6 (B) The Annex on Implementation and

7 Verification.

8 (C) The Annex on the Protection of Con9 fidential Information.

10 (D) The Resolution Establishing the Pre11 paratory Commission for the Organization for

12 the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

13 (E) The Text on the Establishment of a

14 Preparatory Commission.

15 (2) ORGANIZATION.—The term ‘‘Organization’’

16 means the Organization for the Prohibition of

17 Chemical Weapons established under the Conven18 tion.

19 (3) STATE PARTY.—The term ‘‘State Party’’

20 means any nation that is a party to the Convention.

21 (4) UNITED STATES INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICA22 TION.—The term ‘‘United States instrument of rati23 fication’’ means the instrument of ratification of the

24 United States of the Convention.

Æ
105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. RES. 75

EXECUTIVE RESOLUTION

To advise and consent to the ratification of the

conditions.Chemical Weapons Convention, subject to certain

APRIL 24, 1997

Considered, amended, and agreed to