United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 03-2395

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June Williams, *

*

 Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

* 

The Thomson Corporation; Thomson * [PUBLISHED]

Publishing Corporation; West *

Publishing Company, doing business *

as West Legal Publishing, doing *

business as West Group; Brian Hall; *

Andrew Prozes; Timothy J. Blank; *

Jeannine Bieter; Lea Harpster, also *

known as Lea Walstrom; Kevin *

Appold; Kay Engler; Kirk Emmen, *

*

 Appellees. *

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Submitted: May 14, 2004

Filed: August 25, 2004

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Before MURPHY, HEANEY, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

June R. Williams was terminated on February 4, 1998, after four years of

working as a reference attorney for the Westlaw division of West Group. Following
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The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Court Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

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her termination, Williams lodged a complaint against Westlaw with the Office of

Federal Contract Compliance Programs, alleging that she was discriminated against

on the basis of her race, sex, religion, and disability. Williams’s complaint was

referred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which mailed

a right-to-sue letter to her on-file address on June 17, 1999. Williams filed suit

against West Publishing Corporation, The Thomson Corporation, several of

Thomson’s subsidiaries, and various West employees on October 21, 1999, in the

United States District Court for the District of Ohio, advancing claims under Title

VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Equal Pay

Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Minnesota Whistleblower’s Act, and the

Family Medical Leave Act. The district court in Ohio granted the defendants’ motion

to transfer the case to the District of Minnesota. After the case was transferred, the

defendants moved for summary judgment, urging the district court1

 to dismiss several

of the claims as time-barred and to dismiss the remaining claims on the merits. The

court granted the motion and Williams now appeals. After carefully reviewing the

record before us, see McKay v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 340 F.3d 695, 697

(8th Cir. 2003) (applying de novo review to an appeal from a grant of summary

judgment), we affirm.

We agree with the district court that Williams’s Title VII and ADA claims are

time-barred, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (applying the 90-

day statute of limitations to ADA claims); Maegdlin v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists &

Aerospace Workers, Dist. 949, 309 F.3d 1051, 1054 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming the

dismissal of Title VII claims as untimely because they were filed more than 90 days

after the issuance of the right-to-sue letter). Williams’s explanation that she did not

read the right-to-sue letter until two weeks after it arrived at her forwarding address,

does not save her claims from being time-barred. Hill v. John Chezik Imps., 869 F.2d
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1122, 1124 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Generally, the ninety-day filing period begins to run on

the day the right to sue letter is received at the most recent address that a plaintiff has

provided the EEOC.”); St. Louis v. Alverno Coll., 744 F.2d 1314, 1317 (8th Cir.

1984). Additionally, Williams’s argument that the district court was bound by the

law of the case doctrine because the Ohio court ordered her case transferred, as

opposed to dismissing her claims as untimely, is incorrect. See Murr Plumbing, Inc.

v. Scherer Bros. Fin. Servs., Co., 48 F.3d 1066, 1070 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he doctrine

of law of the case is applicable only to final judgments, not to interlocutory orders.”);

United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Am. Family Life Assurance Co., 787 F.2d 438 (8th Cir.

1986) (per curiam) (holding that an order transferring the case to another district court

is an interlocutory order). 

Furthermore, the district court was correct to conclude that the facts of this case

do not warrant an equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. See Heideman v.

PFL, Inc., 904 F.2d 1262, 1266 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Equitable tolling is appropriate only

when the circumstances that cause a plaintiff to miss a filing deadline are out of his

hands.”). Williams failed to update her address with the EEOC when she moved to

Ohio in the beginning of June, despite her pending appeal with the EEOC and her

awareness that the EEOC intended to issue her a right-to-sue letter. See Hill, 869

F.2d at 1124 (finding that equitable tolling was not appropriate when the plaintiff did

not inform the EEOC of her new address); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7(b) (stating that a party

who has a complaint pending with the EEOC has “the responsibility to provide the

Commission with notice of any change in address and with notice of any prolonged

absence from that current address”). Additionally, even if Williams’s claims were not

time-barred, she has not adduced any evidence to show that West’s legitimate reasons

for denying her promotions, and eventually terminating her, were pretextual. See

Brooks v. Ameren UE, 345 F.3d 986, 988 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming summary

judgment when the employer offered a nondiscriminatory reason for denying plaintiff

the promotion and plaintiff could not offer proof of pretext); Edmund v.

MidAmerican Energy Co., 299 F.3d 679, 685 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that plaintiff
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must do more than “raise doubts about the wisdom and fairness of the opinions of him

held by his superiors and his fellow employees” to survive a summary judgment

motion). 

We also find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking

Williams’s affidavit in support of her opposition to the defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. See Northwest Bank & Trust Co. v. First Ill. Nat’l Bank, 354

F.3d 721, 725 (8th Cir. 2003) (“We review the district court’s application of its local

rules for an abuse of discretion.”). Based on her pattern of late filings, the court was

well within its discretion to strike the document; especially considering her affidavit

merely repeated the allegations contained in her complaint. See African Am. Voting

Rights Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Villa, 54 F.3d 1345, 1350-51 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding

no abuse of discretion when the district court refused to admit materials submitted in

violation of local rules).

As to Williams’s remaining claims, we find that the district court correctly

applied the summary judgment standard by resolving all doubt in Williams’s favor.

For the reasons aptly stated by the district court, we find that Williams failed to raise

any triable issues, thereby entitling the defendants to summary judgment.

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

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