Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Romanowski, 2016 IL App (1st) 142360

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

WESTON ROMANOWSKI, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. First District, First Division

Docket No. 1-14-2360

Filed August 22, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 13-CR-14429; the 

Hon. Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Katie Anderson, all of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, 

Miles J. Keleher, and Czarina Powell, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of 

counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Connors and Harris concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant, Weston Romanowski, was convicted of aggravated 

driving while under the influence of alcohol and sentenced to 18 months in prison and 1 year of 

mandatory supervised release. In this direct appeal, Mr. Romanowski contends that his 

conviction should be reversed because the circuit court erroneously permitted the arresting 

officer to testify that Mr. Romanowski was told of the civil penalties that he would be subject 

to if he refused to submit to a blood-alcohol test. Mr. Romanowski also contends that the 

circuit court’s order requiring him to pay a public defender fee in the amount of $450 should be 

vacated, because no hearing was held concerning his ability to pay such a fee. For the reasons 

that follow, we affirm Mr. Romanowski’s conviction and sentence for aggravated driving 

while under the influence of alcohol and we vacate the $450 public defender fee. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 A jury trial was held in this matter on June 10, 2014. The only witness who testified was the 

arresting officer, Officer John McGuire of the Chicago police department. Officer McGuire 

testified that, at approximately 8:30 p.m. on the evening of May 16, 2013, he encountered Mr. 

Romanowski’s vehicle parked, with the engine running, at a tollbooth serving the northbound 

lanes of the Chicago Skyway. The vehicle was in a lane displaying a red “X,” indicating that it 

was out of service. As he approached and began to question Mr. Romanowski, Officer 

McGuire smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle, observed Mr. 

Romanowski fumbling through the glove box, and could see three empty beer cans in the rear 

seat of the vehicle. Officer McGuire testified that Mr. Romanowski’s speech was slurred and 

incoherent; he had bloodshot, glassy eyes; and he kept turning his face away from the officer 

when he was spoken to. Mr. Romanowski had to be told to step out of the vehicle four times 

and required assistance to do so. 

¶ 4 Officer McGuire described three field sobriety tests that he was trained to administer and 

did administer to Mr. Romanowski, in a lighted area with level pavement just outside the toll 

booth: the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, the walk and turn test, and the one-legged 

stand test. The HGN test, which focuses on the movement of the eyes in response to an external 

stimulus, is designed to detect signs that a subject has consumed alcohol. Officer McGuire 

explained how, when asked to track the movement of a light pen horizontally and at a 45 

degree angle to his line of vision, Mr. Romanowski exhibited a “lack of smooth pursuit” or 

uncontrolled jerking of the eyes, a positive indicator for the consumption of alcohol. The walk 

and turn test, which requires a subject to count out and take nine heel-to-toe steps along a 

straight line, turn around, and take nine more heel-to-toe steps in the opposite direction, 

assesses a subject’s ability to perform multiple tasks simultaneously. According to Officer 

McGuire, Mr. Romanowski took four steps that were not heel-to-toe steps and lost his balance 

on the fifth step, raising his arms for balance and stepping off the line before ending the test. 

The one-legged stand test, another test that gauges a subject’s ability to perform tasks when his 

or her attention is divided, requires the subject to raise one foot 12 inches off of the ground and, 

while looking at the toe of the raised foot, count by saying “one 1,000, two 1,000, three 1,000, 

etc.” Officer McGuire stated that, during the test, Mr. Romanowski’s left ankle “was turning 

and wiggling,” and he was able to raise his right leg for only four seconds before losing his 

balance and putting his foot down. Mr. Romanowski was given a single chance to perform 
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each test, and according to Officer McGuire, the results indicated that Mr. Romanowski had 

consumed alcohol and was impaired. 

¶ 5 On cross-examination, Officer McGuire acknowledged that he had never met Mr. 

Romanowski before and was not familiar with what his normal speaking voice sounded like or 

whether his eyes were regularly bloodshot due to allergies or some other reason. He admitted 

that he could not tell, from the mere presence of an alcoholic odor, what Mr. Romanowski had 

had to drink, how much he drank, or when he drank it. He further agreed that the HGN test he 

administered could not tell him what Mr. Romanowski’s blood-alcohol level was. It was 

nevertheless the officer’s opinion, “[b]ased on the totality of the clues that [he] observed from 

the tests that were performed ***, the smell of an alcoholic beverage, the visual appearance of 

[Mr. Romanowski] with his eyes and his breath[, a]nd his inability to answer questions,” that 

Mr. Romanowski was intoxicated. 

¶ 6 After he had finished the field sobriety tests, Officer McGuire arrested Mr. Romanowski 

and placed him in the back of the officer’s squad car. There, Mr. Romanowski made 

belligerent and at times incoherent remarks—including threats to the officer and the officer’s 

family and claims that Mr. Romanowski was a government agent—before attempting to unzip 

his pants and urinate. Officer McGuire called for backup, which soon arrived to take Mr. 

Romanowski to the fourth district police station in Chicago. When Officer McGuire next 

encountered Mr. Romanowski, Mr. Romanowski was urinating on the floor of a processing 

room at the police station. 

¶ 7 Officer McGuire moved Mr. Romanowski to a holding cell to complete the paperwork 

related to his arrest. This paperwork included reading Mr. Romanowski a document that 

Officer McGuire referred to as the “warnings of motorists.” Over defense counsel’s objection 

and after denying defense counsel’s request for a sidebar, the circuit court permitted the officer 

to describe the contents of that warning to the jury: 

“Q. [The State:] Please explain what the warning to motorists is?

 A. [Officer McGuire:] That in Illinois, drivers when requested by a law officer to 

submit to three types of testing, either blood, breath or urine. And if you refuse to take 

one of those tests, the repercussions of that refusal will be a suspension of your driver’s 

license. 

 Q. Did the defendant then agree to take any of those tests? 

 A. No, he did not. 

 Q. He refused to take the blood, breath or urine? 

A. Correct.” 

¶ 8 Officer McGuire further testified that, at approximately 10:20 that evening, Mr. 

Romanowski was given Miranda warnings and, waiving his right to remain silent, agreed to 

answer the officer’s questions. When asked if he knew where he was, Mr. Romanowski 

responded “Indiana.” Mr. Romanowski responded to each of the officer’s subsequent 

questions with profanity. According to Officer McGuire, Mr. Romanowski then fell “fast 

asleep” on a bench and was “snoring his head off.” The officer finished his paperwork and, as 

part of the booking process, discovered that Mr. Romanowski’s driver’s license was 

suspended. 

¶ 9 Officer McGuire told the jury that, both as a police officer and in his personal life, he had 

observed individuals under the influence of alcohol on thousands of occasions. It was his 
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opinion that Mr. Romanowski was under the influence of alcohol when he was found sitting in 

his vehicle with the engine running on the evening of May 16, 2013. 

¶ 10 Following this testimony, the jury was excused and defense counsel was permitted to make 

a record concerning his objection to the testimony regarding the contents of the warning to 

motorists. Arguing that the civil consequences of a refusal to submit to blood-alcohol testing 

are not relevant in DUI cases and are highly prejudicial, defense counsel requested a mistrial. 

The circuit court denied the request, stating that: 

“I allowed that evidence to show a continued pattern of combativeness and let me go to 

my notes and get the exact words of the officer. 

 The officer testified that he was cocky, combative and profane. The way he reacted 

in the police station, the way he treated the police officer throughout all of their 

encounter in the police station, when the police officer was trying to do his job was 

highly inappropriate, combative as he said, the policeman, he was cocky and profane. 

And I simply allowed that evidence to further the defendant’s actions and explain 

everything he did when he was being confronted by the police officer in the police 

station.” 

¶ 11 The jury deliberated and found Mr. Romanowski guilty of aggravated driving while under 

the influence of alcohol. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (d)(1)(H) (West 2012). The circuit court 

denied Mr. Romanowski’s motion for a new trial and sentenced him to 18 months’ 

imprisonment, with credit for 340 days of time served, followed by 1 year of mandatory 

supervised release. 

¶ 12 At the sentencing hearing, the circuit court granted the State’s motion seeking 

reimbursement for the services of the public defender and ordered a $450 fee to be deducted 

from Mr. Romanowski’s bond for this purpose.

¶ 13 JURISDICTION 

¶ 14 Mr. Romanowski timely filed his notice of appeal in this matter on July 10, 2014, the same 

day he was sentenced. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, section 6, 

of the Illinois Constitution and Illinois Supreme Court Rules 603 and 606, governing appeals 

from a final judgment of conviction in a criminal case entered below. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, 

§ 6; Ill. S. Ct. Rs. 603, 606 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). 

¶ 15 ANALYSIS 

¶ 16 A. Testimony Regarding the Warning to Motorists 

¶ 17 Mr. Romanowski acknowledges that his refusal to take a blood-alcohol test was admissible 

at trial. Section 11-501.2(c)(1) of the Illinois Vehicle Code specifically provides for the 

admissibility of evidence of a driver’s refusal to submit to blood-alcohol testing. 625 ILCS 

5/11-501.2(c)(1) (West 2012). Our courts have long recognized that a defendant's refusal to 

take such a test is “relevant as circumstantial evidence of his consciousness of guilt.” People v. 

Garriott, 253 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1052 (1993). Mr. Romanowski argues, however, that the 

circuit court erred when it permitted the arresting officer to also testify to the contents of the 

admonishment he received warning him of the consequences of such a refusal. 

¶ 18 Under Illinois law, any individual who “drives or is in actual physical control of a motor 

vehicle upon the public highways of this State shall be deemed to have given consent *** to a 
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chemical test or tests of blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the content of 

alcohol *** in the person’s blood” upon their arrest for driving while under the influence. 625 

ILCS 5/11-501.1(a) (West 2012). A driver asked to submit to such a test must be warned by the 

requesting law enforcement officer that a positive test result (defined as an alcohol 

concentration of 0.08 or more) will result in a 6-month statutory summary suspension of the 

individual’s driver’s license, while a refusal to be tested will result in a 12-month suspension 

for a first offender or a 3-year suspension for a repeat offender. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(c) (West 

2012) (requiring suspension); 625 ILCS 5/6-208.1(a)(1)-(3) (West 2012) (establishing length 

of the suspension). This is the warning described in Officer McGuire’s testimony and referred 

to by the parties as the “warning to motorists.”

¶ 19 Section 11-501.2(c)(1) of the Illinois Vehicle Code provides as follows: 

“If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test under the provisions of 

Section 11-501.1, evidence of refusal shall be admissible in any civil or criminal action 

or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person 

under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, or intoxicating compound or 

compounds, or any combination thereof was driving or in actual physical control of a 

motor vehicle.” 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(c)(1) (West 2012). 

¶ 20 Mr. Romanowski contends that the circuit court erred in admitting the arresting officer’s 

testimony regarding the contents of the warning to motorists because such testimony is not 

specifically made admissible by section 11-501.2(c)(1) and that the statute should be 

interpreted to prohibit admission of such evidence in this case. The State responds that the 

circuit court allowed the testimony as a proper exercise of its discretion. 

¶ 21 The admission of evidence is generally within the sound discretion of the circuit court, and 

we will not disturb a court’s evidentiary rulings, absent an abuse of discretion. People v. 

Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 455 (2001). However, to the extent that admissibility of evidence 

requires the interpretation of a statute and its intended scope, our review is de novo. See People 

v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996) (construction of a statute is a question of law reviewed

de novo). Mr. Romanowski’s primary argument here is that the statute prohibits admission of 

this testimony and that the trial judge did not have discretion to admit it. 

¶ 22 Three cases have directly addressed the admissibility of the contents of the warning given 

to motorists in a DUI trial. In City of Rockford v. Elliott, 308 Ill. App. 3d 735, 739-40 (1999), 

the second district held that the probative value of testimony regarding the contents of the 

warning is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The appellate court in Elliott construed section 

11-501.2(c)(1) of the Illinois Vehicle Code as making only evidence of the refusal itself 

admissible. Id. at 738-39. In the court’s view, to also allow evidence of the civil penalties the 

defendant faced when he refused was “an inappropriate expansion of the statute” amounting to 

a “double refusal.” Id. Although it acknowledged that the evidence had “some probative 

value,” the court nevertheless concluded that its relevance was outweighed by prejudice to the 

defendant. Id. at 739-40. 

¶ 23 In two later cases, People v. Lynn, 388 Ill. App. 3d 272, 277-78 (2009), and People v. Bock, 

357 Ill. App. 3d 160, 170-71 (2005), the fourth and first districts of this court, respectively, 

reached the opposite result, concluding that testimony regarding the contents of the warning to 

motorists was properly admitted in DUI cases. 
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¶ 24 The Lynn court “emphatically decline[d] to follow Elliott,” holding instead that testimony 

regarding the warning to motorists is plainly relevant as circumstantial evidence of a 

defendant’s consciousness of his own guilt:

“ ‘[A] driver’s refusal to take a breath test is relevant because it implies that he believes 

he is intoxicated, something that he is clearly in a prime position to appraise. *** If a 

driver’s refusal to take a breath test is relevant because it implies that he believes he is 

intoxicated, why would it not logically follow that the jury should be informed of the 

same factors that [the] defendant considered—namely, the civil penalties that would 

result from his refusal—when he decided to refuse the test? A reasonable inference 

under these circumstances is that [the] defendant was so afraid that the breath test 

would show he was intoxicated that he adhered to his refusal to take it despite having 

been informed of the severe civil penalties that would follow.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) 

Lynn, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 277-78 (quoting People v. Dea, 353 Ill. App. 3d 898, 902-03 

(2004) (Steigmann, J., specially concurring)). 

¶ 25 Similarly, the Bock court concluded there was no support for the narrow reading of section 

11-501.2(c)(1) adopted in Elliott: 

“[W]e depart from the Elliott court’s apparent conclusion that the statutory provision 

allowing admission into evidence of a driver’s breath test refusal in any civil or 

criminal proceeding for acts relating to intoxicated driving [citation] precludes 

admission of the fact that a defendant had been advised of the civil consequences of 

refusing the test. The statute provides that ‘evidence of refusal shall be admissible’; in 

our view, the Elliott court’s discussion of the statutory language would be persuasive if 

the statute instead provided that ‘only the fact of a driver’s refusal shall be admissible.’ 

We find no support in the language of the statute for the conclusion that the 

circumstances surrounding a driver’s breath test refusal may not be admitted into 

evidence.” Bock, 357 Ill. App. 3d at 170-71. 

¶ 26 We agree with the reasoning articulated in Lynn and Bock. Evidence is considered relevant 

if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 

evidence.” Ill. R. Evid. 401 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Like the court in Lynn, we find the contents of 

the warning to motorists to be relevant circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s consciousness 

of his own guilt. Although Mr. Romanowski did not have a valid driver’s license at the time of 

his arrest, the warning was still pertinent to his decision to refuse testing because he would not 

be eligible to obtain a license until the summary suspension period expired. 625 ILCS 

5/6-103(3) (West 2012). By refusing to be tested, Mr. Romanowski guaranteed that he would 

not be able to obtain a driver’s license for at least a year, twice as long as if he submitted to 

testing and returned a positive result. We therefore disagree with Mr. Romanowski’s assertion 

that “the probative value of the contents of the warning [i]s minimal at best.” To the contrary, 

the probative value of Mr. Romanowski’s refusal to be subjected to a blood-alcohol test is most 

fully recognized when put in the context of the civil penalties Mr. Romanowski knowingly 

accepted as a consequence of his decision. 

¶ 27 Mr. Romanowski argues that the circuit court admitted the warning to show 

“combativeness” and it was not relevant to that. It is unclear whether the circuit court permitted 

the arresting officer to testify regarding the contents of the warning to motorists only “to show 

[Mr. Romanowski’s] continued pattern of combativeness,” or to explain and put in context 
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“everything” that Mr. Romanowski did when confronted by the police officer. We agree with 

Mr. Romanowski that the contents of the warning are not relevant to his combativeness, which 

was otherwise detailed extensively. It does not matter. The testimony was otherwise relevant to 

establish Mr. Romanowski’s guilt. We can certainly affirm the circuit court’s ruling on that 

basis. See People v. Dinelli, 217 Ill. 2d 387, 403 (2005) (a reviewing court “may affirm the 

circuit court on any basis supported by the record”). 

¶ 28 Of course, relevant evidence should be excluded “if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” 

Ill. R. Evid. 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). “In this context, prejudice means an undue tendency to 

suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly an emotional one, such as sympathy, hatred, 

contempt, or horror.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 329 

(1995). 

¶ 29 Mr. Romanowski makes a number of arguments in an attempt to convince us that 

admission of this evidence was unduly prejudicial. He argues that the warning to motorists 

“alerts the jury to the fact that the defendant is already being punished for th[e] incident, which 

implies that he was doing something wrong” and insists it is improper for a court to allow 

“evidence that a defendant has already been subjected to a punishment for the same actions for 

which he is currently on trial.” This argument is unconvincing. The civil penalties contained in 

the warning to motorists serve not as a punishment for driving while under the influence, but as 

an incentive for an arrested motorist to submit to blood-alcohol testing. 

¶ 30 Mr. Romanowski argues that testimony concerning the warning to motorists is unduly 

prejudicial because it “undermines the presumption of innocence.” But evidence of guilt 

always undermines the presumption of innocence. Evidence is unduly prejudicial only if it 

“cast[s] a negative light upon the defendant for reasons that have nothing to do with the case 

on trial” (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted) (Lynn, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 

278), or invites the jury to decide the case “on an improper basis, commonly an emotional one, 

such as sympathy, hatred, contempt, or horror” (internal quotation marks omitted) (Lewis, 165 

Ill. 2d at 329). While the warnings may be circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s guilt, this 

does not encourage a decision on any improper basis. 

¶ 31 We likewise reject Mr. Romanowski’s argument that testimony regarding the contents of 

the warning to motorists is unduly prejudicial because the jury may overvalue it and give it 

more credence than is warranted. The cases that Mr. Romanowski cites involving polygraph 

and DNA evidence are distinguishable, as they involve technical evidence a jury could view as 

“hav[ing] a special aura of certainty and mystic infallibility.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) People v. Watson, 2012 IL App (2d) 091328, ¶ 33. The evidence at issue here is not 

technical in nature but rather implicates basic common sense: a person is given an incentive to 

submit to testing and nevertheless refuses to be tested, indicating that he knows the results will 

be unfavorable to him. 

¶ 32 Other cases that Mr. Romanowski relies on, in which courts have ruled that a defendant’s 

refusal to take certain tests may be inadmissible also have no bearing here, where the statute 

expressly makes the refusal to take a blood-alcohol test admissible. Compare People v. Eghan, 

344 Ill. App. 3d 301, 312-13 (2003) (holding a defendant’s refusal to be tested for cocaine is 

inadmissible), and People v. Ealy, 2015 IL App (2d) 131106, ¶¶ 49-50 (holding a defendant’s 

refusal to submit to DNA testing is inadmissible). In reaching its decision, the Ealy court 

specifically distinguished cases like this one where a DUI defendant refuses to submit to 
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blood-alcohol testing, on the basis that motorists have no constitutional right to refuse such 

testing. Ealy, 2015 IL App (2d) 131106, ¶ 66 (citing People v. Johnson, 218 Ill. 2d 125, 140 

(2005)). 

¶ 33 We furthermore reject Mr. Romanowski’s argument that Bock “ignore[s] the maxim of 

statutory construction that when a statute expressly includes one thing—evidence that a 

motorist refused a breathalyzer—it may be inferred that all omissions therefrom—the contents 

of the warning to motorists—are intended to be excluded.” As Bock points out, the statute does 

not expressly make “only” the fact of the defendant’s refusal admissible, but rather “evidence 

of refusal,” a phrase that invokes something broader. Cf. People v. Dabbs, 239 Ill. 2d 277, 283 

(2010) (where the legislature has made “evidence of” prior offenses admissible in domestic 

violence cases, courts have not limited this to certified copies of convictions, but have allowed 

testimony by prior victims regarding the details of those offenses). Moreover, the “default” 

rule is that evidence is admissible at the circuit court’s discretion. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d at 455. 

Thus, this statute, that expressly makes specific evidence admissible, should not be read to 

prohibit admission of any omitted category of evidence. Such evidence, like the vast majority 

of evidence not provided for by statute, remains subject to this default rule. 

¶ 34 We must likewise reject Mr. Romanowski’s argument that the circuit court failed to 

instruct the jury regarding the limited purpose for which it could consider the arresting 

officer’s testimony regarding the contents of the warning to motorists and that his attorney was 

ineffective for failing to request such an instruction. As we conclude that this evidence was not 

for the limited purpose of establishing Mr. Romanowski’s combative behavior, no limiting 

instruction was required. The circuit court did not err in failing to give one and defense counsel 

was not ineffective for failing to request one. Because there is no arguable basis for a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, we need not reach the State’s argument in its motion to strike 

taken with this case that Mr. Romanowski failed to preserve the issue by raising it for the first 

time in his reply brief. 

¶ 35 Finally, Mr. Romanowski argues that, by amending the Illinois Vehicle Code eight times 

since Elliott, but never changing section 11-501.2(c) to expressly make the contents of the 

warning to motorists admissible, “the legislature has tacitly accepted Elliott’s holding.” We 

reject this logic, particularly where seven of those amendments took effect after Bock and six 

after Lynn, making it unlikely that the General Assembly’s decision not to amend the section 

was in any way intended as an endorsement of the holding in Elliott. The cases Mr. 

Romanowski relies on are furthermore distinguishable because they involved statutes that 

were construed by the Illinois Supreme Court. See People v. Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d 348, 353 

(1970) (where a statute and its predecessors had been “repeatedly and consistently construed” 

by the supreme court, it was “presumed that the legislature had acquiesced in the court’s 

exposition of the legislative intent”); People v. Agnew, 105 Ill. 2d 275, 280 (1985) (concluding 

the legislature gave its “implicit approval” of the supreme court’s holding that a statute 

imposing a fee applied to appellate court proceedings when it later amended the statute only to 

change the fee amount). 

¶ 36 We also note that, even if we were to conclude that the testimony at issue was admitted in 

error, that error would have been harmless where other compelling evidence of Mr. 

Romanowski’s guilt was presented in this case. Mr. Romanowski argues that, by failing to 

include citations to the record, the State has forfeited its argument that any error in this case 

was harmless. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). Where the record is short and the 
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issue is a simple one, however, we may choose to address the issue despite a party’s failure to 

provide citations to the record. People v. Johnson, 192 Ill. 2d 202, 206 (2000). We do so here. 

¶ 37 A charge of aggravated driving while under the influence of alcohol is sustained where a 

trier of fact concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that (1) the defendant was in actual, 

physical control of a motor vehicle; (2) at the time of such control, the defendant was under the 

influence of alcohol; and (3) at the time of such control, the defendant did not possess a 

driver’s license or permit. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (d)(1)(H) (West 2012). “ ‘A person is 

under the influence of alcohol when, as a result of drinking any amount of alcohol, his mental 

or physical faculties are so impaired as to reduce his ability to think and act with ordinary 

care.’ ” People v. Gordon, 378 Ill. App. 3d 626, 631 (2007) (quoting Illinois Pattern Jury 

Instructions, Criminal, No. 23.29 (4th ed. 2000)). Here, Officer McGuire, the sole witness at 

trial, testified that Mr. Romanowski did not have a valid driver’s license; was found in his 

running vehicle smelling of alcohol with three empty beer cans in the rear seat; had to be 

helped from his vehicle; failed multiple field sobriety tests; was belligerent, unintelligible, and 

threatening to law enforcement; urinated on the floor of the police station during processing; 

and fell sound asleep following questioning. This testimony was unrebutted. See Baker v. 

Hutson, 333 Ill. App. 3d 486, 493 (2002) (“Where the testimony of a witness is neither 

contradicted by direct adverse testimony or by circumstances nor inherently improbable and 

the witness has not been impeached, the testimony cannot be disregarded by the fact finder.” 

(citing People ex rel. Brown v. Baker, 88 Ill. 2d 81, 85 (1981))). Unlike Elliott, this is not a case 

that “could have gone either way.” Elliott, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 740. An error is considered 

harmless where, “consider[ing] the totality of the evidence presented,” it “can safely [be] 

conclude[d] that a trial without th[e] error would produce no different result.” People v. 

Warmack, 83 Ill. 2d 112, 128-29 (1980). Such is the case here. Although Mr. Romanowski’s 

refusal to submit to blood-alcohol testing despite the civil consequences of such a refusal was 

relevant circumstantial evidence of his guilt, we can safely conclude that the jury would have 

found him guilty even if it had not been aware of those consequences. 

¶ 38 B. Public Defender Fee 

¶ 39 Mr. Romanowski argues that the $450 fee the circuit court ordered him to pay as 

reimbursement for the services of his public defender should be vacated where he was not 

provided with notice of a hearing, the amount of attorney fees was not properly established, 

and no effort was made to determine his ability to pay. Although Mr. Romanowski admits this 

issue was not properly preserved for review, the State has made no argument for forfeiture. See 

People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 347 (2000) (noting that forfeiture of an issue by the 

defendant is an argument that must be made in the State’s brief or it is likewise forfeited). Our 

review of this issue is de novo. People v. Elcock, 396 Ill. App. 3d 524, 538 (2009). 

¶ 40 Section 113-3.1(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) authorizes the circuit 

court to order a criminal defendant for whom legal counsel has been provided to pay a 

reasonable sum to reimburse the county or state for that representation. 725 ILCS 5/113-3.1(a) 

(West 2014). Before ordering payment, the circuit court is required to hold a hearing focusing 

on “the foreseeable ability of the defendant to pay reimbursement as well as the costs of the 

representation provided.” People v. Love, 177 Ill. 2d 550, 563 (1997). It is undisputed that no 

such hearing was conducted here. The State filed its motion on July 10, 2013, and the circuit 

court granted it that same day at Mr. Romanowski’s sentencing hearing, without questioning 
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the public defender regarding the scope of his representation and without making any inquiry 

into Mr. Romanowski’s ability to pay. The State concedes that the order requiring payment 

must therefore be vacated, but urges us to remand the matter for a hearing that complies with 

section 113-3.1(a). 

¶ 41 Section 113-3.1(a), however, clearly requires that such a hearing be held “no later than 90 

days after the entry of a final order disposing of the case at the trial level.” 725 ILCS 

5/113-3.1(a) (West 2014). In support of remand, the State cites Love, in which our supreme 

court vacated a public defender fee and remanded for a hearing without referencing the 90-day 

requirement or addressing the fact that more than 90 days had passed since the circuit court 

issued its order. Love, 177 Ill. 2d at 559-60, 565. The State urges us to join cases like People v. 

Fitzpatrick, 2011 IL App (2d) 100463, ¶ 13, which acknowledge the statutory requirement but 

nevertheless follow Love, without attempting to reconcile the apparent conflict. 

¶ 42 In People v. Moore, 2015 IL App (1st) 141451, ¶ 41, however, this court recently 

interpreted the statutory 90-day time limit as mandatory. There, the circuit court briefly 

questioned the attorneys regarding the public defender’s involvement in the case but did not 

address the defendant at all before ordering him to pay a public defender fee. Id. The Moore 

court concluded that remand was improper, where no hearing took place within the required 

time frame; “[t]here was no inquiry, however slight, into the issue of the defendant’s ability to 

pay the public defender fee, the defendant’s financial circumstances and his foreseeable ability 

to pay or the defendant’s financial affidavit, if any.” Id. 

¶ 43 Moore expanded on our supreme court’s holding in People v. Somers, 2013 IL 114054, 

¶ 15, that remand is proper where at least “some sort of a hearing,” albeit an insufficient one, is 

initially held within the 90-day period specified in the Code. In Somers, although the circuit 

court failed to hold a formal hearing on the defendant’s ability to pay a public defender fee, it 

did informally question the defendant regarding whether he suffered from any physical 

condition preventing him from working, whether he believed he could obtain employment 

upon his release from prison, and whether he planned to use his future income to pay his fines 

and costs. Id. Noting that the problem was thus “not that the trial court did not hold a hearing 

within 90 days, but that the hearing that the court did hold was insufficient to comply with the 

statute,” the supreme court remanded for a new hearing that complied with section 113-3.1(a). 

Id. ¶¶ 15, 18. 

¶ 44 Here, unlike Somers but as in Moore, no inquiry into Mr. Romanowski’s ability to pay was 

made within the statutory time period. Accordingly, we vacate the public defender fee and 

decline the State’s invitation to remand this matter for a belated hearing not in compliance with 

section 113-3.1(a). 

¶ 45 CONCLUSION 

¶ 46 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Romanowski’s conviction and sentence for 

aggravated driving while under the influence of alcohol and vacate the circuit court’s order 

requiring Mr. Romanowski to pay a $450 public defender fee. 

¶ 47 Affirmed in part and vacated in part.