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52–415 PDF 2008

FDA’S FOREIGN DRUG INSPECTION PROGRAM: 

WEAKNESSES PLACE AMERICANS AT RISK 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 22, 2008 

Serial No. 110–107 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

energycommerce.house.gov 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, Chairman 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

Vice Chairman 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JANE HARMAN, California 

TOM ALLEN, Maine 

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

HILDA L. SOLIS, California 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana 

JOHN BARROW, Georgia 

BARON P. HILL, Indiana 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

Ranking Member 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

CHARLES W. ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING, 

Mississippi 

VITO FOSSELLA, New York 

STEVE BUYER, Indiana 

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARY BONO, California 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

DENNIS B. FITZGIBBONS, Chief of Staff 

GREGG A. ROTHSCHILD, Chief Counsel 

SHARON E. DAVIS, Chief Clerk 

DAVID L. CAVICKE, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

BART STUPAK, Michigan, Chairman 

DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado 

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana 

Vice Chairman 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan (ex officio) 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

Ranking Member 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

JOE BARTON, Texas (ex officio) 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Bart Stupak, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 1 

Hon. Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 4 

Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, prepared statement ...................................................................................... 6 

Hon. John Shimkus, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 7 

Hon. Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, opening statement .................................................................................... 9 

Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 55 

WITNESSES

Andrew C. von Eschenbach, M.D., Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration ........................................................................................................................ 11

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 15 

Marcia G. Crosse, Director of Public Health and Military Health Issues, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office .............................................................. 65 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 68 

Gail H. Cassell, Ph.D., Vice President, Scientific Affairs and Distinguished 

Lilly Research Scholar for Infectious Diseases, Eli Lilly and Company ......... 93 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 97 

William K. Hubbard, Former FDA Associate Commissioner and Current Senior Advisor to the Coalition for a Stronger FDA ............................................... 100 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 102 

Carl R. Nielsen, Retired Director of the Division of Import Operations, Office 

of Regulatory Affairs, Food and Drug Administration, U.S. Department 

of Health and Human Services ........................................................................... 105 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 107 

Benjamin L. England, Esq., Benjamin L. England & Associates, LLC, and 

FDAimports.com ................................................................................................... 117 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 120 

SUBMITTED MATERIAL

Slides accompanying Mr. Stupak’s opening statement ........................................ 146 

Subcommittee exhibit binder .................................................................................. 154 

(1) 

FDA’S FOREIGN DRUG INSPECTION 

PROGRAM: WEAKNESSES PLACE AMERICANS AT RISK 

TUESDAY, APRIL 22, 2008 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:00 a.m., in room 

2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon Bart Stupak (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Stupak, Melancon, Green, Dingell (ex 

officio), Shimkus, Burgess, and Barton (ex officio). 

Staff Present: Chris Knauer, John Sopko, Kevin Barstow, David 

Nelson, Kyle Chapman, Calvin Webb; Alan Slobodin, Peter Spencer, and Whitney Drew. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BART STUPAK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Mr. STUPAK. This meeting will come to order. Today we have a 

hearing titled ‘‘FDA’s Foreign Drug Inspection Program: Weaknesses Place Americans at Risk.’’ Each member will be recognized 

for an opening statement of 5 minutes. I will begin. 

Today’s hearing will once again explore the question of whether 

the Food and Drug Administration, FDA, is adequately regulating 

the overseas manufacture of pharmaceutical products. As this subcommittee has reported before, a significant and still growing 

quantity of pharmaceutical products used by Americans are now 

manufactured with ingredients obtained overseas from countries on 

almost every continent. With exact quantities and sources for these 

drugs difficult to determine, the general consensus is that at least 

80 percent of all active pharmaceutical ingredients, APIs, used by 

U.S. manufacturers to produce drugs are imported. More importantly, much of this production occurs in regions that lack robust 

regulatory systems, such as China and India. China alone has 

more firms registered to export drugs to the U.S. than any other 

country, posing major challenges to the FDA. As was noted by 

former FDA Commissioner David Kessler in a major news production, I quote: ‘‘China is ‘as close to an unregulated environment as 

you can get.’ In fact, it is a lot like the U.S. was in 1906, he says— 

’That’s why we developed an FDA.’’’ 

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration is the Agency responsible for overseeing the safety and effectiveness of all human drugs 

2 

marketed in the U.S. As part of its effort to oversee the safety and 

quality of these products, FDA’s policy is to physically inspect foreign establishments that ship drugs to the American market. 

Last year this subcommittee asked the Government Accountability Office, GAO, to undertake a comprehensive audit of FDA’s 

foreign drug regulatory system. The preliminary findings of that 

audit were presented at a hearing before this subcommittee on November 1st of last year. The GAO reported that a substantial lack 

of human and economic resources, weaknesses in databases in IT 

systems used by the FDA to track inspections and drug imports, 

and a lack of permanent operational support in foreign locations 

were major challenges facing the program. GAO also found that 

many of the FDA databases used to track foreign firms that export 

to the United States contain substantial material inaccuracies that 

have yet to be reconciled by the Agency. 

More specifically, a lack of resources was determined to be a 

major factor undermining FDA’s drug inspection program. For example, while current law requires FDA to inspect domestic firms 

once every 2 years, which FDA is managing to do roughly every 2.7 

years, GAO reported that FDA only has enough resources to inspect foreign firms about once every 13 years. In China, one of the 

largest producers of active pharmaceutical ingredients for the U.S. 

market, FDA only inspects about 10 to 20 firms each year against 

an inventory of more than 700 firms. At this rate, the FDA can 

only inspect each Chinese firm about once every 30 to 40 years. 

Worldwide, GAO concluded that on an annual basis, the Agency 

only has enough resources to inspect about 7 percent of existing 

foreign plants, which amounts to inspecting one plant every 13 

years. Given that these inspections are the most important tool the 

FDA has to ensure firms are meeting U.S. drug safety regulations, 

these rates are unacceptable. 

FDA’s IT systems for managing inspections and prioritizing risk 

was another major concern highlighted at the November 1st hearing. GAO testified that this system was antiquated, not designed 

for this purpose, and fraught with duplicative and inaccurate data. 

Such flaws made it difficult for the Agency to assess risk and 

prioritize inspections. Further, FDA could not determine how many 

foreign firms were subject to FDA inspections or where they were 

located. One database suggested that there were 3,000 foreign 

firms registered with FDA to market drugs in the U.S., and yet another database seemed to show 7,000 firms actually shipped products to the United States. 

How can there be any confidence that the FDA is adequately regulating foreign drug firms when the FDA has no idea who’s making 

what, where they are physically located, and when they were last 

inspected? These problems highlighted 10 years ago still plague the 

Agency today. 

If the GAO and Subcommittee findings were not enough to demonstrate that the FDA’s regulatory systems are broken, allow me 

to provide more evidence. In December of last year, a specially 

formed committee for the FDA submitted a comprehensive 2-year 

study entitled, ‘‘FDA Science and Mission at Risk: Report of the 

Subcommittee on Science and Technology.’’ This Science Advisory 

Board report assessed the Agency’s ability to support a variety of 

3 

existing and future regulatory operations. The special subcommittee that concluded this review was comprised of nearly 3 

dozen external experts who represent industry, academia, and 

other governmental agencies. 

This subcommittee held a hearing on January 29th, 2008, to explore both the general concerns raised by the Science Review Board 

and their implications for food and drug import issues. The report 

advisors, including Chairperson Dr. Cassell, who will testify again 

today, provided alarming testimony regarding FDA deficiency in 

meeting its regulatory responsibilities. The panel is particularly 

troubled by the multitude of IT issues affecting the entire agency, 

including those related to foreign drug inspection program. 

With regard to the scarcity of resources for conducting foreign 

drug inspections at the Agency, the report states: ‘‘Although approximately 80 percent of the active pharmaceutical ingredients 

used in our prescription drugs are imported from abroad, and foreign imports of drugs and active pharmaceutical ingredients were 

valued at more than $42 billion in 2006, FDA conducted only 361 

foreign drug and biological product establishments in 2006. Only 

32 field inspections were made in India and 15 in China, the two 

largest sources of pharmaceutical exports to the United States. Millions of shipments of FDA-regulated products are now imported 

into the country each year from foreign facilities that have never 

been inspected by FDA, and, with current appropriations, never 

will be.’’ 

The FDA Commissioner was present at the January 29th hearing. During his testimony the Commissioner agreed to consult further with the Subcommittee to explore ways to resolve the many 

problems identified in the Science Advisory Board report and address a multitude of concerns raised by the GAO, the Subcommittee, and others related to food and drug imports. Almost immediately on the heels of the January hearing, the FDA was quickly overwhelmed by the very type of crisis these reports and audits 

predicted would occur: contaminated heparin from China. 

As we are now familiar, in late 2007 and early 2008, FDA began 

noticing hundreds of reports of adverse reactions to heparin, including vomiting, breathing difficulties, low blood pressure, and as 

many as 81 deaths. We would learn that tainted heparin was imported from China, and that the Chinese facility, Changzhou SPL, 

which made the active ingredient, had never been inspected by the 

FDA because of multiple internal failures. Laboratory testing revealed that a foreign ingredient called oversulfated chondroitin sulfate had somehow been added into the heparin production chain. 

While investigation into the origin of this contaminant continues, 

this tragic episode underscores the vulnerabilities in the current 

system used to regulate foreign drugs. 

We have spent almost a year investigating the nature and extent 

of failures in FDA’s foreign drug inspection program. After several 

hearings, the findings of the GAO, FDA’s own Science Board, 

countless press articles, and the Subcommittee’s own work, there 

are enough red flags to suggest to this Chairman, it is time to act 

and fix this program. GAO said it perfectly in last year’s testimony, 

and I quote: ‘‘Until FDA responds to systemic weaknesses in the 

management of this important program, it cannot provide the needVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:46 Oct 05, 2009 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\110-107 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
4 

ed assurance that the drug supply reaching our citizens is appropriately scrutinized and safe.’’ To date, FDA has been unable to assure the public these products are safe because they do not address 

the numerous systemic weaknesses many of us have identified. Because GAO and others will report today that many of the same 

problems we identified last year are still with us today, I can only 

conclude that American lives are unnecessarily being placed at 

risk. 

I look forward to hearing from the Commissioner today. However, given the current nature of his agency’s foreign drug inspection program, I think it is incumbent upon him to lay out a credible 

plan that demonstrates what steps the FDA has or will take to 

close these gaps and what resources or regulatory tools he needs 

to do the job. 

Last year, this Nation’s regulatory failure resulted in dead dogs 

and cats. This year, it has tragically led to the deaths of people. 

If we don’t make rapid progress on fixing the foreign drug inspection program, the next melamine or heparin tragedy will soon be 

upon us. 

With that, I next recognize the Ranking Member of the Committee, Mr. Shimkus from Illinois, for an opening statement. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to yield my 

time to the Ranking Member of the full committee, Mr. Barton, for 

an opening statement. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Barton, please, for an opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE BARTON, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, and I apologize for going out of order. 

I have another meeting upstairs that I’m going to go to after the 

statement and then I will come back down for the questions. 

I want to commend Chairman Stupak and Ranking Member 

Shimkus for holding this hearing. It continues the bipartisan tradition of oversight work to ensure that the FDA is policing the safety 

of our drug supply. I want to commend Dr. von Eschenbach for attending, as he said he would when we had a hearing on this subject several months ago. It shows that he is a man who keeps his 

word and is willing to come before the Subcommittee when necessary. 

We’re all very concerned about the safety of our imported food 

and drugs. And we’re even more concerned that many of those are 

coming from China, which has a spotty record of regulating its 

products which are sold for export. There is a long history of counterfeit products from China, shoddy manufacturing. Sometimes 

those shoddy manufactured products and counterfeit products 

cause real problems in our country. The American people deserve 

better, and there is something very, very wrong with our system 

if we can’t decide on a collective basis, cooperative basis with the 

administration and the Congress, what to do about it. 

This subcommittee has done outstanding work over the years in 

revealing the weaknesses in our current inspection program, both 

domestically and foreign. The risk from imported drugs has increased quite simply because the number of imported drugs have 

increased almost exponentially. And we haven’t given the FDA the 

5 

resources to handle the increased scope of activity. And it is quite 

probable—if it’s not probable, it’s at least possible that the FDA’s 

regulatory scheme has not been up to the task in terms of overseas 

inspections. 

I was under the impression, until preparing for this hearing, that 

an active drug—a new active drug ingredient if it is from an overseas plant—had to have preapproval, and that required inspection. 

Apparently that’s not the case because we’ve got evidence that the 

FDA has allowed foreign facilities to go uninspected or barely inspected. It would seem that that would be one change that we need 

to make and we need to make immediately. 

Another issue before us is, I believe that the ability of the FDA 

to refuse products to come into this country needs to be put into 

statute. I thought again in preparation, not for this hearing but a 

previous hearing, that we had the statutory authority to give to the 

FDA that if they felt like a facility or particular drug or base ingredient wasn’t safe, they could refuse its admittance to the United 

States market. Apparently that’s not the case. It is an authority 

that the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary 

Leavitt, has asked for. It is an authority that I support giving the 

FDA, and hopefully it’s an authority we can put into statutory law 

on a bipartisan basis later this year. 

It is clear that the FDA needs some new thinking in how to deal 

with the 21st century in the global commercial market that we 

have today. We don’t have the luxury that we had even 50 years 

ago of just staying here, snug as a bug in a rug, in our home country, and blocking out the rest of the world in terms of drug imports 

and things like that. We have to come up with a system that 

makes sense both from an economic standpoint, from a regulatory 

and manpower standpoint, but also from a safety and efficacy 

standpoint. And that is the bottom-line purpose of this hearing. 

The agency needs congressional approval to clarify its jurisdiction to warrant criminal conduct outside the United States that 

threatens the health and safety of the United States population— 

again, that’s something I hope we can give the FDA in statutory 

authority later this year. The FDA needs a foreign inspection program with many, many more full-time inspectors overseas and with 

the availability to go into these foreign plants and conduct the inspections in overseas plants like they are allowed to conduct the inspections in domestic United States plants. Foreign inspections, 

unfortunately, are the neglected stepchild of the FDA’s drug inspection program and that simply cannot continue. 

I am told Commissioner von Eschenbach has several good ideas 

to share with us in this hearing about how to make those changes. 

Again, I want to welcome the Commissioner and welcome the panelists on the other panels. This is an important hearing and hopefully, while it’s an oversight hearing, will lead to some legislative 

action that this committee takes to help remedy this problem in 

this Congress. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Barton. 

Mr. Dingell for opening statement, please. 

6 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Mr. DINGELL. Sir, I thank you for holding this very important 

hearing. Today we are here to again explore whether this administration is adequately able to protect American citizens from unscrupulous or incompetent foreign manufacturers of pharmaceutical 

products or whether they have the will to get the money and the 

resources necessary to do so. 

Given the findings of this subcommittee of the recent disturbing 

events surrounding tainted heparin, I believe that FDA is clearly 

not up to the test, or cannot or will not undertake the reforms 

needed to protect Americans from this threat from abroad, or get 

the resources that they need to carry out the business that they are 

charged with. Indeed, they don’t even tell us what their needs are 

to meet the challenges that are imposed upon them by their important responsibilities of protecting the health and safety of American 

people. 

Now, let’s summarize some of the Committee’s key findings from 

its investigation so far. and then let us ask the Commissioner to 

defend the indefensible. 

First, significant and growing amounts of pharmaceutical products are used by Americans that are manufactured overseas. At 

least 80 percent of all active pharmaceutical ingredients are now 

imported, much of it from countries lacking competent regulatory 

systems, such as China and India. Current U.S. law requires FDA 

to inspect domestic manufacturing firms once every 2 years. But 

there is no law requiring the same for foreign firms. And it is to 

be observed that FDA cannot and does not investigate foreign firms 

sending these kinds of substances into the United States. 

While FDA is able to investigate and inspect domestic firms 

about once every 2.7 years, the inspection rate for foreign firms is 

once every 13 years or more. In fact at this time, FDA is able to 

only inspect about 7 percent of existing foreign firms shipping drug 

products to the United States annually. 

Now, what does this mean? More than 700 Chinese firms are 

currently ‘‘registered’’ to export drug products to the United States. 

But FDA can only inspect about 10 or 20 of them per year. In other 

words, it would take FDA more than 30 years to inspect each Chinese firm a single time, assuming that no new firms are added to 

the list. 

The information technology system, or IT system, that FDA uses 

to track and manage data on foreign manufacturers and the drugs 

they export to the United States is archaic and fraught with inaccuracies. As a matter of fact, FDA has pointed out to the Committee or to the public that a recent inspection of one of the firms 

involved in the heparin question was the wrong firm because it had 

a similar name. 

FDA is unable to tell us how many foreign firms are subject to 

inspection globally, or where they are located. GAO reports that 

FDA cannot determine how many firms are exporting drugs to the 

United States. And we are imposing upon American manufacturers 

duties to produce safe, effective commodities and to do so under 

proper manufacturing practices. No such imposition is going on 

7 

with regard to foreign firms, simply because FDA can’t inspect 

them or tell us that these requirements are being put in place. 

The last time the Commissioner of Food and Drugs was here, he 

promised to return and give us the details of how he was going to 

fix this sorry mess. I hope that his testimony today will not resemble what he told the Senate appropriators last week, which appeared to be extraordinarily short on substance and heavy on bureaucratic buzz words. I’m hoping that the Commissioner will finally tell us what additional resources he needs. 

The President’s 2009 budget does little, if anything, to close the 

gap in foreign inspection rates. To this point, neither I nor the 

American people have any reason to believe that the administration is protecting us or is serious about protecting us from dangerous foreign-made drugs or raw materials from which these 

drugs are made. Frankly, until the Commissioner honestly tells the 

Congress what new regulatory tools are needed and what it will 

take to fix the broken IT systems, and how many personnel it will 

take to inspect foreign firms with meaningful frequency, I fear that 

we are going to continue to see contaminated products entering 

both our food and our drug supply, while FDA sits helplessly by 

watching calamities impend upon the safety and security of the 

United States. 

This is an intolerable situation and this committee intends to address this with legislation this year. We hope that the Food and 

Drug Administration and this administration will do something 

about these matters. If they will cooperate and help, it will make 

it easier; but if they won’t, we will do it to them anyway. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Dingell. 

Mr. Shimkus for an opening statement, please, sir. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today’s hearing revisits the question of great and urgent importance to the American 

public and that is, What must the Food and Drug Administration 

do or be able to do to assure the safety of drugs in bulk drug ingredients imported into the United States? Part of the answer, of 

course, involves assuring a sufficiently robust foreign drug inspection program. 

This committee explored the foreign drug inspection program in 

some detail at a hearing this past November. As was established 

at that hearing, the present situation doesn’t make sense. We have 

an agency that has focused a majority of its facility inspections on 

domestic firms, when most of the facilities involved in supplying 

drug product to the American public are now situated overseas. A 

good portion of these facilities are in countries like India and 

China. And we have an agency that has not implemented the IT 

systems and informational tools to identify fully and rapidly the 

risks confronting us from abroad, let alone identify all the foreign 

facilities that should be subject to inspection. 

We have already heard the numbers that show the imbalance in 

risk priorities, with most domestic firms inspected about every 2 

years, about literally hundreds of foreign firms that have not seen 

8 

an inspection, if at all, in a decade. Clearly these priorities need 

to be brought closer into balance. 

The Subcommittee also established that frequent surveillance inspections are important for assuring good manufacturing practices 

in foreign facilities. Good manufacturing practices and related safeguards over the supply chain reduce the risk that dangerous impurities in substandard products will turn up in U.S. medicine cabinets. Weak quality assurance safeguards have tragic effects. As Mr. 

Whitfield noticed in November, a bulk product that contains an impurity, something spot-testing may not detect, can cause injury or 

death to numerous people. 

We saw this with Chinese imports of gentamicin in the late 

1990s. We worry that the same may have occurred with heparin 

contamination in recent months. 

The main reason for today’s hearing is for the FDA Commissioner von Eschenbach to lay out for us his strategy for improving 

the Agency’s foreign inspection program. He is here this morning 

to respond to findings by this subcommittee, and the GAO as well 

as the FDA Science Advisory Board. That panel’s subcommittee report painted a picture of the FDA struggling to fill its public health 

mission. It described resource shortfalls, deficient information systems and structural problems at the Agency that we should address. 

I very much appreciate the Commissioner’s willingness to step 

once more into the Subcommittee’s fire, but it is very important to 

hear its plans to address the problems we see. We will hear this 

morning some positive actions; but are these actions enough? Is the 

Agency using all the tools at its disposal to orient itself fully to the 

realities of foreign imports? 

For example, we know there are informational tools at the FDA’s 

disposal, such as pilot Predict system, that promise large advances 

in realtime risk assessment. Predict has been pilot-tested, but we 

have yet to see this deployed widely. Why the hold-up? And what 

does this say about the Agency’s commitment to modernize? More 

disturbing is the Agency’s policy to waive inspections, even in countries such as China, for reasons that have nothing to do with the 

facility risk or location. This ad hoc waiver may be driven by resource constraints, but it raises questions about the Agency’s policy 

priorities as well. 

As we move through the hearing today, I think it is important 

that first we develop good information about what the Agency is 

doing now to improve its information systems and foreign posture. 

We should learn how quickly it can bring some balance between its 

domestic and foreign inspection priorities. We should discuss what 

authorities FDA needs regarding overseas criminal conduct. This 

should help us improve our discussions about what Congress can 

do legislatively. 

And second, as we discuss what more needs to be done, I’m hopeful we can also discuss where we want the Agency to be 10 years 

out. Do we want an agency structured as it is today, just with more 

people; or can we find some agreement that we need a smarter, 

more agile agency, using all the best and integrated information 

technology that can tackle the challenges of global commerce more 

cost effectively than the current model? 

9 

Mr. Chairman, the Subcommittee has done great work to identify 

the Agency’s weaknesses as they exist today. Let us gather some 

facts and perspective to develop a vision for this agency’s future as 

well. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. STUPAK. I thank you. 

I want to ask Mr. Melancon for an opening statement, please. 

Mr. MELANCON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’m going to waive an 

opening statement and reserve my time for future use. Thank you. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Burgess. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL C. BURGESS, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing today. I think it’s timely and, as the heparin story 

unfolds, we have no choice but to be more proactive in our safety 

measures abroad. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m a physician before I came to Congress, and 

I know that I have to trust what I’m prescribing for my patients. 

I have to trust that it is not adulterated, that it has not been mislabeled. I have to trust that someone with criminal intent has not 

adulterated the medication. The reason I trust the medicine is because the Food and Drug Administration approved it. 

If it is acceptable that we do not know exactly who manufactured 

the ingredients of the drug, or if those ingredients are safe or not, 

or if the factories have even been inspected, then that whole system comes into question. 

Pure and simply, doctors rely on the Food and Drug Administration to approve drugs that keep the American public safe, and 

they’ve done a great job over the years. That safety is generally 

stipulated when a patient comes into a doctor’s office and a prescription or treatment is recommended. 

Today, we are very fortunate to have a physician at the helm of 

the Food and Drug Administration. Therefore, he can relate to my 

concerns about the trust that physicians place in this Federal agency. I certainly would like to thank Dr. von Eschenbach for once 

again appearing before us to continue this important dialogue on 

the Food and Drug Administration’s inspection program. 

In addition to Dr. von Eschenbach’s testimony, we will also hear 

from the Chair of the Science Board. When we had our hearing 

earlier this year on the report, I was very disturbed at some of the 

findings. Dr. Cassell’s testimony today will hopefully shed more 

light on how the report relates to a Food and Drug Administration 

foreign drug inspection program. With the significant increase in 

imports, I think this program should be one of the most crucial programs we have at the Food and Drug Administration. So, Dr. 

Cassell, thank you for being with us today as well. 

And I would be remiss if I did not welcome Dr. William Hubbard. 

You have provided this committee with great insight, and I thank 

you for your commitment to making what I believe is arguably the 

most important Federal agency in the United States better and 

stronger. 

We heard the Chairman—I’m sorry, the Ranking Member of the 

subcommittee—Ranking Member of the full committee, rather, talk 

about the ability to stop dangerous food imports from entering our 

10 

country. H.R. 3967, the Imported Food Safety Improvement Act 

that was introduced earlier this year, that bill came largely as cooperation and instruction and advice from Al Hubbard, Dr. Hubbard, to our office. And we need the same authority now for the active pharmaceutical ingredients that are manufactured in other 

countries coming into our country. 

Mr. Chairman, we are here today to better understand the Food 

and Drug Administration’s foreign drug inspection program. And, 

unfortunately, we all realize the Food and Drug Administration has 

real problems in ensuring that our Nation’s food, drugs, and devices are safe and effective. What is not clear is how the Agency 

has responded to these shortcomings, and how effective these 

measures have been, and how Congress could actually be helpful 

in getting the FDA to make the necessary changes. 

According to the GAO report that we will hear about today, some 

changes are being made as to how the FDA handles drug importation. But these changes will require widely invested resources and 

firm leadership in order to have the accomplishments that we all 

so much desire. 

The former Speaker of this House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, says, time and time again, real change requires real change. 

New technology is desperately needed to help integrate the databases and modernize the recordkeeping. 

Apparently there is talk of starting FDA field offices overseas, a 

measure that I would likely support. However, the mission of these 

new offices is still not clear in establishing that clarity should be 

crucial for receiving the support of this subcommittee. Meanwhile, 

we are still consuming drugs from factories that have never been 

inspected, are possibly completely unknown, and we have people 

dying from these affected medicines. 

The heparin story is still evolving, Mr. Chairman. It is interesting that no test, no test available would have detected the 

hypersulfated chondroitin present in the contaminated product that 

came into this country, the very contaminant that is thought to 

cause the adverse heparin reactions. 

With that, the FDA is trying to improve, and I believe is trying 

to improve, under the leadership of Dr. von Eschenbach. Change 

and progress is occurring, but these improvements require resources that have been denied for many years. 

Now, the Chairman of the full committee asked a question, a 

rhetorical question, I assume: What additional resources the FDA 

needs to protect the American people. He questioned the administration’s sincerity about protecting the American people. I think realistically anyone who has watched this full committee over the 

past several weeks would have to wonder about congressional intent and whether or not that’s also suspect, with the ill-advised bill 

we had a few weeks ago to have the FDA take on an entirely new 

venture to regulate tobacco. And the lead editorial in today’s Wall 

Street Journal finishes with the observation, ‘‘congressional priorities are rarely so grotesque.’’ And I would agree with that. 

Mr. Chairman, it is not just dollars. We’ve heard from the 

Science Subcommittee the personnel report, and the training of 

those personnel are important. The policy and procedures within 

the Food and Drug Administration are critical, the lack of informaVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:46 Oct 05, 2009 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\110-107 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
11 

tion technology infrastructure prevents—truly prevents the development of a 21st century system that’s needed to protect Americans. And after all, at the end of the day, that’s what we are all 

after, providing Americans with the protection that they have 

grown to give, that knowledge that they have grown to accept from 

the Food and Drug Administration that that protection is just a 

given, it is just assured. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. STUPAK. I thank the gentleman. 

Seeing no other members, we will call our first witness. 

That concludes the opening statements by members of the subcommittee, and I call our first panel witness to come forward. Our 

first panel, we have the Honorable Dr. Andrew von Eschenbach, 

Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration. It is the policy 

of this subcommittee to take testimony under oath. Please be advised that you have the right under the rules of the House to be 

advised by counsel during your testimony. Do you wish to be represented by counsel? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. No, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. 

[Witness sworn.] 

Mr. STUPAK. Let the record reflect the witness replied in the affirmative. Doctor, you are now under oath, we will hear your opening statement. You may submit a longer statement for inclusion in 

the record. Commissioner, your opening statement, please. 

STATEMENT OF ANDREW C. VON ESCHENBACH, M.D., COMMISSIONER, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, 

D.C. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Thank you very much, Chairman Stupak, 

Ranking Member Shimkus, members of the Committee, and Chairman Dingell. Over the past 21⁄2 years, everytime I have appeared 

before this committee my message has been the same: The FDA is 

immersed in a rapidly and radically changing world and we must 

make radical and rapid changes if we are going to continue our 

record of excellence as the world’s gold standard regulatory agency 

for food and medical products for both people and animals. 

I have consistently endorsed the fact that this would require additional resources, and over three budget cycles have presented requests for those additional resources to the Administration and to 

Congress. Most importantly, I’ve presented to this committee plans 

and proposals to use current and future resources wisely and strategically to achieve our mission to protect and promote the health 

of every single person in the country and, in fact, around the world. 

Globalization, increased product complexity, and other market 

developments, are placing tremendous strains on our import safety 

system. These trends are not new and were anticipated years ago 

in a report by the GAO. The agency’s response has been deliberate, 

but nowhere adequate in proportion to the growth of the challenge. 

[Slide shown.] 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. The first slide I share with you just demonstrates the volume of FDA-regulated products that are entering 

into this country. The data demonstrate that inspection at our borVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:46 Oct 05, 2009 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\110-107 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
12 

ders for this volume of products could never be an adequate barrier 

that would assure protection to patients and consumers. 

[Slide shown.] 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. The next slide shows the number of establishments producing drugs outside the United States for import 

and, just looking at drugs, there are over 1,300 sites. And you can 

multiply this many-fold if you consider active pharmaceutical ingredients, biologics, medical devices, and generic drugs. No matter 

how we arrived at this point, if we address the challenges of this 

reality, the solution is not simply to just do more of what we have 

done in the past, but we must do things differently. 

[Slide shown.] 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. The next slide indicates that FDA must 

not just be a gatekeeper, but must be involved across the full life 

cycle of the products that we regulate, from their very production 

to consumption, by imposing strategies that encompass prevention, 

intervention, and response across the entire supply chain, both domestic and foreign. 

As you mentioned this morning, Mr. Chairman, at the core of 

this systems approach to this total engagement and product life 

cycle is the need to create a state-of-the-art information technology 

infrastructure with data management systems that are capable of 

acquiring the complex and diverse information from multiple 

sources with integration and analysis of that information that defines risks, and targets appropriately FDA’s regulatory resources 

and actions. 

At the last hearing I discussed with you our vision for our enhanced information technology infrastructure and the progress we 

are making along a trajectory toward a total renovation of this infrastructure by 2010. But information management that provides 

comprehensive information about the regulated product is only one 

component of what is required. We must assure that quality is 

built into these products at the very source of production, and that 

all parties involved in the entire supply chain are held accountable 

for maintaining that quality. FDA must be proactive. 

In that regard, today, I describe to you a major initiative of quality assurance: FDA’s Beyond our Borders Initiative. This addresses 

imported products with a systems-based approach to the systemic 

problem of the Agency’s regulation of food, cosmetics, and medical 

products. The initiative includes a number of broad activities, including increased collaboration with foreign regulators, use of third 

parties to provide information about regulated industry compliance 

with FDA standards, and also providing additional direction to the 

regulated industry for their global activities. 

Beyond our Borders presents and builds on the very extensive 

and successful collaboration we have already established with foreign counterparts, including more than 70 cooperative agreements 

and 30 confidentiality agreements with trusted foreign regulators, 

many of which provide the possibility of sharing inspection reports. 

These relationships provide a strong foundation for more extensive 

collaborations to prevent failure and quality, to intervene earlier 

when standards are not being met, and respond more rapidly and 

efficiently to signals of adverse outcome. 

13 

The increasingly global nature of product development and production requires our continuous and intensive interaction beyond 

our border. This plan includes the establishment of FDA offices in 

China, India, Latin America, Europe and the Middle East. I have 

been engaged in direct discussions in each of those areas to obtain 

support and a welcome for a U.S. FDA presence, and that progress 

is well underway, especially to establishing our first office in 

China. 

FDA can rely in part on these efforts in making important riskbased decisions regarding imports. Permanent overseas offices, especially in China, will allow greater access for FDA inspectors and, 

very importantly, greater interactions on an ongoing basis between 

FDA staff and Chinese officials and manufacturers to help assure 

that products that are being shipped to the United States meet 

FDA standards for safety and manufacturing quality. 

Another component of Beyond our Borders leverages private sector resources. As recommended in the President’s action plan for 

import safety, FDA is pursuing expanded use of third-party certification by foreign producers to verify compliance with U.S. safety 

and security standards with FDA oversight and verification. These 

third parties can include foreign government agencies as well as 

independent agencies accredited by the FDA. And they can provide 

helpful information about compliance with FDA’s requirements. 

FDA certification will not supplant our inspectional responsibilities 

or our regulatory activities, but will simply complement them and 

expand our affect. 

To help increase information about foreign facilities, we will also 

engage external nongovernmental organizations with foreign offices 

to conduct onsite verification of registration data, product listing 

information, and the information so necessary in our ability to understand the source of these products. We would also be visiting 

foreign firms and verifying and documenting that information on a 

continuous ongoing basis. Assisting foreign regulators to be able to 

understand, implement, and embody FDA standards is another essential component of this initiative to build capacity beyond the 

FDA to a global effort at product safety. 

My written testimony about our prevention intervention response 

strategy provides more specific information about Beyond our Borders Initiative and our efforts are underway to enhance our oversight of imported products. Important of these is the request of new 

authorities that will help ensure that foreign manufacturers of 

drug products are in compliance with U.S. law. 

We have requested Congress to provide statutory authority for 

FDA to require certification by third parties, in certain circumstances that incoming products must meet U.S. importing 

standards; that we can refuse admission of products for which FDA 

encounters undue delay, limits, or denials of access for inspection 

of foreign manufacturing sites; that we have the authority to expedite destruction of certain unsafe medical products and authority 

to seek asset forfeiture remedies for criminal offenses regarding 

fraudulent or counterfeit products. 

I appreciate the opportunity to once again be with you today, and 

I look forward to answering your questions about the details of 

these proposals that will enhance and strengthen FDA’s ability to 

14 

ensure Americans of the quality of the products they consume, irrespective of where they are made. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. von Eschenbach follows:] 

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Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Commissioner, appreciate you being here today, 

and thank you for taking the time to come to the hearing. We invite you to stick around for our second panel’s testimony. The witnesses on our second panel represent more than 100 years of working experience with the FDA in the pharmaceutical industry, as 

well as significant oversight experience at the GAO. So while we 

welcome your testimony, we think their testimony would also be 

valuable in assisting you in making changes at the FDA, and I 

think it would be worthwhile for you to listen to it. 

I’m going to yield my time for questioning at this point in time 

and turn to the Chairman on the full committee, Mr. Dingell, for 

questions, please. 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, you are most kind and considerate, 

for which I thank you. Yes or no to these questions, Mr. Commissioner, because I have very little time. Isn’t it true that in 2007 

there were 3,200 foreign firms registered with FDA to ship drug 

products into the United States? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I believe that number is correct, sir, yes. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, is it also true that according to a GAO audit, 

you inspect only about 2- to 300 of those foreign establishments 

each year? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. That’s correct, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. At current inspection rates, that it will take FDA 

more than 13 years to inspect each foreign establishment once? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir. And that’s why we need a systemic approach. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, GAO estimates that there are 714 drug manufacturing establishments in China registered with FDA; isn’t that 

true? Yes or no. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I believe that to be true, sir. I would have 

to check that number. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, of these 700 and more firms in China, isn’t 

it also true that you’d inspect an average of 10 or 20 of these each 

year? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. GAO tells this committee the Agency inspects each 

domestic drug manufacturing firm once every 2.7 years. If FDA is 

inspecting each foreign firm once every 2 or 3 years, each domestic 

firm once every 2 or 3 years, how can you justify not inspecting foreign firms at the same rate? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Mr. Chairman, we are completely in 

agreement that we need to extend our ability to provide regulatory 

oversight to firms. 

Mr. DINGELL. So you’re telling me that that situation is indefensible; is that correct? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. It is unacceptable for the future, yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. OK. Now let us address your budget. GAO reports 

across 41- to 44,000 for each foreign inspection; is that correct? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I cannot verify that number, sir. We have 

slightly different numbers, but—— 

Mr. DINGELL. According to GAO, if FDA were to inspect each foreign establishment once every 2 years, as is required for domestic 

forms—firms, it would cost FDA approximately $70 million. Have 

you seen these figures? 

37 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir, I have. 

Mr. DINGELL. Do you agree with them? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. That figure may be somewhat higher than 

our estimates, but it is a reasonable number. 

Mr. DINGELL. It is within the ballpark. 

Now, to inspect Chinese firms at the same rate FDA inspects 

U.S. firms, it would then cost FDA about $16 million if we use the 

estimates of GAO; is that correct? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Approximately; yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. Do you differ with those? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think it is important for me to point out—— 

Mr. DINGELL. Yes or no. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH [continuing]. That I believe we need to look 

not just at the cost of inspections but the entire system that we’re 

using for inspections, and that may require different cost. 

Mr. DINGELL. My time here—my time here is much limited, and 

I do apologize, but I’ve got—quite frankly, I’m going to be honest 

with you, I’m establishing that you don’t have the resources and 

you can’t do your job. 

Now, GAO reveals the most curious finding, in which the FDA 

has dedicated only $11 million for fiscal year 2008 and $13 million 

for fiscal year in 2009 to conduct all foreign inspections, and this 

includes food as well. Are you aware of that finding? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. Do you agree with it or disagree with it? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I agree with the finding. 

Mr. DINGELL. Pardon? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I agree with the finding. 

Mr. DINGELL. All right. In light of these numbers, does the FDA 

need more resources to conduct inspections of foreign drug manufacturers? Yes or no. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir; I’ve asked for more resources. 

Mr. DINGELL. All right. So is it fair for me to say, then, using 

FDA’s estimate—rather, using GAO’s estimate of $16 million just 

for Chinese firms, your resources here under the budget request of 

$11 million and 13 million are not adequate; isn’t that right? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. They are not in—they are not in concurrence with GAO’s estimates; that’s correct. 

Mr. DINGELL. OK. Are you telling me that these are adequate or 

not? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I’m telling you that we are putting those 

to appropriate use. I have requested additional resources to do 

more, but I’m trying to make the point that in addition to doing 

more, we have to do it differently. 

Mr. DINGELL. You know, I’ve been in this business a long time, 

and I’ve had Food and Drug Commissioners constantly tell me, oh, 

we’re going to have a new means of doing this and we’re going to 

do this, we’re going to be leaner and meaner. It turns out that they 

are leaner and poorer and weaker and less capable of doing their 

job. And all these promises that I get from commissioners of Food 

and Drug about how they are going to do better turn out to be 

nothing more or less than, quite frankly, hooey. 

38 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me in the 

dialogue—— 

Mr. DINGELL. It is very—— 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Heparin—— 

Mr. DINGELL. I’ve been talking to Food and Drug Commissioners 

for 40 years. You’re not the first fella I’ve had to skin for not doing 

his job and coming up here and defending an indefensible situation. 

So I want to maintain any respect for you, but I can’t maintain my 

respect for you if you keep toe-dancing around the hard facts that 

curse you with the inability to do your job because you don’t have 

the resources. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Mr. Chairman, I agree with you that we 

need more resources, but I think the point of the story is, the heparin situation indicated that, even if we had done the inspection, 

we would not have detected that contamination. That’s why I’m 

trying to make the point to you that in addition to resources for 

more inspections, which I agree with—— 

Mr. DINGELL. Well—— 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH [continuing]. That we also have to change 

the system. 

Mr. DINGELL. How much—let’s come right down to the nut-cutting stage here and let’s get a hard answer. How much money do 

you really need to carry out your responsibilities? In regard to foreign inspection, foreigners are not compelled by absence of inspections by FDA to carry out good manufacturing practices. American 

manufacturers are. How much money do you need to see to it that 

you put your treatment of foreign manufacturers of prescription 

pharmaceuticals and foods in the same position that you put U.S. 

manufacturers, because you inspect U.S. manufacturers on an adequate level and you do not inspect foreign manufacturers in the 

same way? How much money do you need to do the job that you 

have to have? Now, give me an answer to that question. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, sir if you took the $45,000 for inspection and multiplied it by the number of facilities—— 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Commissioner, just tell me how much do you 

need? I’m rather tired of all this toe-dancing. You cannot do your 

job, you are not doing your job. How much money do you need to 

do it? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Mr. Chairman, that would require me to 

present to you a business plan. You gave a figure of $45,000 per 

inspection, if we were to inspect everything every 2 years—— 

Mr. DINGELL. How much money do you need to do your job if you 

do the job on foreigners that you do on Americans? Simple question. I’m sure you—— 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. It would be the number of facilities. 

Mr. DINGELL. Repeat it. How much money do you need? You are 

carrying water for an administration that is not giving you the resources that you need. This committee wants you to have the resources that you need to do the job that you have to do to protect 

the American people. Sixty-two people died because of bad heparin. 

Hundreds of others were made sick. You presided over this, because you do not have the resources to do the job that you need 

to do. 

39 

How much money do you need to do the job that you are supposed to do to see to it that Americans are safe? You are the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration. You are presiding 

over an intolerable situation. How much resources do you need? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the 

resources that will enable us to do a systemic overhaul of the entire 

process, not a figure that’s related to the cost per inspection times 

the number of facilities. 

Mr. DINGELL. I don’t want—just how much money do you need, 

on the basis of what I have described is going on, to do the job that 

you have to do to see to it that good manufacturing practices are 

conducted in places like China so as to protect the American consumers against unsafe commodities? You have one fine scandal 

going on, you have others going on with regard to fish and fish 

products. And you simply are absolutely incapable of addressing 

your responsibilities. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, Mr. Chairman, if you wanted an answer to that question just for drugs, given the formula—— 

Mr. DINGELL. Well, please answer just for drugs. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH [continuing]. $45,000. It is $45,000 per inspection times 3,000 facilities, just for drugs. What I am attempting to do is respond to your question. 

Mr. DINGELL. I don’t want to hear about how you’re—— 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Bigger than that. 

Mr. DINGELL. Going to have new methodologies and how you’re 

going to have a new regime for dealing with the Chinese. I just 

want you to tell me how much it takes you to provide the same 

necessary inspection for Chinese manufacturers of pharmaceuticals 

that you have now going on with regard to American manufacturers, so that you can insist that there be good manufacturing practices carried forward in China like they are carried forward in 

America. 

It makes about no sense American manufacturers are getting 

raw materials in from China that put American citizens at risk. So 

how much do you need to do your responsibility of inspecting those 

foreign firms in China to see to it that they carry out their proper 

responsibilities of giving us good manufacturing practices to assure 

the safety of the American consuming public? Simple question. 

How about an answer? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. If there are 3,000 facilities in China at 

$45,000 per inspection, that would be the figure. 

Mr. DINGELL. What did he say? What did you say? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. If the estimate is that it costs $45,000 per 

inspection and there are 3,000 facilities, that would be the figure. 

But I’m trying to discuss with you the fact that I don’t believe that 

is the solution to the problem. I believe it is much more complex 

and the solution needs to be much more comprehensive than simply inspecting a facility. 

Mr. DINGELL. Well, all right. How do you propose to assure, then, 

that good manufacturing practices are carried forward without inspecting these people? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, they need to be inspected. I’m not 

precluding that—— 

Mr. DINGELL. All right. 

40 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH [continuing]. This doesn’t—— 

Mr. DINGELL. How are you assured that the facilities are safe? 

How are you to be assured that they are clean? How are you to be 

assured that there are not adulterants added? You just have a fine 

fuss going with the Chinese about whether they are adding illegal 

components. It is here in the newspaper. Are you aware of this? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. One thing, Mr. Chairman—— 

Mr. DINGELL. Are you aware of this article, Commissioner? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. One thing, as I pointed out in my opening 

statement, is that we cannot do this on an episodic basis of going 

and coming. We have to have offices that are physically present in 

these countries where these products are being produced; engaged 

in an ongoing continuous presence that involves inspections and 

enhancement of our inspection, at the same time building capacity 

within those countries. 

Mr. DINGELL. See, if I can simplify this and get rid of the toedancing here, you’ve got $45,000 per investigation, you’ve got 3,000 

firms, that comes to $70 million, am I right? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, I will trust your math, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. I note, with apology to you, Mr. Chairman, that my 

time has expired. I want to get back into these matters at a time 

later. 

Commissioner, I have nothing—no ill will towards you. I have ill 

will of the most gross sort towards the fact that you come up here 

and defend a situation that is indefensible, and that you are not 

soliciting the resources that you need to do your job to protect the 

American people the way the law says you should, and that you are 

tolerating an administration which is allowing this kind of situation to obtain, because they are too damn tight to see to it that the 

American people have the funds that are necessary to protect them 

against wrongdoing in foreign countries. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. STUPAK. I thank the Chairman. 

Mr. Shimkus for questions, please. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. von Eschenbach, it is—we knew it would be an interesting 

morning, so it is good to have you here. Let me just put this out 

just to start with. Did you attempt through the budgetary process 

to solicit additional funds to address some of these funding constraints that the chairman tried to raise? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir, I did. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Can you say that again? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir. I’m sorry. I did. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you. One of—the success of elected officials, 

hopefully, is to try to take the complex and make it simple for folks 

to understand. And I think that is where the frustration comes, because we’re not trying to manage an unwieldy bureaucracy. If we 

had a dime for every outsider who came in to reform the Federal 

bureaucracy with all the great ideas and then left really being 

tamed by the bureaucracy, not able to really develop—and there 

are some people, and we’re going to hear it from other panelists 

later on. 

Some of the questions that we pose is, how do we remake the 

Agency in a new world, in a new era? How do we—some people say 

41 

dismantle it. If we were to start over from scratch, what would we 

do? 

I’m not convinced that more money is always the solution. I 

think there is an argument that—more resources in this case. But, 

based upon the whole budget and other priorities, as I will address 

to the other members of the panel, if you have a producer, a manufacturing facility in the United States that has operated 10 years 

straight, been investigated every 2 years, 5 times, with zero defects, that may call for readjusting priorities and saying, well, you 

have clearly got this down. We are going to come once every 3 

years, and then you can shift to areas that we know need to be inspected. 

I like charts and slides, and I can’t put this up like you did. But 

the reality is, you just have a factory, And we have got raw materials coming in, and we produce a product, and it gets to the consumer. And right here in the factory is where everything happens. 

And in good manufacturing practices, under ISO standards or 

under any type of thing, they test the raw materials coming in. You 

test the product that is going out—you should—and you watch the 

chain inside the factory to make sure there is no contamination 

and you have—you have a process. 

Constitutionally, I know the President proposes a budget. We always get folks to come up here and complain—it doesn’t matter 

what administration—they are cutting one side to give money to 

another. And we always respond—I always respond what the President proposes and we dispose. 

Constitutionally, all spending begins in the House. So, you know, 

as much as we have identified a resource issue—you have mentioned that you have asked for more resources. It is up to the 

House of Representatives in our appropriation process, if there is 

a shortfall, for us to do that. And there may be proposals that come 

through that will end up doing that. But the military acronym that 

we used in the infantry, keep it simple. There is another one. 

There are actually 2 S’s, but it is not politically correct to say the 

second S. Keep it simple. 

So based upon the opening statements of your testimony, we 

have got a resource concern, and we—that—we also know it is a 

manufacturing evaluation in these factories, and we have technological hurdles that many of us would have hoped we would have 

been before and seen a little bit more progress than what we think 

we are at. And so that is kind of the analysis that I have. 

We have this chart, the majority put up another one using the 

country of China and the United States. But it basically has the 

domestic inspections versus—the inspectors versus the facilities, 

and there we have foreign, and there is a big gap. The question is, 

how do we fix that gap? Can you just—and that is the whole 

premise of this whole hearing, is how do we fix that gap? Tell me 

how we would do this as simply as possible, because we are all basically simple people up here. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. The answer to your very important point 

of looking at this and arriving at a conclusion is the fact that if we 

were just simply to increase the number of inspections, which we 

need to, but that in itself would not solve this problem, that—no 

42 

greater example of that than the heparin situation in which inspection would have not detected that contaminant. 

And so what I have been attempting to do and what I tried to 

share with Chairman Dingell is that, in addition to addressing the 

need to increase our inspections, we also need to overhaul the entire system, everything from the creation of an information technology infrastructure to working with our foreign components and 

other regulatory agencies in other governments, to working with 

the private sector in terms of good manufacturing processes and 

hold them accountable for building quality at the outset. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Because my time is short, get through—I think 

we’ll build on these. 

In the second panel, GAO will testify on the next panel that, although the Agency has made positive progress in its databases and 

in steps to improve foreign inspections, it is not enough, as I said, 

to close the gap. 

And you’ve already started talking about commenting. We have 

established in good manufacturing that good manufacturing practice surveillance inspections are critical to assure quality of the 

drug supply and that more surveillance of foreign firms is needed. 

And I think you would agree with that. How quickly do you believe 

it will take us to close this inspection gap, the gap that I just 

raised in the first question? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I believe that trajectory is going to be limited by our resources and authority and capacity to absorb the 

change. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. So tell us the authority and follow up with the 

chairman’s question on what resources. That’s what we need. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. The information technology infrastructure 

could be in by 2010 to 2012 at the very latest. The expansion of 

the workforce and enhancement of our capacity in our overseas 

presence could be done again within a matter of 2 to 3 years. So 

I think the timelines for modernization for the FDA are relatively 

in a 5-year frame. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. We will examine heparin next week more closely. 

But given the broader implications, would good manufacturing 

practices surveillance inspection of the SPL plant, which did not 

occur, have provided information that would have helped in the 

current investigation? Now, that is a different question than what 

you have stated before. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Mr. Shimkus, I cannot answer for that 

question as authoritatively today. I don’t believe it would have, 

based on our current understanding of this investigation and our 

findings. But it is ongoing. It is an ongoing investigation, and I 

think the final answer is not yet determined. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Yesterday, FDA released a warning letter on the 

Chinese-based heparin firm that supply the contaminated product, 

which said violations cause the heparin to be considered adulterated. If it wasn’t for the heparin recall, how long do you think this 

plant would have shipped adulterated product before it was inspected? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I cannot give you a time on that, sir. 

43 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Its U.S. client apparently didn’t catch the violations. Wouldn’t an earlier FDA surveillance inspection have kept 

adulterated product off the product? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, again, this contaminant was not detectable by the routine analytical methods. So the answer is no. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Well, that’s going to be the debating point. It’s not 

detected. But other aspects of a good manufacturing product evaluation might have highlighted flaws in the process where—I concur. I think that under current inspections—see, we’re talking 

about two things, and I had to learn this. One is getting the product after it has been produced, smashing it up, and testing it to see 

if the efficacy and if it has been adulterated and all those other 

things. But the whole process of the manufacturing processes is 

watching as the production line is moving forward. And that is 

where it is just not testing the end product, it is testing the production of the product. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Correct. There is no question that, based 

on our inspection, that particular facility would have come under 

our regulatory intervention and for other reasons, and that in 

itself, perhaps, would have shut down that particular source. It is 

my understanding that there are other factories, other sources 

whose good manufacturing practices were quite appropriate and acceptable, yet the contaminant was still occurring. 

So, again, it is the issue of that particular facility had problems. 

We would have detected those. But that doesn’t mean we would 

have detected this contamination of the heparin supply, because 

that is much more ubiquitous and would not have been detected by 

our routine analysis. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Yes. And I’ll end on this. Mr. Chairman, thank you 

for the time. 

Our concern is that the possible deviation of the good manufacturing processes, and I—that’s where we want to keep these issues 

and highlight that point. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Shimkus. 

Mr. Commissioner, on page 4 of the GAO testimony it states— 

and I quote—‘‘the regular inspections of manufacturing establishments are an essential component in ensuring drug safety,’’ end of 

quote. Do you agree with that? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir, I do. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Commissioner, you keep saying that the inspection would not have detected the heparin contamination. You don’t 

know that. You don’t know that because you don’t know what you 

would have found if you would have inspected that lab or that 

plant because you didn’t inspect them until after we had these 

deaths. 

In fact, Mr. Commissioner, the opposite can also be true, can it 

not, that your lack of inspections, like 30 years in China, actually 

encourages manufacturers to do substitutes like they did in this 

case here. If I’m not going to be inspected for 30 years, instead of 

using the pig intestines that you’re supposed to use, why not use 

a sulphate chondroitin? No one is going to catch it, right? So why 

not use it? 

44 

The same thing with melamine. We want to get a higher protein 

for this industrial food. Why not put melamine in there? They’re 

not going to inspect us. It’s going to take 30 years, so you’ll never 

catch us. 

So one could easily argue that the lack of inspections actually encourages a less safe product in some of these plants, is that not 

true? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. That is certainly one possibility, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. So the only definitive answer we can give is, 

look, we didn’t inspect. It is wrong. We are supposed to inspect. We 

inspect in this country every 2 to 3 years. We must inspect every 

2 to 3 years for that deterrent effect that inspections cause, whether it is in the United States or in China or anywhere else in the 

world, correct? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. We need to inspect appropriately. And 

what I have been trying to express is the fact that we need—— 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Before you go there, before you go there—— 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH [continuing]. The number of inspections or 

the frequency but the kind of inspections that we’re doing. 

Mr. STUPAK. I’m willing to go there with you, but you have to 

agree with me an inspection is a deterrent. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I’m sorry, sir. I didn’t hear. 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. You would agree with me that the inspection 

is a deterrent? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. It can be, yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. I mean, in the short time we have been here, toothpaste with the antifreeze, DEG, the cough syrup with the DEG, the 

melamine, the mixed protein, and now we have the heparin with 

chondroitin. So inspections actually act as the deterrent. 

Now, you want to talk about other ways to do inspections. Our 

last hearing, I had mentioned in the opening, was January 29th, 

and you were at that hearing. I know you sat through it, and we 

appreciated the fact that you did. 

And you’re talking about setting up—in fact, Kyle, if you can put 

that pyramid up that the inspector had. He has his FDA on top, 

FDA presence; and then you have these agreements. You have this 

pyramid here. It looks at the very top you have the FDA, but on 

the bottom where the work is being done you’re relying on third 

parties to do it. Is that sort of correct? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. No. It is just a little graphic. 

Mr. STUPAK. Third-party certification program, foreign competent 

authority inspections—— 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. That is intended to show that everything 

channels up to the FDA as the final authority. But, actually, you 

could turn it the other way around and say the FDA is the foundation for all of that. 

Mr. STUPAK. Right. And you were talking—when Mr. Dingell was 

asking questions, are there other ways to do inspections, you’re 

talking about third parties and having third-party certifications, 

right? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. That’s one other addition, yes, sir. It expands our effectiveness and our influence across a wider horizon. 

45 

Mr. STUPAK. In one of your earlier slides you show, besides 

drugs, we have medical devices, animal food, biologics all coming 

into this country from foreign countries, right? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. January 29th, when you were in a hearing, we had 

a the GAO, and they talked about your third-party inspection programs and—especially on medical device manufacturing. Your 

third-party inspection program has been around since 2004, and it 

is called the accredited persons inspection program, the pilot multipurpose audit program. And it shows that over a 4-year period only 

5 inspections had been accredited by these organizations, these 

third-party organizations. And the GAO concluded that the small 

number of inspections completed to date by accredited third-party 

organizations raises questions about the practicality and effectiveness of establishing similar programs that rely on third parties to 

quickly help FDA fulfill its responsibilities. 

So you are saying this proposal you’re talking about, even in your 

testimony, so far at least in medical devices, it is not going to work, 

it is not effective, there is too few of them. In 4 years, you had 5 

inspections only from third parties. So why is this going to be different? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. That’s correct. And I have spoken to the 

people in CDRH about what some of those barriers were for acceptance of that third party. There are opportunities, I think, to improve upon that substantially. 

The other thing is, of course, what we define by a third party. 

That could also, of course, be other foreign regulatory agencies 

which have their own jurisdictions. So it is a much broader scope. 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. But even the FDA says, even in looking at 

your Beyond the Borders program, the one you talk about in your 

testimony, we are lacking specific implementation steps. What are 

the associated time frames would this be on our borders that— 

there is a lot of talk about this, but it will have little impact to reduce the interval between inspections. The FDA will have to—how 

do you plan on doing it? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well—— 

Mr. STUPAK. I mean, you talk—— 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. First of all, it is a multi-pronged approach. 

In addition to establishing these FDA Beyond Our Borders initiative—— 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. What is the main prong? You said this is a 

multi-pronged approach. What is the main one? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Enhancing our current inspections. 

Mr. STUPAK. Enhancing your current inspections. What data are 

you going to have to enhance current inspections done by? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. We did more foreign inspections this year 

than in the history of the FDA. We can do even more next year in 

targeting—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Even with $13 million and each one costs $45,000, 

you’re going to do more? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. We are targeting 500 foreign inspections 

next year in addition to creating a foreign presence. 

46 

Mr. STUPAK. Five hundred at $45,000. I wasn’t a math major. 

That would be about $200 million you’re going to need, and you ask 

for $11 million. How is that going to jive? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. There is already an inherent—it is up to 

500. We are up to 350, approximately. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. So I wasn’t a math major. That would be $20 

million, not $200 million. So, either way, $20 million is about half 

of what you have asked for. So how do you get there? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, there is also the capability of 

leveraging what we already had in play. 

Mr. STUPAK. Leveraging with who? Who is going to do the inspections if you’re not doing them? How are you leveraging? Who 

is doing them? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. We have inspectors in the Agency—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH [continuing]. And we’ll need to detail them 

to the foreign inspections that we are targeting. 

Mr. STUPAK. I see. So—— 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. One of the things that is more efficient—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Your IT system is broken. You don’t—how are you 

going to prioritize it? The GAO says you can’t even tell us what is 

being produced and sent to the United States. Therefore, it is hard 

to prioritize what is most significant to prioritize your inspections. 

So once you start with your IT system so you know who is out 

there, what are they sending? What is the right of the American 

people? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir. And we started that 2 years ago. 

That’s in midcourse. We anticipate—— 

Mr. STUPAK. When will it be done, your midcourse? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Pardon me? 

Mr. STUPAK. Your midcourse, when will it be done? Two more 

years? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Two more years. 

Mr. STUPAK. So 2 more years before we have an IT system that 

can tell us what is out there, who is producing what, and then be 

able to prioritize our inspection. So we have got to wait 2 more 

years before we can even prioritize? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. It is incremental. It is improving consistently and constantly, but it won’t be at full maturation until 2 

years. The data center, for example, at White Oak at our consolidated facility is expected to open up in early ’09. 

Mr. STUPAK. Early ’09. 

OK, it is my understanding that you proposed but not yet implemented a Foreign Vendor Registration Verification Program. When 

is that program going to start? I understand it is supposed to help 

improve the accuracy of the information in your databases. And the 

way I understand the program, your Foreign Vendor Registration 

Verification Program, the FDA is going to contract with an external 

organization to physically conduct site verification on the registration data of the firms shipping drugs and other FDA-regulated 

products of the United States. When is that going to start? Have 

you began the Foreign Vendor Registration Verification Program? 

47 

It sounds to me like you’re saying we can’t do it internally, so let’s 

get someone externally to do it. Have you begun that process? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. No. It is a matter of leveraging where 

those verifications are occurring for multiple purposes. We can benefit from that. Because, as you pointed out in the data system, 

there is a lot of redundancy. There are, in fact, firms that registered and are no longer shipping to the United States, and that 

is what created that discrepancy in the database. 

Mr. STUPAK. Right. So you’re going to have this Foreign Vendor 

Registration Verification Program. When is that going to start? 

Have you contracted with anyone to do this? That’s what I’m asking. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. That is in process, And I cannot tell you 

when that will be fully implemented. But it is in process. 

Mr. STUPAK. ’09? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I would have to get back to you about 

that, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. Do you have any money in the budget to implement 

a Foreign Vendor Registration Verification Program? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. These are parts of the planning of the 

budget, yes. 

Mr. STUPAK. But do you have in ’09—is there a line in there for 

a Foreign Vendor Registration Verification Program? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I cannot specifically speak to a line item 

for that. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Shouldn’t we really assign, in fact, some of the 

legislative proposals have indicated a unique identification number 

to every foreign establishment that makes a drug and that have all 

databases, including those used by FDA, Customs, track activities 

such as inspection, products alert? Shouldn’t we have that? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. Do you have that program ready to be implemented 

where every establishment—— 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. That is being done in collaboration with 

the other agencies that you have talked about. 

Mr. STUPAK. But you can’t give them a foreign inspection number 

until you know what firms are out there, right? You have got to 

establish the firms first before you can give them a foreign inspection number, right? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Correct. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. So it sounds like you’re verifying what is out 

there first, correct? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, it is a combination of both. It is 

through registration and our verification. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. My time has expired. Mr. Burgess for questions. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. von Eschenbach, welcome again to our humble little subcommittee. Since most of the reason for this hearing today, at least 

in my opinion, revolves around the heparin story coming out of 

China, let’s stay on that for just a minute. What is the culprit there 

that is making people sick? 

48 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. It was a compound that was added to the 

heparin that you alluded to earlier, the hypersulfated chondroitin 

sulfate. 

Mr. BURGESS. When you say ‘‘added,’’ did Baxter add this? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. No, sir. This appears to be coming from 

the source in China. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, of course, the counter from—at least my understanding from reading the papers today, the Chinese say, well, 

it may have been added in the United States. So we have a fair 

degree of certitude that that contaminant was in the product before 

it was ever imported to this country? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, how would someone get it in there? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. We haven’t determined that at this point, 

sir. 

Mr. BURGESS. We’re reasonably sure that this hypersulfated 

chondroitin sulfate is the culprit? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BURGESS. What are the tests used to detect that? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, upon noticing the adverse events 

and searching for what the offending component was within the 

heparin the patients were receiving, the routine analytical methods 

did not detect any abnormality. It wasn’t until we did very sophisticated testing with nuclear magnetic resonance and a variety of 

other very sophisticated strategies in highly specialized laboratories that we were able to detect the presence of something that 

shouldn’t have been there. And then that was subsequently identified as this particular compound. 

Mr. BURGESS. Now, did the Food and Drug Administration decide 

to start doing the nuclear magnetic resonance testing on the compound? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir. We launched that investigation. 

We engaged both within the FDA as well as outside the FDA the 

appropriate scientists. And then, once we identified the compound, 

we actually developed an assay that could be used for routine 

screening to be able to find that contaminant in heparin; and that 

was distributed essentially worldwide so that many agencies 

around the world are now using our assay and evaluating their 

own heparin supplies. 

Mr. BURGESS. But in December of 2007, no one, including the 

FDA or any of the manufacturers—or the importers, rather, or any 

other country would have been using that test? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. No, sir. It didn’t exist. 

Mr. BURGESS. It didn’t exist. So it would have been impossible, 

even had you—we have heard all the stories about perhaps the 

wrong manufacturing location was selected for inspection. But even 

had all of the inspections—even if we had had an inspector at 

every plant in every foreign country, likely as not this contaminant 

could have found its way through? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BURGESS. In fact, it seems very likely that this contaminant 

would have found its way through. 

Mr. Stupak brings up a good point about we have got the melamine in the dog food and now we have got hypersulfated 

49 

chondroitin sulfate in the heparin. And you do have to wonder, is 

this just a very unscrupulous merchant with its thumb on the scale 

or is someone actively trying to do us harm? And, obviously, I 

wouldn’t ask you to speculate since I’m doing that for you, but it 

does raise those very big questions. 

So what ability do we have—now, we—I realize the dog food 

wasn’t your purview. But what ability do we have to anticipate the 

next level of larceny or terrorism—if I can use that word—that 

might come our way in our food or the active pharmaceutical ingredients that are coming from overseas? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, our ability to protect and promote 

the public health is going to be dependent upon the information 

that we have to act upon. And what I am suggesting in this system’s approach to our ability to now deal with products that are 

coming from all over the world, have an extraordinarily diverse 

complexity, that we have to be able to be much more present at the 

source of the production of those products. 

Mr. BURGESS. Not only that, you have got to think like a thug 

and have the same type of simulations and—you could not intuitively have known that this product was going to enter the pipeline. I mean, none of us—— 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. No. 

Mr. BURGESS [continuing]. Fat, dumb, and happy last Christmas 

would have had any idea that this was about to happen to our 

pharmaceutical industry. 

I guess what I’m asking is, is there a room of guys over—or men 

and women over at the FDA, one of whom who thinks like criminals, one of whom thinks like terrorists, and they try to run these 

simulations? Where is our new vulnerability—— 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. And, in fact—in fact, that has been a 

model that we’ve benefited from as we looked at our food protection 

plan. Because we had been approaching food from the perspective 

of food defense as it related to intentional contamination, as well 

as food safety as it related to the unintentional contamination that 

could come from bacteria, et cetera, and chemicals; and we appreciated the opportunity to integrate that into a cohesive system that 

is based on important intelligence as well as modern scientific analytical tools. And that’s a concept that we have extended to all of 

the products that we regulate, and it is inherent in this prevention/ 

intervention response strategy. 

Mr. BURGESS. One of the things that really was striking when we 

had our food safety hearings earlier this year was the fact that 

there is no communication between the various commercial interests that are overseas importing food back to our country. There 

was no communication between them if they had a bad supplier or 

they got something that was contaminated within their shop, that 

they didn’t communicate I guess largely because of competitive concerns with their counterparts. 

But really even more disturbing is that they wouldn’t communicate with the Food and Drug Administration; and it just seems 

like now, with the melamine in the dog food and the hypersulfated 

chondroitin sulfate in heparin, that there are some minds out there 

that require that we be so vigilant that we are willing to give up 

some competitive influence or, if nothing else, the Food and Drug 

50 

Administration may need to require that people be forthcoming 

with this information lest we get a bucket of chicken wings full of 

polonium over here someday, which none of us would like to see. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. And to that point, Dr. Burgess, we have 

consistently enhanced our dialogue in collaboration with other Federal agencies, importantly, our relationship with Homeland Security. 

Mr. BURGESS. Now, earlier—well, actually, I guess it was last 

year—I introduced H.R. 3967. Mr. Hubbard helped us a great deal 

with that. And the whole idea there was to have the ability to stop 

something from coming into the country if we knew it was wrong, 

if we knew it was bad. Right now, it doesn’t seem like we have the 

tools at our disposal, and Ranking Member Barton mentioned that 

in his opening statement, that we don’t have a way to stop this 

stuff from coming in. And that is—going forward, that just seems 

to me to be something that is so critical that we need to incorporate 

that into whatever plan you come up with or we come up with. 

The whole concept of equivalence came up when we talked about 

food safety, the equivalence standard that the United States Department of Agriculture has for about 20 percent of the jurisdiction 

that it has over imported food; and the Food and Drug Administration has an 80 percent jurisdiction over imported food but doesn’t 

have that same equivalency standard that, even though the manufacturing is in a different country, it has got to be equivalent to 

what the manufacturing process would be in this country. And it 

is my understanding we don’t even have that equivalence standing 

for the production of active pharmaceutical ingredients. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. One of the points of FDA Beyond Our Borders is to work effectively with our foreign counterparts so that 

these products meet our standards before they are able to come 

into this country. And there is a dialogue in—that I think we need 

to find for harmonization. 

I convened the first meeting of all of the international regulators 

from mature regulatory agencies around the world, all 27 of 

them—24, I believe—that came to the meeting 2 years ago to begin 

this dialogue, and we’ve had 3 meetings since. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well—but it seems like the standards already set 

by the USDA would be—again, that equivalency standard would be 

one that would be pretty easy. We talk about harmonization. That 

is great. But we have a standard out there that works reasonably 

well for the 20 percent jurisdiction that is out there. And at least 

for the active pharmaceutical ingredients, it seems like that is 

something that we should be quick to pick up. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. There may be some issues with regard to 

the individual products that may or may not create unique concerns about equivalence, but it is an area we are discussing. 

Mr. BURGESS. Do you have—does this discussion we are having 

about heparin right now—and I realize that heparin would not fall 

into the debate about bio-similars or bio-identicals. But just the 

fact that we have got the story out there with an adulterated product, does this affect the debate on the so-called generic biologics— 

bio-similar products that this committee—Health Subcommittee of 

this full committee is investigating? 

51 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, again, I think, Dr. Burgess, it reflects the important testimony that you heard from our scientific 

advisory board at a previous hearing and that one other component 

of this systematic modernization of the FDA is that we have a really robust and strong scientific infrastructure that will give us the 

modern tools of science and technology to make discriminating decisions about these complex and very difficult products to understand but to do that in a way that gives us greater insight from 

a scientific perspective about those products. And I think whether 

it is the—dealing with the complexities of bio-equivalence or understanding the components of a drug that is causing an adverse reaction, building the scientific infrastructure is one other pillar to this 

new FDA. 

Mr. BURGESS. Let me just ask you one other question quickly, because it is about money, and Chairman Dingell went to some 

lengths to talk about money. We have heard about the administration’s budget. Of course, Congress has—April 15th has come and 

gone, and we have not passed a unified budget resolution. Clearly, 

it is up to the House. It is up to House leadership. In fact, it is 

up to the Speaker of the House to work—initiate the work on those 

appropriations bills, those critical appropriations bills that you’re 

going to depend upon to get your funding. 

The stories that I’m hearing are likely that we will not be able 

to do that work this year. The environment is just too toxic and too 

contentious. As a consequence, there will be a continuing resolution 

at the end of the fiscal year, which essentially will leave you at 

level funding. 

So although it is great to go into some sound and fury about 

budget numbers, the reality is, the reality for your agency, is what 

is being handed to you by the Speaker of the House is you’re likely 

to have level funding this next year, this next fiscal year; and how 

is that going to impact your ability to do all of these things that 

we have talked about this morning? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, I believe it has been my responsibility in the 21⁄2 years I have been at the FDA to critically assess 

the status of the Agency, to bring multiple partners together to 

begin to define a strategic plan for what the Agency needed to accomplish and how it needed to change and what those initiatives 

would be that would require support, would require resources, 

would require new authorities, and we have done that across the 

wide spectrum. Everything from our food protection plan to now 

addressing issues—— 

Mr. BURGESS. But in order for you to do our job and for us to 

do our job—and, unfortunately, right now, that does not seem to 

be the case. 

I will yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. You have no time to yield back. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Melancon for questions, please. 

Mr. MELANCON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In listening to Mr. Burgess—and we’re talking about the level 

funding and trying to blame the Speaker, I think we can go back 

about a couple of years and blame the previous Speaker and the 

majority. So if you want to put blame where it stands looking at 

GAO, this decline started sometime back if I recall. 

52 

Not trying to put any blame on anybody, but the article today in 

the New York Times, one of the things that catches my attention 

is Chinese imports—you’ve had exported poisonous toothpaste, 

lead-painted toys, toxic pet food, tainted fish, and now contaminated medicine. It seems to be getting worse rather than better. I 

mean, with all this that is surrounding us, did you not expect that 

maybe we would be talking about heparin or some other medication that is coming from China today? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I believe what has occurred is not necessarily things are getting worse. I think what we have done is systematically uncover what has been a significant set of issues, and 

we’re addressing them systematically in an effort to resolve them. 

I believe even—if you’ll give me a moment—when we first encountered the problem with melamine in pet food, our ability to interact 

and work with our Chinese counterparts at that time was nowhere 

near as effective as this most recent episode with heparin, where 

we had immediate and rapid access into the country. We worked 

directly with our counterparts at the SFDA, sharing specimens, engaging in analytical processes. So I believe we’re making progress, 

but the problems are substantial, and they require substantial effort. 

Mr. MELANCON. Well—and I hear what you are saying. But then 

when you suggest that the heparin was contaminated in China, the 

Chinese are saying it got contaminated over on our side. Isn’t there 

some memorandum of understanding or agreement that is supposed to be going on between the two countries or is this just pointing the fingers at each other? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. No. There was a scientific dispute, if you 

will, about an analytical methodology; and we’re engaged in the 

discussion of that. We believe the analytical methodologies that we 

have applied and are being applied by others are the correct ones. 

Mr. MELANCON. Well, it appears to me that this memorandum of 

agreement is more like a memorandum of let’s disagree. And it is 

just—it is a growing tension, I think, between the two countries. 

You know, I think what I read in the article, that there was less 

pointing of fingers between the Germans and the Chinese than between the United States and the Chinese over this heparin issue. 

Given China’s fundamental difference and understanding of 

science used to assess what is causing the tainted heparin problem, 

can we trust the Chinese to adequately regulate our drug supply, 

since it appears that FDA isn’t willing to do it? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, the FDA is working very directly 

with our counterparts in China. They are engaged, I think, in a 

very conscientious effort to improve their entire system within the 

country. I have met with their Minister of Health who believes this 

is as important to the health and welfare of the Chinese people as 

it is to the rest of the world. 

Mr. MELANCON. What is it that they have done that you can document? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, as part of the memorandum of understanding, we have really engaged, as I just pointed out with the 

heparin situation, in an opportunity for us to work directly with 

them, specimen sharing and the ability to get to the bottom of 

product—— 

53 

Mr. MELANCON. That’s why I concern myself with this memorandum of misunderstanding or disagreement in that they are immediately saying it is your fault, it isn’t our fault. I mean, do we 

not work through the process of how the science is going to be done 

on these products so that we’ll know? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir. We convened an international 

meeting at which they were present, and the scientists internationally have been engaged in this discussion, and we are continuing 

that. 

Mr. MELANCON. Let me go back to the—when we started. GAO 

is showing that, in the beginning of ’02, we started a decline in inspectors. Do you have any numbers that go back past ’02 that 

shows that—the budgetary and the number of inspections or inspections that were done overseas as opposed to inspections that 

are done here? I’m trying to see if there was a trend or if this just 

started at a certain period of time and is it all budgetary. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I cannot give you specific numbers. My 

recollection of what I evaluated when I looked at this, coming to 

FDA, was that the number of foreign inspections had remained relatively flat, while the number of products and firms that were producing things and coming into the United States was growing almost exponentially. So the gap was substantially widening. And we 

obviously need to keep pace. So the—I don’t know that the inspections went down as much as stayed flat, while the demand substantially increased. 

Mr. MELANCON. So as we’ve exported all our manufacturing to 

other countries we have not kept up with the overseeing of the 

manufacturing of these products? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. That’s correct. We’ve not kept up with the 

globalization that has occurred in the marketplace. 

Mr. MELANCON. And we’re outsourcing again. Maybe we can 

outsource people to go out there and do them. 

I’ve had some conversations with some company representatives. 

They seem to be opposed to any form of charge by the Department 

to pay for the inspections, and I understand that they don’t want 

to have any cost—any additional cost incurred. How do we pay for 

this since we don’t have the money, since we are left with a huge 

deficit and a huge problem? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I’m sorry. 

Mr. MELANCON. It’s OK. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, I have, again, consistently proposed 

that the FDA need—should and is on a broad base as far as its resource infrastructure. Budget appropriations are an important part 

of that. User fees have also been a part of our budget when applied 

appropriately and segregated appropriately so that they’re not influencing our regulatory decisions. And I think user fees are an alternative mechanism of support. 

Mr. MELANCON. Did someone in the Department, you or someone 

within the Department that can make decisions, surely saw this 

problem coming toward us, did they not? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I’m sorry, sir. 

Mr. MELANCON. The inspection problem or the ability to not inspect, to have the manpower to have the money, no one saw this 

coming? Did we just wake up last month and say—— 

54 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. No, sir. When I arrived at FDA 21⁄2 years 

ago, I set 5 strategic priorities, one of which was globalization. And 

that was an effort to recognize what was occurring and what had 

been pointed out by others and to really begin a very aggressive, 

systematic, and systemic approach to being able to address the 

complexity and the magnitude of the problem. And what we have 

been discussing are the parts and pieces of that. 

Mr. MELANCON. Well, the difficulty I have with an aggressive approach is that 21⁄2, 31⁄2 years later we are here; and we are getting 

dumped on with chemicals and bad drugs and such as that. Did 

you come to the Congress? Did you go to the White House? Did you 

say to somebody, look, we need to have the money. Either give it 

to us in user fees, inspection fees or set up a mechanism where the 

companies can send people over there to inspect the products that 

are going to be part of their final products? Did we do any of that? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir. For the period of time I have 

been at the FDA, I have consistently and continuously requested 

increases in the budget. That trajectory is continuing. I have consistently attempted to bring forward plans of initiatives that I believed would be demonstrated to have impact and for which we 

could be held accountable for outcomes. We have talked on multiple 

occasions, just even this morning, about the transformation of our 

IT infrastructure. 

Mr. MELANCON. So you requested the White House for the increase of the budget over the periods of years? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MELANCON. And they have rejected that. How much more 

did you ask for for the inspectors from the White House? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. While I was going through the budget 

presentations and made my request to the Department, that subsequently went on to the administration and then recommended to 

the Congress. 

Mr. MELANCON. How much? What was the dollar amounts that 

you asked for to make sure that we were adequately supervising 

overseas manufacturing of our products? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, I asked for additional resources; and 

I cannot give you that specific number today. 

Mr. MELANCON. If you could get that back to us so that we could 

have that as part of the record, I would sure appreciate that. 

In this changing world that everybody has been talking about for 

the last 10 years, surely people have looked to the future of where 

the jobs are going to go, or maybe they didn’t look to where the jobs 

are going to go and where the manufacturing was going to be done. 

If we were friends with everybody in the world, I probably wouldn’t 

be sitting here having this conversation. But, as Mr. Burgess contemplated, there are some people that don’t really like us, and this 

may be an avenue for them, through terrorism, to come after us, 

and that is the last thing we need. And so, I would wish that you 

would impose upon the administration the importance of food safety to this country’s security. 

I think my time is out. I yield back my time, if I have any. 

Mr. STUPAK. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Green for questions, please. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

55 

I would like to welcome Dr. von Eschenbach back. 

Mr. Chairman, I apologize for not being here for opening statements. I ask unanimous consent to have my full statement placed 

into the record. I just want my full statement—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. GENE GREEN

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today on the FDA’s foreign 

drug inspection program. I think this a very important topic. 

As we know from previous hearings in this subcommittee and the FDA’s self assessment report, ‘‘Science and Mission At Risk,’’ the Agency is underfunded and 

does not have enough employees or resources to protect the country against unsafe 

drugs, medical devices and food. 

The inadequacies of the FDA’s foreign drug inspection program were most recently highlighted with the blood thinning drug heparin. 

Initially, the tainted heparin was believed to be an isolated incident and the active ingredient in the drug was traced back to a Chinese facility that had never been 

inspected due to confusion in the FDA because the name of the facility was confused 

with another plant with a similar name. 

However, further investigations found the contaminated heparin products have 

been found in at least 10 countries, not including the United States, and have been 

linked back to 12 different Chinese companies that were somehow involved in the 

tainted heparin. A man-made chemical is believed to be responsible for the adverse 

reactions and 81 deaths associated with the drug. 

We should not be surprised by the lack of inspections in foreign drug establishments by the FDA. 

According to the GAO in FY07, there were 714 drug establishments in China, but 

only 13 inspections were conducted over the entire year. As another example, India 

had 410 drug establishments and only 65 inspections were conducted. 

What is alarming is the fact that eighty percent of the active pharmaceutical ingredients of drugs consumed in the United States are manufactured abroad and 

most of those drugs are manufactured in China and India. And, the FDA has publicly acknowledged that some foreign facilities may never be inspected. 

Clearly, the FDA foreign drug inspection program needs to be changed and has 

some hurdles to overcome. 

The FDA currently does not have the authority to conduct inspections at will overseas and must be invited to a plant in order to conduct inspections and the FDA 

often warns plant officials before they are inspected. 

Additionally, the FDA does not rely on end product testing with drugs as they do 

with food products, which can detect contamination in a final product. Also, the 

FDA does not have one system to track and monitor foreign drug inspections. 

The FDA needs resources including more employees, an IT system, and appropriate funding. In short, the foreign drug inspection program needs a complete overhaul in order to ensure product safety, which I know is something we all want. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. 

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, this is not necessarily a question for 

our FDA Commissioner, but I find it ironic, because in our full 

committee and even our Health Subcommittee over the last few 

years, particularly after the 2003 Medicare Prescription Act or even 

before, we have had a number of hearings by our committee concerned about my constituents going on the Internet and importing 

pharmaceuticals, whether it be from Canada or Europe or whatever, because they don’t really know where they come from. And 

the argument we heard many times is that we don’t know where 

they come from. We don’t know if you’re ordering it from a Canadian pharmacy, or you are maybe ordering it from a China pharmacy, or somewhere else. 

And yet now it seems like what we’re hearing is our drugs that 

are approved, that 80 percent of the ingredients are imported. And, 

56 

you know, we have learned that there is no oversight over that, or 

I guess very little, if any. 

I guess my concern, if I was in the business of producing a pharmaceutical, just like if I was in the business of producing any other 

product, the responsibility for that assures the oversight with the 

FDA but also with that person or that company who is importing 

that ingredient, whether it is active or inactive, is part of something we are putting in our body that is a pharmaceutical. 

Has there been any discussion on what the pharmaceutical companies—I know our next panel will hear that. Has the FDA looked 

and said, OK, did you all go to this plant in China to look for these 

ingredients? What—let me see your track record of what you did. 

Because you are importing that product to put it in something that 

you’re putting your name on. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. You make a very, very important point, 

Mr. Green, that the corporate responsibility is an integral part of 

this whole effort and the safety; and FDA holding them accountable for that has been a part of this. It is required that they carry 

out their own quality assurance and are vigilant in the screening 

of their materials, and so I do concur with you that that is an important part of the effort, and FDA holds them accountable and 

that secures our supply of drugs. 

Mr. GREEN. Is there any information you can give the Oversight 

Committee, for example, on heparin or whatever else that may 

come along? When this developed, did the FDA go to that company 

and say, OK, let’s see what you did on the quality of this product 

that you’re selling to our constituents? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Right. When a company imports an ingredient to—an active pharmaceutical ingredient to incorporate in the 

development of a finished product, they are responsible and accountable for assuring the quality of that product, and they have 

to assess it and test it. I think the point we were making earlier 

is, with regard to the contaminant in heparin, none of the conventional tests could detect that contaminant. So it was something 

that was beyond our ability to recognize using conventional testing. 

Mr. GREEN. And I think what you are going to hear from most 

of us is that the FDA is the traffic cop, and you need more resources to do that. And I appreciate you asking the administration. 

It is also our job as Members of Congress. Although when the Chairman miscalculated $200 million to $20 million—that’s why 

we are not the Appropriations Committee. But if we were, we 

would probably be—what we’ve heard for a number of months—we 

would probably be saying, yes, we need to upgrade and provide a 

lot more funding so you can do your job as the traffic cop but not 

take away the corporate responsibility. 

Because I am speeding down the road, and I have an accident, 

sure, if there had been a policeman there to stop me, I wouldn’t 

have had that accident, but it is still my responsibility for speeding 

down that road. And, Mr. Chairman, I think that’s what we need. 

Maybe the next panel will explain the corporate responsibility 

along with our effort to try and make sure the FDA does their job 

as a traffic cop. 

I yield back. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. 

57 

Mr. Barton for questions, please. 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. von Eschenbach, my understanding is that recently the FDA 

has announced some of its preliminary results in the heparin investigation, and it is my understanding that your agency has indicated 

that you have traced the contaminated material to China. Is that 

right? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Mr. BARTON. OK. Now it is also my understanding that the Chinese authorities don’t accept the FDA’s findings. Is that correct? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. It is my understanding that the one difference is that they believed that there was product with which 

there were adverse events associated, but they could not find the 

contaminant in that product and, therefore, they were refuting the 

causal link. Our assay, our methodologies, which are much more 

sensitive, did in fact find the contaminant in that product. So that’s 

where there is a very specific difference—— 

Mr. BARTON. Where do we go from here? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, I think what—where we are at this 

point is we have assured that the supply of heparin in this country 

today is safe. We have prevented any further import of product 

coming from China from—through an import alert, from companies 

that are in question. And everything that is coming is being tested 

before it is allowed into the United States to be sure it is free of 

the impurities. 

Mr. BARTON. So you—under current law, the FDA has the authority in this case to prevent any product manufactured in China 

of that name from coming into the country? So even if the Chinese 

don’t agree, it really doesn’t matter, because the FDA can say you 

can’t bring it in? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. That’s correct. We deemed it adulterated. 

Mr. BARTON. OK. Now, do we—my understanding is that you 

and Secretary Levitt have indicated that you do think that the 

FDA needs explicit authority in terms of foreign imports and foreign inspections to categorically prohibit certain products when you 

have found defects in them. Is that correct? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. What we’ve requested, Mr. Chairman, if 

I can be explicit, is we can deny a product entry into this country 

if we deem it adulterated. What we’d like to do is extend that to 

not allowing a product to come in if we haven’t had the opportunity 

or been given the opportunity to inspect facilities from which that 

is coming. So the very fact we have been denied access to the facility in itself would allow us—— 

Mr. BARTON. So you’ve got the authority under existing law to 

prohibit adulterated material. What you want is the authority to 

say, if they refuse to allow U.S. FDA inspectors, then you can also 

prohibit the material? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Exactly. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTON. Now, when Chairman Dingell—I wasn’t here, but 

when Chairman Dingell was asking questions, my understanding 

is that he wanted you to give some assurances in terms of numbers 

of increased inspectors and in numbers of increased dollars and assets that you would need in the FDA to instigate these overseas inVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:46 Oct 05, 2009 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\110-107 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
58 

spections. Now you told me in my office that you want to locate 

FDA inspectors permanently overseas, is that correct? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Mr. BARTON. All right. Do you have an estimate yet as to how 

many inspectors and how much additional resources in terms of 

dollars that you would need to implement this kind of general plan 

that you have talked to me about? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. With specific reference to the first initiative in China, we would anticipate placing 13 FDA personnel. Eight 

of them would be FDA coming from the United States, and five 

would be local residents that we would employ. The approximate 

cost of that—that would also include our presence in Beijing, 

Guangzhou, where there is major food production, and Shanghai, 

where the largest exports are occurring, and the approximate cost 

of that operation is about $13 million. 

Mr. BARTON. $13 million. Now, in that specific case, have the 

Chinese authorities been in consultation with you and your staff? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I apologize, Mr. Chairman. May I correct that? It is 13 people, but $3.1 million. I apologize. 

Mr. BARTON. That is a better number. So long as it is an adequate number. Have you or your staff consulted with the Chinese 

authorities about this specific case? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTON. If so, are they supportive, neutral, in opposition to 

it? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. They have been very supportive across a 

number of their ministries, but we are awaiting approval from 

their foreign office. That is still outstanding. But in our interactions with counterparts and their regulatory agencies, as well as 

their export agency, AQSIQ, and the Ministry of Health, they recognize this is an important opportunity to enhance capacity. 

Mr. BARTON. Now, if this plan materializes, will the inspectors 

in China have the same authorities as the inspectors in the United 

States? In other words, can they go into any facility at any time 

or do they have to go through some procedure that would make it 

possible to let there be a cover-up before they were able to actually 

undertake the inspection? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. No, we will anticipate they would have the 

same authority as if they were coming from the United States. 

Mr. BARTON. OK. On a slightly different topic, it has been suggested that inspections overseas, facilities overseas that the U.S. 

FDA does inspect, that they be inspected on the same timetable as 

domestic facilities, i.e., at least once every 2 years. Our GAO 

friends are going to testify later today that if we implemented that 

system, it would cost at least $70 million a year just for China— 

no, $70 million a year in total, and of that cost $17 million would 

be in China by itself. One, do you agree with those numbers? And, 

two, if you do agree with those numbers, is this funding level something that the FDA can digest without too much of a growing pain? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, to be clear, I don’t disagree with the 

numbers per se. What I have tried to explain to Chairman Dingell 

was I really think the conversation has to be broadened beyond 

just the number of inspections and their frequency. I believe that 

it needs to be a tiered approach. There are some facilities that, 

59 

quite candidly, need to be inspected more frequently and more intensively than that and others, by the very nature of their product 

and their history on a risk-based approach, may very well be able 

to be inspected less frequently than that with oversight by FDA, 

by having information and intelligence that comes from other regulatory agencies who are also doing inspections and by having also 

local information from our local counterparts and the producers 

and suppliers. 

So I was trying to explain to Mr. Dingell that, rather than simply 

responding to a formulaic number, that what I really think we 

need to do is create a much more strategic system of inspections 

that is tiered, that is risk-based, and that is focused on the particular issues of the product and its source. 

Mr. BARTON. Well, that system that you just outlined, do you do 

that in the United States? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Not to the degree that we need to and this 

is all consistent with what is really an integrated program. 

Mr. BARTON. So this idea is something that would be relatively 

novel if implemented? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, I think it is the modern FDA and 

it is based also on the importance of having an information technology infrastructure that supports all this. 

Mr. BARTON. OK. Well, it is worth pursuing. 

My final question, Mr. Chairman. Republican staff have been 

noodling some with their pencils and come up to do the foreign inspections that we think need to be done, we being Republican staff 

from the Subcommittee of Oversight and Investigation. It is going 

to take about 500 FDA inspectors additionally. Do you agree or disagree with that number and if you agree with it, how long do you 

think it would take to find and train those inspectors and get them 

in place overseas? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I can’t—— 

Mr. BARTON. That is just on a—that is not an official estimate. 

That is Mr. Shimkus’ and my staff’s best guess. It is not from some 

think tank that tens of millions of dollars went into to come up 

with. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I can’t refute the number. But it would 

have to be a phased-in approach to bring the number of people of 

that magnitude, more importantly, those skill sets. 

Mr. BARTON. The number is in the ballpark? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I am going to accept it is in the ballpark, 

yes. 

Mr. BARTON. And do you have a time frame? You were getting 

ready to answer that and I cut you off. Two years, 5 years, 3 years? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I believe that could be accomplished, as I 

indicated earlier, in an overall time frame of five at the outset. 

That particular process could be accomplished as early as perhaps 

three. 

Mr. BARTON. My final question, are there any other countries 

that do foreign inspections like we are contemplating asking, directing the FDA to do? Do the Europeans have foreign inspections 

in place—— 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes. 

Mr. BARTON [continuing]. In China. 

60 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Other—not necessarily do they have offices abroad, but they engage in foreign inspection. 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Barton. 

Mr. Commissioner, are you familiar with the program that was 

put in late 1990s with Europe, the mutual recognition agreement 

that they attempted to put in? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I am aware of it, sir, but I am not familiar 

with all the details. 

Mr. STUPAK. And what happened to that program? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I apologize, I cannot answer that for you 

today. 

Mr. STUPAK. I was on a committee for a while and it was under— 

Mr. Barton actually was the chairman and then we had a hearing 

in 1998 on it and basically it didn’t work. This was with Europe, 

European Union, where we are supposed to do mutual inspections. 

In fact, it says under this arrangement the EU member states will 

be taking the place of FDA when it comes to inspections for good 

manufacturing practices. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes. 

Mr. STUPAK. Now if that program in the late 1990s didn’t work 

with Europe, which is probably closer to us in culture and same 

standards and regulatory system, how on God’s green Earth will it 

ever work in China, where we have very little in common? If Europe doesn’t work, how is it going to work in China? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Because I believe fundamentally the world 

is a lot different in 2008 than it was in 1998 and peoples’ thinking 

is different. I’ve just recently even met a few days ago with growers. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, wouldn’t we want to try to get back with Europe then? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Pardon me. 

Mr. STUPAK. Wouldn’t it be easy to implement this agreement in 

Europe and in China? Why wouldn’t we go back there and then the 

inspectors we are using in Europe we can use them in China and 

get to that 500 number that Mr. Barton talked about? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. One of the places that is included in FDA 

beyond our borders is Europe and working with our European 

counterparts—— 

Mr. STUPAK. So do you have an agreement like that in Europe? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH [continuing]. Part of this effort. We haven’t 

established the office in Europe but it is part of the plan. 

Mr. STUPAK. Part of the plan, which hasn’t worked yet and I 

don’t see how it is going to work now. 

Now let me ask you this, and I don’t mean to be argumentative, 

draft legislation sent to your office a draft of our committee—latest 

copy of our food and drug inspection legislation. Have you seen 

this? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir, I have. 

Mr. STUPAK. We sent it to your office. Are you prepared to comment on it at all? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. We are looking forward to working with 

you and Chairman Dingell and others on the Committee. 

61 

Mr. STUPAK. Yes, you say that all the time but you never comment on our legislation. We are trying to help you out here so—— 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, my staff has had multiple interactions with the staff of the Committee, and we look forward to 

those continuing with the specifics of the bill. 

Mr. STUPAK. We would like to know where the FDA stands on 

the bill, OK? It is going to be moving quickly, so—in fact one of 

the parts in there—let me just ask you a quick question. Isn’t it 

true that foreign drug manufacturing firms can register with the 

FDA even if the firm does not intend on shipping products to the 

United States? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. And in order to do that you have to do an inspection 

and everything it costs us taxpayers, right? If you apply for—you 

go and do a pre-inspection, right? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I believe that is correct, yes. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. According to the GAO, some of these manufacturers will register with the FDA as a marketing tool because the 

FDA registration might be seen as an endorsement of that plant 

by the FDA in some foreign markets. Are you aware of that? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I have heard that alluded to. 

Mr. STUPAK. And therefore, as in our legislation, wouldn’t the 

sizable registration fee ensure that foreign establishments who register with the FDA are serious about actually exporting drugs to 

the United States? In other words, a sizable registration fee, would 

it weed out those firms who wish just to register so they can market products elsewhere and not to the United States? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I can’t comment whether that would be an 

adequate deterrent or not, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. They are gumming up your databases, aren’t they, 

these firms that applied to get the U.S. certification, but they never 

ship; they are sitting in your database or just gumming up the IT 

system that we are having so much trouble with, are they not? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, there may be important intelligence 

information about those firms that could be helpful to us. I don’t 

know that it is gumming up the system, but they shouldn’t— 

Mr. STUPAK. What important intelligence information would be 

in the database? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Pardon me. 

Mr. STUPAK. What important intelligence information would be 

beneficial by having them sitting in your database that they never 

ship drugs to the United States? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, maybe we would learn something 

about them that we would never want them to ship drugs into the 

United States. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, after you pre-approve them and they are registered, you would never know, because you don’t go back and 

check them because they are not shipping to the United States. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. But by recognizing we might be able to 

cross-reference them with other databases that exist in our other 

counterparts around the world. 

Mr. STUPAK. How many man-hours and the amount of resources 

have we spent on this heparin investigation, do you know? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. How many man-hours are spent what, sir? 

62 

Mr. STUPAK. On this heparin investigation thus far by the FDA. 

You have gone over and done an inspection over there, you have 

a couple reports on the 483, we got letters. How much time have 

you spent? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I can’t give you an exact hourly figure. 

Mr. STUPAK. Give me a guesstimation. How many inspections 

could we have done if we would have—we have 90,000, 100,000 

more? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I couldn’t give you that estimate, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Because I don’t think they are exactly 

equivalent. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, if you had gone over and done the inspection 

which was never done in this plant before, you already did one inspection there, right, on heparin, that is approximately $45,000, 

you have a couple of people over there doing that, right? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, the point—I thought the point of the 

question you asked me was what was the effort expenditure across 

FDA. The effort expenditure—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Correct. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH [continuing]. Across FDA involved a whole 

host of people in a variety of places within the FDA. That wouldn’t 

necessarily translate into those people doing inspections. 

Mr. STUPAK. I see. But to give you more money to do things. 

Let me just change gears here for a minute. FDA’s primary goal 

here is to protect the public health. And let me ask you a question 

or two and then I’ll—if anyone else wants to ask a question they 

can on any issue. 

But this bisphenol A, BPA, OK, it is the chemical used in baby 

bottles and has terrible side effects. The National Toxicity Program 

at NIH has determined BPA may cause neural and behavioral 

problems as well as effects in the prostate gland, mammary gland 

at an early age for puberty in females. The Canadian Government 

has declared BPA to be toxic. The FDA continues to maintain that 

it is safe. 

While the FDA has undertaken a formal transparent reassessment safety of BPA, to include those in Federal Register public 

comment and expert advisory panels, when do you expect to have 

some decision on BPA? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, upon learning of the new data, new 

information, we immediately convened an interagency task force to 

address that new data scientifically, and that is in process and that 

will render our opportunity to make a decision. The Canadians are 

continuing their process of assessment with a commentary period. 

So we will be working with them, other counterparts, and our own 

internal scientific process, which is underway. 

Mr. STUPAK. When do you expect to have a decision? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I cannot tell you exactly when that decision will be made, because I don’t know what the complexity of the 

analysis will involve, but it is underway. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, the Canadian Government has already pulled 

BPA as being toxic, as they labeled it in their country, so why has 

it taken us so much longer to get at this? 

63 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I think again, Mr. Stupak, it is going to 

be based on what the science dictates and what the science tells 

us, and until we have that analysis—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Are you saying the Canadian Government wasn’t 

based on science? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. What I am saying is that FDA is going to 

assess the science and make its own independent decision taking 

into account the information that is available from other sources 

like Canada. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, we would like some decisions soon on BPA. 

Our subcommittee is working on it and—— 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. We are acting upon this as we speak. 

Mr. STUPAK. I have heard so many of those promises and they 

never come true. So I just want to make sure we have some date 

certain that you can give us when we could expect a decision on 

BPA. 

Any questions, Mr. Shimkus, Mr. Burgess? 

Mr. BURGESS. Yes, I could—just a couple of follow-ups on the line 

of questioning that you were pursuing, Mr. Chairman. Now, Dr. 

von Eschenbach, again we will cover the same ground, but inspectors in every location and every port in the People’s Republic of 

China wouldn’t have found that goop that got into the heparin, 

would it? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. No, sir. 

Mr. BURGESS. Because we didn’t know it was there. We didn’t 

test for it. We didn’t know to test for it. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Correct. 

Mr. BURGESS. Now the chairman also talks about how he is concerned that all of these extra applications coming into the IT systems are going to gum up the works. Are you at all concerned— 

when you think about gumming up the works that might be a little 

concern, but are you at all concerned about what we just did to the 

Agency with dumping tobacco in your lap? Because this is a huge 

new regulatory authority taken over by your agency that quite honestly we see that we are having trouble keeping up with what we 

are supposed to keep up with, and now we have got a product that 

when used as directed kills 400,000 people a year and you are 

going to certify that it is safe and effective? I mean, it is beyond 

goofy to think that that legislation makes sense with the crisis 

mode that the Food and Drug Administration is in right now. 

Again, it is our premier Federal agency and we are treating it with 

extreme disrespect by adding that regulatory requirement to what 

you are already doing. 

And I don’t expect you to answer that because I know that you 

are too smart to, but in today’s Wall Street Journal you are quoted: 

The Food and Drug Administration Commissioner Andy von 

Eschenbach told Congress in October that the $5 billion in user 

fees over the next decade was not enough to kickstart a tobacco division, and the Food and Drug Administration may have to divert 

funds from its other programs. 

Is that—did the Wall Street Journal get it right? Is that essentially correct? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, I think the point of that was that 

the monies were not coming to the FDA. They were going to the 

64 

general treasury with the idea that you have pointed out—is that 

our resources and authorities have to be commensurate with our 

responsibilities, so that if we don’t have the capability of carrying 

out those responsibilities then we will fail in our mission. 

Mr. BURGESS. Again, your core mission is to—things have got to 

be safe and effective. So can we ever do that with tobacco? Can we 

ever say it is safe? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, as a physician I know that there is 

no way that you can define a tobacco product as being safe. If used 

as directed, it produces the result of disease and death. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, now there was, I thought, a very insightful 

amendment offered during the markup process that would have allowed the Food and Drug Administration the authority to either 

ban tobacco outright or require that tobacco manufacturers produce 

a zero milligram nicotine cigarette. If you are going to have this 

authority, would you not think those two tools in your toolbox 

would be essential for securing the public health? 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Well, I believe there is a need for a lot of 

discussion about what tools are in the toolbox. As you pointed out, 

the significant issue of nicotine being the most—one of the most addictive substances that humans are exposed to, especially during 

development as teenagers are, that if you eliminated that completely you would eliminate the problem of addiction. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. I yield back the 

balance of my time. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thanks. Mr. Melancon or Mr. Green? Mr. Shimkus. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Just have unanimous consent that I may submit 

some questions for the record and just for the statement say that 

if—I think a lot of the basic premise here is that if people want 

to sell goods and products to our citizens they need to meet our 

standards. And if you want to sell goods and services to our citizens, I think you ought to be willing to pay for that opportunity 

since we are the market everybody wants to get to. And, you know, 

it shouldn’t be the burden placed upon taxpayers. 

I also believe in trust, but verify when you have international 

agreements, and also that management by walking around or inspecting by walking around is still a basic practice that we all 

should observe and in this case that is our concern about not being 

involved in the factory. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. You will be happy to know our legislation does include in there registration fees so taxpayers aren’t paying for it. Please look at it. We are moving that legislation quickly. 

Dr. von Eschenbach, thank you for your time. I hope you will 

stay for the next panel. As indicated earlier, they have 100 years 

of experience in these areas, and hopefully we can all benefit from 

their expertise. Thank you again for your time, sir. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just let me 

close by expressing I know what you share and other members of 

the Committee share. And that is, although we are talking about 

the many important changes that have to occur at FDA, some of 

the things that we must always preserve is the caliber and the 

quality of the incredible people that make up that agency. There 

are—half of the Agency are involved in our field activities and they 

65 

are doing heroic work, as you just alluded to with regard to our 

ability to immediately mitigate the problems associated with contaminated heparin. And so I thank you for our opportunities to 

present to you a vision for the future, and I appreciate your recognition of the incredible efforts that the people of FDA are making 

on behalf of the American people. 

Mr. STUPAK. I agree with you, and the best way we can honor 

their work is to give them the resources they need so they can fully 

do their job. 

Dr. VON ESCHENBACH. I agree with you. Thank you. 

Mr. STUPAK. I would like to call up our second panel of witnesses 

and ask them to come forward here in a few moments. Gail Cassell, 

Vice President, Scientific Affairs and Distinguished Lilly Research 

Scholar for Infectious Diseases at Eli Lilly and Company. Dr. 

Marcia Cross, Director of Public Health and Military Health Care 

Issues at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Mr. William 

Hubbard, former FDA Associate Commissioner and current Senior 

Advisor to the Coalition for a Stronger FDA. Mr. Ben England of 

Benjamin England & Associates and FDAImports.com. Mr. England previously held several senior level regulatory positions at the 

FDA. And Dr. Carl Nielsen, retired Director of the Division of Import Operations within the Office of Regulatory Affairs at the FDA. 

We will give everybody a minute or two here to assemble before 

we do the oath. It is the policy of the subcommittee to take all testimony under oath. Please be advised that witnesses have the right 

under the Rules of the House to be advised by counsel during their 

testimony. Do any of you wish to be represented by counsel? A 

shaking of the heads indicate no. Therefore, let’s take the oath. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. STUPAK. Let the record reflect that witnesses replied in the 

affirmative. You are now under oath. 

We will now hear a 5-minute opening statement from each of our 

witnesses on the second panel. You may submit a longer statement 

for inclusion in the hearing record. 

Dr. Cross, for the Government Accountability Office, shall we 

start with you, please? 

STATEMENT OF MARCIA G. CROSSE, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC 

HEALTH AND MILITARY HEALTH CARE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Dr. CROSSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be 

here today as you examine FDA’s foreign drug inspection program. 

I testified before this subcommittee last November on this topic. At 

that time I discussed how FDA’s programs were not keeping up 

with the globalization of drug manufacturing. I testified about 

weaknesses in FDA’s data systems, difficulties in prioritizing foreign establishments to inspect, infrequent inspections and challenges unique to conducting foreign inspections. 

Slide, please. I have a slide. This slide shows the large mismatch 

between the number of foreign drug establishments and the number of inspections performed. As you can see, the largest mismatch 

is in China. Since the hearing in November, FDA has announced 

a number of initiatives to address these concerns, as we have heard 

66 

today from the Commissioner. You asked that we examine these 

and the extent to which they will fill the gaps we identified. 

FDA’s initiatives have the potential to strengthen FDA’s foreign 

drug inspection program, but they do not fully address the weaknesses. 

Let me discuss in turn the four key areas of concern we previously raised. 

I testified in November that FDA’s databases did not provide an 

accurate count of foreign establishments and provide widely divergent counts, with the result that FDA does not know how many 

foreign establishments are subject to inspection. 

One recent FDA initiative is to require electronic registration to 

reduce inaccuracies in its registration database. However, this will 

not prevent erroneous registration by firms that do not manufacture for the U.S. market. Another initiative aimed at reducing duplication in its import database is a proposal that FDA has supported to change the data it receives from Customs and Border 

Protection on products entering the United States. However, the 

implementation of this proposal is not certain and would require 

actions from multiple Federal agencies in addition to FDA. 

FDA has also begun efforts to integrate its various databases. 

This could provide FDA with a more accurate count of establishments subject to inspection, but it is too early to tell how much it 

will help and this effort has not been fully funded. In fact, FDA officials told us that implementation has been slow because the 

Agency has been forced to shift resources away from the improvements in order to maintain the current systems. 

Next I testified that gaps in information weaken FDA’s processes 

for prioritizing the inspection of foreign establishments that pose 

the greatest risk to public health. FDA lacks key information on 

many foreign establishments. This limits its ability to use its riskbased approach to select establishments for inspection. 

To address this, FDA has discussed obtaining useful information 

such as inspection reports from foreign regulatory bodies. However, 

the Agency already has a number of such agreements in place and 

it has faced challenges in using these arrangements in the past. 

For example, FDA had difficulties in determining whether the 

scope of other countries’ inspections met its needs and inspection 

reports were not always readily available in English. FDA also told 

us that complete reliance on another country’s inspection results is 

risky. The result has been that FDA only used its existing arrangements six times in the past year. This raises concerns about some 

of the proposals the Commissioner has discussed to rely on inspections from others. 

I also testified in November that FDA inspected relatively few 

foreign establishments each year. And at the current rate it would 

take FDA more than 13 years to inspect all foreign establishments 

just once. FDA slightly increased the number of foreign drug inspections in fiscal year 2007, but the Agency still inspects foreign 

establishments at a substantially lower rate than domestic establishments. 

The foreign inspections shown in the figure are the largest number that FDA has ever conducted. FDA’s budget calls for incremental increases in funding for foreign inspections. FDA dedicated 

67 

about $10 million to foreign drug inspections in fiscal year 2007 

and plans to dedicate about $11 million to such inspections in fiscal 

year 2008. However, it would cost about $70 million per year to 

perform biennial inspections of foreign establishments, as is already required for domestic establishments. The $11 million FDA 

plans to spend this year for all foreign drug inspections falls short 

of the $16 million that would be needed each year just to conduct 

biennial inspections in China. 

Finally, I testified that FDA faced certain logistical and staffing 

challenges unique to conducting foreign inspections, including reliance on volunteer inspectors and a lack of translators. FDA has 

proposed establishing a dedicated cadre of staff to conduct foreign 

inspections, but the overall time frame associated with this initiative is unclear. 

FDA has also announced plans to establish offices overseas with 

an initial eight FDA staff to be based in China and five Chinese 

nationals to provide translation and logistical support. However, 

the impact that these offices will have on the foreign drug inspection program is unknown because these staff would be responsible 

for all FDA regulated products. 

In China, in addition to the estimated 714 drug establishments, 

there are an estimated 675 medical device establishments and 

many more firms manufacturing food and other FDA-regulated 

products subject to inspection. The agreement with China is not finalized and plans for other countries are still in development. 

In conclusion, Americans depend on FDA to ensure the safety 

and effectiveness of the drugs they take. The recent incident involving heparin underscores the importance of FDA’s initiatives. 

FDA’s actions, if fully implemented, could address some of the concerns we identified. Given the growth in foreign drug manufacturing for the U.S. market and the relatively few foreign inspections conducted by FDA, the Agency will need to devote considerable resources to this area if it is to increase the rates of inspections. However, FDA’s incremental increases will have little impact 

in the near future to reduce the interval between inspections for 

these establishments. 

In addition, many of FDA’s initiatives will take several years to 

implement and require funding and certain interagency or intergovernmental agreements that are not yet in place. Taken together, 

FDA’s plans represent a step forward in filling the large gaps in 

FDA’s foreign drug inspection program, but do little to accomplish 

short-term change. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I will be 

happy to answer any questions that you or other members of the 

subcommittee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Crosse follows:] 

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Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Doctor. 

Dr. Cassell. 

STATEMENT OF GAIL H. CASSELL, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT, 

SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS AND DISTINGUISHED LILLY RESEARCH 

SCHOLAR FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES, ELI LILLY AND COMPANY 

Dr. CASSELL. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I am 

Gail Cassell, Vice President for Scientific Affairs and Distinguished 

Research Scholar for Infectious Diseases at Eli Lilly and Company. 

Of relevance to my testimony today, I have previously been a member of the advisory committees of the Directors of both Centers for 

Disease Control and the National Institutes of Health. And in 

1994–95 I also cochaired the congressionally mandated review of 

the NIH Intramural Program. I appear before you today as a member of the FDA Science Board, Advisory Committee to the FDA 

Commissioner. I served as Chair of the Subcommittee on Science 

and Technology of the Science Board, which authored the report 

that you have heard referenced today by Chairman Stupak, the 

‘‘FDA Science and Mission At Risk.’’ 

By way of background I just remind you that in December of 

2006, the Commissioner charged the Science Board with establishing a subcommittee to assess whether or not FDA’s current 

science and technology can support the Agency’s statutory mandate 

to protect the Nation’s food and drug supply. You have already also 

heard Mr. Stupak allude to the composition of the Committee. I 

would just emphasize that this committee was made up of a very 

distinguished group of 30 experts, including former deputy—our 

former Chief Counsel to the FDA, as well as knowledgeable experts, some of whom had worked in FDA. Over 14 members of the 

30—of the 33-member committee were members of the National 

Academy of Sciences, and we had one Nobel laureate. 

The record of the proceedings of the meeting in which we presented the results of this report will show that the full report was 

accepted by the full Science Board and, in fact, the full 33-member 

committee adopted the recommendations of the report. 

For over a year this group of experts worked intensively conducting their review. It became rapidly apparent that the FDA suffers from serious scientific deficiencies and is not in a position to 

meet current or emerging regulatory responsibilities. It is agencywide and not limited to a single program or center. Since every regulatory decision must be based upon the best available scientific 

evidence in order to protect the public’s health, we concluded that 

American lives are at risk and that there is an urgent need to address these deficiencies. 

Of relevance to the topic that we have at hand today, which is 

that of foreign inspections, especially for drugs, I might add that 

many aspects of food and drug manufacturing also should be based 

upon the latest, very latest science and technology, including scientific methods and technologies that are the latest as far as specificity and sensitivity for detecting not only chemical contaminants 

but also microbial contaminants, and that we should have investigators in the field performing those manufacturing inspections 

94 

that in fact are qualified in terms of quality control and scientific 

expertise. 

The level of concern by all of the members of our subcommittee 

of the Science Board was and remains high, and thus the intensity 

of our commitment to the review and their insistence that define 

our findings be broadly communicated. Quite simply, what we 

found is that FDA resources have not increased, while the responsibilities have increased extraordinarily, and you have heard that 

from many different individuals today and you’ll hear further from 

others. 

We also found that the Agency has not adapted in order to maximize existing resources by capitalizing upon scientific resources in 

the academic community and other government agencies; i.e., 

leveraging their resources. The specifics of our finding was the subject of a hearing, as you have heard Mr. Stupak refer to this morning, on January the 29th. So I will not discuss all the findings in 

detail, but I would rather like to focus upon those aspects of our 

review that are most relevant to the topic of today’s hearing on foreign inspection. 

Number one is the area of growing disparity between responsibility and resources; two, gaps in scientific capacity and capability, 

information technology and to a lesser extent organizational structure. 

With regards to growing disparity between FDA responsibility 

and resources, there is no more quintessential governmental responsibility than the protection of basic commodities of American 

life, such as our food and drugs. The Science Board emphasizes 

that the need for an effective FDA is greater today than ever before 

since the FDA regulates 80 percent of the Nation’s food supply, 

plays a critical role in assuring the safety of therapeutics and vaccines and devices, and regulates a vast number of other consumer 

products, and historically has been the Agency to which governments around the world look to for determinants of the safety of 

products. 

Moreover, something that hasn’t been mentioned today, I would 

like to emphasize that FDA is increasingly important to the Nation’s economic health, as it regulates a quarter of consumer expenditures, and the industries that it regulates are innovative leaders in science and technology and among the few American industries with a positive trade balance with other nations. Further, 

FDA will be a critical component in combating bioterrorism. That 

has been alluded to this morning but not to any great extent. It 

is something that certainly should be of great concern to all of us 

as we talk about potential for intentional contamination of the food 

and drug supply as it relates to bioterrorism. 

The Science Board concluded that FDA is slowly being hollowed 

out by a progression of budget cuts and inattention to the Agency’s 

needs. That deterioration in turn means that not only can the 

Agency not fulfill its public health mission, but that the safety of 

the citizens and the well-being of our country are undermined. Furthermore, as the Agency falls further and further behind, the public is increasingly losing confidence in the government’s ability to 

protect them. 

95 

The demands upon the FDA have soared. As we have already 

said, the metrics alone are daunting, 125 new statutes added to the 

FDA’s workload by Congress in the past two decades, most without 

resources. And in reference to the number of establishments we 

were told during our review that there were a total of 375,000 establishments outside the United States making products coming 

into the United States and in effect that these were on all continents and over 100 countries. 

In addition, there has been a tripling in a decade of R&D and 

drugs and medical devices; an exponential increase in drug adverse 

reaction reports and the emergence of extraordinarily new health 

threats that threaten contamination of products, including mad 

cow disease, E. coli 157, et cetera. 

But perhaps most emblematic of the trend is the tenfold increase 

in the past decade of imports from other countries. Today, as you 

know, 15 percent of our food supply is imported from more than 

100 nations, along with over half the drugs. Yet FDA has been 

given virtually no new authorities nor resources to address such a 

dramatic change in the sourcing from products made overseas often 

in developing countries with little or no tradition of scientific rigor. 

What about gaps in capacity and expertise? FDA’s resources have 

not only not kept pace with responsibilities, many critical agency 

programs have sustained actual cuts. I won’t go into the cuts as it 

relates to food, but certainly that was one of our areas of biggest 

concern. 

Although one FDA function, new drug and device review, has received additional funding from industry paid user fees, it is important for you to realize that the Agency as a whole has lost a thousand people over the past decade that perform critical function. 

Some of them relate to, of course, the foreign inspection that we 

are talking about today. This loss in scientific capacity has resulted 

in loss of personnel to perform not only the inspection associated 

with marketed products, but is equally important in that it has resulted in loss of individuals in critical areas of scientific expertise, 

and we will come back to that in a minute. 

Innovations and advancements in science are outstripping FDA’s 

capacity to understand and regulate them, and I would contend 

that this applies both with regards to manufacturing of those new 

products as much as it does to pre-approval of those new products. 

We are on the cusp of another revolution in therapeutics, breakthroughs in human, animal, and microbial genomics, molecular biology, nanotechnology, computational mathematics, imaging, et 

cetera, that will revolutionize not only medicine and food production, but also drugs for animal health. Yet FDA is not and does not 

have the capacity to prepare for these breakthroughs, whether it 

be again in the pre-approval process or the post-marketing surveillance or manufacturing inspection. 

Tens of billions of dollars are being spent by both the public and 

private sector on the development of such products, yet FDA has 

been denied the relatively minor funding necessary to ensure their 

rapid and safe entry into the market. At a time in which U.S. competitors in science, medicine and food production are under increasing strain from overseas, a weak and underfunded FDA will be a 

96 

brake on the very technologies that the United States is relying on 

for its medical and technological future. 

It is absolutely critical that individuals involved in inspection of 

these products coming in from overseas in terms of manufacturing 

inspections have the adequate science and technology to allow them 

to do a better job than they are currently able to do today. They 

should have the methods to perform increased sensitivity tests in 

looking for contaminants, both chemical and microbial, both in 

drugs and in vaccines, biologics, and also food, perhaps even including, something, as we heard this morning, maybe others would not 

call it quite as sophisticated, it is much more practical than most 

would admit, but perhaps information technology as well. 

I would also be remiss if I did not remind you, however, that 

again the FDA’s food safety program is one that needs the greatest 

support with regards to these new technologies because they are 

simply at rock bottom, both in terms of numbers of scientists but 

also their scientific capabilities as far as monitoring the food supply. 

The Science Board subcommittee viewed the current scientific 

needs of FDA to be extensive and diverse in critical terms—in 

terms of critical expertise, infrastructure and knowledge perhaps, 

as I have said, across the Agency, and we do believe that this is 

a serious impediment. 

FDA, in terms of the recent heparin episode, illustrates just how 

critical science is at FDA for monitoring of drug quality. We heard 

during our review of the Center for Biologics, for example, that 

that center mandates that some of their scientists be present in 

manufacturing inspections to play a role in quality control; i.e., so 

that they can be assured that the right technologies are being applied to evaluate the quality of the drugs being manufactured, and 

I would submit to you that this should be something that shouldn’t 

be an exception with regards to biological products or vaccines, but 

it also should be true for drugs. 

It is commendable that FDA was able to develop a new test very 

quickly that has picked up the contaminant in heparin, but also 

has certainly shared it around the world, but in fact perhaps it 

could have been done more quickly had more sensitive tests been 

in operation and in use all along. 

Mr. STUPAK. Doctor, would you summarize? 

Dr. CASSELL. Yes, thank you. 

In conclusion, FDA can no longer fulfill its mission without substantial and sustained additional appropriations, particularly in 

the area of information technology. Others will address this in detail. I will in the questioning if asked. The current situation has 

developed over years. The question is not why or how we got here 

but how we are going to go forward. 

The report actually, we would argue, would serve as a blueprint 

with regards to that and we recognize that financial additions to 

the budget are not the only answer, as we already heard this morning. While our report focused upon the FDA organizational structure related most to the scientific infrastructure, it might well be 

in light of continuing issues related to globalization that we should 

be asking what FDA organizational structure is needed to protect 

the public’s health in the 21st century setting of globalization with 

97 

rapidly expanding importation of foreign drugs, vaccines, and biologics. And again, while our subcommittee focused on organizational structures that related to the scientific infrastructure, Congress may like to consider requesting, for example, the Institute of 

Medicine to perform a more in-depth study to evaluate overall 

agency structure as it relates to food safety and also drug safety. 

And with that, because I am out of time I will stop, but thank 

you very much for your patience. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cassell follows:] 

STATEMENT OF GAIL H. CASSELL, PH.D. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am Gail H. Cassell, Vice 

President for Scientific Affairs and a Distinguished Research Scholar for Infectious 

Diseases of Eli Lilly and Company. I am also Professor and Chairman Emeritus of 

the Department of Microbiology of the University of Alabama Schools of Medicine 

and Dentistry. I am a member of the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy 

of Sciences and am currently serving a second term on the governing board of the 

IOM. Of relevance to my testimony today, I have previously been a member of the 

Advisory Committees of the Directors of both the Centers for Disease Control and 

the National Institutes of Health (NIH). In 1994–95, I also co-chaired the congressionally mandated review of the NIH intramural program. I appear before you today 

as a member of the FDA Science Board, Advisory Committee to the FDA Commissioner. I served as Chair of the Subcommittee on Science and Technology of the 

Science Board, which authored the report ‘‘FDA Science and Mission at Risk.’’ 

BACKGROUND

In December 2006, the Commissioner charged the Science Board with establishing 

a subcommittee to assess whether FDA’s current science and technology can support 

the Agency’s statutory mandate to protect the Nation’s food and drug supply. The 

subcommittee was comprised of three Science Board members and 30 other experts. 

The subcommittee formally presented its report to the Science Board and FDA on 

December 3, 2007. The report was unanimously endorsed by each of the 33 members 

of the Subcommittee and the full Science Board. The Science Board accepted the report as final and dissolved the subcommittee. The record of the proceedings of that 

meeting will show that due to the seriousness of the deficiencies found and the urgency of the situation, the Science Board was adamant that the report be broadly 

disseminated among the public and policy makers, including posting it in the Federal Register. 

The subcommittee review was unique in many respects. First, it is only the second 

time in over a century that the Agency has been reviewed by an external committee 

reviewing the Agency as a whole entity. Second, the Committee was composed of 

leaders, not from a single sector, but from industry, academia, and other government agencies. The expertise and level of accomplishments of the members are almost unprecedented in a single committee, especially considering their breadth and 

knowledge in regulatory science and understanding of the mission of the Agency. 

The subcommittee included expertise ranging from a Nobel laureate in pharmacology, 14 members of the National Academy of sciences (including two engineers), 

a renowned economist and specialist in workforce issues, a leader in health care policy and technology assessment, a former CEO of a large pharmaceutical company, 

a former Assistant Secretary for Health and Human Services who also headed global regulatory affairs within a large company for over 20 years, a former Chief Counsel for the FDA, and the first under Secretary for Food Safety at the U.S. Department of Agriculture overseeing the Food Safety and Inspection Service and coordinating U.S. government food safety policy. 

For over a year, this group of experts worked intensively conducting their review. 

It became rapidly apparent that the FDA suffers from serious scientific deficiencies 

and is not positioned to meet current or emerging regulatory responsibilities. It is 

agency wide, i.e. not limited to a single program or Center. Since every regulatory 

decision must be based upon the best available scientific evidence in order to protect 

the public’s health, we concluded that American lives are at risk and that there is 

an urgent need to address the deficiencies. The level of concern by all members of 

the Subcommittee and the Science Board members was, and remains, high, and 

thus the intensity of their commitment to this review and their insistence that the 

findings be broadly communicated. 

98 

What we found is, quite simply, demands of FDA have soared over the past two 

decades. Resources have not! Furthermore, we found that the Agency has not adapted in order to maximize existing resources by capitalizing upon the scientific resources in the academic community and other government agencies. 

The specific findings of our review were the subject of a hearing of this Oversight 

Committee held on January 29, 2008 ‘‘Science and Mission at Risk: FDA’s Self-Assessment.’’ Thus, I will not discuss all of the findings in detail today but rather I 

would like to focus upon those aspects of our review that are most relevant to the 

topic of today’s hearing on foreign inspections: 1) Growing Disparity Between Responsibilities and Resources; 2) Gaps in Scientific Capacity and Capability; 3) Information Technology; and 4) Organizational Structure. 

GROWING DISPARITY BETWEEN FDA RESPONSIBILITIES AND RESOURCES

There is no more quintessential governmental responsibility than the protection 

of basic commodities of American life such as our foods and drugs. The Science 

Board report emphasizes that the need for an effective FDA is greater than ever 

before: FDA regulates 80% of the nation’s food supply; plays a critical role in assuring the safety of therapeutics such as drugs, vaccines, and medical devices; regulates a vast number of other consumer products, ranging from televisions and cellular telephones to cosmetics, blood, and pet food; and has historically been the 

Agency to which governments around the world look to make determinations about 

the safety of new products. Moreover, the FDA is increasingly important to the Nation’s economic health, as it regulates a quarter of consumer expenditures, and the 

industries it regulates are innovative leaders in science and technology and among 

the few American industries with a positive trade balance with other nations. Further, FDA will be a critical component in combating emerging threats such as intentional contamination of the food supply and the threat of chemical, biological and 

radiological attack-as well as naturally occurring threats such as SARS, West Nile 

virus, and avian influenza. 

The Science Board concluded that FDA is being slowly ‘‘hollowed out’’ by a progression of budget cuts and inattention to the Agency’s needs. That deterioration, 

in turn, means that not only can the Agency not fulfill its public health mission, 

but that the safety of our citizens and the well being of our economy are being undermined. Further, as the Agency falls farther and farther behind, the public is increasingly losing confidence in the government’s ability to protect them. 

The demands upon the FDA have soared due to the extraordinary advance of scientific discoveries, the complexity of the new products and claims submitted to FDA 

for approval, the emergence of heretofore unknown health threats, and the 

globalization of the industries that FDA regulates. The metrics alone are daunting, 

125 new statutes added to FDA’s workload by Congress in the past two decades, 

most without resources to implement them; 375,000 establishments making FDAregulated products; a tripling in a decade of R & D in drugs and medical devices; 

an exponential increase in drug adverse reaction reports; and the emergence in recent years of extraordinary new health threats, such as, E. coli 0157H:7, AIDS, mad 

cow disease, and more. Perhaps most emblematic of this trend is the ten fold increase in the past decade of imports from other countries. Today, 15% of our food 

supply is imported from more than 100 nations, along with over half of our drugs, 

yet FDA has been given virtually no new authorities nor resources to address a dramatic change in the sourcing (and associated risk) from products made overseas, 

often in developing countries with little or no tradition of scientific rigor. 

GAPS IN SCIENTIFIC CAPACITY AND EXPERTISE

FDA’s resources have not only not kept pace with its responsibilities, many critical agency programs have sustained actual cuts. For example, FDA’s food headquarters program has lost 20% of its scientists in just the past three years, despite 

an upswing in outbreaks of foodborne disease in the United States and a steady increase in contaminated seafood, produce and other foods being imported from foreign countries. Similarly, FDA has lost several hundred inspectors due to budget 

cuts since 2003, leaving the Agency not only incapable of inspecting domestic manufacturers but also ensuring that most of the nation’s ports have no FDA inspectors. 

Although one FDA function, new drug and device review, has received additional 

funding from industry-paid user fees, the Agency as a whole has lost 1000 people 

over the past decade. This loss in scientific capacity has resulted in loss of personnel 

to perform inspections associated with marketed products but equally important, it 

has resulted in significant and critical gaps in scientific expertise. 

Innovations and advancements in science are outstripping FDA’s capacity to understand and regulate them, threatening not only the safe introduction of new techVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:46 Oct 05, 2009 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00102 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\110-107 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
99 

nologies but also American leadership in pharmaceuticals, vaccines, biotechnology, 

and medical devices. The United States is on the cusp of another ‘‘revolution’’ in 

therapeutics that holds great promise for effective treatments of cancer, Alzheimer’s, 

Parkinson’s, and other previously incurable conditions. Breakthroughs in human, 

animal, and microbial genomics, molecular biology, nanotechnology, food processing 

technology, computational mathematics, in vivo imaging and many more are likely 

to change the face of medicine and food production, yet FDA has not been given the 

capacity to prepare for these breakthroughs. Tens of billions of dollars are being 

spent by both the public and private sector on the development of such products, 

yet FDA has been denied the relatively minor funding necessary to ensure their 

rapid and safe entry into the market. At a time in which U.S. competitiveness in 

science, medicine, and food production are under increasing strain from overseas, 

a weak and underfunded FDA will be a brake on the very technologies that the 

United States is relying upon for its medical and technological future. 

Our Science Board Subcommittee considered the funding issues to be more acute 

for the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) than for other FDA 

programs. FDA’s food safety program is characterized as one steadily dropping in 

staffing, and in funding for essential functions. Budget cuts for food safety have 

brought the Agency from doing 35,000 domestic food inspections in 1973 to fewer 

than 8000 in 2007 (meaning FDA inspects most facilities on average only every 10 

years). The foreign inspection rate is even worse, as the Agency may manage to inspect a dozen foreign food manufacturers in 2008, despite the thousands of overseas 

producers sending food to our shores. Moreover, as FDA’s leadership in food safety 

erodes, other countries are presenting themselves as the appropriate model for food 

safety standard setting, even though such standards can be unscientific and disguised trade barriers, to the detriment of principles of sound science and to market 

access for American food exports. A recent GAO report indicates that less than 7% 

of foreign drug manufacturing sites are inspected annually be FDA. 

The Science Board Subcommittee viewed the current scientific needs of FDA to 

be extensive and diverse in terms of critical expertise, infrastructure, and knowledge 

gaps across FDA. Again, they were particularly critical in CFSAN. The food industry is rapidly changing both in terms of its global nature and the sophistication of 

the technologies used for production, processing, and marketing. In addition, the 

hazards related to food are changing and evolving in concert with changing food 

technologies and food production locales. The food regulatory program lacks sufficient high-quality applied field and laboratory research data to understand the 

mechanisms of contamination and how to mitigate or eradicate the many pathogens 

involved in the food production process. Additionally, CFSAN scientists are limited 

in their knowledge of food production, whether in the agricultural or aquacultural 

aspects of food production, especially in foreign production arenas. The capability 

and capacity of FDA to detect food-borne viruses and parasites have not kept pace 

with the emergence of this public health threat from international sources. It is essential that FDA have the capability to rapidly detect food-borne pathogens. Currently they are limited in scope and have lengthy time requirements. Quick high 

throughput technologies are needed. This is a serious impediment to the US food 

safety program. Likewise, quick high throughput technologies are needed for detecting chemical contamination in both food and drugs. While the FDA was able to develop an assay for screening of heparin during the recent adverse reactions, the 

assay needs to be adapted to high throughput with improved sensitivity and adoption for field use. 

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS

FDA’s information technology systems are woefully outdated and inadequate, posing a concrete threat to the Agency’s public health mission. The report’s authors 

were extremely disturbed by the state of FDA’s IT infrastructure. We found a situation problematic at best, at worst dangerous. Many of FDA’s systems are far beyond 

their expected life span, and systems fail frequently (even email systems are unstable). Emergency back-up systems are not in place. I heard recently that the newly 

established program related to adverse event reporting was lost due to failure of a 

back-up system. This has already resulted in a 6 week delay in implementation and 

it remains inoperable. Reports of product dangers are not rapidly compared and 

analyzed, inspectors’ reports are still laboriously handwritten, and the system for 

managing imported products cannot communicate with Customs and other government systems. These inadequacies do not only cause inefficiencies and waste, but 

more importantly mean that dangers lurking in information coming to the FDA are 

simply missed—such as drug adverse reactions that are duly reported but not 

flagged for attention due to incapacities in information management. Data bases 

100 

and data mining capabilities for appropriate tracking of inspections sites has proved 

to be a major challenge with existing technology and expertise. Inaccurate data 

bases and data bases not easily mined continue to hamper foreign inspections for 

drug manufacturing even though some of the problems were identified by GAO over 

a decade ago. 

CONCLUSION

FDA can no longer fulfill its mission without substantial and sustained additional 

appropriations. The current situation has developed over many years, the question 

is not why or how we got here but rather how do we strengthen FDA going forward? 

Our subcommittee strongly believes our report provides the required blueprint. 

The report is unique in yet another important way. It not only provides an assessment by a rigorous review of the Agency by a diverse team of experts from the public and private sectors, but it also includes a simultaneous assessment by leaders 

of the FDA (as contained in Appendices L–M). Our Subcommittee requested staff 

to not only identify science and technology gaps but to link each directly to their 

specific regulatory mission. This comprehensive external/internal analysis—done at 

the same point in time for an entire Agency—is indeed rare. 

We recognize that adequate resources—human and financial—alone will not be 

sufficient to repair the deteriorating state of science at FDA, which is why our committee also recommended significant restructuring. While our report focused upon 

the FDA organizational structure related most to the scientific infrastructure, it 

might well be that in light of continuing issues related to globalization that we 

should be asking ‘‘What FDA organizational structure is needed to protect the 

public’s health in the 21st century setting of globalization with rapidly expanding 

importation of foreign drugs, vaccines, biologics, and food?’’ While our Subcommittee 

recommended that the Science Board conduct an extensive review of the Office of 

Regulatory Affairs and the National Center for Toxicological Research, Congress 

may want to consider requesting IOM to perform a more in depth study to evaluate 

the overall Agency structure given the concerns also raised regarding structure and 

drug safety. Regardless of the organizational structure, it is clear that without a 

substantial increase in resources, the Agency will be unable to meet either the mandates of Congress or the expectations of the American public, regardless of management or leadership changes. Our findings are supported by many recent GAO reports as you will hear today as well as recent reports form the congressional Research Service and the National Academy of Sciences. 

On behalf of our Subcommittee, we thank Chairmen Stupak and Dingell and 

ranking members Barton and Shimkus for holding this hearing and for your recognition of the seriousness of the deficiencies we have identified and the urgency 

with which they need to be addressed. The urgency of our advisory is simply predicated upon the fact that we see signs of an increasingly chaotic environment descending upon FDA, and the need to address the deficiencies we identified. Without 

immediate action, injuries and deaths from an overwhelmed regulatory system are 

certain, and the costs to our society will be far greater than any dollar figure upon 

which we all can agree. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Doctor. 

Mr. Hubbard, please, for your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM K. HUBBARD, FORMER FDA ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER AND CURRENT SENIOR ADVISOR TO 

THE COALITION FOR A STRONGER FDA 

Mr. HUBBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have written testimony. I will just make a few opening remarks. 

It is ironic but sad that we were here on November 1st talking 

about this at the very time when the initial heparin deaths began 

to come in in reports, and so I appreciate the fact that you stayed 

with this issue because I do think it needs to be stayed with until 

we find a solution. And while FDA can’t with absolute certainty associate the contamination from Chinese sources, the evidence is 

pretty darn strong, and the inadequate conditions that the FDA 

101 

found when it did inspect the facility in Changzhou is, I think, indisputable. 

I can’t overemphasize the risk we are putting our citizens 

through by continuing to allow these products to come into our 

country with no FDA screening. 

You referred, Mr. Chairman, in your opening remarks to Commissioner Cassell’s remarks about why the FDA was created. I 

think that is a very appropriate analogy for us to consider. When 

Congress created the FDA in ’06 you had a marketplace overrun 

with problems with foods and drugs, and there were three characteristics. You had widespread substitution of cheap, but unsafe food 

and drug ingredients, things like talcum for flour and sawdust for 

cereal, an abundant use of all kinds of chemicals and drugs and 

products driven more by profit motive than by quality, and lastly 

a weak-to-nonexistent regulatory system. Well, you know, that 

sounds familiar, doesn’t it? So these factors are very clearly the 

case now with our import system. 

FDA has found substitutions of cheaper but dangerous ingredients, and that is often from less developed nations. You had mentioned melamine, the antibiotics in seafood, saccharine masking putrid fish, watered-down apple juice. The list is a fairly long one. 

And further, foreign producers, as you referred earlier, Mr. Chairman, can rely on the fact that FDA is not on the case and that a 

firm is unlikely to be caught and then if they are caught they are 

unlikely to be punished, and so that the incentives are all in the 

wrong place. 

And then—and then lastly, you have got equally evident that the 

governments of these nations are incapable, in my view, of assuring the safety of the products they send to us. In fact, they often 

deny the very existence of the problem. So we really only have 

three alternatives. We do nothing, that has just been the default 

for many years, and just hope for the best. We can rely on the assurances of these foreign governments, but as I said, I just don’t 

think that is meaningful in this environment. Or we can accept the 

fact that we have not taken care of the FDA and given it the 

means. 

So I’ll note that we have built a terrific regulatory authority in 

this country with over almost a century. We have built up the 

FDA, it has wonderful scientists and dedicated personnel, but we 

don’t use it in protecting us from these foreign drugs, which I just 

think is a tremendous lapse. And we have not given them the tools 

and resources they need. You know as consumers we spend a 

penny and a half a day on the FDA. And I believe if we just spend 

2 or 3 cents a day on the FDA that we could fix these problems. 

And I think if you polled American citizens, they would put 

FDA—the things that FDA does—at the top five or six things that 

they would want to see their tax funds spent for. And if we don’t 

do something, Mr. Chairman, I think we are going to be back here 

over and over again having these same discussions. And in fact, 

these foreign drugs form a string of ticking time bombs. Heparin’s 

gone off and I think there are going to be more until we fix this 

problem. 

And so with that, I thank you for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hubbard follows:] 

102 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM K. HUBBARD

INTRODUCTION 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am William K. Hubbard. Before 

my retirement after 33 years of Federal service, I served for many years with the 

U.S. Food and Drug Administration, and for my last 14 years was an FDA Associate 

Commissioner responsible for, among other things, FDA’s regulations and policy development. Although I remain retired since my departure from FDA, I serve as an 

advisor to The Alliance for a Stronger FDA, a consortium of patient, public interest, 

and industry organizations whose mission is to urge that FDA’s appropriations be 

increased. The Alliance and its constituent members are greatly concerned that 

FDA’s resource limitations have hampered the Agency’s ability to ensure the safety 

of our food and drug supply. Today’s hearing is a further exploration of your recent 

focus on one of those concerns—the massive increase in pharmaceuticals being imported into the United States at a time in which FDA’s capacity to oversee those 

foreign producers is in serious doubt. Accordingly, I wish to thank the Committee 

for inviting me to testify on that subject today. 

BACKGROUND 

As you know, Congress created the current regulatory structure for assuring the 

safety of human drugs in 1938, through its enactment of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. That statute recognized that drugs could be a key component of our 

health care system, but that drugs were also powerful chemicals with the capability 

to produce great harm if not carefully regulated. Thus, Congress determined it necessary to create a relatively pervasive regulatory system, a key part of which is 

oversight of the production processes by which our drugs are manufactured. In carrying out its congressional mandate, FDA has promulgated regulations that provide 

specific requirements for drug manufacturers to meet, known as GMPs (for Good 

Manufacturing Practices). These include requirements that active ingredients of the 

drug be of a prescribed purity, strength and quality; that the drug be made in well 

controlled, sanitary conditions; that its labeling and packaging be equally well controlled; and that laboratory tests of the drug be performed routinely using well established scientific methods and properly calibrated equipment to confirm that the 

drug is always produced in the form approved by the FDA. 

GMPs and Domestic Drug Production—A Successful Safety Record. The result of 

this regime, established by Congress, and implemented by FDA and drug manufacturers, has been a domestic drug supply in which Americans can have great confidence with regard to quality and safety. Combined with the success of the user 

fee program that this committee created, we have access to new drugs as fast or 

faster than anywhere else in the world and we can be assured that our medications 

produced in the United States conform to equally high production standards. Moreover, countries around the world have been able to look to the FDA as the ‘‘gold 

standard’’ for determining if a new drug should be approved and for establishing 

safe manufacturing controls for marketed drugs. But the investigations you have 

been pursuing in recent months with regard to imported drugs point to a dark side 

of drug manufacturing that threatens to undercut the hard work of so many and 

the traditional safety assurances upon which we have long relied. 

FOREIGN SOURCING OF THE U.S. DRUG SUPPLY 

The reason for this concern, of course, is that 80% of the active ingredients in our 

drugs are now coming from overseas, and increasingly the so-called ‘‘finished pharmaceutical’’—the pill we take by mouth or liquid injected into our bodies—is being 

produced in other countries as well. Further, the most rapid growth in foreign drug 

suppliers has occurred in developing nations such as China and India, with the 

prospect of future suppliers from Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and a host of African counties. Unfortunately, we know from experience that drugs produced overseas 

are not given the same ‘‘special’’ treatment that we have given drugs made here in 

the United States. In most countries, pharmaceuticals products are subject to normal arbitrage, which means that drugs move about much as do electronics, apparel, 

auto parts and thousands of other goods. This has meant that drugs are often purchased from suppliers who have little or no oversight by regulatory bodies; that key 

elements of safe drug production are ignored—such as quality testing, expiration 

dating, and labeling; and that producers of substandard and counterfeit drugs have 

a relatively easy access to the marketplace. Finally, in less developed countries, it 

is abundantly clear that the regulatory bodies, if they exist at all, are weak and ill 

103 

prepared to assure the safe production, distribution, and storage of drugs being exported to the United States. 

DRUG COUNTERFEITING 

Further complicating and endangering this situation is the prevalence of counterfeiting around the world. We, of course, see counterfeit designer clothing, watches 

and videos being sold on street corners across the country. But a fake Gucci bag 

is likely to pose little threat to your health, while counterfeit drugs are reported to 

cause deaths in the hundreds of thousand worldwide each year. In some countries, 

it is estimated that a patient is more likely to get a counterfeit drug than a real 

one, meaning that more than half of that nation’s drug supply is fake. Indeed, drug 

counterfeiting is considered to be endemic around the world, with the United States, 

until recently, a rare exception. But that may be changing rapidly. FDA has seen 

its counterfeit drug caseload soar in recent years, paralleling the movement of drug 

production from domestic to foreign sources. 

Perhaps this is coincidental, but certainly China has been alleged to be a principle 

world supplier of counterfeit products. For example, a ‘‘sting’’ operation by the The 

Sunday Times of London last year set up a phony drug wholesaler, who was able 

to buy large quantities of counterfeit drugs from a Chinese manufacturer, who was 

reported to make pharmaceutical ingredients for legal sale by day and fake drugs 

for illicit sale by night. The Times reported that counterfeiters are increasingly 

turning from fake handbags and currency to drugs, because the drugs are so easy 

to make and sell on world markets. 

And the New York Times described recently how counterfeit glycerin, which has 

been linked to hundreds of deaths in children when used in cough syrups and analgesics, was traced through a pipeline ‘‘from the Panamanian port of Colon, back 

through trading companies in Barcelona, Spain, and Beijing, to its beginning near 

the Yangtze Delta in a place local people call ‘chemical country’.’’ 

FDA AND IMPORTED DRUGS 

As this is occurring, what has been the reaction by our regulatory structure—the 

FDA? I recognize that you and others in Congress have been highly critical of FDA’s 

oversight of drug imports in a number of areas—poor identification of foreign drug 

sourcing, little examination or testing of drugs when they arrive at U.S. ports, and 

virtually no routine surveillance of foreign drug manufacturers for adherence to 

GMPs. But, as you know, I have often defended the Agency as a cadre of highly 

capable, dedicated public servants who are struggling to keep up with the challenges of a rapidly changing pharmaceutical supply chain. I contend that we as a 

nation have failed to give FDA the tools it needs to carry out the mission we have 

assigned to them, such as: 

• Staff to conduct regular inspections in foreign facilities as are now done for domestic manufacturing plants; 

• Modern IT systems that would allow FDA to effectively track and monitor the 

production and movement of imports. The import data system is so old and communicates so poorly with other FDA information systems that it is difficult for FDA 

officials to use risk as a predominant driver of their compliance; 

• Registration procedures for foreign drug manufacturing that would allow us to 

know who is making drugs for our market, where they are located, and what they 

are manufacturing; and 

• Port inspectors to examine the almost 20 million annual shipments of foods, 

drugs, and other products that FDA is expected to regulation. For over 400 ports 

of entry, FDA has only 450 inspectors, meaning that most ports aren’t staffed at 

all and many can be staffed only part time. 

Irrespective of particular needs, however, we must also face up to the fact that 

FDA is asked to regulate these products with a law whose 70th anniversary is this 

year—a time in which there were few drugs being made anywhere in the world, and 

none being imported into the United States. To use a transportation analogy, drug 

manufacturing has moved in the ensuing years from automobiles to airplanes to 

spacecraft, and FDA is still driving a Ford Model T, at least with respect to imported drugs. Current law and resource allocations for the FDA place most of the 

responsibility for assuring the safety of imported drugs on the Agency. So, while domestic drug manufacturers are held to a high standard of drug safety, with regular 

GMP inspections, foreign producers often need worry only about the remote possibility that an FDA inspector at a border crossing will find a problem and stop the 

drug’s entry. 

104 

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 

I recognize that members of Congress on both sides of Capitol Hill are considering 

a number of legislative improvements to address import safety. Making major 

changes in the regulatory structure will likely be akin to turning a giant oil tanker—you can start the turn now, but it will take considerable time to fully change 

direction. But I believe there are some key principles that could be adopted right 

away, which have been suggested by the GAO and by FDA’s Science Board: 

1) We need to initiate GMP inspections of foreign drug manufacturing facilities immediately, with a special focus on drugs made in countries without a safe drug production and internal regulation. Without such inspections, 

we essentially have no oversight of those manufacturers. A GMP inspection is far 

more than just a snapshot of that facility the day the inspector arrives. It is a detailed survey of how that plant has been operating for months, which allows a realistic conclusion about whether that facility can and does follow accepted drug production procedures. Relying on testing by the FDA or the U.S. drug company that 

receives the foreign ingredients is not a substitute for examining the source of production. The GAO notes that FDA today can allocate only about $11 million for its 

entire foreign drug inspection program. That is far too little an effort for such an 

important part of our national safety net, but, unfortunately, says a great deal 

about our current commitment to assuring the safety of those drugs. I urge you to 

support a level of appropriated funds that will permit FDA to assure that foreign 

facilities are complying with our standards. 

2) Upgrading FDA’s IT systems should be among our highest priorities. 

If we don’t even have a system for capturing who’s making these products, where 

they are, what’s coming into our country, and related critical information needs, we 

can’t hope to begin the process of improving our coverage of imports. The IT systems 

should be configured in a way that allows the Agency to use a myriad of risk factors, 

including potential impact on the public health, to direct its inspectional and import 

efforts. The Science Board recommends increased appropriations of $800 million for 

FDA’s overall IT needs, so there is a long way to go if FDA is to have state-of-theart information systems, but we could at least start with funding an effective import 

information system. 

3) Institute a vigorous mechanism for testing drugs for ingredients or 

contaminants that are not approved for that compound. History has shown 

that processors, especially in less developed countries, can be adept at adding substances to increase the value of the product or decrease costs of production. But the 

danger of doing so, whether it be the industrial plastic melamine in pet food, the 

polysaccharide inulin in apple juice, or the dietary supplement chondroitin in heparin, is well established, and poses an enormous hole in the safety net we are trying 

to maintain. Recent events have shown that U.S. processors and the public can be 

victimized alike by these nefarious activities, and we must find a way to end them. 

In conclusion, I believe that the scientists within the Food and Drug Administration have shown that they can effectively assure the safety of drug production when 

given the tools with which to do so. And U.S. drug manufacturers accept the need 

for high standards in drug manufacturing and generally adopt those standards 

faithfully, and many go to great lengths to secure their chain of supply of drug ingredients. Drugs made in the United States under FDA’s rigorous quality control 

standards have an extraordinarily good safety record, as measured by the paucity 

of manufacturing defects and deaths and illnesses related to manufacturing deficiencies. But it is obvious that foreign sources do not share in that record of success. 

It does no good to have rules if they are not obeyed, no good to set high standards 

if they are not used, and no good to develop advanced scientific skills if they are 

not employed. That countries such as China have a record of serious problems in 

drug manufacturing is indisputable. And the disparity in drug inspections—in which 

FDA inspects U.S. facilities regularly and those in China and India almost never— 

is indefensible. I urge you to make changing that paradigm one of your highest priorities for this year. 

Thank you again for inviting me to give my views on this subject. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Hubbard. 

Mr. Nielsen, please, for your opening statement, sir. 

105 

STATEMENT OF CARL R. NIELSEN, RETIRED DIRECTOR OF 

THE DIVISION OF IMPORT OPERATIONS, OFFICE OF REGULATORY AFFAIRS, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

Dr. NIELSEN. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I 

thank you for another opportunity to discuss FDA’s foreign drug inspection program, and I hope my participation will help the subcommittee develop effective remedies for a public health and safety 

system needing serious attention. 

The press has been very active the last couple months following 

the contaminated heparin story. FDA had a press call yesterday 

and reported there are now 81 deaths associated with the use of 

contaminated heparin from China. Truly the heparin story is a 

tragedy that seems to keep growing in magnitude. Because the 

FDA investigation has not isolated the likely node in the supply 

chain where the contamination occurred, FDA is encouraging all 

batches of heparin to be tested. Is that sufficient? 

FDA wants to be able to say it would not have made a difference 

whether the Changzhou plant was inspected earlier, that the contamination would not have been discovered. FDA is responding in 

its usual react mode to a serious injurious event after the damage 

is done, not a prevention mode. Granted, the mandatory identity 

test in each batch of API received by the drug manufacturer would 

not have identified the contamination, but facility inspections do 

help leverage safety. I say that the Chinese foreign manufacturer 

and its suppliers had adhered to good manufacturing practices and 

control of raw material and if FDA had inspected the plant to 

verify good manufacturing practices were in place, then perhaps 81 

lives could have been saved. 

If compliance with the current GMP regulations could not have 

reasonably prevented or deterred the contamination of the heparin, 

then it may be time to finally update and rewrite the drug GMP 

regulations rather than trying to convince industry through nonbinding guidance documents to enhance scrutiny of active ingredients and other components. 

The vulnerability of the U.S. Drug supply to imported substandard or counterfeit active pharmaceutical ingredients, or APIs, 

is not a new issue before the Agency. Beginning in 1991, my colleague Benjamin L. England, who is also appearing on his behalf, 

another FDA investigator and I initiated numerous international 

investigations with U.S. Customs related to APIs from several foreign countries, including China. 

In my previous testimony before this subcommittee on November 

1st, 2007, I stated those counterfeit investigations found evidence 

that there were deaths associated with the use of carbamezapine, 

an anti-convulsant made out of imported counterfeit carbamezapine 

active ingredient. Those investigations also found evidence of imported counterfeit APIs back to the mid-1980s. 

Only one of the counterfeit cases was successfully prosecuted. In 

March 1996, in a plea agreement the defendant admitted the importation of several counterfeit APIs for several years. In May 

1996, while I was a senior special agent in FDA’s Office of Criminal 

Investigations, I wrote an internal memorandum to the upper management of the OCI describing the potential threats of harmful imVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:46 Oct 05, 2009 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\110-107 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
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purities being introduced into finished drugs by counterfeit APIs 

and APIs from unapproved sources, and I suggested several strategies to combat the threats of counterfeit APIs. 

This memorandum was produced to this subcommittee by FDA 

during a hearing in June 2000 on the subject of counterfeit drugs. 

Ultimately, months after I submitted my memorandum, a meeting 

was held in the Commissioner’s office in February 1997 and the imported counterfeit drug problem was verbally declared a top priority. Unfortunately, there was a leadership change at the Agency 

within a month and the counterfeit API issue largely left the Agency’s radar scope. 

It seems it takes numerous deaths now to generate a call to 

evaluate and modify FDA requirements and operations. It has been 

8 years since the 2000 hearing on imported counterfeits and 17 

years since the first imported counterfeit API investigation. The 

same regulatory requirements for receiving and accepting components by finished drug manufacturers remain the same:identity 

tests and certificates of analyses provided by the supplier. 

Sadly, when looking at the history of the API problem, it should 

not be a surprise that it is possible for the recent heparin incident 

to occur. 

It is time for a radical change in improvement and adjustment 

of agency operations that fits the international trade paradigm and 

facilitates the trade of safe products. FDA must have a credible 

presence in foreign markets to better ensure compliance with good 

manufacturing practices and other requirements that it assure a 

supply of safe and effective drugs. 

The heparin incident demonstrates just how internationally 

linked we are relative to drug safety. Prescription drugs and overthe-counter medicines may represent less than 10 percent of all 

FDA imported regulated commodities, but the heparin scenario 

shows the serious cascading adverse health affects of the contamination of just one common and old drug. 

The FDA can be rebuilt, but it will be expensive. The public 

health cost is higher though if no significant investment is made, 

as demonstrated by the heparin incident. Effective post-market 

surveillance activities are essential to FDA’s public health and 

safety mission. 

There are many great ideas for steering FDA effectively into the 

21st century, but without investment in the integrated IT, execution of the great ideas are not very likely. If the IT development 

is functionally absent from corrective measures, then we should 

just plan a 10-year reunion to revisit what should have been known 

or done to prevent more deaths from contaminated drugs. 

The foreign firms may not be in immediate reach for inspection, 

but the products are. Imported drugs are not going into a black 

hole. 

I thank you for your time and look forward to answering any 

questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nielsen follows:] 

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Mr. STUPAK. Thank you and thank you for your testimony. Mr. 

England, please, your opening statement, sir. 

STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN L. ENGLAND, ESQ., BENJAMIN L. 

ENGLAND & ASSOCIATES, LLC, AND FDAIMPORTS.COM, INC. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

Committee. I am Benjamin L. England, founder and owner of an 

FDA consulting practice called FDAImports.com, practicing attorney, and I represent foreign and domestic food, drug, medical device, and cosmetic companies in matters that involve the FDA. 

I am a 17-year veteran of the FDA. My written testimony, which 

is supplied for the record, discusses my background in greater detail. I am not going to belabor it here. I am pleased that the subcommittee has taken up the initiative to press for solutions for 

managing these safety risks associated with imported products 

again and to focus today specifically upon FDA’s foreign drug inspection program. 

I am troubled that we are again meeting in the shadow of adverse events that have claimed the lives of American consumers, 

and we are still hearing about what FDA is doing after the fact. 

The last time I appeared before you I had made mention of the 

counterfeit bulk drug investigations of the 90s as well. And I 

might—Mr. Nielsen just recounted his efforts to improve the FDA’s 

investigation of imported counterfeit drugs which was most likely, 

at least in my opinion, quashed at some point in the Agency. In 

fact, when Mr. Nielsen left OCI—I am going to tell a story on him 

and he doesn’t know I am going to do it—but when he left OCI and 

eventually reported to his job as the Director of the Division of Import Operations and Policy, he indicated to his supervisor, his new 

supervisor, that he was looking forward to getting back to finding 

ways to prevent counterfeit drugs from other countries into this 

country, to which his supervisor asked, what counterfeit drugs? 

This heparin incident apparently occurred because of some 

human error in deciding inspection had already been conducted or 

should be conducted. I believe that we are on the brink of a series 

of these events and that waiting for FDA’s timeline will be a mistake. The time for developing strict strategies is long past. 

As I said months ago in the press and to your staff, Mr. Chairman, this recent case appears to be the close cousin of the counterfeit drug cases discovered nearly 2 years ago—2 decades ago, excuse me. 

At that time, the illegal conduct was discovered through intensive smart facility inspections and by the efforts of forward thinking forensic scientists and investigators. This occurred only because 

of the intellectual connection between certain domestic inspections 

at U.S. facilities by a keen FDA investigator who had previously 

conducted the foreign inspection of the bulk supplier, coupled with 

follow-up inspections at the foreign supplier, which were themselves targeted with knowledge of where evidence of illegal conduct 

was likely to be found. It is no different today except that we now 

have available to us significantly improved technological solutions 

that may prove more useful to more precisely and efficiently identify, target, and intercept safety risks prior to the realization in the 

marketplace. 

118 

I will provide now just a summary of six of my recommendations, 

and at this stage I believe that they are basically in the order of 

priority I would put them at. One, it is axiomatic that FDA’s data 

systems, operational and management systems alike, have become 

the breeding grounds for potential disasters. Now let me be clear. 

That is not to say that all the products being imported or distributed into the U.S. are dangerous or even high risk. Rather, the relative risk of any of them is not known by the FDA. The agency can 

barely manage to do more on a daily basis than to check for registration numbers, listing numbers, and on a very good day some 

Establishment Evaluation data. When determining whether imported drugs should enter the country, the systems remain badly 

stovepiped or siloed and FDA’s proposals will take at least another 

5 years to correct them. FDA’s solutions appear primarily to be to 

lay a common portal over the systems, which will not actually integrate the legacy systems. 

Number two, FDA does not conduct enough foreign GMP surveillance inspections to constitute a regulatory force in the world, even 

though the prized markets for such articles is here in the United 

States. The agency should be required to conduct foreign good 

measuring practice inspections at the same frequency as domestic 

inspections. Even without additional funding this would level the 

relevant risks between domestic and foreign sources of drugs and 

would force the Agency to balance those risks against the two 

sources. 

The cGMP surveillance inspection, when conducted by competent 

investigators who have at their disposal integrated account-based 

information covering the life cycle of products manufactured by the 

facility, remains the single most effective means for detecting the 

kinds of activities that have been prevalent in the counterfeiting of 

drugs, the production of articles using unapproved sources of materials, and product substitution. Without a rigorous foreign inspection program FDA will never prevent the next product contamination before it causes illness or death. 

Three, throwing more money at FDA without requiring the resources to be used to produce different outcomes will produce diminishing returns. In my opinion, I believe the most critical area 

for increasing funding is in FDA’s IT systems. FDA systems must 

be far smarter and must be capable of taking data from a variety 

of sources, both internal and external, for comparison against legacy data. Its operational systems must utilize risk-based algorithms, designed to predict where an exertion of agency effort will 

yield positive and measurable safety and security results. 

Without a major reinvention of FDA’s IT systems, even the hundreds of proposals that were in the 2003 import strategic plan are 

of limited value. And following that, I would dramatically increase 

the resources in the field inspection force to include dedicated foreign inspection cadres, funding to increase laboratory capacity, 

funding for leveraging State inspections for FDA’s domestic operations, and enhancement of those few headquarters components 

that are capable of actually assisting the field operations. 

Four, in order to take the most advantage of enhanced IT systems, the Agency should begin moving immediately to an accountbased regulatory approach that enables the interconnectivity of 

119 

regulatory processes along the entire life cycle of its products to encompass all steps from application and approval, where required, 

to the consumer impact. 

FDA could learn a lot by understanding how Customs has moved 

from a transaction-only approach to an accounts-based approach 

that evaluates the transaction in the context of the account. 

Customs has accomplished much of this by requiring each submission of the data to be connected to a unique numerical identifier. These identifiers can be related to one another enabling crosslinking of companies that demonstrate interrelationships. 

Under the current regime the lack of integration of data accounts 

means a human must notice slight differences in company names 

to assess whether a foreign drug facility has been ever inspected, 

and in this regard a unified registration system could quite easily 

have prevented some of the deaths as well. 

Five, I believe the organization of the Agency contributes to its 

inefficiencies. I recommend again establishing within FDA an organization that reports to the Commissioner with the mission of focusing on enhancing the safety of foreign made products, all products. 

I continue to believe fixing FDA’s import and foreign inspection 

problem requires it to be broken free from the domestic operation, 

which produces much of the bureaucratic inertia against change in 

this area. 

This new organization would be responsible for all important 

international-focused work-planning activities, conducting facility 

inspections of foreign processors and importers, overseeing and conducting border operations, conducting foreign government and industry assessments and training, and support trade negotiations in 

a manner to enhance safety of imported products. 

And to accomplish this, the new organization should be directly 

funded rather than receiving its funding through the product centers. A basic persistent infrastructure to manage risk associated 

with all imported commodities must be maintained regardless of 

the year-to-year changes that may appropriately occur in program 

directions. 

And six, and finally, perhaps an unpopular solution to some involves the use of some third parties. In my opinion, FDA should 

begin obtaining as much information as it can from as many reliable sources as the Agency can find regarding the cGMP compliance status and supply change security programs of foreign drug 

facilities that are not inspected by FDA and are not ever going to 

be inspected by the FDA. 

Additional risk data could come in the form of third party inspection and certification companies, accompanied by a robust auditing 

process on both sides of the border. All such data should be connected to the firm’s unique identifier and incorporated into the account data to permit its assessment in light of other legacy and 

other agency data. This recommendation would permit the Agency 

to focus its import inspection and examination efforts on shipments 

representing known and unknown risks. 

And I thank the subcommittee Chair and the members for the 

opportunity to discuss these important issues again. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. England follows:] 

120 

STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN L. ENGLAND, J.D. 

1. INTRODUCTION 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am Benjamin L. England, founder and owner of an FDA consulting practice, FDAImports.com, Inc., and a practicing 

attorney representing foreign and domestic food, drug, medical device and cosmetic 

companies in matters involving the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). I am 

a 17-year veteran of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). From 1986 to 

2003 I held the positions of Regulatory Microbiologist in FDA’s Baltimore Microbiology Laboratory, Consumer Safety Officer and Compliance Officer in FDA’s Baltimore District Office, Special Agent with FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations in 

the Miami Field Office, Compliance Officer in FDA’s Miami Resident Post, and Regulatory Counsel to FDA’s Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs (or ACRA) 

in Headquarters. I resigned my most recent FDA position as Regulatory Counsel to 

the ACRA in July 2003—a position I held in FDA for over 3 years as a Title 42 

appointee. During my last 3 years at FDA, I was a key point person for Customs 

and Border Protection, I chaired the FDA’s Counterfeit Drug Working Group, instituted the Joint Agency-Industry Working Group to combat product counterfeiting 

and tampering, which laid the ground work for the preparation of FDA’s initial 

Counterfeit Drug Task Force report, and co-chaired FDA’s Import Strategic Plan 

Steering Committee. 

Along with my colleague, Mr. Carl Nielsen, who is also before you today testifying 

on his own behalf, I established the Agency’s first series of Import Enforcement 

Training Courses, and with a few dedicated FDA and Customs officials, trained 

nearly every FDA import inspector, investigator, import program manager, and compliance officer in the effective use of Customs enforcement tools against products imported in the U.S. in violation of FDA requirements. 

At the outset, I am pleased the Committee has taken the initiative to press for 

solutions for managing safety risks associated with imported products—and to focus 

today specifically upon FDA’s foreign drug inspection program. I do not feel it is necessary to reiterate all of the history in this testimony, as it is a part of the record 

from previous hearings. Some points, however, bear repeating. Further, since my 

last appearance before you on November 1, 2007, more evidence has appeared in 

the U.S. marketplace laying bare the brokenness of the regulatory and information 

technology (IT) systems FDA is hobbling along with and the real safety risks that 

attend the Agency’s present condition. 

I highlighted in my previous testimony the counterfeit bulk drug investigations 

of the 1990s, which were all but abandoned by FDA. We discussed how reminiscent 

those cases were to press accounts identified by the Chair related to counterfeit articles, both finished and bulk, in any number for foreign markets. Today we are confronted with serious adverse events involving a widely used drug product that appears to have been made using substituted active ingredients at a foreign facility 

that was never inspected by FDA—because of some human error in deciding whether an inspection had already been conducted or should be conducted. I believe that 

we are truly on the brink of a series of these events and that waiting for FDA to 

take some action that actually mitigates risk or encouraging the Agency to act unilaterally will be an exercise in futility. As I said in the press and to your staff, Mr. 

Chairman, this recent case appears to be the close cousin of the same conduct discovered nearly two decades ago. At that time, it was through intensive and smart 

facility inspections and by the efforts of forward thinking forensic scientists and investigators the activity was discovered. Moreover, the successfully prosecuted counterfeit bulk drug case was made possible only through the intellectual connections 

between certain domestic inspections at U.S. facilities by a keen FDA investigator 

who had previously conducted the foreign inspection of the bulk supplier, coupled 

with follow up inspections at the foreign supplier, which were themselves targeted 

with knowledge of where evidence of illegal conduct was likely to be found. 

It is no different today—except that we now have available to us significantly improved technological solutions that may prove useful to more precisely and efficiently identify, target, and intercept safety risks prior to their realization in the 

market place. 

2. INTEGRATING THE SOLUTIONS ACROSS THE AGENCY 

One of my greatest concerns as a former FDA official and a current consumer is 

that Congress would jump to solutions that are as ‘‘stove-piped’’ or ‘‘siloed’’ as the 

Agency. This is particularly true with regard to FDA’s information technology systems. As the General Accountability Office (GAO) has articulated several times over 

121 

the last 15 years, the Agency’s legacy data systems are antiquated and not integrated. The FDA has been striving for decades under a budget that is anemic with 

regard to IT funding. Most Americans, I presume, would find it quite astonishing 

that FDA personnel (humans) must make decisions about whether a foreign facility 

should be (or has previously been) inspected by reading the name and comparing 

it to names in a number of data systems. 

Even more astonishing would be the realization that FDA’s various registration 

systems—across all of its Centers and regulated commodities—are not relationally 

integrated to background agency data or to its operational systems. Humans are 

still entering data bases and checking to see if a registration, supplied during the 

importation process is ‘‘in’’ the system and whether the number ‘‘belongs to’’ the 

manufacturer declared in an entry. FDA still receives its manufacturer declarations 

via the Customs Manufacturer Identification (MID) process and that MID must be 

translated in FDA’s systems to its own numbering system. Because of the variations 

in the MID process, FDA ends up with duplicate or triplicate numbers for the same 

facility—or far worse. Portal overlays can help reduce the number of data base user 

names and passwords an FDA official may have to remember—but they will not integrate data. These realizations, among others, account for at least some of the discrepancies in the Agency’s data with respect to how many foreign facilities have 

been or should be inspected. This is an annoying result. But it is more than annoying when the lack of integration of data accounts for a regulatory regime which relies on a human to notice slight differences in company names to assess whether 

a facility has ever been inspected. In this regard, a unified registration system could 

quite easily have prevented the recent heparin scenario. 

3. MORE THAN COUNTING COMPANIES 

Although it is critical for FDA to be able to define its universe, regulatory oversight requires far more than counting. It is critical that FDA is able to obtain reliable and affirmative evidence that foreign facilities manufacturing drugs for the U.S 

market are operating within the scope of FDA’s current good manufacturing practices (cGMP) requirements. This information can be derived from a number of 

sources—but one primary and historical information source has been the physical 

FDA inspection of the facility making the bulk active pharmaceuticals and the finished dosage drugs. As discussed in previous testimony, the drug manufacturing industry has undergone significant changes over the last 15 years in how and where 

its bulk actives and finished drugs are prepared, packed, and labeled. Many more 

drugs are manufactured in foreign jurisdictions now than ever before. FDA’s inability to count those facilities is indeed troubling. But the point of being able to count 

them must be based upon FDA’s ability to conduct adequate oversight of how they 

manufacture the drugs we take. I might add that without a number we can all point 

to, you are also unable to assess how FDA is doing in evaluating the safety and effectiveness of those drugs. Confidence in the system understandably erodes. 

The post-marketing surveillance inspections of drug and medical device facilities 

are absolutely critical to assessing the quality, purity, safety and effectiveness of the 

articles they manufacture. I have never heard FDA or the domestic industry as a 

whole say otherwise, although I am sure there are different opinions as to the absolute frequency that should be applied. Further, the sophistication of the inspector, 

the sufficiency of agency inspection guidance, the amount of time the facility is 

available to the inspector, and the depth and scope of the inspection all play significant roles in the reliability of the inspection results. The frequency of cGMP surveillance inspections correlates directly to the level of confidence FDA and the consumers enjoy respecting the critical elements of the articles. 

The cGMP (or Quality System) requirements are intended to address the adequacy and appropriateness of the manufacturing process, the design of that process, 

the equipment used in the process, the control and adequacy of raw materials subjected to processing, the source of those ingredients, the qualifications of the facility’s critical personnel, the packaging, labeling, and failure evaluation processes, and 

post-distribution monitoring, including company recall procedures. FDA’s current inspection frequency for foreign prescription finished drug and active ingredient manufacturers is reportedly on a 13-year inspection cycle. FDA is required to inspect 

corresponding domestic drug facilities on a 2-year cycle. When you compare this foreign facility inspection cycle (for Rx Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient manufacturers alone) to the increase in the numbers of imported drug shipments over the last 

10 years, one can see its impact historically and can predict that impact prospectively. 

For instance, according to FDA data, from 1991 to 2000 the number of FDA-regulated import shipments increased by 272% and in 2001 alone there were more than 

122 

1 A commercial line of entry is the equivalent of a line on a commercial invoice covering the 

sale of a product from a foreign exporter to a U.S. importer, owner, or consignee. A line may 

consist of a single laser DVD reader from Taiwan, regulated by FDA as an electronic product, 

or it may consist of 10 x 40 foot refrigerated containers of cantaloupes from Mexico. With regard 

to drugs, a line may be a shipment of 10 cases of retail ready over-the-counter (OTC) tablets 

of acetaminophen or a container of several metric tons of relatively pure bulk active pharmaceutical ingredients. A single invoice may have one or dozens of lines. FDA counts its import 

transactions by commercial line of entry. Each FDA-regulated line is subject to FDA jurisdiction 

based upon the legal definitions of the various products in the FDCA. 2More regretfully, even though roughly half of all FDA-regulated products consumed in the 

U.S. are either manufactured in whole or in part in a foreign country, as I recall by the summer 

of 2003 approximately only 7 out of every 100 dollars spent by FDA regulating products under 

the Agency’s jurisdiction was focused on FDA’s import or foreign programs. 3See Statement of Jane E. Henney, M.D., FDA Commissioner, Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, Comm. on Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, http://www.fda.gov/ 

ola/2000/counterfeitdrugs.html (Oct. 3, 2000). 4 ‘‘OASIS’’ is an acronym that stands for FDA’s ‘‘Operational and Administrative System for 

Import Support.’’ See FDA’s discussion of OASIS at http://www.fda.gov/ora/import/oasis/home— 

page.html. 5These numbers are derived from two separate FDA data systems and thus the disparity. The 

lower number is reportedly from FDA’s Drug Registration and Listing System (DRLS). The 

higher number is a downward departure from data stored in ORADDS, the OASIS data warehouse. Therefore, the lower number is taken from the process whereby foreign manufacturers 

report data to FDA in order to meet two of the most basic minimum requirements to export 

drugs to the U.S.: drug registration and drug listing; and the higher number is taken from the 

process whereby Customs brokers report to Customs and to FDA through OASIS the identity 

of foreign manufacturers actually exporting drugs to the U.S. This discrepancy alone is troubling. It is unclear over what time frame the two numbers were derived and whether they correlate. Further, it undercuts FDA’s traditional argument that OASIS data is unreliable simply 

because it represents self reporting through the importation process. DRLS also represents self 

reporting to FDA, and in the import declaration environment, there is another agency, Customs 

and Border Protection, that strictly governs and enforces proper data reporting. 

7 million imported commercial lines of entry. 1 In 2002, approximately 7.8 million 

lines of FDA-regulated commercial shipments were imported. From 1997 to 2002, 

the number of imports of every kind of FDA-regulated product at least doubled. In 

2007, FDA had jurisdiction over more than 17 million imported commercial lines of 

entry under its jurisdiction will be imported. This represents two doublings in the 

sheer number of entry transactions every five years since 1997. FDA’s inspection resources directed at assessing the safety of imported products and evaluating the 

manufacturing systems of foreign facilities has remained static throughout that time 

period. 2

Based upon my experience at FDA, which is further informed by statements from 

FDA in the press and in testimony before various congressional committees, roughly 

60% of the total number of commercial lines of entry consists of food imports; 25% 

consists of imported medical devices; and 10% consists of imported drugs and biologics. Using these proportions, FDA is responsible for ensuring the quality, safety 

and efficacy of nearly 2 million imported drug shipments per year. 

As I testified in November 1, 2007, FDA’s list of ‘‘uninspected’’ foreign API manufacturers exporting to the U.S. ranged from 242 to 4,600, depending upon the criteria used to populate the list. 3 The reasons for such disparity include the FDA’s 

multiple, ‘‘siloed’’, antiquated and non-integrated IT systems; the lack of a meaningful gatekeeper for the Agency’s drug establishment registration process; and the 

Agency’s insistence to mitigate the usefulness of FDA’s historical import entry 

(OASIS 4) transactional data. 

Today, it is apparent that all of these factors persist at FDA and the Agency is 

still struggling to identify the scope of the universe of foreign drug firms under its 

jurisdiction—whether we speak in terms of all foreign firms exporting drugs for 

human or animal consumption or merely foreign firms that FDA believes ‘‘should 

be’’ inspected. Lacking the ability to identify the larger, total universe of foreign 

drug firms exporting drugs to the U.S., the attempt to reduce that total to a more 

manageable ‘‘high risk’’ universe for targeting inspections has little foundation in reality. Consequently, FDA’s current range of foreign drug firms exporting drugs to 

the U.S. that should be inspected by FDA is from 3,000 to 6,700. 5

So at present, FDA is tasked with evaluating the safety and effectiveness of nearly 2 million imported shipments of drugs from as many as 6,700 foreign facilities, 

any number of which have not been visited by an FDA inspector for as long as a 

decade (or have not been visited at all, as in the case of the Chinese supplier of 

heparin potentially linked to 81 deaths in the U.S.). FDA is doing this with an IT 

system that contains multiple duplicate or triplicate facilities with different or nonunified numerical identification systems, literally dozens of data bases that are disVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:46 Oct 05, 2009 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00126 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\110-107 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
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connected, and a couple hundred people on a part time basis. This certainly seems 

to be a resource problem—but it is far more than that. 

4. WHY NOT JUST SAMPLE MORE? 

As stated in my previous testimony, when FDA is virtually absent in the foreign 

market assessing compliance with cGMPs, the Agency is left with attempting to assess risks associated with foreign sourced drugs and drug ingredients using its import operations. The FDA’s current import program, however, focuses primarily on 

FDA approved application, facility registration, and drug listing database submissions, label reviews, and finished product testing. These approaches are incapable 

of assessing the cGMP compliance and therefore the quality and safety of imported 

drugs. Although testing can tell FDA something about the quality and even the 

safety of an imported product, finished product testing at the border (or anywhere 

along the supply chain) is not a statistically valid method for predicting the safety 

of later or earlier untested shipments—even other shipments from the same processor. 

Where product (and patient) safety is so dependent upon an ongoing and rigorous 

manufacturing quality system, finished product testing is not even a valid way to 

determine product safety within the same shipment. Compliance with FDA’s drug 

cGMP program is the only (current) framework within which the Agency can justify 

relying upon the results obtained from finished product test. Finished product testing is confirmatory only. Without an assessment and understanding about the conditions of manufacture within the facility, the finished product test results are anecdotal at best. Such an approach cannot predict, measure, assess, or assure drug 

safety. 

Any question about this premise is laid to rest with a simple observation from 

a recent drug safety crisis. FDA now is maintaining that because it took some time 

for any number of laboratories to identify the contaminant in the heparin, which 

has caused such tragic loss of life recently, the FDA concludes that there are ‘‘limitations as to what inspections can tell you.’’ This is an appalling and irresponsible 

position. To the contrary, the absence of a meaningful and recurrent FDA inspection 

presence has far more to do with the events of recent months than almost any other 

factor. The evidence as to product safety (and security) is found only in the facilities 

and companies that make and move products into the U.S. market. Lacking a robust 

foreign drug inspection program, which takes into consideration all elements of prescription and non-prescription foreign drug manufacturing in its scheduling and 

preparation, promotes a ‘‘catch me if you can’’ foreign drug compliance culture. 

I would only add that if FDA’s IT systems were capable of linkage using a unique 

numerical identification system with some level of verification of registration data, 

then I dare say the system could be designed to flag any submission to the Agency, 

linked with the unique numerical identifier, with an on screen warning that the facility submitting the data has not be inspected by the Agency. This alone would 

have enabled FDA to assess whether the manufacturer of the heparin should be approved as a source for the finished dosage manufacturer. Instead, FDA personnel 

had to resort to recognizing slight variations in the names of two firms. 

5. ACCOUNT-BASED OVERSIGHT PROVIDES ADDITIONAL BENEFITS 

Other government agencies having regulatory oversight over hundreds of thousands of companies, transactions, and compliance procedures have begun to move 

to account-based regulatory processes to integrate the many steps the agencies must 

take to assess risks. For instance, Customs, with more than three times the number 

of import transactions, the responsibility for enforcing virtually every federal law in 

the importation arena, and the added weight of ensuring the security of imported 

products and our port infrastructure, has moved to account-based processing. As 

FDA notes in its various import safety proposals and (purported) risk-based food 

safety plans, Customs’ development of its Automated Commercial Environment 

(ACE) and the International Trade Data Systems (ITDS) will assist the government 

in improving its interoperability. However, FDA’s background data systems (managing, for instance approval submissions, registrations, listings, 510(k)s, Food Canning Establishment registrations, bioterrorism registrations, drug master file submissions, to name a few) will not be integrated with the final implementation of 

ACE or ITDS. Although Customs will require a unique numerical identifier from 

any company providing data into its systems (and for any company identified in 

such submitted data), FDA will still have to translate that unique identifier into its 

own registration system—and back into its duplicative, disconnected systems. So it 

is true that FDA will be able to obtain its import data from one place—as will the 

124 

6 In my view, the unique numerical identifier should be site specific and should be capable 

of verification by government and private systems and processes. Because of the amount of consolidation that can occur in any economic market, whether developed or developing, the identifier must be able account for mergers, acquisitions, business closings etc. Consider, for instance, 

the ownership changes that can occur over the current FDA foreign inspection cycle of 13 years. 

Entire countries can disappear or newly emerge in the same geographical location over that 

amount of time. 

other border agencies—however, FDA’s own systems will remain disconnected, nonintegrated and stove-piped. 

If FDA moved to an account-based system to regulate products in the supply 

chain, wherever they may be found, and if FDA only accepted data when a Customscomparable unique numerical identifier is provided with the submission, the Agency 

would be able to begin the process of internal data integration and meaningful data 

connectivity with Customs and other border agencies. Inspectional data, import 

data, adverse event data, and submission data could all be connected via the unique 

numerical identifier. The data systems could then be connected to FDA’s operational 

data systems (FACTS and OASIS) to permit integration with importation data 

transmitted by Customs and to help target domestic and foreign facility inspections 

and border evaluations, inspections, and sampling. The account-based system would 

develop over time eliminating the now ever-present duplications in firm data and 

would enable FDA to actually identify the scope and size of the ‘‘hay stack’’ as it 

exists in the real world. 6

With an account based regulatory system, the assessment of user fees (or review 

fees) can be predicted with greater specificity, FDA can identify the size and scope 

of its regulated industry, modifications, mergers, and facility closings can be identified and tracked, post-market events can be connected to product source, objectionable conditions observed at manufacturing facilities can be tracked through supply 

chains more readily, supply chains are more transparent and interagency coordination improves dramatically. These are just a few of the benefits. 

6. CONCLUSION 

A. MISSED OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE

In conclusion, I reiterate my previous testimony regarding steps going forward. 

The efforts of over 100 dedicated FDA personnel from all of FDA’s product Centers, 

the Office of Regulatory Affairs (ORA), the field offices, the laboratories, the various 

information technology offices, and the office of international programs should be 

presented to Congress and industry in an open forum to enable the Agency to learn 

risk in the real world. FDA’s foreign drug inspection program is only one means for 

FDA to assess and mitigate risks related to imported drugs. Foreign sourced drugs, 

whether finished or ingredients, active or inactive, must also pass through the bottleneck of FDA’s and Customs’ import assessment. Although it is true that FDA’s 

import program is woefully inadequate today, only addressing imported drug risks 

in terms of increased foreign inspections leaves open risks that may arise in between foreign inspections (even if conducted every 2–3 years) or in the product supply chain (e.g., product counterfeiting, commingling, or tampering). Further, as FDA 

will never cross enough foreign thresholds to enable the Agency to apply inspection 

data on all imported drug shipments—more than just additional resources for foreign inspections is needed. 

Shortly after September 11, 2001, FDA’s Leadership Council established an Import Strategic Plan Steering Committee. By spring 2003 the Import Strategic Plan 

was virtually complete. FDA developed the ISP from the contributions of more than 

one hundred Agency experts in all product Centers, field and headquarters components, laboratories, international programs staff, the General Counsel’s Office and 

the Office of Policy, Planning and Legislation. 

The ISP’s principles were simple but far reaching: Push the current FDA import 

evaluation process from the extremely limited border transaction to a life-cycle process, which: • Intentionally gleans information from all points along an article’s supply chain; 

• Assesses that information based upon FDA requirements and risk of harm; 

• Delivers the assessment to border inspectors, compliance officers, and electronic 

screening systems for reliable targeting decisions; and • Results in the facilitation of safe products and enforcement against products that 

are unsafe. 

The significance of the ISP and its proposed action items rests in what it represents: an internal agency demand for a dramatic shift in thinking about the identification, assessment and mitigation of risks in the international supply chain. 

125 

Many of the ISP proposals are indeed costly. However, many could have been implemented nearly immediately and would have begun the process of increasing FDA’s 

import efficiency and effectiveness using existing resources. It is this shift in thinking that FDA’s middle and upper management seems to continue to resist. I believe 

that all involved in the ISP process recognized the import problems—even in 2003- 

are complex and cannot be solved with FDA’s traditional regulatory approaches and 

philosophy. 

B. SOME PROPOSED CHANGES GOING FORWARD

First, any action by this Subcommittee should include a significant resource investment targeted directly for reengineering FDA’s stove-piped IT systems. IT improvements recommended in the ISP are a contingency for executing any serious 

risk-targeting strategies for foreign inspections and import interdiction of unsafe 

drugs. This investment, however, cannot be targeted solely at drugs and devices, for 

the same operational systems must manage the other 90% of imported shipments 

and the inspection of other products. The IT fix must either be across all Centers 

and ORA or it must occur at the Department level to leave open the option of breaking food regulation out of FDA and combining it with other food regulators into a 

Food Safety Administration as a sister to the remaining Drug & Device Agency. 

Second, I recommend the establishment within FDA of an organization reporting 

to the Commissioner with the mission of focusing on enhancing the safety of imported products—all products. I continue to believe fixing FDA’s import and foreign 

inspection problem requires it be broken free from the domestic programs, which 

produce much of the bureaucratic inertia against change in this area. A new organization would enable proper staffing, allocation of human resources at ports of entry, 

management and implementation of ISP-based strategies. It should be responsible 

for all import and international focused work-planning activities; conducting facility 

inspections of foreign processors and importers; overseeing and conducting border 

operations; conducting foreign government and industry assessments and training; 

and support trade negotiations in a manner to enhance safety of imported products. 

To accomplish this, the new organization should be directly funded, rather than receiving its funding through the product Centers. A basic persistent infrastructure 

to manage risks associated with all imported commodities must be maintained regardless of year-to-year changes that may appropriately occur in program directions. 

Third, section 302(b) of the Bioterrorism Act, which enables FDA to implement 

risk-based strategies for managing food imports, should be expanded to cover all 

other FDA-regulated products including drugs. This would clarify FDA’s authority 

to facilitate the importation of drugs that are in compliance with FDA requirements 

and pave the way for distinguishing between and among shipments based upon 

verifiable risk data. 

Fourth, FDA should be required to inspect foreign drug facilities (at least those 

that fall into categories FDA admits should be inspected on a regular basis) at the 

same frequency as domestic facilities. 

Fifth, FDA should work with Customs to adopt a uniform numerical identification 

system to begin the process of regulating its industries using an account-based system. This would enable FDA to integrate its numerous and disparate background 

data systems and to interrelate the data it receives from Customs and other government agencies. 

Sixth, FDA should publish and begin implementing the ISP in accordance with 

the plan’s guiding principles, goals, and themes. 

Seventh, FDA should begin developing programs for obtaining as much information as can be obtained from as many reliable sources as the Agency can find regarding the cGMP compliance status and supply chain security programs of foreign 

drug facilities that are not inspected by FDA. This population of drug manufacturers will always exist, and simply saying it represents too many companies for oversight or too much data to digest is no answer at all. Additional risk data could come 

in the form of third party inspection and certification companies, accompanied by 

a robust auditing process on both sides of the border, by foreign inspectorates, or 

by other U.S. Government Agency inspections and information. All such data should 

be connected to the firm’s unique identifier and incorporated into the account data 

to permit its assessment in light of other legacy and other agency data. I continue 

to hold to the view that obtaining and assessing all available risk data better enables FDA to (a) target its foreign and domestic inspections; (b) interdict and examine high-risk imported drug shipments (related to product safety); (c) follow up in 

the domestic market those shipments that proceeded through the border with inadequate inspections; and (d) facilitate imported drug shipments that are likely to 

have been manufactured in accordance with FDA’s cGMP requirements. This would 

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permit the Agency to focus its most earnest import inspection and examination efforts on shipments representing known and unknown risks. 

Eighth, FDA requires additional resources to conduct more foreign inspections 

and import examinations and to develop and publish meaningful Agency guidance 

relating to identifying and managing risks in the full life cycle of imported products. 

Ninth, FDA should rely on Customs and Border Protection and the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) to manage security risks associated with FDA regulated imports. DHS’ security programs should be expanded to incorporate product 

security risks (such as product counterfeiting and tampering) rather than focusing 

solely upon the security of in-transit cargo or inbound containers. 

* * * 

I thank the Subcommittee Chair and Members for the opportunity to discuss 

these important issues and I look forward to answering any questions. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, and thank you to everyone for your testimony today. 

Mr. Hubbard, Mr. Nielsen, Mr. England, I believe you were here 

when the Commissioner testified. What would each of you—if you 

would just give me quick—what would you each do if you were the 

Commissioner? How would you come to address this issue? Give me 

the top 3 things you would do, starting with you, Mr. Hubbard. 

Mr. HUBBARD. First you have got to know who is making our 

drugs and sending them to us. So you need registration. And I 

think you’ve mentioned that. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. A foreign vendor registration we were talking 

about. 

Mr. HUBBARD. Everyone that is in the supply chain, all the way 

back to the pig—the pig farmer and his heparin. So at least we 

know who they are and where they are. That is, I think, number 

one. Second, you need to get over there and look at all the facilities 

and see what you find. Because we don’t know now because we 

don’t go there. And, thirdly, as I think these gentlemen have mentioned, you have got to have some sort of IT system to track it. 

And there are many more things you need to do, but I would put 

those 3 things as sort of the sequential first things to do to begin 

to get a grip on this problem. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Nielsen. 

Dr. NIELSEN. I do believe—I do believe IT has to be the first 

item, and there has to be funding. It is for the center. It is for the 

ORA. Coupled with that, I would say number two is functional organizational structure to deal with the issues at hand; and I do 

concur with what Ben said, that there does need to be a separate 

entity. 

I also recommended that, in my written statement, that the foreign inspection oversight, the border operations, and oversight of 

the importers are all extremely related as far as risk; and I do believe a formation of an organization with the responsibility and 

funded and empowered will provide solutions that will work. And 

certainly funding is still a big issue, but the funding needs to be 

attached to very specific events with articulated outcomes or expected outcomes. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. England. 

Mr. ENGLAND. I think there are two levels. One is, what do you 

do in the instant event; and I think that the FDA is doing probably 

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the best they can in trying to figure out where this product came 

from. 

Mr. STUPAK [continuing]. Heparin you mean? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Yes, right. The specific heparin situation. I disagree entirely with the theory that the inspection couldn’t have had 

a significant impact in preventing this. I mean, I think if we keep 

in mind that the inspection that we have now seen the 483 for occurred after the adverse events, and we still saw the conditions we 

saw. If FDA had been there prior to the adverse events during a 

pre-approval inspection, I’m inclined to believe that they would 

have seen a facility in even worse condition, in which case they 

would not have been in a position to be a source for this product. 

Mr. STUPAK. Hang on. OK. 

Mr. ENGLAND. So I think—I think that the foreign inspection 

component is absolutely critical, and it has been for years. I also 

think that because of the mandate that FDA has to inspect the domestic industry every 2 years, you end up—I think FDA ends up 

trying to reach that mandate to the exclusion of the foreign market 

where it doesn’t have the mandate and that it tries to do the best 

it can. 

Most of the foreign inspections, in reaction to the idea that, well, 

even some foreign inspections were conducted and yet there was 

still contaminated product that came from perhaps those facilities, 

those inspections were probably 2-day pre-approval inspections. 

The inspection we just saw at this facility regarding heparin was 

probably a 5-day, I believe, inspection, far more deep. In the United 

States, that would have been a 10- to 12- to 16-day inspection. 

Maybe that is not necessary to find the appearance of a violation 

and prevent that product to come in, but I would agree that a 2- 

day inspection may not be able to produce this or to be able to find 

these kinds of problems. So I think inspections. 

But if you don’t have the IT, it really doesn’t matter what you 

do. You can’t put together a risk-based program. I mean, even Customs work, the integration with international trade data systems, 

the FDA still has to have data to bounce that data against. And 

without integration on the FDA side, you can go one place to get 

the data, but you can’t really do much with it anyway. 

Mr. STUPAK. We are going to have a hearing next week, actually, 

next Tuesday, on heparin. 

I don’t mean to belabor the heparin point, but, Mr. England, you 

brought up—and I think Mr. Melancon brought up, too—it is our 

understanding that this plant was never inspected, but Baxter did 

inspect it. Where is the corporate responsibility here or why would 

Baxter inspect it and we still have all these problems that were 

highlighted in the document that you indicated with the FDA inspection? 

I mean, if we had had—if the FDA did inspections, would that 

also pressure Baxter then in this case to make sure that what they 

are doing as inspections are robust and complete and safe for the 

American people? 

Mr. ENGLAND. First, I don’t want to get into a liability question, 

because I just don’t. I have not seen any of the documents on those 

inspections. I have no idea what the scope of the Baxter review 

was. 

128 

Mr. STUPAK. It is called response—— 

Mr. ENGLAND. I mean, the importer of a product has responsibility to ensure that the product they are importing is in compliance with U.S. law. In the case of an API, that means that they 

should have some—they should be able to make some assertions as 

far as the product having been manufactured in compliance with 

GMPs. That is from the Federal perspective. 

Mr. STUPAK. If the government system broke down here because 

it was never in fact inspected and if the private company that is 

making the profit here broke down, the American people are truly 

just at risk then. I mean, there is nothing we can do other than 

a re-overhaul of the FDA. 

Mr. ENGLAND. I believe—I believe that that is not an overstatement. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Nielsen, you’re trying to jump in there. 

Dr. NIELSEN. And coupled with that, as far as responsibility is, 

I do think there has to be a reevaluation of the good manufacturing 

and practice regulations. It is not a new topic for the Agency, for 

a rewrite of the drug GMPs. 

Mr. STUPAK. Any idea last time that was rewritten, Mr. Hubbard? 

Mr. HUBBARD. 2003. They are relatively new, but they’re very 

general. They don’t really deal with some of the problems that 

arise here. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Dr. Crosse, we’re focusing quite a bit on IT 

here with these questions I was asking. But yet on page 12 of your 

testimony you talk about the Foreign Vendor Registration 

Verification Program, and I was pressing the Commissioner to try 

to give us some kind of idea on when it is going to happen. And, 

in your testimony, FDA currently plans to award this contract of 

May ’08, but yet you cite for an example the Agency has not yet 

established the criteria it would use to determine which establishments would be visited for verification purposes to determine how 

many establishments it would verify annually. Does it look like one 

of these things where the FDA is going to award a contract but yet 

not have the criteria before we even have the contract? 

Dr. CROSSE. It is not clear to us. This is something that is very 

new, and it was difficult for us to get very much information about 

it. Our understanding yesterday, after we submitted this statement, is now that it has been pushed off to June but that they do 

still intend to move forward in trying to establish some program. 

It is not clear to us what exactly is going to be done under this 

contract, whether they are going to perform onsite inspections of a 

certain proportion of facilities, how they are going to select those 

facilities, what is going to be involved in the verification, what information they’re going to get beyond just is there a building there 

and do they manufacture drugs. It is really unclear at this point, 

and we were not able to get very many specifics from FDA about 

it. 

Mr. STUPAK. And I think Mr. Nielsen or Mr. England mentioned 

the Shared Establishment Data Service. That all would have to be 

dovetailed into this, also, would it not? FDA needs to know about 

it, but Customs needs to know what is coming in and—what’s coming in. Could you probably get the information quicker by going to 

129 

Customs? Because at least they know what is coming into this 

country. 

Dr. CROSSE. It is not clear how this backtracks to a particular 

facility that is manufacturing a drug. The information that is coming in from Customs is again—sometimes they have difficulty linking back in that way. And as I said in my statement, there is not 

yet agreement that this SEDs system, the unique identifier that 

would be used with Customs, is going to move forward, because it 

requires the agreement of a large number of Federal agencies, and 

they all have to fund the changes to their systems to make this 

work. 

Mr. STUPAK. My time is running out, and I think we’ll probably 

go a second round, because I enjoy this panel, and you have good 

suggestions. 

But, Dr. Cassell, if I may, on page 56 of the Science Board report 

there is a recommendation—and I pressed the FDA last time and 

never got a commitment. So let me ask it this way. There is a recommendation that the FDA develop a comprehensive plan that includes how and when the Agency would respond to the recommendation. 

Has anyone from the FDA, after you submitted a report, got back 

with the Science Board and said, here is what we’re trying to do. 

Help us implement. Here are our recommendations to implement— 

I mean, you gave them a blueprint on how to fix things. Have they 

worked with you to try to get it implemented or say here is our priorities? What happened after you submitted your report? 

Dr. CASSELL. To my knowledge, they have not gotten back to the 

Science Board. I’m only one member of the Science Board. They 

could have talked to others to share with us specifically how they 

would propose to implement their recommendations. 

I’m aware, however, they have begun the review of ORA and 

NCTR that we have recommended, and I am aware that a chief scientist has been appointed, although that was not in relationship to 

our recommendation but, rather, it seems the PADUFA legislation 

that also recommended the chief scientific officer. 

Outside of those three things, I’m not aware of other activities 

that are ongoing. 

Mr. STUPAK. And as the chair of the Science Board, your Science 

Board members are available to help the FDA implement these recommendations, are they not? 

Dr. CASSELL. Well, I’m not a chair of the Science Board, but, 

rather, I was chair of the subcommittee that conducted the review. 

But just, still, a member of the Science Board. But the Science 

Board clearly is eager to help in any way. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Shimkus for questions. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I, too, want to commend the chairman for the hearing and this 

panel in particular. 

This has been held up maybe before. This is the hearing record 

from the 105th Congress, which is my first Congress, Volume III, 

11 years ago. Far be it from us 11 years from now when someone 

goes through and holds this up that we haven’t done this. 

I liken this to—one of my other responsibilities was telecommunications and interoperability for first-line responders. We 

130 

have had Katrina. We’ve had September 11th. We’re still—yes, we 

are still struggling, and we’re trying to move. But, you know, people’s lives are at risk, and so I—you all have been a great panel. 

If everybody was living by the golden rule or the second table of 

the law and loving their neighbor and not wanting to steal, we 

wouldn’t have this problem. But we live in a sinful world, so—but 

the folks that are producing illicit drugs to enter our consumer 

market, we ought to identify them. They ought to be punished to 

the full extent. Why can’t we just say, you don’t comply with our 

inspection regime, you don’t sell in our country? 

Mr. HUBBARD. Well, that is one of the things that I think is mentioned in Chairman Dingell’s bill. The concept is, for both food and 

drugs, is if someone can’t show that they are meeting our standards, they ought not to be sending us food, and the FDA ought to 

have the ability to say, did this company demonstrate that it met 

the standards? And if the answer is no, it doesn’t come in. And 

then you’ve shifted the burden from FDA to find the problem back 

to the producer to show he is doing a good show. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Yes, I’m not a big—I’m not well received by the 

trial lawyers, but I’m thinking if they had some good ones in 

China, we may not have this problem sometimes because they 

would be going after these firms that are illicitly putting other elements in these drugs and taking advantage. 

There are a couple parts of the testimony that we found compelling and—talk about. One of the questions this deals with, if we 

don’t have institutional reform in the FDA and we just give them 

more money, what would be the result, do you think, Mr. Nielsen? 

Dr. NIELSEN. Probably a little more of the same. Until there is 

a real change in direction in how resources are allocated, how priorities are selected—for example, I don’t think it is just an issue 

of getting more resources, but there has to be a hard look as to how 

existing resources are also used. Even if the entire domestic industry is being inspected at the total expense of lack of oversight of 

the foreign supply just does not make sense. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Mr. England, do you want to chime in? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Yes. I think that to a certain extent—I can give 

you just a couple of examples. I wish I brought slides with me. 

Because if you look at the organizational structure of the FDA— 

you know, when the act was established in 1906, nobody imported 

anything in here. So the imports regime was set up under a curtain 

context which doesn’t exist anymore. 

And similarly, as time went on to the 1900s, there was some 

functionality in FDA for managing import issues. But most of what 

was coming in was bulk ingredients that was for further manufacturing. In those circumstances, FDA would ensure that there was 

inspection and quarantining that was happening on the domestic 

side and that they were properly qualifying—properly qualifying 

the vendors. So they’d use the domestic inspection. 

Now we have a whole lot less of that. Now, in the drug industry, 

it is actually still very much like that, which is an example, for instance, with heparin, which is why you still have to do inspections 

of those bulk facilities. 

But—so now you’ve got—you’ve got a situation where FDA has 

a division of import operations and policy that Carl was the direcVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:46 Oct 05, 2009 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00134 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\110-107 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
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tor over, and he is responsible for managing OASIS, the IT system. 

He has absolutely no authority over anybody in the field. He cannot tell them to do anything. So he can have all the great ideas 

in the world to fix a situation, but he lacks the power to make FDA 

move. 

And those are the kinds of organizational structures that exist. 

It is an appendage. It is an appendage. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Let me follow up, because you all sat in to hear 

the Commissioner and his testimony, and my opening statements 

talked about how well-intentioned individuals go into the bureaucracy trying to slay the dragon and really walk away not being able 

to do so. I think there are more examples of that occurring than 

really transforming. Because some of the terminology—we talked 

about stovepipe and silos. I mean—and in my opening statement, 

a comment was if you were to just rebuild, I mean, stop and restart 

the process, how would we go about getting to that area of where 

we need to be? 

So the question is, based upon listening to the Commissioner, did 

you get a feeling that there was an understanding of the transformational nature, that the FDA has to change, or did you get a 

feeling—I think the frustration is that it is not a 100 percent commitment. 

Mr. England? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Yes. I don’t want to characterize the commitment 

level. I think, though, however, that part of it is that we are at a 

stage I think now where the Agency is saying what a number of 

us have been saying for literally a decade as far as this risk and 

these kinds of things that are out there. And they are starting to 

say it. But I also think that FDA has lost a fair number of people 

who actually would have known how to do it. So they are in some 

ways a little bit perplexed as to what the steps ought to be. 

Also—I also feel that they feel pressure from Congress and from 

this committee and other committees perhaps that they should be 

doing certain things because it was mandated, even if maybe those 

aren’t the best things to be doing. So I think they are a little bit 

between a rock and a hard place. 

But I also would add that it does take more—we are way beyond 

strategy, way beyond planning, that the Agency should be assessing, OK, what can we not do right now in order to do these things 

that are priority and start this shift. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Part of stovepipe—and this may be just a couple 

of panelists. It is not directed to anybody. Whoever wants to chime 

in. Address the frequency debate both—obviously, we can’t talk 

about frequency if we’re not inspecting overseas. If we were, what 

would be the frequency there versus the frequency here? 

You’re talking about—Mr. England just mentioned mandated 

things that we have to do and may be—and my previous with the 

Commissioner talking about, you know, if a manufacturing facility 

has a 10-year record of being inspected every year with zero defects, shouldn’t we consider frequency evaluation in that venue? 

Anyone want to chime in real quick? Mr. Hubbard. 

Mr. HUBBARD. Well, I think as a start you do need the same frequency. But I think Commissioner von Eschenbach was correct in 

that, over time, you do want to move towards a risk-based system. 

132 

If you’ve got a facility, as you say, that has been doing very well 

and makes a relatively low-risk drug, then maybe that gets a pass 

every 2 years; and someone who is not doing a good job or makes 

a high-risk drug gets inspected every year. 

But they can’t even begin that shift without resources, in my 

view. They would have to strip inspectors out of domestic inspections to fund anything foreign at this point, And then we could see 

the deterioration of our domestic drugs. So it is kind of—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. I want to tie into the flexibility of domestic inspectors. I understand that. We get that there needs to be more resources but also the flexibility of being able to move an inspection 

regime and the frequency debate with international concerns. 

Mr. HUBBARD. Well, that raises a whole other issue. Because 

they are having difficulty finding enough people willing to go to 

these countries. I think the Agency would like to create a foreign 

inspectorate of people that are hired for that purpose, posted in 

these countries and in sufficient numbers to do the coverage. And 

I think that is a good idea personally. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Go ahead, Mr. Nielsen. 

Dr. NIELSEN. I would also say that that is another scenario 

where the integrated IT function is critical. You can gather all of 

this information, but you just as well not have it if you can’t get 

access to it. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. That’s right. And I wanted to move—Mr. England, 

I just want clarification, and I think it ties in with IT. You propose 

what is called the accounting system approach. Can you just again 

for the—elaborate just for someone who is simple-minded, how is 

that a change? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Yes. An account-based system, an account-based 

approach, as opposed to a transactional approach. Right now, if you 

look at the way FDA manages its import program, for instance, everything is on a line-by-line basis. Now, sometimes they will make 

some decisions based upon history of a processor. For instance, I 

would presume, based upon the warning letter, that this manufacturer of heparin is now on an import alert. Now, whether that 

works or not is a completely different question, because I think the 

import alerts don’t work anyway in far too many cases. But, ordinarily, the Agency is doing transaction by transaction; and the inspector or the evaluator is trying to figure out whether to let this 

one in rather than—for instance, on a registration basis, someone 

registers, they—if there is a user fee, there is a user fee. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Do you think the FDA can do that now? Does it 

need legislative authority? Can they—can that be part of the 

change in dynamics? 

Mr. ENGLAND. I think they could do it now. I would be surprised 

if they didn’t have the authority to move to that system. They probably don’t have the resources to do the IT piece of it, but I don’t 

see an authority problem with it. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired. 

I appreciate your—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Melancon for questions. 

Mr. MELANCON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Hubbard, has there been—and I have only been here in the 

Congress for 3 years now. Has there been a period in time someVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:46 Oct 05, 2009 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00136 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\110-107 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
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where where, appropriation-wise, the Department was given some 

monies because of the concern with inspectors, that money was 

taken and then used other places? I have heard rumors of that, and 

I don’t know if—— 

Mr. HUBBARD. Well, the best example is, after 9/11, HSS Secretary Thompson was very concerned about foreign products in 

general from a bioterrorism point of view, and with a lot of 

pushback from the White House, he demanded the hiring of new 

inspectors for the ports. And FDA very rapidly hired 650 new inspectors in 2003, hired them in a matter of weeks and trained 

them and had them going very quickly. The subsequent budget 

cuts, though, took away all those inspectors; and now they are actually back with fewer than they had before 9/11. So all those 650 

folks are gone. 

Mr. MELANCON. And they were just—instead of maybe trying to 

keep them on and then retraining them for foreign—— 

Mr. HUBBARD. There was no money to pay them. So they—it 

really wasn’t that people were fired. It was an attrition. As inspectors retired or left, they couldn’t—so they just disappeared over 

about 4 or 5 years. 

Mr. MELANCON. Now, that was—I wasn’t sure what the scenario 

was. I just heard that there were fewer people than there were at 

certain periods as of 9/11. 

You mentioned in your testimony that China had been associated 

with a number of problems related to counterfeiting and tainted exports. Should the FDA consider treating the country’s products, 

particularly in areas we have seen problems such as drug exports, 

different than other countries who have not advanced—who have 

more advanced regulatory systems, i.e., should we be focusing on 

China specifically? 

Mr. HUBBARD. I certainly think that less-developed countries 

need inspection, at least an initial inspection. 

One concept that we looked at a few years ago was to say that 

if a country or given product from a country was repeatedly problematic then that would trigger a greater degree of regulation so 

that that country would then have to come to the FDA and say we 

fixed whatever problem you found; future shipments to the United 

States will meet your standards and demonstrate that. And that 

would mean that countries that don’t have a problem, that don’t 

send bad products wouldn’t have to do anything different. But 

countries with a problem, they would have to step up. 

Personally, I think that concept is one that could be valid. But 

I think it is partly met by Chairman Dingell’s bill through the certification concept. 

Mr. MELANCON. So the tainted food, the toothpaste, the fish, 

what have we done? Have we just slapped their wrist and moved 

on? 

Mr. HUBBARD. The way the law works now is FDA has to catch 

each shipment, find the problem and say you can’t come in. Since 

they only inspect 6/10ths of 1 percent, very little gets caught. So 

you need to shift it the other way and say they need—the ones that 

are caught, they need to do something more. Because you know it 

is just going to keep on happening until they fix the problem. 

134 

Mr. MELANCON. In other words, if you start embargoing those 

products that have problems, then either the people that are importing or the people that exporting would start having a concern? 

Mr. HUBBARD. That is exactly right. You need to put that burden 

back on them so it costs them money to keep sending bad food or 

bad drugs to us. Right now, it is just a cost of doing business because FDA catches so little. 

Mr. MELANCON. Yes. Go ahead, Mr. England. 

Mr. ENGLAND. If I could, just briefly. And I agree with those 

ideas in concept. The problem with it if we only go that direction 

is that you’re right back to a transactional mode because you’ve got 

to figure out as those goods come to the United States which ones 

are the ones that are subject to the ban. You’re still in that—which 

is still an IT issue, A. 

And, B, it seems to me that if the FDA were to be able to do 

more foreign inspections, they would be able to better distinguish 

segments of industries and segments of—or kinds of industries in 

contrast to others and actually incentivize, for instance, in China, 

industries that are doing it right in order to create examples even 

in China. 

And I think that is a kind of a policy that encourages a holding 

up of those that are meeting our standards rather than just trying 

to catch—I think we’re still trying to catch them at the border, and 

I don’t think it is going to be as effective. 

Mr. HUBBARD. I agree with that. I don’t think what I said—I 

think you need both, you know. 

Dr. NIELSEN. And just a little clarity. The way the law is written 

right now for the admissibility—Bill had said it is up to the Agency 

to find the problem. It is not like USDA where there is an existing 

permit requirement that affirms compliance. And one of the possibilities with an account base is to be able to link. In order to establish an account is to have an affirmative process for that compliance. 

Mr. MELANCON. Is it your opinion in having similar problems or 

countries within the union like we’re having with imports coming 

in that are tainted? 

Mr. HUBBARD. Well, certainly they have had a problem with heparin. Germany has already had several deaths. And just today I 

understand Spain has announced heparin adverse reactions. So it 

can go anywhere. And, as the FDA said yesterday, there are about 

a dozen countries that have gotten contaminated heparin. 

Dr. CROSSE. I would just add also that the EU doesn’t do as 

many inspections of the active pharmaceutical ingredients, the API 

manufacturers like the facility in China. So they are less likely to 

be doing those inspections. 

I would also point out it is not a simple matter to just say this 

country’s products that are coming to the U.S. could be problematic, because those products go other places and then come to the 

U.S. For example, China ships many products to the EU to be incorporated in finished products that are manufactured there and 

then come to the U.S. So the chain can go many directions. 

Mr. MELANCON. And, of course, I deal with shrimp because I’m 

from south Louisiana. I understand that most of the shrimp that 

are aquaculture-type shrimp or—that might be sent to the EU, get 

135 

discovered to be bad and where do they end up? They end up here, 

I believe, if I’m not mistaken. So our own FDA isn’t protecting us 

on that foodstuff. 

Mr. England, Mr. Hubbard and Mr. Nielsen, shouldn’t we require 

a hefty registration fee for those foreign establishments to ensure 

that if a firm is going to register at the FDA they are serious about 

exporting to the U.S. market? Would that help clean up the foreign 

drug inspection database? 

Dr. NIELSEN. I think it can help, but I believe what is more important is the link with the registration process, a requirement to 

provide affirmative information that they can make the product in 

conformance with FDA requirements. Even if they didn’t ship but 

they provided information that if they did ship, it could be significant information. Even if they are distributing somewhere else on 

the globe but they ultimately intend to be here, there could be 

some utility. But the bottom line is we need much more information than just who they are. We need to know what the conditions 

are, can they make a safe product. 

Mr. MELANCON. And that is kind of one—the point is, what do 

we do to make them know up front that we are going to be checking or that we want—we are going to be on top of it? I mean, is 

there any specific recommendation? 

Dr. NIELSEN. I would modify the registration process. The current registration process—and, as Bennett said, establish a universal process for all of the commodities. But that process was just 

totally inadequate. It is not just an IT issue. You and I can register 

right now. OK? No problem. 

Mr. MELANCON. What does it cost me? 

Dr. NIELSEN. Nothing. You can go online and do it. 

Mr. MELANCON. Fill out the form? 

Dr. NIELSEN. That’s right. But the bottom line—that is just very 

cursory information. To make real risk-management decisions, you 

need to know something about the operation. Are they capable, 

even if it is the basics. And I think the registration process should 

be more of a submission of more information or develop some kind 

of process that will be recognized by the Agency as verifying that 

this place does exist, that it does have potable water, et cetera, 

whatever the infrastructure is required for safety. 

Mr. MELANCON. Is there anywhere in this process bond that are 

required of any of these folks that register or do importing into this 

country? I.e., if I’m an insurance company and I’m going to write 

a bond for you, I want to know damn well that what you are shipping in that country I’m not going to have to pay off on that. Do 

we require anything such as that? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Not for registration. There is a bond for every importation. It is a basic importer’s bond, and it is usually for FDA 

purposes, FDA products, three times the invoice value. So—— 

Mr. MELANCON. So how—OK. It is three times the invoice value 

of that one shipment. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Right. 

Mr. MELANCON. But if we don’t have the authority to go embargo 

every other pile that is coming in—— 

Mr. ENGLAND. Well, I mean, at this point, they have the authority to detain without physical examination any shipment. And 

136 

that’s where you get to the—for instance, the countrywide import 

alerts that we have for the wheat gluten and the soy proteins and 

aquaculture coming out of China. Those are countrywide import 

alerts. And the Agency does them now. 

I think part of the question—I mean, the question about whether 

the Agency has the authority to refuse has to do with whether or 

not if someone delayed or denied an inspection in a foreign facility, 

then FDA could automatically put them up into an automatic detention and stop their products. But FDA has the authority to do 

that now. 

I think the reason it is not doing them is that—Carl hired the 

guy who is running policy at DIOP now. They have 5 people, I 

think. I mean, the people who are responsible for OASIS and responsible for reviewing import alerts, there are 5 people doing it, 

and we are talking about 17 million lines of entry that these folks 

are responsible for. 

That goes to resources. It goes to IT. It also goes to theory and 

policy and where you put the resources. And I don’t think many 

people are really thinking about it inside the Agency, because 

they’re just trying to do what they have always been doing and 

that is what—that’s why I believe the series of events are really 

just beginning, that we are going to see a series of these from a 

number of different sources. 

Mr. MELANCON. Thank you. My time is up and this—Mr. Chairman. Go ahead. 

Mr. STUPAK. Go ahead, Doctor. Do you want to answer this question? 

Dr. CASSELL. Yes. I would just like to say that, to me, it all goes 

back not only to the resources and priority setting but people and 

the quality of individuals now, that we don’t have good people 

there. 

We mentioned in our report the importance of constant external 

peer review that would identify these problems, make an argument 

for correcting them, stay on top of them before we have an emergency. ORA, for example, we identified had never had an external 

peer review. So this review that is ongoing right now, it is the first 

time to our knowledge that has ever occurred. I think a lot of these 

problems would not have occurred had those processes been in 

place. 

I just wanted to bring to the attention of everybody that I think 

that the issue of personnel is critical—getting the right people, recruiting them, retaining them, whether it be the scientists or information technology specialists, which they seem to have a hard time 

recruiting, are absolutely critical to everything we are talking 

about today. 

Mr. ENGLAND. I would like to follow up, if I could, please. 

I agree absolutely, entirely. When I say resources, I mean humans as well, human resources. And I’m going to give you just an 

example. 

When the Office of Criminal Investigations came online in 1992, 

I went into OCI. I was one of the early agents that came out of 

FDA and into OCI. And OCI was responsible from really that point 

forward in conducting criminal investigations and conducting investigations that where there is some suspicion of fraud—CSOs, 

137 

the Consumer Safety Office, or the inspectors, they only started 

losing those skills. 

I mean, many folks that used to do the investigations were conducted by the regular inspectors. And now, once you had a criminal 

enforcement arm, they began to—the inspectors began to just have 

to check boxes off. And they—and I think that there was a training—some training that was lost. I think there was some intelligence that was lost. Not that they are not intelligent, but as far 

as institutional knowledge about how to think through these situations like the drug investigations where just a keen investigator 

knew how to do investigations and he was an inspector and he put 

2 and 3 together, came up with the number 5, pulled in people, got 

resources. And at one point we had 10, 12 grand juries running. 

And so it can be done. 

But I think that that part goes to the organizational aspect of it. 

These inspectors can do it with the tools. If they have the tools and 

they have the training and they have the time to be in the facilities, they can do it. 

Mr. STUPAK. We would have a second round of questions, but go 

back to OCI. On Ketek, the OCIs were doing their job, and they 

were asked to do their investigation, and they were denied the opportunity. And they got frustrated and basically are leaving the 

Agency because they’re not allowed to do their work in some cases. 

It is more of a structural thing. 

And we were talking of issues of mandates that the FDA—we— 

this committee or our Energy and Commerce Committee, we don’t 

mean to micromanage the FDA on—mandate lots of programs. But 

without quality of leadership at the top of the FDA, we must resort 

to mandates as a trigger or a triage or emergency patch to correct 

some of these most pressing issues. 

And that’s why I was pressing the Commissioner today on BPA 

or on discussion draft of the legislation we have floating. Because 

we want to move that quickly to try to give them the resources 

they need to do their job and to help reconfigure the FDA so we 

can get at this issue, which is getting to be a growing problem. 

Along those lines, on our legislation, Mr. Hubbard has mentioned—and a couple of the others have mentioned it—if you have 

some suggestions on things we should improve upon in that draft, 

we are moving on that bill fairly quickly. So if you have anything 

further, please get with us. 

Dr. Cassell, you indicated new drugs, new biologics, the genome, 

that active pharmaceutical ingredients, other things we were going 

to be relying upon, given the multitude of additional foreign 

firms—and you’re going to see places like Thailand, Vietnam and 

Malaysia are expected to start making drugs and will likely export 

to the U.S. If we’re grappling with a problem right now and all 

these other countries come on line and new medical discoveries 

come online, how are we ever going to be able to keep ahead of the 

curve? 

Dr. CASSELL. Oh, I agree. I think in some respects it is almost 

mind-boggling when you think about the degree of the complexity 

of the products increasing and especially in terms of safety issues 

as it relates to biologics. They are not as easily manufactured as 

you—we all know and appreciate as small molecules. So I think, 

138 

again, it goes back to assuring that we have the latest scientific 

evidence for the decisions that would be made, the best people 

making those decisions, the technologies in place to improve upon 

our inspections. 

We mentioned in our testimony, I think, in some of the discussion on the 29th of January that the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security has invested millions of dollars in 

their information technology for doing datamining in a lot of different topics, particularly as it relates to biological weapons, and 

they have also developed very sophisticated methodologies for detection in the field of both chemicals and biologicals. These same 

methodologies could be applied, I believe, to inspection in terms of 

quality control as far as potential chemical and biological contamination of our products. 

I don’t know to what extent the FDA has tried to leverage those 

technologies and apply them or bring them on line, but I think we 

have to begin to apply newer, better technology as well as just be 

sure that the individuals that are performing these functions are 

up to date in terms of what new science is available to help resolve 

the problems. 

Mr. STUPAK. In the last panel, we talked a little bit about this 

heparin and the altered drug, and I think Mr. Burgess brought up 

the fact that it could have been for a criminal or a deviant mind. 

But whether it is melamine or heparin, I don’t think we see that. 

Is it really economic pressures putting pressure on to find a 

cheaper substitute? As in melamine, you know, it was supposed to 

be high protein, but it ended up—why would you alter a drug? 

Does anyone care to speculate on that? I’m sure it is just not criminal. I mean—— 

Mr. HUBBARD. You have very good chemists over there. And the 

best example is pharmaceutical grade glycerin is fairly pricey, and 

antifreeze you can get down at the dollar store. So, you know, it 

tastes the same; it looks the same. It is just one will kill you, and 

one is perfectly safe. And, you know, people just don’t care about 

where it ends up going. And, of course, a lot of children in Haiti 

and Panama and other countries die because someone didn’t care. 

Mr. ENGLAND. I think also, if I could quickly, that my understanding was that there was a problem with some of the—— 

Mr. STUPAK. The pig intestines. The pig stock, right. 

Mr. ENGLAND. So they were running into a capacity problem. So 

it wouldn’t surprise me that, under that pressure, that there was 

some intent to find something to put it in there. 

I’ll point out, just quickly, the APIs that FDA approved—and everything goes into a source inspection and finds an API facility to 

be fined, the value of their product on the world market doubles 

overnight. So, right now, you’ve got the incentive, you’ve got cushion between guys who are—people who are not approved and people who are. And it is a lot cheaper sometimes to buy the product 

than it is to make it. 

Mr. STUPAK. So instead of using the pig intestines and heparin 

and I use something else, do I have to get FDA approval to make 

heparin in this manner and method or can I just say, oh, no, this 

is OK because the end result is still heparin? 

139 

Mr. HUBBARD. You’re supposed to get approval. But, believe me, 

you can get it for that. 

Mr. STUPAK. Is that common? I mean, we make substitutions to 

a formula that we use? 

Mr. HUBBARD. You can’t do that. You have to at least—it depends on the severity of the change. If it is a very great change, 

you have to get FDA approval. If it is a minor change, you have 

to at least tell FDA so they can object. 

Dr. NIELSEN. I mean, one of the things to keep in mind, even on 

the counterfeit APIs, like the carbamazepine, it has to pass the 

test. Even if it is nominal, it has to pass the identity test at least. 

And so it has—it is going to have to look like that or else at least 

the safeguard at the end user or the finished dose manufacturer 

will detect it. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. England, you mentioned the import alerts. In 

fact, as this panel was seated, we’ve had three import alerts just 

come out from the FDA on some foods and other issues here. You’re 

not a big fan of it. They don’t work, you said. Explain that a little 

bit further. And what should we do? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Right. I mean, what solutions perhaps there might 

be as far as them not working, I think that is an IT issue. There 

is evidence last year where products that were—that should have 

been subject to a number of different seafood a reporter rather 

quickly found 200-some-odd shipments that had gotten through the 

system and had never been tested by the FDA and had never been 

stopped, even though they were subject to the criteria. 

So when Carl was asked in the press as to whether or not that 

surprised him, of course the answer is no. I mean, there has been 

holes in that system forever. So putting up an import alert is not 

an answer. It certainly is a piece, and it certainly does put information out there. 

I think another aspect of it is that I’m not so sure that the FDA 

has the authority that it exercises sometimes in these countrywide 

alerts. So if Congress wants FDA to have that, that is something 

they may want to consider clarifying. But, in many respects, the 

import alert is supposed to be just guidance to the field, and it really ends up acting as a regulation. 

And I think that is where the Agency begins to run into some 

potential liability. They’ve been challenged a number of times, and 

I don’t think they have—I don’t think FDA has won yet when 

they’ve been challenged on an import alert as to whether it was legitimate. To fix that—those sort of problems, I think FDA—— 

In fact, Bill Hubbard, when he was in the Agency and along with 

us, we went through a process of trying to establish what we called 

a detention without physical examination rule that basically described these are the kinds of evidence the FDA might rely on to 

issue an import alert. Here is the kinds of evidence we might seek 

in order to overcome it. And at least you created a regulatory regime to manage it, and then your guidance could be your alerts 

that are just applying the reg. 

But there is a number of those kinds of situations, both IT—and 

I think also the way that the authority is structured, that the 

Agency is vulnerable, and it is not as effective. 

140 

Mr. STUPAK. Let me just—and anyone can jump in on this one. 

But, Mr. Hubbard, it is more directed at you. 

I’m not a big fan of PADUFA, where you have a user fee that 

gets your drugs approved with the new drug applications. But, 

from a practical point of view, PADUFA has worked. I mean, 

you’ve given them money. The drugs are approved by such and 

such a time line. I’m not talking about the safety or efficacy of it, 

but we’ve met those timelines, given the resources. 

And I know Mr. Burgess kept bringing up the tobacco issue. 

Again, they will be given the resources. If given the resources, with 

a clearly defined mission, can the FDA—and the Dingell bill, Dingell-Pallone-Stupak bill—we have a registration fee that is probably going to be sizeable to fund this program. Can the FDA do the 

job if given the resources in a focused area as in PADUFA or tobacco regulation? Wherever there might be—as long as resources 

are there and they—can they attract the science people that we 

need to do the job in this country? 

Mr. HUBBARD. I think absolutely. I think the programs in a more 

funded FDA work well. You don’t hear the criticisms about them. 

And the programs that are not funded well are the ones that everyone is screaming about. 

The one problem with PADUFA is that it is sent to the OMB and 

the appropriators. There is a lot of new money flowing into FDA. 

So we can cut back on appropriations. And those cutbacks have occurred in places like imports and food safety, not in the drug-review programs. So it has had a negative consequence, I’m afraid, 

in that sense. 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. And in that sense, like the new money coming 

into the FDA in the last budget, that is really from MADUFA and 

PADUFA fees. There is really not that much new money to take 

care of these shortfalls, and that’s what we’ve got to guard against. But it seems like the $71 million we’ve been talking about to do 

the proper inspections is probably a small amount; and we can attract the science and the inspectors we need, provided we have a 

dedicated funding source. Because I don’t want to see an example 

like this panel has pointed out where Homeland Security had the 

650 inspectors, got them right away right after 9/11, got them 

trained and within 2 or 3 years they were all gone because there 

was not a dedicated funding source. That seems—— 

Dr. Cassell, do you want to jump in on that? 

Dr. CASSELL. I think you’re right to be concerned about that. I, 

like Mr. Hubbard, though, believe given the resources with emphasis upon the right people, not just warm bodies, I think they can 

absolutely do the job. 

The other thing that I would just encourage us all to think about 

again, though, is to encourage putting in place this external peer 

review, if you will, process. Because, to me, that would also help 

ensure accountability. And in the long run I know it is just one 

more committee for FDA to deal with. But if you look at the NIH, 

if you look at CDC now, they have these external review committees in place. The peer pressure does play an important role in 

keeping things on track. 

Mr. STUPAK. My time is up. 

Mr. Shimkus. 

141 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, I appreciate the panel. I, too, am adverse—Federal Government, we always overpromise; we underdeliver. If we set up a 

trust fund, we all dip into it. So we—I think this legislation would 

have a much better success if it was a Dingell-Pallone-Stupak-Barton deal and Shimkus. Maybe we will get there. 

Because there are a lot of things that we agree upon and, hopefully—I know the legislation is out for comment. Hopefully, our 

folks—I’m going to check with Barton and Diaz and see what they 

think of it. 

I also thought about the current—well, it’s an old series of books 

and movies: Series of Unfortunate Events. And we don’t want this 

to continue to be a series of unfortunate events. Everything does 

go back to leadership, though. I mean, I’m from the military school 

of training, and someone at the top has to drive transformational 

change. And that we are all skeptical—— 

And it goes back—it is not one—Commissioner von Eschenbach 

has only been there 21⁄2 years. Now that 21⁄2 years really makes 

substantial changes, but there was guys before him. There will be 

folks after him. There is other administrations. And we have fallen 

to a dilemma that a lot of us don’t want to see. We want to see 

it fixed. 

And I think you’ve got some great comments. You talked about— 

Chairman Stupak talked about if other countries start coming into 

the system. I wish legislatively we could stop—if you’re in a hole, 

the best way to get out of it is to stop digging. We have got new 

entries into this. Maybe that is where we start a regime. But then 

you have not being favorably inclined to—— 

Mr. England, do you want to chime in on that? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Yes, just quickly, because this actually came up 

early; and I don’t know if I forgot to answer it or left it for somebody else. 

But the question is to whether or not—what is the point about 

why are we going to China in order to try to do MRAs? Why are 

we trying—probably 50 percent—Carl probably knows the number 

better than I do—of what is imported either comes from Canada or 

Mexico or comes through Canada and Mexico. And they are right 

here. They are our NAFTA neighbors. We have access to them. We 

have ways to put together risk-based programs, and we can actually verify it. 

I mean, my feeling is that if we were to focus where we could 

apply risk-based principles and be able to have some verification, 

trust but verify, and then you take the resources and you put them 

where you really don’t have any basis to trust or verify, then I 

think you start creating incentives for countries to want to be those 

countries and they want to be like those countries. And you throw 

in the registration pieces and expenses of that and where that 

money goes I think is important. 

I think, you know, your IT money and how that is applied is a 

management decision. But when it comes to this, how you address 

China versus other places, I think we have got—we actually have 

the ability to show some leadership in markets where we have access to show it, prove it and then begin to create the incentives for 

other countries to come into it. 

142 

Mr. SHIMKUS. I want to go back to the account-based with a 

question. Have you—or anyone might—I think everybody understands the premise. Is there anything that the FDA is doing right 

now that gives you hope that they are understanding that or moving in that direction? 

Mr. ENGLAND. I would have to see what the current IT proposals 

are. My recollection of the IT proposals as I left and the ones I saw 

from November were—mostly was a portal overlaying existing systems. Which means you still have your silos. You just have them 

in one basket now. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. What—let me jump—predict that we have all been 

waiting—is that—would that—if that was taken hold of and moved, 

would that be moving in that direction? 

Mr. ENGLAND. PREDICT would require integration to be most effective. But PREDICT itself is not an integration system. What it 

does do, though, is take data from multiple sources; and it does 

think about that data using evolutionary algorithms. But it also 

uses it with rules based looking at the Agency’s historical data. So 

it is hard to go from seafood into other products without already 

having—being able to do some of that risk analysis to think about 

how you’re going to weight, you know, these different characteristics. So it will not do the integration, but I think it should be at 

the front end of their inspection program as well. I mean, I think 

it just makes the most sense. 

Mr. STUPAK. If I can jump in for just a minute. You know, I sat 

through the ’98 hearing when J.L. testified again about the IT system, and it has been 10 years. Why is IT here such a problem to 

get our hands around? It is not just FDA. It seems like IT just 

seems to be a problem that the government can’t get its hands 

around, especially this one. We have got I think seven different 

databases we are dealing with the FDA on food and drug safety. 

Why has this been an insurmountable task that we can’t seem to 

get to? 

Dr. NIELSEN. From my observation, a good portion of the existing 

legacy system is based on the need of a particular product center. 

And ORA is not directly funded, and IT is not directly funded. And 

that is why one of my proposals is—why I believe a new entity, 

funded entity needs to be established, is you have to start line item 

the IT. And ORA set it in the position, doing a good portion of the 

post-market surveillance work, what need for information from 

each of those silo legacy systems. It has to be integrated. 

The investigators and ORA either at the border or doing facility 

inspections need information. They are going to go from one industry to another. They may do a drug inspection, a device inspection, 

a biologic inspection. So that is why the integration. But it is not 

funded. It is just—it is not a direct line. And ORA considerations, 

in my opinion, just have not been at the fore. 

Mr. HUBBARD. If I may, Mr. Chairman, the IT is expensive. The 

Science Board suggested it needed about $800 million. And I think 

the folks at—above FDA have just not felt that it is worthy. And, 

in fact, many years we would ask for money—around the time of 

your ’98 hearing, we were asking for money for import IT. In fact, 

we would get cuts that said you don’t really—IT, that is not important. You can always use efficiencies and do better. And it 

143 

squeezed—it cut 10, 20 million. And so you have never had that 

commitment to fixing the IT systems. So you have these 1970s and 

’80s systems limping along, totally ineffective. 

Mr. STUPAK. Dr. Cassell. 

Dr. CASSELL. Yes. I would agree and just remind you in our report we pointed out that FDA’s IT budget is less than half of that 

that CDC currently has, yet the information that needs to be managed is far greater. 

The other thing I have heard this week that is very disturbing 

is that, while we were well on our way to developing a new IT system for adverse event reporting, apparently the backup system that 

we pointed out that didn’t exist actually doesn’t exit. It was lost. 

They are 6 weeks behind in terms of implementation, and the problem still hasn’t been resolved. So I think again this is one area that 

is urgent. It is critical that it be fixed and fixed quickly. 

Mr. HUBBARD. Can you imagine the frustration at FDA last year 

when the FBI decided its $800 million system didn’t work and 

threw it away and said we’ll start over. Now, if they had gotten 

that kind of money, I personally think FDA would have spent that. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. England, go ahead. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Just real quick examples. One—because I think 

some of this responsibility actually happens because Congress 

sometimes tries to fix problems one piece at a time. Prior notice, 

for example. FDA got mandated—you were mandated to do due 

prior where they were given no money to put the IT system together. So all the money they were going to use for OASIS enhancements all went into prior notice, which, quite frankly, I think 

didn’t really accomplish very much. 

Now, as we think about the idea of proposing a registration system where people pay money for registration, some of that money 

will go into what? An IT system. And it will be a stovepipe system 

just like the rest of them. So as these solutions come up, if they’re 

not for across the entire agency, it actually aggravates the problem. 

They start using that money to create stovepipe solutions to manage the new mandate. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Yes, and that’s one of the issues of the whole institution; and, indeed, if you would rebuild it from the ground up— 

and we’ve got to break down these barriers. 

I’m going to throw out 3 phrases for the sake of time and just 

have comments. 

The appearance standard for kicking off an import alert and then 

also the debate on extraterritorial jurisdiction on our ability to hold 

overseas importers somehow more accountable under the law. Any 

comments on that? Does that make sense? I mean, I can go into 

the whole question, but you know the phrases, right? 

Mr. ENGLAND. The appearance standard, I mean, right now the 

Agency already has the authority under the appearance standard. 

Nobody knows what it is. No judge has ever said so, nor will the 

FDA ever want a judge to say so, because they would all of a sudden have a standard that they would have to meet. But there is 

no—the appearance standard—as long as it appears to be in violation of the act, they can stop that product now. 

144 

And then the courts tend to defer to the Agency as to what the 

appearance is. And is that right? Well, I represent other people 

who don’t like that, but you can see why judges do it. 

As far as extraterritorial power, you’re not really reaching into 

those foreign governments with that standard. All you’re doing is— 

you’re just saying, not in my backyard, not here. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. I know that the question is should that be something that we legislatively consider? 

Mr. HUBBARD. The appearance standard is a relic of 1906. It says 

the FDA has to define either that problem clearly or the appearance of that problem and then stop the product. If you’re going to 

change the paradigm, you need to move the burden to the producer 

to show they are making safe food or drugs, not on FDA to find 

every single problem with every single shipment when you have 20 

million shipments. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Mr. Nielsen. 

Dr. NIELSEN. I think the task is to make certain it is equal burden for the domestic and foreign industry or else it is unfair competition. 

Mr. ENGLAND. I mean, just on the extraterritorial question, I 

would think—it would seem to me where it would be difficult is 

how you enforce it. I mean, if—and part of it—if you’re talking 

about some how penalizing—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. I understand—I mean, we were talking about heparin a lot, but if there is criminality—— 

Mr. ENGLAND. The United States government already has power 

to prosecute foreign nationals that commit those kinds of crimes. 

They’ve done it before. They did it in the drug investigations. 

Gerd—what is his name? Gerd Weithase was a German national. 

He was involved in the manufacture—somehow involved in the 

scheme—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. You know, I’m getting help here, but I hear that 

DOJ wants some explicit language to help us more fully prosecute. 

Mr. ENGLAND. DOJ has often gone along with FDA and said we 

agree. That would certainly help. It isn’t clear that the Food and 

Drug Cosmetic Act—and I think that clarification was not going to 

hurt anything. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. But if we are moving legislation, if we wanted it 

clear, we could at least look at the language. 

Mr. HUBBARD. FDA would clearly like you to deal with the 

extraterritoriality. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you. I’m done, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Melancon? No. 

Well, thank you to this panel. It is always a very, very good 

panel. We enjoy it. That’s why I like the members to just go on and 

ask the questions. 

I mentioned the three recalls just while this panel was 

empaneled. We had from China snow fungus, which is mushrooms; 

from Vietnam, ginger; and from China, dried lily bulbs. Those are 

three recalls—or alerts that just came in. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Not my clients—— 

Mr. STUPAK. I thought I’d give you a heads-up. 

Mr. NIELSEN [continuing]. Yet. 

145 

Mr. STUPAK. I am still trying to figure out what do we do with 

dried lily bulbs. 

Anyway, that concludes our questioning. I want to thank our witnesses for coming today and your testimony and thank you again. 

And, Dr. Cassell, be sure you tell your committee thank you very 

much for their work and expertise. 

I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record will remain 

open for 30 days for additional questions for the record. 

Without objection, the record will remain open. 

I ask unanimous consent that the contents of our document binder be entered in the record. 

Without objection, documents will be entered into the record. 

That concludes our hearing. Without objection, this meeting of 

the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:00 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:] 

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