Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

PHILIP R. SKODINSKI GREGORY F. ZOELLER 

South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana 

ERIC P. BABBS

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

RODNEY D. MOSBY, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 71A04-1209-CR-469

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable John M. Marnocha, Judge

Cause No. 71D01-1205-FB-58

May 17, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BRADFORD, Judge
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Devante Williams was robbed at gunpoint by Terrell Howard of almost $400.00 while 

Appellant-Defendant Rodney Mosby sat on a couch nearby. Mosby advised Williams to give 

Howard everything lest he make the situation worse or get himself hurt. After Howard 

pistol-whipped Williams, Williams dropped all of his cash on the ground and left. Howard 

and Mosby left together and attempted to flee when they were spotted by police. When the 

duo was apprehended, Howard was in possession of $378.00, and Mosby, $100.00. Mosby 

was convicted of Class B felony robbery and Class A misdemeanor resisting law 

enforcement. Mosby contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain his 

robbery conviction, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit certain testimony, 

and the trial court committed fundamental error by mentioning the Aurora, Colorado 

shootings1 during voir dire. Because we find no legal error, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the morning of May 1, 2012, Williams withdrew $400 from an ATM, stopped at a 

7-11 for cigarettes and a drink, and went to a friend’s South Bend house. Orlando, another 

friend of Williams’s, was supposed to be going to court that day, and Williams planned to 

meet him at the house and give him money to help make bail. When Williams arrived, he 

found only Mosby and Howard, both in the downstairs living room. Howard told Williams 

that Orlando had already gone to court, and Williams left. As Williams walked away from 

the house, Howard yelled at him to return, saying that Orlando was on the telephone. 

 

1

 On July 20, 2012, twelve persons were killed and fifty-eight wounded when a gunman opened fire in 

an Aurora, Colorado movie theater. 
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Williams returned to find Howard on the stairs and Mosby lying on a couch. Howard 

handed Williams the telephone, walked past him, slammed the door shut, put a handgun to 

Williams’s head, and demanded that he “come off everything[,]” which Williams understood 

as a demand that he hand over anything of value. Howard handed the telephone to Mosby, 

saying, “Hey, Bro, come on, take the phone.” Tr. p. 177. Mosby said, “Just give him 

everything, so you won’t make it a worser [sic] situation or get yourself hurt.” Tr. p. 180 

([sic] in transcript). When Williams did not initially comply with Howard’s demands, 

Howard struck him on the head with the grip of the handgun. Williams threw all of his cash 

on the ground, and Howard ordered him to leave. 

A neighbor saw three men on the porch, and heard one of them say, “You hit me in the 

head, and now you took my money.” Tr. p. 209. Williams called police and said that he had 

been robbed by two men. As Mosby and Howard walked away from the house, the neighbor 

overheard one say to the other, “Oh, he ain’t going to do nothing.” Tr. p. 215. South Bend 

Police Officer James Dennin soon arrived and observed Mosby and Howard walking in an 

alley. When Officer Dennin identified himself as a police officer and yelled at the duo to 

stop, they turned, looked, and ran off down the alley. When Mosby and Howard were 

apprehended soon thereafter, Mosby had $100.00 on his person and Howard had $278.00. 

On May 2, 2012, the State charged Mosby with Class B felony robbery with a deadly 

weapon, Class B felony robbery causing bodily injury, and Class A misdemeanor resisting 

law enforcement. Mosby’s trial began on July 31, 2012. During voir dire, the trial court said 

the following to the prospective jurors:
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THE COURT: In Counts I and II, let me explain a little bit about the 

law. And I think it’s kind of a topic at this point, because I got a lot of 

questions from people yesterday concerning the murders in Aurora, Colorado. 

You will recall if you’ve been watching the news, there were twelve people 

that were killed in that situation. 

But the authorities, the State in Colorado, charged twenty-four counts of 

murder, one [sic] for each victim in the case. 

And here you have a situation where there is alleged one robbery and 

one victim, but there are two counts that are charged. 

I can tell you that the State is entitled to charge alternate theories of 

criminal liability. And in this case, Count I, is Robbery, as a B Felony, 

because it’s alleged that there was a firearm that was used. Then Count II, is 

Robbery, as a Class B Felony, because it is alleged that bodily injury resulted. 

And so the State is allowed to do that, and juries are allowed to decide 

whether the State has proved each of those cases. 

So in situations like this or in any other case where there are alternative 

theories, those alternative theories are allowed to go to the jury. And the jury 

could find the person guilty on both counts or not guilty on both counts, or 

guilty on one and not guilty on the other. 

But whether judgments of convictions could be entered on both counts, 

let’s say you find a person guilty on both counts, that’s something that I deal 

with as a matter of law. Because a person cannot be twice convicted of the 

same crime. 

But’s that’s not a jury issue, that’s a judge issue. 

Does everyone understand that? 

(Whereupon, all the veniremen indicate affirmatively.) 

Tr. pp. 21-22 ([sic] in transcript). 

During trial, Howard testified on Mosby’s behalf. Howard testified that no robbery 

had taken place but that Williams had come to the house looking for drugs, which led to a 

scuffle when Howard refused to provide any. Mosby testified that he had been awakened by 

Howard yelling at Williams, “You have to go, Bro, you have to go.” Tr. p. 352. When 

Mosby attempted to testify that Williams had replied, “That’s f***ed up[,]” the trial court 

sustained the State’s hearsay objection. Tr. p. 352. The jury found Mosby guilty as charged, 
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and the trial court entered judgment of conviction on counts I and III and sentenced Mosby to 

an aggregate sentence of fifteen years of incarceration. 

DISCUSSION

I. Whether the State Produced Sufficient Evidence 

to Sustain Mosby’s Burglary Conviction

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider 

only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 

867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). It is the factfinder’s role to assess witness credibility and 

weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. Id. We 

consider conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. We 

affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find that the elements of the 

crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 

Mosby contends only that the State produced insufficient evidence to establish that he 

and Howard worked in concert to rob Williams. In order to convict Mosby as charged, the 

State was required to show that he “knowingly or intentionally aid[ed], induce[d], or 

cause[d]” Howard to “take[] property from [Williams] by using or threatening the use of 

force on any person ... or ... by putting any person in fear ... while armed with a deadly 

weapon[.]” Ind. Code §§ 35-42-5-1; 35-41-2-4. 

Factors considered by the fact-finder to determine whether a defendant aided 

another in the commission of a crime include: (1) presence at the scene of the 

crime; (2) companionship with another engaged in a crime; (3) failure to 

oppose the commission of the crime; and (4) the course of conduct before, 

during, and after the occurrence of the crime. 

Wieland v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1198, 1202 (Ind. 2000). 
6

We conclude that the State produced sufficient evidence to sustain Mosby’s robbery 

conviction, as there is ample evidence that he and Howard were working together. Mosby 

was at the scene and did not oppose the robbery. The evidence most favorable to Mosby’s 

conviction also establishes companionship and behavior consistent with working with 

Howard. After Howard put his handgun to Williams’s head, Mosby took the telephone from 

Howard, who referred to Mosby as “Bro.” Tr. p. 177. Mosby then advised Williams to give 

Howard everything so that he would not make the situation worse or get himself hurt. This 

statement can be interpreted as indicating a knowledge of Howard’s intentions, further 

evidence of the two working together. After the robbery, Howard and Mosby walked from 

the house together, and one said to the other, “Oh, he ain’t going to do nothing.” Tr. p. 215. 

When apprehended, Howard had $278.00 on his person and Mosby had $100.00, suggesting 

that they split the almost $400.00 stolen from Williams. Finally, when spotted by police and 

told to stop, both Mosby and Howard attempted to flee, which can be circumstantial evidence 

of a guilty conscience. See, e.g., Abercrombie v. State, 478 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 1985). 

Mosby’s argument in this regard amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we 

will not do. 

II. Whether the Trial Court Abused its 

Discretion in Not Admitting Certain Evidence

The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Curley 

v. State, 777 N.E.2d 58, 60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans denied. We will reverse a trial court’s 

decision on the admissibility of evidence only upon a showing of an abuse of that discretion. 

Id. An abuse of discretion may occur if the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic 
7

and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the court has misinterpreted 

the law. Id. The Court of Appeals may affirm the trial court’s ruling if it is sustainable on 

any legal basis in the record, even though it was not the reason enunciated by the trial court. 

Moore v. State, 839 N.E.2d 178, 182 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. We do not reweigh 

the evidence, and consider the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Hirsey v. 

State, 852 N.E.2d 1008, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. 

Howard testified that a scuffle ensued when Williams came to the house looking for 

drugs and Howard refused to provide any. Mosby argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion in refusing to admit his testimony regarding Williams’s response to Howard’s 

request that he leave following their scuffle, which was, “That’s f***ed up.” Tr. p. 352. 

Mosby contends that this evidence corroborates Howard’s version of events. We conclude 

that even if the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit testimony regarding the 

out-of-court statement, any such abuse was harmless. “Errors in the admission of evidence 

are to be disregarded as harmless unless they affect the substantial rights of the defendant.” 

Goudy v. State, 689 N.E.2d 686, 694 (Ind. 1997). Even if we assume that Williams’s 

statement tends to support Howard’s version of events, the jury clearly did not believe 

Howard, and there is no reason to conclude that this—at best—cumulative evidence would 

have swayed it. Any abuse of discretion the trial court may have committed can only be 

considered harmless. 

III. Whether the Trial Court’s Remarks During 

Voir Dire Amounted to Fundamental Error
8

Mosby contends that the trial court’s voir dire reference to the shootings in Aurora, 

Colorado, to which he did not object, nonetheless constituted fundamental error. 

A claim that has been waived by a defendant’s failure to raise a 

contemporaneous objection can be reviewed on appeal if the reviewing court 

determines that a fundamental error occurred. See, e.g., Trice v. State, 766 

N.E.2d 1180, 1182 (Ind. 2002); Hayworth v. State, 904 N.E.2d 684, 694 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2009). The fundamental error exception is “extremely narrow, and

applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, 

the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the 

defendant fundamental due process.” Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 

(Ind. 2006). The error claimed must either “make a fair trial impossible” or 

constitute “clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due 

process.” Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 2009). This exception is 

available only in “egregious circumstances.” Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 

1064, 1068 (Ind. 2003). 

Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010). 

Mosby has failed to establish that the trial court’s statements amounted to fundamental 

error. The trial court merely used a familiar news story to illustrate the non-controversial 

legal concept of charging in the alternative. The trial court did not in any way compare 

Mosby’s alleged actions to those committed in Aurora or compare him to James Holmes, the 

alleged perpetrator in that case. We fail to see, and Mosby does not explain, how such 

statements could possibly have rendered a fair trial impossible. The trial court’s voir dire

statements did not constitute fundamental error. 

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

RILEY, J., and BROWN, J., concur.