NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

STATE OF ARIZONA
, Appellee
,

v.

CARLEEN CRENSHAW BRUCE
, Appellant

.

No. 1 CA

- CR 13

- 0788

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2010

- 112998

- 001 SE The Honorable David B. Gass , Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General’s Office , Phoenix By Colby Mills Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office
, Phoenix By Carlos Daniel Carrion C ounsel for AppellantSTATE v. BRUCE Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Maurice Portley delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

P O R T L E Y , Judge:

¶1 Carleen Crenshaw Bruce challenges h er convictions for interfering with judicial proceedi ngs, a Class 1 misdemeanor; resisting arrest, a Class 6 felony; and possession of dangerous drugs, a Class 4 felony. She claims that the trial court erred by : (1) con ducting a suppression hearing in her absence and (2) denying a mo tion to suppress her statement to police prior to receiving Miranda 1 warning s

. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUD

¶2 Before trial, Bruce filed a motion to suppress statements that she made to a Mesa p olice o fficer after her arrest for i nterfering with judicial proceedings and resisting arrest

. In her presence, t he court set the motion for a hearing on November 4, 2011. T he State subsequently learned of a conflict and
, with no defense objection, t he court moved the hearing to November 2 by minute entry

. ¶3 Bruce did not appear for the rescheduled hearing

. The trial
court asked if the parties w anted to proceed. Bruce’s lawyer advised the

cou rt that he had left a message with his client of the change in schedule
, but did not know if she received the message. C ounsel , however, told the court that he was ready to “go forward with the motion at this time
, ” and confirmed that he was not going to call Bruce to testify.

¶4 The hearing proceed ed and the police officer , the sole witness
, testified. The court denied the motion to suppress

. Bruce was subsequently convicted at a bench trial and sentenced.

1 Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

.STATE v. BRUCE Decision of the Court

3 DISCUSSION

I.

¶5 Bruce argues o n appeal that her rights under the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated and the trial court committed reversible error by holding the suppression hearing in her absence. U.S. Const. amend. VI ; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 14

. We dis agree because any error was invited and her argument is foreclosed by the invited erro r doctrine

. ¶6 The invited error doctrine provides that a defendant who invites error at trial may not complain of that error on appeal. State v. Pandeli , 215 Ariz. 514, 528, ¶ 50 , 161 P.3d 557, 571 (2007) . The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent a party from creating or injecting error in to a proceeding and then profit ing from it on appeal. State v. Logan , 200 Ariz. 564, 56 6 , ¶ 11, 30 P.3d 631, 633 (2001)

. Thus, i f error is invited, we do not consider if the alleged error is fundamental because doing so would run contrary to the purpose s of the doctrine. Id . at 565

- 66 , ¶ 9, 30 P.3d at 632

- 33

. ¶7 Bruce argues that her presence at the hearing would have been helpful because she could have heard the officer’s testimony and been available to testify and contra dict the officer’s testimony. 2 Bruce’s trial lawyer , however, had the opportunity to ask the court to continue the hearing if he thought Bruce ’s presence at the hearing w ould have been helpful to his interrogation of the officer. He apparently did not th ink her
presence was necessary and specifically informed the court that he did not intend to call her to testify and wished to proceed without her.

¶8 A lthough she may argue with his strategy, a defendant may be bound by her counsel’s “trial st rategy, misconduct and mistakes of counsel so long as counsel’s assistance at trial was not reduced to a ‘ mere farce or sham. ’ ” State v. Levato , 186 Ariz. 441, 444 n.3, 924 P.2d 445, 448 n. 3 (1996) (quoting State v. Jones , 110 Ariz. 546, 550, 521 P.2d 978, 982 (1 974))

. Bruce’s lawyer thought he could proceed in her absence, and the record confirms that he was prepared to challenge the officer’s testimony

. Consequently, because Bruce’s lawyer explicitly told the court that he

2 Bruce has not specified on appeal how she could have assisted her lawyer at the hearing other than a generalized assertion of assistance.STATE v. BRUCE Decision of the Court

4 wished to proceed in her absence, Bru ce may not now assert her absence as error on appeal. Pandeli , 215 Ariz. at 528, ¶ 50, 161 P.3d at 571

.

II.

¶9 Bruce also argues that the court committed reversible error by denying her motion to suppress

. We review a ruling on a motion to suppress for an a buse of discretion. State v. Zamora , 220 Ariz. 63, 67, ¶ 7, 202 P.3d 528, 532 (App. 2009)

. “ We defer to the court’s factual determinations; however , t o the extent its ultimate ruling is a conclusion of law, we review de novo

. ” Id

. (citation omitted). And i n reaching our decision we only consider t he evidence presented at the suppression heari ng and view that evidence, and reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to upholding the ruling. State v. May , 210 Ariz. 452, 454, ¶ 4, 112 P. 3d 39, 41 (App. 2005) (citation omitted).

¶10 After Bruce was arrested, she was transported to the police station for booking. After pulling into the sally port of the garage, Officer Christopher Col burn testified that he asked Bruce a “routine” question that he asks all arrestees “for safety purposes ; ” namely, “if she had anything hidden on her person that she shouldn’t have.” Bruce replied that she “had a bag of meth in her left bra.” The information was relayed to a female detention officer who searched B ruce prior to booking her into jail and found in Bruce’s bra “a baggie containing a crystalline substance [that] tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine

. ” Bruce was subsequently Mirandized and voluntarily spoke to Colburn about the matters she was arrested for and possession of a dangerous drug.

¶11 At the suppression hearing, Bruce, by counsel, argued that Col burn’s question co nstituted custodial interrogation meant to elicit incriminating evidence and because she answered before she wa s Mirandized , her answer had to be suppressed. In denying the motion
, t he court found that the “single question asked before Miranda warnings were given was not for invest igative purposes” but simply a “ routine question[] asked for booking purposes.” In reaching its decision, the court relied on United States v. Sims , 719 F.2d 375 , 378 (11 th Cir. 1983) , which held that “requesting ‘routine’ information for booking purposes is not an interrogation under Miranda
, even though that information turns out to be incriminating.” In fact, t he trial court stated:

I’m persuaded there was just one question and I also find persuasive and a heavy factor that [defendant] was not suspected of methSTATE v. BRUCE Decision of the Court

5 possession. The suspicion o f the offenses were violating the order of protection and resisting arrest, so the fact that the generic question was asked do you have anything on you does not

concern t he Court that [defendant ] should have been Mirandized prior to that single question being asked, so the statement made is admissible at trial

. ¶12 Bruce contends the court abused its discretion in finding that the question was a routine booking question rather than a question meant to elicit incriminating statements

. She points out that the booking questions in Sims and the related cases were different in kind b ecause th os e question s involve d only identi fication information. See i d . at 379 (address and telephone number secured in port

- arrest interview). See also State v. Jeney
, 163 Ariz. 293, 297, 787 P.2d 1089, 1093 (App. 19 89 ) (ownership of residence searched proved through booking information).

¶13 Although even seemingly innocuous information may
, in retrospect , turn out to be incriminating , the answer to an innocuous question should not be suppressed so long as the purpose for which the i nformation is obtained is a routine booking purpose and “not an interrogation under Miranda

. ” Sims , 719 F.2d at 378

. Here, t he court was persuaded that the o fficer routinely asked all arrestees t his question solely for officer safety reasons

. And t he court was also persuaded that the question was “routine” b ecause the charges that Bruce was arrested for, violation of an order of protection and resisting arrest
, do not necessarily give rise to a suspicion of drug possession. Because w e give d eference t o the finder of fact who hears the live testimony and has to judge credibility, Matter of Pima County Juvenile Action No. 63212

- 2, 129 Ariz. 371, 375, 631 P.2d 526, 530 (1981)
, the denial of the motion to suppress was not an abuse of discretion. 3

3 We also find that even if there was any error, it was harmless because the drugs would have been found in her bra during the search prior to booking

. “Error is harmless only if we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it ‘did not contribute to or affect the verdict.’” State v. Green , 200 Ariz. 496, 501, ¶ 21, 29 P.3d 271, 276 (2001) (quoting State v. Bible , 1 75 Ariz. 549, 588, 858 P.2d 1152, 1191 (1993) )

. Therefore, even without her statement, the drugs in her bra would have been admitted and supports the conviction.STATE v. BRUCE Decision of the Court

6 C ONCLUSION

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences.