SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLAT E DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1040-22 CARMEN SALGADO, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. JAMES MEIERS, Defendant-Appellant.

__________ ______________

Submitted January 24, 2024

– Decided May 15, 202 4 Before Judges Accurso and Walcott-Henderson. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, Docket No. FM

- 09

- 2595

- 08. Heymann & Fletcher, attorneys for appellant (Alix Claps, on the brief). Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM Defendant-father appeals from a November 4, 2022 F amily Part order granting plaintiff-mother's motion in-part enforcin g litigants rights and NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 1040 -22

compelling defendant to contribute to their child's college tuition and expenses.
At issue is whether defendant violated the parties' P roperty Settlement Agreement ("P SA ") by failing to contribute to college tuition and ex penses a nd by claim ing their child as a dependent in 2021. We affirm. At the time of their divorce in 2009, the parties e xecuted a PSA which explicitly included support for their child, the sole ch ild of the marriage. Under the terms of their PSA, the parties recognized their responsibility to provide a college education for their child "dependent upon t heir ability to pay[.]" The PSA included a separate provision for "college education/college accounts," which states in pertinent part:

Both parties recognize that, under current New Jers ey law, as divorced parents they are both responsible for providing a college or other post-secondary educati on for their child dependent upon their ability to pay at that time and the child's aptitude, opportunities and inclinations. The contributions of the parties shal l be calculated after all applicable and/or available st udent loans, grants and scholarships have been applied fo r and the child's accounts have been fully accessed to t he extent allowable. The child shall have an obligati on to contribute by working summers and during the school recesses, if possible. The parties anticipate shar ing these expenses based on the guidelines percentages that are in effect at the time the child enters college. The child's loans shall be his responsibility unless th e parties voluntarily decide to contribute. In other words, the parties shall have no obligation to pay for the child's loans.3 A- 1040 -22

There is no dispute plaintiff and defendant partici pated in the child's selection of a college and equally shared the cost of tuition for the fir st year and that defendant failed to contribute to the costs of college tuition during their child's sophomore year

. Additionally, per Article III paragraph 8 of their PSA, the par ties had agreed to alternately claim their child as a depend ent every other year with defendant claiming the tax credit in even years and plaintiff in odd years. There is no dispute in the record that defendant claimed their child in 2021 when it was plaintiff's designated year

. Plaintiff moved to enforce litigant's rights and fo r an order compelling defendant to pay fifty percent o f the child's sop homore college tuition and
expenses ; for an order requiring defendant to amend his 2021 income tax return to remove the child as a dependent

— allow ing plaintiff to claim the child on her 2021 income tax return and every odd year thereafte r; counsel fees; and to enforce the $98.00 a week child support obligation

. Defendant, then-self-represented, replied in an opp osition styled as an "answer to plaintiff's motion and request for relie f. " He maintained the PSA "grants [him] the discretion to contribute to [thei r child's] college education as [defendant] deem[s] [he is] able," and that for the first year he "took a loan for4 A- 1040 -22

$15,000 and [he] still owe[d] $12,500 on this loan. " Thus, he argued, "[his] determination that [he] cannot contribute further t o college costs at this time is based on experience and is not capricious. " As to the head of household tax credit, defendant m aintained that: Article III, paragraph 8 of the PSA is no longer bin ding on the Parties. Further, paragraph 9 of the Certif ication Affidavit shows the years that each Party was permi tted to claim [the child] as a dependent and ends at 202 0. This paragraph thus demonstrates that the Parties h ad not yet come to an agreement over who would claim [their child] as a dependent in 2021. [Id. at 84.] At the hearing, defendant testified that at the time of the PSA "I was not making a commitment to pay [] half of [their child's] tuit ion, 15 years in the future. . . . And, freshman year, I gave it a shot and I just could not continue to do it." In an oral decision, the Family Part judge found de fendant violated the terms of the PSA by failing to contribute to their child's college tui tion and expenses. The court noted the parties jointly part icipated in their child's college selection

— having specifically considered Syracuse's accelerat ed engineering program and work- study . A lthough it found, "no obligation in their agreement or subsequent written document confirming . . . tha t they would each pay 50/505 A- 1040 -22

of the cost," the court concluded the parties "anti cipated sharing these expenses based on the guidelines percentages that are in eff ect at the time that the child attends college," based on the explicit language of the PSA. The court granted plaintiff's motion in -part

— declining to equally divide college tuition

— finding that defendant violated litigant's rights by premat urely claiming their child on his 2021 tax returns, clarified that plaintiff was entitled to claim the child in odd years, and continued defendant's child support obli gation, stating "there's no motion before me to modify." In its subsequent written decision on plaintiff's f ee application, the court noted that "[d]efendant did not file a cross-motion , and thus, [d]efendant does not have any requests pending before the [c]ourt at this time." The court further found that it was "unable to make findings on [d] efendant’s current financial circumstances as the record properly before the [c] ourt today is silent regarding
same." Defendant appeals and presents the following argume nts: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY MISSTATING THE PARTIES' PSA AND INACCURATELY LIMITING STUDENT LOANS TO "SUBSIDIZED" LOANS. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE OF THE PSA THAT MAKES6 A- 1040 -22 THE STUDENT SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR REPAYMENT OF HIS STUDENT LOANS. III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ASSESSING THE PARTIES' CURRENT ABILITY TO PAY AND PROPORTIONAL INCOME, BUT RATHER RELYING ON A CALCULATION FROM 2012. IV. (NOT RAISED BELOW) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD A PLENARY HEARING REGARDING COLLEGE CONTRIBUTION. V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT MODIFYING DEFENDANT’S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION BASED ON THE CHILD NO LONGER RESIDING WITH PLAINTIFF. VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT ADDRESSING THE AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF SOUGHT BY DEFENDANT AND IGNORING WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSTRUED AS A CROSS-MOTION.
We owe substantial deference to the Family Part's fin dings of fact because of that court's special expertise in family matters . Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). "A trial court's interpretatio n of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are n ot entitled to any special deference. " Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).7 A- 1040 -22

Matrimonial and property settlement agreements are governed by basic contract principles and, as such, courts should dis cern and implement the parties' intentions. J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 326 (2013). "It is not the function of the court to rewrite or revise an agreement when the in tent of the parties is clear. " Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016) (citing J.B., 215 N.J. at 326). Thus, the court must "discern and implement 'the common inten tion of the parties[,]' and 'enforce [the mutual agreement] as written.'" Id. at 46 (first quoting Tessmar v. Grosner, 23 N.J. 193, 201 (1957); then quoting Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co. , 33 N.J. 36, 43 (1960)). "Accordingly, [PSAs] should be enforced so long as they are consensual, voluntary, conscionable, and n ot the result of fraud or overreaching," or if they are wholly unconscionable when made. Satz v. Satz , 476 N.J. Super. 536, 551 (App. Div. 2023) (first ci ting Weishaus v. Weishaus , 180 N.J. 131, 143

– 44 (2004); then citing Guglielmo v. Guglielmo, 253 N.J. Super. 531, 541 (App. Div. 1992) ). Defendant argues that under the PSA, "[the child's] loans shall be [the child's] responsibility unless the parties voluntar ily decide to contribute ," and thus he argues "the parties shall have no obligation to pay for [the child's] loans ." Defendant further argues that no review of child su pport upon the child's entry into college was conducted, as provided for under t he PSA. Plaintiff filed no8 A- 1040 -22

responsive brief in this appeal and has since aband oned her cross-app eal for counsel fees.
We are persuaded the Family court based its decision on the parties' PSA, those language was clear and required no interpretation. Although we can appreciate the financial impact on defendant in hav ing to contribute towards the substantial costs of college tuition and related ex penses, the Family court did not err in enforcing his obligation under the plain language of the PSA. As the court stated, the parties jointly participated in t heir child's college selection

— having specifically considered Syracuse University 's accelerated engineering program and work- study

— and the PSA evidences an agreement to share those

costs. Moreover, PSA s "should be enforced so long as they are consensua l, voluntary, conscionable, and not the result of frau d or overreaching." Satz, 476 N.J. Super. at 551. Defendant makes no such challenge to the PSA. The parties' PSA explicitly provides that "[t]he pa rties anticipate sharing these expenses based on the guidelines percentages that are in effect at the time the child attends college." The court according de nied that aspect of plaintiff's motion seeking the parties shared tuition expenses equally as it was contrary to the terms of their agreement

. We discern no err or in the court's findings which were based on the express terms of the PSA.9 A- 1040 -22

Similarly, the court did not err by confining its r uling to the issues properly before it in the motion and by declining t o construe defendant's "answer" and arguments as a cross-motion. Defendan t did not file a formal motion requesting a ny relief, nor did he file a case information statemen t (CIS) as required under our court rules:

when a motion or cross-motion is brought for the en try or modification of an order or judgment for alimony or child support based on changed circumstances, the pleading filed in support of the motion shall have appended to it a copy of the prior [CIS] or stateme nts filed before entry of the order or judgment sought to be modified and a copy of a current [ CIS ]. [ R. 5:5-4 .] Thus, we discern no basis for the court to have gone beyo nd the motion that was before it to sua sponte consider any other issues

. Contrary to defendant's arguments, the court had no basis to co nvert his answer to an application for modification of his child support o bligation. As the court indicated, it was "unable to make findings on [d]efendant’s current financial circumstances as the record properly before the [c] ourt today is silent regarding same." At the hearing, defendant testified his inco me in 2012 was only $29,000 and fell significantly short of the $80,000 imputed to him at that time. However,10 A- 1040 -22

he does not make any representations about his curr ent income other than to assert it hasn't changed much. Based on this record, defendant voluntarily paid on e half of the child's tuition during the first year . A lthough defendant's financial circumstances may have changed , he presented the court with no reliable evidence , such as a CIS, which would have set forth his income and expenses, of that purported fact. Our Court Rules provide a mechanism for review of suppo rt obligations due to a change in circumstances, which defendant did not av ail himself of

. See R. 5:5

- 4. Instead, defendant engag ed in self-help by claiming the child as a dependent on plaintiff's year. Having reviewed this record, we are satisfied the c ourt fairly resolved the issues before it and did not abuse its discretion. Defendant was not entitled to the relief he now seeks on appeal in the absence of a motion and the filing of a complete CIS and other pertinent financial informatio n. Defendant cannot avail himself of the benefits of financial relief from hi s obligations while shielding his finances. We conclude defendant's remaining arguments are wit hout merit and do not warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11

– 3(e)(1)(E).
Affirm ed

.