T h e pan el u n an i mou s l y c on cl u des t h at t h i s c as e i s s u i t abl e f or de ci s i on * wi t ho ut oral argument. Fed

. R

. A p p
. P

. 34 (a)( 2 ).

F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA ,

Plaintif f-Appellee ,

v. B EN J AMI N H A R R IS , Defendant-

Appellant

. No. 11-50503

D.C. No. 2:11-cr- 00414- SJ O-1
ORDER AND AMENDED OPI

NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he Ce ntr a l D istri c t of

Ca lif or nia S. J ames Ote ro, District Judge, Pre siding Submit ted Novembe r 6, 2012 * Pa sa de na , Ca lif

or nia
Filed De cembe r 5, 2012 Amended January

14, 2013
Be fore : Susan P. Graber , Sandra S. Ikuta, and An dr e w D . H ur

wi tz, C ir c uit

Judg e s. Orde r; Opinion by

J udg e Gr aberU NI TED S T A T ES V
. H A R R IS 2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no part o f the o pi ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s ** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y **

Crim inal L aw Af f i r m i n ga c o n v i c t i o n , th e p an e l h e l d th at4 9 U

. S.C. § 46505, which prohibits car rying a “conc eale d dang erous wea pon” on air cra ft, is not unconstitut ionally vague as a pp lie d to an a ir

po rt e mpl oye e wh o s ne aks a

po c ke tkn if

e wi th a bla de that is a lmo st tw o- and -a -h a lf inc he s lo ngpa st a secur ity chec kpoint and then g ives it to a passe ng er who takes it aboard a

n airplane

.

CO UN SEL Wil l i amS

. H ar

r i s , L awO f

f i c e s o f W i l l i amS

. H ar

r i s , S o uth Pa sa de na , Ca lif

or nia , f or De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. Melissa Mills, Assi stant United States Attorney , National Se c ur it y Se c ti o n , L o s A n g e le s , Ca li f o r n ia , f o r Pl a inti ffAppellee

.

OR DE R The opinion filed on De cembe r 5, 2012, and a ppear ing a

t 20 12 WL60 54 77 8, is a

me nd e d a s f

oll ow s:U NI TED S T A T ES V
. H A R R IS 3 On slip opinion page s 10–11, in the car ryover pa ragraph, chang e “w e must rea d § 46505,” throug h “B y stating” to: § 4 65 05 —whic h la c ks a

sim ila r r e fe re nc e —is un c o n s ti tuti o n a ll y

v a gu e a s a

p p li e d

. We

4 disag ree . W e h ave alrea dy explained why § 46505 g ave f

air notice to thi

s Def endant that thi s knife was proscr ibed. T wo other statut e s— e na c te d at dif

fe re nt tim e s to a dd

re ss differ ent subjects—do not cha ng e our conclusion. I f any

thing, by stating
On sli p o pin ion

pa g e 11 , c ha

ng e “thi s inte rp re tatio n, ” to

“ that inte rp re tatio n. ” and de le te “ as that st atut e me re ly confirms that the te rm ‘dang erous w ea p on’ includes suc h a pocketknife ”. Wit h these amendments, Appellant’s pe tition for panel rehe aringis DENI ED. No fur ther pe titions for r ehea

ringor petitions for rehe aringen banc will be enter tained.

OP IN ION
GRABE R, Circuit J udg e: The que stion presented is whether 49 U .S.C. § 46505, which prohibits car

rying a “concea led dange rous weapon” on airc raf t, is unconstitut ionally

vague as applied to an airpor t e mpl oye e wh o s ne aks a

po c ke tkn if

e wi th a bla de that is almost two-and-a -half inches longpast a sec urity chec kpoint and then g ives it to a passeng er who takes it aboa rd an airplane

. Reviewingde novo, United St ates v. Zhi Y ong Guo ,U NI TED S T A T ES V
. H A R R IS 4 634 F.3d 1119, 1121 ( 9th Cir.), cert. de nied , 131 S. Ct . 3041 (2 01 1) , w e h o l d

th atth e s t atu t e i s n o tun c o n s t i tu t i o n a lly va gue a s a

pp lie d a nd , th e re fo re , w e a ff

ir m. On Ja nu ar y 3 0 , 2 0 1 1 , th e T r an s p o rt at i o nS e c uri ty Administra t i o n (“TSA” ) pre vented Edw ard L ee H ender son, a JetB lue Ai rw ay s p a sse ng e r, fr om p a ssi ngthr ou g h a se c ur ity chec kpoint at the L ongBe ach, Ca lifornia, airport beca use he had a poc ketkn i fe in his carry -on bag . The poc ketknife ha d two blades, t h e long er of which mea sured slig htly less than two-and- a-ha lf inches. He re is a photograph of the knife:U NI TED S T A T ES V
. H A R R IS 5 TSA pers o n nel told Hender son to return to the ticke ting c ounte r s o th at he c ou ld p la c e the kn if e into on e of

his chec ked bag s. Hende rson went first to the curbside c heck- in, wher e he ha d chec ked his l ug g ag e, but was dire cted to the J etB lue ticketingcounter . Def endant, B enjamin Har

ris, an Airport B ag s employ ee w ith a Security I dentification Display Are a badg e, ac compani ed Henderson f rom the cur

bside chec k-in to the ticketingcounter

. At the ticketingcounter , Alem Habta y , a Jet Bl ue employ ee, told He nderson that it was too c lose to the flig ht’s bo ard ingtim e to place the po c ke tkn if e in h is p re vio us ly c he c ke d lu g g a g e but th at he c ou ld c he c k th e kn if e se pa ra te ly for $30. Hende rson s aid t hat he did not have $30. Def endant the n s ug g e ste d to He nd e rs on tha t he might b e a

ble to assi st him with his problem, and toge ther the two men walked a way from the c ounter a

nd out of the ticketingare a. Outside the ticketingar ea , the two men agree d that Def endant would help Hende rson g et the pocke tknife past the TSA chec kpoint. Hende rson g ave D efe ndant the pocke tknife so that H e nd e rso n co uld g o thro ug h th e TSAc he c kp oint. De fe n d an t ’s s ec uri ty

cl ea ra n ce al l o we d h i m t o u s e h i s b ad ge and PI N number to e nter the boa rdi n g ar ea , with the knife, without passing through a TSA che ckp o i n t . The two men met in a re stroom, where Def endant r eturned t h e knife. Severa l signs in and a

round t h e ter

minal cautioned that

“ kn ive s” we re pr oh ibi te d in the se c ur e d p or tio n o f t he a ir po rt

. Me anwhil e , H a

bta y su sp e c te d th at D e fe nd ant m ig ht t ry to us e his ba dg e to take the po c ke tkn if e pa st s e c ur ity . Sh e tol d a co- worke r of her suspicion; the co-w orker , in tur n, told the J etB lue Station Mana g er on duty , Gre g Gar cia. Habtay then spoke direc tly

with Garc ia, wher eupon the two we nt to theU NI TED S T A T ES V
. H A R R IS 6

T itl e 4 9 U .S .C . § 4 6 5 0 5 sta te s in r e le v a n t p a rt: 1 ( b) An i n di v i du al s h al l be f i n ed u n der t i t l e 18, i m p ri soned f

o r not m o re t han 1 0 y ears, o r bo t h, i f t he ind ivid u a l— (1) when o n, o r at t em p t i ng to get o n, an ai rcraf t i n, or i n t en ded f

or ope r at i on i n , a i r t rans por t at i on or i nt ras t at e ai r t rans p o rtat i o n, has o n or ab o ut t he i ndi vi dual or t he propert y of t he i ndi vi dual a c oncea l ed d angero us weap o n that is or wo ul d be accessi b l e t o t he ind ivid u a l i n fl igh t[.]

. . . . (e ) If tw o o r m o re p e rs o n s c o n sp ire to vio la te s u bs ec t i on ( b)

. . . , an d one or mor e of s u ch pe r s on s do boardingare a to locate Hende rson. Unable to find him, they boarde d the plane, a

nd Habtay

identified He nderson.
Gar cia approac hed He nderson a nd asked f

or the knife

. He nd e rs on

ini tia lly de nie d h avin ga

kn if e . B ut, wh e n G arc ia said that he would have He nderson r emoved f rom the plane if nec essar

y , Hende rs o n handed the knife to Ga rcia

. He nd e rs on

re ma ine d o n th e fl ig ht.
Ga rc ia no tif ie d v ari ou s se c ur ity pe rs onne l of the inc ide nt. Duringan intervie w with a L ongBe ac h police off icer , De fe nd ant a dmi tte d h is r ole in t he fo re g oin ge ve nts

. A g rand jury

indi cted De fenda

nt for conspira cy

to car ry a c o n c e a le d d an g e r o u s w e a p o n o n an a ir c r a f

t, a v io lation of 49 U.S.C. § 46505(e), a

nd for a iding a

nd abettingthe ca

rry ing of a conce aled dang erous wea pon on an airc raf

t, a v i o l ation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 49 U.S.C. § 46505(b)(1)

. Def endant 1U NI TED S T A T ES V
. H A R R IS 7

an y a ct t o e f

f ec t t h e o b jec t of

t h e con s pi r ac y , e ac h of t he part i es t o s uch cons pi r acy s hall be puni s hed a s p rovided i n s uch subsect i o n. mov e d to di sm iss the ind ic tme nt, arguin gtha t 49 U. S.C. § 4 6 5 0 5 ’ s p r o h ib it io no f

“ d an g e r o u s w e a

p o n [s ]” o na ir c r aft is unconstituti onally

vague as a

pplied. The district cour t de ni e d th e m o t i o n
. D e f

e n d an te n t e r e d

a c o n d i t i o n a l guil ty ple a , re se rv ing his ri g ht to a pp e a l th e de nia l of

his mot ion

to dis mis s. He tim e ly

a pp e a ls.
“A c riminal statute is v o i d fo r vague ness if it is not su ff i ciently clea r to provide guidance to citiz ens conc erning how they can a void violating it and to provide au t h o ri ties with principles g overningenfor ceme nt.” Zhi Y o n g Guo , 634 F.3d at 1121 (internal quotation mar ks omi t t ed ). In a fa c ia l c ha lle ng e , a

statut e is unc on st it ution a lly va gue if it “‘f ails to provide a person of ordinary intelligenc e fa ir notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it aut h o ri zes or enc ourag es ser iously discriminatory

enfor ceme nt.’” United States v. Kilbride , 584 F.3 d 1 240, 1257 (9th Cir. 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g United St ates v. W illiams , 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2 00 8) ). In a

n a s- a pp lie d c ha lle ng e , a st atut e is unconstitutionally

vague if it “fa il[ s] t o put a defenda nt on notice that his conduc t was cr iminal.” Id. “F or statutes . . . inv olv ingc ri min a l sa

nc tio ns the re qu ir e me nt f or c lari ty is enhanc ed.” Id. (interna l quotation marks omitted). “[V]ague ness challeng es to statutes which do not involve First Amendme nt free doms must be examined in the light of th e f a c ts o f th e c a s e at h an d

. ” Un ite d S tates v . M

az ur ie , 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975). Thus, De fe ndant’s as- applied c ha lle ng e to 49 U.S.C. § 46 50 5 tu rn s o n whe the r t

he statut e provided a dequate notice to him that his particular c onductU NI TED S T A T ES V
. H A R R IS 8

C ont r ar y t o D ef

endan t ’ s ar gu ment , § 46 50 5(b) ( 1)’ s l ack of a s ci ent er 2
e le m e n t d o e s n o t r e n d e r i t un c o n stitutio n a lly v a g u e
. See H ot el& M ot el As s ’ n of O akl and v

. Ci t

y of O akl and , 34 4 F.3d 95 9 , 97 3 (9t h C i r. 20 0 3 ). was prosc ribed. Def

endant kne w that this particular knife ha d been turned back by TSA. Moreove r, there wer e signs in and around the terminal that prohibited all knives. I t should have been c lear

to him that § 46505’s prohibiti on of “da ng er o us wea pon[s] ” includes a

pocketknife with a blade almost twoan d -a -half inc hes long . There fore , even c onsideringthe enhanc ed re quirement of c l arity for c riminal statutes, we conclude that the s tatute gave Def endant a dequate notice that his conduct wa s prohibited. 2
The only decision of which we are awa re that addresses an as- a p p li e d v a gu e n e s s c h a ll e n g e to 4 9 U

. S. C. § 4 6 505 s up p o rt s the conc lusion we rea ch her e. In United States v. Hedrick , 2 0 7 F. Supp. 2d 710, 712 (S.D. Ohio 2002), a pa sse ng e r f

le w o n an air

pla ne “ we ari nga

be lt b uc kle equipped with a knif

e that had a

three -inch blade .” The court held that § 46505 is not void for vagu eness, because “the common sense de finition of ‘dang erous weap o n ’ provides sufficie nt notice re g ardingthe conduc t that is prohibited . . . [and] include[s] a knife with a three -inch blade .” Id. at 714. We ag ree . Def

endant’ s attempt to disti nguish Hedrick by the leng th of the knife’ s blade fa il s . The diff ere nce be tween a thr e e -i nc h b la de and

a bla de of jus t un de r two -a

nd -a -h a lf inc he s d oe s n ot make the statut e va gue a s a pp lie d to Def endant, e specia lly

consideringthat he, unlike the defe ndant in Hedrick

, was a n airport e mploy ee. Our two pri o r d ecisions interpre ting the sc ope of § 46505’s pre dece ssor statute, 49 U.S.C. § 1472( l) (1964) ,U NI TED S T A T ES V
. H A R R IS 9 also support our hold i ng . The e arlier statute prohibited conce aled “ deadly

or dang erous we apon[s] ” on air cra ft. Id.
In United States v. W

allace , 8 00 F .2 d 1 50 9, 15 12 –1 3 ( 9th Cir . 1 98 6) , w e he ld t

hat a stun gun , a s a

matte r o f l aw, is a dang erous wea

pon aboar d an airc raf

t. We reasone d that stun guns can c ause se rious perma nent injury to the eyes and c an incapa cit ate many

people at once, that e ven tempora ry inc a pa c itatio n o f k e y

pe rs onne l on

an air cra ft

is d ang e ro us , and that “ d is p la

y o f th e gun is li k e ly to p r o v o k e f e ar in the surr ound ingpa sse ng e rs c re atin g‘a n imme diate da

ng e r t hat a violent response w ill ensue.’” Id. at 1513 (quoting McLaughlin v. United States , 4 76 U. S. 1 6, 18 (1 98 6) ); see als o M c Lau gh lin , 4 76 U. S. at 17 (h old ingthat th e imm e diate dang er of a viol ent response to display of an unloa ded fire arm is “independe ntly

sufficie nt” to support the conc lusion that an un lo a d e d f

ir e ar m is a “ d an g e r o u s w e a p o n ” w it h in the meaningof the fe dera l bank robbe ry statute)).
In United States v. Dishman , 486 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 19 73 ), we re ve rs e d th e c onvic tio n of a m an who atte mpt e d to board an airplane with a .22 ca liber starte r pistol. The pistol was inca pable of firingbullets beca

use “[ t ] h e bar

rel wa s s o l i d l y p l u g g e d n ea r t h e e n d

an d th e c yl i n d er

ca rt ri d ge retaining holes or

bores we re ha lf filled with metal and incapa ble of receivingand holdingcar tridg es.” Id. at 729. We de fined “dea dly and dang erous wea pon” as “one which in its i ntended or

rea dily adapta ble use is likely

to produce death or serio u s i n

jury .” Id. at 730 (e mphasis omitt ed) ( qu o ti n g9 4 C. J. S. We a

p o n s § 6(c) , p
. 4 8 9 )

. B e c a u s e “ [i ]t would take a machinist considera ble time w ith [ a] m etal cutting drill and saw to conve rt [the starter pistol] into anyU NI TED S T A T ES V
. H A R R IS 10

T h i s c ou r t de ci ded Di s h m an b e fo r e the S u p re m e C o u rt h e ld in 3 M c L a u g h lin t hat t he i mm edi at e d ang er o f a vi ol ent res po ns e t o t he di s pl ay o f an unl o ad ed gun i s suf f i ci ent t o m ake t hat gun a “ d angero us weap o n” un der t he f

eder al bank r ob bery s t at ut e.
T i t l e 1 8 U .S.C

. § 9 3 0 (g)(2 ) p ro vid es: 4

T he t erm “ d angero us weap o n” m e a n s a weap o n, dev i ce, i n s t r u men t , ma t er i al , or s u bs t an ce , a n i mat e or ina n im a te , tha t is u se d fo r, o r i s re a d ily c a p a b le o f, c a u sin g d e a th o r se rio u s b o d ily inj u ry, exc ept t ha ts uch t erm d o es n o t i n clu d e a p o ck et kn i f e w i t h a b l a d e o

f l ess th a n 2 1⁄2 in c h e s in len g th

. (E m p h a sis a d d e d .) semblance of an ope ra ting we apon,” the starter pistol was mere ly an “ine rt object.” Id. at 732. 3
L ike t he stun gun in W

allace , a pocketknife can inf lict, at a min imum, p e rm ane nt i nju ry . It c an in c a

pa c itate , at le a st temporar ily , key personne l on an air cra ft. In the conf ines of an air cra ft, its display

has the potential to provoke a violent response . Unlike the starte r pistol in D is h m an , the pocketknife at is sue her e is “re adily adapta ble” to a dang erous u s e, ev en if it is not i ntended f or that use. No a lte ratio n is re qu ir e d to e na ble it to inf

lic t serio us bodil y harm. The ref

ore, W allace and Dishman su gg est that a pocketknife with a blade of just unde r two-and- a-ha lf inches is a “ da ng e ro us we a

po n” a bo ard an a ir c ra ft

. F in ally , D e fe nd ant a

rgue s th at, b e c a

us e 18 U. S.C. § 93 0( g )( 2) and 18 U. S.C. § 19 92 (d )( 2) make s pecif ic ref ere nce to “ a pocke t knife with a blade o f less than 2 1⁄2 inches in leng th,” § 465 0 5 —which lac ks a similar ref ere nce—is unc onstitut ionally vague as a

pplied. We

4U NI TED S T A T ES V
. H A R R IS 11

T i t l e 1 8 U .S.C

. § 1 9 9 2 (d )(2 ) p ro vid es:

[T ]he t erm “d angero us weap o n” m eans a weap o n, dev i ce, i n s t r u men t , ma t er i al , or s u bs t an ce , a n i mat e or ina n im a te , tha t is u se d fo r, o r i s re a d ily c a p a b le o f, c a u s ing d e a th o r se rio u s b o d ily inj u ry, i ncl udi ng a p o c k e t k n ife w ith a b la d e o f l e ss th a n 2 1⁄2 in c h e s in le n g th

. . . . (E m p h a sis a d d e d .) dis a g re e . We have a lr e a dy e xpla ine d why § 4 65 05 g ave fa ir notice to thi

s De fe nd ant t

hat thi s knife was prosc ribed. Two other statutes—e nacte d at diffe rent times to addre ss differ ent subjects—do not chang e our conc lusion. I f any thing, by stating that the term “da nger ous wea

pon” in § 930(g )(2) “does not include a pocket knife with a blade of l ess than 2 1⁄2 inc he s in le ng th, ” Con g re ss imp lie d that su c h kn ives woul d be c on side red

da ng e ro us we a

po ns but f

or the ir e xpre ss exclusion. And nothi ngin § 1992(d)(2) detra cts fr om that interpre tation.
In sum, w e conclude that 49 U.S.C. § 4 6 5 0 5 gave adequate notice to De fenda nt that a pocketknife with a blade of slightly

less than two-a

nd-a- h alf inches is prohibited aboar d an air cra ft. Ther efor e, we hold that the statute is not unconstitutionally

vague as a

pplied.
AF F IRMED.