By Richard Chait 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

National Defense University

March 2009

Perspectives from Former 

Executives of the DOD Corporate 

Research Laboratories 
ii

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official 

policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the 

U.S. Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from 

unclassified materials. 

Richard Chait is a Distinguished Research Fellow at CTNSP. He was previously Chief 

Scientist, Army Material Command, and Director, Army Research and Laboratory 

Management. Dr. Chait received his PhD in Solid State Science from Syracuse 

University and a BS degree from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. 

Acknowledgements 

The author expresses deep appreciation to the interviewees (Drs Timothy Coffey, 

John Lyons, and Vincent Russo) for their willingness to be interviewed and for their 

candid thoughts regarding their successful careers as leaders of the Service corporate 

research laboratories. Many thanks are due to Dr. Lance Davis, who provided the OSD 

perspective on key laboratory legislative matters that affected the Service laboratories 

during the Coffey-Lyons-Russo timeframe, and to Dr. Tom Killion for his review of the 

manuscript. Also, the time spent by Mr. Jordan Willcox in copyediting the text is 

acknowledged with appreciation. 

Defense & Technology Papers are published by the National Defense University Center for Technology 

and National Security Policy, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. CTNSP publications are available 

at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html. 
iii

Contents 

Introduction......................................................................................................................................1 

Important Studies and Directed Actions..........................................................................................2 

John Lyons and the Army Research Laboratory..............................................................................7 

 

Timothy Coffey and the Naval Research Laboratory....................................................................10 

 

Vincent Russo and the Air Force Research Laboratory.................................................................13 

 

Other Important Perspectives.........................................................................................................16 

 

Discussion and Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................19

Appendix A – Highlights from the AFRL Timeline .....................................................................22 
iv
1

Introduction 

Recent studies at the National Defense University (NDU) have documented the important 

science and technology (S&T) contributions of the military service laboratories.1

 These 

studies showed that in-house Department of Defense (DOD) laboratories, in cooperation 

with the private sector and academia, developed critical technologies for weapon systems 

that strongly impacted the outcomes of World War II and the Cold War. Involvement of 

the in-house laboratories continues today, undiminished, as our Nation battles the threat 

of international terrorism. 

The fundamental research component of the in-house laboratory system within DOD 

rests with the Army, Navy, and Air Force corporate research laboratories, henceforth 

called CRLs in this paper. These are the laboratories that perform the basic research that 

underpins the S&T programs for each Service. It is the purpose of this paper to document 

the thoughts and opinions of individuals who have led research activities at each of the 

following CRLs: the Army Research Laboratory (ARL) in Adelphi, MD; the Naval 

Research Laboratory (NRL) in Washington, DC; and the Air Force Research Laboratory 

(AFRL) in Dayton, Ohio respectively. These individuals are: John Lyons (ARL), 

Timothy Coffey (NRL), and Vincent Russo (AFRL) and are referred to collectively as 

“former laboratory executives” or “executives” below. These executives had over 100 

combined years of experience directing laboratory research. The interviews with Lyons, 

Coffey, and Russo occurred during February 2008. The Lyons and Coffey discussions 

were conducted in-person, while a teleconference was used for the Russo interview. 

Directed actions from both the Congress and the Executive Branch have had a significant 

impact on the CRLs. Some of these actions have been accompanied by studies that have 

also played significant roles. What follows is a discussion of some of these important 

directed actions and studies, so as to place in perspective both the history of the CRLs 

and the views of those executives who ran them. 

Following the discussion of directed actions and studies, historical highlights of each 

CRL will be presented. This will be followed by the biographies and interview highlights 

of each former laboratory executive, as well as additional perspectives as seen through 

the eyes of former senior members of the Office of the Director, Defense, Research and 

Engineering (DDR&E). The paper concludes with a discussion of the various viewpoints 

expressed in the interviews. Included here are recommendations that seek to leverage the 

vast amount of experience possessed by the former laboratory executives. 

 

1

 Richard Chait, John Lyons, and Duncan Long, “Critical Technology Events in the Development of the 

Abrams Tank: Project Hindsight Revisited,” Defense and Technology Paper 22 (Washington, DC: Center 

for Technology and National Security Policy, 2005). Also see Richard Chait, John Lyons, and Duncan 

Long, “Critical Technology Events in the Development of the Apache Helicopter: Project Hindsight 

Revisited,” Defense and Technology Paper 26 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National 

Security Policy, 2006). Finally see John Lyons, Duncan Long, and Richard Chait, “Critical Technology 

Events in the Development of the Stinger and Javelin Missile Systems,” Defense and Technology Paper 33 

(Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2006). 
2

Important Studies and Directed Actions 

As noted earlier, the DOD in-house laboratories have played a vital role in our Nation’s 

defense. Given this role and the visibility that comes with it, it is not surprising that they 

have been the subject of many studies and/or actions. It has been estimated that about 100 

studies and related reviews of government laboratories, also referred to as in-house 

laboratories, have been conducted since 1962.2 Most have been initiated by Congress, 

The White House, or the Pentagon. It is not possible to provide details of each and every 

study. However, there are several that have had a marked influence on the formation and 

operation of the Service laboratories. Note that these studies and actions, presented in a 

generally chronological fashion below, have emphasized consolidation and increased 

efficiency. 

One of the most notable laboratory reviews was conducted in 1982. Under the authority 

of the White House Science Council, a Federal Laboratory Review Panel was appointed 

for the purpose of reviewing Federal Laboratories and making recommendations in areas 

of utilization and performance. The Panel’s charge included looking at laboratory 

missions and identifying any systemic impediments to performance. The Panel issued its 

report, generally referred to as the Packard Report, in 1983.3

 They made a number of 

recommendations pertaining to the Federal Laboratories’ missions, personnel, faculty, 

and management. Among the most important were the adoption of peer review and the 

empowerment of the laboratory directors in critical areas of laboratory management. One 

of the examples cited in the Packard Report was the experiment in personnel 

management being conducted at the Navy’s Surface Weapons Center in China Lake, CA 

and the Naval Ocean Systems Center in San Diego, CA. Known as the China Lake 

alternative personnel system or simply “China Lake Experiment,” this 1980 project 

included a streamlined personnel classification system based on performance, rather than 

on longevity. One of the most important things the Packard Report did was to 

recommend that all Federal laboratories could benefit by applying aspects of the China 

Lake experiment. In 1984, based on a Packard Report progress report,4

 the White House 

Office of Science and Technology Policy drafted legislation to enable other federal 

laboratories to follow up on the China Lake experiment. However, Office of Personnel 

Management (OPM) and personnel officers in other Cabinet Departments resisted, and 

the legislation did not move forward. 

 

2

 Timothy Coffey et al, “Alternative Governance: A Tool for Military Laboratory Reform,” Defense 

Horizons 34 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, November 2003), 

available at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/DefHor/DH34/DH34.pdf>. 

3

 Report of the White House Science Council Federal Laboratory Review Panel (Washington, DC: The 

White House, May 1983). 

4

 Office of Science and Technology Policy, Progress Report on Implementing the Recommendations of the 

White House Science Council’s Federal Laboratory Review Panel, Vol. 1—Summary Report (Washington, 

DC: Office of Science and Technology Policy, July 1984). 
3

A 1987 Defense Science Board report supported a streamlined management process that 

would provide for effective and efficient operation of the DOD laboratories.5

 This led to 

the creation in 1989 of the DOD-wide Laboratory Demonstration Program (LDP), which 

sought many of the features contained in the China Lake experiment. To move things 

along more quickly, the S&T executives of the three Services established the Laboratory 

Quality Improvement Program (LQIP) in 1993, as a means to re-energize the LDP 

initiative to improve the quality and productivity of the DOD laboratories. Under LQIP, 

some DOD laboratories made headway by streamlining their business practices in such 

areas as civilian personnel, financial management, information infrastructure, contracting, 

and facilities renewal. The goal was to grant the heads of the DOD laboratories increased 

authority to choose the most cost-effective means of operating their organizations. 

Initiatives included designing and implementing streamlined civilian personnel and R&D 

contracting procedures; improving facility renewal efforts, using increased minor 

construction thresholds; designing financial management approaches that allowed the 

identification and comparison of the true cost of doing business; and creating an 

information infrastructure that would aid the scientists and engineers in exchanging 

analytical information. 

In line with these initiatives, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the 

Services established Project Reliance in 1990. The objective of this initiative was to 

reduce duplication across the Services, and improve coordination and integration. Only 

the three Services initially participated in Project Reliance; it was subsequently expanded 

to include other DOD activities, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. As participation grew, Project 

Reliance was expanded and became part of a more comprehensive DDR&E developed 

strategy and planning method, which included the following: a Defense Technology Area 

Plan for presenting the DOD technology investment plan and strategies; Defense 

Technology Objectives to define return on investment; and an independent review called 

the Technology Area Review and Assessment (a “TARA review”) to assess integration 

and recommend opportunities for improved synergy among the Services. These processes 

resulted in an improved investment strategy for each Service. 

The LQIP and Project Reliance efforts were part of the response to the White House and 

the Congress as they pushed for more emphasis on reduced infrastructure through more 

cross-service integration and Service laboratory consolidation, all in an effort to meet the 

challenge of reduced R&D funding. In addition, several actions and mechanisms were 

used by the Congress and the White House. At the top of the list was the DOD-initiated, 

congressionally approved, Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) action. Many closures 

and consolidations have occurred as a result of the BRAC process. For example, the 1991 

BRAC disestablished and consolidated management of nine Army laboratories under one 

command, and led to the creation of the Army Research Laboratory. Similarly, the 1993 

BRAC and the 1995 BRAC disestablished and transferred functions of the Belvoir R&D 

Center and Aviation Troop Command. The Navy and Air Force took similar actions 

during this time period. The Air Force consolidated its laboratories into four large 

 

5

 Defense Science Board, Report on the 1987 Summer Study on Technology Base Management 

(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1987) 
4

laboratories (called “super” laboratories in Air Force parlance), while the Navy 

consolidated the technical infrastructure of four Warfare Centers. 

Despite BRAC, LQIP, and the Project Reliance initiatives, there was a belief within the 

DOD leadership that more reforms were necessary. What the Pentagon had in mind was 

embodied in the Defense Management Report Decision 922 (DMRD 922) in late 1989.6

Here, special in-house groups were appointed to investigate options for consolidating 

DOD functions, including the advantages and disadvantages of interservice and intraservice consolidation of laboratories. As a result, the Services were directed to explore 

the entire range of laboratory options, including alternatives to a concurrently considered 

proposal to create an overarching DOD laboratory. 

Additional input resulted from a very extensive study undertaken in 1991 by the Federal 

Advisory Commission on Consolidation and Conversion of Defense Research and 

Development Laboratories.7 The purpose of the Commission, which was established by 

public law, was to study the DOD laboratory system and provide recommendations to the 

Pentagon on the feasibility and desirability of various means to improve their operations. 

In its study, the Commission reaffirmed that the laboratories within each service “are a 

function of that Service’s weapon systems acquisition structure” and that “there was no 

need to force the service laboratory systems into a single model”. Recognizing the need 

to improve the effectiveness of the DOD laboratory, there was also strong support for 

Project Reliance, as well as the laboratory consolidation efforts noted above for the 

Army, Navy, and Air Force. 

With a change in administration came another round of laboratory reviews. In November 

1993, the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) was established with the 

aim of conducting an in-depth review of laboratories from several federal agencies. This 

Interagency Federal Laboratory review concentrated on laboratories operated by the 

DOD, Department of Energy and NASA. A report was issued in May 1995 that 

concluded that the laboratory systems of these agencies provided essential services to the 

Nation.8

 While the White House endorsed the report, it noted that the DOD needed to 

explore the advantages of cross-Service integration more thoroughly. To address the 

cross-Service issue, the Pentagon was directed to issue a follow-up report in early 1996. 

Congress also had an interest in improving the efficiency of DOD laboratories. In 1996, it 

passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Section 277 of this legislation 

directed DOD to develop a 5-year plan to set forth specific actions needed to “consolidate 

the laboratories and test and evaluation centers.” To initiate the effort, the Secretary of 

Defense was instructed to submit an initial plan to Congress no later than May 1996, 

 

6

 Department of Defense, Defense Management Report Decision 922 (Washington, DC: Department of 

Defense, October 1989). 

7

 Federal Advisory Commission on Consolidation and Conversion of Defense Research and Development 

Laboratories, Report to the Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC: Federal Advisory Commission on 

Consolidation and Conversion of Defense Research and Development Laboratories, September 1991). 

8

 National Science and Technology Council, Report to the White House (Washington, DC: National 

Science and Technology Council, May 1995), available at 

<http://www.ostp.gov/galleries/NSTC%20Reports/Federal%20Laboratory%20Review%201995.pdf>. 
5

outlining the DOD strategy for accomplishing the consolidation and restructuring of the 

laboratories and test centers. 

 

Since there were now two actions underway stressing reform—the response to the NSTC 

and the White House as well as the response to the 1996 NDAA and Congress—it was 

decided to combine the outcomes from the two studies into a single plan called Vision 

21.9

 As requested, the report discussed ways to reduce cost, eliminate duplication, and 

maximize efficiency and effectiveness for the DOD laboratories. The plan identified three 

key pillars in accomplishing the desired laboratory reform. These were: 

• Reduction of infrastructure costs with emphasis on high-maintenance and 

 inefficient facilities while retaining critical capabilities 

• Restructuring resulting from improved processes and cross-service reliance 

• Revitalization of key laboratories with an emphasis on critical technologies. 

In essence, the goal of Vision 21 was to provide a plan for eliminating unnecessary 

infrastructure, at the same time maintaining the research and development programs and 

facilities essential to developing the technology for weapon systems of the future. As will 

be discussed in later sections of this paper, Vision 21 played an important role in the Air 

Force’s decision to continue to overhaul its laboratory infrastructure, ultimately resulting 

in the creation of AFRL. 

In addition to the 1996 NDAA, there have been other congressional actions taken to 

promote DOD laboratory reform. In Section 913 of the 2000 NDAA, Congress proposed 

that DOD use university study teams to look at the relevance of the defense laboratories 

and evaluate their current work and utility in the future. The studies found that relevant 

work is being performed and that the laboratories are well focused on the technical needs 

of the services. Some concerns were noted. These included a heavy concentration on 

short-term needs at the expense of longer-term opportunities, and the need to continue to 

address challenges in the science and engineering (S&E) personnel area. 

Congressional actions continued to focus on the challenges in the S&E personnel area. 

For example, wanting to see a faster pace of reform, Congress acted in Section 342 of the 

1995 NDAA, to make the China Lake experiment permanent. As a result, many Service 

laboratories applied for the laboratory demonstration status, which enabled them to carry 

out personnel demonstration projects similar to the China Lake experiment. Laboratories 

that applied for this status and were approved became known as “Reinvention 

Laboratories” and were overseen by DDR&E under LQIP. 

Section 9902 of the 2004 NDAA was also a very important piece of legislation, as it 

called for a DOD-wide personnel system overhaul. This new personnel system, called the 

National Security Personnel System (NSPS), replaced the former 15-step General 

Schedule system with a four-band system, and adopted the principle of pay for 

performance. As shown in Table 1, the authorizations offered by NSPS did not provide 

 

9

 Department of Defense, Vision 21—The Plan for 21st Century Laboratories and Test and Evaluation 

Centers of the Department of Defense (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 1996). 
6

the laboratories with the degree of flexibility provided by the reinvention status under 

LQIP. It is important to note that one of the main objectives of LQIP was to improve 

laboratory management by allowing laboratory managers to waive many regulatory 

statutes. These powers are not available under NSPS. NSPS would appear instead to 

move most of the decision authority to higher levels rather than to delegate to individual 

laboratory managers. 

Table I

Comparison of Elements of LQIP vs. NSPS10

LQIP NSPS 

Can waive many parts of Title 5, the Civil 

Service System 

 Cannot waive these items 

SECDEF approves changes OPM must approve changes 

May pay starting salaries anywhere in a 

pay band 

Limited to 30 percent above minimum 

 Has a Pay Band V for senior positions Does not have such a band 

Supervisors not automatically paid more 

than group members 

Assumes supervisors are paid more 

Can promote from band to band without 

competition 

Crossing pay bands requires competition 

Can manage most of Human Resources 

(HR) functions 

HR functions performed above the 

laboratory level 

Classification, recruiting, qualification, and 

hiring authorities reside with laboratory 

managers 

Classification and related actions are 

performed above the laboratory level 

It should be noted that in approving NSPS, Congress exempted the Service laboratories 

until 2013 to allow for an orderly transition. Congress also revisited some S&E personnel 

issues in the 2005 NDAA (Section 1107) and 2006 NDAA (Section 1128). These 

legislative actions requested studies comparing NSPS and LQIP to each other as well as 

to systems utilized in the private sector. To date, these studies have not been completed. 

With this background in place, the next several sections present the perspectives from 

former CRL executives. 

 

10 William McCorkle et al., memorandum to W.S. Rees, Chair, Laboratory Quality Enhancement Program, 

Office of Director, Defense Research and Engineering, August 2006. 
7

John Lyons and the Army Research Laboratory 

Prior to the formation of ARL, the Army had research facilities at several locations. One, 

the facility at Watertown Arsenal, where pyrotechnics and waterproof paper cartridges 

were studied, dates back to 1820. As the Army’s technology needs grew, other 

laboratories had been formed. Among them were the Atmospherics Science Laboratory 

(White Sands, NM), Harry Diamond Laboratory (Adelphi, MD), Human Engineering 

Laboratory (Aberdeen, MD), Vulnerability Assessment Laboratory (White Sands, NM), 

Ballistic Research Laboratory (Aberdeen, MD), and Electronic Devices Technology 

Laboratory (Ft Monmouth, NJ). Over time, the laboratory located in Watertown, MA 

evolved into the Materials Technology Laboratory. 

These laboratories operated independently, each reporting to the Army Materiel 

Command (AMC) in Alexandria, VA. This reporting chain was changed in 1989, when 

Laboratory Command was formed under AMC. The laboratories were now managed by a 

single reporting element commanded by a general officer. Several additional actions 

taken created further organizational changes. The most important of these was the 

previously discussed 1991 BRAC action, which established ARL. 

Biography 

John Lyons has a varied background, including an undergraduate degree in chemistry and 

a PhD in physical chemistry, as well as extensive experience in both the private and 

public sectors. He served with Monsanto Company for 18 years in various research and 

development positions, starting at the research bench and then holding various positions 

in management of research and development. Following his stay at Monsanto, Lyons 

joined the Department of Commerce’s National Bureau of Standards (today known as the 

National Institute for Standards and Technology or NIST) in Gaithersburg, MD. At 

NIST, he was at first Director, Center for Fire Research; and then Director, National 

Engineering Laboratory; before being appointed by the President to serve as Director, 

NIST. In total, Lyons spent 20 years at NIST. Following his career at NIST, Lyons 

moved to the Department of Defense as Director of the Army Research Laboratory. He 

served in that position for over 5 years before retiring from government service in 1998. 

In summary, Lyons spent a total of 18 years in the private sector and 25 years in the 

public sector. He is now a Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense 

University’s Center for Technology and National Security Policy. 

Interview Highlights 

Lyons’ approach to managing ARL was influenced by his private sector experience. At 

Monsanto, he observed that those individuals who took a fundamental approach to 

solving industrial problems and were able to publish the results of their research in 

refereed journals often had successful careers, whether in research or management. His 

appreciation was established there for the important role of basic research within both the 

private and public sectors. The thought here was that the grounding one gets at the 

research bench provides the basis for the sound technical judgment that is critical to a 

successful career. 
8

At NIST, Lyons was able to apply what he had learned at Monsanto. He observed that in 

its content, the Center for Fire Research program was more of an applied engineering 

program than a research program. Believing that some basic research was needed, Lyons 

created a fire science program, forming the underpinnings of what became a nationally 

recognized activity at NIST. The National Science Foundation (NSF) was funding a 

similar fire science program in academia. Because of the upgraded NIST program and a 

change in emphasis at NSF, Congress transferred the NSF program to NIST. As a result, 

NIST had both a rapidly improving in-house technical program and a first-rate academic 

effort. The NIST fire research program soon gained a reputation as a world-class fire 

research capability. 

Having gained this reputation, it was important to Lyons for NIST to recruit and keep top 

scientists and engineers. For example, one NIST scientist, who was to go on to win a 

Nobel Prize, was heavily recruited by a leading university. NIST management provided 

strong support for his research, excellent laboratory equipment and facilities, and the 

freedom to pursue good science. This support was important in NIST’s ability to retain 

this scientist. As evidence of this emphasis on basic research and quality work, NIST 

scientists have won three Nobel prizes since 1997. 

Lyons also found the potential interactions and funding streams at NIST quite interesting. 

In contrast to what he was going to encounter at ARL, funding was appropriated directly 

to NIST by Congress, and Lyons testified before the authorization and appropriation 

committees. Congress was also interested in maintaining contact with the NIST 

leadership, since they had been instrumental in reorganizing NBS into NIST. It was thus 

easy for Lyons to establish a line of communication with Congressional committees. 

Another NIST observation was that the customer base was different; it was made up 

largely of scientists and engineers in academia and industry. NIST’s importance to these 

customers stemmed from NIST’s goal to establish the technical standards needed to 

support the increasingly sophisticated work in science, engineering, and manufacturing. 

As a result, Lyons noted a very positive attitude on the part of the private sector rather 

than the less than positive comments that are sometimes heard regarding the government 

S&T or technology development laboratories. 

At ARL, Lyons found certain differences in comparison to NIST. At NIST, he had been 

free to talk with congressional staffers, resulting in frequent interactions. At ARL on the 

other hand, such interactions were less frequent, as they were handled by higher 

headquarters. In this respect, ARL was more like Monsanto. While the interface with 

Congress was different at ARL, Lyons’ management techniques were similar to those he 

used at NIST. He was protective of basic research funding, believing, as he had at 

Monsanto, that a sound underpinning of fundamental research was of great benefit to the 

technology development programs. He believed that this sound research base, coupled 

with an excellent technical staff, led to an excellent scientific product. ARL was thus in a 

solid position to be an honest broker in the Army acquisition cycle, should the 

opportunity arise. 
9

The technical decisions Lyons made were based on both his interaction with his technical 

staff and “gut feel”. His comfort with the technical staff stemmed in part from a 

management style that got him “out and around” both internally and externally. Lyons 

frequently used the outside technical community to benchmark his programs. For 

example, at NIST he gained from visits to many public and private-sector laboratories. 

One example was his visit to Bell Laboratories to discuss his fiber optics program 

initiatives. At NIST, the National Research Council (NRC) had provided peer review of 

the technical quality of the programs. This practice was continued at ARL, where he 

initiated an ARL Technology Assessment Board (TAB) with the NRC. The TAB effort 

reviewed the technical programs of each ARL directorate, covering key areas such as 

sensors, armor, anti-armor and human factors. He found the TAB critiques very helpful, 

and was diligent in following up on TAB recommendations. Lyons was mindful of what 

it took to have a world-class laboratory, having served on the Federal Advisory 

Committee mentioned on page four. He used selected metrics (patents, publications, etc) 

to monitor ARL’s response to the TAB’s recommendations. In addition to the oversight 

of technical quality, Lyons utilized an Army Materiel Command Board of Directors 

(technical directors of other AMC laboratories) and a group of stakeholders drawn from 

the Army’s senior leadership, the latter to address overarching relevancy and policy 

matters. 

Lyons also brought about increased interaction with the private sector, using partnering 

initiatives that leveraged industry’s and academia’s acknowledged strengths in given 

technology areas. This Federated Laboratory Initiative, as it was originally known, 

formed a competitive selection of external laboratories into consortia, in order to work 

jointly with ARL to meet the Army’s expanding research needs in areas such as 

telecommunications, simulation, displays, and advanced sensors. The concept was to 

rapidly secure advanced technologies in areas where ARL had not previously 

concentrated, while at the same time building up internal competence at ARL. He 

contrasted this approach to that of simply contracting out the work. This highly 

successful concept continues today as the Collaborative Technology Alliances. 

Lyons expressed pride in the above accomplishments, and believes that they have 

contributed significantly to ARL’s growing reputation in the technical community. 
10

Timothy Coffey and the Naval Research Laboratory 

Established in 1923, The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) is the oldest of the military 

service laboratories. It was opened at the instigation of Thomas Edison, who wrote in the 

New York Times that “the government should maintain a great research laboratory—in 

this could be developed all the techniques of military and naval progression without any 

vast expense.” NRL’s original organization consisted of three divisions: Radio, Sound, 

and Metallurgy. The laboratory did pioneering work in the fields of radar, high frequency 

radio, underwater sound propagation, and defect analysis in metal castings and 

weldments. During WWII, the staff grew nearly ten-fold, and five new NRL divisions 

were added in the areas of optics, chemistry, metallurgy, mechanics and electricity. The 

expanded research effort produced important devices and systems for the war effort in 

areas such as radar, sonar, and countermeasure systems. Also, a new thermal diffusion 

process for separating the U–235 isotope was developed in support of the Manhattan 

Project to develop the first atomic bombs. 

Following WWII, NRL was able to adopt a long-term perspective and address basic 

research issues associated with the operational environment: earth, sea, sky, and space. 

To reshape and coordinate the research, NRL needed to transform a group of largely 

autonomous scientific divisions into a unified organization with a clear mission and a 

fully coordinated research program. The first attempt at reorganization vested power in 

an executive committee composed of all the division heads. Further streamlining came in 

1949, when a civilian Director of Research was named and given full authority over the 

program, which today includes most of the science and technology areas of interest to the 

Department of the Navy. After WWII, NRL pioneered naval research that led to the 

Nation’s first intelligence satellite, Global Positioning System, and molecular structure 

analysis, for which two NRL scientists received the Nobel Prize. 

Biography 

Coffey’s background includes an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering and a 

PhD in physics. Following graduate school, he spent several years with EG & G Inc. as a 

research consultant working projects involving theoretical and mathematical physics. He 

became familiar with NRL programs during this time period and as a result decided to 

join the NRL staff. He spent the next 30 years at NRL, beginning as head of the Plasma 

Dynamics Branch, where he directed research in areas such as the simulation of plasma 

instabilities and the development of computer codes for chemically reactive flows. His 

next positions at NRL were as head of the Plasma Physics Division, Associate Director of 

Research, and then Director of Research. He occupied the latter position for 20 years 

before retiring from government service in 2001. Currently, Coffey is a Distinguished 

Research Fellow at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the 

National Defense University. 

Interview Highlights 

Like John Lyons, Coffey’s strong research background had a marked influence on his 

vision for NRL. He believed that NRL should be a “bona-fide card-carrying member of 
11

the scientific and technical community” and that it was his job to maintain NRL’s 

scientific and technical reputation as a major research laboratory. His approach to making 

the critical scientific and technical decisions involved in this task required him to gather 

input from a number of sources. These included in-house technical discussions, where he 

would hear from the proponents of competing scientific and technical approaches. He 

would also seek opinions on these approaches from outside experts. In addition, he would 

attend scientific and technical conferences and symposia to hear members of the NRL 

scientific and technical staff present papers. This provided him with an opportunity to 

evaluate the presentation, as well as hear the comments and questions that took place 

during the session. After attending a number of these sessions, Coffey was able to draw 

conclusions related to proposed research or the quality of ongoing NRL research. 

The emphasis on scientific and technical quality also was apparent when it came to 

making decisions regarding selections for heads of NRL divisions and branches. His 

priority was to select the person with the best technical qualifications. He believed that 

these people were paid for making the sound technical decisions and to provide scientific 

and technical leadership. The more administrative and procedural matters could be 

handled by a well-trained office staff. 

Because Coffey believed that the NRL scientists needed to be visible in the scientific and 

technical community, he tended to monitor their activities, using metrics such as papers, 

presentations, patents, and peer recognition that stressed scientific and technical output. 

He used peer reviews to judge performance of NRL programs. Early in his tenure as 

Director of Research, Coffey contracted with the National Research Council to assist 

with the review of the NRL program. He ultimately settled on the use of ad-hoc 

committees of scientific and technical experts in the areas being reviewed. Members of 

the committees were drawn from industry and academia, and were nationally recognized 

as subject matter experts in the appropriate fields. 

To answer the question of whether an S&T laboratory is world class or not, one must 

examine its performance in comparison to the rest of the scientific and technical 

community. Coffey believes that NRL passed this test with high marks. Maintaining the 

world class reputation of NRL not only involved paying close attention to the quality and 

importance of the scientific and technical programs as noted above, but also to attracting 

and retaining top quality scientists and engineers. For this to be realized, NRL placed 

emphasis on quality of life factors (equipment, facilities, support services, etc) and on 

providing competitive salaries to complement the emphasis on scientific and technical 

quality. 

Among his successes, Coffey cites NRL’s consistent support from the Navy’s scientific 

and technology base, as well as from the acquisition and development community. Also, 

NRL maintained its status as one of the top DOD laboratories, as reflected by its 

technical achievements, new programs, quality of the technical staff, patents, and 

publications. Coffey’s disappointments include the feeling that despite these successes, 

NRL seemed to be in a constant “survival drill”. Yesterday’s accomplishments and 

contributions were dismissed with the question, “but what have you done for me lately?” 
12

It became clear that there was no way to “win;” rather one had to ensure that NRL “did 

not lose.” 

He was also concerned about the increasing outsourcing of the S&T that was traditionally 

performed by the DOD in-house laboratories. In addition, the growing dependence on 

non-government entities in important aspects of S&T administration was bothersome. 

Coffey’s thoughts on this subject will be discussed in more detail in the Discussion and 

Concluding Remarks section of the paper. 
13

Vincent Russo and the Air Force Research Laboratory 

The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) was activated in 1997. Prior to the creation 

of AFRL, the Air Force conducted its research at four major laboratories containing 

thirteen different operational entities. These major Air Force laboratories, or “super” 

laboratories as they were called, were: Armstrong Laboratory (San Antonio, TX), Phillips 

Laboratory (Albuquerque, NM), Rome Laboratory (Rome, NY), and Wright Laboratory 

(Dayton, OH). Organizationally, each laboratory was aligned with a given Product 

Center. For example, Wright Laboratory reported to the Aeronautical Systems Division, 

the predecessor to what is today known as the Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC). Like 

the other product centers, ASC in turn reported to the Air Force Material Command. 

In response to several directed actions from Congress and the White House in the mid1990s (see previous section on Directed Actions and Important Studies for details), the 

Air Force initiated a plan to reconfigure and streamline its laboratory structure to produce 

a more integrated and cost-effective operation. This action ultimately led to the decision 

in 1996 to reorganize and consolidate resources by establishing a single laboratory, 

AFRL. In addition to the single laboratory concept, it was decided that AFRL would be 

commanded by a general officer and report directly to AFMC, just as the product centers, 

logistic centers and test centers did. These actions led to the creation of AFRL in 1997, 

which at that time consisted of the following technology directorates: Air Vehicles, Space 

Vehicles, Information, Munitions, Directed Energy, Materials and Manufacturing, 

Sensors, Propulsion, and Human Effectiveness. The Air Force Office of Scientific 

Research, which supports research in academia, also reported to AFRL. 

Biography 

Russo’s background includes an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering and a 

PhD in metallurgical engineering. His professional career was centered at WrightPatterson Air Force Base (WPAFB), home of Wright Laboratory, where he began his 

career as a materials scientist. In 1989, following several years in various management 

and leadership positions at WPAFB, he became head of the Materials Laboratory. In the 

mid-90’s, the leadership within the Air Force became very interested in the idea of 

reorganizing the infrastructure to increase integration and reduce the cost of its 

laboratories. Improved efficiency was also an important goal, as a large potential 

manpower reduction was on the horizon. Russo’s managerial skills attracted the attention 

of those responsible for this initiative, and he became the head of a transformation team 

responsible for the concept of converting the four super laboratories within the Air Force 

(of which Wright Laboratory was one) into a single laboratory (eventually known as 

AFRL). Following the successful formation of AFRL, Russo moved to the Aeronautical 

Systems Center, where he became Executive Director. This center, one of four Air Force 

Product Centers, is responsible for the design, development, and acquisition of aerospace 

weapon systems. 

In total, Russo spent approximately 40 years within the Air Force technology and 

acquisition communities in one capacity or another. Throughout his long career with the 
14

Air Force, Russo was very proactive in his management style, looking for new ways to 

improve his and other Air Force organizations. Russo felt strongly about leadership 

training, leading him to install an organizational development office within the Materials 

Laboratory during his tenure as its leader. When AFRL was established, a similar office 

was established within the headquarters and at each of the technical directorates. At ASC, 

with a much broader set of responsibilities, Russo continued to innovate in this area, 

establishing an in-house course that emphasized leadership training. The course was 

designed and taught by senior ASC leaders. Russo’s philosophy was one of “leaders 

teaching leadership.” The course was very popular, and received high approval ratings. 

Russo expressed much pride in this achievement. It should be noted that Russo retired 

from government service in 2004, but has continued his strong interest in the leadership 

area today from his position as the President and CEO of Growing Splendid Leaders, 

LLC. 

Interview Highlights 

Regarding the AFRL technical programs, Russo’s views reflected many of the same 

thoughts that were expressed by Lyons and Coffey. To achieve world-class laboratory 

status, AFRL must strive to hire world class scientists and engineers, and at the same 

time provide these people with world class equipment and facilities. A strong cadre of 

world class scientists is essential to conducting quality in-house research, which in turn is 

central to building the required AFRL core competencies that support the Air Force 

mission. To maintain the cadre of top research talent in some technical areas, Russo 

turned to regional universities and research firms to augment the in-house research staff. 

His approach was to contract with the universities and research firms to provide 

individuals with the appropriate background that could complement and assist with S&T 

efforts at the in-house laboratories. This GOCA (government-owned, contractor assisted) 

approach worked well in all of the key in-house materials programs and the additional 

scientists working with the in-house scientific staff made significant contributions to the 

quality of the program. 

Russo believed it was important to continually evaluate the AFRL technical program. To 

provide the AFRL leadership with a directorate-by-directorate assessment, Russo favored 

utilizing the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (SAB). This group, made up of 

technical experts, addressed the technical quality of each directorate’s program, while 

participants from the Air Force Product Centers addressed the relevance aspects. These 

evaluations not only provided assessment of each directorate, but when combined, 

assisted in obtaining the AFRL macro-picture. While directing the materials S&T 

program, Russo employed an ad hoc peer review group to assess the technical quality of 

specific programs. He utilized nationally recognized subject matter experts to review the 

program at the program element level. This provided a more in-depth evaluation of 

technical quality than the directorate-by-directorate review of the SAB / Product Center. 

With the feedback from the peer review group, Russo was able to fine tune the AFRL 

advanced materials program. 

At ASC, Russo became more involved in the transitioning of technology, and realized 

that it was a more difficult challenge than he had originally thought, mainly because the 
15

system program offices were not funded to integrate the products of the advanced 

development programs into their systems. To tackle the challenge, he helped institute an 

approach that coupled the technology needs of the system program office and the prime 

contractor with the laboratory funding proposals, mainly those in the advanced 

development areas. To aid in the process, the Air Force user commands were involved 

with evaluating the proposed projects. Upon evaluation, the projects were placed in one 

of three categories based on user needs, namely: user will provide transition funding, user 

will seek transition funding, and user not interested in seeking transition funding. To 

complete the cycle, approved projects were then assured of user-command support in the 

out-year budgetary process, an important requirement if the technology was intended for 

use by prime contractors. This process worked well and resulted in very favorable 

comments from industry, the user command, and the AFRL principal investigators. 

Russo was also concerned about some perceptions and directions of the Air Force 

technology development program. From a quality viewpoint, the current and prior years’ 

program have been very successful and have met Air Force needs. For the future, Russo 

hopes the trend continues. He emphasized, however, that care must be taken not to place 

too much emphasis on efficiency and expediency at the expense of technical quality and 

long term vision. If this change in emphasis comes to pass, Russo believes that the AFRL 

technology development program could be “headed in the wrong direction.” While some 

in the private sector may not agree, it is the job of the in-house laboratory to act as an 

honest broker in the Air Force weapon system acquisition process. Without the 

underpinning of a quality S&T program, this role could be in jeopardy. 

 Russo also expressed concerns over some personnel related issues. Traditionally, AFRL 

has benefited from a strong cadre of technical managers who have had a long standing 

commitment to, and involvement with, AFRL. The trend toward hiring managers who 

lack years of experience at AFRL could negatively impact this cadre. Russo’s concern 

was heightened by the Air Force leadership’s interest in implementing a “geographical 

mobility model,” whereby frequent reassignments of senior laboratory managers, such as 

those in the Senior Executive Service, would be mandatory. This approach mirrors the 

policy for active duty military officers, who are reassigned several times during the 

course of their careers. 

Lastly, Russo expressed concern about the Project Reliance concept. The Services have 

worked hard to make this program a success. Russo believes that the most recent deemphasis of the concept was not in the best interest of the overall DOD S&T program. 

The Project Reliance concept allowed the services to exchange ideas and share 

information regarding their technology development programs on a regular basis, and 

address issues of common concern. Russo believes that it is particularly important that 

Project Reliance succeed. He considers the idea of a single DOD corporate research 

laboratory or “purple laboratory,” as it is sometimes called, to replace ARL, NRL, and 

AFRL, to be an unattractive alterative. Given the unique set of mission-related 

requirements for each service, Russo believes that it would be unrealistic to expect Air 

Force personnel, civilian or military, to have the same degree of confidence in a DODwide laboratory as they have today in AFRL. 
16

Other Important Perspectives 

Having heard from the former CRL executives, it is interesting to turn to those who have 

served in the Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) and 

get their perspectives. The DDR&E is the office within DOD that oversees Service S&T 

activities in basic research, applied research, and advanced development. As part of this 

responsibility, it also addresses laboratory management issues.

Lance Davis was responsible for laboratory management within DDR&E during the 

1993–1998 timeframe, overlapping the tenures of Lyons, Coffey, and Russo as technical 

directors at their respective laboratories. Davis was interviewed in March 2008. This 

section discusses his thoughts, as well as those of Hans Mark, who was responsible for all 

of DDR&E in the time period (1998–2001) which followed Davis. 

Lance Davis 

Davis’ background, including an undergraduate degree in metallurgical engineering and a 

PhD in engineering applied science, was ideally suited for the DDR&E position. 

Following graduate school, Davis served two years as a postdoctoral student. He then 

joined Allied Chemical Company and continued his research in their corporate materials 

research laboratory. Following six years at the research bench, he became in succession 

group manager, materials research director and finally vice president for R&D. Davis 

ultimately spent about 25 years at Allied Chemical (now part of Honeywell Corporation). 

At Allied, Davis was part of a strong basic and applied research program. This research 

program led to products that provided Allied with a competitive advantage. One of the 

most important examples was metallic glass research, which led to the development of 

low-loss magnetic materials that had distinctive advantages over more traditional 

materials. Things changed in 1992, when Allied’s management decided to enter other 

markets by aggressively acquiring other companies. With these new acquisitions and the 

accompanying corporate culture change, there was less appreciation and support for the 

Allied research program, and the competitive advantages it provided. 

In 1993, Davis moved to the public sector and took a position with DDR&E as the 

Director of Technology Transition. In a short period of time, his responsibilities were 

expanded to include laboratory management. It was from this position, as Director of 

Laboratory Management and Technology Transition, that Davis directed DOD’s response 

to the congressionally mandated NDAA laboratory review of 1996. As noted previously, 

this response became known as Vision 21. The heart of the Vision 21 effort was an indepth evaluation of all the Service laboratories in search of ways to gain significant 

improvements in operating efficiency. 

The interview with Davis brought out several important thoughts related to the in-house 

S&T laboratories. Davis knew the importance of research from his time at Allied 

Chemical, and carried to DDR&E the belief that the in-house laboratories played an 

important role within DOD. Davis saw this role as not only developing technology, but 

also serving other important Service needs, such as providing an honest broker for 
17

technical opinions in the system acquisition cycle. Therefore, Davis believed that Vision 

21 thrust should not be directed toward closing any of the laboratories, but rather towards 

developing an approach that would lead to reduced infrastructure and lower operational 

costs. The approach he took was based on a three-pronged effort based on reduction, 

restructure, and revitalization of the in-house laboratories. To accomplish the objectives, 

he had each Service form a Vision 21 team. The output of all three service teams was 

integrated under Davis’ direction. 

The Vision 21 report was completed and sent to Congress in April 1996.11 It is important 

to note that the Vision 21 effort provided the impetus for the Air Force to move forward 

with a single laboratory concept (AFRL) as a means of achieving reduced operational 

costs. AFRL was activated in 1997. Highlights from the AFRL chronology, including the 

role of Vision 21, are shown in Appendix A. 

Another effort that Davis strongly supported, and was the recipient of much his attention, 

was the Laboratory Quality Improvement Program. Under his leadership, the number of 

laboratories achieving “reinvention” status as provided by the 1995 NDAA increased 

significantly. Also, additional benefits were requested for laboratories covered under the 

LQIP demonstration project. These were: 

• Authorization to exceed full-time equivalent authorization on a temporary 

basis 

• Authorization to increase time to complete staffing actions 

• Definition of high grades within the pay-banding system. 

Davis retired from government service in 1998 and is currently Executive Officer of the 

National Academy of Engineering. 

Hans Mark 

Hans Mark has both an undergraduate degree and a PhD in physics. He has held research 

and faculty appointments at MIT and the University of California-Berkeley. Prior to 

heading DDR&E in 1998, Mark was Chancellor of the University Of Texas and served in

previous administrations as Secretary of the Air Force and Deputy NASA Administrator. 

Mark’s views, published in the open literature and based on an examination of several 

government technology development laboratories (NRL, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 

and NIST), 12 are pertinent to the subject of this paper. He highlights several important 

characteristics that were exhibited by these successful government technology 

development laboratories. Near the top of the list was basic research. He noted that 

performing basic research is essential to the work of the laboratory. It not only supports 

the laboratory’s long-term mission, but it enables exploration into technical areas that are 

contiguous to the laboratory’s mission, in case such areas may later become relevant. 

 

11 Department of Defense, Vision 21. 12 Hans Mark and Arnold Levine, The Management of Research Institutions (Washington, DC: National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1984). 
18

Thus, a commitment to basic research enables the laboratory to move into new areas and 

to “diversify” as Mark put it, while sustaining the ability to conduct current programs. 

In addition to conducting basic research and successfully diversifying its knowledge base, 

Mark notes the following important characteristics of successful government laboratories: 

• Leaders of successful technology development laboratories must be responsible 

for the following priorities: 

o The primacy of diversification in decisions on the relevance of a technical 

area to current or future work pursued in the laboratory 

o Supporting basic research by: encouragement of scientists to publish their 

work in professional journals, collaboration with university researchers, 

sponsorship of interchanges of personnel between laboratory divisions as 

well as with the private sector, and sponsorship of improved 

instrumentation 

o Maintaining the proper balance between basic research and the more 

applied laboratory programs, including managing the internal perception 

that one group is gaining favor at the other’s expense 

o Sponsoring discretionary research 

o Evaluating the technical quality of the work done by the laboratory and 

deciding how much of the laboratory’s manpower can be devoted to 

customer funded programs 

o Maintaining the vitality of the laboratory by changing assignments, 

identifying candidates for management positions, instituting leave 

programs for professional development, and retraining staff when 

necessary 

• The principal role of the laboratory is to strengthen the research and engineering 

base of new technologies, rather to serve as managers of large systems or to 

develop new products. That is not to say that occasionally a technology laboratory 

should not undertake a project if it has the technical capability to do so. Such an 

effort may provide the technology base for follow-on systems. 

• The technology development laboratory is best administered as a number of 

loosely coupled units, rather than as a classical hierarchical system. Staff can then 

take responsibility for defining goals and communicating between the basic and 

applied sections of the organization. 
19

Discussion and Concluding Remarks 

While the thoughts of the laboratory executives, Lyons, Coffey, and Russo, and the 

DDR&E officials, Davis, and Mark, were expressed slightly differently, threads of 

commonality are evident. These threads were most apparent in areas related to basic 

research, achieving world class status, peer reviews, the role of government laboratories, 

and personnel matters related to recruitment and retention of scientists and engineers. 

This section will discuss these areas and conclude with some recommendations. 

There was general agreement among the executives that a basic research program was an 

essential underpinning to the technical success of their laboratories. In addition to putting 

a laboratory in a strong technical position to be an honest broker in the acquisition cycle, 

it was also essential for achieving world class laboratory status, a goal sought by all three 

laboratory executives. Other factors contributing to world class laboratory status were 

also mentioned. In addition to modern equipment and facilities, it was important for 

scientists and engineers to: 

• Have the opportunity to publish the results of their research in the open literature 

in refereed journals 

• Be duly recognized by peers 

• Earn a respectable salary 

• Have the opportunity to transition findings to follow-on more applied programs 

• Have the support of the acquisition and user elements of each Service. The latter 

requires a meaningful relationship with the customer, something that each 

executive worked hard to maintain. 

To aid and guide the executives in maintaining a high quality technical program, a 

meaningful in-depth peer review process was necessary. There was agreement among the 

executives that recognized external subject matter experts should be engaged to provide 

the review. It was noted that external subject matter experts could either be engaged by 

an external group such as the National Research Council, or by the laboratory executives 

themselves. The selected subject matter experts were to be not only leaders in their 

technical field, but independent thinkers as well. 

Metrics such as the number of patents, publications, and number of PhD’s were utilized, 

but in varying degree. ARL under John Lyons collected a full range of metrics, but used 

only a selected number in managing the laboratory. Timothy Coffey found that a smaller 

number would suffice for NRL. 

Some concern was expressed by the executives regarding the perception of the outside 

community toward government laboratories. The executives condemned the perception in 

some quarters that the in-house laboratories executed research of insufficient quality, and 

that the Nation would be better served having academia or industry perform S&T for 

DOD. It was strongly believed by the executives that such a turn of events would clearly 

not be in the Nation’s best interest. 
20

In addition to the many contributions that their laboratories have made to the Nation’s 

defense, another important reason was given for the executives’ strong beliefs that the inhouse laboratories needed to be in the technology development business. When it comes 

time to produce a given weapon system, the private industry plays the dominant role, 

providing most of the capability to manufacture and field the weapon system. To win the 

production contract, the private sector competes to provide the government with technical 

proposals. The proposals in turn must be evaluated. Acquisition officials who lack the 

special technical knowledge required to evaluate the performance claims of such 

proposals can turn to the subject matter experts in the in-house laboratories for unbiased 

reviews and recommendations. On many occasions the technical experts reside in more 

than one Service laboratory, so that an increased measure of objectivity is possible. Thus, 

the in-house laboratories can be utilized as honest brokers to make the military smart 

buyers. It was strongly believed that having this in-house capability significantly 

improved the likelihood that the DOD would avoid costly acquisition mistakes. 

As to the reason behind the previously discussed negative perception of the in-house 

laboratories, some interesting thoughts were provided by the executives. First, after the 

final production of weapons systems by industry, it is often very difficult to determine the 

origin of critical technologies that end up in the fielded weapon system. There is no 

marker on the weapon system that a given component was made possible by 

contributions from a given in-house laboratory. What is known is that the weapon system 

was produced by private industry. It is thus assumed by the public that industry was the 

source of all the critical technologies that made that weapon system possible, when in 

fact it was, in many cases, a teaming arrangement between the public and private sector 

that made the difference. 

The executives also had some important comments on scientist and engineer (S&E) 

personnel matters. Some discussion was centered on NSPS, the DOD-wide personnel 

system based on the principle of pay-for-performance, which established four pay bands 

to replace the 15-step GS system. The executives would have preferred an S&E personnel 

system with the LQIP characteristics shown in Table 1. Under LQIP, laboratory 

management is empowered to a greater extent than with NSPS. The executives believed 

that while NSPS was a step back and much more bureaucratic, it was still workable. One 

executive stated that NSPS would not kill the laboratories, expressing faith in their 

resiliency, and that the DOD laboratories would conduct successful S&T programs just as 

before. 

Some discussion with the executives centered on related subjects. The first had to do with 

the idea of a “geographic mobility model” that appears to be under discussion in some 

quarters for very senior civilian personnel. Such systems could lead to the periodic 

movement of senior officials, such as Senior Executive Service members, from one 

location to another. Such mandatory moves would reflect the military model, and it was 

felt that such a system, if instituted, would hurt recruitment and retention, and in general 

would not be beneficial. 
21

Concern was also expressed regarding the long-term outlook for DOD S&E workforce. 

This concern centered on outsourcing of the in-house technology development effort to 

the private sector. In addition to the February 2008 interview, Coffey has recently 

qualified his thoughts on the subject.13 He has suggested that increased outsourcing could 

lead to an “accountability gap,” and that the DOD should not abdicate its role of making 

the key technical decisions involved in the acquisition of weapon systems. DOD is the 

customer for these systems and is ultimately answerable to the public. However, as more 

and more of the DOD S&T is outsourced, the private sector workforce that is funded to 

do this work—as well as much of the administration (planning, formulation, review)—

comes to play more of a dominant role. This sets up a possible conflict of interest, and 

raises the question of who is in charge of the DOD acquisition cycle, the government or 

the private sector? The answer may have come from Congress,14 which has moved to 

limit the use of outsourcing, and with it the Lead Systems Integrator approach that was 

utilized for the development of such systems as the Army’s Future Combat System and 

the Navy’s Submarine Combat System. 

Coffey also notes that to meet these challenges, the DOD S&E workforce must keep pace 

with both the necessary talent and numbers, in comparison to the national S&E skill mix. 

Complicating matters is the fact that the DOD S&E workforce continues to shrink, 

relative to the national S&E workforce. This suggests that most of the future S&E talent 

may reside outside DOD. To offset these trends, Coffey proposes that the DOD S&E 

workforce, on average, center around a fixed percentage of the national workforce. Such 

an approach would go a long way toward addressing the above workforce issues. 

Concluding Remarks and Recommendations 

This paper has gathered the views of individuals who have collectively had many years 

directing research laboratories within the Federal government. In particular, they directed 

S&T programs for the three military services at the Army Research Laboratory, Naval 

Research Laboratory, and the Air Force Research Laboratory. They have made the 

difficult executive decisions mentioned by Mark and detailed in the previous section. 

These decisions played a significant role in shaping the in-house research programs that 

formed the underpinnings of technology development for the Nation’s weapons systems. 

As a result, Lyons, Coffey, and Russo get, in the author’s opinion, high marks for 

successfully meeting the challenges of their leadership positions. 

With the above in mind, it is felt that tapping the extensive wealth of knowledge and 

experience of these former laboratory executives in a single forum would pay significant 

dividends. The opportunity for them to interact with, and impart their advice and 

guidance to the current group of senior S&T in-house laboratory managers, some of 

whom may be relatively new to their position, would provide for a most beneficial 

exchange. Lastly, it may also be possible for these executives to participate in courses 

under consideration at the National Defense University.15

 

13 Timothy Coffey, “Building the S&E Workforce for 2040,” Defense and Technology Paper 49 

(Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2006). 14 Elise Castelli, “US House Seeks Curbs on Contractors,” Defense News, May 2008. 15 Samuel Musa, private communication, December 2008. 
22

Appendix A – Highlights from the AFRL Timeline16

1986 Packard Commission’s blue ribbon study looks at ways to 

operate DOD in a more efficient and economical manner. 

David Packard, former Undersecretary of Defense, heads 

the study. 

June 1986 Packard Commission issues its final report, A Quest for 

Excellence, proposing sweeping reforms to improve 

efficiency. 

1986 President Reagan signs National Security Decision 

Directive 219, directing implementation of the major 

recommendations of the Packard Commission. 

1986 President Reagan signs into law the Goldwater-Nichols 

Department of Defense Reorganization Act, considered 

the most significant defense-reform effort since 1947. 

Late 1980s With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the 

dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, unpredictable 

regional conflicts replace the monolithic communist 

threat. 

1989 President Bush hears complaints from Congressional 

representatives that the services are dragging their feet in 

supporting management reforms initiated by the Packard 

Commission and the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 

February 1989 President Bush directs the Secretary of Defense to draft a 

plan to look at ways to improve management (with fewer 

employees) and organizational efficiency in DOD. The 

goal is to devise a strategy to implement sweeping reforms 

proposed in the Packard Commission’s report. 

June 1989 Secretary of Defense Cheney completes a major 

reorganization plan known as the Defense Management 

Review (DMR) that addresses ways to improve the 

defense procurement process. It urges military services to 

borrow/implement streamlined business practices used in 

the private sector. 

July-September 1989 As part of the continual review process following the 

DMR report of June 1989, Secretary of Defense Cheney 

appoints special groups to investigate options for 

consolidating DOD functions, including laboratories. 

October 1989 As a result of the special study groups, DMR Decision 

922 strongly advises that the Pentagon consider merging 

all military laboratories directly under DOD. 

December 1990 Thirteen Air Force laboratories become four. 

 

16 Excerpted from Robert Duffner, Science and Technology—The Making of the Air Force Research 

Laboratory (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, November 2000). 
23

October 1992 Consolidated Army Research Laboratory headquartered at 

Adelphi, Maryland, is formed. 

November 1993 President Clinton announces a plan for an across-theboard review of all federal laboratories to streamline 

laboratory operations in view of projected decreases in 

federal R&D dollars. 

May 1994 President Clinton issues a directive establishing the 

Interagency Federal Laboratory Review 

May 1994-May 1995 At the direction of President Clinton, the National Science 

and Technology Council (NSTC) reviews the Nation’s 

three largest laboratory systems operating within DOD, 

the Department of Energy, and the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration. 

Mid-1990’s The “planning studying, and assessing” phase of the 

laboratory structure ends. The Clinton administration, 

Congress, and DOD want the Air Force to take action and 

start reconfiguring the labs to produce an even leaner and 

more cost-effective R&D operation. 

1995 DOD undertakes the Base Realignment and Closure 

(BRAC) process. 

May 1995 Air Force leadership initiates a movement to produce a 

new Air Force vision for the 21st century. A study group 

that consists of senior military and civilian leaders is 

formed to come up with a more realistic vision that would 

be responsive to changing political conditions around the 

world. 

May 1995 After a year of investigating how the DOD, DOE, and 

NASA laboratories operate, the NSTC submits its final 

report to President Clinton, indicating unanimous support 

for the legitimacy of laboratory functions but ample 

opportunity to improve management and cut redundancy. 

February 1996 Congress passes the National Defense Authorization Act 

for fiscal year 1996. Section 277 of the legislation (Public 

Law 104–106) directs the Secretary of Defense to develop 

a 5-year plan to consolidate and restructure laboratories 

and test and evaluation centers assigned to DOD. 

February 1996 President Clinton instructs the Secretary of Defense to 

submit a report to him, “detailing plans and schedules for 

downsizing the DOD laboratories.” 

April 1996 The Secretary of Defense delivers the Vision 21 plan to 

Congress, which becomes the catalyst for the Air Force to 

move forward to completely revamp the laboratory 

system. The final Vision 21 report combines outcomes 

from two studies—the DOD report compiled as a result of 

NSTC recommendations on laboratory restructuring, and 

the Vision 21 DOD plan prepared in response to the 
24

Defense Authorization Act of 1996. 

Late Spring 1996 The Air Force leadership proposes the formation of a 

single laboratory. 

November 1996 The Secretary of the Air Force approves the singlelaboratory concept. 

January 1997 Dr. Russo is selected to serve as the single-laboratory 

transition director. 

April 1997 By order of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Air Force 

Research Laboratory (AFRL) is activated. 

July 1997 The AFRL organizational structure, including the 

consolidation of 22 technology directorates to 9, is 

announced.