SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1558-19

LAKEVIEW LOAN SERVICING, 

LLC

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOLIE BATTISTA, MR. BATTISTA,

HUSBAND OF JOLIE BATTISTA,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellants.

________________________________

Submitted February 22, 2021 – Decided May 13, 2021

Before Judges Rothstadt and Susswein.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Middlesex County, Chancery Division, Docket No. 

F-018407-18.

Jolie Battista, appellant, pro se.

McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, LLC, attorneys for 

respondents (James A. French, of counsel and on the 

brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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PER CURIAM

Defendant Jolie Battista appeals from an October 1, 2019 order awarding 

a final judgment of foreclosure in favor of plaintiff and a December 10, 2019 

order denying defendant's motion to vacate that final judgment. After carefully 

reviewing the record in light of the arguments of the parties and governing legal 

principles, we affirm.

We presume the parties are familiar with the procedural history and the 

facts relevant to this appeal, which we need only briefly summarize. On June 9, 

2015, defendant executed a note on their residential property in the amount of 

$255,290 to plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest, American Neighborhood 

Mortgage Acceptance Company, LLC (ANMAC). The note was secured by a 

mortgage against the residential property to Mortgage Electronic Registration 

Systems, Inc. (MERS) as nominee for ANMAC. The mortgage was duly 

recorded.

On December 22, 2016, MERS assigned the mortgage to ANMAC and 

recorded the assignment. On August 31, 2017, ANMAC assigned the mortgage 

to plaintiff Lakeview Loan, LLC. That assignment was duly recorded on 

September 25, 2017.
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Defendant failed to make the required mortgage payments. The parties 

then entered into a loan modification agreement, which they recorded on 

September 5, 2017. In December 2017, defendant failed to make the monthly 

mortgage payment as required by the Loan Modification Agreement. On April 

6, 2018, plaintiff served defendant with a Notice of Intention to Foreclose (NOI).

The loan remained in default. On September 6, 2018, plaintiff filed a 

complaint seeking foreclosure. Defendant filed an answer contesting the 

complaint and asserting affirmative defenses. On November 7, 2018, plaintiff 

filed a motion for summary judgment, which defendant opposed. On February 

8, 2019, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.

On February 15, 2019, defendant filed a motion to vacate the summary 

judgment order. The court denied the motion on June 14, 2019. On June 24, 

2019, plaintiff filed a motion for final judgment. Defendant filed a cross-motion 

to bar plaintiff from moving for final judgment, which was denied on August 

14, 2019.

On August 19, 2019, defendant filed a motion to vacate the August 14 

order, which the court denied on September 20, 2019. On October 1, 2019, the 

court entered final judgment for plaintiff and issued a writ of execution directing 

the sale of the property. On October 9, 2019, defendant filed a motion to vacate 
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the final judgment order. The trial court denied the motion on December 10, 

2019.

Later that month, the property was sold to a third-party purchaser at a 

sheriff's sale. On December 18, 2019, defendant filed a motion to vacate the 

sale, which was denied on January 16, 2020. Defendant's ensuing motion for 

reconsideration was denied on March 18, 2020. This appeal follows. 

Defendant argued to the trial court that plaintiff did not have standing to 

bring the foreclosure action, failed to serve a NOI as required by the Fair 

Foreclosure Act (FFA), N.J.S.A. 2A:50-53 to -68, and presented improper 

proofs in the form of certifications by employees of the plaintiff's servicing 

agent. In its February 8, 2019 order, the court considered those arguments and 

found that the record clearly established the validity of the mortgage, the amount 

of the indebtedness, and plaintiff's right to resort to the mortgaged premises. 

More specifically, the trial court concluded the mortgage had been properly 

assigned to plaintiff, establishing plaintiff's standing to initiate the foreclosure 

action. With respect to the NOI, the court found that it had been mailed to 

defendants in accordance with the FFA, N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56(a). The court 

repeatedly reaffirmed these findings in each of its subsequent orders denying 

defendant's various motions to vacate and reconsider, explicitly noting that 
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defendant continued to offer only blanket conclusory statements but had failed 

to provide any new information that would warrant a change in judgment.

The court also rejected defendant's argument that it was improper for 

plaintiff to submit and rely upon certifications by two employees of the company 

that served as the servicing agent. Those certifications detailed the basis for 

their knowledge and ability to authenticate the business records concerning the 

loan that were attached to the certifications. The certifications and appended 

documents thus were admissible as business records pursuant to N.J.R.E. 

803(c)(6). See R. 4:64-2(c)(2) (expressly authorizing proofs submitted in 

support of a foreclosure by affidavit or certification "based on a personal review 

of business records of the plaintiff or the plaintiff's mortgage loan servicer, 

which records are maintained in the regular course of business"). 

On appeal, defendant's arguments relate solely to plaintiff's standing to 

bring the foreclosure complaint.1 We therefore deem the other arguments 

1

 The sole point heading of defendant's brief reads: 

APPELLANT JOLIE BATTISTA ARGUMENTS[sic] 

OF RECORDS WITH CONTESTING ANSWER AND 

AFFIRMATIVE CHALLENGE[sic] LAKEVIEW 

LOAN SERVICING, LCC[sic] TO PROVE THAT IT 

ESTABLISHED STANDING TO FORECLOSE 

UNDER BOTH THE LAW OF ASSIGNMENT AND 
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defendants raised to the trial court to be waived for purposes of this appeal. See 

Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011) ("An issue 

not briefed on appeal is deemed waived.").

We begin our analysis by acknowledging the standard for summary 

judgment. Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 4:46-2, which 

provides in pertinent part:

The judgment or order sought shall be rendered 

forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 

to any material fact challenged and that the moving 

party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of 

law. An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the 

burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by 

the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate 

inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, 

would require submission of the issue to the trier of 

fact.

[R. 4:46-2(c).]

UNIFMORM[sic] COMMERCIAL CODE AS A 

HOLDER OF THE NOTE THEREFORE PLAINTIFF 

WAS REQUIRED TO PROVE ITS CLAIM IN 

ACCORDANCE WITH THE UCC AND NEW 

JERSEY CASE LAW.

The text of defendant's seven-page brief pertains solely to her argument 

that plaintiff "was not the proper party to file this foreclosure action . . . ."
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To satisfy its burden of proof on a summary judgment motion, the moving 

party must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving 

party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Brill v. Guardian Life 

Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 528–29 (1995). If the moving party satisfies its 

burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present evidence that there 

is a genuine issue for trial. Ibid. The non-moving party may not rest upon mere 

allegations or denials in its pleadings but must produce sufficient and competent 

evidence to reasonably support a verdict in its favor. Id. at 535–36; see also

Triffin v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 372 N.J. Super. 517, 523–24 (App. Div. 2004) 

(holding that in order to successfully oppose summary judgment, "the 'opponent 

must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the 

material facts.'") (quoting Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 

F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d. Cir. 1992)).

The motion judge is required to determine "whether the evidence presents 

a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 

Inc. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 445–46 (2007) (quoting Brill, 142 

N.J. at 536). The motion judge must review the facts in the light most favorable 
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to the party opposing summary judgment. Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 

469, 479 (2016). 

Moreover, Rule 4:5-4 requires that all affirmative defenses be supported 

by specific facts. Parties must respond with affidavits setting forth specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. An "issue of fact is genuine only 

if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the 

parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring 

the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact." 

R. 4:46-2(c); see also Brill, 142 N.J. at 535.

Summary judgment should be applied to serve two competing policies:

On the one hand is the desire to afford every litigant 

who has a bona fide cause of action or defense the 

opportunity to fully expose his [or her] case. . . . On 

the other hand, protection is to be afforded against 

groundless claims and frivolous defenses, not only to 

save antagonists the expense of protracted litigation but 

also to reserve judicial manpower and facilities to cases 

which meritoriously command attention.

[Id. at 541-42.] 

We next consider how these general principles apply in the context of 

foreclosure actions. A plaintiff need only present three elements to establish a 

prima facie right to foreclose: "the execution, recording, and non-payment of 

the mortgage." Thorpe v. Floremoore Corp., 20 N.J. Super. 34, 37 (App. Div. 
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1952). Accordingly, the defenses to a foreclosure action are narrow and limited. 

The only material issues in a foreclosure proceeding are the validity of the 

mortgage, the amount of indebtedness, and the right of the mortgagee to 

foreclose on the mortgaged property. Great Falls Bank v. Pardo, 263 N.J. Super. 

388, 394 (Ch. Div. 1993). 

For a party to have standing to prosecute a foreclosure action, it "must 

own or control the underlying debt." Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ford, 418 N.J. 

Super. 592, 597 (App. Div. 2011) (citing Bank of N.Y. v. Raftogianis, 418 N.J. 

Super. 323, 327–28 (Ch. Div. 2010)). "Either possession of the note or an 

assignment of the mortgage that predated the original complaint confer[s] 

standing." Deutsche Bank Trust Co. v. Angeles, 428 N.J. Super, 315, 318 (App. 

Div. 2012) (citing Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 

214, 216 (App. Div. 2011)). 

In this instance, the record shows that plaintiff satisfies both methods for 

establishing standing. Plaintiff possesses the note. Furthermore, the record 

shows that ANMAC assigned the mortgage to plaintiff and that assignment was 

duly recorded on September 25, 2017, well before the foreclosure complaint was 

filed on September 6, 2018. We add that defendant has not asserted that an 

entity other than plaintiff has made demand upon them for payment. On this 
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record, summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on the issue of plaintiff's 

standing to bring the foreclosure action was appropriate. 

To the extent we have not specifically addressed them, any remaining 

arguments raised by defendant lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.