Missile Defense Agency 

Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) 

Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 

January 2007

VOLUME 1 

FINAL BMDS PEIS 

Department of Defense 

Missile Defense Agency 

7100 Defense Pentagon 

Washington, DC 20301-7100
i

Volume 1 

Table of Contents 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.............................................................................................. ES-1 

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................ AC-i 

1 PURPOSE OF AND NEED FOR THE PROPOSED ACTION .............................1-1

1.1 Introduction......................................................................................................1-1

1.2 Background......................................................................................................1-1

1.3 Purpose of the Proposed Action ......................................................................1-8

1.4 Need for the Proposed Action..........................................................................1-8

1.5 The Proposed Action .......................................................................................1-8

1.6 Scope of the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement........................1-8

1.7 Consultations and Coordination ....................................................................1-12

1.8 Summary of the Public Involvement Process................................................1-13

1.8.1 Scoping ............................................................................................1-13

1.8.2 Public Comment Period ...................................................................1-14

1.9 Related Documentation..................................................................................1-15

2 DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED ACTION AND ALTERNATIVES ...................2-1

2.1 BMDS Concept................................................................................................2-1

2.1.1 BMDS Layered Defense and Missile Flight Phases..........................2-3

2.1.2 BMDS Functional Capabilities..........................................................2-6

2.1.3 BMDS System Acquisition Approach.............................................2-10

2.2 BMDS Components.......................................................................................2-13

2.2.1 Weapons...........................................................................................2-13

2.2.2 Sensors .............................................................................................2-17

2.2.3 Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications 

(C2BMC) .........................................................................................2-23

2.2.4 Support Assets .................................................................................2-26

2.2.5 MDA’s Programs.............................................................................2-34

2.3 BMDS Life Cycle Activities .........................................................................2-38

2.3.1 Development of BMDS Components..............................................2-38

2.3.2 Testing of the BMDS.......................................................................2-43

2.3.3 Deployment of the BMDS ...............................................................2-57

2.3.4 Planning for Decommissioning of the BMDS.................................2-61

2.4 Alternatives....................................................................................................2-62

2.4.1 Alternative 1 – Implement Proposed BMDS with Land-, Sea-, Airbased Weapons Platforms................................................................2-63

2.4.2 Alternative 2 – Implement Proposed BMDS with Land-, Sea-, Airand Space-based Weapons Platforms ..............................................2-65

2.5 No Action Alternative....................................................................................2-66

2.6 Alternatives Considered But Not Carried Forward .......................................2-67

2.6.1 Cancel Development of Ballistic Missile Defense Capabilities......2-67
ii

2.6.2 Single or Two-Platform BMDS.......................................................2-67

3 AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT ...............................................................................3-1

3.1 Resource Areas ................................................................................................3-6

3.1.1 Air Quality .........................................................................................3-6

3.1.2 Airspace ...........................................................................................3-12

3.1.3 Biological Resources .......................................................................3-16

3.1.4 Cultural Resources...........................................................................3-20

3.1.5 Environmental Justice......................................................................3-22

3.1.6 Geology and Soils............................................................................3-23

3.1.7 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste ....................................3-26

3.1.8 Health and Safety.............................................................................3-28

3.1.9 Land Use ..........................................................................................3-30

3.1.10 Noise ...............................................................................................3-32

3.1.11 Socioeconomics ..............................................................................3-38

3.1.12 Transportation.................................................................................3-40

3.1.13 Utilities............................................................................................3-42

3.1.14 Visual Resources.............................................................................3-44

3.1.15 Water Resources .............................................................................3-47

3.2 Affected Environment....................................................................................3-49

3.2.1 Arctic Tundra Biome .......................................................................3-50

3.2.2 Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome ..................................................................3-55

3.2.3 Deciduous Forest Biome..................................................................3-59

3.2.4 Chaparral Biome ..............................................................................3-62

3.2.5 Grasslands Biome ............................................................................3-66

3.2.6 Desert Biome ...................................................................................3-68

3.2.7 Tropical Biome ................................................................................3-71

3.2.8 Savanna Biome ................................................................................3-75

3.2.9 Mountain Biome ..............................................................................3-78

3.2.10 Broad Ocean Area...........................................................................3-80

3.2.11 Atmosphere.....................................................................................3-85

4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES ..............................................................4-1

4.1 Alternative 1 – Implement BMDS Using Land-, Sea-, and Air-Based Weapons 

Platforms........................................................................................................4-21

4.1.1 BMDS Components.........................................................................4-21

4.1.2 Test Integration ..............................................................................4-101

4.1.3 Activities at Locations Outside of the Continental U.S.................4-113

4.1.4 Cumulative Impacts .......................................................................4-113

4.2 Alternative 2 – Implement BMDS Using Land-, Sea-, Air-, and Space-Based 

Weapons Platforms......................................................................................4-118

4.2.1 Impacts Analysis............................................................................4-118

4.2.2 Test Integration ..............................................................................4-126

4.2.3 Cumulative Impacts .......................................................................4-131

4.3 No Action Alternative..................................................................................4-133
iii

4.4 Adverse Environmental Effects That Cannot Be Avoided..........................4-134

4.5 Relationship between Short-Term Use of the Human Environment and the 

Maintenance and Enhancement of Long-Term Productivity ......................4-134

4.6 Irreversible or Irretrievable Commitment of Resources..............................4-134

4.7 Federal Actions to Address Protection of Children from Environmental Health 

Risks and Safety Risks (EO 13045, as Amended by EO 13296 

and EO 13229)............................................................................................4-135

5 REFERENCES.........................................................................................................5-1

6 LIST OF PREPARERS............................................................................................6-1

7 DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................................................................................7-1

INDEX VOLUME 1 ..............................................................................................Index V1-1 
iv

Table of Exhibits 

Exhibit ES-1. Ballistic Missile Flight Phases .............................................................ES-4 

Exhibit ES-2. Complexities of an Integrated BMDS..................................................ES-5 

Exhibit ES-3. Affected Environment Descriptions.....................................................ES-9 

Exhibit ES-4. Map of Global Biomes .......................................................................ES-11 

Exhibit ES-5. Component Test Activities with Potential Impacts............................ES-14 

Exhibit ES-6. Description of System Integration Tests ............................................ES-20 

Exhibit ES-7. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 1 - Weapons.....ES-23 

Exhibit ES-8. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 1 - Sensors .......ES-25 

Exhibit ES-9. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 1 - C2BMC ......ES-27 

Exhibit ES-10. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 1 – Support Assets .....

 ............................................................................................................ES-29 

Exhibit ES-11. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 1 - Test Integration ....

 ............................................................................................................ES-32 

Exhibit ES-12. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 2 – Weapons ....ES-38 

Exhibit ES-13. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 2 - Test Integration ....

 ............................................................................................................ES-41 

Exhibit 1-1. Ballistic Missile Defense Timeline .........................................................1-4 

Exhibit 1-2. Complexities of the BMDS .....................................................................1-9 

Exhibit 1-3. Typical Activities for BMDS Proposed Action ....................................1-11 

Exhibit 2-1. Types and Maximum Ranges of Ballistic Missiles.................................2-2 

Exhibit 2-2. Ballistic Missile Flight Phases and Defense Segments...........................2-2 

Exhibit 2-3. Boost Phase and the Boost Defense Segment .........................................2-3 

Exhibit 2-4. Midcourse Phase and the Midcourse Defense Segment..........................2-4 

Exhibit 2-5. Terminal Phase and the Terminal Defense Segment ..............................2-5 

Exhibit 2-6. Crosswalk of Functional Capability with Components...........................2-9 

Exhibit 2-7. Block Development Process..................................................................2-12 

Exhibit 2-8. The MDA Systems Engineering Process ..............................................2-13 

Exhibit 2-9. Interceptor Schematic............................................................................2-14 

Exhibit 2-10. Interceptor Launch.................................................................................2-15 

Exhibit 2-11. Radar Band Designations ......................................................................2-20 

Exhibit 2-12. DSP Satellite..........................................................................................2-20 

Exhibit 2-13. Proposed Sensors, Roles and Operating Environments ........................2-22 

Exhibit 2-14. Typical Command Center .....................................................................2-23 

Exhibit 2-15. BMDS Limited Defensive Capability Block 2004 Test Bed ................2-29 

Exhibit 2-16. Summary of Representative Test Sensors.............................................2-30 

Exhibit 2-17. Typical Test Targets..............................................................................2-32 

Exhibit 2-18. Representative MDA Targets and Boosters ..........................................2-33 

Exhibit 2-19. MDA Programs Supporting the BMDS Acquisition Life Cycle...........2-34 

Exhibit 2-20. Deployment of Countermeasures during Flight Phases ........................2-36 

Exhibit 2-21. Facilities Available in the Atlantic or Gulf of Mexico..........................2-41 

Exhibit 2-22. Description of System Integration Tests ...............................................2-47 
v

Exhibit 2-23. Typical Fielding Activities....................................................................2-59 

Exhibit 3-1. Map of Global Biomes ............................................................................3-3 

Exhibit 3-2. Non-Attainment Areas for Criteria Pollutants January 2004..................3-7 

Exhibit 3-3. General Conformity De Minimis Levels .................................................3-9 

Exhibit 3-4. Definitions of Airspace Categories .......................................................3-13 

Exhibit 3-5. Geographic Distribution for Earthquakes in the Continental U.S.........3-24 

Exhibit 3-6. Landslide Areas in the Contiguous U.S. ...............................................3-25 

Exhibit 3-7. Comparative A-Weighted Sound Levels...............................................3-33 

Exhibit 3-8. Examples of Outdoor Day-Night Average Noise Levels in Various Land 

Use Locations ........................................................................................3-34 

Exhibit 3-9. Range of Noise Measurements..............................................................3-35 

Exhibit 3-10. Summary of Quality of Assessed Rivers, Lakes, and Estuaries............3-48 

Exhibit 3-11. Global Distribution of the Arctic Tundra Biome ..................................3-51 

Exhibit 3-12. Regulated Activities Near Seabird Colonies in Arctic Regions............3-53 

Exhibit 3-13. Global Distribution of the Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome .............................3-56 

Exhibit 3-14. Global Distribution of the Deciduous Forest Biome.............................3-59 

Exhibit 3-15. Global Distribution of the Chaparral Biome .........................................3-63 

Exhibit 3-16. Global Distribution of the Grasslands Biome .......................................3-66 

Exhibit 3-17. Global Distribution of the Desert Biome ..............................................3-69 

Exhibit 3-18. Global Distribution of the Tropical Biome ...........................................3-72 

Exhibit 3-19. Global Distribution of the Savanna Biome ...........................................3-75 

Exhibit 3-20. Global Distribution of the Mountain Biome .........................................3-78 

Exhibit 3-21. Altitude Range for Atmospheric Layers ...............................................3-86 

Exhibit 3-22. Relationship Between Airspace Classifications and Atmospheric Layers ..

 ...............................................................................................................3-87 

Exhibit 4-1. Life Cycle Activities Determined to Have No Significant Environmental 

Impact ......................................................................................................4-3 

Exhibit 4-2. Analysis of Impacts of Development Phase Activities ...........................4-4 

Exhibit 4-3. Analysis of Impacts of Test Life Cycle Phase Activities........................4-6 

Exhibit 4-4. Analysis of Impacts of Deployment Phase Life Cycle Activities.........4-14 

Exhibit 4-5. Analysis of Impacts of Decommissioning Phase Life Cycle Activities4-15 

Exhibit 4-6. Decommissioning Activities for Fixed Facilities..................................4-19 

Exhibit 4-7. Estimated In-Flight COIL Gaseous Emissions in Kilograms (Pounds)*.....

 ...............................................................................................................4-22 

Exhibit 4-8. Freshwater Species Tolerance to Acidity..............................................4-27 

Exhibit 4-9. Potential Exceedances Due to Accidental Oxidizer or Fuel Leak to Air 

During Fueling Activities......................................................................4-53 

Exhibit 4-10. Potential Exceedances Due to Accidental Oxidizer or Fuel Leak at the 

Booster Impact Site ...............................................................................4-56 

Exhibit 4-11. Emission Products from Launches of Representative Targets and 

Interceptors in metric tons (tons).........................................................4-104 

Exhibit 4-12. Emission Products from Launches of Representative Targets and Lasers 

in kilograms (pounds)..........................................................................4-104 
vi

Exhibit 4-13. Summary of Estimated Emission Loads to the Stratosphere from 

Launches (2004-2014) in metric tons (tons)* .....................................4-114 

Exhibit 4-14. Comparison of Emission Loads of CO and CO2 to both the Troposphere 

and Stratosphere ..................................................................................4-115 

Exhibit 4-15. Comparison of Emission Loads of Chlorine (HCl and Free Cl) in both the 

Troposphere and Stratosphere .............................................................4-116 

Exhibit 4-16. Relationship between Altitude and Orbital Lifetime ..........................4-120 

Exhibit 4-17. Typical Satellite Breakup ....................................................................4-121 

Volume 2 

APPENDICES 

Table of Contents 

Appendix A – Consultation and Coordination...................................................................A-1 

Appendix B – Public Involvement..................................................................................... B-1 

Appendix C – Related Documentation .............................................................................. C-1 

Appendix D – Descriptions of Proposed BMDS Elements ...............................................D-1 

Appendix E – Descriptions of Proposed BMDS Sensors .................................................. E-1 

Appendix F – Advanced Systems .......................................................................................F-1 

Appendix G – Applicable Legal Requirements .................................................................G-1 

Appendix H – Biome Descriptions ....................................................................................H-1 

Appendix I – Cumulative Impacts ...................................................................................... I-1 

Appendix J – Glossary ........................................................................................................ J-1 

INDEX VOLUME 2 ..............................................................................................Index V2-1 

Volume 3 

APPENDICES 

Table of Contents 

Appendix K – Comment Responses ..................................................................................K-1 

Appendix L – Perchlorate Technical Appendix................................................................. L-1 

Appendix M – Orbital Debris Technical Appendix.......................................................... M-1 

Appendix N – Impacts of Radar on Wildlife .....................................................................N-1 

INDEX VOLUME 3 ..............................................................................................Index V3-1 
ES-1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Introduction 

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended; the Council on 

Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations that implement NEPA (Code of Federal 

Regulations [CFR], Title 40, Parts 1500-1508); Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 

4715.9 Environmental Planning and Analysis; applicable service environmental 

regulations that implement these laws and regulations; and Executive Order (EO) 12114, 

Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions (whose implementation is 

guided by NEPA and the CEQ implementing regulations) direct DoD lead agency 

officials to consider potential impacts to the environment when authorizing or approving 

Federal actions. 

This Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) evaluates the potential 

environmental impacts of activities associated with the development, testing, deployment, 

and planning for decommissioning of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). 

This PEIS considers the current technology components, assets, and programs that make 

up the proposed BMDS as well as the development and application of new technologies, 

and considers cumulative impacts of implementing the BMDS. A programmatic NEPA 

evaluation is the appropriate approach for projects that are large in scope, diverse 

geographically, and implemented in phases over many years. It provides the analytical 

framework that supports subsequent NEPA analysis of specific actions at specific 

locations within the overall system, i.e., tiering. 

Purpose and Need for the Proposed Action 

The purpose of the proposed action is for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to 

incrementally develop and field a BMDS that layers defenses to intercept ballistic 

missiles of all ranges in all phases of flight. The proposed action is needed to protect the 

United States (U.S.), its deployed forces, friends, and allies from ballistic missile threats. 

The BMDS is a key component of U.S. policy for addressing ballistic missile threats 

worldwide. 

Proposed Action 

The MDA is proposing to develop, test, deploy, and to plan for related decommissioning 

activities for an integrated BMDS using existing infrastructure and capabilities, when 

feasible, as well as emerging and new technologies, to meet current and evolving ballistic 

missile threats. The Secretary of Defense assigned this critical defense mission to the 

MDA. 
ES-2

Scope of the PEIS 

This PEIS identifies, evaluates, and documents the potential environmental effects of 

developing, testing, deploying, and planning for the eventual decommissioning of a 

BMDS. Although extensive environmental analysis already exists for many of the 

existing and projected components of the proposed BMDS, this PEIS examines potential 

environmental impacts of MDA’s concept for developing an integrated system, based on 

current Congressional and Presidential direction. The BMDS PEIS also assesses whether 

cumulative environmental effects would result from implementing the proposed action. 

Further, the BMDS PEIS provides the analytical framework for tiering subsequent 

specific NEPA analyses of activities including increasingly complex and robust System 

Integration Testing. 

Consultation and Coordination 

The MDA, as the lead agency responsible for preparing this PEIS, is required to 

coordinate with affected Federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, and other interested 

parties. The MDA identified several agencies that may be cooperating or consulting 

agencies within the requirements of NEPA for this PEIS. These agencies include 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National Marine Fisheries Service 

(NOAA Fisheries Service), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Advisory Council on 

Historic Preservation (ACHP), and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 

Consulting agencies may submit comments and provide data to support the 

environmental analysis, but they do not participate in the internal review of documents, 

issues, and analyses. A cooperating agency is any Federal agency, other than a lead 

agency, that has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental 

impact involved in a proposal (or reasonable alternative) for legislation or other Federal 

action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. (40 CFR 1508.5) 

MDA has held informal meetings with several agencies; however, MDA has not 

requested that any agencies participate as cooperating agencies for this PEIS.

Public Involvement 

The MDA provided several opportunities and means for public involvement throughout 

the preparation of the BMDS PEIS. The CEQ implementing regulations for NEPA 

describe the public involvement requirements for agencies. (40 CFR 1506.6) Public 

participation in the NEPA process provides for and encourages open communication 

between the MDA and the public, thus promoting better decision-making. 

Public involvement for the development of the BMDS PEIS began with the publication 

of the Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (FR) (68 FR 17784) on April 11, 

2003. The MDA invited the participation of Federal, state, and local agencies, Native 
ES-3

American Tribes, environmental groups, organizations, citizens, and other interested 

parties to assist in determining the scope and significant issues to be evaluated in the 

BMDS PEIS. MDA held public scoping meetings in accordance with CEQ regulations. 

(40 CFR 1501.7) Meetings took place in Arlington, Virginia on April 30, 2003; 

Sacramento, California on May 6, 2003; Anchorage, Alaska on May 8, 2003; and 

Honolulu, Hawaii on May 13, 2003. The purpose of the scoping meetings was to solicit 

input from the public on concerns regarding the proposed activities as well as to gather 

information and knowledge of issues relevant to analyzing the environmental impacts of 

the BMDS. The public scoping meetings also provided the public with an opportunity to 

learn more about the MDA’s proposed action and alternatives. The MDA developed a 

publicly accessible web site, http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/mdalink.html, to provide 

information on the BMDS PEIS and request scoping comments. The MDA also 

established a toll-free phone and fax line, e-mail address, and U.S. postal service mailbox 

for submittal of public comments and questions.

During scoping, the MDA received 285 comments. Comments received pertaining to 

reasonable alternatives to the proposed action, resource areas, human health, and 

environmental impacts have been considered in this PEIS. 

The public comment period began with the publication of the Notice of Availability 

(NOA) on September 17, 2004 in the FR by the Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA). The NOA announced the availability of the Draft PEIS and requested comments 

on it. A downloadable version of the Draft PEIS was available on the BMDS PEIS web 

site and hardcopies of the document were placed in public libraries in the cities holding 

the public hearings. In October, 2004 MDA held public hearings in Arlington, Virginia; 

Sacramento, California; Anchorage, Alaska; and Honolulu, Hawaii. The MDA also 

placed legal notices in local and regional newspapers and notified state representatives of 

the public hearings. The purpose of these hearings was to solicit comments on the 

environmental areas analyzed and considered in the Draft PEIS. Appendix B contains a 

detailed description of the public comment period and a reproduction of the transcripts of 

the public hearings. The MDA’s consideration of the approximately 8,500 comments 

received on the Draft PEIS and responses to in-scope comments can be found in 

Appendix K of this PEIS. Additional areas of analysis—orbital debris, perchlorate, and 

radar impacts to wildlife—are addressed in more technical detail in Appendices L, M, 

and N. The Final BMDS PEIS will be available for download at the site address listed 

above. 

The Proposed BMDS 

Conceptually, the BMDS would be a layered system of defensive weapons (i.e., lasers 

and interceptors); sensors (i.e., radars, infrared, optical, and lasers); Command and 

Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC); and support assets (i.e., 

auxiliary equipment, infrastructure and test assets); each with specific functional 
ES-4

capabilities, working together to defend against all classes and ranges of threat ballistic 

missiles in the three flight phases. A flight phase is a portion of the path taken by a threat 

missile moving through the atmosphere or space. The three flight phases of a ballistic 

missile are boost, midcourse, and terminal. Exhibit ES-1 describes these three phases. 

Multiple defensive weapons would be used to create a layered defense comprised of 

multiple intercept opportunities. 

Exhibit ES-1. Ballistic Missile Flight Phases 

Flight Phase Description 

Boost First phase - rocket engine is ignited, missile lifts off and 

sets out on a specific path. 

Midcourse 

Second phase - begins when the rocket engine cuts off 

and the missile continues on a ballistic trajectory. 

Warheads and decoys may be deployed in this phase. 

Terminal Third phase - final portion of a ballistic trajectory 

between the midcourse phase and trajectory termination. 

To determine environmental impacts, this PEIS analyzes the proposed BMDS in terms of 

its components, i.e., weapons, sensors, C2BMC, and support assets. These components 

become part of the BMDS through the acquisition life cycle phases – develop, test, 

deploy, and decommission. The components and activities could occur in various land, 

sea, air, and space operating environments. Exhibit ES-2 depicts the multi-dimensional 

complexities involved in considering the impacts of implementing an integrated BMDS. 

Impact Launch

Boost

Midcourse

Terminal

Warheads and 

Decoy 

Deployment 
ES-5

Exhibit ES-2. Complexities of an Integrated BMDS 

Components of the BMDS 

The proposed BMDS would be comprised of components, i.e., weapons, sensors, 

C2BMC, and support assets. These are the systems and subsystems of logically grouped 

hardware and software that perform interacting tasks to provide BMDS functional 

capabilities. Historically, MDA primarily focused on developing stand-alone elements 

with specific defensive capabilities. The proposed approach maximizes flexibility to 

develop and test an integrated system while allowing initial capabilities to be fielded. 

 Weapons. Weapons consisting of interceptors and high energy lasers (HELs) would 

be used to negate threat missiles. Interceptors would use either direct impact or 

directed fragmentation technology. BMDS weapons are designed to intercept threat 

ballistic missiles in one or more phases of flight and could be activated from land, 

sea-, air-, or space-based platforms. 

 Sensors. BMDS sensors provide the relevant incoming data for threat ballistic 

missiles. They acquire, record, and process data on threat missiles and interceptor 

missiles; detect and track threat missiles; direct interceptor missiles or other defenses 

(e.g., lasers); and assess whether a threat missile has been destroyed. These sensors 

include signal-processing subcomponents, which receive raw data and use hardware 

and software to process these data to determine the threat missile’s location, direction, 
ES-6

velocity, and altitude. The data from these sensors would travel through the 

communication systems of the proposed BMDS to Command and Control (C2) where 

a decision would be made to employ a defensive weapon such as launching an 

interceptor. The technologies used by existing and proposed BMDS sensors are based 

on the frequency or electromagnetic (EM) energy spectrum used by the sensor and 

include radar, infrared, optical, and laser systems. 

 C2BMC. C2BMC would effectively integrate all components of the BMDS and 

would consist of electronic equipment and software that enable military commanders 

to receive and process information, make decisions, and communicate those decisions 

regarding the engagement of threat missiles. Specifically, C2BMC would receive, 

fuse, and display tracking and status data from multiple components so that 

commanders at various locations would have the same integrated operating picture 

and could make coordinated decisions about deploying weapons. The BMDS 

C2BMC includes three primary parts, C2, Battle Management (BM), and 

Communications. C2 would provide an integrated architecture to plan, direct, control, 

and monitor BMDS activities. BM would control the launching or firing of missiles 

and integrate the surveillance, detect/track/classify, engage, and assess across the 

layered defenses. Communications would allow all BMDS components to exchange 

data and network with BMDS assets. 

 Support Assets. Support assets would be used to facilitate BMDS development, 

testing, and deployment. Support assets include support equipment, infrastructure, 

and test assets. Support equipment includes general transportation and portable 

equipment (e.g., automotive, ships, aircraft, rail, generators); BMDS Test Bed 

equipment (e.g., aircraft, vehicles, ships, mobile launch platforms, operator control 

units, sensor operations equipment [antennas, electronic equipment, cooling units, 

prime power units]); and weapons basing platforms (e.g., Aegis Cruiser and Airborne 

Laser [ABL] aircraft). Infrastructure includes docks, shipyards, launch facilities, and 

airports/air stations. Test assets include test range facilities, targets (missiles and 

drones), countermeasure devices, simulants, test sensors, optical and infrared cameras, 

computers, and observation vehicles. These test assets would simulate a threat missile 

in a realistic environment and assess and provide data used to enhance the 

performance of BMDS components in negating those threats. Some of the equipment 

(i.e., radar and tracking stations) and infrastructure (e.g., launch facilities) and all of 

the test assets comprise the BMDS Test Bed. 

Acquisition Life Cycle Phases 

The MDA, as the acquisition agency for the BMDS, has implemented a new, more 

flexible approach to its development. This approach is capability driven and componentbased. Capability-based planning allows MDA to develop capabilities and system 

performance objectives based on technology feasibility, engineering analyses, and the 
ES-7

potential capability of the threat. Spiral development is an iterative process for 

developing the BMDS by refining program objectives as technology becomes available 

through research and testing with continuous feedback among MDA, the test community, 

and the military operators. Thus, MDA can consider deployment of a missile defense 

system that has no specified final architecture and no set of operational requirements but 

which will be improved incrementally over time. Development, testing, and deployment 

of an integrated BMDS would occur over several years using this evolutionary, spiral 

development process. Each new technology would go through development; promising 

technologies would go through testing and demonstration; and proven technologies 

would be incorporated into the BMDS. 

 Development. Development includes the various activities that would support 

research and development of the BMDS components and overall systems. This would 

include planning, budgeting, research and development, systems engineering, site 

preparation and construction, repair, maintenance and sustainment, manufacture of 

test articles and initial testing, including modeling, simulation, and tabletop exercises. 

 Testing. Testing of the BMDS involves demonstration of BMDS elements and 

components through test and evaluation. The successful demonstration of the BMDS 

would rely on a robust testing program aimed at producing credible system 

characterization, verification, and assessment data. To confirm these capabilities, 

MDA would continue to develop Test Beds using existing and new land-, sea-, air-, 

and space-based assets. Some construction at various geographic locations would be 

required to support infrastructure and assets where BMDS components and the overall 

system would be tested. Testing of the BMDS includes ongoing and planned tests 

(e.g., ground tests [GTs], flight tests) of components that might be incorporated into 

the BMDS, as well as tests of the layered, integrated BMDS through increasingly 

realistic System Integration Tests through 2010 and beyond. 

 Deployment. Deployment of the BMDS refers to the fielding (including the 

manufacture, site preparation, construction and transport of systems) and sustainment 

(including operations and maintenance, training, upgrades, and service life extension) 

of BMDS architecture. The evolving BMDS is intended to have the capability over 

time to deploy different combinations of interoperable components. Deployment also 

would involve the transfer of facilities, elements and programs to the military 

services. On December 17, 2002, President Bush directed the fielding of initial 

defensive operation (IDO) capabilities by 2004, which would provide limited 

protection to defend the U.S. against ballistic missile attack. In October 2004, MDA 

achieved a limited missile defense capability (LDC) when certain BMDS components 

could also be placed on alert and used in defensive operations. 

 Decommissioning. Decommissioning would involve the demilitarization and final 

removal and disposal of the BMDS components and assets. Plans would be made for 
ES-8

decommissioning BMDS components by either demolition or transfer to other uses or 

owners. 

Alternatives 

In this PEIS, MDA considers two alternatives to implementing an integrated BMDS that 

address the use of weapons components from land-, sea-, air-, and space-based platforms 

in addition to the No Action alternative as required by NEPA. 

 Alternative 1. Under Alternative 1, the MDA would develop, test, deploy, and plan 

to decommission land-, sea-, and air-based platforms for BMDS weapons components 

and related architecture and assets. Alternative 1 would include space-based sensors, 

but would not include space-based defensive weapons. 

 Alternative 2. Under Alternative 2, the MDA would develop, test, deploy, and plan 

to decommission land-, sea-, air-, and space-based platforms for BMDS weapons 

components and related architecture and assets. Alternative 2 would be identical to 

Alternative 1, with the addition of space-based defensive weapons. 

 No Action Alternative. Under No Action the MDA would not develop, test, deploy, 

or plan for decommissioning activities for an integrated BMDS. Instead, the MDA 

would continue existing development and testing of discrete systems as stand-alone 

missile defense capabilities. Individual systems would continue to be tested but 

would not be subjected to System Integration Tests. 

Affected Environment 

To assess the impacts of implementing the proposed BMDS, it is necessary to 

characterize the existing condition of the affected environment in the locations where 

various BMDS implementation activities are proposed to occur. The affected 

environment includes all land, air, water, and space environments where proposed 

activities are reasonably foreseeable. For this PEIS, the affected environment includes all 

existing locations for ranges, installations, and facilities that the MDA has used, uses, or 

proposes to use for the BMDS both in the U.S. and outside the continental U.S. MDA 

determined that activities associated with the proposed BMDS might occur in locations 

around the world. Therefore, the affected environment has been considered in terms of 

global biomes, broad ocean areas, and the atmosphere. 

Each biome covers a broad region, both geographically and ecologically for both 

domestic and international locations where components of the proposed BMDS may be 

located or operated. Climate, geography, geology, and distribution of vegetation and 

wildlife determine the distribution of the biomes. Using biomes as affected environment 

designations enables future site-specific environmental documentation to tier from this 
ES-9

PEIS. Note that there are no reasonably foreseeable BMDS activities that would occur 

in Antarctica; therefore, it is not included among the terrestrial biomes. 

The affected environment has been divided into nine terrestrial biomes, the Broad Ocean 

Area (BOA), and the Atmosphere. Exhibit ES-3 describes the affected environment, and 

Exhibit ES-4 illustrates the global distribution of the biomes. 

Exhibit ES-3. Affected Environment Descriptions1

Description Latitudinal Location Areas of Interest for the BMDS 

Arctic Tundra 

Biome Areas above 60° North 

Arctic regions of North America 

and the arctic coastal regions that 

border the North Atlantic Ocean, 

North Pacific Ocean, and Arctic 

Ocean, including parts of Alaska, 

Canada, and Greenland 

Sub-Arctic Taiga 

Biome 

Between 50° and 60° 

North 

Sub-arctic regions of North 

America and sub-arctic coastal 

regions that border the North 

Pacific Ocean, including portions 

of Alaska 

Deciduous Forest 

Biome 

Mid-latitudes, between 

the polar regions and 

tropical regions 

Eastern and northwestern U.S. and 

portions of Europe 

Chaparral Biome 

Western coastal regions 

of continents between 

30° and 40° both North 

and South of the equator 

Portion of the California coast and 

coastal region of the 

Mediterranean from the Alps to 

the Sahara Desert and from the 

Atlantic Ocean to the Caspian Sea 

Grasslands 

Biome 

No particular latitudinal 

range; occurs in the 

interior of all continents, 

except Antarctica 

Prairie regions of Midwestern U.S.

Desert Biome 

Between 15° and 35° 

both North and South of 

the equator 

Arid environment of southwestern 

U.S. 

 

1

 The latitudinal designations identify the general location for each biome; however, the biomes do not have rigid 

edges that begin and end at these latitudes. Therefore, there may be some overlap of biomes at or near these 

latitudinal designations. 
ES-10

Exhibit ES-3. Affected Environment Descriptions1

Description Latitudinal Location Areas of Interest for the BMDS 

Mountain Biome 

No particular latitudinal 

range; applies to areas 

with high elevations just 

below and above the 

snow line of a mountain 

Rocky Mountains in the western 

U.S. and Alps in Central Europe 

Tropical Biome 

Between 23.5° North 

(Tropic of Cancer) and 

23.5° South (Tropic of 

Capricorn) 

Pacific Equatorial Islands 

Savanna Biome 

Between 5° and 20° both 

North and South of the 

equator 

Northern Australia 

BOA No particular latitudinal 

range 

Pacific, Atlantic and Indian 

Oceans 

Atmosphere 

No particular latitudinal 

range; refers to the 

atmosphere that envelops 

the entire Earth 

Four principal atmospheric layers: 

troposphere, stratosphere, 

mesosphere, and ionosphere (or 

thermosphere) 
Exhibit ES-4. Map of Global Biomes 

Source: Modified From National Geographic, 2003b 
ES-12

The characteristics (e.g., climate, soil types, flora and fauna) that define global biomes 

are the same regardless of whether the biome area of concern is coastal or inland. 

However, unique features (e.g., wetlands, estuaries, wind currents, hurricanes) of coastal 

biome areas may affect the environmental impacts. Therefore, the Affected Environment 

discusses these unique features within the biome descriptions. Describing coastal areas 

as part of the larger inland biomes minimizes repetition among the descriptions yet 

captures the important aspects of the coastal areas in a way suitable for impacts analysis. 

For this PEIS, the existing environmental conditions within each biome, as well as the 

BOA and the Atmosphere, were assessed based on several resource areas, as appropriate. 

Resource Areas 

The resource areas considered in this analysis are those resources that can potentially be 

affected by implementing the proposed BMDS. Some resource areas are site-specific or 

local in nature and therefore cannot be effectively analyzed in this type of programmatic 

document. The potential impacts on these resource areas are more appropriately 

discussed in subsequent site-specific documentation, tiered from this PEIS. The resource 

areas analyzed in this PEIS include: air quality, airspace, biological resources, geology 

and soils, hazardous materials and hazardous waste, health and safety, noise, 

transportation, and water resources. The MDA has included orbital debris as a resource 

consideration because of the likelihood of orbital debris occurring from various launch 

and test activities and its potential for impact to health and safety and the environment. 

Other resource areas including cultural resources, environmental justice, land use, 

socioeconomics, utilities, and visual resources depend upon site-specific or local factors. 

Each of these was discussed regarding methodology and thresholds for significance to 

provide the reader with a “roadmap” for performing future site-specific analyses tiering 

from this PEIS. These discussions outline the types of information that would be needed 

to conduct site-specific analyses and identify the steps necessary to ensure that potential 

impacts are thoroughly and appropriately considered. 

Environmental Consequences 

To determine environmental consequences or impacts of implementing the proposed 

BMDS, its components (i.e., weapons, sensors, C2BMC, and support assets) were 

considered as they are developed, tested, deployed and decommissioned during these 

acquisition life cycle phases. Not all of the activities associated with the proposed 

BMDS are expected to produce environmental impacts. Only those activities with 

expected impacts for each life cycle phase are identified. Further, only those activities 

that are considered reasonably foreseeable are analyzed in this PEIS. BMDS programs 

that are largely conceptual are not analyzed in this document. 
ES-13

Because of the extensive nature of this project, this PEIS analyzes the BMDS as 

described in the following four steps. 

Step 1 – Identify and Characterize Activities 

The BMDS is organized by component (i.e., weapons; sensors; C2BMC; and support 

assets). Each component has life cycle phase activities associated with developing, 

testing, deploying, and decommissioning those components within the BMDS. These 

activities produce environmental impacts, which are examined in this PEIS. To consider 

impacts of the BMDS, the emissions/stressors from the component life cycle phases were 

identified and characterized. 

Step 2 – Identify Activities with No Potential for Impact 

Once the activities were identified, analysis revealed that some of those activities had no 

potential for (significant) impact. This conclusion was reached because either previous 

NEPA analysis revealed insignificant impacts, or because the activity was typically 

categorically excluded. These activities are not further analyzed in this PEIS. 

Step 3 – Identify Similar Activities across Life Cycle Phases 

The remaining activities with the potential for environmental impacts were then 

examined to determine which had similar environmental impacts. For example, impacts 

associated with site preparation and construction in the development phase would be the 

same as impacts from site preparation and construction activities in the testing and 

deployment phases of the life cycle. Accordingly many activities were addressed 

together to eliminate redundancy. 

Step 4 – Conduct Environmental Analyses 

The final step in the BMDS analysis is to determine the respective impact resulting from 

the proposed activities. The significance of an impact that an activity has on the 

environment is a function of the nature of the receiving environment. For example, a 

booster launch has different emissions than those resulting from activating a chemical 

laser. Whether those emissions create impacts and the degree of significance of these 

impacts depends, among other things, upon the environment in which they are released. 

In this analysis, the PEIS considers the emissions/stressors from each component’s 

activity in the context of each resource area (e.g., air quality, biological resources, water 

resources, etc.). Impacts were distinguished based on the different operating 

environments (land, sea, and air for Alternative 1 and land, sea, air, and space for 

Alternative 2) in which the activity would occur. These impacts were further 

distinguished based on the worldwide biomes in which the activity would occur. 
ES-14

As a result, the PEIS is organized by BMDS component, examining each resource area, 

and distinguishing between operating environments in the context of a particular biome. 

The analysis describes where the impacts differ based on the operating environment or 

biome. 

Life Cycle Phase Activities 

Development phase activities with the potential to produce environmental impacts 

include site preparation and construction and testing. Both of these activities occur in 

other life cycle phases for the proposed BMDS, and so the analysis has been combined 

where appropriate. For example, testing of component prototypes (development phase) 

has been assumed to cause the same or similar impacts as testing of component test 

articles (test phase), and so these activities were analyzed as one activity. 

Test phase activities were considered in two distinct analyses: one focused on the 

components and their individual test activities, and the other focused on System 

Integration Testing which could include multiple components with one or more attempted 

intercepts to test system capability and effectiveness in increasingly robust and realistic 

test scenarios. 

Component test activities assumed to have potential impacts on the environment were 

considered for each component as shown in Exhibit ES-5. 

Exhibit ES-5. Component Test Activities with Potential Impacts 

Component Activity Source of Impact Impacts Analysis 

Manufacturing of 

Test Articles 

Manufacturing/assembly 

of laser components and 

chemicals 

Activity categorically 

excluded or 

previously analyzed 

and found to have no 

significant impact. 

Rationale presented 

in Section 4.1.1.10 

Support Assets - Test 

Assets 

Weapons-Laser 

Site Preparation 

and Construction 

Construction or 

modifications necessary 

to support laser 

use/firing 

Section 4.1.1.9 

Support Assets - 

Infrastructure 
ES-15

Exhibit ES-5. Component Test Activities with Potential Impacts 

Component Activity Source of Impact Impacts Analysis 

Transportation 

Transport of the laser 

and chemicals to 

appropriate location 

Activity categorically 

excluded or 

previously analyzed 

and found to have no 

significant impact. 

Rationale presented 

in Section 4.1.1.8 

Support Assets - 

Support Equipment 

Activation Firing the laser Section 4.1.1.1 

Weapons - Lasers 

Manufacturing of 

Test Articles 

Manufacturing 

interceptor components 

and propellants 

Activity categorically 

excluded or 

previously analyzed 

and found to have no 

significant impact. 

Rationale presented 

in Section 4.1.1.10 

Support Assets - Test 

Assets 

Site Preparation 

and Construction 

Construction or 

modifications necessary 

to support launch 

Section 4.1.1.9 

Support Assets - 

Infrastructure 

Transportation 

Transport of the booster, 

kill vehicle, and 

propellants to the launch 

location 

Activity categorically 

excluded or 

previously analyzed 

and found to have no 

significant impact. 

Rationale presented 

in Section 4.1.1.8 

Support Assets - 

Equipment 

WeaponsInterceptor 

Prelaunch 

Assembly and fueling of 

the booster or kill 

vehicle, as appropriate 

Section 4.1.1.2 

Weapons - 

Interceptors 
ES-16

Exhibit ES-5. Component Test Activities with Potential Impacts 

Component Activity Source of Impact Impacts Analysis 

Launch/Flight 

Ignition of rocket motors 

and flight of boosters or 

separation of kill vehicle 

and subsequent flight 

along its trajectory 

Section 4.1.1.2 

Weapons - 

Interceptors 

Postlaunch Clean up or debris 

recovery, if required 

Section 4.1.1.2 

Weapons - 

Interceptors 

Manufacturing 

Manufacturing/assembly 

of the sensor hardware 

and software 

Activity categorically 

excluded or 

previously analyzed 

and found to have no 

significant impact. 

Rationale presented 

in Section 4.1.1.10 

Support Assets - Test 

Assets 

Site Preparation 

and Construction 

Construction or 

modifications necessary 

to support sensor use 

Section 4.1.1.9 

Support Assets - 

Infrastructure 

Transportation Transport of the sensor 

to appropriate location 

Activity categorically 

excluded or 

previously analyzed 

and found to have no 

significant impact. 

Rationale presented 

in Section 4.1.1.8 

Support Assets - 

Equipment 

Sensors 

Activation Use of the sensor 

Sections 4.1.1.3 

Sensors - Radar, 

4.1.1.4 Sensors - 

Infrared and Optical, 

and 4.1.1.5 Sensors - 

Laser 
ES-17

Exhibit ES-5. Component Test Activities with Potential Impacts 

Component Activity Source of Impact Impacts Analysis 

Manufacturing Assembly of associated 

hardware and software 

Activity categorically 

excluded or 

previously analyzed 

and found to have no 

significant impact. 

Rationale presented 

in Section 4.1.1.10 

Support Assets - Test 

Assets 

Site Preparation 

and Construction 

Construction or 

modification for 

computer terminals, 

antennas, and 

underground cable 

trenching 

Section 4.1.1.9 

Support Assets - 

Infrastructure 

Transportation Transport of C2BMC to 

appropriate location 

Activity categorically 

excluded or 

previously analyzed 

and found to have no 

significant impact. 

Rationale presented 

in Section 4.1.1.8 

Support Assets - 

Equipment 

C2BMC 

Activation 

Use of computer 

terminals, antennas, and 

underground cable 

Sections 4.1.1.6 

C2BMC - Computer 

Terminal and 

Antennas, 4.1.1.7 

C2BMC - 

Underground Cable 

Support AssetsSupport 

Equipment 

Manufacturing 

New or major 

modification of existing 

support equipment 

Activity categorically 

excluded or 

previously analyzed 

and found to have no 

significant impact. 

Rationale presented 

in Section 4.1.1.10 

Support Assets - Test 

Assets 
ES-18

Exhibit ES-5. Component Test Activities with Potential Impacts 

Component Activity Source of Impact Impacts Analysis 

Operational 

Changes 

Implementation of new 

operating parameters of 

existing support 

equipment 

Section 4.1.1.8 

Support Assets - 

Equipment 

Site Preparation 

and Construction 

New construction or 

major modification of 

existing infrastructure 

Section 4.1.1.9 

Support Assets - 

Infrastructure 

 Transportation Transport of support 

equipment 

Activity categorically 

excluded or 

previously analyzed 

and found to have no 

significant impact. 

Rationale presented 

in Section 4.1.1.8 

Support Assets - 

Equipment 

Support AssetsInfrastructure Site Preparation 

and Construction 

Construction or 

modification of 

infrastructure 

Section 4.1.1.9 

Support Assets - 

Infrastructure 

Manufacturing 

Assembly of 

hardware/software 

associated with the test 

sensor 

Activity categorically 

excluded or 

previously analyzed 

and found to have no 

significant impact. 

Rationale presented 

in Section 4.1.1.10 

Support Assets - Test 

Assets 

Support AssetsTest Assets 

Site Preparation 

and Construction 

Construction or 

modifications necessary 

to support the test sensor 

or launch 

Section 4.1.1.9 

Support Assets - 

Infrastructure 
ES-19

Exhibit ES-5. Component Test Activities with Potential Impacts 

Component Activity Source of Impact Impacts Analysis 

Transportation 

Transport of the sensor, 

booster and propellants 

to the test location 

Activity categorically 

excluded or 

previously analyzed 

and found to have no 

significant impact. 

Rationale presented 

in Section 4.1.1.8 

Support Assets - 

Equipment 

Activation Use of the test sensor in 

a test event 

Section 4.1.1.3 

Sensors - Radar, 

4.1.1.4 Sensors - 

Infrared and Optical, 

and 4.1.1.5 Sensors - 

Laser 

Prelaunch 

Assembly and fueling of 

the booster as 

appropriate 

Section 4.1.1.2 

Weapons - 

Interceptors 

Launch/Flight 

Ignition of rocket 

motors, separation from 

launch platform, and 

flight of the boosters or 

separation of the target 

object and subsequent 

flight along its trajectory 

Section 4.1.1.2 

Weapons - 

Interceptors 

Use of 

Countermeasures, 

Simulants or 

Drones 

Use and deployment of 

various 

countermeasures, 

simulants a or drones to 

support testing 

Section 4.1.1.10 

Support Assets - Test 

Assets 

Postlaunch 

Clean up or debris 

recovery to include 

launch platform, 

countermeasures, and 

simulants, if required 

Section 4.1.1.2 

Weapons - 

Interceptors 

System Integration Testing of the BMDS would occur at the system level. System 

Integration Tests evaluate the ability of various component configurations to work 

together. System Integration Testing would be used to assess the ability of BMDS 
ES-20

components to work interoperably to meet the required functional capabilities of the 

BMDS as a system and to demonstrate performance. System Integration Tests would 

integrate existing and planned components such as sensors, weapons, and C2BMC. This 

PEIS assesses the potential for environmental impacts of integrated BMDS testing under 

Alternatives 1 and 2. Test integration activities would involve land-, sea-, and air-based 

operating environments for weapons; and land-, sea-, air- and space-based operating 

environments for sensors, C2BMC, and support assets for Alternative 1. Assessment of 

Alternative 2 considers only the additional impacts of the proposed space-based operating 

environment for interceptors. System Integration Tests with the potential for 

environmental impacts are shown in Exhibit ES-6. 

Exhibit ES-6. Description of System Integration Tests 

Test Activities 

Integrated Ground 

Tests (GTs) 

GTs are tests used to collect data for BMDS components 

characterization and assessment and do not include booster 

function flight tests. GTs aim to reproduce the existing state of 

BMDS architecture, typically components scheduled for upcoming 

flight tests, to prepare for those flight tests and to assess 

component performance. For the purposes of this PEIS GTs do 

not include activities associated with components but rather have 

been focused on System Integration Testing. 

System Integration 

Flight Tests 

(SIFTs) 

SIFTs are conducted to verify the integration of select BMDS 

components. These tests generally include a target launch, sensors 

tracking the target, laser activation or an interceptor launch, and 

sensors to determine whether the target was destroyed. The 

number of sensors, weapons, and targets used in a SIFT can be 

adjusted to create the desired test scenario. 

The analysis of intercept impacts includes a discussion of the impact of debris from an 

intercept. Depending on the location used for testing or deployment of weapons, debris 

may impact either inland or in marine environments. Therefore, impacts from postlaunch 

activities involving intercepts are subcategorized based on where intercept debris would 

be likely to impact. For any single intercept, it was assumed that the debris impacts 

would occur within a single receiving environment, either on land or in water. 

Not all test activities would have environmental impacts and MDA has determined that 

modeling, simulation and analysis; modeling defense integration exercises; and integrated 

missile defense wargames would not result in significant impacts. These are virtual tests 

(modeling and computational analysis) or software compatibility and communication 

tests that would be conducted within existing laboratory or test facilities. 
ES-21

Deployment activities with potential impacts on the environment would include 

production of the components, site preparation and construction, use of human services, 

transport of components to the deployment site, testing (prelaunch, launch/flight, 

activation, postlaunch) and maintenance or sustainment of the components. For purposes 

of this analysis, the environmental impacts associated with transportation are assumed to 

be the same as the impacts associated with transporting the components to a test location 

and the impacts associated with maintenance are assumed to be the same as or similar to 

the impacts associated with manufacturing activities. 

Decommissioning activities would include demilitarization and disposal or replacement 

of the component, recycling and disposal of hazardous materials. The environmental 

impacts associated with decommissioning of specific components would be more 

appropriately addressed in subsequent tiered environmental analyses; however, this PEIS 

provides a roadmap for considering impacts of decommissioning for each component. 

Impacts from accidents and spills are considered where appropriate in this analysis. 

Specifically, the impacts from booster failures and from spills or releases of laser 

chemicals, booster propellants, and fuels used to power support assets have been 

considered. Boosters can fail on or directly above the launch pad or at some point during 

flight. If a booster fails on or above the pad, there is a potential for damage to 

infrastructure at and around the launch area. The impact of this type of booster failure is 

most appropriately addressed in site-specific analysis. If a booster fails during flight, it 

may be possible to use a Flight Termination System (FTS), if there is one on the vehicle, 

to destroy the booster. In this instance, the resulting debris would be similar to that 

produced during an intercept. If an FTS is not used, the booster would fall substantially 

intact to the surface. The resulting impact from both in-flight failures would depend on 

the specific location and when in the flight the failure occurred. The quantity of residual 

propellant released may be greater under a booster failure then during a successful 

booster flight or intercept. Spills or releases of propellants and fuels would be handled in 

accordance with standard operating procedures at each facility, range or installation, and 

therefore, would not be expected to pose significant impacts to the environment. 

Cumulative impacts of Alternative 1 and Alternative 2 have been considered in this PEIS. 

The CEQ NEPA regulations define cumulative impacts as those impacts on the 

environment that result from the incremental impact of the action when added to other 

past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency 

(Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions. (40 CFR 1508.7)

Summary of Environmental Impacts – Alternative 

This alternative considers the use of land-, sea-, and air-based platforms for BMDS 

weapons components. Alternative 1 would include space-based sensors, but would not 

include space-based defensive weapons. A summary of potential environmental effects 
ES-22

from Alternative 1 is provided by subcomponent in Exhibits ES-7 through ES-10. The 

summary tables are organized by component and subcomponent. The analyses are 

specific to each resource area based on the impacts from the activities associated with the 

subcomponent. The impacts associated with the manufacturing, site preparation and 

construction, and transportation activities of components are discussed under Support 

Assets. 
Exhibit ES-7. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 1 - Weapons 

Resource 

Area Lasers Interceptors 

Air Quality 

Emissions from laser operation (less than 30 seconds) would be minimal and would be dispersed by wind and would not significantly affect local or regional air quality. 

Negligible amounts of fuel and oxidizer vapopropellant transfers. Most launch emissions wand would not significantly affect local or regdepletion. 

Airspace Following required scheduling and coordination procedures would minimize the potential for adverse impacts to airspace. Following required scheduling and coordinati

minimize potential for adverse impacts to airs

Biological 

Resources 

Emissions, noise, and the laser beam from laser activation could negatively impact biological resources. Emitted chlorine might damage vegetation; hydrogen chloride (HCl) might irritate birds flying through the exhaust cloud or reach and disrupt aquatic 

ecosystems. Wildlife could be startled by noise from laser support equipment. The laser beam could pose fire hazards to vegetation and 

eye and skin hazards to wildlife. However, impacts to these resources would be minimal if the beam is contained or directed upward. 

The presence of launch-related personnel prioand launch emissions could impact biological however, launches are relatively infrequent ansignificantly impact wildlife. Debris impactincause non-acoustic effects to biological resoufrom falling debris, entanglement in debris, anof debris or propellants. However, these effeimpact biological resources. 

Geology and 

Soils 

Soil acidity might be affected as a result of chlorine emissions from laser activation. Magnitude of impact would be related to the amount of limestone in the soils. However, chlorine emissions are small and laser activation relatively infrequent and the impacts to geology and soils would not be significant. 

Potential impacts would not be significant. Labove the mixing height or above the tropospimpacts. Soil acidity might be affected as a resome launch activities. Magnitude of impact amount of limestone in the soils. Debris from could hit and affect the surface and soils wherwould be no significant impact on geology. 

Hazardous 

Materials and 

Hazardous 

Waste 

Spent laser chemicals and wastewater would be treated and disposed 

in accordance with applicable transport and management regulations to prevent impacts. Therefore, no significant impacts from hazardous materials or hazardous waste would be expected. 

Applicable regulations and operating proceduwould prevent impacts from improper transpoof hazardous materials or hazardous waste. 

Health and 

Safety 

Following spill prevention and control procedures would reduce potential health and safety impacts from accidental releases of laser chemicals. Hazard distances would be established to protect against skin or eye hazards from the laser beam and inhalation hazards from air emissions; therefore, no significant health and safety impacts 

would be expected. 

Potential health and safety impacts include excontact with launch debris, and exposure to lawould take place on facilities with restricted aof the public to these hazards. Following appfueling and prelaunch operations would reducsite personnel would be protected from launch no significant health and safety impacts woul
Exhibit ES-7. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 1 - Weapons 

Resource 

Area Lasers Interceptors 

Noise 

The public would be excluded from areas where noise from operational equipment would be detrimental and workers would use recommended hearing protection. Therefore, no significant noise impacts would be expected. 

The launch and flight of boosters would produbooms. The public would not be in proximity therefore would not be exposed to significant personnel would either leave the area or wear protection. Therefore, no significant noise im

Transportation 

Air traffic might be impacted by laser activation. Following 

required scheduling and coordination procedures would minimize the potential for adverse impacts. No significant impacts would be expected to other transportation modes. 

Impacts on traffic due to temporary road closusignificant. Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) an(NOTMARs) would provide sufficient warninimpacts to air and marine transportation. 

Water 

Resources 

Some emissions from laser activation have the potential to temporarily and locally increase the acidity of surface waters. However, these emissions would be diluted and dispersed by receiving waters. Therefore, no significant water resource impacts would be expected. 

Following appropriate procedures during fuelreduce the potential for propellants to impact emissions from launches could temporarily ansurface waters. However, these emissions wodispersed by receiving waters and would not bsignificant impacts to water resources. 

Orbital Debris N/A 

Debris created from a booster failure while opexoatmosphere would reenter Earth’s atmospBecause the debris would be on orbit for a relnot have a significant impact on orbiting strucsmall amount of debris would survive reentry impacts are expected. 
Exhibit ES-8. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 1 - Sensors 

Resource 

Area Radars Infrared and Optical Sensors Lase

Air Quality 

Emissions from radars would be limited to generator exhaust, which are considered in Support Assets. 

Emissions from infrared and optical sensors would be limited to generator exhaust, which are considered in Support Assets. 

Gas laser sensors wouhelium, nitrogen (N2)

which can be asphyxiwould be insignificanoxygen levels; therefoquality impacts would 

Airspace 

NOTAMs would be issued and pilots would be restricted from electromagnetic radiation (EMR) hazard areas during radar activation. Restrictions would be short term and would not significantly impact airspace. 

Activation of infrared and optical sensors would not interfere with airspace; therefore, 

no impacts to airspace would be expected. 

Ground testing of laseconducted in an estabarea. Activation of laplatforms would occucommercial aircraft trsignificant airspace im

Biological 

Resources 

There may be some risk of thermal heating to birds from the COBRA DANE radar as discussed in Appendix N, Impacts of Radar on Wildlife. However, MDA has proposed mitigation measures such as limiting the use of the radar during migratory seasons and when flocks may be in the vicinity. Therefore, no significant biological resource impacts would be expected. 

Activation of infrared and optical sensors would not interfere with biological resources; therefore, no significant biological resource impacts would be expected. 

Birds and mammals isuffer eye damage. Tactivation and small rimpacts. Direction of space platforms towawould suffer distortioconditions reducing thlasers. Therefore, no biological resources w

Geology and 

Soils 

Impacts would be limited to accidental spills of diesel fuel or coolants from support generators, which are considered in Support 

Assets. 

Impacts would be limited to accidental spills of diesel fuel or coolants from support generators, which are considered in Support Assets. 

Activation of laser segeology and soils. 

Hazardous 

Materials and 

Hazardous 

Waste 

Applicable regulations and procedures would be followed and would minimize impacts from management of hazardous materials or waste. 

Applicable regulations and procedures would be followed and would minimize impacts from management of hazardous materials or waste. 

Refrigerant 404, an omay be used to cool swould be closed loop of refrigerant only duperformed according therefore, no significamaterials or waste maexpected. 
Exhibit ES-8. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 1 - Sensors 

Resource 

Area Radars Infrared and Optical Sensors Lase

Health and 

Safety 

Prior to activation of radars, an EMR survey would be conducted to consider hazards to personnel, fuels, and ordnance. Resulting recommendations would establish safety exclusion zones to minimize exposures. Safety exclusion zones would also be established to minimize high voltage exposure from generator wiring and cabling. Therefore, no significant health and safety impacts would be expected. 

Activation of infrared and optical sensors would not impact health and safety. Safety exclusion zones would be established as required to minimize high voltage exposure from generator wiring and cabling. 

Sensor laser beams caof living organisms wdistance. Applicable procedures, such as edisplaying warning siareas, and removing rreduce potential healtsignificant levels. Saalso be established to exposure from genera

Noise 

Noise impacts would be limited to noise produced by generators, which are considered in Support Assets. 

Noise impacts would be limited to noise produced by generators, which are considered in Support Assets. 

Noise impacts would produced by generatoSupport Assets. 

Transportation 

NOTAMs and NOTMARs would provide sufficient warning. Therefore, no significant transportation impacts would be expected. 

Activation of infrared and optical sensors would not interfere with transportation. Therefore, no significant transportation impacts would be expected. 

Activation of laser sewith transportation. Ttransportation impact

Water 

Resources 

Releases of diesel fuel or coolants from support generators into surface water would be diluted rapidly; therefore, no significant impacts to water resources would be expected. 

Releases of diesel fuel or coolants from support generators into surface water would be diluted rapidly; therefore, no significant impacts to water resources would be expected. 

Liquids used in laser non-hazardous and in release would not be resources. 

Orbital Debris 

Space-based radars could reenter the Earth’s atmosphere due to failure; however, most objects break up and vaporize in the upper atmosphere under intense forces and heating during reentry. Even if an object survives 

reentry, it would most likely land in an ocean area, and the chance of hitting populated land area would be small. Therefore, no significant orbital debris impacts would be expected. 

Space-based infrared and optical sensors could reenter the Earth’s atmosphere due to failure; however, most objects break up and vaporize in the upper atmosphere under intense forces and heating during reentry. Even if an object survives reentry, it would most likely land in an ocean area, and the chance of hitting populated land area would be small. Therefore, no significant orbital 

debris impacts would be expected. 

Space-based laser senEarth’s atmosphere dmost objects break up atmosphere under intduring reentry. Even reentry, it would mosarea, and the chance oarea would be small. orbital debris impacts 
Exhibit ES-9. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 1 - C2BMC 

Resource Area Computer Terminals and Antennas Underground 

Air Quality Activation emissions would be limited to generator exhaust. Impacts from generator emissions are considered in Support Assets. Impacts would be limited to ground d

construction activities. Impacts from considered in Support Assets. 

Airspace 

Radio transmission frequencies used by computer terminals and antennas could impact airspace through interference with commercial 

air traffic control communications. Radio frequency use and testing would be coordinated with the appropriate air traffic control agencies; therefore, no significant airspace impacts would be expected. 

Activation of underground cable wouairspace; therefore, no significant airsexpected. 

Biological 

Resources 

Biological resources could be impacted by activation activities, but the level of impact would vary based on signal frequency and energy, and the proximity of the source to sensitive environments or specific threatened or endangered species. Radio frequency use and testing would be coordinated with the appropriate resource management agencies; therefore, no significant biological resource impacts would 

be expected. 

Activation of underground cable woubiological resources. Therefore, no sresource impacts would be expected. 

Geology and Soils 

Activation of computer terminals and antennas would not interfere with geology and soils. Therefore, no significant geology and soils impacts would be expected. 

Impacts to geology and soils would bpreparation activities. Impacts from considered in Support Assets. 

Hazardous Materials 

and Hazardous 

Waste 

Any hazardous materials or wastes used or generated would be handled 

in accordance with appropriate regulations. Therefore, no significant 

hazardous materials and hazardous waste impacts would be expected. 

Impacts from hazardous materials anbe limited to site preparation activitiedisturbance are considered in Suppor

Health and Safety 

Health and safety impacts would vary based on signal frequency and energy, and the proximity of the source to site personnel or the public. No significant health and safety impacts would be expected. 

Potential health and safety hazards wdust/particulate inhalation, improper improper use of machinery during sitconstruction. Impacts from ground dSupport Assets. 

Noise 

Noise impacts associated with activation of computer terminals and antennas would be limited to noise produced by generators. Impacts related to generator noise are discussed in Support Assets. 

The activation of underground cable that has the potential to impact sensit

Transportation 

Personnel operating and maintaining computer terminals and antennas would generate traffic as a result of activation. Personnel would be on site only during operating hours and during routine maintenance activities; therefore, no significant transportation impacts would be expected. 

Any necessary repairs to underground excavation of the cable. These activito transportation through movement oto the repair site. However, this wou

therefore, impacts to transportation w
Exhibit ES-9. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 1 - C2BMC 

Resource Area Computer Terminals and Antennas Underground 

Water Resources 

Activation of computer terminals and antennas would not interfere with water resources. Therefore, no significant impacts would be expected. 

Impacts to water resources might resuactivities. Impacts from ground distuSupport Assets. 

Orbital Debris 

Space-based computer equipment could reenter the Earth’s atmosphere 

due to failure, but no significant orbital debris impacts would be expected. 

N/A 
Exhibit ES-10. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 1 – Support As

Resource 

Area Support Equipment Infrastructure T

Air Quality 

Increased use of support equipment resulting in greater quantities of emissions could impact air quality. The significance of the impact depends on the local and regional regulatory setting and the physical climate where emissions would occur. 

Site preparation and construction activities would result in air emissions; however, it is assumed that the impact on air quality would be temporary and localized. Therefore, no significant air quality impacts would be expected. 

The developmensimulants, countecould impact air standard operatinpotential impacts significant levels

Airspace 

Operational use changes of support assets would not interfere with airspace. Increases in support asset operations would be in accordance with existing airspace use regulations. Therefore, no significant airspace impacts would be expected. 

Site preparation and construction would not interfere with airspace. Therefore, no significant airspace impacts would be expected. 

Simulants, countdelivery systems airspace. Site-spconducted to addimpacts. 

Biological 

Resources 

Following required scheduling, duration of testing, and completing required agency regulatory agency consultations would reduce potential impacts on biological resources below significant levels. 

Site preparation and construction activities could impact biological resources. Sitespecific analyses and regulatory agency consultations would be conducted to address these potential impacts. 

Potential impacts could be associatsimulants and coSite-specific anaaddress these pot

Geology and 

Soils 

In general, operational use changes would not be expected to significantly impact geology and soils. Mitigation measures may be used in instances where impacts could occur to reduce impacts to less than significant levels. 

Construction would incorporate design parameters consistent with the geologic setting to reduce potential seismic impacts. Construction activities could impact soils; however, Best Management Practices would be implemented to minimize impacts.

Development and countermeasures on the compositicountermeasure. would be conducimpacts. 

Hazardous 

Materials and 

Hazardous 

Waste 

Hazardous waste would be handled and disposed in accordance with appropriate regulations. Therefore, no significant hazardous materials and hazardous waste impacts would be expected. 

Hazardous waste would be handled and disposed in accordance with appropriate regulations. Therefore, no significant hazardous materials and hazardous waste impacts would be expected. 

Hazardous waste disposed in accorregulations. Thehazardous materiimpacts would be 

Health and 

Safety 

Standard operating procedures specific to an action or installation would be used and equipment training performed to reduce potential impacts to health and safety. 

Standard operating procedures specific to an action or installation would be used and equipment training performed to reduce potential impacts to health and safety. 

Standard operatinaction or installaequipment traininpotential impacts 
Exhibit ES-10. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 1 – Support As

Resource 

Area Support Equipment Infrastructure T

Therefore, no significant health and safety impacts would be expected. 

Therefore, no significant health and safety impacts would be expected. 

Therefore, no sigimpacts would be 

Noise 

Noise impacts are based on site-specific receptors and are regulated on a regional basis. Site-specific analysis would be conducted for actions that may have noise impacts. 

Noise impacts are based on site-specific receptors and are regulated on a regional basis. Site-specific analysis would be conducted for actions that may have noise impacts. 

The developmencountermeasures impacts. The lauwould produce ninterceptors. HoExhibit ES-6 no would be expecte

Transportation 

Operational use changes that increase the amount of time that support equipment are used could impact transportation. However, these impacts are not expected to be significant. 

Site preparation and construction activities may require the use of heavy machinery and 

an influx of construction workers which could change the congestion and level of demand for access to the existing roadways. However, these activities would not be expected to cause a significant impact on transportation. 

The developmenwould not impacterm road closureNOTAMs and Nand mariners of arecovery activitieimpact transporta

Water 

Resources 

Operational use changes occurring at existing facilities designed for the support equipment would not impact water resources. Operational use changes that result in impacts to areas not specifically designed for use of the support equipment could be subject to additional environmental review. 

Applicable protocols and permits would reduce potential impacts to water resources from construction activities to below significant levels. Site-specific analyses would be conducted for new installations. 

The developmencountermeasures resources. Site-sconducted to deteimpacts. 

Orbital Debris 

No impacts from orbital debris would occur as a result of the development of new or the major modification of existing equipment or an operational use change of such equipment. Space-based equipment (satellites) could reenter the Earth’s atmosphere due to failure, but would not likely result in significant impacts because they would burn up on reentry. 

No impacts from orbital debris would occur as a result of the development of new or the major modification of existing infrastructure. 

If countermeasurorbit, they have tdamage space-bacommunication sbecause the debrrelatively short tisignificant impacaddition, only a swould survive resignificant impac
 ES-31

Test Integration 

System Integration Tests would integrate existing and planned components such as 

sensors, weapons, and C2BMC. Under Alternative 1, test integration activities would 

involve land-, sea-, and air-based platforms for weapons; and land-, sea-, air- and spacebased platforms for sensors, C2BMC, and support assets. Integrated GTs and SIFTs have 

the potential for environmental impacts, as described in Exhibit ES-6. 

 

For this PEIS, two representative scenarios that could be used during SIFTs were 

considered for Alternative 1. These two representative scenarios involve similar 

activities (launches of targets, use of multiple sensors, and use of land-, sea-, and airbased weapons); however, they differ in number of target launches and number of 

weapons used. Both representative scenarios may be used to support the proposed 

BMDS and are analyzed in this PEIS. The activities associated with each type of System 

Integration Tests that were analyzed in this PEIS include 

 Integrated GTs. The activation of multiple sensors and C2BMC components, and 

passive activation of weapons (e.g., powering the tracking and communication aspects 

of the weapons system but not firing the weapon) within the same biome or across 

several biomes, which would coordinate the control and transfer of information 

between land-, sea-, and air-based weapons. 

 SIFT Scenario 1- Single Weapon with Intercept. The activation of multiple 

sensors and C2BMC components within the same biome or across several biomes 

coupled with the launch of one target and the activation of a laser or launch of an 

interceptor, and the debris from an intercept. 

 SIFT Scenario 2- Multiple Weapons with Multiple Intercepts. The activation of 

multiple sensors and C2BMC components within the same biome or across several 

biomes coupled with the launch of up to two targets from the same biome or different 

biomes, the activation or launch of multiple weapons in the same biome or multiple 

biomes, and the debris from intercepts. 

A summary of potential environmental effects associated with Test Integration for 

Alternative 1 is provided in Exhibit ES-11. The analyses are specific to each resource 

area based on the impacts from the activities associated with each test.
Exhibit ES-11. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 1 - Test Integra

Resource 

Area GT SIFT Scenario 1 SIFT 

Air Quality 

Emissions from generators used to power sensors and C2BMC would be a small fraction of the de minimis threshold and 

would not impact air quality. The activation of radars, infrared, and optical sensors would not impact air quality. 

Emissions from launch activities and laser activation would be less than two percent of de minimis thresholds; impacts to air quality would be insignificant. 

Impacts to air qualiprovided the activitthe launch facility o

Airspace 

Coordination with the FAA Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC), military installations, and foreign countries with jurisdiction over affected airspace would minimize the potential for impact. All laser sensors would be operated using appropriate range safety regulations. 

Close coordination with the FAA ARTCC, military installations, and foreign countries with jurisdiction for airspace management would minimize the potential for adverse impacts on airspace use and scheduling. Upon completion of such coordination for each test, there would be no significant impacts to airspace. 

Close coordination military installationwith jurisdiction ovreduce the potentiaUpon completion oeach test, there wouimpacts to airspace

Biological 

Resources 

Potential impacts to the environment and the threatened and endangered species, the unique or sensitive environments, and the migratory, breeding, and feeding activities would be evaluated in site-specific analyses. 

Potential impacts to the environment and the threatened and endangered species, the unique or sensitive environments, and the migratory, breeding, and feeding activities would be evaluated in site-specific analyses. 

Potential impacts to threatened and endunique or sensitive migratory, breedingwould be evaluated 

Geology and 

Soils 

Fuel spills associated with generators would be controlled and cleaned up according to appropriate procedures; therefore any 

impacts would be insignificant. 

HCl and particulate emissions from interceptor and target launches would not result in significant impacts to geology and soils. 

HCl and particulate interceptor and targresult in significant soils. 

Hazardous 

Materials and 

Hazardous 

Waste 

Hazardous materials and waste would be handled according to all applicable regulations, and each test location would have a Spill Prevention, Control and Countermeasure (SPCC) plan in place to handle any spills or leaks of hazardous materials; therefore impacts would be insignificant. 

Applicable regulations and procedures would be followed and would prevent impacts from management and disposal of hazardous materials or waste associated with laser activation and target and weapons launches. 

Applicable regulatibe followed and womanagement and dmaterials or waste activation and targe

Health and 

Safety 

All safety procedures would be followed, safety zones would be established, and participating personnel would be trained 

All safety procedures would be followed, safety zones would be established, and participating personnel would be trained and certified to reduce the potential for impacts to 

All safety procedursafety zones would participating personcertified to reduce t
Exhibit ES-11. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 1 - Test Integra

Resource 

Area GT SIFT Scenario 1 SIFT 

and certified to reduce the potential for impacts to health and safety. 

health and safety associated with launches of targets and weapons. 

health and safety astargets and weaponto health and safety SIFT Scenario 2 w

result in a significa

Noise 

Generators would be operated during tests, and sea- and air-based systems typically would not be operated in proximity to sensitive receptors. In general, the increase in noise from multiple generator use within an environment would not be significant. 

Noise from launches of targets and weapons and sonic booms would occur in areas away from sensitive receptors, and would not result in significant impacts. 

Noise from launcheand sonic booms wfrom sensitive recein significant impac

Transportation 

NOTAMs and NOTMARs would be issued in advance of testing events to allow aircraft and vessels to plan alternate routes to avoid the EMR hazard areas; the impacts would be insignificant. 

Closures of roads, airspace, and marine areas would be of short duration and would be considered routine occurrences for launch sites, and issuance of NOTAMs and NOTMARs would allow vehicles to clear the affected areas. Impacts to transportation would be insignificant. 

The increase in tranor any increases in number of transporresult in a significa

Water 

Resources 

In general, an increase in risk from hazardous materials and hazardous waste spills and an increase in demand for potable water would not result in significant impacts. 

Impacts from the deposition of emissions, propellants, and debris into water resources would be dependent on the specific biome and the unique and sensitive water resources that occur in the biome. In general, impacts to water resources from laser activation and launches would not have additive impacts for activities occurring within the same biome. 

Site-specific envirobe completed to evsignificant impactswater resources frolaunches would not activities occurring 
Exhibit ES-11. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 1 - Test Integra

Resource 

Area GT SIFT Scenario 1 SIFT 

Orbital Debris N/A 

Debris created from exoatmospheric intercepts would reenter Earth’s atmosphere within a few months. Because the debris would be on orbit for a relatively short time it would not have a significant impact on orbiting structures. In addition, only a small amount of debris would survive reentry and therefore no significant impacts are expected. 

Debris created from intercepts would rewithin a few monthwould be on orbit fwould not have a siorbiting structures. amount of debris wtherefore no signifi
 ES-35

Cumulative Impacts

The implementation of the proposed BMDS under Alternative 1 is worldwide in scope 

and potential application, and only other actions that are international in scope, have been 

considered for cumulative impacts. Regional or local past, present, or future actions, 

which may result in cumulative impacts, would be considered during the completion of 

site-specific NEPA analyses. Worldwide launch programs for commercial and 

government programs were determined to be actions of international scope that might be 

reasonably considered for cumulative impacts in this PEIS. Launches contribute to 

cumulative impacts in areas including ozone depletion, global warming, and orbital 

debris. 

The cumulative impact on stratospheric ozone depletion from BMDS launches would be 

far less than and indistinguishable from the effects caused by other natural and man-made 

sources. The estimated emission loads of chlorine from both BMDS and worldwide 

launches from 2004 to 2014 would account for only 0.5 percent of the industrial chlorine 

load from the U.S. over the same 10-year period. Therefore, the cumulative impacts to 

ozone depletion would not be significant. 

The cumulative impact on global warming from BMDS launches from 2004 to 2014 

would be insignificant compared to other industrial sources (e.g., energy generation using 

fossil fuel) and activities (e.g., deforestation and land clearing). The BMDS launch 

emissions load of carbon monoxide (CO) and CO2 to the troposphere and stratosphere 

would be only five percent of the emissions load from worldwide launches. However, 

even when accounting for both BMDS launches and worldwide launches over the 10-year 

period, the CO and CO2 load is extremely small compared to emissions loads from other 

industrial sources, accounting for 3.5 x 10-4 percent of emissions from U.S. industrial 

sources in just one year. Therefore, the cumulative impacts to global warming would not 

be significant. 

Orbital debris could be produced from BMDS space-based sensors. Orbital debris that 

remains on orbit could create hazards to orbiting spacecraft and could have impacts upon 

reentry if the debris reaches the Earth’s surface in large pieces or containing hazardous 

materials. 

Successful flight tests of the BMDS in the exoatmosphere would result in kinetic energy 

(i.e., hit-to-kill) intercepts that would produce both target and interceptor debris clouds. 

With the need for increasingly realistic test scenarios, MDA is considering high altitude, 

high velocity intercept tests. MDA analysis of BMDS flight tests employing groundlaunched interceptors shows that the majority (90 to 95 percent) of post-intercept debris 

reenters the Earth's atmosphere within six hours. A small amount of post-intercept debris 

may become orbital debris; however, modeling indicates that risk to spacecraft from 

intercept debris is far lower than the risk posed by existing background debris. 
 ES-36

Additional efforts are on-going to determine flight test risks in the space environment and 

resulting potential impacts on orbiting spacecraft. 

The effects of orbital debris on other spacecraft would depend on the altitude, orbit, 

velocity, angle of impact, and mass of the debris. Debris less than 0.01 centimeter (0.004 

inch) in diameter can cause surface pitting and erosion. Debris between 0.01 to 1 

centimeter (0.004 and 0.4 inch) in diameter would produce significant impact damage 

that can be serious, depending on system vulnerability and defensive design provisions. 

Objects larger than one centimeter (0.4 inch) in diameter can produce catastrophic 

damage. 

Astronauts or cosmonauts engaging in extra-vehicular activities could be vulnerable to 

the impact of small debris. On average, debris one millimeter (0. 04 inch) is capable of 

perforating current U.S. space suits. 

Proposed BMDS space-based sensor activities would be expected to produce small 

quantities of orbital debris, primarily explosive bolts and small pieces of hardware. 

MDA exoatmospheric flight testing may also produce orbital debris. However, because 

the majority of BMDS activities would occur in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) where debris 

would gradually drop into successively lower orbits and eventually reenter the 

atmosphere, the debris would not be a permanent hazard to orbiting spacecraft. As 

BMDS testing becomes more realistic, there is potential for an increased amount of 

debris reaching and remaining on orbit. A large portion of this debris would likely not 

remain on orbit for more than one revolution, and eventually all of the debris would be 

expected to de-orbit. 

Although it cannot be determined with certainty how much orbital debris would be 

produced from BMDS space-based sensors or intercepts annually, the fact that orbital 

debris reenters the Earth’s atmosphere on a daily basis, and that this debris has not caused 

injury or significant property damage on Earth indicates that orbital debris produced by 

BMDS space-based sensors and potential exoatmospheric intercepts would not pose 

significant impacts upon reentry. Therefore the cumulative impacts of orbital debris from 

Alternative 1 are not expected to be significant. 

Summary of Environmental Impacts - Alternative 2 

This alternative includes the use of interceptors from land-, sea-, air-, and space-based 

platforms. The impacts associated with the use of interceptors from land, sea, and air 

platforms would be the same as those discussed for Alternative 1. Therefore, the analysis 

for Alternative 2 focuses on the impacts of using interceptors from space-based 

platforms. At this time although MDA has historically conducted research and 

development efforts on space-based lasers, these efforts have been put on hold as kinetic 

energy missile technology, which is more promising in the short term, is being pursued. 
 ES-37

If Alternative 2 were selected, additional environmental analysis would be required as the 

technologies intended to be used become more robust. For purposes of impacts analysis 

for space-based interceptors it was assumed that all manufacturing activities impacts 

would be the same as those discussed for Alternative 1, therefore, they are not discussed 

in detail for Alternative 2. Space-based interceptors would be launched on launch 

vehicles and maintained from platforms similar to other satellites used for DoD and 

commercial purposes in prescribed orbits around the Earth. The launch vehicles used to 

insert the weapon platforms into the proper orbit would likely be existing launch 

vehicles; and therefore, the impacts of the launch would be as described for support 

assets. A summary of potential environmental effects from Alternative 2 is provided in 

Exhibit ES-12. 
Exhibit ES-12. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 2 – Weapon

Resource 

Area Interceptors Debris 

Air Quality 

Emissions from space-based launches would not affect the human environment; therefore, no significant air quality impacts would be expected. 

Most space-based interceptors and associatedestroyed upon reentry. Some small particlserve as reaction sites for chemical reactionto the infrequency of debris reentry and deosignificant air quality impacts would be exp

Airspace 

A space-based interceptor may be directed towards the Earth during intercepts and could impact the use of airspace in the interceptor’s designated path. Coordination with the appropriate FAA ARTCC and relevant military installations with responsibility for airspace management would minimize the potential for any adverse impacts to airspace use. Therefore, no significant airspace impacts would be expected. 

For controlled reentries, affected portions of of aircraft. For uncontrolled reentries, curreprocedures provide a limited ability to prediparticular object would reenter the Earth’s awarning could be given to clear airspace in uncontrolled reentry. However, uncontrolleinfrequently and therefore, no significant airexpected. 

Biological 

Resources 

Trajectories would be carefully selected such that interceptor debris would impact in a cleared portion of the ocean or military range. It is unlikely that any interceptor debris that survives reentry would impact biological resources and no significant impacts would be expected. 

Most interceptor and platform debris would The debris would fall to the Earth’s surface open ocean waters, where impact would be immediate surface waters near the impact pomammals at lower depths of the ocean woulto the sound and would be able to avoid the significant biological resource impacts woul

Geology and Soils The launch of interceptors from space-based platforms would not impact geology and soils. 

Most debris from space-based interceptors onot survive reentry; surviving debris would Therefore, no significant impacts would be soils from space-based debris. 

Hazardous 

Materials and 

Hazardous Waste 

The launch/flight of space-based interceptors would not produce hazardous waste that would be transported to or disposed of on Earth. Therefore, no significant hazardous material and waste 

impacts would be expected. 

Debris contaminated with hazardous materihigh temperatures during reentry, likely renthe time it reaches the Earth’s surface. Debwould not be considered hazardous waste. Thazardous materials or waste impacts would 

2 Impacts from Alternative 2 include impacts analyzed under Alternative 1 with the addition of space-based weapons. 
Exhibit ES-12. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 2 – Weapon

Resource 

Area Interceptors Debris 

Health and Safety 

Trajectories would be selected such that, in the event of an unsuccessful intercept attempt, interceptor debris would impact in the open ocean or in designated land-based areas, which would reduce the potential for impacts to health and safety. Therefore, no significant health and safety impacts would be expected. 

Trajectories would be selected such that debopen ocean or in designated land-based areauncontrolled deorbit, debris might hit and inthe risk that an individual would be hit and iorbital debris is estimated to be less than onno significant health and safety impacts wou

Noise 

Launch noise from space-based launches would not be audible in the human environment and therefore, no significant impacts would be expected. 

The noise produced by large pieces of debrimight cause startle responses in nearby animmobile species for a short time. However, agenerally be small in size, no significant noiexpected. 

Transportation Launches from space-based platforms would not impact transportation. Debris reaching the open ocean would most 

Debris recovery on land would be as describwould not have an impact on transportation

Water Resources Launches from space-based platforms would not impact water 

resources. 

Debris would be rendered inert due to the hireentry. Thus debris impacting in surface wwater resources. 
 ES-40

Test Integration 

System Integration Tests would integrate existing and planned components such as 

sensors, weapons, C2BMC, and support assets. Under Alternative 2, System Integration 

Tests would involve land-, sea-, air-, and space-based platforms for weapons; and land-, 

sea-, air- and space-based platforms for sensors, C2BMC, and support assets. 

The unique activities associated with each type of System Integration Test analyzed in 

this PEIS under Alternative 2 include 

 Integrated GT. The use of additional components to control and coordinate the 

activities of the four weapon platforms (land-, sea-, air-, and space-based). 

 SIFT Scenario 1 – Single Weapon with Intercept. The launch of interceptors from 

space-based platforms with an intercept. 

 SIFT Scenario 2 – Multiple Weapons with Multiple Intercepts. The launch of 

multiple interceptors from multiple weapon platforms (land-, sea-, air-, and spacebased) at up to two targets with intercepts. Under Alternative 2, the analysis assumes 

that the launch of a space-based interceptor would replace a land-, sea-, or air-based 

weapon launch or laser activation. 

A summary of potential environmental effects associated with Test Integration for 

Alternative 2 is provided in Exhibit ES-13. The analyses are specific to each resource 

area based on the impacts from the activities associated with each test. 
Exhibit ES-13. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Alternative 2 - Test Integra

Resource 

Area SIFT Scenario 23

Air Quality 

If an interceptor launch from a space-based weapon replaced an interceptor launch from a land- or sea-based wea

level emissions would occur. If the activation of an air-based weapon were replaced, then a reduction in emission

upper atmosphere. Impacts to air quality would be less than those for Alternative 1. 

Airspace 

If the flight path of a space-based weapon is limited to the exoatmosphere, then the impacts to airspace would be 

Alternative 1. If the flight path of a space-based weapon is directed toward Earth in the endoatmosphere, then the would be similar to those for Alternative 1. 

Biological 

Resources 

Interceptor launches from space-based weapons would result in fewer impacts on Earth from noise and pollutant 

biological resources for Alternative 2 would be less than those for Alternative 1. 

Geology and Soils 

If a land-based launch is replaced by a space-based launch, then the impacts to geology and soils would be less fo

for Alternative 1. If a sea- or air-based launch is replaced by a space-based launch, then the impacts to airspace w

for Alternative 1. 

Hazardous 

Materials and 

Hazardous Waste 

Under Alternative 2, there would be a reduction of hazardous materials use, and hazardous waste generation assoactivation of a weapon. The impacts from hazardous materials and hazardous wastes for Alternative 2 would be l

Alternative 1. 

Health and Safety 

Launching an interceptor from space rather than from land, air, or sea would result in a reduction in the number o

be exposed to health and safety risks associated with launch activities. Because no significant impacts were identfrom the increased use and generation of hazardous materials and hazardous waste, no significant impacts would Alternative 2. 

Noise Noise produced from the launch of interceptors from space-based platforms would not be audible on Earth. Beca

were identified under Alternative 1 from increased noise, no significant impacts would be expected from Alternat

Transportation The transportation impacts under Alternative 2 would be the same as the impacts under Alternative 1. 

Water Resources 

An interceptor launch from a space-based platform would replace an interceptor launch from a land-, sea-, or air-b

would result in a potential reduction in the debris and simulants that would reach a water resource based on elevaflight termination would occur. Impacts to water resources for Alternative 2 would be less than or equal to those 

Orbital Debris 

Increases in orbital debris would be greater under Alternative 2 than under Alternative 1 because a higher proport

occur in the exoatmosphere because of testing associated with space-based interceptors. However, 90 to 95 perceexoatmospheric intercepts would reenter Earth’s atmosphere within six hours. Because the debris would be on ortime it would not have a significant impact on orbiting structures. In addition, only a small amount of debris wou

therefore no significant impacts would be expected. 

3 The environmental impacts associated with GTs and SIFT Scenario 1 are not presented by resource area because such impacts were n

substantially different from the impacts described for Alternative 1. 
ES-42 

Cumulative Impacts

Placing interceptors in space would add additional structures to space for extended 

periods of time; therefore, it is appropriate to include in this cumulative impacts analysis 

other programs that are international in scope which place structures in space for 

extended periods of time. The International Space Station (ISS) was determined to be 

such a program. Therefore, the cumulative impacts analysis for Alternative 2 

encompasses the discussion of worldwide launch programs as discussed for Alternative 1 

and includes a discussion of the impacts of the proposed BMDS on and with the ISS. 

Because the majority of BMDS activities would occur in LEO where debris would 

gradually drop into successively lower orbits and eventually reenter the atmosphere, and 

the orbital debris produced by BMDS activities would be small in size and in amount, 

orbital debris from BMDS activities would not pose a long-term hazard to the ISS. The 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the U.S. Air Force Space 

Command monitor orbiting space objects and are aware of instances when the ISS is 

predicted to be in proximity to space debris that has the potential to damage spacecraft. 

Prior to every BMDS flight test, MDA assesses the risks posed to spacecraft from postintercept debris. Launch times are selected to preclude any conjunctions between 

spacecraft and intercept debris. If necessary, additional analysis is conducted to 

determine safe launch times within launch windows thereby minimizing the risks to 

spacecraft. This analysis allows MDA to determine when to safely conduct a flight test. 

Because the proposed BMDS activities would be expected to produce small quantities of 

debris which would eventually be removed from orbit and because MDA would only use 

launch windows when the ISS would not be in the debris, there would be no significant 

impacts expected to the ISS from the implementation of Alternative 2 for the BMDS. 

Summary of Environmental Impacts - No Action Alternative 

The No Action Alternative involves the continuation of MDA activities to develop and 

test discrete weapons, sensors, C2BMC, and support assets and would not include System 

Integration Testing of these components. For the potential sites being considered for 

BMDS deployment, the No Action Alternative would be a continuation of activities 

currently occurring or planned at those locations for individual systems. Therefore, the 

environmental impacts on the various resource areas associated with the No Action 

Alternative would be the same as the impacts resulting from continued development and 

testing of individual missile defense elements. 

The decision not to deploy a fully integrated BMDS could result in the inability to 

respond to a ballistic missile attack on the U.S. or its deployed forces, allies, or friends in 

a timely and successful manner. Further, this alternative would not meet the purpose of 

or need for the proposed action or the specific direction of the President and the U.S. 

Congress. 
AC-i 

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 

ABL Airborne Laser 

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile 

ACGIH American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists 

ACHP Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 

AFB Air Force Base 

AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory 

ait atmospheric interceptor technology 

ALCOR Advanced Research Project Agency Lincoln C-band 

Observable Radar 

Al2O3 Aluminum Oxide (alumina) 

ANSI American National Standards Institute 

AMOS Air Force Maui Optical and Supercomputing Station 

ARS Active Ranging System 

ARTCC Air Route Traffic Control Center 

AWS Arrow Weapon System 

BILL Beacon Illuminator Laser 

BM Battle Management 

BMC2 Battle Management/Command and Control 

BMC3 Battle Management/Command, Control and Communications 

BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Organization 

BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System 

BMEWS Ballistic Missile Early Warning System 

BOA Broad Ocean Area 

BTS Bureau of Transportation Statistics 

o

C Degrees Celsius 

C2 Command and Control 

C2BMC Command and Control, Battle Management, and 

Communications 

CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 

Liability Act 

CEQ Council on Environmental Quality 

CFC Chlorofluorocarbon 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

Cl Atomic Chlorine 

Cl2 Molecular Chlorine 

CM/CM Critical Measurements and Countermeasures 

CO Carbon Monoxide 

CO2 Carbon Dioxide 

COIL Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser 

COMSATCOM Commercial Satellite Communications 

CONOPS Concept of Operations 
AC-ii 

CTF Combined Test Force 

dB Decibel 

dBA A-weighted decibel 

DNL Day Night Average Noise Level 

DoD Department of Defense 

DOT Department of Transportation 

DRMO Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office 

DSP Defense Support Program 

EA Environmental Assessment 

EIS Environmental Impact Statement 

EKV Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle 

EM Electromagnetic 

EMR Electromagnetic Radiation 

EO Executive Order 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

ESA European Space Agency 

ESG Engagement Sequence Group 

ESQD Explosive Safety Quantity Distance 

ETR Extended Test Range 

EWR Early Warning Radar 

o

F Degrees Fahrenheit 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

FBX-T Forward Based X-Band Radar Transportable 

FL Flight Level 

FM Flight Mission 

FR Federal Register 

FTS Flight Termination System 

GBI Ground-Based Interceptor 

GBMC2 Ground-Based Midcourse Command and Control 

GBR-P Ground-Based Radar Prototype 

GEO Geosynchronous Earth Orbit 

GHz Gigahertz 

GMD Ground-Based Midcourse Defense 

GT Integrated Ground Test 

H2 Hydrogen 

H2O Water 

HAA High Altitude Airship 

HAIR High Accuracy Instrumentation Radar 

HALO High Altitude Observatory 

HAP Hazardous Air Pollutant 

HEL High Energy Laser 

HCl Hydrogen Chloride 

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
AC-iii 

ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile 

IDC Initial Defensive Capability 

IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health 

IDO Initial Defensive Operations 

IDOC Initial Defensive Operations Capability 

IDT In-Flight Interceptor Communication System Data Terminal 

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 

IFR Instrument Flight Rules 

IPSC Interagency Perchlorate Steering Committee 

IRFNA Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid 

IRST Infrared Search and Track 

ISS International Space Station 

ISTEF Innovative Science and Technology Experimentation Facility 

KEI Kinetic Energy Interceptor 

KLC Kodiak Launch Complex 

LDC Limited Defensive Capability 

Leq Equivalent Noise Level 

LEO Low Earth Orbit 

LHA Launch Hazard Area 

Lidar Light Detection and Ranging 

LOAEL Lowest Observed Adverse Effect Level 

LOS Level of Service 

MDA Missile Defense Agency 

MDIE Missile Defense Integration Exercises 

MEADS Medium Extended Air Defense System 

mg/m3

 Milligrams per cubic meter 

mg/kg Milligrams per kilogram 

MHz Megahertz 

MOA Military Operating Area 

MPE Maximum Permissible Exposure 

MSL Mean Sea Level 

MSSS Maui Space Surveillance System 

MSX Midcourse Space Experiment 

N2 Nitrogen 

NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standards 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act 

NEXRAD Next Generation Weather Radar 

NIOSH National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 

NFIRE Near-Field Infrared Experiment 

NMD National Missile Defense 

NO2 Nitrogen Dioxide 

NOX Nitrogen Oxides 
AC-iv 

NOA Notice of Availability 

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

NOAA Fisheries Service NOAA National Marine Fisheries Service 

NOI Notice of Intent 

NOTAM Notice to Airmen 

NOTMAR Notice to Mariners 

NPDES National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 

NRC National Research Council 

OCONUS Outside the Continental United States 

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

PAC-3 PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 

PAVE PAWS Position and Velocity Extraction Phased Array Warning 

System 

PEIS Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 

PEL Permissible Exposure Limit 

ppm parts per million 

PM Particulate Matter 

PM10 Particulate Matter with diameter 10 microns or less 

PM2.5 Particulate Matter with diameter 2.5 microns or less 

PMRF Pacific Missile Range Facility 

RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 

RfD Reference Dose 

ROD Record of Decision 

RTS Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site 

SBIRS Space-Based Infrared Sensor 

SBX Sea-Based X-Band Radar 

SDI Strategic Defense Initiative 

SDIO Strategic Defense Initiative Organization 

SIFT System Integration Flight Test 

SIP State Implementation Plan 

SM Standard Missile 

SO2 Sulfur Dioxide 

SOX Sulfur Oxides 

SPCC Spill Prevention, Control and Countermeasure 

START Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty 

STEL Short Term Exposure Limit 

STSS Space Tracking and Surveillance System 

SWPPP Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan 

THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 

TILL Track Illuminator Laser 

TLV Threshold Limit Value 

TMD Theater Missile Defense 

TOO Target of Opportunity 
AC-v 

TPS-X Transportable System Radar 

UCAR University Corporation for Atmospheric Research 

U.S. United States 

USAF United States Air Force 

USAKA U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll 

USFWS United States Fish and Wildlife Service 

U.S.C. United States Code 

USGS United States Geological Survey 

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

VFR Visual Flight Rules 

VOC Volatile Organic Compound 

WASP Widebody Airborne Sensor Platform 

WSMR White Sands Missile Range 

XBR X-Band Radar 
 

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1-1 

1 PURPOSE OF AND NEED FOR THE PROPOSED ACTION 

1.1 Introduction 

Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 as amended (42 

United States Code [U.S.C.] 4321, et seq.), the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 

Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of NEPA (40 Code of Federal 

Regulations [CFR] 1500-1508), Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 4715.9, 

Environmental Planning and Analysis, Presidential Executive Order (EO) 12114, 

Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, and the applicable DoD 

military service environmental regulations that implement these laws and regulations, all 

Federal agencies must consider the environmental consequences when planning for, 

authorizing, and approving Federal actions. Accordingly, the Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA) is preparing this Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) to 

examine the potential for impacts to the environment as a result of the development, test, 

deployment, and planning for decommissioning activities of an integrated Ballistic 

Missile Defense System (BMDS). 

A PEIS analyzes actions that are broad in scope, occur in phases, and may be widely 

dispersed geographically. It also creates a comprehensive, global analytical framework 

that supports subsequent analysis of specific actions at specific locations within the 

overall system, i.e., tiering. Ranges, installations, and facilities at which specific test 

activities occur can develop more focused site-specific analyses that tier from this PEIS, 

thereby reducing analytical requirements and saving resources. This PEIS addresses the 

BMDS and the development and application of new technologies; evaluates the range of 

complex programs, architecture, and assets that comprise the BMDS; and provides the 

framework for future environmental analyses as activities evolve and mature. This PEIS 

supports the proposed integrated test schedule and considers BMDS deployment and 

decommissioning activities. This PEIS also considers the cumulative environmental 

effects that could result from the proposed action. 

1.2 Background 

In 1955, the United States (U.S.) began to study ways to protect against ballistic missile1

attack. This study led to the development of the Nike-Zeus System, which accomplished 

the first successful intercept of a target Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in 

1962. Ten years later, the U.S. and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

(USSR) signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limited the development, 

 

1

 A ballistic missile is a projectile traveling without its own power or guidance (like a bullet once it has been shot 

from a gun; the bullet travels a ballistic trajectory with only the forces of gravity and the atmosphere’s friction acting 

on it). 
1-2 

testing, and deployment of ABM systems and components.2

 A 1974 amendment to the 

treaty further limited ABM defense deployment to one site at either an ICBM field or 

near the respective national capital. In 1975, the SAFEGUARD System, the only U.S. 

BMDS ever deployed, was activated in North Dakota. The SAFEGUARD System only 

operated until 1976, when it was deactivated. 

In 1983, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was established within the 

DoD to manage and direct the research and testing of advanced technologies applicable 

to the development of a strategic missile defense system. These research and testing 

activities were known collectively as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Initially, the 

main purpose of SDI research concerned protecting the U.S. from weapons of mass 

destruction involving multiple ICBM strikes. 

After the break up of the USSR and the conflict in the Persian Gulf in the early 1990’s, 

the SDIO was refocused to emphasize protecting theater (i.e., outside the U.S.) operations 

and defending the U.S. against limited missile attacks (i.e., 200 warheads or less). In 

January 1991, President Bush described the need to acquire and deploy a Ballistic Missile 

Defense (BMD) system to protect not only the U.S. but also its forces overseas and its 

friends and allies. Subsequently, Congress provided guidance and direction to the DoD 

to redirect research and development for protection against ballistic missiles, regardless 

of their source, by enacting the Missile Defense Act.3

 In May 1993, the DoD reorganized 

the SDIO, renaming it the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). 

In October 1993, the DoD completed the Report on the Bottom-Up Review, which 

reviewed the need for restructuring programs within the DoD. With respect to BMD, the 

review recommended the acquisition of a robust Theater Missile Defense (TMD) 

system4

, combined with the further development, but not the acquisition, of a more 

limited National Missile Defense (NMD) system. Accordingly, the DoD analyzed the 

proposed TMD system, its alternatives, and their potential environmental impacts in the 

1993 Final Theater Missile Defense Programmatic Life-Cycle Environmental Impact 

 

2

 MDA activities are in compliance with the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty 

(START). Any mention of target ICBMs in this PEIS refers to decommissioned ICBMs. 3

 The Missile Defense Act enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1992 (Public Law 92-190) 

established goals for theater and national missile defenses. It directed the DoD to develop a TMD system for 

possible deployment at an initial ABM Treaty-compliant site by 1996 or as soon as appropriate technology would 

allow. In July 1992, Secretary of Defense Cheney outlined a plan for the development and deployment of theater 

and national missile defenses. In passing the National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 92-484) of 1993, 

Congress deleted the dates contained in the Act and in the conference report accompanying this Act; Congress 

endorsed a plan to deploy a limited NMD system by 2002. 

4

 A theater missile is defined as "any missile (e.g., ballistic, cruise, or air-to-surface guided missile) directed against 

a target in an area of operations outside the U.S." (Final Theater Missile Defense Programmatic Life cycle 

Environmental Impact Statement 1993) The purpose of TMD is to "prevent or counter the launch of theater missiles 

against U.S. forces and allies, protect U.S. forces and allies from missiles launched against them, reduce the 

probability of and minimize the effects of damage caused by such an attack, and manage a coordinated response to a 

theater missile attack and integrate it with other combat operations.” 
1-3 

Statement (TMD PEIS) and in the 1994 Theater Missile Defense Extended Test Range 

Environmental Impact Statement (TMD ETR EIS). The TMD PEIS included analysis of 

the environmental impacts of the research, development, and testing of TMD systems as 

well as the later life cycle phases of the system, such as production, basing, and 

decommissioning. The TMD ETR EIS included analysis of the environmental impacts of 

conducting extended-range TMD missile demonstration and operational test flights, 

target intercept tests, and sensor tests. 

By 1994, the BMDO believed that the definition of an NMD system, as well as the 

technologies and resources required to implement the system, were sufficiently well 

understood to allow for a programmatic analysis of environmental impacts. Therefore, 

the BMDO issued a BMD PEIS that evaluated the environmental impacts of alternatives 

that would provide the U.S. the capability to produce and deploy an NMD system in the 

future. It further examined the cumulative environmental impacts of both the NMD and 

TMD systems.5

 Although the 1994 BMD PEIS ultimately selected the technology 

readiness (no action) alternative (i.e., the continuation of ongoing NMD activities and 

programs initiated under existing Congressional direction that were part of BMDO's 

technology readiness program) the BMD PEIS also analyzed several systems acquisition 

alternatives.6

 These alternatives, which involved more intensive research, development, 

and system-level testing as part of a program to acquire a specific defense system, 

included various combinations of ground-based and/or space-based elements (e.g., 

sensors, interceptors, and systems management tools). 

Unlike the preferred technology readiness alternative, the system acquisition alternatives 

evaluated in the BMD PEIS had defined system architectures and descriptions of system 

acquisition life cycle phases. Thus, for those alternatives, the BMD PEIS evaluated 

potential environmental impacts of NMD activities beyond development and testing 

including: system production, fielding (deployment), operations and maintenance, and 

eventual decommissioning of facilities. The BMD PEIS programmatic analysis of the 

system acquisition alternatives would support “decisions on research, development, and 

testing activities” and thus would also serve “as the foundation from which future 

environmental documentation can be prepared, if needed.” 

On February 16, 1996, the DoD completed another review of its BMD program. At that 

time, the DoD began an NMD Deployment Readiness program that would involve a shift 

 

5

 The BMD PEIS focused more intensively on NMD because the DoD determined that the TMD program had 

independent utility and had already completed the TMD PEIS in 1993. The DoD incorporated the TMD PEIS by 

reference into the BMD PEIS, however, because the DoD intended TMD and NMD to operate as a multi-layered 

ballistic missile defense that would commit an appropriate interceptor, whether TMD or NMD, to defend against an 

attack. The BMD PEIS evaluated the combined effects of the TMD and NMD programs in a cumulative impacts 

analysis.

6

Record of Decision (ROD) for the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for the BMD 

Program signed April 25, 1995. 
1-4 

from a technology readiness to a deployment readiness program, but without a decision to 

deploy an NMD system at that time. Therefore, DoD adopted a “3 plus 3” program for 

NMD, which would have enabled the U.S. to develop, within three years, elements of an 

initial NMD system that could be deployed within three years of a deployment decision. 

The DoD expected an NMD three-year development phase, which commenced in 1997, 

to culminate in a deployment readiness review in the year 2000, at which time the DoD 

would have decided whether to begin a three-year program to deploy an NMD system. 

An overview of the major events in the BMDS timeline is depicted in Exhibit 1-1. 

Exhibit 1-1. Ballistic Missile Defense Timeline 

On July 15, 1998, the “Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United 

States”7

 issued a report to Congress. The report unanimously concluded that there had 

been concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations (including 

North Korea, Iran, and Iraq) to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear 

payloads, posing a growing threat to the U.S. The report concluded that these nations 

would be able to inflict major destruction on the U.S. within approximately five years of 

a decision to acquire such a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq). The report also 

concluded that the threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities was broader, 

more mature, and evolving more rapidly than had been reported in estimates and reports 

by the Intelligence Community and that ultimately, the U.S. might have little or no 

 

7

 The Commission's mandate was to “assess the nature and magnitude of the existing and emerging powers to arm 

ballistic missile with weapons of mass destruction.” Members of the Commission were nominated by Congressional 

leaders and appointed by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 
1-5 

warning before operational deployment.8

 For these reasons, the Commission 

unanimously recommended that “the analyses, practices, and policies” of the U.S. “that 

depend on expectations of extended warning of deployment be reviewed and, as 

appropriate, revised to reflect the reality of an environment in which there may be little or 

no warning.” 

On November 17, 1998, the BMDO published in the Federal Register (FR) a Notice of 

Intent (NOI) “to prepare an EIS for a potential NMD deployment, should the U.S. 

Government make such a decision.”9

 The BMDO, in July 2000, issued the final 

Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for NMD deployment. The proposed action 

identified in the final EIS was a decision to deploy and operate an NMD system 

consisting of five elements, including: 1) ground-based interceptors (GBIs)10; 2) Battle 

Management/Command and Control (BMC2)11; 3) an X-band radar (XBR)12; 4) an 

upgraded early warning radar (EWR)13; and 5) space-based satellite detection systems.14 

The final NMD Deployment EIS further specified that as part of a program to deploy an 

NMD system, a “Test, Training, and Exercise Capability” would be implemented. 

In October 1999, while the draft NMD Deployment EIS was being circulated for public 

comment, the BMDO successfully completed its first test involving a planned intercept of 

 

8

 The Commission's report also unanimously determined that the Intelligence Community's ability to provide timely 

and accurate estimates of ballistic missile threats was eroding and that the warning times the U.S could expect for 

new, threatening ballistic missile deployments were decreasing. 

9

 63 FR 63915 (1998). In the notice, the BMDO identified the technological elements of the NMD system that 

would be analyzed in the EIS and stated 

“The decision to be made is whether to deploy such a system. This decision will be based on an analysis of the 

potential limited strategic ballistic missile threat to the U.S. from a rogue nation, technical readiness of the 

NMD system for deployment, and other factors including potential environmental impacts. If the decision is to 

deploy, then sites would be selected from the range of locations studied in the EIS. The EIS will provide the 

U.S. Government with the information necessary to properly account for the environmental impacts of this 

decision.” 

As the BMDO further explained 

“[s]hould the deployment options not be exercised in the year 2000, improvements in NMD system element 

technology would continue, while an ability to deploy a system within three years of a decision would be 

maintained.” 10 The GBI's mission is to intercept incoming ballistic missile warheads outside the Earth's atmosphere 

(exoatmospheric) and destroy them by the force of the impact alone, i.e., without explosives or nuclear warheads. 

The GBI element includes the interceptor (i.e., missile), kill vehicle, and associated launch and support equipment, 

silos, facilities, and personnel. 

11 BMC2 is a sub-component of Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) that 

supplies the means to plan, select, and adjust missions and courses of action. 12 The XBRs would be ground-based, multi-function radars that, for NMD purposes, would perform tracking, 

discrimination, and kill assessments of incoming ballistic missile warheads. 

13 Early warning phased-array surveillance radars, for example, “Position and Velocity Extraction Phased Array 

Warning System (PAVE PAWS),” are used to detect, track, and provide early warning of sea-launched ballistic 

missiles. These radars also are used to track satellites and space debris. 14 Existing DoD satellites provide the U.S. early warning satellite capability. These satellites are comparatively 

simple, inertially fixed, geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) satellites with an unalterable scan pattern. 
1-6 

an ICBM.15 The test demonstrated “hit-to-kill technology” to intercept and destroy the 

ballistic missile target. The next two tests, which were conducted in January 2000 and 

July 2000, respectively, did not result in an intercept. 

On September 1, 2000, President Clinton announced that, due to technical uncertainties, 

unsuccessful flight tests, and concerns about potential implications for the ABM Treaty, 

he would not authorize deployment of an NMD system but would leave that decision to 

his successor.16 In the interim, President Clinton stated the DoD would continue 

developing and testing radars and interceptors that would defend the U.S. against 

incoming ballistic missiles. 

In early 2001 with the election of George W. Bush as President, the BMDO began to 

expand the test infrastructure to support greater realism in the test program and 

restructured the development approach into one that adopted spiral development of 

technologies and capabilities in coherent, incremental blocks.17 Elements of the BMDO 

began development of a “test bed” in the Pacific to support this effort.18

Because the ABM Treaty limited the development, testing, and development of ballistic 

missile defense capabilities, President Bush gave Russia formal notice on December 13, 

2001 that the U.S. would withdraw from the ABM Treaty in six months. On January 2, 

2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld issued a directive to the DoD to establish a single 

development program for all the work needed to design, develop, and test elements of an 

integrated BMDS that would operate under a newly titled MDA.19 

To support test bed activities, MDA completed the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense 

Validation of Operational Concept Environmental Assessment (GMD Validation of 

 

15 Exoatmospheric Reentry Vehicle Interceptor System Environmental Assessment (EA), 1987, analyzed the launch 

of a Minuteman target from Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB) and the launch of a GBI from the Ronald Reagan 

Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site (RTS), Kwajalein Atoll. 

16 On May 20, 1999 Congress passed the National Missile Defense Act to “deploy as soon as is technologically 

possible an effective NMD system...” 

17 “Spiral development” is an iterative process for developing the BMDS by refining program objectives as 

technology becomes available through research and testing with continuous feedback between MDA, the test 

community, and military operators. Thus, MDA can consider deployment of a missile defense system that has no 

specified final architecture and no set of operational requirements, but which will be improved incrementally over 

time. Blocks are synchronized sets of capability developments that can be added to the BMDS, build on previous 

blocks, and will be verified prior to transfer to the military services. 

18 “Test bed” is defined as a collection of integrated BMD element development hardware, software, prototypes, and 

surrogates, as well as supporting test infrastructure (e.g., instrumentation, safety/telemetry systems, and launch 

facilities) configured to support realistic development and testing of the BMDS. 

19 The MDA’s mission is to develop, test and prepare for deployment a missile defense system. Using 

complementary interceptors; land-, sea-, air-, and space-based sensors; and battle management, command and 

control, and communications systems, the planned missile defense system will be able to engage and negate all 

classes and ranges of ballistic missile threats. The Secretary directed that MDA “employ a BMDS that layers 

defenses to intercept missiles in all phases of their flight (i.e., boost, midcourse, and terminal) against all ranges of 

threats.” 
1-7 

Operational Concept EA) to construct test bed assets at Fort Greely, Alaska and at other 

supporting Alaska locations.20 The GMD Validation of Operational Concept EA 

primarily examined ground activities regarding the construction of six GBI silos and 

support facilities to validate the operational concept of the test bed. The GMD Validation 

of Operational Concept Supplemental EA further analyzed additional infrastructure 

requirements necessary to support validation of the test bed operational concept.21 

In July 2003, MDA completed the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Extended Test 

Range Environmental Impact Statement (GMD ETR EIS), which provided for the 

construction and operation of additional launch and communication facilities in the 

Pacific test bed, and for development and operation of a sea-based X-band radar (SBX).22

Following continued test bed development and successful flight test activities, President 

Bush decided to provide the nation with an operational missile defense capability. On 

December 17, 2002, the President announced his decision to field an initial defensive 

operation (IDO) capability.23 The initial fielding would provide a modest protection of 

the U.S. and would be improved over time. In view of this decision, MDA issued a 

Record of Decision (ROD) from the 2000 NMD Deployment EIS to support the fielding 

of up to 40 GBI silos at Fort Greely, Alaska.24 In addition, the IDO capability would 

include four silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB). This latter action was addressed 

in the Environmental Assessment for GMD Initial Defensive Operations Capability 

(IDOC) at Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB).

25

Prior to initiation of this PEIS, MDA and its predecessor agencies prepared several 

programmatic NEPA documents regarding ballistic missile defense.26 In addition, each 

program element prepared extensive NEPA documentation to cover its own specific, 

tiered documents. Ballistic missile defense has again evolved to the point that this 

programmatic EIS is being prepared to consider the coordinated BMDS as envisioned by 

the January 2002 creation of the MDA. 

 

20 The GMD Validation of Operational Concept EA Finding of No Significant Impact was signed in April 2002. 21 The GMD Validation of Operational Concept Supplemental EA Finding of No Significant Impact was signed in 

January 2003. 

22 The GMD ETR EIS addressed dual GBI and target capabilities at Vandenberg AFB, the RTS, Kwajalein Atoll, 

and the Kodiak Launch Complex (KLC) in Kodiak, Alaska. It further addressed necessary infrastructure in the 

Pacific to support these capabilities. There have been two RODs for actions analyzed in this EIS: 1) ROD to 

Establish a GMD ETR, dated August 2003, and 2) Supplemental ROD to Conduct Target Launches from Kodiak 

Launch Complex in Support of GMD ETR, dated November 2003. 23 In October 2004, MDA achieved a limited missile defensive capability (LDC) when certain BMDS test 

components could also be placed on alert and used in defensive operations. As decisions are made based on 

technical performance, maturity, military utility, and national security, assets may be “placed on alert” as operational 

defensive capabilities. These defensive capabilities may initially be limited but could become more robust as more 

capability is developed or acquired. 

24 The ROD To Establish a GMD Initial Defensive Operations Capability (IDOC) at Fort Greely, Alaska, was 

finalized April 2003. 

25 The GMD IDO Capability at Vandenberg AFB Finding of No Significant Impact was signed in October 2003. 26 The most recent programmatic documents were the 1993 TMD PEIS and the 1994 BMD PEIS. 
1-8 

1.3 Purpose of the Proposed Action 

The purpose of the proposed action is to incrementally develop and deploy a BMDS, the 

performance of which can be improved over time, that layers defenses to intercept 

ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases of flight. 

1.4 Need for the Proposed Action 

The proposed action is needed to protect the U.S., its deployed forces, friends and allies 

from ballistic missile threats. 

In 1972, only eight countries had ballistic missiles; today there are over 30 and the threat 

is pervasive and proliferating. The U.S. national policy for addressing the threat of 

ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction includes a dual-path approach of both 

diplomatic and military measures. Diplomatically, the U.S. tries to assure our allies that 

we will be a dependable and strong partner for our collective security and also to 

dissuade or prevent potential adversaries from acquiring or developing ballistic missiles 

and related technologies altogether. The second path would require a non-offensive, 

BMDS that would protect the U.S. and its friends and allies from short-, medium-, and 

long-range threats. 

1.5 The Proposed Action 

The MDA proposes to develop, test, deploy and to plan for related decommissioning 

activities for an integrated BMDS using existing infrastructure and capabilities, when 

feasible, as well as emerging and new technologies, to meet current and evolving threats 

from ballistic missiles. The Secretary of Defense assigned the MDA the mission to 

develop and field an integrated BMDS capable of providing a layered defense for the 

homeland, deployed forces, friends, and allies against ballistic missiles of all ranges in all 

phases of flight. 

1.6 Scope of the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 

This PEIS identifies, evaluates and documents, at the programmatic level, the potential 

environmental effects of the development, testing, and deployment of a BMDS, along 

with planning for its eventual decommissioning. Although there is already extensive 

environmental analysis for many of the existing and projected components of the 

proposed BMDS, this PEIS examines potential environmental impacts of MDA’s concept 

for developing an integrated BMDS, based on current Congressional and Presidential 

direction. The BMDS PEIS will provide the framework for analyzing the development, 

testing and deployment of the range of complex components, architectures, and assets 

comprising the proposed BMDS, as well as planning for their decommissioning. The 

BMDS PEIS considers cumulative environmental effects that could result from the 
1-9 

proposed action at an appropriate programmatic level. This framework also will provide 

a basis from which to tier environmental impact analyses for future MDA activities. 

 

This PEIS will address the life cycle of the proposed BMDS and its components from 

original research and development through planning for decommissioning. Conceptually, 

the BMDS is envisioned to be a layered system of weapons (i.e., interceptors and lasers), 

sensors (i.e., radars, infrared, optical and lasers), Command and Control, Battle 

Management, and Communications (C2BMC), and support assets (i.e., equipment, 

infrastructure and test assets), each with specific functional capabilities, working together 

to defend against all classes and ranges of threat ballistic missiles in the boost, midcourse, 

and terminal flight phases. Exhibit 1-2 depicts the multi-dimensional complexities 

Exhibit 1-2. Complexities of the BMDS 

involved in considering the impacts of implementing an integrated BMDS in terms of its 

components, acquisition life cycle activities, and operating environments. 

There currently are no final or fixed architecture and no set operational requirements for 

the proposed BMDS. Instead, development, demonstration, and deployment of the 

integrated BMDS would occur over several years in an evolutionary, spiral development 

process designed to field an initial capability in 2004-2005 and gradually replace, 

enhance, or supplement this with layers of increasingly capable weapons and sensors, 

made possible by emerging technologies. Each new technology would go through 

development; promising technologies would go through testing and demonstration; and 

proven technologies would be incorporated into the BMDS. 

Operating Environment 

BMDS Component 
1-10 

Development includes the various activities that would support research and 

development of the BMDS components and the overall system. Development activities 

would include planning, budgeting, research and development, systems engineering, site 

preparation and construction, maintenance and sustainment, manufacture of test articles 

(prototypes) and initial testing, and tabletop exercises. Tabletop exercises would be used 

to develop and improve the Operations Concepts, the broad outline or overall picture of 

BMDS operations. This PEIS addresses technologies that currently are in the 

development stage and provides a framework for evaluating new technologies that may 

be developed in the future. 

Testing of the BMDS involves demonstration of BMDS components through test and 

evaluation. The successful demonstration of the BMDS would rely on a complex testing 

program aimed at producing credible test data for system characterization, verification, 

and assessment. To confirm these capabilities, MDA would continue to develop a Test 

Bed using existing and new land-, sea-, air- and space-based assets. Some construction at 

various geographic locations would be required to support infrastructure and assets where 

BMDS components and the overall system would be tested. The BMDS PEIS includes 

ongoing and planned tests (e.g., ground tests [GTs] and flight tests) of components that 

might be incorporated into the BMDS, as well as tests of the layered, integrated BMDS 

through increasingly complex System Integration Tests including system integration 

flight tests (SIFTs) through 2010 and beyond. 

Deployment of the BMDS refers to the fielding (including the manufacture, site 

preparation, construction and transport of systems) and sustainment (operations and 

maintenance, training, upgrades, and service life extension) of BMDS architecture. The 

evolving BMDS is intended to have the capability over time to deploy different 

combinations of interoperable sensor suites, weapons, and C2BMC. After production, 

some BMDS components would be transported to deployment locations. Deployment 

also would involve the transfer of facilities, elements, and programs to the military 

services. The BMDS PEIS includes start up and ongoing operations and maintenance 

activities that would be required at the facility locations. For some technologies and 

fixed assets, such as large radars, proposed deployment locations can be identified. For 

other technologies, such as mobile launchers and the Airborne Laser (ABL), potential 

deployment locations can be anticipated only in a general sense, as actual deployment 

decisions would depend on future geopolitical conditions and security concerns. 

Although the operational life of some BMDS technologies can be estimated, it is difficult 

to estimate for many proposed technologies given both the uncertainty of their 

development and deployment schedules as well as the potential for technology upgrades 

and service life extensions. 

Decommissioning would involve the demilitarization and final removal and disposal of 

the BMDS components and assets. Plans would be made for decommissioning BMDS 

components by either demolition or transfer to other uses or owners. 
1-11 

Typical activities involved in developing, testing, deploying and planning for 

decommissioning the proposed BMDS are identified in Exhibit 1-3. 

Exhibit 1-3. Typical Activities for BMDS Proposed Action 

Life 

Cycle 

Phase 

Components Typical Activities 

Planning/Budgeting 

Research and Development 

Systems Engineering 

Site Preparation and Construction 

Maintenance or Sustainment 

Manufacturing of Prototypes 

Testing of Component Prototypes 

Development

Weapons - Laser 

Weapons - Interceptor 

Sensors 

C2BMC 

Support Assets - Equipment 

Support Assets - Infrastructure 

Support Assets - Test Assets Tabletop Exercises 

Manufacturing 

Site Preparation and Construction 

Transportation Weapons - Laser 

Activation 

Manufacturing 

Site Preparation and Construction 

Transportation 

Prelaunch 

Launch/Flight 

Weapons - Interceptor 

Postlaunch 

Manufacturing 

Site Preparation and Construction 

Transportation Sensors

Activation 

Manufacturing 

Site Preparation and Construction 

Transportation C2BMC

Activation 

Manufacturing 

Support Assets - Equipment Operational Changes 

Site Preparation and Construction 

 Transportation 

Support Assets - Infrastructure Site Preparation and Construction 

Manufacturing 

Site Preparation and Construction 

Testing* 

Support Assets - Test Assets

Transportation 
1-12 

Exhibit 1-3. Typical Activities for BMDS Proposed Action 

Life 

Cycle 

Phase 

Components Typical Activities 

Activation 

Prelaunch 

Launch/Flight 

Use of Countermeasures, 

Simulants, or Drones 

Postlaunch 

Manufacturing 

Site Preparation and Construction 

Transportation 

Prelaunch 

Launch/Flight 

Postlaunch 

Activation 

Maintenance or Sustainment 

Upgrades 

Training 

Use of Human Services 

Deployment 

Weapons - Laser 

Weapons - Interceptor 

Sensors 

C2BMC 

Support Assets - Equipment 

Support Assets - Infrastructure 

Support Assets - Test Assets 

Service Life Extension 

Demilitarization 

Decommissioning

Weapons - Laser 

Weapons - Interceptor 

Sensors 

C2BMC 

Support Assets - Equipment 

Support Assets - Infrastructure 

Support Assets - Test Assets Disposal 

*Includes System Integration Testing that includes integrated GTs as well as system integration flight tests 

(SIFTs) with a single weapon with single intercept scenario and a multiple weapons with multiple intercepts 

scenario. 

1.7 Consultations and Coordination 

As the lead agency, MDA has primary responsibility for preparing the PEIS. As part of 

the scoping process, the lead agency is required to consult with affected Federal, state, 

local, and tribal agencies, and other interested parties. A continuing relationship with 

affected and interested entities can be established to promote cooperation and resolution 

of mutual land-use and environment-related problems, and to promote the concept of 
1-13 

regional ecosystem management as well as general cooperative problem solving. The 

agencies involved in this process are referred to as coordinating or consulting agencies. 

Consulting agencies do not enter into a legal agreement with the lead agency. Consulting 

agencies may submit comments and provide data to support the environmental analysis, 

but they do not participate in the internal review of documents, issues, and analyses. A 

consulting agency does not participate directly in the development of technical analyses 

and conclusions. 

The MDA has identified several agencies that may be coordinating or consulting agencies 

for this PEIS. These agencies include: National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA Fisheries Service), the 

Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and 

the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 

A cooperating agency is any Federal agency, other than a lead agency, that has 

jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact 

involved in a proposal (or reasonable alternative) for legislation or other major Federal 

action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. (40 CFR Part 1508.5) 

The MDA has held informal meetings with several agencies; however, MDA has not 

requested that any agencies participate as cooperating agencies for this PEIS. See 

Appendix A for additional information on consultation and coordination. 

1.8 Summary of the Public Involvement Process 

The MDA provided several opportunities and means for public involvement during 

scoping and throughout the preparation of the BMDS PEIS. The CEQ implementing 

regulations for NEPA describe the public involvement requirements for agencies (40 

CFR 1506.6). Public participation in the NEPA process not only provides for and 

encourages open communication between the MDA and the public, but also promotes 

better decision-making. Throughout the preparation and review of the Draft BMDS 

PEIS, the MDA aimed to obtain meaningful input concerning the issues that should be 

addressed. 

1.8.1 Scoping 

Scoping for the development of the BMDS PEIS began with the publication of the NOI 

in the FR (68 FR 17784) on April 11, 2003. See Appendix B for a detailed description of 

scoping and a copy of the NOI. During scoping, the MDA invited the participation of 

Federal, state, and local agencies, Native American Tribes, environmental groups, 

organizations, citizens, and other interested parties to assist in determining the scope and 

significant issues to be evaluated in the BMDS PEIS. The MDA developed a web site, 

http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/mdalink.html, to provide information on the BMDS 

PEIS and to solicit scoping comments. The MDA also established toll-free phone and 
1-14 

fax lines, an e-mail address, and a U.S. postal service mailbox for submittal of public 

comments and questions. 

MDA held public scoping meetings in accordance with CEQ regulations. (40 CFR 

1501.7) Meetings took place in Arlington, Virginia on April 30, 2003; Sacramento, 

California on May 6, 2003; Anchorage, Alaska on May 8, 2003; and Honolulu, Hawaii 

on May 13, 2003. The purpose of the scoping meetings was to request input from the 

public on concerns regarding the proposed activities as well as to gather information and 

knowledge of issues relevant to analyzing the environmental impacts of the BMDS. The 

public scoping meetings also provided the public with an opportunity to learn more about 

the MDA’s proposed action and alternatives. In addition to announcing the public 

scoping meetings in the NOI, the MDA placed legal notices in local and regional 

newspapers and notified state governors, mayors, members of Congress and local media 

representatives about the scoping meetings. See Appendix B for additional information 

on public involvement. 

During scoping, the MDA received 285 comments. The MDA requested scoping 

comments be submitted by June 12, 2003, to be considered in developing the Draft 

BMDS PEIS. The majority of comments were related to opposition to the BMDS, 

especially with regard to the use of space as a weapons platform; concern that the 

program would bankrupt the economy and that Federal funds should be channeled to 

address socioeconomic problems, better health care and insurance coverage, and 

education; and concern that the BMDS would create an arms race, especially in space. 

Other key issues included opposition to development of nuclear weapons and concern 

that missile defense could be a first strike capability for U.S. worldwide military 

domination. Public comments concerning DoD policy, budget, and program issues are 

outside the scope of the Draft BMDS PEIS. Comments received pertaining to reasonable 

alternatives to the proposed action, resource areas, human health, and environmental 

impacts were considered in this BMDS PEIS. See Appendix B for comment excerpts 

related to resource areas and human health and environmental impacts. 

1.8.2 Public Comment Period 

The public comment period began with the publication of the Notice of Availability 

(NOA), published in the FR by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on 

September 17, 2004. The NOA announced the availability of the Draft PEIS, initiated 

the public comment period for the NEPA process, and requested comments on the Draft 

PEIS. The MDA also published a NOA in the FR on September 17, 2004, which 

provided information on the proposed action and alternatives, listed the dates and 

locations of the public hearings, and provided contact information for submitting 

comments to the MDA. See Appendix B for a detailed description of the public comment 

period and a copy of the NOA. 
1-15 

A downloadable version of the Draft PEIS was available on the BMDS PEIS web site 

and hardcopies of the document were placed in the following public libraries: 

 Anchorage Municipal Library, 3600 Denali Street, Anchorage, AK 99503 

 Mountain View Branch Library, 150 South Bragaw Street, Anchorage, AK 99508 

 California State Library, Library and Courts Building, 914 Capital Mall, Sacramento, 

CA 95814 

 Sacramento Public Library, 828 I Street, Sacramento, CA 95814 

 Hawaii State Library, Hawaii Documents Center, 478 South King Street, Honolulu, 

HI 96813 

 University of Hawaii at Manoa, Hamilton Library, 2550 The Mall, Honolulu, HI 

96822 

 Arlington County Public Library, Central Branch, 1015 North Quincy Street, 

Arlington, VA 22201 

 District of Columbia Public Library, Central Branch – Martin Luther King, Jr. 

Memorial Library, 901 G Street, NW, Washington, DC 20001 

MDA held public hearings in Arlington, Virginia on October 14, 2004; Sacramento, 

California on October 19, 2004; Anchorage, Alaska on October 21, 2004; and Honolulu, 

Hawaii on October 26, 2004. In addition to announcing the public hearings in the NOA, 

the MDA placed legal notices in local and regional newspapers and notified state 

governors, mayors, and members of Congress. See Appendix B for additional 

information on the public hearing notification process. 

The purpose of the public hearings was to solicit comments on the environmental areas 

analyzed and considered in the Draft PEIS. Appendix B contains a reproduction of the 

transcripts of the public hearings. 

During the public review period, the MDA received approximately 8,500 comments on 

the Draft PEIS. See Appendix K for an overview of comments received on the Draft 

PEIS and the MDA’s responses to in-scope comments. Additional areas of analysis—

orbital debris, perchlorate, and radar impacts to wildlife—are addressed in more technical 

detail in Appendices L, M, and N, respectively. 

1.9 Related Documentation 

Existing relevant NEPA analysis and health and safety documentation is incorporated by 

reference. These documents are listed in Appendix C, Related Documentation. The 

relevant information and analyses contained in these documents is summarized in this 

PEIS where appropriate.
 

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2-1

2 DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED ACTION AND ALTERNATIVES 

The proposed action is to develop, test, deploy, and to plan for decommissioning 

activities for an integrated BMDS using existing infrastructure and capabilities, when 

feasible, as well as emerging and new technologies, to meet current and evolving threats 

in support of the MDA’s mission. 

2.1 BMDS Concept 

The BMDS is designed to negate threat ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases of 

flight. To achieve this mission, the BMDS would be made up of components 

(i.e., weapons; sensors; C2BMC; and support assets). These components would be 

 

assembled into programs known as elements, which can operate independently or 

together to defeat a threat missile. 

Multiple defensive weapons are required to create a layered defense comprised of 

multiple intercept or shot opportunities along the incoming threat missile’s trajectory. 

These weapons would be used from a variety of platforms (i.e., any military structure or 

vehicle bearing weapons). This layered defense would provide a defensive system of 

capabilities that could back up one another. For example, one element could engage a 

threat missile in its boost phase and other elements could be used to intercept the threat 

missile in later phases if initial intercept attempts were unsuccessful. As shown in 

Exhibit 2-1, ballistic missiles can be categorized based on their approximate flight 

distances. 

Component: Subsystem, assembly, or subassembly of logically grouped hardware 

and software, that performs interacting tasks to provide BMDS capability at a 

functional level. 

Element: A functional set of integrated components comprising a stand-alone 

defensive capability. The elements provide “blueprints” for some of the specific 

functional capabilities that would be included in the proposed BMDS. However, the 

configuration of these elements is dependent upon the ongoing testing and 

enhancement of their components. 
2-2

Exhibit 2-1. Types and Maximum Ranges of Ballistic Missiles 

Type of Ballistic Missile Approximate Flight Distance 

in kilometers (miles) 

Short Range Ballistic Missile 600 (373) 

Medium Range Ballistic Missile 1,300 (808) 

Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 5,500 (3,418) 

Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) 10,000 (6,214) 

Each type of ballistic missile has three distinct phases of flight: boost, midcourse, and 

terminal. A flight phase is a portion of the path followed by an object moving through 

the atmosphere or space. Each phase of flight presents its own challenges to a defensive 

intercept due to variations in speed, configuration, altitude, and range. The proposed 

BMDS is envisioned to be capable of defending against all classes of threat ballistic 

missiles in all phases of flight. Exhibit 2-2 presents missile flight phases also defined as 

defense segments with the existing BMDS elements designed to operate in them. Please 

refer to the legend on Exhibit 2-2 to identify the elements that are in the various flight 

phases or defense segments. 

Exhibit 2-2. Ballistic Missile Flight Phases and Defense Segments 

Terminal 

Defense 

Segment

Impact

Boost Defense 

Segment

SRBMs

Midcourse 

Defense Segment

Launch

ABL

BMDS 

Interceptor

GMD

Aegis BMD

THAAD

Arrow

MEADS

PAC-3 

MRBMs/IRBMs ICBMs

Boost

Midcourse

Terminal

Legend
2-3

The following section describes each of the three phases of ballistic missile flight, and the 

currently configured or planned program elements within the BMDS that are designed to 

address the threat missile within that phase. An overview of the program elements is 

provided in Appendix D. 

2.1.1 BMDS Layered Defense and Missile Flight Phases 

2.1.1.1 Boost Phase and the Boost Defense Segment 

The Boost Phase (see Exhibit 2-3) is the first phase of a ballistic missile trajectory, when 

the rocket engine is ignited and the missile is lifting off and setting out on a specific path. 

The missile is powered by its engines throughout this phase. 

Exhibit 2-3. Boost Phase and the Boost Defense Segment 

Currently configured or planned BMDS elements in the boost defense segment include 

Airborne Laser (ABL). The ABL involves putting a weapons class laser aboard a 

modified Boeing 747 aircraft and using that laser to destroy enemy ballistic missiles in 

the boost phase. 

 Ballistic missiles are most 

vulnerable during boost – 

relatively easy to find and 

moving slowly 

 BMDS needs to be alerted 

and positioned near the 

enemy launch site to engage 

in boost phase 

 Requires quick reaction 

times, high confidence 

decision making, and 

multiple engagement 

capabilities 

 Missile is within Earth’s 

atmosphere 

(endoatmosphere) 

 Boost phase lasts about 180 

to 600 seconds 

 Key elements: ABL and 

Kinetic Energy Interceptor 

(KEI) 
2-4

Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI or BMDS Interceptor). The primary objective of 

the KEI or BMDS Interceptor program is to develop an interceptor capable of destroying 

ICBMs in the boost phase. 

2.1.1.2 Midcourse Phase and the Midcourse Defense Segment 

The Midcourse Phase (see Exhibit 2-4) begins when the rocket engine cuts off and the 

threat missile travels a ballistic trajectory. During this phase, the threat missile is 

approximately 100 kilometers (62 miles) above Earth’s surface. At this point it could 

deploy decoys to confuse detection and discrimination systems and/or a warhead that 

continues on the missile’s trajectory towards its target. 

Exhibit 2-4. Midcourse Phase and the Midcourse Defense Segment 

 Ballistic missiles 

“coast” for several 

minutes during 

midcourse and may 

deploy warheads and 

decoys 

 BMDS uses multiple 

sensors to determine 

“real” threat and 

directs weapons to 

destroy threat objects 

in space

 Threat missile is about 

100 kilometers above 

the Earth’s surface 

(exoatmosphere)

 Midcourse phase lasts 

about 1200 seconds

 Key elements: 

Ground-Based 

Midcourse (GMD) and 

Aegis BMD
2-5

BMDS elements currently configured to comprise the midcourse defense segment include 

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD). The GMD mission is to defend against 

long-range ballistic missile attacks, using its weapon, the GBI, to defeat threat missiles 

during the midcourse segment of flight. 

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD). The Aegis BMD will provide the 

capability for Navy Aegis cruisers to use hit-to-kill technology to intercept and destroy 

short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. 

2.1.1.3 Terminal Phase and the Terminal Defense Segment 

The Terminal Phase (see Exhibit 2-5) begins as the deployed warhead or the missile 

continues along its ballistic trajectory towards trajectory termination. 

Exhibit 2-5. Terminal Phase and the Terminal Defense Segment

 Ballistic missile is 

seconds away from its 

intended target as it 

approaches trajectory 

termination 

 BMDS “last line of 

defense” - defensive 

systems must be 

positioned near area 

to be protected (e.g., 

city, airfield) 

 Terminal phase lasts 

about 30 seconds 

 Key elements: 

PATRIOT Advanced 

Capability – 3 (PAC3), Terminal High 

Altitude Area 

Defense (THAAD), 

Israeli Arrow Weapon 

System, Multinational Medium 

Extended Air Defense 

System (MEADS) 
2-6

BMDS elements currently configured or planned for the terminal defense segment 

include 

PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3). PAC-3 is a mobile and transportable 

land-based missile defense element that is capable of multiple simultaneous engagements 

of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and can operate in electronic 

countermeasure environments. 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). THAAD is designed to destroy a 

ballistic missile as it transitions from the mid-course to terminal phase of its trajectory 

both inside and outside of the atmosphere (in the endo- or exoatmosphere). THAAD is a 

land-based element that has the capability to shoot down a short- or medium-range 

ballistic missile and has rapid mobility to provide a means of defense anywhere in the 

world in a short timeframe. 

Arrow Weapon System (AWS). The AWS is a cooperative effort between the U.S. and 

the Government of Israel to develop a missile defense system to protect the State of Israel 

and U.S. and allied forces deployed in the Middle East Region. The AWS is a groundbased missile defense system capable of tracking and destroying multiple short- and 

medium-range ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of their flight. 

Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). The MEADS program is a 

transatlantic cooperative effort between the U.S., Germany, and Italy to develop an air 

and missile defense system that is strategically transportable and tactically mobile. 

MEADS will defend population centers, vital assets, and forces by countering short- and 

medium-range ballistic missile threats in the terminal phase of their flight. MEADS will 

integrate the PAC-3 hit-to-kill interceptor into a system that can move with and protect 

forces as they maneuver in combat. 

2.1.2 BMDS Functional Capabilities 

The ability of the proposed BMDS to achieve a layered defense can be described in terms 

of functional capabilities. The functional capabilities of the BMDS would be developed 

with the objective of deploying an initial set of capabilities by 2004-2005 and enhancing 

these capabilities over time. 

Functional capabilities: The capability of the proposed BMDS to detect, identify, 

track, discriminate, intercept, and destroy a threat ballistic missile during a specific 

phase of flight (i.e., boost, midcourse, or terminal). Functional capabilities are the 

abilities to negate specific ballistic missile threats. 
2-7

The functional capabilities of the proposed BMDS include the long-term flexibility of the 

BMDS to evolve to meet future threats. To engage a threat, an engagement sequence is 

needed. 

Combinations of these capabilities with common characteristics, called engagement 

sequence groups (ESGs), may be used to simplify the specification of BMDS 

capabilities and to more easily assess system performance during testing and operations. 

The BMDS would need to 

1. Provide input for missile defense battle management decisions 

The BMDS should provide a way to decide when a foreign missile launch poses a threat 

that warrants a response, what response to take, and when the threat has been negated. 

The BMDS must be able to obtain the necessary information and provide it to the 

decision-maker in a timely manner. Functional capabilities needed to provide the 

information include the ability to 

 Detect threat missile launches, 

 Determine threat posed by missile (including type of warhead and potential payload), 

 Track missile flight path, 

 Predict threat impact location(s), 

 Communicate with defensive weapons to direct the intercept, and 

 Detect/assess the intercept. 

Engagement Sequence: A unique combination of detect-control-engage 

functions performed by BMDS components (e.g., sensors, weapons, and C2BMC 

equipment) used to engage a threat ballistic missile. The command and control, 

battle management, and fire control functions enable the engagement sequence. 

Engagement Sequence Group (ESG): The logical categorization of engagement 

sequences based upon common capabilities or characteristics (e.g., sensors, 

weapons, and C2BMC equipment) that perform overlapping or similar functions 

in the execution of an engagement. Using ESGs as a tool enhances functional 

and engineering analysis, creates manageable combinations for Initial Defensive 

Operations and Block configurations, simplifies allocation of BMDS capabilities, 

provides a structure to assess BMDS performance, and assists the warfighter in 

operating the BMDS.
2-8

2. Negate threat missiles during flight 

The BMDS should have the capability to destroy threat missiles anywhere along the 

flight trajectory. Functional capabilities that the BMDS must have to destroy threat 

missiles include the ability to 

 Launch a defensive weapon, 

 Overcome any countermeasures released by a threat missile, 

 Guide defensive weapon to critical point, 

 Engage threat missile, and 

 Negate threat payload. 

3. Provide multiple engagement opportunities during flight 

The BMDS should provide multiple engagement opportunities along a flight path. Threat 

missiles evading initial intercept attempts could be negated by subsequent attempts. This 

capability also provides opportunities to destroy the threat while it is over enemy territory 

(i.e., during boost) or over sparsely populated areas (i.e., during midcourse flight). 

Functional capabilities needed to provide multiple engagement opportunities include the 

ability to 

 

 Coordinate and manage multiple weapon launches, 

 Sustain/maintain launch facilities, and 

 Engage threat missile in all flight phases. 

4. Provide robust defense against evolving threats 

The BMDS should have the capability to adjust to a constantly evolving threat 

environment. Enemies will adjust and develop their offensive tactics and capabilities. 

Changing political situations may shift where threat missiles may be launched and the 

theater of operations the BMDS must protect. Functional capabilities that must be 

developed to defend against evolving threats include 

 Interoperable technologies that can work in various combinations, and 

 Interoperable technologies that are deployable where needed. 

According to the functional capabilities currently identified for the proposed BMDS, the 

system would detect, identify, track, discriminate, engage, and destroy ballistic missiles 

in all phases of flight that threaten the U.S. and its deployed forces, allies, and friends. 

To achieve these functional capabilities, the proposed BMDS would be a system of 

integrated technologies, or components, that are greater than the sum of the current 

defensive elements. The components of the BMDS are 
2-9

 Weapons (i.e., interceptors and lasers), 

 Sensors (i.e., radars, infrared, optical, and lasers), 

 C2BMC, and 

 Support Assets (i.e., auxiliary equipment, infrastructure, and test assets). 

Individual components can be thought of as “tools” or “building blocks” that could be 

combined in different ways to meet the required functional capabilities of the proposed 

BMDS. Components would contribute to the functional capabilities as described in 

Exhibit 2-6. 

Exhibit 2-6. Crosswalk of Functional Capability with Components 

COMPONENTS 

FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY 

Weapons Sensors C2BMC 

Support 

Assets 

1. Input for Missile Defense Battle 

Management Decision 

Detect Threat Missile Launches X X 

Determine Threat Posed by Missile X X X 

Track Missile Flight Path X X 

Predict Impact Location X X X 

Communicate with Other Elements and 

Weapon System X X X X 

Detect/Assess Intercept X X X 

2. Negate Threat Missiles During Flight

Launch Defensive Weapon X X X 

Overcome Countermeasures X X X 

Guide Weapon to Critical Point X X X X 

Interrupt Missile Flight X X 

Negate Threat Payload (Lethality) X X 

3. Provide Multiple Engagement 

Opportunities During Flight 

Coordinate Multiple Weapon Launches X X X X 
2-10

Exhibit 2-6. Crosswalk of Functional Capability with Components 

COMPONENTS 

FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY 

Weapons Sensors C2BMC 

Support 

Assets 

Engage Threat Missile in All Flight 

Phases X X X X 

4. Provide Robust Defense Against 

Evolving Threats 

Interoperability of Components X X X X 

Deployable Where Needed X X X X 

The BMDS functional capabilities would evolve over time in response to newly defined 

threats and technology developments. As the functional capabilities change, individual 

components and elements would be enhanced with new technologies to meet those 

threats. The evolution of the proposed BMDS is described in Section 2.1.3 BMDS 

System Acquisition Process below. 

2.1.3 BMDS System Acquisition Approach 

2.1.3.1 Traditional Approach to Missile Defense Acquisition 

The system acquisition process for evolving defensive systems historically required 

defined system architectures. Under the traditional approach, the MDA primarily 

focused on developing single elements and associated technologies that could provide 

independent defensive military utility. These stand-alone elements can be characterized 

as packages of components, typically comprised of sensors, a weapon, accompanying 

C2BMC hardware and software, and support assets. 

 

The traditional acquisition process focused on developing, testing, and procuring 

individual elements with certain functional defensive capabilities. However, this process 

can also require a rigid adherence to a defined life cycle. All components of an element 

must meet all existing weapons acquisition specific test, development, and operational 

requirements before the element can be produced and procured. This inflexible process 

can be redundant and inefficient as technical challenges associated with one component 

might delay the progress of other components in an element. The initial focus of the 

DoD on developing and acquiring elements resulted in several NEPA analyses to support 

the development, testing, and procurement of the proposed defensive elements and their 

components. Detailed discussions of these elements can be found in Appendix D. 
2-11

2.1.3.2 New Approach to Proposed BMDS 

The MDA, as the acquisition agency for the BMDS, has implemented a new, more 

flexible approach to developing the proposed BMDS. This approach is capability-driven 

and component-based rather than focused on specific elements or programs. Capabilitybased planning allows MDA to develop capabilities and objectives based on technology 

feasibility, engineering analyses, and the capability of the threat. This development 

involves an iterative process known as spiral development that refines program objectives 

as technology becomes available through research and testing with continuous feedback 

between MDA, the test community, and the military operators. Thus MDA can consider 

deployment of a missile defense system that has no specified final architecture and no set 

operational requirements but which will be improved incrementally over time. 

MDA’s approach to accomplish the goal of developing an integrated, layered BMDS 

capable of engaging enemy ballistic missiles of all ranges during the boost, midcourse 

and terminal phases of flight would focus on 

 Fielding an initial defensive capability (IDC) in accordance with the President’s 

direction; 

 Adding interceptors and networked, forward-deployed ground-, sea- and space-based 

sensors to make the interceptors more effective in 2006-2007; and 

 Adding layers of increasingly capable weapons and sensors, made possible by 

inserting emerging technologies. 

The approach for incremental improvement involves 

 Determining functional capability needs, 

 Identifying potential ways to meet these needs with new and/or enhanced 

components, 

 Using a spiral development process to develop, test, and identify new technologies, 

and 

 Fielding only those new and/or enhanced components with proven ability to meet the 

identified functional capability needs. 

Spiral development begins when a desired functional capability is identified. The ability 

of existing components and emerging technologies to meet the functional capability 

would be reviewed and efforts to develop or enhance specific components would be 

initiated. Testing and ongoing modification would be used to determine the ability of 

each component to meet the functional capability needs. For example, new components 

would undergo initial development or proof-of-concept testing, while existing 

components would be tested to determine their readiness for use. Work on a given 

technology improvement would stop if testing failed to demonstrate effectiveness or 

functional capability needs changed. 
2-12

The process is organized into two-year time windows, or Blocks, consisting of packages 

of capabilities that are being developed over several years. For example, Block 2004 

represents years 2004-2005, and Block 2006 represents years 2006-2007. During each 

Block, the MDA would research, develop, and test components in varying stages of 

development. 

Thus, the development and testing of individual components to meet a specific BMDS 

functional capability would “spiral” through several successive Blocks (see Exhibit 2-7). 

When appropriate, spiral development within block increments would help keep pace 

with useful technology improvements, reduce risk through iterative reviews, and match 

user expectations with delivered performance to provide improved capabilities as quickly 

as possible. Eventually, some components would be transitioned to the military service 

responsible for deployment, operation and maintenance. Evolutionary acquisition in 

block increments would provide a practical approach to aggressively develop and field 

early BMDS capabilities while preserving flexibility to respond to evolving ballistic 

missile threats and incorporate improved technology. 

Exhibit 2-7. Block Development Process 

Block: A block is a two-year increment of the BMDS providing an integrated set 

of capabilities, which has been rigorously tested as part of the BMDS Test Bed and 

assessed to adequately characterize its military utility. The configuration for each 

block is drawn from the prior BMDS Block; BMDS elements, components, 

technologies, and concepts; C2BMC architecture; and externally managed 

systems, elements or technologies.
2-13

Exhibit 2-8 shows spiral development via the systems engineering process. 

Exhibit 2-8. The MDA Systems Engineering Process 

Guidance Block

Alternatives

Block

Specification

Development

and Testing

Block

Assessment

Fielding

Decision

Spiral Development Feedback Loop

The engineering principle for organizing and discussing the BMDS capability is the ESG, 

which is a means to categorize or group similar engagement sequences based on 

capability or function. An engagement sequence is a unique combination of detectcontrol-engage functions performed by BMDS components used to engage a threat 

ballistic missile; it would define a specific detection sensor, specific fire control radar and 

specific weapon. ESGs define the sequence of events, functions, and system components 

used to enable a weapon to engage a target and provide the structure for measuring the 

level of performance and integration maturity of the BMDS. ESGs also relate multiple 

ways of engaging a target. 

An example of an ESG is an intercept scenario in which the GBI would receive its final 

target update from the COBRA DANE Radar. As the BMDS grows in complexity, i.e., 

integration of many elements and components, the number of ESGs will increase, thereby 

increasing system capability. Better information about the threat from additional sensors 

and more chances to destroy the threat from additional weapons will also result in 

enhanced system performance. Using ESG as a tool enhances functional and engineering 

analysis creates manageable combinations for Block configurations, simplifies allocation 

of BMDS capabilities, provides a structure to assess BMDS performance, and assists the 

warfighter in operating the BMDS. 

2.2 BMDS Components 

The components of the proposed BMDS are weapons, sensors, C2BMC, and support 

assets that as part of the existing or envisioned elements can provide the functional 

capabilities of the BMDS. The proposed BMDS would integrate components in a unified 

system. The general characteristics of these components are described in the following 

sections. Descriptions of components of existing elements are provided in Appendix D. 

2.2.1 Weapons 

Weapons are the components of the BMDS that can be used to destroy threat missiles. 

For the BMDS, weapons consist of various types of interceptors and directed energy 

weapons (e.g., high energy lasers [HELs]). Interceptors would use two primary kinetic 

energy technologies, hit-to-kill or direct impact and directed fragmentation. 
2-14

Interceptors must conduct multiple tasks simultaneously, adjust flight path accurately, 

discriminate the reentry vehicle from countermeasures, and engage and negate the threat 

missile. BMDS interceptors could be placed on land, sea-, air-, or space-based platforms. 

BMDS directed energy systems are currently envisioned to perform target illumination 

and tracking and to negate threat missiles from an air-based platform, although they could 

also be placed on land-, sea-, or space-based platforms. 

2.2.1.1 Weapons Technologies and Subcomponents 

Interceptors 

Interceptors use kinetic energy either in a direct impact or hit-to-kill mode, or to deflect 

or possibly destroy a threat missile by directed blast fragmentation. Interceptors are 

composed of two primary parts, a booster and a kill vehicle (see Exhibit 2-9). An 

interceptor may have one or more boosters (also called stages). The number of boosters 

or stages refers to the number of rocket motors that sequentially activate. Multiple stages 

allow the interceptor to fly at higher velocities and altitudes, and for longer distances. 

The kill vehicle is the portion of the interceptor that performs the intercept and destroys 

the threat missile. It is anticipated that solid and liquid propellants would be used in the 

boosters and in the kill vehicles. For the purposes of this PEIS, interceptors will be 

discussed and analyzed for environmental impacts at the booster and kill vehicle level. 

This will allow the MDA the flexibility to configure new interceptors based on boosters 

and kill vehicles analyzed in this document to address new or emerging threats. 

Exhibit 2-9. Interceptor Schematic 

Interceptors may also use lethality enhancers, seekers, and attitude control systems. 

Lethality enhancers are non-nuclear explosive devices that increase the probability of 

destroying the threat missile and its payload (e.g., explosives, chemical or biological 

agents). Seekers help to detect the threat missile and home in on it. Attitude controls are 

small motors used to modify the flight path of the kill vehicle and position it into the 
2-15

flight path of the threat missile. All of these are important parts of interceptors and the 

environmental impacts from their use will be considered as part of the analysis of 

boosters and kill vehicles in this PEIS. 

Boosters use two broad classes of propellants: solid and liquid. Propellants consist of a 

fuel and oxidizer. An oxidizer is a substance such as perchlorate, permanganate, 

peroxide, and nitrate that yields oxygen readily to support the combustion of organic 

matter, powdered metals and other flammable material. Boosters can use liquid 

hydrocarbon propellants (e.g., kerosene) plus an oxidizer such as liquid oxygen; 

cryogenic propellants (e.g., liquid oxygen or liquid hydrogen [H2]) where the fuel and 

oxidizer are maintained at very low temperatures; hypergolic propellants (e.g., hydrazine 

[fuel] and nitrogen tetroxide [oxidizer]) where mixing the fuel and oxidizer ignites the 

engine without requiring an external ignition source; or solid propellant (e.g., 

polybutadiene matrix, acrylonitrile oxidizer and powdered aluminum). Solid rocket 

motors can also be used as external motors to supplement the thrust of the first stage of 

an interceptor. Some propellants such as hydrogen peroxide can be used in concentrated 

form as a monopropellant or in conjunction with other propellants. 

Interceptor Technology 

As mentioned above there are two major kinetic energy technologies employed by 

interceptors, hit-to-kill and directed blast fragmentation. 

Hit-To-Kill 

Hit-to-kill technology relies on high closing speeds of an interceptor to collide with and 

destroy the threat missile. The interceptor uses kinetic energy, that is, the force of the 

collision, to destroy the threat warhead. Most of the BMDS elements, e.g., GMD, Aegis 

BMD, THAAD, and PAC-3, use this interceptor technology. Exhibit 2-10 shows an 

example of an interceptor launch. 

 Exhibit 2-10. Interceptor Launch 

Directed Blast Fragmentation 

Directed blast fragmentation technology involves 

the interceptor approaching the threat ballistic 

missile and exploding close to it, thereby disrupting 

the path of the threat missile and possibly 

destroying it. The interceptor does not actually 

collide with the threat ballistic missile. A directed 

blast fragmentation kill vehicle explodes near the 

threat missile and distributes its fragments over a 

large area to create a kill zone around the path of 
2-16

the threat missile. As the quickly moving threat missile enters the kill zone it collides 

with the fragments, which alter its path and potentially destroy the threat missile 

altogether. Arrow and PATRIOT systems currently include this technology. 

Lasers 

Laser use directed energy to destroy threat ballistic missiles. High mobility and speed-oflight intercept are key aspects of directed energy weapons. The ABL element currently 

uses this laser technology. 

A megawatt class chemical HEL is being developed as part of the BMDS boost phase 

defense system. HEL devices are laser systems that use high speed flowing gas or large 

amounts of electrical power, or combinations of the two, to produce directed beams of 

energy. The chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL) is one of three lasers under 

consideration to be integrated into the BMDS. The COIL operates by creating chemical 

reactions between chlorine gas and a mixture of hydrogen peroxide and alkali metal 

hydroxides. The chemical reactions produce a form of oxygen (singlet delta) that is used 

to transfer the energy to atoms of iodine. The iodine, in turn, releases this energy as light, 

which is then focused by mirrors and lenses into a laser beam. The COIL has four 

primary parts: oxygen generator, gain generator (or resonator), pressure recovery system, 

and storage tanks that hold all the chemicals needed to operate the laser. Directed energy 

from the laser weapon would heat the threat missile body canister causing overpressure 

and/or stress fracture, which would destroy the missile. The HEL could be mounted on 

an aircraft and flown at high altitudes to detect, track, and destroy threat missiles in the 

boost phase. 

2.2.1.2 Weapons Basing Platforms 

There are four primary weapons basing platforms considered in this PEIS: land, air, sea, 

and space. Some of the interceptor and laser technologies could be based on more than 

one type of platform while others might be based on only a single platform. The basing 

platform for a weapon would affect the impact that the weapon has on the environment. 

The weapons basing platform may also affect the phase of flight in which the weapon can 

intercept a threat missile. The description and analysis of the support equipment and 

infrastructure associated with the fixed weapons basing platforms (e.g., missile silos, 

launch pads, sled tracks) and the mobile weapons basing platforms (e.g., mobile 

launchers, aircraft, ships, satellites) are presented under Support Assets, equipment and 

infrastructure, respectively. 
2-17

Land-based Platforms 

Land platforms would be either fixed or mobile. The fixed land platforms would include 

missile silos, launch pads, and launch stools from which interceptor missiles could be 

launched. Sled tracks and engine test stands could be used to test motors for interceptors 

or conduct GTs of directed energy weapons. Mobile land platforms currently include 

mobile launchers mounted on trucks or trains and moved into the desired location. The 

following BMDS weapons would use land platforms: KEI, GBI, THAAD, PAC-3, AWS 

and MEADS. 

Air-based Platforms 

Air platforms would include balloons and aircraft of various types and sizes. The ABL is 

currently the only proposed BMDS element with a weapon using an air platform, i.e., the 

HEL. 

Sea-based Platforms 

Sea platforms would be either fixed or mobile. The fixed platforms would include manmade islands or vessels anchored to the sea floor. The mobile platforms would be either 

self-propelled or moved or towed via a tug vessel. These could include ships, 

submarines, and other sea-faring vessels (e.g., platforms not anchored to the sea floor). 

The KEI and the Standard Missile (SM) are currently the proposed BMDS weapons using 

a sea platform. 

Space-based Platforms 

Space platforms would carry sensors and/or weapons and would be carried into space by 

launch vehicles. Once released by the launch vehicle, the space platform would 

maneuver into the appropriate orbit around the Earth using on-board propulsion systems. 

The platforms could be maneuvered into several different types of orbits including 

Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO), which allows the platform to remain positioned over 

one location on the Earth, and Low Earth Orbit (LEO), which allows the platform to be 

positioned over various parts of the Earth at different times. The space platforms would 

maintain their orbit by using on-board propulsion systems for the duration of their useful 

life. The proposed KEI and space-based lasers are types of weapons that could use a 

space platform. 

2.2.2 Sensors 

Sensors are the tools that function as the “eyes and ears” of the BMDS. BMDS sensors 

would provide the relevant incoming data for threat ballistic missiles. Detailed sensor 

descriptions can be found in Appendix E. The data from these sensors would travel 
2-18

through the communication systems of the proposed BMDS to Command and Control 

(C2) where a decision would be made to employ a defensive weapon such as launching 

an interceptor. The BMDS sensors would provide the information needed to determine 

the origin and path of a threat missile to support coordinated and effective decisionmaking against the threat. Additionally, these sensors would provide data on the 

effectiveness of the defense employed, that is, whether the threat has been negated. 

BMDS sensors would be developed or enhanced to acquire, record, and process data on 

threat missiles and interceptor missiles; detect and track threat missiles; direct interceptor 

missiles or other defenses (e.g., lasers); and assess whether a threat missile has been 

destroyed. These sensors (i.e., radar, infrared, optical, and laser) would include signalprocessing subcomponents, which receive raw data and use hardware and software to 

process these data to determine the threat missile’s location, direction, velocity, and 

altitude. This and other relevant information would then be integrated into planning and 

controlling intercept engagements through the C2BMC component of the BMDS. For 

the purposes of this PEIS, the analysis of sensor systems will focus on the emissions 

power and range of the sensor categories to determine which sensors have the most 

potential for environmental impacts. 

The three general categories of sensors considered in this PEIS include 

 Weapon/Element Sensors. These sensors are part of the individual weapons and 

elements and allow them to operate independently from the overall BMDS. An 

example of this type of sensor is the PATRIOT radar. Although weapon/element 

sensors are designed for independent utility, they would also have the capability to 

function as an integrated part of the BMDS both in a testing or deployment scenario. 

For example, the ABL sensors could serve as forward sensors for the BMDS and 

could be used during testing to provide target information to midcourse and terminal 

phase weapon components. Discussion of sensors in this category is found under the 

individual Weapon/Element discussions in Appendices D and E of this PEIS. 

 BMDS Mission Sensors. These are radar and optical sensors that are not part of an 

element but would provide data essential to the functional capabilities of the BMDS. 

These independent sensors would provide information for missile warning, early 

interceptor commit, in-flight target updates, and target object maps through the 

BMDS C2BMC architecture to the BMDS and its components. The MDA would 

include these existing sensors in testing activities either as part of the BMDS 

architecture or to evaluate a test of other parts of the BMDS architecture. For 

example, an EWR, such as the Position and Velocity Extraction Phased Array 

Warning System (PAVE PAWS), could be used to identify an ICBM target and 

provide cueing information to a midcourse sensor, such as SBX, to test sensor 

interoperability. 
2-19

 Test Range Telemetry Sensors. These are the sensor systems used to acquire, 

record, and process data on targets and interceptor missiles during testing on a test 

range. They detect and track targets, observe defensive weapons, and assess whether 

a target has been destroyed. They also support range safety activities by providing 

test operators with information on whether the range is clear of non-test participants 

(i.e., recreational boats, private aircraft, etc.) and the test is proceeding within planned 

parameters. These sensors are not part of the actual BMDS, but are considered part of 

the BMDS Test Bed. Test range telemetry sensors include fixed sensors at test range 

facilities and mobile sensors at test range facilities or on ships or aircraft. Mobile 

sensor capabilities add flexibility for testing while minimizing fixed infrastructure 

investment. The description and analysis of such sensors are presented under Support 

Assets - Test Assets. 

Sensors can also be described in terms of the technologies employed in the various sensor 

types as discussed below. 

2.2.2.1 Sensor Technologies 

The technologies used by the existing and proposed BMDS sensors fit into four basic 

categories, radar, infrared, optical, and laser, based on the frequency or electromagnetic 

(EM) energy spectrum used by the sensor. 

Radar Technology 

Radar, which stands for RAdio Detection And Ranging, typically is an active sensor that 

emits radio frequency energy toward an object and measures the energy of radio waves 

reflected from the object. Radars are currently based in land and sea operating 

environments. Most modern radars operate in a frequency range of about 300 megahertz 

(MHz) to 30 gigahertz (GHz), which corresponds to a wavelength range of one meter to 

one centimeter. The time delay in the return signal or echo allows the determination of 

distance to the object and the change in the frequency of the echo through the Doppler 

Effect allows the determination of the object’s speed. The Doppler Effect is the shift in 

frequency resulting from relative motion of an object in relation to, in this case, the radar. 

Most current radars are mono-static because the transmitter and receiver are collocated. 

There are also radars with multiple transmitters and multiple receivers in different 

locations that are called bi-static and multi-static radars based on the number of 

transmitters and receivers. Exhibit 2-11 summarizes the wavelengths and frequencies of 

radar bands. 
2-20

Exhibit 2-11. Radar Band Designations 

Band Wavelength Ranges Frequency 

Ranges 

High Frequency 100-10 meters (328-33 feet) 3-30 MHz 

Very High Frequency 10-1 meters (33-3.3 feet) 30-300 MHz 

Ultra High Frequency 

1 meter-10 centimeters (3.3 

feet-4 inches) 300-3,000 MHz 

L band 30-15 centimeters (12-6 

inches) 1-2 GHz 

C band 15-7.5 centimeters (6-3 

inches) 2-4 GHz 

S band 7.5-3.75 centimeters (3-1.5 

inches) 4-8 GHz 

X band 3.75-2.50 centimeters (1.5-1 

inches) 8-12 GHz 

Ku band 2.5-1.67 centimeters (1-0.66 

inches) 12-18 GHz 

K band 1.67-1.11 centimeters (0.66-

0.44 inches) 18-27 GHz 

Ka band 1.11-0.75 centimeters (0.44-

0.30 inches) 27-40 GHz 

W band 3 millimeters (0.12 inches) 95 GHz 

Mm band - 110-300 GHz 

Infrared Technology 

 Exhibit 2-12. DSP Satellite 

Infrared sensors detect the heat energy or infrared 

radiation from an object. Infrared electromagnetic 

radiation (EMR) has wavelengths longer than the red 

end of visible light and shorter than microwaves 

(roughly between one and 100 microns). The 

Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite, as shown 

in Exhibit 2-12, is an example of a space-based 

infrared sensor (SBIRS) that can detect the heat 

signature or plume from the launch of a ballistic 

missile. 
2-21

Optical Technology 

Optical sensors operate in the visible range and are generally passive sensors that detect 

objects or missiles by collecting light energy or radiation emitted from the target in 

wavelengths visible to the human eye. Specifically, the human eye perceives this 

radiation as colors ranging from red (longer wavelengths, approximately 700 nanometers) 

to violet (shorter wavelengths, approximately 400 nanometers). The planned Space 

Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites, for example, would have both 

infrared and optical sensors. 

Laser Technology 

Laser is an acronym for Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation. 

Laser sensors use laser energy of various energy levels and frequencies (ultraviolet, 

visible) to illuminate an object to detect the object’s motion. Like radar, a laser-based 

sensor is an active sensor that sends out laser energy toward an object and then receives a 

return echo from the object. The time delay in the return signal or echo allows the 

determination of distance to the object and the change in the frequency of the echo 

through the Doppler Effect allows the determination of the object’s speed. The ABL 

aircraft uses passive infrared sensors to detect, and laser sensors to illuminate and track 

threat ballistic missiles. 

2.2.2.2 Sensor Operating Environments 

The operating environments of the existing and proposed BMDS sensors can be 

considered in four general categories. Land-based sensors may be fixed, located in or on 

a building, or mobile, located on a vehicle or trailer. Air-based sensors are located on 

platforms that can travel through the air such as airplanes, balloons, and airships. Seabased sensors are located on platforms that travel on water (e.g., ships or a floating 

platform) or are fixed in water (e.g., a man-made island or platform like an oil platform 

that is fixed to the seafloor). Space-based sensors are located on satellites, which travel 

in circular or elliptical orbits around the Earth. These satellites can be in several different 

types of orbits including GEO, which is an orbit at approximately 36,000 kilometers 

(21,700 miles), synchronized with the Earth’s rotation, and LEO, which is an orbit at an 

altitude of approximately 160 to 1,600 kilometers (100 to 1,000 miles). Weather, 

communications, and some military satellites, such as DSP satellites, typically use GEO 

orbits. 

The following exhibit outlines many of the current and proposed sensors that would or 

could be developed to provide the BMDS with the required sensor functionality. Exhibit 

2-13 includes the proposed operating environment or current proposed location for each 

of the sensor types. 
2-22

Exhibit 2-13. Proposed Sensors, Roles and Operating Environments 

Sensor Primary Function Operating 

Environment

ABL Infrared Search and Track 

(IRST) Infrared Sensor Airborne 

ABL-Active Ranging System 

(ARS) Laser Sensor Airborne 

ABL-Beacon Illuminator Laser 

(BILL) Laser Sensor Airborne 

ABL-Track Illuminator Laser 

(TILL) Laser Sensor Airborne 

Advanced Research Project 

Agency Lincoln C-band 

Observable Radar (ALCOR) 

Tracking Radar Fixed land-based 

Aegis SPY-1 Radar Fire Control Radar Mobile sea-based 

Arrow Fire Control Radar Warning and Fire 

Control Radar Mobile land-based

Forward-Based X-Band Radar 

Transportable (FBX-T) 

Tracking and 

Discrimination Radar Mobile land-based

Ballistic Missile Early Warning 

System (BMEWS) EWR Fixed land-based 

COBRA DANE EWR Fixed land-based 

U.S. Naval Ship Observation 

Island Radar 

Mobile sea-based 

observation 

platform 

DSP Infrared Sensor Space-based 

Ground Based Radar Prototype 

(GBR-P) Fire Control Radar Fixed land-based 

Innovative Science and 

Technology Experimentation 

Facility (ISTEF) 

Optical and laser 

sensors 

Land-based sensor 

experimentation 

facility 

ISTEF Mobile Sensors Optical and laser 

sensors 

Mobile sensor 

systems based at 

ISTEF 

Maui Space Surveillance System 

(MSSS) [a.k.a. AMOS] Optical Infrared Sensor Fixed land-based 

MEADS Surveillance Radar 

Warning and Fire 

Control Radar Mobile land-based
2-23

Exhibit 2-13. Proposed Sensors, Roles and Operating Environments 

Sensor Primary Function Operating 

Environment

PATRIOT Radar Warning and Fire 

Control Radar Mobile land-based

PAVE PAWS Radar Early Warning 

Radar Fixed land-based 

SBX Tracking and 

Discrimination Radar 

Mobile, sea-based 

platform 

STSS Infrared Sensor Space-based 

SBIRS-High Infrared Sensor Space-based 

THAAD Radar Warning and Fire 

Control Radar Mobile land-based

Transportable System Radar 

(TPS-X) 

Instrumentation Test 

Bed Radar Mobile land-based

2.2.3 Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) 

C2BMC would provide the rules, tools, displays and connectivity to enable the proposed 

BMDS to engage threat missiles. C2BMC would be the overall integrator of the BMDS. 

C2BMC would consist of electronic equipment and software that enable military 

commanders to receive and process information, make decisions, and communicate those 

decisions regarding the engagement of threat missiles (see Exhibit 2-14). This would 

include computer workstations installed in existing infrastructure at certain locations, and 

may include new fiber optic cable, radios, and satellite communications. 

Exhibit 2-14. Typical Command Center 

C2BMC would be designed and built to 

provide war fighters with the capability 

to effectively plan and execute the 

MDA’s mission. C2BMC would 

integrate and expand existing capabilities 

that provide the flexibility to exploit a 

wide range of tactics, techniques and 

procedures and BM options. The goal of 

C2BMC is to achieve seamlessness in a 

layered defense through coordinated C2 

and integrated fire control. 
2-24

Specifically, C2BMC would receive, process, and display tracking and status data from 

multiple elements, components and sensors so that local commanders at various locations 

would have the same integrated operating picture and could make coordinated decisions 

about deploying weapons. This would allow the central command structure to use the 

most effective weapons to engage threat ballistic missiles in all flight phases. 

The BMDS C2BMC includes three primary parts, Command and Control (C2), Battle 

Management (BM), and Communications that would operate in an integrated fashion 

across all BMDS components. 

 C2 would provide a flexible, integrated architecture to plan, direct, control and 

monitor BMDS activities. C2 would provide decision-aid applications that integrate 

information and recommendations for defensive options in near real-time to develop 

the operational war fighting aids required for formulating and implementing informed 

decisions and reduce decision cycles. This would permit quick redirection and 

reallocation of assets based on rapidly changing situations and threats. C2 also would 

integrate the Unified Commands, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other allies, 

friends, and other external systems to which C2 would connect. 

 BM would control the launching or firing of missiles and integrate the kill chain 

functions (surveillance, detect/track/classify, engage and assess) across the layered 

defenses (boost, midcourse and terminal). Initially, BM would provide the means for 

executing preplanned responses by integrating available information to provide near 

real-time tasking and status. As the BMDS evolves, BM would evolve to provide the 

user with increased automation, capability, and ability to integrate information from 

increasingly diverse resources. Advancements in BM are intended to further increase 

the battle space with continued improvements in tracking and discrimination 

information, sensor netting, operability with coalition partners, near real time 

intelligence, battlefield learning and dynamic planning, and integrated BM execution 

using disparate sensors and firing units. 

 Communications would allow all BMDS components to exchange data and network 

with BMDS assets. The goal of BMDS communications is to provide robust 

networks that manage the dissemination of the information necessary to perform the 

C2 and BM objectives. The communications networks would seamlessly connect 

BMDS components and link them with other applicable DoD and non-DoD networks 

and assets as required. The network infrastructure would make optimal use of 

existing data and information conduits and protocols. 

The long-term development of the C2BMC would begin with planning and monitoring 

the autonomous operation of elements with stand-alone capability and expand to the 

centralized and integrated control of the BMDS. Currently, each BMDS element, such as 

THAAD, PAC-3, or ABL operates or is designed to operate as an autonomous unit, each 
2-25

with stand-alone capability and with its own BM, C2 and communications system (i.e., 

element-specific BMC3). C2BMC would fuse the data of these BMC3 components by 

integrating communications to provide a more robust picture of the operational arena. 

Individual element weapon system component descriptions can be found in Appendix D. 

For example, a BMDS element like the PAC-3 has an internal or organic BMC3 

component that transfers needed data from its data-gathering sensors (e.g., satellites and 

radars) to its local military commander. Using the information, the local military 

commander can make a BM decision to launch a weapon at the incoming threat ballistic 

missile. The BMDS C2BMC would capture and display tracking and status data from 

multiple existing and proposed weapon systems’ BMC3 systems and sensors so that local 

commanders at various locations would have the same integrated operating picture and 

could make coordinated decisions about deploying weapons. C2BMC would include 

existing and new land-, sea-, air- and space-based C2BMC systems. 

In an integrated BMDS, C2BMC would ensure interoperability with other BMDS 

components in reacting to the threat. For example, if an ABL sensor identifies the 

presence of an incoming ballistic missile, the information would be transmitted to the 

BMDS C2BMC. In coordination with other incoming information across the BMDS, a 

decision could be made that an Aegis cruiser launching a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) 

would be the most effective element to engage and negate the threat missile. The 

commander of the cruiser would have real-time knowledge of the decision to quickly 

launch an SM-3 interceptor against the threat missile.

The MDA plans to improve the internal BMC3 capabilities of each BMDS element and 

to develop and continually upgrade the overall BMDS C2BMC. New or additional 

sensors and communications nodes would be incorporated, as well as new target 

discrimination algorithms, as they are developed. 

Various U.S. command centers would eventually house a C2BMC node. A node is a set 

of equipment and processes that performs the communications functions at the end of the 

data links that interconnect those elements, which are resident on the networks. C2BMC 

nodes are located at geographically dispersed facilities and receive and display tracking 

and status data from multiple BMDS components so that local commanders can make 

coordinated decisions about deploying weapons. Each node consists of electronic 

equipment, software, computer workstations, radios, fiber optic cables, and 

communication devices. Nodes at various locations integrate and communicate data 

using this hardware and software to support C2 and BM activities. Each of these nodes 

would receive and display the same data to local commanders so that they can make 

coordinated decisions about weapons use. 
2-26

2.2.4 Support Assets 

Support assets are comprised of auxiliary equipment, infrastructure, and test assets that 

facilitate BMDS operations. Some of the support equipment (e.g., tracking stations and 

data processing systems) and infrastructure (e.g., test ranges and launch facilities), and all 

test assets comprise the BMDS Test Bed. They enable BMDS components to operate at 

maximum effectiveness over an extended useful life. Assets that support BMDS 

components include mobile equipment, such as cooling systems, power generators, and 

operator control units as well as fixed infrastructure such as docks and shipyards, launch 

facilities, airports and air stations, and communication facilities. Support assets as 

described above will be analyzed separately from their associated component. 

Test assets used for component and system testing and deployment purposes include 

mobile equipment, infrastructure, and other equipment (e.g., target missiles). Although 

these test assets are not components of the BMDS, they are critical to its effective 

development and demonstration. Typical test assets would include test range facilities, 

targets, countermeasure devices, test sensors, optical and infrared cameras, computers, 

and observation vehicles (e.g., aircraft, ship, trucks, etc.). These test assets are designed 

to simulate a threat missile in a realistic environment and to assess and enhance the 

performance of BMDS components in negating those threats. 

2.2.4.1 Equipment 

The MDA would use a variety of equipment to support the functioning of BMDS 

components. Interceptors may require generators, fuel tanks, lightning protection, and 

security surveillance systems. Some weapons elements have mobile launchers such as 

the THAAD’s modified M-1120 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck-Load 

Handling System Palletized Load System launcher, as presented in Section 2.2.1.2, 

Weapons Basing Platforms. Support equipment for the ABL includes chemical transfer 

and recovery receptacles to capture laser chemicals from the aircraft and cooling systems 

for the laser. Existing aerospace ground equipment at each air base would be utilized 

where possible to support the ABL aircraft, as needed (e.g., generator to run the aircraft's 

electrical system). Sensors require antenna equipment units, electronic equipment units, 

cooling equipment units, and prime power units. These units are housed on separate 

trailers interconnected with power and signal cabling, as required. 

Mobile assets also may include trucks, telemetry vans, personnel trailers, rail cars, 

aircraft, ships, ocean tugs or barges. For each testing event or deployment location, the 

MDA would use these vehicles to transport the component, test assets (i.e., targets, 

sensors, telemetry, etc.), and personnel to the site. 
2-27

2.2.4.2 Infrastructure 

Infrastructure that supports the functions of BMDS components includes docks, 

shipyards, rocket and missile launch facilities, airports/air stations, and communication 

facilities. These facilities serve as a base of operation from which components begin 

their missions and return for maintenance, repair, or storage. The MDA would use 

existing facilities to the extent possible to minimize the need for new construction. 

Specific types of facilities that would support the BMDS are discussed below. 

Docks and Navy Bases

Sea-based components (e.g., Aegis BMD configured ships, mobile launch platforms, 

transportable telemetry stations) would operate from existing U.S. Navy bases near 

deployment locations, and possibly other Federal, state and local assets if required. Seabased platforms for sensors (e.g., SBX platform, mobile launch platform) would be 

launched from a base and transported to deployed locations at sea. Periodically, the 

platform would return to primary support base for repairs, maintenance, or upgrades. The 

operation of the SBX platform has been considered in the GMD ETR EIS. 

Launch Facilities and Ranges

The MDA would use existing launch facilities like those at Cape Canaveral Air Station, 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) Kennedy Space Center 

and Wallops Flight Facility, Vandenberg AFB and the Kodiak Launch Complex (KLC) 

to launch test and defensive operational assets into orbit. As appropriate, test launch 

activities could also take place from these facilities. The MDA activities at these launch 

facilities would be the same as those for other non-BMDS launches at a DoD or NASA 

launch facility. Other test ranges, e.g., White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), Pacific 

Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site 

(RTS), etc., would continue to be used for various test events involving interceptor and/or 

target launches. These ranges and facilities comprise the BMDS Test Bed. 

Airports and Air Stations

The MDA would use existing military airports and air stations as a base for operation of 

airborne components including airborne sensors and weapons. The suite of MDA 

airborne sensors would be installed and operated in modified civilian and military 

aircraft, which have the capability to land and takeoff from any large airport. The aircraft 

would use both contractor and military facilities. Hangars and maintenance facilities at 

the home air base would be used to maintain the airborne sensors. 
2-28

Communication Facilities 

The MDA would use the existing communication facilities (e.g., C2BMC nodes, 

transmission towers, and repeaters) located at existing military service installations, 

launch facilities, ranges, air stations, and on other federally owned or leased property. 

BMDS development, testing, and integration might require the modification of existing 

communication facilities, or the construction of new communication facilities within or 

outside such areas. 

2.2.4.3 Test Assets 

Test assets are not components of the BMDS but are support assets critical to its effective 

development and testing. Typical test assets would include test range facilities that make 

up the BMDS Test Bed, sensors used only for test purposes, targets, countermeasure 

devices, and warhead simulants. Test assets are designed to enhance the BMDS by 

simulating a threat missile in a realistic environment and to assess the performance of 

BMDS components in negating those simulated threats. The development and use of 

countermeasures and simulants in the BMDS test program are part of MDA’s 

Measurement Program as identified in Section 2.2.5. In analyzing impacts of 

implementing the BMDS in Section 4, countermeasures and simulants will be considered 

as part of the test portion of the acquisition life cycle as part of Support Assets – Test 

Assets. 

Test Bed 

The BMDS Test Bed encompasses the infrastructure and environment where testing takes 

place. It provides a collection of integrated development hardware, software, prototypes, 

and surrogates, as well as supporting test infrastructure (e.g., instrumentation, 

safety/telemetry systems, and launch facilities) configured to support realistic 

development and testing of the BMDS. Exhibit 2-15 depicts key components of the 

BMDS Test Bed. The infrastructure primarily provides GT facilities, range and range 

instrumentation, and mobile sensors. The existing BMDS Test Bed infrastructure 

components that support testing as a secondary purpose (e.g., COBRA DANE and the 

EWR National Energy Technology Laboratory) are described under their respective 

component (e.g., sensors). A major focus is to develop infrastructure that enables 

realistic testing by permitting realistic geometries for sensor viewing and interceptor 

engagements. The Test Bed includes test locations already being used, such as GT sites, 

or already developed, such as the GMD ETR in the Pacific Ocean. In addition, testing 

could occur from existing operationally deployed sites in compliance with all applicable 

Federal, state, and local regulations. The MDA may also develop test beds in other areas 

such as the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, or outside the continental U.S. to support 

testing of BMDS components in those areas. In 2012, MDA contemplates the 

development of a space-based test bed; however, the concept is too speculative to be 
2-29

analyzed in this PEIS. The BMDS Test Bed provides opportunities to use several target 

and interceptor missile trajectories that encompass a range of missile threats. Test Bed 

activities help wargames prove out doctrine; operational concepts; tactics, techniques, 

and procedures; and concept of operations (CONOPS) in militarily relevant 

environments. 

Exhibit 2-15. BMDS Limited Defensive Capability Block 2004 Test Bed 

MDA’s limited defensive capability (LDC) includes the BMDS components having a 

limited, combat capability to defeat adversary threats. The LDC allows Combatant 

Commanders use of the BMDS, to refine operational tactics, techniques, and procedures 

and exercise command control functions while maintaining a missile defense test and 

development program. For more discussion of BMDS fielding and deployment see 

Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.3.1, respectively. 

Test Sensors 

The technology and operating environments for test range telemetry sensors, radars, and 

light detection and ranging (lidar) sensors are the same as the technology and operating 

environments of the element sensors and the BMDS mission sensors described in Section 

2.2.2. During test planning, the MDA would identify the appropriate sensor that would 

provide the necessary location and functions to support achievement of the test 
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objectives. BMDS mission sensors and test range telemetry sensors as well as radars and 

lidars would be returned to their normal non-BMDS mission after each test event. Test 

sensors would be analyzed for environmental impacts in the same manner as described 

for weapons and mission sensors. Exhibit 2-16 provides information on representative 

test sensors that are available for use in BMDS testing. These sensors are further 

described in Appendix E. 

Exhibit 2-16. Summary of Representative Test Sensors 

Sensors Type Test 

Telemetry Operating Environment 

Advanced Missile Signature 

Center 

Optical 

sensors X Fixed land-based facility 

Air Force Research 

Laboratory (AFRL) Mobile 

Atmospheric Pollutant 

Mapper Carbon Dioxide 

(CO2) Lidar 

Test Lidar Mobile land-based 

AFRL Ka-Band Radar Test Radar Mobile land-based 

AFRL Mobile Lidar Trailer Test Lidar Mobile land-based 

ALTAIR Test Radar X Fixed land-based 

AN/FPQ-10 Upgraded Test Radar X Fixed land-based 

AN/FPS-16 Test Radar X Fixed land-based 

AN/MPS-25 

AN/MPS-25 (upgraded) Test Radar X Fixed land-based 

AN/MPS-36 Test Radar X Mobile land-based 

AN/MPS-39 Test Radar X Mobile land-based 

AN-TPQ-18 Test Radar X Fixed land-based 

ATR-500C Tracking 

Radar X Fixed land-based 

FPQ-14 Test Radar X Fixed land-based 

High Accuracy 

Instrumentation Radar 

(HAIR) 

Range Radar X Fixed land-based 

High Altitude Observatory 

(HALO) 

Infrared/ 

Optical Sensor X Mobile air-based platform 

Homing All-the-Way-Killer 

X-Band Doppler Radar Test Radar Fixed land-based 

Midcourse Space 

Experiment (MSX) 

Observatory 

sensors X Space-based 

Millimeter Wave Radar Test Radar X Fixed land-based 

MK-74 Test Radar X Mobile land-based 
2-31

Exhibit 2-16. Summary of Representative Test Sensors 

Sensors Type Test 

Telemetry Operating Environment 

Recording Automatic 

Digital Optical Tracker Optical sensor X Fixed land-based 

Tracking and 

Discrimination Experiment 

Radar 

Test Radar X Fixed land-based 

W-Band Tornado Radar Test Radar Mobile land-based 

Widebody Airborne Sensor 

Platform (WASP) 

Tracking 

Radar X Mobile air-based platform 

Targets 

Because targets are test assets, they would not be deployed in the BMDS in the same way 

as weapons or sensors. Target missiles would be used to provide realistic threat 

challenges for testing new and evolving interceptor missile and sensor components that 

would comprise the BMDS. Target missiles would be used to validate the capabilities of 

the BMDS missile defense sensors and weapons. Target missiles typically mimic a 

possible threat, both in physical size and performance characteristics. A wide variety of 

target missiles would be used to support the development and test requirements of 

various BMDS elements, and validate their design and operational effectiveness. Targets 

would be used to test how well the BMDS can track the threat missile, communicate the 

threat to the appropriate ground command, and employ an interceptor to engage the 

threat. Targets can be launched from air, ground and sea platforms. The availability of 

multiple platform options allows the MDA to develop challenging and creative test 

scenarios, including salvos (i.e., simultaneous discharge of weapons), and also provides 

numerous viable options for test events to ensure safe testing. 

Exhibit 2-17 shows the relative sizes and ranges of some typical test targets. Test targets 

are sometimes referred to by the names of their stages or motors. 
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Exhibit 2-17. Typical Test Targets 

A typical target missile consists of one or more boosters and a target test object. Boosters 

are the rocket motors that sequentially activate to launch the missile. Target test objects 

are the parts of target missiles that are designed to represent threat warheads or reentry 

vehicles. (The term reentry vehicle is used in conjunction with threat missile.) A target 

test object typically separates from its booster(s); but some targets are non-separating. 

Separating targets can be single-stage, meaning that they have one motor that initiates 

flight, or multiple-stage, with two or more motors that fire sequentially. Multiple stages 

allow a target missile to fly at higher velocities and altitudes, and for longer distances. 

Once the motor on a single-stage target has used all of its propellant, the spent stage may 

be jettisoned or released from the test object and falls back to Earth, often breaking up 

into small pieces before it reaches the surface of the designated test area. For targets with 

multiple stages, the first stage operates similar to a single stage target. However, after the 

first stage uses all of its propellant, that stage is jettisoned and the second stage or motor 

is ignited and the target continues on its path. This sequence of events is repeated until 

all of the stages have been used. Exhibit 2-18 lists the representative targets and boosters 

used by the MDA. There also are additional targets under development based on the 

Navy Trident-1 motors and alternative liquid fuel concepts. 
2-33

Exhibit 2-18. Representative MDA Targets and Boosters 

Aries 

Foreign Material Acquisition 

Hera 

Lance 

Liquid Propellant Target 

Long Range Air Launch Target 

Medium Range Target 

Minuteman II 

PATRIOT as a Target 

Peacekeeper Target Missile 

Short Range Air Launch Target 

Storm 

Strategic Target System 

Strypi 

Trident Target Missile, C-4 

Targets 

Vandal 

Antares 

Black Brant 

Castor IVB 

Lynx 

Malemute 

M55, M56, M57 

Orbus 

SR-19 

Talos 

Terrier 

Boosters 

Trident C4 First Stage, Second Stage, Third Stage 

The target test object would separate from the booster at a designated point in its flight. 

Test objects typically consist of steel or aluminum housing assembly, thermal sensors, 

guidance and control electronics, radio transmitters and receivers, a power supply (which 

may include lithium or nickel-cadmium batteries), and a Flight Termination System 

(FTS). 

Target test objects may use countermeasures or decoys to imitate threat missiles as well 

as simulants to imitate the characteristics of the payload of a threat missile. 

Countermeasures are devices that accompany the target missile during its flight and 

attempt to confuse the sensors and C2 systems, making a successful intercept more 

difficult. Simulants are substances that mimic the significant characteristics of chemical, 

nuclear, biological or explosive payloads carried by threat missiles. Countermeasures 
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and simulants are also used to support the development and testing of the BMDS. They 

are programs within MDA’s Measurements Program and are discussed further in Section 

2.2.5. 

2.2.5 MDA’s Programs 

The MDA implements several programs that support various aspects of the 

implementation of the BMDS, notably including the Advanced Systems program, the 

Measurements Program, and the International Program. As shown in Exhibit 2-19, the 

Advanced Systems program supports the development portion of the BMDS acquisition 

life cycle. The Measurements Program includes the Countermeasures and Corporate 

Lethality Programs, which support the test portion of the BMDS acquisition life cycle. 

Exhibit 2-19. MDA Programs Supporting the BMDS Acquisition Life Cycle 

Given the worldwide implications of ballistic missile defense, MDA also has an active 

International Program that includes the participation of several international partners in a 

variety of BMDS-related development and test activities. 

2.2.5.1 Advanced Systems 

The Advanced Systems program addresses research and technology improvements to 

enhance, supplement, or replace various building blocks or capabilities as the proposed 

BMDS evolves over time. Some technology improvements are currently proposed; 

others will evolve in the future (i.e., cannot be identified at present). Examples of current 

Advanced Systems projects include Project Hercules, the High Altitude Airship (HAA) 

and Multiple Kill Vehicles. Additional discussion of the MDA’s Advanced Systems 

program can be found in Appendix F. 

2.2.5.2 Measurements Program 

To assess and characterize specific aspects of BMDS components’ performance during 

testing, the MDA implements a Measurements Program. The program is designed to 

provide critical data and analyses that fulfill BMDS requirements identified and 

Advanced Systems

Develop

Countermeasures

Lethality

Measurements Program

Test Deploy Decommission
2-35

prioritized by the Measurements Program Assessment Team. Measurements tests would 

be incorporated in individual component tests as well as integrated tests in laboratories, 

GTs of components, and during flight tests. 

The Measurements Program would conduct critical measurements tests to collect data for 

all components to support system engineering assessments/performance verifications and 

ground effects analysis, and to characterize potential or actual countermeasures. At this 

time, “measurements” includes counter-countermeasures characterization, lethality, kill 

assessment, discrimination data, phenomenology measurements (the observation, 

description and explanation of the visible appearance of a test), and other critical 

measurements. The Measurements Program includes the Critical Measurements and 

Countermeasures Program (CM/CM), Countermeasure and Counter-countermeasure 

Program, and the Corporate Lethality Program. The CM/CM program is designed to 

address discrimination phenomenology, countermeasure performance, BMDS 

performance degradation, and potential mitigation options. The Countermeasure and 

Counter-countermeasure program attempts to characterize countermeasure signatures and 

to assess counter-countermeasure efficacy. Lethality, or the ability of the BMDS to 

prevent a ballistic missile threat from producing lethal effects, relies on kill assessment 

and other data gathered by BMDS component sensors and test sensors. Data are gathered 

through the Optical Data Analysis, Radar Data Analysis, and Radar Data Exploitation 

Programs. 

Countermeasures 

Countermeasures are designed to increase the probability that the reentry vehicle from a 

threat missile reaches its intended target. BMDS testing would include the use of robust 

countermeasures designed to mimic those that could be used on potential threat missiles. 

By testing the capabilities of U.S. interceptors against realistic targets including 

countermeasures the ability of the U.S. to respond to an enemy missile attack would be 

greatly enhanced. The specific signature and nature of the countermeasures that would 

be used as part of the BMDS testing activities are classified. Therefore, the discussion in 

this document on the potential impacts of countermeasures that would be used in BMDS 

testing is generic in nature. 

There are two primary types of countermeasures, penetration aids or penaids and inherent 

countermeasures. Penaids are items that are added to the missile to increase the chance 

of the missile reaching its intended target. Penaids could be housed in the target reentry 

vehicle separation module. One penaid technique is for an offensive missile to carry, in 

addition to the actual target reentry vehicle, several decoy target reentry vehicles. These 

decoys, shown in Exhibit 2-20, when released, appear to be actual warheads. Inherent 

countermeasures are elements of normal operations of missiles that make it harder for 

interceptors to identify and destroy the target missile. This would include the separation 
2-36

Exhibit 2-20. Deployment of Countermeasures during Flight Phases 

of the reentry vehicle from the booster, which decreases the size of the portion of the 

missile to be tracked and destroyed by the interceptor. 

There are various basic categories of countermeasures that could be used by MDA in 

characterization and in testing the BMDS. These include simulation, anti-simulation, 

traffic maskers/obscurants, aim point denial, and maneuver. Each uses different methods 

to add potential threat characteristics to targets used in the Measurements Program or in 

other BMDS testing. 

Simulation countermeasures deploy various materials to confuse sensors and prevent 

them from correctly identifying the reentry vehicle. These countermeasures would 

primarily be fabricated from graphite, stainless steel, and tungsten. Anti-simulation 

countermeasures attempt to disguise the reentry vehicle by making the reentry vehicle 

look to the sensors like something other than a reentry vehicle. Traffic countermeasures 

deploy many items at once; this could include using multiple reentry vehicles or multiple 

countermeasures to confuse sensors. Maskers or obscurants are materials or objects that 

move in flight along with the reentry vehicle to confuse the sensors and prevent them 

from correctly identifying the reentry vehicle. Aim point denial is the ability to confuse 

the sensors from identifying the point on the reentry vehicle that should be hit to prevent 

the reentry vehicle from reaching its intended target. Maneuver countermeasures include 

the ability of reentry vehicles to change trajectory as they enter the atmosphere thus 

preventing the interceptor from predicting the path of the reentry vehicle. Other 

countermeasures are designed to increase the probability that the reentry vehicle reaches 

its intended target. 
2-37

Lethality 

Lethality is a measure of the ability of the BMDS to prevent a threat ballistic missile from 

producing lethal effects. Preventing a threat missile from completing its mission could 

entail the use of kinetic energy (hit-to-kill and blast fragmenting weapons) or directed 

energy (laser) to intercept and neutralize the target. Adequate lethality of the interceptor 

missile ensures the destruction of incoming enemy warheads to minimize potential 

threats. Lethality effects are described as either hard kills or soft kills. A hard kill occurs 

when damage done directly to the threat at the point of intercept results in the payload’s 

immediate destruction. A soft kill occurs when damage done to the threat either causes 

the threat’s destruction due to the effects of atmospheric drag/reentry on surviving 

payloads or prevents the payload from reaching its intended target. Lethality analyses 

begin at the moment of impact and continue through to interaction of the target pieces 

and any surviving payload contents with the Earth. The MDA is developing criteria to 

evaluate the lethality capability of BMDS technology against various threats. Potential 

enemy threats could include bulk High Explosive, High Explosive-laden submunitions, 

nuclear, biological, chemical, and bulk chemical payloads carried on tactical ballistic 

missiles. 

Lethality studies include the monitoring and analysis of threat payload destruction and 

dispersion during intercepts of test threat targets. Although limited testing is done on 

actual lethal agents under controlled laboratory conditions, most of the testing relies on a 

number of payload simulants that, while chemically and biologically neutral, mimic the 

significant qualities, such as dispersion, weight, and viscosity of a toxic or hazardous 

substance for test purposes. Testing would require the use of existing simulants and may 

require the use of newly developed ones. 

Because the countermeasures and lethality programs support BMDS testing, they will be 

considered along with other test assets (i.e., test bed, test sensors, and targets) in the 

analysis of impacts in Section 4. 

2.2.5.3 International Programs 

The MDA’s mission is to develop and field an integrated BMDS capable of providing a 

layered defense for the U.S. homeland, deployed forces, allies and friends against 

ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases of flight. To this end, the MDA supports a 

variety of international programs and invites international participation in its own 

programs. For example, the Arrow System Improvement Program is a joint undertaking 

with Israel, which will include technical cooperation to improve the performance of the 

AWS and a cooperative test and evaluation program to validate the improved 

performance. 
2-38

2.3 BMDS Life Cycle Activities 

This section describes the activities that occur during each phase of the acquisition life 

cycle (i.e., development, testing, deployment, and decommissioning) for BMDS 

components. 

2.3.1 Development of BMDS Components 

The MDA would develop the necessary components of the BMDS using an evolutionary 

spiral development process described in Section 2.1.3.2. The MDA would use existing 

infrastructure and components, when feasible, and would add emerging and new 

technologies as they become available. The components would be combined into 

specific configurations to achieve desired functional capabilities. Development activities 

would contribute to the evolution of the BMDS design as existing component 

configurations are altered or new configurations are created in response to evolving 

functional capabilities. During the development of new and modified components, 

environmental and occupational safety and health procedures would be developed. As 

outlined in Exhibit 1-3, development of BMDS components includes activities such as 

planning, budgeting, research and development, systems engineering, site preparation and 

construction, maintenance and sustainment, manufacture and initial testing of prototype 

test articles, and conduct of tabletop exercises. 

2.3.1.1 Weapons 

Weapons include interceptors and lasers as described in Section 2.2.1. Development of 

weapons components would build on existing infrastructure and capabilities of the 

BMDS elements. Research and development activities for weapons that could potentially 

have environmental consequences include research and development activities such as 

developing and testing propellant formulations for new rocket motors, developing or 

selecting casing materials, and developing and testing subscale rocket motors. System 

engineering tests such as hardware-in-the-loop tests would involve using an actual kill 

vehicle, intercept sensor unit, or directed energy component electrically connected to a 

computer system that simulates the functions of the other components of an interceptor. 

Repair, maintenance, and sustainment of weapons systems would include checks to 

ensure that system technology is still viable and cleaning, which may involve the use of 

solvents. Manufacturing and initial testing of prototype weapons technology may require 

static-fire testing of boosters or the firing of the HEL and may also involve the use of a 

sled (i.e., a carrier vehicle that is designed to move along a section of rail at speeds 

approaching missile flight velocities) to test boosters or to provide target opportunities. 

Tabletop exercises would allow developers to plan the interaction of a weapons system’s 

internal technology, as well as its interaction with other components. These activities 

would occur at both contractor and government facilities and would include 

environmental and operational tests under simulated field conditions and computer 

simulations. 
2-39

2.3.1.2 Sensors 

The development of sensors would build on existing sensors and infrastructure including 

the current development efforts for radars such as X-band, S-band, L-band, C-band, and 

infrared, optical, and laser sensors as described in Section 2.2.2 and Appendix E. The 

types of activities involved in developing sensor components would include planning, 

budgeting, research and development, systems engineering, repair, maintenance, and 

sustainment, manufacture and initial testing of prototype test articles, and conduct of 

tabletop exercises. Research and development of mobile systems might include 

transportability demonstrations, possibly using aircraft and ground transport. All other 

development activities for sensors would be similar to those required for weapons. For 

example, systems engineering tests would include environmental and operational tests 

under simulated field conditions and computer simulations. These activities would occur 

at both contractor and government facilities and would include environmental and 

operational tests under simulated field conditions and computer simulations. 

2.3.1.3 C2BMC 

C2BMC includes the hardware and software and related infrastructure that connects and 

integrates the BMDS as described in Section 2.2.3. Development occurs in close 

conjunction with the weapons and sensors components described above and would utilize 

the existing assets and infrastructure when feasible. Development activities would 

include planning, budgeting, research and development, systems engineering, repair, 

maintenance, and sustainment, manufacture and initial testing of prototype test articles, 

and tabletop exercises. 

For purposes of this PEIS, analysis of the environmental impacts associated with the 

installation, construction, or manufacture of C2BMC equipment and facilities will be 

considered, including computer terminals and displays (hardware) and the necessary 

computer programs (software) to provide BM and C2 functionality. C2BMC 

improvements may include simple software upgrades, updated computers, new facilities, 

buried communications cable, and, possibly, construction of new centers. Additionally, 

the analysis includes communications assets such as military and commercial satellite 

communications (COMSATCOM) terminals and antennas, radio communications 

terminals and antennas, and above- and below-ground communications cables (e.g., fiber 

optic and copper). A satellite communication system would provide satellite 

communications among C2BMC nodes. The satellite system would consist of satellite 

terminals, equipment buildings housing communications enclosures, backup power and 

dish antennae. The In-Flight Interceptor Communication System Data Terminal (IDT) is 

a part of the C2BMC and provides an in-flight communications link between nodes and 

interceptors. If a new satellite system or IDT system would be required, impacts would 

result from building construction and launch of the satellites. Fiber optic cable uses light 

pulses to transmit information along fiber optic lines. Where new fiber optic cable is 
2-40

required, cable may be installed on either side of existing rights-of-way (e.g., normal 

roads or railroad tracks). Typically, fiber optic cable would be buried to a depth of 

approximately one meter (three feet) from the surface. 

2.3.1.4 Support Assets 

Support assets as described in Section 2.2.4 are the mobile and fixed auxiliary equipment, 

vehicles, and facilities that are needed to support and facilitate the operation and on-going 

evolution of BMDS components and testing of the system. Development of support 

assets including test assets for the BMDS would be closely coordinated with the 

development of the weapons, sensors, and C2BMC components. Planning for future 

support assets is critical to ensuring that they are acquired in time to meet the needs of 

upcoming BMDS components. 

BMDS Test Bed 

The BMDS Test Bed would encompass the infrastructure and environment where testing 

takes place. Development of the Test Bed would focus on planning for and acquiring 

infrastructure that enables realistic testing by permitting realistic geometries for sensor 

viewing and interceptor engagements. The proposed Test Bed includes test locations 

already being used, such as GT sites, or already developed, such as the GMD ETR in the 

Pacific Ocean. The MDA may also expand the Test Bed to include other areas in the 

Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, outside the continental U.S., and ultimately a spacebased test bed to support robust and realistic testing of BMDS components in those areas. 

The MDA would use existing sensors and launch facilities along the Atlantic and Gulf 

coasts to evaluate phenomenology and interoperability of sensors. Exhibit 2-21 lists the 

facilities in the Atlantic or Gulf of Mexico that are currently used for MDA activities or 

may be used in the future and could be eventually included in the BMDS Test Bed. 

Some facilities are independent, and others fall under the jurisdiction of a Range. Those 

installations that are under the jurisdiction of a Range are presented beneath that Range. 

The MDA would use launches from NASA and U.S. Air Force (USAF) facilities as 

targets of opportunity to reduce the number of MDA launches required. 
2-41

Exhibit 2-21. Facilities Available in the Atlantic or Gulf of Mexico 

Facility Location 

Gulf Test Range/Eglin AFB Florida 

Cape San Blas Florida 

Santa Rosa Island Florida 

Mobile Sea-Based Platform Broad Ocean Area 

(BOA) 

Eastern Test Range/Cape Canaveral Air Force Station Florida 

Mobile Sea-Based Platform BOA 

NASA Kennedy Space Center Florida 

Tyndall AFB Florida 

Space Port Florida (Florida Space Authority) Florida 

ISTEF – Merritt Island Florida 

Mobile Sea-Based Platform 

Cape Cod Air Station Massachusetts 

Hanscom AFB Massachusetts 

Lincoln Space Surveillance Complex Massachusetts 

Redstone Arsenal Alabama 

Naval Air Test Center Patuxent River Maryland 

Aberdeen Proving Ground Maryland 

Ocean City Municipal Airport Maryland 

NASA Wallops Flight Facility Virginia 

Newport News Municipal Airport Virginia 

GBI Development and Integration Laboratory Alabama 

Stennis Space Center Mississippi 

Test Sensors 

Development of test sensors, as described in Section 2.3.1.2, would include activities 

similar to those that would occur in the development of the BMDS mission sensors and 

BMDS element sensors. 

Targets 

Preparing targets for flight test events would involve designing, prototyping, developing, 

procuring, certifying and qualifying them. Targets would be developed in response to the 

needs of BMDS and element testing requirements. To reduce costs, several targets would 

use retired components from other programs, including the U.S. Army Pershing II 

program, U.S. Navy Polaris program, Trident-1 (C-4), and U.S. Air Force Minuteman II 

program, as well as some Foreign Material Acquisitions. This practice would not only 

reduce the amount of raw material used but would also limit the amount of production 
2-42

needed to develop realistic threat targets. These retired components may be used in their 

original configuration, or may undergo minor reconfiguration, depending on the 

specifications of the test. Every target system currently built meets unique test 

requirements; therefore, production of target systems is item-by-item and not in 

quantities. MDA is developing a family of targets to provide a standard target missile to 

support short-, medium-, and long-range test requirements. 

Advanced target applications in progress include short- and long-range air-launched 

targets and liquid fuel boosters, as well as a multi-mode medium-range target. MDA is 

developing a family of targets that provides standard target missiles to support short, 

medium and long range test requirements. Mobile launch/basing platforms are being 

considered, along with the development and future procurement of advanced 

countermeasures and payloads. 

Countermeasures

Development of countermeasures would involve detailed planning for test events, and 

identifying test objectives, appropriate countermeasures and counter-countermeasures, 

and acquiring any necessary materials. 

Two types of defensive measures would be used to oppose countermeasures. The first 

would be improving sensor technology to more completely discriminate between the 

reentry vehicle and any deployed countermeasures. During the development of flight 

tests involving countermeasures, appropriate sensors would be selected and scheduled to 

participate in the test event. The second defensive measure would be improving 

interceptor technology to increase the chance that the interceptor can correctly identify 

and destroy the reentry vehicle. Development activities would include modeling and 

simulation as well as ground testing to characterize physical properties of 

countermeasures and predict behavior during flight tests. 

Lethality

Assessing lethality involves the use of chemical or biological simulants that, while 

chemically and biologically neutral, mimic the significant qualities of a toxic or 

hazardous substance for test purposes. Development of simulants would involve research 

and planning, identification of neutral or inert substances with the required physical 

properties for specific tests, and in some cases manufacturing significant quantities of the 

simulant. 
2-43

2.3.2 Testing of the BMDS 

Testing is a critical aspect of the BMDS life cycle and under the spiral development 

process would occur simultaneously with the development and deployment periods of the 

life cycle acquisition process. Testing allows for the life cycle of all BMDS components 

to be closely correlated so that efforts in particular areas of the BMDS may be truncated 

or canceled if the results are unsatisfactory or where the development effort should be 

shifted to another integrated BMDS element to permit acceleration. 

Testing will require several basic activities as outlined by component in Exhibit 1-3. 

Weapons, sensors and C2BMC components would be manufactured specifically for a test 

event, and appropriate site preparation and construction would be conducted at the test 

location. Infrastructure in the Test Bed would be constructed and prepared and 

components transported to the site, as necessary, and interceptors and targets would be 

assembled and fueled. Where necessary, sensors would be assembled before activation. 

The appropriate occupational safety and health procedures and appropriate training would 

be developed and followed for these activities. 

Testing occurs at the component (Section 2.3.2.1), element (Section 2.3.2.2), and system 

(Section 2.3.2.3) levels. The goal of BMDS testing is to demonstrate integrated and 

effective functioning during increasingly complex and realistic engagement sequences. 

An engagement sequence is a unique combination of detect-control-engage functions 

performed by BMDS components (such as sensors, weapons and C2BMC) used to 

engage a threat ballistic missile. The C2, BM, and fire control functions enable the 

engagement sequence. Individual component and element tests are required to 

demonstrate the functionality of BMDS technology. Element tests evaluate the ability of 

component configurations to work together. These tests are the beginning of integrated 

BMDS tests. Some components may not be designed to be a part of an element (e.g., 

upgraded EWR). In those cases, the component would move from component level 

testing directly into System Integration Tests. See Section 2.3.2.3 for description and 

discussion of System Integration Tests. Integration testing is the activity that occurs 

above and beyond that which is required during the demonstration phase for each 

component or element. Integration system testing assesses the ability of BMDS 

components to work as a unit and to meet the required functional capabilities of the 

system. 

2.3.2.1 Component Tests 

The following describe the test activities that would be performed for each of the 

components in the proposed BMDS. 
2-44

 Weapons. Weapons testing activities for interceptors would include the static firing 

of rocket boosters, sled tests, and isolated flight tests to confirm booster function (for 

single and multiple stages). For lasers, testing would demonstrate laser function and 

individual operation of laser-related components. 

 Sensors. The primary objective of sensor component testing would be to evaluate 

performance in detecting and tracking surrogate threat ballistic missiles. Tests would 

utilize targets of opportunity, that is, launches supporting other research programs. 

Performance would be evaluated by comparing observed and predicted performance 

on target detectability, measurement accuracy, and tracking accuracy. In general, test 

objects representative of the reentry vehicles and countermeasures would be required 

to support both development and operational test and evaluation activities.

 C2BMC. The C2BMC must receive, fuse, and display tracking and status data from 

multiple components and coordinate firing/launches and intercepts. Testing would 

involve modeling and simulations to assess hardware and software capabilities and to 

demonstrate interoperability prior to participation in test events. C2BMC components 

would be tested in concert with their corresponding weapons and sensors components. 

 Support Assets. Testing of support assets (including test assets) is discussed 

separately following the discussion of System Integration Tests. This includes the 

discussion of MDA Measurements Program countermeasures and simulants testing as 

part of test assets.

Testing of individual components has been largely addressed in existing NEPA analyses 

as listed in Appendix C, Related Documentation. 

2.3.2.2 Element Tests 

Element tests are required to evaluate the ability of component configurations to work 

together. Descriptions of element test activities and status by block are described in 

Appendix D, Descriptions of Proposed BMDS Elements. Testing of individual elements 

and support asset components have been largely addressed in existing NEPA analyses as 

described in Appendix C, Related Documentation. 

2.3.2.3 System Integration Tests 

The MDA is proposing to perform integration test activities on existing and planned 

components such as sensors, weapons, and C2BMC equipment. Integration testing of 

BMDS components provides system characterization, verification and assessment. 

Integration testing assesses the ability of BMDS components to work as a unit and to 

meet the required functional capabilities. Ongoing demonstration activities are required 

to assess a component’s continuing utility within the system. System Integration Tests 
2-45

would be used to demonstrate BMDS performance. System Integration Tests rely on a 

foundation of individual component tests and culminate in SIFTs. This section describes 

typical flight test activities, the approach and descriptions of integration test events, and 

the contribution of the MDA’s BMDS Measurements Programs to the assessment of 

technological capabilities. 

Typical Flight Test 

A typical weapons flight test would involve the use of a simulated airborne target, the use 

of a drone, or the launch of a target missile, the launch of an interceptor missile or the 

firing of a laser, and the intercept of the simulated threat missile target. Flight-testing 

also would provide measurements on the effectiveness against countermeasures and the 

lethality of the kill vehicle. 

The MDA would deploy personnel and assets to the test locations to prepare for the flight 

mission (FM), conduct the flight test, and refurbish the test sites to pretest conditions, if 

applicable. Prior to a test event, the target launch site(s) would generally be occupied for 

approximately three months before a scheduled launch and about two weeks after a 

launch. A typical three-month launch cycle ramp-up would include 25 people during the 

first month, 25 to 75 people during the second month, and 100 to 150 people during the 

third month. Dual target launches would include approximately 25 people during the first 

month, 75 to 100 people during the second month, and 150 to 175 people during the third 

month. After a launch, approximately 50 personnel would immediately depart, and the 

remaining personnel would depart after launch site refurbishment. 

The MDA would launch target missiles in a manner that represents relevant adversarial 

capability and provides the components with opportunities to practice their function in a 

realistic situation. The duration of a typical test flight would vary based on the 

component(s) that are involved and the flight phase where intercepts would occur. 

Flights with a planned intercept in the boost phase would last up to five minutes. Flights 

with intercepts in the midcourse phase would last from about five to 20 minutes. Flights 

with intercepts in the terminal phase would last up to approximately 20 to 30 minutes. 

Airspace surveillance procedures, which would be implemented to ensure range safety, 

would last as little as 45 minutes or longer if the test is delayed. 

After launch, the target missile would slowly gain speed in the first few seconds of flight, 

and then rapidly accelerate out of sight and earshot. One minute into flight, a typical 

target missile would be at an altitude of approximately 16 to 19 kilometers (10 to 12 

miles). The first stage would burn out, and in the case of a separating target, would fall 

within the predicted booster impact area. The second and third stages (if used) would 

perform in similar manners, and the target missile would climb out of the atmosphere and 

into space. The reentry vehicle or non-separating target would reenter the atmosphere 

and decelerate until it is intercepted or until the mission is completed. 
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To intercept the target missile, the tracking radar would acquire and track the target while 

the interceptor C2 system computes the best time to launch the interceptor missile. The 

interceptor missile would then be launched. Approximately one minute into flight, the 

interceptor would be at an altitude of about 50 kilometers (31 miles) and approximately 

65 to 80 kilometers (40 to 50 miles) down range. (The altitude and distance down range 

will depend greatly on the trajectory and type of missile.) The first stage would burn out 

and fall within the predicted booster impact area. The second and third stages (if used) 

would ignite, and the interceptor would continue along its intended path. After burnout, 

the second and third stages would fall into their designated impact areas. After the final 

stage burnout, the interceptor, or deployed kill vehicle, would continue its flight until the 

target is intercepted. If the intercept were unsuccessful, the interceptor or kill vehicle 

would be destroyed by mission control or would be allowed to return to Earth. All 

booster stages and interceptors would be programmed to land in predetermined and 

verified clear areas. Intercept altitudes could vary from approximately 100 to more than 

250 kilometers (62 to more than 150 miles). (The altitude and distance down range 

would depend greatly on the trajectory and type of missile.) 

System Integration Testing Approach 

The BMDS Test Program provides for a cohesive testing program of the interoperability 

of all Block architecture components and elements. System Integration Tests would 

involve interaction between and assessment of ground-, sea-, air- and, in some cases, 

space-based test assets. As the BMDS evolves, System Integration Test scenarios would 

become more complex and realistic to evaluate the integration of a higher number of 

working elements and components. More realistic scenarios would introduce an 

increasing number of targets. In addition, critical measurements programs may start as 

early as the components level and go up through integration system tests. 

MDA’s Responsible Test Organization provides the single point of responsibility, 

authority, and accountability for the BMD System Integration Testing. The Responsible 

Test Organization manages the test bed infrastructure and collaborates with the elements 

and components to develop system characterization and coordinate System Integration 

Tests. The Combined Test Force (CTF) is the execution arm of the Responsible Test 

Organization that develops long range and detailed plans, provisions, executes, acquires 

data from and analyzes the Campaigns. 

The System Integration Test planning process is driven by goals that are laid out in 

guidance and technical objective documents. These objectives indicate the functional 

capabilities that need to be met by BMDS technologies. From the overview documents, a 

series of more detailed planning documents outline the details of test objectives, test 

requirements, and scenarios for System Integration Testing. These documents would be 

developed and revised regularly. Combinations of components that can meet functional 

capabilities would be identified. Dedicated component and element tests would be 
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synchronized to create a System Integration Test. Supporting components are identified 

to maximize the amount of data that can be gathered during a System Integration Test. 

System Integration Tests include modeling, simulation, and analysis, missile defense 

wargames, missile defense integration exercises (MDIEs), integrated GTs, and one or 

more SIFTs. System Integration Tests may also be performed for targets of opportunity. 

SIFTs are the culminating test event combining all prior test activities. These testing 

events evaluate component and integrated system performance and readiness. 

A brief description of each type of System Integration Tests is provided in Exhibit 2-22. 

Exhibit 2-22. Description of System Integration Tests 

Test Description 

Modeling, 

Simulation, and 

Analysis 

Modeling, simulation, and analysis are used during test 

planning, rehearsal, prediction of test outcomes, and post-flight 

assessment to verify and update models. 

Integrated Missile 

Defense Wargames 

Integrated missile defense wargames are table-top or computer 

simulations of military operations involving two or more 

opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures designed to 

depict an actual or assumed real-life situation. 

MDIEs 

MDIEs are designed to characterize interoperability and how 

BMDS software components communicate prior to actual test 

flights. 

Integrated GTs 

GTs are tests used to collect data for BMDS components 

characterization and assessment and do not include booster 

function flight tests. GTs aim to reproduce the existing state of 

BMDS architecture, typically components scheduled for 

upcoming flight tests, to prepare for those flight tests and to 

assess component performance. For the purposes of this PEIS 

GTs do not include activities associated with components but 

rather have been focused on System Integration Testing. 

SIFTs 

SIFTs are conducted to verify the integration of select BMDS 

components. These tests generally include a target launch, 

sensors tracking the target, laser activation or an interceptor 

launch, and sensors to determine whether the target was 

destroyed. The number of sensors, weapons, and targets used 

in a SIFT can be adjusted to create the desired test scenario. 
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Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis 

Modeling, simulation, and analysis are used to provide insight on test design and 

potential range constraints. Models are used prior to tests to rehearse and predict the test 

outcomes. In the post-flight phase, models are used to assess and analyze test results. 

Use of models allows the actual tests to be more successful, for example, by ensuring that 

a test does not violate a range constraint. Modeling also allows for “overlaying,” a 

technique to predict and evaluate a component’s response to a test exercise in which it 

did not participate. Analysis of post-flight data also allows the validation, verification 

and update of models. 

Integrated Missile Defense Wargames 

Integrated missile defense wargames are simulations, by whatever means, of military 

operations involving two or more opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures 

designed to depict an actual or assumed real-life situation. They are designed to gain 

insight into how human decision-making affects the use of BMDS components. The 

MDA would use wargames to confirm the effectiveness of its CONOPS. The MDA 

could conduct multiple system-wide wargames per year. Prior to a wargame event, the 

MDA would determine the necessary data requirements. Integrated missile defense 

wargames are tabletop and computer simulation based and do not have a field 

component. Actual participants attend each wargame and the results allow insight into 

the information exchange between the BMDS elements and components, coordination 

during engagement, inventory expenditures, and improvement to CONOPS. For 

example, prior to a Campaign, an integrated missile defense wargame would be 

conducted with players and observers to examine BM schemes, shot doctrines, and other 

operations procedures. 

Missile Defense Integration Exercises (MDIEs) 

MDIEs are exercises designed to characterize how BMDS software components are 

communicating. The MDA has developed a Missile Defense System Exerciser to support 

interoperability testing. Its primary purpose is to characterize the interoperability among 

the BMDS elements, ensuring the ability to operate as a single system. Throughout the 

development of the BMDS, there are frequent updates to software, particularly the 

C2BMC software. The Missile Defense System Exerciser allows for tests of MDA 

software and hardware. An MDIE would be conducted specifically to support block 

software integration prior to SIFTs. The MDA plans to conduct multiple MDIEs per 

year. 
2-49

Integrated GTs 

GTs are tests used to collect data for BMDS characterization and assessment, and do not 

include component testing activities and System Integration Tests. For purposes of this 

PEIS, static test firings of rocket boosters, sled tests, or booster function flight tests are 

considered component level GTs. Component tests have largely been addressed in 

existing NEPA analyses as identified in Appendix D. Those analyses that were 

incorporated by reference are included in Appendix C. The analysis of GT activities 

considered in this PEIS focuses on system integration GTs, which would provide an 

understanding of the BMDS component integration and assessment, as well as how each 

component responds in different situations. Such tests provide data on risk reduction for 

system flight tests and for scenario exploration where flight-testing is either impractical 

or impossible. System integration GTs aim to reproduce the current state of BMDS 

architecture, typically components scheduled for upcoming flight tests, to prepare for 

those flight tests and to assess component performance. The GT tool must include 

weapon and sensor representations to do system performance testing and must be 

connected to a test bed as well as other deployed systems. 

System Integration Flight Tests (SIFTs) 

SIFTs measure BMDS component interoperability and assessment of BMDS functional 

capabilities in each developmental Block. SIFTs are the culminating test event that relies 

on testing activities such as integrated missile defense wargames and MDIE test events 

discussed above. They involve interaction between and assessment of ground-, sea-, air-, 

and, in some cases, space-based components. Each of the SIFTs incorporates dedicated 

component and element tests scheduled to occur at the same time. For example, testing 

of a specific interceptor would be synchronized to occur with the dedicated test of 

separate radar. The MDA plans to conduct up to two SIFTs per year. 

Additional test components could be included in a SIFT to support data collection and 

overlays. For example, during a dedicated test of GMD’s ability to track and intercept a 

threat missile, the Aegis SPY-1 radar could be used as a forward sensor to track threat 

missile trajectory and relay it to the GMD interceptor. Any number of extra sensors 

could be tested during the SIFT to confirm other sensors’ tracking data. Overlaying is a 

technique to predict and evaluate a component’s response to a test exercise in which it 

did not participate. For example, the response of a PAC-3 interceptor to a threat that a 

THAAD interceptor actually engaged can be modeled to generate additional data and 

predictions. 

Planned System Integration Tests 

The MDA has planned a series of System Integration Tests to evaluate the status of the 

BMDS and its components. Activities conducted during a System Integration Test 
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include the planning of integration tests, production of components and support and test 

assets, and implementation of actual flight tests. 

Targets and Countermeasures activities for Block 2004 would include the development of 

full-up target systems to support BMDS and element testing; development of payload 

suites for CM/CM flight tests and target risk reduction flights; and the maintenance, 

surveillance, refurbishment and routine testing of existing Government Furnished 

Equipment boosters. 

The MDA plans to conduct a series of additional System Integration Tests to test the 

BMDS capabilities in Block 2004 and beyond. System Integration Tests represent 

independent flight tests that leverage from existing element or component tests. Future 

block testing would be planned and developed to meet the needs of the BMDS at the time 

of testing. Therefore, details of these integrated test events are only conceptual at this 

time. The general objectives and investment priorities for future Blocks include testing 

and validation efforts with a focus on integrated flight tests, with added realism and more 

stressing threat countermeasures. The BMDS layered defense is envisioned to be 

developing a strong boost phase intercept capability. 

This PEIS examines the range of System Integration Test events as planned and 

described above. However, of the System Integration Test events, the GTs and SIFTs 

represent the most realistic testing scenarios. GTs involve the simultaneous activation of 

multiple sensors and C2BMC components, which would coordinate the control and 

transfer of information between weapons. A SIFT combines a range of test activities into 

a single test event that may occur over several days. SIFTs are designed to be 

increasingly complex integration tests over time. GTs and SIFTs are the only System 

Integration Tests with a field component and thus have the broadest range of potential 

environmental consequences. The example SIFT scenario described below is designed to 

capture the range of environmental effects that could occur from increasingly complex 

integrated testing of the BMDS. This example is meant to show a representative SIFT 

that could be conducted as part of the Proposed Action; it is not meant to be inclusive or 

exclusive of testing possibilities or launch trajectories. 

Generic SIFT 

A generic example of a SIFT would comprise initial selection of a launch and intercept of 

a single threat missile. In general, targets and interceptors would be launched from sites 

in the Test Bed. As a threat missile was launched, specific sensors would be tasked with 

acquiring and tracking the boosting threat missile and passing cueing information through 

the C2BMC to other sensor and weapon components. As the threat missile enters its 

midcourse phase, tracking responsibilities might be transferred to another component 

designed for that phase of flight. Additional cueing information would be passed again 

through the C2BMC to interceptor components. The threat reentry vehicle would be 
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identified and an interceptor launched. Intercepts would occur over designated land areas 

and BOAs. Once the threat had been intercepted, the component would perform a hit 

assessment and notify C2BMC of the results. 

For example, a representative SIFT could include the GMD element engaging an ICBM 

long range target in the boost phase, with Aegis BMD acquiring and tracking the target 

from another location and sending the data to GMD. At the same time, Aegis BMD 

could engage a different target in the midcourse phase, with ABL acquiring and tracking 

the target during the boost phase. THAAD could engage another target in the terminal 

phase, coordinating with PAC-3 to identify the reentry vehicle. Additional components 

and elements could participate, by using the event as a target of opportunity (TOO) to 

validate their system performance. 

Using information gathered during the SIFT; overlay scenarios would be constructed for 

other interceptor components. These scenarios would provide the ability to assess the 

capacities and limitations of each component in intercepting the threat without additional 

flight tests. Simulation overlays would also serve as a risk reduction in the integration of 

the components into the BMDS. 

Future System Integration Tests 

As discussed previously, System Integration Tests are designed to measure BMDS 

component interoperability and to assess BMDS functional capabilities. As the BMDS 

evolves to meet emerging threats, System Integration Tests must reflect the increasing 

number of integrated components. System Integration Tests become more complex as 

those components occupy more geographically diverse locations. Modeling, simulation, 

and analysis; MDIE; and integrated missile defense wargames are virtual tests (modeling 

and computational analyses) or software compatibility and communication tests that 

would be conducted within existing laboratory or test facilities. GTs involve the 

simultaneous activation of multiple sensors and C2BMC components, which would 

coordinate the control and transfer of information between weapons. However, SIFTs 

could involve the launch of targets and firing or launch of interceptors in addition to the 

participation of multiple sensors and C2BMC components. 

SIFT scenarios attempt to capture more realistic intercept parameters. For purposes of 

this analysis, two representative scenarios that could be used during SIFTs under 

Alternatives 1 and 2 were considered. These two scenarios involve similar activities 

(launches of targets, use of multiple sensors, and use of land-, sea-, air-, and for 

Alternative 2 space-based weapons); however, they differ in number of target launches 

and number of weapons used. Both SIFT scenarios may be used to support the proposed 

BMDS and are analyzed in this PEIS. 
2-52

SIFT Scenario 1 represents the simplest SIFT and would include the launch of a single 

target and use of a single weapon component to intercept the target. This scenario would 

use multiple sensors and C2BMC components. Under SIFT Scenario 1, the launch of the 

target and the activation of a laser or launch of an interceptor may occur within the same 

biome or may involve multiple biomes. As BMDS capabilities are proven, a second 

SIFT Scenario (SIFT Scenario 2) is envisioned that would build upon SIFT Scenario 1. 

SIFT Scenario 2 would include the launch of up to two targets. For each target launch, 

more than one weapon component would be able to engage or “take a shot” at the target. 

Dual-target or interceptor launches would occur within seconds or minutes of each other. 

As with SIFT Scenario 1, numerous sensor components also would acquire the target and 

relay tracking data. Under this test scenario, the two targets may be launched from one 

biome and the weapons may be activated or launched from the same or different biomes. 

SIFT scenarios are confined by geographic as well as range constraints that limit the 

number or types of launches that can occur at a specific location based on infrastructure 

and allowable debris impact zones. Each facility has either physical limits or regulatory 

limits on the number of simultaneous launches that it can execute. Test objectives also 

would limit the types of targets, countermeasures and simulants used. 

The MDA would conduct future SIFTs in the existing or an expanded Test Bed. The 

current Test Bed is based around the Pacific Ocean. However, additional test facilities 

along the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico as well as components located outside the 

continental U.S. may also be used. 

2.3.2.4 Role of Test Assets in Integrated Testing 

The MDA would use test assets to enhance the BMDS by simulating a threat missile in a 

realistic environment. Specific target missiles would be configured to meet the 

objectives of a SIFT scenario. Test assets would also support integration testing by 

providing infrastructure needed to assess the performance of components and systems, 

e.g., non-BMDS test sensors and telemetry may be used to acquire, record, and process 

data on targets and interceptors during testing. 

Test Bed 

The BMDS Test Bed would provide opportunities to use several target and interceptor 

missile trajectories that encompass a range of missile threats. Test Bed activities would 

help wargames prove out doctrine; operational concepts; tactics, techniques, procedures; 

and CONOPS in militarily relevant environments. Components of the Test Bed provide 
2-53

IDC.30 The IDC is comprised of the technical capabilities (hardware and software) of the 

BMDS available for operations on September 30, 2004. After the Combatant 

Commander has completed the requisite planning and the operators have been trained, 

qualified and certified to effectively employ the IDC equipment, along with the 

supporting integrated logistics and training systems, the components will constitute IDO. 

Test Sensors 

The primary objective of test sensor testing is to evaluate performance in detecting and 

tracking surrogate threat ballistic missiles. Tests would use targets of opportunity (TOO) 

as well as BMDS targets. Performance would be evaluated by comparing observed and 

predicted performance of the test sensor’s ability to detect the target, accurately measure 

and track the target, and discriminate the reentry vehicle from countermeasures. In 

general, test objects representative of the threat ballistic missiles, reentry vehicles, and 

countermeasures would be required to support both development and operational test and 

evaluation activities for test sensors. 

Targets 

Target missiles are tested individually in risk reduction flights, to demonstrate their flight 

capabilities and ensure their safe operation. They are also used to test the capability of 

sensors. In interceptor tests, targets are used to test the coordination of the sensors, 

interceptors and C2BMC in completing a successful intercept. In some instances, the 

objective of the test event is to track and destroy the target with the defensive interceptor. 

Targets are also involved in flight tests as TOO. Tests using TOO rely on launches 

supporting other programs. In this instance, another program would participate in a 

passive role in a flight test, perhaps testing the ability of its sensors to track the target and 

communicate its properties to the appropriate ground control. 

Flight-testing would be performed to verify performance and to test the interceptor’s 

ability to engage and destroy target missiles under realistic conditions. Certain tests 

would involve only the acquisition of the target missile by the interceptor’s seeker/sensor, 

while in other tests the target missile would be destroyed. In all cases, safety analyses 

would be conducted to ensure human health and safety are maintained and to avoid or 

minimize the possibility that any debris would cause harm to environmentally sensitive 

resources. Typically, several flight tests are conducted within a given test program. 

Targets are transferred to their test locations by air, barge, and/or over-the-road truck for 

system assembly and checkout. Some missile components may be shipped to an airfield 

near the launch site and transferred to the launch site by local truck. Once target missiles 

 

30 IDC refers to the sensors, C2BMC, and weapons from Block 04 that are available for limited, militarily useful 

capability by September 2004. The IDC will include early warning and tracking sensors based on land, at sea, and 

in space, C2, and GBIs for midcourse and terminal intercepts. 
2-54

reach the test range and are assembled, an appropriate Explosive Safety Quantity 

Distance (ESQD) would be established and maintained around facilities where ordnance 

would be stored or handled. Target missile launch preparation at ground launch sites 

may include the following activities: construction and/or modification of facilities and 

infrastructure to support launch preparation and flight test activities; fueling of liquid 

targets; transportation, handling, and storage of target missile system components and 

assemblies; assembly and maintenance of target missile and support equipment; and 

checkout and testing of target missile system components and assemblies. 

Activities associated with ground, air, and sea launched targets differ based on the launch 

platform. In general, target missile operations at the test site may include missile 

assembly and checkout, maintenance, final inspections, testing and checkout for the 

reentry vehicle, and placement of the target on the launch pad. 

Ground Launch Targets 

Land launches of target missiles would be accomplished from a launch pad, launch stool, 

silo, or runway. Missiles would be assembled and checked out and erected on the launch 

stool or the pad or transferred to a launch silo before a scheduled test launch. Unmanned 

aerial vehicles or drones could also be used as targets. Drones can use a variety of 

engines including turbojet engines and gasoline powered combustion engines. Each 

missile storage or processing facility would have an ESQD established around it. Before 

a launch, a Launch Hazard Area (LHA) would be established. The LHA is the area that 

could be affected by missile debris should an explosion occur on or just above the launch 

area or in the event that the missile’s flight must be terminated on the pad or just shortly 

after liftoff. This LHA is cleared of all non-mission essential personnel during launch 

operations to ensure personnel are not exposed to missile launch hazards. 

Air Launch Targets 

Air launches of target missiles may include target drones as described above for ground 

launch targets. However, for purposes of this analysis a typical Air Launch Target 

missile would use solid propellant boosters. The rocket motors for Air Launch Targets 

would be shipped from U.S. Government or contractor facilities by truck or air. Other 

components, such as the target/pallet assembly, would be shipped as applicable. When 

the target arrives at the test location, the motors would be assembled and the FTS 

installed and integrated with other components. The target reentry vehicle would be 

attached to the booster; then the booster, pallet and sled assembly, and support equipment 

would be loaded onto the aircraft. 

Air Launch Targets would be launched from specifically configured U.S. Air Force cargo 

aircraft. Various target missile configurations could be used depending on the range 

needed for the particular test. The integrated target/pallet assembly would be loaded into 
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the aircraft and flown to a predetermined drop point. The target/pallet assembly would 

be pulled from the aircraft by parachute and dropped to a level between approximately 

6,096 and 7,620 meters (20,000 and 25,000 feet) above mean sea level (MSL). The 

target would separate from the pallet and then descend via parachutes to approximately 

4,100 meters (13,450 feet) above MSL. At this altitude, the parachutes would release the 

target, and motor ignition would occur during free-fall. After firing, the boosters would 

drop into predetermined areas in the ocean. The target would then follow its flight path 

to interception or to splash down within a designated ocean impact area. The target 

would be fitted with an FTS to terminate the flight if unsafe conditions develop. 

Sea Launch Targets 

Sea launches of target missiles would be conducted using specially configured missiles 

and any one of a number of sea-based platforms. The Sea Launch Target missile would 

consist of solid or liquid propellant boosters. The liquid propellant boosters can be either 

pre-fueled or non-pre-fueled. Target missiles and support equipment would be 

transported from U.S. Government storage depots or contractor facilities in accordance 

with Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations. They would be placed in secure 

storage until assembly and launch preparation. Applicable safety regulations would be 

followed in the transport and handling of hazardous materials. An appropriate ESQD 

would be established and maintained around facilities where ordnance is stored or 

handled. 

Countermeasures 

In Block 2004, the MDA would conduct activities that would contribute to the use of 

countermeasures in future Blocks. Dedicated flight tests of CM/CM, CM/CM-1 and 

CM/CM-2, would be conducted to support Block 2006/2008 system definition. During 

Block 2006 work would continue to improve existing countermeasure capabilities and 

provide new capabilities including development of payload suites for CM/CM flight tests 

and target risk reduction flights. The work completed during Block 2008 would represent 

a major step in the BMDS evolution. As target development matures, capability-based 

targets and payload suites (to include new and more complex countermeasures) would be 

developed, tested, and integrated into the BMDS testing program. The technical details 

for Block 2010 are less defined than near-term Block efforts however, it is expected that 

progression on the development and use of increasingly realistic countermeasures would 

be incorporated into the BMDS testing activities. 

Lethality 

Lethality studies include the monitoring and analysis of threat payload destruction and 

dispersion resulting from intercepts of test threat missiles. Although limited testing is 

done on actual lethal or live agents under controlled conditions (i.e., in a certified 
2-56

laboratory environment), the majority of testing relies on a number of payload 

“simulants.” Testing would require the use of existing simulants and may require the use 

of newly developed simulants. 

The MDA divides lethality into four areas of interest. The first is target response, which 

analyzes the actual ballistic missile intercept of a threat. The second is the formation of 

the debris cloud containing both pieces of the target and any payload surviving the 

intercept. The third looks at the atmospheric conditions for transport and dispersion of 

the debris cloud. Last, the lethality program examines where and how much of the 

debris, especially the payload, impacts the Earth. 

Lethality tests include investigating the impact of the intercept of various threat payloads 

at various altitudes and speeds. This involves using a mix of laboratory experiments, 

field tests, flight tests of opportunity, models, and hydrocode simulations and 

computational analysis. One critical objective of lethality testing is to calculate weapons 

of mass destruction intercept effects and consequences. Intercepts would occur in the 

boost phase of target flight or in the endo- or exoatmosphere. Therefore, the altitude and 

speed of intercepts may affect the effectiveness of an intercept and fate and transport of 

threat payloads. Because the nature of an incoming threat payload is unknown, lethality 

testing would assist in establishing a methodology to allow warhead typing based on 

impact response. 

Simulant payloads would be incorporated into targets already scheduled to participate in 

BMDS element and system flight tests. This “piggy-back” method of data collection 

allows for the observation of tests of opportunity and the gathering of post-engagement 

lethality information. Analysis would be done to determine the damage done to 

submunitions (for both high explosive and chemical payloads) from interceptor missile 

impact. Submunitions are individual containers in the target designed to distribute a 

threat payload to a wider area. Multi-wavelength sensors would be used to track and 

characterize the resulting intercept debris cloud and its eventual impact on the ground. 

Testing would also include the study of lethality enhancers, which aim to increase the kill 

radius of an interceptor missile. Examples of lethality enhancers could include additional 

explosives or tungsten pellets that explode out of the interceptor upon impact. In some 

cases, the additional explosives are included in the interceptor missile’s FTS. Data 

collected from these tests would be used to continue to refine existing core lethality 

models. These studies are currently being conducted at federally funded research 

development centers, academic institutions, and DoD facilities in the U.S. and abroad. 

Simulated bulk chemicals can be dispersed upon impact with the interceptor and/or by 

using an explosive device. Using an explosive charge in the payload can enhance the 

dispersion of the chemicals, and thereby reduce the concentration of the simulant before 

it reaches ground level. In the event of a missed intercept, a termination device may be 

used to disperse the chemicals. 
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In Block 2004, the MDA would focus on resolving lethality questions and concerns for 

bulk chemical targets with simulants while transitioning to a greater focus on validating 

physical phenomena with full-scale flight-test data. This would include activities such as 

collecting data and analyzing various chemical agents and their simulants. Experiments 

would investigate the in-situ negation and breakup of simulants with a focus on boost and 

terminal phase intercepts. Lethality tests in future Blocks have yet to be determined but 

would involve similar tests based on prior block experiences and individual component 

and integrated testing plans. 

2.3.3 Deployment of the BMDS 

The U.S. would incrementally expand the functional capabilities of the BMDS by 

deploying components and elements as testing demonstrates that they are sufficiently 

capable of defending against threat ballistic missiles. Generally, a component would be 

deployed after it has been sufficiently developed and tested to demonstrate that it is 

capable of operating successfully within an integrated BMDS and the associated safety 

and health procedures are developed and deemed adequate. 

The DoD is planning to use Missile Defense Test Bed assets to defend the U.S. when it 

has been determined that they provide a militarily useful defensive capability. However, 

the MDA could deploy individual developmental assets on an emergency basis, may field 

elements in limited numbers should it be determined that the prototype or test article had 

the potential to provide a militarily useful and sustainable capability, or the asset could be 

deployed if directed in support of national interests.31 Components deployed on an 

emergency basis would function as partially integrated components of the BMDS until 

the emergency situation ends. 

Deployment involves a series of actions to prepare the component or element to function 

in its defensive position and maintain a state of readiness to address missile threats. 

Deployment would involve fielding and sustainment activities as described below. 

Development activities include acquiring components and planning for possible transfer 

to military services. As the missile defense acquisition agency, the MDA would be 

responsible for the purchase of developmental components and engaging the military 

services and Combatant Commands regarding their uses and sustainment. DoD decides 

that a military service will engage in component production with procurement funds. The 

MDA, through its development contractors, could build or assemble the component and 

the associated support assets needed for operation in the field. The MDA would engage 

the operating Combatant Command and the military service in transition planning to 

address roles and responsibilities regarding timing, resourcing, and other requirements. 

 

31On December 17, 2002, President Bush directed the fielding of IDO capabilities by 2004, which would provide 

limited protection to defend the U.S. against ballistic missile attack. In October 2004, MDA achieved LDC when 

certain BMDS test components could also be placed on alert and used in defensive operations. 
2-58

The military service and MDA would agree in writing on roles and responsibilities 

regarding the fielding of the components to include the preparation of the deployment 

site, transport of the component to the deployment site, installation and test in a field 

environment, and staffing the deployment sites. Preparing the deployment site includes 

facilities acquisition and related logistics functions that might be required to support the 

component in its fielded state. DoD direction to transfer the component to a service 

would establish the functions performed by MDA, the military service, and the 

Combatant Command(s). In the absence of an agreed to transition plan, or a DoD 

transfer decision, the MDA would operate and maintain the component. 

 

Sustainment includes various maintenance and operating activities, including maintaining 

components in a ready state by conducting routine maintenance, repairing damaged or 

defective parts, testing the component’s readiness, and resupplying the component with 

necessary materials. Component upgrades and service life extensions, as well as training 

operation personnel, also are sustainment activities. 

Future deployment of BMDS components would occur at times and places where the 

deployed component would provide the most useful defensive capability to counter 

existing or emerging threats. This could include sites outside the continental U.S. The 

following subsections discuss potential deployment actions associated with each aspect of 

the deployment process (acquiring, fielding, transfer, and sustainment) that are 

considered in this PEIS. 

2.3.3.1 Fielding BMDS Components 

The MDA or a military service would obtain components for deployment by purchasing 

the components and their parts, and assembling the parts either on site or in an assembly 

facility, by transferring unused units originally planned for testing, or by ordering 

additional units from the manufacturer. Generally, the components would be 

manufactured by the same contractor and assembled in the same facilities where the units 

were manufactured and assembled for the testing program. However, the MDA or a 

military service would acquire the components from other sources if the existing 

contracts expire and a subsequent contract is awarded to another successful offeror. This 

PEIS assumes that components continue to be built by the existing development 

contractors at the same facilities because predictions of contract changes are speculative. 

All manufacturing would be conducted at facilities that are subject to Federal, state, and 

local environmental regulations. Construction of new facilities would be subject to all 

applicable requirements of NEPA, EO 12114, and other relevant Federal, state, and local 

environmental laws and regulations, as appropriate. 

Fielding would include construction of facilities, transportation and installation of 

equipment, and training with the integrated components of the proposed BMDS. 
2-59

Deployed components would be fielded at a number of locations to provide an integrated 

and evolutionary BMDS. Additional capabilities would be added to expand the BMDS 

as the technology develops. Components would be fielded at locations where they 

provide a layered defense against all phases of missile flight. Boost phase defense 

components would be fielded where they can operate in close proximity to potential 

threat missile launch sites. Midcourse defense components would be fielded at locations 

near potential missile flight paths. Terminal defense components would be fielded near 

theaters of operation, near major U.S. cities and other potential targets, and on allied 

territory. 

The MDA or a military service would field components as directed by the DoD to 

provide a BMDS to counter a wider range of threats. Fielding of components requires 

several actions to move personnel and materials to the fielding site, prepare the site, place 

the component at the site, and to activate the component. Exhibit 2-23 summarizes 

typical fielding activities for the potential platforms. 

Exhibit 2-23. Typical Fielding Activities 

Platforms Components Typical Fielding Activities 

Fixed and 

Mobile Landbased 

Weapons, Sensors, 

C2BMC, Support 

Assets 

 Site layout and clearing 

 Facility construction, operation and 

maintenance 

 Utility construction (electric, water, sewer, 

fiber optics, etc.) 

 Material transport (truck, rail, air, ship) 

 Waste management 

 Human services (lodging, eating, work 

space) 

Fixed and 

Mobile Seabased 

Weapons, Sensors, 

C2BMC, Support 

Assets 

 Facility (e.g., dock, port) construction, 

operation and maintenance 

 Utility construction (electric, water, sewer, 

fiber optics, etc.) 

 Material transport (truck, rail, air, ship) 

 Waste management 

 Human services (lodging, eating, work 

space) 

Mobile Airbased Weapons, Sensors, 

C2BMC, Support 

Assets 

 Airport and support facility construction, 

operation and maintenance (e.g., chemical 

plant) 

 Utility construction (electric, water, sewer, 

fiber optics, etc.) 

 Material transport (truck, rail, air, ship) 

 Waste management 
2-60

Exhibit 2-23. Typical Fielding Activities 

Platforms Components Typical Fielding Activities 

 Human services (lodging, eating, work 

space) 

Mobile 

Space-based 

Weapons, Sensors, 

C2BMC, On Ground 

Support Assets 

 Weapon or sensor construction 

 Material transport (truck, rail, air, ship) 

 Rocket launch 

 Support facility construction, operation, and 

maintenance 

In conjunction with combatant commanders, the MDA is planning to activate test assets 

(e.g., missiles, launchers, sensors, and C2 components) to provide continuous or near 

continuous defense of the U.S. The ongoing activities in support of the IDO at 

Vandenberg AFB and Fort Greely are illustrative of the site preparation activities that 

would be performed by the MDA when a component is fielded. The IDO fielding 

activities, and future fielding activities, would use existing facilities and infrastructure to 

the extent possible to minimize new construction. Site preparation at the two locations 

includes 

 Construction of new or modified launch facilities and silos; 

 Installation of sensors, fire control center, and C2BMC facilities; 

 Development of missile assembly and launch preparation facilities; 

 Development of facilities to store liquid propellants (fuel and oxidizers) and 

hazardous wastes; 

 Installation of communication cables in existing conduits or new trenches, sensor 

hardstands, and antennae; 

 Upgrade of electric power lines, installation of backup generators, and upgrades to 

water and sewer hookups as needed; 

 Modification of existing or construction of new buildings to provide storage, 

maintenance, administrative space, security facilities, and housing; 

 Upgrade of existing roadways and parking facilities, and 

 Installation of security equipment. 

The DoD transferred the PAC-3 program and realigned the MEADS program from MDA 

to the Department of the Army on February 5, 2003. As part of that transfer and 

realignment, MDA retained the responsibility for further research, development, test and 

evaluation, target development, future Block capability flight-testing, and software 

improvements to improve and maintain interoperability with C2BMC. This PEIS 

assumes that the MDA would retain similar responsibilities during future transfers to the 

military services. 
2-61

2.3.3.2 Sustainment of BMDS Components 

Sustainment of BMDS components includes operation, maintenance and repair, upgrades 

and service life extensions. MDA would operate deployed components until they are 

transferred to a service. Operation would include the consumption of fuel and power and 

generation of wastes. MDA and/or contractor personnel would conduct routine 

maintenance and repair on deployed components prior to transfer to a service. After 

transfer to a service, sustainment of components would be the responsibility of the 

appropriate service. Routine maintenance would primarily occur at the fielding location 

unless safety or environmental constraints necessitated a change in location. 

2.3.4 Planning for Decommissioning of the BMDS 

Decommissioning would involve the planning for the final demilitarization and disposal 

of the BMDS components and support assets no longer needed for the BMDS or its 

testing program. Decommissioning occurs when components reach the end of their 

effective service life, when technological advances render them obsolete, or when 

changes to the threat environment render them unnecessary at a location. 

Demilitarization is the act of destroying a system’s offensive and defensive capabilities to 

prevent the equipment from being used for its intended military purpose. 

Demilitarization of the components would be performed in accordance with the DoD 

Directive 4160.21-M, Defense Reutilization and Disposal; DoD Directive 4160.21-M-1, 

Defense Demilitarization Manual; procedures developed by MDA or the responsible 

military service; and applicable Federal, state, and local regulations and procedures. 

Disposal is the process of redistributing, transferring, donating, selling, abandoning, 

destroying, or any other disposition of the property. Disposal of components would 

involve establishing the availability of disposal facilities and then shipping hardware and 

materials to the disposal site. Disposal of materials would then conform to DoD 

directives, Joint Service Regulations, and comply with all applicable Federal and state 

laws. 

Decommissioning processes will vary for weapons, sensors, C2BMC, and support assets 

and will be performed by the appropriate DoD agent. The following list describes the 

decommissioning activities that would be performed for each of the components in the 

proposed BMDS. 

 Weapons. Decommisioning of weapon components would involve transferring the 

equipment to other uses or demilitarization in accordance with the appropriate 

requirements. 

 

 Sensors. If sensor equipment is only needed for testing purposes and would not be 

used in the BMDS architecture, decommissioning would involve returning the 
2-62

equipment to the responsible military service. If the equipment would be used in the 

BMDS architecture, decommissioning of sensors would include recycling/reuse or 

disposal or unused and residual materials, in accordance with the appropriate 

requirements. Additionally, assets can be converted to another MDA use, transferred 

to a military service, or sold. Space-based sensors would be decommissioned by 

being abandoned in orbit, parked in higher orbit, deorbited, retrieved, or 

reprogrammed for alternate uses. 

 C2BMC. As technology advances and BMDS needs evolve, upgrades of C2BMC 

hardware and software would likely be necessary. C2BMC equipment that is 

replaced would be decommissioned in accordance with appropriate requirements. 

 Support Assets. Decommissioning of equipment, infrastructure, and test assets 

would involve continued or adaptive use by the DoD or other government agencies, or 

performance of any necessary decontamination activities in the event the fixed asset 

will no longer be used, followed by sale. In the event of decommissioning, utilities 

could be left in place if the potential to use them for future DoD or other purposes 

existed. Mobile test or support assets would be refurbished and transferred to an 

alternate use, demilitarized, or dismantled and disposed. In terms of MDA BMDS 

Programs, aspects of particular MDA programs could be decommissioned by 

transferring them to another government agency, selling them, removing and using 

specific parts (i.e., sensors), or storing them at a government airfield. Each individual 

program also may have particular decommissioning activities associated with it. 

Decommissioning could involve complete termination of operations and disposal of the 

system or its replacement with a new or upgraded system. Individual components would 

be removed from test ranges and test facilities at the conclusion of the testing activities. 

Testing facilities could also be decommissioned when they are no longer needed for the 

BMDS testing program. 

Prior to decommissioning components, the MDA would evaluate the components for 

continued use by other U.S. Government agencies (e.g., U.S. Customs, U.S. Department 

of the Treasury) or as candidates for Foreign Military Sales. Various adaptive reuses 

would be analyzed and implemented if appropriate. If no adaptive reuses were identified, 

the units would be demilitarized and disposed as excess to the needs of the Government. 

2.4 Alternatives 

This PEIS considers two alternative approaches to providing the layered integrated 

BMDS program described in sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. MDA analysis of the threat 

environment (potential launch locations, missile flight paths, and target locations) 

concludes that an effective missile defense should include weapons components based on 

at least the land, sea, and air. The addition of a space-based weapons platform would 
2-63

provide another layer of missile defense capability. Providing only one or two weapons 

platforms would either leave areas unprotected or reduce the opportunities to engage 

threat missiles. 

2.4.1 Alternative 1 – Implement Proposed BMDS with Land-, Sea-, Air-based 

Weapons Platforms 

In Alternative 1, the MDA would develop, test, deploy, and plan to decommission land-, 

sea- and air-based platforms for BMDS weapons components and related architecture and 

assets. The BMDS envisioned in Alternative 1 would include space-based sensors, but 

would not include space-based weapons. 

This section describes components and associated activities that would occur during each 

stage of the acquisition life cycle (development, testing, deployment, and 

decommissioning) under Alternative 1. Individual components would be developed and 

tested to determine the adequacy for deployment, that is, military utility and ability to 

function in an integrated BMDS. In addition, the BMDS C2BMC architecture would be 

designed and tested to meet the needs of an integrated system. Components deemed 

capable of integrated BMDS activities would be deployed and decommissioned as 

needed. 

2.4.1.1 Alternative 1 - Development 

Weapons subcomponents such as boosters, kill vehicles, and lasers would be derived 

from the existing and proposed elements. Development of the BMDS components as 

described in Section 2.3.1 for Alternative 1 would involve the following weapons 

components based on land, sea, and air operating environments 

 Land – GMD GBI; THAAD; PAC-3; AWS; MEADS; KEI 

 Sea – Aegis BMD; KEI 

 Air – ABL

Development of BMDS sensors would build on existing sensors and infrastructure on 

land, sea, air and space operating environments. The development of C2BMC and 

support assets would be closely linked with the development of other components. The 

C2BMC is designed to mold components into a complementary and synergistic systemof-systems. Ongoing development of BMDS components is required to meet evolving 

functional capabilities. The main types of development activities include planning, 

budgeting, research and development, systems engineering, maintenance and 

sustainment, manufacture and initial testing of prototype test articles, and conduct of 

tabletop exercises. 
2-64

New technologies are continuously being considered by the MDA’s Advanced Systems 

program and by Systems Engineering Directorate within the MDA in concert with the 

National Team. The technologies and programs underway are discussed in Appendix F. 

2.4.1.2 Alternative 1 - Testing 

Testing activities, as discussed in Section 2.3.2, comprises the majority of activities under 

Alternative 1. Testing of the BMDS components and elements provides system 

characterization, verification, and assessment. Systems integrated tests rest on a 

foundation of component and element level tests, which were described in previous 

environmental documentation. This PEIS analyzes System Integration Tests including 

Modeling, Simulation and Analysis, integrated missile defense wargames, MDIEs, GTs 

and SIFTs. For the purposes of this analysis, all integrated tests with the exception of the 

SIFTs involve only ground-based components. The SIFTs could include a combination 

of any of the existing or planned land-, sea-, or air-based weapons components, and any 

land-, sea-, air- or space-based sensors and support assets. Integrated testing would 

determine the ability of the evolving C2BMC to integrate the BMDS components. The 

SIFTs will be discussed in terms of existing and reasonably foreseeable test scenarios. 

Existing SIFTs leverage currently scheduled element tests. Future SIFTs would be 

developed with increasing fidelity and complexity. SIFTs would involve the launch of at 

least one target missile to be negated by either an interceptor missile or a laser. Several 

sensor systems would acquire and track the target missile and interceptor missile (or 

ABL), as well as the actual intercept. For each planned test intercept, debris impact 

zones would be established. SIFTs could cross multiple environment types. Testing 

would occur within the confines of the U.S. and surrounding BOAs, as well as at some 

select locations abroad. As the proposed BMDS grows in capability, testing would 

expand to include more international sites. 

2.4.1.3 Alternative 1 - Deployment 

Under Alternative 1, the BMDS missile interceptors and directed energy missile defense 

system components, and related architecture and assets would be deployed on land-, seaand air-based platforms. See Section 2.3.3 for a discussion of Deployment as part of the 

acquisition life cycle. Because the BMDS is envisioned to be an evolving system with 

interchangeable interoperable components, there is no final architecture defined for the 

system. Deployment would require fielding and sustainment of BMDS components in 

the U.S. and at strategic locations abroad. Components would be deployed as they are 

deemed capable of functioning within the BMDS. Fielding activities such as 

manufacturing, site preparation and construction and transport of components to 

deployment sites would be required. Sustainment activities include operation and 

maintenance of components, training, upgrades, and service life extensions where 

appropriate. 
2-65

2.4.1.4 Alternative 1 - Planning for Decommissioning 

Decommissioning would involve the planning for the final demilitarization and disposal 

of the BMDS components and support assets no longer needed for the BMDS or its 

testing program (see Section 2.3.4). Plans for decommissioning BMDS components and 

facilities would be incorporated into site development activities. Under Alternative 1, 

decommissioning of weapons would involve the removal and disposal of rocket 

propellant and dismantlement and disposal of residual materials such as the missile shell. 

Both testing as well as deployed components and facilities may be decommissioned. 

Thus, target missiles would undergo similar decommissioning processes. 

Decommissioning of sensors would include the recycling/reuse and disposal of residual 

materials associated with the antennae, electronic, cooling and power units. Space-based 

sensors would be abandoned in orbit, parked in a higher orbit, deorbited, retrieved, or 

reprogrammed for alternate uses. C2BMC hardware and software would be upgraded or 

removed and disposed according to applicable requirements. Fixed facility support assets 

would be assigned new missions, returned to their owners, or transferred to new owners. 

Mobile support assets such as transportation vehicles, missile launchers and launch 

vehicles would be refurbished and transferred to an alternate use, or dismantled and 

disposed. 

2.4.2 Alternative 2 – Implement Proposed BMDS with Land-, Sea-, Air- and Spacebased Weapons Platforms 

In Alternative 2, the MDA would develop, test, deploy and plan to decommission land-, 

sea-, air- and space-based platforms for weapons and related architecture and assets. 

Alternative 2 would be identical to Alternative 1, with the addition of space-based 

defensive weapons. A space-based test bed would be considered and evaluated to 

determine the feasibility of using kinetic energy to intercept threat missiles from space. 

This section describes the space-based weapons components and associated acquisition 

life cycle activities under Alternative 2. Individual components would be tested to 

determine the adequacy for military utility and ability to function in an integrated BMDS. 

In addition, the BMDS C2BMC architecture would be designed and tested to meet the 

needs of an integrated system. 

2.4.2.1 Alternative 2 - Development and Testing 

MDA is developing an exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV), which, as described in 

Section 2.2.1, acts as the kinetic energy weapon on an interceptor. EKVs could be 

launched as hit-to-kill weapons from a space-based platform. Under Alternative 2, the 

KEI is a potential space-based defensive weapon to counter threat ballistic missiles 

during boost phase. The development of midcourse and terminal phase defensive 
2-66

weapons may be included as well. The new interceptor would have effectiveness similar 

to earlier interceptors but would achieve it by decreasing the mass of the interceptor and 

increasing the speed at which the interceptor travels. This interceptor may use existing or 

new boosters; however, a new EKV would likely be designed for the interceptor. The 

EKV would be adaptable and could be launched from a space-based platform. Testing of 

a space-based weapons platform would involve ground-based testing including modeling 

and simulations of space-based technology, as well as multiple launches to emplace 

prototype technology in orbit. The prototype would then be tested in increasing realistic 

scenarios involving simulated and actual intercepts of targets. The Near-field Infrared 

Experiment (NFIRE) spacecraft could be launched on a Minotaur space launch vehicle 

from Wallops Flight Facility. The spacecraft bus would be shipped unfueled; however, 

the payload would be shipped fully fueled from the manufacturer. Spacecraft integration 

with the booster would also occur at Wallops Flight Facility. 

2.4.2.2 Alternative 2 - Deployment 

MDA would deploy EKVs and space-based launch platforms to deploy a space-based 

weapons component, currently envisioned as the KEI. The MDA would also obtain 

launch services to deploy the launch platform satellite and weapons components into their 

orbits. They could use Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles launched from Vandenberg 

AFB and Cape Canaveral. 

2.4.2.3 Alternative 2 - Planning for Decommissioning 

A space-based weapons platform resembling a satellite would be decommissioned by 

being abandoned in orbit, parked in a higher orbit, deorbited, or retrieved. A weapons 

platform carrying a sensor system could have alternate uses including monitoring rocket 

launches and aircraft flights. MDA or the military services would make decisions on the 

disposition of the space-based weapons platforms based on the stability of the orbits, the 

costs and risks of deorbiting or retrieval, the remaining useful life of the equipment, and 

potential for alternate uses. 

2.5 No Action Alternative 

Under the No Action Alternative, the MDA would not test, develop, deploy, or plan for 

decommissioning activities for an integrated BMDS. Instead, the MDA would continue 

existing test and development of discrete missile defense systems as stand-alone 

defensive capabilities. 

Under the No Action Alternative, individual components would continue to be tested to 

determine the adequacy of their stand-alone capabilities, but would not be subjected to 

integrated system-wide tests. In addition, the C2BMC architecture would be designed 
2-67

around the needs of individual components and would not be designed or tested to meet 

the needs of an integrated system. 

The approach and methods for deployment and decommissioning of components under 

the No Action Alternative would be the same as under the proposed action. However, 

deployment of individual components could occur earlier under the No Action 

Alternative because they would not undergo System Integration Testing. In addition, a 

greater number of units of the components may need to be deployed to provide a 

comparable number of opportunities to intercept threat missiles as provided by an 

integrated system. 

Failure to deploy a fully integrated BMDS could result in the inability to respond to a 

ballistic missile attack on the U.S. or its deployed forces, allies and friends in a timely 

and successful fashion. This could result in the successful attack on one or more large 

population centers with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons of mass destruction. 

The threat of such an attack could also jeopardize national security interests. Further, this 

alternative would not meet the purpose of or need for the proposed action or the specific 

direction of the President and the U.S. Congress. 

2.6 Alternatives Considered But Not Carried Forward 

2.6.1 Cancel Development of Ballistic Missile Defense Capabilities 

As suggested to the MDA during the scoping process, one alternative would involve 

canceling the development of all ballistic missile defense capability development and 

testing. Such an alternative would rely upon diplomacy and military measures to deter 

missile threats against the U.S. However, this proposed alternative would eliminate the 

capability to defend the U.S., its deployed forces, allies, or assets from a ballistic missile 

attack should diplomacy or other deterrents fail. This alternative does not meet the 

purpose of or need for the proposed action as described in Sections 1.3 and 1.4, 

respectively; does not meet the direction of the President and the U.S. Congress; and 

therefore will not be analyzed further. 

2.6.2 Single or Two-Platform BMDS 

MDA has evaluated the threat environment (potential launch locations, missile flight 

paths, and target locations) and concluded that an effective missile defense should 

include components based on at least the land, sea, and air. Alternatives that provide 

only one or two platforms would reduce the capability of the BMDS to defend the U.S., 

its deployed forces, allies, or assets from a ballistic missile attack. This could result in 

the successful attack on one or more large population centers with chemical, biological, 

or nuclear weapons of mass destruction. The threat of such an attack could also 

jeopardize national security interests. Therefore, alternatives that provide a BMDS with 

only one or two platforms will not be carried forward for further analysis.
 

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3-1

3 AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT 

Introduction 

This Section discusses the biomes, ocean areas, and the atmosphere that comprise the 

Affected Environment in this PEIS, as well as the resource areas that could be impacted 

by the proposed action. This Section defines each resource area (Section 3.1) and 

discusses those resource areas within the context of a particular biome, ocean area or the 

atmosphere (Section 3.2). 

 

The Affected Environment includes all land, air, water, and space environments where 

proposed activities are reasonably foreseeable. The Affected Environment considered in 

this PEIS includes specific locations in the U.S. and areas outside the U.S. As a result, 

applicable international treaties, foreign national laws and U.S. Federal, state, and local 

laws and regulations must be considered. The description of each resource area in 

Section 3.1 includes potentially relevant legal requirements and provides a roadmap of 

issues to consider for impacts assessment of a tiered document along with a 

determination of significance of the impacts. Appendix G contains additional 

information about laws and regulations that should be considered for subsequent impact 

analyses. 

The Affected Environment for this PEIS examines global biomes32 where development, 

testing, deployment, and planning for decommissioning activities for the proposed 

integrated BMDS may occur. 

The biomes each cover a broad region, both geographically and ecologically. The 

distribution of global biomes is widely documented and accepted within the scientific 

community, and classification of biomes is based upon the characteristics of climate, 

geography, geology, vegetation, and wildlife.33 Using biomes as affected environment 

designations captures the relevant differences between environments in a way that 

supports a useful analysis of impacts and allows future site-specific environmental 

documentation to tier from this PEIS. Note that there are no reasonably foreseeable 

BMDS activities occurring in Antarctica. For this reason, this continent does not appear 

on any of the biome maps in the PEIS. 

 

32 Merriam-Webster defines biome as a major ecological community type (as tropical rain forest, grassland, or 

desert). (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2004) 

33 Biogeography, 2nd ed. James H. Brown and Mark V. Lomolino. Pages 110-111. Sinauer Associates, Inc. 

Publishers, 1998. (stating “[E]cologists and biogeographers have almost without exception classified terrestrial 

[ecosystems] on the basis of the structure or [natural features] of the vegetation.”) 
3-2

The Affected Environment in this PEIS is divided into nine terrestrial biomes, the BOA, 

and the Atmosphere as identified below. 

 Arctic Tundra 

 Sub-Arctic Taiga 

 Deciduous Forest 

 Chaparral 

 Grasslands 

 Desert 

 Tropical 

 Savanna 

 Mountain 

 BOA 

 Atmosphere 

Exhibit 3-1 shows the global distribution of the various terrestrial biomes (not including 

the BOA and the Atmosphere). Biomes may be further subdivided based on geographic 

location; however, this PEIS considers nine overarching terrestrial biomes. 

 

The characteristics (e.g., climate, geology, flora and fauna) that define a global biome are 

the same regardless of whether the biome area of concern is coastal or inland. However, 

unique features (e.g., wetlands, estuaries, wind currents, hurricanes) of coastal areas34

may affect determination of environmental impacts. Therefore, the Affected 

Environment discusses these unique features within the biome descriptions. Describing 

coastal areas as part of the larger inland biomes minimizes repetition among the 

descriptions yet captures the important aspects of the coastal areas in a way suitable for 

impacts analysis. 

Each biome description contains representative examples of past, current, or proposed 

locations used by the MDA within that biome. Therefore, an entity tiering from the PEIS 

would be able to map a particular site to its applicable biome. For example, WSMR in 

New Mexico is located within the Desert Biome. The description of the Desert Biome 

describes the particular characteristics of the biome that could affect the impacts of 

activities proposed at WSMR, or other locations in this biome. 

 

34 For the purposes of this PEIS, the coastal area includes the near shore, which is an indefinite zone extending 

seaward from the shoreline beyond the breaker zone, and is not coextensive with the area afforded protection under 

the Coastal Zone Management Act. This typically includes water depths of less than 20 meters (65 feet). The 

inland portion of the coastal area includes shoreline, tidal wetlands, coastal wetlands, and coastal estuaries. 
Exhibit 3-1. Map of Global Biomes 

Source: Modified From National Geographic, 2003b 
3-4

 Arctic Tundra Biome. The Arctic Tundra Biome as described in Section 3.2.1 is 

located in areas above 60o

 North latitude.35 The areas of potential interest for the 

BMDS in the Arctic Tundra Biome include the arctic regions of North America and 

the arctic coastal regions that border the North Atlantic Ocean, North Pacific Ocean, 

and Arctic Ocean, including portions of Alaska, Canada, and Greenland (administered 

by Denmark). 

 Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome. The Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome as described in Section 3.2.2 

occurs between 50° to 60° North latitudes. The areas of interest in the Sub-Arctic 

Taiga Biome include the sub-arctic regions of North America and the sub-arctic 

coastal regions that border the North Pacific Ocean, including portions of Alaska. 

 Deciduous Forest Biome. The Deciduous Forest Biome as described in Section 3.2.3 

is located in the mid-latitude, which means that it is found between the Polar Regions 

and the tropics. The areas of interest in the Deciduous Forest Biome include the 

eastern and northwestern U.S. and portions of Europe. 

 Chaparral Biome. The Chaparral Biome as described in Section 3.2.4 occurs on the 

west coastal regions of continents between 30° and 40° North and South of the 

equator. The Chaparral Biome areas of interest include a portion of the California 

Coast and the coastal region of the Mediterranean from the Alps to the Sahara Desert 

and from the Atlantic Ocean to the Caspian Sea. 

 Grasslands Biome. The location of the Grasslands Biome as described in Section 

3.2.5 is not limited to a particular latitude range. Instead, Grasslands occur in the 

middle of all continents, except Antarctica. The areas of interest in the Grasslands 

Biome include prairie regions of the Midwestern U.S. 

 Desert Biome. The Desert Biome as described in Section 3.2.6 is located between 

15° and 35° North and South of the equator. The area of interest in the Desert Biome 

includes the western arid environment of the southwestern U.S. 

 Mountain Biome. The Mountain Biome as described in Section 3.2.7 occurs in areas 

with high elevations just below and above the snow line of a mountain. The area of 

interest in the Mountain Biome includes the Rocky Mountains in the western U.S. and 

the Alps in central Europe. 

 

35The latitudinal designations identify the general location for each biome; however, the biomes do not have rigid 

edges that begin and end at these latitudes. Therefore, there may be some overlap of biomes at or near these 

latitudinal designations. 
3-5

 Tropical Biome. The Tropical Biome as described in Section 3.2.8 occurs between 

the Tropic of Cancer (23.5° North) and the Tropic of Capricorn (23.5° South). The 

area of interest in the Tropical Biome includes the Hawaiian Islands. 

 Savanna Biome. The Savanna Biome as described in Section 3.2.9 occupies latitudes 

between 5o and 20o North and South of the equator. The area of interest in the 

Savanna Biome includes northern Australia. 

 Broad Ocean Area (BOA) Environment. For the purposes of this PEIS, the BOA 

Environment as described in Section 3.2.10 includes the Pacific Ocean, the Atlantic 

Ocean, and the Indian Ocean. 

 Atmosphere Environment. The Atmosphere Environment as described in Section 

3.2.11 includes the atmosphere that envelops all areas of the Earth and consists of four 

principal layers: troposphere, stratosphere, mesosphere, and ionosphere (or 

thermosphere). 

The description of the Affected Environment must be specific enough to allow 

meaningful assessment of potential impacts, yet broad enough to encompass all potential 

locations. The information in this Section and analysis in Section 4 do not purport to 

address site-specific issues. Additional analyses may be required to determine sitespecific impacts for a proposed action. 

The Affected Environment is discussed in terms of the following resource areas: air 

quality; airspace; biological resources; cultural resources; environmental justice; geology 

and soils; hazardous materials and hazardous waste; health and safety; land use; noise; 

socioeconomics; transportation; utilities; visual resources; and water resources. These 

areas represent the resources that the proposed BMDS may impact and were identified 

based on review of previous environmental documentation for the MDA, the DoD, and 

other agencies that conduct activities similar to those proposed for the BMDS (e.g., U.S. 

Air Force, NASA, FAA). 

Definitions and descriptions are provided below for each resource area followed by a 

discussion of the issues that an impact assessment should address. Some resource areas 

are not analyzed in Section 4 of this PEIS, because they depend upon local factors and 

conditions and are too dependent on local information requirements to discuss 

meaningfully at a programmatic level. These resource areas include: cultural resources, 

environmental justice, land use, socioeconomics, utilities, and aesthetics (visual 

resources). 
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3.1 Resource Areas 

3.1.1 Air Quality 

Definition and Description 

Air quality is determined by the type and amount of pollutants emitted into the 

atmosphere, the size and topography of the air basin, the prevailing meteorological 

conditions, and the location of sensitive receptors relative to the source of the emission of 

air pollutants. Air pollutants of concern fall into four categories. 

 Criteria Air Pollutants. These are a group of seven pollutants identified in the Clean 

Air Act for which the U.S. EPA is required to establish allowable concentrations in 

ambient air: sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), 

ozone (including the compounds that contribute to its formation - volatile organic 

compounds [VOCs] and nitrogen oxides [NOX]), particulate matter (PM) with a 

diameter of less than ten microns (PM10), particulate matter of with a diameter of 2.5 

microns or less (PM2.5), and lead. 

 Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAPs). These are a group of 188 chemicals identified in 

the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (40 U.S.C. 7412(b)). Exposure to these 

pollutants has been determined to cause or contribute to cancer, birth defects, genetic 

damage, and other adverse health effects. Examples of HAPs include benzene, 

asbestos, and carbon tetrachloride. 

 Mobile Source Air Toxics. These are a group of 20 HAPs plus “diesel PM and 

diesel exhaust organic gases,” which are complex mixtures that contain numerous 

HAPs. 

 Regional Haze Pollutants. The principle air pollutants that cause regional haze are 

SO2, NOX, VOC, PM10, PM2.5, and ammonia. The fraction of PM in the PM2.5 size 

range is the most active component of PM in visibility degradation. SO2, NOX, VOC, 

and ammonia all undergo chemical transformations that result in the formation of 

sulfate, nitrate, and organic aerosols in the fine size range. 

Sources of air pollutants include stationary sources (e.g., industrial facilities, refineries, 

power plants, launch pads), area sources (which are a collective representation of sources 

not specifically identified), mobile sources (e.g., motor vehicles, ships, aircraft, off-road 

engines, mobile platforms), and biogenic (natural) sources (e.g., forest fires, volcanoes). 

The size and topography of the air basin, as well as the prevailing meteorological 

conditions determine how air pollutants are dispersed. Air currents carry secondary 
3-7

pollution from one region to another, often increasing the background levels of air 

pollutants for the recipient regions. Such conditions are addressed in the Clean Air Act 

Section 184, which defines an Ozone Transport Region that includes Connecticut, 

Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 

Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington D.C. The emission standards are 

more protective in Ozone Transport Regions. An example of secondary pollution would 

be ozone (smog) created when NOX and VOCs react in the presence of sunlight. The 

NOX and VOCs could be released into the atmosphere a long distance from where the 

ozone ultimately degrades the air quality. 

The Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401) requires the adoption of National Ambient Air 

Quality Standards (NAAQS) to protect the public health, safety, and welfare from known 

or anticipated effects of criteria air pollutants. According to EPA guidelines, an area with 

air quality better than the NAAQS is designated as being in attainment, while areas with 

worse air quality are classified as non-attainment areas. Pollutants in an area may be 

designated as unclassified when there are insufficient data for the EPA to identify 

attainment status. Current non-attainment areas in the U.S. are indicated in Exhibit 3-2. 

Exhibit 3-2. Non-Attainment Areas for Criteria Pollutants January 2004 

Note: Map is shaded by county to indicate the number of criteria pollutants for which the county is in nonattainment. However, the purpose of this exhibit is to generally illustrate the location of non-attainment 

areas in the U.S. 

Source: EPA, 2004 
3-8

The official list of non-attainment areas and a description of their boundaries can be 

found in the CFR at 40 CFR Part 81 and pertinent FR notices. EPA maintains an 

unofficial list on the Internet at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/greenbk/. As of February 

2004, there were 68 non-attainment and 69 maintenance areas for ozone, 59 

nonattainment and 24 maintenance areas for PM10, 11 nonattainment and 65 maintenance 

areas for CO, 22 nonattainment and 30 maintenance areas for SO2, and eight maintenance 

areas for lead. 

For areas that are designated non-attainment, the Clean Air Act establishes levels and 

timetables for each region to achieve attainment of the NAAQS. States must prepare a 

State Implementation Plan (SIP), which documents how the region will reach its 

attainment levels by the required date. The SIP includes inventories of emissions within 

the area and establishes emissions budgets that are designed to bring the area into 

compliance with the NAAQS. In maintenance areas, the SIP documents how the state 

intends to maintain compliance with NAAQS. 

Section 176(c) of the Clean Air Act prohibits Federal entities from taking actions in nonattainment or maintenance areas that do not “conform” to the SIP. The purpose of the 

conformity regulation is to ensure that Federal activities 1) do not interfere with the 

budgets in the SIPs; 2) do not cause or contribute to new violations of the NAAQS; and 

3) do not impede the ability to attain or maintain the NAAQS. In November 1993, EPA 

promulgated two sets of regulations to implement CAA section 176(c): 

 The Transportation Conformity Regulations, which establish the criteria and 

procedures for determining that transportation plans, programs, and projects funded 

under Title 23 U.S.C. or the Federal Transit Act conform to the SIP. The 

transportation conformity regulations are codified in 40 CFR 93, in Subpart A. 

 The General Conformity Regulations, which ensure that other Federal actions also 

conform to the SIPs, and are applicable to all other Federal actions not covered under 

Transportation Conformity. The General Conformity regulations are codified in 40 

CFR 93, Subpart B. All Federal actions are covered unless otherwise exempt (such as 

actions covered by transportation conformity, exempt actions listed in the rule, and 

cases where the action does not create emissions above the de minimis threshold 

levels specified by EPA regulations in 40 CFR 93.153(b)). 

The proposed action is subject to the General Conformity Regulations, not Transportation 

Conformity Regulations. Under the General Conformity Regulations, MDA is required 

to determine whether the proposed action and alternatives would result in emissions 

within a non-attainment or maintenance area that would exceed established de minimis

levels or would be regionally significant (i.e., exceed ten percent of the emission 

inventory). If so, MDA must make a General Conformity Determination in accordance 
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with EPA requirements. Exhibit 3-3 shows de minimis levels of pollutants for various 

non-attainment levels. 

Exhibit 3-3. General Conformity De Minimis Levels 

Criteria 

Pollutant 

Area Designation Pollutant De Minimis Level, 

metric tons per year 

(tons per year) 

Ozone Extreme Non-attainment NOX or VOC 9 (10) 

 Severe Non-attainment NOX or VOC 23 (25) 

 Serious Non-attainment NOX or VOC 45 (50) 

 Other Non-attainment with 

Transport 

NOX 91 (100) 

 Other Non-attainment with 

Transport 

VOC 45 (50) 

 Other Non-attainment 

without Transport 

NOX or VOC 91 (100) 

 Maintenance NOX 91 (100) 

 Maintenance with Transport VOC 45 (50) 

 Maintenance without 

Transport 

VOC 91 (100) 

PM10 Serious Non-attainment PM10 64 (70) 

 Moderate Non-attainment PM10 91 (100) 

 Maintenance PM10 91 (100) 

CO Non-attainment or 

Maintenance 

CO 91 (100) 

SO2 Non-attainment or 

Maintenance 

SO2 91 (100) 

NO2 Non-attainment or 

Maintenance 

NO2 91 (100) 

Lead Non-attainment or 

Maintenance 

Lead 23 (25) 

Source: 40 CFR 93.153(b) 

The Clean Air Act lists 188 HAPs, which are individual chemicals or elements that have 

been linked to observed human health effects such as increased risk of cancer, damage to 

the immune system, neurological problems, damage to reproductive systems (e.g., 

reduced fertility) and developmental systems, respiratory damage, and other health 

problems. Details on precisely how each HAP affects humans can be found in EPA’s 

Integrated Risk Information System, a database available to the public.36 The elemental 

 

36 EPA, 2003c 
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HAPs are primarily metals and families of metallic compounds (e.g., mercury 

compounds, arsenic compounds). The remaining HAPs are primarily organic compounds 

and selected inorganic gaseous compounds. Benzene, ethyl chloride, and 

pentachlorophenol are examples of organic HAPs. Hydrochloric acid and hydrogen 

fluoride are examples of inorganic HAPs. 

The Clean Air Act regulations include a regional haze rule (64 FR 35714 [July 1, 1999]) 

that requires states to develop SIPs to address visibility at designated mandatory Class I 

areas, including 156 designated national parks, wilderness areas, and wildlife refuges. 

General features of the regional haze rule are that all states are required to prepare an 

emissions inventory of all haze related pollutants from all sources in all constituent 

counties. Most states will develop their regional haze SIPs in conjunction with their 

PM2.5 SIPs over the next several years. 

Another concern with respect to air quality is greenhouse gas emissions. The primary 

greenhouse gas emitted by anthropogenic or human-derived activities in the U.S. is CO2, 

which represented approximately 84 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions in 2001. 

The largest source of CO2, and of overall greenhouse gas emissions, is fossil fuel 

combustion, both from stationary (power plants, industry and manufacturing processes) 

and mobile sources (automobiles, trucks, construction equipment, lawn mowers). 

Electric power generation, from utilities and non-utilities combined, accounted for the 

largest source of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2001, closely followed by 

transportation sources and industrial processes. On an annual basis, the overall 

consumption of fossil fuels in the U.S., and therefore emissions from the combustion of 

those fuels, generally fluctuates in response to changes in general economic conditions, 

energy prices, weather (temperature extremes during winters and summers), and the 

availability/acceptance of non-fossil fuel alternatives. 

Although CO, NOX, VOCs, and SO2 do not have a direct global warming effect, they are 

regulated because of their role in influencing the formation and destruction of 

tropospheric (ground-level) and stratospheric (upper atmosphere) ozone. CO is produced 

when carbon-containing fuels are combusted incompletely. NOX (i.e., nitrogen oxide 

[NO] and NO2) originate predominantly from fossil fuel combustion, with the majority of 

emissions from mobile sources, but also from stationary sources. VOCs, which include 

hundreds of organic compounds that participate in atmospheric chemical reactions, are 

emitted primarily from transportation, industrial processes, and non-industrial 

consumption of organic solvents. In the U.S., SO2 is primarily emitted from coal 

combustion for electric power generation and from the metals industry. (EPA, 2003b) 

Impact Assessment 

MDA activities that would contribute to air quality impacts include actions that emit 

criteria pollutants, HAPs, mobile source air toxics, or regional haze pollutants, as well as 
3-11

compounds that would affect climate change. MDA actions that would result in the 

emission of such pollutants and compounds include missile launches, operation of 

internal combustion and jet engines, incineration, heating and cooling of facilities and 

components, use of fuel storage tanks, fueling activities, and construction. Best available 

control technologies are applied to new emissions sources and to sources that are 

modified to minimize the effects that MDA activities would have on air quality. Impacts 

on the regulated local and regional air quality from activities related to the proposed 

BMDS would result from construction and operation activities at specific locations, 

launch related activities, and other general activities. The emission of CO2 and ozonedepleting substances associated with the proposed BMDS has the potential to result in 

climate change impacts. 

Construction and Operations Activities 

Emissions resulting from site preparation and construction activities as well as new or 

increased operations activities would include PM, CO, NOX, sulfur oxides (SOX), and 

VOC. The use of construction and supply equipment may increase all types of emissions. 

Emissions due to new or increased site operations activities would result from 

 Increase in overland shipments related to new or increased operations; 

 Use of new equipment and generators or increased use of existing equipment and 

generators; 

 Relocation of support personnel and localized increase in commuter traffic; 

 Use of new fuel storage facilities or the increased use of existing fuel storage 

facilities; 

 Use of new facilities and associated infrastructure (boilers, solvent degreasing, 

painting, used oil, spills, and incineration) or the increased use of existing facilities 

and associated infrastructure; and 

 Use of earth-moving equipment during construction. 

Emissions should be determined using EPA emissions factors and compared against 

ambient air quality standards. The emissions associated with industrial operations would 

be compared against historically similar operations or by methods outlined in the toxics 

release inventory, as necessary. 

Launch Emissions 

Emissions resulting from launch related activities would include CO, NOX, PM, SOX, 

VOC, and hydrogen chloride (HCl). The analysis of launch emissions impacts can be 

considered in two categories, above and below 914 meters (3,000 feet). The 914-meter 

(3,000-foot) altitude is an appropriate threshold because the EPA uses this altitude for 

determining contributions of emissions to ambient local and regional air quality. EPA 

emissions factors should be used to determine emissions fractions for each emission 
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source for emissions above and below 914 meters (3,000 feet). Total emissions should be 

estimated by multiplying emissions fractions by the total amount of propellant used. 

 

Determination of Significance 

For actions that would occur in the U.S. within a non-attainment or maintenance area, the 

total annual emission of each criteria pollutant would be calculated and would be 

compared against EPA de minimis levels. Annual emissions values that exceed the de 

minimis level or ten percent of the total emission budget of the non-attainment or 

maintenance area, or state or local ambient air quality standards would be considered 

significant and would require a general conformity evaluation. 

The risk associated with the emissions of HAPs on sensitive receptors within the U.S. 

would be evaluated. (EPA, 1999) Risk factors that exceed acceptable levels established 

by EPA would be considered significant. Emissions within the U.S. would also be 

compared against the requirements and standards included in SIPs to address visibility at 

Class 1 areas (156 designated national parks, wilderness areas, and wildlife refuges). 

Emissions that exceed the regional haze standard of an SIP would be considered a 

significant impact. Actions proposed to occur outside of the U.S. and its territories would 

be reviewed in accordance with applicable international or foreign ambient air quality 

standards. Emissions that would occur in locations that violate applicable international or 

foreign laws would be considered significant. 

The effects of emissions that would occur above an altitude of 914 meters (3,000 feet) 

would be reviewed for potential contribution to ozone depletion (particularly in the upper 

troposphere/stratosphere), acid rain, and global warming. To determine the significance 

of impacts to air quality, emission levels would be compared with studies of other similar 

emissions, as well as U.S. or global emissions of ozone-depleting substances, acids and 

greenhouse gases (e.g., CO2). Annual emissions greater than one percent of the global 

emissions, annual MDA program emissions that exceed the average level of emissions 

associated with the program over the preceding three years by more than ten percent or 

single events that exceed one percent of the global emissions would be considered 

significant. 

3.1.2 Airspace 

Definition and Description

Airspace refers to the space that lies above a nation and comes under its jurisdiction. 

Airspace is a finite resource that can be defined vertically and horizontally, as well as 

temporally. Time is an important factor in airspace management and air traffic control. 

The FAA has established various airspace designations to protect aircraft while operating 

near and between airports and while operating in airspace identified for defense-related 
3-13

purposes. Flight rules and air traffic control procedures govern safe operations in each 

type of designated airspace. Military operations follow specific procedures to maximize 

flight safety for both military and civil aircraft. 

The types of airspace are defined by the complexity or density of aircraft movements, the 

nature of operations conducted within the airspace, the level of safety required, and the 

national and public interest in the airspace. The classes of airspace are controlled, 

uncontrolled, special use, and other airspace, as defined in Exhibit 3-4. 

Exhibit 3-4. Definitions of Airspace Categories 

Category Definition Examples 

Controlled 

Airspace 

Airspace used by aircraft 

operating under Instrument Flight 

Rules (IFR) that require different 

levels of air traffic service 

Altitudes above Flight Level 

(FL) 180 (5,500 meters [18,000 

feet] above MSL) 

Airport Traffic Areas 

Airport Terminal Control Areas 

Jet Routes 

Victor Routes 

Uncontrolled 

Airspace 

Airspace primarily used by 

general aviation aircraft operating 

under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) 

As high as 4,420 meters (14,500 

feet) above MSL 

Special Use 

Airspace 

Airspace within which specific 

activities must be confined or 

access limitations are placed on 

non-participating aircraft 

Restricted Areas 

Military Operating Areas 

(MOA) 

Other 

Airspace 

Airspace not included under 

controlled, uncontrolled, or 

special use categories 

Military Training Routes 

Controlled Airspace 

Controlled Airspace covers airspace used by aircraft operating under IFR that require 

different levels of air traffic service. As shown in Exhibit 3-4, examples of controlled 

airspace include the altitudes above FL 180 (approximately 5,500 meters (18,000 feet) 

above MSL, some Airport Traffic Areas, and Airport Terminal Control Areas. General 

controlled airspace includes the established Federal airways system, which consists of the 

high altitude (Jet Routes) system flown above FL 180, and the low altitude structure 

(Victor Routes) flown below FL 180. 

Controlled airspace has numerous designations from Class A to Class G depending upon 

the degree of airspace control required to maintain flight safety. Airspace in North 

America contains “North American Coastal Routes,” which are numerically coded routes 
3-14

preplanned over existing airways and route systems to and from specific coastal fixes. 

North American Routes consist of 

 Common Route/Portion. That segment of a North American Route between the 

inland navigation facility and the coastal fix. 

 Noncommon Route/Portion. That segment of a North American Route between the 

inland navigation facility and a designated North American terminal. 

 Inland Navigation Facility. A navigation aid on a North American Route at which 

the common route and/or the noncommon route begins or ends. 

 Coastal Fix. A navigation aid or intersection where an aircraft transitions between 

the domestic route structure and the oceanic route structure. 

During peak air travel times in the U.S., there are about 5,000 airplanes in the sky every 

hour. This translates to approximately 50,000 aircraft operating in U.S. skies each day. 

The U.S. airspace is divided into 21 zones (centers), and each zone is divided into 

sectors. Also within each zone are portions of airspace, about 81 kilometers (50 miles) in 

diameter, called Terminal Radar Approach Control airspaces. Multiple airports exist 

within each of these airspaces and each airport has its own airspace with an eightkilometer (five-mile) radius. 

Uncontrolled Airspace 

Uncontrolled Airspace is primarily used by general aviation aircraft operating under VFR 

and generally refers to airspace not otherwise designated and operations below 365.8 

meters (1,200 feet) above ground level. Uncontrolled airspace is not subject to the strict 

conditions of flight required by those aircraft using controlled airspace and can extend as 

high as 4,420 meters (14,500 feet) above MSL.

Special Use Airspace 

Special Use Airspace is airspace within which specific activities must be confined or for 

other reasons, access limitations are imposed upon non-participating aircraft. The types 

of Special Use Airspace are 

 Alert Areas. Alert areas are airspace in which a high volume of pilot training 

activities or unusual aerial activity takes place. The activities within alert areas are 

not considered hazardous to aircraft and are conducted in accordance with FAA 

regulations. Both participating and transiting aircraft are responsible for collision 

avoidance. (FAA, 2003) 
3-15

 Restricted Areas. Restricted areas contain airspace identified by an area on the 

surface of the earth within which the flight of aircraft, while not wholly prohibited, is 

subject to restriction. Activities within these areas are confined to permitted activities 

and limitations are imposed upon all other aircraft operations. Restricted areas 

generally are used to contain hazardous military activities. The term “hazardous” 

implies, but is not limited to, weapons deployment (these areas also are referred to as 

controlled firing areas and may be either live or inert), aircraft testing, and other 

activities that would be inconsistent or dangerous with the presence of nonparticipating aircraft. 

 MOAs. MOAs include airspace designated for non-hazardous military activities and 

are established outside of controlled airspace below FL180. Typical activities that 

occur in MOAs include military pilot training, aerobatics, and combat tactics training. 

When MOAs are in use, non-participating aircraft flying under IFR clearances are 

directed by air traffic control to avoid the MOA. However, even when a MOA is in 

use, entry into the area by VFR aircraft is not prohibited, and flight by nonparticipating aircraft can occur on a see-and-avoid basis. 

 Prohibited Areas. Prohibited areas include airspace where no aircraft may be 

operated without the permission of the using agency. This airspace is established for 

security and other national welfare reasons. (FAA, 2003) 

 Warning Areas. Warning areas include airspace that may contain hazards to nonparticipating aircraft in international airspace. Warning areas are established beyond 

the 22.2-kilometer (12-nautical-mile) limit. Although the activities conducted within 

warning areas may be as hazardous as those in restricted areas, warning areas cannot 

be legally designated as restricted areas because they are over international waters. 

(FAA, 1996) By Presidential Proclamation No. 5928, December 27, 1988 (issued in 

1989), the U.S. territorial limit was extended from 5.6 to 22.2 kilometers (three to 12 

nautical miles). Special Federal Aviation Regulation 53 establishes certain regulatory 

warning areas within the new (5.6- to 22.2-kilometer [three to 12-nautical-mile]) 

territorial airspace to allow continuation of military activities while further regulatory 

requirements are determined. 

Other Airspace 

Other Airspace includes Military Training Routes. They are low altitude, high-speed 

routes established by the FAA as airspace for special use by the military services. Routes 

may be established as IFR Routes or VFR Routes. Military Training Routes are depicted 

on aeronautical charts and detailed descriptions are provided in the DoD Flight 

Information Publication AP/1B. 
3-16

En route airways and jet routes are air corridors used by commercial and private aircraft. 

These corridors are generated based on the prevailing jet stream and their positions vary. 

The airways are identified by a “V” and a number designation and apply to altitudes up to 

5.5 kilometers (18,000 feet). Jet routes are identified by a “J” and a number designation 

and apply to altitudes over 5.5 kilometers (18,000 feet). Coordination procedures used at 

locations where activities for the proposed BMDS may occur would prevent any potential 

impacts to aircraft in these routes. 

Impact Assessment 

Assessment of potential impacts on airspace would include a review and analysis of 

 Projected volume and frequency of flights into airspace areas; 

 Operating altitudes of vehicles, missiles, and targets; 

 Lateral orientation of aircraft, missiles, and targets; 

 Identification of airspaces that would be entered; 

 Anticipated effect of the use of sensors on airspace availability; 

 Effects of intercept or booster failure debris on airspace areas; 

 Identification and description of the Region of Influence; 

 Necessary approvals or agreements with controlling and using agencies for special 

use airspaces; and 

 Comparison of airspace used by aircraft operating under IFR versus VFR. 

Using this information, a map of the Region of Influence would be developed for the 

affected areas, as well as charts detailing the airspace areas and potential conflicts or 

approval hurdles. Specific activities may require letters of agreement to operate in 

certain airspace. Impacts on airspace due to activities associated with the proposed 

BMDS would be identified at the programmatic level and mitigated to the extent 

possible. Site-specific impacts on airspace would be addressed in site-specific 

documentation. 

Determination of Significance 

Actions that conflict with existing airspace use or designations where approvals or 

agreements with regulatory agencies cannot be obtained would be considered significant. 

3.1.3 Biological Resources 

Definition and Description

Native or naturalized vegetation (flora), wildlife (fauna), and the habitats they occupy are 

collectively referred to as biological resources. As part of the NEPA analysis, the 

potential impacts to all species potentially impacted by the proposed activity are 
3-17

considered and evaluated. Special emphasis is placed on those species that are 

designated as sensitive. Plant and wildlife species may be designated as sensitive 

because of overall rarity, endangerment, unique habitat requirements, and restricted 

distribution. Generally, a combination of these factors leads to a sensitivity designation. 

Sensitive plant and wildlife species include those listed or proposed to be listed as 

threatened or endangered by the USFWS and National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA) National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA Fisheries Service) 

under the Endangered Species Act, as well as those species listed by state wildlife 

resource agencies. 

Federally or state listed species are afforded regulatory protection that involves a 

permitting process, including specific mitigation measures for any allowable (incidental) 

impacts to the species. Species proposed to be listed are treated similarly to listed 

species, but recommendations of the USFWS are advisory rather than mandatory in the 

case of proposed species. A federally listed endangered species is defined as any species, 

including subspecies that is in “in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant 

portion of its range.” A federally listed threatened species is defined as any species 

“likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a 

significant portion of its range.” Proposed threatened or endangered species are those 

species for which a proposed regulation has been published in the FR, but a final rule has 

not been issued. In addition, the USFWS may designate critical habitat for threatened or 

endangered species. Critical habitat is defined as specific areas, within the geographical 

areas occupied by the species at the time it is listed, which contain the physical or 

biological features essential to conservation of the species and may require special 

management considerations or protection. In 2003, Congress amended the Endangered 

Species Act to allow the Secretary of the Interior to exempt DoD sites from critical 

habitat designations if adequate natural resources management plans are in place at the 

sites. 

Federal agencies that propose to conduct activities that may impact a listed species or a 

species proposed to be listed are required to consult with the USFWS under Section 7 of 

the Endangered Species Act. Additional consultation activities with USFWS and other 

agencies with natural resource management responsibilities may be required under other 

applicable laws and regulations. A listing of relevant laws, regulations, and EOs is 

provided in Appendix G. 

Impact Assessment 

The impact analysis should include existing information on plant and animal species and 

habitat types in the vicinity of proposed sites, with special emphasis on the presence of 

any species listed as threatened or endangered by Federal or state agencies. In the U.S., 

proposed activities must be coordinated with the appropriate state wildlife agency to 

determine if threatened and endangered species or critical habitat exists within the region 
3-18

of influence. If the proponent of the proposed activity determines that threatened or 

endangered species or critical habitat may be affected by the proposed action, the 

proponent would initiate either informal consultation or formal consultation under 

Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. The consultation process may require the 

proponent of the proposed activity to conduct a biological assessment, resulting in a 

biological opinion from the resource agency. This opinion would include mitigation 

actions required of the proponent to ensure that impacts to species and habitat would be 

minimized. 

If the proponent of the proposed action determines that marine mammals may be affected 

by the proposed action, the proponent should consult with NOAA Fisheries Service, 

Department of Interior, U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, as appropriate, to ensure 

compliance with the Marine Mammal Protection Act. The Marine Mammal Protection 

Act established a moratorium, with certain exceptions, on the taking of marine mammals 

in U.S. waters and by U.S. citizens on the high seas, and on the importing of marine 

mammals and marine mammal products into the U.S. If the proponent of the proposed 

action determines that coral reefs or endangered fish habitat may be affected by the 

proposed action, the proponent should work with NOAA Fisheries Service to ensure all 

requirements are met. 

If the proponent of the proposed activity determines that migratory bird species may be 

adversely impacted, then the proponent should consult with the USFWS’s Regional 

Migratory Bird Program, to ensure compliance with the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and 

the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the 

taking of migratory birds is not authorized without a permit. The project proponent 

should also consult with the USFWS to determine whether conservation measures may be 

implemented to minimize or avoid the take of migratory birds. MDA has included a 

technical appendix, Appendix N, considering the potential effects of radar on migratory 

birds. 

MDA activities that could contribute to biological impacts include air emissions and 

noise from missiles, EMR or radio frequencies from sensors or support assets, habitat 

destruction through clearing activities, and construction and operations, as well as debris 

impacts. 

Activities Resulting in Air Emissions 

Air emissions from transportation vehicles, dust from clearing or construction, or launch 

emissions such as the ground cloud from lift-off could impact biological resources. The 

potential for launch emissions to impact local wildlife, vegetation, and specialized 

habitat, such as wetlands, should be considered. 
3-19

Activities Resulting in Noise

Noise produced from missile launches and other activities related to the BMDS could 

affect biological resources. The potential for this noise to affect areas used by wildlife 

for migration, foraging, and breeding, should be considered. 

Activities Resulting in EMR or Radio Frequencies 

Radars and other equipment could emit EMR or radio frequencies, with the potential to 

impact biological resources. The analysis of EMR and radio frequency emissions should 

include the following metrics for review of Institute of Electrical and Electronics 

Engineers (IEEE) and American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards for 

exposure to EM fields 

 Peak and average power (modulation properties), 

 Polarization of the EM field, 

 Power density values for the beams over the range and azimuth of the sensor, 

 Typical motion of the beams, and 

 Size of the main and side beams. 

Construction and Operation Activities

The impacts analysis should address construction activities and operations that could 

result in impacts to habitat including loss and restriction of habitat; light pollution; and 

leaks, spills, and other releases of contaminants. Noise impacts from operation of 

generators and construction equipment have the potential to impact species in the area. 

Other noise including sonic booms from launch and flight of missiles also should be 

analyzed for potential impacts on biological resources. 

Debris Related Activities 

Debris from booster failures or missile intercepts could impact biological resources. 

Debris would fall in pre-established impact zones on land or in water. The expected 

casualty to humans from debris produced during launches would be less than or equal to 

30 x 10 -6. Debris recovery efforts, if required, would only occur on land and could result 

in impacts to biological resources from transportation activities. Such disturbances could 

include noise, emissions, fire caused by debris or unspent fuel, chemical payloads (such 

as tributyl phosphate), and surface disturbance impacts. 

Determination of Significance 

Actions that negatively affect a species or its habitat (critical habitat or essential fish 

habitat) protected under Federal or state law or an international treaty (e.g., Endangered 
3-20

Species Act, Marine Mammal Protection Act, Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation 

and Management Act), as well as other resources provided protection under Federal or 

state regulations or orders (e.g., Sikes Act, Migratory Bird Treaty Act, EO 13112 

Invasive Species), where appropriate consultation or considerations have not been 

completed, documented, and implemented would be considered significant. In addition, 

it may be appropriate to consider multiple species habitat conservation planning efforts 

occurring in areas proximate to proposed BMDS activities.

3.1.4 Cultural Resources 

Definition and Description

Cultural resources include prehistoric and historic artifacts, archaeological sites 

(including underwater sites), historic buildings and structures, and traditional resources 

(such as Native American and Native Hawaiian religious sites). Paleontological 

resources are fossil remains of prehistoric plant and animal species and may include 

bones, shells, leaves, and pollen. 

Cultural resources of particular concern include properties listed or eligible for inclusion 

in the National Register of Historic Places (National Register). Only those cultural 

resources determined to be potentially significant under 36 CFR 60.4 are subject to 

protection from adverse impacts resulting from an undertaking. To be considered 

significant, cultural resources must meet one or more of the criteria established by the 

National Park Service that would make that resource eligible for inclusion in the National 

Register. The term “eligible for inclusion in the National Register” includes all 

properties that meet the National Register listing criteria which are specified in 

Department of Interior regulations at 36 CFR 60.4. Therefore, sites not yet evaluated 

may be considered potentially eligible for the National Register and, as such, are afforded 

the same regulatory consideration as nominated properties. Whether prehistoric, historic, 

or traditional, significant cultural resources are referred to as historic properties. 

Impact Assessment 

Because they possess unique qualities and characteristics, cultural and historic resources 

should be identified and analyzed in site-specific environmental documentation. The 

analysis should include consideration of the contemporary use of historic properties 

owned by the Federal government and intergovernmental cooperation and partnerships 

for the preservation and use of historic properties as required by EO 13287, Preserving 

America. MDA activities that could impact cultural resources primarily include 

construction, operation, and debris impacts. 

 
3-21

Construction and Operation Activities

The analysis should address construction and operation activities that could result in 

ground disturbances, vibrations, significant air emissions, or leaks, spills, and other 

accidental releases of contaminants. The proponent should identify the region of 

influence for the activities and contact the appropriate State Historic Preservation Officer 

to determine whether there are any known listed or eligible sites in the vicinity and to 

determine whether mitigation measures are required, such as: site-specific cultural and 

historic surveys, records searches of the sacred lands of the Native American Heritage 

Commission to determine the presence of Native American cultural resources in the 

region of influence, contacting Native American individuals and organizations for 

additional information, and using a qualified archaeologist to monitor site-specific 

ground-disturbing activities during construction. If appropriate, construction-related 

personnel would be informed of the sensitivity of cultural resources and the penalties that 

could be incurred if sites are damaged or destroyed. If during construction, cultural items 

are discovered, activities should cease in the immediate area and the corresponding State 

or Tribal Historic Preservation Officer would be notified. Subsequent actions should 

follow the guidance provided. 

Debris Related Activities 

Debris resulting from booster failures and missile intercepts could impact cultural 

resources. However, prior to establishing debris impact zones, archeological, cultural 

and historic surveys would be conducted to determine the presence of such resources. 

Debris recovery efforts, if required, would only occur on land, but should not impact 

cultural resources outside the impact zone. Efforts would be made to mitigate any 

impacts of transportation, noise, emissions and surface disturbance during recovery 

efforts. 

Determination of Significance 

Actions that would destroy or alter the character of a historic property on, or eligible for 

inclusion on the National Register, or actions that would adversely affect a Native 

American or traditional cultural property, where appropriate consultation in accordance 

with the National Historic Preservation Act has not been completed, would be considered 

significant. Such consultations and mitigation measures must be approved by the 

appropriate State Historic Preservation Officer, Tribal Historic Preservation Officer, or 

the ACHP. 
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3.1.5 Environmental Justice 

Definition and Description 

Environmental Justice (EO 12898) is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of 

all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the 

development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and 

policies. Fair treatment means that no group of people, including a racial, ethnic, or 

socioeconomic group, should bear a disproportionate share of the negative environmental 

consequences resulting from industrial, municipal, and commercial operations or the 

exclusion of Federal, state, local, and tribal programs and policies. Meaningful 

involvement means that potentially affected community residents have an appropriate 

opportunity to participate in decisions about a proposed activity that would affect their 

environment or health; the public’s contribution can influence the regulatory agency’s 

decision; the concerns of all participants involved would be considered in the decisionmaking process; and the decision-makers would seek out and facilitate the involvement 

of those potentially affected. 

Environmental Justice concerns include consideration of the race, ethnicity, and the 

poverty status of populations near the site of a proposed action. The CEQ defined 

“minority” to consist of the following groups: Black/African American, Asian, Native 

Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, American Indian or Alaska Native, and Hispanic 

populations (regardless of race). The Interagency Federal Working Group on 

Environmental Justice guidance states that a “minority population” may be present in an 

area if the minority population percentage in the area of interest is “meaningfully greater” 

than the minority population in the general population. The CEQ defined “low-income 

populations” as those identified with the annual statistical poverty thresholds from the 

Bureau of the Census. The accepted rationale in determining what constitutes a lowincome population is similar to minority populations, in that when the low-income 

population percentage within the area of interest is “meaningfully greater” than the lowincome population in the general population, the community in question is considered to 

be low-income. 

Impact Assessment 

Although each community is unique, there are several determination procedures that are 

common to most environmental justice assessments. One must first identify whether the 

geographic area under consideration qualifies as low-income or minority-based. To 

identify minorities or low-income populations, the Environmental Index methodology in 

EPA Region 6, Office of Planning and Coordination, dated 1996 would be used. Based 

on that guidance, environmental justice populations can be defined as meeting either of 

the following criteria 
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 Over one-half of the residents are minorities; or 

 Over one-half of the households are low income. 

An analysis of the most recent census data for the area provides this information. The 

U.S. Census Bureau maintains census data for racial classifications and income levels. 

The five racial classifications for which data are maintained are white, black, Hispanic, 

American Indian/Eskimo/Aleut, and Asian/Pacific Islander. Low-income data relates to 

those households that fall below the mean poverty level. Using these data, the 

percentages of minority and low-income populations may be determined for a particular 

geographic area. 

After determining whether a minority or low-income population exists in the area, a 

determination must be made as to whether the proposed action would have a 

disproportionately high or adverse effect on those populations. The analysis involves 

first determining whether there are significant and adverse impacts and second whether 

those impacts disproportionately affect the minority or low-income population in the 

area. Where environmental justice concerns are found, the EPA recommends increased 

public involvement, perhaps as early as project scoping. Public participation and access 

to information are emphasized in EO 12898 and the Presidential Memorandum. The 

Presidential Memorandum instructs agencies to provide opportunities for community 

input throughout the NEPA process, including identifying potential effects and mitigation 

measures in consultation with the community and improving access to meetings, 

documents, and notices. 

Environmental justice analyses require information about local communities, and 

therefore will be analyzed in site-specific environmental documentation. 

Determination of Significance

Adverse environmental impacts that disproportionately affect minority or low-income 

populations would be considered significant. 

3.1.6 Geology and Soils 

Definition and Description 

Geology and soils are those earth resources that may be described in terms of landforms, 

geology, and soil conditions. The makeup of geology and soils, including freshwater and 

marine sediments, could influence erosion, depletion of mineral or energy resources, 

seismic risk or landslide, structural design, and soil and ground water contamination 

resulting from proposed construction and operational activities. 
3-24

Geology is the study of the composition and configuration of the Earth’s surface and 

subsurface features. The general shape and arrangement of a land surface, including its 

height and the position of its natural and man-made features, is referred to as topography. 

The topography of the land surface can influence erosion rates and the general direction 

of surface water and ground water flow. Ground water is stored and transmitted 

underground in aquifers that supply lakes and rivers and is often used for human 

purposes, such as drinking water and irrigation for crops. 

Geologic conditions also influence the potential for naturally occurring or human-induced 

hazards, which could pose risk to life or property. Such hazards could include 

phenomena such as landslides, flooding, ground subsidence, volcanic activity, faulting, 

earthquakes, and tsunamis (tidal waves). The potential for geologic hazards is described 

relative to each biome type’s geologic setting. Exhibit 3-5 shows the geographic 

distribution for earthquakes in the continental U.S. Exhibit 3-6 shows landslide areas in 

the continental U.S. 

Soils and sediments are the unconsolidated materials overlying bedrock or other parent 

material. Soils and sediments typically are described in terms of their composition, slope, 

and physical characteristics. Differences among soil and sediment types in terms of their 

structure, elasticity, strength, shrink-swell potential, and erosion potential affect their 

Exhibit 3-5. Geographic Distribution for Earthquakes in the Continental U.S. 

 Source: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 2002b 
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Exhibit 3-6. Landslide Areas in the Contiguous U.S. 

 Source: USGS, 2002d 

abilities to support certain applications or uses. In appropriate cases, soil and sediment 

properties must be examined for their compatibility with particular construction activities 

or types of land use. In a limited number of cases, the presence, distribution, quantity, 

and quality of mineral resources might affect or be affected by a proposed action.

Impact Assessment 

Site preparation activities such as grading, vegetation removal, and reseeding, as well as 

construction, operation, transportation and intercept debris could cause ground 

disturbances, and therefore could impact geology and soils. Ground disturbances should 

be assessed for potential impacts such as substantial erosion, siltation, landslides or 

slumps, soil compaction, or impacts to permafrost areas. In addition, ground disturbances 

could impact valuable mineral deposits or prime or unique farmland (see Section 3.1.9, 

Land Use). Off-road vehicle activities for debris recovery or other activities could impact 

soils as well. The potential for impacts depends upon the geology and topography of the 

area. Seismic activity within a region of influence should be evaluated and standard 

measures for seismic safety implemented. For example, construction activities should 

consider information bearing on seismic design and construction standards, and a design 

engineer and geotechnical consultant should consider surface faulting potential. Some 

test activities could impact the stability of seismically active areas. The handling of 

propellants and other chemicals, as well as launch impacts, should be assessed for 

potential spills or ground cloud effects of contaminating soils. Best Management 
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Practices should be identified in the impacts analysis. For example, frequent watering of 

excavated material and/or use of soil additives to bond exposed surface soils would 

reduce potential for soil erosion. The analysis also should evaluate the potential for 

debris craters in impact zones, including impacts to ocean sediment. For test activities, a 

qualified accident response team would be available near launch locations to minimize 

any adverse effects from an unlikely event such as flight termination. 

Determination of Significance 

Actions that would result in uncontrolled soil erosion, uncontrolled contamination of soil, 

disruption of more than one-acre of permafrost soil, or that would increase the geologic 

seismic instability of an area would be considered significant. 

3.1.7 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

Definition and Description

Hazardous materials and hazardous waste are defined by a number of U.S. regulatory 

agencies. In general, hazardous materials and hazardous waste include substances that, 

because of their quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious 

characteristics, may present substantial danger to the public health, welfare, or the 

environment when released. The EPA regulates hazardous chemicals, substances, and 

wastes under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Comprehensive 

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), and the Toxic 

Substances Control Act. In addition, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

(OSHA) has definitions and workplace safety-related requirements and thresholds for 

listed “hazardous and toxic substances,”37 and the U.S. DOT has definitions and 

requirements for the safe transport of “hazardous materials.”38 

Hazardous Materials Management 

Hazardous materials management is the responsibility of the cognizant authority 

operating facilities, installations or ranges. Maintenance and flight support operations at 

various locations may require the use of products containing hazardous materials, 

including paints, solvents, oils, lubricants, acids, batteries, fuels, surface coatings, and 

cleaning compounds. These products would be used and stored at appropriate locations 

throughout each site, but would be primarily associated with industrial and maintenance 

activities. Site-specific plans would outline the strategies and procedures for storing, 

handling, and transporting hazardous materials, as well as responding to on-site or offsite spills. 

 

37 OSHA, 2003 

38 DOT, 2003 
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Hazardous Waste Management

Federal and state regulations require that hazardous waste be handled, stored, transported, 

disposed of, or recycled in compliance with applicable regulations. Aircraft and vehicle 

maintenance, fuel storage and dispensing, and facility and grounds maintenance activities 

are MDA activity operations that could generate hazardous wastes. The sources of 

hazardous waste include waste fuel, chemical simulants, laser chemicals, waste oils, 

spent solvents, paint waste, and used batteries. Site-specific procedures and plans would 

outline the steps for appropriate management of hazardous wastes, such as satellite 

accumulation points and properly labeled DOT approved containers. Wastes may be 

disposed of using designated hazardous waste accumulation facilities or private 

hazardous waste contractors, as needed. 

Impact Assessment 

BMDS activities that could involve impacts from hazardous materials transport, disposal, 

storage, handling, and hazardous waste generation include site preparation and 

construction, prelaunch, launch/flight, and postlaunch activities and activation of laser 

weapons, sensors, and C2BMC. Site preparation activities could include exposure to 

previously contaminated sites. Missile build-out, fueling operations, or construction also 

may result in the handling of hazardous materials. The analysis should address the use of 

any ozone-depleting substances, such as refrigerants or foams. 

Other toxic, corrosive, or flammable materials that personnel or environmental resources 

may be exposed to include asbestos, polychlorinated biphenyls, lead-based paint, radon 

gas, pesticides, petroleum and oils, chemical simulants, and propellants. 

Any hazardous waste generated would be disposed of per appropriate state and Federal 

regulations. Federal military ranges would have established instructions to ensure proper 

handling and use of hazardous materials. Personnel involved in such operations would be 

trained in the appropriate procedures to handle hazardous materials and would wear 

protective clothing and receive specialized training in spill containment and cleanup. 

Any spills would be handled using established cleanup procedures. All tasks would be 

performed in accordance with standard operating procedures, and would include 

provisions for proper handling of hazardous materials/wastes and waste minimization. 

Determination of Significance 

Actions that would result in uncontrolled generation of hazardous materials or waste, 

actions that would require hazardous materials and do not have a closure or 

decommissioning plan, actions that would conflict with existing RCRA or other 

hazardous material or waste regulations, or actions that would expose the general public, 

unprotected MDA personnel, or wildlife to hazardous materials or waste that would result 
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in human or ecological health risk levels greater than 1 x 10-6 would be considered 

significant. 

3.1.8 Health and Safety 

Definition and Description

Health and safety includes consideration of any activities, occurrences, or operations that 

have the potential to affect the well being, safety, or health of workers or members of the 

general public. The primary goal is to identify and prevent accidents or impacts to onsite workers and the general public. In terms of the proposed action and alternatives, 

safety and health risks would occur primarily from accidents during construction, testing, 

operation, maintenance, or decommissioning activities. Safety and health risks may also 

occur from exposure to debris produced during test activities. The health and safety 

resource area addresses both occupational and environmental health and safety. 

Occupational Health and Safety 

Occupational health and safety deals with work sites and operational areas where workers 

would be located. (DOT, 2002) Typical potential hazards and accidents include 

 

 Explosions of flammable liquids, solids, or compressed gases; 

 Fires; 

 Failures leading to fires or explosions involving boosters or other launch assets; 

 Electrocution and burns from electrical equipment and currents; 

 EM emissions (radars, lasers, infrared sensing devices); 

 Inhalation or dermal exposure to hazardous materials or waste; 

 Spills of chemicals and propellants; 

 Falling debris related to construction and decommissioning; 

 Confined spaces; 

 Falls from structures; 

 Accidents related to earth moving equipment and power tools; and 

 Transportation accidents. 

Hazard analyses are performed to identify and assess credible accident scenarios at work 

sites. The findings of a hazard analysis are used to establish health and safety procedures 

to prevent accident occurrences and to report and respond to any accidents that do occur. 

Environmental Health and Safety 

Environmental health and safety considers environmental quality both on and off the 

work site and operational areas that could impact the human health of the general public. 

Typical potential hazards and accidents include 
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 Explosions of flammable liquids, solids, or compressed gases; 

 Fires; 

 EM emissions (radars, lasers, infrared sensing devices); 

 Spills of chemicals or propellants that contaminate surface or ground water; 

 Inhalation of hazardous particulate and gaseous materials; 

 Chronic/acute exposures to toxic/hazardous materials; 

 Failures of electrical grids; 

 Falling debris (e.g., from interceptor tests); 

 Transportation accidents; and 

 Personnel injury and equipment damage due to electrical shock. 

Risk assessments are performed to identify, characterize, quantify, and evaluate risks to 

human health and the environment. A risk assessment considers both the likelihood or 

probability of occurrence and the consequences of accidents and hazardous events, 

including catastrophic ones. The results of a risk assessment are used to establish 

preventative and mitigating measures to reduce the risks to environmental quality and 

human health. Consideration of risk would also include debris modeling and analysis to 

determine the potential impact area in the event of a launch failure (including those 

launches requiring use of an FTS). 

Impact Assessment 

MDA activities with the potential to impact the health and safety of workers include 

construction; radar activation, laser weapon activation, missile storage, assembly, and 

transfer; and launch and post-launch activities. Any debris recovery and emergency 

operations also could impact worker health and safety. The areas of potential impacts to 

the health and safety of the public include prelaunch transport of missiles, launches, radar 

activation, laser activation, and missile flight. The potential impacts of a launch failure 

should be analyzed. Launch failure could involve an explosion, falling missile debris, 

release of toxic materials into the air or water, high noise levels, and/or fire. 

Handling and assembly of missile components, which are typically accomplished within 

enclosed buildings, have the potential to affect worker health and safety. Range 

Commanders Council Standard 321-02 limits the collective risks to 1 x 10-3 for nonmission essential personnel and to 1x10-2 for mission essential personnel. If a launch site 

malfunction occurs, it could result in the scattering of the resulting missile debris 

anywhere within the LHA. A probabilistic risk analysis would be performed before each 

flight test to determine that individuals of the general public would not be exposed to a 

probability of fatality greater than 1 in 10 million for any single mission and 1 in 1 

million on an annual basis, as per the Range Commander’s Council Standard 321-02. 

Site-specific environmental documents would identify and, if appropriate, analyze 

required health and safety regulations for individual sites where activities for the 
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proposed BMDS may occur. Compliance with Federal, state and local regulations would 

be required. 

Federal military ranges would have specific regulations to ensure the health and safety of 

members of the range as well as the public in the surrounding area. Applicable safety 

regulations would be followed in the transport, receipt, storage, and handling of 

hazardous materials. All shipping would be conducted under DOT regulations. 

Transportation and loading practices would meet Federal, state, and local regulatory and 

safety requirements. 

Determination of Significance 

Actions that would not fall under the existing health and safety operating procedures of 

the facility or range where such actions would occur, actions that would conflict with 

existing OSHA regulations, or actions that would result in a level of risk that exceeds the 

Range Commanders Council Standard 321-02 to the health and safety of the general 

public and MDA personnel would be considered significant. 

3.1.9 Land Use 

Definition and Description 

Land use is described as the human use of land resources for various purposes, including 

economic production, natural resource protection, or institutional uses. Land uses 

frequently are controlled by management plans, policies, ordinances, and regulations that 

determine the uses that are permissible or protect specially designated or environmentally 

sensitive areas (e.g., prime farmlands, coastal zones, national parks, historic properties). 

Planning departments at the local and municipal level typically designate land uses for 

specific areas, which describe the permitted development activities that are acceptable for 

the area, such as agricultural, residential, commercial, and industrial. 

Public land may be assigned specific designations for which land use and management 

guidelines are provided. These designations include 

 Controlled use or wilderness areas; 

 Limited use areas, which protect sensitive, natural, ecological, scenic, and cultural 

resource values; 

 Low intensity regions, which carefully control multiple uses of resources and ensure 

sensitive values are not significantly diminished; 

 Moderate use regions, which provide for a controlled balance between higher 

intensity uses and resource protection; and 

 Intensive use regions, which provide for concentrated use of lands and resources to 

meet human needs. 
3-31

Types of land use include agriculture, livestock grazing and production, conservation and 

recreation sites, military installations, and research sites managed by other agencies and 

organizations. A particular environment may include cities, towns, and rural 

communities of all sizes, throughout which are extensive communication systems; 

industrial complexes with factories and power plants; energy distribution systems for 

electricity, natural gas, liquid fuels, and nuclear, solar, hydro, and wind power; water 

treatment facilities; and waste management facilities. Wildlife refuges, national 

landmarks, and coastal zones present within an environment typically are afforded special 

status or protection. 

A given site for proposed BMDS activities may include launch sites, impact areas, 

instrumentation sites, facilities, and equipment. On-site land use designations may 

include flight line zones, test ranges, support service areas, and explosive hazard zones. 

Land use categories for each site may be defined independently. Differences in 

terminology for land use classification among facilities where activities for the proposed 

BMDS may occur can be attributed to the local nature of land use classification, the 

unique circumstances at a particular facility, or the different interpretations of widely 

used terms (e.g., industrial, open space). Each land use category depends on a variety of 

factors, including the level of residual hazards and the risks associated with potential 

exposures. 

The combined efforts of state, county, local, and on-site plans may regulate land use 

within the boundaries of a particular installation. Facilities where proposed BMDS 

activities may occur may use a wide range of planning documents as their land use plans, 

including legal settlement agreements narrowly tailored to designating land uses; 

comprehensive site plans incorporating all planning information, including current and 

future land uses, budget projections, and institutional plans; and a hierarchy of multiple 

planning documents. Wide variation in the level and types of coordination between site 

personnel and off-site communities regarding land use planning issues may occur. The 

variation appears to depend on the site’s mission, closure schedule, proximity to local 

off-site development, and level of community interest. On-site land use management 

plans may address the security of essential mission activities from encroachment and the 

protection of both human and natural environments. 

Impact Assessment 

Numerous land use designations may characterize a given environment and the sites 

located within that environment. As a result, site-specific analysis will identify and, if 

appropriate, analyze potential impacts to particular land use designations for individual 

sites where activities for the proposed BMDS may occur. Compliance with Federal and 

state regulations and local land use plans would be required. Site-specific analysis would 

be coordinated with the appropriate agencies, including the Bureau of Land Management, 

National Park Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service, and state agencies, 
3-32

as well as county and municipal planning groups and local communities. At some 

facilities, it may be necessary to address the issue of encroachment to ensure that off-site 

development is not encroaching on the site where activities for the proposed BMDS may 

occur. 

Determination of Significance 

Actions that would require modification to an existing land use plan of an installation or 

range, or would preclude existing land use activities at lands adjacent to the action that 

are not owned by DoD or for which no easement exists between the land owner and the 

DoD for longer than one week, actions that would disrupt or divide established land use 

configurations or represent a substantial change in existing land uses, actions that would 

require the use of other Federal lands where an existing use agreement has not been 

prepared and authorized by both Federal Agencies, or conflict with existing regulations 

and policies governing land use (e.g., Coastal Zone Management Act) would be 

considered significant. 

3.1.10 Noise 

Definition and Description 

Noise is often defined as unwanted or annoying sound that is typically associated with 

human activity. Most sound is not a single frequency, but rather a mixture of 

frequencies, with each frequency differing in sound level. The intensities of each 

frequency combine to generate sound, which usually is measured and expressed in 

decibels (dB). Decibels are measured on a logarithmic scale, which means that a 

doubling of sound energy or number of sources producing the same sound level will 

result in a three dB increase. A 3 dB increase is considered just noticeable to most 

people, while a 10 dB increase is considered a doubling of perceived loudness. 

 A-weighted decibels (dBA). Most measures of noise for community planning 

purposes use dBA, which are used to characterize noise as heard by the human ear. 

 Community Noise Equivalent Level. The Community Noise Equivalent Level 

describes the average sound level during a 24-hour day in dBA. For noises occurring 

between 7:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., five dBA are added to the measured noise level, 

and for noises occurring between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m., 10 dBA are added to the 

measured noise level. 

 Day night average noise level (DNL). DNL is the energy average noise level during 

a 24-hour day. It is reported in dBA and is used to predict human annoyance and 

community reaction to unwanted sound (noise). Because humans are typically more 
3-33

sensitive to noise in the evening, the DNL places a 10-dBA penalty on noise produced 

between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. 

 Equivalent Noise Level (Leq). The Leq is the energy average A-weighted sound level 

during a stated measurement period. It is used to describe the time-varying character 

of environmental noise. 

 Pounds per Square Foot. Pounds per square foot is a measure of pressure. Some 

activities of the proposed BMDS may produce pressure waves in the form of sonic 

booms that can cause damage to eardrums and structures. 

Examples of A-weighted noise levels for various common noise sources are shown in 

Exhibit 3-7. 

Exhibit 3-7. Comparative A-Weighted Sound Levels 

Noise Level 

(dBA) Common Noise Levels

Indoor Outdoor 

100 – 110 Rock band Jet flyover at 304 meters (997 

feet) 

90 – 100 Food blender at one meter (three feet) Gas lawnmower at one meter 

(three feet) 

80 – 90 Garbage disposal at one meter (three 

feet) 

Diesel truck at 15 meters (49 

feet) - Noisy urban daytime 

70 – 80 

Shouting at one meter (three feet) 

Vacuum cleaner at three meters (ten 

feet) 

Gas lawnmower at 30 meters 

(98 feet) 

60 – 70 Normal speech at one meter (three feet) Commercial area heavy traffic 

at 100 meters (328 feet) 

50 – 60 Large business office 

Dishwasher next room 

40 – 50 Small theater (background) 

Large conference room (background) Quiet urban nighttime 

30 – 40 Library (background) Quiet suburban nighttime 

20 – 30 Bedroom at night Quiet rural nighttime 

10 – 20 Broadcast/recording studio (background) 

0 – 10 Threshold of hearing 

Source: Modified from FAA, 2001 

Noise from transportation sources, such as vehicles and aircraft, and from continuous 

sources, such as generators, would be assessed using the A-weighted DNL. The A-
3-34

weighted DNL significantly reduces the measured pressure level for low-frequency 

sounds, while slightly increasing the measured pressure level for some high-frequency 

sounds. Noise from small arms ranges is assessed using the A-weighted DNL. Impulse 

noise resulting from armor, artillery, and demolition activities is assessed in terms of the 

C-weighted DNL. The C-weighted DNL is often used to characterize high-energy blast 

noise and other low frequency sounds capable of inducing vibrations in buildings or other 

structures. The C-weighted scale does not significantly reduce the measured pressure 

level for low frequency components of a sound. 

Impact Assessment 

The acceptability of noise depends in part on expectations associated with land use. An 

urban environment is noisier than a suburban environment, and a suburban environment 

is noisier than a rural one. Exhibit 3-8 provides a range of DNL values by land use type. 

Exhibit 3-8. Examples of Outdoor Day-Night Average 

Noise Levels in Various Land Use Locations 

Outdoor Location DNL in dB 

Apartment next to freeway 88 

3⁄4 mile from touchdown at major airport 86 

Downtown with some construction activity 79 

Urban high density apartment 78 

Urban row housing on major avenue 68 

Old urban residential area 59 

Wooded residential 51 

Agricultural crop land 44 

Rural residential 39 

Wilderness ambient 35 

Source: EPA, 1978 

Exhibit 3-9 lists noise measurements that were recorded at some existing facilities where 

launch activities have taken place, which encompass various environmental settings. 

Site-specific analysis would identify and, if appropriate, analyze potential impacts from 

noise levels at individual sites where activities for the proposed BMDS may occur. Noise 

impacts resulting from activities associated with the proposed BMDS may include but are 

not limited to construction activities, missile launches, and use of generators. Three types 

of receptors are typically analyzed: humans, wildlife, and structures. For each type of 

receptor, the potential impacts of noise would need to be analyzed in site-specific 

analyses. 
3-35

Exhibit 3-9. Range of Noise Measurements 

Measurement Locations Noise Level

(dBA) 

Remote desert environments39 22-38 

Interstate interchanges (non-urban)40 55-70 

Marshall Space Flight Center (wooded area with insects 

dominating the higher reading)41

40-54 

Vandenberg AFB42 48-67 

Edwards AFB (with some areas off base at 80 dBA)43 65-85 

Main post 55-65 

Property boundary 45-55 WSMR44

Nearby San Andreas National 

Wildlife Refuge 

45 

Eastern Range45 60-80 

Approximately 1,905 meters 

(6,250 feet) from center of pad 

95 

KLC46 Distance of 9 to 24 kilometers 

(5.6 to 15 miles) from the 

launch pad 

70 

Source: Modified from DOT, 2001b 

Launch Activity Noise 

Noise during launch activities would occur due to the rocket engine. Noise generated 

during launch would result from the interaction of the exhaust jet with the atmosphere 

and the combustion of the fuel. The sound pressure from a missile is related to the 

engine’s thrust level and other design features. Workers exposed to excessive launch 

noise would be required to wear hearing protection. 

Sonic booms also would be generated during launches when the launch vehicle reached 

supersonic speed. A sonic boom is a sound that resembles rolling thunder, and is 

produced by a shock wave that forms at the nose of a vehicle that is traveling faster than 

 

39 Estimate, no other specifics given 

40 Monitoring data, no other specifics given 

41 One-hour monitoring 

42 Twenty-four hour monitoring 

43 Monitoring data, no other specifics given 

44 Estimate, no other specifics given 

45 Daytime monitoring 

46 Rocket noise levels from launch of U.S. Air Force atmospheric interceptor technology test vehicles 
3-36

the speed of sound. The sound heard at the Earth’s surface as the “sonic boom” is the 

sudden onset and release of pressure after the buildup by the shock wave or “peak 

overpressure.” 

Construction Noise 

In addition to operational noise, construction would result in intermittent, short-term 

noise effects that would be temporary, lasting for the duration of the noise generating 

construction activities. Noise-generating construction activities would include 

excavation and grading, utility construction and paving, and frame building. The specific 

types of equipment that would be used during construction would be identified in sitespecific analyses. Excavation and grading would normally involve the use of bulldozers, 

scrapers, backhoes, and trucks. The construction of buildings likely would involve the 

use of pile drivers, concrete mixers, pumps, saws, hammers, cranes, and forklifts. 

Power Generation Noise 

The use of power generators should not exceed locally regulated noise levels or facility 

specific noise levels. The noise associated with generators would be controlled by use of 

standard silencing packages (mufflers) provided by the manufacturer and routine 

maintenance and inspection of such systems. 

Human Response. Noise from single events can be annoying due to noise level, duration 

of the event, how loud the event is relative to ambient sound levels, and the frequency of 

occurrence. Additional annoyance can be attributable to a ‘startle effect’ associated with 

a sonic boom. Site-specific analysis will identify and, if appropriate, analyze potential 

impacts from noise levels at individual sites where activities for the proposed BMDS may 

occur. Compliance with Federal as well as state and local regulations will be required. 

(EPA, 1978, as referenced in DOT, 2001b) 

The annoyance experienced as a result of sonic booms has been widely studied both in 

the field and in laboratory settings. Annoyance is generally considered to be a function 

of boom intensity, number of booms per time period, attitude of the population, and the 

activity in which people were engaged in at the time of the boom. However, there is no 

precise relationship between the parameters. One study was done to determine the 

reactions of people routinely exposed to sonic booms (eight sonic booms per day) over a 

six-month period. This study found that sonic boom annoyance increases as the number 

and or level of sonic booms increases. (DOT, 2001b) In that study, approximately 20 

percent of the population reported annoyance from sonic booms with median peak 

overpressures of 0.5 psf. Another study suggested that prior experience with sonic 

booms (such as people who live on an AFB) seems to lower sensitivity to sonic booms. 

(DOT, 2001b) Other factors that influence the loudness and annoyance are the rise time 

of the sonic boom and shape of the waveform. (DOT, 2001b) In general, some public 
3-37

reaction can be expected if occasional sonic booms with peak overpressures between 1.5 

and 2 psf impact populated areas (NASA, 1994), but it is possible that at lower 

amplitudes people can express annoyance to sonic booms. The impacts assessment 

would include the number, frequency, location, and intensity of sonic booms, and identify 

affected receptors. 

Structural Response. Sonic booms also may cause structural damage, which could 

impact prehistoric and historic resources. Vibrations from the sonic booms could disturb 

existing cultural and historic structures, especially those that are not structurally sound. 

The impacts assessment would identify and evaluate effects on existing cultural resources 

and historic structures. 

Wildlife Response. Responses of wildlife would vary based on the type of noise and its 

characteristics (amplitude, rise time, duration, frequency content), the species of wildlife, 

hearing capability, location, habitat type, current activity of the animal, sex and age, 

previous experience with noise exposure, and condition of the animal. (Manci, 1988) 

Potential physiological impacts from noise can range from short-term mild impacts, such 

as an increase in heart rate or small temporary changes in hearing, to more damaging 

impacts, such as permanent changes in hearing, metabolism, and hormone balance, to 

long-term severe impacts, such as chronic distress that is harmful to the health of wildlife 

species and their reproductive fitness. (DOT, 2001b) Potential behavioral impacts from 

noise also range greatly from minor responses, including small changes in current 

behavior such as, a “heads up” response, to more severe responses, such as panic and 

escape flight responses that might result in physiological damage (falling, trampling, 

crashing, piling). Behavioral responses of wildlife to noise also can accompany 

physiological responses. The impacts assessment would identify and evaluate effects on 

affected wildlife, including threatened and endangered species and migratory 

populations. 

Hearing Damage 

The OSHA regulation 1910.95 establishes a maximum noise level of 90 dBA for a 

continuous eight-hour exposure during a working day and higher levels for shorter 

exposure time in the workplace. The OSHA standards allow for a 5 dBA increase in 

sound level for a 50 percent reduction in exposure time. Therefore, the maximum noise 

exposure permitted under the regulation for continuous exposure would be 115 dBA for 

15 minutes. (FAA, Aviation Noise Effects, 1985) Other standards have also been 

recommended for exposure to continuous noise. The EPA has recommended an average 

Leq of 70 dBA for continuous 24-hour exposure to noise to protect hearing. This level is 

considered conservative and is based on the probability of negligible hearing loss, 

defined as less than 5 dB in 100 percent of the exposed population, at the human ear’s 

most sensitive frequency (4,000 hertz) after a 40-year exposure. (FAA, 1985) Noise also 
3-38

may be impulsive in nature. Under OSHA regulation 1910.95 exposure to impulse noise 

should not exceed 140 dBA. 

Determination of Significance 

Federal and state agencies that regulate noise handle the determination of significant 

noise impact differently. For example, the FAA considers the threshold of a significant 

impact to be a 1.5 dBA increase from 65 DNL (FAA Order 1050.1E) Federal Highway 

Administration (FHWA) does not employ significance thresholds for noise; rather, 

FHWA uses Noise Abatement Criteria (NAC) where noise abatement is considered 

(where reasonable and feasible) for EISs as well as EAs. The NAC vary by land use—

the residential NAC is 66 dBA, 1 hour Leq. FHWA considers both absolute and relative 

noise impacts. A relative noise impact refers to the amount of project-related noise 

increase above ambient noise levels. 

Potential BMDS noise impacts could be associated with a wide range of noise sources 

and noise environments. For example, a generator produces a steady-state noise, with 

moderate noise levels and limited geographic effect. A missile launch could produce 

high noise levels for a short duration with little to no exposure in populated areas. 

Because NEPA requires ‘context and intensity’ in consideration of significant impact, 

these disparate noise situations potentially call for different definitions of significance. 

Therefore, the details of what would comprise a ‘significant’ noise impact for the PEIS 

will be developed and considered on a case-by-case basis. 

3.1.11 Socioeconomics 

Definition and Description 

Socioeconomics is defined as the basic attributes and resources associated with the 

human environment, in particular population and economic activity. Socioeconomic 

resources consist of several primary elements including population, employment, and 

income. Other socioeconomic aspects that are described often may include housing and 

employment characteristics, and an overview of the local economy. 

Impact Assessment 

Potential socioeconomic impacts from MDA activities may stem from construction or 

operation of the BMDS. The magnitude of the impacts would depend on the duration and 

extent of displacement or modification of existing activities and the diversion or 

temporary suspension of access. Impact analyses should focus on the following broad 

areas of economic or social impacts: employment and income; growth inducement; 

potential impacts to locally significant industries such as tourism, commercial fishing, or 
3-39

agriculture; displacement of populations, residences, or businesses; and housing or 

accommodation availability. 

Employment and Income

Activities for the proposed BMDS could have a positive economic impact in local 

communities due to increased jobs in the defense industry. These jobs generally are 

technology-based and require workers with specialized skills and education. These jobs 

would contribute to local economies by increasing personal income, thereby increasing 

the tax base. In addition, an increase in workers in a particular area increases the need for 

services, which creates more jobs in other industries, such as retail, food services, 

education, and health. 

Local Economies 

Additional construction personnel, by spending money in the local economy, mainly via 

accommodation and procurement of goods and services, would represent both a potential 

increase in local service-based employment opportunities and a small but positive 

temporary economic impact to the local community. Site-specific documentation would 

be required for comprehensive analysis of impacts to local economies. 

Displacement Impacts 

Some missile defense activities could result in a negative economic impact from 

displacement of populations, residences or businesses; housing or accommodation 

availability. For example, health care facilities, housing, and other infrastructure may be 

insufficient in some areas to support an influx of workers during construction. Testing 

and operation activities also may require an influx of additional personnel into the area. 

Proposed activities also could cause displacement of populations during test events and 

potential impacts to local industries such as tourism, or agriculture due to the closure of 

these areas during test events. Proposed activities could cause a loss in property value 

due to adjacent test activities. Site-specific analyses would be required to determine the 

magnitude of the potential for impact. 

Determination of Significance 

Significant economic or social impacts do not require preparation of an EIS unless those 

impacts are combined with significant impacts from other resource categories (see 40 

CFR 1504.14). Actions that would disrupt local or regional economies or would displace 

or introduce a new population that would substantially alter the socioeconomic setting, or 

actions that would cause a ten percent increase in the risk of crime or other undesirable 

social factors would be considered significant. 
3-40

3.1.12 Transportation 

Definition and Description 

The transportation section addresses ground, air, and marine transport systems. 

According to the most recently available data, the U.S. has over four million miles of 

highways, railroads, and waterways that connect all parts of the country. It also has 

19,000 public and private airports and approximately 1.6 trillion miles of oil and gas 

distribution pipelines. This extensive transportation network supported about 4.9 trillion 

passenger-miles of travel in 2001 and 3.8 trillion ton-miles of commercial freight 

shipments in 2001. The U.S. transportation system, one of the world’s largest, serves 284 

million residents and seven million business establishments. (DOT Bureau of 

Transportation Statistics [BTS], 2003) 

Metropolitan areas are characterized by urban transit, a complex mix of heavy, light, and 

commuter rail; buses and demand responsive vehicles; ferries; and other less prevalent 

types such as inclined planes, trolley buses, and automated guide ways. More than onethird of America’s population lives outside of urbanized areas, which typically do not 

have extensive transit systems. 

Paved roadways constituted about 65 percent of all highway mileage in 2001. Nearly all 

of the public roads in U.S. urban areas are paved, however, about half of the miles of 

rural public roads are unpaved. In 2001, 71 percent of U.S. roads were classified as being 

in good or very good condition and 14 percent as mediocre or poor. The remaining 15 

percent were classified as fair. The generally poorer condition of urban roads, as 

compared with rural roads, can be attributed to the higher levels of traffic they carry. 

(DOT BTS, 2003) Urban roads handled about 60 percent of all traffic in 2000 with far 

fewer miles of road. (DOT BTS, 2001) 

The most heavily populated states, California, Texas, Florida, and New York, are the 

most heavily traveled. However, Wyoming, the least populated state, had the highest 

vehicle-miles of travel per capita in 2000 at 16,400, followed by Georgia, Alabama, 

Oklahoma, and New Mexico at over 12,500. The District of Columbia and New York 

had the lowest vehicle-miles of travel per capita at less than 7,000. (DOT BTS, 2001) 

Landside access to water ports comprises a system of intermodal rail and truck services. 

Landside congestion, caused by inadequate control of truck traffic into and out of port 

terminals combined with the lack of adequate on-dock or near-dock rail access, affects 

the productivity of U.S. ports and the flow of U.S. international trade. Changes in vessel 

design impact access to both landside and waterside services. For example, container 

vessels have increased in size and capacity, which, in turn, drives a need for adequate 

trans-shipment hub and feeder ports. 
3-41

Ground Transportation 

Ground transportation and traffic circulation refer to the movement of vehicles from 

origins to destinations through a road and rail network. Roadway operating conditions 

and the adequacy of the existing and future roadway system to accommodate these 

vehicular movements usually are described in terms of the volume-to-capacity ratio, 

which is a comparison of the average daily traffic volume on the roadway to the roadway 

capacity. The volume-to-capacity ratio corresponds to a Level of Service (LOS) rating, 

ranging from free-flowing traffic conditions (LOS A) for a volume-to-capacity of usually 

less than 30 percent of the roadway capacity to forced-flow, congested conditions (LOS 

F) for a volume-to-capacity of 100 percent of the roadway capacity. LOS A, B, and C are 

considered good operating conditions where motorists experience minor delays. LOS D 

represents below average conditions, and LOS E corresponds to the maximum capacity 

of the roadway. LOS F indicates a congested roadway. 

Railway operating conditions and safety standards in the U.S. are regulated by the U.S. 

DOT, Federal Railroad Administration. The Federal Railroad Administration has 

established standards for nine types of track (Class 1 through 9); each class has unique 

construction, maintenance, and inspection standards, as well as operational requirements. 

Class 1 track is the minimum acceptable standard for general use and has a 16 kilometer 

per hour (ten mile per hour) speed limit for freight and a 24 kilometer per hour (15 mile 

per hour) speed limit for passengers. Class 9 track has the most stringent track standards 

and allows both freight and passenger trains to travel up to 322 kilometers per hour (200 

miles per hour). Local regulations, e.g., city speed limits, may reduce speeds regardless 

of track quality. (DOT, FRA 2002) 

Air Transportation 

Air transportation refers to the movement of aircraft through airspace. The control of 

airspace used by air traffic varies from very highly controlled to uncontrolled areas. 

Examples of highly controlled air traffic situations are flight in the vicinity of airports, 

where aircraft are in critical phases of flight (take-off and landing), flight under IFR, and 

flight on the high or low altitude route structure (airways). Less controlled situations 

include flight VFR or flight outside of U.S. controlled airspace (e.g., flight over 

international waters off the coast of California, Hawaii, or Alaska). 

Marine Transportation 

Marine traffic is the transportation of commercial, private, or military vessels at sea, 

including submarines. Marine traffic flow in congested waters, especially near 

coastlines, is controlled by the use of directional shipping lanes for large vessels (cargo, 

container ships, and tankers). Traffic flow controls also are implemented to ensure that 

harbors and ports-of-entry do not become congested. There is less control on ocean 
3-42

traffic involving recreational boating, sport fishing, commercial fishing, and activity by 

naval vessels. However, U.S. Navy vessels follow military procedures and orders (e.g., 

Fleet Forces Command) as well as Federal, state, and local marine regulations. In most 

cases, the factors that govern shipping or boating traffic include adequate depth of water, 

weather conditions (primarily affecting recreational vessels), the availability of fish of 

recreational or commercial value, and water temperature (higher water temperatures will 

increase recreational boat traffic and diving activities). 

Impact Assessment 

General transportation impacts can be assessed by determining the existing traffic flow 

and LOS. MDA activities that could cause impacts to the LOS include the increased 

delivery of construction equipment, propellants, or test event equipment, and the influx of 

construction workers or test operation personnel. In addition, roads, ports, or waterways 

within the LHA may be closed during test events. Roads also may be closed during the 

arrival of missile payloads and/or boosters to ensure that roadways near a Range would 

be vacated. 

The region of influence in determining impacts would depend on local traffic volume and 

transportation infrastructure. At the programmatic level, analysis shows that construction 

events and associated increases in transport of equipment and personnel are typically 

short-lived. However, site-specific analyses should be completed to determine local 

conditions. 

Determination of Significance 

Actions that are not included as categorical exclusions in DoD’s NEPA implementing 

regulations, or actions that would require the movement of an extremely hazardous, toxic 

or radiological substance, would generate traffic levels that would require construction of 

new roadways or expansion of existing roadways, alteration of circulation patterns, or 

would result in inadequate parking, transportation actions that would result in multi-day 

disruptions (more than two days) of marine or air traffic shipping lanes would be 

considered significant. In addition, actions that would result in road closures for more 

than two days or closures of major highways for more than one hour during peak traffic 

hours would be considered significant. 

3.1.13 Utilities 

Definition and Description 

The purpose of the utilities section is to address the existing rate of consumption, 

generation, and distribution of utilities, which include energy, water, wastewater, and 

solid waste and construction debris. This section address those facilities and systems that 
3-43

provide power, water, wastewater treatment, the collection and disposal of solid waste, 

and other utility services. 

 Energy. Energy refers to the power that is produced by a central electrical power 

plant or, in some cases, by individual power generators. The power would be utilized 

for both construction and operational activities on different sites. 

 Water. Water refers to the system that produces water, the treatment system that 

purifies the water, and the network that distributes that water. This water system 

usually is controlled, managed, and distributed by an entity such as a utility purveyor. 

In the absence of a water system, individualized water wells or a series of wells meet 

the demand for water. The water system is identified by potable, or drinkable, 

freshwater and nonpotable water used for other activities such as construction, 

operations, and irrigation. In some cases the non-potable system is saltwater. The 

water system is composed of a source that produces the water and the treatment 

systems that cleanse and purify it, making it available for use. Water made available 

to the public must meet EPA standards as described in Section 3.1.15. 

 Wastewater. There are different methods of treating wastewater that is produced by 

a site. Wastewater can be collected in a central system and then directed to a 

treatment plant where it can be treated and then discharged. In many instances, the 

wastewater is further treated and reclaimed for use as nonpotable water. In the 

absence of a central system, septic systems collect and treat water either individually 

(individual households) or collectively (within a community). 

 Solid Waste. Solid waste disposal includes the collection, handling, and disposal of 

waste. Designated landfills within an area or region are the final destinations where 

solid waste and construction debris is transported for processing. Solid waste usually 

is processed to separate out recyclable products first. Solid waste disposal also 

includes practices such as open burning, septage disposal, and burial in open or 

excavated trenches, where allowed by law. 

Impact Assessment 

A site-specific impact assessment should consider whether there is adequate wastewater 

treatment capacity or capability and if the proposed action would exceed wastewater 

treatment requirements and alter the existing rate of consumption, generation, and 

distribution of utilities. An impact analysis should include an evaluation of waste 

disposal facilities and landfills and waste discharge requirements. MDA activities require 

consistent power sources, and depletion of an existing power supply from a central 

electric power plant or individual power generators should be considered. Assessment of 

potential impacts on utilities would include a review and analysis of 
3-44

 Wastewater treatment requirements of the applicable Regional Water Quality Control 

Board or other governing authority; 

 Availability of sufficient water supplies to serve the proposed action, or need for new 

or expanded entitlements; 

 Availability of waste disposal facilities and landfills with sufficient permitted capacity 

to accommodate solid waste disposal needs; 

 International treaties and Federal, state, and local statutes and regulations related to 

solid waste; and 

 Capacity of the existing power supply providers and wastewater treatment providers 

to determine whether they could adequately serve the projected demand of the 

proposed action, in addition to the provider’s existing commitments. 

Determination of impacts on utilities also would include consideration of whether the 

proposed action would require or result in the construction of new water or wastewater 

treatment facilities, new storm water drainage facilities, or energy sources beyond 

permitted levels. Construction of new facilities or expansion of existing facilities has the 

potential to cause significant environmental impacts. It would be necessary to obtain 

appropriate permits for activities that may impact utility systems and facilities and to 

ensure compliance with local laws and regulations. 

Site-specific analysis would be required to identify and, if appropriate, analyze potential 

impacts to a local utility system for individual activities for the proposed BMDS. For this 

reason, this PEIS will not include an analysis of the proposed BMDS activities’ impacts 

on utilities. 

Determination of Significance 

Actions that would result in exceeding the existing capacity of the regional utility service 

providers (water supply, wastewater disposal, electricity, natural gas, solid waste 

disposal) and would require the identification or development of new utilities, supplies 

(water, electricity, natural gas), or disposal facilities (wastewater treatment facilities or 

solid waste disposal facilities) and their associated utility transmission corridors would be 

considered significant.

3.1.14 Visual Resources 

Definition and Description 

Visual resources are defined as the natural and man-made features that constitute the 

aesthetic qualities of an area. Landforms, surface water, vegetation, and man-made 

features are the fundamental characteristics of an area that define the visual environment 

and form the overall impression that an observer receives of an area. The importance of 

visual resources and any changes in the visual character of an area is influenced by social 
3-45

considerations, including the public value placed on the area, public awareness of the 

area, and community concern for the visual resources in the area. 

The visual resources of an area and any proposed changes to these resources can be 

evaluated in terms of “visual dominance” and “visual sensitivity.” Visual dominance 

describes the level of noticeability that occurs as the result of a visual change in an area. 

The levels of visual dominance vary from “not noticeable” to a significant change that 

demands attention and cannot be disregarded. Visual sensitivity depends on the setting of 

an area. Areas such as coastlines, national parks, and recreation or wilderness areas 

usually are considered to have high visual sensitivity, whereas heavily industrialized 

urban areas tend to have the lowest visual sensitivity. 

The significance of visual effects is very subjective and depends upon the degree of 

alteration, the scenic quality of the area disturbed, and the sensitivity of the viewers. The 

degree of alteration refers to the height and depth of maximum cut and fill areas and the 

introduction of urban elements into an existing natural environment or a substantial 

increase of structural elements into an already urban environment, while acknowledging 

any unique topographical formation or natural landmark. Sensitive viewers are those 

who utilize the outdoor environment or value a scenic viewpoint to enhance their daily 

activity and are typically residents or recreation users. Changes in the existing landscape 

where there are no identified scenic values or sensitive viewers are considered less than 

significant. Also, it is possible to acknowledge a visual change as possibly adverse but 

not significant, because either viewers are not sensitive or the surrounding scenic quality 

is not high. Visual impacts also would occur if proposed development is inconsistent 

with existing goals and policies of jurisdictions in which the project is located. 

Many environments are likely to include regions of rich aesthetic and visual resources as 

well as designated and undesignated natural areas of great beauty and scenic diversity. 

Visual resources may fall under several different designations including national forest; 

national monument; national, state, and county parkland; national wildlife refuges; 

wilderness areas; wild and scenic rivers; national trails; and privately owned land. 

Various roads also may be designated scenic byways due to their scenic, historic, and 

cultural qualities. Visually sensitive recreational areas or scenic highways may be 

located in close vicinity of a site where activities for the proposed BMDS may occur. 

Installations where MDA activities for the proposed BMDS may occur are typically 

dominated by developed, high technology buildings and support facilities. Some existing 

military sites are relatively unobtrusive when viewed from surrounding areas; however, it 

is possible that a variety of visual and aesthetic resources may be located near sites where 

activities for the proposed BMDS may occur. 
3-46

Impact Assessment 

MDA activities could have aesthetic impacts associated with changes in either the built or 

natural environment. An impacts analysis should include the length of visual disturbance 

(short- or long-term). 

Assessment of potential impacts on visual resources should include a review and analysis 

of 

 Short-term visual impacts such as the presence of heavy machinery during 

construction of a project (large trucks, cranes, and other construction equipment 

would be visible within the construction zone and in surrounding areas only during 

the construction phase.); 

 Long-term visual changes such as those associated with altering the existing visual 

environment by constructing buildings, including those with high vertical profiles; 

 Existing scenic resource, including but not limited to trees, rock outcroppings, and 

historic buildings within a state scenic highway; 

 Existing visual character or quality of a site and its surroundings; 

 New sources of substantial light or glare, which could adversely affect day or 

nighttime views in the area (for example, nighttime lighting, particularly during 

construction can cause impacts to visual resources); 

 Viewer concern, or the level of scenic importance based on expressed human concern 

for the scenic quality of land; 

 Distance an area can be seen by observers and the degree of visible detail within that 

area; and 

 Extent of modification that would occur as a result of the proposed action. 

Numerous visual and aesthetic resources may be identified in a given environment and at 

or near BMDS installations located within that environment. As a result, site-specific 

environmental documentation will identify and, if appropriate, analyze potential impacts 

to visual and aesthetic resources located in the vicinity of sites where activities for the 

proposed BMDS may occur. For this reason, this PEIS will not include an analysis of the 

proposed BMDS activities’ impacts on visual resources. 

Determination of Significance 

Actions that would be considered significant include those that involve structures or land 

alterations that are visually incompatible with or obtrusive to the existing visual setting 

and landscape, noticeably increase visual contrast and reduce the scenic quality rating, 

permanently block or disrupt existing views or reduce public opportunities to view scenic 

resources, or conflict with existing regulations and policies governing aesthetics and 

visual resources (e.g., National Historic Preservation Act). 
3-47

3.1.15 Water Resources 

Definition and Description 

Water resources include surface water, ground water, and floodplains. Surface water 

resources consist of lakes, rivers, and streams. Surface water is important for its 

contributions to the economic, ecological, recreational, and human health of a community 

or locale. Storm water flows, which may be exacerbated by high proportions of 

impervious surfaces (e.g., buildings, roads, and parking lots), are important to the 

management of surface water. Storm water also is important to surface water quality 

because of its potential to introduce sediments and other contaminants into lakes, rivers, 

and streams. 

Ground water consists of the subsurface hydrologic resources. It is an essential resource 

often used for potable water consumption, agricultural irrigation, and industrial 

applications. Ground water typically may be described in terms of its depth from the 

surface, aquifer or well capacity, water quality, surrounding geologic composition, and 

recharge rate. 

Floodplains are areas of low-lying ground along a river or stream channel. Such lands 

may be subject to periodic or infrequent inundation due to rain or melting snow. Risk of 

flooding depends on topography, the frequency of precipitation events, and the size of the 

watershed above the floodplain. Often development in floodplains is limited to passive 

uses, such as recreational and preservation activities, to reduce the risks to human health 

and safety.

The National Water Quality Inventory summarizes the water quality assessments 

performed by state, local and Tribal governments. (EPA, 2000) Water quality standards 

consist of three elements: (1) designated uses assigned to water body (e.g., drinking, 

swimming, and fishing); (2) criteria to protect the designated use (e.g., chemical specific 

threshold limits); and (3) anti-degradation policy to prevent deterioration of current water 

quality. The status of the U.S. water quality in 2000 is described in Exhibit 3-10. 
3-48

Exhibit 3-10. Summary of Quality of Assessed Rivers, Lakes, and Estuaries 

Water Body 

Type 

Total Size, 

approximate 

Amount 

Assessed* 

(Percent of 

Total) 

Good 

(Percent of 

Assessed) 

Good but 

Threatened 

(Percent of 

Assessed) 

Polluted 

(Percent of 

Assessed) 

Rivers, 

kilometers 

[miles] 

5.94 million 

(3.7 million) 19 percent 52 percent 98 percent 38 percent 

Lakes, 

hectares 

[acres] 

16.4 million 

(40.6 million) 43 percent 46 percent 8 percent 44 percent 

Estuaries, 

square 

kilometers 

[square miles] 

22,630 

(87,370) 36 percent 45 percent <43 percent 50 percent 

Source: EPA, 2002 

*Includes water bodies assessed as not attainable for one or more uses 

Note: percentages may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding 

The leading causes of impairment of rivers and streams include pathogens (bacteria), 

siltation (sedimentation), and habitat alterations, and the leading sources for these include 

agriculture, hydraulic modifications, and habitat modifications. The leading causes of 

impairment of lakes, ponds and reservoirs include nutrients, metals (primarily mercury), 

and siltation (sedimentation), and the leading sources for these include agriculture, 

hydraulic modifications, and urban runoff/storm sewers. The leading causes of 

impairment of estuaries include metals (primarily mercury), pesticides, and oxygendepleting substances, and the leading sources for these include municipal point sources, 

urban runoff/storm sewers, and industrial discharges. (EPA, 2002) 

Impact Assessment 

MDA activities that could impact water resources include those that either alter the flow 

of surface water, supply of ground water, or in some way contribute foreign bodies 

(pollution, sediment) to these water resources. 

Assessment of potential impacts on water quantity would include a review and analysis 

of activities that 

 Increase the number of impervious surfaces in an environment such as construction of 

new roads, buildings, parking lots, launch pads or runways (these surfaces can impact 

storm water runoff and recharge of ground water sources); and 
3-49

 Consume ground water or surface water for a particular facility (the availability of 

water resources varies between locations). 

Assessment of potential impacts on water quality would also include a review and 

analysis of activities that result in emissions or discharge of pollutants to water resources 

such as 

 Construction or operation activities that could contribute to the sedimentation of water 

bodies; and 

 Causes of point and non-point source pollution such as transportation emissions and 

ground clouds from launch, runoff of deluge or wash down water, thermal discharges, 

debris impacts, and any plans for open burning/open detonation. 

Individual construction projects and associated water demands cannot be considered at 

the programmatic level, but must be analyzed in site-specific environmental 

documentation that can assess the impacts of such activities. This PEIS addresses the 

general impacts of BMDS activities resulting in sedimentation and pollution on water 

resources. 

Determination of Significance 

Actions that would fill in jurisdictional wetlands at levels that exceed the criteria for a 

Nationwide Permit and would require consultation with the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers and the development and implementation of a mitigation plan would be 

considered significant. Actions that would violate or exceed existing National Discharge 

Elimination System or Total Maximum Daily Load standards or would degrade the Total 

Maximum Daily Load classification of a water body, or would violate existing 

international, Federal, or state water discharge treaties or regulations would be considered 

significant. Actions that occur within and do not comply with a state wellhead protection 

area and its management practices, a state coastal zone management program, or any new 

ground water or surface water extraction system that would affect the water table or flow 

rates that has not been coordinated with the appropriate regulatory agency would be 

considered significant. 

3.2 Affected Environment 

The Affected Environment discussion describes the particular characteristics of each 

resource area

47 within nine terrestrial biomes, the BOA, and the Atmosphere, which 

represent the land, air (atmosphere), water, and space environments where proposed 

BMDS activities are reasonably foreseeable. Each contains distinct plant and animal 

groups and political boundaries. 

 

47 Cultural resources, environmental justice, land use, socioeconomics, utilities and visual resources are not 

discussed in the biome descriptions because they are local in nature and are not analyzed in Chapter 4. 
3-50

A biome is a large geographical area of distinctive plant and animal groups. The climate 

and geography of an area determine what type of biome can exist in that area. Major 

terrestrial biomes include deserts, forests, grasslands, mountains, tundra and associated 

surface water bodies. Major marine systems include intertidal zones (which include 

sandy beaches, rocks, estuaries, mangrove swamps and coral reefs), neritic zones (the 

relatively shallow ocean that extends to the edge of the continental shelf, where primary 

productivity depends on planktonic algae growing as deep as the light can reach), oceanic 

zones, and abyssal plains. 

 

Detailed descriptions of the nine terrestrial biomes, the BOA, and the Atmosphere as 

addressed in this PEIS are found in Appendix H Biome Descriptions. 

3.2.1 Arctic Tundra Biome 

The Arctic Tundra Biome48 discussion encompasses the arctic coastal regions that border 

the North Atlantic Ocean and Arctic Ocean. This biome includes coastal portions of the 

state of Alaska in the U.S., Canada, and Greenland (administered by Denmark). The 

global distribution of this biome is depicted in Exhibit 3-11. 

The majority of the Arctic Tundra Biome is located north of the latitudinal tree line and 

consists of the northern continental fringes of North America from approximately the 

Arctic Circle northward. For example, Thule AFB, Greenland, which is located 

approximately 1,100 kilometers (700 miles) north of the Arctic Circle, is the 

northernmost installation where MDA activities for the proposed BMDS may occur. The 

Arctic Tundra Biome includes other coastal locations that may be situated south of the 

Arctic Circle but have a climate and ecosystem similar to that of inland Arctic Tundra. 

These sites are located on the islands of the Aleutian chain and include Eareckson Air 

Station, Shemya Island, Alaska, and Port of Adak, Adak, Alaska. 

 

48 Exhibit 3-11 shows the global location of the Arctic Tundra ecosystem. However, based on reasonably 

foreseeable locations for activities for the proposed BMDS to occur, the Affected Environment focuses on the 

coastal portions of this ecosystem. 
3-51

Exhibit 3-11. Global Distribution of the Arctic Tundra Biome 

Source: Modified from National Geographic, 2003a 

3.2.1.1 Air Quality 

The climate of the Arctic Tundra Biome is characterized as polar maritime with persistent 

overcast skies, high winds, frequent and often violent storms, and a narrow range of 

temperature fluctuation throughout the year. The average annual temperature is 

-28°Celsius (o

C) (-18°Fahrenheit [oF]). Parts of the Arctic Tundra may be classified as 

desert due to low precipitation. Annual precipitation is light, often less than 200 

millimeters (eight inches). Most precipitation falls as snow in October through 

November. However, because potential evaporation also is very low, the climate tends to 

be humid. The Arctic Tundra also is characterized by high winds, which can blow 

between 48 to 97 kilometers (30 to 60 miles) per hour. 

Air quality in the Arctic Tundra Biome is considered good, however, some areas in and 

around urban centers are in non-attainment for CO. 

3.2.1.2 Airspace 

Airspace above U.S. military airfields in the Arctic Tundra Biome includes controlled 

airspace and operates under IFR. The Arctic Tundra Biome also includes regions that are 

located in international airspace and therefore, the procedures of the International Civil 

Aviation Organization (ICAO) are followed. Much of Alaska's aviation activity takes 
3-52

place within existing MOAs, through a shared-use agreement, with information provided 

by the Special Use Airspace Information Service, which is a system operated by the U.S. 

Air Force under agreement with the FAA Alaskan Region to assist pilots with flight 

planning and situational awareness while operating in or around MOAs or Restricted 

Areas in interior Alaska. In Canada, the Air Navigation Services and Airspace Services 

of Transport Canada are responsible for issues involved with airspace utilization and 

classification, levels of service for Air Navigation Service facilities, and services, 

including weather, navigation, radar, and communication services. In Greenland, the 

Danish Civil Aviation Administration issues Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) regarding 

restricted airspace. 

Civilian, military, and private airports exist in the Arctic Tundra Biome. Civilian 

aircrafts generally fly along established flight corridors that operate under VFR. 

3.2.1.3 Biological Resources 

Tundra environments are characterized by treeless areas, which consist of dwarfed shrubs 

and miniature wildflowers adapted to a short growing season. Species resident in arctic 

tundra have evolved adaptations peculiar to high latitudes. Examples of land mammals 

found on the Arctic Tundra include shrews, hares, rodents, wolves, foxes, bears and deer. 

Several lakes in the Arctic Tundra region support a small, unique assemblage of 

freshwater fishes. 

Wetlands are typical of the Arctic Tundra. Ecological reserves and wildlife refuges are 

found throughout the Arctic Tundra region. Disturbance caused by boats or aircraft 

usually is controlled by distance or altitude regulations in protected areas and advisory 

restrictions elsewhere. Sometimes boat activities, such as the use of horns, are restricted. 

Exhibit 3-12 gives distance/altitude restrictions currently in place in Arctic countries. 

Canada, Finland, Greenland, Russia, and the U.S. restrict the distance boats can approach 

breeding seabirds, but restrictions apply only to specific protected areas. Distance 

restrictions range from 15 meters (49 feet) for unmotorized boats in some reserves within 

Newfoundland, Canada, to 1,600 meters (5,250 feet) in reserves in the U.S. 

Arctic countries restrict the altitude below which aircraft cannot fly over a seabird 

colony. In general, minimum altitudes are in the range of 300-500 meters (984 to 1,640 

feet) but are higher over some reserves in the U.S. (700 meters [2,300 feet]). Canadian 

flight manuals advise a minimum altitude of over 600 meters (1,970 feet) when flying 

over bird concentrations. In Greenland, advisory rules are in place restricting disturbance 

to wildlife caused by mineral resource exploration and extraction (directed mainly at 

helicopters). 
3-53

Exhibit 3-12. Regulated Activities Near Seabird Colonies in Arctic Regions 

Country Boat Distance 

(closest approach) 

Boat Speed 

(maximum) 

Aircraft Altitude 

(minimum) 

Use of Boat 

Siren 

Canada 

20 meters (66 feet) 

– motorized1

 15 

meters (49 feet) – 

non-motorized 100 

meters (328 feet) or 

50 meters (164 

feet) off murre 

colonies 

-- 

300 meters (984 

feet) April 1 – 

September 1 in 

Newfoundland 

province reserves, 

most large colonies 

are marked on 

aeronautical charts 

Not explicitly 

restricted but not 

allowed if 

disturbance to 

colony occurs 

Greenland 

500 meters (1,640 

feet) for some 

protected colonies 

18 kilometers 

per hour (11 

miles per 

hour)2

500 meters (1,640 

feet) -- 

U.S. 100 – 1,600 meters 

(328 – 5,250 feet) -- 500 – 700 meters (1,640 – 2,300 feet) -- 

Source: Modified from Chardine and Mendenhall, 2003 

1

Provincial regulation; Gull Island, Witless Bay- mixed Atlantic Puffin, Black-legged Kittiwake, Common 

Murre colony. Boat tour operators presently exempt. 2

Restriction in place for mineral exploration activities only 

3.2.1.4 Geology and Soils 

Under a protective layer of sod, water in the soil melts in summer to produce a thick mud 

that sometimes flows downslope to create bulges, terraces, and lobes on hillsides. The 

freeze and thaw of water in the soil sorts out coarse particles, giving rise to such patterns 

in the ground as rings, polygons, and stripes made of stones. The coastal plains have 

numerous lakes of thermokarst origin, formed by melting ground water. 

Soil particles in the Arctic Tundra derive almost entirely from mechanical breakup of 

rock, with little or no chemical alteration. Continual freezing and thawing of the soil 

have disintegrated its particles. In the Arctic Tundra, the soil is very low in nutrients and 

minerals, except where animal droppings fertilize the soil. (Bailey, 1995) Below the soil 

is the tundra's permafrost, a permanently frozen layer of earth. The majority of the Arctic 

Tundra Biome resides on a layer of permafrost. 

Geologic hazards in the Arctic Tundra Biome include earthquakes, volcanic activity, and 

avalanches. 
3-54

3.2.1.5 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

Installations where MDA activities for the proposed BMDS may occur may store and use 

large quantities of hazardous materials, including a variety of flammable and combustible 

liquids. Procedures that comply with applicable laws and regulations for managing 

hazardous materials are developed to establish standard operating procedures for the 

correct management and storage of hazardous materials at installations. Due to the 

extreme climate, special measures may be necessary for storage and handling of 

hazardous materials in arctic areas. 

Wastes generated by facilities that may be used for the proposed BMDS include oils, 

fuels, antifreeze, paint, paint thinner and remover, photo chemicals, pesticides, aerosol 

canisters, batteries, used acetone, sulfuric acid, and sewage sludge. Procedures that 

comply with applicable laws and regulations are developed for managing hazardous 

wastes at sites where activities for the proposed BMDS may occur. 

3.2.1.6 Health and Safety 

All activities associated with the proposed BMDS would comply with Federal, state, and 

local laws and regulations applicable to worker and environmental health and safety. The 

MDA would take every reasonable precaution during the planning and execution of the 

operations, training exercises, and test and development activities to prevent injury to 

human life or property. Health and safety procedures should be included in site-specific 

operating documents. 

3.2.1.7 Noise 

The principal sources of noise from missile defense operations are vehicular traffic and 

military activities, including aircraft operations, rocket testing, and rocket launches. 

Frequency and duration of noise from military activities vary as a factor of the irregular 

training schedules, and noise levels vary with the type of activities at these facilities. 

Sonic booms may be produced as a result of BMDS activities. Other sources of noise 

would result from construction activities. Measurements of ambient sound levels should 

be analyzed in site-specific environmental documents. 

3.2.1.8 Transportation 

Roadway travel in the Arctic Tundra Biome is generally limited due to the lack of roads 

in the vast, undeveloped terrain. The summer months experience the highest amount of 

traffic, due to tourism and good weather. The Arctic Tundra Biome includes railway 

systems that provide freight, passenger, and intermodal transportation across North 

America, as well as regional and local service railways. Given the vast area of the Arctic 

Tundra Biome and the limited road network, aircraft provide an alternate means of 
3-55

transportation. Marine travel tends to be limited in the Arctic Tundra Biome due to 

glacial patches found throughout many waterways. 

3.2.1.9 Water Resources 

In the Arctic Tundra, alluvial deposits are the principal aquifers for ground water, which 

is greatly restricted by permafrost. During the summer when snow melts, the water 

percolates through the active layer but is unable to penetrate the permafrost. Pools of 

water form on the surface, and the active layer becomes saturated. Surface waters in the 

Arctic Tundra tend to be acidic and rich in organic material. 

Surface water and ground water quality is generally good in the Arctic Tundra Biome 

except in isolated areas of known contamination. Although soils in the Arctic Tundra 

Biome are strongly acidic, pH of regional surface waters in North America is around 7, 

ranging from 6.8 to 7.5 in streams and 7.1 to 7.3 in lakes. The relatively high pH and 

capacity of streams and lakes to buffer acid inputs from natural and man-made sources 

are presumed to be the result of ions (e.g., calcium and magnesium) that have been 

carried into the atmosphere with sea spray and subsequently returned in rainfall. This is a 

common occurrence in coastal maritime regions. (Wetzel 1975, as referenced in FAA, 

1996) 

3.2.2 Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome 

The Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome discussion focuses on the sub-arctic regions of North 

America, including portions of the state of Alaska. This biome is generally located 

between latitudes 50 and 60 degrees north (see Exhibit 3-13). The sub-arctic climate 

zone coincides with a great belt of needleleaf forest, often referred to as boreal forest, and 

with the open lichen woodland known as taiga. Existing inland sites found in Alaska in 

the Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome include Fort Greely (which includes Delta Junction), Clear 

Air Force Station, Eielson AFB, and Poker Flat Research Range. 
3-56

Exhibit 3-13. Global Distribution of the Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome 

Source: Modified From National Geographic, 2003b 

Coastal sites also are located in the Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome, including portions of 

southwestern and western Alaska. Coastal sites are influenced by the cool climate 

generated by the cold waters of the North Atlantic Ocean and share maritime 

characteristics. Existing coastal sites where proposed BMDS activities may occur are 

found in Alaska in the Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome and include the KLC and the Port of 

Valdez. 

3.2.2.1 Air Quality 

The average temperature is below freezing for six months out of the year. Winter is the 

dominant season and the temperature range is -54o

C to -1°C (-65°F to 30°F). Summers 

are mostly rainy, and humid, and temperatures range from –7°C to 21°C (20°F to 70°F). 

The total precipitation in a year is 30 to 85 centimeters (12 to 33 inches), which may fall 

as rain or snow or accumulate as dew. Surface winds along the coast are much stronger 

and more persistent than at inland areas. 

Air quality in the Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome generally is considered favorable; however, 

some areas in and around urban centers, such as Anchorage and Fairbanks are in nonattainment for CO concentrations. These urban centers typically exceed CO NAAQS 

only during the winter (October through March). 
3-57

Emissions from activities for the proposed BMDS include CO, NOX, SOX, VOCs, HAPs, 

and PM. In coastal areas, wind-blown volcanic dust is the primary air contaminant. 

3.2.2.2 Airspace 

Airspace above U.S. military airfields in the Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome generally includes 

controlled airspace and operates under IFR. 

Much of Alaska's aviation activity takes place within existing MOAs, through a shareduse agreement, with information provided by the Special Use Airspace Information 

Service, which is a system operated by the U.S. Air Force under agreement with the FAA 

Alaskan Region to assist pilots with flight planning and situational awareness while 

operating in or around MOAs or Restricted Areas in interior Alaska. 

 

There are approximately 600 civilian, military, and private airports and more than 3,000 

airstrips in the state of Alaska. Existing military airfields, with runways that are paved 

and in good condition, would be used to support activities for the proposed BMDS. 

Civilian aircraft generally fly along established flight corridors that operate under VFR. 

3.2.2.3 Biological Resources 

The vegetation of the Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome is primarily boreal forest, which is a 

complex array of plant communities shaped by fire, soil temperature, drainage, and 

exposure. 

The interior areas of the Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome are populated with many animals that 

have evolved to meet conditions found at higher latitudes. All estuarine and marine areas 

out to the exclusive economic zone (322 kilometers [200 miles] from the coast) of the 

U.S. used by Alaskan Pacific salmon are designated as Essential Fish Habitat for salmon 

fisheries. Essential Fish Habitat also has been designated for scallops and Gulf of Alaska 

ground fish in the Port of Valdez. (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 

2003) 

Most wetlands in the Sub-Arctic Taiga generally are classified as palustrine (nonflowing) or riverine, which occur alongside rivers and streams. On most wetlands in the 

sub-arctic region, wet soils result from a variety of sources, including the late melt of 

snow over either impervious subsoil layers such as glacial silts or discontinuous 

permafrost. 
3-58

3.2.2.4 Geology and Soils 

High mountains, broad lowlands, diverse streams and lakes, and complex rock formations 

characterize the geology of the Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome. 

 

The boreal forest grows on poorly developed soils with pockets of wet, organic histosols. 

These light gray soils are wet, strongly leached, and acidic; they form a highly distinct 

layer beneath a topsoil layer of organic matter. Soils in the coastal areas are typically 

rocky, organic, or volcanic. The maritime taiga is characterized by poor drainage of 

surface water. 

Geologic hazards in the Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome include earthquakes, volcanic activity, 

and avalanches. 

3.2.2.5 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

Hazardous materials and hazardous waste in the Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome are similar to 

those found in the Arctic Tundra Biome described in Section 3.2.1.5. 

3.2.2.6 Health and Safety 

Health and Safety attributes of the Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome are similar to those discussed 

in Section 3.2.1.6. 

3.2.2.7 Noise 

The Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome generally is sparsely populated and most of the region is 

expected to have a background noise level of DNL less than or equal to 55 dBA. 

3.2.2.8 Transportation 

Transportation attributes of the Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome are similar to those discussed in 

Section 3.2.1.8. 

3.2.2.9 Water Resources 

Ground water is supplied by rivers, precipitation, and melt water in the Sub-Arctic Taiga 

Biome. Characteristic of the taiga are innumerable water bodies, including bogs, fens, 

marshes, shallow lakes, rivers and wetlands, which are intermixed among the forest and 

hold vast amounts of water. In coastal areas, ground water is found primarily in river 

basins and recharged by infiltration of melt water from precipitation and glaciers. 

Water quality is subject to seasonal variations, but remains within established EPA 

drinking water standards. 
3-59

3.2.3 Deciduous Forest Biome 

As shown in Exhibit 3-14, the Deciduous Forest Biome includes the deciduous forest 

regions of North America, which include most of the eastern portion of the U.S. and parts 

of central Europe and East Asia. The description in this section of the U.S. deciduous 

forest is representative of this biome throughout the world. 

Exhibit 3-14. Global Distribution of the Deciduous Forest Biome 

Source: Modified From National Geographic, 2003b 

Existing inland sites in the Deciduous Forest Biome include Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; 

Fort Devens, Massachusetts; and Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. 

Coastal sites also are located in the Deciduous Forest Biome. These sites share maritime 

characteristics. Existing coastal sites include Naval Air Station Patuxent River, 

Maryland; Wallops Island, Virginia; Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida; Cape 

Cod Air Force Station, Massachusetts; and Eglin AFB, Florida. 

3.2.3.1 Air Quality 

The average annual temperature in a deciduous forest is 10°C (50°F). The average 

rainfall is 76 to 152 centimeters (30 to 60 inches) a year, with nearly 36 centimeters (14 

inches) of rain in the winter and more than 46 centimeters (18 inches) of rain in the 
3-60

summer. Humidity in these forests is high, ranging from 60 to 80 percent. Because of its 

location, air masses from both the cold polar region and the warm tropical region 

contribute to the climate changes in this biome. 

Many metropolitan regions on the U.S. Atlantic Coast are in non-attainment for EPA’s 

NAAQS for ozone, the primary constituent of urban smog. The southern Atlantic coast 

from Virginia through Florida is in attainment for all criteria air pollutants. However, the 

entire coastal area from northern Virginia through Maine is in non-attainment for ozone 

(ranging from moderate to severe), and small areas in Connecticut are in moderate nonattainment for PM10. 

Emissions from activities for the proposed BMDS include CO, NOX, SOX, VOCs, HAPs, 

and PM. Existing emissions sources in the coastal areas of the Deciduous Forest Biome 

are primarily the same as for those in the inland areas. 

3.2.3.2 Airspace 

The Deciduous Forest Biome in the U.S. contains all FAA classifications for airspace, as 

described in Section 3.1.2. 

3.2.3.3 Biological Resources 

On numerous sites where activities for the proposed BMDS may occur, native vegetation 

has been removed, and the land is landscaped and maintained by mowing and brush 

control measures. Isolated pockets of vegetation may remain on sites where activities for 

the proposed BMDS may occur, however, vegetation on off-site areas is widespread and 

may be undisturbed. 

The Deciduous Forest Biome provides habitat for a wide variety of animals. State and 

federally endangered and threatened species in the biome include but are not limited to 

red-cockaded woodpeckers and the northeastern tiger beetle. 

The Florida Keys have been designated a National Marine Sanctuary, Outstanding 

Florida Waters, and an Area of Critical State Concern. In addition, the Deciduous Forest 

Biome includes critical habitat. For example, critical habitat for the Northern Right 

whale (Eubalaena glacialis) is designated for portions of Cape Cod Bay and Stellwagen 

Bank, the Great South Channel (each off the coast of Massachusetts) and waters adjacent 

to the coasts of Georgia and the east coast of Florida. 
3-61

3.2.3.4 Geology and Soils 

The geology of the Deciduous Forest inland is varied and consists of low mountains and 

plateaus. The Coastal Plain is predominantly flat and is covered with terrestrial 

sediments. 

There are two types of soil found in deciduous forests in the U.S. Fertile soils with high 

organic content are rich in nutrients and have well-developed layers of clay. The second 

type, the “red clay” soils are found in humid temperate and tropical areas of the world, 

typically on older, stable landscapes. In coastal areas of this biome, soils are 

predominantly deep and adequately drained. 

Because limited seismic activity occurs along the Atlantic continental shelf, the risk of an 

earthquake in the Deciduous Forest Biome is low. Volcanic activity generally is not 

observed along the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, however, cracks present in the Eastern 

Seaboard have the potential to cause the seabed to crumble and create a tsunami that 

would push huge masses of sea water toward the coast. Landslides are a significant 

geologic hazard throughout the Deciduous Forest Biome.

3.2.3.5 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

Hazardous materials and hazardous waste attributes of the Deciduous Forest Biome are 

similar to those discussed in Section 3.2.1.5. Except the moderate climate characteristic 

of the Deciduous Forest Biome does not require special consideration as is necessary in 

the extreme temperatures of the Arctic Tundra Biome. 

3.2.3.6 Health and Safety 

Health and Safety attributes of the Deciduous Forest Biome are similar to those discussed 

in Section 3.2.1.6. 

3.2.3.7 Noise 

The Eastern Range is a representative example of noise levels for sites where activities 

for the proposed BMDS may occur in the Deciduous Forest Biome. Ambient noise levels 

based on daytime monitoring, range from 60 dBA to 80 dBA. (DOT, 2001) Noise 

sources associated with the proposed BMDS are similar to those described in Section 

3.2.1.7. 

3.2.3.8 Transportation 

The Deciduous Forest Biome includes both coastal and inland regions that sustain 

widespread infrastructure, including marine ports and docks that are supported by traffic 
3-62

circulation systems such as highways and byways, unpaved roads, non-maintained roads, 

trails, railroad lines, municipal, private, and military airports and any other system 

involved in mass transportation. 

On-site roadways provide access to launch complexes, support facilities, and industrial 

areas. Railways transport both cargo and passengers in the region. 

There are numerous commercial, private, and military airports within the Deciduous 

Forest Biome. They vary in size from major international airports such as HartsfieldJackson Atlanta International Airport in Georgia that supports 80 million passengers each 

year to small, rural airstrips that support single engine planes. 

The top ports in U.S. foreign trade are deep draft (drafts of at least 12 meters [40 feet]). 

Twenty-five U.S. ports, located within the Deciduous Forest Coastal Biome, received 73 

percent of total vessel calls. (DOT BTS, 2001) 

3.2.3.9 Water Resources 

Ground water provides about 40 percent of the U.S. public water supply. Where water 

demand is great, sophisticated reservoir, pipeline, and purification systems are needed to 

meet demands. Ground water resources along the coast are vulnerable to saltwater 

intrusion and nutrient contamination. (USGS, 2000) 

Water quality in the Deciduous Forest Biome varies depending on pressures from human 

activity (e.g., industrial effluents and agricultural run-off). Pollution of coastal waters 

often results from runoff laden with particulates and other pollutants; sewage treatment 

plants; combined sewer overflows; and storm drains that discharge liquid waste directly 

into the ocean through pipelines, dumping of materials dredged from the bottoms of 

rivers and harbors, and waste from fish processing plants, legal and illegal dumping of 

wastes from ships and ground water from coastal areas. 

3.2.4 Chaparral Biome 

The Chaparral Biome includes regions corresponding to those shown in 

Exhibit 3-15, but focuses on a portion of the California Coast and the coastal region of 

the Mediterranean from the Alps to the Sahara Desert and from the Atlantic Ocean to the 

Caspian Sea. Representative sites where activities for the proposed BMDS may occur are 

part of the Western Range, including Vandenberg AFB and the Point Mugu Sea Range. 
3-63

Exhibit 3-15. Global Distribution of the Chaparral Biome 

Source: Modified From National Geographic, 2003b 

3.2.4.1 Air Quality 

The Chaparral climate consists of hot summer drought and winter rain in the midlatitudes, north of the subtropical climate zone. The climate in this area is unique with 

the wet season occurring in winter and annual rainfall of only 38 to 102 centimeters (15 

to 40 inches). Cold ocean currents and fog affect temperatures, which limit the growing 

season. The high-pressure belts of the subtropics drift northwards in the Northern 

Hemisphere from May to August and they coincide with substantially higher 

temperatures and little rainfall. During the winter, weather becomes dominated by the 

rain-bearing low-pressure depressions. While usually mild, such areas can experience 

cold snaps when exposed to the icy winds of the large continental interiors, where 

temperatures can drop to -40°C (-40o

F) in the extreme continental climates. (Atmosphere, 

Climate and Environment Programme, 2003) 

The primary sources of air pollutants in coastal areas include stationary sources, area 

sources, mobile sources, and biogenic sources such as forest fires. VOCs react with 

sunlight in the atmosphere to produce ozone (i.e., smog). In some areas, background 

levels of air pollutants are relatively high due to air currents depositing pollution from 

sources outside of the coastal area. 
3-64

There is a large area along the Pacific coast, particularly in southern California that is in 

non-attainment for ozone (ranging from severe to extreme). A large area in southern 

California is in severe non-attainment for PM10. (EPA, 2003f) The EPA has designated 

the near shore areas of southern California as unclassified/attainment areas. Due to the 

lack of major emissions sources in the area and the presence of strong northeast winds, 

the likelihood of pollutants remaining in the ambient air is low. 

Heavy industrial activities, high automobile traffic, and energy generation are the main 

sources of air pollutants along the southern Pacific coast. 

The European Union eight-hour air quality standard for ozone (53 nmol/mol) is exceeded 

throughout the summer in the entire Mediterranean region. 

3.2.4.2 Airspace 

Airspace in coastal regions of North America contains “North American Coastal Routes,” 

which are numerically coded routes preplanned over existing airways and route systems 

to and from specific coastal fixes. See Section 3.1.2 for a description of North American 

Routes. 

Portions of the Chaparral Biome are located in international airspace. Therefore, the 

procedures of the ICAO (outlined in ICAO Document 444, Rules of the Air and Air 

Traffic Services) are followed. 

There are numerous restricted areas in the near shore environment associated with the 

Western Range. The procedures for scheduling each portion of airspace are performed in 

accordance with letters of agreement with the controlling FAA facility, Los Angeles Air 

Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC). 

Numerous airports and airfields exist within the Chaparral Biome. Numerous jet routes 

that cross the Pacific pass through the U.S. Chaparral Biome, including A331, A332, 

A450, R463, R465, R584, Corridor V506 and Corridor G10. 

3.2.4.3 Biological Resources 

The vegetation of the Chaparral is characterized by the presence of hard, tough, 

evergreen leaves and low, shrubby appearance. 

 

Birds of the Chaparral include the endangered California gnatcatcher (Polioptila 

californica), California thrasher (Toxostoma redivivum), western scrub jay (Aphelocoma 

californica), and cactus wren (Campylorhynchus brunneicapillus). 
3-65

The near shore and coastal environment of the Chaparral Biome support numerous 

threatened or endangered species. 

The Chaparral Biomes around the world support 20 percent of all plants, but these areas 

are all relatively small and many are threatened. Essential Fish Habitat includes those 

waters and sediment that are necessary to complete the life cycle for fish from spawning 

to maturity. There are two Essential Fish Habitat zones in this region, coastal pelagic and 

groundfish. 

3.2.4.4 Geology and Soils 

The California Coastal Chaparral area consists of narrow ranges with wide plains in 

between, as well as alluviated lowlands and coastal terraces. 

The soils of the Chaparral Biome may be classified into four categories, coastal beach 

sands, tidal flats, loamy sands, and silty clay. The erosion hazard of these soils depends 

on slope and vegetation cover. 

 

The California Chaparral Coastal area is noted for its intense seismic activity due to the 

right lateral motion of the Pacific and North Atlantic Plate boundary. 

3.2.4.5 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

Hazardous materials and hazardous waste attributes of the Chaparral Biome are similar to 

those discussed in Section 3.2.1.5. Except the moderate climate characteristic of the 

Chaparral Biome does not require special consideration as is necessary in the extreme 

temperatures of the Arctic Tundra Biome. 

3.2.4.6 Health and Safety 

Health and Safety attributes of the Chaparral Biome are similar to those discussed in 

Section 3.2.1.6. 

3.2.4.7 Noise 

Vandenberg AFB is a representative example of noise levels for sites where activities for 

the proposed BMDS may occur in the Chaparral Biome. Ambient noise levels at 

Vandenberg AFB range from 48 dBA to 67 dBA. (DOT, 2001) Noise sources associated 

with the proposed BMDS are described in Section 3.2.1.7. 
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3.2.4.8 Transportation 

Transportation attributes of the Chaparral Biome are similar to those discussed in Section 

3.2.3.8. 

3.2.4.9 Water Resources 

Very few perennial streams occur in the Southern California coastal area. There is 

relative scarcity, on a per capita basis, of freshwater supplies in Mediterranean regions, 

where agriculture competes for freshwater with growing tourism and industrial use. 

(UNEP Plan Bleu, 2000) 

Water quality attributes of the Chaparral Biome are similar to those described in Section 

3.2.3.9. 

3.2.5 Grasslands Biome 

As shown in Exhibit 3-16, the Grasslands Biome includes the grasslands of North and 

South America, Eurasia, and Australia. The description in this section is representative 

of this biome throughout the world. Currently there are no active sites in the Grassland 

Biome where activities for the BMDS are proposed to occur. However, past military 

installations within this biome make it reasonable foreseeable that future activity 

proposed for the BMDS could occur there. There are no reasonably foreseeable coastal 

sites located in the Grasslands Biome. 

Exhibit 3-16. Global Distribution of the Grasslands Biome 

Source: Modified From National Geographic, 2003b 
3-67

3.2.5.1 Air Quality 

In the Grasslands Biome, approximately 25 to 76 centimeters (10 to 30 inches) of 

precipitation falls annually. The temperature varies due to the vast latitudinal span of the 

grasslands, with annual temperatures ranging from -20oC to 43°C (-4oF to 104°F). The 

average annual temperature across the Grasslands Biome is 24°C (43°F). The low 

humidity of the Grasslands Biome arises because mountain barriers block warm, moist 

air from oceans. 

Air pollution issues of special concern to the Grasslands Biome are emissions from open 

burning and fugitive dust. 

Due to the low population density of most grassland areas, biogenic (naturally occurring) 

activities are the predominant sources of air pollution emissions in this biome. 

3.2.5.2 Airspace 

The U.S. Grassland Biome contains all FAA airspace classifications, as described in 

Section 3.1.2. 

3.2.5.3 Biological Resources 

Short grasses, which are predominant throughout the Grasslands Biome, have adapted 

physiological responses to widespread drought and fire. 

Naturally occurring grasslands are becoming harder to find due to human encroachment 

that can be attributed to increasing population pressures, desire for farmland, and oil 

exploration, among others. Biological resources of particular concern in the biome are 

migrating waterfowl and ephemeral prairie potholes. 

3.2.5.4 Geology and Soils 

The predominant soil type found throughout the Grasslands Biome is characterized by a 

thick, dark surface horizon resulting from the long-term addition of organic matter 

derived from plant roots. 

There are no significant geological hazards within the Grasslands Biome. 

3.2.5.5 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

Hazardous materials and hazardous waste attributes of the Grasslands Biome are similar 

to those discussed in Section 3.2.1.5, except that the moderate climate characteristic of 
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the Grassland Biome does not require special consideration as is necessary in the extreme 

temperatures of the Arctic Tundra Biome. 

3.2.5.6 Health and Safety 

Health and Safety attributes of the Grasslands Biome are similar to those discussed in 

Section 3.2.1.6. 

3.2.5.7 Noise 

Noise sources associated with the proposed BMDS are similar to those described in 

Section 3.2.1.7. 

3.2.5.8 Transportation 

Railroads and motor carriage (i.e., trucking) are the backbone of the freight transportation 

system in the Grasslands region. The highway system in the prairies consists largely of 

rural roads, many of which are local roads that are maintained by county and township 

governments. 

3.2.5.9 Water Resources 

Sources of water in the Grasslands Biome include precipitation, ground water in aquifers, 

and surface water in rivers, streams, lakes, and wetlands. Due to the heavy dependence 

on underground water systems for irrigation of the plains’ extensive farmland (and to a 

lesser extent for municipal water systems and industrial development), the depletion of 

the Grassland Biome’s aquifers is of special concern. 

The quality of water in the High Plains aquifer generally is suitable for irrigation use, but 

in many places, the water does not meet EPA drinking water standards with respect to 

several dissolved constituents: dissolved solids/salinity, fluoride, chloride, and sulfate. 

(USGS, 2003) 

3.2.6 Desert Biome 

The Desert Biome includes the desert regions of North America, which include the 

western arid environment of the southwestern U.S. (See Exhibit 3-17) The description in 

this section of the U.S. desert is representative of this biome throughout the world. 

Existing inland sites in the Desert Biome include WSMR, New Mexico; Fort Bliss, 

Texas; Edwards AFB, California; and the Nevada Test Site, Nevada. 
3-69

Exhibit 3-17. Global Distribution of the Desert Biome 

Source: Modified From National Geographic, 2003b 

3.2.6.1 Air Quality 

In cold desert regions, temperatures range from 2oC to 4oC (36oF to 39oF) in the winter 

and from 21oC to 26oC (70oF to 79oF) in the summer. Total annual precipitation averages 

15 to 26 centimeters (six to ten inches). In contrast, hot desert regions have average 

monthly temperatures above 18oC (64oF), with typical temperatures ranging from 20o

C to 

25oC (68o

F to 77oF). Hot desert regions usually have very little precipitation annually 

and/or concentrated precipitation in short periods, totaling less than 15 centimeters (six 

inches) per year. 

A unique pollutant of concern in desert regions is dust, i.e., PM, which contributes to 

desertification, the process of creating deserts. Activities that expose and disrupt topsoil, 

such as grazing and agricultural cultivation common throughout the western U.S., can 

increase the amount of dust released into the air. 

The predominant source of air pollution in the Desert Biome is agriculture, which 

disturbs the surface layer soil and emits dust into the air. 
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3.2.6.2 Airspace 

The U.S. Desert Biome contains all FAA classifications for airspace, as described in 

Section 3.1.2. 

3.2.6.3 Biological Resources 

The Desert Biome encompasses three major vegetation types: semi-desert grassland, 

plains-mesa sand scrub, and desert scrub. 

Desert animals include small nocturnal carnivores, insects, arachnids, reptiles, and birds. 

3.2.6.4 Geology and Soils 

Nearly 50 percent of desert surfaces are plains where the removal of fine-grained material 

by wind has exposed loose gravels consisting predominantly of pebbles and occasional 

cobbles, forming “desert pavement.” The remaining surfaces of the Desert Biome are 

composed of exposed bedrock outcrops, desert soils, and fluvial deposits, including 

alluvial fans (a cone-shaped deposit of sediments), playas (dry lake beds), desert lakes, 

and oases. Bedrock outcrops commonly occur as small mountains surrounded by 

extensive erosional plains. 

Desert soils are predominately mineral soils with low organic content. Poorly drained 

areas may develop saline soils and dry lakebeds may be covered with salt deposits. 

Geologic hazards within the Desert Biome include earthquakes and landslides. 

3.2.6.5 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

Hazardous materials and hazardous waste attributes of the Desert Biome are similar to 

those discussed in Section 3.2.1.5. 

3.2.6.6 Health and Safety 

Health and Safety attributes of the Desert Biome are similar to those discussed in Section 

3.2.1.6. 

3.2.6.7 Noise 

Ambient noise levels for remote desert environments range from 22 to 38 dBA. Ambient 

noise levels at a representative site where activities for the proposed BMDS may occur 

within the Desert Biome range from 65 dBA to 85 dBA at Edwards AFB and from 45 

dBA to 65 dBA at WSMR. (DOT, 2001) Noise sources associated with the proposed 

BMDS are described in Section 3.2.1.7. 
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3.2.6.8 Transportation 

Because the population density is so low and dispersed throughout most of the region, 

transportation infrastructure is concentrated near metropolitan centers. 

3.2.6.9 Water Resources 

In the Desert Biome, droughts and aquifer supply issues are of particular concern. The 

leading causes of impairment of rivers and streams include pathogens (bacteria), siltation 

(sedimentation), and habitat alterations, and the leading sources for these include 

agriculture, hydraulic modifications, and habitat modifications. 

3.2.7 Tropical Biome 

The Tropical Biome49 encompasses areas within the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. (See 

Exhibit 3-18) The coastal zone stretches 1,000 meters (3,281 feet) inland of the coastal 

shoreline, tidal wetlands, coastal wetlands, and coastal estuaries. (Coastal Planning 

Coalition of Australia, 2003) Because many of the islands within the Pacific and Atlantic 

Oceans are relatively small, the entire island may be considered within this Affected 

Environment section. 

The Pacific Tropical Biome would include islands found within the equatorial region. 

The Pacific contains approximately 25,000 islands, the majority of which are found south 

of the equator. (Wikipedia, 2003) Current Ranges within this biome where activities of 

the proposed BMDS may occur include PMRF, U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll (USAKA), 

Wake Island, and Midway. 

The majority of islands in the Atlantic Tropical Biome are in the Caribbean between the 

Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean. 

 

49 Exhibit 3-18 shows the global location of the Tropical ecosystem. However, based on reasonably foreseeable 

locations for activities for the proposed BMDS to occur, the affected environment focuses on the coastal portions of 

this ecosystem. 
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Exhibit 3-18. Global Distribution of the Tropical Biome 

Source: Modified From National Geographic, 2003b

3.2.7.1 Air Quality 

The climate for the Tropical Biome is tropical marine to semi-tropical marine, 

characterized by relatively high annual rainfall and warm to hot, humid weather 

throughout the year. Steadily blowing trade winds allow for relatively constant 

temperatures of 21°C to 27°C (70°F to 81°F) throughout the year. The annual rainfall in 

the Tropical Biome is approximately 127 to 1,016 centimeters (50 to 400 inches). 

Ambient air quality monitoring data are not readily available for islands in the Pacific. In 

the Caribbean, and Latin America generally, increasing urbanization and rampant forest 

destruction have led to considerable air quality degradation. 

Because of the relatively small numbers and types of air pollution sources, dispersion 

caused by trade winds, and lack of topographic features at most locations, air quality in 

the equatorial region is considered good (i.e., well below the maximum pollution levels 

established for air quality in the U.S.). (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 

2003) 
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3.2.7.2 Airspace 

The majority of islands in the Pacific Tropical Coastal region are located in international 

airspace and therefore, the procedures of the ICAO are followed. The Atlantic Pacific 

Coastal region consists of both U.S. and international airspace. 

The procedures for scheduling each portion of airspace are performed in accordance with 

letters of agreement with the controlling FAA facility. 

There are numerous Range-affiliated airport and airfields located within the Pacific 

Tropical Coastal Affected Environment, including Wake Island, USAKA, PMRF, and 

Midway. Many of these airfields are engaged in activities similar to those of the 

proposed activities. Future test events would act in accordance with existing activities at 

the airfields. The majority of local airports within the Atlantic Tropical Coastal region 

handle smaller, private aircraft, which are uncontrolled. 

High-altitude overseas jet routes cross the Pacific Tropical Coastal region via nine 

Control Area Extension corridors off the California coast. 

3.2.7.3 Biological Resources 

Vegetation and wildlife in the Tropical Biome is among the most biologically diverse in 

the world. 

There are numerous environmentally sensitive habitats within the Tropical Biome, 

including barrier reefs, whale sanctuaries, and fisheries. 

3.2.7.4 Geology and Soils 

Islands within the Pacific Tropical Biome range from atolls with small, low inlets and 

extensive lagoons, to raised limestone islands, to volcanic high islands with substantial 

topographic and internal climatic diversity. Coral reefs have developed upon the eroded 

platforms around some of the islands. 

Islands within the Atlantic Tropical Biome are composed of two distinctive chains of 

islands, the Lesser and Greater Antilles. The islands are characterized by a range of 

geological formations, from volcanic and sedimentary strata to coral limestone and 

alluvium. 

The soils on smaller atolls in the Pacific Ocean have low fertility due to alkalinity. The 

soils are permeable, and infiltration is rapid. Wind erosion is severe when vegetation has 

been removed. 
3-74

The islands within the Atlantic Tropical Biome include a wide range of soils, which may 

be derived from limestone, serpentine, dolomite, basalt, granite, diorite, gabbro, 

sandstone, or slate. 

Volcanic islands within the Pacific Ocean have been built of successive lava flows. 

Volcano eruptions occur relatively frequently on the islands. (NOAA, 2003b) 

In the Atlantic region, many earthquakes and tsunamis have occurred in the northeastern 

Caribbean, where the movements of the Earth's surface plates are rapid and complicated. 

(USGS, 2001) Volcanoes erupt on the eastern and western sides of the Caribbean plate. 

3.2.7.5 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

Hazardous materials and hazardous waste attributes of the Tropical Biome are similar to 

those discussed in Section 3.2.1.5. However, the moderate climate characteristic of the 

Desert Biome does not require consideration as is necessary in the extreme temperature 

of the Arctic Tundra Biome. 

3.2.7.6 Health and Safety 

Health and Safety attributes of the Tropical Biome are similar to those discussed in 

Section 3.2.1.6. 

3.2.7.7 Noise 

Natural background sound levels in the Tropical Biome are relatively high due to wind 

and surf. Sources of noise in the Tropical Biome are similar to principle sources of noise 

associated with sites where activities for the proposed BMDS may occur, as described in 

the Section 3.2.1.7. 

3.2.7.8 Transportation 

The smaller islands may require marine transport vessels to transport passengers and 

supplies between islands. The isolated locations of the equatorial environments make 

transportation vital to many of the locations. Ground transportation facilities consist of 

roadways and pathways used by motor vehicles, bicycles, and pedestrians. Ships and 

smaller craft carry ocean cargo and fuel to the Equatorial Islands and deliver workers and 

cargo, including fuel, between islands. 

3.2.7.9 Water Resources 

Seasonal rainfall is the primary source of freshwater for most small islands. Catchments 

are used to capture rainfall for potable use. Raw water is stored in aboveground storage 
3-75

tanks. Coastal areas of the Caribbean near major watersheds often contain large lagoons 

of fresh or brackish water. 

Of the land-based sources of pollution, eutrophication, or nutrient enrichment, from 

human sewage disposal is a growing problem in the Caribbean, particularly in the vicinity 

of large coastal cities and harbors. 

Pacific Island water quality is generally of very high, with high dissolved oxygen and pH 

at levels typical of mid-oceanic conditions. 

3.2.8 Savanna Biome 

The Savanna Biome includes the transitional zone between the tropical forest and the 

semi-desert scrub vegetation types and typically occupies latitudes between 5o and 20o 

North and South of the equator (see Exhibit 3-19). Savannas cover extensive areas in the 

tropics and subtropics of Central and South America, Central and South Africa, and 

northern Australia in both inland and coastal environments. Currently there are not sites 

in the Savanna Biome where activities are proposed for the BMDS; however, it is 

reasonably foreseeable that future activity for the BMDS could occur here. The 

description in this section is representative of this biome throughout the world. 

Exhibit 3-19. Global Distribution of the Savanna Biome 

Source: Modified From National Geographic, 2003b 
3-76

3.2.8.1 Air Quality 

Towards the equator, annual rainfall is typically higher relative to the more poleward 

edges of the Savanna belt, and total annual precipitation may be as high as 250 

centimeters (98 inches). On the Savanna edges nearest the tropics (towards the poles), 

annual rainfall totals may be as little as 50 centimeters (20 inches). In Australian savanna 

environments, coastal areas receive twice as much rainfall as inland savannas. 

Annual temperatures in the Savanna Biome are relatively constant, averaging roughly 

24oC to 27oC (75oF to 80oF). 

The Savanna Biome faces similar air quality concerns as those found in the Grassland 

Biome, namely emissions from open burning, natural drought-driven fires, and other 

fugitive dust. 

Fire is a predominant emission source, while anthropogenic activities, such as agriculture 

and mining also contribute. 

3.2.8.2 Airspace 

The Savanna Biome is located in international airspace; and therefore, the procedures of 

the ICAO are followed. 

3.2.8.3 Biological Resources 

Savannas are characterized by a continuous cover of perennial grasses, often one to two 

meters (three to six feet) tall at maturity. They also may have an open canopy of droughtor fire-resistant trees or an open shrub layer. 

National parks and reserves have been established to preserve and protect threatened 

vegetative and wildlife species in the Savanna Biome. However, the parks are vastly 

under funded and often poorly managed. 

3.2.8.4 Geology and Soils 

Savannas typically have porous (often sandy) soil, with only a thin covering of nutrientrich humus and an overall low concentration of nutrients. 

Savannas are similar to grasslands in geologic and topographic features, predominantly 

characterized by flat terrain and may be marked with escarpments and other plateau-like 

features of sandstone or limestone composition. There are no significant geological 

hazards throughout the Savanna Biome. 
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3.2.8.5 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

There are no existing facilities proposed for use in the BMDS in the Savanna Biome. 

However, future sites would use hazardous materials similar to those in use at existing 

sites discussed in this chapter and would produce similar hazardous wastes. 

Any future facilities that may be used as part of the proposed BMDS would adhere to all 

applicable legal requirements for hazardous materials and hazardous waste management 

as described in Section 3.1.7. 

3.2.8.6 Health and Safety 

Health and safety attributes of the Savanna Biome are similar to those discussed in 

Section 3.2.1.6. 

3.2.8.7 Noise 

Noise sources associated with the proposed BMDS in the Savanna Biome are similar to 

those described in Section 3.2.1.7. 

3.2.8.8 Transportation 

Transportation in the Savanna Biome is typically limited due to the frequently remote and 

rural nature of savannas. Highways, if present, are typically unpaved and may not be 

regularly maintained due to the low volume of traffic carried and remote locations. 

Railways are not a dominant form of transportation in the Savanna Biome. 

Airports with paved runaways are scarce in the Savanna Biome. 

Navigable waterways are present in some wetter savannas and may be used to transport 

goods to ports along coastal savannas. 

3.2.8.9 Water Resources 

Savanna water resources are highly vulnerable to the effects of weed invasion, feral 

animals, overgrazing, and fire. Water resources are further strained by heavy water use 

in riparian areas for agriculture and tourism. (Douglas and Lukacs, 2004) 

Water quality problems most commonly are caused by livestock and feral animals during 

the dry season. 
3-78

3.2.9 Mountain Biome 

As shown in Exhibit 3-20, the Mountain Biome includes the mountainous regions of 

North America and Europe, which include the Rocky Mountains in the western U.S. and 

the Alps in central Europe. The description in this section is representative of this biome 

throughout the world. Mountain Biomes are found at high altitudes and lie just below 

and above the snow line of a mountain. Existing inland sites in the Mountain Biome 

include Buckley AFB, Cheyenne Mountain AFB and Fort Carson Military Reserve, 

Colorado; and F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming. 

Exhibit 3-20. Global Distribution of the Mountain Biome 

Source: Modified From National Geographic, 2003b 

3.2.9.1 Air Quality 

Given its high altitude, the Mountain Biome is characteristically cold with heavy 

snowfall and frequently bitter winds. Temperatures remain below freezing for at least 

seven months of the year, and in the summer, average temperatures range from 10°C to 

15°C (50°F to 59°F). The average precipitation across mountain environments is 30 

centimeters (12 inches) a year. 
3-79

Mountain Biomes exhibit particular sensitivity to air pollution via deposition of both wet 

and dry pollutants, principally in snowpacks, which can in turn result in reduced surface 

water quality. Regional air pollutants of concern to mountainous areas include visibilityreducing PM, deposition of nitrogen and sulfur compounds, ozone, greenhouse gases that 

contribute to localized warming, and air toxics such as mercury and persistent organic 

pollutants. 

Typical sources of air pollutants in the Mountain Biome include population centers, 

energy development and power plants, and agricultural activities. 

3.2.9.2 Airspace 

The U.S. Mountain Biome contains all FAA classifications for airspace, as described in 

Section 3.1.2. 

3.2.9.3 Biological Resources 

The high elevations of the mountain environments have harsh climatic conditions that 

support about 200 species of mountain plants. 

 

Mountain animals have to tolerate cold temperatures and intense ultraviolet radiation. 

Because of the year-round cold, only warm-blooded animals can survive in the Mountain 

Biome, although insects also exist. 

Some mammals within the Mountain Biome are considered sensitive species and may 

warrant special conservation measures, including critical habitat designation. Because 

food chains may be shorter in this biome than in more temperate biomes, food chains are 

more sensitive to environmental changes. 

3.2.9.4 Geology and Soils 

Much of the Mountain Biome appears as barren rock or a cover of thin soils. Soils in the 

biome are relatively fragile and are subject to erosion when disturbed. 

The Mountain Biome is a complex network of mountain ranges characterized by extreme 

physiographic variability. Wide differences in elevation, slope steepness, and exposure 

exist locally and between major mountain masses. 

Mountain Biomes are subject to numerous geological hazards, including earthquakes, 

landslides, and volcanoes. 
3-80

3.2.9.5 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

Hazardous materials and hazardous waste attributes of the Mountain Biome are similar to 

those discussed in Section 3.2.1.5. 

3.2.9.6 Health and Safety 

Health and Safety attributes of the Mountain Biome are similar to those discussed in 

Section 3.2.1.6. 

3.2.9.7 Noise 

Sources of noise in the Mountain Biome are similar to principle sources of noise 

associated with sites where activities for the proposed BMDS may occur, as described in 

Section 3.2.1.7. 

3.2.9.8 Transportation 

The Mountain Biome sustains widespread infrastructure, including traffic circulation 

systems such as highways and byways, unpaved roads, non-maintained roads, trails, 

railroad lines, municipal, private, and military airports and any other system involved in 

mass transportation. 

Due to the extreme cold and heavy snowfall characteristic of the Mountain Biome, 

airports within this region require the ability to provide landing access under zero 

visibility conditions such as blizzards and de-icing capability. 

3.2.9.9 Water Resources 

Surface water resources in the Mountain Biome include glacial lakes, streams, and rivers 

fed by rainfall and melting snow and those that originate from ground water sources. 

Mountain lakes are particularly sensitive to the effects of acidification because they have 

soft water, which does not neutralize acid readily. 

In the Mountain Biome, elevated levels of contaminants accumulate in snowpacks, 

negatively impacting local flora and fauna. Upon melting, the concentrated pollutants are 

dispersed throughout the area watershed, deteriorating the quality of downstream surface 

and ground water systems. (USGS, 2003) 

3.2.10 Broad Ocean Area 

For purposes of this PEIS, the BOA encompasses the Pacific Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean, 

and the Indian Ocean. 
3-81

Proposed activities in the BOA would take place at a distance of several hundred 

kilometers from any land mass. The BOA is subject to EO 12114, Environmental Effects 

Abroad of Major Federal Actions, which requires consideration of Federal actions abroad 

with the potential for impacts to the environment. 

The Pacific Ocean is comprised of approximately 156 million square kilometers (60 

million square miles) and includes the Bali Sea, Bering Sea, Bering Strait, Coral Sea, 

East China Sea, Flores Sea, Gulf of Alaska, Gulf of Tonkin, Java Sea, Philippine Sea, 

Savu Sea, Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, South China Sea, Tasman Sea, Timor Sea, and 

other tributary water bodies. Its maximum length is 14,500 kilometers (9,000 miles) and 

its greatest width is 17,700 kilometers (11,000 miles), which lies between the Isthmus of 

Panama and the Malay Peninsula. (Encyclopedia.com, 2003) 

The Atlantic Ocean is comprised of approximately 76.8 million square kilometers (29.6 

million square miles) and includes the Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Caribbean Sea, Davis Strait, 

Denmark Strait, part of the Drake Passage, Gulf of Mexico, Mediterranean Sea, North 

Sea, Norwegian Sea, almost all of the Scotia Sea, and other tributary water bodies. The 

Atlantic Ocean extends from the North Pole southward for about 16,100 kilometers 

(10,000 miles) to the Antarctic continent, and covers 106 million square kilometers (41 

million square miles). The width of the Atlantic varies from approximately 2,850 

kilometers (1,770 miles) between Brazil and Liberia to 4,830 kilometers (3,000 miles) 

between Norfolk, VA, and Gibraltar. The average depth is about 3,660 meters (12,000 

feet) and the greatest depth is 8,650 meters (28,400 feet) in the Puerto Rico Trench. 

(Oceans of the World, 2003) 

The Indian Ocean is comprised of about 68 million square kilometers (26 million square 

miles) and includes the Andaman Sea, Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Great Australian 

Bight, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Mozambique Channel, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Strait 

of Malacca, Timor Sea, and other tributary water bodies. (CIA, 2003) It is triangular and 

bordered by Africa, Asia, Australia, and the Southern Ocean. Its maximum width is 

about 10,000 kilometers (6,200 miles) between the southernmost portions of Africa and 

Australia, and its average depth is approximately 4,000 meters (13,120 feet). The 

greatest depth occurs in the Java Trench at approximately 7,300 meters (24,000 feet) 

below sea level. (Oceans of the World, 2003) 

3.2.10.1 Air Quality 

No sources of ambient air quality monitoring data are known to exist for the BOA. There 

are no known existing emission sources in the Pacific Ocean. Air quality over the Pacific 

Ocean is expected to be good because there are no major sources of air pollution, and the 

nearly constant trade winds in the area serve to disperse any pollutants from transient 

sources, such as passing seagoing vessels or low-flying aircraft. 
3-82

In the Atlantic Ocean, there is potential for large, thick plumes of aerosols blowing 

eastward over the North Atlantic. The aerosol plume is the regional haze produced by the 

industrial northeastern U.S. and typically occurs during the summer months. The haze is 

composed of sulfates and organics that originate from power plants and automotive 

sources. (NASA, 2003a) Ozone and other pollutants found in the Atlantic Ocean are 

primarily the result of anthropogenic sources. 

A monitoring station in the Maldives Islands records air quality in the Indian Ocean. 

(Environmental News Network, 1999) The aerosol cloud covering much of the northern 

Indian Ocean originates primarily (at least 85 percent) from anthropogenic sources (Max 

Planck Society, 2001), namely agricultural and other biomass burning, the use of 

biofuels, and fossil fuel combustion in South and Southeast Asia. (Lelieveld et al., 2001) 

Model calculations indicate that, in contrast to European and North American pollution, 

anthropogenic emissions from South and East Asia reduce the concentration of hydroxyl 

(OH) radicals. Because OH is a powerful oxidant and acts as an atmospheric cleansing 

agent, the Asian pollution decreases the oxidizing power of the atmosphere, contributing 

to greater pollution problems over the Indian Ocean. (Max Planck Society, 2001) 

Air quality over the Indian Ocean is seasonally poor due to anthropogenic emissions from 

growing South and Southeast Asian countries, particularly India. During the dry 

monsoon season (northern hemisphere winter), air pollutants in South and Southeast Asia 

are transported long distances to the Indian Ocean by persistent northeasterly monsoon 

winds. A dense, brown haze covers an area greater than 10 million square kilometers 

(3,900 million square miles) over most of the northern Indian Ocean (Max Planck 

Society, 2001), including the Arabian Sea, much of the Bay of Bengal, and part of the 

equatorial Indian Ocean to about five degrees south of the equator. (Environmental News 

Network, 1999) The haze extends from the ocean surface up to three kilometers (two 

miles). Comprised primarily of soot, sulfates, nitrates, organic particles, fly ash, and 

mineral dust, the airborne particles can reduce visibility over the BOA to less that 10 

kilometers (6.2 miles) and reduce the solar heating of the ocean by about 15 percent. The 

haze also contains relatively high concentration of gases, including CO, SO2, and other 

organic compounds. (Environmental News Network, 1999) 

3.2.10.2 Airspace 

Because the airspace in the BOA is beyond the territorial limit and is in international 

airspace, the procedures of the ICAO, outlined in ICAO Document 444, Rules of the Air 

and Air Traffic Services are followed. The FAA acts as the U.S. agent for aeronautical 

information to the ICAO. 

Domestic Warning Areas are established in international airspace to contain activity that 

may be hazardous and to alert pilots of nonparticipating aircraft to the potential danger. 
3-83

There are no airports or airfields located in the BOA. 

High-altitude overseas jet routes cross the Pacific BOA via nine Control Area Extension 

corridors off the California coast. 

3.2.10.3 Biological Resources 

Marine biology of the open ocean consists of the animal and plant life that lives in and 

just above the surface waters of the sea and its fringes. 

3.2.10.4 Geology and Soils 

The Pacific Ocean floor of the central Pacific basin is relatively uniform, with a mean 

depth of about 4,270 meters (14,000 feet). (Oceans of the World, 2003) The Pacific 

Ocean is surrounded by a zone of violent volcanic and earthquake activity sometimes 

referred to as the “Pacific Ring of Fire.” Icebergs are common in the Davis Strait, 

Denmark Strait, and the northwestern Atlantic Ocean from February to August and have 

been spotted as far south as Bermuda and the Madeira Islands. (Oceans of the World, 

2003) 

The principal feature of the bottom topography of the Atlantic BOA is a great submarine 

mountain range called the Mid-Atlantic Ridge. It extends from Iceland in the north to 

approximately 58 degrees south latitude, reaching a maximum width of about 1,600 

kilometers (1,000 miles). 

The Mid-Ocean Ridge dominates the terrain of the Indian Ocean floor. The Indian Ocean 

is subdivided by the Southeast Indian Ocean Ridge, Southwest Indian Ocean Ridge, and 

the Ninetyeast Ridge. (CIA, 2003) 

Ocean sediments are composed of terrestrial, pelagic (open sea), and authigenic (grows in 

place with a rock) material. Terrestrial deposits consist of sand, mud, and rock particles 

formed by erosion, weathering, and volcanic activity on land and then washed to sea. 

(Wikipedia, 2003) Occasional icebergs occur in the southern reaches of the Indian 

Ocean. (CIA, 2003) 

3.2.10.5 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

For test events using sea-based platforms, hazardous materials would be handled and 

used in accordance with all applicable state and Federal regulations as well as rangespecific and U.S. Navy standard operating procedures. 

The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of hazardous substances into or upon U.S. 

waters out to 370 kilometers (200 nautical miles). Also shipboard waste handling 
3-84

procedures for commercial and U.S. Navy vessels govern the discharge of hazardous 

wastes as well as non-hazardous waste streams. These categories include “blackwater” 

(sewage); “greywater” (leftover cleaning water); oily wastes; garbage (plastics, nonplastics, and food-contaminated waste); hazardous wastes; and medical wastes. (U.S. 

Department of the Navy, 2002b) 

The Uniform National Discharge Standards provisions of the Clean Water Act provide 

for the evaluation of the 39 discharges from U.S. Navy Vessels. Section 312(n)(2)(B) of 

the Clean Water Act identifies seven factors for consideration when determining if a 

discharge requires a marine pollution control device: the nature of the discharge; the 

environmental effects of the discharge; the effect that installing or using the marine 

pollution control device has on operations or the operational capability of the vessel; 

applicable Federal and state regulations; applicable international standards; and the 

economic costs of installing and using the marine pollution control device. 

Under the regulations implementing the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, as amended, 

and the Marine Plastics Pollution Research and Control Act, the discharge of plastics, 

including synthetic ropes, fishing nets, plastic bags, and biodegradable plastics, into the 

water is prohibited. A slurry of sea water, paper, cardboard, or food waste that is capable 

of passing through a screen with opening no larger than 12 millimeters (0.4 inch) in 

diameter may not be discharged within 5.6 kilometers (three nautical miles) of land. 

Discharge of floating dunnage, lining, and packing materials is prohibited in navigable 

waters and in areas offshore less than 46.3 kilometers (25 nautical miles) from the nearest 

land. 

Test event sponsors would be responsible for tracking hazardous wastes; for proper 

hazardous waste identification, storage, transportation, and disposal; and for 

implementing strategies to reduce the volume and toxicity of the hazardous waste 

generated. For test events using a sea-based platform, hazardous materials and hazardous 

waste would be managed in accordance with all applicable state and Federal regulations 

as well as Range-specific and U.S. Navy standard operating procedures. 

The transport, receipt, storage, and handling of hazardous materials would comply with 

Army TM 38-410, Navy NAVSUP PUB 505, Air Force AFR 69-9, Marine Corps MCO 

4450-12 or Defense Logistics Agency DLAM 4145.11, Storage and Handling and 

Implementing Regulations Governing Storage and Handling of Hazardous Materials.

3.2.10.6 Health and Safety 

The region of influence for health and safety in the BOA would be limited to work crews 

located on sea-based platforms. The WorldWide Navigational Warning Service is a 

worldwide radio and satellite broadcast system for the dissemination of Maritime Safety 

Information to U.S. Navy and merchant ships. The WorldWide Navigational Warning 
3-85

Service provides timely and accurate long range and coastal warning messages promoting 

the safety of life and property at sea and Special Warnings that inform mariners of 

potential political or military hazards that may affect safety of U.S. shipping. 

3.2.10.7 Noise 

Studies of ambient noise of the ocean have found that the sea surface is the predominant 

source of noise above the water, and that the source is associated with the breaking of 

waves. (Knudsen, et al., 1948, as referenced in FAA, 2001a) The primary human-made 

noise source within the BOA is associated with ship and vessel traffic, including 

transiting commercial tankers and container ships, commercial fishing boats, and military 

surface vessels and aircraft. Noise sources above the water would also include launch or 

other activities from sea-based platforms. 

Noise also occurs under the ocean surface. The dominant sources of ambient underwater 

noise and their corresponding frequency ranges are seismic activity, turbulent-pressure 

fluctuations, and second order pressure effects due to surface gravity waves (1to 100 Hz); 

ship traffic and industrial activity (10 Hz to 10 kHz); biologics (10 Hz to 100 kHz); sea 

ice activity (10 Hz to 10kHz); breaking waves, bubbles, and spray (100 Hz to 20 kHz); 

precipitation (100 Hz to 30 kHz); and thermal effects (30 to 100 kHz). Noise from 

sources above the water may be magnified underwater. For example, a tug and barge 

produces sound that measures 171 dB in water and 110 dB in air. (Gisiner, 1998) 

3.2.10.8 Transportation 

The Transportation in the BOA consists predominantly of marine shipping. Marine 

shipping refers to the conveyance of freight, commodities, and passengers via mercantile 

vessels. 

3.2.10.9 Water Resources 

The two main factors that define ocean water are the temperature and the salinity of the 

water. (UCAR, 2001b) Water quality in the open ocean is considered excellent, with high 

water clarity, low concentrations of suspended matter, dissolved oxygen concentrations at 

or near saturation, and low concentrations of contaminants such as trace metals and 

hydrocarbons 

3.2.11 Atmosphere 

The Atmosphere Environment refers to the Atmosphere that envelops all areas of the 

Earth and consists of the four principal layers of the Earth’s atmosphere: troposphere, 
3-86

stratosphere, mesosphere, and ionosphere or thermosphere.50 These layers are 

characterized by altitude, temperature, structure, density, composition, and degree of 

ionization – the positive or negative electric charge associated with each layer. Altitude 

ranges for atmospheric layers are described in Exhibit 3-21. 

Exhibit 3-21. Altitude Range for Atmospheric Layers 

 Source: ICF Kaiser for Beal Aerospace, 1998 

3.2.11.1 Air Quality 

During the past 150 years, combustion of fossil fuels has resulted in increasing 

concentrations of atmospheric gases that are believed to influence global climate. The 

temperature of the Earth's atmosphere is determined by three factors: the sunlight it 

receives, the sunlight it reflects, and the infrared radiation absorbed by the atmosphere. 

The principal absorbers include CO2, water vapor, nitrous oxide, chlorofluorocarbons 

(CFCs), and methane. 

3.2.11.2 Airspace 

Exhibit 3-22 illustrates the relationship between airspace classifications and atmospheric 

layers. 

 

50 Most resource areas do not apply to the Atmosphere. Therefore, the Affected Environment discussion includes 

only Air Quality, Airspace, and Biological Resources, and consideration of Orbital Debris. 
3-87

Exhibit 3-22. Relationship Between Airspace Classifications and Atmospheric 

Layers 

Type of Airspace Altitude 

(from MSL) Atmospheric Layer(s) 

Controlled > 5.5 kilometers (3.4 miles) Troposphere, Stratosphere 

Uncontrolled < 4.4 kilometers (2.7 miles) Troposphere 

3.2.11.3 Biological Resources 

While the atmosphere generally is not considered to contain biological resources, 

atmospheric conditions have a direct impact on climate, which affects the location and 

health of biological resources. 

3.2.11.4 Orbital Debris 

Although there is no absolute definition of space, it can generally be defined at an altitude 

approximately 100 kilometers (62 miles) from the Earth’s surface, where the 

aerodynamic forces of the thinning atmosphere become so small that the various control 

surfaces of an aircraft (e.g., rudder, aileron, and elevator) cease to function effectively. 

Space is not generally considered to be part of the human environment, as defined by 

NEPA and therefore, the discussion of impacts to space for this PEIS will be limited to 

the impacts from orbital debris. Orbital debris is man-made material introduced by 

spacecraft. The debris can be as large as spent rocket motors and as small as dust 

particles released during motor firings. Orbital debris that remains on orbit could create 

hazards to orbiting spacecraft, to astronauts or cosmonauts engaged in extra-vehicular 

space activities and it could have impacts upon reentry if the debris reaches the Earth’s 

surface in large pieces or contains hazardous components. The effects of orbital debris 

on other spacecraft depend on the altitude, orbit, velocity, angle of impact, and mass of 

the debris. Eventually this orbiting debris loses energy and drops into consecutively 

lower orbits until it reenters Earth’s atmosphere. Orbital debris has no impact on the 

human environment unless and until the debris enters the Earth’s atmosphere. Deorbiting debris (i.e., debris reentering the atmosphere from orbit) is a potential concern as 

a course of deposition of small particles into the stratosphere, and a possible contributor 

to stratospheric ozone depletion. 
 

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4-1 

4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 

Introduction 

This Section of the PEIS describes the potential environmental consequences of 

implementing the proposed action via Alternatives 1 and 2 in various worldwide biomes, 

the BOA or the atmosphere. This Section also identifies potential cumulative impacts 

associated with those alternatives. It is intended to address the impacts in the context of 

worldwide biomes based on similar ecological characteristics rather than political 

boundaries. Only BMDS Programs and activities that are considered reasonably 

foreseeable are analyzed in this PEIS. Programs that are still conceptual in nature are not 

analyzed in this document. 

This PEIS provides a comprehensive, global analytical framework that can support 

subsequent analysis of specific actions at specific locations, as appropriate. A description 

of the analytical framework follows in the next section. The manner and extent to which 

future actions tier from the PEIS is left to the discretion of the preparer. The framework 

established in this document is intended to serve as a guide for preparing future sitespecific documents and does not dictate their preparation. 

This PEIS also contemplates BMDS activities outside the jurisdictional limits of the U.S. 

and therefore beyond the scope of NEPA and other Federal U.S. laws. The DoD 

addresses these issues primarily in DoD Directive 6050.7 and DoD Instruction 4715.5. 

See Appendix G for a description of the framework to be used for this process. 

Cumulative impacts of Alternatives 1 and 2 are also considered. The CEQ NEPA 

regulations define cumulative impacts as the impacts on the environment that result from 

the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably 

foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person 

undertakes such other actions (40 CFR § 1508.7). 

Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor, but collectively significant, 

actions taking place over a period of time. For this PEIS, potential cumulative impacts 

are addressed for activities that would occur on a scale similar to the proposed BMDS. 

Thus, activities were considered that are national or international in scope. Future 

activities were identified based on review of worldwide rocket launches and commercial 

and government space programs. 

As a result of the public comment process, additional areas of analysis – orbital debris, 

perchlorate, and radar impacts on wildlife – have been addressed in more technical detail 

in Appendices L, M, and N, respectively. 
4-2 

Analysis Process 

Because of the extensive nature of this project, this PEIS analyzes the BMDS as 

described in the following four steps. 

 Step 1 – Identify and Characterize Activities for each BMDS component. 

 Step 2 – Identify Activities with No Potential for Impact and dismiss those for 

which prior NEPA analysis determined insignificant impacts or those that are 

categorically excluded. 

 Step 3 – Identify Similar Activities across Life Cycle Phases for activities that are 

determined to have similar environmental impacts. 

 Step 4 – Conduct Environmental Analyses for the remaining life cycle activities for 

each component. 

Step 1 – Identify and Characterize Activities 

The BMDS is organized by component (i.e., weapons; sensors; C2BMC; and support 

assets). Each component has life cycle activities associated with developing, testing, 

deploying, and decommissioning those components within the BMDS. These activities 

produce environmental impacts which are examined in this PEIS. 

To consider impacts of the BMDS, the emissions/stressors from the component life cycle 

activities were identified and characterized. Exhibit 1-3 displays the typical activities 

within each life cycle phase for each component. 

Step 2 – Identify Activities with No Potential for Impact 

Actions for which previous NEPA analyses indicated no significant impacts51 or actions 

that are normally categorically excluded52 were not analyzed in detail in this PEIS. 

Exhibit 4-1 identifies activities for which categorical exclusions are generally available. 

These activities are not further analyzed in this PEIS. 

 

51After scrutinizing NEPA documents for programs and elements (see Appendix D), it was determined that there 

was no significant impact from several BMDS life cycle activities because these activities have been previously 

analyzed and were shown to have no impact. 

52 In accordance with CEQ regulations for implementing NEPA (40 CFR 1507.3(b)), the DoD and military services 

have developed regulations that provide for the establishment of categorical exclusions (40 CFR 1507.3(b)) for 

those actions, which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant impact on the human environment. 

Where appropriate, DoD and military services have established categorical exclusions for such activities. For 

example, infrequent, temporary (less than 30 days) increases in air operations up to 50 percent of the typical 

installation aircraft operation rate are categorically excluded. See Appendix G, Exhibit G-1 for citations of DoD 

NEPA implementing regulations categorical exclusions. 
4-3 

Exhibit 4-1. Life Cycle Activities Determined to Have No Significant Environmental 

Impact 

Life Cycle Phase Activities 

Planning/Budgeting 

Research and Development 

Systems Engineering Development 

Tabletop Exercises 

Deployment Training 

Some activities such as transportation of components, maintenance and sustainment, and 

manufacturing were determined to need no further analysis in this PEIS either because 

they have been categorically excluded or addressed in previous NEPA analyses and 

found to have no significant impacts. The rationale for these conclusions is presented in 

Sections 4.1.1.8, 4.1.1.9, and 4.1.1.10, respectively, of this PEIS. 

Step 3 – Identify Similar Activities across Life Cycle Phases 

The remaining activities with the potential for environmental impacts were then 

examined to determine which had similar environmental impacts. For example, impacts 

associated with site preparation and construction in the development phase would be 

similar to or the same as impacts from site preparation and construction activities in the 

testing and deployment phases of the life cycle. Accordingly many activities were 

addressed together to eliminate redundancy. 

Many activities in the various life cycle phases have been combined in the analysis of 

Support Assets. This was done because activities associated with support assets whether 

infrastructure, equipment or test assets (including countermeasures and simulants), were 

considered similar in terms of impacts created. Some activities require the use of 

operating platforms, such as aircraft for air-based components or ships for sea-based 

components; these specific platforms are considered support assets. Impacts from the use 

of operating platforms are discussed as part of Support Assets. Details of the life cycle 

phase analysis are provided below (Life Cycle Phase Activities). Exhibits 4-2 through 4-

5 illustrate by life cycle phase, the activities that are analyzed in this PEIS and the 

corresponding section in which the analysis can be found. 

Step 4 – Conduct Environmental Analyses 

The significance of an impact that an activity has on the environment is a function of the 

nature of the receiving environment. For example, a booster launch has different 

emissions than those from activating a chemical laser. Whether those emissions create 
4-4 

impacts and the degree of significance of these impacts depends upon the environment in 

which they are released. 

In this analysis, the PEIS considers the emissions/stressors from each component’s 

activity in the context of each resource area (e.g., air, water, etc.). Impacts were 

distinguished based on the different operating environments (land, sea and air for 

Alternative 1 and land, sea, air and space for Alternative 2) in which the activity would 

occur. These impacts were further distinguished based on the worldwide biomes in 

which the activity would occur. 

As a result, the PEIS is organized by component; the analysis examines each resource 

area and distinguishes between operating environments in the context of a particular 

biome. The analysis also describes where the impacts differ based on the operating 

environment or biome. 

Life Cycle Phase Activities 

Development Phase Activities 

Exhibit 4-2 shows the activities in the development life cycle phase that were considered 

to produce environmental impacts and where in the analysis each activity is addressed. 

Planning and budgeting; research and development; systems engineering; and tabletop 

exercises are activities for which categorical exclusions are generally available; therefore 

these activities are not further analyzed in this PEIS. Manufacturing of prototypes and 

maintenance and sustainment are routine activities that have been considered in previous 

NEPA analyses and determined to have no significant impact or are categorically 

excluded and are not considered further in this PEIS. Site preparation and construction 

and testing are part of other life cycle phases for the proposed BMDS. To eliminate 

redundancy these activities are addressed together. Testing of component prototypes has 

been assumed to cause the same or similar impacts as testing of component as described 

for the test life cycle phase. 

 

Exhibit 4-2. Analysis of Impacts of Development Phase Activities 

Activity Source of Impact Impacts Analysis 

Planning/Budgeting None Routine activity categorically 

excluded; not further analyzed 

Research and 

Development None Routine activity categorically excluded; not further analyzed 

Systems Engineering None Routine activity categorically 

excluded; not further analyzed 
4-5 

Exhibit 4-2. Analysis of Impacts of Development Phase Activities 

Activity Source of Impact Impacts Analysis 

Site Preparation and 

Construction 

Construction or 

modifications necessary 

to support component 

prototype development 

Section 4.1.1.9 Support Assets 

- Infrastructure 

Maintenance or 

Sustainment 

Activities related to 

hardware or software 

upgrades or maintenance 

of component prototypes 

Routine activity categorically 

excluded or analyzed in 

previous NEPA documents 

and found to have no 

significant impact. Rationale 

presented in Section 4.1.1.9 

Support Assets - Infrastructure 

Manufacturing of 

Prototypes 

Manufacturing of 

component prototypes 

Routine activity categorically 

excluded or analyzed in 

previous NEPA documents 

and found to have no 

significant impact. Rationale 

presented in Section 4.1.1.10 

Support Assets - Test Assets 

Testing of Component 

Prototypes 

Activities related to 

activation or use of the 

component prototypes 

Sections 4.1.1.1 Weapons - 

Lasers, 4.1.1.2 Weapons - 

Interceptors, 4.1.1.3 Sensors - 

Radar, 4.1.1.4 Sensors - 

Infrared and Optical, 4.1.1.5 

Sensors - Laser, 4.1.1.6 

C2BMC - Computer 

Terminals and Antennas, 

4.1.1.7 C2BMC - 

Underground Cable, 4.1.1.8 

Support Assets - Equipment, 

4.1.1.9 Support Assets - 

Infrastructure, 4.1.1.10 

Support Assets - Test Assets 

Tabletop Exercises None 

Routine activity categorically 

excluded; activity not further 

analyzed 
4-6 

Test Phase Activities 

Test life cycle phase activities were considered in two distinct analyses; one focused on 

the components and their individual test activities, and the other focused on System 

Integration Testing which could include multiple components with one or more attempted 

intercepts to test system capability and effectiveness in increasingly robust and realistic 

test scenarios. 

BMDS component testing activities assumed to have potential impacts on the 

environment were considered for each component as shown in Exhibit 4-3. Some of the 

activities that comprise the test life cycle phase are unique to individual components. For 

example launch/flight is relevant for interceptors and targets but not for C2BMC. Test 

life cycle phase activities are specific to each component. Therefore, Exhibit 4-3 is 

presented by component and shows those specific activities that were determined to have 

the potential for impact. Other activities such as site preparation and construction are not 

unique to individual components and are therefore considered collectively in Support 

Assets. The impacts associated with a target intercept involving either laser or 

interceptor weapons are addressed as part of Test Integration. 

Exhibit 4-3. Analysis of Impacts of Test Life Cycle Phase Activities 

Component Activity Source of Impact Impacts Analysis 

Manufacturing of 

Test Articles 

Manufacturing/assembly 

of laser components and 

chemicals 

Routine activity 

categorically 

excluded or analyzed 

in previous NEPA 

documents and found 

to have no significant 

impact. Rationale 

presented in Section 

4.1.1.10 Support 

Assets - Test Assets 

WeaponsLaser 

Site Preparation 

and Construction 

Construction or 

modifications necessary 

to support laser 

use/firing 

Section 4.1.1.9 

Support Assets - 

Infrastructure 
4-7 

Exhibit 4-3. Analysis of Impacts of Test Life Cycle Phase Activities 

Component Activity Source of Impact Impacts Analysis 

Transportation 

Transport of the laser 

and chemicals to 

appropriate location 

Routine activity 

categorically 

excluded or analyzed 

in previous NEPA 

documents and found 

to have no significant 

impact. Rationale 

presented in Section 

4.1.1.8 Support 

Assets - Equipment 

Activation Firing the laser Section 4.1.1.1 

Weapons - Lasers 

Manufacturing of 

Test Articles 

Manufacturing 

interceptor components 

and propellants 

Routine activity 

categorically 

excluded or analyzed 

in previous NEPA 

documents and found 

to have no significant 

impact. Rationale 

presented in Section 

4.1.1.10 Support 

Assets - Test Assets 

Site Preparation 

and Construction 

Construction or 

modifications necessary 

to support launch 

Section 4.1.1.9 

Support Assets - 

Infrastructure 

Transportation 

Transport of the booster, 

kill vehicle, and 

propellants to the launch 

location 

Routine activity 

categorically 

excluded or analyzed 

in previous NEPA 

documents and found 

to have no significant 

impact. Rationale 

presented in Section 

4.1.1.8 Support 

Assets - Equipment 

WeaponsInterceptor 

Prelaunch 

Assembly and fueling of 

the booster or kill 

vehicle, as appropriate 

Section 4.1.1.2 

Weapons - 

Interceptors 
4-8 

Exhibit 4-3. Analysis of Impacts of Test Life Cycle Phase Activities 

Component Activity Source of Impact Impacts Analysis 

Launch/Flight 

Ignition of rocket motors 

and flight of boosters or 

separation of kill vehicle 

and subsequent flight 

along its trajectory 

Section 4.1.1.2 

Weapons - 

Interceptors 

Postlaunch Clean up or debris 

recovery, if required 

Section 4.1.1.2 

Weapons - 

Interceptors 

Manufacturing 

Manufacturing/assembly 

of the sensor hardware 

and software 

Routine activity 

categorically 

excluded or analyzed 

in previous NEPA 

documents and found 

to have no significant 

impact. Rationale 

presented in Section 

4.1.1.10 Support 

Assets - Test Assets 

Site Preparation 

and Construction 

Construction or 

modifications necessary 

to support sensor use 

Section 4.1.1.9 

Support Assets - 

Infrastructure 

Transportation Transport of the sensor 

to appropriate location 

Routine activity 

categorically 

excluded or analyzed 

in previous NEPA 

documents and found 

to have no significant 

impact. Rationale 

presented in Section 

4.1.1.8 Support 

Assets - Equipment 

Sensors 

Activation Use of the sensor 

Sections 4.1.1.3 

Sensors - Radar, 

4.1.1.4 Sensors - 

Infrared and Optical, 

and 4.1.1.5 Sensors - 

Laser 
4-9 

Exhibit 4-3. Analysis of Impacts of Test Life Cycle Phase Activities 

Component Activity Source of Impact Impacts Analysis 

Manufacturing Assembly of associated 

hardware and software 

Routine activity 

categorically 

excluded or analyzed 

in previous NEPA 

documents and found 

to have no significant 

impact. Rationale 

presented in Section 

4.1.1.10 Support 

Assets - Test Assets 

Site Preparation 

and Construction 

Construction or 

modification for 

computer terminals, 

antennas, and 

underground cable 

trenching 

Section 4.1.1.9 

Support Assets - 

Infrastructure 

Transportation Transport of C2BMC to 

appropriate location 

Routine activity 

categorically 

excluded or analyzed 

in previous NEPA 

documents and found 

to have no significant 

impact. Rationale 

presented in Section 

4.1.1.8 Support 

Assets - Equipment 

C2BMC 

Activation 

Use of computer 

terminals, antennas, and 

underground cable 

Sections 4.1.1.6 

C2BMC - Computer 

Terminal and 

Antennas, 4.1.1.7 

C2BMC - 

Underground Cable 
4-10 

Exhibit 4-3. Analysis of Impacts of Test Life Cycle Phase Activities 

Component Activity Source of Impact Impacts Analysis 

Manufacturing 

New or major 

modification of existing 

support equipment 

Routine activity 

categorically 

excluded or analyzed 

in previous NEPA 

documents and found 

to have no significant 

impact. Rationale 

presented in Section 

4.1.1.10 Support 

Assets - Test Assets 

Operational 

Changes 

Implementation of new 

operating parameters of 

existing support 

equipment 

Section 4.1.1.8 

Support Assets - 

Equipment 

Support 

AssetsSupport 

Equipment 

Site Preparation 

and Construction 

New construction or 

major modification of 

existing infrastructure 

Section 4.1.1.9 

Support Assets - 

Infrastructure 

 Transportation Transport of support 

equipment 

Routine activity 

categorically 

excluded or analyzed 

in previous NEPA 

documents and found 

to have no significant 

impact. Rationale 

presented in Section 

4.1.1.8 Support 

Assets - Equipment 

Support 

AssetsInfrastructure 

Site Preparation 

and Construction 

Construction or 

modification of 

infrastructure 

Section 4.1.1.9 

Support Assets - 

Infrastructure 
4-11 

Exhibit 4-3. Analysis of Impacts of Test Life Cycle Phase Activities 

Component Activity Source of Impact Impacts Analysis 

Manufacturing 

Assembly of 

hardware/software 

associated with the test 

sensor 

Routine activity 

categorically 

excluded or analyzed 

in previous NEPA 

documents and found 

to have no significant 

impact. Rationale 

presented in Section 

4.1.1.10 Support 

Assets - Test Assets 

Site Preparation 

and Construction 

Construction or 

modifications necessary 

to support the test sensor 

or launch 

Section 4.1.1.9 

Support Assets - 

Infrastructure 

Transportation 

Transport of the sensor, 

booster and propellants 

to the test location 

Routine activity 

categorically 

excluded or analyzed 

in previous NEPA 

documents and found 

to have no significant 

impact. Rationale 

presented in Section 

4.1.1.8 Support 

Assets - Equipment 

Activation Use of the test sensor in 

a test event 

Section 4.1.1.3 

Sensors - Radar, 

4.1.1.4 Sensors - 

Infrared and Optical, 

and 4.1.1.5 Sensors - 

Laser 

Support 

Assets- Test 

Assets 

Prelaunch 

Assembly and fueling of 

the booster as 

appropriate 

Section 4.1.1.2 

Weapons - 

Interceptors 
4-12 

Exhibit 4-3. Analysis of Impacts of Test Life Cycle Phase Activities 

Component Activity Source of Impact Impacts Analysis 

Launch/Flight 

Ignition of rocket 

motors, separation from 

launch platform, and 

flight of the boosters or 

separation of the target 

object and subsequent 

flight along its trajectory 

Section 4.1.1.2 

Weapons - 

Interceptors 

Use of 

Countermeasures, 

Simulants or 

Drones 

Use and deployment of 

various 

countermeasures, 

simulants or drones to 

support testing 

Section 4.1.1.10 

Support Assets - Test 

Assets 

Postlaunch 

Clean up or debris 

recovery to include 

launch platform, 

countermeasures, and 

simulants, if required 

Section 4.1.1.2 

Weapons - 

Interceptors 

The operating environments in which test activities occur (i.e., land, sea, air, and space) 

were determined to influence the environmental impacts only for laser activation, 

launch/flight activities, sensor activation, and activation of C2BMC. Therefore, these 

activities were also considered by operating environment in analyzing their 

environmental effects. Individual component tests are needed to demonstrate the 

functionality of BMDS technology. Potential environmental consequences of component 

tests are discussed in previous NEPA documentation and in their respective sections in 

this PEIS. 

BMDS System Integration Testing activities would occur at the system level. System 

Integration Tests evaluate the ability of various component configurations to work 

together. System Integration Testing would be used to assess the ability of BMDS 

components to work interoperably and to meet the required functional capabilities of the 

BMDS as a system and to demonstrate performance. 

System Integration Tests would integrate existing and planned components such as 

sensors, weapons, and C2BMC. This PEIS assesses the potential for environmental 

impacts of integrated BMDS testing activities under Alternatives 1 and 2. Test 

integration activities would involve land-, sea-, and air-based operating environments for 

weapons; and land-, sea-, air- and space-based operating environments for sensors, 

C2BMC, and support assets for Alternative 1. Assessment of Alternative 2 considers 
4-13 

only the additional impacts of proposed space-based operating environment for 

interceptors. 

System level tests would include modeling, simulation, and analysis; integrated missile 

defense wargames; MDIE; integrated GTs; and SIFTs. A description of each type of test 

is provided in Exhibit 2-22. 

The analysis of intercept impacts includes discussion of the impact of debris from an 

intercept. Depending on the location used for testing or deployment of weapons, debris 

may impact either inland or in marine environments. Therefore, impacts from postlaunch 

activities involving intercepts have been subcategorized based on where intercept debris 

would be likely to impact. For purposes of this PEIS, it was assumed that the debris 

impacts from any single intercept would occur within a single receiving environment, 

either on land or in water. 

Deployment Phase Activities 

Deployment phase activities with the potential for impacts on the environment would 

include manufacturing (production) of components, site preparation and construction, use 

of human services, transportation of components to the deployment site, testing 

(prelaunch, launch/flight, activation, postlaunch), training, and maintenance or 

sustainment of the components (operation and maintenance, upgrades, and service life 

extension). The environmental impacts associated with maintenance including hardware 

and software upgrades and service life extension are routine activities that are generally 

categorically excluded and are not analyzed in this PEIS. The environmental impacts 

associated with manufacturing, site preparation and construction, and transportation, and 

human services are routine activities that are generally categorically excluded or are 

analyzed in previous NEPA documents and found to have no significant impact. The 

rationale for why they are not analyzed in this PEIS is provided in Support Assets. The 

environmental impacts associated with training would be similar to the use of the 

component as described under the testing life cycle activity. 

Future deployment of BMDS components would occur at times and places where the 

deployed component would provide the most useful defensive capability to counter 

existing or emerging threats. This could include sites outside the continental U.S. The 

environmental impacts of deployment at specific locations would need to be considered 

in subsequent site-specific NEPA analyses tiered from this PEIS. The activities and 

associated impacts from deployment phase activities are presented in Exhibit 4-4. 
4-14 

Exhibit 4-4. Analysis of Impacts of Deployment Phase Life Cycle Activities 

Activity Source of Impact Impacts Analysis 

Manufacturing Manufacturing (production) of 

the component 

Routine activity categorically 

excluded or analyzed in 

previous NEPA documents 

and found to have no 

significant impact. Rationale 

presented in Section 4.1.1.10 

Support Assets - Test Assets 

Site Preparation and 

Construction 

Construction or modifications 

necessary to support 

component deployment 

Section 4.1.1.9 Support - 

Infrastructure 

Transportation Transporting component to 

deployment location 

Routine activity categorically 

excluded or analyzed in 

previous NEPA documents 

and found to have no 

significant impact. Rationale 

presented in Section 4.1.1.8 

Support Assets – Equipment 

Testing 

Activities related to prelaunch, 

launch/flight, postlaunch, or 

activation of the component 

Testing of components would 

be the same as or similar to the 

use of the component as 

described under the testing 

lifecycle activity 

Maintenance or 

Sustainment 

Activities related to hardware 

or software upgrades 

Activities related to prelaunch, 

launch/flight, postlaunch, or 

activation of the component 

Upgrades No source of impact 

Routine activity categorically 

excluded; activity not further 

analyzed 

Training 

Activities related to prelaunch, 

launch/flight, postlaunch, or 

activation of the component 

Testing of components would 

be the same as or similar to the 

use of the component as 

described under the testing life 

cycle activity 

Use of Human 

Services 

Activities related to increasing 

the presence of staff at 

deployment sites 

The use of human services is 

more appropriately addressed 

in site specific documentation. 

Rationale presented in Section 

4.1.1.9 Support Assets - 

Infrastructure 
4-15 

Exhibit 4-4. Analysis of Impacts of Deployment Phase Life Cycle Activities 

Activity Source of Impact Impacts Analysis 

Service Life 

Extension No source of impact 

Routine activity categorically 

excluded; activity not further 

analyzed 

Decommissioning Phase Activities 

Typical decommissioning phase activities would include demilitarization and disposal or 

replacement of the component. Activities associated with decommissioning may include 

recycling and disposal of hazardous materials. The activities associated with 

decommissioning are presented in Exhibit 4-5. The environmental impacts associated 

with decommissioning of specific components would be more appropriately addressed in 

subsequent tiered environmental analyses. 

Exhibit 4-5. Analysis of Impacts of Decommissioning Phase Life Cycle Activities 

Activity Source of Impact Impacts Analysis 

Demilitarization 

Destruction of offensive or 

defensive systems capability 

which may include disposal or 

detonation of hazardous materials 

(propellants, batteries, etc) 

A roadmap for considering 

decommissioning impacts is provided; 

an analysis would be more 

appropriately addressed in subsequent 

tiered environmental analyses. 

Disposal 

Materials to be disposed may 

include hazardous materials and 

hazardous waste (propellants, 

coolants, batteries, etc.) 

A roadmap for considering 

decommissioning impacts is provided; 

an analysis would be more 

appropriately addressed in subsequent 

tiered environmental analyses. 

A roadmap for considering impacts of decommissioning for each component has been 

developed and is provided below. A Government depot or contractor may accomplish 

demilitarization and disposal of the components. The military service responsible for 

managing each piece of equipment would initiate the demilitarization and disposal 

process. Normally, each individual piece of equipment would have disposition 

instructions that have been prepared by its development contractor or project office in the 

case of MDA. These instructions identify the hazardous materials contained in the 

equipment item. A copy of the disposition instructions would be provided to the depot or 

contractor performing the demilitarization and disposal. It would be the responsibility of 

the depot or contractor to identify, remove, segregate, package, and document all 

hazardous materials in the item. In the case of a depot, disposal of hazardous materials 
4-16 

would be through Government channels as described below. When a contractor is 

utilized, hazardous materials disposal would be processed through commercial channels 

in compliance with all applicable Federal, state, and local laws. 

When a depot performs the demilitarization and disposal functions, disposal of hazardous 

and nonhazardous materials would be through a Defense Reutilization and Marketing 

Office (DRMO). The DRMO would physically accept and process all property that falls 

within the DRMO area of responsibility. The DRMO would be responsible for disposing 

of hazardous materials in accordance with applicable Federal, state, and local laws, 

utilizing best management practices. 

Components would be transported to demilitarization and disposal locations by the 

method appropriate to their location and military sensitivity. Transportation to 

contiguous land areas could be by ground (truck or rail) in accordance with DOT, state 

and local transportation and safety regulations and procedures. Transportation from, or 

to, island locations would be by aircraft in accordance with DOT and U.S. Air Force 

regulations and procedures, or by U.S. Navy, U.S. Army, or commercial ships in 

accordance with U.S. Coast Guard and Maritime Administration requirements and any 

other applicable regulations and procedures. 

Potential decommissioning activities for weapons, sensors, C2BMC, and support assets 

are discussed below. 

Decommissioning of weapons components would involve transferring the equipment to 

other uses, as described above, or demilitarization in accordance with the requirements of 

DoD 4160.21-M-1, Appendix 4 “Demilitarization Requirements for Munitions List 

Items.” Specific requirements are found in DoD 4160.21-M-1, Appendix 4, Category IV, 

“Launch Vehicles, Guided Missiles, Ballistic Missiles, Rockets, Torpedoes, and 

Components,” and DoD 4160.21-M-1, Appendix 4, Category V “Military Explosives, 

Solid and Liquid Propellants, Bombs, Mines, Incendiary Agents, and Their Constituents.” 

Because the BMDS does not include nuclear weapons, the requirements of DoD 4160.21-

M-1, Appendix 4, Category XVI, “Nuclear Weapons Design and Test Equipment,” would 

not apply to the decommissioning of weapons components. Examples of potential 

decommissioning plans for missiles (interceptors and targets) are included below. 

Decommissioning of missiles would first require the removal and proper disposal of 

liquid, solid, or hybrid (liquid and solid combination) propellants from the booster(s). 

Where possible, propellants would be recovered and reused. Aging motors that contain 

flaws would likely be decommissioned using open detonation. Some liquid fueled 

missiles are fueled only before a scheduled launch; others are pre-fueled. In addition, the 

kill vehicle on an interceptor missile typically uses liquid hypergolic propellants and 

some solid propellants for its divert and attitude control system. Liquid propellants 

would need to be emptied before disassembly of the missile could occur. Solid rocket 
4-17 

propellant would be removed for reclamation or burning in a controlled environment, 

such as an incinerator. Where practicable, incineration or closed burning of rocket 

propellant would be performed. Most of the acid and particulates ejected during the burn 

would be collected in plume scrubber water. This water would be treated for acceptance 

by a publicly owned (or federally owned) water treatment works or discharged in 

accordance with a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. 

Decommissioning of lasers would require the removal and proper disposal or 

neutralization of chemical laser fuels from the storage facilities. Where possible, these 

chemicals would be recovered and reused. Decommissioning of the aircraft would be 

conducted in accordance with DOD 4160.21-M-1, Appendix 4, Category III, “Military 

Aircraft (Combat, Tactical Air Vehicles) Spacecraft and Associated Equipment” and 

other applicable requirements. Decommissioning activities for other laser components 

would be conducted as appropriate in accordance with applicable regulations. 

The MDA would develop new sensor equipment in addition to using a variety of existing 

equipment. Equipment intended only for testing purposes and not for use in the BMDS 

architecture would be returned to the responsible military service for continuation of its 

original duties. Any decommissioning activities for this equipment would be carried out 

by the responsible military service. Equipment would be demilitarized in accordance 

with DoD 4160.21-M-1, Appendix 4, Category XII “Fire Control, Range Finder, 

Optical, and Guidance and Control Equipment.” 

The decommissioning of sensors, equipment, and facilities would include the 

recycling/reuse or disposal of residual materials and unused products associated with the 

antennae, electronic, cooling, and power units. These products would include but are not 

limited to lubricants, coolants, batteries, and fuels. These materials would be 

decommissioned in accordance with Chapter 10, Environmentally Regulated and 

Hazardous Property, of the (DoD) Directive 4160.21-M, Defense Reutilization and 

Disposal and any applicable Federal, state, and local regulations and requirements. 

Reusable materials from sensors, such as metals, would be recovered. Other materials 

would be shredded and recycled or disposed of, as appropriate. 

Sea-based sensors such as the SBX radar use a MOSS CS50 platform to support a radar 

support structure and radome. The CS50 platform was designed for use in oil 

exploration. After the sea-based radar system is removed, the platform could be 

converted to another MDA use (launch platform, test or deployed radar platform, etc.), 

transferred to a military service, or sold. If another use of the platform is not feasible, 

DoD would dismantle the platform and dispose of the materials by recycling, reuse, or 

discarding it in appropriate waste management facilities. DoD could also consider 

sinking the platform at sea after all toxic materials are removed, to provide a foundation 

for marine life. 
4-18 

Space-based sensors would be decommissioned by being abandoned in orbit, parked in a 

higher orbit, deorbited, or retrieved. Space-based sensors left in orbit that have nonBMDS utility could be transferred to alternate uses if economically feasible and the 

alternate use would not affect national security. Potential alternate uses include 

monitoring rocket launches and aircraft flights. DoD would make decisions on the 

disposition of the space-based components based on the stability of their orbits, the costs 

and risks of deorbiting or retrieval, the remaining useful life of the equipment, and 

potential for alternate uses. 

Components could be retrieved from orbit and brought back to Earth for 

decommissioning and demilitarization if allowing them to remain in orbit poses 

unacceptable risks. Components abandoned in orbit would continue to orbit until 

gravitational and atmospheric drag cause the component to deorbit and reenter the 

atmosphere where it would either burn up or fall to Earth. Potential risks include danger 

to populations on Earth or the loss of equipment sensitive to national security. U.S. 

Space Command tracks orbits of satellites and space debris, and provides reentry 

predictions. When the predictions indicate a risk to land areas, a controlled deorbit would 

be considered to ensure reentry occurs over ocean areas. Parking the component in a 

higher orbit would increase the time before deorbit. Demilitarization of space-based 

components would be conducted in accordance with DoD 4160.21-M-1, Appendix 4, 

Category VIII, “Military Aircraft (Combat, Tactical Air Vehicles), Spacecraft and 

Associated Equipment,” Category XI, “Military and Space Electronics,” and Category 

XV, “Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment.” 

The MDA would develop new C2BMC equipment as well as use a variety of existing 

equipment. As technology advances and the needs of the BMDS evolve, multiple 

upgrades of C2BMC hardware and software are likely. DoD would be responsible for 

decommissioning activities in accordance with appropriate requirements for the specific 

C2BMC equipment. 

Support assets include fixed facilities and mobile equipment as well as test assets 

including the test bed, test sensors, and targets. This discussion of decommissioning 

activities focuses on fixed and mobile equipment. Components that make up the test bed, 

test sensors and targets are addressed previously under decommissioning weapons and 

sensors. 

Fixed facilities may include DoD-owned buildings located on ranges, installations, or 

related real estate such as islands temporarily used for BMDS purposes. Government 

contractor facilities include such sites as the Nevada Test Site and Sandia National 

Laboratory in New Mexico. Privately owned facilities include those owned by 

companies manufacturing components for the BMDS. Exhibit 4-6 describes 

decommissioning activities for fixed facilities. 
4-19 

Exhibit 4-6. Decommissioning Activities for Fixed Facilities

Decommissioning Activities

Left in Place Disposed 

Fixed Facilities 

Mission 

Realignment 

Return to 

Owners/Host 

Facility 

Transfer 

Title to 

New 

Owner 

Transfer 

Land Title 

to New 

Owner 

DoD-owned X X X 

Government 

Contractor Buildings X 

Private X 

DoD Launch 

Pads/Runways X X X 

Silos X 

Other 

Government X 

Private X 

Launch 

Locations 

Municipal 

Airports 

(runways) 

 X 

Water/Sewer 

Systems X X X X 

Power Plants 

(gas and coal 

fired) 

X X X X Utilities 

Fiber optic and 

Other Cables X X X X 

Fixed buildings or structures could include those used for testing purposes, deployment, 

or both. As described above, the MDA would evaluate DoD-owned buildings for 

continued or adaptive use by the DoD or other U.S. Government agencies. Following the 

decision to decommission, any necessary decontamination activities would be performed. 

Buildings owned by the DoD that are not assigned new missions could be sold and the 

title transferred to the new owner. Any space devoted to BMDS activities in government 

contractor or contractor facilities would be returned to the host installation. All BMDSrelated equipment would be removed according to decommissioning regulations. 

Other fixed BMDS components include launch pads, in-ground missile silos, and 

runways. Launch pads, silos, and runways located at the various DoD installations, upon 

completing their BMDS mission, might be assigned new DoD missions and might not 
4-20 

need to be decommissioned. Other government launch facilities include those run by the 

NASA such as Kennedy Space Center. 

Private facilities include those owned by states or private organizations such as the KLC, 

which is run by the Alaska Aerospace Development Corporation. Upon termination of 

any BMDS testing or deployment activities conducted on the grounds of these facilities, 

any private assets and components used by MDA to support testing or deployment would 

be returned to full control of the host installation or otherwise disposed per existing 

contractual agreement. 

Utilities installed in new or existing facilities as part of the BMDS mission would include 

water/sewer systems and fiber optic or other cables. Depending on the decommissioning 

decision related to any related DoD-buildings or structures, utilities could be left in place 

if the potential existed to use them for future DoD or other entity purposes. They would 

either be passed to the existing owner or host installation if installed on contractor 

property. Should a related structure be transferred to a new owner, utilities likely would 

be left in place. 

The scope of the BMDS includes some testing and potential deployment at locations 

abroad. Decommissioning options for international buildings, launch locations, or 

utilities would be the same as for domestic locations. However, it is expected that the 

extent of the BMDS presence in other countries would be less than in the continental U.S. 

Mobile land-based components include transportation vehicles (e.g., trucks, vans and 

trains) and missile launchers. Equipment removed from the mobile land-based 

components would be refurbished and transferred to an alternate use, demilitarized, or 

dismantled and disposed. Upon completion of their BMDS mission, DoD-owned 

transportation vehicles would either be assigned another mission or be disposed or sold 

by DoD. Vehicles owned by government contractors or private companies would be 

returned to their original owners following any decontamination required. Missile 

launchers, such as the THAAD mobile launcher, which uses a U.S. Army Heavy 

Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck with Load Handling System Truck would be 

disassembled and disposed. Some missile launcher interiors were coated with a 

specialized paint containing chromium. Disposal of chromium contaminated paint dust 

or water used in the removal of the paint would require disposal according to applicable 

Federal and State regulations. 

Following the decision to decommission, any necessary decontamination activities would 

be performed. Land areas would be restored to previous conditions or other condition 

compatible with planned land use of the site. Demilitarization of land-based components 

would be conducted in accordance with the applicable category of DoD 4160.21-M-1, 

Appendix 4 “Demilitarization Requirements for Munitions List Items,” or other 

applicable requirements. Disposal of land-based components would involve the removal 
4-21 

of BMDS equipment and assets. The components could be left in place and a new 

mission assigned for them. The components could be returned to the owners of the host 

facility (if not DoD-owned) or transferred to new owners. Transfer would occur under an 

interagency agreement, memorandum of understanding, lease agreement, or other 

agreement. 

The MDA would decommission the three current airborne sensor aircraft (HALO I, 

HALO II, and Widebody Airborne Sensor Platform [WASP]) and future airborne sensors 

when they are no longer needed to support the MDA testing program. MDA would 

remove the sensors and other government property from the aircraft and then 

decommission the aircraft by transferring to another government agency, selling as 

excess government property, salvaging usable parts, or mothballing at a government 

airfield. MDA is currently purchasing the HALO aircraft. 

Under the Measurements Program, countermeasures would be recycled or reused for 

alternate DoD missions. Simulants and submunitions used for lethality testing also 

would be recycled or reused, where possible, or disposed in accordance with applicable 

regulations. 

4.1 Alternative 1 – Implement BMDS Using Land-, Sea-, and Air-Based Weapons 

Platforms 

4.1.1 BMDS Components 

The following analyses are organized by component and subcomponent. The analyses 

are specific to each resource area (i.e., air quality, airspace, biological resources, geology 

and soils, hazardous materials and hazardous waste, health and safety, noise, 

transportation, and water resources) based on the impacts from the life cycle activities 

associated with each component. Where activities that are not unique to the life cycle 

phase or component and have the potential to result in similar environmental impacts, 

they were addressed together to eliminate redundancy. Where activities that are not 

unique to an individual component and have the potential to result in similar 

environmental impacts, they were addressed together to eliminate redundancy. As 

previously discussed under the Description of Life Cycle Activities and Development 

Phase Activities, manufacturing, site preparation and construction, and transportation of 

components are discussed under Support Assets. Because such activities would be 

performed by or on support assets, the impacts from manufacturing, site preparation and 

construction, and transportation activities associated with each BMDS component are 

discussed under Support Assets. 

4.1.1.1 Weapons - Lasers 

As described in Exhibit 4-3, the analysis for lasers is based upon impacts from the 

activation of the laser. 
4-22 

Air Quality 

Operation of a COIL would result in gaseous emissions of water vapor, CO2, oxygen, 

helium, nitrogen (N2), ammonia, chlorine, H2, and iodine. Liquid hydrogen peroxide also 

would be released. Ammonia and chlorine are hazardous substances. At altitude, the 

gases produced by the laser are exhausted into the air. During activation from land and 

sea platforms (assuming that sea-based laser activation was done under the same test 

conditions used for ground testing), most of the gaseous emissions produced by the laser 

would be captured in an air pollution scrubber. The estimated quantities released and 

scrubbed (for laser activation from land and sea platforms) in a single lasing event are 

shown in Exhibit 4-7. (U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1997b) 

 

Exhibit 4-7. Estimated In-Flight COIL Gaseous Emissions in Kilograms (Pounds)* 

Chemical

Total Quantity 

Produced per 

Laser Activation 

Kilograms 

(Pounds)

Quantity of 

Emissions Released 

to Atmosphere for 

Air Platform Laser 

Activation 

Kilograms (Pounds)

Quantity of 

Emissions 

Captured in 

Solution by 

Scrubber for Land 

and Sea Platform 

Laser Activation 

Kilograms 

(Pounds)

Quantity of 

Emissions 

Released to 

Atmosphere for 

Land and Sea 

Platform Laser 

Activation 

Kilograms 

(Pounds)

Ammonia 

(recovered in 

closed-loop 

system) 

N/A N/A N/A N/A 

Carbon dioxide 761 (1,677) 761 (1,677) 0 (0) 761 (1,677) 

Chlorine 29 (63) 29 (63) 24 (53) 5 (10) 

Helium/N2 86 (190) 86 (190) 0 (0) 86 (190) 

H2 20 (43) 20 (43) 0 (0) 20 (43) 

Iodine 10 (23) 10 (23) 9 (20) 1 (3) 

Oxygen 219 (483) 219 (483) 0 (0) 219 (483) 

Water 1,389 (3,063) 1,389 (3,063) 1,181 (2,603) 209 (460) 

*Calculations subject to rounding 

 Source: U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1997b 

Land and Sea Operating Environments 

Impacts to air quality from the activation of the COIL from land or sea platforms would 

be minimal, given the short duration of the laser operation (less than 30 seconds [U.S. 

Department of the Air Force, 1997b]) and the propensity of hot gases in the emission 
4-23 

cloud to rise. Because a small amount of chlorine may remain after scrubbing and be 

released to the atmosphere, rain within two hours of laser activation could cause 

hydrochloric acid to form and be deposited in small quantities. (U.S. Department of the 

Air Force, 1997b) 

Under high humidity or rainy conditions, chlorine exhaust would be removed from the 

atmosphere in a shorter amount of time, as the chlorine is converted to hydrochloric acid. 

Because of their humid climates hydrochloric acid would likely be produced as a result of 

laser activation in a number of biomes including Arctic Tundra Coastal, Sub-Arctic Taiga 

Coastal, Deciduous Forest, Deciduous Forest Coastal, and Mountain Biomes. In 

addition, hydrochloric acid could be produced in the Sub-Arctic Taiga, Chaparral, 

Grasslands, and Savanna Biomes when cool and humid conditions exist during laser 

activation activities. The strong winds in the BOA would support the rapid dispersion of 

emissions. Given the dry conditions in the Desert Biome, it is unlikely that chlorine 

would be converted to hydrochloric acid. The Tropical Coastal Biome is generally humid 

but the temperatures do not cool enough to convert any chlorine produced as a result of 

laser activation to hydrochloric acid. 

Hydrochloric acid produced as a result of the interaction between laser emissions and 

moisture in the air has the potential to produce impacts on biological resources, including 

plants and aquatic animals, and water quality. The extent and relative significance of the 

impact depends on the site-specific receptors present at the location. However activation 

of lasers, in general, would result in a small amount of chlorine being converted to 

hydrochloric acid, which would be further diluted by rain water. 

Air Operating Environment 

Impacts to air quality from laser activation from air platforms would result in similar 

impacts to those discussed above for land and sea operating environments. However, the 

potentially harmful substances would be released at approximately 12,192 meters (40,000 

feet) above the Earth’s surface and therefore, would be less likely to affect ground-level 

air quality. High exhaust gas temperature would result in positive buoyancy, allowing 

the exhaust emissions to rise quickly. The high exit velocity of the exhaust gases and the 

chemical composition of the exhaust would further increase the rate of dispersion and 

increase the altitude at which dispersion occurs. Therefore, the gases would not 

accumulate in any significant quantities, and no significant impact to air quality would be 

expected due to activation of lasers from air operating environments. (U.S. Army Space 

and Strategic Defense Command, 1998b) 

If the COIL were operating in the upper reaches of the troposphere and in the lower 

stratosphere (up to 12 kilometers [7 miles]), chlorine exhaust emissions would be 

converted quickly to forms that dissolve in water and would be removed from the 
4-24 

atmosphere. (U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1997b) Chlorine may be converted to 

hydrochloric acid, which has the potential to increase the acidity of precipitation. 

Ammonia is water-soluble and would dissolve in water and be removed from the 

atmosphere in approximately 20 days. (Seinfeld, 1986, as referenced in U.S. Department 

of the Air Force, 1997b) Emissions of chlorine and ammonia from the COIL would be 

insignificant compared to the amount of chlorine and ammonia released by industrial 

sources every year. (U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1997b) Emissions of CO2

associated with operation of the COIL would be minimal and would not be expected to 

contribute significantly to global warming. 

Chlorine is capable of destroying ozone, which is beneficial in the upper atmosphere for 

blocking harmful rays from the sun. If the emissions occur in the lower stratosphere 

(above the troposphere), the local concentration of chlorine would increase 

approximately 35 percent for a short period of time (less than 24 hours). (MDA, 2003a) 

The increased levels would return to background levels within several hours as 

atmospheric winds disperse the chlorine. Operation of the COIL in the stratosphere 

would be spread out over time, thereby eliminating the possibility for local, cumulative 

effects. 

In the event that the aircraft is unable to land at the appropriate landing location, it may 

be necessary to jettison aircraft fuel and laser chemicals. The laser chemicals could be 

discarded at a minimum altitude of at least 4,572 meters (15,000 feet). Chemical 

dispersion modeling has shown that release of liquids used by the COIL at this altitude 

will not reach the ground and would be diluted in the atmosphere. (MDA, 2003a) Laser 

chemicals include hydrogen peroxide, ammonia, chlorine, helium, N2, and iodine. Iodine 

would be carried as a solid and would not be jettisoned. If the chemicals could not be 

released at or above this height, the laser chemicals would remain onboard until the air 

operations could be grounded. 

B-747 aircraft would be used for air-based lasers. B-747 fire suppression systems contain 

150 kilograms (330 pounds) of Halon 1301 and 9 kilograms (20 pounds) of Halon 1211, 

both of which are Class I ozone-depleting substances that contribute to ozone depletion 

when released to the atmosphere. Use of Halon CFC fire suppression systems would take 

place only in emergency situations, which would be extremely rare. In the case of a fire, 

the amount of Halon released would be small compared to the amount of CFCs already 

present in the atmosphere. Fire suppression substitutes are being developed and 

evaluated and may be available for future operation of lasers in an air operating 

environment. 
4-25 

Airspace 

Land and Sea Operating Environments 

Ground testing of HELs that would occur in indoor facilities would have no effect on 

airspace in any biome considered in this PEIS. Outdoor activation of lasers from land or 

sea operating environments could impact the use of airspace. Close coordination with the 

FAA ARTCC and relevant military installations with responsibility for airspace 

management would minimize the potential for any adverse impacts on airspace use. 

Activation of lasers would occur in cleared airspace within designated airspace areas. 

Air Operating Environment 

Laser activation from air platforms would occur at an altitude of approximately 12,192 

meters (40,000 feet). The laser beam would be pointed horizontally or upward. 

Activation of lasers would occur in cleared airspace within designated airspace use. 

Close coordination with the FAA ARTCC and relevant military installations with 

responsibility for airspace management would minimize the potential for any adverse 

impacts on airspace use. 

Biological Resources 

Land and Sea Operating Environments 

Ammonia and chlorine produced from the land- and sea-based operation of the COIL 

could harm underlying vegetation and wildlife. Chlorine is known to injure plant leaves 

and affect wildlife. Direct effects could include discoloration, foliage loss, and changes 

in species composition. (U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1997b) Birds flying through 

the exhaust plume might be exposed to concentrations of hydrochloric acid, which could 

irritate eye and respiratory tract membranes. However, the high temperature of the 

emissions, the noise produced by support equipment, and visual cues of the emissions 

would likely cause birds to fly away from the launch area and therefore, prevent them 

from being exposed to the chlorine exhaust. 

Furthermore, studies involving a variety of laser projects in New Mexico indicate that 

cumulative impacts to wildlife from laser propagation are negligible. (U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, 1989) 

The presence of hydrochloric acid in freshwater bodies may cause temporary increases in 

water acidity and could alter the regular functioning of the aquatic ecosystem. However, 

saltwater tends to neutralize acid; therefore, significant acidification does not occur in the 

ocean and most estuaries, where freshwater and saltwater combine. (EPA, 2003g) 
4-26 

Nonetheless, deposition of HCl into the ocean may create a temporary hazard to marine 

wildlife. Special consideration should be given to any potential impacts to Essential Fish 

Habitat and efforts, such as scrubbing emissions, should be made to mitigate the impacts. 

Once deposited, hydrochloric acid would be diluted and dispersed by the receiving 

waters. Impacts would be limited to a small area surrounding the point of contact, as the 

waves and ocean currents would inhibit widespread deleterious effects to marine wildlife. 

In environments where there are water bodies, including bogs, fens, marshes, shallow 

lakes, rivers, and wetlands, chlorine would be converted to an acidic form, where it could 

alter the pH of the water body. The activation of lasers would not be expected to cause a 

significant increase in water acidity; however, site-specific analyses would be needed to 

consider specific impacts to individual locations. In general, the Sub-Arctic Taiga 

Coastal, Deciduous Forest, Deciduous Forest Coastal, and Mountain Biomes are likely to 

have water bodies that could be affected by an increase in acidity. Much of the 

Deciduous Forest Biome is already affected by acidic precipitation; therefore, its regional 

flora and fauna may not be able to tolerate additional acidic toxicity from laser activation. 

The presence of hydrochloric acid in prairie potholes in the Grasslands Biome could 

lower the pH of the water (making it more acidic), which could have a negative effect on 

waterfowl, shorebirds, and waterbirds that stopover during migration and/or breed in the 

waters. Mountain lakes are particularly sensitive to the effects of acidification because 

they have soft water, which does not neutralize acid readily. Furthermore, mountain lake 

ecosystems quickly show the effects from an external input. As a result, some mountain 

lake wildlife might not be able to adapt to a lower pH level quickly enough to absorb the 

effects of increased water acidity without harm. (PECO/COPERNICUS, 1999) Other 

biomes including Arctic Tundra Coastal, Sub-Arctic Taiga, Chaparral Coastal, Desert, 

Tropical Coastal, BOA, and Savanna are unlikely to experience increased acidity in 

surface waters either because hydrochloric acid is unlikely to be produced as a result of 

laser activation or because surface water is uncommon in these areas. An increase in 

acidity could affect pH-sensitive aquatic species, as shown in Exhibit 4-8. This has the 

potential to adversely affect biodiversity; however, this potential affect would be limited 

to the areas surrounding the laser activation site. The overall increase in acidity, and 

therefore, the impact to biodiversity would not be expected to be significant. 
4-27 

Exhibit 4-8. Freshwater Species Tolerance to Acidity 

Source: Atmosphere, Climate and Environment Information Programme, 2003 

Species including birds, pinnipeds, and sea otters are less likely to be impacted by laser 

activation related noise than other noises. Given the short duration (less than 30 seconds) 

and proposed infrequent operation of the lasers, any startle responses in animals would be 

short-lived and localized to the area near the activation site. (U.S. Department of the Air 

Force, 1997b) 

Indoor testing would be contained and would not damage vegetation or wildlife in any 

biome. During outdoor testing, laser beams could either be directed upwards toward air 

targets or horizontally towards ground targets. If the beam were directed at an upward 

angle, vegetation and terrestrial wildlife would not be affected. The probability of the 

laser beam striking a bird is very low. If the beam is directed horizontally toward ground 

targets, it could pose a fire hazard to vegetation or cause skin or eye damage to wildlife. 

Precautions would be taken to prevent harm to vegetation and wildlife. 

When the light energy of the laser beam is focused, damage due to thermal heating of the 

retina or a photochemical change in the retina would most likely occur (in the same way 

that a magnifying glass can be used to focus light energy from the sun to produce a hot 

spot). (Swope, 1969, as referenced in U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1990) Damage 

to the fovea (a small part of the retina that provides acute vision) could result in a severe 

visual handicap. If the eye were not focused on the laser source, the light energy would 

not be focused to a point on the retina but would be spread out over a larger area of the 
4-28 

retina and would not be as likely to cause damage. Also, if the eye were pointed 

somewhere off to the side rather than directly at the source, any damage to the retina 

would be outside the fovea and would be less likely to produce severe visual handicap. 

(U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1990) 

Ground testing of ABLs would use equipment that would simulate atmospheric 

conditions at the altitude where the laser would be used. The equipment would operate 

for a few minutes or less, and would generate noise that could affect wildlife. This noise 

could cause flushing in birds and temporary abandonment of nesting and other normal 

activities. These noises may startle animals and cause them to flee the area and abandon 

normal activities. However, studies indicate that birds and animals generally return to 

normal activities within a short time following noise disturbances. (Manci, et al., 1988) 

Specifically, a 1982 study by Stewart found that birds exposed to 115.6 to 145.5 dBA 

short intensity noise events returned to their nests within 2 to 10 minutes after the 

disturbance. (Stewart, 1982, as referenced in Manci, et al., 1988) In addition, a 1980 

study by Jehl and Cooper used shotgun blasts and explosives to simulate short duration 

noise events and found that nesting birds returned within 30 seconds of the disturbance. 

(Jehl, J.R and C.F. Cooper, 1980, as referenced in Manci et al, 1988) 

Air Operating Environment 

Impacts to biological resources from laser activation from air platforms would result in 

similar impacts to those discussed above for land-based operations. However, the 

potentially harmful substances would be released at approximately 12,192 meters (40,000 

feet) above the Earth’s surface and therefore, would be less likely to affect human health, 

wildlife, or vegetation. Emissions would be diluted and dispersed quickly in the 

atmosphere. Terrestrial biota would not be exposed to significant concentrations of 

emissions. The laser beam would be pointed upward; and therefore, the test geometry 

would prevent the possibility of harming terrestrial wildlife directly from contact with the 

beam. Because the laser is activated in the upper troposphere or above, the potential for 

the beam striking birds in flight would be low. 

A misdirected laser beam would have virtually no potential to impact any moving or 

stationary individual animal, either on land, in the air, or in the sea. The light energy 

would be reduced (i.e., less concentrated) and would be less able to cause injury because 

the beam’s width would increase due to atmospheric refraction as it approached the 

Earth’s surface. Exposure to the beam would be extremely short due to the rapidity with 

which the beam would swing past the animal or would be shut off; and therefore, damage 

would be minimal. (U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1990) 
4-29 

Geology and Soils 

Land Operating Environment 

Only small amounts of emissions from the operation of the COIL on the ground would be 

released and would not be expected to affect geology and soils in any biome. Ground 

testing equipment would receive the laser emissions and scrub them using a vacuum 

device before releasing them into the atmosphere. Use of the vacuum system would 

reduce the amount of emissions that could affect geology and soils. 

Under rainy or humid conditions, a small amount of chlorine produced from the operation 

of the COIL would be deposited on the soil as hydrochloric acid, which could result in a 

temporary increase in soil acidity that might have a short-term effect on vegetation and 

soil-dwelling microorganisms. The intensity of the acidic effect is a function of the 

amount of limestone (calcium carbonate) in the soils. 

Soils that are strongly leached (removed of nutrients, including calcium) and therefore, 

acidic could be adversely affected by the addition of hydrochloric acid which could 

further increase soil acidity. This could occur in the Arctic Tundra, Sub-Arctic Taiga, 

Savanna, Mountain and parts of the Deciduous Forest, and Tropical Biomes. 

Soils with large amounts of calcium carbonate have nearly unlimited buffering capacities 

and rarely show effects of acidification. (EPA, 2003g) This would be true for soils in the 

Grasslands, and parts of the Deciduous Forest including Florida and islands in the Pacific 

and Atlantic Ocean that are limestone-based. However, many soils common throughout 

the Deciduous Forest Biome lack calcium carbonate due to the warm, humid climate that 

leads to rapid weathering and subsequent leaching of minerals in soils, including calcium 

and therefore might be subject to impacts from increased soil acidity. 

The Chaparral and Desert Biomes would be unlikely to produce hydrochloric acid as a 

result of laser activation and therefore soils in these biomes would not be subject to acid 

deposition from this source. 

Accidental releases of spent laser chemicals would be contained in accordance with sitespecific spill plans that minimize impacts on geology and soils. In the case of an 

accidental fire, liquid and solid laser chemicals would either be consumed or contained. 

Chemicals consumed by the fire would be released as gases and would not impact 

geology or soils. Remaining laser chemicals would be contained by spill control 

measures and would be removed and disposed in accordance with standard procedures. 
4-30 

Air Operating Environment 

Activation of lasers from an air platform would generally occur at approximately 12,192 

meters (40,000 feet). Emissions would occur above the mixing height and might occur 

above the troposphere. Gaseous emissions occurring at this altitude would be dispersed 

and diluted in the atmosphere and would not reach the ground surface. Therefore, there 

would be no impact to geology and soils. 

Sea Operating Environment 

Laser activation on sea platforms would result in similar impacts to those discussed for 

land platforms. The small quantities of substances released would be dispersed by 

atmospheric winds or the motion of the ocean currents and waves without affecting 

geology and soils on the ocean floor beneath the sea operating environment. 

 

Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Wastes 

Land and Sea Operating Environments 

COIL chemicals include chlorine (Cl2), iodine, and hydrogen peroxide. Effluents from 

the operation of the HEL are managed by use of chemical scrubbers and chemical 

reactions that produce non-toxic by-products. The volume of waste would depend on 

site-specific activities. The use and disposal of hazardous materials would be 

incorporated into hazardous materials and hazardous waste management documents. 

Hazardous materials would be stored in a centralized location and Material Safety Data 

Sheets would be posted at all locations where hazardous materials are stored or used. All 

waste would be collected and segregated as nonhazardous, hazardous, and possibly 

special wastes for proper disposal in accordance with Federal, state, local, and DoD 

requirements. Personnel would follow safety procedures to prevent exposure. All 

hazardous materials used and hazardous waste generated would be handled in accordance 

with a Hazardous Waste and Hazardous Materials Standard Operating Procedure Manual 

as well as applicable legal requirements. (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 

Command, 2002d) Accidental releases of hazardous materials would be contained in 

accordance with a site-specific spill plan. 

Laser activation activities would produce the same hazardous materials and hazardous 

waste impacts in all of the biomes considered in this PEIS. As discussed above for 

impacts to geology and soils, ground testing of lasers intended for use from air operating 

environments would use vacuum and scrubber devices to simulate atmospheric 

conditions at the proposed operating altitude. Scrubbing would generate hazardous 

wastewater that would be contaminated and corrosive. This contaminated water would 

be treated and disposed in accordance with applicable regulations. 
4-31 

Spent laser chemicals would be neutralized and reused elsewhere in the chemical mixing 

facility or disposed of as waste product. This waste would be handled, treated, and 

disposed in accordance with standard procedures, preventing the release of 

contamination. In the case of an accidental fire, liquid and solid laser chemicals would 

either be consumed or contained. Chemicals consumed by the fire would be released as 

gases and would not become hazardous waste. Remaining laser chemicals would be 

contained by spill prevention, countermeasure, and control plans, and would be removed 

and disposed in accordance with applicable regulations and standard operating 

procedures. Laser chemical and chemical waste storage areas would operate in 

accordance with appropriate regulations to minimize impacts from potential spills and/or 

leaks. 

Air Operating Environment 

Emissions from laser activation from air platforms would be vented to the atmosphere 

while the platform is at operational altitude. Thus, emissions would not reach the Earth, 

and would not require treatment as hazardous waste. 

In the event of an accident on the runway causing rupture of fuel bladders on the B-747, 

the impact on geology, soil, or water resources from the jet fuels and firefighting 

materials would be similar to the impact from other aircraft accidents. The liquid and 

solid laser fuels released in an accident on the runway would be consumed by fire or 

contained, and the gaseous laser fuels would either burn or vent to the atmosphere where 

they would not impact geology, soils, or water quality. 

Health and Safety 

Land and Sea Operating Environments 

Laser activation activities would produce the same impacts on health and safety in all of 

the biomes considered in this PEIS. A Material Safety Data Sheet would be made 

available for each hazardous chemical in use at the facility. Storage specifications for 

hazardous chemicals would prevent dangerous intermixing of reactive chemicals. 

Exhaust emissions from laser activation have the potential to harm human health. A 

safety zone would be established around the laser during operation to prevent exposure to 

emissions. The general public and non-operational personnel would not be permitted in 

the safety zone during operations; and therefore, no impact on health and safety would be 

expected from exhaust emissions. 

Before activation activities are conducted, components would be reviewed for hazards. 

Personnel would be trained to handle laser chemicals and operate the laser. During 

ground testing of lasers, the beam would be contained in a beam containment system at 
4-32 

all times. During sea-based operations, a laser hazard zone would be established to 

prevent non-essential personnel or bystanders from crossing the direct or reflected beam 

path of the laser. 

An accidental release of laser chemicals and chemicals used to support laser operation 

would have the potential to affect health and safety of workers in the vicinity of the 

release. The primary scenarios for an accidental release involve the transfer of the 

reactants from the loading truck to the ground storage tanks, transfer from the storage 

tank to the test apparatus, a catastrophic storage container failure, and a massive release 

of hazardous chemicals resulting either from the slow combustion or the detonation of 

compounds where reactants are stored. (BMDO, 2001) Spill control procedures would be 

followed on military installations, and emergency response personnel would be trained to 

respond to such emergencies. 

Laser beams can cause serious health problems if they contact the skin or eyes. Hazard 

distances would be determined for each laser depending on the hazardous and adverse 

biological impacts it has on the eye or skin. A spherical exclusion area would be 

established around the laser during operation. While the intended beam direction is the 

most likely hazard area, the spherical shape of the exclusion area would account for laser 

scatter, the intensity of which can be as strong as or weaker than the original beam. 

HELs are dangerous at the source of the laser beam, and they become more dangerous 

around the focus point, where the beam has the smallest cross-sectional area. The 

strength of a laser beam is attenuated and scattered as it moves through the atmosphere. 

Lower energy lasers (such as those used in laser sensing and tracking systems) may not 

be dangerous at the source of the beam, but may become dangerous around the focus 

point. 

During ground testing activities, the laser beam would be directed away from population 

centers. Range areas would be used during ground testing and public access to these 

areas would be restricted. Laser targets would be designed to keep any spectral hazard on 

the range or to exit at a safe altitude. Hazard zones would be blocked off to prevent 

exposure to personnel. Target backstops would be used in case the laser misses the 

target. 

Air Operating Environment

The accidental release of laser chemicals onboard an aircraft during flight would be 

highly unlikely. The accidental release of chemicals inside the aircraft during flight 

would not endanger the flight crew because the aircraft would include a pressure 

bulkhead that separates the chemical storage areas from the flight crew area. This 

pressurized bulkhead would ensure that any laser emissions would not penetrate the 

inhabited portion of the aircraft. Chemicals could also be jettisoned to minimize the 

amount released inside the aircraft.
4-33 

Flight test activities would be configured so that reflected lasers would be contained 

within range boundaries. Exposure to a reflected laser beam would likely be very short, 

less than 0.01 seconds in duration and would not impact health and safety. (U.S. Air 

Force, 1997a, as referenced in MDA, 2003a) 

Noise

Land and Sea Operating Environments 

Laser activation activities would produce the same noise levels in all of the biomes 

considered in this PEIS. The potential for impact would depend on the specific operating 

location. Operation of equipment to support tests of lasers on land and sea operating 

environments would last for less than five minutes for each test. (U.S. Department of the 

Air Force, 1997b) The public and on-site personnel would be excluded from the area 

where the noise from this equipment would be detrimental. The size of this exclusion 

area would be determined using OSHA limit for noise exposure. 

High noise levels between 110 and 134 dBA are associated with the pressure recovery 

system during activation of the laser. All personnel who could be affected would be 

evacuated from the area for their protection or required to wear appropriate hearing 

protection. 

Air Operating Environment

Activation of the laser on an air platform would take place at an altitude of approximately 

12,192 meters (40,000 feet), and noise resulting from this activation would not affect 

ground level noise. 

Transportation 

Land and Sea Operating Environments

Air traffic is the transportation mode that might be affected by the activation of lasers. 

The use of lasers from land and sea platforms has the potential to impact the use of 

airspace if the laser beam were directed upwards. 

Air Operating Environment 

The use of lasers from air platforms could also impact the use of airspace. The impacts 

on airspace are discussed above. These impacts would be the same in all of the biomes 

considered in this PEIS. 
4-34 

Water Resources 

Land Operating Environment 

Chlorine released by the operation of the COIL would react with water vapor in the 

atmosphere to produce hydrochloric acid. Hydrochloric acid absorbed by surface waters 

would cause a temporary pH change such that any alteration of the water’s pH would be 

almost imperceptible. (U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1997b) 

In areas where precipitation is heavy, catchment basins are small, and stream gradients 

are steep hydrochloric acid would pass quickly out of stream drainages. (FAA, 1996) 

Ocean waters would not be significantly affected by changes in pH due to sea water’s 

ability to readily neutralize acid. 

Usually the chlorine exhaust cloud would be highly dispersed before coming into contact 

with surface waters and would become dilute hydrochloric acid upon mixing with water. 

Under rainy or humid conditions, chlorine could be concentrated spatially or locally in 

nearby ground and surface water sources. This could occur in the Arctic Tundra, SubArctic Taiga, Deciduous Forest, and Mountain Biomes. In addition, hydrochloric acid 

could be produced in the Sub-Arctic Taiga, Chaparral, Savanna, and Grasslands Biomes 

when cool and humid conditions exist during laser activation activities. The strong winds 

in the BOA would support the rapid dispersion of emissions. Given the dry conditions in 

the Desert Biome it is unlikely that chlorine would be converted to hydrochloric acid. 

The Tropical Biome is generally humid but the temperatures do not cool enough to 

convert the chlorine produced as a result of laser activation to hydrochloric acid. 

Hydrochloric acid deposition in surface waters may cause temporary increases in water 

acidity. Once deposited, hydrochloric acid would be diluted and dispersed by the 

receiving waters. Therefore, hydrochloric acid emissions would have minimal impacts 

on water pH levels and would not be considered harmful. 

Sources of potential ground water contamination are spills of cooling water or stored 

chemicals and/or leaks from the chemical waste and sludge tanks. Accidental releases of 

spent laser chemicals would be contained in accordance with site-specific spill plans that 

minimize impacts on water resources. 

In the case of an accidental fire, liquid and solid laser chemicals would either be 

consumed or contained. Chemicals consumed by the fire would be released as gases and 

would not impact water resources. Remaining laser chemicals would be contained by 

spill prevention and control measures, and would be removed and disposed in accordance 

with standard procedures. 
4-35 

Ground testing of ABLs would use vacuum and scrubbing equipment that would result in 

hazardous wastewater that would need to be treated and disposed in accordance with 

applicable regulations. 

Air Operating Environment 

Activation of lasers from an air platform would occur at an altitude of approximately 

12,192 meters (40,000 feet), which is higher than the mixing height. Emissions would be 

dispersed by wind and diluted in the atmosphere and would not impact surface water 

resources. 

Sea Operating Environment 

Impacts from laser activation during sea-based operations would be similar to those 

described above for land operations. The addition of hydrochloric acid to the ocean from 

the operation of the COIL would cause a slight increase in acidity of waters in the 

immediate vicinity of the contact point. However, saltwater tends to readily neutralize 

acid and the continual movement of waves further disperses and dilutes the chemicals. 

Therefore, significant acidification would not occur in the ocean. 

4.1.1.2 Weapons - Interceptors 

As described in Exhibit 4-3, the analysis for interceptors is based upon impacts from 

prelaunch, launch/flight, and postlaunch activities. 

Air Quality 

Prelaunch Activities 

For pre-fueled liquid propellant boosters and solid propellant boosters, prelaunch 

activities, such as elevating the booster to the launch angle and attaching fins to the 

booster, would not significantly impact air quality in any of the biomes considered in this 

PEIS. 

For non-pre-fueled liquid propellant boosters, the prelaunch activity with the greatest 

potential for air quality impacts is fueling. All fueling procedures would need to be 

approved by the site where the activity is to occur, and associated emergency response 

plans would need to be reviewed before beginning fueling activities. Although total 

oxidizer and fuel vapor emissions would vary depending on the propellant transfer 

equipment used and how it is assembled, it is anticipated that only very small amounts 

(approximately 10 grams [0.4 ounces]) of oxidizer vapors would be released to the 

atmosphere during the oxidizer transfer operation. A negligible amount of fuel vapors 
4-36 

would also be released into the atmosphere during fuel transfers. (U.S. Army Space and 

Missile Defense Command, 2002c) 

Propellant releases, although unlikely, could occur during propellant loading or transfer 

due to failure of transfer equipment or valves. An analysis conducted for the Liquid 

Propellant Targets Environmental Assessment (2002) assumed a leak over a three-minute 

period would release up to 17 liters (4.5 gallons) of oxidizer inhibited red fuming nitric 

acid (IRFNA), hydrogen peroxide, or nitrogen tetroxide, or hydrazine fuel. 

Boosters could be shipped to the test range with the kill vehicle attached, or the booster 

could be shipped separately from the kill vehicle. In either case, the fuel and oxidizer 

tanks would be installed in the kill vehicle at the test site. If the booster is shipped 

separately from the kill vehicle, the kill vehicle would be mated to the booster in a 

missile assembly building. These structures are commonly used for these types of 

activities, and no impacts to air quality would be expected from the mating and assembly 

process. (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2003) 

Launch/Flight Activities 

Launches of pre-fueled liquid propellant boosters would use a solid propellant gas 

generator as the ignition source. This solid propellant gas generator would have 

emissions similar to those discussed for solid propellant boosters; however, the quantities 

involved would be significantly smaller. The primary exhaust products of pre-fueled 

liquid propellant boosters are water, H2, N2, hydrogen fluoride, CO2, and CO. 

Emissions from the launch of pre-fueled liquid propellant boosters would have minimal 

impact on air quality. (Cortez III Environmental, 1996) The only HAPs produced from 

launches of these missiles would be from the solid propellant gas generator, which would 

produce approximately 0.05 kilograms (0.10 pounds) of hydrochloric acid per launch, 

which is much less than the Clean Air Act regulatory reporting requirement of nine 

metric tons (10 tons) per year. (U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1997b) 

Launches of non-pre-fueled liquid propellant boosters would be started by using 

triethylamine and dimethylaniline as an initiator fuel. The initiator fuel would have 

emissions similar to those discussed for the primary exhaust products for liquid 

propellants. The primary exhaust products of non-pre-fueled liquid propellant boosters 

are CO, CO2, H2, N2, and water. Emissions from the launch of non-pre-fueled liquid 

propellant boosters would have minimal impact on air quality. 

The primary exhaust products of solid propellant boosters are HCl, CO, NOX, and 

aluminum oxide (Al2O3). HCl and CO emissions are gases and Al2O3 is emitted as 

particulate. CO and NOX emissions are further oxidized to CO2 and NO2 due to the high 

temperatures experienced during launch; however, the quantities released from a single 
4-37 

test event are not expected to contribute to localized accumulation of greenhouse gases. 

Gaseous HCl produced by launches of solid propellant boosters combines with water in 

the atmosphere to create hydrochloric acid aerosol, which may contribute to the 

formation of acid rain. This is a particular concern in high precipitation areas or humid 

biomes where moisture in the air could aid the conversion of HCl to hydrochloric acid. 

Several biomes including Arctic Tundra, Sub-Arctic Taiga, Deciduous Forest, and 

Mountain Biomes are considered humid. In addition, acid precipitation could be 

produced in the Sub-Arctic Taiga, Chaparral, and Grasslands Biomes when cool and 

humid conditions exist during launch activities. 

As the booster proceeds through the layers of the atmosphere the impact of emissions 

from launch/flight activities varies depending on the propellant system used. One 

emission of concern produced by some liquid propellant boosters is CO, which can cause 

radiative heating and minor chemical reactions when emitted in the stratosphere. 

Launch/flight activities can contribute to global warming through the emission of 

greenhouse gases. These emissions could include water vapor and CO2. However, 

launch/flight activities would not contribute significantly to the total emissions of these 

gases, and so would not have a significant effect. 

Within the stratosphere, ozone depletion is a primary concern. Ozone in the stratosphere 

provides a protective layer shielding the Earth from ultraviolet radiation and subsequent 

harmful effects. Ozone may be depleted through complex reactions with chlorine, Al2O3, 

and NOX. 

Solid propellant boosters emit HCl through high temperature afterburning reactions in the 

exhaust plume, which could partially be converted to atomic chlorine and molecular 

chlorine (Cl and Cl2). These active forms of chlorine can contribute to localized ozone 

depletion in the wake of the booster. The USAF atmospheric interceptor technology (ait) 

vehicle may be representative of solid propellant boosters that would be used as part of 

the BMDS. The ait would spend approximately 25 seconds in the stratosphere at an 

altitude between 15 and 40 kilometers (9 and 25 miles). The first stage of the ait would 

deposit approximately 181 kilograms (400 pounds) of HCl and approximately 249 

kilograms (550 pounds) of combined Cl and Cl2 between an altitude of 15 kilometers (9 

miles) and 34.6 kilometers (21.5 miles). This represents less than 14 kilograms (30 

pounds) of active chlorine being distributed per kilometer of altitude traveled by the test 

vehicle. The second stage of the ait would contribute a total of approximately 3 

kilograms (6 pounds) of HCl, Cl, and Cl2 between ignition and 40 kilometers (25 miles) 

altitude. It is estimated that less than one pound per kilometer of altitude of the active 

forms of chlorine would be emitted by the second stage. Due to the large air volume over 

which these emissions would be spread, and because of rapid dispersion by stratospheric 

winds, the active chlorine from launches would not contribute to significant localized 

ozone depletion. 
4-38 

The emission of Al2O3 has been the subject of study with respect to ozone depletion. 

Al2O3 is emitted as solid particulates that may serve as sites for atmospheric chemical 

reactions. The studies (Molina, 1996, as referenced in U.S. Department of the Air Force, 

1997a) indicate that Al2O3 can activate chlorine. The exact magnitude of ozone depletion 

that can result from a build-up of Al2O3 over time has not yet been determined 

quantitatively, but appears to be insignificant based on existing analysis. 

Exhaust from the first stage of the USAF ait vehicle is approximately 27 percent by 

weight Al2O3, and the second stage exhaust is 35.4 percent Al2O3 by weight. The total 

amount of Al2O3 deposited between an altitude of 15 and 40 kilometers (9 and 25 miles) 

by each USAF ait flight is approximately 535 kilograms (1,180 pounds) from the first 

stage and 38 kilograms (83 pounds) from the second stage. The Al2O3 emitted during ait

flight is in the form of smooth particles with sizes varying in diameter from less than one 

micron to ten microns. (Beiting, 1997, as referenced in U.S. Department of the Air Force, 

1997a) Depending on the altitude where these particles are emitted, they may diffuse out 

of the stratosphere over a period of weeks to a few years. The particles would participate 

in reactions that may cause ozone depletion during the time that they stay in the 

stratosphere. (Molina, 1996 and Jackman, 1996, as referenced in U.S. Department of the 

Air Force, 1997a) The Al2O3 solid particles would have the potential to contribute to 

ozone-depleting reactions while in the stratosphere but because of the large air volume in 

the stratosphere and rapid mixing, they would not cause significant localized effects on 

stratospheric ozone depletion. 

NOX is produced during high temperature reactions known as afterburning in the exhaust 

plume of solid propellant boosters. As the temperature of the exhaust decreases with 

increasing altitude, less NOX is formed. For the USAF ait, the first stage afterburning 

production of NOX is nearly stopped before the vehicle reaches the stratosphere. The 

total NOX deposited in the stratosphere is approximately two kilograms (four pounds) 

from the USAF ait first stage and less than 0.5 kilograms (one pound) from the second 

stage. Stratospheric winds would disperse these quantities rapidly; therefore, no 

significant effect on ozone depletion would be expected from these emissions. (Molina, 

1996, as referenced in U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1997a) 

Land and Sea Operating Environments. Because the booster is moving away from the 

point of launch, only a small portion of the launch exhaust would be emitted near the 

launch area. In general, biomes with moderate to high winds experience less 

concentration of air emissions because the winds tend to disperse the ground level 

emissions. These biomes may include: Deciduous Forest, Chaparral, Desert Biomes, and 

the BOA. Other biomes including the Arctic Tundra, Sub-Arctic Taiga, Grasslands, 

Tropical, Mountain, and Savanna may experience higher localized concentrations of air 

emissions although this would depend on the site-specific conditions. 
4-39 

Launch activities would not be expected to bring any new stationary emission sources to 

the launch area; therefore, new permits or changes to existing air permits would not be 

required. If new stationary emission sources were introduced into the region, it is 

possible that additional permits or changes to existing air quality permits would be 

required. 

Kill vehicles could use either solid or liquid propellants. The liquid propellants likely to 

be used on the kill vehicle are hypergolic propellants, which would be used in small 

quantities. Because the launch/flight of kill vehicles is not initiated until the vehicle is 

high above the Earth’s surface, emissions released from the kill vehicle would occur 

above the troposphere (10 kilometers [6.2 miles]) and therefore, would not impact 

ground-level air quality. 

Air Operating Environment. Launches of pre-fueled and non-pre-fueled liquid and solid 

propellant boosters from air-based platforms would have less impact on ground-level air 

quality than launches from land or sea platforms because these launches would produce 

air emissions at a higher altitude. Using this type of operating environment, the rocket 

motor would be ignited at an altitude from 1.5 to 6 kilometers (0.93 to 3.7 miles). At this 

altitude, the booster would be ignited in the troposphere (extending to 10 kilometers [6.2 

miles] above the surface of the Earth). Pollutants above the troposphere (and therefore, 

above the mixing layer) do not significantly impact ground-level air quality. The mixing 

layer allows for vertical “stirring” of air masses, which aids in the dilution of pollutants 

before they are slowly transported to ground level. 

Postlaunch Activities 

The impacts of postlaunch activities have been separated into two discussions below – 

one for air quality impacts when launch debris or residual propellants hit land and the 

other when these fall into water. 

Launch Debris Hitting Land. The amount of residual propellant in the booster when it 

hits the ground would depend on several factors including how much propellant was in 

the booster at launch and how far the booster traveled during the mission. The amount of 

residual IRFNA in a pre-fueled liquid propellant booster could vary from 12 to 343 

kilograms (26.5 to 756 pounds) and the amount of residual unsymmetrical dimethyl 

hydrazine could vary from 14 to 123 kilograms (31 to 271 pounds). A non-pre-fueled 

liquid propellant booster could impact the ground with approximately 265 liters (70 

gallons) of fuel and approximately 473 liters (125 gallons) of oxidizer remaining. The 

residual propellants could burn upon impact, or one or both propellants could be released 

to the atmosphere without burning. (Cortez III Environmental, 1996) 

If the propellants burn upon impact, short-term impacts to air quality would occur. The 

ground-based booster impact areas would be isolated from inhabited areas and would be 
4-40 

evacuated prior to a launch; therefore, any exceedances of the NAAQS or exceedances of 

health-based criteria would not endanger the public. The remote location of the impact 

area would allow time and distance sufficient to disperse fumes to a non-hazardous level. 

It is not anticipated that combustion of the propellant(s) would result in air quality 

impacts beyond the immediate impact site. 

If the residual propellants were released to the atmosphere without burning, the IRFNA is 

likely to be volatilized as NOX and nitric acid. Observations of launches of pre-fueled 

liquid propellant boosters at WSMR indicate that a brown cloud has been observed 

immediately after impact. (Wilson, 1999, as referenced in Cortez III Environmental, 

1996) This cloud is likely produced by IRFNA converting to NOX, which can induce 

severe irritation to the eyes, skin, and mucous membranes and can lead to suffocation. 

Unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine is a known carcinogen that can react with oxygen and 

release toxic fumes of NOX if released to the air without combusting. These releases have 

been studied to dissipate below hazardous levels within 24 hours and to be undetectable 

after a period of six months. (Wilson, 1991, as referenced in Cortez III Environmental, 

1996) Hydrogen peroxide and hydrocarbons would dissipate when exposed to air. 

Nitrogen tetroxide if released to the air without combusting would be converted to 

gaseous form. 

Residual propellant from solid propellant boosters would likely continue to burn until 

expended if encased; however, if released from the motor casing, it is possible that solid 

propellant would not burn completely. This combustion would have a minor impact on 

air quality. There is a possibility that the burning solid propellant if encased could start a 

fire on the ground. The resulting fire could impact air quality in the area immediately 

surrounding the impact area. 

During a mission involving a successful intercept, the kill vehicle would be destroyed and 

small pieces of debris would impact the Earth’s surface. The small pieces of debris may 

temporarily serve as sites for chemical reactions in the Earth’s atmosphere until the 

debris reaches the ground. However, the impacts to air quality would be minimal. 

If the propellants in the kill vehicle were released to the atmosphere in an impact, they 

would either burn up, or one or both propellants could be released to the atmosphere and 

evaporate. Impacts from either scenario would be similar to those discussed above for 

propellants released from liquid propellant boosters. 

Launch Debris Hitting Water. The impacts to air quality from postlaunch activities 

resulting in boosters and kill vehicles hitting the ocean would be similar to, but less than 

those impacts discussed above for boosters and kill vehicles hitting land because the 

residual liquid propellants would be released into the ocean rather than the air. Impacts 

to water quality from a direct release to water are described in the hazardous waste 
4-41 

section. Solid propellant, if still in the casing, might continue to burn for some time even 

under water. However, this would create minimal impacts to air quality. 

Airspace 

Prelaunch Activities 

There would be no impact on airspace from prelaunch activities, including, fueling, 

evacuations and clearances, and road closures, because these activities do not physically 

interfere with navigable airspace or affect airspace scheduling. 

Launch/Flight Activities 

Close coordination with the appropriate FAA ARTCC and relevant military installations 

with responsibility for airspace management would minimize the potential for any 

adverse impacts on airspace use and scheduling for launches from all operating 

environments in all of the biomes considered in this PEIS. Launches of boosters and kill 

vehicles would require coordination with current aeronautics and space activities within 

the airspace associated with launch sites. Launch, flight, and impact of boosters and kill 

vehicles would occur in designated areas of cleared airspace. 

Land Operating Environment. Although launches of interceptors might require closure 

of some airspace and would, therefore, impact the amount of available airspace, this type 

of activity is considered routine at many military installations and would not constitute a 

significant impact. Aircraft transiting the area would be notified of any necessary 

rerouting requirements before departing their originating airport and would thus be able 

to take on any additional fuel before takeoff to avoid the affected area. Launches would 

be scheduled such that they would not affect airborne activities outside the airspace 

complex(es) where they are to occur, and would not interfere with any low- or highaltitude en route airways or jet routes use by civilian or private airports in the vicinity of 

the launch site. 

In addition, before conducting an operation that is potentially hazardous to nonparticipating aircraft, Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) would be established in accordance 

with range safety procedures. To satisfy airspace safety requirements, the responsible 

official would obtain approval from the FAA, prior to conducting the launch. Provisions 

also would be made for surveillance of the affected airspace by radar and patrol aircraft 

prior to booster launch. Safety regulations dictate that hazardous operations are 

suspended when any non-participating aircraft enters any part of the hazard area. 

Operations would resume when the non-participating entrant has left the area or a 

thorough check of the suspected area has been performed. For these reasons, no adverse 

impacts to airspace are expected from ground launches. 
4-42 

Air Operating Environment. Within minutes after launch, the booster would be propelled 

to an altitude of several hundred thousand feet, well above the typical altitudes used by 

commercial aircraft. The launches, flight trajectory, and ground impacts would occur at 

sufficient distance and altitude to be virtually unnoticed by local, non-military flying 

activities. Other impacts to airspace from launches of boosters from air operating 

environments would be as described for launches from land operating environments. 

Sea Operating Environment. Potential impacts to airspace from launches of boosters 

from sea platforms would be minimized by coordination between airspace complexes. 

Procedures would be similar to those for launches from land and air operating 

environments. If the sea operating environment were positioned in the BOA, potential 

impacts would be further minimized because airspace over the BOA is not heavily used. 

Establishing restricted areas would marginally reduce the amount of navigable airspace in 

the BOA, but because the airspace is not heavily used, the impacts to controlled and 

uncontrolled airspace would be minimal. If possible, the sea environment would be 

positioned to avoid the en route airways and jet routes that cross the BOA. Therefore, no 

significant impacts to the over-water airways and jet routes would be expected from any 

type of missile launched from a sea operating environment. 

Postlaunch Activities 

Impacts of postlaunch activities on airspace are discussed below addressing postlaunch 

debris recovery on land and in water. 

 

Launch Debris on Land. If necessary, helicopter retrieval of debris, from boosters or kill 

vehicles deposited on land would be within the boundaries of the designated impact area 

and therefore, within the airspace complex. Debris retrieval would have no impact on 

navigable airspace or airborne activities outside the restricted airspace complex. 

Launch Debris in Water. If debris from boosters or kill vehicles falls into water, MDA 

would not likely recover the debris. Therefore, helicopters and other equipment would 

not be used, and no impacts to airspace would be expected. If it were necessary to 

recover debris from water for a specific test, the impacts of debris retrieval would be 

analyzed as appropriate. 

Biological Resources

Prelaunch Activities 

There would be no impacts to biological resources from prelaunch activities for prefueled and solid propellant boosters and kill vehicles. For non-pre-fueled liquid 

propellant boosters, no more than a few grams of propellant would be released during 
4-43 

normal fueling operations and appropriate responses to leaks and releases would be 

implemented to minimize the hazard to biological resources. All fueling would be 

conducted using impermeable barriers appropriate for this type of activity, which would 

minimize the potential for a spill to impact biological resources. 

Launch/Flight Activities 

The presence of launch-related personnel prior to launch, noise associated with launch, 

and launch emissions all have the potential to impact biological resources during launch. 

Informal observation at several launch facilities indicates that the increased presence of 

personnel immediately before a launch tends to cause birds and other mobile species of 

wildlife to temporarily leave the area prior to the launch. This would effectively reduce 

the effects of sound, launch emissions, and heat on these animals. However, personnel 

associated with the launch would comply with USFWS, other regulatory agency, and 

relevant site-specific procedures to protect biological resources including species of 

special concern. 

The effects of noise on wildlife can be categorized as either auditory or non-auditory. 

Auditory effects would consist of direct physical changes, such as eardrum rupture or 

temporary threshold shift (temporary hearing loss). Non-auditory effects could include 

stress, behavioral changes, and interference with mating or foraging success. The effects 

of noise on wildlife vary from serious to no effect in different species and situations. 

Animals can also be sensitive to noises in some situations and insensitive to the same 

noises in other situations. (Larkin, 1996) Behavioral responses to noise also vary from 

startling to retreat from favorable habitat. 

Launches would be relatively infrequent events. Disturbance to wildlife would be brief 

and would not be expected to have a lasting impact nor a measurable negative effect on 

migratory bird populations. Wildlife would resume feeding and other normal behavior 

patterns after a launch is completed. Specifically, a 1982 study by Stewart found that 

birds exposed to 115.6 to 145.5 dBA short intensity noise events returned to their nests 

within 2 to 10 minutes after the disturbance. (Stewart, 1982, as referenced in Manci, et 

al., 1988) In addition, a 1980 study by Jehl and Cooper used shotgun blasts and 

explosives to simulate short duration noise events and found that nesting birds returned 

within 30 seconds of the disturbance. (Jehl, J.R and C.F. Cooper, 1980, as referenced in 

Manci et al, 1988) Wildlife driven from preferred feeding areas by aircraft or explosions 

usually return soon after the disturbance stops, as long as the disturbance is not severe or 

repeated. (FAA, 1996) Foraging birds would be subjected to increased energy demands 

if flushed by the noise, but this should be a short-term, minimal effect. 

Video camera observations of a wood stork colony located 0.8 kilometer (0.5 mile) south 

of the Space Shuttle launch pad at Kennedy Space Center showed the birds flew south 
4-44 

away from the noise source and started returning within two minutes, with a majority of 

individuals returning in six minutes. (NASA, 1997, as referenced in U.S. Army Space 

and Missile Defense Command, 2002c) This rookery continues to be used successfully, 

even though it has received peak noise levels of up to 138 dB. (American Institute of 

Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1993, as referenced in U.S. Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command, 2002c) Birds roosting within 250 meters (820 feet) of Titan launch 

complexes at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station have shown no mortality or reduction in 

habitat use. 

Fixed wing aircraft and helicopters are often used for routine flights around the Arctic 

Tundra Biome. These aircraft noises have been shown to produce sounds that are 

disturbing to seabirds. (Fjeld et al., as referenced in Chardine and Mendenhall, 2003) 

Breeding murres and eiders appear to be sensitive to this type of disturbance. Murres do 

not build nests but rather incubate their eggs on their feet; therefore, overflight noises 

may produce panic flights, leading to egg loss. 

During breeding and nesting periods birds may be less likely to flush from their nests for 

long periods of time. Monitoring studies of birds during the breeding season indicate that 

adults respond to Space Shuttle noise by flying away from the nest, but they return within 

two to four minutes. 

 

Noise associated with launches may disrupt critical nesting and migratory points for birds 

in the Deciduous Forest and Chaparral Biomes, which are common migration corridors 

for many species. Efforts at reducing noise interference are already underway to protect 

the endangered Red-Cockaded Woodpecker in the Southeast U.S., where it is estimated 

that nearly a quarter of the remaining Red-Cockaded Woodpecker population resides on 

16 military installations. (Delaney et al., 2002) Birds located in other biomes may also be 

impacted by launch activities and the extent of impact would be determined based on 

site-specific considerations. 

Noise level thresholds for impact to marine life in general and marine mammals in 

particular, are currently the subjects of scientific studies. Because different species of 

marine mammals have varying sensitivities to different sound frequencies, and the 

species may be found at different locations and depths in the ocean, it is difficult to 

generalize sound impacts to marine mammals from booster launches. Should consensus 

emerge from scientific analyses about the effects of noise on underwater marine 

mammals, it would be possible to predict the consequences of particular sonic boom 

contours on marine mammals in the area. 

According to analysis provided in the U.S. Navy’s Point Mugu Sea Range Environmental 

Impact Statement (EIS)/Overseas EIS (2002), brief transient sounds such as sonic booms 

are unlikely to result in significant adverse effects to pinnipeds or whales in the water. 

Pinnipeds seem tolerant of noise pulses from sonic booms, although reactions may occur. 
4-45 

Temporary displacement, less than one or two days, is considered a less than significant 

impact. Baleen whales (humpback, gray, and bowhead) have often been observed 

behaving normally in the presence of loud noises, such as distant explosions and seismic 

vessels. Most gray and bowhead whales show some avoidance of areas where these 

noises have pressures exceeding 170 dB. (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2002, as 

referenced in U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2003) 

Launch emissions from pre-fueled and non-pre-fueled liquid propellant boosters would 

have the potential to impact biological resources, but the impact would be minimal. HCl 

and Al2O3 emitted during launches of solid propellant boosters can harm plants and 

wildlife. Studies indicate that low-level, short-term exposure to HCl, as would be the 

case in booster launches, would not cause significant damage to vegetation or wildlife. 

Animals and birds passing through the exhaust plume may be exposed to levels of HCl 

that would irritate their eyes and respiratory systems. (FAA, 1996, as referenced in U.S. 

Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2002a) Al2O3 has a very low toxic 

potential. HCl and Al2O3 do not bioaccumulate; and therefore, no effects on the food 

chain would be expected. Surface water including wetlands could be impacted by the 

presence of hydrochloric acid, which could lower the pH and have a negative effect on 

species relying on the wetlands. 

Land Operating Environment. Launch activities from land-based operations that take 

place in previously disturbed areas would not be expected to adversely affect plant 

species. Launch areas are typically cleared of all vegetation and either covered with a 

layer of course gravel or left bare. (Cortez III Environmental, 1996) However, fire from 

a launch mishap at the launch site could impact plant species that may be present. Any 

fire would be extinguished quickly, where possible, minimizing impacts to vegetation 

remaining in the area. The risk of fires from launch activities is particularly prevalent in 

the Chaparral and Tropical Biomes, which are prone to wildfires. 

Sea Operating Environment. Pollutants would be present in the exhaust plume from 

boosters launched from sea platforms that could threaten wildlife near the point of the sea 

launch. However, these pollutants would be produced in trace quantities and would not 

have measurable effects on biological resources. 

Postlaunch Activities 

Impacts of launch debris on biological resources are discussed below on land versus 

those impacts of debris falling into water. 

Launch Debris Hitting Land. The amount of ground disturbed for each booster or kill 

vehicle impact would be less than 0.2 hectares (0.5 acres). (U.S. Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command, 2002c) Restoration of impact sites that are currently used for booster 

or kill vehicle impacts, if deemed necessary, would be conducted on a case-by-case basis 
4-46 

in coordination with the appropriate officials. Because threatened and endangered plant 

and animal species tend to be widely scattered and occupy small surface areas, the 

probability of a booster striking an individual of a federally listed, threatened, or 

endangered species is remote. 

New impact areas for boosters or kill vehicles could be created for specific missions. 

Selection of a new impact area would be coordinated with the appropriate range 

personnel to avoid or minimize potential harm to protected species. Effects to biological 

resources from impacts on a new area would be similar to those described above for 

impacts on existing areas. 

Recovery of booster and kill vehicle debris, if required, would be conducted in 

accordance with the launch site’s existing procedures. These procedures outline steps to 

be taken to avoid known sensitive areas. Off-road vehicle recovery operations would be 

used only if necessary and would be coordinated with the appropriate responsible 

officials. Recovery by vehicle would be limited to the minimum number of vehicles 

necessary to complete the operation. If necessary, light-lift helicopters could be used to 

recover debris in rough terrain. Aircraft, particularly helicopters, are loud and produce 

sounds that might disturb wildlife. Low altitude helicopter flights, which are known to 

cause panicky reactions in some wildlife species, would be intermittent, would involve 

gradual descents when necessary, and would then return to altitudes that would avoid 

further startling effects. 

In the unlikely event of flight termination or catastrophic missile failure, the impact of 

debris on land areas may damage vegetation and wildlife. In the case of flight 

termination or missile failure, debris and residual propellant could result in a fire that 

could damage vegetation and wildlife. However, impact areas would generally be 

cleared of vegetation, minimizing the potential for impact to biological resources due to 

fires. Hazardous debris, if any, would be recovered as quickly as possible. 

Launch Debris Hitting Water. Debris falling into water has the potential to cause nonacoustic effects to biological resources. These effects include physical impact by falling 

debris, entanglement in debris, and contact with or ingestion of debris or propellants. 

Boosters hitting the ocean surface would impart a considerable amount of kinetic energy 

to the ocean water upon impact. Interceptors would hit the water with speeds of 91 to 

914 meters (300 to 3,000 feet) per second. The shock wave from their impact with the 

water would be similar to that produced by explosives. Depending on the water depth, 

strong waves from the impact may detach kelp strands from the sea floor. During 

successful missions, boosters would impact in the deep open ocean waters. At close 

ranges, injuries to marine mammal internal organs and tissues would likely result. 
4-47 

However, the density of marine species including marine mammals generally decreases, 

and the corresponding probability of impact decreases, as the distance from the shore 

increases. Injury to any marine mammal by direct impact or shock wave impact would 

be extremely remote (less than 0.0006 (6 in 10,000) marine mammals exposed per year). 

(U.S. Department of the Navy, 2002b) 

Impacts to marine biological resources from releases of residual propellants from liquid 

propellant boosters would not be significant. The natural buffering capacity of sea water 

and the strong ocean currents would neutralize the reaction to any release of the liquid 

propellants. Impacts to water quality from a direct release to water are described in the 

hazardous waste section. 

The parts of solid rocket motor propellant expelled from a destroyed or exploded rocket 

motor that fall into the ocean would most likely sink to the ocean floor at depths of 

thousands of meters. At such depths, the propellant parts would be located away from 

feeding marine mammals. (U.S. Department of the Navy, 1998 as referenced in U.S. 

Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2003) Therefore, marine animals would not 

be impacted from ingesting the solid propellant. 

Geology and Soils 

Prelaunch Activities 

There would be no impacts to geology and soils from prelaunch activities for pre-fueled 

liquid and solid propellant boosters. Fueling of non-pre-fueled liquid propellant boosters 

would be conducted using appropriate impermeable barriers. (U.S. Army Space and 

Missile Defense Command, 2002c) Adherence to these procedures would minimize the 

potential for spills and any impacts to soils. 

Launch/Flight Activities 

Impacts to geology and soils are discussed separately below for land, sea and air 

operating environments. 

 

Land Operating Environment. Potential geology and soils impacts from ground launches 

would be minor. Emissions that occur above the mixing height or above the troposphere 

would not affect geology and soils. 

Soils that are strongly leached (removed of nutrients, including calcium) and are 

therefore acidic could be adversely affected by the addition of hydrochloric acid 

produced when HCl interacts with water in humid biomes further increasing soil acidity. 

This could occur in the Arctic Tundra, Sub-Arctic Taiga, Savanna, Mountain and parts of 

the Deciduous Forest, and Tropical Biomes. 
4-48 

The intensity of the acidic effect is a function of the amount of calcium carbonate in the 

soils. Calcium carbonate in some soils including those in the Grasslands and Deciduous 

Forest and some limestone rich portions of the Tropical Biome have nearly unlimited 

buffering capacities and would likely prevent emissions produced from solid boosters 

from affecting geology and soils. (EPA, 2003g) Therefore, no significant impacts to 

geology and soils would be expected. 

The Chaparral and Desert Biomes are unlikely to produce hydrochloric acid as a result of 

launches of solid propellant boosters and therefore soils in these biomes are unlikely to be 

affected by increased acid deposition. Although overall impacts to geology and soils 

from launch activities are expected to be minor, in areas where launches have not 

previously occurred, such as the U.S. Mountain Biome, the exhaust ground cloud could 

impact areas not previously disturbed by launch activities. The specific impacts to these 

areas would need to be analyzed as appropriate. 

Air Operating Environment. Impacts to geology and soils from air-based launches would 

be minor because ignition of the booster would occur several thousand feet above ground 

level. Emissions from air launches of boosters would have a smaller effect on geology 

and soil resources than land launches because the emissions would be at a greater altitude 

and would, therefore, be subject to greater dispersion and dilution prior to reaching the 

ground. 

Sea Operating Environment. No impacts to geology and soils would be expected from 

launches from sea-based platforms due to the depth of the ocean in areas from which sea 

launches would operate. 

Postlaunch Activities 

Impacts to geology and soils from launch debris hitting land versus falling into water are 

discussed separately below. 

Launch Debris Hitting Land. The debris from boosters and kill vehicles could physically 

impact the ground surface and overlying soils, but there would be no impact expected on 

geologic resources. Land surface damage from debris would be variable and determined 

by impact energy, soil compressibility, presence of water, and altitude from which the 

debris fell. (U.S. Army WSMR, 1998) The impact of the debris may result in ground 

depressions up to six meters (20 feet) deep. The extent of immediate physical 

disturbance to the soil from debris impact is likely to be less than 0.2 hectares (0.5 acres). 

Debris recovery, if required, would be limited to necessary vehicles and off-road access 

would follow the same entry route, to the extent possible, to complete the recovery 

operations with minimal disturbance to soils. (U.S. Army WSMR, 1998) 
4-49 

Residual propellants may be released upon booster or kill vehicle impact. If the 

propellants burn on impact, fire containment activities could also cause minor impacts to 

the soil. If vegetation were damaged, then wind and water erosion could both increase. 

If the residual IRFNA or unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine in a pre-fueled liquid 

propellant booster do not explode or burn at impact, then they would most likely be 

deposited on the ground. The IRFNA would volatilize into the atmosphere. Hydrazine 

fuel would slowly dissipate from surface soils within 24 hours. Hydrazine fuels buried in 

an impact crater created by the debris would dissipate over several months and would not 

significantly impact geology or soils. (Cortez III Environmental, 1996) 

If the residual propellants from non-pre-fueled liquid propellant boosters do not explode 

or burn at impact, then they would most likely be deposited on the ground. The nitrogen 

tetroxide oxidizer would volatilize into the atmosphere. Any residual nitric acid would 

react with alkaline soils resulting in the deposition of nitrates that would act as a fertilizer 

and would not appreciably affect soils. Hydrogen peroxide oxidizer deposited on the 

ground would decompose into water and oxygen within several hours. Kerosene or JP-8 

fuel deposited on the ground would be absorbed by the soil. Personnel at the debris 

impact site would follow standard operating procedures to determine whether soil 

remediation or removal and treatment and disposal actions are required. 

Launch Debris Hitting Water. No impacts to geology and soils would be expected from 

debris falling into the ocean due to the depth of the ocean where debris would impact. 

Inert pieces of debris would be deposited in the ocean and would consist of aluminum, 

steel, graphite composite, plastic, ceramic, and rubber. These materials would likely sink 

to the ocean floor; however, they would be unlikely to impact geology and soils in ocean 

areas. 

Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

Prelaunch Activities 

The types of hazardous materials used and waste generated during prelaunch, 

launch/flight, and postlaunch activities would be similar to those currently used and 

generated at military installations. Accidental releases of hazardous materials would be 

contained in accordance with site-specific spill plans. Temporary storage tanks and other 

facilities for the storage of hazardous materials would be located in protected and 

controlled areas. Activities would be conducted to comply with site-specific spill 

prevention, control and countermeasure (SPCC) plans, such as an Oil Discharge 

Prevention and Contingency Plan and a Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan 

(SWPPP). (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2002d) Any spill of a 

hazardous material or hazardous waste that might occur could be quickly remediated in 
4-50 

accordance with a Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan and SPCC plan that would be 

developed for each site. 

Should it become necessary to remove the propellants from a pre-fueled liquid propellant 

booster, the propellant would be drained into empty bulk liquid propellant containers 

stored at the fueling location. (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2002c) 

The defueled oxidizer tank would be flushed with deionized water, and the fuel tank 

would be flushed with ethyl alcohol. The booster would be transported back to the 

missile assembly building for reuse or returned to an appropriate facility. Emergency 

response planning would be incorporated into the operations requirements to minimize 

any impacts due to an unplanned release of hazardous materials. Therefore, no 

significant impacts would be expected. 

Non-pre-fueled liquid propellant boosters could be fueled at the launch location, provided 

there is sufficient space, or at a fixed, permanent facility. Fuel and oxidizer would be 

transported separately to the loading location and loaded at different times. Spill 

containment for the propellant transfer operation could be provided by a temporary 

containment system that is impervious to each particular fuel and oxidizer. One set of 

temporary containment barriers would be used for fuel, and a second set would be used 

for oxidizer. (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2002c) After completion 

of the transfer operations, the transfer equipment would be flushed to decontaminate it. 

Flushing the fuel transfer system would generate approximately 208 liters (55 gallons) of 

ethyl alcohol with approximately 40 grams (1.4 ounces) of fuel in solution. Flushing the 

oxidizer transfer system with deionized water would generate approximately 4,164 liters 

(1,100 gallons) of neutralized deionized water and oxidizer rinsate (less then 1 percent) 

and would result in the release of approximately five grams (0.2 ounces) of nitric oxide to 

the atmosphere. The material generated from flushing the propellant transfer systems 

would be handled as hazardous waste and would be disposed via appropriate procedures 

using permitted disposal facilities. Although propellant quantities and fueling systems 

have not been defined for all non-pre-fueled liquid propellant boosters, it is anticipated 

that similar materials would be generated when flushing hydrogen peroxide oxidizer and 

hydrocarbon fuel. Flushing nitrogen tetroxide oxidizer would involve similar methods 

and materials generated as IRFNA. 

Should it become necessary to remove the propellants from the non-pre-fueled liquid 

propellant booster, the propellant would be transferred into empty bulk liquid propellant 

containers stored at the fueling location. (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 

Command, 2002c) The propellant containers would then be transported to the respective 

propellant storage areas for reuse in the next mission. The defueled oxidizer tank would 

be flushed with deionized water and the fuel tank would be flushed with ethyl alcohol as 

described above. The booster would be transported back to the missile assembly building 

for reuse or returned to an appropriate facility. 
4-51 

The fuel and oxidizer tanks in kill vehicles would be installed at the test site. Spill 

containment and propellant removal procedures would be similar to those described 

above for non-pre-fueled liquid propellant boosters. 

There would be no impacts from prelaunch activities for solid propellant boosters. 

Launch/Flight Activities 

Launch activities would produce the same hazardous materials and hazardous waste in all 

biomes considered in this PEIS. Launches would potentially increase the hazardous 

waste generated at the launch sites. However, this increase in hazardous waste would not 

overburden the various facilities’ hazardous waste management programs, and only 

minimal impacts would be anticipated. During a nominal launch there would be no 

hazardous materials or hazardous waste impacts from the launch/flight of boosters or kill 

vehicles. 

Postlaunch Activities 

Impacts from hazardous materials and hazardous waste launch debris are addressed 

separately below on land versus in water. 

Launch Debris on Land. Debris from boosters and kill vehicles and residual propellant 

would be handled in accordance with the appropriate spill contingency plan for the 

launch location/debris impact site. These plans establish responsibility, outline personnel 

duties, and provide resources and guidelines for use in the control, clean up, and response 

to spills. 

Entry to the debris impact site would be restricted to trained hazardous material response 

personnel until the area is determined to be safe. All debris would be tested to determine 

if it is hazardous waste. Hazardous waste would be disposed via permitted procedures. 

For a nominal flight, liquid propellant boosters would contain unburned propellant upon 

impact within the planned impact area. The amount of propellant remaining in the 

booster would vary depending on the particular mission objectives (i.e., distance flown 

and fuel burned). 

 

During nominal flights of solid propellant boosters, most of the solid propellant would be 

expended. Debris would include structural material and batteries. These materials would 

be inert and would not have any significant impacts. Flight termination or catastrophic 

failure of the booster would result in the deposition of structural material and battery 

debris and any residual propellant. Some of the potentially hazardous material contained 

in the batteries or propellants would likely be consumed during the termination or failure. 

It is not expected that the remaining debris would pose a significant impact. 
4-52 

Launch Debris in Water. NASA has conducted evaluations of the effects of missile 

systems deposited in sea waters. The studies determined that materials would be rapidly 

diluted, and except for areas in the immediate vicinity of the debris, would not be found 

at concentrations identified as causing any adverse effects. This applies to debris 

deposited either as a result of successful or unsuccessful intercepts, or due to in-flight 

malfunction or flight termination along the flight corridor. Eventually, all hazardous 

materials falling into the ocean would become diluted and would cease to be of concern. 

NASA determined that the release of hazardous materials aboard missiles into sea waters 

would not be significant. (NASA, 1973 as referenced in U.S. Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command, 2003) Therefore, no significant impacts to the ocean environment 

would be expected from postlaunch activities involving liquid propellant missiles. 

During flight termination or catastrophic missile failure of solid propellant boosters, 

pieces of unburned propellant could be dispersed over an ocean area of up to several 

kilometers. Once in the water, ammonium perchlorate could slowly leach out and would 

be toxic to plants and animals. In freshwater at 20o

C (68oF), it is likely to take over a 

year for the perchlorate contained in solid propellant to leach out into the water. (Lang et 

al., 2000, as referenced in U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2003) 

Lower water temperatures and more saline waters would likely slow the leaching of 

perchlorate from the solid propellant into the water. Over this time, the perchlorate 

would be diluted in the water and would not reach significant concentrations. (U.S. Army 

Space and Missile Defense Command, 2003) 

Health and Safety 

Prelaunch Activities 

The handling and assembly of booster components are typically accomplished within 

enclosed buildings. These activities would adhere to applicable laws and regulations 

including the Range Commanders Council Standard 321-02, which establishes limits for 

risk to human health and safety. These analyses would take into account installationspecific and test-specific safety tolerances (range hazard areas). 

Prelaunch activities for pre-fueled liquid and solid propellant boosters would not have 

any impact on health and safety. All liquid propellant booster fueling procedures for 

non-pre-fueled liquid propellant boosters would be approved for the site where the 

activity is to occur, and associated emergency response plans would need to be reviewed 

before beginning activities to ensure protection of health and safety. Total oxidizer and 

fuel vapor emissions would vary depending on the propellant transfer equipment used 

and how it is assembled. It is anticipated that only very small amounts of oxidizer vapors 

would be released to the atmosphere during the oxidizer transfer operation. A negligible 

amount of fuel vapors would also be released into the atmosphere during fuel transfers. 

Exposure to liquid propellants resulting from fueling activities would be minimal. The 
4-53 

existing condition in several biomes would preclude fueling emissions from impacting 

health and safety of workers; this would be true in biomes where wind conditions would 

rapidly disperse emissions. Windy conditions are likely in the Sub-Arctic Tundra Biome. 

Analysis conducted using the U.S. Air Force Toxic Corridor Model computer model 

indicated potential exceedances of health standards as shown in Exhibit 4-9. Actual 

hazard distances would depend on the propellant, the amount released, meteorological 

conditions, and emergency response measures taken. Standard operating procedures 

would be developed and would include personal protection equipment procedures and 

distances at which it would be safe to establish fueling operations area boundaries. 

Establishment of and adherence to these procedures would minimize the potential health 

and safety hazards to personnel in the unlikely event of an unplanned propellant release. 

The low likelihood of such an occurrence and the implementation of approved emergency 

response plans would limit the impact of such a release. People located at distances in 

excess of the exceedance distance would not be exposed to health and safety impacts 

from prelaunch fueling activities. 

Exhibit 4-9. Potential Exceedances Due to Accidental Oxidizer or Fuel Leak to Air 

During Fueling Activities 

Propellant Health Standard Standard Limit Exceedance Distance

OSHA Permissible Exposure 

Limit (PEL)a

2 parts per million 

(ppm) (5 milligrams 

per cubic meter 

(mg/m3

)) 

34 meters (112 feet) 

National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and 

Health (NIOSH) Short Term 

Exposure Limit (STEL)b

4 ppm (10 mg/m3

) 20 meters (66 feet) 

IRFNA 

Immediately Dangerous to 

Life and Health (IDLH)c

25 ppm 

(65.5 mg/m3) Not Exceeded 

OSHA PEL 1 ppm (1.4 mg/m3) 212 meters (696 feet) 

NIOSH STEL 1 ppm (1.4 mg/m3) 212 meters (696 feet) Hydrogen 

Peroxide IDLH 75 ppm (105 mg/m3

) 14 meters (46 feet) 

American Conference of 

Governmental Industrial 

Hygienists (ACGIH) 

Threshold Limit Value 

(TLV)d

3 ppm (5.4 mg/m3

) 310 meters 

(1,017 feet) 

ACGIH STELb 5 ppm (9 mg/m3) 227 meters (746 feet) 

Nitrogen 

Tetroxide 

IDLH 75 ppm (135 mg/m3

) 103 meters (336 feet) 

Hydrazine OSHA PEL 1 ppm (1.31 mg/m3) 117 meters (383 feet) 
4-54 

Exhibit 4-9. Potential Exceedances Due to Accidental Oxidizer or Fuel Leak to Air 

During Fueling Activities 

Propellant Health Standard Standard Limit Exceedance Distance

ACGIH STEL 0.1 ppm 

(0.131 mg/m3

) 36 meters (118 feet) 

IDLH 50 ppm 

(65.5 mg/m3

) Not Exceeded 

Source: Modified from U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2002c 

Notes: 

a

 The OSHA PEL is the level of exposure that must not be exceeded when the exposure is averaged over an 

8-hour workday and a 40-hour workweek in the workplace. b

 The NIOSH STEL (or OSHA STEL or ACGIH STEL) is the level of exposure that must not be exceeded 

at any time during a workday when the exposure is averaged over 15 minutes. c

 The IDLH is the level of exposure (not time-weighted) above which it is anticipated a person would suffer 

life-threatening or irreversible health effects or other injuries that would impair them from escaping the 

hazardous environment. d The ACGIH TLV is an average value of exposure over the course of an 8-hour work shift. e

 Exceedance Distance-Average of U.S. Air Force Toxic Corridor model results for 15-minute and 30-

minute averaging time and multiple stability classes. 

Boosters could arrive at the test range with the kill vehicle attached, or the booster may 

be shipped separately from the kill vehicle. In either case, the fuel and oxidizer tanks 

would be installed in the kill vehicle at the test site. If the booster is shipped separately 

from the kill vehicle, the kill vehicle would be mated to the booster in a missile assembly 

building at the launch facility. These structures are commonly used for these types of 

activities and no impacts to health and safety would be expected from the mating and 

assembly process. (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2003) 

Launch/Flight Activities 

Launch activities would produce the same impacts on health and safety in all of the 

biomes considered in this PEIS. Potential impacts to health and safety include exposure 

to explosives, contact with launch debris, and exposure to noise produced during launch. 

Because launches would take place on facilities with restricted access, members of the 

public would not be exposed to these hazards. 

Appropriate health and safety standard operating procedures would be developed to 

protect personnel. Every reasonable precaution would be taken during the planning and 

execution of a launch to prevent injuries. 

A written procedure for all explosive activities is required and must be approved by the 

appropriate range authorities. Established procedures to prohibit access to restricted 

areas would be followed. The restricted areas are based upon the probability of potential 

hazards involved with malfunction during launches and would include 
4-55 

 The impact limit line, which sets the boundary protection line for all non-mission 

essential personnel; 

 The launch caution corridor, an area limited to essential personnel; 

 The LHA, an area around the launch point limited to essential personnel in hardened 

facilities; and 

 The stage or booster impact area. 

Impact zones for each launch would be delineated based on detailed launch planning and 

trajectory modeling, which would include analysis and identification of a flight corridor. 

Flights would be conducted when trajectory modeling verifies that launch-related debris 

would be contained within predetermined areas, all of which would be located away from 

inhabited land and populated areas. 

Launch-related personnel that would be exposed to noise in excess of applicable 

standards including OSHA regulation 1910.95 would be required to wear appropriate 

hearing protection, which would reduce the noise levels to prescribed health and safety 

levels. 

Postlaunch Activities 

There is the potential for impact of debris from boosters and kill vehicles at any point 

along the flight corridor due to missile malfunction and/or termination of a missile flight 

by the FTS. The resulting debris would follow a ballistic trajectory and would impact in 

designated impact areas either on land or in the ocean. Because an exact point of 

termination cannot be determined, the potential effects footprint is determined by 

considering the limits of debris fallout based on destruction of a test missile at the 

boundaries of the acceptable flight corridor, along with additional flight time based on the 

time required to initiate the FTS. The possibility of debris hitting the ground or water 

outside the designated impact area is remote; and therefore, safety impacts of flight 

termination would not be significant. Debris modeling and analysis would be conducted 

for specific proposed activities as appropriate. 

Launch Debris on Land. Procedures would be developed to establish appropriate debris 

recovery procedures, as necessary, and would include personal protective equipment and 

determination of appropriate recovery zone hazard boundaries. Therefore, no health and 

safety impacts would be expected from postlaunch activities. 

Exhibit 4-10 indicates the results of an analysis using the U.S. Air Force Toxic Corridor 

Model to determine distances at which various health standards could be exceeded based 

on the release of residual propellant at the debris impact area. The analysis was 

conducted for non-pre-fueled liquid propellant boosters assuming 473 liters (125 gallons) 

of the remaining oxidizer and 265 liters (70 gallons) of the remaining fuel were released 
4-56 

to the atmosphere. People located at distances in excess of the exceedance distance 

would not experience impacts to health and safety from postlaunch activities. 

Exhibit 4-10. Potential Exceedances Due to Accidental Oxidizer or Fuel Leak at the 

Booster Impact Site 

Propellant Health 

Standard Standard Limit Exceedance Distance 

OSHA PEL 2 ppm (5 mg/m3) 213 meters (699 feet) 

NIOSH STEL 4 ppm (10 mg/m3) 140 meters (458 feet) 

Inhibited Red 

Fuming Nitric 

Acid (IRFNA) IDLH 25 ppm (65.5 mg/m3

) 50 meters (164 feet) 

OSHA PEL 1 ppm (1.4 mg/m3) 195 meters (639 feet) 

NIOSH STEL 1 ppm (1.4 mg/m3) 195 meters (639 feet) Hydrogen 

Peroxide IDLH 75 ppm (105 mg/m3

) 11 meters (36 feet) 

ACGIH TLV 3 ppm (5.4 mg/m3) 1,074 meters (3,525 feet) 

ACGIH STEL 5 ppm (9 mg/m3 Nitrogen ) 740 meters (2,429 feet) 

Tetroxide IDLH 75 ppm (135 mg/m3

) 274 meters (899 feet) 

OSHA PEL 1 ppm (1.31 mg/m3) 462 meters (1,515 feet) 

ACGIH STEL 0.1 ppm (0.131 mg/m3 Hydrazine ) 123 meters (404 feet) 

IDLH 50 ppm (65.5 mg/m3

) 13 meters (44 feet) 

Source: Modified from U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2002c 

Launch Debris in Water. Booster trajectories would be established to preclude potential 

water impacts in heavily trafficked ocean areas. Notices to Mariners (NOTMARs) would 

be issued as appropriate to advise mariners of the projected impact area. In the event of a 

flight termination, the possibility of debris impacting a sea vessel would be remote, and 

therefore safety impacts of flight termination would not be significant. 

During flight termination or catastrophic missile failure of solid propellant boosters, 

pieces of unburned propellant could be dispersed over an ocean area of up to several 

kilometers. Once in the water, ammonium perchlorate could slowly leach out. In 1985, 

perchlorate was detected in wells of California Superfund sites; however, perchlorate 

contamination was not detected nationwide until 1997. Currently there are no Federal 

drinking water standards for perchlorate. The EPA has the responsibility to establish 

national drinking water standards and has issued draft risk assessments of perchlorate. 

These assessments have been criticized because it has been suggested that the findings 

are based on flawed scientific studies and that not all available data were considered and 

incorporated. Because of these controversies, the EPA, DoD, DOE, and NASA asked the 

National Research Council (NRC) to independently assess the adverse health effects of 

perchlorate ingestion from clinical, toxicological, and public health perspectives. The 

NRC was also tasked to review the scientific literature and findings from the EPA’s 2002 
4-57 

draft risk assessment, Perchlorate Environmental Contamination: Toxicological Review 

and Risk Characterization. 

Although there are no Federal drinking water standards for perchlorate several states have 

proposed interim guidance levels or goals for perchlorate levels in drinking water. In 

March 2004, the State of California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment 

established a public health goal for perchlorate in drinking water of 6 parts per billion. 

(California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment, 2005) The NRC study 

considered the health impacts from perchlorate exposure. The results of this study and an 

overview of additional relevant studies on the impacts of perchlorate on human health 

and the environment are discussed in Appendix M of this PEIS. 

Perchlorate can impact thyroid function because it inhibits the transport of iodide into the 

thyroid. The NRC study examined short-term studies that found that to negatively impact 

the thyroid, iodide uptake by the body would need to be reduced by at least 75 percent for 

months or longer. The NRC reported results of longer term studies that found that to 

cause hypothyroidism in adults would require them to be given more than 0.40 

milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg) of perchlorate (assuming a body weight of 70 

kilograms). However, in pregnant women, infants, children, and people with low iodide 

intake or pre-existing thyroid dysfunction, the dose required to cause hypothyroidism 

may be lower. 

Epidemiologic studies considered by the NRC have examined the relationship between 

perchlorate exposure and thyroid function and thyroid disease in newborns, children, and 

adults. The NRC concluded that no studies have investigated the effect of perchlorate 

exposure in vulnerable groups, such as low birth weight or preterm infants. In addition, 

these studies have not considered the impacts to the offspring of mothers who were 

exposed to perchlorate and had a low iodide intake. Finally, adequate studies have not 

been completed of maternal perchlorate exposure and neurodevelopmental outcomes in 

infants. 

The NRC study considered the applicability of animal toxicology studies to human health 

and found that although studies in rats provide useful qualitative information on potential 

adverse effects of perchlorate exposure, they have limited applicability for quantitatively 

assessing human health risks associated with perchlorate exposure. 

The NRC study also reviewed EPA’s findings presented in the 2002 perchlorate risk 

assessment. A primary purpose of EPA’s perchlorate risk assessment was to calculate a 

reference dose (RfD). The NRC study did not agree with the basis of the EPA’s study, 

which relied on animal data. The NRC reviewed both human and animal data and found 

that the human data formed a better basis for risk assessments. The EPA study’s draft 

RfD for perchlorate was 0.00003 mg/kg per day and the NRC study recommended an 

RfD of 0.0007 mg/kg per day. The NRC stated that this value is supported by other 
4-58 

clinical studies, epidemiologic studies, and studies of long-term perchlorate 

administration. The NRC report concluded that the proposed RfD of 0.0007 milligrams 

per kilogram per day should protect even the most sensitive populations. The EPA has 

established an official RfD of 0.0007 mg/kg/day of perchlorate consistent with this 

recommended RfD, which translates into a Drinking Water Equivalent Level of 24.5 ppb. 

Noise 

Prelaunch Activities 

Prelaunch activities including evacuation and road closure activities and storing boosters, 

propellants, and kill vehicles would have no impact on noise. 

Launch/Flight Activities 

Launch activities would produce the same noise levels in all of the biomes considered in 

this PEIS. The potential for impact would depend on the specific launch location. Three 

possible issues must be addressed to determine potential noise impacts, including 

personnel safety, public safety, and public annoyance. The impact of noise from 

launches on biological resources is addressed in Biological Resources. Launches would 

not add new types or levels of noise to the current noise environment at existing launch 

sites. Noise levels produced by BMDS launches would be similar to past and current 

noise levels at launch sites. Launches would be relatively short noise events during 

which all personnel would be located in various control or blockhouses and therefore 

would be protected from noise by the sound attenuation provided by the building’s 

construction. Zones in the operations area with high noise levels would be designated 

off-limits to non-essential personnel. Entry into these zones would be prohibited except 

to personnel wearing hearing protection that would reduce noise. 

Sonic booms may be generated during launch or booster reentry. Each booster would 

propagate a unique sonic boom contour depending upon its mass, shape, velocity, and 

launch or reentry angle, among other variables. Areas affected by a sonic boom could 

extend up to several miles on each side of the focal point of the sonic boom. Sonic 

booms may produce overpressures as high as 8 to 16 pounds per square foot, but this 

would be of very short duration, lasting up to several milliseconds. (U.S. Army Space and 

Strategic Defense Command, 1994a) These levels of sonic booms can have minor effects 

on physical structures (glass failure, plaster may crack, etc.) but are not strong enough to 

cause injury to people. 

Air Operating Environment. Noise generated by the booster launched from an air 

platform would reach the Earth’s surface. Prior analyses of air-launched boosters showed 

that an Air Drop vehicle launched from an altitude of approximately 5,000 feet above 

MSL would generate approximately 115 dBA at ground level directly below the launch 
4-59 

point. (BMDO, 1998) The noise levels that reach the ground will vary depending on the 

altitude and attitude at which the booster is launched. This noise would decrease rapidly 

as the launch altitude increases; thus, launch noise would be brief. 

Sea Operating Environment. Launches from sea platforms in the BOA would have fewer 

noise impacts because of the distance of the sea operating environment from population 

centers. Essential personnel would be located in an area of the sea launch environment 

that is protected from the noise generated during launch. Non-essential personnel would 

be moved to a safe distance and would be protected from the noise generated during 

launches. Personnel that may be exposed to loud noises would be required to wear 

hearing protection, such as earplugs or earmuffs, which would reduce noise levels to 

prescribed health and safety levels. 

Postlaunch Activities 

Impacts of noise from launch debris recovery activities on land are discussed below. 

Launch Debris on Land. Vehicles used for booster and kill vehicle debris recovery 

operations (trucks and helicopters) on land would produce noise. Each recovery 

operation would be expected to last less than one day; thus, noise associated with debris 

recovery would not be a constant occurrence. Helicopter flight helmets would provide 

the required noise attenuation for the crew. Noise impacts from debris recovery 

operations would be minor. 

Transportation 

Prelaunch Activities 

Prelaunch activities including booster fueling, road closure, and evacuations would not 

impact transportation. Road closures would be implemented in the areas around the 

launch site and along the expected trajectory. These temporary road closures would be of 

short duration and would be considered routine occurrences for launch sites. Prominent 

notices would be posted to notify the general public and local businesses of expected 

closures. Therefore, impacts on traffic are not expected to be significant. Existing 

agreements regarding road closures would be followed. These impacts would be the 

same in all of the biomes considered in this PEIS. Any disruption due to military 

convoys or roadblocks would be of short duration and would not be expected to have a 

significant impact on transportation. 

Propellants for non-pre-fueled liquid propellant boosters would be transported from the 

storage facility to the fueling location in accordance with appropriate regulations and 

would not be expected to pose significant impacts to transportation. 
4-60 

Launch/Flight Activities 

Issuance of NOTMARs is standard practice when a launch has the potential to impact 

marine areas and would allow marine vessels to clear the affected area; thus, launch 

activities would have no impact on marine transportation 

In some biomes there are few roads and much of the transportation in the region occurs 

by airplane. Therefore, while launches may have little to no impact on ground 

transportation due to road closures, air transportation may be temporarily affected. 

NOTAMs would be issued prior to launch events that would notify pilots of proposed 

airspace closures and would permit pilots to find new routes or to delay their trip until 

after the airspace is reopened. Impacts to air transportation are discussed above in 

Airspace. 

Postlaunch Activities 

Impacts to transportation from debris recovery are addressed separately for land and 

water below. 

Launch Debris on Land. Trucks and mobile ground equipment used for debris recovery 

operations for boosters and kill vehicles would travel both on- and off-road. Debris 

recovery requires a relatively small number of vehicles and therefore, is not expected to 

impact traffic or transportation infrastructure. 

Launch Debris in Water. Debris from boosters and kill vehicles may fall into waters 

normally occupied by commercial shipping. The majority of international trade uses 

routes of least distance. The actual debris impact area for boosters and kill vehicles 

would be small and would depend upon the individual flight path. Prior warning of 

proposed launch activities through issuances of NOTMARs would enable commercial 

shipping to follow alternative routes away from the proposed debris impact area. 

Water Resources 

Prelaunch Activities 

Adherence to existing policies and procedures would minimize the impacts from spills 

related to pre-fueled and solid propellant boosters and kill vehicles. Fueling of non-prefueled liquid propellant boosters would be conducted in accordance with approved 

procedures and all applicable regulations. All fueling would be conducted using 

appropriate impermeable barriers that would prevent spills from reaching bodies of water. 
4-61 

Launch/Flight Activities 

Small amounts of hydrochloric and hydrofluoric acids would be generated from the 

launch of pre-fueled liquid propellant boosters. These acids could reach surface water if 

rainfall occurred within two hours of a launch. This is most likely to occur in the Arctic 

Tundra, Sub-Arctic Taiga, Deciduous Forest, and Mountain Biomes where rain is a 

frequent occurrence. In addition, hydrochloric acid could be produced in the Sub-Arctic 

Taiga, Chaparral, Grasslands, and Savanna Biomes when cool and humid conditions exist 

during launch activities. Given the dry conditions in the Desert Biome it is unlikely that 

chlorine would be converted to hydrochloric acid. The Tropical Biome is generally 

humid but the temperatures are not cool enough to convert the HCl produced as a result 

of launches to hydrochloric acid. In the BOA, the acid produced would be neutralized by 

calcium carbonate in ocean water. However, exhaust emissions from pre-fueled liquid 

propellant missiles would not significantly impact water quality. 

Launch of solid propellant boosters could result in deposition of small amounts of Al2O3

from booster exhaust. This exhaust product could be deposited in surface waters. EPA 

has determined that Al2O3 as found in solid propellant exhaust is nontoxic. (NASA, 1990, 

as referenced in U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command, 1994a) Al2O3 would 

be hazardous only in acidic biomes (pH less than 5) where it would dissociate into free 

aluminum cation. (FAA, 1996, as referenced in U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 

Command, 2003) 

In biomes where rain is a frequent occurrence, launches with solid boosters have an 

increased likelihood of contributing to acid rain, thereby increasing the amount of HCl 

deposited in regional surface waters. In areas with low velocity of surface and ground 

water movement and relatively shallow ground water table it is possible that deposition 

of acidic water may impact water resources. The potential for and extent of impact 

would need to be examined in site-specific environmental analysis. 

In the absence of substantial surface and ground water bodies, launch exhaust emissions 

are unlikely to impact water resources. Additionally, in many desert areas, the ground 

water table is lower than six meters (20 feet) below ground level, which would inhibit 

contamination from surface pollutants. For example, the evaporation and deposition of 

dissolved solids in the water for thousands of years has formed a hardpan over much of 

the Tularosa Basin, which houses an aquifer that underlies WSMR, New Mexico, and 

Fort Bliss, Texas. The hardpan consists of impermeable silt and clay and aids in 

preventing pollution of the aquifer from the land surface. It is unlikely that the aquifer 

could be contaminated from surface seepage from the lower elevations of the basin. This 

eliminates any direct channeling to the water table. (Carmichael, 1986, as referenced in 

U.S. Army WSMR, 1991) 
4-62 

Postlaunch Activities 

If residual liquid propellants were deposited in surface water (either in the ocean or in 

lakes or streams), nitric acid would cause a short-term pH change in the water body. The 

acid would mix with the water and eventually be neutralized and diluted. Hydrogen 

peroxide in surface water would decompose into water and oxygen within eight hours to 

20 days. Kerosene or JP-8 fuel would not mix with the water, but would form a slick on 

the surface that would stick to surfaces it contacts. Hydrazine fuels would degrade 

primarily into N2 gas and water over a period of hours to weeks, with degradation 

proceeding more rapidly in alkaline waters. 

Impacts to water quality from a direct release on land are described in the hazardous 

waste section above. 

Launch Debris in Water. In some instances, an early flight termination could result in 

propellant and debris deposition in water bodies. Some perennial surface waters could be 

impacted following a flight termination. However, the probability of any individual 

water body, spring, or creek being directly impacted is extremely low and would be a 

function of the amount of surface water in the impact area. An early flight termination 

also could possibly impact in an area of shallower ground water or an aquifer recharge 

zone. In any of these unlikely events, the appropriate officials would be notified. 

In the event of a failure, effluents may enter water bodies if the debris impacts in surface 

water areas. These effluents could enter underground sources of drinking water in areas 

where there is a shallow ground water table. However, the release rates of materials that 

impact surface water would be such that no significant changes in surface water quality 

would be detectable. 

The booster and kill vehicle would consist primarily of inert metal objects that would 

have little potential to contaminate water bodies. In general, a typical water 

contamination response would include 

 Rendering the booster or debris safe, 

 Stopping the flow of oxidizer or fuel, 

 Neutralizing the oxidizer in the stream (or body of water) sufficiently far downstream 

so as to avoid a continuing hazard to water quality, 

 Installing surface skimmers and absorptive materials downstream from the lead edge 

of contamination to collect the fuel, 

 Monitoring the pH along the stream to ascertain that a background pH level has been 

established, and 

 Removing all petroleum products from stream surfaces and returning the damaged 

area to an environmentally sound level.
4-63 

Orbital Debris 

Prelaunch Activities 

No orbital debris would be produced from prelaunch activities. 

Launch/Flight Activities 

Orbital debris could be produced from launch/flight activities in the event of a booster 

failure while in the exoatmosphere. However, any debris would not be expected to 

remain in orbit for more than a short time, followed by deorbiting and eventual burn-up 

during reentry of the Earth’s atmosphere. 

Postlaunch Activities 

A failure of a booster in the exoatmosphere may generate orbital debris. The type of 

orbital debris produced from a booster failure would be similar to that produced from a 

high altitude successful intercept. However, the amount of debris from a booster failure 

would be less than that produced from an intercept. The impacts of orbital debris from 

intercepts are discussed in Section 4.1.2.10 and were found to not pose significant 

impacts. Therefore orbital debris from a booster failure would similarly not pose 

significant impacts. 

4.1.1.3 Sensors - Radars 

As described in Exhibit 4-3, the analysis for radars is based upon impacts from the 

activation of the radar. 

Air Quality 

Activation emissions from radars would be limited to exhaust produced by generators. 

Impacts related to generator emissions are discussed in Support Assets. These impacts 

would be the same in all of the biomes considered in this PEIS. 

Airspace 

During activation of land-based radars, NOTAMs would be issued and pilots would be 

restricted from EMR hazard areas. NOTAMs would be sent in accordance with the 

conditions of the directive specified in Army Regulation 95-10, Operations to notify 

aircraft of EMR hazard areas during the activation of radars. Airspace restrictions would 

be short-term events and would not pose a significant impact on available airspace. 

Sufficient notice of restricted areas would be provided to allow pilots to select alternate 

flight paths to avoid restricted areas. 
4-64 

The activation of radars in the Sub-Arctic Taiga Biome may impact small civilian 

aircraft, which frequently transit the biome at low altitudes. Because many remote 

civilian airports within this biome do not have operating control towers, some aircraft 

pilots may be required to upgrade their communication equipment (at their own expense) 

to ensure that they are aware of activation activities and areas that must be avoided. 

Civilian aircraft would be required to contact local range control towers when transiting 

restricted airspace. The controllers would then be able to advise civilian pilots as to their 

proximity to hazard areas during activation of radars. (U.S. Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command, 2000) Other biomes including Arctic Tundra and the BOA are 

unlikely to experience impacts because small civilian aircraft would not readily occur in 

these regions. The Deciduous Forest, Chaparral, Grasslands, Desert, Tropical, Savanna, 

and Mountain Biomes are unlikely to experience impacts because these biomes are more 

likely to have operational control towers that could communicate with civilian aircraft. 

For activation activities occurring in international airspace, procedures of the ICAO 

would be followed. ICAO Document 4444 is the equivalent air traffic control manual to 

the FAA Handbook 7110.65, Air Traffic Control. Personnel would ensure coordination 

with the ICAO through the FAA, to issue NOTAMs, locate ships with radar capable of 

monitoring the airspace, contact all commercial airlines and civil and private airports, and 

monitor appropriate radio frequencies to minimize potential safety impacts. 

During activation of radars in the BOA, at least one Control Area Extension corridor in 

the BOA would remain available for use by general aviation and commercial air carriers. 

Potential interference to aircraft electronic and emitter units (e.g., flight navigation 

systems and tracking radars) would be examined before activation of radars. A highenergy radiation area would be configured to mitigate potential impacts to aircraft and 

other potentially affected systems and a notice would be published on the appropriate 

aeronautical charts, notifying aircraft of the radio frequency radiation area. Boundaries 

of these radio frequency radiation areas would be configured to minimize impacts to 

aircraft operations and other potentially affected systems. In addition information would 

be published in the Airport Facility section of the FAA Airport Guide. Flight service 

personnel would brief pilots flying in the vicinity about the radio frequency radiation 

area. Radar operations would be coordinated with FAA and range officials and if 

possible would be programmed to limit radio frequency emissions in the direction of 

airways that pass within the potential interference distance. 

EMR from radar activation may interact with and adversely affect aircraft operations by 

disabling or inadvertently initiating vital electronic equipment, including electroexplosive 

devices on-board aircraft. Electroexplosive devices on aircraft in flight could be 

illuminated by a radar main beam. Software controls and coordination with military and 

commercial aircraft controllers would eliminate this potential hazard. (U.S. Army Space 

and Missile Defense Command, 2003) 
4-65 

The FAA and DoD have standards, such as MIL-STD-464, for EMR interference with 

aircraft, which would not be exceeded. To operate in an affected area, military aircraft 

would have to be hardened or protected from EMR levels up to 3,500 volts per meter 

(peak power) and 1,270 volts per meter (average power). Commercial aircraft must be 

hardened or protected from EMR levels up to 3,000 volts per meter (peak power) and 300 

volts per meter (average power) as mandated by the FAA by Notice 8110.71, Guidelines 

for the Certification of Aircraft Flying through High Intensity Radiated Field 

Environments. Radars would not exceed the 3,000 volts per meter power threshold. 

Reducing the time on-board electronic equipment is exposed to EMR would lower the 

average power threshold experienced. (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 

2003) Commercial aircraft equipment would be affected only if the main beam 

illuminated the aircraft long enough to affect on-board electronics. Because radars are 

typically in constant motion, it is highly unlikely that a radar would illuminate an aircraft 

long enough to interfere with on-board electronics. 

Activation impacts from air- and sea-based radars would be similar to those described for 

land-based radars. Radars located on sea-based operating environments would most 

likely be located far enough off the coast to not interfere with existing airfield or airport 

arrival and departure traffic flows. Activation of space-based radars would not be 

expected to impact airspace. 

Biological Resources 

Radar activation activities would produce the same impacts on biological resources in all 

of the biomes considered in this PEIS. The potential for main-beam exposure thermal 

effects to animals, especially birds, exists from the activation of land- and air-based 

radars. The Final Ground-Based Radar Family of Radars Environmental Assessment 

(1993) and Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Extended Test Range Environmental 

Impact Statement (2003) analyzed potential impacts on wildlife from EMR. Additional 

analysis is provided in this PEIS in Appendix N. Potential effects include exposure of 

birds to the main radar beam, which could result in thermal heating or interference with 

the navigation of migratory birds, EMR impacts from the COBRA DANE radar operating 

on Eareckson Air Station on Shemya Island, Alaska, bird collisions with radar and radar 

equipment, and effects in the near shore environment.

Appendix N evaluates under what conditions a BMDS radar beam could be sufficiently 

powerful to cause thermal heating or to interfere with the navigational ability of 

migratory birds. The proposed BMDS radars would operate within five different 

wavebands: UHF, L, S, C, and X bands. For each of the five bands, the most powerful 

type of radar operating in that band was evaluated. The representative radar from each 

band is PAVE PAWS for UHF, COBRA DANE for L-band, Aegis for S-band, MPS-36 

for C-band and SBX for X-band. 
4-66 

The conservative analysis presented in Appendix N indicated that there is no concern for 

birds flying through radar beams emanating from the X-band, C-band and UHF radars. 

This applies to bird flights perpendicular to or in the direction of stationary beams, as 

well as for beams in surveillance mode. However, for the L-band COBRA DANE radar, 

there may be some risk to birds flying at flight altitudes of less than 1,700 meters above 

the radar, when the beam is elevated between four and fifty degrees above horizontal. 

This is a worst-case scenario for birds migrating from Alaska along the Pacific Oceanic 

migration route that might fly parallel to the COBRA DANE radar beam for a portion of 

their flight. Birds migrating from Alaska to Asia are likely to be flying more 

perpendicular or at an angle to the radar beam than parallel to the beam. For higher beam 

elevations and for lower flying birds, migrating birds flying parallel to the beam may not 

receive exposures above the no-harm reference value. 

In Appendix N, MDA has considered mitigation measures to reduce the possible risks to 

migrating birds. The mitigation measures discussed in Appendix N include 

 Evaluating the possibility that the COBRA DANE radar might be tested with 

stationary beams during spring and fall migrations. 

 Evaluating whether the locations where the COBRA DANE radar would be used are 

in a significant migratory route or near to a migratory stopover, such that large 

migratory flocks might on occasion pass through the radar beam. 

 Considering use of a local Next Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD) to help 

evaluate when large flocks might be in the vicinity of the radar if a risk to migratory 

flocks is deemed to exist, so that the timing of a test does not coincide with 

particularly large flocks of birds flying close to the radar. 

Bird collisions with radars and radar equipment also are a concern. MDA could mitigate 

this risk by using highly visible paints and a change in brightness of warning lights on the 

antenna towers and guy wires to minimize the potential for bird collisions with radar 

equipment. Overall, no significant impacts to birds would be expected from the operation 

of radars. 

Potential impacts on wildlife from the activation of sea-based radars in the near shore 

environment would include seabirds and shorebirds, including migratory species, striking 

the antennas, telescopes, and shelters or becoming disoriented due to high intensity 

lighting at night. To minimize the occurrence of bird strikes, antennas would be raised 

only as necessary and colorful streamers or other visual indicators could be used to 

increase visibility to birds, if there is no interference with the operation of the radar. To 

prevent birds from becoming disoriented, high intensity lighting would be used only 

when necessary and low intensity lighting would be used whenever possible. Lighting 

would be adequate for safe working conditions but minimized to the extent practical. 
4-67 

Radar main beams on sea-based operating environments would not be directed toward the 

ocean surface, which would limit the probability of energy absorption by surface-oriented 

wildlife. The power density level just below the surface of the ocean where marine 

mammals may be located would not exceed the PEL for uncontrolled environments. 

(U.S. Department of the Navy, 2002a, as referenced in U.S. Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command, 2003) No adverse impact would occur to whales, other marine 

mammals, or sea turtles found at least 1.3 centimeters (0.5 inch) below the surface. It is 

also highly unlikely that an individual would be on or substantially above the surface of 

the water for a significant amount of time within the main beam area during radar 

activation. Therefore, no impacts are anticipated to whales, other marine mammals, or sea 

turtles that might be present in the vicinity of the radar. 

Previous analysis (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2003) has shown 

the potential EMR interference distance for fully-populated XBR to be only 19 

kilometers (12 miles). Because space-based platforms would be placed in LEO or GEO 

at altitudes ranging from approximately 160 to 1,600 kilometers (100 to 1,000 miles) for 

LEO and approximately 35,000 kilometers (21,700 miles) or greater for GEO, it is 

expected that EMR would not reach Earth; thus, the activation of space-based radars 

would not be expected to impact biological resources. 

Geology and Soils 

Radar activation activities would produce the same impacts on geology and soils in all of 

the biomes considered in this PEIS. Impacts to geology and soils from activation of 

radars would be limited to accidental spills of diesel fuel from generators used to support 

the activation of radars. Potential impacts from releases of diesel fuel are discussed in 

Support Assets. 

 

Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

Radar activation activities would produce the same hazardous materials and hazardous 

waste impacts in all of the biomes considered in this PEIS. The types of hazardous 

materials used and waste generated would be similar to those currently used and 

generated at military installations. Antifreeze and fire suppressants would be used for 

radar electronic systems. Cooling equipment units would use coolant fluids, such as a 

mixture of ethylene glycol and water. In addition, radar components and antenna units 

may require periodic application of petroleum-based lubricating oils. Used petroleum, 

oil, and lubricants would be generated in smalls amounts are not normally considered 

hazardous waste (designation varies by state). (U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense 

Command, 1993c) All hazardous materials used and hazardous waste generated during 

the activation of land- and air-based radars would be handled in accordance with 

applicable regulations. Accidental releases of hazardous materials would be contained in 

accordance with site-specific spill plans. 
4-68 

Temporary storage tanks and other facilities for the storage of hazardous materials would 

be located in protected and controlled areas designed to comply with SPCC plans. 

Hazardous wastes generated during radar activation activities may consist of materials 

such as waste oils, hydraulic fluids, cleaning fluids, cutting fluids, and waste antifreeze. 

The minimal quantities of hazardous waste that could potentially be generated would be 

disposed of in accordance with appropriate waste disposal regulations. 

Impacts from hazardous materials and hazardous waste management for sea-based radars 

would be similar to those described for land- and air-based radars. The U.S. Navy 

requires that, to the maximum extent practical, ships retain hazardous waste onboard for 

shore disposal. If hazardous materials are discharged overboard, this must occur more 

than 370 kilometers (200 nautical miles) from land. Discharging hazardous materials 

overboard is not standard practice and would only be done in emergency situations. 

Twenty-five liquid discharges, such as clean ballast, deck runoff, and dirty ballast, from 

normal operation of military vessels are required to be controlled by installation of 

control technologies or use of management practices (marine pollution control devices) 

under the Uniform National Discharge Standard provisions of the Clean Water Act. In 

compliance with Uniform National Discharge Standards, the sea-based operating 

environment would incorporate marine pollution control devices, such as keeping decks 

clear of debris, cleaning spills and residues, and engaging in spill and pollution 

prevention practices, in design or routine operation. 

Health and Safety 

Radar activation activities would produce the same impacts on health and safety in all of 

the biomes considered in this PEIS. Safety precautions for handling, storing and 

transporting hazardous materials and hazardous waste releases would be followed at sites 

involved in BMDS activities. Each site would follow spill control and emergency 

response plans that would provide response actions for cleanup. Sites would maximize 

on-site and off-site recycling to reduce the need for waste disposal sites and handle or 

dispose of hazardous materials or wastes in compliance with all applicable laws, 

regulations, and guidance. (U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command, 1993b) 

Prior to activation of radars, an EMR survey would be conducted that considers hazards 

of EMR to personnel, to fuels, and to ordnance. The analysis would provide 

recommendations for sector blanking and safety systems to minimize exposures. 

Appropriate safety exclusion zones would be established before operation, and warning 

lights to inform personnel when the system is operating and emitting EMR would be 

installed. 

Personnel exclusion areas would be established to protect personnel from potential EMR 

hazards during radar activation. Personnel not involved in test event activities would not 

be permitted to enter established hazard zones during the activation of radars. EMR 
4-69 

hazard zones would be established within the main beam’s tracking space near emitter 

equipment. A visual survey of the area would be conducted to verify that all personnel 

are outside of the hazard zone prior to activation. Safety exclusion zones would also be 

established around generator wiring and cabling to protect personnel from high voltage 

exposure. 

Potential health and safety hazards associated with the operation of radars were analyzed 

in previous documents. Two examples of these are Ground-Based Radar Family of 

Radars Environmental Assessment (1993) and Environmental Assessment for Theater 

Missile Defense Ground-Based Radar Testing Program at Fort Devens, Massachusetts

(1994). These analyses considered operational requirements and restrictions and rangerequired safety procedures. It was determined that implementing safety procedures, 

including establishing controlled areas and limitations in the areas subject to illumination 

by radars, would preclude any potential safety hazard to either the public or projectrelated personnel from exposure to EMR. 

The analysis method used to evaluate potential impacts of radio frequency radiation is the 

IEEE Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE), which defines the maximum timeaveraged radio frequency power density allowed for uncontrolled human exposure. The 

MPE method is independent of body size or tissue density being exposed. EMR hazard 

zones provide a safety factor 10 times greater than the MPE. MPEs are capped at 5 

megawatts per square centimeter for frequencies greater than 1,500 MHz. (IEEE C95.1-

1999, Standard for Safety Levels with Respect to Human Exposure to Radiofrequency 

EM Fields, 3 kilohertz to 300 GHz) General public exposure is typically limited to one 

fifth of the occupational limits. 

At X-band frequencies, the IEEE standard for human exposure is 5.33 megawatts per 

square centimeter. For radars to have an effect on human health, the beam operating at 

full power would have to come in contact with a person and remain on them for 7.5 

minutes (at 8,000 MHz) or 11.25 minutes (at 12,000 MHz). (U.S. Army Space and 

Missile Defense Command, 2003) The beam would normally be in motion, which would 

reduce the likelihood that a person would remain within the most intense area of the 

beam for any considerable length of time. 

In addition to the impacts described above, activation of radars on sea-based operating 

environments would be coordinated with the FAA, U.S. Coast Guard, and other groups or 

agencies as appropriate. The implementation of software controls would prevent a 

radiation hazard zone from occurring on the deck of the sea-based operating 

environment. 
4-70 

Noise 

Radar activation activities would produce the same noise impacts in all of the biomes 

considered in this PEIS. Noise impacts associated with activation of radars would be 

limited to noise produced by generators. Impacts related to generator noise are discussed 

in Support Assets. 

 

Transportation 

The activation of radars has the potential to impact air transportation. These impacts are 

discussed in Airspace. These impacts would be the same in all of the biomes considered 

in this PEIS. 

NOTMARs would be issued in advanced of test events; therefore, commercial marine 

vessels would be able to choose transportation routes outside of proposed radar activation 

areas. 

Water Resources 

Additional personnel would be needed for the activation of radars; these personnel would 

increase the demand for potable water. An increase in demand could exceed the capacity 

of the existing infrastructure at some locations. (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 

Command, 2003) This is of particular concern in portions of the Sub-Arctic Taiga, 

Grasslands, Desert, Tropical, and Mountain Biomes. It is anticipated that additional 

packaged potable water systems would be installed to meet the demands in areas where 

access to potable water is limited. Site-specific studies should consider the limited 

potable water supplies in these areas when analyzing the impacts to water resources from 

the proposed activation of radars. Other biomes including Arctic Tundra, Sub-Arctic 

Taiga, Deciduous Forest, Chaparral, and Savanna Biomes are unlikely to experience 

impacts to water resources. Due to ample ground water supply, it is unlikely that a 

significant increase in demand would exceed the capacity of existing infrastructure in 

these biomes. 

 

Impacts to water resources from activation of radars would include potential release of 

hazardous materials. Materials released from sea-based operating environments would 

be rapidly diluted and would not be found at concentrations identified as producing any 

adverse impacts due to the high buffering capacity of sea water in the open ocean. The 

ocean depth in the vicinity of sea-based radar would most likely be thousands of meters 

deep, and consequently, any impact from fuel or hazardous material spills would be 

minimal. From land- and air-based operating environments, impacts from hazardous 

materials releases would depend on the characteristics of the water bodies in the 

respective biome. No impacts to water resources would occur as a result of space-based 

sensors that would be in GEO. 
4-71 

Orbital Debris 

No impacts from orbital debris would occur as a result of the activation of land-, air-, and 

sea-based radars. 

Orbiting objects lose energy through friction with the upper atmosphere and various other 

orbit perturbing forces. Over time, an object may drop into progressively lower orbits 

and may eventually fall to Earth. As the object’s orbital trajectory draws closer to Earth, 

it speeds up and outpaces objects in higher orbits. Once the object enters the measurable 

atmosphere, atmospheric drag will slow it down rapidly and cause it either to burn up or 

deorbit and fall to Earth. 

Space-based radars could reenter the Earth’s atmosphere due to failure, but would not 

likely result in significant impacts. Most objects break up and often vaporize under the 

intense aerodynamic forces and heating that occur during reentry. Most of the objects 

which reenter would fragment and burn in the upper atmosphere and would make only 

negligible changes in its chemical composition. An estimated 500 objects and thousands 

of debris fragments reenter the Earth’s atmosphere each year; however, few survive 

reentry. Out of approximately 3,100 objects from 44 launches between 1956 and 1972, 

only 100 have survived reentry and been recovered. Even if an object does survive 

reentry, only one third of the Earth is land area, and only a small portion of this land area 

is densely populated. The chance of hitting a populated land area upon reentry would be 

small. (SDIO, 1992) 

4.1.1.4 Sensors - Infrared and Optical Sensors 

As described in Exhibit 4-3, the analysis for infrared and optical sensors is based upon 

impacts from the activation of the sensors. 

Air Quality 

Activation emissions from infrared and optical sensors would be similar to those 

discussed for radars. These impacts would be the same in all of the biomes considered in 

this PEIS. 

Airspace 

No impacts to airspace would be expected due to the activation infrared and optical 

sensors. 

 
4-72 

Biological Resources 

No impacts to biological resources would be expected due to the activation infrared and 

optical sensors. 

 

Geology and Soils 

Impacts to geology and soils from activation of infrared and optical sensors would be 

similar to those discussed for radars. Infrared and optical sensor activation activities 

would produce the same impacts on geology and soils in all of the biomes considered in 

this PEIS. 

Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

Impacts to hazardous materials and hazardous waste from activation of infrared and 

optical sensors would be similar to those described for radars. 

Health and Safety 

Safety exclusion zones would be established around generator wiring and cabling to 

protect personnel from high voltage exposure. These impacts would be the same in all of 

the biomes considered in this PEIS. 

 

Noise 

Noise impacts associated with activation of infrared and optical sensors would be similar 

to those described for radars. These impacts would be the same in all of the biomes 

considered in this PEIS. 

Transportation 

There would be no impacts to transportation from the activation of infrared and optical 

sensors. 

Water Resources 

Impacts to water resources from activation activities would be similar to those described 

for radars. These impacts would be the same in all of the biomes considered in this PEIS. 

Orbital Debris 

Impacts from orbital debris related to space-based sensor activities would be similar to 

those described for radars. See Section 4.1.1.3. 
4-73 

4.1.1.5 Sensors - Laser Sensors 

As described in Exhibit 4-3, the analysis for laser sensors is based upon impacts from the 

activation of the sensor. 

Air Quality 

Laser sensor activation activities would produce the same air quality impacts in all of the 

biomes considered in this PEIS. Laser sensors include gas lasers and solid-state lasers 

that expend low-level infrared radiation to form a focused laser beam. (MDA, 2003a) 

Potential emissions produced during activation would depend on chemicals used. These 

emissions would typically be released to the air where the impacts would be as discussed 

below. 

The operation of a CO2 gas laser sensor, like the Active Ranging System (ARS) laser 

associated with the ABL, would include the use of helium, N2, and CO2. (MDA, 2003a) 

None of these inert gases are considered hazardous; however, they can be asphyxiants, 

replacing oxygen to create oxygen-deficient conditions. A leak of these gases to the 

atmosphere would be insignificant relative to ambient oxygen concentrations. Impacts 

from asphyxiants would occur only in confined areas. Gas laser sensors could use a 

glycol (Refrigerant 404) closed-loop cooling system. Refrigerant 404 is an ozonedepleting substance; however, the closed-loop system would prevent releases to the 

atmosphere. In the unlikely event that a release does occur during testing or activation, 

the small amount released would quickly be dispersed and would not significantly impact 

air quality. 

Solid-state lasers like the Beacon Illuminator Laser (BILL) and the TILL associated with 

the ABL have crystals as the active medium. Operation of these lasers causes thermal 

expansion of the crystal, which alters the effective cavity dimensions, thus changing the 

mode structure of the laser. The lasers are cooled by non-hazardous liquids such as water 

and deuterium oxide, which are in closed looped systems. No pollutant emissions are 

associated with the testing and activation of these lasers, therefore no impacts to air 

quality would be expected. 

Airspace 

The use of laser sensors would occur in cleared airspace within designated airspace areas. 

Close coordination with the FAA ARTCC and relevant military installations with 

responsibility for airspace management would minimize the potential for any adverse 

impact on airspace use. Lasing activities would be suspended immediately when ground 

observers using binoculars indicate an aircraft might be approaching the area; therefore, 

no impacts to airspace would be expected. Laser sensor activation activities from the 
4-74 

ground would produce the same airspace impacts in all of the biomes considered in this 

PEIS. 

Flight-testing and activation activities for air-based laser sensors would occur at altitudes 

greater than 10,671 meters (35,000 feet) above MSL. Targets would be actively engaged 

at or above 10,671 meters (35,000 feet) above MSL, and would not engage below the 

10,671 meters (35,000 feet) horizon. This would ensure activation of the laser sensors at 

an upward angle from the 10,671 meters (35,000 feet) horizon, and thus above 

commercial aircraft traffic and away from the Earth’s surface. Due to the negative 

impacts of cloud cover on sensing lasers and the increase in air traffic below the 10,671 

meters (35,000 feet) horizon, activation of lasers in a deployed situation would be 

conducted above the 10,671 meters (35,000 feet) horizon as well. 

Activation of lasers would occur in cleared airspace within designated airspace use. 

Close coordination with the FAA ARTCC and relevant military installations with 

responsibility for airspace management would minimize the potential for any adverse 

impacts on airspace use. 

Biological Resources 

Impacts to biological resources as a result of activation of laser sensors could occur. 

Ground testing of air-based lasers has the greatest potential for impacts. Wildlife in the 

beam path of the laser could suffer eye damage as a result of the laser activation. Due to 

the short duration of the laser operations during testing and the small range area used for 

the ground testing, impacts to wildlife would be insignificant. Laser sensor activation 

activities would produce the same biological resource impacts in all of the biomes 

considered in this PEIS. 

Flight-testing and activation of air-based laser sensors would occur at an altitude of 

10,671 meters (35,000 feet) above MSL or greater. Impacts from the laser operation on 

biological resources on the ground would be insignificant. Birds in the beam path of the 

laser could suffer eye damage as a result of the laser activation. However, bird densities 

at 10,671 meters (35,000 feet) above MSL would be extremely low, and the time of 

exposure to the beam path would be extremely low as well. Also, because the laser 

beams from solid-state laser sensors are usually not continuous, but consist of a large 

number of separated or pulsed power bursts, it is highly unlikely that a bird would remain 

within a beam for any considerable length of time. Therefore, significant impacts to birds 

would not be expected. (MDA, 2003a) 

Impacts from the activation of land-, and sea-based lasers would be insignificant. The 

beam path of land-, and sea-based lasers would be directed at an upward angle from the 

Earth’s surface, and thus would not impact biological resources on the ground. Impacts 
4-75 

to birds and from beam reflection would be similar to those described for air-based laser 

sensors. 

Impacts to biological resources as a result of testing and activation of space-based laser 

sensors would be insignificant. In the unlikely event that the laser was directed towards 

the Earth’s surface, distortion from atmospheric conditions would reduce the radiance 

level of the lasers. The ANSI refers to the eye hazard distance as the Nominal Ocular 

Hazard Distance. This distance is defined as “the distance along the (propagation) axis of 

the unobstructed beam from a laser ... to the human eye beyond which the ... exposure 

... is not expected to exceed the appropriate MPE.” (MDA, 2003a) 

The Earth’s surface would likely be beyond the Nominal Ocular Hazard Distance of the 

laser sensor, and thus, the impacts would be insignificant. 

Geology and Soils 

No impacts to geology and soils would occur as a result of activation of land-, 

sea-, air-, and space-based laser sensors. The only hazardous material that would be used 

to cool gas laser sensors is a gas at ambient conditions and would not impact geology and 

soils. 

 

Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste

Laser sensor activation activities would produce the same hazardous materials and 

hazardous waste impacts in all of the biomes considered in this PEIS. The types of 

hazardous materials used and waste generated would be similar to those currently used 

and generated at military installations. No hazardous materials would be used during 

activation of lasers. Gas laser sensors would use CO2, helium and N2 to generate the 

laser, but these substances are not hazardous. These gases would be held in compressed 

gas tanks and would be handled according to all applicable Federal, state, and local 

regulations. Gas laser sensors would use a glycol (Refrigerant 404) cooling system. 

(MDA, 2003a) Refrigerant 404 is an ozone-depleting substance. However, the cooling 

system would be a closed loop system, and the refrigerant would be replaced only during 

routine maintenance. Used refrigerant would be handled and disposed of or recycled 

according to all applicable Federal, state, and local regulations. Accidental releases of 

hazardous materials would be contained in accordance with a site-specific spill plan. 

 

Solid-state laser sensors would use non-hazardous crystals as the laser generating 

medium. These sensors could use either water or deuterium in their cooling systems. 

(MDA, 2003a) These non-hazardous coolants would be contained in closed-loop systems 

and would be recycled or replaced as needed. 
4-76 

Health and Safety 

Laser sensor activation activities would produce the same impacts on health and safety in 

all of the biomes considered in this PEIS. Laser sensors are created by chemical 

reactions that release low levels of energy in a focused energy beam that is invisible to 

the naked eye. Despite its relatively low energy level, the laser beams can be hazardous 

to the eyes of living organisms within a certain proximity (or hazard distance) specific to 

the parameters of the laser beam. The MPE of the laser’s energy is the standard that 

indicates “the level of laser radiation to which a person may be exposed without 

hazardous effect or adverse biological change in the eye.” (ANSI Z136.1, Safe Use of 

Lasers, as referenced in MDA, 2003a) The MPE is a function of laser wavelength and 

exposure duration, but also varies based on waveform (pulsed or chopped), and the 

waveform’s respective parameters (e.g., for pulsed waves, pulse width and pulse 

repetition frequency are additional factors in the MPE calculation). 

The MPE and output parameters, such as power and divergence or beam spread, can be 

used to evaluate the hazard at various proximities, known as the eye hazard distances. 

ANSI refers to the eye hazard distance as the Nominal Ocular Hazard Distance. This 

distance is defined as “the distance along the (propagation) axis of the unobstructed beam 

from a laser ... to the human eye beyond which the ... exposure ... is not expected to 

exceed the appropriate MPE.” 

Laser light is predominantly scattered forwards and backwards, whereas relatively little is 

scattered sideways. Therefore, an organism would have to look straight down the beam 

to be at risk. Some laser beams, such as those produced by gas laser sensors, diverge 

once they leave the sensor, therefore a lower hazard risk would be expected as the 

distance between the source sensor and a receptor increases. Other laser beams, like 

those produced by solid-state laser sensors, may maintain or increase their focus once 

they leave the sensor. When the laser’s focus is maintained instead of diverging, the laser 

may become hazardous to an organism’s eyes at a certain distance (e.g., two kilometers) 

before the primary focus point and stay hazardous until that same distance (e.g., two 

kilometers) after the primary focus point. (MDA, 2003a) 

The DoD follows limitations outlined in ANSI Z136.1, Safe Use of Lasers, for the testing 

and activation of laser sensors. The limitations include establishing a restricted area 

excluding all but authorized and properly trained personnel, displaying warning signs 

designating the restricted area, removing reflective surfaces, and incorporating automatic 

hard-stop limits and/or laser blanking devices. This last measure would ensure that laser 

energy does not extend beyond natural features or backstops during testing scenarios. 

(MDA, 2003a) Safety exclusion zones would be established around generator wiring and 

cabling to protect personnel from high voltage exposure. 
4-77 

Noise 

Noise impacts associated with activation of laser sensors would be similar to those 

discussed for radars. These impacts would be the same in all of the biomes considered in 

this PEIS. 

Transportation

Testing and activation of land-, sea-, air-, and space-based lasers could impact the use of 

airspace. These impacts are discussed in the Airspace section. These impacts would be 

the same in all of the biomes considered in this PEIS. 

Water Resources 

Laser sensor activation activities would produce the same impacts on water resources in 

all of the biomes considered in this PEIS. Gases used to generate gas laser sensors are 

inert and would not impact water resources through atmospheric deposition. Refrigerant 

404 would be used to cool gas laser sensors in a closed loop system. In the unlikely 

event of a spill or leak, the coolant becomes a gas under ambient conditions and would 

not impact water resources. 

Solid-state laser sensors would use either water or deuterium oxide as a coolant. 

Deuterium oxide is water that contains a significantly higher proportion of deuterium 

atoms to ordinary hydrogen atoms. The laser coolants would operate within a closedloop system and are only replaced during general maintenance requirements. The 

cooling liquids are non-hazardous and would not be expected to impact water resources. 

Orbital Debris

Impacts from orbital debris related to space-based laser sensor activation activities would 

be similar to those described for radars. See Section 4.1.1.3. 

4.1.1.6 C2BMC - Computer Terminals and Antennas 

As described in Exhibit 4-3, the analysis for computer terminals and antennas is based 

upon impacts from the activation of the computer terminals and antennas. Impacts from 

site preparation and construction activities related to computer terminals and antennas are 

addressed in Support Assets. 
4-78 

Air Quality 

Activation emissions from computer terminals and antennas would be limited to exhaust 

produced by generators. Impacts related to generator emissions are discussed in Support 

Assets. These impacts would be the same in all of the biomes considered in this PEIS. 

Airspace 

Activation activities for computer terminals and antennas would have the potential to 

impact airspace use by utilizing radio transmission frequencies, which may interfere with 

commercial air traffic control communications. The magnitude of the impact on airspace 

would depend on the specific location proposed. In accordance with standing 

regulations, MDA would coordinate radio frequency use and testing with the appropriate 

air traffic control agencies. A re-radiation tower is a transmission and receiving tower 

used in conjunction with fiber optic cable to verify the communication link between radar 

and an interceptor missile. Re-radiation towers can be built to heights of 31 meters (100 

feet) and could impact airspace as collision hazards if constructed adjacent to airports and 

airfields. MDA would coordinate tower siting with the appropriate air traffic control 

agencies to avoid conflicts with established takeoff and landing patterns. 

Biological Resources 

Activation activities for land-, sea, and air-based computer terminals and antennas would 

have the potential to impact biological resources. The level of impact would vary based 

on the frequency and energy of the signal, and the proximity of the source to sensitive 

environments or specific threatened or endangered species, as well as the specific 

location proposed. In accordance with standing regulations, MDA would coordinate 

radio frequency use and testing with the appropriate resource management agencies. 

Re-radiation towers are built to heights of up to 31 meters (100 feet). There is a potential 

risk of bird collisions with these towers. MDA could mitigate this risk by using highly 

visible paints and warning lights on the towers. 

Space-based computer terminals and antennas would be in GEO and would have no 

impacts on biological resources. 

Geology and Soils

Impacts to geology and soils from computer terminals and antennas would be limited to 

site preparation and construction activities. These activities are discussed in Support 

Assets. No impacts to geology and soils are anticipated as a result of the activation of 

computer terminals and antennas in any biome considered for this PEIS. (U.S. Army 

Space and Missile Defense Command, 2002d) 
4-79 

Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

Regular maintenance and operation activities at land-based computer terminal and 

antenna sites would involve a continuous but relatively low level of hazardous materials 

use. These activities would produce the same hazardous materials and hazardous waste 

in all of the biomes considered in this PEIS. The anticipated amounts of hazardous 

materials used at the site are not known but are expected to be small. They could include 

protective coatings, lubricants and oils, motor and generator fuels, cleaning agents 

(isopropyl alcohol), backup power batteries, adhesives, and sealants. (U.S. Army Space 

and Missile Defense Command, 2002d) The use and disposal of these materials would

be incorporated into hazardous material and waste management documents, such as an 

SWPPP and an Oil and Hazardous Substance Discharge Prevention and Contingency 

Plan. (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2002d) The hazardous 

materials would be stored in a centralized location for distribution when needed for 

maintenance. Material Safety Data Sheets would be posted at all locations where 

hazardous materials are stored or used. A site-specific hazardous materials management 

plan and an SPCC plan would be developed for the sites. (U.S. Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command, 2002d) The use and storage of hazardous materials would be in 

accordance with these regulations and applicable Federal, state, and local regulations. 

A Pollution Prevention Plan would be implemented for the proposed sites. This plan 

would control and reduce the use of hazardous materials at the installation site. (U.S. 

Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2002d) In addition, the program would 

comply with any existing base Pollution Prevention Plan. Program personnel would 

continue to update the system-wide Pollution Prevention Plan, which would outline 

strategies to minimize the use of hazardous materials over the life cycle of the facilities. 

Any hazardous waste generated from the use of these materials would be handled in 

accordance with appropriate Federal, state, and local regulations. Site-specific hazardous 

waste management plans would be in place for the operation and maintenance of the 

sites. If a release were to occur, all hazardous waste would be handled in accordance with 

appropriate regulations. In addition, a trained spill containment team would manage any 

release of hazardous waste at the site. (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 

2002d) 

Health and Safety 

Activation activities for computer terminals and antennas would have the potential to 

impact the health and safety of MDA personnel and the general public through the use of 

radio transmission frequencies and hazardous materials. These activities would produce 

impacts in all of the biomes considered in this PEIS; however, the impact would vary 

based on the site selected. The level of impact would vary based on the frequency and 

energy of the signal, the amount of hazardous materials to be used, and the proximity of 

the source to MDA personnel or the general public. MDA would train operating 
4-80 

personnel in the operation and maintenance of C2BMC equipment, and would not direct 

or use C2BMC equipment in a manner that would adversely impact the health and safety 

of the general public. 

Noise 

Computer terminal and antenna activation would produce the same type of noise in all 

biomes considered in this PEIS. Noise impacts associated with activation of computer 

terminals and antennas would be limited to noise produced by generators. Impacts 

related to generator noise are discussed in Support Assets. 

Transportation 

Impacts to transportation due to activation of computer terminals and antennas would be 

minimal in all biomes considered for this PEIS. Personnel operating and maintaining the 

components would generate the only traffic as a result of the activation. Personnel would 

be on site only during operational hours and during routine maintenance activities. (U.S. 

Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2003) Impacts as a result of activation 

would be insignificant. 

Water Resources 

Additional personnel would be needed for the activation of computer terminals and 

antennas; these personnel would increase the demand for potable water. Potable water 

demands associated with the activation activities would be relatively minimal. However, 

an increase in demand could exceed the capacity of the existing infrastructure. (U.S. 

Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2003) This is of particular concern in 

portions of the Sub-Arctic Taiga, Grasslands, Desert, Tropical, Mountain, and Savanna 

Biomes where access potable water may be limited. Additional packaged potable water 

systems could be installed to meet the demands. Site-specific studies should consider the 

limited potable water supplies in these areas when analyzing the impacts to water 

resources from the proposed activities. In other biomes including Arctic Tundra, SubArctic Taiga, Deciduous Forest, and Chaparral Biomes, water resources are generally not 

scarce and therefore, it is unlikely that water demand from additional personnel 

associated with activation of computer terminals and antennas would exceed the existing 

capacity. However, there may be site-specific or localized water resource availability 

issues and these should be considered for any biome. 

Operation of the components would have negligible effects on water quality. 

Implementation of a SWPPP and best management practices would reduce the risk of 

impacts from erosion and sedimentation to nearby surface waters. Compliance with the 

SPCC Plan would minimize the potential for accidental spills of hazardous materials and 

hazardous wastes to affect surface and ground water resources. 
4-81 

Space-based computer terminals would be in GEO and would have no impacts on water 

resources. 

Orbital Debris 

Space-based computer equipment could reenter the Earth’s atmosphere due to failure, but 

would not likely result in significant impacts. Impacts from orbital debris related to 

space-based computer terminal and antenna activation activities would be similar to those 

described for radars. See Section 4.1.1.3. 

4.1.1.7 C2BMC - Underground Cable 

As described in Exhibit 4-3, the analysis for underground cable is based upon impacts 

from the activation of the underground cable. 

Air Quality 

Air quality impacts associated with underground cable would be limited to ground 

disturbances resulting from construction activities. These impacts are discussed in 

Support Assets. Activation activities related to underground cable would not have any 

impact on air quality in any biome considered for this PEIS. 

Airspace

The activation of underground cable would not have any impact on airspace in any biome 

considered for this PEIS. 

 

Biological Resources 

Impacts to biological resources may occur during site preparation, these impacts are 

discussed in Support Assets. Activation of underground cable would not result in any 

impacts to biological resources in any biome considered in this PEIS. 

Geology and Soils

Impacts to geology and soils would be limited to site preparation activities. Activation of 

underground cable would not result in any impacts to geology and soils in any biome 

considered in this PEIS. 

 

Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

Impacts from hazardous materials and hazardous wastes would be limited to site 

preparation activities. No hazardous materials or wastes would be generated from the 
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activation of terrestrial and marine underground cable. Therefore, no significant impacts 

from hazardous materials or hazardous waste would be expected in any biome considered 

in this PEIS. 

Health and Safety 

Potential health and safety hazards from site preparation include dust/particulate 

inhalation, improper chemical handling, and improper use of machinery; these impacts 

are discussed in Support Assets. No impacts to health and safety would be expected from 

activation-related activities in any biome considered in this PEIS. 

Noise 

The activation of underground cable would not produce noise that has the potential to 

impact sensitive receptors. 

Transportation 

There would be no significant impact to transportation from activation underground cable 

in any biome considered in this PEIS. Any necessary repairs to underground cable would 

require excavation of the cable. These maintenance activities could result in impacts to 

transportation through movement of equipment and personnel to the repair site. 

However, repair events would occur infrequently and would require much less activity 

than that needed for construction. Therefore, impacts to transportation would be 

insignificant. 

Water Resources

Potable water demand for the installation and activation of underground cable would be 

small. Impacts from the demand for potable water associated with an increase in the 

number of project related personnel would be as described for Water Resources for 

Computer Terminals and Antennas. Impacts to water resources may occur during site 

preparation, particularly in marine environments. These impacts are discussed in Support 

Assets. 

Orbital Debris 

The use of underground cable would have no impact on orbital debris. 

4.1.1.8 Support Assets - Equipment 

Support equipment includes transportation and portable equipment (e.g., automotive, 

ships, aircraft, rail, generators, cooling units, storage tanks, chemical transfer equipment, 
4-83 

aerospace ground equipment), BMDS Test Bed support equipment (e.g., aircraft, 

vehicles, ships, mobile launch platforms, operator control units, sensor operations 

equipment [antenna, electronic equipment, cooling equipment, prime power units]), and 

weapons basing platform equipment (e.g., Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck with 

Load Handling System, Aegis Cruiser, ABL aircraft), as discussed in Section 2.2.4.1 and 

Section 4.0. This equipment is part of the military services inventory and is used to 

support mission-related activities. 

MDA reviewed the impact analyses and conclusions in previously prepared site-specific 

NEPA documentation, specifically for the use of transportation of equipment and use of 

general portable equipment. The use of this type of support equipment has been analyzed 

in a number of previously prepared documents, including the Ballistic Missile Defense 

Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (BMDO, 1994); Ground-Based 

Midcourse Defense Initial Defense Operations Capability at Vandenberg Air Force Base 

Environmental Assessment (MDA, 2003b); Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Extended 

Test Range Environmental Impact Statement (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 

Command, 2003); National Missile Defense Deployment Environmental Impact 

Statement (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2000); Theater Missile 

Defense Extended Test Range Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (U.S. Army 

Space and Strategic Defense Command, 1998a); Theater Missile Defense Extended Test 

Range Environmental Impact Statement (U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense 

Command, 1994a): Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program Environmental Impact 

Statement (U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1998); Point Mugu Environmental Impact 

Statement/Overseas Environmental Impact Statement (U.S. Department of the Navy, 

2002b); and Pacific Missile Range Facility Enhanced Capability Environmental Impact 

Statement (U.S. Department of the Navy, 1998). The use of general portable equipment 

and transport of equipment as defined in the previously prepared NEPA documents 

would not result in a significant impact. 

For example, analyses on generator and transportation emissions conducted at KLC 

showed that emissions associated with the use of the facility and associated equipment 

for missile defense activities would be below the 90.7-metric-ton (100-ton) per year 

criteria pollutant Federal de minimis levels that apply to a non-attainment area. However, 

the use of certain generators would require an amendment to the existing Pre-approved 

Limit Permit for KLC. (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2003) 

In addition, at Vandenberg AFB, procedures are in place so target missile launches would 

not represent a significant new impact on transportation, including air traffic, vehicular 

traffic, rail traffic, and marine traffic. (U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense 

Command, 1994) Other transportation analyses found that the use of aircraft and 

commercial ground transportation vehicles to ship equipment from various 

manufacturing locations to basing locations would result in minor air emissions that were 

determined to be less than significant. 
4-84 

In many instances, transportation activities can be categorically excluded from further 

NEPA analysis. In accordance with DoD regulations for implementing NEPA (32 CFR 

188), CEQ regulations provide for the establishment of categorical exclusions (40 CFR 

1507.3(b)) for those actions, which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant 

impact on the human environment. Where appropriate, DoD has established such 

categorical exclusions. For example, infrequent, temporary (less than 30 days) increases 

in air operations up to 50 percent of the typical installation aircraft operation rate, are 

categorically excluded. 

Review of previously prepared NEPA analyses and existing categorical exclusions have 

indicated that impacts associated with transportation would not be significant. 

Transportation activities would be performed in accordance with existing operating 

procedures and appropriate regulations, as well as in accordance with appropriate NEPA 

analyses. The shipment or transportation of hazardous and non-hazardous materials 

would be performed in accordance with applicable DOT standards, as well as established 

handling and transfer procedures. Proper containment, handling procedures, separation 

of reactive chemicals, and worker warning and protection systems would be used where 

necessary. Site-specific spill prevention guidelines, including leak detection and spill 

control measures, would be followed. However, if the proposed BMDS would increase 

transportation activities or result in the use of mobile support assets over existing levels 

or over what has been determined to be categorically excluded, site-specific NEPA 

analyses might be required. 

As discussed above, general portable equipment has been considered in previously 

prepared NEPA analyses. These analyses demonstrate that the impacts associated with 

their use would not be significant. The use of some specific element support equipment 

has also been previously analyzed, and the impacts associated with their use would not be 

significant. 

The use and operation of support equipment would be in accordance with installationspecific requirements that consider impacts on local, regional, and global environmental 

resources. The ongoing activities that occur at specific installations would be performed 

in accordance with appropriate Federal, state, and local regulations, and therefore would 

not be expected to result in a significant impact. Potential operational limitations include 

restrictions on timing, duration, or operational requirements as dictated through 

consultations and memorandums of agreement with appropriate regulatory agencies. 

The following sections present the impacts associated with operational changes including 

implementation of new operating parameters for existing support equipment. These 

operational changes have not been previously analyzed or categorically excluded. 
4-85 

Air Quality 

An increase in use of support equipment that results in increased emissions of a criteria 

pollutant, of a HAP, or of pollutants that affect regional haze could impact air quality. 

The significance of such impacts on air quality depends on the local or regional 

regulatory setting as well as the physical climate conditions where the emissions would 

occur. The regulatory setting includes EPA recognized non-attainment and maintenance 

areas, areas that have submitted regional haze SIPs to EPA, and locations that have 

sensitive receptors to HAP emissions. Each of the regulated areas occurs throughout the 

U.S. and its territories, which include all of the biomes except for the BOA and the 

Atmosphere. 

The physical climate conditions that would affect the intensity and severity of the impact 

include regions that have periods of air inversions or other climatic conditions that does 

not permit normal air circulation or turnover to occur. Such conditions occur in the 

Chaparral, Mountain, and Tropical Biomes. 

For areas that fall under a regulated setting through non-attainment and maintenance area 

designations, regional haze requirements, and their associated SIPs, the regulatory 

constraints of the location would be addressed in an action specific analysis. The impacts 

related to the emissions of HAPs would depend on the proximity of sensitive receptors in 

the impacted area. This type of analysis would require dispersion modeling or other risk 

calculation methods to evaluate the degree of the impact and identify appropriate 

mitigation measures. 

If emissions are produced that are greater than the de minimis values, or if the emission 

increase would equal or exceed ten percent of the total emission inventory for the entire 

non-attainment area, then, a Conformity Determination under the Clean Air Act would be 

required. The de minimis thresholds in non-attainment areas are presented in Section 3 in 

Exhibit 3-3. A review of the state specific SIPs would be performed to identify whether 

the actions would equal or exceed 10 percent of the total emission inventory. 

Airspace 

The implementation of new operating parameters for existing support equipment would 

not impact airspace in any of the biomes considered. An increase in operations of 

support assets could affect the airspace of the biome where such activities would occur. 

The impacts on the airspace in the various biomes would be insignificant because all 

operations involving support equipment would be performed in accordance with existing 

airspace use requirements. 
4-86 

Biological Resources 

Operational use changes could impact biological resources in the various biomes where 

such activities would occur. The impacts on biological resources would result from 

emissions of criteria pollutants and HAPs, equipment emitting EMR or radio frequencies, 

operations within sensitive environments (wetlands, critical habitat, essential fish habitat, 

wild and scenic rivers, or other protected natural resource areas), and debris from missile 

intercepts, catastrophic failure, or flight terminations. Methods employed to reduce 

impacts on natural resources including scheduling and duration considerations, as well as 

informal and formal consultations with regulatory agencies would be expected to reduce 

the potential for impact below significant levels. Should the impacts affect a threatened or 

an endangered species or its habitat, essential fish habitat, jurisdictional wetlands, or 

another regulated resource then in addition to analysis under NEPA and other applicable 

laws (Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act), regulatory agency consultation would 

be required. The appropriate Federal agency must be consulted under Section 7 of the 

Endangered Species Act when site specific analysis indicates the continued existence of a 

threatened or endangered species is likely to be jeopardized. 

Geology and Soils 

In most biomes an operational use change would not impact geology or soils. However, 

in the Artic Tundra and Sub-Arctic Taiga Biomes, construction or modification activities 

have the potential to alter the condition of the permafrost that covers the biome. In 

addition, these biomes may be subject to earthquakes. 

When appropriate, construction would incorporate seismic design parameters consistent 

with the critical nature of the facility and its geologic setting. In biomes with floodplains 

and the coastal environments, siting of facilities should consider the proximity to 100-

year floodplains and maximum probable tsunami wave run-up areas. 

Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

An operational use change could result in an impact from the use of hazardous materials 

and the generation of hazardous waste, if such materials were used in the process. Such 

impacts could affect the biome where the action would occur. Should an operational use 

change result in new hazardous materials or hazardous waste, such items would be 

handled in accordance with specific protocols and appropriate regulations. Federal 

military ranges have established procedures in accordance with Federal regulations to 

ensure proper handling and use of these hazardous materials. These procedures would be 

reviewed to ensure that they address the hazardous materials that would be used. An 

evaluation of the potential impacts would occur if operational changes would utilize 

hazardous materials or generate hazardous waste not addressed in relevant specific 

protocols. All hazardous waste generated would be disposed of in accordance with 
4-87 

applicable laws and regulations. The personnel involved in hazardous material 

operations would be trained in the appropriate procedures, use appropriate personal 

protective clothing, and be up-to-date on any specialized training in hazardous material 

handling, spill containment and cleanup, or other hazardous material activities 

Health and Safety 

An operational use change would have the potential to impact health and safety. Impacts 

on health and safety are not associated with particular biomes; rather they are associated 

with the processes and activities that would be implemented under a specific action. The 

personnel who would operate equipment would be familiar with standard operating 

procedures and would receive specific equipment training as necessary. In addition to 

adhering to existing procedures, all activities would be performed in accordance with the 

health and safety requirements of the specific installation or test range, which are 

designed to protect public heath and safety. 

Noise 

Operational changes could impact ambient noise levels. Such impacts would affect the 

biome where the action would occur, and include new sources of noise or new operations 

that would alter the intensity, frequency, or duration of a noise-emitting source. The 

severity of such an impact would be related to the proximity of sensitive receptors to the 

noise source. Receptors include DoD workers, the general pubic, noise sensitive areas 

(housing developments, schools), and wildlife including critical habitat. An action- or 

site-specific study, in accordance with NEPA, would be performed for activities that may 

impact noise. Such a study would identify the receptors, quantify the impact, and 

recommend mitigation measures. 

Transportation 

Operational use changes could result in impacts to transportation; however, these impacts 

would not be significant. Mobile equipment would be used for a limited time during a 

test event, or would be used to transport supplies and components to and from various 

facilities. As indicated in Section 4.1.1.2, the use of support equipment during launch 

and post-launch activities (debris recovery) would not be expected to significantly impact 

transportation. 

Water Resources

Because operational use changes of existing infrastructure would occur at existing 

facilities specifically designed for the support equipment in accordance with all relevant 

and applicable regulations, such activities would not impact water resources in any of the 

biomes. Operational use changes that would result in impacts to areas not specifically 
4-88 

designed for use of the support equipment could be subject to additional environmental 

review. 

Orbital Debris 

No impacts from orbital debris would occur as a result of an operational use change of 

support equipment. 

Space-based equipment (satellites) could reenter the Earth’s atmosphere due to failure, 

but would not likely result in significant impacts. Most objects break up and often 

vaporize under the intense aerodynamic forces and heating that occur during reentry. 

Most of the objects which reenter would fragment and burn in the upper atmosphere and 

would make only negligible changes in its chemical composition. Even if an object does 

survive reentry, only one third of the Earth is land area, and only a small portion of this 

land area is densely populated. The chance of hitting a populated land area upon reentry 

would be small. (SDIO, 1992) 

4.1.1.9 Support Assets - Infrastructure 

The following discussion of support asset infrastructure includes BMDS Test Bed 

infrastructure (test ranges and associated facilities), non-BMDS Test Bed Infrastructure 

(radar and tracking stations), and weapons basing platform infrastructure (missile silos) 

as discussed in Section 2.2.4.1 and Section 4.0. This equipment is part of the military 

services inventory and is used to support mission-related activities. 

MDA reviewed the impact analyses and conclusions in previously prepared site-specific 

NEPA documentation, specifically for the use and modification of existing infrastructure, 

repair, maintenance, and sustainment. These activities have been analyzed in a number 

of previously prepared documents, including the Ballistic Missile Defense Programmatic 

Environmental Impact Statement (BMDO, 1994); Ground-Based Midcourse Defense 

Initial Defense Operations Capability at Vandenberg Air Force Base Environmental 

Assessment (MDA, 2003b); Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Extended Test Range 

Environmental Impact Statement (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 

2003); National Missile Defense Deployment Environmental Impact Statement (U.S. 

Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2000); Theater Missile Defense Extended 

Test Range Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (U.S. Army Space and 

Strategic Defense Command, 1998a); Theater Missile Defense Extended Test Range 

Environmental Impact Statement (U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command, 

1994a): Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program Environmental Impact Statement

(U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1998); Point Mugu Environmental Impact 

Statement/Overseas Environmental Impact Statement (U.S. Department of the Navy, 

2002b); and Pacific Missile Range Facility Enhanced Capability Environmental Impact 
4-89 

Statement (U.S. Department of the Navy, 1998), and Mobile Sensors Environmental 

Assessment (MDA, 2005). 

These previous analyses show that potential impacts from infrastructure modification 

include construction-related impacts that could result from PM and construction 

equipment emissions. These emissions would be short-term, and would only affect those 

receptors close to construction areas. Activities that would continue in existing facilities 

at government and contractor installations would not result in any significant impacts. 

All activities would follow applicable regulations and established guidelines and 

management practices. Any increased water demands or demands on other utilities 

(electricity, natural gas, waste water disposal) that could be readily met by existing 

supply and treatment systems, groundwater withdrawals, or alternative sources, would 

not result in significant environmental impacts. (BMDO, 1994) 

In many instances, use and modification or maintenance and sustainment of existing 

infrastructure is categorically excluded from further NEPA analysis. For example, per 32 

CFR Part 651, Appendix B, construction of an addition to an existing structure or new 

construction on a previously undisturbed site is categorically excluded if the area to be 

disturbed has no more than five cumulative acres of new surface disturbance, and the 

construction does not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human 

environment. 

Previous analyses show that the impacts of such activities in support of the BMDS would 

not be significant because such activities would be performed in accordance with existing 

regulations. However, if proposed BMDS activities would result in major modification 

of existing infrastructure or major changes in use, site-specific NEPA analysis would be 

required. Additionally, changes in the level of human services used to support BMDS 

activities would be analyzed in site-specific NEPA analysis. In accordance with 40 CFR 

Part 1508.14, the site-specific NEPA analysis would address the socioeconomic impacts 

that are interrelated with impacts on the natural and physical environment. 

The following sections present the impacts associated with site preparation and 

construction, including the modification of existing infrastructure, which are not 

sufficiently covered in previous NEPA analyses or categorically excluded. 

 

Air Quality 

The development of new or the major modification of existing infrastructure could 

impact air quality. Such impacts would affect the biome where the action would occur, 

and would result from site preparation and construction activities. Estimates of air 

quality impacts from construction are based on building square footage, acreage 

disturbed, and duration of construction, as well as general meteorological and soil 

information. Construction would require ground disturbances resulting in PM10 and 
4-90 

fugitive dust impacts. In 1995, EPA estimated that ground-disturbing activities cause the 

release of 1.08 metric tons (1.2 tons) of uncontrolled fugitive dust emissions per 0.4 

hectare (1 acre) per month of ground-disturbing activity. (U.S. Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command, 2003) An estimated 50 percent of fugitive dust emissions consist of 

PM10, though a more accurate percentage is based on the makeup of the local soil. (U.S. 

Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2003) Standard fugitive dust reduction 

measures would be implemented when necessary. Water trucks might be used to dampen 

soil to minimize dust by releasing water or another biodegradable dust suppressant. The 

speed of construction vehicles would be restricted to limit soil separation into dust, and 

any soil stockpiled as fill material would be covered until use to prevent moisture 

evaporation and separation induced by wind. (MDA, 2003b) 

The use of construction equipment would result in emissions of CO, NOX, VOCs, and 

oxides of sulfur. Potential construction equipment emissions would be determined on a 

site-by-site basis by using emission factors from various sources including EPA. Proper 

tuning and preventive maintenance of construction vehicles would serve to minimize 

exhaust emissions and maximize vehicle performance. Construction would be conducted 

in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations. While the construction would 

cause an increase in air pollutants, it is assumed that the impact would be both temporary 

and localized. Once construction ceased, air quality would return to its former level. 

Airspace 

Site preparation and construction would not have any impact on airspace because all 

activities would take place on the ground and would not involve any closures or 

restrictions on airspace use. Modifications to infrastructure not previously addressed in 

NEPA analyses would not have any impact on airspace because the modifications would 

not result in any closures or restrictions on airspace use. 

Biological Resources 

Site preparation and construction could impact biological resources in the various biomes 

where such activities would occur. Vegetation, wildlife, and specific sensitive habitats 

could be affected based on the specific location of the development or modifications. 

The construction and expansion of buildings and roads could result in the clearing of 

vegetation and adverse impacts on wildlife near the activities. Site preparation activities 

may require pouring of pavement or spreading of gravel to facilitate mobility of the 

construction vehicles. Site preparation and construction activities that generate dust, 

irritable pollutants and noise, might temporarily disturb nearby wildlife, while permanent 

structures would result in the loss of habitat, displacement of wildlife, increased stress, 

and disruption of daily/seasonal behavior. (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 

Command, 2002d) Construction of infrastructure could lead to increased surface runoff. 

The combination of increased noise levels and human activity would likely displace some 
4-91 

small mammals and birds that forage, feed, nest, or have dens within a 15-meter (50-foot) 

radius of such activities. (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2002d) 

Whenever possible, construction and site preparation activities would occur on or near 

previously disturbed areas. 

In Artic Tundra, Chaparral, and Tropical Biomes site preparation and installation 

activities for underground cable could impact species that rely on the shore environment 

including species of pinnipeds, shorebirds, waterbirds, otters and whales, and sea turtles. 

The installation of marine underground cable through near shore areas and through 

shoreline and tidal areas could disturb the habitats that these species depend on. 

Pinnipeds and shorebirds are easily startled by noise and movement. (U.S. Army Space 

and Missile Defense Command, 2003) Site preparation and construction activities could 

cause a range of behavioral responses from heightened alertness to abandonment of 

favorable habitat areas. (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2003) It may 

also be possible for site preparation and construction noise to lead to nest abandonment or 

changes in migration routes. The severity of the response would depend on the intensity 

(noise level, area of the disturbance) of the installation project, the proximity to the 

pinniped and shorebird habitats, and the sensitivity of the species. Site-specific analyses 

would more accurately assess the potential impacts of the proposed activities on 

biological resources. 

Shorebirds are very sensitive to noise during the nesting season. (U.S. Army Space and 

Strategic Defense Command, 1998a) The flushing of shorebirds from nests could result 

in the exposure of eggs to excess cold/heat and to predation. 

Construction activities would be planned and sited to avoid regulated habitats 

(jurisdictional wetlands, critical habitat, or essential fish habitat). Should the impacts 

affect a threatened or an endangered species or its habitat, essential fish habitat, 

jurisdictional wetlands, or another regulated resource then in addition to analysis under 

NEPA, compliance with other laws (e.g., Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, 

Marine Mammal Protection Act, Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and Bald and Golden Eagle 

Protection Act), and regulatory agency consultation would be required. The appropriate 

Federal agency must be consulted under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act when 

site specific analysis indicates the continued existence of a threatened or endangered 

species is likely to be jeopardized. 

Environmentally sensitive habitats could be impacted by site preparation and construction 

activities for underground cable. Trenching through coral reef areas would adversely 

impact the reef. Coral reefs are slow developing habitats that are very sensitive to 

changes in water quality. The trenching activity would disturb seafloor sediment and 

would temporarily increase the turbidity of the water column. This would lower the solar 

light penetration that the reefs depend on for growth and energy. (University of the 
4-92 

Virgin Islands, 2003) In addition, the trenching activities would break up existing reef. 

Studies have shown that coral reefs are very sensitive to physical disturbances. Reefs 

that have been physically damaged can be more susceptible to disease. (University of the 

Virgin Islands, 2003) Underground cable site preparation and construction activities 

would comply with EO 13089 and would be avoided to the extent possible in coral reef 

areas. 

The marine underground cable installation activities could startle and temporarily 

displace whales and sea otters. However, these species would likely return once the 

installation is complete. Installation activities that occur in freshwater and tidal streams 

could cause siltation and disturbance of maturation and feeding habitats for some species 

of fish. (U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command, 1994a) Site-specific studies 

should analyze the potential impacts of the proposed activities on the biological resources 

of the affected environment. 

Studies have shown that artificial light can affect sea turtle behavior. (U.S. Army Space 

and Strategic Defense Command, 1998a) Artificial light associated with construction 

sites could confuse nesting sea turtles causing abandonment of nesting sites. Artificial 

lights could also confuse hatchling turtles by causing them to move in circles and 

reducing their chances of making it safely to the ocean. (U.S. Army Space and Strategic 

Defense Command, 1998a) Trenching and backfilling in sea turtle nesting areas could 

disturb buried nests or cover the nests with a sand layer too deep for the hatchlings to 

escape. Because sea turtle and shorebird nesting is a seasonal process, construction 

activities could be coordinated to avoid nesting seasons. Site-specific analyses would 

more accurately assess the potential impacts of the proposed activities on biological 

resources. 

Geology and Soils 

Typical construction activities that could adversely affect local geology and soils include 

cut-and-fill operations, paving operations, compaction, mixing, grading, and general soil 

erosion. Exposed soils become dry and porous and shift easily resulting in increased 

erosion rates. Paving operations would degrade the quality of the soil as it mixes with tar 

and reduces permeable surfaces. Best Management Practices53 would be implemented to 

minimize negative short-term effects of clearing and grading activities during site 

preparation, as well as excavations and grading for connecting infrastructure, roadways 

and parking. Any construction activities greater than five-acres would be required to 

obtain an NPDES storm water run-off permit, which typically specifies the Best 

Management Practices for the entire construction site. Except for localized soil 

compaction in the construction area, long-term impacts to the soils resulting from 

 

53 A best management practice is a business function, process, or system considered superior to all other known 

methods, that improves performance and efficiency in a specific area. (Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Comptroller iCenter, 2004) 
4-93 

construction would not be anticipated. (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 

2003) 

Site preparation and construction could impact the geology and soils of the Artic Tundra 

and Sub-Arctic Taiga Biomes. Such impacts would be related to activities that alter the 

condition of the permafrost that covers the biome. 

Whenever possible, construction and site preparation activities would occur on or near 

previously disturbed areas to limit or reduce disturbance of undisturbed areas. 

Construction would incorporate seismic design parameters consistent with the critical 

nature of the facility and its geologic setting. In biomes with floodplains and the coastal 

biomes, facilities should be constructed outside of existing 100-year floodplains and 

beyond established limits for tsunami wave run-up for a maximum probable tsunami 

event. (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2003) 

Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

Site preparation and construction and development could result in an impact from the use 

of hazardous materials and the generation of hazardous waste. Such impacts would affect 

the biome where the action would occur. Based on the type of infrastructure the potential 

hazardous wastes that would be generated during construction and site preparation 

include solvents, cutting fluids, acetylene, and various paint products, used acetone, 

motor fuels, heating fuels, waste oils, hydraulic fluids, used batteries, and waste 

antifreeze. Small quantities of solvents are typically used for degreasing or other 

cleaning activities. Residual solvents would be disposed of as hazardous waste along 

with contaminated materials (e.g., rags). Hazardous waste disposal would take place at 

permitted sites equipped to handle the safe and proper disposal of such materials. 

A Pollution Prevention Plan would be implemented for new or major modification to 

existing infrastructure. This plan would control and reduce the use of hazardous 

materials at the site. (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2002d) In 

addition, the program would comply with any existing base Pollution Prevention Plan. 

Program personnel would continue to update the system-wide Pollution Prevention Plan, 

which would outline strategies to minimize the use of hazardous materials over the life 

cycle of the facilities. 

Renovation and site preparation activities may generate wastes that include asbestoscontaining material and lead-based paints. Prior to any existing building modification or 

demolition, surveys would be conducted to determine if these materials are present in the 

modification area. A licensed asbestos abatement contractor, in accordance with state 

and Federal regulations, would perform renovations in these instances. All removed 

asbestos would be disposed of in a solid-waste landfill designed to receive asbestoscontaining material. Management and abatement of asbestos and lead-based paint at 
4-94 

selected sites would be compliant with management plans such as a Lead-Based Paint 

Management Plan, an Asbestos Management Plan, an Asbestos Operating Plan, as well 

as the applicable legal requirements. (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 

2003) 

Health and Safety

Site preparation and construction could impact health and safety. Impacts on health and 

safety are not associated with particular biomes, rather are associated with the processes 

and activities that would be implemented under a specific action. Potential health and 

safety hazards from site preparation and construction activities include dust/particulate 

inhalation, improper chemical handling, and improper use of machinery. General safety 

procedures would be followed to protect construction workers, base personnel, and the 

general public during site preparation and construction activities. No impacts to human 

health and safety from site preparation and construction activities would be expected, if 

all applicable legal requirements are met. 

Construction activities would produce physical hazards such as noise, electrical, heavymoving equipment and machinery, welding, and earth moving and digging activities. 

Health and safety procedures would be compliant with appropriate management plans 

and applicable regulations. Any waste would be collected and segregated as nonhazardous, hazardous, and possibly special wastes for proper disposal in accordance with 

applicable legal requirements. 

The design of new facilities or the modification of exiting facilities would incorporate 

measures to minimize the potential for and impact of health and safety related accidents. 

Operating procedures and training would be instituted to minimize the potential for and 

impact of releases of hazardous materials. Specific health and safety plans would be 

developed including evacuation plans, and notification of local and offsite emergency 

response as required. 

Noise 

Site preparation and construction and development of new or the major modification of 

existing infrastructure could impact ambient noise levels. Such impacts would affect the 

biome where the action would occur, and would be related to construction activities or 

new operations that would alter the intensity, frequency, or duration of a noise emitting 

source, and would depend upon the sensitivity of the receptor to the sound generated. 

Receptors include workers, wildlife, and the public in the proximity of the noise source. 

Site preparation and construction activities would be comparable to common construction 

activities. The amount of noise generated would depend upon the amount and type of 

construction being done. Construction on existing facilities would likely be minor; 

construction of new infrastructure could result in larger impacts. Personnel that may be 
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exposed to loud noises would be required to wear hearing protection, such as earplugs 

and earmuffs, which would reduce the noise levels to prescribed health and safety levels. 

An action or site-specific study would be performed for activities that may increase noise 

levels. Such a study would identify sensitive receptors and their locations, quantify the 

impact, and recommend mitigation measures. 

Transportation 

Site preparation and construction activities may require the use of heavy machinery the 

transportation of which could cause changes in the amount of congestion on the existing 

road network. In addition, an influx of construction workers may change the level of 

demand for access to the existing roadways. In general, these activities would not be 

expected to cause a significant impact on transportation. However, if these changes in 

demand and congestion demonstrate the potential for significant impact, site specific 

analyses would be prepared. 

Water Resources 

Site preparation and construction could impact water resources by increasing operations 

resulting in a discharge of wastewater. Modifications or construction activities would 

follow site-specific protocols for storm water and ground water pollution prevention, and 

would require application for appropriate permits and development of pollution 

prevention plans for protection of water resources on- and off-site. For new installations, 

site-specific documentation would be required to determine potential effects of 

construction and operation activities on surface water, ground water, and floodplains. 

The impacts on water resources would be analyzed in accordance with NEPA and other 

appropriate regulations, including the Clean Water Act and any applicable international 

or foreign legal requirements for activities outside of the U.S. 

Orbital Debris 

No impacts from orbital debris would occur as a result of site preparation and 

construction. 

4.1.1.10 Support Assets - Test Assets 

The following discussion of support asset test assets include assets of the BMDS Test 

Bed (test sensors and communications) and assets that are used to support the BMDS 

Test Bed (targets, countermeasures, and simulants) as discussed in Section 2.2.4.1 and 

Section 4.0. This equipment is part of the military services inventory and is used to 

support mission-related activities. 
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MDA reviewed the impact analyses and conclusions in previously prepared site-specific 

NEPA documentation, specifically for the development and use of test assets. These 

activities have been analyzed in a number of previously prepared documents, including 

the Ballistic Missile Defense Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (BMDO, 

1994); Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Initial Defense Operations Capability at 

Vandenberg Air Force Base Environmental Assessment (MDA, 2003b); Ground-Based 

Midcourse Defense Extended Test Range Environmental Impact Statement (U.S. Army 

Space and Missile Defense Command, 2003); National Missile Defense Deployment 

Environmental Impact Statement (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 

2000); Theater Missile Defense Extended Test Range Supplemental Environmental 

Impact Statement (U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command, 1998a); Theater 

Missile Defense Extended Test Range Environmental Impact Statement (U.S. Army 

Space and Strategic Defense Command, 1994a): Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 

Program Environmental Impact Statement (U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1998); 

Point Mugu Environmental Impact Statement/Overseas Environmental Impact Statement 

(U.S. Department of the Navy, 2002b); and Pacific Missile Range Facility Enhanced 

Capability Environmental Impact Statement (U.S. Department of the Navy, 1998). 

MDA also reviewed existing categorical exclusions to determine which activities 

associated with the development and use of test assets are categorically excluded from 

further NEPA analysis. 

The activities previously analyzed and those that are categorically excluded include the 

development, manufacturing, and assembly of components and component prototypes at 

existing DoD and non-DoD (contractor) facilities. 

 

For example, the Theater High Altitude Area Defense Initial Development Program 

Environmental Assessment (U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command, 1994c) 

found that all manufacturing and engineering activities would be accomplished in 

existing facilities and would use personnel routinely engaged in these types of activities. 

The facilities and personnel utilized would operate at levels and intensities similar to 

current conditions, which would result in no significant impacts. In addition, the EA 

found that manufacturing and engineering various missile components would involve the 

use of various hazardous materials. Because the facilities would comply with the CCR, 

Title 22, Division 4, Environmental Health; Title 40 CFR, Parts 260-280, and the RCRA, 

as well as specific facility guidelines that describe procedures for items such as correct 

storage, labeling, and transportation of hazardous waste, such activities would be not 

significant. 

Similarly, because the manufacturing and assembly of the BMDS components would 

occur at existing facilities, would follow established standard operating procedures to 

protect worker and public safety, and would be performed in accordance with all 

appropriate and relevant laws and regulations, the impacts associated with manufacturing 
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would not be significant. However, should an activity require new or major modification 

to an existing DoD-owned or operated manufacturing facility, or require the preparation 

of new assembly standard operating procedures, action-specific NEPA analysis would be 

conducted. 

The use of test assets in various configurations has been considered in previous NEPA 

analyses. Most of this equipment is sensor, tracking (optical, laser, and radar systems), 

and communications systems. The use of such equipment is both installation- and 

scenario-specific. Previous analyses have shown that impacts associated with the use of 

support equipment for test assets would not be significant. 

The use of targets and their boosters, target test objects, simulants and countermeasures at 

some specific locations has been considered in previous NEPA analyses. For example, 

the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Extended Test Range Environmental Impact 

Statement (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2003), shows that the 

Peacekeeper target missile would contain less solid rocket fuel and would produce lower 

exhaust emissions that existing target missiles. In addition, modeling of target missiles to 

include dual launches demonstrated that the level of HCl emitted would be below the 

1-hour Air Force standard, but would exceed the peak HCl standard for a short duration. 

The emission levels for both CO and Al2O3 were determined to be within NAAQS and 

California AAQS; therefore, the nominal launch of a single Peacekeeper target missile is 

anticipated to remain within NAAQS, California AAQS, and Air Force Standards. 

Previous analyses show that the impacts associated with the use of targets and their 

boosters for activities associated with the proposed BMDS would have no significant 

impacts. 

The use of drones as targets has been considered in previous NEPA analyses and has not 

been found to result in significant impacts. Drones are used to mimic the heat and radar 

returns of missiles and aircraft, and can use various countermeasures to deceive 

interceptors. The potential for impacts from the use of drones is influenced by the 

specific flight pattern to be flown and intercept altitude, if appropriate. Site specific 

analysis including debris analysis might be required for future proposed actions using 

drones. 

The development and use of individual test assets (e.g., sensors, targets, and drones) have 

been analyzed in site-specific NEPA documents, which found no significant impacts 

from such activities. The development and use of those test assets as defined in the 

previous site-specific NEPA documents would not result in a significant impact. The 

combined impact associated with test assets and the other BMDS components was 

analyzed in Section 4.1.2, Test Integration. The following sections present the impacts 

associated with the use of simulants and countermeasures. 
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Air Quality 

The development and use of simulants, countermeasures, and drones could impact air 

quality in the biome where the action would occur. The prelaunch activities where the 

simulants, countermeasures, and drones are assembled and prepared for use would result 

in the emissions of Federal or state-listed criteria pollutants, as well as potential HAP 

emissions. The HAPs that may be released would depend on the chemical composition 

of the simulant or countermeasure, or the materials associated with the drones. The use 

of simulants, countermeasures, and drones during test events would result in emissions to 

the air; however, based on the parameters of the specific test, the emissions may be at an 

elevation above 914 meters (3,000 feet) and would not affect ground level air quality. 

Based on the chemical composition and volume of the simulant, or the composition and 

volume of volatile substances in the countermeasure component or drone, the emissions 

above 914 meters (3,000 feet) may impact air quality in terms of ozone depletion 

(particularly in the upper troposphere and stratosphere), acid rain, and global warming. 

Existing impact analyses prepared in accordance with NEPA and standard operating 

procedures would be reviewed to ensure that the activities would not result in a 

significant impact. Site-specific environmental analysis would be completed to evaluate 

potentially significant impacts. 

Airspace 

The use of delivery systems (boosters) for the simulants and countermeasures, as well as 

the simulants and countermeasures themselves could impact airspace of the biome where 

the action would occur. The operating altitudes, lateral orientation, specific type of 

airspace, and the region of influence are the parameters of specific test scenarios that 

influence the degree of the impact on airspace. The use of simulants and 

countermeasures may increase the duration and severity of impact on a particular 

airspace. The impacts of specific simulants and countermeasures on airspace would be 

reviewed in accordance with NEPA. 

Biological Resources

The development and use of simulants and countermeasures could impact biological 

resources of the biome where the action would occur. Should the impacts affect a 

threatened or endangered species or its habitat, essential fish habitat, or jurisdictional 

wetlands, or another regulated resource then in addition to analysis under NEPA, 

compliance with other applicable laws (e.g., Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, 

Marine Mammal Protection Act, Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and Bald and Golden Eagle 

Protection Act), as well as regulatory agency consultation could be required. 
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Geology and Soils 

The development and use of simulants and countermeasures would not impact geology; 

however, such activities could impact soils in the biome where the action would occur. 

The impact would result from the deposition of the simulants or countermeasures on the 

soil. The severity of the impact would be based on the composition of the simulant or 

countermeasure. The impacts related to the use of new simulants or countermeasures 

would be evaluated as necessary in accordance with NEPA. 

Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

The development and use of simulants and countermeasures could result in an impact 

from the use of hazardous materials and the generation of hazardous waste. A wide 

variety of hazardous materials may be used in the development of simulants and 

countermeasures including solvents, and toxic metals and substances. No radioactive 

materials would be used in the development and use of simulants and countermeasures. 

The development and use of specific simulants and countermeasures would include a life 

cycle analysis of potential impacts, including specific decommissioning activities for any 

hazardous materials. Hazardous materials or hazardous waste associated with the use of 

a simulant or countermeasure would be handled in accordance with installation and range 

specific protocols and appropriate regulations. Federal military ranges have established 

procedures in accordance with Federal regulations to ensure proper handling and use of 

these hazardous materials. These procedures would be reviewed to ensure that they 

address the appropriate hazardous materials. An evaluation of the potential impacts in 

accordance with NEPA and other relevant regulations would occur if the use of a 

simulant or countermeasure would utilize hazardous materials or generate hazardous 

waste not addressed in installation specific protocols. All hazardous waste generated 

would be disposed of in accordance with appropriate state and Federal regulations. The 

personnel involved in hazardous material operations would be trained in the appropriate 

procedures and would use appropriate personal protective clothing and would be up-todate on any specialized training in hazardous material handling, spill containment and 

cleanup, or other hazardous material activities. 

Health and Safety 

The development and use of simulants and countermeasures could impact health and 

safety. Impacts on health and safety are not associated with particular biomes; rather 

they are associated with the processes and activities that would be implemented under a 

specific action. Health and safety impacts would be commensurate with the chemical 

composition of the simulant and the operating parameters involved with the use of 

simulants and countermeasures. New standard operating procedures that address safe 

handling and operational requirements to protect public health and safety would be 

developed for new or modified simulants and countermeasures. Such plans would 
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address health and safety issues for general operation and handling, as well as health and 

safety operations for system and operational testing and failures. The personnel who 

would operate and handle such equipment would be familiar with the standard operating 

procedures and would receive specific training as necessary. These actions would be 

performed in accordance with health and safety requirements of the specific installation 

or test range, which are specifically designed to protect public heath and safety. 

Noise 

The development and use of simulants or countermeasures would not impact noise within 

any biomes because these activities do not generate noise. The noise associated with the 

delivery system (i.e., booster) of a simulant or countermeasure is presented in Weapons – 

Interceptors. 

Transportation 

The development and the use of simulants would not impact transportation. As indicated 

in Section 4.1.1.2, short-term road closures along launch trajectories, the issuance of 

NOTAMs and NOTMARs to notify pilots and mariners of area closures, and debris 

recovery activities would not be expected to impact transportation. 

Water Resources 

The development and use of simulants and countermeasures could impact water 

resources in the biome where the action would occur. The severity of the impacts would 

depend on the chemical composition of the simulant or countermeasure. Impacts would 

occur from the deposition of simulants and countermeasures on surface waters, or from 

simulants migrating through soils to ground water. The disposal of simulants or 

countermeasures would follow appropriate protocols for the composition of the simulants 

and countermeasures. Prior to using simulants or countermeasures that may impact water 

resources, the impacts related to the specific chemical composition and operational 

testing environment would be analyzed in accordance with NEPA. Compliance with 

Federal and state regulations also would be required. 

Orbital Debris 

If countermeasures are used and remain on-orbit, they have the potential to disrupt or 

damage other space-based assets (e.g., communication satellites). However, orbiting 

objects lose energy through friction with the upper atmosphere and various other orbit 

perturbing forces. Over time, objects including countermeasures, may drop into 

progressively lower orbits and may eventually fall to Earth. As the object’s orbital 

trajectory draws closer to Earth, it speeds up and outpaces objects in higher orbits. Once 
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the object enters the measurable atmosphere, atmospheric drag will slow it down rapidly 

and cause it either to burn up or deorbit and fall to Earth.

4.1.2 Test Integration 

Test integration considers the range of integrated testing activities the BMDS proposes to 

implement to transition from the testing of individual components to the evaluation of 

how they will work together and perform as the BMDS. Modeling, simulation, and 

analysis; MDIE; and integrated missile defense wargames are virtual tests (modeling and 

computational analyses) or software compatibility and communication tests that would be 

conducted within existing laboratory or test facilities. Because of the nature of these 

tests, no significant impacts would occur in any biome. However, activities associated 

with GTs and SIFTs would have the potential for environmental impacts. 

GTs test components for interoperability. Such tests would assess and evaluate the 

C2BMC integration of the various components as well as the assimilation and use of the 

various sensors tracking system data. No laser weapons would be activated and no 

interceptors would be launched during GTs. To conduct these tests, multiple sensors and 

C2BMC components could be used from land-, air-, sea-, and space-based operating 

environments that would coordinate the control and transfer of information between 

weapons based on land, sea, and in the air. These sensors and C2BMC components could 

be activated from within the same biome or across several biomes. 

For purposes of this analysis, two representative scenarios that could be used for SIFTs 

were considered. These two scenarios involve similar activities (launches of targets, use 

of multiple sensors, and use of land-, sea-, and air-based weapons); however, they differ 

in number of target launches and number of weapons used. Both scenarios may be used 

to support the proposed BMDS and are analyzed in this PEIS. 

 

SIFT Scenario 1 – Single Weapon with Intercept represents the simplest SIFT and would 

include the launch of a single target and use of a single weapon component to intercept 

the target. This scenario would use multiple sensors and C2BMC components as 

described for GTs. Under SIFT Scenario 1, the launch of the target and the activation of 

a laser or launch of an interceptor may occur within the same biome (e.g., all within the 

Desert Biome) or may involve multiple biomes (e.g., target launch from the Tropical 

Biome and laser activation or interceptor launch in the BOA). As BMDS capabilities are 

proven, a second SIFT Scenario is envisioned that would build upon SIFT Scenario 1. 

SIFT Scenario 2 – Multiple Weapons with Multiple Intercepts would include the launch 

of up to two targets. For each target launch, more than one weapon component (land-, 

sea-, or air-based) would be able to engage or “take a shot” at the target. Dual-target or 

interceptor launches would occur within seconds or minutes of each other. As with SIFT 

Scenario 1, numerous sensor components also would acquire the target and relay tracking 
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data. Under this test scenario, the two targets may be launched from one biome and the 

weapons may be activated or launched from the same or different biomes. 

Environmental Consequences 

Component testing would continue to occur under Alternative 1. These component tests 

would be conducted in addition to the proposed System Integration Tests. SIFTs would 

generally be designed around planned component flight tests. However, MDA may 

schedule additional tests that are not part of previously planned flight tests. Therefore, 

the total number of target and interceptor launches and laser, sensor, and C2BMC 

activation events would increase when compared to the No Action Alternative. This 

would increase the total number of tests, and thus the magnitude of environmental 

impacts. 

The environmental consequences associated with the use of BMDS components under 

Alternative 1 are analyzed in Section 4.1. Impacts from activities that are discussed 

earlier in this PEIS will not be discussed in this section. Therefore, the analysis of 

System Integration Tests will focus on those environmental impacts that are unique to 

these types of tests. For this programmatic analysis, a qualitative impact assessment was 

completed for each resource area because specific System Integration Test parameters 

have not been developed that would provide quantitative values. 

The activities associated with each type of System Integration Test analyzed in this PEIS 

include 

 Integrated GTs. The activation of multiple sensors and C2BMC components, and 

passive activation of weapons (e.g., powering the tracking and communication aspects 

of the weapons system but not firing the weapon) within the same biome or across 

several biomes, which would coordinate the control and transfer of information 

between land-, sea-, and air-based weapons. 

 SIFT Scenario 1 – Single Weapon with Intercept. The activation of multiple 

sensors and C2BMC components within the same biome or across several biomes 

coupled with the launch of one target and the activation of a laser or launch of an 

interceptor, and the debris from an intercept. Because the impacts associated with the 

use of multiple sensors and C2BMC components is discussed for GTs, this portion of 

the impacts analysis will not be repeated for this scenario. 

 SIFT Scenario 2 – Multiple Weapons with Multiple Intercepts. The activation of 

multiple sensors and C2BMC components within the same biome or across several 

biomes coupled with the launch of up to two targets from the same biome or different 

biomes, the activation or launch of multiple weapons in the same biome or multiple 

biomes, and the debris from each intercept. Because the impacts associated with the 
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use of multiple sensors and C2BMC components are discussed for GTs, this portion 

of the impacts analysis will not be repeated for this scenario. 

4.1.2.1 Air Quality 

Integrated GTs 

The emissions from generators required to power sensor and C2BMC systems could 

impact air quality. However, these generators would only be operated for a short time 

and the emissions associated with the activation of one generator would be a small 

fraction of de minimis thresholds. Activating multiple generators in a single biome or 

across multiple biomes would not have a significant impact on air quality. 

The activation of radars, infrared, and optical sensors would not impact air quality. 

Leaks of inert gases, such as helium, N2, and CO2, from gas propellant laser sensors 

could occur; however, a leak of these gases to the atmosphere would be insignificant 

relative to ambient oxygen concentrations. There are no air emissions associated with the 

activation of solid-state lasers; therefore, no impacts to air quality would be expected. An 

increase in the number of laser sensors activated during GTs would not have a significant 

impact on air quality regardless of whether the sensors were located in the same or 

multiple biomes. 

SIFT Scenario 1 – Single Weapon with Intercept

 In addition to the impacts presented under GTs, the emissions from SIFT Scenario 1 

would include emissions from activation of lasers and launches. The primary exhaust 

products of boosters and lasers would be as described for weapons components. An 

intercept would result in the release of gases and PM. 

For a target launch and the activation of a laser or launch of an interceptor occurring in 

the same biome, the emissions from laser activation and launches combined with the 

release of gases and particulates from an intercept could impact air quality. Exhibit 4-11 

shows the combined emission products from the launch of a representative target and 

interceptor within the same biome. Exhibit 4-12 shows the emission products from the 

launch of a representative target and the activation of a laser within the same biome. 

Emissions from launch activities and laser activation would not be expected to result in 

significant impacts to air quality. EPA uses six criteria pollutants as indicators of air 

quality, including ozone, CO, NO2, SO2, PM, and lead, and has established a maximum 

concentration for each, above which adverse effects on human health may occur. Of 

these pollutants, only CO is emitted during the launch of targets and the launch or firing 

of weapons. The de minimis level for CO is 91 metric tons (100 tons) per year. As 

shown in Exhibits 4-11 and 4-12, CO levels for the launch of a target and a launch of an 

interceptor would be only three percent of the de minimis level. The CO levels for the 
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launch of a target and the activation of a laser also would be less than two percent of the 

de minimis level. The magnitude of potential impacts from other emissions from launch 

and laser activation would depend on the biome in which the activities took place and 

would be analyzed in site-specific analyses. Impacts to air quality from laser activation 

and launches occurring in different biomes would not have the additive impacts of 

activities occurring within the same biome. 

Exhibit 4-11. Emission Products from Launches of Representative Targets and 

Interceptors in metric tons (tons) 

Emission 

Product Target Interceptor Total 

Al2O3 2.30 (2.54) 3.01 (3.32) 5.31 (5.85) 

CO 1.75 (1.93) 0.98 (1.08) 2.73 (3.01) 

HCl 1.73 (1.91) 1.77 (1.95) 3.50 (3.86) 

N2 0.68 (0.75) 5.77 (6.36) 6.45 (7.11) 

H2O 0.92 (1.02) 1.93 (2.13) 2.85 (3.15) 

H2 0.16 (0.17) 0.00 (0.00) 0.16 (0.17) 

CO2 0.34 (0.37) 1.47 (1.62) 1.81 (1.99) 

Other 0.00 (0.00) 0.16 (0.18) 0.16 (0.18) 

Source: Dailey, 1993 as referenced in U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense 

Command, 1994d and U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2003. 

Exhibit 4-12. Emission Products from Launches of Representative Targets and 

Lasers in kilograms (pounds) 

Emission 

Product Target Laser Total Total metric tons (tons) 

Al2O3 2,300 (5,060) - 2,300 (5,060) 2.30 (2.54) 

CO 1,747 (3,846) - 1,747 (3,846) 1.75 (1.93) 

HCl 1,733 (3,815) - 1,733 (3,815) 1.73 (1.91) 

N2 680 (1,497) 108 (238) 788 (1735) 0.79 (0.87) 

H2O 924 (2,033) 540 (1,190) 1464 (3223) 1.46 (1.61) 

H2 156 (344) 23 (51) 179 (395) 0.18 (0.20) 

CO2 336 (739) 396 (873) 732 (1612) 0.73 (0.81) 

Oxygen - 270 (595) 270 (595) 0.27 (0.30) 

Cl - 36 (79) 36 (79) 0.04 (0.04) 

Ammonia - 81 (179) 81 (179) 0.08 (0.09) 

Iodine - 13 (29) 13 (29) 0.01 (0.01) 

Source: U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command, 1993c; Dailey, 1993 as referenced in U.S. 

Army Space and Strategic Defense Command, 1994d and U.S. Department of the Air Force, 

1997b 
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SIFT Scenario 2- Multiple Weapons with Multiple Intercepts

In addition to the impacts presented under SIFT Scenario 1, the emissions from launching 

any two targets (liquid- or solid-propellant) from the same location at the same time 

would not be expected to result in significant impacts to air quality, provided that such an 

activity is within the operating parameters of the launch facility or range. The launch or 

activation of multiple weapons and use of additional support equipment would result in a 

localized increase in emissions. The concentration of the localized emissions and the 

subsequent severity of the impact would vary based on the number of launches or 

activations and support equipment, the proximity (both geographically and in time) of 

each launch or activation and operation of support equipment, and the specific location of 

such activities within a biome. The combined impacts of all the emissions associated 

with SIFT Scenario 2 (emissions from support equipment, launches, laser activations, and 

debris from intercepts) might result in significant impacts to air quality. Site-specific 

environmental analysis would be completed to evaluate potentially significant impacts. 

4.1.2.2 Airspace 

Integrated GTs 

EMR and other radio frequency transmissions associated with radar sensors and C2BMC 

equipment activated during GTs could potentially impact airspace operations by 

interfering with communication and navigation equipment. Coordination with the 

appropriate FAA ARTCC, relevant military installations, and relevant foreign countries 

with jurisdiction over affected airspace would minimize the potential for impact from 

these tests. 

In addition, laser sensors have the potential to cause eye damage to aircraft pilots. All 

laser sensors would be operated according to appropriate range safety regulations. An 

increase in the number of laser sensors activated during GTs would not be expected to 

significantly impact airspace. 

SIFT Scenario 1 - Single Weapon with Intercept 

In addition to the impacts presented under GTs, the impacts associated with airspace from 

SIFT Scenario 1 would include the additional restricted airspace associated with launches 

and the activation of lasers. Launches of targets and the activation or launch of a 

weapon, and impact of the target and interceptor would occur in designated areas of 

cleared airspace. Close coordination with the appropriate FAA ARTCC, relevant 

military installations, and foreign countries with jurisdiction for airspace management 

would minimize the potential for any adverse impacts on airspace use and scheduling. In 

addition, before conducting an operation that is potentially hazardous to non-participating 

aircraft, NOTAMs would be issued. 
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Retrieval of debris on land would occur within the boundaries of the designated impact 

area; therefore, debris retrieval would have no impact on navigable airspace or airborne 

activities outside the restricted airspace complex. It is not anticipated that debris falling 

into the BOA would be retrieved. 

SIFT Scenario 2 – Multiple Weapons with Multiple Intercepts 

In addition to the impacts presented under SIFT Scenario 1, the additional impacts to 

airspace under SIFT Scenario 2 would result from a larger portion of cleared airspace 

required to support the specific SIFT, the increased duration of the test, the additional 

debris areas associated with two targets and multiple intercept attempts, and increased 

operation of support equipment, which could result in an increase in the disruption of 

commercial and civilian air travel and operations. Close coordination with the 

appropriate FAA ARTCC, military installations, and relevant foreign countries with 

jurisdiction over affected airspace would reduce the potential impacts to airspace. Upon 

completion of such coordination for each test, there would be no significant impacts to 

airspace. 

4.1.2.3 Biological Resources 

Integrated GTs 

Impacts to biological resources resulting from GTs would include EMR emissions from 

radar sensors and laser beams from laser sensors. The size, motion, and orientation of the 

beams would limit the beam exposure time on biological resources. An increase in the 

number of radar sensors operating within a biome would increase the risks to biological 

resources, but the impacts would be insignificant. 

 

SIFT Scenario 1 – Single Weapon with Intercept

In addition to the impacts presented under GTs, the impacts from SIFT Scenario 1 would 

include the emissions associated with activation of lasers, including CO2, ammonia, and 

chlorine. Such impacts are considered to be minor as the laser would be operated for a 

few seconds per launch, and would not emit large quantities of gases. Potential impacts 

from launches include emissions, deposition of hazardous materials, debris associated 

with intercepts, and noise associated with launch and flight. Impacts to biological 

resources associated with SIFT Scenario 1 activities would result primarily from the 

noise associated with launch and intercept. Sonic booms may create startle responses in 

some animals. Debris from the intercept could directly hit an animal. Coordination and 

consultation with appropriate regulatory agencies, as well as adherence to appropriate and 

relevant international treaties, would be required to address any potentially significant 

impacts on biological resources. Impacts to biological resources would depend on the 
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biome in which the launch and intercept took place. The potential for and extent of 

impact would need to be examined in site-specific environmental analysis. 

SIFT Scenario 2 – Multiple Weapons with Multiple Intercepts

In addition to the impacts presented under SIFT Scenario 1, the environmental impacts to 

biological resources under SIFT Scenario 2 are related to the biome and the threatened 

and endangered species, the unique or sensitive environments, and the migratory, 

breeding, and feeding activities that occur in the biome, which would be affected by such 

activities. Site-specific environmental analysis would be completed to evaluate 

potentially significant impacts. 

4.1.2.4 Geology and Soils 

Integrated GTs 

Impacts to geology and soils as a result of GTs would be limited to fuel spills associated 

with generators. Appropriate control, handling, and clean up procedures would be in 

place for any hazardous material spills or leaks. An increase in the number of sensors or 

C2BMC systems tested within a biome would not significantly increase the impacts to 

geology and soils. 

SIFT Scenario 1- Single Weapon with Intercept 

In addition to the impacts presented under GTs, the impacts from SIFT Scenario 1 would 

include increased soil acidity from the emission of small amounts of chlorine if the laser 

is activated in a humid biome. Similarly, HCl emitted primarily from launch of solid 

propellant boosters could be deposited on the soil in the form of acid rain and result in 

increased soil acidity. 

Impacts to geology and soils also may result from the emissions and subsequent 

deposition of PM and any simulant used in the target. A target launch and the activation 

or launch of a weapon would not result in a significant impact to geology and soils. 

SIFT Scenario 2 – Multiple Weapons with Multiple Intercepts

The activities performed under SIFT Scenario 2 would not impact geology. In addition 

to the impacts presented under SIFT Scenario 1, the environmental impacts to soils under 

SIFT Scenario 2 would be related to the biome, the characteristics and condition of the 

soil, and the type and amount of material that would be deposited on the soil during a test 

event. Site-specific environmental analysis would be completed to evaluate potentially 

significant impacts. 
4-108 

4.1.2.5 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

Integrated GTs 

GTs would involve an increase in the volume of hazardous materials and hazardous 

wastes used and generated by the testing of sensors and C2BMC systems. However, 

hazardous materials and hazardous waste would be handled in accordance with all 

applicable regulations, and each test location would have an SPCC plan in place to 

handle any spills or leaks of hazardous materials. An increase in the use of sensors and 

communication systems in a biome would not result in significant impacts from 

hazardous materials and hazardous waste. 

SIFT Scenario 1 – Single Weapon with Intercept 

SIFT Scenario 1 would potentially increase the impacts from hazardous materials and 

hazardous waste. The impacts from laser activation would include the production of 

spent laser chemicals, which would be neutralized and treated as waste. Potential 

impacts from launches include fueling procedures (if applicable) and debris disposal. 

Appropriate waste management and disposal procedures would be in place to safely 

manage these substances in accordance with applicable regulations. 

For a target launch and the activation of a laser or launch of an interceptor, impacts from 

hazardous materials and hazardous waste would not result in a significant impact. 

Applicable regulations and procedures would be followed and would prevent impacts 

from management and disposal of hazardous materials or hazardous waste. If 

appropriate, debris from launches would be handled in accordance with approved 

disposal requirements. 

SIFT Scenario 2 – Multiple Weapons with Multiple Intercepts 

The activities under SIFT Scenario 2 would use more hazardous materials and would 

generate more hazardous waste than those under SIFT Scenario 1. The increased use and 

generation of hazardous materials and hazardous waste would not result in a significant 

impact. Hazardous materials and hazardous waste including debris (if appropriate) would 

be handled in accordance with approved disposal requirements. 

4.1.2.6 Health and Safety 

Integrated GTs 

Operation of multiple sensors and C2BMC systems during GTs would increase potential 

risks to health and safety. All health and safety procedures would be followed in the 

operation of the sensors and C2BMC systems. Appropriate safety exclusion zones, 
4-109 

personnel exclusion zones, and EMR hazard zones would be established prior to testing. 

All participating personnel would be trained and certified in the risks associated with 

testing and operation of sensors and C2BMC systems. As a result, the increase in risks to 

health and safety would not be considered significant. 

SIFT Scenario 1 – Single Weapon with Intercept 

The potential impacts associated with SIFT Scenario 1 would increase the exposure to 

health and safety risks from those found in the GTs. Impacts would include potential 

impacts from laser operation including handling laser chemicals and potential contact 

with the laser beam. Potential impacts to health and safety from launches include 

exposure to explosives, contact with launch debris, and exposure to noise produced 

during launch. 

Impacts to health and safety from activities associated with SIFT Scenario 1 would 

depend on the biome in which launches and intercept took place. Because launches 

would take place on facilities or at locations with restricted access, members of the public 

would not be exposed to these hazards. Operating procedures would be developed to 

protect personnel, reducing any potential impacts to less than significant levels. 

Individuals exposed to health and safety risks would be DoD or DoD contractor 

personnel, other participants in the test, and other support, security, or observer 

personnel. All personnel exposed to elevated health and safety risks would be trained 

and certified for such risks, while the remaining test personnel would be briefed on the 

health and safety risks in accordance with appropriate and relevant regulations and 

standard operating procedures. The establishment of restricted impact areas and 

adherence to applicable regulations and standard operating procedures would reduce 

impacts from debris to less than significant levels. 

SIFT Scenario 2 – Multiple Weapons with Multiple Intercepts 

The activities associated with SIFT Scenario 2 would result in an increased exposure to 

health and safety risks in comparison to those associated with SIFT Scenario 1. The 

increased exposure to health and safety risks associated with SIFT Scenario 2 would not 

be expected to result in a significant impact. 

4.1.2.7 Noise 

Integrated GTs 

Impacts from noise as a result of GTs would be limited to noise associated with the 

operation of generators required to activate sensors and C2BMC. Noise impacts from 

generators would be dependent on the intensity, the duration, and the proximity of the 

noise to sensitive receptors. The generators would be operated during tests, and sea- and 
4-110 

air-based systems typically would not be operated in proximity to sensitive receptors. 

Site-specific environmental analysis would be completed to evaluate potentially 

significant impacts. However, in general, the increase in noise from multiple generator 

use within a biome would not be significant. 

SIFT Scenario 1 – Single Weapon with Intercept 

Potential impacts from noise associated with SIFT Scenario 1 would be greater than those 

associated with GTs. For a target launch and the activation of a laser or launch of an 

interceptor, up to two sonic booms would be generated. The sonic booms could each 

produce overpressures as high as 8 to 16 pounds per square foot; however, these would 

be of short duration, lasting up to several milliseconds. Noise produced above 12,192 

meters (40,000 feet) would not affect ground level noise. In addition, launches would 

occur at locations where members of the public would not be exposed to launch noise in 

excess of OSHA regulations. Personnel associated with launch would either be removed 

from the launch location or would use hearing protection to reduce exposure to less than 

significant levels. Impacts would be dependent on the biome in which launches and 

intercept took place. However, in general, noise associated with SIFT Scenario 1 would 

not be significant. 

SIFT Scenario 2 – Multiple Weapons with Multiple Intercepts 

The activities under SIFT Scenario 2 would result in increased noise levels when 

compared to SIFT Scenario 1. Activities under SIFT Scenario 2 will be evaluated for 

noise on a case-by-case basis. 

4.1.2.8 Transportation 

Integrated GTs 

Impacts to transportation as a result of GTs would be limited to those associated with 

radar sensors. Air and marine transportation could be impacted by EMR emissions. 

Impacts to air transportation are described in Airspace. For marine transportation, 

NOTMARs would be issued in advance of the testing event to allow vessels to plan 

alternate routes to avoid the EMR hazard areas. The activation of multiple sensors in a 

biome would not significantly impact transportation. 

SIFT Scenario 1 – Single Weapon with Intercept 

In addition to the impacts presented under GTs, potential impacts to transportation from 

SIFT Scenario 1 would include temporary road closures around launch sites, expected 

flight trajectories, and debris impact zones. Debris recovery on land would require a 

relatively small number of vehicles. For SIFT Scenario 1 activities, areas around the 
4-111 

launch sites, the expected flight trajectories, and debris impact zone would be affected. 

However, closures of roads, airspace, and marine areas would be of short duration and 

would be considered routine occurrences for launch sites. Issuance of NOTAMs and 

NOTMARs would allow vehicles to clear the affected areas. All transportation of the 

components and support assets would be completed in accordance with the appropriate 

and relevant national and international standards and requirements. Therefore, no 

significant transportation impacts would be expected. 

SIFT Scenario 2 – Multiple Weapons with Multiple Intercepts 

The increase in transportation requirements or any increases in the frequency, duration, or 

number of transport route closures that would be required under SIFT Scenario 2 would 

not result in a significant transportation impact. All closures would be coordinated 

through the appropriate authorities. 

4.1.2.9 Water Resources 

Integrated GTs 

GTs would involve an increase in risk for hazardous materials and hazardous waste spills 

and an increase in demand for potable water. Spills and leaks of hazardous materials and 

hazardous waste would be handled according to appropriate regulations and to the spill 

plans at each test site. Potable water supplies could be impacted, especially in areas with 

limited water supplies and infrastructure. The increase in personnel in these areas 

associated with GTs could exceed the capacity of the available potable water supply 

infrastructure. Site-specific environmental analysis would be completed to evaluate 

potentially significant impacts. However, in general impacts to water resources would 

not be significant. 

 

SIFT Scenario 1 – Single Weapon with Intercept 

Impacts to water resources from SIFT Scenario 1 would add to those associated with 

GTs. Impacts would include the generation of HCl from laser activation and launches of 

some boosters. For a target launch and the activation of a laser or launch of an 

interceptor occurring in the same biome, impacts to water resources would be dependent 

on the biome in which the launches and intercept took place. An early flight termination 

could result in propellant and debris from the target and interceptor being deposited in 

water bodies. Specific impacts on water resources are related to the biome and the 

unique or sensitive environments (wetlands, marine sanctuaries, essential fish habitat) 

that occur in the biome, which would be affected by such activities. Coordination and 

consultation with appropriate regulatory agencies would be required to address any 

potentially significant impacts on water resources. Impacts to water resources from laser 
4-112 

activation and launches occurring in different biomes would not have additive impacts of 

activities occurring within the same biome. 

SIFT Scenario 2 – Multiple Weapons with Multiple Intercepts 

In addition to the impacts presented under SIFT Scenario 1, the environmental impacts on 

water resources under SIFT Scenario 2 would result from increased pollutant emissions 

and subsequent deposition associated with the launches and successful intercepts or flight 

terminations. Site-specific environmental analysis would be completed to evaluate 

potentially significant impacts. 

4.1.2.10 Orbital Debris 

Integrated GTs 

The amount of orbital debris would not be impacted by GTs. 

SIFT Scenario 1 – Single Weapon with Intercept 

The amount of orbital debris could increase under SIFT Scenario 1, from GMD or boost 

phase intercepts in the upper atmosphere. Such increases in orbital debris would be 

temporary, as studies indicate that objects in orbit between 200 and 399 kilometers (123 

to 248 miles) reenter the atmosphere within a few months. (Interagency Group [Space], 

1989, as referenced in U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1998) 

Orbiting objects lose energy through friction with the upper reaches of the atmosphere 

and various other forces. Over time, the object falls into progressively lower orbits and 

eventually falls to Earth. As the object’s orbital trajectory draws closer to Earth, it speeds 

up and outpaces objects in higher orbits. Once the object enters the measurable 

atmosphere, atmospheric drag will slow it down rapidly and cause it either to burn up or 

deorbit and fall to Earth. 

NASA has determined that a significant amount of debris does not survive the severe 

heating that occurs during reentry. (NASA, 2003a) Components that do survive are most 

likely to fall into the oceans or other bodies of water or onto sparsely populated regions. 

During the past 40 years an average of one cataloged piece of debris fell back to Earth 

each day. No serious injury or significant property damage caused by reentering debris 

has been confirmed. Although it cannot be determined with certainty how much debris 

would be produced under SIFT Scenario 1, the fact that the orbital debris would only be 

on orbit for a limited time, the majority of the orbital debris would burn up upon reentry 

into the Earth’s atmosphere, other orbital debris that falls to Earth daily has not caused 

injury or significant property damage indicates that orbital debris associated with SIFT 

Scenario 1 would not pose significant impacts. 
4-113 

SIFT Scenario 2 – Multiple Weapons with Multiple Intercepts 

Increases in orbital debris would be greater under SIFT Scenario 2 than SIFT Scenario 1. 

Under SIFT Scenario 2 additional space-based sensors and C2BMC assets would be used 

and therefore these platforms could also produce orbital debris. As with SIFT Scenario 1, 

it may also be possible for debris from boost or midcourse intercepts to become orbital 

debris until it reenters the Earth’s atmosphere. As defined under SIFT Scenario 1, the 

orbital debris would not pose a significant impact. 

4.1.3 Activities at Locations Outside of the Continental U.S. 

Some MDA activities may occur outside the continental U.S. (OCONUS), its territories 

and possessions. Because NEPA and other environmental laws do not generally apply to 

OCONUS activities, various EOs and DoD directives and instructions have been 

implemented. Appendix G describes the framework within which the MDA activities 

must comply regarding these international activities. 

Impacts Analysis for MDA OCONUS Activities and Facilities 

To conduct an analysis of potential impacts from proposed OCONUS BMDS activities, 

MDA considered global biomes based on similar ecological characteristics rather than 

political boundaries. The activities conducted in international locations would have the 

same emissions and stressors on resource areas as those conducted within the U.S. and its 

territories, e.g., types and amounts of emissions and noise from booster launches. 

However, the receiving environment may be very different and international regulatory 

requirements may have different standards for what constitutes a trigger for significance 

of impacts. The framework in terms of overseas environmental planning and compliance 

issues is addressed in Appendix G. 

4.1.4 Cumulative Impacts 

The proposed action addressed in this PEIS is the development, testing, deployment, and 

planning for decommissioning for an integrated BMDS to protect the U.S., its allies, and 

its interests worldwide. Thus this action is worldwide in scope and potential application, 

and only activities similar in scope have been considered for cumulative impacts. 

Regional or local past, present, or future activities would be considered for cumulative 

impact assessment as appropriate, during subsequent site- or action-specific NEPA 

analyses. Worldwide launch programs for commercial and government programs were 

determined to be activities of international scope that might reasonably be considered for 

cumulative impacts in this PEIS. Launches can contribute to cumulative impacts in three 

specific areas – ozone depletion, global warming, and orbital debris. 
4-114 

The number of BMDS projected launches was estimated at 51554 during the years 2004 to 

2014. Worldwide projected launches, which include 77 U.S. commercial launches (FAA 

AST, 2003); 99 U.S. government launches (NASA, 2003a; NASA, 2003b; NASA, 

2003c); 183 foreign commercial launches (COMSTAC, 2003); and 476 foreign 

government launches (NASA, 2004; Gunter’s Space Page, 2004; Spaceflight Now, 

2004a; Spaceflight Now, 2004b), were estimated to total 835 launches during the years 

2004 and 2014. 

Exhibit 4-13 summarizes both BMDS and other worldwide launch emission loads to the 

stratosphere, based on the projected number of launches identified above. Note that the 

load to the troposphere would be the same as the load to the stratosphere because the 

residence time is assumed to be the same and the propellant types used are assumed to be 

the same (see Appendix I for assumptions used to estimate launch emissions loads). 

Exhibit 4-13. Summary of Estimated Emission Loads to the Stratosphere from 

Launches (2004-2014) in metric tons (tons)* 

HCl Al2O3 CO2 H2O N2 Cl NOX CO

BMDS 

Projected 

Launches 

1,344 

(1,481) 

2,432 

(2,680) 

3,118 

(3,436) 

1,810 

(1,994) 

0 

(0)

18 

(20) 

1,821 

(2,006) 

0 

(0) 

Worldwide 

Projected 

Launches 

6,526 

(7,192) 

11,777 

(12,979)

57,287 

(63,130) 

50,298 

(55,429)

0 

(0)

87 

(96) 

94,933 

(104,616) 

0 

(0) 

Total 

Projected 

Launches 

7,870 

(8,673) 

14,210 

(15,659)

60,404 

(66,566) 

52,108 

(57,413)

0 

(0)

105 

(116) 

96,754 

(106,623) 

0 

(0) 

*Calculations subject to rounding; see Appendix I for additional information on launch emission load 

calculations and related assumptions 

Global Warming 

Potential launch emissions that could affect global warming include CO and CO2. Unlike 

CO2, CO is not a greenhouse gas; however, it can contribute indirectly to the greenhouse 

gas effect and is therefore included in this analysis. The cumulative impact on global 

warming from launches would be insignificant compared to other industrial sources (e.g., 

energy generation using fossil fuel) and activities (e.g., deforestation and land clearing). 

Estimated BMDS launch emissions load of CO and CO2 to the troposphere and 

stratosphere would account for only five percent of the emissions load from launches 

worldwide. However, even when accounting for both BMDS launches and other 

launches worldwide, the CO and CO2 load would be extremely small compared to 

 

54 Projected number of launches based on MDA estimates. 
4-115 

emissions loads from other industrial sources just in the U.S. As Exhibit 4-14 indicates, 

the amount of CO and CO2 emissions load from all launches over the ten-year period 

under consideration would account for 3.5 x 10-4 percent of CO and CO2 emissions load 

from U.S. industrial sources in one year. 

Exhibit 4-14. Comparison of Emission Loads of CO and CO2 to both the 

Troposphere and Stratosphere 

Emission Sources CO and CO2 Emissions in metric tons (tons)* 

BMDS Projected Launches 

from 2004-2014 

6,235 

(6,871) 

Worldwide Projected 

Launches from 2004-2014 

114,573 

(126,260) 

Other Industrial Sources in 

the U.S.** 

34 billion (37.6 billion) for one year 

136.3 billion (150.2 billion) for four years 

 * Calculations subject to rounding 

** Source: EPA, 2003d

Ozone Depletion 

Ozone depletion is a major concern, as the stratospheric ozone layer protects the Earth 

from adverse levels of ultraviolet radiation. Chlorine is a chemical of primary concern 

with respect to ozone depletion. Launches are one of the human-made sources of 

chlorine in the stratosphere. The cumulative impact on stratospheric ozone depletion 

from launches would be far below and indistinguishable from the effects caused by other 

natural and man-made causes. Projected BMDS launches would include boosters 

considerably smaller than those used on the Space Shuttle; therefore, the air quality 

impacts from the Space Shuttle provide a conservative upper bound for comparison. 

As Exhibit 4-15 indicates, the emission loads of chlorine (as HCl and free Cl) from both 

BMDS and other launches worldwide as projected from 2004-2014 would account for 

only 0.5 percent of the industrial Cl load from the U.S. over the 10-year period. The 

majority of the chlorine load from launches is as HCl, which does not readily break down 

into the ozone-depleting substance Cl. Also, the HCl in the troposphere is usually 

quickly removed by water in the atmosphere. The emissions load of chlorine from 

launch activities would also be minimal in comparison to the 362,874 metric tons 

(400,000 tons) of inorganic chlorine created annually by photolysis of historical 

reservoirs of CFCs. (DOT, 2001b) 
4-116 

Exhibit 4-15. Comparison of Emission Loads of Chlorine (HCl and Free Cl) in both 

the Troposphere and Stratosphere 

Emission Source Cl Emissions in metric tons (tons)* 

Projected BMDS Launches 2004-2014 2,724 (3,002) 

Projected Worldwide Launches 

2004-2014 13,226 (14,580) 

Other Industrial Sources in the U.S 

2004-2014** 2,993,694 (3,000,000) 

* Calculations subject to rounding 

**Source: Adapted from DOT, 2001b 

Almost all of the studies to date on ozone depletion from launches are based upon 

homogenous gas phase chemistry, which does not address the effects from particulates 

and aerosols released during ascent. There are no commonly accepted models that 

accurately predict the effects from particulates and aerosols on ozone depletion caused by 

launches. Future analysis of launches using heterogeneous chemistry could significantly 

alter the understanding of cumulative impacts of launch emissions on stratospheric ozone 

depletion. There is some evidence that particulates may play a larger role in ozonedepletion reactions than has currently been demonstrated. If this were the case, assuming 

only homogeneous gas phase chemistry (i.e., no effects from particulates or aerosols), the 

amount of ozone depletion actually occurring as a result of emissions from launches 

would be underestimated. 

Orbital Debris 

Orbital debris would be produced by space-based BMDS sensors and space-based 

C2BMC components and could be produced by midcourse and boost phase intercepts 

with sufficient energy. The effects of orbital debris on other spacecraft would depend on 

the altitude, orbit, velocity, angle of impact, and mass of the debris. Debris less than 0.01 

centimeter (0.004 inch) in diameter can cause surface pitting and erosion. Over a long 

period of time, the cumulative effect of individual particles colliding with a satellite 

might become significant because the number of particles in this size range is very large 

in LEO. Long-term exposure of payloads to such particles is likely to cause erosion of 

exterior surfaces and chemical contamination, and may degrade operations of vulnerable 

components such as optical windows and solar panels. Debris between 0.01 and 1 

centimeter (0.004 and 0.4 inch) in diameter could cause significant impact damage that 

could be serious, depending on system vulnerability and defensive design provisions. 

Objects larger than 1 centimeter (0.4 inch) in diameter can produce catastrophic damage. 

Although it is currently practical to shield against debris particles up to one centimeter 

(0.4 inch) in diameter (a mass of one gram [0.05 ounce]), for larger debris, current 

shielding concepts become impractical. (Office of Science and Technology Policy, 1995, 

as referenced in U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1998) 
4-117 

Astronauts or cosmonauts engaging in extra-vehicular activities could be vulnerable to 

the impact of small debris. On average, debris one millimeter (0. 04 inch) in diameter is 

capable of perforating current U.S. space suits. (Cour-Palais, 1991, as referenced in 

Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, 1995) 

Solid rocket motors eject Al2O3 dust (typically less than 0.01 centimeter [0.004 inch] in 

diameter) into the orbital environment, and may release larger chunks of unburned solid 

propellant or slag. However, solid rocket motor particles typically either decay very 

rapidly, probably within a few perigee passages, or are dispersed by solar radiation 

pressure. Thus, the operational threat of solid rocket motor dust is probably limited to 

brief periods of time related to specific mission events. (Office of Science and 

Technology Policy, 1995, as referenced in U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1998) 

Orbital debris generated by launch vehicles contributes to the larger problem of pollution 

in space that includes radio-frequency interference and interference with scientific 

observations in all parts of the spectrum. For example, emissions at radio frequencies 

often interfere with radio astronomy observations. (Office of Technology Assessment, 

1990, as referenced in U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1998) Not only can orbital 

debris interfere with the performance of scientific experiments, but also it can even 

accidentally destroy them. (Scheraga, 1986, as referenced in U.S. Department of the Air 

Force, 1998) 

Orbiting objects lose energy through friction with the upper reaches of the atmosphere 

and various other forces. Over time, the object falls into progressively lower orbits and 

eventually falls to Earth. As the object’s orbital trajectory draws closer to Earth, it speeds 

up and outpaces objects in higher orbits. Once the object enters the measurable 

atmosphere, atmospheric drag will slow it down rapidly and cause it either to burn up or 

deorbit and fall to Earth. 

NASA has determined that a significant amount of debris does not survive the severe 

heating that occurs during reentry. (NASA Orbital Debris Program, 2003) Components 

that do survive are most likely to fall into the oceans or other bodies of water or onto 

sparsely populated regions like the Canadian Tundra, the Australian Outback, or Siberia 

in the Russian Federation. During the past 40 years an average of one cataloged piece of 

debris fell back to Earth each day. No serious injury or significant property damage 

caused by reentering debris has been confirmed. Although it cannot be determined with 

certainty how much debris would be produced from BMDS activities, or how much 

debris is produced by worldwide launches annually, the fact that orbital debris reenters on 

a daily basis and this debris has not caused injury or significant property damage 

indicates that orbital debris produced by BMDS space-based sensors would not pose 

significant impacts. Therefore the cumulative impacts of orbital debris for Alternative 1 

are expected to be less than significant. 
4-118 

4.2 Alternative 2 – Implement BMDS Using Land-, Sea-, Air-, and Space-Based 

Weapons Platforms 

Alternative 2 includes the use of weapons from land-, sea-, air-, and space-based 

platforms. The impacts associated with the use of weapons from land, sea, and air 

platforms would be the same as discussed for Alternative 1. Therefore, the analysis for 

this alternative will focus only on the additional impacts of using weapons from spacebased platforms. Although MDA has historically conducted research and development 

efforts on space-based lasers, these efforts have been put on hold as kinetic energy 

missile technology, which is more promising in the short term, is being pursued. 

Therefore, this PEIS only addresses space-based interceptor technology and any future 

application of lasers from a space platform would be addressed as required. 

4.2.1 Impacts Analysis 

If Alternative 2 were selected, additional environmental analysis could be needed as the 

technologies intended to be used become more defined and robust. Because the impacts 

associated with the use of interceptors from space-based platforms are not environment 

specific, the impacts analysis for this alternative will not discuss specific environments. 

The life cycle activities for space-based interceptors would be as described in Section 4.1 

and in Exhibit 4-3. 

For purposes of impacts analysis for space-based interceptors it was assumed that all 

manufacturing activities impacts would be the same as those discussed for Alternative 1. 

Therefore, they are not discussed for Alternative 2. 

Space-based interceptors would be launched on launch vehicles and maintained from 

platforms similar to other satellites used for DoD and commercial purposes in a 

prescribed orbit around the Earth. The launch vehicles used to insert the weapon 

platforms into the proper orbit would likely be existing launch vehicles; and therefore, the 

impacts of the launch would be as described for Support Assets. 

The impacts associated with the use of space-based interceptors and debris and deorbiting 

are unique to space and are discussed in some detail in this section. The NEPA and EO 

12114, which require review of the environmental impact of certain Federal actions, do 

not apply to impacts in space. However, this PEIS considers the impacts that space-based 

objects, including orbital debris, might have on the terrestrial environment. Therefore, 

this analysis will focus on the impact to Earth of the launch of interceptors and the 

reentry of orbital debris. 
4-119 

Interceptors 

Interceptors may be used from space-based platforms. Although preliminary design and 

development has been considered for a space-based interceptor, in the future MDA may 

develop and test other space-based interceptor designs. 

Space-based interceptors would most likely be placed in LEO via existing launch 

vehicles. The booster used on the space-based interceptor would be either a pre-fueled 

liquid propellant booster or a solid propellant booster, with properties similar to those 

interceptors described in Alternative 1. It is unlikely that a non-pre-fueled liquid 

propellant would be used on a space platform. The interceptor and platform would likely 

be composed of aluminum, magnesium, carbon resin composites, titanium, and limited 

quantities of beryllium. 

Space-based interceptors would be capable of providing defense against threat missiles in 

all flight phases. Because of this, the launch scenario may direct the interceptor towards 

Earth along a trajectory to intercept a threat missile. In planning test activities, the MDA 

would select launch scenarios that would result in both the interceptor and the debris 

impacting in designated areas either in the ocean or on cleared land-based ranges. The 

space-based interceptors may also be equipped with an FTS that, in the event of a launch 

mishap, would be activated to destroy the interceptor. The resulting debris from the 

interceptor would be the same as that produced during a successful intercept and would 

be as discussed for other debris. 

Orbital Debris 

Orbital debris presents the most significant deviation from the impacts described for 

Alternative 1. Orbital debris generally refers to material that is on orbit as the result of 

space initiatives, but is no longer serving any function. Orbital debris can return to Earth 

via controlled or planned deorbiting or via uncontrolled deorbiting. Using interceptors 

from a space-based platform would create orbital debris, from successfully intercepting a 

threat missile and causing it to break up or from the break up of an unsuccessful 

interceptor or the space platform. 

Space-based weapons platforms would contribute to orbital debris while in orbit and 

upon deorbiting, potentially hitting other satellites in their paths. The U.S. Air Force 

Space Command, located inside Cheyenne Mountain AFS, Colorado, tracks objects 

larger than 10 centimeters (4 inches) in diameter orbiting Earth. Space surveillance 

conducted by U.S. Space Command includes reentry assessment to predict when and 

where an object would reenter the Earth’s atmosphere. U.S. Space Command does not, 

however, make surface impact predictions. NASA estimates that there are over 9,000 

objects larger than 10 centimeters (4 inches) in diameter in space. The estimated 

population of particles between 1 and 10 centimeters (0.4 and 4 inches) in diameter is 
4-120 

greater than 100,000, and the number of smaller particles probably exceeds tens of 

millions. (NASA, 2001, as referenced in U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1998) 

The addition of orbital materials from the operation of space-based weapons would 

contribute to the accumulation of orbital debris in LEO. Unless reboosted, satellites in 

orbits at altitudes of 200 to 399 kilometers (124 to 248 miles) reenter the atmosphere 

within a few months. At orbital altitudes of 399 to 900 kilometers (248 to 559 miles), 

orbital lifetimes can exceed a year or more depending on the mass and area of the 

satellite. Above 900-kilometer (559-mile) altitudes, orbital lifetimes can be 500 years or 

more. (Interagency Group [Space], 1989, as referenced in U.S. Department of the Air 

Force, 1998) Exhibit 4-16 shows the relationship between altitude and orbital lifetime. 

Exhibit 4-16. Relationship between Altitude and Orbital Lifetime 

Debris in orbit gradually loses altitude. When orbiting objects enter dense regions of the 

atmosphere, friction between the object and atmosphere generates heat. This heat can 

melt or vaporize all or portions of the object resulting in minimal amounts of debris 

reaching the surface of the Earth. During reentry, the deceleration of the debris creates 

loads on the structure that can exceed ten times the acceleration of gravity. These loads 

combine with the high temperature to cause the debris to break apart. 

Some debris can survive reentry heating. This occurs if the debris component’s melting 

temperature is high, or if its shape enables it to lose heat fast enough to keep the 

temperature below the melting point. (Aerospace Corporation, Center for Orbital Reentry 

and Debris Studies, 2003) In general, components made of aluminum and other materials 

with low melting temperatures do not survive reentry, while components made of 

materials with high melting temperatures, such as stainless steel, titanium, and glass, 

often do survive. Large pieces with moderate melting temperatures can also survive 

reentry, radiating heat over their large surface areas. Pieces that survive reentry tend to 
4-121 

be large and in some cases heavy, posing a significant hazard to people and property 

within the bounds of the object's reentry debris footprint. (Aerospace Corporation, Center 

for Orbital Reentry and Debris Studies, 2003) When possible, debris impact areas would 

be carefully selected to include deep ocean areas or designated locations on military 

ranges. However, the majority of orbital debris burns on reentry and thus does not reach 

the Earth. It is unlikely that the impact of debris associated with an uncontrolled reentry 

would pose a significant threat to the environment on Earth.

Debris that survives reentry would impact within debris or impact footprints, i.e., the 

areas on the land or water surfaces that would contain all of the debris pieces. Debris is 

more likely to terminate in water than on land because water covers 75 percent of the 

Earth’s surface. Debris falling into water would produce impacts similar to those 

described for postlaunch activities in Alternative 1. It is possible to estimate the size of 

the impact footprint, but very difficult to predict precisely where the footprint would be 

on the Earth's surface or where specific pieces of debris would land. Exhibit 4-17 shows 

the various phases of reentry. After initial and subsequent breakups, surviving pieces of 

the reentering object would hit down in the debris or impact footprint area. 

Exhibit 4-17. Typical Satellite Breakup 

Source: Aerospace Corporation, Center for Orbital Reentry and Debris Studies, 2003 

The size of the debris footprint is determined by estimating the breakup altitude of the 

orbiting object; then by estimating the mass and aerodynamic properties of surviving 

debris. Heavy debris would generally travel farther downrange within the debris 

footprint; lighter material would generally fall near the point of intercept. Footprint 

lengths can vary from 185 to 2,000 kilometers (115 to 1,243 miles), depending on the 

characteristics and complexity of the object.
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The footprint width is generally determined by the impact of wind on the falling debris 

objects, with heavy objects less affected than lighter ones. The breakup process also may 

affect the width of the footprint. For example, if the object should explode during 

reentry, fragments would be spread out across the footprint. A footprint width of 20 to 40 

kilometers (12 to 25 miles) is typical, with the most pronounced effects near the part of 

the footprint closest to the point of intercept. (Aerospace Corporation, center for Orbital 

Reentry and Debris Studies, 2003) 

Upon termination of the useful life of a space-based weapon, the weapon and its platform 

would be deorbited in a controlled fashion. The deorbiting process for a space-based 

interceptor would not be different from deorbiting activities for other DoD or commercial 

objects on orbit. During the controlled deorbiting process, the interceptor and its 

platform would either be placed in a disposal orbit, which is normally 300 kilometers 

(186 miles) above geosynchronous orbit, or lowered through the atmosphere where, after 

experiencing the friction and heat of reentry, remaining debris would be deposited in a 

designated area of the ocean. The majority of the platform would be expected to burn 

upon reentry. The on-board chemicals would also burn, destroying them; therefore, they 

would not pose a threat to human health or the environment. The impacts associated with 

debris from deorbiting the weapon and its platform would be similar to the impacts of 

debris from postlaunch activities described in Alternative 1. 

Debris from a successful intercept or a launch mishap resulting in the activation of an 

FTS would reenter the Earth’s atmosphere in an uncontrolled manner. Missions are 

designed such that in the event of an FTS action by the flight safety officer, debris will 

reenter and impact either the BOA or on land on cleared ranges. It is also possible that 

during the planned deorbiting of a platform, the platform would experience a failure or 

lose communications with the ground controllers in which case the platform may reenter 

in an uncontrolled manner. In either scenario, the majority of the debris and platform 

would burn during reentry, resulting in a small amount, if any, inert debris reaching the 

Earth’s surface. 

4.2.1.1 Air Quality 

Impacts from Launch/Flight

The air emissions associated with launching an interceptor from a space-based platform 

would be the same as those emitted during launch from any platform discussed in 

Alternative 1. However, emissions produced in a space environment would not affect the 

human environment; therefore, there would be no impact to air quality from space-based 

interceptors. 
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Impacts from Debris 

Upon reentry, the majority of the space-based interceptor and its platform would burn due 

to the intense friction and heat created during reentry through the Earth’s atmosphere. 

Any on-board hazardous materials would burn and would not pose a threat to human 

health or the environment. Some small particles and pieces of debris may serve as 

reaction sites for chemical reactions in the atmosphere; however, due to the infrequency 

of debris reentry and deorbiting events, the impacts would be insignificant. 

4.2.1.2 Airspace 

Impacts from Launch/Flight 

Although launch of the interceptor would occur in space, the interceptor may be directed 

towards the Earth during intercepts and could impact the use of airspace in the 

interceptor’s designated path. Any potentially affected airspace would be cleared before 

launch of the interceptor. Coordination with the appropriate FAA ARTCC and relevant 

military installations with responsibility for airspace management would minimize the 

potential for any adverse impacts to airspace use and scheduling. 

Impacts from Debris 

For controlled reentries, it would be possible to indicate an area of airspace that would 

need to remain cleared during reentry events. For uncontrolled reentries, current 

capabilities and procedures provide a limited ability to predict within a 30-minute, 9,656-

kilometer (6,000-mile) window when and where a particular object would reenter the 

Earth’s upper atmosphere. (U.S. Strategic Command, 2002) Given the difficulty in 

predicting the path of uncontrolled reentering space-based interceptors and their 

associated platforms, little advance warning could be given to clear airspace. However, 

most objects break up and vaporize under aerodynamic forces and heating that occur 

during reentry. Thus potential impacts to airspace are not expected to be significant. 

4.2.1.3 Biological Resources 

Impacts from Launch/Flight 

The launch of interceptors from space-based platforms could result in impacts to 

biological resources. In the event that an intercept was attempted and was unsuccessful, 

the trajectory used by the interceptor could cause it to hit the Earth’s surface. The 

trajectory for test events would be carefully selected such that the interceptor would 

impact in a cleared portion of the ocean or in a cleared military range. Also, space-based 

interceptors may be equipped with an FTS. In the event of a launch mishap, the FTS 
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would be activated to destroy the interceptor, which would further reduce impacts to 

biological resources. 

Impacts from Debris 

Upon reentry into the atmosphere, the majority of the interceptor and platform would be 

expected to break up and burn up due to the frictional forces and intense heat created 

upon reentry. Therefore, any on-board hazardous materials would also be consumed and 

would not pose a threat to biological resources. The remaining debris would fall to the 

Earth’s surface and likely fall into open ocean waters where impact would be limited to 

fish and marine animals in the immediate surface waters surrounding the impact point. 

Fish and marine mammals at lower depths of the ocean would have more time to react to 

the sound of the impact and would be able to avoid the impact area. 

Debris could potentially be scattered over a wide area. Factors affecting an object’s path 

could include variations in the gravitational field of the landmass and ocean areas, solar 

radiation pressure, and atmospheric drag. Objects reentering may skip off the Earth’s 

atmosphere, similar to a stone skipping across a pond, causing them to impact much 

further away than originally predicted and unintentionally disturbing wildlife and 

vegetation. (U.S. Strategic Command, 2002) The impacts of debris affecting biological 

resources would be similar to the impacts of postlaunch activities as described in 

Alternative 1. 

4.2.1.4 Geology and Soils 

Impacts from Launch/Flight 

No impacts to geology and soils would be expected from the launch/flight of space-based 

interceptors. 

Impacts from Debris 

Because interceptor and station keeping platform propellants would likely be consumed 

during reentry into the upper atmosphere, debris and deorbiting activities for space-based 

weapons and their platforms would not be expected to release toxic substances that would 

impact soils. 

The impact of debris from space-based weapons platforms or interceptors reaching the 

Earth’s surface and creating craters or impacting unstable soils would be extremely 

unlikely, as most debris would not survive reentry. Debris that might survive reentry 

would likely be very small in size and would not create serious impact force on the 

surface. Further, when possible, debris impact areas would be carefully selected to 

include deep ocean areas or designated locations on military ranges, where impacts could 
4-125 

be contained. Because of the infrequency of debris reentry and the expected small size of 

surviving reentry debris, no significant impacts to geology or soils would be expected. 

4.2.1.5 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

Impacts from Launch/Flight 

The launch/flight of interceptors would not produce hazardous waste that would be 

transported to or disposed on Earth. 

Impacts from Debris 

Debris that is contaminated with hazardous materials would reenter the Earth’s 

atmosphere and be exposed to high temperatures during reentry. This would likely 

render the debris inert by the time it reaches the Earth’s surface. Debris and deorbited 

material would not be considered hazardous waste. Therefore, there would be no impact 

on hazardous waste management from space-based interceptor debris. 

4.2.1.6 Health and Safety 

Impacts from Launch/Flight 

Launch trajectories would be selected such that, in the event of an unsuccessful intercept 

attempt, the debris from the interceptor launched from a space-based platform would 

impact in the open ocean area or in a designated area on land. This would minimize the 

possibility that health and safety of people on the ground would be affected by 

launch/flight activities. Also, space-based interceptors may be equipped with an FTS. In 

the event of a launch mishap, the FTS would be activated to destroy the interceptor, 

which would further reduce impacts to health and safety. 

Impacts from Debris 

Launch trajectories would be selected such that the debris from a space-based platform 

would impact in the open ocean area or in a designated area on land. This would 

minimize the possibility that health and safety of people on the ground would be affected 

by launch/flight activities. However, in the event of uncontrolled deorbiting, there is 

potential for the subsequent debris (devoid of any potentially harmful chemicals) to hit 

and injure humans. However, as mentioned above, humans only inhabit one-eighth of the 

Earth’s surface; therefore, any impacts to health and safety expected from debris and 

deorbiting material would be minimal. The risk that an individual would be hit and 

injured by reentering orbital debris is estimated to be less than one in one trillion. As a 

reference point, the risk that an individual in the U.S. will be struck by lightning is 

approximately one in 1.4 million. Over the last 40 years, more than 1,400 metric tons 
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(1,543 tons) of material is estimated to have survived reentry with no reported casualties. 

(Aerospace Corporation, Center for Orbital Reentry and Debris Studies, 2003) 

Therefore, the impacts to health and safety expected from debris and deorbiting material 

would be negligible. 

4.2.1.7 Noise 

Impacts from Launch/Flight 

No impacts from noise would be expected from the launch/flight of space-based 

interceptors. 

4.2.1.8 Transportation 

Impacts from Launch/Flight 

There would be no impacts to transportation from launch/flight of space-based 

interceptors. 

Impacts from Debris 

Any orbital debris falling into the open ocean would most likely not be recovered. Debris 

recovery on land would be as described for Alternative 1, and would not have an impact 

on transportation. 

4.2.1.9 Water Resources 

Impacts from Launch/Flight 

There would be no impacts to water resources from launch/flight of space-based 

interceptors. 

Impacts from Debris 

Upon reentry through the upper atmosphere, space-based interceptors and components 

would be subject to extreme heat, destroying residual chemicals or rendering them inert. 

Therefore, no impacts to water resources would be expected from debris and deorbiting 

material. 

4.2.2 Test Integration 

This section assesses the potential for environmental impacts of BMDS System 

Integration Test activities under Alternative 2. 
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Description of Tests Analyzed 

The System Integration Tests would incorporate land-, sea-, air-, and space-based 

platforms for weapons, sensors, C2BMC, and support assets. The System Integration 

Test activities under Alternative 2 would be the same as those presented under 

Alternative 1. 

In addition to the land-, sea-, and air-based interceptors described under Alternative 1, 

interceptors may be launched from space-based platforms under Alternative 2. All other 

activities and their associated impacts from System Integration Tests would be the same 

as those described under Alternative 1. GTs would not involve weapons components; 

however additional sensor and C2BMC components would be required to control and 

coordinate the activities of the four weapon platforms (land-, sea-, air-, and space-based) 

under Alternative 2. The System Integration Tests conducted under SIFT Scenarios 1 

and 2 could include launches of interceptors from space-based platforms. Other aspects 

of these tests would be the same as described under Alternative 1. 

Environmental Consequences 

Component testing would continue under Alternative 2. These tests would be conducted 

in addition to the System Integration Tests described under Alternative 1; System 

Integration Tests conducted under Alternative 2 also could include the use of space-based 

interceptors. Space-based interceptors would replace a land-, sea-, or air-based weapon 

launch or activation. Space-based interceptors would be capable of providing defense 

against threat missiles in all flight phases. 

Impacts from activities that are discussed earlier in this PEIS, including System 

Integration Tests using weapons from land-, air-, and sea-based platforms will not be 

discussed in this section. The analysis of System Integration Tests under Alternative 2 

will focus on those environmental impacts that are unique to the use of space-based 

interceptors compared to those described for System Integration Test activities under 

Alternative 1. 

The unique activities associated with each type of System Integration Test analyzed in 

this PEIS under Alternative 2 include 

 Integrated GTs. The use of additional components to control and coordinate the 

activities of the four weapon platforms (land-, sea-, air-, and space-based). 

 SIFT Scenario 1 – Single Weapon with Intercept. The launch of interceptors from 

space-based platforms with an intercept. 
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 SIFT Scenario 2 – Multiple Weapons with Multiple Intercepts. The launch of 

multiple interceptors from multiple weapon platforms (land-, sea-, air-, and spacebased) at up to two targets with intercepts. Under Alternative 2, the following 

analysis assumes that the launch of a space-based interceptor would replace a land-, 

sea-, or air-based weapon launch or activation. The use of support assets or C2BMC 

during test events is addressed under Alternative 1. 

Tests Not Analyzed By Resource Area 

 Integrated GTs. The use of additional components to control and coordinate the 

activities of a space-based interceptor would result in a negligible increase in the 

severity of the impacts across the resource areas presented under Alternative 1; 

therefore, impacts from GTs will not be considered further in this section. 

 SIFT Scenario 1 – Single Weapon with Intercept. Under Alternative 2, the launch 

of the interceptor from a space-based weapon platform instead of a land-, sea-, or airbased platform as described under Alternative 1, would result in a negligible 

reduction (a beneficial change) in the overall impacts on each resource area. Under 

Alternative 2 an interceptor launch from a space-based weapon would replace the 

interceptor launch from a land- or sea-based weapon, which would result in a 

reduction in ground level emissions. Based on the projected target intercept flight 

path of a space-based interceptor, Alternative 2 may result in fewer impacts to 

airspace than Alternative 1. If the flight path were limited to the exoatmosphere, 

Alternative 2 would have fewer impacts to airspace than Alternative 1; however, if the 

flight path were directed towards Earth for an endoatmospheric intercept the impacts 

to airspace would be the same as for Alternative 1. The impacts of the launch of a 

space-based interceptor would be reduced for air quality, airspace, biological 

resources, geology and soils, hazardous materials and hazardous waste, health and 

safety, noise, transportation, and water resources. The impacts of the launch of a 

space-based interceptor are addressed in Section 4.2.2.10. 

The impacts due to debris from launching an interceptor from a space-based platform 

are not unique for either SIFT scenario. Launching an interceptor from a space-based 

platform could allow intercepts to occur at higher levels of the atmosphere than 

described under Alternative 1, but the impacts due to debris reentry would be the 

same as those discussed earlier in this PEIS. 

Tests Analyzed by Resource Area 

 SIFT Scenario 2 – Multiple Weapons with Multiple Intercepts. The following 

sections present the environmental impacts, by resource area, for SIFT Scenario 2. 

For this programmatic analysis, a qualitative impact assessment for each resource area 
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was completed because specific System Integration Test parameters have not been 

developed that would provide quantitative values. 

4.2.2.1 Air Quality 

Under Alternative 2, there would be fewer impacts on air quality than under Alternative 

1. Should an interceptor launch from a space-based weapon replace an interceptor launch 

from a land- or sea-based weapon, a reduction in ground level emissions would occur. If 

the activation of an air-based weapon were replaced, then a reduction in emissions would 

occur in the upper atmosphere (12,192 meters [40,000 feet]). The intercept would occur 

in the upper levels of the atmosphere, and would potentially occur in the exoatmosphere, 

where the majority of debris would burn upon reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere. 

4.2.2.2 Airspace 

Under Alternative 2, there would be fewer impacts on airspace than under Alternative 1. 

Launch of an interceptor from space could result in a reduction in potential interference 

with airspace. Based on the projected target intercept flight path of a space-based 

interceptor, Alternative 2 may result in fewer impacts to airspace than Alternative 1. If 

the flight path is limited to the exoatmosphere, Alternative 2 would have fewer impacts to 

airspace than Alternative 1; however, if the flight path is directed towards Earth for an 

endoatmospheric intercept the impacts to airspace would be the same as for Alternative 1. 

Whether the intercept of a space-based weapon occurs in the endoatmosphere or 

exoatmosphere, the debris associated with an intercept of a space-based weapon would 

have the same impact on airspace as presented under Alternative 1. For exoatmospheric 

intercepts, the majority of the debris would burn upon reentry into the Earth’s 

atmosphere; however, airspace would have to be cleared to allow for any debris from 

such an intercept to pass through the atmosphere to the surface of the Earth. 

4.2.2.3 Biological Resources 

Under Alternative 2, there would be fewer impacts on biological resources than under 

Alternative 1. Launch noise produced from a space-based interceptor would not reach 

the Earth. Therefore, tests under SIFT Scenario 2 would result in a reduction in noise and 

pollutant emissions associated with a launch or laser activation which could adversely 

affect biological resources. Specific impacts on biological resources would be related to 

threatened and endangered species, unique or sensitive environments, and migratory, 

breeding, and feeding activities that occur in an environment affected by such activities. 

Coordination and consultation with appropriate regulatory agencies, as well as adherence 

to appropriate and relevant regulations would be required to address any potentially 

significant impacts on biological resources. Site-specific environmental analysis would 

be completed to evaluate such impacts. 
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4.2.2.4 Geology and Soils 

The activities performed under Alternative 2 would not impact geology. Under 

Alternative 2, there would be fewer impacts on soil than under Alternative 1. If an 

interceptor launch from a space-based weapon would replace an interceptor launch from 

a land-based weapon there would be a reduction in ground level emissions; however, if 

launch of a sea- or air-based interceptor were replaced, there would be no change in the 

impact on soils. 

4.2.2.5 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste 

Under Alternative 2, there would be fewer hazardous material and waste impacts than 

under Alternative 1. Fewer hazardous materials and hazardous waste would need to be 

disposed on Earth under Alternative 2. Such reductions would occur through the 

reduction of a launch or activation of a weapon from the human environment and the 

associated use of hazardous materials, and generation of hazardous waste. Because no 

impacts were identified under Alternative 1 from the increased use and generation of 

hazardous materials and hazardous waste, no significant impacts would be associated 

with Alternative 2. 

4.2.2.6 Health and Safety 

Under Alternative 2, there would be fewer health and safety impacts than under 

Alternative 1. Launching an interceptor from space rather than from land, air, or sea 

would result in a reduction in the number of individuals that would be exposed to health 

and safety risks associated with launch activities. Because no significant impacts were 

identified under Alternative 1 from the increased use and generation of hazardous 

materials and hazardous waste, no significant impacts would be expected from 

Alternative 2. 

4.2.2.7 Noise 

Under Alternative 2, there would be fewer noise impacts than under Alternative 1. Noise 

produced from the launch of interceptors from space-based platforms would not be 

audible on Earth. Because no significant impacts were identified under Alternative 1 

from increased noise, no significant impacts would be expected from Alternative 2. 

4.2.2.8 Transportation 

The transportation impacts under Alternative 2 would be the same as the impacts under 

Alternative 1. 
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4.2.2.9 Water Resources 

Under Alternative 2, there would be fewer impacts on water quality than under 

Alternative 1. An interceptor launch from a space-based weapon would replace an 

interceptor launch from a land-, sea-, or air-based weapon, which would result in a 

potential reduction in the debris and simulants that would reach a water resource based on 

the altitude where an intercept or flight termination would occur. Specific impacts on 

water resources are related to the unique or sensitive environments (wetlands, marine 

sanctuaries, essential fish habitat) that occur in the biome, which would be affected by 

such activities. Coordination and consultation with appropriate regulatory agencies, as 

well as adherence to appropriate and relevant regulations would be required to address 

any potentially significant impacts on water resources. Site-specific environmental 

analysis would be completed to evaluate potentially significant impacts. 

4.2.2.10 Orbital Debris 

 SIFT Scenario 1 – Single Weapon with Intercept. Increases in orbital debris would 

be greater under Alternative 2 than under Alternative 1. Under Alternative 2 a higher 

proportion of the SIFT Scenario 1 tests would occur in the upper atmosphere because 

of testing associated with the space-based weapon. As defined under Alternative 1, 

the orbital debris would not pose a significant impact. 

 SIFT Scenario 2 – Multiple Weapons with Multiple Intercepts. Increases in 

orbital debris would be greater under SIFT Scenario 2 than SIFT Scenario 1. Under 

SIFT Scenario 2 space-based interceptors, may be launched at a target in the upper 

atmosphere. As defined under Alternative 1, the orbital debris would not pose a 

significant impact. 

4.2.3 Cumulative Impacts 

As described for cumulative impacts from Alternative 1, worldwide launch programs for 

commercial, civil, and military programs were determined to be actions of international 

scope that could be appropriately considered for cumulative impacts in this PEIS. The 

impacts of worldwide launch programs were considered in the discussion of cumulative 

impacts for Alternative 1. 

Alternative 2 includes placing weapons on all platforms considered for Alternative 1 

(land, air, and sea) and placing weapons in space. The air emissions associated with 

launching interceptors from a space-based platform would be the same as those emitted 

during launch from any platform discussed in Alternative 1. However, emissions 

produced in a space environment would not affect the human environment; therefore, the 

cumulative impacts analysis for Alternative 2 does not address the additive impacts of 

emissions produced by launches from a space-based platform. Placing weapons in space 
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involves adding additional structures to space for extended periods of time; therefore, it is 

appropriate to include in this cumulative impacts analysis other programs that are 

international in scope which place structures in space for extended periods of time. 

The International Space Station (ISS) was determined to be an action that is international 

in scope and has a purpose of placing structures in space for extended periods of time. 

Therefore the cumulative impacts analysis for Alternative 2 encompasses the discussion 

of worldwide launch programs as discussed for Alternative 1 and includes a discussion of 

the impacts of the proposed BMDS in conjunction with the ISS. 

The ISS is a collaborative project including contributions from 27 countries worldwide. 

As originally designed, the ISS would have a mass of about 471,736 kilograms 

(1,040,000 pounds) and would measure 109 meters (356 feet) across and 88 meters (290 

feet) long, with almost an acre of solar panels. (ISS, 1999) The first piece of the ISS was 

placed into orbit on November 20, 1998; the ISS is still under construction and therefore 

the current orbiting structure does not meet the dimensions described above. However, 

the ISS the largest single human-made structure currently orbiting in space. 

The ISS maintains an orbit around the Earth. The ISS and other man-made orbiting 

objects can be adversely affected by orbital debris. Orbital debris is produced during 

orbital launches and would be produced during some proposed BMDS test events and 

activities including those used to place space-based weapons on orbit. If the orbital 

debris produced during BMDS activities was located in orbits on the same plane or 

higher than the ISS the potential would exist for orbital debris to impact the ISS. The 

extent of the impact of orbital debris on structures depends on the size of the debris and 

the velocity at which it is traveling. 

Debris as small as a fleck of paint approximately 0.02 centimeter (0.008 inches) in 

diameter traveling at a velocity of three to six kilometers per second (two to four miles 

per second) has been documented to create a 0.5 centimeter (0.2 inch) indention in the 

windshield of the Space Shuttle. In LEO, an aluminum sphere 0.13 centimeter (0.05 

inch) in diameter has damage potential similar to that of a .22-caliber long rifle bullet. 

An aluminum sphere one centimeter (0.4 inch) in diameter is comparable to a 181-

kilogram (400-pound) safe traveling at 97 kilometers per hour (60 miles per hour). A 

fragment 10 centimeters (3.9 inches) long is roughly comparable to 25 sticks of 

dynamite. In general, debris smaller than 0.1 centimeter (0.04 inch) in size does not pose 

a hazard to spacecraft functionality. Debris from 0.1 centimeter (0.04 inch) to one 

centimeter (0.4 inch) in size may or may not penetrate a spacecraft, depending on 

material and whether shielding is used. However, penetration through a critical 

component, such as the flight computer or propellant tank, can result in loss of the 

spacecraft. Debris fragments between one and 10 centimeters (0.4 and 3.9 inches) in size 

will penetrate and damage most spacecraft. Astronauts or cosmonauts engaging in extravehicular activities could be vulnerable to the impact of small debris. On average, debris 
4-133 

1 millimeter (0. 04 inch) is capable of perforating current U.S. space suits. (Cour-Palais, 

1991, as referenced in Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, 1995) 

In general, any orbital debris produced by BMDS activities would likely be small, 

primarily consisting of explosive bolts and small pieces of hardware. It may also be 

possible for debris related to an intercept to become orbital debris. However, because the 

majority of BMDS activities would occur in LEO where debris would gradually drop into 

successively lower orbits and eventually reenter the atmosphere, the debris would not be 

a significant hazard to the ISS. As BMDS testing becomes more realistic, there is 

potential for an increased amount of debris reaching and remaining on orbit. Most of this 

debris would likely not remain on orbit for more than one revolution, and eventually all 

of the debris would de-orbit. NASA and its ISS partners may be able to implement 

mitigation strategies to further reduce the impacts to the ISS from orbital debris. NASA 

and the U.S. Air Force Space Command monitor orbiting space objects and are aware of 

instances when the ISS is predicted to be in proximity to space debris that has the 

potential to damage spacecraft. 

MDA would evaluate risk to existing space assets prior to test launches as indicated in 

Appendix L Orbital Debris. MDA would use launch window screening and schedule 

tests to eliminate risk of BMDS intercept debris impacting the ISS. Because the debris 

produced by BMDS activities would be expected to be small and would eventually be 

removed from orbit, and MDA would schedule launches to avoid the ISS, there would be 

no significant impacts expected to the ISS from the implementation of Alternative 2 for 

the BMDS PEIS. 

4.3 No Action Alternative 

Under the No Action Alternative, the MDA would not develop, test, deploy, or plan for 

decommissioning activities for an integrated BMDS. Instead, the MDA would continue 

existing test and development of individual missile defense systems as stand-alone 

capabilities. Under the No Action Alternative, individual components would continue to 

be tested to determine the adequacy of their stand-alone capabilities, but they would not 

be subjected to System Integration Tests. Further, C2BMC architecture would be 

designed to meet individual components needs and would not be designed or tested to 

meet the needs of an integrated system. The No Action Alternative would not allow for 

the effective development of an integrated BMDS to defend against threat missiles in all 

flight phases. 

The No Action Alternative involves the continuation of current MDA activities for 

individual weapons, sensors, C2BMC, and support assets and would not include 

integration or System Integration Testing of these components. For the potential sites 

being considered for deployment, the No Action Alternative would be a continuation of 

activities currently occurring or planned at those locations. Therefore, the environmental 
4-134 

impacts associated with the No Action Alternative would be the same as the impacts 

resulting from existing activities assuming no integration. Because System Integration 

Testing would not occur under the No Action Alternative, the impacts associated with 

this testing would not occur. 

The decision not to develop and field a fully integrated BMDS could result in the 

inability to respond to a ballistic missile attack on the U.S. or its deployed forces, allies, 

or friends in a timely and successful fashion. Further, the No Action Alternative would 

not meet the purpose of or need for the proposed action or the specific direction of the 

President and the U.S. Congress. 

4.4 Adverse Environmental Effects That Cannot Be Avoided 

Adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided include the removal of vegetation 

during site preparation and construction activities; minor short-term noise impacts 

startling of wildlife; deposition of small amounts of pollutants on land, air, and sea; minor 

increased generation of hazardous materials; and emission of EMR. 

In general, most known adverse effects resulting from implementation of the BMDS 

would be mitigated through project planning and design measures, consultation with 

appropriate agencies, and the use of Best Management Practices. As a result, most 

potential adverse effects would be avoided and those that could not be avoided should not 

result in a significant impact to the environment. Consultation with the appropriate 

agencies would result in the development of mitigation measures needed to ensure that 

impacts remain at less than significant levels. 

4.5 Relationship between Short-Term Use of the Human Environment and the 

Maintenance and Enhancement of Long-Term Productivity 

Section 1502.16 of the CEQ NEPA Implementing Regulations; require that the 

relationship between short-term uses of the human environment and the maintenance and 

enhancement of long-term productivity be discussed. 

Proposed BMDS activities would take advantage of existing facilities and infrastructure 

to the extent practicable. The implementation of the BMDS would not necessarily 

preclude the use of facilities and infrastructure for other purposes. Therefore, options for 

future use would not be eliminated. 

4.6 Irreversible or Irretrievable Commitment of Resources 

Implementing the BMDS would not be expected to result in the loss of threatened or 

endangered species or cultural resources. However, some irretrievable resources would 

be used (e.g., construction materials, fuel, and labor). Site preparation and construction 

activities would result in some minor loss of biological habitat and wetlands, but impacts 
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would be minimized through the implementation of mitigation measures. Sensitive 

biological habitat would be avoided to the extent practicable. Proposed BMDS activities 

would not irreversibly curtail the range of potential uses of the environment. There 

would be no preclusion of development of underground mineral resources that were not 

already constrained. 

Although the proposed BMDS activities would result in some irreversible or irretrievable 

commitment of resources such as various construction materials, minerals, and labor, this 

commitment of resources is not significantly different from that necessary for many other 

defense research and development programs carried out over the past several years. 

Proposed activities would not commit natural resources in significant quantities. 

4.7 Federal Actions to Address Protection of Children from Environmental 

Health Risks and Safety Risks (EO 13045, as Amended by EO 13296 and 

EO 13229) 

This PEIS has not identified any environmental health and safety risks that may 

disproportionately affect children, in compliance with EO 13045 as amended by EO 

13229. 
 

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U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 2002e. “Geographic Distribution of Major Hazards in 

the U.S., Map 5: Hurricane Activity in the Conterminous United States.” 

U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 2001. “Earthquakes and Tsunamis in Puerto Rico and 

the U.S. Virgin Islands.” USGS Fact Sheet FS–141–00, April. 

http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs141-00/fs141-00.pdf, accessed October 2003. 

U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 2000. “Ground-Water Resources for the Future.” 

USGS Fact Sheet 085–00, September. http://water.usgs.gov/ogw/pubs/fs00085/pdf/fs085-00.pdf, accessed October 2003. 

U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 1999. “The Status and Trends of the Nation's 

Biological Resources.” http://biology.usgs.gov/s+t/SNT/index.htm, accessed September 

2003. 

U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 1997. “Ground Water Atlas of the United States - 

Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska, HA 730-D.” Electronic version of the publication by 

James A. Miller and Cynthia L. Appel, Office of Ground Water. 

http://capp.water.usgs.gov/gwa/ch_d/index.html, accessed June 2004. 

U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), 2003. “U.S. National Assessment of 

the Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change Educational Resources 

Regional Paper: Rocky Mountain/Great Basin Region.” 

http://www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/nacc/education/rockies-greatbasin/rockiesandgreatbasinedu-3.htm, accessed November 2003. 

U.S. Strategic Command, 2002. “Space Control: Re-entry Assessment and Space 

Surveillance, Fact File.” http://www.stratcom.mil/fact_sheets/fact_spc.html, accessed 

December 2005. 

Virtual Domain Application Data Center, 2004. “Monsoon.” George Mason University. 
5-16 

Welch, David, 2002. “Air Issues in Canadian Mountain Parks.” Ecological and Earth 

Science in Mountain Areas Conference, September 6-10, 2002. 

http://www.banffcentre.ca/mountainculture/mtnconferences/eesma/abstract/welch.htm, 

accessed October 2003. 

Western Pacific Fisheries Management Council, 2003. “Managing Marine Fisheries of 

Hawai’i and the US Pacific Islands- Past, Present and Future.” 

http://www.wpcouncil.org/documents/WPRFMCDocument/WPRFCBrochure.pdf, 

accessed November 2003. 

Wikipedia, 2003. “Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia Homepage.” 

http://www.wikipedia.com, accessed September 2003. 

World Bank, 2003a. “Air Quality Standards.” 

http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/em/power/standards/airqstd.stm, accessed 

October 2003. 

World Bank, 2003b. “Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities.” 

http://www.cleanairnet.org/caiasia/1412/channel.html, accessed December 2005. 
6-1 

6 LIST OF PREPARERS 

This list presents the primary contributors to the technical content of this PEIS. 

Government Preparers 

Name: Martin Duke 

Affiliation: MDA 

Education: BS Civil Engineering, MS Engineering Management, Registered PE 

Experience: Twelve years environmental compliance and acquisition management 

experience 

Name: Col Allison Polchek 

Affiliation: MDA 

Education: JD, LLM Environmental Law 

Experience: Nine years environmental assessment and NEPA experience 

Contractor Preparers 

Name: Deborah K. Shaver 

Affiliation: ICF Consulting, MDA Contractor 

Education: BS Chemistry, MS Chemistry 

Experience: Thirty-one years environmental assessment management experience 

Name: Sara Eisenstat 

Affiliation: ICF Consulting, MDA Contractor 

Education: BA Environmental Science and Policy 

Experience: Two years environmental assessment experience 

Name: Brantley Fry 

Affiliation: ICF Consulting, MDA Contractor 

Education: JD, BA Sociology 

Experience: Two years environmental assessment experience 

Name: Brenda Girod 

Affiliation: ICF Consulting, MDA Contractor 

Education: BA Personnel Administration, BS Journalism 

Experience: Fifteen years environmental program management experience 
6-2 

Name: David Goldbloom-Helzner 

Affiliation: ICF Consulting, MDA Contractor 

Education: BA Chemistry, BS Engineering and Policy 

Experience: Seventeen years air quality and health and safety analyses experience 

Name: Pam Schanel 

Affiliation: ICF Consulting, MDA Contractor 

Education: BA Environmental Public Policy 

Experience: Nine years environmental assessment experience 

Name: Audrey Slesinger 

Affiliation: ICF Consulting, MDA Contractor 

Education: MSc Geology, BS Geology 

Experience: Four years environmental assessment experience 

Name: Todd Stribley 

Affiliation: ICF Consulting, MDA Contractor 

Education: MS Environmental Science and Policy, BS Biology 

Experience: Eleven years environmental assessment experience 

Name: Stacey Zee

Affiliation: ICF Consulting, MDA Contractor 

Education: MS Environmental Policy, BS Natural Resource Management 

Experience: Seven years environmental assessment experience 
7-1 

7 DISTRIBUTION LIST 

 Libraries 

Alaska 

Anchorage Municipal Library 

3600 Denali Street 

Anchorage, AK 99503 

Mountain View Branch Library 

150 South Bragaw Street 

Anchorage, AK 99508 

California 

California State Library 

Library and Courts Building 

914 Capitol Mall 

Sacramento, CA 95814 

Sacramento Public Library 

828 I Street 

Sacramento, CA 95814 

Hawaii 

Hawaii State Library 

Hawaii Documents Center 

478 South King Street 

Honolulu, HI 96813 

University of Hawaii at Manoa, 

Hamilton Library 

2550 The Mall 

Honolulu, HI 96822 

Washington, DC 

Arlington County Public Library 

Central Branch 

1015 North Quincy Street 

Arlington, VA 22201 

District of Columbia Public Library 

Central Branch – Martin Luther King, Jr. 

Memorial Library 

901 G Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20001 

Federal Agencies 

Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) 

Office of Federal Agency Programs 

1100 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20004 

Attn: Don Klima, Director

Dave Berwick, Army Affairs Coordinator

Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 

722 Jackson Place, NW 

Washington, DC 20503 

Attn: Horst Greczmiel, Associate Director for National Environmental Policy Act 

(NEPA) Oversight 
7-2 

Federal Agencies 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National Marine Fisheries 

Service (NOAA Fisheries Service) 

U.S. Department of Commerce, NOAA 

1315 East-West Highway 

Silver Spring, MD 20910 

Attn: Steve Kokkinakis, NEPA Coordinator

David Kaiser, Federal Consistency and Regulatory Coordinator, Coastal 

Programs Division, N/ORM 3 

John Hansel, Office of Protected Resources 

US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) 

4401 N. Fairfax Drive 

Arlington, VA 22203 

Attn: Rick Sayers, Chief, Division of Consultation, Habitat Consultation 

Planning, Recovery and State Grants, USFWS Endangered Species Program 

John Fay, Staff Biologist, Division of Consultation, Habitat Consultation 

Planning, Recovery and State Grants, USFWS Endangered Species Program 

Laura Henze, National Sikes Act Coordinator, Branch of Resource 

Management Support 

Congressional Delegations 

Alaska 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Lisa Murkowski 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Don Young 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

California

The Honorable Barbara Boxer 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Lois Capps 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein 

112 Hart Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Elton Gallegly 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

The Honorable Wally Herger 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 
7-3 

Congressional Delegations 

The Honorable George Miller 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

The Honorable William M. Thomas 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

Hawaii 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

The Honorable Ed Case 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

New Mexico 

The Honorable Pete Domenici 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Jeff Bingaman 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Heather Wilson 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

The Honorable Steve Pearce 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

The Honorable Tom Udall 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

Virginia 

The Honorable John Warner 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable George Allen 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable James Moran 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committee 

Chairmen/Ranking Members 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter 

Chairman 

Committee on Armed Services 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 
7-4 

House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committee 

Chairmen/Ranking Members 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Jerry Lewis 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee of Appropriations 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

State Officials 

Governor Frank H. Murkowski 

P.O. Box 110001 

Juneau, AK 99811-0001 

Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger 

State Capital Building 

Sacramento, CA 95814 

Governor Linda Lingle 

State Capital Executive Chambers 

Honolulu, HI 96813 

Local Officials 

Alaska 

City of Anchorage 

George Wuerch, Mayor 

632 West 6th Avenue, Suite 840 

Anchorage, AK 99519-6650 

Delta Junction 

Thomas “Roy” Gilbertson, Mayor 

P.O. Box 1069 

Delta Junction, AK 99737 

City of Delta Junction 

City Official 

P.O. Box 229 

Delta Junction, AK 99737-0229 

City of Fairbanks 

Rhonda Boyles, Mayor 

809 Pioneer Road 

Fairbanks, AK 99707 

Kodiak, Alaska 

Carolyn L. Floyd, Mayor 

710 Mill Bay Road 

Kodiak, AK 99615 

California 

City of Lancaster 

Frank C. Roberts, Mayor 

44933 North Fern Avenue 

Lancaster, CA 93534 

City of Lompoc 

Dick DeWees, Mayor 

100 Civic Center Plaza 

Lompoc, CA 93438 
7-5 

Local Officials 

City of Sacramento 

Heather Fargo, Mayor 

730 I Street, Suite 321 

Sacramento, CA 95814 

Hawaii 

City of Honolulu 

Jeremy Harris, Mayor 

Honolulu Hale 530 South King Street 

Honolulu, HI 96813 

City and County of Honolulu 

Eric G. Crispin 

Director, Department of Planning and 

Permitting 

650 S. King Street 

Honolulu, HI 96813 

County of Kauai 

Brian J. Baptiste, Mayor 

Office of the Mayor 

4444 Rice Street, Suite 235 

Lihue, HI 96766 

Offices of the Adjutant General 

Brigadier General Craig E. Campbell 

The Adjutant General 

Alaska Air National Guard 

Fort Richardson, AK 99505 

Major General Paul D. Monroe, Jr. 

The Adjutant General 

9800 Goethe Road 

Sacramento, CA 95827 

Major General Robert G. F. Lee 

The Adjutant General 

3049 Diamond Head Road 

Honolulu, HI 96813 

Organizations 

Rick Bettis 

United Nations Association 

Sacramento, CA 

Linda Copeland 

Physicians for Social Responsibility 

Sacramento, CA 

Patrick Coullahan 

GMS 

Anchorage, AK 

John Edwards 

SMC/AXF 

El Segundo, CA 

Hans G. Ehrbar 

University of Utah 

Salt Lake City, UT 

Mark Ethridge 

Earth Tech 

Alexandria, VA 

JoAnn Fuller 

Peace Action 

Sacramento, CA 

Greg Garcia 

No Nukes North Alaskans for Peace and 

Justice 

Chugiak, AK 
7-6 

Organizations 

Poppy Harrover 

EG&G Technical Services 

Woodbridge, VA 

Michael Jones 

Physics Department 

University of Hawaii 

Honolulu, HI 

Kristi Kendall 

Community Relations CRMD 

Eagle River, AK 

William Kohl 

United Nations Association 

Sacramento, CA 

Lynn Pullen 

CSSO/ANTEON 

Ewa Beach, HI 

Duane Robertson 

United Nations Association 

Orangevale, CA 

Jo An Saltzen 

Sacramento/Yolo Peace Action 

Pollock Pines, CA 

Tara Wiskowski 

Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA 

Private Citizens – Draft PEIS 

Jean Bodeau 

Anchorage, AK 

Ronald A. Bowek 

Sacramento, CA 

Frank Chapuran 

Huntsville, AL 

Kathy Crandall 

Washington, DC 

David Culp 

Washington, DC 

Megan Eierman 

Anchorage, AK 

Peter Elias 

North San Juan, CA 

Margaret Sarah Gardoni 

Sacramento, CA 

John Geddie 

Albuquerque, NM 

Joan Govedare 

Langley, WA 

Carolyn Heitman 

Kodiak, AK 

John Hurd 

Clinton, WA 

Heidi Kaiguth 

Honolulu, HI 

Kyle Kajihiro 

Honolulu, Hi 

Todd Morikawa 

Honolulu, HI 

Lori Oneal 

Clinton, WA 

Ryan Phillips 

Sacramento, CA 

Bruce Pleas 

Waimea, HI 

Paul Prebys 

Anchorage, AK 

Gail Ramsay 

Anchorage, AK 

Rod Ryan 

Anchorage, AK 

Steve Schroeder 

South Riding, VA 

Jimmy Spearow 

Davis, CA 

Trish Taylor 

Sacramento, CA 

Hector Velasquez 

Sacramento, CA 
7-7 

Private Citizens – Final PEIS 

Robert Z Alpern 

Healdsburg, CA 

Marion Ano 

Honolulu, HI 

Cassie Bacher 

Sacramento, CA 

Oah Bacher 

Sacramento, CA 

Catherine Betts 

Honolulu, HI 

Lance Blanco 

Sacramento, CA 

Sebastian Blanco 

Honolulu, HI 

Jean Bodeau 

Anchorage, AK 

Marjorie Boehm 

Elk Grove, CA 

Daniel A. Brown 

San Pedro, CA 

Kevin Call 

Huntsville, AL 

John Carpenter 

Anchorage, AK 

Michael Clark 

Anchorage, AK 

Steve Cleary 

Anchorage, AK 

Elma Coleman 

Honolulu, HI 

Keli’I Collier 

Address Not Provided 

Michael Comer 

Carmichael, CA 

Philip Coyle 

Los Angeles, CA 

Sheri Dela Cuadra 

Address Not Provided 

Christopher Curtis 

Hilo, HI 

Charlotte Deftereos 

Sacramento, CA 

D Delu 

Sacramento, CA 

Winnie Detwiler 

Sacramento, CA 

Alex Deucher 

Arlington, VA 

Byron H. Diel 

Fresno, CA 

Fred Dodger 

Wai’anae, HI 

Bill Durston 

Gold River, CA 

MacGegor Edg 

Salrior, CA 

Lynette Eldredge 

Nevada City, CA 

Julia Estreela 

Address Not Provided 

Mark Ethridge 

Silver Springs, MD 

Miles Everett 

Healdsburg, CA 

Jessica Fernandez 

Wai’anae, HI 

Leonard Fisher 

Los Angeles, CA 

Ronald Fujiyoshi 

Hilo, HI 

Greg Garcia 

Chugiak, AK 

Margaret Geddies 

Sacramento, CA 

M.A. Glover 

Wai’anae, HI 

Corrine Goldstick 

Honolulu, HI 

Stephen M. Gonzalez 

Fresno, CA 
7-8 

Private Citizens – Final PEIS 

Angela Guzman 

Arlington, VA 

Fawn D. Hadley 

Sacramento, CA 

Myrna Hammond 

Anchorage, AK 

Theresa Hitchens 

Alexandria, VA 

Ali Hosseinion 

Gold River, CA 

Susan Hosseinion 

Gold River, CA 

Michael Jones 

Honolulu, HI 

Kyle Kajihiro 

Honolulu, HI 

Camille Kalama 

Honolulu, HI 

Jeanie Keetner 

Address Not Provided 

Terri Keko’olani 

Honolulu, HI 

Jack Kennedy 

Sacramento, CA 

Joe Kriz 

Laytonsville, MD 

Leon Leison 

Sacramento, CA 

Jimmy Lindburg 

Sacramento, CA 

Stella Levy 

Sacramento, CA 

A Doug Matsuka 

Honolulu, HI 

Rod Macdonald 

Address Not Provided 

Ruth Mazup 

Yuba City, CA 

Matthew May 

West Sacramento, CA 

Helen Mendenhall 

Sacramento, CA 

Susan McKenney 

Arlington, VA 

Phil Moskuff 

Green Valley, CA 

Lara Morrison 

Address Not Provided 

Trisha Nakamua 

Honolulu, HI 

Stephen Myers 

Sacramento, CA 

Jonathan Parfrey 

Pacific Palisades, CA 

Kanoa Nelson 

Honolulu, HI 

Elayne Pool 

Kaneohe, HI 

Andrew Peterson 

Washington, DC 

Duane E. Robertson 

Address Not Provided 

Christine Reichman 

Anchorage, AK 

Victoria Samson 

Washington, DC 

Isabelle A. Robertson 

Address Not Provided 

Caroline Schmidt 

Address Not Provided 

David S. Scanlon 

Waikoloa, HI 

Dina Shek 

Address Not Provided 

Ellen Schwartz 

Sacramento, CA 

Ruth Sheridan 

Anchorage, AK 

Bruce Sollenberger 

Anchorage, AK 
7-9 

Private Citizens – Final PEIS 

Lenny Siegel 

Mountainview, CA 

Alan Stahler 

Nevada City, CA 

Jimmy Spearow 

Davis, CA 

Rick Thomas 

Fullerton, CA 

Bruce Thomas 

Folsom, CA 

Harry Wang 

Sacramento, CA 

Carol Totten 

Anchorage, AK 

Alexis Winter 

Roseville, CA 

Zohreh Whitaker 

Gold River, CA 

Stephen Young 

Washington, DC 

Seiji Yamada 

Honolulu, HI 
 

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Index V1-1 

INDEX VOLUME 1 

Acquisition Life Cycle .. .....iv, ES-4, ES-6, ES-12, 1-3, 1-9, 2-28, 2-33, 2-37, 2-62, 2-63, 

2-64 

Advanced Systems..................................................................................vi, 2-33, 2-34, 2-63 

Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) ................ ES-2, AC-i, 1-13, 3-21, 7-1 

Air Quality.. ...ii, ES-12, ES-13, ES-22, ES-24, ES-27, ES-29, ES-31, ES-37, ES-40, 3-5, 

3-6, 3-7, 3-10, 3-11, 3-12, 3-52, 3-57, 3-60, 3-64, 3-65, 3-68, 3-70, 3-73, 3-77, 3-79, 

3-82, 3-83, 3-86, 3-87, 4-21, 4-22, 4-23, 4-35, 4-36, 4-38, 4-39, 4-40, 4-63, 4-71, 4-73, 

4-78, 4-81, 4-85, 4-89, 4-90, 4-98, 4-103, 4-105, 4-115, 4-122, 4-128, 4-129, 5-8, 5-9, 

5-15, 5-17, 6-2 

Air-based Platforms........ES-8, ES-21, ES-30, ES-40, 2-14, 2-17, 2-30, 2-62, 2-63, 4-38, 

4-128 

Airborne Laser (ABL) .....ES-6, AC-i, 1-10, 2-3, 2-16, 2-17, 2-18, 2-21, 2-22, 2-24, 2-25, 

2-26, 2-50, 2-62, 2-63, 4-27, 4-34, 4-73, 4-83, 5-6, 5-13 

Airspace.... ii, v, ES-12, ES-22, ES-24, ES-27, ES-29, ES-31, ES-32, ES-37, ES-40, 2-44, 

3-5, 3-12, 3-13, 3-14, 3-15, 3-16, 3-42, 3-52, 3-58, 3-61, 3-65, 3-68, 3-71, 3-74, 3-77, 

3-80, 3-83, 3-86, 3-87, 4-21, 4-24, 4-25, 4-33, 4-40, 4-41, 4-42, 4-60, 4-63, 4-64, 4-65, 

4-70, 4-71, 4-73, 4-74, 4-77, 4-78, 4-81, 4-85, 4-90, 4-98, 4-105, 4-106, 4-110, 4-111, 

4-123, 4-128, 4-129 

Arrow System Improvement Program ...........................................................................2-37 

Arrow Weapon System (AWS)..................................................AC-i, 2-6, 2-17, 2-37, 2-62 

Atmosphere.......ii, ES-4, ES-8, ES-9, ES-10, ES-12, ES-23, ES-25, ES-28, ES-30, ES-33, 

ES-34, ES-35, ES-37, ES-40, ES-41, 1-1, 1-5, 2-2, 2-6, 2-36, 2-44, 3-1, 3-2, 2, 3-5, 3-6, 

3-7, 3-10, 3-36, 3-50, 3-51, 3-56, 3-64, 3-83, 3-86, 3-87, 3-88, 4-1, 4-17, 4-22, 4-23, 

4-24, 4-26, 4-28, 4-29, 4-30, 4-31, 4-33, 4-34, 4-35, 4-36, 4-39, 4-40, 4-48, 4-50, 4-52, 

4-55, 4-63, 4-71, 4-73, 4-81, 4-85, 4-88, 4-100, 4-103, 4-112, 4-113, 4-115, 4-117, 4-119, 

4-120, 4-122, 4-123, 4-124, 4-125, 4-126, 4-128, 4-129, 4-131, 4-133, 5-1 

Biological Resources..........ii, ES-12, ES-13, ES-22, ES-24, ES-27, ES-29, ES-31, ES-37, 

ES-40, 3-5, 3-16, 3-18, 3-19, 3-53, 3-58, 3-61, 3-65, 3-68, 3-71, 3-74, 3-77, 3-80, 3-84, 

3-86, 3-88, 4-21, 4-23, 4-25, 4-28, 4-42, 4-44, 4-45, 4-46, 4-58, 4-65, 4-67, 4-72, 4-74, 

4-75, 4-78, 4-81, 4-86, 4-90, 4-91, 4-92, 4-98, 4-106, 4-107, 4-123, 4-124, 4-128, 4-129, 

5-16 

Biome .ii, iv, v, vi, ES-8, ES-9, ES-10, ES-11, ES-12, ES-13, ES-14, ES-30, ES-32, 2-51, 

3-1, 3-2, 2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-24, 3-50, 3-51, 3-52, 3-53, 3-54, 3-55, 3-56, 3-57, 3-58, 3-59, 

3-60, 3-61, 3-62, 3-63, 3-64, 3-65, 3-66, 3-67, 3-68, 3-69, 3-70, 3-71, 3-72, 3-73, 3-74, 

3-75, 3-76, 3-77, 3-78, 3-79, 3-80, 3-81, 4-1, 4-4, 4-22, 4-24, 4-26, 4-27, 4-28, 4-29, 

4-30, 4-31, 4-32, 4-33, 4-35, 4-36, 4-38, 4-40, 4-43, 4-45, 4-47, 4-50, 4-52, 4-54, 4-58, 
Index V1-2 

4-59, 4-60, 4-61, 4-63, 4-64, 4-65, 4-67, 4-68, 4-70, 4-71, 4-72, 4-73, 4-74, 4-75, 4-76, 

4-77, 4-78, 4-79, 4-80, 4-81, 4-82, 4-85, 4-86, 4-87, 4-89, 4-90, 4-91, 4-93, 4-94, 4-98, 

4-99, 4-100, 4-101, 4-102, 4-103, 4-104, 4-105, 4-106, 4-107, 4-108, 4-109, 4-110, 

4-111, 4-113, 4-131, 5-6 

Blocks................................... 1-6, 2-9, 2-12, 2-34, 2-43, 2-47, 2-49, 2-54, 2-56, 3-47, 3-68 

Boost Phase ..........iv, 2-1, 2-3, 2-4, 2-16, 2-44, 2-49, 2-50, 2-55, 2-58, 2-64, 4-112, 4-116 

Booster... iv, v, 13, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 29, 2-14, 2-15, 2-31, 2-32, 2-33, 2-35, 2-38, 

2-41, 2-43, 2-44, 2-45, 2-46, 2-48, 2-49, 2-53, 2-54, 2-62, 2-65, 3-16, 3-19, 3-21, 3-28, 

3-43, 4-3, 4-7, 4-8, 4-11, 4-16, 4-35, 4-36, 4-37, 4-38, 4-39, 4-40, 4-41, 4-42, 4-44, 4-45, 

4-46, 4-47, 4-48, 4-49, 4-50, 4-51, 4-52, 4-53, 4-54, 4-55, 4-56, 4-58, 4-59, 4-60, 4-61, 

4-62, 4-63, 4-97, 4-98, 4-100, 4-103, 4-107, 4-111, 4-113, 4-115, 4-119 

Broad Ocean Area (BOA) ......ii, ES-9, ES-10, ES-12, AC-i, 2-40, 3-2, 2, 3-5, 3-50, 3-51, 

3-81, 3-82, 3-83, 3-84, 3-85, 3-86, 4-1, 4-23, 4-26, 4-33, 4-38, 4-41, 4-59, 4-61, 4-64, 

4-85, 4-101, 4-106, 4-122 

Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser (COIL)..........v, AC-i, 2-16, 4-21, 4-22, 4-23, 4-24, 4-25, 

4-28, 4-29, 4-33, 4-34 

Clean Air Act..................................................................3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 3-10, 4-36, 4-85 

Clean Water Act .....................................................3-84, 3-85, 4-68, 4-86, 4-91, 4-95, 4-98 

Coastal Zone Management Act .............................................................................. 3-2, 3-32 

Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) ..i, iv, ES-3, 

ES-4, ES-5, ES-6, ES-12, ES-13, ES-16, ES-17, ES-19, ES-27, ES-30, ES-31, ES-39, 

ES-41, AC-i, 1-5, 1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 1-12, 2-1, 2-9, 2-10, 2-13, 2-18, 2-23, 2-24, 2-25, 2-28, 

2-38, 2-39, 2-42, 2-43, 2-47, 2-49, 2-50, 2-51, 2-52, 2-58, 2-59, 2-60, 2-61, 2-62, 2-63, 

2-64, 2-65, 3-27, 4-2, 4-5, 4-6, 4-9, 4-12, 4-16, 4-18, 4-77, 4-80, 4-81, 4-101, 4-102, 

4-103, 4-105, 4-107, 4-108, 4-109, 4-113, 4-116, 4-127, 4-128, 4-133 

Components..... i, ii, iv, ES-1, ES-2, ES-4, ES-5, ES-6, ES-7, ES-8, ES-12, ES-13, ES-14, 

ES-15, ES-19, ES-20, ES-21, ES-30, ES-39, ES-41, 1-2, 1-5, 1-7, 1-8, 1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 

2-1, 2-8, 2-9, 2-10, 2-11, 2-12, 2-13, 2-18, 2-23, 2-24, 2-25, 2-26, 2-27, 2-28, 2-29, 2-31, 

2-34, 2-37, 2-38, 2-39, 2-40, 2-42, 2-43, 2-44, 2-45, 2-46, 2-47, 2-48, 2-49, 2-50, 2-51, 

2-52, 2-53, 2-56, 2-57, 2-58, 2-59, 2-60, 2-61, 2-62, 2-63, 2-64, 2-65, 2-66, 3-6, 3-11, 

3-29, 3-34, 3-88, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 4-12, 4-13, 4-14, 4-15, 4-16, 4-17, 4-18, 

4-19, 4-20, 4-21, 4-31, 4-52, 4-67, 4-80, 4-87, 4-96, 4-97, 4-98, 4-101, 4-102, 4-103, 

4-111, 4-112, 4-116, 4-117, 4-120, 4-126, 4-127, 4-128, 4-132, 4-133, 5-11 

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)

..............................................................................................................................AC-i, 3-26 

Concept of Operations (CONOPS) ..................................................AC-ii, 2-29, 2-47, 2-51 

Consulting Agencies.............................................................................................ES-2, 1-13 
Index V1-3 

Cooperating Agencies ..........................................................................................ES-2, 1-13 

Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)........ ES-1, ES-2, ES-3, ES-21, AC-i, 1-1, 1-13, 

1-14, 3-22, 4-1, 4-2, 4-84, 4-134, 7-1 

Critical Habitat ............................................... 3-17, 3-19, 3-61, 3-80, 4-86, 4-87, 4-91, 5-2 

Cultural Resources ................................ ii, ES-12, 3-5, 3-20, 3-21, 3-30, 3-38, 3-50, 4-134 

Decommissioning.... i, v, ES-1, ES-2, ES-4, ES-7, ES-8, ES-13, ES-20, 1-1, 1-3, 1-8, 1-9, 

1-11, 1-12, 2-1, 2-37, 2-60, 2-61, 2-62, 2-64, 2-65, 2-66, 3-1, 3-27, 3-28, 4-2, 4-14, 4-15, 

4-16, 4-17, 4-18, 4-19, 4-20, 4-99, 4-113, 4-133 

Department of Transportation (DOT) ........AC-ii, 2-54, 3-26, 3-27, 3-28, 3-30, 3-36, 3-37, 

3-38, 3-41, 3-42, 3-62, 3-63, 3-66, 3-71, 4-15, 4-84, 4-115, 4-116, 5-2, 5-13, 5-14 

Deployment.. .. i, iv, v, ES-1, ES-6, ES-7, ES-13, ES-19, ES-20, ES-41, 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-5, 

1-6, 1-7, 1-8, 1-9, 1-10, 1-12, 2-11, 2-12, 2-18, 2-26, 2-27, 2-35, 2-37, 2-42, 2-56, 2-57, 

2-62, 2-63, 2-65, 2-66, 3-1, 3-15, 4-3, 4-11, 4-12, 4-13, 4-14, 4-19, 4-20, 4-83, 4-88, 

4-96, 4-113, 4-133, 5-11 

Development......i, iv, v, ES-1, ES-2, ES-6, ES-7, ES-8, ES-13, ES-14, ES-29, ES-30, ES35, ES-41, 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1-6, 1-7, 1-8, 1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 1-13, 1-14, 2-10, 2-11, 2-12, 

2-13, 2-24, 2-26, 2-28, 2-29, 2-31, 2-32, 2-33, 2-37, 2-38, 2-39, 2-40, 2-41, 2-42, 2-43, 

2-47, 2-49, 2-52, 2-54, 2-55, 2-56, 2-57, 2-59, 2-62, 2-64, 2-65, 2-66, 3-1, 3-22, 3-30, 

3-31, 3-32, 3-45, 3-46, 3-48, 3-50, 3-55, 3-69, 3-80, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-15, 4-19, 4-21, 4-89, 

4-90, 4-93, 4-94, 4-95, 4-96, 4-97, 4-98, 4-99, 4-100, 4-113, 4-118, 4-119, 4-133, 4-134, 

4-135, 5-10, 5-12 

Directed Blast Fragmentation............................................................................... 2-14, 2-15 

Early Warning Radar (EWR) .................................AC-ii, 1-5, 2-18, 2-22, 2-28, 2-42, 5-12 

Electromagnetic Radiation (EMR).. ..ES-24, ES-25, ES-32, AC-ii, 2-20, 3-18, 3-19, 4-63, 

4-64, 4-65, 4-67, 4-68, 4-69, 4-86, 4-105, 4-106, 4-109, 4-110, 4-134 

Engagement Sequence Group (ESG) ..................................................................AC-ii, 2-13 

Environmental Justice ...................................................AC-ii, ES-12, 3-5, 3-22, 3-23, 3-50 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) .. .....ES-1, ES-3, AC-ii, 1-1, 1-14, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 

3-9, 3-10, 3-11, 3-12, 3-22, 3-23, 3-26, 3-34, 3-37, 3-38, 3-44, 3-48, 3-49, 3-59, 3-61, 

3-65, 3-69, 4-25, 4-29, 4-47, 4-56, 4-57, 4-61, 4-85, 4-89, 4-90, 4-103, 4-115, 5-14, 5-15, 

7-1 

Exclusive Economic Zone..............................................................................................3-58 

Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) .......................................................... AC-ii, 2-64, 5-1 

Explosive Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD)............................................ AC-ii, 2-53, 2-54 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)..... ...ES-2, ES-31, ES-37, AC-ii, 1-13, 3-5, 3-12, 

3-14, 3-15, 3-33, 3-38, 3-39, 3-53, 3-56, 3-58, 3-61, 3-65, 3-68, 3-71, 3-74, 3-80, 3-83, 
Index V1-4 

3-86, 4-24, 4-25, 4-33, 4-40, 4-41, 4-43, 4-44, 4-61, 4-64, 4-65, 4-69, 4-73, 4-74, 4-105, 

4-106, 4-114, 4-123, 5-4 

Fielding.............................v, ES-7, 1-3, 1-7, 1-10, 2-11, 2-56, 2-57, 2-58, 2-59, 2-60, 2-63 

Flight Termination System (FTS) ...........ES-21, AC-ii, 2-33, 2-53, 2-54, 2-55, 3-29, 4-55, 

4-119, 4-122, 4-123, 4-125 

Floodplains .........................................................................................3-48, 4-86, 4-93, 4-95 

Functional Capabilities....... i, ES-4, ES-5, ES-19, 1-9, 2-6, 2-7, 2-8, 2-9, 2-10, 2-13, 2-18, 

2-37, 2-42, 2-43, 2-45, 2-48, 2-50, 2-56, 2-62, 4-12 

Geology and Soils ...... ii, ES-12, ES-22, ES-24, ES-27, ES-29, ES-31, ES-37, ES-40, 3-5, 

3-23, 3-25, 3-54, 3-59, 3-61, 3-66, 3-68, 3-71, 3-74, 3-77, 3-80, 3-84, 4-21, 4-28, 4-29, 

4-30, 4-47, 4-48, 4-49, 4-67, 4-72, 4-75, 4-78, 4-81, 4-86, 4-92, 4-93, 4-99, 4-107, 4-124, 

4-128, 4-130 

Global Warming .....................................ES-34, 3-10, 3-12, 4-23, 4-36, 4-98, 4-113, 4-114 

Greenhouse Gases ....................................................................................... 3-12, 3-80, 4-36 

Ground-based Interceptor.................................................................................................1-5 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) ......AC-ii, 1-6, 1-7, 2-5, 2-15, 2-27, 2-28, 2-39, 

2-48, 2-50, 2-62, 4-112, 5-11 

Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste...........ii, ES-12, ES-20, ES-22, ES-24, ES-27, 

ES-29, ES-31, ES-32, ES-34, ES-37, ES-40, 2-54, 2-59, 3-5, 3-26, 3-27, 3-28, 3-29, 3-30, 

3-55, 3-59, 3-62, 3-66, 3-68, 3-71, 3-75, 3-78, 3-80, 3-84, 3-85, 4-14, 4-15, 4-21, 4-29, 

4-30, 4-34, 4-40, 4-46, 4-49, 4-50, 4-51, 4-62, 4-67, 4-68, 4-70, 4-72, 4-75, 4-79, 4-80, 

4-81, 4-84, 4-86, 4-93, 4-94, 4-96, 4-99, 4-106, 4-108, 4-111, 4-123, 4-124, 4-125, 4-128, 

4-130, 4-134, 5-13 

Health and Safety . ...ii, ES-12, ES-22, ES-25, ES-27, ES-29, ES-31, ES-38, ES-40, 1-15, 

2-52, 3-5, 3-28, 3-29, 3-30, 3-48, 3-55, 3-59, 3-62, 3-66, 3-69, 3-71, 3-75, 3-78, 3-81, 

3-85, 4-21, 4-31, 4-32, 4-52, 4-54, 4-55, 4-59, 4-68, 4-69, 4-72, 4-76, 4-79, 4-82, 4-87, 

4-94, 4-99, 4-108, 4-109, 4-125, 4-128, 4-130, 4-135, 6-2 

Hit-To-Kill.............................................. ES-34, 1-6, 2-5, 2-6, 2-13, 2-14, 2-15, 2-36, 2-64 

Infrared.... ... ES-3, ES-6, ES-16, ES-18, ES-24, ES-25, ES-31, 1-9, 2-9, 2-18, 2-19, 2-20, 

2-21, 2-22, 2-23, 2-26, 2-30, 2-38, 2-65, 3-28, 3-29, 3-87, 4-5, 4-8, 4-11, 

4-71,4-72, 4-73, 4-103 

Initial Defensive Capability (IDC)....................................................AC-iii, 1-7, 2-11, 2-52 

Initial Defensive Operations (IDO).................................. AC-iii, 1-7, 2-52, 2-56, 2-59, 5-6 

Integrated Ground Tests (GTs)... ES-7, ES-20, ES-30, ES-31, ES-39, ES-40, AC-iii, 1-10, 

1-12, 2-17, 2-28, 2-34, 2-39, 2-41, 2-46, 2-48, 2-49, 2-50, 2-63, 4-12, 4-21, 4-30, 4-31, 
Index V1-5 

4-32, 4-74, 4-101, 4-102, 4-103, 4-105, 4-106, 4-107, 4-108, 4-109, 4-110, 4-111, 4-112, 

4-127, 4-128 

Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) ................AC-iii, 1-1, 1-2, 1-6, 2-2, 2-18, 2-50 

Interceptors............iv, v, ES-3, ES-5, ES-15, ES-16, ES-19, ES-20, ES-22, ES-30, ES-31, 

ES-34, ES-35, ES-36, ES-37, ES-38, ES-39, ES-40, ES-41, 1-3, 1-5, 1-6, 1-9, 1-11, 1-12, 

2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-9, 2-11, 2-13, 2-14, 2-15, 2-16, 2-17, 2-18, 2-19, 2-25, 2-26, 2-27, 2-28, 

2-29, 2-31, 2-34, 2-35, 2-36, 2-37, 2-39, 2-41, 2-42, 2-43, 2-44, 2-45, 2-46, 2-48, 2-49, 

2-50, 2-51, 2-52, 2-55, 2-56, 2-63, 2-64, 3-29, 3-36, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 4-8, 4-11, 4-12, 4-16, 

4-34, 4-37, 4-40, 4-46, 4-78, 4-97, 4-100, 4-101, 4-102, 4-103, 4-104, 4-105, 4-108, 

4-110, 4-111, 4-118, 4-119, 4-122, 4-123, 4-124, 4-125, 4-126, 4-127, 4-128, 4-129, 

4-130, 4-131, 5-8, 5-13 

Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile ...............................................................................2-2 

Ionosphere .................................................................................................. ES-10, 3-5, 3-86 

Kill Vehicle... ES-15, ES-22, 1-5, 2-14, 2-15, 2-34, 2-37, 2-44, 2-45, 2-62, 4-7, 4-8, 4-16, 

4-35, 4-38, 4-40, 4-42, 4-45, 4-48, 4-50, 4-51, 4-53, 4-55, 4-58, 4-59, 4-60, 4-62 

Kinetic Energy...................... ES-34, ES-35, 2-4, 2-13, 2-14, 2-15, 2-36, 2-64, 4-46, 4-118 

Land Use............................ii, v, ES-12, 3-5, 3-25, 3-30, 3-31, 3-32, 3-34, 3-39, 3-50, 4-20 

Land-based Platforms.....................................................................................................2-17 

Lasers.............v, ES-3, ES-5, ES-13, ES-14, ES-15, ES-16, ES-18, ES-20, ES-21, ES-22, 

ES-23, ES-24, ES-25, ES-30, ES-31, ES-32, ES-35, ES-39, 1-9, 1-11, 1-12, 2-3, 2-9, 

2-13, 2-16, 2-17, 2-18, 2-19, 2-21, 2-22, 2-26, 2-36, 2-37, 2-38, 2-43, 2-44, 2-46, 2-51, 

2-62, 2-63, 3-27, 3-28, 3-29, 4-3, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 4-8, 4-11, 4-12, 4-16, 4-21, 4-22, 4-23, 

4-24, 4-25, 4-27, 4-28, 4-29, 4-30, 4-31, 4-32, 4-33, 4-34, 4-73, 4-74, 4-75, 4-76, 4-77, 

4-97, 4-101, 4-102, 4-103, 4-104, 4-105, 4-106, 4-107, 4-108, 4-109, 4-110, 4-111, 

4-118, 4-129, 5-1, 5-11 

Lethality........................................2-9, 2-14, 2-33, 2-34, 2-36, 2-41, 2-44, 2-55, 2-56, 4-21 

Light Detection and Ranging (Lidar) .................................................................AC-iii, 2-30 

Material Safety Data Sheets ................................................................................. 4-30, 4-79 

Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE)......................................... AC-iv, 4-69, 4-75, 4-76 

Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) ....... AC-iii, 2-6, 2-17, 2-22, 2-59, 2-62 

Medium Range Ballistic Missile ......................................................................................2-2 

Mesosphere................................................................................................. ES-10, 3-5, 3-86 

Midcourse Phase....................................................................iv, ES-4, 2-4, 2-44, 2-49, 2-50 

Missile Defense Agency (MDA)............. i, iv, ES-1, ES-2, ES-3, ES-5, ES-6, ES-7, ES-8, 

ES-12, ES-20, ES-24, ES-34, ES-35, ES-41, AC-iii, 1-1, 1-2, 1-6, 1-7, 1-8, 1-10, 1-12, 

1-13, 1-14, 1-15, 2-1, 2-10, 2-11, 2-12, 2-13, 2-14, 2-18, 2-23, 2-25, 2-26, 2-27, 2-28, 
Index V1-6 

2-29, 2-31, 2-32, 2-33, 2-34, 2-35, 2-36, 2-37, 2-39, 2-41, 2-43, 2-44, 2-45, 2-47, 2-48, 

2-49, 2-51, 2-54, 2-55, 2-56, 2-57, 2-58, 2-59, 2-60, 2-61, 2-62, 2-63, 2-64, 2-65, 2-66, 

3-5, 3-8, 3-10, 3-12, 3-18, 3-20, 3-27, 3-29, 3-30, 3-39, 3-43, 3-44, 3-46, 3-47, 3-49, 

3-51, 3-55, 4-15, 4-16, 4-17, 4-18, 4-19, 4-20, 4-24, 4-32, 4-42, 4-66, 4-73, 4-74, 4-75, 

4-76, 4-78, 4-79, 4-83, 4-88, 4-90, 4-95, 4-96, 4-102, 4-113, 4-114, 4-118, 4-119, 4-133, 

5-6, 6-1, 6-2 

Mobile Launch Platform ............................................................................ ES-6, 2-27, 4-83 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)........ ..ES-41, AC-iv, 2-27, 2-39, 

2-40, 3-5, 3-38, 3-83, 4-19, 4-43, 4-51, 4-56, 4-61, 4-112, 4-114, 4-117, 4-119, 4-133, 

5-6, 5-7 

National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)... ...AC-iv, 3-7, 3-8, 3-57, 3-61, 4-39, 

4-97, 5-14 

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) ......ES-1, ES-2, ES-8, ES-13, ES-21, ES-34, 

AC-iv, 1-1, 1-7, 1-13, 1-14, 1-15, 2-10, 2-43, 2-48, 2-58, 3-16, 3-23, 3-39, 3-43, 3-88, 

4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10, 4-11, 4-12, 4-13, 4-83, 4-84, 4-86, 4-87, 

4-88, 4-89, 4-90, 4-91, 4-95, 4-96, 4-97, 4-98, 4-99, 4-100, 4-113, 4-118, 4-134, 6-1, 7-1, 

7-2 

National Missile Defense ..................AC-iv, 1-2, 1-3, 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, 4-83, 4-88, 4-96, 5-11 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) .. ...ES-2, AC-iv, 1-13, 3-17, 

3-18, 3-75, 5-7, 7-2 

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) .................. AC-iv, 4-16, 4-92 

National Register of Historic Places (National Register)..................................... 3-20, 3-21 

Near Shore................................................................3-2, 3-64, 3-65, 3-66, 4-65, 4-66, 4-91 

Noise..ii, v, ES-12, ES-22, ES-23, ES-25, ES-27, ES-30, ES-32, ES-38, ES-40, 3-5, 3-18, 

3-19, 3-21, 3-29, 3-32, 3-33, 3-34, 3-36, 3-37, 3-38, 3-39, 3-55, 3-59, 3-62, 3-66, 3-69, 

3-71, 3-75, 3-78, 3-81, 3-86, 4-21, 4-25, 4-27, 4-32, 4-33, 4-42, 4-43, 4-44, 4-54, 4-58, 

4-59, 4-70, 4-72, 4-77, 4-80, 4-82, 4-87, 4-90, 4-91, 4-94, 4-100, 4-106, 4-109, 4-110, 

4-113, 4-126, 4-128, 4-129, 4-130, 4-134, 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, 5-6, 5-15 

Notice of Availability (NOA)......................................................... ES-3, AC-iv, 1-14, 1-15 

Notice of Intent (NOI)............................................................. ES-2, AC-iv, 1-5, 1-13, 1-14 

Orbital Debris ..........vi, ES-3, ES-12, ES-23, ES-25, ES-28, ES-30, ES-33, ES-34, ES-35, 

ES-38, ES-40, ES-41, 1-15, 3-86, 3-88, 4-1, 4-63, 4-71, 4-72, 4-73, 4-77, 4-81, 4-82, 

4-88, 4-95, 4-100, 4-112, 4-113, 4-116, 4-117, 4-118, 4-119, 4-120, 4-121, 4-125, 4-126, 

4-131, 4-132, 4-133, 5-2, 5-6 

Ozone Depletion.....ES-22, ES-34, 3-12, 3-88, 4-24, 4-36, 4-37, 4-38, 4-98, 4-113, 4-115, 

4-116 
Index V1-7 

PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) .......AC-iv, 2-6, 2-15, 2-17, 2-24, 2-25, 2-48, 

2-50, 2-59, 2-62, 5-12 

Perchlorate..........................................................vi, ES-3, 1-15, 2-15, 4-1, 4-51, 4-56, 4-57 

Radar... ..iv, vi, ES-3, ES-6, ES-16, ES-18, ES-24, 1-5, 1-15, 2-13, 2-18, 2-19, 2-20, 2-21, 

2-22, 2-23, 2-30, 2-34, 2-45, 2-48, 3-14, 3-18, 3-29, 3-53, 4-1, 4-5, 4-8, 4-11, 4-17, 4-41, 

4-63, 4-64, 4-65, 4-66, 4-67, 4-68, 4-69, 4-70, 4-78, 4-88, 4-97, 4-105, 4-106, 4-110, 5-12 

Sea-based Platforms ..........................2-17, 2-23, 2-27, 2-54, 3-84, 3-85, 3-86, 4-48, 4-127 

Sea-based X-band Radar (SBX)............................. AC-v, 1-7, 2-18, 2-23, 2-27, 4-17, 4-65 

Sensors........ i, iv, vi, ES-3, ES-4, ES-5, ES-6, ES-8, ES-12, ES-13, ES-16, ES-18, ES-19, 

ES-20, ES-21, ES-24, ES-25, ES-30, ES-31, ES-34, ES-35, ES-39, ES-41, 1-3, 1-6, 1-9, 

1-10, 1-11, 1-12, 2-1, 2-9, 2-10, 2-11, 2-13, 2-17, 2-18, 2-19, 2-20, 2-21, 2-22, 2-23, 

2-24, 2-25, 2-26, 2-27, 2-28, 2-29, 2-30, 2-31, 2-33, 2-34, 2-35, 2-37, 2-38, 2-39, 2-40, 

2-41, 2-42, 2-43, 2-46, 2-48, 2-49, 2-50, 2-51, 2-52, 2-55, 2-58, 2-59, 2-60, 2-61, 2-62, 

2-63, 2-64, 2-65, 3-16, 3-18, 3-19, 3-27, 4-2, 4-5, 4-8, 4-11, 4-12, 4-16, 4-17, 4-18, 4-20, 

4-63, 4-70, 4-71, 4-72, 4-73, 4-74, 4-75, 4-76, 4-77, 4-83, 4-97, 4-101, 4-102, 4-103, 

4-105, 4-106, 4-107, 4-108, 4-109, 4-110, 4-113, 4-116, 4-117, 4-127, 4-133, 5-6 

Short Range Ballistic Missile...........................................................................................2-2 

Short Term Exposure Limit (STEL) ..........................................................AC-v, 4-53, 4-56 

Socioeconomics.............................................................................ii, ES-12, 3-5, 3-39, 3-50 

Solid Rocket Motors........................................................................................... 4-46, 4-117 

Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS)......................................AC-v, 2-21, 2-23 

Space-based Platforms .....ES-5, ES-8, ES-30, ES-35, ES-37, ES-38, ES-39, ES-40, 2-14, 

2-17, 2-64, 4-67, 4-118, 4-119, 4-122, 4-123, 4-125, 4-127, 4-128, 4-130, 4-131 

State Historic Preservation Officer.................................................................................3-21 

Stratosphere..... ...v, vi, ES-10, ES-34, 3-5, 3-12, 3-86, 3-87, 3-88, 4-23, 4-36, 4-37, 4-38, 

4-98, 4-114, 4-115, 4-116 

Superfund .......................................................................................................................4-56 

Support Assets............i, iv, ES-3, ES-4, ES-5, ES-6, ES-12, ES-13, ES-14, ES-15, ES-16, 

ES-17, ES-18, ES-19, ES-21, ES-24, ES-25, ES-27, ES-28, ES-29, ES-30, ES-36, ES-39, 

ES-41, 1-9, 1-11, 1-12, 2-1, 2-9, 2-10, 2-13, 2-16, 2-19, 2-26, 2-28, 2-39, 2-43, 2-57, 

2-58, 2-59, 2-59, 2-60, 2-61, 2-62, 2-63, 2-64, 3-18, 4-2, 4-3, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10, 

4-11, 4-12, 4-13, 4-14, 4-14, 4-16, 4-21, 4-63, 4-67, 4-70, 4-77, 4-78, 4-80, 4-81, 4-82, 

4-84, 4-85, 4-88, 4-95, 4-111, 4-118, 4-127, 4-128, 4-133 

System Integration Flight Tests (SIFTs) ....... ..ES-20, ES-30, ES-31, ES-39, ES-40, AC-v, 

1-10, 1-12, 2-44, 2-46, 2-47, 2-48, 2-49, 2-50, 2-51, 2-63, 4-12, 4-101, 4-102, 4-103, 
Index V1-8 

4-105, 4-106, 4-107, 4-108, 4-109, 4-110, 4-111, 4-112, 4-113, 4-127, 4-128, 4-129, 

4-131 

Targets .. iv, v, ES- 6, ES-20, ES-29, ES-30, ES-31, ES-32, ES-39, 2-19, 2-26, 2-28, 2-31, 

2-32, 2-34, 2-35, 2-36, 2-40, 2-41, 2-42, 2-43, 2-45, 2-46, 2-49, 2-50, 2-51, 2-52, 2-53, 

2-54, 2-55, 2-56, 2-58, 2-65, 3-16, 4-6, 4-16, 4-18, 4-27, 4-32, 4-35, 4-74, 4-95, 4-97, 

4-101, 4-102, 4-103, 4-104, 4-105, 4-106, 4-128, 5-11 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).. ......AC-v, 2-6, 2-15, 2-17, 2-23, 2-24, 

2-26, 2-48, 2-50, 2-62, 4-20 

Terminal Phase ............................................ iv, 2-5, 2-6, 2-11, 2-18, 2-44, 2-50, 2-56, 2-64 

Test Assets. ...ES-3, ES-6, ES-14, ES-15, ES-16, ES-17, ES-18, ES-19, ES-29, 1-9, 1-11, 

1-12, 2-9, 2-19, 2-26, 2-28, 2-31, 2-36, 2-39, 2-43, 2-45, 2-49, 2-51, 2-59, 2-61, 4-3, 4-5, 

4-6, 4-7, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10, 4-11, 4-13, 4-18, 4-95, 4-96, 4-97 

Test Bed.....iv, ES-6, ES-7, 1-6, 1-7, 1-10, 2-19, 2-23, 2-26, 2-27, 2-28, 2-29, 2-36, 2-39, 

2-42, 2-45, 2-48, 2-49, 2-51, 2-56, 2-64, 4-18, 4-83, 4-88, 4-95 

Test Sensors... iv, ES-6, ES-18, 2-18, 2-26, 2-29, 2-30, 2-34, 2-36, 2-40, 2-51, 2-52, 4-10, 

4-11, 4-18, 4-95 

Testing... ...i, ES-1, ES-2, ES-6, ES-7, ES-8, ES-13, ES-14, ES-19, ES-20, ES-24, ES-27, 

ES-29, ES-32, ES-35, ES-40, ES-41, 1-2, 1-3, 1-6, 1-8, 1-10, 1-11, 1-12, 2-7, 2-10, 2-11, 

2-12, 2-18, 2-19, 2-26, 2-28, 2-29, 2-31, 2-33, 2-34, 2-35, 2-36, 2-37, 2-38, 2-39, 2-40, 

2-41, 2-42, 2-43, 2-44, 2-45, 2-46, 2-47, 2-48, 2-49, 2-51, 2-52, 2-53, 2-54, 2-55, 2-56, 

2-57, 2-59, 2-60, 2-61, 2-62, 2-63, 2-64, 2-65, 2-66, 3-1, 3-15, 3-28, 3-40, 3-55, 4-2, 4-3, 

4-4, 4-5, 4-6, 4-11, 4-12, 4-13, 4-14, 4-16, 4-19, 4-20, 4-21, 4-24, 4-27, 4-28, 4-30, 4-31, 

4-32, 4-34, 4-69, 4-73, 4-74, 4-75, 4-76, 4-77, 4-78, 4-100, 4-101, 4-102, 4-108, 4-109, 

4-110, 4-113, 4-127, 4-131, 4-133, 5-1, 5-12 

Theater Missile Defense (TMD) ....AC-v, 1-2, 1-3, 1-7, 4-69, 4-83, 4-88, 4-96, 5-11, 5-12 

Threatened and Endangered Species.................ES-31, 3-17, 3-38, 4-107, 4-129, 5-8, 5-15 

Transportation...ii, 6, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 25, 27, 30, 32, 38, 40, i, ii, 1-11, 1-12, 

2-53, 2-58, 2-64, 3-5, 3-8, 3-10, 3-18, 3-19, 3-21, 3-25, 3-28, 3-29, 3-30, 3-34, 3-41, 

3-42, 3-43, 3-50, 3-55, 3-59, 3-62, 3-67, 3-69, 3-72, 3-75, 3-78, 3-81, 3-85, 3-86, 4-3, 

4-7, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10, 4-11, 4-13, 4-15, 4-20, 4-21, 4-33, 4-59, 4-60, 4-70, 4-72, 4-77, 4-80, 

4-82, 4-83, 4-84, 4-87, 4-95, 4-96, 4-100, 4-110, 4-111, 4-126, 4-128, 4-130, 5-4, 5-14 

Troposphere.. ......vi, ES-10, ES-22, ES-34, 3-5, 3-12, 3-86, 3-87, 4-23, 4-24, 4-28, 4-29, 

4-38, 4-47, 4-98, 4-114, 4-115, 4-116 

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)... ES-2, AC-v, 1-13, 3-17, 3-18, 4-42, 5-6, 5-15, 

7-2 

Utilities ........................ ii, ES-12, 2-61, 3-5, 3-10, 3-43, 3-44, 3-45, 3-50, 4-19, 4-20, 4-89 

Visual Resources ........................................................ ii, ES-12, 3-5, 3-45, 3-46, 3-47, 3-50 
Index V1-9 

Water Resources....ii, ES-12, ES-13, ES-23, ES-25, ES-28, ES-30, ES-32, ES-38, ES-40, 

3-5, 3-48, 3-49, 3-50, 3-56, 3-59, 3-63, 3-67, 3-69, 3-72, 3-75, 3-78, 3-81, 3-86, 4-21, 

4-30, 4-33, 4-34, 4-60, 4-61, 4-70, 4-72, 4-77, 4-80, 4-81, 4-82, 4-87, 4-95, 4-100, 4-111, 

4-112, 4-126, 4-128, 4-131, 5-5, 5-10, 5-16 

Weapons .... ..i, ii, iv, ES-3, ES-4, ES-5, ES-6, ES-8, ES-12, ES-13, ES-14, ES-15, ES-16, 

ES-19, ES-20, ES-21, ES-22, ES-30, ES-31, ES-32, ES-36, ES-37, ES-39, ES-40, ES-41, 

1-2, 1-4, 1-8, 1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 1-12, 1-14, 2-1, 2-3, 2-5, 2-7, 2-8, 2-9, 2-10, 2-11, 2-13, 

2-14, 2-16, 2-17, 2-18, 2-19, 2-24, 2-25, 2-26, 2-27, 2-29, 2-31, 2-36, 2-37, 2-38, 2-39, 

2-42, 2-43, 2-44, 2-46, 2-48, 2-49, 2-50, 2-51, 2-52, 2-55, 2-58, 2-59, 2-60, 2-62, 2-63, 

2-64, 2-65, 2-66, 3-15, 3-27, 3-29, 4-2, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 4-8, 4-11, 4-12, 4-16, 4-18, 4-21, 

4-34, 4-83, 4-88, 4-100, 4-101, 4-102, 4-103, 4-105, 4-106, 4-107, 4-108, 4-109, 4-110, 

4-111, 4-112, 4-113, 4-118, 4-119, 4-120, 4-122, 4-124, 4-127, 4-128, 4-129, 4-130, 

4-131, 4-132, 4-133 

Wetlands.... ES-12, ES-2, 3-18, 3-50, 3-53, 3-58, 3-59, 3-69, 3-72, 4-25, 4-44, 4-86, 4-91, 

4-98, 4-111, 4-131, 4-134 

X-Band Radar (XBR)..................................................................AC-v, 1-5, 1-7, 2-22, 4-67