United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Military Procurement,

Committee on National Security, House of Representative

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

10:00 a.m., EDT

Tuesday,

March 11, 1997

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

AND MATERIEL

Key Factors Affecting

Disposal Costs and

Schedule

Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller

General, National Security and International Affairs

Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work concerning the

Department of Defense’s (DOD) management of the programs for

destroying the U.S. stockpile of chemical munitions and planning for the

disposal of nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel. Since 1988, the

Congress has appropriated $4.2 billion for the disposal programs, and DOD

estimates that $23.4 billion more will be needed to complete them.1 The

Army is working to complete the stockpile program by the congressionally

mandated date of December 31, 2004, and estimates that the nonstockpile

program will take nearly 40 years to complete. Appendix I provides

appropriation and expenditure data for the programs for fiscal years 1988

through 1997. Appendix II provides estimated funding data for the

programs for fiscal years 1998 through 2005.

Since 1990, we have issued a number of reports addressing opportunities

to improve various aspects of these disposal programs. In February 1997,

we issued a report that discussed the key factors affecting the costs and

schedules for the chemical weapons and related materiel disposal

programs.2

 As requested, my statement today provides an overview of our

February report and includes a discussion of the chemical stockpile and

nonstockpile program, actions the Army has taken to improve the

programs, and alternatives to the current approach.

Results in Brief While there is general agreement about the need to destroy the chemical

stockpile and related materiel, progress has slowed due to the lack of

consensus among DOD and affected states and localities about the

destruction method that should be used. As a result, the costs and

schedules for the disposal programs are uncertain. However, they will cost

more than the estimated $23.4 billion above current appropriations and

take longer than currently planned. The key factors affecting the programs

include the public concerns about the safety of incineration, the

environmental process, the legislative requirements, and the introduction

of alternative disposal technologies.

1

The programs’ combined life-cycle cost estimate is $27.6 billion. This amount includes $12.4 billion for

the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program and $15.2 billion for the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel

Program.

2

Chemical Weapons and Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and Schedule

(GAO/NSIAD-97-18, Feb. 10, 1997).

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program’s cost and schedule are largely

driven by the degree to which states and local communities are in

agreement with the proposed disposal method at the remaining stockpile

sites. Based on program experience, reaching agreement has consistently

taken longer than the Army anticipated. For example, the Army has

consistently underestimated the time required to obtain environmental

permits for the disposal facilities. Until DOD and the affected states and

localities reach agreement on a disposal method for the remaining

stockpile sites, the Army will not be able to predict the Chemical Stockpile

Disposal Program’s cost and schedule with any degree of accuracy.

Moreover, many of the problems experienced in the stockpile program are

also likely to affect the Army’s ability to implement the Nonstockpile

Chemical Materiel Program. For example, efforts to dispose of

nonstockpile materiel are likely to be driven by the need to obtain state

and local approvals for destruction methods. In addition, more time is

needed for the Army to prove that its proposed disposal method for the

nonstockpile program will be safe and effective and accepted by the

affected states and localities.

Notwithstanding these issues, DOD and the Army have taken actions in

response to congressional direction and our recommendations to improve

program management. In December 1994, DOD designated the Army’s

chemical demilitarization program, consisting of both stockpile and

nonstockpile munitions and materiel, as a major defense acquisition

program. The objectives of the designation were to stabilize the disposal

schedules, control costs, and provide more discipline and higher levels of

program oversight. In addition, Army officials have identified

cost-reduction initiatives, which are in various stages of assessment, that

could reduce program costs by $673 million.

Recognizing the difficulty of satisfactorily resolving the public concerns

associated with each individual disposal location, suggestions have been

made by members of the Congress, DOD officials, and others to change the

programs’ basic approach to destruction. However, the suggestions create

trade-offs for decisionmakers and would require changes in existing legal

requirements. These suggestions have included deferring plans for

additional disposal facilities until an acceptable alternative technology to

incineration is developed, consolidating disposal operations at a national

site or regional sites, destroying selected nonstockpile chemical warfare

materiel in stockpile disposal facilities, establishing a centralized disposal

Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
facility for nonstockpile materiel, and modifying laws and regulations to

standardize environmental requirements.

Background In 1985, the Congress passed Public Law 99-145 directing the Army to

destroy the U.S. stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions. The

stockpile consists of rockets, bombs, projectiles, spray tanks, and bulk

containers, which contain nerve and mustard agents. It is stored at eight

sites in the continental United States and on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific

Ocean. Appendix III identifies the locations of the chemical stockpile

storage sites. To comply with congressional direction, the Army

established the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program and developed a

plan to incinerate the agents and munitions on site in specially designed

facilities. In 1988, the Army established the Chemical Stockpile Emergency

Preparedness Project (CSEPP) to help communities near the chemical

stockpile storage sites enhance existing emergency management and

response capabilities in the unlikely event of a chemical stockpile

accident.

Recognizing that the stockpile program did not include all chemical

warfare materiel requiring disposal, the Congress directed the Army in

1992 to plan for the disposal of materiel not included in the stockpile. This

materiel, some of which dates back to World War I, consists of binary

chemical weapons, miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel, recovered

chemical weapons, former production facilities, and buried chemical

warfare materiel.3

 Appendix IV identifies the storage locations for the

nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel. In 1992, the Army established the

Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program to dispose of the materiel.

Appendix V provides a chronology of the Army’s chemical disposal

programs.

Potential Impact of the

Chemical Weapons

Convention

In 1993, the United States signed the U.N.-sponsored Chemical Weapons

Convention. In October 1996, the 65th nation ratified the convention

making the treaty effective on April 29, 1997.4

 If the U.S. Senate approves

3

Binary weapons are formed from two nonlethal elements through a chemical reaction after the

munitions are fired or launched. The weapons were manufactured, stored, and transported with only

one of the chemical elements in the weapon. The second element was to be loaded into the weapon at

the battlefield.

4

The convention becomes effective 180 days after the 65th nation ratified the treaty.

Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
the convention, it could affect implementation of the disposal programs.5

Through ratification, the United States will agree to dispose of its

(1) unitary chemical weapons stockpile, binary chemical weapons,

recovered chemical weapons, and former chemical weapon production

facilities by April 29, 2007, and (2) miscellaneous chemical warfare

materiel by April 29, 2002. If a country is unable to maintain the

convention’s disposal schedule, the convention’s Organization for the

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons may grant a one-time extension of up to

5 years. Under the terms of the convention, chemical warfare materiel

buried before 1977 is exempt from disposal as long as it remains buried.

Should the United States choose to excavate the sites and remove the

chemical materiel, the provisions of the convention would apply. The

Senate has not approved the convention, however, the United States is

committed by public law to destroying its chemical stockpile and related

warfare materiel.

Our Prior Reports Noted

Cost and Schedule Issues

In prior reports, we expressed concern about the Army’s lack of progress

and the rising cost of the disposal programs. Appendix VI provides a listing

of our products related to these programs. In 1991, we reported that

continued problems in the program indicated that increased costs and

additional time to destroy the chemical stockpile should be expected. We

recommended that the Army determine whether faster and less costly

technologies were available to destroy the stockpile.6

 In a 1995 report on

the nonstockpile program, we concluded that the Army’s plans for

disposing of nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel were not final and, as

a result, its cost estimate was likely to change.7

 In July 1995, we testified

before this subcommittee that the Army had experienced significant cost

growth and delays in executing its stockpile disposal program and that

further cost growth and schedule slippages could occur.8

 In 1996, we

reported that efforts to enhance emergency preparedness is Alabama had

been hampered by management weaknesses in CSEPP.

9

5

Under the U.S. Constitution, treaties must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the Senate.

6

Chemical Weapons: Stockpile Destruction Cost Growth and Schedule Slippages Are Likely to

Continue (GAO/NSIAD-92-18, Nov. 20, 1991).

7

Chemical Weapons Disposal: Plans for Nonstockpile Chemical Warfare Materiel Can Be Improved

(GAO/NSIAD-95-55, Dec. 20, 1994).

8

Chemical Weapons Disposal: Issues Related to DOD’s Management (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-185, July 13,

1995).

9

Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is Hampered by Management

Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-96-150, July 23, 1996).

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
Stockpile Program’s

Cost and Schedule

Are Uncertain but Will

Exceed Current

Estimates

The stockpile program will likely exceed its $12.4 billion estimate and take

longer than the legislative completion date of December 2004.10 This is

because reaching agreement on site-specific disposal methods has

consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated. Public concerns

about the safety of incineration have (1) resulted in additional

environmental requirements, (2) slowed the permitting of new

incinerators, and (3) required the Army to research disposal alternatives.

Approximately $1 billion of the estimated $12.4 billion is associated with

CSEPP. The cost estimate for CSEPP has increased because of delays in the

stockpile program and longstanding management weaknesses. These

weaknesses have also slowed the program’s progress in enhancing

emergency preparedness.

Cost Growth and Schedule

Slippages

Since 1985, the Army’s cost estimate for the stockpile disposal program

has increased seven-fold, from an initial estimate of $1.7 billion to

$12.4 billion, and the planned completion date has been delayed from 1994

to 2004. Although the Army is committed to destroying the stockpile by the

legislatively imposed deadline of December 31, 2004, it is unlikely to meet

that date. Only two of the nine planned disposal facilities are built and

operating, 4 percent of the stockpile has been destroyed, and

environmental permitting issues at the individual sites continue to delay

construction of the remaining facilities. For example, since the Army

developed the most recent cost and schedule estimate in February 1996,

the plant construction schedule has slipped by 6 months at the Anniston

Army Depot, 9 months at the Pine Bluff Arsenal, 10 months at the Pueblo

Depot Activity, and 4 months at the Umatilla Depot Activity.

Reaching Agreement on

Environmental Issues Has

Been a Lengthy Process

Predicting the disposal schedule for the various sites is difficult. According

to Army officials, this is partly due to the uncertainty of the time required

to satisfy changing environmental requirements. For example, although

based on federal requirements, individual state environmental

requirements differ and are occasionally changed. In most cases, these

changes have added unanticipated requirements, resulting in the need for

additional data collection, research, and reporting by the Army.

In addition, according to the Army, the original scope of the health risk

assessment to operate the disposal facilities was not completely defined,

10Through fiscal year 1997, the Congress has appropriated $4 billion and the Army estimates that it will

require $8.4 billion to complete the program.

Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
the health assessment requirements have changed, and the requirements

currently vary from state to state. According to DOD officials, states have

modified the requirements of their health risk assessments well into the

process, delaying the development of the final assessment document.

Based on program experience, the Army’s 1996 schedule does not provide

sufficient time for the Army to complete the environmental approval

process.11 As a result, program delays past the mandated completion date

of December 2004 are likely. For example, the schedule for the Anniston

disposal facility includes a grace period of a month for any slippage in the

construction, systemization, or operation to meet the legislative

completion date of December 31, 2004. Although the Army estimated that

the permit would have been issued by the end of September 1996, Alabama

regulatory officials expect the permit to be issued in June or July 1997—a

slippage of about 8 months in the schedule. This slippage will cause

disposal operations at Anniston to extend to the middle of 2005.

Considering Alternative

Technologies Has Affected

Disposal Cost and

Schedule

In the 1993 National Defense Authorization Act, the Congress directed the

Army to report on potential technological alternatives to incineration.

Consequently, in August 1994, the Army initiated a program to investigate,

develop, and support testing of alternative disposal technologies for the

two bulk-only stockpile sites—Aberdeen Proving Ground and Newport

Chemical Activity. According to the National Research Council, the Army

has successfully involved the state and the public in its alternative

technology project for the two bulk-only stockpile sites, demonstrating the

importance of public involvement to the progress of a program.12 The

development of alternative disposal technologies for assembled chemical

munitions provides the Army the mechanism for encouraging public

involvement and establishing common objectives for the remaining

disposal sites.

In the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act, the Congress directed DOD

to assess alternative technologies for the disposal of assembled chemical

munitions. The act also directed the Secretary of Defense to report on the

assessment by December 31, 1997. Similarly, the 1997 DOD Appropriations

Act provided $40 million to conduct a pilot program to identify and

demonstrate two or more alternatives to the baseline incineration process

11Department of Defense’s Interim Status Assessment for the Chemical Demilitarization Program, DOD

(Apr. 15, 1996).

12Public Involvement and the Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, National Research Council

(Oct. 25, 1996).

Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
for the disposal of assembled chemical munitions. The act also prohibited

DOD from obligating any funds for constructing disposal facilities at the

Blue Grass Army Depot and Pueblo Depot Activity, until 180 days after the

Secretary reports on the alternatives. Although the prohibition applies

only to Blue Grass and Pueblo, public concerns about incineration may

prompt state regulators at other locations to delay their final decisions to

permit incinerators until the Secretary reports his findings.

Management Weaknesses

and Disagreements Have

Slowed the Progress of

CSEPP

The Army’s and the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) joint

management of CSEPP has not been effective in controlling the growth in

program costs and achieving timely results. The Army’s current life-cycle

cost estimate of $1.03 billion for the program has increased by 800 percent

over the initial estimate of $114 million in 1988. The primary reasons for

the cost increase are the 10-year slippage in the completion of the

Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program and financial management

weaknesses. Program management weaknesses have also contributed to

the increase and resulted in slow progress in enhancing emergency

preparedness in the 10 states and local communities near the chemical

stockpile storage sites. Nine years after CSEPP’s inception, states and local

communities still lack critical items for responding to a chemical stockpile

emergency, including alert and notification systems, decontamination

units, and personal protection equipment.

Although the Army has responded to this criticism and taken actions in

response to congressional direction to improve program management, the

completion of these actions has been delayed by disagreements between

Army and FEMA officials. For example, the Army is still working to respond

to direction in the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act to report on

the implementation and success of CSEPP Integrated Process Teams.13

Because of this and other differences regarding their roles and

responsibilities, Army and FEMA officials have not reached agreement on a

long term management structure for CSEPP.

13In the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 104-201), the Congress directed the

Secretary of the Army to submit a report within 120 days of the act’s enactment that assessed the

implementation and success of the site-specific Integrated Process Teams.

Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
Nonstockpile

Program’s Cost and

Schedule Are Also

Uncertain

Through fiscal year 1997 the Congress has appropriated $221 million for

the nonstockpile program. The Army estimates that it will require an

additional $15 billion and nearly 40 years to complete the program.

However, given the factors driving the program, it is uncertain how long

the program will take or cost. The program is driven by the uncertainties

surrounding buried chemical warfare materiel and unproven disposal

methods.

Buried Materiel Will Drive

Cost but Little Is Known

About Them

The Army estimates that it can dispose of binary weapons, recovered

chemical weapons, former production facilities, and miscellaneous

chemical warfare materiel within the time frames established by the

Chemical Weapons Convention. Under the terms of the convention,

chemical warfare materiel buried before 1977 is exempt from disposal as

long as it remains buried. Although the Army estimates that buried

chemical materiel accounts for $14.5 billion (95 percent) of the

nonstockpile program cost, the Army is still exploring potential sites and

has little and often imprecise information about the type and amount of

materiel buried. Appendix VII identifies the potential locations with buried

chemical warfare materiel. The Army estimated that it will take until 2033

to identify, recover, and dispose of buried nonstockpile materiel.

Proposed Disposal

Systems Are Not Yet

Proven Effective and

Acceptable by the

Public

Although Army officials are confident that the proposed disposal systems

will function as planned, the Army needs more time to prove that the

systems will safely and effectively destroy all nonstockpile materiel and be

accepted by the affected states and communities. The Army’s disposal

concept is based on developing mobile systems capable of moving from

one location to the next where the munitions are remotely detoxified and

the waste is transported to a commercial hazardous waste facility.

Although the systems may operate in a semi-fixed mode, they are

scheduled to be available for mobile use at recovered and burial sites after

1998.

Environmental Issues

Will Also Affect Cost

and Schedule

Environmental issues similar to those experienced in the stockpile

program are also likely to affect the Army’s ability to obtain the

environmental approvals and permits that virtually all nonstockpile

activities require. Whether the systems are allowed to operate at a

particular location will depend on the state regulatory agency with

authority over the disposal operations. In addition, public acceptance or

Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
rejection of the mobile systems will affect their transportation plans and

disposal operations.

Actions the Army Has

Taken to Improve the

Disposal Programs

DOD and the Army have taken a number of steps to respond to

congressional direction and independent reviews and improve their

management and oversight of the stockpile and nonstockpile programs.

These steps have included efforts to improve coordination with the public

through an enhanced public outreach program, increase public

involvement in the alternative technology program for the two bulk-only

stockpile sites, and establish a joint CSEPP Army/FEMA team to coordinate

and implement emergency preparedness activities.

In December 1994, DOD designated the Army’s chemical demilitarization

program, consisting of both stockpile and nonstockpile munitions and

materiel, as a major defense acquisition program. The objectives of the

designation were to stabilize the disposal schedules, control costs, and

provide more discipline and higher levels of program oversight.14

In response to our recommendations and similar ones by the National

Research Council, the Army initiated the Enhanced Stockpile Surveillance

Program in 1995 to improve its monitoring and inspection of chemical

munitions. On the basis of those activities, the Army estimates that the

stockpile will be reasonably stable through 2013.

The Army’s review of the stockpile disposal program has identified several

promising cost-reduction initiatives, but the Army cannot implement some

of the more significant initiatives without the cooperation and approval of

state regulatory agencies. Army officials estimated that the initial

cost-reduction initiatives, which are in various stages of assessment, could

potentially reduce program costs by $673 million. The Army plans to

identify additional cost-reductions as the stockpile program progresses.

Alternatives to the

Army’s Basic

Approach to

Destruction

Recognizing the difficulty of resolving the public concerns associated with

each individual disposal location, suggestions have been made to change

the programs’ basic approach to destruction. For example, members of the

Congress and officials from environmental groups and affected states and

counties have suggested deferring plans for additional disposal facilities

until an acceptable alternative technology to incineration is developed.

14The designation transferred management responsibility to the Assistant Secretary of the Army

(Research, Development, and Acquisition) and required the program manager to develop a cost and

schedule baseline and prepare quarterly and annual reports on variances from the baseline.

Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
Congressional members have also suggested consolidating disposal

operations at a national or regional sites. In addition, officials of various

DOD organizations have suggested destroying selected nonstockpile

chemical warfare materiel in stockpile disposal facilities, establishing a

centralized disposal facility for nonstockpile materiel, and modifying laws

and regulations to standardize environmental requirements.

Deferring Incineration

Until an Acceptable

Alternative Is Developed

Deferring disposal operations may eliminate much of the public concern

that has influenced the current approach to destroying the chemical

stockpile. According to Army officials, alternative technologies may not

reduce costs or shorten disposal operations but are likely to be acceptable

to a larger segment of the public than incineration. Given the current

status of alternative technologies, the cost and schedule would remain

uncertain and there would be a corresponding increase in the risk of an

accident from continued storage of the munitions. Although the Army has

been researching technological alternatives to incineration for chemical

agents stored in bulk containers, only recently have research and testing

demonstrated potentially effective alternatives. Currently, there is no

proven alternative technology to incineration capable of safely and

effectively destroying assembled chemical munitions.

Consolidating Disposal

Operations at a National

Site or Regional Sites

Consolidating disposal operations could reduce construction and

procurement costs, but the required transportation of chemical munitions

could be an insurmountable barrier. This option would extend the disposal

schedule and result in increased risk not only from storage but also from

handling and transportation. Although consolidating disposal operations

could reduce estimated facility construction and operation costs by as

much as $2.6 billion, the savings would be reduced by uncertain but

potentially significant transportation and emergency preparedness costs.

To help reduce costs, the Army would have to consolidate three or more

stockpile sites, develop less expensive transportation containers, and

control emergency response costs. In 1988, the Army and many in the

Congress rejected transporting the chemical stockpile weapons to a

national site or regional disposal sites because of the increased risk to the

public and the environment from moving the munitions. DOD and Army

officials continue to be concerned about the safety of moving chemical

weapons and public opposition to transportation of the munitions has

grown since 1988.

Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
Destroying Selected

Nonstockpile Materiel in

Stockpile Facilities

Using the chemical stockpile facilities to destroy nonstockpile chemical

materiel has the potential for reducing costs. Although selected

nonstockpile items could be destroyed in stockpile disposal facilities, the

1986 DOD Authorization Act, and subsequent legislation, specifies that the

chemical stockpile disposal facilities may not be used for any purpose

other than the disposal of stockpile weapons. This legislative provision, in

some cases, necessitates that the Army implement separate disposal

operations for nonstockpile materiel along side of the stockpile facilities.

In its 1995 implementation plan, the Army suggested that the stockpile

disposal facilities could be used to process some nonstockpile weapons,

depending on the location, the type of chemical weapon or materiel, and

condition.15

Destroying Nonstockpile

Materiel in a Central

Facility

Another method for destroying nonstockpile chemical materiel could be

based on the use of a central disposal facility with equipment designed

specifically for destroying nonstockpile materiel. Although a national

disposal facility could reduce program costs, the legislative restrictions on

the transportation of nonstockpile chemical material and the prevalent

public attitude that such a disposal facility should not be located in their

vicinity would be significant obstacles that would have to be resolved.

Modifying Laws and

Regulations

Modifying laws and regulations to standardize environmental requirements

could enhance both the stockpile and nonstockpile programs’ stability and

control costs. The current process of individual states establishing their

own environmental laws and requirements and the prevalent public

attitude that the Army’s disposal facilities should not be located in their

vicinity have been obstacles to the stockpile disposal program and are also

likely to affect the nonstockpile program. For example, individual state

environmental requirements differ, such as the number of required trail

burns, and are occasionally changed. As a result, there are no standard

environmental procedures and requirements for stockpile and

nonstockpile disposal sites. According to the Army, establishing

standardized environmental requirements for all disposal sites would

enhance the programs’ stability. However, efforts to modify existing laws

and regulations to standardize the environmental requirements for

chemical weapons disposal would likely be resisted by the affected states

and localities and environmental organizations.

15Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Program Implementation Plan, U.S. Army Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization (Aug. 1995).

Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
Conclusions In summary, implementation of the disposal programs has been slowed

due to the lack of consensus among DOD and the affected states and

localities over the process to dispose of chemical munitions and materiel.

Recognizing the difficulty of satisfactorily resolving the public concerns

with the disposal of chemical munitions, suggestions have been made by

members of the Congress, DOD officials, and others to change the Army’s

basic approach to destruction. However, these suggestions create

trade-offs for decisionmakers and would require changes in legal

requirements. While our February report presented these suggestions, we

did not take a position on them or the Army’s current approach given the

associated policy and legislative implications. Rather, our report presented

the suggestions in context of the trade-offs they present and noted that

should the Congress decide to consider modifications or alternatives to

the current approach, it may wish to consider the suggestions related to

the creation of alternative technologies, consolidation of stockpile

disposal operations, utilization of stockpile facilities for nonstockpile

items, centralization of nonstockpile destruction, and standardization of

environmental laws and requirements.

In commenting on these suggestions, DOD said that it favored the Congress

considering the ones to establish a centralized disposal facility for

nonstockpile materiel and to modify laws and regulations to standardize

environmental requirements for chemical weapons disposal. DOD

recommended against consideration of the options to defer incineration

plans, consolidate disposal operations, and to use stockpile facilities for

destroying nonstockpile items.

In addition, we believe that high-level management attention is needed to

reach agreement on a long-term management structure for CSEPP that

clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of Army and FEMA personnel.

This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer

any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have.

Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
Appendix I 

Appropriation, Obligation, and

Disbursement Data for Fiscal Years 1988

Through 1997

The following tables show appropriation, obligation, and disbursement

data for the disposal programs. Funding data for the Chemical Stockpile

Disposal Program, Alternative Technology and Approaches Project, and

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Project are shown in 

tables I.1, I.2, and I.3, respectively. Funding data for the Nonstockpile

Chemical Materiel Program are shown in table I.4.

Table I.1: Chemical Stockpile Disposal

Program Dollars in millions

Fiscal year Appropriated Obligated Disbursed

1988 $195.8 $194.3 $192.9

1989 168.0 165.5 165.4

1990 210.4 208.2 205.9

1991 255.0 252.3 251.5

1992 331.3 330.1 326.8

1993 419.1 417.9 316.0

1994 249.1 246.7 234.9

1995 486.5 472.2 279.2

1996 484.2 346.0 130.5

1997 534.7

Total $3,334.1 $2,633.2 $2,103.1

Table I.2: Alternative Technology and

Approaches Project Dollars in millions

Fiscal year Appropriated Obligated Disbursed

1994 $22.4 $22.2 $10.2

1995 9.4 9.4 6.8

1996 22.2 19.6 12.2

1997 56.0

Total $110.0 $51.2 $29.2

Page 14 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
Appendix I 

Appropriation, Obligation, and

Disbursement Data for Fiscal Years 1988

Through 1997

Table I.3: Chemical Stockpile

Emergency Preparedness Project Dollars in millions

Fiscal year Appropriated Obligated Disbursed

1988 $2.5 $2.5 $2.5

1989 11.3 11.3 11.1

1990 43.8 43.7 43.3

1991 37.7 37.6 37.5

1992 40.9 40.5 40.0

1993 88.2 87.5 62.1

1994 71.9 71.6 65.5

1995 56.5 56.4 27.6

1996 80.0 65.2 27.3

1997 82.4

Total $515.2 $416.3 $316.9

Table I.4: Nonstockpile Chemical

Materiel Program Dollars in millions

Fiscal year Appropriated Obligated Disbursed

1992 $2.2 $2.2 $2.2

1993 6.3 6.3 6.0

1994 31.5 31.2 26.4

1995 26.0 25.8 18.5

1996 69.7 40.4 14.6

1997 85.3

Total $221.0 $105.9 $67.7

Source: The Army’s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization.

Page 15 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
Appendix II 

Estimated Program Cost for Fiscal Years

1998 Through 2005

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year

Chemical

Stockpile

Disposal

Program

Alternative

Technology and

Approaches

Project

Chemical

Stockpile

Emergency

Preparedness

Project

Nonstockpile

Chemical

Materiel

Program

1998 $946.8 $16.0 $94.4 $71.7

1999 960.9 30.5 66.6 174.1

2000 842.2 19.0 74.0 112.2

2001 700.2 15.0 71.3 154.4

2002 1,644.8 88.3 69.5 166.5

2003 866.2 66.2 101.7

2004 938.9 60.8 101.8

2005 235.8 55.2

Totala $7,135.8 $168.8 $502.8 $937.6

Note: Then-year dollars.

aTotals do not add to the Army’s estimated funding to complete the programs because (1) the

estimates were developed at different times and based on different assumptions and (2) the table

does not reflect total costs for the nonstockpile program, which is estimated to continue through

2033.

Source: DOD’s Selected Acquisition Report (June 30, 1996).

Page 16 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
Appendix III 

The U.S. Stockpile of Chemical Agents and

Munitions

Umatilla Depot Activity,

Oregon

Number of items: 220,599

Tons of agent: 3,717

Johnston Atoll,

Pacific Ocean

Number of items: 292,121

 Tons of agent: 1,134 

Tooele Army Depot,

Utah

Number of items: 1,138,488

 Tons of agent: 13,616 

Pueblo Depot Activity,

Colorado

Number of items: 780,078 

 Tons of agent: 2,611 Hawaii

Blue Grass Army Depot,

Kentucky

 Number of items: 101,764

Tons of agent: 523

Pine Bluff Arsenal,

Arkansas

Number of items: 123,093

 Tons of agent: 3,850

Anniston Army Depot,

Alabama

Number of items: 661,529

 Tons of agent: 2,254

Aberdeen Proving Ground,

Maryland

Number of items: 1,818

 Tons of agent: 1,625

Newport Chemical Activity,

Indiana

Number of items: 1,690

 Tons of agent: 1,269

Note: As of December 15, 1995.

Source: DOD.

Page 17 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
Appendix IV 

Storage Locations of Nonstockpile Chemical

Warfare Materiel

Umatilla Depot Activity,

Oregon

Binary chemical weapons

Miscellaneous chemical materiel

Johnston Atoll,

Pacific Ocean

Recovered chemical weapons

Tooele Army Depot,

Utah

Binary chemical weapons

Miscellaneous chemical materiel

Recovered chemical weapons

Pueblo Depot Activity,

Colorado

Miscellaneous chemical materiel

Recovered chemical weapons Hawaii

Blue Grass Army Depot,

Kentucky

Miscellaneous chemical materiel

Pine Bluff Arsenal,

Arkansas

Binary chemical weapons

Former production facilities

Miscellaneous chemical materiel

Recovered chemical weapons

Anniston Army Depot,

Alabama

Miscellaneous chemical materiel

Aberdeen Proving Ground,

Maryland

Binary chemical weapons

Former production facilities

Miscellaneous chemical materiel

Recovered chemical weapons

Newport Chemical Activity,

Indiana

Former production facilities

Dugway Proving Ground,

Utah

Recovered chemical weapons

Miscellaneous chemical materiel

Redstone Arsenal,

Alabama

Recovered chemical weapons

Camp Bullis,

Texas

Recovered chemical weapons

Fort Richardson,

Alaska

Recovered chemical weapons

Rock Mountain Arsenal,

Colorado

Former production facility

Recovered chemical weapons

Source: Based on 1996 data provided by the Army’s Project Manager for Nonstockpile Chemical

Materiel.

Page 18 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
Appendix V 

Chronology of the U.S. Chemical

Demilitarization Program

Time frame Activity

1917-1960s Obsolete or unserviceable chemical warfare agents and munitions were disposed of by open pit

burning, land burial, and ocean dumping.

1969 The National Academy of Sciences recommended that ocean dumping be avoided and that public

health and environmental protection be emphasized. It suggested two alternatives to ocean disposal:

chemical neutralization of nerve agents and incineration of mustard agents.

1970 The Armed Forces Authorization Act (P.L. 91-441) required a Department of Health and Human Services

review of any disposal plans and detoxification of weapons prior to disposal. It also limited the

movement of chemical weapons.

1971 The Foreign Military Sales Act prohibited the transportation of U.S. chemical weapons from Okinawa,

Japan, to the continental United States. The weapons were moved to Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.

1971-1973 The Army tested and developed an incineration process and disposed of several thousand tons of

mustard agent stored in ton containers at Rocky Mountain Arsenal.

1973-1976 The Army disposed of nearly 4,200 tons of nerve agent by chemical neutralization at Tooele Army Depot

and Rocky Mountain Arsenal. The process was problematic and not very reproducible, making

automation difficult.

1979 The Army opened the Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System at Tooele to test and evaluate

disposal equipment and processes for chemical agents and munitions on a pilot scale.

1981 The Army decided to build the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System to dispose of its

chemical M55 rocket stockpile.

1981-1986 The Army used the Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System to test and evaluate incineration of

chemical agents and energetic materiel, and decontamination of metal parts and ton containers.

1982 An Arthur D. Little Corporation study for the Army concluded that using incineration, rather than

neutralization, to dispose of the stockpile would reduce costs.

1982 The Army declared its stockpile of M55 rockets obsolete.

1983 The Army expanded its chemical disposal program to include the M55 rocket stockpile at Anniston

Army Depot, Umatilla Depot Activity, and Blue Grass Army Depot.

1984 The Army expanded its chemical disposal program to include the M55 rocket stockpile at Pine Bluff

Arsenal and Tooele Army Depot.

1984 The National Research Council endorsed the Army’s disassembly and high-temperature incineration

process for disposing of chemical agents and munitions. It also recommended that the Army continue to

store most of the chemical stockpile, dispose of the M55 rockets, and analyze alternative methods for

disposing of the remaining chemical stockpile.

1985 The Army began construction of the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System.

1985 The DOD Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 (P.L. 99-145) mandated the destruction of the U.S.

stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions. It also required that the disposal facilities be cleaned,

dismantled, and disposed of according to applicable laws and regulations.

1986 The DOD Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1987 (P.L. 99-500) prohibited shipments of chemical

weapons, components, or agents to the Blue Grass Depot Activity for any purpose.

1987 Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System operations were suspended as a result of a low-level nerve

agent release.

1988 The Army issued the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for the Chemical Stockpile

Disposal Program. The Army selected on-site disposal of the chemical stockpile because it posed fewer

potential risks than transportation and off-site disposal.

(continued)

Page 19 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
Appendix V 

Chronology of the U.S. Chemical

Demilitarization Program

Time frame Activity

1988 The National Defense Act of Fiscal Year 1989 (P.L. 100-456) required the Army to complete operational

verification testing at Johnston Atoll before beginning to systematize similar disposal facilities in the

continental United States.

1989 The Army started construction of the chemical demilitarization facility at Tooele Army Depot.

1990 The Army completed the successful retrograde of all chemical munitions stored in Germany to storage

facilities at Johnston Atoll.

1990 The Army initiated disposal of M55 rockets at Johnston Atoll.

1990 A very small amount of nerve agent leaked through the common stack during maintenance activities at

Johnston Atoll. The agent release was below allowable stack concentration.

1990-1993 The Army completed four operational verification tests at the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal

System. During the test, the Army destroyed more than 40,000 munitions containing nerve and mustard

agents. In August 1993, the Secretary of Defense certified to the Congress that the Army has

successfully completed the operational verification tests at Johnston Atoll.

1991 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (P.L. 101-510) restricted the use of funds to

transport chemical weapons to Johnston Atoll except for U.S. munitions discovered in the Pacific,

prohibited the Army from studying the movement of chemical munitions, and established the emergency

preparedness program.

1991 The Army moved 109 World War II mustard-filled projectiles from the Solomon Islands to Johnston Atoll

for storage and disposal.

1991 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (P.L. 102-190) required the

Secretary of Defense to develop a chemical weapons stockpile safety contingency plan.

1992 The U.S. Army Chemical Materiel Destruction Agency was established to consolidate operational

responsibility for the destruction of chemical warfare capabilities into one office.

1992 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (P.L. 102-484) directed the Army to

establish citizens’ commissions for states with storage sites, if the state’s governor requested one. It also

required the Army to report on (1) disposal alternatives to the baseline incineration method and (2) plans

for destroying U.S. nonstockpile chemical weapons and materiel identified in the Chemical Weapons

Convention.

1993 The Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System was shut down during operation and verification

tests when residue explosive material generated during the processing of M60 105mm projectiles

caught fire, causing damage to a conveyor belt and other equipment in the explosive containment room.

1993 The Army completed construction and started systemization of the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal

Facility.

1993 The Army issued its report on the physical and chemical integrity of the chemical stockpile to the

Congress.

1993 A mustard leak from a ton container was discovered at Tooele Army Depot.

1993 The Army issued an interim survey and analysis report on the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program

to the Congress.

1994 Approximately 11.6 milligrams of nerve agent were released into the atmosphere at the Johnston Atoll

during a maintenance activity on the liquid incinerator.

1994 The National Research Council issued its recommendations for the disposal of chemical agents and

munitions to the Army.

1994 The Army issued its alternative demilitarization technology report to the Congress. The Army

recommended the continuation of the chemical demilitarization program without deliberate delay and

the implementation of a two-technology research and development program.

(continued)

Page 20 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
Appendix V 

Chronology of the U.S. Chemical

Demilitarization Program

Time frame Activity

1994 The Army issued it M55 rocket stability report to the Congress. The report recommended that an

enhanced stockpile assessment program be initiated to better characterize the state of the M55 rocket

in the stockpile.

1994 The Army initiated the Alternative Technology Project to develop an alternative disposal technology to

the baseline incineration process for the bulk-only stockpile locations in Maryland and Indiana. This

research and development effort is conducted in conjunction with activities to implement the baseline

program.

1994 The U.S. Army Chemical Materiel Destruction Agency was redesignated the U.S. Army Chemical

Demilitarization and Remediation Activity after a merger with the U.S. Army Chemical and Biological

Defense Command. In addition, the Army restructured and centralized its chemical stockpile

emergency preparedness program to streamline procedures, enhance responsiveness of operations,

and improve the budgeting process.

1994 The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition became the DOD

Executive Agent for the Chemical Demilitarization Program, replacing the Assistant Secretary of the

Army for Installations, Logistics, and Environment. The Chemical Demilitarization Program was

designated a DOD Acquisition Category 1D Program.

1995 The Army initiated the Enhanced Stockpile Surveillance Program to investigate, develop, and support

methods to improve monitoring and inspection of chemical munitions.

1995 The U.S. Army Chemical Demilitarization and Remediation Activity was renamed the Program Manager

for Chemical Demilitarization.

1995 The Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System surpassed the 1-million pounds target and

completed the disposal of all M55 rockets stored on Johnston Atoll. Disposal rates exceeded

established goals.

1995 A perimeter monitor located about 100 yards from the demilitarization building at Johnston Atoll

detected a trace level of nerve agent. The source of the leak was identified as a door gasket in the air

filtration system. Temporary air locks were erected and the gasket replaced. No one was harmed from

this event.

1995 The Army awarded the contract for small burial sites and issued its implementation plan for the

nonstockpile program.

1995 The Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility completed equipment systemization testing.

1995 The Army certified to the Congress that all Browder Amendment requirements for the award of the

Anniston construction contract were met.

1996 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (P.L. 104-106) directed DOD to conduct an

assessment of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program and options that could be taken to reduce

program costs.

1996 The Army completed disposal of all Air Force and Navy bombs stored on Johnston Atoll ahead of

schedule.

1996 The Army awarded the systems contract for the construction, operation, and closure of the proposed

Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility. Construction of the facility is scheduled to begin after the

state of Alabama issues the environmental permits.

1996 The Army started disposal operations at the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility. Shortly after the

start, operations were shut down for a week after a small amount of agent was detected in a sealed

vestibule attached to the air filtration system. No agent was released to the environment and no one was

harmed.

1996 Several hair line cracks were discovered in the concrete floor of the Tooele disposal facility’s

decontamination area. The cracks caused a small amount of decontamination solution to leak to a

electrical room below. No agent was detected and the cracks were sealed.

(continued)

Page 21 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
Appendix V 

Chronology of the U.S. Chemical

Demilitarization Program

Time frame Activity

1996 The 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-201) directed DOD to conduct an assessment of

alternative technologies for the disposal of assembled chemical munitions. The act also directed the

Secretary of Defense to report on this assessment by December 31, 1997.

1996 The 1997 DOD Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-208) provided the Army $40 million to conduct a pilot

program to identify and demonstrate two or more alternatives to the baseline incineration process for the

disposal of assembled chemical munitions. The act also prohibited DOD from obligating any funds for

constructing disposal facilities at Blue Grass and Pueblo until 180 days after the Secretary reports on

the alternatives.

1996 The Chemical Weapons Convention was ratified by the 65th country needed to make the convention

effective. As a result, the convention will go into effect April 29, 1997. Through ratification, the United

States will agree to dispose of its (1) unitary chemical weapons stockpile, binary chemical weapons,

recovered chemical weapons, and former chemical weapon production facilities by April 29, 2007, and

(2) miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel by April 29, 2002.

Page 22 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
Appendix VI 

Related GAO Products

Chemical Weapons and Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and

Schedule (GAO/NSIAD-97-18, Feb. 10, 1997).

Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is

Hampered by Management Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-96-150, July 23, 1996).

Chemical Weapons Disposal: Issues Related to DOD’s Management

(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-185, July 13, 1995).

Chemical Weapons: Army’s Emergency Preparedness Program Has

Financial Management Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-95-94, Mar. 15, 1995).

Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Review (GAO/NSIAD-95-66R, Jan. 12,

1995).

Chemical Weapons: Stability of the U.S. Stockpile (GAO/NSIAD-95-67, Dec. 22,

1994).

Chemical Weapons Disposal: Plans for Nonstockpile Chemical Warfare

Materiel Can Be Improved (GAO/NSIAD-95-55, Dec. 20, 1994).

Chemical Weapons: Issues Involving Destruction Technologies

(GAO/T-NSIAD-94-159, Apr. 26, 1994).

Chemical Weapons Destruction: Advantages and Disadvantages of

Alternatives to Incineration (GAO/NSIAD-94-123, Mar. 18, 1994).

Arms Control: Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements and the Chemical

Weapons Convention (GAO/NSIAD-94-136, Mar. 15, 1994).

Chemical Weapon Stockpile: Army’s Emergency Preparedness Program

Has Been Slow to Achieve Results (GAO/NSIAD-94-91, Feb. 22, 1994).

Chemical Weapons Storage: Communities Are Not Prepared to Respond to

Emergencies (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-18, July 16, 1993).

Chemical Weapons Destruction: Issues Affecting Program Cost, Schedule,

and Performance (GAO/NSIAD-93-50, Jan. 21, 1993). Chemical Weapons

Destruction: Issues Related to Environmental Permitting and Testing

Experience (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-43, June 16, 1992).

Chemical Weapons Disposal (GAO/NSIAD-92-219R, May 14, 1992).

Page 23 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
Appendix VI 

Related GAO Products

Chemical Weapons: Stockpile Destruction Cost Growth and Schedule

Slippages Are Likely to Continue (GAO/NSIAD-92-18, Nov. 20, 1991).

Chemical Warfare: DOD’s Effort to Remove U.S. Chemical Weapons From

Germany (GAO/NSIAD-91-105, Feb. 13, 1991).

Page 24 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
Appendix VII 

Potential Locations With Buried Chemical

Warfare Materiel

Virgin Islands -six potential locations.

Locations with potential buried chemical warfare materiel that may require remediation.

Source: Based on 1996 data provided by the Army’s Project Manager for Nonstockpile Chemical

Materiel.

(709248) Page 25 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118
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