U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

38–842 PDF 2009

S. Hrg. 110–893 

CONFRONTING THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE 

HOMELAND: SIX YEARS AFTER 9/11 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2007 

Available via http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

CHRISTIAN J. BECKNER, Professional Staff Member 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

LEAH Q. NASH, Minority GAO Detailee 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 3 

Senator Tester .................................................................................................. 23 

Senator Warner ................................................................................................ 25 

Senator Coleman .............................................................................................. 27 

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 30 

Senator Sununu ................................................................................................ 32 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 37 

Senator Stevens ................................................................................................ 42 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 43 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 44 

WITNESSES 

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2007 

Hon. Michael Chertoff, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ...... 5 

Hon. J. Michael McConnell, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Director of National Intelligence ................................................................................................ 10 

Hon. John Scott Redd, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Director, National 

Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence ....... 14 

Hon. Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. 

Department of Justice ......................................................................................... 17 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Chertoff, Hon. Michael: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 59 

McConnell, Hon. J. Michael: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 73 

Mueller, Hon. Robert S. III: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 17 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 106 

Redd, Hon. John Scott: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 14 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 93 

APPENDIX 

Questions and responses for the record from: 

Secretary Chertoff ............................................................................................ 115 

Admiral McConnell ........................................................................................... 137 

Admiral Redd .................................................................................................... 151 

Mr. Mueller ....................................................................................................... 155 

(1) 

CONFRONTING THE TERRORIST THREAT TO 

THE HOMELAND: SIX YEARS AFTER 9/11 

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in Room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Carper, Pryor, McCaskill, 

Tester, Collins, Stevens, Voinovich, Coleman, Warner, and Sununu. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. I thank 

everyone who is here, including, of course, our four witnesses. 

Tomorrow—September 11, 2007—people across our Nation, and, 

in fact, in many places around the world, will pause to mourn and 

reflect on the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 

Today in this Committee room, we rededicate ourselves to the 

memories of those lost—the families and the Nation that grieve for 

them. Today we take time to assess the continuing Islamist terrorist threat to America and what our government is doing to protect the American people from an attack like the one that occurred 

6 years ago. 

Today we ask: What lessons were learned? Where do we stand 

in our ability to detect and deter the next attack that we know is 

being plotted? And is our government ready to respond effectively 

to mitigate the damage to our citizens and our way of life should 

another terrorist attack be carried out? 

The ‘‘National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the 

US Homeland,’’ which was issued in July 2007, makes the continuing dangers clear. ‘‘We assess that al-Qaeda’s Homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on prominent political, economic, 

and infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the US population.’’ 

While the core of the September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda is weaker 

and no longer operates under the cover of the Taliban government 

of Afghanistan—and its forces in Iraq are now on the run—it is 

clear that the leadership of al-Qaeda has regenerated itself and its 

hateful ideology is metastasizing across the Internet. 

In his tape posted over the weekend, Osama bin Laden may 

sound like a rambling political candidate of the Internet fringe, 

2 

railing against American business, coming out for lower taxes, expressing concern about high mortgage interest rates, and then ultimately making clear that mass conversion to Islam is the best way 

for Americans to secure our future. Taken by itself, this statement 

might seem like the ranting of a weird but harmless person. But 

the fact is Osama bin Laden is a mass murderer who has the blood 

of tens of thousands of people on his hands. And I am speaking not 

just of the more than 3,000 Americans who died on September 11, 

2001, or in other terrorists attacks against the West, but also in 

the murder of thousands and thousands of his fellow Muslims— 

men, women and children—innocents upon whom al-Qaeda has 

rained indiscriminate death in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout 

the world. 

Bin Laden’s tape is another shot across our bow. It is the sound 

of another alarm which calls us to alertness and duty and tells us 

that bin Laden and his ilk are out there, and so long as they are, 

the life of every American is endangered. 

Consider the most recent plot broken up in Germany—with, I 

might say proudly, the help of American intelligence operatives. 

This plot, which German officials have said was professionally organized mostly by native Germans who were radicalized in Germany, was nonetheless carried out by these people after they traveled to al-Qaeda camps in Waziristan for training. 

And then remember the actual and foiled attacks that originated 

in England, Scotland, Spain, Algeria, Denmark, and so many other 

places—all also locally plotted, some aimed at America and/or 

American targets. 

And then come home and focus on the Fort Dix and JFK Airport 

plots, which demonstrated beyond any doubt that there are people 

right here in America who have swallowed the jihadist ideology 

and are prepared to kill innocent Americans. These are the evils 

and dangers of our age that we must live with and defend against. 

Today, we are most grateful to have as witnesses the four men 

who are responsible for the protection of the American people from 

Islamist terrorism. As I look at the four of you, it is striking to me 

that three of you lead Federal departments or offices that did not 

exist on September 11, 2001, and were created in legislation that 

in part was initiated in this Committee, passed by Congress with 

the support of Members of both parties, and signed by the President, all of which have been aimed at providing better protection 

to the American people than they were getting from their government on this day 6 years ago. 

Let me say clearly that the agencies you four administer, the 

Federal employees that you lead, and the work that you have done 

together have made our country a lot safer than it was on September 11, 2001. And, in fairness, though they are not here, of 

course, I would add the Department of Defense and the Department of State and all who work for them. 

There is undoubtedly some luck in the fact that America—contrary to all expectations on September 11, 2001—has not suffered 

another terrorist attack in the last 6 years. But it is no mere accident and not just luck. It is in good measure, I believe, because of 

the smart, hard work that you and your agencies have done that 

we have not been attacked again here at home. 

3 

I say this with gratitude, but with no sense of comfort or triumph. You and I know there is more your agencies must do—and 

do better—and that the enemy remains strong, agile, and eager to 

attack us again. But on the eve of the sixth anniversary of one of 

the darkest days in American history, September 11, 2001, it is appropriate that we stop and thank you and your co-workers for all 

that you have done in the last 6 years to protect us and our homeland. 

When we created the Department of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, the National Counterterrorism Center, and supported Director Mueller’s transformation of the FBI, no 

one intended them to be static offices or organizations. We wanted 

them to be not just strong and capable, but as agile, flexible, and 

fast-moving as our enemies. 

We are still in the early days of what will be a long war against 

Islamist extremists. Today we want to consider what we have done 

and still must do together to secure our homeland and win this 

war. 

I thank you for being here, and I look forward to your testimony. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Tomorrow is the anniversary of a day that, 6 years later, still defies understanding. The loss of nearly 3,000 innocent men, women, 

and children, the cruelty of the attackers, and the courage at the 

Twin Towers, the Pentagon, and on Flight 93 remain beyond the 

ability of our minds to comprehend fully or our words to express 

adequately. 

It is appropriate that we are holding this hearing today, the eve 

of this somber day of remembrance. If there is one thing we fully 

understand about September 11, 2001, it is that the horror of that 

day was made possible by what has been called ‘‘September 10th 

thinking.’’ What the 9/11 Commission so memorably terms as ‘‘a 

failure of imagination’’ was exploited by our enemies with devastating effectiveness. 

Events in my home State of Maine on September 10, 2001, illustrate the collision course between innocence and hatred. 

On that day, Robert and Jackie Norton drove from their home in 

Lubec, Maine, to Bangor, the first leg of a cross-country trip to the 

West Coast for a family wedding. Early the next morning, a commuter plane would take the beloved retired couple to Boston, where 

they would board Flight 11. 

On that day, James Roux of Portland, an Army veteran, a devoted father, and a man known for his generosity and outgoing 

spirit, was packing for a business trip to California. He left Logan 

the next morning on Flight 175. 

On that day, Robert Schlegel of Gray, Maine, was celebrating his 

recent promotion to the rank of Commander in the U.S. Navy. He 

was settling into his new office at the Pentagon. His office was believed to be the point of impact for Flight 77. 

And on that day, Mohamed Atta and his fellow terrorist rented 

a car in Boston and drove to Portland. They checked into a motel, 

ate pizza, and made other preparations. When they boarded their 

4 

commuter plane for Logan the next morning to seize control of 

Flight 11, they left behind a trail of dots—of financing and training, of global travel and visa violations, and of known terrorism involvement—that would not be connected until it was far too late. 

Complacency, turf battles, and intelligence failures prevented the 

coordination and communication that just might have allowed the 

September 11, 2001 plot to be detected in time. 

Nevertheless, the people of our great country responded to those 

attacks with determination, unity, and a sense of purpose. My concern is that our response may be in danger of flagging. If we allow 

ourselves to become complacent, to revert to September 10th thinking, the next attack will not be due to a failure of imagination but 

to a failure of resolve. 

Today’s hearing is held in the context of the ‘‘National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland’’ report. This report judged that the United States will face ‘‘a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three years.’’ 

The key words are ‘‘persistent’’ and ‘‘evolving.’’ This Committee 

has dedicated itself to anticipating the changing nature of terrorism and to addressing our vulnerabilities. One of our concerns 

is a central issue raised in the National Intelligence Estimates 

(NIEs). 

That issue is homegrown terrorism. The NIE assessment is that 

a growing number of radical, self-generating terror cells in Western 

countries indicates that the radical and violent segment of the 

West’s population is expanding. In our own country, as the Chairman indicated, the Torrance, California, case and the Fort Dix and 

JFK Airport plots all illustrate that we are not immune from domestic terror cells. Those homegrown terrorists, inspired by alQaeda’s hate-filled perversion of the Muslim faith, will challenge 

the ability of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to respond effectively. And they pose a challenge to all Americans to be 

observant and to not be afraid to report what they see. 

This Committee has conducted extensive investigations of this 

phenomenon, in particular, the radicalization of prison inmates, the 

use of the Internet as a radicalizing influence, and the lessons 

learned by our European allies who also face this threat. I am very 

interested in discussing with our witnesses today how we can best 

counter this clear and escalating threat. 

The NIE also states that al-Qaeda remains driven by an undiminished intent to attack and continues to adapt and improve its 

capabilities. Even more disturbing is what the report further concludes: That although worldwide counterterrorism efforts have constrained the ability of al-Qaeda to attack us again, the level of 

international cooperation may wane as September 11, 2001 becomes a more distant memory and perceptions of the threat diverge. 

In other words, we are challenged not just by a ruthless, calculating, and determined enemy, but also by our own resolve. The 

names of Robert and Jackie Norton, of James Roux, of Commander 

Schlegel, and of so many others must not become distant memories. 

They must always remain a vivid reminder of the terrible price 

that was paid for September 10th thinking. The threat that was so 

fully and terribly revealed on September 11, 2001, is not a matter 

5 

1The prepared statement of Secretary Chertoff appears in the Appendix on page 59. 

of divergent perceptions. It is a persistent and evolving reality that 

we must continue to confront. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins, 

for that statement. 

We will now go to the witnesses. Generally speaking, gentlemen, 

as you know, we asked you to speak to us this morning about your 

evaluation of the current threat environment and your own selfevaluation of the status of reform at the agencies that you lead. 

Obviously, we would welcome anything else you want to say this 

morning. 

We will begin with Secretary Chertoff. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL CHERTOFF,1 SECRETARY, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you, Senator Collins, and Members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you again today as we approach the sixth anniversary of that terrible day. And it is also an appropriate time 

to recommit ourselves and reaffirm our determination to continue 

to build on the progress that this Committee made possible 

through its earlier rounds of legislation and that all of us have 

been working very hard over the past 6 years to address. 

I would like to recognize, first of all, my colleagues at the table: 

Director McConnell, Director Mueller, and Admiral Redd. All of us 

meet together frequently. We confer frequently, and we all share 

with others—and, of course, ultimately the President—the responsibility to protect the American people and, in the words the President has used, ‘‘not to let this happen again.’’ All of us recognize 

that this is a daunting challenge and one that requires a partnership with State and local officials, with the private sector, and with 

our international partners. 

I would also like to take this moment to thank this Committee 

which has really led the charge to build the institutions that can 

adapt to 21st Century challenges such as those posed by this war 

currently being waged by Islamist extremists. And once again, as 

bin Laden’s tape disclosed over the weekend indicates, for our enemies this war is very much a current concern and very much in 

the forefront of their minds. It must remain in the forefront of our 

mind. 

Finally, of course, I have to express my gratitude not only to the 

208,000 men and women who work with me at the Department of 

Homeland Security protecting our borders, our sea lanes, our infrastructure, and our airways, but also my colleagues all across the 

government in all of the agencies represented here and others who 

work very hard 24/7 to protect the American people. 

Over the last 6 years, we have made some tremendous strides in 

making this country safer, and in answer to the question I often 

get asked, it is clear to me that we are much safer than we were 

prior to September 11, 2001. It is also clear to me that we have 

more work to be done because, as you said, Mr. Chairman, the 

enemy is not standing still. They are constantly revising their tacVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 038842 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\38842.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
6 

tics and adapting their strategy and their capabilities. And if we 

stand still or, worse yet, if we retreat, we are going to be handing 

them an advantage that we dare not see them hold. 

The fact that we have not suffered another terrorist attack on 

our soil in the last 6 years does say something about the success 

of our efforts so far. Now, some people do say it is just because we 

are plain lucky. I do not believe ‘‘luck’’ is an adequate explanation 

for this. Others may contend that the terrorist threat has subsided 

or that the United States is no longer in danger, or maybe that the 

terrorists have lost interest. But, again, I would just commend the 

videotape we saw over the weekend as a refutation of that. I commend to you the arrests that we saw in Germany and Denmark. 

The enemy is very focused on continuing to wage this war. They 

have not lost interest, and if we allow ourselves to become complacent and to think that the threat has diminished, we are going to 

be crippling ourselves in our ability to prevent future attacks. 

It is not the case that the enemy has not tried to attack us over 

the past several years. In December 2001, the Shoe Bomber tried 

to blow up an airliner coming to the United States. Last summer 

the British, with our help, disrupted a plot that, had it been carried out, would have resulted in multiple explosions on airliners 

flying from the United Kingdom to the United States. So it is not 

for want of trying that we have not suffered a successful attack. 

Even in recent months, we have disrupted terrorist plots in our 

country: The plot against Fort Dix and the plot against JFK Airport. Last week German authorities thwarted a serious plot, as 

they themselves have acknowledged, directed in part against Americans in Europe. And Danish police also arrested terrorist suspects 

in their country. 

These events underscore what the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) made clear, which is the enemy’s effort to continue 

to focus on the West and to recruit operatives who can move in the 

West. And that is one of the reasons that I want to thank the Committee for the 9/11 legislation, which has now given us some additional capabilities in plugging the vulnerability through the Visa 

Waiver Program. Every day at our own borders we turn away dangerous people, including individuals with known ties to terrorism, 

as well as criminals, drug dealers, and human traffickers. 

So I sum up by saying that I believe the reason that there have 

not been successful attacks on American soil is not because the 

threat is diminished; it is because we have raised our level of protection and our level of disruption, both by undertaking action 

overseas and undertaking action within our own borders. It is a 

testament to the partnership reflected in part by those at this 

table, the hard work of the dedicated men and women who work 

for the agencies of the Federal Government as well as State and 

local officials, and our partnerships overseas, which I think become 

stronger every single day. 

Now, that is not to say that our efforts have been flawless or that 

our work is over with. On the contrary, the biggest challenge to us 

is not to lose the sense of urgency which animated all of us in the 

weeks and months after September 11, 2001. If we continue to 

adapt ourselves and continue to feel the need to move quickly and 

substantially to meet this threat, we are maximizing our ability to 

7 

protect ourselves. But if we do otherwise, we are turning around 

and moving in the wrong direction. 

Now, I have provided the Committee with a fairly lengthy assessment of where I think we are in a number of areas. 

I thought what I might take in the next couple of minutes is the 

opportunity to look at a few areas where I think we are now addressing gaps that have not yet been filled. Part of what we have 

to do, of course, is not merely plug those vulnerabilities that have 

been identified looking backwards, but we need to look forward. In 

fact, we need to look around the corners at some vulnerabilities 

that have not been spoken about. And we need to make sure that 

we are working to address those as well. So let me talk about a 

number of those. 

The first is general aviation. As this Committee knows, we have 

spent a lot of time focused on the question of people smuggling in 

weapons of mass destruction through maritime containers or putting them on commercial aircraft, but we have not looked at the 

question of general aviation coming from overseas as a potential 

vector through which weapons of mass destruction or people who 

are dangerous might be smuggled into the country. We are now 

working to plug that threat. 

Later today we will be unveiling a plan to begin the process of 

increasing our security for overseas general aviation coming into 

this country substantially. The first step of this is to move forward 

with earlier screening of people who are on crews and who are passengers in general aviation planes crossing the Atlantic and Pacific 

Oceans. We are going to use our authorities to align early reporting 

of crew members and passengers before take-off in the same way 

we now require for commercial airliners so that we can prevent 

people from getting on airplanes and taking off to the United 

States, and, as important, or more important, prevent weapons of 

mass destruction from getting on airplanes and coming to the 

United States on private aircraft. The vision of where we want to 

go with this moves beyond simply screening people, but ultimately 

looks to a process of physical screening of private aircraft overseas 

before they come into the United States. 

We also remain mindful of the threat to our ports not only from 

containers in commercial cargo vessels but from small boats and 

privately owned oceangoing vessels which could seek to duplicate 

a USS Cole-style attack on our ports or again to smuggle dangerous weapons, materials, or people into the country. We have 

been working with small-vessel owners, principally through the 

Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection, to assess what 

those risks are and to come up with a strategy that will help us 

efficiently but also protectively to address the risk presented by 

smaller boats and privately owned oceangoing vessels to our country. 

We have, for example, in the last week launched a program in 

Seattle to work with local authorities to conduct vulnerability and 

risk assessments with respect to the smuggling of nuclear materials into the port of Seattle through private vessels. Part of this 

involves the deployment of radiation detection technology and 

equipment to key maritime pathways and choke points so that we 

can begin the process of radiological scanning of small vessels that 

8 

might bring nuclear materials into the port of Seattle. As we evaluate how this works in an operational environment, we look to expand this capability from Seattle to places like the port of San 

Diego and also New York City as well. 

I am also committed, as are my colleagues at the table, to particularly focus on those kinds of challenges and weapons which 

could have a truly catastrophic effect on the United States, and 

that means, of course, nuclear or dirty bomb-type attacks. 

We recognize that our first and most urgent priority is to prevent 

nuclear weapons from coming into this country and preventing 

dirty bombs from being constructed and detonated. And that is, of 

course, where we put most of our attention. But we do have to recognize that, should our actions fail, nuclear forensic and attribution 

capabilities would be critical in protecting against a follow-on attack, and also in making sure that we responded to anybody who 

launched nuclear bombs against us using terrorists as the delivery 

vehicle. 

Therefore, even before an attack occurs, our ability to demonstrate that we have real and robust forensic and attribution capability will give us a significant measure of deterrence value, particularly against any state actor that had it in mind to use terrorists as a disguised method of delivering a nuclear bomb against the 

United States. That is why we have created the National Technical 

Nuclear Forensics Center, which is an interagency center focused 

on forensics and attribution, and it is housed within our Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office. I had an opportunity last week to meet 

with the Interagency Leadership Executive Committee of that center. It is dedicated to continuing to develop and improve and to sustain a rapid and credible capability to support attribution, conclusions, and potential responses to a nuclear attack or a dirty bomb 

in this country. I think that is a critical element of our protection 

and response to a catastrophic attack. 

The Nuclear Forensics Center involves partnerships all across 

the Federal Government, including very deep partnerships with my 

colleagues at the table here today—DNI, FBI, and the NCTC. 

Of course, our improvements to screening, critical infrastructure 

protection, and intelligence fusion and sharing have to continue. 

We have to continue sharing intelligence horizontally and 

vertically. Again, I want to commend the Chairman and the Ranking Member for their leadership on information sharing in past sessions of Congress, and we are dedicated to being a full partner in 

the Information Sharing Environment about which more will be 

heard later this morning. 

Finally, I would like to observe that, again, one of the cuttingedge elements of this information sharing has to do with biological 

threats. Providing early warning biosurveillance on human and 

animal health, protection, and vulnerabilities of the food and water 

supply, and the environment in general as it relates to biological 

conditions is a critical element in getting early warning and rapid 

response to a biological threat, whether that be a natural threat or 

a manmade threat. 

We have recently established the National Biosurveillance Integration Center which will fuse clinical data, intelligence information, and what we get from our Biowatch sensors into a comprehenVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 038842 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\38842.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
9 

sive analysis of biological threats and events. While considerable 

work needs to be done to get this center fully deployed and fully 

operational, we have made some considerable progress, particularly 

in the last year. And, again, this is a classic example of an interagency effort, including not only those at this table, but the Departments of Defense, State, Interior, Agriculture, Health and Human 

Services, and Transportation. 

Let me conclude by saying that as we honor the victims of September 11, 2001, tomorrow, I hope that the anniversary of that day 

is not merely an opportunity to commemorate the loss of life or to 

celebrate heroism, but also an opportunity to rededicate ourselves 

to the struggle and to recognize the most important lesson is 

‘‘Never again,’’ at least to the limit of our human abilities. 

I would like to thank the Committee for your ongoing support 

and for the opportunity to testify at the hearing. I look forward to 

continuing our important work in protecting the American people. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Chertoff, 

for an excellent statement. I particularly want to thank you for 

those announcements toward the end of your statement about what 

you are doing to try to raise the security with regard to private 

aviation and boats coming into the country, as well as the development of a center to make sure that we have the forensic capability 

to consider rapidly the aftereffects of a nuclear attack. This is a 

gruesome business, but as Senator Collins said and the 9/11 Commission said, it was a failure of imagination, which is to say a failure to imagine that anyone could possibly do what the terrorists 

did on September 11, 2001, that created part of the vulnerability 

we had on that day. And I think you are imagining now what our 

enemies might do to attack us, and you are attempting to close 

those vulnerabilities. So I appreciate it very much. 

The Department of Homeland Security, as we know, was created 

out of Congress. The next two agencies we are going to hear from 

are the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and 

the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), who were the two 

leading recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the so-called 

Kean-Hamilton Commission. It strikes me that since they are both 

headed now by retired admirals, we may have to revise MacArthur’s old statement and say that ‘‘Old sailors not only do not 

die; they do not even fade away.’’ 

[Laughter.] 

They come back and serve their country, and for that we are extremely grateful. 

Admiral McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence—— 

Senator WARNER. Add me to the list. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Senator Warner is added to the list as 

well. You are not calling yourself an ‘‘old sailor’’ are you? 

Senator WARNER. You better believe it. I am older than these 

guys. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Admiral McConnell, go ahead. 

10 

1The prepared statement of Admiral McConnell appears in the Appendix on page 73. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,1 VICE ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY (RET.), DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Sir, Senator Warner was the Secretary of 

the Navy when I was briefing him as a young lieutenant, so thank 

you, sir. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and Members of the Committee, 

thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before the Committee to provide a status of our efforts to confront terrorist threats 

to the Nation. I also appreciate the opportunity to describe the implementation of the reforms mandated by the Congress and the 

President since September 11, 2001, and, as has been mentioned, 

6 years ago tomorrow. 

My biggest concern, as mentioned by Senator Collins, is going 

back to September 10th thinking by many in our country. As stated 

in our July National Intelligence Estimate, the level of focus and 

commitment may wane in time. The threat is real, and we must 

remain vigilant. 

As noted, in July my office released the National Intelligence Estimate, the intelligence community’s most authoritative judgment 

on a particular subject, and this was on the terrorist threat to the 

U.S. homeland. In our key judgments, an unclassified version of 

which has been mentioned here and is posted on our website, for 

the 3-year period of the estimate, we assess that our Nation faces 

and will continue to face a persistent and evolving threat, mainly 

from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, and most especially alQaeda. 

The terrorist threat without question is real. I will share with 

you today how we in the intelligence community are working to 

counter these threats. I also have submitted a more comprehensive 

overview in my statement for the record, and I ask that it be submitted to the record. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Without objection. 

Admiral MCCONNELL. To confront today’s threats, we have made 

many changes in the way we conduct intelligence, law enforcement, 

homeland security, and diplomatic and defense activities. Our 

greatest progress can be concentrated, I believe, in four areas: 

First, by improving our organizational structures to meet the new 

threats of this century; next, by fostering greater information sharing to provide the right information to the right people at the right 

time, largely driven by this Committee; third, strengthening our intelligence analysis; and, fourth, implementing the necessary reforms that allow us to build a dynamic intelligence enterprise that 

promotes diversity to gain insight and to sustain a competitive advantage against our adversaries. 

First let me touch on the structural improvements in the intelligence community. One of our challenges was integrating foreign 

and domestic intelligence, that is, foreign intelligence collected inside the United States. We are ensuring that we collect the right 

information to most accurately and objectively reflect the threats 

inside the United States. We are better able to do this with the establishment of the FBI’s National Security Branch (NSB). The NSB 

11 

integrates the FBI’s counterterrorism, counterintelligence, weapons 

of mass destruction, and intelligence programs, allowing for a coordinated focus on collecting foreign intelligence within the United 

States. And, of course, as mentioned, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) uses all that information with foreign collected information to provide a more comprehensive picture. 

Second, with regard to our structure, creation of the National 

Clandestine Service at CIA to guide all clandestine human operations across the community with the most effective leadership allows for better oversight and coordination we did not have before. 

Third, we are working to dismantle stovepipes, the stovepipe 

mentality inside the intelligence community. This mind-set is 

where an agency can produce, and limit within its walls, vital national intelligence. One way we promote greater collaboration is by 

using cross-community mission managers to identify intelligence 

priorities, gaps, and requirements. Mission managers engage in 

strategic planning and collection management against our hardest 

targets. Today we have mission managers for North Korea, Iran, 

Cuba, and Venezuela, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and 

counterintelligence. 

Finally, with the support of this Committee, we have established 

a Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment to 

enhance our sharing of terrorism information not only among Federal but also among State, local, tribal governments, as well as the 

private sector. 

Let me turn now more specifically to information sharing. Our efforts to improve information sharing mechanisms are of special significance, given that the failure to do so contributed to our inability 

or our failure to prevent the September 11, 2001 attacks. In our 

July National Intelligence Estimate, we assess that al-Qaeda is 

planning to attack the homeland, is likely to continue to focus on 

prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets, with a 

goal of producing mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, 

and significant economic shocks. And, of course, as mentioned by 

the Chairman, the intent is to create fear among our population. 

To counter this, we must depend not only on the 16 agencies of 

the intelligence community, but also on the eyes and ears of our 

State and local partners across the country. And more than depending on them, we must be willing to share threat information 

and work with them to protect our Nation. We believe that State 

and local partners can no longer be treated only as first responders, 

but also as the first lines of prevention. In the past 6 years, the 

Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment has 

led the charge to transform our policies, processes, procedures, and, 

most important, workforce or workplace cultures to reinforce sharing terrorist threat information as the rule, not the exception. I 

have also made improved information sharing a centerpiece of the 

DNI’s strategic planning going forward. 

Although the effort to implement the Information Sharing Environment is well underway, it is essential that the implementation 

activities take place within a broader strategic context of enhancing 

our Nation’s ability to combat terrorism. The ultimate goal is not 

simply information sharing for the sake of sharing. The objective 

12 

is to improve our national capacity to protect our Nation from future attack. We are working very hard to do just that. 

Let me now turn to analysis. We are in the process to fundamentally reform our analytical process. In addition to focusing on improved formal training and analytical rigor, we are moving the intelligence community toward implementing a community-wide information technology architecture that allows, among other things, 

analysts to better share and to collaborate. This means communitywide computer connectivity and standardized information-sharing 

policies. So whether you are an analyst in Hoboken or Honolulu, 

a special agent in the FBI, or a soldier on the front lines, we will 

be able to contribute to and benefit from accurate and timely intelligence. This is balanced, of course, so that we do not compromise 

operational security, consistent with our responsibilities to protect 

sources and methods. 

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence is also developing virtual communities for analysts who can securely exchange 

ideas and expertise across organizational boundaries, to find, access, and share information to make their analytical judgments. We 

are better engaging with outside professionals who can challenge 

our analytical assumptions, provide deep knowledge, insights, and 

new ways of thinking. We conduct red-teaming and alternative 

analysis to ensure we have examined all possibilities in our analytical process. 

We also have taken steps to ensure the impartiality of our analysis and our analytical products. As mandated by the Intelligence 

Reform Act, we established an Assistant Deputy Director for Analytical Integrity and Standards. This person serves as a focal point 

for analysts who wish to raise concerns regarding politicization, 

bias, lack of objectivity, appropriate alternative analysis, or dissenting views. 

We also have made qualitative improvements to our analysis, 

specifically our National Intelligence Estimates. Key judgments are 

written to explore more thoroughly the implications of our critical 

underlying conclusions. Appendices and annexes now provide full 

transparency in our analytical judgments by describing the analytical train of reasoning we used to arrive at our conclusions. And 

the main text now highlights the full range of analytical judgments 

and their implications, bringing dissenting opinions to the fore so 

policymakers, such as Members of this Committee, can have the 

benefit of the full analytic picture. 

Let me move now to implementing necessary changes in our policy and our practices. I will turn to the policies we have enacted 

across the intelligence community as well as policies we are currently pursuing through our recently completed 100-day plan and 

the upcoming 500-day plan. These reforms will allow us to better 

confront threats to the Nation as we go forward. 

In June, I signed a directive mandating civilian joint duty for intelligence officers across the intelligence community. This initiative 

was started by Ambassador Negroponte as far back as 2005. It was 

difficult to get agreement, but it is now passed. Now it is up and 

running. If an up-and-coming officer aspires to be serving at the 

senior reaches of the community, he or she will have to serve a 

tour of duty at a different agency outside their parent agency durVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 038842 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\38842.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
13 

ing their career. The experience provides the officer with broader 

perspective and brings the community towards a higher level of collaborative behavior. Our approach was patterned after the successful Goldwater-Nichols bill of 1986 that moved DOD to military 

jointness. 

We also have been working to recruit intelligence officers with 

the needed background and skills that will strengthen our abilities. 

We are developing programs to recruit young people from all walks 

of life, including first-generation and second-generation Americans 

and members of traditionally underrepresented groups with language skills and cultural understanding that we need for the insights and for our analysis. Recruiting new and talented employees 

means little, however, if we are unable to get them through our security process. Therefore, we have a pilot project with the Department of Defense to see if we can go much faster using an automated process, commercial best practices, and then a new approach 

for life-cycle monitoring once you are on the inside. 

We have accomplished a great deal, but we still have a lot more 

to go. To better integrate the intelligence community, we initiated 

a deliberate planning process based on the principles of transparency, accountability, deadlines, and deliverables. The first phase 

of these efforts was spelled out in our 100-day plan. They were designed to jump-start the necessary reforms in the community to 

build momentum. The next phase, our 500-day plan, started in August. It is intended to sustain and accelerate the momentum with 

an expanded set of initiatives and greater level of participation. 

Our plan was developed through a community-wide effort through 

the use of working groups, blogs, and wikis to solicit inputs from 

the community. 

I am happy to report that enthusiastic participation by the community allowed us to put together what we think is a comprehensive plan. This plan will be executed through cross-organizational 

and community-wide engagement. Our primary emphasis is improved collaboration across the community. Working groups from 

each of the areas will focus on the key issues and engage the key 

stakeholders. Our intent is to integrate the intelligence community 

and enable cross-organizational collaboration across critical mission 

areas to serve our customers better but, more importantly, to better protect the Nation. We must continue to accelerate our efforts. 

In closing, we have come a long way over the past 6 years developing a more integrated, more collaborative community. I believe 

the result is a stronger community better able to protect the Nation. I think the Nation is better protected today than it was 6 

years ago, but we must remain vigilant, and we must remain engaged. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks. I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Admiral McConnell. I 

have a few questions that I hope we can build on during the Q&A 

period. Particularly, I appreciate your last thoughts there, which is 

that you are moving toward an integrated, collaborative intelligence community, which is part of what we did not have on September 11, 2001. 

14 

1The prepared statement of Admiral Redd appears in the Appendix on page 93. 

Admiral Redd, thanks for being here. Thanks for your service. I 

will just say in introducing you that more than a year ago, Senator 

Collins and I went out and spent a good part of a day at the National Counterterrorism Center, and it was one of those occasions 

when you have the satisfaction of actually seeing something that 

was called for in legislation, enacted and carried out. And I remember we said to each other—I went home that night and said to my 

family, ‘‘I was at the NCTC today, and you all have reason to feel 

more secure tonight as a result of what is happening out there.’’ 

So I thank you for that, and we welcome your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JOHN SCOTT REDD,1 VICE ADMIRAL, U.S. 

NAVY (RET.), DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM 

CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Admiral REDD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and that is a very 

good point, that words do eventually mean something, and they do 

translate into tangible things, and NCTC is a very tangible example of that. 

Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, distinguished Members of 

the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you 

today on our Nation’s efforts to confront the terrorist threat to the 

homeland since September 11, 2001. I also have a short oral statement and would ask that my longer written statement be submitted for the record. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Without objection. 

Admiral REDD. And before we leave the old sailors analogy, I 

would note that Director Mueller, as a former Marine, is a member 

of the Department of the Navy, which is probably about as far as 

we can take that discussion without getting into trouble here. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Remember, we are looking for collaboration. 

Admiral REDD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MUELLER. Our liaison just broke down. 

Admiral REDD. In the 6 years since September 11, 2001, the U.S. 

Government has taken significant steps to improve our understanding of the terrorist threat and our ability to combat it, and 

many of those steps are indeed the result of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which was championed by this 

Committee. And for that, sir and madam, we are in your debt. 

While I am going to focus today on the progress we have made, 

I would just start with a comment that none of what I say should 

obscure the real and significant challenges that we continue to 

face. We are in a long war, and our enemy is determined and dangerous. Our counterterrorism efforts have disrupted many of the 

enemy’s plans and diminished certain capabilities. But the events 

of the last days and the last weeks clearly demonstrate the clear 

and present danger which continues to exist. 

With that in mind, let me turn briefly to the role the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) plays and continues to play in 

the war on terror. Today, as directed by the legislation, NCTC has 

15 

two roles, two fundamental roles. In military terms, I wear two 

hats. The first is a very familiar one to everyone, and that is intelligence, and in that hat I report to Admiral McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence. The second hat is to do with a thing 

called ‘‘strategic operational planning,’’ which is a new and I believe revolutionary capability in our government. And in that hat, 

I report to the President. 

Let me first turn to NCTC’s role in counterterrorism intelligence. 

As envisioned in the legislation, analysis is the heart and soul of 

NCTC’s intelligence mission. More than half of our government 

workforce, which is about 400 people, is devoted to this effort. I 

would submit that today NCTC provides the best example of allsource, integrated analysis in the intelligence community. There 

are two primary reasons for that, some of which have been alluded 

to here. 

First, NCTC is the only place in the U.S. Government where all 

intelligence, both foreign and domestic, comes together. 

Second, we are, as indicated and directed in legislation, a truly 

joint organization. Virtually all of our analysts come from other 

Federal agencies, and this allows them to leverage the diverse 

skills and backgrounds of their co-workers in reaching their analytic conclusions. 

In addition to producing analysis, NCTC also has a mandate to 

integrate analysis across the intelligence community. The net result of this effort is a full spectrum of intelligence product for policymakers and operators. These range from raw intelligence products, such as our threat matrix, which is designed to provide immediate situational awareness of an impending threat, to more indepth types of analytic products, which, for example, the President’s Daily Brief (PDB). 

Significantly, virtually all of the reports for senior policymakers 

are coordinated through NCTC as the DNI’s mission manager. The 

purpose of that is to ensure that differing views are not only represented but that they are also put in context. 

So how was all this played out in the real world? Perhaps one 

of the best examples occurred a year ago during the U.K. aviation 

threat. In this, the most significant threat to the homeland since 

September 11, 2001, NCTC worked hand in glove with DHS, FBI, 

CIA, NSA, and others to share intelligence and provide integrated 

analysis in a very dynamic environment. When the President and 

the National Security Council met, NCTC gave the intelligence 

briefing, combining both foreign and domestic information. In my 

view, and in the view of others, that is exactly what the legislation 

had in mind when you established NCTC. 

Another key function of NCTC is information sharing. Let me 

give you three examples now of how we have improved information 

sharing, I believe dramatically so, since Septemer 11, 2001. 

The first is NCTC Online. Simply put, this is the Nation’s premier classified website for counterterrorism intelligence. Maintained by NCTC, this highly classified electronic library contains 

over 7 million counterterrorism documents—or terrorism documents. These reports come into NCTC on over 30 networks from 

over 60 organizations, and it is instantly available to around 8,000 

analysts around the world. 

16 

The second example of information sharing is what we call the 

Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment. You have to have a 

good acronym, so it is TIDE. Today, the U.S. Government has one 

central knowledge base of all known and suspected terrorists. It is 

maintained by NCTC and is based on all-source classified information. Every day we distribute a sensitive but unclassified extract, 

which is the basis of various screening activities. We send that to 

Bob Mueller’s folks at the Terrorist Screening Center, and that becomes the information which provides for entry checks at borders, 

Secretary Chertoff’s business, consular checks for visa applications 

in the State Department, and TSA’s no-fly list. 

The third example of information sharing deals with situational 

awareness. Every day NCTC chairs three secure video teleconferences—8 o’clock in the morning, 3 o’clock in the afternoon, and 

1 o’clock in the morning. There are partipants from across the community to make sure everybody is on the same page. Our Watch 

Center is open 24/7, passing information as events occur, again, 

around the intelligence community. Also, significantly, we are 

physically collocated with the FBI and CIA’s Watch Centers for 

Counterterrorism. And of great significance to those who have been 

in the intelligence business, there are no doors between those 

Watch Centers. 

Let me now turn briefly to NCTC’s second role in the war on terror: Strategic operational planning. In this role, we lead an interagency planning effort that brings all elements of national power 

to bear in the war on terror. This effort also involves a spectrum 

of activities from deliberate, long-range strategic planning to more 

dynamic, short-range operational planning efforts. An example of 

the former is the National Implementation Plan (NIP), which was 

approved by the President last year. NIP serves as the Nation’s 

strategic blueprint for the war on terror and it integrates the full 

weight of our diplomatic, homeland security, law enforcement, financial, and military activities, as well as intelligence. At the other 

end of the planning spectrum are more operational planning efforts, including those established to address specific threats. The 

interagency task force, which deals with the current heightened 

threat environment, is an ongoing example. 

So where does all this leave us? Despite continuing and significant challenges, I believe that today, 6 years after September 11, 

2001, the United States is better prepared to fight the war on terror than at any time in our history. Let me give you seven reasons 

why I say that. 

First, our intelligence is better. Terrorists are a tough target, but 

our collection, our analysis, and our production are significantly 

improved. 

Second, we have made major strides in information sharing and 

getting intelligence to the people who need it to take action. 

Third, we are taking the fight to the enemy and have achieved 

significant successes in the field. Thousands of terrorists have been 

taken off the field of battle, and dozens of plots have been disrupted. 

Fourth, we are attacking every element of the terrorist’s life 

cycle, including terrorist travel and terrorist finance. 

17 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Mueller appears in the Appendix on page 106. 

Fifth, and very importantly, this is not only an American effort. 

We are working more closely and more effectively with a greater 

number of allies around the world to defeat the terrorists. 

Sixth, and of special interest to this Committee, we have taken 

significant steps to make the homeland a hostile place for terrorists 

to enter and operate. 

Finally, through a new strategic planning effort, we are laying 

the groundwork to take the efforts already underway to a new level 

of integration and effectiveness. 

All of this means to me that we are safer today than we were 

on September 11, 2001. But we are not safe, and nor are we likely 

to be for a generation or more. We are in a long war. We face an 

enemy that is adaptable, dangerous, and persistent, and who always has a vote. While we have won many battles since September 

11, 2001, there are many battles yet to be fought, and we must anticipate that there will be setbacks along the way. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Admiral Redd, for that excellent testimony. 

Director Mueller, obviously the FBI is the senior institution at 

the table, pre-existing September 11, 2001, but under your leadership it has gone through quite a significant internal transformation 

to meet this new threat to our homeland. So I thank you for being 

here, thank you for what you have done, and look forward to your 

testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. ROBERT S. MUELLER III,1 DIRECTOR, 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF JUSTICE 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning, 

Senator Collins and Members of the Committee. I also appreciate 

the opportunity to be here today to discuss the terrorist threats facing our Nation, as well as those steps, measures the FBI has taken 

to confront those threats. 

After September 11, 2001, the FBI’s priorities shifted dramatically. The FBI’s top priority is and will continue to be the prevention of another terrorist attack. By joining our traditional collection 

expertise with our expanding intelligence capabilities, we have had 

a number of successes in the war against terror. Several have been 

mentioned here today, from Portland, Oregon; Torrance, California; 

to Chicago; to the recent Fort Dix and JFK plots. Indeed, the development of a mature intelligence and national security infrastructure is and will continue to be a key to our success. 

We have established the National Security Branch, and the Directorate of Intelligence has dedicated and integrated intelligence 

services within the Bureau. And beginning immediately after September 11, 2001, we have made significant strides in reshaping the 

way we meet our mission. We have doubled the number of intelligence analysts on board, tripled the number of linguists, set up 

field intelligence groups comprised of FBI, Federal, State, and local 

partners in each of our 56 field offices. And today intelligence is 

woven throughout every FBI program and every operation. 

18 

While much of the U.S. Government’s attention is focused on— 

and rightfully so—al-Qaeda’s reach from abroad into the United 

States, homegrown radicalization also exists. The role of our law 

enforcement partners is absolutely critical to identifying individuals and groups presenting this threat, especially through the 

FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces, of which there are over 100 

today. And, moreover, outreach to Muslim and South Asian communities plays an essential role in helping the FBI to identify violent extremists within those communities. To that end, I periodically meet with members of major Muslim and Arab communitybased organizations, civil rights groups, as do senior executives at 

FBI headquarters. 

Special agents in charge of all of our 56 field offices conduct town 

meetings with members of Arab and Muslim communities, and 

members of the Arab American community attend the FBI’s Citizens’ Academy, an 8-week program designed to give community 

leaders an overview of the FBI and the Department of Justice procedures and operations. 

And while the FBI and other members of the intelligence community, several sitting here today, and State and local law enforcement partners have been successful to date in preventing another 

major terrorist event within the homeland, we cannot rest easy. alQaeda and other extremist groups continue to have the will and 

the ability to attack us, and we must all continue our vigilance, 

commitment, and efforts to keep America safe. 

The FBI was created nearly 100 years ago to address crime 

crossing State boundaries. The threats we now face are global, and 

technology is moving more quickly than we could have foreseen 

just 10 years ago. And we together, those of us at the table and 

in the FBI, must continue to protect the security of our Nation 

while upholding the civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify this morning, and I look forward 

to answering your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Director Mueller. 

Gentlemen, I would say that my impression, as I listened to the 

four of you—and I hope that others across the country will be able 

to do so—is the picture of a great Nation that was attacked on September 11, 2001 in a way that we simply did not anticipate, now 

marshaling our enormous resources and patriotism to defend 

against another such attack. So, again, no one at the table, no one 

up here is feeling comfortable because the enemy is out there. But 

I think the composite picture is of enormous progress that has been 

made to close the vulnerabilities that existed on September 11, 

2001, and again for that I thank you. 

We are going to have a 6-minute round here at the beginning. 

Votes will go off at 11 o’clock, but I am going to keep the hearing 

going and just ask us to take turns going over to vote and coming 

back. 

I want to talk in specifics about the collaboration. The 9/11 Commission and others, in looking back at September 11, 2001, pointed 

to the gaps particularly between the CIA and the FBI in sharing 

information, some of which came from a historic pre-September 11, 

2001 mind-set about where the responsibility of each was and how 

19 

you could not have anybody involved in foreign intelligence work 

with domestic law enforcement. 

Obviously, we are in a different kind of war now where the lines 

between foreign and domestic are effectively blurred, if not eliminated, and I wanted to ask both Director Mueller and Director 

McConnell if you would just address briefly whether you think that 

the gaps that existed between the two communities have been effectively closed since September 11, 2001. Admiral Redd, sometimes a picture is worth a thousand words. When we were out at 

the NCTC, we noted that there was no door between the CIA desk 

and the FBI desk. But beyond that, are you sharing information, 

Admiral McConnell? 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Sir, I think the gap is significantly less 

than it was. I think we are still closing it. It is the process of transforming cultural—or human behavior. As you mentioned, the wall 

between us that was generated in a period of the 1970s, 1980s, the 

difference between foreign intelligence and domestic activity, was 

significant. In my view, that was one of the things that contributed 

to our failings at September 11, 2001. So while legislation has 

changed so we can now talk to each other, as opposed to going one 

way, it can go back and forth. We have created the National Security Branch in the FBI to actually have an intelligence mission 

more focused on this sort of thing. 

So I think we are significantly better, but I would not want you 

to take away from this that we have done everything that we need 

to do. It is truly cultural transformation. This means human behavior. That is one of the reasons we pushed the joint duty approach to get people to serve in the other person’s organization. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Fair enough. Director Mueller. 

Mr. MUELLER. I would support what the Admiral said. I had 

mentioned three things. The impediments to sharing that there 

were before September 11, 2001, have been removed. The PATRIOT Act is in some large part attributable or responsible for 

breaking down those walls. Second, the NCTC as a mechanism for 

sharing has worked exceptionally well. There are no doors, there 

are no walls in terms of the exchange of information, the quality 

and caliber of the analysis that is done there. And, third, the exchange of personnel. Now that the wall has been broken down, the 

ability to trade personnel and information, we have established the 

National Security Branch, the No. 2 person in the National Security Branch, Phil Mudd, is from the CIA, as an example of the exchange of personnel and the importance we all recognize of sharing 

information, exchanging information, integrating information, 

whether it be collected overseas or collected domestically. 

And, finally, I would say that I would agree that we have made 

substantial strides, but we have a ways to go. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. The other respect is that intelligence gathered overseas may directly relate to intelligence that 

we need here at home to protect against an attack on our homeland. We are, as we have all said, at war, and in this war, even 

more than in traditional wars, intelligence is critically important to 

prevent enemy attacks. Part of what we are trying to do is adjust 

our intelligence-gathering system and our technologies to that new 

reality. 

20 

Admiral, before we broke for the August recess, we had quite a 

go-round about FISA, and we adopted legislation. I wanted to ask 

you to speak for a moment about that, and if you can in this open 

setting—there have been some press suggestions, media suggestions that the United States through your office, was able to assist 

the German Government in the apprehension of those plotting terrorist attacks against American targets in Germany. Could you 

comment on that specifically and more generally on how the system we adopted in July, early August, is going? 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Yes, thank you, Senator. With the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act under consideration for updating, we 

found ourselves in a position of actually going backwards, losing capability because of the interpretations of the law. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. By courts. 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Yes, sir, by the FISA Court. Looking at the 

requests, it was actually taking us too much time, and because of 

the interpretations we were losing ground. So the approach we took 

was to ask for basically three things: First of all, do not require the 

intelligence community to obtain a warrant when we are targeting 

a foreigner, a terrorist, in a foreign country. We had found ourselves in the position where, based on the interpretation of the law, 

we were being asked to get warrants against terrorists operating 

in a foreign country. So we asked for relief for that. 

The second thing, for those private entities that assisted us, we 

needed to have some protection for them with regard to liability. 

And the third thing, quite frankly, was in the interest of protecting civil liberties and the privacy of Americans, we felt it was 

appropriate to be required, as we were in the old FISA legislation, 

to have a warrant anytime we targeted a U.S. person. That would 

include even a foreigner in this country suspected of being a terrorist. So we thought it had the right balance. 

It was passed, as you well know, and we are very pleased with 

that, and we are better prepared now to continue our mission—specifically Germany, it made significant contributions. It allowed us 

to see and understand all the connections with regard—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The newly adopted law facilitated that 

during August? 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Yes, sir, it did. The connections to alQaeda, the connections specifically to what is referred to as the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), an affiliate of al-Qaeda. Because we could 

understand it, we could help our partners, and through a long process of monitoring and observation, realizing that the perpetrators 

had actually obtained explosive liquids, hydrogen peroxide which 

they would condense or try to condense to an explosive. And so at 

the right time when Americans and German facilities were being 

targeted, the German authorities decided to move. 

[Information provided for the Record from Admiral McConnell 

follows:] 

INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

During the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

hearing on September 10, 2007, I discussed the critical importance to our national 

security of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), and the recent amendments to FISA made by the Protect America Act. The Protect America Act was urgently needed by our intelligence professionals to close critical gaps in our capabiliVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 038842 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\38842.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
21 

ties and permit them to more readily follow terrorist threats, such as the plot uncovered in Germany. However, information contributing to the recent arrests was not 

collected under authorities provided by the Protect America Act. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Admiral Redd, you recently said in an interview with Newsweek, ‘‘We are going to get hit again.’’ Secretary 

Chertoff talked today about some of the possible lines of attack 

that he is working on, for example, general aviation, small boats. 

When you look at the intelligence, what kind of attack do you believe we should be preparing for? 

Admiral REDD. Thank you, Senator. First of all, there were two 

parts of that interview, which, as you know, sometimes get 

conflated. One is the heightened awareness or the heightened 

threat environment in which we are right now. And the second is 

the statement, which I also made in my oral statement, that over 

time, over a 40-year generational period, just statistically batting 

a thousand would be very difficult, and that is why I said we may 

get hit again. 

The short answer is you cannot focus on any one of those. We 

watch very carefully what al-Qaeda is saying. We watch their planning. There is a certain sense at which they tend to come back and 

be persistent and try the same things again. As was indicated in 

the NIE, they are focused on large elements or large reaction to 

things like our transportation system, particularly aviation. But we 

cannot just look at one of those. We have to look across the board. 

Senator COLLINS. Secretary Chertoff, if you look at the recent 

plots that were thwarted in this country, if you look at Germany 

just last week, at Scotland, London, the JFK plot, it appears that 

terrorists still are looking at bombs and that they are looking at 

IEDs as the weapon of choice. 

What is DHS doing in the area of IEDs? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, Senator, I think you are correct that 

the attack weapon of choice still is the IED, and we are doing a 

number of different things, all of which I think will soon be captured in a strategic document directed both by Congress and the 

President. But let me go through some of the major elements of 

what we are doing. 

Of course, we begin with detection. We want to detect and prevent something from going off. One element of that, of course, is 

technology. Through our Science and Technology Directorate, we 

are doing research in such things as technology that will enable us 

to detect liquid explosives even when they are in a container, and 

to detect those liquid explosives rapidly and accurately in an operational environment. 

With respect to other kinds of technological issues, of course, the 

Defense Department is doing a lot of work based on what they are 

seeing in Iraq and other places overseas. We get the benefit of that. 

And then through our Office for Bombing Prevention, which is 

part of the Directorate of Infrastructure Protection, we actually 

educate State and local bomb detection and bomb prevention units 

in what they ought to look for and how they can deal with these 

threats. 

A second element, of course, is detecting someone who is trying 

to bring a bomb onto an airplane or into transit or some other part 

22 

of infrastructure. Part of the process of doing that, of course, is deploying the existing technology. Part of it is an enhanced use of 

what we call VIPR Teams, which are teams with canines and other 

hand-held detection equipment that we can surge into mass transit. We do that in response to a particular threat. We do it in response to a high-profile event, like the Super Bowl or something of 

that sort. And we do it on a random basis. 

A third element is the use of behavioral observation. This is a 

technique which we see overseas sometimes at airports. The 

Israelis use a version of this. We actually use it at the border. We 

train people in how to observe a behavior in a way that tips off 

somebody who might be planning to do us harm. And so as we 

have increased training and deployment of behavioral units at our 

airports and other locations, that has given us another element. 

So we use the whole spectrum of tools, whether it be advanced 

scientific research, widespread deployment of existing technology, 

use of dogs, and training of our screeners and of State and local 

officials in how to detect different kinds of components and suspicious behavior. 

Senator COLLINS. Director Mueller, there was a report last week 

by the Inspector General of the Department of Justice that was 

very critical of the terrorist watch list that is maintained under 

your direction. On the one hand, the IG found that there were several known or suspected terrorists who were not listed appropriately, and the IG was also critical that there were innocent people on the list and that it was very difficult for them to be removed 

from the list. All of us have had examples of constituents who have 

been on the list because their name is similar to someone who 

should be on the list. 

What is your response to the DOJ IG’s criticism of the watch 

list? This obviously is an important tool, but its usefulness is lessened if it is not as accurate and complete as possible. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, we absolutely agree with that, that it has 

to be as up-to-date as possible with the latest information. The IG’s 

report gave us some credit for having made substantial strides 

since his previous report, but still focused on two areas in which 

we have still got a great deal of work to do. The first is in terms 

of redress. Since his last report, we have established an Office of 

Redress. It is operating. I think both the IG as well as ourselves 

would like it to operate faster. But it is operating successfully. 

The second area is in the quality assurance of the information 

that we get, assuring that it is updated so that persons who may 

have been on the list at some point in time when we have additional information are removed from the list. And, again, as is 

often the case, it is a question of money and personnel, and we are 

putting money and personnel into assuring and upgrading our 

quality assurance. 

The IG made 18 recommendations. We are following up on every 

one of those recommendations. I pointed to a computer glitch—I 

will call it a computer glitch—writ large in terms of the individuals 

that in a particular instance, but it was over a period of time, did 

not make it on the list, and that has been remedied. So we have 

taken each one of the recommendations from the IG and are working on those recommendations. 

23 

One more recent example is we have been able to go through and 

scrub the no-fly list and cut it in half. And so we are making 

progress in terms of the goals that we share with the IG in assuring the quality assurance on the list. But it is and has been exceptionally successful in terms of doing what it was established to do, 

and that is, identifying persons whom we do not want to let into 

the country, identifying persons who may be in the country, and 

giving us some indication as to where they are and what they are 

doing. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

As is the custom of the Committee, we call in order of appearance, so the next three Senators are Senator Tester, Senator Warner, and Senator Coleman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER 

Senator TESTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate the 

panel’s coming here today and testifying before us. 

I want to add my voice to the many colleagues and witnesses in 

remembering the horrors of September 11, 2001. They are real stories of bravery, cops, firefighters, regular folks who performed acts 

of heroism that inspired us then and inspire us now. We should 

truly give thanks to those folks whose actions represented the best 

of what this Nation is truly about. 

Six years ago today, I was a regular farmer in Montana, unprepared for what was going to be happening the next day. And today 

I am still a farmer, although I spend a little less time on the farm. 

But it is interesting to hear today about how our Nation has made 

advances, but still needs to strive for better preparedness. 

In listening to the testimony this morning, we have made some 

progress, most impressively in first responders and sharing of information to deal with potential threats and actual emergencies. In 

other areas, we still need improvement. Some of it is due to new 

agencies. Secretary Chertoff as well as your predecessor have built 

a new agency, and I understand, Admiral McConnell, that the DNI 

has only existed for 2 years. 

But in too many areas, we have seen a real lack of urgency. The 

fact that there appears to be no real effort to track individuals who 

overstay their visas, for example, is particularly shocking and troubling to me, especially when we try to address the immigration 

problems we face, as well as the homeland security problems we 

face. 

The fact is there are still gaps, huge gaps. The security of our 

food supply needs to be addressed. Director Mueller and others, I 

think that you folks have got it absolutely right when you talk 

about the threat of complacency in this world post-September 11, 

2001. 

I would like to also talk a little bit about the men and women 

of our Customs and Border Patrol. I have had a chance over the 

years to visit with many of them who work the Northern Border 

that Montana shares with Canada. They work very hard, but too 

often many of them are overwhelmed with staff shortages and 

other personnel matters that can limit their ability to do their job. 

24 

As you gentlemen point out, they need to be right every time, while 

a terrorist only needs to be lucky once. 

We have seen the GAO investigators that have been able to bring 

certain radiological materials across the Northern border, and we 

have seen potential terrorists attempt to cross into the United 

States through the Northern border. And as I understand it, we are 

about 1,722 Customs officers and 488 Border Patrol officers short 

on the Canadian line. I can tell you, my staff and I have heard a 

lot of complaints from folks trying to cross the border, DHS employees, from constituents traveling through these border crossings. 

I will start my questioning with Secretary Chertoff, and that is, 

from your perspective as head of the Department of Homeland Security, what is the plan for getting staffed up at the Northern border? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, first let me say, Senator, that we— 

I guess when the President started his term, we had about 9,000 

Border Patrol agents. As of last week, we are at about 14,400, and 

we are on track to being at 18,300 by the end of next year. So we 

are going to be doubling it. 

Obviously, the largest element of the Border Patrol has gone to 

the Southern border, and that is because between the ports of 

entry 98 to 99 percent of the illegal crossings are the Southern border rather than the Northern border. 

What we try to do on the Northern border is use air asset sensors and high-tech equipment as a way of getting a broader sense 

of who is crossing the border so we can deploy assets more efficiently. 

I think we are on the way to having several air wings stood up 

along the Northern border, which will give us better coverage in 

terms of airframes. 

I do envision some number of the new Border Patrol agents who 

are being added will be going to the Northern border, although I 

will tell you that the lion’s share of those will be going to the 

Southern border. 

What is particularly promising is as we work on what we call our 

SBInet, which is a combination of ground-based radar and cameras, we are currently operationally testing down at the Southern 

border. That will eventually be a tool that we use at the Northern 

border as well. 

Senator TESTER. And I appreciate those efforts. I can just tell you 

that—and I know the focus is on the Southern border and for good 

reason. But I live 100 miles south of Medicine Hat, which is about 

70 miles south of the Canadian border, 60 miles south, and I can 

tell you that it is fairly common knowledge, I mean, there is work 

that needs to be done there. So I really appreciate your efforts in 

that. 

You talked a little bit about general aviation. You talked a little 

bit about containers. There has been some conversation about that. 

Can you give me any sort of idea on the containers that are coming 

in, commercial containers? What percentage of those are being tested? And do we need to put more emphasis on that? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. By the end of this year, we will be scanning 

virtually every container that comes into the United States by sea, 

at least at the port at which it enters the United States. Also, purVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 038842 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\38842.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
25 

suant to the SAFE Port Act, we have agreements with seven overseas ports to do the radiation scanning over there. We are operational in three of them, including one in Pakistan. And pursuant 

to the new legislation, we are going to try to put as much of this 

offshore as possible. But first things first. We are at a minimum 

going to get it done, as I said, virtually 100 percent by the end of 

this year. I should say by the end of next year we will be scanning 

virtually 100 percent of all the containers coming in through the 

land ports of entry, including from Canada as well. 

Senator TESTER. That is good. I appreciate those efforts. My time 

has expired. Hopefully I will not get waylaid and I will be able to 

get back here. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I hope so. Thanks, Senator Tester. 

We are going to go to Senator Warner and then to Senator Coleman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER 

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I would like to say that all of us remember September 11, 

2001 but I remember it particularly because I remained on Capitol 

Hill with a small group of Senators, and this fine gentleman, Robert Mueller, came up with the Attorney General to brief us. My 

recollection was it was early afternoon, and you shared with us everything you knew at that time. And I look back on what few facts 

you were able to convey, and I see before us today a team of four 

of the finest public servants, most of whom have come in from 

other positions to serve once again in public office. And I have a 

great deal of confidence in this team and their ability to protect 

America. 

I, for one, think we are going a long way towards protecting this 

country, certainly much beyond what you were able to convey on 

the morning of September 11, 2001. Am I not correct, Mr. Mueller? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, and thank you for your comments, sir. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, I hold up here two cards: One is my Virginia driver’s 

license and the other is my Senate ID. Now, this license is not unlike those in all the other States, and it was skillfully fabricated 

by several of the September 11, 2001 perpetrators. This Senate ID 

involves high-tech and, as far as I know, cannot be fabricated. 

Now, the question comes about the REAL ID program. I consider 

it one of the highest priorities. I join with my colleagues Senator 

Collins, Senator Voinovich, and others to try to get the funding 

necessary to help the States begin this program. 

We lost by only six votes. A swing of four votes could have made 

that difference. I hope that we repeat that effort in the near future, 

but I would like to ask each of you, given your dramatic statements 

here this morning, particularly about al-Qaeda and the threat to 

this country, where you ranked the REAL ID Act as a priority program. And do you fully or equivocally endorse it? Secretary 

Chertoff. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, Senator, as you know, under the 

REAL ID Act, we are bound and we are pushing very hard to get 

a nationally secure identification. We also have a similar complementary program for travel within the Western Hemisphere 

26 

called the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. I think this is one 

of the three or four really big items I want to get well launched 

before the end of this President’s term. I think it is at the highest 

rank of priority, and—— 

Senator WARNER. That will help me. I want to try and get each 

one’s opinion here. Admiral McConnell. 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Sir, fully endorse. It is absolutely needed. 

Senator WARNER. High priority? 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. 

Senator WARNER. Admiral Redd. 

Admiral REDD. Same thing. Fully endorse. We need to get to the 

point where we can tell yes or no, this is the individual. 

Senator WARNER. Director Mueller. 

Mr. MUELLER. Anyone who has read the 9/11 Commission report 

understands the utility that the hijackers put to use these IDs, 

would understand the necessity and the importance of this program. I absolutely support it. 

Senator WARNER. Highest priority? 

Mr. MUELLER. High priority. 

Senator WARNER. We have discussed al-Qaeda here this morning, 

and several of us serve on the military intelligence committees. We 

have a lot of discussion about that organization, and you have mentioned it, certainly, each of you today. Can each of you tell us what 

you can so that the American public has a little better understanding to what extent they are making efforts to take actions 

here in this country, and to what extent, if any, they have, should 

we say, chapters or splinter groups or self-appointed al-Qaeda in 

the United States? Let’s start with you, Secretary Chertoff. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. To be brief, Senator, they are still intent on 

carrying out acts against the United States, preferably in the 

homeland; if not, against American interests elsewhere. I think 

they are looking both to develop operatives so that they can launch 

from overseas. They are also, I think, hoping to radicalize those 

within this country. They have been less successful in the latter respect here than they have in Europe, but it is a growing issue. 

Senator WARNER. Fine. Admiral McConnell. 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Sir, they have committed leadership that 

can adapt. They have safe haven for training. They have middle 

management for organization, training, and preparation. The thing 

they need the most are operations personnel. We watched them recruit. We watched them bring them to Pakistan, that border area 

between Pakistan and Afghanistan, to train them in things like liquid explosives and so on. 

So the intent is clear. They have not yet been successful infiltrating back in the United States. 

Senator WARNER. As an organization, do you think they are as 

strong as they were on September 11, 2001, or much stronger? 

Admiral MCCONNELL. They have regained a significant level of 

their capability. I do not think they are as strong because they 

commanded so much and were so much larger before the invasion 

of Afghanistan, and they had a country to operate freely in. So they 

are in an area that makes them difficult to get to, so I would say 

significant capability but not as strong as September 11, 2001. 

27 

Senator WARNER. And due to the successful efforts of our military and many others. 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. Our military, and collaboration 

also with the Pakistani military. 

Senator WARNER. Admiral Redd. 

Admiral REDD. I would just agree that this strategic intent is unchanged, and in terms of the homeland or groups here inside the 

homeland, obviously that is what we spend every day looking at. 

If we know they were here, obviously they wouldn’t be here, they 

wouldn’t be effective. But we work extremely close with the FBI 

and across the intelligence community to make sure that any piece 

of information—and it may come from somewhere well outside our 

borders, which could indicate that. 

Senator WARNER. In the domestic arena, Director Mueller, what 

can you share with us? 

Mr. MUELLER. I look at it in three tiers: Core al-Qaeda in 

Waziristan, the border area, Afghanistan, and between Afghanistan and Pakistan where individuals were being trained; and the 

desire of al-Qaeda to insert such individuals in the United States 

as being a tremendous concern. 

Second, you have loosely affiliated groups who may get some 

training but do not have the planning necessarily, orchestration 

from core al-Qaeda. The takedown in Germany, Denmark most recently, London, and Madrid are examples to a certain extent of 

loosely affiliated groups, of which we have got concern. 

With those two groups, the biggest concern we have is those coming in from Europe who may have been trained and be inserted either by core al-Qaeda or undertake attacks in the United States 

without the planning or financial backing of core al-Qaeda. 

And the last tier is those who are self-radicalized, those in the 

United States who do not have ties overseas with al-Qaeda, but adherence to that ideology. Miami and the Fort Dix plot are just a 

couple of examples of that. 

We do have individuals in the United States who adhere to that 

ideology, that extremist ideology, and we work with our counterparts to make certain that we identify. We, after identification, determine to what extent there are other participants either here or 

overseas, and then work to disrupt those plots, and we mentioned 

some examples of that. 

Senator WARNER. I thank the panel. I thank the Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner. 

Senator Coleman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to associate 

myself with the comments of my colleague from Virginia, and 

thank you, gentlemen, for your service. 

We have clearly gotten past the silo mentality, and I think it 

should raise the level of confidence, understanding that this is a 

race without a finish line. I remember, Secretary Chertoff, in your 

confirmation when you said you have got to be right 100 percent 

of the time, and a single failure is something we cannot afford. 

Let me follow up on the question that my colleague from Virginia 

talked about, the level of the threat. Director Mueller, you kind of 

28 

broke it into three parts. When we look at homegrown, which is I 

think what we were seeing in Germany, first let me step back. Do 

we have the tools, do you have the tools that you need to identify 

the threats early on? Is there anything that you need in terms of 

the ability to surveil, the ability to respond, that you do not have 

today that this Congress should offer you? Secretary Chertoff. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think at this point, from the standpoint 

of my agency—and I think Director Mueller can maybe talk a little 

bit more specifically about the Bureau—we do have the tools we 

need, including information and our ability to screen. I worry, however, that those tools not get taken away from us. I worry that people not start to degrade what we have spent time building up. 

Senator COLEMAN. Is that in particular the PATRIOT Act? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, I am thinking particularly about 

some of our capabilities with respect to screening people as they 

come to the border, our ability to move to more biometric, fingerprint-based screening, and what Senator Warner said about identification cards. I mean, we are moving to get more secure identification. If we move backwards, that is going to make it harder rather 

than easier to detect problems. 

Senator COLEMAN. Admiral McConnell, we just dealt with FISA, 

which is a temporary piece. That is not a final fix. Do you have the 

tools? And if not, what else do you need? 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Sir, that is what I was going to mention, 

FISA, and it was a temporary fix. Some are of the belief that this 

community is spying on Americans, doing data mining and so on; 

that is simply not true. And so the debate with FISA gave us partially what we needed. So that debate is going to continue over the 

next few months, and if we lose FISA, we will lose, my estimate, 

50 percent of our ability to track, understand, and know about 

these terrorists, what they are doing to train, what they are doing 

to recruit, and what they are doing to try to get into this country. 

Senator COLEMAN. Admiral Redd. 

Admiral REDD. I would agree, obviously, with all these comments. I would just mention there is another way that we can lose 

tools, and that is through leaks. These are methods which are extremely sensitive, and we have to be very careful, particularly 

when we have had a success somewhere, that people do not start 

thinking that it is okay to talk about how we did it because those 

are very sensitive and very fragile in some cases. 

Senator COLEMAN. Director Mueller. 

Mr. MUELLER. I would not talk so much in the way of tools as 

such, but in terms of understanding the importance of State and 

local law enforcement to our success, it is often overlooked because 

it is perceived in some way as being quintessentially a Federal 

problem. But every one of the cases we have made have been made 

by Joint Terrorism Task Forces where State and local law enforcement are absolutely essential participants. 

To the extent that we develop sources in communities, it is State 

and local law enforcement that assist us developing those resources. 

Senator COLEMAN. I was going to follow up with that question. 

By the way, let me ask you, are those efforts adequately funded? 

29 

Mr. MUELLER. I would say that we have to keep an eye that they 

continue to be adequately funded, particularly with the uptick 

around the country for violent crime. If you talk to a police chief 

or a sheriff, their concern is responsiveness to their community on 

violent crime, but it is absolutely essential to our success to harness the 700,000-plus State and local law enforcement around the 

country through the Joint Terrorism Task Forces or other mechanisms. And so I do believe as there is momentum to provide funding to address violent crime, we should not forget the necessity of 

utilizing and funding efforts by State and local law enforcement to 

continue to address the terrorism threat. 

Senator COLEMAN. In addition to the State and local law enforcement focusing on the homegrown or even loosely affiliated—my 

background is as a former prosecutor—prisons are breeding 

grounds for gang violence. Are we looking at prison grounds as a 

breeding for terrorist activity? And do we have the tools to deal 

with that? Secretary Chertoff. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Actually, that is one of the first areas that 

we did look at because we had exactly the same insight that you 

did, that has traditionally been an area where you bring together 

people who are predisposed to break the law, many of whom are 

violent. They have time on their hands, and this can be a dangerous mixture. 

We have done a lot of work with the Bureau jointly in places like 

California and New York, which are also doing a lot of work themselves, and we are working also with correctional systems not only 

at the Federal level, but in other States to talk about first of all 

identifying the problem, figuring out ways to reduce the problem, 

making sure there is adequate screening of people who are coming 

into prisons claiming to be religious leaders, to make sure they are 

not there actually promoting a brand of indoctrination that would 

create a danger. And I think this is an area of continued concern 

for all of us. 

Senator COLEMAN. Anybody else want to respond to that? Director Mueller, is that an area you are looking at? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. We, for several years, have had an initiative 

that looks not just at the Federal system, which is fairly easy to 

take care of, since they are also in the Department of Justice, but 

in the various prison systems at the State and local level. And in 

several of our Joint Terrorism Task Forces, we have representatives of the State prison systems that participate on a daily basis 

to address that ongoing concern. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I have a whole 

other area of inquiry on smuggling nuclear material. We are going 

to have at least a second round here? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I hope so. Yes, indeed. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Please come back. Thanks, Senator Coleman. 

Admiral McConnell, at the risk of editorializing, which is a risk 

I will assume, I just want to come back and say by way of punctuating what you have said this morning, you said in response to my 

question earlier that the authority that the FISA reform law gave 

30 

you helped you—us—assist the Germans in breaking up that terrorist group in Germany. 

Second, you have just testified in response to Senator Coleman’s 

question that if you lost the FISA authority, you would lose 50 percent of the information capacity you have to gather about what terrorists are doing and planning to do to us. That is very compelling 

testimony. 

I want to yield to Senator Voinovich because we are on the clock, 

but I want to thank you for it. Senator Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As Woody Hayes once said, ‘‘You win with people.’’ In my mind, 

the real issue is having the right people with the right knowledge 

and skills at the right place and at the right time. And I think anybody listening to the four of you this morning has to be impressed 

with what we have heard. 

During consideration of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004, I underscored my belief that the interpersonal skills and the relationships between the leadership within 

the intelligence community was just as important as the organizational structure. 

I want to commend all of you for working together. I am concerned about the continuity our intelligence community will have 

over the next several years as we transition to a new administration. I think this is something that all of us should give a great 

deal of consideration to. 

Several years ago, we had testimony from State and local enforcement representatives who observed poor information sharing 

between Federal, State, and local government. I want to tell you 

there has been considerable improvements in this area. The Joint 

Terrorism Task Forces in Cincinnati and Cleveland are examples 

of this improvement, and you all ought to feel very good about that, 

Director Mueller. 

Even with the increased resources and better information, I 

think that we must remember that in 1998 Osama bin Laden made 

a fatwa, or a religious decree, effectively declaring war on the 

United States. He declared war on us in 1998, stating ‘‘The ruling 

to kill Americans and their allies—both civilian and military—is an 

individual duty for every Muslim who is able, in any country where 

this is possible.’’ 

After reading the National Intelligence Estimate, we know the 

threat continues. I sometimes look back and wonder if we had 

taken the resources that we put into Iraq and had sent them to Afghanistan how far ahead we would be today from where we were 

then—although we have made, according to what you have said to 

us, some real progress. 

My concern is how our Federal agencies are working together to 

reduce radicalization in the United States while at the same time 

ensures our democractic principles are unheld. Director Mueller, I 

have spent a lot of time talking to Muslims in Ohio, and one of 

their big complaints is on that. They feel that they are being unfairly profiled. I think that this is something from a dignity we 

must continue to work on. 

31 

[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Collins, I commend you both for convening 

today’s hearing regarding our national security and the threats posed by terrorism 

to the U.S. homeland. On the eve of the sixth anniversary of the tragic and violent 

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, I know the question on many Americans’ 

minds is: ‘‘Are we safer?’’ Although security is difficult to measure or quantify, the 

American public should be reassured that we are indeed safer. 

The United States is at war against a transnational terrorist movement fueled by 

radical extremists who seek to harm us and our way of life. These individuals will 

continue to adapt and attempt to find new ways to disrupt our security. It is our 

responsibility as Members of Congress to thwart their efforts by providing the necessary tools to our national security personnel for mission success. This investment 

will continue to yield great dividends, as I strongly believe that strengthening our 

intelligence gathering capabilities is the first and best line of defense against potential terrorist activity. 

Woody Hayes often said that, ‘‘you win with people.’’ If you do not have the right 

people, with the right skills, in the right job, at the right time, no organization will 

meet its goal. The men and women of our law enforcement and intelligence communities have made great strides in cooperation in pooling resources to better counter 

threats posed by terrorists. The public is aware of at least several recent instances 

of intelligence and law enforcement personnel successfully disrupting terrorism plots 

including at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York and at Fort Dix in New Jersey. 

The U.S. homeland has been free from attack for six years; a fact we surely owe 

in part or in its entirety to the men and women working for the agencies represented today. 

While we can enact legislation and authorize funding to minimize risk, it is an 

uncomfortable truth that we can never fully eliminate it. Thus, we must use common sense in developing future legislation to ensure our limited resources are allocated based upon risk assessments grounded in credible intelligence and analysis. 

Several years ago, this Committee heard testimony from state and local law enforcement representatives who observed poor information sharing between the Federal, State and local government. Since that time, we have witnessed the positive 

development of State and local fusion centers throughout the country, with Federal 

agencies engaged in counterterrorism activities working together on a larger and 

more productive scale then ever seen before. For example, in my home State, the 

Ohio Strategic Analysis and Information Center, which partners with DHS and the 

FBI, has been positively regarded as a ‘‘one stop shop’’ for terrorism-related law enforcement information. 

Even with increased resources, better information sharing and cooperation among 

agencies and across all levels of government, the threat remains real, and we must 

remain vigilant. In 1998, Osama bin Laden made a fatwa, or religious decree, effectively declaring war on the United States. He said: ‘‘The ruling to kill Americans 

and their allies—both civilian and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim 

who is able, in any country where this is possible.’’ Almost a decade later, the threat 

from Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda is still very real. 

A significant challenge that remains is improving the Federal Government’s ability to recruit and train skilled translators and linguists to meet our national security needs. Significant progress has been made in this area, but we need to do more 

to raise the proficiency of our intelligence and law enforcement personnel in critical 

foreign languages and cultures. Earlier this year, the Subcommittee on Oversight 

of Government held a hearing to examine our national level of foreign language proficiency. Unfortunately, the hearing revealed a shortage of Federal employees with 

proficiency in critical languages. Thus, I am anxious to hear from our witnesses 

about progress in this area. 

In addition, our clearance processing system remains broken, limiting the ability 

of our national security agencies to meet their heightened mission requirements. 

The Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management began its oversight 

work on the security clearance process during the 109th Congress because of our 

concern with the long standing backlog of security clearances and the cumbersome 

process that hampered the Federal Government’s ability to clear highly skilled employees in a timely manner. I would remind my colleagues that this program has 

been on the Government Accountability Office’s High-Risk List since 1990. The first 

timeliness milestones set forth in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 

Act for security clearance reform are behind us, but we still have a long way to go 

if we are to make meaningful improvements in this critical area. Accordingly, I look 

32 

forward to learning when the new process outlined in Director McConnell’s 100 Day 

Plan will be operational. 

I would like to thank our distinguished panel for sharing their thoughts and time 

with the Committee. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I would like to hear more about what other 

things are we doing to try and eliminate this receptivity to Muslims in various parts of the world to Osama bin Laden’s extremism. 

Admiral REDD. Senator, I could give you sort of a top-down view, 

if that would help. I mentioned, too, in my remarks the National 

Implementation Plan, which is, for all intents and purposes, the 

Nation’s war plan, if you will, for the war on terror. As you expect, 

it has stuff like protect and defend the homeland and go after the 

terrorists, but one of the key pillars in there is countering violent 

Islamic extremism. And so, that is recognized as one of the strategic musts or imperatives, for us as a government. If you go 

through that plan and you look at all the tasks that are assigned 

to the various Cabinet officers, almost 30 percent of them or a third 

of them are assigned to the State Department for exactly that reason. 

So the short answer is yes, it is recognized. It is, as you understand, a very difficult problem. We have an analytic group at 

NCTC which works with the rest of the community in terms of 

what the messaging is. And as you indicated, there is no surprise 

in al-Qaeda’s ideology. They have been very clear about it and very 

public about it from the very beginning. But in terms of how you 

message that and how that is broken down, I would say the State 

Department in fairly recent times has stood up a group called the 

Counterterrorism Communications Center whose job is, on a more 

tactical basis, to take a look at what is going on around the world 

and to start to get our side of the message out. 

But as you well understand, this is not just a U.S. effort. You 

and I cannot do very well in terms of countering a fatwa by Osama 

bin Laden. It has to come from Muslim clerics who have that capability in other parts of the world. I think that we are starting to 

see in many cases a resurgence—not a resurgence, but the emergence of an understanding of that and effects beginning, but this 

is going to be the generational part of the war, in my view. This 

is why this is going to be like the Cold War in really only two respects: One, it is going to last a long time; and, two, it has a strong 

ideological component. 

So I would say we recognize it, working to go in that direction, 

but this is a fairly new beast for us. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

Senator COLLINS [presiding]. First let me say it is wonderful to 

be Chairman again. 

[Laughter.] 

However briefly. Senator Sununu. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SUNUNU 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Director Mueller, there was an earlier question about the terrorist watch list, and I wanted to follow up on that a little bit to 

get a little bit more specific information about the recommendaVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 038842 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\38842.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
33 

tions of the IG and objectives for implementing their recommendations. 

They made 18 suggestions. You indicated that you are already 

underway in implementing some of those suggestions. Could you 

speak to the two or three that you think are the most significant 

and describe the way that you think they will improve the integrity 

and usefulness of the watch lists? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, the two that I have mentioned before, I 

think, areas where we need to spend more effort, and that is in the 

area of quality assurance of the information. We have information 

coming through from a number of agencies that results in an individual’s name being put on the watch list. What we have accomplished over the last several years, I guess, is put into place a quality assurance program that scrubs that information. It was pointed 

out by the Inspector General, and that was not working as well as 

it should. What we are looking at is adding personnel, improving 

training, and assuring that scrub is more effective and efficient 

than it has been in the past. 

The second area is in redress, giving those who are stopped and 

believe that is as a result of their name being improperly placed 

on this watch list, is to give those individuals an Office of Redress 

where you can go and determine—and ask the questions about 

whether or not your name is on it and get some redress. We established that office—— 

Senator SUNUNU. How often does that happen? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to get back to you, but I believe it 

is several hundred, the last figures I saw. 

Senator SUNUNU. Over a one-year period, several hundred times? 

Mr. MUELLER. I believe it was over a one-year period. And what 

the IG focused on, it is good that you set up an Office of Redress. 

What is happening is it takes too long to get that accomplished. 

And that is an area that, again, with resources, personnel, and 

training we hope to do better at. 

Senator SUNUNU. Is there any particular area of law enforcement 

or particular source of information where names are being provided 

to the watch list that really should not be? In other words, any specific areas where the quality of the information provided has been 

especially poor? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. I cannot pick any particular entity that contributes to the watch list and say this is more problematic. The 

problem comes in identifiers, and the problem comes if the name 

can be identifiers, dates of birth can be identifiers, and you can 

have with one individual a number of names; you can have a number of dates of birth associated with that particular name. And 

sorting out the information that may come in from overseas or may 

come in domestically and identifying it with a particular person 

with particular identifiers is a substantial challenge. 

I will tell you, I believe the latest figure I saw, approximately 90 

percent of the names on the watch list are individuals outside the 

United States. 

Senator SUNUNU. You mentioned increased staffing a couple of 

times. How many more people do you expect to add to this task? 

And what is your timeline for implementation of the majority of the 

18 recommendations? 

34 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to get back to you on that, sir. 

Senator SUNUNU. OK. Please do. 

Secretary Chertoff, Senator Collins and others on this Committee 

have been very concerned about the process of implementing the 

REAL ID program. As you well know, my personal preference 

would be to have pursued aggressively the negotiated rulemaking, 

the collaborative rulemaking that was underway back in 2004 and 

2005 prior to the passage of the REAL ID mandate. 

At the moment, however, the proposal is to publish the final rule 

in October, and October is also the deadline for States to file for 

an extension for implementation. That would not seem to give the 

States a fair amount of time to really assess the scope, the costs, 

and the changes that are necessary for compliance in implementation. How are you going to address that administrative train 

wreck? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, first of all, we did put a preliminary 

rule out, and we did indicate that we would be quite reasonable in 

terms of granting extensions. The current plan would be in theory 

to have next spring be the point at which the process of people 

signing up for REAL ID licenses would begin. But we have indicated that we anticipate extending that to the end of 2009 upon a 

request and indication that States want to move forward and do 

that. And I think, frankly, a lot of States have now begun the process and have been seriously engaged with us in talking about what 

their plans are, including many of the major States—States like 

California, Arizona, and I think Virginia. 

So I envision that this is not going to be a problem. I do think 

if a State does not want to participate, obviously, and they give us 

notice about that, that is not so much an implementation issue as 

it is a resolve issue. 

Senator SUNUNU. As I understand, one of the requirements of the 

preliminary rule is that the data fields that are collected through 

the ID process would have to be made available in a database to 

all other States. That naturally raises privacy concerns, and I 

would like you to describe the way in which at the Federal level 

you intend to protect the private information, which I think everyone would understand needs to be protected in a very aggressive 

way. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, first, let me make clear that we have 

tried to design this so as to maximize privacy. We specifically 

avoided creating a new Federal database that would accumulate information that is otherwise not there. And we have also worked 

very closely with the Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators. 

There is a model for doing this kind of sharing with respect to commercial driver’s licenses where there is cross-checking among 

States. So we envision using that model. It is basically a distributed model in which States would be able to have access to other 

States’ databases for purposes of checking, but we would not create 

a new database. 

I might add that one of the positive privacy benefits of the new 

rules is the requirement of background checks in DMVs. That is 

going to elevate the level of privacy. I can tell you historically as 

a prosecutor, I remember cases where people abused their access 

to existing systems for criminal reasons or because they saw an atVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 038842 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\38842.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
35 

tractive woman going down the highway and they wanted to get 

her phone number. So we are actually curing that problem by putting these background check requirements in place. 

Senator SUNUNU. I appreciate your candor, and I would underscore that the privacy issues are issues that need to be a very high 

priority. I believe that they are with the work that you are doing, 

but it is always worth underscoring that we need to continue to 

maintain that priority status. 

Second is dealing with the cost. This is a Federal mandate. You 

mentioned a new database is not being created, but there is a requirement that the information be shared, and that costs money 

and carries with it risks. So we have got to recognize the costs associated with the program and do everything possible to minimize 

those costs. There are some people that would like to use the fact 

that it is a mandate as an excuse to simply increase the size of the 

role or the responsibility at the Federal level. I think that the focus 

should be on minimizing the costs, and I hope you take that to 

heart. 

And the third is the concern of unintended consequences, and 

that is probably my biggest concern with a program like this: Not 

that it cannot be implemented in a reasonable way, but that it will 

provide a foundation for others to use the program at a later date 

in ways in which it just was not intended. And it is very difficult 

to sit here today and to look 2, 3, or 4 years, or 10 or 20 years 

down the road and try to come up with ways that the program 

might be misused or misapplied or expanded in an inappropriate 

way. But I think that is something we all need to be conscious of, 

most of all those who are working to structure the program today. 

Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think that is reasonable. If I might just 

for one moment. 

Senator COLLINS. Yes. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. The actual deadline for requesting extensions is going to be February 2008, so there will be some time to 

assimilate—— 

Senator SUNUNU. There will not be an October deadline to request an extension, but a February deadline? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Correct. 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Sununu, for 

bringing up that very important issue. That is a major issue in 

both Maine and New Hampshire, as the Secretary is well aware. 

I think the Department went a long ways by setting up the new 

process, but I also hope that the Department is following through 

on a more collaborative approach, bringing in State officials, privacy experts, and technological experts to make sure this is being 

done in a way that will minimize privacy concerns as well as the 

rather extraordinary costs. 

Is that process underway as well, sort of a negotiated rulemaking 

after the fact before you get to a final rule? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, we have done a lot of consultation in 

the run-up to the final rule that is going to be issued in the fall, 

36 

and that includes with State officials, the Motor Vehicle Association, and privacy people. 

I might add as well, this kind of complements the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, and in particular, our efforts to get States 

to come up with enhanced driver’s licenses that would satisfy that. 

I have myself in the last few months dealt with the governors of 

Arizona, California, New York, Michigan, Minnesota, and Vermont 

on all these issues, and States are increasingly signing up for enhanced driver’s licenses, which will actually operate along a system 

that is very similar and scalable to REAL ID. 

So what I think we are now beginning to see is not only do we 

have increased engagement with the States, but we have increased 

enthusiasm on behalf of most States for biting the bullet to get involved with this process. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Director McConnell, I want to bring up the issue of information 

sharing further with you. I think you have made real progress, but 

this was a major recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. And 

when the Commission did its report card, it gave the government’s 

efforts only a D as far as improving information sharing. Now, that 

obviously was before your time. 

Recently, several technology companies have told my staff that 

there are technological solutions to the barriers that prevent intelligence agencies from more easily sharing information, and there 

have been recent reports that the NSA, for example, is linking 

databases to encourage information sharing. 

But, unfortunately, we have also heard from the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment that the barrier is 

not really technological, that it is cultural; and that although a lot 

of progress has been made, that there still is a hesitation to share 

information particularly with State and local law enforcement. 

Do you still believe that there are significant cultural barriers to 

be overcome before we have the kind of seamless system that will 

encourage the sharing of information that could be absolutely vital 

to thwarting and uncovering a terrorist attack? 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Yes, ma’am, there are still significant cultural issues, and where we find ourselves is attempting to create 

a situation that would adapt to the current needs. By that we have 

a responsibility to protect sources and methods. We have a responsibility to protect those who have agreed to cooperate with us in 

spying on someone else, whose lives would be at risk if the information were compromised. 

So the way I try to describe it when we are having this dialogue 

and debate in the community is we are committed to information 

sharing, but we also have a responsibility to protect sources and 

methods. So we want to try to create a situation where there is 

tension in the system. We cannot be prescriptive to get the perfect 

answer for every situation, but if we can create a culture where the 

analytical community is not thinking about—I have information, 

you have to demonstrate a need to know it, but my attitude as an 

analyst is I have a responsibility to provide—that puts tension in 

the system to share. 

Now, for those who recruit spies or operate very sensitive systems or capabilities that, if compromised, we would have a loss of 

37 

life or lose a capability, there are people who want to not be as 

willing to share. So it is managing that cultural dynamic that is 

the big challenge. We recognize it, we are addressing it, and we are 

being very aggressive in attempting to transform this culture to get 

us to the right place. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN [presiding]. Thanks very much, Senator 

Collins. Do you want to finish the time or are you okay? 

Senator COLLINS. I thought that since Senator McCaskill had not 

questioned—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is good of you. The remaining Senators who have not asked questions are Senators Akaka, Carper, 

Pryor, and McCaskill. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, thank you all. I listened to all of your testimony at a different location, even though I was not physically here, and I do 

want to congratulate all of you for putting in the effort and the 

time that you do every day to try to do the very best job we can 

in terms of making this country safe. 

Unfortunately, the issue of whether or not we are safer or not 

has become colored with the brush of politics, as so often happens 

in our government, and that is unfortunate. And as I said the other 

day in a hearing, we cannot really say that we have not been attacked because of what we have done, because that is not true. Because if we were attacked tomorrow, the people who say that we 

were attacked because we failed, that would not be true either. 

The truth is somewhere in between. We are safer, but there are 

still gaping holes. There are still major problems, whether it is 

communication, whether it is technology, whether it is the struggle 

for ideas that we seem to be failing at around the world, whether 

it is our image in the moderate Muslim world and how that is undermining the ultimate struggle we have, which is the radicalism 

that we find in some parts of the Muslim world. 

I would like to focus for a minute on transportation security, and 

the reason I would like to focus there is that I used to say a long 

time ago when I was in the courtroom all the time that the courtroom that really mattered in terms of how we treated people was 

municipal court because that is where all the people came. Most 

people’s contact with our judicial system has to do with going to 

court on a speeding ticket or something like that. They never have 

contact with what I call the ‘‘rarified atmosphere’’ of those rooms 

with all the lawyers around a deposition table or the litigation arguments that go on in big Federal courthouses around the country. 

As people consider whether or not we are safer, really the face 

of our security many times is what they encounter when they travel. And that is where they are made to feel whether they are safer 

or not. And, Secretary Chertoff, I have been confused and I think 

the American people have been confused about what I would consider an inconsistent and a stutter start-stop in many different 

areas of airport screening and transportation security. And this 

seems to be a trivial example, but it is a great example of what 

I am talking about. 

38 

We all were taking liquids until one day no one could take liquids anymore. Didn’t we know liquids were dangerous before that 

date? And if we didn’t, why didn’t we? And why did it appear that 

it was a knee-jerk reaction instead of something that was an overarching, consistent policy that had been well thought out? 

Buried in that policy, after we decided liquids were dangerous, 

seems to be some kind of nonsensical thing that happened. And 

now, I was on a flight just yesterday where mothers were comparing notes: 

‘‘Well, I got my apple juice through. Did you get your apple juice 

through?’’ 

‘‘I got my formula through that was already mixed. Did you have 

to mix yours?’’ 

And then the one that bugs women across America, particularly 

those of us who travel a lot, the mascara. I know it seems small, 

but for most people in America, they do not understand why mascara is a problem. It does not appear to be consistent or have any 

kind of rhyme or reason to it, and the reason I think that is important is because it is the face. It is the face that the traveling public 

sees. In fact, it is the face most Americans see. 

So I would appreciate a little bit of input on that, and then I 

would like to ask some specific questions about advanced baggage 

screening and airlines’ ability to pre-screen manifests. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think you have basically asked two questions: Why did we suddenly put in place a ban on liquids, which 

we then modified slightly? And then some particular elements of 

the ban. 

We knew that liquids were a vulnerability prior to the attack in 

London, or the attempted attack in London. We also were working 

hard to come up with a technology that would separate out dangerous liquids from non-dangerous liquids, and we had not found 

and have not yet found a technology that will do that in real time, 

meaning we can do it if you take a bottle and put it in a device, 

but if you multiply that by the millions of people who travel every 

day, it would be impossible. 

What I think the London plot brought home to us was that the 

enemy had not only focused on liquids but had come further along 

in coming up with ways to defeat the measures we were using of 

a non-technological basis to detect potential problems, and that was 

in particular a focus on detonators as opposed to liquids themselves. And some of the measures we were taking to inspect liquids, without getting into too much detail here, were clearly—the 

enemy had figured out a way to potentially defeat it. 

So having recognized where the enemy was, we determined that 

at that point the risk balance had changed. Our initial response 

was, of course, to make this happen very quickly. It had to be done 

in about 6 hours in a very—in an overnight session which I participated in. And then ultimately, after some careful study, again balancing the risk, we determined that a 3-ounce rule where you put 

3-ounce containers in a 1-quart clear plastic bag was the right mix. 

It made it impractical to smuggle in explosives, but would allow 

people to bring in things that they like to have on airplanes. We 

did coordinate this, by the way, with the Europeans, and I think 

this will remain in place until such time as we are confident 

39 

enough operationally that we have detection equipment that we 

can loosen up. 

Now, I can tell you, for example—let me say two things. The general rule is if it pours or smears, it is a liquid, and it has to go 

in that plastic bag. That is the simplest way I can put it. Sure, you 

can always come up with an example of something that is at the 

margin, but we have to come up with a rule that can be applied 

consistently across the board. 

Do people sometimes succeed in smuggling things past the 

screeners? Sure they do. People sometimes smuggle drugs into the 

country. No system works 100 percent. But even if we are working 

90 percent, that is a huge barrier to the enemy which is planning 

to try to smuggle something on an airplane. 

So I think we have the balance struck right there. We obviously 

would love to get the technology in place, but I am not going to do 

it until I am confident it meets operational requirements. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Can you briefly, since I am just out of time, 

talk about why we are now estimating that it is going to be 2024 

before we get advanced baggage screening in place across this 

country? And what about the airlines being able to effectively 

screen their manifests with the sharing of information? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, the first thing is that we obviously do 

screen all the baggage currently now that goes in the hold of the 

airplane. We do it in a variety of different ways. Some of it is in 

line; some of it is not in line. 

One of the challenges we have that is probably a little bit beyond 

the scope of the hearing is recognizing that the technology is 

changing and we need to find a method of financing and acquiring 

the technology that does not require billions of dollars in investments in equipment that becomes obsolete in 3 or 4 years. It is a 

little bit like having to keep buying your PC over and over again. 

It gets irritating after a while. 

On the issue of screening the manifests, under Secure Flight, assuming Congress funds the request that we have made in the current budget, by the end of next year we should be doing all the 

manifest screening ourselves as you take it in, which will eliminate 

one of the real irritants, which is that when we take people off the 

watch list, the airline does not necessarily do it. So assuming we 

get the money from Congress, we should get that done by the end 

of next year. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator McCaskill. 

I have been impressed, as others have this morning, by the reports that the four of you have given us about the progress we have 

made in closing some of the operational gaps on our side and in 

adjusting to meet an ever-changing enemy, and part of that is obviously prevention. 

There is another side to this prevention of acts of terrorism carried out by Islamist extremists, and that is what has come to be 

called the battle of ideas, the battle for the hearts and minds of the 

Muslim world. 

I know there are some programs in the State Department that 

are directed toward entering that battle globally, but what about 

40 

here at home? I do not know that any one of you is expected to play 

that role. I must say I have been impressed, Director Mueller, in 

our own series of hearings on the threat of Islamist radicalization 

here in the United States that the FBI has done some very significant outreach to the American Muslim community. 

But let me start at this end of the table and work back to Secretary Chertoff. Are we effectively fighting the battle of—maybe I 

should go back one step further. You alluded to this in your opening statement. Do we have a problem of Islamist radicalization 

here at home? And if we do, what are we doing as the government 

working with the Muslim community to try to engage on the level 

of ideas and ideology? Because this is a war, but it is ultimately 

a war against and with an ideology that is inimical to our own values of freedom, tolerance, and diversity. 

Mr. MUELLER. To the question of whether we do have a problem, 

I would say we do. It would be irresponsible to say that we do not. 

And if you look at some of the groups that we have investigated 

over the last couple of years and ultimately disrupted and prosecuted, you have to say yes, we do have a problem, particularly 

with the ubiquity of the Internet now and the ability for one to access anyone around the world who spews this radical ideology. 

In terms of programs, as I have alluded to and I think you have 

held a hearing on—since September 11, 2001, we have had any 

number of ways that we undertake outreach to the Muslim American community, Arab American community, and Sikh American 

community. And that has been effective in the sense of working 

with these communities to understand the FBI, but also working 

with communities to develop ways, generally in local jurisdictions, 

to address the radicalization issue. 

When I meet with Muslim leaders, the one point that we try to 

make is that the worst thing that could happen to the Muslim community here in the United States is another attack such as September 11, 2001. And so a great deal of activity that has to be undertaken to address this has to be done by the Muslim community 

itself and a recognition by the Muslim community, 99.9 percent is 

as patriotic and American as anybody else in this room or elsewhere, but to identify those individuals who may be subjected to 

that type of tutoring and the like, and to address it themselves or 

alert us that this may cause a problem. And that is within our particular bailiwick. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you this, and then I will move 

on to anyone else on the panel who wants to answer. Do you take 

it to be in any sense the responsibility of the FBI to engage in this 

battle of ideas here at home within the Muslim American community? 

Mr. MUELLER. Put that way, I would say no, that it would not 

be our responsibility for any religion to engage in the war of ideas. 

I do think it is our responsibility to explain that once one goes over 

the line and it becomes not a war of ideas but a criminal offense, 

this is what you can expect, and to elicit the support of those in 

whatever religious community to assist us in assuring that those 

who cross that line are appropriately investigated and convicted. 

41 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. Admiral Redd or Admiral 

McConnell, do you want to add anything on this subject, which is 

the battle of ideas? 

Admiral REDD. I would just make the point, which I think we 

had another discussion, that if you understand that this is obviously a long-term issue which is going to be with us for some time, 

and the fact that strategic planning, the strategic operational planning is not very glamorous, nonetheless what we have done as a 

government is something which is, I think, very foundational, and 

gone through and laid out the war on terror, and one of the four 

pillars in that war actually is countering violent Islamic extremism, the war on ideas. It goes through, lists a number of tasks, 

assigns those tasks to different Cabinet officers—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Who is doing them domestically? 

Admiral REDD. The domestic part is probably the hardest part, 

and as you have just noted, we do not have a home office, per se, 

as the Brits do. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Admiral REDD. Primarily it is DHS and the FBI in their various 

roles. But overseas and obviously the other problem is how do you 

split this apart because something that is on the Internet does not 

stop at the water line, obviously. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Correct. 

Admiral REDD. So as you know, the State Department in recent 

days or recent months has stood up a group to get our counter-messaging out. But, again, the key to this thing is, one, it is going to 

be a very long battle; two, it is not just an American issue. It has 

to have the support of governments and of Muslim clerics around 

the world. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Admiral McConnell, Secretary Chertoff, 

my time is running out, but I want to give you each a chance briefly to respond. 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Senator, I think it is an excellent question 

and a very critical question, and the community I represent is primarily limited to foreign. If it doesn’t have a foreign nexus, foreign 

focus—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Even if there is a domestic situation, the 

intelligence community would only be engaged if the domestic situation was in contact with, influenced by someone in a foreign dimension. So our community is focused on foreign. 

We contribute analytically to understanding. We would make 

that information available to policymakers who may be able to use 

it. But we are for the most part limited to foreign. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Secretary Chertoff. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I do not want to repeat what others have 

said. Let me be specific about what we do. 

We have what we call an Incident Management Team, which is 

chaired by the head of our Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Office. 

When there is an event in the world at large or domestically that 

we think will have an impact on the Islamic community because 

there is a terrorist element to it, we in advance, to the extent we 

can, of it becoming public, convene a group of community leaders, 

give them a heads-up, work with them to try to make sure that the 

42 

community is reassured that this is not going to become a general 

problem for the community at large. 

In addition, we do quite a bit of aggressive outreach. I do it personally. I meet with community leaders. We had a group of, I 

guess, people in their early 20s that we convened for a conference 

that I had an opportunity to deal with, as well as going around and 

traveling around the country. 

I will say I have kind of a bottom-line thing I say to the community. It is a battle of ideas, and in the end, when you are trying 

to counteract radicalization that is directed at people within the 

Muslim community, the people who are best situated to counteract 

that is the community itself. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. They do not want to hear the government 

argue theology. What they want to hear are community imams and 

community leaders arguing theology. And so one of our big pushes 

is to get the community to step up and get more involved in the 

process of counter-radicalization. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I could not agree more. When somebody 

like bin Laden puts out a tape, or Zawahiri, obviously it is one 

thing for somebody from the U.S. Government to respond, but the 

really credible response would come from some leadership within 

the Muslim community. I thank you for your answer. 

Senator Stevens, I know you are in the middle of another meeting, but I would be happy to call on you now. 

OPENING STATEMENT FOR SENATOR STEVENS 

Senator STEVENS. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 

am, and I wanted to come to ask the Director one specific question, 

and that deals with the attempts to give some type of immunity to 

those providers of telecommunications to respond to the government’s requests for information. What is the status of that, Mr. Director? And how important is it for us to finish that and make a 

decision on that? 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Senator, thanks for the question. It is absolutely essential, and the status currently is we have a temporary 

reprieve that is prospective, meaning going forward. So in the law 

that was passed and signed by the President on August 5, there 

is liability protection for those in the private sector who assist us 

going forward. We do not, however, have liability protection for the 

carriers or the private sector that assisted us in the past, and that 

is the key element we have to address in the coming months. 

Senator STEVENS. Have you lost any of the cooperation you had 

in the past because of that hiatus? 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Not at this moment, but we are on a path 

to lose all that cooperation. That was clear as we were negotiating 

over the summer. 

Senator STEVENS. What is the deadline? We are marking up the 

defense bill this week, I believe, and other bills that have looked 

at this issue before. 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. If we could get retroactive liability protection in the current time frame, it would put us in a very 

good position going forward. That is the key issue. 

43 

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Stevens. 

Now, still on a first round for a couple of our colleagues, Senator 

Akaka, you would be next, followed by Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Even at 

this time I want to add my welcome to our witnesses here, and I 

would like to ask Secretary Chertoff about the DHS proposal to create a National Applications Office. 

Let me preface my remarks by saying that I recognize the value 

of using imagery to improve our ability to prepare for and respond 

to disasters. It was at my initiative that the Office of Geospatial 

Affairs was created in the Department. Leaving a blueprint of critical facilities is important to our first responder community. However, at this point in time, I am concerned about the privacy impact 

of the new proposal to expand the Department’s surveillance in the 

United States. I am also disturbed by the Administration’s failure 

to consult with relevant committees of Congress, including this one. 

After press reports revealed this program several weeks ago, my 

Committee staff asked for a briefing on the issue, but to date, the 

Department has failed to respond to this request. This raises further suspicions concerning the Department’s intent. It is not clear 

what this new office will do. 

Do national applications mean national technical means? As you 

know, national technical means include a much broader range of 

capabilities than just satellite imagery. Is this the case, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I am glad, Senator, for the opportunity to 

clarify something which has probably become a little bit more obscure than it needed to be. 

First of all, I apologize if there has been a delay in briefing you. 

I know well in advance of this rolling out, a number of committees 

were briefed. We probably did not brief all that we should have 

briefed, but we did brief the intelligence committees, the appropriating committees, and I want to make sure we complete that 

process. 

This is really less of a big deal than it has been made to appear. 

There has always been something called the Civil Applications 

Committee, which is basically a way in which when customers in 

the civil domain want to use our satellites to get imagery, they operated through this committee to task the satellite to do the work. 

And as you pointed out, the vast majority of that was natural disasters, things of that sort. 

I think the recommendation by outside consultants with some experience with the imagery a couple of years ago was that we were 

not being systematic and disciplined in the way we deployed these 

assets, and so the determination was made to take the cost of the 

Civil Applications Committee and have DHS become the executive 

agent, basically essentially Executive Secretariat of what used to 

be the Civil Applications Committee but what is now going to be 

renamed the National Applications Office. It is chaired jointly by 

Director McConnell and myself, and it will involve the participation 

44 

of all the stakeholders. And what it is designed to do is create a 

disciplined way for prioritizing how these imagery assets are used 

when they are requested by a civil agency. 

Here is the critical point from a privacy standpoint. None of this 

changes any of the authorities or restrictions that are applied to 

the use of these means one iota. There is no suggestion here that 

this Applications Office is going to make it—is going to lift any restrictions or create any exceptions or circumvent any of the existing 

rules that currently govern the use of these means in various kinds 

of contexts. 

Lawyers have been involved in designing this from the very beginning. Lawyers will be involved in the process of dealing with 

any request to use these means. And the bottom line is the authorities and restrictions that are currently in place will remain in place 

in every respect moving forward. 

Senator AKAKA. Secretary Chertoff, the domestic use of national 

technical means raises very serious privacy and civil liberty issues. 

As you know, privacy and security safeguards must be built into 

any program at the beginning. While I understand that DHS’ Chief 

Privacy Officer has issued a Privacy Impact Assessment, which is 

now being revised, I am curious as to whether the DHS Privacy 

Advisory Committee has reviewed and commented on the program. 

If so, what were its views? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, as I said, the Privacy Officer and the 

DNI’s Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer were involved as of last 

fall in designing this program. Now, obviously the program is classified so the ability to share the details of it on the outside is a little bit restricted. But, again, let me try to make clear that the vast 

majority of uses one can envision here involve uses that have been 

of long standing. They involved, for example, imagery of things 

that people are doing out in the open in places that are visible to 

the naked eye or to an airliner flying overhead. And, in fact, although I think we are better than Google Earth, I do not think it 

is terribly different than Google Earth. 

So I do not think any of these raise novel privacy issues. What 

we have tried to do, though, is build a process and to make sure 

that if we should wind up with an unusual application, we do not 

step over the line. And the process is built to have lawyers reviewing this at every stage of the process, much the same way as any 

other methodology or technique we might use for purposes of homeland security or law enforcement. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your responses. Mr. Chairman, 

thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Akaka. Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thanks very much. 

Gentlemen, thank you for joining us today and for your stewardship, for your service for our country, some for many years. 

Mr. Mueller, you talked a little bit about the no-fly list, and I 

think you said—and I think it is a quote almost—that we scrubbed 

the no-fly list and cut it in half. And to that I can only say good 

for you. We have any number of people in my State who have the 

45 

misfortune of being given the wrong name by their parents, and 

they have ended up on the no-fly list and have gone through all 

kinds of trouble and turmoil, which I mentioned to at least one of 

you before. And every now and then I hear from them now, and 

they send not bouquets but thank-you notes, and it is a lot better 

than what we had before. 

I realize how important it is to have no-fly lists and to make sure 

that they are accurate, but I also appreciate the fact that the work 

has been done to scrub it and clean it up. 

The second thing I want to say—I think it was Admiral Redd, 

I believe it was during your comments, your testimony, not in response to a question. One of the things you said is our intelligence 

is better. Almost a verbatim quote: ‘‘Our intelligence is better.’’ And 

I want you to go back and talk to us about how is it better as it 

relates to the ability to get better human intelligence. What are we 

doing better in that regard, both inside this country and out? 

Admiral REDD. Well, I think it is hard to talk very far into that, 

obviously, for all the reasons you understand. I think if you saw 

the Washington Post yesterday, you saw that there were an awful 

lot of folks who had been taken out of circulation, or taken off the 

battlefield. I think that is one of a number of instances which there 

was basically demonstration of the fact that our intelligence has 

gotten better. It is not only human intelligence, it is also signals 

intelligence and other stuff. But it is very difficult to go into many 

details. And as I mentioned in another comment, we have to be 

very careful about that because some of those sources are very 

fragile. 

So I guess I would have to say look at the results. The terrorists 

are—I also said they are a very difficult target. You are talking 

about individuals. All the things we have been talking about here, 

how do you stop a single individual from coming across, and you 

do it by going after every element of the terrorist life cycle, starting 

with recruitment but through travel, communications, training, all 

the things that go on. 

In open session—it is very hard to go much deeper than that, sir. 

Senator CARPER. I understand. As an old air intelligence officer 

in the Navy, I can appreciate what you are saying. Let me follow 

it up, though, with a related question. I think since September 11, 

2001, we have heard on any number of occasions that a shortage 

of folks with key language skills has been a problem. I just want 

to ask what, if any, progress has been made in recruiting and retraining key intelligence and other personnel with some knowledge 

of Arabic or other languages that are useful in counterterrorism. 

Admiral REDD. I want to defer that one, if I could, to Director 

McConnell, since that is more along his line in terms of the training of the community. I will just say in general that not only in 

language but in analytic capability, writ large, obviously we have 

been growing a lot of folks. And as you will recall from your earlier 

days, if you want a petty officer with 10 years’ experience, it takes 

10 years. We have been trying to stuff 10 years into 4 or 5 years. 

But in the analytic community, we have had to bring an awful lot 

of folks on line. 

I will let Admiral McConnell talk about the language—— 

46 

Senator CARPER. Admiral McConnell, are you willing to answer 

that question? 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Yes, sir, I am. 

Senator CARPER. Before you do, let me just add, maybe give you 

a second half to the question. Do you know of anything that we are 

doing to encourage more students to take up some of these languages early on? 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Let me combine your questions, sir. 

Senator CARPER. That would be great. 

Admiral MCCONNELL. You asked specifically about Human Intelligence (HUMINT). We are on a path to double our HUMINT capability, so from September 11, 2001 until now, doubling the number 

of case officers and capability in the field. 

The second thing I would comment is focus—— 

Senator CARPER. Over what period of time? Any idea? 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Since September 11, 2001, until in the current time frame, it will double. And as Admiral Redd mentioned, 

just adding a body is one thing, but adding a trained body who 

speaks a language is another thing. So with the language capability, significantly improved, not enough yet. One of the things 

that we have decided to do or that we are attempting to do is to 

recruit more first-generation Americans. They have never been specifically ruled out by either law or policy, but by practice and custom. So we are trying to change the cultural approach inside the 

community. So if we have a first-generation American who speaks 

a language, understands the culture of the area of concern, that we 

would, in fact, bring them into the community and make them a 

part of it. So there are a number of initiatives to—— 

Senator CARPER. Any luck on that? 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Yes. We have had significant luck, and we 

have had a lot of focus on training in languages, like Urdu, Farsi, 

and Arabic and so on. So much better than we were. We still have 

some distance to go, but that is our objective, to keep us focused 

on this particular problem because it is the most significant threat 

we face. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thanks. Thanks for that report. 

At a hearing last week, Comptroller General David Walker—I 

call him ‘‘General Walker’’—of GAO reported that maritime security is one of the areas where the Department of Homeland Security has had some of its best successes in recent years, and this is 

probably more for you, Secretary Chertoff. Witnesses from the GAO 

and the Department both testified that some of the reasons for the 

success are the fact that Congress did get involved and that the 

Department was able to work with us to devote some significant 

time and resources to the effort. I would ask are there other areas 

where we can see some similar progress or the potential for 

progress where that kind of attention on our part, as well as yours, 

can leave the kind of success that we have enjoyed with maritime 

security, or maybe chemical security, for example. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, there is, of course, as you know, Senator, one gap in the chemical security legislation that we had. Now, 

we are currently on the verge of issuing Appendix A, which is going 

to be very specific to people in the chemical sector about what is 

required from them in terms of self-evaluation, what are considered 

47 

to be the high-risk chemicals and the quantities at which they have 

to begin to submit themselves to regulation. 

Wastewater treatment plants and water treatment plants were 

exempted from this, so that is an area where we are currently internally looking at the question of what are our authorities, if we 

need to use authorities. I have certainly argued to people in that 

sector that they need to be mindful of the fact that chlorine is a 

very dangerous chemical and it can be used in a variety of nefarious ways. And, therefore, securing chlorine against theft is something that they have to make their business. 

Another area where we are, again, certainly looking at regulatory 

action, if not congressional action, is, as I said earlier, general aviation, in particular, private jets coming from Europe and Asia, 

where we want to make sure we have the ability to screen for 

weapons of mass destruction in the way we are doing with containers. And, finally, small boats is the area we are doing some 

work in now. 

Again, I believe we have ample authorities through the Coast 

Guard, but I also want to make sure Congress works with us, first 

to make sure we are adequately funded to do what we need to do; 

and, second, to make sure we do not have backsliding. Sometimes 

the industry pushes back when we try to put security measures in 

place, and it is important to make sure that if we do put measures 

in place with respect to small boats we do not wind up getting 

pushed backwards. 

Senator CARPER. Okay. 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Could I follow on, if I may? 

Senator CARPER. Please, yes. 

Admiral MCCONNELL. You asked me things you could focus on. 

We are about to start a debate this month on a very important 

piece. If you think about it at a summary level, a major piece in 

the intelligence community, what do we do? We take pictures. We 

have human-to-human interaction—HUMINT, you mentioned earlier. Or we listen to other people’s communications. That other people’s communications is called ‘‘signals intelligence.’’ We are going 

to debate that this month about whether to change or modify the 

law that was passed in August. It is very important that we retain 

that capability because it is a significant portion of what we are 

able to do with regard to foreign threats to the country. 

Senator CARPER. I would just say in closing that we had a tough 

vote on the night of August 3, and some of us on our side voted 

with the majority on the other side. And I have personally taken— 

I would suggest to some of you I have taken a fair amount of flack 

from folks who are concerned about civil liberties, potential abuses 

to civil liberties. And I am encouraged to hear that the vote that 

we took was one that may have led to a better outcome in Germany 

than would otherwise have been the case. 

I would just urge us, I would urge my leadership and I would 

certainly urge you in the Administration to work with us to find— 

let’s not wait until January or the end of the year. Work with us 

now in the weeks ahead to find the right common ground so that 

we could go after the bad guys, do the right job there, protect civil 

liberties. There is a way to do both. 

Admiral MCCONNELL. There is a way to do both. 

48 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Carper. For my part, 

may I say that any flack you receive on that issue is wholly 

undeserved. I really believe it. I think this is intercepting communications between those who are not in the United States, and if 

it hits an American, Admiral McConnell and his folks go to court. 

I just think it self-evidently covers—that is what we need to do to 

protect the American people and also protect their liberties. 

You have been very encouraging this morning, the four of you. 

I want to give you a small piece of encouragement. We promised 

that we would not keep you beyond 12:30, and we will not. So there 

will be a few other questioners, but we want you to be able to get 

back to your assigned responsibilities. 

Senator Collins and I have already had our time on the second 

round, so in order of original appearance, we go now to Senator 

Coleman and Senator Voinovich. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me talk about 

the capacity to bring nuclear material into this country. 

Secretary Chertoff, you talked about the ability to screen perhaps 

100 percent of the cargo coming into this country and the efforts 

you are doing on cargo before it comes into this country, which is 

really ultimately where we need to be. I mean, God forbid a device 

went off in the port of Long Beach or New York, something like 

that. My question, though, has to do with the ability to detect 

shielded special nuclear material in lead pipes. I asked the question before about the resources that you need to do what has to be 

done. There are some difficulties even with the systems we have 

with certain types of nuclear material. Can you talk a little bit 

about where we are at in being able to truly screen that kind of 

material? Are there research issues, financing? I just want to know 

what we are doing to make sure that you have the tools that you 

need to prevent nuclear material from getting into this country. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. The current operational technology, you are 

right—and I want to be careful how I say this—is much more challenged when it deals with heavily shielded material. It depends on 

what the nuclear material is. The greater the emitter, the harder 

it is to shield. But with respect to certain kinds of materials that 

can be used in a nuclear bomb, it is possible to shield it. 

Currently, therefore, the way we deal with shielding is we really 

want to have a combined system where we both passively test for 

emissions, but we also actively test to see if there is dense material 

in the container which could be suggestive of shielding. And the 

constraint we face, which we are tapping overseas by building an 

integrated system, is how do you make sure you can pass containers through passive and active at the same time. 

While we are building out a system to use both of those techniques, which is partly an issue of money, but it is also partly an 

issue of having foreign ports agree to do this and having them have 

a geographical footprint that allows us to do this, we are working 

on technology, which I cannot say is imminent, that would allow 

us to detect even rather heavily shielded material. But that is a bit 

of a ways off. 

I would also say I would not underestimate the importance of intelligence in helping us focus and target on those containers where 

49 

there might be a higher risk, where we might actually want to 

open the container or at least pull it out and do a much more active 

interrogation. 

Senator COLEMAN. I would hope when we talk about intelligence 

that it is one thing to rely upon detectors, which may or may not 

do what they need to do; it is another thing to be able to lock down 

nuclear material wherever it is to make sure that it is not in the 

hands of the bad guys. If I may say, one of our challenges with 

Iran, trying to figure out where they are at. It is one thing if they 

are depending upon their own abilities to generate material that 

can be used for atomic weapons. It is another thing if there is material out there on the market that they can have access to. 

Admiral McConnell, in terms of that issue, of using intelligence 

to ensure that there is not nuclear material being bought or sold 

on the black market, where are we at with that? 

Admiral MCCONNELL. I am very focused on that because we have 

information that al-Qaeda, as an example, has stated an intention 

to try to acquire nuclear material. So it is an area of intense focus. 

I wish I could be more optimistic to tell you that we have great 

confidence that we could always detect it. There are always potential work-arounds, but an area of focus, we have some sensors that 

would aid us in that capability, but it takes the entire panoply of 

intel resources to be able to do this. You have to penetrate targets. 

You have to have human agents. You have to be able to find places 

on a map, take the pictures, and also do the signals intelligence 

part. But it is an area of focus. 

Senator COLEMAN. Let me just shift gears. It has been interesting with this panel here. The latest Osama bin Laden tape, first, 

is that his beard? It is a different-looking guy. Can you give me an 

assessment of what that tape is all about? Is there a purpose to it? 

Do we expect—is it a signal? I am not sure what we can talk about 

here, but I would like to get a better understanding of what we 

know after viewing that tape. 

Admiral MCCONNELL. So far we do not think there has been a 

signal. He has done this periodically, as has Zawahiri, and there 

has not been a correlation necessarily between one of these tapes 

or a public statement and a particular event. 

The big question in the community this morning is: Is that beard 

real? Because, as you know, just a few years ago, the last time he 

appeared, it was very different. So we do not know if it is dyed and 

trimmed or real, but that is one of the things we are looking at. 

But no specific message. It does reflect intent, and the big change 

for me as an intelligence analyst in the community, back in the 

Cold War it was very easy to do capability and always difficult to 

determine intent. In this situation, it is very difficult to capture the 

capability, a single human being in a given place, nuclear material, 

or whatever. So capability is the challenge, but intent is clear. 

Senator COLEMAN. Again, my time is very short. Just following 

up on that, much of the discussion was American politics. Do we 

have a sense of someone who we assume is in a cave somewhere, 

do we have any sense of his ability to be tracking what happens 

in daily American politics? 

50 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Sir, the Internet has revolutionized that 

process, so we have good evidence that the al-Qaeda leadership 

reads the press, particularly the editorials, and—— 

Senator COLEMAN. And some of the things that are said in Congress. 

Admiral MCCONNELL. And the Congress, no doubt. Every part of 

the debate, it is all watched very closely. And remember, there is 

an American in that group in Pakistan who is an adviser, I am 

sure. But there is a very close focus on this Nation because we are 

so open in what we do and what we say and where it might take 

someone. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Coleman. Senator 

Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Director McConnell, Senator Akaka and I 

have held hearings on the security clearance process as part of our 

responsibility for the Oversight of Government Management Subcommittee. The security clearance system has been on GAO’s highrisk list for quite some time. In the last hearing we had, Clay 

Johnson indicated that you were going to undertake a new system 

that would get the job done as part of your 100-day plan. Currently, I understand there is a wait time of 203 days for individuals 

awaiting clearances. 

What is the status of the new system? Have you discussed it at 

all with Comptroller General Walker, who will be determining 

whether or not our security clearance system should be removed 

from the high-risk list? What is your strategic plan? Are there 

metrics that will be used to judge whether or not the new system 

in place is effective? 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Sir, first of all, it would be fair to say that 

there is a debate. Some would argue that we need to go faster and 

do better with the current system. General Jim Clapper and I, in 

DOD, representing all the intelligence capability in the Department 

of Defense, and me on the DNI side, we have agreed to run a pilot, 

and our fundamental premise is we want to re-engineer the process. You mentioned 203 days. General Clapper and I believe we 

should be able to do that process in 30 days or less. 

Why do we believe that? We can look at the commercial models 

where they clear people very quickly, people that handle billions of 

dollars of transactions. What is the difference? If you can automate 

the process and clear people quickly, and then change the way we 

do business, that we monitor the life cycle of the employee, we can 

get to faster in the front and better protection in the back. 

I would submit, of the spies we know about, all but one or two 

of them did it for money. And of the spies that we know about, almost every one of them did not know they were a spy when they 

came in on the front. So the key is life-cycle monitoring. So we are 

trying to run the pilot to make it go much faster and hopefully be 

much more effective. We will know more about the end of this pilot 

in some months. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Will we know about it before this Administration leaves office? 

51 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. If we are going to have any impact at all on the system, we have to do it before this Administration—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. How soon? 

Admiral MCCONNELL. It is months, sir. It took us a period of 

time to agree to it. This was one of the issues, when I came back 

in the government, that was very important to me as having been 

on the outside struggling with it. So I made it a priority. We got 

the agreement from the Defense Department. We worked with Clay 

Johnson. We are running the pilot, and in some matter of months, 

we will be able to tell you if it is working or not. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I would suggest also that your people spend 

some time with the Government Accountability Office because during this Subcommittee’s hearing last week, Mr. Schneider from 

DHS and Comptroller General David Walker spent about 20 percent of their time quibbling over the definition of what the metrics 

were to determine whether or not DHS had done what it was supposed to do. 

Is there anyone that is really working on this whole issue of winning the hearts and minds of Muslims here in the United States 

and around the world? This is not a new issue. And, quite frankly, 

I am not confident that anybody has really sat down to figure out 

a major effort in this area to win the hearts and minds of people 

not only here in the United States but around the world. Could you 

comment on that? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Yes, let me venture into this. Although I do 

not think there is a single person, we do have a committee, and I 

think it is actually chaired by the head of our Civil Rights and 

Civil Liberties Office, that looks at that issue in the United States. 

I think the Bureau and the Department of Justice are represented 

on it. We do not deal with the overseas element. We deal with the 

domestic element of it. And a lot of it is outreach, and it is from 

the top level down to the regional and local offices to get people 

from the government out into the community trying to recruit individuals to come into government service. I do not mean as informants. I mean to occupy positions in government service so that the 

community feels they are part of the process of homeland security 

and law enforcement. Part of it is giving notice to community members when something is happening in the world so they can reassure the community. And some of it is just a lot of outreach to get 

the community engaged in the process of counter-radicalization. 

This is all supported by research that we do. We do a lot of research through our Intelligence and Analysis Directorate looking at 

studies. Some of them are academic studies; some of them are studies we get from overseas as to what causes radicalization. I think 

the FBI does a lot of that as well, and they tend to be maybe a 

little more focused on individual cases. We tend to be maybe a little 

bit more general. 

So we do have a very focused strategy on this issue. I should 

say—and I have to be a little careful here because the First 

Amendment does limit us to some extent in getting into the area 

of what I would call too upfront efforts to persuade or convince. I 

think we generally feel, at least in our Department, that we are 

52 

best served by getting the community itself to get out there 

and—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. What would give me comfort is to see how 

these efforts are linked. I recently met with Imam Abdul Rauf, who 

has organized a forum of Muslim religious scholars to work on connecting democracy and the U.S. Constitution to the foundations of 

Islam to show that they are compatible. 

I think that much greater effort has got to be made in this area. 

We are on the defense, and we are trying to secure the country. 

But I think that unless we recognize the challenge that we have 

got on this other side, our success will be limited. We need to have 

an offense here, and I am not sure we have one. 

Admiral REDD. Senator, if I could comment on that. As I mentioned earlier, we have built this thing called the National Implementation Plan, which is the overall blueprint. One of the four pillars of that is exactly that—countering violent Islamic extremism. 

And it goes through and lays out a number of tasks, assigns those 

tasks to different Cabinet officers. You have heard about the domestic part of it, and you are correct, the State Department has a 

lead for the overseas piece of it. And we are starting up—Karen 

Hughes has an operation, as you know, the Counterterrorism Communications Center, which is designed to be on a very tactical basis 

to respond to things that happen around the world. 

But clearly this is tough. This is new for us. Some people try to 

compare it to the public diplomacy thing we did during the Cold 

War. But even that is significantly different because we were basically talking to Western or similar cultures in those days. 

But it is not just an American issue, obviously. As you mentioned, it is going to take people who have credibility in the area, 

whether it is here in the United States or overseas. I would say 

that a lot of foreign governments have obviously woken up to this 

and are becoming more involved. But it is going to be a long—it 

is going to be a generation—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. I have taken enough time, but all I can tell 

you is from my perspective how well we do in that regard will have 

a major impact on how long this war against Islamic extremist religious fanatics goes on. I really bring to all of your attention that 

something should be done to pull everybody together and figure out 

a master plan on how this thing is going to work. 

Admiral REDD. I could not agree with you more, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Voinovich. 

Senator Akaka, we will have a last round, and then Senator Collins did not use all her time, so I am going to have her ask one 

last question. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral McConnell, more than a year ago, we learned that the 

CIA had closed the bin Laden issue station, a unit that had focused 

exclusively on finding Osama bin Laden and his top lieutenants. At 

that time the CIA said that it did so partly because al-Qaeda had 

changed form, evolving from a hierarchical organization with bin 

Laden at the helm to one characterized by a collection of splinter 

cells. However, both were testimony that the July 2007 NIE stated 

that bin Laden and his deputy have been able to regenerate alQaeda and key elements of its homeland attack capability. 

53 

Given this assessment, do you believe that a unit dedicated to 

finding, capturing, or killing Osama bin Laden and his top officials 

should be re-established? 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Sir, it is established. I would say it is 

probably a matter of semantics, but we have such a unit. Osama 

bin Laden and Zawahiri are our No. 1 and No. 2 priority, very 

strong and significant focus. And so we are pursuing it with significant resources. 

Senator AKAKA. Admiral, if bin Laden has reconstituted the alQaeda organization so that it looks similar to its original pre-September 11, 2001 form, then do you believe that finding him should 

be the top priority? 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Top priority; yes, sir. And I would add another dimension. You mentioned splinter groups a moment ago. I 

would describe it a little differently. There are extremists in virtually any country. What al-Qaeda has been successful in doing is 

linking them. So now if you start across Northern Africa, in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, all the way across, there are 

groups now that affiliate with and some even change their names 

to be al-Qaeda. So it almost takes on the connotation of a franchise. 

So I think the reasoning maybe a year ago was splintering, but 

the fact that they have sanctuary in that tribal area between Afghanistan and Pakistan has allowed them to adapt and morph. 

With the sanctuary and committed leadership, they have rebuilt 

the middle tier. What they do not have is the vast numbers of recruits to carry out the acts they would like to perpetrate. So that 

is where we have our focus, is to try to cut off the head of the 

snake. 

Senator AKAKA. Admiral Redd, in early 2004, then-CIA Director 

George Tenet said that al-Qaeda’s leadership was seriously damaged and had continued to lose operational safe havens. Today we 

have a different picture of al-Qaeda, one in which the organization 

has become resurgent and is rebuilding. 

What in your opinion has changed? And why hasn’t the United 

States been more successful in heading off such a resurgence? 

Admiral REDD. I think if you look back, Senator, at the history 

from September 11, 2001, it has been a series—as all warfare, if 

you do not mind me using the analogy—of puts and takes, or pressure and response. And I would say the single most critical factor 

over the last year, year and a half, has been the resurgence of that 

safe haven in the tribal areas of Pakistan. 

Senator AKAKA. Do you believe that, as currently configured, the 

Executive Branch agencies are well placed to help reverse that 

tide? 

Admiral REDD. I think, sir, the whole thrust of our testimony has 

been that the agencies are working together in ways that we have 

never worked together before, whether it is across attacking terrorists or protecting and defending the homeland. But the short answer is you never stop on that, and you keep moving, you keep trying, and you keep pushing. And that is clearly one of our highest 

priorities. 

Senator AKAKA. Admiral McConnell and Admiral Redd, the July 

report issued by the National Counterterrorism Center stated that 

the key to al-Qaeda’s resurgence has been the use of ungoverned 

54 

spaces in Pakistan and, in particular, areas along the Pakistan-Afghan border. Yet I understand that Pakistan restricts the deployment of American troops in these areas in hot pursuit of those terrorists’ networks. 

As long as these safe havens exist, what is there to prevent the 

continued resurgence of al-Qaeda? Admiral McConnell. 

Admiral MCCONNELL. If the safe havens continue to exist, we 

will continue to have this problem. About a year ago, the leadership in Pakistan made a decision as a way to address the problem 

is to form an alliance or a peace treaty, if you will, with the tribal 

leaders in this area. Remember, this area has never been conquered by anyone, not even Pakistan—never been controlled by 

Pakistan. It is a separate enclave in their constitution, so it is an 

independent region in that border area. 

So the leadership in Pakistan decided they would make an accommodation with the leadership to force the foreigners—to be expelled. That did not work. We counseled against it. It did not work. 

Now, what has changed since that time? President Musharraf 

has moved two additional divisions into the area, is applying additional pressure. We are cooperating with the Pakistanis, providing 

information, intelligence. We are working it from the Afghan side 

of the border, working with Special Operations Forces and so on. 

So intense focus, but as of this point in time, we have not been able 

to eliminate it. But it is our No. 1 priority. 

Senator AKAKA. Would you comment, Admiral Redd. 

Admiral REDD. I would just agree with Director McConnell. I 

mean, we clearly understand the high priority of this. The cooperation out there is significant. I think it is fair to note, too, that the 

Pakistanis themselves are also victims of al-Qaeda’s violence. It is 

not just the United States. But it is a longstanding issue, and it 

is one which has a lot of policy dimensions to it. It is being worked 

very hard. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your responses. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Akaka. 

We have reached 12:30, but Senator Collins did not use her 

whole time, and Senator Carper, who is a very effective advocate, 

has asked to ask one more question. If any of you have an urgent 

need to depart, we will understand. If not, two more questions. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. That is, we will understand if it is 

after our questions. 

This Committee has worked diligently to try to identify shortcomings and gaps in the legal authority that you have as we try 

to fight this war against terrorism. Last year, for example, Secretary Chertoff, you told us that we needed authority in the area 

of chemical security, and we passed legislation giving you that. 

More recently, Admiral, you came to us on the FISA issue. 

I would like to ask each of you to identify any legislative reforms 

or authority that you need to more effectively do your job as we 

battle terrorism. Secretary Chertoff, we will start with you, and we 

will just go down the panel. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I did mention the issue of wastewater and 

water treatment, and I think we are contemplating what we might 

55 

do to address that issue and whether we ought to make a suggestion to Congress. 

If I might, I would like to request the opportunity to actually 

think about that and come back with a little bit more of a comprehensive answer than I give just off the table. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Admiral Redd. 

Admiral MCCONNELL. Like Secretary Chertoff, I need to give you 

a more deliberative answer, but I have been back only a few 

months, as you are aware, and the title is Director of National Intelligence. I think ‘‘Director’’ may be a little bit of a misnomer. I 

am more of a coordinator. So when I want to make a hard decision, 

it is a little bit like this body. As opposed to deciding, you get to 

engage in dialogue and debate and so on. It was made reference 

earlier that it is interpersonal skills. Well, mine have been tested 

quite a bit to try to get hard decisions made. 

So at some point, I will formulate some recommendations about 

do we need to make some adjustments to how we are organized. 

We did not create a Department of Intelligence. We created a Director of National Intelligence who has a responsibility of coordinating a community of 15 of 16 agencies who work for another Cabinet officer. So there is a challenge or two embedded in that. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Admiral Redd. 

Admiral REDD. As you know, I wear the two hats on the intelligence sides. Obviously, in fact, I am actually part of the DNI, and 

the DNI has actually used his authorities to help us out in some 

cases. So I think I would certainly identify with everything Admiral McConnell said. 

I think there is a question which is not now but is probably a 

year or so down the road, on the other race to strategic operational 

planning. As you know, when the 9/11 Commission came out, they 

had in mind a much more, shall we say, aggressive or directive 

view of that. I do not think we are far enough down the road to 

know whether that is desirable or even doable. We are working together. But I think that is something that in a couple of years the 

Congress may want to come back and look at. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Director Mueller. 

Mr. MUELLER. One of the areas we are concerned about and have 

been for some time is, first of all, the lone wolf actor who is not 

tied in with any particular group overseas, and we addressed that 

in legislation a year or so ago. But as you have self-radicalization 

growing and radicalization in the United States, where it does not 

have any foreign component, we operate under Title III, the criminal side of the house. And over a period of time, as technology has 

improved—and the statutes focus on facilities, a particular facility 

as opposed to the target. One of the things I would like an opportunity to get back to you on is the possibility of making modifications to make it easier with appropriate safeguards to do interceptions of those individuals who might be self-radicalized and intent 

on undertaking terrorist attacks as opposed to other criminal activities within the United States, without any foreign nexus. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. And let me just conclude by thanking you all for your extraordinary service. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. Those are important answers. Senator Carper. 

56 

Senator CARPER. I would second that closing comment from Senator Collins. 

Secretary Chertoff, I am going to telegraph my picture and let 

you think about this while I make a comment or two. It is rare that 

you come before us that I do not ask you about rail security and 

transit security, and that will be my question, to ask you for an update. We have talked here today a little bit about maritime security 

and chemical security, but I want, before we leave, for you to give 

us a bit of an update on how we are doing with respect to security 

for people who ride trains and people who take transit, especially 

rail transit. 

I want to go back to Senator Akaka’s questioning of you, Admiral 

McConnell, and he focused a good deal on Osama bin Laden, and 

you mentioned—I think what you said is, ‘‘Our focus is to cut off 

the head of the snake.’’ I urge you to maintain that focus. 

Secretary Chertoff, your Department is going through a rulemaking with respect to potentially establishing reporting requirements for those who have significant quantities of propane on their 

properties. You probably heard a little bit about this. On the Delmarva Peninsula, we have hundreds of chickens for every person 

who lives there. There are 300 chickens for every person who lives 

in Delaware. We have a lot of chicken farms, and we have tens of 

thousands of them around the country, and your agency has been 

intent on trying to establish some kind of reporting requirement for 

chicken farmers who have significant quantities of propane. 

I think we are in the process of trying to infuse some common 

sense into that argument. I would say good and we look forward 

to the final outcome. 

One of our chicken farmers on the Delmarva Peninsula said, 

‘‘The worst thing that could happen if they blow up my propane in 

my chicken house is we end up with barbecued chicken.’’ So he did 

not think it was all that bad. But I would just ask that we focus 

more on where the real threat lies. I do not think that is where 

it lies. 

Your name has been in the news as a potential Attorney General. I do not have any question that you would be a very fine Attorney General. I heard last week that you had asked not to be considered, and I think we need in your Department continuity. Not 

worst things that could happen, but one of the not so positive 

things that could happen would be to just add to that turmoil, so 

I applaud your decision. I hope the President was listening. 

Here is your opportunity to respond to my question: How are we 

doing on transit security, rail transit security in particular? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. First, just on the issue of propane, let me 

make clear that there was a preliminary rule that was put out. It 

is put out precisely for the reason that we do want to get comments 

back, and it is not uncommon and it is pretty easy to anticipate 

that we are going to take those comments into effect. 

It is going to be a line-drawing issue. There is going to be an 

amount of propane that is large enough and close enough to a 

major population area that we will have to regulate it. But we really do not want to regulate chicken farmers. We are not worried 

about barbecued chicken. 

57 

With respect to rail security, as you know, Senator, we put out 

not only a round of grants earlier this year, but then a supplemental round. So we have got several hundred million dollars out 

there, and we would be very focused on a risk-based approach in 

which we look at those elements of the rail system that are the 

most vulnerable. If we are talking about passenger rail, that tends 

to be a highly populated mass transit, particularly where you are 

dealing with track that is underground or underwater. And, frankly, that is where we are putting most of our money and most of our 

effort. 

At the same time we are doing a couple of other things. We are 

working to increase the number of what we call VIPR Teams. 

These are combined teams of TSA personnel, and now we are adding in some Coast Guard and Custom Border Patrol personnel that 

we surge into a train station or we went onto the Seattle ferries 

last month, with canines, with handheld devices. They are not 

meant to be steady state, but they are meant to be random surge 

operations, similar to what the New York Police Department does 

where every week or so they put a whole bunch of police cars out 

and they surge into an area and in a counterterror operation. So 

we are proceeding with that, too. 

The third thing is we are looking at different kinds of systems 

that would be used to potentially detect explosives without putting 

into place in train stations what we have at airports, which would 

not work architecturally. That is a technological challenge. I promised Admiral Cohen I was going to use this word in a hearing, and 

I am now going to use it. Muon technology, which involves the subatomic particles, is apparently a promising technology but some 

distance off; that if, in fact, it is capable of being implemented, 

would allow us to detect in a stand-off way explosives in a confined 

area, like a train station or something. 

So we are proceeding on all of those tracks, and it is a very high 

priority for us. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me that opportunity. One last quick thing I would say is Senator Voinovich 

was talking about how do we defuse some of the hatred and animosity toward our country, and he, I thought mentioned—in the 

back-and-forth some good ideas were discussed. I would suggest 

that one of the things that needs to be done is for a real serious 

effort to be made in support of what is going on in the dialogue between the Israelis and the Palestinians on the West Bank. That by 

itself is not going to solve this problem, but to the extent that the 

Palestinians could end up with a homeland of their own and the 

Israelis could end up with peace and secure borders, that would 

sure help. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Carper. 

Thanks to the four of you. I must say, Senator Collins and I just 

said before she had to go that while the first part of what we asked 

you to do today, which is to assess the current threat environment, 

obviously your assessment is serious, it is sobering. This is an 

alarming and persistent threat environment. But the second part, 

which is to give us a report on the status of institutional reform 

to deal with the threat, has been, in my opinion, greatly encourVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 038842 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\38842.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
58 

aging, understanding that we all know that we have got a lot more 

to do. 

I would add that the four of you each bring tremendous experience and talent to this assignment. You are impressive in your individual capacities, and you give the definite impression that you 

are working well together as a team. And I will note with some 

particular appreciation in this capital city that you seem not to let 

your egos get in the way of carrying out your assigned responsibilities to protect our homeland. So we thank you for all that, with 

the understanding that we have got a lot more to do. We look forward to doing it together to protect our country and its people. 

The record of the hearing will remain open for 15 more days for 

additional questions and statements. I thank you all again. The 

hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(59) 

A P P E N D I X 


38842.001
60 


38842.002
61 


38842.003
62 


38842.004
63 


38842.005
64 


38842.006
65 


38842.007
66 


38842.008
67 


38842.009
68 


38842.010
69 


38842.011
70 


38842.012
71 


38842.013
72 


38842.014
73 


38842.015
74 


38842.016
75 


38842.017
76 


38842.018
77 


38842.019
78 


38842.020
79 


38842.021
80 


38842.022
81 


38842.023
82 


38842.024
83 


38842.025
84 


38842.026
85 


38842.027
86 


38842.028
87 


38842.029
88 


38842.030
89 


38842.031
90 


38842.032
91 


38842.033
92 


38842.034
93 


38842.035
94 


38842.036
95 


38842.037
96 


38842.038
97 


38842.039
98 


38842.040
99 


38842.041
100 


38842.042
101 


38842.043
102 


38842.044
103 


38842.045
104 


38842.046
105 


38842.047
106 


38842.048
107 


38842.049
108 


38842.050
109 


38842.051
110 


38842.052
111 


38842.053
112 


38842.054
113 


38842.055
114 


38842.056
115 


38842.057
116 


38842.058
117 


38842.059
118 


38842.060
119 


38842.061
120 


38842.062
121 


38842.063
122 


38842.064
123 


38842.065
124 


38842.066
125 


38842.067
126 


38842.068
127 


38842.069
128 


38842.070
129 


38842.071
130 


38842.072
131 


38842.073
132 


38842.074
133 


38842.075
134 


38842.076
135 


38842.077
136 


38842.078
137 


38842.079
138 


38842.080
139 


38842.081
140 


38842.082
141 


38842.083
142 


38842.084
143 


38842.085
144 


38842.086
145 


38842.087
146 


38842.088
147 


38842.089
148 


38842.090
149 


38842.091
150 


38842.092
151 


38842.093
152 


38842.094
153 


38842.095
154 


38842.096
155 


38842.097
156 


38842.098
157 


38842.099
158 


38842.100
159 


38842.101
160 


38842.102
161 


38842.103
162 

Æ 


38842.104