AH-64D Apache Longbow/Video from UAS for 

Interoperability Teaming Level II (VUIT-2) 

Aircrew Workload Assessment 

by Jamison S. Hicks, David B. Durbin, and LTC Brian Sperling 

ARL-TR-4724 April 2009 

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
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Army Research Laboratory 

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005-5069 

ARL-TR-4724 April 2009 

AH-64D Apache Longbow/Video from UAS for 

Interoperability Teaming Level II (VUIT-2) 

Aircrew Workload Assessment 

Jamison S. Hicks and David B. Durbin 

Human Research and Engineering Directorate, ARL 

LTC Brian Sperling

United States Military Academy 

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 
ii

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5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 

5b. GRANT NUMBER 

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 

AH-64D Apache Longbow/Video from UAS for Interoperability Teaming Level II 

(VUIT-2) Aircrew Workload Assessment 

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 

5d. PROJECT NUMBER 

62716AH70 

5e. TASK NUMBER 

6. AUTHOR(S) 

Jamison S. Hicks, David B. Durbin, and LTC Brian Sperling 

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7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 

U.S. Army Research Laboratory 

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9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 

AH-64D Apache Longbow 

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Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898 

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Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 

14. ABSTRACT 

An AH-64D/Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) aircrew workload assessment was conducted during February 2008 in Huntsville, AL. The 

purpose of the assessment was to evaluate AH-64D aircrew workload during UAS level II interoperability under simulated mission 

conditions. The workload assessment consisted of operational missions conducted by aircrews (eight pilots) in an AH-64D simulator. Pilot 

workload, situational awareness (SA), crew coordination, crewstation interface, switch actuations, simulator sickness, visual gaze and dwell 

times (using a head-eye tracker), audio-video, and tactics, techniques and procedures data were collected and analyzed. Additionally, subject 

matter experts (SMEs) observed each mission and rated crew workload, crew SA, crew coordination and mission success. 

Pilots reported that workload was tolerable for the tasks performed during the missions. The workload ratings provided by the pilots and 

SMEs were lower than the Objective and Threshold workload ratings requirements listed in the Apache Block III (AB3) Capability 

Development Document. The pilots reported that they had moderate levels of SA during the missions. Pilots stated that having to interact 

with an additional sensor (UAS sensor) increased their overall task workload, but the SA provided by the UAS sensor decreased the workload 

required to detect and engage targets and decreased overall target engagement timelines. Most pilots reported that the UAS crewstation 

interface was usable, but needed improvements to enhance overall effectiveness. The pilots commented that with several enhancements and 

more experience using the system, workload would be decreased. 

15. SUBJECT TERMS 

AH-64D, Apache Longbow, UAS, VUIT-2, pilot workload 

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Jamison S. Hicks 

a. REPORT 

Unclassified 

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Unclassified

c. THIS PAGE 

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 ABSTRACT 

UU 

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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98) 

Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18 
iii

Contents 

List of Figures vi

List of Tables vi

1. Introduction 1

1.1 Background .....................................................................................................................1 

1.2 System Description..........................................................................................................2 

1.3 Assessment Procedure Overview ....................................................................................3 

1.4 Apache RACRS Cockpits ...............................................................................................3 

1.5 OneSAF (One Semi-Automated Forces).........................................................................5 

1.6 UAS Control Station .......................................................................................................5

1.7 AH-64 #2 Control Station ...............................................................................................5 

1.8 Terrain Location..............................................................................................................6 

2. Method 7

2.1 Data Collection................................................................................................................7 

2.2 Pre- and Post-Trial Questionnaires..................................................................................7 

2.3 Demographics..................................................................................................................7 

2.4 Workload.........................................................................................................................7 

2.4.1 Bedford Workload Rating Scale (BWRS)...........................................................8 

2.5 Situation Awareness (SA) ...............................................................................................8 

2.5.1 Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART).................................................8 

2.6 UAS Crewstation Interface (UCI)...................................................................................9 

2.7 Simulator Sickness Questionnaire (SSQ)........................................................................9 

2.8 Switch Actuations............................................................................................................9 

2.9 Audio-Video Collection ................................................................................................10 

2.10 After Action Reviews (AARs) ......................................................................................10 

2.11 Subject Matter Experts (SMEs).....................................................................................10 

2.12 Evaluation Design .........................................................................................................10 
iv

3. Instrumentation 11

3.1 Switch Actuations..........................................................................................................11 

3.2 Overhead Cockpit Cameras...........................................................................................11 

3.3 Head and Eye Tracker System ......................................................................................11 

3.4 Data Analysis, Limitations, and Pilot Demographics ...................................................11 

3.4.1 Data Analysis ....................................................................................................11 

3.4.2 Evaluation Limitations ......................................................................................12 

3.4.3 Participants ........................................................................................................12 

4. Results 13

4.1 Crew Workload .............................................................................................................13 

4.1.1 Average Bedford Workload Ratings for Flight and Mission Tasks..................13 

4.1.2 CPG Task Shedding ..........................................................................................14 

4.1.3 SME Ratings of Aircrew Coordination .............................................................14 

4.1.4 SME Workload Ratings.....................................................................................15 

4.1.5 Visual Workload................................................................................................16 

4.1.6 Comparison of Eye Tracker Data......................................................................18 

4.2 Crew Situation Awareness ............................................................................................19 

4.2.1 Situation Awareness Ratings.............................................................................19 

4.2.2 SME Situation Awareness Ratings....................................................................20 

4.2.3 SME Ratings of Mission Success and Mission Objectives...............................20 

4.3 UAS Crewstation Interface (UCI).................................................................................21 

4.4 Switch Actuations..........................................................................................................21 

4.5 Top Improvements Recommended by Pilots ................................................................23 

4.6 Simulator Sickness ........................................................................................................23 

4.7 Comparison of RACRS Simulator SSQ Scores to Other Helicopter Simulators..........24 

5. Conclusions 25

5.1 Crew Workload .............................................................................................................25 

5.2 Crew Situation Awareness ............................................................................................25 

5.3 Crew Coordination ........................................................................................................26

5.4 UAS-Crewstation Interface ...........................................................................................26 

5.5 Simulator Sickness ........................................................................................................26 

6. Recommendations 26
v

7. References 28

Appendix A. Bedford Workload Rating Scale Scores and Pilot Comments 29

Appendix B. Subject Matter Expert Workload Comments 35

Appendix C. Situation Awareness Ratings and Comments 39

Appendix D. VUIT-2-Crewstation Interface Ratings and Comments 47

Appendix E. Top Improvements for VUIT-2 Integration 53

Appendix F. Switch Actuations (UAS) 57

Appendix G. Operations Order 63

List of Symbols, Abbreviations, and Acronyms 67

Distribution List 70 
vi

List of Figures 

Figure 1. UAS to AH-64D information flow..................................................................................1 

Figure 2. Depiction of VUIT-2 for the CPG...................................................................................2 

Figure 3. Apache RACRS simulator (Camber Corp). ....................................................................4 

Figure 4. Apache RACRS CPG cockpit (Camber Corp)................................................................4 

Figure 5. UAS control station. ........................................................................................................5 

Figure 6. AH-64 #2 control station.................................................................................................6 

Figure 7. Apache RACRS Afghanistan database screenshot..........................................................6 

Figure 8. Eye tracker, pupil/camera monitors, and control panel interface..................................12 

Figure 9. PI and CPG workload ratings........................................................................................13 

Figure 10. SME ratings for PI and CPG aircrew coordination.....................................................15 

Figure 11. SME Bedford workload ratings...................................................................................15 

Figure 12. CPG visual gaze and dwell times during VUIT-2 missions........................................16 

Figure 13. CPG visual gaze and dwell times during non-VUIT-2 missions. ...............................17 

Figure 14. PI visual dwell times estimates for all missions..........................................................18 

Figure 15. Overall SART scores for PI and CPG. ........................................................................19 

Figure 16. SME ratings of mission success and mission objectives.............................................21 

List of Tables 

Table 1. Variables that were controlled during the simulation.....................................................10 

Table 2. Pilot demographics (N = 8).............................................................................................13 

Table 3. Comparison of eye tracker results for AH-64D, UH-60M, and ARH-70 simulations. ..18 

Table 4. SME situation awareness rating......................................................................................20 

Table 5. MPD page changes during the VUIT-2 missions. ..........................................................22 

Table 6. MPD page changes during the non-VUIT-2 missions....................................................22 

Table 7. Simulator sickness questionnaire (SSQ) ratings.............................................................23 

Table 8. Categorization of simulator sickness symptoms.............................................................24 

Table 9. Comparison of RACRS simulator SSQ ratings with other helicopter simulators. .........24 

Table 10. Pilot workload requirements and ratings. .....................................................................25 
1 

1. Introduction 

1.1 Background 

The ability to conduct level II interoperability (receiving video feed from an unmanned aerial 

system [UAS]) adds a new capability to the AH-64D. Specifically, the UAS operates as a 

remote sensor system, adding an additional sensor system to the AH-64D reconnaissance and 

targeting systems. The Video from UAS for Interoperability Teaming Level II (VUIT-2) system 

was designed to provide level II interoperability between the UAS and the AH-64D. This is 

accomplished by providing real-time streaming video from a UAS sensor to the AH-64D crew 

and allowing the crew to re-transmit that video (or their aircraft sensor video) to a ground unit 

equipped with a one system-remote video terminal (OSRVT) or to another airborne OSRVT as 

needed. The flow of information between the UAS, AH-64D, and OSRVT is depicted in 

figure 1. 

The U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL) Human Research and Engineering Directorate 

(HRED) conducted an AH-64D/UAS aircrew workload assessment during February 2008 in 

Huntsville, AL. The purpose of the assessment was to evaluate AH-64D aircrew workload 

during UAS level II interoperability (using VUIT-2) under simulated mission conditions. 

Unmanned 

Aerial 

System 

Ground 

Control 

Station One System-Remote 

Video Terminal 

AH-64D 

 Level-2 Data Flow 

 Voice Communication 

Ku 

Band 

C/L Band 

and 

UHF 

C/L Band 

and 

Ultra-High 

Frequency 

(UHF) 

Figure 1. UAS to AH-64D information flow.
2 

1.2 System Description 

The major components of the VUIT-2 system on the AH-64D are: a mast-mounted C/L-band 

omni-directional antenna for reception of UAS video and an ultra high frequency (UHF) antenna 

for reception of UAS data; an OSRVT and Thermite computer to process received video for 

presentation on the crewmember-selected multipurpose display (MPD); keyboard style control 

that permits the copilot gunner (CPG) to interface with the VUIT-2 system; and a mini-tactical 

common data link (MTCDL) system that permits transmission of received UAS or aircraft sensor 

video to a ground or airborne OSRVT. The VUIT-2 is incorporated as a strap-on system for 

Block I and II AH-64Ds involving minimal interface with the current production aircraft bus 

architecture. The VUIT-2 software version used during this simulation was 1.7.5. 

The AH-64D Apache is a twin-engine, tandem-seat, aerial weapons platform built by Boeing 

Integrated Defense Systems. Aircraft armament includes a belly-mounted slewable 30-mm chain 

gun, Hellfire missiles, and 2.75-in aerial rockets. The aircraft integrated sensor suite includes a 

mast-mounted Longbow fire control radar (FCR) and a nose-mounted modernized target 

acquisition designation sight/pilot night vision sensor (MTADS/PNVS). The aircraft displays 

(figure 2) include two MPDs in each cockpit, the MTADS electronic display and control in the 

CPG station, and the integrated helmet and display sight system. The aircraft has a flight control 

system with a fully articulated, four-bladed main rotor system. The flight control system consists 

of conventional cockpit controls: cyclic, collective, and pedals connected mechanically to 

hydromechanical actuators for the main and tail rotors; a limited authority automatic stabilization 

system; and an electrically actuated stabilator. 

Apache 

MTADS

From 

UAS 

Real-Time 

Map and 

Position 

Figure 2. Depiction of VUIT-2 for the CPG.
3 

1.3 Assessment Procedure Overview 

The workload simulation consisted of operational missions conducted by Apache aircrews in the 

AH-64D Risk and Cost Reduction Simulator (RACRS). The simulator was modified to 

represent the UAS Level II functionality to the maximum extent practicable given the maturity of 

the Apache Block II design. 

Pilots received two days of training prior to the beginning of the assessment. The training 

consisted of classroom instruction and hands-on flight training in the RACRS. The pilots flew 

the same types of missions during training that they later flew during the record trials. The 

mission scenario was based on a battlefield environment simulating southwest Asia. Each 

successive mission increased in difficulty in order to impose progressively greater workload on 

the pilots. The aircrews performed specific Aircrew Training Manual (ATM) tasks during each 

mission. Each ATM task had prescribed conditions and standards to which both crewmembers 

had to perform to help ensure mission accomplishment. The aircrews also conducted missions 

without VUIT-2 to establish a baseline for comparing workload during non-UAS missions to 

workload during UAS missions. 

During the formal evaluation, the aircrews performed Air Escort missions. The mission 

scenarios were developed by the TRADOC System Manager, Reconnaissance Attack (TSM RA) 

office, Fort Rucker, AL. The scenarios were developed in accordance with established aircraft 

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). 

The pilots completed the Simulator Sickness Questionnaire (SSQ) before and after each flight. 

They completed the Bedford Workload Rating Scale (BWRS), Situation Awareness Rating 

Technique (SART), and the UAS-Crewstation Interface (UCI) questionnaire after each mission. 

During each mission, the CPG wore an eye tracker. The eye tracker was used to assess pilot 

visual workload. In addition to the pilot data, subject matter experts (SMEs) were used to 

provide an independent assessment of aircrew workload, SA, and mission success. The SMEs 

completed an aircrew workload, SA, and mission success survey after each mission. After all 

three aircrews completed the mission and surveys, they participated in a mission debriefing and 

after-action review (AAR). 

During the simulation, aircrew actions within the cockpit were recorded for post-test analysis. 

Video recordings of each crewstation and all displays were kept as a permanent record. Log files 

recorded all button and switch activations and recorded which MPD display was selected on each 

of the MPDs during the test. 

1.4 Apache RACRS Cockpits 

The RACRS cockpits consisted of high fidelity aircraft flight controls and displays (figures 3 and 

4). The CPG utilized the TADS Electronic Display and Control (TEDAC) grips to control 

Apache sensors characteristics such as selecting sensors, field of view, azimuth, elevation, gain, 

and level. These controls were also selectable for adjustment of the UAS sensor. The TEDAC 

and MPD displays were used to monitor the sensor view from the Apache and/or the UAS. 
4 

Figure 3. Apache RACRS simulator (Camber Corp). 

Figure 4. Apache RACRS CPG cockpit (Camber Corp).
5 

1.5 OneSAF (One Semi-Automated Forces) 

The OneSAF simulation provided the ability to generate threats/targets on the battlefield. 

Scenarios were developed that incorporated the detection, identification, and acquisition of 

simulated targets. OneSAF produced outputs on the distributed information system (DIS) 

network enabling all attached simulations to receive and display the entities. 

1.6 UAS Control Station 

A stand-alone workstation (figure 5) was developed to allow a UAS operator to independently 

fly a UAS during the scenarios. This was a desktop computer with a visual system representing 

the same terrain location as the Apache simulation. A commercial joystick and keyboard 

provided user input for UAS control. The operator was linked with the Apache crew via audio 

communications using the existing lab intercom. The UAS positional information was output 

onto the DIS network, allowing the other components to be aware of its location. 

Figure 5. UAS control station. 

1.7 AH-64 #2 Control Station 

A stand-alone workstation (figure 6), similar to the UAS control station, was developed to allow 

an operator to independently fly a second AH-64 (wing man) during the scenarios. This was a 

desktop computer with a visual system representing the same terrain location as the Apache 

simulation. A commercial joystick and keyboard provided user input for the second AH-64 

control. The operator was linked with the Apache crew via audio communications using the 

existing lab intercom. The AH-64 positional information was output onto the DIS network, 

allowing the other components to be aware of its location. 
6 

Figure 6. AH-64 #2 control station. 

1.8 Terrain Location 

The simulator visual system was configured to fly the existing Bagram, Afghanistan, visual 

database (figure 7). This is a geo-specific large gaming area built from satellite acquired highresolution imagery and detailed terrain relief. It also contained ample terrain and cultural 

features which supported the goals of the assessment. 

Figure 7. Apache RACRS Afghanistan database screenshot.
7 

2. Method

2.1 Data Collection 

Pilot workload, situational awareness, crew coordination, VUIT-2 crewstation interface, switch 

actuations, simulator sickness, visual gaze and dwell times (head-eye tracker), audio-video, and 

TTP data were collected and analyzed. These areas were assessed to determine if (1) pilot 

workload was tolerable when interacting with an UAS, (2) pilot workload in the AH-64D is 

higher, lower, or comparable to pilot workload when not interacting with an UAS, (3) pilots have 

adequate SA when interacting with the UAS, (4) the UAS control interface is easy to understand 

and navigate, and (5) pilots experienced simulator sickness symptoms. The data were being used 

to recommend design improvements to the UAS menu system, training, and associated 

switchology and to refine TTPs. 

2.2 Pre- and Post-Trial Questionnaires 

ARL HRED administered a series of questionnaires as part of the workload assessment. The 

questionnaires were: 

• Demographics 

• Simulator Sickness Questionnaire (SSQ) 

• Workload (Bedford Workload Rating Scale) 

• Situational Awareness (Situational Awareness Rating Technique) 

• UAS Crewstation Interface (UCI) 

• Subject Matter Expert (SME) Ratings 

2.3 Demographics 

A demographics questionnaire was used to collect basic information on each pilot’s experience 

and flight qualifications. The demographic data documented the range of pilot experience levels 

and qualifications. 

2.4 Workload 

A common definition of pilot workload is “the integrated mental and physical effort required to 

satisfy the perceived demands of a specified flight task” (Roscoe, 1985). It is important to assess 

pilot workload because mission accomplishment is related to the mental and physical ability of 

the crew to effectively perform their flight and mission tasks. If pilots experience high workload 

when they perform flight and mission tasks (e.g., control UASs), the tasks may be performed 

ineffectively or abandoned. 
8 

2.4.1 Bedford Workload Rating Scale (BWRS) 

To estimate the level of workload needed to control the UAS, the pilots completed the BWRS 

immediately after each mission. The pilots rated the workload needed to perform several UAS, 

flight, and mission tasks. This provided an overall assessment of the workload required to 

perform the missions. 

The BWRS has been used extensively by the military, civil, and commercial aviation 

communities for estimating pilot workload (Roscoe and Ellis, 1990). It requires pilots to rate the 

level of workload associated with a task based on the amount of spare capacity they feel they 

have to perform additional tasks. Spare workload capacity is an important commodity for pilots 

because they are often required to perform several tasks concurrently. For example, pilots must 

often perform flight tasks and navigation tasks, and monitor radios within the same time interval. 

Mission performance is reduced if pilots are task saturated and have little or no spare capacity to 

perform other tasks. Design of the UCI should help ensure that pilots can maintain adequate 

spare workload capacity while they control UASs and perform other flight and mission tasks. 

2.5 Situation Awareness (SA) 

SA can be defined as the pilot’s mental model of the current state of the flight and mission 

environment. A formal definition (Endsley, 1988) is “the perception of the elements in the 

environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the 

projection of their status in the near future.” It is important to assess SA because it has a direct 

impact on pilot performance. Good SA increases the probability of good decisions and good 

performance by pilots. The workload levels that pilots experience during a mission affects their 

SA. As pilot workload levels increase, their SA often decreases. Design of the crewstation and 

UAS UCI should ensure that pilots are able to maintain consistently high levels of SA while they 

control the UAS and perform other flight and mission tasks. 

2.5.1 Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART) 

To estimate the level of SA that they experienced during missions, the pilots completed the 

SART scale after each mission. The SART was developed as an evaluation tool for design of 

aircrew systems (Taylor, 1989) and is composed of three subscales. The subscales are 

Understanding (U), Demand (D), and Supply (S). Taylor proposed that SA is dependent on the 

pilot’s U (e.g., quality of information they receive), and the difference between the D (e.g., 

complexity of mission) on the pilot’s resources and the pilot’s S (e.g., ability to concentrate). 

When D exceeds S, there is a negative effect on U and an overall reduction of SA. The formula 

SA = U – (D – S) is used to derive the overall SART score. The SART is one of the most 

thoroughly tested rating scales for estimating SA (Endsley, 2000).
9 

2.6 UAS Crewstation Interface (UCI) 

The UCI impacts crew workload and SA during a mission. A UCI that is designed to augment 

the cognitive and physical abilities of crews will minimize workload, enhance SA, and contribute 

to successful mission performance. To assess the UCI, the pilots reported any problems that 

contributed to high workload and low SA at the end of each mission. They also completed a 

lengthy questionnaire at the end of their final mission. The questionnaire addressed usability 

characteristics of the UCI. 

2.7 Simulator Sickness Questionnaire (SSQ) 

The SSQ was used to assess any problems with simulator sickness in the simulator. Any 

discomfort felt by the participants can adversely affect performance and how they perceive their 

levels of workload and SA. The SSQ helped determine if the visual effects of the simulator are a 

possible contributor to high workload and SA, rather than the UAS aircrew interface design. 

Simulator sickness has been defined as a condition in which pilots suffer physiological 

discomfort in the simulator, but not while flying the actual aircraft (Kennedy et al., 1989). It is 

generally believed that simulator sickness is caused by a mismatch between the sensory 

information (e.g., acceleration cues) presented by the simulator and the sensory information 

presented by the primary aircraft that the pilot operates. When the sensory information presented 

by the simulator does not match the aircraft, the pilot’s nervous system reacts adversely to the 

sensory mismatch and the pilot begins to experience discomfort. Characteristics of simulator 

sickness include nausea, dizziness, drowsiness, and several other symptoms (Kennedy et al., 

1989). It is important to assess simulator sickness because the discomfort felt by pilots can be 

distracting. Pilot distraction is one of the operational consequences of simulator sickness listed 

by Crowley (1987). If pilots are distracted by the discomfort they feel during missions, their 

performance is likely to suffer. Additionally, the discomfort could influence the perceived levels 

of workload and SA that the pilots experience during a mission. 

The SSQ (Kennedy et al., 1993) is a checklist of 16 symptoms. The 16 symptoms are 

categorized into three subscales. The subscales are Oculomotor (e.g., eyestrain, difficulty 

focusing, blurred vision), Disorientation (e.g., dizziness, vertigo), and Nausea (e.g., nausea, 

increased salivation, burping). The three subscales are combined to produce a Total Severity 

score. The Total Severity score is an indicator of the overall discomfort that the pilots 

experienced during the mission. 

2.8 Switch Actuations 

The RACRS was instrumented to log switch actuations to help determine whether there were 

tasks (e.g., UAS menu navigation) that need to be streamlined because of excessive switch 

manipulation. 
10 

2.9 Audio-Video Collection 

Audio, video, and digital photography data collection was recorded during the simulation. Video 

cameras were used in the front seat and back seat of the RACRS during the trials to record pilot 

actions. All voice communications that occurred over the interphone communications system 

(ICS) were recorded and dubbed into the video recordings. 

2.10 After-Action Reviews (AARs) 

Daily AARs were conducted by the AH-64D Product Manager’s Office (PMO) to help analyze 

workload, SA, and document TTP insights about the optimal employment of UASs. 

2.11 Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) 

SMEs observed each mission and rated crew workload, crew SA, crew coordination, and mission 

success. The two SMEs were both CW4 Apache pilots, and each had over 3000 hours of flight 

experience. The SMEs were familiar with UAS Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The SMEs 

provided an independent assessment of the workload and SA levels experienced by the crews. 

They helped identify whether problems with crew workload or crew SA contributed to lack of 

mission success. SME personnel observed the missions using a suite of monitors that showed all 

crewstation displays in the RACRS. They also listened to all audio communications between 

crewmembers, aircraft, ground control station, ground commander, and the tactical operations 

center during the missions. Several large displays provided real-time status of the location of the 

aircraft, UAS, friendly forces, and enemy forces to the SMEs. 

2.12 Evaluation Design 

While the evaluation was operational in nature rather than experimental, multiple variables were 

controlled in order to maximize the validity of the conclusions regarding the areas of evaluation. 

Table 1 summarizes the variables that were controlled during the simulation. 

Table 1. Variables that were controlled during the simulation. 

Factor Control Conditions

Mission Constant Air Assault

Flight profile Tactically varied Nap of the Earth (NOE), contour 

Light conditions Constant Day 

Scenario Constant Southwest Asia 

Crew Constant Maximize crew familiarity 

Seat position Varied Front, back 

Flight uniform Constant Air Warrior Gen 3 combat-basic 
11 

3. Instrumentation

3.1 Switch Actuations 

When initiated, the data collection software collected switch actuations at a 10 Hz rate. The 

collected data were time-stamped and written to a comma-delimited log file. The log file was 

then post-processed to an Excel spreadsheet format. The data collection software provided an 

interface to allow the operator to initiate and cease collection during an executed run. 

3.2 Overhead Cockpit Cameras 

An overhead camera was mounted in the front seat and a small camera was mounted on the 

glareshield in the back seat to record pilot actions. This aided in determining what the pilots 

were doing during different phases of the mission. The cameras had a time stamp added so it 

could be compared with other data collection material. 

3.3 Head and Eye Tracker System 

A head-eye tracking system from Applied Science Laboratories (ASL) was used to measure 

visual gaze and dwell times, and to help assess visual workload of the pilot (CPG) who 

controlled the UAS. Data obtained via the eye tracker helped determine if pilots were required 

to spend too much time looking at the crewstation displays to perform tasks. Data provided by 

the eye tracker was summarized in a graphical format. The format depicts the amount of time 

that each pilot spent looking at the crewstation displays and controls vs. the out-the-window 

visual scene. The ASL 501 head-eye tracker (figure 8) has been used extensively by the military 

and industry and presents no known health hazards to the wearer. The system was mounted onto 

the pilot’s flight helmet (front seat only) via the Night Vision Goggle (NVG) mount. Head-eye 

tracker results complemented the questionnaire results and provide an increased understanding of 

crewstation workload and UCI. 

3.4 Data Analysis, Limitations, and Pilot Demographics 

3.4.1 Data Analysis 

Pilot responses to the BWRS, SART, SSQ, and UCI questionnaires were analyzed with means 

and percentages. Their responses to the BWRS, SART, and SSQ were further analyzed with the 

Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (WSRT) to compare the ratings between the CPG and pilot and 

between ratings for the VUIT-2 missions vs. non-VUIT-2 missions (MTADS only) to determine 

if the differences were statistically significant at p = 0.05. 
12 

 

Figure 8. Eye tracker, pupil/camera monitors, and control panel interface. 

The eye tracker data were summarized by calculating the total percentage of fixations that 

occurred for the different areas of interest (AOI). Six AOIs were created for the CPG: right 

MPD, left MPD, TEDAC, keyboard, and kneeboard. Visual gaze and dwell times were also 

recorded for out-the-window. A final category, called “Other”, captured eye fixations not 

focused on a specific AOI. 

3.4.2 Evaluation Limitations 

The primary limitations included the small sample size of pilots (N=8) who participated in the 

crewstation simulation assessment, the limited training they received (two days), and mix of AH64D software versions in the RACRS. 

These limitations are typical when constrained by time and funding, and when replicating a 

complex aviation system in a simulator. However, the information and data listed in the Results 

and Conclustion sections of this report should be interpreted based on these limitations. 

Additional data should be collected during future simulations and tests to augment and expand 

the findings contained in this report. 

3.4.3 Participants 

Eight AH-64D pilots participated in the assessment. Six pilots were assigned to the 3-3 Aviation 

Regiment, Fort Stewart, GA; one pilot was assigned to the Directorate of Evaluation and 

Standardization, Fort Rucker, AL; and one pilot was assigned to the AH-64D Apache Longbow 

Program Management Office, Redstone Arsenal, AL. All pilots held the rank of warrant officer 

(CW2 = 2 pilots, CW3 = 2 pilots, CW4 = 4 pilots). Five pilots were Flight Activity Category 
13 

(FAC) 1, two pilots were FAC 2, and one pilot was FAC 3. Seven pilots were Readiness Level 

(RL) 1 and one pilot was RL 3. They represented a broad range of experience with total flight 

hours from 500 to 3800 hours. The pilot demographics are listed in table 2. 

Table 2. Pilot demographics (N = 8). 

Summary of 

Demographic 

Characteristics 

Age 

(yrs) 

Flight Hours 

in AH-64D 

Total Flight Hours 

in Army Aircraft 

Mean 37 1050 2428

Median 37 1300 2525 

Range 29–43 150–1700 500–3800 

4. Results

4.1 Crew Workload 

4.1.1 Average Bedford Workload Ratings for Flight and Mission Tasks

The average overall Bedford workload rating for VUIT-2 missions was 3.3 for the CPG and 2.6 

for the pilot (PI) (figure 9). These ratings indicate that the CPGs and PIs typically felt that 

workload was tolerable for the tasks, and they had enough spare mental capacity for all desirable 

additional tasks. The difference in workload ratings between the CPG and PI was statistically 

significant (WSRT, Z = –4.109, p < 0.01). This suggests that the pilots firmly believed that 

workload levels were somewhat higher for the CPG than the PI during most missions. 

3.3 2.6 3

3.7

0

2

4

6

8

10

VUIT-2 Missions Non-VUIT-2 Missions

Pilot and CPG Bedford Workload Ratings

CPG

PI

Figure 9. PI and CPG workload ratings. 
14 

The overall Bedford workload rating for the non-VUIT-2 missions was 3.0 for the CPG. This 

rating indicates that the CPGs typically believed that workload was tolerable, and they had 

enough spare mental capacity for all desirable additional tasks. The overall Bedford workload 

rating for the non-VUIT-2 missions was 3.7 for the PI. This rating indicates that the PIs 

typically believed that workload was tolerable, but they had insufficient spare capacity for easy 

attention to additional tasks. The difference in workload ratings between the CPG and PI was 

not statistically significant (WSRT, Z = –1.684, p = 0.09). This suggests that pilots perceived 

that workload levels were comparable for the CPG and the PI during most missions. The 

differences in workload ratings between VUIT-2 missions and non-VUIT-2 missions was not 

statistically significant for the CPG (WSRT, Z = –0.674, p = 0.500), nor statistically significant 

for the PI (WSRT, Z = –0.502, p = 0.616). The majority of pilots commented that the workload 

levels they experienced during VUIT-2 missions were comparable to workload levels they 

experienced during missions using only the MTADS. They reported that having to manage an 

additional sensor (UAS sensor) increased their overall task workload, but the SA provided by the 

UAS sensor typically decreased the workload required to detect and engage targets. They stated 

that (1) it was easier for them to detect and engage targets using the UAS sensor because of the 

steep visual aspect angle (‘God’s Eye’ view) that the UAS sensor provided, compared to the 

shallower visual aspect angle that the MTADS typically provides during missions, (2) the SA 

provided by the UAS sensor reduced the time required to detect and engage targets, and (3) 

while they had more tasks to complete because of the additional sensor, they had more time to 

complete target detection and engagement tasks because of the greater stand-off range that the 

UAS sensor provided vs. the stand-off range that the MTADS provides during missions. 

4.1.2 CPG Task Shedding 

The CPGs reported that there were very few tasks that, due to high mission workload, they had 

to ask the PIs to perform. ARL personnel observed only a few instances when the CPG asked 

the PI to perform a task because he was experiencing high workload. However, the CPGs 

occasionally shed tasks such as responding to radio calls. There was one instance, due to high 

mission workload, when the CPG was unable to acquire a target and perform normal engagement 

tasks. In this instance, the PI utilized the 30-mm gun to engage a target because the aircraft was 

in close range to the threat. 

4.1.3 SME Ratings of Aircrew Coordination 

The SMEs provided ratings (figure 10) of how well the crews performed aircrew coordination 

tasks (e.g., positive communication) per Training Circular 1-210. The SMEs rated aircrew 

coordination during VUIT-2 missions as ‘Excellent’ (15%), ‘Good’ (31%), or ‘Average’ (54%). 

The SMEs rated aircrew coordination during non-VUIT-2 missions as ‘Excellent’ (17%), ‘Good’ 

(33%), or ‘Average’ (50%). 
15 

15% 17%

31% 33%

54%

50%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Excellent Good Average

SME Ratings of Aircrew Coordination

VUIT-2 Missions

Non-VUIT-2 Missions

Figure 10. SME ratings for PI and CPG aircrew coordination. 

4.1.4 SME Workload Ratings 

SMEs provided an overall Bedford workload rating for each mission that they observed. The 

average SME Bedford workload rating (figure 11) was 3.9 for the CPG and 2.5 for the PI during 

the VUIT-2 missions. The average SME Bedford workload rating was 3.3 for the CPG and 4.2 

for the PI during the non-VUIT-2 missions. These ratings indicate that the SMEs believed that 

(1) workload was tolerable for the CPG and PI during VUIT-2 missions, but the CPG had 

insufficient spare capacity for easy attention to additional tasks; and (2) workload was tolerable 

for the CPG and PI during non-VUIT-2 missions, but the PI had insufficient spare capacity for 

easy attention to additional tasks. The difference in SME workload ratings between the CPG and 

PI was statistically significant for the VUIT-2 missions (WSRT, Z = –2.555, p = 0.011), but not 

statistically significant for the non-VUIT-2 missions (WSRT, Z = –0.447, p = 0.655). 

3.9

2.5

3.3

4.2

0

2

4

6

8

10

VUIT-2 Missions Non-VUIT-2 Missions 

SME Bedford Workload Ratings

CPG

PI

Figure 11. SME Bedford workload ratings.
16 

In previous simulations and operational tests that ARL has helped conduct, SMEs have typically 

rated pilot workload higher than the ratings provided by the pilots. SMEs have more information 

(e.g., location of all threat and friendly vehicles) available to them to assess pilot performance 

and workload than the information that the pilots have available to them. SMEs are often more 

aware of pilot mistakes (that may be attributable to workload) than the pilots. The additional 

information that the SMEs have likely results in a more critical assessment of pilot performance 

and workload. 

4.1.5 Visual Workload 

Figure 12 shows the average percentage of time that the CPGs were visually focused on each 

AOI during the VUIT-2 missions. The CPGs were visually focused on the right MPD for 13% 

of the time during missions. They were visually focused on the left MPD for 17% of the time 

and the TEDAC (MTADS sensor) for 48%. It is interesting to note that the CPGs typically spent 

only 3% of the time visually focused out-the-window during missions. Figure 13 shows the 

average percentage of time that the CPGs were visually focused on each AOI during the nonVUIT-2 missions. The CPGs were visually focused on the right MPD for 10% of the time 

during missions. They were visually focused on the left MPD for 4% of the time and the 

TEDAC for 73%. 

Figure 12. CPG visual gaze and dwell times during VUIT-2 missions.

MPD 

13%

MPD 

17% TEDAC 

48%

Keyboar

d 8% Kneeboard/

Printed 

Map

Out-The-Window 

3%

Other 4%
17 

MPD 

10%

MPD 

4% TEDAC 

73%

Keyboar

d 2% Kneeboard/

Printed 

Map

Out-The-Window 

4%

Other 

2%

Figure 13. CPG visual gaze and dwell times during non-VUIT-2 missions. 

A small camera was mounted on the glareshield in the rear cockpit so that ARL personnel could 

observe how much time the PIs spent visually focused inside versus outside the aircraft. ARL 

personnel observed that the PIs were visually focused outside the aircraft approximately 75% of 

the time and inside 25% of the time during the VUIT-2 missions and non-VUIT-2 missions 

(figure 14). The PIs confirmed the observations made by ARL personnel during post-mission 

discussions. 

During the VUIT-2 missions and non-VUIT-2 missions, the CPGs were not able to maintain 

visual focus outside the aircraft to assist with navigation (e.g., identification of terrain features), 

local security, terrain flight, etc. For 96+% of the time, the CPGs were visually focused inside 

the aircraft performing (mostly) target detection and engagement tasks. It should be cautioned 

that the simulation was conducted with a small sample size of pilots, the pilots did not get all of 

the peripheral visual cues that they would in an aircraft, and pilots knew that they would not 

suffer harm if they crashed the simulator. 
18 

Out-The-Window 

75%

In The Cockpit

25%

Camera Used For 

Observing Pilot Visual 

Gaze and Dwell Times

Figure 14. PI visual dwell times estimates for all missions. 

4.1.6 Comparison of Eye Tracker Data 

Table 3 shows a comparison of AH-64D, Armed Recon Helicopter (ARH) and UH-60M eye 

tracker data for Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flight during various aircraft simulations. These 

simulations were observed by ARL-HRED personnel and include workload assessments, limited 

user tests, and crewstation evaluations. While the aircraft, missions, training and personnel 

experience levels were different for each simulation evaluation, it is interesting to note the 

differences in visual gaze and dwell times for each evaluation. 

Table 3. Comparison of eye tracker results for AH-64D, UH-60M, and ARH-70 simulations. 

AH-64D/VUIT2 Workload 

Assessment

AH-64D/UAS 

Workload 

Assessment 

(non-VUIT-2) 

AH-64D 

Workload 

Assessment 

(Block III) 

UH-60M Limited 

User Test 

ARH-70 HFECAAS Evaluation 

 

Flying 

Pilota

(%) 

CPG 

(%) 

Flying 

Pilota 

(%) 

Non 

Flying 

Pilot 

(%) 

Flying 

Pilota 

(%) 

Non 

Flying 

Pilot 

(%) 

Flying 

Pilot 

(%) 

Non 

Flying 

Pilot 

(%) 

Flying 

Pilot 

(%) 

Non 

Flying 

Pilot 

(%) 

Outside 75 3 75 4 75 6 86 28 61 7 

Inside 25 97 25 96 25 94 14 72 39 93 a

Estimate from watching PI gaze and dwell times with video camera during missions (non-eye tracker). 
19 

4.2 Crew Situation Awareness 

4.2.1 Situation Awareness Ratings 

The overall SART scores provided by the pilots were 19.0 for the CPG and 21.3 for the PI 

(figure 15) during the VUIT-2 missions. These scores indicate that the CPG and PI felt they had 

moderate levels of overall SA during the missions. The difference between SART scores for the 

CPG and PI was not statistically significant (WSRT, Z = –0.491, p = 0.624). The SART scores 

for non-VUIT-2 missions were 19.6 for the CPG and 18.0 for the PI (figure 15). The difference 

between SART scores for the CPG and PI was not statistically significant for the non-VUIT-2 

missions (WSRT, Z = –1.633, p = 0.102). The difference between SART scores for the VUIT-2 

missions and non-VUIT-2 missions was not statistically significant for the CPG (WSRT, Z = 

–0.535, p = 0.593) or for the PI (WSRT, Z = –1.342, p = 0.180). The pilots stated that they had 

higher SA during VUIT-2 missions (vs. non-VUIT-2) mostly because of the “God’s Eye” view 

that the UAS sensor video provided during missions. The UAS sensor video also gave the pilots 

good SA earlier in the mission (vs. non-VUIT-2 missions) because they often received the video 

prior to (or just after) take-off of their aircraft. 

19

21.3

19.6 18

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

VUIT-2 Missions Non-VUIT-2 Missions

SART Scores For VUIT-2 Missions vs. 

Non-VUIT-2 Missions

CPG

PI

Figure 15. Overall SART scores for PI and CPG. 

The pilots reported that they had moderate levels of SA of most of the battlefield elements 

(appendix C) during both VUIT-2 and non-VUIT-2 missions. The battlefield elements included 

location of enemy and friendly units, location of own ship, location of cultural features (e.g., 

bridges), and route information (e.g., waypoints). However, there were instances during VUIT-2 

missions and non-VUIT-2 missions when the aircraft flew near the target(s) and missiles were 

fired outside of the aircraft/UAS constraints. This was likely caused by the lack of extensive 

training and experience with the UAS and the need for improved cueing symbology to help 

pilots understand where both their aircraft and the UAS are located in reference to the targets. 
20 

4.2.2 SME Situation Awareness Ratings 

The SMEs provided an independent assessment of aircrew SA based on the scale shown in 

table 4. The SMEs mean SA rating for aircrews during VUIT-2 missions was 2.08. The SMEs 

mean SA rating for non-VUIT-2 missions was 3.0. This indicates that the SMEs perceived that 

the aircrews typically had adequate levels of SA during the VUIT-2 and non-VUIT-2 missions. 

Table 4. SME situation awareness rating. 

SME Situation Awareness Ratings 

1 Crew was consistently aware of all entities on the battlefield as well as the status 

of their aircraft. 

2 Crew was aware of the battlefield and their own ship with minor or insignificant 

variation between perception and reality. 

3 Crew was aware of the battlefield and their own ship. Variation between reality 

and perception did not significantly impact mission success. 

4 SA needs improvement. Lack of SA had some negative effect on the success of 

the mission. 

5 Lack of SA caused mission failure. 

The SMEs noted that there were instances when the aircraft flew near the target(s) and missiles 

were fired outside of the aircraft/UAS constraints. During the non-VUIT-2 missions, crew 

members occasionally had difficulty identifying friendly targets using the MTADS. The 

misidentification of targets resulted in fratricide and increased workload while both pilots tried to 

determine whether the target was friendly. 

4.2.3 SME Ratings of Mission Success and Mission Objectives 

At the end of each mission, SMEs rated whether the mission was a success or failure. The 

criteria that the SMEs used to rate mission success or failure was whether the aircrew completed 

most or all of their mission objectives and did not get shot down or crash. The SMEs rated all of 

the VUIT-2 missions as “successful” (figure 16). The SMEs rated 17% of the non-VUIT-2 

missions as failures or incomplete. This was due to a fratricide resulting from a misidentification 

of a friendly entity. They also rated whether the aircrew completed their mission objectives. 

The mission objectives were given to the pilots during the pre-mission brief and are listed in 

appendix G. The SMEs believed that the aircrews completed their objectives for 100% of the 

VUIT-2 missions and 83% of the non-VUIT-2 missions. 

Mean Rating 

(Non-VUIT-2)

3.00 

(SD = 1.55)

Mean Rating 

(VUIT-2) 

2.08 

(SD = 0.95)
21 

100%

83%

0%

17%

100%

83%

0%

17%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Successful

Missions

Failed

Missions

Objectives

Completed

Objectives

Not

Completed

VUIT-2

Non-VUIT-2

Figure 16. SME ratings of mission success and mission objectives. 

4.3 UAS Crewstation Interface (UCI) 

Most pilots reported that the UCI was usable, but needed improvements to enhance overall 

effectiveness. The pilots reported some difficulty operating the buttons on the VUIT-2 keypad, 

and that a backspace or clear button was needed to reduce workload and the amount of time 

needed during data entry procedures to correct any errors. Most CPGs reported that the UCI 

contributed to higher workload during the missions due to difficult data entry procedures and 

map symbology. The CPGs also occasionally forgot the steps required for operating the UAS 

interface during set up and target tracking. All CPGs reported that with more experience and 

training, they would be able to remember the steps required for operating the UAS interface. 

CPGs reported that the map symbology for the UAS was difficult to read and interpret. 

Suggestions were made to change the color and scale of the icons, along with modifying the 

manner in which the direction of the UAS sensor is displayed on the map. Several 

improvements that the pilots recommended be made to the UCI to increase usability and 

decrease workload, and the time required to complete tasks, are listed in appendix E. 

4.4 Switch Actuations 

Switch actuations were recorded to help determine whether there were CPG tasks (e.g., UAS 

menu navigation) that need to be streamlined because of excessive switch actuations. The switch 

actuations are summarized in appendix F. The CPGs made an average of 316 switch actuations 

per UAS mission. The CPGs made an average of 53 VUIT-2 specific button presses per mission. 

The total average combined number of button presses for VUIT-2 missions was 369. This 

equates to approximately 7–8 switch actuations per minute, or one switch actuation per 8 s for 

each mission. The switch actuations were often clumped together within specific time intervals. 

Non-VUIT-2 missions averaged 525 button presses per mission. This equates to approximately 

11 button presses per minute, or one switch actuation every 5 s interval for each mission. The 

rise in the number of switch actuations from VUIT-2 missions to non-VUIT-2 missions was 

mostly due to the increased use of the MTADS FOV switch. The pilots were forced to use the 
22 

MTADS to search for targets rather than the UAS video feed, causing an increase in the amount 

of button presses required to search and locate targets. The switches that were actuated most 

often by the CPG during both VUIT-2 and non-VUIT-2 missions were the MTADS FOV select 

switch, right-hand grip slave select switch, left-hand grip tracker switch, right-hand grip laser 

trigger, right MPD bezel buttons, and the weapon trigger. The pilots reported that they did not 

think that the number of switch actuations per mission was excessive. Many of the switch 

actuations were momentary actuations of the MTADS FOV select switch and right-hand grip 

slave select switch. 

Table 5 summarizes the number of MPD page changes per mission. The average number of 

right and left MPD page changes was 50 for the CPG and 48 for the PI per VUIT-2 mission. The 

average number of right and left MPD page changes during non-VUIT-2 missions was 39 for the 

CPG and 24 for the PI (table 6). The Tactical Situation Display (TSD) and Tactical Common 

Data Link (TCDL) pages were the pages most often displayed by the CPG and PI during 

missions. 

Table 5. MPD page changes during the VUIT-2 missions. 

No. of Page Changes per Mission (VUIT-2 Missions)

Mission 

CPG 

(Right MPD) 

CPG 

(Left MPD) 

Pilot 

(Right MPD) 

Pilot 

(Left MPD) 

1 59 47 40 42 

2 34 20 9 76 

3 2 35 27 8 

4 40 2 14 30 

5 29 26 11 20 

6 28 0 0 6 

7 24 15 28 44 

8 31 1 13 14 

Average 30.875 18.25 17.75 30 

Std. dev. 15.93 17.22 12.87 23.52 

Min 2 0 0 6 

Max 59 47 40 76 

Table 6. MPD page changes during the non-VUIT-2 missions. 

No. of Page Changes per Mission(Non-VUIT-2 Missions) 

Mission 

CPG 

(Right MPD) 

CPG 

(Left MPD) 

Pilot 

(Right MPD) 

Pilot 

(Left MPD) 

9 22 18 5 21 

10 21 2 8 42 

11 14 37 19 13 

12 24 16 11 0 

Average 20.25 18.25 10.75 19 

Std. dev. 4.35 14.38 6.02 17.61 

Min 14 2 5 0 

Max 24 37 19 42 
23 

4.5 Top Improvements Recommended by Pilots 

The pilots recommended that several improvements be made to the UCI and UAS to increase 

usability and decrease workload and the time required to complete tasks. Following are the most 

significant improvements that the pilots recommended be made to improve UAS employment. 

Examples for each improvement are listed in appendix E. 

• Need the ability to record MTADS and VUIT-2 video and audio communications without 

switching one recorder off. 

• UAV icon colors should be changed to make them more easily recognizable while 

scanning. 

• Map needs increased fidelity and proper scaling of icons and symbology. 

• UAV icons should be integrated into the current TSD page. 

• Improve functionality of the VUIT-2 keypad, to include a backspace function and enter 

key. 

• Need battlefield graphics to aid with remote laser designation during target engagements. 

4.6 Simulator Sickness 

Pilots reported that they typically experienced very mild to mild simulator sickness symptoms 

during the evaluation. The overall mean Total Severity (TS) score (post mission) for the pilots 

was 4.98 (table 7). The mean TS score for the CPGs was 7.79 and the mean TS score for the PIs 

was 2.18. The difference between the pre-flight SSQ and the post-flight SSQ scores for the CPG 

was not statistically significant (WSRT, Z = –0.768, p = 0.461). The difference between the preflight SSQ and the post-flight SSQ scores for the PI was also not statistically significant (WSRT, 

Z = 0.000, p = 1.000). Based on the categorization of simulator sickness symptoms proposed by 

Kennedy et al. (2002) (table 8), the pilots experienced “minimal” simulator sickness symptoms 

during the missions. 

Table 7. Simulator sickness questionnaire (SSQ) ratings. 

Condition 

Nausea 

Subscale 

Oculomotor 

Subscale 

Disorientation 

Subscale 

Total Severity 

Score (Mean) 

Pre-mission (CPG) 3.97 6.31 4.64 5.92 

Post-mission (CPG) 3.97 7.58 9.28 7.79 

Pre-mission (PI) 1.59 3.15 0 2.18 

Post-mission (PI) 2.38 2.52 0 2.18 

Pre-mission CPG and PI 2.78 4.73 2.32 4.05 

Post-mission CPG and PI 3.18 5.05 4.64 4.98 
24 

Table 8. Categorization of simulator sickness symptoms. 

SSQ Total Score Categorization 

0 No symptoms 

<5 Negligible symptoms (PI) 

5–10 Minimal symptoms (CPG) 

10–15 Significant symptoms 

15–20 Symptoms are a concern 

>20 A problem simulator 

Note: Categorization of symptoms based on central tendency (mean or median) 

using military aviation personnel in each simulator (Kennedy, 2002). 

4.7 Comparison of RACRS Simulator SSQ Scores to Other Helicopter Simulators 

To assess whether the SSQ ratings provided by the pilots during the assessment were similar or 

different to ratings obtained in other helicopter simulators, the mean SSQ scores for the RACRS 

simulator were compared to the mean SSQ scores for several other helicopter simulators (table 9). 

The other helicopter simulators were the AH-64A (Army Research Institute, non-motion 

simulator), Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH-70), S-3H, CH-46E, CH-56D, CH-56F, 

Sikorsky RAH-66 Engineering Development Simulator (EDS), RAH-66 Comanche Portable 

Cockpit (CPC), and the simulator used during the UH-60M for the Early User Demo (EUD), 

RACRS (UAS) and Limited Early User Evaluation (LEUE). In comparison, the RACRS 

induced fewer simulator sickness symptoms than the other helicopter simulators listed in table 9. 

Based on pilot SSQ ratings, observation by ARL HRED personnel during missions, feedback 

during post mission interviews, and comparison of SSQ ratings with ratings from other 

helicopter simulators, it is reasonable to assume that the simulator sickness symptoms the pilots 

experienced did not (1) cause them significant discomfort, (2) distract them during missions, or 

(3) contribute to an increase in perceived workload. 

Table 9. Comparison of RACRS simulator SSQ ratings with other helicopter simulators. 

Simulator 

Nausea 

Subscale 

Oculomotor 

Subscale 

Disorientation 

Subscale 

Total Severity Score 

(Mean) 

AH-64Aa — — — 25.81 

ARH-70 18.02 21.48 9.28 20.15 

SH-3H 14.70 20.00 12.40 18.80 

RAH-66 EDS 11.84 14.98 4.54 13.25 

CH-53F 7.50 10.50 7.40 10.00 

RAH-66 CPC 3.29 12.94 7.89 9.80 

UH-60M (LEUE) 6.36 11.81 3.09 9.15 

RACRS (UAS) 9.01 7.58 4.64 8.51 

UH-60M (EUD) 13.88 6.89 0 8.50 

CH-53D 7.20 7.20 4.00 7.50 

CH-46E 5.40 7.80 4.50 7.00 

RACRS (VUIT-2) 3.18 5.05 4.64 4.98 a

SSQ subscale data not available. 
25 

5. Conclusions

Pilots reported that they typically experienced tolerable workload when performing missions 

while controlling the UAS. They reported that the workload they experienced was comparable 

to workload they experienced during “non-VUIT-2” missions. They stated that having to 

interact with an additional sensor (UAS sensor) increased their overall task workload, but the SA 

provided by the UAS sensor decreased the workload required to detect and engage targets, and 

decreased overall target engagement timelines. The SMEs reported that the pilots typically 

experienced tolerable workload when controlling the UAS during missions, but had reduced 

spare workload capacity. The workload ratings provided by the pilots and SMEs were lower 

than the Objective and Threshold workload ratings requirements listed in the Apache Block III 

(AB3) Capability Development Document (CDD) (table 10). 

5.1 Crew Workload 

Table 10. Pilot workload requirements and ratings. 

CDD Bedford Workload 

Rating Requirements 

Pilot Bedford Workload 

Ratings for VUIT-2 

Missions 

SME Bedford Workload 

Ratings for VUIT-2 

Missions 

Objective req. – ‘5.0’ 

Threshold req. – ‘6.0’ 

PI – ‘2.6’ 

CPG – ‘3.3’ 

PI – ‘2.5’ 

CPG – ‘3.9’ 

5.2 Crew Situation Awareness 

Pilots typically experienced moderate levels of SA during missions. They reported that they had 

high levels of SA of most of the battlefield elements (e.g., threat location) during the missions. 

However, there were instances when they flew near the targets and fired missiles outside of the 

aircraft/UAS constraints. This was likely caused by the lack of extensive training and experience 

with the UAS and the need for improved cueing symbology to help pilots understand where their 

aircraft and the UAS are located in reference to the targets. The pilots stated that they had higher 

SA during VUIT-2 missions (vs. non-VUIT-2 missions) mostly because of the “God’s Eye” view 

that the UAS sensor video provided during missions. The UAS sensor video also gave the pilots 

good SA earlier in the mission (vs. non-VUIT-2 missions) because they often received the video 

prior to (or just after) take-off of their aircraft. The SMEs reported that the aircrews typically 

had adequate levels of SA.
26 

5.3 Crew Coordination 

The SMEs identified no significant problems with aircrew coordination during the VUIT-2 and 

non-VUIT-2 missions. The SMEs rated aircrew coordination during VUIT-2 missions as 

“Excellent” (15%), “Good” (31%), or “Average” (54%). The SMEs rated aircrew coordination 

during non-VUIT-2 missions as “Excellent” (17%), “Good” (33%), or “Average” (50%). 

5.4 UAS-Crewstation Interface 

Most pilots reported that the UCI was usable, but needed improvements to enhance overall 

effectiveness. They reported that they were able to appropriately operate the VUIT Interface 

Panel (VIP) switches and keypad to accomplish UAS mission tasks, although the current 

configuration was not considered the most efficient design. Pilots commented that the number of 

switch actuations per mission was not excessive. They also felt that the overall design of the 

UCI somewhat hindered them from interacting with the UAS in a timely manner, and reported 

that the UCI contributed to high workload during specific data entry procedures and symbology 

interpretation. In some instances, the buttons were considered too small to manipulate quickly, 

and pilots reported that remembering their appropriate functions was difficult. The functionality 

of the keypad also caused an increase in time and workload during some missions. All of the 

pilots reported that the symbology presented was difficult to understand. 

The pilots recommended that several enhancements should be made to improve the VUIT-2 

crewstation interface and overall operation (appendix E). The pilots commented that with 

several enhancements and more experience using the system, most of the increased workload and 

decreased efficiency could be improved. 

5.5 Simulator Sickness 

Pilots reported that they typically experienced very mild to mild simulator sickness symptoms 

during the evaluation. The simulator sickness symptoms the pilots experienced did not (1) cause 

them significant discomfort, (2) distract them during missions, or (3) contribute to an increase in 

perceived workload. 

6. Recommendations

The following recommendations are made to enhance the overall effectiveness and suitability of 

the UAS VUIT-2 integration into the AH-64D: 

• Address and incorporate the recommended improvements (as appropriate) provided by the 

pilots. 

• Use the Crew Station Working Group to address and incorporate the recommended 

improvements. 
27 

• Upgrade the RACRS simulator to make it representative of the AH-64D Block 3 design to 

enhance future simulations. 

• Continue using the RACRS to help train pilots, and refine the UCI and TTPs for the Block 

2 UAS integration (VUIT). 

• Maximize the amount of pilot training for future UAS evaluations. 

• Use the same data collection methodology (e.g., Bedford, SART) during future simulations 

and tests for Apache VUIT-2 teaming. Standardizing the data collection methodology will 

help identify changes that work (e.g., changes that reduce workload), identify areas that 

still need more work, and drive continuous incremental improvements. 

• Incorporate VUIT-2 capability into the Longbow Crew Trainers to aid with pilot training. 
28 

7. References 

Crowley, J. S. Simulator sickness: A Problem for Army Aviation. Aviation Space and 

Environmental Medicine 1987, 58, 355–357. 

Endsley, M. R. Design and Evaluation for Situation Awareness Enhancement. Proceedings of 

the Human Factors Society 32nd Annual Meeting, Vol. 1, 92–101, 1988.

Endsley, M. R. Situation Awareness Analysis and Measurement. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: 

Mahwah, NJ, 2000. 

Kennedy, R. S.; Drexler, J. M.; Compton, D. E.; Stanney, K. M.; Lanham, D. S.; Harm, D. L. 

Configural Scoring of Simulator Sickness, Cybersickness, and Space Adaptation Syndrome: 

Similarities and Differences. In Virtual and Adaptive Environments: Applications, 

Implications, and Human Performance; Hettinger, L. J., Haas, M. W., Eds., Mahwah, NJ: 

Erlbaum, 2002, pp. 247–278. 

Kennedy, R. S.; Lane, N. E.; Berbaum, K. S.; Lilienthal, M. G. Simulator Sickness 

Questionnaire: An Enhanced Method for Quantifying Simulator Sickness. International 

Journal of Aviation Psychology 1993, 3, 203–220. 

Kennedy, R. S.; Lilienthal, M. G.; Berbaum, B. A.; Balzley, B. A.; McCauley, M. E. Simulator 

sickness in U.S. Navy Flight Simulators. Aviation Space and Environmental Medicine 1989,

60, 10–16. 

O’Brien, T. G.; Charlton, S. G. Handbook of Human Factors Testing and Evaluation; Lawrence 

Erlbaum Associates: Mahwah, NJ, 1996. 

Roscoe, A. H. The Airline Pilots View of Flight Deck Workload: A Preliminary Study Using a 

Questionnaire; Technical Memorandum No. FS (B) 465; Royal Aircraft Establishment: 

Bedford, UK, 1985. 

Roscoe, A. H.; Ellis, G. A. A Subjective Rating Scale for Assessing Pilot Workload in Flight: A 

Decade of Practical Use. Royal Aerospace Establishment: Bedford, UK, 1990. 

Taylor, R. M. Situational Awareness Rating Technique (SART): The Development of a Tool for 

Aircrew Systems Design. Proceedings of the NATO Advisory Group on Aerospace Research 

and Development (AGARD) Symposium on Situational Awareness in Aerospace Operations 

AGARD-CP-478, 3/1 - 3/17), Neuilly Sur Seine, France: NATO – AGARD, 1989.
29 

Appendix A. Bedford Workload Rating Scale Scores and Pilot Comments

 

This appendix appears in its original form, without editorial change. 
30 

Bedford Workload Rating Scale 

 Workload Description “Rating”

 

Pilot Decisions 

 

 Was it possible to 

 complete the task? 

Was workload tolerable 

for the task?

Was workload

satisfactory 

without reduction in 

spare (workload) capacity?

NO 

NO

NO 

Workload insignificant 1 

Workload low 

Enough spare capacity for all 

desirable additional tasks 

 2 

 3

Insufficient spare capacity for easy 

attention to additional tasks 

Reduced spare capacity. Additional 

tasks cannot be given the desired 

amount of attention 

Little spare capacity: level of effort 

allows little attention to additional 

tasks 

YES

YES

YES

 4 

 

 5 

 6 

Very little spare capacity, but 

maintenance of effort in the primary 

tasks not in question 

Extremely high workload. No spare 

capacity. Serious doubts as to ability 

to maintain level of effort 

Very high workload with almost no 

spare capacity. Difficulty in 

maintaining level of effort 

 

 7 

 

 8 

 9 

Task abandoned. Pilot unable to 

apply sufficient effort 

 

10 
31 

Flight and Mission Tasks VUIT 2 Mission 

Workload Rating 

Non VUIT-2 Mission 

Workload Rating 

Seat Front Back Front Back 

Before Takeoff Checks 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.0 

Observing NAI’s 3.0 1.5 3.0 1.0 

Target Detection 2.9 2.4 3.3 2.0 

Target Acquisition 2.5 2.3 3.7 3.0 

Target Engagement 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.0 

Movement To Contact 2.3 2.0 3.0 1.5 

Actions On Contact 2.7 2.0 2.5 2.5 

Battle Damage Assessment 

And Reporting 1.4 1.5 2.0 1.5 

Mission Change 2.3 2.2 2.0 3.0 

Battle Handover 2.3 1.7 3.0 

Tactical Navigation 

 (Contour/NOE) 2.0 1.4 1.0 1.5 

Communications (TOC, Wingman) 2.1 2.0 1.5 3.0 

NOE/Contour/Low Level Flight 2.3 1.4 2.0 1.0 

Maintain Airspace Surveillance 3.3 2.4 2.0 3.0 

VMC Flight Maneuvers 1.8 1.5 1.0 1.5 

Electronically Aided Navigation 2.5 1.5 1.7 2.0 

Terrain Flight Navigation 2.2 1.4 1.0 1.0 

Masking and Unmasking 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 

Evasive Maneuvers 2.3 2.0 2.0 

MTADS/PNVS Operations 2.7 1.8 2.0 1.5 

Route Recon 1.7 1.4 3.0 1.5 

Area Recon 1.7 1.4 3.0 1.0 

Level 2 UAS Control 2.9 2.0 

Data Entry Procedures 3.6 2.0 2.3 1.0 
32 

Engage with Hellfire 1.9 2.1 1.7 1.5 

Engage with 2.75 Rockets 1.5 1.5 1.0 

Engage with 30mm AWS 2.3 1.3 1.7 1.0 

Multi-ship Operations 2.4 1.5 2.0 2.3 

Transmit Tactical Reports 2.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 

Identify Major US/Allied and Threat 

Equipment 2.1 1.6 3.0 3.0 

Information Management In The 

Front Seat (CPG) 3.3 ----- 2.3 ----- 

Information Management In The 

Back Seat (Pilot) ----- 2.6 ----- 2.3 

Average Ratings for ATM Tasks 2.3 1.8 2.2 1.8 

Overall Workload Rating For The 

Mission (Average) 3.3 2.6 3.0 3.7 

Pilot Workload Comments 

If you gave a workload rating of ‘5’ or higher for any task in the UAS mission column, explain why 

the workload was high for the task. 

Explanations as to why the pilots assigned a rating of ‘5’ or higher for a task 

(VUIT-2 Missions) 

Question 1: 

Target Detection and Acquisition: 

• Target detection and acquisition. With VUIT you have the ability to see the target and 

atmosphere from a distance. W/out VUIT we depend on “most of the time” a general grid from 

ground units. VUIT a definite plus. 

• Target detection. You know there is a target out there, but actually detecting it is frustrating. – 

Non UAV is frustrating but you don’t know there is a target there. 

• Target Detection. Enroute VUIT is a great asset in detecting targets. Once you’re in the fight it’s 

too busy for the CPG to be messing with the VUIT. It turns the pilot into truly alone and in the 

fight.
33 

• Target Detection. We know there is a target there, but where in relation to our A/C and altitude. 

Maintain Aircraft/Airspace Surveillance: 

• Maintain A/C surveillance. A lot of heads down in the front seat in light out operations it is a big 

concern for obstacle avoidance. 

• Maintain Airspace. Heads down entire flight, could not spare time to help clear A/C. 

• Airspace Surveillance. Same as before, only one set of eyes outside and a more complex mission. 

Data Entry: 

• Data Entry. If you place another piece of equipment in the aircraft it requires you to enter more 

information, but the VUIT increases your SA 10x fold which decreases your workload. 

• Data entry. Takes so much time to enter numbers, then if you mess up, no backing up, I had to 

restart the page. 

Information Management: 

• Info. Management. A lot of info quick, CPG has to prioritize what must happen first and this 

does not leave much spare attention to other tasks. 

• Information management. Was able to keep awareness, but due to the VUIT I was having some 

problems maintaining the UAV location. Had to depend on the CPG for that. 

• Information Management (CPG). I still spend too much time inside and not outside gathering 

situation awareness. 

• Pilot Info Management. More complex mission and the use of VUIT-2 limits how quickly we can 

change from VUIT to VCR. 

Communication: 

• Commo. A lot more target activity and commo requirement for this type of mission. 

(Non-VUIT-2 Missions) 

Question 1: 

Target Acquisition: 

• Target acquisition. Was a little more difficult compared to a VUIT engagement. Actually PID’ing 

the correct target. 

• TGT ACQ – due to the fact the simulator is not like the A/C.
34 

Communication: 

• Commo. More complex mission requires more communications between all members of the 

flight. 

List any flight and/or mission tasks that you had to ask your crewmember to accomplish because 

your workload was too high. 

 (VUIT-2 Missions) 

Question 2: 

• I didn’t need anything to be done for me. However, sensing how busy the CPG was with the 

VUIT, the radios, and targeting. I took a lot of the radio traffic on as well as some engagements. 

• Engagement of one target was taken over by PLT gun because of closeness to target. 

• 2 Hellfire missiles lost due to lost of SA and crew coordination due to workload. Increase in 

workload due to both mission type and some VUIT requirements.
35 

Appendix B. Subject Matter Expert Workload Comments

 

This appendix appears in its original form, without editorial change. 
36 

If you assigned a workload rating of ‘5’ or higher for either crewmember, explain why: 

(VUIT-2 Missions) 

TSC WL1: 

• Much better “SA” than yesterday for this crew. CPG had a much better grasp of the system. 

• Good mission. 

• Had to be prompted to come out of freeze on the VUIT-2. Did not use VUIT-2 map for 

orientation. Front seat couldn’t move sensor, but was still autotracking. 

• Both set up VUIT video, B/S up flight page. B/S told warlock deviation to engage ZSU. 

• Crew still had difficulty operating VUIT system. Crew recorded engagement well. No reports to 

warlock that they were going to engage. 

• Because of CPG unfamiliarity with Longbow systems, this caused greater workload when VUIT2 capability was added. CPG saturated and having difficulty including additional tasks. 

(Non-VUIT-2 Missions) 

TSC WL1: 

• Pilot inside helping CPG with engagement, almost allowed aircraft to descend into ground. 

• Flew constantly enroute at 106%. Front seater had difficulty manipulating the MTADS auto 

tracker. 

• Front seat was unaware that his missile and laser code did not match. ZSU engagement. 30mm 

was at the AZ limit. A/C heading 302 TADS heading 180. 

• The crew at times had difficulty orienting their sensor and the A/C in the same direction to 

effectively track and engage targets. 

SME Aircrew Coordination Comments: 

(VUIT-2 Missions) 

TSC WL2: 

• Good coordination for weapons engagements. 

Describe any problems that aircrews had with situation awareness: 

 (VUIT-2 Missions) 

TSC SA: 

• Engagement 1 – Good geometry/good remote shot. 
37 

• Engagement 2 – CPG intent on adding information and allowing TADS to hit symbol units. 

While changing between UAS video, crew was sent incorrect data causing confusion. Updated 

grid with wrong identifier (VD instead of WD). CPG kept up screen capture mode after inserting 

grid, not required and ties up MPD. 

• Crew was aware of their position and the UAS position. 

• Engagement 1 – Good engagement. 

• Engagement 2 – Remote, good geometry for shot, target destroyed. 

• Engagement 1 – Good shot. Good use of UAS. 

• Engagement 2 – Good SA comparing UAS video to TADS video. Crew should be cognizant of 

getting too close to enemy (do not overfly target). 

• Engagement 1 – CPG inserted wrong Freq. not received UAS video slowing the process. This is 

not he first time this CPG has inputted wrong Freq, but getting better. Both crewmembers have 

VUIT-2 video up all the time. Recommend using VUIT-2 video/map for orientation, especially 

during autonomous engagement. 

• Engagement 2 – Crew read back Freq’s. (good technique) good engagements. 

• Good mission. 

• Operator knowledge of MTADS caused confusion in cockpit. CPG should try to coordinated 

UAS video to TADS video instead of inserting grids. Inserting grids takes more times for 

engagement. CPG has difficulty coordinating video from UAS and TADS video. Fired missile 

out of constraints, shot wrong target. UAS video frozen for 5 minutes without CPG correction. 

(Non-VUIT-2 Missions) 

TSC SA: 

• CMWS ineffective at altitudes aircraft at. Aircraft susceptible to SA missile threats. Pilot so low 

and inside that he allowed aircraft to come within 17 feet of ground contact. 

• Friendly casualty in objective. Friendly given as in mangrove, north of 3a. Crew shot friendly. 

• Poor MTADS tracking almost caused missile miss on ZSU. 

Did the aircrew complete their mission objectives? 

(Non-VUIT-2 Missions) 

TSC MS1: 

• Friendly was shot. 

If no, why weren’t the mission objectives completed?
38 

(Non-VUIT-2 Missions) 

TSC MS2: 

• Fratricide.
39 

Appendix C. Situation Awareness Ratings and Comments

 

This appendix appears in its original form, without editorial change. 
40 

SA RATINGS (VUIT-2 Missions) 

Front Seat 

‘Demand’ During Missions 

Low 1-------3-------5-------7-------9-------11-------13-------15-------17-------19-------21 High 

‘Supply’ During Missions 

Low 1-------4--------7--------10--------13--------16--------19--------21--------24-------28 High 

‘Understanding’ During Missions 

Low 1-------3-------5-------7-------9-------11-------13-------15-------17-------19-------21 High

Overall SART Score: 19.0 

Back Seat

13.38

17.63

14.75
41 

‘Demand’ During Missions 

Low 1-------3-------5-------7-------9-------11-------13-------15-------17-------19-------21 High 

‘Supply’ During Missions 

Low 1-------4--------7--------10--------13--------16--------19--------21--------24-------28 High 

‘Understanding’ During Missions 

Low 1-------3-------5-------7-------9-------11-------13-------15-------17-------19-------21 High

Overall SART Score: 21.38 

SA RATINGS (Non – VUIT-2 Missions) 

Front Seat 

12.5

18.88

15.0
42 

‘Demand’ During Missions 

Low 1-------3-------5-------7-------9-------11-------13-------15-------17-------19-------21 High 

‘Supply’ During Missions 

Low 1-------4--------7--------10--------13--------16--------19--------21--------24-------28 High 

‘Understanding’ During Missions 

Low 1-------3-------5-------7-------9-------11-------13-------15-------17-------19-------21 High

Overall SART Score: 19.67 

SA RATINGS (Non – VUIT-2 Missions) 

Back Seat 

13.33

19.67

13.33
43 

‘Demand’ During Missions 

Low 1-------3-------5-------7-------9-------11-------13-------15-------17-------19-------21 High 

‘Supply’ During Missions 

Low 1-------4--------7--------10--------13--------16--------19--------21--------24-------28 High 

‘Understanding’ During Missions 

Low 1-------3-------5-------7-------9-------11-------13-------15-------17-------19-------21 High

Overall SART Score: 18.0 

13.0

19.33

11.67
44 

Battlefield Elements Ratings (VUIT-2 Missions) 

Battlefield 

Elements 

Very High 

Level of 

Situation 

Awareness 

Fairly High 

Level of 

Situation 

Awareness 

Borderline 

Fairly Low 

Level of 

Situation 

Awareness 

Very Low 

Level of 

Situation 

Awareness 

Front Back Front Back Front Back Front Back Front Back 

Location of 

Enemy Units 25% 38% 50% 25% 13% 25% 13% 13% 0% 0% 

Location of 

My Aircraft 

During 

Missions 

38% 38% 50% 50% 0% 13% 13% 0% 0% 0% 

Location of 

Other Aircraft 

In My Flight 

0% 0% 25% 25% 50% 63% 13% 13% 13% 0% 

Route 

Information 

(ACPs, BPs, 

EAs, RPs, etc.) 

25% 25% 38% 63% 25% 0% 13% 13% 0% 0% 

Status of My 

Aircraft 

Systems (e.g., 

fuel 

consumption) 

13% 38% 38% 38% 25% 13% 13% 0% 13% 13% 
45 

Battlefield Elements Ratings (Non – VUIT-2 Missions) 

Battlefield 

Elements 

Very High Level 

of Situation 

Awareness 

Fairly High 

Level of 

Situation 

Awareness 

Borderline 

Fairly Low 

Level of 

Situation 

Awareness 

Very Low 

Level of 

Situation 

Awareness 

Front Back Front Back Front Back Front Back Front Back 

Location of 

Enemy Units 0% 0% 33% 33% 67% 67% 0% 0% 0% 0% 

Location of 

My Aircraft 

During 

Missions 

67% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 

Location of 

Other Aircraft 

In My Flight 

0% 0% 67% 33% 33% 67% 0% 0% 0% 0% 

Route 

Information 

(ACPs, BPs, 

EAs, RPs, 

etc.) 

0% 33% 33% 33% 67% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 

Status of My 

Aircraft 

Systems (e.g., 

fuel 

consumption) 

33% 0% 33% 67% 33% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 

Pilot Situational Awareness Comments 

APACHE UAS SA Comments 

SA2 (VUIT-2 Missions): 

• When the grid passed off by the battle captain was wrong, but the UAV feed cleared up the 

situation. 

• Received no information on civilian areas but also didn’t ask. I think as a P/C in the real world, I 

would take longer before allowing the CPG to shoot. I’d have him looking at collateral damage 

possibilities more. We had problems with getting correct grids for targets which is actually more 

realistic. The terrain was challenging (complicated more by the grid issues). Higher altitudes 

helped reduce workload immensely and kept me as the backseater from having the urge to get 

close because I wouldn’t be able to see the target due to structure of the A/C. 

• During the remote engagements, I had to put more attention to finding the UAVs location to me 

and the target.
46 

• Location of friendly units. Need a BFT icon for UAV to provide location info to B/S. F/S has 

same degree of UAS location on VUIT map which was not available to pilot in B/S. 

• Once Blackjack dismounted they entered the city. Commander didn’t know where his soldiers 

were, so we quit shooting until he said they were clear. We got too close and would have taken 

damage, however based on the speed the lift and ground forces moved it’s impossible to stay 

back. A lot of questions that an AMR with lift and inf would have corrected. 

• When the troop got off of their A/C, I could not see them. I don’t know if it was a LCT issue or if 

they went behind a building. I could not fire due to unknown location at first. 

• I didn’t keep up with the other A/C once we engaged. I still had no time to monitor A/C systems 

due to other activities. 

• Location of my A/C – because of requirement to focus inside cockpit, location SA was lost a few 

times. Majority of the dwell time inside cockpit caused by similar limitation (no IHADSS 

boresight) some caused by CPG lack of familiarity with MTADS (only 3.0 hours). 

• Difficulty remembering to unfreeze UAV feed. 

SA2 (Non – VUIT-2 Missions): 

• I was inside so much I could not keep a mental picture. 

• We were uncertain of the location of the non combatants and the informant. 

• Miscommunication in locating personnel.
47 

Appendix D. VUIT-2-Crewstation Interface Ratings and Comments

 

This appendix appears in its original form, without editorial change. 
48 

P1. Did you experience any problems using the VIP keys during mission to accomplish UAV tasks? 

Place an X in the ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ column for each key listed below. If you checked ‘Yes’, explain the 

problems you experienced: 

UAV MAP 

• Needed smaller icons. My icon needs same cues. Can’t see UAVS holding cues. 

• Map and icons are hard to read and see. 

• Concerned that the system will no be able to hold enough map data. 

• Detail is limited. 

MTCDL PG 

• Just needs faster means of fixing Freq. 

FRQ SCRL 

• Just need the ability back space or entry. 

• Can’t back out. 

• Needs to have a data entry field of its own, instead of defaulting to data entry field on key 2 page. 

• Labeled wrong, should be UAV pg. 

XMT O/O 

VIP Keys Yes No 

1 – UAV MAP 67% 33% 

2 – MTCDL PG 17% 83% 

3 – BIT PG 0% 100% 

4 – FRQ SCRL 67% 33% 

5 – STR PIC 0% 100% 

6 – RCL PIC 17% 83% 

7 – ZM IN 17% 83% 

8 – KEY INFO 0% 100% 

9 – ZM OUT 0% 100% 

0 – XMT O/O 17% 83% 

CNCL * 33% 67% 

NUM LOC # 33% 67% 
49 

• This should be an enter also. 

ZM IN 

• It zoomed in on the same map, not different scales. 

RCL PIC 

• Need ability to delete saved images that are no longer required. 

CNCL 

• Need single space clear and backspace option available. 

• Need to have a single back clear, not clear all as it is now. 

NUM LOC 

• Name and visual does not really correlate to the buttons function which is cursor select and data 

enter. 

• Confusing why it is labeled NUM LOC. 

P2. Overall, how quickly were you able to use the VIP keypad and switches to accomplish UAV tasks 

(e.g., data entry, toggling keys)? 

 1 2 3 4 5 

 __________________________________________________________ 

 Very Somewhat Borderline Somewhat Very 

 Quickly Quickly Slowly Slowly 

If ‘Somewhat Slowly or ‘Very Slowly’, describe the problems you experienced: 

• The buttons are too small for fast operation. There needs to be more streamline setup like a 

computer keyboard. “Just use the KU” keyboard unit in the A/C now. 

• Rated “Somewhat Slowly” due to operator proficiency. I expect to improve with continued use. 

A second reason is the button functionality issues addressed on page 1 i.e. cncl clear function, 

key 4 data entry on key 2 page, etc. 

P3. Was there any UAV symbology or wording depicted on the MPD that was difficult to quickly and 

easily understand? 

• Yes 100% No 0% 

2.7 
50 

If yes, explain which symbology or wording was difficult to understand and why: 

• Hard to see icon cues on map. 

• The symbology was very hard to see on our MPD. The icons represented around 800 meters on 

the map scale, which we used. It made it hard to tell where everything was really at. You could 

not see the symbology which tells which way it was flying or looking. 

• Lack of flight info (i.e. north arrow, UAS altitude, uas speed, uas direction of travel) for UAS. 

Lack of color symbols (i.e. sensor pointing direction) displayed on map. 

• LOS arrow symbology should be black, not white and have a different symbol on the end. ----X 

• The UAV line of sight arrow is difficult to break out from the background map. 

• Symbology on the map page is too large for that scale of map. Need to have a North seeking 

arrow on VUIT video page. 

P4. On average, how often did the design of the UAV interface (e.g., VIP, infor on MPD) significantly 

hinder you from quickly and easily performing UAV tasks? 

(Circle one) 

 

 1 2 3 4 

 ________________________________________________________________ 

 Never Seldom Often Frequently 

• If ‘Often or Frequently’, describe how the design of the UAV interface significantly hindered you 

from quickly and easily performing UAV tasks: 

• Its just hard because its not integrated and your MPD usage is too much. 

• Same as similar problems. 

• Not having a back arrow or a dedicated “enter” button slows down our ability to quickly input the 

desired info. 

P5. On average, how often did the design of the UAV interface contribute to high workload when 

controlling the UAV? (Circle one) 

 

 1 2 3 4 

 ________________________________________________________________ 

 Never Seldom Often Frequently 

2.7 

2.5 
51 

If ‘Often or Frequently’, describe how the design of the UAS interface contributed to high workload 

during missions: 

• It was the whole problem. 

• Same as similar problems 

• Not having a back arrow or a dedicated “enter” button slows down our ability to quickly input the 

desired info. 

P6. List any other UAV interface usability features that hindered your performance during the 

missions: 

• Not being able to record your video at same time. 

• Most important is inability to record VUIT video and coordinating communications with the on 

board A/C recording system.
52 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.
53 

Appendix E. Top Improvements for VUIT-2 Integration

 

This appendix appears in its original form, without editorial change. 
54 

Top Improvements Recommended By Pilots 

Video/VCR 

• Need to be able to record on VCR as we receive VUIT video. 

• Redesign to record UAV feed. 

• Have two recorders so we don’t have to switch ours off.

• Need to be able to record our TADS video without switching. People will forget to switch 

• On board recording capability of VUIT video and comms. 

Symbology 

• Need to change the colors of the icon so we can scan them. 

• LOS arrow needs to better break itself out from the background. 

• Change MPD UAV symbol to black. 

TSD Integration 

• Needs to work with current TSD page. 

• Have the UAV icon integrated on our TSD.

Map 

• Need to see our site and heading on the map icon. Very important for remote. This will reduce 

the time. 

• Map data fidelity. 

• Need to have the ability of different scales of maps in the VUIT feed. Making the symbols scale 

to each map. Current symbols are too large for the 1:250k map. 

Keyboard/Button Functionality 

• Make sure the VIP works the same as the keyboard unit. Need an enter button, and 

backspace/clear button. 

• Button functionality issues. 

• Have a backup button when your inputting frequency. 

• Need to have an “enter” button and a single space, backspace ability.

• Use a rocker switch for scroll and zoom, this will free up a couple of buttons for other functions. 

Miscellaneous
55 

• Being able to recall the MGRS grid after you have stored it.

• Get a standard format for the remote handover. 

• Be able to select a preset frequency.
56 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.
57 

Appendix F. Switch Actuations (UAS)

 

This appendix appears in its original form, without editorial change. 
58

Number of Switch Actuations Per Mission 

Column Detailed Description 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 A

TFOV Left Hand Grip TAD FOV Select 66 54 24 20 153 130 126 80 81.Slave Right Hand Grip Slave Select 43 30 16 26 68 83 25 53 4Tracker Left Hand Grip Tracker Switch 8 38 4 10 18 44 120 46 3Laser Right Hand Grip Laser Trigger 24 21 6 3 41 51 60 64 33CPGR CPG Right Bezel Buttons 43 44 3 38 20 29 21 35 29.PLTL Pilot Left Bezel Buttons 52 11 8 28 24 15 4 7 18.PLTR Pilot Right Bezel Buttons 45 6 22 10 25 0 21 7 1CPGL CPG Left Bezel Buttons 32 16 39 5 21 0 6 8 15.WpnTrig Weapon Trigger 4 4 4 4 20 12 46 26 1WpnSel Left Hand Grip Weapon Select 6 6 2 20 20 14 8 12 1TgtSt Left Hand Grip Target Store 4 5 0 0 12 10 0 37 8LMC Left Hand Grip LMC Select 3 8 0 4 1 6 0 10 4 Sensor Left Hand Grip Sensor Select 2 5 0 2 0 0 0 2 1.3DisB TEDAC Display Brightness Rocker Switch 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 0.6TVidSel TEDAC TADS Video Select 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.Level TEDAD Level Rocker Switch 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.1DisC TEDAC Display Contrast Rocker Switch 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.1UFOV UAV Field of View 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Gain TEDAC Gain Rocker Switch 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PVidSel TEDAC PNVS Video Select 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SymB TEDAC Symbology Brightness Rocker Switch 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Scan Left Hand Grip Scan Switch 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 UVidSel TEDAC UAV Video Select 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Map Right Hand Grip Map Symbols Select 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sight Right Hand Grip Sight Select 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Enter Right Hand Grip Enter for Cursor Control 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Polarity Right Hand Grip Polarity Select 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

Sum 332 250 128 172 423 395 437 391 3
59

Time of Movement 

Column Detailed Description 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Av

TFCAz RHG Thumb Force Controller Azimuth 396.7 374.2 202.3 100.2 880.5 494.9 685.2 915.7 506.TFCEI RHG Thumb Force Controller Elevation 369.6 360.1 217.5 113 877.1 475.3 646.5 860.9 49Cursor UD Left Hand Grip Cursor Up/Down 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 104.9 0 0 13.Cursor RL Left Hand Grip Cursor Right/Left 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0.00

VUIT - 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Av

Button Presses 60 66 33 40 36 73 65 44 52.

Combined Total of Button Presses 392 316 161 212 459 468 502 435 368

Switch Actuations (Non - UAS) 

Number of Switch Actuations Per Mission 

Column Detailed Description 1 2 3 4 Avg 

TFOV Left Hand Grip TAD FOV Select 224 140 126 196 171.5 Tracker Left Hand Grip Tracker Switch 68 86 26 123 75.75 Laser Right Hand Grip Laser Trigger 43 48 43 70 51 Slave Right Hand Grip Slave Select 81 47 36 26 47.5 WpnTrig Weapon Trigger 24 54 12 46 34 Level TEDAD Level Rocker Switch 46 30 4 1 20.25 CPGR CPG Right Bezel Buttons 12 28 18 15 18.25 Gain TEDAC Gain Rocker Switch 30 41 0 0 17.75 WpnSel Left Hand Grip Weapon Select 20 12 18 20 17.5 CPGL CPG Left Bezel Buttons 20 2 32 9 15.75 TgtSt Left Hand Grip Target Store 5 13 29 10 14.25 PLTL Pilot Left Bezel Buttons 34 11 6 0 12.75 LMC Left Hand Grip LMC Select 10 0 28 3 10.25 PLTR Pilot Right Bezel Buttons 7 3 12 7 7.25 TVidSel TEDAC TADS Video Select 3 13 0 0 4 Sensor Left Hand Grip Sensor Select 4 0 6 0 2.5 SymB TEDAC Symbology Brightness Rocker Switch 0 8 0 0 2 PVidSel TEDAC PNVS Video Select 0 5 0 0 1.25 DisB TEDAC Display Brightness Rocker Switch 0 1 1 0 0.5 
60

DisC TEDAC Display Contrast Rocker Switch 0 0 1 1 0.5 Sight Right Hand Grip Sight Select 2 0 0 0 0.5 Polarity Right Hand Grip Polarity Select 0 1 0 0 0.25 UFOV UAV Field of View 0 0 0 0 0 Scan Left Hand Grip Scan Switch 0 0 0 0 0 UVidSel TEDAC UAV Video Select 0 0 0 0 0 Map Right Hand Grip Map Symbols Select 0 0 0 0 0 Enter Right Hand Grip Enter for Cursor Control 0 0 0 0 0  Sum 633 543 398 527 525.25 

Time of Movement 

Column Detailed Description 1 2 3 4 Avg 

TFCAz RHG Thumb Force Controller Azimuth 983.4 820.4 1314.6 1061.8 1045.05 TFCEI RHG Thumb Force Controller Elevation 961.8 796.6 1214.5 1034.8 1001.925 Cursor UD Left Hand Grip Cursor Up/Down 18.5 0 0 0 4.625 Cursor RL Left Hand Grip Cursor Right/Left 0.02 0 0 0.01 0.0075 
61 

Time and Percentage of Time That Menu Pages Were Displayed on MPDs 

UAS Missions 

CPG 

(Left MPD) 

CPG 

(Right MPD) 

Title Time (s) % Title Time (s) % 

VCR Page 12930.5 73% Wpt Page 8589.6 49% 

Test Status Page 2900.9 16% Test Status Page 3360 19% 

Eng Page 673.7 4% Route Menu Page 1605.3 9% 

ABR Page 532 3% VCR Page 1394.3 8% 

Wpt Page 150.9 1% Show Page 684.8 4% 

Route Menu Page 150.7 1% ABR Page 501.9 3% 

Show Page 138.7 1% Ctrlm Page 500.7 3% 

Point Page 99.3 1% DTU Page 392.2 2% 

Load Page 49.3 <1% Flt Page 231.7 1% 

Video Page 43.7 <1% Load Page 127.8 1% 

DMS Page 26.3 <1% Point Page 96.3 1% 

Tre Page 7.6 <1% Eng Page 82.1 <1% 

Ctrlm Page 2.8 <1% Video Page 81.8 <1% 

 Freq Page 16.9 <1% 

 Tre Page 11.7 <1% 

 TSD Page 7.8 <1% 

 Rpt Page 7.6 <1% 

 Line Page 4.5 <1% 

 AC Util Page 2.5 <1% 

 Thrt Page 2.4 <1% 

 Wpthz Page 0.7 <1% 

Pilot 

(Left MPD) 

Pilot 

(Right MPD) 

Title Time (s) % Title Time (s) % 

Flt Page 4604.1 26% Wpt Page 7497.2 42% 

VCR Page 4413.8 25% Video Page 5661.3 32% 

Video Page 3117 18% VCR Page 2699.1 15% 

Eng Page 1988.8 11% Test Status Page 771.2 4% 

Wpt Page 1523.9 9% Route Menu Page 539.2 3% 

Test Status Page 669.6 4% Eng Page 252.4 1% 

Point Page 555.2 3% Point Page 54.8 <1% 

ABR Page 254.3 1% Show Page 46.7 <1% 

Perf Page 235.5 1% Flt Page 40.8 <1% 

Wpn Util Page 210.9 1% AC Util Page 33.7 <1% 

Show Page 39.7 <1% ABR Page 31.6 <1% 

TSD Page 26.9 <1% Ctrlm Page 22.8 <1% 

Fuel Page 24.5 <1% TSD Page 12.8 <1% 

Load Page 12.4 <1% Perf Page 12.7 <1% 

Freq Page 11.2 <1% Tre Page 12 <1% 

Tre Page 7.5 <1% Rpt Page 9.1 <1% 
62 

ASE Page 7.2 <1% Fuel Page 8.9 <1% 

AC Util Page 3.7 <1% 

DMS Page 0.9 <1% 

Non-VUIT-2 Missions 

CPG 

(Left MPD) 

CPG 

(Right MPD) 

Title Time (s) % Title Time (s) % 

Test Status Page 5993.3 72% Wpt Page 7573.4 87% 

Eng Page 835.4 10% Route Menu Page 335.8 4% 

Flt Page 709 9% DTU Page 327.5 4% 

ABR Page 458.9 6% Test Status Page 160.3 2% 

ASE Page 105.9 1% Ctrlm Page 100.5 1% 

Load Page 85 1% Load Page 68.8 1% 

TSD Page 17 <1% Point Page 30.4 <1% 

Wpt Page 13 <1% ABR Page 21.3 <1% 

Point Page 10.5 <1% TSD Page 16.1 <1% 

Video Page 10.3 <1% Show Page 11 <1% 

AC Util Page 10.3 <1% Freq Page 8.9 <1% 

VCR Page 6 <1% VCR Page 6 <1% 

Show Page 4.3 <1% Tre Page 5 <1% 

Tre Page 4.2 <1% Video Page 0.8 <1% 

Fuel Page 3.6 <1% TCDL Util Page 0.7 <1% 

WCA Page 3.1 <1% 

Sys Page 1.8 <1% 

Pilot 

(Left MPD) 

Pilot 

(Right MPD) 

Title Time (s) % Title Time (s) % 

Flt Page 3190.5 37% Video Page 4010.4 46% 

Wpt Page 2899.9 33% Wpt Page 3584.6 41% 

Eng Page 2003.4 23% Flt Page 514.5 6% 

ABR Page 172.7 2% VCR Page 363.6 4% 

Test Status Page 126.8 1% Show Page 142.1 2% 

Test Rgp Page 74.2 1% ABR Page 23.6 <1% 

Ctrlm Page 59.9 1% Tre Page 7.3 <1% 

Wpn Util Page 42.7 <1% Point Page 1.9 <1% 

VCR Page 29 <1% 

TSD Page 18.5 <1% 

Video Page 15.1 <1% 

Point Page 12.7 <1% 

Show Page 9.3 <1% 

Fuel Page 6.3 <1% 

Tre Page 4 <1% 

Wpn Page 1.5 <1% 
63

Appendix G. Operations Order

 

This appendix appears in its original form, without editorial change. 
64

1. Situation: 

a) Enemy Forces 

 1) Situation 

 a. Enemy – Enemy forces are operating all across the battle space. Enemy forces are 

loosely organized into small teams which act independently in support of a larger 

objective of destabilizing the local government and swaying the local populace 

against allied forces. 

 b. Weather – clear, winds are 180/5 G10, vis >7 mile. 

 2) Capabilities - These teams are normally made up of local 20 – 40 year old men with the 

likely-hood of a non-local formally trained team leader. Their weapons consist of small 

to medium caliber weapons, mortars, rockets, SA7s or 16s, mines and IEDs. They 

normally will go to ground in the event of attack but are not reluctant to stand and fight 

if their home or leader is threatened. Sympathetic boarder nations have been supplying 

the enemy forces with weapons that are becoming increasingly lethal. The border 

nations have also pre-positioned small armored units near the boarder as a show of 

force and to deter allied nations from cross-border pursuit. The units have been known 

to surge forward toward the border to provoke a response from allied forces but have 

stopped short of crossing the international boundary. 

 3) Probable course of action - Their most probable course of action is to ambush allied 

forces using mines, IEDs and SAMs followed by small arms fire with a quick retreat 

before allied re-enforcements arrive. Their most dangerous course of action is to 

ambush allied forces using mines, IEDs and SAMs followed by a deliberate defense of 

the target area to delay allied forces. This may be supported by a cross border incursion 

of the border nation to aid in the destruction of the allied forces or withdraw of the local 

enemy insurgent back to the sanctuary of the border nation. 

 b) Friendly Forces. 

 1) Mission of Next higher unit. – 1-14th Aviation Regiment mission is to support 3BCT 

with attack helicopter support to prevent or deter enemy forces from disrupting 3 BCTs 

movement. 

 2) Mission of adjacent units – 1st and 2d BCT are conducting similar missions in the city 

and plains sector of the battle space. 

 3) Mission and location of supporting elements 

 a. HHC 1-14th (Heavy) is located at the 1-14th Assembly Area with the mission to 

provide class 3/5.
65

 b. 2-14th (Warlock) is located at the 1-14th Assembly Area with the mission to 

provide lift capability to 3BCT. 

 c. JSTARS is on station as directed to provide over-watch and Intel on NAIs as 

directed. 

 d. A Co UAV (Shadow) is located at 1-14th Assembly Area with the mission to provide 

over-watch and Intel for the 3BCT and supporting elements as directed by 3 BCT. 

 e. 1-15th In (Blackjack) is located at the 1-14th Assembly Area with the mission to 

prevent insurgent activity in their area of operation and to destroy insurgent forces 

operating in their battle space. 

2. Mission: 

B Company 1-14th Aviation Regiment will conduct route and area recon in support of 2-14th Air 

Assault into objective Red to prevent hostile engagement of friendly forces. On order, conduct 

Close Combat Attack to destroy enemy forces in objective red to prevent the delay of 1-15th

Infantry’s advance into the objective. Be prepared to conduct a hasty attack to destroy units 

moving from the border nation in order to prevent their influence on the objective. 

3. Execution: 

a) Concept of Operation. Will be an Air Assault 500m North of objective red by 1-15th

Infantry with recon and over-watch provided by B Company 1-14th. Once on the ground 1-

15th will advance into objective red to destroy enemy forces. 

 1) Scheme of maneuver. B 1-14th will depart with 2-14 Avn Assets to conduct route and 

area recon. Once at the objective, B 1-14 will set-up in an over-watching position of the 

objective to provide fires for 1-15th infantry. B 1-14th will then conduct relief on 

stations to provide continuous over watch of the objective until released by 1-15th or 

higher headquarters. 

 2) Formation. Teams abreast 

 3) Route. Ingress – Route Falcon 

 Egress – Route Sparrow 

 4) Tactical Missions to subordinate Units. 

 a) A Company UAV - will depart prior to B 1-14th departure to have the UAVs on 

station at vicinity of Waypoint 2 and LZ. A UAV will provide route and area recon 

while another recons the LZ and Objective Red. 

 b. 3-17th FDC – will provide priority fires to 1-15th and B 1-14th Aviation for the 

entirety of the mission.
66

 5) Coordinating Instructions. B Company 1-14th and A Company UAS will conduct a 

commo check prior to departure and a UAS video link-up when within range of the 

UAV in the vicinity of Waypoint 2 (CC). Additional control will be governed by the 

direction of the 1-15th ground commander. 

4. Service Support: 

 a) Ammunition load is 300 rounds of 30mm, 12 rockets and 8 Hellfires. 

 b) Fuel is 2+30. 

5. Command and Signal. See Communications Card 
67

List of Symbols, Abbreviations, and Acronyms 

AAR after-action review 

AB3 Apache Block III 

ACP Air Control Point 

AH Attack Helicopter 

AOI area of interest 

ARH Armed Recon Helicopter 

ARL U.S. Army Research Lab 

ASL Applied Science Laboratories 

ATM Aircrew Training Manual 

BWRS Bedford Workload Rating Scale 

CDD Capability Development Document 

CONOPS Concept of Operations 

CPC Comanche Portable Cockpit 

CPG copilot-gunner 

DIS distributed information system 

EDS Engineering Development Simulation 

EUD Early User Demonstration 

FAC Flight Activity Category 

FCR fire control radar 

FOV field of view 

HRED Human Research and Engineering Directorate 

ICS interphone communication system 

LEUE Limited Early User Evaluation 

MPD multi-purpose display 
68

MTADS modernized target acquisition and designation sight 

MTCDL mini-tactical common data link 

NOE nap of the Earth 

NVG Night Vision Goggles 

OneSAF One Semi-Automated Forces 

OSRVT one system-remote video terminal 

PI pilot (pilot in back seat who flew the aircraft) 

PMO Product Manager’s Office 

PNVS pilot night vision sensor 

RACRS Risk and Cost Reduction Simulator 

RL Readiness Level 

SA situation awareness 

SART Situational Awareness Rating Technique 

SME subject matter expert 

SSQ Simulator Sickness Questionnaire 

TCDL Tactical Common Data Link 

TEDAC TADS Electronic Display and Control 

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command 

TS Total Severity 

TSD Tactical Situation Display 

TSM RA TRADOC System Manager, Reconnaissence Attack 

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures 

UAS unmanned aerial system 

UCI UAS Crewstation Interface 

UHF ultra high frequency 

VFR Visual Flight Rules 

VIP VUIT Interface Panel 
69

VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions 

VUIT-2 Video from UAS for Interoperability Teaming Level II 

WSRT Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
NO. OF 

COPIES ORGANIZATION 

70

 1 DEFENSE TECHNICAL 

 (PDF INFORMATION CTR 

 only) DTIC OCA 

 8725 JOHN J KINGMAN RD 

 STE 0944 

 FORT BELVOIR VA 22060-6218 

 1 DIRECTOR 

 US ARMY RESEARCH LAB 

 IMNE ALC HRR 

 2800 POWDER MILL RD 

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 1 DIRECTOR 

 US ARMY RESEARCH LAB 

 AMSRD ARL CI OK TL 

 2800 POWDER MILL RD 

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 2800 POWDER MILL RD 

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ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND

 1 DIR USARL 

 AMSRD ARL CI OK TP (BLDG 4600) 
NO. OF NO. OF 

COPIES ORGANIZATION COPIES ORGANIZATION

71

 1 ARMY RSCH LABORATORY - HRED 

 AMSRD ARL HR ML J MARTIN 

 MYER CENTER RM 2D311 

 FT MONMOUTH NJ 07703-5601 

 1 ARMY RSCH LABORATORY - HRED 

 AMSRD ARL HR MZ A DAVISON 

 320 MANSCEN LOOP STE 115 

 FT LEONARD WOOD MO 65473 

 1 ARMY RSCH LABORATORY - HRED 

 AMSRD ARL HR MD T DAVIS 

 BLDG 5400 RM C242 

 REDSTONE ARSENAL AL 35898-7290 

 1 COMMANDANT USAADASCH 

 ATSA CD 

 AMSRD ARL HR ME DR HAWLEY 

 5800 CARTER RD 

 FT BLISS TX 79916-3802 

 1 ARMY RSCH LABORATORY - HRED 

 AMSRD ARL HR MM DR V J RICE 

 BLDG 4011 RM 217 

 1750 GREELEY RD 

 FT SAM HOUSTON TX 78234-5002 

 1 ARMY RSCH LABORATORY - HRED 

 AMSRD ARL HR MG R SPINE 

 BLDG 333 

 PICATINNY ARSENAL NJ 07806-5000 

 1 ARMY RSCH LABORATORY - HRED 

 ARMC FIELD ELEMENT 

 AMSRD ARL HR MH C BURNS 

 THIRD AVE BLDG 1467B RM 336 

 FT KNOX KY 40121 

 1 ARMY RSCH LABORATORY - HRED 

 AWC FIELD ELEMENT 

 AMSRD ARL HR MJ D DURBIN 

 BLDG 4506 (DCD) RM 107 

 FT RUCKER AL 36362-5000 

 1 ARMY RSCH LABORATORY - HRED 

 AMSRD ARL HR MK MR J REINHART 

 10125 KINGMAN RD 

 FT BELVOIR VA 22060-5828 

 1 ARMY RSCH LABORATORY - HRED 

 AMSRD ARL HR MY M BARNES 

 2520 HEALY AVE 

 STE 1172 BLDG 51005 

 FT HUACHUCA AZ 85613-7069 

 1 ARMY RSCH LABORATORY - HRED 

 AMSRD ARL HR MP D UNGVARSKY 

 POPE HALL BLDG 4709 

 BCBL 806 HARRISON DR 

 FT LEAVENWORTH KS 66027-2302 

 1 ARMY RSCH LABORATORY - HRED 

 AMSRD ARL HR MJF J HANSBERGER 

 JFCOM JOINT EXPERIMENTATION J9 

 JOINT FUTURES LAB 

 115 LAKEVIEW PKWY STE B 

 SUFFOLK VA 23435 

 1 ARMY RSCH LABORATORY - HRED 

 AMSRD ARL HR MQ M R FLETCHER 

 NATICK SOLDIER CTR 

 AMSRD NSC WS E BLDG 3 RM 343 

 NATICK MA 01760-5020 

 1 ARMY RSCH LABORATORY - HRED 

 AMSRD ARL HR MT J CHEN 

 12423 RESEARCH PKWY 

 ORLANDO FL 32826 

 1 ARMY RSCH LABORATORY - HRED 

 AMSRD ARL HR MT C KORTENHAUS 

 12350 RESEARCH PKWY 

 ORLANDO FL 32826 

 1 ARMY RSCH LABORATORY - HRED 

 AMSRD ARL HR MS C MANASCO 

 SIGNAL TOWERS 

 BLDG 29808A RM 303 

 FT GORDON GA 30905-5233 

 1 ARMY RSCH LABORATORY - HRED 

 AMSRD ARL HR MU 

 6501 E 11 MILE RD MS 284 

 BLDG 200A 2ND FL RM 2104 

 WARREN MI 48397-5000 

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 AMSRD ARL HR MF C HERNANDEZ 

 2421 NW AUSTIN RD STE 220 

 FT SILL OK 73503-9043 

 1 ARMY RSCH LABORATORY - HRED 

 AMSRD ARL HR MV 

 S MIDDLEBROOKS 

 91012 STATION AVE RM 348 

 FT HOOD TX 76544-5073 
72

 1 ARMY RSCH LABORATORY - HRED 

 AMSRD ARL HR MN R SPENCER 

 DCSFDI HF 

 HQ USASOC BLDG E2929 

 FT BRAGG NC 28310-5000 

 1 ARMY RSCH LABORATORY - HRED 

 AMSRD ARL HR MW E REDDEN 

 BLDG 4 ROOM 332 

 FT BENNING GA 31905-5400 

 1 ARMY G1 

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ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND

 6 DIR USARL 

 AMSRD ARL CI OK TP 

 S FOPPIANO 

 AMSRD ARL HR 

 P FEDELE 

 T LETOWSKI 

 AMSRD ARL HR MD 

 D HARRAH 

 AMSRD ARL HR MR 

 F PARAGALLO 

 AMSRD ARL HR SD 

 B AMREIN 

TOTAL: 33 (1 PDF, 31 HCs, 1 CD)