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42–130 PDF 2008

REAUTHORIZATION OF THE 

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION 

SAFETY BOARD 

(110–120) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

AVIATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 23, 2008 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

NICK LAMPSON, Texas 

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

TED POE, Texas 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

THELMA D. DRAKE, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois, Chairman 

BOB FILNER, California 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

NICK LAMPSON, Texas 

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

JOHN J. HALL, New York, Vice Chair 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 

(Ex Officio) 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

TED POE, Texas 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

(Ex Officio) 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vi 

TESTIMONY 

Dillingham, Dr. Gerald, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, accompanied 

by Gregory Wilshusen, Director, Information Security Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 4 

Rosenker, Hon. Mark V., Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board .... 2 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois .......................................................................... 22 

Mitchell, Hon. Harry E., of Arizona ....................................................................... 28 

Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota ................................................................. 29 

Petri, Hon. Thomas E., of Wisconsin ..................................................................... 35 

Richardson, Hon. Laura A., of California .............................................................. 43 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Dillingham, Dr. Gerald L. ....................................................................................... 46 

Rosenker, Hon. Mark V. .......................................................................................... 87 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Rosenker, Hon. Mark V., Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board: 

Response to request from Rep. DeFazio ............................................................. 99 

Response to request from Rep. Oberstar ............................................................ 100 

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42130.012
(1) 

HEARING ON REAUTHORIZATION OF THE 

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 

Wednesday, April 23, 2008 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jerry F. Costello [chairman of the Subcommittee] Presiding. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Subcommittee will come to order. The Chair 

will ask all Members, staff and everyone to turn electronic devices 

off or on vibrate. 

The Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the re- authorization of the National Transportation Safety Board. I have 

a statement that I will enter into the record, make brief comments 

and then recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, for any comments that he may have or any opening statement that he may 

have. 

So I will enter my statement in the record so that we can get to 

witnesses. It is my understanding that we will be called for votes 

about 2:45, so rather than for us to give our opening statements, 

we would rather hear from you, your testimony, and to give us 

some time for questions. And so I will enter my statement in the 

record. 

But this hearing, of course, is concerning the reauthorization of 

the NTSB. The NTSB is requesting both additional statutory authority and funding. The President’s budget would not allow for additional staff or additional resources for the NTSB. 

It is my position that the NTSB has to have the necessary resources and staffing in order for them not only to carry out their 

statutory responsibilities but to continue to be the premier investigative agency in the world. 

So with that, I will recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, for 

his opening statement or brief comments. 

Mr. PETRI. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I will follow your excellent example and ask that my full statement be 

made a part of the record. And let me just summarize by first 

thank you for having this important hearing. 

The National Transportation Safety Board, under the recent able 

leadership of our Mark Rosenker, is an agency of some 500 professionals; and they have built a tremendous record of making recommendations that have increased the safety of the traveling public in carefully examining instances as they occur. And they are 

2 

looked to by safety agencies and by people all over the world when 

accidents occur, and they operate not only within the United States 

but abroad. 

So this is a national gem. And I am delighted to have people 

from the agency and the panel before us here today. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank the Ranking Member for his comments. 

And now I want to recognize our witnesses and thank them for 

being here today: the Chairman of the NTSB, the Honorable Dr. 

Mark Rosenker; Dr. Gerald Dillingham, who is the Director for 

Physical Infrastructure Issues with the U.S. Government Accountability Office—and I understand that you are accompanied by, but 

he will not be offering testimony, but is here to answer questions, 

Mr. Gregory Wilshusen, who is Director of Information Security 

Issues, with the Government Accountability Office as well. 

Mr. Chairman Rosenker, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE MARK V. ROSENKER, 

CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 

Mr. ROSENKER. Thank you sir. 

Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, as Chairman of the 

NTSB, I am pleased to be appear before you today in support of 

our request for reauthorization. 

First, I would like to thank this Committee for its tremendous 

support. The Safety Board enjoys a reputation both here at home 

and abroad for impartial, independent investigation of aviation disasters. As this Committee knows, we have approached accidents in 

all modes of transportation with that same philosophy. 

We are currently in the midst of investigating a highway accident that shocked our Nation, the collapse of the I-35W bridge in 

Minneapolis. We are making excellent progress in this investigation and hope to present a final report in a public Board meeting 

before the end of this year. 

Other surface transportation accident investigations that will 

soon be completed are the fiery freight train derailment in New 

Brighton, Pennsylvania, the crash of a motor coach from Ohio last 

year in Atlanta that took seven lives, and the grounding of the Empress of the North in Alaska that endangered hundreds of cruise 

ship passengers. 

Since our last reauthorization in 2006, the Board has held 32 

public Board meetings and adopted 58 accident investigation reports. We also investigated more than 3,200 aviation accidents and 

numerous surface transportation accidents, we published over 

3,900 aviation accident briefs, and our labs read out 179 flight data 

recorders, 156 cockpit voice recorders and performed 326 wreckage 

examinations. 

Additionally, the Board issued more than 345 safety recommendations. 

I am extremely proud of the significant management improvements we have made in recent years. The number of open general 

aviation investigations declined from 2,231 cases in 2002 to 647 

open cases as of this morning. Several high-profile major investigations were completed in a year or less, among them the Big Dig 

tunnel ceiling collapse, which was completed in exactly 12 months; 

the crash of a Comair regional jet in Kentucky, which was comVerDate Aug 31 2005 20:15 Jun 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42130 JASON
3 

pleted in 11 months; and the derailment of a Washington, D.C., 

Metro train at Mount Vernon Square was completed in only 9 

months. 

In order to build on this success, the Safety Board is asking for 

authorized resource levels capable of funding 399 full-time positions in fiscal year 2009 and 475 FTEs in both fiscal years 2010 

and 2011. 

In fiscal year 2008, several years of virtually no budgetary 

growth following several years of virtually no budgetary growth, 

Congress provided the Safety Board with $1.5 million over the 

President’s budget. That enabled us to return 8 FTE investigative 

personnel back to the Agency’s ranks. 

We are also able to achieve significant cost savings by consolidating portions of the NTSB Training Center in our headquarters 

and then subleasing that space to other Federal agencies. Through 

these savings, we were able to return another five FTEs to our 

rolls. In order to carry out the mission of the Safety Board effectively, we still need 475 FTEs. 

In preparation for this hearing, Agency staff, with the input from 

our Board members, performed a review of our governing statutes, 

and we respectfully present some suggested amendments. 

The first area is one where we believe technical corrections are 

advisable to clearly articulate the Board’s authority to investigate 

incidents. The Board already investigates some incidents. One example would be runway incursions that come quite close to causing 

an accident. However, some on my staff are concerned that our current statutes do not clearly grant this authority. 

ICAO is also urging member States to investigate a greater number of serious incidents in order to be proactive in advancing aviation safety. Our proposed amendments would make clear the Safety 

Board’s authority to provide independent investigation of certain 

incidents. 

A second issue reflected in our reauthorization request is our 

perceived need for a clearer articulation of the Board’s authority to 

access critical information during Board investigations. We believe 

that Congress expects the Safety Board to access all records, materials and information necessary to make a proper determination of 

the causes of an accident. 

We are seeking clear authority to access medical and financial 

records. Medical records, say, of a ship’s master or pilot, perhaps, 

in order to assess the accuracy of a medical certificate application 

and the propriety of the licensing and medical oversight process. 

Financial records, for example, such as the credit card records of 

pilot involved in a commercial aircraft disaster in order to examine 

the activities the night before and their relationship to rest periods 

and fatigue management. 

And finally, the Board proposed changes to enhance its authority 

to investigate marine accidents, that have sufficient national importance such that an accident is deserving of an independent investigation by the Board. I understand the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee will be holding a hearing in 

early May to discuss that specific issue. 

Thank you again for your support. And I will be happy to answer 

any questions. 

4 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Chairman Rosenker. And 

let me say to your ending comment that the Coast Guard Subcommittee will, in fact, be reviewing these issues and some of the 

proposals that you have made for statutory authority and other 

changes. 

The Chair now recognizes Dr. Dillingham. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. GERALD DILLINGHAM, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, ACCOMPANIED BY GREGORY WILSHUSEN, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY 

ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Petri, Chairman Oberstar. 

In 2006, at the request of this Subcommittee, we reviewed 

NTSB’s activities and made 18 management and internal controlrelated recommendations. Our examination of agencies across the 

government have shown that effective management practices and 

internal controls are critical for agencies to carry out their missions 

cost effectively and efficiently. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to note that we do not find anything that 

would diminish NTSB’s status as the gold standard for accident investigations in either our 2006 review or the follow-up review that 

we conducted this year. 

My testimony this afternoon provides the Subcommittee with an 

update of NTSB’s performance in the key areas of our 2006 review, 

namely, general management practices, accident investigations and 

safety studies and the operation of the NTSB Training Center. 

We also reviewed NTSB’s information security practices and its 

reauthorization proposal for issues that the Subcommittee may 

want to examine closely for potential unintended consequences. 

Regarding general management practices, we found that NTSB 

had made significant progress in this area and established a solid 

foundation for future improvements. We think that these future 

improvements should include a training plan for staff that supports 

the Agency’s strategic plan and a full cost accounting system that 

will enable management to know what Agency resources are being 

applied to which task across the Agency. 

Regarding accident investigation and safety studies, NTSB has 

developed transparent, risk-based criteria for selecting which rail, 

pipeline, and hazardous material accidents to investigate. In contrast, NTSB has made limited progress in limiting its use of safety 

studies. We believe safety studies can increase the scope and impact of NTSB’s safety recommendations. 

With regard to the training center, NTSB has increased the use 

of the training center and decreased the center’s overall operating 

deficit. However, the classroom space is still used less than 25 percent of the time. Furthermore, we found that NTSB’s business plan 

for the center lacked marketing strategies to explain how it could 

further increase its use and how it could reduce the training center’s remaining $1 million a year annual deficit. 

With regard to information security, NTSB has also made 

progress in this area. However, we think that this could be among 

the most serious deficiencies in NTSB’s operations; specifically, 

until NTSB takes action to encrypt all of its laptops and limit acVerDate Aug 31 2005 20:15 Jun 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42130 JASON
5 

cess privileges on work stations, the Agency is at increased risk 

that its computers and the data they contain may be compromised. 

We are, therefore, making new recommendations in this testimony that NTSB should address these critical information security 

gaps as soon as possible. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we would like to draw the Subcommittee’s attention to some specific provisions and language of NTSB’s 

reauthorization proposal. 

First, the NTSB is seeking an exemption from the Antideficiency 

Act, which would authorize the Board to incur obligations for both 

the acquisition and lease of real property in advance or in excess 

of an appropriation. We recommend that the Subcommittee consider a more narrow authority that addresses NTSB’s particular 

need to obtain a new lease for its headquarters in 2010. 

Second, the reauthorization proposal seeks to make several 

changes to the Agency accident investigation process that has the 

potential to expand the scope of the Agency’s authority. For example, the proposal expands the definition of accidents to include 

events that affect transportation safety, but do not involve structural damage. The implications for such a change for NTSB’s workload are unclear and should be explored further. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, because a full 

implementation of effective management practices and internal 

controls are critical to NTSB’s being able to continue to carry out 

its accident investigation mission and remain the gold standard, we 

recommend that NTSB report on its progress in improving its management practices and internal controls in its annual performance 

and accountability report by other congressionally approved forwarding mechanisms. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be pleased to answer any question that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Dr. Dillingham. 

Chairman Rosenker, let me ask you a couple of questions concerning your request to both change some statutory language and 

to give the NTSB more authority, specifically the requirement 

today that single probable cause be identified as a—the primary 

factor in aviation accidents in particular. 

I understand that the requirement to identify a single probable 

cause is not consistent with ICAO standards, and I wonder if you 

might share your thoughts with us as to the benefits of modifying 

that statutory requirement. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Sir, in reality, we do actually have causes, probable causes when, in fact, we make and finish our accident investigations. Sometimes there were one or two; sometimes there can 

be an entire page or two. The actual heading states ′′probable 

cause,′′ but in the language, many times it will include causes and 

additional factors. 

So, as far as we are concerned, it is the way we operate right 

now. It is our operating procedure and so, therefore, we are not— 

it is not necessary for us to have to go too far with that issue. 

Mr. COSTELLO. But you are aware that there is discussion going 

on in the aviation community that they have concerns about this 

issue. 

6 

Let me also ask you about what role you think the Safety Board 

should play in increasing emphasis on human factors as a way to 

improve aviation safety. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Human factors are critical. 

As you know, the majority of accidents that result in fatalities, 

and frankly, the majority of accidents, have a large number of 

human factors that, in fact, have created the environment for the 

accident to occur. So when we can, in fact, improve and understand 

and eliminate some of the mistakes that are being done whether 

it be by fatigue or whether it be training or whether it be by skill 

or a host of other distractions, then we can begin the process of actually reducing the number of accidents that we investigate. 

Mr. COSTELLO. You mentioned in your testimony concerns about 

the NTSB’s ability to gain access to personal financial records. And 

can you give examples, either in general or specific, as to how your 

lack of ability to gain personal financial records has hampered investigations in the past? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Sir, when we attempt to subpoena, for example, 

records—financial records, credit card records—of an accident victim, perhaps an airplane pilot who we are attempting to understand the 72-hour background, getting his credit cards or her credit 

cards would go a long way to understanding if they were in a bar 

somewhere, if they were supposedly supposed to be sleeping and 

they were out at a club or out purchasing something. 

So the financial records in those kinds of accidents, along with 

any operator accident, would help us a great deal toward understanding the 72-hour background before we make determinations. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Dr. Dillingham, would you like to follow up and 

comment on any of the questions that I just asked Chairman 

Rosenker as far as the authority of identifying the single probable 

cause versus, which is apparently inconsistent with, ICAO standards? What are your thoughts on changing the NTSB to identify 

more than one probable cause to an incident or an accident? 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I think there is some value to 

harmonization of standards; and I think in terms of the ICAO having a different standard than what the NTSB has actually been operating under for quite some time, I think it is worthwhile that 

NTSB sort of collaborate with ICAO to see if there is a medium 

that can be reached. 

Mr. COSTELLO. And the issue of gaining access to financial 

records, would you like to comment on that? 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir. I think that is a—those are capabilities that I think NTSB needs. I think those are similar kinds of access that law enforcement agencies currently have. And if it allows 

NTSB to complete a more robust investigation and come to a cause 

sooner, I think that is important. 

I think one of the concerns that we heard as we tried to look at 

this, was the idea of the violation of privacy issues; and to the best 

of our knowledge, these kinds of records are protected by freedom 

of information and, therefore, the privacy issues are also taken care 

of. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Chairman Rosenker, the final question before I 

recognize the Ranking Member. 

7 

You were also—the NTSB is also asking for additional authority 

to issue subpoenas beyond your current ability concerning public 

hearings that may include, for example, depositions. Tell us why 

that is necessary. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Sir, we have been issuing subpoenas and, for the 

most part, we get a good response. But in areas such as medical 

records and, right now, financial records, there has been some reluctance on behalf of those that we have subpoenaed to provide 

that information to us. So, they have read our statute narrowly; 

even though we believe we have the authority, it needs to be clarified. 

In the HHS preamble concerning the HIPAA regulations, we are 

actually named there as a health—not a health provider but a 

health agency that is, in fact, similar to the FDA or the CDC; but 

it is not clarified in the actual regulations themselves. So this type 

of clarification for us would go a long way to enable us to get the 

medical records which we believe are critical. 

We have looked at an accident right now where medical records 

were extremely important in the collision of the Cosco Busan, 

where the pilot of the ship had a number of prescription drugs that 

he had in his records. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Would you agree that the President’s budget request that he submitted to the Congress is inadequate to deal with 

what the NTSB wants to do in terms of hiring additional personnel? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Sir, earlier in the budgeting process, we submitted to the White House, and we also submitted to Congress as 

we normally do each year, what we believe would be the appropriate number of people to do this job effectively. We received our 

budget, and that is what we are—I am here representing at this 

time. 

Mr. COSTELLO. So would the answer be ′′yes′′ or ′′no′′? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Sir, we can always use more people. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair would note that in your information 

and the testimony that you have submitted to us, you believe that 

the needs are a minimum of 475 full-time equivalent employees to 

fully meet the NTSB’s core mission of accident investigation. 

Clearly, the President’s budget that has been submitted to the 

Congress would not allow for the additional personnel, so I would 

note that for the record and answer the question for you. 

The Chair at this time now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr. 

Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I noticed from the report that you submitted that you have conducted some 1,800 aviation-related investigations in just the last 

year. Fortunately, in commercial aviation there have been no fatalities during that period; but there have been a number of incidents 

that you have investigated and some 100 highway, rail and maritime situations, perhaps the most spectacular of which is the investigation that resulted in some 13 fatalities on I-35 in Minneapolis, 

Minnesota. 

Could you discuss the status of that whole review and the conclusions of your staff and what you are doing to help minimize similar 

situations occurring in the future? 

8 

Mr. ROSENKER. Yes, sir. 

As you know, on August 1st it was a terrible tragedy in Minneapolis when the I-35W bridge collapsed. Our team got there on 

the first day and watched the first responders work very hard. And 

I have to congratulate the people of Minnesota and the people of 

Minneapolis and the first responding community; they did an outstanding job. 

We brought in all the investigators we possibly could; all of our 

highway investigators and a number of research and engineering 

investigators came in. We had about 30 people at the site, many 

of whom stayed until November when, mid-October, we released 

the site back to Mn/DOT. 

November, we had finished up all of our on-site work in Minneapolis and brought some key pieces of the structure back to our 

laboratory, restoring a whole host of it in our training center. 

In January, we made an announcement. We made a recommendation to the Federal Highway Administration that we had 

seen some interesting issues as it related to the design of the I35W bridge in the gusset plates. They seemed to be inadequate. 

They seemed to be less than what, in fact, would be necessary for 

the appropriate safety margin. 

As a result of that—and we are continuing to test—we made recommendations to the Federal Highway Administration to basically 

deal with the States that any time a change in weight—whether 

it be an operational load, a live load; or whether it be an enhancement, additional decking, new systems for it such as guard rails— 

any time you are going to change that weight, a complete assessment of calculations of the bridge, including gusset plates, must be 

done. 

And as a result of that—one of the things that became quite 

clear, Mn/DOT took a look at all of their bridges and did that series 

of calculations, and recently found that the DeSoto Bridge in St. 

Cloud was not up to the safety margins it needed; and as a result, 

Mn/DOT closed that bridge. 

Mr. PETRI. There are some issues as to whether there should be 

more hearings on the process. I wonder if you could discuss that. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Yes, sir. 

Each time we deal with a major accident, the professional investigative staff will create what we call an ′′action memo.′′ That action memo is an internal document that is used for the Members 

to decide whether we should vote for having a hearing or vote not 

to have a hearing. 

They give us a very detailed argument for whether they want the 

hearing and believe it will be of great value and provide additional 

information to their investigation; or whether they believe it would 

not be of value and, thus, not invest the intense resources that it 

takes to do such a hearing. 

In this case, the professional investigative team offered its action 

memo to the Board, and three of the five Board members voted to 

support their finding which was to not hold a hearing, since it 

would not provide a return on investment as it related to the 

amount of time which it would take. 

Ultimately, what happens is, since we have small numbers of resources to work on these projects, on all of our projects, in order 

9 

to devote the appropriate time it takes to do a good hearing, a thorough hearing, to guarantee we get something for that time, it takes 

a good deal of time to do that, and it normally will take anywhere 

from an additional 2 to 4 months in the investigative procedure. 

In this case, the professional investigators believe and have indicated to me they can have this investigation completed and provide 

it to a public sunshine Board meeting before the end of this year. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member and now 

recognizes the distinguished Chairman of the Full Committee, 

Chairman Oberstar. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman Rosenker, for participating in this 

hearing, which is necessary because it is your job description. And 

it is the reauthorization of the Board, so it is a matter of courtesy 

to thank you, but it is your responsibility to be here for its future. 

And you know I have been a strong advocate for the Board over 

all of its years. I was on the staff of this Committee when the Department of Transportation was created, and we established the 

National Transportation Safety Board as an independent safety 

board within the Department. 

But several years later, it was determined—it was clear that the 

Board was not functioning as—although it had held very important 

inquiries, investigations, made numerous recommendations for improvements—over 10 major accident reports, seven public hearings; 

in just the first year of the Board’s operation, they had done over 

800 general aviation accident investigations, 3,000 summary reports. Those they were very significant inquiries undertaken by the 

Board. 

But it is clear to Members of Congress that the Board needed 

greater independence than it could achieve within the Department 

of Transportation. And so before my last year as the chief of staff 

of the Committee, the National Transportation Safety Board was 

established in its current structure. And over the years, the Board 

has achieved status in the world community, particularly in aviation investigations, but also in other areas; as I have called it ′′the 

gold standard for accident investigation.′′ 

And the cornerstone of that status is its transparency, the clarity 

of its actions, the skill of the Board’s staff, the ability of the Board 

to harness the best talent in the public as well as the private sector 

to conduct investigations, to get the best metallurgists to look at 

metal fatigue, to get the best people to understand accidents in all 

modes of transportation. And a very important part of that responsibility has been adequacy of staff. 

Now I see that your Board recommendation or request is for exactly the number of staff that the administration requested, and I 

am puzzled by that: 399 for 2008; 399 for President’s budget for 

2009, and the Board’s request is 399. 

For 2010, you do increase your request for 475 full-time equivalents, a 20 percent increase. What caused you to make that recommendation? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Sir, first of all, thank you for your compliments 

to the Board and its history. You are one of the great friends of 

this Board. You have made tremendous contributions in the time 

that you have served here, both as staff, as a Member and as 

10 

Chairman. So I continue to thank you for that history and hope 

that you will continue to offer that great support. 

As it relates to the Board’s submission, as I indicated earlier, we 

did put out a request when we do our normal Board submissions 

to both the Congress and to the OMB. 

Sir, when I received back the budget, I recognized and understood the various budget constraints that the entire United States 

Federal Government was operating under. And, thus, I unfortunately had to come in and suggest that I won’t be able to get the 

additional people that we could use. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. So you made a request for a larger number of 

personnel? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Yes, sir. And Congress received that request. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. In a bill that we will consider on the House floor 

tomorrow, the Coast Guard authorization, we are going to give 

the—and I am quite confident this will pass the House and the 

Senate—we will give the Board authority to hear appeals from proceedings of the Coast Guard disciplinary process, their certification 

of seafarers, certification of uniformed personnel, as well as civilian 

personnel, give the Board authority to hear appeals to rulings of 

the Coast Guard, as we have done in aviation, to give the Board— 

do you have any idea, have you given it some thought, are you 

aware of the proceeding in the legislative process, given it some 

thought as to what additional personnel that might entail? Or can 

it be handled with the existing staff? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Not within our 475, Mr. Chairman, or the 399 

clearly. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. It will take effect next fiscal year? 

Mr. ROSENKER. I think the Committee will have to work very 

hard with our staff to be able to integrate if this legislation becomes law. We will accept that mission, of course, and do it exceptionally well, as we believe we do with the aviation community. 

But appropriations are going to have to come with it, because we 

could not—we could not be able to do it. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Do you recall, when we transferred to the Board 

the authority to hear appeals in aviation, whether some of the civil 

appeals, ALJs, were transferred from DOT to NTSB? 

My recollection is, there was some movement of personnel, sort 

of a lateral shift over to NTSB. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have that off the top of my 

head. That is way, way, way before my time here. But, sir, I will 

find out and get back to you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Not ′′way, way before,′′ but before your time. 

In another arena, what are the Board’s criteria for holding a public hearing? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Sir, there are a number of criteria. The one that 

we look at the most and probably the easiest one to understand is 

when, in fact, professional investigative staff in their action memo 

present a reason why they should be doing it and what they intend 

to get from it for their investment of time and effort. 

By the same token, there will be many times where the Board’s 

professional staff will say, we do not believe we have enough information at this time to be able to do a thorough investigation in a 

11 

timely way without the additional time and effort it would take to 

do the hearing. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Are those the only criteria? What about differential between modes? What was the deciding factor in the 

McDonough rail incident to hold the public hearing? 

Mr. ROSENKER. I think that was probably an issue of hazardous 

material disposal and other issues, as well. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. What was the decision to—what would underlie 

the decision to hold a public hearing on the Minot rail incident? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Clearly, that was a terrible hazmat release. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And? And that is it? 

Mr. ROSENKER. No, I am sure there were a host of other issues 

that were involved there. Those were decisions that were made before my time. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. What lessons to be learned in that hearing? 

Mr. ROSENKER. I believe also there would be a reason to be requesting that information from the investigating staff. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And the allision of recent note in California, 

where there was an oil spill, there was a public hearing. What 

were the underlying causes of that? 

Mr. ROSENKER. The professional staff said they needed more information, as they could take a look at oversight issues and medical oversight issues and the relationship with the pilots, to the operators and the States. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And do you include in the determination of 

whether or not to hold a public hearing the opportunity for both 

a teaching experience and a learning experience? 

Mr. ROSENKER. That is also an important part of it, Mr. Chairman. I totally agree. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Now, one of the factors that you have cited that 

I learned only after our phone conversation about the subject of the 

bridge, the I-35W bridge in Minneapolis, was that the Board felt 

that the hearing—the staff felt that the hearing would delay publication of the report. 

I am not so concerned about timeliness of a report as I am about 

the substantive nature of the report and the inclusiveness and the 

role of the Board in conducting these public meetings which go to 

the transparency, the clarity, the openness of the Board, and the 

opportunity to learn and to teach. And you never can never say 

that we are not going to learn anything from this, because you 

never know what you are not going to learn. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Sir, you are right in that occasion that, in fact, 

you never know what you don’t know. 

But there are times, and frankly, what we have looked at 

through the history of this organization is—as a matter of fact, I 

wanted to make sure and I wanted to be prepared to be able to answer your question on the numbers—— 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You knew I would ask this? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Yes, sir I did. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You are very clever. 

Mr. ROSENKER. We took a look at the number of votes that we 

had from 1975, dealing with whether to have a hearing or not have 

a hearing. 

12 

During that 33-year period, there were 326 notation items, votes 

from the Board over that 33-year period; and only 12 times out of 

326 did the Board members disagree with what staff’s recommendation was—six that said we are not going to have a hearing when, in fact, the staff said we should; and when staff said we 

shouldn’t have a hearing, six where we said we should have a hearing. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes. I have looked at those records as well. And 

I have the years, the major accident investigations and the public 

hearings that were held, and what I can’t find is consistency in the 

pattern. 

It is not so important whether the Board voted with or against 

the staff, but on what basis and what were the substantive issues. 

And I find no consistency in the basis on which public hearings, determination to hold public hearings is made or not. 

Mr. ROSENKER. I think the vast majority, Mr. Chairman, were 

based on what the professional staff is presenting to us if they need 

additional information. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. In instant case, for the staff to say it is going to 

delay publication of the report says to me, you don’t have enough 

staff and that the staff doesn’t have enough confidence in, or has 

a condescending attitude toward, other specialists in the field, who 

might bring information to the Board the staff have not seen, have 

not heard, have not been exposed to. And I think this is a critically 

important matter. 

I am going to tell you, in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, in the 

greater Minnesota area, there is huge skepticism about the objectivity of the Board in conducting this inquiry. And I am not asking 

you, I am telling you that a public hearing will dispel—will go a 

long way to dispel the questions raised and the lack of trust in the 

Board’s actions. 

I am constantly asked by citizens, by reporters, by local officials, 

by State legislators, what has happened with the Board? Why isn’t 

it doing this hearing? What other motives are there? 

And I think you need, as Chairman, and your fellow Board members and your staff need, to go back and reconsider that decision 

and to be inclusive of the public and to be respectful of the loss of 

life that occurred and of the unique situation of this bridge. 

The allision was one of a kind. 

There have been other hazmat crashes in the rail sector; 38,000 

people were evacuated from Duluth and Superior when a benzene 

spill occurred in a rail crash. The Board didn’t hold a hearing. I 

don’t quarrel with that; there were no unique circumstances. 

But this was one of a class of bridges of which there are 740, and 

we haven’t had a public hearing on a bridge failure in over 20 

years. This is an opportunity for a teaching moment and a learning 

moment for the Board and for its staff, and I urge you to go back 

and reconsider it. 

And I don’t ask you to make an answer here, but I am just telling you that that is what I expect. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Mr. Chairman, you are a very persuasive man, 

and I have great respect to you. And I don’t enjoy being in your 

dog house, believe me. We have had a wonderful relationship—unVerDate Aug 31 2005 20:15 Jun 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42130 JASON
13 

fortunately, up until just the last month or two—and I want to get 

that relationship back. 

And so I must also tell you, this decision was one of the toughest 

ones—matter of fact, I can tell you as far as my career at the 

NTSB, it was the toughest decision to make, and I believe it was 

the toughest decision for my colleagues to make. 

There are 13,000 steel truss bridges, give or take a few hundred, 

across the United States. There are 50 State DOTs that are waiting for resolution of what we find in this investigation. We are 

about ready to complete the finite element analysis in the next 45 

to 60 days. 

It was the professional staff’s belief that these were issues of 

math, mechanics, and computer science that they had to be working with. And transparency, I agree, Mr. Chairman, is of the utmost importance; we try to do that in everything we do, sir. 

We opened up our docket, our public docket, and put it on the 

Web as soon as we made that announcement back in March. We 

are continuing to populate it with pictures and reports, and the 

next series of reports should be in there in the next few weeks. 

These are group chairmen reports which tell us everything we have 

found, and a good deal of evidence is factual in nature. No analysis, 

sir. 

These people that are working with us right now—and I have 30 

investigators, half of which are from our highway department; and 

another 30, these are internal staff, are from our research and engineering department, computer people, metallurgists, top in their 

field. They are working hard every day to get this resolved. 

We will be doing, Mr. Chairman, an excellent presentation, an 

excellent sunshine presentation, where this will get a public airing 

like nothing we have done before, sir. When this is complete, there 

will be peer review ad nauseam as it relates to that; and we will 

have it done, sir, before this year is over. 

They are working hard to achieve that, Mr. Chairman, believe 

me, they are. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you Chairman Costello. You have just made the best argument for an open 

public hearing. Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now recognizes the Ranking Member of the Full Committee, Mr. Mica. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you and let me continue along these lines. 

First of all, I have the greatest respect for the NTSB. It is one 

of the finest federal agencies I have ever had to deal with. I 

Chaired for 6 years, as you know, Aviation; we had a whole host 

of issues. And I think—one thing that I always caution myself was 

that, as a legislator, is not trying to influence the direction of your 

Board. 

I admire your staff. I admire you for the positions you take, and 

I think it is important that you continue that independence no 

matter what slings and arrows are tossed at you when we call on 

you to independently evaluate the causes of accidents and incidents. 

I read through the memo that the staff prepared to the Board in 

January of 2008. It lays it out pretty clearly. Let me read from 

this. 

14 

It says, ′′Immediately after the′′—and this is a staff report to you. ′′Immediately after the collapse, congressional interest focused on 

aging infrastructure, with the suspicion that this bridge collapsed 

as a result of its deteriorating condition over time. The FHWA’s 

National Bridge Inspection Standards program, which must be 

used by every State, is designed to address infrastructure aging by 

finding evidence of fatigue cracking or corrosion that could lead to 

diminished bridge safety capacity. Staff finds no basis for attributing the collapse to fatigue cracking or corrosion.′′ Basically, 

again, they have a pretty good idea of what happened. Let me go 

on and read here. ′′Staff Recommendation: Staff believes that the issues associated 

with the accident’s probable cause can most effectively and efficiently be addressed through the ongoing efforts of the existing investigative groups. Taking resources away from this activity to conduct a hearing will lengthen the time necessary to complete the investigation and quite probably cause various parties to the investigation to proceed with their independent activities, potentially 

even separating their activities from the Board’s. Therefore, staff 

recommends that a public hearing not be convened in connection 

with this accident.′′ 

So I think that to prolong this would also do damage in trying 

to get information out. This appears pretty much to be a design 

flaw. I don’t know if you are prepared to say that, but there were 

design errors. 

There is something in the NBIS standards that did not take into 

consideration looking for that kind of defect that, in fact, we have 

commentary from 1998, we have pictures from 2002, we can see 

what was happening. 

Wasn’t it your best judgment to get out to—how many bridges 

are of a similar design? 

Mr. ROSENKER. That particular design was, as Chairman Oberstar said, we are talking about between 400-some or 700-some. 

But there are 13,000 steel truss bridges, approximately, yes, sir. 

Mr. MICA. But knowing what you know and knowing that we 

have again a load stress factor on a bridge under construction, the 

thing collapsed and you have enough evidence to warn others and 

conclude this investigation and warn others, one, to look for and 

how to proceed in the future to keep this from reoccurring. 

Is that an oversimplification? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Mr. Mica, I appreciate your interest in this case, 

and obviously, you are supportive of the staff’s position. 

I want to make sure, because I have been sensitized by Chairman Oberstar, and I don’t want to do this again, but I am not 

going to be telling you what happened to that bridge yet. 

Mr. MICA. I read the report. This is pretty clear. And, again, the 

worst thing we can do, as legislators—I have been through this; I 

have been through with the previous Chair, and I saw the pressure 

that is put on you all to do certain things in certain time frames, 

or in a certain manner. That, I think, is highly inappropriate. 

I think it is highly inappropriate, and I demand just as much as 

anybody; I demand that you retain your independence and you proceed in this investigation as you feel best would benefit the general 

public interest. And the general public interest in what I see is, you 

15 

have—we have—your investigators have identified the reason for 

the collapse of this bridge. We need to get that information to people as soon as possible without delaying the process, without having the investigation go out. And they cite right here what can happen or what would happen in delaying that. 

So I see no immediate need for a hearing. I see no need to try 

to—you know, people are trying to justify, well, I thought it was 

aging and I said it was aging, but it really didn’t turn out to be 

aging. But maybe we should look at aging, even if they don’t want 

to look at aging. 

And we could spend more time looking at a factor that isn’t a factor, but maybe we can make it look like it was a factor, so we don’t 

make it look as bad as we did because we said something that 

might occur. But we could put pressure on NTSB to do something 

that it probably shouldn’t be doing. 

So I don’t want you to do that. I feel just as strongly. This is very 

important, and if you do that, you set a bad precedent for the future. You won’t be there, but someone else will be there; and the 

same pressure is going to come from this dais—and people maybe 

a lot more powerful than myself and Mr. Oberstar—to do something else other than the right thing and what you were set to do. 

So I am telling you that I don’t want that done unless you think 

that it is the right thing to do. And if you want to reverse what 

your staff has said and what you said, you are free to do that. But, 

again, I want to lay this out in clear terms. 

And I have been through it again with the Board, and I have 

seen the pressure on previous chairmen and Board members to 

look this way, look that way, to do this, do that. And I tell you, 

as long as I have been here, I have never seen that to be the case. 

And I have the highest respect for every one of the Board members, 

and I don’t want that to be the case. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. MICA. Yes. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I disagree fundamentally with the gentleman’s 

line of argumentation. 

The purpose of holding a public hearing is not to determine an 

outcome, but to spread upon the record the information and to receive information from others with expertise in the subject matter. 

The Board decides who testifies at those hearings. The Board determines whom they will invite to those hearings. And the document from which the gentleman is quoting, I asked the Chairman 

of the Board for that document when he called. He said, ′′It is not 

available.′′ 

It was subsequently made available. I did not see this information until long after I had the conversation with the Chairman of 

the Board. And having seen the document, there is a misstatement, 

a misunderstanding: ‘‘congressional interest focused on aging infrastructure, with the suspicion that this bridge collapsed as a result 

of its deteriorating condition—.’’ 

The purpose of the proposal I set forth before this Committee 

was not a bill; it was a proposal to strengthen the standards, upgrade the standards by which bridge safety is determined, by which 

bridges are designed, and to improve the quality of inspections and 

inspectors. It had nothing to do with this sentence. 

16 

And, again, I disagree with the gentleman completely. An open, 

investigative—an open hearing on an investigation is a teaching 

moment for the Board and a learning moment for the public. 

Mr. MICA. Reclaiming my time, again I will read from the staff 

recommendation, not from any Board member or the Chairman’s 

recommendation, ′′Taking resources away from this activity to conduct a hearing will lengthen the time necessary to complete the investigation and quite probably cause various parties to the investigation to proceed with their independent activities, potentially 

even separating the activities from the Board.′′ It goes on. 

But, again, I am not taking what he has said; I am taking what 

the staff and the professionals have recommended. And they have 

taken that, in most instances in the past they have taken that; in 

here they have taken it and are proceeding with that. And I am 

willing to accept that. And I don’t think we should be pressuring 

them to go back and reverse all this on some hunt that will, according to what is said by their professionals, detract from what we are 

trying to achieve. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I simply observe that it was not a unanimous 

vote by the Board, which I was led to believe, and that there is a 

dissenting view on the Board. 

But I still feel that open public hearings on categories of issues 

are vital for the public interest without determining what the outcome should be or what the probable cause should be, but rather 

to hold that public hearing and engage the public. 

Mr. MICA. Again, I have to go—— 

Mr. OBERSTAR. We have a disagreement on that. 

Mr. MICA. We have a disagreement on that, but we have an 

agreement, Mr. Chairman, that we both want to correct the situation. That is what is most fundamental. We want to make certain 

this doesn’t happen again. 

We have identified hundreds of bridges that have the same condition. We need to make certain that something is done, directives 

are done. And I think you have already taken some steps—and you 

sent out a memo in January, I was told—because that was my first 

consideration. My God, we know pretty good that—and, again, I am 

concluding that it was design—that there are bridges like this. 

We also found—and the staff confirms, too—that the criteria by 

which the National Bridge Inspection Standards program is conducted doesn’t take into consideration the factors that we should be 

taking in like design that could contribute to something like this. 

So we should be changing our criteria, what you are asking for, 

and increasing our bridge inspection and take in the criteria to look 

for the things that cause bridges like this to collapse. 

So I think we want to same goal. 

But my concern, too, is this Board, its independence. For them 

to reverse now and go back, it is going to look like congressional 

pressure made them do something—that we expand this hearing 

time, that the investigation go in different directions, and that we 

don’t, as the staff recommend, conclude this. 

It was a 3-2 vote. But that is the way things are done, so we go 

on. 

But the integrity of this process, NTSB and your credibility, I believe the credibility is at stake when we step over that boundary. 

17 

I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from 

California, Ms. Richardson. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

According to the background information that we have, part of 

your objective is not only to evaluate accidents but to evaluate the 

effectiveness of other Government agency programs for preventing 

transportation accidents. 

How much time and effort and resources are used focusing on 

that area? 

Mr. ROSENKER. We have a large advocacy program that does enable us to move our recommendations to implementation. Most of 

what we look at is based on accident investigation. That is the facts 

and the science that we must deal with. So, as it relates to making 

audits on other Government agencies, we really do not do that. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. My second question is: Under your leadership, what safety improvements would you most like to see 

adopted by the aviation industry? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Well, I just so happen to have, Congresswoman, 

a copy of my most-wanted list. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. I was just asking staff for that. 

Mr. ROSENKER. I happen to have it. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. 

Mr. ROSENKER. If you would like a copy, I would be delighted to 

get you a copy and a copy for anyone on the Committee who would 

also like it. I am trying to save money. That is why I only brought 

one with me. 

As far as aviation is concerned—— 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Oh, I suggest you try and save money in another area than that. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Okay. Runway incursions is probably the biggest 

thing that keeps me up. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. 

Out of respect for the Chairman, I am going to stop there so 

other Members can ask their questions before our vote time. 

Thank you. I would like that copy. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Yes, ma’am. Would you like it now? 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and recognizes 

the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. DeFazio. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Rosenker, with regard to the staff memo which triggers the vote of the Board on whether or not to hold a public hearing, why is that confidential? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Sir, sometimes there are things in that that are 

sensitive. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. But, I mean, you can understand the Chairman’s 

concern and, I think, mine. I have to disagree with Mr. Mica. This 

is how conspiracy theories get born, you know? Your staff secretly 

makes a recommendation. You have a split vote, three to two. You 

decide not to hold a public hearing. I understand what you say the 

end-point disclosure is going to be, but that is going to be the point 

at which you have made conclusions. 

I also do not understand—you know, I understand there is a fair 

amount of work that goes into holding a good hearing, but I do not 

18 

see why it would cause a 4-month delay in the process unless you 

are saying that, you know, something might come up at the hearing that would trigger further investigation or a different direction 

in the investigation. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Mr. DeFazio, the history and the only thing I can 

go on, sir—I have been here 5 years. We have looked at the entire 

history, and the statistics show it adds anywhere between 2 and 4 

months to the conclusion of an investigation. As it relates to 

the—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. That is just by the mere fact of holding a hearing 

because you have to respond to issues raised in the hearing. Is that 

it? 

Mr. ROSENKER. No. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So this, perhaps, goes back to the point you made. 

We will not be able to get the additional people we could use, and 

critical work will be delayed or will go undone. So, if you had gotten those additional staff, could you have held the hearing and 

then not have had a 4-month or a 2-month delay? 

Mr. ROSENKER. In this particular case, we have some specialists 

who have some unique skills and capabilities and knowledge that 

would be the appropriate people if we were going to do a substantive hearing. They would be taken away and would be drawn 

into doing the work of getting the witnesses, of coming up with the 

appropriate agenda, of dealing with the questions, of doing the research. 

When that happens, because we are not two- and three- and 

four-deep, the work that they are doing stops. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Well, I was just going to say that I do not find the 

2 to 4 months credible. A week, 2 weeks. And, also, I think that 

you live in the process. You close, preclude—how about Comair? 

How come you did not hold a hearing on Comair? Is it because 

of a secret staff recommendation. 

Mr. ROSENKER. No, sir. That was unanimous, and the professional staff said they did not need it to conclude the investigation. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. But you do not think, in a case like that, where 

you have, you know, parties, a large number of families who have 

lost loved ones, that holding a hearing would contribute to the public process and also, perhaps, bring some additional pressure to 

bear on the airline, itself? 

You know, I mean, part of your job is to push for safety. You 

have all of these recommendations that have not been responded 

to, but part of triggering that is public pressure. So, if you do not 

hold the hearing, those people are all isolated in their grief, and 

they do not get to come together; they do not get the coverage; you 

do not hold the hearing, and there is not additional pressure put 

on the airline or airlines. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Mr. DeFazio, that case was completed in 11 

months. It was done. When we finished it, we brought the families 

that wished to come to Washington. There were others who did it 

in—I believe we did this through a video capability in Lexington, 

Kentucky. All of our Board meetings are done in the sunshine 

through the Web cast. In 11 months, all of the families—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Except the staff recommendations? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Sir? 

19 

Mr. DEFAZIO. The staff recommendations, though, are not done 

in the sunshine on whether or not to hold hearings. 

Mr. ROSENKER. It is a notation process, but the documentation, 

at least the history, according to what I have asked my staff, both 

counsel and managing director, that these are not released. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I would yield, although I have another line of questioning. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Just briefly on this, our Committee last year, 

held 97 hearings. We heard from 705 witnesses, 310 hours of hearings. If your Board staff cannot conduct a hearing on one issue, 

then they need to come and take lessons from ours. 

I think that this judgment that was made—and the staff, in my 

recollection, rarely, if ever, recommends a public hearing. It is the 

Board members who make a decision. That is why you are there, 

to take into account the public interest and the learning opportunity, the learning experience, from, in this case, an issue that reflects upon a whole category of bridge failures or potential failures. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to turn to a different subject, though, your safety 

recommendations. 

Now, my understanding—and there is, sort of, a new emphasis 

on closing out safety recommendations, more so than in the past. 

Are you closing out some that have not been acted on? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Mr. DeFazio, that is a different administration, 

as far as Chairman, in taking a different way of closing. We have 

gone back—as a matter of fact, this Board that we have right now 

is much tougher in closing recommendations. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. All right. 

Mr. ROSENKER. So, no, sir. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. All right. The last time we reauthorized NTSB, I 

got the law changed a little bit to require a more—rather than the 

black hole downtown, but to get a response from the Secretary 

when you make an initial recommendation. 

Have they followed through on their obligations in all cases? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Sir, I do not have a report in front of me yet, but 

I appreciate that legislative change that you made to help, in fact, 

their having to respond to us and Congress about where they are 

in their process. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Well, there are two. There is the initial filing of 

your recommendation and a response period for that, with a ′′we 

will take action/we are not going to take action/we are going to 

take partial action.′′ 

But then there is a second provision, which is an annual report 

of your outstanding recommendations, and the Secretary is supposed to report to the Board by March 1st. And if you do not receive that report by March 1st, you are supposed to notify us. 

So did you get a report this year on March 1st? 

Mr. ROSENKER. We did not, sir. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So you should have reported to us that you did not 

receive the report. Did you do that? 

Mr. ROSENKER. I do not believe that has been reported yet, sir. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. So we are getting the report now, but—— 

20 

Mr. ROSENKER. I will get that report for you before this week is 

over, at least our response that we have not gotten anything yet. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. So did they comply last year? 

Dr. Dillingham, are you familiar with any of this? Have you been 

following this? 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir, we have not. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. Would you be interested in this? 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Well, yes. We have a request in-house to examine the NTSB recommendation, its closure, its rate, and the principal agencies that it gives its recommendations to. We just have 

not staffed that request yet. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. If you would, look at particularly these new 

requirements and the new responsiveness that we require to the 

Secretary. Because we got tired of the fact that they would make 

major recommendations, then they would disappear in the FAA or 

wherever, and you would not hear from them for years. Now there 

is supposed to be an initial and a follow-up, and we seem to be out 

of compliance, from what the Chairman is telling me here. 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir. Will do. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Sir, I will research that and guarantee you will 

have an answer. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair will announce to Members that we 

have a little over 4 minutes to vote. I understand Mr. Carnahan 

has one question, and we would like a brief answer. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. I have so many questions, but I guess I am going 

to choose the one level of safety issue for commuter air carriers in 

terms of operating under the same rules as the larger aircraft. 

Given the number of fatal accidents since 2003 in the commuter 

area, in the under-50-seat aircraft, two of those incidents were in 

the State of Missouri, I think totaling 85 fatalities in all, I would 

like your opinion on whether we have achieved that one level of 

safety for commercial flight. 

Aren’t these statistics a wake-up call in terms of those disparities? What are we doing to attack that? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Mr. Carnahan, we agree with that. One level of 

safety, certainly at the 121, needs to be, when you pay for a ticket, 

no matter how big that airplane is or no matter how small that airplane is, you ought to be entitled to know that it is a safe ride that 

will get you there in a manner in which you are entitled, efficiently 

and safely. 

We are not seeing—as a matter of fact, we have done a number 

of investigations that deal with commuter-type operations, and 

some of those operations have shown a deep concern to us. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair would ask the gentleman, if that answer is not adequate, to contact the Chairman of the NTSB and follow up. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Chairman, I have some other questions that 

I could not get to, and I would like to submit those for the agency. 

And I would appreciate your response. 

Mr. ROSENKER. We will take those questions and respond as 

quickly as we can, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection. 

21 

And the Chair thanks the witnesses for testifying here at the 

Subcommittee hearing today. 

And that concludes our hearing. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Whereupon, at 3:13 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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