S. HRG. 111–106 

SENATE PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE BUDGET RESOLUTION/ 

RECONCILIATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

February 12, 2009—SENATE PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERATION OF 

THE BUDGET RESOLUTION/RECONCILIATION 

( 

Printed for use of the Committee on the Budget 

SENATE PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE BUDGET RESOLUTION/RECONCILIATION 

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50–923pdf 2009

S. HRG. 111–106 

SENATE PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE BUDGET RESOLUTION/ 

RECONCILIATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

February 12, 2009—SENATE PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERATION OF 

THE BUDGET RESOLUTION/RECONCILIATION 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Budget 

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET 

KENT CONRAD, NORTH DAKOTA, CHAIRMAN 

PATTY MURRAY, WASHINGTON 

RON WYDEN, OREGON 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN 

ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA 

BILL NELSON, FLORIDA 

DEBBIE STABENOW, MICHIGAN 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, NEW JERSEY 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, MARYLAND 

BERNARD SANDERS, VERMONT 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND 

MARK WARNER, VIRGINIA 

JEFF MERKLEY, OREGON 

JUDD GREGG, NEW HAMPSHIRE 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, IOWA 

MICHAEL ENZI, WYOMING 

JEFF SESSIONS, ALABAMA 

JIM BUNNING, KENTUCKY 

MIKE CRAPO, IDAHO 

JOHN ENSIGN, NEVEDA 

JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, TENNESSEE 

MARY ANN NAYLOR, Majority Staff Director 

CHERYL JANAS REIDY, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

iii 

C O N T E N T S 

HEARINGS 

Page 

February 12, 2009—Senate Procedures for Consideration of the Budget Resolution/Reconciliation ............................................................................................. 1 

STATEMENTS BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Chairman Conrad .................................................................................................... 1 

Ranking Member Gregg .......................................................................................... 6 

Senator Byrd............................................................................................................... 7, 11 

WITNESSES 

Robert Dove, Former Parliamentarian, United States Senate............................. 33, 35 

Bill Heniff, Jr., Analyst, Congressional Research Service.................................... 39, 42 

G. William Hoagland, Former Staff Director, Senate Budget Committee..................................................................................................................... 24, 28 

Hon. Arlen Specter, A United States Senator from the State of 

Pennslyvania......................................................................................................... 16, 18 

(1) 

SENATE PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERATION 

OF THE BUDGET RESOLUTION/RECONCILIATION 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m., in room 

SD–608, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Kent Conrad, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Conrad, Cardin, Whitehouse, Gregg, Sessions, 

and Alexander. 

Staff present: Mary Ann Naylor, Majority Staff Director; and 

Denzel McGuire, Minority Staff Director. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CONRAD 

Chairman CONRAD. The hearing will come to order. 

I want to welcome everyone to the Budget Committee this morning. I especially want to welcome our most senior member, Senator 

Byrd, who is also a valued member of this Committee. 

Today’s hearing will focus on Senate procedures for consideration 

of the budget resolution and reconciliation. I would like to address 

the practice known here as ‘‘vote-a-rama,’’ and before I go further, 

I want to make very clear that I have no interest in restricting the 

rights of the minority. I have been in the minority. I have been in 

the majority. I am acutely aware that we might be in the minority 

again. And so I am absolutely devoted to continuing the full rights 

of the minority. That is not the issue before this hearing. 

The fundamental issue before us is: Can we improve the process? 

Can we make it better? I think many of us felt acutely after last 

year that there had to be a better way. I think those of us who 

have been most deeply involved have felt this for many years. But 

last year, because the Presidential candidates were coming and 

going and it forced the votes into a very short period of time, at 

least the key votes, it became, I think, even more apparent than 

it has been, certainly to the general membership of the Senate, 

that this system really needs a review and a reworking. 

I am delighted to have Senator Byrd as a witness today. Senator 

Byrd is a giant in the Senate. He is the Senate’s Pro Tempore, 

former Majority Leader, and a valued member of this Committee. 

And he is a leading expert on Senate rules and procedures and 

played a critical role in the creation of the Congressional Budget 

Act under which we operate. 

Senator Specter will also be here. Senator Specter is the Ranking 

Member and a former Chairman of the Senate Judiciary ComVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:24 Oct 23, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\50923.TXT SBUD1 PsN: TISH
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mittee. He is also an expert on Senate rules and procedures. He 

has introduced legislation, Senate Resolution 29, that builds on the 

ideas put forward by Senator Byrd on reforming the vote-a-rama 

process. So I very much look forward to both of their testimony. 

Let me begin by making clear why we have vote-a-rama. Under 

the Congressional Budget Act, the budget resolution and reconciliation bills are given special fast-track treatment that limits debate: 

50 hours for a budget resolution, 20 hours for a reconciliation bill. 

This means that these measures cannot be filibustered. As a way 

to protect the rights of the minority, the Budget Act allows an unlimited number of amendments to be filed even after all time has 

expired on the resolution or the bill. So as frustrating as vote-arama may be for all of us, the ability to offer unlimited amendments is meant to safeguard minority rights. 

Again, I want to make clear I have no interest in truncating minority rights, but there are real problems with vote-a-rama, and I 

think they became even more clear last year. 

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No. 1, it results in many back-to-back votes, sometimes continuing for days, with little time for review and debate. And some 

of these amendments have far-reaching consequences. As a result, 

Senators often are not fully certain of the implications of the 

amendments they are voting on. When you have a debate that lasts 

2 minutes, 1 minute a side, and nobody has seen the amendment 

until 15 minutes before it is voted on, we have got a problem. 

The number of amendments offered to budget resolutions has 

generally been rising. According to the Congressional Research 

Service, the last 3 years are among the top 5 years with the most 

amendments offered. You can see that in 2008 we saw the most 

amendments ever—113. 

The number of roll call votes on budget resolutions has also generally been rising, and, disturbingly, the percentage of votes taken 

on amendments offered after all time has expired has been rising. 

This means that Senators are increasingly taking votes on amendments that were given no real time for debate. In 2008, we had 40 

votes, 60 percent of which were on amendments that were given no 

time for debate. 


50923.057
5 

Here are some potential ways to reform the vote-a-rama process: 

We could create filing deadlines for first and second degree 

amendments. This would prevent amendments from being filed 

after all time has expired and hopefully allow more time for debate. 


50923.058 50923.059
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We could increase the number of amendments debated prior to 

vote-a-rama by reducing the time allotted to each amendment. 

Again, this would hopefully encourage more substantive debate on 

amendments. 

Third, we could require a brief layover period to review amendments. 

And, fourth, we could allow the yielding back of time only by 

unanimous consent. This would help protect Senators’ rights to 

continue debate on amendments in light of the other changes we 

might make that would limit amendments being offered. 

Now, I have not formed any hard and fast opinion on any of 

these. I am completely open to what we might agree to jointly as 

a way of reforming the process. I know we have got strong majorities here on the Committee and on the floor and that we could ram 

through rule changes perhaps. I have no intention of doing that. I 

want to make that very clear. That is not what this exercise is 

about. I am interested, though, in working together to see if we can 

improve the process. 

With that, I will turn to Senator Gregg, who we are delighted is 

back in the Committee. While we in some ways wish him well in 

the confirmation process, if I am honest about it, I would not be 

heartbroken if somehow the confirmation process broke down and 

he were required to stay with us. But, in any event, we are delighted you are here. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR GREGG 

Senator GREGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for those 

generous words, and now I know who has the hold on me. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman CONRAD. Multiple holds. 

Senator GREGG. First off, it is always a pleasure to have the Senator Pro Tempore here today, or any day. He is the oracle of the 

Senate on the issue of rules, procedure, and proper decorum, and 

all of us have read much of his writings and enjoyed listening to 

his presentations on the floor, and we will today. 

The issue of vote-a-rama is difficult, and there is no clear answer 

to it. The vote-a-rama is the Senate’s equivalent to Chinese water 

torture, especially for those of us who manage the bill on the floor. 

But, on the other hand, it is the opportunity for the minority to 

make its points. We have seen in recent years where the minority 

has lost its capacity to make its points in the traditional way on 

the Senate floor, with a number of cloture petitions and tree-filling 

events. And so the budget rules, as they are presently structured, 

really is the last absolute bastion of the right of the minority to 

bring forward its opinions and have a vote on them without being 

able to be shut off. 

Granted, the debate on the amendments is extremely truncated, 

as the Chairman said, and it is a minute on each side. But the 

right at least still exists. 

Now, I want to express my great appreciation to Senator Reid in 

the way he has run the Senate so far in this session. It has been 

open. It is the way it used to be. It is the way it should be. And 

it has been enjoyable. It has been just plain enjoyable to have the 

Senate function as a house of debate and a place where people get 

7 

their points across on the floor and get to vote on them. And I hope 

we can maintain that approach, and I admire his leadership this 

year on that issue. 

But I do not know that the minority is going to be willing—and 

I think the Chairman has not even implied that this would be his 

purpose, but the minority is not going to be willing to neutralize 

or significantly adjust its rights here if it would affect the ability 

to make our points. And so we have to come up with a procedure 

which addresses the rights of the minority and at the same time 

gets into a more orderly process at the end of the day when we get 

to the final hour on the budget. That is what we are looking for. 

And if there was a quick answer, we would have it. But we do not. 

Some of the ideas that the Chairman has suggested in his four 

points here are, I think, worth discussing and seeing—you know, 

playing them back and forth and seeing if we can work them out. 

But at the end of the day, the bottom line for us is going to be that 

people in the minority—and we hope we will not be in the minority 

forever, and we will give the opportunity back to the Senator from 

North Dakota at some point. The people in the minority will have 

the ability in the budget process to amend without any limitation 

that is unreasonable, and that the rights of the minority would not, 

therefore, be curtailed. 

But that does not mean we cannot in some way fix the vote-arama. I do believe there must be something better, and so let us 

take a look and see if we can find it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CONRAD. I thank very much the Ranking Member for 

his statement and the spirit that he brings to the exercise. Look, 

I have been in the minority. I have been in the majority. As I said, 

I am acutely aware that I might be in the minority again. So I am 

not going to be at all interested in something that truncates or reduces the rights of the minority. 

Senator GREGG. And the Chairman’s fairness is renowned 

throughout the Senate. You have always been extraordinarily fair 

and forthright with the minority, and we very much appreciate it. 

And we understand that that is your position as we move forward 

on this issue. 

Chairman CONRAD. You know, one of the questions that has run 

through my mind is: If you are confirmed as Secretary, will you be 

hiring at all? Because maybe a number of us would like to join you 

up there. 

Seriously, together hopefully we can have a chance here to explore how we can improve the process. We could not do better than 

to have Senator Byrd, a member of this Committee and somebody 

who has forgotten more about the rules than most of us know. Welcome, Senator Byrd. Good to have you here, sir. Please proceed 

with your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT C. BYRD, A UNITED STATES 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA 

Senator BYRD. Well, Mr. Chairman and Senator Gregg, I thank 

you for this opportunity to testify on Senate procedures for considering budget resolutions and reconciliation bills. I commend the 

8 

Committee and I commend Senator Specter for focusing attention 

on this important matter. 

I am a proud author of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. I am one of the proud authors. At the 

time, I served as Chairman of the Senate Committee on Standing 

Rules of the Senate. With a staff from 10 Senate Committees, I 

conducted 90 hours of meetings–90 hours of meetings during 25 

sessions over a 16-day period. I met with the Senate Parliamentarian, the Congressional Research Service, and the Senate Legal 

Counsel. As Majority Whip, I managed the Senate floor deliberations on the Budget Act. When the Senate completed its several 

weeks of debate and amendments, I served on the conference committee that finalized the Budget Act. And I can say with confidence 

that the process that the Senate utilizes today hardly resembles 

the process envisioned in 1974. 

The budget reconciliation process, for example, was once thought 

to allow for last-minute adjustments between two or more budget 

resolutions in a fiscal year—something that has never happened in 

the 35 years since the enactment of the Budget Act. 

Today the reconciliation process serves as a reminder of how 

well-intentioned changes to the Senate rules can threaten the institution in unforeseen ways. Reconciliation can be used by a determined majority to circumvent the regular rules of the Senate in 

order to advance partisan legislation. 

We have seen one party and then we have seen the other party 

use this process to limit debate and amendments on non-budgetary 

provisions that otherwise may not have passed under the regular 

rules. The reconciliation process was designed to facilitate legislation to reduce deficits. Instead, the process has been used to enact 

multi-trillion-dollar tax cuts that have led to record deficits over 

the last 8 years. 

Of the few checks on this fast-track process, I am proud to say 

that one of the most effective bears my name under the Byrd Rule, 

prohibiting extraneous matter on reconciliation bills. I am also 

pleased that the Committee created at my request a point of order 

in the fiscal year 2008 budget resolution prohibiting reconciliation 

bills that worsened the deficit. I hope that this prohibition will be 

codified in the Budget Act as the Byrd Rule was codified. But these 

checks alone, I am sorry to say, are not sufficient to prevent abuse. 

It is long past time, I say, that the Senate take a look at the reconciliation process and even consider doing away with it—doing 

away with it—if it is found that the rights of the minority cannot 

be better protected. 

While we are at it, let us get rid of the perennial and painfully 

ridiculous budget vote-a-ramas. I once described vote-a-ramas as 

‘‘pandemonium,’’ which was the Palace of Satan in Milton’s ‘‘Paradise Lost.’’ But that term fails to describe the ignominy of the Senate when it becomes engulfed in these budget vote carnivals. 

To the credit of Senators Gregg and Conrad, vote-a-ramas have 

been limited in recent years, but they do continue to occur nonetheless. 

In 2007—I hesitate. I want to welcome one of the best Senators, 

one of the finest Senators that this chamber has ever witnessed 

9 

who knows more about constitutional law than many of us ever 

read. He is a Senator’s Senator. 

Now, where was I? 

Senator SPECTER. Go on with the theme you are developing, Senator Byrd. I like it. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BYRD. You like that? All right. 

Well, in 2007, during the debate on the College Cost Reduction 

and Access Act, the so-called education reconciliation bill—I do not 

know why we use that term, ‘‘the so-called education reconciliation 

bill’’—a Senator offered an unrelated amendment on the Federal 

Communications Commission, which then prompted the other side 

to offer a sense of the Senate resolution on detainees at Guantanamo Bay, which then prompted an amendment urging President 

Bush not to pardon ‘‘Scooter’’ Libby, which then prompted a retaliatory amendment on pardons granted by President Clinton. 

Amendment after amendment after amendment was offered, 

each completely unrelated—I say each completely unrelated—Mr. 

Whitehouse—each completely unrelated to the education reconciliation bill, and subject to multiple violations under the Budget Act. 

Yet each side continued—continued to raise the stakes—that is ST-A-K-E-S. I have got to have a little fun as we go along. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BYRD. Taking shots, political shots, political potshots— 

you have to be careful how you say that now. Political potshots at 

the opposing side while the Senate drifted far—remember the old 

song, ‘‘Drifting Too Far from the Shore.’’ 

[Singing.] 

Senator BYRD. While the Senate drifted too far from its constitutional responsibility to legislate for the American people. 

We do have to have a little levity as we go along. Isn’t that right? 

It underscores the dangers of the reconciliation process—and 

would you say ‘‘ree-conciliation’’ or ‘‘reck-onciliation’’? Reconciliation—where bills and amendments are considered under the expedited procedures where vote-a-ramas occur and chaos ensues and 

where Senators are called upon to cast votes on nearly anonymous 

and potentially dangerous amendments without adequate time for 

debate and understanding. 

No wonder the American people are losing faith in their governmental institutions. We engage in these vote-a-ramas once and 

sometimes twice and sometimes more each year and make spectacles of ourselves in order to create fodder for press releases and 

for campaign ads. Even the name ‘‘vote-a-rama’’ is ridiculous. 

I call upon the Republican and Democratic leadership as well as 

the members of the Budget Committee and all Senators to 

strengthen the congressional budget process. I believe today, as I 

believed in 1974, that the Congress should produce an annual 

budget that reflects its views just as the President is required to 

submit a budget that reflects his views. But reconciliation is different. Unlike the budget, a reconciliation bill can become the law 

of the land. And it is not a necessary exercise. The Budget Act does 

not require reconciliation, nor does the Budget Act require or even 

mention the use of vote-a-ramas. This is self-inflicted abuse, and 

our Nation can suffer and does suffer as a result. 

10 

What a magnanimous gesture it would be from the newly expanded majority in furthering a new tone and a new era of bipartisanship if we were to begin bipartisan discussions in earnest on 

improving and civilizing what has traditionally been a partisan 

process. As part of those discussions, I encourage the Committee to 

consider the unprecedented deficits that we—that is you and me, 

that is us—that we are accumulating and try to find consensus, as 

we did in 1990—Senator Gregg, you may remember—at Andrews 

Air Force Base. Do you remember that magnanimous spectacle 

over there? I should say ‘‘magnificent spectacle’’—on renewing the 

strong budget enforcement mechanisms that have served our Nation in the past. 

Now, for the benefit of the record, I ask that my amendment on 

vote-a-rama from 2001 and a statement from the Congressional 

Record on the Function 920 account be included in the Committee 

record. 

Chairman CONRAD. Without objection. 

Senator BYRD. I thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member. 

This vote-a-rama amendment, which Senator Specter has embraced in his proposal, could serve as a starting point for this Committee as it considers reform. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Byrd follows:] 

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Chairman CONRAD. Thank you, Senator Byrd. Thank you very 

much for your wise words, and thanks for your service to the country, especially your service to this body and certainly to this Committee. And what you have proposed will certainly form the basis 

of the discussions that we will have on how we can improve this 

process. 

With that, we will turn to Senator Specter. Welcome. 

Senator Specter, I want to indicate, last year approached me and 

said, ‘‘We have got to do better than this vote-a-rama process,’’ and 


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urged me to engage on this issue to hold a hearing. I promised him 

then that we would hold a hearing and that we would seriously engage in an attempt to improve the process before we repeated it 

again this year. 

So, Senator Specter, thank you for your leadership, and thank 

you for the energy that you have brought to the need for reform. 

Senator Specter. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A UNITED STATES 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I begin by thanking the Committee for undertaking this consideration. I would supplement what the Chairman has said. To put a 

time on our conversation, it was March 14th at 1:50 a.m., and votea-rama had started on March 13th at 11:15 a.m., and we had 44 

votes, and it was bedlam. 

Before I describe it further briefly, I want to acknowledge the 

honor of sitting at this table with Senator Byrd. Senator Byrd, as 

we all know, was elected to the Senate in 1958, after he had been 

in the House of Representatives, having been elected there in 1952. 

And I attended the ceremony for Congressman Dingell a couple of 

days ago, the longest-serving House Member, but nowhere near the 

tenure of Senator Byrd, who has the all-time record. So it is an 

honor to sit beside him today. It has been an honor to sit with him 

for going on 29 years for me, which is a limited amount of time 

compared to what Senator Byrd has done. 

Senator BYRD. It has been my treasured honor. My treasured 

honor. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Byrd. 

The subject matter is, I think, of vital importance to the procedures of the Senate because the way it has necessarily been conducted with the chamber full, that is the occasion when there are 

more Senators on the floor longer than any other time that the 

Senate functions, because if you step out of the chamber, you are 

likely to miss a vote. And with nearly 100 Senators on the floor, 

we do not sit in our seats waiting to be recognized, staying out of 

the well and staying out of conversations. There is no order. And 

it is impossible to hear what is happening. 

And when the roll is called, we have to vote, and it is inevitable 

that votes are cast—I am right in the middle of the same procedure—where we do not know what we are voting on because we 

have not heard the debate. And there is only 2 minutes of debate, 

and if you listen closely, it is pretty hard to figure out some of 

these amendments. And they have not been written down; they 

have not been publicized. Staffs are totally overworked with each 

of us devoting many of our staff members, and they cannot get on 

the floor. So it is hardly a function of the world’s greatest deliberative body. 

I ask consent that my full statement be made a part of the 

record, and I will summarize it very briefly. 

Chairman CONRAD. Without objection. 

Senator SPECTER. It follows a proposal submitted by Senator 

Byrd back on April 5th of 2001, and the essence of it is, as the essence of Senator Byrd’s was, to require that first degree amendVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:24 Oct 23, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\50923.TXT SBUD1 PsN: TISH
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ments be filed at the desk prior to the 10th hour of debate, second 

degree amendments prior to the 20th hour of debate, set aside the 

budget resolution one calendar day prior to the 40th hour of debate, to allow printing in the record and a review, and consent required to have time yielded back. 

I am aware, acutely aware, of the issue of minority rights. But 

there is no doubt that the complex amendments are designed as 

‘‘gotcha’’ amendments to put people on the record. I believe that 

this issue is closely interwoven with another resolution. My resolution this year is Senate Resolution 29, and earlier I reintroduced 

Senate Resolution 12, which would limit the procedures to fill the 

tree where we have seen Senators’ rights to offer amendments very 

drastically curtailed. 

The two unique qualities about the Senate as a legislative body 

are the right of any Senator at virtually any time to introduce virtually any amendment on any subject. Added to that unlimited debate, this is a chamber where the American people can see big 

issues debated. And you do not have to debate it for 26 hours, as 

Senator Thurmond did, to establish a record. It attracts attention. 

And people have an opportunity to focus on big issues—big issues— 

and Senators representing their constituents have an opportunity 

to improve the quality of public policy in America. And that change 

there would protect minority rights. 

As usual, when there are undesirable practices, the partisan 

blame is pretty nearly evenly divided between the two parties, and 

leaders of both parties have undertaken this process. And I am 

glad to see this year that we had debate on SCHIP and we had debate on the stimulus package, and I hope we have put that behind 

us, so that Senators have an opportunity to offer amendments on 

pending legislation. And I think we need to refine what we mean 

by ‘‘germane.’’ Perhaps we ought to adopt a term which is ‘‘relevancy’’ as opposed to what is ‘‘germane.’’ Very hard to figure out 

what is germane. Not easy to figure out what is relevant, but we 

have a lot of law on the subject of what is relevant, a big body of 

case law. 

So I hope we will make some changes, starting in this very distinguished body, and I think we have to move fast because we do 

not want to lose the wisdom of the Ranking Member, Senator 

Gregg, on this. And he may not be with us too long. So I would 

want to utilize his full talents, and if that sets a narrow parameter, 

it would not do this body any harm to move with some deliberate 

consideration, but no undue delay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Specter follows:] 

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Chairman CONRAD. Thank you, Senator Specter, and thank you 

again for your interest and for taking the time. I know the Committee on which you are Ranking Member is meeting at this same 

time, and we understand that it took a special effort for you to be 

here with us today. I very much appreciate it. 

I really do think working together there has got to be a way for 

us to reach conclusion on how to improve this process. It was not 

in the best traditions of the Senate to have circumstances in which 

so many votes were taken so rapidly with so little debate, so little 


50923.011
24 

considerations, and a certain level of chaos, as the Senator describes. It seems to me there is a way to absolutely protect minority rights, but to do it in a way that we can be proud of. And that 

really is the test that we have. 

With that, I want to thank both Senator Byrd and Senator Specter for being with us. We deeply appreciate your contributions to 

the Committee, and we will call on you as we move through this 

process. We hope we can do this together. It will not work unless 

we do. And do we are going to put together a proposal that tries 

to take the best ideas that come from this hearing and see if we 

cannot get all sides to agree. 

Thank you both very much. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you. 

Chairman CONRAD. Thank you, Senator Byrd. 

Senator BYRD. Thank you. 

Chairman CONRAD. Thank you for your service. Thank you, Senator Specter. 

I will now turn to our second panel of witnesses. We are joined 

today by Bill Hoagland. Bill is currently serving as Vice President 

for Public Policy and Government Affairs at the CIGNA Corporation. He served as the Majority or Minority Staff Director on the 

Budget Committee from 1986 to 2002 and as a budget and economic adviser to the then- Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist from 

2003 to 2007. I think it is fair to say that Bill Hoagland is one of 

the most respected staff persons to ever serve the U.S. Senate. 

Second, we have Robert Dove. Bob Dove served as Senate Parliamentarian for 36 years. He is now a professor at George Washington University’s Graduate School of Political Management, and 

Bob Dove brings a wealth of knowledge on parliamentary history 

of the U.S. Senate and on procedure. 

Third, we have Bill Heniff with us. Bill is an analyst with the 

Congressional Research Service and is an expert on the Federal 

budget process and budget process reform. 

I want to welcome all of you here today, and with that, I am 

going to ask Bill to proceed with his testimony. Bill Hoagland. We 

will ask Bill to proceed and, again, welcome back to the Budget 

Committee, Bill. We miss you around here, and we are delighted 

that you are here to share your views on how we could improve 

this process. Bill Hoagland. 

STATEMENT OF G. WILLIAM HOAGLAND, FORMER STAFF 

DIRECTOR, SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE 

Mr. HOAGLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Gregg and 

members of the Committee. I am humbled to appear before you on 

this side of the dais. I am also a little surprised to be asked to come 

back to the Committee on this particular topic. I anticipated that 

if I was ever asked to appear before the Committee, it would have 

been to atone for budget sins before what we staff used to refer to 

as the ‘‘Budget Committee Nuremberg Trials.’’ I am pleased to be 

joined here by Bob Dove, one who understands the procedures 

much better than I could ever hope. 

In preparing for what I was to say to the Committee, I consulted 

with two previous staff directors that served in the majority— 

Hazen Marshall under Senator Nickles and Scott Gudes under the 

25 

Ranking Member—both during a time when vote-a-rama expanded. 

There were three themes that emerged from our discussions. 

First, we all agree that yes, vote-a-rama created much angst, 

frustration, and exhaustion for both Committee staff as well as 

floor staff. Nonetheless, this relatively minor inconvenience visited 

upon staff was acceptable as it was our responsibility to you to help 

manage the completion of the measure. Further, we note that despite the growing practice, budget resolutions were brought to completion, in large part because of the cooperation between the Chairman and the Ranking Member. 

Second, but infinitely more important, our greater concern is the 

feeling that this procedure diminishes and embarrasses the institution we love, too. Further, the spectacle of vote-a-rama plays to the 

opponents of the congressional budget process—a process we obviously think that needs to be strengthened and preserved, particularly in these difficult economic times. 

Finally, we all agreed that the rights of the minority had to be 

protected in this process. And, of course, we think vote-a-rama does 

protect those rights. 

We concluded, as you have, Mr. Chairman, that there must be 

a better, more orderly, fairer way to complete action. 

I was curious as to whether the Senators involved in the drafting 

of the original Budget Act had purposefully not considered Senate 

cloture procedures in crafting time limitations within the Act. Researching, I found very few answers. The legislative history of the 

Budget Act informs that the original bill to reform the budget process—introduced by Senator Sam Ervin and others in October 

1973—included language on procedures for consideration of what 

was then referred to as a ‘‘budget limitation bill’’ that is almost 

identical to the language found today in Section 305 of the final 

Act, except that the introduced bill called for 60 hours of debate not 

50. And when the bill was reported out of the Senate Committee 

on Government Operations in November 1973, the 60 hours had 

been increased to 100 hours with debate on amendments at 4 hours 

apiece. 

I think the Senate drafters were very clear and explicit that the 

budget resolution was to be treated as a highly privileged matter 

and those 100 hours, which they referred to as ‘‘the equivalent of 

nearly 17 6-hour days,’’ was to give assurances to both Houses of 

the Congress that adequate time for the full consideration of the 

budget would be held. I note also that in the original bill, as reported in the House, there would be a 10-day—unbelievable—a 10- 

day layover after the resolution was reported before it was considered in the chamber in its 10 hours. And today, of course, the 

House and the Senate can consider a resolution any day after it 

has been reported. 

I conclude from the legislative history that vote-a-rama was 

never envisioned simply because it was assumed that there would 

be sufficient and adequate time available for the full consideration 

both before and after the resolution was presented to the chamber; 

and, further, that the requirement that amendments offered to the 

resolution must be germane would also be a limiting factor. 

Now, thinking only the best motives of Senators, one could argue 

that vote-a-rama is not meant to be a delaying tactic, for after all 

26 

a final vote will happen if out of exhaustion for no other reason. 

Rather, Senators must feel that the full consideration of such an 

important blueprint to guide fiscal policy somehow has not been 

achieved within the time available. 

Now, I recognize that arguing for additional time on a resolution 

or reconciliation bill runs counter to the pressures that are placed 

upon the current Majority Leader in managing the floor. And expanding time also would place tremendous pressure on the managers of the resolution to secure Senators’ participation throughout 

the period and not, as the members are wont to do today, wait 

until the end of the period to offer their amendments. 

Alternatively, without increasing the statutory time for consideration, the argument for greater review of the amendments offered 

within the time constraints must be considered. And I think that 

is how the amendments have evolved since the mid-1990’s. We 

have already heard about in 1997, with Republicans in the majority, the Senate did adopt—it did adopt on a 92–8 vote—an amendment offered by Senator Byrd that modified debate on reconciliation bills that: increased the statutory time on reconciliation; set 

a time period for filing of first degree amendments; but most importantly, that 92–8 vote added in statute Senate Rule XXII that 

brought to a close all actions on reconciliation bills at the end of 

30 hours. 

Chairman Conrad, you and Senator Gregg voted in support of 

that Byrd amendment as did my former boss, Chairman Domenici, 

and Senator Nickles. The amendment was added during the Revenue Reconciliation Act that year. The balanced budget could not 

be worked out, so it was dropped in conference. 

In 2001, as we have heard this morning already, the Senate once 

again adopted by a voice vote this time to a budget resolution—a 

Byrd amendment on a budget resolution that retained the 50 hours 

of debate on resolutions; increased time on reconciliation bills to 

the same, up to 50 hours, which I think is a good idea; and specified filing deadlines within the 50 hours, but dropped the post-cloture rule from the previous proposal. Again, that amendment was 

dropped in conference also. 

In 2006, I believe the Chairman at that time, Senator Gregg, introduced reform legislation that maintained the 50 hours but eliminated vote-a-rama by limiting time to ‘‘consideration’’ rather than 

‘‘debate.’’ And I think Senator Specter’s proposal here today is simply an evolution of moving forward from the 2001 vote. 

So what should be done? Very quickly, Mr. Chairman, the Senate 

needs to decide what its goals are in considering a budget resolution. If the Senate wants to limit time for consideration of a budget 

reconciliation bill or to a specified time, there is one sure way of 

accomplishing through a hard and fast post-cloture type rule, and 

we understand the risk that creates for the minority. 

Alternatively, if the purpose of the budget resolution is to provide 

an opportunity for the Senate to engage in a logical, fully informed 

debate surrounding fiscal policy, as was envisioned by the original 

drafters of the Act, then I think the reform proposals that have 

been evolving since 2001—setting deadlines for submitting amendments in a timeframe—seem appropriate. The risk, many amendVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:24 Oct 23, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\50923.TXT SBUD1 PsN: TISH
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ments, however, could still be filed and pending, requiring votes 

well beyond the 50 hours or the 30-hour limit. 

My time is running out here so let me very quickly, if you will 

bear with me, Mr. Chairman, I have, with all due respect, a couple 

of recommendations I would proffer that might impact the amendments considered during budget deliberations. 

No. 1, require at a minimum, at least a minimum, of a 1-day layover of the reported resolution or reconciliation bill before proceeding to the Senate floor. 

No. 2, require unanimous consent to yield back time on budget 

resolutions or reconciliation bills. 

No. 3, if you decide to have 50 hours statutory time limit, limit 

it to two amendments per Senator and require—as is the practice 

today—to alternate amendments but begin with the minority having the right of refusal on the first amendment. 

No. 4, adopt in statute a very clear definition of ‘‘germaneness’’ 

that would prohibit the consideration of the sense of the Senate 

amendments. I thought when I left here that was taken care of. I 

understand it is not the case today. I am not critical of the Senate 

Parliamentarian’s office. I am just saying they have a job to do, too, 

and I think if that is put in statute, that might help. 

I might also suggest that that be extended to ‘‘deficit neutral reserve funds,’’ but I have not fully thought through the consequences of limiting that like sense of the Senate amendments. 

And then falling in the category of ‘‘green eyeshade’’ from the 

staff, I would say either do away with Function 920 Allowances in 

the reported budget resolution, or if technically needed, make it out 

of order to offer an amendment that touches the function on the 

Senate floor. Function 920, Senator Whitehouse, has become a 

magic asterisk for unspecified offsets on the floor and creates a 

number of amendments. 

And, finally, one last observation. Mr. Chairman, I present with 

some trepidation. I believe that while increased vote-a-rama activity in recent years is a function of many variables, one of those 

variables is whether the resolution is considered in an even-numbered or odd-numbered year. Budget resolutions have become messaging instruments, not budgeting instruments. Too many times I 

was aware of amendments drafted on both sides of the aisle to 

stoke political press releases, and it was unspoken, but generally 

understood, that political campaigns considered budget resolutions 

the mother lode of opportunities for political ads. I have no suggestions on how to deal with the ‘‘gotcha’’ amendments. I only observe 

that to the extent these type amendments continue to proliferate, 

reform of the procedures to consider a budget resolution will likely 

prove unsatisfactory. 

Thank you and continue to preserve the budget process. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hoagland follows:] 

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Chairman CONRAD. Thank you, Bill. We very much appreciate 

your thoughtful testimony. And I tell you, sense of the Senate really became absurd, and I think Senator Gregg and I have been able 

to accomplish something in terms of discouraging sense of the Senate resolutions. But, you know, you talk about the ultimate absurdity, that really is it on a budget resolution, has no force and effect 

of anything. It is purely messaging, and it is a giant waste of time, 

in my judgment. We have been able to reduce that largely by an 


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agreement between the two of us to discourage it on both sides. 

But you cannot prevent it without some stronger medicine. 

Mr. Dove, welcome, our former Parliamentarian, deeply knowledgeable on budget process and the precedents. Please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT DOVE, FORMER PARLIAMENTARIAN, 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

Mr. DOVE. Thank you. First of all, I am not here as a representative of the Parliamentarian’s office, and I appreciate Bill’s acquiescence in that. I am a college professor now, and I teach about congressional procedure, and I talk about the budget process. And I 

tell my students, ‘‘We meant well.’’ 

Basically, when Senator Byrd spoke of those hours in his office, 

I remember them. I was the representative from the Parliamentarian’s office when this law was being crafted. I can explain to Bill 

why we did not use the cloture language which ends all possibility 

of amendment at the end of the time. That is because that cloture 

language did not exist then. The cloture rule in 1974 was the old 

rule, the two-thirds rule. It had no limitation on consideration. 

That came into being after basically that rule was shown in 1977 

to be somewhat worthless. And then in 1979, a limitation on consideration was put in place. 

But I will tell you that I really picked up on Senator Byrd’s 

statement about what was intended with the Budget Act and what 

has resulted. No, I do not recognize today’s budget process from 

what was intended in the 1974 Act, and vote-a-rama was certainly 

never intended. I can think of reasons why it has happened and 

why probably there are members of the minority who would be 

loath to give up their rights to offer amendments, and it is largely 

because there are so few opportunities on the Senate floor to offer 

amendments in the recent past. 

I did see that Senator Specter complimented the Majority Leader 

on the open amendment process on the stimulus bill. My reaction 

is it is like a steam kettle. You fire it up, and it is going to come 

out someplace. If Senators can freely offer amendments on other 

measures, they may not be as interested in offering amendments 

on the budget resolution. But as long as the budget resolution 

stands almost alone as a way for minority members to get votes on 

things that they are very interested in getting votes on, you will 

be a target. And that is, I think, in a sense very sad for the budget 

process. 

The budget process, I will say, was devised in an atmosphere— 

Richard Nixon was the President when the budget process act was 

enacted. And the view, frankly, was that the Democratic Congress 

was going to continue forever, and that probably the Republicans 

were going to hold the White House forever. This is only 2 years 

after the landslide of the 1972 bill, and it was a way for the Democratic Congress in effect to take their most important power, the 

money power, into their own hands. 

It has not worked out that way. Instead of taking power away 

from a President, to me the reconciliation process has given power 

to the President. President Reagan used it. President Clinton used 

it. President George W. Bush used it. 

34 

When Senator Byrd talked about reconciliation and whether it 

was necessary, to me that is an area that I think the Budget Committee might concentrate on. That to me is what has been abused. 

Yes, vote-a-rama is an embarrassment, but the abuse of reconciliation is much more serious. After all, reconciliation bills become 

law. The budget resolution does not. So if—— 

Chairman CONRAD. Can I stop you on that point? 

Mr. DOVE. Absolutely. 

Chairman CONRAD. Because, you know, I think the impetus for 

this hearing was vote-a-rama. 

Mr. DOVE. Yes. 

Chairman CONRAD. But as we have gone through this hearing 

and the preparations for this hearing, there has been much more 

of a focus on reconciliation. And what you have just said I think 

is critically important for us not to lose sight of. And maybe here 

lies a place for compromise, because I, too, believe reconciliation 

has been abused, and been abused by both sides. It was never intended for the purposes to which it has been put, and the minority 

should be especially concerned about our now using the reconciliation process the way it has been used by both Democratic and Republican Presidents in the past. 

And I can tell you as the Budget Committee Chairman, I have 

been approached repeatedly already—repeatedly—about using reconciliation to achieve one goal or another, however meritorious, 

whether it is health care reform, whether it is global climate 

change legislation. I think we need as a body to think very, very 

carefully about do we want reconciliation to be used in that way, 

to override the normal process and to allow without ability to filibuster a simple majority to pass sweeping legislation. 

And we all know the make-up of the House. We know where the 

White House—the White House is in the hands of the majority. So 

this may be a critical moment for us to think very carefully about 

reconciliation. 

Please. 

Mr. DOVE. That is really very encouraging. I think maybe there 

is the basis for some kind of grand bargaining, because I remember 

very well in January of 2001 when the House passed a budget resolution providing for multiple tax reconciliation bills. And the idea 

was the Senate was going to be dealing with these all year long, 

just one after another. And I gave advice that that was not in 

order, that the Senate should only deal with one tax reconciliation 

bill. And as far as I know, the Parliamentarian’s office has maintained that advice. But it has been abused, yes. 

That basically is where I would come down on this issue. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dove follows:] 

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Chairman CONRAD. This may be a very critical moment for this 

body and this Committee and this Budget Act. And if I were in the 

minority at this moment, I would want to think very, very carefully: Do I want an unfettered reconciliation process? Now, it may 

not get used this year. May not. I have been arguing strenuously 

against it. But I can tell you, there are people who have a very different view. And I do not think my views will be dispositive. And 

just as I know there is enormous pressure to use it this year, I suspect those pressures will only grow. And next year we will really 


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be confronted with intense pressure to whatever extent the agenda 

does not move this year. 

With that, Mr. Heniff, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF BILL HENIFF JR., ANALYST, CONGRESSIONAL 

RESEARCH SERVICE 

Mr. HENIFF. Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank 

you for inviting me here today to present information on the topic 

of the consideration of the budget resolution and reconciliation legislation. It is a privilege and an honor to have this opportunity to 

testify to the Senate Committee on the Budget, and I hope you will 

find the information I present today helpful as you consider how 

the process might be modified. 

I will add that it is also an honor and a bit humbling to be on 

the same panel as those so much more experienced than I—Bill 

Hoagland and Bob Dove. 

The Chairman and others have noted the contours of the votea-rama. As provided by the Budget Act, budget resolutions and reconciliation have debate limits, putting some constraints to expedite 

consideration, but not too strict constraints such as Rule XXII, the 

cloture rule. 

In my testimony this morning, I plan to provide a brief description of the information my colleagues and I compiled at the request 

of the Committee to help you assess the proportion of amendments 

and roll call votes that might be affected by various proposals that 

change the procedures. 

Let me first tell you what we did. We reviewed the amendment 

activity related to the budget resolutions and reconciliation legislation for the period 1987 to 2008, covering the 100th Congress to the 

110th Congress, a period that includes an equal number of years 

with a Democratic majority and a Republican majority. 

Specifically, for both budget resolutions and reconciliation bills, 

we examined the number of amendments offered, the number of 

roll call votes in relation to those amendments, and the disposition 

of those amendments, both before and after the expiration of the 

statutory limit on debate. This information and a more extensive 

analysis is provided in a memorandum we have provide the Committee. 

Now let me make some general observations based on that study. 

The first observation is that the existing procedure under the 

Budget Act does not require a vote-a-rama every year on the budget resolution or on reconciliation legislation. In the first 6 years of 

this study, 1987 to 1992, as well as 2 years since 1992—in 1994 

and 2004—the Senate completed all consideration of the budget 

resolution, including disposing of all amendments offered within 

the statutory 50-hour limit on debate. That is, in the period we 

looked at, eight times the Senate considered the budget resolution 

without a vote-a-rama. 

As for reconciliation legislation, the Senate completed all consideration, including disposing of all amendments offered, within the 

statutory 20-hour limit on debate twice—both prior to 1990. 

Indeed, there is variation regarding the amendment activity 

under the existing procedures. However, experience becomes practice with regularity. In most years since 1992 for the budget resoluVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:24 Oct 23, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\50923.TXT SBUD1 PsN: TISH
40 

tion and every reconciliation measure considered since 1989, the 

Senate has had a vote-a-rama. My next set of observations provides 

some numbers to objectively illustrate the extent of vote-a-rama. 

These numbers relate to the consideration of the budget resolution, 

but the patterns are the same with reconciliation legislation. 

First, let me present data on the amendments actually offered 

after time expired. These are amendments that receive little or no 

floor debate after being formally presented to the Senate. And it is 

this set of amendments that most concern many Senators because 

these amendments may not be available for a sufficient amount of 

time and debate before having to make a decision on them. 

Since 1992, an average of 31 amendments have been offered after 

time expired. This makes up about 41 percent of the total number 

of amendments offered to the budget resolution. And, again, this is 

the proportion of amendments that might not have been available 

in writing until shortly before the vote and that likely received little or no actual discussion on the floor. 

Second, let us talk about the numbers that perhaps directly 

speak to the vote-a-rama, the number of amendments disposed of 

after the expiration of the statutory time limit on debate. I say 

these amendments directly speak to the vote-a-rama because it is 

these that are included in the succession of votes after time expired. As we have heard from Senators and other panelists, it is 

this succession of votes that some complain is confusing, frantic, 

and opens the door to potential mistakes. 

Between 1993 and 2008, most amendments offered to budget resolutions were disposed of after debate time expired. An average of 

almost 49 amendments, or 65 percent of the total number of 

amendments, was disposed of after debate time expired. Now, some 

of these were offered before time expired. They may or may not 

have been debated at length. But they at least were available for 

review. The data show that about 24 percent of the total number 

of amendments, or an average of almost 18 amendments per budget resolution, were offered before debate time expired, but not disposed of until after time had expired. 

The third set of numbers I want to highlight is the percentage 

of amendments on which a roll call vote occurred. These figures address the amount of statutory debate time being consumed by voting. They also represent to some degree the extent to which Senators are registering their individual preferences on amendments 

that may or may not have been available before the vote and that 

may or may not have been discussed on the floor before the vote. 

After 1992, again, when the Senate has regularly considered the 

budget resolution, including amendments, beyond the 50-hour debate limit, most amendments were disposed of without any associated roll call vote. That is, 57 percent of all amendments were disposed of without a roll call vote. And roll call votes were more likely to occur in relation to amendments disposed of before debate expired than in relation to amendments disposed of after debate expired. That is, over half of the amendments disposed of before debate time expired received a roll call vote. In contrast, only about 

39 percent of the amendments disposed of after debate time expired received a roll call vote. 

41 

Most amendments offered to budget resolutions are disposed of 

by unanimous consent or voice vote or withdrawn. When amendments are disposed of by roll call vote, more of those roll call votes 

occur before debate time expires than after. 

That is the research that we provided, as I said, in the memorandum. CRS, of course, would be happy to do further research to 

address this information or any other questions that you may have. 

Thank you, and I would be happy to answer any questions now 

as well. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heniff follows:] 

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Chairman CONRAD. Thank you very much. 

Let me ask each of you, what are the two or three things that 

you think are most important to reforming the process? If you 

could pick out two or three things and say, look, these are things 

that you really ought to try to accomplish in terms of reforming the 

process, what would those be? Bill? 

Mr. HOAGLAND. As it relates specific to vote-a-rama or general? 

Chairman CONRAD. Either way. 

Mr. HOAGLAND. Well, specific to vote-a-rama, I think I outlined 

specifically some—I think you really do need to put some layover 

time after the resolution is reported from the Committee and before 

it goes to the floor. Whether that is 1 day or 2 days, I do not know. 


50923.054 50923.055
63 

But I think going straight from the Committee to the floor creates 

problems. 

I also think you ought to require—— 

Senator SESSIONS. You mean a layover from the Committee—— 

Mr. HOAGLAND. To the floor, yes, sir. Yes, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. You are not talking about the amendments at 

this point. 

Mr. HOAGLAND. No, no, no. In fact, the theory a little bit is, as 

I think—when I think about why that original Budget Act has 10 

days’ layover in the House with only 10 hours on the House floor, 

I think the theory when I read the history, Bob, was that this 

would give members a chance to actually read the resolution and 

understand what is in it. Some amendments they would not offer 

because they now understood what was in it, because lots of 

amendments get created because people just—staff are creating 

amendments down there because they want to get to it as quickly 

as possible. 

The other one, I guess I would also suggest that this germaneness issue—I know we talked about relevancy. I will leave it to the 

Parliamentarian to get into that, but I think you really do need to 

specify that we know those are not germane amendments. And if 

you have to write that in statute—it is like pornography. We know 

it when we see it, and let us—you have got to tighten that up on 

the sense of the Senate. And I think one—I am going to go here 

a little bit further than I should. I think that deficit-neutral reserve funds are just a little bit higher-class sense of the Senate 

amendments. And I know that Senator Domenici, when I was here 

as staff, with Chairman Gray over in the House, we started those 

things, and we probably should not have. 

And then, of course, I would not be true to my old boss if I did 

not say that in the broad scheme of things, I think it would be nice 

if there was a way that we could have a biennial budgeting and 

appropriation process. Do the authorizations, give time for the authorizing—this is not just the Budget Committee. This is the whole 

Senate. We were always criticized as occupying too much time, that 

the budget takes up too much of the time of the Senate. If there 

is a way to do the appropriations and budgeting 1 year and give 

time for the authorizing committees to do their oversight and work, 

maybe that would be another approach. 

I will stop there. 

Chairman CONRAD. Let me ask you, on reconciliation, do you 

think we ought to take action with respect to reconciliation? 

Mr. HOAGLAND. I am hesitating. I am thinking, in honor of President Lincoln’s birthday today, better to remain silent and thought 

a fool than open one’s mouth and remove all doubt. 

President Carter used reconciliation, Bob. 

Mr. DOVE. The big bill of 1980 was put through when President 

Carter was in office. I would not say that he used it. It was regularly used against him because his budget was rejected. And to me, 

that leads me to my suggestion. I do not think a budget process 

that tries to shut out the President is a good idea. I wish the budget resolution were a joint resolution and that the President, therefore, would have to sign it, and you would no longer have Presidential budgets that come down and are marked ‘‘dead on arrival,’’ 

64 

as I have seen in many ways. And I also think it is not necessary 

to have a written unanimous consent agreement into a law for handling the budget resolution. 

We thought it was a good idea in 1974. In retrospect, I do not 

think it was a good idea. I do not think people who are in the Senate now feel that they had anything to do with writing that unanimous consent agreement in 1974 and, therefore, look at ways to get 

around it. I think the budget resolution could be handled as a joint 

resolution in the normal process that other things are handled in 

the Senate, with the President having to sign it at the end. 

Chairman CONRAD. And how about reconciliation? 

Mr. DOVE. Well, I have already mentioned that, to me, the great 

departure from what was perceived in 1974 was, I think, the perversion of the reconciliation process. It was never designed to be 

anything like it has become. 

Chairman CONRAD. They would not believe it, would they? I 

think Senators at that time would be absolutely stunned at how 

reconciliation has come to be treated. 

Mr. DOVE. Well, I can tell you, in the 1975 reconciliation bill, 

Senators were stunned on the floor that it was a reconciliation bill. 

In the 1980 reconciliation bill, Senators were stunned. And even in 

1981, a number of Senators were stunned. Yes. 

Chairman CONRAD. Other elements in terms of priorities, Dr. 

Dove, that you think if you were in charge of writing a reform 

package, the two or three things that you would most emphasize? 

Mr. DOVE. Well, I do not know how you would reform this, but 

what I remember is the Budget Committee that I started working 

with in 1975 was a truly bipartisan Committee. Senator Muskie 

and Senator Bellmon worked together and defended the budget 

that they had come up with together. I do not know how easy it 

would be to return to that kind of system. But to me, it is not a 

good thing that the Budget Committee is so divided on a partisan 

basis. 

Chairman CONRAD. You know, the Budget Committee was seen 

as a very different instrument at the time, that you would have Finance Committee represented here, you would have Appropriations 

Committee represented here at a high level. And that other key 

committees, the heads of, would be here. And you would work out 

a budget that then would be enforceable throughout the year to 

prevent the siloing effect of what occurs without the budget process. 

Mr. DOVE. Well, that is what happened. I remember Senator 

Muskie taking on Senator John Stennis, a very powerful Senator, 

over a defense issue and beating him. It was seen as a turning 

point for the Budget Committee that they had basically proven 

themselves that they would take on the vested interests and win. 

Chairman CONRAD. Mr. Heniff, what would be your two or three 

top priorities? 

Mr. HENIFF. Well, I guess, first, of course, CRS has no official position on any particular reform. But I will say two things: 

First, I think it is important, as you consider changes to this 

process, to think of the budget resolution and reconciliation separately. And it may be time to decouple the two. In my capacity at 

CRS, I am often asked questions relating to the two, and there is 

65 

a lot of confusion between the two. And it is very important to understand, as this Committee obviously knows, that a budget resolution does not become law. And so the consideration of the budget 

resolution is quite different than a reconciliation bill that does become law, and if mistakes happen, they have graver consequences. 

The second point I would make is that it is important that with 

regard to the budget process—and this is basically the history of 

the budget process—is that if the budget process loses support, 

then it loses its legitimacy. And so I would just simply suggest, 

rather than take a position on any particular reform proposal, to 

keep in mind that if there is not a lot of support for the budget 

process and all its elements, then it can lose its legitimacy. And so 

this hearing, I think, is basically addressing that. 

Chairman CONRAD. All right. Senator Sessions, for Senator 

Gregg. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I would be glad to let Senator Alexander, who was here before me, take my time. 

Senator ALEXANDER. That is nice of you. 

Chairman CONRAD. Senator Alexander. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

This has been real helpful, and I wonder if I could in my comments and my time get the sense of the other Senators here about, 

you know, where we go from here with this. What occurs to me— 

and Senator Whitehouse is here within the last 3 years. We have 

a lot of new Senators, and even some who have been here a while, 

like me, who do not have a clue what reconciliation means, how it 

is different from the budget process, where this all came from, 

what it was supposed to accomplish, and whether it deserves some 

amendment. So understanding what we are talking about would 

seem to me to be a precondition of doing anything within the Senate, because if we were to make some recommendations to the 

whole Senate about the budget process and reconciliation, they 

would not know what we are talking about. That happens all the 

time around here, but in this case, I do not think we should. 

So one thing we could do or could consider doing is during our 

Tuesday morning bipartisan breakfast, we might spend one or two 

times just bringing people up to speed, those who would like to 

come, on reconciliation and the vote-a-rama and minority rights 

and these various issues. There is no school for this except being 

here a long time. So that is one thing that occurs to me, and I wonder if the Chairman might want to think about that, and Senator 

Sessions and Senator Whitehouse might want to think about that, 

too, as we go ahead. 

The second thing that occurs to me is I really appreciate what 

both the Chairman and Judd Gregg said about your motives here. 

We do not question each other’s motives, but it is nice to hear you 

say that this is not a time when you want to ram through some 

rules changes at a time when you could. It was nice to hear Senator Byrd say that this would be a good time—he added that to his 

statement, actually—to have some civilized discussion about procedures around here. That would be very helpful. Again, maybe our 

bipartisan breakfast could spend a couple or three times on different aspects of that before we choose up sides and say, oh, you 

66 

are working on minority rights. Maybe Senator Byrd could be a 

part of that. 

Chairman CONRAD. Can I just interrupt the Senator on this point 

and say to you, I tell you, there is no single element of Senate rules 

that goes more against minority rights than reconciliation that I 

know of. Reconciliation is the 800-pound gorilla, and I have already 

been approached on three occasions about my willingness to use 

reconciliation to do things, because a simple majority, no ability to 

filibuster. Now, that is real power of a process. No ability to filibuster, simple majority, and other than Byrd Rule issues, boy, you 

could really grease the skid. 

Senator ALEXANDER. That is true, and as Senator Byrd—I wish 

he were still here because I can remember how he and Senator 

Baker used to work when they were Leaders. There is that great 

story in 1981 when Baker suddenly became the Majority Leader. 

He went over to Byrd and said, ‘‘Bob, you know more about the 

rules than I ever will. I will make a deal with you. I will not surprise you if you do not surprise me.’’ And Senator Byrd said, ‘‘I will 

think about it.’’ 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ALEXANDER. And the next day he told him yes, and that 

is how they worked. I am oversimplifying this, but basically they 

worked out an understanding, sort of a general unanimous consent 

agreement by which the Senate ran which protected lots of minority rights and created lots of opportunities and it worked pretty 

well. And Senator Byrd has said publicly that during that time the 

idea of filling up the tree as a way of using the Majority Leader’s 

prerogative to limit minority rights was rarely—rarely—exercised. 

That was not the spirit of the Senate. That is not the way they 

work. 

Senator Byrd gave a speech to an orientation of Senators in 1996 

that was distributed to new Senators this year. It was so good that 

I gave it out to every member of the Republican Conference because it is one of the most eloquent defenses of minority rights that 

anyone could have. And it is in the same spirit as his testimony 

today. 

And if you go all the way back to de Tocqueville’s writing in the 

1830’s about our democracy, this young Frenchman who came here 

to observe what we saw and, you know, ran into all sorts of strange 

people like Davy Crockett and had a little opinion of Andrew Jackson and wrote it all down. The one thing he said was the greatest 

danger to the American democracy, he said, was ‘‘the tyranny of 

the majority.’’ The Senate is the one place where that is so visibly 

protected. And as Senator Byrd said in here, what makes the Senate different is virtually unlimited debate, virtually unlimited 

amendment. 

We are talking about a big subject here, and we have made a few 

little steps back this year to getting the Senate functioning like it 

is supposed to function. But even though we are debating amendments, we are not taking very long to do it, for example, on this 

$800 billion bill, and it did not go to authorizing committees. I 

mean, the thing that we are passing is probably the biggest education bill ever passed without any consideration of policy. It is 

probably one of the biggest energy bills ever passed without any 

67 

consideration of policy. It is a major preemption of the national 

health care debate we are going to have later this year. I am not 

making a speech about the stimulus bill, but we have got a ways 

to go before we get back to the regular order of things. 

I greatly welcome this testimony and the spirit of it, and I would 

like to see us take additional steps. Senator Reid has taken steps 

with more amendments. That is good. You have taken some steps 

with this hearing. That is good. Maybe we could think of ways and 

maybe Senator Sessions, Senator Whitehouse, and Senator Conrad 

can reflect on whether it would be useful to have two or three sessions at our bipartisan breakfast on where reconciliation came from 

and where the budget came from as we approach the budget. In 

that time we might get a number of Senators interested in these 

issues, and from that might come a grand bargain. That would be 

a pretty big bargain if we ever got to that, or maybe even a minor 

change like agreeing on the layover. 

One of the issues, it seems to me—and I am not asking questions 

because I have listened. But one of the issues is it all goes so fast 

that Senators do not have time to consider everything. And the 

other is if you fill up the tree, then there is no outlet for all these 

amendments. Well, if Senator Reid allows a lot of amendments, 

and if we have a longer layover even than 1 or 2 days and more 

time to debate, maybe the vote-a-rama takes care of itself. And 

maybe it is reduced as much of a problem. 

This has been a terrific discussion. It is almost Senate 101, and 

it is the course that most of us skip coming in here, and maybe one 

of the services that we could do is help other Senators—how many 

new Senators do we have? I almost need a photograph album. You 

know, it is like a bus station down here, people coming in I have 

never seen, barely heard of before. I mean, how are they going to 

know about all this? 

Maybe we could make a special effort to see if we could bring up 

the level of understanding so we could adopt some of these suggestions. 

I apologize for not asking questions, although I have listened to 

every single word, and I thank Senator Sessions for giving me a 

chance to make my remarks. 

Chairman CONRAD. Thank you very much. They are very 

thoughtful remarks, and this is an opportunity to fix some things 

that really do need fixing, and to fix them in a way that is not an 

attack on minority rights. In fact, I tell you, I have not thought it 

through fully, but I would be—I think I could be persuaded on reconciliation. And if you are in the minority, if somebody in the majority says they would consider altering the reconciliation process, 

you should think very carefully about that. That is a big thing. 

Senator Whitehouse. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have enjoyed 

being at this hearing, and I was particularly struck by the testimony of the President Pro Tempore, Senator Byrd. He has served 

in this institution longer than any other human, I believe. He has 

led it. He has studied it, I think more assiduously than any other 

Senator. He knows its rules and its nature better than any person 

ever has, I believe. And when he uses words like ‘‘pandemonium’’ 

‘‘carnival,’’ ‘‘ignominy,’’ ‘‘ridiculous,’’ ‘‘chaos,’’ and ‘‘spectacle’’ about 

68 

an organization that he loves so deeply and has dedicated so much 

of his life to, I think that sends a very cautionary message out. 

I had the mixed pleasure—I am still so excited to be here that 

every day is a good day. But in that context, it was a little strange 

to go through the 2007 experience that Senator Byrd chronicled in 

his testimony. And we were the new Senators then, Senator Alexander, and we were still finding our way around. And as we went 

up to vote on these kind of preposterous, comical, bomb-throwing, 

positioning amendments, a lot of the new freshmen at the time 

were thinking and saying to each other, ‘‘You know, this is just too 

damn silly to vote on.’’ And so we at the time discussed the idea 

of actually changing the Senate voting tally so that your choices 

were ‘‘yea,’’ ‘‘nay,’’ or ‘‘too damn silly to vote on.’’ 

Senator ALEXANDER. Mr. Chairman, if I may say, Senator 

Whitehouse actually wrote that down on a piece of paper, and it 

was ‘‘yes,’’ ‘‘no,’’ ‘‘maybe,’’ or ‘‘too silly to vote on.’’ And we have it 

framed and hanging in my office in case anyone wants to see it. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And, you know, that is probably not the 

right rule change to make to solve this problem, but I do think it 

touches on a point, which is that if the Senate is dignified and decent, then we can find a way to have that dignity and decency control. If the Senate is itself neither dignified nor decent, then no 

amount of rules are going to make us behave that way. 

But it does seem to me that through peer pressure and through 

some mechanism—I mean, perhaps there could be a point of order 

raised that something is too damn silly to vote on so that the opprobrium of peers can be brought to bear when a line is cross of 

some kind. Then you do not actually have to change the voting 

tally, but, you know, you are back to yea and nay again. I am far 

too new here and too junior here to get too deeply into the details 

and the weeds of this discussion, and I certainly am too respectful 

of others’ judgments to suggest that that is a fine idea and we 

should sign up on it. But I do think that there is an element in 

this discussion of using the rules that we do pursue to enable the 

better angels of our nature to come forward, because I can remember one particular amendment that I thought was just idiotic. It 

happened to be a Republican amendment, but we had ones that 

were blameworthy as well. So I am not picking that as an example 

to make a partisan point. But what I remember from that is Republican Senators coming forward to vote on that, and they looked 

as miserable and as ashamed as we did. 

And so I think that there is a critical mass that can be obtained 

once things get beyond a certain point, and so there may be hope 

for solving this, and I hope to be helpful in doing it. I think Senator 

Alexander’s idea of trying to take this up a little bit more formally, 

particularly with the new Senators, is a very good one. 

Two quick questions. 

Senator Specter indicated that he thought ‘‘relevancy’’ might be 

more useful than ‘‘germaneness.’’ I think of ‘‘relevancy’’ as a judicial term, ‘‘germaneness’’ as a legislative term. I would ask Dr. 

Dove, the Parliamentary, I would expect that after hundreds of 

years of operations we had a pretty nailed-down definition of ‘‘germaneness’’ from a Parliamentarian point of view. 

69 

And the second question is: With respect to his proposal that a 

joint resolution and a Presidential signature might help with this, 

would that not have the effect of accomplishing a fairly significant 

power shift from legislative to executive branch? 

Those are the questions. 

Mr. DOVE. OK. The first one I can address because I was at a 

meeting where they were working out an agreement where they 

were going to impose germaneness, which because of the series of 

precedents set in the late 1970’s had become an extraordinarily 

narrow area. And I actually suggested that they use the term ‘‘relevant,’’ and I said our office would interpret that in a rather broad 

subject matter test. 

It was accepted, and that is why there are now two standards. 

Relevancy seems to be more useful, frankly, from a Senate standpoint of limiting amendments without limiting them in an extraordinary way. 

As to the joint resolution giving power to the President, I can tell 

you the whole purpose of the Congressional Budget Act was to 

snatch away power from the President. In my view, it did not work. 

It simply allowed Presidents like Reagan and Clinton and George 

W. Bush to get their programs through in spite of the Congressional Budget Act trying to take power from them without any responsibility and made a division in terms of Presidential budgets 

and congressional budgets that to me is artificial. 

That is why I suggested—if it had worked, if basically Congress 

had been able to marginalize the President’s role on budgeting— 

as they wanted to do in 1974—I would not have this proposal. But 

I do not think it has worked. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Mr. Chairman, in the final seconds that I 

have, let me just join you in thanking these witnesses for their testimony. I think for as long as I am here, I will continue to be a 

student of this institution, and their considerable expertise and 

time here and their palpable affection and regard for the institution I think has been very salutary this morning. Thank you. 

Chairman CONRAD. Thank you, Senator Whitehouse. 

Senator Sessions? 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been a very 

excellent hearing. In all of your hearings, you allow honest discussion, and I appreciate that. Sometimes it does not always occur in 

the Senate. 

I think, Bob, you did not notice there that slipping into the back 

of the room was a wonderful lady whose presence in front of the 

presiding officer in the Senate, a little better visage for the Senate 

than when you were sitting there, your daughter, Laura, back 

there who is a fabulous staff member of the Senate, and we appreciate her and you did a good job raising that young lady. 

Bob, wasn’t it the purpose of the Budget Act—this is just an impression I have—that various committees would go out and report 

appropriations reports and spending, and there was no real way for 

somebody to say, wait a minute, this one wants to spend more 

here, this one wants to spend more here, and you couldn’t stop it? 

So the budget was created to say this is all you have. It was designed to contain an unhealthy tendency of each Committee appropriations—each appropriations bill, more correctly—to exceed a 

70 

reasonable amount and, therefore, subject the country to excessive 

spending? 

Mr. DOVE. You are absolutely right in that the Budget Act was 

aimed at appropriations. The reconciliation process was aimed at 

appropriations. The view was that under the original act, which 

had not just one but two budget resolutions, that having passed the 

first one, if during the summer the Appropriations Committees had 

passed bills that the Senate thought were excessive, in the second 

they would limit that using the reconciliation process and, in effect, 

draw back appropriations. That was—— 

Senator SESSIONS. The Budget Committee had a power to actually constrict the appropriations process. 

Mr. DOVE. Through the use of reconciliation. That was the idea. 

That has never been taken into effect. Frankly, the Appropriations 

Committee I think was simply too powerful. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, that is probably true. But did it have 

some impact in containing excessive spending or, in your opinion, 

very little? 

Mr. DOVE. The Appropriations Committee, which before 1974, in 

effect, was the Budget Committee, I think was turned by the budget process from a committee which really, I think, tried to guard 

the taxpayers’ dollar into a committee that now tries to spend 

every dime it can get away with under the budget process and then 

hide behind the thing that, ‘‘Well, it is the Budget Committee that 

is supposed to be controlling us. And if we can do things like 

changing a pay date from September 30th to October 1st, we 

should be able to do that.’’ They have come up with repeated ways, 

in effect, to spend every dime they can under the present process. 

Senator SESSIONS. That is my observation, that sometimes it 

makes you think that they consider their very existence, the most 

important characteristic of some of the members is to see how 

much they can beat the budget and see how much more they can 

spend than they were actually allocated, and the more they are 

successful, they feel like they have accomplished something. 

That is too unkind. You know, I know that was an exaggeration. 

I probably should not have said it. But every now and then, that 

thought crosses my mind, I will admit. 

Now, the Chairman is correct. A lot of this is about pure power. 

I remember in Alabama one time when President Reagan was running for President against George Bush, the First, and the State 

committee was set to vote, and the question was: Was it winner 

take all, in which case Reagan would get every delegate, or proportional representation, in which Mr. Bush would get a number of 

delegates? 

Well, they had the most beautiful political side speeches you ever 

heard, but after it was over, I observed that everybody that was for 

Ronald Reagan had a beautiful argument for winner take all, and 

everybody who was for President Bush had the proportional representation. 

So every time one party has a majority, they begin to make the 

same arguments the other party was making previously because it 

is so close to us and it is hard to get in and see it in perspective. 

71 

So, Mr. Chairman, you courageously have given us some perspective here for the long term, and it is hard to do in the immediacy 

of the issues we face. 

I will just tell you one of the things I worry about: End runs 

around the budget are increasing, it seems to me. We had the war 

supplemental each year, sometimes more than one a year, and that 

was used to tack on other things to it. We had the hurricanes. Each 

year we had at least a hurricane or some emergency of that nature, 

and other things get added to it. This past fall, we passed the $700 

billion TARP outside the budget process. We just finished or are 

about to finish the $800 billion stimulus bill outside the process. 

And we are expecting more housing and financial TARP-like money 

or housing bailout money all outside the process. 

This year, during this period, the numbers are so huge, it is almost as much as the discretionary budget. It may be as much as 

the discretionary budget. 

Do you sense that another erosion of the power of the process, 

Mr. Hoagland and Mr. Dove, is the emergency spending idea and 

when we get outside of it, we have a core emergency need and 

tacked onto it are matters that should normally go through the 

budget process? 

Mr. HOAGLAND. Senator Sessions, one of your colleagues told me 

just 2 weeks ago, ‘‘Why do we need a budget anymore?’’ on the concept that given what is going on, does the budget matter anymore? 

And so I would wholeheartedly agree with you that if this Committee is to start to re-establish its role, which I still think it has 

a major role in setting broad fiscal policy in this country, spending, 

revenues, I think you need to seriously revisit the whole issue of 

a definition of ‘‘emergency spending’’ or set up some mechanism to 

bring it back through this Committee to revise the budget resolution appropriately. I realize that is time-consuming, but the definition of ‘‘emergency’’ I think was crafted at that 1990 Andrews Air 

Force Base with Dick Darman because it was necessary, immediate, and we were about ready to go into Kuwait at that time. 

The problem was we set discretionary caps, and then we said, 

But we cannot anticipate floods, hurricanes, wars, and so we have 

to have this definition of ‘‘emergency.’’ And I think the emergencies 

now have kind of gotten out of hand. As you will recall, the Census 

Bureau was defined as an emergency one time even though we 

knew it was coming 10 years in advance. 

Senator SESSIONS. In fact, Bob, I would like for you to comment, 

but just to note that is a lack of will in the Senate. I mean, we 

have the ability to say no, this is not an emergency; you have got 

too much in this bill that is not an emergency, and we will not 

waive the Budget Act. But the truth is, as a practical matter, it 

seems to me we lack the will to challenge the core emergency 

spending bill to fix that. 

Would you comment on that, Mr. Hoagland and then Bob? 

Mr. DOVE. Well, I am reminded of Brutus’ statement that the 

fault is not in the stars but in ourselves. Yes, only the Senate can 

govern itself, and if it wants to get around the budget, it does. 

Mr. HOAGLAND. I have been away a little while, so I may have 

forgotten the procedure, and the staff will certainly correct. But I 

thought you did have a point of order against items as to whether 

72 

it was an emergency or not, that you could raise the point of order 

against that as specifically not emergency. 

Now, again, it is not self-executing. You have to raise the point 

of order. But unless there are 60 votes to waive you can knock out 

an emergency disgnation 

Senator SESSIONS. Against a line item in the bill? 

Mr. HOAGLAND. Yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. Is that right, Mr. Dove? Do you recall? 

Mr. DOVE. I have been away too long. I am sorry. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you for the advice. I am going to check 

that, Mr. Hoagland. I have got to tell you. 

Well, I want to thank you for your suggestion on biennial budgeting. I really believe that is a good reform. That is a good government reform. 

Mr. Chairman, one point, I tried to push it, and the Democrats 

were in the minority, and they felt, I think, a little uneasy. Then 

they got the majority for a while there, and they were still uneasy, 

and some Republicans were, and vice versa. But I really think, if 

anything, it may be a benefit to the majority to do biennial budgeting. And I do not see how it hurts the minority—I mean helps 

the minority, who could wrestle through this process and extract 

some concessions, you know, to go through the process each year 

and maybe get a little more. 

So, at any rate, I would hope we could discuss that again. President Clinton favored it. President Bush favored it. Pete Domenici, 

a lot of Appropriations Committee members do, so maybe we can 

consider it. 

Chairman CONRAD. Absolutely. One of the great things about the 

U.S. Senate is nothing is ever settled. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman CONRAD. I want to thank all the members who have 

participated. I want to thank the witnesses. There just has to be 

a better way, and I think some of the suggestions here have been 

especially helpful, and I am delighted that the three witnesses 

were willing to come here and put your energy and your effort into 

testimony and providing your insights to this Committee, because 

I think we have got an opportunity here to improve things. 

One of the things that just jumps out at you—and, Dr. Dove, I 

think your testimony really hit on this point: unintended consequences. I do not think anybody—if you would go back to 1974— 

would ever have dreamed the reconciliation process was going to be 

used the way it has been. It would never, ever have gotten through 

if people would have thought it was going to be used in this way. 

And, you know, both sides have used it in a way that I think is 

way beyond what was ever intended. And I think we had better 

think very carefully about that as we go into this new Presidency, 

because anybody that does not think the pressure is going to build 

to use reconciliation for a certain purpose—it was used for tax cuts 

in the Bush administration. There is absolutely no reason this majority cannot flip it and use it for spending. And I can tell you, 

health care reform and climate change are out there, and people 

are thinking about options for how they move it, and move it with 

73 

the least resistance possible. And reconciliation is the tool that 

some are thinking about. So that is the reality. 

I very much like, Senator Alexander, your proposal that we take 

this up in the bipartisan group for several sessions or whatever in 

your judgment is reasonable. I think we do have a real challenge 

if so many new Senators do not know the history here, do not know 

the background. Many sitting Senators do not know the history 

and the background, how these things have been used, how far 

away from those who wrote the legislation things have strayed, and 

what the consequences are and the implications for body, because, 

you know, as I read the history, our forefathers intended the Senate to be the cooling saucer. This was the place you could slow 

things down, think very carefully, have extended debate to be able 

to even change people’s minds. Maybe that is a rarity around here, 

but I think it still happens. And that is the fundamental function 

in our structure of the U.S. Senate. And I tell you, reconciliation 

goes directly against that. Directly against that. 

So, again, thanks to the witnesses, thanks to the members, and 

we will continue to work together and see if we cannot make this 

process work better. 

The Committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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