IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Brenda Searfoss a/k/a Brenda Walton, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, : No. 145 M.D. 2023

Respondent : Submitted: November 9, 2023

BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: December 7, 2023

Brenda Searfoss a/k/a Brenda Walton (Claimant) has filed a petition for 

review in the nature of a complaint sounding in breach of contract, quasi-contract,

and mandamus (Complaint) in this Court’s original jurisdiction. Claimant is seeking 

to enforce an alleged compromise and release (C&R) agreement settling her 

workers’ compensation claim (WC) against her employer, the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania (Employer).

Presently before the Court are Employer’s preliminary objections (POs) 

to the Complaint. For the reasons discussed below, we sustain Employer’s demurrer 

asserting that there is no valid and enforceable C&R agreement as a matter of law. 

We dismiss the Complaint with prejudice and dismiss the remaining POs as moot. 

We also dismiss as moot Claimant’s application to depose certain witnesses.
2

I. Background

The Complaint avers the following pertinent facts. Claimant sustained 

an injury in August 2016 in the course of her work for Employer. Complaint, ¶ 4. 

The parties engaged in settlement negotiations beginning in June 2020 Id., ¶ 8. In 

January 2021, Employer offered a lump-sum payment of $125,000 to settle the wage 

loss portion of Claimant’s WC claim. Id., ¶ 10. 

Employer extended the same offer again in a mediation in October 

2021. Complaint, ¶ 11. At the mediation, Claimant was allegedly told by “Judy,” 

purportedly on behalf of Employer, that Claimant needed to apply for a “disability” 

pension prior to any C&R hearing before a WC judge (WCJ). Id., ¶ 12. Claimant 

avers that she indicated she would accept Employer’s settlement offer “once the 

disability pension step was completed.” Id., ¶ 13. In December 2021, Claimant 

sought an estimate of her disability pension payments. Id., ¶ 14. 

In October 2022, Claimant informed Employer that she was accepting 

the $125,000 offer. Id., ¶ 15. The next day, Claimant applied for a disability 

pension. Id., ¶ 16. However, Employer indicated that the offer was no longer open 

and refused to settle at the previously offered amount. Id., ¶ 20.

Despite Employer’s refusal to settle, Claimant filed a C&R petition in 

November 2022. POs, ¶ 20. Employer responded to the petition and denied there 

was a valid and enforceable C&R agreement between the parties. Id. After holding 

a hearing in December 2022, a WCJ issued an order dismissing the petition because 

“no signed [C&R agreement] was submitted by the parties.” Id., Ex. 1. Claimant 

did not appeal from the WCJ’s order. Id., ¶ 20.

Claimant then filed the Complaint, sounding in contract, quasi-contract 

(detrimental reliance), and mandamus, to enforce the alleged C&R agreement.
3

II. Employer’s POs

Employer asserts various POs to the Complaint,

1 which we reorder and 

summarize as follows. Employer contends that, as a matter of law, no valid and 

enforceable C&R agreement exists, even where the parties have a signed written 

agreement, unless and until a WCJ has held a hearing and approved the C&R

agreement. Employer maintains that the WC Act2 provides for WCJ approval of a 

C&R agreement as the exclusive means of effectuating a settlement and that

Claimant’s failure to appeal the WCJ’s dismissal of the C&R petition leaves 

Claimant with no recourse in this Court. Regarding Claimant’s averment of 

detrimental reliance, Employer posits that the claim is legally insufficient because 

Claimant does not explain how applying for disability pension benefits caused any 

detriment or why she did not simply withdraw that application when she learned 

Employer would not move forward with a C&R. Further, Employer asserts that (1)

it is not subject to a mandamus claim because it is not acting as a governmental entity 

in its capacity as Claimant’s employer, (2) mandamus will not lie in the absence of 

a clear right to relief, and (3) mandamus cannot be used to force a party to settle a 

case. 

We agree with Employer that because its refusal to execute a written 

C&R agreement resulted in the WCJ’s dismissal of Claimant’s C&R petition, there 

1

In ruling on POs, this Court accepts as true all well-pleaded material allegations of fact 

in the Complaint and any reasonable inferences from those averments. However, we are not bound 

by legal conclusions, unwarranted inferences, argumentative allegations, or opinions in the 

Complaint. We will sustain POs only if the law is clear that Claimant cannot succeed on her claim. 

Any doubt whether the POs should be sustained must be resolved in favor of overruling the POs.

M.T. v. Pa. State Police, 298 A.3d 466, 469 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (citations omitted).

2 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2710.
4

was never a valid and enforceable settlement as a matter of law. Accordingly, we 

will sustain that PO, and we need not reach Employer’s other POs.

Claimant has also filed an application to compel certain depositions. 

Based on our disposition of the POs, we likewise need not reach the merits of the 

application.

III. Discussion

Section 449 of the WC Act, 77 P.S. § 1000.5,3 governs approval of 

C&R agreements. Section 449 provides that an employer may submit a signed C&R

agreement to a WCJ for a hearing and approval; it further provides that “[e]very 

[C&R agreement] by stipulation shall be in writing and duly executed . . . .” Id. 

Here, Claimant insists that once she accepted an offer last made by Employer a year 

earlier, there was a binding C&R agreement, and Employer was required to move 

forward with the approval process. This Court has considered and rejected similar 

arguments in two previous decisions. 

In McKenna v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (SSM Industries, 

Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.), 4 A.3d 211 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), the parties entered 

into a written, signed C&R agreement, and the employer requested a C&R hearing

for approval of the C&R agreement. Later, however, the employer withdrew its 

petition for approval and refused to proceed with the hearing unless the claimant 

agreed to an added term.4 Id. at 211-12. The claimant filed a penalty petition 

3 Added by the Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350.

4 The claimant was employed by a subcontractor, but the WC insurance policy for the 

project was carried by the general contractor, who suddenly insisted, after execution of the C&R

agreement, that the claimant must agree never to seek employment with the general contractor in 

the future.
5

asserting that the employer violated the WC Act by withdrawing the petition and 

refusing to go forward with the executed C&R agreement. Id. at 212. A WCJ 

initially granted the penalty petition, but on appeal, the WC Appeal Board (Board) 

reversed. This Court affirmed the Board’s decision. We explained:

[Section 449] does not prohibit an employer or insurer 

from withdrawing a petition for approval. Moreover, this 

[C]ourt has stated that, under [S]ection 449 of the [WC] 

Act, “settlement agreements are not valid until they are 

approved by a WCJ. . . .” Thus, the C&R agreement here, 

although executed, was not a final, conclusive and binding 

agreement under [S]ection 449 of the [WC] Act . . . .

Id. at 213 (citation omitted).

In this case, the absence of a valid C&R agreement is even clearer than 

in McKenna. There, the parties had actually executed a written agreement and a 

hearing request was pending when the employer suddenly demanded that the 

claimant accede to the addition of a new term. Here, there was never a written 

agreement. Claimant purported to accept an offer Employer had extended nearly 

two years earlier and had last renewed during mediation a year earlier. At that point, 

Employer informed Claimant that the offer was no longer open. Under Section 449 

and McKenna, there was never a binding C&R agreement in this case.

Claimant’s attempt to distinguish McKenna is without merit. Claimant 

observes that McKenna involved withdrawal of a C&R petition before its approval, 

while this case involves Employer’s refusal to enter into the C&R agreement. 

Claimant posits: 

McKenna is factually inapposite to the facts in the instant 

case. Here, it is not the C&R agreement which was 

withdrawn but the settlement offer itself after it was 

accepted, and after [Claimant] detrimentally relied upon 

her Employer’s representations.
6

[Employer] withdrew the $125,000 settlement offer, after 

it was accepted. Section 449 of the [WC] Act is a 

procedural provision mandating how the parties get a 

settlement agreement approved, not whether there was one 

in the first instance.

Claimant’s Br. at 12 (bold emphasis removed). This reasoning is directly contrary 

to this Court’s opinion in McKenna. Whether an employer refuses to enter into a 

C&R agreement or withdraws from one already executed is a distinction without a 

difference. Plainly, under McKenna, Employer here could have executed a C&R

agreement, filed a petition for its approval, and then changed its mind and withdrawn 

the petition at any time before approval of the C&R agreement. In that instance, 

there would have been no valid and binding agreement – as Claimant expressly 

admits. Claimant’s Br. at 12 (agreeing that it “is certainly true” that a C&R

agreement, “even if executed by [the] parties . . is not a final agreement if the 

employer withdraws the petition prior to approval . . .”). That being the case, 

Claimant cannot be heard to argue that Employer could not refuse to execute a C&R 

agreement in the first place or that a valid C&R agreement could arise despite such 

refusal. Claimant’s argument makes no sense in light of our reasoning in McKenna.

In Falkinburg v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Lowe’s Home 

Centers, LLC) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1867 C.D. 2014, filed August 14, 2015),5this Court 

again held that a C&R agreement could not be enforced where the employer’s 

hearing petition had been withdrawn. In Falkinburg, the claimant and the employer 

reached a settlement agreement; the claimant accordingly withdrew her pending 

appeal before the Board and the employer filed a petition for a hearing to approve 

the C&R agreement. Id., slip op. at 11. Later, however, the employer withdrew its 

5 This unreported case is cited as persuasive authority pursuant to Section 414(a) of this 

Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
7

petition for a hearing when negotiations broke down. Id. As we did in McKenna, we 

refused to enforce the C&R agreement in Falkinburg, holding that “[a]s in McKenna, 

[the e]mployer had no obligation to honor an unapproved C&R agreement.” Id. 

Notably, this Court’s opinion in Falkinburg did not indicate whether 

the parties had actually executed a written C&R agreement. As stated above, that 

distinction is immaterial. This Court’s decisions applying Section 449 have 

articulated a bright line rule delineating valid from invalid C&R agreements. Unless 

and until a WCJ has held a hearing and issued an order approving a C&R agreement, 

there is no valid agreement. Here, there was never even a signed C&R agreement, 

so there was nothing for the WCJ to approve.

Claimant’s attempt to sidestep the WC Act by bringing a civil action is 

likewise unavailing. If Claimant believed herself aggrieved by the WCJ’s dismissal 

of her petition for approval of the alleged C&R agreement, she could have appealed 

the WCJ’s decision to the Board. She did not do so. She cannot now resurrect her 

claim by repackaging it as a civil contract suit. 

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing discussion, Employer’s PO demurring to the 

Complaint on the basis that there is no valid C&R agreement as a matter of law is 

sustained, and the Complaint is dismissed, with prejudice. Employer’s remaining 

POs are dismissed as moot. We also dismiss as moot Claimant’s application to 

compel depositions.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Brenda Searfoss a/k/a Brenda Walton, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, : No. 145 M.D. 2023

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 7

th day of December 2023, the preliminary objection 

(PO) of Respondent, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Employer), demurring to 

the petition for review (Complaint) on the basis that there is no valid compromise 

and release agreement as a matter of law is SUSTAINED, and the Complaint is 

DISMISSED, with prejudice. Employer’s remaining POs are DISMISSED as moot. 

The application of Petitioner, Brenda Searfoss a/k/a Brenda Walton, to compel 

depositions is DISMISSED as moot.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge