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DISASTER CAPACITY IN 

THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION: 

EXPERIENCES, CAPABILITIES, 

AND WEAKNESSES 

(111–22) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 3, 2009 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

PHIL HARE, Illinois 

JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio 

MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan 

BETSY MARKEY, Colorado 

PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia, Chairwoman 

BETSY MARKEY, Colorado 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania, 

Vice Chair 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 

(Ex Officio) 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vii 

TESTIMONY 

DeAtley, Craig, Director, Institute for Public Health Emergency Response ...... 50 

Delinski, Jeff, Deputy Chief Special Operations Bureau, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ........................................................................... 28 

Gallegos, Gabrielle, Director of Law Enforcement Policy, Department of 

Homeland Security ............................................................................................... 6 

Herron, Vernon, Deputy Chief Administrative Officer for Public Safety/Director of Homeland Security, Office of the County Executive, Prince George’s 

County ................................................................................................................... 28 

Mathes, Linda, President and CEO, American Red Cross of the National 

Capital Area ......................................................................................................... 50 

Nichols, Daniel R., Assistant Chief, United States Capitol Police Department . 6 

Nickles, Peter, Attorney General, District of Columbia; Daniel R. Nichols, 

Assistant Chief, United States Capitol Police Department .............................. 6 

Sarubbi, Jonathan, Region III Administrator, FEMA .......................................... 50 

Schwartz, Major General Errol R., Commanding General, District of Columbia 

National Guard .................................................................................................... 28 

Wall, Kenneth, Acting Director, Office of National Capital Region, FEMA ....... 50 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Diaz-Balart, Hon. Mario, of Florida ....................................................................... 71 

Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, of the District of Columbia ................................. 74 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

DeAtley, Craig .......................................................................................................... 78 

Delinski, Jeff ............................................................................................................ 127 

Herron, Vernon ........................................................................................................ 135 

Mathes, Linda .......................................................................................................... 143 

Nichols, Daniel R. .................................................................................................... 162 

Nickles, Peter ........................................................................................................... 165 

Sarubbi, Jonathan ................................................................................................... 170 

Schwartz, Major General Errol R. .......................................................................... 192 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

DeAtley, Craig, Director, Institute for Public Health Emergency Response: 

‘‘A Blueprint for Emergency Preparedness by Nonprofits,’’ The Greater 

Washington Task Force on Nonprofit Emergency Preparedness, September 2003 ............................................................................................... 81 

′′District of Columbia Healthcare Facilities Emergency Care Partnership Program′′, chart ................................................................................. 124 

′′Washington Hospital Center at a Glance′′, fact sheet .............................. 125 

′′HHS Awards $25 Million in Healthcare Partnership Emergency Care′′, 

News Release ............................................................................................. 126 

Responses to questions from the Subcommittee ......................................... 117 

Herron, Vernon, Deputy Chief Administrative Officer for Public Safety/Director of Homeland Security, Office of the County Executive, Prince George’s 

County, responses to questions from the Subcommittee .................................. 141 

Mathes, Linda, President and CEO, American Red Cross of the National 

Capital Area: ........................................................................................................

List of schools ................................................................................................ 151 

Responses to questions from the Subcommittee ......................................... 156 

Page

VI 

Sarubbi, Jonathan, Region III Administrator, FEMA, responses to questions 

from the Subcommittee ........................................................................................ 179 

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(1) 

DISASTER CAPACITY IN THE 

NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION: EXPERIENCES, 

CAPABILITIES, AND WEAKNESSES 

Friday, April 3, 2009 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC

BUILDINGS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton 

[Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Ms. NORTON. The hearing will come to order. And I will ask the 

first panel if you will be seated. 

While the Senate hasn’t finished its work, the House finished its 

work, finished the budget, and I think most people are home by 

now. 

This hearing is so important, however, that we wanted to proceed in any case. The Ranking Member, Mr. Diaz-Balart, has a 

statement for the record. I am pleased to receive it at this time. 

I welcome today’s witnesses at this hearing concerning an important mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, an 

agency of the Department of Homeland Security, under the jurisdiction of our Subcommittee. 

But for this hearing, I would be attending the funeral of Mrs. 

Loree Murray, a gentle soul who became a beacon of resistance of 

gun violence when crack and the crack wars gripped the District 

in the 1990’s. An indication of Mrs. Murray’s success as a citizen 

anticrime activist is that, before I arrived at the viewing and wake 

last night, I am told that D.C. Police Chief Cathy Lanier was in 

attendance. Mrs. Murray was also such a statehood and voting 

rights advocate that her family placed her ‘‘Free D.C.’’ cap in her 

casket. 

Considering that an important part of what concerns us at today’s hearing is a new firearms risk posed by a dangerous gun 

amendment proposed for the District of Columbia House Voting 

Rights Act. I told Mrs. Murray’s family and friends last night that 

I wanted to dedicate today’s hearing to Loree Murray. 

Today we are pleased to welcome Federal and District law enforcement officials, emergency managers, and first responders to 

testify concerning steps to prevent, prepare for, and respond as 

necessary to incidents of all types. FEMA is the lead agency 

2 

charged with preparing for and responding to disasters and emergencies, whether natural or manmade. 

When Congress established the Department of Homeland Security shortly after 9/11, the statute that created it also established 

a Special Office of National Capital Region Coordination, now 

placed in FEMA. Our region faces the same risks as other major 

areas of our country from natural disasters, such as the 2001 floods 

in the Bloomingdale section of the District of Columbia, or manmade disasters, such as the tragic plane crash into the Pentagon 

on September 11, 2001. 

The Nation’s Capital occupies a special place in the Nation’s security network with the District ranking in the top four at risk for 

terrorist threats, along with New York, Chicago, and San Francisco. However, the challenges of responding to threats in the seat 

of the Federal Government are unique, and as a result, Congress 

established the NCCR, the only regional office inside the DHS 

charged specifically with coordinating security for one region alone. 

The unique nature of the National Capital Region brings distinct 

challenges for the region and its officials. For example, the Metropolitan Police Department must work with no less than 32 Federal 

police agencies, and MPD, the largest police force in the region, is 

an indispensable part of the Federal security network for the Nation’s Capital and the National Capital Region of our Nation. 

The recent inauguration, the largest event ever held in the Nation’s Capital, with an estimated 2 million people in attendance, including foreign dignitaries, entertainment stars, and virtually 

every important Federal and State official in the United States, is 

perhaps the quintessential example of what makes the work of 

elected officials and police and security officials in our Nation’s 

Capital uniquely difficult. 

Although hearings have been held concerning some problems at 

the 2009 inaugurations, such as citizens who were held in the 

Third Street tunnel, it is noteworthy that there was not a single 

arrest at the National Mall, notwithstanding the unprecedented 

crowds and the disappointments of some concerning admission. The 

Third Street tunnel problems are among those that will be studied 

by the Government Accountability Office with a report and recommendation to come. 

However, Mayor Adrian Fenty, D.C. Police Chief Cathy Lanier, 

Metro, the Capitol Police, and the DHS agencies involved, including the lead agency, the Secret Service, deserve credit for the planning and operations that resulted in what most agree was an unusually successful event. Although the problems that arose require 

study, we are also interested in how the Federal and District agencies in cooperation with the region pulled off an event the size of 

which was unlike anything we had seen before, as many as five 

times the number of people on the Mall as anyone had ever seen, 

and how they were able to keep it up for 4 days of the engagement, 

that is also something that will help us to understand what a 

unique event can bring since nobody knew how many people would 

come, and the authorities had to be prepared for however many 

came, almost all of them without tickets. 

Since 9/11, this region has had notable success working together 

to shore up unique risks to homeland security here. Literally bilVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:32 Oct 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\48880 JASON
3 

lions of dollars have been spent, not only to repair the Pentagon, 

where 184 people were lost, but to fortify Metro against the unique 

vulnerabilities of the National Capital Region with its porous borders, 14 million people, 200,000 Federal employees, and national 

and foreign dignitaries that pose security risks as they move often 

in motorcades throughout the National Capital Region. 

No risk is more apparent to homeland security in particular than 

the widespread availability of firearms. While the city was in the 

act of writing new legislation this summer, the National Rifle Association forced a number of Democratic Members of the House during the primaries just before the 2008 election to demand an upand-down vote on a bill to eliminate all gun laws in the District 

of Columbia and to strip the District of all public safety gun enforcement jurisdiction. 

This bill is essentially the same as the Ensign Amendment now 

attached to the District of Columbia House Voting Rights legislation passed by the Senate in February. Despite hearings and testimony from Federal and D.C. police chiefs that the gun bill posed 

a, quote, ‘‘grave threat’’ to elected and appointed Federal officials 

and visitors in addition to D.C. Residents, the bill passed the 

House on the belief that it could be stopped in the Senate, and we 

were able to do so. 

However, despite the hearings, almost no one had ever looked at 

the gun bill itself. They were focused on not doing harm to Members from more conservative districts who were facing election. 

Now, with the Ensign Amendment attached to the Voting Rights 

bill in the Senate, the time has come to look the Ensign Amendment straight in the eyes. 

Understand this, we are going to get the D.C. Voting Rights 

passed this year. Therefore, if the Ensign Amendment is on the bill 

in the House, it will become law right along with the D.C. House 

Voting Rights Act. 

The Congress has largely regarded the gun bill as just another 

piece of local legislation. However, Federal police must operate 

largely under the District’s gun laws and have testified that these 

gun laws have been critical to homeland security. 

Today we intend to face head on what it would mean for the Nation’s Capital to have no local gun laws. We must ask whether the 

gun laws, as the Washington Post recently noted, ‘‘protecting the 

lives of D.C. Residents as well as those of tourists and foreign dignitaries, national leaders, and the President, and his family,’’ end 

quote, should be eliminated. 

Before us today is whether appointed and elected Federal officials, employees, visitors and Federal presence would be more or 

less secure under the Ensign Amendment, which would allow, and 

let’s here hear it and face it, would allow military-style weapons, 

including 50-caliber armor-piercing guns, to be legally possessed 

without limit on the numbers in the Nation’s Capital. 

The Nation’s Capital becomes the only jurisdiction permitting, indeed inviting, people to cross State lines to purchase guns and 

bring them back from two nearby States, facilitating gun running 

by criminals, felons, or terrorists between the States and the Nation’s Capital. A gun show loophole would be open eliminating the 

assault weapons ban, among other things, without any background 

4 

checks of any kind, permitting the purchase of weapons of every 

kind from private individuals at gun shows on a cash-and-carry 

basis. No gun registration is permitted, and therefore, there would 

be no way for police to trace guns used in crimes. 

The District is deprived of all gun safety jurisdiction to revise its 

laws for the safety of residents and visitors and government officials even if serious threats arise. Any person could bring guns concealed or openly to any workplace in the city. Employees therefore 

could bring guns to a Wizards game if they worked the at the 

Verizon Center, to the National Baseball Park at Nationals Park, 

to a national convention at the Convention Center, to Pepco headquarters, to law offices, to other small and large workplaces 

throughout the city, to churches and other places of worship, to 

bars, restaurants and nightclubs, to hotels, to power plants, and to 

all District government offices. In short, would elected and appointed Federal officials and foreign dignitaries, visitors and District residents be safer and more secure with or without the Ensign 

Amendment? 

Asked another way, what is to be gained from the Ensign 

Amendment? The time to ask these questions is now, not after 

there is blowblack and recriminations following serious gun carnage affecting residents, Federal officials, and employees. Our job 

is to prevent, not only to protect. 

Today’s hearing, of course, will focus on not only this most recent 

and serious threat to homeland security since 9/11, but on all the 

steps that have been taken by the agencies involved, including the 

District of Columbia National Guard, the Department of Homeland 

Security, FEMA, the U.S. Capitol Police, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transportation Authority Police, the D.C. Attorney 

General, Prince George’s County Office of the County Executive, 

the Washington Hospital Center, and the American Red Cross. 

Yet, the hearing is likely to be remembered most by whether we 

in Congress, with a clear threat in plain sight on the Voting Rights 

bill, did what was required to protect the Nation’s Capital and the 

National Capital Region and all who live and work here. We are 

deeply grateful to today’s witnesses. 

May I ask my good friend and colleague, Ms. Edwards, if she has 

any opening statement. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

And just a brief statement. First, I want to say to all of the witnesses who will appear today that you have a unique responsibility 

in this region. And this region, as you know, is different from just 

about any other in the country, both in terms of our vulnerability 

and access, our meaning to this country and around the world. So 

all the agencies in this very close region sharing borders, crossing 

borders, require the kind of coordination and communication that 

is different than almost anyplace else. 

So I thank you in advance for your testimony today and for helping me as a new legislator to understand your responsibilities, the 

challenges that you face, and what we might do here in the United 

States Congress to try to mitigate some of those barriers and those 

challenges. 

I will say, as a representative of Prince George’s and Montgomery County in Maryland’s Fourth Congressional District, I can 

5 

only recall my experiences as a parent and a worker on 9/11 and 

the challenges of trying to get to a son over here on Capitol Hill 

while I was over on Dupont Circle, while Dad was over in Virginia, 

and trying to communicate, and the lack of communication, the difficulty of moving in and getting out of the city. And I thought just 

then that while, overall obviously, we handled that disaster and 

tragedy quite well, we still have a lot to do and especially if there 

were a more compelling disaster in this region, just the mere movement of people and vehicles and emergency services. 

As someone who represents Prince George’s and Montgomery 

Counties, I have been more recently focused on things like our communication systems for law enforcement, whether we have the 

kinds of communication systems that allow us to communicate 

across agencies and law enforcement operations. I am concerned 

about that. 

I am concerned about our emergency room and hospital capacity 

to handle a tremendous disaster. We are home, as you know, to Adventist Hospital, to Prince George’s County Hospital, to numerous 

other medical facilities, and yet in that, we also know that these 

facilities face tremendous financial and other challenges. And we 

have to, I think, in this region pay particular focus to those facilities and make sure that they have the emergency services and capacity to handle any impending disaster. I am not sure, frankly, 

that we are quite there yet. So I look forward to your testimony 

today and learning from each of you as you appear, and obviously, 

thank the Chairwoman for the foresight in pulling this discussion 

together. 

And let me just say on the Chairwoman’s closing remarks, particularly regarding D.C.’s autonomy and ability to make its own decisions both about emergency services and other decisions for the 

city, I am full square behind and with her because we know in this 

jurisdiction that it is important to have people who are capable of 

making decisions independently for their jurisdictions but working 

together. 

And we want a full partner, a full voting partner, in the District 

of Columbia. And Maryland doesn’t want the responsibility of registering guns from D.C. Residents and moving firearms across borders. That poses a tremendous burden on our State. It poses an absolute burden on our local law enforcement in Prince George’s and 

Montgomery Counties. And so I look forward to continuing to work 

with the Chairwoman to address these issues as they impact our 

ability to respond to disasters and emergencies. 

Thank you very much, and I yield. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. 

Mr. Perriello, do you have a comment you would like to make, 

opening comments? Thank you. 

I am very grateful to today’s opening panel. I am grateful particularly to District of Columbia Attorney General Peter Nickles, 

who volunteered to come when Police Chief Cathy Lanier encountered a family emergency. I am very pleased and grateful to you, 

Attorney General Nickles, for coming. 

I am pleased also to hear from the Assistant Chief of the United 

States Capitol Police Department, who is here for Chief Morse, who 

had to be away today. 

6 

We work very closely with you, Assistant Chief Nichols, on homeland security here in the Capitol and in the District. 

And I am particularly grateful to the administration for providing us with a witness from the Department of Homeland Security, Gabrielle Gallegos, who is Director of Law Enforcement Policy 

at the Department of Homeland Security. 

Ms. NORTON. Let us begin with Attorney General Nickles. 

TESTIMONY OF PETER NICKLES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; DANIEL R. NICHOLS, ASSISTANT 

CHIEF, UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

AND GABRIELLE GALLEGOS, DIRECTOR OF LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. NICKLES. Good morning, Chairwoman and Members of the 

Committee. 

I appeared with the Chief almost a year ago when we presented 

testimony with respect to the gun legislation that was being considered by the House. And I am a poor substitute for Chief Lanier, 

but I am very happy to be here to talk about the impact on homeland security and this Nation’s Capital of what has been called the 

Ensign Amendment. 

I want to first talk about a very important proposition, and that 

is that the District of Columbia is in compliance with the Second 

Amendment ruling of the Supreme Court in the Heller case. Now, 

it is a fact that some of the same individuals and lawyers who contest the original District legislation have sued again, but I am confident and I would think the Congress would be confident that the 

courts will ultimately resolve any issues that relate to a very long 

and deliberate process engaged in by the mayor and the City Council to satisfy the requirements of the Supreme Court. 

We fully respect the decision of the Supreme Court, and we have 

signed into law and promulgated regulations that, in my view as 

a lawyer who has practiced some 45 years, fully satisfy the directives of the Supreme Court. 

What is important to emphasize is that the laws that the mayor 

and the Council have enacted affirm the District residents’ right to 

register hand guns and possess them for self-defense in the home. 

I take note of the statement of Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion in Heller. And he underscored the District’s authority 

to regulate firearms under the Second Amendment, and he stated, 

and I think it bears repetition in this discussion, ‘‘although we do 

not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full 

scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be 

taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession 

of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the 

carrying of firearms in sensitive places, such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on 

the commercial sale of arms.’’ 

Consistent with that opinion, the District, like many States, and 

the District is not alone here, has determined that assault weapons 

and certain unsafe firearms are not eligible to be registered and 

possessed. 

I want to correct some of the misinformation that I have heard 

about the District’s gun laws. Shot guns, rifles, and hand guns, inVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:32 Oct 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\48880 JASON
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cluding many semi-automatic models, can all be registered in the 

District. Indeed, rifles and shot guns, including many semi-automatic versions, were never prohibited at all, and residents have 

been able to register many semi-automatic handguns since September 16, 2008. And since the Heller decision alone, more than 

400 handguns and 160 long guns have been registered. There is 

currently one licensed firearms dealer in the District, and we think 

more will follow because the market will take care of that. 

To state it clearly, it is no more difficult to open a dealership 

here than opening a restaurant. And the District is certainly not 

alone in requiring a firearm dealer’s license. Indeed, 17 States do 

exactly what the District has enacted. 

Now, the Ensign Amendment. In my view, the Ensign Amendment goes far beyond compliance with Heller. Most importantly, 

this amendment would repeal the District’s ban on assault weapons. The city’s ban is similar to the Federal ban which was in place 

until 2004, and that ban was not unconstitutional. And Federal law 

had a sunset provision after 10 years, at which time it was allowed 

to expire, and what is most important is that the authority then 

reverted to the States. 

And then, in all, 10 States have banned or regulated assault 

weapons with 5 States having provisions that are similar, if not 

identical, to that of D.C. Even the ATF has described assault weapons, and I quote, as ‘‘large-capacity semi-automatic firearms designed for rapid-fire combat use. Most are patterned after machine 

guns used by military forces.’’ Certainly the District’s ban of this 

type of weapon is a reasonable exercise of its regulatory authority 

and certainly consistent with what Justice Scalia wrote in the Heller case. 

Now, critics of the District’s ban will argue that criminals can get 

assault weapons anyway, and we all know that the use of assault 

weapons by criminals is a growing problem in cities across the 

country. We saw that most recently in the tragic incident in Oakland, California, in which two law enforcement officers were killed 

by a parolee with an assault rifle. 

Fortunately, at this time, assault weapons do not have a strong 

presence in D.C. Last year, of more than 2,500 illegal firearms recovered by police, only 1 percent were assault weapons. Certainly 

a determined criminal could get an assault weapon, and if our assault weapons ban were merely repealed, anyone eligible to purchase a firearm under Federal law would be able to. 

But the Ensign Amendment goes well beyond that by taking the 

unprecedented step of allowing District residents to purchase firearms in Maryland and Virginia, which would have a significant effect on the ability of this entire region to regulate firearms, including assault weapons. Nowhere in the Nation, nowhere in the Nation, are residents allowed to purchase a firearm in another State 

without going through a federally licensed dealer in their own 

State, nowhere in the Nation. 

As the Governor of Maryland warned, his State would not be 

able properly to regulate firearms purchased by District residents. 

Maryland does not have the necessary expertise to interpret District laws, much less the many possible dispositions under the 

city’s criminal justice system. The result would be that even people 

8 

who are prohibited under Federal law from purchasing a firearm 

may be able to take advantage of those gaps and buy a weapon, 

including an assault weapon, in Maryland or Virginia. 

Last September, our distinguished Chief of Police, Kathy Lanier, 

testified before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform about the special concerns in protecting this unique city, the 

District of Columbia. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 

demonstrated something that we have known for some time: Government facilities, dignitaries, and public servants are prime targets for terrorists, both foreign and domestic. Protecting government officials and infrastructure is a challenge for every city in the 

United States, but in Washington, the likelihood of attack is higher, and the challenges to protect the city are greater. As a result, 

it would seem to me that the District is the last place where U.S. 

residents across the country would want to allow assault weapons. 

The District’s high concentration of iconic structures, such as the 

national monuments, the White House, and, of course, the Capitol, 

make it a highly attractive target. The high-profile human targets, 

from the Nation’s top elected leaders to the more than 400 foreign 

dignitaries that make official visits to D.C. Each year, are obviously an attractive target. Moreover, we should not be solely concerned about well-coordinated terrorist attacks. We need also to 

consider the unsophisticated lone wolf terrorist angry at the U.S. 

Government for whatever reason. 

The second key vulnerability, and Madam Chairwoman, I will 

come to an end very shortly if you will give me a few more seconds, 

is, due to the sheer volume of secure motorcades traveling in this 

city every day, given the daily movements around the city of the 

President, the Vice President, and their families, and the fact that 

almost 3,000 foreign dignitaries spend time in our city each year, 

the routes for those movements cannot be shut down as they are 

in other cities. 

As you know from your own districts, when the President and 

Vice President travel outside of Washington, roads are cleared of 

all traffic, parked cars and such. And spectators are often kept behind barricades. We don’t do this in this city because shutting 

down the routes for every motorcade would make it virtually impossible to navigate much of the city on a continuous basis, and we 

do not want the Nation’s Capital to take on the character of an 

armed fortress. 

This freedom, however, comes with the cost of high vulnerability 

both for the officials and dignitaries and the general population. As 

Chief Lanier noted last September, in attempted and successful assassinations around the world, the first step in attacking a motorcade is frequently to take out the security detail with semi-automatic and automatic firearms. This forces the motorcade to stop, at 

which point the terrorists can use explosives to attack the armored 

vehicles carrying the targeted individuals. 

We all have an immediate concern for any life threatened or lost 

in a terrorist event. But, as my colleague Chief Lanier noted, here 

in the Nation’s Capital, we must recognize that any terrorist incident, no matter how small, would garner worldwide attention and 

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percussions of an incident in the city should be of grave concern to 

everyone in this room. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Attorney General Nickles. 

Mr. Nichols, Chief Nichols. 

Mr. NICHOLS. Good afternoon, ma’am. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the public safety and the consequence of management capabilities of the United States Capitol Police. I would like to make 

some brief opening remarks and, with your permission, submit my 

written testimony for the record. 

The U.S. Capitol Police accomplishes its mission through a variety of functions to provide comprehensive around-the-clock protection for the United States Congress, the legislative process, the 

Capitol complex, and the millions of visitors from across the globe 

that come to see democracy at work. In an effort to maximize our 

ability to prepare for and respond to incidents affecting public safety, the U.S. Capitol police specifically focuses on key internal capabilities which, when necessary, can be augmented by specialized resources from our partners in the National Capital Region. Our current internal capabilities show the rewards of several years of investment in training, robust command-and-control systems, and 

physical security improvements. 

Providing security, protection, and law enforcement services to 

the United States Congress in the Capitol Complex in a post–9/11 

threat environment is a challenging task. To do this, we rely on the 

provisions of Title II of U.S. Code 1961, which states, ‘‘Capitol police shall police the United States Capitol Buildings and Grounds 

under the direction of the Capitol Police Board.’’ We also rely on 

Title XL of the U.S. Code 5104, which states, ‘‘except as authorized 

by regulations prescribed by the Capitol Police Board, persons may 

not carry on or have readily accessible to any individual on the 

Capitol Grounds or in any of the Capitol Buildings a firearm, dangerous weapon, explosives, or an incendiary device.’’ We have recently made a number of high-profile gun, explosives, and dangerous weapons arrests through interdiction and security screening. 

As the host law enforcement agency for many events of national 

significance, we understand that working with our many partners 

in the National Capital Region and sharing our resources is imperative. In recent years, we have worked hard to improve our interoperability with local agencies, such as the D.C. Fire Department 

and the Metropolitan Police Department as well as our Federal 

partners in the National Capital Region, including the FBI, U.S. 

Secret Service, FEMA, Department of Health and Human Services, 

and the Department of Defense. 

The planning for such events involves an all-hazards approach, 

an appropriate risk analysis, an event-specific threat assessment, 

and a comprehensive crisis management plan to ensure we are prepared to implement appropriate protective measures with little or 

no notice. As an example, the U.S. Capitol Police successfully implemented a mass notification and evacuation of more than 8,000 

people at two consecutive July 4th concerts in 2006 and 2007. We 

had to air security threat evacuations at the Capitol Complex, one 

10 

during President Reagan’s state funeral, demonstrating our ability 

to move large amounts of people into safety while maintaining the 

security and integrity of all legislative facilities. These evacuations 

were based on imminent threat of severe weather creating unsafe 

conditions for our visitors with regard to the two concerts, and a 

direct air security threat to the Capitol Complex during other 

events. 

I would like to also acknowledge the relationship we enjoy between the United States Capitol Police and the Capitol Police 

Board. The support, guidance and oversight provided by this entity 

allow the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the U.S. Capitol Police planning to maintain a direct path and ensures consistent messages are provided across Capitol Hill. Consistent communications with this body ensures that we will be able to elicit 

additional resources if they are required. This process has been utilized effectively in the past, allowing the U.S. Capitol to supplement its resources and/or extend our abilities of the resources we 

have on hand every day. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. This concludes my opening remarks, 

and I will be happy to answer any questions that you have. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Nichols. 

Ms. Gallegos. 

Ms. GALLEGOS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and other distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. 

I am Gabrielle Gallegos, and I am the Director of Law Enforcement and Information Policy at the Department of Homeland Security. 

I appreciate being asked to appear before you, and on behalf of 

the department, I very much want to recognize the hard work that 

Congresswoman Norton has done over the years on a range of important homeland security issues that impact the safety and security of Washington, D.C., and the Capital Region. 

As we all know, Washington, D.C., is the site of numerous embassies, international organizations, and Federal offices. The highprofile events that occur in Washington and the many dignitaries 

and officials that visit, live, and work here can pose unique challenges. 

That D.C. Is our Nation’s Capital naturally affects the security 

picture. DHS’s mission is to address the broad range of potential 

threats that can impact that security. Threats that include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, along with natural disasters of all types: threats that may impact human health 

or our critical infrastructure; threats that may come from other 

countries or originate right here at home. 

In developing and executing security policy in the National Capital Region, DHS is very aware that multiple factors affect the 

overall level of security. DHS recognizes that the security of the 

Capital may be affected by local conditions and policies. Also, given 

the prominence of Washington as the seat of government and the 

proximity to Washington of Maryland and Virginia and the other 

mid-Atlantic States, local circumstances in this city inevitably have 

an impact on the work of the Federal Government in promoting regional security. These and other matters remain important as we 

work on a coordinated plan to advance crucial goals in this area. 

11 

The Department of Homeland Security works closely with local 

law enforcement and with all our State and local partners to bolster Federal, State, and local capacity to respond to the many security issues we face. One of the primary missions of the department 

is to support and coordinate with State and local partners, and I 

want to recognize the crucial relationships the department is fortunate to have with all of the local and regional police departments 

in the Capital region, the emergency managers and first responders, the State and local homeland security officers, and the National Guard. 

And I feel particularly honored to be here with my fellow witnesses today. They clearly represent the best of modern policing 

and the important partnerships that we have in this area. These 

working relationships and the mutual support they provide are the 

cornerstone of our ability as a Nation to achieve important security 

functions. We will continue to foster these relationships as we work 

to address both existing threats and emerging challenges. 

Thank, you and I would be pleased to answer any questions. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you again, Ms. Gallegos. 

Let me begin with Attorney General Nickles. 

Attorney General Nickles, you are one of the District’s most distinguished attorneys working before the District was fortunate to 

attract you. And you are now the highest law enforcement officer 

in the District until we get you the full authority to be the District 

Attorney. So I am asking you some questions in light of your legal 

background and your role in the District. 

Now, after the Heller decision, the city changed its gun laws. The 

Heller decision speaks and uses the word throughout, ‘‘handguns.’’ 

Does the new law in the District of Columbia disallow semi-automatic handguns? 

Mr. NICKLES. The new law authorizes a certain type of semiautomatics to be registered in the District, and I think it needs to 

be recounted that rifles and shotguns, including some semi-automatic versions, were never prohibited at all. So we have it—and I 

think a careful balance and the Council and the Mayor have tried 

to achieve, consistent with the Heller case, have been very receptive to the views of the gun proponents. This is a balance, protection of the safety of our citizens with the Second Amendment 

Rights of those same citizens. I think we have struck the right balance, Madam Chairwoman, and I think we have developed a 

scheme of legislation and regulation that is fully constitutional. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, the Heller decision indicated that a person 

must be able to have firearms, including handguns, in the home 

and that these handguns must be kept operable. Is that the case 

with District laws today? 

Mr. NICKLES. I think, effectively, yes, that we have protected the 

Second Amendment Right of a citizen to have a gun in the home 

for purposes of self-defense. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, the Heller decision did not allow guns outside 

the home, is that correct? It spoke only of guns in the home? 

Mr. NICKLES. Only in special cases where there were permits for 

security-type individuals, your statement is correct. The handgun 

or the registered gun, in our case, would be in the home. 

12 

Ms. NORTON. Let me ask Mr. Nichols, the Ensign Amendment 

uses the words that a person may have a home in his place of business. Well, the place of business for most people is where they 

work. Could I ask you what you think—first, let me ask you about 

the Capitol. How strict are the gun laws in the Capitol of the 

United States? 

Mr. NICHOLS. The gun laws within our jurisdiction, the U.S. Capitol Complex, are very strict. As I mentioned in my opening statement, we rely on Title XL of the U.S. Code to prohibit all handguns, weapons, and incendiary devices within our jurisdiction. 

Ms. NORTON. So no handguns, no guns of any kind can come into 

this Capitol, and everybody in this Capitol is fully protected from 

guns in this Capitol, even though it is a place of business? 

Mr. NICHOLS. Yes, ma’am. They are protected by us through 

the—— 

Ms. NORTON. Is this the case with the Federal courts as well? 

Mr. NICHOLS. I am sorry? 

Ms. NORTON. Is this the case with Federal courts as well, that 

you can’t take a handgun into Federal courts of this city? 

Mr. NICHOLS. That is correct. I believe that there are also restrictions, even though it is not our jurisdiction, there are restrictions 

that deal with Federal properties elsewhere in the city, also. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Nickles, under this bill, could you take a gun 

into the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the Court of 

Appeals of the District of Columbia? 

Mr. NICKLES. I would hate to think that is the case. At the September 2008 hearing, we pointed out the problems in the legislation being considered about carrying firearms in public or concealed, and that was eliminated, but the dangerous language in the 

Ensign Amendment is that while it would allow the District to prohibit the carrying of firearms, concealed or openly, but except at 

the person’s dwelling place, place of business, or on other land possessed by the person, as your opening statement pointed out, that 

language ‘‘place of business’’ or ‘‘on other land possessed by the person’’ is, in my view, very dangerous. I am not personally familiar 

with the rules of the Superior Court and the D.C. Court of Appeals. 

I know there is significant screening there. I would doubt that you 

could take guns into that venue, but—— 

Ms. NORTON. You think the courts could, in the District of Columbia, although—first of all, are these rules pursuant to the laws 

of the District of Columbia, any laws that the courts would have 

in the District of Columbia, pursuant to the laws of the District of 

Columbia, or would they, because they are Article I courts be protected under Federal legislation? 

Mr. NICKLES. I think because they are Article I courts, they could 

adopt rules that would protect entrance into the courts, but all 

these other places of ‘‘business’’ that you discussed in your opening 

are potentially open, and that causes me great concern. 

Ms. NORTON. Including the D.C. Council, the offices of the District Government and the like, all of those would be places of business where employees could have guns? 

Mr. NICKLES. Potentially. This language is very unclear, but it 

is a loophole through which you could drive a truck. 

13 

Ms. NORTON. You patrol off-campus, Mr. Nichols. And when I 

was in my second term and the District was experiencing great gun 

carnage, like every large city in the United States, Congress decided it wasn’t enough simply to allow the Capitol Police, if invaded, to do what it could but extended your jurisdiction. Would 

you describe your extended jurisdiction and how the changes in the 

D.C. Law would affect your ability to protect the Capitol in light 

of your extended jurisdiction, and what jurisdiction you think you 

need now and what jurisdiction you think you should have in any 

case? 

Mr. NICHOLS. The jurisdiction of the United States Capitol Police 

is rather unique. We have a primary jurisdiction that encompasses 

the United States Capitol, all the congressional buildings, about 19 

congressional buildings, and all the adjoining streets and parks. It 

is about 40 city blocks that are in the core of the city. We have an 

extended jurisdiction that extends out several blocks in any direction from the United States Capitol where officers enjoy the same 

law enforcement authority as that of the Metropolitan Police Department, and we do have an active presence within that area to 

enforce the laws of the District. 

Also, elsewhere throughout the city, we have authority when we 

are on official business to enforce the laws when it comes to crimes 

of violence that are committed in our presence. So we can protect 

the citizenry when we are in any given area of the city at any given 

time. Layered on that is a Federal protective authority that is provided to the United States Capitol Police to protect Members of 

Congress anywhere within the United States, its territories and 

possessions. 

The way that we currently operate is that police in our primary 

jurisdiction, we apply both D.C. Code or Federal Code to ensure 

that we keep the complex safe. That is, if we identify people who 

are unlawfully in possession of firearms, incendiary devices, explosives, then, obviously, we can identify them readily and make that 

arrest. 

Elsewhere in the District of Columbia, just as we have all the 

time that I have been a police officer for 25 years, when you run 

into somebody on the street with a firearm, you can assume that 

they are either a law enforcement officer or a criminal because 

there really is no gray area in between right now with how the gun 

laws on the street are applied. That is how our officers are trained. 

[Submitted subsequent to the hearing: There are limited exceptions 

for select registered lawful firearms that are being transported.] 

Anyone in possession of a firearm that—— 

Ms. NORTON. If someone were to say, but, officer, I am on my 

way, and I am just taking it there, would that be presumed to be 

legal under the Ensign Amendment? 

Mr. NICHOLS. As you know, ma’am, since we are a legislative 

branch agency, we don’t comment on pending legislation. I would 

have to study the implications of that. But speaking in general, because of the environment in which we work, anytime we come in 

contact with an individual who has a firearm, it is our position we 

have to treat them as if they are a threat until we can prove that 

they are not because we have to understand the context in which 

they are possessing that firearm and what their potential intent is. 

14 

So anything that changes the current conditions that we are in is 

going to complicate our enforcement efforts. 

Ms. NORTON. I am going to ask Ms. Gallegos a question, and 

then I will go on to the other Members and come back with remaining questions. 

Ms. Gallegos, you have testified that you work closely in the Department of Homeland Security with local jurisdictions. Would that 

include the District of Columbia Police Department, and if so, 

would changes such as the abolition of, elimination of gun laws in 

the District of Columbia hurt or enhance homeland security in the 

District of Columbia, in your view? 

Ms. GALLEGOS. We do work closely with the Metropolitan Police 

Department at the Department of Homeland Security, of course 

through the Secret Service and through the Federal Protective 

Service, and other law enforcement agencies. 

There are a number of threats, of course, that the Capitol faces, 

as you know. And we do the type of risk analysis and threat assessment that Chief Nichols was talking about. And we rely very 

closely on our State and local partners to provide the on-the-ground 

information about the threats in their jurisdictions and about the 

issues that are going to be most important to them, and about the 

types of support that they are going to need from the Department 

of Homeland Security. 

Ms. NORTON. So if guns could be brought in, military-style weapons, for example, from other jurisdictions here, you would rely on 

who in order to help preserve Homeland Security in the District of 

Columbia? 

Ms. GALLEGOS. We would be relying on a coordinated approach. 

Just this morning, when I was coming here, listening on the radio 

hearing about a new partnership between the District of Columbia 

and Maryland and Virginia, those are the types of partnerships 

that the Department of Homeland Security wants to foster and applauds. 

Ms. NORTON. Are you prepared for a situation where you would 

be called upon to help the jurisdictions detect military style weapons that could be used in the District of Columbia in light of home 

rule security risks? How would you handle that? 

Ms. GALLEGOS. We work with a variety of scenarios. We are constantly planning and preparing to adapt to changing circumstances. 

Ms. NORTON. How would you adapt to individuals being able to 

go without background checks and buy .50 caliber military-style, 

armor-piercing weapons at gun shows in another jurisdiction? How 

would you prepare for that? 

Ms. GALLEGOS. We are going to approach that with the same 

kind of threat assessment, planning, coordination, working with 

State and local partners to address exactly that kind of emerging 

threat which can come from that kind of quarter, or from any number of quarters. 

When we do threat assessment and we work with State and local 

partners, we are not just looking at particular types of weapons or 

particular types of incidences, we are planning across the spectrum 

of scenarios for the range that could include the type of weapons 

you are describing, or incendiary devices, or shoulder mounted. 

15 

Ms. NORTON. Well, this is a particular threat that no one has 

had to prepare for, Mrs. Gallegos. Of the threats we have had to 

prepare for, legal permission from the Federal Government to buy 

guns in another jurisdiction that could be military-style weapons 

that could be used against Federal officials, is, so far as I know, 

not a contingency you have had to prepare for. Do you have a risk 

assessment involving that yet? 

Ms. GALLEGOS. Well, I want to be careful when I answer that, 

a specific risk assessment, because my day-to-day responsibilities 

don’t involve working with specific risk assessments. You notice 

that my title is Law Enforcement and Information Sharing Policy, 

and my focus is on the types of day-to-day coordination partnerships and strategic planning that I have been talking about. But 

I would be happy to, of course, go back to the Department and see 

if we can provide some additional information to you on the 

types—— 

Ms. NORTON. Well, I appreciate that. And I realize you are a policy expert, Ms. Gallegos. I am a Member of the Homeland Security, 

and I have been kept very busy with the Department on threat assessments. And I must say, the threat assessments that we are 

most concerned about in this jurisdiction today, cyber threats, 

carry-on nuclear devices, and the rest, lead me to think that neither the Department nor anybody else is prepared for a new threat 

from, of all places, military weapons coming into the Nation’s capital. We hope you won’t have to include this threat assessment in 

your arsenal of assessments, which I am aware that the Department has taken on and taken on so well. 

I am going to ask Ms. Edwards if she has questions at this time. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I do have a couple of questions. 

First, in terms of the line of questioning that you have been directing regarding the challenges to D.C.’s gun laws and autonomy, 

I would like to have entered into the record a response from Governor Martin O’Malley of Maryland to an inquiry by our Maryland 

delegation regarding the impact on Maryland of a change in—the 

impact of this Ensign amendment and the effect on Maryland. 

As I had described earlier, of course, one of the challenges is that 

we face a tremendous fiscal and budget crisis just like a lot of 

States and jurisdictions. We hardly have the resources to apply to 

registering guns for D.C. residents; it is just not what we are in 

the business of doing. We are challenged by registering firearms in 

our own State and our local jurisdictions. And it would be a huge 

burden on Maryland to take on this responsibility. 

That aside, for those who believe in not imposing unfunded mandates on States, this clearly would be an unfunded mandate on the 

State of Maryland, proposing a tremendous burden on our State 

troopers and our budget. 

For those people who are concerned about silly little things like 

State sovereignty, well, I understand that there are those who 

share the view that they can impose, at will, anything on the District of Columbia because they don’t view it as a sovereign. Maryland is a State, Maryland is a sovereign. And we can’t have the 

United States Congress imposing on us the requirement to register 

guns from another jurisdiction. 

16 

And so I would like to have entered into the record a letter from 

the Governor of the State of Maryland, Martin O’Malley, expressing our State’s serious concerns, and I will quote from the letter. 

‘‘We have serious concerns with the language of Senate amendment 

575 and request that you reject this proposal if introduced for consideration in House bill H.R. 157 and defeat it during a likely conference of the two measures.’’ And it does go on to state all of the 

implications for Maryland that would really impose on our State 

sovereignty and on our budget. I would like to have that entered 

into the record. 

Ms. NORTON. So ordered. And Ms. Edwards, might I say that I 

have spoken with your governor, Governor O’Malley and with Governor Tim Kaine. And I am pleased to report here that both Governors are strongly opposed to the entire Ensign amendment and 

that, as I understand it, they are writing a joint letter—in addition 

to the very well-documented letter that the Governor of Maryland, 

on his own, has already written. I would like to have that letter 

in the record as well, and any information we have from these two 

sovereign States who have been drafted into this matter without 

any consultation with anyone in the State or with any Member of 

the Virginia or Maryland delegation. I would like to have any information in that regard put in the record so that that infringement, 

as the Member says, we are accustomed to in the District, does not 

begin to infect the two sovereign States that are our neighbors and 

that work so closely with us. So ordered. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

And I just have a couple of questions; one to Assistant Chief 

Nichols, a couple of concerns. One, we have a number of your police 

officers who are constituents of mine in the Fourth Congressional 

District in Maryland and have been greatly concerned about the 

Blackmen-Malloy case, the discrimination case, those 300 black law 

enforcement officers of the Capitol Police. And I wonder just in 

terms of your ability to coordinate with other jurisdictions, how 

that impacts the morale of the law enforcement officers under your 

jurisdiction and where we see this going so that it can be resolved? 

Mr. NICHOLS. That is currently before the U.S. Capitol Police 

Board. I know that our attorneys are talking to the representatives 

of the Black Police Officers Association to try to find some path forward on that. I think it is the District Court was making a ruling 

about who was actually included in the set of that lawsuit. 

But I appreciate your question because it drives to the heart of 

professionalism of the United States Capitol Police. Regardless of 

some of the internal issues that we deal with on a day-to-day basis 

with personnel policies and procedures and even some of the concerns that the unions or the Black Police Officers Association may 

have, our officers separate out those issues from their professional 

responsibilities. And I think it was evidenced during the inauguration the extraordinary lengths that U.S. Capitol Police officers go 

to ensure that the Capitol complex and all those who work and 

visit here are safe. We are able to build upon that level of dedication and integrity to coordinate with our partner agencies throughout the region also, And we share a very good reputation, as do the 

other agencies that we work with. 

17 

We all have a mutual responsibility here. And I can’t remember 

if it was your opening statement or Madam Chair’s, but there is 

no one agency that is an island in this city. We all have to jointly 

work together to ensure the safety and security of not only people 

who live and work here, but the millions of visitors who come 

through here every year. And the laws that affect us and allow us 

to do our jobs are important in our efforts in that regard. 

So we monitor these types of developments very closely. We look 

at the impact, and then we move forward in a unified fashion to 

ensure that we can meet the constitutional requirements that are 

provided, and also the public safety entities and responsibilities we 

carry every day. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Well, I thank you for that. And of course I greatly 

appreciate, even as a new Member, the professionalism of the Capitol Police. But you should know at least that this Member remains 

really concerned about that outstanding litigation, precisely because so many of those officers do live in the Fourth Congressional 

District. 

I would like to say to you as well, you know, and just again continue to salute the Capitol Police, and especially the memory of 

John Michael Gibson and Private First Class Jacob Joseph Chestnut, who was a resident of Prince George’s County in Maryland. It 

speaks to the high quality and caliber of service of the Capitol Police. And I would just want to just ensure that, as we go forward, 

that we not only have the highest quality and caliber and performance, but that we recruit in the most diverse way possible and reward those officers for their service. 

And then finally, and I know I am going over my time, Madam 

Chairwoman, just one question for Ms. Gallegos. And the only reason that I know to say Gallegos is because I grew up in New Mexico. But I have one question for you regarding Homeland Security 

and your coordination efforts because in this region—and this region poses a different kind of homeland security concern. We have 

so many different law enforcement agencies that have responsibility in the region. And so I want to know kind of more directly 

your relationship with the Prince George’s County police, Montgomery County police, in terms of our local law enforcement and 

the District of Columbia, and how often those agencies are pulled 

together for the purposes of coordination, and the role that Homeland Security, particularly, plays in that coordination. 

Ms. GALLEGOS. Representative Edwards, I would be happy to 

provide some additional information for you on that. I don’t have 

that level of detail with me today, but I would be happy to provide 

a response after the hearing. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you very much. And I yield. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. 

Mr. Perriello. 

Mr. PERRIELLO. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Let me start just by echoing Congresswoman Edwards’ comments. As a new Member, I have just been incredibly impressed by 

the Capitol Police, the professionalism, the handling, particularly 

under some very, very difficult circumstances like the inauguration. So I just want to say, from me and my staff, my family that 

18 

has come to visit, we have been incredibly impressed by the job 

that you do. 

And let me also preface this by saying that I think you have 

made a compelling case that there are many aspects of the District 

that are unique in terms of security threats. I think what we are 

probably interested in doing here is making sure that you have the 

ability and the leeway you need to protect us, to protect the city, 

to protect these national treasures. At the same time, for better or 

for worse, the unique aspects of the District also mean you have 

significant presidential values for constitutional rights for other 

parts of the country. 

I certainly come from a part of the Commonwealth of Virginia 

that has very different issues when it comes to gun rights and people’s use of guns. And I just, for now, want to ask two clarifying 

questions, and then I may want to pick things up offline. 

First for you, Assistant Chief, you were saying that when you 

stop someone who possesses a weapon, there is a presumption that 

that person is a threat. Can you say a little bit more about that, 

and about whether that matters whether that is an authorized 

weapon or not, and what you mean by that? 

Mr. NICHOLS. Well, the way that the gun laws work right now 

within our complex is the only person who can lawfully possess a 

weapon on the street is a law enforcement officer. So anyone other 

than a law enforcement officer who we find to be in position of a 

weapon, we automatically determine them to be a threat. Now, it 

is a sliding scale. There are people who come to the city who have 

a registered firearm and a license to carry a firearm in their home 

districts, they come to the city thinking that is legal here. It, in 

fact, is not. 

So once we do the fielding interview, we will determine if they 

are not a threat, they are just somebody who is misinformed, but 

nevertheless in violation of the law. On the other end of the spectrum, you have people who do come here with the very intent of 

carrying a weapon in order to cause harm or violate the law. And 

as Congresswoman Edwards talked about, we have suffered the 

outcome of that when we had the lone wolf come up here trying 

to force their way into the United States Capitol building in 1998. 

Two of our police officers were killed. 

Just recently, within the past few months, we have had many 

gun cases where people that cause us concern about what their intent really was showed up within our jurisdiction with long guns, 

shotguns, homemade hand grenades, things of that nature. 

Because of our experience, and the fact that we know this is a 

target not only for terrorists, but for people who want to come here 

to seek retribution against the United States Government, our officers are trained to be very wary of people they run across in the 

field, whether it is within our primary jurisdiction or extended jurisdiction, who are possessing firearms because we have to run that 

investigation rather quickly to determine, one, if they are a threat, 

and two, if it is part of a larger threat that is going to be a multiprong attack on the Capitol complex. So it is a difficult position for 

our officers. For our own protection, and the protection of people 

like you and your family that you talked about, we have to be very 

19 

wary and very on guard of people we come into contact with up 

here. 

The way the laws are right now, either if you are in possession 

of a gun, you are a law enforcement officer, or you are violating the 

law. And it is pretty clear for us to move forward in that respect. 

If there are efforts to introduce gray areas, then of course it is 

going to be more and more difficult for officers to determine rather 

quickly the means by which somebody is in possession of a gun. 

And it is going to take a lot of retraining and a lot more coordinated effort to ensure that we don’t make an assumption on one 

end of the spectrum that is wrong, or assume that there isn’t a 

threat when there is one, if there is, when there isn’t. It just complicates the matter for us. 

Mr. PERRIELLO. Maybe that is a segue to the Attorney General. 

If you could give some sense—you have talked about some about 

of the District laws that you believe are permissible under the Heller decision. Can you give some sense of what you think would not 

be permissible, other than what has already been explicitly ruled 

out in your mind based on Heller? 

Mr. NICKLES. I am not quite sure what the Congressman has in 

mind. We have looked at every element of the gun laws that we 

have enacted. We have some lawsuits that have been filed that 

challenge various elements of our gun laws, for example, the requirement of training, certain of the preregistration requirements. 

But I think, by and large, the lawsuits that have been filed accept the fact that the District has a basis in the Heller decision 

reasonably to regulate handguns and who gets the handguns and 

who gets the semi-automatics that are permissible. 

The concern I have, Congressman, is with section 210 of the Ensign amendment. That is the one that creates the exception to Federal anti-trafficking laws only for the Nation’s capital, which seems 

to me to be a sort of a contradiction in terms. You have got the 

most unique jurisdiction in the world in terms of the monuments 

and the government officials and the dignitaries and the IMF conferences and the World Bank conferences and the conferences of 

the G–7 and the G–20. 

So everybody agrees this is the most unique place in the world. 

And then we are talking about making this most unique place in 

the world the only place in the Nation where residents are allowed 

to purchase a firearm in another State without going through some 

kind of licensed dealer. 

To me, section 210, which also opens up the issue that Madam 

Chairman talked about, the gun show problem, and also as Congresswoman Edwards talked about foisted upon Virginia and Maryland the issue of registration, or what to do about the District residents. It doesn’t make sense. And if the Congress thought it didn’t 

make sense, the Congress has plenary power over the District. So 

our laws come in front of the Congress. 

It was interesting to me that the date by which Congress could 

have acted to change the laws we enacted was April 1—April Fools 

Day. And we had no comment by Congress that any of the laws 

that we had enacted over a long, arduous period of negotiation with 

the community, with the advocates on both sides of the issue, we 

put together what I considered to be a very comprehensive statute 

20 

and regulatory picture which I believe will sustain any attack, and 

Congress lets it go into effect for this unique jurisdiction. 

So that is, perhaps, the long answer to a simple question, but it 

poses to me the ultimate irony in the Ensign legislation and in section 210; why would you take the most unique place in the world 

and make it a unique place from the standpoint of regulation of 

firearms? I don’t understand it. 

Mr. PERRIELLO. I appreciate the passage you read from Justice 

Scalia’s decision on that. I am just trying to understand in your 

mind what it is that you believe we could do in terms of limiting 

firearms in D.C. that would be unconstitutional, that would be out 

of bounds for the District, that would be inconsistent with the other 

holdings of Heller. 

Mr. NICKLES. Well, I think if we were to take steps that effectively impede, prevent, stand in the way unnecessarily of the right 

of a citizen to have and provide self-defense in his home, that 

would be very worrisome to me. And so when we had advocates on 

the one side of gun regulation proposed that we really not respond 

at all to Heller, I was very adamant, as was the Council and the 

Mayor, in saying, now, look, we accept what the Supreme Court 

has done. We are not going to fly in the face of what the Supreme 

Court has said about the second amendment right. But at the same 

time, Justice Scalia said, we don’t intend in any way to take away 

the right of your jurisdiction, as every State in this country, the 

right of a jurisdiction reasonably to regulate the use of firearms.That is what we have done. 

Mr. PERRIELLO. Again, I appreciate all that you all have done to 

try to protect the Capitol and to protect us and for being part of 

this hearing. And I yield back. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, I have a number of questions raised in part 

by the questions of my colleagues, very good questions of my colleagues. 

Let me ask Ms. Gallegos—see, I am not from the West—— 

Ms. GALLEGOS. Please call me Gabrielle, or Gabby. 

Ms. NORTON. You can tell I am a third generation Washingtonian. 

Ms. Gallegos, I am going to ask a question because she speaks 

the language of Homeland Security. 

In hearing after hearing in the Committee on Homeland Security 

we have been told that the approach we should be looking to protect our Nation, including of course the Nation’s capital, is a layered security approach, where one would wish at every level, level 

after level, until you were sure, as opposed to some great approach 

that would, in fact, accomplish what we are after. 

In your view, is a layered approach to Homeland Security most 

effective in preventing a terrorist attack? And if so, how would the 

elimination of all local gun laws affect a layered approach if that 

layer was eliminated? 

Ms. GALLEGOS. Well, that is a complicated question. Again, I am 

afraid that my expertise doesn’t extend to all of the potential types 

of security planning and policy that goes into answering that. And 

if you would permit, I would like to get back to you with a more 

detailed response at a later time. 

21 

Ms. NORTON. I would request within 10 days a response from the 

Department on whether or not in the layered approach—which 

they have virtually invented since 9/11—that approach would be facilitated, hurt, helped, enhanced by the elimination of an entire 

layer, local gun laws, there would be left whatever is the Federal 

law that affects everybody. But even the most permissive jurisdictions have their own set of gun laws, here you would have none. 

And I understand your role and I very much appreciate your testimony, but we are trying to document. And you must understand 

that the leadership of the House and the Senate are trying earnestly to discover at this point whether there is any effect on homeland security, that for the first time the leaders in both Houses are 

looking very seriously at this gun law. And they are aware that the 

gun law is going to become law because we are going to pass the 

D.C. House Voting Rights Act. We are not letting anything stand 

in the way of that. And they have strongly supported it; it is already through the Senate. The House was the first to get it 

through last time on a clean rule and a clean bill. 

There is no question in my mind that these leaders are going to 

get this done. And there is also no question in my mind that if you 

have this attached to both bills, it is law. And that is why I said 

in my testimony, don’t want the recriminations; want to know up 

front whether or not there is any effect of having no layer of local 

law here. 

Now, Mr. Nickles, this law would deprive the jurisdiction of the 

District of Columbia of all authority over gun laws in the District 

of Columbia. In the public safety hierarchy, where does having 

some say over guns rank in the public safety hierarchy of every 

large city? How important is it? What is the biggest threat to public safety in every city? 

Mr. NICKLES. I think the Chief has spoken eloquently to the fact 

that guns are at the heart of public safety, and the need to regulate 

guns. The Chief has said many times, guns, drugs and gangs. We 

have been working, and we had a meeting yesterday with the Governor of Maryland to talk about how to improve coordination with 

respect to matters of violence because there are cross-border issues. 

But if the principal problems facing any municipality, particularly 

the urban areas, is guns, gangs and drugs, you take away the ability of the major police force in the city to deal effectively with guns 

as the elective leaders of the city have determined. 

And I am no expert on the layered approach, but I am a firsthand viewer of what the Chief and her terrific police department 

do in this community. I sat with the Chief of Police in September 

last year when she sought to explain the problems in the House bill 

at that time. 

Ms. NORTON. Which is the same bill as this bill. 

Mr. NICKLES. Except for minor differences, it’s the same bill we 

are talking about. And it causes the Chief and myself, particularly 

section 210, significant heartburn. 

Ms. NORTON. Could I ask Chief Nichols, Chief Morse raised an 

issue that had not been raised before last time, and I will ask your 

view on it. It had to do with officer safety. He spoke of the changes 

that I enumerated in my testimony and the effect of the safety on 

officers of the force here. Would you speak to that, please? 

22 

Mr. NICHOLS. Yes, ma’am. It is pretty much in line with what I 

responded to earlier. As we police the city now on the streets, 

whenever you come in contact with an individual who is in possession of a firearm, whether it is through an arrest situation or 

through just merely seeing them on the street in a patrol operation, you can safely assume with very limited exceptions that, 

they are either a law enforcement officer or a criminal who is unlawfully in possession of that firearm. And that allows the officer, 

the officer who has made the contact with the individual, to approach in a very cautious manner and protect themselves in that 

regard because there really is no gray area right now. 

The officer can perceive anybody that they see on the street carrying a firearm, whether it’s a handgun or a long gun, as a threat 

not only to public safety, but to themselves, and they take the appropriate precautions to handle that situation. It is the way that 

we have been policing in this city for as long as I have been a cop. 

When you generally have people on the street who are lawfully 

in possession of weapons, it starts to gray the area a little bit more 

because the officer will then know that it is not as clear cut. And 

it is a concern that is going to take a lot of retraining for our officers to ensure that they are approaching the right way and that 

they understand that there may be another added layer when they 

come in contact with somebody. 

Ms. NORTON. So would you have to retrain every officer? 

Mr. NICHOLS. Yes, ma’am. The way that we have been trained 

now is that it is illegal to possess a firearm on the street. And no 

matter how we come in contact with that weapon, whether it is 

search incident to arrest, search of a vehicle, or merely somebody 

that we see in possession of a handgun, if other aspects of lawful 

possession are introduced with regard to street operations, then, 

yes, that is going to take a lot of retraining. 

Ms. NORTON. So you would have to come to the Congress and ask 

for funds to retrain every officer of the Capitol Police force. 

I do want to clarify, with respect to Mr. Nickles, when I was talking about depriving the local jurisdiction, leaving no layer whatsoever there for Federal police because there is no gun laws here, 

would you describe how gun laws and every other law becomes effective? 

Let me give you a law professor’s hypothetical. Suppose the District of Columbia passed a gun law that the Congress disagreed 

with. Let us forget the question of constitutionality for the moment 

because, as I understand it, Attorney General Nickles, there have 

been 80 court suits brought since Heller and not a single gun law 

has been overturned. So let’s just assume that the District passes 

a gun safety law with which the Congress disagrees. Is the Congress, under present law, powerless to do anything to correct its 

disagreement with the District of Columbia, or must it now do, as 

this gun amendment does, deprive it of all jurisdiction, no matter 

what the circumstances over gun safety laws? 

Mr. NICKLES. Oh, absolutely not. The Congress has plenary 

power over the District. And the District cannot enact any law 

until that law lays over in the Congress for 30 legislative days 

when you have a civil law, or 60 legislative days for criminal laws, 

which sometimes, as the Chairwoman knows, could mean months. 

23 

So that the time frame and the ability of Congress to say ultimately whether it agrees or disagrees with the gun laws is an ultimate weapon by the Congress. If there is some part of our gun laws 

that Congress does not like—putting aside the constitutional 

issue—Congress has plenary power, because no laws can become 

effective until those laws lay over here. 

I might add, Madam Chairwoman, we are in the process of submitting and having had hearings on it, an omnibus crime bill. With 

the U.S. Attorney and the Police Department and the Attorney 

General’s office, we have spent literally months developing an omnibus crime bill that deals with guns, with gangs, with drugs, with 

stalking, with victim protection, and many other features. And so 

to have in the middle of that very comprehensive effort in the District to deal with crime, and then in the middle of our effort to 

work with the Governor of Maryland and all of his key people who 

were with us yesterday in the Wilson Building, to have the Ensign 

amendment come in sort of in the middle of this when the Congress does have the power, ultimately, with respect to our gun laws 

or any other laws, to say no, we don’t like that. I am not really 

clear why the Ensign amendment is being pressed at this time. 

Ms. NORTON. So, in other words, at best, it is redundant because 

Congress can do whatever it wants to do with the District. It could 

wipe out all the laws of the District of Columbia right now, could 

it not? 

Mr. NICKLES. I am afraid to say yes. It makes me feel pretty 

powerless, but the fact is the Congress has plenary power over the 

District. And it is really upon that basis that, at least in my view, 

that Congress has the power to grant voting rights to the District 

because it does have this plenary power, and in the past, in many 

situations, the Congress has treated the District as a State. 

Ms. NORTON. Could I ask Ms. Edwards, who has another question, and then I will come back. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

I just have one question that was raised in the message that we 

received from our Governor, and it has to do with the data systems 

integration and communications. 

Assistant Chief Nichols, do you have the capacity now, let’s say, 

if Maryland had to register a gun of a resident from the District 

of Columbia and that person somehow ended up here on Capitol 

grounds, to be able to communicate with Maryland? And does 

Maryland then have the ability to go into the data systems in the 

District to know whether somebody has a mental health prohibition 

or a previous conviction that would prohibit the purchase or possession of a firearm? Do you have that capacity now? Is it fully integrated? 

Mr. NICHOLS. We do have a number of data systems that we 

interact with local law enforcement and also Federal law enforcement on. Whether those specific issues that you raise can be obtained through those systems, I would have to go back and then 

give the answer for the record. 

Ms. EDWARDS. I would be curious to know that. 

And then Mr. Nickles—and you don’t have to answer this now, 

and it may require checking and getting back to us—my understanding is that if somebody in the District of Columbia has a menVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:32 Oct 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\48880 JASON
24 

tal health prohibition or they had already registered the firearm, 

as would be required under Ensign, in Maryland and then got a 

conviction, Maryland wouldn’t necessarily know that it had to revoke that license because the systems are not transparent in that 

kind of way. And so it would be really complicated for Maryland 

or Virginia to do the kind of follow up that it has to do with guns 

that are registered by its own residents in the State because we 

have a State system that allows us, if a subsequent conviction 

comes along or a mental health prohibition comes along, we would 

know and then be able to revoke that firearm. We would not necessarily have that capacity registering folks in the District of Columbia, nor would we have the capacity, I don’t believe, to communicate that from one law enforcement agency to another law enforcement agency. And so it seems to me that, in terms of homeland security, this problem really poses a great danger in terms of 

the District even knowing whether someone who had a prohibition 

didn’t also still have a gun. 

Mr. NICKLES. Let me get back to you on that. I do know that one 

of the nice features of the gun laws that we have enacted, it has 

a very clear standard as to who can register a gun. And it is also 

very important to us that if we find guns later, we are able to trace 

those guns back. 

As to the question of the data systems, I have got people behind 

me that probably know the answer, but why don’t we confer and 

get back to you on that? 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you. Perhaps Chief Nichols or Attorney General Nickles can answer this question. 

I think it is the Attorney General who has mentioned the Federal 

anti-trafficking laws. I believe those were passed in the 1930’s. 

Why is it that Federal law requires that you purchase a gun in 

your own State and only in your own State and not go out of State 

in order to purchase a gun when we usually allow free commerce 

across States? 

Mr. NICKLES. Well, I don’t want to speculate, but it seems to me 

commonsensical that if each individual State is doing the registration of firearms, it can, A, ensure that people that shouldn’t have 

firearms don’t get them. And then, if those individuals go into Virginia or Maryland, for example, in order for that individual to retrieve the gun, he has to go to a federally licensed place in the District so that, once again, the District and the Federal authorities 

can keep track of those guns. 

We are not dealing chewing gum here. I mean, there seems to 

me to be some basic public interest in knowing where firearms are 

and whether the individual who is receiving a firearm is mentally 

competent has been convicted of a felony, and a variety of different 

pre-registration requirements. This is not unique to the District. 

All other States in this country have similar regimes of regulation. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you. Now, you are aware, perhaps, Ms. 

Gallegos, that this Subcommittee is also in the process of building 

a large new compound out in Ward 8 for the Department where its 

headquarters and several of its agencies will be located. Are you 

aware that under this amendment a person who is voluntarily committed to St. Elizabeth’s mental hospital—and most people today 

25 

are voluntarily committed—would be able to immediately, upon release from a mental hospital, for whatever period of time, without 

any waiting period, be able to buy and keep a gun? And St. Elizabeth’s Hospital is right next to the planned Department of Homeland Security. Does that give you any pause? 

Ms. GALLEGOS. I was aware that that provision is in this amendment. And as we build our facilities at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, or 

St. Elizabeth’s facility, we are, of course, going to be concerned 

about the security of that facility as we are about a number of 

the—I think the Federal Protective Service, through the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency, protects somewhere in the 

neighborhood of 9,000 Federal buildings. And of course at all of 

those buildings we do prohibit guns from coming in. And we do 

that through screening, metal detection, of course visual inspection. 

And we are concerned about creating that level of security in all 

of the Federal buildings that we are protecting. 

Ms. NORTON. This is a particularly high-security agency, is it 

not? 

Ms. GALLEGOS. Yes. But of course we take the protection of all 

the Federal workers in all of our Federal buildings very seriously. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, we are very glad to have your concern. I was 

asking a question about the Department itself and its near location 

to the mental hospital. 

Ms. GALLEGOS. I presume that we will continue our security procedures when we are in that facility. 

Ms. NORTON. So you don’t have any concern that people could get 

out of St. Elizabeth’s and buy a gun immediately. 

Ms. GALLEGOS. I am certainly concerned about protecting Federal buildings, which is our charge, and about protecting our facilities. 

Ms. NORTON. Let me ask you, Chief. Is it of any concern that assault weapons could be legally stored in houses or office buildings 

surrounding the Capitol complex under the amendment? Is it of 

any concern to the Capitol Police? 

Mr. NICHOLS. Well, again, as you know, we don’t comment specifically on pending legislation. But speaking in general, you were 

talking earlier about layers of security. The layers of security that 

we use with the Capitol complex is concentric rings, where we try 

to identify threats the furthest distance away from the Capitol 

complex so we can intercept and mitigate that threat. 

The availability of stand-off weapons starts to skew that ability 

to identify a threat further away because the longer-range weapons 

extend out their actual threat parameters. So any time that there 

is a long gun that is in our proximity, yes, it is a concern, just as 

you get closer in, a handgun becomes more of a threat because it 

is a closer threat-type weapon. 

As you know, the Capitol complex is completely open and inviting. And there are times where we don’t know that we have a 

threat coming toward us with regard to an armed individual until 

they are actually at our doors. So despite our best efforts, any time 

that there is a stand-off weapon nearby, it is a legitimate concern 

to the United States Capitol Police. 

Ms. NORTON. Attorney General Nickles, on page 2of your testimony you say the District is certainly not alone in requiring a fireVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:32 Oct 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\48880 JASON
26 

arm dealer’s license, and that 17 States do it as well. We note that 

the gun amendment repeals the requirement that licensed dealers 

keep records of ammunition received into the inventory and ammunition sold or transferred. Were you referring to that? 

Mr. NICKLES. I believe we were. The other provision that I would 

just raise with you, Madam Chairwoman, that really causes me 

also concern is this language where, under the Ensign amendment 

the District would be barred from enacting any law that would— 

let me give you the words, because these are far-reaching—’’ prohibit, constructively prohibit, or unduly burden the firearm possession by anyone not otherwise prohibited by Federal law.’’ And then 

it goes on to bar the District from enacting any laws or regulations 

that might discourage private ownership or use of firearms in a 

person’s dwelling or place of business, including regulations that 

would prevent the mentally ill, drug abusers, or domestic violence 

perpetrators from obtaining and possessing firearms. So this bill is 

a many splendored thing. 

Ms. NORTON. Yes, I just wanted to get your view of that on the 

record, Attorney General Nickles. 

I want to ask Chief Nichols a question about something that is 

in Attorney General Nickles’ testimony. He talks about the assault 

weapon ban. And of course it is now up to the States, and that has 

been his testimony. The ATF has described the assault weapons 

that we are talking about as large capacity, semi-automatic firearms designed for rapid fire, combat use. Most are patterned after 

machine guns used by military forces. Those are guns which could 

be possessed and stockpiled in the District of Columbia. 

Would you describe any concern you have that such stockpiles of 

guns used, as the ATF says, by military forces usually, what effect 

would that have on protecting the jurisdiction under your control? 

Mr. NICHOLS. Well, the concern is as it has always been, that 

those types of weapons, or any weapons falls into the wrong hands 

and then is used to further a criminal act or an assault or an attack. So it is the availability of those types of weapons, by whatever means they are obtained by people who want to come up to 

the Capitol complex within our jurisdiction and do harm, that is a 

significant concern. And as I said earlier, we have had instances 

within the past 18 months where we have had people come up here 

with assault-type weapons and we have been able to intercept 

them and arrest them. 

Ms. NORTON. One final question. And this really flows from the 

testimony of Chief Lanier in—I guess it was September. And I 

would like the view of all three of you on this testimony from the 

Chief. 

’’ If the gun bill, the very one before us now, were passed, it 

would be far more difficult for the Metropolitan Police Department 

and Federal law enforcement agencies in the District of Columbia 

to ensure the safety and security of the Nation’s capital.’’ 

Do any or all of you share those concerns? 

Mr. NICKLES. I would never disagree with the Chief of Police, 

who I think is the city’s foremost expert on what affects the public 

safety and security of this city. She has been in the police department for some 20 years, I think. She is a woman that has seen 

every facet of public safety matters in the city. She is a leader, and 

27 

she is doing a great job. And so when she says that, she means it. 

I support it. 

Ms. NORTON. Attorney General Nickles, as I understand it, Chief 

Lanier established the city’s own Department of Homeland Security, was its first officer, and is the primary contact with the Federal law enforcement and security network for the Nation’s capital; 

is that correct? 

Mr. NICKLES. That is correct. It is one of her many distinctions. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Attorney General Nickles. 

Chief Nichols. 

Mr. NICHOLS. I have known Chief Lanier for a number of years 

and I have watched her as Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department. And I would agree with the comment she made. I think that 

any professional law enforcement officer would concur with her 

views on that matter. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Chief Nichols. 

Ms. Gallegos. 

Ms. GALLEGOS. At DHS, we respect Chief Lanier enormously, of 

course. And as I mentioned earlier before, we regard the views of 

the State and local partners that we work with as extremely important. And they have enormous input into how we formulate our 

policy and how we go forward. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, I want to thank all three of you, Attorney 

General Nickles, Chief Nichols, and Ms. Gallegos, for really very, 

very important testimony for this Subcommittee. It is important to 

hear from those who are on the front line in every respect. And I 

don’t think we could have had a panel that was more informative 

or more indispensable to our understanding of how we should go 

forward. 

Thank you again, all three of you. 

Chief Nichols is going to stay for the next panel. And could I ask 

the second panel to come up, in addition to the chief; Mr. Jeff 

Delinski, Deputy Chief Special Operations Bureau, Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; Major General Errol 

Schwartz, Commanding General, D.C. National Guard. And because my good friend and colleague has another important engagement and must leave before the next panel, I am going to ask Mr. 

Vernon Herron, who is the Deputy Chief Administrative Officer of 

Public Safety and Director of Homeland Security for Prince 

George’s County, if he would come forward in this panel. And instead of my asking the first questions, I am going to ask that Representative Edwards ask the first questions of this panel. 

Perhaps we should proceed with Mr. Herron in case Ms. Edwards 

has to leave early. 

28 

TESTIMONY OF DANIEL R. NICHOLS, ASSISTANT CHIEF, 

UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE DEPARTMENT; JEFF 

DELINSKI, DEPUTY CHIEF SPECIAL OPERATIONS BUREAU, 

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY; 

MAJOR GENERAL ERROL R. SCHWARTZ, COMMANDING GENERAL, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA NATIONAL GUARD; AND 

VERNON HERRON, DEPUTY CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER FOR PUBLIC SAFETY/DIRECTOR OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF THE COUNTY EXECUTIVE, PRINCE 

GEORGE’S COUNTY 

Mr. HERRON. Good morning, Chairwoman Norton. Thank you for 

allowing me to be here today. I am Vernon Herron, Deputy Chief 

Administrative Officer for Public Safety, and Director of Homeland 

Security for Prince George’s County, Maryland. 

I appear before you today on behalf of one of the largest counties 

in the National Capital Region. But before I begin, I also would 

like to take this time to thank Congresswoman Donna Edwards for 

her leadership in the critical issue of National Capital Region public safety, and for recommending that I appear before you today. 

If time permits, I would like to offer testimony on the Ensign legislation. 

First, I want to take a moment to recall that Prince George’s 

County has testified on this issue before. In July of 2006, Prince 

George’s County Sheriff Michael Jackson testified before the House 

Energy and Commerce Committee on H.R. 5785, the Warning, 

Alert and Response Network Act. In that testimony, Sheriff Jackson explained that warning the public of an impending disaster is 

a good first step, but not nearly enough to address the total reality 

of public safety in response to a large-scale disaster. We are 

pleased this hearing goes further than debating how we warn the 

public and discusses how we can lead and coordinate masses of 

people to safety. 

Prince George’s County, Maryland, is located in the heart of the 

Baltimore-Washington corridor. The county borders Washington, 

D.C., and is just 37 miles south of the City of Baltimore. The county’s population exceeds 820,000, with a daily work population of 

well over 1 million people. 

Covering an area of close to 500 square miles, the county is home 

to many businesses, as well as State and Federal agencies. Some 

of these Federal agencies include NASA’s Goddard Space Flight 

Center, Andrews Air Force Base, U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 

Beltville facility, a Federal Records Center, a large Internal Revenue Service office complex, and the National Oceanic Atmospheric 

Administration Center for Weather and Climate Prediction. Additionally, a large portion of the region’s Metro system and Interstate 

95 pass through Prince George’s County. 

Fortunately, for most communities in America, the threat of terrorism remains just that, a threat. However, the United States has 

experienced several acts of terrorism and widespread natural disasters which caused devastation and catastrophe. And 9/11 was an 

example of this devastation and catastrophe for New York, the National Capital Region, and the entire United States. Therefore, 

Prince George’s County is in a prime position to offer perspectives 

29 

on how to address the need, impact, and practicality for orchestrating large-scale public safety response. 

Coordinated planning across the National Capital Region will 

greatly assist the utilization of limited resources available to support evacuation and sheltering of residents, citizens, and visitors to 

the National Capital Region. Actual emergencies are inherently unstable and consist of rapidly changing events whose outcome may 

be difficult, if not impossible, to predict. 

Resource sharing will be necessary in order to ensure the region 

can efficiently manage a major evacuation or sheltering event. 

Prince George’s County works closely with the Maryland Emergency Management Agency and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to ensure all resources needed are being utilized in 

the most efficient and effective manner. 

Locally, we have executed MOUs with the Board of Education to 

provide emergency access to the use of 260 public schools located 

throughout the county. Although there is adequate number of public schools to shelter thousands of citizens, we do not have enough 

resources to open every school, or multiple schools, simultaneously 

and also handle our daily responsibilities. 

In the event that multiple shelters would be needed to house 

large numbers of citizens for an extended period, we have 

preselected two mega shelters, Ritchie Coliseum in the northern 

portion of the county and Show Place Arena in the southern portion of the county. Both are capable of sheltering several hundred 

people. 

Prince George’s County has also pre-stocked mobile caches consisting of cots, blankets, pillows and personal hygiene kits ready for 

transport to any shelter. For larger shelter needs, we have pre-positioned FEMA tractor trailers loaded with emergency shelter supplies ready to activate. 

Having immediate access to emergency supplies enables Prince 

George’s County to mitigate, respond to, and recover from disastrous events. Disasters require coordination between Public Safety 

departments, our Health and Human Services departments, as well 

as the other emergency support function agencies. Having these departments train and exercise together ensures that social service 

support and agency collaboration is available to assist during this 

trying time. 

In the event a full evacuation of a county is necessary, the county’s transportation department has access to traffic cameras located 

at major traffic intersections. Using these cameras can alter the 

time of the traffic light to reduce gridlock and facilitate smooth 

traffic flow. 

The experiences from past incidents reveal that vehicle evacuation requires a unified effort, and this will be required for the National Capital Region. Region coordination is paramount in any effective response and recovery plan. To facilitate and effect a recovery plan, the National Capital Region has developed a regional 

video conference system. This video conference system uses its own 

data network lines which provide a direct link to every emergency 

operation center throughout the National Capital Region. The ability for senior officials from each jurisdiction to directly reach out 

and communicate with their neighbor in the National Capital ReVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:32 Oct 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\48880 JASON
30 

gion will not only enhance the recovery process, but expedite the 

use of resource sharing and mutual aid. 

The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, also 

known as COG, has played a major role in fostering regional communications. Through COG, senior officials and public safety chiefs 

and directors of each emergency support function meet regularly to 

discuss issues and concerns that greatly impact jurisdictions’ ability to coordinate, communicate, and collaborate during emergencies 

and disasters. 

Prince George’s County communicates directly with MEMA during any major event. MEMA is advised of the event and placed on 

alert that mutual aid may be required. 

Prince George’s County also depends on several Federal funding 

mechanisms to support the county’s operations. Those mechanisms 

include the Urban Area Security Initiative, COPS Law Enforcement Technology Program, the Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance 

Grants, the Byrne Discretionary Grants, and the American Recovery Reinvestment Act funds. These funding streams are critical to 

our continued ability to deliver public safety services and response 

capabilities. 

Some of the grants require a match dollar amount for the jurisdictions. For example, the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness 

Grant program lies dormant due to the fact that jurisdictions cannot provide the 20 to 25 percent grant match. This grant requirement cripples the ability of the jurisdiction to obtain the available 

funding, especially during this difficult economic time. 

Also, the fiscal year 2010 House Budget resolution decreases the 

public safety function authority by $5 billion, while increasing the 

outlay by only $1 billion. This discrepancy gives us pause, as we 

are not able to provide as much public safety response to the National Capital Region, with cuts to important programs such as the 

ones I listed above. 

In examining the state of operations today, we would make the 

following recommendations: 

First and furthermore, we must keep UASI whole and urge a fiscal year 2010 budget to not be set below $900 million; 

Strive for greater coordination and communication between local 

governments and FEMA, including conducting of unified NCR 

drills and exercises; 

Establish clear and efficient report instructions between local 

governments, FEMA, and the Executive Office of the President; 

Establish mechanisms for emergency expenditure reimbursement.If local governments are going to assist Federal emergency 

response activities, there needs to be a clear path which those local 

governments can seek reimbursement for those costs. 

Hurricane Isabel, 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and the massive 

crowds of this past inauguration, have all taught us valuable lessons regarding large-scale public safety response. However, if we 

are to move forward with the entire National Capital Region ensync, then more coordination will need to be established and critical Federal support cannot be stripped away. 

Are all of our local governments fully interoperable within themselves? And are all jurisdictions of the NCR? Is there a coordinated 

31 

National Capital Region plan for FEMA? And are all local government entities completely versed with this plan? 

These are the questions we should ask moving forward. Prince 

George’s County would continue to partner with the NCR to make 

our country safe. 

Each day we want to be able to inform our citizens that we are 

better prepared today than we were yesterday. I want to thank the 

Subcommittee for calling this hearing today and the Chairwoman 

for allowing us to speak on this important matter. 

I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Herron. 

Let’s move to, Major General Schwartz, D.C. National Guard. 

General SCHWARTZ. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and Members of this Committee for the opportunity to testify in front of you 

today. 

I have submitted my testimony for the record, but please allow 

me to make some highlighting remarks concerning the District of 

Columbia National Guard and their contribution to the National 

Capital Region. 

I have been a capital guardian now for 32 years, and we continue 

to provide excellent support to the city. The District of Columbia 

National Guard consists of the Air National Guard and the Army 

National Guard, and we are housed within the District of Columbia, at Andrews Air Force Base and Fort Belvoir, Virginia. These 

installations outside of the District of Columbia provide us the support that we would need to perform missions in the District such 

as our air assets, our schoolhouses and other important venues. 

The District of Columbia National Guard has a Federal and a 

District mission. It does not limit us to the way we perform our duties from the limited actions during a nonemergency all the way to 

martial law, where we can support the District. 

I would like to emphasize the primary role of the District of Columbia National Guard, and let you know that it is in support of 

local authorities; we will only respond based upon the requests of 

local authorities. 

The District of Columbia National Guard is like no other National Guard in the Nation. The 53 States and Territories have a 

Governor that they report to as their commander in chief. The District of Columbia’s commander in chief is the President of the 

United States. He has delegated that responsibility through the 

Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the Army who has oversight for all local missions. 

The Secretary of the Air Force also has oversight over our air assets. We provide excellent air support to Congress by housing three 

C–40 aircraft out of Andrews Air Force Base to move the congressional delegations around, two C–38 jets and other support equipment. 

The District of Columbia National Guard also performs its Federal mission, that is, supporting the warfight, Army or air, no matter what part of the world it is. 

My responsibility is to make sure that the District of Columbia 

National Guard can rapidly respond to any homeland initiative. 

The Office of the Mayor will contact the Guard, I will do the necessary coordinations with senior officials about my level to make 

32 

sure that the District of Columbia gets all it needs in a very short 

period of time. We support 16 ESFs from the response plan, and 

that is transportation, communication, mass care, search and rescue, all-in hazards response, agriculture, natural resources, public 

safety and security. The District has added a 16th ESF for donation and volunteer management which—we are supporting them 

with our field kitchens and other resources that they may need 

from the Guard. 

We are working very closely with the District of Columbia Homeland Security Emergency Management Agency and other agencies 

within the FEMA Region 3 area. We are housing the FEMA Region 

trailer and the American Red Cross trailer in the parking lots of 

our armory because we envision the armory with its 58,000-squarefoot capacity can house—can be a shelter in case of an emergency 

here in the District, like we did for Hurricane Katrina where we 

housed several individuals who came in from Louisiana. 

We have the ability to build capacity through our partnerships 

in the region. The Maryland National Guard, Virginia National 

Guard, Pennsylvania, Delaware and West Virginia offer support to 

the District of Columbia when needed. An example of that support, 

which stretches beyond those States, is our support to the Presidential Inauguration in January, where 30 States and one Territory provided over 7,000 troops to the District. Our objective is to 

remain in the background, but to make sure that the events are 

safe and secure. 

In our capacities from Fort Belvoir, we have just received new 

UH–72 helicopters for medevac reasons. We are picking up an additional three helicopters in a week or so, and we will be using 

those in case of local emergencies. I yield back my time, Madam 

Chair, and I will be happy to answer any of your questions at the 

end. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, General Schwartz. 

Mr. Delinski. 

Mr. DELINSKI. Good morning. And thank you, Chairwoman Norton, for inviting me to testify on behalf of Washington Metropolitan 

Area Transit Authority. 

My name is Jeff Delinski. I am a Deputy Chief of the Metro 

Transit Police. The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, otherwise known as WMATA, or Metro, is a far-reaching system, serving 3.5 million people living in an area of roughly 1,500 

square miles. We provide, on average, 1.2 million rides on weekdays, making WMATA an important contributor to the health and 

vitality of the regional economy. 

WMATA has a history of providing emergency response training 

and outreach to our regional public safety partners. WMATA 

opened the Carmen E. Turner Training Facility in 2002, a first-ofits-kind facility in the United States dedicated to transit. The facility includes a 260-foot tunnel, two Metro railcars, a simulated electrified third rail for mock fire and rescue exercises, and a passenger rail emergency evacuation stimulator. Since its opening, 

nearly 15,000 people have been trained at this facility, which has 

earned a national reputation. 

In 2004, the Metro Transit Police launched a training initiative 

entitled Managing Metro Emergencies. During a 2-year period this 

33 

course provided over 5,000 regional law enforcement, fire and rescue, Department of Transportation and WMATA operations personnel enhanced training for mitigating, evacuating, transporting 

and recovering from a major service disruption in our system. 

WMATA has recently intensified its focus on emergency management activities by creating an Office of Emergency Management. In 

December of 2008, Mr. Peter LaPorte was hired to oversee this new 

office and has a direct report to Metro’s Chief of Police. With the 

recommitment of six internal staff and the hiring of five personnel, 

Mr. LaPorte has created a team that has over 200 years of transitbased incident response and emergency management experience. 

The Office of Emergency Management will oversee a new training initiative involving the delivery of incident command system 

training to an estimated 8,000 Metro employees. Funded through 

the Department of Homeland Security’s Transit Security Grant 

Program and the regional Urban Area Security Initiative funds, 

this program will raise awareness of security-related issues and instruct operational employees to implement the proper response procedures and command system structure during the initial and developing phases of a Metro-specific incident or emergency. 

Above all, partnerships with first responders and regional stakeholders are the foundation of effective emergency management. 

WMATA would not be able to manage emergencies without capitalizing on the strengths of our partnering agencies. Continuance of 

frequent training and exercises as well as ongoing involvement 

with the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments are the 

primary ways for building and improving our relationships with external agencies. 

WMATA is critically tied to the success of the numerous special 

events that take place in this region. The most recent of these 

large-scale special events was the 2009 Presidential Inauguration, 

which resulted in the largest crowd served in WMATA’s history, 

providing over 1.5 million individual trips on both bus and rail. The 

success on Inauguration Day is proof not only of WMATA’s ability 

to work within the region, but the region’s propensity to work together. 

When an unplanned incident does occur in the National Capital 

Region, it is our responsibility to ensure customer safety, minimize 

the delay and get people moving again. WMATA’s actions on September 11, 2001, provides a good example of our ability to move 

large numbers of people during a regional emergency. 

However, it must be said that while WMATA is willing and prepared to operate in less than ideal circumstances, we do have limits in our capacity to move passengers. Even in the best conditions, 

the region always faces traffic management challenges. To address 

this, WMATA in conjunction with its regional partners has been active in the development of the Metropolitan Area Transportation 

Operations Coordination program, otherwise known as MATOC. 

MATOC is an area-wide situational awareness effort that enhances 

coordination between the region’s transportation providers. 

Thanks to funds appropriated by the Federal Government that 

make emergency management a priority, WMATA and the region 

have done a great job dealing with and responding to emergencies 

and planning for events. Continued investment in emergency manVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:32 Oct 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\48880 JASON
34 

agement initiatives such as proper equipment, training efforts, 

planned processes, response measures, recovery protocols and overall prevention techniques is imperative for enhancing the National 

Capital Region’s mobility, safety and quality of life. 

The men and women of WMATA will continue to strengthen our 

capabilities and relationships with our local, regional and Federal 

partners to ensure a safer, more secure and better prepared region. 

Thank you. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Delinski. 

Mr. Nichols, do you have additional statement at this time? 

Mr. NICHOLS. The only thing I would like to add, ma’am—obviously, I have already submitted a statement for the record, but one 

thing I would like to highlight is, you will hear today in the previous panel and this panel the need to coordinate and share resources within the Washington metropolitan area. There is no one 

agency that is well suited to work in a unilateral manner to handle 

the types of emergencies that occur in Washington or could potentially occur in Washington. And we have seen that, even something 

with the evacuation of the Mall to coordination for the Inauguration and the events on 9/11. 

One of the priorities of Chief Morse, myself and Gloria Jarmon, 

our CAO, has is to make sure that the United States Capitol Police 

are able to obtain a new radio system that allows us to be a full 

partner with interoperability. The requirement of the agencies to 

have plans is fine, but the lifeblood of the agencies in this region 

to coordinate is our ability to communicate with each other. And 

when you have a key partner who has limited interoperable capabilities to talk to the people who are sitting at this table—seated 

at this table, certainly it causes a concern. 

We are working very closely with U.S. Capitol Police Board and 

the Committees of jurisdiction to make sure that we have the authority and the appropriations to obtain this system, and to make 

sure that we can fully integrate with the Washington metropolitan 

area law enforcement public safety agencies should there be a 

major situation develop that requires an evacuation of the area or 

an event that causes us to bring resources into our jurisdiction so 

we can communicate and coordinate those rescue and law enforcement activities. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Nichols. 

Let me understand your testimony. Your radio system is not now 

fully integrated with even the D.C.—the Metropolitan Police Department, which is the largest police department in the region; is 

that so? 

Mr. NICHOLS. We have limited interoperability with the Metropolitan Police Department, but we don’t have full interoperability. 

When we bring some of our other partners, who are seated at the 

table here, online, we have limited interoperability. 

The other problem that we have with our current system radio 

system is, it is not encrypted, so that when we are handling an 

emergency situation, everybody’s little brother with a scanner can 

listen to what we are doing and that, therefore, compromises our 

operations. 

Ms. NORTON. I am going to go now to my good friend, Representative Edwards, for the first series of questions. I just wanted to 

35 

make sure I understood what you were saying. This testimony is 

that, even as we speak, the Capitol Police are not fully interoperable within the region or even with the D.C. Police Department located right here. 

Ms. Edwards. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Well, thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And also 

thank you for enabling Mr. Herron to come to this panel as I have 

to depart. 

It is exactly this point of operability of systems that I wanted to 

focus on. So I appreciate, Assistant Chief Nichols, your raising 

that. And I want to direct this question also to Mr. Herron, because 

my understanding is that the Prince George’s County Police Department also has a radio communications operability concern and 

deficit. The Montgomery County Police Department also has an 

interoperability problem, in addition to the Capitol Police and the 

District of Columbia police. 

And I am not sure, Mr. Delinski, perhaps you can tell me whether WMATA suffers the same deficit. Because this is a huge concern. 

Here we are in a region, and our major law enforcement agencies 

have limited capacity in an emergency situation to communicate 

with each other and to do it in a secure fashion. This is perhaps— 

I mean, this is a tremendous deficit for one of the most significant 

regions in the country. And I think that as we look to—and this 

is an authorizing Committee and not an appropriating Committee. 

But I would say to my colleagues that as we go forward, this is a 

huge deficit that needs to be cleared up. And it can’t go any longer. 

We are, perhaps, just lucky that we haven’t had the kind of 

emergency event that would require us to draw on our communications capacity and then suffer for that deficit. 

And so I appreciate, Mr. Herron, first, your comments about 

Prince George’s County’s interoperability deficit. 

Mr. HERRON. Yes, ma’am. 

If an emergency occurred today, Prince George’s County’s first responders would not be able to seamlessly communicate with partners in the National Capital Region. 

As you know, during the 9/11 attacks, our first responders responded to the Pentagon and had to be handing out radios so we 

could communicate with those first responders. 

We recently purchased a new radio system to replace our existing 40-year-old radio system. We are hopeful to be online with that 

system within the next 15 months. It is the latest and the greatest 

encryption, and we will be able to communicate effectively with our 

partners in the National Capital Region. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Mr. Delinski. 

Mr. DELINSKI. I share your concerns with interoperability as 

well. It is certainly a problem that has been challenging the Metro 

Transit Police Department. 

As you know, we operate in all three major jurisdictions here and 

communicate with all local police departments. We have some limited capacity to do so, Metropolitan Police, for one, on a limited 

basis and U.S. Park Police come to mind. 

However, this issue has also been brought up through the Council of Governments here in Washington, D.C., and using Urban 

36 

Area Security Initiative funds, we have purchased two thousand 

radios that obviously do communicate with each other; and they 

are in storage caches strategically placed throughout the region. So 

if there is a major event, we do have that option of pulling out 

those two thousand radios and distributing them to the first responders on the scene of a major incident. 

So we have that option while we wait for technology to be able 

to bring our radio systems together. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Major General Schwartz, can you describe your 

communications capacity with the law enforcement agencies and 

other first responders in the region? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for the question. 

First of all, let me talk about the framework in which we communicate. The Joint Operation Center in the District of Columbia is 

tied to the D.C. Emergency Management Agency through several 

communications mechanisms, radio CB being one of those, and radios if we have to be deployed to the streets. It further is tied to 

other EOCs or JOCs within the region, within the FEMA Region 

3. So we have a 24/7 capability to communicate to our Joint Operation Centers within this region. 

If we are deployed to the streets to assist the Metropolitan Police 

Department or the Park Police or whoever requires our service, we 

are then issued land mobile radios, or handhelds, to communicate 

back to our JOC and then out to different regions so that they can 

report back what is going on. 

So because we are not on the streets 24/7, the pressures that the 

law enforcement agencies may feel are not realized by the Guard. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. 

And then finally, Mr. Herron, what would be the cost for a fully 

interoperable communications system for Prince George’s County in 

this really critical metropolitan region? 

Mr. HERRON. The cost is $65 million, and as I indicated, we did 

sign a contract with a vendor. We are moving forward with the 

placement of the towers and the testing and so forth. 

And I must say that there have been—the Byrne Grant accounts 

and UAC’s funding has helped us facilitate the purchase of this 

equipment. And hopefully within the next 15 months, barring any 

other issues, we will be able to go live with this radio system. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. 

And then lastly, before I have to depart, my other question was 

also about medical emergency services. I have been really concerned that at a time when we need to step up and think about 

our regional medical emergency services and how we would handle 

a disaster, we are seeing—for example, at Andrews Air Force Base, 

Major General Schwartz, where some of your units are supported— 

Malcolm Grow Medical Center will be declining actually in its service, in its medical services at that facility. 

Prince George’s Hospital Center is under great strain, even 

though it has the region’s trauma unit there. And I worry about 

the capacity of then Washington—and we will hear from Washington Hospital Center and the American Red Cross later on about 

our capacity to deliver the kind of medical emergency services that 

we need, especially outside of the District of Columbia, presuming 

an event that might require movement of great masses of people 

37 

out into the suburbs and particularly the southern suburbs of 

Prince George’s County that are more adjacent to the Capitol Complex. 

And so I wonder, Mr. Herron, if you—because I am looking right 

now at how we actually might support a much more regional approach on medical service delivery for the purposes of homeland security. 

Mr. HERRON. Yes, ma’am. 

In the National Capital Region we have been working together 

for the past couple years to deal with the capacity in the hospitals, 

our surge capacity, so to speak. We rely heavily on MOUs to support one another, and our hospitals have these MOUs in place as 

well. 

We have purchased several mobile medical buses to transport 

large numbers of victims to hospitals. We are not at the place 

where we really need to be—to address a large catastrophe, so to 

speak. We are moving in the right direction, but there is plenty of 

work to be done. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. 

Madam Chairwoman, I yield. And I look forward to both reading 

and looking at the testimony of the remainder of this panel and the 

subsequent one. And I appreciate your enabling me to ask this line 

of questions. 

And thank you all for your presence here today. Thank you. 

Mr. HERRON. Thank you. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Congresswoman Edwards. We are very 

glad you live in the region so that even when Congress is dismissed, you are willing to travel from Prince George’s to be able 

to offer the very, very important and helpful comments and questions you have offered this afternoon. 

Let me follow up on the Congresswoman’s questions on interoperability because it may involve a real-life circumstance. That involves the enforcement—what we understand to be a multi-law-enforcement approach to events like the Inauguration. 

Now, there has been a report issued thus far, and I have indicated that we are not prepared until the GAO report is issued to 

go very deeply, because we haven’t had an independent report on 

what happened. But we do know from constituents around the 

country that there were people who could not get out of the Third 

Street Tunnel. And some have identified this as perhaps the most 

important, if not the only, homeland security issue that arose during what was an extraordinarily successful event in other ways. 

And yet there were perhaps hundreds of people who were told to 

make their way by walking through the Third Street Tunnel; they 

did and could not get out. 

I am wondering if this was a question of interoperability, whether any of you participated in communication with one another so 

that these people who, we are told, were not even told why they 

were being held. 

Did the Metropolitan Police sergeant, did the Capitol Police know 

about this? Did Metro? Did you, General Schwartz? Did you, Mr. 

Herron? How did this occur? And was there any communication 

among the agencies who appear to have coordinated so well in 

other regards to the Inauguration? 

38 

Mr. NICHOLS. I can probably be in the best position to answer 

that right now. 

There was a joint report that was done by the agencies that were 

involved in the planning of the Inauguration that addressed this 

and some of the other issues we found, which turned out to be 

rather significant challenges with regard to the security plan and 

the balance and security plan with the level of access that we 

wanted to provide people to the various venues in the city. 

Essentially, everything was compounded by the fact that there 

was an unprecedented, almost 2 million people in the city. Since 

that had never been experienced before, we didn’t really have a historical perspective on how that would strain infrastructure, how 

that would test the communications capabilities of the law enforcement public safety agencies, and just generally the security plans 

that we put in place that day. 

I will be happy to send the report over to you if you haven’t had 

a chance to see it. 

Ms. NORTON. Actually, I am trying to find out from all four of 

you whether you had any communication during the time that people were in the Third Street Tunnel. I am trying to find out whether interoperability or the communication system was partly at fault 

here. 

Did any of you know that there were people—I will go down. You 

knew, Mr. Nichols? 

Mr. NICHOLS. We knew that there were people in the southbound 

tube of the Third Street Tunnel because that was a designated pedestrian route. The command level positions at the various multiagency command centers did not know that there were people in 

the northbound tube. The northbound tube was never intended for 

pedestrian use. 

Ms. NORTON. How did they get in there? 

Mr. NICHOLS. Officers on the ground level, in order to overcome 

crowding challenges that were taking place in the northwest sector 

of the city, directed people down there to relieve pressure. 

Ms. NORTON. See, this is interesting because this is the kind of 

unplanned circumstance where the officer on the ground has to 

make a decision. And actually, if you think about it, it would seem 

to be a good kind of on-the-ground decision, but you would expect 

it to be made—the notion that you are getting a lot of crowding. 

Look, here is this tunnel that is closed. It won’t have vehicular 

traffic. Let’s send them through this tunnel. It makes perfect sense 

as long as everybody knows it. 

Was the failure of communication related at all to interoperability? 

Mr. NICHOLS. I think—yes, I believe that that was one of the factors. We had a multiagency command center going on, but in the 

multiagency command center, what we are really doing is listening 

to about 15 or 20 or maybe even more independent radio transmissions from the independent agencies. 

Ms. NORTON. Including, for example, anybody can get on that 

now because you are doing—you are tuning into other systems 

rather than having your own system. 

39 

Mr. NICHOLS. That is correct. So there was no one radio system 

you could monitor to get a global view of what was going on in the 

city that day. 

Conversely, should there have been a major situation develop, 

the same would have been true. We would have had to listen to all 

these multitude of different agencies’ transmissions in order to coordinate our activities and tie operations together. 

Ms. NORTON. Including, for example, Mr. Nichols, if somebody, 

you know, these incidents that we had here; and the one which is 

most indelibly in our minds, of course, is the incident that occurred 

here in the Capitol. 

Here you had the tunnel open. You had millions of people here, 

almost none of them with real tickets. Now, if among them there 

had been someone with a military-style weapon who decided to 

open fire, what would have been the consequence there? When 

would you have known about it? How would that have been handled? 

Mr. NICHOLS. Well, we had contingency plans in place to handle 

any number of situations that could occur, including an active 

shooter. We actually had table-top exercises on how these various 

agencies would respond, depending on whose jurisdiction the event 

was taking place in at any given time. 

But again, the potential for something like that to occur occurs 

every day. It is compounded exponentially when you have large 

crowds at a national secure event like that where you have instant 

media attention of what is going on. 

Ms. NORTON. And, of course, it would be compounded if, in fact, 

there was free access to military-style weapons which would make 

it much, much easier to mow down people in such a crowd if you 

happen to be either a crazy person or a person intent upon doing 

harm. 

Mr. NICHOLS. And that is an important point because, obviously, 

our focus is on an enduring constitutional government and the protection of the leadership of the United States, because everybody 

was outside of the West Front of the Capitol. You had the entire 

top level of the government in one place at one time. That is certainly a significant security concern. 

But you can’t discount the fact that there doesn’t necessarily 

have to be an attack upon that area in order to completely disrupt 

and overtake the inaugural activities of that day. And we were 

very cognizant of that. We always are. 

The agencies that were involved in the Inauguration have a constitutional requirement to make sure that the President is sworn 

in at noon on the 20th, like the Constitution says; and anything 

that has the potential of disrupting that, whether it is an active 

shooter on the Mall or something occurring here on the Capitol 

grounds, we have to guard against that. 

And as the threats proliferate through access to weapons or 

whatever, the difficulty of making sure that we hit that constitutional requirement for the Inauguration is even more difficult. 

Ms. NORTON. So would you be as alert today in looking for the 

lone gunman, single shooter as looking for somebody carrying a nuclear device, assuming that was possible, into this area? 

40 

Mr. NICHOLS. Yes, ma’am. We run a spectrum of threats and we 

look at threats based upon the probability and the consequence. 

And we weigh our resource allocation toward that scale. 

Ms. NORTON. Let’s talk probability and consequence. 

Isn’t there a greater probability for a single shooter to come in 

spraying a crowd or a motorcade than there is for someone to bring 

in a nuclear device today? 

Mr. NICHOLS. Yes. And I think if you look at some of the terrorist 

attacks that have taken place just recently—Mumbai is probably 

the best example of what a small group of people who are heavily 

armed can do to disrupt an entire city. We are not immune from 

that. 

We have seen—and you have talked about it, I have talked about 

it also—what occurred on July 24, 1998, where we had one individual with one handgun, and the disruption that he caused and 

two police officers dead and a citizen wounded. 

So, yes, it is a significant concern. It is a significant test of the 

planning and response capabilities of the law enforcement agencies 

in the city. And it is something we have to be cognizant of every 

single day. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Chief. 

Now, I would like to go down the line and ask any of you if you 

knew—of all the things that happened, most of the things you 

would expect to happen. I think what people didn’t expect was that 

the officers would have to make an almost instant decision about 

the crowding and sending people through a tunnel. As it turns out, 

some of those had tickets. In fact, many, many of those had tickets 

and did not get out. 

I am trying to learn whether or not, with the present system of 

operability, if any of you were informed of the fact that there were 

people in the Third Street Tunnel. 

Mr. Delinski? 

Mr. DELINSKI. I will say that communications up to and including the Inauguration itself were very robust. The planning was tremendous; the event was tremendous. We had officers and officials 

assigned to many different command posts throughout the region 

that were able to feed back information to our EOC at Metro, so 

we would get real-time information and so forth. We had an extensive antenna out in the field, getting as much information as we 

could. 

However, to my knowledge, we were not notified of the Third 

Street Tunnel condition. There was no request made to help alleviate that. Of course, we had our hands full with Metro-related 

issues, transporting 1.5 million people. 

Ms. NORTON. You would have had your hands full, Mr. Delinski, 

if there had been a shoot-out in there, but I bet you would have 

dispatched Transit Police to help in the event that there was such 

an event. 

Mr. DELINKSI. Absolutely. 

Ms. NORTON. I am just trying to hear—I am not casting blame. 

If anything, we are trying to help, because we are shocked, amazed, 

and awed that there would not be interoperability among all those 

related and that you would have to do what looks like a jerry-built 

system if you want interoperability. 

41 

Major General Schwartz, you had a major role to play. In fact, 

you were the commander of all the forces, not only the D.C. National Guard, but all forces at the Inauguration. 

Were you informed through radio or other kinds of contact that 

people were stuck in the Third Street Tunnel? 

General SCHWARTZ. Ma’am, the joint task force D.C. was not 

missioned to provide support to the tunnel. We had 7,000—— 

Ms. NORTON. Yes, sir, I am just trying to know if you knew about 

it. 

General SCHWARTZ. No, ma’am, we did not know about it. 

Now, does that point towards a physical communication problem 

or just failure to communicate? And that is what we have to look 

at. The officer who was probably sending folks down into the tunnel probably had no situational awareness of what was happening 

in the tunnel. Therefore, was it the failure to communicate or a 

communications problem physically? 

Ms. NORTON. Well, we will find out, but the—in this age of high 

technology, it doesn’t seem to us, if there were a state-of-the-art 

system available to officers, that there would have been lack of notice of all officers. And, again, although there were people who got 

sick in the tunnel, handled very well, you hardly heard anything 

about it. 

And although people continued to be joyful about the Inauguration, our job and your job is to think of worst-case scenarios. And 

the worst-case scenario that I know, from speaking to a number of 

you about planning, was not that there would be a lot of folks 

there—you had already shown you could handle lots of people—but 

that something unforeseen would happen. As it turns out, this was 

the unforeseen event. And it happened in part because officers 

were trying to relieve crowding, not because of some outside force. 

And yet some outside force could have taken advantage of the failure to communicate. 

Mr. Herron, you are a public safety officer, as well. Do you know 

whether Prince George’s officials or you were informed that people, 

I am sure some from your own county, were stuck in the Third 

Street Tunnel? 

Mr. HERRON. Madam, I was in the emergency operations center 

during the entire event, and we were not informed. 

Ms. NORTON. And this is the emergency operations center of 

where? 

Mr. HERRON. Prince George’s County. 

Ms. NORTON. And you were not informed. 

Mr. HERRON. No, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. I think that the testimony here of very competent 

officers is all that needs to be said about this appropriation period 

and interoperability. 

Chief Nichols, isn’t it true that some funds have been allocated 

to begin, at least, on interoperability among the region and the District of Columbia police? 

Mr. NICHOLS. Yes, ma’am. I believe that there was a lot of money 

that was given to the Department of Homeland Security to distribute across the Nation, with regard to grant money for local and 

State law enforcement agencies. 

42 

The U.S. Capitol Police, because of the fact that we are a legislative branch agency, can’t receive grant money. So we were appropriated a supplemental appropriation to begin planning for our new 

radio system. And we have requested additional funds in the current bill. 

Ms. NORTON. So how far along are you, sir? 

Mr. NICHOLS. We are pretty far along in the planning stages 

right now. We are being monitored very closely by the Committees 

of jurisdiction to make sure that we are in the realm of—— 

Ms. NORTON. Does that mean not only the D.C. Police Department, but Metro? Does that also mean the region, that you would 

be interoperable with the entire region? 

Mr. NICHOLS. Yes, we would be interoperable with the entire region. We project right now, if we getting the funding that we are 

requesting and the authority to move forward, it would still be 

about 3 years before we get our system completely online and up 

and running. That is why the chief has made this such a priority, 

because nobody can predict in the span of 3 years what we are 

really going to be facing, not only within the Capitol complex but 

within the region. So this is something that has a very high priority so we can get it online and get down the road with fulfilling 

our mission. 

Ms. NORTON. Yes, General Schwartz? 

General SCHWARTZ. Madam, may I just add that if the system is 

going to be delivered in 3 years, we have to look at upgrades to the 

existing system to make sure that they can all interoperate or upgrade it together. 

Ms. NORTON. And it looks like between now and a fully interoperable system we are into jerry-built systems, at some considerable risk, I take it, it to homeland security. 

Mr. NICHOLS. You are right. Right now we are making due with 

what we have. I believe that, obviously, from the testimony today, 

we are not the only agency that is in this position. But the agencies 

in the region have to continue to bridge the gaps that we experience with regard to our communications capabilities. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Herron, could I ask you a question? Once there 

was the evacuation of New Orleans, everybody talked about, how 

can we evacuate? Some of us have emphasized ‘‘stay in place,’’ that 

there are few events where there would be a need to evacuate 

whole populations. For example, we have floods in this area, but 

seldom have we had a hundred-year event, as they are called. 

However, it could be that there would be the need to evacuate 

people from the District of Columbia. It is a pretty big jurisdiction. 

You have spoken of a place—a shelter. I want to make sure I 

have—the places that are mentioned, which have been mentioned. 

Mr. HERRON. Ritchie Coliseum and Showplace Arena. 

Ms. NORTON. Ritchie Coliseum, Showplace Arena. How many 

people could be sheltered in these two facilities? 

Mr. HERRON. I think, combined, we can probably shelter up to 

probably 3,000 people. 

Ms. NORTON. If more than 3,000 poured out, think about where 

Prince George’s is located. 

Mr. HERRON. Then we are in trouble. To be quite honest with 

you, we are in trouble. You know, we have asked our citizens to 

43 

be prepared to make a plan to shelter in place to prepare for the 

future. 

In Louisiana, we had more than 2,000 residents migrate to 

Prince George’s County to stay with relatives, which impacted our 

capacity. They self-evacuated and stayed with relatives in Prince 

George’s County, and it was a strain on our resources. 

Ms. NORTON. Do you advise shelter in place unless told to evacuate? 

Mr. HERRON. I think every citizen should have a plan to shelter 

in place, have alternative housing with friends and relatives that 

they can migrate to in case of an emergency. 

Of course there will be that segment of society who will not have 

the resources to do that. And that is when the government must 

be prepared to respond to the needs of those citizens. 

Ms. NORTON. Most of the time, when there has been an event of 

some kind, you don’t know what it is. Chief Nichols has testified 

that it is likely to be a spraying event of some shooter, as we had 

here in the capital, as it is to be some exotic event. So, therefore, 

the first thing is we don’t know anything. That is why the questioning that Ms. Edwards and I have done on operability, in the 

first place. 

And before we tell people to stay in place, we would like to know 

what the event is, so that we can know what we are talking about. 

It puts us in a terrible position, you in a terrible position, to tell 

people to stay in place or to go without being able to speak to one 

another, with everybody trying to get on these little jerry-built systems that you have concocted. And, by the way, in case of a terrorist event, others being able to listen in to what it is you are saying. 

I would like to know, in the event of an emergency, whether 

known or unknown, where you would expect a unified command, 

who is in charge of making decisions? 

General SCHWARTZ. Ma’am, I would think the local incident commander is in charge. That is the first person on the scene. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, that would mean whoever in the jurisdiction, 

like Mr. Herron? 

General SCHWARTZ. I think the first responders, which is normally police or fire, would be on the scene, and then the supporting 

packages will come in to assist that incident commander. 

Mr. DELINSKI. He is exactly right, if I could follow up on that. 

When there is an incident such as an active shooter, the first law 

enforcement official on the scene would set up an incident command. Any responding units, whether it be from that particular 

agency or other agencies, would report to incident command and 

ask for directions, get information and so forth, and feed that information back to their departments as well. 

If it is a rescue situation, such as a fire it would be in the hands 

of the fire department. At that point, law enforcement would respond to incident command and then work with them to mitigate 

the situation. 

Ms. NORTON. Could I ask you this question, Mr. Delinski? I noted 

in your testimony, if I can find it, 2008, Metropolitan Transit Police 

Department investigated 224 suspicious packages and people, nine 

44 

unknown substances, 20 bomb threats in your facilities. ‘‘Investigated,’’ that doesn’t mean you found anything. 

Mr. DELINSKI. Correct. 

Ms. NORTON. And I do appreciate that. Did any of these investigations involve guns? 

Mr. DELINSKI. There were a few incidents that were reported of 

suspicious people that were seen carrying weapons. 

Ms. NORTON. When you see—now, of course, your system transports people throughout the region and especially to the District of 

Columbia, which is the hub of the region. If you see a person with 

a weapon in one of your facilities, how do you respond today? 

Mr. DELINSKI. If the weapon is concealed, obviously you approach 

that person and get as much information, maintaining a safe distance, watching the person’s hands and so forth, doing the—— 

Ms. NORTON. How would you know if it were concealed, sir? 

Mr. DELINSKI. Because of a bulge maybe in the side, maybe 

someone else had seen it previously. It may have been moderately 

displayed underneath his jacket, where it was sticking out, the butt 

of the gun, or something along those lines. 

Obviously, if the weapon is out, we make the immediate police 

challenges to, raise your hands, stop what you are doing. And we 

have the person, if the weapon is in their hand, direct them to drop 

the weapon on the ground, move it away from them, and then 

spread them out in the prone position on the ground, where we can 

go and secure them and then investigate the circumstances that led 

us to that point. 

Ms. NORTON. I believe, if I am not—I believe that Virginia does 

allow concealed weapons. 

Mr. DELINSKI. Correct. 

Ms. NORTON. How do you handle the fact that one part of the— 

I am not sure Maryland does, however. 

Mr. DELINSKI. No, it is illegal. 

Ms. NORTON. Maryland does not. 

Mr. HERRON. You have to have a permit issued by the Maryland 

State Police in order to carry a concealed weapon. 

Ms. NORTON. So you can have one with a permit? 

Mr. HERRON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. It may require a permit, for that matter, in Virginia. But the point is you can conceal, carry, carry in many places 

in Virginia for sure. 

Mr. DELINSKI. Yes. 

Ms. NORTON. How does the Metro handle three jurisdictions, all 

with vast amounts of the Federal presence, who have their own 

quite different gun laws? 

Mr. DELINSKI. It is complicated, to say the least. I mean, that is 

one of the reasons our recruits are selected through a vigorous 

background process. We go through three training academies. We 

are certified in all three States, as we refer to, the District of Columbia—— 

Ms. NORTON. So you have to know the laws, essentially, in all 

three States? 

Mr. DELINSKI. We have to learn the laws in all three States, correct. 

45 

Ms. NORTON. So you would, if we passed a whole new gun law 

in the District of Columbia, so new that it said, ‘‘You don’t have 

any more gun laws in the District of Columbia,’’ would you have 

to retrain every officer? 

Mr. DELINSKI. All 450 sworn members we would have to retrain, 

yes. 

Ms. NORTON. Are you funded to retrain all sworn officers of the 

Metropolitan Transit Authority? 

Mr. DELINSKI. There is currently no funding available for that 

now. 

Ms. NORTON. How would you handle bus travel? Do bus drivers 

assume any responsibility—they are not law enforcement officers— 

for people carrying weapons? How would they be expected to respond, when coming from two jurisdictions which do have their 

own local gun laws to a jurisdiction which has no gun laws whatsoever, the Nation’s capital? 

Mr. DELINSKI. We ask our employees, particularly those on the 

buses and in the rail system, to be vigilant in observing suspicious 

behavior. And we ask that if they do see this type of activity, a concealed weapon or otherwise, that they report it to us immediately. 

We do not ask them to intervene or take any type of police action 

and to be very limited in their contact with any type of suspicious 

person. 

Ms. NORTON. Would such personnel, and in particular I am 

thinking about personnel who may see people who board the vehicle, such as a bus driver, would such personnel have to be retrained, as well, if there were no gun laws in the District of Columbia and they traveled on vehicles between the District of Columbia 

and other jurisdictions? 

Mr. DELINSKI. Currently, there is no training in the law for other 

employees outside the police department. 

Ms. NORTON. So how do they know whether to call if there is a 

concealed weapon, for example? 

Mr. DELINSKI. We ask them through public service announcements and also public awareness campaigns, internally and externally, to follow those procedures and not take any type of direct action and contact us and let us do that. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Herron, did you have something to add to that? 

Mr. HERRON. Yes, ma’am, if I may take this opportunity to speak 

briefly about the amendment. 

Ms. NORTON. Please. 

Mr. HERRON. As you know, I am the public safety director in 

Prince George’s County. As part of my responsibilities, I direct the 

police department and the fire department, the Department of Corrections. 

Prior to my appointment as public safety director, I was a Maryland State trooper for 27 years, and I proudly served in several jurisdictions throughout the State of Maryland, including Prince 

George’s County. During my tenure, 13 of my colleagues were 

killed in the line of duty. Two of these colleagues were personal 

friends of mine, and they were killed at the hands of men who possessed illegal firearms. I personally was involved in a shooting 

where a man who attempted to take my life possessed a gun unlawfully. 

46 

If this legislation passes, Prince George’s County currently would 

be in a situation where our crime would increase tremendously. 

Just recently, we announced a drop in crime that had reach an 

all-time low. It hadn’t been this low in 20 years, and this is because 

of the work of our men and women of the police department and 

our citizens. During this fight to decrease crime, two of our police 

officers were killed in the line of duty, Sergeant Richard Findley 

and Sergeant Goggins. Sergeant Goggins was killed at the hands 

of a criminal who should not have been in possession of a handgun. 

In the State of Maryland, we have gun straw purchases, where 

people can buy guns legally and then give those guns to somebody 

who should not possess them. With the enactment of this amendment in the District of Columbia, it will triple the straw purchases 

in the region. And I can tell you from experience from a local level 

that that would cause an increased amount of gun violence in 

Prince George’s County and throughout the national capital region. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Herron, the testimony is important, especially 

your testimony concerning increase and, as you have been able to 

report, the recent decrease in gun violence in Prince George’s 

County. The District had as many as 430, 440 homicides in the 

early 1990’s, and it is down to something a little over 200 now. 

We cannot imagine how rapid or how savage would be the increase in gun violence if there were no gun laws in the District of 

Columbia at all. When everyone thinks of tight gun laws, all one 

has to imagine is a jurisdiction where there is none at all and you 

are left to your own devices. 

Now, let me ask you, Mr. Herron, as a public safety officer, how 

would the absence of gun laws here in the District of Columbia 

complicate any evacuation activities? You have your own gun laws; 

we would have none. You could stockpile assault weapons. You 

could have any—you could have gone to Maryland, you could have 

gone to Virginia. Maybe when you are leaving you want to take 

your guns with you. 

How would the presence of no gun laws, and therefore the accumulation of guns here, complicate evacuation and other activities 

associated with a natural or man-made disaster? 

Mr. HERRON. I think the absence of gun laws, Madam Chair, 

would impair our efforts in the national capital region to keep our 

citizens safe. It is important that we have these layers of security, 

and the interdiction of illegal guns is one of those layers. If we are 

not able to control or we are in partnership with a jurisdiction that 

has no gun laws at all, it would definitely impede or impact not 

only evacuations but the safety of our citizens in the national capital region. 

You asked a question about the training of police officers, additional resources. You know, currently, the Maryland State Police is 

responsible for registering handguns and the purchase of handguns. If, in fact, this burden would be put on the State of Maryland, I don’t think the State of Maryland has the resources to be 

able to have to register handguns from another jurisdiction. 

Ms. NORTON. Would guns be allowed in any of the shelters where 

you would receive people from other jurisdictions or from your own 

jurisdiction? 

47 

Mr. HERRON. No guns would be allowed in any shelters unless 

you were a law enforcement officer. 

Ms. NORTON. Of course, particularly with interoperability, it 

might be hard for people to know that. 

Mr. HERRON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. If any kind of event were to occur now. 

General SCHWARTZ. Similarly with the D.C. Armory, now that we 

have metal detectors on each of our entrances, we will be able to 

detect if any weapons would be coming into the building. 

Ms. NORTON. I wonder if—no, that maybe under Federal law. 

Let me ask all four of you about layers. Again, this comes from 

testimony that we have received in hearings of the Homeland Security Committee, where the mythology of layers after layer after 

layer, local level, certain things happen there, certain things happen at the State, and the cumulative effects, if I may summarize 

it, is that you are able to provide security in a region as high-risk 

as this. 

I would like to speak about layering and what would happen if 

one layer, namely gun laws in the District of Columbia, the Nation’s capital, were to disappear? Let’s start with Mr. Herron and 

go on down. 

Mr. HERRON. Madam Chair, I was present when you asked this 

question previously. I think that without a doubt that, if that layer 

was removed, it would impact homeland security in this region. 

It is important to have layers. It is important to have collaboration and cooperation. It is important to know what happens in others’ jurisdictions about the sale and the purchase of guns and 

things of this nature. 

I am very concerned, our county executive is very concern about 

this pending amendment and how it is going to impact our citizens 

in Prince George’s County. 

Ms. NORTON. Major General Schwartz, you, of course, are perhaps most aware of the military-style weapons. I know that you 

have served in Iraq. I would like you to describe the notion of 

layering, which I understand goes on also on the ground when you 

are in a theater of war. 

General SCHWARTZ. Ma’am, first, to clear the record and get it 

straight, I was not in Iraq, but my troops were in Iraq. 

But on the topic of layering, I think the first thing we have to 

do is the education of all citizens in this area so that they know 

the laws, so that they can assist the local authorities with this 

problem. If all citizens are fully aware of what the laws are, what 

the issues are—— 

Ms. NORTON. But, you see, I am not at the citizen level. I am 

now asking for officers. I am trying to find out—I understand the 

citizen layer has to be aware. I am assuming that the citizen layer, 

by the way, is not aware. I am not going to assume what millions 

of people know. I am trying to find out about the layering provided 

by various authorities available to us. 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, ma’am. And I think that, in the law enforcement arena, all layers are extremely important, and we cannot 

eliminate any one of those layers. There would be a significant gap, 

and there the security and safety of the entire population will be 

at risk. 

48 

Ms. NORTON. General Schwartz, if there had been no assault 

weapon ban in the District of Columbia at the time of the Inauguration, would that have complicated or affected the National 

Guard security that you were called upon to provide? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, ma’am, it would have affected the briefings that our men and women received before going out on their 

mission, especially in the Mall where there were no screening required for the large number of folks—— 

Ms. NORTON. Well, please, let’s make that point clear. There was 

screening if you happened to be close in and to have a ticket. But 

if there were 2 million people on the Mall, surely a million and a 

half were completely unscreened individuals. 

Go ahead, sir. 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, ma’am. As a matter of fact, they all 

were unscreened. They would only be screened if they were going 

into the parade corridor or close to the Capitol. 

So it was a concern. And we were very vigilant in making sure— 

and, as you hear earlier, we had mechanisms in place to conquer 

what may happen. And we were very fortunate that day that nothing happened. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Delinski, going on down the line. 

Mr. DELINSKI. One of the things that we pride ourselves on at 

WMATA is our very low crime rate. The chances of someone being 

a victim of a Part 1 crime in the system, meaning one of the more 

serious crimes—rape, robbery, homicides, and so forth—are very 

low. Chances of being a victim of one of those Part 1 crimes is less 

than three per every million riders that we have on a regular daily 

basis. 

So if suddenly there is this influx of weapons that maybe this bill 

may bring about, you would certainly expect that we would see an 

increase of guns in the Metrorail system, which you can go down 

the road through this process and say may equate to a higher level 

of crime. 

Mr. DELINSKI. Also, we have a very open system at Metro. We 

do not have security points in place like airports—— 

Ms. NORTON. No screening whatsoever to get onto—— 

Mr. DELINSKI. We have approval for random bag checks at station entrances. However, it is under conditions of higher alert levels or significant threat against a system. So they are not out there 

every single day. 

We don’t have this airport-type screening of everyone who is 

coming into our system. So I think, with this amendment being 

passed, or if it would be passed, you would certainly expect that 

our vulnerability would increase as a result. 

Ms. NORTON. I must compliment the Metro for apparently receiving endless numbers of new riders. You have become the most popular ticket in town. And you have kept a low crime rate. 

Of course, more people, more risk. And you are finding all kinds 

of people, including Federal officials who decide they are going to 

pass up that ride and just get on a Metro and get here. So that 

has increased, as well, we know for a fact. 

Finally, Chief Nichols? 

Mr. NICHOLS. Yes, ma’am, within our jurisdiction, we use a concept that allows us to identify threats the furthest point that we 

49 

can. Our goal is to detect, deter, respond to a threat, defeat that 

threat, and then mitigate the results of what that threat brought 

to our jurisdiction. 

Those principles have to interplay well with each other. And, as 

you know, we are in the middle of this city, so we are not an island. Things that occur just on the other side of the street from us, 

even though it may be legal in that jurisdiction, especially with regard to weapons, doesn’t diminish the concern that we have within 

our jurisdiction about a potential incoming threat. 

So it is a very significant issue; it has to interplay with each 

other. And we do take the layers of security and the concentric 

rings of security very seriously. 

Ms. NORTON. The testimony of all four of you has been quite indispensable to this hearing. We are trying to get a sense of the 

threats to the region. We are trying to understand evacuation. We 

are trying to understand what happened, of course, at the inauguration. 

And even given the criticism, I want to take this opportunity to 

commend each and every one of you for a stellar performance. We 

didn’t expect perfection; we didn’t get it. Perhaps we didn’t expect 

the Third Street Tunnel, but we should have expected there would 

be something like that. 

I don’t know how Metro was able to absorb all of these people. 

It isn’t as if you had any idea how many you were supposed to absorb. 

I do want to say for the record that, when it became clear that 

Metro had done all it could, I asked Mr. Catoe to come see me to 

do even more, so that the subways would be kept open beyond 

what he had already agreed to do without additional resources. 

I want you to know this is one Member—I think I have my whole 

region with me—going to try to get those additional resources for 

what was a Herculean job Metro did. There just would have been 

no inauguration, let’s face it, without Metro. We would have been 

sitting here by ourselves, telling the President, ‘‘It is 12 o’clock 

now. Metro has broken down, so nobody has come.’’ That is just 

how indispensable Metro has been. 

And the reason people felt so safe, despite the crowds, was precisely because of the job each and every one of you did during that 

time. I regard it as an unplanned event. Sure, there was planning, 

and, sure, most of the planning worked. But I think it is most valuable because of what you could not possibly have planned for. 

So I want to take this opportunity, even given my questioning, 

to thank all of you for the work you did then and especially for 

your testimony concerning a brand-new threat that none of you 

could have contemplated and that may be upon us. I thank you 

very much. 

And I am going to now call the next panel. I am going to ask 

the—because we have run past where some of you I know expected, 

I am going to ask all of you who have not testified—Mr. Sarubbi, 

Mr. Wall, Mr. DeAtley, Ms. Mathes—to come forward at this time. 

I apologize for the time it has taken. 

The purpose of this hearing was to get on the record what Members of Congress do not know. No one has read the bill. People 

were about to vote blindly against the security that we have spent 

50 

billions of dollars to protect. At least no one will be able to say that 

they did not know, if they approve the Ensign amendment. 

And we are very pleased to hear from Jonathan Sarubbi, the regional administrator of FEMA, where the Office of National Capital 

Region is located; from Kenneth Wall, the acting director of that 

office, which is also in FEMA; from Craig DeAtley, director of the 

Institute for Public Health Emergency Response, ER One, and 

Washington Hospital Center; and, finally, from Linda Mathes, who 

is the president and CEO of the American Red Cross. 

Could I ask you to testify in that order? 

Mr. Sarubbi? 

TESTIMONY OF JONATHAN SARUBBI, REGION III ADMINISTRATOR, FEMA; KENNETH WALL, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, FEMA; CRAIG 

DEATLEY, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 

EMERGENCY RESPONSE; LINDA MATHES, PRESIDENT AND 

CEO, AMERICAN RED CROSS OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL 

AREA 

Mr. SARUBBI. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman. I am Jonathan Sarubbi, the regional administrator for the Federal Emergency Management Agency Region III, based in Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the 

Subcommittee to discuss today’s hearing topic, ‘‘Disaster Capacity 

in the National Capital Region: Experiences, Capabilities, and 

Weaknesses,’’ and to answer your questions. 

I am joined today by my colleague, Kenneth Wall, acting director 

of FEMA’s Office of National Capital Region Coordination. 

In my position as regional administrator for Region III, I oversee 

FEMA’s all-hazard preparedness and emergency management efforts in Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. Region III works with our partners in the regional, State, and local levels to prepare for, respond 

to, and mitigate against man-made and natural disasters. 

The regional office is composed of experts in four distinct areas 

that provide support in our mission, and they are preparedness, 

mitigation, response, and recovery. As a part of our mission, Region 

III plays a vital role in the event that a Federal disaster declaration is issued for our region, including assisting in the development 

of preliminary damage reports and providing support for public assistance grants and individual assistance grants. 

Let me address a number of specific points of interest to the 

Committee. 

We partner closely with our colleagues in the Office of National 

Capital Region Coordination. This partnership includes areas of 

risk assessment to support decision-making, participating in drills 

and exercises, and the coordination in response to incidents in the 

national capital region. Should a natural disaster occur in the national capital region, FEMA Region III coordinates disaster response and recovery under the guidance of the Robert T. Stafford 

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. 

In accordance with the national response framework, disasters 

are managed locally. Within the national response framework, 

FEMA Region III provides direct support to Virginia, Maryland, 

51 

and the District, including assistance with evacuations, sheltering, 

and other unmet needs. Each State and the District maintains sovereign authority and receives support in disaster funding from 

FEMA Region III independently. The Stafford Act directs that the 

District be treated as any of our 50 States. The Stafford Act also 

equates the position of mayor with that of a State Governor, and 

he or she would act accordingly for the purpose of asking for Federal disaster assistance. 

During an incident within the District, local first responders establish command of the incident and manage the response. FEMA 

Region III monitors the incident, assesses District needs, and provides assistance upon request to the mayor and approval of the 

President. 

On the issue of mass care, the District’s Department of Human 

Services has the lead for Emergency Support Function Six. This entity would be responsible for shelter or feeding operations within 

the District. The American Red Cross of the National Capital Area 

supports the District’s Department of Human Services by providing 

sheltering management teams while Serve D.C. Augments with 

further volunteer support upon request. In addition, the District 

Department of Health utilizes the Medical Reserve Corps and 

works in conjunction with the Department of Health and Human 

Services to support any medical needs. 

With regard to the Capitol grounds, we are not aware of any formal agreement between the legislative and executive branches to 

address disasters on the Capitol grounds. In the event of a localized incident, such as a fire or severe storm, the local jurisdiction 

response would normally address the response. The Capitol Police 

would be the first to respond to an incident on the Capitol grounds 

and, as the incident commander, coordinate with other response 

agencies as necessary. This is in line with the National Incident 

Management System and the National Response Framework. 

For a larger event, such as a major hurricane, where there is a 

Stafford Act declaration, any Capitol grounds issues could be coordinated through the Unified Coordination Group within the Joint 

Field Office. The Joint Field Office coordinates the delivery of Federal assistance and funds to the District of Columbia. 

In conclusion, our disaster capacity in the national capital region 

is robust. Through working with the Office of National Capital Region, State, Federal, and local entities, Region III is prepared to 

provide the support necessary in the event of a disaster in the national capital region. The experiences we have had with disasters 

in this region, a refinement of our capabilities, and lessons learned 

have Region III properly prepared to respond to a disaster in our 

region and specifically in the capital area. 

I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you, Madam 

Chairwoman. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much. 

We will go on to Mr. Wall now, the Office of National Capital Region Coordination. 

Mr. WALL. Good afternoon, Madam Chair. I am Ken Wall, acting 

director of the Office of National Capital Region Coordination, 

which is now part of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

And I appreciate your invitation to join my colleagues Jon Sarubbi, 

52 

Craig DeAtley, and Linda Mathes in appearing before the Subcommittee today. 

As you mentioned in your opening statement, due to the unique 

nature of the national capital region, Congress established the Office of National Capital Region to coordinate Federal, State, local, 

and regional authorities for the purpose of enhancing preparedness 

in the national capital region. 

We do this by working closely with our regional partners, an example of which is our engagement with the National Capital Region Senior Policy Group, which is compromised of the homeland 

security advisors and chief emergency managers of Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia, who represent their chief executives and jurisdictions. I am a member of the Senior Policy Group, 

representing the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

The Senior Policy Group plays a key role in sustaining a coordinated regional approach to homeland security and strengthening 

integrated decision-making and planning. This is just one example 

of the engagement of the Office of National Capital Region Coordination. We also work closely with other National Capital Region 

stakeholders and partners, to include the local chief administrative 

officials, public health officials, first responders, emergency managers, leaders from the private sector and nonprofit communities, 

and many other Federal, State, local, and regional officials. 

Working with our National Capital Region partners, the office 

provides support and build in capacity to respond to an incident in 

a coordinated fashion. For example, the Office of National Capital 

Region Coordination and other Senior Policy Group members developed the ‘‘First-Hour Checklist’’ for the National Capital Region to 

guide coordinated leadership decisions and actions during the initial response to an incident in the National Capital Region. 

Significant strides have also been made with regards to interoperability, as well as risk analysis to support decision-making by 

NCR leaders. Additionally, the Office of National Capital Region 

Coordination plans, leads, or participates with regional partners in 

exercise and drills and events that occur frequently in the National 

Capital Region. These efforts bolster regional information-sharing 

and integrated planning. 

During response to a natural disaster, the office is able to support Region III and the Federal coordinating officer. For example, 

we provide enhanced situational awareness, assist in the coordination with national capital region partners, and deploy agency representatives to National Capital Region Operation Centers, where 

needed, to augment FEMA and Region III’s capability. 

The Office of National Capital Region Coordination’s activities 

allow us to contribute to FEMA’s broader efforts to improve and 

maintain relationships with State and local partners, toward the 

end of working well together in the event of another natural disaster. 

I look forward to addressing any questions you may have. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. DeAtley? 

Mr. DEATLEY. Madam Chairwoman, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I previously submitted my written testimony but appreciate, in particular, the opportunity to share some 

53 

concise remarks and have brought one additional document that I 

would request, if possible, to be added to the record. 

I would like to begin my comments today by noting that, in the 

context of remarks that have been made prior to mine, I think it 

is important to keep in mind that when laws are broken and weapons are used to inflict harm, oftentimes the victims of that crime 

end up in a trauma center such as the Washington Hospital Center. I think it is also important to keep in mind, too, that hospitals 

and, as we saw last weekend, even nursing homes can become the 

actual site of that violence. 

When talking about disaster capacity, given the current climate 

for change in our health care system, I think it is also important 

to keep in mind that no meaningful change can occur in our system 

at present that does not include expanding the support given to 

emergency preparedness both for our hospitals in the national capital region and across this Nation, as well as for all other members 

of the health care system. 

Since 2002, I have been one of two people responsible for coordinating emergency preparedness at the Washington Hospital Center, more recently at the National Rehabilitation Hospital, as well 

as for MedStar Health, the parent company for both of these facilities. Prior to that time, I spent 29 years at George Washington 

University, where I had similar responsibilities. 

The Washington Hospital Center recognizes that, as the largest 

hospital in the national capital region, home of the busiest trauma 

center, emergency department, and only adult burn unit, we have 

special responsibility in the area of emergency preparedness. 

Since 1999, with the inception of the project ER One, a unique 

federally funded project to develop an all-hazards, all-risks-ready 

health care facility, the Washington Hospital Center has undertaken a number of important initiatives to improve our state of 

readiness. These include, but are not limited to, introducing an innovative facility design to maximize capacity, capability, and protection, as well as building a state-of-the-art ready room to take 

care of victims from mass casualty incidents from natural as well 

as man-made causes. 

The Washington Hospital Center took the lead in writing and obtaining, on behalf of a broad-based District of Columbia health care 

coalition, one of five nationally awarded $5 million Department of 

Health and Human Services coalition partnership grants. The purpose of this grant is to improve the emergency preparedness of the 

entire District of Columbia health care system. The Washington 

Hospital Center is privileged to be administering that Federal 

grant. 

I think it is important to note that the health care facilities occupy a unique position in the emergency response framework. If 

you look at the big six—police, fire, EMS, hospitals, public health, 

and emergency management—hospitals are the only ones that are 

privately funded. The work we need to do to become and stay prepared and ready to respond to a major disaster must be funded 

from clinical care or else be supported by government grants and 

other forms of assistance. 

In December 2007, in response to a recognized problem of a 

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54 

bia and as a result of that $5 million HHS grant, the District of 

Columbia Emergency Health Care Coalition was founded to create 

a more comprehensive and collaborate approach to preparedness as 

well as response, one that unites all aspects of our health care system. The District of Columbia Emergency Health Care Coalition 

now includes all of the D.C. Government agencies with health care 

facilities working alongside all of the private-sector health care organizations in our Nation’s capital. 

In the short span of 18 months, the coalition’s Emergency Management Committee and associated work groups have conducted a 

first-ever hazard vulnerability analysis for the health care system, 

written a much-needed emergency operations plan and accompanying attachments on communication and the role of the public 

information officer. And soon there will be a health care facility 

evacuation template, as well. We have expanded our hospital mutual aid radio system and included additional partners as part of 

that system. 

We are solving the family reunification problem; that is, how 

does a family member or friend find out which hospital their loved 

one has been taken to in the midst of a mass casualty incident? 

Soon, seven of the busiest emergency departments in the city will 

be sharing real-time patient registration data with the D.C. Department of Health during a declared emergency. This is a remarkable accomplishment, one that is equalled by few other cities in our 

country. 

The coalition has also hired a consultant to conduct a security 

risk assessment for eight hospitals and completed a design 

charrette of the Washington Hospital Center campus, a campus 

that has been identified as one of 24 critical infrastructures in our 

city. 

We also recognize that a mass casualty incident does not respect 

political or geographic boundaries. We need to and have been increasingly coordinating our efforts with our colleagues from Maryland and Virginia. 

Despite the significant improvements and the progress that I 

mentioned, there are still numerous needs and issues that individual hospitals, such as my own, and the coalition itself are confronting. These include but are not limited to, for example: The 

Washington Hospital Center is still seeking $120 million to fund 

the building of our ER One facility, to provide expanded and adequate capacity and capability, to deliver emergency care to the people of District of Columbia, and also to be a national demonstration 

facility for emergency care design, optimized both for daily operations and high-consequence events. The coalition funding will end 

September of 2009, and there is no follow-on Federal funding being 

planned. We need that continued funding in order to meet the additional substantive work that remains to be done. 

And, finally, changes need to be made in State and Federal funding regulations. Currently, hospitals are not allowed to receive disaster funding under the Stafford Act and other select Federal, 

State, and local disaster regulations. During the inauguration, for 

example, hospitals throughout the national capital region incurred 

millions of dollars in expenses and lost revenues associated with 

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55 

dures, but were told by FEMA that we are not eligible for relief 

funding, despite there being a presidential declaration. The fear 

that some of us has is the disaster within the disaster. uncompensated expenses related to our response will bankrupt a hospital 

such as my own because we are operating on a 1 to 2 percent operating margin. 

Since 9/11 and especially over the past 18 months, the health 

care system in our Nation’s capital has made significant improvement in emergency preparedness. And the Washington Hospital 

Center feels privileged and pleased to have played a role in facilitating some of these improvements. But much more needs to be 

done. 

I would be glad to answer any subsequent questions that you 

have. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. DeAtley. 

Now Ms. Mathes? 

Ms. MATHES. Chairwoman Norton, thank you for inviting me to 

participate on this important panel with these great colleagues. I 

am Linda Mathes. I am CEO of your American Red Cross in the 

national capital region. I am absolutely honored to represent the 

American Red Cross in the District of Columbia and, in Virginia, 

Alexandria, Arlington, Fairfax County, Prince William and 

Loudoun Counties, and, in Maryland, Prince George’s County and 

Montgomery County, Maryland, and all the cities within these 

counties. 

With your permission, I would like to submit the entire written 

testimony and simply highlight right now a few key comments, 

major themes in the testimony. 

First, a little bit about the background of the role and the experience and the capacity of the American Red Cross in this region. For 

more than 125 years, our Nation has relied on the American Red 

Cross in times of disaster to help provide shelter, food, clothing, 

emotional and other support. We also supply nearly half the Nation’s blood, and we teach literally hundreds of thousands of people 

in life-saving and emergency preparedness skills. In addition, we 

support the men and women of the military and their families. 

In this community, we have been engaging the community in carrying out this mission and delivering these services for over 104 

years. Our mission is to provide relief to the victims of disasters 

and help people prevent, prepare for, and respond to emergencies. 

We carry this mission out absolutely every day, responding typically every day to some two to four disasters, typically fires in this 

community, like the three we responded to this Saturday. We assisted some 33 people, spent about $8,000 providing for food and 

clothing and health and medical supplies and mental and emotional support that is needed. 

While responding to these everyday local disasters, we also respond to the larger periodic disasters that have been mentioned 

today—hurricanes, floods, tornadoes—and those odd ones like the 

sniper attack, the anthrax attack, the terrorist attack. While responding to these, we are always preparing for the next major, 

large disaster that could occur. In addition, our local Red Cross has 

a unique opportunity to work with community officials in preparing 

for and responding to national special security events, like the 

56 

presidential inauguration or memorial openings or presidential funerals. 

Our typical role and the one that is built into local and county 

plans and even the National Response Framework is largely mass 

care, human care, providing the feeding and the sheltering and the 

bulk distribution of critical supplies. 

To carry out all these services, we rely on a network of thousands of volunteers. We have thousands of volunteers in this area 

and about a thousand who are dedicated to helping us with disaster work. We manage large numbers of spontaneous volunteers, 

as well. The example of the thousands of people who were displaced by Katrina coming into our community. There were some 

7,000 evacuees who came into our community. We mobilized some 

2,000 volunteers to help us here, and we deployed some 2,000 to 

help along the Gulf Coast. 

We rely on partnerships and collaboration with dozens of public 

and private and nonprofit partners to recruit volunteers and carry 

out these services. Partnerships with faith-based organizations, 

with organizations like 100 Black Men, the Nonprofit Roundtable, 

Salvation Army, Catholic Charities. We work with the Board of 

Trade and the Council of Governments. 

We also rely on having ready access to equipment and supplies 

to enable us to shelter and feed thousands of people, particularly 

critical during those first 72 hours up to a week. Our model for disaster services is collaborative, diverse, inclusive. This is truly all 

about neighbors helping neighbors. 

We have increased our capacity significantly over the past several years. We have focused on increasing preparedness of Red 

Cross chapters throughout the area, increasing the preparedness of 

families and businesses throughout the region. And we have done 

you this through a variety of education and training programs. We 

train, in the course of a given year, typically over 100,000 people 

in important life-saving and emergency preparedness skills. 

We focus on extending our outreach, again, through dozens of 

public and private and nonprofit partnerships. We play the leadership role with the Nonprofit Roundtable and at the seat with the 

Council of Governments on the Emergency Preparedness Council 

with the Regional Human Services Working Group. We co-chair the 

Nonprofit Emergency Preparedness Task Force. We reach out to 

networks of networks to engage our partners and colleagues. 

Within the region, we have developed region-wide plans to mobilize Red Cross resources throughout the region wherever they are 

needed. We have been fortunate to receive UASI funding—UASI 

has been mentioned several times today—to be able to increase our 

critical supply of cots and blankets and comfort kits, the kinds of 

essential supplies we need to shelter and feed thousands of people 

at any time. We have also been fortunate in acquiring charitable 

dollars and private sponsorships that has enabled us to open up a 

Regional Disaster Coordination Center to facilitate coordination 

and communication throughout the region. 

Three remaining key points: First, we have a plan in place, and 

we have experience implementing it. We test it, we drill it, we 

learn from our experiences and update our plans. Secondly, we 

57 

have made great progress. And this is largely due to the kind of 

collaboration and partnerships each of us has spoken about today. 

Thirdly, as much progress has we have had, there is much 

progress yet to be had. Some key areas for further strengthening 

are: first, volunteers. Well, we have thousands of volunteers, and 

they are the backbone of the American Red Cross. We need more. 

We need people to step up to the plate and get training before the 

next disaster occurs. 

Secondly, and this has been mentioned today too, the importance 

of more families taking seriously the development of personal and 

family emergency preparedness plans, taking those few basic, core 

actions to prepare themselves and their families for emergencies. 

We urge more attention and more leadership to encouraging families to do this. 

Thirdly, supplies. We have the ability, we have ready access to 

the kind of supplies that would enable us to shelter some 15,000 

people tonight. We have the ability to feed more than twice that 

many. We need more supplies. We need more supplies that would 

enable us to take care of people with special needs and disabilities. 

We have some; we need more. 

And, lastly, we need the kind of warehouse and storage space to 

store these supplies, and, again, on both sides of the river. 

In conclusion, Madam Chairwoman, I am confident that we are 

more prepared now as a local community, a region, and a nation, 

more prepared than we ever have been. We have made great 

progress. You can count on your American Red Cross to do everything we can to work with you to help the families in this community and the businesses and the community in general be as prepared as we can possibly be for excellent response. 

Thank you. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, thank you, Ms. Mathes. I should thank you 

for your continuing really indispensable activities here in the District of Columbia all the time, always available. 

Mr. Sarubbi and Mr. Wall, you heard the testimony, I presume, 

concerning interoperability. Were you aware of this interoperability? And to what extent is this region-wide interoperability? 

Mr. WALL. I would like to address that. 

We were aware that there are legacy systems that exist still in 

the National Capital Region—— 

Ms. NORTON. Well, Mr. Wall, let me ask you, before you go any 

further, how much money have you received, you the region—as a 

region, our money comes straight to you first off—how much money 

have you received from the Federal Government since 9/11? 

Mr. WALL. The National Capital Region, through the Urban Area 

Security Initiative grant, has received about $335 million since, I 

believe, the first round in 2003. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, of that, how much money has gone to systems 

for interoperability? 

Mr. WALL. Specifically for voice interoperability radio systems, I 

believe Chief Delinski mentioned the radio cache. We have 1,250 

radios positioned around the region for catastrophic events to provide some of that interoperability. About $5.5 million has gone for 

the purchase of those radios to maintain—— 

58 

Ms. NORTON. So who is interoperable on what you are describing 

there as various devices? 

Mr. WALL. The caches that I am describing were purchased by 

the region to assist with the jurisdictions that aren’t in a full operational state right now, including Federal responders, such as Capitol Police, as the chief mentioned, and other local jurisdictions. In addition to that, I believe about $6 million from the regional 

Urban Area money was also provided in support of Prince George’s 

County, to help them with their interoperability challenge as well. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Wall, is there any plan to have a—first of all, 

I appreciate what you have done to fill in the blanks there. But in 

light of the fact that even the Capitol Police can’t talk with the 

D.C. Police, have any funds been set aside? Are we in the process 

of making the national capital region interoperable one with another? 

Mr. WALL. Yes, ma’am, I believe we are. I think we are taking 

aggressive steps to do that. 

And one thing that I would like to raise, just so we have in context the state of interoperability, the Department of Homeland Security a couple years ago went to urban areas around the country 

and did an interoperability test. And the national capital region 

was one of a handful of jurisdictions that received the highest 

marks for tactical-level voice interoperability. 

So, in terms of where we are with the rest of the Nation, through 

the systems that we have in place, both legacy systems, both in 

systems that connect legacy systems to other systems, you know, 

we do have that tactical voice interoperability. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Wall, I think you have done exactly the right 

thing, given what, I take it, is a much larger expense for complete 

interoperability. I must start, though, from the hit on the Pentagon. From the description, I believe it was the chief or Mr. 

Herron, of how they had to just hand out whatever they had then. 

And I must ask then, therefore, is there a plan and has any 

money been set aside to make the National Capital Region, where 

the bulk of the Federal presence is located, fully interoperable, 

quite apart from what you have? It seems to me done quite well 

to fill in the gaps pending what I still haven’t heard. Is there a 

plan to make the region fully interoperable? 

Mr. WALL. I will say, yes, there is a plan, but understanding 

that, when we are talking interoperability in the National Capital 

Region, we have resources that are available to our State and local 

responders. And that process has worked very well. We have put 

a lot of resources into that—— 

Ms. NORTON. So the money that went to State and locals they 

have tried to use for that purpose. What would it take for all of 

them to be a part of an interoperable system so that you wouldn’t 

need little radios and the rest that you have already done to, in 

fact, make it possible to talk among yourselves? 

Mr. WALL. I am sorry, I am not sure I—— 

Ms. NORTON. What would it take, either in terms of logistics or 

funds, to go beyond what you have done since 9/11? 

Mr. WALL. It would take some resources for some Federal responders so they can come up to the same level of capability that 

our State—— 

59 

Ms. NORTON. Are you satisfied that if there were an event, with 

what you have been able to do—and I commend you for what you 

have been able to do—that there would be secure systems, that you 

could talk one to the other, today? 

Mr. WALL. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. Who owns those radios or other devices you are 

speaking about? 

Mr. WALL. The devices that I am speaking about and the radio 

caches are owned by the region, if you will. They were bought with 

regional funds. They are managed by Fairfax County, Montgomery 

County, and the District of Columbia. So they maintain the radios, 

they program the radios, they deploy the radios. 

Ms. NORTON. If your testimony is that you are satisfied that the 

devices of various kinds that you now have on the ground are secure and interoperable, why do we need interoperability at all? Or 

do we? Perhaps you are testifying we don’t need interoperability. 

Mr. WALL. No, ma’am, I am not testifying that we don’t need 

interoperability. And to the point made on the earlier panel, I 

think there are steps that we still can achieve to increase our interoperability. 

What I am saying is we have a baseline of capability today that 

was developed by the region, by the public safety folks in the region, the decision process up through their chief executives, that 

size what we have now and the capability and the plan so that we 

have, today, interoperable communications. 

Ms. NORTON. All right. Are you satisfied with what Chief Nichols 

and the chief of police of the District of Columbia have on the 

ground in terms of the way they do interoperability? 

Mr. WALL. I can’t speak specifically to the state of the Capitol 

Police, so I would have to get back to you. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, what do you think of the fact that most of the 

officers I asked at the table, I don’t think one of them knew that 

hundreds, if not thousands, of people were stuck in the Third 

Street Tunnel, didn’t know it, even though they had been funneled 

there by what seems to me to be a competent decision on the part 

of the police. And other police at the other end of the tunnel, seeing 

these people come, even though they had tickets that they were 

waving in the air, kept them there. 

How do you justify that kind of interoperability, if that is what 

they were supposed to have had, given their testimony that none 

of them even knew about it at the time? 

Mr. WALL. I don’t justify that situation. And—— 

Ms. NORTON. I ask you about that because it is a real-life example. We have very few real-life examples, and that was a tremendous success. But here is an in-time example of no interoperability 

when we had more people in the District of Columbia than at any 

time in the history of the Nation’s capital. 

So when you say we have these devices on the ground, you would 

have expected, of all the time they would have been working, during the inauguration. So I am left to understand how that could 

have occurred, that even Capitol Police at one end of the tunnel 

didn’t know that other police had, in fact, funneled people through 

the tunnel, and others were completely in the dark, including the 

commander of all of the forces, the military forces, who were here. 

60 

So I am not yet understanding interoperability with these devices 

that you have on the ground. 

Could it happen again? I guess since you say, ‘‘Hey, we have got 

these devices,’’ what is to keep that from happening tomorrow if, 

in fact, we have people in the Third Street Tunnel? 

Mr. WALL. I would say, my understanding of exactly what happened is very limited, that there is—I think the takeaway from—— 

Ms. NORTON. The only reason I press you, Mr. Wall, is that you 

have testified that what you now have is secure—and you haven’t 

even said you have requested full interoperability—is secure and 

does, in fact, give you the ability to operate as you are supposed 

to operate. 

It is only in light of that question that I am putting these questions before you. Because I have this real-life example that I have 

to account for. And I have the fact that this could happen again, 

and I don’t have any way to know what I, as a Member of Congress, should be doing, what I should be asking for, and the like. 

Mr. WALL. I am not—— 

Ms. NORTON. Maybe Mr. Sarubbi, your superior, has some ideas. 

I need to know, could this happen tomorrow? Are you satisfied with 

what is on the ground? This is the national capital region. We have 

a real-life example from 9/11 of 2 million people here, thousands 

stuck in the tunnel. 

And Mr. Wall has put together the best he can with the money 

he has had. And I want to know why that didn’t work during the 

inauguration and thousands of people were stuck in a tunnel. 

Mr. SARUBBI. Well, our role in FEMA is to prepare first responders to respond to a disaster, and also to assist them in responding 

to a disaster by providing direct Federal assistance, as well as 

funding. So I think the questions that you are asking are perhaps 

a little bit outside my purview, in terms of—— 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Wall reports to you, sir. This is an office in 

FEMA. We set up a special office. First it was located just in the 

office; then they moved it on to FEMA. 

Now, Mr. Wall is only a coordinator. He has coordinated, it 

sounds to me, as best he can. And yet he is unable to tell me 

whether or not, if you had people stuck in the Third Street Tunnel, 

the system he has put in place would work interoperably so that 

people at one end of the tunnel would know what people at the 

other end of the tunnel were doing. 

Therefore, I don’t know what to ask Congress to do, what to tell 

my colleagues. I am left here with no answer. Somebody has to tell 

me what to do so there is not another Third Street Tunnel event. 

Mr. WALL. Madam Chair, if I might just—I, perhaps, gave a bad 

description of what my role is and led to some sort of misunderstanding. 

The interoperable communications that I was talking about funded through the Urban Area is State and local capability based on 

State and local decisions and plans. We, as a coordinator, support 

that process and make sure that the Federal, State, and local people are part of that process and have awareness into it. 

But I don’t have—it is not the role of the office to put in place 

an operable communication for an event such as the inauguration. 

61 

Ms. NORTON. No, I understand the difference between an operations office and a coordinator. But you are the coordinator. You 

are the only ones who know—who are supposed to know what is 

at one end of the tunnel and what is at the other so you can tell 

the others what it is they have to do. 

Mr. WALL. Well, I think that assumes that we have a tacticallevel operational role, which our office does not. 

Ms. NORTON. So do we have a void there? Nobody knew what 

was happening in the tunnel, and nobody is able to tell me who 

should have known or what we should do about it. 

Could I ask you to do this, Mr. Wall? 

Mr. WALL. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. I have no complaint about what you have done, 

given the resources available to you. I have had to sit here and listen to the chief of the Capitol Police say he can’t even talk to the 

chief of the largest police office in his very jurisdiction, that is to 

say the District of Columbia. Then, upon further examination of 

witnesses, they say they can’t talk either. 

And yet you have testified that you have these devices that enable people to talk; they are fairly secure. But you have not been 

able to tell me that there have been conversations that tell you 

that these devices enable you to be interoperable in the Third 

Street Tunnel again, should an event occur there. I have to assume 

an event will occur there. It is not my job to assume that this is 

the last event in the Third Street Tunnel or some other tunnel. We 

have nothing but tunnels in the District of Columbia. 

It is my obligation to ask you to meet with the members of the 

region to discuss interoperability and, within 30 days, indicate to 

us whether or not you believe, in the event of an event in the tunnel or, for that matter, in WMATA, which is also in essence a tunnel, whether you could communicate, one to the other, and what it 

is, regardless as a request for funds, but what it is you would need 

in order that police even in the same district, the District of Columbia, can talk to one another and certainly across the district. 

We are not going to be sitting up here having another event and 

people didn’t even tell us what to do, or another Third Street event 

and we weren’t even warned that you were not interoperable. That 

is why we feel so strongly. I lost three schoolchildren, among other 

residents, among these 184 people. 

And we need more information on interoperability so that, in my 

role as a Member of the Homeland Security Committee, in my role 

as Chair of this Committee, which has the major jurisdiction over 

FEMA, I can know what it is to tell my colleagues is needed. 

Now, Mr. DeAtley, you testified that, under the Stafford Act, the 

hospitals weren’t even—some of them weren’t even eligible to be reimbursed. Now, first of all, I am told—let me ask you this question 

to precede it. What hospitals in the District of Columbia are forprofit, and what hospitals remain nonprofit? Are you aware of that? 

Mr. DEATLEY. Generally speaking, yes, ma’am. The three forprofit facilities that I am personally familiar with are George 

Washington University and the specialty hospitals of Hadley and 

Capitol Hill. And, actually, I think there is a fourth; that would be 

United Regional. 

The remaining facilities—— 

62 

Ms. NORTON. You said United Regional. That is Greater Southeast? 

Mr. DEATLEY. Old Greater Southeast, yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. How about Metropolitan Hospital Center? 

Mr. DEATLEY. The Washington Hospital Center is a not-for-profit. NRH is a not-for-profit. Those other facilities in the system, if 

you will, which number now, I believe, about eight others, are all 

not-for-profit, is my understanding. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. DeAtley, I have been informed by staff that one 

of the reasons—and this is an absurdity. This is why people need 

to tell us and why I am pressing Mr. Wall and Mr. Sarubbi to get 

us the appropriate information. I am told that the Stafford Act provides funding for nonprofits. Isn’t that ridiculous? I mean for nonprofits only. 

For at least 50 years, you have had hospitals turning from nonprofit to for-profit. Here we have some of the biggest hospitals in 

the District of Columbia now for-profit. And I am sitting up here 

with a major jurisdiction over the Stafford Act not even knowing 

that I should have requested a change in the Stafford Act to request a change in medical funding and medical operations today 

where they are often owned, even if they are connected with a university, by a for-profit entity. 

And I do want to thank you for that testimony, because it is another one of the absurdities of how easy it is for the bureaucrats 

to simply answer, when you ask for funding, ‘‘Sorry, we only fund 

for-profit,’’ without coming and telling us about that. Any Member 

of Congress will today have for-profit hospitals that yesterday were 

nonprofit. 

So forgive me for not knowing that. And that is a change I expect 

to request in the Stafford Act upon finding more information about 

it. 

Ms. Mathes, as I am aware of the extent which you are dependent upon volunteers, I need to know how many of your thousands 

of volunteers live in the District of Columbia. 

Ms. MATHES. We will be happy to follow up with you to give you 

some precise numbers. The figures I quoted to you, several thousand volunteers who work with us in this region, that figure can 

be broken down according to how many are in the District and how 

many are in other parts of the region. If you would permit me, I 

would like to follow up and give you that level of detail. 

Ms. NORTON. I am aware that there is great generosity in sharing volunteers across regional lines. But I would, in the event of 

an event, getting to the District, if you were a volunteer who resided in the region, might be difficult. And your own people might 

be asking you to give aid first and foremost there. 

So we really do need to know the breakdown of these volunteers. 

I would like it for the District of Columbia, Montgomery County, 

and Prince George’s County and the other regions in the national 

capital region, if you will. 

Have you had any mock exercise here, either for evacuation or 

any other event, Ms. Mathes? 

Ms. MATHES. We have participated in numerous exercises with 

our colleagues at the table and colleagues around the region, exercises and drills in the District and elsewhere. 

63 

Ms. NORTON. Any involving evacuation? 

Ms. MATHES. I would like to—typically, the exercises and drills 

involve a particular type of incident. I would like to get back to you 

on a precise answer regarding if any of them have regarded evacuation. 

Ms. NORTON. One of the things I am most interested in, Ms. 

Mathes, is whether, in the event of an evacuation, absent some 

kind of event with gases so noxious that they were being released 

all over the District of Columbia, one could imagine a situation 

where instead of evacuating to Prince George’s County, which has 

limited capacity as you heard in prior testimony, one might evacuate to other sheltering places in the District of Columbia, such as 

the Armory, such as large places such as the Verizon Center and 

the rest. 

Are those places considered places for evacuation? In other 

words, for sheltering within the District of Columbia, what would 

those places be, please? 

Ms. MATHES. We have identified quite a few shelter locations in 

the District of Columbia and elsewhere. They are typically schools, 

some churches, some other organizations. We have identified some 

56,000 spaces, again throughout the region, but I can follow up 

with you to provide a specific number of those within the District 

of Columbia. 

We have surveyed them to make sure that they meet some basic 

criteria for being able to accommodate the immediate and emergency needs of people. 

Ms. NORTON. We would very much appreciate those numbers. 

Mr. Sarubbi and Mr. Wall, have there been any discussions within the region of differences in gun laws and capacity in the event 

of a gun event in this city or region? 

Mr. SARUBBI. Again, Madam Chairman, our role within FEMA is 

to provide support to our State and local partners—— 

Ms. NORTON. All right, then let me ask Mr. Wall, since he is the 

coordinator. 

Have you assumed, Mr. Wall, that all have different gun laws, 

and yet if there were a spraying, such as of a motorcade where dignitaries traveled daily, or an event involving guns, have you assumed that there are different gun laws in how you would handle 

such an event? Have there at least been discussions on a coordinating level of that kind? 

Mr. WALL. I have not been involved in any conversation of—— 

Ms. NORTON. How would those discussions have occurred, sir, if 

they occurred at all? If not within an office whose job it is to do 

coordination, where and with what form would they have occurred? 

Mr. WALL. As I said, I am not aware of discussions that have occurred—— 

Ms. NORTON. Could I ask you to—go ahead. 

Mr. WALL. There are forums, as mentioned before, at the Metropolitan Washington Council of Government, where chiefs of police 

and our law enforcement folks from the region get together and 

talk about law enforcement issues. I would imagine that such a discussion would happen in one of those forums. 

Ms. NORTON. As a coordinator, I would ask that, if such discussions occur, you be informed of them so that you can know that 

64 

such a—I mean, it is hard to understand what the role of a coordinator is if not to at least understand what is being discussed 

among the various parties he coordinates. 

Mr. WALL. Yes, ma’am. And we do have representatives in each 

of those meetings. And what I am saying is, to my knowledge, the 

specific discussion that you mentioned has not occurred. 

Ms. NORTON. In light of the fact that the testimony here has 

been that a gun attack would be more likely than any other attack 

in the District of Columbia today given risk analysis, could I ask 

that you assure this Subcommittee that such discussions do, in 

fact, occur? 

Mr. WALL. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. I appreciate it. 

Mr. DeAtley, ER One has been a major concern to me. It would 

be the only system capable of receiving people who were contaminated and of decontaminating them in large numbers. 

You have apparently received some funds, some $5 million from 

HHS to improve emergency preparedness. Were any of these related to the so-called ER One, which would, of course, be a demonstration project but would also be such a facility here in the District of Columbia to handle contamination of people in the region? 

Mr. DEATLEY. No, ma’am. The coalition’s focus primarily has 

been across the spectrum over the health care facilities. 

$100,000 of the $5 million is being spent on developing what we 

refer to as the ceiling membrane concept. That would be studying 

the airflow using a revised filter or ceiling tile being strategically 

in rooms that would isolate and contain contagions, if you will. 

But that is a concept development. The rest of the money is 

going to a broader coalition set of deliverables than decontamination. 

Ms. NORTON. So most of the money to decontaminate people, for 

example—you are the closest hospital or one of the closest hospitals 

straight up the way from the Congress, from the Supreme Court. 

Most of the money to do decontamination, if there was contamination, for example, some kind of contamination got set loose in the 

Capitol or in the Supreme Court or in the White House, you do not 

have the funds presently to decontaminate individuals, officials, 

residents, and the like? 

Mr. DEATLEY. All of the hospitals in the District of Columbia and 

the national capital region, including the Hospital Center, have 

spent their own moneys to a point in building their current capacity. That initial outlay of funding and its sustainment cost has 

been supplemented periodically by other sources of funding, including a grant which is currently in place to focus just on mass decontamination where hospitals and hazardous material team personnel are working together to do a gap analysis—that has been 

completed—to purchase equipment to fill the gap and, once that 

equipment arrives, to initiate training to use that equipment so 

there can be a greater sharing. 

That all having been said, additional funding support would be 

keenly appreciated by hospitals, especially to sustain, if not to expand, our current capability. 

65 

Ms. NORTON. Well, as important as it is, indeed it is vitally important, that local hospitals be able to do decontamination, what is 

the point of ER One as a major facility for decontamination? 

Mr. DEATLEY. Well, the Washington Hospital Center, as I said 

previously, is the largest hospital in the national capital region. So, 

being the largest facility, having the busiest ER and the only adult 

burn unit, we fully expect that in incidences throughout the national capital region we will get a large percentage of that population coming to our facility. 

Ms. NORTON. Would your plan be to direct, to the extent possible, 

if ER One were to become fully operative, that such patients be 

brought to that facility as opposed to other facilities? 

Mr. DEATLEY. Well, we are not trying to advocate for taking patients away, so much as we are trying to be, as a facility, prepared 

for the unusually large number of patients that we would expect 

to see because of who we are and where we are located. 

ER One is all about taking a concept of what the ideal facility 

is to be designed like to now request funding to build that facility, 

to have that enhanced capability, while at the same time serving 

as a national model, a study place, if you will, for further developing scientific approaches to some of these ongoing problems. 

Ms. NORTON. With the Secretary, the first Secretary of HHS 

under President George W. Bush, I came to the Washington Hospital Center, sat with your personnel, and had a very impressive 

briefing of what ER One would look like and how it would operate. 

As I understood it, the Washington Hospital Center was prepared to invest considerable funds on its own into that center. 

Could you discuss that, please? 

Mr. DEATLEY. Yes, ma’am. I am not the one that is ultimately 

in charge of that design, but, from my perspective of being one of 

five directors of the institutes that constitute ER One, I know that 

the Washington Hospital Center had, particularly early on, spent 

significant sums of its own operating capital to fund an improvement in the emergency department itself and then, using funding 

that came from the city and from the Federal Government, to build 

what we now have as the ready room. 

And what we have built from that is additional funding to do the 

first and the second phase of the ER One project, which was to 

take a subject matter group of experts to define what should we be 

doing, how better could we be doing it. That was phase one. Then 

working with architects to design the facility capable of 

operationalizing those concepts. And that leads us up to this current phase three, where, with that additional funding to match 

what the Washington Hospital Center and MedStar Health is willing to commit, to build—— 

Ms. NORTON. If the funding were available, would you be prepared to start—with the design work having been done, as I hear 

your testimony, would you be prepared to start in building such a 

decontamination facility in the District of Columbia? 

Mr. DEATLEY. We would be anxious and quite willing to proceed 

as quickly as possible. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. DeAtley, would you, within 10 days, get to this 

Committee a record of the funds from Washington Hospital Center, 

non-Federal sources, District of Columbia, Washington Hospital 

66 

Center and other non-Federal sources that have already been committed to or would become committed if the Federal funds were 

available? 

Mr. DEATLEY. Yes, ma’am, we would be glad to. 

Ms. NORTON. Ms. Mathes, we understand that the Red Cross is 

indispensable. We have seen you operate so often, giving food and 

shelter. Do you give cash to victims of disasters, of natural disasters or, for that matter, other disasters? 

Ms. MATHES. We do provide assistance to family members to assist in their purchasing the kind of food and clothing and health 

and medical supplies they need. 

Ms. NORTON. What is the extent of your Federal funding in the 

District of Columbia? How much of your funds come from Federal 

sources, what percentage from private sources? 

Ms. MATHES. Virtually all of our funding comes from private 

sources. We are totally dependent upon people giving of their time 

and their money to make Red Cross services possible. 

We have applied a couple of times in the past few years for the 

Urban Area Security Initiatives funding and have been fortunate 

to receive some funding for equipment and supplies. But, otherwise, it is the people of this community who are making our services possible. 

Ms. NORTON. And is that in the event of a natural or man-made 

disaster as well? 

Ms. MATHES. Yes. 

Ms. NORTON. It is important to put that on the record, because 

people see the Red Cross on the job so often when there is a natural disaster such as the one we just had in North Dakota, Minnesota, Kentucky. And they just figure you are one of us. And it 

is important that the record know that is one of you; that is to say, 

that is the people of the United States of America. And we are 

grateful for those contributions. 

You have testified, Ms. Mathes, that there are approximately 55 

volunteers to each paid staff member in the national capital region. 

I don’t know how to evaluate that compared to other regions. Is it 

high or low compared with other metropolitan regions? 

Ms. MATHES. Thank you. We like it to be higher. Again, back to 

the important role a volunteer can play—— 

Ms. NORTON. How does it compare with New York, Los Angeles, 

Chicago, and the like, for example? 

Ms. MATHES. Madam Chairwoman, I am not certain of their percentages, their ratios. We find it very important to track that ratio; 

not all of our colleagues do. I would be happy to follow up and report back to you on it. 

Ms. NORTON. It would be very important for us to be able to say 

to our region how we compare with the other regions. You heard 

me name four other cities, which really means regions—San Francisco, Chicago, and what am I leaving out? New York. How could 

I? All of whom are in the top four. It would be important for us 

to know what the ratio of volunteers here is compared to there. 

Mr. DeAtley, there is a District of Columbia Health Care Coalition. Who are they? And who is responsible for calling that coalition into action? 

67 

Mr. DEATLEY. The coalition was created as a result of that HHS 

grant that I spoke about earlier. It is a combination of all of the 

city government agencies that have health care responsibilities, 

coupled with all of the other private-sector health care organizations. We have never seen such a coalition in my 36 years of working here in the city before December of 2007. 

Insofar as the action is concerned, it is present itself on a daily 

basis. By that I mean there is a duty officer, for example, that is 

standing watch, representing the coalition, working with—— 

Ms. NORTON. Is that a duty officer in every particular hospital? 

Mr. DEATLEY. No, ma’am. That is one duty officer. There is 13 

of us that volunteer to take this weekly tour of duty, if you will. 

Ms. NORTON. Rotating? 

Mr. DEATLEY. Rotating responsibility. There is a primary and a 

backup. 

There is an additional source of volunteers to—if an event were 

to happen in the city, we could activate depending upon the situation what we call our Health Care Coalition Response Team to 

work with that duty officer to support the District of Columbia, 

principally HSEMA and DOH, to deal with health care system delivery-related problems. 

But the core of the effort, quite candidly, is the Emergency Management Committee that is meeting every 2 weeks that volunteer 

committee members from all of the member organizations to do the 

development work, the policies, the procedures. We are right now 

beginning to plan a citywide exercise to be held in June, all in an 

effort to improve our preparedness. 

Ms. NORTON. Indeed, you presaged a question. I want to know 

if ER One has ever had a test-run of capabilities, or are you waiting for the funding? 

Mr. DEATLEY. No, ma’am. The ER One, the Washington Hospital 

Center stands ready to respond to an emergency right now. We 

have a decontamination capability. We train our personnel. We 

have the equipment to at least start that effort. So it is not about 

having no capability; we are talking about improving that capability. 

Ms. NORTON. If, indeed, there was some kind of contamination, 

how many people in the District of Columbia or region could you 

handle today? 

Mr. DEATLEY. One, I would like to reiterate that it would not be 

a single facility that would be successful. It needs to be a combination of facilities. 

But, in our particular case, particularly during what I will call 

prime-time business hours, up until 8 o’clock at night, we could 

process with our current staffing and equipment for at least a 3- 

hour period of time roughly 100 critical patients an hour and 200 

noncritical participants. That is the most that we could do. 

Lesser staffing, off-hours, then that would begin to drop off. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, does ER One assume that, in the event of an 

event involving contamination, that some hospitals at least, for example, you are located in northwest Washington, might be able, 

given how you share apparently and have your duty officer and the 

rest, might be able to direct, despite some capability on their own, 

that participants be taken to the larger capability at ER One? For 

68 

example, Howard University Hospital, which is close by; for that 

matter, Walter Reed, which is close by; some of the other hospitals 

perhaps. 

Does the existence of a very special hospital, with larger capacity 

than others, assume that there would be some capacity to take referrals from others in the event of a capacity rather than do what 

you do now, which is everybody is on his own? 

Mr. DEATLEY. We are working hard with D.C. Fire-EMS and 

their hazardous material team officials for a situation like you described, to try and ensure that facilities are not brought patients 

in excess of their current capability. 

Would we at the Hospital Center expect for an incident in the 

city to receive more patients than the other hospitals? That is entirely plausible, and we are trying to prepare for that possibility, 

most definitely. 

What I would like to reiterate, the strength of the system is not 

having one that can do it all. It is the sum of the parts that we 

need to continue to struggle to improve upon. 

Ms. NORTON. That is a very important point. But I ask this question because, to the extent that the Federal Government is supposed to be paying for a central facility, which is a facility for demonstrating to the entire Nation and a facility for the District of Columbia and the region, the Congress is likely to expect some specialization if Federal money is going into such an activity. But fully 

understanding precisely what you said, we would also expect everybody to be able to handle patients as they receive them. 

Mr. DEATLEY. If I may follow up on that comment, while we are 

talking about decontamination as one aspect, I would also point out 

that the ER One project, the concept design is about treating patients of a variety of different problem sets, whether it would be 

trauma from an explosion, biologic in nature, as well as contamination from a chemical or radiologic incident. 

Ms. NORTON. That is an important point, as well. On the other 

hand, it is a contamination point that I think would most interest 

the Federal Government. Because there you would have to have 

not only the people who do what you do every day—look, we have 

a lot of gun trauma. If we had an explosion, somebody who works 

in a trauma emergency room would know how to handle that. 

But I am not certain that the same capability throughout the region would exist if some unknown substance—first of all, it would 

be unknown. Secondly, it would be dispersed around the region and 

then have everybody trying to figure out what it is, what personnel 

would be best suited to handle that kind of contamination. That is 

the kind of expertise that I believe we are looking for in ER One. 

Mr. DEATLEY. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. One final question. The, perhaps, most pathetic, 

most tragic part of Katrina had to do with people who could not 

take care of themselves, and these were patients, trauma patients 

who were in hospitals. 

I would like to ask if the Red Cross has any coordinator for persons with disability. I am not dealing with hospitals now; that, I 

have to assume, the hospitals understood. But the region has very 

generous programs for dealing with people with disabilities. How 

69 

would the Red Cross handle large numbers of people with various 

kinds of disabilities? 

We have everything from Gallaudet, where people are hard of 

hearing or cannot hear at all, sometimes cannot speak; to people 

who are in group homes; to children who go to special schools to 

get special education. This is a region that has many special facilities for disabled people. 

How would the Red Cross handle an event with so many widely 

dispersed people with disabilities across the region? 

Ms. MATHES. Excellent question. Madam Chairwoman, we work 

closely with partners who specialize in working with people of special needs and disabilities. We engage them in planning efforts and 

in the execution of them. So we would count on our close working 

partnerships with our colleagues in the government, as well as our 

nonprofit colleagues, who work closely with people with special 

needs and disabilities. 

We work, for example, with the National Organization on Disability to anticipate the needs of people with special needs and disabilities in coming into shelters. We have acquired quite a bit of 

equipment specifically to accommodate people with special needs; 

also children, special equipment for children, for sheltering. 

We have worked with partner organizations to mount preparedness efforts, preparedness education efforts, to assist with what we 

have talked about earlier today in terms of helping families develop 

emergency preparedness plans. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, staff tells me, Mr. Sarubbi, that, after 

Katrina, headquarters now has a disability coordinator by statute. 

That is one of the things we learned from Katrina. Is there a disability coordinator in this region and, to your knowledge, in other 

regions? 

Mr. SARUBBI. There is a disability coordinator at the national 

level. Each of the FEMA regions do not have a disability coordinator. But we work closely, similar as to what my Red Cross colleague indicated, with our partners in helping to assess the evacuation and sheltering of people with special needs, particularly special medical needs. 

For example, we have been working on a project here, the last 

2 1/2 years, called the gap analysis, where the scenario would be 

a Category 3 hurricane. How would we deal with the evacuation of 

people with special medical needs? We have been looking at ways 

of enhancing that capability, also working closely with our partners 

at HHS. 

It is not an issue that has been resolved as of yet. There is still 

much work to be done in that area. But it is certainly one of our 

focuses, particularly here in Region III, in the national capital region, as well as for a hurricane scenario in the Hampton Roads 

area, which is an area that is extremely vulnerable to a direct hit 

by a hurricane and, because of the geography of the area, would 

be particularly difficult in evacuating citizens, particularly citizens 

or people with special medical needs. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Sarubbi. 

May I ask that, of all of the—one of the things that we had testimony here today was about the use of July 4th as a real-time exerVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:32 Oct 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\48880 JASON
70 

cise. And something we would like to see in this region is more 

real-time exercises. 

But I have to ask you that, of all—you know, for the average person, which might be a quick learner, we have seen very good results when people are told what to do, who have all of their capabilities. Without real-time exercises, perhaps they could get 

through. 

I would ask, in this region, that you consider real-time exercises 

for people with disabilities. They are all over the region. They are 

often away from their home base. Without real-time exercises, I 

have no confidence that a disabled person of whatever disability 

would necessarily be prepared, as any able-bodied person might, to 

simply do what the person is instructed to do, where sign language 

may be necessary, where the person could be handicapped in other 

ways. 

So I would ask FEMA, through your disability coordinator established by statute after Hurricane Katrina, to consider real-time exercises throughout the United States, of course, but particularly in 

this region, where we are more vulnerable than most other regions. 

Mr. SARUBBI. I will certainly do that, Madam Chairman. And, as 

I indicated earlier, that is an area of emphasis for us, to continue 

to work with people with special medical needs. And, certainly, 

having real-time exercises, I think, is an important step in that direction. Thank you. 

Ms. NORTON. I know that all of you have waited a very long time 

for us to testify and then to undergo my cross-examination, as it 

were. But all I am trying to do is to get on the record what we need 

to know in order to respond to your needs. 

I have found the testimony of each and every one of you invaluable. And may I thank you, first of all, for your great patience in 

waiting so long, but most of all for your very valuable testimony. 

Thank you very much. 

And this hearing is finally at an end. 

[Whereupon, at 2:20 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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