MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2021 ME	39

Docket: SRP-20-307

Argued: June	3,	2021

Decided: July	22,	2021

Panel: MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY,	HORTON,	and	CONNORS,	JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v.

DUSTAN	J.	BENTLEY

HORTON,	J.

[¶1]	 Dustan	 J.	 Bentley	 appeals	 from	 a	 sentence	 of	 forty	 years	 of	

imprisonment	 entered	 by	 the	 trial court (York	 County,	 Douglas,	 J.) after	

Bentley’s	 guilty	 plea	 to	 murder,	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 § 201(1)(A) (2021).	 Because	

Bentley	has	not	identified	any	misapplication	of	principle or	abuse	of	discretion	

in	either	the	court’s	sentencing	analysis or	its	exercise of	its	sentencing	power,	

we	affirm	the	sentence.

I.	 BACKGROUND

A. Facts

[¶2]		The	following	undisputed	facts	are	drawn	from	the	State’s	summary	

of	the	evidence	that	it	would	have	presented	had	the	matter	proceeded	to	trial.		

See M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	11(b)(3),	(e);	State	v.	Lord,	2019	ME	82,	¶	3,	208	A.3d	781.
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[¶3]	 	 On	 March	 18,	 2019,	 at	 approximately	 10:30	 p.m., several	 Old

Orchard Beach	police	officers	were	dispatched	to	the	home	shared	by Bentley,	

age	thirty,	and	the	victim,	age	sixty-five.		The	dispatch	was	in	response	to	a	call	

from	 Bentley’s	 mother,	 who claimed	 that	 Bentley	 had	 called	 her	 roughly	

forty-five	minutes	 earlier and	 told	 her	 that	 he	had	 stabbed	 his	 roommate	 to	

death.		Upon	arriving at the	apartment building,	one	officer saw	a car	backed	up	

to	the	door	of	Bentley’s	apartment	with	its	trunk	door	open	and	the	trunk	lined	

with	 a	 shower	 curtain.	 	 The	 officers	 found Bentley	 in	 the	 doorway	 of	 the	

apartment	with	one	end	of	a	ratchet	strap	tied	around	him.		The	other	end	of	

the	strap	was	tied	around	the	victim’s	body.

[¶4]		According	to	an	autopsy	conducted	the	next	day,	the	victim	suffered	

twenty-five	 to	 thirty	 sharp	 knife	wounds.	 	 The	medical	 examiner	 also	 found	

evidence	of	blunt	force	trauma	to	the	victim’s	head,	neck,	and	torso.		The	victim	

suffered	 breaks	 or	 fractures	 to	 his	 nose,	 neck	 bone,	 hyoid	 bone,	 sternum,	

several	 ribs,	 and	 fingers	 on	 both	 hands.	 	 In	 addition,	 the	 medical	 examiner	

found	hemorrhaging	in	the	front	of	the	victim’s	neck	caused	by	a	USB	cord	that	

Bentley	used	to	strangle	the	victim.		The	medical	examiner	determined	that	the	

death	was	caused	by	 the	multiple	blunt	 force	 traumas,	 the	stab	wounds,	and	

strangulation.
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B. Procedural	History

[¶5]	 	 A	 grand	 jury	 indicted	 Bentley	 on	 one	 count	 of intentional	 or	

knowing	 murder	 in	 violation	 of	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 201(1)(A).	 	 The	 court	 held	 a

hearing	pursuant	to	M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	11 at	which	Bentley	pleaded	guilty	to	the	

charge.	 	 Following	 its	 offer	 of	 proof,	 the	 State	 informed	 the	 court that, in	

exchange	 for	 Bentley’s	 guilty	 plea,	 the	 State	 would	 recommend	 a	 sentence	

between	the	statutory	minimum	of	twenty-five	years	and	a	cap	of	forty	years	of	

imprisonment.	 	 The	 court	 accepted	 the	 plea	 and	 found	 Bentley guilty	 of	

intentional	or	knowing	murder.

[¶6]	 	At	 Bentley’s	 sentencing hearing,	the	 State	 recommended	 a	 basic	

sentence	of	fifty	years	with	the	final	sentence	of	forty	years	in	accordance	with	

the	cap	agreed	upon	by	the	parties	in	the	plea.		Bentley	requested	that	the	court	

set	a	basic	sentence	of	twenty-five	years	and	a	final	sentence	of	twenty-eight	

years.	 	 Following	 both	 parties’	 presentations,	 the	 court	 made	 oral	 findings	

regarding	Bentley’s	commission	of	the	offense. The	court	also	stated	that	it	was	

“supposed	to	consider	in	setting	a	basic sentence	other	comparable	cases.”

[¶7]		The	court	cited	as	guides three	different	murder	cases,	all	of	which	

involved	 sentences	 entered	 after	 trials.	 	 Based	 on	 its	 findings	 and	 the	

comparable	cases,	the	court	set the	basic	sentence	at fifty	to	fifty-five	years	of	
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imprisonment.		The	court	then	weighed the	aggravating	and	mitigating	factors

specific	 to	 the	 circumstances	 of	 the	 case.	 	 It concluded	 that	 the	 mitigating	

factors—in	 particular,	 that Bentley took responsibility	 for	 his	 actions	 by	

pleading	guilty—outweighed	the	aggravating	factors	and	therefore	supported

a	sentence	shorter	than the	basic	sentence. The	court	set	the	final	sentence	at	

forty	years	of	imprisonment.

[¶8]		Bentley	 filed	an	application	 for	leave	 to	appeal	 the	sentence. See

15 M.R.S.	§	2151 (2021);	M.R.	App.	P.	20.		The	Sentence	Review	Panel	granted	

Bentley’s	 request.	 	 See	 M.R.	 App.	 P.	 20(g);	 State	 v.	 Bentley,	 No. SRP-20-307	

(Me. Sent.	Rev.	Panel	Dec. 22,	2020).

II.		DISCUSSION

[¶9]		Bentley	argues	that	the	trial	court	erred	by considering	sentences	

imposed	 in comparable	 cases	 in imposing	 a	 sentence	 of	 forty years of

imprisonment.		Specifically,	he	cites	to State	v.	Diana,	2014	ME	45,	89	A.3d	132,	

for	the	proposition	that	the	court	denied	Bentley “an	individualized	sentence”	

by	relying	on	comparable	cases	to	determine	an	appropriate	sentence.
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A. Sentencing	Procedure

[¶10]		In	a	murder	case,	the	sentencing	court	employs	a	two-step	process.		

17-A M.R.S.	§	1252-C (2018);1 State	v.	Gaston,	2021	ME	25,	¶	33,	250 A.3d	137.		

In	the	first	step,	“the	court	determines	the	basic	term	of	imprisonment	based	

on	an	objective	consideration	of	 the	particular nature	and	seriousness	of	 the	

crime.”		Gaston,	2021	ME	25,	¶	33, 250 A.3d	137	(quotation	marks	omitted).		In	

the	second	 step,	“the	court	determines	 the	maximum	period	of	incarceration	

based	on	all	other	relevant	sentencing	factors,	both	aggravating	and	mitigating,	

appropriate	 to	 that	 case,	 including	 the	 character	 of	 the	 offender	 and	 the	

offender’s	 criminal	 history,	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 offense	 on	 the	 victim[,] and	 the	

protection	of	 the	public	interest.”		Id. (quotation	marks	omitted).		We review	

the	determination	of	the	basic	sentence	(1)	de	novo	for	misapplication	of	legal	

principles,	 15	 M.R.S.	 § 2155 (2021); State	 v.	 Hayden,	 2014	 ME	 31,	 ¶	 17,	

86 A.3d 1221, and	(2)	for	“an	abuse	of	the	court’s	sentencing	power,”	State	v.	

Nichols,	2013	ME	71,	¶	13,	72 A.3d	503.

[¶11]		The	Legislature	has	articulated	the	goals	of	sentencing, which	are,	

in	 part,	 to	 create consistency	 among	 sentences	 for	 similar	 offenses	 while	

 1		Title	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1252-C	(2018)	has	since	been	repealed	and	replaced, but	both	versions	of	the	

sentencing	 statute	 set	 out	 the	 same	 steps.	 P.L.	 2019,	 ch. 113,	 §§	 A-1,	 A-2	 (emergency,	 effective	

May 16, 2019)	(codified	at	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1602	(2021)).
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encouraging individualization of	each	sentence	based	on	circumstances	specific	

to	the	case	and	the	defendant.		See 17-A	M.R.S.	§	1151(5),	(6)(2018).

2		The	steps	

in	the	sentencing	process	guide	the	court	in	furthering	both	the	goal	of	systemic	

consistency	in	sentencing	and	 the	goal	of	imposing	a	sentence	 that	considers	

the	defendant	as	an	individual	human	being.		See	17-A	§ 1602(1),	(2);	Nichols,	

2013	 ME	 71,	 ¶	 14,	 72	 A.3d	 503.	 	Recognizing	 the	 challenge	 a	 court	 faces	 in	

reconciling	 these	 disparate	 sentencing	 goals,	 we	 afford	 the	 court significant	

leeway	in	what	factors	it	may	consider	and	the	weight	any	given factor	is	due	

when	determining	a	sentence.		See	State	v.	Hamel,	2013	ME	16,	¶	8,	60	A.3d	783	

(“[T]he	selection	for	appropriate	emphasis	among	the[] disparate	purposes	[of	

sentencing	 goals]	 rests	 in	 the	 discretion	 of	 the	 court.” (quotation	 marks	

omitted)).

B. Consideration	of	Comparable	Cases

[¶12]		Bentley	bases	his	claim	of	legal	error	on	the	court’s	statement	that	

it	“is	supposed	to	consider in	setting	a	basic	sentence	other	comparable	cases.”		

He	argues	that	reliance	on	comparable cases	constitutes	a	misreading	of	case	

law,	see	Diana,	2014	ME	45,	¶	41,	89 A.3d	132,	and	that	the	facts	of	the	cases	on	

 2		Title	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1151	(2018)	has	also	been	repealed	and	replaced.		See	P.L.	2019,	ch.	113,	

§ A-1,	(emergency,	effective	May 16, 2019)	(codified	at	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1501 (2021).		Both	versions	of	

the	statute	set	out	the	same	sentencing	goals.
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which	the	court	relied	in	determining	the	basic	sentence	were	so	different	from	

the	facts	here	that	he	was	denied	an	individualized	sentence.		He	points	out that	

all of	 those	 cases	 involved	 sentences	 imposed	 following convictions entered	

after	trials.

[¶13]	 	Bentley’s	 first	 argument	 is based	 on a	 misinterpretation	 of	 our	

precedent	 regarding the use	 of	 comparable	 cases	 at	 sentencing.	 “[I]t	 is	

permissible for	 the	sentencing	court	 to	consider	comparable	sentences	at	 the	

first	 step	 if	 appropriate,	 [although]	 neither	 the	 statute	 nor	 our case	 law	

mandate	it.”		Nichols,	2013	ME	71,	¶	20,	72	A.3d	503 (emphasis	added).		Indeed,	

trial	 courts	 have	 “wide	 discretion	 in	 determining	 the	 sources	 and	 types	 of	

information	to	consider	when	imposing	a	sentence.”		Reese,	2010	ME 30,	¶	28,	

991	A.2d	806.		Relying	on	comparable	cases	is	undoubtedly	consistent	with	our	

precedent	 and	 the	 goals	 of	 sentencing	 laid	 out	 by	 the	 Legislature.	 	 See	 id.;	

17-A M.R.S.	§	1501.

[¶14]		Contrary	to	Bentley’s assertions,	the	court’s	statement	that	it	was	

“supposed	to	consider”	comparable	cases	does	not	in	itself	justify	vacating	the	

sentence,	in	light	of the	permissive	nature	of	our instructions	for	trial	courts	in	

Diana,	 2014 ME	 45,	 ¶	 41,	 89	 A.3d	 132, and	 in Nichols,	 2013 ME	 71,	 ¶	 20,	

72 A.3d 503.	 	 Although	 the	 court	 was	 not	 required	 to	 consider	 comparable	
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cases,	see Diana,	2014 ME 45,	¶	41,	89 A.3d	132,	the	court	correctly	applied

sentencing	 principles	 at	 both	 steps of	 the	 sentencing	 analysis.	 	 The	 court	

carefully	 considered	 both	 objective	 and	 subjective	 factors	 and	 imposed a	

sentence	 consistent	 with	 the	 cap	 agreed	 upon	 by	 the	 parties	 in	 the	 plea	

agreement.		See Gaston,	2021	ME	25, ¶	33, 250 A.3d	137.

[¶15]		Bentley’s	argument	that	the	court	should	not	have	relied	in	the	first	

step	of	the	sentencing	analysis	upon	cases	where	sentences	were	imposed	after	

a	 trial is	 unconvincing.	 	 The	 court	 began	 the	 first	 step of	 the	 analysis	 by	

discussing	 the	 details	 specific	 to	 this	 murder	 that	 spoke	 to	 its	 “nature	 and	

seriousness.”	 	 Id. (quotation	 marks	 omitted).	 	 Those	 details	 included	 the	

“significant	disparity	in height,	 age,	weight	and	physical	 vitality	between	 the

victim	and	[Bentley]”; the	“savage”	nature	of	Bentley’s	attack	on	the	victim; and	

Bentley’s	 attempt	 to	 conceal	 the	 crime	 from	 the	 police.	 	 It	 was	 only	 after	

considering	 these	specific	 factors	 that	 the	court	discussed	comparable	cases.		

This	 discussion	 is	 not	 evidence	 that	 the	 court	 deprived	 Bentley	 of	 an	

individualized	 sentence.	 	 Rather,	 the purpose	 of	 the court’s	 analysis	 was	 to	

place	Bentley’s	crime,	as	it	was	committed,	at	a	point	on	the	“continuum	for	the	

type	 of	criminal	conduct	involved.”		See	State	v.	Schofield,	2006	ME	101,	¶ 9,	

904 A.2d	409 (quotation	marks	omitted).
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[¶16]	 	The	 first	 step	in	 sentencing	 emphasizes	 the	 goal	 of	 consistency	

more	than	the	second	step,	which	focuses on	individualization	of	the	sentence,	

based	 on,	 among	 other	 factors, the	 defendant’s	 unique	 life history	 and the	

impact	of	the	crime	on	the victim.		See	id. ¶¶	9,	13.		It	follows	that, at the	first	

step, a sentencing	court	may	consider	comparable	cases	when	engaging	in an	

objective	consideration	of	the	“nature	and	seriousness” of	the	crime for	which	

the	sentence	is	being	imposed.		Nichols,	2013	ME	71,	¶¶ 12,	14, 20,	72	A.3d	503

(quotation	 marks	 omitted).	 	The	 purpose	 of	 the	 comparison	 is	 to	 assign the	

crime	 a	 basic	 sentence	 considering	 the range of	 sentences	 that	 have	 been	

imposed	 in	 cases	 involving	 similar	 crimes	 committed	 under	 similar	

circumstances.		See	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1602(1)(A).	 Although	 the	comparison	may	

take	into	account	whether	a	comparable	sentence	resulted	from	a	plea	or	a	trial,	

that	 the	comparable	sentences	were	imposed	after	 trial	did	not	preclude	 the	

court	 from	 considering	 them	 in	 determining	 a	 basic	 sentence	 for	 Bentley’s	

crime	within	 the	 sentencing	 range	 for	murder	 of	 twenty-five	 years	 to	life	in	

prison.

[¶17]		At	the	second	step	of	the	sentencing	process,	the	court	weighed	the	

individualized	aggravating	and	mitigating	factors	in	detail	when	it	determined	

the	maximum	sentence.		See Schofield,	2006	ME	101,	¶	13,	904	A.2d	409.	In	fact,	
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the court imposed	 a	 sentence	 shorter	 than	 its	 basic	 sentence	 based	 on	 its	

review	of	Bentley’s	background	and	choice	to	plead	guilty	rather	than	subject	

the	 victim’s	 family	 to a trial.	 	 Bentley’s	 argument	 that	 he	 was	 denied	 an	

individualized	sentence	is	simply	not	reflected	anywhere	in	the	record.		At	no	

point	did	the	court	depart from	sentencing	principles	or	abuse	its	discretion	in	

coming	to	or	issuing	its	sentence.		See	Diana, 2014 ME 45,	¶	37,	89	A.3d	132.

The	entry	is:

Sentence	affirmed.

Joseph	 Mekonis,	 Esq. (orally),	 Law	 Office	 of	 Joseph	 Mekonis,	 P.A.,	 Saco,	 for	

appellant	Dustan	J.	Bentley

Aaron	 M.	 Frey,	 Attorney	 General,	 and	 Donald	W.	 Macomber,	 Asst.	 Atty.	 Gen.

(orally), Office	of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

York	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR-2019-213

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY