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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 42109

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL J. CULLEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 585

Filed: August 6, 2015

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Payette County. Hon. Thomas J. Ryan, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and sentence for second degree murder, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Reed P. Anderson, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

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GUTIERREZ, Judge

Michael J. Culley appeals from his judgment of conviction after he pled guilty to second 

degree murder. On appeal, he contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He also argues that his sentence is excessive. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm. 

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

This appeal arises out of the homicide of Elizabeth “Libby” Baune (the victim). At the 

time of her death, the victim was living in a house with her cousin (Culley’s mother), Culley, and 

the victim’s boyfriend. One night in November 2012, Culley’s mother discovered the body of 

the victim on the floor of a room with a knife sticking out of her head. An autopsy later revealed 

that the victim had twenty-nine stab wounds, including eleven wounds in her head. Two days 
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after the homicide, police arrested Culley, and Culley implicated himself and a co-defendant in 

the death of the victim.1

 According to Culley’s statements to the police, Culley and his codefendant entered the house to steal money or financial transaction cards from the victim in order 

to acquire methamphetamine.

Culley was charged by indictment with first degree murder, grand theft by receiving or 

possessing stolen property, and burglary. As part of a plea agreement, the State later filed an 

amended indictment charging Culley with second degree murder, grand theft, and burglary. At 

the change of plea hearing, the State acknowledged that it had agreed to dismiss the grand theft 

and burglary counts, and Culley pled guilty to second degree murder. At that hearing, Culley 

provided a factual basis for the plea. He explained that he and his co-defendant went over to the 

house where the victim was staying to rob the victim. According to Culley, as he and the codefendant were sneaking into the house, the victim woke up and yelled at the co-defendant. The 

co-defendant yelled back and stabbed the victim. The co-defendant then handed Culley the knife 

and said, “You’re either with me or you’re not with me.” Culley then stabbed the victim, 

recalling that he stabbed her in the back and chest. But according to a letter Culley later wrote to 

his grandfather, he also “drove the knife into her brain so she would not suffer.” 

Months after the presentence investigation report was prepared, but prior to sentencing, 

Culley filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 33 motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Culley included an 

affidavit with his motion and later filed another affidavit explaining why he was seeking to 

withdraw his plea. According to Culley, he was threatened with injury by an inmate and was 

actually struck by an inmate worker. Further, Culley explained that his medication had changed 

and that he was remembering more facts of the crime such that the facts would show he was not 

guilty. The district court conducted a hearing on this motion, hearing testimony from the Payette 

County jail commander and a psychologist who had visited with Culley after his guilty plea. The 

district court issued a memorandum decision denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, 

finding that Culley had not shown a just reason for withdrawing the plea. The case proceeded to 

 1 Culley also initially implicated the co-defendant’s uncle in the homicide, but it appears 

that the co-defendant’s uncle was not involved in the crime.
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sentencing, where Cully was sentenced to a unified life sentence, with forty-five years 

determinate.2

 Culley appeals.

II.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Culley argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Specifically, Culley contends that he provided just reason 

for withdrawing his plea because his plea was not entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently due to threats. Culley also asserts that he provided just reason for withdrawing his 

plea because of a change in medication. 

In a motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing, a defendant must demonstrate a 

just reason for withdrawing the plea. I.C.R. 33(c); State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 222, 177 P.3d 

966, 969 (2008). We have previously explained that a just reason is “a plausible reason to justify 

the withdrawal.” State v. Rose, 122 Idaho 555, 559, 835 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Ct. App. 1992). The 

decision to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the sound discretion of the trial 

court. State v. Boehm, 158 Idaho 294, 302, 346 P.3d 311, 319 (Ct. App. 2015). In considering 

whether to grant the motion, the trial court may “temper its liberality by weighing the 

defendant’s apparent motive” if the defendant has learned the content of the presentence report 

or has received other information about the probable sentence. State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 

647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 2004).

Because the trial court must exercise discretion in deciding whether to grant a motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea, we review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Boehm, 

158 Idaho at 302-03, 346 P.3d at 319-20. When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed 

on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the 

lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted 

within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to 

the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise 

of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). 

Culley asserts that his guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 

entered because Culley was threatened by other inmates. According to Culley’s affidavits, 

 2 Culley’s co-defendant also received a unified life sentence, with forty-five years 

determinate. 
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another jail inmate threatened that Culley would suffer physical harm if he testified against the 

co-defendant and did not take a plea deal. Additionally, Culley explained that an inmate worker 

struck him while he was in jail, causing a laceration and breaking Culley’s glasses. The district 

court found the first assertion not credible and then determined that the evidence as to the inmate 

worker incident did not support a finding that the incident was related to this case.

As for the alleged threat by an inmate, the jail commander confirmed that the inmate who 

allegedly threatened Culley was in the same cell as Culley’s co-defendant, but the jail 

commander testified that the inmate went to prison more than five months prior to Culley’s 

guilty plea. Thus, as the district court appropriately determined, “[i]t is hard to believe that any 

threat made by [the inmate] over five months earlier continued to haunt [Culley].” Moreover, 

Culley’s co-defendant pled guilty more than a month before Culley did, and therefore the 

condition precedent to the threat--that Culley testify against his co-defendant--would never 

occur. As for the incident involving the inmate worker, the district court correctly found that 

Culley did not present any evidence that linked the incident to his guilty plea. Incidentally, the 

jail commander testified that it was his opinion, based on a video of the incident, that Culley 

“aggressed” the inmate worker, provoking the inmate worker to hit Culley. Thus, the alleged 

threats (and actual violence) did not provide just reason to withdraw the guilty plea.

Culley also explained in his affidavits that since he entered his guilty plea, his 

medications have changed and now he remembers more facts of the case that he believes will 

show that he is not guilty of the crimes charged. After a psychologist testified concerning the 

psychologist’s visits with Culley, the district court determined that the evidence did not show 

that the medication Culley was taking impacted his ability to enter a knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary plea. 

Here, the psychologist testified that in meetings prior to the change of medication, 

Culley’s thinking was logical and coherent. But after the change in medication,3 the 

psychologist detailed that even though Culley had an improved memory component, he at times 

expressed “delusional or magical sort of thinking,” noting further that Culley’s thought processes 

“were not linear, they were not analytical.” The district court’s factual finding, that Culley’s 

mental condition is less coherent after the change of medicine, is supported by substantial 

 3 The psychologist was unaware of what medicine Culley was on the day of his guilty plea, 

because the psychologist did not meet with Culley until after the guilty plea had been entered. 
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evidence in the record. Moreover, the district court also correctly concluded that the evidence 

did not support a conclusion that the medicine Culley was taking on the day of his guilty plea 

had any impact on his ability to enter a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea. Finally, 

Culley did not present any evidence that would have contradicted his testimony at the guilty plea 

hearing concerning the factual basis he provided. Thus, Culley did not provide a just reason for 

withdrawing his plea due to his change in medication. 

Culley also contends that his sentence for second degree murder is excessive; he was 

sentenced to a unified life sentence with forty-five years determinate. A defendant convicted of 

second degree murder must be sentenced to a unified sentence of ten years or more, and may be 

sentenced to a unified life sentence. Idaho Code § 18-4004. Sentencing is a matter for the trial 

court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the 

reasonableness of the sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. See State v. 

Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 

Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 

650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the 

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). The 

issue before this Court is not whether the sentence is one that we would have imposed, but 

whether the sentence is plainly excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Toohill, 103 

Idaho at 568, 650 P.2d at 710. If reasonable minds might differ as to whether the sentence is 

excessive, we are not free to substitute our view for that of the district court. Id. Applying these 

standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court 

abused its discretion.

III.

CONCLUSION

The district court exercised sound judicial discretion in considering Culley’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea, and the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Culley’s motion. 

Culley’s asserted reasons for withdrawing the guilty plea did not amount to just reason. Finally, 

Culley’s sentence is not excessive, and hence does not amount to an abuse of discretion. 

Therefore, Culley’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.

Chief Judge MELANSON and Judge GRATTON CONCUR.