Transformation for 

Disaster Relief 

Developing a Hastily Formed Network 

During Operation Vigilant Relief

Case Studies in National Security Transformation 

Number 2 

John M. Epperly 

December 2006 

Sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

Forces Transformation and Resources 

Prepared by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy 
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official 

policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, the 

Virginia Army National Guard or the U.S. Government. All information and sources for 

this paper were drawn from unclassified materials. 

LTC John M. Epperly is currently the battalion commander for 3-116th Infantry, 1st 

Brigade Combat Team, 29th Infantry Division (Light), Virginia Army National Guard. 

He commanded 2-116 Infantry during Operation Vigilant Relief in Mississippi in the 

wake of Hurricane Katrina. LTC Epperly is a 1989 graduate of the United States Military 

Academy at West Point, NY, and holds an MBA in Finance from Drexel 

University. He served several tours on active duty as an armor and cavalry officer, 

primarily with 10th Cavalry and 70th Armor. In his civilian role, he is the general 

manager of Innovative Concepts, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Herley Industries, 

Inc. Innovative Concepts is an embedded software systems company that provides 

datalink communications to the U.S. military and first responder community, as well as 

numerous international clients. 

ii
Introduction 

The purpose of this case study is to facilitate the analysis of the role and effects of 

network-centric operations during the National Guard’s initial response to Hurricane 

Katrina, which made landfall in Louisiana August 29, 2005. The study explores the 

problem of establishing a hastily formed network during a complex humanitarian disaster 

scenario by focusing on the difficulties of establishing a network at the rifle battalion 

level during Operation Vigilant Relief. In particular, the study focuses on those operations 

along the Mississippi Gulf Coast between September 6 and October 1, 2005 conducted by 

the Virginia Army National Guard’s 2nd Battalion, 116th Infantry, part of the 1st Brigade 

Combat Team of the 29th Infantry Division (Light). 2-116th Infantry was designated as 

Task Force (TF) Stonewall prior to its deployment to Mississippi. A sister National 

Guard task force from Virginia designated TF Cardinal was deployed simultaneously to 

the Louisiana area of operations (AO). While both units eventually established 

operational networks, the initial stages offer valuable lessons on what to expect during a 

complex humanitarian disaster (CHD)—especially in terms of communication networks 

and the attendant effect on continuity of operations. By reviewing the case study, future 

policymakers as well as civilian and military leadership will have a better frame of 

reference for solving communication problems encountered during a CHD and also 

potential solutions for similar incidents.

Strategic Situation, Background, and Event Significance 

On August 27, 2005, two days before Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the U.S. Gulf 

Coast, President Bush declared a state of emergency for Louisiana, Mississippi, and 

Alabama. The resulting evacuation orders from local and state authorities affected over 

one million people, many in hard to access rural areas. Prior to landfall, 4,000 National 

Guard soldiers had been pre-positioned in Louisiana and 2,500 in Mississippi to shorten 

response time. 1 Despite the precautionary measures, many troops were not available 

when needed. Significant portions of the 155th Brigade Combat Team from Mississippi 

and 256th Brigade Combat Team from Louisiana were deployed to Iraq when Katrina 

struck. This reduced the number of troops available to the governors of those heavily 

damaged states.2 While the states were left with fewer home units, several Emergency 

Management Assistance Compacts (EMACs) were in place between most of the Gulf 

Coast states. The EMACs were essentially mutual aid agreements between the state 

governors allowing the National Guard assets from one state to be used in another state 

 

1

 LTG H. Steven Blum Interview, “Defense Department Briefing on Ongoing National Guard Response to 

Hurricane Katrina Transcript,” September 3, 2005. Available online at 

<http://www.dod.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050903-3850.html>.

2

 Government Accounting Office, “Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Need to Guide the 

Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters,” GAO Report GAO-06-808T. Statement for the 

Record to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives, May 25, 2006, 7. 

 

1
without federalization.3

 These EMACs allowed for rapid reinforcement of National 

Guard units in Mississippi and Louisiana by units in contiguous states. Unfortunately, 

most non-contiguous states did not have EMACs established with Mississippi and 

Louisiana. Previous disasters, including Hurricane Camille, had been handled by the 

combined efforts of Gulf Coast states with occasional federal assistance. Katrina, of 

course, was different. Due to the scale of the Katrina disaster and the required response, 

EMACs eventually were developed with every state in the union to allow units from all 

states to participate in the incident response. Such an EMAC allowed my battalion (2-

116th Infantry) to be deployed from Virginia to the Mississippi AO. 

At 0600 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall 

on the Gulf Coast of the United States near Buras-Triumph, Louisiana. It was the 

strongest Gulf hurricane and the fourth-strongest Atlantic hurricane recorded to that date, 

and the deadliest storm to affect the U.S. mainland since 1928. Katrina may have been 

the largest hurricane of its strength to approach the United States in recorded history; it 

caused devastation over 100 miles from the storm center.4

The effects of the hurricane were horrific. Many of the levees protecting New Orleans 

were breached and the city flooded, and the city was completely incapacitated from the 

resulting turmoil and flood damage. Beyond the city, nearly 200 miles of coastline were 

devastated in three states. Katrina caused roughly $75 billion in damages (in 2005 

dollars), making it the most costly hurricane in U.S. history. Additionally, Hurricane 

Katrina was blamed for 1,836 deaths in the affected region.5 To deal with this event, the 

National Guard eventually deployed more than 50,000 troops from 49 states and four 

territories in a little over three weeks, not to mention thousands of tons of supplies.6 The 

response was the largest domestic deployment of the National Guard in U.S. history. 

TF Stonewall Deploys 

My unit, 2-116th Infantry, was put on alert at 8 p.m. EDT, Saturday, September 3, 2005, 

over the Labor Day weekend. The alert was sent from the Virginia National Guard Joint 

Operation Center (JOC) at Fort Pickett, Virginia, to all affected units notifying us to 

prepare for a possible deployment. The alert effectively functioned as a warning, 

allowing units to prepare for mobilization. The alert also gave us the general parameters 

of the mission we would likely receive. This information was distributed in what is called 

a Warning Order (WARNO). The alert was preceded by the initial development of an 

EMAC between Virginia and Mississippi, which meant that Mississippi was agreeing to 

fund the Virginia troops ... at least initially. The alert was followed by mobilization 

 

3

 FEMA, “Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) Operations,” Final Pre-Course Reading 

Assignment. FEMA Emergency Management Institute, May 2005, 1-2. Available online at 

<http://training.fema.gov/EMIweb/downloads/EMAC_Full_Precourse_04_14_05.pdf>. 4

 Wikipedia, “Hurricane Katrina,” 2005. Available online at 

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane_Katrina>. 

5

 Ibid.

6

 Lou Dolinar, “Katrina: What the Media Missed,” Real Clear Politics, May 23, 2006. Available online at 

<http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/05/katrina_what_the_media_missed.html>. 

2
orders at 4 p.m. EDT Sunday, September 4, which allowed for a recall of troops into local 

armories.7

 The deployment order called for a troop and equipment tasking of 250 

Virginia Guardsmen and 34 vehicles of varying types.8 The order also called for the main 

body of troops to deploy by air no later than 3 p.m. EDT September 6. The ground 

vehicle convoy was to conduct a 1,300 mile road march and conduct a link-up with the 

main body at Camp Shelby in Mississippi.9 

The advance party arrived by air in Jackson, Mississippi, September 6 at 11 a.m. EDT, 43 

hours after mobilization, with roughly two tons of supplies and equipment. The main 

body arrived some seven hours later.10 Upon arrival, the task force was assigned to the 

38th Infantry Division of the Indiana Army National Guard, which had tactical control of 

all relief operations along the Mississippi Gulf Coast and was subordinate to the 

Mississippi National Guard Joint Operations Center (JOC), which in turn was subordinate 

to the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA). 

Figure 1 shows the command relationship. The distinctions are important. While National 

Guard units remained under state control, the chain of command for active forces, such as 

the 82nd Airborne Division, culminated with U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). 

Thus, two separate chains of command were in effect for active and Guard forces, 

because guard forces were not federalized. Throughout the Katrina relief operations, 

National Guard forces remained in a Title 32 status, that is, under the control of the state 

governors. While the Federal Government was paying for the incident response, it 

stopped short of federalizing National Guard soldiers under Title 10.11 

This distinction is important because Guardsman in either a state active duty status or 

Title 32 status can be used for law enforcement activities, whereas active duty soldiers 

are prohibited from law enforcement because of Posse Comitatus restrictions.12 When 

soldiers from one state are used for law enforcement in another state, an agreement 

between the state attorneys general must be developed. It took approximately 48 hours 

for the attorney general of Virginia to conclude an agreement with the attorney generals 

of Louisiana and Mississippi. Shortly after arrival, TF Stonewall was reinforced with an 

additional infantry company from the 76th Infantry Brigade, Indiana Army National 

Guard, and a Military Police Platoon, also from Indiana Army National Guard. This 

brought the total strength of TF Stonewall to 410 soldiers and 68 vehicles.13 

 

7

 2-116th Infantry Daily Staff Journal, DA Form 1594, September 4, 2005, 1. 8

 The vehicles deployed in TF Stonewall included numerous types of HMMWVs, 2 1⁄2 ton capacity cargo 

trucks, 5 ton capacity cargo trucks, HMMWV ambulances, a 5-ton capacity wrecker, and several trailers for 

carrying cargo and large generators. 

9

 2-116th Infantry Operations Order 05-09, Para. 3.e. Coordinating Instructions, September 4, 2005, 3. 10 2-116th Infantry Daily Staff Journal, DA Form 1594, September 4, 2005, 4. 11 Under Title 10, Guard soldiers work for the President of the United States and share the same chain of 

command as their active duty counterparts. Guardsmen who have been federalized under Title 10 are 

subject to the Posse Comitatus Act and cannot be used for law enforcement within U.S. borders. 

12 Lawrence Kapp, “Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers,” Congressional 

Research Service, Order Code RL30802, January 18, 2006 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing 

Office), 10. 

13 2-116th Infantry Fragmentary Order 2 to Operations Order 05-09 Para. 1b, Friendly Forces, September 

12, 2005, 1.

3
Figure 1. National Guard Chain of Command

Governor of Mississippi 

Mississippi Emergency 

Management Agency (MEMA) 

Mississippi National Guard 

Joint Operations Center (JOC) 

38th Infantry Division HQ 

Indiana Army National Guard 

TASK FORCE WRIGHT 

(BRIGADE HQ) 

TASK FORCE STONEWALL HQ 

Virginia Army National Guard 

14

TF Stonewall AO 

After the task force linked up with its ground convoy September 8, it was immediately 

tasked with providing security, humanitarian relief, and recovery assistance to four 

Mississippi Gulf Coast towns: Pass Christian, Long Beach, Gulfport, and Biloxi. The 

task force frontage was 22 miles wide with a 10-mile inland depth—a very large area for 

a unit this size. Figure 2 shows the battalion task force AO. The terrain in the AO is only 

a few feet above sea level, with many water obstacles due to flooding and many 

streambeds. In addition, much of the AO was urban, with significant damage to 

structures. Many bridges and roads were either unsafe to use or destroyed outright. 

Highway 90 along the beach was nearly destroyed and too dangerous to use, with the 

exception of emergency vehicles. Rubble and storm debris often impeded vehicular 

movement. The weather was generally hot and humid, as is to be expected along the Gulf 

Coast in September. Electrical storms were common, but rainfall was not. 

 

14 The command relationship shown in figure 1 does not show that the Virginia JOC exercised 

administrative control of TF Stonewall during Operation Vigilant Relief. Thus, the Virginia command team 

exercised limited authority over TF Stonewall and assisted the task force in solving soldier problems while 

deployed. However, in terms of day-to-day operations, the 38th Infantry Division and Task Force 

maintained tactical control of TF Stonewall, as shown in figure 1. 

4
Figure 2. Battalion Task Force AO15

 

TF Stonewall Mission and Key Tasks 

The TF mission statement read:

Task Force Stonewall deploys to the Mississippi Gulf Coast region no later than 

061500SEP05 and conducts humanitarian relief, recovery and security operations vicinity 

Gulfport and Biloxi, MS in order to assist civil authorities in restoring those communities 

from Hurricane Katrina.16

The Operations Order (OPORD) for deployment delineated the first three key tasks based 

on the battalion commander’s intent: 

• Provide security in sector 

• Provide humanitarian assistance 

• Provide support to recovery operations17

 

15 Mapquest. Available online at <www.mapquest.com>. 16 2-116th Infantry Operations Order 05-09, Para. 2. 17 Ibid. 

5
Providing sector security to such a large sector was a significant task, given the extent of 

the AO. Specifically, TF Stonewall had to deny unauthorized personnel access to the 

beach area while recovery operations were underway. This was done by establishing a 

cordon with 54 static checkpoints manned by two soldiers 24 hours a day. The static 

cordon was reinforced by roving, dismounted patrols and military police patrols mounted 

on High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs). This reinforcement was 

necessary because of the significant distance between many checkpoints—in many cases 

up to 600 meters—which sometimes allowed people to slip between the checkpoints. 

Looting and civil violence were sporadic in the initial 72 hours after the task force 

arrived. Thereafter, very little violence or looting was reported or seen. Drug-related and 

gang activity within the Gulfport and Long Beach city limits gave the Red Cross some 

difficulty, but local law enforcement and the military police from TF Stonewall dealt with 

it quickly. The task force also provided security to Point of Distribution (POD) sites. The 

local populace were able to acquire food, water, ice, clothing, and sundry items at several 

POD sites located throughout the task force AO. These sites were usually run by the 

American Red Cross or volunteer non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as 

church groups. 

In addition to sector security, the task force also provided humanitarian assistance. While 

securing POD sites, task force personnel often helped distribute supplies. Further, task 

force personnel conducted “search and assist” missions by canvassing rural areas in twoman HMMWV teams to ensure that residents needing assistance were identified and, if 

necessary, rescued. Search and Rescue operations were an implied task for TF Stonewall 

within the confines of the specified task of providing humanitarian assistance. In fact, 

most of the search and rescue work within the Mississippi AO was completed by 

September 9. 

 

Finally, task force personnel provided support to the recovery effort by securing power 

and water utility workers while they worked to restore basic services. The task force also 

assisted the local populace, where possible, in clearing debris. This was generally done 

on roadways to ensure vehicular access. Additionally, dismounted patrols assisted 

recovery operations by identifying and marking human and animal biological remains for 

later recovery by other agencies, such as the Georgia Bureau of Investigation and 

Harrison County Animal Control. 

 

The Problem of Creating a Network in a Disaster Area Emerges 

By this point, several items have been established: the strategic situation and event 

significance, the troops and equipment available to TF Stonewall, the task force mission 

and key tasks, as well as a description of the AO. Establishing a communications network 

under these conditions with such aggressive mission parameters proved extremely 

challenging. The problem of creating a network was compounded by the following 

challenges, which could be grouped into two categories: technology based and policies, 

techniques, and procedures.

6
Technology Based Challenges 

The Sheer Size of the AO: TF Stonewall was tasked with providing the aforementioned 

support in an area measuring 220 square miles with 410 soldiers. Usually, the doctrinal 

frontage of a sector for a U.S. Army Infantry battalion no more than three kilometers 

(about two miles), and depth is no more than five kilometers (about three miles), 

depending on such factors as the mission, terrain, and available troops and equipment. 

The size of the sector made it very difficult to establish a standard FM radio 

communications network with the communications equipment normally found in a rifle 

battalion, such as SINCGARS radios. 

Communications Equipment: Communications equipment provided two main 

challenges. First, there were not enough long range OE-254 antennae to adequately cover 

the sector with the standard FM communications suite. There were also too few 

SINCGARS radios because so many checkpoints and dismounted patrols were underway. 

This problem was exacerbated by the fact that much of the necessary equipment was not 

available because it had been reassigned to other National Guard units deploying 

overseas in support of the Global War on Terror. (The second challenge was that much of 

the communications equipment that was available was not interoperable with other first 

responders (police, fire, and rescue) or other government agencies. Thus, the traditional 

communications links to establish a wireless network were insufficient for the task. 

Policies, Techniques, and Procedures Based Challenges 

Minimal Situational Awareness: The most significant challenge to the problem of 

developing a working network in the disaster zone was discovering who should be in the 

network. Upon reaching the AO, situational awareness as to whom and what resources 

were available was minimal. Nor was there a great deal of information available on the 

location of these resources. Alternatively, situational awareness of where the military 

units were located was very good based on the briefing from the 38th Infantry Division’s 

Main Command Post. However, in a domestic support operation (DSO), especially a 

CHD, it is vital to know the location and capability of other government and civilian 

relief agencies, because these agencies usually provide the bulk of relief support.18 Little 

to no information was available on the disposition, composition, and general condition of 

local government; police, fire, and rescue; Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) command posts; Red Cross shelters; and power and water recovery teams, to 

name a few. All of this had to be determined once TF Stonewall arrived on the scene. 

Because the task force sector straddled four different municipalities and one county, 

tracking down the information was difficult. Each municipality had a local government, 

fire department, and police department that needed to be located and liaison established. 

Finding them all and coordinating consistent communications often proved a challenge. 

The solution used by the battalion, as discussed later, was decidedly low-tech. 

 

18 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-07 Stability Operations and Support Operations (Washington, DC: 

February 2003), 1–7. 

7
Limited Training in Developing a Network in a Disaster Scenario: TF Stonewall 

deployed with a command team that had more than 100 years of experience in developing 

and exercising command and control of widely dispersed units in austere, all weather 

environments. The U.S. military is uniquely suited and well trained to deploy into 

environments and scenarios where they must create a working network from scratch 

using a myriad of communications and command and control techniques. The problem of 

creating a network during Operation Vigilant Relief came when TF Stonewall needed to 

integrate numerous other organizations and agencies into its normal military network. 

Compounding the system interoperability problems was the fact that TF Stonewall had 

never trained or rehearsed the integration of these organizations and agencies. Nor had 

these organizations and agencies trained to integrate with U.S. military units. The 

battalion task force Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) had little in the way of tactics, 

techniques, and procedures for developing a hastily formed network with the diverse 

governmental organizations and agencies also deployed within the assigned sector. TF 

Stonewall discovered that interagency training and rehearsal is absolutely fundamental to 

real disaster preparedness. 

The Constantly Changing Network: Further exacerbating the complexity of forming a 

comprehensive network was the existence of large numbers of small, undocumented, 

NGOs providing relief in the AO. On any given day, numerous church and volunteer 

groups were providing food and clothing. Some of the groups were well financed and 

established impressive support operations. Others would arrive in-sector, provide some 

assistance, and depart within a few days. The task force needed to maintain awareness on 

who and what organizations were providing support in the AO. Often, Guardsmen on 

static checkpoints or patrols would encounter people who would ask how and where to 

get services. Additionally, Guardsmen had to field questions on when it was okay to 

return to homes and by what route. Thus, it was critical that Guardsmen in the field be 

kept well informed with the latest information from the network. Interestingly, the 

Guardsmen on checkpoints and patrol had become a node in the network of everyday 

Mississippians in the disaster area. Besides the task force tactical operations center 

(TOC), and perhaps FEMA, no organization or agency was even trying to maintain a 

common operational picture of the sector. The task force was able to inform the populace 

about where to get certain services via our 54 static checkpoints and dismounted patrols. 

Keeping track of the changes within the network was a major daily challenge. 

Sewing Confusion—Inconsistency of Policy and Procedures: The sixth challenge to 

the problem of creating a network in a disaster area is the inconsistency of policies and 

procedures among townships within the task force sector. Disasters usually overlap 

political boundaries, often resulting in a non-uniform response and confusion within the 

network and with the policies of neighboring jurisdictions. In the TF Stonewall sector, 

four townships had policies that often contradicted each other. For example, one of the 

key tasks for TF Stonewall was to secure the beach areas from extraneous traffic and 

sightseeing so that emergency workers could do their jobs more effectively. Downed 

power lines, fetid water, and dangerous wildlife, such as alligators and snakes in places 

they were not normally found, made for extreme safety issues. Unfortunately, some of the 

townships were more lenient than others in allowing access to beach areas. Different 

8
policies were aired on local radio stations and enforced by local police departments. This 

made it very difficult to create and enforce a standard policy via the network. Some 

localities refused the use of concertina wire, while others allowed it to enable the 

National Guardsman assigned to their town to do more dismounted roving patrols with 

fewer static checkpoints. However, when one town used concertina to deny access to the 

beach area and another town did not, it was easy for people to drive a mile or two, bypass 

the concertina roadblock, and gain access to restricted areas. Adding to the confusion, 

local governments often changed policies and access times to the beach areas. Even local 

police were often confused. Some days access was granted by merely showing a driver’s 

license; other days a driver’s license along with a recent utility bill for the address in 

question were required to show proof of occupancy. In the end, the inconsistency in 

policy reduced the effectiveness of the response. These inconsistencies created stress on 

the network and often reduced the credibility of relief agencies while increasing public 

frustration. 

The TF Stonewall Hastily Formed Network—A Solution, Not The

Solution 

A network is an interconnected system of things or people and consists of nodes and 

links. Once the battalion task force arrived on station, we had to identify the nodes in our 

network and then establish communication links. We identified two types of nodes:

military and non-military. The military nodes were simple because they were largely 

known and we had trained to use them in previous exercises. Examples of military nodes 

were the task force TOC, company command posts, the 54 static checkpoints throughout 

the task force sector, and brigade and division headquarters. These military nodes were 

the same network nodes found in any standard military network. These nodes were often 

connected by standard FM communications using SINCGARS radios and OE-254 longrange antennae. The FM network links were augmented by cell phones, satellite phones 

(usually Iridium), and FRS/GMRS handheld radios for shorter communication links. 

Figure 3 illustrates the basic military nodes and links from the static checkpoints 

providing the security cordon along the coast line to division headquarters, along with the 

average distance the network link had to traverse. The Southern Linc radios provided full 

duplex (two-way) radio capability over a CDMA cellular network. These were only 

deployed to company commanders and above. 

9
Figure 3. Voice Network from Checkpoint to Division Headquarters

 

I 

II 

xx 

x 

16 miles 

3 - 18 miles 

FM with Retrans 

FRS/GMRS 

Southern 

Linc Radio 

100-600 m 

5 miles 

FRS/GMRS

Static Checkpoints 

3 miles FRS 

While the military nodes were easier to identify, the non-military nodes were absolutely 

crucial to mission success because of the services and supplies they provided the 

populace. FM 3-07 Stability Operations and Support Operations points out that 

interagency cooperation and unity of effort are crucial to mission success.19 A 

functioning network is an enabler to that success. To have a network, one must be able to 

identify the nodes in that network and link them together. Unfortunately, upon the task 

force’s arrival, no one really knew who or what was in our sector, much less what was on 

its way. Therefore, our mounted and dismounted patrols had to discover these nodes over 

the first three to four days on station. While this technique was decidedly low-tech, it did 

work—after a while. However, the time it took greatly reduced the effectiveness of the 

humanitarian response for all agencies in the intervening period. 

One must remember that non-military governmental agencies and NGOs have no 

network infrastructure equivalent to Blue Force Tracker, which enables a common 

operating picture to be created rapidly. Even the military nodes did not have an 

immediate common operating picture at all levels, because most National Guard units 

were not fielded with the latest digital communications equipment being used in theaters 

 

19 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-07 Stability Operations and Support Operations (Washington, DC: 

February 2003), 1-7. 

10
like Iraq or Afghanistan. Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom had, in fact, 

drained a great deal of standard communications equipment from many National Guard 

units, leaving them less than fully equipped for responding to natural disasters. 

Table 1 shows some of the military nodes external to TF Stonewall and some of the nonmilitary nodes in our sector. Once we identified these nodes and met with the leaders 

running them, we were able to establish communications links in ways which will be 

discussed later. The key point is that to have both a united and effective effort during 

CHDs, it is critically important to rapidly establish a network. Otherwise, military units 

and civilian agencies can wastefully duplicate efforts unknowingly. What’s worse, they 

can inadvertently work at cross purposes. Even once nodes have been established, the 

work must continue. Identifying nodes is a non-stop process because the network nodes 

change over time with the arrival and departure of new military units and relief 

agencies/groups. 

Table 1. Military and Non-Military Nodes 

Military Nodes Non-Military Nodes 

Mississippi Joint Operations Center Mississippi State Government 

Virginia Joint Operations Center Municipal Governments of 4 townships 

38th Infantry Division HQ Police Departments of 4 townships 

Task Force Wright (Brigade) HQ Fire and Rescue Departments of 4 

townships 

Tennessee National Guard (Engineers) 2 American Red Cross Shelters 

1-293rd Infantry (Battalion HQ to the east) Cellular Phone Companies (5 identified) 

Local FEMA Operations Center (Gulfport) 

Georgia Bureau of Investigation (Remains 

Recovery) 

Indiana State Police (Augmentation to local 

Police) 

Gulf Power Company 

Gulfport Memorial Hospital 

Biloxi Regional Medical Center 

Local Water Authority 

Church groups and volunteer organizations 

Network Links in TF Stonewall’s Hastily Formed Network 

Once the network nodes were identified, we had to establish network links. We used 

several means to do this. As previously mentioned, most military nodes were linked with 

FM communications via SINCGARS radios and OE-254 antennae. In the early hours and 

days, we actually had to use couriers or liaison officers for the outlying nodes, which 

literally reduced our communication to World War I methods. Again, this was a very 

low-tech solution. However, there were advantages to the face-to-face communication the 

liaison officers used with agencies like the local police departments, the American Red 

11
Cross, and FEMA. The task force probably enjoyed better communication later, when the 

regular communication links became operational, because this early face-to-face 

communication established relationships that otherwise might not have existed. 

Balanced against the advantage of face-to-face communication was the information lag 

time caused by the travel time between nodes. Often information is useful only if 

received in a timely fashion. The lag time associated with travel by liaison officers and 

couriers often reduced the value of information dramatically. Fortunately, the absolute 

need for liaisons and couriers was very short lived, because other methods of 

communications rapidly became available. The cell phone companies were able to restore 

their networks within days of the disaster. It is worth noting that the cell phone and power 

companies did a remarkable job in getting their services restored in a timely manner. The 

cell phone companies in particular demonstrated strong continuity of operations planning 

(COOP) and execution. They arrived on scene shortly after the storm passed with their 

own self supporting task force that included replacement equipment and life support, 

such as tentage, food, water, and power generation for their workers. 

While the initial cell phone service restoration left many dead spots, our ability to link 

nodes improved dramatically. We were able to use cell phones to establish 

communication with outlying checkpoints and command posts as well as other agencies. 

In fact, cell phones, and to a lesser extent satellite phones, allowed us to establish links to 

agencies we could not have communicated with on an FM military network due to 

distances or a lack of system interoperability. Interestingly, the cell phone companies 

were able to restore roughly 97 percent of their network capacity within three weeks of 

Katrina’s striking the coast. The problem was that calls were often blocked, because the 

network operated at 140 percent capacity during daylight or peak usage hours most days. 

The usage of the wireless network was so high because the land line system was virtually 

destroyed. Thus, almost all calls were hitting the wireless network. This was caused by 

severe damage to the land-line telephone system. Elevated phone lines had been blown 

down by surface winds in excess of 150 mph, and underground telephone switches were 

often flooded and ruined. This would take months to fully repair. 

Even though most cell phone towers were damaged or destroyed, the network was 

quickly re-established through the use of devices like the Cell On Light Trucks (COLT). 

(See figure 4). COLTs are CDMA, GSM, and Satellite capable. They can carry both 

voice and data traffic and have similar band-width to many fixed cell tower assets. The 

difference is they are mobile, can be protected until a storm passes, and then rapidly 

deployed to bring cell coverage back on line. 

12
Figure 4: Cell on Light Truck20

 

In addition to couriers, FM communications, and cell phones, my unit also used satellite 

phones, FRS/GMRS radios, and later, to a lesser extent, land lines as they came back into 

service. Satellite phones were the most reliable form of communication for “long haul” 

communications. Unfortunately, there were never enough of them to go around. They 

were generally restricted to battalion or brigade commanders and above on the military 

side. On the civil government and NGO side, satellite phones were more prevalent. 

Media outlets had the most satellite communications available by far. Media outlets also 

used up most of the available satellite bandwidth. FRS/GMRS radios were mainly used 

to link our 54 checkpoints to each other and back to the platoon and company command 

posts. These connections offered mutual support and allowed the guards on duty to report 

problems. While these radios were extremely reliable and easy to power with readily 

available AA batteries, they had limited range and no ability to carry data. However, they 

fulfilled the purpose of providing low-cost, reliable, short-range, albeit insecure, tactical 

communications. 

We were able to get limited but reliable use of regular telephone land lines approximately 

1 month after the storm hit. This was most useful for data communications, such as email. 

The limiting factor with dial-up data access is bandwidth, but slow email is better than no 

email. 

In terms of data, the discussion of network links would be incomplete without noting the 

impact of commercial, wireless data connectivity. Even with the heavy use of the 

wireless network, we were able to get reliable data connectivity in low use hours (mainly 

 

20 Magnatek Website. Available online at 

<http://www.magnetektelecom.com/tpgproductsmobilecomm_colt.htm>. 

13
late at night) using wireless broadband cards from Verizon and Cingular. We were able to 

email and share large files in non-peak usage hours very effectively. Instant Messaging 

also became available through this technology. Combining these cards with laptops 

allowed us to create a fairly reliable data network with surprisingly robust bandwidth. 

The effectiveness, ease of use, and cost of this solution made it very attractive during 

Operation Vigilant Relief. Figure 5 shows examples of some of these cards. 

Figure 5: COTS Wireless Access Cards21

 

The good news is that TF Stonewall was able to develop a working voice and data 

network fairly rapidly with commercial off-the shelf (COTS) technology to reinforce the 

existing military communications suite. While these technologies often were not fully 

encrypted and secure, the nature of the mission made that an acceptable risk. 

Additionally, while the data network did not have great bandwidth, it was better than no 

data network. Satellite communication was by far the most flexible and resilient, but it 

was the least pervasive at the company, battalion, and brigade task force levels. Initially 

during the operation, Satellite communication also provided the best “reach-back” 

communication (communication with higher headquarters) outside the area of operations. 

In our case, that was reach-back communication to the Virginia JOC. Once terrestrialbased cell coverage was restored, reach-back communication became much easier and 

wide spread. 

Summary and Lessons Learned 

Operation Vigilant Relief taught us several lessons about how to prepare for and respond 

to complex humanitarian disasters, especially in terms of communication networks. The 

lessons learned can be grouped into four categories: 

• Policy and Planning 

• Technology and Equipment 

• Training 

• Unit Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 

 

21 Verizon Wireless Website. Available online at <http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/mobileoptions/ 

broadband/serviceoverview.jsp>. 

14
Policy and Planning Lessons 

• The hardest part of developing an ad hoc network during a CHD is determining 

the nodes that exist in the network and keeping the network updated. 

• Network centric operations are more than equipment, its people and processes. 

• The “battlespace” we will occupy in a CHD domestic support operation will be 

larger than we expect making C4

I and information sharing much more difficult. 

• The only network you can rely on is the one you bring with you. Units deploying 

to CHD environments must be as self supporting as possible and expect little to 

no re-supply in the first 96 hours. 

• Deploy with spare parts for communication gear and other mission critical 

equipment. 

• Adjacent Municipalities may differ greatly on policy issues that create confusion 

among the populace and degrade response effectiveness. 

• The current military transformation does not transcend interagency boundaries. 

(Civilian agencies don’t have Blue Force Tracker.) 

• Military organizations and processes have the ability to rapidly bring order to 

interagency confusion. We train to cooperate and task organize in an ad hoc 

fashion. 

Technology and Equipment 

• Our current, organic communication equipment is inadequate for interagency 

communication. 

• 802.11B/G and Bluetooth were not robust enough for our needs in terms of range 

• 802.16E WIMAX may well be the low cost, commercial off the shelf solution for 

data connectivity in a CHD environment. 

• Commercial laptops with wireless cards to access cell networks worked very well 

to get data communications up and running (satellite GSM cards were even better 

from a quality of service perspective) 

• Guard units still lag far behind their active duty counterparts in fielded digital 

communication systems which degrades the Guard’s effectiveness as well as a 

comprehensive common operating picture. 

Training 

• Developing a network under mission and time pressure in a CHD environment is 

hard and you need to train for it. 

• Training for disaster relief and domestic support operations is very similar to 

training for Stability and Support Operations (SASO). 

• SASO staff training using JANUS is an excellent training tool for improving staff 

effectiveness and vetting unit Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for disaster 

relief. 

• Interagency training and rehearsal is absolutely fundamental to real disaster 

preparedness. We do not do enough of it. 

15
• Train officers and senior NCOs in the fundamentals of continuity of operations. 

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 

• We need to add a section to our battalion, company and platoon SOPs for 

supporting domestic civil authorities and non-governmental relief organizations. 

• If possible, acquire first responder radios for the TOC and company command 

post. This will link the military net to the first responder net using a human 

interface (a radio telephone operator). 

• Deploy with as many OE-254 long range antennae as possible. 

• Deploy with as many generators as possible 

• Deploy with a satellite phone assigned to all commanders. 

• Assign a liaison officer to each municipal leadership team for communication, 

information sharing and relationship building. 

• Where possible assign units to specific municipalities for ease of command and 

control and relationship building. As an example, I assigned Bravo Company to 

Biloxi, MS and Alpha Company to Long Beach. 

• Battery use will be extremely high, bring lots of extras and use rechargeable 

batteries where possible. 

• Begin immediate patrolling upon arriving in the area of operations to build a list 

of nodes for the network as quickly as possible. 

This list of lessons learned is not comprehensive, but it highlights the key points. There 

is no doubt that those reviewing the case study will discover additional lessons learned. 

In many ways, this operation was a dress rehearsal for an even bigger disaster of either 

natural or manmade origins. The scale and scope of Katrina had never before been 

experienced on U.S. soil. Moreover, the National Response Plan was effectively untested 

and unrehearsed for a disaster of this magnitude. One can expect that National Guard 

units like TF Stonewall will be heavily used in future scenarios, since disaster response is 

a core mission of the National Guard. However, to make the response effective, planners 

must revise response plans, ensure adequate equipment acquisition and interoperability 

among agencies, and ensure that response plans are well rehearsed through interagency 

exercises. Done properly, interagency networks can be established with rather low-cost 

COTS technology. All that said, one of the most significant observations of those on the 

ground was that network-centric operations is about far more than technology and 

equipment. It is about policies and procedures that not only allow, but set conditions for, 

interagency cooperation and network development in the shortest possible time and in the 

worst possible conditions. By learning the lessons of Hurricane Katrina, we ensure the 

next response will be far better and more effective.

16
Instructor’s Guide for Transformation for Disaster 

Relief Case Study 

Introduction 

The Transformation for Disaster Relief case study details the problems and some possible 

solutions to developing a hastily formed network when much of the local infrastructure is 

damaged, destroyed, or otherwise unavailable. It is important to note that the case study 

focuses only at the battalion level, and on a National Guard battalion at that. Yet the 

lessons learned can be applied at the tactical, operational, and to an extent, policy levels. 

Based on class composition, this case study and the attendant class discussion may cause 

great tension. Katrina was both the finest and worst hour for many agencies and 

institutions. The instructor must be aware of the emotions of students, which may be high 

in discussing this, because many students may have worked for the agencies named. In 

point of fact, much improvement has already been made in preparing for future disasters 

of this magnitude. Yet much work remains. The purpose of this case study is to place 

students as close to the tactical (battalion) level as possible and allow them to develop 

solutions to the problems we faced on the ground along the Mississippi Gulf Coast. This 

will afford the nation better-trained decisionmakers in the future, as they will have the 

benefit of our experience. 

Learning Objectives 

At the completion of the case study, students should have the following knowledge: 

• Understanding at the most basic level of what comprises a network in terms of 

links and nodes in network-centric operations. 

• The composition of a network in terms of links and nodes in a disaster zone. 

• Understanding of the basic facts making up the case study, such as the strategic 

background, AO, battalion task force mission, critical tasks, agencies and 

organizations involved, and the chain of command. 

• Challenges faced in developing a multi-agency, hastily formed network. 

• An introduction to the solutions used and the development of some of his/her own 

solutions based on their understanding of the situation. This will be accomplished 

through a small-group, practical exercise. 

• An appreciation for the problems rooted in technology, as well as those problems 

rooted in policies, techniques, and procedures. 

Instructor Themes 

During the discussion generated by this case study, the instructor may wish to emphasize 

some or all of the following themes to assist in students’ retention of knowledge. 

Policy and Procedure vs. Technology. Often during this case study students will gravitate 

toward finding technical solutions to interoperability for interagency response. This is no 
doubt important and should be discussed. However, the most intractable problems are 

those related to the policies and organizational roles and responsibilities that govern the 

response. With adequate funding and acquisition discipline, interoperable 

communications can be developed and deployed. However, creating uniform responses 

across municipal, state, and federal jurisdictions is much more difficult and often 

overlooked. In real terms, both areas must be addressed, not one or the other. The 

instructor should encourage the holistic approach to problem-solving. 

Planning vs. Rehearsing. During the case study, most student questions will address 

planning. Very few students will voice the need for rehearsal. In fact, the national 

response plan had been updated a few months before Katrina struck, but the 

dissemination and interagency rehearsal of that plan was almost non-existent. The results 

were obvious. Students must internalize the importance of rehearsing complex plans if 

they wish to have a positive outcome during a CHD. On a similar note, some students 

will press the singular value of simulations. Simulation is good, but simulation is not a 

stand-alone method for training and rehearsal. The instructor may offer that scenariodriven, command post exercises work well and are not cost prohibitive. 

Information Sharing vs. Information Pushing. One network-centric concept that students 

often miss is the sharing of information versus the pushing of information. This is where 

technology plays a vital role. The case study illustrates an often low-tech approach to 

netcentricity. Information is usually pushed between command and control nodes, but it 

was rarely shared in the NCO sense. This is because there was no technological 

infrastructure to facilitate real-time sharing at multiple echelons. The instructor may wish 

to encourage thought in how best to develop a network that shares information instead of 

predominantly pushing information. 

Interesting Case Study Points 

There are numerous interesting points brought out in the case study. Students will 

mention more than are shown here, but these are ideas to facilitate the discussion. 

Common Operational Picture. The U.S. military has Blue Force Tracker (BFT), but other 

government agencies do not. Indeed, most National Guard units do not have BFT. 

Therefore, it is much more difficult (and manual) to create a common operating picture 

and keep it updated in real or near-real time. 

Constant Network Change. Because numerous NGOs entered and exited the AO on any 

given day, the network nodes were changing. Further, because infrastructure was coming 

back on line, the network links were also changing. 

Posse Comitatus. While not a specific NCO concept, this point can cause confusion, and 

students need to be clear. The National Guard is usually under the control of state 

governors. The National Guard, while in a state active duty status or a U.S. Code Title 32 

status, may be used for domestic law enforcement. However, if the President of the 

United States federalizes the Guard under U.S. Code Title 10, the National Guard is in 

18
the same legal status as the active duty military and may not be used for domestic law 

enforcement. 

Inconsistent Policies and Coordination of Civil Government. Most municipalities initially 

were “islands unto themselves.” This led to confusion and frustration because of differing 

policies on such things as access to beach areas and curfews. Further, the coordination 

between municipal and state officials was very loose initially. 

Global War on Terror. Effects of the Global War on Terror included a lack of some 

equipment and fewer units available from both Mississippi and Louisiana. Students 

should understand that planners must deal with shortages due to other priorities. These 

conditions will no doubt recur. 

Practical Exercise 

The following practical exercise is designed for students in small groups. The instructor 

ideally should assign four students to a team. Each team will get one scenario. Based on 

what was learned in the case study, each team should develop answers to the questions 

below and present them to the class. 

Scenario 1: “Dirty Bomb” is detonated in Washington, D.C. Reagan National Airport is 

rendered unusable. 

Scenario 2: Massive earthquake strikes San Francisco destroying 40 percent of the city, 

including most port facilities. 

Scenario 3: Tsunami strikes Oahu, effectively destroying all port facilities in Pearl 

Harbor. Death toll is estimated at more than 40,000. 

Scenario 4: Avian Flu (H5N1) virus mutates to spread easily among humans. The virus 

reaches the United States, initially in upstate New York and Minnesota. Within three 

weeks, mid-west and northeast states are reporting more than 700,000 cases. 

Group Questions 

Question 1: Identify the challenges to creating a hastily formed network in this scenario. 

Question 2: Discuss techniques for overcoming these challenges. 

Question 3: Describe how these challenges are unique to the specific scenario. 

Question 4: What special technological and policy planning considerations must be taken 

into account for this scenario? 

19