UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ In re: ROBERT RAEL; LISA RAEL, Debtors.

------------------------------ PATRICK S. LAYNG, United States Trustee for Region 19, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. ROBERT RAEL; LISA RAEL, Defendants - Appellants. No. 18-8026 (D.C. No. 1:17- CV-00104-NDF) (D. Wyo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before LUCERO , KELLY , and PHILLIPS , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ This appeal involves several orde rs entered in the bankruptcy p roceedings stemming from the joint petition for bankruptcy relief filed by Robert and Lisa Rael (“the Raels”), and the adversar y proceeding filed by the United States Trustee

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel ha s determined unanimously to honor the parties ’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir . R. 34.1(G). The case is ther efore submitted without oral argument. T his order and judgment is no t binding precedent, except under the doctrines of la w of the case, res judicata, an d collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 7, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 (“Trustee”) seeking denial of th e Raels’ claim for discharge. The Raels appeal the district court’s orders (1) affir ming the bankruptcy court orde r denying their motion to dismiss the adversary procee ding; (2) affirm ing the bankrupt cy court’s denial of their C.R.C.P. 60(b) motions, w hich, like the motion to dismiss , challenged the court’s jurisdiction to enter an order permitting the sale of t heir real property; (3) reversing the bankruptcy c ourt judgment granting their clai m for discharge; and (4) reversing the bankruptcy cou rt’s order requiring the Truste e to pay the Raels’ attorney fees as a discovery san ction. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
BACKGROUND The bankruptcy court confirmed the Raels’ Amended Chapter 11 Pl an of Reorganization (“the Plan”) and granted a final decree soon the reafter. As pertinent here, the Plan required them to sa tisfy a debt to Wells Fargo B ank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) by selling several parc els of real property in Wyoming and making monthly payments to Wells Fargo. The Rael s voluntarily closed their Ch apter 11 case after confirmation to avoid accruing Trustee’s fees during the admini stration of the Plan. After the Raels defaulted on thei r monthly payments, Wells Farg o obtained state court judgments against the m and filed liens against the Wyoming properties based on those judgments. In r esponse, the Raels filed motions in the bankruptcy court to reopen the Chapter 11 case and to hold Wells Fargo in contempt for filing the state court proceedings.3 In the reopened proceedings, the b ankruptcy court issued an ord er at the Raels’ request approving the sale of t he Wyoming properties that were the subject of the liens (“Sale Order”). Consiste nt with the terms of the Plan, t he Sale Order required the Raels to pay the proceeds of any sales to Wells Fargo. The court denied the Raels’ motions to hold Wells Far go in contempt for obtaining th e state court judgment and filing the liens (“C ontempt Orders”). After the c ourt denied the Raels’ motion for reconsideration of the Contempt Orders, they appeale d to the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Pan el (“BAP”), which affirmed. Rael v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., (In re Rael) , Nos. WY–14–035, 08–20251 & WY–14–048, 527 B.R. 799, 2015 WL 847432 (B.A.P. 10th Cir . Feb. 27, 2015) (“BAP Order”). While the appeal of the Contempt Orders was pending, the Raels closed on the sale of one of the Wyoming proper ties that was the subject of t he state court liens and the bankruptcy court’s Sale Ord er, but they did not give the pr oceeds to Wells Fargo as required by the Sale Order. I nstead, almost a year after th e closing, they used the proceeds to pay their non-discha rgeable legal fees and IRS debt . Soon thereafter, they converted their Chapter 11 case to a Chapter 7 proceeding and filed a motion for discharge. The Trustee then commenced an a dversary proceeding to prevent d ischarge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6), on the ground that the Raels viola ted the Sale Order by not giving Wells Fargo the proceed s of the sale. The Raels mov ed to dismiss the adversary proceeding and to set a side the Sale Order, claiming that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to ent er the Sale Order because, afte r the court closed the4 Chapter 11 case, the Wyoming pr operties were no longer the prop erty of the bankruptcy estate. The court de nied both motions. After trial , the court granted discharge, finding that the Raels violated the Sale Order but t hat their non-compliance was not willful becau se they violated the order in reliance on the advice of their attorney. U.S. Trustee v. Ra el (In re Rael) , Case Nos. 08-20251 & 15-2013, 2017 WL 4083128, at *4 (B ankr. D. Wyo. Sept. 14, 2017)

. On appeal, the U.S. District Cour t for the District of Wyoming affirmed the orders denying the Raels’ motion to dismiss the adversary proce eding and to set aside the Sale Order, but reversed th e judgment granting discharge, c oncluding that the bankruptcy court’s determinati on that the Raels’ violation of t he Sale Order was not willful was clearly erroneous. The district court also rev ersed the order awarding attorney fees against the Trus tee as a discovery sanction.
DISCUSSION
I. Denial of Motion to Dismis s Adversary Proceeding The Raels claim the bankruptcy c ourt erred by denying their mot ion to dismiss the adversary proceeding under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the Sale Order in the reopened Cha pter 11 proceeding and therefore lacked jurisdiction to enforce that order in the adve rsary proceeding. We disagree. When hearing an appeal from a district court’s review of a bank ruptcy court order, we independently revie w the underlying bankruptcy court decision. Jubber v. SMC Elec. Prods., Inc. (I n re C.W. Mining Co.) , 798 F.3d 983, 986 (10th Cir. 2015).5 We accept the bankruptcy court’ s factual findings unless they a re clearly erroneous. Alderete v. Educ. Credit Mg mt. Corp. (In re Alderete) , 412 F.3d 1200, 1204 (10th Cir. 2005). But we review its legal conclusions, includi ng on jurisdictional questions, de novo. Lee v. McCardle (In re Peeples) , 880 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir. 2018). Initially, we note that in affirm ing the bankrupt cy court’s den ial of the motion to dismiss, the district court in terpreted the Raels’ argument as challenging the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding i tself. Aplt. App. Vol. V, at 1039. To the extent t he Raels make such an argument on appeal, we reject it. A challenge to the propriety of discharge under § 727 impa cts the determination whether to grant discharge. It i s thus part of a core proceedi ng that is plainly within the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I) (providing that the bankruptcy court may hear proce edings related to core proceedin gs, including “determinations as to the disch argability of particular debts”)

. We also reject the Raels’ cont ention that the bankruptcy court’ s ruling in the Contempt Orders constituted a finding that the court lacked jur isdiction over the property after the case was close d. In their contempt motions, the Raels claimed Wells Fargo’s state court actions were improper because they vi olated the automatic stay and because the bankruptcy c ourt had exclusive jurisdictio n to enforce the provisions of the Plan. Relying on Santander Consumer, USA, Inc. v. Houlik (In re Houlik) , 481 B.R. 661 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012), the bankruptcy court reje cted those arguments, finding that (1) afterthe case was closed, the auto matic stay was no6 longer in effect, and (2) Wells Fargo was entitled to enforce i ts rights under the confirmed Plan in state court be cause the bankruptcy court did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the property. See id. at 674 (holding that auto matic stay terminates as to bankruptcy estate property upon plan confirmation and as to all other property when the case is closed and that bankruptcy courts do not have “related to” jurisdiction to issue sanctions i n non-core post-confirmation a ctions alleging a violation of the plan for filing state court enforcement action ). With respect to the latter finding, the court concl uded that the bankruptcy court r etained jurisdiction over core proceedings and matters rel ated to the bankruptcy estate, but that the state court had jurisdiction over Wells Fargo’ s state court actions to enfo rce its liens and determine the prior ity of lien rights. See id. at 679 (Brown, J., concurring) (explaining that the “state cour t would have concurrent jurisdi ction to enforce the Plan as a contract” between the debtors and their creditors). The BAP affirmed, holding that while the bankruptcy court was “not left without j urisdiction entirely,” it “did not have exclusive jurisdiction to e nforce” the Plan. In re Rael , 527 B.R. 799, 2015 WL 847432, at *1, 8 (emphasis added). Contrary to the Raels’ contenti on, nothing in either the Contem pt Orders or the BAP Order suggested tha t, after the case wa s closed, the bankru ptcy court lacked jurisdiction over any matters rela ted to the property that was the subject of the Sale Order—those orders simply held that the bankruptcy court did no t have exclusive jurisdiction over issues related to the subject property. Inde ed, an order that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdi ction altogether would have been inconsistent with the7 jurisdiction retention language i n the Plan, which provided tha t the bankruptcy court retained post-confirmation jurisd iction to “enter orders necess ary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of” the Plan. Aplt. App. Vol. I, at 1 52. In any event, at the Raels’ reque st, the case had been reopened before the Sale Order was entered. And, because e ntry of a sale order is a cor e proceeding, the bankruptcy court was statutorily within its jurisdiction to ent er an order—again, at the Raels’ request—authorizing them to sell the property. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(f)-(h) (setting forth circ umstances under which trustee may sell property in the bankruptcy estate); 11 U.S. C. § 1107(a) (providing that, su bject to limitations not applicable here, a debtor in pos session has the same rights and powers as the trustee); 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(N) (providi ng that bankruptcy court may h ear and determine all core proceedings, which incl ude “orders approving the sale of property”); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6004 (establishing pro cedure for obtaining bankruptcy court order authorizing sale of property).
II. Denial of Rule 60(b) Motions to Vacate or Set Aside Sale Order The Raels also claim the bankrup tcy court erred by denying thei r motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), which is made applicable to bankru ptcy proceedings by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024. We disagree. As with the other bankruptcy cou rt rulings, we directly review the bankruptcy court’s decision on the Rule 60( b) motions and do not defer to the district court’s intermediate appellate analysis. See Paul v. Iglehart (In re Paul) , 534 F.3d 1303, 1310 (10th Cir. 2008). We review t he bankruptcy court’s ruling on a Rule 60(b)(4)8 motion de novo, King Fisher Marine Serv., Inc. v. 21st Phoenix Corp ., 893 F.2d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 1990) (dete rmination whether judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4) for lack of jurisd iction is reviewed de novo), an d we review its ruling on Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) motions for “an abuse of discretion, k eeping in mind that Rule 60(b) relief is e xtraordinary and may only be granted in e xceptional circumstances,” Lebahn v. Owens , 813 F.3d 1300, 1306 (10th Cir. 2016). The Raels’ Rule 60(b) motions s ought to vacate the Sale Order a s void under Rule 60(b)(4) and argued that enf orcement of the order was ineq uitable under Rule 60(b)(5) and that justice r equired that it be set aside un der Rule 60(b)(6) due to mutual mistake. All of the Raels ’ Rule 60(b) arguments are bas ed on their challenge to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdi ction to enter the Sale Order and their mischaracterization of the ruli ngs in the Contempt Orders and B AP Order. Having already concluded that the bankr uptcy court had jurisdiction to enter the Sale Order and that neither the Contempt O rders nor the BAP Order suggeste d otherwise, we find no error in the bankruptcy c ourt’s denial of the Rule 60(b ) motions on the same basis. 1

1 In light of this conclusion, we need not address the Trustee’s argument that the Raels’ challenges to the Sal e Order in the context of theirRule 60(b) arguments are barred as untimely because the y did not appeal the Sale Ord er within 14 days after it was entered. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(1). We nevertheless note that we have p reviously held, in an unpublish ed decision, that a bankruptcy court order “authoriz ing sale of real property . . . is a final order” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), w hich governs the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals over appeals from final decisions, judgments, orders an d decrees under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) and (b). Bush v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. of Colo

. (In re Bush) ,9 III. Denial of Discharge Claim The Raels next contend that the d istrict court erred by reversi ng the bankruptcy court order granting th em a complete discharge of th eir debts. More specifically, they claim the dist rict court applied the wrong s tandard of review in rejecting the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that they did not i ntentionally violate the Sale Order and based its holding on its own unsupported finding s, which were contrary to the findings of the bankruptcy court. We disagree. “Where a district court acts in its capacity a s a bankruptcy appellate court, we review the bankruptcy court’ s decision independently.” Ahammed v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. (In re Pr imeline Sec. Corp.) , 295 F.3d 1100, 1105 (10th Cir. 2002). We review the bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Gullickson v. Brown (In re Brown) , 108 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 1997)

. A finding is clearly erroneous if “it is without factual supp ort in the record or if, after reviewing all of the evidence, [the Court i s] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Gillman v. Ford (In re Ford) , 492 F.3d 1148, 1153 ( 10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6)(A), a court will deny a discharge i f “the debtor has refused . . . to obey any lawf ul order of the court, other than an order to respond to a material question or to test ify.” Section 727(a)(6) gives the bankruptcy court a means to ensure debtors seeking discharge are straightforward i n dealings with

No. 93–1345, 1994 WL 596762, at *1 (10th Cir. Nov. 2, 1994) (ci ting Hendrick v. Avent , 891 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1990)) (further citations omitted ).10 creditors and that they comply w ith its orders, and the denial of discharge for refusing to obey a court order fo llows the general rule that a court order “must be obeyed by the pa rties until it is reverse d by orderly and prope r proceedings.” Maness v. Meyers , 419 U.S. 449, 459 (1975) (int ernal quotation marks omitted). The party objecting to discharge under § 727(a)(6) must demonst rate that “the debtor received the order in que stion and failed to comply with its terms.” Standiferd
v. U.S. Trustee , 641 F.3d 1209, 1212 ( 10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation mark s omitted). The burden then shift s to the debtor to explain his non-compliance. Id

. The court “may not deny discha rge under § 727(a)(6)(A) unless i t finds that the debtor’s non-compliance was willful.” Id . (explaining that the Code does not grant the “substantial benefit” of disc harge “indiscriminately” and t hat “the opportunity for a completely unencumbered new be ginning is reserved only for th e honest but unfortunate debtor” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A party acts willfully when he f ails to comply with a court ord er even if he subjectively believed th e order was invalid. See Walker v. City of Birmingham , 388 U.S. 307, 316-17, 320 (1967) (upholding criminal contempt f or violation of injunction, even where injuncti on raised “substantial constitut ional issues”); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consum ers Union of the U.S., Inc. , 445 U.S. 375, 386 (1980) (holding that those subject to a court order “are expected to o bey that [order] until it is modified or reversed, even if t hey have proper grounds to ob ject to the order”). Thus, if a party “to whom a court directs an order believes tha t order is incorrect the remedy is to appeal, but, absent a stay, he must comply promptl y with the order11 pending appeal,” and parties “who make private determinations o f the law and refuse to obey an order genera lly risk” adverse rulings. Maness , 419 U.S. at 458; see also
Howat v. Kansas , 258 U.S. 181, 189–90 (1922) (e xplaining that court orders mus t be obeyed “however erroneous the act ion of the court may be,” unti l they are “reversed for error by orderly review” a nd “disobedience of them is conte mpt of [the court’s] lawful authority”). Here, the bankruptcy court found that the Trustee had satisfied its burden of establishing that the Raels viol ated the provision in the Sale Order requiring them to give the sale proceeds to Wells F argo, but that they had met th eir burden of showing that the violation was not willfu l because they acted in relian ce on the advice of their counsel. To prove their advice of counsel d efense, the Raels were requir ed to show that (1) they requested counsel’s advi ce about what to do with the p roceeds of the sale and communicated all relevant f acts to counsel; (2) counsel adv ised them not to give the proceeds to Wells Fargo and that it was legal not to pay We lls Fargo; and (3) they relied in good faith on counsel ’s advice in using the proceeds to pay other debts.
See C.E. Carlson, Inc. v. S.E.C , 859 F.2d 1429, 1436 ( 10th Cir. 1988) (listing elements of advice of counsel defense); In re Rupp v. Biorge , 536 B.R. 24, 30 (Bankr. D. Utah 2015) (same). The bankruptcy court’s conclusi on that the Raels relied on coun sel’s advice in violating the Sale Order was bas ed on its finding that they rel ied on counsel’s February and March 2015 letters a dvising them that, based on hi s view that the Sale12 Order was invalid, they could us e the proceeds of the sale to p ay their non-dischargeable debts to him a nd the IRS. But in reversing t he discharge determination, the district cour t found that the bankruptcy cou rt’s advice-of-counsel finding was clearly erroneous be cause it did not address the fa ct that the sale closed in April 2014 and the Raels were i n violation of the Sale Orderfor over ten months before receiving counsel’s advice. Our independent review of the record confir ms that the Raels di d not explain their failure to comply with the Sale Order between when the sa le closed and when they received counsel’s letters. While they testified that cou nsel had told them he questioned the validity of the Sa le Order before he sent the le tters advising them how to distribute the sale proceeds, there is no evidence indicatin g that he advised them between April 2014 and February 20 15 to ignore the clear requir ement of the Sale Order that they use the proceeds to pay Wells Fargo, not to men tion the Plan’s mandate that they pay Wells Fargo before paying any other credi tors, including the
IRS. We thus agree with the district court’s conclusion that the ban kruptcy court clearly erred in finding that t he Raels’ non-compliance was notwillful because it was based on the advice of counsel. 2 See Middleton v. Stephenson , 749 F.3d 1197, 1201

2 Having concluded that the ban kruptcy court’s advice of counsel finding was clearly erroneous, we need not a ddress the Trustee’s argument t hat the court further erred by not requiring the Raels to prove—in addition to the ot her elements of the advice of counsel defense—that counsel was independent. We rec ognize that this Circuit has held that to preva il on the advice of counsel defen se in SEC enforcement actions, counsel must be inde pendent or disinterested. See S.E.C. v. Kokesh ,13 (10th Cir. 2014) (explaining th at under clear error standard, r eversal is appropriate if a “finding lacks factual s upport in the record”); Takecare Corp. v. Takecare of Okla.,
Inc. , 889 F.2d 955, 957–58 (10th Ci r. 1989) (recognizing that “unde r certain circumstances, a party’s reasona ble reliance on the advice of c ounsel may defuse otherwise willful conduct,” but holding that defendant could no t prove reasonable reliance on the advice of counsel where there was no “showing o f what counsel advised defendant”); New Prods. Corp. v. Dickinson Wr ight PLLC (In re Modern Plastics Corp.) , 577 B.R. 690, 710 (W.D. Mich. 2017) (upholding bankruptcy cou rt ruling finding parties in contempt for violating an order requi ring them to make certain payments, concluding that the they “did not promptly co mply with the order” because they failed to make the r equired payment for several mo nths following entry of the order). And, because the Raels’ advice of counsel defense did not mitigate their willful violation of the Sal e Order, the bankruptcy court erred in granting their request for discharge.
IV. Award of Attorney Fees against Trustee The Raels further maintain that the district court erred in rev ersing the bankruptcy court’s award of attor ney’s fees against the Trustee as a discovery

834 F.3d 1158, 1167 ( 10th Cir. 2016) (requi ring independence fo r advice of counsel defense in securities fraud civil enforcement action), rev’d on other grounds , __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017); C.E. Carlson, Inc ., 859 F.2d at 1436 (same); S.E.C. v. Melchior , No. 90–C–1024J, 1993 WL 89141 , at *20 (D. Utah Jan. 14, 1993) (holding that “[d]efendants cannot claim t o reasonably rely on the advic e of counsel where counsel has a pecuniary interest in the offering and thus parti cipated in the allegedly violative scheme”). But this Ci rcuit has not applied that requ irement in the bankruptcy context, and we need not decide whether to do so her e.14 sanction, and the Trustee cross-a ppeals that order. We agree w ith the district court’s conclusion that the award is inc onsistent with the bankruptcy c ourt’s finding that the Trustee’s lack-of-knowledge obj ections were substantially justi fied. Accordingly, we reverse the fees order. Federal Rule of Civil Procedur e 37(a)(5)(A), which is made appl icable here by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Proce dure 7037, provides that, if a motion to compel discovery is granted, the court must require the party avoiding discovery to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses, i ncluding attorney fees. “But th e court must not order this payment” if the “nondisclo sure, response, or objection was substantially justified.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37( a)(5)(A)(ii). The Supreme Cour t has defined “substantially justified” as “not justified to a high degree” b ut “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood , 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the bankruptcy court’s substantial justification dete rmination and its decision to impose sanctions f or an abuse of discretion. See Sun River Energy, Inc. v. Nelson , 800 F.3d 1219, 1228 (10th Cir . 2015) (reviewing substantial justification determination unde r Fed. R. Civ. P . 37(c)(1) for abuse of discretion); Orjias v. Stevenson , 31 F.3d 995, 1005 (10t h Cir. 1994) (review ing imposition of sanctions for abuse of discreti on). A court abuses its discret ion when its decision is “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical , or manifestly unreasonable.” Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control , 165 F.3d 767, 777 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks15 omitted). A court also abuses its discretion if it bases its r uling “on an erroneous view of the law.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. , 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). Here, the Raels served request s for admission (“RFA”) on the Tr ustee that sought information related to t he dispute between the Raels and Wells Fargo, including whether Wells Fargo had a mortgage interest in or jud gment lien against their property. The Trustee obj ected to the RFAs on numerous g rounds, including lack of knowledge. In ruling on the Raels’ motion to compel, the bankruptcy court sustained one of the Trustee’s objections, ove rruled others, and, with respec t to the lack-of-knowledge objection, ord ered the Trustee to file amende d responses explaining what steps it took to comply with Rule 36’s reasonab le-inquiry requirement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4) (providi ng that a party answering RFA s “may assert lack of knowledge or information as a reason for fa iling to admit or deny only if the party states that it has made reasonable inquiry an d that the information it knows or can readily obtain is ins ufficient to enable it to adm it or deny”). As pertinent here, the court found that the Trustee’s lack-of-know ledge objection was “reasonably justified,” because t he RFAs may have sought inform ation outside the Trustee’s control and a party re sponding to RFAs is not require d to obtain responsive information from third parties to satisfy the reasonable-inquir y requirement. Aplt. App. Vol. I, at 61B-61C. Despite f inding that there was “subst antial justification [for] objecting,” the court orde red the Trustee to pay a portio n of the Raels’ attorney’s fees as a sanction fo r not providing an adequate rea sonable inquiry16 explanation. Id. at 61C-61D. The court denied t he Trustee’s motion to reconsid er, reiterating its conclusion that s anctions were warranted despit e its finding that the objection was “reasonably justif ied.” Aplee. App. at 1. On ap peal, the district court reversed the sanctions award, c oncluding that the bankruptcy co urt abused its discretion by ordering the Trust ee to pay the R aels’ attorney’s fees “when [it] simultaneously found the Trustee’ s response was justified.” Ap lt. App. Vol. V, at
1035-36. Initially, we reject the Raels’ contention that the bankruptcy court “misspoke” and did not mean to find that t he Trustee’s objection was subst antially justified. Aplt. Br. at 51. The bankruptcy court made that express findin g several times in its oral ruling on the motion to compe l and again in the order deny ing the Trustee’s motion to reconsider. We decline to second guess the meaning o f the court’s finding and conclude that th e record supports it. See G.J.B. & Assocs., Inc. v. Singleton , 913 F.2d 824, 831 (10th Cir. 1990) (appellate court should not second guess at the meaning of the district court’ s order). And, having concluded that the Trustee’s objection, though ultimately unsu ccessful, was substantially ju stified, the bankruptcy court lacked authority under Ru le 37 to impose sanctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(ii) (court “must not ” impose sanctions if the objec tion was substantially justified). Accordingly, the c ourt’s order was based on an err oneous view of the scope of its authority under Rule 37(a)(5)(A)(ii) and was there fore an abuse of discretion. See King v. Fleming , 899 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10t h Cir. 2018) (a court17 abuses its discretion if its discovery or sanctions order is ba sed on an erroneous view of the law (citing Cooter & Gell , 496 U.S. at 405)).
CONCLUSION The district court’s rulings are a ffirmed, and the case is rema nded to the district court with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy co urt for further proceedings consistent with t his order and judgment.

Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge