# Official Journal L 100/2019

| | ISSN 1977-0677 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 100 |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 6211 April 2019 |

ISSN 1977-0677

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 100

English edition

Legislation

Volume 6211 April 2019

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| Contents | | II   Non-legislative acts | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS |
| | * | Council Decision (EU) 2019/572 of 8 April 2019 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of an amendment to the Agreement between the United States of America and the European Community on cooperation in the regulation of civil aviation safety | 1 |
| | * | Council Decision (EU) 2019/573 of 8 April 2019 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union and its Member States, of the Third Additional Protocol to the Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part, to take account of the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union | 3 |
| | | REGULATIONS |
| | * | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/574 of 4 April 2019 entering a name in the register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications Paška sol (PDO) | 5 |
| | * | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/575 of 4 April 2019 conferring protection under Article 99 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the name Cebreros (PDO) | 6 |
| | * | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/576 of 10 April 2019 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate originating in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America | 7 |
| | | DECISIONS |
| | * | Council Decision (EU) 2019/577 of 8 April 2019 appointing an alternate member, proposed by the Republic of Cyprus, of the Committee of the Regions | 42 |
| | * | Council Decision (EU) 2019/578 of 8 April 2019 appointing an alternate member, proposed by the Kingdom of Denmark, of the Committee of the Regions | 43 |
| | * | Council Decision (EU) 2019/579 of 8 April 2019 appointing an alternate member, proposed by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, of the Committee of the Regions | 44 |
| | * | Council Decision (EU) 2019/580 of 8 April 2019 appointing two members and an alternate member, proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany, of the Committee of the Regions | 45 |
| | * | Council Decision (EU) 2019/581 of 8 April 2019 appointing an alternate member, proposed by the Hellenic Republic, of the Committee of the Regions | 46 |
| | * | Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/582 of 3 April 2019 confirming or amending the provisional calculation of the average specific emissions of CO2 and specific emissions targets for manufacturers of new light commercial vehicles for the calendar year 2017 and for the Volkswagen pool including its members for the calendar years 2014, 2015 and 2016 pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council
  (notified under document C(2019) 2342)

   (
  1
  ) | 47 |
| | * | Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/583 of 3 April 2019 confirming or amending the provisional calculation of the average specific emission of CO2 and specific emissions targets for manufacturers of passenger cars for the calendar year 2017 and for certain manufacturers belonging to the Volkswagen pool for the calendar years 2014, 2015 and 2016 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council
  (notified under document C(2019) 2359)

   (
  1
  ) | 66 |

Contents

II   Non-legislative acts

page

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

*

Council Decision (EU) 2019/572 of 8 April 2019 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of an amendment to the Agreement between the United States of America and the European Community on cooperation in the regulation of civil aviation safety

1

*

Council Decision (EU) 2019/573 of 8 April 2019 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union and its Member States, of the Third Additional Protocol to the Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part, to take account of the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union

3

REGULATIONS

*

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/574 of 4 April 2019 entering a name in the register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications Paška sol (PDO)

5

*

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/575 of 4 April 2019 conferring protection under Article 99 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the name Cebreros (PDO)

6

*

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/576 of 10 April 2019 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate originating in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America

7

DECISIONS

*

Council Decision (EU) 2019/577 of 8 April 2019 appointing an alternate member, proposed by the Republic of Cyprus, of the Committee of the Regions

42

*

Council Decision (EU) 2019/578 of 8 April 2019 appointing an alternate member, proposed by the Kingdom of Denmark, of the Committee of the Regions

43

*

Council Decision (EU) 2019/579 of 8 April 2019 appointing an alternate member, proposed by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, of the Committee of the Regions

44

*

Council Decision (EU) 2019/580 of 8 April 2019 appointing two members and an alternate member, proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany, of the Committee of the Regions

45

*

Council Decision (EU) 2019/581 of 8 April 2019 appointing an alternate member, proposed by the Hellenic Republic, of the Committee of the Regions

46

*

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/582 of 3 April 2019 confirming or amending the provisional calculation of the average specific emissions of CO2 and specific emissions targets for manufacturers of new light commercial vehicles for the calendar year 2017 and for the Volkswagen pool including its members for the calendar years 2014, 2015 and 2016 pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council
  (notified under document C(2019) 2342)

   (
  1
  )

2

(notified under document C(2019) 2342)

1

47

*

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/583 of 3 April 2019 confirming or amending the provisional calculation of the average specific emission of CO2 and specific emissions targets for manufacturers of passenger cars for the calendar year 2017 and for certain manufacturers belonging to the Volkswagen pool for the calendar years 2014, 2015 and 2016 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council
  (notified under document C(2019) 2359)

   (
  1
  )

2

(notified under document C(2019) 2359)

1

66

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| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance. |

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(1)   Text with EEA relevance.

1

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
| --- | --- |

EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.

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II Non-legislative acts

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

| 11.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 100/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 100/1

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COUNCIL DECISION (EU) 2019/572

of 8 April 2019

on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of an amendment to the Agreement between the United States of America and the European Community on cooperation in the regulation of civil aviation safety

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 100(2), in conjunction with point (a) of the second subparagraph of Article 218(6) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

Having regard to the consent of the European Parliament, (1)

Whereas:

| (1) | In accordance with Council Decision (EU) 2018/61 (2), Amendment 1 to the Agreement on cooperation in the regulation of civil aviation safety between the United States of America and the European Community (‘Amendment 1’) was signed on 13 December 2017, subject to its conclusion at a later date. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

In accordance with Council Decision (EU) 2018/61 (2), Amendment 1 to the Agreement on cooperation in the regulation of civil aviation safety between the United States of America and the European Community (‘Amendment 1’) was signed on 13 December 2017, subject to its conclusion at a later date.

| (2) | Amendment 1 extends the areas of cooperation between the Parties to the Agreement between the United States of America and the European Community on cooperation in the regulation of civil aviation safety (‘the Agreement’) where reciprocal acceptance of approvals and findings of compliance can apply, so as to allow for an optimised resource utilisation and commensurate cost savings while maintaining a high degree of safety in air transport. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Amendment 1 extends the areas of cooperation between the Parties to the Agreement between the United States of America and the European Community on cooperation in the regulation of civil aviation safety (‘the Agreement’) where reciprocal acceptance of approvals and findings of compliance can apply, so as to allow for an optimised resource utilisation and commensurate cost savings while maintaining a high degree of safety in air transport.

| (3) | Amendment 1 should be approved, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Amendment 1 should be approved,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Amendment 1 to the Agreement on cooperation in the regulation of civil aviation safety between the United States of America and the European Community is hereby approved on behalf of the Union. (3)

Article 2

The President of the Council shall, on behalf of the Union, give the notification provided for in Article 3 of Amendment 1.

Article 3

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Done at Luxembourg, 8 April 2019.

For the Council

The President

F. MOGHERINI

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(1)  Consent of 13 December 2018 (not yet published in the Official Journal).

1

(2)  Council Decision (EU) 2018/61 of 21 March 2017 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and provisional application of an amendment to the Agreement between the United States of America and the European Community on cooperation in the regulation of civil aviation safety (OJ L 11, 16.1.2018, p. 1).

2

(3)  The text of Amendment 1 has been published in OJ L 11, 16.1.2018, p. 3, together with the decision on signature.

3

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| 11.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 100/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 100/3

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COUNCIL DECISION (EU) 2019/573

of 8 April 2019

on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union and its Member States, of the Third Additional Protocol to the Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part, to take account of the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 91, Article 100(2), Articles 207 and 211, in conjunction with point (a) of the second subparagraph of Article 218(6) thereof,

Having regard to the Act of Accession of the Republic of Croatia, and in particular Article 6(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

Having regard to the consent of the European Parliament (1),

Whereas:

| (1) | The Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part (2) (the ‘Global Agreement’), was signed on 8 December 1997 and entered into force on 1 October 2000. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part (2) (the ‘Global Agreement’), was signed on 8 December 1997 and entered into force on 1 October 2000.

| (2) | In accordance with Article 6(2) of the Act of Accession of the Republic of Croatia, the accession of Croatia to the Global Agreement is to be agreed by means of a protocol to the Global Agreement concluded between the Council, acting unanimously on behalf of the Member States, and the United Mexican States. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

In accordance with Article 6(2) of the Act of Accession of the Republic of Croatia, the accession of Croatia to the Global Agreement is to be agreed by means of a protocol to the Global Agreement concluded between the Council, acting unanimously on behalf of the Member States, and the United Mexican States.

| (3) | On 14 September 2012, the Council authorised the Commission to open negotiations with the United Mexican States with a view to concluding the Third Additional Protocol to the Global Agreement to take account of the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union (the ‘Protocol’). The negotiations were successfully concluded and the Protocol was signed in accordance with Council Decision (EU) 2018/2024 (3) on 27 November 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 14 September 2012, the Council authorised the Commission to open negotiations with the United Mexican States with a view to concluding the Third Additional Protocol to the Global Agreement to take account of the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union (the ‘Protocol’). The negotiations were successfully concluded and the Protocol was signed in accordance with Council Decision (EU) 2018/2024 (3) on 27 November 2018.

| (4) | The Protocol should be approved, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The Protocol should be approved,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The Third Additional Protocol to the Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part, to take account of the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union is hereby approved on behalf of the Union and its Member States (4).

Article 2

The President of the Council shall, on behalf of the Union and its Member States, give the notification provided for in Article 5(2) of the Protocol (5).

Article 3

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Done at Luxembourg, 8 April 2019.

For the Council

The President

F. MOGHERINI

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(1)  Consent of 12 February 2019 (not yet published in the Official Journal).

1

(2)  
  OJ L 276, 28.10.2000, p. 45.

2

(3)  Council Decision (EU) 2018/2024 of 22 May 2018 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union and its Member States, and provisional application of the Third Additional Protocol to the Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part, to take account of the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union (OJ L 325, 20.12.2018, p. 1).

3

(4)  The text of the Protocol has been published in OJ L 325, 20.12.2018, p. 3, together with the decision on signature.

4

(5)  The date of entry into force of the Protocol will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union by the General Secretariat of the Council.

5

Official Journal of the European Union

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REGULATIONS

| 11.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 100/5 |
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11.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 100/5

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COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/574

of 4 April 2019

entering a name in the register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications ‘Paška sol’ (PDO)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (1), and in particular Article 52(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, Croatia's application to register the name ‘Paška sol’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, Croatia's application to register the name ‘Paška sol’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2).

| (2) | As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the name ‘Paška sol’ should therefore be entered in the register, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the name ‘Paška sol’ should therefore be entered in the register,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The name ‘Paška sol’ (PDO) is hereby entered in the register.

The name specified in the first paragraph denotes a product in Class 2.6. — salt, as listed in Annex XI to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2014 (3).

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 4 April 2019.

For the Commission,

On behalf of the President,

Phil HOGAN

Member of the Commission

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(1)  
  OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

1

(2)  
  OJ C 449, 13.12.2018, p. 17.

2

(3)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2014 of 13 June 2014 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (OJ L 179, 19.6.2014, p. 36).

3

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| 11.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 100/6 |
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11.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 100/6

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COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/575

of 4 April 2019

conferring protection under Article 99 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the name ‘Cebreros’ (PDO)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 (1), and in particular Article 99 thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | In accordance with Article 97(2) and (3) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, the Commission has examined the application to register the name ‘Cebreros’ sent by Spain and has published it in the Official Journal of the European Union (2). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

In accordance with Article 97(2) and (3) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, the Commission has examined the application to register the name ‘Cebreros’ sent by Spain and has published it in the Official Journal of the European Union (2).

| (2) | No statement of objection has been received by the Commission under Article 98 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

No statement of objection has been received by the Commission under Article 98 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

| (3) | In accordance with Article 99 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, the name ‘Cebreros’ should be protected and entered in the register referred to in Article 104 of that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

In accordance with Article 99 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, the name ‘Cebreros’ should be protected and entered in the register referred to in Article 104 of that Regulation.

| (4) | The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee for the Common Organisation of the Agricultural Markets, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee for the Common Organisation of the Agricultural Markets,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The name ‘Cebreros’ (PDO) is hereby protected.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 4 April 2019.

For the Commission,

On behalf of the President,

Phil HOGAN

Member of the Commission

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(1)  
  OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671.

1

(2)  
  OJ C 438, 5.12.2018, p. 2.

2

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| 11.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 100/7 |
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11.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 100/7

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COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/576

of 10 April 2019

imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate originating in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (1) and in particular Article 7 thereof,

After consulting the Member States,

Whereas:

1.   PROCEDURE

PROCEDURE

1.1.   Initiation

Initiation

| (1) | On 13 August 2018, the European Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports into the Union of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate originating in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America ‘the countries concerned’) on the basis of Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘the basic Regulation’). The Notice of Initiation (‘NoI’) was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 13 August 2018, the European Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports into the Union of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate originating in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America ‘the countries concerned’) on the basis of Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘the basic Regulation’). The Notice of Initiation (‘NoI’) was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2).

Official Journal of the European Union

2

| (2) | The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged on 29 June 2018 by Fertilizers Europe (‘the complainant’) on behalf of producers representing more than 50 % of the total Union production of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate (‘UAN’). The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged on 29 June 2018 by Fertilizers Europe (‘the complainant’) on behalf of producers representing more than 50 % of the total Union production of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate (‘UAN’). The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.

1.2.   Registration

Registration

| (3) | The Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration under Article 14(5a) of the basic Regulation by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/455 of 20 March 2019 (3) (‘the registration Regulation’). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration under Article 14(5a) of the basic Regulation by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/455 of 20 March 2019 (3) (‘the registration Regulation’).

3

1.3.   Interested parties

Interested parties

| (4) | In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited interested parties to contact it in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the complainant, known Union producers, the known exporting producers and the authorities of the Russian Federation (‘Russia’), Trinidad and Tobago (‘TT’), and the United States of America (‘US’), known importers and associations representing the interests of users and other associations known to be concerned about the initiation of the investigation and invited them to participate. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited interested parties to contact it in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the complainant, known Union producers, the known exporting producers and the authorities of the Russian Federation (‘Russia’), Trinidad and Tobago (‘TT’), and the United States of America (‘US’), known importers and associations representing the interests of users and other associations known to be concerned about the initiation of the investigation and invited them to participate.

| (5) | Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the investigation and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the investigation and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings.

| (6) | The co-operating exporting producers in Russia and US claimed that the complainants had no standing and that there was no sufficient evidence of dumping and injury to initiate the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The co-operating exporting producers in Russia and US claimed that the complainants had no standing and that there was no sufficient evidence of dumping and injury to initiate the investigation.

| (7) | The Commission rejected both claims. The Commission cross-checked and confirmed the conclusions contained in the Note to the file on standing available for inspection by interested parties that the complaint was lodged on behalf of producers representing more than 50 % of the total Union production of UAN. Moreover, the Commission carried out an examination of the complaint in accordance with Article 5 of the basic Regulation, coming to the conclusion that the requirements for initiation of an investigation were met, namely that the adequacy and accuracy of the evidence presented by the complainant was sufficient. According to Article 5(2) of the basic Regulation, a complaint shall contain such information as is reasonably available to the complainant on the factors indicated therein. On the basis of the evidence provided, as confirmed by the Commission's own assessment, that requirement was satisfied. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The Commission rejected both claims. The Commission cross-checked and confirmed the conclusions contained in the Note to the file on standing available for inspection by interested parties that the complaint was lodged on behalf of producers representing more than 50 % of the total Union production of UAN. Moreover, the Commission carried out an examination of the complaint in accordance with Article 5 of the basic Regulation, coming to the conclusion that the requirements for initiation of an investigation were met, namely that the adequacy and accuracy of the evidence presented by the complainant was sufficient. According to Article 5(2) of the basic Regulation, a complaint shall contain such information as is reasonably available to the complainant on the factors indicated therein. On the basis of the evidence provided, as confirmed by the Commission's own assessment, that requirement was satisfied.

1.4.   Sampling

Sampling

| (8) | In its Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

In its Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

1.4.1.   Sampling of the Union producers

Sampling of the Union producers

| (9) | In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had decided to limit to a reasonable number the Union producers that would be investigated by applying sampling and that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers. The Commission selected the provisional sample on the basis of the reported production and Union sales volume, by the Union producers, in the context of the pre-initiation standing assessment analysis. The provisional sample thus established consisted of three Union producers that accounted for around 70 % of Union production and sales according to the information available. Details of this provisional sample were made available in the file for inspection by interested parties and the Commission invited interested parties to comment. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had decided to limit to a reasonable number the Union producers that would be investigated by applying sampling and that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers. The Commission selected the provisional sample on the basis of the reported production and Union sales volume, by the Union producers, in the context of the pre-initiation standing assessment analysis. The provisional sample thus established consisted of three Union producers that accounted for around 70 % of Union production and sales according to the information available. Details of this provisional sample were made available in the file for inspection by interested parties and the Commission invited interested parties to comment.

| (10) | Shortly after initiation, one of the provisionally sampled producers, Yara Sluiskil B.V., informed the Commission that it did not want to cooperate. Moreover, two Union producers sent replies in response to the pre-initiation standing assessment after the publication of the Notice of Initiation. The Commission took into account those Union producers' data on production and sales in order to establish the final sample. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Shortly after initiation, one of the provisionally sampled producers, Yara Sluiskil B.V., informed the Commission that it did not want to cooperate. Moreover, two Union producers sent replies in response to the pre-initiation standing assessment after the publication of the Notice of Initiation. The Commission took into account those Union producers' data on production and sales in order to establish the final sample.

| (11) | Several interested parties submitted further comments with regard to the provisional sample. The Commission considered the comments and explained in the note added to the open file on 5 September 2018 why those comments did not have an impact on the final sample selection. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Several interested parties submitted further comments with regard to the provisional sample. The Commission considered the comments and explained in the note added to the open file on 5 September 2018 why those comments did not have an impact on the final sample selection.

| (12) | The Commission's approach to apply sampling, pursuant to Article 17 of the basic anti-dumping Regulation, on the basis of volume of production and sales of the like product in the Union during the investigation period, was consequently maintained. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The Commission's approach to apply sampling, pursuant to Article 17 of the basic anti-dumping Regulation, on the basis of volume of production and sales of the like product in the Union during the investigation period, was consequently maintained.

| (13) | Given that Yara Sluiskil B.V. did not wish to cooperate, the Commission decided to replace it with OCI Nitrogen. The final sample of Union producers, comprising AB Achema, Grupa Azoty Zaklady Azotowe Pulawy S.A. and OCI Nitrogen B.V., accounted for more than 50 % of the total Union production and sales volumes of the like product. The sample is representative of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Given that Yara Sluiskil B.V. did not wish to cooperate, the Commission decided to replace it with OCI Nitrogen. The final sample of Union producers, comprising AB Achema, Grupa Azoty Zaklady Azotowe Pulawy S.A. and OCI Nitrogen B.V., accounted for more than 50 % of the total Union production and sales volumes of the like product. The sample is representative of the Union industry.

1.4.2.   Sampling of importers

Sampling of importers

| (14) | To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

| (15) | Several unrelated importers made themselves known as interested parties, although only three provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In view of the low number of replies received, the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary. All three importers were invited to complete a questionnaire. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Several unrelated importers made themselves known as interested parties, although only three provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In view of the low number of replies received, the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary. All three importers were invited to complete a questionnaire.

1.4.3.   Sampling of exporting producers in Russia, TT and US

Sampling of exporting producers in Russia, TT and US

| (16) | To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all known exporting producers in Russia, TT and US to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, the Mission of Trinidad and Tobago to the European Union, and the Mission of the United States of America to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all known exporting producers in Russia, TT and US to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, the Mission of Trinidad and Tobago to the European Union, and the Mission of the United States of America to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

| (17) | Two exporting producers in Russia, one exporting producer in TT, and one exporting producer in US provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Two exporting producers in Russia, one exporting producer in TT, and one exporting producer in US provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample.

| (18) | In view of the low number of responses from exporting producers, the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

In view of the low number of responses from exporting producers, the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary.

| (19) | All known exporting producers concerned, and the authorities of the countries concerned, were informed on the selection of the companies to be investigated by note of 21 August 2018. No comments were received. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

All known exporting producers concerned, and the authorities of the countries concerned, were informed on the selection of the companies to be investigated by note of 21 August 2018. No comments were received.

1.5.   Replies to the questionnaire

Replies to the questionnaire

| (20) | The Commission sent questionnaires to the three sampled Union producers, the complainant, the three unrelated importers which had made themselves known, the four exporting producers in the countries concerned and all users' associations and economic operators which made themselves known and requested a questionnaire. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The Commission sent questionnaires to the three sampled Union producers, the complainant, the three unrelated importers which had made themselves known, the four exporting producers in the countries concerned and all users' associations and economic operators which made themselves known and requested a questionnaire.

| (21) | In the complaint, the complainant provided sufficient evidence of raw material distortions in Russia regarding the product concerned. Therefore, as announced in the Notice of Initiation, the investigation covers these raw material distortions to determine whether to apply the provisions of Article 7(2a) and 7(2b) of the basic Regulation with regard to Russia. For this reason, the Commission sent an additional questionnaire to the Government of Russia (‘GOR’). |
| --- | --- |

(21)

In the complaint, the complainant provided sufficient evidence of raw material distortions in Russia regarding the product concerned. Therefore, as announced in the Notice of Initiation, the investigation covers these raw material distortions to determine whether to apply the provisions of Article 7(2a) and 7(2b) of the basic Regulation with regard to Russia. For this reason, the Commission sent an additional questionnaire to the Government of Russia (‘GOR’).

| (22) | Questionnaire replies were received from the three sampled Union producers, Fertilizers Europe, three unrelated importers, the four exporting producers in the countries concerned and seventeen different economic operators, including some representing the interests of users. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Questionnaire replies were received from the three sampled Union producers, Fertilizers Europe, three unrelated importers, the four exporting producers in the countries concerned and seventeen different economic operators, including some representing the interests of users.

| (23) | A questionnaire reply was also received from the GOR. However, the GOR's reply was significantly incomplete and lacked the basic information needed by the Commission to examine the allegations of raw material distortions in Russia and to assess whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove injury. The GOR did not reply to the Commission's request with regard to an on-spot verification of the data provided in the questionnaire reply. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

A questionnaire reply was also received from the GOR. However, the GOR's reply was significantly incomplete and lacked the basic information needed by the Commission to examine the allegations of raw material distortions in Russia and to assess whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove injury. The GOR did not reply to the Commission's request with regard to an on-spot verification of the data provided in the questionnaire reply.

| (24) | The Commission informed the GOR by two notes of 22 October and 19 December 2018 of the deficiencies of the response to the questionnaire and the lack of reply to the Commission's request to verify the provided data. The Commission indicated that by not providing the necessary information, it would make its findings with regard to the existence of raw material distortions in Russia on the basis of the facts available. The GOR failed to provide the necessary information in response to those notes. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

The Commission informed the GOR by two notes of 22 October and 19 December 2018 of the deficiencies of the response to the questionnaire and the lack of reply to the Commission's request to verify the provided data. The Commission indicated that by not providing the necessary information, it would make its findings with regard to the existence of raw material distortions in Russia on the basis of the facts available. The GOR failed to provide the necessary information in response to those notes.

1.6.   Verification visits

Verification visits

| (25) | The Commission sought and verified all the information deemed necessary for a provisional determination of dumping, raw material distortions with regard to the product concerned in Russia, resulting injury and Union interest. Verification visits pursuant to Article 16 of the basic Regulation were carried out at the premises of the following companies:






  (a) | Union producers and their associations






  — | AB Achema, Jonava, Lithuania |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

(25)

The Commission sought and verified all the information deemed necessary for a provisional determination of dumping, raw material distortions with regard to the product concerned in Russia, resulting injury and Union interest. Verification visits pursuant to Article 16 of the basic Regulation were carried out at the premises of the following companies:

(a)

Union producers and their associations

—

AB Achema, Jonava, Lithuania

| — | Grupa Azoty Zaklady Azotowe Pulawy S. A., Pulawy, Poland |
| --- | --- |

—

Grupa Azoty Zaklady Azotowe Pulawy S. A., Pulawy, Poland

| — | OCI Nitrogen BV, Geleen, Netherlands |
| --- | --- |

—

OCI Nitrogen BV, Geleen, Netherlands

| — | Fertilizers Europe, Brussels, Belgium |
| --- | --- |

—

Fertilizers Europe, Brussels, Belgium

| (b) | Unrelated importers






  — | UnionInvivo, Paris, France |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

Unrelated importers

—

UnionInvivo, Paris, France

| — | Interore, Wavre, Belgium |
| --- | --- |

—

Interore, Wavre, Belgium

| (c) | Exporting producers: | Exporting producers in Russia: | Acron Group:






  — | PJSC Acron (‘Acron’), Veliky Novgorod, Russia (producer) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |

(c)

Exporting producers:

Exporting producers in Russia:

Acron Group:

—

PJSC Acron (‘Acron’), Veliky Novgorod, Russia (producer)

| — | Agronova Belgorod (‘Agronova’), Moscow, Russia (domestic trader) |
| --- | --- |

—

Agronova Belgorod (‘Agronova’), Moscow, Russia (domestic trader)

| | EuroChem Group:






  — | Novomoskovsky Azot, JSC, Novomoskovsk, Russia (producer) |
| --- | --- | --- |

EuroChem Group:

—

Novomoskovsky Azot, JSC, Novomoskovsk, Russia (producer)

| — | Nevinnomyssky Azot, JSC, Nevinnomyssk, Russia (producer) |
| --- | --- |

—

Nevinnomyssky Azot, JSC, Nevinnomyssk, Russia (producer)

| — | EuroChem Trading Russia, Moscow, Russia (domestic trader) |
| --- | --- |

—

EuroChem Trading Russia, Moscow, Russia (domestic trader)

| | Exporting producer in TT:






  — | Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) Limited (‘MTHL’), Point Lisas, TT |
| --- | --- | --- |

Exporting producer in TT:

—

Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) Limited (‘MTHL’), Point Lisas, TT

| | Exporting producer in US:






  — | CF Industries Holdings, Inc. (‘CFI’), Deerfield, Illinois, US |
| --- | --- | --- |

Exporting producer in US:

—

CF Industries Holdings, Inc. (‘CFI’), Deerfield, Illinois, US

| (d) | Related importers:






  — | Acron France SAS (‘Acron SAS’), Paris, France (importer related to Acron Group) |
| --- | --- | --- |

(d)

Related importers:

—

Acron France SAS (‘Acron SAS’), Paris, France (importer related to Acron Group)

| — | EuroChem Agro GmbH, Mannheim, Germany (importer related to EuroChem Group) |
| --- | --- |

—

EuroChem Agro GmbH, Mannheim, Germany (importer related to EuroChem Group)

| — | EuroChem Agro France SAS, Paris, France (importer related to EuroChem Group) |
| --- | --- |

—

EuroChem Agro France SAS, Paris, France (importer related to EuroChem Group)

| — | Helm AG (‘HAG’), Hamburg, Germany (importer related to MHTL) |
| --- | --- |

—

Helm AG (‘HAG’), Hamburg, Germany (importer related to MHTL)

| — | Helm Engrais France (‘HEF’), Paris, France (importer related to MHTL) |
| --- | --- |

—

Helm Engrais France (‘HEF’), Paris, France (importer related to MHTL)

| (e) | Related exporters:






  — | Acron Switzerland AG (‘Acron AG’), Baar, Switzerland (exporter related to Acron Group) |
| --- | --- | --- |

(e)

Related exporters:

—

Acron Switzerland AG (‘Acron AG’), Baar, Switzerland (exporter related to Acron Group)

| — | EuroChem Trading GmbH, Zug, Switzerland (exporter related to EuroChem Group). |
| --- | --- |

—

EuroChem Trading GmbH, Zug, Switzerland (exporter related to EuroChem Group).

1.7.   Investigation period and period considered

Investigation period and period considered

| (26) | The investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018 (‘the investigation period’ or ‘IP’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2015 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period considered’). |
| --- | --- |

(26)

The investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018 (‘the investigation period’ or ‘IP’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2015 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period considered’).

2.   PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

2.1.   Product concerned

Product concerned

| (27) | The product concerned is mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate in aqueous or ammoniacal solution originating in Russia, TT, and the US, currently falling under CN code 3102 80 00 (‘the product concerned’ or ‘UAN’). |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The product concerned is mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate in aqueous or ammoniacal solution originating in Russia, TT, and the US, currently falling under CN code 3102 80 00 (‘the product concerned’ or ‘UAN’).

| (28) | UAN is a liquid nitrogen fertilizer. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

UAN is a liquid nitrogen fertilizer.

| (29) | The nitrogen content is the most significant feature of the product concerned. It can vary between 28 % and 32 % of UAN. Such variation is usually obtained by adding more or less water to the solution. Most of the imported solutions tend to have a nitrogen content of 32 %. UAN with a nitrogen content of 32 % is more concentrated than UAN with 30 % or lower, and therefore cheaper to ship. However, whatever their nitrogen content, all solutions of urea and ammonium nitrate are considered to have the same basic physical and chemical characteristics and therefore constitute a single product |
| --- | --- |

(29)

The nitrogen content is the most significant feature of the product concerned. It can vary between 28 % and 32 % of UAN. Such variation is usually obtained by adding more or less water to the solution. Most of the imported solutions tend to have a nitrogen content of 32 %. UAN with a nitrogen content of 32 % is more concentrated than UAN with 30 % or lower, and therefore cheaper to ship. However, whatever their nitrogen content, all solutions of urea and ammonium nitrate are considered to have the same basic physical and chemical characteristics and therefore constitute a single product

2.2.   Like product

Like product

| (30) | UAN is a pure commodity product, and its quality and basic physical characteristics are identical whatever the country of origin. Union producers offer UAN with a nitrogen content ranging from 28 to 32 %. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

UAN is a pure commodity product, and its quality and basic physical characteristics are identical whatever the country of origin. Union producers offer UAN with a nitrogen content ranging from 28 to 32 %.

| (31) | The investigation showed that the following products have the same basic physical and chemical characteristics as well as the same basic uses:






  — | the product concerned; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(31)

The investigation showed that the following products have the same basic physical and chemical characteristics as well as the same basic uses:

—

the product concerned;

| — | the product produced and sold on the domestic market of the countries concerned; and |
| --- | --- |

—

the product produced and sold on the domestic market of the countries concerned; and

| — | the product produced and sold in the Union by the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

—

the product produced and sold in the Union by the Union industry.

| (32) | The Commission decided at this stage that those products are therefore like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The Commission decided at this stage that those products are therefore like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

2.3.   Claims regarding product scope

Claims regarding product scope

| (33) | One Union producer highlighted that adding other substances (‘additives’, notably ammonium sulphate but potentially also other substances) to UAN still entailed the resulting mixture to be UAN and fall under CN code 3102 80 00. The investigation showed that it is a common practice to add additives in small quantities and that the market still considers the resulting product to be UAN. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

One Union producer highlighted that adding other substances (‘additives’, notably ammonium sulphate but potentially also other substances) to UAN still entailed the resulting mixture to be UAN and fall under CN code 3102 80 00. The investigation showed that it is a common practice to add additives in small quantities and that the market still considers the resulting product to be UAN.

| (34) | Therefore, the Commission decided at this stage to clarify that the product scope of the investigation includes mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate in aqueous or ammoniacal solution that may have additives unless the additives are of the kind and of the quantity to make the mixture be classified under a different CN code. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Therefore, the Commission decided at this stage to clarify that the product scope of the investigation includes mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate in aqueous or ammoniacal solution that may have additives unless the additives are of the kind and of the quantity to make the mixture be classified under a different CN code.

3.   DUMPING

DUMPING

3.1.   Russia

Russia

3.1.1.   Exporting producers

Exporting producers

| (35) | According to the findings of the investigation, there were three groups of companies in Russia that produced UAN in the IP: Acron Group, Eurochem Group and Kuibyshev Azot. Of those, the two first groups exported UAN to the Union during the IP. Both groups cooperated in the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

According to the findings of the investigation, there were three groups of companies in Russia that produced UAN in the IP: Acron Group, Eurochem Group and Kuibyshev Azot. Of those, the two first groups exported UAN to the Union during the IP. Both groups cooperated in the investigation.

| (36) | In the case of Acron Group, there was one producer of UAN in the group operating in Russia. The domestic sales of the like product in the IP were made directly to unrelated customers and also indirectly via one related domestic trader. Export sales to the Union in the IP were made directly to independent customers or indirectly through either a related exporter located in Switzerland or a related importer located in France. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

In the case of Acron Group, there was one producer of UAN in the group operating in Russia. The domestic sales of the like product in the IP were made directly to unrelated customers and also indirectly via one related domestic trader. Export sales to the Union in the IP were made directly to independent customers or indirectly through either a related exporter located in Switzerland or a related importer located in France.

| (37) | In the case of Eurochem Group, there were two producers of UAN in the group operating in Russia. The domestic sales of the like product in the IP were all made via one of the two related domestic traders. Export sales to the Union in the IP were made solely through a related exporter located in Switzerland and subsequently via a related importer located in Germany. The German related importer was then further selling either directly to unrelated customers or via one of three related traders located in Bulgaria, France and Spain. The latter company still made some part of its sales via another related trader also located in Spain. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

In the case of Eurochem Group, there were two producers of UAN in the group operating in Russia. The domestic sales of the like product in the IP were all made via one of the two related domestic traders. Export sales to the Union in the IP were made solely through a related exporter located in Switzerland and subsequently via a related importer located in Germany. The German related importer was then further selling either directly to unrelated customers or via one of three related traders located in Bulgaria, France and Spain. The latter company still made some part of its sales via another related trader also located in Spain.

3.1.2.   Normal value

Normal value

| (38) | To calculate the normal value, the Commission first examined whether the total volume of domestic sales for each cooperating exporting producer was representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The investigation found that Acron was producing, selling domestically and exporting to the Union only UAN with nitrogen content of 32 % in the IP. The domestic sales are considered to be representative if the total domestic sales volume of the like product to independent customers on the domestic market per exporting producer represent at least 5 % of its total export sales volume of the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

To calculate the normal value, the Commission first examined whether the total volume of domestic sales for each cooperating exporting producer was representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The investigation found that Acron was producing, selling domestically and exporting to the Union only UAN with nitrogen content of 32 % in the IP. The domestic sales are considered to be representative if the total domestic sales volume of the like product to independent customers on the domestic market per exporting producer represent at least 5 % of its total export sales volume of the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period.

| (39) | On this basis, the sales of Acron of the like product on the domestic market were found not to be representative. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

On this basis, the sales of Acron of the like product on the domestic market were found not to be representative.

| (40) | As the like product was not sold in representative quantities on the domestic market, the Commission constructed the normal value for Acron in accordance with Article 2(3) and Article 2(6) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

As the like product was not sold in representative quantities on the domestic market, the Commission constructed the normal value for Acron in accordance with Article 2(3) and Article 2(6) of the basic Regulation.

| (41) | Normal value was thus constructed by adding the following to the average cost of manufacturing of the like product of the cooperating exporting producer during the investigation period:






  (a) | the weighted average selling, general and administrative (‘SG&A’) expenses incurred by the cooperating sampled exporting producer on domestic sales of the like product, in the ordinary course of trade, during the IP; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(41)

Normal value was thus constructed by adding the following to the average cost of manufacturing of the like product of the cooperating exporting producer during the investigation period:

(a)

the weighted average selling, general and administrative (‘SG&A’) expenses incurred by the cooperating sampled exporting producer on domestic sales of the like product, in the ordinary course of trade, during the IP; and

| (b) | the weighted average profit realised by the cooperating exporting producer on domestic sales of the like product, in the ordinary course of trade, during the IP. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the weighted average profit realised by the cooperating exporting producer on domestic sales of the like product, in the ordinary course of trade, during the IP.

| (42) | The costs of manufacturing used for construction of the normal value were adjusted as explained in recitals (52) to (55) and (59) to (60). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

The costs of manufacturing used for construction of the normal value were adjusted as explained in recitals (52) to (55) and (59) to (60).

| (43) | In case of Eurochem, on the basis of the representativity test described in recital (38), it was found that the like product was sold in representative quantities on the domestic market. The investigation found that in the IP Eurochem was producing, selling domestically and exporting to the Union only one product type, UAN with nitrogen content of 32 %.Therefore, the Commission did not have to examine whether the quantities of domestic sales for each product type that is identical or comparable with a product type sold for export to the Union were representative. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

In case of Eurochem, on the basis of the representativity test described in recital (38), it was found that the like product was sold in representative quantities on the domestic market. The investigation found that in the IP Eurochem was producing, selling domestically and exporting to the Union only one product type, UAN with nitrogen content of 32 %.Therefore, the Commission did not have to examine whether the quantities of domestic sales for each product type that is identical or comparable with a product type sold for export to the Union were representative.

| (44) | The Commission next defined the proportion of profitable sales to independent customers on the domestic market in order to decide whether to use actual domestic sales for the calculation of the normal value, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Commission next defined the proportion of profitable sales to independent customers on the domestic market in order to decide whether to use actual domestic sales for the calculation of the normal value, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation.

| (45) | The normal value is based on the actual domestic price for the one product type, irrespective of whether those sales are profitable or not, if:






  (a) | the sales volume of the product type, sold at a net sales price equal to or above the calculated cost of production, represent more than 80 % of the total sales volume of this product type; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(45)

The normal value is based on the actual domestic price for the one product type, irrespective of whether those sales are profitable or not, if:

(a)

the sales volume of the product type, sold at a net sales price equal to or above the calculated cost of production, represent more than 80 % of the total sales volume of this product type; and

| (b) | the weighted average sales price of that product type is equal to or higher than the unit cost of production. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the weighted average sales price of that product type is equal to or higher than the unit cost of production.

| (46) | In this case, the normal value is the weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales of that product type during the IP. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

In this case, the normal value is the weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales of that product type during the IP.

| (47) | The normal value is the actual domestic price per product type of only the profitable domestic sales of the product types during the IP, if:






  (a) | the volume of profitable sales of this product type represents 80 % or less of the total sales volume of this type: or |
| --- | --- | --- |

(47)

The normal value is the actual domestic price per product type of only the profitable domestic sales of the product types during the IP, if:

(a)

the volume of profitable sales of this product type represents 80 % or less of the total sales volume of this type: or

| (b) | the weighted average price of this product type is below the unit cost of production. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the weighted average price of this product type is below the unit cost of production.

| (48) | The analysis of domestic sales showed that less than 15 % of all domestic sales were profitable and that the weighted average sales price was lower than the cost of production. Accordingly, the normal value was calculated as a weighted average of the profitable sales only. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The analysis of domestic sales showed that less than 15 % of all domestic sales were profitable and that the weighted average sales price was lower than the cost of production. Accordingly, the normal value was calculated as a weighted average of the profitable sales only.

| (49) | The costs of manufacturing, being part of the cost of production used for the ordinary course of trade test (‘OCOT’) described in recitals (45) to (48), were adjusted as explained in the recitals (52) to (55) and (59) to (60). |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The costs of manufacturing, being part of the cost of production used for the ordinary course of trade test (‘OCOT’) described in recitals (45) to (48), were adjusted as explained in the recitals (52) to (55) and (59) to (60).

| (50) | Eurochem claimed that in the calculation of the net domestic sales price an additional allowance should be applied for the SG&A cost of the domestic related trader and for a part of the SG&A costs of the two producers within the same group. It claimed that these costs resulted from a different level of trade of the domestic sales in comparison with the export sales, namely from the fact that, through its related traders, the majority of domestic sales is sold directly to farmers. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Eurochem claimed that in the calculation of the net domestic sales price an additional allowance should be applied for the SG&A cost of the domestic related trader and for a part of the SG&A costs of the two producers within the same group. It claimed that these costs resulted from a different level of trade of the domestic sales in comparison with the export sales, namely from the fact that, through its related traders, the majority of domestic sales is sold directly to farmers.

| (51) | However, such an allowance would not reflect properly the net domestic sales price where normally the SG&A costs of related domestic traders and those of producers are not deducted so that it reflects properly the price paid or payable, at arm's length, in the domestic market. The claim was therefore rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

However, such an allowance would not reflect properly the net domestic sales price where normally the SG&A costs of related domestic traders and those of producers are not deducted so that it reflects properly the price paid or payable, at arm's length, in the domestic market. The claim was therefore rejected.

| (52) | Natural gas is the main raw material in the manufacturing process of UAN and represents a significant proportion, more than 50 % (4), of the total cost of production. Following the claim by the complainant and the findings of previous investigations concerning fertilizers originating in Russia, the Commission examined whether the costs of natural gas associated with the production of the product concerned were reasonably reflected in the records of the Russian exporting producers, in accordance with Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Natural gas is the main raw material in the manufacturing process of UAN and represents a significant proportion, more than 50 % (4), of the total cost of production. Following the claim by the complainant and the findings of previous investigations concerning fertilizers originating in Russia, the Commission examined whether the costs of natural gas associated with the production of the product concerned were reasonably reflected in the records of the Russian exporting producers, in accordance with Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation.

4

| (53) | The investigation found that natural gas prices in Russia are regulated by the State via federal laws and are based on policy objectives. Natural gas prices in Russia do not reflect normal market conditions. Under normal market conditions, prices are mostly set by production costs and profit expectations. In contrast, in Russia prices set by the State are directly applicable to Gazprom, the Russian state-owned gas provider. Gazprom is the biggest gas provider in the country with a market share above 50 % and therefore acts as price-setter. The investigation confirmed this price-setting behaviour, where all other gas providers sell at similarly low prices. In addition, Gazprom is the owner of the pipelines through which all gas, including the one supplied by the independent producers, is transported at tariffs which are also regulated. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The investigation found that natural gas prices in Russia are regulated by the State via federal laws and are based on policy objectives. Natural gas prices in Russia do not reflect normal market conditions. Under normal market conditions, prices are mostly set by production costs and profit expectations. In contrast, in Russia prices set by the State are directly applicable to Gazprom, the Russian state-owned gas provider. Gazprom is the biggest gas provider in the country with a market share above 50 % and therefore acts as price-setter. The investigation confirmed this price-setting behaviour, where all other gas providers sell at similarly low prices. In addition, Gazprom is the owner of the pipelines through which all gas, including the one supplied by the independent producers, is transported at tariffs which are also regulated.

| (54) | With regard to the gas adjustment, the GOR and the two Russian cooperating exporting producers commented that:






  (a) | the prices of natural gas in Russia are not distorted as they reflect normal market conditions, where prices are principally set by production costs and profit expectations; namely the regulated price covers all Gazprom's costs; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(54)

With regard to the gas adjustment, the GOR and the two Russian cooperating exporting producers commented that:

(a)

the prices of natural gas in Russia are not distorted as they reflect normal market conditions, where prices are principally set by production costs and profit expectations; namely the regulated price covers all Gazprom's costs;

| (b) | even if the regulated domestic natural gas price of Gazprom were found to be distorted, the gas adjustment should only be applied to the price of gas excluding transportation costs; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

even if the regulated domestic natural gas price of Gazprom were found to be distorted, the gas adjustment should only be applied to the price of gas excluding transportation costs;

| (c) | no adjustment should be applied to natural gas purchased from domestic suppliers independent from Gazprom; and |
| --- | --- |

(c)

no adjustment should be applied to natural gas purchased from domestic suppliers independent from Gazprom; and

| (d) | the Waidhaus price is not a proper indicator of the market-based cost of natural gas. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

the Waidhaus price is not a proper indicator of the market-based cost of natural gas.

| (55) | In response to those comments, the Commission provisionally concluded that:






  (a) | the findings of the investigation did not support the claim that the regulated domestic price covers all the costs of Gazprom. Although Gazprom is a profitable company according to its audited accounts, the profits are generated by the company's export sales due to export prices being much higher than domestic prices. Furthermore, the calculation of the level of the regulated domestic price (5) takes into account as one of the factors the projected profits from the supply of gas for export. Therefore, it can be assumed that if Gazprom only had domestic sales, it would not be profitable. In that respect, the Commission observed that, due to the GOR's lack of cooperation, the Commission was unable to examine the details of the calculation of domestic regulated price for Gazprom during the IP. Thus, the Commission concluded that the GOR's intervention on the gas market affects the reliability of Gazprom's reported costs. Indeed, but for this intervention, Gazprom would operate on the basis normal commercial considerations, based on recovery of costs and profit, also with respect to its domestic sales. No evidence was brought to the Commission's attention showing that prices of natural gas were freely negotiated between the both cooperating exporting producers and their suppliers, which are directed to follow the regulated domestic price. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(55)

In response to those comments, the Commission provisionally concluded that:

(a)

the findings of the investigation did not support the claim that the regulated domestic price covers all the costs of Gazprom. Although Gazprom is a profitable company according to its audited accounts, the profits are generated by the company's export sales due to export prices being much higher than domestic prices. Furthermore, the calculation of the level of the regulated domestic price (5) takes into account as one of the factors the projected profits from the supply of gas for export. Therefore, it can be assumed that if Gazprom only had domestic sales, it would not be profitable. In that respect, the Commission observed that, due to the GOR's lack of cooperation, the Commission was unable to examine the details of the calculation of domestic regulated price for Gazprom during the IP. Thus, the Commission concluded that the GOR's intervention on the gas market affects the reliability of Gazprom's reported costs. Indeed, but for this intervention, Gazprom would operate on the basis normal commercial considerations, based on recovery of costs and profit, also with respect to its domestic sales. No evidence was brought to the Commission's attention showing that prices of natural gas were freely negotiated between the both cooperating exporting producers and their suppliers, which are directed to follow the regulated domestic price.

5

| (b) | according to the information received from the Russian cooperating exporting producers (6), the Russian State also regulates transportation tariffs (including those of independent companies) if the gas pipelines owned by Gazprom are used (7). The Russian State also regulates the prices of logistic support services and supply and services fees. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

according to the information received from the Russian cooperating exporting producers (6), the Russian State also regulates transportation tariffs (including those of independent companies) if the gas pipelines owned by Gazprom are used (7). The Russian State also regulates the prices of logistic support services and supply and services fees.

6

7

| (c) | as explained in the recital (53), taking into account the dominant position of Gazprom on the Russian gas market, independent suppliers of gas follow the regulated price and thus sell at similarly low levels. This is also confirmed by the audited accounts of the biggest private natural gas supplier in Russia – Novatek (8). |
| --- | --- |

(c)

as explained in the recital (53), taking into account the dominant position of Gazprom on the Russian gas market, independent suppliers of gas follow the regulated price and thus sell at similarly low levels. This is also confirmed by the audited accounts of the biggest private natural gas supplier in Russia – Novatek (8).

8

| (d) | The Waidhaus price was found to be a proper benchmark in previous investigations in which a gas adjustment was made (9). Furthermore, in the IP the level of the Waidhaus price was in a close range to other important price quotations in Europe (UK Heren NBP Index, Netherlands TTF DA Heren Index) (10). Finally, the Commission considered that the US price (US Henry Hub Index), proposed by the Russian interested parties as an alternative benchmark, would not be appropriate taking into account the different geographical region, the different type of natural gas sources (such as shale gas) and the limited possibilities of the US to export natural gas in gaseous form (compressed natural gas or CNG). |
| --- | --- |

(d)

The Waidhaus price was found to be a proper benchmark in previous investigations in which a gas adjustment was made (9). Furthermore, in the IP the level of the Waidhaus price was in a close range to other important price quotations in Europe (UK Heren NBP Index, Netherlands TTF DA Heren Index) (10). Finally, the Commission considered that the US price (US Henry Hub Index), proposed by the Russian interested parties as an alternative benchmark, would not be appropriate taking into account the different geographical region, the different type of natural gas sources (such as shale gas) and the limited possibilities of the US to export natural gas in gaseous form (compressed natural gas or CNG).

9

10

| (56) | Finally, the GOR and the Russian cooperating exporting producers invoked a recent ruling of the WTO panel in the dispute between Russia and Ukraine in ‘DS493 - Ukraine - Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate’ which rejected the gas adjustment made by Ukraine. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Finally, the GOR and the Russian cooperating exporting producers invoked a recent ruling of the WTO panel in the dispute between Russia and Ukraine in ‘DS493 - Ukraine - Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate’ which rejected the gas adjustment made by Ukraine.

| (57) | It should be noted that the WTO panel report in DS493 concerns a dispute between Russia and Ukraine whereby Russia challenged the determinations reached by Ukraine. The Union was not involved in that case. As noted by the Panel in that case, the question of whether the records of the exporters or producers reasonably reflect the costs associated with production and sale of the product under consideration ‘is a question which needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the evidence before the investigating authority, and the determination that it makes’. (11) While this in itself already shows the irrelevance of the panel report for the current investigation, the Commission further notes that the panel report is currently under appeal. Therefore, the Commission rejects the comment relating to the panel report. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

It should be noted that the WTO panel report in DS493 concerns a dispute between Russia and Ukraine whereby Russia challenged the determinations reached by Ukraine. The Union was not involved in that case. As noted by the Panel in that case, the question of whether the records of the exporters or producers reasonably reflect the costs associated with production and sale of the product under consideration ‘is a question which needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the evidence before the investigating authority, and the determination that it makes’. (11) While this in itself already shows the irrelevance of the panel report for the current investigation, the Commission further notes that the panel report is currently under appeal. Therefore, the Commission rejects the comment relating to the panel report.

11

| (58) | For all those reasons, the Commission rejected those claims and considered the gas adjustment warranted under Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation as confirmed by the Court of Justice (12). |
| --- | --- |

(58)

For all those reasons, the Commission rejected those claims and considered the gas adjustment warranted under Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation as confirmed by the Court of Justice (12).

12

| (59) | Following those findings, the Commission, as in previous investigations concerning fertilizers originating in Russia, adjusted the Russian cost of natural gas by replacing the distorted Russian domestic price with an undistorted international benchmark price (‘gas adjustment’). As a benchmark price, the Commission used the so-called Waidhaus price, which is the price of exported Russian gas at the German/Czech border. The price was duly adjusted to ex works-level of the Russian producers. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

Following those findings, the Commission, as in previous investigations concerning fertilizers originating in Russia, adjusted the Russian cost of natural gas by replacing the distorted Russian domestic price with an undistorted international benchmark price (‘gas adjustment’). As a benchmark price, the Commission used the so-called Waidhaus price, which is the price of exported Russian gas at the German/Czech border. The price was duly adjusted to ex works-level of the Russian producers.

| (60) | There are four sequential intermediate inputs in the production of UAN (i.e. ammonia, nitric acid, ammonium nitrate solution and urea). Natural gas is used to manufacture ammonia. After adjusting the cost of natural gas in the cost of manufacturing of ammonia, the Commission replaced the adjusted cost of manufacturing of ammonia in the cost of manufacturing of the second intermediate product, nitric acid, of which ammonia is a direct raw material. This ‘cascade effect’ went on, allowing the gas adjustment to be passed-on to the ammonium nitrate solution, then to urea and finally to UAN. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

There are four sequential intermediate inputs in the production of UAN (i.e. ammonia, nitric acid, ammonium nitrate solution and urea). Natural gas is used to manufacture ammonia. After adjusting the cost of natural gas in the cost of manufacturing of ammonia, the Commission replaced the adjusted cost of manufacturing of ammonia in the cost of manufacturing of the second intermediate product, nitric acid, of which ammonia is a direct raw material. This ‘cascade effect’ went on, allowing the gas adjustment to be passed-on to the ammonium nitrate solution, then to urea and finally to UAN.

| (61) | Because of the high profitability of Acron's domestic sales, the gas adjustment did not impact the normal value calculated for Acron. All of Acron's domestic transactions of the company still remained profitable after the gas adjustment. Therefore, in the construction of the normal value for Acron, as described in recital (41), the increase in the cost of manufacturing was exactly counterbalanced by a decrease in the profit made on the profitable domestic sales. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

Because of the high profitability of Acron's domestic sales, the gas adjustment did not impact the normal value calculated for Acron. All of Acron's domestic transactions of the company still remained profitable after the gas adjustment. Therefore, in the construction of the normal value for Acron, as described in recital (41), the increase in the cost of manufacturing was exactly counterbalanced by a decrease in the profit made on the profitable domestic sales.

3.1.3.   Export price

Export price

| (62) | As explained in recitals (36) to (37), the cooperating Russian exporting producers exported to the Union either directly to independent customers or through related companies acting as importers, exporters or traders. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

As explained in recitals (36) to (37), the cooperating Russian exporting producers exported to the Union either directly to independent customers or through related companies acting as importers, exporters or traders.

| (63) | Where the exporting producers exported the product concerned directly to independent customers in the Union, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Where the exporting producers exported the product concerned directly to independent customers in the Union, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.

| (64) | Where the exporting producers exported the product concerned to the Union through related companies acting as an importer, the export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. In this case, adjustments to the price were made for all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG&A expenses and dilution costs; and for a reasonable profit. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

Where the exporting producers exported the product concerned to the Union through related companies acting as an importer, the export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. In this case, adjustments to the price were made for all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG&A expenses and dilution costs; and for a reasonable profit.

| (65) | With regard to dilution costs, specific for this case, the Russian exporting producers exported only UAN with a nitrogen content of 32 % during the IP. The related importers, however, sold to the independent customers UAN with a nitrogen content of either 32 % or less. Therefore, where the product concerned was diluted with water to achieve lower nitrogen content, the adjustment mentioned in recital (64) also included the additional costs of dilution incurred by the related importer. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

With regard to dilution costs, specific for this case, the Russian exporting producers exported only UAN with a nitrogen content of 32 % during the IP. The related importers, however, sold to the independent customers UAN with a nitrogen content of either 32 % or less. Therefore, where the product concerned was diluted with water to achieve lower nitrogen content, the adjustment mentioned in recital (64) also included the additional costs of dilution incurred by the related importer.

3.1.4.   Comparison

Comparison

| (66) | The Commission compared the normal value and the export price of the Russian cooperating exporting producers on an ex-works basis. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Commission compared the normal value and the export price of the Russian cooperating exporting producers on an ex-works basis.

| (67) | Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments were made for import charges and indirect taxes; discounts, rebates and differences in quantities; transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs; credit cost; SG&A costs of the related exporters including mark-up. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments were made for import charges and indirect taxes; discounts, rebates and differences in quantities; transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs; credit cost; SG&A costs of the related exporters including mark-up.

3.1.5.   Dumping margins

Dumping margins

| (68) | For the Russian exporting producers, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of the like product with the weighted average export price of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and 2(12) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

For the Russian exporting producers, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of the like product with the weighted average export price of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and 2(12) of the basic Regulation.

| (69) | On that basis, the provisional weighted average dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows: 31,9 % for Acron and 34,0 % for Eurochem. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

On that basis, the provisional weighted average dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows: 31,9 % for Acron and 34,0 % for Eurochem.

| (70) | The CIF price used to calculate the dumping margins was constructed for each transaction (based on transfer prices in case of related importer resales) on the border where custom clearance took place, which might not be the same border where the goods physically crossed the Union border. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

The CIF price used to calculate the dumping margins was constructed for each transaction (based on transfer prices in case of related importer resales) on the border where custom clearance took place, which might not be the same border where the goods physically crossed the Union border.

| (71) | For all other potential exporting producers in Russia, the Commission established the dumping margin on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. To this end, the Commission determined the level of cooperation of the Russian exporting producers. The level of cooperation is the volume of exports of the cooperating exporting producers to the Union expressed as proportion of the total export volume — as reported in Eurostat import statistics — from the country concerned to the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

For all other potential exporting producers in Russia, the Commission established the dumping margin on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. To this end, the Commission determined the level of cooperation of the Russian exporting producers. The level of cooperation is the volume of exports of the cooperating exporting producers to the Union expressed as proportion of the total export volume — as reported in Eurostat import statistics — from the country concerned to the Union.

| (72) | The exports of the Russian cooperating exporting producers constituted 100 % of the total exports from Russia to the Union during the IP. On that basis, the Commission decided to base the residual dumping margin at the level of the cooperating company with the highest dumping margin, namely Eurochem Group. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

The exports of the Russian cooperating exporting producers constituted 100 % of the total exports from Russia to the Union during the IP. On that basis, the Commission decided to base the residual dumping margin at the level of the cooperating company with the highest dumping margin, namely Eurochem Group.

| (73) | The provisional dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:






  Company | Provisional dumping margin |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Acron Group | 31,9 % |
| Eurochem Group | 34,0 % |
| All other companies | 34,0 % |

(73)

The provisional dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

Company

Provisional dumping margin

Acron Group

31,9 %

Eurochem Group

34,0 %

All other companies

34,0 %

3.2.   Trinidad and Tobago

Trinidad and Tobago

3.2.1.   Normal value

Normal value

| (74) | MHTL, the cooperating exporting producer, appeared to be the only producer of the product concerned in TT during the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

MHTL, the cooperating exporting producer, appeared to be the only producer of the product concerned in TT during the investigation period.

| (75) | The Commission first examined whether MHTL's total volume of domestic sales was representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Commission first examined whether MHTL's total volume of domestic sales was representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation.

| (76) | As there were no sales of a like product on the domestic market, the Commission constructed the normal value in accordance with Article 2(3) and 2(6)(b) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

As there were no sales of a like product on the domestic market, the Commission constructed the normal value in accordance with Article 2(3) and 2(6)(b) of the basic Regulation.

| (77) | The normal value was constructed by adding the following to the average cost of production of the like product of the cooperating exporting producer during the investigation period:






  (a) | the actual amounts of SG&A expenses applicable to production and sales, in the ordinary course of trade, of the same general category of products incurred by MHTL in the domestic market of TT; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(77)

The normal value was constructed by adding the following to the average cost of production of the like product of the cooperating exporting producer during the investigation period:

(a)

the actual amounts of SG&A expenses applicable to production and sales, in the ordinary course of trade, of the same general category of products incurred by MHTL in the domestic market of TT;

| (b) | the actual amount of profit applicable to production and sales, in the ordinary course of trade, of the same general category of products realised by MHTL in the domestic market of TT. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the actual amount of profit applicable to production and sales, in the ordinary course of trade, of the same general category of products realised by MHTL in the domestic market of TT.

| (78) | In its post-verification submission of 12 December 2018, MHTL commented that the Commission should use the SG&A applicable to the production and sales, in the ordinary course of trade, of the same general category of products it had incurred in the domestic market of TT. Since MHTL provided sufficient justification that such approach would be in line with Article 2(3) and (6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission accepted this claim. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

In its post-verification submission of 12 December 2018, MHTL commented that the Commission should use the SG&A applicable to the production and sales, in the ordinary course of trade, of the same general category of products it had incurred in the domestic market of TT. Since MHTL provided sufficient justification that such approach would be in line with Article 2(3) and (6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission accepted this claim.

| (79) | In accordance with Article 2(3) and 2(6)(b), the Commission also used the profits made by MHTL on sales, in the ordinary course of trade, of the same product category as mentioned in recital (78). |
| --- | --- |

(79)

In accordance with Article 2(3) and 2(6)(b), the Commission also used the profits made by MHTL on sales, in the ordinary course of trade, of the same product category as mentioned in recital (78).

3.2.2.   Export price

Export price

| (80) | MHTL exported to the Union only via related companies acting as importers in the investigation period. All sales to the Union were carried out via a related importer in Germany. This related importer sold the product concerned to independent customers in Germany or to related companies in France and Spain, which in turn sold the product concerned to independent customers on their respective national markets. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

MHTL exported to the Union only via related companies acting as importers in the investigation period. All sales to the Union were carried out via a related importer in Germany. This related importer sold the product concerned to independent customers in Germany or to related companies in France and Spain, which in turn sold the product concerned to independent customers on their respective national markets.

| (81) | Therefore, the export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. In this case, adjustments to the price were made for all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG&A expenses and dilution and mixing costs; and for a reasonable profit. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Therefore, the export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. In this case, adjustments to the price were made for all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG&A expenses and dilution and mixing costs; and for a reasonable profit.

| (82) | With regard to the dilution and mixing costs, specific for this case, MHTL exported only UAN with a nitrogen content of 32 % during the investigation period. The related importers, however, sold to the independent customers UAN with a nitrogen content of either 32 % or less. Therefore, in case where the product concerned was diluted with water or mixed with sulphur to achieve lower nitrogen content, the adjustment mentioned in recital (81) also included the additional costs of dilution and mixing incurred by the related importer. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

With regard to the dilution and mixing costs, specific for this case, MHTL exported only UAN with a nitrogen content of 32 % during the investigation period. The related importers, however, sold to the independent customers UAN with a nitrogen content of either 32 % or less. Therefore, in case where the product concerned was diluted with water or mixed with sulphur to achieve lower nitrogen content, the adjustment mentioned in recital (81) also included the additional costs of dilution and mixing incurred by the related importer.

3.2.3.   Comparison

Comparison

| (83) | The Commission compared MHTL's normal value and export price on an ex-works basis. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

The Commission compared MHTL's normal value and export price on an ex-works basis.

| (84) | Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments were made for discounts, rebates and differences in quantities; transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs, and credit cost. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments were made for discounts, rebates and differences in quantities; transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs, and credit cost.

3.2.4.   Dumping margin

Dumping margin

| (85) | For MHTL, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of the like product with the weighted average export price of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

For MHTL, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of the like product with the weighted average export price of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.

| (86) | On that basis, the provisional weighted average dumping margin expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, amounts to 55,9 %. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

On that basis, the provisional weighted average dumping margin expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, amounts to 55,9 %.

| (87) | For all other exporting producers in TT, should there be any besides MHTL, the Commission established the dumping margin on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. To this end, the Commission determined the level of cooperation of the exporting producers. The level of cooperation is the volume of exports of the cooperating exporting producer to the Union expressed as proportion of the total export volume — as reported in Eurostat import statistics — from TT to the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

For all other exporting producers in TT, should there be any besides MHTL, the Commission established the dumping margin on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. To this end, the Commission determined the level of cooperation of the exporting producers. The level of cooperation is the volume of exports of the cooperating exporting producer to the Union expressed as proportion of the total export volume — as reported in Eurostat import statistics — from TT to the Union.

| (88) | The level of cooperation in this case is high because the exports of the cooperating exporting producer, namely MHTL, constituted 100 % of the total exports from TT to the Union during the investigation period. On that basis, the Commission decided to base the residual dumping margin at the level of MHTL. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

The level of cooperation in this case is high because the exports of the cooperating exporting producer, namely MHTL, constituted 100 % of the total exports from TT to the Union during the investigation period. On that basis, the Commission decided to base the residual dumping margin at the level of MHTL.

| (89) | The provisional dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:






  Company | Provisional dumping margin |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) Limited | 55,9 % |
| All other companies | 55,9 % |

(89)

The provisional dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

Company

Provisional dumping margin

Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) Limited

55,9 %

All other companies

55,9 %

3.3.   United States of America

United States of America

3.3.1.   Normal value

Normal value

| (90) | In the complaint, the complainant provided information that there are at least two producers of UAN in the US. The investigation confirmed that there are more producers of the product concerned than the sole cooperating exporting producer, CFI. It was, however, also apparent that only CFI exported the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

In the complaint, the complainant provided information that there are at least two producers of UAN in the US. The investigation confirmed that there are more producers of the product concerned than the sole cooperating exporting producer, CFI. It was, however, also apparent that only CFI exported the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period.

| (91) | The Commission first examined whether CFI's total volume of domestic sales was representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales are representative if the total domestic sales volume of the like product to independent customers on the domestic market per exporting producer represent at least 5 % of its total export sales volume of the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period. On this basis, the total sales of CFI of the like product on the domestic market were representative. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

The Commission first examined whether CFI's total volume of domestic sales was representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales are representative if the total domestic sales volume of the like product to independent customers on the domestic market per exporting producer represent at least 5 % of its total export sales volume of the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period. On this basis, the total sales of CFI of the like product on the domestic market were representative.

| (92) | The Commission determined that CFI exported only one product type of UAN to the Union in the investigation period, namely UAN with nitrogen content of 32 %. The Commission subsequently identified the product types sold domestically by CFI that were identical or comparable with the product type sold for export to the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

The Commission determined that CFI exported only one product type of UAN to the Union in the investigation period, namely UAN with nitrogen content of 32 %. The Commission subsequently identified the product types sold domestically by CFI that were identical or comparable with the product type sold for export to the Union.

| (93) | The Commission then examined whether the domestic sales of CFI on its domestic market for the product type that is identical or comparable with the product type sold for export to the Union were representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales of a product type are representative if the total volume of domestic sales of that product type to independent customers during the investigation period represents at least 5 % of the total volume of export sales of the identical or comparable product type to the Union. The Commission established that the domestic sales of the product type identical or comparable with the product type sold for export to the Union were representative during the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The Commission then examined whether the domestic sales of CFI on its domestic market for the product type that is identical or comparable with the product type sold for export to the Union were representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales of a product type are representative if the total volume of domestic sales of that product type to independent customers during the investigation period represents at least 5 % of the total volume of export sales of the identical or comparable product type to the Union. The Commission established that the domestic sales of the product type identical or comparable with the product type sold for export to the Union were representative during the investigation period.

| (94) | The Commission next defined the proportion of profitable sales to independent customers on the domestic market for the product type in question during the investigation period in order to decide whether to use actual domestic sales for the calculation of the normal value, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

The Commission next defined the proportion of profitable sales to independent customers on the domestic market for the product type in question during the investigation period in order to decide whether to use actual domestic sales for the calculation of the normal value, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation.

| (95) | The normal value is based on the actual domestic price per product type, irrespective of whether those sales are profitable or not, if:






  (a) | the sales volume of the product type, sold at a net sales price equal to or above the calculated cost of production, represents more than 80 % of the total sales volume of this product type; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(95)

The normal value is based on the actual domestic price per product type, irrespective of whether those sales are profitable or not, if:

(a)

the sales volume of the product type, sold at a net sales price equal to or above the calculated cost of production, represents more than 80 % of the total sales volume of this product type; and

| (b) | the weighted average sales price of that product type is equal to or higher than the unit cost of production. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the weighted average sales price of that product type is equal to or higher than the unit cost of production.

| (96) | In this case, the normal value is the weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales of that product type during the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

In this case, the normal value is the weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales of that product type during the investigation period.

| (97) | The normal value is the actual domestic price per product type of only the profitable domestic sales of the product types during the investigation period, if:






  (a) | the volume of profitable sales of the product type represents 80 % or less of the total sales volume of this type, or |
| --- | --- | --- |

(97)

The normal value is the actual domestic price per product type of only the profitable domestic sales of the product types during the investigation period, if:

(a)

the volume of profitable sales of the product type represents 80 % or less of the total sales volume of this type, or

| (b) | the weighted average price of this product type is below the unit cost of production. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the weighted average price of this product type is below the unit cost of production.

| (98) | The analysis of domestic sales showed that 60 to 80 % (13) of all domestic sales of the product type that is identical or comparable with the product type sold for export to the Union were profitable and that the weighted average sales price was higher than the cost of production. Accordingly, the normal value was calculated as a weighted average of the profitable sales only. |
| --- | --- |

(98)

The analysis of domestic sales showed that 60 to 80 % (13) of all domestic sales of the product type that is identical or comparable with the product type sold for export to the Union were profitable and that the weighted average sales price was higher than the cost of production. Accordingly, the normal value was calculated as a weighted average of the profitable sales only.

13

3.3.2.   Export price

Export price

| (99) | CFI exported to the Union directly to independent customers. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

CFI exported to the Union directly to independent customers.

| (100) | In this case, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

In this case, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.

3.3.3.   Comparison

Comparison

| (101) | The Commission compared CFI's normal value and the export on an ex-works basis. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

The Commission compared CFI's normal value and the export on an ex-works basis.

| (102) | Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments were made for import charges and indirect taxes; discounts, rebates and differences in quantities; transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs and credit cost. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments were made for import charges and indirect taxes; discounts, rebates and differences in quantities; transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs and credit cost.

3.3.4.   Dumping margin

Dumping margin

| (103) | For CFI, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of the respective type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

For CFI, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of the respective type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.

| (104) | On that basis, the provisional weighted average dumping margin expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, amounts to 37,3 %. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

On that basis, the provisional weighted average dumping margin expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, amounts to 37,3 %.

| (105) | For all other exporting producers in the US, should there be any besides the apparent only exporting producer that is cooperating with the investigation (CFI), the Commission established the dumping margin on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. To this end, the Commission determined the level of cooperation of the exporting producers. The level of cooperation is the volume of exports of the cooperating exporting producers to the Union expressed as proportion of the total export volume — as reported in Eurostat import statistics — from the US to the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

For all other exporting producers in the US, should there be any besides the apparent only exporting producer that is cooperating with the investigation (CFI), the Commission established the dumping margin on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. To this end, the Commission determined the level of cooperation of the exporting producers. The level of cooperation is the volume of exports of the cooperating exporting producers to the Union expressed as proportion of the total export volume — as reported in Eurostat import statistics — from the US to the Union.

| (106) | The level of cooperation in this case is high because CFI's exports constituted 100 % of the total exports from the US to the Union during the investigation period. On this basis, the Commission decided to base the residual dumping margin at the level of the cooperating exporting producer, namely CFI. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

The level of cooperation in this case is high because CFI's exports constituted 100 % of the total exports from the US to the Union during the investigation period. On this basis, the Commission decided to base the residual dumping margin at the level of the cooperating exporting producer, namely CFI.

| (107) | The provisional dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:






  Company | Provisional dumping margin |
| --- | --- | --- |
| CF Industries Holdings, Inc. | 37,3 % |
| All other companies | 37,3 % |

(107)

The provisional dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

Company

Provisional dumping margin

CF Industries Holdings, Inc.

37,3 %

All other companies

37,3 %

4.   INJURY

INJURY

4.1.   Definition of the Union industry and Union production

Definition of the Union industry and Union production

| (108) | The like product was manufactured by 20 known producers in the Union during the investigation period. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(108)

The like product was manufactured by 20 known producers in the Union during the investigation period. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

| (109) | The total Union production during the investigation period was established at around 3,9 million tonnes. The Commission established the figure on the basis of all the available information concerning the Union industry, namely, the Fertilizers Europe production survey and Fertecon (Fertecon being a recognized market intelligence provider on global fertilizers markets). As indicated in recital (12), three Union producers were selected in the sample representing over 50 % of the total Union production of the like product. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

The total Union production during the investigation period was established at around 3,9 million tonnes. The Commission established the figure on the basis of all the available information concerning the Union industry, namely, the Fertilizers Europe production survey and Fertecon (Fertecon being a recognized market intelligence provider on global fertilizers markets). As indicated in recital (12), three Union producers were selected in the sample representing over 50 % of the total Union production of the like product.

4.2.   Union consumption

Union consumption

| (110) | The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of the sales volume of the Union industry on the Union market plus imports from all third countries as recorded in Eurostat. |
| --- | --- |

(110)

The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of the sales volume of the Union industry on the Union market plus imports from all third countries as recorded in Eurostat.

| (111) | Union consumption developed as follows:

  Table 1


  Union consumption (tonnes) | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Total Union consumption | 4 803 732 | 4 658 736 | 4 783 671 | 4 571 721 |
| Index | 100 | 97 | 100 | 95 |
| Source: Fertilizers Europe and Eurostat |

(111)

Union consumption developed as follows:

Table 1

Table 1

Union consumption (tonnes)

Union consumption (tonnes)

2015

2016

2017

IP

Total Union consumption

4 803 732

4 658 736

4 783 671

4 571 721

Index

Index

100

100

97

97

100

100

95

95

Source: Fertilizers Europe and Eurostat

Source:

| (112) | During the period considered, the Union consumption fluctuated with an overall fall of 5 %. In 2016 and the investigation period a drought in key markets of UAN meant that usage by farmers fell as a consequence. |
| --- | --- |

(112)

During the period considered, the Union consumption fluctuated with an overall fall of 5 %. In 2016 and the investigation period a drought in key markets of UAN meant that usage by farmers fell as a consequence.

4.3.   Imports from the countries concerned

Imports from the countries concerned

4.3.1.   Cumulative assessment of the effects of imports from the countries concerned

Cumulative assessment of the effects of imports from the countries concerned

| (113) | The Commission examined whether imports of UAN originating in the countries concerned should be assessed cumulatively, in accordance with Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(113)

The Commission examined whether imports of UAN originating in the countries concerned should be assessed cumulatively, in accordance with Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation.

| (114) | That provision stipulates that the imports from more than one country shall be cumulatively assessed only if it is determined that:






  (a) | the margin of dumping established in relation to the imports from each country is more than de minimis as defined in Article 9(3) and the volume of imports from each country is not negligible; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(114)

That provision stipulates that the imports from more than one country shall be cumulatively assessed only if it is determined that:

(a)

the margin of dumping established in relation to the imports from each country is more than de minimis as defined in Article 9(3) and the volume of imports from each country is not negligible; and

| (b) | a cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition between imported products and the like Union product. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

a cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition between imported products and the like Union product.

| (115) | The margins of dumping established in relation to the imports from each of the three countries concerned were above the de minimis threshold laid down in Article 9(3) of the basic Regulation. The volume of imports from each of the countries concerned was not negligible within the meaning of Article 5(7) of the basic Regulation. Indeed, the market shares in the investigation period were 13,4 % for imports from Russia, 8,1 % from TT and 16,2 % from the US. |
| --- | --- |

(115)

The margins of dumping established in relation to the imports from each of the three countries concerned were above the de minimis threshold laid down in Article 9(3) of the basic Regulation. The volume of imports from each of the countries concerned was not negligible within the meaning of Article 5(7) of the basic Regulation. Indeed, the market shares in the investigation period were 13,4 % for imports from Russia, 8,1 % from TT and 16,2 % from the US.

| (116) | The conditions of competition between the dumped imports from Russia, TT and the US and between the dumped imports from the countries concerned and the like Union product were similar. More specifically, the imported products competed with each other and with the UAN produced in the Union because they are sold through the same sales channels and to similar categories of customers. The product concerned is a homogenous commodity and competition took place largely based on price alone. |
| --- | --- |

(116)

The conditions of competition between the dumped imports from Russia, TT and the US and between the dumped imports from the countries concerned and the like Union product were similar. More specifically, the imported products competed with each other and with the UAN produced in the Union because they are sold through the same sales channels and to similar categories of customers. The product concerned is a homogenous commodity and competition took place largely based on price alone.

| (117) | Therefore, all the criteria set out in Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation were met and imports from Russia, TT and the US were examined cumulatively for the purposes of the injury determination. |
| --- | --- |

(117)

Therefore, all the criteria set out in Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation were met and imports from Russia, TT and the US were examined cumulatively for the purposes of the injury determination.

| (118) | In a hearing MHTL claimed that imports from TT should not be cumulated on the grounds that i) prices from TT were consistently higher than prices from the US and Russia, ii) import volumes dropped during the period considered (unlike those from the US and Russia), iii) MHTL is part of a European group, iv) MHTL is a price follower and v) TT is a developing country Member of the WTO. |
| --- | --- |

(118)

In a hearing MHTL claimed that imports from TT should not be cumulated on the grounds that i) prices from TT were consistently higher than prices from the US and Russia, ii) import volumes dropped during the period considered (unlike those from the US and Russia), iii) MHTL is part of a European group, iv) MHTL is a price follower and v) TT is a developing country Member of the WTO.

| (119) | The Commission rejected those claims. The decision as to whether or not imports should be assessed cumulatively must be based on the criteria set out in Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation, which were met in this case as highlighted in recitals (114) to (117). None of the aspects raised by MHTL could question the appropriateness of examining imports from TT together with those from Russia and US (14). |
| --- | --- |

(119)

The Commission rejected those claims. The decision as to whether or not imports should be assessed cumulatively must be based on the criteria set out in Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation, which were met in this case as highlighted in recitals (114) to (117). None of the aspects raised by MHTL could question the appropriateness of examining imports from TT together with those from Russia and US (14).

14

4.3.2.   Volume and market share of the imports from the countries concerned

Volume and market share of the imports from the countries concerned

| (120) | The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of Eurostat data. The market share of the imports was established by comparing the volume of imports with the Union consumption. |
| --- | --- |

(120)

The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of Eurostat data. The market share of the imports was established by comparing the volume of imports with the Union consumption.

| (121) | Imports into the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows:

  Table 2


  Import volume (tonnes) and market share | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Volume of imports from the countries concerned (tonnes) | 1 051 602 | 1 581 863 | 1 647 295 | 1 723 839 |
| Index | 100 | 150 | 157 | 164 |
| Market share | 21,9 % | 34,0 % | 34,4 % | 37,7 % |
| Index | 100 | 155 | 157 | 172 |
| Volume of imports from the Russian Federation (tonnes) | 339 075 | 582 906 | 557 966 | 613 491 |
| Index | 100 | 172 | 165 | 181 |
| Market share | 7,1 % | 12,5 % | 11,7 % | 13,4 % |
| Index | 100 | 177 | 165 | 190 |
| Volume of imports from Trinidad and Tobago (tonnes) | 488 392 | 452 194 | 444 290 | 368 178 |
| Index | 100 | 93 | 91 | 75 |
| Market share | 10,2 % | 9,7 % | 9,3 % | 8,1 % |
| Index | 100 | 95 | 91 | 79 |
| Volume of imports from the US (tonnes) | 224 136 | 546 763 | 645 040 | 742 170 |
| Index | 100 | 244 | 288 | 331 |
| Market share | 4,7 % | 11,7 % | 13,5 % | 16,2 % |
| Index | 100 | 252 | 289 | 348 |
| Source: Eurostat |

(121)

Imports into the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows:

Table 2

Table 2

Import volume (tonnes) and market share

Import volume (tonnes) and market share

2015

2016

2017

IP

Volume of imports from the countries concerned (tonnes)

1 051 602

1 581 863

1 647 295

1 723 839

Index

Index

100

100

150

150

157

157

164

164

Market share

21,9 %

34,0 %

34,4 %

37,7 %

Index

Index

100

100

155

155

157

157

172

172

Volume of imports from the Russian Federation (tonnes)

339 075

582 906

557 966

613 491

Index

Index

100

100

172

172

165

165

181

181

Market share

7,1 %

12,5 %

11,7 %

13,4 %

Index

Index

100

100

177

177

165

165

190

190

Volume of imports from Trinidad and Tobago (tonnes)

488 392

452 194

444 290

368 178

Index

Index

100

100

93

93

91

91

75

75

Market share

10,2 %

9,7 %

9,3 %

8,1 %

Index

Index

100

100

95

95

91

91

79

79

Volume of imports from the US (tonnes)

224 136

546 763

645 040

742 170

Index

Index

100

100

244

244

288

288

331

331

Market share

4,7 %

11,7 %

13,5 %

16,2 %

Index

Index

100

100

252

252

289

289

348

348

Source: Eurostat

Source:

| (122) | Imports from the countries concerned increased by 64 % over the period considered. The increase in market share was even more pronounced as the market share of the imports concerned increased by 72 %, from 21,9 % in 2015 to 37,7 % in the investigation period. As consumption dropped by 5 % over the same period, the steep increase in market share by the countries concerned was clearly to the detriment of other market participants. |
| --- | --- |

(122)

Imports from the countries concerned increased by 64 % over the period considered. The increase in market share was even more pronounced as the market share of the imports concerned increased by 72 %, from 21,9 % in 2015 to 37,7 % in the investigation period. As consumption dropped by 5 % over the same period, the steep increase in market share by the countries concerned was clearly to the detriment of other market participants.

4.3.3.   Prices of the imports from the countries concerned and price undercutting

Prices of the imports from the countries concerned and price undercutting

| (123) | The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of Eurostat data. It is important to clarify that the level of these statistical prices might differ from verified prices for co-operating exporting producers as such, as most of the imports from the countries concerned are made through related importers. |
| --- | --- |

(123)

The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of Eurostat data. It is important to clarify that the level of these statistical prices might differ from verified prices for co-operating exporting producers as such, as most of the imports from the countries concerned are made through related importers.

| (124) | The weighted average price of imports into the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows:

  Table 3


  Import prices (EUR/tonne) | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Russian Federation | 179 | 130 | 135 | 126 |
| Index | 100 | 73 | 75 | 70 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 197 | 151 | 141 | 140 |
| Index | 100 | 77 | 72 | 71 |
| US | 188 | 137 | 126 | 124 |
| Index | 100 | 73 | 67 | 66 |
| Countries Concerned | 189 | 138 | 133 | 128 |
| Index | 100 | 73 | 70 | 68 |
| Source: Eurostat |

(124)

The weighted average price of imports into the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows:

Table 3

Table 3

Import prices (EUR/tonne)

Import prices (EUR/tonne)

2015

2016

2017

IP

Russian Federation

179

130

135

126

Index

Index

100

100

73

73

75

75

70

70

Trinidad and Tobago

197

151

141

140

Index

Index

100

100

77

77

72

72

71

71

US

188

137

126

124

Index

Index

100

100

73

73

67

67

66

66

Countries Concerned

189

138

133

128

Index

Index

100

100

73

73

70

70

68

68

Source: Eurostat

Source:

| (125) | Import prices from the countries concerned fell on average by 32 %. In fact the prices of imports from all three of the countries concerned fell between 30 % and 34 % depending on the country. This fall was particularly evident in 2016 when raw material prices (mainly gas) fell. However, in the investigation period import prices fell by 4 %, unlike raw material prices, which went up. |
| --- | --- |

(125)

Import prices from the countries concerned fell on average by 32 %. In fact the prices of imports from all three of the countries concerned fell between 30 % and 34 % depending on the country. This fall was particularly evident in 2016 when raw material prices (mainly gas) fell. However, in the investigation period import prices fell by 4 %, unlike raw material prices, which went up.

| (126) | The Commission determined the price undercutting during the investigation period by comparing:






  — | the weighted average prices per product type of the imports from the cooperating exporting producers in the countries concerned to the first independent customer on the Union market, established on a cost, insurance, freight (CIF) basis, with appropriate adjustments for customs duties and post-importation costs; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(126)

The Commission determined the price undercutting during the investigation period by comparing:

—

the weighted average prices per product type of the imports from the cooperating exporting producers in the countries concerned to the first independent customer on the Union market, established on a cost, insurance, freight (CIF) basis, with appropriate adjustments for customs duties and post-importation costs; and

| — | the corresponding weighted average sales prices per product type of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market. |
| --- | --- |

—

the corresponding weighted average sales prices per product type of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market.

| (127) | The Commission normally compares the Union border CIF price of the exporting producers to the ex-works price of the Union producers because such approach usually provides a fair comparison. However, the investigation has revealed that there are exceptional circumstances in this case in that, for around a third of the sales transactions of the sampled Union producers, using the sales price at ex-works level would result in Union industry prices which are not at a level comparable with the import prices in terms of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(127)

The Commission normally compares the Union border CIF price of the exporting producers to the ex-works price of the Union producers because such approach usually provides a fair comparison. However, the investigation has revealed that there are exceptional circumstances in this case in that, for around a third of the sales transactions of the sampled Union producers, using the sales price at ex-works level would result in Union industry prices which are not at a level comparable with the import prices in terms of competition.

| (128) | Indeed, for those Union industry sales which incurred sea freight for delivery to ports such as Rouen (France) and Ghent (Belgium), it was found appropriate to use the prices for delivery to that port instead of calculating ex-works prices for those sales. Those sales represented around 40 % of the sales of the Union industry. Such approach was considered more accurate than using ex-works prices for the following reasons:






  (i) | UAN is a corrosive liquid and transport to users and distributors involves special vehicles and storage facilities. This increases logistics costs to the extent that these costs are often more than 20 % of the sales price of UAN sold in Western Europe and can be up to 30 % of the sales price for certain delivery terms; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(128)

Indeed, for those Union industry sales which incurred sea freight for delivery to ports such as Rouen (France) and Ghent (Belgium), it was found appropriate to use the prices for delivery to that port instead of calculating ex-works prices for those sales. Those sales represented around 40 % of the sales of the Union industry. Such approach was considered more accurate than using ex-works prices for the following reasons:

(i)

UAN is a corrosive liquid and transport to users and distributors involves special vehicles and storage facilities. This increases logistics costs to the extent that these costs are often more than 20 % of the sales price of UAN sold in Western Europe and can be up to 30 % of the sales price for certain delivery terms;

| (ii) | the two largest producers in the sample are located in Poland and Lithuania whereas the largest markets for UAN are in Western Europe which means that logistics costs are particularly high and involve sea freight; these two producers compete in Eastern Europe on EXW and CIF basis with Russian imports and in Western Europe with delivered prices from Trinidad and Tobago, Russia and the US. In fact, it was observed that the main difference between the selling prices of these producers in Eastern and Western Europe was the amount of these logistic and transport costs; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the two largest producers in the sample are located in Poland and Lithuania whereas the largest markets for UAN are in Western Europe which means that logistics costs are particularly high and involve sea freight; these two producers compete in Eastern Europe on EXW and CIF basis with Russian imports and in Western Europe with delivered prices from Trinidad and Tobago, Russia and the US. In fact, it was observed that the main difference between the selling prices of these producers in Eastern and Western Europe was the amount of these logistic and transport costs;

| (iii) | many interested parties, including exporting producers, have indicated that the main point of comparison for UAN prices in Western Europe is the CIF price (plus import duty if applicable) of deliveries to the ports of Rouen (France) and Ghent (Belgium); |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

many interested parties, including exporting producers, have indicated that the main point of comparison for UAN prices in Western Europe is the CIF price (plus import duty if applicable) of deliveries to the ports of Rouen (France) and Ghent (Belgium);

| (iv) | most imports from the countries concerned in the investigation period were delivered on a CIF basis in large sea freight tankers to Western Europe. This involved almost all deliveries originating in Trinidad and Tobago and the US but also a large quantity of sales from the Russian Federation; |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

most imports from the countries concerned in the investigation period were delivered on a CIF basis in large sea freight tankers to Western Europe. This involved almost all deliveries originating in Trinidad and Tobago and the US but also a large quantity of sales from the Russian Federation;

| (v) | UAN is a homogenous commodity and therefore the majority of customers purchase the product solely on price; |
| --- | --- |

(v)

UAN is a homogenous commodity and therefore the majority of customers purchase the product solely on price;

| (vi) | at distributor and end-user level there can be a lack of traceability of the origin of the product concerned because the UAN delivered to Western European ports such as Rouen or Ghent is stored in the same tanks whatever its source; and |
| --- | --- |

(vi)

at distributor and end-user level there can be a lack of traceability of the origin of the product concerned because the UAN delivered to Western European ports such as Rouen or Ghent is stored in the same tanks whatever its source; and

| (vii) | the competition of sales from the port of delivery was made to the same customers for both imports and Union industry sales using comparable incoterms and was often delivered to customers in the same delivery vehicles. |
| --- | --- |

(vii)

the competition of sales from the port of delivery was made to the same customers for both imports and Union industry sales using comparable incoterms and was often delivered to customers in the same delivery vehicles.

| (129) | Therefore, the Commission concluded that, in order to examine whether there is price undercutting, it is appropriate to adjust around a third of the sales transactions of two sampled Union producers so that those sales can be compared in terms of their actual competition with the subject imports. For the two thirds of Union industry sales, which did not involve sea freight, the normal CIF vs ex-works methodology was maintained. |
| --- | --- |

(129)

Therefore, the Commission concluded that, in order to examine whether there is price undercutting, it is appropriate to adjust around a third of the sales transactions of two sampled Union producers so that those sales can be compared in terms of their actual competition with the subject imports. For the two thirds of Union industry sales, which did not involve sea freight, the normal CIF vs ex-works methodology was maintained.

| (130) | The price comparison was made on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the same level of trade, duly adjusted where necessary, and after deduction of rebates and discounts. The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers' turnover during the investigation period. It showed a weighted average undercutting margin of 3,4 % for imports from Russia, 6,2 % for imports from TT and 9,9 % for imports from the US. Bearing in mind that the product concerned is a commodity and that competition is largely based on price alone, and that its prices are very transparent (i.e. known in the market), such a margin is considered significant. A low price difference will make the buyer switch suppliers. This was also confirmed by the replies of representatives of the users. |
| --- | --- |

(130)

The price comparison was made on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the same level of trade, duly adjusted where necessary, and after deduction of rebates and discounts. The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers' turnover during the investigation period. It showed a weighted average undercutting margin of 3,4 % for imports from Russia, 6,2 % for imports from TT and 9,9 % for imports from the US. Bearing in mind that the product concerned is a commodity and that competition is largely based on price alone, and that its prices are very transparent (i.e. known in the market), such a margin is considered significant. A low price difference will make the buyer switch suppliers. This was also confirmed by the replies of representatives of the users.

| (131) | In the investigation period, comparing the sales prices on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the same level of trade, imports from the countries concerned undercut the prices of the Union industry by 6,8 % on average. |
| --- | --- |

(131)

In the investigation period, comparing the sales prices on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the same level of trade, imports from the countries concerned undercut the prices of the Union industry by 6,8 % on average.

4.4.   Economic situation of the Union industry

Economic situation of the Union industry

4.4.1.   General remarks

General remarks

| (132) | In accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(132)

In accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

| (133) | As mentioned in recital (13), sampling was used for the determination of possible injury suffered by the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(133)

As mentioned in recital (13), sampling was used for the determination of possible injury suffered by the Union industry.

| (134) | For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire response of Fertilizers Europe. These data related to all Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(134)

For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire response of Fertilizers Europe. These data related to all Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

| (135) | The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, and magnitude of the dumping margin. |
| --- | --- |

(135)

The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, and magnitude of the dumping margin.

| (136) | The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit costs, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital. |
| --- | --- |

(136)

The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit costs, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

4.4.2.   Macroeconomic indicators

Macroeconomic indicators

4.4.2.1.   Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

| (137) | The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 4


  Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Production volume (tonne) | 4 238 411 | 3 695 546 | 4 253 903 | 3 890 476 |
| Index | 100 | 87 | 100 | 92 |
| Production capacity (measuring unit) | 8 055 000 | 8 205 000 | 8 385 000 | 8 385 000 |
| Index | 100 | 102 | 104 | 104 |
| Capacity utilisation | 53 % | 45 % | 51 % | 46 % |
| Index | 100 | 86 | 96 | 88 |
| Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe |

(137)

The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 4

Table 4

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

2015

2016

2017

IP

Production volume (tonne)

4 238 411

3 695 546

4 253 903

3 890 476

Index

Index

100

100

87

87

100

100

92

92

Production capacity (measuring unit)

8 055 000

8 205 000

8 385 000

8 385 000

Index

Index

100

100

102

102

104

104

104

104

Capacity utilisation

53 %

45 %

51 %

46 %

Index

Index

100

100

86

86

96

96

88

88

Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe

Source:

| (138) | In the Union, UAN is normally produced at integrated chemical sites. These sites convert gas and nitrogen into nitrogen based fertilisers and other similar industrial products such as melamine. The production process involves various stages such as ammonia and nitric acid production and is therefore heavily reliant on access to sources of gas (the main ultimate raw material) via pipelines or terminals and is highly capital intensive. Producers can switch production between end products but this ability is limited and varies between producers. This depends on the configuration of the integrated site and on the producer's customer base. Each company aims to maximise the profitability of the site as a whole. Nevertheless, this investigation focuses solely on UAN. |
| --- | --- |

(138)

In the Union, UAN is normally produced at integrated chemical sites. These sites convert gas and nitrogen into nitrogen based fertilisers and other similar industrial products such as melamine. The production process involves various stages such as ammonia and nitric acid production and is therefore heavily reliant on access to sources of gas (the main ultimate raw material) via pipelines or terminals and is highly capital intensive. Producers can switch production between end products but this ability is limited and varies between producers. This depends on the configuration of the integrated site and on the producer's customer base. Each company aims to maximise the profitability of the site as a whole. Nevertheless, this investigation focuses solely on UAN.

| (139) | Overall production of UAN fell by 8 % over the period considered. Production dropped strongly in 2016, when imports from the countries concerned increased by 50 % as compared to the year before and demand was affected by a drought in key markets of UAN. Although the situation improved in 2017, falling UAN prices and profitability led to some Union producers to switch production to other nitrogen based fertilizers in the investigation period. Where this switch in production was not possible on an economic basis, Union producers suffered production shut-downs. |
| --- | --- |

(139)

Overall production of UAN fell by 8 % over the period considered. Production dropped strongly in 2016, when imports from the countries concerned increased by 50 % as compared to the year before and demand was affected by a drought in key markets of UAN. Although the situation improved in 2017, falling UAN prices and profitability led to some Union producers to switch production to other nitrogen based fertilizers in the investigation period. Where this switch in production was not possible on an economic basis, Union producers suffered production shut-downs.

| (140) | Production capacity increased by 4 % whereas capacity utilisation fell by 12 % over the period considered. As noted in recital (138), production capacity as well as capacity utilisation for this type of production and industry can be affected by the production of other products which can be produced on the same production equipment and that is indeed reflected in these trends. |
| --- | --- |

(140)

Production capacity increased by 4 % whereas capacity utilisation fell by 12 % over the period considered. As noted in recital (138), production capacity as well as capacity utilisation for this type of production and industry can be affected by the production of other products which can be produced on the same production equipment and that is indeed reflected in these trends.

4.4.2.2.   Sales volume and market share

| (141) | The Union industry's sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 5


  Sales volume and market share | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sales volume on the Union market (tonnes) | 3 348 196 | 2 796 506 | 2 934 634 | 2 645 143 |
| Index | 100 | 84 | 88 | 79 |
| Market share | 69,7 % | 60,0 % | 61,3 % | 57,9 % |
| Index | 100 | 86 | 88 | 83 |
| Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe |

(141)

The Union industry's sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 5

Table 5

Sales volume and market share

Sales volume and market share

2015

2016

2017

IP

Sales volume on the Union market (tonnes)

3 348 196

2 796 506

2 934 634

2 645 143

Index

Index

100

100

84

84

88

88

79

79

Market share

69,7 %

60,0 %

61,3 %

57,9 %

Index

Index

100

100

86

86

88

88

83

83

Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe

Source:

| (142) | The sales volume of the Union industry was calculated on a macro basis of sales to unrelated and related parties. However, a small quantity of such sales (around 3 % of the total) consisted of resales of production from imports of various sources. Such sales are excluded from the above sales volume figures as they should comprise only sales of production of Union producers. In order to avoid double-counting these resales were also excluded from the consumption figures at recital (114). On this basis the Union sales volume of the Union industry fell by 21 % over the period considered. The volume of sales lost over this period is close to the volume of increased sales by the countries concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(142)

The sales volume of the Union industry was calculated on a macro basis of sales to unrelated and related parties. However, a small quantity of such sales (around 3 % of the total) consisted of resales of production from imports of various sources. Such sales are excluded from the above sales volume figures as they should comprise only sales of production of Union producers. In order to avoid double-counting these resales were also excluded from the consumption figures at recital (114). On this basis the Union sales volume of the Union industry fell by 21 % over the period considered. The volume of sales lost over this period is close to the volume of increased sales by the countries concerned.

| (143) | The market share of the Union industry fell by 17 % over the period considered. This development was a result of poor market conditions, especially low prices, which meant that Union sales volume was lost to imports from the countries concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(143)

The market share of the Union industry fell by 17 % over the period considered. This development was a result of poor market conditions, especially low prices, which meant that Union sales volume was lost to imports from the countries concerned.

4.4.2.3.   Growth

| (144) | The above figures in respect of production, sales volume and market share demonstrate that the Union industry was not able to grow, either in absolute terms or in relation to consumption, over the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(144)

The above figures in respect of production, sales volume and market share demonstrate that the Union industry was not able to grow, either in absolute terms or in relation to consumption, over the period considered.

4.4.2.4.   Employment and productivity

| (145) | Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 6


  Employment and productivity | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Number of employees | 2 164 | 2 029 | 2 104 | 2 005 |
| Index | 100 | 94 | 97 | 93 |
| Productivity (tonne/employee) | 1 959 | 1 821 | 2 022 | 1 940 |
| Index | 100 | 93 | 103 | 99 |
| Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe |

(145)

Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6

Table 6

Employment and productivity

Employment and productivity

2015

2016

2017

IP

Number of employees

2 164

2 029

2 104

2 005

Index

Index

100

100

94

94

97

97

93

93

Productivity (tonne/employee)

1 959

1 821

2 022

1 940

Index

Index

100

100

93

93

103

103

99

99

Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe

Source:

| (146) | In view of the deteriorating market circumstances, the number of employees of the Union industry fell by 7 % over the period considered. Nevertheless, as production decreased even more, productivity still fell by 1 % over the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(146)

In view of the deteriorating market circumstances, the number of employees of the Union industry fell by 7 % over the period considered. Nevertheless, as production decreased even more, productivity still fell by 1 % over the period considered.

4.4.2.5.   Magnitude of the dumping margin

| (147) | All dumping margins were significantly above the de minimis level. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was substantial, given the volume and prices of imports from the countries concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(147)

All dumping margins were significantly above the de minimis level. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was substantial, given the volume and prices of imports from the countries concerned.

4.4.3.   Microeconomic indicators

Microeconomic indicators

4.4.3.1.   Prices and factors affecting prices

| (148) | The weighted average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 7


  Sales prices in the Union | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Average unit EXW sales price in the Union to unrelated customers (EUR/ tonne) | 176 | 130 | 127 | 127 |
| Index | 100 | 74 | 72 | 72 |
| Unit cost of production EXW (EUR/ tonne) | 146 | 115 | 123 | 130 |
| Index | 100 | 79 | 84 | 89 |
| Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers |

(148)

The weighted average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Table 7

Sales prices in the Union

Sales prices in the Union

2015

2016

2017

IP

Average unit EXW sales price in the Union to unrelated customers (EUR/ tonne)

176

130

127

127

Index

Index

100

100

74

74

72

72

72

72

Unit cost of production EXW (EUR/ tonne)

146

115

123

130

Index

Index

100

100

79

79

84

84

89

89

Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers

Source:

| (149) | Sales prices fell by 28 % over the period considered and the unit cost of production fell by 11 %. The largest fall in prices was in 2016, when low-priced imports from the countries concerned increased by 50 % and demand was slightly weaker. The trend of cost of production was mainly determined by fluctuations in gas prices. However, the increases in costs in 2017 and the investigation period were not matched by corresponding sales price increases for the like product which were thus further suppressed. |
| --- | --- |

(149)

Sales prices fell by 28 % over the period considered and the unit cost of production fell by 11 %. The largest fall in prices was in 2016, when low-priced imports from the countries concerned increased by 50 % and demand was slightly weaker. The trend of cost of production was mainly determined by fluctuations in gas prices. However, the increases in costs in 2017 and the investigation period were not matched by corresponding sales price increases for the like product which were thus further suppressed.

4.4.3.2.   Labour costs

| (150) | The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 8


  Average labour costs per employee | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Average labour costs per employee (EUR) | 24 876 | 24 323 | 27 143 | 27 410 |
| Index | 100 | 98 | 109 | 110 |
| Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers |

(150)

The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Table 8

Average labour costs per employee

Average labour costs per employee

2015

2016

2017

IP

Average labour costs per employee (EUR)

24 876

24 323

27 143

27 410

Index

Index

100

100

98

98

109

109

110

110

Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers

Source:

| (151) | The average labour costs per employee of the sampled Union producers increased by 10 % over the period considered. Labour costs per employee increased especially in 2017 when production and productivity increased. |
| --- | --- |

(151)

The average labour costs per employee of the sampled Union producers increased by 10 % over the period considered. Labour costs per employee increased especially in 2017 when production and productivity increased.

4.4.3.3.   Inventories

| (152) | Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 9


  Inventories | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Closing stocks (tonnes) | 83 826 | 54 411 | 72 814 | 38 961 |
| Index | 100 | 65 | 87 | 46 |
| Closing stocks as a percentage of production | 3,7 % | 2,7 % | 3,2 % | 1,8 % |
| Index | 100 | 71 | 85 | 49 |
| Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers |

(152)

Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Table 9

Inventories

Inventories

2015

2016

2017

IP

Closing stocks (tonnes)

83 826

54 411

72 814

38 961

Index

Index

100

100

65

65

87

87

46

46

Closing stocks as a percentage of production

3,7 %

2,7 %

3,2 %

1,8 %

Index

Index

100

100

71

71

85

85

49

49

Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers

Source:

| (153) | Closing stock and stock as a percentage of production fell over the period considered. However, as stock as a percentage of production is low throughout the period and closing stocks are subject to seasonal variations this factor is not considered to be a meaningful indicator of injury in this investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(153)

Closing stock and stock as a percentage of production fell over the period considered. However, as stock as a percentage of production is low throughout the period and closing stocks are subject to seasonal variations this factor is not considered to be a meaningful indicator of injury in this investigation.

4.4.3.4.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

| (154) | Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 10


  Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover) | 14,0 % | 10,0 % | 1,1 % | – 3,5 % |
| Index | 100 | 71 | 8 | – 25 |
| Cash flow (EUR) | 78 775 697 | 39 007 376 | 19 727 317 | 5 827 513 |
| Index | 100 | 50 | 25 | 7 |
| Investments (EUR) | 18 082 767 | 15 044 306 | 5 110 610 | 8 593 605 |
| Index | 100 | 83 | 28 | 48 |
| Return on investments | 57,2 % | 28,3 % | 7,9 % | – 8,7 % |
| Index | 100 | 49 | 14 | – 15 |
| Source: Verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers |

(154)

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Table 10

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

2015

2016

2017

IP

Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover)

14,0 %

10,0 %

1,1 %

– 3,5 %

Index

Index

100

100

71

71

8

8

– 25

– 25

Cash flow (EUR)

78 775 697

39 007 376

19 727 317

5 827 513

Index

Index

100

100

50

50

25

25

7

7

Investments (EUR)

18 082 767

15 044 306

5 110 610

8 593 605

Index

Index

100

100

83

83

28

28

48

48

Return on investments

57,2 %

28,3 %

7,9 %

– 8,7 %

Index

Index

100

100

49

49

14

14

– 15

– 15

Source: Verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers

Source:

| (155) | The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. Profitability fell substantially throughout the period considered because of the developments in average sales prices and costs of production described at recital (152). The rising cost of production as from 2017 and suppressed sales prices due to imports from the countries concerned caused the Union industry to make losses in the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(155)

The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. Profitability fell substantially throughout the period considered because of the developments in average sales prices and costs of production described at recital (152). The rising cost of production as from 2017 and suppressed sales prices due to imports from the countries concerned caused the Union industry to make losses in the investigation period.

| (156) | The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The trend in net cash flow developed negatively throughout the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(156)

The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The trend in net cash flow developed negatively throughout the period considered.

| (157) | The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. It developed negatively over the period considered reflecting the trends previously described for profitability and cash flow. |
| --- | --- |

(157)

The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. It developed negatively over the period considered reflecting the trends previously described for profitability and cash flow.

| (158) | The Union industry continued to invest in the period considered. The investments were made to improve the efficiency of production, reduce energy consumption and in environmental improvements. However, investments were substantially lower in 2017 and the investigation period than in 2015 and 2016. The falling investment levels were caused by a reduced ability to raise capital as demonstrated by the deteriorating cash flow situation. |
| --- | --- |

(158)

The Union industry continued to invest in the period considered. The investments were made to improve the efficiency of production, reduce energy consumption and in environmental improvements. However, investments were substantially lower in 2017 and the investigation period than in 2015 and 2016. The falling investment levels were caused by a reduced ability to raise capital as demonstrated by the deteriorating cash flow situation.

4.4.4.   Conclusion on injury

Conclusion on injury

| (159) | Over the period considered, the Union industry suffered large falls in sales prices (28 %) which together with increased costs in 2017 and the investigation period have caused a profit level of 14 % in 2015 to turn into losses in the investigation period. This trend resulted in similar falls in cash flow, return on investment and reduced investment. Significant negative effects have also been felt in volume indicators such as production, that fell by 8 %, sales volume, that fell by 21 %, and market share, that went from 69,7 % in 2015 to 57,9 % in the investigation period. These developments left the Union industry in a vulnerable situation. |
| --- | --- |

(159)

Over the period considered, the Union industry suffered large falls in sales prices (28 %) which together with increased costs in 2017 and the investigation period have caused a profit level of 14 % in 2015 to turn into losses in the investigation period. This trend resulted in similar falls in cash flow, return on investment and reduced investment. Significant negative effects have also been felt in volume indicators such as production, that fell by 8 %, sales volume, that fell by 21 %, and market share, that went from 69,7 % in 2015 to 57,9 % in the investigation period. These developments left the Union industry in a vulnerable situation.

| (160) | Very few of the indicators examined showed a positive development. Production capacity slightly increased over the period considered but production fell as stated in the previous recital. Also, stocks have fallen but the level of stocks is low throughout the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(160)

Very few of the indicators examined showed a positive development. Production capacity slightly increased over the period considered but production fell as stated in the previous recital. Also, stocks have fallen but the level of stocks is low throughout the period considered.

| (161) | On the basis of the above, the Commission therefore concluded at this stage that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(161)

On the basis of the above, the Commission therefore concluded at this stage that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.

5.   CAUSATION

CAUSATION

| (162) | In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could, at the same time, have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the countries concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. Inter alia, these factors are: imports from third countries, a fall in consumption, developments on the (world) urea market, increases in gas prices in 2017 and the investigation period, the export performance of the Union industry, higher costs for Union producers and certain purchases and sales of UAN by Union producers. |
| --- | --- |

(162)

In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could, at the same time, have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the countries concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. Inter alia, these factors are: imports from third countries, a fall in consumption, developments on the (world) urea market, increases in gas prices in 2017 and the investigation period, the export performance of the Union industry, higher costs for Union producers and certain purchases and sales of UAN by Union producers.

5.1.   Effects of the dumped imports

Effects of the dumped imports

| (163) | Imports from the countries concerned increased by 64 % over the period considered increasing their market share by 72 % as shown in table 2. This development took place despite a fall in consumption of 5 % over the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(163)

Imports from the countries concerned increased by 64 % over the period considered increasing their market share by 72 % as shown in table 2. This development took place despite a fall in consumption of 5 % over the period considered.

| (164) | Import prices from the countries concerned fell on average by 32 %. In fact the prices of all three of the countries concerned fell by between 30 % and 34 % depending on the country. This fall in sales prices was particularly evident in 2016 when, at the same time, the volume of imports from the countries concerned increased by 50 % as compared to 2015. In the investigation period, comparing the sales prices on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the same level of trade, imports from the countries concerned undercut the prices of the Union industry by 6,8 % on average. |
| --- | --- |

(164)

Import prices from the countries concerned fell on average by 32 %. In fact the prices of all three of the countries concerned fell by between 30 % and 34 % depending on the country. This fall in sales prices was particularly evident in 2016 when, at the same time, the volume of imports from the countries concerned increased by 50 % as compared to 2015. In the investigation period, comparing the sales prices on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the same level of trade, imports from the countries concerned undercut the prices of the Union industry by 6,8 % on average.

| (165) | It is clear that the large increase in imports at falling prices played a substantial role in the rapid deterioration of the Union industry's economic indicators. Two product specific factors aggravated this impact. Firstly, UAN is a commodity sold to customers based almost exclusively on price. Therefore, only a small difference in price may have a significant consequence. Secondly, UAN is a liquid product requiring special tanks for storage which means that market prices have to be accepted shortly after the time of production whatever the cost of production applicable at the time. |
| --- | --- |

(165)

It is clear that the large increase in imports at falling prices played a substantial role in the rapid deterioration of the Union industry's economic indicators. Two product specific factors aggravated this impact. Firstly, UAN is a commodity sold to customers based almost exclusively on price. Therefore, only a small difference in price may have a significant consequence. Secondly, UAN is a liquid product requiring special tanks for storage which means that market prices have to be accepted shortly after the time of production whatever the cost of production applicable at the time.

| (166) | The low sales prices from the countries concerned were most damaging in 2017 and the investigation period when costs were increasing due to higher gas prices. The depressed Union industry sales prices, which could not be risen in line with the increasing costs due to price pressure from imports, caused the Union industry's performance indicators to deteriorate resulting in losses by the investigation period. In 2017 and the investigation period, several producers thus could not avoid production breaks and the investment levels went significantly down. This in turn further aggravated the injury because continuous investment in an integrated chemical plant is essential to long-term survival. |
| --- | --- |

(166)

The low sales prices from the countries concerned were most damaging in 2017 and the investigation period when costs were increasing due to higher gas prices. The depressed Union industry sales prices, which could not be risen in line with the increasing costs due to price pressure from imports, caused the Union industry's performance indicators to deteriorate resulting in losses by the investigation period. In 2017 and the investigation period, several producers thus could not avoid production breaks and the investment levels went significantly down. This in turn further aggravated the injury because continuous investment in an integrated chemical plant is essential to long-term survival.

| (167) | Some parties invoked a lack of correlation between the level of imports and the Union industry's sales prices and profits in the sense that Union industry's sales prices and profits were high during periods when there were significant imports and vice-versa. However, the points made above in this section and the inability of the Union industry to take advantage of its domestic market to the same extent as producers from the countries concerned are evidence of the existence of injury caused by the dumped imports. |
| --- | --- |

(167)

Some parties invoked a lack of correlation between the level of imports and the Union industry's sales prices and profits in the sense that Union industry's sales prices and profits were high during periods when there were significant imports and vice-versa. However, the points made above in this section and the inability of the Union industry to take advantage of its domestic market to the same extent as producers from the countries concerned are evidence of the existence of injury caused by the dumped imports.

5.2.   Effects of other factors

Effects of other factors

5.2.1.   Imports from third countries

Imports from third countries

| (168) | The volume of imports from other third countries developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 11


  Imports from third countries | | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Total of third countries except the countries concerned | Volume (tonne) | 403 934 | 280 367 | 201 741 | 202 738 |
| Index | 100 | 69 | 50 | 50 |
| Market share | 8,0 % | 5,7 % | 3,8 % | 4,1 % |
| Index | 100 | 72 | 48 | 51 |
| Average price | 189 | 140 | 136 | 129 |
| Index | 100 | 74 | 72 | 68 |
| Source: Comext |

(168)

The volume of imports from other third countries developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Table 11

Imports from third countries

Imports from third countries

2015

2016

2017

IP

Total of third countries except the countries concerned

Volume (tonne)

403 934

280 367

201 741

202 738

Index

Index

100

100

69

69

50

50

50

50

Market share

8,0 %

5,7 %

3,8 %

4,1 %

Index

Index

100

100

72

72

48

48

51

51

Average price

189

140

136

129

Index

Index

100

100

74

74

72

72

68

68

Source: Comext

Source:

| (169) | Imports from third countries (mainly from Belarus, North Macedonia, Serbia and Algeria) decreased by 50 % over the period considered and in the investigation period they had a market share of only 4,1 %. |
| --- | --- |

(169)

Imports from third countries (mainly from Belarus, North Macedonia, Serbia and Algeria) decreased by 50 % over the period considered and in the investigation period they had a market share of only 4,1 %.

| (170) | It was therefore provisionally concluded that such imports could only have a marginal impact on the situation of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(170)

It was therefore provisionally concluded that such imports could only have a marginal impact on the situation of the Union industry.

5.2.2.   Export performance of the Union industry

Export performance of the Union industry

| (171) | The volume of exports of the Union industry developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 12


  Export performance of the Union industry | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Export volume (tonne) | 272 077 | 306 840 | 559 840 | 552 979 |
| Index | 100 | 113 | 206 | 203 |
| Average price (EUR/tonne) | 171 | 124 | 122 | 125 |
| Index | 100 | 72 | 72 | 73 |
| Source: Fertilizers Europe and sampled producers |

(171)

The volume of exports of the Union industry developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 12

Table 12

Export performance of the Union industry

Export performance of the Union industry

2015

2016

2017

IP

Export volume (tonne)

272 077

306 840

559 840

552 979

Index

Index

100

100

113

113

206

206

203

203

Average price (EUR/tonne)

171

124

122

125

Index

Index

100

100

72

72

72

72

73

73

Source: Fertilizers Europe and sampled producers

Source:

| (172) | Over the period considered, the Union industry increased its sales on the export markets by ca. 280 000 tonnes. The increased sales on its export market, thus, only compensated for a small part the loss of ca. 700 000 tonnes in the Union market. The prices of the Union industry's exports were similar to its prices on the Union market. |
| --- | --- |

(172)

Over the period considered, the Union industry increased its sales on the export markets by ca. 280 000 tonnes. The increased sales on its export market, thus, only compensated for a small part the loss of ca. 700 000 tonnes in the Union market. The prices of the Union industry's exports were similar to its prices on the Union market.

| (173) | It was therefore provisionally concluded that such exports did not contribute to the injury suffered by the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(173)

It was therefore provisionally concluded that such exports did not contribute to the injury suffered by the Union industry.

5.2.3.   Consumption

Consumption

| (174) | During the investigation some parties referred to fluctuating consumption and/or adverse weather conditions in key markets as drivers of the injurious situation of the Union industry. Table 1 shows that the consumption on the Union market indeed fluctuated over the period considered and fell by 5 % overall. However, despite these fluctuations and the overall fall, imports from the countries concerned increased steadily during the period considered, at the expense of other imports and Union industry sales. |
| --- | --- |

(174)

During the investigation some parties referred to fluctuating consumption and/or adverse weather conditions in key markets as drivers of the injurious situation of the Union industry. Table 1 shows that the consumption on the Union market indeed fluctuated over the period considered and fell by 5 % overall. However, despite these fluctuations and the overall fall, imports from the countries concerned increased steadily during the period considered, at the expense of other imports and Union industry sales.

| (175) | It was therefore provisionally concluded that the development of demand did not contribute to the injury suffered by the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(175)

It was therefore provisionally concluded that the development of demand did not contribute to the injury suffered by the Union industry.

5.2.4.   The (world) price of urea

The (world) price of urea

| (176) | Some parties claimed that Union producers' injurious situation was attributable to the world urea price since the latter drove Union UAN prices down. However, the investigation showed that there is no world price for urea which could have influenced the situation of the Union industry. There are independent actors that publish spot prices for urea at various points around the world. These prices show price variations from place to place over the period considered (15). In addition, whereas worldwide urea represents 56 % of all fertilisers consumed, urea is not the preferred fertiliser in the Union, where it represents some 19 % of fertilisers used. |
| --- | --- |

(176)

Some parties claimed that Union producers' injurious situation was attributable to the world urea price since the latter drove Union UAN prices down. However, the investigation showed that there is no world price for urea which could have influenced the situation of the Union industry. There are independent actors that publish spot prices for urea at various points around the world. These prices show price variations from place to place over the period considered (15). In addition, whereas worldwide urea represents 56 % of all fertilisers consumed, urea is not the preferred fertiliser in the Union, where it represents some 19 % of fertilisers used.

15

| (177) | It was therefore provisionally concluded that the (world) price of urea could not have a significant impact on the Union industry's sales prices and its injurious situation. |
| --- | --- |

(177)

It was therefore provisionally concluded that the (world) price of urea could not have a significant impact on the Union industry's sales prices and its injurious situation.

5.2.5.   Higher costs within Union producers

Higher costs within Union producers

| (178) | Several parties pointed at increases in selling, administrative and general expenses within Union producers and/or said that some complaining Union producers are in an injurious situation because they pay a high price for their gas. |
| --- | --- |

(178)

Several parties pointed at increases in selling, administrative and general expenses within Union producers and/or said that some complaining Union producers are in an injurious situation because they pay a high price for their gas.

| (179) | The investigation did not show any abnormal evolution of selling, administrative and general expenses within sampled Union producers. As to the level of gas prices during the period considered, its evolution does not explain the shrinking profits in this case. High gas prices could explain a continuous inability to reach adequate profitability levels, which is not the situation here since in 2015 and 2016 profitability levels were 14 % and 10 % respectively. |
| --- | --- |

(179)

The investigation did not show any abnormal evolution of selling, administrative and general expenses within sampled Union producers. As to the level of gas prices during the period considered, its evolution does not explain the shrinking profits in this case. High gas prices could explain a continuous inability to reach adequate profitability levels, which is not the situation here since in 2015 and 2016 profitability levels were 14 % and 10 % respectively.

| (180) | It is therefore considered that the gas price evolution was as an aggravating factor of the injury suffered by some Union producers. Nevertheless, neither gas nor other cost increase was the main cause of injury. It was the price pressure exerted by imports from the countries concerned that did not allow the Union industry to pass on the costs increases via sales prices. |
| --- | --- |

(180)

It is therefore considered that the gas price evolution was as an aggravating factor of the injury suffered by some Union producers. Nevertheless, neither gas nor other cost increase was the main cause of injury. It was the price pressure exerted by imports from the countries concerned that did not allow the Union industry to pass on the costs increases via sales prices.

5.2.6.   Certain UAN purchased and sold by Union producers

Certain UAN purchased and sold by Union producers

| (181) | Several parties said that the injury eventually suffered by some Union producers was self-inflicted because some Union producers purchased UAN. |
| --- | --- |

(181)

Several parties said that the injury eventually suffered by some Union producers was self-inflicted because some Union producers purchased UAN.

| (182) | The investigation showed that some Union producers or their trading arms purchased some UAN from importers or traders in the Union in order to fulfil certain orders or for logistical reasons. Given that UAN from several sources is mixed in tanks and the fact that sometimes such tanks are shared by several players in the market, it cannot be excluded that Union producers actually repurchased some of the UAN previously sold by them. In any case, UAN purchases by Union producers were negligible in volume terms compared to overall Union sales. |
| --- | --- |

(182)

The investigation showed that some Union producers or their trading arms purchased some UAN from importers or traders in the Union in order to fulfil certain orders or for logistical reasons. Given that UAN from several sources is mixed in tanks and the fact that sometimes such tanks are shared by several players in the market, it cannot be excluded that Union producers actually repurchased some of the UAN previously sold by them. In any case, UAN purchases by Union producers were negligible in volume terms compared to overall Union sales.

| (183) | The claim made by one Russian exporting producer that some Union producers sell UAN in the Union at discounted prices below the market price was not substantiated with any evidence. |
| --- | --- |

(183)

The claim made by one Russian exporting producer that some Union producers sell UAN in the Union at discounted prices below the market price was not substantiated with any evidence.

| (184) | In light of the above it was provisionally concluded that none of the above-mentioned operations had a significant impact on the Union industry's injurious situation. |
| --- | --- |

(184)

In light of the above it was provisionally concluded that none of the above-mentioned operations had a significant impact on the Union industry's injurious situation.

5.2.7.   Other factors

Other factors

| (185) | During the investigation some parties referred to other factors as drivers of the injurious situation of the Union industry. These other factors include i) the seasonality of UAN prices, ii) the Union producers' swing capacities, iii) irregular supplies by some Union producers and iv) a digital platform that would sell fertilizers on the web at aggressive prices. |
| --- | --- |

(185)

During the investigation some parties referred to other factors as drivers of the injurious situation of the Union industry. These other factors include i) the seasonality of UAN prices, ii) the Union producers' swing capacities, iii) irregular supplies by some Union producers and iv) a digital platform that would sell fertilizers on the web at aggressive prices.

| (186) | The investigation showed, however, that i) the analysis being made on the basis of 12-months period, the effect of any seasonality of UAN prices is offset, that ii) Union producers resort to swing capacities as a protective measure, that iii) certain irregular supplies by some Union producers were due to normal maintenance operations and that iv) online UAN sales, limited, were done at similar market prices. |
| --- | --- |

(186)

The investigation showed, however, that i) the analysis being made on the basis of 12-months period, the effect of any seasonality of UAN prices is offset, that ii) Union producers resort to swing capacities as a protective measure, that iii) certain irregular supplies by some Union producers were due to normal maintenance operations and that iv) online UAN sales, limited, were done at similar market prices.

| (187) | It was therefore provisionally concluded that none of these factor was a driver of the injurious situation of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(187)

It was therefore provisionally concluded that none of these factor was a driver of the injurious situation of the Union industry.

5.3.   Conclusion on causation

Conclusion on causation

| (188) | Over the period considered and against a backdrop of decreasing consumption in the Union, import volumes from the countries concerned and their market shares increased significantly whereas prices from the countries concerned fell on average by 33 %. The increase in the market share of the imports coincided with a similar decrease of market share for the Union industry. Bearing in mind that UAN is a price sensitive commodity, that the market share of imports from the countries concerned was 37,7 % in the investigation period, and that those imports were made at prices that undercut Union industry prices, such imports produced substantial harmful effects. The price pressure from imports from the countries concerned on Union producers was particularly damaging in 2017 and the investigation period when costs were increasing. Such pressure caused the Union industry's performance indicators to deteriorate and led to losses in the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(188)

Over the period considered and against a backdrop of decreasing consumption in the Union, import volumes from the countries concerned and their market shares increased significantly whereas prices from the countries concerned fell on average by 33 %. The increase in the market share of the imports coincided with a similar decrease of market share for the Union industry. Bearing in mind that UAN is a price sensitive commodity, that the market share of imports from the countries concerned was 37,7 % in the investigation period, and that those imports were made at prices that undercut Union industry prices, such imports produced substantial harmful effects. The price pressure from imports from the countries concerned on Union producers was particularly damaging in 2017 and the investigation period when costs were increasing. Such pressure caused the Union industry's performance indicators to deteriorate and led to losses in the investigation period.

| (189) | The analysis in recitals (171) to (188) above found that no other factor had a significant impact on the Union industry's injurious situation. |
| --- | --- |

(189)

The analysis in recitals (171) to (188) above found that no other factor had a significant impact on the Union industry's injurious situation.

| (190) | On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the material injury to the Union industry was caused by the dumped imports from the countries concerned and the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link. |
| --- | --- |

(190)

On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the material injury to the Union industry was caused by the dumped imports from the countries concerned and the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link.

| (191) | The Commission distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports. The effect of most of these factors was practically non-existent, whereas the effect of the evolution of gas prices on the Union industry's negative developments in terms of depressed profits was limited. |
| --- | --- |

(191)

The Commission distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports. The effect of most of these factors was practically non-existent, whereas the effect of the evolution of gas prices on the Union industry's negative developments in terms of depressed profits was limited.

6.   LEVEL OF MEASURES

LEVEL OF MEASURES

| (192) | To determine the level of the measures, the Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports to the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(192)

To determine the level of the measures, the Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports to the Union industry.

| (193) | In the present case, the complainants claimed the existence of raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation with regard to one of the countries under investigation, namely Russia. The assessment concerning Russia is in Section 6.3 below. |
| --- | --- |

(193)

In the present case, the complainants claimed the existence of raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation with regard to one of the countries under investigation, namely Russia. The assessment concerning Russia is in Section 6.3 below.

| (194) | One of the cooperating Russian exporting producers claimed that the potential application of the provisions of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation with regard to Russia would be discriminatory, since raw material distortions within the meaning of this Article also applied to the natural gas markets in TT and US. |
| --- | --- |

(194)

One of the cooperating Russian exporting producers claimed that the potential application of the provisions of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation with regard to Russia would be discriminatory, since raw material distortions within the meaning of this Article also applied to the natural gas markets in TT and US.

| (195) | The Commission examined these claims and provisionally concluded that:






  (a) | the alleged subsidization of the purchases of natural gas used by the UAN producer in TT does not fall under the raw material distortions listed in Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(195)

The Commission examined these claims and provisionally concluded that:

(a)

the alleged subsidization of the purchases of natural gas used by the UAN producer in TT does not fall under the raw material distortions listed in Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation.

| (b) | although the alleged prohibition of natural gas exports without prior authorisation in the US could potentially fall under the raw material distortions listed in Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, the export licensing system used appears to be of an automatic nature and the negligible licence fee does not affect the export price. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

although the alleged prohibition of natural gas exports without prior authorisation in the US could potentially fall under the raw material distortions listed in Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, the export licensing system used appears to be of an automatic nature and the negligible licence fee does not affect the export price.

| (196) | Therefore, the Commission provisionally rejected the claim of discriminatory treatment in the application of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation with regard to Russia. |
| --- | --- |

(196)

Therefore, the Commission provisionally rejected the claim of discriminatory treatment in the application of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation with regard to Russia.

6.1.   Examination of the margin adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry for Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America

Examination of the margin adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry for Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America

| (197) | The Commission first established the amount of duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry in the absence of distortions in the sense of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. In this case, the injury would be eliminated if the Union industry was able to cover its costs of production, including those costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia of the basic Regulation, and to obtain a reasonable profit (‘target profit’). |
| --- | --- |

(197)

The Commission first established the amount of duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry in the absence of distortions in the sense of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. In this case, the injury would be eliminated if the Union industry was able to cover its costs of production, including those costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia of the basic Regulation, and to obtain a reasonable profit (‘target profit’).

| (198) | In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, for establishing the target profit, the Commission took into account the following factors: the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the country under investigation, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (R&D) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(198)

In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, for establishing the target profit, the Commission took into account the following factors: the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the country under investigation, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (R&D) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition.

| (199) | As shown in table 2, in 2016 imports from the countries concerned started soaring. Any profit margin for this purpose would thus need to be derived from the years before. In order to avoid that an exceptional profit year would be used it was decided to use the weighted average profit achieved by the Union industry over the period 2013-2015. The thus obtained target profit, which amounted to 10 %, was considered to represent a healthy profit under normal conditions of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(199)

As shown in table 2, in 2016 imports from the countries concerned started soaring. Any profit margin for this purpose would thus need to be derived from the years before. In order to avoid that an exceptional profit year would be used it was decided to use the weighted average profit achieved by the Union industry over the period 2013-2015. The thus obtained target profit, which amounted to 10 %, was considered to represent a healthy profit under normal conditions of competition.

| (200) | One sampled Union producer claimed that the Commission should add to the target profit planned investments which were not implemented during the period considered. The Commission investigated this claim under Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation. However, the company concerned was unable to provide documentary evidence to support this claim, which was therefore provisionally rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(200)

One sampled Union producer claimed that the Commission should add to the target profit planned investments which were not implemented during the period considered. The Commission investigated this claim under Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation. However, the company concerned was unable to provide documentary evidence to support this claim, which was therefore provisionally rejected.

| (201) | In accordance with article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, as a final step, the Commission assessed the future costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia of the basic Regulation, that the Union industry will incur during the period of the application of the measure pursuant to Article 11(2). Based on the evidence available, the Commission established an additional cost of 3,7 % which was added to the non-injurious price. A note to the file on how the Commission established this additional cost is available in the file for inspection by interested parties. |
| --- | --- |

(201)

In accordance with article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, as a final step, the Commission assessed the future costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia of the basic Regulation, that the Union industry will incur during the period of the application of the measure pursuant to Article 11(2). Based on the evidence available, the Commission established an additional cost of 3,7 % which was added to the non-injurious price. A note to the file on how the Commission established this additional cost is available in the file for inspection by interested parties.

| (202) | These costs comprised the additional future costs to ensure compliance with the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The EU ETS is a cornerstone of the EU's policy to comply with Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Such additional costs were calculated on the basis of the average estimated additional EU Allowances (EUA) which will have to be purchased during the life of the measures. The EUAs used in the calculation were net of free allowances receivable and, like all costs of production, were verified to ensure they were correctly allocated to the product concerned. The costs of the EUAs were extrapolated to account for the expected price variation during the lifespan of the measures. The source for these projected prices is a Bloomberg New Energy Finance extraction dated 8 February 2019. The average projected price for EUAs for this period is 24,14 EUR/tonne of CO2 produced. |
| --- | --- |

(202)

These costs comprised the additional future costs to ensure compliance with the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The EU ETS is a cornerstone of the EU's policy to comply with Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Such additional costs were calculated on the basis of the average estimated additional EU Allowances (EUA) which will have to be purchased during the life of the measures. The EUAs used in the calculation were net of free allowances receivable and, like all costs of production, were verified to ensure they were correctly allocated to the product concerned. The costs of the EUAs were extrapolated to account for the expected price variation during the lifespan of the measures. The source for these projected prices is a Bloomberg New Energy Finance extraction dated 8 February 2019. The average projected price for EUAs for this period is 24,14 EUR/tonne of CO2 produced.

| (203) | On this basis, the Commission calculated a non-injurious price of the like product for the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(203)

On this basis, the Commission calculated a non-injurious price of the like product for the Union industry.

| (204) | The Commission then determined the injury elimination level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the cooperating exporting producers in TT and US, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value. The result of these calculations is shown in the table below.








  Country | Company | Dumping margin (%) | Underselling margin (%) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Trinidad and Tobago | Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) Limited | 55,9 | 16,3 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | All other companies | 55,9 | 16,3 |
| United States of America | CF Industries Holdings, Inc. | 37,3 | 22,6 |
| United States of America | All other companies | 37,3 | 22,6 |

(204)

The Commission then determined the injury elimination level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the cooperating exporting producers in TT and US, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value. The result of these calculations is shown in the table below.

Country

Company

Dumping margin (%)

Underselling margin (%)

Trinidad and Tobago

Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) Limited

55,9

16,3

Trinidad and Tobago

All other companies

55,9

16,3

United States of America

CF Industries Holdings, Inc.

37,3

22,6

United States of America

All other companies

37,3

22,6

6.2.   Examination of the margin adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry for Russia

Examination of the margin adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry for Russia

6.2.1.   Comparison between dumping margin and underselling margin

Comparison between dumping margin and underselling margin

| (205) | In accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission first examined in relation to Russia whether the margin of dumping provisionally established would be higher than the margin adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry. To this effect, a comparison between the weighted average import price of the cooperating exporting producers in Russia, with the target price of the Union industry as explained in Section 6.1 above, was made. The result of these calculations is shown in the table below.








  Country | Company | Dumping margin (%) | Underselling margin (%) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Russia | PJSC Acron | 31,9 | 12,5 |
| Russia | Novomoskovsky Azot JSC | 34,0 | 15,8 |
| Russia | Nevinnomyssky Azot JSC | 34,0 | 15,8 |
| Russia | All other companies | 34,0 | 13,6 |

(205)

In accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission first examined in relation to Russia whether the margin of dumping provisionally established would be higher than the margin adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry. To this effect, a comparison between the weighted average import price of the cooperating exporting producers in Russia, with the target price of the Union industry as explained in Section 6.1 above, was made. The result of these calculations is shown in the table below.

Country

Company

Dumping margin (%)

Underselling margin (%)

Russia

PJSC Acron

31,9

12,5

Russia

Novomoskovsky Azot JSC

34,0

15,8

Russia

Nevinnomyssky Azot JSC

34,0

15,8

Russia

All other companies

34,0

13,6

| (206) | Since the underselling margin so calculated was lower than the margin of dumping, the Commission underwent the examination required under Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(206)

Since the underselling margin so calculated was lower than the margin of dumping, the Commission underwent the examination required under Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation.

6.3.   Raw material distortions

Raw material distortions

| (207) | The complainant provided sufficient evidence in the complaint that there are raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation with regard to the product concerned in Russia. According to the evidence in the complaint, natural gas, which accounts for substantially more than 17 % of the cost of production of the product concerned, is subject to dual pricing in Russia. |
| --- | --- |

(207)

The complainant provided sufficient evidence in the complaint that there are raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation with regard to the product concerned in Russia. According to the evidence in the complaint, natural gas, which accounts for substantially more than 17 % of the cost of production of the product concerned, is subject to dual pricing in Russia.

| (208) | Therefore, as announced in the notice of initiation, in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, when assessing the appropriate level of measures in relation to Russia, the Commission examined the alleged distortion and any other distortions covered by Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation in Russia. |
| --- | --- |

(208)

Therefore, as announced in the notice of initiation, in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, when assessing the appropriate level of measures in relation to Russia, the Commission examined the alleged distortion and any other distortions covered by Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation in Russia.

| (209) | The Commission first identified the main raw materials used in the production of the product concerned by each of the cooperating exporting producers. As main raw materials were considered those raw materials which are likely to represent at least 17 % of the cost of production of the product concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(209)

The Commission first identified the main raw materials used in the production of the product concerned by each of the cooperating exporting producers. As main raw materials were considered those raw materials which are likely to represent at least 17 % of the cost of production of the product concerned.

| (210) | The Commission established that natural gas is the main raw material for the production of the product concerned. The investigation confirmed that it accounts for more than 17 % of the cost of production of UAN for both cooperating Russian exporting producers, as required by Article 7(2a). For both companies, on the basis of the information provided by them, the cost of gas in the total cost of production of UAN accounted for more than 50 % with the gas prices as reported by the companies. With the gas adjustment as described in recitals (52) to (55) and (59) to (60), the cost of gas in the total cost of production of UAN is in the range of 70 % to 85 %. |
| --- | --- |

(210)

The Commission established that natural gas is the main raw material for the production of the product concerned. The investigation confirmed that it accounts for more than 17 % of the cost of production of UAN for both cooperating Russian exporting producers, as required by Article 7(2a). For both companies, on the basis of the information provided by them, the cost of gas in the total cost of production of UAN accounted for more than 50 % with the gas prices as reported by the companies. With the gas adjustment as described in recitals (52) to (55) and (59) to (60), the cost of gas in the total cost of production of UAN is in the range of 70 % to 85 %.

| (211) | The Commission then examined whether natural gas used in the production of the product concerned is distorted by one of the measures listed in Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation: dual pricing schemes, export taxes, export surtax, export quota, export prohibition, fiscal tax on exports, licensing requirements, minimum export price, value added tax (VAT) refund reduction or withdrawal, restriction on customs clearance point for exporters, qualified exporters list, domestic market obligation, captive mining. For this purpose the Commission examined the relevant Regulations of the Russian Federation, submissions of the interested parties including by the GOR, publicly available reports and studies (16), audited annual accounts of the Russian gas suppliers and strategic documents of the GOR (17). |
| --- | --- |

(211)

The Commission then examined whether natural gas used in the production of the product concerned is distorted by one of the measures listed in Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation: dual pricing schemes, export taxes, export surtax, export quota, export prohibition, fiscal tax on exports, licensing requirements, minimum export price, value added tax (VAT) refund reduction or withdrawal, restriction on customs clearance point for exporters, qualified exporters list, domestic market obligation, captive mining. For this purpose the Commission examined the relevant Regulations of the Russian Federation, submissions of the interested parties including by the GOR, publicly available reports and studies (16), audited annual accounts of the Russian gas suppliers and strategic documents of the GOR (17).

16

17

| (212) | The Commission established that one of the measures listed as raw material distortions in the second paragraph of Article 7(2a), namely an export tax (of 30 %) (18), existed and affected the sales of natural gas in Russia during the IP. |
| --- | --- |

(212)

The Commission established that one of the measures listed as raw material distortions in the second paragraph of Article 7(2a), namely an export tax (of 30 %) (18), existed and affected the sales of natural gas in Russia during the IP.

18

| (213) | In addition, an exclusive right for export of gas in gaseous state is granted to the owner of the Unified Gas Supply System (‘UGSS’). It is also provided by law that the owner of the UGSS can only be an entity controlled by the State. Therefore, Gazprom enjoys the only licence to export natural gas. The situation as described could qualify as either ‘licensing requirements’ or ‘qualified exporter list’ measure. |
| --- | --- |

(213)

In addition, an exclusive right for export of gas in gaseous state is granted to the owner of the Unified Gas Supply System (‘UGSS’). It is also provided by law that the owner of the UGSS can only be an entity controlled by the State. Therefore, Gazprom enjoys the only licence to export natural gas. The situation as described could qualify as either ‘licensing requirements’ or ‘qualified exporter list’ measure.

| (214) | Finally, the complainant referred to the dual pricing of natural gas as a potential raw material distortion. The investigation indeed found evidence indicating the existence of dual pricing concerning the natural gas in Russia for domestic and export sales based on the gas price formula used in determination of the regulated domestic prices. |
| --- | --- |

(214)

Finally, the complainant referred to the dual pricing of natural gas as a potential raw material distortion. The investigation indeed found evidence indicating the existence of dual pricing concerning the natural gas in Russia for domestic and export sales based on the gas price formula used in determination of the regulated domestic prices.

| (215) | In this respect, the domestic price in Russia is regulated for the state-owned gas supplier Gazprom and unregulated for other suppliers. Suppliers other than Gazprom, however, closely follow the price determined by GOR for Gazprom as observed in the investigated exporting producers but also from publicly available information (19). Depending on the year, the domestic price is set using a gas price formula or is determined by indexation. The index to be used is regularly published in a forecast of socio-economic development by the Russian Ministry of Economic Development (20). The gas price formula calculates the appropriate level of domestic price by deducting the export tax, international and domestic transport costs and so called reduction coefficient from an international price of natural gas. The Commission considered that the effect of dual pricing can be attributed to the reduction coefficient which is independent from the effect of the export tax. |
| --- | --- |

(215)

In this respect, the domestic price in Russia is regulated for the state-owned gas supplier Gazprom and unregulated for other suppliers. Suppliers other than Gazprom, however, closely follow the price determined by GOR for Gazprom as observed in the investigated exporting producers but also from publicly available information (19). Depending on the year, the domestic price is set using a gas price formula or is determined by indexation. The index to be used is regularly published in a forecast of socio-economic development by the Russian Ministry of Economic Development (20). The gas price formula calculates the appropriate level of domestic price by deducting the export tax, international and domestic transport costs and so called reduction coefficient from an international price of natural gas. The Commission considered that the effect of dual pricing can be attributed to the reduction coefficient which is independent from the effect of the export tax.

19

20

| (216) | The Commission compared the price of natural gas to price in the representative international market. The investigation confirmed that the domestic price of natural gas in Russia is significantly, more than twice, lower as compared to Waidhaus price calculated as explained in recital and (59) to (60). |
| --- | --- |

(216)

The Commission compared the price of natural gas to price in the representative international market. The investigation confirmed that the domestic price of natural gas in Russia is significantly, more than twice, lower as compared to Waidhaus price calculated as explained in recital and (59) to (60).

| (217) | As explained in the recital (55) point d), the Commission considered the Waidhaus price as an appropriate benchmark for the representative international market price to assess the distortion in the domestic market price of natural gas in Russia. |
| --- | --- |

(217)

As explained in the recital (55) point d), the Commission considered the Waidhaus price as an appropriate benchmark for the representative international market price to assess the distortion in the domestic market price of natural gas in Russia.

| (218) | One of the Russian cooperating producers claimed that natural gas is not the raw material for the production of UAN and therefore it cannot be subject to the analysis under Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Furthermore, the interested party in question claimed that it was not clear from the complaint that the cost of natural gas met the 17 % threshold in the total cost of production of UAN. |
| --- | --- |

(218)

One of the Russian cooperating producers claimed that natural gas is not the raw material for the production of UAN and therefore it cannot be subject to the analysis under Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Furthermore, the interested party in question claimed that it was not clear from the complaint that the cost of natural gas met the 17 % threshold in the total cost of production of UAN.

| (219) | As explained in recital (52), natural gas accounts for more than 50 % of the cost of production of the product concerned. The fact that it is used to manufacture ammonia, one of the first steps of production of the product concerned, as explained in recital (60), does not change its nature as a necessary raw material for production of the product concerned. Both Russian producers of UAN are fully integrated chemical plants and therefore they both take advantage of the distortions identified for natural gas for making the product concerned. The claim is therefore provisionally rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(219)

As explained in recital (52), natural gas accounts for more than 50 % of the cost of production of the product concerned. The fact that it is used to manufacture ammonia, one of the first steps of production of the product concerned, as explained in recital (60), does not change its nature as a necessary raw material for production of the product concerned. Both Russian producers of UAN are fully integrated chemical plants and therefore they both take advantage of the distortions identified for natural gas for making the product concerned. The claim is therefore provisionally rejected.

| (220) | Taking into account its assessment as explained in recitals (205) to (215), the Commission provisionally concluded that natural gas is subject to distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(220)

Taking into account its assessment as explained in recitals (205) to (215), the Commission provisionally concluded that natural gas is subject to distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation.

6.4.   Union interest under Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation

Union interest under Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation

| (221) | Having concluded that there are raw material distortions as provided for by Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation in the case of Russia, the Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was in the Union interest to determine the amount of provisional duties in accordance with Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all pertinent information to this investigation, including the spare capacities in the exporting country, competition for raw materials and the effect on supply chains for Union companies in accordance with Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation. In order to conduct this assessment, the Commission inserted specific questions in the questionnaires to all interested parties. The complainant and some complaining producers provided a response to those questions. A few other parties provided a response to those questions but most of the responses of these few parties were incomplete. |
| --- | --- |

(221)

Having concluded that there are raw material distortions as provided for by Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation in the case of Russia, the Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was in the Union interest to determine the amount of provisional duties in accordance with Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all pertinent information to this investigation, including the spare capacities in the exporting country, competition for raw materials and the effect on supply chains for Union companies in accordance with Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation. In order to conduct this assessment, the Commission inserted specific questions in the questionnaires to all interested parties. The complainant and some complaining producers provided a response to those questions. A few other parties provided a response to those questions but most of the responses of these few parties were incomplete.

6.4.1.   Spare capacities in the exporting country

Spare capacities in the exporting country

| (222) | As to UAN, as noted in recitals (141) and (143), UAN is normally produced at integrated chemical sites. Thus, spare capacity is largely dependent on the configuration of these integrated sites and on the producer's customer base. Each company aims to maximise the profitability of the site as a whole and therefore it is difficult to establish the precise spare capacity. |
| --- | --- |

(222)

As to UAN, as noted in recitals (141) and (143), UAN is normally produced at integrated chemical sites. Thus, spare capacity is largely dependent on the configuration of these integrated sites and on the producer's customer base. Each company aims to maximise the profitability of the site as a whole and therefore it is difficult to establish the precise spare capacity.

| (223) | Considering that fact, and on the basis of the information collected during the investigation, the Commission established that the spare capacity in Russia ranges between 330 000 and 750 000 tons per year, which constitutes between 7 % and 16 % of the UAN consumed in the Union. These numbers were established on the basis of verified capacity information of the two cooperating Russian exporting producers made up for most of the production in Russia (actual spare capacity, disregarding the ‘swing capacity’) and information provided by the complainants (potential spare capacity, considering the ‘swing capacity’). |
| --- | --- |

(223)

Considering that fact, and on the basis of the information collected during the investigation, the Commission established that the spare capacity in Russia ranges between 330 000 and 750 000 tons per year, which constitutes between 7 % and 16 % of the UAN consumed in the Union. These numbers were established on the basis of verified capacity information of the two cooperating Russian exporting producers made up for most of the production in Russia (actual spare capacity, disregarding the ‘swing capacity’) and information provided by the complainants (potential spare capacity, considering the ‘swing capacity’).

| (224) | The Russian UAN market (21) is relatively small as compared to the Russian UAN production capacity (22). With a production that significantly outweighs domestic consumption, Russia is a net exporter of UAN. |
| --- | --- |

(224)

The Russian UAN market (21) is relatively small as compared to the Russian UAN production capacity (22). With a production that significantly outweighs domestic consumption, Russia is a net exporter of UAN.

21

22

| (225) | In 2017, Russia exported over 100 000 tons of UAN to Ukraine. Following the imposition of anti-dumping measures on UAN originating in Russia by Ukraine in May 2017, these exports became available to be directed to other more interesting markets, including the Union market. |
| --- | --- |

(225)

In 2017, Russia exported over 100 000 tons of UAN to Ukraine. Following the imposition of anti-dumping measures on UAN originating in Russia by Ukraine in May 2017, these exports became available to be directed to other more interesting markets, including the Union market.

| (226) | Russia's export potential is patent. Even if the ‘swing capacities’ of Russian producers were deemed limited, it is undeniable that since August 2018 UAN import volumes into the Union from Russia continued the upward trend shown in table 2 (see also Table 1 of the registration Regulation). It is also noted that on page 9 of its submission dated 19 September 2018 Eurochem foresaw an increase of Russian UAN exports in 2018 and 2019. |
| --- | --- |

(226)

Russia's export potential is patent. Even if the ‘swing capacities’ of Russian producers were deemed limited, it is undeniable that since August 2018 UAN import volumes into the Union from Russia continued the upward trend shown in table 2 (see also Table 1 of the registration Regulation). It is also noted that on page 9 of its submission dated 19 September 2018 Eurochem foresaw an increase of Russian UAN exports in 2018 and 2019.

6.4.2.   Competition for raw materials

Competition for raw materials

| (227) | As highlighted in recital (54) above, the investigation showed that gas prices in Russia were regulated by the State via federal laws and did not reflect normal market conditions, where prices are principally set by production costs and profit expectations. |
| --- | --- |

(227)

As highlighted in recital (54) above, the investigation showed that gas prices in Russia were regulated by the State via federal laws and did not reflect normal market conditions, where prices are principally set by production costs and profit expectations.

| (228) | Acron submitted a presentation on the competition in the gas market in Russia (namely on gas pricing, profitability of regulated and non-regulated prices and sources of supply) prepared in 2016 by the GOR outside the scope of this investigation. However, the Commission did not consider that this presentation, which is addressed in recitals (56)-(57) above, undermined the findings stated in the recital above. |
| --- | --- |

(228)

Acron submitted a presentation on the competition in the gas market in Russia (namely on gas pricing, profitability of regulated and non-regulated prices and sources of supply) prepared in 2016 by the GOR outside the scope of this investigation. However, the Commission did not consider that this presentation, which is addressed in recitals (56)-(57) above, undermined the findings stated in the recital above.

| (229) | The regulation of the gas market in Russia results in an unfair advantage to Russian UAN producers since they have access to artificially low gas prices in the domestic market due to the domestic regulations explained in recitals (209) to (217) above. At the same time, Union producers are negatively affected by the price discrimination caused by these regulations in Russia, which makes them pay considerably higher prices than those paid by Russian producers for the same gas. |
| --- | --- |

(229)

The regulation of the gas market in Russia results in an unfair advantage to Russian UAN producers since they have access to artificially low gas prices in the domestic market due to the domestic regulations explained in recitals (209) to (217) above. At the same time, Union producers are negatively affected by the price discrimination caused by these regulations in Russia, which makes them pay considerably higher prices than those paid by Russian producers for the same gas.

| (230) | The Commission deems that this situation is unlikely to change in the near future (23). |
| --- | --- |

(230)

The Commission deems that this situation is unlikely to change in the near future (23).

23

6.4.3.   Effect on supply chains for Union companies

Effect on supply chains for Union companies

| (231) | According to the findings of the investigation, the expected impact on supply chains is limited. In fact, most parties, including importers, stated that UAN's ultimate users, i.e. farmers, would be the only parties affected by price increases stemming from measures given that there are no intermediate parties in the supply chain that can absorb duties. Being a liquid and rather homogeneous commodity, UAN from several origins is mixed in tanks and most actors in the supply chain ignore the origin of the UAN purchased/used. Overall supply chains are thus not expected to significantly change if measures are imposed. Union producers will continue producing UAN, while imports from Russia (as well as from the other countries investigated) are expected to continue in light of the growth foreseen in UAN demand and the fact that Union producers can switch products to a limited extent. |
| --- | --- |

(231)

According to the findings of the investigation, the expected impact on supply chains is limited. In fact, most parties, including importers, stated that UAN's ultimate users, i.e. farmers, would be the only parties affected by price increases stemming from measures given that there are no intermediate parties in the supply chain that can absorb duties. Being a liquid and rather homogeneous commodity, UAN from several origins is mixed in tanks and most actors in the supply chain ignore the origin of the UAN purchased/used. Overall supply chains are thus not expected to significantly change if measures are imposed. Union producers will continue producing UAN, while imports from Russia (as well as from the other countries investigated) are expected to continue in light of the growth foreseen in UAN demand and the fact that Union producers can switch products to a limited extent.

| (232) | According to the findings of the investigation, the effects on Union farmers as a whole would be small. The Commission found that UAN represents less than 1 % of overall farming costs in the Union. A price increase derived from measures, if any, should thus not have a significant impact on the farming sector in the Union as a whole. |
| --- | --- |

(232)

According to the findings of the investigation, the effects on Union farmers as a whole would be small. The Commission found that UAN represents less than 1 % of overall farming costs in the Union. A price increase derived from measures, if any, should thus not have a significant impact on the farming sector in the Union as a whole.

| (233) | Given that UAN as a fertilizer covers very diverse realities and its use varies a lot from crop to crop, from region to region, etc., the Commission assessed the impact on farms specialised in common wheat (main crop using UAN) in France (main wheat producing country in the Union) that use UAN as a sole source of nitrogen fertiliser separately. |
| --- | --- |

(233)

Given that UAN as a fertilizer covers very diverse realities and its use varies a lot from crop to crop, from region to region, etc., the Commission assessed the impact on farms specialised in common wheat (main crop using UAN) in France (main wheat producing country in the Union) that use UAN as a sole source of nitrogen fertiliser separately.

| (234) | In such specialised farms, in 2013 all fertilisers represented 21,94 % of their costs (24). The Commission estimated that in the 2017/2018 campaign UAN represented up to 10 % of their total costs of production (25). Considering the highest provisional antidumping duty imposed, this would represent a maximum of 3 % (26) increase in the cost of production, if measures were passed on in the same proportion. Thus, the Commission concluded that measures would not have a disproportionate impact even for these farms. Moreover, many farms in the Union (including France) rely on several crops. |
| --- | --- |

(234)

In such specialised farms, in 2013 all fertilisers represented 21,94 % of their costs (24). The Commission estimated that in the 2017/2018 campaign UAN represented up to 10 % of their total costs of production (25). Considering the highest provisional antidumping duty imposed, this would represent a maximum of 3 % (26) increase in the cost of production, if measures were passed on in the same proportion. Thus, the Commission concluded that measures would not have a disproportionate impact even for these farms. Moreover, many farms in the Union (including France) rely on several crops.

24

25

26

6.4.4.   Conclusion

Conclusion

| (235) | Having assessed all pertinent information to this investigation, the Commission provisionally concluded that, for Russia, it is in the Union interest to determine the amount of provisional duties in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(235)

Having assessed all pertinent information to this investigation, the Commission provisionally concluded that, for Russia, it is in the Union interest to determine the amount of provisional duties in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation.

| (236) | In particular, the Commission first established that there are there are distortions on raw materials with regard to the product concerned in Russia. Second, the Commission found that Russia has spare capacity which can be used to increase exports to the Union. In addition, the Commission found that Russian producers have an unfair advantage vis-à-vis Union producers with regard to natural gas due to the regulation in the Russian market. Finally, the Commission concluded that measures would not negatively affect the supply chain in Europe. More specifically, the Commission found that, although a limited number of farmers in the Union could potentially be affected by measures, any impact would be limited and not disproportionate overall. Finally, the Commission considered that imports of UAN would continue and, therefore, supply would not be disrupted by measures. Imports from the countries concerned, with a market share above 37 % in the investigation period, are expected to continue in light of the growth foreseen in UAN demand and the fact that Union producers can switch products to a limited extent. In any event, Union producers, with spare capacities, can produce significant volumes of UAN. |
| --- | --- |

(236)

In particular, the Commission first established that there are there are distortions on raw materials with regard to the product concerned in Russia. Second, the Commission found that Russia has spare capacity which can be used to increase exports to the Union. In addition, the Commission found that Russian producers have an unfair advantage vis-à-vis Union producers with regard to natural gas due to the regulation in the Russian market. Finally, the Commission concluded that measures would not negatively affect the supply chain in Europe. More specifically, the Commission found that, although a limited number of farmers in the Union could potentially be affected by measures, any impact would be limited and not disproportionate overall. Finally, the Commission considered that imports of UAN would continue and, therefore, supply would not be disrupted by measures. Imports from the countries concerned, with a market share above 37 % in the investigation period, are expected to continue in light of the growth foreseen in UAN demand and the fact that Union producers can switch products to a limited extent. In any event, Union producers, with spare capacities, can produce significant volumes of UAN.

vis-à-vis

| (237) | On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that, in the case of Russia, a duty lower than the margin of dumping would not be sufficient to remove injury to the Union industry. Union producers are not only harmed by dumping, but suffer from additional distortions of trade compared to Russia's exporting producers. Therefore, in order to adequately protect trade, the level of measures for Russia must equate the margin of dumping as provisionally established. |
| --- | --- |

(237)

On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that, in the case of Russia, a duty lower than the margin of dumping would not be sufficient to remove injury to the Union industry. Union producers are not only harmed by dumping, but suffer from additional distortions of trade compared to Russia's exporting producers. Therefore, in order to adequately protect trade, the level of measures for Russia must equate the margin of dumping as provisionally established.

7.   UNION INTEREST

UNION INTEREST

| (238) | In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case in respect of imports from Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the USA, despite the determination of injurious dumping. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, users and other relevant economic operators. |
| --- | --- |

(238)

In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case in respect of imports from Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the USA, despite the determination of injurious dumping. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, users and other relevant economic operators.

7.1.   Interest of the Union industry

Interest of the Union industry

| (239) | There are 20 known producers of UAN across the Union. Union producers covering 80 % of Union production volume cooperated with the investigation. Two companies or groups of companies representing 30 % of UAN production in the Union opposed to the case. |
| --- | --- |

(239)

There are 20 known producers of UAN across the Union. Union producers covering 80 % of Union production volume cooperated with the investigation. Two companies or groups of companies representing 30 % of UAN production in the Union opposed to the case.

| (240) | The absence of measures is likely to have a significant negative effect on the Union industry in terms of lower sales volumes and further price depression, thus lowering profitability and investments. Measures would allow the Union industry to exploit its potential on a Union market that is a level-playing field, recover lost market share, and improve profitability to levels considered sustainable. |
| --- | --- |

(240)

The absence of measures is likely to have a significant negative effect on the Union industry in terms of lower sales volumes and further price depression, thus lowering profitability and investments. Measures would allow the Union industry to exploit its potential on a Union market that is a level-playing field, recover lost market share, and improve profitability to levels considered sustainable.

7.2.   Interest of unrelated importers

Interest of unrelated importers

| (241) | Three unrelated importers submitted a questionnaire reply. Only two of them agreed to further co-operate with the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(241)

Three unrelated importers submitted a questionnaire reply. Only two of them agreed to further co-operate with the investigation.

| (242) | UAN activities represented a minor share of the activities of one of the two co-operating importers, which is in fact a union of cooperatives acting on behalf of its members. The other importer, more reliant on UAN, adapts its selling prices depending on the evolution of the UAN market. The two co-operating importers offer a wide range of services and/or products and have several sources of supply. |
| --- | --- |

(242)

UAN activities represented a minor share of the activities of one of the two co-operating importers, which is in fact a union of cooperatives acting on behalf of its members. The other importer, more reliant on UAN, adapts its selling prices depending on the evolution of the UAN market. The two co-operating importers offer a wide range of services and/or products and have several sources of supply.

| (243) | Any negative consequences for importers in the Union stemming from measures cannot outweigh the positive consequences of the latter on the Union industry. Measures are intended to create a level playing field that all parties can benefit from. Moreover, importers offer in general a wide range of fertilisers and/or services and have several sources of supply. Most parties, including both co-operating importers, stated that UAN's ultimate users, i.e., farmers, would be the parties affected by price increases (if any) stemming from measures in the end. |
| --- | --- |

(243)

Any negative consequences for importers in the Union stemming from measures cannot outweigh the positive consequences of the latter on the Union industry. Measures are intended to create a level playing field that all parties can benefit from. Moreover, importers offer in general a wide range of fertilisers and/or services and have several sources of supply. Most parties, including both co-operating importers, stated that UAN's ultimate users, i.e., farmers, would be the parties affected by price increases (if any) stemming from measures in the end.

7.3.   Interest of users

Interest of users

| (244) | Eleven parties representing the interests of users submitted questionnaire replies although with limited verifiable data. |
| --- | --- |

(244)

Eleven parties representing the interests of users submitted questionnaire replies although with limited verifiable data.

| (245) | Associations representing relevant cooperatives and/or farmers in the Union (COPA-COGECA), France (COOP de France), Ireland (Irish Farmers Association) and Finland (MTK) submitted that measures would have a negative impact on UAN users, i.e. farmers. A significant number of French cooperatives, unions/groups of cooperatives and purchase platforms buying agricultural supplies on behalf of farmers commented on the negative impact that measures could have on French farmers. Co-operating exporting producers, a series of unrelated importers and different economic operators in France and Spain expressed a similar view. |
| --- | --- |

(245)

Associations representing relevant cooperatives and/or farmers in the Union (COPA-COGECA), France (COOP de France), Ireland (Irish Farmers Association) and Finland (MTK) submitted that measures would have a negative impact on UAN users, i.e. farmers. A significant number of French cooperatives, unions/groups of cooperatives and purchase platforms buying agricultural supplies on behalf of farmers commented on the negative impact that measures could have on French farmers. Co-operating exporting producers, a series of unrelated importers and different economic operators in France and Spain expressed a similar view.

| (246) | One large French intermediary active in agri-foods products and fertilisers stated that any anti-dumping measures ‘will have to be light’. |
| --- | --- |

(246)

One large French intermediary active in agri-foods products and fertilisers stated that any anti-dumping measures ‘will have to be light’.

| (247) | Some parties claimed that there are limited/no substitutive products for farmers (and/or other economic operators) because there is not enough production of nitrogen fertilisers in the Union. However, nothing on file points at a shortage of nitrogen fertilisers in the Union; there are numerous sources of supply of nitrogen fertilisation in general, such as calcium ammonium nitrate, ammonium nitrate or urea. |
| --- | --- |

(247)

Some parties claimed that there are limited/no substitutive products for farmers (and/or other economic operators) because there is not enough production of nitrogen fertilisers in the Union. However, nothing on file points at a shortage of nitrogen fertilisers in the Union; there are numerous sources of supply of nitrogen fertilisation in general, such as calcium ammonium nitrate, ammonium nitrate or urea.

| (248) | Some comments concerned the importance of UAN costs in a farm (although the quantification varied significantly from party to party) and/or pinpointed that farmers have been suffering for years for various reasons (such as a bad crop in 2016, low sale prices, bad weather or high market competitiveness) and the jobs at stake. According to these parties, anti-dumping measures would force some farmers to stop producing and/or further deteriorate a sector that cannot pass on costs and needs to remain competitive in a globalised market. For some parties anti-dumping measures would be a trade-off with the Common Agricultural policy and the latter will become insufficient to guarantee farms' income and competitiveness. |
| --- | --- |

(248)

Some comments concerned the importance of UAN costs in a farm (although the quantification varied significantly from party to party) and/or pinpointed that farmers have been suffering for years for various reasons (such as a bad crop in 2016, low sale prices, bad weather or high market competitiveness) and the jobs at stake. According to these parties, anti-dumping measures would force some farmers to stop producing and/or further deteriorate a sector that cannot pass on costs and needs to remain competitive in a globalised market. For some parties anti-dumping measures would be a trade-off with the Common Agricultural policy and the latter will become insufficient to guarantee farms' income and competitiveness.

| (249) | The Commission dismissed these arguments. While acknowledging that the impact could vary depending on the type of farm or on the farming practice, the Commission found that UAN represents less than around 1 % of overall farming costs in the Union. A price increase derived from measures, if any, should thus not have a significant impact on the farming sector as a whole in the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(249)

The Commission dismissed these arguments. While acknowledging that the impact could vary depending on the type of farm or on the farming practice, the Commission found that UAN represents less than around 1 % of overall farming costs in the Union. A price increase derived from measures, if any, should thus not have a significant impact on the farming sector as a whole in the Union.

| (250) | Given that UAN as a fertilizer covers very diverse realities and its use varies a lot from crop to crop, from region to region, etc., the Commission examined the potential impact of measures for farms specialised in common wheat (main crop using UAN) in France (main wheat producing country in the Union) that use UAN as a sole source of nitrogen fertiliser. |
| --- | --- |

(250)

Given that UAN as a fertilizer covers very diverse realities and its use varies a lot from crop to crop, from region to region, etc., the Commission examined the potential impact of measures for farms specialised in common wheat (main crop using UAN) in France (main wheat producing country in the Union) that use UAN as a sole source of nitrogen fertiliser.

| (251) | In such specialised farms, in 2013 UAN represented 15,4 % of their costs (27). The Commission estimated that in the 2017/2018 campaign UAN represented up to 10 % of their total costs of production (28). Considering the highest provisional antidumping duty imposed, this would represent approximately a 3 % (29) increase in the cost of production, if measures were passed on in the same proportion. Thus a price increase derived from the measures imposed, if any, should not have a disproportionate high impact on farms in the ‘worst case scenario’, given, inter alia, the tools at the disposal of farmers in order to secure UAN at reasonable prices (e.g. pooling purchases via purchase platforms or insurances to hedge margins). Moreover, many farms in the Union rely on several crops. |
| --- | --- |

(251)

In such specialised farms, in 2013 UAN represented 15,4 % of their costs (27). The Commission estimated that in the 2017/2018 campaign UAN represented up to 10 % of their total costs of production (28). Considering the highest provisional antidumping duty imposed, this would represent approximately a 3 % (29) increase in the cost of production, if measures were passed on in the same proportion. Thus a price increase derived from the measures imposed, if any, should not have a disproportionate high impact on farms in the ‘worst case scenario’, given, inter alia, the tools at the disposal of farmers in order to secure UAN at reasonable prices (e.g. pooling purchases via purchase platforms or insurances to hedge margins). Moreover, many farms in the Union rely on several crops.

27

28

29

| (252) | As to the claim regarding the impact on jobs in farms, it is noted that for years farming in the Union is/will be becoming more technology-intensive, and has seen a reduction of workforce which is forecasted to continue (30). The impact of the anti-dumping measures is expected to be limited as compared to these ongoing trends. |
| --- | --- |

(252)

As to the claim regarding the impact on jobs in farms, it is noted that for years farming in the Union is/will be becoming more technology-intensive, and has seen a reduction of workforce which is forecasted to continue (30). The impact of the anti-dumping measures is expected to be limited as compared to these ongoing trends.

30

| (253) | Notwithstanding the provisional findings above, the Commission encourages parties that have not yet provided their views to make representations on the interests of users. These observations and any other elements brought to the Commission attention by interested parties after provisional measures within the set deadlines will be careful analysed at definitive stage. |
| --- | --- |

(253)

Notwithstanding the provisional findings above, the Commission encourages parties that have not yet provided their views to make representations on the interests of users. These observations and any other elements brought to the Commission attention by interested parties after provisional measures within the set deadlines will be careful analysed at definitive stage.

7.4.   Other factors

Other factors

| (254) | This section takes stock of other comments which were common among several interested parties. These parties are exporting producers, importers, associations representing relevant cooperatives and/or farmers in the Union, France and Ireland; French cooperatives, unions/groups of cooperatives and purchase platforms buying agricultural supplies on behalf of farmers, and different economic operators in France, Spain and other parts of the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(254)

This section takes stock of other comments which were common among several interested parties. These parties are exporting producers, importers, associations representing relevant cooperatives and/or farmers in the Union, France and Ireland; French cooperatives, unions/groups of cooperatives and purchase platforms buying agricultural supplies on behalf of farmers, and different economic operators in France, Spain and other parts of the Union.

| (255) | Some parties opposed to measures on the grounds that imports are necessary, that there is not enough UAN production in the Union and that the gap between demand and supply increases and that Union UAN producers favour other value-added products. The Commission dismissed these arguments. Overall there are enough sources of UAN supply. The fact that there is limited UAN production in the Union, the increases in UAN demand in the Union and the disappearance of some traditional UAN sources of supply in the Union (e.g. one company that was previously producing UAN in France switch fully to other fertilisers) does not justify dumping practices. The investigation showed the benefits of preserving several sources of supply in the Union (31), including local UAN producers, rather than increasing UAN dependence on third countries with unfair trade practices and/or raw material distortions and/or a higher carbon footprint (32). It also showed that Union UAN producers have the capacity/possibility to increase UAN production when a level playing field is ensured. |
| --- | --- |

(255)

Some parties opposed to measures on the grounds that imports are necessary, that there is not enough UAN production in the Union and that the gap between demand and supply increases and that Union UAN producers favour other value-added products. The Commission dismissed these arguments. Overall there are enough sources of UAN supply. The fact that there is limited UAN production in the Union, the increases in UAN demand in the Union and the disappearance of some traditional UAN sources of supply in the Union (e.g. one company that was previously producing UAN in France switch fully to other fertilisers) does not justify dumping practices. The investigation showed the benefits of preserving several sources of supply in the Union (31), including local UAN producers, rather than increasing UAN dependence on third countries with unfair trade practices and/or raw material distortions and/or a higher carbon footprint (32). It also showed that Union UAN producers have the capacity/possibility to increase UAN production when a level playing field is ensured.

31

32

| (256) | Some parties claimed that measures will reduce the usage of UAN, a fertiliser that has less negative environmental effects than other fertilisers, which entails a trade-off with environment protection policies. The Commission dismissed this point. Even if UAN has multiple agronomic advantages, it is not neutral for the environment and causes in principle higher ammonia volatilization losses than nitrate-based fertilisers. |
| --- | --- |

(256)

Some parties claimed that measures will reduce the usage of UAN, a fertiliser that has less negative environmental effects than other fertilisers, which entails a trade-off with environment protection policies. The Commission dismissed this point. Even if UAN has multiple agronomic advantages, it is not neutral for the environment and causes in principle higher ammonia volatilization losses than nitrate-based fertilisers.

| (257) | Some parties claimed that other economic operators will suffer, that there are less jobs in Union UAN producers than in other sectors, that food security is at stake (since measures will make farmers user less UAN, which will reduce yields and, as a consequence, output crops) and that all nitrogen fertilizers will become more expensive (so that the normal gap between the different types of fertilisers remains). The Commission dismissed these arguments. There are no reliable estimates of the number of UAN-related jobs in relevant economic operators whereas, according to verified figures, there are more than 1 000 UAN-related jobs in Union producers. Six parties representing the interests of different economic operators submitted questionnaire replies although with limited verifiable data. As to food security, the aim of the measures is to create a level playing field all parties can benefit from. Nothing on file suggests that price increase of UAN, if any, will have a significant effect on the prices of other fertilizers. |
| --- | --- |

(257)

Some parties claimed that other economic operators will suffer, that there are less jobs in Union UAN producers than in other sectors, that food security is at stake (since measures will make farmers user less UAN, which will reduce yields and, as a consequence, output crops) and that all nitrogen fertilizers will become more expensive (so that the normal gap between the different types of fertilisers remains). The Commission dismissed these arguments. There are no reliable estimates of the number of UAN-related jobs in relevant economic operators whereas, according to verified figures, there are more than 1 000 UAN-related jobs in Union producers. Six parties representing the interests of different economic operators submitted questionnaire replies although with limited verifiable data. As to food security, the aim of the measures is to create a level playing field all parties can benefit from. Nothing on file suggests that price increase of UAN, if any, will have a significant effect on the prices of other fertilizers.

7.5.   Conclusion on Union interest

Conclusion on Union interest

| (258) | On the basis of the above, the Commission provisionally concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of UAN originating in the countries concerned at this stage of the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(258)

On the basis of the above, the Commission provisionally concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of UAN originating in the countries concerned at this stage of the investigation.

8.   PROVISIONAL ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

PROVISIONAL ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

| (259) | On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on dumping, injury, causation and Union interest, provisional measures should be imposed to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports. |
| --- | --- |

(259)

On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on dumping, injury, causation and Union interest, provisional measures should be imposed to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports.

| (260) | Provisional anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate in aqueous or ammoniacal solution originating in Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States of America in accordance with the lesser duty rule in Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation. The Commission compared the injury margins and the dumping margins (recital (208) above). The amount of the duties was set at the level of the lower of the dumping and the injury margins. |
| --- | --- |

(260)

Provisional anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate in aqueous or ammoniacal solution originating in Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States of America in accordance with the lesser duty rule in Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation. The Commission compared the injury margins and the dumping margins (recital (208) above). The amount of the duties was set at the level of the lower of the dumping and the injury margins.

| (261) | Provisional anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate in aqueous or ammoniacal solution originating in Russia in accordance with Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation. The Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove injury. Having found distortions on raw materials with regard to the product concerned in the sense of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, namely in the form of, among others, an export tax of 30 %, the Commission concluded that it would be in the Union interest, as provided for in Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation, to set the amount of the duties at the level of the dumping margins as a duty lower than the margin of dumping would not be sufficient to address the injury suffered by the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(261)

Provisional anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate in aqueous or ammoniacal solution originating in Russia in accordance with Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation. The Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove injury. Having found distortions on raw materials with regard to the product concerned in the sense of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, namely in the form of, among others, an export tax of 30 %, the Commission concluded that it would be in the Union interest, as provided for in Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation, to set the amount of the duties at the level of the dumping margins as a duty lower than the margin of dumping would not be sufficient to address the injury suffered by the Union industry.

| (262) | On the basis of the above, the provisional anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:









  Country | Company | Dumping margin (%) | Injury margin (%) | Provisional anti-dumping duty |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Russia | PJSC Acron | 31,9 | 31,9 | 31,9 |
| Russia | Novomoskovsky Azot JSC | 34,0 | 34,0 | 34,0 |
| Russia | Nevinnomyssky Azot JSC | 34,0 | 34,0 | 34,0 |
| Russia | All other companies | 34,0 | 34,0 | 34,0 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) Limited | 55,9 | 16,3 | 16,3 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | All other companies | 55,9 | 16,3 | 16,3 |
| United States of America | CF Industries Holdings, Inc. | 37,3 | 22,6 | 22,6 |
| United States of America | All other companies | 37,3 | 22,6 | 22,6 |

(262)

On the basis of the above, the provisional anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:

Country

Company

Dumping margin (%)

Injury margin (%)

Provisional anti-dumping duty

Russia

PJSC Acron

31,9

31,9

31,9

Russia

Novomoskovsky Azot JSC

34,0

34,0

34,0

Russia

Nevinnomyssky Azot JSC

34,0

34,0

34,0

Russia

All other companies

34,0

34,0

34,0

Trinidad and Tobago

Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) Limited

55,9

16,3

16,3

Trinidad and Tobago

All other companies

55,9

16,3

16,3

United States of America

CF Industries Holdings, Inc.

37,3

22,6

22,6

United States of America

All other companies

37,3

22,6

22,6

| (263) | The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflected the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the countries concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates. |
| --- | --- |

(263)

The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflected the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the countries concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

| (264) | A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (33). The request must contain all the relevant information to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a notice informing about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

(264)

A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (33). The request must contain all the relevant information to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a notice informing about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

33

| (265) | To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the high difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) hereof. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’. |
| --- | --- |

(265)

To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the high difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) hereof. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.

| (266) | To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other companies should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(266)

To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other companies should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period.

9.   REGISTRATION

REGISTRATION

| (267) | As mentioned in section 1.2, the Commission made imports of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate in aqueous or ammoniacal solution subject to registration. Registration took place with a view to possibly collecting duties retroactively under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(267)

As mentioned in section 1.2, the Commission made imports of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate in aqueous or ammoniacal solution subject to registration. Registration took place with a view to possibly collecting duties retroactively under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation.

| (268) | In view of the findings at provisional stage, the registration of imports should cease/be discontinued. |
| --- | --- |

(268)

In view of the findings at provisional stage, the registration of imports should cease/be discontinued.

| (269) | No decision on a possible retroactive application of anti-dumping measures has been taken at this stage of the proceeding. Such a decision will be taken at definitive stage. |
| --- | --- |

(269)

No decision on a possible retroactive application of anti-dumping measures has been taken at this stage of the proceeding. Such a decision will be taken at definitive stage.

10.   INFORMATION AT PROVISIONAL STAGE

INFORMATION AT PROVISIONAL STAGE

| (270) | In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed interested parties about the planned imposition of provisional duties. This information was also made available to the general public via DG TRADE's website. Interested parties were given three working days to provide comments on the accuracy of the calculations specifically disclosed to them. |
| --- | --- |

(270)

In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed interested parties about the planned imposition of provisional duties. This information was also made available to the general public via DG TRADE's website. Interested parties were given three working days to provide comments on the accuracy of the calculations specifically disclosed to them.

| (271) | Comments were received from Fertilizers Europe and the four exporting producers. The Commission took the comments into account that were considered of a clerical nature and corrected the margins accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(271)

Comments were received from Fertilizers Europe and the four exporting producers. The Commission took the comments into account that were considered of a clerical nature and corrected the margins accordingly.

11.   FINAL PROVISIONS

FINAL PROVISIONS

| (272) | In the interests of sound administration, the Commission will invite the interested parties to submit written comments within 15 days and/or to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings within 5 days. |
| --- | --- |

(272)

In the interests of sound administration, the Commission will invite the interested parties to submit written comments within 15 days and/or to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings within 5 days.

| (273) | The findings concerning the imposition of provisional duties are provisional and may be amended at the definitive stage of the investigation, |
| --- | --- |

(273)

The findings concerning the imposition of provisional duties are provisional and may be amended at the definitive stage of the investigation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1.   A provisional anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate in aqueous or ammoniacal solution, currently falling under CN code 3102 80 00 and originating in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States of America.

2.   The rates of the provisional anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies listed below shall be as follows:

| Country | Company | Provisional anti-dumping duty (%) | TARIC additional code |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Russia | PJSC Acron | 31,9 | C500 |
| Russia | Novomoskovsky Azot JSC | 34,0 | C501 |
| Russia | Nevinnomyssky Azot JSC | 34,0 | C504 |
| Russia | All other companies | 34,0 | C999 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) Limited | 16,3 | C502 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | All other companies | 16,3 | C999 |
| United States of America | CF Industries Holdings, Inc. | 22,6 | C503 |
| United States of America | All other companies | 22,6 | C999 |

Country

Company

Provisional anti-dumping duty (%)

TARIC additional code

Russia

PJSC Acron

31,9

C500

Russia

Novomoskovsky Azot JSC

34,0

C501

Russia

Nevinnomyssky Azot JSC

34,0

C504

Russia

All other companies

34,0

C999

Trinidad and Tobago

Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) Limited

16,3

C502

Trinidad and Tobago

All other companies

16,3

C999

United States of America

CF Industries Holdings, Inc.

22,6

C503

United States of America

All other companies

22,6

C999

3.   The application of the individual duty rates specified for the companies mentioned in paragraph 2 shall be conditional upon presentation to the Member States' customs authorities of a valid commercial invoice, on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by name and function, drafted as follows: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume) of (product concerned) sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in [country concerned]. I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct’. If no such invoice is presented, the duty applicable to all other companies shall apply.

4.   The release for free circulation in the Union of the product referred to in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provision of a security deposit equivalent to the amount of the provisional duty.

5.   Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 2

1.   Interested parties shall submit their written comments on this regulation to the Commission within 15 calendar days of the date of entry into force of this Regulation.

2.   Interested parties wishing to request a hearing with the Commission shall do so within 5 calendar days of the date of entry into force of this Regulation.

3.   Interested parties wishing to request a hearing with the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings shall do so within 5 calendar days of the date of entry into force of this Regulation. The Hearing Officer shall examine requests submitted outside this time limit and may decide whether to accept to such requests if appropriate.

Article 3

1.   Customs authorities are hereby directed to discontinue the registration of imports established in accordance with Article 1 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/455 of 20 March 2019 (34) (‘the registration Regulation).

2.   Data collected regarding products which entered the Union for consumption not more than 3 weeks prior to the date of the entry into force of this regulation shall be kept until the entry into force of possible definitive measures, or the termination of this proceeding.

Article 4

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Article 1 shall apply for a period of six months.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 10 April 2019.

For the Commission

The President

Jean-Claude JUNCKER

---

(1)  
  OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21.

1

(2)  Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate originating in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America. OJ C 284, 13.8.2018, p. 9.

2

(3)  
  OJ L 79, 21.3.2019, p. 9.

3

(4)  On the basis of the original cost accounts of the Russian companies before the ‘gas adjustment’.

4

(5)  Article 11 and 14 of Government Resolution No 1021 of 29 December 2000

5

(6)  Submission of Acron of 22 October 2018 being the updated version of the presentation of the GOR prepared for the US Countervailing Duty Investigation concerning Cold-Rolled Steel Flat Products originating in the Russian Federation

6

(7)  In practice means these are all the gas pipelines in Russia except for certain small local connections between factory and main pipeline

7

(8)  See Audited Annual Report 2017 of Novatek (page 71) – open Exhibit C-9-2 Annex O of the Questionnaire reply by Eurochem (NAK)

8

(9)  Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 7 February 2013 - EuroChem Mineral and Chemical Company OAO (EuroChem MCC) v Council of the European Union, T- 84/07, ECLI:EU:T:2013:64, and Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 7 February 2013 - Acron OAO v Council of the European Union, T-118/10, ECLI:EU:T:2013:67.

9

(10)  See BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2018

10

(11)  Panel Report, Ukraine – Anti-dumping measures on Ammonium Nitrate, WT/DS493/R, para. 7.85.

11

Ukraine – Anti-dumping measures on Ammonium Nitrate

(12)  Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 7 February 2013 - EuroChem Mineral and Chemical Company OAO (EuroChem MCC) v Council of the European Union T118/10, ECLI:EU:T:2013:67; Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 7 February 2013 - Acron OAO v Council of the European Union, T- 84/07, ECLI:EU:T:2013:64.

12

(13)  The exact figure is not provided as this is the company specific data.

13

(14)  See also Panel Report, EU – Footwear (WT/DS405/R), para. 7.403.

14

EU – Footwear

(15)  See for instance slide 8 of Yara's presentation from 11 September 2018 available via https://www.yara.com/siteassets/investors/057-reports-and-presentations/conferencesrs/2018/2018-09-11-yar-handelsbanken-presentation.pdf/

15

(16)  BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2018;

16

Russian Oil and Gas Sector Regulatory Regime: Legislative Overview (King and Spalding 2017).

(17)  Forecasts of socio-economic development for years 2016 – 2036 (Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation).

17

(18)  Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 30 August 2013 No. 754 on approving the rates of export customs duties on goods exported from the Russian Federation outside the states parties to the agreements on the Customs Union.

18

(19)  In the Annual Report 2017, Novatek (an independent producer and supplier of natural gas) identified the price regulation as a risk in its risk management considerations stating that ‘[a]s an independent natural gas producer, Novatek is not subject to state regulation of natural gas prices. Nevertheless, the Company's prices are strongly influenced by the prices established by a Federal body.’

19

(20)  Available at http://economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/macro/prognoz/ (last viewed 4 March 2019).

20

(21)  Page 9 of the open version of the complaint contains a graph called ‘World UAN market (2015)’. Russia's UAN market is just a fraction in the share ‘others’ (1 705 000 tons).

21

(22)  
  3 280 000 tons in 2018 according to page 94 of the open version of the complaint.

22

(23)  For example, page 45 of Grupa Azoty Zaklady Azotowe Pulawy S. A.'s directors' report for 2018 foresees rather stable natural gas prices in the Union until 2020. This report is available in the open file (t18.010219).

23

(24)  In light of the ‘EU Cereal farms report base on 2013 FADN data’, DG AGRI, p. 44, in a farm specialised in common wheat in France in 2013 fertilizers (all types) represented 286 EUR/ha. 21,94 % is the result of dividing 286 EUR by the sum of the operational costs (1 003 EUR/ha) and depreciation (298 EUR/ha).

24

(25)  In light of the ‘EU Cereal farms report base on 2013 FADN data’, DG AGRI, p. 44, in a farm specialised in common wheat in France in 2013 fertilizers (all types) represented 286 EUR/ha. It was thus assumed that in such a farm UAN would have represented up to 200 EUR/ha (70 % of 286 EUR/ha, since nitrogen fertilizers account for 70 % of total fertilizer use in the EU), which is 13 % of the total costs of production in 2013. This percentage dropped after 2013. Given the drop in prices of nitrogen fertilisers in France since 2013 as published in ‘Agreste Bilan conjoncturel 2017 – Décembre 2017’ (see http://agreste.agriculture.gouv.fr/conjoncture/bilans-annuels-conjoncturels/), it can reasonably be assumed that in the 2017/2018 campaign in a farm specialised in common wheat in France using UAN as a sole source of nitrogen fertiliser UAN represented up to 10 % of total costs of production.

25

(26)  This percentage would be 5 % if calculated with the data in footnote 24.

26

(27)  In light of the ‘EU Cereal farms report base on 2013 FADN data’, DG AGRI, p. 44, in a farm specialised in common wheat in France in 2013 fertilizers (all types) represented 286 EUR/ha. 15,4 % is the result of dividing 286 EUR by the sum of the operational costs (1 003 EUR/ha) and depreciation (298 EUR/ha).

27

(28)  In light of the ‘EU Cereal farms report base on 2013 FADN data’, DG AGRI, p. 44, in a farm specialised in common wheat in France in 2013 fertilizers (all types) represented 286 EUR/ha. It was thus assumed that in such a farm UAN would have represented up to 200 EUR/ha (70 % of 286 EUR/ha, since nitrogen fertilizers account for 70 % of total fertilizer use in the EU), which is 13 % of the total costs of production in 2013. This percentage dropped after 2013. Given the drop in prices of nitrogen fertilisers in France since 2013 as published in ‘Agreste Bilan conjoncturel 2017 – Décembre 2017’ (see http://agreste.agriculture.gouv.fr/conjoncture/bilans-annuels-conjoncturels/), it can reasonably be assumed that in the 2017/2018 campaign in a farm specialised in common wheat in France using UAN as a sole source of nitrogen fertiliser UAN represented up to 10 % of total costs of production.

28

(29)  This percentage would be 5 % if calculated with the data in footnote 23.

29

(30)  ‘EU Agricultural Outlook for the Agricultural markets and Income 2017-2030, European Commission, 2017, p. 68, inter alia.

30

(31)  The Irish Farmers Association acknowledges that Irish farmers pay among the highest prices in the world for their fertilisers (t18.010593). The applicant links this fact to the disappearance years ago of the local producer of fertilisers (t18.011682).

31

(32)  The carbon footprint of ammonium nitrate in the EU is 1,1 tonne CO2 equivalent/tonne product, 2,3 in the USA and 2,6 in Russia. Source: ‘Growing together’, Fertilizers Europe, 2018.

32

(33)  
  European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate H, Rue de la Loi 170, 1040 Brussels, Belgium.

33

(34)  
  OJ L 79, 21.3.2019, p. 9.

34

---

DECISIONS

| 11.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 100/42 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 100/42

---

COUNCIL DECISION (EU) 2019/577

of 8 April 2019

appointing an alternate member, proposed by the Republic of Cyprus, of the Committee of the Regions

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 305 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal of the Government of Cyprus,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 26 January 2015, 5 February 2015 and 23 June 2015, the Council adopted Decisions (EU) 2015/116 (1), (EU) 2015/190 (2) and (EU) 2015/994 (3) appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020. On 26 July 2016, by Council Decision (EU) 2016/1233 (4), Mr Kyriakos CHATZITTOFIS was replaced by Mr Stavros YEROLATSITES as an alternate member. On 5 May 2017, by Council Decision (EU) 2017/799 (5), Mr Stavros YEROLATSITES was replaced by Mr Kyprianos ANDRONIKOU as an alternate member. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 26 January 2015, 5 February 2015 and 23 June 2015, the Council adopted Decisions (EU) 2015/116 (1), (EU) 2015/190 (2) and (EU) 2015/994 (3) appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020. On 26 July 2016, by Council Decision (EU) 2016/1233 (4), Mr Kyriakos CHATZITTOFIS was replaced by Mr Stavros YEROLATSITES as an alternate member. On 5 May 2017, by Council Decision (EU) 2017/799 (5), Mr Stavros YEROLATSITES was replaced by Mr Kyprianos ANDRONIKOU as an alternate member.

| (2) | An alternate member's seat has become vacant following the end of the term of office of Mr Kyprianos ANDRONIKOU, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

An alternate member's seat has become vacant following the end of the term of office of Mr Kyprianos ANDRONIKOU,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The following is hereby appointed as an alternate member of the Committee of the Regions for the remainder of the current term of office:

| — | Mr Kyriacos XYDIAS, Mayor of Yermasoyia Municipality. |
| --- | --- |

—

Mr Kyriacos XYDIAS, Mayor of Yermasoyia Municipality.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Done at Luxembourg, 8 April 2019.

For the Council

The President

F. MOGHERINI

---

(1)  Council Decision (EU) 2015/116 of 26 January 2015 appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020 (OJ L 20, 27.1.2015, p. 42).

1

(2)  Council Decision (EU) 2015/190 of 5 February 2015 appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020 (OJ L 31, 7.2.2015, p. 25).

2

(3)  Council Decision (EU) 2015/994 of 23 June 2015 appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020 (OJ L 159, 25.6.2015, p. 70).

3

(4)  Council Decision (EU) 2016/1233 of 26 July 2016 appointing a member and an alternate member, proposed by the Republic of Cyprus, of the Committee of the Regions (OJ L 202, 28.7.2016, p. 41).

4

(5)  Council Decision (EU) 2017/799 of 5 May 2017 appointing three members and two alternate members, proposed by the Republic of Cyprus, of the Committee of the Regions (OJ L 120, 11.5.2017, p. 20).

5

---

| 11.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 100/43 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 100/43

---

COUNCIL DECISION (EU) 2019/578

of 8 April 2019

appointing an alternate member, proposed by the Kingdom of Denmark, of the Committee of the Regions

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 305 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal of the Danish Government,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 26 January 2015, 5 February 2015 and 23 June 2015, the Council adopted Decisions (EU) 2015/116 (1), (EU) 2015/190 (2) and (EU) 2015/994 (3) appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020. On 4 June 2018, by Council Decision (EU) 2018/839 (4), Mr Per NØRHAVE was replaced by Mr Marc PERERA CHRISTENSEN as an alternate member. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 26 January 2015, 5 February 2015 and 23 June 2015, the Council adopted Decisions (EU) 2015/116 (1), (EU) 2015/190 (2) and (EU) 2015/994 (3) appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020. On 4 June 2018, by Council Decision (EU) 2018/839 (4), Mr Per NØRHAVE was replaced by Mr Marc PERERA CHRISTENSEN as an alternate member.

| (2) | An alternate member's seat on the Committee of the Regions has become vacant following the end of the term of office of Mr Marc PERERA CHRISTENSEN, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

An alternate member's seat on the Committee of the Regions has become vacant following the end of the term of office of Mr Marc PERERA CHRISTENSEN,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The following is hereby appointed as an alternate member of the Committee of the Regions for the remainder of the current term of office, which runs until 25 January 2020:

| — | Mr Søren WINDELL, Councillor, Municipality of Odense. |
| --- | --- |

—

Mr Søren WINDELL, Councillor, Municipality of Odense.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Done at Luxembourg, 8 April 2019.

For the Council

The President

F. MOGHERINI

---

(1)  Council Decision (EU) 2015/116 of 26 January 2015 appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020 (OJ L 20, 27.1.2015, p. 42).

1

(2)  Council Decision (EU) 2015/190 of 5 February 2015 appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020 (OJ L 31, 7.2.2015, p. 25).

2

(3)  Council Decision (EU) 2015/994 of 23 June 2015 appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020 (OJ L 159, 25.6.2015, p. 70).

3

(4)  Council Decision (EU) 2018/839 of 4 June 2018 appointing two members and six alternate members, proposed by the Kingdom of Denmark, of the Committee of the Regions (OJ L 141, 7.6.2018, p. 7).

4

---

| 11.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 100/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 100/44

---

COUNCIL DECISION (EU) 2019/579

of 8 April 2019

appointing an alternate member, proposed by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, of the Committee of the Regions

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 305 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal of the Luxembourg Government,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 26 January 2015, 5 February 2015 and 23 June 2015, the Council adopted Decisions (EU) 2015/116 (1), (EU) 2015/190 (2) and (EU) 2015/994 (3) appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020. On 13 July 2018, by Council Decision (EU) 2018/1015 (4), Mr Pierre WIES was replaced by Ms Cécile HEMMEN as an alternate member. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 26 January 2015, 5 February 2015 and 23 June 2015, the Council adopted Decisions (EU) 2015/116 (1), (EU) 2015/190 (2) and (EU) 2015/994 (3) appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020. On 13 July 2018, by Council Decision (EU) 2018/1015 (4), Mr Pierre WIES was replaced by Ms Cécile HEMMEN as an alternate member.

| (2) | An alternate member's seat on the Committee of the Regions has become vacant following the end of the mandate on the basis of which Ms Cécile HEMMEN (Maire de la Commune de Weiler-la-Tour) was proposed, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

An alternate member's seat on the Committee of the Regions has become vacant following the end of the mandate on the basis of which Ms Cécile HEMMEN (Maire de la Commune de Weiler-la-Tour) was proposed,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The following is hereby appointed as an alternate member of the Committee of the Regions for the remainder of the current term of office, which runs until 25 January 2020:

| — | Ms Cécile HEMMEN, Conseillère communale de la Commune de Weiler-la-Tour (change of mandate). |
| --- | --- |

—

Ms Cécile HEMMEN, Conseillère communale de la Commune de Weiler-la-Tour (change of mandate).

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Done at Luxembourg, 8 April 2019.

For the Council

The President

F. MOGHERINI

---

(1)  Council Decision (EU) 2015/116 of 26 January 2015 appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020 (OJ L 20, 27.1.2015, p. 42).

1

(2)  Council Decision (EU) 2015/190 of 5 February 2015 appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020 (OJ L 31, 7.2.2015, p. 25).

2

(3)  Council Decision (EU) 2015/994 of 23 June 2015 appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020 (OJ L 159, 25.6.2015, p. 70).

3

(4)  Council Decision (EU) 2018/1015 of 13 July 2018 appointing two members and three alternate members, proposed by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, of the Committee of the Regions (OJ L 181, 18.7.2018, p. 85).

4

---

| 11.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 100/45 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 100/45

---

COUNCIL DECISION (EU) 2019/580

of 8 April 2019

appointing two members and an alternate member, proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany, of the Committee of the Regions

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 305 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal of the German Government,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 26 January 2015, 5 February 2015 and 23 June 2015, the Council adopted Decisions (EU) 2015/116 (1), (EU) 2015/190 (2) and (EU) 2015/994 (3) appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 26 January 2015, 5 February 2015 and 23 June 2015, the Council adopted Decisions (EU) 2015/116 (1), (EU) 2015/190 (2) and (EU) 2015/994 (3) appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020.

| (2) | A member's seat on the Committee of the Regions has become vacant following the end of the term of office of Ms Babette WINTER. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

A member's seat on the Committee of the Regions has become vacant following the end of the term of office of Ms Babette WINTER.

| (3) | A member's seat on the Committee of the Regions has become vacant following the end of the mandate on the basis of which Ms Marion WALSMANN (Mitglied des Thüringer Landtags) was proposed. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

A member's seat on the Committee of the Regions has become vacant following the end of the mandate on the basis of which Ms Marion WALSMANN (Mitglied des Thüringer Landtags) was proposed.

| (4) | An alternate member's seat has become vacant following the appointment of Mr Dieter LAUINGER as a member of the Committee of the Regions, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

An alternate member's seat has become vacant following the appointment of Mr Dieter LAUINGER as a member of the Committee of the Regions,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The following are hereby appointed to the Committee of the Regions for the remainder of the current term of office, which runs until 25 January 2020:

| (a) | as members:






  — | Mr Dieter LAUINGER, Minister für Migration, Justiz und Verbraucherschutz, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(a)

as members:

—

Mr Dieter LAUINGER, Minister für Migration, Justiz und Verbraucherschutz,

| — | Ms Marion WALSMANN, Mitglied des Erfurter Stadtrats (change of mandate), |
| --- | --- |

—

Ms Marion WALSMANN, Mitglied des Erfurter Stadtrats (change of mandate),

| (b) | as an alternate member:






  — | Mr Malte KRÜCKELS, Staatssekretär für Medien und Bevollmächtigter des Freistaates Thüringen beim Bund. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

as an alternate member:

—

Mr Malte KRÜCKELS, Staatssekretär für Medien und Bevollmächtigter des Freistaates Thüringen beim Bund.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Done at Luxembourg, 8 April 2019.

For the Council

The President

F. MOGHERINI

---

(1)  Council Decision (EU) 2015/116 of 26 January 2015 appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020 (OJ L 20, 27.1.2015, p. 42).

1

(2)  Council Decision (EU) 2015/190 of 5 February 2015 appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020 (OJ L 31, 7.2.2015, p. 25).

2

(3)  Council Decision (EU) 2015/994 of 23 June 2015 appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020 (OJ L 159, 25.6.2015, p. 70).

3

---

| 11.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 100/46 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 100/46

---

COUNCIL DECISION (EU) 2019/581

of 8 April 2019

appointing an alternate member, proposed by the Hellenic Republic, of the Committee of the Regions

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 305 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal of the Greek Government,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 26 January 2015, 5 February 2015 and 23 June 2015, the Council adopted Decisions (EU) 2015/116 (1), (EU) 2015/190 (2) and (EU) 2015/994 (3) appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 26 January 2015, 5 February 2015 and 23 June 2015, the Council adopted Decisions (EU) 2015/116 (1), (EU) 2015/190 (2) and (EU) 2015/994 (3) appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020.

| (2) | An alternate member's seat has become vacant following the end of the term of office of Mr Petros SOULAS, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

An alternate member's seat has become vacant following the end of the term of office of Mr Petros SOULAS,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The following is hereby appointed as an alternate member of the Committee of the Regions for the remainder of the current term of office:

| — | Mr Konstantinos TZANAKOULIS, Municipal Councillor of Larissa. |
| --- | --- |

—

Mr Konstantinos TZANAKOULIS, Municipal Councillor of Larissa.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Done at Luxembourg, 8 April 2019.

For the Council

The President

F. MOGHERINI

---

(1)  Council Decision (EU) 2015/116 of 26 January 2015 appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020 (OJ L 20, 27.1.2015, p. 42).

1

(2)  Council Decision (EU) 2015/190 of 5 February 2015 appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020 (OJ L 31, 7.2.2015, p. 25).

2

(3)  Council Decision (EU) 2015/994 of 23 June 2015 appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020 (OJ L 159, 25.6.2015, p. 70).

3

---

| 11.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 100/47 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 100/47

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION (EU) 2019/582

of 3 April 2019

confirming or amending the provisional calculation of the average specific emissions of CO2 and specific emissions targets for manufacturers of new light commercial vehicles for the calendar year 2017 and for the Volkswagen pool including its members for the calendar years 2014, 2015 and 2016 pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council

(notified under document C(2019) 2342)

(Only the Czech, Dutch, English, Estonian, French, German, Hungarian, Italian, and Swedish texts are authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011 setting emission performance standards for new light commercial vehicles as part of the Union's integrated approach to reduce CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicles (1), and in particular Article 8(6) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 510/2011, the Commission is required to calculate each year the average specific emissions of CO2 and the specific emissions target for each manufacturer of light commercial vehicles in the Union. On the basis of that calculation, the Commission is to determine whether manufacturers and pools of manufacturers have complied with their specific emissions targets. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 510/2011, the Commission is required to calculate each year the average specific emissions of CO2 and the specific emissions target for each manufacturer of light commercial vehicles in the Union. On the basis of that calculation, the Commission is to determine whether manufacturers and pools of manufacturers have complied with their specific emissions targets.

| (2) | The detailed data to be used for the calculation of the average specific emissions and the specific emissions targets are based on Member States' registrations of new light commercial vehicles during the preceding calendar year. Where light commercial vehicles are type-approved in a multi-stage process, the manufacturer of the base vehicle take responsibility for the CO2 emissions of the completed vehicle. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The detailed data to be used for the calculation of the average specific emissions and the specific emissions targets are based on Member States' registrations of new light commercial vehicles during the preceding calendar year. Where light commercial vehicles are type-approved in a multi-stage process, the manufacturer of the base vehicle take responsibility for the CO2 emissions of the completed vehicle.

| (3) | All Member States submitted the 2017 data the Commission in accordance with Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011. Where, as a result of the verification of the data by the Commission, it was evident that certain data were missing or manifestly incorrect, the Commission contacted the Member States concerned and, subject to the agreement of those Member States, adjusted or completed the data accordingly. Where no agreement could be reached with a Member State, the provisional data of that Member State were not adjusted. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

All Member States submitted the 2017 data the Commission in accordance with Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011. Where, as a result of the verification of the data by the Commission, it was evident that certain data were missing or manifestly incorrect, the Commission contacted the Member States concerned and, subject to the agreement of those Member States, adjusted or completed the data accordingly. Where no agreement could be reached with a Member State, the provisional data of that Member State were not adjusted.

| (4) | On 17 May 2018, the Commission published the provisional data and notified 65 manufacturers of the provisional calculations of their average specific emissions of CO2 and their specific emissions targets in 2017. Manufacturers were asked to verify the data and to notify the Commission of any errors within three months of receipt of the notification. 23 manufacturers submitted notifications of errors. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

On 17 May 2018, the Commission published the provisional data and notified 65 manufacturers of the provisional calculations of their average specific emissions of CO2 and their specific emissions targets in 2017. Manufacturers were asked to verify the data and to notify the Commission of any errors within three months of receipt of the notification. 23 manufacturers submitted notifications of errors.

| (5) | For the remaining 42 manufacturers that did not notify any errors in the datasets or respond otherwise, the provisional data and provisional calculations of the average specific emissions and the specific emissions targets should be confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

For the remaining 42 manufacturers that did not notify any errors in the datasets or respond otherwise, the provisional data and provisional calculations of the average specific emissions and the specific emissions targets should be confirmed.

| (6) | The Commission has verified the errors notified by the manufacturers and the respective reasons for their correction and the dataset has been confirmed or amended. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The Commission has verified the errors notified by the manufacturers and the respective reasons for their correction and the dataset has been confirmed or amended.

| (7) | In the case of records without matching vehicle identification numbers and with missing or incorrect identification parameters, such as type, variant, version code or type-approval number, the fact that manufacturers cannot verify or correct those records should be taken into account. As a consequence, it is appropriate to apply an error margin to the CO2 emissions and mass values in those records. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

In the case of records without matching vehicle identification numbers and with missing or incorrect identification parameters, such as type, variant, version code or type-approval number, the fact that manufacturers cannot verify or correct those records should be taken into account. As a consequence, it is appropriate to apply an error margin to the CO2 emissions and mass values in those records.

| (8) | The error margin should be calculated as the difference between the distances to the specific emissions target expressed as the specific emissions targets subtracted from the average specific emissions calculated including and excluding those registrations that cannot be verified by the manufacturers. Regardless of whether that difference is positive or negative, the error margin should always improve the manufacturer's position with regard to its specific emissions target. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The error margin should be calculated as the difference between the distances to the specific emissions target expressed as the specific emissions targets subtracted from the average specific emissions calculated including and excluding those registrations that cannot be verified by the manufacturers. Regardless of whether that difference is positive or negative, the error margin should always improve the manufacturer's position with regard to its specific emissions target.

| (9) | In accordance with Article 10(2) of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011, a manufacturer should be considered as compliant with its specific emissions target referred to in Article 4 of that Regulation where the average emissions indicated in this Decision are lower than the specific emissions target, expressed as a negative distance to target. Where the average emissions exceed the specific emissions target, an excess emission premium is to be imposed, unless the manufacturer concerned benefits from an exemption from that target or is a member of a pool and the pool complies with its specific emissions target. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

In accordance with Article 10(2) of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011, a manufacturer should be considered as compliant with its specific emissions target referred to in Article 4 of that Regulation where the average emissions indicated in this Decision are lower than the specific emissions target, expressed as a negative distance to target. Where the average emissions exceed the specific emissions target, an excess emission premium is to be imposed, unless the manufacturer concerned benefits from an exemption from that target or is a member of a pool and the pool complies with its specific emissions target.

| (10) | On 3 November 2015 the Volkswagen Group made a statement to the effect that irregularities had been found when determining type approval CO2 levels of some of their vehicles. Following a thorough investigation, sufficient clarifications have been obtained for confirming or amending the provisional data for the Volkswagen pool and its members Audi AG, Dr Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG, Quattro GmbH, Seat S.A., Skoda Auto A.S., and Volkswagen AG for the calendar years 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

On 3 November 2015 the Volkswagen Group made a statement to the effect that irregularities had been found when determining type approval CO2 levels of some of their vehicles. Following a thorough investigation, sufficient clarifications have been obtained for confirming or amending the provisional data for the Volkswagen pool and its members Audi AG, Dr Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG, Quattro GmbH, Seat S.A., Skoda Auto A.S., and Volkswagen AG for the calendar years 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017.

| (11) | The values relating to the performance of a manufacturer as confirmed or amended by this Decision could be revised in the event that the relevant national authorities confirm the existence of irregularities in the CO2 emission values provided for the purpose of determining the manufacturer's compliance with the specific emissions target, |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The values relating to the performance of a manufacturer as confirmed or amended by this Decision could be revised in the event that the relevant national authorities confirm the existence of irregularities in the CO2 emission values provided for the purpose of determining the manufacturer's compliance with the specific emissions target,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

1.   The values relating to the performance of manufacturers, as confirmed or amended for each manufacturer of light commercial vehicles and for each pool of manufacturers of light commercial vehicles in respect of the 2017 calendar year are specified in Annex I.

2.   The values relating to the performance of the Volkswagen pool and its members Audi AG, Dr Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG, Quattro GmbH, Seat S.A., Skoda Auto A.S., and Volkswagen AG, as confirmed or amended in respect of the calendar years 2014, 2015 and 2016 are specified in Annex II to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the following individual manufacturers and pools formed in accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011:

| (1) | ALFA Romeo S.P.A. |
| --- | --- |
| C.so Settembrini, 40 |
| Gate 8 — Building 6 — 1st floor — B15N Colonna N47 |
| 10135 Torino |
| Italy |

(1)

ALFA Romeo S.P.A.

C.so Settembrini, 40

Gate 8 — Building 6 — 1st floor — B15N Colonna N47

10135 Torino

Italy

| (2) | Alke Srl |
| --- | --- |
| via Vigonovese 123 |
| 35127 Padova |
| Italy |

(2)

Alke Srl

via Vigonovese 123

35127 Padova

Italy

| (3) | Audi AG |
| --- | --- |
| Letter box 011/1882 |
| 38436 Wolfsburg |
| Germany |

(3)

Audi AG

Letter box 011/1882

38436 Wolfsburg

Germany

| (4) | Automobiles Citroen |
| --- | --- |
| 7, rue Henri Sainte-Claire Deville |
| 92500 Rueil-Malmaison |
| France |

(4)

Automobiles Citroen

7, rue Henri Sainte-Claire Deville

92500 Rueil-Malmaison

France

| (5) | Automobiles Peugeot |
| --- | --- |
| 7, rue Henri Sainte-Claire Deville |
| 92500 Rueil-Malmaison |
| France |

(5)

Automobiles Peugeot

7, rue Henri Sainte-Claire Deville

92500 Rueil-Malmaison

France

| (6) | AVTOVAZ JSC
  Represented in the Union by:





  CS ATUOLADA |
| --- | --- |
| 211 Konevova |
| 130 00 Prague 3 |
| Czech Republic |

(6)

AVTOVAZ JSC

Represented in the Union by:

CS ATUOLADA

211 Konevova

130 00 Prague 3

Czech Republic

| (7) | BLUECAR SAS |
| --- | --- |
| 31-32 quai de Dion Bouton |
| 92800 Puteaux |
| France |

(7)

BLUECAR SAS

31-32 quai de Dion Bouton

92800 Puteaux

France

| (8) | Bayerische Motoren Werke AG |
| --- | --- |
| Petuelring 130 |
| 80788 München |
| Germany |

(8)

Bayerische Motoren Werke AG

Petuelring 130

80788 München

Germany

| (9) | BMW M GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Petuelring 130 |
| 80788 München |
| Germany |

(9)

BMW M GmbH

Petuelring 130

80788 München

Germany

| (10) | FCA US LLC
  Represented in the Union by:





  Fiat Chrysler Automobiles |
| --- | --- |
| Gate 8 — Building 6 – 1st floor – B15N Colonna N47 |
| C.so Settembrini, 40 |
| 10135 Torino |
| Italy |

(10)

FCA US LLC

Represented in the Union by:

Fiat Chrysler Automobiles

Gate 8 — Building 6 – 1st floor – B15N Colonna N47

C.so Settembrini, 40

10135 Torino

Italy

| (11) | Automobile Dacia SA |
| --- | --- |
| Guyancourt |
| 1 avenue du Golf |
| 78288 Guyancourt Cedex |
| France |

(11)

Automobile Dacia SA

Guyancourt

1 avenue du Golf

78288 Guyancourt Cedex

France

| (12) | Daimler AG |
| --- | --- |
| F403 EA/R |
| 70546 Stuttgart |
| Germany |

(12)

Daimler AG

F403 EA/R

70546 Stuttgart

Germany

| (13) | DFSK MOTOR CO., LTD.
  Represented in the Union by:





  Giotti Victoria Srl |
| --- | --- |
| Sr.l. Pissana Road 11/a 50021 |
| Barberino Val D'Elsa (Florence) |
| Italy |

(13)

DFSK MOTOR CO., LTD.

Represented in the Union by:

Giotti Victoria Srl

Sr.l. Pissana Road 11/a 50021

Barberino Val D'Elsa (Florence)

Italy

| (14) | Esagono Energia S.r.l. |
| --- | --- |
| Via Puecher 9 |
| 20060 Pozzuolo Martesana (MI) |
| Italy |

(14)

Esagono Energia S.r.l.

Via Puecher 9

20060 Pozzuolo Martesana (MI)

Italy

| (15) | FCA Italy S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |
| Gate 8 — Building 6 – 1st floor – B15N Colonna N47 |
| C.so Settembrini, 40 |
| 10135 Torino |
| Italy |

(15)

FCA Italy S.p.A.

Gate 8 — Building 6 – 1st floor – B15N Colonna N47

C.so Settembrini, 40

10135 Torino

Italy

| (16) | Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd
  Represented in the Union by:





  Ford Werke GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Niehl Plant, building Imbert 479 |
| Henry-Ford-Straße 1 |
| 50735 Köln |
| Germany |

(16)

Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd

Represented in the Union by:

Ford Werke GmbH

Niehl Plant, building Imbert 479

Henry-Ford-Straße 1

50735 Köln

Germany

| (17) | Ford Motor Company |
| --- | --- |
| Niehl Plant, building Imbert 479 |
| Henry-Ford-Straße 1 |
| 50735 Köln |
| Germany |

(17)

Ford Motor Company

Niehl Plant, building Imbert 479

Henry-Ford-Straße 1

50735 Köln

Germany

| (18) | Ford Werke GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Niehl Plant, building Imbert 479 |
| Henry-Ford-Straße 1 |
| 50735 Köln |
| Germany |

(18)

Ford Werke GmbH

Niehl Plant, building Imbert 479

Henry-Ford-Straße 1

50735 Köln

Germany

| (19) | Mitsubishi Fuso Truck & Bus Corporation
  Represented in the Union by:





  Daimler AG |
| --- | --- |
| F403 EA/R |
| 70546 Stuttgart |
| Germany |

(19)

Mitsubishi Fuso Truck & Bus Corporation

Represented in the Union by:

Daimler AG

F403 EA/R

70546 Stuttgart

Germany

| (20) | Mitsubishi Fuso Truck Europe SA
  Represented in the Union by:





  Daimler AG |
| --- | --- |
| F403 EA/R |
| 70546 Stuttgart |
| Germany |

(20)

Mitsubishi Fuso Truck Europe SA

Represented in the Union by:

Daimler AG

F403 EA/R

70546 Stuttgart

Germany

| (21) | LLC Automobile Plant Gaz |
| --- | --- |
| Poe 2 |
| Lähte Tartumaa |
| 60502 |
| Estonia |

(21)

LLC Automobile Plant Gaz

Poe 2

Lähte Tartumaa

60502

Estonia

| (22) | General Motors Holdings LLC
  Represented in the Union by:





  Adam Opel GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Bahnhofsplatz 1 IPC 39-12 |
| 65423 Rüsselsheim |
| Germany |

(22)

General Motors Holdings LLC

Represented in the Union by:

Adam Opel GmbH

Bahnhofsplatz 1 IPC 39-12

65423 Rüsselsheim

Germany

| (23) | GAC Gonow Auto Co. Ltd
  Represented in the Union by:





  Autorimessa Monte Mario SRL |
| --- | --- |
| Via della Muratella, 797 |
| 00054 Maccarese (RM) |
| Italy |

(23)

GAC Gonow Auto Co. Ltd

Represented in the Union by:

Autorimessa Monte Mario SRL

Via della Muratella, 797

00054 Maccarese (RM)

Italy

| (24) | Goupil Industrie S.A. |
| --- | --- |
| Route de Villeneuve |
| 47320 Bourran |
| France |

(24)

Goupil Industrie S.A.

Route de Villeneuve

47320 Bourran

France

| (25) | Great Wall Motor Company Ltd
  Represented in the Union by:





  Great Wall Motor Europe Technical Center GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Otto-Hahn-Str. 5 |
| 63128 Dietzenbach |
| Germany |

(25)

Great Wall Motor Company Ltd

Represented in the Union by:

Great Wall Motor Europe Technical Center GmbH

Otto-Hahn-Str. 5

63128 Dietzenbach

Germany

| (26) | Honda Motor Co., Ltd
  Represented in the Union by:





  Honda Motor Europe Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| Cain Road |
| Bracknell |
| Berkshire |
| RG12 1HL |
| United Kingdom |

(26)

Honda Motor Co., Ltd

Represented in the Union by:

Honda Motor Europe Ltd

Cain Road

Bracknell

Berkshire

RG12 1HL

United Kingdom

| (27) | Honda of the UK Manufacturing Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| Honda Motor Europe Ltd |
| Cain Road |
| Bracknell |
| Berkshire |
| RG12 1HL |
| United Kingdom |

(27)

Honda of the UK Manufacturing Ltd

Honda Motor Europe Ltd

Cain Road

Bracknell

Berkshire

RG12 1HL

United Kingdom

| (28) | Hyundai Motor Company
  Represented in the Union by:





  Hyundai Motor Europe GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Kaiserleipromenade 5 |
| 63067 Offenbach |
| Germany |

(28)

Hyundai Motor Company

Represented in the Union by:

Hyundai Motor Europe GmbH

Kaiserleipromenade 5

63067 Offenbach

Germany

| (29) | Hyundai Assan Otomotiv Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S.
  Represented in the Union by:





  Hyundai Motor Europe GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Kaiserleipromenade 5 |
| 63067 Offenbach |
| Germany |

(29)

Hyundai Assan Otomotiv Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S.

Represented in the Union by:

Hyundai Motor Europe GmbH

Kaiserleipromenade 5

63067 Offenbach

Germany

| (30) | Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Czech s.r.o. |
| --- | --- |
| Kaiserleipromenade 5 |
| 63067 Offenbach |
| Germany |

(30)

Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Czech s.r.o.

Kaiserleipromenade 5

63067 Offenbach

Germany

| (31) | Isuzu Motors Limited
  Represented in the Union by:





  Isuzu Motors Europe NV |
| --- | --- |
| Bist 12 |
| 2630 Aartselaar |
| Belgium |

(31)

Isuzu Motors Limited

Represented in the Union by:

Isuzu Motors Europe NV

Bist 12

2630 Aartselaar

Belgium

| (32) | IVECO S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |
| Via Puglia 35 |
| 10156 Torino |
| Italia |

(32)

IVECO S.p.A.

Via Puglia 35

10156 Torino

Italia

| (33) | Jaguar Land Rover Limited |
| --- | --- |
| Abbey Road |
| Whitley |
| Coventry |
| CV3 4LF |
| United Kingdom |

(33)

Jaguar Land Rover Limited

Abbey Road

Whitley

Coventry

CV3 4LF

United Kingdom

| (34) | KIA Motors Corporation
  Represented in the Union by:





  Kia Motors Europe GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Theodor-Heuss-Allee 11 |
| 60486 Frankfurt am Main |
| Germany |

(34)

KIA Motors Corporation

Represented in the Union by:

Kia Motors Europe GmbH

Theodor-Heuss-Allee 11

60486 Frankfurt am Main

Germany

| (35) | KIA Motors Slovakia s.r.o. |
| --- | --- |
| Theodor-Heuss-Allee 11 |
| 60486 Frankfurt am Main |
| Germany |

(35)

KIA Motors Slovakia s.r.o.

Theodor-Heuss-Allee 11

60486 Frankfurt am Main

Germany

| (36) | LADA Automobile GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Erlengrund 7-11 |
| 21614 Buxtehude |
| Germany |

(36)

LADA Automobile GmbH

Erlengrund 7-11

21614 Buxtehude

Germany

| (37) | Magyar Suzuki Corporation Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| 2500 Esztergom |
| Schweidel Jozsef U52 |
| Hungary |

(37)

Magyar Suzuki Corporation Ltd

2500 Esztergom

Schweidel Jozsef U52

Hungary

| (38) | Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd
  Represented in the Union by:





  Mahindra Europe S.r.l. |
| --- | --- |
| Via Cancelliera 35 |
| 00040 Ariccia (Roma) |
| Italy |

(38)

Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd

Represented in the Union by:

Mahindra Europe S.r.l.

Via Cancelliera 35

00040 Ariccia (Roma)

Italy

| (39) | MAN Truck & Bus AG |
| --- | --- |
| Letter box 011/1882 |
| 38436 Wolfsburg |
| Germany |

(39)

MAN Truck & Bus AG

Letter box 011/1882

38436 Wolfsburg

Germany

| (40) | Mazda Motor Corporation
  Represented in the Union by:





  Mazda Motor Europe GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| European R & D Centre |
| Hiroshimastr 1 |
| D-61440 Oberursel/Ts |
| Germany |

(40)

Mazda Motor Corporation

Represented in the Union by:

Mazda Motor Europe GmbH

European R & D Centre

Hiroshimastr 1

D-61440 Oberursel/Ts

Germany

| (41) | M.F.T.B.C.
  Represented in the Union by:





  Daimler AG |
| --- | --- |
| F403 EA/R |
| 70546 Stuttgart |
| Germany |

(41)

M.F.T.B.C.

Represented in the Union by:

Daimler AG

F403 EA/R

70546 Stuttgart

Germany

| (42) | Mitsubishi Motors Corporation MMC
  Represented in the Union by:





  Mitsubishi Motors Europe B.V. MME |
| --- | --- |
| Mitsubishi Avenue 21 |
| 6121 SG Born |
| The Netherlands |

(42)

Mitsubishi Motors Corporation MMC

Represented in the Union by:

Mitsubishi Motors Europe B.V. MME

Mitsubishi Avenue 21

6121 SG Born

The Netherlands

| (43) | Mitsubishi Motors Europe B.V. MME |
| --- | --- |
| Mitsubishi Avenue 21 |
| 6121 SH Born |
| The Netherlands |

(43)

Mitsubishi Motors Europe B.V. MME

Mitsubishi Avenue 21

6121 SH Born

The Netherlands

| (44) | Mitsubishi Motors Thailand Co., Ltd MMTh
  Represented in the Union by:





  Mitsubishi Motors Europe BV MME |
| --- | --- |
| Mitsubishi Avenue 21 |
| 6121 SG Born |
| The Netherlands |

(44)

Mitsubishi Motors Thailand Co., Ltd MMTh

Represented in the Union by:

Mitsubishi Motors Europe BV MME

Mitsubishi Avenue 21

6121 SG Born

The Netherlands

| (45) | Nissan International SA
  Represented in the Union by:





  Renault Nissan Representation Office |
| --- | --- |
| Av des Arts 40 |
| 1040 Bruxelles |
| Belgium |

(45)

Nissan International SA

Represented in the Union by:

Renault Nissan Representation Office

Av des Arts 40

1040 Bruxelles

Belgium

| (46) | Adam Opel GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Bahnhofsplatz 1 IPC 39-12 |
| 65423 Rüsselsheim |
| Germany |

(46)

Adam Opel GmbH

Bahnhofsplatz 1 IPC 39-12

65423 Rüsselsheim

Germany

| (47) | Opel Automobile GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Bahnhofsplatz 1IPC 39-12 |
| 65423 Rüsselsheim |
| Germany |

(47)

Opel Automobile GmbH

Bahnhofsplatz 1IPC 39-12

65423 Rüsselsheim

Germany

| (48) | Dr Ing hc F Porsche AG |
| --- | --- |
| Letter box 011/1882 |
| 38436 Wolfsburg |
| Germany |

(48)

Dr Ing hc F Porsche AG

Letter box 011/1882

38436 Wolfsburg

Germany

| (49) | Piaggio & C S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |
| Viale Rinaldo Piaggio 25 |
| 56025 Pontedera (PI) |
| Italy |

(49)

Piaggio & C S.p.A.

Viale Rinaldo Piaggio 25

56025 Pontedera (PI)

Italy

| (50) | Renault S.A.S. |
| --- | --- |
| Guyancourt |
| 1 avenue du Golf |
| 78288 Guyancourt Cedex |
| France |

(50)

Renault S.A.S.

Guyancourt

1 avenue du Golf

78288 Guyancourt Cedex

France

| (51) | Renault Trucks |
| --- | --- |
| 99 Route de Lyon |
| TER L10 0 01 |
| 69802 Saint Priest Cedex |
| France |

(51)

Renault Trucks

99 Route de Lyon

TER L10 0 01

69802 Saint Priest Cedex

France

| (52) | Romanital Srl |
| --- | --- |
| Via delle Industrie, 107 |
| 90040 Isola delle Femmine PA |
| Italy |

(52)

Romanital Srl

Via delle Industrie, 107

90040 Isola delle Femmine PA

Italy

| (53) | SAIC MAXUS Automotive Co. Ltd
  Represented in the Union by:





  SAIC Luc, S.a.r.l. |
| --- | --- |
| President Building |
| 37A avenue J.F. Kennedy |
| 1855 Luxembourg |
| Luxembourg |

(53)

SAIC MAXUS Automotive Co. Ltd

Represented in the Union by:

SAIC Luc, S.a.r.l.

President Building

37A avenue J.F. Kennedy

1855 Luxembourg

Luxembourg

| (54) | Seat SA |
| --- | --- |
| Letter box 011/1882 |
| 38436 Wolfsburg |
| Germany |

(54)

Seat SA

Letter box 011/1882

38436 Wolfsburg

Germany

| (55) | SFL Technologies GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Innovationspark 2 |
| 8152 Stallhofen |
| Austria |

(55)

SFL Technologies GmbH

Innovationspark 2

8152 Stallhofen

Austria

| (56) | Skoda Auto AS |
| --- | --- |
| Letter box 011/1882 |
| 38436 Wolfsburg |
| Germany |

(56)

Skoda Auto AS

Letter box 011/1882

38436 Wolfsburg

Germany

| (57) | SsangYong Motor Company
  Represented in the Union by:





  SsangYong Motor Europe Office |
| --- | --- |
| Herriotstrasse 1 |
| 60528 Frankfurt am Main |
| Germany |

(57)

SsangYong Motor Company

Represented in the Union by:

SsangYong Motor Europe Office

Herriotstrasse 1

60528 Frankfurt am Main

Germany

| (58) | StreetScooter GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Jülicher Straße 191 |
| 52070 Aachen |
| Germany |

(58)

StreetScooter GmbH

Jülicher Straße 191

52070 Aachen

Germany

| (59) | Subaru Corporation
  Represented in the Union by:





  Subaru Europe NV/SA |
| --- | --- |
| Leuvensesteenweg 555 B/8 |
| 1930 Zaventem |
| Belgium |

(59)

Subaru Corporation

Represented in the Union by:

Subaru Europe NV/SA

Leuvensesteenweg 555 B/8

1930 Zaventem

Belgium

| (60) | Suzuki Motor Corporation
  Represented in the Union by:





  Magyar Suzuki Corporation Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| 2500 Esztergom |
| Schweidel Jozsef U52 |
| Hungary |

(60)

Suzuki Motor Corporation

Represented in the Union by:

Magyar Suzuki Corporation Ltd

2500 Esztergom

Schweidel Jozsef U52

Hungary

| (61) | Tesla Motors Ltd
  Represented in the Union by:





  Tesla Motors NL |
| --- | --- |
| 7-9 Atlasstraat |
| 5047 RG Tilburg |
| The Netherlands |

(61)

Tesla Motors Ltd

Represented in the Union by:

Tesla Motors NL

7-9 Atlasstraat

5047 RG Tilburg

The Netherlands

| (62) | Toyota Motor Europe NV/SA |
| --- | --- |
| Avenue du Bourget 60 |
| 1140 Brussels |
| Belgium |

(62)

Toyota Motor Europe NV/SA

Avenue du Bourget 60

1140 Brussels

Belgium

| (63) | Univers Ve Helem |
| --- | --- |
| 14 rue Federico Garcia Lorca |
| 32000 Auch |
| France |

(63)

Univers Ve Helem

14 rue Federico Garcia Lorca

32000 Auch

France

| (64) | Volkswagen AG |
| --- | --- |
| Letter box 011/1882 |
| 38436 Wolfsburg |
| Germany |

(64)

Volkswagen AG

Letter box 011/1882

38436 Wolfsburg

Germany

| (65) | Volvo Car Corporation |
| --- | --- |
| VAK building Assar Gabrielssons väg |
| SE-405 31 Göteborg |
| Sweden |

(65)

Volvo Car Corporation

VAK building Assar Gabrielssons väg

SE-405 31 Göteborg

Sweden

| (66) | Pool for: Daimler AG |
| --- | --- |
| F403 EA/R |
| 70546 Stuttgart |
| Germany |

(66)

Pool for: Daimler AG

F403 EA/R

70546 Stuttgart

Germany

| (67) | Pool for: FCA Italy S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |
| Gate 8 — Building 6 – 1st floor – B15N Colonna N47 |
| C.so Settembrini, 40 |
| 10135 Torino |
| Italy |

(67)

Pool for: FCA Italy S.p.A.

Gate 8 — Building 6 – 1st floor – B15N Colonna N47

C.so Settembrini, 40

10135 Torino

Italy

| (68) | Pool for: Ford-Werke GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Neihl Plant, building Imbert 479 |
| Henry-Ford-Straße 1 |
| 50735 Köln |
| Germany |

(68)

Pool for: Ford-Werke GmbH

Neihl Plant, building Imbert 479

Henry-Ford-Straße 1

50735 Köln

Germany

| (69) | Pool for: General Motors |
| --- | --- |
| Bahnhofsplatz 1 IPC 39-12 |
| 65423 Rüsselsheim |
| Germany |

(69)

Pool for: General Motors

Bahnhofsplatz 1 IPC 39-12

65423 Rüsselsheim

Germany

| (70) | Pool for: Hyundai |
| --- | --- |
| Kaiserleipromanade 5 |
| 63067 Offenbach |
| Germany |

(70)

Pool for: Hyundai

Kaiserleipromanade 5

63067 Offenbach

Germany

| (71) | Pool for: Kia |
| --- | --- |
| Theodor-Heuss-Allee 11 |
| 60486 Frankfurt am Main |
| Germany |

(71)

Pool for: Kia

Theodor-Heuss-Allee 11

60486 Frankfurt am Main

Germany

| (72) | Pool for: Mitsubishi Motors |
| --- | --- |
| Mitsubishi Avenue 21 |
| 6121 SG Born |
| The Netherlands |

(72)

Pool for: Mitsubishi Motors

Mitsubishi Avenue 21

6121 SG Born

The Netherlands

| (73) | Pool for: Renault |
| --- | --- |
| 1 Avenue du Golf |
| 78288 |
| Guyancourt Cedex |
| France |

(73)

Pool for: Renault

1 Avenue du Golf

78288

Guyancourt Cedex

France

| (74) | Pool for: Volkswagen Group LCV |
| --- | --- |
| Letter box 011/1882 |
| 38436 Wolfsburg |
| Germany |

(74)

Pool for: Volkswagen Group LCV

Letter box 011/1882

38436 Wolfsburg

Germany

Done at Brussels, 3 April 2019.

For the Commission

Miguel ARIAS CAÑETE

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  
  OJ L 145, 31.5.2011, p. 1.

1

---

ANNEX I

Table 1

Values relating to the performance of manufacturers confirmed or amended in accordance with Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 for calendar year 2017

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Manufacturer name | Pools and derogations | Number of registrations | Average specific emissions of CO2 (100 %) | Specific emissions target | Distance to target | Distance to target adjusted | Average mass | Average CO2 emissions (100 %) |
| ALFA ROMEO SPA | | 8 | 137,375 | 161,283 | – 23,908 | – 23,908 | 1 558,50 | 137,375 |
| ALKE SRL | DMD | 1 | 0,000 | | | | 1 030,00 | 0,000 |
| AUDI AG | P8 | 1 275 | 133,705 | 179,293 | – 45,588 | – 45,588 | 1 752,16 | 133,773 |
| AUTOMOBILES CITROEN | | 158 465 | 130,881 | 167,142 | – 36,261 | – 36,261 | 1 621,51 | 131,273 |
| AUTOMOBILES PEUGEOT | | 169 852 | 132,590 | 169,521 | – 36,931 | – 36,931 | 1 647,09 | 133,040 |
| AVTOVAZ JSC | P7 | 272 | 215,967 | 135,884 | 80,083 | 80,013 | 1 285,40 | 215,967 |
| BLUECAR SAS | DMD | 21 | 0,000 | | | | 1 325,00 | 0,000 |
| BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE AG | DMD | 94 | 150,979 | | | | 1 870,16 | 150,979 |
| BMW M GMBH | DMD | 411 | 146,029 | | | | 1 904,06 | 146,029 |
| FCA US LLC | P2 | 157 | 220,541 | 201,360 | 19,181 | 19,181 | 1 989,44 | 220,541 |
| AUTOMOBILE DACIA SA | P7 | 26 775 | 117,858 | 135,230 | – 17,372 | – 17,372 | 1 278,37 | 117,858 |
| DAIMLER AG | P1 | 147 953 | 187,603 | 212,680 | – 25,079 | – 25,079 | 2 111,16 | 187,604 |
| DFSK MOTOR CO LTD | DMD | 353 | 179,759 | | | | 1 243,27 | 179,759 |
| ESAGONO ENERGIA SRL | DMD | 19 | 0,000 | | | | 1 225,74 | 0,000 |
| FCA ITALY SPA | P2 | 143 889 | 149,154 | 174,813 | – 25,659 | – 25,659 | 1 703,99 | 149,154 |
| FORD MOTOR COMPANY OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED | P3 | 38 381 | 214,276 | 227,258 | – 12,982 | – 12,982 | 2 267,91 | 214,276 |
| FORD MOTOR COMPANY | P3 | 9 | 159,111 | 199,459 | – 40,348 | – 40,348 | 1 969,00 | 159,111 |
| FORD-WERKE GMBH | P3 | 242 012 | 156,630 | 193,916 | – 37,286 | – 37,286 | 1 909,40 | 156,630 |
| MITSUBISHI FUSO TRUCK & BUS CORPORATION | P1 | 446 | 242,807 | 264,642 | – 21,835 | – 21,835 | 2 669,89 | 242,807 |
| MITSUBISHI FUSO TRUCK EUROPE SA | P1 | 31 | 236,806 | 274,345 | – 37,539 | – 37,539 | 2 774,23 | 236,806 |
| LLC AUTOMOBILE PLANT GAZ | DMD | 37 | 285,000 | | | | 2 256,89 | 285,000 |
| GENERAL MOTORS HOLDINGS LLC | P4 | 344 | 163,282 | 178,428 | – 15,146 | – 15,146 | 1 742,86 | 163,282 |
| GONOW AUTO CO LTD | DMD | 51 | 184,647 | | | | 1 358,33 | 184,647 |
| GOUPIL INDUSTRIE SA | DMD | 349 | 0,000 | | | | 1 123,89 | 0,000 |
| GREAT WALL MOTOR COMPANY LIMITED | DMD | 57 | 202,439 | | | | 1 771,93 | 202,439 |
| HONDA MOTOR CO LTD | DMD | 14 | 112,571 | | | | 1 335,21 | 112,571 |
| HONDA OF THE UK MANUFACTURING LTD | DMD | 21 | 141,429 | | | | 1 660,14 | 141,429 |
| HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY | P9 | 2 775 | 209,458 | 223,768 | – 14,310 | – 14,310 | 2 230,39 | 209,458 |
| HYUNDAI ASSAN OTOMOTIV SANAYI VE | P9 | 1 | 112,000 | 122,176 | – 10,176 | – 10,176 | 1 138,00 | 112,000 |
| HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING CZECH SRO | P9 | 83 | 111,590 | 147,043 | – 35,453 | – 35,453 | 1 405,39 | 111,590 |
| ISUZU MOTORS LIMITED | | 9 887 | 195,044 | 204,716 | – 9,672 | – 9,672 | 2 025,53 | 195,044 |
| IVECO SPA | | 23 369 | 203,007 | 239,767 | – 36,760 | – 36,760 | 2 402,42 | 203,020 |
| JAGUAR LAND ROVER LIMITED | DMD | 387 | 157,755 | | | | 1 995,43 | 157,755 |
| KIA MOTORS CORPORATION | P5 | 1 295 | 124,415 | 155,643 | – 31,228 | – 31,228 | 1 497,86 | 124,511 |
| KIA MOTORS SLOVAKIA SRO | P5 | 312 | 124,160 | 150,401 | – 26,241 | – 26,241 | 1 441,49 | 124,160 |
| LADA AUTOMOBILE GMBH | DMD | 3 | 216,000 | | | | 1 285,00 | 216,000 |
| MAGYAR SUZUKI CORPORATION LTD | DMD | 2 | 115,000 | | | | 1 370,00 | 115,000 |
| MAHINDRA & MAHINDRA LTD | DMD | 310 | 210,958 | | | | 1 973,90 | 210,958 |
| MAN TRUCK & BUS AG | P8 | 1 485 | 197,790 | 220,221 | – 22,431 | – 22,438 | 2 192,25 | 197,790 |
| MAZDA MOTOR CORPORATION | DMD | 105 | 136,905 | | | | 1 546,78 | 136,905 |
| MFTBC | P1 | 36 | 239,250 | 265,401 | – 26,151 | – 26,151 | 2 678,05 | 239,250 |
| MITSUBISHI MOTORS CORPORATION MMC | P6/D | 330 | 184,176 | 195,000 | – 10,824 | – 10,824 | 1 887,06 | 184,176 |
| MITSUBISHI MOTORS EUROPE BV MME | P6/D | 205 | 217,210 | 195,000 | 22,210 | 22,210 | 2 217,08 | 217,210 |
| MITSUBISHI MOTORS THAILAND CO LTD MMTH | P6/D | 20 576 | 185,501 | 195,000 | – 9,499 | – 9,499 | 1 895,76 | 185,501 |
| NISSAN INTERNATIONAL SA | | 55 137 | 158,636 | 191,852 | – 33,216 | – 33,216 | 1 887,20 | 162,648 |
| ADAM OPEL GMBH | P4 | 65 538 | 159,798 | 180,693 | – 20,895 | – 20,895 | 1 767,22 | 159,798 |
| OPEL AUTOMOBILE GMBH | | 17 373 | 168,923 | 189,777 | – 20,854 | – 20,854 | 1 864,89 | 168,923 |
| PIAGGIO & C SPA | D | 2 980 | 151,640 | 155,000 | – 3,360 | – 3,360 | 1 087,29 | 153,319 |
| DR ING HCF PORSCHE AG | P8 | 53 | 186,774 | 206,254 | – 19,480 | – 19,480 | 2 042,06 | 186,774 |
| RENAULT SAS | P7 | 223 583 | 149,683 | 177,514 | – 27,831 | – 27,832 | 1 733,03 | 151,064 |
| RENAULT TRUCKS | | 9 126 | 208,652 | 229,287 | – 20,635 | – 20,635 | 2 289,73 | 208,652 |
| ROMANITAL SRL | DMD | 48 | 166,354 | | | | 1 272,60 | 166,354 |
| SAIC MAXUS AUTOMOTIVE CO LTD | DMD | 159 | 231,595 | | | | 2 200,75 | 237,421 |
| SEAT SA | P8 | 354 | 109,263 | 128,576 | – 19,313 | – 19,315 | 1 206,82 | 109,263 |
| SFL TECHNOLOGIES GMBH | DMD | 5 | 0,000 | | | | 1 631,40 | 0,000 |
| SKODA AUTO AS | P8 | 4 209 | 110,631 | 133,165 | – 22,534 | – 22,548 | 1 256,16 | 110,631 |
| SSANGYONG MOTOR COMPANY | D | 1 000 | 192,914 | 210,000 | – 17,086 | – 17,086 | 2 071,59 | 192,914 |
| STREETSCOOTER GMBH | | 3 808 | 0,000 | 159,554 | – 159,554 | – 159,554 | 1 539,91 | 0,000 |
| SUBARU CORPORATION | DMD | 52 | 161,192 | | | | 1 643,60 | 161,192 |
| SUZUKI MOTOR CORPORATION | DMD | 14 | 162,714 | | | | 1 132,14 | 162,714 |
| TESLA MOTORS LTD | DMD | 1 | 0,000 | | | | 2 427,00 | 0,000 |
| TOYOTA MOTOR EUROPE NV SA | | 38 266 | 168,452 | 196,264 | – 27,812 | – 27,990 | 1 934,64 | 168,452 |
| UNIVERS VE HELEM | DMD | 5 | 0,000 | | | | 1 138,40 | 0,000 |
| VOLKSWAGEN AG | P8 | 192 470 | 159,987 | 189,446 | – 29,459 | – 29,502 | 1 861,33 | 160,011 |
| VOLVO CAR CORPORATION | DMD | 852 | 121,619 | | | | 1 691,41 | 121,964 |

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

Manufacturer name

Pools and derogations

Number of registrations

Average specific emissions of CO2 (100 %)

Specific emissions target

Distance to target

Distance to target adjusted

Average mass

Average CO2 emissions (100 %)

ALFA ROMEO SPA

8

137,375

161,283

– 23,908

– 23,908

1 558,50

137,375

ALKE SRL

DMD

1

0,000

1 030,00

0,000

AUDI AG

P8

1 275

133,705

179,293

– 45,588

– 45,588

1 752,16

133,773

AUTOMOBILES CITROEN

158 465

130,881

167,142

– 36,261

– 36,261

1 621,51

131,273

AUTOMOBILES PEUGEOT

169 852

132,590

169,521

– 36,931

– 36,931

1 647,09

133,040

AVTOVAZ JSC

P7

272

215,967

135,884

80,083

80,013

1 285,40

215,967

BLUECAR SAS

DMD

21

0,000

1 325,00

0,000

BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE AG

DMD

94

150,979

1 870,16

150,979

BMW M GMBH

DMD

411

146,029

1 904,06

146,029

FCA US LLC

P2

157

220,541

201,360

19,181

19,181

1 989,44

220,541

AUTOMOBILE DACIA SA

P7

26 775

117,858

135,230

– 17,372

– 17,372

1 278,37

117,858

DAIMLER AG

P1

147 953

187,603

212,680

– 25,079

– 25,079

2 111,16

187,604

DFSK MOTOR CO LTD

DMD

353

179,759

1 243,27

179,759

ESAGONO ENERGIA SRL

DMD

19

0,000

1 225,74

0,000

FCA ITALY SPA

P2

143 889

149,154

174,813

– 25,659

– 25,659

1 703,99

149,154

FORD MOTOR COMPANY OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED

P3

38 381

214,276

227,258

– 12,982

– 12,982

2 267,91

214,276

FORD MOTOR COMPANY

P3

9

159,111

199,459

– 40,348

– 40,348

1 969,00

159,111

FORD-WERKE GMBH

P3

242 012

156,630

193,916

– 37,286

– 37,286

1 909,40

156,630

MITSUBISHI FUSO TRUCK & BUS CORPORATION

P1

446

242,807

264,642

– 21,835

– 21,835

2 669,89

242,807

MITSUBISHI FUSO TRUCK EUROPE SA

P1

31

236,806

274,345

– 37,539

– 37,539

2 774,23

236,806

LLC AUTOMOBILE PLANT GAZ

DMD

37

285,000

2 256,89

285,000

GENERAL MOTORS HOLDINGS LLC

P4

344

163,282

178,428

– 15,146

– 15,146

1 742,86

163,282

GONOW AUTO CO LTD

DMD

51

184,647

1 358,33

184,647

GOUPIL INDUSTRIE SA

DMD

349

0,000

1 123,89

0,000

GREAT WALL MOTOR COMPANY LIMITED

DMD

57

202,439

1 771,93

202,439

HONDA MOTOR CO LTD

DMD

14

112,571

1 335,21

112,571

HONDA OF THE UK MANUFACTURING LTD

DMD

21

141,429

1 660,14

141,429

HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY

P9

2 775

209,458

223,768

– 14,310

– 14,310

2 230,39

209,458

HYUNDAI ASSAN OTOMOTIV SANAYI VE

P9

1

112,000

122,176

– 10,176

– 10,176

1 138,00

112,000

HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING CZECH SRO

P9

83

111,590

147,043

– 35,453

– 35,453

1 405,39

111,590

ISUZU MOTORS LIMITED

9 887

195,044

204,716

– 9,672

– 9,672

2 025,53

195,044

IVECO SPA

23 369

203,007

239,767

– 36,760

– 36,760

2 402,42

203,020

JAGUAR LAND ROVER LIMITED

DMD

387

157,755

1 995,43

157,755

KIA MOTORS CORPORATION

P5

1 295

124,415

155,643

– 31,228

– 31,228

1 497,86

124,511

KIA MOTORS SLOVAKIA SRO

P5

312

124,160

150,401

– 26,241

– 26,241

1 441,49

124,160

LADA AUTOMOBILE GMBH

DMD

3

216,000

1 285,00

216,000

MAGYAR SUZUKI CORPORATION LTD

DMD

2

115,000

1 370,00

115,000

MAHINDRA & MAHINDRA LTD

DMD

310

210,958

1 973,90

210,958

MAN TRUCK & BUS AG

P8

1 485

197,790

220,221

– 22,431

– 22,438

2 192,25

197,790

MAZDA MOTOR CORPORATION

DMD

105

136,905

1 546,78

136,905

MFTBC

P1

36

239,250

265,401

– 26,151

– 26,151

2 678,05

239,250

MITSUBISHI MOTORS CORPORATION MMC

P6/D

330

184,176

195,000

– 10,824

– 10,824

1 887,06

184,176

MITSUBISHI MOTORS EUROPE BV MME

P6/D

205

217,210

195,000

22,210

22,210

2 217,08

217,210

MITSUBISHI MOTORS THAILAND CO LTD MMTH

P6/D

20 576

185,501

195,000

– 9,499

– 9,499

1 895,76

185,501

NISSAN INTERNATIONAL SA

55 137

158,636

191,852

– 33,216

– 33,216

1 887,20

162,648

ADAM OPEL GMBH

P4

65 538

159,798

180,693

– 20,895

– 20,895

1 767,22

159,798

OPEL AUTOMOBILE GMBH

17 373

168,923

189,777

– 20,854

– 20,854

1 864,89

168,923

PIAGGIO & C SPA

D

2 980

151,640

155,000

– 3,360

– 3,360

1 087,29

153,319

DR ING HCF PORSCHE AG

P8

53

186,774

206,254

– 19,480

– 19,480

2 042,06

186,774

RENAULT SAS

P7

223 583

149,683

177,514

– 27,831

– 27,832

1 733,03

151,064

RENAULT TRUCKS

9 126

208,652

229,287

– 20,635

– 20,635

2 289,73

208,652

ROMANITAL SRL

DMD

48

166,354

1 272,60

166,354

SAIC MAXUS AUTOMOTIVE CO LTD

DMD

159

231,595

2 200,75

237,421

SEAT SA

P8

354

109,263

128,576

– 19,313

– 19,315

1 206,82

109,263

SFL TECHNOLOGIES GMBH

DMD

5

0,000

1 631,40

0,000

SKODA AUTO AS

P8

4 209

110,631

133,165

– 22,534

– 22,548

1 256,16

110,631

SSANGYONG MOTOR COMPANY

D

1 000

192,914

210,000

– 17,086

– 17,086

2 071,59

192,914

STREETSCOOTER GMBH

3 808

0,000

159,554

– 159,554

– 159,554

1 539,91

0,000

SUBARU CORPORATION

DMD

52

161,192

1 643,60

161,192

SUZUKI MOTOR CORPORATION

DMD

14

162,714

1 132,14

162,714

TESLA MOTORS LTD

DMD

1

0,000

2 427,00

0,000

TOYOTA MOTOR EUROPE NV SA

38 266

168,452

196,264

– 27,812

– 27,990

1 934,64

168,452

UNIVERS VE HELEM

DMD

5

0,000

1 138,40

0,000

VOLKSWAGEN AG

P8

192 470

159,987

189,446

– 29,459

– 29,502

1 861,33

160,011

VOLVO CAR CORPORATION

DMD

852

121,619

1 691,41

121,964

Table 2

Values relating to the performance of pools confirmed or amended in accordance with Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 for calendar year 2017

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Pool name | Pool | Number of registrations | Average specific emissions of CO2 (100 % | Specific emissions target | Distance to target | Distance to target adjusted | Average mass | Average CO2 emissions (100 %) |
| DAIMLER AG | P1 | 148 466 | 187,791 | 212,862 | – 25,072 | – 25,072 | 2 113,12 | 187,793 |
| FCA ITALY SPA | P2 | 144 046 | 149,232 | 174,842 | – 25,610 | – 25,610 | 1 704,3 | 149,232 |
| FORD-WERKE GMBH | P3 | 280 402 | 164,521 | 198,481 | – 33,960 | – 33,960 | 1 958,48 | 164,521 |
| GENERAL MOTORS | P4 | 65 882 | 159,816 | 180,681 | – 20,865 | – 20,865 | 1 767,09 | 159,816 |
| HYUNDAI | P9 | 2 859 | 206,583 | 221,506 | – 14,923 | – 14,923 | 2 206,06 | 206,583 |
| KIA | P5 | 1 607 | 124,366 | 154,625 | – 30,259 | – 30,259 | 1 486,91 | 124,443 |
| MITSUBISHI MOTORS | P6/D | 21 111 | 185,788 | 195,000 | – 9,212 | – 9,212 | 1 898,74 | 185,788 |
| RENAULT | P7 | 250 630 | 146,382 | 172,951 | – 26,569 | – 26,570 | 1 683,97 | 147,587 |
| VW GROUP PC | P8 | 199 846 | 158,978 | 188,321 | – 29,343 | – 29,385 | 1 849,24 | 159,002 |

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

Pool name

Pool

Number of registrations

Average specific emissions of CO2 (100 %

Specific emissions target

Distance to target

Distance to target adjusted

Average mass

Average CO2 emissions (100 %)

DAIMLER AG

P1

148 466

187,791

212,862

– 25,072

– 25,072

2 113,12

187,793

FCA ITALY SPA

P2

144 046

149,232

174,842

– 25,610

– 25,610

1 704,3

149,232

FORD-WERKE GMBH

P3

280 402

164,521

198,481

– 33,960

– 33,960

1 958,48

164,521

GENERAL MOTORS

P4

65 882

159,816

180,681

– 20,865

– 20,865

1 767,09

159,816

HYUNDAI

P9

2 859

206,583

221,506

– 14,923

– 14,923

2 206,06

206,583

KIA

P5

1 607

124,366

154,625

– 30,259

– 30,259

1 486,91

124,443

MITSUBISHI MOTORS

P6/D

21 111

185,788

195,000

– 9,212

– 9,212

1 898,74

185,788

RENAULT

P7

250 630

146,382

172,951

– 26,569

– 26,570

1 683,97

147,587

VW GROUP PC

P8

199 846

158,978

188,321

– 29,343

– 29,385

1 849,24

159,002

Explanatory notes to Tables 1 and 2:

Column A:

Table 1: ‘Manufacturer name’ means the name of the manufacturer as notified to the Commission by the manufacturer concerned or, where no such notification has taken place, the name registered by the registration authority of the Member State.

Table 2: ‘Pool name’ means the name of the pool declared by the pool manager.

Column B:

‘D’ means that a derogation relating to a small volume manufacturer has been granted in accordance with Article 11(3) of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 for the calendar year 2017.

‘DMD’ means that a de minimis exemption applies in accordance with Article 2(4) of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011, i.e., a manufacturer which together with all its connected undertakings was responsible for fewer than 1 000 new registered vehicles in 2017 does not have to meet a specific emissions target.

‘P’ means that the manufacturer is a member of a pool (listed in table 2) formed pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 and the pooling agreement is valid for the calendar year 2017.

Column C:

‘Number of registrations’ means the total number of new light commercial vehicles registered by Member States in a calendar year, not counting those registrations that relate to records where the values for mass or CO2 are missing and those records which the manufacturer does not recognise. The number of registrations reported by Member States may otherwise not be changed.

Column D:

‘Average specific emissions of CO2 (100 %)’ means the average specific emissions of CO2 (g CO2/km) that have been calculated on the basis of the 100 % of the vehicles attributed to the manufacturer. Where appropriate, the average specific emissions of CO2 take into account the errors notified to the Commission by the manufacturer concerned. The records used for the calculation include those that contain a valid value for mass and CO2 emissions. The average specific emissions of CO2 include emission reductions resulting from the provisions on super-credits in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011.

Column E:

‘Specific emissions target’ means the emissions target calculated on the basis of the average mass of all vehicles attributed to a manufacturer applying the formula set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 510/2011.

Column F:

‘Distance to target’ means the difference between the average specific emissions of CO2 specified in column D and the specific emissions target in column E. Where the value in column F is positive, the average specific emissions of CO2 exceed the specific emissions target.

Column G:

‘Distance to target adjusted’ means that where the values in this column are different from those in column F, the values in that column have been adjusted to take into account an error margin. The error margin is calculated in accordance with the following formula:

Error = absolute value of [(AC1 – TG1) – (AC2 – TG2)]

AC1= the average specific emissions of CO2 including the unidentifiable vehicles (as set out in column D);

TG1= the specific emissions target including the unidentifiable vehicles (as set out in column E);

AC2= the average specific emissions of CO2 excluding the unidentifiable vehicles;

TG2= the specific emissions target excluding the unidentifiable vehicles.

Column H:

‘Average mass’ means the average of the mass in running order (kilogrammes) of the vehicles attributed to the manufacturer.

Column I:

‘Average CO2 emissions (100 %)’ means the average specific emissions of CO2 that have been calculated on the basis of 100 % of the vehicles attributed to the manufacturer. Where appropriate, the average specific emissions of CO2 take into account the errors notified to the Commission by the manufacturer concerned. The records used for the calculation include those that contain a valid value for mass and CO2 emissions but exclude emission reductions resulting from the provisions on super-credits in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011.

---

ANNEX II

Table 1

Values relating to the performance of manufacturers which are members of the pool VOLKSWAGEN GROUP LCV confirmed or amended in accordance with Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 for calendar year 2016

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Manufacturer name | Pools and derogations | Number of registrations | Average specific emissions of CO2 (80 %) | Specific emissions target | Distance to target | Distance to target adjusted | Average mass | Average CO2 emissions (100 %) |
| AUDI AG | P9 | 610 | 137,399 | 191,687 | – 54,288 | – 54,288 | 1 885,43 | 144,943 |
| DR ING HCF PORSCHE AG | P9 | 96 | 180,487 | 210,465 | – 29,978 | – 29,978 | 2 087,34 | 189,656 |
| QUATTRO GMBH | P9 | 2 | 189,000 | 166,072 | 22,928 | 22,928 | 1 610,00 | 189,000 |
| SEAT SA | P9 | 952 | 103,075 | 126,562 | – 23,487 | – 23,487 | 1 185,16 | 107,797 |
| SKODA AUTO AS | P9 | 5 188 | 103,349 | 130,968 | – 27,619 | – 27,619 | 1 232,54 | 108,373 |
| VOLKSWAGEN AG | P9 | 190 987 | 152,518 | 183,040 | – 30,522 | – 30,571 | 1 792,45 | 165,863 |

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

Manufacturer name

Pools and derogations

Number of registrations

Average specific emissions of CO2 (80 %)

Specific emissions target

Distance to target

Distance to target adjusted

Average mass

Average CO2 emissions (100 %)

AUDI AG

P9

610

137,399

191,687

– 54,288

– 54,288

1 885,43

144,943

DR ING HCF PORSCHE AG

P9

96

180,487

210,465

– 29,978

– 29,978

2 087,34

189,656

QUATTRO GMBH

P9

2

189,000

166,072

22,928

22,928

1 610,00

189,000

SEAT SA

P9

952

103,075

126,562

– 23,487

– 23,487

1 185,16

107,797

SKODA AUTO AS

P9

5 188

103,349

130,968

– 27,619

– 27,619

1 232,54

108,373

VOLKSWAGEN AG

P9

190 987

152,518

183,040

– 30,522

– 30,571

1 792,45

165,863

Table 2

Values relating to the performance of the pool VOLKSWAGEN GROUP LCV confirmed or amended in accordance with Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 for calendar year 2016

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Pool name | Pool | Number of registrations | Average specific emissions of CO2 (80 %) | Specific emissions target | Distance to target | Distance to target adjusted | Average mass | Average CO2 emissions (100 %) |
| VOLKSWAGEN GROUP LCV | P9 | 197 835 | 150,346 | 181,442 | – 31,096 | – 31,153 | 1 775,27 | 164,024 |

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

Pool name

Pool

Number of registrations

Average specific emissions of CO2 (80 %)

Specific emissions target

Distance to target

Distance to target adjusted

Average mass

Average CO2 emissions (100 %)

VOLKSWAGEN GROUP LCV

P9

197 835

150,346

181,442

– 31,096

– 31,153

1 775,27

164,024

Table 3

Values relating to the performance of manufacturers which are members of the pool VOLKSWAGEN GROUP LCV confirmed or amended in accordance with Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 for calendar year 2015

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Manufacturer name | Pools and derogations | Number of registrations | Average specific emissions of CO2 (75 %) | Specific emissions target | Distance to target | Distance to target adjusted | Average mass | Average CO2 emissions (100 %) |
| AUDI AG | P8 | 940 | 128,279 | 177,884 | – 49,605 | – 49,605 | 1 737,01 | 140,181 |
| DR ING HCF PORSCHE AG | P8 | 115 | 181,209 | 215,896 | – 34,687 | – 34,687 | 2 145,74 | 192,417 |
| QUATTRO GMBH | P8 | 5 | 223,000 | 204,667 | 18,333 | 18,333 | 2 025,00 | 223,000 |
| SEAT SA | P8 | 1 264 | 99,069 | 126,760 | – 27,691 | – 27,691 | 1 187,29 | 104,435 |
| SKODA AUTO AS | P8 | 5 458 | 110,886 | 133,291 | – 22,405 | – 22,422 | 1 257,52 | 118,741 |
| VOLKSWAGEN AG | P8 | 168 339 | 167,921 | 188,905 | – 20,984 | – 20,984 | 1 855,52 | 181,173 |

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

Manufacturer name

Pools and derogations

Number of registrations

Average specific emissions of CO2 (75 %)

Specific emissions target

Distance to target

Distance to target adjusted

Average mass

Average CO2 emissions (100 %)

AUDI AG

P8

940

128,279

177,884

– 49,605

– 49,605

1 737,01

140,181

DR ING HCF PORSCHE AG

P8

115

181,209

215,896

– 34,687

– 34,687

2 145,74

192,417

QUATTRO GMBH

P8

5

223,000

204,667

18,333

18,333

2 025,00

223,000

SEAT SA

P8

1 264

99,069

126,760

– 27,691

– 27,691

1 187,29

104,435

SKODA AUTO AS

P8

5 458

110,886

133,291

– 22,405

– 22,422

1 257,52

118,741

VOLKSWAGEN AG

P8

168 339

167,921

188,905

– 20,984

– 20,984

1 855,52

181,173

Table 4

Values relating to the performance of the pool VOLKSWAGEN GROUP LCV confirmed or amended in accordance with Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 for calendar year 2015

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Pool name | Pool | Number of registrations | Average specific emissions of CO2 (75 %) | Specific emissions target | Distance to target | Distance to target adjusted | Average mass | Average CO2 emissions (100 %) |
| VOLKSWAGEN GROUP LCV | P8 | 176 121 | 164,509 | 186,696 | – 22,187 | – 22,190 | 1 831,76 | 178,477 |

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

Pool name

Pool

Number of registrations

Average specific emissions of CO2 (75 %)

Specific emissions target

Distance to target

Distance to target adjusted

Average mass

Average CO2 emissions (100 %)

VOLKSWAGEN GROUP LCV

P8

176 121

164,509

186,696

– 22,187

– 22,190

1 831,76

178,477

Table 5

Values relating to the performance of manufacturers which are members of the pool VOLKSWAGEN GROUP LCV confirmed or amended in accordance with Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 for calendar year 2014

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Manufacturer name | Pools and derogations | Number of registrations | Average specific emissions of CO2 (70 %) | Specific emissions target | Distance to target | Distance to target adjusted | Average mass | Average CO2 emissions (100 %) |
| AUDI AG | P8 | 2 653 | 137,151 | 175,118 | – 37,967 | – 37,967 | 1 707,27 | 147,383 |
| DR ING HCF PORSCHE AG | P8 | 216 | 191,166 | 218,989 | – 27,823 | – 27,823 | 2 179,00 | 203,032 |
| QUATTRO GMBH | P8 | 12 | 231,500 | 197,847 | 33,653 | 33,653 | 1 951,67 | 237,333 |
| SEAT SA | P8 | 1 530 | 98,730 | 127,899 | – 29,169 | – 29,169 | 1 199,54 | 104,810 |
| SKODA AUTO AS | P8 | 9 409 | 115,061 | 137,318 | – 22,257 | – 22,427 | 1 300,82 | 124,157 |
| VOLKSWAGEN AG | P8 | 185 710 | 164,086 | 185,477 | – 21,391 | – 21,391 | 1 818,66 | 179,637 |

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

Manufacturer name

Pools and derogations

Number of registrations

Average specific emissions of CO2 (70 %)

Specific emissions target

Distance to target

Distance to target adjusted

Average mass

Average CO2 emissions (100 %)

AUDI AG

P8

2 653

137,151

175,118

– 37,967

– 37,967

1 707,27

147,383

DR ING HCF PORSCHE AG

P8

216

191,166

218,989

– 27,823

– 27,823

2 179,00

203,032

QUATTRO GMBH

P8

12

231,500

197,847

33,653

33,653

1 951,67

237,333

SEAT SA

P8

1 530

98,730

127,899

– 29,169

– 29,169

1 199,54

104,810

SKODA AUTO AS

P8

9 409

115,061

137,318

– 22,257

– 22,427

1 300,82

124,157

VOLKSWAGEN AG

P8

185 710

164,086

185,477

– 21,391

– 21,391

1 818,66

179,637

Table 6

Values relating to the performance of the pool VOLKSWAGEN GROUP LCV confirmed or amended in accordance with Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 for calendar year 2014

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Pool name | Pool | Number of registrations | Average specific emissions of CO2 (70 %) | Specific emissions target | Distance to target | Distance to target adjusted | Average mass | Average CO2 emissions (100 %) |
| VOLKSWAGEN GROUP LCV | P8 | 199 530 | 159,447 | 182,664 | – 23,217 | – 23,218 | 1 788,41 | 176,047 |

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

Pool name

Pool

Number of registrations

Average specific emissions of CO2 (70 %)

Specific emissions target

Distance to target

Distance to target adjusted

Average mass

Average CO2 emissions (100 %)

VOLKSWAGEN GROUP LCV

P8

199 530

159,447

182,664

– 23,217

– 23,218

1 788,41

176,047

Explanatory notes to Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6:

Column A:

Table 1, 3, 5: ‘Manufacturer name’ means the name of the manufacturer as notified to the Commission by the manufacturer concerned or, where no such notification has taken place, the name registered by the registration authority of the Member State.

Table 2, 4, 6: ‘Pool name’ means the name of the pool declared by the pool manager.

Column B:

‘P’ means that the manufacturer is a member of a pool formed pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 and the pooling agreement is valid for that calendar year.

Column C:

‘Number of registrations’ means the total number of new light commercial vehicles registered by Member States in a calendar year, not counting those registrations that relate to records where the values for mass or CO2 are missing and those records which the manufacturer does not recognise. The number of registrations reported by Member States may otherwise not be changed.

Column D:

Table 1, 2: ‘Average specific emissions of CO2 (80 %)’ means the average specific emissions of CO2 that have been calculated on the basis of the 80 % lowest emitting vehicles in the manufacturer's fleet in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011. Where appropriate, the average specific emissions of CO2 take into account the errors notified to the Commission by the manufacturer concerned. The records used for the calculation include those that contain a valid value for mass and CO2 emissions. The average specific emissions of CO2 include emission reductions resulting from the provisions on super-credits in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 or eco-innovations in Article 12 of that Regulation.

Table 3, 4: ‘Average specific emissions of CO2 (75 %)’ means the average specific emissions of CO2 that have been calculated on the basis of the 75 % lowest emitting vehicles in the manufacturer's fleet in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011. Where appropriate, the average specific emissions of CO2 take into account the errors notified to the Commission by the manufacturer concerned. The records used for the calculation include those that contain a valid value for mass and CO2 emissions. The average specific emissions of CO2 include emission reductions resulting from the provisions on super-credits in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 or eco-innovations in Article 12 of that Regulation.

Table 5, 6: ‘Average specific emissions of CO2 (70 %)’ means the average specific emissions of CO2 (g CO2/km) that have been calculated on the basis of the 70 % lowest emitting vehicles in the manufacturer's fleet in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011. Where appropriate, the average specific emissions of CO2 take into account the errors notified to the Commission by the manufacturer concerned. The records used for the calculation include those that contain a valid value for mass and CO2 emissions. The average specific emissions of CO2 include emission reductions resulting from the provisions on super-credits in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011.

Column E:

‘Specific emissions target’ means the emissions target calculated on the basis of the average mass of all vehicles attributed to a manufacturer applying the formula set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 510/2011.

Column F:

‘Distance to target’ means the difference between the average specific emissions of CO2 specified in column D and the specific emissions target in column E. Where the value in column F is positive, the average specific emissions of CO2 exceed the specific emissions target.

Column G:

‘Distance to target adjusted’ means that where the values in this column are different from those in column F, the values in that column have been adjusted to take into account an error margin. The error margin is calculated in accordance with the following formula:

Error = absolute value of [(AC1 – TG1) – (AC2 – TG2)]

AC1= the average specific emissions of CO2 including the unidentifiable vehicles (as set out in column D);

TG1= the specific emissions target including the unidentifiable vehicles (as set out in column E);

AC2= the average specific emissions of CO2 excluding the unidentifiable vehicles;

TG2= the specific emissions target excluding the unidentifiable vehicles.

Column H:

‘Average mass’ means the average of the mass in running order (kilogrammes) of the vehicles attributed to the manufacturer.

Column I:

‘Average CO2 emissions (100 %)’ means the average specific emissions of CO2 that have been calculated on the basis of 100 % of the vehicles attributed to the manufacturer. Where appropriate, the average specific emissions of CO2 take into account the errors notified to the Commission by the manufacturer concerned. The records used for the calculation include those that contain a valid value for mass and CO2 emissions but exclude emission reductions resulting from the provisions on super-credits in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 510/2011.

---

| 11.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 100/66 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 100/66

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION (EU) 2019/583

of 3 April 2019

confirming or amending the provisional calculation of the average specific emission of CO2 and specific emissions targets for manufacturers of passenger cars for the calendar year 2017 and for certain manufacturers belonging to the Volkswagen pool for the calendar years 2014, 2015 and 2016 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council

(notified under document C(2019) 2359)

(Only the Czech, Dutch, English, French, German, Hungarian, Italian and Swedish texts are authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 setting emission performance standards for new passenger cars as part of the Community's integrated approach to reduce CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicles (1), and in particular the second subparagraph of Article 8(5) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 443/2009, the Commission is required to calculate each year the average specific emissions of CO2 and the specific emissions target for each manufacturer of passenger cars in the Union as well as for each pool of manufacturers. On the basis of that calculation, the Commission is to determine whether manufacturers and pools have complied with their specific emissions targets. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 443/2009, the Commission is required to calculate each year the average specific emissions of CO2 and the specific emissions target for each manufacturer of passenger cars in the Union as well as for each pool of manufacturers. On the basis of that calculation, the Commission is to determine whether manufacturers and pools have complied with their specific emissions targets.

| (2) | The detailed data to be used for the calculation of the average specific emissions of CO2 and the specific emissions targets is based on Member States' registrations of new passenger cars during the preceding calendar year. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The detailed data to be used for the calculation of the average specific emissions of CO2 and the specific emissions targets is based on Member States' registrations of new passenger cars during the preceding calendar year.

| (3) | All Member States submitted the 2017 data to the Commission. Where, as a result of the verification of the data by the Commission, it was evident that certain data were missing or manifestly incorrect, the Commission contacted the Member States concerned and, subject to the agreement of those Member States, adjusted or completed the data accordingly. Where no agreement could be reached with a Member State, the provisional data of that Member State was not adjusted. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

All Member States submitted the 2017 data to the Commission. Where, as a result of the verification of the data by the Commission, it was evident that certain data were missing or manifestly incorrect, the Commission contacted the Member States concerned and, subject to the agreement of those Member States, adjusted or completed the data accordingly. Where no agreement could be reached with a Member State, the provisional data of that Member State was not adjusted.

| (4) | On 23 April 2018, the Commission published the provisional data and notified 91 manufacturers of the provisional calculations of their average specific emissions of CO2 and their specific emissions targets in 2017. Manufacturers were asked to verify the data and to notify the Commission of any errors within three months of receipt of the notification. 35 manufacturers submitted notifications of errors within the given time-limit. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

On 23 April 2018, the Commission published the provisional data and notified 91 manufacturers of the provisional calculations of their average specific emissions of CO2 and their specific emissions targets in 2017. Manufacturers were asked to verify the data and to notify the Commission of any errors within three months of receipt of the notification. 35 manufacturers submitted notifications of errors within the given time-limit.

| (5) | For the remaining 56 manufacturers that did not notify any errors in the datasets or respond otherwise, the provisional data and provisional calculations of the average specific emissions and the specific emissions targets should be confirmed. For two manufacturers all vehicles reported in the provisional dataset were outside the scope of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

For the remaining 56 manufacturers that did not notify any errors in the datasets or respond otherwise, the provisional data and provisional calculations of the average specific emissions and the specific emissions targets should be confirmed. For two manufacturers all vehicles reported in the provisional dataset were outside the scope of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009.

| (6) | The Commission has verified the errors notified by the manufacturers and the respective reasons for their correction, and the provisional dataset has been confirmed or amended as appropriate. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The Commission has verified the errors notified by the manufacturers and the respective reasons for their correction, and the provisional dataset has been confirmed or amended as appropriate.

| (7) | In the case of records with missing or incorrect identification parameters, such as the type, variant, version code or the type approval number, the fact that manufacturers cannot verify or correct those records should be taken into account. As a consequence, it is appropriate to apply an error margin to the CO2 emissions and mass values of those records. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

In the case of records with missing or incorrect identification parameters, such as the type, variant, version code or the type approval number, the fact that manufacturers cannot verify or correct those records should be taken into account. As a consequence, it is appropriate to apply an error margin to the CO2 emissions and mass values of those records.

| (8) | The error margin should be calculated as the difference between the distances to the specific emissions target expressed as the specific emissions target subtracted from the average specific emissions calculated including and excluding those registrations that cannot be verified by the manufacturers. Regardless of whether that difference is positive or negative, the error margin should always improve the manufacturer's position with regard to its specific emission target. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The error margin should be calculated as the difference between the distances to the specific emissions target expressed as the specific emissions target subtracted from the average specific emissions calculated including and excluding those registrations that cannot be verified by the manufacturers. Regardless of whether that difference is positive or negative, the error margin should always improve the manufacturer's position with regard to its specific emission target.

| (9) | In accordance with Article 10(2) of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009, a manufacturer should be considered as compliant with its specific emissions target referred to in Article 4 of that Regulation where the average emissions indicated in this Decision are lower than the specific emissions target, expressed as a negative distance to target. Where the average emissions exceed the specific emissions target, an excess emission premium is to be imposed, unless the manufacturer concerned benefits from an exemption from that target or is a member of a pool and the pool complies with its specific emissions target. On that basis, Société des Automobiles Alpine SAS, Automobili Lamborghini S.p.A. and Mazda Motor Corporation should be considered as exceeding their specific emissions targets for 2017. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

In accordance with Article 10(2) of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009, a manufacturer should be considered as compliant with its specific emissions target referred to in Article 4 of that Regulation where the average emissions indicated in this Decision are lower than the specific emissions target, expressed as a negative distance to target. Where the average emissions exceed the specific emissions target, an excess emission premium is to be imposed, unless the manufacturer concerned benefits from an exemption from that target or is a member of a pool and the pool complies with its specific emissions target. On that basis, Société des Automobiles Alpine SAS, Automobili Lamborghini S.p.A. and Mazda Motor Corporation should be considered as exceeding their specific emissions targets for 2017.

| (10) | On 3 November 2015, the Volkswagen Group made a statement to the effect that irregularities had been found when determining type approval CO2 levels of some of their vehicles. Following a thorough investigation, sufficient clarifications have been obtained for confirming or amending the provisional data for Audi AG, Audi Hungaria Motor Kft, Bugatti Automotive S.A.S, Quattro GmbH, Seat S.A., Skoda Auto A.S., and Volkswagen AG for the calendar years 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017. However, further clarifications are needed from Dr Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG with regard to possible irregularities in the CO2 emissions and fuel consumption values stated in the emissions type approval of one vehicle model. As a consequence, the values for those calendar years for the Volkswagen pool and its member Dr Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG cannot be confirmed or amended. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

On 3 November 2015, the Volkswagen Group made a statement to the effect that irregularities had been found when determining type approval CO2 levels of some of their vehicles. Following a thorough investigation, sufficient clarifications have been obtained for confirming or amending the provisional data for Audi AG, Audi Hungaria Motor Kft, Bugatti Automotive S.A.S, Quattro GmbH, Seat S.A., Skoda Auto A.S., and Volkswagen AG for the calendar years 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017. However, further clarifications are needed from Dr Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG with regard to possible irregularities in the CO2 emissions and fuel consumption values stated in the emissions type approval of one vehicle model. As a consequence, the values for those calendar years for the Volkswagen pool and its member Dr Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG cannot be confirmed or amended.

| (11) | The Commission has, in accordance with Article 12 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 725/2011 (2), performed an ad hoc verification of CO2 savings certified by reference to Commission Implementing Decision 2013/341/EU (3) and Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/158 (4). The verification showed satisfactory results with regard to the CO2 savings certified by reference to Implementing Decision 2013/341/EU. However, with regard to Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/158, the certified CO2 savings of two efficient alternators fitted in vehicles manufactured by Daimler AG exceeded the savings resulting from the Commission's verification by 9 % and 23 % respectively. The Commission notified Daimler AG of the deviations found and invited that manufacturer to provide evidence demonstrating the accuracy of the certified CO2 savings. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The Commission has, in accordance with Article 12 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 725/2011 (2), performed an ad hoc verification of CO2 savings certified by reference to Commission Implementing Decision 2013/341/EU (3) and Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/158 (4). The verification showed satisfactory results with regard to the CO2 savings certified by reference to Implementing Decision 2013/341/EU. However, with regard to Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/158, the certified CO2 savings of two efficient alternators fitted in vehicles manufactured by Daimler AG exceeded the savings resulting from the Commission's verification by 9 % and 23 % respectively. The Commission notified Daimler AG of the deviations found and invited that manufacturer to provide evidence demonstrating the accuracy of the certified CO2 savings.

| (12) | Based on the information provided by Daimler AG, the Commission has found that the difference in savings was due to the way in which the testing methodology referred to in Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/158 was applied for the purposes of the certification. More precisely, a run-in of the efficient alternators was performed prior to the certification test, even though the testing methodology referred to in that Implementing Decision neither prescribes nor allows a specific run-in of the efficient alternators to be performed outside the certification test. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Based on the information provided by Daimler AG, the Commission has found that the difference in savings was due to the way in which the testing methodology referred to in Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/158 was applied for the purposes of the certification. More precisely, a run-in of the efficient alternators was performed prior to the certification test, even though the testing methodology referred to in that Implementing Decision neither prescribes nor allows a specific run-in of the efficient alternators to be performed outside the certification test.

| (13) | It follows from Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 that, in order for CO2 savings from innovative technologies to be taken into account for the calculation of a manufacturer's specific average emissions, those savings must make a verified contribution to CO2 reductions, in accordance with a testing methodology capable of producing verifiable, repeatable and comparable results. As the certified CO2 savings of two efficient alternators in certain vehicles manufactured by Daimler AG have not been confirmed by the verification performed on the basis of the testing methodology referred to in Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/158, the certified CO2 savings attributed to those eco-innovations, in total 0,292 gCO2/km, should not be taken into account for the calculation of the average specific emissions of Daimler AG. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

It follows from Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 that, in order for CO2 savings from innovative technologies to be taken into account for the calculation of a manufacturer's specific average emissions, those savings must make a verified contribution to CO2 reductions, in accordance with a testing methodology capable of producing verifiable, repeatable and comparable results. As the certified CO2 savings of two efficient alternators in certain vehicles manufactured by Daimler AG have not been confirmed by the verification performed on the basis of the testing methodology referred to in Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/158, the certified CO2 savings attributed to those eco-innovations, in total 0,292 gCO2/km, should not be taken into account for the calculation of the average specific emissions of Daimler AG.

| (14) | The values relating to the performance of a manufacturer as confirmed or amended by this Decision could be revised in the event that the relevant national authorities confirm the existence of irregularities in the CO2 emission values provided for the purpose of determining the manufacturer's compliance with the specific emissions target, |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The values relating to the performance of a manufacturer as confirmed or amended by this Decision could be revised in the event that the relevant national authorities confirm the existence of irregularities in the CO2 emission values provided for the purpose of determining the manufacturer's compliance with the specific emissions target,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

1.   The values relating to the performance of manufacturers, as confirmed or amended for each manufacturer of passenger cars and for each pool of such manufacturers in respect of the 2017 calendar year are specified in Annex I.

2.   The values relating to the performance of Audi AG, Audi Hungaria Motor Kft, Bugatti Automotive S.A.S, Quattro GmbH, Seat S.A., Skoda Auto A.S., and Volkswagen AG, as confirmed or amended in respect of the 2014, 2015 and 2016 calendar years are specified in Annex II.

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the following individual manufacturers and pools formed in accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009:

| (1) | Adidor Voitures SAS |
| --- | --- |
| 2/4 Rue Hans List |
| 78290 Croissy-sur-Seine |
| France |

(1)

Adidor Voitures SAS

2/4 Rue Hans List

78290 Croissy-sur-Seine

France

| (2) | ALFA Romeo S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |
| Gate 8 — Building 6 — 1st floor — B15N Colonna N47 |
| C.so Settembrini, 40 |
| 10135 Torino |
| Italy |

(2)

ALFA Romeo S.p.A.

Gate 8 — Building 6 — 1st floor — B15N Colonna N47

C.so Settembrini, 40

10135 Torino

Italy

| (3) | Alpina Burkard Bovensiepen GmbH & Co. KG |
| --- | --- |
| Alpenstraße 35 - 37 |
| 86807 Buchloe |
| Germany |

(3)

Alpina Burkard Bovensiepen GmbH & Co. KG

Alpenstraße 35 - 37

86807 Buchloe

Germany

| (4) | Société des Automobiles Alpine SAS |
| --- | --- |
| 1 Avenue du Golf |
| 78288 Guyancourt Cedex |
| France |

(4)

Société des Automobiles Alpine SAS

1 Avenue du Golf

78288 Guyancourt Cedex

France

| (5) | Aston Martin Lagonda Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| Gaydon Engineering Centre |
| Banbury Road |
| Gaydon Warwickshire |
| CV35 0DB |
| United Kingdom |

(5)

Aston Martin Lagonda Ltd

Gaydon Engineering Centre

Banbury Road

Gaydon Warwickshire

CV35 0DB

United Kingdom

| (6) | Audi AG |
| --- | --- |
| Letter box 011/1882 |
| 38436 Wolfsburg |
| Germany |

(6)

Audi AG

Letter box 011/1882

38436 Wolfsburg

Germany

| (7) | Audi Hungaria Motor KFT |
| --- | --- |
| Letter box 011/1882 |
| 38436 Wolfsburg |
| Germany |

(7)

Audi Hungaria Motor KFT

Letter box 011/1882

38436 Wolfsburg

Germany

| (8) | Automobiles Citroen |
| --- | --- |
| 7, rue Henri Sainte-Claire Deville |
| 92500 Rueil-Malmaison |
| France |

(8)

Automobiles Citroen

7, rue Henri Sainte-Claire Deville

92500 Rueil-Malmaison

France

| (9) | Automobiles Peugeot |
| --- | --- |
| 7, rue Henri Sainte-Claire Deville |
| 92500 Rueil-Malmaison |
| France |

(9)

Automobiles Peugeot

7, rue Henri Sainte-Claire Deville

92500 Rueil-Malmaison

France

| (10) | AVTOVAZ JSC
  Represented in the Union by:





  CS AUTOLADA |
| --- | --- |
| 211 Konevova |
| 130 00 Prague 3 |
| Czechia |

(10)

AVTOVAZ JSC

Represented in the Union by:

CS AUTOLADA

211 Konevova

130 00 Prague 3

Czechia

| (11) | Bee Bee Automotive |
| --- | --- |
| 182 RT Beaugé |
| 72700 Rouillon |
| France |

(11)

Bee Bee Automotive

182 RT Beaugé

72700 Rouillon

France

| (12) | Bentley Motors Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| Pyms Lane |
| Crewe |
| Cheshire |
| CW1 3PL |
| United Kingdom |

(12)

Bentley Motors Ltd

Pyms Lane

Crewe

Cheshire

CW1 3PL

United Kingdom

| (13) | BLUECAR SAS |
| --- | --- |
| 31-32 quai de Dion Bouton |
| 92800 Puteaux |
| France |

(13)

BLUECAR SAS

31-32 quai de Dion Bouton

92800 Puteaux

France

| (14) | Bayerische Motoren Werke AG |
| --- | --- |
| Petuelring 130 |
| 80788 München |
| Germany |

(14)

Bayerische Motoren Werke AG

Petuelring 130

80788 München

Germany

| (15) | BMW M GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Petuelring 130 |
| 80788 München |
| Germany |

(15)

BMW M GmbH

Petuelring 130

80788 München

Germany

| (16) | Bugatti Automobiles SAS |
| --- | --- |
| Letter box 011/1882 |
| 38436 Wolfsburg |
| Germany |

(16)

Bugatti Automobiles SAS

Letter box 011/1882

38436 Wolfsburg

Germany

| (17) | BYD AUTO INDUSTRY COMPANY LIMITED
  Represented in the Union by:





  BYD Europe B.V. |
| --- | --- |
| 's-Gravelandseweg 256 |
| 3125 BK Schiedam |
| The Netherlands |

(17)

BYD AUTO INDUSTRY COMPANY LIMITED

Represented in the Union by:

BYD Europe B.V.

's-Gravelandseweg 256

3125 BK Schiedam

The Netherlands

| (18) | Caterham Cars Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| 2 Kennet Road Dartford |
| Kent |
| DA1 4QN |
| United Kingdom |

(18)

Caterham Cars Ltd

2 Kennet Road Dartford

Kent

DA1 4QN

United Kingdom

| (19) | Chevrolet Italia S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |
| Bahnhofsplatz 1 IPC 39-12 |
| 65423 Rüsselsheim |
| Germany |

(19)

Chevrolet Italia S.p.A.

Bahnhofsplatz 1 IPC 39-12

65423 Rüsselsheim

Germany

| (20) | FCA US LLC
  Represented in the Union by:





  Fiat Chrysler Automobiles |
| --- | --- |
| Gate 8 — Building 6 — 1st floor — B15N Colonna N47 |
| C.so Settembrini, 40 |
| 10135 Torino |
| Italy |

(20)

FCA US LLC

Represented in the Union by:

Fiat Chrysler Automobiles

Gate 8 — Building 6 — 1st floor — B15N Colonna N47

C.so Settembrini, 40

10135 Torino

Italy

| (21) | CNG-Technik GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Niehl Plant, building Imbert 479 |
| Henry-Ford-Straße 1 |
| 50735 Köln |
| Germany |

(21)

CNG-Technik GmbH

Niehl Plant, building Imbert 479

Henry-Ford-Straße 1

50735 Köln

Germany

| (22) | Automobile Dacia SA |
| --- | --- |
| Guyancourt |
| 1 avenue du Golf |
| 78288 Guyancourt Cedex |
| France |

(22)

Automobile Dacia SA

Guyancourt

1 avenue du Golf

78288 Guyancourt Cedex

France

| (23) | Daimler AG |
| --- | --- |
| F403, EA/R |
| 70546 Stuttgart |
| Germany |

(23)

Daimler AG

F403, EA/R

70546 Stuttgart

Germany

| (24) | Donkervoort Automobielen BV |
| --- | --- |
| Pascallaan 96 |
| 8218 NJ Lelystad |
| The Netherlands |

(24)

Donkervoort Automobielen BV

Pascallaan 96

8218 NJ Lelystad

The Netherlands

| (25) | Dr Motor Company Srl |
| --- | --- |
| S.S. 85, Venafrana km 37,500 |
| 86070 Macchia d'Isernia |
| Italy |

(25)

Dr Motor Company Srl

S.S. 85, Venafrana km 37,500

86070 Macchia d'Isernia

Italy

| (26) | Ferrari S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |
| Via Emilia Est 1163 |
| 41122 Modena |
| Italy |

(26)

Ferrari S.p.A.

Via Emilia Est 1163

41122 Modena

Italy

| (27) | FCA Italy S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |
| Gate 8 — Building 6 — 1st floor — B15N Colonna N47 |
| C.so Settembrini, 40 |
| 10135 Torino |
| Italy |

(27)

FCA Italy S.p.A.

Gate 8 — Building 6 — 1st floor — B15N Colonna N47

C.so Settembrini, 40

10135 Torino

Italy

| (28) | Ford India Private Ltd
  Represented in the Union by:





  Ford Werke GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Niehl Plant, building Imbert 479 |
| Henry-Ford-Straße 1 |
| 50735 Köln |
| Germany |

(28)

Ford India Private Ltd

Represented in the Union by:

Ford Werke GmbH

Niehl Plant, building Imbert 479

Henry-Ford-Straße 1

50735 Köln

Germany

| (29) | Ford Motor Company |
| --- | --- |
| Niehl Plant, building Imbert 479 |
| Henry-Ford-Straße 1 |
| 50735 Köln |
| Germany |

(29)

Ford Motor Company

Niehl Plant, building Imbert 479

Henry-Ford-Straße 1

50735 Köln

Germany

| (30) | Ford Werke GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Niehl Plant, building Imbert 479 |
| Henry-Ford-Straße 1 |
| 50735 Köln |
| Germany |

(30)

Ford Werke GmbH

Niehl Plant, building Imbert 479

Henry-Ford-Straße 1

50735 Köln

Germany

| (31) | General Motors Holdings LLC
  Represented in the Union by:





  KnowMotive |
| --- | --- |
| Bouwhuispad 1 |
| 8121 PX Olst |
| Netherlands |

(31)

General Motors Holdings LLC

Represented in the Union by:

KnowMotive

Bouwhuispad 1

8121 PX Olst

Netherlands

| (32) | GM Korea Company
  Represented in the Union by:





  Adam Opel GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Bahnhofsplatz 1 IPC 39-12 |
| 65423 Rüsselsheim |
| Germany |

(32)

GM Korea Company

Represented in the Union by:

Adam Opel GmbH

Bahnhofsplatz 1 IPC 39-12

65423 Rüsselsheim

Germany

| (33) | Great Wall Motor Company Ltd
  Represented in the Union by:





  Great Wall Motor Europe Technical Center GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Otto-Hahn-Str. 5 |
| 63128 Dietzenbach |
| Germany |

(33)

Great Wall Motor Company Ltd

Represented in the Union by:

Great Wall Motor Europe Technical Center GmbH

Otto-Hahn-Str. 5

63128 Dietzenbach

Germany

| (34) | Honda Automobile (China) Co., Ltd
  Represented in the Union by:





  Honda Motor Europe Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| Cain Road |
| Bracknell |
| Berkshire |
| RG12 1HL |
| United Kingdom |

(34)

Honda Automobile (China) Co., Ltd

Represented in the Union by:

Honda Motor Europe Ltd

Cain Road

Bracknell

Berkshire

RG12 1HL

United Kingdom

| (35) | Honda Motor Co., Ltd
  Represented in the Union by:





  Honda Motor Europe Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| Cain Road |
| Bracknell |
| Berkshire |
| RG12 1HL |
| United Kingdom |

(35)

Honda Motor Co., Ltd

Represented in the Union by:

Honda Motor Europe Ltd

Cain Road

Bracknell

Berkshire

RG12 1HL

United Kingdom

| (36) | Honda Turkiye A.S.
  Represented in the Union by:





  Honda Motor Europe Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| Cain Road |
| Bracknell |
| Berkshire |
| RG12 1HL |
| United Kingdom |

(36)

Honda Turkiye A.S.

Represented in the Union by:

Honda Motor Europe Ltd

Cain Road

Bracknell

Berkshire

RG12 1HL

United Kingdom

| (37) | Honda of the UK Manufacturing Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| Honda Motor Europe Ltd |
| Cain Road |
| Bracknell |
| Berkshire |
| RG12 1HL |
| United Kingdom |

(37)

Honda of the UK Manufacturing Ltd

Honda Motor Europe Ltd

Cain Road

Bracknell

Berkshire

RG12 1HL

United Kingdom

| (38) | Hyundai Motor Company
  Represented in the Union by:





  Hyundai Motor Europe GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Kaiserleipromenade 5 |
| 63067 Offenbach |
| Germany |

(38)

Hyundai Motor Company

Represented in the Union by:

Hyundai Motor Europe GmbH

Kaiserleipromenade 5

63067 Offenbach

Germany

| (39) | Hyundai Assan Otomotiv Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S.
  Represented in the Union by:





  Hyundai Motor Europe GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Kaiserleipromenade 5 |
| 63067 Offenbach |
| Germany |

(39)

Hyundai Assan Otomotiv Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S.

Represented in the Union by:

Hyundai Motor Europe GmbH

Kaiserleipromenade 5

63067 Offenbach

Germany

| (40) | Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Czech s.r.o. |
| --- | --- |
| Kaiserleipromenade 5 |
| 63067 Offenbach |
| Germany |

(40)

Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Czech s.r.o.

Kaiserleipromenade 5

63067 Offenbach

Germany

| (41) | Hyundai Motor Europe GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Kaiserleipromenade 5 |
| 63067 Offenbach |
| Germany |

(41)

Hyundai Motor Europe GmbH

Kaiserleipromenade 5

63067 Offenbach

Germany

| (42) | Hyundai Motor India Ltd
  Represented in the Union by:





  Hyundai Motor Europe GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Kaiserleipromenade 5 |
| 63067 Offenbach |
| Germany |

(42)

Hyundai Motor India Ltd

Represented in the Union by:

Hyundai Motor Europe GmbH

Kaiserleipromenade 5

63067 Offenbach

Germany

| (43) | Jaguar Land Rover Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| Abbey Road |
| Whitley |
| Coventry CV3 4LF |
| United Kingdom |

(43)

Jaguar Land Rover Ltd

Abbey Road

Whitley

Coventry CV3 4LF

United Kingdom

| (44) | KIA Motors Corporation
  Represented in the Union by:





  Kia Motors Europe GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Theodor-Heuss-Allee 11 |
| 60486 Frankfurt am Main |
| Germany |

(44)

KIA Motors Corporation

Represented in the Union by:

Kia Motors Europe GmbH

Theodor-Heuss-Allee 11

60486 Frankfurt am Main

Germany

| (45) | KIA Motors Slovakia s.r.o. |
| --- | --- |
| Theodor-Heuss-Allee 11 |
| 60486 Frankfurt am Main |
| Germany |

(45)

KIA Motors Slovakia s.r.o.

Theodor-Heuss-Allee 11

60486 Frankfurt am Main

Germany

| (46) | Koenigsegg Automotive AB |
| --- | --- |
| Valhall Park |
| 262 74 Angelholm |
| Sweden |

(46)

Koenigsegg Automotive AB

Valhall Park

262 74 Angelholm

Sweden

| (47) | KTM-Sportmotorcycle AG |
| --- | --- |
| Stallhofnerstrasse 3 |
| 5230 Mattighofen |
| Austria |

(47)

KTM-Sportmotorcycle AG

Stallhofnerstrasse 3

5230 Mattighofen

Austria

| (48) | LADA Automobile GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Erlengrund 7-11 |
| 21614 Buxtehude |
| Germany |

(48)

LADA Automobile GmbH

Erlengrund 7-11

21614 Buxtehude

Germany

| (49) | Automobili Lamborghini S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |
| via Modena 12 |
| 40019 Sant'Agata Bolognese (BO) |
| Italy |

(49)

Automobili Lamborghini S.p.A.

via Modena 12

40019 Sant'Agata Bolognese (BO)

Italy

| (50) | Lotus Cars Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| Hethel Norwich |
| Norfolk |
| NR14 8EZ |
| United Kingdom |

(50)

Lotus Cars Ltd

Hethel Norwich

Norfolk

NR14 8EZ

United Kingdom

| (51) | Magyar Suzuki Corporation Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| 2500 Esztergom |
| Schweidel Jozsef U52 |
| Hungary |

(51)

Magyar Suzuki Corporation Ltd

2500 Esztergom

Schweidel Jozsef U52

Hungary

| (52) | Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd
  Represented in the Union by:





  Mahindra Europe S.r.l. |
| --- | --- |
| Via Cancelliera 35 |
| 00040 Ariccia (Roma) |
| Italy |

(52)

Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd

Represented in the Union by:

Mahindra Europe S.r.l.

Via Cancelliera 35

00040 Ariccia (Roma)

Italy

| (53) | MAN Truck & Bus AG |
| --- | --- |
| Letter box 011/1882 |
| 38436 Wolfsburg |
| Germany |

(53)

MAN Truck & Bus AG

Letter box 011/1882

38436 Wolfsburg

Germany

| (54) | Maruti Suzuki India Ltd
  Represented in the Union by:





  Magyar Suzuki Corporation Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| 2500 Esztergom |
| Schweidel Jozsef U52 |
| Hungary |

(54)

Maruti Suzuki India Ltd

Represented in the Union by:

Magyar Suzuki Corporation Ltd

2500 Esztergom

Schweidel Jozsef U52

Hungary

| (55) | Maserati S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |
| Viale Ciro Menotti 322 |
| 41122 Modena |
| Italy |

(55)

Maserati S.p.A.

Viale Ciro Menotti 322

41122 Modena

Italy

| (56) | Mazda Motor Corporation
  Represented in the Union by:





  Mazda Motor Europe GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| European R & D Centre |
| Hiroshimastr 1 |
| 61440 Oberursel/Ts |
| Germany |

(56)

Mazda Motor Corporation

Represented in the Union by:

Mazda Motor Europe GmbH

European R & D Centre

Hiroshimastr 1

61440 Oberursel/Ts

Germany

| (57) | McLaren Automotive Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| Chertsey Road |
| Woking |
| Surrey GU21 4YH |
| United Kingdom |

(57)

McLaren Automotive Ltd

Chertsey Road

Woking

Surrey GU21 4YH

United Kingdom

| (58) | Mercedes-AMG GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| F403, EA/R |
| 70546 Stuttgart |
| Germany |

(58)

Mercedes-AMG GmbH

F403, EA/R

70546 Stuttgart

Germany

| (59) | MG Motor UK Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| International HQ |
| Q Gate |
| Low Hill Lane |
| Birmingham |
| B31 2BQ |
| United Kingdom |

(59)

MG Motor UK Ltd

International HQ

Q Gate

Low Hill Lane

Birmingham

B31 2BQ

United Kingdom

| (60) | Mitsubishi Motors Corporation MMC
  Represented in the Union By:





  Mitsubishi Motors Europe B.V. MME |
| --- | --- |
| Mitsubishi Avenue 21 |
| 6121 SH Born |
| The Netherlands |

(60)

Mitsubishi Motors Corporation MMC

Represented in the Union By:

Mitsubishi Motors Europe B.V. MME

Mitsubishi Avenue 21

6121 SH Born

The Netherlands

| (61) | Mitsubishi Motors Europe B.V. MME |
| --- | --- |
| Mitsubishi Avenue 21 |
| 6121 SH Born |
| The Netherlands |

(61)

Mitsubishi Motors Europe B.V. MME

Mitsubishi Avenue 21

6121 SH Born

The Netherlands

| (62) | Mitsubishi Motors Thailand Co., Ltd MMTh
  Represented in the Union by:





  Mitsubishi Motors Europe B.V. MME |
| --- | --- |
| Mitsubishi Avenue 21 |
| 6121 SH Born |
| The Netherlands |

(62)

Mitsubishi Motors Thailand Co., Ltd MMTh

Represented in the Union by:

Mitsubishi Motors Europe B.V. MME

Mitsubishi Avenue 21

6121 SH Born

The Netherlands

| (63) | Morgan Technologies Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| Pickersleigh Road Malvern Link |
| Worcestershire |
| WR14 2LL |
| United Kingdom |

(63)

Morgan Technologies Ltd

Pickersleigh Road Malvern Link

Worcestershire

WR14 2LL

United Kingdom

| (64) | Nissan International SA
  Represented in the Union by:





  Renault Nissan Representation Office |
| --- | --- |
| Av des Arts 40 |
| 1040 Bruxelles |
| Belgium |

(64)

Nissan International SA

Represented in the Union by:

Renault Nissan Representation Office

Av des Arts 40

1040 Bruxelles

Belgium

| (65) | Noble Automotive Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| 24a Centurion Way |
| Meridian Business Park |
| Leicester LE19 1WH |
| United Kingdom |

(65)

Noble Automotive Ltd

24a Centurion Way

Meridian Business Park

Leicester LE19 1WH

United Kingdom

| (66) | Adam Opel GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Bahnhofsplatz 1 IPC 39-12 |
| 65423 Rüsselsheim |
| Germany |

(66)

Adam Opel GmbH

Bahnhofsplatz 1 IPC 39-12

65423 Rüsselsheim

Germany

| (67) | Opel Automobile GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Bahnhofsplatz 1 IPC 39-12 |
| 65423 Rüsselsheim |
| Germany |

(67)

Opel Automobile GmbH

Bahnhofsplatz 1 IPC 39-12

65423 Rüsselsheim

Germany

| (68) | Pagani Automobili S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |
| Via dell' Artigianato 5 |
| 41018 San Cesario sul Panaro (Modena), |
| Italy |

(68)

Pagani Automobili S.p.A.

Via dell' Artigianato 5

41018 San Cesario sul Panaro (Modena),

Italy

| (69) | Perodua UK Limited |
| --- | --- |
| Dorney House |
| 46 - 48a High Street |
| Buckinghamshire |
| SL1 7JP |
| United Kingdom |

(69)

Perodua UK Limited

Dorney House

46 - 48a High Street

Buckinghamshire

SL1 7JP

United Kingdom

| (70) | PGO Automobiles |
| --- | --- |
| ZA de la pyramide |
| 30380 SAINT CHRISTOL les Alès |
| France |

(70)

PGO Automobiles

ZA de la pyramide

30380 SAINT CHRISTOL les Alès

France

| (71) | Dr Ing hc F Porsche AG |
| --- | --- |
| Letter box 011/1882 |
| 38436 Wolfsburg |
| Germany |

(71)

Dr Ing hc F Porsche AG

Letter box 011/1882

38436 Wolfsburg

Germany

| (72) | PSA Automobiles SA |
| --- | --- |
| 2-10 boulevard de l'Europe |
| 78300 Paris |
| France |

(72)

PSA Automobiles SA

2-10 boulevard de l'Europe

78300 Paris

France

| (73) | Quattro GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Letter box 011/1882 |
| 38436 Wolfsburg |
| Germany |

(73)

Quattro GmbH

Letter box 011/1882

38436 Wolfsburg

Germany

| (74) | Radical Motorsport Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| 24 Ivatt Way Business Park |
| Westwood |
| Peterborough |
| PE3 7PG |
| United Kingdom |

(74)

Radical Motorsport Ltd

24 Ivatt Way Business Park

Westwood

Peterborough

PE3 7PG

United Kingdom

| (75) | Renault S.A.S. |
| --- | --- |
| Guyancourt |
| 1 avenue du Golf |
| 78288 Guyancourt Cedex |
| France |

(75)

Renault S.A.S.

Guyancourt

1 avenue du Golf

78288 Guyancourt Cedex

France

| (76) | Renault Trucks |
| --- | --- |
| 99 Route de Lyon |
| TER L10 0 01 |
| 69802 Saint Priest Cedex |
| France |

(76)

Renault Trucks

99 Route de Lyon

TER L10 0 01

69802 Saint Priest Cedex

France

| (77) | Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| Petuelring 130 |
| 80788 München |
| Germany |

(77)

Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd

Petuelring 130

80788 München

Germany

| (78) | Seat SA |
| --- | --- |
| Letter box 011/1882 |
| 38436 Wolfsburg |
| Germany |

(78)

Seat SA

Letter box 011/1882

38436 Wolfsburg

Germany

| (79) | Secma S.A.S. |
| --- | --- |
| Rue Denfert Rochereau |
| 59580 Aniche |
| France |

(79)

Secma S.A.S.

Rue Denfert Rochereau

59580 Aniche

France

| (80) | Skoda Auto AS |
| --- | --- |
| Letter box 011/1882 |
| 38436 Wolfsburg |
| Germany |

(80)

Skoda Auto AS

Letter box 011/1882

38436 Wolfsburg

Germany

| (81) | SsangYong Motor Company
  Represented in the Union by:





  SsangYong Motor Europe Office |
| --- | --- |
| Herriotstrasse 1 |
| 60528 Frankfurt am Main |
| Germany |

(81)

SsangYong Motor Company

Represented in the Union by:

SsangYong Motor Europe Office

Herriotstrasse 1

60528 Frankfurt am Main

Germany

| (82) | Subaru Cooperation
  Represented in the Union by:





  SUBARU EUROPE N.V./S.A |
| --- | --- |
| Leuvensesteenweg 555 B/8 |
| 1930 Zaventem |
| Belgium |

(82)

Subaru Cooperation

Represented in the Union by:

SUBARU EUROPE N.V./S.A

Leuvensesteenweg 555 B/8

1930 Zaventem

Belgium

| (83) | Suzuki Motor Corporation
  Represented in the Union by:





  Magyar Suzuki Corporation Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| 2500 Esztergom |
| Schweidel Jozsef U52 |
| Hungary |

(83)

Suzuki Motor Corporation

Represented in the Union by:

Magyar Suzuki Corporation Ltd

2500 Esztergom

Schweidel Jozsef U52

Hungary

| (84) | Suzuki Motor Thailand Co. Ltd
  Represented in the Union by:





  Magyar Suzuki Corporation Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| 2500 Esztergom |
| Schweidel Jozsef U52 |
| Hungary |

(84)

Suzuki Motor Thailand Co. Ltd

Represented in the Union by:

Magyar Suzuki Corporation Ltd

2500 Esztergom

Schweidel Jozsef U52

Hungary

| (85) | Tecno Meccanica Imola SPA
  Represented in the Union by:





  Via Selice Provinciale 42/E |
| --- | --- |
| 40026 Imola |
| Bologna |
| Italy |

(85)

Tecno Meccanica Imola SPA

Represented in the Union by:

Via Selice Provinciale 42/E

40026 Imola

Bologna

Italy

| (86) | Tesla Motors Ltd
  Represented in the Union by:





  Tesla Motors NL |
| --- | --- |
| 7-9 Atlasstraat |
| 5047 RG Tilburg |
| The Netherlands |

(86)

Tesla Motors Ltd

Represented in the Union by:

Tesla Motors NL

7-9 Atlasstraat

5047 RG Tilburg

The Netherlands

| (87) | Toyota Motor Europe NV/SA |
| --- | --- |
| Avenue du Bourget 60 |
| 1140 Brussels |
| Belgium |

(87)

Toyota Motor Europe NV/SA

Avenue du Bourget 60

1140 Brussels

Belgium

| (88) | Volkswagen AG |
| --- | --- |
| Letter box 011/1882 |
| 38436 Wolfsburg |
| Germany |

(88)

Volkswagen AG

Letter box 011/1882

38436 Wolfsburg

Germany

| (89) | Volvo Car Corporation |
| --- | --- |
| VAK building |
| Assar Gabrielssons väg |
| 405 31 Göteborg |
| Sweden |

(89)

Volvo Car Corporation

VAK building

Assar Gabrielssons väg

405 31 Göteborg

Sweden

| (90) | Pool for: BMW Group |
| --- | --- |
| Petuelring 130 |
| 80788 Munich |
| Germany |

(90)

Pool for: BMW Group

Petuelring 130

80788 Munich

Germany

| (91) | Pool for: Daimler AG |
| --- | --- |
| F403, EA/R |
| 70546 Stuttgart |
| Germany |

(91)

Pool for: Daimler AG

F403, EA/R

70546 Stuttgart

Germany

| (92) | Pool for: FCA Italy S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |
| C.so Settembrini, 40 |
| Gate 8 — Building 6 — 1st floor — B15N Colonna N47 |
| 10135 Torino |
| Italy |

(92)

Pool for: FCA Italy S.p.A.

C.so Settembrini, 40

Gate 8 — Building 6 — 1st floor — B15N Colonna N47

10135 Torino

Italy

| (93) | Pool for: Ford-Werke GmbH |
| --- | --- |
| Niehl Plant, building Imbert 479 |
| Henry Ford Strasse 1 |
| 50735 Köln |
| Germany |

(93)

Pool for: Ford-Werke GmbH

Niehl Plant, building Imbert 479

Henry Ford Strasse 1

50735 Köln

Germany

| (94) | Pool for: General Motors |
| --- | --- |
| Bahnhofsplatz 1 IPC 39-12 |
| 65423 Rüsselsheim |
| Germany |

(94)

Pool for: General Motors

Bahnhofsplatz 1 IPC 39-12

65423 Rüsselsheim

Germany

| (95) | Pool for: Honda Motor Europe Ltd |
| --- | --- |
| 470 London Road Slough |
| Berkshire SL3 8QY |
| United Kingdom |

(95)

Pool for: Honda Motor Europe Ltd

470 London Road Slough

Berkshire SL3 8QY

United Kingdom

| (96) | Pool for: Hyundai |
| --- | --- |
| Hyundai Motor Europe GmbH |
| Kaiserleipromenade 5 |
| 63067 Offenbach |
| Germany |

(96)

Pool for: Hyundai

Hyundai Motor Europe GmbH

Kaiserleipromenade 5

63067 Offenbach

Germany

| (97) | Pool for: Kia |
| --- | --- |
| Theodor-Heuss-Allee 11 |
| 60486 Frankfurt am Main |
| Germany |

(97)

Pool for: Kia

Theodor-Heuss-Allee 11

60486 Frankfurt am Main

Germany

| (98) | Pool for: Mitsubishi Motors |
| --- | --- |
| Mitsubishi Avenue 21 |
| 6121 SH Born |
| The Netherlands |

(98)

Pool for: Mitsubishi Motors

Mitsubishi Avenue 21

6121 SH Born

The Netherlands

| (99) | Pool for: Renault |
| --- | --- |
| 1 Avenue du Golf |
| 78288 |
| Guyancourt Cedex |
| France |

(99)

Pool for: Renault

1 Avenue du Golf

78288

Guyancourt Cedex

France

| (100) | Pool for: Suzuki |
| --- | --- |
| Suzuki Allee 7 |
| 64625 Bensheim |
| Germany |

(100)

Pool for: Suzuki

Suzuki Allee 7

64625 Bensheim

Germany

| (101) | Pool for: Tata Motors Ltd, Jaguar Cars Ltd, Land Rover |
| --- | --- |
| Abbey Road |
| Whitley |
| Coventry CV3 4LF |
| United Kingdom |

(101)

Pool for: Tata Motors Ltd, Jaguar Cars Ltd, Land Rover

Abbey Road

Whitley

Coventry CV3 4LF

United Kingdom

| (102) | VW Group PC |
| --- | --- |
| Letter box 011/1882 |
| 38436 Wolfsburg |
| Germany |

(102)

VW Group PC

Letter box 011/1882

38436 Wolfsburg

Germany

Done at Brussels, 3 April 2019.

For the Commission

Miguel ARIAS CAÑETE

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  
  OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, p. 1.

1

(2)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 725/2011 of 25 July 2011 establishing a procedure for the approval and certification of innovative technologies for reducing CO2 emissions from passenger cars pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 194, 26.7.2011, p. 19).

2

2

(3)  Commission Implementing Decision 2013/341/EU of 27 June 2013 on the approval of the Valeo Efficient Generation Alternator as an innovative technology for reducing CO2 emissions from passenger cars pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 179, 29.6.2013, p. 98).

3

2

(4)  Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/158 of 30 January 2015 on the approval of two Robert Bosch GmbH high efficient alternators as the innovative technologies for reducing CO2 emissions from passenger cars pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 26, 31.1.2015, p. 31).

4

2

---

ANNEX I

Table 1

Values relating to the performance of manufacturers confirmed or amended in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 for calendar year 2017

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Manufacturer name | Pools and derogations | Number of registrations | Average specific emissions of CO2 (100 %) | Specific emissions target | Distance to target | Distance to target adjusted | Average mass | CO2 savings from eco-innovations | Average CO2 emissions (100 %) |
| ADIDOR VOITURES SAS | DMD | 42 | 159,000 | | | | 1 300,00 | | 159,000 |
| ALFA ROMEO SPA | P3 | 82 132 | 120,506 | 133,388 | – 12,882 | – 12,884 | 1 466,54 | | 120,506 |
| ALPINA BURKARD BOVENSIEPEN GMBH E CO KG | DMD | 486 | 179,021 | | | | 1 874,76 | | 179,021 |
| SOCIETE DES AUTOMOBILES ALPINE | | 7 | 137,000 | 119,425 | 17,575 | 17,575 | 1 161,00 | | 137,000 |
| ASTON MARTIN LAGONDA LTD | D | 2 174 | 289,245 | 299,000 | – 9,755 | – 9,755 | 1 873,04 | | 289,245 |
| AUDI AG | P13 | 776 701 | 124,527 | 137,686 | – 13,159 | – 13,159 | 1 560,59 | | 124,527 |
| AUDI HUNGARIA MOTOR KFT | P13 | 7 743 | 145,060 | 129,957 | 15,103 | 15,103 | 1 391,47 | | 145,060 |
| AUTOMOBILES CITROEN | | 626 876 | 105,584 | 122,062 | – 16,478 | – 16,478 | 1 218,71 | | 105,584 |
| AUTOMOBILES PEUGEOT | | 949 417 | 104,533 | 123,476 | – 18,943 | – 18,943 | 1 249,64 | | 104,533 |
| AVTOVAZ JSC | P10 | 3 767 | 171,997 | 121,641 | 50,356 | 50,356 | 1 209,50 | | 171,997 |
| BEE BEE AUTOMOTIVE | DMD | 4 | 0,000 | | | | 763,50 | | 0,000 |
| BENTLEY MOTORS LTD | D | 3 439 | 267,428 | 287,000 | – 19,572 | – 19,572 | 2 514,71 | | 267,428 |
| BLUECAR SAS | DMD | 340 | 0,000 | | | | 1 455,68 | | 0,000 |
| BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE AG | P1 | 965 330 | 120,794 | 138,061 | – 17,267 | – 17,267 | 1 568,78 | 0,173 | 120,967 |
| BMW M GMBH | P1 | 17 246 | 160,703 | 141,478 | 19,225 | 19,225 | 1 643,57 | 0,205 | 160,908 |
| BUGATTI AUTOMOBILES SAS | P13 | 13 | 517,769 | 160,949 | 356,820 | 356,820 | 2 069,62 | | 517,769 |
| BYD AUTO INDUSTRY COMPANY LIMITED | DMD | 1 | 0,000 | | | | 2 495,00 | | 0,000 |
| CATERHAM CARS LIMITED | DMD | 119 | 141,975 | | | | 620,76 | | 141,975 |
| CHEVROLET ITALIA SPA | P5 | 2 | 119,000 | 107,040 | 11,960 | 11,960 | 890,00 | | 119,000 |
| FCA US LLC | P3 | 104 206 | 141,530 | 140,371 | 1,159 | 1,157 | 1 619,33 | | 141,530 |
| CNG-TECHNIK GMBH | P4 | 517 | 162,714 | 137,815 | 24,899 | 24,899 | 1 563,40 | | 162,714 |
| AUTOMOBILE DACIA SA | P10 | 456 291 | 117,496 | 121,287 | – 3,791 | – 3,792 | 1 201,74 | | 117,496 |
| DAIMLER AG | P2 | 959 295 | 126,672 | 139,684 | – 13,304 | – 13,306 | 1 604,30 | 0,087 | 126,759 |
| DONKERVOORT AUTOMOBIELEN BV | DMD | 6 | 178,000 | | | | 865,00 | | 178,000 |
| DR MOTOR COMPANY SRL | DMD | 410 | 151,634 | | | | 1 257,80 | | 151,634 |
| FERRARI SPA | D | 2 578 | 282,772 | 290,000 | – 7,228 | – 7,228 | 1 732,75 | | 282,772 |
| FCA ITALY SPA | P3 | 789 688 | 116,079 | 120,190 | – 4,111 | – 4,112 | 1 177,74 | | 116,079 |
| FORD INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED | P4 | 35 037 | 113,770 | 114,631 | – 0,861 | – 0,861 | 1 056,10 | | 113,770 |
| FORD MOTOR COMPANY | P4 | 19 185 | 205,214 | 149,988 | 55,226 | 55,219 | 1 829,77 | | 205,214 |
| FORD-WERKE GMBH | P4 | 969 899 | 119,360 | 130,121 | – 10,761 | – 10,764 | 1 395,05 | | 119,360 |
| GENERAL MOTORS HOLDINGS LLC | P5 | 2 478 | 260,976 | 151,809 | 109,167 | 109,167 | 1 869,62 | | 260,976 |
| GM KOREA COMPANY | P5 | 6 | 139,500 | 136,166 | 3,334 | 3,334 | 1 527,33 | | 139,500 |
| GREAT WALL MOTOR COMPANY LIMITED | DMD | 2 | 214,500 | | | | 1 735,50 | | 214,500 |
| HONDA AUTOMOBILE CHINA CO LTD | P6 | 1 | 125,000 | 117,643 | 7,357 | 7,357 | 1 122,00 | | 125,000 |
| HONDA MOTOR CO LTD | P6 | 72 149 | 119,922 | 124,126 | – 4,204 | – 4,204 | 1 263,86 | 0,062 | 119,984 |
| HONDA TURKIYE AS | P6 | 766 | 138,168 | 128,157 | 10,011 | 10,011 | 1 352,07 | 0,174 | 138,342 |
| HONDA OF THE UK MANUFACTURING LTD | P6 | 58 701 | 135,935 | 135,678 | 0,257 | 0,257 | 1 516,64 | 0,003 | 135,938 |
| HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY | P7 | 89 118 | 115,397 | 133,556 | – 18,159 | – 18,159 | 1 470,21 | | 115,397 |
| HYUNDAI ASSAN OTOMOTIV SANAYI VE TICARET AS | P7 | 172 602 | 113,695 | 115,302 | – 1,607 | – 1,607 | 1 070,77 | | 113,695 |
| HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING CZECH SRO | P7 | 235 459 | 131,628 | 132,985 | – 1,357 | – 1,357 | 1 457,71 | | 131,628 |
| HYUNDAI MOTOR EUROPE GMBH | P7 | 256 | 111,055 | 134,884 | – 23,829 | – 23,829 | 1 499,28 | | 111,055 |
| HYUNDAI MOTOR INDIA LTD | P7 | 3 | 134,667 | 114,703 | 19,964 | 19,964 | 1 057,67 | | 134,667 |
| JAGUAR LAND ROVER LIMITED | P12/ND | 229 124 | 151,667 | 178,025 | – 26,358 | – 26,358 | 1 953,18 | | 151,667 |
| KIA MOTORS CORPORATION | P8 | 299 233 | 113,941 | 127,350 | – 13,409 | – 13,409 | 1 334,42 | | 113,941 |
| KIA MOTORS SLOVAKIA SRO | P8 | 156 263 | 132,944 | 132,392 | 0,552 | 0,552 | 1 444,74 | | 132,944 |
| KOENIGSEGG AUTOMOTIVE AB | DMD | 3 | 381,000 | | | | 1 442,00 | | 381,000 |
| KTM-SPORTMOTORCYCLE AG | DMD | 27 | 191,667 | | | | 886,11 | | 191,667 |
| LADA AUTOMOBILE GMBH | DMD | 917 | 216,000 | | | | 1 285,15 | | 216,000 |
| AUTOMOBILI LAMBORGHINI SPA | D | 897 | 320,896 | 316,000 | 4,896 | 4,815 | 1 682,85 | | 320,896 |
| LOTUS CARS LIMITED | D | 704 | 204,964 | 225,000 | – 20,036 | – 20,036 | 1 150,01 | | 204,964 |
| MAGYAR SUZUKI CORPORATION LTD | P11/ND | 111 790 | 121,564 | 123,114 | – 1,550 | – 1,552 | 1 221,97 | | 121,564 |
| MAHINDRA & MAHINDRA LTD | DMD | 410 | 187,344 | | | | 1 986,61 | | 187,344 |
| MAN TRUCK & BUS AG | P13 | 3 | 194,000 | 169,299 | 24,701 | 24,701 | 2 252,33 | | 194,000 |
| MARUTI SUZUKI INDIA LTD | P11/ND | 19 780 | 100,060 | 123,114 | – 23,054 | – 23,054 | 957,15 | | 100,060 |
| MASERATI SPA | D | 8 715 | 199,485 | 242,000 | – 42,515 | – 42,515 | 2 150,33 | | 199,485 |
| MAZDA MOTOR CORPORATION | ND | 215 697 | 130,745 | 129,426 | 1,319 | 1,319 | 1 324,24 | 0,026 | 130,771 |
| MCLAREN AUTOMOTIVE LIMITED | D | 790 | 252,158 | 270,000 | – 17,842 | – 17,842 | 1 525,91 | | 252,158 |
| MERCEDES-AMG GMBH | P2 | 2 111 | 241,227 | 142,677 | 98,550 | 98,550 | 1 669,80 | | 241,227 |
| MG MOTOR UK LIMITED | D | 4 385 | 128,122 | 146,000 | – 17,878 | – 17,878 | 1 301,50 | | 128,122 |
| MITSUBISHI MOTORS CORPORATION MMC | P9 | 75 724 | 125,682 | 138,791 | – 13,109 | – 13,109 | 1 584,76 | | 125,682 |
| MITSUBISHI MOTORS EUROPE BV MME | P9 | 9 | 135,000 | 127,377 | 7,623 | 7,623 | 1 335,00 | | 135,000 |
| MITSUBISHI MOTORS THAILAND CO LTD MMTH | P9 | 29 213 | 96,637 | 108,541 | – 11,904 | – 11,904 | 922,84 | | 96,637 |
| MORGAN TECHNOLOGIES LTD | DMD | 415 | 194,535 | | | | 1 083,06 | | 194,535 |
| NISSAN INTERNATIONAL SA | | 562 522 | 116,915 | 128,675 | – 11,760 | – 11,760 | 1 363,41 | | 116,915 |
| NOBLE AUTOMOTIVE LTD | D | 2 | 335,500 | | | | 1 416,00 | | 335,500 |
| ADAM OPEL GMBH | P5 | 748 316 | 123,837 | 127,333 | – 3,496 | – 3,496 | 1 334,05 | | 123,837 |
| OPEL AUTOMOBILE GMBH | | 168 684 | 123,572 | 127,263 | – 3,691 | – 3,691 | 1 332,52 | 0,006 | 123,578 |
| PAGANI AUTOMOBILI SPA | DMD | 2 | 343,000 | | | | 1 340,00 | | 343,000 |
| PERODUA UK LIMITED | DMD | 1 | 137,000 | | | | 1 025,00 | | 137,000 |
| PGO AUTOMOBILES | DMD | 3 | 202,333 | | | | 1 281,67 | | 202,333 |
| PSA AUTOMOBILES SA | | 503 | 130,205 | 137,935 | – 7,730 | – 7,730 | 1 566,03 | | 130,205 |
| QUATTRO GMBH | P13 | 7 188 | 218,391 | 149,262 | 69,129 | 69,129 | 1 813,88 | | 218,391 |
| RADICAL MOTORSPORT LTD | DMD | 7 | 343,000 | | | | 1 148,00 | | 343,000 |
| RENAULT SAS | P10 | 1 171 619 | 106,280 | 126,441 | – 20,161 | – 20,162 | 1 314,53 | | 106,280 |
| RENAULT TRUCKS | DMD | 25 | 169,800 | | | | 2 200,84 | | 169,800 |
| ROLLS-ROYCE MOTOR CARS LTD | P1 | 600 | 329,247 | 181,831 | 147,416 | 147,416 | 2 526,56 | | 329,247 |
| SEAT SA | P13 | 386 597 | 117,749 | 124,835 | – 7,086 | – 7,087 | 1 279,38 | | 117,749 |
| SECMA SAS | DMD | 50 | 133,560 | | | | 686,86 | | 133,560 |
| SKODA AUTO AS | P13 | 660 580 | 115,948 | 126,105 | – 10,157 | – 10,255 | 1 307,18 | 0,023 | 115,971 |
| SSANGYONG MOTOR COMPANY | ND | 16 426 | 157,207 | 167,573 | – 10,366 | – 10,366 | 1 668,47 | | 157,207 |
| SUBARU CORPORATION | ND | 28 951 | 160,390 | 164,616 | – 4,226 | – 4,226 | 1 594,90 | | 160,390 |
| SUZUKI MOTOR CORPORATION | P11/ND | 78 324 | 114,500 | 123,114 | – 8,614 | – 8,614 | 964,30 | | 114,500 |
| SUZUKI MOTOR THAILAND CO LTD | P11/ND | 23 258 | 96,756 | 123,114 | – 26,358 | – 26,358 | 882,16 | | 96,756 |
| TECNO MECCANICA IMOLA SPA | DMD | 4 | 0,000 | | | | 749,50 | | 0,000 |
| TESLA MOTORS LTD | | 17 780 | 0,000 | 172,304 | – 172,304 | – 172,304 | 2 318,09 | | 0,000 |
| TOYOTA MOTOR EUROPE NV SA | | 692 814 | 103,069 | 127,740 | – 24,671 | – 24,906 | 1 342,94 | | 103,069 |
| VOLKSWAGEN AG | P13 | 1 634 804 | 120,391 | 130,638 | – 10,247 | – 10,250 | 1 406,36 | | 120,391 |
| VOLVO CAR CORPORATION | | 277 748 | 124,437 | 146,260 | – 21,823 | – 21,823 | 1 748,19 | | 124,437 |

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

Manufacturer name

Pools and derogations

Number of registrations

Average specific emissions of CO2 (100 %)

Specific emissions target

Distance to target

Distance to target adjusted

Average mass

CO2 savings from eco-innovations

Average CO2 emissions (100 %)

ADIDOR VOITURES SAS

DMD

42

159,000

1 300,00

159,000

ALFA ROMEO SPA

P3

82 132

120,506

133,388

– 12,882

– 12,884

1 466,54

120,506

ALPINA BURKARD BOVENSIEPEN GMBH E CO KG

DMD

486

179,021

1 874,76

179,021

SOCIETE DES AUTOMOBILES ALPINE

7

137,000

119,425

17,575

17,575

1 161,00

137,000

ASTON MARTIN LAGONDA LTD

D

2 174

289,245

299,000

– 9,755

– 9,755

1 873,04

289,245

AUDI AG

P13

776 701

124,527

137,686

– 13,159

– 13,159

1 560,59

124,527

AUDI HUNGARIA MOTOR KFT

P13

7 743

145,060

129,957

15,103

15,103

1 391,47

145,060

AUTOMOBILES CITROEN

626 876

105,584

122,062

– 16,478

– 16,478

1 218,71

105,584

AUTOMOBILES PEUGEOT

949 417

104,533

123,476

– 18,943

– 18,943

1 249,64

104,533

AVTOVAZ JSC

P10

3 767

171,997

121,641

50,356

50,356

1 209,50

171,997

BEE BEE AUTOMOTIVE

DMD

4

0,000

763,50

0,000

BENTLEY MOTORS LTD

D

3 439

267,428

287,000

– 19,572

– 19,572

2 514,71

267,428

BLUECAR SAS

DMD

340

0,000

1 455,68

0,000

BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE AG

P1

965 330

120,794

138,061

– 17,267

– 17,267

1 568,78

0,173

120,967

BMW M GMBH

P1

17 246

160,703

141,478

19,225

19,225

1 643,57

0,205

160,908

BUGATTI AUTOMOBILES SAS

P13

13

517,769

160,949

356,820

356,820

2 069,62

517,769

BYD AUTO INDUSTRY COMPANY LIMITED

DMD

1

0,000

2 495,00

0,000

CATERHAM CARS LIMITED

DMD

119

141,975

620,76

141,975

CHEVROLET ITALIA SPA

P5

2

119,000

107,040

11,960

11,960

890,00

119,000

FCA US LLC

P3

104 206

141,530

140,371

1,159

1,157

1 619,33

141,530

CNG-TECHNIK GMBH

P4

517

162,714

137,815

24,899

24,899

1 563,40

162,714

AUTOMOBILE DACIA SA

P10

456 291

117,496

121,287

– 3,791

– 3,792

1 201,74

117,496

DAIMLER AG

P2

959 295

126,672

139,684

– 13,304

– 13,306

1 604,30

0,087

126,759

DONKERVOORT AUTOMOBIELEN BV

DMD

6

178,000

865,00

178,000

DR MOTOR COMPANY SRL

DMD

410

151,634

1 257,80

151,634

FERRARI SPA

D

2 578

282,772

290,000

– 7,228

– 7,228

1 732,75

282,772

FCA ITALY SPA

P3

789 688

116,079

120,190

– 4,111

– 4,112

1 177,74

116,079

FORD INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED

P4

35 037

113,770

114,631

– 0,861

– 0,861

1 056,10

113,770

FORD MOTOR COMPANY

P4

19 185

205,214

149,988

55,226

55,219

1 829,77

205,214

FORD-WERKE GMBH

P4

969 899

119,360

130,121

– 10,761

– 10,764

1 395,05

119,360

GENERAL MOTORS HOLDINGS LLC

P5

2 478

260,976

151,809

109,167

109,167

1 869,62

260,976

GM KOREA COMPANY

P5

6

139,500

136,166

3,334

3,334

1 527,33

139,500

GREAT WALL MOTOR COMPANY LIMITED

DMD

2

214,500

1 735,50

214,500

HONDA AUTOMOBILE CHINA CO LTD

P6

1

125,000

117,643

7,357

7,357

1 122,00

125,000

HONDA MOTOR CO LTD

P6

72 149

119,922

124,126

– 4,204

– 4,204

1 263,86

0,062

119,984

HONDA TURKIYE AS

P6

766

138,168

128,157

10,011

10,011

1 352,07

0,174

138,342

HONDA OF THE UK MANUFACTURING LTD

P6

58 701

135,935

135,678

0,257

0,257

1 516,64

0,003

135,938

HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY

P7

89 118

115,397

133,556

– 18,159

– 18,159

1 470,21

115,397

HYUNDAI ASSAN OTOMOTIV SANAYI VE TICARET AS

P7

172 602

113,695

115,302

– 1,607

– 1,607

1 070,77

113,695

HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING CZECH SRO

P7

235 459

131,628

132,985

– 1,357

– 1,357

1 457,71

131,628

HYUNDAI MOTOR EUROPE GMBH

P7

256

111,055

134,884

– 23,829

– 23,829

1 499,28

111,055

HYUNDAI MOTOR INDIA LTD

P7

3

134,667

114,703

19,964

19,964

1 057,67

134,667

JAGUAR LAND ROVER LIMITED

P12/ND

229 124

151,667

178,025

– 26,358

– 26,358

1 953,18

151,667

KIA MOTORS CORPORATION

P8

299 233

113,941

127,350

– 13,409

– 13,409

1 334,42

113,941

KIA MOTORS SLOVAKIA SRO

P8

156 263

132,944

132,392

0,552

0,552

1 444,74

132,944

KOENIGSEGG AUTOMOTIVE AB

DMD

3

381,000

1 442,00

381,000

KTM-SPORTMOTORCYCLE AG

DMD

27

191,667

886,11

191,667

LADA AUTOMOBILE GMBH

DMD

917

216,000

1 285,15

216,000

AUTOMOBILI LAMBORGHINI SPA

D

897

320,896

316,000

4,896

4,815

1 682,85

320,896

LOTUS CARS LIMITED

D

704

204,964

225,000

– 20,036

– 20,036

1 150,01

204,964

MAGYAR SUZUKI CORPORATION LTD

P11/ND

111 790

121,564

123,114

– 1,550

– 1,552

1 221,97

121,564

MAHINDRA & MAHINDRA LTD

DMD

410

187,344

1 986,61

187,344

MAN TRUCK & BUS AG

P13

3

194,000

169,299

24,701

24,701

2 252,33

194,000

MARUTI SUZUKI INDIA LTD

P11/ND

19 780

100,060

123,114

– 23,054

– 23,054

957,15

100,060

MASERATI SPA

D

8 715

199,485

242,000

– 42,515

– 42,515

2 150,33

199,485

MAZDA MOTOR CORPORATION

ND

215 697

130,745

129,426

1,319

1,319

1 324,24

0,026

130,771

MCLAREN AUTOMOTIVE LIMITED

D

790

252,158

270,000

– 17,842

– 17,842

1 525,91

252,158

MERCEDES-AMG GMBH

P2

2 111

241,227

142,677

98,550

98,550

1 669,80

241,227

MG MOTOR UK LIMITED

D

4 385

128,122

146,000

– 17,878

– 17,878

1 301,50

128,122

MITSUBISHI MOTORS CORPORATION MMC

P9

75 724

125,682

138,791

– 13,109

– 13,109

1 584,76

125,682

MITSUBISHI MOTORS EUROPE BV MME

P9

9

135,000

127,377

7,623

7,623

1 335,00

135,000

MITSUBISHI MOTORS THAILAND CO LTD MMTH

P9

29 213

96,637

108,541

– 11,904

– 11,904

922,84

96,637

MORGAN TECHNOLOGIES LTD

DMD

415

194,535

1 083,06

194,535

NISSAN INTERNATIONAL SA

562 522

116,915

128,675

– 11,760

– 11,760

1 363,41

116,915

NOBLE AUTOMOTIVE LTD

D

2

335,500

1 416,00

335,500

ADAM OPEL GMBH

P5

748 316

123,837

127,333

– 3,496

– 3,496

1 334,05

123,837

OPEL AUTOMOBILE GMBH

168 684

123,572

127,263

– 3,691

– 3,691

1 332,52

0,006

123,578

PAGANI AUTOMOBILI SPA

DMD

2

343,000

1 340,00

343,000

PERODUA UK LIMITED

DMD

1

137,000

1 025,00

137,000

PGO AUTOMOBILES

DMD

3

202,333

1 281,67

202,333

PSA AUTOMOBILES SA

503

130,205

137,935

– 7,730

– 7,730

1 566,03

130,205

QUATTRO GMBH

P13

7 188

218,391

149,262

69,129

69,129

1 813,88

218,391

RADICAL MOTORSPORT LTD

DMD

7

343,000

1 148,00

343,000

RENAULT SAS

P10

1 171 619

106,280

126,441

– 20,161

– 20,162

1 314,53

106,280

RENAULT TRUCKS

DMD

25

169,800

2 200,84

169,800

ROLLS-ROYCE MOTOR CARS LTD

P1

600

329,247

181,831

147,416

147,416

2 526,56

329,247

SEAT SA

P13

386 597

117,749

124,835

– 7,086

– 7,087

1 279,38

117,749

SECMA SAS

DMD

50

133,560

686,86

133,560

SKODA AUTO AS

P13

660 580

115,948

126,105

– 10,157

– 10,255

1 307,18

0,023

115,971

SSANGYONG MOTOR COMPANY

ND

16 426

157,207

167,573

– 10,366

– 10,366

1 668,47

157,207

SUBARU CORPORATION

ND

28 951

160,390

164,616

– 4,226

– 4,226

1 594,90

160,390

SUZUKI MOTOR CORPORATION

P11/ND

78 324

114,500

123,114

– 8,614

– 8,614

964,30

114,500

SUZUKI MOTOR THAILAND CO LTD

P11/ND

23 258

96,756

123,114

– 26,358

– 26,358

882,16

96,756

TECNO MECCANICA IMOLA SPA

DMD

4

0,000

749,50

0,000

TESLA MOTORS LTD

17 780

0,000

172,304

– 172,304

– 172,304

2 318,09

0,000

TOYOTA MOTOR EUROPE NV SA

692 814

103,069

127,740

– 24,671

– 24,906

1 342,94

103,069

VOLKSWAGEN AG

P13

1 634 804

120,391

130,638

– 10,247

– 10,250

1 406,36

120,391

VOLVO CAR CORPORATION

277 748

124,437

146,260

– 21,823

– 21,823

1 748,19

124,437

Table 2

Values relating to the performance of pools confirmed or amended in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 for calendar year 2017

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Pool names | Pool | Number of registrations | Average specific emissions of CO2 (100 %) | Specific emissions target | Distance to target | Distance to target adjusted | Average mass | CO2 savings from eco-innovations | Average CO2 emissions (100 %) |
| BMW GROUP | P1 | 983 176 | 121,621 | 138,147 | – 16,526 | – 16,526 | 1 570,67 | 0,173 | 121,794 |
| DAIMLER AG | P2 | 961 406 | 126,924 | 139,690 | – 13,058 | – 13,061 | 1 604,44 | 0,087 | 127,011 |
| FCA ITALY SPA | P3 | 976 026 | 119,169 | 123,455 | – 4,286 | – 4,288 | 1 249,19 | | 119,169 |
| FORD-WERKE GMBH | P4 | 1 024 638 | 120,798 | 129,967 | – 9,169 | – 9,172 | 1 391,68 | | 120,798 |
| GENERAL MOTORS | P5 | 750 802 | 124,290 | 127,414 | – 3,124 | – 3,124 | 1 335,82 | | 124,290 |
| HONDA MOTOR EUROPE LTD | P6 | 131 617 | 127,170 | 129,301 | – 2,131 | – 2,131 | 1 377,11 | 0,036 | 127,206 |
| HYUNDAI | P7 | 497 438 | 122,487 | 126,952 | – 4,465 | – 4,465 | 1 325,71 | | 122,487 |
| KIA | P8 | 455 496 | 120,460 | 129,080 | – 8,620 | – 8,620 | 1 372,27 | | 120,460 |
| MITSUBISHI MOTORS | P9 | 104 946 | 117,597 | 130,369 | – 12,772 | – 12,772 | 1 400,48 | | 117,597 |
| RENAULT | P10 | 1 631 677 | 109,568 | 124,989 | – 15,421 | – 15,422 | 1 282,75 | | 109,568 |
| SUZUKI POOL | P11/ND | 233 152 | 114,892 | 123,114 | – 8,222 | – 8,223 | 1 079,05 | | 114,892 |
| TATA MOTORS LTD, JAGUAR CARS LTD, LAND ROVER | P12/ND | 229 124 | 151,667 | 178,025 | – 26,358 | – 26,358 | 1 953,18 | | 151,667 |
| VW GROUP PC (1) | P13 | | | | | | | | |

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

Pool names

Pool

Number of registrations

Average specific emissions of CO2 (100 %)

Specific emissions target

Distance to target

Distance to target adjusted

Average mass

CO2 savings from eco-innovations

Average CO2 emissions (100 %)

BMW GROUP

P1

983 176

121,621

138,147

– 16,526

– 16,526

1 570,67

0,173

121,794

DAIMLER AG

P2

961 406

126,924

139,690

– 13,058

– 13,061

1 604,44

0,087

127,011

FCA ITALY SPA

P3

976 026

119,169

123,455

– 4,286

– 4,288

1 249,19

119,169

FORD-WERKE GMBH

P4

1 024 638

120,798

129,967

– 9,169

– 9,172

1 391,68

120,798

GENERAL MOTORS

P5

750 802

124,290

127,414

– 3,124

– 3,124

1 335,82

124,290

HONDA MOTOR EUROPE LTD

P6

131 617

127,170

129,301

– 2,131

– 2,131

1 377,11

0,036

127,206

HYUNDAI

P7

497 438

122,487

126,952

– 4,465

– 4,465

1 325,71

122,487

KIA

P8

455 496

120,460

129,080

– 8,620

– 8,620

1 372,27

120,460

MITSUBISHI MOTORS

P9

104 946

117,597

130,369

– 12,772

– 12,772

1 400,48

117,597

RENAULT

P10

1 631 677

109,568

124,989

– 15,421

– 15,422

1 282,75

109,568

SUZUKI POOL

P11/ND

233 152

114,892

123,114

– 8,222

– 8,223

1 079,05

114,892

TATA MOTORS LTD, JAGUAR CARS LTD, LAND ROVER

P12/ND

229 124

151,667

178,025

– 26,358

– 26,358

1 953,18

151,667

VW GROUP PC (1)

P13

Explanatory notes to Tables 1 and 2:

Column A:

Table 1: ‘Manufacturer name’ means the name of the manufacturer as notified to the Commission by the manufacturer concerned or, where no such notification has taken place, the name registered by the registration authority of the Member State.

Table 2: ‘Pool name’ means the name of the pool declared by the pool manager.

Column B:

‘D’ means that a derogation relating to a small volume manufacturer has been granted in accordance with Article 11(3) of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 for the calendar year 2017;

‘ND’ means that a derogation relating to a niche manufacturer has been granted in accordance with Article 11(4) of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 for the calendar year 2017;

‘DMD’ means that a de minimis exemption applies in accordance with Article 2(4) of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009, i.e. a manufacturer which together with all its connected undertakings was responsible for fewer than 1 000 new registered vehicles in 2017 does not have to meet a specific emissions target;

‘P’ means that the manufacturer is a member of a pool (listed in table 2) formed pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 and the pooling agreement is valid for calendar year 2017.

Column C:

‘Number of registrations’ means the total number of new cars registered by Member States in a calendar year, not counting those registrations that relate to records where the values for mass and/or CO2 are missing and those records which the manufacturer does not recognise. The number of registrations reported by Member States may otherwise not be changed.

Column D:

‘Average specific emissions of CO2 (100 %)’ means the average specific emissions of CO2 (in g CO2/km) that have been calculated on the basis of 100 % of the vehicles attributed to the manufacturer. Where appropriate, the average specific emissions of CO2 take into account the errors notified to the Commission by the manufacturer concerned. The records used for the calculation include those that contain a valid value for mass and CO2 emissions. The average specific emissions of CO2 include emission reductions resulting from the use of innovative technologies referred to in Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 (see also note on Column I).

Column E:

‘Specific emissions target’ means the emissions target calculated on the basis of the average mass of all vehicles attributed to a manufacturer applying the formula set out in Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 443/2009.

Column F:

‘Distance to target’ means the difference between the average specific emissions of CO2 specified in column D and the specific emissions target in column E. Where the value in column F is positive the average specific emissions of CO2 exceed the specific emissions target.

Column G:

‘Distance to target adjusted’ means that where the values in this column are different from those in column F, the values in that column have been adjusted to take into account an error margin. The error margin only applies if the manufacturer has notified the Commission of records with the error code B as set out in Article 9(3) of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1014/2010 (2). The error margin is calculated in accordance with the following formula:

Error = absolute value of [(AC1 – TG1) – (AC2 – TG2)]

AC1= the average specific emissions of CO2 including the unidentifiable vehicles (as set out in column D);

TG1= the specific emissions target including the unidentifiable vehicles (as set out in column E);

AC2= the average specific emissions of CO2 excluding the unidentifiable vehicles;

TG2= the specific emissions target excluding the unidentifiable vehicles.

Column H:

‘Average mass’ means the average of the mass in running order (kilogrammes) of the vehicles attributed to the manufacturer.

Column I:

‘CO2 savings from eco-innovations’ means the emission reductions that are taken into account for the calculation of the average specific emissions of CO2 listed in column D resulting from the use of innovative technologies that make a verified contribution to CO2 reductions and that have been approved by the Commission in accordance with Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009.

Column J:

‘Average CO2 emissions (100 %)’ means the average specific emissions of CO2 that have been calculated on the basis of 100 % of the vehicles attributed to the manufacturer. Where appropriate, the average specific emissions of CO2 take into account the errors notified to the Commission by the manufacturer concerned. The records used for the calculation includes those that contain a valid value for mass and CO2 emission but exclude emission reductions resulting from innovative technologies referred to in Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009.

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(1)  The data for the VW Group PC pool cannot be confirmed or amended for calendar year 2017.

(2)  Commission Regulation (EU) No 1014/2010 of 10 November 2010 on monitoring and reporting of data on the registration of new passenger cars pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 293, 11.11.2010, p. 15).

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ANNEX II

Table 1

Values relating to the performance of manufacturers which are members of the pool VW GROUP PC confirmed or amended in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 for calendar year 2016

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Manufacturer name | Pools and derogations | Number of registrations | Average specific emissions of CO2 (100 %) | Specific emissions target | Distance to target | Distance to target adjusted | Average mass | Average CO2 emissions (100 %) |
| AUDI AG | P14 | 783 896 | 124,968 | 138,723 | – 13,755 | – 14,046 | 1 583,27 | 124,968 |
| AUDI HUNGARIA MOTOR KFT | P14 | 9 950 | 144,517 | 130,000 | 14,517 | 14,017 | 1 392,40 | 144,517 |
| BUGATTI AUTOMOBILES SAS | P14 | 7 | 568,143 | 157,376 | 410,767 | 396,747 | 1 991,43 | 568,143 |
| QUATTRO GMBH | P14 | 9 275 | 214,612 | 147,126 | 67,486 | 67,465 | 1 767,14 | 214,612 |
| SEAT SA | P14 | 340 155 | 115,849 | 123,936 | – 8,087 | – 8,088 | 1 259,70 | 115,849 |
| SKODA AUTO AS | P14 | 627 533 | 111,894 | 124,918 | – 13,024 | – 13,189 | 1 281,20 | 111,894 |
| VOLKSWAGEN AG | P14 | 1 651 339 | 118,551 | 130,216 | – 11,665 | – 11,754 | 1 397,13 | 118,551 |

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

Manufacturer name

Pools and derogations

Number of registrations

Average specific emissions of CO2 (100 %)

Specific emissions target

Distance to target

Distance to target adjusted

Average mass

Average CO2 emissions (100 %)

AUDI AG

P14

783 896

124,968

138,723

– 13,755

– 14,046

1 583,27

124,968

AUDI HUNGARIA MOTOR KFT

P14

9 950

144,517

130,000

14,517

14,017

1 392,40

144,517

BUGATTI AUTOMOBILES SAS

P14

7

568,143

157,376

410,767

396,747

1 991,43

568,143

QUATTRO GMBH

P14

9 275

214,612

147,126

67,486

67,465

1 767,14

214,612

SEAT SA

P14

340 155

115,849

123,936

– 8,087

– 8,088

1 259,70

115,849

SKODA AUTO AS

P14

627 533

111,894

124,918

– 13,024

– 13,189

1 281,20

111,894

VOLKSWAGEN AG

P14

1 651 339

118,551

130,216

– 11,665

– 11,754

1 397,13

118,551

Table 2

Values relating to the performance of manufacturers which are members of the pool VW GROUP PC confirmed or amended in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 for calendar year 2015

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Manufacturer name | Pools and derogations | Number of registrations | Average specific emissions of CO2 (100 %) | Specific emissions target | Distance to target | Distance to target adjusted | Average mass | Average CO2 emissions (100 %) |
| AUDI AG | P14 | 717 933 | 126,245 | 139,941 | – 13,696 | – 13,696 | 1 589,53 | 126,834 |
| AUDI HUNGARIA MOTOR KFT | P14 | 11 710 | 142,770 | 131,387 | 11,383 | 11,383 | 1 402,36 | 142,770 |
| BUGATTI AUTOMOBILES SAS | P14 | 7 | 541,857 | 160,959 | 380,898 | 380,898 | 2 049,43 | 541,857 |
| QUATTRO GMBH | P14 | 6 313 | 224,593 | 149,793 | 74,800 | 74,800 | 1 805,11 | 224,593 |
| SEAT SA | P14 | 332 980 | 116,577 | 124,324 | – 7,747 | – 7,747 | 1 247,79 | 116,577 |
| SKODA AUTO AS | P14 | 585 553 | 115,511 | 125,552 | – 10,041 | – 10,041 | 1 274,68 | 115,511 |
| VOLKSWAGEN AG | P14 | 1 655 305 | 118,259 | 130,864 | – 12,605 | – 12,605 | 1 390,90 | 118,853 |

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

Manufacturer name

Pools and derogations

Number of registrations

Average specific emissions of CO2 (100 %)

Specific emissions target

Distance to target

Distance to target adjusted

Average mass

Average CO2 emissions (100 %)

AUDI AG

P14

717 933

126,245

139,941

– 13,696

– 13,696

1 589,53

126,834

AUDI HUNGARIA MOTOR KFT

P14

11 710

142,770

131,387

11,383

11,383

1 402,36

142,770

BUGATTI AUTOMOBILES SAS

P14

7

541,857

160,959

380,898

380,898

2 049,43

541,857

QUATTRO GMBH

P14

6 313

224,593

149,793

74,800

74,800

1 805,11

224,593

SEAT SA

P14

332 980

116,577

124,324

– 7,747

– 7,747

1 247,79

116,577

SKODA AUTO AS

P14

585 553

115,511

125,552

– 10,041

– 10,041

1 274,68

115,511

VOLKSWAGEN AG

P14

1 655 305

118,259

130,864

– 12,605

– 12,605

1 390,90

118,853

Table 3

Values relating to the performance of manufacturers which are members of the pool VW GROUP PC confirmed or amended in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 for calendar year 2014

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Manufacturer name | Pools and derogations | Number of registrations | Average CO2 (80 %) corrected | Specific emissions target | Distance to target | Distance to target adjusted | Average mass | Average CO2 (100 %) |
| AUDI AG | P12 | 683 752 | 121,362 | 138,499 | – 17,137 | – 17,137 | 1 557,98 | 131,253 |
| AUDI HUNGARIA MOTOR KFT | P12 | 5 018 | 145,034 | 131,858 | 13,176 | 13,176 | 1 412,66 | 151,730 |
| BENTLEY MOTORS LTD | P12 | 2 249 | 285,434 | 181,668 | 103,766 | 103,670 | 2 502,60 | 301,128 |
| BUGATTI AUTOMOBILES SAS | P12 | 17 | 552,846 | 160,388 | 392,458 | 392,458 | 2 036,94 | 558,647 |
| AUTOMOBILI LAMBORGHINI SPA | P12 | 510 | 317,490 | 144,398 | 173,092 | 173,092 | 1 687,06 | 328,422 |
| QUATTRO GMBH | P12 | 4 874 | 225,943 | 153,011 | 72,932 | 72,932 | 1 875,52 | 236,635 |
| SEAT SA | P12 | 316 545 | 110,877 | 124,039 | – 13,162 | – 13,164 | 1 241,57 | 117,265 |
| SKODA AUTO AS | P12 | 546 133 | 114,628 | 125,591 | – 10,963 | – 11,034 | 1 275,52 | 120,968 |
| VOLKSWAGEN AG | P12 | 1 549 589 | 113,030 | 130,532 | – 17,502 | – 17,605 | 1 383,64 | 123,868 |

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

Manufacturer name

Pools and derogations

Number of registrations

Average CO2 (80 %) corrected

Specific emissions target

Distance to target

Distance to target adjusted

Average mass

Average CO2 (100 %)

AUDI AG

P12

683 752

121,362

138,499

– 17,137

– 17,137

1 557,98

131,253

AUDI HUNGARIA MOTOR KFT

P12

5 018

145,034

131,858

13,176

13,176

1 412,66

151,730

BENTLEY MOTORS LTD

P12

2 249

285,434

181,668

103,766

103,670

2 502,60

301,128

BUGATTI AUTOMOBILES SAS

P12

17

552,846

160,388

392,458

392,458

2 036,94

558,647

AUTOMOBILI LAMBORGHINI SPA

P12

510

317,490

144,398

173,092

173,092

1 687,06

328,422

QUATTRO GMBH

P12

4 874

225,943

153,011

72,932

72,932

1 875,52

236,635

SEAT SA

P12

316 545

110,877

124,039

– 13,162

– 13,164

1 241,57

117,265

SKODA AUTO AS

P12

546 133

114,628

125,591

– 10,963

– 11,034

1 275,52

120,968

VOLKSWAGEN AG

P12

1 549 589

113,030

130,532

– 17,502

– 17,605

1 383,64

123,868

Explanatory notes to Tables 1, 2, 3:

Column A:

‘Manufacturer name’ means the name of the manufacturer as notified to the Commission by the manufacturer concerned or, where no such notification has taken place, the name registered by the registration authority of the Member State.

Column B:

The manufacturer is a member of the VW GROUP PC pool (P12 or P14) formed pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 and the pooling agreement is valid for the calendar years 2014, 2015 and 2016. The provisional data for the VW GROUP PC pool can however not be confirmed or amended for any of those calendar years.

Column C:

‘Number of registrations’ means the total number of new cars registered by Member States in a calendar year, not counting those registrations that relate to records where the values for mass and/or CO2 are missing and those records which the manufacturer does not recognise. The number of registrations reported by Member States may otherwise not be changed.

Column D:

Tables 1, 2 and 3: ‘Average specific emissions of CO2 (100 %)’ means the average specific emissions of CO2 (g CO2/km) that have been calculated on the basis of 100 % of the vehicles attributed to the manufacturer. Where appropriate, the average specific emissions of CO2 take into account the errors notified to the Commission by the manufacturer concerned. The records used for the calculation includes those that contain a valid value for mass and CO2 emissions. The average specific emissions of CO2 include emission reductions resulting from the use of innovative technologies referred to in Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009, and in Tables 2 and 3 emission reductions resulting from the provisions on super credits in Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 and the use of E85 in accordance with Article 6 of that Regulation.

Table 3: ‘Average CO2 (80 %) corrected’ means the average specific emissions of CO2 that have been calculated on the basis of the 80 % lowest emitting vehicles in the manufacturer's fleet in accordance with the third indent of the second paragraph of Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 and point 4 of Commission Communication COM(2010) 657 final (1).

Column E:

‘Specific emissions target’ means the emissions target calculated on the basis of the average mass of all vehicles attributed to a manufacturer applying the formula set out in Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 443/2009.

Column F:

‘Distance to target’ means the difference between the average specific emissions of CO2 specified in column D and the specific emissions target in column E. Where the value in column F is positive the average specific emissions of CO2 exceed the specific emissions target.

Column G:

‘Distance to target adjusted’ means that where the values in this column are different from those in column F, the values in that column have been adjusted to take into account an error margin. The error margin only applies if the manufacturer has notified the Commission of records with the error code B as set out in Article 9(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1014/2010. The error margin is calculated in accordance with the following formula:

Error = absolute value of [(AC1 – TG1) – (AC2 – TG2)]

AC1= the average specific emissions of CO2 including the unidentifiable vehicles (as set out in column D);

TG1= the specific emissions target including the unidentifiable vehicles (as set out in column E);

AC2= the average specific emissions of CO2 excluding the unidentifiable vehicles;

TG2= the specific emissions target excluding the unidentifiable vehicles.

Column H:

‘Average mass’ means the average of the mass in running order (kilogrammes) of the vehicles attributed to the manufacturer.

Column I:

Tables 1, 2 and 3: ‘Average CO2 emissions (100 %)’ means the average specific emissions of CO2 that have been calculated on the basis of 100 % of the vehicles attributed to the manufacturer. Where appropriate, the average specific emissions of CO2 take into account the errors notified to the Commission by the manufacturer concerned. The records used for the calculation include those that contain a valid value for mass and CO2 emission but exclude emission reductions resulting from innovative technologies referred to in Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009. For the calendar years 2014 and 2015 (Tables 2 and 3) the emission reductions resulting from the provisions on super-credits in Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 and on the use of E85 in Article 6 of that Regulation are also excluded from the calculation.

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(1)  Communication from the Commission of 10 November 2010 on the monitoring of data on the registration of new passenger cars (COM(2010) 657 final).

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