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41-575 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–97] 

AIR FORCE STRATEGIC INITIATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 24, 2007 


Congress.#13
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

MARK E. UDALL, Colorado 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

ANDREW HYDE, Professional Staff Member 

STEPHANIE SANOK, Professional Staff Member 

MARGEE MECKSTROTH, Staff Assistant 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2007 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, October 24, 2007, Air Force Strategic Initiatives ............................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, October 24, 2007 ................................................................................. 51 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2007 

AIR FORCE STRATEGIC INITIATIVES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Committee on Armed 

Services ................................................................................................................. 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Moseley, Gen. T. Michael, USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force ......................... 5 

Wynne, Michael W., Secretary of the Air Force .................................................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Wynne, Michael W., joint with Gen. T. Michael Moseley ............................. 55 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Letter from Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, Chief of Staff, Department of the 

Air Force, to Hon. Jim Marshall, regarding the potential transfer of 

the Joint Cargo Aircraft program to the Air Force .................................... 65 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 69 

Mrs. Boyda ........................................................................................................ 69 

Ms. Castor ......................................................................................................... 69 

Mr. Marshall ..................................................................................................... 69 

Mr. Saxton ......................................................................................................... 69 

Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 75 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 80 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 80 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 81 

Mr. LoBiondo .................................................................................................... 75 

(1) 

AIR FORCE STRATEGIC INITIATIVES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 24, 2007. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:03 a.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the 

committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, we will come to order. 

And our hearing today is on the strategic initiatives of America’s 

Air Force. 

Some few weeks ago we had a strategic overview hearing for the 

United States Army, and members found that day’s discussion to 

be invaluable, so we decided to have a similar strategic overview 

with the Air Force. And, of course, we intend to hold a maritime 

services hearing in the future. 

There is a common thread among these hearings, and it is the 

heavy burden of war on the military services. Ongoing operations 

are putting a serious strain on the Air Force. While the strain on 

the Air Force is currently not as severe as it is for the Army, it 

is significant. 

It is also important to note that our Air Force has been engaged 

in manning Iraqi-related deployments continuously since 1990. For 

them, Iraq has been a marathon as opposed to a sprint. Today, I 

hope we can address the future of the Air Force in terms of people, 

in terms of budgets, and the Air Force’s role in the Department of 

Defense. 

And an organization is only as good as its people. For the Air 

Force, the news is pretty good. You have done well in recruiting. 

Your quality of people is exceptional. There is one trouble spot; 

that is recruiting for the Air Guard. But overall you continue to recruit and retain high-quality people. That, of course, is quite good 

news. 

The Air Force, however, in 2005 made a decision to reduce its 

force structure by some 40,000 people. Some of us had problems 

with that. We are getting close to fully implementing that decision, 

however, and I am concerned that it is not working that well. The 

savings from this personnel reduction have been eaten up by operating costs and have not served to boost modernization accounts. 

Since 2005, the Army and Marine Corps have decided to increase 

their ranks considerably, as I have suggested—as everyone on this 

committee knows—since 1995. As a result, the Air Force appears 

2 

to be short of people needed to support a larger ground force. I will 

be interested to hear your views on that. 

No Chief or Secretary has ever come before this committee to tell 

us that they have too much money. This year-end, the looming 

budget shortfalls seem urgent. Late last year, the Air Force reported a resource shortfall of some $20 billion; that was due to mismatch between strategy on the one hand and budget on the other. 

This year, due to the escalating costs for energy, health care, maintaining the aging fleet, the Air Force reportedly will have a $79 billion shortfall. 

Most recently, I have heard reports of a potential shortfall of 

more than that. Hopefully, you can clarify that for us. 

Last, I would mention the roles and missions discussion that the 

Air Force has been deeply engaged in this year with your sister 

services. This is an old and gnawing problem. It is one that this 

committee will help spearhead to cause you to look at it—and when 

I say ‘‘you,’’ all of the services—to look at it seriously and come to 

an agreement at some moment which will make the dream of Goldwater-Nichols further come true. 

And, second, it will save a considerable amount of dollars. 

Today, our distinguished witnesses are Secretary Michael 

Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force, General ‘‘Buzz’’ Moseley, Chief 

of Staff of the United States Air Force. 

Now, before recognizing you two gentlemen, let me recognize my 

friend, Jim Saxton, who is standing in for the ranking member 

today. 

Mr. Saxton. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

NEW JERSEY, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me just say at 

the outset how appreciative I am that we are holding this hearing 

today. I think it is a very important hearing on strategic initiatives, and quite frankly, strategic challenges, which are quite difficult for the Air Force to solve. 

I am very pleased to be here, because I believe the issues we are 

addressing are absolutely crucial to the Nation’s ability to meet the 

national security strategy. The issues that we will talk about today 

will focus discussions and shape decisions as we continue the conference with the Senate on the 2008 authorization bill. 

As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, General Casey and Secretary 

Geren were recently here to testify to this same committee that the 

Army was out of balance. Unfortunately, I am convinced that it is 

not just the Army; it is the Department of Defense (DOD). 

And the Air Force’s aging aircraft fleet is a clear indicator that 

the Air Force is out of balance as well. Requirements for modernization in the Air Force are enormous, far outrunning the dollars available to meet the task. And in some cases, we have legislated hurdles which are impossible, or at least nearly impossible, 

to overcome. There can be no more concrete example of this than 

our strategic airlift fleet, and I would like to say why in my opening statement. 

The Air Force inventory currently consists of 169 C–17 and 111 

C–5s. While the C–17 fleet is performing well beyond everyone’s exVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:09 Aug 03, 2009 Jkt 041575 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-97\41575.TXT HARM2 PsN: MARY
3 

pectations, the C–5 fleet continues to demonstrate consistently low 

reliability and low mission-capable rates. This, in itself, directly impacts the cost of doing business. Today, it costs the Air Mobility 

Command $11,626 per hour—$11,626 per hour to fly the C–5A and 

B airplanes; and it costs $5,960 per hour to fly the C–17. That cost 

difference, the low reliability of the C–5, and the large size and 

runway length requirements drive the Air Force to use the C–17 

for more than 80 percent of airlift missions worldwide and 90 percent in theater. 

Faced with this reality, the Air Force set about a program to improve the performance and reduce the operating costs of the C–5. 

I supported that program at the outset. In fact, I led a delegation 

to Andrews Air Force Base many years ago to actually see the C– 

5, experience its problems; and we authorized the modernization 

program subsequent to that. 

The core of this effort is the Reliability Enhancement and Reengineering Program, generally referred to as RERP. While the 

program is still in its infancy, we were recently notified that it suffered a Nunn-McCurdy breach due to substantial cost growth. In 

fact, the latest Air Force cost projections of $17.8 billion in the program costs are more than 50 percent higher than it was originally 

forecast at a $5 to $8 billion level. 

If you recall, Mr. Chairman, the Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act prohibited retirement of C–5 aircraft, one 

of the hurdles that I talked about a few minutes ago. So today we 

have an aging fleet of aircraft with low reliability rates and high 

costs to operate. 

We have modernization programs that turn out to be more complex, more costly, and less productive than we had anticipated. 

And finally, we have those that would prohibit the Air Force, 

here in Congress, from doing anything about it by legislating that 

they must keep these old airplanes on the tarmac. In the case of 

the strategic airlift, we are jeopardizing the deployability and readiness of the remainder of the armed forces. We are overflying the 

assets that we do have, that is, the C–17 fleet, to compensate for 

the shortcomings of the C–5 fleet that we are trying to sustain, and 

we are pushing an enormous bow wave of procurement requirements to generations to come. 

During our question-and-answer period, I will inquire about how 

to fix the airlift recapitalization plan. I supported the original plan, 

as I said a few minutes ago, to modernize part of the C–5 fleet. But 

those who believe that it would be wise to modernize the entire 

fleet, rather than just the newer B models, which were the birds 

to be modernized in the original plan, must now realize that the 

degree of inefficiency and the high cost of modernizing all 111 C– 

5s make it a most unwise option. 

General Moseley and Secretary Wynne, the Air Force is facing 

some extraordinary challenges. I thank you for being with us today, 

and look forward to hearing your perspectives on these challenges. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Saxton. 

Secretary Wynne. 

4 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL W. WYNNE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR 

FORCE 

Secretary WYNNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, it is my pleasure to 

come before you today to represent our total force of active, Reserve, and National Air Guard airmen that provide the strategic 

shield for America in air, space, and, increasingly, cyberspace. I appreciate the opportunity afforded to update my testimony from the 

spring as the Congress comes to grips with several funding vehicles 

for the armed forces. 

First, division. Like President Teddy Roosevelt opined, speak 

softly and carry a big stick. Our mission is to provide sovereign options that speak directly to this extension of diplomacy by other 

means. This spring, I worried about our Air Force future as we get 

smaller. And recently, in a very public way, I filed off a yellow-star 

cluster about how the strategy for recapitalization was not working 

like I wanted, and I worry. 

I have been advised by our historian that we, as an Air Force, 

are now smaller than the Army Air Corps was on December 7, 

1941. More capable? Yes, provided that recapitalization picks up 

the pace. But sometimes, as well, quantity has a quality all of its 

own. 

Our mission spread has steadily increased, and no one has relieved us of the strategic mission, even as we stretch our forces to 

protect and supply joint coalition forces in the ongoing global war 

on terror while actively deterring in other parts of the world. 

This point was recently hammered home with regard to the unauthorized weapons transfer that occurred between Minot Air 

Force Base and Barksdale Air Force Base. This was the sixth of 12 

planned flights to comply with the decommissioning aspects of the 

Moscow Treaty. Weapons transfer procedures were in place and 

validated. The number of people available to make the tactical 

ferry program work was sufficient. The adherence to procedure was 

lacking, and the sequential errors this set in motion are being corrected. 

We are asking, via a blue ribbon commission, are the training 

and surrounding procedures adequate to eliminate this in the future? DOD is asking General Larry Welch, Retired, in his role in 

nuclear surety, to look across the DOD and identify weaknesses. 

The Department of Defense inspector general investigation to determine the correctness of our findings is in progress. We are satisfied that, with recertification, the tactical ferry program could resume in a safe manner. 

Though we are proud of our people who presently serve in the 

ground force tasking, it is a conundrum at this time why air 

taskings are highly desired by ground forces. But that is not my 

present concern because, if we forfeit air dominance in the future, 

this difference is moot. 

Increasingly, the asymmetric advantage that we have, as indicated by General McCaffrey in a recent note, is being reprioritized 

in a funding sense. We have recently requested that the F–22 line 

be extended by converting the closure costs to long lead to ensure 

the President has a fifth generation line open. As you know, we are 

nowhere near the requirements set by Air Combat Command of 

5 

381 of these fifth generation fighters. We have been advised informally that this will break the bank for the Air Force, unaffordable 

in fiscal year 2010. And it is big money, no doubt. 

I have been told that the Air Force isn’t bleeding, and we all 

grieve for the Army and the Marines, and are working hard to set 

the conditions for victory with them. But when the Air Force does 

bleed, as it did in World War II with 40,000 lost in Europe and 

more in the Pacific, or in the fighters, F–4s and B–52 raids over 

North Vietnam, to Triple-A—when it does bleed, some enemy will 

have discovered that we have forfeited air dominance, and I worry. 

I was taught some of the best lessons are taught by the enemy on 

the battlefield. 

Strategically, we learned well, and we have held our position not 

in vengeance, but as a sovereign option. And we need to husband 

this, our asymmetric advantage, and never get into a fair fight in 

the air. As well, nurture our advantage that we now have in space 

and grow to dominance in cyberspace. 

So, as an update, you might ask what do we want? Number one, 

your Air Force has gotten more efficient, and we have saved resources. Let us supply those resources to recapitalization. Don’t 

allow any open production lines to close until we have restored and 

stabilized our Air Force readiness. Surging strategic forces too late 

comes at our peril. 

Number two, we are so proud of our people, especially supply, 

maintenance, and adoptive operators in airspace and cyberspace, 

that we worry about the stress and strain that is showing up in 

our retention figures and on families. High tech requires high 

touch, and we appreciate what you can do to support our commitment to our Air Force family. 

Number three, we have indicated that we would like as much as 

a $20 billion per year increase to recapitalize at efficient rates in 

air and space and cyberspace. I ask that you take a careful look 

at priorities, and don’t easily trade strategic advantage to maximize our tactical engagement. The world is simply not getting 

kinder, and both need funding. 

And last, number four, allow us to manage our fleet within our 

Air Force. 

Thank you very much. I am prepared for your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Wynne and General 

Moseley can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

And General Moseley. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, USAF, CHIEF OF 

STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General MOSELEY. Mr. Chairman, distinguished committee members, thank you for the opportunity for the Secretary and I to 

spend some time with you this morning to talk about things on 

your mind as well as things on our mind. 

Let me start by saying, America expects its total force, its Air 

Force, to deliver decisive military power on a global scale; and 

today we are able to do that. Today, we give our Nation true global 

vigilance, global reach, and global power; the ability to see and 

sense targets and activities around the planet, in the heavens 

6 

above, and in the growing domain of cyberspace from networks of 

computer systems, manned and unmanned airborne platforms, and 

through constellations of satellites; the ability to reach out and 

strike these targets or activities, supply them or evacuate them, 

continue to surveil them, or simply hold them at risk, deterring 

and dissuading or compelling enemies far from our Nation’s shores; 

and the ability to quickly, precisely, and lethally, if required, bring 

American airspace and cyber power to bear to impart strategically 

dislocated and paralyzing effects on our opponents in all weather, 

daylight or dark, at speeds unmatched in any medium. 

Yes, your Air Force is the most combat-tested force in its history, 

having been in combat continually for 17 straight years. 

The Secretary and I visit our total force airmen, active, Guard, 

Reserve, and civilians at their deployed locations and throughout 

the country. We are bolstered by their morale and their uncanny 

ability to maximize the technology we give them to fight in today’s 

conflicts. 

I am impressed by our newly recruited airmen, and by the airmen and their families we retain term after term—Guard, Reserve, 

active. And I am awed by the magic that they work to keep our 

Air Force the best in the world. These airmen are absolutely committed to winning the war today. 

Today’s mission: It is not something we can or will walk away 

from, because our enemies currently fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan will follow us home. It is my opinion that we must win this 

war today. However, as a service chief, I am worried about tomorrow. Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, there are storm clouds on the 

horizon, troubling global trends that will bring friction, competition, and conflict that will no doubt involve potential adversaries 

who have gone to school on American air power these last 17 years. 

Our Nation’s existing and emerging competitors know that the 

combined power of America’s joint military team, first and foremost, depends on air, space and cyber dominance. Potential opponents understand this awesome asymmetric advantage that the 

United States Air Force gives this country, so it is not surprising 

that many of them are developing and buying weapons that will 

put the air and space dominance we enjoy today at risk. Yet the 

air and space inventory America relies on today is largely what 

Congress appropriated 20 or 25 years ago. 

We won’t choose where the next fight will start. We won’t know 

for certain how far off this distant horizon is. What we do know 

is that the next fight will depend on the long arm of America’s Air 

Force and that that long arm is becoming increasingly less capable 

over time. Ours is a tired and aging inventory that must be recapitalized and modernized to prepare for an uncertain, complex, and 

threatening future. 

Tomorrow’s successes depend on our ability to defend the American homeland, to shape and influence events around the world, 

and to deter, dissuade, and defeat our country’s enemies. The 

timelines associated with fielding such new capabilities preclude us 

from waiting until tomorrow to think about tomorrow. 

At the rate at which we get to the distant horizon, certain strategic surprises, such as successful antisatellite test shots, escalating nuclear efforts, continually outpace our estimates. We must 

7 

therefore accelerate our efforts to build a 21st century force with 

the required range, payload, speed, survivability, lethality, and precision. 

We must begin that today. This critical piece of the joint team 

won’t change over the future. 

To ensure our ability to fulfill what we see as our roles and missions and to ensure our ability to dominate airspace and cyberspace, we have embarked on the biggest and most important recapitalization and modernization effort ever. This effort includes retiring old and obsolete aircraft, such as the C–5A, KC–135E, C– 

130E, U–2, B–52, and replacing them with fewer numbers of more 

capable systems. Our top five procurement priorities are a step in 

the right direction toward fielding these systems. 

We have also programmed for C–130Js and joint cargo aircraft, 

now the C–27, more unmanned aerial vehicles, and the F–22 fighters and F–35 fighters to fulfill our Nation’s combatant commander 

requirements and to flesh out the full-spectrum capabilities we expect for tomorrow. 

Mr. Chairman, we truly appreciate the committee’s consistent 

support of goals and priorities, and for watching over the great people that wear the uniform of the American military. We look forward to partnering with this committee in the future to guarantee 

that America’s global vigilance, global reach, and global power remain intact. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, we both look forward 

to your questions and your comments. Thank you, sir. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Moseley and Secretary 

Wynne can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you very much. 

We are here to gather accurate information, and sometimes a 

‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ answer is far better than a dissertation on how to 

make a clock. 

So let me begin. Secretary Wynne, do you have too many people 

in the United States Air Force? 

Secretary WYNNE. Sir, right now we cannot afford to have—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Just give me a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no,’’ and then explain, 

please. 

Let me ask it again. Do you have too many people in the United 

States Air Force? 

Secretary WYNNE. We are continuing to decline, so the answer is 

‘‘yes.’’ 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. 

You wish to cut some 5,600 from the Air Force active duty? Is 

that correct? 

Secretary WYNNE. We are constrained by the amount of money 

we have, sir, so we are in fact cutting those people. 

The CHAIRMAN. And you wish to cut some 7,700 from the Air 

Force Reserve. Is that correct? 

Secretary WYNNE. I do not wish it. I would prefer not to. 

The CHAIRMAN. You are asking them; am I correct? 

Secretary WYNNE. Yes, sir, you are correct. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Saxton. 

Mr. SAXTON. Let me just follow up on that question by asking 

this. 

8 

What is it that causes you to visualize the need to make the cuts 

that the chairman was just talking about? 

Secretary WYNNE. I tell airmen who ask me this very same question that the chairman asked me—I say, it is the duty of every airman to make sure that the future airmen are as capable and as 

confident to go to war for America as the airmen are today. One 

of the sacrifices we have to make is cutting force structure and trying to do more with less. 

The reason is because I foresee that we are just not going to get 

the resources to recapitalize at the rate we need to recapitalize. 

And I worry more to make sure that if there is only one pilot left, 

they have the best possible equipment that America can afford to 

give them. 

And that is the mission that we took three years ago—two years 

ago, really—when I became Secretary of the Air Force. It was as 

a former airman; it was not one that I looked forward to and certainly not one that I look forward to. And I confront that question 

at every air base that I go to. 

Mr. SAXTON. I mentioned earlier that General Casey was here 

testifying a short time ago, and he indicated that in order to both 

modernize and repair equipment and to carry out all the other responsibilities in the Army, he simply didn’t have enough money. 

Isn’t that the case with the Air Force as well? 

Secretary WYNNE. Yes, sir. We have summed it up by saying that we feel that the $20 billion per year is an approximate level where 

we could buy efficiently and we could also man efficiently across 

our Air Force. 

We are committed to managing the resources as best we can, and 

that is the reason we are embarked upon Air Force Smart Operations 21, which is a Lean Six Sigma, adopted from American industry; but it is an unpleasant reality that at some point we will 

be too small. 

Mr. SAXTON. Now, Mr. Secretary, you just talked about managing the Air Force, and that is an important phrase. So your 

choices, again with regard to modernization, are to make some 

tough choices; and with regard to personnel, to make some tough 

choices—to balance the books, to reduce personnel. And I guess I 

would have to conclude that you don’t really want to do that. 

Secretary WYNNE. Sir, I do not really want to do that, but I believe that the budget pressures are forcing us to be a smaller Air 

Force, whether it starts with equipment or whether it starts with 

people. 

In the Air Force, we buy equipment and we man the equipment 

to the best of our ability. I would have to tell you that if I cannot 

buy new equipment, it doesn’t do me any good to have people 

standing around on the ground; every airman or rifleman does not 

work in the end. 

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Secretary, in your opening statement—I wrote 

down several things that you had mentioned, and one was that we 

should not allow any production lines to close. 

Would you tell us specifically what you are referring to there? 

Secretary WYNNE. The purpose of an air force is to fly airplanes. 

I worry about our industrial base. We currently have only one large 

transport line in America. We currently have active only one fifth 

9 

generation fighter line. We currently have active only one medium 

transport line in America. 

Mr. SAXTON. And what would happen—let us talk about the strategic line, the transport line; what would happen if the C–17 line 

closed? 

Secretary WYNNE. We would probably—under management, we 

would put those tools in as close to ready storage as we could. We 

would have to take an order approximately three and a half years 

out, because you have to go to a forging mill in order to restart the 

line. 

I have got to have forgings for the landing gear, and so since I 

am not storing any forgings, I would probably be using what I 

could of my spares line. And it would be three and a half to four 

years to restart that line. 

Mr. SAXTON. And how much money? 

Secretary WYNNE. I haven’t estimated it, sir, but the last time 

I looked, it was close to—in the 10s, it wasn’t in the single digit 

billions. 

Mr. SAXTON. So additional money to an Air Force that is already 

strapped and trying to balance the books by reducing the size of 

the force? 

Secretary WYNNE. That is right. 

Mr. SAXTON. Recently I had the opportunity to join General Light 

in bringing the first KC–135R model to McGuire Air Force Base. 

As we taxied up to the tarmac, I counted 17 KC–135E models 

parked on the tarmac. And I said to General Light, where are you 

going to park these newer R models? And he said, I don’t know, 

but we are going to figure that out. 

What is the problem? 

Secretary WYNNE. The problem is that we have 85 active KC– 

135Es. We only have 40 that can fly. Of those 40, more than 13 

are being stood down locally by their commanders because they 

don’t want to fly them. They break too often and they suck their 

maintenance out. 

So what we would like to do is get the right to retire KC–135Es, 

to transfer the Rs into their slots and, effectively, better manage 

our fleet. We think we can use the crews that are currently assigned to KC–135Rs to effectively get more efficiency out of the 

KC–135R fleet. 

And, of course, we need desperately to start that. 

Mr. SAXTON. Isn’t it true that Congress legislated in such a way 

that you can’t retire those old airplanes that are costing us money 

to sit on the tarmac and take up space that we need for other airplanes? 

Secretary WYNNE. Yes, sir. And further requirements, we have to 

have an assigned maintenance crew to go down and start the engines every so often, even if the planes never leave the ground. 

Mr. SAXTON. Now, isn’t there a retirement problem with other 

aircraft in your inventory, such as the C–5? 

Secretary WYNNE. We are restricted on the C–5 to manage that 

fleet. We are attempting, as you know, to increase the capability 

of that fleet. We know the reticence of the contractor is, the A 

model aircraft are so old that when they open the aircraft up they 

are afraid to bid a fixed price on the repair job because they are 

10 

afraid it may have, in an aging, geriatric sense, ‘‘cancer’’ in the aircraft. If it does, it will cost them and us a lot more money. This 

is the essence of the problem. 

The B model aircraft, I believe, are a lot more accepted—and are 

a lot younger, by the way—to make the transition. So, yes, sir, we 

are constrained there. 

And we are also constrained on C–130Es. We would like to remove the 1,000 requirement for the E models that are at A mark 

already, and retire another tranche of C–130Es. I remember when 

I was an officer in 1973, the E model was the one that I worked 

on as—when I was in the Air Force. 

Mr. SAXTON. All right. 

Mr. Secretary, back to the C–5 issue again. Isn’t it true that 

your—meaning the Air Force, some years ago—original idea on the 

C–5 modernization program was to do just the B models? Is that 

correct? 

Secretary WYNNE. I believe so. 

Mr. SAXTON. Right. And wasn’t it Congress that did two things: 

actually put the retirement restriction in law relative to C–5A and 

B models, and required the Air Force to study and do a test on 

whether or not it would be possible to modernize—or feasible, let 

me put it that way—to modernize the C–5A older fleet? 

We did those two things, didn’t we? 

Secretary WYNNE. I believe you did, yes, sir. 

Mr. SAXTON. Yes, sir. And at the outset we thought the cost of doing that would be somewhere between $5 and $8 billion, and you 

have recently sent out a message that the Nunn-McCurdy breach 

has been reached. And, in fact, the $5 to $8 billion has increased 

to almost to $18 billion; is that correct? 

Secretary WYNNE. We are examining what the extent is, and I 

think the difference is between 12 and 17, yes, sir. 

Mr. SAXTON. Twelve and 17; I saw a number of 17.8 billion. All 

right. 

And if you had your druthers, and the legislation weren’t written 

the way the—the statutes weren’t written the way they are written—— 

Secretary WYNNE. I believe we and the contractor—— 

Mr. SAXTON. How would you manage the C–5, C–17 fleet? And 

I remind you that just a minute ago you said it would be a bad 

idea to close the C–17 line. 

Secretary WYNNE. I do believe it would be a bad idea to allow 

the line to close. It is one idea, just like the reduction of force structure that I am confronted with. And I am confronted with it because I can’t afford to put in my budget more C–17s. 

To your question, we look at the C–5Bs as great airplanes. We 

would like to see them extended. We have some C–5As that we 

think we should change and aircraft modernization program (AMP) 

them, and we can fly them in America for outsized cargo locally; 

we would just not take them overseas. 

I will tell you that the Navy has already rejected the use of C– 

5s, and they have requested Antonov airplanes. We have flown over 

200,000 pounds of cargo with Antonov airplanes, and the Antonov 

airplane fleet is doing very well. I believe the line may still be open 

over in Russia. 

11 

We are now, by the way, sharing the mission of flying mine resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs) over to Iraq between 

C–17s and Antonov airplanes. I think it is a good use of the commercial, but it is an indication—if you will, a large arrow. That basically says that was—300 units of that was prescribed in the 2005 

Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS–05) that only talked about the 

American fleet. Did it truly consider that we would be supplying 

war supplies with Russian-made Antonov airplanes? I don’t know. 

I do think it is a good answer, given the state of the fleet that they 

have. 

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, I have taken more than my amount 

of allotted time, and I thank you for giving us that flexibility. 

I must say that I heard something that I wasn’t fully aware of, 

that we are using big Russian planes to fly materiel to theater because our C–5 fleet is not capable of carrying out that mission and 

we don’t have enough C–17s to substitute. So I think that makes 

a great point. 

I would just say, Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, that our statutes 

have put handcuffs on some of the services; and in this case we 

have tied up and gagged the Air Force—not gagged, I guess, but 

we have tied up the Air Force on their capability to manage their 

fleet. We have got an opportunity in this conference to address that 

issue, and I hope we will. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. An observation, Mr. Secretary, that everything of 

which you speak, whether it be people or planes or equipment, is 

budget driven. I have heard no word about strategic thought or 

where the Air Force should be in a strategic position for our country. So I would take it from your testimony that everything is 

budget driven in the Air Force, as opposed to giving thought to 

where this fits into the defense and security of our Nation. 

Mr. Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, Chief, it is good to see you this morning. And by 

the questioning from my colleagues, I think that we do have serious, serious problems. And I can assure you that we want to work 

with you and see how we can—it looks like we are going to have 

to come from bottoms up to correct what we need to correct. And 

they were very serious questions. 

But—I wish I could continue in that line of questioning, but because my chairman mentioned—and my good friend, Mr. Saxton, 

we are meeting with the Senate conferees at this time; and we had 

a meeting with them yesterday. 

So I was going to ask, General Moseley, the Senate defense authorization bill would mandate that the Air Force conduct a fee-forservice pilot program for in-flight refueling. Now, what challenges 

would you see with fee-for-service air refueling, and how would the 

Senate’s pilot program affect the tanker flying hours program? 

And it goes much further into other things now, the criteria for 

number of hours, the number of contractors, and the number of aircraft. You know what I am talking about. And we want to be sure 

that when we continue to meet with the Senate, this conference 

panel, that we do the right thing. 

12 

So if you could maybe enlighten me as to how this is going to 

have an impact on you and the Air Force. 

Secretary WYNNE. We worry on a couple of levels, and I would 

like the Chief to comment. 

We worry on a level that it first uses resources. We don’t know 

that it is an imprudent use of resources. The Navy does do fee-forservice tanking. We worry that it might be used as a tool to delay 

the KC–X program. We worry that I still have an aging fleet of 

tankers, and the first time to do night refueling is not when you 

are going to war. I worry, therefore, about training our crews and 

not having a commercial crew. I worry about how far do we go into 

the Blackwater world. 

Chief. 

General MOSELEY. Congressman, thanks for that question. The 

notion of conducting a proof-of-concept test is a useful opportunity. 

I think we should do that. I think we should look at these details 

and see what opportunities are there. 

My concern is, we are given guidance to conduct something more 

than a proof of concept that takes us into an operational area. That 

creates some concerns about assignment and training of air crew 

maintainers, about cost for this, about passing the operations and 

maintenance (O&M) cost through a contract, about where do our 

people live, how do we operate, how do we deploy, how do we fight. 

It is one thing to look at a proof of concept, which we welcome; 

it is another to take an immediate leap to an operational template 

that drives us into a force structure discussion before we know the 

impacts after the proof of concept. 

So, Congressman, I would offer, the test is a good idea. The ability to look at this is a good idea. Then we need some time to look 

at the operational impacts and the magnitude of a contracting 

scheme or a contracting template that may or may not have true 

operational impact on the way that we provide aerial refueling to 

the joint team and the combatant commanders. 

And how would we deploy these, or not? How many would we 

look at? What type? What is the technology presented? Is it a boom 

or is it a basket? If it is a boom, my understanding the booms have 

not been developed yet. So there are some things to think about. 

So the proof of concept, I believe, is a good idea. I think the two 

of us, we would welcome that. But to go straight from that into an 

operational construct, I think, is premature. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The way I feel, I think that we need to give you some 

flexibility and see how it works. 

Now, I have nothing against contractors. I mean, you know, you 

contract when it makes sense. But I know we have Federal Express 

and we have other contractors, but I would much rather—and this 

is my own personal opinion—see it in house, because you have better control. 

You know, just like you stated, where are they going to site— 

where are they going to live, the workers? 

I have had experiences with contractors. Sometimes—in fact, not 

too long ago, we had flight training in Florida where the instructors went on strike, and for about two, three months they couldn’t 

teach our pilots how to fly. 

13 

I mean, it is a matter of when somebody can strike, would be different than when you have control over the people working for you? 

And I don’t want to take too much time, but I know maybe there 

will be a second round, Mr. Chairman. 

General MOSELEY. Congressman, there is another piece of this 

that I don’t know. And the details that I have seen of the concept 

would not be as onerous on the overall operation. But I don’t know 

what the final details are, and I don’t know—when you look at a 

KC–135 or a KC–10 performing a refueling mission, that is an 

operational training mission for the tanker crew as well as for the 

receiving crew. So I don’t know what this would do to our overall 

training and our overall readiness rates in our tanker squadrons. 

So the first step is a proof of concept to see what this looks like 

and to see how we would apply this. 

I welcome that, but I am hesitant to buy into an operational construct immediately without the proof of concept. I don’t know what 

that does to us until we can see the details. 

Mr. ORTIZ. I agree with you. 

And, again, we will work with you. It is nice to see a fellow 

Texan with us this morning. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Terry Everett. 

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

Mr. Secretary, General Moseley, thank you for being here today, 

and thank you for your service to our country. We are going to talk 

a lot today about hardware. But before we get there—I have some 

questions myself about hardware. 

Before we get there, I would like to talk about some things going 

on at the Air University down in Maxwell; and what the Air University would like is the authority to award a doctorate degree in 

strategic studies, a master of science in flight test engineering, and 

a master of science in airspace and cyberspace. 

Would you tell me what this means to the Air Force and also 

what it means to our professional men and women that have chosen to wear the uniform to serve this country? 

General MOSELEY. Congressman, thank you for that question, 

and thanks to the committee for helping us with this. 

In our tenure, we have asked Air University, the commander of 

Air University and Air Education and Training Command, to revitalize everything we can about Air University to be relevant in today’s fight, to understand more about insurgencies and more about 

a global war on terror, but also to understand how to better take 

care of our people and prepare people for the future and to better 

gauge what the future may look like. So for Air University to be 

able to grant this degree is a big deal for us. 

But, sir, I would also tell you that this is, as one of our officers 

goes through the course of Command and Staff College in many of 

the schools, from Monterey to Navy, Marine, Army, and back to the 

School of Advanced Aerospace Studies, they have already done 

most of the course content that would allow us to accredit that degree. 

What we are really asking for is the ability to give credit, which 

is for the work already been done. 

14 

I also want to be able to stress upon future officers the ability 

to see the horizon better. I want bigger thinkers. I want broader 

thinkers. I want more joint thinkers, more combined thinkers. And 

the ability to wrap this up and partner this inside Air University 

is a big deal for us for the future. It helps us get our arms around 

tomorrow. It helps us prepare ourselves for the bigger thinkers and 

the bigger thoughts and the uncertainty for tomorrow. 

So, sir, thanks for that question, and thanks for the opportunity 

to tell you this is a big deal for us. And we welcome the committee’s help on making this happen. 

Mr. EVERETT. Well, thank you. 

You have testified that our tanker fleet, which we need—we have 

to have, we can’t not have it—that it is about 44 years old. And 

I have a two- or three-part question on that. 

What is your current plan to retire these aircraft? Does your current acquisition plan for the KC–X, Y and Z tankers support the 

retirement plan? What is the current timing for the KC–X acquisition? Will there be any delays in that? And then what are the attributes and assessment criteria you are using to choose between 

the capabilities of the contenders for the KC–X? 

Secretary WYNNE. Sir, one thing that is for sure is. We have 44- 

year-old tankers. One thing that is for sure is that some of those 

tankers will go to age 75 before we can retire them simply because 

of affordability, that we cannot afford the rate of growth. Even if 

we were to award today, we can forecast that they would be 75 

years old. 

Our plan is to go ahead and put that program into action, retire 

the KC–135Es with the accession of the KC–X. And our plan then 

is to essentially prolong the best of the KC–135Rs until we can 

fully replace and amortize those. 

The KC–10s, as well, will look like they are going to span and 

work for another 20 to 25 years. 

We right now are treating both competitors with extreme fairness. All of the things that we have been through have augured for 

transparency and fairness in competition. We have done a very serious look at what they have done, and I still hope that we can, 

by January of next year, come to an agreement and award a KC– 

X contract. And that is where I am aimed. 

Mr. EVERETT. Did you say this year or next year? 

Secretary WYNNE. 2008. 

Mr. EVERETT. 2008. 

General MOSELEY. Congressman, if I could follow up on the KC– 

135 challenge, Congressman Saxton saw those airplanes in 

McGuire. 

The KC–135Es that we have parked, every week we have to send 

a crew chief out and tug and tow the airplane a certain distance 

to be able to keep the tires from going flat. And every 25 or 30 days 

we have to taxi the airplane to an engine run stand and run the 

engines to keep it in a status as mandated by language. 

Our preference would be to be able to manage our own inventory 

and retire those airplanes so we don’t spend manpower and time 

and money on these mandated status of these old airplanes. 

We have two locations that we are flying the E models, one at 

McGuire and one at Scott. Those are scheduled to come off of the 

15 

books so that we don’t have to do that. And our request to the Congress is to lift the restrictions on the XJ status and on the 1000 

status so we don’t have to spend that time and manpower and 

money on these airplanes that we don’t fly. 

And we only fly the KC–135Es in the vicinity of the airfield for 

Operation Noble Eagle and the Northeast Tanker Task Force. We 

don’t deploy them. We can’t take them into theater. We can’t lift 

the weight. We can’t operate at the temperatures with this airplane. And by the spring of 2010—all of them are now grounded 

because of the pylons and the structure, and so we are asking 

again for the Congress to please give us the authority to manage 

our inventory so we don’t waste crew chiefs and manpower and 

time and money on these airplanes. 

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. It is good to hear General Moseley speak about 

the Air University and teaching people to be big thinkers, strategic 

thinkers. It would have been helpful had we had a bit of your strategic thought through the Air Force eyes this morning, as opposed 

to budget cuts from people and budget constraints on your airframes. 

The Air Force fits into a strategic mold for our entire national 

security, and I would hope that your testimony is based upon solid 

strategic thought, which we haven’t received this morning. And I 

know the gnawing pressure on you is budgetary, but it would help 

for us to get a picture as to why you are making these decisions 

based upon solid strategy. 

Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to ask a couple 

of questions. 

First, maybe I will ask you, General Moseley, as you look at 

what is going on around the world and the tremendous responsibility you have now in terms of moving people and personnel into 

Afghanistan, Iraq, and those kind of theatres, I will ask you the 

General Casey question. If we have, you know, two weeks from now 

some major event that is going to require military action somewhere in the Far East, somewhere in the Pacific area—whether 

you talk about North Korea coming across over the border or something over Taiwan, a major event—do you have the ability now, 

from the transportation perspective, to move the kinds of personnel 

and equipment that would be required in those kinds of events and 

still maintain your current responsibilities in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

General MOSELEY. Congressman, it would be a challenge. I would 

be remiss in telling you we couldn’t do it. I mean, we would break 

all the rules, we would break all the established procedures to be 

able to deliver to Admiral Keating or General Bell the required materiel and people on the peninsula or in the Pacific. 

Some of the airplanes that we have, the C–5As, there are a number of them that are less reliable than others. But the crews that 

fly them and the maintainers that operate them at those bases, 

whether they are active, Guard, or Reserves, spend their lives trying to get those airplanes to do what you are asking. 

So it is not because the people don’t try. Some of it is just the 

age of the hardware and the capability attendant with that design. 

16 

Dr. SNYDER. But when you say it is a challenge, does that mean 

you lie awake at night thinking it is going to take longer, it will 

take you more time? You are at risk of its taking, instead of several 

weeks, several months, or instead of several days, several weeks? 

Or you may get planes out there that break down, and you won’t 

have the ability to get them up and moving, that the whole—— 

General MOSELEY. Sir, you have captured a part of my lie-awakeat-night concerns, and that is that the capacity and the sustainability and the reliability of some of these older platforms, both the 

tankers and the C–5s and some of the C130s, to be able do that. 

And as Congressman Saxton mentioned, we have used the C–17s 

at a much higher rate because they are so much more reliable. We 

are operating C–17s now as we used to operate C–130s. 

Our C–130 inventory that you are so familiar with, the H models 

and the J models, are as reliable as any other airplane. The E models are a challenge for us. 

Dr. SNYDER. I just wanted to get you to talk about that overall 

view. 

General MOSELEY. Yes, sir. 

Dr. SNYDER. Because I think that, you know, you all have a cando spirit, as does the rest of the military, and you will do whatever 

it takes to get the mission done. 

The problem, I think, for us as a country is, will it take you 

longer and at greater risk and potentially more loss of lives because of the ability or lack of ability to move things as quickly as 

you would like to under the best case scenario? And that is the concern. 

I want to ask—to pick on Mr. Saxton; my only criticism of what 

Mr. Saxton said this morning is, he didn’t have his microphone 

pulled in close enough, and I had a little trouble hearing, but I appreciate him taking the time and fleshing out some of these issues. 

I don’t understand—as you know, I have a C–130 base in my district, and I guess it is to my advantage, having C–130Es sitting out 

there that have to be started up and maintained, but I don’t see 

it. I mean, I just don’t understand why we have congressional legal 

language that prohibits you from, in your words, ‘‘managing your 

own fleet.’’ 

I guess the argument is—in fact, I appreciate in your-all’s joint 

written statement—it is only six pages long, but you have a significant couple paragraphs in here talking about just some of the need 

to retire some of these E models. I guess the argument would be 

the fear that you are going to go in—that is, the Air Force, if you 

had the ability to completely manage your fleet, you are going to 

overretire, you are going to overscrap, something will happen three 

months from now that you will say, Oops, we retired too many, we 

scrapped too many. 

Respond to that issue or share with me what you think the arguments are that you are hearing, why we are not giving you the authority to do that. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, I would offer to you that the fear that we 

would overretire is a bit shallow, because we still have the requirements to meet with U.S. Transportation Command and the theater 

commanders. 

17 

And so, for instance, at Ramstein, I am told by our commander 

in Germany that we have one C–130E that is so broken we can’t 

operate it, and we have four so restricted that we can’t lift any 

cargo other than the crew. 

Dr. SNYDER. Don’t you have some now sitting on tarmacs that 

are in such shape if you retire them you won’t be able to fly them 

out of there? 

General MOSELEY. The one in Ramstein is going to be a challenge to get out because we can’t fly it, I am told. But there are 

others in that same status. 

And so my desire would be, with the commanders in the field, 

to be able to retire the airplanes before we get to a safety-of-flight 

issue which, of course, you know we will get to at some point and 

be able to recapitalize these. 

So I suspect some of the fear in the Congress is that we will 

overretire, and we don’t have the budget authority or the financing 

or we don’t have the programs in place to replace those particular 

airplanes. And, of course, we work that very hard with the Guard, 

Reserve, and the active components to make sure we don’t disadvantage a unit. 

Dr. SNYDER. But spending money to keep planes that are not 

going to be used isn’t helpful. 

Mr. Chairman, I wanted to add to what Mr. Saxton said, that I 

hope that at conference—we have language that deals with the C– 

130E issue, at least we address that in our bill; and I hope the 

House conferees will really work with our Senate partners to explain to them where we are coming from, because I think it is an 

important issue of cost savings. 

It saves money. Literally, tens of millions of dollars can be saved 

annually if we will do this. 

Mr. ORTIZ [presiding]. I agree with the gentleman. Now that we 

are in conference, maybe we can look at all these problems that we 

have. 

And now Mr. Hayes. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We had a very productive 

conference meeting yesterday, as you well remember; and thank 

you for bringing up the fee-for-service program. 

General Moseley, if we could follow up on the fee-for-service for 

just a moment, very specifically, you and I have talked at great 

length, as have other very capable members of your staff. You have 

stated this morning already that fee-for-service presents a potential 

cost-saving, efficiency-producing option. Tell us the best way to do 

that. 

Based on the conference yesterday, we don’t need language from 

either side—the House doesn’t do it, the other body does—telling 

you what to do and how to do it. Tell us how that should be for 

the best effect of the Air Force in the country. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, my request to the committees would be 

to give us the opportunity to run a proof of concept, to understand 

what this really means. And then from that, we can develop an 

operational construct to know how we would fit that. Would we fit 

it into only training missions? Would we fit it into only unique special missions? How would that impact our assigning of squadrons, 

our manning of squadrons? How would that impact our O&M acVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:09 Aug 03, 2009 Jkt 041575 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-97\41575.TXT HARM2 PsN: MARY
18 

counts? How would that impact our deployability? How would we 

deploy or not deploy? How would this fit. 

Mr. HAYES. No disrespect, Chairman Skelton. You have made my 

point. You are the ones to do it. Mention also that you are in agreement that this in no way affects our need to go ahead with the K– 

CX and retirement of these incredibly costly airplanes. And just for 

a quick refresher, those here who don’t fly, one of the most expensive things you do is to start a jet engine. That is the maximum 

amount of heat, and it costs you a ton of money, but you have to 

start it. 

Well, anyway, I made the point for you. Now, let me jump over— 

well, go ahead and finish the service—this is not interrupting what 

we need to do for the future of the Air Force. 

General MOSELEY. No, sir. This is a useful look at an opportunity 

or an option. We embrace that. It cannot be a negative influence 

on fielding of K–CX because this will not provide the capacity for 

the jet tankers that we need for the joint team or the combatant 

commanders. We have to proceed with the number one procurement priority of the Air Force, which is the K–CX. 

Mr. HAYES. Absolutely. And I hope the other body is listening. 

It is very, very important that we do all aspects. And as you and 

I talk about it both as members of the Air Force and legislature, 

the practical matter—and you all, for the benefit of the Air Force 

and the military, raise the proper concerns and I am confident that 

you are addressing them fully. Joint cargo aircraft, there seems to 

be a little confusion. You and I have talked about this. The portion 

that goes to the Army, you are still in support of that concept, correct? 

General MOSELEY. Absolutely. 

Mr. HAYES. All right. There seems to be another train of thought 

out there that DOD or somebody wants to change that and give it 

all to the Air Force. That is incorrect? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, General Casey and I have had several 

conversations and we are working our way through this, chief to 

chief. There is still a roles and missions issue about intratheater 

airlift and about how intratheater airlift is conducted for the joint 

team. That piece is yet to be discussed. But the programmatic piece 

of fielding the C–27 in the Army, the Air Force, the National 

Guard or the Air National Guard, I am a big believer in this and 

I think there is a requirement for about 125 airplanes. 

Mr. HAYES. Okay. So you very clearly said, or I heard you say 

that you want the Army to have those aircraft as we have outlined 

it, and the last tactical mile is what you and General Casey are 

going to work out in theory. Is that sort of what we are saying? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, the last tactical mile is an interesting notion, because I believe in the intratheater airlift business. The last 

tactical mile also belongs to the air component, whether it is joint 

precision airdrop or whether it is a C–130 or whether it is a C– 

27. That is the discussion that General Casey and I will continue 

to have. But I do believe this is an intact program and I do believe 

that this is a useful program for the National Guard, the Air National Guard, the Army and the Air Force. Where the program 

ends up living and what has the program oversight and 

intratheater airlift, we are working our way through that, sir. 

19 

Mr. HAYES. Okay. I am not 100 percent clear, and I think you 

are saying that the Army has that capability now with helicopters. 

It has it with old Sherpa and aircraft that are even older than the 

tanker fleet. So this needs to be worked out so that they have that 

capability where a fixed wing is a far better instrument than a 

rotor wing aircraft to provide that flexibility for the Army, and you 

and General Casey are going to work that out. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, absolutely. The defining of the requirement for the delivery of materiel lives inside the land component 

and air components of a combatant commander. And so how 

intratheater airlift works and how things and people are delivered 

lives inside that joint structure. I believe that this airplane is useful and I believe we should buy this, and I believe the delivery 

schedules with the units that we have announced that happen to 

be Army Guard units first, we should continue with that delivery 

and with that funding. 

Mr. HAYES. Mr. Chairman, that gets me for now. I wanted to try 

to help the other body understand the Air Force. 

Mr. ORTIZ [presiding]. I think it would be good if we could get 

our staff together before we go to the next conference meeting so 

that they can go ahead—they know what the needs are and they 

can continue to meet with their staff. Like I said this morning, we 

have huge, huge problems. And some of this you can do on your 

own. But if you don’t have the money and if you don’t have the 

blessings from above, there is not much that you can do. 

Mr. HAYES. Mr. Chairman, we had that preliminary meeting 

after we finished the conference the other day and it was—they 

were listening. I don’t know how well they processed it. But I think 

clarification provided by General Moseley, Secretary Wynne, yourself, and Chairman Skelton this morning should be very helpful as 

we follow up. I will call in Ms. Tauscher if we need reinforcements. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Sir, I agree with your statements and I hope that we 

can get our stuff together and start working on this so we can get 

with the oversight on the Senate side and start working on this so 

we can try to see how we can help you. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to follow 

up on Congressman Hayes’ questions on the joint cargo aircraft. 

The present arrangement operates under a memorandum of agreement between the Army and the Air Force; is that correct? 

General MOSELEY. Correct. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Okay. And obviously the Senate passed language 

which would change that arrangement by statute at a point where 

it is clear, just from your testimony, you have not really completed 

your discussions with General Casey; is that correct? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, we have had several discussions, but not 

come to closure. I believe what I am seeing in the proposed language is the notion that the Air Force does intratheater lift. We 

spend our lifetime looking at intratheater lift and delivering people 

and services, whether it is a C–130 or in this case a C–27 or a C– 

17. So I believe—I have not been asked, nor have I talked to them. 

But I believe that is the genesis of the language in the other committee. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And that is fine. And you may be absolutely right 

that that belongs in the Air Force. The problem I have is that ConVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:09 Aug 03, 2009 Jkt 041575 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-97\41575.TXT HARM2 PsN: MARY
20 

gress is jumping the gun by inserting language without, in my 

knowledge anyway, a public hearing even on this issue. And I 

think you know that the ripple effect in terms of the disclosure of 

the language from the Senate has caused great consternation out 

there because this program has proceeded under the memorandum 

of agreement that there has been staffing on the Army side that 

has not been matched by the Air Force, and there are people who 

are very concerned about whether or not it is going to push back 

the planning and the implementation of the JCA program. 

Again, this is not about the Air Force as far as I am concerned. 

I think it is about the Congress jumping the gun with a process— 

I am a freshman. I am brand new. I was in the State legislature, 

though, for, eight years and it always seemed like unless there was 

an emergency before you act, you actually have a hearing and you 

discuss it and you have a real exchange and dialogue on any issue 

before you proceed. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, could I take a bit of issue with you on the 

notion that the Air Force has not been involved in this? We have 

been involved in this at the very beginning in the joint program 

and we understand how to field airplanes and buy airplanes and 

operate airplanes. So the notion that there would be a delay, or the 

notion that it would cost more, or the notion that there would be 

a disruption, I don’t buy that. But General Casey and I have not 

had a chance to sit down and have this discussion that you are 

talking about. 

Mr. COURTNEY. To me that really is the bottom line, which is 

that that should happen first before Congress proceeds with changing the status quo. And I appreciate your answers because that 

sort of helps frame sort of where we are in the process today, right 

now. 

And I just wanted to go back to the point that I was making because you did respond to it, which is the question of how the JCA 

program has been proceeding; because the Army, again, it appears 

that certainly since the agreement was signed, they have staffed 

this program to a greater extent than the Air Force right now. 

Maybe you can help with that. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, I will disagree. This is a joint program. 

We have had people in the program office. We understand how to 

build and operate and fly airplanes. I would offer to you that I disagree with the notion that there would be any disruption or delay 

or any impact on the program. I just don’t agree with that. But, 

again, General Casey and I haven’t had a chance to talk about this. 

And, sir, this is approaching the roles and missions issue about 

who does airlift. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And it does. And obviously this triggered a great 

response, pointing out the fact that the Army has been involved in 

this for a long time and that it is a change that the Senate has 

proposed a course of action that has been in existence for an awful 

long time. Again, to me this is about the process, and I don’t see 

an emergency here that says that we should go forward without 

having this thoroughly discussed so that everybody is on the same 

page. And there is a lot of confidence out there because there are 

National Guard associations, Governors out there that have erupted since the knowledge of this language was disclosed. And I don’t 

21 

think that is fair to them. I just don’t think Congress should surprise people who have been acting in reliance on a system and a 

memorandum agreement that has been in place for at least a couple of years. 

I don’t know if, Secretary Wynne, you want to respond to that 

at all. 

Secretary WYNNE. Sir, I was just going to say that the Army was 

very collegial in accepting the requirements that we needed. This 

is not called the joint cargo aircraft because it is a single op. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Right. But what the Senate is proposing to do is 

take the joint out of the—— 

Secretary WYNNE. The Senate recalls in years past, because you 

all are the memory for the Department of Defense because we— 

people like me come and go in the positions that we have. It is an 

honor to serve, but we understand it is a relatively short time. You 

may remember when the Army refused to take the Sherpas and 

they had to write legislation to force them to take it. That is what 

they remember. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, I would also offer we have both been on 

record and I have met with a variety of Governors to say the 

United States Air Force is committed to this for homeland security, 

homeland defense, for a Governors’ mission, for the National 

Guard, for the Air National Guard. There is no walking away from 

this requirement. 

Mr. COURTNEY. I appreciate that. What I think is of concern, 

though, is frankly the way this process has moved. I mean, we 

have not given the Governors a fair chance to come to Washington 

and actually share what their response is to that. I am not saying 

they wouldn’t necessarily agree with you. I mean, what we have 

heard this morning is that you have tremendous stresses and 

strain, just like the other branches that we have had hearings on. 

I would just humbly suggest again, as somebody who doesn’t 

even come close to your background, that taking on this issue with 

the process that has been employed by the Senate is not good for 

your situation in terms of the huge challenges that face you. I 

think we want everybody working together and the way this process has occurred, it is—it really has not created that kind of confidence for a lot of people out there who want to be your advocates 

and cheerleaders. 

General MOSELEY. But one last offering to you. The airlift and 

intratheater airlift is a core competency of the United States Air 

Force. That is what we do for the combatant commander for the 

Army, for the Marines, for the Navy, for the Special Ops. So I suspect we are looking now at the beginnings of roles and missions 

discussions because of limited resources and limited programs. I 

suspect that is where this is beginning to swirl. That is the piece 

that General Casey and I—that and the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

(UAVs) and C–27s are the things General Casey and I will have 

a chance to begin to work through. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And I look forward to that outcome. But it 

shouldn’t happen in a conference committee behind closed doors. 

And I will get off my soapbox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. Mr. Conaway. 

22 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General and Mr. Secretary, thank you for coming this morning. Can we talk some about 

the CSAR–X program and kind of bring us up to speed or update 

to date on where that is? We have had a couple of protests on the 

awarding thing that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

worked through. And can you talk to us about funding? We have 

got, I think, $280 million requested in this year’s budget for research, design, test, and evaluation (RDT&E). Where is that on the 

overall original plan, and is it more or less? Give us your thoughts 

on the overall procurement process for this aircraft as well as kind 

of where we go from today. 

Secretary WYNNE. As I understand it, the team released the 

draft amendment 5 yesterday, where we have got to give the 

teams, the contractor teams, about 21 to 30 days to take a look at 

it and get their feelings back on it and then we’ll turn it around 

and deliver it to them, so we are looking forward to delivering 

them in mid-November, the final amendment 5. 

I think we are going to give them probably 60 days to turn that 

around. So in January, I would anticipate that we could go through 

a review and probably by mid-February, which is about mid—the 

fiscal year we would award. Because the three programs are actually wrapped around helicopters that are essentially designed, we 

would anticipate that the contractors would be capable of expending the budget that we have asked for. You know, we regret the 

delay because our warfighters need the equipment, but that is kind 

of the timing I think you asked for, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY. On the amendment 5, if some of the contractors 

believe the scope is too narrow, will that be addressed during this 

comments and response period that you are talking about? 

Secretary WYNNE. That is exactly—we believe that we are attempting to comply with the GAO finding. And we think that that 

is the role that we need to play. And what this is, is this is an ongoing dispute that I think we need to sort out. And so we are asking each contractor to come on in and talk to us about it. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you. Just the overall idea of managing 

your fleet, whether it is C–5s or C–130s or tankers, whatever it is, 

and in getting back a little bit to what the Chairman talked about 

earlier in terms of strategic, if you had a balance sheet of aircraft 

you currently have versus craft that you really need and want, 

could you give that to us and let us just look at that to see what 

those numbers would look like all the way—from the cargo aircraft 

all the way through the F–35 and the F–22 as to kind of the—what 

should the Air Force capitalization look like if we weren’t worried 

about budgetary concerns? 

General MOSELEY. Congressman, we have got that. In fact, yesterday I spent all day with our four-star major commanders and 

the senior staff, Air National Guard, the Reserve, and our acquisition people doing exactly what the Chairman asked about and what 

you asked about. We call that the planning force, which is the force 

that we plan against with the combatant commander’s requirements. It has got each of the major portfolios: vigilance, reach, 

power. It has got each of the major systems. And it has got beddown—not only how many, but where would they be based and 

23 

how soon would we base them given the program force and the 

planning force, and that delta is the budget. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Each year we produce, or you produce, an unfunded wish list which we all sometimes think games get played 

with that. But could you also develop what the delta is between 

where we are right now in terms of costs—what would it cost us 

to get to that planned force that you would like to see in place, 

what is the capitalization cost on that? 

Secretary WYNNE. Yes, sir. This should not be a surprise to you 

because I have been quite public about it. The Chairman made a 

couple of points and I would say that the difference between the 

planning force, which we think satisfies the grand strategy, and 

the program force, which is what the budget is constraining us to 

do, is a briefing that we have in fact taken internal to the building. 

I believe it is going to go to Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB), and I would tell you that is one that we feel like you should 

request and I think might satisfy both you and the Chairman’s desires. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Well, I am not sure how that request thing 

works, but if the Chairman presents his request from the next-tolast Ranking Member on the committee, we would like to request 

that briefing. 

General MOSELEY. Congressman, that also includes the satellite 

systems, it includes all the air breathing systems, it includes all of 

the major design systems, whether they are tankers, cargo, 

intratheater lift, intertheater lift, the fighters, the unmanned vehicles. It is everything in there about how we meet the combatant 

commander’s requirements. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, I would like to have that in a briefing setting which would be a little less formal than this. But I would love 

to get that information. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ORTIZ. I think that is a good request. If we could maybe have 

a confidential briefing among some of you gentlemen so you could 

really come out and lay it down and tell us exactly what you think 

when it is convenient for you. 

General MOSELEY. Yes, sir. We would also like to include the Air 

National Guard and the Reserve in this, because everything that 

we have done, every new system that we are bringing on board, we 

are rolling that into an associate arrangement with the Guard and 

the Reserve. Yesterday, we had one of the TAGs with us in the session, as well as the director of the Guard—the Air Guard and Reserve. So nothing we do is without that total force flavor. So I 

would request if you ask us to do that, please allow us to bring Air 

National Guard and Reserve representation also. 

Mr. ORTIZ. We’d like to do that. An example is the fires in California right now where they are having probably to borrow from 

other States, but that depletes not only the manpower but the 

equipment that is being used. So I think that is a good request if 

we can work on that and then just get among ourselves and see 

how we can address this. Mr. Sestak. 

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, sir. I have always looked at the Air 

Force as the most transformational of the services. You said it well 

in your testimony that you want to dominate not just the air, but 

the real new commons space in cyberspace. So if that is the straVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:09 Aug 03, 2009 Jkt 041575 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-97\41575.TXT HARM2 PsN: MARY
24 

tegic thrust, just go down one more level then on this—just to take 

one or two operational tenets that have been placed out here to 

which you responded. 

I have been taken with the Air Force that as they look at the 

F–35, that pilot flying back pushes a button and the maintainers 

know automatically what is wrong with that plane before it lands. 

Less manpower needed for maintenance. 

You have taken the future—for us in the future for unmanned 

air vehicles. Unmanned air vehicles. And the leadership you have 

shown, that aircraft don’t have to go up all the time to do twos and 

twos or fours and fours, they can do it in these new flight simulators. So I have been taken how you have led over the years the 

fight within the Pentagon that actually the future is one where it 

should be less manpower-intensive, not as your testimony says the 

lesser of two evils but exactly the right approach. 

And I bring that up because you say we have gone down since 

2001, six percent in our manpower, but yet now there are some 

numbers whether we really need as many. But to me that is really 

more of a symptom of this Iraqi war as the in-lieu-of (ILO) tasking 

comes about and your deployments has increased 30 percent. Are 

you now telling me that the future is really better with more manpower? With all the attending health care costs, all the attendant, 

isn’t what you have always preached over there less manpower-intensive, more technology is the future? 

General MOSELEY. Congressman, that is a great question. The 

ability to do with less people is a reality for us. The new systems 

require less maintenance. 

Mr. SESTAK. A good reality, am I wrong? 

General MOSELEY. No, you are not wrong. The notion of how to 

do this business in the future with fewer of the most expensive of 

our resources, which are our treasured people, there is an opportunity to be smaller. No different than the Navy has done with the 

manning of their ships. But, sir, I would also tell you that the contemporary—or today’s mission with the tasking has put a bit of a 

knot in our rope. With about 6,100 people deployed—— 

Mr. SESTAK. If I could interrupt you, because I don’t have enough 

time. Can I buy off, then, that absent this war, you are on the right 

glide slope for manpower? 

General MOSELEY. Yes, sir. And our planning force that we 

talked about takes us through a force structure of 86 wings. 

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, General. Because then I can walk out 

of here saying decreasing manpower, not bad, if absent this war. 

Second question, if I could, General. I am sorry. I don’t mean to 

be rolling. I just get 5 minutes and they usually shave 30 seconds 

off the freshmen. 

Airlift experts do logistics, amateurs do tactics. You brought out 

the Antonov, whatever the Russian aircraft is. And you brought up 

Korea. Before everybody walks out of this hearing, isn’t the real reality that we don’t want the C–17s carrying everything over to 

Iraq? We consciously in sea and airlift want to commercialize a lot 

of that because it saves us money and doesn’t wear our planes out. 

And in Korea’s case, when we invoke civil reserve air fleet (CRAF), 

the civilian airlift that all our war planes call for—the only real 

25 

strain on our lift is when you have two nearly simultaneous major 

contingencies—we are going to do okay for lift for Korea. 

General MOSELEY. But, sir, remember the CRAF is mostly people. 

Mr. SESTAK. Yes, sir. If I could—and I should have put this out. 

We were told by Admiral Fallon when he departed the Pacific, that 

at this moment we cannot deploy Army units to help 30,000 service 

members in South Korea, because no one in the unit is ready to 

deploy, and the Air Force and the Navy will have to be the reinforcements. I think that is a bit bad, and that is the tragedy of this 

war and why we need that strategic redeployment from Iraq. 

That said, at this moment, there is no capability to deploy 

ground troops. So with CRAF, is it not true that we can really handle that situation from where we are today? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, I still at night worry about our strategic 

airlift and the ability to move things, equipment, bulk, outsized 

cargo, because a sizeable portion of our strategic airlifters are not 

as reliable on launch reliability or in commission rates than the 

others. The going to the contract option is not a bad idea, but it 

provides you no in-depth capacity or indigenous capability to be 

able to do that under surge. And if you surge the system with some 

of the aircraft with low launch probabilities or end commission 

rates, you won’t get there from here. 

Secretary WYNNE. Congressman, you know, we stood up five National Guard squadrons to apply Predators so that they don’t have 

to leave their home station. We are also thinking about relying on 

the National Guard heavily in our cyber command so they don’t 

have to leave their home station. So what we are trying to do is 

to avoid deployments and avoid—reach forward where we can. 

But I would tell you that it is a chicken-and-an-egg thing. When 

you are desperate to figure out how to save money, you do interesting things to do that. And one of them is restructure and look 

at your manpower in a very interesting way, and we are looking 

at it. And it is overlayed with technology. There are no more operators. We use telephone routers, for example. So there are interesting ways to do it. I mean, I worry about it primarily when somebody tells me we are smaller than the Army Air Corps was, but we 

are more capable and we are more capable. We just need to continue our recapitalization. 

Mr. SESTAK. Sir, if I could just close. There are two reasons for 

my questions. I don’t think your answers are spot-on. But I was 

taken by your testimony where you said as the Army now wants 

to increase, the Air Force needs to. But I never remember in the 

1990’s as the Army was going down, that the Air Force said we 

should come down commensurately. 

Second, with the Army asking for $70 billion for 92,000 troops, 

22 billion to reset, $6 billion for MILCON, $10 billion a year for 

wages, and now your $20 billion a year, and the Navy and Army 

hasn’t even been here. Somehow this manpower issue and others 

and how we use civilian and fee-for-service really has to be an 

operational part of this. 

General MOSELEY. Congressman, remember for Desert Shield, 

Desert Storm, and at the peak of the Cold War when the Berlin 

Wall fell, the Air Force was over 600,000 people. On 1 October, we 

26 

were 333,000 people. So we have come down as the commensurate 

forces have come down. As the Army grows and the Marines grow 

in regimental and brigade combat teams, remember, we have a 

large number of airmen that are living attendant inside those 

units. Our combat controllers, our combat weather, our combat 

com, our air-to-surface operational squadrons and groups, I mean, 

we live inside those units to provide air-to-ground support to combatant forces. If the number of brigade combat teams goes up, we 

will have to go up in those particular elements. 

And that is another case that—another episode that General 

Casey and I are working. In fact, how big does that look, how many 

growth opportunities do we have for airmen to be inside those brigade combat teams? That is an unknown. I don’t have that answer 

yet. 

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you very much. As Mr. Secretary just said, 

this is a conundrum. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The gentlelady from Virginia, Ms. Drake. 

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Wynne, General Moseley, thank you for being here. 

Both of you in your comments talked a lot about cyberspace. Certainly you know there is a great deal of interest here on that command, but the media reports different timelines. I wondered if you 

could tell us the timeline that the Air Force is working with and 

when you expect to know what benchmarks a specific locality 

would have to meet to be considered, and when do you expect to 

make a decision about where the cyber command will be sited? 

Secretary WYNNE. I believe it is just finding its legs. And we 

have not established a process to answer the questions that you 

have. I think I have given them until year end to come up with a 

process to allow this to happen. So I would be jumping the gun if 

somebody said, if I were to pronounce timelines, because I don’t 

know where the manpower will come from to do the evaluation to 

do it. But I will say that we are at an interim state and we will 

be following the process to determine what is the proper end state. 

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you. 

General MOSELEY. There is a follow-on to that that gets to Congressman Sestak’s question. In a normal major command, the staff 

is about 1,000, to 1,200 to 1,300 people just for the staff. As we look 

at standing up cyber command as a major command, we are having 

to redistribute amongst the major commands to find that manpower to do that, so it is not a plus-up in total numbers of people. 

That takes some time because of the competencies we are looking 

for inside that cyber command. So that is a piece that we don’t 

know yet. 

The other piece is you do an environmental assessment and environmental impact studies in a variety of locations. You want to do 

that right. That takes a number of months to be able to go out to 

the various locations and consolidate that material and then make 

judgments on data. So that is playing out. 

Secretary WYNNE. But one of the things, just as Congressman 

Sestak says, as we look at cyber command, we are also looking at 

it being a virtual command. So the number of people is not going 

to be anywhere close to what we have in our classic major commands. In fact, so far, I think they have asked for about 180 total 

27 

people. And what we are going to do is rely on the out offices to 

essentially provide them command status via the Net, which is 

what they are. So we are putting some pressure on them to try to 

bring us better management techniques, given that they are a part 

of the New Age themselves. So that is another thing that I think 

you should take into account is that as we go down this road, we 

are hoping that this will help us limit some of the angst that is 

going on. 

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you for that. 

I just wanted to ask one other thing quickly if I could. And that 

is in regards to the Joint Strike Fighter, how many the Air Force 

plans on procuring and if that is affordable. But my question really 

wraps around the F–22 and whether the 183 F–22s, whether that 

executes our national strategy and whether the number of the 

Joint Strike Fighters, whether that is a block to the number of F– 

22s that we might need, and especially since the Navy and the Marines are buying Joint Strike Fighters too, whether Air Force focus 

should be on the F–22. I know there is not much time left. But 

thank you. 

Secretary WYNNE. Let me start by saying with 1,763 F–35s, we 

want 381 that we have asked for in our planning force; 381 F–22s. 

So far we have been authorized 183 F–22s. Nobody in Air Combat 

Command (ACC) has changed their requirement. The Chairman 

asked about strategy. You have one kind of strategy when you have 

381 F–22s. You have another kind of strategy when you have 183. 

You have one kind of strategy when you have 1,763 F–35s. You 

have another strategy when that purchase is stretched out over 25 

years. So it is the rate of access of the airplanes. 

So right now what I have asked to do is at least bridge over till 

we actually have a working fifth generation F–35 line and at least 

allow me to get 20 additional F–22s. This is far below the 381. But 

it does allow me to begin to fill out some of my squadrons that are 

in fact in theaters that I worry about. 

General MOSELEY. Ma’am, the numbers of F–35s that the Air 

Force has programmed is 1,763. The number that the Navy and 

Marines have programmed is a number of about 600 or so, if I remember right. And please don’t confuse the missions of each of 

these aircraft because they are completely different designs. 

The A model, which is the Air Force airplane, is designed to generate hundreds of sorties a day inside a theater to provide the 

throw-away in the striking capacity. The Marine airplane is designed to operate off ships and expeditionary places. The Navy airplane is a bigger and heavier airplane to operate off of a carrier. 

These are different-kind designs and different operational templates. So they are not mutually exchangeable for degrading the 

total numbers of aircraft in the program. 

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Tauscher. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Wynne, General Moseley, welcome back. Good to see 

you again. I have a few issues that I want to kind of move through 

very smartly. As you know, my district is the home of Travis Air 

Force Base and the Air Mobility Command and we are very honVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:09 Aug 03, 2009 Jkt 041575 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-97\41575.TXT HARM2 PsN: MARY
28 

ored to have all of those folks in our district and want to thank you 

both for your service. 

And I think, Secretary Wynne, particularly at this time, having 

a man with your kind of background when we are dealing with all 

of these procurement issues and the strategic issues of how we get 

our airlift capabilities at least of one of the many things right, I 

think that you are the right man for the job. 

And General Moseley, let me tell you how impressed I am about 

how quickly and how effectively you moved out after the news of 

the tactical ferry incident, which was unacceptable and shocking to 

say the least, moved out. I think both General Newton and General 

Rehberg’s reports have been of significant information to our—excuse me, sir. I can’t see my witnesses. And I think that we have— 

really I think gotten a lot of candor from you. And I very much appreciate that, considering the import of that incident and how, as 

I said, shocking it was. 

I think the follow-on reports that the Secretary has asked for 

from both Larry Welch and from the intergovernmental review 

(IGR) are very good. Clearly we don’t know everything. There is a 

lot more that we will get to know. I have introduced legislation 

that is a companion to Senator McCaskill’s amendment that calls 

for an independent analysis of airlift requirements. And I am interested in understanding—we don’t expect this report, which we 

think will go through the conference perhaps, to be available till 

February of 2009. But I think that the problem that we have is 

that there is no such thing as a red-headed stepchild in the services called the Air Force. We need to have an Air Force that not 

only has all of its capabilities, all of its capitalization, is looking 

forward and is fully manned and equipped, but this is a ‘‘have to 

have’’ and not a ‘‘nice to have.’’ 

And I think that for many reasons, your testimony reflects a 

sense that we are suffering from priorities that came upon us, both 

IEF and OEF, but also because of the aging fleet. And I think 

that—I don’t really have a question about it other than to say that 

I think that we need a lot more peeling back of the onion. I think 

we have to have much more of a strategic view of what exactly we 

are expecting, what we are going to need to have, what our capabilities are going to have to be, not only because of the aging fleet, 

but because of contingencies in other theaters. 

But also I think that—what we are also hearing is that we need 

some intraservice—joint requirements oversight council (JROC) 

perhaps talking, other things happening, that give us a better view. 

And what I would suggest and I would ask the Chairman, if he 

would concur, if we could have you back perhaps very early next 

year to have a much more strategic view. I know both of you think 

strategically. I know that you have—when I work from my subcommittee point of view on space and other parts of this, it is completely from a strategic point of view. But I do think that we need 

to go to the next round of understanding; for example, what the 

size of the strategic airlift needs to be, what do we do with an 

aging fleet that has all of these different demands? What do we do 

about fee-for-service and is that the best cost-effective way for us 

to do this? 

29 

You know, I am not happy about the fact that the Congress has 

had to add—I have helped lead the effort for the C–17s for the last 

couple of years that were not in the President’s budget. I am also 

not happy that every time we have done that to keep that line not 

only warm but hot, we haven’t gotten any cost savings. I always 

expected that if I kept the line warm, that I was going to see some 

cost savings. The price for coffee and a plane has not gone down. 

So we need to find a sweet spot in all of those areas. 

I will ask the Chairman to have you back as soon as we can 

when we come back next year. And once again, I appreciate both 

of your service. And if you have any comments, I am happy to hear 

them. 

General MOSELEY. Congresswoman, thank you for that. As you 

know, by having us spend time with you, and you know from having Travis in your district, we do things strategically. And these 

issues that we work, we begin from the top down. Now, whether 

that is how we teach ourselves, that is also how the Air Force has 

historically done business. We look at the global requirement from 

the combatant commanders and we begin to work down through 

the strategic, to the operational and tactical level. 

So the ability to operate on a global scale is what makes this Air 

Force unique from the other services, but also from any other service in any other country. There is no other service that has the access to a global set of activities, whether they are humanitarian relief, whether they are fires in Southern California right now, 

whether they are disaster relief, or whether they are targets or 

whether they are surveillance issues. That is just in our DNA code 

to approach this from the strategic level first. So we would welcome 

that opportunity. 

Secretary WYNNE. Madam Congresswoman, it addresses the 

Chairman’s view on strategy. And I believe if we could get the 

briefing on the planning force over to the committee, I think it 

would very much help answer his questions and yours as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. You know, a while ago, 

General, you were speaking about the university and people thinking big. And you talked about your global responsibilities. This is 

a budget hearing. Don’t you think we ought to have a basic understanding as to why you need fighters and how many? Why you 

need tankers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), bombers, 

et cetera and fit it into the whole picture and then talk about the 

budgets, that you can’t get as many tankers as you want, dot, dot, 

dot and—we have to struggle with the strategic requirements. And 

it would be very, very helpful and why should we have to have a 

separate hearing for this, Mr. Secretary. I am sorry to—— 

Secretary WYNNE. Sir, I think there is—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry to tell you I am disappointed, but we 

can have a budget hearing anytime. We need to know the strategic 

requirements to defend the national interest, and the Air Force in 

so many respects is the glue between all the other services. They 

can’t get there but for you. They can’t defend against so much but 

for you. You are the power projection. And where you fit into this 

whole scheme of strategy is so important, and that is why we 

should have benefit of that, and that is what I was hoping, Mr. 

Secretary, you would do this morning. Well, I won’t belabor it. 

30 

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t 

know if these mikes are on or not. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary and General. Thank you for coming today. 

My questions I hope will address a very important element of the 

Air Force, the fighter fleet. We have had some discussions before, 

and I am deeply concerned not only for the ability of the Air National Guard fighter wings such as the 177th in my district to perform in the war over there, but for their ability to protect the 

homeland in a vital air sovereignty alert mission. As I am sure you 

are well aware, the number of Class A accidents for F–16s has increased per year and has increased in recent years as the planes 

age. 

Potential for loss for life and property and maintenance costs increase with the age of the airframe. Age issues affect the Air National Guard heavily as the Air National Guard flies older planes 

such as the Block 30 F–16. 

As part of your September remarks, you stated that in the near 

future, conflicts with countries possessing newer Russian SAM systems, the F–15, 16 and 18, would not be able to participate in the 

fight over these countries. That knocks out every Air National 

Guard unit in the country from the warfighting half of their mission. 

The second half of the air sovereignty alert mission is equally 

bleak. The F–16s at the 177th are projected to run out of flight 

hours around 2012. Unless newer aircraft are procured, the 177th 

and many other air sovereignty alert missions, the units will be out 

of business protecting America’s cities such as New York, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Washington. 

My question, Mr. Secretary, as you noted in September, when 

the age of equipment reaches a certain point it means you are 

going out of business. It is simply a matter of time. I think, sir, 

that was essentially your quote. Is there a recapitalization plan for 

the Air National Guard fighters and will it be implemented in time 

to avoid having units such as the 177th with missions but without 

planes? 

Secretary WYNNE. I started that whole conversation by saying 

when we went into Baghdad in 2003, we only took F–117s and B– 

2s. We actually restricted anybody else from going into the fight 

until 72 hours after the city had been opened, and we didn’t put 

B–52s in until 10 days after. I hope those dates are correlated with 

my—the guy who ran the air war. But frankly, that tells me that 

as modernization happens in our enemies, yeah, we are going to— 

we are going to put behind us the fourth generation, and are wanting to invest in the fifth generation airplanes. And we feel very 

constrained by—as the Chairman has indicated, as we forecast the 

requirement for 381 F–22s and 1,763 F–35s, we feel like that is a 

sufficient quantity to replace what we have now. And we have a 

bed-down plan through 2025 to lay those in to all of the squadrons 

that deserve them. 

We haven’t been flying F–15s for a very long time because we 

know that we cannot replace all of that, and they are very effective 

31 

in areas where we have air dominance and where we have air superiority. So we feel like there is going to be an ongoing mission. 

And if you fly within the continental United States (CONUS) on an 

operational level, you need a little bit less, because this is U.S. sovereign airspace. So we feel like, yes, the National Guard is going 

to be playing a role for a long time to come. 

General MOSELEY. Congressman, let me add to that, sir. I would 

offer to you that our aggressor squadrons that we have right now 

and the Thunderbirds, the Air Force Jet Demonstration Squadron 

flies Block 30s. So this is not an issue of the Guard having something that the active doesn’t have. We fly the same airplanes. And 

we are a total force. 

Yesterday, when we sat down and went through every single one 

of the road maps and potential bed-down locations and new equipage to get at the strategic setting that the Chairman is talking 

about—how many fighters do you need to do what and where 

should they be—we had a TAG invited and we had the international Guard on board and we showed the entire bed-down, 

whether it was Active, Guard, or Reserve. 

And, sir, when we fielded the F–22 first at Langley, that was a 

Guard-associated unit with Virginia. As we look at the next set of 

bed-downs for the F–22, there is Reserve units in—Reserve or 

Guard in New Mexico, Reserve in Alaska, and there is a full Guard 

squadron in Hawaii. 

On the F–35 bed-downs, we are looking at immediate association 

with Guard and Reserve in every one of those units. So, sir, we are 

dead serious about the strategic setting of how many tactical fighters do you need, roughly 2,250, and how do you wrap up and imbed 

in that the Guard, Reserve, and inactive to make sure that you get 

absolute benefit from each of those aircraft in each of those locations? 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, General. Just very quickly because I 

know my time is running out. I am aware of the so-called four-corners proposal for the transition of F–22s into the—maybe I can get 

to you later, General. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Castor, please. 

Ms. CASTOR. Good morning, gentlemen. Across all of the services, 

all service members, men and women, are struggling now. Here we 

are in the fifth year of the war in Iraq, well into the fifth year, and 

servicemen and women are struggling with very lengthy war zone 

rotations, worn-out equipment. We have growing discipline problems and sometimes disjointed medical care when they return as 

wounded and injured veterans. 

And then for the Air Force, you add on top of that the challenges 

of the in-lieu assignments where members of the Air Force are assigned to tasks and missions that are outside of their training. I 

think you testified we are now up to well over 6,000; is that right? 

General MOSELEY. Sixty-one hundred today. 

Ms. CASTOR. Sixty-one hundred. And that trend has just continued to increase over the past year. Do you see any sign of that 

changing? 

General MOSELEY. Ma’am, there is actually 15,000 because you 

have people in training and in the pipeline. But you have got 6,100 

32 

deployed. Now, I will say that the Air Force is part of a joint team. 

And if there is a requirement for us to participate, we will do that. 

Ms. CASTOR. And I understand and I hear that from folks that 

serve in the Air Force, that they are proud to do that. But it comes 

at a cost. And I have heard estimates that it is costing us three 

times the amount of money that it does. Is that an accurate assessment? 

General MOSELEY. Ma’am, I don’t know where that calculation 

came from. I would have to take that for the record and see—— 

Ms. CASTOR. This was from a four-star general in the Air Force 

recently. 

General MOSELEY. I probably know him, if you have got his 

name there. 

Ms. CASTOR. I do. I do. He says it costs as much as three times 

when you consider the training, preparation, recertification for airmen being set down range, those just returned home and those preparing—— 

General MOSELEY. Let me get the facts for you, ma’am. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 69.] 

Ms. CASTOR. Because I would like to know how, if we can quantify that in dollars a little bit more, it costs three times more? 

What does that do? 

And now back to the Chairman’s overriding concern and you 

stated it, that you are also concerned, as the new chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff is as he enters his new assignment with this 

strategic risk confronting this country because of the war in Iraq 

and the way it has played out. I imagine you have been involved 

in significant discussions on how that affects your strategic missions. I know the defense bill contains a new direction to examine 

the roles and missions. 

But what are the—if you can get back to the Chairman’s point 

and point out to us how all of this informs you and what your general direction will be for strategic roles and missions and try to 

quantify it in dollars for us, but also especially noting the strategic 

risks that confronts this country. 

General MOSELEY. Ma’am, I would offer first that the Air Force 

has been in combat out there for 17 years. Since the deployment 

for Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Air Force hasn’t left the region. 

In fact, we flew 12 years in the no-fly zones, being shot at almost 

every day on top of Bosnia, Kosovo, then Afghanistan and Iraq. So 

our clock started in August of 1990 in the Middle East. And so our 

deployment schedule and our rotation schedule has been changed 

over time to adapt to that high tempo. 

We also understand that we will be there for a long time because 

the attributes of air and space power are the exact things that will 

be constant. 

Now, once the land component has other challenges and perhaps 

become smaller, you will always have a requirement for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance. You will always have a requirement for lift, for combat search and rescue, for strike. My prediction is the Air Force, with elements of the Navy and the Marines that fly, also will be there probably for another decade. We 

are prepared to do that. So the in-lieu-of tasking is one of those 

33 

things that we are having to work very hard and take care of our 

people to make sure they are actually trained to do the things we 

ask them to do. 

Our red lines are that we don’t send anybody into one of these 

mission sets that is not their competency. So we train them inside—whether security forces or civil engineering or intelligence— 

to do the things that we are asking them to do. 

But it is slightly different when you do it in this in-lieu-of 

tasking than when they are assigned to an air expeditionary force. 

And that is the delta in training and that may be where the price 

that you referenced comes from. I will get those numbers for you. 

Ms. CASTOR. And how does it impact the growing global strategic 

risk? How does that focus in the CENTCOM area affect what we 

need to be doing around the world? 

Secretary WYNNE. As we have been preparing for this conference, 

as well as over time, we have been assembling statistics that basically show we have a steady erosion in the operational readiness 

of our force structure. Recently we have had some erosion in our 

statistics for retention and for recruiting. We worry. 

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. Mr. Jones from North 

Carolina. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And Secretary 

Wynne and General Moseley, it is always a pleasure. And thank 

you for your leadership for this Nation. 

Along the lines of what Ms. Castor was talking about, I want to 

kind of build on that for just a moment. I was not here for your 

formal presentation. I apologize. But I have written down just 

words, and I want to get to a question after I just—I think, Secretary Wynne, you said I hope we won’t be too small in the future; 

budget pressures; chicken and egg; desperate to save money; other 

comments that I have no need to read. 

I realize that, you know, this country is not your doing; that you 

have got to adjust to what is happening within this country. We 

are getting ready to have close to 80 million baby boomers to retire 

over the next 2 or 3 years that will start drawing Social Security. 

Congressman Sestak mentioned the issue of the $10 billion a 

month in Iraq, $300 million per day roughly. I am just at a point 

of—Secretary Wynne, how long—your comment again I repeat, ‘‘I 

hope we won’t be too small in the future.’’ 

Let us talk a little bit about the future. I am always concerned 

about China. Not so much that China is going to attack America, 

but China is a nation that has proven that it is very smart in the 

respect of patience. And if this country is in such a situation where 

you, as a Secretary of the Air Force, and certainly the other secretaries would say the same thing, that they have budget pressures, 

I hope we are not too small in the future. Knowing that we have 

a trade deficit of about $300 billion with China, being told that— 

I think you testified to this several months back—that they are 

spending their money to build their Air Force, they are buying the 

fastest fighter that the Russians make. The difference is we still 

have the best pilots. But how soon in the future are we going to 

compromise our air superiority with all of the problems that you 

can’t control and we can’t even control them in Congress, talking 

34 

about the growing debt? How soon will that future come that we 

could be too small and our air superiority could be challenged? 

Secretary WYNNE. Sir, let me start by saying that tonight and tomorrow morning we are prepared to go to war, without a doubt, 

and we would be victorious. There is not a doubt in my mind. As 

Chairman Pace, I think was asked, ‘‘What do you do about additional threats?’’ Clearly they rely on the Air Force and the Navy. 

And the both of us, by the way, are getting smaller in the number 

of ships and the number of airplanes. So right today we have no 

problem. 

What I worry about is the 2020 to 2025 time frame. That is when 

we will have essentially—if you look at our timeline, we will have 

theoretically shut down every production line in America other 

than the F–35. And at that point in time, you have got to ask yourself—and perhaps the tanker will be going on by then. And you 

have got to ask yourself, ‘‘Is that what we want?’’ And right now, 

I can tell you, with the erosion in operational readiness, the Chief 

and I see no alternative but to essentially recapitalize our way out 

of this operational readiness decline. I think our training is good. 

I think the spares are good. I think having some of the instructor 

pilots engaged in war, that could have an effect. We are trying to 

calculate that. 

Mr. JONES. General Moseley, would you speak to that also, 

please? 

General MOSELEY. Congressman Jones, the technology imbalance, we are already there. The F–15s that are in your district, 

they are wonderful airplanes, they are very capable airplanes. But 

against the new generation threat systems, they don’t have the advantage that we had when they were designed in the late 1960’s 

and built in the 1970’s. 

The F–22 and the F–35 are the answer to the air dominance 

piece which is the predicate to anything that happens in a theater. 

So the deliveries of the F–22 and the F–35 are critical not just for 

the Air Force, but for the entire joint team in a strategic setting. 

So as far as the balance of technological capability, we are there 

with the threat system. That is why the F–35 and the F–22 are important. I could make the same point for the new bomber. I could 

make the same point for the tanker. I could make the same point 

across the spectrum on the space systems as well, and the capabilities that we can field that gives us that strategic leverage in the 

future. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Boyda, please. 

Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for your service and being here. This can’t be 

easy on anyone. As a member of the Personnel Subcommittee, I 

was just going to direct some of my questions in that regard. Just 

with the ILOs, you have kind of taken, or you have taken on a new 

mission, an additional mission. How are the ILOs affecting your retention and recruitment? 

General MOSELEY. Ma’am, they are having some impact. It was 

the same question that Congresswoman Castor was asking. We 

have been doing this for a while, and so we are seeing some cracks 

in some of the retention numbers. 

35 

The recruiting numbers, we have not had a problem yet, touch 

wood. We are very selective about our recruiting. We have not 

changed the standards. We have not lowered the standard. We 

don’t intend to lower the standard because of the nature of the Air 

Force. That has not been the problem to date. Even the Guard, 

which we thought we were going to have a hiccup with that, we 

are now at I think 99.3 percent of their meeting their requirement. 

Mrs. BOYDA. About 104 in Kansas. 

General MOSELEY. There you go. 

But the retention piece is different. Once you get into the folks 

that have been on active duty 6 years or 10 years or more, and 

they have had multiple deployments into tasking that is not in 

their mind their core competency, then we are having some challenges with that. And we work that very hard. We work that with 

the families. We work that with the training. We work that with 

the recovery time. We work that in theater, so that airmen work 

for airmen. We know where every one of them goes, what they are 

supposed to do. 

Mrs. BOYDA. Let me ask another question as well, and I appreciate your direct answer on that. With contractors and, you know— 

we said that we know that this whole conflict is not going to be 

over any time soon—how many contractors would you say are 

working for the Air Force right now? And let me tell you where I 

am going with that question, so I don’t have that little yellow light 

pop up here. When we—we are going to cut our troop strength in 

the active and the Guard, or the Reserve components of the Air 

Force. A year from now, how many more contractors will you have 

hired or employed or contracted with? And two years from now, 

how many more contractors for every hundred people that are cut, 

how many more contractors? And by the way, I hope to be here in 

two years to ask you this question, Secretary. 

Secretary WYNNE. We are going to have to get back to you on the 

baseline, so that you can properly ask the question and we can get 

a score sheet for you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 69.] 

Mrs. BOYDA. My anticipation is, how many of those are going to 

be replaced by contractors? 

Secretary WYNNE. I am cutting the operations and maintenance 

money as well, and we are actually—so we are driving out contractors. I have asked for a 10 percent reduction in contractor labor 

over the course of time. This is not going to be a suffering that is 

just inside the service. This is going to be in our contractor support, 

too. I got a lot of push back. I got a lot of push back, because there 

is a great contractor community. And we all try to add value to the 

Air Force. 

Mrs. BOYDA. So the airmen, and I appreciate and agree with 

what you are saying, the airmen, the thousands of airmen that 

were additional airmen that we are going to be cutting, active and 

Reserve, do you anticipate any of those being picked up? Is there 

any place in the budget, any place, any budget, are we going to be 

replacing airmen with contractors? 

Secretary WYNNE. It is all on the basis of need and requirement. 

But, right now, we are actually looking at the Reserve, as whether 

36 

or not they should have some restoration. If we examine how we 

spend our money across our Air Force, we are looking at all the active, all the National Guard and all the Reserve to make sure that, 

if we have to go up as a result of the ground force improvement, 

that we kind of bias it to the Reserve, the National Guard and the 

active, in that kind of order. 

Mrs. BOYDA. Again, I don’t know if I got—are you anticipating 

any of these airmen cuts to be replaced by contractors? 

Secretary WYNNE. As I said, I have asked for a reduction in contractors as well. I don’t know the specifics of your answer because 

that is a very office-to-office thing. 

Mrs. BOYDA. If there is a chance to take a look at that, I certainly would appreciate it. 

Secretary WYNNE. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Akin to be followed by Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Mr. Secretary and General, earlier this year, the Air Force 

leaders testified in support of the retirement of at least 30 of the 

C–5s and procurement of at least an additional 30 C–17s. Is this 

still the Air Force’s official or unofficial position? If yes, does the 

Air Force plan on funding C–17s in 2009 or 2010 or beyond? And 

if not, why has the Air Force stopped talking about the working for 

the so-called 30–30 proposal? 

Secretary WYNNE. Thank you for the question. The 30–30 proposal was just that, a proposal. It was in response to requests from 

Congress as to what would be a preferred, if you were just taking 

life cycle costs into action. We have never had the money to fund 

the C–17s. So we are congressionally restricted by law from retiring C–5s. So we did not put anything in our budget that would violate the law. And that is where we stand right now. 

Mr. AKIN. So, then, if the C–5 part of the law were taken away, 

would it then be your interest, if you could, to replace those 30 C– 

5s with C–17s? 

Secretary WYNNE. If the C–5 law was taken away and we could 

manage the fleet, I think what we would like to do is pretty much 

documented in that proposed 30–30, because we still need 300 

lifters. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, we still need the C–5s. The ones that remain in the inventory, we need them in the best shape we can possibly put them in. 

Secretary WYNNE. Right. 

Mr. AKIN. As I recall, there are different models of those, and it 

was the earliest model, the performance of those has been very 

poor in terms of maintenance. And apparently, the costs are just 

continuing to skyrocket on those. Is that correct? 

[Nonverbal response.] 

Mr. AKIN. So if we did see fit to take out the language that the 

Senate had put in in protecting those planes that are, what, 30 percent available or something like that; if we could not protect those 

anymore, then it would make sense to have some other lift capability. The C–17 has been working well for you. So that would 

37 

make—so that is that 30–30 proposal. So you still support that. 

Just we have to get that language out. Is that correct? 

Secretary WYNNE. Right. Because I cannot tell you that I have 

a lot of money to put against C–17s. And as I mentioned, I really 

can’t go against the law until you all act. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman from Missouri. 

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate—am I on 

here? Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate your leadership for our Air Force and the job that 

you do and the job that the Air Force does. The chairman encouraged you to think strategically, or to at least make more strategic 

presentations to us. And just on the C–5/C–17 continuing debate 

that has been going on for, gosh, at least 10 years now, we have 

got the recent news concerning reliability enhancement and reengining program (RERP) and the dispute concerning the anticipated costs between the Air Force and the contractor and then Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) stepping in and splitting the difference between the two contestants here and the possibility of a 

Nunn-McCurdy breach. 

It seems to me that that is—and it is necessary for you to do this 

in the day-to-day management of the Air Force. But that is getting 

down into the weeds a little bit more than we ought to. And the 

reason I say that is because I continue to be convinced, and I think 

an awful lot of other people are also, that 300 is not the number 

and that the minimum need is probably a good bit more than that. 

That the Air Mobility Study, it was fundamentally flawed with the 

assumptions that were required to be made, and with the absence 

of any real study of the inter-theater use of C–17s specifically. And 

we have got to be above 300. And to get above 300, it may well be 

that we wind up concluding it is wisest for us to keep those C–5s, 

or at least an awful lot more C–5s and add more C–17s. And if the 

Air Force—are we going through another or an update to the Air 

Mobility Study? I know—— 

Secretary WYNNE. Yes, sir, I understand we are going through 

another. It is called MCS–08, which I guess is Mobility Capability 

Study, fiscal year 2008, which I think is underway. 

General MOSELEY. Yes, it is. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Mobility capability study concept of this? 

Secretary WYNNE. Yes. 

Mr. MARSHALL. That would be great. I really think it is foolish 

for us to make some dramatic move with regard to the C–5/C–17 

choice before we hear what our real strategic need is. JCA, Representative Courtney mentioned, it is probably inappropriate for us 

to take any dramatic steps to change the present course as part of 

the conference committee, given what the Senate has done. My reaction, Chief, is to agree with you. This is a roles and missions 

issue. It is an Air Force kind of deal. Air Force ought to be taking 

the lead with regard to this lift and ought to be taking the lead 

with regard to lift and all aspects, training, maintenance, et cetera. 

And, you know, part of whether or not we change clearly would be 

whether or not there are going to be substantial delays. Senator 

38 

Levin sent a letter. Question six in the letter specifically raised the 

question of delay. Air Force gave one response, Army gave another 

response. 

It would be very helpful, Chief, if General McNabb perhaps could 

take the lead, I don’t know who you would direct to do that, in responding to the Army’s response. Army clearly contemplates that 

there will be substantial delays. General McNabb’s comment was 

pretty brief, simply says, no, we don’t anticipate there will be any 

delays. But then Army got into the details concerning why there 

would be delays. So, you know, obviously, we are not going to move 

forward in conference here to make some dramatic change unless 

Senator Levin’s question concerning number six is answered. And 

maybe you guys could get that done. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, please let us take that for the record, and 

we will get Joe McNabb to provide that for you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 65.] 

Mr. MARSHALL. UAVs, I guess I could get you to speak for a 

while on that subject. It has got to be a sore point at this point. 

Back to roles and missions again. I hope that the deputy Secretary’s recent decision is a temporary decision, and that the DOD 

will be complying with our directive and committee report that 

some clear statement is given to us by DOD concerning roles and 

missions effectively by March 31st of next year. 

Secretary WYNNE. One thing we know for sure, sir, and from a 

strategic basis there would be no argument over UAVs if we didn’t 

have air dominance. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Absolutely. 

Secretary WYNNE. Because we own the skies, we can talk about 

it. 

General MOSELEY. Congressman Marshall, this is another one of 

those topics George and I are going to spend some time with. As 

you would imagine, as service chiefs, we see this pretty much the 

same about competencies and about providing, at the strategic 

level, the operational level, the tactical level, where those demarcations are. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Before my time expires, Chief, I am so tired of 

this particular subject—I know you are as well—it is the Air Force 

Personnel Reorganization. You know, frankly, my impression is 

that Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) is designing a test to 

prove that it works. And that is not a real test. You know, if AFPC 

considers that there needs to be one standard for all of the Air 

Force concerning fill, look at San Antonio’s progress with regard to 

fill. It is pitiful, frankly, compared to what the large civilian centers are capable of doing. I am tired of bringing this up. I wish we 

could get some resolution that makes sense. 

General MOSELEY. Agree, sir. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Turner, to be followed by Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the Chairman’s comments concerning strategic and 

visionary thinking. 

39 

And I want to thank you, Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, 

for your efforts in not only leading the Air Force strategically, but 

also in trying to give us a picture of some of the variables that you 

face in thinking visionarily, as a vision for the future. Your presentation has included descriptions of cutting personnel, aging aircraft, escalating costs in acquisition and modernization, long lead 

times for replacement, congressional restraints on retirement, and 

declining and projected shutdowns of industrial base. Those are 

pretty significant variables that impact the ability of the Air Force 

in its future strategic thinking and in being visionary. 

As you know, in my district, we have Wright-Patterson Air Force 

Base, which is a base that is focused on our advantage on the battlefields of tomorrow. And that tomorrow is the future that we all 

look to you for as to how we are going to ensure that we have air 

dominance. And you have brought to us some significant issues 

that are impacting your ability to project our success in the future. 

In thinking on a visionary and strategic basis, looking at the restraints that you have on retirements, I was wondering if you could 

talk for a moment about that policy. Because I want to echo what 

Mr. Saxton has been saying on the restraint on retirements, specifically in the C–5 and the C–17 area. But I don’t see any real 

good policy basis for the restraint that you have. And if you could 

give us some insight as to how a restraint on retirement fits within 

the Air Force or limits the Air Force and its ability for strategic 

and visionary thinking. 

Secretary WYNNE. There is a belief, which we apparently have 

been unsuccessful in disproving, that if you park the airplanes on 

the side of the ramp somehow, a balloon goes up, those will magically turn into 5-year-old airplanes or 10-year-old airplanes. It is a 

problem that I think we have tried to attack from several perspectives. But I must tell you, I would be disappointed with myself to 

tell you that we have yet been successful. There is clearly money 

to be saved and manpower to be saved in not maintaining these 

airplanes any longer. It is scary for the crews, frankly. It is getting 

that way. Although we have a Fleet Viability Board that tries to 

make sure that we don’t violate the safety of flight. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, I feel frustrated in not being able to articulate something as simple to an aviator as having an airplane 

on these restrictions and not being able to retire it and move to the 

next generation. It seems so simple to me. So I suspect this is a 

failure on myself. I won’t accuse my boss. But it seems we have 

been unable to articulate what I perceive to be the obvious on being 

able to manage our inventory and being able to put the money in 

the right place to meet the strategic vision of recapitalization and 

modernization and the new technologies. While we are managing 

the oldest inventory we have had in the history of the Air Force, 

and still have the restrictions on us that we have to attach a tug 

to airplane every 7 to 10 days and tow it to keep the tires from 

going bad that we have no intention of flying, or we have to take 

to an engine test stand and run every 25 or 30 days just to keep 

it in the status as required by the language. So I accept this as a 

failure. I have been unable to articulate why this is a bad idea. 

Mr. TURNER. Of course, I don’t see it as your failure that you are 

having to operate within a restraint that is imposed upon you. I see 

40 

it as a great benefit that you are ensuring that we are well aware 

and continuously aware of how this impacts your ability to strategically and visionarily—and have vision for moving forward. On the 

issue of personnel, it seems to me, and I was a little confused by 

the discussion, you are proposing significant reductions in personnel in attempts to fund your modernization and recapitalization. 

But I did not believe that that was strategically where you wanted 

your personnel level to be. It is not as if you decided where your 

personnel should be and then from that looked where you would 

take those cost savings. You looked at your immediate need on 

equipment, recapitalization and modernization and then sought 

where you could find savings. How does that impact the future of 

the Air Force? 

Secretary WYNNE. If you recapitalize on a reasonable schedule, 

what we note is you save maintenance and manpower almost immediately. If you can retire airplanes on a schedule, you save maintenance. We have forecasted that savings. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. Just before I ask Mr. Taylor, as I understand it, General, if an airplane, because of age and 

because of structure problems, is, in the opinion, of the Air Force 

unworthy to fly, you decommission that airplane despite the fact 

that it has not been officially retired by Congress. Is that correct? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, what we will do, because we cannot take 

it off the books, we are still required to spend money on it in the 

top 1,000 status or the XJ status. What we will do is just ground 

it and not fly it, which we have with some of the KC–135Es and 

C–130Es. But because of the language, we have to maintain it in 

a certain status, which means we have to put manpower, crew 

chiefs and money against it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Would it ever be flyable again? 

General MOSELEY. Theoretically, you could bring it back to flight 

status, but it would take an infinite amount of money to be able 

to do that for the entire fleet. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General, thank you 

for your service. Secretary Wynne, thank you for your service. Secretary Wynne, I am going to direct this question to you because I 

regret it has taken me so long, but I have now come to clearly see 

a pattern. For seven years now, representatives of the Bush Administration come to this committee in January and February, tell 

us everything is fine, we need some slight tweaking of the budget, 

but we don’t need a whole lot of money for this program. For seven 

years, in the fall, the same Administration officials will come before 

this committee with a story of gloom and doom. But by January 

when the budget request comes along, the gloom and doom has 

been transformed to this just needs a little tweaking. So in our annual gloom and doom—and I am in agreement with you, by the 

way—we hear about the KC–135s, we hear about the B–52s, we 

hear about the B–1Bs, and we hear about HH–60s. Giving you now 

one last opportunity to come before this committee in January and 

February, what are you going to propose to fix these things? 

41 

Because, quite frankly, if Congress adds money that the Administration doesn’t ask for, then all these nice folks in the media back 

there are going to say it is pork barrel. So you have articulated 

very well some problems. And I am in agreement with you on these 

problems. And I know you are putting your budget together for 

January now. So which of these things are you going to propose to 

fix, or is it going to be like mine resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs)? Is it going to be like body armor? Is it going to be 

like jammers? And is it going to be like up-armored Humvees, 

where the Administration fails to come up with a proposal and 

Congress has got to do it for them? 

Secretary WYNNE. One thing we are charged to do, Congressman, 

and I am probably talking to the choir here, but when we understand the amount of resources that we get, we array those resources to the best defense America can afford. And we recognize 

that we are a wealthy country, but we are not spending at a rate 

anywhere close to what we would spend in a wartime event. We 

have made these choices. So when we get to understand what 

budget we are being allocated, it is much like the Chairman has 

indicated, we will array those resources to make sure that America 

stays protected to the best of our ability. 

Mr. TAYLOR. In the context of your answer, which I am in agreement with, when you hear the President say we need another 

round of tax cuts, does anyone in the DOD say, Wait a second, Mr. 

President, we got kids flying in 50-year-old airplanes, how about 

instead of a tax cut for your contributors we fix that airplane? Or 

that ship? Or produce those MRAPs, which the Administration has 

most reluctantly come around to the decision that we are going to 

build? 

I mean, I think these are all very fair questions, Secretary 

Wynne. And it is not that you have done this for one year—I am 

not saying you, I am saying the Administration people who have 

held your job. It is not that this has happened one time. This is 

now the seventh time that we have gone through this cycle where 

everything—and I guarantee, if you hold this job and I hold this 

job, come January, whomever is in your job is going to come before 

the committee and say, everything’s cool, and we just need to 

tweak it a little bit. I am hoping to see you break that cycle in January. I am hoping you will come to this committee and not only 

say, We got old B–52s, but I am asking for this much money to replace them with something better. I am asking for this much 

money to replace the KC–135s. I am asking for this much money 

to replace the B–2s. Because I do sense some inconsistency on the 

part of the Administration request. And I think it has—the fix has 

really got to start with you all. 

Secretary WYNNE. Well, in every good budget session, sir, we try 

to arm up our representatives that go to OMB. And I know they 

are going to argue to the best of their ability. We don’t get invited 

to those sessions, so I would say to you that we try to arm them 

up with the best of the arguments that we can to make sure we 

can in fact get an affordable Air Force. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, I appreciate both of you for your service. 

Thank you for being here. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Gingrey, please. 

42 

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Thank you Secretary Wynne, General Moseley. We appreciate so 

much your testimony here today. I just want to comment that I 

think the C–17, of course, is a great airplane. And the C–5 provides 

its own very unique capability as well. And as they are complementary in our airlift capability, and I hope, I truly hope we can find 

a way to buy C–17s and also continue to modernize our C–5s. But 

I wasn’t here for the entire hearing, but I don’t think that the C– 

5 has been treated fairly here today by the testimony that I heard 

and comments from some of the members. 

I want to ask you this question. If the Air Force signs a fixed 

price contract, and Lockheed was wrong, and the actual cost exceeds the contracted amount by $30 million, at that point, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Chief, at that point the contractor has to eat the difference, not the Air Force. And certainly not the taxpayer. Wouldn’t 

the Air Force want the fixed price offer to be as low as possible, 

even if they were wrong, if it results in greater budget flexibility 

and allows us to buy more of other platforms like the very important C–17? It just seems like we are searching for an excuse here, 

any excuse to get away from the program of record. I wonder what 

the excuse would be if the contractor indeed offered a fixed price 

contract to modernize all the C–5s for free. Then would it be that 

the modernization was too cheap? Maybe we could call that a Mendoza breach, after a light hitting shortstop Mario Mendoza. Answer 

that question for me. Why, you know, the contractor offers a fixed 

price, they miss the mark a little bit, and you hold them to it. Is 

that not good for the taxpayer? And in fact, you know, as far as 

what the contractor said the price would be and what the Air Force 

said, there was a difference there of about $5 billion. But really 

when we had an independent body look at it, it was much more, 

much closer to what Lockheed said would be the price for the 

RERP and the avionics modernization program (AMP). So they 

were pretty close to accurate. Now, whether or not that is a NunnMcCurdy breach I guess remains to be seen, but I would appreciate 

your answer to that question. 

Secretary WYNNE. Sir, if you have ever dealt with a building contractor that has to tear into a wall, you know that it has to do with 

the terms and conditions of the agreement that you reach. And in 

a situation like this, I would tell you that a fixed price contract is 

the least you will ever pay. And the reason is because when you 

open up a C–5, the contractor has got to assume liability for making sure that it is safe to fly when it comes off of his line. And he 

has no idea what that looks like under the skin. Part of the disagreement here is that Lockheed is unwilling to take a fixed price 

with an unknown fix on an airplane. And part of the problem is 

that these C–5As, they are old. And I kind of agree with them that 

that is a very tough thing to do. So what you are saying is, can 

you limit the scope to those things that they do understand? And 

the answer is, that is not going to buy me a flyable C–5 airplane. 

So I have to go in and look at how things are working. But I know 

that Lockheed is trying very hard to bring us the best deal that 

they can, and I appreciate that. And I hope that they do, because 

I want to fly C–5Bs and some C–5As for some years to come. 

43 

Dr. GINGREY. Well, let me just move onto another question. Regarding the 30–30 swap-out that has been talked about here this 

morning, the funds needed for the C–17 are a fiscal year 2008 

issue. C–5 RERP funds are not projected to be available until 2011. 

And I think General Schwartz put it best when he said, budget 

lines to pursue this option don’t coincide. C–17 procurement is a 

fiscal year 2008 issue. C–5 RERP funds for fiscal year 2008 are 

$253 million less than the cost of a single C–17. So how does retiring 30 C–5s pay for 30 new C–17s? If you retire C–5s now, will 

that pay for the C–17s? 

Secretary WYNNE. That is right. If you think about current budget, answer is no. If you think about budget over the next 25 years, 

answer is yes. It is very difficult, though, to line things up. I agree 

with you. 

General MOSELEY. Congressman, the dilemma we have, and I 

will speak for myself, I am a fan of the C–5 because of what it provides, the outsize cargo, the amount, the bulk, the square, the cube. 

The airplane is a magnificent airplane. Except some of them are 

getting to the point where they are not useful. The MC rates are 

not high. That is the concern we have got, not about retiring all 

of the C–5s, but getting and managing this inventory so we can get 

the right number of them so we can fly and operate them. 

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired. Thank 

you for letting us go over just a little bit. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Secretary and General, thanks for coming, helping us out today. General, you are somewhat apologetic in what 

you profess is your inability to communicate to folks like us the 

need for the flexibility in order to manage your platforms the way 

you need to do that. And I am with you. I wrote down something. 

Maybe you need something more pithy. That is we are forcing you 

to choose between requirements and retirements. And that is essentially what we are doing. We are forcing you to make that 

choice in a budget context that is very restrictive for you as well. 

And perhaps if we focused more on helping you meet your requirements and less on preventing retirements of platforms, we could 

have easier conversations with the Air Force. 

Secretary Wynne, just a quick note, I want to just review what 

I heard earlier in response to Mr. Everett’s questions about the 

KC–X. You said you hope the KC–X decision will be in January 

2008. So it is not going to be this calendar year? 

Secretary WYNNE. I am trying very hard to retain it, but in response to our inquiries, the contractors did a superb job of responding to us and in some depth. And that is what caused us to miss 

some interim milestones. And bless their hearts, I know they are 

working their butt off, and I want to give them a fair treatment. 

Mr. LARSEN. And fair treatment is going to be important. However, do you anticipate that this phase one of the buy will be an 

all or nothing? That is that it won’t be a split procurement? Do you 

at least anticipate that? 

Secretary WYNNE. Yes, sir, I do now. 

Mr. LARSEN. You do now anticipate that will be an all or nothing? Phase one. 

Secretary WYNNE. Phase one. 

44 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. Sure. I want to give you an opportunity to 

talk about something other than airplanes. You recently found or 

heard that the Air Force recently found some additional problems 

in Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and released a memo 

with a cost assessment of a billion dollars to solve that problem. 

Have you identified the problems and the mitigation efforts? 

Secretary WYNNE. The problem is in the software integration. It 

is as a result of a lesson learned from a current flyer, and it is a 

problem of fail-safe. In other words, one of the satellites that is in 

fact in orbit could not fail in a safe mode and so had to be taken 

off line. We think the same software is in the space based infrared 

system (SBIRS). It is a very fragile architecture. And we need to 

take some time so we don’t essentially break the architecture trying to fix this what I consider to be a relatively easy problem. That 

having been said, I can tell you that because of the marching Army 

that associates with the satellite, once it is in construction, you 

have to keep it going. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Secretary WYNNE. And that is where the money comes from. And 

it pushes the entire program out. So it is my—I mean, reach for 

how bad could this get? It is not an estimate that I would be proud 

of. And I am hoping that by the November 7th meeting with the 

Under Secretary of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L), 

we have a much better handle on it. 

Mr. LARSEN. So the $1 billion estimate is an estimate, and you 

are trying to work that—— 

Secretary WYNNE. Down. 

Mr. LARSEN [continuing]. That number down. 

Secretary WYNNE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. And the problem in November—I don’t want get 

into too much detail, but as I understand it, the problem you have 

identified is a software problem that you found in a current satellite—— 

Secretary WYNNE. Right. 

Mr. LARSEN [continuing]. That will be in SBIRS, and you want 

to make sure that you fix that in SBIRS as you move forward. 

Secretary WYNNE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Just so I understand. By November 7th, then will 

you have an idea on the schedule then, the impact on the schedule? 

Secretary WYNNE. Yes, sir, that is our forecast for the Under Secretary is to come to him with an impact to cost and schedule, and 

which we hope to be robust. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. Can you at that point then get back to us on 

what cost, what the impact on costs will be? 

Secretary WYNNE. Yes, sir, I am pretty sure he will put out an 

acquisition decision memorandum (ADM), and you will be able to 

see that. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right. Good. That is fine then. Mr. Chairman, 

thank you very much and thank the gentlemen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Bartlett? Mr. Bartlett, let me ask one question right before 

I recognize you. 

General, what can a C–5 carry that a C–17 can’t? 

45 

General MOSELEY. Sir, latest data with current equipment, 

which is a partially erected Patriot battery and a Mark V boat— 

but—that is the outsize bulk. But the advantage the C–5 has is it 

can carry more pieces of equipment than the C–17. But the size 

cube, the only two things that won’t fit are the partially erected Patriot battery and the Mark V boat. That is half the answer. The 

other answer is just more stuff, more vehicles, et cetera. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, that is why the C–5 is so valuable to us. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Thank you. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I want to apologize for having to leave the committee for a markup in another committee and for a floor debate. 

Thank you very much for your service. Secretary Wynne, in September, you were quoted as saying, ‘‘Right now, we like Boeing, but 

it is now, let the best company win.’’ What did you mean by that, 

and do you think it was really appropriate to make that comment 

while the program was under such a high level of scrutiny? 

Secretary WYNNE. Sir, that is the CSAR–X program that you are 

referring to. And by that time we had actually down selected Boeing as the winner, and the protesters—were protests, and the GAO 

was continuing to decide. And I will tell you that the Air Force did 

a superb study and down selected to Boeing. I think the GAO has 

told us go back. And I think my direction to the team is, you treat 

every contractor like they just walked in the door. So, right now, 

we have to treat every contractor like they are brand new, including Boeing. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. I am glad we can get that 

on the record. General Moseley, you have said that the Chinook 

would not have been your choice for the combat search and rescue 

(CSAR) platform, that you were surprised when it was selected, but 

that the service would make it work. Why wouldn’t you have 

picked the Chinook, and why do you think it emerged as the winner? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, I think it met the criteria of low technology risk. I think our acquisition people did everything they 

could to look at an open and transparent competition, and the Chinook won. But from my experience commanding the theater air effort in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Chinook is a big, heavy helicopter. Our combat search-and-rescue helicopters have not been 

that big and that heavy. So I was honest when I answered it, and 

I will still say it is not the one I would have picked, but if we end 

up with this helicopter, we will make it work. And our Army flies 

this into some very dangerous places. The airplane is survivable. 

We will make it work. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. I appreciate your honesty, 

sir, and the opportunity to get this on the record. Are we relatively 

happy with the KC–135R? 

General MOSELEY. Yes, sir. We are very happy with it, but I 

don’t know how much longer we can be happy with it until we—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. How do we get KC–135Rs? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, we put bigger engines on them. 

Mr. BARTLETT. We put bigger engines on what? 

46 

General MOSELEY. On both the KC–135E and the KC–135R from 

the original baseline. They had much more efficient engines. The 

R model is the most efficient. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Don’t we convert Es to Rs? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, we have converted some Es to Rs. If you 

allow me to take that for the record, we will get you the exact details of the entire inventory. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I think we convert a lot of Es to Rs. Do you know 

how much it costs to convert an E to an R? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, we will take that for the record if you 

allow us. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 69.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. It is just a fraction of the cost of buying a new 

tanker. And since we are happy with the Rs, and an R made today 

is going to be better than an R that was done 10 years ago, right? 

I am having some trouble understanding, with our tight budgets, 

why we aren’t more interested in converting the Es, with which we 

are considerably unhappy, to Rs, with which we are quite happy, 

when the cost is very small compared to the cost of buying a new 

platform. 

General MOSELEY. Congressman, let my take that on from aviator perspective. The airplanes were designed in the 1950’s, and 

those airplanes were built during the Eisenhower Administration. 

And the structure on those airplanes is not a modern structure. We 

have also operated those airplanes now for about 40 years. So the 

money spent on modification of one of the old airplanes is you still 

have an old airplane. My fear, when I am asked what do you worry 

about at night, is a catastrophic failure of one of these 707 air 

frames, and we ground the entire fleet. And the impact we will 

have in the strategic setting of no jet tanker, sir, I believe is an 

unacceptable risk. 

Mr. BARTLETT. It is just a matter of priorities. If we had all the 

money in the world, clearly we would replace all of them. We don’t. 

And I just am concerned that there may be higher priorities for the 

use of our limited dollars. And we are pretty happy with the R. The 

E is a problem. Let’s convert the Es to the Rs. And I thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. It appears, Mr. McIntyre, you will be 

able to close out our hearing. We do have votes. However, I think 

Mr. Saxton will have a question or two afterward. But we will be 

able to squeeze it all in before we go vote. Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have three or four 

questions, and I will say them quickly, and then what you can answer very succinctly, please do. Number one, with all the space systems providing so many critical capabilities to the warfighter, to 

global positioning, protected communications, intelligence and so 

on, do you see the Air Force, as we talk about the future, requesting a larger percentage of the budget toward supporting space program needs? 

Secretary WYNNE. Yes, we do. We have got the space I think 

under control, and now is the time to exploit the management techniques that we brought to bear on back to basics. 

47 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Do you know about how much you expect that 

percentage to grow by? 

Secretary WYNNE. No, sir, I don’t. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. If you have any projections on that, if you could 

supply them that would be helpful. Second, speaking of the future, 

the next generation bomber you talk about wanting to field by 2018 

in your testimony. Can you tell us if you have any particular designation for this bomber yet, and if you have any of the plans on 

the drawing board? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, we would have to go to a different setting 

and a different classification to talk about that. 

Secretary WYNNE. We don’t have any names for it, though, like 

any snappy names. If you have one, we—— 

General MOSELEY. No, sir. But to talk about those sorts of 

things, we will need a different configuration. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. But are you working on that next-generation 

bomber? 

General MOSELEY. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. And there is not a designation number yet for it 

at all? 

General MOSELEY. No, sir. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Okay. There have been several accidents involving F–16s. Many reported nationwide through the AP just as recently as yesterday. And we know that there have been 10 class 

A F–16 accidents in the past fiscal year, which was up from 9 the 

previous year, up from 5 the year before that, up from 2 the year 

before that. I don’t know if you all have done a study or have an 

answer to what is occurring here that you can supply in more detail. Or if you have a short answer, you can give that right now. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, you know, we take this very serious about 

the safety of the airplanes and the people that we ask to fly them. 

So the loss of any airplane, and for sure the loss of any of our pilots 

is a catastrophic event for us and the families, whether it is Guard, 

Reserve or active. Sir, you also know that we take every opportunity in training and in rules of engagement and in training rules 

to minimize the threat. The details of each of those losses are all 

somewhat different. We haven’t got a constant thread of a wing 

failure or a tail failure. It is a moving challenge to operate aging 

aircraft and to protect our people and still meet the mission requirements. If you will let us take that question for the record, we 

will get you the details of each of those, and the constancy of each 

of the outcomes of the investigations. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. That would be helpful. Do you have someone specially designated, given this increasing pattern of failure, that is 

specifically looking at this? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, we have a major general who runs our office of safety, and that is his entire life is to watch this. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. What is his name, sir? 

General MOSELEY. Griffin. Sir, we will get you all of that. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. If you could, at least a preliminary report in the 

next two weeks to my office, that would be helpful. 

General MOSELEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Finally, can you tell me why, this is something 

that many people have wondered, but no one will ever address it, 

48 

why we jumped in designation from F–22 all the way to F–35? Are 

all those numbers intermittently not going to be reserved for future 

aircraft? Are they just going to be skipped? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, previous administrations, previous predecessors made some of those decisions. If you have watched how we 

have gone back to the basics on designation of numbers, we are 

going back to a sequence. I can’t answer why we went from F–22 

to F–35, but I can tell you, as we get into the new tanker, it will 

be a KC something that is in sequence with the rest of the airplanes. Each of the new aircraft we field the nomenclatures will be 

in sequence, because I believe that is the only right way to do it. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Correct. Do you know the answer to that, Secretary? 

Secretary WYNNE. No, sir, I don’t. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Okay. A few years ago, when I asked that question, I was told, because it was a favorite number of one of the generals; he liked the number 35. I don’t know if you can check that. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, I have no clue, but we will go check. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Saxton, you have a wrap-up question? 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Quickly, back to fee-for-service demonstration for just a minute. 

General Moseley, do you need legislation to proceed with the feefor-demonstration project? And second, if you are not forced to do 

this with legislation, will you still give it full and fair consideration? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, I think there is something to be said to 

doing it. The Secretary and I have talked about this. I think there 

is a very useful notion of looking at this concept. And so I believe 

we will do it, whether we have language or not, to look at that 

scope and look at the validation of that. We need to know that before we can answer the specific questions on operational impact. 

And I don’t have that yet. 

Mr. SAXTON. So to answer the question, do you need legislation 

to proceed with the fee-for-service demonstration, you would 

say—— 

General MOSELEY. No. 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, the follow-on is, would we conduct the 

test? Yes. 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. I am told that in the cost of the C–5 

modernization program which caused the Nunn-McCurdy breach, 

the level of confidence in that number, which you wrote in a letter 

to us was $17.8 billion, the confidence level that that number is 

correct is apparently 50 percent. What would that number look 

like—I mean, that is a fairly low confidence level, I would assume. 

If a business person started out on a project assuming that he was 

going to spend X number of dollars and he had a 50 percent confidence level that that is what he was going to spend, the business 

person wouldn’t feel real good about that. What would that number 

look like if we had a higher level of confidence, let’s say 80 percent, 

that the number is correct? 

49 

Secretary WYNNE. Sir, I would have to get you that for the 

record. I don’t have it right off the top of my head. It would be 

higher. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 69.] 

Mr. SAXTON. It would be higher. Okay. There have been several 

members here today who have advocated for modernizing—continuing the modernization program for all 111 C–5s. I read in some 

papers recently that, if we did that, it would give us the equivalent 

of 10 additional airplanes. Can you speak to that, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary WYNNE. I believe the intent of the program, sir, was 

to increase the operational readiness from what is apparently in 

the mid–60’s, say 65, to apparently in the mid–70’s, say 76. So that 

would be an improvement of approximately 11 percent. I think 

where the calculation goes is that 11 percent of what? And 11 percent of operational readiness applied to 111 airplanes is approximately 11 airplanes. And I think that is what, when you compare 

that to the cost of the program, you can see that it is a very different division than if you divide by 111. 

Mr. SAXTON. We can argue about what the real cost of the modernization of the entire 111 is. The number that you wrote to us 

was 17.8 billion. Lockheed says 14 billion. But in either case, to increase the equivalent number of airplanes by 10, isn’t that pretty 

expensive per airplane? 

Secretary WYNNE. Per airplane, sir, by that divisor, it would be. 

Mr. SAXTON. It would be like a billion-plus an airplane; wouldn’t 

it? 

Secretary WYNNE. By that divisor, it would definitely be in that 

range. 

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, I have found this hearing to be very 

useful and informative today. And I again want to thank you for 

hearing it. And I want to thank the Secretary and Chief for being 

here to share this information with us today. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman, Mr. Saxton, from New 

Jersey. The Air Force I know has strategic vision. The Air Force 

I know has a strategy in the defense of American interests. And it 

would be very helpful to us to share that with us as we fit the 

budget or lack of budget into that strategic vision. 

General, you were good enough to speak about the war colleges 

and the larger thought that the military needs. And sitting behind 

you are six airmen who have either been to a senior or junior or 

intermediate or all of the war colleges. That is what they have 

done. And it would be very helpful if you would fit the jigsaw puzzle, Mr. Secretary, together for us next time that you come. It 

would be very, very helpful. And we know you live with budget 

problems. We know that. And they jump at you every day. They 

probably keep you awake at night. But it also would be very helpful for us to have that strategic vision shared with us, and how you 

may or may not be able to meet it through the budget. We thank 

you for your service. It is excellent. We thank you for your knowledge and, most of all, for your leadership. Thank you. 

Secretary WYNNE. Thank you, sir. 

General MOSELEY. Thank you, sir. 

[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

OCTOBER 24, 2007 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

OCTOBER 24, 2007 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

OCTOBER 24, 2007 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

OCTOBER 24, 2007 

(69) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SAXTON 

Secretary WYNNE. Sir, the $17.8 billion ($TY) we previously provided for total program cost at the 50% confidence level was subsequently adjusted to $17.5 billion 

($TY) due to a reduction in spare engine requirements. That total program cost at 

the 80% confidence level would be $20.2 billion ($TY). [See page 49.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

General MOSELEY. The KC–135 Reengining line is closed. The cost to reopen the 

line is $40–50M. In addition to this one-time cost, the 2005 Fleet Viability Board 

estimated the cost to convert a KC–135E to a KC–135R at $37.1M. [See page 46.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MARSHALL 

General MCNABB. [This information is provided in a 6 Nov 07 letter to Congressman Marshall, which can be found in the Appendix on page 65.] [See page 38.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. BOYDA 

Secretary WYNNE. We have not offset the current organic reduction with an equivalent increase in contractor support. In addition to the manpower reduction referenced above, the AF reduced contractor support by ∼$6.2B through the FYDP to 

help pay for recapitalization and modernization of the AF air, space, and cyberspace 

systems. 

We do not track the actual number of contractors in accordance with the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Sec. 802, Savings Goals for Procurements 

of Services. Our contracts are written, and funded, for a specified level of service, 

not for specified numbers of contractor personnel. We have instituted policies and 

procedures to ensure that the scenario you described above does not happen. 

The Air Force continues to implement functional reengineering, reachback, 

warfighting headquarters, and continuous process improvement strategies to transform our Service to meet present and future missions within existing resources. We 

also instituted a policy that requires senior leadership approval of requirements exceeding $10M. The MAJCOM commander must approve requirements in excess of 

$10M with the AF Service Acquisition Executive approving requirements over 

$100M. [See page 35.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. CASTOR 

General MOSELEY. For the Air Force, costs for in-lieu-of (ILO) tasking expand beyond typical dollar costs. Impacts are pervasive within limited communities. Direct 

relationships, secondary and tertiary impacts, and cause/effect can only be characterized in a subjective manner. 

ILO Opportunity Costs: 

Retention—We are seeing affects on continuation and upgrade training for our airmen, yet we are still on track with our overall retention goals. 

Air Force (AF) retention slightly below expectations: 97% of goal; as of 30 Jun 

07 (3% below goal) 

AF carefully monitoring retention trends 

ILO tasked Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC) 7% lower retention than non-ILO 

Vehicle Maintenance, Vehicle Operations, Paving & Construction Equipment, 

Structural Engineering, Aerospace Medical, and Explosive Ordinance Disposal 

(EOD) falling short of retention goals 

70 

Mobilization—Fiscal Year 2007 (FY07) mobilizations amounted to 2,902 authorizations. Of these 1,033 were for ILOs filling EOD, Security Forces, Combat Search and 

Rescue (CSAR), Intelligence positions. 

Medical—Currently the Army is unable to fill all requirements. This situation has 

AF medical personnel currently filling 62 deployments that last for 365 days. It is 

important to note the 60-day training tail makes the time away from home station 

up to 15 months, and home station medical facilities must backfill through Global 

War on Tenor (GWOT) contracts due to local healthcare market and short-notice notifications. There is the inevitable learning curve and training tail associated with 

bringing new members into the organizations. During the last six months AF Medical has lost 14 professionals (senior leaders, high demand specialists, and mid-level 

officers) who opted to separate and/or retire rather than deploy for 365-days. If a 

deployed professional is backfilled with contract civilians, the cost is steep. For example: a radiologist at a rate of $425,000 per year/per Radiologist. When filling ILO 

solutions, the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) process loses its ‘‘predictability and 

stability’’, as ILO tour lengths don’t always afford the opportunity to plan within 

AEF rotations. Access to care is an on-going issue. Two family practioner physicians 

on 365-day deployments equate to a loss of 20 visits/day and roughly $70/visit resulting in a loss of $1400/day in purchased care. 

CSAR—ILO taskings continue to stress the CSAR HH–60 community with over half 

of all deployed assets supporting ILO missions. Due to focus on ILO taskings, the 

ability to concentrate on core CSAR mission has been greatly diminished with fewer 

opportunities to perform integrated Combat Search and Rescue Task Force 

(CSARTF) operations with CSAR and supporting forces, minimizing traditional 

CSAR experience across the force. In addition, the ops tempo of CSAR units has created the inability to maintain specific qualifications. For instance, Active Duty (AD) 

Continental United States (CONUS) units have ceased sustainment of NVG water 

operations and shipboard deck landing qualifications due to the inability to maintain currencies with deployment tempo. 

Intelligence—To date, intelligence is accomplishing all JCS-directed requirements, 

but may soon need to reclama requirements. Many workarounds have been enacted. 

For example, US Air Force Europe (USAFE) fighter squadron intelligence shops 

have consolidated intelligence support functions at the Operations Support Squadrons (OSS) in order to accommodate deployment tempo. The primary deployers are 

5- & 7-level enlisted, captains and majors. With these Airmen down range, there’s 

no one at home to truly accomplish the OJT, mission certifications/qualifications, 

and very critical day-to-day mentoring of 3-levels and trainees. This may lead to a 

generation of Airmen who are not be properly trained and equipped to handle the 

missions of the future. Extensive pre-deployment training requirement for the ILO 

positions adds 2–4 months additional time away from home station. This extensive 

absence impacts two primary areas: 

1. A good number of Intelligence positions have on-going currency and certification requirements to ensure the Airmen remain qualified to perform the mission. Examples are Air Operation Center positions, Distributed Common 

Ground System crews, and OSS-level platform currency. Therefore Intel professionals must spend another 1–3 months regaining qualifications in order to recertify in previously held positions. 

2. Due to the length of ILO taskings and the 1:1 dwell of most intel AFSCs, 

the home stations must make critical risk assessments to determine what ingarrison mission will bear the loss of the ILO deployer. This degradation is 

starting to show in poor performances in Staff Assistant Visits and Unit Compliance Inspections, because the home station missions can’t support the continuous loss of 50% of their personnel. 

EOD—Unaccomplished training is the greatest cost of ILO support. EOD lacks the 

ability to completely support flying operations on various aircraft and weapons systems in the event of a ground or in-flight emergency. Standards are being lowered— 

range clearance standards have been reduced by 50% (1 yr waiver submitted) due 

to a lack in manning. Base Force Protection suffers without the ability to enact mutual support agreement with local authorities at home locations. This also leads to 

a deficit in Homeland Defense; EOD does not have resources to train with local authorities. Equipment is showing signs of degradation due to lack of manpower to 

perform maintenance. 

ILO Dollar Costs: 

We estimate in FY07 the AF expended over $80M in operations and maintenance 

costs to support Army ILO missions. The major expense areas for FY07 include TDY 

travel to and from various training locations prior to members augmenting the ILO 

71 

missions as well as additional personal equipment and gear to meet soldier standards. FY07 GWOT Supplemental funding was adequate to cover the day to day expenses associated with ILO missions. [See page 32.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

OCTOBER 24, 2007 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

Mr. BARTLETT. Is the Air Force considering a combined CSAR/CVLSP acquisition 

program? Do you believe that a combined approach could be a way of achieving long 

term cost-savings and reduction of risk? 

General MOSELEY. The Air Force originally considered a combined Combat Search 

And Rescue (CSAR–X)/Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP) acquisition 

strategy. In March 2005, CVLSP was separated from the CSAR–X acquisition strategy to keep the CSAR–X effort on track and allow the Air Force to conduct further 

analysis supporting the CVLSP requirement. As of this writing, CVLSP requirements have not been vetted through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

(JROC), preventing a combined CSAR–X/CVLSP effort at this point. Once the program is funded and the requirements are validated, market research will be conducted to determine a material solution to replace the UH–1N. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The CSAR–X program is facing significant funding cuts in 2008. 

At this point, what is the need for any funding in FY08? 

General MOSELEY. FY2008 dollars will go towards the Combat Search And Rescue–X (CSAR–X) System Development and Demonstration (SDD) contract, including 

the purchase of test vehicles, as well as to pay for government costs, studies and 

test planning support. 

Mr. BARTLETT. What lessons has the Air Force learned from the CSAR–X debacle 

that can be applied to other high-level acquisition programs? 

General MOSELEY. We believe, in today’s economy, protests will become more and 

more prevalent as aircraft manufacturers compete for a shrinking number of majority aircraft acquisition programs. While the government will never be able to completely mitigate the risk of protest in the acquisition process, we should be prepared 

to review even our most time-tested approaches to ensure clarity in our communications to offerors, transparency in our processes, and verifiable acquisition decisions. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO 

Mr. LOBIONDO. During the hearing, you mentioned Associate Basing for ANG 

units who received and are to receive fifth-generation fighters. How do individual 

ANG units become eligible for Active Associate Basing status? What was the notification process for ANG of the policy of Active Associate Basing equaling fifth-generation fighters? Can you provide to the Committee the guidance for Active Associate Basing which were provided to ANG units? What concerns, legal and practical, 

about the integration of ANG and Active Duty personnel in the operational environment were considered in the Active Associate Basing development process? 

General MOSELEY. As the Air Force finds ways to recapitalize its fleet and yield 

a smaller, yet more capable force, it is using innovative basing constructs, known 

as associations, as one means of maximizing efficiencies. We must balance the need 

to enhance capabilities force-wide, but must do so with a shrinking inventory. As 

the Air Force strives to manage its assets across the 54 states and territories, associations have become the best way for bases to both retain and obtain flying missions. While we realize that all current Air National Guard locations would like to 

receive fifth-generation aircraft, and Active Associate basing constructs with this capability are in high demand, the fiscal responsibility that comes with such restructuring is enormous. The Air Force must be judicious in its decision-making processes; the demand for fifth-generation capabilities is growing against a fiscally limited supply. 

The primary, and most important factor driving all basing decisions, is the ability 

to generate combat capability to meet force structure and COCOM requirements. All 

Air National Guard bases currently flying comparable fighter aircraft will be considered for fifth-generation fighters except those bases that have been assigned new 

missions as a result of BRAC; these units will retain their new missions. In conjunction with the criteria that determines fifth-generation fighter beddown, the Air 

Force takes into consideration factors such as available facilities, environmental impact, available manpower, usable airspace, and current number of aircraft when 

considering association basing opportunities. 

76 

The National Guard Bureau is the primary channel of communication between 

the Secretary of the Air Force and the Adjutants General. Any state wishing to pursue an association should do so through the National Guard Bureau. Headquarters 

Air Force, in close coordination with the MAJCOMs and the National Guard Bureau, develops missions, basing decisions and identifies potential integration opportunities to satisfy current and future capabilities requirements. 

The successful planning and execution of Total Force association models relies 

upon the active participation of all stakeholders. Interested parties are strongly encouraged to familiarize themselves with the available Total Force Integration guidance, particularly Air Force Instruction 90–1001, Responsibilities for Total Force Integration. This guidance provides an extensive look at Total Force Integration associate basing models, objectives, command arrangements, roles and responsibilities, 

and essential direction regarding initiative establishment procedures. 

Legally, Title 10 and Title 32 of United States Code have presented some of the 

more difficult challenges to the Total Force mission. The FY2007 National Defense 

Authorization Act has helped knock down many of the barriers between Title 10 

Federal and Title 32 State chains of command impeding successful integration. Continued discussion of legislative and policy changes are occurring and will need to 

continue to ensure that the Air Force is able to operate as a Total Force with the 

most effective use of resources. 

Practically, our experiences with Guard and Regular Air Force active associations 

have been very positive. To date, we have two fighter and one airlift Active Associate units (Burlington, VT, McEntire JNGB, SC, and Cheyenne Air National Guard 

Base, WY) that are working examples of successful integration. Success depends not 

only on the sound guidance of leadership and careful planning, but also on the relationships fostered between the Airmen of the associating units. Associate models ensure partnership in virtually every facet of Air Force operations, and great care 

must be taken to support each component’s unique culture, heraldry and history. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. How committed to the Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) mission to protect the homeland is the USAF? Should the ASA mission not be the number one 

priority for the ANG? If ASA is the number one priority, why are some ASA units 

only given 90 days of work days (MPA) at a time? Are there plans to correct this 

funding/priority issue? If not, why not? 

General MOSELEY. The Air Force is 100 percent committed to protecting the Nation from all threats as directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense, and 

has provided a Total Force (Air National Guard (ANG), Air Force Reserve Command 

and Active Duty) solution for totally supporting the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Air Sovereignty Alert missions. This support has been 

provided without reliance on other Services’ air assets since the inception of this 

steady state activity. 

As part of the Air Force Total Force solution to the ASA mission, the ANG units 

tasked to participate have also provided 100 percent commitment to the NORAD operations. In FY2006, the ANG flew 1,365 sorties and 4,021 hours defending the Nation’s skies, including the tens of thousands of hours ANG members spend watching 

radarscopes, or sitting alert waiting for the call, or maintaining alert aircraft and 

facilities. This commitment to defend the United States homeland does not begin 

and end at our national boundaries, but the Air Force Total Force solution to the 

Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) guarantees that America is protected both within 

the U.S. and abroad. 

MPA days are resourced and executed throughout the fiscal year. To sustain maximum flexibility, the Air Force’s Major Commands balance the needs of the Combatant Commanders with the requirements on a quarterly basis. We continue to search 

for solutions funding ASA just as we do with the full spectrum of missions as we 

seek to achieve total force victory in the GWOT against the asymmetric threat we 

face as a sovereign nation. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Is there a plan to keep ANG units currently flying F–16s viable 

for both the ASA mission and a warfighting mission? What is that plan? Is there 

a performance metric for determining which ANG units are best suited to 

warfighting or homeland defense missions? Can you provide those metrics for review 

by the Committee? 

General MOSELEY. In short, yes. Air National Guard (ANG) units along with the 

rest of the Total Force maintain capability to meet both the Air Sovereignty Alert 

mission and expeditionary mission sets. F–16 Ready Aircrew Program training requirements ensure that ANG, Air Force Reserve Command and Active Duty pilots 

are trained to meet combatant commander requirements, both in the homeland and 

overseas. While there is not a performance metric specifically designed to determine 

which ANG units are ‘‘best’’ suited for mission sets, all Total Force units train to 

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ment. Those requirements are evaluated by inspection programs at the local and 

Major Command (MAJCOM) level. Any unit that does not meet the warfighting 

readiness posture as specified by their USAF MAJCOM documentation receives 

daily attention of the MAJCOM commander and operations staffs who immediately 

initiate remediation to attain acceptable risk in warfighting readiness. Additionally, 

local commanders assess and report their ability to meet the DOC requirements 

monthly. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. What is the ‘‘Sierra Bravo’’ Base Design Concept? How will it impact the ANG’s ASA mission? Have the expected savings and benefits from Sierra 

Bravo implementation been analyzed from the perspective of ANG units operating 

older 4th generation fighters? Is it not true that many of the savings are based on 

speculative estimates of reliability of 5th generation fighters? 

General MOSELEY. ‘‘Sierra Bravo’’ is an Air Force reorganization concept which includes putting flight-line maintenance functions under the Operations Group as well 

as moving all other functions, including support shops, to depot or other centralized 

locations. We expect little impact on the Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) mission. The 

Air Force does expect a savings, but fully recognizes that ‘‘Sierra Bravo’’ contemplated a ‘‘Clean Sheet’’ Air Base; and there are none of those. Thus the savings 

are very dependent on what idea is adapted from the many generated in the study. 

However, the Air National Guard, which operates with a small fulltime workforce 

in maintenance, medical and other support shops, does not expect to realize significant savings under this concept. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Regarding the Thunderbird’s Block 30 F–16s, how many of the 

manufacturer’s suggested upgrades do the Thunderbird’s planes have? How many 

of these ‘‘optional’’ upgrades have the typical ANG unit’s Block 30s received? 

General MOSELEY. In order to maintain a consistent configuration control baseline, modifications are frequently applied to all aircraft within a specific Block of 

the weapon system and are not considered ‘‘optional’’ enhancements. Thunderbird 

and Air National Guard (ANG) F–16s have received all of the basic structural modifications required for the specific Block of aircraft. Similarly, the mechanical system 

modifications are fully distributed across the Block 30/32 fleet as the aircraft all 

have the same egress, landing, and hydraulic systems. However, the ANG has both 

Block 30 and Block 32 aircraft which are identical except for the engines. 

The largest difference (outside the presence of the Thunderbird smoke generating 

system) between a Block 30 Thunderbird and a Block 30/32 ANG aircraft is the 

modifications to the avionics systems. Due to warfighter requirements, ANG aircraft 

have been modified with significant enhancements over their Thunderbird counterparts. For example, the avionics modifications to the ANG Block 30/32 aircraft include Time Compliance Technical Orders (TCTOs) upgrading the color video camera, 

Situational Awareness Data Link (SADL) radios, antennas for the threat warning 

system, updates to the Fire Control and GPS/Inertial Navigation System, and Advanced Color Programmable Display Generator (ACPDG). 

Mr. LOBIONDO. The USAF standard PAA (Primary Aircraft Authorized) for an F– 

16 wing is 24 planes. How many support personnel are allocated to a 24 PAA F– 

16 air wing? How many support personnel are allocated to a typical ANG F–16 wing 

with an 18 PAA? With the current emphasis on Total Force Integration, why are 

there two different PAAs, one for Active Duty and one for the ANG, when ANG 

units are frequently tasked to warfighting missions in lieu of Active Duty units with 

more robust PAAs? 

General MOSELEY. The standard of 24 Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA) per 

squadron is applied to CONUS fighter wings. This number does vary across active 

duty units. For example, during the fourth quarter FY2009, the overseas F–16 

wings at Kunsan, Misawa, and Aviano, have a programmed squadron size of 18, 18 

and 21 PAA per squadron respectively. 

Using the 20th Fighter Wing (FW) at Shaw AFB as the model for a 24 PAA Active 

Duty (AD) F–16 wing, the USAF has 776 programmed support personnel. 

An 18 PAA Air National Guard (ANG) F–16 wing has an average base operating 

support of approximately 400 military with 120 of these being full time. 

As stated, variations do exist with PAA. The Base Realignment And Closure 

(BRAC) FY2005 report suggests that 24 PAA is best for efficiency and effectiveness 

with respect to the older legacy fighters. However, the report also states that ANG 

wings can accommodate an 18 PAA squadron size because of the higher experience 

level of the personnel. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. When can the Committee expect a detailed plan for distribution 

of fifth-generation fighters such as the F–22 and F–35 to ANG unit? Would a full 

Committee hearing on the ASA mission on the issue so Members could gain insight 

and provide input be helpful? 

78 

General MOSELEY. The Air Force gathered its senior leaders in late October to finalize a single vision, or ‘‘roadmap’’ for basing fifth-generation fighters, as well as 

for other future weapon systems. Since this meeting there has been a concerted effort to work the details of this roadmap; a follow-up meeting to present the plan 

to the 54 Adjutant Generals is slated for the first week of December. We expect to 

publicly announce a list of candidate bases in the near future. The Air Force goal 

is, to the maximum extent possible; integrate assets from the Total Force (Active 

Duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserves) at each location. While the Air 

Force stands ready to answer any questions presented by Congress, our basing plan 

will take into account the importance of the ASA mission, and an additional Committee hearing on the matter will not be necessary. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. I am aware of the so-called ‘‘Four Corners’’ proposal for transition 

of the F–22 into the Air National Guard. Is there a similar proposal for integrating 

new F–35s into the ANG for the ASA mission? What factors were considered or do 

you expect to be considered in formulating such a plan? Under the current proposal, 

are the F–22s to come from the 183 USAF buy or from a separate buy coming from 

‘‘ANG funds’’? 

General MOSELEY. The FY08PB funds F–22A production at 183 aircraft. The last 

F–22As will deliver to the Hawaiian Air National Guard (ANG) in FY2011. Based 

on the requirement to fill out existing combat squadrons to an optimum 24 Primary 

Assigned Aircraft end strength, F–22A procurement must increase beyond 260 before the Air Force considers ‘‘Four Corners’’ basing locations. Future procurement 

decisions that address the 381 F–22A requirement will take ANG basing locations 

into consideration. There is currently no proposal for distributing F–35s based solely 

on the Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) mission. The F–35 will assume the ASA mission 

as the legacy workhorses, F–15 and F16, phase out of service. The Air Force plans 

to procure large numbers of F–35s to replace the currently aging legacy fighters, ensuring the ANG’s integral role in F–35 basing plans. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Does the USAF direct a flying hour reduction ‘‘tax’’ program to 

recoup dollars for other programs and then take manpower positions away from 

Wings because they say the positions are tied to flying hour programs? Is it not true 

that positions have traditionally been tied to numbers of aircraft assigned to a wing, 

i.e. PAA, not the number of flying hours expected to be flown? 

General MOSELEY. The Air Force does not direct a flying hour reduction ‘‘tax.’’ The 

Air Force programs and executes flying hours in the President’s Budget to meet its 

‘‘peacetime’’ training requirement. Manpower is earned by the number and type of 

Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA) in support of War Mobilization Plans and Training/Test Requirements. The process used to determine manpower per PAA takes 

wartime and peacetime flying hours, as well as a number of other variables (e.g. 

sorties rate, sortie duration, deployment location) into account. Minor changes in 

any one variable result in a negligible impact to manpower requirements. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Does the USAF now look at ‘‘seasoning days’’ for newly minted 

pilots just back from earning their wings as less important today then just two 

years ago? 

General MOSELEY. The Air National Guard (ANG) views the training of our Airmen as our single highest priority. Seasoning days are exclusive to the ANG and 

Air Force Reserve. Seasoning days are utilized as a mechanism for providing experience to our ‘‘newly minted’’ fighter pilots upon completion of their Formal Training 

Unit (FTU) training and after they return to their home unit. Seasoning days are 

designed to allow the pilot to concentrate on honing their skills without conflict from 

their civilian job and provide base-level of experience before transitioning to a traditional, part-time status. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Isn’t it true that the mission has become more complex and very 

difficult especially since we’re at war, yet the USAF has taken away the standard 

two years of seasoning in favor of less seasoning days (255 instead of 365 days per 

year)? 

General MOSELEY. The first and second-year fighter pilot seasoning requirements 

are being funded as part of the Air National Guard formal school training program. 

The first year seasoning requirement is programmed and budgeted specifically for 

the purpose of seasoning; and immediately following completion of training at the 

Formal Training Unit (FTU). The second-year fighter pilot seasoning is a different 

issue. As a result of increased complexity in aircraft and missions, we expanded the 

seasoning program from one-year to two-years of fighter pilot seasoning. Prior to 

Fiscal 2007, the second year seasoning days were funded from an existing program, 

the special training (ST) funds. The impact of using an existing source of funding 

is management must take an innovative approach to address all requirements. 

We have taken this challenge and developed a comprehensive method of assuring 

the ‘‘totality’’ of training requirements is achieved. Each member is entitled to 254 

79 

days for first and second year seasoning. When these 254 days are combined with 

other training programs, 15 days of annual training (AT), 48 additional flying training periods (AFTP), and 48 unit training assemblies (UTA), each member receives 

a total of 365 days of duty towards each year fighter pilot seasoning requirement. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Why has the USAF chosen to toughen the inspection standards 

into areas of minutia while knowing that ANG units are stretched very thin performing dual tasked missions and supplying airmen into war Areas of Responsibility 

(AORs)? Could this be considered an unprecedented demand to ask of the volunteer 

airman and unlike any other wartime schedule where inspections were put on the 

back burner to fight the war with the full impact of people not worn down by off 

cycle inspections? Why does the USAF talk about ‘‘transformation’’ and how to 

change the construct into more efficient warfighting capability and yet the inspection process has not evolved out of the Cold War mindset? 

General MOSELEY. Inspection standards have not been toughened into areas of 

minutia. The Air National Guard (ANG) is inspected by the same standards as the 

active duty. ANG are designated as an operational reserve and are therefore an integral part of Air Force operational forces. Because the Air Force operates as a total 

force, it is critical that the ANG, Air Force Reserve, and active duty maintain the 

highest levels of force readiness. The inspection process is how the Air Force validates its capability and ensures units remain viable, relevant members of the Total 

Force. 

Inspections are designed to complement not detract from real-world missions. 

While inspections were put on hold immediately following September 11, 2001, once 

Air Force got into a battle rhythm, inspections were re-started because readiness 

is not just the next deployment to Southwest Asia, but includes the ability of the 

unit to meet other potentially assigned wartime, contingency, or force sustainment 

missions. 

The Air Force inspection system has undergone significant changes over the past 

10 years and thus has been on the leading edge of transformational change. In 1997, 

the CSAF commissioned a Blue Ribbon Commission to conduct an ‘‘end-to-end’’ review of the Air Force assessment program. The 1997 Blue Ribbon resulted in sweeping changes to the Inspector General (IG) inspection process including the elimination of Quality Air Force assessments and reduction in the quantity of items required for compliance inspections. Additional Air Force level inspection policy 

changes have been implemented since that time. It is now Air Force policy to minimize the inspection footprint to the maximum extent practical. MAJCOM IGs use 

sampling, combined inspections, multi-MAJCOM inspections, credit for unit activity 

in conjunction with exercises and contingencies, and other measures of sustained 

performance as inspection credit. The results of these changes have been significant. 

MAJCOM IG staffs have been reduced from over 1100 in 1997 to approximately 500 

today and inspection intervals between Operational Readiness Inspections (ORI) 

and Compliance Inspections (CI) have increased (not decreased). In 1999 ARC units 

could expect an inspection every 3 years, today’s average is 4 years. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. How would you address concerns that the overall ‘‘inspection 

creep’’ bar for performance has risen ‘‘over the top’’ and detracts from the real world 

missions ANG units are expected to perform and perform well? Is the USAF substituting inspection ratings for real world performance in assessing ANG unit capability? 

General MOSELEY. Inspections are designed to complement, not detract from realworld missions. They are how we validate our capability and show combatant commanders we perform our missions by the book and do it well. Inspections are a good 

way to train, test, and validate combat readiness before a unit has to send personnel 

in harms way. The governing instruction on Inspector General (IG) activities, Air 

Force Instruction 90–201, states that it is Air Force policy to minimize the inspection footprint to the maximum extent practical so as not to detract from real world 

missions. Major Command (MAJCOM) IGs understand the unique characteristics of 

the Air National Guard (ANG) and go to great lengths to ensure inspection schedules are properly coordinated and deconflicted with known, major deployments. 

The Air Force is not substituting inspection ratings for real world performance in 

assessing ANG unit capability. Many MAJCOM IGs provide inspection credit for 

real-world training and contingency events. However, it is impractical for IGs to deploy with a unit to a forward operating location and actually observe real-world 

combat operations. The IG is tasked to evaluate a wide spectrum of combat readiness scenarios vice a single specific scenario potentially seen during an IG inspection at a forward operating location. The ANG is committed to the Air Force’s inspection process. Inspections conducted by an objective and independent IG are key 

to certifying our ability to provide forces anytime, any place and ensure we are prepared for more than the next deployment to Southwest Asia. 

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Mr. LOBIONDO. Are there plans or proposals to eliminate the National Guard Bureau realigning the Guard Directors’ reporting chain directly to their Service Chiefs? 

Would this not usurp the traditional balance of authority within the National 

Guard? How do you envision any such proposal interacting with the National Guard 

Empowerment Act? 

General MOSELEY and Secretary WYNNE. The Air Force is unaware of any plans 

or proposals to realign the reporting chain of the Director of the Air National Guard 

(ANG) to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. The Air Force continues to integrate 

the ANG as part of the Total Air Force as it has for over twenty years. The existing 

reporting chain of the Director of the Air National Guard has been effective and the 

Air Force believes that it is more efficient to keep the current command alignment 

in its present format where many Title 10 and Title 32 requirements are executed 

and effectively coordinated. Finally, the Air Force cannot predict how such a proposal would interact with pending legislation such as the Guard Empowerment Act. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

Mr. BISHOP. What is the Air Force doing today or in the near future to plan for 

the next generation ground-based ICBM once the Minuteman III missiles have aged 

out of the inventory starting in 2020? Are Air Force or Department of Defense dollars currently being used to begin advanced planning in this area inasmuch as it 

takes between 18–20 years to field a major new weapons system? 

General MOSELEY and Secretary WYNNE. The Air Force is committed, in accordance with Congressional direction in the FY2007 National Defense Authorization 

Act (NDAA), to sustain the deployed force through FY2030, ten years past the previously estimated end of service life. To comply with NDAA direction, the Air Force 

is extending the service life of the Minuteman III missile and supporting infrastructure by continuing our integrated process of aging surveillance, timely sustainment 

activities and modification programs. As our focus shifts from the current modernization programs to long-term weapon system sustainment, the Air Force will 

continue to assess advanced strategic missile technology through the ICBM Demonstration/Validation (Dem/Val) program. The ICBM Long Range Planning (ILRP) 

element of Dem/Val coordinates and balances these efforts to ensure the viability 

of the current ICBM weapon system while identifying potential areas of enterprise 

investment that could be applied to future ICBM recapitalization or other strategic 

missions. 

Mr. BISHOP. Are you concerned about preserving the U.S. industrial base in the 

sensitive area of ICBM production and technology once the Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP) is completed in view of the likely gap between the 

end of the Minuteman III PRP program and production of a follow-on system. If so, 

what are your plans to address that concern? 

General MOSELEY and Secretary WYNNE. The ICBM industrial base remains a 

critical element in the Air Force’s ability to sustain the Minuteman III force through 

FY2030, in accordance with the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act. This 

represents a service life extension of the Minuteman III program, so as Minuteman 

modernization activities such as PRP are completed our focus will shift to weapon 

system sustainment, with the Air Force planning to continue to exercise unique industrial skills/capabilities through several existing programs such as: the ICBM 

Demonstration/Validation program; the Integrated High Payoff Rocket Propulsion 

Technology program; and the Technology for the Sustainment of Strategic Systems 

program. The intent of these programs is to investigate/demonstrate advanced strategic concepts and address science and technology issues to sustain strategic capabilities, to include solid rocket motor propulsion. 

Additionally, the Air Force continues to participate in recurring technical interchange meetings with the Navy Strategic Systems Program (SSP) to jointly identify/ 

analyze areas of common technologies to most efficiently leverage the strategic industrial base. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. The Army currently plans to field 75 Joint Cargo Aircraft over the 

next several years. I am concerned that if the Air Force were to take the lead in 

the Joint Program Office that the fielding plan for the Army would be terminated. 

If the Air Force were to become executive agent for the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) 

program, would the Air Force commit to continue fielding the current Army requirement of 75 aircraft for the JCA? 

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General MOSELEY. The Air Force supports the same units receiving C–27s and 

continuing with the beddown plan as proposed. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I have read in recent media reports that the Air Force believes 

it should become the executive agent for the Joint Cargo Aircraft’s Joint Program 

Office. As you are aware, on June 20, 2006, General John Corley, Vice Chief of Staff 

for the Air Force signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with General Richard 

Cody, Vice Chief of Staff for the Army that stated the Army would lead the Joint 

Program Office. What has changed since the signing of this MOA that would lead 

the Air Force to want to wrest control of the office away from the Army? Do you 

feel the results of the JROC process that lead to the eventual MOA with the Army 

were not thorough or complete enough? 

General MOSELEY. Since the 20 June 2006 Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), the Air Force has supported the joint program. Its 

support included the JCA Capabilities Development Document approval in the 19 

April 2007 Joint Requirements Oversight Council. As General Moseley stated in the 

24 October 2007 hearing, he ‘‘absolutely’’ supported the Army portion of the program. 

Intra-theater airlift, including time-sensitive mission-critical support to the Joint 

Force Land Component Commander, is essential to the success of the Joint Force 

Commander (JFC). The threshold issue is how best to employ any airlift platform, 

including the JCA, to meet joint intra-theater airlift needs. The Air Force believes 

the JFC can most effectively and efficiently match intra-theater airlift resources to 

requirements in a single pool of mobility assets under the Joint Force Air Component Commander. 

In response to related Senate Armed Services Committee language, the Air Force 

supports the proposition that if given the resources, the mission, and the requisite 

joint coordination process, it can and will continue to support JFC requirements. 

The Air Force is better positioned today than any other organization to accomplish 

the intra-theater airlift mission and it does not expect delays in delivery of the JCA, 

should Congress decide to transfer the JCA program to the Air Force. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. On October 23, 2007 the President reiterated his direction to the Department of Defense to achieve a credible deterrent in nuclear warheads. It is my 

belief that Congress must sufficiently fund the Department of the Air Force so that 

it does not have to run budget drills and be forced to decide between funding fighter 

jets, bombers, or nuclear missiles. I have been told the land-based leg of our nuclear 

Triad, the Minuteman III Land-Based Strategic Deterrent program, recently lost its 

‘‘highest national defense urgency ‘‘DX’’ designation. My understanding is that the 

sea-based leg of our nuclear Triad, the Trident II D5 program, is still considered 

to be a DX program of ‘‘highest national defense urgency,’’ as is demonstrated by 

the Navy’s long-term budgeting for the D5 service life-extension program. Currently, 

the Air Force does not yet have any plans in place to either extend the life of the 

Minuteman III system, or to replace it with another system. How should this committee interpret the discrepancy between these two critical programs? I understand 

a Land-Based Strategic Deterrent (LBSD) Acquisition Decision Memorandum 

(ADM) that provided recommendations for a follow-on Strategic Deterrence capability is awaiting determination by the Secretary of the Air Force. I am concerned 

that failure to forward a Land-Based Strategic Deterrent (LBSD) Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) to OSD is another indication that the Air Force may not 

see the need to plan how to replace this critical capability when it ages out. Should 

the HASC conclude that these Department actions—or lack of—constitute a means 

of eliminating the land-based leg of the Triad entirely? Is the Air Force choosing 

not to fund the land-based leg of the Triad due to higher funding priorities? 

General MOSELEY. Minuteman III is a critical element of the Nation’s strategic 

deterrence and the Air Force is committed to sustaining the Minuteman III force 

through FY2030, in accordance with the FY2007 National Defense Authorization 

Act (NDAA). To this end, we are extending the service life of the Minuteman III 

missile and its supporting infrastructure by continuing our integrated process of 

aging surveillance, timely sustainment activities, and modification programs. Earlier this year, the Department reduced the DX rating list from 22 to 7 programs. 

The Air Force is requesting OSD (AT&L) give Minuteman III the industrial priority 

ranking appropriate to ensure its readiness by restoring the Minuteman III DX rating. 

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The Air Force remains committed to maintaining a robust land-based strategic capability. The decision to defer development of a follow-on ICBM program was based 

on the extension of the Minuteman III service life to FY2030. Based on this extension, an Acquisition Decision Memorandum to support a follow-on ICBM program 

would be premature at this time. 

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