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[H.A.S.C. No. 110–100] 

AFRICA COMMAND 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

NOVEMBER 14, 2007 


Congress.#13
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

MARK E. UDALL, Colorado 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

MARK LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

STEPHANIE SANOK, Professional Staff Member 

MARGEE MECKSTROTH, Staff Assistant 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2007 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, November 14, 2007, Africa Command .............................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, November 14, 2007 ............................................................................. 41 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2007 

AFRICA COMMAND 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Henry, Hon. Ryan, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy ..... 4 

Mull, Ambassador Stephen D., Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau 

of Political-Military Affairs .................................................................................. 6 

Ward, Gen. William E. ‘‘Kip,’’ USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command .......... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Henry, Hon. Ryan ............................................................................................. 45 

Mull, Ambassador Stephen D. ......................................................................... 52 

Ward, Gen. William E. ‘‘Kip’’ ........................................................................... 61 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

AFRICA COMMAND 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, November 14, 2007. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for bearing with us. And, 

ladies and gentlemen, we welcome you to the Armed Services hearing on the United States African Command (AFRICOM). 

We have appearing before us the Honorable Ryan Henry, Principal Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Ambassador Stephen 

Mull, Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; and General Kip Ward, the Commanding General of 

Africa Command. 

And, General, we welcome you and thank you for being with us 

today. 

This is a reminder today that there are places in the world well 

beyond Iraq and Afghanistan that we must be concerned with, and 

this is a new thought, a new venture, and we in our country need 

to pay a great deal of attention to it. 

When you stop and think about it, Africa represents a range of 

real and potential national security-related concerns and deserves 

great consideration by us. 

First, of course, is that Africa is a theater in the war on terror. 

We remember the attacks on the American embassies in Tanzania 

and Kenya in 1998. 

And today Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara (OEF– 

TS) is ongoing as we speak, with American forces working with 

their African counterparts in places like Algeria, Chad, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria and Tunisia to strengthen the region’s counterterrorism efforts—one or more of those nations and large portions of 

territory where no state government really exists and terrorists can 

find safe haven, sadly, in those ungoverned places. 

So we do welcome you gentlemen. We look forward to your testimony. I will ask that the balance of my prepared statement be put 

in the record without objection. 

And I will ask our esteemed ranking member for his comments 

at this time. 

Mr. Hunter. 

2 

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for holding this hearing. 

And welcome to General Kip Ward, who appears before this committee for the first time as the commander of the new United 

States Africa Command. 

And, General, we value your continued commitment and services. 

We recognize the growing importance of stability on the African 

continent and its significant impact on the international security 

environment and especially the global war on terror. 

We also welcome the Honorable Ryan Henry and Ambassador 

Stephen Mull, who will certainly provide insight into both the creation of AFRICOM and its future as a model of interagency cooperation. 

Ever since the Department of Defense (DOD) released its latest 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in February of 2006, we in 

Congress have been watching to see how the Department would 

translate its multitude of findings and recommendations into some 

concrete steps that will help the young men and women of our U.S. 

military meet the challenges of a changed and still-evolving security environment. 

Earlier this year, President Bush announced his decision to create AFRICOM as one such step. At the time, he noted that ‘‘this 

new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa 

and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring 

peace and security to the people of Africa.’’ 

Over the last several decades alone, we can all recall the horrifying genocides, rebellions and civil wars and the natural disasters 

that have occurred on the African continent. 

These events, which raised death tolls to unimaginable levels 

and caused massive influxes of refugees and internally displaced 

people, serve as a grim reminder of what we all stand to lose in 

the face of massive instability. 

We see this reminder still in the current situation within the 

Darfur region of Sudan and in the continued saber-rattling within 

several other Africa subregions. 

So I agree with the President’s goals as he laid out earlier this 

year—development, health, education, democracy and economic 

growth. 

The question becomes, though, how a United States combatant 

command can best work toward these goals which, to be honest, 

may contribute to national security but are not viewed as traditional military goals. 

My questions are therefore twofold. First, many media outlets 

and regional experts report that Africa officials have expressed significant misgivings that the establishment of Africa Command will 

lead to the militarization of our relations with their nations. 

In light of the number of coups and armed conflicts that have occurred in Africa since many of those nations gained independence, 

I imagine that those officials are justifiably wary of anything with 

even a hint of militarization. 

3 

In addition, in a briefing I recently received, I learned that the U.S. Government spends about $9 billion per year in Africa on 

health, development, trade promotion and good governance activities. 

Yet we spend only $250 million annually on building capabilities 

and capacities for peacekeeping, border and coastal security, and 

logistics and airlift support for peacekeeping, as well as holding 

training exercises and bilateral events. 

Mr. Henry, you also highlighted this disparity in your written 

testimony. 

Given their possible distrust of foreign military influence and 

given this disparity in the focus of U.S. aid, how are we reassuring 

our African friends that this new command will not lead to increased U.S. efforts to control or otherwise influence their militaries? 

And how have you responded to their concerns as expressed to 

date? And what is your plan for continued engagement on such future concerns? 

My second question focuses on the interagency aspect of this new 

command. I understand that AFRICOM is attempting to establish 

a complementary mix of military and civilian personnel with officials from the State Department and the United States Agency for 

International Development (USAID) working side by side with Defense Department officials. 

However, I have also heard rumblings that U.S. embassy personnel in African capitals and elsewhere may be suspicious of an 

overarching regional construct, particularly one that is essentially 

a military combatant command. 

The best way I think of to ensure that a player is fully invested 

in a successful team-oriented outcome is to make certain that player is literally invested. 

Given that a significant number of AFRICOM personnel will be 

State Department and USAID officials, please describe the costsharing arrangement for Fiscal Year 2008 and in future fiscal 

years so that we can rest assured non-DOD players are full stakeholders in the success of this command and its interagency missions. 

And particularly, gentlemen, I have always been concerned with 

the standup of military operations which end up being viewed as 

a money payer by the other agencies, and I hope that we will see 

burden-sharing in this, what really has to be considered to be a 

joint venture in Africa. 

In closing, we have seen how ungoverned and undergoverned 

spaces can become safe havens for terrorists. By partnering more 

closely with nations on the African continent, we can help to develop more secure borders, more responsible and capable military 

forces and security institutions that are more responsive to national governments, and we can help to close the doors of any safe 

havens located there. 

I look forward to hearing how standing up AFRICOM will expand upon those efforts. 

And once again, General, as we discussed a little earlier, General 

Ward, I think that one of the real values of the combatant commands around the world and the military presence is the developVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:09 Jul 10, 2009 Jkt 044633 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-100\318000.000 HARM2 PsN: MARY
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ment of those relationships between military leaders in those countries and American military leaders. 

And to a large degree, I have seen our military leaders as being 

really, truly our best ambassadors, our best diplomats. And I would 

think that establishing working relationships with the military 

leaders of the African states will accrue to our benefit in the future. 

And it is an area that we should prioritize in terms of developing 

relationships, having lots of visits to American training commands, 

and trying to build long-term, stable relationships that will pay off 

5 years, 10 years, 15 years, 20 years from now. 

So thank you, gentlemen. Thanks for being with us this morning. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this very important hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

I have invited Don Payne, the subcommittee chairman on Africa 

from the Foreign Affairs Committee, to join us, and without objection he will be with us today. 

And with that said, Secretary Henry, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN HENRY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 

Secretary HENRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are genuinely 

appreciative of the opportunity to come and talk to you today. 

We have found that dialogue and discussion not only helps inform people of where we are trying to go with the command but 

also enriches our efforts in standing up this new command with a 

new construct. So we genuinely look forward to it. 

The fact that Africa is rising in significance to the United States 

is undeniable. The reorganization of our military structure within 

the Department of Defense to accommodate a continental unified 

command is just a manifestation of that growing importance. 

In my submitted statement, I outlined the rationale, structure 

and objectives for guiding the creation of AFRICOM and addressed 

some of the ranking member’s second question. Hopefully, in my 

oral statement, I will address some of your first question. 

Because over the course of hundreds of consultations regarding 

AFRICOM, we as a group have learned that the vast majority that 

we talk to have initial reservations about the new command, and 

especially those on the African continent, and that these misgivings 

are fed by misperceptions and recirculated myths. 

These misunderstandings—they tend to cloud the dialogue until 

they are adequately addressed, and therefore I would like to use 

the brief period I have for my oral statement to address these misunderstandings and thereby afford General Ward and Ambassador 

Mull the opportunity to address the proactive aspects of AFRICOM 

in their statements. 

First myth: Many Africans and even some of their leaders suspect that we are establishing AFRICOM to further some specific 

Department of Defense agenda on the continent. And it usually 

comes down to three variants of that. 

Either we are there solely to fight terrorism and thereby will 

make the continent a bigger target for terrorist activity, or we are 

there to counter growing Chinese influence and thereby we are 

going to polarize the continent between two superpowers, or even 

5 

we are there to secure Africa’s mineral wealth—usually it is specifically oil they think that we are after—and thereby exploit the continent in a neo-colonial fashion. 

These myths just are not true. Violent extremism and the safe 

havens afforded to them by ungoverned, misgoverned and undergoverned areas is a concern which we will address in cooperation 

with our African partners in a manner similar to the way we do 

today, each and every day, but it is not the singular focus of the 

command. 

The United States, China and other countries share a common 

interest in a stable, secure and rising Africa. And though we may 

differ on the means, we look forward to cooperating with China as 

a responsible international stakeholder to achieve that end. 

Additionally, while natural resources represent much of Africa’s 

current and future material wealth, it is in a stable environment 

where Africans have unimpeded access for bringing their goods to 

the world marketplace that will deliver the most benefit to Africans 

and, I might add, non-Africans. 

The second set of myths swirl around the claim that AFRICOM 

is a manifestation of a militarization of foreign policy, the Pentagon’s effort to make inroads in the area of foreign policy. This is 

also false. 

AFRICOM will not change the State Department’s role as the 

lead in foreign policy. 

Each of our ambassador’s authorities as the chief of mission in 

any country will not just be respected but will be reinforced by 

AFRICOM’s cooperative and integrated whole government approach to security issues under the country team leadership of the 

ambassador. 

And I think it is notable with Ambassador Mull being here 

today—and in each and every meeting or deliberation that we have 

had regarding AFRICOM, there has been a representative of the 

State Department there. 

The third generic myth is that some accuse AFRICOM of being 

a unilateral mechanism for seizing control of security issues on the 

continent. Again, this is not why we need an AFRICOM. 

Africans will continue to lead efforts to address their own security challenges. The Department of Defense recognizes and applauds the leadership role that Africans both on a regional and individual basis and also the African Union are taking to promote security and stability. 

We seek to complement these efforts in a supporting role, not to 

compete with them in a leadership role. Through many of our capacity-building programs, we seek to support, not supplant, African 

leadership. 

U.S. national security is enhanced most on the continent when 

African nations and organizations can address and resolve emerging security issues before they erupt into regional and international 

crises that will require, then, international intervention. 

Finally, despite such misrepresentations, AFRICOM was not developed in a vacuum. Our outreach campaign was comprised of 

hundreds of separate engagements with African nations both on 

the continent and here in Washington, D.C., with Congress, nonVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:09 Jul 10, 2009 Jkt 044633 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-100\318000.000 HARM2 PsN: MARY
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governmental organizations, the media, multilateral institutions 

and numerous foreign governments in Europe and Asia. 

Constant and continuing dialogue with our African partners has 

genuinely influenced the development of the command. I have personally been to the continent twice to consult with the key leaders 

of 14 different nations. 

And despite some public accounts to the contrary, almost all the 

African nations expressed their appreciation for the greater U.S. 

engagement in Africa and their support for our desire to work with 

the African Union (AU). 

Overwhelmingly, once people are educated about the command, 

their fears subside and their interests are heightened. 

Of course, no matter the extent of our outreach efforts, rumors 

will persist, and the key to dispelling rumors, in addition to speaking with you here today, is to stand up AFRICOM and demonstrate 

that these fears have no foundation. 

We are thrilled to have General Ward in command of AFRICOM 

and believe his efforts to execute defense policies on the continent 

will be successful and continue to be received favorably by Africans. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Henry can be found in the 

Appendix on page 45.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks so much, Mr. Secretary. 

Ambassador Mull. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR STEPHEN D. MULL, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF POLITICALMILITARY AFFAIRS 

Ambassador MULL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hunter. It is a great delight to appear before the 

House Armed Services Committee again today to talk about 

AFRICOM. 

Africa today is a place of promise and opportunity linked to the 

United States through culture, history and commerce. But it is also 

a place of severe challenges such as poverty, disease, terrorism and 

instability that all together pose critical risks for U.S. interests. 

From the very first conversation between the Departments of 

State and Defense on the idea of AFRICOM more than a year ago, 

we at State have enthusiastically welcomed the idea of a unified 

command for Africa which would feature a number of exciting innovations, including the transformation of the U.S. military strategic 

approach to the continent from three separate commands into one; 

expanded attention to building the military capacity of our African 

partners so that they can better work together with us in confronting the common threats we face such as terrorism, ungoverned 

areas, and civil and international conflicts, as the chairman mentioned; but also feature a more coherent approach to important regional security concerns that affect America’s vital interests. 

It would provide a more efficient way of giving emergency humanitarian assistance and managing the response to military crises. 

And it would provide an unprecedented new way of interagency 

cooperation that would feature opening the door to substantial ciVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:09 Jul 10, 2009 Jkt 044633 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-100\318000.000 HARM2 PsN: MARY
7 

vilian agency involvement in the command, including by putting 

senior civilians in leadership positions in the command. 

Our enthusiasm for the idea only increased with the appointment 

of General Kip Ward, whose strong leadership skills and warm personal relationships across the continent will only augur well for the 

command’s success. 

From the very beginning of planning for AFRICOM, State was 

an integral partner. We assigned officers to join the command design team here in Washington and later in Stuttgart, and many aspects of the new command reflect substantial input by State and 

other civilian officials. 

We collaborated in briefing your staffs here in the Congress, appropriate nongovernmental organizations, African governments and 

in briefing the press. 

We joined in officially briefing key African partners on a series 

of trips to the region and at a conference here in the United States. 

And we joined in briefing key allies and partners around the world 

on our intentions. 

The result of this collaboration is a command that will substantially improve the U.S. Government’s effectiveness in responding to 

Africa’s unique challenges and in creating an atmosphere that is 

favorable to America’s considerable interests there. 

In describing AFRICOM, it is probably more important to describe what it is not. It will not take the place of the Department 

of State and of U.S. embassies in the field as the voice of American 

foreign policy in our relationships with African states and organizations. 

It will not have any authorities beyond those that U.S. military 

commands already enjoy. 

It will not establish new military bases on the African continent. 

It will not have any less responsibility to obtain chief of mission 

concurrence and coordinate all its activities in individual countries. 

Its civilian officials will not exercise any authority on behalf of 

their parent agencies. 

And finally, to Congressman Hunter’s remarks, I believe that 

will not supplant U.S. foreign assistance activities. Last year, total 

U.S. foreign assistance for Africa totaled to be about $9 billion. 

AFRICOM’s resources will be substantially less than that, three 

percent to five percent of that, depending on how the budget turns 

out. 

Now, conversely, here is what the command will allow. Instead 

of a more traditional focus on preparing for combat, AFRICOM will 

concentrate on a more strategically coherent focus on our security 

cooperation and military relationships in Africa and more effective 

support of important programs that we fund with Foreign Military 

Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training 

(IMET), peacekeeping funds and Section 1206 funds. 

These programs include the President’s Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI), which aims to train tens of thousands 

of new troops for peacekeeping operations; the Trans-Sahel 

Counterterrorism Initiative, which aims to improve the capacities 

of northern and central African states to respond to the terrorist 

threat; the Maritime Security Initiative in the Gulf of Guinea 

which aims to increase the ability of the region’s states to provide 

8 

for their own maritime security and other African coastal and border security programs. 

It will help support the East African counterterrorism initiative 

and support for peacekeeping missions in Africa such as the United 

Nations (U.N.) mission in Darfur. 

AFRICOM will also help support security sector reform in such 

key places as Liberia and southern Sudan. 

Also, importantly, it will allow civilian agencies like State and 

AID to have a seat at the table in shaping the military support of 

these programs, working in close liaison with all of our embassies 

on the continent. 

We are proud that the State Department has already contributed 

Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates as one of the two deputies to the 

commander and look forward to contributing a number of other officers to assist and guide the command in its work, such as a foreign policy adviser, Jerry Lanier, who joins me here today. 

There will obviously be substantial challenges to overcome in 

standing up this command regarding the location or locations of the 

command, security and infrastructure concerns, winning political 

and diplomatic support for the command on the continent, and 

sorting out the status of AFRICOM’s forces in the countries where 

they reside both with host governments and resident U.S. embassies. 

But we are confident, based on our extremely productive interagency partnership thus far, that we are going to succeed in overcoming those challenges and scoring a real win for America’s interests in Africa in the longer term. 

Thanks very much for the opportunity to appear before you 

today, and I look forward to taking your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Mull can be found in the 

Appendix on page 52.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much. 

General Ward, please. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL WILLIAM E. ‘‘KIP’’ WARD, USA, 

COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND 

General WARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter, 

distinguished members of the committee. I am honored to be appearing before you in my position as the commander, United States 

Africa Command. 

U.S. AFRICOM was created to consolidate and focus the work of 

the Department of Defense and to enable us to better support 

United States policy in Africa. 

I believe that U.S. AFRICOM will add value to America’s security cooperation projects and the delivery of American security assistance programs in Africa, thus making them more efficient and 

responsive. 

The leadership of the African Union was positive in their support 

for this objective during my visit with them just this past week. 

And I might add that I discussed this with 23 separate African ambassadors to the A.U.—again, overwhelming support for the objectives of the command. 

9 

It is in our national interest to build an enduring organization 

designed to enhance our government’s capacity to help Africans 

care for their stability, development and prosperity. 

AFRICOM is a command under construction. We are building the 

team. We would like to realize a complementary mix of Department 

of Defense civilian and military staff and, as has been noted, representatives from across the interagency departments of our government. 

With the goal of achieving full operational capability as a unified 

command by October 2008, U.S. AFRICOM endeavors to be innovative in its construct. 

Our intention is to move beyond the traditional concept of liaison 

officers and instead have our interagency partners serve in staff 

positions alongside their Department of Defense counterparts. 

U.S. AFRICOM will complement, as the under secretary pointed 

out, not compete with, the activities of other U.S. governmental activities and organizations. 

U.S. AFRICOM will, indeed, add value and, in so doing, do no 

harm to the collective and substantial ongoing security cooperation 

programs and other efforts on the continent. 

We will do everything in our power not to disrupt or confuse current security and stabilizing efforts in Africa. We do need to be 

aware of those other activities. 

We will add value by harmonizing U.S. military efforts to maximize the effectiveness of our programs in Africa. 

U.S. AFRICOM will respect the leading roles for the U.S. Department of State in our Nation’s foreign policy and U.S. Agency for 

International Development in our Nation’s development and humanitarian assistance programs. 

U.S. AFRICOM will seek to promote relationships and build 

partnerships to enable the work of Africans in providing for their 

own security. It begins with listening and understanding our African partners’ definitions of their own environment and interest. 

Appreciation of their perspective will allow us to jointly identify 

ways and means that address both African and American interests. 

Our intent is to build mutual trust, respect and confidence with 

our partners in Africa and our international friends through sustained engagement by a single unified command dedicated solely to 

Africa. 

We will work with African nations and their security organizations as partners. 

I would like to reaffirm that AFRICOM will sustain ongoing activities as it accepts new missions in a seamless transition from the 

three existing geographic combatant commands in Africa. 

Past activities have made visible and measurable differences on 

the ground, through professionalism of military units and by showing that America is a caring and loyal partner. These types of 

events and programs will continue. 

They include medical readiness exercises. You are familiar with 

MEDFLAG and Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP). 

Communications interoperability enhancements through Africa 

Endeavor, disaster preparedness exercises. You are familiar with 

Natural Fire and Golden Spear. 

Capacity-building exercises. You are familiar with Flintlock. 

10 

Security sector reform activities such as in Liberia. And State 

partnership programs where we are now up to eight in Africa. 

U.S. AFRICOM will actively support the State Department in 

training African peacekeepers under the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program, or ACOTA. 

New U.S. activities such as the African Partnership Station 

(APS) demonstrate the types of activities that U.S. AFRICOM will 

promote as forces for good in bringing stability to the continent of 

Africa. 

Showing our commitment to these relationships requires enhanced and expanded resources for our African partners. International military education and training, as was mentioned, and 

foreign military financing remain important tools for building capacity on the continent for generations to come. 

U.S. AFRICOM represents the United States Government’s longterm commitment to strengthen our security ties with Africa. 

We will endeavor to assist African nations in enhancing security 

and stability for the peoples of Africa where growth and expanded 

horizons exist for future generations, thus increasing our stability 

here in America. 

We will move forward in a very deliberate manner so that decades from now all of us will be able to look back and see that the 

foundation we laid for this new command is something to be proud 

of, something that America stands to benefit from. 

It is an honor to continue to serve alongside the outstanding soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and statesmen of the United States 

Africa Command. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Ward can be found in the 

Appendix on page 61.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you so much. 

I have two quick questions before I ask Mr. Hunter and the other 

members of the committee. 

The headquarters today is in Stuttgart, Germany, am I correct? 

General WARD. Correct, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. And where will the new headquarters of the Africa Command be, please? 

General WARD. Mr. Chairman, that decision has not been established. At the current time, there are activities taking place on the 

continent to determine, based on a series of factors, including items 

such as infrastructure, stability, political receptiveness, locations, 

locale, the ability to move around—those are all being looked at 

now. 

The construct of the headquarters on the continent has not been 

determined. There are models that are discussed under deliberation with respect to a distributed headquarters where elements of 

the staff might be located in various parts of the continent. 

But again, Mr. Chairman, those decisions have not been taken 

and will not be taken until further deliberation and understanding 

is there and in consultation with you, with the Administration 

here, has taken place. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a judgment as to when that decision 

will be made? 

General WARD. Sir, at this time I do not. We are looking closely 

at the various factors because we understand the implications for 

11 

the follow-on budgetary cycle, but as I pointed out, sir, we have 

been cautioned to be very deliberate in that. 

We are moving apace with the work to determine the potentials, 

but then the negotiations—we have to be invited to a particular location, and so those are the efforts that are still to be accomplished. 

And as we move those efforts along, we will certainly keep you 

informed. But I cannot put a timeline on it now. We do have a goal, 

Mr. Chairman, that by the time we achieve full operational capability, which is October of 2008, that some element of the headquarters will be operating on the continent. 

The CHAIRMAN. On the continent. 

General WARD. Correct, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. One last question. We all know the stretch and 

the strain under which the United States Army is operating today. 

Where will you get your manpower for this new command? 

General WARD. At the current time, sir, the manpower for the 

new command is being distributed from existing activities of the 

joint manning apparatus. As you are aware, currently U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), 

U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) do activities on the continent. 

The initial operating capability that we will continue to work toward achieving throughout this coming series of months will draw 

upon those assets as well as other assets that would be redistributed into the command from existing combatant command accounts. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Just very briefly, the chairman went over an important aspect. 

That is the pull on personnel necessary to staff the command. 

Have you done an analysis on what the incremental increase in 

DOD costs will be that will be attributed to the African Command 

above and beyond what we are spending in that area now under 

the existing commands? 

Secretary HENRY. Well, we will stand up AFRICOM within our 

top line. As far as the funding goes, it will come out of funding that 

is—we have the funding for the coming year, and the funding 

takes—during this year, General Ward and his staff will be laying 

out the program over a five-year program to determine what that 

funding will be. 

So we have brought that forward as an issue in our budget build 

for this coming year and have reallocated dollars. The size of the 

command will be on the small size of what normal combatant commands are. 

And just a minor nuance to what General Ward said. The staffing is coming from those officers that we currently have in joint billets, many of which will be in joint combatant commands, but some 

which might be in other joint billets that we will use to man that. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ortiz, the gentleman from Texas. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

12 

I have a question for anybody that would like to answer. I understand that in late October 2007 members of the Pan-African Parliament, which is the legislative body of the African Union, voted 

in favor of a motion to prevail upon all African—Americans’ government request to host AFRICOM anywhere in the African continent. 

They voted that they, at this point, did not understand exactly 

what we wanted to do. And I know that what we are trying to do 

now is to stay ahead of the curve. We are doing something differently than what we have done before, like after 9/11 and some 

of the other things now. 

How much longer do you think that it will take for us to convince 

this legislative body that what we are trying to do is the right 

thing to do for the African nations and for the continent? 

And I don’t know what you have been working on, but is this a 

true fact that they voted against trying to accede to the United 

States demand that we—if somebody can answer that question. 

Ambassador MULL. Yes, sir. I can tell you that as both Secretary 

Henry and General Ward mentioned in their remarks, the launch 

of AFRICOM when we went public with it did generate some skepticism on the African continent. 

And so that is why we have decided to approach this very deliberately. And we find that as we consult with people privately, the 

response has generally been very, very positive. 

However, we want to make sure that we don’t establish a formal 

presence on the continent until such time that the diplomatic climate and the political climate is right. 

And fortunately, our good allies the Germans have said that they 

would welcome our continuing there in Stuttgart for as long as it 

takes to do that. So we have a place not too far from the African 

continent where we can continue to operate. 

I would note that—there has been a lot of positive response to 

this initiative as well. Certainly, president Sirleaf-Johnson of Liberia has publicly said that she welcomes us and, in fact, would like 

Liberia to be the host of the headquarters. 

That is only one of many options that we are looking at. But we 

will not stand up this command on the continent until we are welcome to do so by the countries there. And we are confident that 

that day will come. 

Secretary HENRY. I might add that both General Ward and myself have been to the African Union on several different occasions 

and talked to the top leadership, the members, the ambassadors, 

and consistently they are positive in regard to what we are trying 

to do. 

Early on, there had been a fourth myth, one I didn’t address, 

that is Africa-specific, and that is that with the coming of 

AFRICOM there would—be the large infusion of American combat 

forces and basing on the continent. 

So normally when we go to talk to them, that is the first rumor 

that we knock down. There are no new bases envisioned in 

AFRICOM, and there are no combat troops. 

There is a staff element to which General Ward talked about, 

that a portion of which will be interfacing with Africans, we believe 

is important that they are on the continent. 

13 

Once we get by that myth and the other three myths, then people are positive. They are looking forward to Americans participating. 

Uniformly, among the African nations, they ask us to have a 

close relationship with the African Union. That is who they look to 

for continental security and who they would like us to work with. 

And again, we have had a very cordial relationship with them. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Another problem that I see—and I am all for trying 

to nourish that relationship with the African countries and the African continent. 

But there was a little problem not too long ago when some of the 

employees of the State Department decided that they did not want 

to be assigned to Iraq because of the seriousness of the problems 

and the war zone. 

Do you anticipate that maybe we will have the same problem by 

assigning State officials to an area that we are not sure whether 

they like us or not or whether it is the proper time to move in or 

not? 

You don’t think that will play a role in moving some of the State 

Departments to an area that we don’t know what we are going to 

do? 

Secretary HENRY. Well, Ambassador Mull is the expert on that. 

I will let him follow up. But to date, we have had a surprisingly 

strong request for information about how interagency personnel 

can participate, requests from people to find out where they get in 

line to be able to sign up for it. 

We haven’t come up with exact billet structure, so we can’t put 

billets against individuals or agencies yet. But from what we can 

see, that will be the least of our problems. 

Ambassador MULL. I would add that since we have begun working with the Defense Department on the standup for this command 

there has been substantial interest from within the ranks of the 

Africanists within the foreign service to be assigned to participate 

in this command, and we have had more expressions of interest 

than we, frankly, have spaces to fill. 

And if I could, I know the subject of today is not Iraq. I just 

would like to give you an update on Iraq in that of the 250 positions that we are filling this year, we now have volunteers identified for 240 of them and expect to find volunteers for the remaining 

10 in the next week or so. 

Mr. ORTIZ. My time is up. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Remembering all those years when I sat in one of the lower rows 

and never had a chance to ask my question, I am going to yield 

my time to the most junior member in attendance today, which 

happens to be a gentleman from my birth state, Mr. Davis. 

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. I thank the gentleman. 

The interagency reform issue is a very personal one with us, and 

I am watching some really good things that have happened in Africa. 

14 

Particularly the operations in the Horn of Africa right now I consider one of the better-kept secrets that are there and look with 

some optimism to the standup of this command and what it could 

be accomplishing in the region, particularly with long-term strategic significance for much of the world there. 

One of the questions, looking at personnel issues, looking at the 

challenges that we face in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Somalia, 

going all the way back to Grenada, for that matter, in the interagency world of working effectively together, I see a real opportunity for us to, let’s say, put a lead on a lot of our nonkinetic assets from a least intrusive through information outreach, diplomacy, across to economic development, and finally having those 

other options as well-placed deterrents on the table. 

One of the questions that comes up from time to time as we talk 

about this are barriers between the agencies, statutory barriers in 

regulation, authorization, appropriation, for the ability to intermingle funds, to collaborate, particularly when you have a relatively short time frame to put together the kind of package for 

support. 

And I was wondering if you could comment for a moment and 

really would open it up to all three, but perhaps begin with Ambassador Mull, on areas in the law that we can change from an authorizing perspective in the respective committees in Congress to 

allow this command to truly be empowered, to avoid many of the 

challenges that we faced on the ground in theater right now. 

Ambassador MULL. Thank you very much, Congressman Davis. 

As General Ward mentioned, this is a command under construction 

right now. 

And in our planning, from the very beginning of the planning 

process for this, when we began to sit down and consult with our 

Defense colleagues last autumn, we agreed that at least early on 

we would not envision any statutory changes to how U.S. military 

commands operate and interoperate with U.S. embassies in the 

field, that the authorities that exist now would remain intact. 

That said, we believe that creating this command will create a 

lot of efficiencies by putting people from the Agency for International Development and the State Department with expertise in 

those particular authorities and areas right there at the table with 

General Ward when he does his planning for his operations of the 

command. 

So as we stand this up and we get people staffed and working 

together, that may change. We may decide that there may need to 

be a change in the legal structure. 

But for the time being, certainly speaking on behalf of the State 

Department, we don’t see any need to change the existing authorities we have now. 

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Part of the reason I asked the question 

was about 6,500 people in the foreign service, for example, compared to seven-figure numbers in the Defense Department of available resources—there certainly is a difference in scale there. 

In many of these areas I think we have just a fraction of what 

we had in the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support 

(CORDS) program in Vietnam now in terms of our actual provincial reconstruction outreach. 

15 

And this is where I come back to the question of if you have limited resources, the payment question could be a challenge. I am 

well aware of what happened in terms of standing up additional 

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) support with our reinforcement that took place earlier this year in Iraq. 

The reason I am asking you first is I hear from the military all 

the time that the interagency is a challenge both from a structure, 

funding and authorization standpoint. 

And perhaps General Ward can comment for a second on that. 

General WARD. Thank you, Congressman Davis, for that. As Ambassador Mull pointed out, as we move down the road with the 

command and look at ways of being more effective in delivering the 

very fine programs that the United States of America wants to implement on the continent, there may be opportunities to come back 

and ask for authorization deviations that will allow us to do that 

in a more effective way. 

What I will say is that in my previous role that I played in many 

theaters, the ability of us to deliver timely and effective American 

security cooperation and American security assistance, regardless 

of its source, is important. 

And so as we move through this effort of this command and 

bringing value added to our ongoing programs, I am very confident 

that should we find a way that we can come back and recommend 

that we can do a better job, that we will come back to you with 

that, because it is something that we would be paying very close 

attention to as we implement the standup of the command. 

Secretary HENRY. Mr. Chairman, I apologize, but if I just might 

add—because we have asked for new authorities, and I just would 

like you to be aware of them. 

We have asked for a global commanders emergency response 

fund—gets to the issue of timeliness. Right now, that is limited to 

the theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan, and AFRICOM is an excellent example of where that will make a difference. 

We have also asked for increased 1206 authorities. That is something that sits between the Title 10 and the Title 22 authorities 

where both secretaries approve them, but it is extremely responsive. It meets the needs and it gives the capability that you are 

asking about on how do we work those interagency seams. 

We think with a deputy commander—deputy to the commander 

from the State Department we will be able to work the Title 10, 

Title 22 issues for FMF specifically much better than we have in 

the past. 

But I would emphasize that those—the 1206 authorities and the 

global commander emergency response funds would be a critical 

addition to the capability here. 

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and particularly, thank 

you for holding this hearing. 

I have concerns that we are taking too long to establish where 

the Africa Command is going to be located. I hope we get a resolution soon. 

16 

I led a trip of Members through the Horn of Africa, so there are 

going to be huge issues. When you factor in Libya, the bridge to 

Spain and the impact they are having on Europe, when you factor 

in Yemen and the other countries in and around the Horn of Africa, intelligence is going to have, I think, a huge part of the role 

that will be played by this new command. 

So I hope we have a decision soon on where it is going to be located. 

I have a couple of questions. The first one deals with the establishment of the J–2 in the Africa Command. How will that change 

our intelligence coverage in the region? 

Specifically, how will the Africa Command’s J–2 differ from the 

current command’s—European Command—J–2? 

And will there be—I am assuming there is going to have to be, 

but will there be emphasis on long-term issues? One of the big concerns that we have, and it was verified when we took the trip into 

the Horn of Africa, is the rise of fundamentalism in the region, particularly in the Sahel region. 

So will there be more emphasis on those kinds of issues as the 

new command stands up? 

And then the last thing I would like for you to address is how 

will the Africa Command affect counterterrorism operations which 

have been ongoing as we look at and talk about issues like the pirates off of the coast of Somalia, the interaction between Ethiopia 

and Kenya, in that vital region? 

That is why I am hoping we make a decision quickly on where 

that command is going to be located. So if you can cover those 

areas, I would appreciate it. 

Secretary HENRY. Let me just start, and I know that General 

Ward will have more specifics for you. 

First of all, we understand your impatience on where the command is going to be, and each and every one of us, as we have approached the problem, that is the first thing we ask. But as we 

have gone into this and looked at it deeper and deeper, the key is 

how does the command operate, not where it is. 

And the worst thing we think we could do is rush into a bricksand-mortar solution that has a lot of military construction 

(MILCON) associated to it and will lack adaptability. 

And rather, we have tried to create a command and a command 

structure that will be able to be out there and interfacing and gathering information that you are concerned about, not just at one specific place, but across the entire area of responsibility. 

And we think that we have come up with a tiered innovative 

structure that will allow us to do that. Part of that tier has been 

a concept of reach back to individuals who do not need to be on the 

continent. 

And for purposes not necessarily for collection but of intelligence 

analysis, it is not necessarily essential that the analysts be at the 

spot that he is looking at. 

And so initially a part of the intelligence personnel are going to 

be currently where they are within the—Jack Molesworth, as part 

of where the European Command intelligence is, and they will be 

separated off and be the AFRICOM cell that will respond directly 

to General Ward. 

17 

And he will also have a staff at his headquarters supporting him. 

But I would like to emphasize that not only do we need intelligence 

in Africa, but we also need information. 

And so we will be putting probably a much greater reliance on 

open source information and being able to use that, and interfaces 

through the diplomatic reporting. 

So we plan to take a 360-degree approach in getting information 

to the commander so that he can make the best decisions. 

General WARD. Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the J–2. One of 

the things that will cause this command to be different from the 

existing combatant commands is that our J–2 is the Director of Intelligence and Knowledge Development. 

We know that we have to integrate in a very substantial way all 

sources of intelligence—the traditional sources as you are so familiar with; as the under secretary pointed out, also the open source 

piece and how we will interact with other partners on the continent, many of whom, although have very good access to information, are not in typical classified channels. 

But we know the importance of all of that, and understanding 

what is happening on the continent from a strategic level, quite 

frankly, down to the tactical level. 

This command and its intelligence and knowledge development 

construct will have to be able to look at strategic-level intelligence, 

through the operational level, down to the tactical level as our personnel are out doing what they do to help increase the capacity of 

our partner nations. 

And we understand the role that we also have to ensure that 

what we are doing as a part of the Operation Enduring Freedom– 

Trans Sahel, as a part of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCP) program in the north, in the Horn of Africa with 

what is being done by the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)–Horn 

of Africa, understanding those programs, integrating those efforts, 

and ensuring that we can provide the type of overarching intelligence infrastructure that will be able to fuse intelligence, understand the situation, and then as appropriate do something with it. 

So we will look to build a command to, in fact, do those very 

things. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

General Ward, it is great to see you again. I think it has been 

some 15 years since we had a chance to chat when we were much 

younger and serving together, in fact, in the Horn of Africa. 

In that operation, Operation Restore Hope (ORH), that was 

under Central Command. In this new construct, were that same 

operation to take place with the existence of AFRICOM, it would 

be the same militarily except it would fall under your command 

rather than Central Command, is that correct? 

General WARD. That is correct, Congressman. 

Mr. KLINE. And with the current training operations that are 

going on across Africa, many of which are being conducted by 

forces from Special Operations Command (SOC), that is now under 

the overwatch, I suppose, mostly of EUCOM. 

18 

That will continue just as it is today, except under AFRICOM, 

is that correct? 

General WARD. Correct. 

Mr. KLINE. Just a couple of—I assumed that was the case. I just 

wanted to make sure that was the case. 

I am constantly concerned about—and this is probably more addressed to Secretary Henry. When you look at the number of combatant commands—I was looking at a number yesterday. 

Our combatant commands consume something over 15,000 people 

and over $3 billion a year to run these combatant commands. And 

now we are creating a new one. So a number of my colleagues have 

already addressed this issue, and I don’t want to dwell on it. 

But what this is going to cost is important. We are using up people. And you have explained that we are going to, at least initially, 

draw from joint billets. 

That implies that we have some spare joint billets out there, and 

I am not sure that is the case. So in the long term, the size of this 

command does matter. 

And then to the point that my friend and colleague from Texas 

Chairman Reyes made, where the headquarters exist probably does 

matter. I don’t share his urgency in getting an answer to that, but 

this is a question for anybody who would like to address it. 

Can AFRICOM work effectively from Stuttgart, from Europe 

today, and could it next year and the year after that? In other 

words, in terms of being able to provide the command structure 

and the overwatch and the things that are necessary, can it function effectively out of Europe? Anybody. 

Secretary HENRY. Yes, it can function effectively. Will it be at its 

optimum level? We definitely think not, and we think to get the 

most effectiveness out of it, it is important that the commander 

and his key staff are on the continent. 

Right now, Central Command functions out of Tampa—— 

Mr. KLINE. Exactly. 

Secretary HENRY [continuing]. Pacific Command out of Hawaii, 

and Southern Command out of Miami. So it is not necessary, 

but—— 

Mr. KLINE. Well, let me interrupt, then, just for a minute. Then 

why do we feel this urgency to rush into the continent, when it has 

been already presented that right now there is nobody eagerly 

seeking our presence there, when we—as you pointed out—we are 

working out of Tampa, we are working out of Hawaii. 

That is a long way from anywhere in the Pacific Command where 

we might employ forces. Why do we feel this rush to put something 

on the ground on the continent? 

Secretary HENRY. Well, I guess there are two things I would take 

exception with. One is that there is not people that want us there. 

There are a number of countries that have come forward, one publicly, several privately, that have asked us to consider them. 

And we don’t feel we want for places, if we were to put in a headquarters, on where that would be. 

The second thing is I would take issue with the fact that we are 

rushing. Actually, we have been very deliberate. We have been 

thinking about this over a year, and we still are telling you that 

19 

we are out gathering facts. We are doing it in a deliberative fashion. 

One thing that we think will be somewhat—I don’t want to say 

special, but this command will be a leader in is adaptability and 

the ability to change to the environmental circumstances. 

And as we come forward and think about the command structure 

and its placement, that is one of the considerations we want to 

have, is how will this be able to adapt to security situations on the 

continent. 

And we don’t want to get locked into some place that would 

cause difficulty later on. So I would just take issue that we are 

rushing into it. 

It is the goal of the Secretary to have a decision on where the 

physical and geographical location of the different elements of the 

command will be as it initially comes on the continent, not necessarily the final disposition, by the end of this fiscal year. 

To address your issue on manpower and manning, another thing 

that is somewhat unique about AFRICOM is this is the first time 

we have stood up a command that hasn’t been in the shadow of 

some sort of emergency or conflict. 

And we are doing it in an anticipatory fashion. And in so doing, 

it has caused us to go back and look at the manning across all of 

the combatant commands. 

And we are in the process of taking the study and understanding 

of how we rationalize manning for combatant commands, what are 

critical functions, which things can be replicated in different commands and what things need to be unique in different commands. 

And that will all be folded into how the long-term manning for 

AFRICOM is handled. 

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Thank you very much. 

I see my time is about to expire, and ever in my continuous effort 

to set the example for my colleagues, I will yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your service. I can see Ambassador Mull is 

looking around. There we go. 

I think it was 10 years ago or maybe even more when General 

Joulwan was here—and I had worked in Africa a couple times as 

a doctor in the olden days, 6 months in Sierra Leone and 3 months 

as part of the Ethiopian refugee relief in 1985. 

And so I asked him if he would benefit from more resources. We 

would like to be able to do more as far as work in Africa. And he 

was almost pleading for additional help. 

And General James Jones has made very eloquent statements 

here at some length about the need to be more involved in Africa. 

So I think what you are doing is very important. I am glad that 

you all are being very sensitive to dealing with some of the concerns expressed by some of the nations down there. I mean, the 

whole point of this is to help us and not to hurt us. 

I will have to say—this is just one person’s opinion—my own 

view is that our foreign policy for the last several years has been 

far too dependent on military, and to the exclusion of the diplomatic corps. 

20 

I would think that perhaps some of that apprehension you are 

hearing is in view of what has gone on for the last several years. 

My own view is that we have underfunded the State Department. 

We should have more redundancy in the State Department so 

you could respond to more things around the world. But hopefully 

we will deal with those issues. 

Ambassador Mull, I wanted to ask you a question, if I might, on 

a somewhat related topic, but when the town meeting at the State 

Department was held a couple of weeks ago, one of the concerns 

that was expressed was inadequacy of treatment of health care— 

specifically, mental health conditions—from people who had served 

in Iraq as State Department employees. 

Our Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee has been looking 

at these issues of why people from the civilian side are less inclined 

to go to Iraq. And it concerned me that that was expressed openly, 

that this person thought that she had received inadequate mental 

health care. 

What is your feeling on that? You responded to the other question. Perhaps you can enlighten us about the status of mental 

health services for employees when they return from Iraq. 

Ambassador MULL. Thank you, Congressman Snyder, for the opportunity to comment on that issue. My friend and colleague, Ambassador Harry Thomas, recently was appointed as the Director of 

Human Resources at the State Department and Director General 

of the Foreign Service, and he has set as one of his top priorities 

addressing those concerns. 

It is true it has been a long time since American Foreign Service 

officers have been serving in war zones, as they have in the past 

five years. 

And I am not an expert. I am not responsible for this area within 

the State Department. But I think it is probably fair to say that 

our institutional capability to respond to the unique needs of Foreign Service officers who serve in combat zones perhaps are not all 

that they could have been. 

I know Ambassador Thomas is working very hard to look at what 

institutions we have in place and has already made some progress 

in coming up with some plans to make sure that not only do we 

take care of our own when they come back, not only take care of 

any physical medical problems they have but any mental or emotional problems as well. 

And not just for the employee, but also to make sure that we are 

taking care of their families as well. 

Dr. SNYDER. So what you are saying today is that it is still a 

work in progress in terms—— 

Ambassador MULL. Yes. 

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. That person’s public comment that was 

picked up by the press was not an inaccurate description of the 

current state of things, that there is a need for better resources for 

State Department personnel when they return from a war zone. 

Is that what you are saying, that it is still a work in progress? 

Ambassador MULL. Yes. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. 

And one specific question, if I might ask Secretary Henry, would 

you—if I might—and tell me if it is inappropriate to ask today. 

21 

Would you make any comments you would like to make on the 

status of the relationship currently and the likelihood of military 

hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia and what the posture of 

the United States is with regard to that potential shooting war 

again? Thank you. 

Secretary HENRY. Yes, I will take it to a certain degree and then 

let Ambassador Mull also take it. The State Department does have 

the lead in foreign policy in our government. 

But we are monitoring it. We have concerns as we have seen the 

buildup of forces. Here lately we have seen a backing away of that 

which we find encouraging. But we don’t think that it will be to 

the benefit of either party or the United States if conflict were to 

break out there. 

Ambassador MULL. I agree with the Under Secretary. It is obviously a critical fault line in African security. The potential conflict 

between these two states has deep historic roots. 

We have been working very energetically through diplomatic 

channels to try and prevent it from happening, and we continue to 

monitor it very closely. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Dr. Gingrey. 

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I know the issue of the 

command headquarters, gentlemen, has been discussed a good bit 

this morning. 

I would like to just specifically ask you, in regard to the temporary headquarters that I guess is shared jointly with European 

Command in Stuttgart, how much investment have we already 

made there in regard to bricks and mortar and security and infrastructure? 

And the question I think from Colonel Kline and maybe some 

others and the response indicating that a lot of our commands are 

not necessarily located in a central area of the particular command—so if you can address that. 

And then the other thing that hasn’t been asked—I notice that 

Egypt, which is very much a part of the African continent, is not 

part of this new Africa Command. 

Maybe it would seem obvious why it isn’t, but it is not totally obvious to me, certainly not from a geographic perspective. You would 

think that clearly it should be part of this new command. 

And maybe we can start with that specific question, since the 

other has already been touched on to some extent. 

And I think I would like to start with General Ward in regard 

to that question, Commander, if you could respond to that. 

General WARD. Congressman Gingrey, I think the question of 

Egypt is more appropriately dealt with by the Under Secretary 

here, so I will leave that to him with respect to the unified command plan as currently set. 

With regards to the headquarters, the interim headquarters in 

Stuttgart—Stuttgart, as a part of our current set, is an enduring 

location for our Department of Defense posture. 

As the decision was taken to stand up AFRICOM there in Stuttgart, it takes advantage of several things. First, it takes advantage 

of the physical location of EUCOM currently dealing with Africa 

22 

quite a bit, so as many of those personnel transition to AFRICOM, 

any costs associated with moving them is taken away. 

Looking at Kelly Barracks where the current headquarters is established for AFRICOM—again, already in place, infrastructure already there, set, no additional bricks and mortar required. There 

are costs incurred with respect to bringing—— 

Dr. GINGREY. General, that satisfies me on that question, and I 

thank you for that response. 

Let’s go directly to Secretary Henry in regard to the issue of 

Egypt. 

Secretary HENRY. Egypt took some thought, a lot of consultation 

with the current combatant commanders. We have had consultations with the Egyptians. 

And we, for reasons of a large foreign assistance and security assistance account that we currently have with Egypt—the administrative processes are already set up through Central Command. 

And plus, you know, Egypt does look toward the Middle East, 

and has large and significant involvements there. We felt for administrative purposes it would be best to keep Egypt in Central 

Command. 

But that being said, any activity that we are doing on a multinational basis that Egypt is invited to attend—I am sure that when 

General Ward has his different meetings and that that their representatives will be invited to attend. 

And so for purposes from an operational perspective, the administrative aspect on our part, our military organization, that Egypt 

will be invited in to participate to the same degree that any other 

of the other 52 countries on the continent will be. 

And they are a member of the African Union, and we plan on 

treating them as such. 

Dr. GINGREY. Absolutely. And, Mr. Secretary—or maybe, Ambassador Mull, you may want to comment on this as well in the little 

bit of time I have got left—it seems to me that it could lead to some 

confusion. 

And that is there a possibility that somewhere down the line, 

after we achieve victory in the Middle East in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom specifically—that at some future date we may want to 

take another look at that and include Egypt as part of AFRICOM? 

Secretary HENRY. The unified command plan is actually under 

continuous review. It comes up for a formal review every two years. 

And we are always looking at seam issues. And this is what we 

refer to as a seam. 

And we have previously had difficult seams on the African continent. This is the one on the continent that remains, and there are 

reasons to go either way, but we do continue to look at it, though. 

Dr. GINGREY. Well, it looks like some of these political gerrymandered maps that we have for congressional districts. So hopefully at some point we can clarify that. Thank you. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. TAYLOR [presiding]. The chair recognizes the gentlewoman 

from California, Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being before us today and for your 

service to our country. 

23 

I had the opportunity last year between Christmas and New 

Year’s to go to Darfur and Sudan and Chad and Djibouti to visit 

troops and to see what was going on. And I do believe that we need 

to concentrate more time, obviously, on Africa and that continent. 

So I do believe that something like an African Command would 

be important, and I think it would be important to put it in Africa 

someplace. I don’t know where that is. I guess that is one of the 

things we are trying to figure out. 

I also represent Orange County, which has one of the largest refugee resettlement programs from all different types of conflicts, so 

you can imagine that our current resettlement happens to be those 

people from that continent, quite a few conflicts having gone over 

the last few years and continuing there. 

My question really deals with this whole issue of the fact that 

since we have had this war on terrorism and we have—it seems to 

me that the complaints that I have received from so many different 

places around the world—not just Africa or Europe or anyplace, but 

from our embassies around the world is that in many cases, we 

now have—because of the issue of terrorism, we have so many resources going into and have more military people within the umbrella of our embassy missions in countries. 

And some have even stated that there seems to be more military 

people than even State Department and Commerce Department 

and other people that we have traditionally had within the embassy enclaves, if you will. 

And to some, in particular at the State Department, there seems 

to be a faltering in the sense that maybe we are using too many 

military assets. Certainly, there is more money coming in from that 

direction, and so they feel this emphasis coming in from the military where they think maybe that might be hindering what they 

are doing. 

So my question is when we are looking at this African Command, 

it is really the first model of how do we put in some of this other 

infrastructure from the State Department. 

My question is how will we ensure that, in fact, we do those stabilization and regrouping, if you will, in these countries more to the 

extent of peacetime sorts of activities rather than another emphasis 

and another dumping of money into the military side of things? 

And I would ask both the General and the Ambassador to comment on—you know, it is important we stand this up, and it is important to have that model of both working together. 

But how do we really move away from such a military presence 

in countries versus a more nurturing sort of relationship that we 

really need in Africa? 

Ambassador MULL. I will be happy to take that question first, 

Congresswoman Sanchez. Thank you very much. You raise a very 

good question. 

And as a diplomat who has spent much of the last 10 years myself working overseas, I agree with you that we have to be concerned that we not convey to our partners around the world that 

we have a militarized foreign policy. 

And so I think you are right to raise the concern. But I don’t 

think we have to worry about it so much in that when we look at 

the total amount of assistance that we provide to Africa, it is of an 

24 

overwhelming nonmilitary nature in terms of providing economic 

development funds, humanitarian assistance, assistance to infrastructure building, to building democratic society, civil society. 

In many of these countries, the amount of military assistance or 

military-oriented assistance that we provide is really just a tiny 

fraction. 

And I think that will continue even with the standup of 

AFRICOM because the problems that we face in Africa are overwhelmingly nonmilitary in nature. 

That said, the military plays a very important role in these countries in providing stability and responding to fast-moving humanitarian crises. 

And we hope that through AFRICOM we will be able to coordinate on our own side of the table, too, on the U.S. Government 

side, in making sure that AID and the State Department and the 

various resources that the military has to bring to the table are all 

coordinated in responding to it. 

I would note that the White House did designate the State Department as having the lead within our government in responding 

to stabilization and reconstruction activities. 

Secretary Rice has a special coordinator, Ambassador John 

Herbst, who is in charge of those efforts. And that will ensure that 

our response to these emerging situations is not primarily military 

in nature. 

Although the military does play a very, very important part, nevertheless the State Department will be in the lead. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. If I could just give a chance to the General to comment on that. 

Mr. REYES [presiding]. Very quickly, General. 

General WARD. The role of the United States military, ma’am, is 

an important role because what we do as we interact with militaries, and given the point that was made by the ambassador, the 

role that militaries play in those societies—we are able to interact. 

We are able to be a force for causing their work to be more reflective of a situation that causes them to be seen as protectors of their 

people, as opposed to oppressors. 

And so that example, that side by side—you take the example 

today of our African Partnership Station, where we have a platform 

that is offshore, with ship riders—that is, representatives from 

other African countries who come aboard, get instructions on how 

to be better maintainers of equipment, better sharers of information, and in so doing, doing things that help enhance their society. 

That is the role that we play in these emerging and maturing democracies that causes the military to be seen as a force for a positive development, as opposed to otherwise. And that is our role, 

and I think it does not supplant the role of the other agencies. It 

just complements those additional efforts. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. REYES. I thank the gentlelady. 

And I just advise the members there are going to be four votes. 

We should be able to get through probably two members. 

Mr. Thornberry, you are up next. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

25 

Secretary Henry, let me just clarify. You talked about some of 

the intelligence assets, followed to Chairman Reyes’ question, coming from EUCOM—Molesworth and so forth. 

Are intelligence assets being transferred from CENTCOM as 

well? 

Secretary HENRY. I am not aware of any specific ones, but let me 

take that for the record to be able to get back to you. Obviously, 

we do have the activities going on in the Horn of Africa. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

I know those responsibilities and resources will be transferred 

over. We haven’t made that transfer of the Horn of Africa to the 

sub-unified command of Africa yet, so those haven’t taken place 

yet, and I will have to get back to you on exactly what the plan 

is for doing that. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, it obviously may be worth attention. If 

you have got intelligence analysts expert in that region, and now 

it is going to be under General Ward, obviously they need to go—— 

Secretary HENRY. Yes, and I would differentiate between those 

at the command level of Central Command and the intelligence assets and that that we are using both at Joint Task Force Horn of 

Africa and then those that are part of Special Operations Forces, 

too. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Of course. 

General Ward, it seems to me you have a tremendous opportunity building this command from the ground up without a crisis. 

Secretary Ryan said the watchword was going to be adaptability. 

You have had numbers of questions about the interagency piece, 

how this can be an example for others about the agencies actually 

working together. 

But the other side of it is if you are successful in really leading 

the way on interagency, you are going to meet resistance. I mean, 

one of two things is going to happen. 

You are either really going to do it and the folks whose interests 

are threatened are going to complain about it and try to stop it, 

or it is going to be lip service and there won’t really be change at 

all. 

I guess what I am most curious about is how are you going to 

overcome that resistance when it comes. Because I believe when 

there is real change there is inevitably resistance from the institutional interests that are threatened by that. 

General WARD. Thank you, Congressman. I think we are going 

to overcome it—by demonstrating on the ground through the execution of programs that we will bring value added. 

And right now, we have examples of that. We have the work that 

is going on, quite frankly, in OEF–TS, in CJTF–Horn of Africa, 

where we brought together an interagency, a multidisciplinary 

team of folk to cause results to be enhanced because of our collective efforts, as opposed to doing it in separate, independent stovepipe ways. 

The more that we do, sir, the more all will be seeing that this 

construct works to their advantage as well, and being a part of that 

construct enhances the work that they do. 

26 

The Africans will see it, and I believe our international and 

interagency partners likewise will see that, that it makes sense. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I think you are right. It was suggested 

to me last week, for example—Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) issued a report that called for a major global health initiative. 

And it was suggested to me this would be an excellent opportunity for AFRICOM to take that in a supporting fashion, but to 

prove that this is not a militarization or to dispel all the myths 

that you laid out at the beginning, that that could be an opportunity to prove it with more than words. 

But I hope, as you try to do that, that you will be willing and 

able to go however high you need to go, including coming to this 

committee, to overcome the obstacles to make you effective. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. I thank the gentleman. 

We have five votes on the floor. I believe we have time for Ms. 

Davis, and then we will adjourn. 

And, gentlemen, we will ask you to remain until we come back. 

Ms. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to all of you for being here and certainly for your 

service as well. 

I am going to try and move through this really quickly. I appreciate the comments of my colleague Mr. Thornberry, because I, too, 

have some concerns about the interagency focus and how we do 

that. 

I did have an opportunity to be on the continent in August. And 

we talk a lot about the vision for the African Command. 

And one of the things I did hear, and I guess I heard this from 

men and women serving on the ground, is that there was so much 

confusion for them for what that might be, because there were multiple commands that were essentially giving orders, and they 

seemed to be sometimes at odds. 

So I think, you know, that is something that obviously is a work 

in progress in some ways. And I hope that we can work through 

that. 

My other question really is how we bring in not just the State 

Department and the Pentagon, essentially, but how we expand that 

to other tools of government. We know, certainly, in Iraq and Afghanistan, whether it is commerce, whether it is agriculture, but 

those also need to be important tools as well. 

And where I think would be important to demonstrate is how decisions that are made might well go—you know, this is the thing 

we need, but we are going to give the tools to USAID, because they 

can do that better than the military can do it. 

How do you see that process working so that this is really a 

shared pool of resources, as opposed to one that seems to be more 

in the hands of one department or another? 

Secretary HENRY. Again, I am concerned maybe that we are not getting our message across—$9 billion the U.S. Government invests in Africa, 3 percent of that, $250 million, is in DOD. Ninetyseven percent of it is in other places where they can do a better 

job. 

27 

What AFRICOM is about is understanding that many of those 

programs—part of their success has to do with the security aspect 

of it. It is very few programs that are going to be successful in trying to build the civil society that only go to one pillar of what that 

civil society is. 

And that is what the recognition within AFRICOM is, is it is 

going to take a multidisciplinary approach to do it. And to date, 

when it comes to the military and the stability and security aspect 

of it, the DOD has been involved episodically, when there has been 

a crisis or when there has been an exercise. 

And now we are making the investment of putting one of our 

best four-star commanders on the continent with a staff that can 

be sustained and involved but approach those problems from an 

interagency, integrated fashion, of which the majority of the time 

DOD, within the U.S. Government, will be in a supporting role, 

and almost all the time the U.S. Government will be in a supporting role to African endeavors. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that. What I am reflecting somewhat is the perception of people that were on the ground and their feelings about this. And so 

I think that it is important to try and make clear—I appreciate 

that—— 

Secretary HENRY. And we will continue. Our interactions have 

been with the ambassadors, and not other members of the staff, as 

we have gone to stand up AFRICOM. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. A quick question—I just want to 

make sure and get this in—in terms of personnel, because we have 

said that, in fact, you are going to be pulling from other resources 

in some cases, and that seems like an appropriate thing to do. 

But the kinds of resources, I think, that you need are in health 

care, perhaps, in special ops, and we know that we are struggling 

in those areas in other places. And so I would like to know how 

we are doing that. 

A second question is whether or not we need to expand services 

at Stuttgart or, again, whether—if we do locate a command—however you want to call it—on the continent, what arrangements 

would be made for people to have families accompanying them in 

that effort? 

And especially, I think, in the Stuttgart situation, are we able to 

do that now? And will we be able to do it as well for State Department officials? 

Secretary HENRY. In regards to the Stuttgart, we are making 

some improvements on an interim basis since that is not a permanent headquarters. 

In regards to accompanied tours, State Department does that 

very successfully already on the continent. We are looking at different models where we can work with State Department to have 

commonality of services. 

As we build our regional integration teams, their specific role 

with the local embassy, we are looking at different models where 

we can get economies of scale. 

So those are all part of the process that we are looking at now. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. And health officials to be part of this 

mission? Where do you see those? 

28 

Secretary HENRY. Yes. There will be an element of that. To what 

degree depends on which programs are there, which agency has the 

leadership on it, and how it is best for us to interface it. 

We are sensitive to this issue of DOD coming in and overwhelming either other programs within the U.S. Government or, in 

some cases, the African host state and their security capabilities. 

And so one of the feedback that we have gotten as we have gone 

around is don’t overwhelm us, and the lower the profile, probably 

the more effective you will be. And that has a lot to do with what 

our approach is. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

We will return after the votes, and we appreciate your being with 

us when we return. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Ms. CASTOR [presiding]. The committee will return to order. 

I am pleased to recognize Mr. Wilson for questions. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

And thank all of you for being here today. And in lieu of questions, I want to extend a warm and cordial invitation for General 

Ward to move to Charleston, South Carolina. 

And this is on behalf of my two colleagues, Congressman Henry 

Brown, Congressman Jim Clyburn, who both represent Charleston. 

I was born in the holy city of Charleston. It is a wonderful place 

to be. 

It would be a wonderful site for the African Command. In fact, 

I have presented you an invitation from the Charleston Metro 

Chamber of Commerce inviting the African Command to be located 

in Charleston. 

And there is so much in common that we have, particularly with 

West Africa, that would make persons feel right at home. And indeed, I have had the privilege of visiting in Sudan, and Kenya, and 

South Africa, and Ghana, and Liberia and Cape Verde. 

And as I was visiting with people in those countries, I found such 

a kinship with South Carolina, but Charleston and the low country 

in particular. 

And I would want you to be aware that the Naval Weapons Station Charleston would be an ideal location. It has ample acreage, 

a secure military facility. It is home of Space and Naval Systems 

Command (SPAWAR) Charleston, which can provide all the technology needed for the command’s security and communications systems. 

Additionally, it has already been cited that there is the precedence of commands located outside of the area that they cover. Particularly we have the Southern Command in Miami, the Central 

Command in Tampa, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) in Honolulu. 

Charleston, again, has such a strong relationship with the African continent. And specifically where it could be so beneficial, 

Charleston is the transportation hub for the United States Transportation Command as well as the primary seaport for container 

cargo between the United States and the south Atlantic. 

The Port of Charleston ranks number one for container traffic, 

handling approximately 50 percent of all container traffic to and 

from the south Atlantic. 

29 

Charleston Air Force Base provides nearly all of the strategic airlift support for Africa for our government, to include embassy support. 

SPAWAR Charleston is the leading provider for command and 

control and communication for European Command’s (EUCOM) 

role in Africa. SPAWAR also supports embassy security operations 

and could stand up an AFRICOM command center at SPAWAR 

Charleston in a matter of days. 

Other relationships include the greater Charleston medical community, which is a world-class medical community for training and 

education, as well as patient support. 

Additionally, most of the rapid deployment forces which would 

support an African operation to include special operations are in 

the southeastern part of the United States surrounding Charleston. 

Charleston is the hub for all military transportation, airlift, sealift and prepositioning. Also, the cultural linkages between Africa, 

Charleston and South Carolina have existed for centuries, and this 

could bring enormous development and cultural opportunities for 

both Africa and the United States. 

In fact, a few minutes ago I was speaking with Congressman 

Clyburn and he and I, both of Charleston background, were commenting how the local dialect of Gullah, which is spoken in South 

Carolina, actually originated in West Africa. 

Additionally, the AME Church, the African Methodist Episcopal 

Church of South Carolina, is partnered with the AME Church of 

Liberia, and I have visited the AME University of Monrovia. And 

so there is a close connection. 

And so I want to make it perfectly clear that Charleston and all 

of South Carolina would welcome the Africa Command, that indeed 

visiting dignitaries of Africa and persons assigned would enjoy living and visiting in America’s most historic city. 

The invitation is clear. It is wide open. You are welcome to 

Charleston, South Carolina for Africa Command. 

I yield the balance of my time. 

Ms. CASTOR. Ms. Shea-Porter. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. 

And I absolutely agree with my colleague. I would like to see it 

anywhere except on the continent of Africa, and so that is my conversation here today. 

I am very concerned about actually having a physical presence, 

as you have stated, because I do believe that while it looks reasonable to us, the rest of the world is not going to accept our reasons 

for it. 

And so I wanted to ask, what are the top three reasons for actually physically placing this on the continent somewhere? And right 

now, there is one country, I believe, Liberia, that has expressed an 

interest, right? 

Secretary HENRY. Publicly. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay, publicly. 

Secretary HENRY. One country publicly has. Several have privately. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Well, it is pretty important that they can be 

public and not private. Whatever people say privately does not 

count because I think that the private ones are reflecting the will 

30 

and the attitude of their own people, which is that they don’t want 

it. 

So I understand all the reasons for paying attention to the continent of Africa. I think it is a wise idea. I do not understand why 

we need to be there physically. So could you please tell me, anybody, the top three reasons? 

Secretary HENRY. I will be glad to give you the top three that I 

have been associated with. The first is actually, contrary to your 

feelings, as we have gone around and talked to leaders of the different African countries, they said it would be important to have 

the commander on the continent. 

It would show a sense of commitment, a sense of equality, that 

we are treating them as equals, rather than a sense of colonialism, 

which is something that they are sensitive to. So that is the first 

reason. 

The second one is we think that we can do a more effective job 

of having the commander, his key staff members, and those that 

interface with the Africans to be there and to be living in the environment. 

They will have more empathy for the type of problems and issues 

that they are going to be faced with rather than if they are displaced. 

And the third one is while we have done it in four different locations, had the combatant command displaced, we have found that 

is not the most effective way to do it. And given the opportunity 

to go back and re-look at those, we might not have made the same 

decision that we originally made. 

So for those three reasons, that is— 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. By that thinking, though, we probably should 

also move our other centers of command, right, because we have 

one in Hawaii instead of actually in any of the Pacific nations, 

other nations. 

So has anybody considered how this might look to the rest of the 

world, considering our difficulties right now in the Middle East and 

our inability to convince people that our motives, while good—you 

know, we are having trouble getting that across. 

Secretary HENRY. Yes, Congresswoman, we have. And that has 

been a subject of consultations both with multinational organizations, extensive consultations in Europe to get the non-African 

opinion. 

And all of them applaud not only standing up AFRICOM but 

having a presence on the continent. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. All of them. 

Secretary HENRY. Yes. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. 

Secretary HENRY. Of the non-African countries that we have consulted. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. Would you be able to get that list to me 

so that I could also look at that? I was surprised to hear my colleague earlier talk about the resistance from some about having us 

physically there. 

We have to look at the appearances of it. 

Secretary HENRY. We will be glad to share with you those in— 

of the Europeans, and that—there is not an issue. 

31 

With some of the African countries, though, they gave us that information in confidentiality, so if we were to send it up here, it 

would have to be currently on a classified basis. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And again, I am concerned that they don’t feel 

they can speak publicly. It says that their nation or they suspect 

that their nation’s people would not support that also, if they cannot speak publicly about this. 

Secretary HENRY. That is one issue. The other issue is one of 

timing and when they think it would be appropriate to come forward on that. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. And my other question is exactly how 

many people are you envisioning there. I heard earlier, and maybe 

I didn’t hear right, but how many people would you think would 

be wherever we wind up building? 

And how many would be military and how many would be State 

Department? 

Secretary HENRY. We don’t have the exact numbers on the mix 

because that is something we are still determining. 

The command structure, again, being sensitive to what Africans 

have told us—they said it is important to be there, but it is also 

important to be low profile. 

So currently the thinking is that there would be a command hub 

where the commander and members of his immediate staff would 

be, and then there would be five regional integration teams dispersed throughout the continent. 

And then there will be a presence in approximately 26 of the embassies, too, so it is a very dispersed, low-profile presence that we 

are trying to achieve for the very reasons that you are concerned 

with, desire by the Africans to have us there, to have a commander 

there, but also not to have too high of a profile. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Is there a reason we can’t get this done with 

our embassies there right now, that we can’t have that face-to-face 

contact that you are talking about? 

Is there some reason we can’t utilize our embassies and our embassy personnel and actually have—— 

Secretary HENRY. We definitely are now and we will continue to 

do that in the future. That will not meet all the needs, though, of 

a command staff for a unified command. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And the last question is do you have any idea 

what this would cost annually? 

Secretary HENRY. We are looking at the cost. It will be part—the 

cost will be reapportioned between other combatant command activities we are doing now, so the net cost to the taxpayer is zero. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Oh, let us go back over that. The net cost to 

the taxpayer is zero. Do you have to build something there? 

Secretary HENRY. Yes, we do have to build something. We have 

to build something for military construction. Then we will 

delay—— 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay, so there is cost. 

Secretary HENRY. We will delay military construction other 

places, so we would re-prioritize this higher than where those dollars were going to be spent previously. 

32 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay, but there is cost. Any time we build 

anything, whether it is good or bad or whatever, we are paying for 

it. 

Secretary HENRY. They are not paying more to the Defense Department accounts to have this capability. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. So you are deferring, is what you are saying. 

Okay. But do we know what your annual budget would be? Do you 

have any—how far along are you? That is what I am trying to figure out. How far are you along in this planning? 

You have used terms like fully operational by, and, you know, I 

am a little surprised to hear you are so far along. So do you have 

a budget? 

Secretary HENRY. We have a budget for the current year, and 

during this year we are going to be building what we refer to as 

a program, a five-year look at what the costs are. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And what would that be? 

Secretary HENRY. Do you have the dollar amount for this year? 

General WARD. Congresslady, those dollar amounts in the out 

years aren’t known. Right now for our current operating profile, it 

is about—and I am not exactly sure, but it is about $75 million for 

just the year 2008. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay, and you said we have a $9 billion a 

year aid cost, right, to the continent? Okay. All right. Thank you. 

I appreciate your being here to share this with us, and—I am 

sorry, one last thing. When will this be fully operational? 

Secretary HENRY. It will have a fully operational capability, 

which means that it will be able to assume all the current missions 

assigned to that geographical area, on October 1st, 2008—is when 

it becomes fully operational. 

That doesn’t mean that it will have all the infrastructure or it 

will be in the places it is going to be, but it will be able to assume 

the mission set. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And how long have you been planning this? 

Secretary HENRY. The President made the decision on December 

15th of last year. He announced it in February. Prior to taking that 

to the President, Secretary Rumsfeld had different planning activities that had been going on for, I don’t know, a year or two prior. 

We looked at a number of different models, finally gave him a 

way that he felt comfortable with to take forward to the President. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Maybe around 2004, is that what you are telling me, two years previous to—— 

Secretary HENRY. The initial thinking on this, I would say, was 

in the 2005 time frame at a very low-level conceptual thought process. Then in 2006 he instituted formal planning processes to deliver 

options to him. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. And again, I would like to say that I 

do think it is a good idea to pay attention to the continent of Africa, 

and I am very concerned about actual physical presence there. 

Thank you very much for being here. 

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you. 

And, gentlemen, could you take some time and describe our current military presence on the continent of Africa, what our missions are? 

33 

And also sketch out for us, to the best of your knowledge, the extent of the State Department and USAID’s work on the continent 

in Africa, how they work together now and how you would see the 

designation of a new command on the continent. How will those 

missions change over time? 

General WARD. The current military mission profile is being carried out through U.S. European Command and through U.S. Central Command, and specifically its Combined Joint Task Force– 

Horn of Africa most predominantly. 

U.S. Pacific Command has some limited activity in the ocean islands off of the east coast of Africa. 

Programs include in the northern part of Africa things such—the 

program Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara, which is the 

military element of the TSCTP, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, which is a counterterrorism activity where we 

are partnering with nine north African nations, improving their 

military capacity to control their borders as they deal with the current terrorist threat that is there in the northern part of the continent. 

Additionally, you swing around—in the current Central Command area of responsibility, the Horn of Africa—the military efforts include counterterrorism, also include humanitarian as well 

as efforts to improve and increase the capacity of militaries in 

those Horn of Africa nations into central Africa to improve their 

military capacity and capability. 

In the west of Africa, the Gulf of Guinea area, our attempts to 

improve and enhance the maritime information and maritime safety and security element of the Gulf of Guinea are ongoing. 

Those efforts are being carried out through our—currently the 

naval component of U.S. European Command. And I will go back 

to say that the activity in the north of Africa is being carried out 

predominantly through the Special Operations Command of the 

U.S. European Command. 

In each case, those activities would fall under the work or the 

umbrella of the U.S. Africa Command once it is stood up. This notion of full operational capability implies many, many elements, 

one of which is the notion that there are certain things being done 

by other parts of the Department of Defense. 

And instead of making redundant capabilities, there may be instances where U.S. Africa Command will engage in a memorandum 

of agreement, a memorandum of understanding with another Department of Defense entity such that, you know, the work that 

would be done, as opposed to being duplicated, will be being done 

by that currently existing command construct. 

In addition to that, on the continent of Africa we are engaged in 

support of the State Department in their various contingency operations and training assistance programs as they are building the 

militaries of other nations to participate in peacekeeping programs 

very specifically. 

There is a support that is provided to that. There is work that 

is being done in the form of other humanitarian efforts—again, not 

that would be competing with the various efforts going on—as an 

example, PEPFAR, the President’s Emergency Program for AIDS 

Relief, where there is a military piece of that, because as we look 

34 

at working with militaries in Africa, as they want to engage in 

peacekeeping operations, one of the constraints that has been 

placed on those forces by the African Union is that those forces be 

HIV/AIDS free. 

And so as we work with those militaries to cause, to the best 

that we can, them be able to produce a force that is as healthy as 

it can be, we then get involved military-to-military as they certainly look toward that capacity. 

There are other programs that are going on that we work on the 

continent. Many of these programs are Title 22 programs out of the 

Department of State, but they are being implemented with our support and with our assistance. 

Our foreign military financing, our international military and 

educational training programs, whereby we work with the Department of State country teams as they identify military members 

that would come back to America to receive training, that hopefully 

will go forth to them professionalizing their forces. 

There are additional training activities at the unit level where 

we take into account the maturing level of militaries, partnering 

them with their Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) professional development programs, their professional development programs, 

again causing those militaries to be seen within their countries 

as—I call it forces for good, so that the potential for them being 

seen as being oppressors of their people goes away and they see in 

a better light insofar as being protectors of their populations. 

So this range of programs from military-to-military assistance— 

I mentioned the State partnership program, where we bring in our 

State partners, National Guards, Reserves, working initially to enhance various military capabilities, from maintenance training to 

increased awareness of air domain, to moving on to additional 

areas of relationship-building—are all ongoing. 

And we would look to reinforce these efforts, focus these efforts 

much better, and ensure that those efforts in particular are efforts 

that are more supportive of and complementary to efforts being 

taken by other elements of our government in the developmental 

activities that they pursue. 

Ambassador MULL. Speaking on behalf of the State Department, 

Madam Chair, for many, many years, the State Department has 

aimed to pursue a policy of diplomatic universality in which we 

have posts in as many countries as possible in the world. 

And we currently have 50 embassies in Africa. There is only a 

small handful of countries where we do not have embassies, either 

very tiny countries or places where there are security concerns 

such as in Somalia. 

And the U.S. Agency for International Development, because of 

our extensive foreign assistance operations, has either a presence 

in each of those embassies or has regional responsibilities for covering those places where we might not have an AID mission in the 

country. 

Military assistance is an important part but only a very small 

fraction of the kinds of assistance that we provide. As General 

Ward mentioned, our foreign assistance budget includes such 

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ment, helping people combat trafficking in persons, human rights, 

humanitarian assistance, and response to natural disasters and so 

forth. 

We currently coordinate the military assistance that we do provide. Previously, before AFRICOM was established, the European 

Command had responsibility for Africa. 

And in most of these embassies there is a Defense attache ́ or a 

security assistance officer who, up until this point, had been coordinating with the European Command. Now they will coordinate 

with AFRICOM in making sure our military assistance is properly 

targeted. 

Ms. CASTOR. Can you tell us how many personnel of the Department of Defense are currently on the continent and how many from 

the State Department in embassies and through USAID? 

Secretary HENRY. General Ward might correct me if I don’t get 

these right, but for the Department of Defense, we have about 

1,300 to 1,400 in the Task Force–Horn of Africa, which is our major 

presence that we have. 

We have Marine detachments at many of the embassies which 

are a handful of people. We have Defense attache ́s in the different 

embassies and offices of military cooperation. And these are individuals to a few individuals in each of the embassies. 

And then we have periodic activities that we do as part of the 

Trans-Sahara initiative. 

General WARD. I think that is an accurate portrayal of the presence. The most persistent presence is in the form of that element 

that is in the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa 

headquartered in Djibouti. 

As the under secretary pointed out, in selected embassies there 

are the Defense attache ́s. And we only have insofar, as security assistance officers, in what was the EUCOM area—that was only in 

9 countries, and I think there are another 3 or 4 in the CENTCOM 

area, so some number less than 15 security assistance officers. 

And each of those officers would have anywhere from one to four 

or five military personnel associated with them. 

There are other military members on the continent, but they are 

in their rotational basis in and out, conducting specialized training 

activities and exercise-related missions. Once those training activities and exercises are conducted, then they leave, so they are in 

there on a Temporary Duty (TDY)-type of a basis. 

Ambassador MULL. And, Madam Chair, for the State Department, we have 853 State Department officers at embassies in Africa, and that that is of a total—we estimate that there—when you 

count all U.S. Government agencies attached to an embassy in Africa, it is about 2,000. 

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. Meek. 

Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And I want to welcome the Secretary and General and Ambassador for coming before the committee. There has been a lot of running around with all of us with the votes and all, and serving on 

other committees. 

36 

I know that you all have been talking a lot about placement 

today, and that is not going to be—I don’t want to spend a lot of 

time on that. 

But I think it is important, since we have gotten off to a rocky 

start, which has improved from the people that I have talked to, 

on the continent—and I wasn’t here, and I don’t know if the chairman had an opportunity—who oversees the African Subcommittee, 

Chairman Payne—did he have an opportunity to ask any questions? 

We were here having a discussion about some of the things people are upset about on continent—and there is a lot of work to be 

done. And I am glad that State is at the table. 

I am glad that USAID and—I mean, there is just a number of— 

and DOD—at the table to help smooth over some of these issues. 

But I think what I don’t want to happen—I don’t want to get— 

I guess, Mr. Secretary and Ambassador, since you all are representing jointly the two agencies in question—and, General Ward, 

if you wish to chime in—on this issue of all of a sudden I pick up 

the Washington Post and learn that the command has been set in 

a country. 

And it was based on an agreement where either the President or 

the Secretary of State said that we would be, you know, we would 

put our command there. 

Because we have so many different issues amongst the African 

countries—some get along with others, some don’t get along with 

others—down in Southern Command (SOCOM)—I mean, Southern 

Command was once talked—it was once in Colombia. Where was 

it located? 

Secretary HENRY. Panama. 

Mr. MEEK. Panama, I am sorry. In Panama. And then there was 

a big discussion about moving it to Miami. 

And the reason why they moved it to Miami and they didn’t 

move it to Tampa or move it over to Louisiana, there were a couple 

of places that wanted the Southern Command, and other countries, 

was that it had to be neutral ground, where all of the partners, just 

about all of the partners, felt comfortable in being there. Because 

it is South America, a Spanish language or bilingual city was important. 

And so I don’t know if once we talk about should we be on the 

continent or should we not be on the continent. I want to know how 

this decision is going to be made. 

Is it going to be made here in Washington? Is it going to be made 

in the area? Will these countries be consulted? Do we take a vote? 

I mean, what happens? 

Because I am just trying to find out, because I think as we look 

at this command, and as it starts to stand up and, fully functional, 

and build its relationships within—because that is going to be hard 

enough, and I know how clannish people are about power and 

being able to control certain things. 

And I know General Ward. He has to be a praying man to make 

sure that everyone understands what has to happen here. And I 

just want to know how that—I want to go a little deeper, because 

I don’t want to spend a lot of time on it. 

37 

I just want to—just give me a feel of how this decision is going 

to be made. Is it going to be our decision or is it going to be something that we work with our friends with on? 

Secretary HENRY. Well, it is a United States decision. You know, 

it can’t be made, and we are not going to go somewhere we are not 

wanted. I mean, that is a fundamental precept we have in our global force posture. 

The process is one where a number of factors were put together 

to come up with a short list of where we might look, and it is all 

the issues you are talking about, military issues, and it was a spectrum of issues. 

There was a weighting system given to those, and there was an 

analytical process to come up with a short list. At that point in 

time, then a team goes out and does a site survey, looking at the 

capacity and capability of that site to be able to support the type 

of staff that we are talking about. 

It also works with the embassy team and the country to get their 

inputs. That is brought back, and then the evaluation criteria are 

re-looked at with more detailed information. 

There are a number of people besides the analysis team that are 

involved in the process at that point in time, in making recommendations to the Secretary. The combatant commander would 

be one. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be one. 

Those who work in international policy would be one. 

And at that point in time, then he will be briefed on what the 

recommendations are, and I would imagine at that point in time 

he would consult with the Secretary of State on this also. 

As part of the evaluation effort—and the teams have put it together—it is an integrated DOD-State Department team—and 

bringing in other parts of the U.S. Government where appropriate, 

and they have expertise to add. 

The decision is taken to the Secretary, though, in consultations 

with his peers and that—he is given the decision, and then he 

would inform the President and make sure that the President is 

comfortable with that decision. 

Now, normally when we make decisions about what we are doing 

with our U.S. forces, we consult with other countries who are 

stakeholders in the process, but we make the decision, and this 

would be done similarly. 

But you can be confident that we will do significant consultation 

prior to making a final decision outside of the U.S. Government 

with our African partners and also perhaps with key European 

partners. 

Mr. MEEK. You know, Mr. Secretary, one of the problems of how 

we got off to a rocky start is that we told them what we were going 

to do. 

And that is what I am hearing back, not necessarily what I 

heard from you all. This is what I am hearing from the folks that 

are in country, some of the countries. 

You know, you talk about African Command—they came in and 

told us, you know, how the show is going to go. 

And I am just saying that I just want to make sure that on the 

State side that there is some massaging going on, and there is a 

38 

discussion that is going on, and making people feel that they are 

a part of this, because without them, we are dead in the water. 

I mean, to be honest with you, as it relates to communications, 

I think some of the best lessons learned have been in the Middle 

East where we have consulted with other countries and worked 

with them in a way and made them feel—I am not saying that 

someone down in, I don’t know, wherever, what have you—or 

Tunis—is going to make a decision on what the U.S. military and 

the State Department of the Federal Government is going to do. 

But I just want to make sure, as we move—especially as we look 

at some of the issues that are in the continent, especially as it relates to some of the issues that are in Somalia and others, and the 

missions that have to be carried out—humanitarian, militarily— 

that this relationship is so very, very important. 

I just wanted to say that, Madam Chair, quickly. I don’t know 

if they called us over, but I just need—— 

Ms. CASTOR. They did, but you have such a keen interest in this. 

I want you to take all the time you need—— 

Mr. MEEK. Okay. Well, thank you—— 

Ms. CASTOR [continuing]. To make sure we have—— 

Mr. MEEK [continuing]. So very much. We won’t miss the vote. 

My interest won’t go that far. 

But I just want to make sure—thank you, though. I just want 

to make sure that I don’t pick up the Post and all of a sudden a 

decision has been made. Where are we in that process right now, 

that long process you just laid out? 

Secretary HENRY. We are in the process where teams have gone 

out to gather information. That aspect of it has not completed. 

Mr. MEEK. Okay. 

Secretary HENRY. So we don’t have the detailed information in 

order to do a second round of evaluation yet. 

Mr. MEEK. Okay. Well, that is the million-dollar question right 

now, where it is going to be and where will it end up. 

I guess the second end of things—and I am going to be in Africa 

over the break and have an opportunity to see some of the operations that we do have ongoing there, and also heavily on the State 

side, understanding how we are doing things over there and how 

we are going to approach it. 

We start looking at the whole budget issue—I was in Tunis, Tunisia a couple of years—no, I don’t know, about three months ago, 

three or four months ago—I was in Tunis, and I was—I know that 

we have our advanced Arabic school there, and I know that we 

have a great mission that is there. 

And I took the opportunity to go visit the mission and talk to not 

only the Defense attache ́ but also the folks on the State side. 

One of their concerns is the fact that we really don’t have a good 

public affairs budget to be able to work with young people that are 

being influenced by other forces that are out there that are getting 

their attention, to put a positive image on the United States of 

America. 

And I just wanted to ask, what level are we going—and this is 

the Armed Services Committee, but there has to be some—a 

human side to this, or it is not going to work. 

39 

And I just want to make sure that we don’t get too excited about 

helicopters and things of that nature, and that we are—that someone or some folks on this committee—because forcing it through a 

square hole is not going to—you know, a square peg through a 

round hole is just not going to happen. 

And I think that is lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan 

and some other areas, and where we are making great leaps and 

bounds is when we incorporate this kind of—so talk to me a little 

bit about what is happening on that side of the ball. 

How is that going to, General, feed into the command that you 

have now? And who will be outside of State? 

Because I am just telling you, I feel like a child that has been 

in the middle of a domestic violence fight, and I know who usually 

kinds of wins these fights when it comes down to these issues, especially trying to do something in a joint way. 

Who is going to be the advocate within DOD and the State pushing, because, really, to get anything through this process here, it 

has to be DOD. You know, on the State side folks are like oh, you 

know, maybe, maybe I feel—I don’t know. 

But if the Department of Defense say that this is important to 

our mission in that command, then it will be prioritized, and we 

will have countries that will be able to receive—or missions that— 

U.S. missions that will be able to receive the dollars, that can work 

with African Command, to make sure that that image that we 

want of the United States of America is the best image that we can 

put forth, and have the resources to do that. 

And that is so very, very important. 

Secretary HENRY. Yes. I will let General Ward speak to specifically what they are doing in the command. But I mean, this is an 

example of the way that we do things interagency. 

The President has designated the State Department for the lead 

in public diplomacy and strategic communications, headed by 

former Under Secretary Hughes. And we align ourselves with those 

processes. 

And I mean, on one hand, people are very concerned about the 

militarization of foreign policy, and other times we get urged to 

step forward and take charge. 

And this is a case where State Department is in the lead. They 

lay out the program and we support it, and we put resources 

against it. 

But until the President directs us otherwise, which we would not 

recommend that he do, we are going to be in the supporting role 

to the State Department on this. 

Now, that doesn’t mean that within the command there is not 

certain aspects that go on, but setting the policy for it and the overall program is the State Department’s lead. 

General WARD. Congressman Meek, one of the things that the 

command will do by design—and we talked about this unique 

structure. We have typically stumbled into these sorts of things because we had not gotten it correct. 

This command will have a director for outreach who is a very 

senior and at this point in time nonmilitary member of the team 

to ensure that following, as the under secretary pointed out, you 

know, the lead of the Department of State in our strategic commuVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:09 Jul 10, 2009 Jkt 044633 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-100\318000.000 HARM2 PsN: MARY
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nications activities, that we are aligned with the Department of 

State, that we are, in fact, going out and understanding from the 

perspective of our intended audience what sorts of things will make 

a difference for them, and then putting the programs in place to 

address their need for understanding, information and perspective, 

again, from their perspective. 

And so this director of outreach—and again, not there yet because, again, we are a command under construction, and those elements are being built, but we are building those elements with a 

very determined appreciation for the point that you have just made 

there with respect to outreach and messaging and strategic communications. 

At the current time, you know, I am doing a lot of it personally, 

quite candidly. As I have gone around the continent, most recently, 

in central Africa last week at the African Union headquarters, engaging with heads of state and others—also with the media, but 

again—as well as at the request of our ambassadors who are there 

on the continent. 

As I attended one of their sessions here in Washington where the 

Secretary of State brought in the—— 

Ms. CASTOR. Excuse me, General. We have five minutes left to 

vote, so if you could just wrap it up, that would be appreciated. 

General WARD [continuing]. Brought in the sub-Saharan ambassadors, messaging with them so that as they are talking about the 

command, it is, again, speaking with one voice. 

So we will remain sensitive to that, and structurally the director 

of outreach will have that as a very specific part of their portfolio. 

Mr. MEEK. And thank you, gentlemen. 

And thank you, Madam Chair. 

And I look forward to working with the three of you, all of you 

in DOD and State, making sure that we have a smooth approach 

in standing up this command. Thank you. 

Ms. CASTOR. And thank you, Congressman Meek, for your leadership on this issue. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much. 

And to everyone else in attendance, thank you for being here. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:08 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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