SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

987 

TP 11-00759 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CENTRA, CARNI, GREEN, AND MARTOCHE, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF DANIEL A. LITTLE AND HELEN 

LITTLE, PETITIONERS, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TOWN OF FABIUS ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS, 

RESPONDENT. 

 

CARDINALE & DELVECCHIO LAW FIRM, PLLC, CORTLAND (JOHN A. DELVECCHIO OF

COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONERS.

DIRK J. OUDEMOOL, SYRACUSE, FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to the

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial

Department by order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County [Anthony J.

Paris, J.], entered April 1, 2011) to review a determination of

respondent. The determination upheld the issuance of a certain

certificate of compliance for mobile home occupancy. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the determination is unanimously 

confirmed without costs and the petition is dismissed. 

Memorandum: Petitioners, the owners of real property in the Town

of Fabius (Town), commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding

challenging the determination, issued following a public hearing, that

upheld the Town Zoning Officer’s 2010 issuance of a certificate of

compliance for occupancy of a mobile home by tenants named in a lease

agreement with the owners of neighboring property (owners). In 1993

respondent had issued a special permit to the owners for the placement

of the mobile home on their property for the use of a full-time

agricultural employee. As a preliminary matter, we agree with

petitioners that this proceeding was improperly transferred to this

Court inasmuch as petitioners do not challenge a determination made as

a result of an evidentiary hearing directed by law (see CPLR 7803 [4];

7804 [g]; Matter of Halperin v City of New Rochelle, 24 AD3d 768, 770-

771, lv dismissed 6 NY3d 890, lv denied 7 NY3d 708). Nevertheless, we

review petitioners’ contentions in the interest of judicial economy

(see Matter of W.K.J. Young Group v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Vil. of

Lancaster, 16 AD3d 1021). 

“A determination of a zoning board made after a public hearing

should be sustained if it has a rational basis and is supported by

evidence in the record” (Matter of Haberman v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of
-2- 987 

TP 11-00759 

Town of E. Hampton, 85 AD3d 1170, 1171). Pursuant to article VI,

section 15 (C) (5) (a) of the Town’s Zoning Law, the owners were

permitted to maintain a mobile home on their property as long as it

was “used as a dwelling by employees of an active farm operation.” 

“Under a zoning ordinance which authorizes interpretation of its

requirements by the board of appeals, specific application of a term

of the ordinance to a particular property is . . . governed by the

board’s interpretation, unless unreasonable or irrational” (Matter of

Frishman v Schmidt, 61 NY2d 823, 825). Here, respondent’s

determination that the property at issue was an “active farm

operation” and that the tenants occupying the mobile home were

“employees” of that operation is not unreasonable or irrational (cf.

Matter of Kinderhill Farm Breeding Assoc. v Walker, 54 AD2d 811, affd

42 NY2d 919).

Contrary to petitioners’ contentions, moreover, respondent

adequately explained the rationale for its determination and afforded

petitioners an opportunity to be heard at the September 2010 public

hearing on their appeal challenging the Town Zoning Officer’s issuance

of the certificate of compliance for occupancy. Although the notice

for respondent’s subsequent hearing in December 2010 stated that

members of the public would be permitted to be heard, that statement

was made in error inasmuch as the record of the September hearing

expressly provides that this matter was “concluded” at the September

hearing. Thus, at the December hearing, “[a]ll that arguably remained

was a vote on the matter and petitioners were not entitled to be heard

further” (Matter of Litz v Town Bd. of Guilderland, 197 AD2d 825,

827). Finally, contrary to the contention of petitioners,

respondent’s answer was not deficient (see CPLR 7804 [d]).

Entered: September 30, 2011 Patricia L. Morgan

Clerk of the Court