Interim Decision #1331 

MATTER OF FONG 

In VISA PETITION Proceedings 

A-13264113 

Decided by Boamd April 6,1064 

An adoptive brother is eligible for preference quota status under section 

203(a) (4), Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, if he qualifies as 

an adopted child of the same parents of the petitioner. (Matter of 

6 I. & N. Dec. 180, superseded.) 

The case conies forward on appeal from the order of the District 

Director, Boston District, dated December 13, 1963, denying the visa 

petition for the reason that Matter of 21—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 180, holds 

that brothers and sisters through adoption are not brothers and sisters 

within the meaning of section 203 (a) (4) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act. 

The petitioner, a native of China and a naturalized citizen of the 

United States, 35 years old, female, seeks preference status under section 203(a) (4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act on behalf of 

her adopted brother, a native and citizen of China, born January 31, 

1949 (CR28-1-8). Section 203(a) (4) provides for preference quota 

status on behalf of a brother or sister of a citizen of the United States. 

An office memorandum dated December 13, 1963, accompanies the 

denial of the visa petition. The memorandum reflects that the petitioner applied for admission to the United States at Boston, Massachusetts on March 26, 1952; that her father Fong Tan TOW, given 

name, Fong Gong Wah, marriage name, was then living in the Philippine Islands and her mother Jee (Gee) (Shee) was living in Mar Det 

Village; that she did not have any brothers or sisters, either natural 

or adopted; that she had only one son, Chin Doo Taw, born OR 38-4-2 

(April 29, 1940) in Chew Jung Village and living with her mother in 

Mar Det Village. Subsequently, the petitioner submitted visa petitions for her mother, Fong Wai Lan also known as Gee Wai Lan, her 

daughter, Chin King Toy, and an adopted brother, Fong Sui Kee. 

In support of these visa petitions she submitted her own affidavit, and 

an affidavit of her husband and a copy of an adoption agreement to 

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Interim. Decision 41331 

substantiate the claimed relationships. Inasmuch as this was the first 

time she had mentioned she had a daughter and an adopted brother, 

the petitioner was interviewed under oath on December 12, 1963. 

She admitted that she never had a son by the name of Chin Doo Taw 

but merely showed him on the record because everyone else was doing 

the same thing. She also testified that she had two natural sisters 

and one adopted brother. Her explanation for not previously reporting their existence was that since they were residing on the mainland 

of China when she came to the United States she thought that if she 

disclosed their existence some harm might come to them. The visa 

petitions filed in behalf of the petitioner's mother and daughter were 

approved on condition that the blood typing of the petitioner and her 

husband and the beneficiary be found compatible. However, it was 

recommended that the visa petition filed on behalf of the adopted 

brother, Fong Sui Kee, be denied on the basis of the decision in 

Matter of M—, 6 I. &N. Dec. 180. 

It is noted that Matter of AI—, supra, was decided on June 23, 

1954, and held that brothers and sisters through adoption were not 

"brothers" or "sisters" within the meaning of section 203(a) (4) of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act and were not eligible for preference quota status under that section. However, subsequently there 

was enacted the Act of September 11, 1957 (71 Stat. 639, 8 U.S.C.A. 

1101, P.L. 85416 (86th Cong., 1st Sess.) S. 2792) which provided in 

section 2 thereof an addition to section 101(b) (1) of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act consisting of subparagraph (E) to include in the 

definitionof the term "child" a child adopted while under the age of 

14 years if the child has thereafter been in the legal custody of, and 

has resided with, the adopting parent or parents for at least two years. 

Senate Report No. 1057 (85th Cong., -1st Sess.) to accompany S. 2792, 

stated that at present the term "child" does not include adopted 

children and it is believed the proposed amendment is desirable to 

prevent hardship in cases where the child is chargeable to a heavily 

oversubscribed quota and would not otherwise be able to accompany 

his adoptive parents. Adequate safeguards were included to prevent 

abuses. Presumably, this meant the limitation to adoption while under 

14 years of age and the requirement of custody and residence thereafter 

for two years by the adopting parent or parents as well as the termination of any immigration right, privilege or status as to the natural 

parent of such adopted child. 

The amendment of September 11, 1957, equated the status of a properly adopted child to that of a. "child" as defined in section 101(b) (1) 

for immigration purposes?. In view of the enactment of this amen2 Matter of A. —, 8 I. & N. Dee. 242. 

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Interim Decision #1331 

datory statute in 1957 subsequent to our decision in Matter of M—, 6 

I. 86 N. Dec. 180 (1954), and the recognition therein for the first time 

of an adopted child as a, "child" it is believed that the matter should 

be reexamined in view of the legislative intent and history to determine 

whether an adopted brother or sister is included within the term 

"brothers" or "sisters." 

The term "brothers" or "sisters" as used in section 203 (a) (4) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act is not defined and recourse may be 

had to the statutory construction adopted to similar words in other 

legislation to determine whether adopted brothers and sisters are included within that terminology. 2Adoption is usually regarded as 

creating the =de relationship between the adoptive parent and the 

adopted child as between a natural parent and his child .s By statute, 

in most jurisdictions, but not a common law, a person may adopt a 

child; and in such a case, unless there are statutory provisions to the 

contrary, the rights, duties and obligations arising from the artificial 

relationship will be substantially the same as those arising from the 

natural relation of parent and child. Where the artificial relation of 

parent and child is created by ad.option under the statute, the relationship will be the express provisions of the statute, and even independently of such provisions, give rise to substantially the same rights, 

duties, and liabilities as arise out of the natural relationsbip. 4 

In the case of Woodward v. U.S., 341 U.S. 112 (1951) the Supreme 

Court was considering an appeal from a decision of the Court of 

Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (185 P. 2d 131) which had held that 

an adopted brother was not a permissible beneficiary under section 

602(g) of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1910.° The 

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has reached a directly contrary 

conclusion under similar circumstances in. Carpenter v. U.S 168 F. 2d 

369 (1918). The grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court was limited 

to the question of whether a daughter by adoption is withinthe 

permissible class of beneficiaries under section 602(g) of the National 

Service Life Insurance Act of 1940. The Court held (p. 113) that 

"The short of the matter is that Congress has not expressed itself 

in regard to the question before us. In resolving the conflict of de- 

'Metier of R—, 5 I. & N. Dec. 438 (1953) concluded that the term "sons" or 

"daughters" included adopted sous or daughters within the provision of section 

203 (a) (4) but that holding, which involved a beneficiary who was 24 years old 

at the time of his adoption, is no longer applicable because the present definition 

in section 101(b) (1) (E) defines "adopted child" as one adopted while under the 

age of 14 years. 

2 2 CJS 413. 

Madden, 3_ W., Persons and Domestic Relations 551 (1951) . 

5This section provided that insurance shall be payable only to a widow, 

widower, child, parent, brother, or sister of the insured. 

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Interim Decision #1331 

cisions, we must determine whether the word "brother," as used in 

this Federal statute, restricts the policy holder's choice of beneficiaries 

to brothers of the blood. We are persuaded by the policy against 

drawing such a distinction in the family relationship. Contemporaneous legal treatment of adopted children as though born into the 

family is a manifestation of that policy. * * Consequently, we hold 

that a brother by adoption is a permissible beneficiary under section 

602(g) of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1910." a 

Section 2 of the Act of September 11, 1957, which added subparagraph (B) to the definition of the term "child" in section 101 

(b) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act placed Congressional 

approval on a construction which would adopt the prevailing view 

that adoption is usually regarded as creating the same relationship 

between the adoptive parent and adopted child as between a, natural 

parent and a natural child. Although there has been some holdings 

to the contrary, the Supreme Court in the case of Woodward v. U.S., 

341 U.S. 112 (1951) settled the divergence in the lower courts as to 

whether a brother or sister by adoption is a "brother" or a "sister" 

within the meaning of the term as used in the National Service Life 

Insurance Act in the affirmative. In the light of the legislative history 

and purpose of the amendatory legislation of the Act of September 

11, 1957, we are convinced that there has been enunciated a Congressional p ()Rey aoainst drawing any distinction between an adopted child 

or adopted brother and sister and "child" or "brother" and "sister." 

We regard Matter of M—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 180, as no longer applicable. 

In the instant case there is evidence to establish that the beneficiary, 

who was born on January 31, 1949, was adopted either on March 1, 

1949, as testified by the petitioner, or on July 19, 1949, as evidenced by 

the adoption agreement. In any event the beneficiary appears to 

qualify as an adopted child of the same parents of the petitioner and 

is considered an adopted brother. As such, he qualifies for eligibility 

for a preference quota visa under section 203(a) (4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The appeal will be sustained. 

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be sustained and that the 

visa petition be approved for preference quota status under section 

203 (a) (4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act on behalf of the 

beneficiary. 

° Cited with approval in Thomas v. United States, 189 F. 2d 495, 504 (6th Cir., 

{1951) Berrilhitt v. Mvited States, 199 F. 2d 217, 218 (6th Cir., 1952) ; U.S. v. 

Rock 200 P. 2d 357, 358 (D.C. Cir., 1952). 

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