United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Military Readiness,

Committee on National Security, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

10:00 a.m., EDT

Tuesday,

March 11, 1997

MILITARY READINESS

Improvements Still Needed

in Assessing Military

Readiness

Statement of Mark E. Gebicke, Director, Military

Operations and Capabilities Issues, National Security and

International Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-97-107

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Today’s American military forces have earned the reputation of being

among the best, if not the best, trained forces in the world. That reputation

stands in stark contrast to the so-called “hollow forces” of the 1970s. Yet,

as we have proceeded through nearly a decade of military downsizing,

periodic concerns or questions have surfaced about the potential for a new

“hollowing” of our forces. Concerns voiced by military personnel to

congressional staff during field visits are quite different from official unit

readiness assessment reports forwarded through service headquarters to

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and to the Office of the Secretary of Defense

(OSD). This difference has resulted in questions in recent years about the

true measure of readiness of our military forces.

Today, I would like to provide a broad overview of the readiness

assessment process and frame my comments around three questions.

• What disconnects are associated with readiness reporting, and why do

they exist?

• What corrective actions have been proposed and taken to measure

readiness?

• What further actions are needed?

Background Historically, readiness of U.S. military forces at the unit level has been

measured using the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS),

under the sponsorship of the JCS. Under SORTS, units report their overall

readiness status as well as the status of four resource areas (personnel,

equipment and supplies on hand, equipment condition, and training). The

readiness status of a unit is reported by assigning capability, or “C,” ratings

as follows:

C-1—Unit can undertake the full wartime missions for which it is

organized or designed.

C-2—Unit can undertake the bulk of its wartime missions.

C-3—Unit can undertake major portions of its wartime missions.

C-4—Unit requires additional resources and/or training to undertake its

wartime missions, but if the situation dictates, it may be required to

undertake portions of the missions with resources on hand.

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-107
C-5—Unit is undergoing a service-directed resource change and is not

prepared to undertake its wartime missions.

While SORTS still provides the basic underpinning to readiness assessments,

both OSD and JCS have established senior oversight groups in recent years

to focus on readiness issues at a higher level and provide a more

comprehensive assessment of readiness.

Summary Formal readiness reports provided by SORTS have sometimes indicated a

higher state of readiness than appears warranted based on other

information coming from military personnel in the field. The implications

are that the formal reporting system is overly optimistic in its readiness

assessments, and questions can be legitimately raised about its credibility.

As we and others have reported, there are many shortcomings in SORTS

that need to be addressed, including the

• lack of emphasis on readiness on a long-term basis, contrasted with the

snapshot in time currently provided;

• use of insufficient indicators to ensure a comprehensive assessment of

readiness; and

• inability to measure integrated readiness of joint operating forces.

Our recommendations have been targeted toward helping DOD identify

indicators most relevant to developing a more comprehensive readiness

assessment and ensuring that comparable data are maintained by all

services to allow the development of trends on the selected indicators.

What Disconnects Are

Associated With

Readiness Reporting,

and Why Do They

Exist?

Several types of disconnects have historically existed between SORTS

formal readiness reports and other information obtained from military

personnel in the field, and those disconnects exist for various reasons. In

recent years, either in reports or testimony before the Congress, we

discussed the Department of Defense’s (DOD) system for measuring

readiness and reported on the need for improvements.1

 We previously

reported instances where, during fieldwork on our assignments, SORTS data

appeared to paint a rosier picture of readiness than did various military

officials, who expressed concerns about readiness in their discussions

with us, or even in correspondence with higher headquarters. These

concerns were centered on high operating tempo (OPTEMPO), frequent

deployments of personnel away from home (known as PERSTEMPO),

1

A list of relevant GAO reports and testimonies is included at the end of this statement.

Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-107
personnel shortfalls and turnovers, and the shifting of funds from key

readiness accounts to meet other needs, each of which could degrade

readiness. Many of these concerns addressed current conditions and, more

importantly, the future if existing conditions persisted.

We have continued to report on these issues in conjunction with more

recent work. Our April 1996 report on PERSTEMPO issues noted that DOD

could not precisely measure the increase in deployments because until

1994 only the Navy had systems to track PERSTEMPO. Still missing were

clear and consistent definitions and data collection on a consistent basis

across the services. Further, during our visits to high-deploying units,

military personnel at major commands expressed grave concerns about

the adverse effects on readiness resulting from high operating tempo and

frequent deployments away from home. However, SORTS C-ratings

examined in conjunction with these assignments have continued to show a

fairly stable level of overall unit readiness. Less than one-third of the

high-deploying units we reviewed dropped below planned readiness levels

due to deployments. During our most recent examination of this issue in

conjunction with Special Operations Forces, we found that a negative

impact on readiness due to increased OPTEMPO was not readily apparent in

the SORTS reports.

In 1995 we reported that participation in peace operations could enhance

or reduce a unit’s combat capability, depending on the type of unit, skills

used or not used, length of participation, and in-theater training

opportunities. We noted that the ground combat forces, mechanized

infantry, armored units, and units that are heavily dependent on equipment

(such as artillery) face the greatest combat skill erosion when they deploy

for peace operations without their equipment. Also, while they are

deployed, they may do tasks that are significantly different from the

combat tasks for which they normally train.

Senior defense officials have stated that it is difficult to estimate the

amount of time required to restore a unit’s combat effectiveness for all its

missions after a unit participates in a peace operation; however, Army

commanders generally estimate a range of 3 to 6 months. Yet when

examining SORTS reports, we have seen little to indicate significant

reductions in C-ratings for units participating in peacekeeping operations.

While I cannot say conclusively that downgraded readiness should have

been reported, I will note that a special study entitled The Effects of Peace

Operations on Unit Readiness, published in February 1996 by the Army’s

Center for Army Lessons Learned, recommended that the Department of

Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-107
the Army consider having units report “C-5” on their unit status reports for

a period of 4 months after return from peace operations.

Our 1996 report on chemical and biological defense pointed out that many

of the types of problems encountered during the Gulf War remain

uncorrected, and U.S. forces continue to experience serious

training-related weaknesses in their chemical and biological proficiency.

At the same time, we found that the effectiveness of SORTS for evaluating

units’ chemical and biological readiness was limited. This was the case

despite a DOD requirement imposed in 1993 for all the services to assess

their equipment and training status for operations in a contaminated

environment and to report this data as a distinct part of SORTS. DOD’s

requirement also allows commanders to subjectively upgrade their overall

SORTS status, regardless of their chemical and biological status. For

example, one early deploying active Army division was rated as C-1—the

highest SORTS category—despite rating itself C-4 for chemical and

biological equipment readiness.

I also want to touch on the effect that manning levels have on readiness,

which we reported on in 1995. This continues to be an important issue.

Existing SORTS data often reflects a high readiness level for manning

because in the aggregate, through substitution, units may numerically have

most of their assigned personnel. However, aggregating data can mask

underlying personnel problems that can be detrimental to readiness, such

as shortages by skill level and rank or grade. Compounding these

problems can be high levels of personnel turnover. When considered

collectively, these factors create situations where commanders may have

difficulty developing and maintaining unit cohesion and accomplishing

training objectives. Judging by our recent review of selected commanders’

comments submitted with their SORTS reports, and other available data, the

problems I have just noted are real, although not well reflected in the

overall C-ratings.

Several factors play a part in the apparent disconnects I have noted here

today. We have noted that formal readiness assessments in SORTS contain

both objective and subjective elements. Gunnery scores, for example, can

be more objectively measured than can the broad impact of personnel

shortfalls and turnovers. The C-rating for training is based on a

commander’s subjective assessment of how well a unit is trained based on

his personal observation and various internal and external evaluations. A

commander may subjectively change his unit’s overall C-rating, based on

experience, to reflect a broader perspective of the unit’s ability to perform

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-107
its wartime missions. Thus, concerns about degradation in readiness in

one area may diminish in relation to the commander’s confidence about

the overall state of readiness.

It may be that a commander’s informal statements of concern over

readiness, apart from SORTS, are a signal of an impending change that may

eventually show up in SORTS reports. However, we have been told by a

variety of military leaders that some commanders may view the SORTS

reports they prepare as scorecards on their capabilities and performance

with the potential to affect their promotion potential. Thus, they are

reluctant to report degraded readiness. We have also been told that the

reluctance to cite degraded readiness is indicative of a “can do” spirit of

optimism. Whatever the cause, the fact is that significant differences can

and do exist between official SORTS reports, other data, and professional

military judgments.

What Corrective

Actions Have Been

Proposed and Taken

to Measure

Readiness?

In 1994 we reported that C-ratings represent a snapshot in time; they are

not predictive and do not address long-term readiness or signal impending

changes in the status of resources. Neither do they assess joint readiness,

that is, the preparedness of unified commands and joint task forces to

effectively integrate individual service combat and support units into a

joint operating force.

We identified and reported on a number of indicators that (1) service

officials told us were either critical or important to a more comprehensive

assessment of readiness and (2) had some predictive value. These

indicators included projected personnel trends, crew manning, recruiting

shortfalls, personnel stability, PERSTEMPO, borrowed manpower, morale,

operating tempo, funding, accidents, and unit readiness and proficiency.

At that time, we recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for

Personnel and Readiness be directed to

• review the indicators we had identified as being critical to predicting

readiness and select the specific indicators most relevant to a more

comprehensive readiness assessment,

• develop criteria to evaluate the selected indicators and prescribe how

often the indicators should be reported to supplement SORTS data, and

• ensure that comparable data is maintained by all services to allow the

development of trends on the selected indicators.

Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-107
In the 1994 time frame and later, OSD and JCS began a number of initiatives

that have heightened the emphasis on readiness within their respective

offices, including some initial emphasis on joint readiness. Additionally,

some of the services have initiated actions to strengthen their assessments

of readiness.

In the fall of 1993, OSD created a Senior Readiness Oversight Council

comprised of high-level military and civilian officials and co-chaired by the

Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of JCS. The Council

meets monthly to review the status of readiness based on briefings given

by each service chief of staff and an overall assessment by the Vice

Chairman. Also, results of the JCS joint reviews are briefed to the Council.

The Council focuses on topical readiness issues too, such as various

aspects of combat support, both on a short- and long-term basis. The

Council is also responsible for providing quarterly readiness reports to the

Congress.2

 The most recent unclassified quarterly readiness report

submitted to the Congress for the period October to December 1996 stated

that “first to fight” forces were at a high level of readiness, while overall

unit readiness was stable at historic levels. At the same time, it noted that

careful management was required for some segments of the force that

were critical to current operations and to major regional contingencies.

OSD is in the beginning stages of attempting to develop a readiness

baseline, which when completed will contain additional indicators with

information on personnel, equipment, training, and joint readiness that is

not available from existing DOD databases. This baseline is now more

oriented to examining functional issues such as accessions, retention,

manning levels, and training on an aggregate basis than it is to developing

a more comprehensive readiness assessment system from a unit

perspective. Over time, as system development continues, the baseline is

expected to facilitate assessments of joint readiness, provide a basis for

resource allocation, and support DOD’s budgeting process. OSD’s efforts

over the past 3 years have focused on identifying indicators that would be

useful to this system. OSD officials told us they hope to have baseline data

available to assist in joint readiness assessments within 3 or 4 years but

that a comprehensive system with predictive capabilities will evolve over

several years.

2

Section 361 of the 1996 defense authorization act added a new section to chapter 22 of 10 U.S.C.,

section 452, requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit quarterly reports on military readiness to the

Congress.

Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-107
To direct more attention to readiness, JCS established the Chairman’s

Readiness System, which became operational in December 1994. A major

component of this system is the Joint Monthly Readiness Review process,

which provides an assessment of readiness to execute the National

Military Strategy through current assessments of unit and joint readiness

at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The process requires each

commander in chief (CINC), service, and combat support agency to assess

and report on the current and projected readiness status of major combat

and critical strategic forces, given specific scenarios. A foundation for

these assessments is provided by SORTS, supplemented by other data

available to the CINCs. JCS staff told us that the joint reviews generally focus

on relatively near-term readiness issues (current time to 2 years), often

dealing with combat support in such functional areas as lift, intelligence,

logistics, and sustainment. These reviews help to identify readiness

deficiencies that can be prioritized for possible remedy or workarounds.

Also, JCS is attempting to develop the capability to combine multiple DOD

databases to assess readiness at tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

In doing so, JCS recognized that the SORTS system is oriented more to

assessing readiness at the tactical or unit level. This capability could be

used to automate and expedite analyses now completed as part of the JCS

joint reviews. A JCS official told us that funding has just been approved to

implement this project. It is important to note that as JCS develops the

planned software programs, the system would still incorporate SORTS, with

its problems, as well as multiple other data systems to provide a broader

assessment of readiness issues at multiple levels.

At the service level, only the Army has taken significant actions on its own

to identify and collect data to provide a more comprehensive assessment

of readiness. The Army Readiness Management System (ARMS), which

began during the past year, is a 4-year effort to combine SORTS data with

Army installation status reports and the Training and Doctrine Command’s

training status report to develop a comprehensive assessment of unit,

operational, and training readiness.3

 The Army’s focus in developing ARMS

has been on improving or enhancing information provided by SORTS

reports. As part of this effort, unit commanders are now required to report

data in a number of additional categories. While this supplemental data is

not used by reporting units to set C-ratings, the data is used by the Army to

3

An installation status report provides an assessment of mission support, strategic mobility, housing,

community, utility, and environmental infrastructure assets on an Army installation. The training

status report provides an assessment of the Training and Doctrine Command’s current and future

capability to provide skilled soldiers, training and equipment criteria, and sound doctrine for Army

units.

Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-107
do supplemental analyses and make some projections of future impacts on

readiness. For example, data now collected pertains to crew proficiency,

the percentage of specialty training completed, and PERSTEMPO. Moreover,

the software program used in ARMS allows Army officials at all levels to

quickly develop and portray current, historical, trend, and near-term

predictive readiness information.

The Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force continue to rely on SORTS to

provide readiness information and have not required commanders to

provide information on additional indicators since our 1994 report. The

Navy has started analyzing existing SORTS data in more finite ways to

enhance its usefulness. This effort includes analyses by fleet, type of ship,

type of aircraft, and deployed status. Within the next year, Navy officials

hope to include information outside of SORTS, for example, maintenance

data and equipment cannibalization data, as part of its analyses in an effort

to develop some short-term readiness forecast capability. The Marine

Corps has continued to collect and report only those indicators required

by JCS regulation as a part of SORTS, and officials told us they have no plans

to systematically obtain other readiness information.

Air Force officials told us they see no need to use readiness indicators

other than those provided by SORTS. Instead, they believe that SORTS

reporting needs to be improved, and they are exploring ways to make the

SORTS data more sensitive to readiness changes by narrowing the

percentage range for reporting at a certain C-rating. However, Air Force

officials told us that changes to SORTS reporting would not be proposed for

at least a year.

What Further Actions

Are Needed?

We continue to have concerns that not enough attention is being devoted

to ensuring the accuracy and completeness of SORTS—the beginning point

for higher-level assessments at the operational and strategic levels.

Continuing shortcomings in SORTS, both in terms of its inherent limitations

and seeming disconnects, need to be addressed if DOD is to have a credible

foundation upon which a more comprehensive readiness reporting system

can be built. In addressing these deficiencies, DOD should develop

additional readiness indicators, and ensure that they are integrated into

assessments of readiness on a unit-level basis within each of the services.

We commend JCS and OSD efforts to develop broader capabilities for

measuring readiness. However, some of those efforts involve making use

of existing databases, apart from SORTS, to develop a more comprehensive

Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-107
assessment of readiness. We believe that efforts will be required to ensure

the accuracy and completeness of those databases. For example, while the

potential for PERSTEMPO to adversely affect retention raises concerns, OSD’s

primary database dealing with reasons for separating from military service

has historically captured limited information on why separations occur.

An OSD official expressed hope that as data systems used in OSD’s baseline

project come into increased use, senior leaders will exert pressure to

enhance the quality of these data systems. We believe that actions to

identify database requirements, limitations, and needed improvements

should occur concurrent with the baseline development.

This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to

any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.

Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-107
Appendix I 

Recent GAO Reports and Testimonies

Dealing With Readiness

Army Ranger Training: Safety Improvements Need to Be Institutionalized

(GAO/NSIAD-97-29, Jan. 2, 1997).

Military Readiness: Data and Trends for April 1995 to March 1996

(GAO/NSIAD-96-194, Aug. 2, 1996).

Operation and Maintenance Funding: Trends in Army and Air Force Use of

Funds for Combat Forces and Infrastructure (GAO/NSIAD-96-141, June 4,

1996).

Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to

Resolve Continuing Problems (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-154, May 1, 1996).

Civilian Downsizing: Unit Readiness Not Adversely Affected, but Future

Reductions a Concern (GAO/NSIAD-96-143BR, Apr. 22, 1996).

Military Readiness: A Clear Policy Is Needed to Guide Management of

Frequently Deployed Units (GAO/NSIAD-96-105, Apr. 8, 1996).

Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to

Resolve Continuing Problems (GAO/NSIAD-96-103, Mar. 29, 1996).

DOD Reserve Components: Issues Pertaining to Readiness

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-130, Mar. 21, 1996).

Military Readiness: Data and Trends for January 1990 to March 1995

(GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR, Mar. 4, 1996).

Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on

Unit Capability (GAO/NSIAD-96-14, Oct. 18, 1995).

Military Personnel: High Aggregate Personnel Levels Maintained

Throughout Drawdown (GAO/NSIAD-95-97, June 2, 1995).

Military Readiness: Improved Assessment Measures Are Evolving

(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-117, Mar. 16, 1995).

Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Develop a More Comprehensive

Measurement System (GAO/NSIAD-95-29, Oct. 27, 1994).

Military Readiness: Current Indicators Need to Be Expanded for a More

Comprehensive Assessment (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-160, Apr. 21, 1994).

(703193) Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-107
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