COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-16-00008-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF P.S., 

A CHILD

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FROM THE 97TH DISTRICT COURT OF ARCHER COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 2015-0007A-CV

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OPINION

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I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant A.W. (Mother), who is appearing pro se, appeals from an order 

establishing the parent-child relationship between Appellee M.S. (Father) and 
2

Mother’s daughter Pamela,1 who was conceived by nonmedical artificial 

insemination using Father’s sperm. The primary issue we address is whether 

Father qualifies as a “donor” under the definition of “donor” set forth in Texas 

Family Code section 160.102(6).

2

 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.102(6). 

Because Father did not provide sperm to a licensed physician for the purpose of 

artificial insemination, we hold that Father is not a donor as that term is defined in

section 160.102(6) and therefore may be named as a parent to Pamela. 

Consequently, we will affirm the trial court’s order establishing Father’s paternity 

of Pamela.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Father and Mother were friends who previously lived together, but they 

never had sexual relations. Mother, who is gay, wanted to have a child and she 

approached Father, requesting that he provide sperm. Father wanted children 

but did not think he would ever marry, so he agreed to Mother’s request. Mother 

provided sterile cups and syringes to Father. Father collected his sperm and 

gave it to Mother. Mother artificially inseminated herself using Father’s sperm

and successfully conceived a child.

 

1To protect the identity of the minor child, we refer to her by a pseudonym 

and to the parents as Mother and Father. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 109.002(d) (West 2014).

2

It is undisputed that Father donated his sperm. The issue of whether 

Father is a “donor” refers to whether he meets the statutory definition of “donor”

and is therefore by statute not the parent of any child conceived from his 

donation. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 160.102(6), .702 (West 2014).
3

Father attended several of Mother’s doctor appointments, as well as the 

sonogram appointment that revealed the child’s gender. Father was present at 

the hospital for Pamela’s birth on August 18, 2014, and signed an 

acknowledgement of paternity and the birth certificate. Pamela received Father’s 

last name. Father saw Pamela five to seven times during the first two months of 

her life, but Father lost contact with Mother in mid-October 2014 because Mother

lost her phone. Around that same time, Mother married her girlfriend. Although 

Father stopped by Mother’s house to visit Pamela, no one would open the door. 

A month after Pamela’s birth, Mother rescinded the acknowledgement of 

paternity that Father had signed. Mother mailed Father a form requesting that he 

voluntarily relinquish his parental rights. Father threw away the form and sought 

assistance from the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) because he wanted to 

be officially named as Pamela’s father so that he would have the right to see her. 

The OAG filed a petition to establish the parent-child relationship between 

Father and Pamela.

3 Mother filed an answer, and Mother’s spouse intervened. 

In due course, the case proceeded to a bench trial. 

 

3Under section 160.307(d), the OAG had standing to bring a proceeding to 

adjudicate parentage because, as the Title IV-D agency, it was affected by 

Mother’s rescission of the acknowledgement of paternity. See Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 160.307(d) (West Supp. 2016) (“Any party affected by the rescission, 

including the Title IV-D agency, may contest the rescission by bringing a 

proceeding under Subchapter G [section 160.601 et seq.] to adjudicate the 

parentage of the child.”). 
4

At trial, Mother and Father both testified that no written contract existed 

memorializing their agreement concerning the artificial insemination. Father 

testified that he and Mother had verbally agreed that he would be involved in

Pamela’s life as her father and would care for her on his days off. Mother 

testified that she and Father had agreed that he would donate sperm only and 

that they would continue to see each other as friends. Mother’s spouse also 

testified. She asked the trial court to find that Father was a sperm donor under 

the family code so that she could adopt Pamela.

The trial court signed an order establishing the parent-child relationship 

between Father and Pamela, found Father to be the biological father of Pamela, 

appointed Father and Mother joint managing conservators, ordered Father to pay 

child support, set a modified possession and access schedule for November and 

December 2015, and ordered a standard visitation schedule beginning January 

1, 2016. Mother then perfected this appeal, raising four issues.

III. BECAUSE FATHER DOES NOT MEET THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF “DONOR,”

HE IS NOT PROHIBITED FROM BEING NAMED AS A PARENT

In her second issue, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion 

by establishing the parent-child relationship between Father and Pamela. Mother 

contends that the trial court violated Texas Family Code section 160.702 by 

naming Father as Pamela’s parent. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.702 

(providing that a “donor” is not a parent of a child conceived by means of 

assisted reproduction). 
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A trial court’s decision in a paternity action or action establishing the 

parent-child relationship is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and will only be 

disturbed when it is clear the court acted in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner, 

without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Stamper v. Knox, 254 

S.W.3d 537, 542 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (citing Worford 

v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 

449, 451 (Tex. 1982)). In family-law cases, the traditional sufficiency standards 

of review overlap with the abuse-of-discretion standard of review; therefore, legal 

and factual insufficiency are not independent grounds of error but are relevant 

factors in our assessment of whether the trial court abused its discretion. 

Neyland v. Raymond, 324 S.W.3d 646, 649 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no 

pet.). To determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion because the 

evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support the trial court’s decision, we 

must determine (1) whether the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to 

exercise its discretion and (2) whether the trial court erred in its application of that 

discretion. Id. The applicable sufficiency review comes into play with regard to 

the first question. Id.

Two statutory provisions are at issue here. Texas Family Code section 

160.702 provides that a donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of 

assisted reproduction. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.702. And section 160.102(6) 

defines “donor” as “an individual who provides . . . sperm to a licensed physician 

to be used for assisted reproduction.” Id. § 160.102(6). 
6

The evidence presented at trial conclusively established that Father did not 

provide his sperm donation to a licensed physician. Because Father did not 

provide sperm to a licensed physician, he does not meet the statutory definition 

of “donor” in section 160.102(6). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.102(6); see 

also C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 524 (Ohio 1994) (rejecting mother’s assertion 

that father could not be named child’s parent when father’s sperm donation was 

not made through a physician). Because Father is not a “donor,” section 160.702 

does not prohibit Father from being named as a parent. See Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 160.702; see also Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal.App.3d at 386, 394

(Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that when no doctor was involved in sperm donation 

or in artificial insemination, sperm was never “provided to a licensed physician”

so donor fell outside statutory nonpaternity provisions). Accordingly, based on 

the evidence presented, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

establishing a parent-child relationship between Father and Pamela. We 

overrule Mother’s second issue.4

 

4Mother’s reliance on H.C.S., in which the San Antonio court held that a 

sperm donor lacked standing to pursue a paternity action, is misplaced. See 219

S.W.3d 33, 36–37 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.). The “donor” pursing 

a paternity action in H.C.S. did provide his sperm donation to a licensed 

physician and hence did meet the statutory definition of “donor”––unlike Father 

here. H.C.S. is therefore not controlling. 
7

IV. MOTHER IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF ON HER REMAINING ISSUES

In her first issue, Mother argues that an error in the prayer at the end of her

answer and her spouse’s plea in intervention (i.e., including names of parties not 

involved in this case) confused the parties and deterred from the facts. We 

broadly construe Mother’s first issue as raising a claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f), 38.9. The doctrine of ineffective 

assistance of counsel does not extend to civil cases in general. See McCoy v. 

Tex. Instruments, Inc., 183 S.W.3d 548, 553 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); 

Green v. Kaposta, 152 S.W.3d 839, 844 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); 

Cherqui v. Westheimer St. Festival Corp., 116 S.W.3d 337, 343 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Although exceptions to this rule exist,

5 no 

exception has been recognized for a suit to determine parentage, and we decline 

to create one. See McCoy, 183 S.W.3d at 548; Green, 152 S.W.3d at 844; 

Cherqui, 116 S.W.3d at 343. Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s first issue.6

In her third and fourth issues, Mother challenges the State’s decision to 

invoke “the Rule” and the trial court’s decision to allegedly shorten the length of 

 

5See In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex. 2003) (holding that statutory 

right to counsel in parental-rights termination cases embodies right to effective 

counsel).

6Moreover, the clerk of this court confirmed with the trial court clerk that the 

specific version of the document Mother complains of was never filed.
8

the trial. Mother, however, did not brief these issues.7 Although we liberally 

construe pro se briefs, litigants who represent themselves are held to the same 

standards as litigants represented by counsel. See Mansfield State Bank v. 

Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978). To hold otherwise would give pro 

se litigants an unfair advantage over litigants with an attorney. Id. The Texas 

Rules of Appellate Procedure require that a brief “contain a clear and concise 

argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and 

to the record.” Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); ERI Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Swinnea,

318 S.W.3d 867, 880 (Tex. 2010) (recognizing that “[t]he Texas Rules of 

Appellate Procedure require adequate briefing”); Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. 

Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 118, 128 (Tex. App.––Houston [1st Dist.] 

2002, pet. denied) (stating that a proper substantive analysis “is not done by 

merely uttering brief conclusory statements, unsupported by legal citations”). 

Because Mother has failed to adequately brief the issues she purports to raise in 

her third and fourth issues, even after being notified multiple times of the 

deficiencies in her appellate brief and being given multiple opportunities to 

correct her deficiencies, we hold that those issues have been waived as 

inadequately briefed. See Magana v. Citibank, N.A., 454 S.W.3d 667, 680–81 

(Tex. App.––Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (deeming issue waived due 

 

7After Mother tendered her initial brief, her first amended brief, and her 

second amended brief for filing with this court, the clerk of our court sent letters 

to Mother notifying her of the deficiencies in each brief and requesting that she 

file an amended brief. The current brief is Mother’s third amended brief. 
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to inadequate briefing); WorldPeace v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 183 

S.W.3d 451, 460 (Tex. App.––Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (holding 

failure of appellant’s brief to offer argument, citations to record, or citations to 

authority waived issue on appeal); Devine v. Dallas Cty., 130 S.W.3d 512, 513–

14 (Tex. App.––Dallas 2004, no pet.) (holding party failing to adequately brief 

complaint waived issue on appeal); see also Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am.

Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284–85 (Tex. 1994) (recognizing long-standing 

rule that error may be waived due to inadequate briefing). We overrule Mother’s 

third and fourth issues.

V. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Mother’s four issues, we affirm the trial court’s order 

establishing the parent-child relationship between Father and Pamela.

/s/ Sue Walker

SUE WALKER

JUSTICE

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and SUDDERTH, JJ.

DELIVERED: October 27, 2016