### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON MA Y 23, 200 7 S es sio n
THOM AS JEFF ERYED GEWOR TH v. STA CYBR AWLE Y E DGE WORT H

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Shelby Cou nty No. CH-03-0826- I Walter L. Evans, Chan cellor

No. W2006-01813-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Augu st 23, 2007

The pa rents, who ha

ve thre e minor sons, wer e divorc ed i n 2 003, and they enter ed an a g ree d pare nting plan where by

the mother was desig nated the primary residential pare nt and the father wa s order ed to pay child support. The fathe r experience d an incr ease in income the followingy ear , and the mother pe titioned the chanc ery court for an incr ease in his child support obli g ation, to which the fathe r ag ree d. I n ear ly

2006, the father lef

t his job for a si milar job with his stepfather a nd brother which provide d him with less income. The fa t h er p et itioned the chanc ery court for a downwa

rd modification of his child support obligation, c iting his de cre ased income. The mother then sent the fathe r a notice of her

intent to relocat e from Memphis t o Fr anklin, Tenne ssee, be cause of an employ ment opportunity . After hear ings, the chanc ery

court de nied the mother’s pe tition for reloc ation. The c hance ry

court instructe d the parties’ attorney s to calculate child support ac cording to the Tenne ssee Child Support Guidelines using income amounts that it had im puted to the mother and father, a

nd without providing a

ny basis as to how it had dete rm i n ed these fig ures. At a later hear ing, the chanc ery

court set a

child support amount in excess of what the par ties had dete rmined
acc ording to t h e T ennessee Child Support Guidelines, which amount was or dere d to include the fathe r’s c ontribution to t he childre n’s private school tuition. The c hance ry court did not include the
c hil d s up po rt

wo rk sh e e ts in its ord e r, no r d id i t pr ov ide wr itt e n f ind ing s su

pp or tin g its de c isi on

to deviate. We r ever se and r emand f or fur ther proc eeding s.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t R e ve r se d and Rem anded

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., and D A V ID G. H AYES , S P .J ., joined.

Mitchell D. Moskovitz , J ason A. Cre ech, Me mphis, TN, for Appe llant

Racha el Emily

Putnam, Kay

Fa rese Turner , Memphis, TN, for A ppellee-2- OP IN ION

I. F ACT S AND P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY This appea l arises fr om the denial of a mother’s pe tition t o reloc ate f rom M emphi s to the Nashville ar ea, a

nd the modification of a fath er ’s m o n thly

child support obligation. St ace y Edg ewor th (“Mother ”) a

n d J ef fr ey Edg ewor th (“F ather ”) w ere divorce d by final dec ree of the Cha nc e ry Court of She lby County e nte re d on J uly 28 , 200 3. Th e pa rt ie s, wh o h a d thre e min or so ns , rea ched a n ag ree ment as to custody of the c hildren as r efle cted in the pe rmane nt pare nting plan incorpora ted by the divorce decr ee. A ccor ding to the pa rentingplan, Mother w as d es i gn ated the children’ s primary

residential pare nt, a

nd Father wa s allowed pa rentingtime ever

y other we ekend from F riday

afte rnoon to Monday morning , ever y Tuesday night to Wednesda

y morning , two wee ks duri ngthe summe r, on e we e k d ur ingwi nte r v a c a tio n, and a lte rn a tin g ho lid ay s. F a the r’ s mo nth ly child su p p o rt was set at $3,450 per month, based upon his monthly income of $12,050 at L ane Fur nitu re

. Mother later

petitioned the cour

t for an inc rea se in child support based upon F ather ’s incre ased inc ome in 2004, and a consent order was e ntere d on October 15, 2004, by

which F ather ag ree d to pay $4,100 per month beg inning September 1, 2004, based upon his monthly income of $14,950 at L ane F urniture.

On J anuar

y 17, 2006, Father pe titioned the chanc ery court in orde r t o modify

the pre vious
o rd er an d d ec re as e h i s ch i l d s u

p p o rt o b l i gat i o nb as edu

p o nwh at h e a l l ege d

t o b e am at er i al ch an ge in circumstanc es re lated to his employ ment. Father stated that he had chang ed jobs “due to force s bey ond his control,” and that his mont hly income wa s now approx i m ately $8,500 at Ashley F ur nit ur e . F a the r r e qu e ste d a mod if ic a tio n of the su

pp or t or de r c on sis te nt w iththe Te nn e sse e Chi ld S u p p o rt Guidelines. Mother responde d to the petition on Fe bruar y 2, 2006, and she sent Father a notice of he r intent to relocate with the childre n to Fra nklin, Tennessee , alleg ing that her e mploy er wa s p ha sin g ou t busi ne ss in Me mph is an d that a hi g he r p ayinge mpl oy me nt o pp or

tun ity e xiste d in the Nashville a

rea . Father re sponded in opposition to M other’s pr oposed re location and f urther petitioned the court for a modification of t he parenting plan and temporary injunctive relief

. Father
c on te nd e d th a t he ha d e xer c ise d a ll p are nti ngtim e wi th t he c hil dr e n a s pr ov ide d by the pla n, a s w e ll as additional time throug h his involvement with the boy s’ extracurr icular a ctivities, to the ex tent that the pa rt ie s w e re sp e nd ing “ su

bs tanti a lly

e qu a l” tim e wi th t

he c hil dr e n. F a the r a

rgue d th a t th e pa

rt ie s’ middle c hild had a medica l condition that was beingtreated at Campbell Clinic in Memphis and that Mother’s r elocation would be detrimental to the child. Father a dditionally reque sted desig nation by the c ourt a s th e c hil dr e n’ s pr ima

ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt. Mo the r re sp on de d that V and e rb ilt Un ive rs ity Medica l Center in Nashville e mploy ed doctors who specia liz ed in the middle child’s condition, and that the re location would there fore h av e n o neg ative impact on the c hild. Mother also counter

petitioned the cour

t for a modific ation of t he parenting plan based upon reloc ation. Mother filed a mot ion t o d i s m i s s F a t h e r ’ s p e t i t i o nt o d e c r e a s e s u p p o rt , a l l e g i n gt h a th e w a s v o l u n t a ri ly undere mploy ed.

On M ay 4, 2006, Fa

ther’s pe tition t o modify the child support awa

rd wa s hear d by

the divorce ref

ere e, who found that Father wa s voluntarily undere mploy ed and dismissed his petition.-3-

On May 9, Father a

ppeale d the re fer ee’ s ruling t o t h e ch an cery court, pursua

nt to Rul e 12 of the L ocal Rules of Chan cer

y . Mother filed a

memorandum of la

w with the cha

ncer y court in support of he r p e tit ion

fo r r e loc a tio n, wh ic h s he su pp ort ed b y a tta c hin g se ve ra l e xhibi ts p ur po rt e dly d e mo n s tr a

ti n g a n e xis ti n g b r o k e r
- s alespe rson contra ct, commission ag ree ment, and sala ry ag ree ment with The Oxford Company , in Fra nklin, Tennessee

. Th e tr ia l c ourt

he ld h e ari ng s on June 19 and 20 , 20 06

. Mo the r te sti fi e d that sh e ha d be e n in the bu sin e ss o f r e a l e state sa le s a s an in de pe nd e nt c on tr a c tor wi th T he Oxf

or d Co mpa

ny in M e mph is for a pproxi mately

twelve y ear s. She pri m ar i l y s o l d homes that wer e new ly constructe d by Riv e rb ir c h H ome s o f M e mph is. She te sti fi e d tha t, i n 2 00 4, Riv e rb ir c h o f M e mph is b e g an to se ll i ts lot s a nd c ur ta il i ts c on st ruc tio n o f n e w h ome s, and sh e of fe re d h e r t a x re tur

ns fr om ye ars 20 03 to 20 05 int o e vid e nc e in s up po rt of he r t e sti mony

that he r i nc ome wa s d

ra sti c a lly re du c e d a s a

re su lt. Reg g ie Gar

ner, Mother ’s b o y fr i en d and the c urre nt co-owne r of The Oxford Company and Riverbirch H omes of Na shville, testified t hat t he buil ding and selling of homes in Memphis had bee n phased out so that the c ompany could foc us on building and se lling Riverbirc h homes in subdivisi ons in the Nashville ar ea, which he de scribed a s “a hot ma rket[.] ” Both Mother

and Mr. Ga

rner testified that Mother had be en off ere d a $70,000 base income sale s position wit h The Oxford Com pa ny /Riv e rb ir c h of

Na sh vil le , a

nd Mo the r o ff

e re d a c on tr a c t in to e vid e nc e de mon str a tin g thi s offe r in support of her

petition to relocate to Fra nklin, Tennesse. Mr

. Gar ner pr ovided compete nt testimony as to Mothe r’s substantial e x pertise at rea l estate sale s, and he state d that, even if his and Mother’s r omantic re lationship did not endure , that he believe d she would continue to w ork for the company

.
Father testified at l e n g th

r eg ardinghis decision to chang e jobs, from L ane F urniture to Ashley Fur niture, in late 2005 a

nd ear ly 2006. Father testified that he beg an wor ki n g as a sale s repr esentative for L ane F urniture in 1993. He stated t hat hi s income increase d steadily from 2000 until 2004. Father testified that in 2004, his stepfathe r had gone into business with Ashley Fur niture, a busi ness with which L ane F urniture c ompeted. F ather testified that by

2005, he had lost seve ral major sales a ccounts, re sulting in dec rea sed income eac h month of that y ear , and that he w as fa ced wi th t he dif fi c ult si tu ati on of

se lli nga g a ins t hi s st e pf

a the r a nd his y oung e r b ro the r, wh o h a d a lso begun workingat Ashley

Fur niture. Father testified that his stepfathe r appr oache d him in S eptember of 2005 to disc uss the prospec t of Father working for Ashley Fur niture for les s m o n ey

. Upon qu e sti on ingby

c ouns e l, F a the r s tate d h is r e a so ns fo r u lti mate ly de c idi ngto l e a ve L ane F ur nit ur e to
wo rk fo r A sh le y

F ur nit ur e in Janu ary

of 20 06 : Q. I n light of the decr ease in income y ou wer e making at L ane Fur n i t u re , was the de cre ase that y ou wer e g oing to suff er g oin g to w or

k f or y our s te pf

a the r g oin g to b e sig nif

ic ant? A. No . I t wa sn ’t g oin g to be sig nif ic ant a ft e r a ll o f my

e xpe ns e s. Imean, I wa s a statutory

employ ee. So my

expenses taking people to lunch, tra

velin g an d all of that and ma rket [attendance ] i s [s ic] very

costly

. . . An d wi th a salar ied job with my fathe r, I knew e x actly

what I was g oing to be-4- making

. I t w a s ju s t s ta

b il it y f o r me

. Iw a s ti r e d

o f li v ing month to mont h with unstable income. At the conc lusion of this hearing , the trial cour t stated its f

in d in g s r e g ardingMother’s pe tition to relocate and F ather ’s appe al of the divorc e re fer ee’ s ruling on c hild support modification:

I n this particular case, we have Edg ewor th versus Edg ewor

th, the petition by

Mrs. Edg ewor

th to relocate t o Nashville base d on an incre ased financial opportunity with the Oxford [ C] ompany and the Riverbirch Homes of Nashville which is in the process of deve loping these two or thr ee ne w subdivisions in which they are building homes in excess of $450,000. An d M r. Re g g ie Ga

rd ne r [s ic ] is o ne of

the ow ne rs of

tho se companies a long w ith Mr. Kevin Hine, and they have ag ree d to pay Mrs. Edg ewor

th a g u ar anteed drawof $70,000 a year ag ainst the commissions t h at she would ea rn for her e ffor

ts in selling the proper ties throug h the Oxford [C ]om pany . Every body seems to fe el that her e x pecte d income would be well in e x cess of the $70,000, and
s h e would be ve ry

appre ciative of

the incre ased inc ome which
ever y body anticipates tha

t she would rec eive. The only – there is no other leg itimate or persua sive rea son for the re loc a tio n e xce pt t

he mon e tary

be ne fi ts t hat Ms. Ed g e wo rt

h f e e ls that she would re ceive

. And things do happen. I t is possible that the relationship between Mrs. Edg ewor th a nd Mr. Reg g ie Gar dner [sic] may rema in the same. I t may g et better . I t may

g et worse . But Mr. Ga rd ne r [f e e ls] th a t no tw ith sta

nd ingthe rel a tio ns hip be tw e e n M rs

. Edg ewor th and himself that beca

use of her expertise, her e x perie nce, he r p e rs ua siv e re c or d o f p ro du c ingre su lts , th a t sh e wo uld
never theless still earn substantial monies by the re location. On the other

hand, Mr. Edg ewor

th fee ls that to deny

– that
su c h a mov e wi th the se c hil dr e n wou ld de ny him the op po rt

un ity to bo nd wi th t he se c hil dr en as he has don e in t he pa st a nd int e nd s to continue in the future

. Th e re is no qu estionin t he Court ’s min d th a t bo th o f t he se pa re nts lov e the se c hil dr e n a nd wa nt t o d o w hat is in t

he be st i nte re st of the c hildren. And the Court in looking at all t h e p ro o f and
e vid e nc e fe e ls that if

the se c hil dr e n a

re re loc a te d to Na sh vil le tha t it would provide a

very serious disru p tion in their present state of aff air s w h e r e th e y

h a v e b e c o me f

a mi li ar w it h th e M e mp h is [an d] Shelby County are a, where they

have a number of suppor

t persons here , g randpa

rents and r elatives, a

nd wher e they are doing e x cellent work in school. Th e y have c la ssm a te s and

fr ie nd s th a t the y

have be c ome fa mil iar w ith , a

nd the C ourt

is o f t he op ini on

that to re loc a te the se-5- children to Na shville at this ti me would be too disruptive for the Court to a pp ro ve su c h a

re loc a tio n. Th a t do e s n ot m e an that – M rs

. Edg ewor th, if she choose s to, can move where ver she so desires, but it appear s as t houg h based on he r attorne y ’s statement that she ha s no intentions of leaving these children her e and she being a primar y resident – or

living somewhe re e lse. So, in a nutshell, what t h e C ourt is goingto do is deny the pe tit ion of Mr s. Ed g e wo rt

h to re loc a te to N a sh vil le wi th the se c hildren

. Th e Court

wi ll a lso de ny

Mr . E dg e wo rt

h’ s p e tit ion

to
c ha ng e the pa

re nti ng– th e a llo c a tio n o f p are nti ngtim e a s se t f or th i n the orig inal perma

nent parenting plan and would r einstate that a s the
a pp ro pr iate arr ang e me nt t

hat sh ou ld c on tin

ue to e xist b e tw e e n th e se parties whe re Mr s. Edg ewor th stil l retains the desig nation of primar y residential c ustodial parent. Reg ardingthe appe al from the r efe ree ’s ruling , the Court is of the opinion that wh en Mr. Edge worth did leave the L ane F urniture Com pa ny , a s th e re fe ree de te rm ine d, he vo lun tari ly be c a me un deremp loye d. B ut t he Court

do e s n ot f

ind that hi s un d e r e mp l o y

m e n tw a s d

u e t o t h e r e a s o no f

t r yi n g t o a v o i d

h is obligation under the – to support his children , b ut for re asons of
wa nti ngto p ro vid e su

pp or t to his ste pf

a the r or to h is f a the r a nd his family members in the de velopment of their Ashley Fur niture Store operat i o n s

. But ne verthe less, it was a voluntary undere mploy

ment decision by

him. But what the ref

ere e did not do is consider the f act that Mr. Ed g e w o rt h ’ s i n c o m e h a s b e e n r e d u c e d f r o m w h a t i t w a s i n 19 – in 2 0 0 4

. A n d

f o r p u r p o s e s o f c o mp u t i n g t h e n e w i n c o m e – I’ m s o r r y, the ne w c hil d s up po rt , th e Cou rt wi ll a llo w a

mod if ic a tio n o f h is c hil d
s u p p o rto b l i g a t i o nb a s e d

o n t h e c u r r e n tg u i d e l i n e s w h i c h t h e a t t o r n e ys will compute. And for pur poses of de termining the child support, the Court is recommendingan income f igur e of $156,000 for Mr. Edg ewor th and $60,000 for Mr s. Edg ewor th. And on the issue of the exact amount of child support and the
matte r i nv olv ingpr ivate sc ho ol t uit ion , th a t w ill be re se rv e d unti l July the 5th afte r the attorney s have put their f igur es tog ether

and ca me up [si c] w it h a c o mp u tati o n a s to h o w mu c h th e c h il d s u p p o rt w il l be. Now, the Court has indicated that a figure somewhere in the neig hborhood of $3,434 .50 [si c], which was the or igina l amount of
c hil d s up po rt , s ho uld

be the a pp ro xima te ra

ng e that the ult imate c hil d support should be if it is deter mined based on the curr ent g uidelines that the amount will be less. And in that ca se, t here should be or could be an upw ard de viation in the amount of child support that Mr. Edg ewor th would be pay

ing f rom whate ver the g uideline fig ure is.-6-

The Court prese nted its ruling in a n order enter ed Aug ust 1, 2006. Father’s suppor t amount was set
a t $3 ,4 50 pe r mon th pe nd ing the c ourt ’s fi na l de te rm inatio n. Mo the r f ile d a no tic e of a pp e a l of thi s order

. Another hear ing was held on Aug ust 14, at which the c hance ry court orde red that Fathe r’s
mo n t h l y s u p port obligation was to be set at $3,450, whic h was to include “ any amount of contribution [by Father] towards the [children’s] private sc hool tuiti on.” This ruling was e ntere d by
or de r on S ept e mbe r 1 5, 20 06 , a nd F a the r’ s su

pp or t of $3 ,4 50 pe r m on th w a s ma de re tr oa c tiv e to J anuar y o f 2 0 0 6

. Mother ame nded her previous notice of

appea l to encompass this ruling, a nd Father a lso filed a notice of appe al. Father a lso filed a motion to alter or amend judg ment in which he re qu e ste d a

mod if ic a tio n o f t

he pa re nti ngpla

n to g ra nt h im j oin t de c isi on makin g a uth or ity a s to educational decisions reg ardingthe childre n. After hear ing F athe r’ s motion, the court enter ed an order on September 26, 2006, r equiring M o t h er t o consult with Fathe r re g ardingeducational decisions, and in the e vent of a dispute, that the parties be require d to se ek mediation for a chieving resolution of that issue.

II. I SSU ES P R ESENTED
Th e iss ue s p re se nte d to thi s Co ur t on a pp e a l are a s f

oll ow s:
1. Whether the trial c ourt err ed by denying Mothe r’s pe tition for relocation. 2. Whether the trial court err ed in its modification of Father’s monthly child support obligation from $4100 to $3450. 3. Whether Mother is entitled to an awa rd of rea sonable attorney s’ fee s incurre d as a re sult of this appeal.

For the followin g re as o n s , we r ever se the judg ment of the c hance ry court a nd rema nd for f urther proce eding s.

III
. S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW On appe al, a tria l court’s fa ctual findings are presumed to be correc t, and we will not overturn those fac tual findi n gs u n less the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst them. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) (2 00 6) ; B ogan v. Bogan , 6 0 S

. W

. 3 d 7 2 1 , 7 2 7 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 1 )

. F o r t h e e v i d e n c e t o p r e p o n d e ra te ag ainst a trial court’s finding of fac t, it must support another finding of fa ct with g reater c onvincing eff ect. Watson v. Watson , 1 9 6 S

. W

. 3 d 6 9 5 , 7 0 1 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Walker v. Sidney Gi lre ath & As so cs. , 4 0 S

. W

. 3 d 6 6 , 7 1 ( T e n n

. C t

. A p p

. 20 00 ); Th e Re alty Shop , I nc . v . R. R. Westm inst

er Holding, In c. , 7 S.W .3d 581, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)). We revie w a tria l court’s conclusi o n s of law unde r a de novo sta nd ard up on the re c or d w ithno pr e sumpt ion of c or re c tne ss. Union C arbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 8 5 4 S

. W

. 2 d 8 7 , 9 1 (T en n

. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Estate of Adkin s v. Whit e Consol. In dus., In c. , 788 S.W .2d 815, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989))

.-7-

The we ight, f

aith and cr edit to be given to any witness’s t estimony lies in the first instance with the trier of

fac t. Koch v. Koch , 87 4 S. W.2 d 5 71 , 5 77 (T e nn . Ct . App . 1 99 3) . T he c re dib ili ty
acc orded w ill be gi v en g reat weig ht by the appe llate cour

t. Id. (c i t i n g Town of Alam o v. Forcum -Jam es Co. , 2 0 5 T e n n

. 4 7 8 , 3 2 7 S

. W

. 2 d 4 7 (1 95 9) ; S i sk v. V alley Forge Ins. Co. , 640 S.W .2d 844 (Tenn.A

pp.1982)).

IV. D I S CUS S I ON

A. M oth e r’ s P e tit ion to R e loc ate

I n 1998, the Tenne ssee leg islature ena cted the pare ntal reloc ation statute, Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 36- 6-108, which se ts out the frame work for courts to deter

mine whether

to permit the primary residential pa

rent to re locate w ith the child, or children, outside Te nnessee or more tha n 100 miles away

inside Tennesse e. See Rog e rs v . Ro ge rs , No. W2006-00858-COA-R3-CV, 2007 Te nn. Ap p. L EX I S 40 7, a t *1 6 ( Te nn . Ct . App . July 3, 20 07 ). Th e fi rst is su e th at we mus t de c ide is whether the t rial cour

t committed error

in denying Mothe r’s pe tition t o reloc ate with the thre e minor children to the N ashville, Tenne ssee a rea base d u p o n t he statutory fac tors set forth at Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 6- 6- 10 8( c ) a

nd (d ). Th e se su

bs e c tio ns pr ov ide in p art : (c) If thepa re nts ar e ac tua lly

sp e nd ing su bs tan tia lly

e qu al i nte rv als of time with the child and the reloc ating pare nt se eks to move with the child, the other p ar ent m ay , within thirty (30) da y s of re ceipt and
n o t ice, f ile a petition in oppositi on to removal of the child. No presumption in favor of or against the reque

st to r el ocate with the
c hil d s ha ll aris e

. The c ou rt sha ll de te rm ine whe the r o r n ot to p e rm it relocation of the child based upon the best interests of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including the followi ng where applicable: (1) The extent to which visi tation rig hts have be en allowe d and exerc ised; (2) W h et h er the primary

residential pa

rent, onc e out of the jur isd ic tio n, is l ike ly

to c omp ly

wi th a ny ne w vis itatio n a

rr ang e me nt; (3) The love, a ff

ec t i o nan d em o t i o n al t i es ex i s t i n g b et we en t he pa re nts and c hil d; (4 ) T he dis po sit ion

of the pa re nts to p ro vid e the c hil d w ith food, clothing , medical car e, education and other ne cessa ry car e and the de g re e to whic h a

pa re nt h a s b e e n th e pr ima

ry c are g ive r; (5) The importance o f continui ty in the child’s life a

nd the leng th of time th e ch i l d has lived in a stable, satisfactory
e nv ir on me nt; (6 ) T he sta

bil ity of the fa mil y un it o f t he pa re nts ; (7 ) T he me nta l and

ph y sic a l he a lth

of the pa re nts ; (8 ) T he ho me , s c ho ol a

nd c omm un ity re c or d o f t

he c hil d;T h e s t at u t e f u r t h er pr ov i des t h at “ [ i ] f t h e cou r t f

i n ds on e ( 1) or mor e of t h e g r ou n ds de s i g n at ed i n s u bs ec t i on 1 (d ), the c o u rt sh a ll d e te rm ine w h e the r o r n o t t o p e rm it re lo c a tio n o f t h e c h ild b a se d o n the b e st inte re st o f t h e c h ild .” T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 6 -6 -1 0 8 (e ) (2 0 0 5 ).
-8-

(9)( A) The rea sonable pre fer ence of t h e child if twelve (12) y e ars of a g e or old e r; (B ) The c ourt may

hear the pre fer ence of a young er c hild upon reque st. The pre fer ence s of older c hildren should normally be g iven g reater we ight than those of the young er c hildren; (1 0) Ev ide nc e of

ph y sic a l or e mot ion a l a

bu se to t he c hil d, to the other pa

rent or to a

ny other pe rson; and (11) The char acte r and be h av i or of a ny other pe rson who resides in or f

reque nts the home of a pa rent a nd such per son’s interac tions with t he child. (d)( 1) If the parents are not actually spe nd ing substanti ally equal intervals of time with t he child and the pa rent s pending the g reater amount of time with the child proposes to reloc ate with the c hild, the other pa rent may , within thirty (30) day s of re ceipt and notice , file a petition in opposition to remova l of the child. The othe r par ent may
no t atte mpt

to re loc a te wi th the c hil d unle ss e xpre ssl y a uth or ize d to do so by the cour t pursuant to a cha

ng e of c ustody

or primary custodial responsibility

. The parent spending the greater am ount of tim e with the c hil

d sha ll be pe rm itt e d to rel oc atewith thec hil d u nle ss the court finds: 1 (A) T he re location does not have a re asonable purpose; (B ) The r elocation would pose a threat of specif ic and se rious harm to the c hild that outweighs the threat of harm to t h e ch ild of a chang e in custody ; or (C ) T he pa

re nt’ s mo tiv e fo r r e loc a tin g wi th t he c hil d is vindicti v e in

th a t i t i s in te n d e d

to d e f e a t o r d e te r v is it a ti o nr ig h ts of the n o n
- c u s to d ia l p ar e n t o r th e p ar e n t s p e n d in g le s s ti me w it h the child.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-108(c )–(d) (1) ( 2005) (e mphasis added) . The statute c lear ly indicates that differ ent fa ctors ar e to be a pplied by the trial cour

t in i t s co nsideration of a petition to relocate , de pe nd ing up on wh e the r “ the pa re nts are a c tua lly sp e nd ingsu bs tanti a lly

e qu a l in te rv a ls o f t ime wi th the c h il d [r e n

. ]” A s expl ained by this Court i n Conn e ll v

. Co nne ll , No. 03A01-9808- CV-00282, 2000 WL 122204, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. J an. 25, 2000):

I n c a se s o f p are nts wh o s pe nd su bs tan tia lly

e qu a l ti me wi th t

he ir
c hil dr e n, a c ourt sim

ply a pp lie s the fa

mil iar b e st i nte re st a

na ly sis to deter mine whether

a par ent may

remove the child. I f the time spent-9- is not subst antially

equal, one of the followingmust be est ablished befo re a cour

t eng ag es in a be st interest ana ly sis: (1) there is no
rea sonable purpose for the reloc ation; ( 2) the reloc ation poses a thre at of spec if i c, s erious har

m to the child; or (3) the pa rent’s motive for the reloc ation is vindictive, as that conce pt is define d in the s t at ute. I f no ne of the g ro un ds is f ound , th e c us tod ia l pa

re nt i s p e rm itt e d to move with the childre n.

I n Pl acenc ia v . P lac e nc ia , 48 S.W .3d 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), the second a ppeal of a custody case , this Court was fac ed with a tria l court’s re fusal to hold an eviden t i ar y hear ing on a
m o t h e r ’ s a l l e g a t i o no f

a c h an g e i nc i r c u m s t an c e s s u p p o rt i n g h e r

p e t i t i o nf

o r c h an g e o f

c u s t o dy, which she had filed in opposition to a fathe r’s petition to reloc ate with the minor child. The father argued that on the pr evious appe al of the c ase, r eg ardingthe iss u e o f chang ed cir cumstance s, that “both [t he trial and appellate ] cour ts a ddresse d the reloc ation by implication in addressing the issue of custo d y .” Id. at 735. We disag ree d, stating that “the issues involved in allowing a custodial pare nt to relocate with a ch i l d ar e too important to leave to ‘implication.’” Id. I n th e ma jor ity opinion, J udg e Craw ford r ecog nized that the mother held a r ight to be he ard on the issue of whe ther reloc ation wa s ap p ro p ri at e. Id. at 734. The ma jority opinion applied Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6- 108(d), g overningsituat i ons in which the par ents are not spending substantially equal amounts of time with the children, to the fa cts of the c ase. Id. at 735. We rec og nized that, in suc h a ca se, the pa re nt s pe nd ingthe g re a te r a mou nt o f t ime wi th t

he c hil d s ha ll b e pe rm itt e d to re loc a te wi th the c hil d
un le ss t he c ourt fi nd s th a t th e re loc a tio n d oe s no t have a re a so na ble purp os e , th e re loc a tio n w ou ld po se a thr eat of sp eci fi c and

se ri ou s h arm

to t he c hil d, or

the pa re nt’ s mo tiv e fo r r e loc a tin g is vindictive. Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108( d) (Supp. 2000)). Although we ha d deter mined in the first appe al t hat t he father’ s motive for relocation was not vindictive, in the second a ppeal we
n o t edt h at t h e o t h er

t wo fa ct o rs we re n ev er

ex p l i ci t l y

ad dre s s edb y

t h e t ri al co u rt , s t at i n g:
T.C.A. § 36-6-108( d) does not appe ar to re quire spec ific finding s as to the t hree elements li sted above, and we ha ve found no Te nnessee case which dire ctly

addre sses whethe r such f indings a re require d. Howeve r, g iven the funda mental nature of the int ere sts involved, we hold that the trial court r uling should have at least a ddres s ed the iss ue s of ‘r e a so na

ble purp os e ’ and ‘s pe c if

ic and se ri ou s h arm ’ i n it s opinion in thi s matter.

Id. at 735-36. We vac ated the or der of the trial cour

t and re manded f

or a he aringon the issue of reloc ation. Id. at 736.

I n Plac e nc ia , J udg e Kirby filed a separ ate concur ring opinion in which she noted that it was
un c le ar f ro m the re c or d wh e the r the tr ia l c ourt ’s he ari ngon re loc a tio n w ou ld h a ve be e n p ur su ant t o T.C.A. § 36-6-108( d), whe re the pare nts are not spe nding substantially equal pa rentingtime, or § 36- 6-108(c ), which g overns a situation wher e the pare nts are spending substantially equal inter

vals of time with the child. Id. at 736-37. She e x plained that throug hout the proce eding s of the ca se, the-10-

pa re nt w i t h w h o m t h e c h i l d p r i m ar i l y r e s i d e d h a d c h an g e d m o r e t h an o n c e , an d t h a t u n d e r t ho se circ umstances, it was unc lear which subsec tion of § 36-6-108 a pplied. Id. at 737. J udg e Kirby stated, “[t] here fore , on rema nd, the trial cour

t must m ake a fac tual deter mination of whether

[t he child] has been re siding primar ily with Fathe r duringthe per tinent time period (undef ined in the statute), or w hether

[t he child] has actua lly spent substantially equal tim e with both pare nts.” Id.

I n C o l l i n s v. Goode , N o. M2 00 2- 02 55 7- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 4 WL 90 40 97 , at *3 (T e nn . Ct

. App. Apr. 2 7 , 2004), the Middle Section of this Court noted that “[t] he cour ts have not provided br ig ht- lin e ru le s f

or de te rm ini ngwh e the r p are nts are sp e nd ing“ su bs tanti a lly

e qu a l” c us tod ia l ti me with the ir children.” We pe rce ived no need to a dopt suc h a “brig ht-line rule

. . . b ec au s e c u s tody decisions, by their very

nature , are inhere ntly

fac t-depe ndent.” Id. Howeve r, we expressed t hat trial courts should ba se this de termination on fac tors such as ( 1) the ter ms of the applica

ble custody

and visitation o rd er s , (2) the numbe r of da y s eac h pare nt has ac tually spent with the child or childre n, (3 ) whe the r t

he pa re nts are us ingthe fu ll a mou nt of re sid e nti a l tim e pr ov ide d th e m, ( 4) the le ng th of the pe riod during which the compar ison of residential time is beingmade, a nd (5) the pa

rticular
ex i gen cies of the pare nt’s circ umstances. Id. T h is Co u rt r e c o g n iz e d th e d if f ic u lt y in r e c o n c iling prior decisions construing “substantially equal” as used in the statutory provision. Id. at n. 8 ( citing, e.g. , Branh am v. Branham , N o. E2 00 3- 01 25 3- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 4 WL 71 67 29 , at *3 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. Ap r. 2, 20 04 ); Conn e ll v . Co nne ll , No. E1998-00731-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 122204, at *3-4 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. Jan. 25 , 20 00 ) (f ind ing that a 60 %- 40 % sp lit of c us tod ia l ti me wa s n ot s ub sta nti a lly
e qu a l) ; Monroe v. Robinson , N o. M2 00 1- 02 21 8- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 3 WL 13 24 63 , a t *4 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. Jan. 16 , 2 00 3) (f

ind ingtha t a 57 %- 43 % s pli t w a s su

bs tanti a lly

e qu a l) ; Woolm an v. Woolm an , No. M2000-02346-COA- R3-CV, 2001 WL 1660714, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2001) (finding that a 65%- 35% split was substantially equal)

.
I n Kaw atra v

. Ka wat ra , 182 S.W .3d 800 (Tenn. 2005) , the Tennessee Supre me Court construed the meaningof “substantially equal” as used by

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-108(c ) and ( d). The Court noted that “[t] he statute re quires the tria l court to deter mine whether

the par ents are ‘ac tually spending substantially equal intervals of t ime with the child.’” Id. at 802. The Court we nt on to state:

To deter mine the num ber of day s to cre dit to eac h pare nt for purposes of T ennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 36-6-108(c ) and ( d), the trial cour

t should first ex amine the pr ovisio n s o f the re sidential schedule

. The trial court should the n consider additional t i m e e ach pare nt spent with the child that is not r eflected in the re sidential schedule . I f either

pare nt viola t ed t h e terms of the r esidential schedule by interfe ring with the other pa rent’s time with the c hild, the tr ia l c ourt sh ou ld make any ne c e ssa ry a dju stm e nts to re fl e c t th e tim e that the child should have be en in th e ca re of the other pa

rent. To allocate a day

to o ne par ent when both pa rents cla im credit for

that da y , the tr ia l c ou

rt sh ou ld e xami ne 1) the ho ur s e a c h p are nt a c tua lly spent with the child on that day ; 2) the activiti es i n which each pa rentT hi s i ss ue was dis p ut ed at t he heari ng. M o t her, t he p ri m ary res i d ent i al pa rent unde r t he p arent i ng plan, 2

t es t i f i ed t hat , i n h er opi ni on, s he and Fat her di d n ot s pend a s ubs t ant i al l y equal amo un t of t i me wi t h t he chi l dren

. Fat her

c la im e d tha t he e x e rc ise d 1 4 5 d a ys o f p a re n ting ti m e w ith the c h ild re n in 2 0 0 5 , as p ro v id e d b y the re sid e n tial sc h e d u le i n t he p arent i ng p l an, b ut that , c o nsi d eri ng the ad d i t i o nal ti m e he spent wi t h t he chi l d ren wi t h t hei r s p o rt i ng event s and

o the r e x tra c u rr ic u la r a c tivities, h e b e liev e d tha t he a n d M o the r we re sp e n d ing su b sta n tially e q u a l a m o u n ts o f t im e w ith the c h ild re n

. -11-

eng ag ed with the child; 3) the re source s the pare nt expended on the child’s behal f d uring that time period, including the costs of a meal or any other c osts directly related t o that pare nt’s car e and supe rvision of the c hil d; a

nd 4) any oth e r f a c tor that th e tr ia l cou

rt de e ms r e le va

nt. (footnotes omitted) Af te r c omp uti ngthe numbe r o f d ay s a llo c a te d to e a c h p are nt, the tr ia l c ourt

mus t de te rm ine the numbe r of mo nth s to us e in compar ing the time that eac h pare nt spent with the child. The use of a sho rt co m putation period may exagg erate the diffe renc e in the
a mo u n t o f t i m e t h a t e a c h p ar e n t i s s p e n d i n g w i t h t h e c h i l d

. We there fore conclude that, when circ umstances pe rmit, the comparison pe ri od shou ld b e the tw e lve c on se c uti ve mon ths imm e diate ly p re ce d i n g t h e r el o ca t i o nh ea ri n g.
Id. at 803-04. I n this case, the tr ial court ne ver indicated its finding a s to whether or not the minor children
wer e “a ctually

spending a substantially

equal amount of time” with Mother and Father. I t is unclear 2 both from the tec hnical re cord a nd the transc ript of the hea ring s held o n J u n e 1 9 and 20, 2006, whether the dec ision to deny Mother’s petition for relocation was based upon an application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 108(c) , or subsec tion (d). Fur thermore , rathe r than a

pply the statutory

fac tors set forth in either

of these subse ctions, the trial cour t based its decision to deny Moth er ’s p et i t ion for
re loc a tio n o n it s f

ind ingthat th e re loc a tio n w ou ld b e “ dis ru pti ve ” to t

he bo y s’ c ur

re nt li ves in Memphis. We believe that a r emand is re quired so that the tria l court may hold additional proce eding s, if nece ssary , in or der to determine the threshold issue of whe ther Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108( c) or

(d) a pplies, and to rec onsider Mother’s petition based upon the a pplicable f

actor s provided ther ein. Ther efor e, we reve rse the tr ial court’s de nial of Mother’ s petition to reloc ate, a nd
rema nd to the chanc ery

court for this purpose.

B. Modification of Father’s Chi ld Su pport Obligati on Both pa rties alleg e er

ror with the tria l court’s modification of Father’s pr evious child support obligation of $4100 per month to $345 0 p er month. Mother argues that the trial c ourt err ed by g ra nti ngF a the r’ s pet iti on to re du c e c hil d sup po rt

. She c on te nd s tha t f ir st, the c ourt

fa ile d to a

pp ly the Tenne ssee Child Support Guidelines in making its decision. Second, she a rg ues that the c ourt-12-

err ed by m o d i fy i ng the support amount wher e no “sig nificant va rianc e” e x isted as to Father’s income. S he submits that the amount of income the tria l court imputed to Father in modifying the
c hil d s up po rt , $ 15 6, 00 0, is n ot s up po rt e d b y the e vid e nc e , a

nd that the tr ia l c ourt

pr ov ide d n o b a sis for its c alculations in this reg ard. Mother also argues, base d upon the same c onsiderations, that the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d b y imp uti ng$6 0, 00 0 o f i nc ome to M oth e r fo r i ts c a lc ulatio n o f c hil d s up po rt

. Finally , Mother conte nds t h at t h e court erre d by not applying the “har dship provision” of the Tenne ssee Child Support Guidelines in this case.

F a the r s imi larl y

take s is su e wi th a sp e c ts o f t he tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g on

the mod if ic a tio n o f c hil d support. Father submits that the court cor rec tly found t hat he was entitled to a modification of the
su pp or t amou nt b a se d u

po n a sig nif ic ant v ari anc e in h is i nc ome , f ro m th e perio d in whi ch he la st worke d at L ane F urniture in 2005 to the time when he beg an working with his stepfather at Ashley Fur niture in 2006. He contends that the cour t corre ctly

imputed income to Mother base d upon an
aver ag e of he r income f

rom 2003 to 2005

. C i t i n g t h e par ties’ mutual desire that the children conti nue attendingprivate sc hool, Fathe r ar g ues that an upw ard de viation from the amount of
su pp or t du e un de r t

he Te nn e sse e Chi ld S up po rt Gu ide lin e s w a s a

pp ro pr iate , h ow e ve r, he su bmi ts that the trial court err ed by not making specific written finding s reg ardingsuch deviations from the
a mou nt o f s up po rt

du e purs ua

nt t o th e g uid e lin e s. The pa rties do not dispute that the modification of c hild support at issue is gove rned by the

“ inc ome sh are s” mod e l of the Te nn e sse e Chi ld S up po rt Gu ide lin e s ( “ the Gu ide lin e s” ), a me ndme nts to which most rece ntly

took effe ct on J une 26, 2006. The Guidelines provide: (1 ) R e qu ir e d F or

ms. (a ) T he se ru le s con ta in a C hil d Su pp or t Wor ks he e t, a Cr e dit Worksheet, Instructions for both Worksheets, and the Child Support Schedule whic h shall be re quired to implement the ch i ld support order deter mination. (b) The u s e o f

th e Workshe ets promulg ated by the Depa rtment is m and a tor

y in o rd e r to e ns ur e un if

or mity in the c a lc ulatio n o f c hil d support awa

rds pursuant to the r

ules.

. . . (e) The completed Worksheets must be maintained as pa rt of the offic ial rec ord either

by filing th em as exhibit s in the tribunal’s file or a s attachme nts to the order. (f) Any child support obl i gat i on deter mined by

the calc ulations made using the Departm ent Worksheets shall also be ref lected in the tr ibunal’s orde r, tog ether with a d es cr i p tion of any additional expenses the par ent i s to pay as par t of the child’s support
as we ll as any

deviations from the pr esumptive child support order

.See al s o T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 5

- 1 0 1 (e)( 1 )( A ) ( 2 0 0 5 ), pro vi d i ng: 3

I n ma k i n g t h e cou r t ’ s de t er mi n at i on con ce r n i n g t h e amou n t of s u ppor t of a n y mi n or chi l d or chi l d ren o f

t he p art i es, t he co urt s hal l ap p l y , as a rebutt ab l e p res um p t i o n, t h e ch i l d s u ppor t g u i del i n es , a s pr ov i ded i n t hi s subse ct i on ( e)

. I f t h e cou r t f

i n ds t hat ev i dence i s su f

f i ci ent t o re but t hi s pre s umpt i on, t he cour t s hal l make a wr i t t en f i n di n g t h at t h e appl i ca t i on of t h e ch i l d s u ppor t g u i del i n es w ou l d be u n j u s t or i nap p rop ri at e i n t hat pa rt i cul ar case, i n o rder t o pro vi d e f o r t he b est i nt erest of t he ch i l d o r ch i l dr en , or t h e equ i t y be t we en t h e par t i es

. Fi n di n g s t h at t h e appl i ca t i on
o f the gui d el i nes wo ul d b e unjus t or i nap p rop ri at e shal l s t at e t he am o unt of supp o rt t h at w ou l d h av e bee n or der ed u n der t h e ch i l d s u ppor t g u i del i n es an d a j u s t i f i ca t i on fo r th e va ria n c e fro m the gu id e line s.

-13- Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.04 ( 2006). 3

Under the Guidelines, in orde r for a child support orde r to be e ligible f or m o d i fi ca t ion, a signific ant var iance must exis t. Tenn. Com p. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4- .05(2)( a) ( 2006). The guidelines provide seve ral a lternative de finitions for “sig nificant va rianc e.” T he def

inition of “signific ant varia nce” applicable in this case, since the Octobe r 2004 orde r incre asing child support to $4100 per
mon th w a s c a lc ulate d und e r t he fl a t pe rc e nta g e g uid e lin e s, is “ [a]t l e a st a fi ft e e n ( 15 %) c ha

ng e in the gross i ncome of the [ alternative residential parent]

. . . .” See Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4- .05(2)( b) (2006) . I f a child support modification is justified, the tribunal is dire cted to increa se or decr ease the support orde r as a ppropriate in acc ordanc e with the Guidelines. Te nn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.05( 5). Calculation under the Guidelines i s to be per formed by completing the
wo rk sh e e ts p ro vid e d b y

the Te nn e sse e De pa

rtme nt o f H uma

n Se rv ic e s: The Child Support W orkshee t and Credit Worksheet provide d by the De pa rtme nt a re mand a tor

y fo r u se in c a lc ulatin g the a pp ro pr iate c hil d support obligatio n under the se Guidelines. The completed Worksheet(s) must be maintained as part of the officia l rec ord either by filing them as exhibi ts in the tribunal’s file or as attac hments to the order

.
Te nn . Co mp. R. & Re gs. 12 40 -2 -4 -. 08 (1 )( a ) ( 20 06 ); see also Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4- .04(1)( b) (2006) (“The use of the Workshee ts pr omulga ted by the Depa

rtment is mandatory

in order to ensure unif

ormity in the calc ulation of child support awa rds pursuant to the r

ules.”).
Reg ardingdeviations from the pr esumptive child support, the Guidelines pr ovide: (1 ) C on sid e ratio n of the C hil d’ s B e st Inte re sts ; Wr itt e n F ind ing s to Support the Deviation. (a) The amounts of support establis h ed by these Guide lines
are rebuttable

.-14- (b) Th e tribunal may

order as a de viation an amount of support differ ent from the a mount o f t h e presumptive child support
or de r if the de viatio n c omp lie s wi th the re qu ir e me nts of th is para g raph ( 1) and w ith this chapte r. The amount or method of such deviation is within the discretion of the tribuna l provided, howe ver, the tribunal must state in its orde r the ba sis for the deviation and the amount the child support orde r would have been w ith out the deviation. In deviating from the Guide li n es, primar y consideration must be g iven t o the best intere st of the child for whom support under these Guide lines is being de termined.

One ba sis for deviation fr om the g uidelines may be when extraordinary educational expenses, which may include tuition and other e x penses a ssociated with private schooling , are involved. See Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.07( 2) (2006) . I n such a c ase, the se expen s es m ay be adde d to the pr e sumpt ive c hil d s up po rt a s a de viatio n, and the Gu ide lin e s re qu ir e that a mon thl y a ve ra g e of

the se expenses be base d on evidenc e of pr ior or anticipated expenses and ente red in the w orkshee ts in the deviation sec tion. Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.07( 2)(d) (1)( i)–(iii).

I n the Octobe r 2004 order , Father’s g ross income was de termined to be $14,950 pe r month, and his c hild support obligation wa s incre ased from $3450 per month to $4100 per month. Father
so ug ht mod if

ic a tio n of thi s o rd e r a ft e r c ha ng ingjob s, fr om L ane F ur nit ur e to A sh le y

F ur nit ur e , in J anuar y of 2006. F ather ’s income tax return f rom 2005, the last y ear in which he wor ked for L ane F ur nit ur e , refle c te d a

g ro ss i nc ome of

$1 53 ,9 19 , o r $ 12 ,8 26 pe r m on th. F a the r s ub mitte d th a t hi s g ross monthly

income at Ashle y

Fur niture, whe re he beg an wor king in January

of 2006, wa s approximately

$8500 per month. As to Father’s chang ing jobs, and his motivations for doing so, the tr ia l c ourt fo un d:
Reg ardingthe appe al from the r efe ree ’s ruling , the Court i s of the opinion that when Mr. Edg ewor th did leav e the L ane F urniture Com pa ny , a s th e refer e e de te rm ine d, he vo lun tari ly be c a me un de re mpl oy e d. B ut t he Court doe s n ot f ind that hi s un de re mpl oy

me nt w a s d

ue to t he reas on

of tr yingto a vo id h is
o b li g a ti o n u n d e r th e

– to s u p p o rt h is c h il dr e n , b u t f

o r r e a s ons of
wa nti ngto p ro vid e su

pp or t to his ste pf

a the r o r t o h is f

a the r an d h is family members in the development of their Ashley

Fur niture Store operations. But never

theless, it wa s a volun t ar y undere mploy

ment decision by

him.

The tr ia l c o u rt im

p u te d in c o me o f $ 1 5 6 , 0 0 0 ( $ 1 3 , 0 0 0 p e r mo n th ) to F a th e r , b u t p r o v ided no mathematica l basis for its calc ulations.

The Guidelines provide that a court may impute additional g ross income if a par ent has be en fo un d to be wi llf

ull y and /or vo lun tari ly

un de re mpl oy e d o r u

ne mpl oy e d, wh e n th e re is n o r e lia bleA d d i t i o nal l y , t he G ui d el i nes provide a l i st of f act o rs t o be co nsi d e re d b y a tr i b unal when m aki ng a 4 d e te rm ina tio n o f willf

u l an d vo lun ta ry u n d e re m p lo ym e n t o r u n e m p lo ym e n t. See T en n

. Comp. R. & Reg s

. 1240- 2- 4- .0 4 (3 )( a )( 2 )( iii ) (2 0 0 6 ).
-15- evidenc e of inc ome, or wh en t h e parent owns substantial non-income producingassets. Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4- .04(3)( a)( 2)(i) (2006). Our revie w of a

trial court’ s finding of

willful or voluntary

undere mploy

ment was re cited by

this Court i n Demers v

. D e mers , 149 S.W .3d 61, 71- 72 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003):

[D] eter mining whe ther a

n obligor pare nt is willfully

undere mploy ed “is a fa ct-drive n i n q u i ry

requiringcar eful c onsideration of a ll the at tendant cir cumstance s.” . . . In makingsuch a de termination, “the Court is required to c onsider the obligor ’s education and prior w ork experience .” . . . In addition, the Court considers the pare nt obligor’ s rea son for a cce pting the lowe r pay ing position to deter

mine whether the decision was made in good f aith. . . “Oblig or par ents should not be per mitted to avoid their child support obliga t i o ns by liquidating their businesses, by

quitting work, or

by taking l o wer paying jobs. .

. . Acc ording ly , the courts must scrutinize the rea sons for the oblig or pare nt’s car eer

decision . . . and the rea sonabl en es s o f his or her ultimate car eer

choice .”. . . . (citations omitted). 4 We believe that the trial court e rre d in finding that Fathe r wa s voluntarily undere mploy ed. We rec og nize the following pr ovision of the Guidelines: “A deter mination of willful and/or voluntary under or unemploy

ment is not limit ed to occ upational choice s motivated only by an intent to avoid or re duce the pay ment of child support. The de termination may be base d upon any intentional cho i ce t h at aff ects a pare nt’s income.” T enn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4- .04(3)( a)( 2)(ii)(I ) (2006)

. Howeve r, we also note a pr ior holding of this Court t hat “if a

pare nt’s
rea sons for wor

king in a lower pa ying job a re rea sonable and in g ood faith, the cour t will not find him or her to be w illfully

and voluntarily

undere mploy ed.” Richardson v. Spanos , 189 S.W .3d 720, 7 2 6 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Wil lis v . W ill is , 62 S.W .3d 7 3 5 , 7 3 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). Fu rt hermore , in W

ilson v. W

ilson , w e h e ld th a t “ [a ]l th o u g h th e r e is n o r e qu ir e me n t th a t a par ent intended to avoid their c hild support obligations by their ac t i o n s, we do think that willful or voluntary unemploy

ment or under employ

ment must result from an intent on the part of the pare nt to reduc e or terminate his or her income.” Wilson v. Wilson , 43 S.W .3d 495, 497 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). No evidenc e wa s submitt ed at the he aring s below to support a findingthat Father’s c hang ing jobs was the re sult of an intent by Father t o re d u ce o r t erminate his income. To the contr ary , the
e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s in fa vo r o f a fi nd ingthat F a the r’ s c ho ic e to l e a ve L ane F ur nit ur e and be g in working for his stepf

ather at Ashley Fur

niture in January of 2006 was rea sonable, and made in good faith. This prec ludes a finding of willful or voluntary undere mploy ment, there fore any

imputation of additional income to F ather on this basis was err oneous.Fa t her’ s co nt ent i o n that the $ 6 0 , 0 0 0 fi gure rep res ent ed a n a verage o f M o t her’ s gross i nco m e f rom t he p revi o us 5 thr e e ye a rs is with o u t m e rit, b a se d up o n a sim p le a p p lica tio n o f ar ithm e tic.

G i ven t he t ri al co urt ’ s l ack o f exp l anat i o n regardi ng i t s d et erm i nat i o n o f t he p art i es’ res p ect i ve i nco m es and 6
f ai l ure t o at t ach chi l d s up p o rt wo rks heet s t o i t s o rder, we bel i eve t hat i t wo ul d b e p rem at ure f o r t hi s C o urt t o co m m ent
o n the c o rrec t ne ss o f

t he ch i l d sup p o rt am o un t d eterm i n e d b y c o un sel. T he refo re, we ex p ress no o p i nio n a s t o t he se
c a lc u la tio n s. -16- M o th e r ’ s in c o me tax r e tu r n s f r o m 2 0 0 3 , 2 0 0 4 , an d

2 0 0 5 , r e f

le c te d g r o s s in c o me s of $103,921; $23,776; and $22,253; respec tively . The c ourt imputed income to Mother of $60,000 per y ear , and simil arly provided no basis for this de termination in its benc h ruling , or the c orre sponding order enter ed on August 1, 2006. 5

The trial c ourt o rd er ed t h e par ties’ attorne y s to complete child support workshe ets based upon these imputed income f igur es, but stated that “a fi gu re somewher e in the neig hborhood of $ 3 , 4 3 4

. 5 0 [ s i c] , wh i ch wa s t h e o ri gi n al am o u n t o f ch i l d s u p p o rt , s h o u l d

b e t h e ap p ro x i m at e r an ge that the ul timate child support should be” and t hat “if it is determined ba sed on the c urre nt guide lines that the amount will be less . . . there should be or could be an upwa rd deviation in the amount of child support that Mr. Edg ewor th w ould be paying from whateve r the g uideline fig ure is.” A t the Au g us t 14 he ari ng , th e pa rt ie s r e po rt e d th e ir

c a lc ulatio ns to t

he tr ia l c ourt :
Th e Court : What wo uld the c hil d su pp or t be a c c or din g to th e g u id e li n e [s ]? M r

. M o s k o v i t z : Th e ch i l d s u p p o rt , aga i n , wi t h o u t any

deviation, our figure is some $1,400 so– 6 The Court: A $1,400 diffe renc e or – Mr. Moskovitz : No , n o , n o

. T h e t o t al s u p p o rt g iven that

y o u ’ v e a s s i g n e d s o m e $ 1 6 0 , 0 0 0 [s i c ] t o him and some a

pproxi mately

$60,000 o f earning capa city t o h er , the total fig ure – a nd there ’s no dispute, Idon’t beli eve, relative to the amount o f day s. That’s not a dispute we ’re havin g . B ut t

he to tal f ig ur e that I ’v e g ot i s some $1,400. So s he wo uld

– s he wo uld su ff

e r s ome $2,700 decr ease in child support based on the fig ures you’ve a sked us to run. The trial court then stated t hat t he “$3450 fig ure w as pure ly based upon w hat the par

ties had ag ree d to in a previous [o] rder

based on the income produc ing a bility of Mr. [Edg ewor

th] at that time[] ” and that it had “no idea

as to what the a ctual guidelines would dictate ba sed on the c urre nt standard.” At the hea

ring , counsel for

both parties stated the ir clients’ mutual prefe re n ce that the childre n re ma in i n p ri vate sc ho ol. Couns e l f or Mo the r a dv oc a te d in favo r of app lic a tio n o f t he ha rd sh ip pr ov isi on of the Gu ide lin e s, loc a te d at T e nn

. Co mp

. R. & Re g s. 12 40 -2 -4 -. 07 (2 )( h) , in or de r t o deviate the amount upwar d. Be fore this iss ue could be addre ssed by the cour t, however , the par

tiesM ot h er ’ s pe t i t i on f or c on t empt a n d w ag e as s i g n men t w as di s mi s s ed by or der e n t er ed on N ov embe r 14, 2006. 7

-17- eng ag ed in heated ar gu m en t re g ardingMother’s pe nding pe tition for contempt. Finally , the 7
c ha nc e ry c ourt ru le d a s f oll ow s:
The Court: I ’ve hear d enoug h. I have hear d enoug h. You

have a Court Reporter. Eith er party can appea l the Court’s decision. The Court is setting the child support
a t $3 45 0 r e troact ive t o th e date of the la st h earing . . . . That includes a ny amount of contribution towards the pr ivate sch o ol tuition. That is not to be adde d to the $3450.

. . . I f M r.

. . . E dg e wo rt

h w ants to c on tr ibute more he can do so. B ut that i n cludes a ny a mou nt [o f] c on tr ibutio n to wa

rd s th e pr ivate school tuition. . . . This ruling w as ente red by order of the c hance ry

court on Septembe r 15, 2006.

I n Guzm an v. Alvarez , 205 S.W .3d 375 (Tenn. 2006) , the Tenne ssee S u p reme Court revie wed severa l aspec ts of a divorce and child support judgme nt, including a trial cour t’s order of
c h i l d s u p p o rtb a s e d

u p o nt h e f l a tp e r c e n t a g e s m o d e l o f

t h e T e n n e s s e e C h i l d

S u p p o rtG u i d e l i n e s

. In
re mand ingwi th d ir e c tio ns to t he tr ia l c ourt to make fu

rt he r fi nd ing s re g ard ing the fa the r’ s in c ome and c hil d s up po rt

ob lig a tio n, the Court

e xpla ine d it s r e a so nin g a s f oll ow s:
The trial c ourt did not specify in it s o rd er whether the $10,176.50
c on sti tut e d n e t in c ome or g ro ss inc ome and do e s not expl a in h owit comp u t ed Mr. Alvarez’ income a nd his child support obligation. Fur thermore , we a

re una ble to asce rtain fr om the record the basis for the trial cour

t’s comput at i o n

. T he re cord doe s not indicate that the trial court intende d to de viate from the Guide lines, and the trial c ourt fa ile d to mak e the wr itt e n o r s pe c if ic fi nd ing s r e qu ir e d to de viate fr om t he Gu ide lin e s.
Guzm an , 205 S.W .3d at 383.

We r e v e r s e th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s o r d e r mo d if yin g F a th e r ’ s c h il d

s u p p o rt o b li g a ti o nf

r o m $4100 per month to $3450 per month, and r emand f or fur ther proc eeding s. As in Guzman , the trial cour t in this case did not specify in its order whe ther the imputed income s to Mother and Father , $60,000 and $156,000 re spectively , constituted net income or g ross income, nor are we a ble to asce rtain fr om the r e c o r d t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l b a s i s f o r t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s c o mp u t a t i o n o f t h e s e f i g u r e s

. T h e m a t t e r i sW i t ho ut exp res si ng an op i ni o n as t o i t s ap p l i cab i l i t y t o t hi s case, we no t e t hat o n remand , t he t ri al co urt m i ght 8

a lso c o n sid e r th e “h a rd sh ip p ro v isio n ” o f t h e G u id e line s, w h ic h p ro v id e s in p a rt:

A ny t i m e f

o l l o wi ng t he ef

f ect i ve d at e o f

thes e R ul es when a t ri b unal i s co nsi d eri ng
m o d i f i cat i o n of an o rder i ni t i al l y est ab l i shed und er T enness ee’s F la t P ercent age G ui d el i nes, and t he t ri b unal f i nd s a si gni f

i cant vari ance b et ween t he am o unt of t he exi s t i ng ch i l d s up p o rt o r der and t he amo un t of t he propo s ed ch i l d s uppo r t order cal cul at ed unde r t hi s chap t er, whi ch c h a n g e res ul t s f rom t he ap p l i cat i o n of t he gui d el i nes r at her t han f rom t he change i n t he i nco m e an d /o r ci rcum st ances of t he p a rtie s, the n the trib u n a l m a y m o d ify the c u rr e n t c h ild su p p o rt o rd e r up to the full

a m o u n t o f t h e v a r ia n c e o r m a y a p p ly a h a rd sh ip d e v ia tio n a s d e sc rib e d b e lo w in p a rts 2 -4

.
T e n n . C o m p . R . & R e g s. 1 2 4 0 -2 -4 -.0 7 (2 )( h ) (2 0 0 6 ).

-18- re mand e d, the re fo re , to the c ha nc e ry c ourt in o rd e r t o d e te rm ine the pa rt ie s’ re sp e c tiv e c ur

re nt g ro ss incomes. The court should the n deter mine whether a signific ant varia nce exis ts, as define d by

the Guidelines, in F ather ’s income ref lected in the October 2004 order which set child support at $4100 per month, a

nd Father’s curr ent income with A shley Fur niture. I f a signific ant varia nce is f ound, and the cha ncer y court deter

mines that a modification is justified a ccor ding to the Guidelines, the cour t should then use the child support workshee ts to calc ulate child support using both parties’ r espec tive incomes and a ccor ding to the Guidelines, as provide d by Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.04, a nd inc lud e its c a lc ulatio ns in its fi na l ord e r, a s fur the r re qu ir e d by the Gu ide lin e s. I f, in s e tti ngthi s c hil d support amount , t h e co urt finds that a de viation is necessa ry in order to a ccommodate for
e xtra or din ary

e du c a tio na l e xpe ns e s, or oth e rw ise , the c ourt

sh a ll p ro vid e wr itten fin din g s in thi s 8

re g ard , as re qu ir e d by Te nn . Code Ann. § 36- 5- 10 1 (e )( 1) (A ) an d the Gu ide lin e s. Mo the r’ s r e qu e st for attorney s’ fe es incurr ed as a result of this appea l is respec tfully denied.

V. C ONCL US I ON

For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the c hance ry court is re verse d and re manded f or fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s c on sis te nt w iththe Gu ide lin e s and thi s opin ion

. Cos ts ar e to be a sse sse d e qu a lly ag ainst Appellant, Stace y Edg ewor th, a nd Appellee , Thomas Edg ewor th.-19- ___________________________________ AL AN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE