1

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the 

convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the 

interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

State v. J.R. (A-50-15) (076694)

Argued October 13, 2016 -- Decided January 9, 2017

Patterson, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

In this appeal, the Court considers whether the State’s expert’s testimony concerning Child Sexual Abuse 

Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) offered against J.R. conformed to the limitations placed on CSAAS evidence 

in prior holdings by this Court and whether, if it did exceed the bounds of proper expert opinion on that subject, the 

admission of that testimony was harmless error.

In May 2010, when N.R. was twelve years old, N.R.’s mother learned that N.R. had allegedly been sexually 

abused on several occasions over the previous two years by N.R.’s father’s stepfather, J.R., and that N.R. had told 

her brothers of the abuse but instructed them not to tell anyone. The mother immediately reported the alleged abuse, 

and a criminal investigation was initiated. Interviewed by a detective specializing in sexual offenses against 

children, N.R. detailed several episodes of sexual abuse by J.R. and indicated that J.R. had instructed her not to tell 

anyone. J.R. was arrested and interviewed. He was charged with first-degree aggravated sexual assault, seconddegree endangering the welfare of a child, second-degree sexual assault, and fourth-degree child abuse.

Prior to J.R.’s jury trial, the court denied a defense motion to exclude the testimony of the State’s proposed 

expert witness on CSAAS, Dr. Lynn Taska, but noted that her testimony should be limited in accordance with the

Court’s opinion in State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588 (2011). Dr. Taska told the jury that she knew nothing about the 

specific defendant, victim, or family involved in this case. Her testimony did not address any aspect of the facts of 

this case. Instead, she described the five “areas” of behavior attributed to child victims that comprise CSAAS. 

N.R., fourteen years old at the time of trial, recounted the incidents that she had alleged in her police 

interview. She described for the jury the location of each offense, the manner in which defendant allegedly coerced 

her, the nature of defendant’s sexual contact with her, and the aftermath of each incident. She confirmed that she

had told only her brothers about J.R.’s alleged sexual abuse, and instructed them not to tell anyone. N.R.’s parents 

and one of her brothers also testified on behalf of the State, and their testimony supported N.R.’s account. J.R. 

called several witnesses including N.R.’s oldest brother. J.R. also testified on his own behalf. 

The jury convicted J.R. of all charges. He was sentenced to eighteen-years’ imprisonment. J.R. appealed, 

challenging the admissibility of Dr. Taska’s testimony and raising several other claims of error. The Appellate 

Division found that the expert had exceeded the bounds of permissible CSAAS testimony and reversed defendant’s 

conviction. The panel declined to fully address the remaining issues raised by J.R.

The Court granted the State’s petition for certification, limited to the issue of whether the State’s expert 

testimony exceeded the permissible scope of admissible CSAAS testimony. 224 N.J. 243 (2016).

HELD: Although Dr. Taska’s testimony was in part proper CSAAS opinion evidence, it exceeded the parameters 

imposed on CSAAS testimony. In that respect, the admission of her testimony constituted error. However, the trial 

court’s error with respect to Dr. Taska was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result, and does not warrant a new 

trial. Accordingly, the Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division panel, and remands to the Appellate 

Division for consideration of the issues raised by defendant that the panel did not reach. 

1. N.J.R.E. 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony, such as CSAAS testimony, which can help “to dispel

[preconceptions] jurors may have concerning the likelihood of the child’s truthfulness as a result of her delay in having 

disclosed the abuse or sought help.” State v. P.H., 178 N.J. 378, 395 (2004). CSAAS testimony must not be admitted 

for purposes of demonstrating that the child was—or was not—subjected to sexual abuse. (pp. 17-21) 
2

2. In State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 578 (1993), the Court held that a CSAAS expert should not opine on the question 

whether the child victims had been sexually abused. That basic rule was refined and expanded in State v. R.B., 183 

N.J. 308, 326 (2005), where the CSAAS expert told the jury that two of the behaviors that had been exhibited by the 

child are “among the range of behaviors consistent with [CSAAS].” The Court warned that CSAAS testimony 

should be used only “to explain . . . why it is not uncommon for sexually abused children, without reference to the 

child victim in that case, to delay reporting their abuse and why many children, again without reference to the child 

victim in that case, recant allegations of abuse and deny the events at issue.” Id. at 329. The Court further 

constrained CSAAS testimony in W.B., supra, 205 N.J. at 613-14, when it declared testimony about the “statistical 

credibility of victim-witnesses” inadmissible and commented that “[a]ny CSAAS testimony beyond its permissible, 

limited scope cannot be tolerated.” The Court has also underscored the critical importance of the trial court’s 

limiting instructions to the jury as to CSAAS testimony. (pp. 21-24) 

3. Here, in most respects, Dr. Taska’s testimony was consistent with the Court’s prior holdings. However, in her 

discussion of the third aspect of CSAAS, entrapment and accommodation, Dr. Taska described to the jury a range of 

behavior expansive enough to encompass the behavior of almost any child, and suggested that adults should believe 

children who manifest any of the disparate types of conduct that she described. Describing an array of behaviors as 

characteristic of children who are confirmed victims of sexual abuse may improperly suggest to the jury that any 

child who exhibits the behavior described has been the victim of sexual abuse. Further, Dr. Taska briefly 

commented on the Pennsylvania State University child sexual abuse case to illustrate that media coverage of child 

sexual abuse typically results in a sharp increase in reporting. To avoid confusing a jury, a CSAAS expert should 

not cite another case—particularly a publicized incident that resulted in a conviction—in his or her testimony. 

Finally, Dr. Taska was called as the State’s first witness, which is incompatible with the exclusively rehabilitative 

role of CSAAS expert testimony. Dr. Taska’s testimony exceeded the parameters imposed on CSAAS testimony, 

and admitting her testimony was error. (pp. 24-29)

4. An error will not lead to reversal unless it is “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2. 

Accordingly, the Court considers the portion of Dr. Taska’s testimony that exceeded the bounds of CSAAS evidence 

in the broader context of J.R.’s trial. (pp. 29-30) 

5. Dr. Taska’s discussion of the range of behavior that child victims of sexual abuse may exhibit was brief. 

Moreover, the trial court delivered a strong limiting instruction, which tracked the CSAAS Model Charge and 

conformed to this Court’s admonitions in P.H. and W.B., immediately before Dr. Taska’s testimony, and again in its 

final charge to the jury. Significantly, the critical witness for the State was not Dr. Taska, but N.R. herself. 

Although there were no witnesses to the alleged abuse, N.R.’s account was corroborated in important respects by 

members of her family, including the brother called as a defense witness. In his testimony, J.R. vehemently denied 

N.R.’s allegations of sexual abuse but confirmed N.R.’s account in material respects. Moreover, his credibility was 

substantially challenged on cross-examination through inconsistencies between his trial testimony and statements he 

made in his police interview, as well as self-incriminating comments he had made during the interview. (pp. 30-33)

6. In light of the testimony of N.R., her family members, and J.R. himself, there is no basis to conclude that Dr. 

Taska’s brief venture beyond the bounds of proper CSAAS testimony changed the result of J.R.’s trial. The trial 

court’s error with respect to Dr. Taska does not warrant a new trial. (pp. 33-34)

7. The Court declines to consider the argument raised by the Office of the Public Defender, as amicus curiae, that 

the Court should reject CSAAS evidence in its entirety on the ground that it is unreliable and therefore inadmissible 

under N.J.R.E. 702, because this argument was not asserted by a party. The Court notes that the proper procedure to 

present evidence that CSAAS has been rejected by experts on child sexual abuse is a challenge of the admissibility 

of the evidence before the trial court in an appropriate case. (pp 34-35)

The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Appellate 

Division so that it may consider the issues that it did not reach in its prior review of this case. 

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA, 

SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion. 
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-50 September Term 2015

076694

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

J.R.,

Defendant-Respondent.

Argued October 13, 2016 – Decided January 9, 2017

On certification to the Superior Court, 

Appellate Division.

John R. Mulkeen, Assistant Prosecutor, 

argued the cause for appellant (Esther 

Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney).

Jeffrey G. Garrigan argued the cause for 

respondent (Cammarata, Nulty & Garrigan, 

attorneys).

Sarah E. Ross, Deputy Attorney General, 

argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney

General of New Jersey (Christopher S. 

Porrino, Attorney General, attorney).

Joshua D. Sanders, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, argued the cause for amicus curiae

Office of the Public Defender (Joseph E. 

Krakora, Public Defender, attorney).

JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we consider a criminal defendant’s challenge 

to the State’s expert’s testimony concerning Child Sexual Abuse 

Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). CSAAS evidence is presented to 
2

explain why some child victims of sexual abuse delay reporting 

sexual offenses to adults, refrain entirely from reporting the 

abuse, or retract their allegations prior to trial. Such 

evidence is not admissible to prove that a particular child was 

the victim of a sexual offense. CSAAS evidence must be 

carefully circumscribed so that it does not improperly bolster 

the testimony of the alleged victim, mislead the jury, or 

prejudice the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

This appeal arises from defendant J.R.’s conviction for 

several sexual offenses against his step-granddaughter, who was 

between ten and twelve years old when the alleged offenses took 

place. The child did not disclose defendant’s conduct to any 

adult; she told only her brothers, one of whom revealed the 

allegations to their mother almost two years after the abuse 

began. 

At defendant’s trial, the State proffered the testimony of 

a CSAAS expert to opine that child victims of sexual offenses 

sometimes delay reporting sexual abuse and to explain other 

aspects of victims’ behavior. The trial court denied 

defendant’s motion to bar the testimony. Testifying as the 

State’s first witness, the expert properly refrained from 

discussing the specific victim in this case. She told the jury, 

however, that studies of confirmed child victims of sexual abuse 

have reported a broad array of behaviors, ranging from a 
3

cooperative demeanor and academic success to disruptive and 

sadistic conduct, including in that broad description behaviors 

exhibited by the alleged victim in this case. The expert also 

invoked a highly publicized child sexual abuse scandal in her 

testimony. 

The State’s witnesses included the victim and members of 

her family. Defendant testified on his own behalf. He was 

convicted of all charges. 

Defendant appealed his conviction, raising the CSAAS 

expert’s opinion as his primary issue on appeal. An Appellate 

Division panel reversed his conviction on the ground that the 

CSAAS expert exceeded the bounds of proper expert opinion on 

that subject. The panel remanded for a new trial. We granted 

the State’s petition for certification, limited to the question

of whether the trial court properly limited the testimony of the 

CSAAS expert. 

We concur with the Appellate Division panel that the 

expert’s testimony did not entirely conform to the limitations 

placed on CSAAS evidence in prior holdings by this Court. 

However, we conclude that the error was harmless. In her 

compelling testimony, the child victim not only described the 

incidents of abuse, but explained her failure to report her 

allegations to anyone but her brothers. As to the critical 

question of defendant’s access to the child on multiple 
4

occasions with no one else present, the victim’s account was 

substantially supported by her parents and brothers, and by the 

admissions of defendant himself. Moreover, defendant’s 

credibility was impeached in important respects when he 

testified. Viewed in the context of all of the trial evidence

heard by the jury, the CSAAS expert’s improper statements were

not clearly capable of producing an unjust result and do not 

warrant a new trial.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate 

Division panel, and remand to the Appellate Division for 

consideration of the issues raised by defendant that the panel 

did not reach. 

I.

We derive our summary of the facts from the trial record.

In the spring of 2008, N.R. was a ten-year-old fourth 

grader. She lived with her mother, C.S., and eleven-year-old 

brother, A.R. Her father, G.R., lived in a different 

municipality with his twelve-year-old son, G.L.R. C.S. and G.R. 

closely cooperated in the parenting of their children. N.R. and 

A.R. spent every other weekend with their father and older 

brother. 

Defendant is G.R.’s stepfather; he married G.R.’s mother 

when G.R. was a teenager. Defendant maintained a close 

relationship with his stepson and step-grandchildren. Defendant 
5

and his wife lived in a series of residences that were either in 

the same building as G.R.’s home, or adjacent to it. The three 

children were fond of their step-grandfather, whom they called 

“Grandpa”; he organized camping trips for the entire family and 

outings for the children. 

During his children’s weekend visits, G.R. sometimes was 

away from home for work or other reasons. Often, the children 

stayed at the home of defendant and his wife. On some of the

occasions when the children were present, defendant’s wife was 

not at home. At times, the two boys left defendant’s apartment

to play outside, but N.R. was not permitted to accompany them. 

The children would occasionally stay overnight, either with 

defendant and his wife or with defendant alone. 

According to N.R. and her brothers, during a ride in the 

back of defendant’s truck in either 2008 or 2009, N.R. told A.R. 

and G.L.R. that “Grandpa” was “touching” her. She was adamant 

that her brothers refrain from telling anyone what she had 

confided in them. According to the three children, A.R. and 

G.L.R. counseled N.R. to make up excuses to avoid being with 

defendant. However, N.R. and her brother A.R. continued to 

visit their father on their regular schedule and spend time with 

defendant as they did before N.R. disclosed the alleged abuse to 

her brothers; her parents did not notice a change in her 

demeanor when in defendant’s presence. According to her 
6

parents, N.R. sometimes isolated herself in her room and she 

struggled academically during that time period.1

In early 2010, shortly after N.R.’s twelfth birthday, her 

parents briefly reconciled. C.S. told N.R. that she and G.R. 

were going out on a date, and that defendant would babysit for 

her, without her brothers present. According to both parents, 

N.R. refused to stay with defendant. C.S. recalled, however, 

that she and G.R. compelled N.R. to go to defendant’s home. 

According to her mother and brother, when N.R. returned from 

that visit, she went straight to her room. Her brother A.R. 

testified that she later told him that “Grandpa” had “touched 

her again.”

N.R.’s allegations were finally disclosed to her parents on 

May 11, 2010. That morning, as N.R. and A.R. waited at a 

relative’s home for their school bus, A.R. sent his mother a 

text message stating that his sister “is having sex with 

Grandpa.” C.S. immediately contacted the children’s father and 

their school. Within hours, the parents met with their 

children, school officials, and law enforcement. The New Jersey 

Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) was 

contacted, and the County Prosecutor’s Office initiated a 

criminal investigation. 

 

1 By the time the case was tried several years later, N.R. was

an honor student.
7

Interviewed by a detective specializing in sexual offenses 

against children, N.R. recounted several incidents. She said 

that defendant first assaulted her when she hid from her 

brothers in defendant’s apartment during a game of hide-andseek. N.R. claimed that defendant shut the door, blocking it 

with a fan, kissed her, undressed her, touched her chest, 

digitally penetrated her, and touched her vagina with his penis,

without engaging in intercourse. She detailed several 

subsequent episodes of sexual abuse by defendant, involving 

digital penetration, genital-oral contact, and contact between 

defendant’s penis and her vagina. According to N.R., these 

incidents occurred in defendant’s apartment, in a second 

apartment to which he moved, on a cot located in his work truck, 

in a second truck in which he stored materials, and on a meat 

cutting board in the back of a restaurant that he owned. 

When the investigator asked during the interview what 

defendant had said to her after one of the incidents, N.R. was 

silent for two minutes. She then wrote on an easel that 

defendant had instructed her not to tell anyone, and that he had 

asked her whether she “liked it.”

Defendant was arrested. He waived his rights under Miranda 

v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 

(1966), and was interviewed by detectives. Defendant denied all 

of N.R.’s allegations. He stated that N.R. had never stayed 
8

overnight in his home and insisted that only the two boys had 

stayed overnight in his apartment. After police officers told 

defendant that they had spoken with witnesses, defendant pressed 

the detectives on whether the witnesses had said that they saw 

him “doing something to her.” He commented, “[s]econd of all 

nobody was there besides [N.R.] with me alone.” 

II.

Defendant was charged with first-degree aggravated sexual 

assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a); second-degree endangering the 

welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a); second-degree sexual 

assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b); and fourth-degree child abuse, 

N.J.S.A. 9:6-1 and 9:6-3.

Prior to defendant’s trial, the trial court denied a 

defense motion to exclude the testimony of the State’s proposed 

expert witness on CSAAS, Dr. Lynn Taska.2 In light of the 

State’s assurance that the expert would not be questioned about 

N.R.’s individual characteristics or asked to opine whether 

defendant had sexually abused N.R., the court held that the 

testimony was admissible. It noted, however, that the expert’s 

testimony should be limited in accordance with this Court’s 

opinion in State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588 (2011). The trial court

 

2 It does not appear that either party requested that Dr. Taska 

testify at a pretrial hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104, and no 

pretrial evidentiary hearing was held.
9

advised counsel that the model charge on CSAAS testimony, Model 

Jury Charge (Criminal), “Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation 

Syndrome” (May 2011) (CSAAS Model Charge), would be used to 

guide the jury to properly interpret Dr. Taska’s testimony. 

Defendant was tried before a jury over nine trial days. 

Prior to the testimony of Dr. Taska, who was the State’s first 

witness, the trial court instructed the jury with respect to the 

limitations of CSAAS, based on the CSAAS Model Charge. 

After she was qualified as an expert witness on the subject 

of CSAAS, Dr. Taska told the jury that she knew nothing about 

the specific defendant, victim, or family involved in this case.

Her testimony did not address any aspect of the facts of this 

case. Instead, the expert generally described the five “areas” 

of behavior attributed to child victims that comprise CSAAS: 

“secrecy,” “helplessness,” “entrapment and accommodation,” 

“delayed and unconvincing disclosure,” and “retraction and 

recantation.” 

Explaining the first component of CSAAS, secrecy, Dr. Taska 

described offenders’ use of threats and coercion to maintain a 

victim’s silence, and opined that child victims of abuse often 

deny abuse notwithstanding the presence of medical evidence or 

the statement of a third party who has witnessed the offense. 

She noted, “when there’s a lot of attention, like recently with 

this Penn State case and Jerry Sandusky, there’s an increase in 
10

disclosure. Here in New Jersey, there’s many more reports to 

[the Division] lately as a result of that case.”

Dr. Taska testified that the second area, helplessness, 

denotes the tendency among child victims to “play dead” or 

“freeze” when confronted by a sexual abuser. 

Addressing the third area, entrapment and accommodation, 

Dr. Taska described a range of behaviors that are sometimes 

exhibited in child victims of sexual abuse. Although Dr. Taska

stated that she was unaware of the facts of this case, the broad 

panoply of potential reactions that she described included

compliant behavior and occasional self-isolation, which N.R.

exhibited during the period of the alleged abuse. 

Dr. Taska stated that the fourth area, delayed and 

unconvincing disclosure, describes the behavior of children who 

delay reporting abuse for years, who disclose sexual abuse by an 

indirect manner such as in a diary, or who never disclose at 

all, due to fear of an investigation, a trial, or “get[ting]

someone in trouble.” 

Finally, Dr. Taska discussed the fifth component, the

“occasional” incidence of retraction and recantation among child 

victims.3

 

3 In addition to Dr. Taska, the State presented the testimony of 

a second expert, a pediatrician whose physical examination of 

N.R. revealed no physical findings confirming sexual abuse. 

Defendant’s challenge to the expert testimony as containing 
11

N.R., fourteen years old at the time of trial, testified on 

behalf of the State. At length and in detail, she recounted the 

incidents that she had alleged in her police interview. She 

described for the jury the location of each offense, the manner 

in which defendant allegedly coerced her, the nature of 

defendant’s sexual contact with her, and the aftermath of each 

incident. In addition to the incidents she had described in the 

interview, N.R., while testifying, recalled one instance in 

which defendant “tried to put [his penis] inside [of her] where 

the tampon goes,” but she was in pain and resisted. She said 

that he apologized and assured her that he would never do that 

again.

N.R. stated that she had not been given access to the 

record of her interview in preparation for her testimony. She 

testified that despite the abuse, she continued with her 

schedule of visits to her father and his family, and acted

normally, “because I was scared” and “because I didn’t want them 

to know.” She confirmed that she had told only her brothers 

about defendant’s alleged sexual abuse, and instructed them not 

to tell anyone. 

 

inadmissible hearsay was briefly addressed by the Appellate 

Division; that challenge is outside the scope of our limited 

grant of certification, and we do not address it.
12

N.R.’s account was supported by the testimony of her 

parents, who described her behavior during the relevant period 

and her refusal to be left with defendant on the occasion in 

early 2010. N.R.’s testimony was also buttressed by her brother 

A.R., who provided “fresh complaint” testimony about her 

disclosure of the alleged abuse to him and their brother G.L.R.

Defendant called as witnesses a detective and a hospital 

employee who had interviewed N.R., two character witnesses, and 

his sister, who stated that N.R. behaved normally in defendant’s 

presence and was affectionate with defendant. He also presented 

the testimony of N.R.’s oldest brother, G.L.R., who stated that 

there was material with sexual content in his father’s apartment 

but confirmed that N.R. was not given access to it. G.L.R. 

substantially corroborated A.R.’s fresh-complaint testimony 

about N.R.’s reporting of the abuse to her brothers. He told 

the jury that “once in a while” N.R. was left alone with 

defendant. 

Defendant testified on his own behalf. Contrary to his 

statement to police, defendant conceded that N.R. and her 

brothers had stayed overnight in his apartment on many 

occasions. He admitted that, on at least one overnight visit,

N.R. slept with him in his bed when his wife was not at home; he 

said that he kept the bedroom door open on that occasion and 
13

that when he awoke, N.R.’s brothers were asleep on the floor 

next to defendant’s bed.

In its final jury charge, the trial court instructed the 

jury, in accordance with the CSAAS Model Charge, that Dr. 

Taska’s CSAAS testimony could be considered only for the limited 

purpose of helping to explain why a sexually abused child may 

keep silent and delay reporting, and not as proof that abuse 

either occurred or did not occur in this case.

The jury convicted defendant of all charges. The trial 

court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial. After merger 

of two of the offenses, the trial court sentenced defendant to 

an eighteen-year term of incarceration, subject to an eightyfive percent parole disqualifier under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, for 

first-degree aggravated sexual assault, and a concurrent eightyear term for second-degree sexual assault.

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. He 

asserted that the trial court had committed three errors with 

respect to Dr. Taska’s CSAAS testimony: admitting opinion

evidence that was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible;

permitting Dr. Taska to exceed the bounds of CSAAS testimony; 

and giving the jury inadequate limiting instructions regarding 

CSAAS. Defendant also contended that the trial court committed 

other errors in evidentiary rulings, permitted prosecutorial 

misconduct, and improperly denied defendant’s motion for a 
14

mistrial. In addition, defendant claimed that his counsel 

provided ineffective assistance at trial, and that his sentence 

was excessive.

The Appellate Division reversed defendant’s conviction. It 

found that the trial court had properly permitted Dr. Taska to 

provide expert opinion about CSAAS. The panel found, however, 

that the expert testimony exceeded the boundaries of permissible 

CSAAS testimony by describing the wide range of behavior 

exhibited by child victims of sexual abuse, and by suggesting 

that children who engage in such behavior should be believed by 

adults when they report abuse. It concluded that the error was 

not harmless, because the jury could have inferred from Dr. 

Taska’s testimony that N.R.’s poor grades and isolation in her 

room signaled that she had been subjected to sexual abuse. The 

panel specifically identified Dr. Taska’s remark about “the Penn 

State case and Jerry Sandusky” as an improper reference that 

should be avoided on retrial. The panel briefly commented on 

several of the remaining issues raised by defendant to provide 

guidance for retrial but declined to fully address them.

We granted the State’s petition for certification, limited 

to the issue of whether the State’s expert testimony exceeded 

the permissible scope of admissible CSAAS testimony. 224 N.J.

243 (2016). We denied defendant’s cross-petition, in which he 

sought to preserve for review the issues not reached by the 
15

Appellate Division. 224 N.J. 245 (2016). We granted amicus 

curiae status to the Attorney General and the Office of the 

Public Defender (OPD). 

III.

The State argues that the Appellate Division panel 

improperly restricted CSAAS expert testimony in child abuse 

cases. The State contends that Dr. Taska’s general discussion 

of a range of behavior manifested in child victims, without 

reference to N.R. and her family, was appropriate, and the fact 

that N.R. exhibited some aspects of the behaviors described by 

the expert does not render the opinion improper. It contests 

the Appellate Division’s conclusion that any error in the 

admission of CSAAS testimony was harmful. The State notes that 

N.R.’s account of the alleged abuse did not change throughout 

the investigation and trial, and that defendant’s testimony was 

riddled with inconsistencies, particularly with respect to the 

important issue of his access to the child.

Defendant counters that, in a series of decisions, this 

Court has unequivocally limited the scope of CSAAS testimony to 

a single purpose: to explain to the jury, without reference to 

the child victim in the case, why it is not uncommon for 

sexually abused children to delay reporting the abuse, and why 

some child victims recant their allegations. He contends that 

Dr. Taska’s testimony ventured beyond the boundaries drawn by 
16

the Court because it encouraged the jury to accept the evidence 

of behavior associated with sexual abuse as substantive evidence 

of defendant’s guilt and suggested that N.R.’s testimony should 

be believed. Defendant asserts that the trial court’s admission 

of the expert evidence was not harmless because he did not 

confess that he committed sexual abuse and because the State’s 

case relied almost entirely on N.R.’s testimony.

The Attorney General argues that CSAAS testimony serves a 

key forensic function: it is rehabilitative evidence that 

explains why many children delay reporting sexual abuse, or 

recant allegations that they previously made. The Attorney 

General asserts that CSAAS evidence is properly presented to 

dispel jurors’ preconceived notions that a child’s delayed 

reporting suggests that his or her allegations are fabricated. 

The Attorney General notes that Dr. Taska did not attempt to 

“connect the dots” between her general testimony and defendant’s 

case, and contends that her testimony was accordingly proper.

Raising a contention not made by defendant, the OPD urges 

the Court to reject CSAAS expert testimony in its entirety by 

holding that it is inadmissible, in all prosecutions for child 

sexual abuse, under N.J.R.E. 702. The OPD contends that any 

legitimate purpose for CSAAS evidence would be served by a jury 

instruction explaining to jurors why child victims of sexual 

abuse may delay reporting the abuse.
17

IV.

A.

The sole issue before the Court -- whether the trial court 

properly limited the State’s expert evidence regarding CSAAS --

is governed by N.J.R.E. 702. That Rule permits a qualified 

expert to offer an opinion “[i]f scientific, technical, or other 

specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” 

N.J.R.E. 702. For an opinion to be admissible under N.J.R.E.

702, the expert must utilize a technique or analysis with “a 

sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably 

reliable results so as to contribute materially to the 

ascertainment of the truth.” State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 210 

(1984); see Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 17 (2008); State v. 

Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 568 (2005). The party seeking to present 

expert testimony must demonstrate that it “would ‘enhance the 

knowledge and understanding of lay jurors with respect to other 

testimony of a special nature normally outside of the usual lay 

sphere.’” Kelly, supra, 97 N.J. at 209 (quoting State v.

Griffin, 120 N.J. Super. 13, 20 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 62 

N.J. 73 (1972)). 

If a party challenges an expert opinion pursuant to 

N.J.R.E. 702, the “trial court should conduct a hearing under 

[N.J.R.E. 104] concerning the admissibility of the proposed 
18

expert testimony.” Torres, supra, 183 N.J. at 567 (citing State 

v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 167 (1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S.

1085, 120 S. Ct. 811, 145 L. Ed. 2d 683 (2000)). In that 

setting, the proponent of the expert testimony may demonstrate 

that the expert’s methodology meets the benchmark of N.J.R.E.

702, and the opposing party may challenge the reliability of the 

expert’s opinion. A hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104 “is a 

favored means to create a record for appellate review of a 

disputed decision.” Ibid. 

Although “the trial court is in a better position to shape 

the record and make credibility determinations,” an “appellate 

court need not be as deferential to the trial court’s ruling on 

the admissibility of expert scientific evidence as it should be 

with the admissibility of other forms of evidence.” Ibid.

(citing Harvey, supra, 151 N.J. at 167).

In accordance with the N.J.R.E. 702 framework and the 

applicable standard of appellate review, this Court has

addressed the role of CSAAS testimony in several decisions. As 

the Court has noted, CSAAS was first discussed in a 1983 study 

by Roland C. Summit, M.D., undertaken “to provide a vehicle for 

a more sensitive, more therapeutic response to legitimate 

victims of child sexual abuse and to invite more active, more 

effective clinical advocacy for the child within the family and 

within the systems of child protection and criminal justice.” 
19

State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 567-68 (1993) (quoting Roland C. 

Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 Child 

Abuse & Neglect 177, 179-80 (1983) (Summit Study)); see State v. 

P.H., 178 N.J. 378, 395-96 (2004). In the Summit Study, 

researchers identified five categories of behavior that 

countered “the most common assumptions of adults.” J.Q., supra, 

130 N.J. at 568 (quoting Summit Study at 181). Those categories 

include two preconditions to abuse, secrecy -- often enforced by 

the abuser’s threats -- and helplessness, and three “sequential 

contingencies” of the abuse: entrapment and accommodation; 

delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure; and 

retraction. Id. at 568-71 (citing Summit Study at 181-88). 

As this Court has observed, 

the behavioral studies of CSAAS are designed 

not to provide certain evidence of guilt or 

innocence but rather to insure that all 

agencies, including the clinician, the 

offender, the family, and the criminal justice 

system, offer “the child a right to parity 

with adults in the struggle for credibility 

and advocacy.”

[Id. at 571 (quoting Summit Study at 191).]

In the courtroom, CSAAS testimony “helps to dispel 

preconceived, but not necessarily valid, conceptions jurors may 

have concerning the likelihood of the child’s truthfulness as a 

result of her delay in having disclosed the abuse or sought 

help.” P.H., supra, 178 N.J. at 395. 
20

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that CSAAS is not a 

diagnostic tool as used by experts in psychiatry or psychology, 

and that in the setting of a criminal trial, CSAAS must not be 

admitted to demonstrate that the child was -- or was not --

subjected to sexual abuse. W.B., supra, 205 N.J. at 610; State 

v. Schnabel, 196 N.J. 116, 133-34 (2008); State v. R.B., 183 

N.J. 308, 327 (2005); P.H., supra, 178 N.J. at 395-96; J.Q., 

supra, 130 N.J. at 578-82. Instead, “CSAAS expert testimony may 

serve a ‘useful forensic function’ when used in a rehabilitative 

manner to explain why many sexually abused children delay in 

reporting their abuse, or later recant allegations of abuse.” 

P.H., supra, 178 N.J. at 395 (quoting J.Q., supra, 130 N.J. at 

579). 

Given an expert witness’s singular status in the courtroom, 

“[t]he uncritical acceptance of expert testimony can becloud the 

issues.” State v. R.W., 104 N.J. 14, 30 (1986). The trial 

court is charged to ensure that the expert does not usurp the 

jury’s function to determine guilt or innocence, or opine on the 

credibility of witnesses. State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 453-57

(2011); see State v. Vandeweaghe, 177 N.J. 229, 239 (2003); 

State v. Jamerson, 153 N.J. 318, 340-41 (1998). The trial 

court’s careful oversight is particularly important when the 

State proffers an expert on CSAAS in a prosecution for the 

sexual abuse of a child. The line between the discrete 
21

rehabilitative purpose of CSAAS testimony and an improper 

inference as to the defendant’s guilt is fine indeed; as we have

noted, courts defining the scope of this evidence are on 

“clearly hazardous ground.” R.B., supra, 183 N.J. at 328

(discussing J.Q., supra, 130 N.J. 554). 

Accordingly, our case law has substantially restricted the 

State’s use of CSAAS testimony. In J.Q., supra, this Court held 

that a CSAAS expert should not opine on the question whether the 

child victims had been sexually abused. 130 N.J. at 578. That 

basic rule was refined and expanded in R.B. There, Dr. Taska, 

testifying for the State as a CSAAS expert, was not asked to 

testify about whether the defendant was guilty or innocent, or 

to opine on the truth of the alleged victim’s allegations. 

R.B., supra, 183 N.J. at 327-28. Instead, without expressly 

connecting her testimony to the child victim’s conduct, the 

expert referred to two of the behaviors that had been exhibited 

by the child -- the torture of animals and the setting of fires

-- and told the jury that both categories of conduct are “among 

the range of behaviors consistent with [CSAAS].” Id. at 326. 

Because the expert’s comment on the behaviors associated 

with CSAAS “was fleeting, was made without connecting those 

elements to [the victim], and was made in the context of 

substantial other evidence of guilt,” the Court did not reverse 

the defendant’s conviction in R.B. Id. at 327, 334. The Court 
22

observed, however, that “the CSAAS expert should not describe 

the attributes exhibited as part of that syndrome due to the 

risk that the jury may track the attributes of the syndrome to 

the particular child in the case.” Id. at 327. It noted that 

the testimony at issue in R.B. came “perilously close to the 

setting we condemned in [J.Q.], where . . . the CSAAS expert 

testified not only to ‘the various aspects of CSAAS’ but also 

‘related them to the behavior she had observed in [the child 

victims].’” Ibid. (second alteration in original) (quoting 

J.Q., supra, 130 N.J. at 559). The Court warned that, 

[i]n the future, prosecutors and trial courts 

must insure that the scope of a CSAAS expert’s 

testimony is carefully circumscribed and does 

not exceed its proper bounds: solely to 

explain to the jury why it is not uncommon for 

sexually abused children, without reference to 

the child victim in that case, to delay 

reporting their abuse and why many children, 

again without reference to the child victim in 

that case, recant allegations of abuse and 

deny the events at issue.

[Id. at 329.]

The Court further constrained CSAAS testimony in W.B. 

There, the State’s redirect examinations of its CSAAS witness 

focused on the statistical improbability that a child who 

accuses an adult of sexual abuse is lying. W.B., supra, 205 

N.J. at 612-13. The Court declared the CSAAS expert testimony 

about the “statistical credibility of victim-witnesses”

inadmissible. Id. at 613. It observed that statistical 
23

evidence “quantifying the number or percentage of abuse victims 

who lie deprives the jury of its right and duty” to make an 

individualized determination as to the credibility of the 

victim. Id. at 613-14. The Court commented that “[a]ny CSAAS 

testimony beyond its permissible, limited scope cannot be 

tolerated.” Id. at 614.

As it has set narrow parameters for CSAAS testimony, the 

Court has also underscored the critical importance of the trial 

court’s limiting instructions to the jury. As directed in P.H., 

supra, 178 N.J. at 399-400, and W.B., supra, 205 N.J. at 621, 

the CSAAS model jury charge instructs jurors that they may or 

may not conclude that the child victim’s testimony is untruthful 

because of his or her silence or delayed disclosure. CSAAS 

Model Charge.4 Consistent with the Court’s decisions in both 

 

4 In P.H., supra, the Court suggested prefatory language for the 

Model Charge, and referred the matter to the Model Charge 

Committee “for their consideration and suggestions for 

refinement.” 178 N.J. at 400. Following the suggestion of the 

Court in P.H., the Model Charge on CSAAS was amended to include 

an opening paragraph to explain that a juror may not 

“automatically” conclude that a child witness is untruthful 

because the child remained silent or took time to come 

forward. The Model Charge was considered again in W.B. There, 

the Court directed the Model Charge Committee to consider 

whether the word “automatically,” as used in the phrase, “you 

may not automatically conclude that [complaining witness’s] 

testimony is untruthful based only on [his or her] 

silence/delayed disclosure,” should be deleted as urged by the 

defendant in that case, and replaced by the language, “[you] may 

or may not conclude that” the testimony is untruthful, or “words 

of like effect.” W.B., supra, 205 N.J. at 621-22. Following 

W.B., the Model Charge was amended to read in part, “[y]ou may 
24

cases, the Model Charge advises jurors that CSAAS is “not a 

diagnostic device and cannot determine whether or not abuse 

occurred,” or that the alleged victim “was or was not truthful.” 

Ibid. It directs jurors to consider CSAAS expert testimony only 

for a limited purpose: to “explain [] certain behavior of an 

alleged victim of child sexual abuse.” Ibid.

This Court’s prior jurisprudence regarding CSAAS thus

recognizes the expert testimony’s potential value to 

rehabilitate a child witness, whose silence in the face of 

sexual abuse might otherwise be viewed as a signal that the 

abuse never occurred. Our case law acknowledges, however, the 

significant risk that jurors may misconstrue the expert’s 

observations to be proof of the child’s credibility and the 

defendant’s guilt; it thus imposes strict limits on the 

evidence. The Court’s decisions urge trial courts and counsel 

to proceed with caution and care in the presentation of CSAAS 

testimony before a jury. See W.B., supra, 205 N.J. at 612-13; 

R.B., supra, 183 N.J. at 327-29; J.Q., supra, 130 N.J. at 577-

81.

B.

 

or may not conclude that [the child witness’] testimony is 

untruthful based only on his/her [silence/delayed 

disclosure].” CSAAS Model Charge. That is the form of the 

charge given in the present case. 
25

We apply the governing standard set forth in the Court’s 

prior jurisprudence to the disputed testimony in this case. 

In most respects, Dr. Taska’s testimony was consistent with 

this Court’s prior holdings. Dr. Taska was not asked to opine 

on the guilt or innocence of the defendant and did not do so. 

See R.B., supra, 183 N.J. at 327-28 (noting that “vice 

identified in [J.Q.] was the expert’s ultimate conclusion” as to 

defendant’s guilt); J.Q., supra, 130 N.J. at 578 (same). The 

expert testified that she was uninformed about the specific 

defendant, victim, and family at issue in this case, consistent 

with the Court’s admonitions in R.B., supra, 183 N.J. at 326-29, 

and W.B., supra, 205 N.J. at 614-15. She did not present 

statistical data on the percentage of children who fabricate 

allegations of sexual assault, as disapproved in W.B., supra, 

205 N.J. at 612-14. 

Dr. Taska’s testimony in this case, however, did not 

entirely conform to the limited role for CSAAS opinion evidence 

that our case law has authorized. In her discussion of the 

third aspect of CSAAS, entrapment and accommodation, Dr. Taska 

told the jury that child victims of sexual abuse manifest a 

broad spectrum of behavior as a result of the abuse: 

One of the ways kids survive is by trying to 

control the environment. There are many kids 

who adapt by being really good -- really 

other-oriented. They try to please this other 
26

person in order to control whether or not 

things are going to happen.

And these kids are very obedient. They look 

very responsible, well-adjusted, they do well 

in school in general, and this leads people 

then to not believe them if they tell, but 

this is a normal thing that happens in real 

cases of sexual abuse. And that -- so that’s 

one form of adaptation.

We have everything in between, all the way 

down to the kids who’s acting out, telling 

lies, setting fires, torturing small animals, 

acting out from him or herself sexually. 

Those kids, when they tell, also are not 

believed, but their behavior is often an 

acting out way of coping with what’s happening 

in their lives.

In between that we have everything. You know, 

a kid who is self-injuring, a kid who’s using 

drugs and alcohol, a kid who’s use --

disassociating.

In one important respect, Dr. Taska’s comments were less 

prejudicial than the testimony that this Court disapproved in 

R.B.: in defendant’s trial, Dr. Taska did not focus on specific

idiosyncratic behaviors that had been observed in the child 

victim at issue, as she did in R.B. Cf. R.B., supra, 183 N.J.

at 327. Here, however, Dr. Taska described to the jury a 

complete range of behavior that might appear in children --

including well-adjusted, considerate and successful children,

destructive and sadistic children, and everything “[i]n 

between.” She then attributed this array of potential conduct -

- expansive enough to encompass the behavior of almost any child 
27

-- to victims of child sexual assault, and suggested that adults 

should believe children who manifest any of the disparate types 

of conduct that she described. That testimony raises the 

concern repeatedly expressed by the Court: that a CSAAS expert, 

expressly or implicitly, might relate the behavior observed in 

some child sexual assault victims to the demeanor and conduct of 

the victim in a given case. Clearly, in discussing entrapment 

and accommodation, an expert may provide a definition of that 

component of CSAAS. The expert, however, should avoid 

describing an array of behaviors as characteristic of children 

who are confirmed victims of child sexual abuse; such testimony 

may improperly suggest to the jury that any child who exhibits 

the behavior described has been the victim of sexual abuse. 

Further, in the context of her discussion of the secrecy 

component of CSAAS, Dr. Taska briefly commented on the 

Pennsylvania State University child sexual abuse case, in which 

a member of the University’s football coaching staff was 

convicted of sexual assault, among other offenses, against 

children. The expert used that highly-publicized case to 

illustrate that media coverage of child sexual abuse typically 

results in a sharp increase in reporting. To avoid confusing a 

jury, a CSAAS expert should not cite another case --

particularly a publicized incident that resulted in a conviction 

-- in his or her testimony. The expert’s opinion should be 
28

streamlined to address the five components of CSAAS for its 

rehabilitative purpose, and nothing more.

Finally, we note that Dr. Taska was called as the State’s 

first witness, prior to the testimony of N.R., her parents, and 

her brother, A.R. We recognize that the timing of an expert 

witness’s appearance may be dictated by that witness’s

scheduling conflicts or other considerations. A trial court, 

however, has discretion to “exercise reasonable control over the 

mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting 

evidence” to “(1) make the interrogation and presentation 

effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless 

consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment 

or undue embarrassment.” N.J.R.E. 611(a). As a general rule, a 

CSAAS witness should not be called as the State’s initial 

witness, prior to the testimony of the child victim. That 

primary position in the sequence of witnesses may mislead the 

jury about the import of the expert’s opinion, and undermine its 

proper function: to counter the inference that the victim’s 

allegations of sexual abuse are fabricated because they were 

delayed. A CSAAS expert’s appearance as the State’s initial 

witness is incompatible with the exclusively rehabilitative role 

of the evidence. 

Accordingly, although Dr. Taska’s testimony was in part 

proper CSAAS opinion evidence, it exceeded the parameters 
29

imposed on CSAAS testimony. In that respect, the admission of 

her testimony constituted error.

C.

We next determine whether Dr. Taska’s testimony deprived 

defendant of a fair trial. An error will not lead to reversal 

unless it is “clearly capable of producing an unjust 

result.” R. 2:10-2. Thus, even though an alleged error was 

brought to the trial judge’s attention, it will not be grounds

for reversal if it was “harmless error.” State v. Macon, 57 

N.J. 325, 337-38 (1971).

An evidentiary error will not be found “harmless” if there 

is a reasonable doubt as to whether the error contributed to the 

verdict. State v. McLaughlin, 205 N.J. 185, 211-12 (2011)

(citing Macon, supra, 57 N.J. at 338). The prospect that the 

error gave rise to an unjust result “must be real [and]

sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether [it] led 

the jury to a verdict it otherwise might not have reached.” 

State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 26 (2012) (second alteration in 

original) (quoting R.B., supra, 183 N.J. at 330). As the Court 

noted in W.B., supra, “[c]onvictions after a fair trial, based 

on strong evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 

should not be reversed because of a technical or evidentiary 

error that cannot have truly prejudiced the defendant or 

affected the end result.” 205 N.J. at 614. 
30

Accordingly, we consider the portion of Dr. Taska’s 

testimony that exceeded the bounds of CSAAS evidence in the 

broader context of defendant’s trial. The State called Dr. 

Taska as its first witness, but her testimony followed defense 

counsel’s attack on N.R.’s credibility because of her delayed 

reporting of her allegations of abuse. Dr. Taska’s presentation 

to the jury was not extensive, and her discussion of the range 

of behavior that child victims of sexual abuse may exhibit was 

brief. As in R.B., Dr. Taska “never attempted either to 

‘connect the dots’ between [the victim’s] behavior and [CSAAS] 

or tender an opinion as to whether [the victim] in fact was 

abused.” R.B., supra, 183 N.J. at 328.

Moreover, the trial court delivered a strong limiting 

instruction, which tracked the CSAAS Model Charge and conformed 

to this Court’s admonitions in P.H. and W.B., immediately before 

Dr. Taska’s testimony, and again in its final charge to the 

jury. Prior to the expert’s testimony, the trial court warned 

the jury:

You may not consider Dr. Taska’s testimony as 

offering proof that child sexual abuse 

occurred in this case. [CSAAS] is not a 

diagnostic device and cannot determine whether 

or not abuse occurs -- occurred, rather. It 

relates only to a pattern of behavior of the 

victim[,] which may be present in some child 

sexes -- sexual abuse cases.

You may not consider expert testimony about 

[CSAAS] as proving whether abuse occurred or 
31

did not occur. Similarly, you may not 

consider that testimony as proving in and of 

itself, that [N.R.], the alleged victim here, 

was or was not truthful.

The trial court’s charge unequivocally informed the jury 

that CSAAS is not a diagnostic device, directed the jury not to 

consider the testimony as proof that sexual abuse had occurred 

in this case or that N.R. was truthful, and stated that the 

expert opinion related only to a pattern of behavior that may 

appear in some victims of sexual abuse.

Significantly, the critical witness for the State was not 

Dr. Taska, but N.R. herself. The record before this Court 

reveals that N.R. told the jury, in simple, non-confrontational 

language, why she was alone with defendant when the alleged acts 

of sexual abuse occurred, and explained the setting of each 

encounter. With minimal prompting by the prosecutor, using 

terms appropriate to her age, N.R. recounted each alleged 

instance of abuse and its aftermath. Although N.R. testified 

that she did not review her statement to police, two years 

earlier, in preparation for trial, her trial testimony was 

fundamentally consistent with that statement, and defense 

counsel had few discrepancies to explore on cross-examination.

N.R. did not leave the jury to speculate about the reason

why she delayed reporting the abuse to an adult and spoke only 

to her slightly older brothers about it. She testified that she 
32

did not disclose the abuse to an adult because she was afraid of 

defendant, who instructed her not to tell anyone, and that she 

told her brothers about the incidents in the hope that they 

would try to protect her. 

Although there were no witnesses to the alleged abuse, 

N.R.’s account was corroborated in important respects by members 

of her family. Her parents and brothers -- including her oldest 

brother, G.L.R., who was called as a defense witness --

supported N.R.’s contention that defendant had access to N.R., 

on multiple occasions, with no one else present. Both brothers 

concurred with her account of her disclosure of the alleged 

abuse to them, and her plea that they not tell anyone what she 

had told them. N.R.’s parents and brothers testified 

consistently about A.R.’s disclosure to his mother and the 

investigation that followed. The family members acknowledged

that defendant was affectionately greeted by all three children, 

including N.R., and that he took them on outings. They 

recounted, however, N.R.’s unsuccessful attempt in early 2010 to 

avoid staying alone with defendant. In short, the testimony of 

four family members was essentially consistent with N.R.’s 

testimony on the critical questions of defendant’s access to her 

and her “fresh complaint” of the alleged abuse. 

In his testimony, defendant vehemently denied N.R.’s 

allegations of sexual abuse. Defendant confirmed N.R.’s account 
33

in material respects, however. Moreover, defendant’s

credibility was substantially challenged on cross-examination. 

In his police interview, defendant denied that N.R. ever stayed 

overnight at the home he shared with his wife, insisting that 

only her brothers made overnight visits to his home. In his 

trial testimony, defendant conceded that N.R. had stayed

overnight in his apartment; he insisted that he did not remember 

stating otherwise to police officers. He admitted that, on 

occasion, N.R. had wanted to leave his apartment and go outside 

with her brothers, but was not permitted to do so, and stayed 

with him alone. 

Defendant was also confronted with self-incriminating 

comments that he had made in his police interview, in which he 

noted that “nobody was there” except him and N.R., and pressed 

officers to tell him whether N.R. had been examined by a doctor. 

He admitted that he had commented to the officers, “I have the 

mind and capability to lie and remember many things. Sure, 

about lies and whatever. I can go to Court. Right? And you 

tell maybe 95 percent of whatever I say over here exactly in 

Court.” Before the jury, defendant had no explanation for that 

statement.

In light of the testimony of N.R., her family members, and 

defendant himself, there is no basis to conclude that Dr. 

Taska’s brief venture beyond the bounds of proper CSAAS 
34

testimony changed the result of defendant’s trial. N.R., 

substantially supported by her parents and brothers, directly 

confronted the question at the heart of CSAAS testimony: why

she did not immediately report the alleged abuse to an adult. 

The jury heard N.R.’s explanation for her disclosure to her 

brothers and her insistence that they not share her secret with 

her parents. N.R.’s testimony was challenged in a skillful 

cross-examination, but the jury evidently found her credible. 

Moreover, defendant’s credibility was effectively impeached on 

the core issue of his access to N.R. 

In short, when the evidence is considered in its entirety, 

it is clear that the trial court’s error with respect to Dr. 

Taska was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result, and 

does not warrant a new trial. 

V.

Amicus curiae the OPD seeks relief that is distinct from 

that requested by defendant and beyond the limited grant of 

certification in this case. The OPD contends that almost all of 

the hypotheses underlying CSAAS testimony have been rejected by 

the scientific community over several decades, and that CSAAS

constitutes “junk science” that has no place in a courtroom. It

seeks the rejection of CSAAS evidence in its entirety on the 

ground that it is unreliable and therefore inadmissible under 

N.J.R.E. 702. The OPD would limit discussion of CSAAS in a 
35

sexual assault prosecution to a brief jury instruction on the 

reasons for which victims of abuse sometimes delay disclosure.

This Court does not consider arguments that have not been 

asserted by a party, and are raised for the first time by an

amicus curiae. See Bethlehem Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. Bethlehem 

Twp. Educ. Ass’n, 91 N.J. 38, 48-49 (1982) (“[A]s a general rule 

an amicus curiae must accept the case before the court as 

presented by the parties and cannot raise issues not raised by 

the parties.”); Fed. Pac. Elec. Co. v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’tl

Prot., 334 N.J. Super. 323, 345 (App. Div. 2000) (holding that

amici curiae “must accept the issues as framed and presented by 

the parties”); accord Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 54 n.5 

(2015). Consequently, we do not consider the OPD’s challenge to 

CSAAS evidence based on developments in the relevant field. 

In the event that the OPD wishes to present evidence that 

CSAAS has been rejected by experts on child sexual abuse, and to 

argue that it should therefore be excluded in accordance with 

N.J.R.E. 702, the proper procedure is a challenge to the 

admissibility of the evidence before the trial court in an 

appropriate case. In such a challenge, the trial court will be 

in a position to hold a pretrial hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E.

104, consider the scientific evidence presented by both sides, 

and generate an appropriate record for appellate review. 

VI.
36

The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and the 

matter is remanded to the Appellate Division so that it may 

consider the issues that it did not reach in its prior review of 

this case. 

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, 

FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s 

opinion.