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53–022 PDF 2009

S. HRG. 111–135 

MARITIME DISPUTES AND 

SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES IN EAST ASIA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN 

AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 15, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

Republican Leader designee 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

JIM WEBB, Virginia Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

Republican Leader designee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Blumenthal, Daniel, resident fellow, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 26 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 30 

Cronin, Dr. Richard, senior associate, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 34 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37 

Dutton, Peter, associate professor of strategic studies, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, Washington, DC .................................. 17 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 21 

Marciel, Hon. Scott, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East 

Asian and Pacific Affairs, Ambasssador for ASEAN Affairs, Department 

of State, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Scher, Robert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast 

Asia, Department of Defense, Washington, DC ................................................. 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 

Webb, Hon. Jim, U.S. Senator from Virginia, opening statement ....................... 1 

(III)

(1) 

MARITIME DISPUTES AND SOVEREIGNTY 

ISSUES IN EAST ASIA 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 15, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jim Webb (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senator Webb. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM WEBB, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator WEBB. Good afternoon. The hearing will come to order. 

In this first oversight hearing of the East Asian and Pacific 

Affairs Subcommittee, in the 111th Congress, we will examine maritime territorial issues in Asia, and how sovereignty issues are impacting the region and United States interests. 

No other topic brings into light the enormous and complex challenges facing the United States in Asia. At the pinnacle of this 

issue is China’s growing military, diplomatic, and economic power, 

not only in the region, but also worldwide. China’s evolution has 

changed the regional economic balance, has enabled China to 

expand its political influence. Across the East Asian mainland, 

from Burma to Vietnam, we have heard statements of concern 

about the impact of China’s reach. 

As the United States continues its attempt to isolate Burma, due 

to the human rights policies of its military regime, China’s influence has grown exponentially, including the recent announcement 

of a multibillion dollar oil pipeline project that would enable the 

Chinese to offload oil obtained in the Persian Gulf and pump it to 

Yunnan province without having to transit the choke point of the 

Strait of Malacca. 

In Vietnam this past January, General Vo Nguyen Giap, commander in chief of the Vietnam People’s Army during the Vietnam 

war, and former Defense Minister, sent an open letter to the Vietnamese Government. He called for a halt to a huge multibillion dollar Chinese bauxite mining project in Vietnam’s Central Highlands, 

citing environmental damage, harm to ethnic minorities, and, most 

importantly, his view that it was a threat to Vietnam’s national 

security. 

Importantly, China has sought not only to expand its economic 

and political influence, but also to expand its territory. China’s 

2 

military modernization has directly supported this endeavor. The 

PLA Navy is developing blue-water capabilities that will enable it 

to project power into the region and beyond. China today has 241 

principal combatant warships in its navy, including 60 submarines, 

and the Department of Defense reported earlier this year that the 

PLA Navy is considering building multiple aircraft carriers by 

2020. 

In addition to the construction of aircraft carriers, the PLA Navy 

has been rapidly modernizing its submarine fleet and surface combatants to enhance its ability to project power from its coast. This 

poses a significant threat to the current geostrategic balance in 

Asia. 

Of particular concern are China’s sovereignty claims in the East 

China Sea and South China Sea. At the forefront of these disputes 

is Taiwan. However, the attention to this potential conflict has 

obscured attention to other disputes in the region. China also lays 

claim to the Senkaku Islands, the Spratly Islands, and the Paracel 

Islands. 

Despite Japan’s control over the Senkaku Islands since the end 

of World War II, and the recognition of others, including the 

United States, of Japan’s sovereignty over these islands, China still 

claims publicly its sovereignty over the Senkakus. 

Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party has, to my understanding, never officially recognized Japan’s sovereignty over the 

Ryukyu Islands, which includes, importantly, Okinawa. 

In the South China Sea, myriad unresolved disputes involve several island groups claimed in whole or in part by China, Vietnam, 

the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei. Key claims focus on 

the Spratly Islands, composed of 21 islands and atolls, 50 submerged land atolls, and 28 partially submerged reefs. Their total 

land mass is small, but they spread out over 340,000 square miles. 

China and Vietnam also claim the Paracels, a smaller group of 

islands located south of China’s Hainan Island. 

These disputes seriously impact third countries in the region, 

and it is important to point out that only the United States has 

both the stature and the national power to confront the obvious imbalance of power that China brings to these situations. And in that 

regard, we have an obligation to maintain a geostrategic balance 

in the region that ensures fairness for every nation in Asia and 

protects the voice of every country seeking a peaceful resolution to 

their disputes. 

The participation of the United States in these disputes also 

affects how these countries perceive threats in their regional environment, and what options they may have available to them as 

they seek to protect their interests. China has demonstrated its 

willingness to display new military capabilities, and at times to use 

force to claim maritime territory. In response, other countries in 

the region are modernizing their naval capabilities, such as 

Vietnam’s recent decision to purchase Kilo-class submarines from 

Russia. 

Additionally, many observers note that China’s pattern of intimidation may hinder free and fair economic development in the 

region. As one example, China’s recent detention of Vietnamese 

fishermen near the Paracel Islands, and its overt threats to United 

3 

States oil companies operating in the South China Sea, highlight 

the increased risks to shipping and fishing, and the limited prospects, resource exploitation. These actions, left unanswered, may 

threaten the well-being of the region. 

These disputes also significantly affect the United States by 

endangering regional peace and security. As the 1995–96 Taiwan 

Strait missile crisis demonstrates, the United States is the only 

world power capable of responding to aggressive and intimidating 

acts by China. In looking at recent events, it appears that the 

United States is responding to maritime incidents as singular tactical challenges, while China appears to be acting with a strategic 

vision. These troubling incidents include, but are not limited to, the 

EP–3 crisis in 2001, the surfacing of a Chinese submarine in the 

midst of the USS Kitty Hawk carrier battle group in 2006, the harassment of the USNS Impeccable, in March of this year, and the 

collision of a Chinese sub with the USS John McCain sonar cable, 

just last month. 

I’m interested to hear our witnesses’ thoughts on how the United 

States should be responding to these sorts of incidents. As a maritime nation, the United States should maintain the quality and 

strength of its sea power. The recent trajectory of American sea 

power is, quite frankly, not encouraging. When I first entered the 

Marine Corps, in 1968, there were 931 combatant ships in the U.S. 

Navy. When I served as Secretary of the Navy, 20 years later, this 

battle force numbered 569 ships. At present the U.S. Navy has 284 

deployable battleforce ships; 42 percent of them underway on any 

given day. And, although the quality of China’s 241 ships cannot 

match that of the United States, that quality gap also is closing. 

If the United States is to remain an Asian nation and a maritime 

nation, our Nation’s leaders have a choice to make. Our diplomatic 

corps and our military, and especially our Navy, must have the 

resources necessary to protect American interests and the interests 

of our friends and our allies. 

To reflect the complexity of maritime disputes in Asia, today’s 

hearing will have two panels. I’d like to extend my thanks to the 

administration for having Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel, 

who also serves as the Ambassador to ASEAN, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Scher, of the Defense Department, to provide 

the administration’s perspective on those issues. 

In addition, we have three highly qualified witnesses in our second panel to expound upon the strategic and economic impacts of 

these disputes. 

I thank all of you for appearing today, and look forward very 

much to hearing your remarks, and also having your insights. 

With that, I would like to welcome our first panel, and in whichever order you gentlemen would like to proceed. I would ask that 

you could summarize your remarks in 10 minutes or so, and your 

full statements will be entered into the record. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SCOT MARCIEL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND 

PACIFIC AFFAIRS, AMBASSADOR FOR ASEAN AFFAIRS, 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador MARCIEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

4 

Chairman Webb and members of the subcommittee, I’m pleased 

to testify before you today on maritime and sovereignty disputes in 

East Asia. The sea-lanes that run through East Asia are some of 

the world’s prime arteries of trade. Over half the world’s merchant 

fleet, by tonnage, sails through the South China Sea each year, for 

example. 

These sea-lanes are of great strategic importance to the United 

States. We have an abiding interest in maintaining stability, freedom of navigation, and the right to lawful commercial activity in 

East Asia’s waterways. We’ve used diplomacy, commerce, and our 

military presence, especially that of the U.S. Navy, to keep the 

peace and protect our interests. Our policy has aimed, also, to support respect for international maritime law, including the U.N. 

Convention on the Law of the Sea. As you know, Mr. Chairman, 

this administration supports ratifying the Convention, and in practice our vessels comply with its provisions governing traditional 

uses of the oceans. 

Mr. Chairman, I’d like to focus my remarks on three topics. 

First, the multiple sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. 

Second, recent incidents involving China, and the activities of U.S. 

naval vessels in international waters, within China’s Exclusive 

Economic Zone, or EEZ. And finally, the strategic contexts of these 

distinct topics, and how the United States should respond. 

China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, 

and Brunei—each claims sovereignty over parts of the South China 

Sea, including the 200 small land features that make up the 

Paracel and Spratly Islands chains. Despite the competing claims, 

the South China Sea is largely at peace and has avoided sustained 

military conflict. 

In 2002, the ASEAN countries and China signed the Declaration 

on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. While nonbinding, it set out some useful principles, such as peaceful resolution, self-restraint, and freedom of navigation, and signaled a willingness among claimants to approach this dispute multilaterally. A 

multilateral solution that builds on this agreement could offer the 

best way to preserve the interests of all parties. 

The United States does not take sides on the competing legal 

claims over territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. In other 

words, we do not take sides on the claims of sovereignty over the 

islands and other land features in the South China Sea, or on the 

maritime zones that derive from those land features. We do, however, have concerns about claims to territorial waters or any maritime zone that does not derive from a land territory. Such maritime 

claims are not consistent with international law, as reflected in the 

Law of the Sea Convention. We’ve urged all claimants to exercise 

restraint. We’ve made clear that we oppose the threat or use of 

force, and any action that hinders freedom of navigation. We would 

like to see a resolution in accordance with international law, including the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. 

We remain concerned about tension between China and Vietnam, 

as both countries seek to tap potential oil and gas deposits that lie 

beneath the South China Sea. Starting in the summer of 2007, 

China told a number of United States and foreign oil firms to stop 

exploration work with Vietnamese partners in the South China 

5 

Sea, or face unspecified consequences in their business dealings 

with China. We object to any effort to intimidate U.S. companies. 

During a visit to Vietnam last September, then-Deputy Secretary 

of State John Negroponte asserted the right of United States companies operating in the South China Sea and stated that we believe 

that disputed claims should be dealt with peacefully and without 

resort to any type of coercion. We’ve raised our concerns with 

China directly. Sovereignty disputes between nations should not be 

addressed by attempting to pressure companies that are not party 

to the dispute. 

Aside from the South China Sea, there are various other maritime disputes in East Asia, which, Mr. Chairman, you’ve already 

mentioned. I’d be happy to address these further if you wish. We 

continue to monitor all disputes, as quarrels over sovereignty can 

escalate quickly. 

I would like to briefly discuss the recent incidents involving 

China and the activities of U.S. vessels, although my colleague will 

go into that in more detail. In March 2009, the USNS Impeccable 

was conducting routine operations, consistent with international 

law, in international waters, in the South China Sea. Actions taken 

by Chinese fishing vessels to harass the Impeccable put ships of 

both sides at risk, interfered with freedom of navigation, and were 

inconsistent with the obligation for ships at sea to show due regard 

for the safety of other ships. We protested these actions to the Chinese, and urged that our differences be resolved through dialogue, 

not through ship-to-ship confrontations that put our sailors at risk. 

Our concerns centered on China’s conception of its legal authority over other countries’ vessels operating in its Exclusive Economic 

Zone, or EEZ, and the unsafe way that China sought to assert 

what it considers its maritime rights. China’s view of its rights on 

this point is not supported by international law. We have stated 

that clearly to the Chinese, and underscored that United States 

vessels will continue to operate lawfully in international waters. 

In closing, I’d like to look at both of these topics, the EEZ concerns and the overlapping South China Sea claims, in a broader 

strategic context. Specifically, what do these issues signify for 

international law and for the evolving power dynamics in East 

Asia, and how should the United States respond? 

The Impeccable incident and the sovereignty disputes in the 

South China Sea are distinct issues that require distinct policy 

responses. On a strategic level, however, both issues highlighted 

growing assertiveness by China in regard to what it sees as its 

maritime rights. In some cases, we do not share, or even understand, China’s interpretation of international maritime law. We do 

believe there are constructive ways to tackle these difficult issues. 

On the freedom of navigation in the EEZ by United States naval 

vessels, we’ve urged China to address our differences through dialogue. China has now agreed to hold a special session of our military and maritime consultative agreement to take up the issue. In 

the case of the South China Sea sovereignty dispute, we’ve encouraged all parties to pursue solutions in accordance with the U.N. 

Convention on the Law of the Sea, and to build on the 2002 agreement between ASEAN and China. 

6 

There is ambiguity in China’s claims to the South China Sea, 

both in terms of the exact boundaries of its claims, and whether 

it is an assertion of territorial waters over the entire body of water, 

or only over its land features. In the past, this ambiguity has had 

little impact on U.S. interests. It has become a concern, however, 

with regard to the pressure China has put on our energy firms, as 

some of the offshore blocs that have been subject to Chinese complaint do not appear to lie within China’s claim. It would be helpful 

to all parties if China provided more clarity on the substance of its 

claims. 

We need to be vigilant to ensure our interests are protected. 

When we have concerns, we will raise them candidly, as we have 

done over the pressuring of our companies. We know that China 

has taken a more conciliatory approach to resolving some disputes 

over land borders, reaching a demarcation agreement last year, for 

example, with Vietnam. China’s diplomacy toward South East Asia 

has generally emphasized good-neighborliness. China’s antipiracy 

deployment to the Gulf of Aden has been a positive contribution to 

a common international concern. 

We’re encouraged by these steps, and hope that China will apply 

a similar constructive approach to its maritime rights and boundaries. We have a broad relationship with China, Mr. Chairman, as 

you know. It covers many issues of strategic importance to both 

countries. We agree on some issues. On some others, we, frankly, 

have differences. Our bilateral relationship can accommodate those 

differences and address them responsively through dialogue. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to 

answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Marciel follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCOT MARCIEL, BUREAU OF

EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Chairman Webb and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to testify before 

you today on maritime and sovereignty issues in East Asia. The sea-lanes that run 

through East Asia are some of the world’s busiest and most strategically important. 

They serve as the prime arteries of trade that have fueled the tremendous economic 

growth of the region and brought prosperity to the U.S. economy as well. Billions 

of dollars of commerce—much of Asia’s trade with the world, including the United 

States—flows annually through those waters. Over half of the world’s merchant 

fleet by tonnage sails through the South China Sea alone each year. 

The United States has long had a vital interest in maintaining stability, freedom 

of navigation, and the right to lawful commercial activity in East Asia’s waterways. 

For decades, active U.S. engagement in East Asia, including the forward-deployed 

presence of U.S. forces, has been a central factor in keeping the peace and preserving those interests. That continues to be true today. Through diplomacy, commerce, and our military presence, we have protected vital U.S. interests. Our relationships with our allies remain strong, the region is at peace, and—as you know 

well—the U.S. Navy continues to carry out the full range of missions necessary to 

protect our country and preserve our interests. 

Our presence and our policy have also aimed to support respect for international 

maritime law, including the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Although the 

United States has yet to ratify the Convention, as you know Mr. Chairman, this administration and its predecessors support doing so, and in practice, our vessels comply with its provisions governing traditional uses of the oceans. 

Issues surrounding maritime and sovereignty disputes in East Asia are multifaceted and complex. With your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, I am going to focus on 

three topics: 

—First, the multiple sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea; 

—Second, recent incidents involving China and the activities of U.S. naval vessels 

in international waters within that country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ); 

7 

—And finally, the strategic context of these distinct topics and how the United 

States should respond. 

China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei each 

claim sovereignty over parts of the South China Sea, including its land features. 

The size of each party’s claim varies widely, as does the intensity with which they 

assert it. The claims center on sovereignty over the 200 small islands, rocks, and 

reefs that make up the Paracel and Spratly Islands chains. 

Sovereignty disputes notwithstanding, the South China Sea is largely at peace. 

Tensions among rival claimants rise and fall. To date, the disputes have not led to 

sustained military conflict. In 2002, the ASEAN countries and China signed the 

‘‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.’’ While nonbinding, 

it set out useful principles, such as that all claimants should ‘‘resolve disputes . . . 

by peaceful means’’ and ‘‘exercise self-restraint,’’ and that they ‘‘reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the 

South China Sea, as provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.’’ 

More importantly, the 2002 document signaled a willingness among claimants to 

approach the dispute multilaterally. We welcomed this agreement, which lowered 

tensions among claimants and strengthened ASEAN as an institution. It has not 

eliminated tensions, nor has it eliminated unilateral actions by claimants in the 

South China Sea, but it’s a start, and a good basis on which to address conflict in 

the region diplomatically. 

U.S. policy continues to be that we do not take sides on the competing legal claims 

over territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. In other words, we do not take 

sides on the claims to sovereignty over the islands and other land features in the 

South China Sea, or the maritime zones (such as territorial seas) that derive from 

those land features. We do, however, have concerns about claims to ‘‘territorial 

waters’’ or any maritime zone that does not derive from a land territory. Such maritime claims are not consistent with international law, as reflected in the Law of the 

Sea Convention. 

We remain concerned about tension between China and Vietnam, as both countries seek to tap potential oil and gas deposits that lie beneath the South China Sea. 

Starting in the summer of 2007, China told a number of U.S. and foreign oil and 

gas firms to stop exploration work with Vietnamese partners in the South China 

Sea or face unspecified consequences in their business dealings with China. 

We object to any effort to intimidate U.S. companies. During a visit to Vietnam 

in September 2008, then-Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte asserted the 

rights of U.S. companies operating in the South China Sea, and stated that we believe that disputed claims should be dealt with peacefully and without resort to any 

type of coercion. We have raised our concerns with China directly. Sovereignty disputes between nations should not be addressed by attempting to pressure companies 

that are not party to the dispute. 

We have also urged that all claimants exercise restraint and avoid aggressive actions to resolve competing claims. We have stated clearly that we oppose the threat 

or use of force to resolve the disputes, as well as any action that hinders freedom 

of navigation. We would like to see a resolution in accordance with international 

law, including the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. 

There are various other maritime-related disputes in East Asia. Japan and China 

have differences over EEZ limits in the East China Sea, and sovereignty over the 

Senkaku Islands. These disputes have drawn less attention than those in the South 

China Sea. We continue to monitor developments on all of these maritime disputes, 

as quarrels over sovereignty can escalate quickly in a region where nationalist sentiment runs strong. 

I would now like to discuss recent incidents involving China and the activities of 

U.S. vessels in international waters within that country’s Exclusive Economic Zone 

(EEZ). In March 2009, the survey ship USNS Impeccable was conducting routine operations, consistent with international law, in international waters in the South 

China Sea. Actions taken by Chinese fishing vessels to harass the Impeccable put 

ships of both sides at risk, interfered with freedom of navigation, and were inconsistent with the obligation for ships at sea to show due regard for the safety of other 

ships. We immediately protested those actions to the Chinese Government, and 

urged that our differences be resolved through established mechanisms for dialogue—not through ship-to-ship confrontations that put sailors and vessels at risk. 

Our concern over that incident centered on China’s conception of its legal authority over other countries’ vessels operating in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and 

the unsafe way China sought to assert what it considers its maritime rights. 

China’s view of its rights on this specific point is not supported by international 

law. We have made that point clearly in discussions with the Chinese and underVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:08 Oct 28, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\MARITIME.TXT BETTY
8 

scored that U.S. vessels will continue to operate lawfully in international waters as 

they have done in the past. 

I would note that there have been no further incidents of harassment by Chinese 

fishing vessels since mid-May. 

In closing, I would like to look at both these concerns—the EEZ concerns with 

China and the overlapping South China Sea claims—in a broader strategic context. 

Specifically, what do these issues signify for international law and for the evolving 

power dynamics in East Asia, and how should the United States respond? 

The Impeccable incident and the sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea are 

distinct issues that require distinct policy responses from the United States. On a 

strategic level, to an extent, both issues highlight a growing assertiveness by China 

in regard to what it sees as its maritime rights. In some cases, we do not share 

or even understand China’s interpretation of international maritime law. 

We believe that there are constructive ways, however, to tackle these difficult 

issues. With respect to freedom of navigation in the EEZ by U.S. naval vessels, we 

have urged China to address our differences through dialogue. Last month at the 

Defense Consultative Talks in Beijing, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

Michele Flournoy raised this issue, and the Chinese agreed to hold a special session 

of our Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (signed in 1998) to take up this 

issue and seek to resolve differences. 

In the case of the conflicting sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, we have 

encouraged all parties to pursue solutions in accordance with the U.N. Convention 

on the Law of the Sea, and other agreements already made between ASEAN and 

China. 

The assertions of a number of claimants to South China Sea territory raise important and sometimes troubling questions for the international community regarding 

access to sea-lanes and marine resources. There is considerable ambiguity in China’s claim to the South China Sea, both in terms of the exact boundaries of its claim 

and whether it is an assertion of territorial waters over the entire body of water, 

or only over its land features. In the past, this ambiguity has had little impact on 

U.S. interests. It has become a concern, however, with regard to the pressure on 

our energy firms, as some of the offshore blocks that have been subject to Chinese 

complaint do not appear to lie within China’s claim. It might be helpful to all parties if China provided greater clarity on the substance of its claims. 

We need to be vigilant to ensure our interests are protected and advanced. When 

we have concerns, we will raise them candidly, as we have done over the pressuring 

of our companies. 

We note that China has taken a more conciliatory approach to resolving some 

disputes over its land borders. Last year, for example, China and Vietnam concluded 

a land border demarcation agreement. China’s general diplomatic approach to 

Southeast Asia has emphasized friendship and good-neighborliness. Likewise, 

China’s antipiracy deployment to the Gulf of Aden has been a positive contribution 

to a common international concern. We are encouraged by these steps, and hope 

that China will apply the same constructive approach to its maritime rights and 

boundaries. 

We have a broad relationship with China, Mr. Chairman, which encompasses 

many issues of vital strategic importance to both countries. We agree closely on 

some issues; on others, we frankly have differences. Our bilateral relationship can 

accommodate and respect those differences, and address them responsibly through 

dialogue. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Ambassador Marciel. 

Mr. Scher. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT SCHER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. SCHER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to appear 

before your subcommittee today to provide testimony on maritime 

territorial disputes and sovereignty issues. I’m honored to be here 

with Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel. 

As you have noted, I’ve submitted written testimony for the 

record, so I will try to keep my opening remarks relatively brief, 

to just highlight some of the key issues. 

9 

I do want to commend the subcommittee’s continuing interest in 

this important topic. These issues are central in the Asia-Pacific 

security equation, and ones that we, in the Department of Defense, 

are paying very close attention to. I look forward to sustaining an 

ongoing dialogue with you as dynamics evolve. 

The Asia-Pacific region, for the past two decades, has largely 

been at peace. It has been stable, and that stability has redounded 

to the benefit of all. Despite this stability, one of the factors that 

we see potentially challenging the Asia-Pacific security environment—and it is, in fact, the subject of today’s hearing—is a series 

of persistent territorial disputes, particularly disputes over maritime territories in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. 

As I note in my written testimony, the sources of the rising frictions are varied. But clearly China has played a key role in this 

evolving strategic environment. In analyzing China’s activities, I 

think it’s important to draw a distinction between the harassment 

of United States naval auxiliary vessels near China and, by extension, China’s interpretation of the rights of vessels in Exclusive 

Economic Zones, and China’s behavior as it relates to the sovereignty disputes in South China Sea, in general. While it’s important to draw this distinction in China’s behavior, the basis for the 

United States response applies equally to both. 

As I’ve noted in the written testimony, the Department of 

Defense views Chinese behavior in its EEZ, and more broadly in 

the South China Sea region—an area, by the way, claimed as 

China territorial waters, but not recognized as such by the international community—as having two basic premises. First, there’s 

the strategic issue of China’s claim to sovereignty over the entire 

South China Sea. This plays out mainly in political and economic 

fronts, which have been discussed in detail by Scot, and involve 

many countries within the region. Many, if not most, of these 

claims are conflicting, notably in areas around the Spratly and 

Paracel Islands. 

Second, to support the growing strategic and political emphasis 

in this region, China has increased, and is likely to continue to increase, its force’s military posture in the South China Sea. As the 

PLA has upgraded its facilities on Hainan Island, for example, we 

see a direct correlation with PRC assertiveness in its reaction to 

U.S. surface and air activity. It is this issue I’d like to address first. 

To be clear, the Department strongly objects to provocative, reckless, and unsafe behavior that puts at risk the safety of our vessels 

and is a clear violation of international norms of behavior in ocean 

waters outside of territorial seas. Our concerns have been raised at 

multiple levels, and we continue to leverage all available channels 

to communicate this position to our PLA counterparts. I will note 

that, since we have raised these concerns, there have been, in fact, 

no additional incidents of the kind we saw earlier this year. 

We will continue to reject any nation’s attempt to place limits on 

the exercise of high-sea freedoms within Exclusive Economic Zones. 

Customary international law, codified in the U.N. Convention of 

the Law of the Sea, guarantees to all nations the right to exercise 

high-seas freedom of navigation and overflight, as well as the traditional uses of oceans, related to those freedoms within the EEZ. 

10 

Our military activity in this region is routine and in accordance 

with this customary international law. We will continue to conduct 

operations in the South China Sea, and United States activity will 

be based on our interest in the region and our desire to preserve 

security and stability throughout the western Pacific. 

Overall, we do recognize that China is taking an assertive position in regard to their rights in Exclusive Economic Zones which 

they have been projecting through their recent actions. Our policies 

have not changed, and we will continue to operate our forces based 

on what we believe is needed to address our interests and the interests of stability in the region. We will look for ways to work with 

Chinese authorities to minimize tensions around these operations 

and, as I said, have had discussions that have resulted in better 

communication between our nations. 

Taken together, these events also demonstrate the rightful importance we place on solidifying our military presence in the region 

and working with our friends and allies to ensure we address and 

promote our shared interests. 

In terms of the South China Sea sovereignty disputes, ably covered by my colleague, I will note that Secretary Gates has said, as 

recently as the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2009, that the United 

States does not take sides in the sovereignty disputes, and supports 

a peaceful resolution that protects freedom of navigation. 

In addition, however, Secretary Gates stated, ‘‘Whether on the 

sea, in the air, in space, or cyberspace, the global commons represents a realm where we must cooperate, where we must adhere to 

the rule of law and other mechanisms that have helped maintain 

regional peace.’’ The United States clearly has an interest in keeping sea lines of communication open, avoiding being drawn into regional conflict, encouraging resolution of territorial disputes 

through multilateral frameworks, and protecting the United States 

reputation in Southeast Asia. 

In support of our policy, the Department has embarked on a 

multipronged strategy that includes clearly demonstrating, through 

both word and deed, that United States forces will remain present 

and postured as the preeminent military force in the region, conducting deliberate and calibrated assertions of our freedom of navigation rights by United States Navy vessels, building stronger security relationships with partners in the region—at both the policy 

level, through strategic dialogues, and at the operational level, by 

building partner capacity—and strengthening the military diplomatic mechanisms we have with China to improve communications 

and reduce the risk of miscalculation. 

As I know you have discussed on other occasions, we see the 

movement of Marines, and the soon-to-come installations on Guam, 

as a key part of solidifying our presence in the western Pacific, as 

I noted in my written testimony. All of this effort is designed to 

reduce volatility. We believe that the South China Sea claimants 

assess that the United States is a stabilizing regional influence. 

While we do not propose to arbitrate or remediate the underlying 

conflicts between competing claims, our presence does provide a 

sense of stability, and a modicum of breathing room for the claimants to pursue political means to resolve these issues. 

11 

Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I am prepared to answer any 

questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Scher follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT SCHER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

DEFENSE, ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF

DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to appear before your subcommittee 

today to provide testimony on Maritime Territorial Disputes and Sovereignty. These 

issues are central in the Asia-Pacific security equation, and ones that we in the 

Department of Defense are paying very close attention to. I commend the subcommittee’s continuing interest in this important topic and I look forward to sustaining an on-going dialogue with you as these dynamics evolve. 

In a speech that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates delivered on May 30, 2009, 

at the Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS) annual defense conference 

in Singapore, he outlined the remarkable changes that have taken place in the 

Asian security environment since the end of the cold war. More specifically, in highlighting the growing wealth and improving living standards of the peoples of Asia, 

Secretary Gates stressed the correlation between stability and economic prosperity, 

one of the defining characteristics of Asian security dynamics during this period. 

The Asia-Pacific region for the past two decades has largely been at peace; it has 

been stable, and that stability has redounded to the benefit of all. 

Despite this stability, one of the factors that we see potentially challenging the 

Asia-Pacific security environment—and the subject of today’s hearing—is a series of 

persistent territorial disputes, particularly disputes over maritime territories in 

Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, among a number of regional actors. In 

recent years, we have observed an increase in friction and tension over these disputes, frictions that stand in contrast to the relatively peaceful and cooperative 

focus on diplomatic solutions that characterized the issue following the landmark 

2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. 

The sources of the rising friction are varied—increased demand for oil and natural 

gas naturally increases the perceived stakes among claimants in securing resource 

rights; increased attention to the question of sovereignty claims in the runup to the 

May 2009 deadline for filing extended continental shelf claims under the U.N. Convention on the Law of Sea; rising nationalism, which increases the sensitivity 

among governments and peoples to perceived slights and infringements related to 

territory and sovereignty. In addition, China’s growing military capabilities have become a factor affecting the tone and tenor of dialogue on regional maritime disputes. 

In analyzing China’s maritime activities, I think it is important to draw a distinction between the harassment of U.S. naval auxiliary vessels near China and China’s 

approach to its South China Sea claims in general. While it is important to draw 

this distinction, the basis for the U.S. response applies equally to both. 

Harassment by Chinese fishing vessels of United States naval auxiliary ships conducting routine and lawful military operations in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone 

(EEZ) reemerged this year as an irritant in the United States-China relationship. 

I will note, however, that since May, there have been no further incidents of PRCflagged fishing vessels harassing U.S. naval vessels. 

While any incident at sea is of concern, the decline of these incidents after a brief 

spike underscores the commitment of the leadership of our two countries to deal 

with these issues peacefully and through diplomatic channels. 

The Department of Defense views Chinese behavior in its EEZ and more broadly 

in the South China Sea region—a large section of which China claims—as having 

two basic premises. 

First, there is the strategic issue of China’s assertion of sovereignty over the bulk 

of the South China Sea. This plays out mainly on the political and economic fronts 

which have been discussed in detail by my colleague from the State Department, 

but suffice to say that China actively opposes any activity by other claimants to 

assert their own sovereignty claims. Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, 

Indonesia, and Brunei each claim sovereignty over portions of the South China Sea 

(SCS); many of these claims are conflicting—notably in areas around the Spratly 

and Paracel Islands. 

Second, to support the growing strategic and political emphasis in this region, 

China has increased, and will continue to increase, its force posture in the South 

China Sea. As the PLA has upgraded its facilities on Hainan Island, for example, 

we see a direct correlation with PRC assertiveness in its reaction to U.S. surface 

and air activity. 

12 

Understanding the strategic premise does not imply that the Department accepts 

the manner in which China has asserted itself in this region. We strongly object to 

behavior that puts at risk the safety of our vessels and is a clear violation of international norms of behavior in ocean waters outside territorial seas. The Department 

will continue to leverage all available channels to communicate this position to our 

PLA counterparts. Indeed, at the recent Defense Consultative Talks in Beijing held 

on 23–24 June, this topic was on the agenda. The two sides agreed to convene a 

Special Meeting under the provisions of the United States-China Military Maritime 

Consultative Agreement (MMCA) (1998) in the coming weeks to review ways to invigorate the MMCA process, improve communications, and reduce the chances of an 

incident or accident between our two forces as they operate near each other. 

Further, we reject any nation’s attempt to place limits on the exercise of high seas 

freedoms within an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Customary international law, as 

reflected in articles 58 and 87 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 

of the Sea, guarantees to all nations the right to exercise within the EEZ, high seas 

freedoms of navigation and overflight, as well as the traditional uses of the ocean 

related to those freedoms. It has been the position of the United States since 1982 

when the Convention was established, that the navigational rights and freedoms applicable within the EEZ are qualitatively and quantitatively the same as those 

rights and freedoms applicable on the high seas. We note that almost 40 percent 

of the world’s oceans lie within the 200 nautical mile EEZs, and it is essential to 

the global economy and international peace and security that navigational rights 

and freedoms within the EEZ be vigorously asserted and preserved. 

As previously noted, our military activity in this region is routine and in accordance with customary international law as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. We have consistently reiterated our basic policy toward the competing 

claims in the South China Sea—most recently at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 

2009, where Secretary Gates stated that the United States does not take sides in 

the sovereignty disputes and supports a peaceful solution that protects freedom of 

navigation. In his speech at that event, Secretary Gates stated, ‘‘whether on the sea, 

in the air, in space, or cyberspace, the global commons represents a realm where 

we must cooperate—where we must adhere to the rule of law and other mechanisms 

that have helped maintain regional peace.’’ 

As Secretary Gates has said, ‘‘we stand for openness, and against exclusivity, and 

for common uses of common spaces in responsible ways that sustain and drive forward our mutual prosperity.’’ The United States has an interest in keeping sea lines 

of communication open; avoiding being drawn into a regional conflict; encouraging 

resolution of territorial disputes through a multilateral framework that avoids any 

precedent setting acquiescence; and protecting the United States reputation in 

Southeast Asia. 

In support of our strategic goals, the Department has embarked on a multipronged strategy that includes: (1) Clearly demonstrating, through word and deed, 

that U.S. forces will remain present and postured as the preeminent military force 

in the region; (2) deliberate and calibrated assertions of our freedom of navigation 

rights by U.S. Navy vessels; (3) building stronger security relationships with partners in the region, at both the policy level through strategic dialogues and at the 

operational level by building partner capacity, especially in the maritime security 

area, and (4) strengthening the military-diplomatic mechanisms we have with China 

to improve communications and reduce the risk of miscalculation. 

Force posture is perhaps the most important component of the first element of our 

policy outlined above. In this regard, the military buildup on Guam is viewed as 

permanently anchoring the United States in the region and cementing our ‘‘resident 

power’’ status. We believe this will have a stabilizing influence on the policies and 

strategies of South China Sea claimants. The alternative—a power vacuum caused 

by a U.S. security withdrawal from the region—would leave very little strategic 

maneuver room for the least powerful among them. 

As for the second element of our strategy, U.S. Pacific Command will continue to 

assert freedom of navigation rights in the region. U.S Pacific Command will continue to conduct operations in the South China Sea, in strict compliance with customary international law as reflected in the U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea. 

The United States activity will be governed by our interests in the region, and our 

desire to preserve security and stability throughout the western Pacific. 

The third element of our strategy will focus on expanding and deepening our defense diplomacy and capacity-building programs in the region as important supporting efforts to prevent tensions in the South China Sea from developing into a 

threat to U.S. interests. To that end, we have recently established high-level defense 

policy dialogues with Vietnam and Malaysia that complement our already strong 

consultative mechanisms with Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. Through a variVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:08 Oct 28, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\MARITIME.TXT BETTY
13 

ety of security cooperation activities ranging from seminars to multilateral exercises, we are also helping the countries of the region overcome longstanding historical and cultural barriers that inhibit multilateral security cooperation. 

Finally, we need to invigorate the mechanisms that we have in place to engage 

China on this and other security issues, namely the United States-China Defense 

Consultative Talks, the United States-China Defense Policy Coordination Talks, and 

the United States-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement process. These 

mechanisms provide open and sustained channels of communication to build greater 

confidence and mutual understanding, discuss candidly our differences, and improve 

understanding and application of safety standards and rules of the road for operations that improve the safety of sailors and airmen of all countries in the region. 

All of this effort is designed to reduce volatility. We believe the South China Sea 

claimants assess that the United States is a stabilizing regional influence. While we 

do not propose to arbitrate or mediate the underlying conflicts between competing 

claims, our presence does provide a sense of stability and a modicum of breathing 

room for the claimants to pursue political means to resolve these issues. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Deputy Assistant Secretary Scher, for those comments. 

I want to start just by asking for one clarification from your written statement, then I’d like to go to this chart and ask both of you 

some questions that you might react from. 

When you mention the relocation of American military from Okinawa to Guam in your statement, you say in your statement, ‘‘This 

military buildup on Guam is viewed as permanently anchoring the 

U.S. in the region, and cementing our resident power status.’’ 

We’ve been in this region for a very long time and, in fact, the 

relocation, should it fully occur, actually will be downsizing, in 

terms of the number of Americans in the region, although centrally 

locating. I wrote about this, 1973, as I recall—1974. But, how, in 

your view, would that change our status in the region? 

Mr. SCHER. I think—we believe that the movement to Guam solidifies our presence from a couple of respects. One, it does more 

centrally locate our presence, and shifts our presence out of simply 

a northeast Asia presence, and makes it more appropriately positioned for the entirety of the East Asia-Pacific region. Also, the 

movement has to be seen, I think, as part of the continuing alliance 

with Japan, and putting that alliance on the right footing, so that 

we can continue to maintain our close cooperation in Japan, with 

the forces we have there, and the security presence, as well. 

Those two pieces, I think, are the center of that. The resident 

remark, obviously, is building upon Secretary Gates’ remarks at 

the Shangri-La Dialogue last year, making the point and trying to 

reassure our allies—that in fact we have been resident in the western Pacific, and have territory in the western Pacific, and have 

been there for, as you say, for an extended period of time. 

So, we see that movement helping in those respects. 

Senator WEBB. Would you say that the idea that Guam is American soil is a part of this permanent anchoring? I’m not quite sure 

where you’re going in your statement, here. 

Mr. SCHER. Absolutely. I think we’re trying to draw attention to 

counter an argument that, I think—I know I hear occasionally in 

East Asia, the fact that we aren’t a part of East Asia, and so it is 

too easy for the United States to pull back from East Asia. And, 

in fact, while that was never our intention, regardless, Secretary 

Gates was trying to make the point that, in fact, we are a resident—a territorial—we have territory in the western Pacific, and 

we are a resident power. And so, there’s not a question of pulling 

14 

back. It is impossible for us to do so. And Guam is one clear manifestation of that. 

Senator WEBB. Plus, I would venture, an appropriate sea power 

presence that comes from a properly configured navy. 

Mr. SCHER. Without a doubt, sir. 

Senator WEBB. Gentlemen, I don’t know if you can see this map. 

Are you able to see this map? 

I had my staff put this together, there are lines on it—we may 

have to pull it further forward. But, the purpose of the map, was 

to, in the first instance, illustrate the region, and second, through 

the red lines, to show what happens when you combine, on the one 

hand, sovereignty claims, with, on the other, the concept of the 

EEZ, which is basically rights of control in terms of movement. And 

when you put the two together on the map, what you basically 

have is a pretty good percentage of the South China Sea that would 

be under some sort of claim by China. Would you agree with that? 

Mr. SCHER. I would agree that that is a reasonable representation of what the effect might be if you agreed with all of the—— 

Senator WEBB. The situation in the region, as it respects the current Chinese claims is to the effect that almost all of the South 

China Sea is in some way claimed by China. 

Ambassador MARCIEL. Mr. Chairman, let me try to respond. 

Senator WEBB. Would you push the button? 

Ambassador MARCIEL. I’ll try to respond and hopefully address 

this. 

Part of the problem here is that this so-called ‘‘cow’s tongue’’ 

that’s been on maps since, I think, the 1940s. On Chinese maps, 

it shows the nine dashes going around most of the South China 

Sea. The Chinese have not really firmly delineated the proposed 

boundary or explained exactly what their claim is. They’ve referred 

to it as a ‘‘territorial sea.’’ But, there is, I think, still a lot of questions about exactly what that claim is. China has, as I said, never 

formally explained the basis of its claim, nor delineated its boundaries, other than by this referent. So, it’s one of the reasons we’ve 

asked the Chinese to clarify, what do they mean by this, what exactly are they claiming here in terms of this so-called ‘‘cow’s 

tongue’’? Because it’s not 100 percent clear to us, and, I think, to 

other parties. 

Senator WEBB. But if you proceed from the sovereignty claims 

that are current, from the Chinese perspective, and the delineation 

and EEZ, et cetera, you would pretty much have that ‘‘cow’s 

tongue,’’ would you not? 

Ambassador MARCIEL. I think that’s right, sir. 

Senator WEBB. And I appreciate the observation that both of you 

made several times that the United States does not take sides in 

issues of sovereignty for many, many reasons. And also, there was 

a phrase in one of your testimonies, we don’t propose to arbitrate 

or mediate in these instances. But, on the other hand, there is a 

question as to whether neutrality, in and of itself, is a position that 

might encourage greater activity, simply because of the imbalance 

in power between China and some of these countries, particularly 

when you look at the Spratlys and the Paracels. 

15 

So, what signals should we be sending? How should we be reassuring these other countries, that may be feeling intimidated by 

this increase in activity, that we actually are being neutral? 

Ambassador MARCIEL. Mr. Chairman, I think there’s a couple 

things that we are doing, and that we should continue to do. One, 

as Bob Scher said, our naval activities are continuing normally 

through these international waters, and we’ve made it clear that 

they will continue, based on our interpretation of international law. 

Two is, although we’ve been neutral in the sense of not taking 

sides, saying, ‘‘Yes, this country is right and this country is wrong,’’ 

we can still be active diplomatically. Not as mediators, so much, 

but in terms of, certainly, discouraging any provocative acts, or any 

acts that increase tension, but also, urging that China sit down 

with ASEAN as a group to resolve this. 

I mean, I think, it would be sort of logical to assume that the 

Chinese would prefer to deal one on one with individual members 

of ASEAN. I think, for the ASEANs, it makes sense to deal more 

as a group, for obvious reasons. And, the third point I would make 

is that, although it’s not directly tied to disputed areas, part of 

what we need to do is to show that we remain very committed and 

engaged in this region, overall. We’re not doing it, as I said, for the 

purposes of dealing with these disputes, but the fact that we remain engaged, committed, very active, I think, is very important, 

and something that the countries of Southeast Asia very much 

want. 

Senator WEBB. Mr. Scher, would you have anything—— 

Mr. SCHER. Absolutely. And I would only add that I think part 

of our alliances and friendships in the region help to bolster the 

ability of countries to feel as if they are playing—potentially that 

they have the ability to play—on a somewhat more even playing 

field. Although we obviously agree that multilateral action, and 

unity of action amongst the ASEAN claimants, is probably the best 

way to approach it. 

Senator WEBB. Would you agree that the response of the United 

States to incidents in this region that we’ve been discussing is 

heavily tactical, while Chinese activities are arguably strategic? 

Mr. SCHER. I won’t venture a guess as to China’s tactics and desires and interests. I think we have a clear strategy and what we 

are trying to achieve with our operations, our alliances, et cetera, 

given that we are seeing tactical efforts to harass—or, did see tactical efforts to harass our—those operations, we have responded 

tactically, and think that’s appropriate. I’m not willing to venture 

a guess as to, necessarily, broader strategic vision for China, but 

I know that—I don’t think that we may be reacting tactically, but 

we have a strategic view as to what we need to do to ensure peace 

and stability in the region, and maintain our—— 

Senator WEBB. But here’s the actual observation. Just as, I 

think, Ambassador Marciel’s comment was, ‘‘Things have been 

quiet since May.’’ We tend to take these incidents as isolated incidents, and we resolve the incident, and then we dismiss it, and we 

say things are fine. And yet, if you tie activities together—not only 

with respect to the United States—if you do the datapoints, and 

put it over a timeline, what you have is a clear example of incrementalism, which has not been properly responded to. That’s the 

16 

difference between tactical resolution of a specific problem, but a 

continuum over time that actually enlarges the problem. 

Mr. SCHER. I take your point, Senator. I think that we are willing to see, and to accept for now, until proven otherwise, that the 

issues that we’ve discussed with China, we have a reasonably effective resolution, and are not willing to say that they’ll necessarily 

occur again, obviously. 

From our strategic point of view, what we are trying to do, we 

are continuing to do. And no action that China has taken will stop 

us, or has stopped us, from continuing to pursue those activities 

that we see in our strategic interests. So, I certainly accept that we 

are responding tactically to operations that, from the Chinese, that 

are intended to change what we are doing and—but I think that 

strategically we have not adjusted what we’ve—the overall purpose—in our operations. We may have adjusted some of how we’ve 

done them, but we’re maintaining that which is part of our longterm and strategic efforts. 

Senator WEBB. Have we had any clear indications that China’s 

been willing to compromise on any of these sovereignty issues? 

Have there been any signals from them to that effect? 

Ambassador MARCIEL. As I think I mentioned in my testimony, 

there have been some—particularly on the land border with Vietnam—where they have worked out agreements with the Vietnamese. And I think they’ve been willing to have more serious discussions and some compromises also in the Gulf—parts of the Gulf 

of Tonkin. 

In the dispute over the so-called ‘‘cow’s tongue,’’ or the Spratly 

Islands and the Paracels, I don’t—the closest you could—one could 

suppose—I make the argument that their proposals for joint development could be seen as a compromise. I think, as you know, the 

Vietnamese don’t really view them as compromises by the Chinese, 

but generally less willing to compromise in those areas. 

Senator WEBB. Has there been a collective viewpoint, from the 

ASEAN countries, on these activities in the South China Sea? 

Ambassador MARCIEL. Not that I’ve heard. The Vietnamese, as 

you know, are the most focused, as they’ve been facing the most 

pressure. There have been discussions in ASEAN meetings about 

this. It’s not clear to me that—as you know, in ASEAN, you require 

all 10 countries to have a consensus to take any action. I haven’t 

seen any indications that there’s a consensus. 

We have suggested to the ASEANs that them working together 

on this makes a lot of sense, following up on the 2002 Declaration 

of Principles. But I think there may not be consensus yet. 

Senator WEBB. Gentlemen, I appreciate your coming today, your 

testimony was very valuable, and we will be following this issue 

very closely over the coming months. Thank you for coming. 

Ambassador MARCIEL. Thank you, sir. 

Senator WEBB. We’ll now go to the second panel. Let me see, 

here. 

We’ll have the second panel: Professor Peter Dutton, Mr. Daniel 

Blumenthal, and Dr. Richard Cronin. 

Mr. Dutton is associate professor of strategic studies in China 

Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College. In 2006, 

he retired from the U.S. Navy, having served as a Navy judge 

17 

advocate, and naval flight officer. His current research focuses on 

American and Chinese views of sovereignty, and the strategic 

implications to the United States and the U.S. Navy of Chinese 

legal and policy choices regarding sovereignty. He has published a 

wide variety of articles on this subject. 

Daniel Blumenthal is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and is a current commissioner and former vice 

chairman of the United States-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission. Previously he was senior director for China, 

Taiwan, and Mongolia in the Secretary of Defense’s Office of 

International Security Affairs. 

Richard Cronin heads the Southeast Asia Program at the Henry 

L. Stimson Center, where he’s currently researching China’s relations with the Mekong Basin countries, United States-ASEAN relations, and issues concerning Japan and Southeast Asia. Dr. Cronin 

joined the Stimson Center after a long career with the Congressional Research Service, as a senior Asian affairs specialist in the 

Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division, and also was a United 

States military veteran of the Vietnam war. 

Gentlemen, I appreciate all of you coming today. We have some 

extraordinary breadth of experience at the table. And again, I 

would ask you to summarize your—don’t feel like you have to summarize it too far, but take 10 minutes or less to summarize your 

statements. Your full statements will be entered into the record. 

And, let’s see. Mr. Dutton, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF PETER DUTTON, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF 

STRATEGIC STUDIES, CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE, 

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Professor DUTTON. There we go, thank you. Thank you very 

much, Senator, and thank you for inviting me to appear today. 

I do have to say two things first. One is that I actually retired 

as a commander. And second, that I am speaking in my personal 

capacity, and not necessarily for the Department of Defense or the 

Department of the Navy. 

Senator WEBB. The record will so note. 

Professor DUTTON. Thank you. 

With my testimony today, I’d like to make the following two 

points. I’ve elaborated more in my written testimony. Be happy to 

answer any questions you have, related to that. The first essential 

point is that China’s East and South China Sea territorial claims 

are weakly grounded in international law, as they—as it exists 

today, as are China’s antiaccess legal perspectives. And together 

they pose a challenge to America’s regional and global maritime 

interests, in my view. 

The second is that China sees its sovereignty claims in the South 

China Sea as fundamentally nonnegotiable, yet they seem to feel 

they are close to being able to grasp and consolidate those claims. 

In the East China Sea, China appears to be willing to wait for 

more favorable circumstances in order to press its claims more 

assertively. 

Concerning China’s official claims in the South China Sea, I have 

a different perspective from some of those who have testified 

already today, which is that they do not actually claim sovereignty 

18 

over the waters of the South China Sea, per se. Their claim is 

based on an assertion of territorial sovereignty over the islands, 

themselves, in the South China Sea, which is articulated in China’s 

law on the territorial sea and contiguous zone. They’re very specific 

in enumerating the islands in the South China Sea that they claim. 

Additionally, China’s EEZ law asserts its claim to an EEZ extending 200 nautical miles from all of its coastlines. Since all the 

islands in the South China Sea are claimed as Chinese territory, 

the effect of the combination of these laws is to claim a Chinese 

EEZ covering nearly the entire South China Sea. This is problematic for all maritime user states because of another set of Chinese 

domestic laws, and their perspective on some international law, 

that expresses the right to limit, or prohibit, foreign military activities in their EEZ. Such control becomes tantamount to the control 

a sovereign exercises over its zones of maritime sovereignty, but 

not an actual claim to sovereignty. 

While pointing out this distinction may seem like splitting hairs, 

it’s important for a fuller understanding of the broader implications 

of China’s policies for international Law of the Sea, generally. Had 

China claimed the right to exercise control over military vessels 

because it claimed sovereignty over the South China Sea, the legal 

impact of the dispute would have been limited to the waters of the 

South China Sea, as was the case with Libya’s claim to the authority to control foreign military activities in the Gulf of Sidra, based 

on it’s excessive claim of sovereignty over those waters. 

What makes the Chinese case so significant for United States 

interests is that, because of the nature of international law, the 

impact of China’s somewhat unique characterization of its EEZ 

could affect how all EEZs are characterized around the world. 

Thus, inasmuch as EEZs cover more than one-third of the oceans— 

world ocean space, China’s legal perspectives undermine the interests of all maritime powers and the United States, as a primary 

guarantor of maritime security, in particular. 

America’s determination to protect traditional freedoms of navigation for military purposes by maintaining a commitment to globally dominant sea power will have important consequences for the 

East Asian region and beyond. Indeed, in my view, a maritime arc 

of antiaccess is developing across the Southern Asian land mass 

from the Arabian Sea to the Sea of Japan. Of the handful of 

remaining states that officially maintain legal perspectives that 

challenge traditional military freedoms of navigation in and above 

the EEZ, a concentration of these states is situated along the 

southern coast of Asia astride some of the most critically important 

sea lines of communication in the world. In this region, Iran, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Burma, Malaysia, China, and North Korea 

all maintain laws that assert some right of control over foreign 

military activities in the EEZ. I would add that there are more, but 

they’re just not on the Asian Continent. 

Vietnam, too, can be added to this list, although it has chosen 

to draw grossly excessive baselines rather than assert EEZ control 

as its antiaccess legal method of choice. 

This is, in addition to the occasional tacit approval that I personally have heard from representatives of the governments of other 

countries in the region, that is somewhat approving of the antiVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:08 Oct 28, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\MARITIME.TXT BETTY
19 

access approach to the Law of the Sea in the region, in part because it would enable them to keep China at bay. 

Some of these countries have been building strong regional 

navies, while others have been actively seeking nuclear capacity or 

conventional antiaccess technologies similar to China’s in order to 

provide teeth to their legal perspectives. China’s territorial claims 

over all of the islands in the South China Sea is weak, in that it 

actually controls relatively few of them and may never, in its long 

history, have actually maintained effective administration and control over most of them. 

While effective administration and exclusive control over territory are the two elements international law generally requires to 

recognize a sovereign’s authority over territory, Chinese scholars 

also assert a historical right to the islands of the East and South 

China Sea, based on a longstanding historical perspective. For various reasons, historical claims to sovereignty are legally much 

weaker than the current occupation and control. 

Thus, to the extent that Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and 

Malaysia all occupy islands over which the Chinese claim, ‘‘indisputable sovereignty,’’ international law tends to strengthen the 

hands of the occupier. 

Accordingly, China is building a maritime force structure, including its aircraft carrier program, which is shifting the balance of 

military power in the South China Sea. This may soon effectively 

prevent its neighbors, many of them U.S. friends and allies, from 

protecting their own island claims. At the same time, China has 

become emboldened to use its increasing military and naval power 

to attempt to disrupt United States naval operations in and above 

the South China Sea. 

Why is China pursuing this course? In my view, China sees itself 

as on the verge of achieving its long-sought geostrategic dominance 

of the South China Sea. Perhaps one of the reasons China has increased its activities against American naval vessels in the South 

China Sea is that it considers among the few things to be standing 

in its way of consolidating its island claims to be the United States 

Navy and the American political will to support freedoms of navigation, and the claims of American regional friends and allies. 

I suspect that China has identified the latter as the most vulnerable and susceptible to its influence, especially during these challenging economic times, a national military focus, which the United 

States has, on ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This, in my 

view, is one of among several reasons that China has embarked on 

its recent campaign to harass United States naval operations in the 

region. If they can undermine the political will to continue active 

United States naval operations in the South China Sea, they do not 

need to confront the power of the American Navy head-on in order 

to achieve their objectives. They can erode the American Navy’s 

effectiveness indirectly and achieve the same result. This would be 

in keeping with China’s military doctrine of the three new warfares: Legal warfare, public opinion warfare, and psychological 

warfare. 

Indeed, some thoughtful analysts and academics have suggested 

that Chinese calculations of American power determine how 

aggressively it pursues its claims in the South China Sea. AccordVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:08 Oct 28, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\MARITIME.TXT BETTY
20 

ing to this line of thinking, China has, for decades, taken advantage of small shifts in their favor in the local power dynamics in 

the South China Sea. Some Chinese actions can be characterized 

as opportunistic, such as China’s sea battle in 1974 with the Republic of Vietnam beleaguered naval forces to wrest control of 

several of the Spratly Islands as the United States was completing 

its withdrawal from South Vietnam. And again in 1976, when 

China took control of the Paracels from a recently united Vietnam. 

Then in the spring of 1988, when, in the midst of the tanker wars, 

American naval power was primarily focused on escorting oil tankers safely through the Strait of Hormuz. China, at that time, engaged in naval battles with Vietnam in the Spratlys and won control of several more islands. Finally, in late 1994, nearly 1995, 

about 2 years after the United States withdrew its forces from 

nearby Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines, China quietly occupied Mischief Reef, a small coral feature in the South China Sea, 

close to the Philippine Islands of Palawan, that had previously 

been administered by the Philippine Government. Chinese naval 

vessels remained in the vicinity of Mischief Reef long enough for 

China to consolidate its gain by building military reinforcements on 

the small island. 

More recent shifts in the South China Sea power dynamics could 

not be characterized as opportunistic. Instead, they are the product 

of years of Chinese research, development, and investment in military technologies designed to challenge outside access—outside 

naval access, in particular—to East Asian waters. China’s submarine force is steadily improving, as we’ve mentioned, and augments China’s already substantial sea-mine antiaccess capabilities. 

Additionally, China appears to be developing an antiship ballistic 

missile program. Thus, given the strength of China’s antiaccess 

technologies and the intensity of its campaign against the legitimacy of four naval activities in the East and South China Sea, 

China probably perceives that its opportunities for a settlement of 

the South China Sea claims are in its favor and increasing. 

In its maritime dispute with Japan in the East China Sea, China 

seems to be willing to live with the ambiguity generated by Japanese control over the Senkaku Islands, even as China occasionally 

takes provocative actions designed to maintain its claim of sovereignty and to wait for some future circumstance in which China 

is in a stronger position in relation to Japan to press its claim. 

Additionally, China has made a continental shelf claim that extends to the footsteps of Japan’s southernmost island chain near 

American bases in Okinawa and Sasebo. This claim has many facets. It is, in part, based on Chinese nationalism, partly it is based 

on international law that allows coastal states to claim the entire 

continental shelf as a matter of coastal state sovereignty, and partly it is based on the desire to assert military control over the full 

extent of these waters in time of conflict or crisis. In any case, 

China’s claims are of deep concern to Japan, and China’s intentions 

regarding its claims are of deep concern to American forces in the 

Pacific. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Professor Dutton follows:] 

21 

1Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, February 25, 1992. 2Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental 

Shelf, June 26, 1998. 3Peter Dutton, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 

June 11, 2009, www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/writtenltestimonies/09l06l11lwrts/ 

09l06l11lduttonlstatement.pdf. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER DUTTON, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, CHINA MARITIME

STUDIES INSTITUTE, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, WASHINGTON, DC 

I would like to thank the chairman and this committee for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

With my testimony today I hope to make the following points: 

1. China’s South China Sea legal claims and the activities it has undertaken to 

enforce them pose a challenge to America’s regional and global maritime interests. 

2. China sees its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea as fundamentally 

nonnegotiable, yet close to being within its grasp to consolidate. 

3. China is a developing maritime power, but its maritime development is best 

characterized as a maritime enhancement to China’s continental strategic focus, 

rather than as a rising expeditionary maritime force. 

4. The United States should exercise renewed maritime leadership to ensure the 

regional and global access necessary to our national defense and to the security of 

the global maritime system generally. 

Beginning with China’s actual claims in the South China Sea, contrary to what 

some commentators have suggested, the Chinese Government has not claimed sovereignty over the water space of the South China Sea per se. China’s claims of legal 

control over the sea space of the South China Sea are based in part on its assertion 

of territorial sovereignty over all of the islands in the South China Sea articulated 

in China’s 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone—under which 

China claims sovereignty over Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands in the East China Sea, and 

in the South China Sea, China claims sovereignty over the Dongsha (Pratas) 

Islands, the Xisha (Paracel) Islands, the Zhongsha (Macclesfield Bank) Islands and 

the Nansha (Spratly) Islands.1 Added to the claims of sovereignty over the islands 

themselves, China’s 1998 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) law asserts its claim to 

an ‘‘exclusive economic zone . . . extending 200 nautical miles from the baselines 

from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.’’ 2 Since all of the islands 

in the South China Sea are claimed as Chinese territory and included in the baselines section of the 1992 Territorial Sea Law, the effect of the 1998 law is to claim 

an exclusive economic zone around each of them. In combination, therefore, the two 

Chinese laws effectively claim a Chinese EEZ covering nearly the entire South 

China Sea. 

Thus, the Chinese Government does not claim that these waters are territorial 

seas, internal waters, or archipelagic waters, or any other sort of coastal state zone 

that would confer the rights of sovereignty over broad swaths of the region’s oceans. 

That said, the combination of their territorial claims over the islands of the South 

China Sea and China’s ‘‘unique’’ interpretation of international Law of the Sea relating to coastal state authorities to limit or prohibit foreign military activities in the 

exclusive economic zone,3 does appear to be part of a Chinese plan to achieve in the 

South China Sea exclusive military control over the water space within their 

U-shaped, nine-dashed line. Such control is tantamount to the control a sovereign 

exercises over its zones of maritime sovereignty. 

Pointing out this distinction may seem like splitting hairs, but it is important to 

a full understanding of the broader implications for international law generally of 

China’s policies. China does not claim sovereignty over the water space of the South 

China Sea and the concomitant right to exercise control over foreign military activities as the prerogative of a sovereign—China claims the right to restrict and even 

to prohibit foreign military activities in these waters as a matter of a coastal state’s 

right to make laws governing its EEZ, which is a nonsovereign zone of special jurisdiction over resources and environmental preservation. Had China claimed the right 

to exercise control over military vessels because it claimed sovereignty over the 

South China Sea, the United States would certainly have objected to the claim, primarily on factual grounds, but we could both agree upon the general legal proposition that only with full sovereignty over water space comes the right to control 

foreign military activities. As such, the legal impact of the dispute would have been 

limited to the waters of the South China Sea, as was the case with Libya’s claim 

to the authority to control foreign military activities in the Gulf of Sidra based on 

its excessive claim of sovereignty over those waters. 

22 

4See, e.g., ‘‘Surveying and Mapping Law of the People’s Republic of China,’’ August 29, 2002, 

and ‘‘Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Management of Foreign-Related Marine Scientific Research,’’ October 1, 1996. For an authoritative articulation of the Chinese perspective on the legal rationale for coastal states to limit foreign military activities in the EEZ, 

see Ren Xiaofeng and Cheng Xizhong, A Chinese Perspective, 29 Marine Policy (2005), p. 139. 5See, e.g., Bonnie S. Glaser and Lyle Morris, ‘‘Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Decline and 

Power,’’ Jamestown Foundation, July 9, 2009 (on line); and Richard Fisher, Jr., ‘‘South China 

Sea Competition: China Contemplates More Mischief,’’ International Assessment and Strategy 

Center, June 28, 2009 (on line). 

What makes the Chinese case so significant for U.S. interests is that the impact 

of our dispute with China over characterization of its EEZ could affect how all EEZ’s 

are characterized everywhere around the world. By tying their legal perspective to 

the legal characterization of the EEZ generally, were China’s perspective to become 

accepted, it could affect the way international law views EEZ’s everywhere. Thus, 

inasmuch as EEZs cover more than one-third of all the world’s oceans and, of 

course, 100 percent of all coastal regions, island regions, and many of the world’s 

strategic chokepoints and sea lines of communication, China’s legal perspectives undermine the interests of all maritime powers and the United States, as the primary 

guarantor of maritime security, in particular. 

China’s territorial claims and its claim to possess EEZ rights over nearly the entire South China Sea is alone controversial enough, since at least four other countries plus Taiwan also claim sovereignty over at least some of the islands, but even 

more so because many of the islands in the South China Sea are too small to legitimately claim an EEZ under the rules and terms as laid out in the United Nations 

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, in addition, through its domestic law and interpretations of international Law of the Sea China claims the 

legal right to broadly limit or regulate foreign military activities in and above its 

EEZ.4 That, for the United States, is the most problematic and challenging aspect 

of China’s legal claims, since China is building a maritime force structure that will 

soon effectively prevent its neighbors—many of them U.S. friends and allies—from 

protecting their own island claims and because China has become emboldened to 

use its increasing military and naval power to attempt to disrupt U.S. naval operations in and above the South China Sea. 

In my view, China sees itself as on the verge of achieving its long-sought dominance over the South China Sea. Perhaps one of the reasons China has increased 

its activities against American naval vessels in the South China Seas is that it considers among the few things to be standing in its way of consolidating its island 

claims to be the United States Navy and the American political will to support freedoms of navigation and the claims of American regional friends and allies. I suspect 

that China has identified the latter as the most vulnerable and susceptible to its 

influence, especially during these challenging economic times and national military 

focus ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This, in my view, is one among several 

reasons that China has embarked on its recent campaign to harass U.S. naval operations in the region: If they can undermine the political will to continue active U.S. 

naval operations in the South China Sea, they do not need to confront the power 

of the American Navy head on in order to achieve their objectives. They can erode 

the American Navy’s effectiveness indirectly and achieve the same result. 

Indeed, some thoughtful analysts and academics have suggested that Chinese calculations of American power determine how aggressively it pursues its claims in the 

South China Sea. According to this line of thinking, China has for decades taken 

advantage of small shifts in their favor in the local power dynamics in the South 

China Sea.5 Some Chinese actions can be characterized opportunistic, such as 

China’s sea battle in 1974 with the Republic of Vietnam’s beleaguered naval forces 

to wrest control over several of the Spratly Islands as the United States was completing its withdrawal from South Vietnam, and again in 1976 when China took 

control of the Paracels from a recently united Vietnam. Then in the spring of 1988, 

when in the midst of the Tanker Wars American naval power was primarily focused 

on escorting oil tankers safely through the Strait of Hormuz, China engaged in 

naval battles with Vietnam in the Spratlys and won control over several more 

islands. Finally, in late 1994 and early 1995, about 2 years after the United States 

withdrew its forces from nearby Subic Bay Naval Base, China quietly occupied Mischief Reef, a small coral feature in the South China Sea close to the Philippines 

Island of Palawan that had previously been administered by the Philippines Government. Chinese naval vessels remained in the vicinity of Mischief Reef long 

enough for China to consolidate its gain by building military reinforcements on the 

small island. 

More recent shifts in South China Sea power dynamics could not be characterized 

as opportunistic. Instead they are the product of years of Chinese research, developVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:08 Oct 28, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\MARITIME.TXT BETTY
23 

6Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, ‘‘Undersea Dragons, China’s Undersea Submarine 

Force,’’ International Security, Vol. 28., No. 4, Spring 2004, pp. 161–196. 7 Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, ‘‘On the Verge of a Game-Changer,’’ Proceedings 

of the U.S. Naval Institute, May 1, 2009. 8 Jin Hongbing, ‘‘Legal Warfare: Sharp Tool to Seize the Opportunity to Grab the Initiative,’’ 

People’s Navy [Renmin Haijun, in Chinese], May 29, 2006. 9 Brian McCarten, ‘‘Roiling the Waters in the Spratlys, Asian Sentinal,’’ February 4, 2008; and 

‘‘China Tells Neighbors to Keep Off Disputed Islands,’’ Reuters, May 12, 2009. 10 Xiong Qu, ‘‘China Starts Examination of Navigational Safety of East China Sea,’’ CCTV, 

July 3, 2008. 

ment, and investment in military technologies designed to challenge American naval 

access to East Asian waters. The work of Lyle Goldstein and William Murray documents China’s steadily improving submarine force and substantial sea-mine capabilities,6 for instance, and Andrew Erickson and David Yang’s research documents 

China’s developing antiship ballistic missile program.7 In addition to changing the 

military balance, China’s sustained campaign to try to undermine the legality and 

legitimacy of routine U.S. naval operations in the South China Sea also appears to 

be an attempt to change the regional political dynamics. This observation is made 

with China’s doctrine of ‘‘Three New Warfares’’ in mind. The three new warfares 

articulated under this Chinese military doctrine are legal warfare, public opinion 

warfare, and psychological warfare. The focus of each of these activities is fundamentally to create and to advance international and domestic legitimacy for China’s viewpoint of its sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and its authority 

to control military activities throughout the South China Sea. An article in Renmin 

Haijun (People’s Navy) a couple of years ago stated that the purpose of legal warfare, for instance is to ‘‘be far-sighted . . . to discern any problems before they actually arise,’’ in order to ‘‘provide a legal pretext for military action,’’ and to ‘‘engage 

in legal contests to vie for the legal initiative’’ in order to ‘‘safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity.’’ 8 Thus, these ‘‘new’’ methods of warfare are 

designed to achieve strategic objectives without having to actually use force by 

leveraging public opinion alongside the implied threat posed by China’s growing 

military power. 

China appears to perceive its opportunities to be increasing for a favorable settlement of its South China Sea claims. The one existing bilateral dialogue on South 

China Sea disputes of which I am aware seems to be making no progress. The 

China-Vietnam Steering Committee on Cooperation released a statement after its 

second meeting in 2008 that both sides had ‘‘agreed to solve disputes through negotiations and safeguard peace and stability in the South China Sea.’’ This statement, 

however, remains at odds with China’s repeated insistence that it has ‘‘indisputable 

sovereignty’’ over the South China Sea Islands, including as recently as May 2009 

when it submitted a statement to the United Nations in response to regional claims 

by the Philippines and Vietnam.9 If China remains unwilling to concede any of the 

islands to other claimants, it is hard to imagine what there is to negotiate. In its 

maritime dispute with Japan in the East China Sea, China seems to be willing to 

live with the ambiguity generated by Japanese control over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) 

Islands, even as China occasionally takes provocative actions designed to maintain 

its claims to sovereignty, and to wait for some future circumstance in which China 

is in a stronger position in relation to Japan to press its claim.10 In my view, China 

is likely to take the same approach to its claims in the South China Sea. If it is 

not in a strong enough position today to gain acceptance of its sovereignty over the 

islands, rather than negotiate a partial result China will likely wait until such 

future time as its position is suitably strengthened to finalize all of its claims. 

Nonetheless, with active U.S. involvement it may be possible to bring together all 

parties to at least open multilateral discussions to manage friction and prevent escalation of competing sovereignty claims, EEZ and continental shelf claims, security 

claims, and access rights. In the context of such discussions, it might be helpful for 

the United States to make clear that it supports peaceful resolution of territorial 

disputes as provided for in the South China Sea Code of Conduct, that we will honor 

our commitments to our friends and allies in the region by supporting them in case 

of attack, and that recent increases in Chinese military and armed maritime law 

enforcement patrols are not helpful. Likewise, all sides must be expected to exercise 

restraint. The end result could be a historic opportunity for China to demonstrate 

that its military buildup is indeed part of its larger policy of Peaceful Development 

and that its intentions toward its neighbors are indeed benign. 

On this latter point, there is some regional skepticism, especially in Japan. 

Indeed, there exists a robust debate within academic and analytical circles in China 

itself concerning the extent to which China’s growing navy should strive to develop 

‘‘blue water’’ capabilities. However, in my view there is no indication that Chinese 

24 

11See, e.g., Robert S. Ross, ‘‘The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the 21st Century,’’ 

International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4, Spring 1999, pp. 81–118. 12See, e.g., Susan Shirk, ‘‘Fragile Superpower: How China’s Internal Politics Could Derail its 

Peaceful Rise,’’ Oxford University Press (2007). 

decisionmakers have been persuaded to create a Navy that will challenge the U.S. 

Navy for command of the seas in the near to medium term. The inevitable result 

of China’s rapid military development over the past two decades, and especially 

after a Chinese flotilla deployed to the Gulf of Aden to support regional antipiracy 

operations, is concern that perhaps China’s naval buildup could portend Beijing’s intention one day of moving beyond development of a maritime defense zone in East 

Asia to challenge America’s global command. However, in my view this would be 

a highly unlikely development for three reasons. 

First, China is unlikely to build a large, expeditionary navy because it is not in 

the geostrategic interests of a fundamentally continental power to put too much 

attention and resources into global control of the seas, especially when a maritime 

superpower exists and provides the service free of charge.11 Second, others have 

suggested that China has too many internal economic, political and demographic 

challenges that will compete for resources and political attention during the remainder of this century for China to be able to afford such an undertaking.12 To these 

observations I add a third reason why I do not foresee China becoming an expeditionary sea power: If China intended its growing naval capacity to be used to challenge American sea power outside of the East and South Chinese Seas, a leading 

indicator of this intention would be a shift in perspective on international Law of 

the Sea from antiaccess to access, because the capacity to wield naval power without 

the international law authorities to use it would be an expensive investment with 

little practical utility. As such, paradoxically, it may be in America’s best interest 

to accept the friction that attends our differing perspectives on international Law 

of the Sea as one of the manageable costs of separating the fundamental interests 

of a strong continental power from the fundamental interests of a strong maritime 

power. 

That is not to say that the United States should in any way compromise its values 

or perspectives related to the international law rights to naval access to the world’s 

oceans for missions related to international peace and security or to missions related 

to security of the seas from nontraditional threats. Although American perspectives 

on the Law of the Sea are shared by approximately 140 of the current 157 members 

of UNCLOS, with the remainder agreeing with China to one degree or another that 

as coastal states they have the right to impose legal restrictions on foreign military 

activities in their EEZ’s, we cannot take the current state for granted. Indeed, the 

Chinese perspective holds some attraction even among China’s neighbors. Despite 

the fact that their governments remain among those that are on record as accepting 

traditional military freedoms in the EEZ, representatives from the Philippines, 

Indonesia, and other regional states sometimes quietly express general support for 

the Chinese perspective, if for no other reason than it could help them hold rising 

Chinese naval power at bay. This unsettling development suggests that our regional 

partners in Asia also sense the shift in power dynamics in the South China Sea and 

may need more reassurance than we are currently giving them that the United 

States remains fully committed to our regional security commitments and to maintaining a dominant naval presence in the region. 

Protecting traditional freedoms of navigation for military purposes by maintaining 

a commitment to globally dominant sea power will have important consequences for 

the East Asian region and beyond. An arc of antiaccess is developing across the 

southern Asian landmass from the Arabian Sea to the Sea of Japan. Of the handful 

of remaining states that officially maintain legal perspectives that challenge traditional military freedoms of navigation in and above the EEZ, a concentration of 

these states is situated along the southern coasts of Asia astride some of the most 

critically important sea lines of communication in the world. In this region, Iran, 

Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Burma, Malaysia, China, and North Korea all maintain laws that assert some right of control over foreign military activities in the 

EEZ. Vietnam too can be added to this list, although it has chosen to draw grossly 

excessive baselines, rather than to assert EEZ control as its antiaccess legal method 

of choice. This is in addition to the occasional tacit approval for antiaccess perspectives sometimes expressed by scholars and officials from the few remaining regional 

states not already listed here. Some of these countries have been building strong 

regional navies, while others have been actively seeking nuclear capacity or conventional antiaccess technologies similar to China’s in order to provide teeth to their 

legal perspectives. 

25 

13Peter Dutton, ‘‘Charting A Course: U.S.-China Cooperation at Sea,’’ China Security, March 

2009. 

In countering the antiaccess concerns of these coastal states, the United States 

will need to make it a priority to promote and demonstrate the maritime security 

benefits that can be provided by strong sea-power capacity combined with broad 

authorities to access ocean space. Specifically, the United States will need to find 

opportunities to undertake with China and other in the region cooperative 

international action to secure the seas from both traditional and nontraditional 

destabilizers. Additionally, since China clearly aspires to play a more important role 

in global leadership, as evidenced for instance by its increased commitment to international peacekeeping efforts, working together with China on an equal footing 

wherever possible will be helpful to the overall relationship.13 Inviting Chinese 

naval vessels to participate in future maritime security operations—even as we disagree about some of the applicable legal authorities—should become routine. Achieving a common maritime objective by either operating in separate sectors or operating in the same sector while performing different tasks are approaches demonstrated in current Gulf of Aden operations that deserve close study as models for 

future cooperation at sea where parties do not necessarily agree on the relevant 

authorities. 

Indeed, China’s decision to participate in antipiracy operations in the Gulf of 

Aden has been an encouraging opportunity to demonstrate the power of a global 

maritime partnership to bring about the order and stability necessary for the wellfunctioning of the global system on which the economic health and political strength 

of all major countries relies. Additionally, such operations enable China to participate meaningfully in the provision of the ‘‘global goods’’ that come from maritime 

humanitarian and constabulary operations, which are supported by reasonable, 

access-oriented interpretations of international Law of the Sea. 

A final point about United States-China cooperation at sea: Because the East and 

South China Seas represent strategically important zones for both China and the 

United States and friction in the region is therefore likely to continue, cooperation 

is more likely to occur between Chinese and American naval forces the further away 

they operate from the East Asian coastal regions. The challenge for the United 

States in interacting with China will be to manage tensions in East Asia while 

encouraging greater global cooperation. China’s aspirations to play a global role as 

a responsible major power and its willingness to undertake security operations in 

parallel, if not exactly in direct cooperation, with the United States and other maritime states in the Gulf of Aden suggests that future such opportunities will present 

themselves and should be welcomed. The more that China works with the United 

States and like-minded states away from East Asian shores, the greater the chance 

that the essential factor of trust will begin to enter into the equation of United 

States-China relations in East Asia. Should opportunities arise for cooperation in 

East Asia, such as humanitarian assistance or disaster relief, China should be welcomed as a partner. China’s new hospital ship may provide opportunities in this 

regard, and joint regional deployments of U.S. and Chinese hospital ships should 

be considered in order to bring the benefits of modern medicine to underserved 

areas of Southeast Asia. Ultimately, such activities could begin to build the essential factor of trust, based on increased military to military contacts, which will help 

develop the strategic stability that all parties desire. 

In conclusion, perhaps the two most important leadership actions the United 

States could undertake to preserve the navigational freedoms that are of strategic 

importance to U.S. national security, are first to reassert our position as the global 

advocate for access-oriented approaches to international Law of the Sea. For too 

long we have neglected this fundamental pillar of American security. We have either 

taken for granted that the benefits of our perspective are self-evident and expected 

that other reasonable state actors would be eventually persuaded to our perspective, 

or we have simply relied on the strength of our national power to do what is in our 

maritime interest to do without much regard for what others thought. Today, however, there is not even complete unity of perspective across the various federal agencies that have a hand in oceans policy. The Federal Government would benefit from 

a comprehensive national oceans policy, and flowing from that policy, a comprehensive strategic communications plan to explain the benefits and strengths of the 

American perspectives on the oceans. 

Second, since October 2007 the United States Navy has been operating under a 

maritime strategy that reflects international cooperation as one of the most important foundations of global maritime security against both traditional and nontraditional threats. As Admiral Willard recently testified, ‘‘our current nonparty status 

constrains’’ us in forming partnerships to achieve national and international secuVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:08 Oct 28, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\MARITIME.TXT BETTY
26 

rity. Admiral Willard also observed that UNCLOS is important because it provides 

a ‘‘robust legal regime for global operations’’ to counter both traditional and nontraditional threats. To these reasons I would add that China’s active promotion of 

its antiaccess perspectives—and the receptive audience the message is reaching in 

some critical parts of the world—reminds us that the current level of freedoms of 

navigation for military purposes that we currently enjoy cannot be taken for 

granted. Additionally, China is exercising leadership on these issues from institutional positions inside the Convention. The United States is not. A Chinese judge 

sits on the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. There is no American 

judge. When negotiations are undertaken to consider changes to the Convention, 

China will have a seat at that table and a vote; the United States will not. In order 

to enhance our global leadership position on Law of the Sea issues, and to preserve 

our national security interests in the oceans from encroachment, it is my view that 

the United States should join the 157 other states that are currently members and 

accede to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea at our earliest 

opportunity. 

In conclusion, international Law of the Sea is important and the United States 

needs to be vigilant to see that our interests in access-oriented approaches to Law 

of the Sea are preserved. However, strength speaks louder than words. In my view 

it is essential to our own national security and to the security of many other states 

that our maritime power be protected from erosion. Power is currently shifting in 

East Asia, not equalizing, but shifting. America’s best chance to preserve peace in 

the region is to show respect for China’s newfound regional position by extending 

the hand of maritime cooperation. However, in order to preserve our own fundamental interests and those of our friends and allies, we must also retain our dominant maritime strength. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Do you prefer ‘‘Professor’’ or ‘‘Commander’’? 

Professor DUTTON. Professor is fine. 

Senator WEBB. Professor. OK, fine. Thank you very much, Professor Dutton. 

Mr. Blumenthal, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL BLUMENTHAL, RESIDENT FELLOW, 

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BLUMENTHAL. Thank you very much, Senator Webb. And it’s 

very much my honor to appear before you today and applaud you 

for holding this important hearing, paying attention to China’s rise 

and growing assertiveness along its maritime periphery. 

It has been well over a decade—I understand you’ve been writing 

about this for longer than a decade, but writings I’ve seen a decade 

ago, when you started writing about this topic, and Chinese naval 

modernization has outpaced even the most extravagant predictions 

within that decade. 

I think—at the risk of boring some people, I think it’s useful to 

go through some of the details of this modernization program up 

front, because it’s actually quite alarming. 

In the past decade, China has deployed 38 new diesel and 

nuclear submarines at a deployment rate of 2.9 subs per year. It 

has also deployed about 10 new classes of indigenously built destroyers and frigates equipped with lethal antiship cruise missiles. 

And very germane to what we’re discussing here today, it has, in 

addition to the over 1,000 ballistic missiles its deployed across from 

Taiwan to the Nanjing military region, it is getting ready to deploy 

and innovating a land-based antiship ballistic missile equipped 

with maneuverable reentry vehicles whose sole purpose could be to 

hit our mobile surface ships, including the very symbol and cornerstone of our power, the carrier battle group. And I believe they will 

probably test this capability in the next couple of years. 

27 

The reason that I ran through some of these details is because 

we haven’t seen anything like this naval—a naval buildup of this 

kind since the early cold war, nor has our Navy ever faced a threat 

of ballistic missiles capable of hitting mobile targets at sea. 

And I think you are quite correct when you wrote recently that 

the Communist Party is making a concerted and calculated 

attempt to expand China’s regional strategic space. This is not just 

tactics or—it’s incrementally doing so, but it is doing so. 

One has to question what drives this military buildup, since, 

indeed, China faces no military threat that anyone can discern. In 

fact, since the end of the cold war and in the past 30 years since 

the end of the Sino-Vietnamese war, the region has been, by and 

large, at peace. Instead, I think that the drivers of this military 

buildup are very much domestic, a desire for national prestige, and 

an insecurity by the Chinese Communist Party. Beijing wants to 

make good on unsettled territorial claims, push out its maritime 

periphery, and develop alternative pathways to break out into the 

open ocean. 

China is behaving exactly as one might expect of great powers. 

The only surprise is that anyone thought they would do otherwise. 

But, that doesn’t make their actions any less destabilizing. And 

here’s why. Since the end of World War II, Asia has enjoyed relative security, underwritten, in large measure, by our own military 

power and set of security commitments. It is within that security 

cocoon that most Asian nations, including China, have enjoyed 

peace, prosperity, and increasing internal development. 

Asia, by any measure today, is fast becoming the center of gravity of international politics. Yet, China’s rise is beginning to change 

the sense of stability and security that has allowed all of these 

positive changes to take place. 

I will note that, just recently, our great Australia ally issued a 

defense white paper that, not only raised concerns about China’s 

rising power, but also about our staying power in the region. We, 

as a nation, want to see an Asia that continues to grow and prosper peacefully, and our allies are looking to us, as they always 

have, to ensure the peace, given the potential for intense regional 

security competition. We must, then, I think, not for any reasons 

of wanting to be overly dominant, but we have to remain Asia’s 

chief guarantor of security for the near future. 

And I think we have to view the disputes we’re talking about in 

this context, because both the dispute with the Japanese, which I’ll 

start with, and with the ASEANs, is about much more than just 

commercial energy interests, although energy interests come into 

play. This is about great power competition, historical animosity, 

and the strategy of the Chinese to find alternative resources and 

alternative supply routes for energy, as well as breaking out into 

the open ocean. 

First, national pride and suspicion of the United States drive 

China to seek alternative sources and routes of oil supply, preferably closer to the mainland in areas where China can project 

military power. They no longer want to, over the long term, rely 

upon our goodwill to protect their sea lines that supply so much of 

their oil and gas. 

28 

Second, the Senkaku/Diaoyu chain resides within what China 

calls the ‘‘first island chain,’’ a demarcation that runs from the Yellow Sea near South Korea, through the South and East China 

Seas, an area that includes Taiwan, the Ryukyu, as you mentioned, 

and waters near Vietnam. China increasingly acts, at least, as if 

they want to dominate this island chain for defensive and offensive 

purposes—defensively, because they don’t like the activities of the 

United States and Japan so close to their shorelines, offensively in 

the sense that they want to—they see that as a way to break out 

into the Pacific. 

Many Chinese believe that the United States-Japan alliance 

operates too close to the PRC shoreline and is a part of a containment strategy. This partly explains China’s recent harassment of 

the Impeccable, as well as its downing of the United States surveillance aircraft at Hainan Island, that you mentioned. Basically, 

China is asserting expansive territorial claims as a part of a strategy to push us back. And I think geopolitics and Chinese maritime 

strategy hold greater purchase in China over the law. This is only 

adding to the Japanese sense of security and a sense that they’ll 

be economically strangled and isolated. 

Finally, I would say, about the Senkakus, that the dispute over 

the EEZ claims also shed some lights about Japanese concerns over 

the final disposition of Taiwan. For Japanese strategists, Chinese 

control over Taiwan would put—potentially put Chinese bases even 

closer to Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands, and extend the Chinese 

EEZ out even further, only heightening Japan’s sense of insecurity. 

The South China Sea, I think, can be viewed in similar ways, 

geopolitically. Also, it impinges on the interests of the three great 

Asian powers—Japan, India, and China. 

Let me move—since I’m running out of time, let me move—we 

know Japan’s concerns—let me move to India. 

I think, last year, when it was revealed that China, in fact, had 

built a base at Hainan Island that can both support submarines, 

as well as surface combatants, and provide stealthy outlet to the 

waterways, particularly the Strait of Malacca, the Indians were 

very vocal, and have been very vocal since then, that the Chinese 

are trying to find ways to enter into the Indian Ocean and constructing a string of maritime bases and facilities that include 

Burma, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. So, in my view, at the core of 

these disputes are the growing Chinese might. In many ways, the 

disputes are a symptom of that and a strategy to push out their 

maritime periphery. 

We’ve talked a little bit about the U.S. position. I think it’s fine 

to stick to general principles regarding peaceful resolution of territorial disputes and freedom of navigation, it—even prudent, given 

that we want a cooperative relationship with China, and the historical sensitivities involved. But, we also have to be aware of the 

apparent desire of China to dominate these seas and extent out its 

freedom—and extend its freedom of action and impede our own. We 

must ensure that our allies and friends have the strength and 

backing to stand up against potential coercion. And we, ourselves, 

have to make good on our diplomatic commitments. While we 

should intensify our alliance to diplomacy and our diplomacy with 

China to reassure them about our own intentions, there is no getVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:08 Oct 28, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\MARITIME.TXT BETTY
29 

ting around the fact about something that you mentioned in your 

opening remarks, which is, we must properly resource our military. 

There’s almost a perfect symmetry between the Chinese naval 

buildup and our own—that I described before—and our own naval 

drawdown. 

I have been asked to say a few words about the role of U.S. sea 

power in maintaining the balance of power, and I do so humbly, 

speaking before a former Secretary of the Navy and entering into 

debates about force posture, which are always contentious. But, let 

me first make this point, and that is, our defense strategy in the 

Pacific should not be solely focused on futuristic warfighting 

scenarios, or thought of even as some kind of science-fiction scenario. Rather, given that China has already changed the regional 

balance of power, rebalancing should be a day-to-day task of our 

forces in the Pacific. 

One way to conceptualize this is, we need a force—a more robust 

presence and engagement force in the region, and then a surge 

force in case of conflict. And I’ll speak about the former, because 

I’m running out of time. 

Our fleet, as you mentioned, has not been this small since the 

early 20th century. While our capabilities are better than the Chinese are, fleet size, given the tasks we have in the region, everything from responding to humanitarian disasters to building up 

partnership capacity to balancing China, our tasks are just great. 

Let me give a rough estimate of some naval requirements that 

may be necessary in the Pacific, as we move forward. Certainly, an 

increase in our submarine force so we can maintain a nearconstant presence in the East and South China Seas, as well as the 

Sea of Japan. More submarines are necessary to protect our carrier 

strike groups and patrol and conduct ISR, as well as other types 

of antisubmarine warfare capabilities. 

Our missile and fleet defenses are currently inadequate, in my 

view, to the growing Chinese innovations and ballistic missile production, over-the-horizon targeting. Unfortunately, we have come to 

a point where, if we want to keep our forward-deployed carriers relevant, we need to focus more on protecting them; and for that, we 

need all sorts of ISR assets in space, as well as on board. While 

we need a layered missile defense, the most promising defense in 

this regard is the directed-energy type of weapons. Littoral combat 

ships can potentially play an important role in maintaining a 

robust ASW presence, as well as antisurface warfare capability in 

the littorals. 

I’d close by saying you were quite correct when you noted that 

we are in an odd position—you said this in some statements I saw 

earlier—where the defense budget announcements have been made 

before the administration has been able to undergo its Quadrennial 

Defense Review. My fear—and I urge the Congress to take a look 

at this—is that the Quadrennial Defense Review will become just 

a matter of fitting into the already-decided-upon budget cuts and 

program cuts. 

Finally, I’d say I’m confident that diplomacy can succeed in Asia 

and we can enjoy 30 more years of peace and prosperity, as long 

as everyone knows that we can back up our commitments. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Blumenthal follows:] 

30 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAN BLUMENTHAL, RESIDENT FELLOW, AMERICAN

ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Senator Webb, members of the committee, it is my honor to appear before you 

here today. You should be applauded for holding this important hearing and for 

paying attention to China’s rise and growing assertiveness along its maritime 

periphery. 

It has been over a decade since you, Senator Webb, began writing about this topic, 

and Chinese naval modernization has outpaced even the most extravagant predictions. In the past decade, China has deployed 38 new diesel and nuclear submarines, a deployment rate of 2.9 subs per year. In addition to its purchase of four 

Russian Sovremenny-class destroyers it has deployed nine new classes of indigenously built destroyers and frigates, equipped with lethal antiship cruise missiles. 

Moreover, in addition to its extant deployment of over a thousand ballistic missiles, the PLA has been developing a land-based antiship ballistic missile equipped 

with maneuverable reentry vehicles whose purpose is to hit our own mobile surface 

ships, including the linchpin of our power projection capability—the carrier battle 

group. We have not seen anything quite like this naval buildup since the early cold 

war. Nor has our Navy ever faced the threat of ballistic missiles capable of hitting 

mobile targets at sea. And you are quite correct when you write that the Chinese 

Communist Party is making concerted, calculated attempts to enlarge China’s 

‘‘regional strategic space.’’ 

What drives this military buildup? It is not driven by threats to China—by any 

objective measure, China does not face a military threat. With the fall of the Soviet 

Union, China no longer must concern itself with protecting its land borders from 

invasion. Since the end of the cold war the region has, by and large, been at peace. 

Instead, I would argue that China’s military buildup is driven by domestic factors, 

the desire for national prestige, and the insecurity of the Chinese Communist Party. 

China is exhibiting behavior that we would expect from a rising great power. The 

only surprise is that we expected them to behave differently. The American public 

has been told time and again by successive administrations and many experts that 

China’s rise would differ from the rise of all other great powers in history. But this 

is simply not happening. 

As China grows stronger and dedicates ever-more resources to its military forces, 

Beijing wants to settle territorial disputes in its favor, push out its maritime periphery, and develop alternative pathways to break out into the open ocean. Indeed, one 

of the more interesting developments within Chinese strategic circles is the ongoing 

debate about the importance of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the theorist of our own rise 

to international prominence, about which Mr. Dutton’s colleagues at the Naval War 

College have written so much. 

Chinese navalists are beginning to grapple with how such concepts as ‘‘command 

of seas’’ and the link between maritime power and international commercial interests apply to the People’s Republic. 

We should not be comforted by the fact that China is behaving as all rising powers do. Here is why: Since the end of World War II, Asia has enjoyed relative security, underwritten in large measure by our own military power and set of security 

commitments. It is within that security cocoon that most Asian nations have enjoyed peace, prosperity, and increasing democratization. Asia today, by almost any 

measure—economic, political, demographic, and military—is fast becoming the center of gravity of international politics. Yet China’s rise is beginning to change the 

sense of stability and security that has allowed for increasing peace, prosperity, and 

democratization. As a resident Pacific power, we want to see an Asia that continues 

to grow and prosper peacefully. An Asia in which the United States is not seen as 

the clearly predominant military power will inevitably be a less stable Asia. An insecure region will be more concerned with security competition than with trade, internal reforms, and regional cooperation. 

It is within that context that I wish to speak about the maritime territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas. Let me begin with Japan and the 

Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, since Japan has long been, and remains, our key 

ally in the region. 

Of all the regional territorial disputes, the Sino-Japanese quarrel in the East 

China Sea is the most vexing, and perhaps most dangerous. The dispute is grounded 

in great power competition, historical animosity, the desire to exploit potential 

energy resources beneath the sea, and concerns over the ultimate disposition of 

Taiwan. This combination of issues is particularly volatile. 

Both countries claim sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and both include the islands in their EEZ/Continental Shelf claims. From the Chinese perspecVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:08 Oct 28, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\MARITIME.TXT BETTY
31 

tive, the islands are important for reasons of energy security as well as their 

expanding maritime ambitions. 

Let me begin with energy security. Both countries make claims to the Chunxiao 

gas field which China claims is 5km away from the Japanese median line in the 

East China Sea. Currently, the Chinese energy company CNOOC is the operator of 

the field, and energy experts estimate that the Chunxiao could have as much as 250 

trillion cubic feet of natural gas and between 70–160 billion barrels of oil. 

Since both Japan and China are committed to diversifying their sources of their 

energy supplies, the natural gas and oil in the East China Sea is of utmost importance to both. 

An additional concern for China is the maritime distance between its ports and 

its main oil suppliers in the Persian Gulf. Beijing is increasingly uncomfortable 

about relying on U.S. goodwill to patrol those waters. Both national pride and suspicion of the United States drive China to seek alternative sources and routes of 

supply, preferably closer to the mainland in areas where China can project military 

power. The Chunxiao field is thus an important piece of Chinese energy security 

strategy. 

Another concern for Chinese strategists is that the Senkaku/Diaoyu chain resides 

within what the Chinese call the ‘‘first island chain,’’ a somewhat arbitrary demarcation that runs from the southern Japanese island of Kyushu, through the East 

and South China Seas. This area includes Taiwan, the Ryukus of Japan, and virtually all of the South China Sea. The Chinese increasingly act as though they want 

to dominate this island chain. For Chinese strategists, there are defensive and offensive purposes behind these claims. 

The Chinese write of being boxed in by a United States-Japan alliance that operates too closely to their own shoreline. Once designed to hem in the Soviet Pacific 

fleet, the alliance is now, Chinese strategists believe, part of an active containment 

strategy aimed at China. This partly explains China’s recent harassment of the 

USNS Impeccable, as well as its downing of a U.S. surveillance aircraft at Hainan 

Island in 2001. While the United States and China dispute provisions of the Law 

of the Sea and what constitutes lawful operations in China’s EEZ, I doubt these 

issues will be resolved in the near future. Geopolitics and Chinese maritime strategy 

hold greater purchase over China’s position than the law. Simply put, China wants 

to push the United States back further and further away from its shoreline and its 

claimed spheres of influence. 

Many Chinese strategists believe that the PRC cannot be a great power as long 

as the country is held within the maritime box constructed by Tokyo and Washington. The alliance, which also protects Taiwan, prevents the Chinese from projecting sea power into the Western Pacific. From a defensive perspective, Chinese 

strategists are committed to impeding U.S. access to this ‘‘first island chain’’ should 

there be a conflict over Taiwan. 

From the Japanese perspective, the Senkakus have been part of Japan throughout 

modern history—Tokyo never ceded that territory, including after losing World War 

II when it ceded much territory under the San Francisco Treaty. As it stands, Japan 

administers the Senkakus—while both China and Taiwan claim the island grouping 

to be theirs. 

Japan has leased part of the island grouping from private owners, intending to 

control any sale of territorial rights. Both Taiwan and China protested this action. 

Around the same time in 2003, CNOOC entered into a partnership to produce 

natural gas at Chunxiao. 

Japan protested and demanded China turn over seismic data. While Beijing remained intransigent, Japan granted the right to one of its own oil companies to 

begin drilling in the East China Sea. China responded by sending a naval flotilla, 

including a Soveremmeny to the site and issuing a stern warning to Japan to stop 

any energy exploration within ‘‘China’s’’ territory. Japan did cease its work. 

The Chinese flotilla sent to the East China Sea in 2005 has not been the first 

show of China’s maritime might. The Japanese declassified documents demonstrating that Chinese military and civilian research vessels and submarines had 

entered the Japanese EEZ over a dozen times in 2004 and 2005. The purpose of 

these maritime incursions included mapping for oil and gas exploration in disputed 

areas, showing force to pressure Japan in the ongoing dispute, and conducting 

research on submarine routes into and out of the Pacific. 

We and the Japanese were quite concerned as well when a Chinese Song-class 

diesel submarine surfaced a little too close for comfort near the USS Kitty Hawk 

during an American exercise near Japan in 2007. The submarine had apparently 

been shadowing the Carrier Strike Group undetected. 

From the Japanese perspective, then, the Senkaku/East China Sea dispute is 

about much more than energy interests and international law. It is a manifestation 

32 

of growing Chinese strength and assertiveness. Japan has a long history of fearing 

economic strangulation and isolation. Growing Chinese maritime power and shows 

of force are only heightening these fears. 

Finally, the dispute over EEZ claims and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands sheds some 

light on Japanese concerns over Taiwan. For Japanese strategists, Chinese control 

over Taiwan would put China’s naval bases even closer to Okinawa and the Ryuku 

Island chain, and extend the Chinese EEZ even further out toward the Pacific. The 

Japanese sense of insecurity—already high given the instability on the Korean 

Peninsula—would only heighten. 

While the two sides came to some agreement in 2008 to jointly explore for energy 

resources and shelve territorial disputes for the time being. But given the dynamics 

I just explained, both sides are keeping their powder dry. 

THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

The South China Sea disputes, including those over the Spratleys and Paracels, 

must be similarly analyzed in a geopolitical context. The dispute impinges upon the 

security interests of three great Asian powers—Japan, India, and China—as well as 

some of our less powerful allies and partners such as Vietnam and the Philippines. 

In essence, China claims sovereignty over all of the South China Sea. Vietnam, 

the Philippines, Brunei, and Taiwan dispute such claims, particularly those of sovereignty and rights of exploration over the islets around the Spratleys and the 

Paracels. As in the East China Sea, all claimants to territory within the South 

China Sea believe that it also holds significant oil and gas reserves. China has 

sparred with Vietnam and with the Philippines over islands in the Spratlys and 

with Vietnam over the Paracels. While China signed the Declaration on the Conduct 

of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, regional actors do not trust that China 

will abide by its commitments. Arguably, growing Chinese power and assertiveness 

in this area were major drivers behind Vietnam’s desire to build closer security ties 

with us, and the Philippines’ desire to sign a Visiting Forces Agreement with us in 

1999. 

The South China Sea is also a pathway to the all-important Strait of Malacca, 

considered to be one of the world’s most important maritime choke points and 

waterways for seaborne trade. Some 50,000 ships carrying a quarter of the world 

seaborne trade, and half of the world’s seaborne oil pass through Malacca annually. 

Since 90 percent of China’s and most of Japan’s oil comes by sea, it is natural that 

both countries have abiding interests in their own definition of security in the strait 

and the South China Sea. 

Last year anxiety heightened in Southeast Asia, Tokyo, and Delhi when the press 

reported on a new naval base that the Chinese have constructed at Hainan Island; 

the base can accommodate attack and ballistic missile submarines as well as a variety of surface combatants. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) can use the 

base to deploy stealthily into the South China Sea and access international waterways. 

Southeast Asians are concerned about the potential for China to put military pressure on them to settle their territorial disputes. Tokyo is concerned about the Chinese potential to dominate the waterways and coerce and isolate Japan. 

The Indians are concerned for two reasons. First, the discovery of the Hainan 

Island base adds to a growing Indian perception that the Chinese are finding ways 

to enter the Indian Ocean and constructing a string of maritime bases and facilities 

along the Indian Ocean—in Burma, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan—that it will use to 

project power closer to what India defines as its own sphere of influence. 

Second, India has been playing a larger economic role in Southeast Asia in particular and wants unimpeded maritime access to the region. It is concerned that 

what we are seeing develop for the region is the Chinese-equivalent of a Monroe 

Doctrine. 

REGIONAL REACTIONS

For now, all the concerned parties are attempting to balance against China’s 

growing power. Both Hanoi and Manila have sought closer ties with us. Tokyo, a 

great power constrained in military matters only by its pacifist constitution, has 

also energetically sought and received an upgraded bilateral alliance. The breakthrough with India was in no small part driven by shared Indian-American perceptions of the maritime security environment. 

In short, we share with our regional partners a desire that China not become the 

hegemonic power. The question that many in the region are beginning to have is 

whether we have the long-term will and power to match China’s rise. 

And that leads me to my concluding remarks. 

33 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We have not had a clear policy on competing claims within the South and East 

China Seas, nor have we taken a clear position with respect to the disposition of 

disputed islands. What we have said is that we will protect freedom of navigation 

and rights in EEZs consistent with international norms. 

Sticking to general principles regarding peaceful resolution of territorial disputes 

and freedom of navigation may be prudent given the historical sensitivities involved 

and our desire to have a cooperative relationship with China. 

But at the same time we must be aware of China’s apparent desire to dominate 

the South and East China Seas, extend its maritime periphery and freedom of 

action, and impede our access to these seas. 

We must also ensure that our friends and allies have the strength and backing 

to stand up against potential coercion, and that we ourselves can make good on our 

diplomatic commitments. 

We neither want to see a costly arms race in Asia nor an Asia dominated by 

China to our exclusion. To accomplish these objectives we should intensify our alliance diplomacy to reassure our allies that they will not be coerced. We should 

demarcate clear redlines to China regarding core principles of maritime behavior. 

But there is no getting around the fact the we must properly resource our 

military. 

There is an almost perfect symmetry between China’s naval buildup and our own 

drawdown. China has deployed dozens of new submarines just as we let our AntiSubmarine Warfare capabilities atrophy. As China deployed dozens of new subs we 

reduced our submarine force by about 25 boats. 

The Chinese have not only noticed the imbalance, they are counting on a continued decline in our naval power. China’s Rear Admiral Yang Yi gloated that ‘‘China 

already exceeds the United States in [submarine production] five times over . . . 18 

[U.S. submarines—the amount resident in the Pacific] against 75 or more Chinese 

submarines is obviously not encouraging [from a U.S. perspective].’’ The Chinese 

admiral is spot on. U.S. boats are superior, though the quality gap is closing. And 

the gap in quantity makes keeping track of the Chinese fleet even more difficult. 

I have been asked to say a few words about the role of U.S. sea power in maintaining the balance of power. I do so humbly, both because I am speaking to a 

former Secretary of the Navy and because I am aware that entering into force posture debates is a perilous endeavor. 

My institute convened a group of security and military experts to take a close and 

comprehensive look at our global force requirements ahead of the administration’s 

QDR. 

We examined Pacific requirements, and let me share some of our findings. 

First let me stress that our defense strategy in the Pacific should not be solely 

focused on possible war-fighting contingencies. Given that China has already 

changed the regional balance of power, ‘‘rebalancing’’ should become a day-to-day 

task of our forces. One way to conceptualize our Pacific force requirements is to 

think about a more robust presence and engagement force, and a surge force in case 

of conflict. I will speak mostly about the former. 

Our fleet size has not been this small since early in the 20th century. While we 

have better capabilities and seamen, given the vast expanse of the Pacific, fleet size 

matters. Our Pacific forces have many tasks besides maintaining the balance of 

power—they build partnership capacity, respond to natural disasters, and conduct 

antipiracy missions, for example. 

But let me focus on the China mission. A very rough estimate of naval requirements in the Pacific would include an increased presence of fast attack submarines 

(SSNs) to maintain a near constant presence in the East and South China Seas as 

well as the Sea of Japan. More submarines are needed to protect our Carrier Strike 

Groups, monitor Chinese submarines on patrol, and conduct ISR operations. Additional capability requirements include P8s and undersea sensors. 

Our missile and fleet defenses are inadequate to the growing Chinese innovations 

in ballistic missile production and over-the-horizon targeting. Unfortunately, we 

have come to a point where, if we want to keep our forward deployed carriers relevant, we need to focus more on protecting them. 

Useful capabilities to protect maritime assets include satellite-launched detection 

systems linked to tracking radar; a near constant presence of forward deployed 

ships capable of ballistic missile defense; and intelligence capabilities to provide to 

at-risk ships real-time indication and warning of anticarrier missile launches. 

While we need a layered missile defense system, directed energy remains the 

most promising means of defeating these threats, particularly the ASBM. More forward deployed Littoral Combat Ships can potentially play an important role in 

34 

maintaining a robust ASW capability and Anti-Surface Warfare capability in the 

littorals. 

All of these capabilities will help us surge if we need to. If our forces need to send 

more carriers to the region, measures to enhance their survivability will render 

them more effective. More robust ASW capability will provide us better freedom of 

action to execute operations. I would say that we should equally emphasize the survivability of our fixed land bases. We should create more logistical hubs in more 

friendly countries to enable our air forces to surge into the region. And, we must 

ensure that we have adequate stealthy aircraft and tankers for missions that are 

sure to be some of the most complex and stressing that we have ever faced. 

You were quite correct, Senator Webb, when you noted that we are in an odd position: Our defense budget has been announced before the Obama administration has 

undergone its own QDR. I would urge the Congress to make sure the administration’s defense review is not simply a budget cutting exercise. 

Finally, I am confident that diplomacy can succeed and Asia can enjoy more peace 

and prosperity as long as everyone knows that we can back up our commitments. 

What is required is good old fashioned American statecraft—speaking softly but carrying a big stick. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Mr. Blumenthal. 

Dr. Cronin, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD CRONIN, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, 

THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. CRONIN. It’s a privilege to address the committee—the subcommittee on this issue, which is very close to my own work and 

interests. 

I would just preface my remarks with a point, after hearing the 

discussion, that I’m suggesting a kind of two-pronged approach. 

And one, of course, is military preparedness and being ready to 

deal with whatever China has militarily, but also that there is a 

need to engage with China and in a way that tries to persuade 

China that its own long-term self-interest is in playing by the rules 

of the game. 

I think the Vietnam war, United States policy, United States 

decision to get into Vietnam, did—it should have taught us a lesson 

that we need to understand the psychology of our adversaries, if 

you want to put it in that way, if we want them to—and particularly if they want to change—we want them to change their own 

behavior. 

Now, that said, China’s unilateral assertion of its maritime 

claims that are contrary to principles of Law of the Sea and its 

willingness sometimes to resort to force and intimidation to achieve 

its goals have, indeed, become matters of serious concern in Asia 

and the Pacific. 

In terms of understanding where China may be coming from, you 

know, and psychologically and otherwise, it is important, I think, 

to keep in mind that, first, China does still feel the humiliation of 

how the Western powers—Russia and India and Japan occupied 

and alienated Chinese territory, and even some of its South 

Asian—smaller Southeast—China Sea neighbors encroached on 

China’s position during the chaos of the Mao’s—Chairman Mao’s 

cultural revolution. 

But then, second, we should see China’s actions in regard to its— 

the spillover effect of being, until recently, the fastest growing 

economy in the world, and its seemingly insatiable demand for raw 

materials and energy. 

35 

I should also add that China’s approach to territorial disputes in 

the South China Sea follows the same pattern as in disputes with 

Japan and its current moribund disputes with North and South 

Korea. And I would like to add, for a personal note, the same attitude also drives China’s determination to exploit the hydroelectric 

potential of the Mekong River without regard to the interests of 60 

million people, or more, in five downstream countries for whom the 

river is their lifeblood and main source of food security. That 

happens to be the main focus of my work right now at the Stimson 

Center. 

The United States isn’t a party, of course—and we’ve gone over 

this already, that—not a party to any of these territorial disputes, 

but it does have strong interests at stake. 

The other—most of them have been mentioned, but I’d particularly—I think you’re interested—or expressed an interest in issues 

like our commercial interest in regional trade and investment, as 

well as just for general desire to support peace and security—peace 

and stability in the region. 

Also, the USA has other important interests in the region that 

don’t, sometimes, get mentioned, but in which China is a real factor, and they include issues of climate change, global warming, 

cooperative and environmentally sustainable exploitation of migratory fish stocks, the protection of coral reefs. 

The fish-stocks issue is critically important, because it affects 

food security, it has provoked clashes at sea, in some cases, and it’s 

very hard to have any kind of regional agreement on managing 

fisheries, so long as the territorial claims are unresolved. 

The other witnesses have already talked about the Law of the 

Sea Convention and the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones and 

the problems that are caused by China’s not playing by the same 

rules in this regard. 

What I would like to mention, primarily, in terms of the Law of 

the Sea Convention, is that there was a deadline of May 13, this 

year, for countries to submit claims. And there was a land rush, 

or a sea rush, if you will. Everybody jumped in with their claims. 

And that has put a higher—generated a higher level of interest and 

tension about these issues. 

The most controversial Chinese actions have been in the Gulf of 

Tonkin and neighboring parts of the South China Sea, where China 

repeatedly has drilled for oil and gas in areas claimed by Vietnam, 

by historical occupation—which are likewise claimed by Vietnam, 

both by historic occupation and under the Law of the Sea rules. 

Chinese ships also have forcefully prevented Vietnamese and 

other neighboring countries’ fishing boats from operating in waters 

claimed by China. 

We’ve talked about the challenge to the U.S. Navy. I won’t get 

into that, the incident with the Impeccable. But, obviously that’s an 

important issue for us. 

I do want to mention other Southeast Asian disputes—maritime 

disputes, which also use competing—also involve competing claims. 

Thailand and Cambodia are now very active—in a very active dispute over ownership of the Preah Vihear Temple on a mountain 

that straddles their mutual border, as well as a dispute over the 

36 

boundaries of each other’s territorial waters. Troops of both countries have been involved in armed clashes. 

The maritime disputes involves overlapping claims to oil and gas 

reserves that Chevron and ConocoPhillips, among others, are seeking to develop. 

Thailand and Vietnam also have conflicting claims to parts of the 

Gulf of Thailand, which is rich—has rich oil and gas deposits. The 

gulf is particularly difficult to delineate because it is bounded by 

Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Everybody can’t have 

a 200-mile EEZ in a curving coastline. 

Malaysia, on Borneo, also has a claim to part of the South China 

Sea that is also claimed by Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, and 

China. 

A joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam to the Law of the 

Sea—we call it UNCLOS, for short, the U.N. Convention on Law 

of the Sea—earlier this year provoked an angry response by China 

and a counterclaim, which, however, was not supported by reference to the provisions of the Law of the Sea, but, again, by China’s 

historical claim. 

So, thus far, the direct and indirect impact of China’s behavior 

has mainly affected the opportunities for American and other multinational countries for oil and gas exploration and development, 

and blocks—and particularly blocs offered by Vietnam. 

Numerous claims report that China has—reports claim that 

China has told American and other multinational companies that 

if they want to do business with China in their oil and gas business, they should not drill in areas in the Tonkin Gulf and South 

China Sea that are claimed by Vietnam. This is a real issue, as you 

know, in China-Vietnam relations. 

For understandable reasons, United States multinational energy 

companies are reluctant to publicize the problems created by China’s attitude toward contested claims. But, there have been reports 

that in 2007 and 2008, China coerced ExxonMobil, as well as BP, 

to suspend drilling in waters claimed by Vietnam. 

Part of my—important part of my testimony, I would say, deals 

with environmental, social, and economic impacts, but I’m going to 

skip by those to just try to identify some things that the United 

States might do in regard to this issue and in support of our allies 

and friendly countries. 

There are several ways that the United States could serve its 

and Southeast Asia’s interests, especially through diplomacy, 

science, and technology support, and capacity-building to deal with 

the rising destruction from storms, climate change, and climate 

change adaptation. 

But, to pursue these issues in the context of China’s claims and 

role, it’s important for the United States to be on the scene, again. 

And I won’t go into the long story of at least the perception that 

the United States has been absent from Southeast Asia for a long 

time, but it has come back, even during the George W. Bush 

administration. In fact, Ambassador Scot Marciel—or Deputy 

Assistant Secretary Marciel was our first Ambassador appointed to 

ASEAN back in 2007. And it apparent—at present, the Obama 

administration, and especially the State Department, appear to be 

stepping up the pace of constructive U.S. involvement in the reVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:08 Oct 28, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\MARITIME.TXT BETTY
37 

gion. All Southeast Asian capitals will be listening closely to what 

Secretary of State Clinton has to say when she attends the ASEAN 

post-ministerial conference between ASEAN and its dialogue partners and the ASEAN Regional Forum in just a couple of days. 

The United States would also help the region and itself by 

responding to requests for material support to ASEAN’s Coral Triangle Initiative. I won’t get into that now, but it’s another issue 

where ASEAN has had a lot of talk and no action. But, part of that 

problem is a lack of financial resources and other resources. 

Just to conclude, I’d like to say that, at the end of the day, China 

can’t be pushed around. We have to engage with China, and we are 

engaging with China, including at this high-level United StatesChina Strategic Economic Dialogue issue. And the important thing 

for us, I think, is to provide moral support to our friends and allies 

in the region, but also, again, to work on China to try to make 

China realize that we can’t be pushed around, either, and that its 

long-term interests lie in the kind of neighborly relations that it 

always insists that it desires with the ASEAN countries. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cronin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD P. CRONIN, DIRECTOR, SOUTHEAST ASIA

PROGRAM, THE STIMSON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC 

Senator Webb and other members of the Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific 

Affairs, I thank you for this opportunity to address the subcommittee about some 

issues in East Asia and the Pacific which are critical to peace, stability, and balanced development in a part of the world that matters greatly to the United States. 

For reasons you have implied in your invitation to testify at this hearing, China’s 

unilateral assertion of maritime claims that are contrary to the principles of the 

Law of the Sea, and its willingness sometimes to resort to force and intimidation 

to achieve its goals, have become matters of serious concern in Asia and the Pacific. 

Nonetheless, if we hope to gain greater Chinese acceptance of the rules and principles of global governance—none of which are completely embraced by any major 

economic power—we should keep in mind at least two important factors that have 

influenced China’s approach. First, China still feels the humiliation of how the 

Western colonial powers, Russia, and Japan occupied and alienated Chinese territory. Even some of its South China Sea neighbors encroached on China’s position 

during the chaos of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, when Chinese attention was focused 

inward. Thus, China remains determined to redress what it sees as past injuries 

and reclaim what it views, rightly or wrongly, as its own. This includes the position 

it once held as the dominant power in what the world still calls the South China. 

Second, much of China’s assertive behavior is a spillover effect of what until just 

recently had been the world’s fastest growing economy. 

Among other goals, China seeks to make its energy and mining companies global 

players in terms of capitalization, technology, and access rights to important national resources. It would be better for China and its trading partners and competitors if its leaders understood the efficiency of global markets and were not wedded 

to a mercantilist approach to locking up energy and other natural resources through 

long-term contracts, but China is not alone in this competition. 

Still, China’s recent behavior does affect legitimate American and Southeast 

Asian interests, including freedom of navigation, access to rich undersea oil and gas 

deposits, and the cooperative and sustainable development of other seabed resources, fisheries, and estuaries. The consequences of China’s behavior in the South 

China Sea in particular jeopardize regional peace and stability, economic development, traditional subsistence livelihoods, and food security among the other countries of the littoral. 

China’s approach to territorial disputes in the South China Sea follows the same 

pattern as in disputes with Japan and its currently moribund disputes with North 

and South Korea. The same attitude also drives China’s determination to exploit the 

hydroelectric power potential of the Mekong River without regard for the interests 

of 60 million people or more in five downstream countries for whom the river is 

their lifeblood and main source of food security. From its own developmental 

38 

perspective, Chinese policymakers appear to believe that the outward expansion of 

the Chinese economy is beneficial to all, but in this case the reality is far different. 

In any event, its behavior toward its downstream neighbors is cavalier and 

unilateralist. I would be glad to address those issues if you wish, but for now I will 

concentrate on the South China Sea. 

The United States itself is not party to any territorial disputes in Asia, but we 

have a strong interest in the issues at stake. Also, the while the United States has 

signed the Convention but has not ratified it. Nonetheless, the United States adheres to the broad principles of the Convention, which it played an important role 

in drafting. Somewhat ironically, China has ratified the Convention but appears to 

be seeking to impose its own interpretation as regards its maritime territorial 

claims. 

U.S. interests include the most basic ones such as regional peace and stability, 

the right of innocent passage of U.S. warships, and important commercial interests 

in regional trade, investment. China’s rejection of accepted international principles 

also extends to the air, and contributed to the 2001 mid-air collision between a U.S. 

reconnaissance plane and a Chinese fighter, and the crash landing of the U.S. aircraft on Hainan Island. 

At the global level we have a very important interest in the South China Sea with 

regard to climate change and global warming, the cooperative and environmentally 

sustainable exploitation of migratory fish stocks and the protection of coral reefs. 

In fact, the U.S. Government has been deeply and constructively engaged with 

China on these issues. 

With regard to maritime territorial disputes, I will address primarily on so-called 

‘‘nontraditional security interests’’ (NTS) such as the impact of territorial disputes 

on economic development, food security, livelihoods, and on American business 

interests in the South China Sea and adjacent Southeast Asian waters. 

IMPACT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION OF 1994

The importance and tenaciousness of conflicting claims to disputed territories has 

grown steadily since the adoption in 1994 of The United Nations Convention on the 

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the ‘‘Law of the Sea,’’ which provides for 200 nautical 

mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) extending beyond a country’s shore. The Convention also conveys exclusive rights to the seabed resources of a nation’s continental shelf, subject to a 350-nautical-mile limit from the ‘‘baseline’’ (most commonly 

the mean low water line on the shore) and 2,500 meters depth. 

The growing tensions over conflicting territorial claims are being driven by presumed seabed resources such as oil and gas and fisheries. The energy sources have 

become increasingly valuable and easier to extract because of technological advances 

in drilling and related activities. The rapid decline open water fish stocks and 

resultant rise in prices has threatened food security in some countries and made 

jurisdiction over fisheries a source of actual conflict. 

Most of the territorial disputes are more heated at this moment because the 

UNCLOS required countries to submit formal claims by May 13, 2009. Several countries have already made formal complaints to other countries’ submissions, most 

notably by China. 

Realistically, it is not possible to draw lines that would give every country a 200- 

mile EEZ. This means that most of these disputes will have to be settled by negotiations or unilateral actions. 

CHINA AS THE COMMON DENOMINATOR IN SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES AND THE

MEKONG DELTA

Beijing has repeatedly asserted its sovereignty over almost the entire South China 

Sea, and has acted forcefully to enforce its claims. In 1974 China took advantage 

of the failing South Vietnamese Government to attack islands in the Paracels group, 

which had been garrisoned by South Vietnamese troops. The reunified Government 

of Vietnam maintains the claims of the former Saigon government. In 1998 more 

than 70 Vietnamese sailors died in a clash between Chinese and Vietnamese ships 

near Johnson Reef in the Spratlys in 1988. The Spratly Islands incident of 1995 involved China’s occupation of small reefs that are 130 nautical miles from the nearest Philippines land mass—well within the Philippines internationally recognized 

EEZ, and 620 miles from China. 

The 1995 incident at Mischief Reef provoked a collective reaction among the 

ASEAN countries that appears to have taken China by surprise. In response, China 

proposed joint development of undersea resources until the issues are resolved. In 

fact, however, China still resolutely refuses to enter into substantive multilateral 

discussions and has used its superior power to enforce its claims unilaterally. 

39 

The most controversial Chinese actions have been in the Gulf of Tonkin and the 

surrounding parts of the South China Sea, where China has repeatedly drilled for 

oil and gas in areas claimed by Vietnam by historical occupation and under 

UNCLOS rules. Chinese ships have also forcefully prevented Vietnamese and other 

neighboring countries’ fishing boats from operating in waters claimed by China. 

China is now directly challenging the U.S. Navy’s rights to operate in what it considers its EEZ. In March 2009, five small Chinese vessels interfered with operations 

of a U.S. Navy survey ship, the Impeccable, some 75 miles from the shore of China’s 

Hainan Island. China claimed that the Impeccable was violating its EEZ by conducting seabed survey operations. Even when the U.S. ship turned fire hoses on the 

Chinese boats they kept interfering with its forward movement. China also threatened to send an armed patrol boat to protect the smaller craft harassing the U.S. 

ship and support its jurisdiction over the Paracel and Spratly islands. 

OTHER SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES

A number of unresolved disputes include those between the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Many of these disputes involve competing claims on both land and sea. Some of the more contentious ones include: 

• Thailand and Cambodia, including a now very active dispute over ownership of 

the Preah Vihear Temple on a mountain that straddles their mutual border as 

well as a dispute over the boundaries of each other’s territorial waters. The 

Preah Vihear dispute is on the front boiler in both countries because of Cambodia’s stated intention to unilaterally request the site and its surroundings as 

a World Heritage protected site. Troops of both countries have been involved in 

armed clashes. The maritime dispute involves overlapping claims to oil and gas 

resources that Chevron and ConocoPhillips, among others, are seeking to 

develop. The handling of this issue by the previous Thai Government played a 

significant role in Thailand’s ongoing political turmoil. • Thailand and Vietnam also have conflicting claims to the parts of the Gulf of 

Thailand, which has rich oil and gas deposits. The Gulf of Thailand is particularly difficult to delineate because it is bounded by Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Cambodia objected to a settlement between Thailand and 

Vietnam. • Malaysia (on Borneo) also has a claim to part of the South China Sea that is 

also claimed by Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, and China. A joint submission by Malaysia and Thailand to UNCLOS earlier this year provoked an angry 

response by China and a counter claim which, however, was not supported by 

reference to the provision of the Law of the Sea. 

IMPACT OF CHINA’S BEHAVIOR ON THE ABILITY OF U.S. COMPANIES TO OPERATE IN

CONTESTED AREAS

Thus far the direct and indirect impact of China’s behavior has mainly affected 

the opportunities for American multinational companies in oil and gas exploration 

and development in blocs offered by Vietnam and other countries. This includes the 

direct operations of U.S. multinationals as well as joint ventures with other multinational companies and national oil and gas companies in Southeast Asia. Numerous reports claim that China has told American and other multinational companies 

that if they want to do business with China they must not drill in areas of the 

Tonkin Gulf that are claimed by Vietnam. 

Vietnam’s oil and gas production has flattened out and probably cannot be increased without the participation of multinational companies. Unless Vietnam and 

China reach some kind of agreement, Vietnam has little prospect of exploiting some 

of the most promising oil and gas fields in areas that it claims as territorial waters 

or EEZs. Beijing has the upper hand, and has been able to pressure multinational 

oil companies operating in China to stop their survey and drilling operations in valuable leases given by Vietnam. 

For understandable reasons U.S. multinational energy companies are reluctant to 

publicize problems created by China’s attitude toward contested claims, but Beijing 

reportedly has successfully intimidated multinational energy companies from drilling in contested areas. In 2007 and 2008 China reportedly coerced ExxonMobil as 

well as BP to suspend drilling in waters claimed by Vietnam. 

Piracy also remains a problem for U.S. and other countries’ shipping companies. 

As in the case of Somalia, the destruction caused to coastal fisheries by large commercial factory-scale fleets may be contributing to the piracy in the South China Sea 

and the Strait of Malacca. In recent years, entire ships with cargoes have disappeared and reappeared under different names and flags, and pirates have boarded 

ships in the Strait of Malacca and held hostages for ransom. Beginning with a 2004 

40 

agreement between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, and support to sea-lane 

monitoring by the U.S. Navy, these incidents have been trending downward in the 

last few years. 

Still, there is a long history of piracy among the Indonesian and Philippine 

Islands, and parts of Malaysia’s coastline on Borneo. As the potential for legitimate 

fishing declines, and as the rampant destruction of tropical forests reduces valuable 

timber cargos, groups with a history of involvement in piracy could return to their 

previous occupations. 

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIOECONOMIC, AND HUMAN SECURITY IMPACTS

Among many negative consequences of these unresolved territorial disputes, they 

pose a significant obstacle to the cooperative and sustainable management of the resources of the South China Sea. Various proposals for cooperative efforts to manage 

fisheries, protect coral reefs, and control the negative impacts of deforestation, mining and urban runoff thus far have been nonstarters. 

The rampant overexploitation of fisheries throughout the South China Sea and 

adjacent waters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans threatens the collapse of important 

food species. Littoral states cannot control what happens on the high seas but if 

these disputes could be resolved, countries would have at least the right, even if not 

the power, to manage their own EEZs. 

A number of maritime disputes directly hinder economic development and, at 

least the possibility of responsible and environmentally and sustainable development. The disputes between Thailand and Cambodia and between China and Vietnam harm the development interests of the weaker parties. Moreover, if Cambodia, 

for instance, could develop offshore and inshore oil and gas deposits, its government 

might not feel the same compulsion to resort to destructive hydropower dam projects 

in currently protected forests in the Cardamom Mountains and on the Mekong 

mainstream. At present, the high cost of electricity in Cambodia is one of several 

major obstacles to development. 

POTENTIAL U.S. ROLE IN SUPPORTING PEACE AND STABILITY

Even though it is not a direct party to these maritime disputes, there are several 

ways that the United States could serve its own and Southeast Asia’s interests, especially through diplomacy, science and technology support, and capacity building 

to deal with rising destruction from storms and climate change adaptation. The 

means to pursue these objectives can include: 

More regional involvement, especially in support of ASEAN. It is widely viewed 

in the region and among observers and policy analysts both here and elsewhere that 

with a few important exceptions the United States has been conspicuously absent 

from the main currents in Southeast Asia for several decades. Thanks in particular 

to the sometimes unpopular efforts of the officials at our embassies and consulates 

in the region to get greater attention from Washington, this has been changing since 

the last years of the Bush administration. The appointment concurrently of Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Bureau, Scot Marciel, as our 

first Ambassador to ASEAN in 2007 is a good example of the positive trend in U.S. 

attention to Southeast Asia. 

At present, the Obama administration and especially the State Department appear to be stepping up the pace of constructive U.S. involvement in the region. All 

Southeast Asian capitals will be listening closely to what Secretary of State Clinton 

has to say when she attends the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) between ASEAN and its ‘‘dialogue partners’’ and the ASEAN Regional Forum, in just 

a couple of days. The expectation is that she will bring a new U.S. initiative, probably regarding support to climate change adaptation and related issues that affect 

human and food security. 

The United States could also help the region and itself by responding to requests 

for material support to ASEAN’s Coral Triangle Initiative. The ‘‘Coral Triangle’’ covers a vast area of sea between Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Papua New 

Guinea, Timor Leste, and the Solomon Islands. Host to thousands of fish species 

worth many billions of dollars a year, the Coral Triangle is under increasing assault 

from destructive methods used by large commercial fishing fleets—including those 

of China, South Korea, and Japan and other major seafaring countries—as well as 

deforestation, and pollution runoff from the land. As with many ASEAN projects, 

this one has seen more grand commitments than action, but none of the countries 

have the necessary resources to carry out their commitments. This would be an appropriate project for cooperation with Australia, which has major concerns about 

this issue and has special relationships with Papua New Guinea (PNG), Timor Leste 

and the Solomons. 

41 

The United States can help resolve maritime disputes between willing nations 

through support to research on undersea structures and resources, and the collection of data. Initiatives such as these might possibly help countries make a better 

case to China, and even help it make concessions without appearing to lose face. 

Directly Asserting U.S. Rights and Interests. Above all, the Obama administration 

should abandon its predecessors’ passive attitude since 1995 toward Chinese behavior in the Spratlys and elsewhere that is not supportable under the principles of the 

Law of the Sea. The Obama dministration should lend at least moral support to 

Southeast Asian countries which are subject to intimidation, and be resolute in asserting its own rights to free passage in the face of Chinese provocations. 

It can do this in the framework of the United States-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The upcoming meeting in Washington during July 27–28 follows 

closely the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and the PMC and ARF meetings in 

Phuket, Thailand, during July 17–23. Secretary of State Clinton should return from 

that meeting after getting firsthand knowledge of the concerns of China’s neighbors. 

Unfortunately, in regard to maritime disputes in the South China Sea, Beijing 

has put itself on the wrong side of international law and norms. For U.S. and other 

diplomacy to have any chance of positive impact, however, China’s perspectives on 

maritime territorial disputes and its power in most cases to enforce its claims need 

to be kept in mind. The only approach that realistically has a chance to succeed is 

for China to realize that a more flexible approach is in its own long-term self-interest as well as that of its neighbors. 

The U.S. Congress can play an important and constructive role by holding hearings such as this one to highlight these issues and by authorizing and funding, after 

due deliberation, important new U.S. initiatives toward ASEAN and Southeast Asia 

more generally. U.S. attention need not, and should not, be polarizing, or aimed at 

stigmatizing China. That simply will not work. Instead, we should make every effort 

to respect China’s aspirations for leadership and major power status, but within the 

internationally recognized rules and norms, and support those of our Southeast 

Asian allies and friends as well. 

Thank you very much for the privilege of testifying at this hearing. I would be 

happy to try to answer any questions you may have or respond subsequently for the 

record. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Dr. Cronin. 

And that was actually a very good way to end the testimony of 

all three of the panelists, all of which I appreciate very much. 

I’d like to comment about something you said, about 2 minutes 

ago, and then clarify my view of what this hearing is all about, and 

then maybe we can have a discussion. We’ve got three very divergent sets of experience that we can draw on. 

One of the worries that I personally have had for a number of 

years goes into what you just said, Dr. Cronin, and that is, if we 

don’t have enough discussion in the United States Congress about 

East Asia—whether it’s Northeast Asia or Southeast Asia—in a 

proactive way—we have fallen into big notions, either reacting to 

crises, like we saw in Burma last year, or talking about the economic relations with China, which seems to dominate the discussion, and every now and then we kind of talk around the edges. 

And it’s very important, I think, to have the kind of discussion 

we’re having today. This is not a hearing that is designed to bash 

China; it’s a hearing that is designed to raise issues that aren’t 

being discussed. And you cannot resolve problems if you don’t discuss them. And that particularly goes for the United States Government in the situation where we find ourselves in with respect 

to our relations with China, and also with East Asia. 

And this is more than the situation of the United States and 

China, it’s very much a question of how we are able to resolve our 

relationship in a way that maintains a proper balance in this 

region—— 

Dr. CRONIN. Right. 

42 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. And in a way that all the countries 

in the region can have the opportunity to grow at their own pace 

and to interact without fear of retribution. And it’s a delicate balance. East Asia has always been a delicate balance. The interests 

of China are there, Japan are there, the United States, and Russia. 

It’s very unique in the world, in that sense. So, I want to clarify, 

really, what we’re after, today. 

I’d like to throw something to the panel, to have all of you react 

to, and I would start by—this is kind of a segue from what I just 

said, but it comes from Professor Dutton’s testimony. When you 

mentioned that, ‘‘With respect to what’s been going on, this unsettling development suggests that our regional partners also sense a 

shift in power dynamics in the South China Sea, and may need 

more reassurance that we are currently giving them that, that the 

United States remains fully committed.’’ This, to me, is sort of a— 

the jugular issue, from my perspective, with the subject matter of 

these hearings today. And I’d like to hear from all three of you with 

respect to that. 

And, Professor Dutton, you may as well start. 

Professor DUTTON. Well, thank you, sir. 

In my line of work, I do a fair amount of traveling throughout 

East Asia, and we have students of the Naval War College 

throughout East Asia. And two things are common in almost every 

conversation. One is the sort of dominating presence of China in all 

aspects of East Asian society, and sort of questioning American— 

the continued American commitment to East Asia in light of our 

current challenges—economic and military—and then also in light 

of the fact that our relationship with China is, in many ways, very 

cooperative. I want to emphasize that, as well. It’s very cooperative 

and also very entwined. We are linked in many ways with China, 

and so, there—leads, frequently, to questioning whether we would 

prioritize the interests of our friends and allies in the region as 

highly as they would if chips were down and if we had to essentially stand behind them in a controversy with China. 

That’s the kind of talk that I hear in—with relative frequency. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

Mr. Blumenthal. 

Mr. BLUMENTHAL. I noted two things in my oral remarks. One 

was that possibly our greatest ally in the world, besides Britain, 

Australia, is becoming much more public about their very deep concerns with respect both to China’s military modernization, as well 

as our staying power and our presence in the region. And those 

things came out very clearly in the Australian white paper. And I 

would take that as a barometer, as an indicator, because a few 

years ago in Australia, things weren’t—things were the opposite, 

where we were—we were more concerned about a hypothetical situation in Northeast Asia, where Australia wouldn’t be at our side 

because of Australian commercial interests. Again, the change in 

Canberra is just dramatic, and, I think, exacerbated by the fact 

that the head of Rio Tinto in China has been arrested this week, 

and I think you get the same—you get the same reactions in 

Tokyo. You’ve seen the way the Vietnamese—I would say one of 

the drivers that lead us back into a Visiting Forces Agreement with 

the Vietnamese was Chinese behavior with respect to the Spratlys 

43 

and Paracels, as well as—sorry, the Visiting Forces Agreement 

with the Philippines and—but, the Vietnamese reach out to us. 

But, again, I think that there is a sense—I think there is a sense, 

based on looking at our fiscal situation and based—looking at our 

budgetary situation, and based on the fact that we already have 

had to cut down on some military-presence activities, there is a 

sense of who’s going to be in the region longer, China or the United 

States? And I think countries are already starting to make that 

calculation. 

And that’s why I also wanted to stress that, sometimes when we 

talk about China and Chinese military modernization, we talk 

about it as if it’s some kind of scientific, futuristic scenario, nextdoor-itis or something like that. For our allies in the region, it’s 

very much a today problem, a daily problem. And therefore, I 

would start to think about it in terms of what we need to do day 

to day to keep the balance of power in Asia in order to avoid conflict, and then conceptually put aside what would happen if we actually got into conflict. 

So, we do tend to think that it’s unthinkable that something 

could happen in Asia, and our allies are not on the same page 

about that. And I think we really need to start to show them that, 

you know, we’re serious, and not only through diplomacy and 

through other means, but also through the military presence to 

back it up. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

Dr. Cronin. 

Dr. CRONIN. Yes, thank you, Senator Webb. 

Frankly, for openers on this, your question, I don’t think the real 

issue right now, and even in the fairly distant future, is about the 

ability of the U.S. Navy to, you know, deal with the Chinese Navy, 

if it comes to that, and as Dan says, you know, the sort of unimaginable situation. That’s not true of our allies and friends in the 

region, who are, you know, much weaker in that particular sphere. 

But, I want to go back to your issue—the point you made about 

the need for balancing. And I think there are two aspects to this, 

some of which I think you were perhaps alluding to already—one 

is this issue of, you know, maintaining a proper military balance. 

And I think—I sort of trust that the U.S. Defense Department and 

the Navy and the Obama administration will take care of that 

without too much difficulty. But, there’s the other issue of balance, 

and that has to do with this economic crisis, the economic crisis, 

and the need to rebalance the economies—the United States economy and the Chinese—China’s economy and those of Southeast 

Asia, which are more export-oriented, and we’re more importoriented. And we’ve now seen that this is an unsustainable kind of 

situation so that each side has to make some painful adjustments. 

And these adjustments that are needed are going to create difficulties in our relations with China. But, on the other hand, they will 

strengthen us, in time, I believe, if we can make this adjustment. 

It’s also a problem for our allies and friends, trading partners in 

Southeast Asia, a bigger problem, perhaps, than it is for China, 

although politically, it’s maybe a bigger problem for China, in 

terms of internal politics. 

44 

So, I think what’s—the big picture here is that the United States 

and China’s roles are—we’re still interdependent—economically 

interdependent, and actually interdependent in a lot of other areas; 

for instance, we need China to help us deal with North Korea 

through the six-party talks. We need China to help keep peace in 

the Strait of Taiwan. There are a lot of reasons why China, you 

know, is an important country to us. 

So, it goes back to the issue of engagement, and then it goes back 

to the issue of—particularly of rebalancing our economies and rebalancing our political relations. 

And to go back to an issue of my interest, which wasn’t exactly 

the South China Sea, but—take, for instance, this Mekong River 

issue and China’s monster dams it is building in Yunnan, which 

are very threatening to Vietnam and other countries in the region. 

You know, the Chinese need to ask themselves, and we need to 

help the Chinese ask themselves, ‘‘If you turn the Mekong into the 

Yangtze, is that going to help your interests in the longer term?’’ 

No, I think there’s an enormous prospect for blowback. I just spent 

3 weeks—just came back a week and a half ago from almost 3 

weeks in Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam, and had a number of 

high-level meetings. And I also got down to the Vietnam Delta for 

the first time, to Can Tho, where I gave a presentation. And, you 

know, this is an issue that is alarming all of these governments. 

Maybe the Cambodian Government less so, but there are people in 

the Cambodian Government who are quite alarmed about it. So, it’s 

an issue where we can engage with China, and we can also engage 

with these regional countries to help them in various ways to deal 

with this concern. 

Senator WEBB. Let me, if I may, offer a quick reaction to your 

comment about balance, because I think that’s really what we 

need, in many different ways, here. In terms of military balance, 

a long time ago, a mentor of mine said that, ‘‘Strategy is like birth 

control, that the possibility of an incident increases if you cease to 

take the necessary precautions.’’ 

Dr. CRONIN. Exactly. [Laughter.] 

Senator WEBB. And this is really—— 

Dr. CRONIN. Yes. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Where we are with the sizing of our 

military. And a big part of a military presence is the credibility 

that it implies. It’s been written many, many times, that there’s a 

difference between a maritime presence and a sea-power presence, 

which—— 

Dr. CRONIN. Right. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Creates a credible deterrence—in 

fact, I see Professor Dutton rolling his eyes. There’s a great piece 

in the ‘‘Naval Review.’’ I’m going to really date myself here. The 

‘‘Naval Review’’ in 1972, there was a German admiral, named 

Wegner, who wrote a wonderful piece defining ‘‘sea power.’’ If you 

can ever dig back in the archives and get it, it’s one of the best 

strategic pieces I’ve ever read. 

The other part, in terms of economic balance, we have a serious 

vulnerability in our relationship with China that feeds a lot of the 

anxieties on these other issues, but there’s also an issue of economic balance in the region. And this is one of the things that I’m 

45 

concerned about. And we don’t discuss it enough here in the United 

States. And we are the only guarantor to provide some sort of a 

credible umbrella under which these other countries in the region 

can successfully grow their economies without intimidation. So, 

that’s really one of the things that has been a concern of mine. 

Dr. Cronin, you mentioned in your testimony, ‘‘The United States 

is not a party to any territorial disputes in Asia, but several allies 

and important friendly countries are.’’ Could you—or, have you covered that in your testimony? If not, I’d like to hear more about it. 

Dr. CRONIN. Well, I didn’t go into the United States angle, in 

particular, but I talked about Thailand—— 

Senator WEBB. So, you’re talking about—— 

Dr. CRONIN [continuing]. Cambodia—— 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Countries in the region—— 

Dr. CRONIN [continuing]. Vietnam—— 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Rather than—— 

Dr. CRONIN. But, you know—— 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. External—— 

Dr. CRONIN [continuing]. Japan—if you go to Northeast Asia, 

Japan and Korea. Thailand’s an ally. Australia has an interest in 

these issues. But, I’m just saying that the actual seabed claims 

are—or, EEZ claims—are of interest—deep interest to us. But, 

they’re not our claims. 

Senator WEBB. You’re not aware of any of those external countries having specifically stated a position on issues like the 

Spratlys and the Paracels? I’m personally not. I was wondering if 

you had heard—— 

Dr. CRONIN. No, I think most countries, apart from the claimants—— 

Senator WEBB. Right. 

Dr. CRONIN [continuing]. Take the same position we do. I do feel, 

though, that—and I think someone else mentioned this earlier— 

that we had been too passive in 1995 about that issue. We did the 

same thing with the assertion by Japan, in this case, that the disputed islands with China were part of Okinawa. In fact, we handed 

them back to Japan. Before we handed back Okinawa, we had to 

actually use them, ourselves, for some minor purposes, you know, 

military exercises, et cetera. That—when it came down to it, the 

State Department initially said, when this came up several years 

ago, that, yes, we—we didn’t have a—we didn’t have an opinion on 

this issue, but we actually—in practice, we had actually handed 

back these islands as part of the Okinawa return. 

I’m not sure if I’ve gotten to your—all of your question, but—— 

Senator WEBB. You did. I’m—— 

Dr. CRONIN. OK, thank you. 

Senator WEBB. I was just curious as to—maybe I was missing 

something, in terms of parties external to the conflict—— 

Dr. CRONIN. Yes. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. That were allies of ours, that had 

taken a specific position. But, I’m not aware that there are any—— 

Dr. CRONIN. No, I’m not—— 

Senator WEBB. I don’t think there are. 

Dr. CRONIN [continuing]. I’m not, either. Thank you. 

46 

And the other thing I should mention, related to this, though, is 

that whether you’re talking to the Vietnamese or the Thais or other 

people—other countries in the—Southeast Asia, yes, they want the 

United States to be there, they want the United States to maintain 

balance, military balance in the region, but they don’t want the 

United States to get into a confrontation with China that leads 

them to—you know, puts them in a position of being the mouse 

that gets trampled by the elephants. I mean, that’s an exaggeration. But, the main point is, what the Vietnamese are looking for 

is advice from us, ‘‘How can we engage China in a nonprovocative 

way and actually get some headway with them? How do we get 

their attention in a way that just doesn’t get’’—— 

Senator WEBB. I would say that—frankly, I think there’s a great 

concern in the Vietnam Government about this. It’s been—— 

Dr. CRONIN. Yes. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Communicated to me directly. And 

they believe they have economic issues that are at risk because of 

the imbalance. I think that’s—— 

Dr. CRONIN. But, if I could—— 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Something that would be—— 

Dr. CRONIN [continuing]. Mention, also, that—sorry. 

Senator WEBB. That’s OK. 

Dr. CRONIN. Prime Minister Abhisit, from Thailand, and Prime 

Minister Dung, from Vietnam, just met, last weekend, and one of 

the main points in the communique was concern about peace and 

stability in the region, but particularly, in this case, the Mekong 

issue. And I think that there’s a growing concern, both about the 

South China Sea and about some of the other areas where China, 

you know, flexes its muscles in a way that makes a lot of people 

worried. 

Senator WEBB. I don’t think there’s any doubt about that. And 

as Mr. Blumenthal mentioned, the Burma situation—I think it was 

Mr. Blumenthal, I think, on the—in testimony, about the perceived 

activities of—naval activities of China in the Indian Ocean and beyond. I mentioned, in my opening remarks, the more than a billiondollar oil pipeline deal that the Burmese just entered into with the 

Chinese, which would obviate the need to go through the Strait of 

Malacca and would increase an already dramatic economic presence of China in Burma. 

At least two of you have something of a disagreement in terms 

of future growth of the Chinese Navy. Professor Dutton, you’re— 

as a naval officer, you basically are fairly saying what about that? 

You were saying you don’t see that the Chinese Navy has a reason 

to expand. And I think, Mr. Blumenthal, you had a different view. 

Would the two of you like to clarify that? 

Professor DUTTON. Well, it’s kind of a qualified statement that 

they don’t have a reason to expand. But, I—fundamentally, I see 

China as what the great geostrategist Mackinder would call it, an 

‘‘inner crescent’’ power. And what that means is essentially a continental power with a naval—with a need for a navy to support its 

continental presence. And its naval power will develop in order to 

meet the needs of its growing trade and regional interests, but 

probably not developed to the extent to challenge a truly maritime 

power from the ‘‘outer crescent,’’ like the United States, Britain, 

47 

Japan once was. These states, like ours, are fundamentally maritime in nature, and we must, in order for our security—maintain 

the size and quality of the navy to exert global influence in the 

maritime commons. 

China, because of its continental situation, will always have 

weaknesses on its land front. As we’ve seen recently, some of them 

are even internal, others are the potential rise of other powers on 

the continent, that they have to be concerned about. They cannot 

afford to put the kind of resources into a navy that we can afford 

to put into it, we must afford to put into a navy, in order to maintain our national security, would be my essential argument in that 

regard. 

Senator WEBB. Mr. Blumenthal. 

Mr. BLUMENTHAL. One of the most interesting debates going on 

in China has been well documented by Peter Dutton’s colleagues at 

the Naval War College, and that’s the fascination with Alfred 

Thayer Mahan, which is gaining great currency in Chinese naval 

circles. And we can, as Americans, debate what command of the 

sea means, or maritime versus sea power, but more interesting is 

that the Chinese are debating that. And what you get out of—what 

you get out of them on that is that—for reasons of national prestige 

and national pride, as well as deep-felt insecurity, partly for the 

reasons that Richard Cronin mentioned about humiliations and 

depredations of the past, and a mistrust of the United States, they 

believe, however—you can interpret Mahan however you want, but 

they believe that they must look seaward. Most of their oil and gas 

comes from the sea. Shanghai and so many of the other seas that 

are at least close to the sea get most—export and import most of 

their goods in and out of the sea. And you’ll get writings that are 

serious and authoritative from Chinese navalists, that they must 

break out of this box that they call the ‘‘first island chain’’ that the 

United States and Japan are constructing around them. That’s part 

of the reason driving them toward their claims on Taiwan. That’s 

part of the reason driving them toward their claims in the 

Senkakus. Again, defensively, they feel boxed in, and they feel that 

they have to deny us access to that area, in case of a conflict, Taiwan. But, there are also offensive purposes behind that. 

They have—you mentioned the surfacing of the Song near the 

Kitty Hawk. But, there has been mapping and service—and other 

oceanographic and maritime activities all the way up to Guam. 

Now, again, part of that is defense. I think Admiral Keating, the 

head of PACOM, made the comment to you about the Chinese joking, ‘‘Ha, ha, ha, let’s divide up the Pacific. We take up to Hawaii, 

and you can have the rest.’’ But, you know, the Chinese Navy 

aren’t a bunch of jokers. I mean, they’re serious people. And this 

is—you know, this is—at least informs their decisionmaking. 

On the other side, because so much of their—of the other ocean, 

the Indian Ocean, because so much of their sea and—so much of 

their oil and gas and trade comes from the Persian Gulf and Africa, 

they want to—they want to project military power; meaning being 

able to protect convoys, if need be, meaning being able to retaliate, 

in case their supply is disrupted. They want to be able to project 

military power into the Indian Ocean. And they’re actually quite 

clear about that. And the Indians—and I’ll just conclude by saying 

48 

that, while the Indians don’t take a particular position on any of 

the claims we’re talking about, if you believe that these disputes 

are symptomatic of a Chinese strategy and a growth in power 

rather than the problem itself—and I think the Indians do—then 

they do take a position with regard to growing Chinese activity in 

the South China Sea. A base at Hainan Island from which—from 

where they could get into the Malacca Strait and out into the 

Indian Ocean, and these naval facilities from Sri Lanka to Burma 

and Guam—to Burma and Pakistan. 

Senator WEBB. I would say the jury is probably out, but the data 

points seem to be there. If you look at other continental powers 

that wanted to become world powers—you look at the German 

model, you look at the Soviet model—both of those countries consciously decided to grow a navy, even though all their lines of communications were internal at the time they did. The Soviet Union 

didn’t—I think, if you go back to 1946, and you look at the size of 

the Soviet Navy, it was basically whatever they had taken from the 

Germans at the end of World War II. They didn’t have a navy. And 

by the time I was Secretary of the Navy, they had a huge navy, 

but most of it—the preponderance of its power being in Northeast 

Asia. The—I think, obviously, the thing to watch is whether China 

intends to develop a carrier force, the concept of a carrier battle 

group, and what it intends to do with it. We can accept the emerging economy of China, and hopefully deal with that in a very positive way. They’re very active in South America, they’re active in 

Africa. But, it’ll be interesting to watch that. 

Let me ask one final question for the panel. We haven’t really 

discussed this, but, with the activities of China recently in the relocation of the United States—or the planned relocation of much of 

the United States military into a Guam/Tinian access, how do you 

see Japanese defense policy evolving? 

We can let Mr. Blumenthal start, and I’d be happy to—— 

Mr. BLUMENTHAL. Yes. Japanese defense policy is evolving in a 

certain direction, for many reasons, the first of which is probably 

the failure to resolve to their liking the North Korea nuclear question and the fact that there’s now another nuclear power close to 

them. And so, I would point out that there’s a lot of work that went 

into upgrading the alliance over the last 8 or 9 years, much of it 

focused on ballistic missile defense. The Japanese certainly showed 

that, when the alliance is going well, they can do things that otherwise they would claim their constitution prohibits them from doing, 

whether it was supporting our forces in Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom, in the Indian Ocean it’s actually 

having some troops in Iraq, to doing peacekeeping missions. But, 

in terms of the China-North Korea question that they’re very much 

focused on BMD right now, and they do have a question of fiscal 

resources—I would note that, for the first time, they’ve openly, inside the Liberal Democratic Party, started a working group and a 

study group on independent conventional strike. It’s well known 

that they’re interested in the F–22, if that remains alive. Obviously, there’s a lot of questions as to whether their system can handle that. But, you know, frankly, the fact that North Korea’s tested 

ballistic missiles around them has prompted this. 

49 

And the fact—one thing that we didn’t talk about is—and I’ll 

close on this—is the fact that the Chinese have not only made 

claims in the Senkakus, but have, in fact, sent maritime vessels, 

including a submarine, I believe, a Sovremenny class destroyer, 

where the Japanese actually had to chase them out. So, both of 

these—the sense of threat is rather high, the sense of assurance in 

the alliance is not where it used to be, and the Japanese can turn, 

as we’ve seen, historically, pretty quickly into a much more militarized country. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

Dr. Cronin, would you like to—— 

Dr. CRONIN. Well, yes, I actually would, Senator, because I was 

in Tokyo in the runup to the first North Korea’s missile launch, 

and I must say, it reminded me of Henny Penny, ‘‘The sky is falling.’’ 

Senator WEBB. You mean in 1998, you’re talking about? 

Dr. CRONIN. No, the last—— 

Senator WEBB. Oh, this last one? 

Dr. CRONIN. This last one. 

Senator WEBB. I was actually there in 1998, when the North 

Koreans fired the first one. But—— 

Dr. CRONIN. Yes, OK. And the thing that I found so much dismaying was to hear Japanese politicians posturing on that issue, 

but not really having anything concrete to say. I think Japan’s own 

defense planning is very reactive, and obviously, as Dan has 

already pointed out, you know, BMD will be a big area that they’ll 

continue to work—to press on in. But, you know, why they want 

an F–22, I—it just—it’s—it makes you wonder what the basis for 

a lot of their planning is. 

And I think the bottom line, ultimately, is—well, first of all, to 

go to your question, I don’t think our moving from—Marines from 

Okinawa to Guam will make any difference, in terms of China’s 

role and perceptions of the alliance, particularly since those forces 

were always earmarked for other things, I think, than that. 

But, the other thing is, look at the—you know, I look at—go look 

at the money. Where’s the money? And—— 

Senator WEBB. If I may, on that point—— 

Dr. CRONIN. Yes. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. My point really was to the effect of 

how it would impact Japan, the—— 

Dr. CRONIN. Oh, yes. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Relocation, not having the American 

forces there, rather than China. But—— 

Dr. CRONIN. I think, in a very mixed way. I mean, the—a lot of 

people would be glad to see the Marines go, particularly in Okinawa. But, at the same time, yes, it does make—it may make the 

Japanese more anxious, in general, but I’m not sure, because of the 

nature of the forces that are being moved, that I think the issue 

for the Japanese now is ballistic missile defense, air—control of the 

air, and sea—and defense against submarines, that sort of thing. 

But, the—I guess the dismaying thing is simply that they’re still 

hovering around 1 percent of GDP. GDP is falling now. And—— 

VOICE. We’re heading there ourselves. 

50 

Dr. CRONIN. Yes, right. So, they don’t seem to be able to 

prioritize in a—what I would say is a very systematic way, and 

particularly with—in terms of—I think cooperation between the 

United States and Japanese military is great. I mean, there’s no 

question about that. But, in terms of their own planning, in terms 

of their own concept of their national defense, I’d defer to others 

who have more insight into that than I do. I’m kind of bewildered. 

Senator WEBB. Professor Dutton, you get the final word. 

Professor DUTTON. Yes, I think so, thank you. 

I do want to point out that it is the technology edge that we 

maintain, both naval technology and airforce, space technology, et 

cetera, that is the strategic balancer in East Asia. And so, to follow 

up on the point about—it is the type of the forces that matters, I 

think, in that it will not be that big of a strategic shift, from the 

perspective of the Japan and China, is important. But, it does 

underscore our need to maintain the strength of our fleet, the 

strength of our air power, and the strength of our cyber and space 

power in East Asia, because technology is our edge. 

The strategic balancing is provided by two things, by strategic 

mass and strategic maneuver, and the way we do that in the region 

is through technology. 

Senator WEBB. Gentlemen, I thank you all for your testimony. I 

think it was a great hearing. And I hope we’re all on the same 

page, in that what we’re after here is the proper communications 

in the region and maintaining the kind of balance that’ll allow the 

United States to remain involved, but also to allow third countries, 

who we don’t discuss often enough, to have the right kind of economic growth and balance, themselves. 

And the hearing record will be open until tomorrow night in case 

any Senators would like to ask any questions. 

Senator WEBB. But, now the hearing is closed. 

[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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