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HOMELAND SECURITY IN THE MARITIME 

ENVIRONMENT: MARITIME DOMAIN 

AWARENESS AND VESSEL TRACKING 

FIELD HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, 

AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

NOVEMBER 26, 2007 

Serial No. 110–88 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 


Congress.#13
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin 

Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

AL GREEN, Texas 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

VACANCY 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee 

JESSICA HERRERA-FLANIGAN, Staff Director & General Counsel 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, Chairwoman 

JANE HARMAN, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

AL GREEN, Texas 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex 

Officio) 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

ALISON ROSSO, Director 

DENISE KREPP, Counsel 

CARLA ZAMUDIO-DOLAN, Clerk 

MANDY BOWERS, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress, and 

Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global 

Counterrorism ...................................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Gus. M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress from the 

State ...................................................................................................................... 2 

WITNESSES

Mr. Stephen D. Dryden, President and CEO, The Mariner Group: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10 

Colonel William H. Janes (U.S. Army, Ret.) Director, Florida Office of Drug 

Control and Assistant Secretary, Substance Abuse and Mental Health, 

Department of Children and Families: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 16 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 18 

Captain Karl Schultz, Commander, U.S. Coast Guard Sector Miami 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

FOR THE RECORD

Dr. Fran Bohnsack, Executive Director, Miami River Marine Group: 

Preapred Statement ............................................................................................. 24 

(1) 

HOMELAND SECURITY IN THE MARITIME 

DOMAIN AWARENESS AND VESSEL TRACKING 

Monday, November 26, 2007 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., at Miami 

City Hall, 3500 Pan American Drive, Miami, Florida, Hon. Loretta 

Sanchez [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Sanchez and Bilirakis. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Good afternoon. I am pleased that this Subcommittee is able to hold this Field Hearing in Miami, and I would 

like to start by thanking Congressman Bilirakis for his interest in 

this hearing, and to thank our witnesses today for agreeing to testify, especially at the end of a Thanksgiving holiday. Thank you for 

being here. 

And I would also like to thank the City of Miami for allowing us 

to use this space today to hold the hearing. 

Maritime security is an incredibly important priority for this 

Subcommittee. In fact, it is carried in our name. Our nation’s maritime ports play a critical role in America’s economy, and in our 

day-to-day lives for many of us. 

But, as we have gone to take a look at different ports this past 

year in particular, we have come across the realization that there 

is not a one-size-fits-all solution to our port security. Every port 

that I have visited has been incredibly interesting, and yet very diverse than the last one I had been to. 

Of course, the ports that I am most familiar with are the Long 

Beach/Los Angeles ports, the largest system that we have here in 

our nation. But, again, they have different challenges, and opportunities, than the rest of the ports that we have here in the United 

States. So it was a really great visit this morning at the Port of 

Miami, take a look at the particulars for that port. 

And I want to thank everyone at the Port of Miami, Miami-Dade 

County, the Coast Guard, our customs and border protection, and 

all the related parties that helped us this morning with respect to 

taking a look at the particulars of the Port of Miami. 

One of the distinctive characteristics of the Port of Miami is the 

high volume of cruise ship vessel traffic, which has earned the port 

this distinction of The Cruise Capital of the World. 

In addition to cruise ships, the Port of Miami is also the largest 

container port here in Florida. And, given the diverse vessel traffic 

2 

at the Port of Miami, and the significant pleasure boat presence in 

the region, this is a perfect place to frame a discussion about Maritime Domain Awareness, or what we call MDA, and Vessel Tracking. 

MDA is an effective understanding of anything associated with 

the Maritime Domain that could impact the security, the safety, 

the economy, or the environment of the United States. And achieving and maintaining full Maritime Domain Awareness at any port 

is a challenge, in particular here in Miami. And that is one of the 

reasons why, for a long time now, I have been wanting to come 

here and take a look at this port in particular. Especially because 

of the small pleasure craft that are here, and what it means to our 

country. 

Remember that this Subcommittee not only does maritime, it 

does all egress and ingress into this nation. And from that standpoint, the type of people who come through here, through Miami, 

through the coastal waters of Florida in particular are of a great 

concern for us. We need to understand how best it is that we protect our coastal—our shores from people and contraband coming in. 

And I say that because, while our focus, in a large respect, from 

this Subcommittee and, of course, the Congress and even America 

right now, is about people crossing our land borders. The fact of the 

matter is, we have a lot more maritime coastal borders than land 

borders to this United States. And we have not really focused on 

that aspect. 

And as we tighten up those land borders, people will find different ways, or find the weaker link, to get in to the United States. 

And this will be a big challenge, especially for this area, Florida, 

and for Miami in particular. 

I am interested in the collaboration between the Coast Guard 

and The Mariner Group to enhance situational awareness in the 

emergency response at Miami Sector Command Center. 

And another issue that I think is very important for maritime security and Maritime Domain Awareness is the vessel tracking systems. And I am concerned about whether the Coast Guard and the 

ports have sufficient and accessible vessel tracking capabilities. So 

I look forward to you, to our witnesses discussing some of these 

and some of the other issues related to the Maritime Domain 

Awareness. 

And now, the Chair would like to recognize the gentleman from 

Florida, Mr. Bilirakis—— 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. —for an opening statement. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. I appreciate it very much. I appreciate you holding this hearing here today, particularly having to travel all the 

way across the country to be here. You truly are a great Chairperson, and I really am honored to serve under you. 

I would also like to welcome you to the State of Florida. I look 

forward to discussing the Maritime Domain Awareness and Vessel 

Tracking by the United States Coast Guard. 

I would also like to thank our witnesses for being here today, 

and I look forward to your testimony. 

The Florida district I represent includes the portions of Clearwater, Tarpon Springs, Palm Harbor, and the Gulf Coast of Pasco 

3 

County, including New Port Richey, and also Hillsborough County, 

where the Port of Tampa is located. 

The people in my district understand firsthand the important of 

maritime security. And I am very interested in the progress being 

made by the Coast Guard, specifically in tracking small boats, 

sharing intelligence, and establishing a common operating picture. 

To improve Maritime Domain Awareness, the Coast Guard must 

be able to effectively locate, identify, and track maritime targets of 

interest in U.S. waters and beyond. 

The Safe Port Act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, 

requires him to develop and implement a long-range automated 

vessel tracking system. To coordinate the Coast Guard’s vessel 

tracking program, the law authorized funding for the creation of an 

Inter-agency Command Centers at all major U.S. ports. The Vessel 

Tracking System would feed these command centers using a common operating picture to insure that inter-agency assets receive 

proper notice and have adequate time to respond to inbound waterborne threats. 

During today’s hearing, I want to get a better understanding of 

the Coast Guard’s operational capabilities to track approaching 

vessels. I would also like to examine what the Coast Guard is doing 

to address the increasing small boat threat. 

It is critical that the Coast Guard be able to identify, track, and 

analyze daily unreported threats, such as small vessels smuggling 

terrorists, weapons, illegal narcotics, and illegal aliens. 

I would like to welcome all of our witnesses here today, especially Colonel Bill Janes, who can offer unique insight into the impact of narcotics smuggling into the State of Florida, and help us 

identify ways to improve drug interdiction capabilities and information sharing. 

I am especially interested in his testimony, and would like to express my appreciation for Bill’s participation here today. 

Colonel JANES. Thank you, Congressman. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Integration and coordination across federal, state, 

and local operations strategies and tactics is critical to the Coast 

Guard’s strategic mission. 

And I want to thank Madam Chair again for having this hearing. 

I look forward to the testimony, and I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I thank the gentleman from Florida, and I would 

just like to put on the record that when I spoke to the gentleman 

about doing a port visit down here to Miami, he said that would 

be great, but Tampa would be better. So I just want to put that 

in the record, because I know that he has asked, and maybe— 

maybe when we get to—we will get to it, but I know that you are 

looking out for your constituents. 

Okay. So, normally, our witnesses would be in front of us, but 

we will have to sort of lean over and look at you. If I send in a 

bill for my neck, I will let you know. But it is great to have you 

up here on the dais with us. 

And let me welcome you and give a little background on each of 

you, and then we will listen to your testimony. 

Our first witness is Captain Karl Schultz. He is the Commander 

of Coast Guard Sector of Miami. And the Captain reports to Sector 

4 

Miami from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, where he completed a one-year research fellowship in National 

Security Studies. And from July, 2003 to July of 2005, Captain 

Schultz served as Commanding Officer aboard the United States 

Coast Guard Cutter Venturous, leading diverse counter-drug, alien 

migrant interdiction, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations in the maritime approaches to the southeastern United 

States and throughout the Caribbean Basin. 

Captain Schultz has served in numerous other afloat and ashore 

assignments since graduating from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy 

in 1983. 

Our second witness is Mr. Stephen D. Dryden, President and 

CEO of The Mariner Group, a software company focused on Homeland Security with particular emphasis in Maritime Domain 

Awareness. 

His current MDA efforts include working with the Department of 

Homeland Security and the United States Coast Guard’s Research 

and Development Center on the United States Coast Guard Sector 

Command Centers of the future visualization and response applications for Enhanced Watch-Stander Situational Awareness Project. 

That is a long name there. 

And our third and final witness is Colonel, U.S. Army Retired, 

William Janes, Director, Florida Officer of Drug Control. And he 

served in the U.S. Army for 24 years, commanded at the Company, 

Battalion, and the Brigade levels. 

We welcome all of you. 

Oh, and after leaving the military, he was a counselor, a manager, and Executive Director for the Drug Abuse Comprehensive 

Coordinated Office in Tampa for ten years. And from 2002 to 2006, 

he served as the Director, National Terrorism Preparedness Institute at St. Petersburg College. 

Welcome to all three of the gentlemen. 

And without objection, the witnesses’ full statements, which they 

turned in, will be inserted in the record. And I will now ask each 

of the witnesses to summarize his statement for five minutes, beginning with Captain Schultz. 

And let us know what you think we need to know about, and 

maybe if you can address some of the issues in our opening statements. For five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN KARL SCHULTZ, COMMANDER, U.S. 

COAST GUARD SECTOR MIAMI 

Captain SCHULTZ. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, Congressman Bilirakis. It is a 

pleasure to be here today to discuss the role of Coast Guard Sector 

Miami in securing our maritime borders in South Florida, and to 

address your specific questions pertaining to vessel tracking and 

domain awareness. 

As Sector Commander and Captain of the Port of Miami, I have 

several statutory responsibilities. I serve as the region’s Federal 

maritime Security Coordinator; the Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator; the Officer-in-Charge Marine Inspection; and the Federal 

On-Scene Coordinator. 

5 

To provide some context on the scope of Sector Miami’s maritime 

security workload, I note that the Sector is responsible for all Coast 

Guard missions spanning 165 miles of southeast Florida coastline. 

Within this region, there are five seaports, collectively handling 

more than 9,000 annual vessel arrivals. The region is home to two 

of three of the largest cruise ship ports in the world, with nearly 

4 million passengers passing through each, Port Everglades and 

Port of Miami, which you toured earlier today. 

Additionally, more than 2 million shipping containers and 20 

percent of Florida’s gasoline and petroleum products servicing 12 

neighboring counties pass through these same ports. 

Within our area of responsibility, the Coast Guard regulates 

more than 260 Maritime Transportation Security Act facilities. 

Our maritime security mission requirements are quite complex, 

as we focus on securing our port and coastal waterways against potential terrorist activities, as well as persistent threats from illegal 

migrants, drugs and other commodities trafficked via maritime 

means. 

Miami is known as the Gateway to the Americas, and the proximity of Sector Miami’s Area of Responsibility to international 

points or origin or trans-ship for illegal migrant and illicit narcotics 

smuggling, presents significant operational challenges. The maritime border is complex, and requires an integrated approach to security, commerce, tourism, and immigration. We are committed to 

striking an optimal balance between trade, travel, and security in 

all that we do. 

The Committee’s invitation noted, as you mentioned, Madam 

Chairwoman, the specific interest in Maritime Domain Awareness 

and Vessel Tracking. And I think, because of its importance, I will 

restate exactly what Maritime Domain Awareness is. It is, in fact, 

as you stated, the effective understanding of anything associated 

with global maritime domain that could affect safety, security, the 

economy, or the environment, and it is essential to Sector Miami 

and our ability to accomplish our broad portfolio of missions. 

MDA supports all Coast Guard missions, and, more specifically, 

our tactical, operational, and strategic decision-making. MDA integrated global maritime intelligence with global maritime situational awareness, and requires collaboration across all layers of 

government, and with the private sector, and with international 

stakeholders. 

Miami, interestingly enough, is home of the Coast Guard’s first 

Sector Command, which was established back in 2004. And our 

Sector Command Center serves as a site for two significant Maritime Domain Awareness-related pilot projects. These are conducted 

jointly with the Department of Homeland Security Science and 

Technology Directorate. 

The first, Project Hawkeye, is a limited sensor network that integrates radar, cameras, and automatic identification system, or AIS, 

data feeds to provide automated vessel tracking data, and port activity monitoring capability to our Command Center watch-standers. 

The second, the Visualization and Response Tools Project, which 

you also mentioned, is a proof-of-concept effort designed to help us 

understand how to visualize a tactical situation and the security 

6 

posture of the seaport by correlating sensor and automated vessel 

tracking information with advanced notification of arrival information and other port activities and data sources. 

These projects serve as test beds for the Coast Guard’s proposed 

acquisition project called Command 21, and give the Sector important perspective and visibility on the wide array of threats to the 

maritime domain here in South Florida. 

There is still a long way to go in managing all the information 

required to support our daily operations and our daily decisionmaking. Tracking large, ocean-going vessels through programs like 

the Nationwide Automatic Identification System, Advanced Notice 

of Arrival process, and the forthcoming International Maritime Organizations Long Range Identification and Tracking Initiative, 

which you mentioned, Congressman Bilirakis, is just the start. 

The small boat threat, for example, continues to present technological and policy challenges, and remains a primary maritime security concern, particularly in our area, where we have over 

100,000 registered recreational vessels just in Palm Beach, 

Broward, and Dade Counties alone. 

Collaboration across all layers of government, federal, state, and 

local, as well as with the private sector and international stakeholders is essential to achieve meaningful MDA and, in turn, address the myriad of threats in our domain. We work hard in southeast Florida to ensure interagency collaboration, and insure that 

collaboration informs and improves our layered approach to maritime security. 

Coordinating bodies such as our Area Maritime Security Committee and its active subcommittees, as well as the State of Florida’s Regional Domestic Security Task Force, which here locally 

brings 100-plus first responder agencies together in a coordinating 

framework, are pivotal to our collaboration and operational coordination. 

Key partnerships with federal agencies such as Customs and 

Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation and their Joint Terrorism Task 

Force, as well as state and local agencies, private maritime organizations such as CLIA, local shippers, the ports, terminal operators, 

industry groups, these are all critical to the success of our cooperation and that integration in the region. 

The Sector Miami team works diligently to insure our maritime 

borders and seaports are as secure as possible given our available 

capabilities and resources. We place continuous emphasis on cultivating and nurturing partnerships, on applying new technologies, 

and on delivering operational excellence in all that we do. 

We are proud to serve the nation in this critical locale, and are 

grateful for your interest in our operations. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I have submitted 

my written statement for the record, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The information follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN KARL L. SCHULTZ

Good afternoon Madam Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee. 

It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the role of Coast Guard Sector Miami 

in securing our maritime borders in South Florida, and to address your specific inVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:27 Nov 06, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-88\48983.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
7 

terests in maritime domain awareness and vessel tracking. I am grateful for your 

interest in our unique operating environment and pleased to welcome you here. 

As Sector Commander and Captain of the Port of Miami, I have several statutory 

responsibilities. I serve as the region’s Federal Maritime Security Coordinator; the 

Search and Rescue (SAR) Mission Coordinator; the Officer-in-Charge Marine Inspection; and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator. The Sector focuses on two major operational processes—PREVENTION and RESPONSE—in support of our service’s five 

fundamental roles: Maritime Safety, Maritime Security, Maritime Mobility, the Protection of Natural Resources, and National Defense. 

The seaports in Sector Miami’s Captain of the Port zone are located on shareduse waterways in densely populated areas. To provide some context on the scope of 

Sector Miami’s maritime security workload, I note that the Sector is responsible for 

all Coast Guard missions spanning 165 miles of southeast Florida coastline and encompassing numerous counties. Within this region there are five ports, collectively 

handling more than 9,000 annual vessel arrivals. The region is home to two of the 

three largest cruise ship ports in the world, with nearly 4 million passengers moving 

through both Port Everglades and the Port of Miami annually. Additionally, more 

than 2 million shipping containers (TEUs) and 20% of Florida’s gasoline and petroleum products servicing 12 neighboring counties pass through these ports. The region is also home to 2 nuclear power plants, and the local commercial fleet includes 

370 small passenger vessels. There are also 170,000 registered recreational boats in 

Palm Beach, Miami Dade and Broward counties alone. Within our Area of Responsibility, the Coast Guard regulates more than 260 Maritime Transportation Security 

Act facilities. 

Our maritime security mission requirements, while only a subset of our broader 

Coast Guard responsibilities, are quite complex as we focus on securing our port and 

coastal waterways against potential terrorist activities as well as potentially persistent threats from illegal migrants, drugs and other commodities and implements 

trafficked via maritime means. Miami is known as the ‘‘Gateway to the Americas,’’ 

and the proximity of Sector Miami’s Area of Responsibility to international origination or trans-shipment points for illegal migrant and illicit narcotic smuggling, presents significant operational challenges. To be certain, the maritime border is a complex national border requiring and integrated approach to security, commerce, tourism and immigration. We are committed to striking an optimal balance among 

trade, travel and security in all that we do. 

The Committee’s invitation noted a specific interest in the areas of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Vessel Tracking. These issues are relevant to Sector 

Miami and I am pleased to speak to them. MDA, or the effective understanding of 

anything associated with the global maritime domain that could affect safety, security, the economy or the environment, is essential to the Sector’s ability to accomplish its broad portfolio of missions, including seaport and border security, maritime 

safety, search and rescue, marine environmental protection, and the facilitation of 

maritime commerce. Indeed, MDA supports all Coast Guard mission areas, and 

more specifically, our tactical, operational and strategic decision-making. MDA integrates global maritime intelligence with global maritime situational awareness and 

requires collaboration across all layers of government (federal/state/local), the private sector, and with international stakeholders. 

Miami is home to the Coast Guard’s first Sector Command, established in 2004. 

The Sector Command Center (SCC) coordinates Coast Guard resources applied to 

the full spectrum of Coast Guard missions found in Southeast Florida and serves 

as the hub, or central nervous system, of the command. Sector Miami’s SCC is also 

the site for two significant MDA-related pilot projects conducted jointly with the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate. The first, 

‘‘Project Hawkeye,’’ is a limited sensor network that integrates radar, cameras and 

Automatic Identification System data (AIS) to provide automated vessel tracking 

data and port activity monitoring capability to the SCC. The second, the Visualization and Response Tools project, is a proof-of-concept effort designed to help us understand how to visualize the tactical situation and security posture of the seaport 

by correlating sensor and automated vessel tracking information with advanced notification of arrival information and other port activity. These projects serve as test 

beds for the Coast Guard’s proposed acquisition project called ‘‘Command 21,’’ and 

give the Sector important perspective and visibility on a wide array of threats to 

the maritime domain. The Command 21 project is conceptually designed to provide 

port-level MDA and to highlight information gaps to provide Sector Commanders 

with the ability to synthesize MDA information in the SCC and to further share 

that information with federal, state and local partners. 

There is still a long way to go in managing all the information required to support 

daily operations and decision-making. Tracking large, ocean-going vessels through 

8 

programs like the National Automatic Identification System, Advanced Notice of Arrival process and the forthcoming International Maritime Organization’s Long 

Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) is just the start. The small boat threat, 

for example, continues to present technology and policy challenges and remains a 

primary maritime security concern, particularly in the Sector Miami area of operations where, as I mentioned earlier, we have over 170,000 registered recreational 

boats. Within the Department of Homeland Security, we are working closely with 

CBP to expand our efforts to secure the small maritime craft environment. 

Collaboration across all layers of government (federal, state and local), as well as 

with the private sector and international stakeholders is essential to achieving 

meaningful MDA and in turn addressing the myriad of threats in the maritime domain. We work hard in Southeast Florida to ensure interagency collaboration informs and improves our layered approach to maritime security. Coordinating bodies 

such as our Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC) and its active subcommittees, as well as the State of Florida’s Southeast Regional Domestic Security Task 

Force (RDSTF–SE), which brings more than 100 first responder agencies together 

in a coordinating framework, are pivotal to our collaboration and operational coordination. Key partnerships with federal agencies such as Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

and their Joint Terrorism Task Force; as well as state and local agencies and private maritime organizations including the Cruise Line International Association 

(CLIA), local shippers, terminal operators and other industry groups are critical to 

the success of our cooperation and integration in the region. 

In my estimation, Sector Miami’s focus on a risk-based approach to layered maritime security is serving Southeast Florida well. The Sector Miami team of active 

duty, reserve, civilian employees and Coast Guard Auxiliarists (our volunteers) 

works diligently to ensure our maritime border and seaports are as secure as possible given available capabilities and resources. At Sector Miami, we place continuous emphasis on cultivating and nurturing partnerships, on applying new technologies and on delivering operational excellence in all that we do. We are proud 

to serve the nation in this critical locale and again grateful for your interest in our 

operations. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to your questions. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. I thank the gentleman. 

And I now recognize Mr. Dryden to summarize his statement for 

five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN DRYDEN, PRESIDENT AND CEO, THE 

MARINER GROUP 

Mr. DRYDEN. Thank you. Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman, 

Congressman Bilirakis. I am Steve Dryden, CEO of The Mariner 

Group. It is an honor to appear here today and talk about the MDA 

and Vessel Tracking. 

My company, The Mariner Group, has been working with the 

Coast Guard over the last three years to significantly improve 

MDA and situational response. My goal is to basically review the 

overall project mission, take you through the challenges we have 

encountered, and then, at the end of this, is to also urge full support of the Safe Port Act and the funding that has already been put 

in for the President to sign. 

As you know, the Safe Port Act directs the Coast Guard to establish Interagency Operations Centers for enhancing port security at 

locations around the nation. The Mariner Group is working with 

the Coast Guard through the Visualization Tools for Situational 

Awareness and Emergency Response, which is a mouthful, I agree. 

As part of the project, Mariner software application, Command 

Bridge, has been employed as the primary underlying technology to 

increase domain awareness in Sector Command Center Miami. 

9 

I would like to take a few minutes to share with you what I believe is an important aspect of the Coast Guard’s efforts to insure 

safety and security. 

Of the many challenges in achieving MDA, none are more important than gaining actionable situation awareness. In a Coast Guard 

Command Center, or any complex border infrastructure or transportation environment, watch-standers must maintain an understanding of what is going on at all times, while simultaneously 

working to predict and prevent ever-changing threats. 

The work of this Committee and the government as a whole has 

allowed technology to be applied to many critical issues in maritime and other security areas. And more and more data is being 

generated to help users make decisions. But an unintended consequence of this is massive amounts of data, and the user becomes 

overloaded with too much information. So it is harder to focus on 

particular, important information. 

Simply put, it is harder to find the needle in the haystack when 

the haystack keeps getting bigger and bigger. 

The goal of the Viz Tools Projects is to inform decision-makers 

and then enable them to take action to prevent incidents and/or appropriately coordinate incident response. The program places 

strong emphasis on providing operational end-users with the technology, the capabilities to detect and prevent terrorist attack, counteract illegal activities, and to help manage those response-related 

actions. 

The project was funded by DHS S&T in collaboration with the 

Coast Guard R&D Center. It is currently an operational prototype 

in Sector Miami, here. 

Viz Tools uses advanced methods to collect and fuse data, better 

analyze that data to create knowledge, and then create more effective ways to visualize and act upon the knowledge, then disseminate that information internally to the Coast Guard and well as externally to port partners. 

Overall, the project objectives include develop and maintain an 

accurate situational picture, identify threats rapidly without the 

need for extensive manpower, and then plan and manage those 

stages of response. 

Prior to Viz Tools, watch-standers had to manually achieve situational awareness by monitoring information from a lot of sources, 

such as radar, the harbor pilots, internal Coast Guard systems, 

weather, and there was just a litany of systems that had to be 

identified and looked at all the time. 

Getting true situational awareness requires advanced technology 

that can focus on meaningful, relevant information. Just displaying 

large amounts of data not only lacks benefit, but also can contribute to an overload, negatively affecting the situation. 

The Viz Tools Project not only fuses information from many 

sources, it also analyzes the combined information for anomalies, 

and then presents meaningful, actionable knowledge without the 

clutter. 

These capabilities keep the watch-stander focused on what is important, while delivering the right information to the right person 

at the right time. 

10 

We are making great stride, but critical gaps still need to be addressed. I would submit that certain areas of developing regional 

security should be properly incorporated into these Interagency 

Command Centers. 

Number one, the integration of cargo and vessel information. 

Two, better sensor technology installed to track small boats and 

non-cooperative vessels that may attempt to spoof or turn off AIS 

transponders. 

The current state of technology in ports today is really—really 

falls short in their ability to do this. 

Emerging projects such as DHS has with the Coast Guard, one 

is called the Automated Scene Understanding Project, which is 

showing a lot of potential benefit, and needs to be examined more. 

We need to foster a better sense of coordination with local law 

enforcement and emergency responders to coordinate security in instant response. 

We need to be able to conduct longer range vessel tracking of 

transits that are out there, not necessarily headed to and from the 

port, but are actually out there in the vicinity. 

And lastly, we need to integrate information in response-related 

activities related to high-interest, critical facilities that are not regulated by the Coast Guard, but they may be on, adjacent to, over 

or under U.S. navigable waters. 

In conclusion, I would recommend that you and your Committee 

provide full funding for the Safe Port Act requirements. The President budget recommends only minimal funding for the Command 

21 Program. Fortunately, with your leadership, Madam Chairman 

and Congressman Bilirakis, the House has chosen to include 

$40,000,000 for the Command 21 Program, and the Senate has proposed 60,000,000 in 2008 funding. 

It will be critical to ensure that we do not fall behind another 

year in this program. In my view, facilitating regional maritime security coordination and response may be the most important and 

the most difficult challenge we face in the larger area of port security. 

Thank you very much for the invitation to speak before you 

today, and giving me the opportunity to talk before you. 

[The information follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN D. DRYDEN

Good afternoon Madame Chairwoman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. I am Steve Dryden, Chief Executive Officer of The Mariner Group. It is 

an honor to appear before you today to discuss Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) 

and Vessel Tracking. 

My company, The Mariner Group, has been working with the US Coast Guard 

over the past three years to significantly improve MDA and response throughout the 

nation. My goals today are to inform you of the overall project mission, the challenges encountered in gaining true MDA, and lastly, to urge support for full funding 

of the Safe Port Act of 2006. 

As you know, the Safe Port Act of 2006 directs the Coast Guard to establish interagency operations centers for enhancing port security at locations around the nation. The Mariner Group is working with the Coast Guard through their Visualization Tools for Situational Awareness and Emergency Response, or ‘‘Viz Tools’’, for 

Sector Command Centers to help in this effort. As part of this project, Mariner’s 

software application, CommandBridge, has been employed as the primary underlying technology to increase Maritime Domain Awareness at the Sector Command 

Center—Miami. I would like to take a few minutes to share with you what I believe 

11 

1Designing for Situation Awareness: An Approach to User-Centered Design by Mica R. 

Endsley,, Betty Bolte, and Debra G. Jones. 2See Attachment ‘‘The Mariner Group’’. 

is an important aspect of the Coast Guard’s efforts to ensure the safety and security 

of U.S. waters. 

Of the many challenges in achieving MDA, none are more important than gaining 

Actionable Situation Awareness. ‘‘Situation awareness is the perception of elements 

in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their 

meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future.’’ 1 In a Coast Guard 

command center, or any highly complex border, infrastructure, or transportation environment, watch standers must maintain an understanding of what is going on at 

all times while simultaneously working to predict and prevent ever changing 

threats.2

The work of this committee, and the government as a whole, has allowed technology to be applied to many critical issues in maritime or other homeland security 

areas, and more and more data is being generated to help users make decisions. As 

examples, technologies including RADAR, cameras, Automatic Identification Systems, and perimeter detection systems have been implemented throughout our 

ports. But an unintended consequence of massive amounts of data is that users are 

overloaded with that data, making it harder to focus on the most important information. Simply put, it’s harder to find the needle-in-the-haystack when the haystack 

keeps getting larger. 

The goal of the Viz Tools project is to inform decision makers and enable them 

to take action to prevent incidents and/or appropriately coordinate incident response. The program places strong emphasis on providing operational end-users 

with the technology and capabilities to detect and prevent terrorist attacks, counteract illegal activities, and to help manage response related actions. 

The project was funded by the Department of Homeland Security Science & Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) in collaboration with the Coast Guard R&D Center 

and Pacific Northwest National Labs (PNNL). The system is currently operational 

as a prototype in District Seven at the Coast Guard’s Sector Command Center in 

Miami. Viz Tools uses advanced methods to collect and fuse data, better analyze the 

data to create knowledge, create more effective ways to visualize and act upon the 

knowledge, and disseminates information internally to the Coast Guard and their 

appropriate partners. 

Viz Tools’ overall project objectives are to: 

• Develop and maintain an accurate situational picture; 

• Assimilate relevant sensor data and couple it with amplifying information; 

• Identify threats rapidly without the need for extensive manpower; 

• Comprehend the nature and gravity of the emerging threat; 

• Maximize Blue Force Assets, operational capacity, and readiness to offset the 

threat; and 

• Plan and manage the stages of emergency response. 

Prior to Viz Tools, watch standers had to manually achieve situation awareness 

by monitoring information from numerous sources such as RADAR screens, harbor 

pilot websites, messaging, commercial information sources, weather systems, internal Coast Guard systems, etc. 

Gaining true actionable situation awareness requires advanced technology that 

can focus the user on meaningful, relevant information. Just displaying large 

amounts of data not only lacks benefits but can also contribute to sensory overload 

negatively affecting the situation. Viz Tools not only fuses information from many 

diverse sources, it also analyzes the combined information for anomalies and then 

presents meaningful, actionable knowledge without the ancillary clutter. These capabilities keep the watch stander focused on what’s important while delivering the 

right information to the right person at the right time. 

Viz Tools enables the Coast Guard, other law enforcement agencies, and Port 

Partners the ability to understand their current situation by providing them the 

most relevant, actionable information and implementing the most appropriate security protocols. Currently envisioned, Viz Tools will promote the ability to leverage 

current technology programs and allow easy adaption of additional technologies as 

port security needs evolve. 

Let me give you an illustration: If a container ship is heading for the Port of 

Miami, Viz Tools tracks its progress. Before it has entered the area, Viz Tools analyzes all relevant information, assessing anomalies, safety, and terrorist potential. 

Information from the Coast Guard, port authorities, harbor pilots, Lloyd’s Register, 

and other vital sources pour in, creating a federated view. In addition, we will be 

12 

working to incorporate information on cargo sensitivity with relevant information 

collected about the vessel. 

Correlating and verifying all information, Viz Tools can apply anomaly detection 

to monitor information such as changes in ownership, manifest discrepancies, inconsistent arrival information, and other intelligence as it becomes available. These 

anomalies automatically display on the user’s screen as an alert that necessitates 

immediate action. In addition, Viz Tools currently allows the Coast Guard to maintain operational control such as alerting the watch stander that a vessel operating 

under restriction has begun to move. Based upon the situation, the watch stander 

can use Viz Tools to automatically contact the appropriate resource to instigate an 

intervention, detaining the ship until it achieves an all-clear status. Over time, Viz 

Tools will evolve to incorporate changing security scenarios by assembling a growing 

portfolio of alert circumstances and therefore continuously increasing port security. 

While we are making great strides, critical gaps still need to be addressed. I would 

submit that certain areas of developing regional maritime security should properly 

be incorporated into the interagency command centers, including: 

1. The integration of cargo and vessel information into Viz Tools. 

2. Better sensor technology installed to track small boats and non-cooperative 

vessels that may attempt to spoof or turn off required AIS transponders. The 

current state of technology in today’s ports falls short in their ability to track 

non-cooperative vessels and small boats. For example, a vessel may be deemed 

non-cooperative if its Automatic Identification System (AIS) tracking isn’t 

turned on. Small boats that don’t have AIS tracking technology are also a potential threat. Emerging projects such as DHS S&T / USCG R&D Center’s 

Automated Scene Understanding project offers the potential to mitigate this 

shortfall. 

3. Foster a better sense of coordination with local law enforcement and emergency responders to coordinate security and incident response. 

4. Ability to conduct longer range vessel tracking of transits. 

5. Integrate information and response related activities related to high-interest, 

critical facilities that are not regulated by the Coast Guard that are on, adjacent to, over, or under, U.S. navigable waters. 

In conclusion, I would also recommend that you and your committee provide full 

funding for the Safe Port Act requirements. The President’s Budget recommends 

only minimal funding for the Command/21 program. Fortunately, with your leadership Madame Chairman and Congressman Bilirakis, the House has chosen to include $40 million dollars for the Command/21 program, and the Senate has proposed $60 million in 2008 funding. It will be critical to ensure that we do not fall 

behind another year on this program. In my view, facilitating regional maritime security coordination and response may be the most important and most difficult challenge that we face in the larger area of port security. 

Thank you very much for the invitation to speak before you today and for giving 

me the opportunity to talk to you about Maritime Domain Awareness and Vessel 

Tracking I’m proud to be associated with this project and am happy to answer any 

questions you may have. 

13 

ATTACHMENT


11088.eps 11088-2.eps
14 


11088-3.eps 11088-4.eps
15 


11088-5.eps 11088-6.eps
16 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Dryden. And I thank you for your 

testimony. 

And I now recognize Colonel, is it Janes or Jannis? 

Colonel JANES. Janes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Janes. Okay. Colonel Janes, to summarize your 

statement for five minutes or less, please. 

STATEMENT OF COLONEL WILLIAM G. JANES, (U.S. ARMY, 

RET.), DIRECTOR, FLORIDA OFFICE OF DRUG CONTROL 

STATEMENT OF KARL SCHULTZ 

Colonel JANES. Madam Chair, thank you for your leadership; 

Congressman Bilirakis, for your outstanding leadership in Florida 

and terrific support of my office; fellow panelists. I am delighted to 

testify. 

On behalf of Governor Charlie Crist and the state, port, and community leaders involved in the combined efforts to secure our ports, 

Florida, and our nation from a transportation security incident, 

drug trafficking, I thank Congress, and particularly this Subcommittee, for the opportunity to talk about our ports, particularly 

Florida ports, the global supply chain, and how to protect the citizens of Florida. 

In terms of geography demography, Florida has many features 

which make it exceptionally attractive for drug trafficking organizations and, potentially, terrorists. These include an extremely diverse population with strong representation from the Caribbean 

Basin, Central and South America, and Mexico. Florida has approximately 1350 miles of largely unprotected continental coastline, 

and the Florida Keys archipelago, that lies astride some of the 

major drug trafficking routes into the United States. 


11088-7.eps
17 

During the last decade, Florida has addressed seriously the 

daunting task of seaport security. We began initially focused on 

crime, cargo theft, drug trafficking, but expanded to terrorism after 

the horrific events of 9/11. 

Our emergency responders in ports are superbly trained and prepared for an incident, but, most importantly, to prevent it. We have 

implemented Regional Domestic Security Task Forces across our 

state to respond to an all-hazards threat. 

Most states have two to three ports to secure. Florida has 14 

deep, public deepwater seaports. Our coastlines are dotted with 

hundreds of smaller, privately owned commercial marinas and 

ports engaged in intra—as well as interstate and international 

business. These present horrific challenges to secure from drug 

trafficking. 

Ensuring the continued growth and prosperity of our ports, even 

as we better secure them from a transportation security incident, 

drug trafficking, and other illegal activity is a primary concern for 

our governor, congressional delegation, legislators, and citizens. 

The challenge of securing Florida ports, Madam Chair, you noted 

with the differences in port governance, organizational structure, 

geography, law enforcement support, labor issues, fundamental 

funding mechanisms, and commercial operations. 

Drug trafficking is now recognized as a nexus for terrorism. Drug 

trafficking is facilitated when cargo volume exceeds monitoring capabilities. Vessels remain for lengthy stays; access control is superficial; physical security is limited; security planning is incomplete; 

law enforcement presence is inadequate; and information security 

is poor. 

Our security standards address these as best we can at this 

point. 

Historically, cocaine trafficking has been the major illegal maritime activity. Certainly, heroin moves in large quantities through 

Florida. Columbians continue to dominate drug and money laundering operations. However, Jamaican, Dominican, Mexican, Bahamian, and Cuban organizations impact drug trafficking in Florida. 

In 2005, Florida had 1,010,370 registered vessels, with 27,204 

commercial and 973,859 pleasure boats. Monitoring these would 

not be unlike trying to secure a vehicle-borne improvised explosive 

device in one of our major cities. These vast numbers of watercraft, 

combined with superb navigational technology, greatly assist small 

vessel drug smugglers moving into Florida. 

Specifically, you asked me to address vulnerabilities. I believe 

the drug trafficking vulnerabilities include a regional threat versus 

a state response. Drug trafficking is international, yet our response 

is often local, to a sheriff, local law enforcement. We need a regional response that includes adjacent states, waterways, air, land, 

and sea approaches. There are inadequate resources at the federal, 

state, and local level to address the volume of drug trafficking that 

occurs in our state and across our nation. 

As you indicated, the shift of emphasis to the southwest border 

will push resources to this corridor again. Arguably, that happened 

as we moved them away from this corridor ten to fifteen years ago, 

but a lot of those resources have been diverted to the war in Iraq. 

18 

Internal conspiracies present a threat, where a vessel crew, passenger, stevedores, checkers, anyone, can be involved in the lucrative business of drug trafficking. 

There is a tension between commerce and security. Security costs 

these ports great amounts of dollars, yet it is very important. Security can slow commerce. These tensions have to be addressed. 

Poor information sharing. Prior to 9/11, the intelligence sharing 

was well documented. Law enforcement sharing of information 

today is impeded with privacy concerns. Though very important, 

have to be addressed as law enforcement background information 

and other intelligence is shared. 

There is imprecise tracking of cargo, which presents problems. 

Federal and state planning must be enhanced into local planning, 

regional planning that is unified. 

The law enforcement response must be preventive, proactive. 

Historically, our law enforcement have responded to criminal activity, investigated, traced the source all the way back, in some cases, 

to a drug trafficking organization. We must become proactive. 

There is a nexus between drug traffic and transportation security 

incidents, but I don’t believe it is operationalized today. 

We should be sharing lessons learned, best practices. Counterdrug operations are difficult to resource. The current Transportation Worker Identification Credential, TWIC, has not been 

aligned with the Florida Credential adequately; we are not sharing 

information. 

How to close these vulnerabilities. Fix responsibility for regional, 

state planning, that includes air, land, sea, and geographic areas 

I mentioned. Develop regional counter-terrorism and counter-drug 

strategies. Produce a regional drug threat analysis. State-wide 

drug threat analyses do not exist today. We believe we will have 

the first truly state-wide drug assessment next year. 

We must share information from law enforcement; involve our 

port directors and port security staff in intelligence information 

sharing on a daily basis; include them in operations; prioritize Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, which has been an interdiction resource in past years, that reduction in resources has affected 

that. 

Finally, include a national plan with regional emphasis and, for 

me, of course, a state-wide focus. 

Florida is recognized as a national leader in port security among 

our great partners throughout the country. We have implemented 

one of our nation’s first drug control strategies. 

Your hearing today enables us to unify these systems. I am honored to have the opportunity to present this testimony, which is expanded in my written comments. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

[The information follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. JANES

Good afternoon, it is my distinct honor to testify before the esteemed members 

of the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and 

Global Counterterrorism. On behalf of Florida Governor Charlie Crist and state and 

community leaders involved in our combined efforts to secure Florida and our Nation from a transportation security incident and drug trafficking, I thank Congress 

and, in particular, this committee for the high level of interest in protecting our naVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:27 Nov 06, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-88\48983.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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tion’s ports, the global supply chain, and the citizens of Florida. I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today. 

Specifically, today I will address, per Congressman Gus Bilirakis’ request, the diversity of Florida’s ports, my assessment of vessel tracking initiatives, critical maritime vulnerabilities as they impact Florida, observations regarding narcotics smuggling, and challenges we currently face. 

Background 

In terms of geography and demography, Florida has many features which make 

it exceptionally attractive to drug trafficking organizations and, potentially, terrorists. These include an extremely diverse population with strong representation from 

the Caribbean Basin, Central and South America, and Mexico. Additionally, Florida 

has approximately 1,350 miles of largely unprotected continental coastline and the 

Florida Keys archipelago (that lie astride some of the major drug-trafficking routes 

into the United States), geographical proximity to ‘‘source’’ countries, and strong cultural ties to countries throughout the region. Florida’s international ports of entry 

must, therefore, be considered critical in the national as well as regional counterterrorism/counter-drug efforts. Importantly, our counter-terrorism and counter-drug 

efforts must be considered concurrently in any threat assessment or response planning. 

During the last decade, Florida has addressed seriously the daunting task of seaport security. Florida’s ports have long been regarded as among the most secure in 

the nation. Our state and local partnerships are strong; our security standards are 

well understood; and the implementation of security planning is effective. Our emergency responders are superbly trained having faced the horrific hurricanes in recent 

years. We are ahead of the nation in developing a biometric port access credential, 

which if supported by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) can be implemented immediately. We have implemented an aggressive all hazards, counterterrorism response concept with seven (7) Regional Domestic Security Task Forces 

(RDSTF) encompassing all of our state including our seaports and a statewide Domestic Security Oversight Board. Since September 11, 2001, we have expanded our 

prevention, preparedness, response, and crisis management capabilities to address 

terrorism in addition to our initial focus on crime, cargo theft, and drug trafficking. 

Most states have two or three ports to secure; Florida has fourteen (14) public 

deepwater seaports. In addition, our coastline is dotted with hundreds of smaller, 

privately owned commercial marinas and ports engaged in intra-state as well as 

inter-state and international business. Florida is home to four of the busiest container ports in the nation, and the top three cruise ports in the world. These ports 

operate within an exceptionally complex inter-modal transport system that must be 

carefully considered in counterterrorism and counter-drug operations and planning. 

Florida enjoys a vibrant and growing economic benefit from these points of entry. 

Ensuring the continued growth and prosperity of our ports, even as we better secure 

them from a transportation security incident, drug trafficking, and other illegal activity is of primary concern to Governor Crist, our Congressional Delegation, our 

legislators, and the citizens of Florida. 

The challenge to the security of Florida’s seaports is exacerbated by the noteworthy differences from port to port. Each is quite different from the others in terms 

of parameters of the establishing charter of the port, governance, organizational 

structure, geography, law enforcement support, labor base, funding mechanisms, 

and commercial operations. Some provide a full range of cargo and cruise operations. Others offer only specific types of cargo and/or cruise operations. Such diversity may well be regarded as a key contributor to the state’s overall economic posture, but it also significantly complicates efforts to standardize security preparedness. 

Florida is well served by the Florida Ports Council, the Florida Seaport Transportation Economic Development (FSTED) Council and the top management in each of 

Floridas deepwater ports. They comprise a community of highly skilled, dedicated, 

and professional public servants, who are integral in maintaining the balance between commerce and security on our ports. They provide strategic input for the 

planning, security, and operations of our ports. I am also privileged to chair the legislatively-mandated Seaport Security Standards Council, which is charged to review 

the existing minimum seaport security standards. This council has also provided an 

effective forum for discussion of concerns and issues for Florida ports and tenant 

agencies. 

Illegal Drug Trafficking (Includes Drug Smuggling) 

As mentioned earlier, the nexus between terrorism and drug trafficking is now 

well established. However, the nature of the drug trafficking threat is substantially 

different from a terrorist act. Rather than a major, horrific event or events that typVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:27 Nov 06, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-88\48983.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
20 

ify a terrorist act, drug trafficking is ongoing. Drug-trafficking is facilitated when 

cargo volume exceeds monitoring capabilities, vessels remain for lengthy stays, access control is superficial, physical security is limited, security planning is incomplete, law enforcement presence is inadequate, or information security is poor. Accordingly, Florida’s minimum security standards emphasize strong access control, 

law enforcement presence, effective operational guidelines and plans, cargo tracking 

by tenant partners, and other countermeasures. Despite Florida leading the nation 

in port security, we remain concerned with our ability to prevent large quantities 

of drugs from entering our state. 

Historically, cocaine trafficking has been the major illegal maritime activity. The 

fact that our cocaine drug overdose rate has climbed steadily in recent years provide 

indisputable evidence that cocaine is still available in abundant quantities. Drug 

trafficking organizations impacting Florida are largely international. Their distribution schemes include multi-state transportation and distribution of illicit drugs at 

the wholesale level. They supply local drug market areas with cocaine, heroin, marijuana, MDMA (Ecstasy), diverted pharmaceuticals and methamphetamine. These illicit drugs vary in demand across Florida as evidenced by higher demand for methamphetamine in rural areas of the state. Colombians continue to dominate drug and 

money laundering operations; however, Jamaican, Dominican, Mexican, Bahamian, 

and Cuban organizations impact drug trafficking in Florida. Interrelated to the drug 

trafficking problems are violence, human trafficking, and the proliferation of gangs 

profiting from drug sales. Venezuelan influence and involvement in drug trafficking 

and money laundering continue to increase. Drug threat assessments at the federal, 

state, and local levels consistently mention the maritime accessibility to Florida. 

Our ports, coastline, and waterways provide major access points for drug traffickers. 

In 2005, Florida had 1,010,370 registered vessels with 27,204 commercial and 

973,859 pleasure boats. These figures do not include out of state commercial, pleasure fishing, and other vehicles that utilize Florida’s waterways, often traveling to 

Caribbean ports. These vast numbers of watercraft, combined with superb navigation technology widely available today, greatly assists small vessel drug smugglers 

moving around the immense Florida and Caribbean littorals with relative ease and 

great precision. While the cooperation among federal, state, and local law enforcement is excellent, the sheer volume of vessels and smaller watercraft present a 

major concern. 

Drug seizures and subsequent investigations document that frequently, crewmembers aboard freighters and passengers or crewmembers on cruise ships routinely smuggle drugs into Florida through a ‘‘body carry’’ after the drugs have been 

concealed aboard the vessel. Cruise ships leaving and entering Florida ports routinely call on drug source and transit countries throughout the Caribbean and Central America. The volume of cargo being moved through our ports is evidenced clearly in Jacksonville. The Port of Jacksonville (JAXPORT) is one of the largest ports 

in the nation. It ranks among the top containers ports and one of the busiest vehicle 

handling ports in the United States. In 2005, JAXPORT’s three public marine terminals handled a total of 8.4 million tons of cargo, a new tonnage record for the port. 

JAXPORT now ranks only behind Tampa and Port Everglades in total tonnage. Additionally, nearly 20 privately-owned Marine terminals also operate in Jacksonville’s 

harbor without support or management from JAXPORT. These independent port operations are not under the Florida minimum standards for seaports and are regulated by the US Coast Guard. 

Florida has three High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA’s) funded by Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). The three HIDTA’s develop annual 

drug threat assessments and coordinate federal, state, and local law enforcement operations in 22 of Florida’s 67 counties. Drug threat assessments for the remaining 

45 counties are being developed by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and 

Florida National Guard. Florida also has a significant presence from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP). We also are assisted by the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South), which has responsibility for the sea approaches to Florida. Collectively, these agencies routinely document and interdict 

significant quantities of drugs moving in our region. 

Vessel tracking poses complex issues involving a myriad of federal and state actors, to include U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Patrol (‘‘CBP’’) and, for 

smaller vessels, the Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation. CBP requires that 24 

hours before a U.S. bound container is loaded onto a ship in a foreign port that an 

electronic manifest of that container’s contents is sent to the CBP by the shipping 

company. The Coast Guard in turn must be notified 96 hours before a cargo vessel 

is scheduled to arrive in a U.S. port of call. During that 96 hour period, the Coast 

Guard uses an intelligence driven, risk-based process to determine what the approVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:27 Nov 06, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-88\48983.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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priate level of engagement should be for any given commercial vessel arriving at a 

U.S. port: should that vessel be denied entry? Should the vessel be boarded at sea 

well outside the U.S. port of call? 

For the tracking of smaller vessels, to include the one million or so pleasure craft 

registered in Florida, Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation supports the funding of 

the ‘‘America’s Waterways Watch’’ program as opposed to the installation of an electronic tracking system on each craft. The tracking of such a large volume of pleasure craft in Florida waterways presents very great electronic challenges, and more 

importantly, almost insuperable challenges to attempting anything like applying 

timely analysis and risk-based processes for determining the threat posed by any 

given small vessel. 

As discussed previously Florida’s location and geography create a lucrative target 

for smuggling illegal drugs through our ports. These illegal drugs can then be repackaged or transshipped across the United States. Ongoing efforts to tighten the 

US/Mexican border create an opportunity for drug-traffickers to increase shipments 

through the Florida corridor. Nationally, there is increasing evidence that drugs are 

being transshipped from our region to Europe. Again, the international aspect of 

drug trafficking impacts Florida, which sits astride these distribution routes. The 

drug threat assessments are further complicated by current vulnerabilities: 

a. Regional threat versus state response. Florida is in the middle of a major 

drug trafficking corridor that includes air, land, and sea approaches. Adjacent 

states and countries, major transportation hubs, and large bodies of water are 

part of the corridor. While Florida has many federal, state, and local partners 

striving to prevent and to interdict drug trafficking, we do not have a regional 

strategy for response. 

b. Inadequate Resources. While our federal, state, and local partnerships are 

strong and effective, there are insufficient staffing at all levels to adequately 

cover the large geographic area and the volume of vessels, imports and exports, 

and daily transactions. Non-intrusive inspection technology is being increased, 

but again is not in sufficient quantities to meet the increasing volumes of goods 

being moved through our ports. This technology is seldom available outside 

Florida’s 14 public ports. 

c. Internal conspiracies: Drug trafficking is an illegal, high profitable activity. The insertion or extraction of illegal drugs can occur at any point along the 

route that otherwise legitimate cargo is being moved. Involvement in this illegal 

activity is not limited to port personnel but could easily include the vessel’s 

crew or others able to access the cargo on the port (longshoremen, stevedores, 

checkers, pier superintendents, or communications workers). Unsupervised access to cargo presents opportunities for internal conspiracies. 

d. Tension between commerce and security. Security costs impact the bottom line for our ports. Perfect security would shut down our ports. There are 

tradeoffs that must be weighed each day. The tension between maintaining 

strong security and allowing free flow of commerce is real and a concern for government and port leadership. 

e. Poor information sharing. Despite the lessons on 9/11, intelligence sharing 

on our ports is limited. Port directors and security directors seldom have access 

to intelligence reports. This effort is being addressed by the Florida Department 

of Law Enforcement, which is implementing a Florida Fusion Center concept, 

which will only be successful if information is shared by federal, state, and 

lanks only behind Tampa. This is not the case today. 

f. Imprecise cargo trafficking. As discussed, the large volume of cargo traffic 

overwhelms ports across our country. International agreements, non-intrusive 

inspection technology and security staffs are all important in addressing the 

problem. However the volume of cargo being moved exceeds our ability to inspect it. 

g. Federal Agency and State Level Planning. As I have consistently stated, 

our federal, state, and local partnerships are effective. However, we do not have 

a national/regional plan that unifies the drug threat assessments and response 

plan at all levels of government. These assessments and plans must involve our 

port directors and leadership. 

h. Proactive Law Enforcement Response. Law enforcement has traditionally responded to criminal activity immediately and then investigated to determine who/what caused the illegal activity. To prevent a transportation security 

incident or drug trafficking, law enforcement must be proactive with intelligence based policing. Threat assessments that result in actionable intelligence 

are necessary to prevent illegal activity. This also requires information sharing 

and coordinated operations at all levels. 

22 

i. Nexus between drug-trafficking and a transportation security incident is not operationalized. The connection between drug trafficking and a 

transportation security incident has been recognized; however, we must improve 

sharing of lessons learned and analysis of drug trafficking as it might be useful 

to prevent a future transportation security incident. Sharing of intelligence will 

be important here also. 

j. Counter-drug operations are difficult to resource. Military requirements 

and competing priorities have reduced the emphasis on counter-drug operations 

in this section of the United States. This is evident in the recent removal of US 

Army helicopters from the Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos (OPBAT) 

mission that has been successful in interdicting drug trafficking through the 

Caribbean. Previously, surveillance capabilities were reduced to meet operational requirements worldwide. 

k. Transportation Worker Identification Credential fielding is not optimizing existing technology. Florida is prepared to implement a biometric 

credential (TWIC aligned) today. Difficulties in collaboration with TSA are preventing this from being realized. 

How to Close the Gap 

a. Fix Responsibility. Drug-trafficking organizations are international. Too 

often, our response is local or community based. While states are funded by 

DHS for counter-terrorism, we do not have a regional counter-drug strategy 

that addresses air, land, and sea approaches to our state. Federal partners, adjacent states, and local agencies must be included in our strategy. We must fix 

responsibility at the national and regional levels to develop and implement the 

plan. Someone must be in charge. This will result in synergistic successes in 

preventing drug trafficking and a transportation security incident. 

b. Develop a regional counter-terrorism and counter-drug strategy. As 

mentioned previously, drug-trafficking is an ongoing process with potential to 

be used as an avenue for terrorists to create a transportation security incident. 

Many federal, state, and local agencies are involved in counter-drug operations. 

Most efforts are local. We do not have a coordinated, multi-state, air/land/sea, 

and law enforcement focused regional strategy to prevent and to respond to a 

transportation security incident. Regional strategies across the United States 

should cascade from a national strategy. 

c. Produce a regional drug threat analysis. While there are multiple drug 

threat analyses available, we lack a unified assessment that could drive coordinated action in our region. Drug trafficking into Florida occurs through the 

states that border the Gulf of Mexico (responsibility of the Gulf Coast HIDTA), 

highway systems from Atlanta (Atlanta HIDTA), water approaches (Joint Interagency Task Force South), and air transportation routes. A common drug threat 

assessment would assist a more unified federal, state, and local response. An 

excellent way for this to happen is federal and local support of the important 

fusion center initiative being implemented by the Florida Department of Law 

Enforcement. 

23 

d. Share information. The sharing of information among federal, state, and 

local law enforcement can be improved. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement is taking the lead to address this problem. The Florida Fusion Center 

protects our state by incorporating an all crimes/all hazards approach to information sharing. Intelligence ‘‘Stovepipes’’ that contributed to the September 11, 

2001 attack on America must be reduced. Privacy considerations and agency 

policies adversely impact the sharing of law enforcement intelligence today. 

This is evident each day as Florida struggles with the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) to align federal and state port access credential. TSA has 

cited federal laws that preclude sharing criminal background information. 

e. Involve Port Directors and Port Security Staff. Port staff are not provided daily intelligence updates. They should be screened for security clearance 

and included in daily intelligence and operations updates that affect ports in 

Florida and the United States. They should also receive relevant operations 

planning information that involved ports or the maritime environment. Port 

staff are included in exercises conducted by our Regional Domestic Security 

Task Forces. However, this must expand to include intelligence sharing and 

daily operations interaction. 

f. Prioritize OPBAT. Operations Bahamas, Turks and Caicos has been an important deterrent 

of drug-trafficking into Florida for many years. Resources reductions have severely reduced operational 

capability. Most recently, the United States Army removed its Blackhawk helicopters to support other 

operations. Prior to the military deployments, significant resources were dedicated to preventing the 

movement of drugs from source countries. We should return to this level of interdiction as soon as 

possible. In the interim, we should coordinate existing strategies and resources among all partners. 

g. National Efforts with Regional Emphasis. The global problem of drug 

trafficking requires a national and international solution. A formal strategy 

must be created with fixed responsibilities that involve our seaports, but also 

the entire inter-modal transportation systems of seaports, airports, railways, 

highways, and remote entry points. Lessons learned from counter-drug operations must be analyzes for counter-terrorism. Sharing of information from this 

national initiative is imperative. 

Conclusion 

Florida is recognized as a national leader in port security. Florida has implemented one of our nation’s first drug control strategies. This strategy clearly emphasizes the importance of port security as part of our law enforcement response. We 

continue to emphasize and to resource drug prevention and drug treatment as equal 

to law enforcement in our strategic efforts against drugs. While we have strong, effective programs across the state and we have enjoyed significant success in many 

of our initiatives, drug trafficking continues at an unacceptable level. It will only 

be reduced with efforts that are synergistically applies with federal, state, and local 

resources. We thank this Subcommittee for its interest in Florida’s and our Nation’s 

security. Your efforts help create the conditions to reduce the illegal drug supply, 

secure our ports and transportation systems from a transportation security incident, 

and most importantly, protect our neighborhoods and families. Thank you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. And I thank all the witnesses for their 

testimony. And I will remind each member that he or she will have 

five minutes to question the panel. And now I will recognize myself 

for questions. 

I think what we will do is we will go through a series of questions and, since it is just the two of us, I will say to my colleague 

we will have plenty of time to ask our questions of the group. 

I would like to begin by putting into this statement for the record 

a Unanimous Consent Request to enter from the Miami River Marine Group, their statement with respect to South Florida Regional 

Maritime Exchange, Promoting Growth of Waterborne Commerce. 

Without objection, it is entered into the record. 

24 

FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. FRAN BOHNSACK

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MIAMI RIVER MARINE GROUP

FOR THE

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM

REGARDING

SOUTH FLORIDA REGIONAL MARITIME EXCHANGE

PROMOTING GROWTH OF WATERBORNE COMMERCE

CHAIRWOMAN SANCHEZ, RANKING MEMBER SOUDER, AND DISTINGUISHED SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS, it is my honor to have the opportunity 

to submit a statement for the record about what the maritime industry is doing to 

enhance maritime domain awareness around the country, and how a Maritime Exchange would benefit the Southern Florida port business community. My name is 

Fran Bohnsack and I am the Executive Director of the Miami River Marine Group. 

The Miami River Marine Group (MRMG) is a private port cooperative of cargo 

carriers and marine related industry dedicated to preserving the Miami River as a 

working river. In the past ten years, improvements in local and international economies have been reflected by an increase in the activity and vitality of the working 

river. 

The Miami River is the fourth largest port in the state of Florida, serving as economic catalyst for the South Florida region and providing vital shipping links to the 

shallow draft ports of the Caribbean and Central and South America. As a working 

river, the Miami River’s navigation and commercial shipping directly generates millions of tons of cargo each year and thousands of direct and indirect jobs. 

Goods shipped from the Miami River are sent to over 80 ports of call in the Caribbean and Central and South America. Just as Miami serves as the gateway to the 

Americas, the Miami River serves as the shallow draft port for foreign flag vessels 

coming from similar shallow ports in this part of the world (shallow drafts are necessary for the Miami River which is only 15 feet deep). Economic projections for 

cargo movement indicate that Miami River shipping growth is expected to continue 

at a healthy rate. 

Among the keys to any successful seaport, including the Miami River, are deep 

water, adequate storage and berthing facilities, and access to inland transportation 

networks. Equally important—and often overlooked—to the efficient, cost-effective 

and safe movement of goods is the information network which ensures that all partners in the transportation chain are aware of the shipping and transit information 

necessary to promote the flow of commerce. 

One of the principal indexes of good management in the maritime field is the 

turnaround a ship receives in port. Simply stated, the shorter the period between 

arrival and departure, the better the turnaround; and the lower the costs. Ports 

which offer faster turnaround times will have an economic advantage over other 

ports. Yet a great deal of communication is required to ensure a ship is serviced 

quickly and safely: a berth must be available, pilots must be ordered, tugs must be 

scheduled, linemen must be in place to handle the lines as the ships come alongside, 

labor must be available, and federal agency inspections must be closely coordinated 

with the vessel’s arrival to eliminate unnecessary delays. All of these activities depend on up-to-the minute communication of any changes in the vessel movement 

schedule. 

These are just a few of the activities which must take place each time a ship arrives in port. In addition, storage and transportation must be arranged, entry must 

be made on the merchandise, chandlers must deliver food and other supplies, the 

crew must be paid, and so on. The list of people who must be kept apprised of ship 

movements is a lengthy one, and given the number of factors which can conspire 

to delay a commercial cargo vessel, the schedules are often outdated the moment 

they are reported. Keeping the interested parties informed of changes is often a fulltime job for those who are charged with the responsibility to do so. 

25 

Many port communities have addressed this need by forming trade associations 

to acquire, preserve, and disseminate maritime and other business information. 

These organizations, known as Maritime Exchanges, are non-profit organizations 

which develop expertise in the areas of Ship Reporting and conduct other activities 

designed to promote trade and commerce in their regions. 

Maritime Exchanges are dedicated to providing information, communications and 

other services in order to ensure safe, secure, efficient and environmentally sound 

maritime operations. These maritime information service organizations represent 

the commercial maritime community’s shared commitment to proactively address 

the challenges faced by the maritime industry, as well as the U.S. Coast Guard, 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Maritime Administration 

(MARAD), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and other federal and state agencies in a cooperative and cost efficient manner. 

While not all of the 351 seaports throughout the U.S. enjoy the benefits of a Maritime Exchange, it is certainly noteworthy that all of the top ports, and several of 

the smaller ones, have recognized the need to centralize the collection and distribution of maritime information through an Exchange. Maritime Exchanges are vital 

to the maritime industry and their government partners in Baltimore, British Columbia, Jacksonville, Alaska, Puget Sound, San Francisco Bay, Hawaii, Southern 

California, New York and New Jersey, the Delaware River and Bay, New Orleans, 

Virginia, Texas and Portland, Oregon. 

Several of the people who oversee the operations of these maritime exchanges are 

former Coast Guardsmen and have served as Captains of the Port at various places, 

and all the people who run these maritime exchanges have extensive maritime experience, including as licensed master mariners, and senior maritime industry executives. For those ports in which no Exchange is located, undoubtedly much of the 

same work is being performed, yet in many instances, those who receive the inquiries or create the reports—pilots, harbor masters, port authorities, agents, and others—must do so in addition to their normal responsibilities. 

Although the majority of Maritime Exchanges were formed in the latter part of 

the 19th and early 20th centuries, the need for Exchanges is equally evident today. 

While information sharing was certainly challenging in the era of the telegraph and 

telegram, the average ship transit was several times longer than today’s voyages. 

Today, transit times are shorter, and communicating information among transportation partners is light years faster. With the advent of new technologies, changes 

in shipping patterns, ever larger vessels, and increasingly stringent maritime security measures, the challenges to the maritime sector are progressively more complex. As a result, two new Exchanges have formed in the last few years, and several 

other port communities are considering forming Exchanges, as well. 

Exchanges exist to keep members informed on a variety of matters, not the least 

of which are the ever-important vessel schedules. Yet most Exchanges also address 

the myriad issues surrounding commercial port operations, such as pending legislation, new regulatory requirements, the growing federal agency information reporting 

requirements, increasing crew, passenger, and cargo inspections, and advances in 

technologies associated with vessel, cargo and crew processing. These are just a few 

of the reasons why the Miami River Marine Group has been working to establish 

a Maritime Exchange in Southern Florida. 

Like any trade association, Exchanges serve as a venue under which often competing port interests can come together to address issues of mutual concern, or to 

identify opportunities for improvement to the overall community. 

Exchanges can also help identify trends in shipping that can be used to both facilitate daily operations and undertake long-term strategic planning. They can coordinate training programs, such as hazardous material transportation or security, 

and in some cases, they will lobby for the rights of industry. Often tagged ‘‘the voice 

of the port,’’ an Exchange will unite members under a single umbrella to oppose or 

support initiatives as they arise. Like other trade associations, the whole is greater 

than the sum of its parts: with each additional member, the Exchange voice is 

strengthened exponentially. 

And of course, Exchanges can be good opportunities for networking, putting members in touch with others who have similar interests to find or obtain new business 

relationships and share ideas. 

Why is a Maritime Exchange needed in Southern Florida? Although some of the 

activities described above are consistent with other trade associations, Marine Exchanges are unique because of their day-to-day operating role in their communities. 

Although the full scope of activities undertaken by each Exchange in the U.S. differs 

based on the unique needs of its port community, all provide the same basic Ship 

Reporting services: 

26 

Ship Reporting: Exchange watchstanders, most of whom operate 24/7, track vessel movements via traditional means, such as contact with the vessel agents, pilots 

and others with vessel schedule information, as well as through AIS or satellite 

technologies. They enter the information into their databases and make it available 

on a real-time basis to those with a right or a need to know. With the information 

consolidated into a central community database, Exchanges can then distribute reports of historical, current and estimated ship movement activities to their members. Using a neutral organization such as an Exchange alleviates concerns over 

sharing what might be considered proprietary commercial information. 

In addition, vessel agents use Exchanges to transmit instructions or other information to their ships while en route, and the ships’ masters or pilots will contact 

the Exchange with a variety of questions, such as whether water is available at the 

berth, what time tugs will be alongside, etc. 

Unlike their federal counterparts who rotate in and out of ports on a frequent 

basis, Exchange staff members are specifically trained in local port operations and 

develop institutional memories. As a result, they often serve as the ‘‘eyes and ears’’ 

of the port community and law enforcement agencies, and can detect and report 

anomalies when appropriate. 

Vessel Particulars: Private and public sector port operators often have a need 

to obtain detailed information about ships as they enter port. From length, breadth 

and weight, to owners, previous names, P&I Club, and safety certificate expiration 

dates, Exchanges are repositories for a wide-range of vessel information. 

Community Information Clearinghouse: Exchanges are often conduits between federal agencies or state authorities and the local communities. They collect, 

broadcast and store navigation restriction notices, security bulletins, bridge openings, dredging schedules, and a host of other information. 

Answering Services: Many Exchanges also operate 24-hour answering services 

for their members. In addition to traditional message taking functions, often Exchanges are prepared to respond to the questions or messages from callers—many 

of which are related to a particular vessel’s schedule. These answering services can 

be utilized during lunchtimes, holidays, nights, weekends or any combination of the 

above. Subscribers have the choice to have callers patched through to their cell 

phones, messages emailed, or messages held for pickup. 

Publications: Newsletters, port directories, and other publications keep members 

informed and present revenue opportunities through advertising and/or subscriptions. 

Other Services: There are any number of roles Exchanges can play in support 

of their port communities. Some may manage job posting bulletin boards, serve as 

harbor safety or area maritime security secretariats, or offer boarding agent services. The list of programs and services can be as long or as short as needed by the 

local community. 

Other Automation Services: These may include: 

• Cargo manifesting: Exchanges, like port authorities, may operate communitybased cargo manifesting and release systems for their communities. In addition 

to helping port customers comply with reporting regulations mandating the use 

of the CBP Automated Manifest System, these types of community-based systems centralize receipt and distribution of messages pertaining to cargo status 

(inspection required, cargo released, cargo held, etc.). 

eNOA/D: With the June 05 requirement for electronic crew/passenger manifesting via the Coast Guard’s electronic Notice of Arrival/Departure system, several Exchanges have stepped in to help their communities achieve compliance 

in a cost-effective manner. 

PORTS: In partnership with the National Ocean Service, Exchanges serve as 

local sponsors for their regions’ Physical Oceanographic Real Time Systems. 

In order for an Exchange to succeed in Southern Florida, it must have the buyin of the local maritime constituencies. These may include both private-sector port 

businesses, public port authorities, and federal, state, local agencies, and elected officials, if appropriate. Specific organizations may include: 

• Pilots 

• Container and bulk carriers 

• Cruise ship operators 

• Steamship agents 

• Port Authorities/terminal operators/stevedores 

• Warehouse operators 

• Tug/barge companies 

27 

• Trucking/rail companies 

• Importers/exporters 

• Brokers/forwarders 

• Labor 

• Admiralty law firms, banks, insurance companies 

• Surveyors, fumigators, and other service providers 

• U.S./State/County legislators 

• Law Enforcement 

• Key Federal Agencies: CBP, Coast Guard, USDA, FDA, COE, etc. 

Needless to say the initial organizational issues will take some period of time to 

resolve. Once these issues are resolved, however, members of the Southern Florida 

port business community will be well-positioned to launch an organization that will 

benefit all maritime stakeholders in the region. 

While a pool of initial start up funds will be necessary to open the doors, the distinct advantage of a Maritime Exchange over other types of associations lies in the 

fact the Exchange can develop a suite of programs and services which can be offered 

on a for-fee basis to ensure the continued viability of the organization over the long 

term. While membership dues remain an important component of an association’s 

revenue stream, the organization is funded primarily by those who use its many 

services. 

There will be individuals who resist the concept. These persons may believe they 

are getting the services they need today at no cost, so why should they pay to fund 

a new organization. The response is clear: Southern Florida ports are doing well 

today, but could they do better? Conversely, can these same ports be kept from slipping in the face of an ever-increasing competitive global shipping industry? Can 

steps be taken to ensure that costly new federal regulations do not over-burden port 

businesses? 

The answer to all these questions is yes, and an Exchange is one mechanism to 

achieve those important goals. 

I would like to thank you, Ms. Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee 

for the opportunity submit this statement today. I am happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Let’s see, what questions do I have for you 

all? 

I would like to begin with asking about, now, Captain, that we 

have so much of an emphasis going on terrorism and counter-terrorism efforts, how are your resources? Is the Coast Guard in this 

area still getting to the things it used to do, before we put all these 

other responsibilities on you? You know, pleasure craft, safety 

issues, search and rescue. Or has that affected your performance? 

Resources, have they been drawn away from the original things 

that the Coast Guard used to do? Do you need more help in that 

area? 

Captain SCHULTZ. Madam Chairman, here, locally, Coast Guard 

Sector Miami and the entire Seventh District has always been a 

very operationally fast-paced location within the Coast Guard. 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, it was in 2004 that we 

created the first Sector Command here. And I think that move has 

actually served us incredibly well. We married together what was 

the former Group Operations, which did the boating safety, the 

boardings, the search and rescue, with the former Captain of the 

Port functions, which involved the full spectrum of marine safety, 

pollution response. We put that under one command. 

We have had some synergies that have stemmed from that. The 

operational resources and the regulatory authorities are all nestled 

in one place. 

Our missions have clearly grown, as you indicated, since 9/11. 

Maritime Homeland Security was a smaller slice of what we do. 

Today it constitutes probably a quarter or so of our total allocation 

of effort. 

28 

Our operations have grown with those new responsibilities. The 

Coast Guard has grown at large, close to 4,000 billets on the macro 

sense. Here, locally, I couldn’t give you the exact specifics on our 

bodies. I jumped onto the organization here in 2006, in the new 

framework we are operating in. 

We are well staffed and funded for our responsibilities. We are 

busy, but I don’t think we have had any letdown in service delivery 

to the public down here. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Thank you, Captain. 

Here is the problem that I have, and one of the reasons I wanted 

to visit the Miami Port and see and get your testimony on record. 

I don’t know which one of you mentioned that there are probably 

over a hundred thousand pleasure boats registered here, between 

the three or four ports just in the immediate area. 

You know, when were talking about identifying ships, boats, 

whatever, most of the pleasure—almost all the pleasure craft don’t 

have a tracking monitor to them, or what have you. 

What do we do? I mean, what is your best concept? And I will 

ask all three of you about what we do with these pleasure craft 

with respect to going off to some island and picking up people who 

shouldn’t be in this country that are being brought in, or drug trafficking, or contraband smuggling. I mean, what is the best idea you 

all have come up with? Because I know you haven’t done it yet. I 

mean, you have done layering, you have done some projects, some 

pilot projects, but what do you think in the long run? What do we 

do about a port like Miami, that has so many pleasure craft attached to it? 

Captain SCHULTZ. Well, Madam Chairman, I threw out the number of 170,000 vessels here in southeast Florida in three counties 

alone, so I will take the first stab at that question. 

I guess what we are doing is we do employ a layered defense, 

and there are many different threats. We have the threat of a terrorist type of activity in a seaport, we have the threats of illegal 

migrant smuggling, illegal drug smuggling. The other missions we 

have down here, people violating our living marine resources; we 

have a lot of rich resources out here, fishes and coral reefs and 

things. We are involved in all those missions. 

What we do currently is we try to get our arms around the domain as best we can with the available sensor information we 

have. We employ a layered strategy to that. We have cutters; Sector Miami has Coast Guard cutters. We don’t control the aviation 

assets, the airplanes and helicopters directly, but we have an air 

station that services two sectors down here. We have flights most 

every day of the week. We partner with Customs and Border Protection, who has an air marine operation down here. 

So, generally, we have maritime patrol aircraft flying over the 

Straits of Florida, with the outer approaches, looking for vessels of 

interest coming across. We have our small boat stations. We have 

four multi-mission small boat stations that fall under my command 

here. We have those vessels on patrol. Our state partners, such as 

the Fish and Wildlife Commission, our local partners, have marine 

units that are on the water. And through those layered vessels, we 

are trying to stop those vessels that stand out as possibly intending 

mal-intent over, you know, legitimate business. 

29 

That does get very challenging. The recreational vessel versus 

the vessel that is posing a threat, look the same down here. Do we 

have visibility on all the smaller vessels? As I mentioned in my 

statement, that clearly is an area where there is room for improvement. I think we have the challenge of the larger vessels, the commercial vessels; we have good domain and awareness on them 

through our classified and unclassified common operational pictures. There are new initiatives mentioned, such as Long-Range 

Identification Tracking that will come and bring even added value 

to that. 

But there is a legitimate challenge on small vessels. But we are 

employing day-to-day layered security. And it is presence, it is maritime cops on the beat on the water, it is intelligence. Intelligence 

is clearly a key component of that, too. And then we respond within 

the best of our capabilities to those threats. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. But, Captain, I have friends who have pleasure 

boats here who say it is very rare to see a Coast Guard cutter out 

there in the bay or, if there is, there is one, and most people know 

what time it goes out. And, I mean, these friends I have, and various say, you know, we could take our boat, go pick somebody up 

off an island, come back in. They have told me about the fact that, 

you know, if they were to do such a thing, they are supposed to 

go up the river and pick up the phone at some given spot and call 

in to the airport and talk to who is ever on the other end, I guess, 

of CVP and tell them they are in town. They say, yeah, Xerox a 

copy on Monday of your passport and send it in to us by mail. 

I mean, do we need more resources, or is just putting a station 

closer or easier for people to follow? I mean, even my friends say, 

why should we do that? Why should we go upriver six miles or 

eight miles and go and do that, only to get somebody out at the 

airport and it doesn’t really matter? I mean, we could be telling 

them there is only four of us on the boat, versus ten of us on the 

boat. And they could care. They don’t really know. 

Captain SCHULTZ. Well, Congresswoman—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What do we do? What do we do? What do we do— 

can we do anything about it? 

Captain SCHULTZ. Well, I think what we do do is we put our best 

capabilities forward. You mentioned a program that is actually run 

by Customs and Border Protection. It is their arrivals, vessels that 

come in from overseas that, typically, down here, it is a lot of times 

the Bahamas. That is about 50 miles away at its closest point. And 

they have a local boater option. It is one scenario where they can 

call in and they are pre-screened and there is a certain level of legitimacy that goes with their registry in that program. 

But the small vessels, there isn’t sufficient resource when you 

are talking 170,000 small boats alone in this reason, and that is 

a small sub-set of our region, where you are going to see every 

boat, every day. 

And I think as we look forward and try to get our arms around 

this thing called Maritime Domain Awareness, hopefully, you 

know, we are looking in the Coast Guard at a future major acquisition called Command 21, that will hopefully bring better sensors, 

better information management systems to integrate information 

30 

from those sensors and databases, intelligence sources, to a product. 

Ideally, we need to see what is out in the area, we need to understand the threats it posed, we need to be able to share that information with our partners. 

So the short answer to your question is do we have—are there 

sufficient resources in my area every day to look at every boat coming in? Clearly not. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Where I am headed with this is, you know, as the 

Chairwoman who also oversees all entry into the United States, 

and exits from the United States, as we tighten other areas, people 

will look for the areas that are least protected. And this seems to 

be pretty wide open, from my standpoint. So getting you all to really think about three, four years down the line, when we have actually got other places under control, this is going to be a sector that 

is going to be hit, I think. Hit in the sense of getting people into 

this country that we probably don’t want here. 

I see that Colonel over there has—— 

Colonel JANES. Madam Chair, your question, I would offer two 

responses. One, the integrated strategy that I talked about before, 

I will bet your friends have, in some cases, seen a sheriff’s craft patrolling the water. And I think an integrated approach that takes 

all the law enforcement, all resources, is something that drug trafficking, counter-terrorism, should be unified with all resources that 

we have, and not just put it on the Coast Guard. 

The second point, I believe, as a vehicle-borne, improvised explosive device, a suicide/homicide bomber, we are going to have to 

have an awareness effort in our communities, our neighborhoods. 

Likewise, those who have small crafts need to be alerted to the 

threat, and, when there is unusual or threatening behavior, a system to report it. 

The Fish and Wildlife Conservation group here in Florida expressed some concern to me about funding that may be taken away 

from Americas Waterway Watch Program, which was intended to 

do that, to provide that awareness, to encourage the dialogue that 

these 1,000,000 pleasure craft in Florida, that a lot of them would 

be sensitive, as good citizens, to that threat and might report something. 

I think it is far beyond the Coast Guard or any local law enforcement to check all this. But, as in a neighborhood, collectively, we 

as citizens, I think, can do something about it, to prevent it. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Did you have any comment? 

Mr. DRYDEN. Yes, I do. I think there is really three areas. It is 

a very complex problem. Just knowing that a vessel is coming in, 

a pleasure craft is coming in, in a free and open society like we 

have, it is almost impossible to be able to take every pleasure craft, 

vet it, understand who is on board and what their intent is. It really just isn’t going to happen that way in the real world. 

It would be nice if we could solve it with technology and we could 

solve it with just, you know, applying more people to it. 

I think what you have to do, there is several things to help along 

the way, but it doesn’t quite get you all the way. One is you have 

to be able to free up the people that are busy doing the grunt work, 

that can focus and use their talents on looking for anomalies. And, 

31 

again, not to say technology-generated things here, but things that 

are suspicious. Suspicious behavior. Whether it is from the sheriff’s 

office or from the Coast Guard, or whoever is out there. 

The second is, you have to start applying technologies and trying 

to push the state of the art of some of these technologies. Which 

I believe the Coast Guard is doing. They are working pretty hard 

on things. I have referenced in my statement this Automated Scene 

Understanding. To be able to classify and understand who are 

these vessels. But not just that they exist there, but what is the 

pattern. Are they doing something that is unusual? You know, is 

there something happening at a period of time at night? What is 

going on? A particular size craft. 

Those might be the things that, if you could automatically sense 

that and alert watch-standers, that would go a long way to look 

into anomalous behavior. Because, again, just knowing that they 

are a sport fisher really doesn’t gain us anything. 

And, lastly, I think the other big thing is there has to be a more 

effective way to share information between all the port partners. 

There has to be a way where we can get past they are trying to 

unclassify or keep so many things close to the vest. And I think 

there is a willingness. At least, what I have seen in the Coast 

Guard, as well as in Florida, there is a willingness to do that. The 

question now is trying to figure out the proper way to make that 

happen, and make it happen fairly rapidly. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

I will defer some questions and give some time to my colleague 

from Florida. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it. 

I want to follow up on Chairman Sanchez’s question. Does the 

Coast Guard have policies—and this is addressed to Captain 

Schultz, of course—does the Coast Guard have policies and procedures for identifying, tracking, and responding to the increasing 

small vessel threat? If not, are there plans to develop these policies 

and procedures in the near future? 

Captain SCHULTZ. Congressman, we, as I mentioned in response 

to the Madam Chairman, we are very concerned with any vessel 

posing any type of a threat. The small vessels, I think, bring a 

unique challenge in that our current suite of sensors is best suited 

for larger vessels, the radars that we employ. 

Obviously, when we are talking about flying airplanes, maritime 

patrol aircraft at sea, larger vessels are easier to detect than a 

small, unlit, fast vessel. Those are the type of vessels that we are 

challenged with right now, that are smuggling illegal migrants or 

smuggling drugs. 

Do we have a plan or a policy? I am going to leave the policy aspects, I think, to the folks in Washington. Here, locally, our plan 

is to apply the given resources we have generic to the Coast Guard, 

force-multiply that, as Colonel Janes talked about, with our state 

and local partners through a coordinated effort. We have many coordinating bodies. We coordinate some of the seaport aspects 

through the area of Maritime Security Committee and Subcommittees. We coordinate some of the other waterfront and coastal-type 

activities in support of migrant interdiction or drugs through entities like the Regional Domestic Security Task Force, where we 

32 

meet on a recurring basis with our state and federal law enforcement partners. As a matter of fact, we are meeting tomorrow here. 

And that is all my state and local partners on the waterfront; we 

will get together and talk about what the current threats are, what 

has happened since we last met. 

So, again, the policy piece, I think is best addressed at the National Coast Guard level. Here, locally, we are employing tools like 

the Hawkeye System, which I mentioned we were the initial test 

site. I think that is at five or six other Coast Guard locations. 

We have the Visualization Tools Project, which is helping us 

automate some of those functions where there used to be a watchstander thumbing through databases or flipping switches on different types of sensors. Now these †† the Visualization Tools brings 

some automation to that. There is alerts we can set. If a vessel 

with automatic identification system comes in—I am talking a bigger vessel now—if that vessel comes in early, and we have some 

rules established with those tools, an alert goes off that that vessel 

is here before we expected it. That is very much simplified than an 

individual flipping through lists to see when those vessels are due 

and then correlating that to what he sees in the radar and all the 

different AIS depictions on the screen. 

So we are doing things. We are embracing those technologies we 

have. There clearly is room for enhanced technologies, better sensors, better integration of sensor data and other sources of information to make us more effective. But here, locally, we are applying 

what we have generic to the Coast Guard, partnering it up with 

state and local partners, Department of Defense assets that come 

in on occasion to support us with maritime patrol aircraft. And we 

are doing, you know, due diligence to the task at hand. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Captain. 

Captain, what is the status of the Coast Guard’s Long-Range 

Identification Tracking Program? 

Captain SCHULTZ. Sir, as I understand the status, it is, you 

know, there are requirements set forth in the Safe Port Act. Here, 

locally, I am not on the cutting edge of the status of that rollout. 

My understanding is, you know, when that comes, that will bring 

some enhanced information on long-range tracking of vessels, vessels that are transiting within a thousand miles of our coastline. 

We will be aware of that. 

Right now, here, locally, I have visibility with Hawkeye, through 

the ability to detect and analyze AIS tracks out to 30, 40, 50 miles 

into the Straits of Florida. 

Long-range tracking will bring us visibility, as I am sure you are 

aware, on all U.S. vessels anywhere in the world; on other vessels 

300 gross tons or larger making approaches to U.S. ports. 

As far as the actual specific status, the funding, that is a little 

bit out of my lane down here, sir. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. Well, I will look into that further. 

Colonel Janes, I have a few questions, if I may. Would you please 

briefly explain some of the differences between Florida’s diverse 

ports and the challenges those differences present in securing 

them? 

Colonel JANES. Certainly, Congressman. 

33 

The—I chair the Florida Seaports Security Standards Council, 

and we look at the minimum standards, but also have talked many 

issues across our state. 

The different governing structures will indicate how ports are 

funded, the private businesses that they orchestrate. In some of our 

ports, they have security personnel that come from the local sheriff’s office. In other cases, they are hired. 

The standards of certified law enforcement versus hired security 

and who should be manning different checkpoints, all come up to 

be critical issues that costs the ports funding, but also get into the 

interpretation of the standard and how well it is being applied. 

The involvement of local government in the ports, again, if the 

county is heavily participating in the funding, the local governance 

could be a board that is comprised of different members across the 

state. 

The bottom line, Congressman, is there is no standard model for 

14 ports. And the fact that we do have 14 ports, the governance 

is varied, the businesses that they transact, some do all, cargo, 

cruise, all business that a major port would do. Others do a very 

focused level. So each port has to be adjusted. 

The great discussion that addresses your question is in the Seaport Security Standards Council, we just had a major discussion 

about should versus shall. And in many of the standards, the word 

from the Florida statute is should. And that recognition is the ports 

vary significantly, that you cannot put a uniform standard on every 

port. The inspector who is checking with compliance must go in 

and determine has that port done everything possible within the 

intent of the standard. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much. 

I am please that you highlighted the importance of the America’s 

Water Watch Program in your written testimony. I am a strong 

proponent of that. 

Would you please briefly explain the benefits of this program— 

and you did go through it—and its importance in increasing Maritime Domain Awareness? 

Colonel JANES. Again, Congressman, my understanding, and, 

again, working with our Fish and Wildlife partners who we look to 

for the small craft security in Florida, in addition to our local partners, the focus of the program that they have made me aware of, 

that if we lose it, I would be concerned, is that it really is an 

awareness, an education of what are the expectations of navigation 

in Florida’s waterways, and what could be the different threats. 

What are illegal actions, suspicious action? And it also helps to 

translate to our boat operators, vessel operators, that they, too, 

have a responsibility in security. It is not just the funded, the governmental aspect. That they can prevent a terrorist act, a transportation security incident, and an illegal act, drug trafficking, by reporting it. 

So it is awareness, involvement, not unlike what we would want 

in our community neighborhoods. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Are you in favor of expanding the program? 

Colonel JANES. Absolutely. I think it is essential to what we do, 

both air, land and sea. We—we can’t fund enough protection 

against drug trafficking and a terrorist act. 

34 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. Thank you very much. Appreciate it very 

much. Thank you. 

Madam Chairwoman. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. We will go to second round of questions. I 

have some questions on—to both Captain Schultz and to Mr. Dryden. 

Viz Tools. Can you expand on how Viz Tools operates and what 

components make the Viz Tools, and what role does The Mariners 

Group/Command Bridge Software have within Viz Tools? 

Captain SCHULTZ. Defer to you first, then talk—— 

Mr. DRYDEN. All right. 

Captain SCHULTZ. ——about our applications or—— 

Mr. DRYDEN. Yeah, I will shy away from the operational side, 

and let you do that. 

But just from a technology standpoint, one of the big problems, 

as I talked about, was there is a lot of information flowing into a 

Command Center. Some of that could just be manual and telephonic, other is electronic from all these new systems. 

One of the major problems is how do you take something—how 

do you take all that and put it together into something meaningful. 

Just the fact that you have a lot of blips out there doesn’t really 

mean anything. So trying to get to this actionable situation awareness is a real issue. 

So, to your question about how is it made up, there is really multiple parts. The first one is how do you fuse all that information 

together. Once you have that, so instead of just radar standing 

stand-alone, and AIS stand-alone, and all these other systems out 

there, once you find a way to bring those together, then you can 

start applying the second part, which is anomaly detection. So you 

can create business rules, as Captain Schultz was mentioning earlier, you can create those business rules, or doctrine, to go look for 

certain circumstances, for anomalies. 

So if you can find those anomalies with those business rules, A, 

you are going to do two things. One is you will find it when it happens, but the other is you are not going to have to divert your 

watch-standers from always looking for those situations, because 

you have another way to achieve that. So the watch-standers, then, 

are free to take action and look around for other things that are 

happening. 

And as the Coast Guard has increasing mission areas, you know, 

it becomes more and more of an issue of if you have a lot more to 

do, how do you figure a way to get there quickly. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So what are the data points? I mean, how—is that 

coming off the radar? Is it only ships that have automated systems? I mean, wha—— 

Mr. DRYDEN. Well, it is very—it really depends on the sensors 

and the systems. For instance, the today AIS, it really is the large 

vessels that have that. The commercial vessels coming in and out 

of here. So you are going to see those. And then you may see it on 

radar, but you are not going to know who they are, you know, if 

it is a small boat. You will know who all the big guys are. We correlate a lot of that information. But when it becomes a small craft, 

you really don’t know. You may be able to tell that it is a particular 

35 

type of vessel or so many feet. Even then, you are really using cameras to figure that kind of stuff out. 

So one of the big problems in the big exposures, I think, that 

exist in the nation, is figuring a way around that. To figure out 

which ones, A, are small boats, but then, do they have behavior 

that would require us to take action, number one. 

And number two is, the other piece of this, is intel. You have to 

be able to find a way to funnel intel, outside of just looking at the 

tactical operation. You have to know in advance, by intel, which is 

generally local intel. It could be from overseas, but in a small boat 

thing, you are generally going to look at the local law enforcement 

and what they hear on the streets and whatnot. You have to have 

a conduit. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So they are calling it in or they are—the local 

intel. 

Mr. DRYDEN. If it is—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. It is called in, it is coming over the fax or the 

wires, something? How—— 

Mr. DRYDEN. Right. I will let the Captain speak to the operational side of how they physically receive it, but, generally, yeah, 

you are getting manual intel that comes in, or you are getting 

phone calls that happen from-from—port partners. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Captain? 

Captain SCHULTZ. Congresswoman, he talked about the Visualization Tools product. The product that were testing, the Command 

Bridge from Mariner Group, as a proof-of-concept, that type of 

product does bring some of the automation to what before was a 

human-intensive project. We have a Watch Center, with a team of 

five watch-standers in there, and we have a sensor operator. We 

have folks that are working different systems, database systems. 

A visualization-type tool can bring to that Command Center 

those automatic alerts. It can integrate sensor data, information, 

present a visual, a graphic visual for the watch-stander. If there is 

a search and rescue case going on, it can automatically populate, 

based on rules, that case, up on a status board. It can show us, if 

you fold in the capabilities of something called Blue Force Tracking, where our friendly forces, their positions are updated. Right 

now, we have that and it is manually updated. The watch-stander 

can look at that visual depiction and see where the Coast Guard 

resources are, partner law enforcement resources are, see the challenge at hand, better connect the dots, and get the right resource 

to the challenge. 

From the security in the seaport standpoint, I mentioned 9,000 

vessel arrivals here. In Port Everglades, in Port of Miami, where 

we have cameras with the Hawkeye system, we can feed the radar 

signature of that vessel. The bigger vessel, we may pick up on 

radar 20 miles out. We can see the AIS signature. We can see the 

radar signature. 

The Visualization Tools Project will take that AIS signal, and I 

mentioned an example before, if that vessel is in before its advance 

notice of arrival, with some parameters that are established in 

there in terms of alerts, we will get an automatic alert that that 

vessel is here early, before its intended arrival. That—the watchstander will be immediately keyed to that. Otherwise, that watchVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:27 Nov 06, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-88\48983.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
36 

stander will be flipping through reams of paper, flipping through 

drop-down screens on computers, and trying to get to that same 

outcome. This is using automation to put more information, better 

situational information, at the fingertips of our watch-standers for, 

hopefully, you know, better security out the back side. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. You mentioned proof-of-concept. Can you tell me 

how far along you are and if this is going to have a—if you think 

it is going to have a positive outcome? 

Captain SCHULTZ. Well, this—the proof-of-concept, we had the 

Command Bridge product for a couple months, and then some of 

the—some of the feeds were turned off. We have just recently been 

informed from the Department of Homeland Security Science and 

Technology Directorate that we have a six-month assessment—extension of our period to assess the product. And, based on our initial assessments of the Visualization Tools, the watch-standers, I 

as the Sector Commander, we did see value there. The ability to 

take information and better process sensors and databases, and 

bring that together, versus just one more box in the Command 

Center, it is clearly a good utility. 

So some type of visualization tool, some type of information management system, I think will be a key component in our Command 

21 way forward, where we are hoping to bring greater capabilities 

to our Command Centers. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you see, if, in fact, you get through the concept 

and you—do you see the Coast Guard maybe applying it in other 

ports? 

Captain SCHULTZ. I think the—I think some type of a visualization tool product, some type of an information management system 

will clearly be part of our—of our, you know, way ahead with regards to Command Centers. 

This is one prototype, proof-of-concept beta test we are doing 

with this product. I am not really privy to what we are doing elsewhere in the country for trying comparable products, but, you 

know, feedback on what we have in hand, it has been a value add. 

We are excited about—we just got the extension for six more 

months here, so we are excited to put it through its paces for a few 

more months. And probably six months from now, I could be able 

to report out a lot more detail about exactly what it does bring to 

the table. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Maybe we will bring you to Washington to do that. 

Colonel Janes, do you think that the Coast Guard has enough assets in South Florida? And if the Coast Guard had more resources 

in South Florida, how do you think they should use them? And 

would more resources help us in effectively decreasing drug trafficking in the region? 

Colonel JANES. Unquestionably, more resources would help us. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What type of resources? 

Colonel JANES. I would defer to the professionals in the Coast 

Guard. As a former Army officer, and having watched the major expansion of the Coast Guard mission in recent years, I would take 

great hesitancy in trying to define for the Coast Guard what they 

need, if I didn’t serve in the Coast Guard. 

But I do know their resources, they are stretched. Every time I 

watch with their different mission requirements and what they 

37 

have been asked to do, funding, I am sure that they would agree 

they would do better had they had more resources. But I would not 

offer a specific example. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The reason I ask is because you are sort of in 

charge of sort of trying to take a look at that, and, as you know, 

somebody who sits under the administration, Coast Guard, for example, isn’t really allowed to tell us they need more resources unless the administration wants them to tell us they need more resources. Of course, they don’t want them to tell us that, because 

the budget is already put forward. 

So I am just asking you, as an observer, what is going on down 

here. Do you think they could use more resources? 

Colonel JANES. Oh, I don’t think there is any question. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Would they be put to good use? 

Colonel JANES. I think it is absolutely imperative that we try to 

resource them for their mission. Their missions been expanded, but 

I have not seen a similar expansion of their resources in recent 

years. And their ability to respond would be, in my thinking, in 

conjunction with the local and national partners who could work in 

the region as they do. 

But certainly, one of the major points of my testimony is we are 

under-resourced to respond to the threat that we have. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

Captain, the Coast Guard dry-docked the 123-foot cutters that 

would have been used in the waters off of south Florida last year. 

Has this impacted your operational readiness here in South Florida? And, again, do you have enough resources to properly fulfill 

your mission? 

Captain SCHULTZ. Madam Chairman, kind of two questions in 

there, and I will deal with following the—Colonel Janes here. 

Regarding the resources, the administration budget as proposed 

does, in fact, ensure our ability to do all our missions. Were additional resources to be directed to the Coast Guard, I am clear that 

there is good applications we could make of those, and deliver more 

service. 

Regarding the 123-foot cutters, as you mentioned, that were 

taken out of service a handful of months ago, actually, close to a 

year ago now, we have come up with what we think are some fairly 

creative strategies to mitigate that gap. Here at Sector Miami, I 

have eight patrol boats that work under our tactical control, that 

are home port in our region. Four of those are 110-foot cutters. The 

other four are 87-foot coastal patrol boats. 

We have worked with my fellow Sector Commanders in Key West 

and St. Petersburg. We have actually taken those platforms, those 

110-foot platforms, that had a 16-person crew before, and we have 

actually married them us with the crews from those eight decommissioned, or eight out-of-service 123-foot cutters. We are now 

multi-crewing those vessels. 

A patrol boat that used to give us 2200 operational hours a year 

is now delivering 3500 operational hours through multi-crewing. So 

the vessel is out more, the crews, the burden on the crews is no 

further time away from home. We are pushing the vessel harder. 

Obviously, the maintenance side of it, we have to sink a few more 

dollars into it. We have to really have a good strategy in place to 

38 

deal with the challenges of running what are already old vessels 

harder. But I think we have hit that pretty well. 

Are we anxiously looking forward to new cutters coming through 

our recapitalization efforts? Absolutely. But here, in the interim, I 

think we have managed to close that gap and deal with that challenge fairly well. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Mr. Dryden, your testimony says that the 

current state of technology in today’s ports is not sufficient to track 

non-cooperative vessels and small boats. What steps do you think 

should be taken to address that issue? 

Mr. DRYDEN. Well, from a technology standpoint, you really have 

to have technology that can do things like pattern analysis, that 

can look, when they turn off—the cooperating vessels are going to 

turn on all their sensors. You are going to see them, and it is, you 

know, well-behaved vessels coming in are going to come in, and it 

is not going to be a problem. 

The legislation currently, I can’t speak to. But I can speak to the 

projects that I know are underway that are partially funded at this 

point. And those projects are seeking to identify all of those, and 

look for anomalous behavior. So that, in fact, when you find something, somebody that should have—that should have their transponders on and they don’t, that is the kind of thing that needs to 

light up in a Command Center, so they can take the action, when 

you have the small boats that aren’t, in the first place, going to 

have those sensors. 

But, you know, the Coast Guard has attempted to push down the 

requirement and to get cooperation from small boaters. But, really, 

it is a daunting task without getting in the small boater’s way. 

So, as they work through that to figure what is the right compromise, you really have to solve it with technology. And, again, I 

would—I would offer that, with the Safe Port Act and with the 

funding of the Safe Port Act, it really allows the Coast Guard to 

spend more consistent dollars over time to reach those objective. 

But when they are having to piecemeal it together, you know, 

when DHS and S&T apply dollars to do projects they think have 

value, you know, we are really taking too much time getting from 

start to finish, because they only have a certain number of dollars 

to use. 

So the promise of the Safe Port Act, and, hopefully, Command 

21, being an acquisition program, is they are going to be able to 

lay all that out and actually execute on those. Today, what they are 

having to do is they are having to work around and find the dollars 

and, you know, kick and scream and figure out a way to fund some 

of these things. 

And the net result is it just takes too long to achieve it. They 

have the will to do it; it is just a matter of getting the dollars 

aligned with that to make it happen. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Bilirakis, do you have another set of questions? 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Just a couple. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Uh-huh. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Again, Colonel Janes, do you believe it is possible 

to track small vessel threats in a meaningful manner, given the 

sheer volume of pleasure crafts in Florida’s waterways? 

39 

Colonel JANES. I don’t believe we can do it with technology. I 

think it goes back to an awareness, and everybody in the waterways cooperating. I think technology has a role, but it would take 

an integrated system. And it would be very complex, not unlike a 

vehicle-borne, improvised explosive device that I mentioned before. 

Just too many, too spread, too hard. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. Maybe, briefly, the rest of the panel can 

comment on that? 

Mr. DRYDEN. I would agree with that. I think that—I think that 

is correct. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. Yes, sir? 

Captain SCHULTZ. And I would add, Congressman, I think we 

can bring greater visibility, greater awareness to that population. 

Can you resolve all challenges with small boats? Probably not. But 

you can—we can do better than we are now with enhanced technologies. And, again, I mentioned the Command 21. I think that is 

kind of where we are hoping to go, and, you know, the Coast Guard 

is looking at ways, partnering with all the stakeholders in that 

small arena. There is obviously strong—strong views there, but I 

think we can do more there. 

Can we completely solve it? You know, that will—that is yet to 

be determined, I guess. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DRYDEN. Congressman, can I make one point? The Interagency Operational Centers that—that Command 21 or that the 

Safe Port Act dictate, that is exactly the kind of thing, I think, 

where it becomes the venue, it becomes the forum in which to do 

that. And there has already been test beds, for lack of a better 

work, but project through DOJ, such as Seahawk in Charleston, 

that have anticipated and kind of worked through a lot of the 

issues of, you know, what are the procedures, what are the lessons 

learned from trying to get a lot of different, disparate organizations 

to work together and share intel. I think with layer—and it is targeted as, you know, at least in part, as a model going forward for 

these Command Centers, for the Interagency Command Centers. 

So I think there is a lot to be learned there, where we can apply 

it and, hopefully, get closer to solving the problem by using that. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

Mr. Dryden, would you please explain how Command Bridge 

helps improve and facilitate actionable situational awareness and 

help watch-standers differentiate between what is important and 

what is not? 

Mr. DRYDEN. Sure. The biggest thing is being able to take all 

those disparate systems and fuse them together, because once you 

have done that, now the sum of these things, when you look at it, 

you can start applying those rules across everything. 

As an example, if you have a—if you have a vessel that you are 

just looking at with AIS, and you know where they are, you don’t 

have the ability, without using something like Viz Tools, you don’t 

have the ability to then take other amplifying data about who owns 

the vessel and things that may be out there. When did they file 

their 96-hour Notice of Arrival? Who are the crew? Who are the 

owners? All that other information that really isn’t related to the 

40 

sensor, not to the blip of AIS. It is related, really, to the bigger picture. 

So the whole idea behind achieving actionable situational awareness is light up the things, get the watch-standers who are in there 

all day long, get them to light up and say, okay, here is something 

you need to look at. Then they use their talents to determine is this 

something they need to explore further or not. 

But by doing that, and getting rid of all those manual processes, 

you have a lot fewer things get missed, because they are spending 

their time, you know, doing the grunt work. What you really want 

is light it up, apply those business rules. 

And if you think of it as a portfolio of rules, the old adage, when 

you have seen one port, you have seen one port. As you go to different AORs and different environments, 80 percent of it might be 

the same, or maybe 50 percent is the same. You have to have a 

way to be able to create rules for them, for those particular ports 

that may be different. You may not have a lot of drug trafficking 

that is going on in Seattle, where you have a lot going on in Miami. 

It is those kind of nuances that you have to be able to give them 

the ability to do themselves. And without some sort of tool, you 

have to—you are not going to achieve it. So the whole idea behind 

Viz Tools is to prove some of those things, and figure out the best 

way to, A, create the rules, but also to visualize that information. 

Whether it is Command Bridge or some other product really isn’t 

the driver here. The driver is lessons learned, figuring out what 

works, what doesn’t. And hopefully being able to apply the process 

going forward. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. You are welcome. 

Captain Schultz, according to your written testimony, Sector 

Miami is responsible for all Coast Guard missions spanning 165 

miles southeast of Florida coastline and encompassing numerous 

counties. And within that region, there are five ports collectively 

handling more than 9,000 annual vessel arrivals. And the region 

is also home to two of the three largest cruise ship ports in the 

world, with nearly 4,000,000 passengers moving through both Port 

Everglades and the Port of Miami annually. 

So how many boats are currently assigned to Sector Miami? 

Captain SCHULTZ. We have nine Coast Guard cutters assigned to 

Sector Miami, and then I have four multi-mission small boat stations, with various levels of small boats assigned. 

Here in Miami Beach, I have—I think it is six hulls assigned to 

Miami Beach. I have actually seven in Miami, four up in Fort Lauderdale, I believe it is. Three in Lake Worth, three up in Fort 

Pierce. And we have some, you know, maintenance response hulls 

to support them when one goes out to service. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So how many of these boats are currently at sea? 

Captain SCHULTZ. Well, on a typical day, Madam Chair, generally we have one to two, on occasion three, patrol boats that are 

actually pushing the border out of the ports, you know, patrolling 

in the Straits of Florida. 

Closer to home, our small boat stations have resources on the 

water every day. They are not on the water 24 hours of every day, 

but they are on the water a certain portion of every day, doing varVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:27 Nov 06, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-88\48983.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
41 

ious types of missions. They may be out doing a search and rescue 

case in the morning or the afternoon; they may be on a ports and 

waterway coastal security patrol, out looking at maritime critical 

infrastructure and key resources up the Miami River; they may be 

involved escorting a cruise ship out here in a patrol with model 

automatic weapons, doing what we call our ports, waterways and 

coastal security mission. 

So there is a presence on the water from those stations just 

about every day of the year, absent, you know, a bad day or two 

where weather precludes that. But there is a presence. I can’t give 

you a specific number, because it varies, depending on the time of 

the day and the day of the week. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How many people are currently assigned to Sector 

Miami? 

Captain SCHULTZ. We have approximately 500 active duty Coast 

Guard men and women, about 150-plus Coast Guard Reservists, 

and then our auxiliary or volunteer ranks number somewhere between 1000 and 1100. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And how many people and assets did Sector Miami 

contribute to the Coast Guard’s efforts in Iraq? 

Captain SCHULTZ. Technically, I don’t have any assets that—that 

are contributing to Iraq. We had—there are two patrol boats, Coast 

Guard Cutter Baranof and Coast Guard Cutter Maui, that were 

home ported previously here in Miami. 

I am not sure exactly how they are reported on—on our books 

regarding their operating facility codes and things, but they have 

been deployed for—deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom for some 

time now. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Does the Coast Guard currently have the ability 

to track all of the vessels carrying illegal migrants and narcotics 

destined for south Florida? 

Captain SCHULTZ. No. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What percentage of these vessels do you think are 

tracked? 

Captain SCHULTZ. Well, there is a two-part answer, Madam 

Chair, to that question. I guess when it comes with Cuban migrants here in south Florida, the Cuban migrants that we interdict 

at sea, we obviously can contain that number, know that number. 

Cuban migrants that make landfall here in south Florida come forward and they start their clock once they are here in the States, 

and certain rights are afforded to them. They can apply for citizenship a year and a day later, I believe it is. 

With migrants from other countries, generally, when they reach 

our shores, they tend to go underground. They don’t self-declare, so 

we really don’t know the denominator in that equation. I couldn’t 

give you a number, because I don’t know the answer to that number, outside of the Cuban migrants. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Colonel—— 

Colonel JANES. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. —you said in your testimony that port staff should 

receive daily intelligence updates from the Department of Homeland Security. Why? 

Colonel JANES. If there were a threat of a security incident, I 

don’t think it is fair to all of a sudden start sending them informaVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:27 Nov 06, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-88\48983.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
42 

tion. I think if we have a system in place, that we share the information, our ports would get into a mode of routinely processing it, 

how they would handle it with their staff, and would probably talk 

through responses. 

If they learned of a threat that would be presented to a port in 

Seattle, I think our port—our ports are security conscious, that 

they would, in many instances, sit down and discuss how they 

might respond. 

I don’t think that you can all of a sudden turn an intelligencesharing process on and off. It ought to be on. The information they 

have a need to know, we should share with them so that they can 

develop their own internal apparatus on how to share it within the 

port and what they might do to respond. 

To me, it is a start of best practices and lessons learned, if they 

are able to participate. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Does your have staff have the security clearances 

necessary to receive daily intelligence briefs? And what assistance 

has the Homeland Security Department given you in trying to attain those clearances? 

Colonel JANES. Madam Chair, I am in the process of getting my 

own clearance in place. So some of that, I could not truly answer. 

And each port would have to—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And how long have you been trying? 

Colonel JANES. I am probably into two months now, to apply. 

And I have turned in the paperwork, fingerprinted, and whatever. 

And, again, I had a security clearance, Top Secret Cosmic Atomal, 

years ago. But when I left the Army, it expired, so I have to go 

through the process again. And I understand that. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And how long do you anticipate, or have they told 

you that it would take, to get you cleared, if everything was according to as it should be? 

Colonel JANES. I—I cannot answer that. I will tell you when I receive it, from the—the time when I applied, when I get it. But right 

now, I couldn’t tell you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In your testimony, you talked about regionalizing 

the government’s national strategies. How would regionalization— 

can you sort of talk to that, and what you think that would look 

like? And I am interested in how it would improve the federal government’s response to drug trafficking and terrorism down here in 

this sector. 

Colonel JANES. Madam Chair, as indicated when you read my 

bio, I worked four years in the National Terrorism Preparedness 

Institute, and work with the Department of Homeland Security. 

I am unaware of planning that—that goes down into a region or 

a state that would indicate how a drug threat assessment, which 

could be used to provide a terrorism weapon into our country, how 

those are discussed locally. I don’t believe they are. And if they are, 

it is stovepipe within a particular law enforcement agency. 

Prior to 9/11, we had a problem sharing national intelligence. I 

submitted in my testimony, I think we have a similar problem 

sharing law enforcement information today. DEA, our high intensity drug trafficking areas, they communicate and share information, but it is not unified into one plan. 

43 

Our three HIDTAs in Florida encompass 22 counties. We have 67 

counties. Next year, with the help of our Florida Department of 

Law Enforcement, and the Florida National Guard, we will capture 

a drug threat assessment for the other 45 counties. That will give 

us a state-wide drug threat assessment. 

A drug threat assessment could be used to parallel what could 

be a terrorism route through drug trafficking. And, likewise, our 

law enforcement, looking proactive, okay, what might we do about 

that. 

The reason I said regional, if you look at the State of Florida, it 

is not just the land that we physically occupy. Our Coast Guard 

has a major role. DEA, ICE, the Immigrations, Customs Border 

Protection, all of these are important players. 

I think a strategy that encompasses the Gulf Coast states that 

take I–10, where we know drugs are moving from Mexico and the 

western United States into Atlanta and right down into our state. 

The HIDTA that is located in Atlanta, I have talked to the Office 

of National Drug Control Policy, also with JIATF South, the Joint 

Interagency Task Force South, Admiral Nimick, we plan to meet 

with them in January and look at each other’s different intelligence 

capabilities, merge those, I hope, and I believe, under our Florida 

Department of Law Enforcement leadership, into a unified law enforcement assessment of what the threat is. And then we can begin 

to operationalize what do we do about it. 

Because right now, it is kind of piecemeal. It is reactive, rather 

than proactive. The drug trafficking organizations are international. If there is a problem in Palm Beach County, and law enforcement in Palm Beach County turns up the heat on the drug 

trafficking organization, they will come north into Tallahassee, into 

Leon County. And as I talk to sheriffs in both counties, they are 

aware of that. 

There is not a unifying strategy in Florida to deal across the 

state. We are working on doing that. I believe Florida needs to be 

a part of a regional strategy. Likewise, the national response needs 

to be looked at regionally, nationally. And these resources, intelligence, and response, should be unified in a regional, national effort. And that is not done today. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. My last question, and it is for all three 

of you, I have a Chief of Port Police in Los Angeles, Chief 

Cunningham. He has since left. But when I initially started several 

years ago on this Committee, he said there are three things you 

need to worry about at a port. One, what is in the box? What is 

in the container? Two, who is on the port? Who should be there and 

who shouldn’t be there? And three, how are the different layers of 

government working together? 

And I am very interested to hear from you how are the layers 

of government working together here in South Florida. And I ask 

that because, of course, we saw the problems we had in Katrina, 

with local and state and federal denying each other access, or not 

talking to each other. And we recently saw what could be the same 

problem in the oil spill response in the Bay area in California just 

two weeks ago. 

So my question to you is: How do you all really get along? Are 

you talking to each other? Are you talking to all the different agenVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:27 Nov 06, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-88\48983.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
44 

cies that are involved if something should happen here or if we 

should try to stop something that we know may happen? And what 

do we need to work on? 

And maybe I will start down there and we will go down here. 

Colonel JANES. I, of course, do not work on a port on a daily 

basis, but I visit our ports and listen to them in the Council. I— 

uniformly, I hear that the cooperation on the port is strong. 

There is a resourcing issue; competition between security and 

commerce that gets to be a big issue. 

To your chief who responded to you in California, Madam Chair, 

I would add that I do believe you need a plan, a unified plan. And 

that is the point that I have made to you, that I don’t believe we 

have. The partners and the cooperation is there, and they share information, but I think that we are doing better. Our ports are 

doing quarterly threat assessments. They have a port security plan 

that addresses their port. 

But it doesn’t regionalize, and it looks only at the port. But the 

threat that impacts these points is air, land, and sea. And it goes 

back to the point that I think I have stressed. Cooperation is there, 

but I don’t think we have fixed responsibility and have an adequate 

plan to address it. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

Mr. DRYDEN. I think I should defer to the operators in the local 

area on this one. 

Captain SCHULTZ. Madam Chair, I think the answer to that is 

a very strong positive message here in South Florida. I am personally involved with the Port Directors, with their designated Assistant Port Directors for Security. We meet on an at least monthly 

basis at an executive level. 

Here in the Port of Miami, up in Port Everglades, and Palm 

Beach, I have folks on my staff, port teams, as we call them, that 

come to work in the seaport. Here in the Port of Miami, which you 

visited this morning, there is a physical presence. They have office 

space there. They walk the docks. They are rubbing elbows with 

the Port Security Enforcement Specialists. They are there with the 

port staff. They are there with the Miami-Dade Police Department, 

who is actually a security provider under contract with the port. 

At the State level, my regional counterpart, the Major here in 

this part of the country, you know, we talk probably a couple times 

a week. As I mentioned earlier, we will meet with the Regional Domestic Security Task Force tomorrow. I co-chair the Maritime 

Working Group there with my State partner from Fish and Wildlife 

Commission. And we—that will be all the law enforcement agencies 

down here, and first responders that have a maritime component 

to their mission. We will get together, and we talk. We share emails. 

When there are new challenges, when the State in Florida Statute 311.11, 311.12 came out with some new requirements on quarterly threat assessments, this Maritime Working Group element of 

the RDSTF, the Regional Domestic Security Task Force, came up 

with a Seaport Security Assistance Team function to help, you 

know, work through those processes. 

So I think we are very well connected in that regard. There is 

always room for improvement, but with—you link this back to the 

45 

cruise ships and the number of passengers here. There is more 

work than any one of our agencies can do alone. Miami is very 

much a maritime city. You mentioned meeting Admiral Stavridis 

recently, and he will talk about Miami, he will put the picture on 

the overhead and show you just how maritime it is, just from a visual standpoint. 

We, day-to-day, we had the Super Bowl 2007 here; Super Bowl 

is back in 2010. We have had the Governors’ Conference on Global 

Warming. We had the State Department/FBI Conference on Combating Global Terrorism with 23, 25 minister-level folks in from 

foreign countries. 

We do water site security every day down here. And we don’t just 

train, we actually live it. And it forces us to have mature relationships. So I would say a good part of my duties as Sector Commander, at my level, is working those relationships at my counterparts, you know, with them, and making sure my folks have that 

same level of connectivity. 

And, again, it is commitment. If you backed out the number of 

folks I have on the Port Teams, that is probably close to 20 percent 

of my Sector staff. Not my outlying field units, but 15 to 20 percent 

of my staff is out, deployed in the seaports. They are working with 

Fran Bonesack from the Miami River. Her folks come in for a 

weekly meeting. 

So, again, we can always do better, but we take that part very 

seriously down here. That is a part of the Domain Awareness that 

I think is probably something we can do and continue to build on. 

Lastly on that, we are working very closely with Customs and 

Border Protection. The Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the 

Commissioner of CBP signed a memorandum, an MOU, back in 

2006, looking at better cooperation. I have got—Monday morning, 

I had a CBP officer in my Command Center, briefing their activities in the port. My people are over there briefing the seaport, the 

CBP folks. 

CBP is building a joint fusion center down here, and we have 

committed bodies to be in that, to further enhance that sharing of 

information, intelligence, cooperation, collaboration. 

So I think there is a good new story there, and we are very focused on building on that good new story. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. All right. Mr. Bilirakis, do you have any questions 

left? 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Just one last question. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. We will let you have the last question, then. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Colonel Janes, in your opinion, how 

do we stand on aligning the TWIC card, aligning it with Florida’s 

Port Access Control Credential? And how important is this to the 

State of Florida? And what can we do as a Committee to make this 

happen? 

Colonel JANES. We have made progress, Congressman, in the last 

month, but I am very concerned that we do not have positive steps 

from Transportation Security Administration to unify the two credential requirements before they begin to issue the TWIC in Florida. 

46 

I think the issue is of paramount importance. I cannot overstate 

it, because it affects every port worker, it doubles costs, it is huge 

morale issues. 

Florida has been ready to issue a biometric credential since— 

since March of this year. We have actually delayed that in our efforts to align, because if we did not, it would double the cost, duplicate costs, cause inconvenience for everyone working on the port. 

Only recently, with the help of former Deputy Secretary Jackson, 

was he able to facilitate a discussion with TSA that the National 

Criminal Investigative Check information could be shared from the 

federal to the state level. 

Now, TSA still has concerns with how to make that happen. The 

privacy concerns, and my concern, is that they show up in January 

to begin to issue the TWIC, which meets the federal rule, but does 

not meet the Florida statute. 

So the concerns are very great. And there is a solution at hand. 

The way you could help is to ask TSA to align their schedule 

with the alignment of the credential. We do not need two credentials in Florida. We don’t need to jeopardize commerce, force our 

businesses to go elsewhere, but just cause a break-down in bureaucracy between the federal and state level to align the systems. 

And anything you can do to encourage TSA to make this happen, 

because they have now been given the wherewithal, I believe, with 

the intervention of the Department of Homeland Security. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much. Thanks for that update. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for the panel testifying. 

Thank you, Madam Chair, for bringing this Committee to the State 

of Florida. Appreciate it. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I thank my colleague from Florida, and I thank 

the witnesses for your testimony, and my colleague for his questions. 

And, as you know, we may ask you additional questions. We will 

do so in writing, and we expect that you will quickly get back to 

us on that. 

And hearing no further business, this Subcommittee stands adjourned. 

Once again, thank you to the people of Florida, Miami in particular, all the different government agencies who hosted us so graciously today. Thank you. 

Hearing no further business, this Subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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