IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2022 ND 147

John Clark Bridges, Petitioner and Appellant

v.

State of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee

Nos. 20220077-20220079 & 

20220086

Appeals from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial 

District, the Honorable Bruce A. Romanick, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by McEvers, Justice, joined by Chief Justice Jensen and 

Justices Crothers and Tufte. Justice VandeWalle concurred in the result.

Kiara Kraus-Parr, Grand Forks, ND, for petitioner and appellant; submitted 

on brief.

David L. Rappenecker, Bismarck, ND, for respondent and appellee; submitted 

on brief.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

JULY 21, 2022 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

Bridges v. State

Nos. 20220077-20220079 & 20220086

McEvers, Justice.

[¶1] John Clark Bridges appeals from district court orders and judgments 

granting the State’s motions for summary disposition and denying Bridges’ 

applications for postconviction relief as untimely, barred by misuse of process 

and res judicata, and for lack of genuine issues of material fact. Bridges argues 

summary disposition of his applications was inappropriate and he was entitled 

to evidentiary hearings in each case. We affirm.

I

[¶2] Bridges was convicted following guilty pleas to murder and kidnapping 

in 2012 and attempted murder in 2013. He did not appeal either conviction. 

Bridges previously applied for postconviction relief, and this Court affirmed 

the orders denying Bridges’ applications. See Bridges v. State, 2022 ND 82, 

973 N.W.2d 6; Bridges v. State, 2021 ND 232, 968 N.W.2d 188.

[¶3] In June 2021, in case 08-2021-CV-01163, Bridges applied for 

postconviction relief related to his murder conviction. In November 2021, in 

case 08-2021-CV-02060, Bridges applied for postconviction relief from his 

attempted murder conviction. In December 2021, in cases 08-2021-CV-02236 

and 08-2021-CV-02302, Bridges filed additional applications for postconviction 

relief in each underlying criminal case. The State filed answers to the 

applications, alleging each was either untimely, a misuse of process, or barred 

by res judicata. The State separately moved for summary disposition of each 

application.

[¶4] The district court granted each motion for summary disposition and 

denied Bridges’ applications for postconviction relief. The court determined 

Bridges’ applications were untimely, Bridges had failed to demonstrate any 

genuine issue of material fact, any alleged new evidence would not have had 

an effect on the proceedings, and Bridges’ claims were barred by res judicata 

and misuse of process. Bridges appeals from each order.
2

II

[¶5] Postconviction relief proceedings are civil in nature and governed by the 

North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. Abdi v. State, 2021 ND 110, ¶ 8, 961 

N.W.2d 303 (citing Morris v. State, 2019 ND 166, ¶ 6, 930 N.W.2d 195). The 

applicant bears the burden of establishing grounds for postconviction relief. 

Id.

[¶6] Summary disposition of an application for postconviction relief after the 

State responds is akin to summary judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56. Davies v. 

State, 2018 ND 211, ¶ 9, 917 N.W.2d 8. “The party opposing the motion for 

summary disposition is entitled to all reasonable inferences at the preliminary 

stages of a post-conviction proceeding, and is entitled to an evidentiary hearing 

if a reasonable inference raises a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. A district 

court may summarily dispose of an application for postconviction relief if there 

is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Everett v. State, 2016 ND 78, ¶ 15, 877 N.W.2d 

796. Questions of law are fully reviewable by this Court. Id.

[¶7] Applications for postconviction relief must be filed within two years of 

the date of the conviction becoming final. N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2). Each of 

Bridges’ applications was filed more than two years after his convictions. 

However, N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3) allows a district court to consider an 

application filed outside two years in three instances: (1) the application 

alleges newly discovered evidence; (2) the petitioner establishes that the 

petitioner suffered from a physical disability or mental disease that precluded 

timely assertion of postconviction relief; or (3) the petitioner asserts a new 

interpretation of law that is retroactively applicable to the petitioner’s case. 

N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3). None of Bridges’ applications allege he suffered from 

a physical disability or mental disease. Bridges’ applications assert claims of 

newly discovered evidence and new interpretations of law. We review his 

individual applications in turn.
3

A

[¶8] In case 08-2020-CV-01163, Bridges argues testimony by his psychiatrist 

at an evidentiary hearing in March 2021 on a previous application for 

postconviction relief from his murder conviction constitutes newly discovered 

evidence.

[¶9] Under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(1), a district court may consider an 

application filed more than two years after conviction if the application alleges 

“the existence of newly discovered evidence” that would establish “in light of 

the evidence as a whole . . . the petitioner did not engage in the criminal 

conduct for which the petitioner was convicted.” Generally, when an applicant 

for postconviction relief seeks to withdraw a guilty plea, the district court 

reviews it under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d) to determine whether relief is necessary 

to correct a “manifest injustice.” Lindsey v. State, 2014 ND 174, ¶ 16, 852 

N.W.2d 383. In the context of an application for postconviction relief based on 

newly discovered evidence following a guilty plea, we have explained the 

“manifest injustice” analysis is similar to N.D.R.Crim.P. 33. Lindsey, at ¶ 29. 

We have applied the following test:

The defendant must show (1) the evidence was discovered after the 

guilty plea, (2) the failure to learn about the evidence before the 

plea was not the result of the defendant’s lack of diligence, (3) the 

newly discovered evidence is material to what would have been the 

issues at trial, and (4) the weight and quality of the newly 

discovered evidence would likely result in an acquittal at trial.

Id. This standard predates the existence of the statute of limitation under 

N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2).

[¶10] The State argues the key concern under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(1) is 

whether the newly discovered evidence, if proved in light of the evidence as a 

whole, would establish Bridges did not engage in the criminal conduct for 

which he was convicted.

[¶11] We agree. We conclude the test to be applied to a motion for a new trial 

on the basis of newly discovered evidence under N.D.R.Crim.P. 33 is higher for 

an application for postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence 
4

under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(1). Our previous analysis only required an 

applicant for postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence to 

establish “the weight and quality of the newly discovered evidence would likely 

result in an acquittal . . . .” Lindsey, 2014 ND 174, ¶ 29 (citing N.D.R.Crim.P. 

33). However, N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(1) requires an applicant to 

“establish that the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct for which 

the petitioner was convicted.” Because the burden is higher for postconviction 

relief than that applied to motions under N.D.R.Crim.P. 33, a more suitable 

test is necessary.

[¶12] We are persuaded by the Montana Supreme Court’s decision in Marble 

v. State, 2015 MT 242, 380 Mont. 366, 355 P.3d 742. In Marble, the Montana 

Supreme Court held it had “erred in equating a motion for new trial with a 

postconviction relief claim based upon newly discovered evidence because, 

while a motion for new trial does—by definition—contemplate a new trial, 

postconviction proceedings are in no way tethered to such relief.” Id. at ¶ 29. 

Before Marble, the Montana Supreme Court applied a standard similar to our 

own under N.D.R.Crim.P. 33, requiring a petitioner to satisfy a five-part test:

(1) [t]he evidence must have been discovered since the 

defendant’s trial;

(2) the failure to discover the evidence sooner must not be the 

result of a lack of diligence on the defendant’s part;

(3) the evidence must be material to the issues at trial;

(4) the evidence must be neither cumulative nor merely 

impeaching; and

(5) the evidence must indicate that a new trial has a reasonable 

probability of resulting in a different outcome.

Marble, at ¶ 22; cf. Everett, 2016 ND 78, ¶ 17 (explaining four-part test for 

defendant to prevail on motion for new trial on basis of newly discovered 

evidence). In Marble, the State argued this five-part test was incompatible 

with postconviction relief. According to the State, proof “the petitioner did not 

engage in the criminal conduct” on an application for postconviction relief is a 

higher requirement than the showing of a “reasonable probability of resulting 

in a different outcome” on a motion for new trial. Marble, at ¶ 24. The court 

agreed, concluding the five-part test was inconsistent with the standard set 
5

forth in the postconviction relief statute requiring “newly discovered evidence 

. . . the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct.” Id. at ¶ 31 (citing

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-102(2)). The court ultimately concluded a district 

court “shall utilize the very test set forth [by statute and] determine whether 

the ‘newly discovered evidence . . ., if proved and viewed in light of the evidence 

as a whole would establish that the petitioner did not engage in the criminal 

conduct’ for which he or she was convicted.” Id. at ¶ 36.

[¶13] Our statute for establishing grounds for postconviction relief on the basis 

of newly discovered evidence is nearly identical to that reviewed by the 

Montana Supreme Court in Marble. Compare N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(1) 

with Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-102(2). Section 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(1), N.D.C.C., 

conflicts with the test under N.D.R.Crim.P. 33 only as it applies to the last 

prong. We therefore agree with the reasoning of Marble and adopt a similar 

test for applications for postconviction relief alleging newly discovered 

evidence. We hold the district court must continue to determine whether the 

alleged evidence is newly discovered under prongs one through three and then, 

applying the statutory requirement, determine “if proved and reviewed in light 

of the evidence as a whole” the newly discovered evidence would “establish that 

the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct for which the petitioner 

was convicted.” See N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(1). We conclude such a test 

more accurately reflects the petitioner’s burden in establishing grounds for 

postconviction relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence.

[¶14] Here, the district court determined Bridges failed to establish that the 

new evidence was material to the issues in this case. The court further 

determined Bridges failed to show how the new evidence would likely result in 

an acquittal. Because Bridges failed to meet the lower standard under the fourpart test above, we conclude he also fails to meet the heightened burden we 

announce today. Nowhere in Bridges’ application does he assert the newly 

discovered evidence would establish he did not engage in the conduct for which 

he was convicted. We agree with the district court Bridges has not provided 

competent admissible evidence entitling him to postconviction relief. We 

therefore conclude the court did not err in summarily dismissing Bridges’ 

application for postconviction relief in case 08-2020-CV-01163.
6

B

[¶15] In case 08-2021-CV-02060, Bridges argues testimony regarding an 

internal investigation conducted by the department of corrections is newly 

discovered evidence in his attempted murder case. Bridges also alleges he was 

not present at his initial appearance, and an order denying him a new trial in 

the underlying criminal case is newly discovered evidence.

[¶16] The district court concluded Bridges’ application was untimely. The 

court determined the internal investigation was not newly discovered, as 

Bridges “certainly was aware of the interview through his participation in it,” 

Bridges was provided the investigative report in discovery, and the 

investigation was discussed at his sentencing hearing. Our review of the 

record indicates the investigation took place before Bridges’ sentencing in 

2013. The court also noted it had previously addressed the internal 

investigation in case 08-2013-CR-02276 and in case 08-2021-CV-01171. The 

court further found Bridges did appear at his initial appearance and, even if 

he had not, his absence would have been known prior to his guilty plea and 

therefore was not newly discovered. We agree with the district court Bridges 

failed to provide competent admissible evidence entitling him to postconviction 

relief. We conclude the court did not err in dismissing Bridges’ application in 

case 08-2021-CV-02060 as untimely.

C

[¶17] In case 08-2021-CV-02236, Bridges argues new interpretations of 28 

U.S.C. §§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) and Chisholm v. State, 2014 ND 125, 848 N.W.2d 

703, resulted in a due process violation in his conviction for attempted murder. 

He also argues the district court’s denial of a previous application for 

postconviction relief constitutes new evidence.

[¶18] Section 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(3), N.D.C.C., permits an applicant to assert “a 

new interpretation of federal or state constitutional or statutory law by either 

the United States supreme court or a North Dakota appellate court” and 

establish “that the interpretation is retroactively applicable to the petitioner’s 

case.” The application for postconviction relief must be filed within two years 
7

of the effective date of the appellate court decision announcing a new 

interpretation of federal or state law. Hieb v. State, 2016 ND 146, ¶ 10, 882 

N.W.2d 724 (quoting N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(b)). This Court has stated “the 

effective date of the retroactive application of law is the date the opinion 

announcing a new interpretation of federal or state law is distributed or 

published.” Id. at ¶ 11.

[¶19] The district court concluded Bridges’ application was untimely. The 

court determined Bridges failed to establish a new interpretation of law that 

was retroactively applicable to his case. The court explained Chisholm was not 

a new interpretation of law, but rather a restatement of law from Overlie v. 

State, 2011 ND 191, 804 N.W.2d 50, published two years before Bridges’ 

sentencing. The court also found Bridges had failed to present newly 

discovered evidence, because Bridges’ arguments regarding an internal 

investigation had previously been addressed in a motion for a new trial and an 

application for postconviction relief. The court rejected those arguments as the 

evidence was known to Bridges at sentencing, would not have been material, 

and was unlikely to result in an acquittal.

[¶20] Bridges has not cited any United States Supreme Court or North Dakota 

appellate court authority newly interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). Bridges 

also has not explained how Chisholm, which held an applicant for 

postconviction relief must be “provided with notice and an opportunity to 

present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact before his application 

was summarily dismissed,” announced a new interpretation of law or is 

retroactive to his case. 2014 ND 125, ¶ 19. Even if Chisholm was a new 

interpretation of constitutional or statutory law and was retroactively 

applicable, the opinion was published in 2014, far more than two years before 

Bridges filed the current application. Bridges also failed to demonstrate 

evidence of the internal investigation was newly discovered as the district 

court had previously addressed the investigation. We conclude the district 

court did not err in dismissing Bridges’ application in case 08-2021-CV-02236 

as untimely.
8

D

[¶21] Finally, in case 08-2021-CV-02302, Bridges argues new interpretations 

of N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) demonstrate 

the occurrence of a due process violation and, further, the district court’s order 

granting summary disposition of a previous application for postconviction 

relief constitutes newly discovered evidence.

[¶22] The district court concluded Bridges’ application was untimely. As 

previously noted, under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(3), an applicant must 

assert a new interpretation of law by “either the United States supreme court 

or a North Dakota appellate court.” The court found Bridges failed to assert a 

new interpretation of law, as he failed to “cite any United States Supreme 

Court case or North Dakota appellate court case that provides a new 

interpretation” of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court explained that citation to 

statutory law alone is insufficient to meet the exception. The court also 

determined Bridges had not presented newly discovered evidence. The court 

explained Bridges was aware of testimony allegedly indicating he acted in selfdefense when he entered his guilty plea, and Bridges acknowledged as much 

in his application. Again, we agree with the district court Bridges has not 

provided competent admissible evidence entitling him to postconviction relief. 

We conclude the court did not err in dismissing Bridges’ application for 

postconviction relief in case 08-2021-CV-02302 as untimely.

III

[¶23] We affirm the district court’s orders and judgments.

[¶24] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte

I concur in the result.

Gerald W. VandeWalle