RENDERED: JUNE 24, 2022; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2021-CA-0549-MR

JOSEPH D. COCKROFT APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM UNION CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE C. RENE’ WILLIAMS, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 15-CR-00132

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: DIXON, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Joseph D. Cockroft appeals the denial of his RCr1 11.42 motion, 

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), and denial of his motion for an 

evidentiary hearing, entered by the Union Circuit Court on April 6, 2021. 

Applying the two-pronged performance and prejudice standard established in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), 

1

 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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the trial court denied Cockroft’s motion, finding that – based on the evidence in the 

record – he failed to demonstrate either prong of Strickland’s requirements of 

deficient assistance or that his case was prejudiced by trial counsel’s actions. 

Following a careful review of the record, the briefs, and the law, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Cockroft was indicted on three counts of flagrant nonsupport.2 The 

minimum sentence for each offense is one year imprisonment, with a maximum of 

five years. Cockroft also faced a fine of up to $10,000. The Commonwealth 

offered Cockroft a plea deal of ten years in prison, probated for five, as well as an 

agreement to pay his current child support obligations and make payments toward

his arrearage (totaling $481.71 a month). Cockroft, his counsel, and the trial court 

accepted this deal, and an order on Cockroft’s guilty plea was entered with a 

corresponding judgment. 

Unfortunately, less than a year into his probation, Cockroft violated its

terms on multiple occasions, and his probation was revoked. Cockroft moved the 

trial court for shock probation in order to complete a local chemical dependency 

program. The trial court granted his motion and placed Cockroft on probation 

again; however, Cockroft failed to report to either the program or his probation 

officer. Consequently, his probation was revoked a second time. Following his 

2

 Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 530.050, a Class D felony. 
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reincarceration, Cockroft again moved the trial court for shock probation, but the 

motion was denied. 

Cockroft subsequently, pro se, moved the trial court for relief under 

RCr 11.42, requesting assistance of counsel and an evidentiary hearing for his IAC 

claims. The trial court appointed counsel, who supplemented his RCr 11.42 

motion. After the matter was fully briefed, the trial court denied Cockroft an 

evidentiary hearing and the requested relief. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As observed by the Supreme Court of Kentucky, when determining 

whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, trial 

courts must consider the totality of the circumstances. Edmonds v. 

Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558, 566 (Ky. 2006). “This inquiry is inherently factsensitive” and is reviewed for clear error. Id.

Concerning Cockroft’s IAC claims, as established in Bowling v. 

Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405, 411-12 (Ky. 2002):

[t]he Strickland standard sets forth a two-prong test for 

ineffective assistance of counsel: [f]irst, the defendant 

must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. 

This requires showing that counsel made errors so 

serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” 

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 

defendant must show that the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that 

counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the 

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
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[Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064]. To 

show prejudice, the defendant must show there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A reasonable probability is 

the probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in 

the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d 

at 695.

(Emphasis added) (paragraph breaks omitted). Both Strickland prongs must be 

met before relief may be granted. “Unless a defendant makes both showings, it 

cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary 

process that renders the result unreliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. 

at 2064. Herein, we need not determine whether counsel’s performance was 

adequate on any or all the issues raised because Cockroft fails to demonstrate 

prejudice resulting from counsel’s alleged deficient performance.3

To establish prejudice, a movant must show a reasonable probability 

exists that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. In short, one must 

demonstrate that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a 

fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Fairness is 

measured in terms of reliability. “The likelihood of a different result must be 

3

 “[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining 

the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Id. at 697, 104 S.

Ct. at 2052.
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substantial, not just conceivable.” Commonwealth v. Pridham, 394 S.W.3d 867,

876 (Ky. 2012) (quoting Harrington v. Ritcher, 562 U.S. 86, 100, 131 S. Ct. 770,

791, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 

2067)). 

Mere speculation as to how other counsel might have 

performed either better or differently without any 

indication of what favorable facts would have resulted is 

not sufficient. Conjecture that a different strategy might 

have proved beneficial is also not sufficient. Baze [v. 

Commonwealth, 23 S.W.3d 619 (Ky. 2000)]; Harper v. 

Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 311 ([Ky.] 1998). As noted 

by Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1995) (en 

banc): “The mere fact that other witnesses might have 

been available or that other testimony might have been 

elicited from those who testified is not a sufficient 

ground to prove ineffectiveness of counsel.”

Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 463, 470 (Ky. 2003), overruled on other 

grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009). “No 

conclusion of prejudice . . . can be supported by mere speculation.” Jackson v. 

Commonwealth, 20 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Ky. 2000) (citations omitted).

In the context of an IAC claim pertaining to a defendant entering a 

guilty plea, Kentucky’s highest court has opined:

A showing that counsel’s assistance was 

ineffective in enabling a defendant to intelligently weigh 

his legal alternatives in deciding to plead guilty has two 

components: (1) that counsel made errors so serious that 

counsel’s performance fell outside the wide range of 

professionally competent assistance; and (2) that the 

deficient performance so seriously affected the 
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outcome of the plea process that, but for the errors of 

counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the 

defendant would not have pleaded guilty, but would 

have insisted on going to trial.

. . .

The trial court’s inquiry into allegations of ineffective 

assistance of counsel requires the court to determine 

whether counsel’s performance was below professional 

standards and caused the defendant to lose what he 

otherwise would probably have won and whether 

counsel was so thoroughly ineffective that defeat was 

snatched from the hands of probable victory. Because 

[a] multitude of events occur in the course of a criminal 

proceeding which might influence a defendant to plead 

guilty or stand trial, the trial court must evaluate whether 

errors by trial counsel significantly influenced the 

defendant’s decision to plead guilty in a manner which 

gives the trial court reason to doubt the voluntariness and 

validity of the plea.

Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486-87 (Ky. 2001) (internal quotation 

marks and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court 

has further observed:

In many guilty plea cases, the “prejudice” inquiry will 

closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts 

reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to 

convictions obtained through a trial. For example, where 

the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or 

discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the 

determination whether the error “prejudiced” the 

defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go 

to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the 

evidence would have led counsel to change his 

recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, 

will depend in large part on a prediction whether the 
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evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a 

trial.

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985). 

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Cockroft argues the trial court erred when it did not 

conduct an evidentiary hearing or grant relief under RCr 11.42 for counsel’s failure 

to (1) ensure proper plea colloquy was conducted and (2) conduct an appropriate 

mitigation investigation. However, it is well-established that the effect of a guilty 

plea is to waive all defenses except that the indictment charges no offense.

Quarles v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. 1970); Commonwealth v. 

Watkins, 398 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, Watkins v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 

965, 86 S. Ct. 1596, 16 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1966). RCr 11.42 does not authorize 

criminal defendants to disregard a valid plea agreement. In the case herein, “since 

appellant’s plea of guilty makes his allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel 

unavailing, he is not entitled to a hearing.” Cox v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 76, 

78 (Ky. 1971). Accordingly, we hold that because Cockroft’s plea was knowingly 

and voluntarily entered, his IAC claim pertaining to his guilty plea was properly 

dismissed. 

We further note that trial counsel is not ineffective where he 

negotiated a plea deal that his client willingly accepted but later regretted. Instead, 

the defendant must show that rejecting the plea deal would have been rational 
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under the circumstances. Stiger v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Ky. 

2012). Cockroft has not done so. Furthermore, Cockroft admitted his guilt. Under 

the plea agreement, Cockroft’s sentence was only two-thirds of the maximum 

sentence and was probated for five years. Rejecting such a deal would not have 

been rational, nor would it have been reasonable for counsel to advise otherwise 

under these circumstances. 

Moreover, not every single right that is waived must be specifically 

listed by the trial court in its colloquy. Even issues concerning constitutional 

rights, such as the right to be free from self-incrimination, may be waived if done 

so knowingly and intelligently. 

In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.

Ed. 2d 274 (1969), the United States Supreme Court cited Carnley v. Cochran, 369 

U.S. 506, 516, 82 S. Ct. 884, 890, 8 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1962), in which it dealt with a 

problem of waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, holding, “Presuming 

waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must 

be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but 

intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.” 

In its order, the trial court observed the following regarding the 

colloquy surrounding Cockroft’s guilty plea:
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Court: “Have you reviewed with the Defendants the 

nature of the charges filed against them, the possible 

penalties they are facing and their constitutional rights?”

Mr. Sysol: “Yes Your Honor[.]”

Court: “Have you reviewed with them the fact that if 

they enter a voluntary plea to any charge, they will waive 

their constitutional rights?”

Mr. Sysol: “Yes Your Honor[.]”

Court: “Have they been able to assist in the preparation 

of the defense of their case?”

Mr. Sysol: “They Have[.]”

Court: “Do you know of any reason why we should not 

go forward with the acceptance of their pleas?”

Mr. Sysol: “No Your Honor[.]”

Granted Mr. Sysol was not standing next to the 

Defendant [at] this time, but this Court is not aware of a 

statute or rule that requires an attorney to stand right 

beside a Defendant during a plea. A complete view of 

the video shows Mr. Sysol walking back and forth 

between the podiums where the Defendant[s] stood and 

counsel table during the entire time of the pleas. It is this 

Court’s common practice when one attorney represents 

multiple Defendants that a “group” plea is entered in the 

interest of judicial economy. The paperwork is reviewed 

individually with each Defendant prior to the plea and 

turned into the Court when they are ready to proceed.

Following the exchange with Mr. Sysol, the Defendants 

were sworn in and the Court began the colloquy with 

them. The court video also shows Mr. Sysol going back 

and forth between the Bench and the Defendants 

transferring papers and talking with the Defendant. . . . 
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The Defendant answered the Court’s questions, including 

the questions concerning the paperwork that was 

submitted and signed by both he and Mr. Sysol. He was 

asked specifically if he was satisfied with the advice he 

had received from his attorney and he indicated he was. 

Additionally, the motion to enter guilty plea signed by Cockroft specifically stated 

on its first page in bold-faced type:

I further understand the Constitution guarantees to 

me the following rights: 

(a) The right not to testify against myself;

(b) The right to a speedy and public trial by jury at 

which I would be represented by counsel and the 

Commonwealth would have to prove my guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt; 

(c) The right to confront and cross-examine all 

witnesses called to testify against me;

(d) The right to produce any evidence, including 

attendance of witnesses, in my favor; [and]

(e) The right to appeal my case to a higher court.

I understand that if I plead “GUILTY,” I waive these 

rights.

Cockroft also signed the order on his guilty plea which contained this exact

language on its first page. Just as in Commonwealth v. Crawford, 789 S.W.2d 779, 

780 (Ky. 1990), “[n]o cases are cited requiring a judge to read from the bench a 

defendant’s rights to a defendant who has already waived those rights by written 

waiver, has acknowledged his signature thereto, and has further acknowledged that 
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he understood those rights.” Thus, waiver here was not implied by Cockroft’s 

silence but was expressly addressed on multiple occasions. 

Cockroft also contends the trial court erred in denying his request for 

post-conviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing. To this challenge, 

we first must ask: When is an evidentiary hearing required? The Supreme Court 

of Kentucky has held:

the trial judge shall determine whether the allegations in 

the motion can be resolved on the face of the record, in 

which event an evidentiary hearing is not required. A 

hearing is required if there is a material issue of fact that 

cannot be conclusively resolved, i.e., conclusively proved 

or disproved, by an examination of the record. Stanford 

v. Commonwealth, [854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993)], 

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1049, 114 S. Ct. 703, 126 L. Ed.

2d 669 (1994); Lewis v. Commonwealth, [411 S.W.2d 

321, 322 (Ky. 1967)]. The trial judge may not simply 

disbelieve factual allegations in the absence of evidence 

in the record refuting them. Drake v. United States, 439 

F.2d 1319, 1320 (6th Cir. 1971). 

Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452-53 (Ky. 2001). This is precisely 

what occurred herein. Since all Cockroft’s allegations of error may be resolved by 

a review of the record, as more specifically addressed herein, no evidentiary 

hearing was required. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying same. 

Cockroft also alleges his trial counsel failed to conduct a thorough, 

complete, and reasonable investigation. The Court in Strickland discussed the 

deference our Court must give trial counsel concerning their investigation, stating:
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strategic choices made after thorough investigation of 

law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 

unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less 

than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to 

the extent that reasonable professional judgments support 

the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel 

has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 

unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular 

decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for 

reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy 

measure of deference to counsel’s judgments. 

Strickland, 446 U.S. at 690-691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. Following Strickland, the 

Court further held that: “[i]n assessing counsel’s investigation, we must conduct 

an objective review of their performance, measured for reasonableness under 

prevailing professional norms, which includes a context-dependent consideration 

of the challenged conduct as seen from counsel’s perspective at the time, (every 

effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight).” Wiggins v. 

Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2536, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2003) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

In Kentucky, this deferential standard pertaining to counsel’s 

investigation has more recently been described as:

Counsel’s performance is deficient when counsel 

made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning 

as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 

Amendment. That being said, the proper inquiry when 

assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is 

whether the counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness. In this 
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reasonableness analysis, we are directed to indulge a 

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 

within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance because, given the surrounding 

circumstances, the challenged action might be 

considered sound trial strategy. We employ this 

presumption to prevent the harsh light of hindsight from 

distorting counsel’s act or omission, making it appear 

unreasonable.

Commonwealth v. Searight, 423 S.W.3d 226, 230 (Ky. 2014) (internal quotation 

marks and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 

Likewise, here, every benefit of the doubt must be given to trial 

counsel’s investigation, which was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. 

Moreover, Cockroft has failed to demonstrate that the so-called “sea of mitigation” 

evidence

4 would likely have impacted the outcome. Absent such a showing, 

Cockroft cannot demonstrate prejudice.

Cockroft has failed to identify how a more thorough investigation 

would have affected his plea. It is well-settled, “vague allegations, including those 

of failure to investigate, do not warrant an evidentiary hearing and warrant 

summary dismissal of the RCr 11.42 motion.” Mills v. Commonwealth, 170 

S.W.3d 310, 330 (Ky. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Leonard, 279 S.W.3d 

4

 Cockroft nebulously claims his mitigation includes the fact that he came to Kentucky to make 

himself available to the child support office after finally having obtained an undescribed means 

to pay down his obligation. He also mentions complications with his legal name – he is also 

known as Joseph Holmes – but fails to describe how that is relevant or mitigating as he has an 

extensive criminal history under each name. His further claims of mitigating evidence are even 

more tangential. 
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151. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied this claim without an evidentiary 

hearing. 

Simply put, Cockroft’s claims do not clear the high bar requiring

demonstration of prejudice as set forth in Strickland for the reasons discussed 

herein. Thus, Cockroft was not entitled to the requested relief due to waiver of his 

right to appeal, nor was he entitled to relief on the alleged merits. Finding no error, 

we must affirm. 

CONCLUSION

Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the order entered by the 

Union Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Katelyn E. Price

Frankfort, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Matthew R. Krygiel

Assistant Attorney General

Frankfort, Kentucky