SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1059-18T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

HASSAN A. STEPHENS, a/k/a

WILLIAMS HASSAN D., 

MCDONALD KAHEEM, and

STEVENS HASSAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________

Submitted May 20, 2020 – Decided June 10, 2020

Before Judges Koblitz and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Union County, Indictment No. 17-02-0121.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Brian P. Keenan, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the briefs). 

Lyndsay V. Ruotolo, Acting Union County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Meredith L. Balo, Special 

Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, 

of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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PER CURIAM

Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his 

person without a warrant during a street encounter with police, defendant 

entered a negotiated guilty plea to unlawful possession of a controlled dangerous 

substance, namely cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1). He was sentenced in 

accordance with the plea agreement to a three-year term of imprisonment. 

Defendant now appeals from the September 24, 2018 judgment of conviction, 

raising the following single point for our consideration:

THE JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 

SUPPRESSION MOTION BECAUSE THE STATE 

FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE CONFIDENTIAL 

INFORMANT'S RELIABILITY AND THE TIP 

PROVIDED NO BASIS OF THE CONFIDENTIAL 

INFORMANT'S KNOWLEDGE AND PROVIDED 

NO PREDICTIVE OR HARD-TO-KNOW 

INFORMATION TO THE DETECTIVES.

After reviewing the record and the applicable legal principles, we find no merit 

to defendant's contention and affirm substantially for the reasons stated in Judge 

John M. Deitch's comprehensive and well-reasoned written opinion issued on 

June 22, 2017. We add these comments. 

At the suppression hearing, Elizabeth Police Department Detective Jose 

Martinez, a fourteen-year veteran officer with five-and-one-half-years in the 

Narcotics Division, testified for the State. Based on his testimony, which the 
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judge described as "direct," "forthright," and "credible," Judge Deitch made the 

following key factual findings: 

On November 16, 2016, at approximately 11:15 

a.m., . . . Detectives Raul Delaprida and Jose Martinez 

received information from a confidential informant 

("CI") that [d]efendant "was in the area of Third and 

Bond Streets and was in possession of CDS cocaine." 

. . . . According to Detective Martinez, the CI has 

previously given information that resulted in the 

execution of three search warrants, the arrest of eleven 

individuals, and the recovery of various types of CDS 

and several handguns. 

. . . . Defendant was known to Detective Martinez 

and his partner as a notorious street level drug-dealer 

through their service in the Narcotics Division. 

Similarly, the area in question was known to the 

detective as a notorious area for open-air drug dealing 

within the City of Elizabeth.[1]

Detective Martinez and his partner drove their 

unmarked police vehicle to that area with the purpose 

of surveilling the block and looking for illegal activity. 

As they drove slowly down the street, they saw 

[d]efendant repeatedly looking in their direction and 

acting suspiciously. They believed that they had been 

recognized by [d]efendant, who[m] they believed had 

begun a "pretend" cellular telephone call to legitimize 

 

1

 Martinez testified that the area was "known for gang activity and violence," 

as well as "open narcotics trafficking." He explained that in the previous six 

months, he had "been involved in approximately [twenty] arrests in that area."
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his presence on the street.

[2]

 The detectives, who 

desired to speak to [d]efendant about his alleged 

conduct, left their vehicle and approached [d]efendant. 

Upon getting closer to [d]efendant, Detective Martinez 

saw a bulge in [d]efendant's left front jacket pocket and 

began to pat [d]efendant down. Defendant voluntarily 

admitted that he had [drug] paraphernalia on his person 

and he was immediately arrested. A more detailed 

search revealed contraband. . . . A review of the 

[contraband's packaging3] confirmed that it was of a 

size that would have been readily observable to . . .

Martinez as he described in his testimony.

After applying the governing principles, the judge determined "the 

detectives had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry[4]stop." He explained:

They had received information from a previously 

reliable informant about [d]efendant selling drugs on 

Bond Street. They went to the area and found 

[d]efendant there – thereby partially corroborating a 

previously reliable source. Once on the scene, they saw 

[d]efendant acting suspiciously in a high-crime area. 

He appeared to recognize the police vehicle and 

 

2

 According to Martinez, his unmarked police car "was well known throughout 

the City as a narcotics vehicle," and "the license plate . . . ha[d] been posted on 

Facebook."

3

 From defendant's front pocket where Martinez had observed the bulge, police 

seized "a black shopping bag containing a torn brown paper bag, numerous loose 

yellow caps, two Ziploc bags with black flower logos each containing yellow 

caps and two boxes of empty glass vials." From defendant's person searched 

incident to his arrest, "police recovered a Ziploc bag with a green butterfly logo 

containing [twenty-eight] glass vials with red caps containing suspected 

cocaine, and a plastic bag tied off in a knot containing suspected cocaine." 

4

 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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thereafter engage[d] in behavior to avoid detection. 

This is ample evidence to support an "objective 

manifestation that the suspect was or is involved in 

criminal activity." The totality of the circumstances 

establish reasonable suspicion on the part of the 

detectives by a preponderance of the evidence. Their 

efforts to investigate [d]efendant was lawful.

Turning to the pat-down, the judge determined "the frisk" was 

"reasonable." He explained that "[w]hen Detective Martinez approached 

[defendant], he immediately observed a large bulge in [d]efendant's jacket 

pocket," which size "support[ed] his observation." Additionally, the judge 

found "[t]he detectives had probable cause to arrest [d]efendant as soon as 

[d]efendant stated, 'All I got on me is drug paraphernalia,'" as well as the 

"authority to conduct a search [of defendant's person] incident to arrest . . . and 

to seize the evidence found as a result of that search." 

We conclude there was sufficient credible evidence in the record to 

support Judge Deitch's factual findings. See State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 425-

26 (2017) ("An appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress evidence in a 

criminal case must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's 

decision, provided that those findings are 'supported by sufficient credible 

evidence in the record.'" (quoting State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 40 (2016))). We 

also agree with the judge's legal conclusions, which we review de novo. See
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State v. Brown, 456 N.J. Super. 352, 358-59 (App. Div. 2018) ("We owe no 

deference, however, to conclusions of law made by trial courts in deciding 

suppression motions, which we instead review de novo." (citing State v. Watts, 

223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015))).

Defendant challenges the stop and pat-down, arguing the judge erred in 

concluding that the CI's tip and defendant's "apparent nervousness provided 

reasonable basis" for a stop, and "Martinez's subsequent observation of a bulge 

in [defendant's] pocket[] provided reasonable basis for a pat-down." Defendant 

asserts "the State failed to present sufficient evidence of the CI's veracity and 

basis of knowledge to adequately establish the reliability of the CI's tip that 

[defendant] was in possession of CDS."

"Police-citizen encounters generally occur at three distinct levels," field 

inquiry, investigative detention, and arrest, but only the latter "two require 

constitutional justification." State v. Sirianni, 347 N.J. Super. 382, 387 (App. 

Div. 2002). While "[o]n-the-spot questioning involves neither detention nor 

seizure in the constitutional sense," an "inquiry may be converted into an 

investigative detention if, given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable 

person were to believe he was not free to leave." Id. at 387-88. An investigative 

detention, commonly referred to as a Terry stop, is a valid exception to the 
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warrant requirement "if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken 

together with [the] rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Williams, 192 N.J. 1, 9 (2007) (quoting 

State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004)).

"The 'articulable reasons' or 'particularized suspicion' of criminal activity 

must be based upon the law enforcement officer's assessment of the totality of 

circumstances with which he is faced." State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511 

(2003) (quoting State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504 (1986)). "Such observations 

are those that, in view of [the] officer's experience and knowledge, taken 

together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, reasonabl[y] warrant 

the limited intrusion upon the individual's freedom." Ibid. (alterations in 

original) (quoting Davis, 104 N.J. at 504). "Facts that might seem innocent 

when viewed in isolation can sustain a finding of reasonable suspicion when 

considered in the aggregate." Ibid. See State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 367 

(2002) ("[A] suspect's nervousness plays a role in determining whether 

reasonable suspicion exists."). 

When an investigatory stop is based in part on a CI's tip, the State must 

establish the reliability of the tip "under the totality of the circumstances." State 

v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 92 (1998) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238
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(1983)). The "informant's 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' are two highly 

relevant factors under the totality of the circumstances." State v. Zutic, 155 N.J. 

103, 110 (1998) (quoting Smith, 155 N.J. at 92). However, "a deficiency in one 

. . . 'may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a 

strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability.'" Smith, 

155 N.J. at 93 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 233). 

Veracity may be established by the informant's past instances of 

reliability, "such as providing dependable information in previous police 

investigations." State v. Keyes, 184 N.J. 541, 555 (2005). A sufficient basis of 

knowledge may be established "if the tip itself relates expressly or clearly how 

the informant knows of the criminal activity." Smith, 155 N.J. at 94. "Even in 

the absence of a disclosure that expressly indicates the source of the informant's 

knowledge, the nature and details revealed in the tip may imply that the 

informant's knowledge of the alleged criminal activity is derived from a 

trustworthy source." Ibid. (citing State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 113 

(1987)).

After stopping a suspect, a protective search or frisk is permissible when 

an officer reasonably believes the individual is "armed and dangerous." Terry, 

392 U.S. at 27. "The search is judged by whether a reasonably prudent person 
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would be warranted in the belief that his or her safety or that of others was in 

danger," State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 45 (1990), and "must 'be confined in scope 

to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other 

hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.'" State v. Privott, 203 

N.J. 16, 25 (2010) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29). Where "the totality of the 

circumstances creates an objectively reasonable concern for the officers' safety, 

retrieving the contents of [a] bulge from [the] defendant's person is allowable." 

State v. Roach, 172 N.J. 19, 29 (2002). See Lund, 119 N.J. at 46 ("[T]o

'substantial dealers in narcotics[,]' firearms are as much 'tools of the trade' as are 

most commonly recognized articles of narcotics paraphernalia." (quoting United 

States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 62 (2d Cir. 1977))).

Applying these principles, based on "the totality of the circumstances," 

Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 23, we agree with the judge that the State met its burden to 

uphold the warrantless stop and ensuing search. See State v. Wilson, 178 N.J. 

7, 13 (2003) ("In satisfying that burden, the State must demonstrate by a 

preponderance of the evidence that there was no constitutional violation."). We 

discern no basis to disturb the judge's finding that the initial inquiry quickly 

escalated into a lawful investigatory detention during which a protective search 

was permissible based on the detectives' observation of a bulge in defendant's 
10 A-1059-18T2

jacket pocket in a high crime area. The judge also correctly determined that the 

tip from a CI who had previously provided information leading to numerous 

arrests and seizures of contraband, corroborated by defendant's presence at the 

described high-crime location, the detective's observation of defendant's 

suspicious behavior, as well as the detective's past experience with defendant 

provided the detective with articulable suspicion to stop defendant. Therefore, 

the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence

seized.

Affirmed.