J-A09018-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ATLANTIC CASUALTY INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

EDWARD ZYMBLOSKY, EDWARD 

ZYMBLOSKY, JR., EDWARD ZYMBLOSKY, 

III AND GAIL ZYMBLOSKY; BOOTS & 

HANKS TOWING & WRECKING; BOOTS & 

HANKS TOWING & WRECKING SERVICE; 

BOOKS & HANKS, INC.; HEIDI HOUSER, 

ROBERT HOUSER, DOROTHY HOUSER, 

DELBERT HOUSER, MARY OGDEN, MARY 

IRWIN AND THOMAS IRWIN, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PARENTS AND 

NATURAL GUARDIANS OF E.I., A MINOR; 

BEN WEITSMAN & SON, INC., BEN 

WEITSMAN & SON OF SCRANTON, LLC; 

BEN WEITSMAN OF SCRANTON; 

UPSTATE SHREDDING, LLC, UPSTATE 

SHREDDING DISC., INC.,

APPEAL OF: HEIDI HOUSER AND 

ROBERT HOUSER; DOROTHY HOUSER 

AND DELBERT HOUSER; MARY OGDEN; 

MARY IRWIN AND THOMAS IRWIN, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PARENTS AND 

NATURAL GUARDIANS OF E.I., A MINOR

No. 1167 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered June 15, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County

Civil Division at No(s): 2015 CV 01571

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OTT, and STABILE, JJ.
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MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JULY 17, 2017

Heidi Houser, Robert Houser, Dorothy Houser, Delbert Houser, 

Mary Ogden, and Mary and Thomas Irwin, individually and as parents and 

natural guardians of E.I., a minor, (“Appellants”) appeal from the order 

granting Atlantic Casualty Insurance Company’s (“Atlantic”) motion for 

summary judgment and entering judgment in favor of Atlantic in this 

declaratory judgment action. We affirm. 

Atlantic filed a declaratory judgment complaint pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 7531, et. seq., against Appellants and other involved parties as discussed 

below, on February 18, 2015. In its declaratory judgment complaint, 

Atlantic asserted that it had no duty to defend or indemnify any party in the 

underlying action of Heidi Houser, et. al. v. Boots & Hanks Towing & 

Wrecking Service, et. al., No. 2013 CV 6433 (“The Underlying Action”). 

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

The Underlying Action was filed on May 16, 2014 by 

[Appellants]. [Appellants] allege that [Edward Zymblosky, 

Edward Zymblosky Jr., Edward Zymblosky III, Gail Zymblosky, 

and Boots & Hanks Towing and Wrecking Service (“the 

Zymblosky Defendants”)] own property at 1500 North Keyser 

Avenue in Scranton, Pennsylvania (“the property”), where 

Defendants Ben Weitsman & Son, Inc., Ben Weitsman & Son of 

Scranton LLC, Ben Weitsman of Scranton, Upstate Shredding LLC 

and Upstate Shredding Disc., Inc. (“the Weitsman Defendants”) 

allegedly operate a scrap metal recycling facility pursuant to a 

lease with one or more of the Zymblosky Defendants. On 

November 28, 2011, the Weitsman Defendants engaged in an 

operation involving scrap metal and negligently caused chlorine 
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gas to release from a cylinder/tank/vessel stored on the 

property, which, in turn, released the gas into the air and 

created a cloud of chlorine gas to form. At the same time, 

[Appellants] Heidi and Dorothy Houser were working in an 

outdoor lot next to the property, selling Christmas trees, while 

Mary Ogden, Mary Irwin, and Emilie Irwin were traveling in a 

vehicle on North Keyser Avenue near the property. All 

[Appellants] claim they were exposed to the cloud of chlorine 

gas and as a result, suffered injuries.

Atlantic is involved in the Underlying Action because it 

issued an insurance policy (“the Policy”) for the salvage yard 

located on the property owned by the Zymblosky Defendants. 

Christopher Slezak (“Slezak”), owner and insurance agent for 

CSI & Associates (“CSI”), on behalf of the Zymblosky 

Defendants obtained the Policy from Atlantic through its 

Managing General Agent, Aberdeen Insurance Group 

(“Aberdeen”). Barbara Rosetti (“Rosetti”), a licensed insurance 

agent who services client accounts at CSI for the past ten years, 

also worked on the Zymblosky Defendants’ account with regard 

to the Policy. The Policy contained a “Total Pollution Exclusion 

Endorsement,” which allegedly excludes coverage for the event 

at issue in the Underlying Action. For this reason, Atlantic filed a 

Complaint on February 18, 2015, for Declaratory Judgment that 

it has no duty to defend or indemnify any party in the Underlying 

Action. 

Subsequent to Defendants’ Answers to the Complaint, 

Atlantic filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on May 14, 

2015. Thereafter, [the trial court] issued an Order denying 

[Atlantic’s] Motion in order to more fully develop the factual 

record. By doing so, [the trial court] believed it would better be 

able to determine whether the Total Pollution Exclusion 

Endorsement is valid and whether Atlantic correspondingly owes 

a duty to defend and indemnify the insured in the Underlying 

Action. Complying with [the trial court’s order], the parties 

conducted discovery and based on the information gathered, 

[Atlantic] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on February 25, 

2016, asserting again that it had no duty to defend and/or 

indemnify Defendants in the Underlying Action based on the 

Policy’s Total Pollution Exclusion Endorsement. 

The Houser and Zymblosky Defendants filed individual 

Replies to Atlantic’s Motion on March 28, 2016. Notwithstanding 
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their continued assertion that chlorine is not a pollutant, the 

Zymblosky and Houser Defendants also contend that regardless 

of the exclusion policy, “the Zymbloskys were provided 

something less than what they had bargained for regarding the 

insurance coverage (Reasonable Expectation Theory).”

Trial Court Opinion, 6/15/16, at 2-4 (internal citations omitted). 

Oral argument was held on Atlantic’s motion on May 12, 2016. The 

trial court issued an order on June 15, 2016, granting Atlantic’s motion for 

summary judgment and entering judgment in favor of Atlantic. On July 12, 

2016, the Houser Defendants filed a notice of appeal.1 A Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement was not ordered. The trial court submitted a statement to this 

Court, indicating that in lieu of filing a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, it was 

relying on its June 15, 2016 Memorandum and Order, which granted 

Atlantic’s motion for summary judgment. Trial Court Letter, 9/29/16, at 1. 

Appellants present the following issues for our review:

[1.] Where the total pollution exclusion contained within the 

Atlantic Casualty policy renders the coverage illusory and as 

such is void as against public policy?

[2.] Whether [Atlantic’s] motion for summary judgment should 

have been denied as genuine issues of material fact exist that 

must be determined by the trier of fact?

3. Whether genuine issues of material fact remain as to the 

insured’s reasonable expectations such that [Atlantic’s] motion 

for summary judgment should have been denied?

____________________________________________

1

 The record does not reflect appeals by the other defendants.
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Appellants’ Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).2

“The proper construction of an insurance policy is resolved as a matter 

of law to be decided by the court in a declaratory judgment action.” 

Swarner v. Mutual Ben. Group, 372 A.3d 641, 644 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

The Declaratory Judgments Act may be invoked to interpret the 

obligations of the parties under an insurance contract, including 

the question of whether an insurer has a duty to defend and/or a 

duty to indemnify a party making a claim under the policy. Both 

the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify may be resolved in 

a declaratory judgment action. [General Accident Ins. Co. of 

America v. Allen, 692 A.2d 1089, 1096 (Pa. 1997)] citing 

Harleysville Mutual Ins. Co. v. Madison, 415 Pa.Super. 361, 

609 A.2d 564 (1992) (insurer can seek determination of 

obligations to insured before conclusion of underlying action) 

(additional citations omitted).

It is well established that an insurer’s duties under an 

insurance policy are triggered by the language of the complaint 

against the insured. In determining whether an insurer’s duties 

are triggered, the factual allegations in the underlying complaint 

are taken as true and liberally construed in favor of the insured.

The obligation of an insurer to defend an action against the

insured is fixed solely by the allegations in the underlying 

complaint. As long as a complaint alleges an injury which may be 

within the scope of the policy, the insurer must defend its 

insured until the claim is confined to a recovery the policy does 

not cover.

The particular cause of action that a complainant pleads is 

not determinative of whether coverage has been triggered. 

Instead it is necessary to look at the factual allegations 

contained in the complaint. If we were to allow the manner in 

which the complainant frames the request for damages to 

control the coverage question, we would permit insureds to 

circumvent exclusions that are clearly part of the policy of 

____________________________________________

2

 We have renumbered Appellants’ issues for ease of disposition. 
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insurance. The insured would receive coverage neither party 

intended and for which the insured was not charged. The fact 

that the plaintiffs couched their claims in terms of negligence 

does not control the question of coverage. 

We focus primarily on the duty to defend because it is 

broader than the duty to indemnify. If an insurer does not have 

a duty to defend, it does not have a duty to indemnify. 

However, both duties flow from a determination that the 

complaint triggers coverage. 

American Nat. Property and Cas. Companies v. Hearn, 93 A.3d 880, 

884 (Pa. Super. 2014) (some internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

In reviewing orders granting summary judgment, we note the 

following:

Our scope of review of an order granting summary 

judgment is plenary. We apply the same standard as the trial 

court, reviewing all the evidence of record to determine whether 

there exists a genuine issue of material fact. We view the record 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all 

doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact 

must be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the 

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law will 

summary judgment be entered.

National Cas. Co. v. Kinney, 90 A.3d 747, 752 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). “The appellate Court may disturb 

the trial court’s order only upon an error of law or an abuse of discretion.” 

Id. at 753. 

In their first issue, Appellants argue that the total pollution exclusion 

contained within the insurance policy renders the coverage illusory and as 
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such, is void against public policy. Appellants’ Brief at 4, 20. Appellants rely 

on Heller v. Pennsylvania League of Cities & Municipalities, 32 A.3d 

1213 (Pa. 2011), in support of this assertion. Id. at 22-23. Appellants 

argue that the total pollution exclusion would bar almost all claims by the 

Zymbloskys due to the nature of their business, rendering the policy useless. 

Id. at 23-26. Appellants argue that under the definition of pollutant in the 

policy, “any substance regardless of form (solid, liquid, or gas) may be 

considered a pollutant.” Id. at 25. Appellants further assert that the 

definition includes “waste,” which is further defined to include “material to 

be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.” Id. According to Appellants, 

“[t]he entire nature of the Zymblosky’s business is to recycle, reclaim, 

and/or recondition materials.” Id. “Therefore, almost all foreseeable injury 

or property damage would have been caused in part by the movement of 

waste/scrap metal on the property and therefore be excluded from coverage 

pursuant to the total pollution exclusion.” Id. at 26. 

The relevant portion of the pollution exclusion in the policy provides as 

follows:

TOTAL POLLUTION EXCLUSION ENDORSEMENT

Exclusion f. under paragraph 2, Exclusions of Section I –

Coverage A – Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability is 

replaced by the following:

This insurance does not apply to:

f. Pollution
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(1) “Bodily injury” . . . which would not have occurred in 

whole or in part but for the actual, alleged or threatened 

discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape 

of “pollutants” at any time.

Insurance policy, 11/24/10, Total Pollution Exclusion Endorsement, at 5. 

The policy defines “pollutants” as:

solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or containment or all 

material for which a Material Safety Data Sheet is required 

pursuant to federal, state, or local laws, where ever discharged, 

dispersed, seeping, migrating or released, including onto or into 

the air or any air supply, water or any water supply or land, 

including but not limited to petroleum, oil, heating oil, gasoline, 

fuel oil, carbon monoxide, industrial waste, acid, alkalis, 

chemicals, waste, treated sewage; and associate smoke, vapor, 

soot and fumes from said substance. Waste includes material to 

be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed. 

Id.

The trial court stated the following regarding the determination to 

define chlorine as a pollutant:

Here [Appellants] failed to present [] evidence demonstrating 

why chlorine gas should not be considered a pollutant or 

contaminant as defined by Atlantic’s policy. . . .

In fact, the only evidence presented to this [c]ourt favors 

defining chlorine as a pollutant. For example, [Atlantic] 

presented evidence including: (1) dictionary definitions of 

chlorine state that “chlorine is a gaseous chemical agent which 

elicits an inflammatory response”; (2) the Sixth Circuit in U.S. 

Fidelity and Guaranty Co., supra found that chlorine is a 

pollutant within the meaning of the policy at issue and that the 

bodily injury did arise from a discharge of this pollutant; (3) 

federal/state statutes and regulations define and treat chlorine 

gas as a pollutant; (4) the Policy defines a ‘pollutant’ as a 

material requiring a MSDS, which chlorine gas requires; (5) the 

Underlying Complaint makes specific allegations and admissions 

that its inhalation caused the Underlying Plaintiffs’ physical 

harm; and (6) it is undisputed that chlorine gas is a dangerous 
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and potentially deadly chemical. For these reasons, [the trial 

court found] that chlorine gas is a potentially hazardous and 

toxic material. Therefore, chlorine is an irritant or contaminant 

constituting a pollutant under the Policy.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/15/16, at 27-28. Thus, we agree with the trial court’s 

conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the 

classification of chlorine as a pollutant under the policy.

Next, we consider whether the pollution exclusion renders the

coverage illusory and as a result, contravenes public policy, as alleged by 

Appellants. 

Generally, courts must give plain meaning to a clear and 

unambiguous contract provision unless to do so would be 

contrary to a clearly expressed public policy. In several recent 

cases, this Court has examined claims that unambiguous 

provisions in [] insurance policies are unenforceable because 

they violate public policies [. . . .] In response, we have 

affirmed our reticence to throw aside clear contractual language

based on “the often formless face of public policy.” With regard 

to the concept of public policy, we have stated:

Public policy is to be ascertained by reference to the 

laws and legal precedents and not from general 

considerations of supposed public interest. As the 

term “public policy” is vague, there must be found 

definite indications in the law of the sovereignty to 

justify the invalidation of a contract as contrary to 

that policy.... Only dominant public policy would 

justify such action. In the absence of a plain 

indication of that policy through long governmental 

practice or statutory enactments, or of violations of 

obvious ethical or moral standards, the Court should 

not assume to declare contracts ... contrary to public 

policy. The courts must be content to await 

legislative action.

It is only when a given policy is so obviously for or 

against the public health, safety, morals or welfare 
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that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard 

to it, that a court may constitute itself the voice of 

the community in so declaring that the contract is 

against public policy.

Heller, 32 A.3d at 153-154 (some internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted).

As noted, Appellants rely on Heller in support of their contention that 

the policy exception resulted in illusory coverage in contravention of public 

policy. This Court previously summarized the holding in Heller as follows:

In Heller, our Supreme Court was asked to determine whether 

“it [was] a violation of public policy to exclude from underinsured 

motorist (UIM) coverage a claim by an individual eligible for 

workers’ compensation benefits.” Heller, 32 A.3d at 1215. The 

appellant (Heller) was severely injured in an automobile accident 

during the course of his employment as a police officer for

Sugarcreek Borough. Id. Subsequently, Heller sought UIM 

benefits from the borough under a policy issued by the appellee 

[an insurer], who ultimately denied Heller’s claim under a policy 

exclusion providing that UIM coverage did not apply to “any 

claim by anyone eligible for workers’ compensation benefits.” 

Id.

The Supreme Court noted that the borough voluntarily 

elected to purchase the optional UIM coverage and paid a 

premium to the appellee for the coverage. Id. at 1222. The 

Supreme Court therefore found persuasive Heller’s argument 

that the borough purchased illusory coverage. Id. at 1223, 

1228. As the Supreme Court observed:

Instantly, we are presented with the situation where 

a mandatory offering under the Motor Vehicle 

Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL) was accepted 

by the borough, who paid a premium for UIM 

coverage to provide additional protection to its 

employees who operate or occupy its vehicles. The 

vehicles in question are used by borough employees 

during the course and scope of their employment. 

Thus, the vast majority of all UIM claims likely 
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will be made by borough employees who are 

eligible for workers’ compensation. The subject 

exclusion, however, operates to deny UIM benefits to 

anyone who is eligible for workers’ compensation. 

Therefore, we find that [the appellee] sold the 

borough additional coverage that, in effect, will 

not attach by virtue of an exclusion. Under the 

facts of this case and as applied to borough 

employees, the exclusion renders the coverage 

illusory. Further, the exclusion operates to convert 

the appellee’s statutory obligation into a sham 

offering. The appellee received a windfall by 

charging the borough a premium for the coverage.

Heller, 32 A.3d at 1223 (emphases in original). The court further 

remarked:

To uphold the exclusion would thwart the purpose of the [law] 

by allowing an insurer to deny benefits for which their insured 

paid a premium. Thus, permitting the exclusion to stand 

provides a disincentive for insureds to pay premiums for 

coverage that is not statutorily required and relieves the insurer 

of its obligation to provide benefits for which the insured paid. 

While the borough may have received a reduced premium in 

exchange for what the appellee deems “limited” coverage, an 

insured cannot contract for illusory coverage.

Id. at 1225.

Westfield Ins. Co. v. Astra Foods Inc., 134 A.3d 1045, 1053 (Pa. Super. 

2016). 

In Westfield, this Court found Heller inapplicable because the policy 

exclusion at issue was not aimed at foreclosing the majority of expected 

claims; rather, it only excluded a claim under the factual circumstances of 

that particular case. Westfield Ins. Co., 134 A.3d at 1054. Additionally, in 

TIG Ins. Co. v. Tyco International Ltd., 919 F. Supp. 2d 439, 466 (M.D. 
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Pa. 2013),3the court presented the following tenets regarding illusory 

insurance coverage:

Insurance coverage is considered “illusory” where the insured 

purchases no effective protection. An insurance policy is not 

illusory if it provides coverage for some acts; it is not illusory 

simply because of a potentially wide exclusion. Coverage under 

an insurance policy is not illusory unless the policy would not pay 

benefits under any reasonably expected set of circumstances. 

Contracts are illusory when one party exploits the other; where 

the contracts are hopelessly or deceptively one-sided.

Id. at 466 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Indeed, the TIG Ins. 

Co. Court cited Heller for the principle that: “Whether coverage is illusory 

must be determined under the specific facts of each case.” Id. at 466. 

(citing Heller, 32 A.3d at 1223. “The relevant inquiry is whether a 

particular coverage provision is swallowed-up by an exclusion, not whether 

the policy as a whole provides some degree of coverage despite the 

existence of an exclusion.” TIG Ins. Co., 919 F. Supp. 2d at 466. 

In the case sub judice, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that 

Heller is not applicable. Trial Court Opinion, 6/15/16, at 35. We can 

anticipate many types of incidents that could occur on the subject property 

that would not be excluded by the policy’s total pollution exclusion. Indeed, 

Atlantic has presented two such potential scenarios where the policy would 

____________________________________________

3

 “While we recognize that federal district court cases are not binding on 

this court, Pennsylvania appellate courts may utilize the analysis in those 

cases to the extent we find them persuasive.” Umbelina v. Adams, 34 

A.3d 151, 159 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011).
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provide coverage: 1) where a customer or invitee suffered a slip and fall on 

the premises due to an irregular physical condition of the premise’s surface 

area due to poor maintenance; or 2) where a customer or invitee was on the 

premises while the insured was doing demolition work on a vehicle and the 

customer or invitee was injured by such process. Atlantic’s Brief at 32. 

Further, we cannot agree with Appellants’ interpretation of “waste” as it is 

presented in the policy’s definition of “pollutants.” “Waste” as used in that 

definition refers to waste resulting from the discharge, dispersal, seeping, 

migrating or release of a pollutant. Insurance Policy, 11/24/10, Total 

Pollution Exclusion Endorsement, at 5. Thus, we do not interpret “waste” as 

used in the “pollutants” definition to apply to any and all recycled, reclaimed, 

or reconditioned substances in the salvage yard, as argued by Appellants.

Accordingly, we conclude that the total pollution exclusion would not 

bar “almost all claims” made under the policy. Even assuming, arguendo,

that the pollution exclusion is a potentially wide exclusion, the coverage still 

is not illusory because it will provide coverage under other reasonably 

expected sets of circumstances. Thus, the exclusion does not render the 

coverage illusory in contravention of public policy. Appellants’ claim 

therefore fails.

In their second issue, Appellants argue that the trial court erred in 

granting Atlantic’s motion for summary judgment. Appellants’ Brief at 20. 

After setting forth statements of law regarding the standard for entry of 
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summary judgment in the argument section of their brief on this issue, 

Appellants simply state: “The evidence in this matter demonstrates that 

genuine issue of material fact remain regarding whether [Atlantic] has a 

duty to defend and indemnify the Zymblosky Defendants. As such, the 

lower Court erred in granting [Atlantic’s] Motion for Summary Judgment.” 

Id. at 20. Appellants do not further develop this argument nor do they 

identify those remaining genuine issues of material fact. 

“Where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim 

with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other 

meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.” Umbelina v. 

Adams, 34 A.3d 151, 161 (Pa. Super. 2011); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). “This 

Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an 

appellant.” Irwin Union Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Famous, 4 A.3d 

1099, 1103 (Pa. Super. 2010). It is not this Court’s responsibility to comb 

through the record seeking the factual underpinnings of a claim. Id. When 

deficiencies in a brief hinder our ability to conduct meaningful appellate 

review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be 

waived. Id.; Pa.R.A.P. 2101. Because Appellants’ failure to sufficiently 

develop their argument significantly hinders our ability to conduct 

meaningful review of this issue, we find this claim waived. Id.; Pa.R.A.P. 

2101. 
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In their final issue, Appellants maintain that summary judgment was 

improperly entered because there are genuine issues of material fact that 

remain as to the insured’s reasonable expectations regarding insurance 

coverage. Appellants’ Brief at 29. In support of their position, Appellants 

argue that the trial court focused solely on the representations made by 

Slezak to the Zymbloskys and failed to consider the representations made 

directly by Atlantic to the Zymbloskys. Id. at 31. Appellants contend that 

Atlantic directly represented to the Zymbloskys that they would be covered 

for activities inherent in operating a salvage yard. Id. Appellants further 

argue that the trial court erred in concluding that Slezak was the exclusive 

agent of the Zymbloskys. Id. at 35. Appellants contend that there is a 

genuine issue of material fact as to whether Slezak was a dual agent 

working for Atlantic and therefore representations by Slezak can be 

attributed to Atlantic. Id. Additionally, Appellants assert that the 

Zymbloskys reasonably relied on the representations made by Slezak, who 

was acting as an agent for Atlantic, and that the Zymbloskys reasonably 

expected that their business was covered. Id. at 38. 

The trial court concluded that the reasonable expectations doctrine is 

inapplicable and does not void the total pollution exclusion endorsement in 

the policy. Trial Court Opinion, 6/15/16, at 28. Specifically, the trial court 

found that Slezak’s alleged deception did not cause the Zymbloskys to 

reasonably believe that the injuries due to pollutant exposure were covered 
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under the policy, as there was no ambiguity in the policy’s exclusion of 

coverage for bodily injury caused by a pollutant. Id. at 28-31. Moreover, 

the evidence supports the conclusion that Slezak was not an agent of 

Atlantic who could bind Atlantic by his representations, but rather was an 

agent of CSI and the Zymbloskys. Id. at 28-33. Furthermore, Appellants 

present no evidence of representations made directly by Atlantic to the 

Zymbloskys. See Appellants’ Brief at 31-35. The trial court addressed 

Appellants’ claims in great detail in its opinion entering summary judgment, 

and the trial court’s determinations on these issues are supported by the 

evidence of record. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision and do 

so based on the thorough trial court opinion entered on June 15, 2016, 

granting Atlantic’s motion for summary judgment.4 Because there was no 

genuine issue of material fact regarding these matters, the trial court 

properly entered summary judgment.

Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

4

 The parties are directed to attach copies of this opinion to future filings in 

the event of further proceedings in this matter.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/17/2017
Circulated 06/23/2017 09:49 AM