United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 16-4052

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Anthony Shane Scott

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

____________

 Submitted: September 22, 2017

 Filed: December 13, 2017

[Published] 

____________

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

After the district court denied Anthony Shane Scott’s motion to suppress guns 1

seized from his home, Scott conditionally pleaded guilty to being a felon in

The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge for the

1

Eastern District of Arkansas. 
possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), reserving the right to

appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Scott now appeals the order denying his

motion, and, for the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

I. Background

Early one afternoon, local law enforcement responded to multiple security

alarms at a rural residence in Fulton County, Arkansas. The officers drove down the

long driveway and stopped at a cattle gate. A truck simultaneously pulled up on the

other side of the gate, and Scott got out. According to the officers, Scott had blood

on his clothes and was visibly shaken up. He told the officers that his wife, who he

claimed was on drugs, had run over him with the truck, shot at him, and thrown the

gun in the yard. Scott expressed concern for the safety of his young children, who

were still with his wife at the house. At this point, the officers considered Scott to be

the potential victim of a domestic dispute. They asked Scott to stay at the gate area

and drove their cars to the house. 

At the house, the officers dispersed to observe both front and rear exits. Those

officers who approached the front of the house saw a woman sitting in a chair at, or

just within, the threshold of the open side of a two-bay garage. She was smoking and

using her cell phone. She did not appear armed or threatening. She did not say

anything to the officers, nor did she gesture for them to come in or keep out. The

officers approached this woman and began speaking with her. As they approached,

two little boys entered the garage from the house.

The woman identified herself as Scott’s wife, Stacy. She told them that earlier

she attempted to drive away in the truck with her small child but that Scott tried to

stop her. He fired fourshots at the truck and had grabbed and clung to the truck’s side

mirror, ripping it off. He then jumped into the bed of the truck and broke the rear

window. In fear, Stacy and her children left the truck and ran inside the house. Stacy

told the officersthat Scott eventually threw the gun into the yard. She asked her small

-2-
son where “Daddy” had thrown the gun, and the boy pointed to the yard near the

house. Some of the officers searched the yard for a gun, but they did not find it. The

officersreported Stacy’s demeanor during this conversation variously as angry, calm,

and frightened, but all described her as cooperative. She did not appear to be on

drugs. With the family now secure, one of the officers went back to the cattle gate and

placed Scott in the backseat of the police car. 

The senior officer present called Scott’s parole officer, who granted permission

for the officers to enter Scott’s home to conduct a parole search. The senior officer

and parole officer recalled the conversation differently, but the parole officer

acknowledged that it was a fluid situation and that a gun was involved. The parole

officer went to Scott’s house and, upon his arrival, did not object to the search, which

was then underway. 

Stacy told the officers that the house contained other firearms, besides the gun

that Scott had discarded, which belonged to her husband and son. She said that she

would take the officers inside and show them the guns as well as the home’s security

camera. The officers accepted her offer and followed her inside. Unfortunately, the

memory card was missing from the security equipment resulting in no recording of

the incident. Stacy then showed the officers around the house, leading them to a

hidden gun and a gun safe. To open the safe, Stacy called her older son at school who

told her the safe’s code. The officers found several firearms inside the safe. The

officers uniformly testified that Stacy freely cooperated and appeared relieved by

their presence. When an investigator arrived, the officers informed him of Stacy’s

cooperation. The investigator discussed a consent-to-search form with Stacy, who

then signed it.

Scott’s counsel moved to suppress the items seized from the residence. The

district court declined to suppress any of the evidence obtained in the house. First, it

found exigent circumstances justified the officers’ entry onto the property and into

-3-
the garage. The court, however, concluded that the exigent circumstances ceased once

the officers spoke with Stacy in the garage and saw that the small children were safe.

The district court then held that although exigent circumstances were no longer

present, Stacy either expressly orimpliedly consented to the officers’ entry. Third, the

district court determined that even if Stacy’s oral invitation to enter the house was not

consent, Stacy gave voluntary written consent after the fact. Finally, the district court

held that the residence search was also a valid search pursuant to the parole officer’s

approval for a parole search and his subsequent ratification of the search.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Scott argues that the district court erred by not suppressing the

evidence seized from the house and all related testimony. He argues primarily that

2

the officers’ warrantless entry into the garage violated the Fourth Amendment. Scott

also argues that Stacy’s later written consent did not purge the taint of the prior

unlawful entry. Finally, he says that the search was not a valid parole search. 

In an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, “we review the district

court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error.” United States

v. Frasher, 632 F.3d 450, 453 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[S]earches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are

presumptivelyunreasonable.” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)

(quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004)). But “because the ultimate

touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is

Scott initially argued that the district court also failed to suppress certain

2

evidence seized from his truck based on an allegedly invalid search warrant. See

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). The government has agreed not to use the

evidence seized from the truck, and Scott conceded at oral argument that this issue

is moot. We therefore need not address Scott’s initial arguments about a Franksissue. 

-4-
subject to certain exceptions.” Id. “An action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth

Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the

circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’” Id. at 404 (alteration in

original) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)). 

The prohibition against warrantless entries does not apply if voluntary consent

has been obtained. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990). Likewise, a

warrant is not required if “‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law

enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under

the Fourth Amendment.” Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403 (citation omitted). “One exigency

obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously

injured or threatened with such injury.” Id. Thus, “legitimate concern for the safety

of individuals may constitute ‘exigent circumstances’ justifying warrantless entries

and searches.” United States v. Janis, 387 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 2004) (citations

omitted) (holding exigent circumstances justified a warrantless entry where officers

knew a gun had discharged and injured someone, were told the gun was in the house,

and observed blood in the driveway). 

We agree with the district court that exigent circumstances justified the

officers’ warrantless entry into the garage. When the officers approached the garage, 3

they had just been told about a violent domestic dispute involving a motor vehicle

and a firearm by an individual covered in blood, who advised them that children were

present at the residence. See id. at 687–88. They proceeded up to and into the garage

legitimately concerned thatsomeone at the house may be armed and that children may

be hurt orin danger. These are exigent circumstances and justified entering the garage

to address the only visible person. See id. at 688 (“[T]he home entry could be justified

for the officers to determine whether anyone else was injured or in danger . . . .”). 

Scott and the government agree that exigent circumstances justified the entry 3

past the cattle gate to the house. 

-5-
Scott admits exigent circumstances were present when the police arrived but

argues that they abated before the officers crossed the threshold of the garage. We

disagree. In its written opinion, the district court concluded that “[o]nce the officers

spoke with Stacy in the garage and saw the small children about whom [Scott] was

worried, and determined that they were all safe, the exigent circumstances

disappeared.” United States v. Scott, 4:14-cr-00142-SWW, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Ark.

Apr. 12, 2016), ECF No. 51. The factual finding that officers entered the garage

before they determined everyone was safe is not clearly erroneous. To be sure, some

officers testified that they concluded there was no longer an emergency as they

walked up to the garage while otherssaid that theymade that determination only after

entering the garage to speak with Stacy. The officers’ varied and potentially

conflicting testimony reflects different perspectives of a highly fluid and evolving

situation as the officers arrived on scene. Viewed objectively, however, reasonable

officers were indeed justified in crossing the garage threshold to fully assess the

situation and determine the safety of everyone present, including the children, who

some officers did not observe until after entering the garage. See Stuart, 547 U.S. at

403.

Scott does not challenge the district court’s factual finding that Stacy invited

the officersinto the home after they entered the garage. On this record, we agree with

the district court that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry into the

garage and that Stacy consented to the officers’ entry into the home. Therefore, the

officers’ subsequent discovery of the guns within the home did not violate the Fourth

Amendment.4

We need not address Scott’s remaining arguments about whether Stacy’s later

4

written consent purged the taint of any prior unlawful entry or whether the residence

search waslawful as a parole search. United States v. Lumpkins, 687 F.3d 1011, 1014

n.3 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Because we find the warrantless search valid on the basis of

consent, we need not address the alternative theories advanced by the Government

to justify the search.”). 

-6-
III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

______________________________

-7-