REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 178

September Term, 2014

DOUGLAS STIDHAM, etc. et al.

v.

R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO., INC., et al.

Kehoe,

Arthur,

Kenney, James A., III

 (Retired, Specially Assigned), 

JJ.

Opinion by Arthur, J.

Filed: August 27, 2015
In Gress v. ACandS, Inc., 150 Md. App. 369, 387-89 (2003), this Court held that a 

circuit court erred in refusing to permit the joinder of wrongful death claims against 

asbestos defendants with wrongful death claims against tobacco defendants, where the 

plaintiffs alleged that their decedent’s death had resulted from the synergistic effect of 

exposure to asbestos fibers and tobacco smoke.

The Gress Court recognized that the circuit court had not entered a final, 

appealable judgment in that case, because it had not adjudicated the claims against the 

asbestos defendants and had declined to certify its ruling as final under Md. Rule 2-

602(b). We reached the merits nonetheless, because we reasoned that we had the 

authority to enter a final judgment on our own initiative under Md. Rule 8-602(e)(1)(C). 

The Court of Appeals reversed our decision in Gress on the procedural ground that 

an appellate court may not enter a final judgment under Rule 8-602(e) when the circuit 

court has been asked to enter a final judgment under Rule 2-602(b), but has properly 

exercised its discretion to decline to do so. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gress, 

378 Md. 667, 682 (2003). The Court of Appeals did not address whether the circuit court 

had erred in dismissing the claims against the tobacco defendants.

The substantive issue, of whether a circuit court may refuse to permit the joinder 

of wrongful death claims against asbestos defendants with wrongful death claims against

tobacco defendants, is now before us again. In this case, the plaintiffs, whose claims 

against the tobacco defendants were dismissed earlier in the litigation, have acquired a 

final judgment by resolving all pending claims against the asbestos defendants. 

Ironically, however, the acquisition of the final judgment has rendered the case moot, 
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because it is impossible to join the cigarette manufacturers with the asbestos defendants 

now that the plaintiffs have disposed of all claims against the latter class of defendants.

Even though we must dismiss the appeal on the ground that it is moot, the appeal 

“‘presents a recurring matter of public concern which, unless decided, will continue to 

evade review[.]’” La Valle v. La Valle, 432 Md. 343, 352 (2013) (quoting Office of the 

Pub. Defender v. State, 413 Md. 411, 423 (2010)). We feel constrained to address the 

merits for the guidance of litigants and courts when confronted with a similar issue, and 

to reaffirm the substantive reasoning of the decision in Gress.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 24, 2008, Jack F. Stidham, a retired electrician, filed a complaint in the 

Circuit Court for Baltimore City against 38 defendants, most of which had been asbestos 

manufacturers or distributors. Mr. Stidham contended that he had developed lung cancer 

because of his exposure to asbestos. He pursued legal theories of strict liability, breach of 

warranty, and negligence. The circuit court placed his case on the asbestos docket.

Mr. Stidham died on December 3, 2008. Shortly thereafter, in April 2009, Mr. 

Stidham’s son filed an amended complaint, adding himself, his siblings, and his mother 

as parties to the action. The amended complaint also added several new counts.

On May 1, 2009, the Stidhams filed a second amended complaint. In that 

complaint, the Stidhams added several tobacco companies as defendants and asserted 

claims against the tobacco and asbestos defendants, both individually and jointly. The 

second amended complaint alleged that the tobacco and asbestos defendants failed to 

warn Mr. Stidham that concurrent exposure to asbestos and tobacco products increased 
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the dangers that he faced, a concept known as the “synergy” theory. See Gress, 150 Md. 

App. at 375 (“[a]ccording to appellants, because the combination of asbestos exposure 

and cigarette smoking acted in ‘synergy’ and multiplied the risk of developing lung 

cancer, cigarette smokers who were exposed to asbestos had a much greater chance of 

developing lung cancer and other disease than non-smokers who were exposed solely to 

asbestos”); see also Carter v. Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust, 439 Md. 333, 

356-57 (2014) (“while there are many variables that go into the causal effects of tobacco 

and asbestos exposure, there is evidence that the effect is multiplicative in nature”).

The Stidhams’ amended complaint describes, in great detail, the synergistic effect 

of concurrent exposure to asbestos and tobacco. Although exposure to each of these 

carcinogens presents a risk of lung cancer, the Stidhams allege that concurrent exposure 

exponentially increases the risk. The Stidhams specifically allege that the tobacco 

defendants had internal, corporate knowledge about the increased risk posed by 

concurrent exposure to cigarettes and asbestos.

On June 1, 2009, the tobacco defendants moved to dismiss the second amended 

complaint, arguing that the Stidhams could not properly join the claims against them with 

the claims against the asbestos defendants. The circuit court granted the motion to 

dismiss. Though the court did not discuss its reasoning on the record, the parties agree 

that the court reiterated its 2002 ruling in Van Daniker v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass 

Corp., Case No. 24-X-97-139541, a case in which the circuit court granted a similar 

motion to dismiss on grounds of improper joinder. The Van Daniker ruling is the ruling 

that this Court reviewed in Gress.
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In October 2010, the Stidhams moved to “reinstate” the tobacco defendants. 

Later, in January 2011, the Stidhams moved to voluntarily dismiss the Wallace and Gale 

Asbestos Settlement Trust, which they thought was the last asbestos defendant against 

which they had pending claims. On October 14, 2011, the circuit court issued orders 

denying the motion for reinstatement and dismissing the Wallace and Gale trust, with 

prejudice.

Believing that they had a final judgment, the Stidhams appealed. Upon a review 

of the record, however, this Court identified several pending and unadjudicated claims 

that the Stidhams had asserted, as well as several pending and unadjudicated cross-claims 

and third-party claims. This Court dismissed the appeal because of the absence of an 

appealable, final judgment. Stidham v. Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc., No. 1922, 

Sept. Term 2011 (filed Mar. 11, 2013).

The case returned to the circuit court, which ordered all parties to show cause why 

any claims should remain open for further adjudication. After none of the parties 

responded, the circuit court filed an order entering a final judgment as to all parties on 

April 2, 2014. The order recited that the court had dismissed the claims against the 

tobacco defendants “without prejudice with the right to refile.”

The Stidhams took another timely appeal.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The Stidhams present two questions, which we have rephrased and consolidated as 

follows: Did the circuit court err or abuse its discretion in granting the tobacco 

defendants’ motion to dismiss on grounds of misjoinder?1

The tobacco defendants, on the other hand, have moved to dismiss the appeal. 

They contend that the circuit court has yet to enter a final judgment, because it gave the 

Stidhams the “right to refile.” They also contend that the case is moot, because it is no 

longer possible to join the tobacco defendants with the asbestos defendants (the latter 

having been dismissed).

Although we conclude that the circuit court has entered a final, appealable 

judgment, we must dismiss the appeal as moot, because we can afford no effective 

remedy for the dismissal of the tobacco defendants now that all of the asbestos 

defendants have been dismissed as well. Nonetheless, because the case involves matters 

of public concern that are capable of repetition, but are difficult if not impossible to 

review in accordance with the constraints of the final judgment rule, we shall address the 

merits.

 

1 The Stidhams phrased their questions as follows:

1. Did the lower court err in granting the Cigarette Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss based on alleged misjoinder with the Stidhams’

previously filed claims against the Asbestos Defendants?

2. Did the lower court err when it denied the Stidhams’ Motion for 

Reinstatement of their claims against the Cigarette Defendants after 

all claims as to the Asbestos defendants had been fully resolved?
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We conclude that the circuit court should not have dismissed the tobacco 

defendants without first considering possible procedural safeguards under Rule 2-212(b) 

to prevent embarrassment, delay, expense, or prejudice.

THE MOTION TO DISMISS

Before discussing the questions presented by the Stidhams in this appeal, we 

address the tobacco defendants’ motions to dismiss.

A. Final Judgment

In general, under Maryland law, an appellate court has jurisdiction over an appeal 

only if the trial court has entered a final judgment. See Md. Code (1974, 2014 Repl. 

Vol.), § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article; Schuele v. Case 

Handyman & Remodeling Servs., 412 Md. 555, 565 (2010); Addison v. Lochearn Nursing 

Home, 411 Md. 251, 261 (2009). “A final judgment is an order that ‘has the effect of 

putting [the plaintiff] out of court’” (Spivery-Jones v. Receivership Estate of Trans 

Healthcare, Inc., 438 Md. 330, 353-54 (2014) (quoting American Bank Holdings, Inc. v. 

Kavanagh, 436 Md. 457, 463 (2013)) and of denying the plaintiff “the means of further 

prosecuting or defending rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding.” 

Kavanagh, 436 Md. at 463 (citation omitted).

A judgment may be final and appealable even if the trial court does not adjudicate 

the merits of the plaintiff’s claims. See, e.g., Brewster v. Woodhaven Bldg. & Dev., Inc., 

360 Md. 602, 617 (2000) (order transferring case because of improper venue or forum 

non conveniens is final judgment because “the party challenging the order is put out of 

the particular court that grants the order”); Ferrell v. Benson, 352 Md. 2, 6-7 (1998) 
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(order transferring case from circuit court to district court is final judgment because it 

puts plaintiff out of circuit court).

In Moore v. Pomory, 329 Md. 428, 432 (1993), the Court of Appeals held that a 

dismissal “without prejudice” was a final, appealable judgment if it did not grant the 

plaintiff leave to amend. The Court explained that “a dismissal of the plaintiff’s entire 

complaint ‘without prejudice’ does not mean that the case is still pending in the trial 

court and that the plaintiff may amend [the] complaint or file an amended complaint in 

the same action.” Id. To the contrary, upon a dismissal without prejudice and without 

leave to amend, “the case is fully terminated in the trial court.” Id. “The effect of the 

designation ‘without prejudice’ is simply that there is no adjudication on the merits and 

that, therefore, a new suit on the same cause of action is not barred by principles of res 

judicata.” Id.

In view of Moore, the order in this case did not lack finality merely because it 

dismissed the claims against the tobacco defendants “without prejudice”; it would lack 

finality only if it granted the Stidhams leave to amend. Thus, the question becomes 

whether a dismissal with “the right to refile” equals a dismissal “with leave to amend.” 

It does not.

When the circuit court stated that the Stidhams had “the right to refile,” the court 

plainly did not intend to allow the Stidhams to amend their pleading to address some 

deficiency in their allegations against the tobacco defendants. The court had already 

dismissed the tobacco defendants on the basis of improper joinder and had declined to 

permit the Stidhams to reinstate the claims against them. Consequently, in recognizing a 
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“right to refile,” the court was simply reiterating that res judicata would not bar the 

Stidhams from filing a new complaint against the tobacco defendants. In this regard, we 

note that the phrase “without prejudice with the right to refile” comes directly from the 

Van Daniker order, which unquestionably envisioned that the plaintiffs could not amend 

their pleading to assert claims against the tobacco defendants in the pending action, but 

could only “refile” a completely new lawsuit against the tobacco defendants.

In summary, when the circuit court dismissed the case without prejudice and with 

leave to refile the claims against the tobacco manufacturers, it put the Stidhams out of 

court and denied them the means of further prosecuting their claims in that action. In so 

doing, the court entered an appealable, final judgment. Accordingly, we deny the motion 

to dismiss on grounds of the absence of appellate jurisdiction.

B. Mootness

“A case is moot when there is no longer an existing controversy when the case 

comes before the Court or when there is no longer an effective remedy the court could 

grant.” Prince George’s Cnty. v. Columcille Bldg. Corp., 219 Md. App. 19, 26 (2014) 

(quoting Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 219 (2007)). Here, the Stidhams have no 

effective remedy. Because of the dismissal of all of the asbestos defendants, there are no 

parties with which the tobacco defendants can be joined. See Black’s Law Dictionary 853 

(8th ed. 2004) (defining “joinder” as “[t]he uniting of parties or claims in a single 

lawsuit”). Nor can the claims against tobacco defendants be “reinstated,” because there 

is “no case left to which the dismissed defendants could be rejoined or reinstated.” 

Silbersack v. ACandS, Inc., 402 Md. 673, 687 (2008).
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Despite our determination that this case is moot, we are nonetheless entitled to 

reach the merits when a case “‘presents a recurring matter of public concern which, 

unless decided, will continue to evade review[.]’” La Valle v. La Valle, 432 Md. 343, 352 

(2013) (quoting Office of the Pub. Defender v. State, 413 Md. 411, 423 (2010)); see also 

Comptroller of the Treasury v. Zorzit, 221 Md. App. 274, 292 (2015). This, in our view,

is such a case.

The issues in this case involve recurring matters of public concern: there are 

currently 700 pending cases in which plaintiffs have attempted to join claims against 

tobacco defendants with claims against asbestos defendants. Appellees’ Brief at 4-5. 

The circuit court, however, has required such plaintiffs to bring two separate actions 

against two classes of joint tortfeasors even though they are alleged to have acted

concurrently, to cause a single, indivisible injury that is incapable of apportionment. 

Carter, 439 Md. at 357 (holding that damages for wrongful death from lung cancer 

allegedly caused by synergistic effect of exposure to asbestos and tobacco were 

indivisible and incapable of apportionment); see Gress, 150 Md. App. at 384-89 (holding

that plaintiffs were entitled to join claims against tobacco defendants and asbestos 

defendants in one action where alleged damages from concurrent exposure were 

indivisible and could not be apportioned). A categorical bar on joinder might 

unintentionally have a deleterious effect on the public interest in access to the courts and 

in the expeditious administration of justice, because requiring completely separate actions 

in these complex, costly cases threatens to increase the duration and expense of litigation. 
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See Gress, 150 Md. App. at 388 n.10. “A trial court’s time is a valuable public 

commodity that should not be wasted.” Id. at 382.2

These issues have evaded and continue to evade appellate review. A number of 

plaintiffs, including the Stidhams, have sought appellate review of the Van Daniker ruling 

in five cases, but have failed each time for lack of a final judgment. If the circuit court 

routinely employs Van Daniker to dismiss the claims against tobacco defendants and 

declines to certify its ruling as a final judgment under Rule 2-602(b), an appellate court 

cannot certify the ruling as a final judgment and cannot review the merits of the decision. 

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gress, 378 Md. at 682; see also Brown & 

Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Culbertson, 387 Md. 501, 502 (2005). Furthermore, except 

in extraordinary circumstances (which have yet to arise in any reported case), a party may 

not take a direct appeal from the circuit court’s discretionary decision not to certify such a 

ruling as a final judgment. Silbersack, 402 Md. at 687. Indeed, when the plaintiffs 

ultimately obtain an appealable, final judgment (as the Stidhams have done by dismissing 

the remaining asbestos defendants), the case automatically becomes moot.

In other words, the Stidhams (and other similarly situated plaintiffs) have no right 

to appeal from an interlocutory order dismissing claims because of alleged misjoinder

 

2 The court’s ruling also raises difficult practical concerns for litigants. For 

example, as this Court pointed out in Gress, what happens if the asbestos defendants 

prevail at trial after the court has refused to permit the joinder of the claims against the 

tobacco defendants? In a subsequent action against the tobacco defendants, does the 

asbestos judgment collaterally estop the plaintiffs from arguing that concurrent exposure 

to asbestos and tobacco had a synergistic effect on the development of the cancer? Gress, 

150 Md. App. at 382 n.8.
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because the order is not final. At the same time, however, they have no right to appeal 

from a final judgment because the final disposition of the claims against the other 

defendants renders the case moot. 

Because a court ruling on a matter of public concern should not be insulated from 

appellate review in this way, we are persuaded to reach the merits even though the case is 

moot. See, e.g., La Valle, 432 Md. at 353 (considering moot issue of whether court may 

extend domestic-violence protective order against private party after order has expired); 

Armstrong v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 169 Md. App. 655, 666 (2006) 

(considering moot issue of whether City Council action would have been subject to 

judicial review as “zoning action,” “so that all interested persons will know what 

procedural avenue for seeking judicial review is applicable in a given situation”); see also 

In re Justin D., 357 Md. 431, 444-45 (2000) (in CINA case, considering moot issue of 

whether court could delegate questions of visitation to Department of Social Services, 

because “it is common practice for the juvenile court in Montgomery County to enter 

orders of this kind, so the issue presented by appellants is a recurring and important one,”

and because “orders of this kind that are appealed will almost always be replaced by 

subsequent orders before this Court will have the opportunity to review them”).3

 

3

In addition to arguing that the judgment is not final and that the issues are moot, 

the tobacco defendants cite Brannan v. Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust, 208 

Md. App. 164 (2012), for the proposition that the Stidhams cannot pursue claims against 

other tortfeasors because they have allegedly received full compensation from the 

asbestos defendants. The short answer to that assertion is that the record currently 

contains nothing to suggest that the Stidhams have received full compensation.
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JOINDER

Rule 2-212(a), concerning permissive joinder of parties, provides, in relevant part, 

as follows: 

All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted 

against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative any right to relief in 

respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 

transactions or occurrences, and if any question of law or fact common to 

all defendants will arise in the action.

In other words, under Rule 2-212(a), a plaintiff may join multiple defendants who 

are alleged to be jointly, severally, or alternatively liable to the plaintiff, if “(1) the issues 

in the litigation arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions, 

and (2) there is a common question of law or fact with respect to all or part of the action.” 

Paul V. Niemeyer and Linda Schuett, Maryland Rules Commentary 143 (3d ed. 2003).4

“The joinder rules were enacted ‘to remedy the procedural and substantive defects 

in the law which prevented the resolution in one action of the rights and obligations of all 

parties whose connection with the case arose out of the same source and occurrence.’”

Gress, 150 Md. App. at 385 (quoting Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Royal Crown 

Bottling Co., 243 Md. 280, 287 (1966)). “Joinder of parties, in some cases, simplifies 

and expedites proceedings, avoids duplicative costs, and eliminates multiple trials.” 

Gress, 150 Md. App. at 385. “The purpose behind the joinder of parties rules is ‘to 

simplify and expedite proceedings and to avoid the useless duplication, expense and 

 

4

“Permissive joinder” is to be distinguished from “required joinder” under Rule 2-

211. Required joinder defines the parties whom a plaintiff must join if the action is to 

proceed. Permissive joinder, by contrast, defines the parties whom a plaintiff may (or 

may not) elect to join.
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possible uncertainty of more than one trial.’” Carter, 439 Md. at 349 n.7 (2014) (quoting 

Allen & Whalen, Inc. v. John C. Grimberg Co., 229 Md. 585, 588 (1962)).

If we look to the salient considerations under the plain language of Rule 2-212(a), 

it is very clear that the tobacco defendants and the asbestos defendants “may be joined in 

one action as defendants[.]”

First, there can be no serious dispute that the tobacco defendants and the asbestos 

defendants are alleged to be jointly and severally liable to the Stidhams within the 

meaning of Rule 2-212(a). In holding that it was inappropriate to apportion the damages 

for a wrongful death caused by exposure to both asbestos and tobacco, the Court of 

Appeals recognized that the asbestos defendants and the tobacco defendants were 

concurrent tortfeasors that were jointly and severally liable for the same, indivisible 

injury. See Carter, 439 Md. at 352-53. Similarly, in Gress, 150 Md. App. at 386-87, this 

Court recognized that the two sets of defendants are concurrent tortfeasors because the 

plaintiffs “alleged that [the decedent’s] exposure to asbestos products and [his] cigarette 

smoking occurred during the same time period[.]”

Second, the Stidhams claim that Mr. Stidham was “injured by the combined effects 

of cigarette smoke and exposure to asbestos products.” Gress, 150 Md. App. at 387. 

Consequently, for purposes of Rule 2-212(a), the claims against the asbestos defendants 

“arise out of the same series of occurrences” as the claims against the tobacco 

defendants. Gress, 150 Md. App. at 387.

Third, as in Gress, “the case[] at bar involve[s] numerous common questions of 

law and fact” within the meaning of Rule 2-212(a). Those questions include “(1) the 
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question of whether there is scientific merit in appellants’ ‘synergy’ theory, and (2) the 

question of what all of the appellees knew or should have known about the synergistic 

effect of cigarette smoking and exposure to asbestos.” Gress, 150 Md. App. at 387-88. 

As in Gress, the tobacco defendants “do not argue to the contrary.” Id. at 388.5

Finally, “there are important policy reasons for joining the two categories” of 

defendants. Gress, 150 Md. App. at 388. Most notably, “‘in the separate suits it is open 

to each defendant to prove that the other was solely responsible, or responsible for the 

greater part of the damage, and so defeat or minimize recovery[.]’” Id. at 388 n.10 

(quoting Prosser and Keeton on Torts 327 n.25 (5th ed. 1984)). In addition, “‘time and 

expense are doubled.’” Id.

In dismissing the claims against the tobacco defendants, the circuit court did not 

appear to have engaged in the required analysis under Rule 2-212(a). The court took no 

express notice of whether the tobacco defendants and the asbestos defendants were 

alleged to be liable jointly, severally, or alternatively to the Stidhams, and the court did 

not discuss whether the claims “ar[ose] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series 

of transactions or occurrences[.]” Md. Rule 2-212(a). Nor did the court consider 

 

5 The tobacco defendants assert that Gress is “contrary to the Circuit Court’s 

findings of fact in Van Daniker.” Appellees’ Brief at 18 n.5. The Van Daniker court, 

however, heard no evidence and made no “findings.” Rather, it made a number of 

unspecific factual assertions in support of its ruling. In any event, the tobacco defendants 

do not explain precisely how the Gress Court’s statements are “contrary” to any specific 

“findings.” They certainly do not explain where the circuit court mentioned, let alone 

made, any “findings” about the presence of any common questions of law and fact, such 

as the validity of the synergy theory or the extent of the defendants’ knowledge about the 

synergistic effect of cigarette smoking and exposure to asbestos.
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whether “any question of law or fact common to all defendants w[ould] arise in the 

action.” Id. In brief, the court denied joinder without expressly evaluating any of the 

specific factors that are relevant, under the rule, to the propriety of permissive joinder.

In premising the dismissal on the Van Daniker order, the circuit court expressed 

concern about the practical consequences of joinder. In light of “a unique set of practices 

and procedures [that] have developed under the asbestos docket,” the court forecast that 

“a joint trial . . . will cause confusion to the jury.” It stated its view that those practices 

and procedures would be “prejudicial” to the tobacco defendants if “they were added 

now.” It also stated that the joinder of the tobacco defendants “would disrupt the orderly 

procedures that the asbestos docket now has in place.”

Although the record lacks specific information about the court’s unique practices, 

about the specific prejudice that those practices might inflict on the tobacco defendants, 

or about the potential disruption of the asbestos docket that joinder might engender, we 

do not gainsay the circuit court’s concerns. Nonetheless, the permissive joinder rule 

provides the court with discretion to employ what it calls “safeguards” to address those 

concerns. Under Rule 2-212(b), “[t]he court may make such orders as will prevent a 

party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of another

[party] who asserts no claim against the party and against whom the party asserts no 

claim, and may order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or prejudice.”

To be sure, the language of Rule 2-212(b) is broad enough to include the safeguard 

of dismissal without prejudice where it may be warranted, but a court should not resort to 

dismissal as a routine remedy in cases where joinder is otherwise proper. This is 
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especially so in cases like this one, where the damages are indivisible (Carter, 439 Md. at 

351, 356-57), and the asbestos defendants have an incentive to limit their own liability by 

emphasizing the culpability of the tobacco defendants, and vice versa.

Rather than dismissal, the court might first consider such safeguards as 

establishing different discovery tracks for the different classes of defendants or retaining 

the short-form pleadings that it has devised for claims involving asbestos defendants. 

The court might also consider ordering separate proceedings on discrete sub-issues that 

affect discrete parties, such as the identity of the asbestos-containing products to which 

the plaintiff was exposed. See Niemeyer & Schuett, Maryland Rules Commentary, supra, 

143-44. The court or the parties themselves will undoubtedly have other reasonable 

suggestions for appropriate safeguards.

Dismissal remains an option, provided that no safeguard can afford adequate 

protection. In the first instance, however, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, 

should first endeavor to “tailor an order for the conduct of the litigation” so as prevent 

embarrassment, delay, expense, or prejudice. Id. at 143.6

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK 

OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED AS 

MOOT; COSTS TO BE EVENLY 

DIVIDED BETWEEN APPELLANTS 

AND APPELLEES.

 

6

In this case, the tobacco defendants complain that the Stidhams amended the 

complaint to add them as defendants only a few months before the scheduled trial, 

without giving them adequate time to conduct discovery and prepare. The belated 

amendment might have given the circuit court grounds to strike the amended complaint 

under Md. Rule 2-341(a) had the defendants requested that remedy.