In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo 

 

No. 07-24-00003-CR 

 

ARTHUR TORREZ, APPELLANT 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

On Appeal from the 364th District Court 

Lubbock County, Texas 

Trial Court No. DC-2022-CR-1436, Honorable William R. Eichman II, Presiding 

July 5, 2024 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ. 

Arthur Torrez appeals from his conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly 

weapon. The victim was his infant daughter whom he dropped and then shook back and 

forth. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred 1) when it instructed the jury that his 

hands were a deadly weapon, 2) by denying his request for an instruction on the lesserincluded offense of simple assault, and 3) by denying his motion for mistrial. We affirm.
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Background 

Appellant and Maritza met in 2015. A year later, they moved in together and had 

a child. AT was born in December 2016. After Maritza’s four-week maternity leave, she 

returned to work while appellant stayed home with the infant. One day in February 2017, 

appellant called Maritza and told her to return home. Apparently, AT needed to go to the 

hospital. When Maritza arrived, she found her daughter in an ambulance. The infant was 

taken to the hospital and underwent a craniotomy. Thereafter, investigation into the 

incident began. 

During an interview with Detective Trent McNeme, appellant said he accidentally 

dropped the baby while preparing a bottle. Allegedly, she landed feet first but then hit her 

head on the floor. He added that he then shook the infant four or five times. 

An attending physician testified at the ensuing trial. She diagnosed AT with 

abusive head trauma. Her injuries or symptoms included retinol hemorrhaging, 

“ligamentous strain” from the base of the skull to the cervical spine, seizures, and 

breathing difficulties. That resulted in the child’s undergoing surgery to ameliorate 

swelling in her brain. So too was she placed on a ventilator to prevent further seizures. 

Ultimately, the jury convicted appellant of the charged offense. Appellant then 

appealed.

Issue One—Deadly Weapon Instruction

Through his first issue, appellant contends the trial court improperly instructed the 

jury that his hands were a deadly weapon. We overrule the issue. 

Upon reading the charge, one encounters an instruction defining “deadly weapon.” 

According to the court, the phrase meant “anything that in the manner of its use or 
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intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” Soon thereafter 

followed the application paragraph. Through it, the trial court informed the jury that “if” it

found from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant “did then and there, 

intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause serious bodily injury to [AT] by shaking or 

causing her to strike a hard surface, and the defendant did then and there use or exhibit 

a deadly weapon, to wit: the Defendant’s hands . . . then you will find [appellant] guilty as 

charged in the indictment.” This language tracked the applicable statutory language. See 

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(a)(17); 22.02(b)(1)(A).

Moreover, nowhere in the charge did the trial court inform the jury that hands were 

a deadly weapon. Rather, it simply defined the term and told the jury that “if” it found 

appellant’s hands fell within the definition’s scope it could convict him of the charged 

offense. Of course, the trial court also conditioned guilt upon the jury’s finding evidence 

proving the remaining elements of aggravated assault. But, again, nowhere did the court 

say appellant’s hands were deadly weapons.

As for appellant basing his argument on Blanson v. State, 107 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. 

App.—Texarkana 2003 no pet.), the opinion is inapposite. The Blanson trial court actually 

provided the directive missing here. It told the jury that “[a] knife is a deadly weapon.” 

Telling the jury that a knife is a “deadly weapon” is far different than merely providing the 

definition of a “deadly weapon” and accompanying that definition with an instruction 

permitting conviction “if” appellant’s hands were found to be deadly weapons. The former 

is wrong. The latter is not. To paraphrase language from Davis-Grant v. State, No. 03-

20-00182-CR, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 8219 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 8, 2021, pet. ref’d) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication), “[i]n light of the preceding, we conclude that 
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the jury would have understood that it was required to determine if [appellant’s hands

were] a deadly weapon as that was defined in the jury charge when determining whether 

he was guilty of the offense . . . .” Id. at *18-19. 

Issue Two—Denial of Lesser-Included Offense Instruction

By his second issue, appellant argues the trial court should have submitted to the 

jury his requested lesser-included instruction for simple assault or simple assault family 

violence. We overrule the issue. 

In determining whether the jury should be charged on a lesser offense, we apply

a two-step analysis. Segundo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 79, 90-91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 

We first decide if the offense is a lesser-included offense of the charged offense by 

comparing the elements of the greater offense, as pleaded in the indictment, with the 

elements of the lesser offense. Id. Second, we decide if there is some evidence in the 

record from which a rational jury could acquit the defendant of the greater offense while 

convicting him of the lesser-included offense. Id. The evidence must establish the lesserincluded offense as a valid rational alternative to the charged offense. Id. And, as said 

in Roy v. State, 509 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017), “[a]lthough little evidence is 

needed to trigger an instruction, the relevant evidence must affirmatively ‘raise[] the 

lesser-included offense and rebut[] or negate[] an element of the greater offense.’" Id. at 

317 (quoting Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).

The parties do not dispute that the requested charge was for a lesser-included 

offense of the charge for which appellant was indicted. So, our focus lies on the second 

part of the applicable test. And, the evidence purportedly entitling appellant to the 

instruction fell within two categories. We address each in turn.
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The first category encompasses the long-term effects of the assault upon the child. 

It consisted of evidence that she recovered over the ensuing years with minimal, if any, 

impairment. According to appellant, her so recovering was evidence indicating she only 

suffered bodily injury, as opposed to serious bodily injury. This distinction is of import. 

While aggravated assault, as charged here, required proof of serious bodily injury, 

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(1), simple assault or simple assault, family violence

merely required proof of “bodily injury.” Id. at § 22.01(a)(1). “Bodily injury” consists of 

“physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition,” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 

1.07(a)(8), while “serious bodily injury” means “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk 

of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or 

impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 

1.07(a)(46). Because the victim recovered, i.e., suffered no permanent disfigurement, 

loss, or impairment, she suffered only bodily injury, according to appellant. 

In so proposing though, appellant ignored the several ways to prove serious bodily 

injury; he ignored the avenue involving proof of injuries that “create[] a substantial risk of 

death.” Evidence that the child recovered did not negate that path. Nor did appellant

explain how it did. Again, the child suffered from brain swelling, retinal bleeding, seizures, 

and spinal cord strain. She underwent head surgery to relieve pressure on her brain. So 

too did she necessitate breathing assistance. Those circumstances posed to the child a 

substantial risk of death, according to the testifying medical expert. Thus, the evidence 

cited us by appellant did not negate an element to the greater offense but, at best, only 

addressed one of several charged ways the State proved that greater element. 
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The second category concerns appellant’s mens rea. Allegedly, his conduct was

merely accidental or negligence as opposed to intentional, knowing, or reckless. And, 

the evidence of same purportedly came from AT’s mother. She purportedly testified that 

“she did not believe Appellant could intentionally hurt [AT]” Upon looking at the record

excerpt to which we were cited, though, the mother did not say that. Instead, she 

indicated that she had “a hard time believing” appellant did something to the child. Her

having “a hard time believing” he injured his offspring describes her mindset, not that of 

appellant. It is no evidence of what appellant thought or intended at the time of the assault 

and, therefore, constitutes no affirmative evidence negating the requisite mens rea. 

To that, we also note the trial court’s definition of the requisite mens rea. It included 

three categories of mindset, that is, intentional, knowing, and reckless. Assuming 

arguendo mother’s testimony could somehow be read as suggesting appellant did not act 

“intentionally,” as posited by appellant, that left knowing and reckless. In other words, he 

could still be convicted of aggravated assault even if his acts were not intentional. So, 

again, the evidence cited fell short of negating an element of the greater offense. 

Issue Three—Denial of Motion for Mistrial

Lastly, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial. 

He so moved during closing arguments and immediately after the prosecutor stated, 

“[f]olks, by the grace of God, [AT] can’t come into this courtroom and tell you what 

happened to her that day. The defendant is the only one that could do that . . . .” That 

comment led defense counsel to object, which objection the trial court sustained. The 

court also instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s comment but denied the 

request for a mistrial. We overrule the issue.
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A mistrial is an extreme remedy, sparingly used for “a narrow class of highly 

prejudicial and incurable errors” committed during the trial process. Herrada v. State, No. 

07-22-00374-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 8973, at *12-13 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 30, 

2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Thus, a trial court may grant 

mistrial only in those instances where it is apparent from the record that an objectionable 

event occurred that is so inflammatory that curative instructions would most likely be 

unsuccessful in preventing the jury from being unfairly prejudiced against the 

defendant. Id. Finally, the denial of a motion for mistrial is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. Id. And, in assessing if such an abuse occurred, we generally consider 1) the 

severity of the misconduct, 2) curative measures undertaken, if any, and 3) the certainty 

of conviction absent the conduct. Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1998).

Here, the comment made by the prosecutor during closing argument may certainly 

be construed as an impermissible direct comment on the defendant’s failure to testify. 

See Lockett v. State, No. 01-22-00302-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 5034, at *8 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 13, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (“[t]he State’s comment on a defendant’s failure to testify violates the United 

States and Texas Constitutions, and statutory law”). Yet, it was fleeting. Moreover, its 

utterance was followed by a prompt instruction to disregard it; such generally cures 

potential harm arising from it. Lockett, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 5034, at *10. Lastly, the 

evidence of appellant’s guilt was not weak. He admitted to shaking the baby and 

described how the child’s head flopped “back and forth.” And, we previously mentioned 
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the extent of the baby’s ensuing injuries. When combined, the Mosely factors weigh in 

favor of finding no abused discretion when denying mistrial.

Yet, our disposition of the third issue is not an invitation to the State to interject 

reference to a defendant’s silence. Such has been prohibited for so long a time it is 

difficult to understand why a prosecutor still does it. Time has come to proceed cautiously 

and stop the practice.

Having overruled each of appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court.

Brian Quinn

Chief Justice

Do not publish.