BEYOND THE STRAIT:

PLA MISSIONS OTHER THAN TAIWAN

Roy Kamphausen

David Lai

Andrew Scobell

Editors

April 2009

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution 

is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 

Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.

 

Visit our website for other free publication 

downloads

http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/

To rate this publication click here.
ii

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. 

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are available 

on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies 

of this report also may be ordered from our homepage. SSI’s 

homepage address is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail 

newsletter to update the national security community on the 

research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and 

upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter 

also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research 

analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please 

subscribe on our homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.

mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-382-5
iii

CONTENTS

Foreword

Admiral Dennis C. Blair .............................................v

1. Introduction

 David Lai and Marc Miller ..................................1

2. How China Manages Taiwan and Its Impact 

on PLA Missions

 Andrew Scobell .............................................29 

3. How China Manages Internal Security 

Challenges and Its Impact on PLA Missions

 Murray Scot Tanner ......................................39 

 

4. China’s Expanding Presence in UN Peacekeeping 

Operations and Implications for the United States

 Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang ........................99

5. PLA Missions in Frontier Security 

and Counterterrorism 

 Robert O. Modarelli III......................................127

6. Strategic Deterrence beyond Taiwan

 Brad Roberts.......................................................167

7. Prospects for China’s Military Space Efforts

 Dean Cheng........................................................211

8. PLA Computer Network Operations: Scenarios, 

Doctrine, Organizations, and Capability

 James Mulvenon................................................253
iv

9. China’s Regional Power Projection: Prospects 

for Future Missions in the South 

and East China Seas 

 Mark Cozad........................................................287

10. PLA “Joint” Operational Contingencies 

in South Asia, Central Asia, and Korea

 Larry M. Wortzel ..............................................327

About the Contributors ..............................................391
v

FOREWORD

As the John M. Shalikashvili (Shali) Chair in 

National Security Studies at The National Bureau of 

Asian Research (NBR), a role in which I have served 

since 2007, I participated in the 2008 Carlisle Chinese 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conference entitled 

“PLA Missions beyond Taiwan.” Throughout my career 

and most recently as the Shali Chair, I have spent a 

great deal of time in China meeting with senior defense 

officials and discussing the security environment in the 

region. While U.S.‐Sino relations are arguably the best 

in at least a decade, continued examination of China’s 

security policy is essential in order to anticipate and 

understand future Chinese military missions within 

China and on its borders, across the Taiwan Strait, and 

around the region.

On September 26, 2008, over 70 leading experts from 

academia, government, the military, and policy think 

tanks assembled at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, for 

that very purpose, to look beyond the PLA’s primary 

focus on Taiwan and to the evolving new roles of the 

PLA. The conference could not have been timelier, 

given the PLA’s active involvement in events during 

2008, including earthquake relief, counterterrorism, 

humanitarian assistance, space activities, and blue 

water naval operations.

While preventing de jure independence likely 

remains the central aim of the PLA vis‐à‐vis 

Taiwan, Chinese foreign policy objectives worldwide 

are rapidly growing and diversifying. Beyond the Strait: 

PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan analyzes the PLA’s 

involvement in disaster and humanitarian relief, 

United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO), 

counterterrorism and border defense, security in 
vi

outer space and cyberspace, and the level of activity 

in regional “joint” operational contingencies. On the 

whole, the volume provides a discerning analysis of 

these varied PLA developments and how they affect 

policy towards both Taiwan and the entire Asia‐Pacific 

region.

Just prior to the PLA conference, the world watched 

China debut on the international stage as it hosted the 

2008 Summer Olympic Games. While the significance 

of China has long been understood, the nation’s rise 

to prominence on the world scene is becoming more 

acutely felt. I believe an understanding of the PLA’s 

growing roles, both within China and internationally, 

is of critical importance to the United States.

I commend the Strategic Studies Institute of the 

U.S. Army War College, NBR, and the Bush School 

of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M 

University for the conference and publication of this 

book in such a timely manner. Beyond the Strait: PLA 

Missions Other Than Taiwan is an essential read for 

those seeking to understand the evolving roles of the 

PLA in carrying out China’s foreign policy.

 

DENNIS C. BLAIR

Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

David Lai and Marc Miller

The volatile year just past will no doubt go down 

as a milestone for the People’s Republic of China 

(PRC), and no less so for its People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA). Two major developments in particular have 

buffeted the PLA’s ongoing modernization and in the 

process created an especially fruitful environment 

for PLA studies. The first development has been the 

recent warming of relations between Taiwan and 

mainland China to a degree unimaginable only a 

few years ago. The second development has been 

the marked growth and diversification in active PLA 

missions in 2008, including those resulting from a 

series of natural disasters, the Beijing Olympics, unrest 

in China’s western provinces, and the fallout from 

the global financial crisis. This remarkable series of 

events challenged the PLA to fulfill a greater variety 

of missions than ever before and makes this volume’s 

theme all the more timely. 

The title of this year’s volume, Beyond the Strait: 

PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, does not suggest 

that the Taiwan issue has been resolved as a potential 

flashpoint or is no longer at the center of the PLA’s 

strategic planning, but rather that recent trends make 

the consideration of the PLA’s growing number and 

variety of missions other than its traditional focus on 

Taiwan of particular relevance. In 2008 The National 

Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) and the Strategic 

Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College were 

pleased to welcome the Bush School of Government 
2

and Public Service at Texas A&M University as a cosponsor of the PLA conference, which brought together 

more than 70 scholars and other close observers of the 

PLA. This volume represents the papers presented in 

Carlisle, PA, in September 2008, revised to incorporate 

discussion and feedback from conference participants. 

Defining the Concept of “Mission.”

Any discussion of “mission,” particularly in 

the Chinese context, is fraught with potential 

misunderstanding. This stems from confusion as 

to whether the PLA makes the same definitional 

distinctions as the U.S. military does between such 

concepts as “mission,” “role,” and “strategy.” For 

example, in the American context, the Department of 

Defense (DoD) defines “mission” as the task, together 

with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be 

taken and the reason therefore. A “mission statement” 

specifies the “who,” “what,” “where,” “when,” and 

“why” of an interrelated set of military tasks, but it rarely 

discusses the “how,” which is seen as the prerogative 

of the commander assigned the mission. During active 

military operations, for military commanders, missions 

are tasks that are undertaken and completed as part of 

campaigns. At higher levels of command and during 

peacetime, military missions are wider-scale tasks that 

are repeated for an extended period or prepared for 

and partially but never fully completed. 

As such, in the American military context, a 

“mission” is distinguished from a “role.” Roles typically 

describe enduring functions or duties, usually aligned 

with individual Services (Army, Navy, Air Force). Roles 

are associated with responsibilities for maintaining 

capabilities. Any discussion of missions and roles will 
3

lead into a discussion of strategy. Strategy in military 

doctrine is relating ends to means. Missions are the 

ends, and roles provide the means. 

Whether the PLA makes the same distinctions 

among strategy, roles, and missions is unclear. In fact, 

evidence indicates to the contrary. For example, the six 

key points defining China’s national defense policy as 

outlined in its 2006 National Defense White Paper are a 

commingling of strategy, roles, and missions.1

 Taking 

all of these into consideration leads to a number of 

challenging questions. For example, does China have 

a military “strategy” in the Western understanding of 

the term? Does it specify political-military objectives, 

the responsibility for achieving them, capacity needed 

to achieve them, and assign the duty to develop the 

capacity? How do the Chinese conceive of these 

concepts? Do they functionally align missions by 

services or with roles? China’s military, while subject to 

the Constitution, the National Defense Law, and other 

laws, is also directly controlled by and responsible to 

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). How does this 

dual command chain drive the development of the 

concept and the implementation of “mission”? What 

role does bureaucratic behavior play in mission—for 

example is the PLA Navy’s aspirational mission of 

protecting China’s oil sea lines of communication 

(SLOC) derived from a strategy, or is it a justification of 

additional resources?

Our purpose in this volume is not to seek definitive 

answers to these challenging questions, or to expound 

on the meaning of mission in a Chinese context. Rather, 

it is to ensure that we carefully distinguish roles from 

missions in the PLA and then concentrate our analysis 

in the following chapters on a selection of existing 

or potential missions, defined here as those military 
4

contingencies that seek to bring about a politicalmilitary end state. 

Drivers of PLA Modernization.

When Deng Xiaoping launched China’s 

economic reform and embarked China on its “Four 

Modernizations” mission 30 years ago, he put the 

modernization of China’s national defense forces on 

the back burner. He pointedly told senior leaders of 

the Chinese PLA the following:

The four modernizations include the modernization of 

defense. Without that modernization there would be only 

three [agriculture, industry, and science and technology]. 

But the four modernizations should be achieved in an 

order of priority. Only when we have a good economic 

foundation will it be possible for us to modernize the 

army’s equipment. So we must wait patiently for a 

few years. I am certain that by the end of the century 

we can surpass the goal of quadrupling the GNP [gross 

national product]. At that time, when we are strong 

economically, we shall be able to spend more money on 

updating equipment. . . . If the economy develops, we 

can accomplish anything. What we have to do now is to 

put all our efforts into developing the economy. That is 

the most important thing, and everything else must be 

subordinated to it.2

But the PLA did not have to wait long to acquire the 

resources to improve its fighting power. Several triggers 

set China’s defense modernization in motion earlier 

than Deng had expected; one of the most significant 

was the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis. 

From an historical perspective, the Taiwan issue is 

a product of the Chinese Civil War (1946-49). After the 

Chinese Communists defeated the Nationalists and 

founded the PRC on the mainland, the Nationalists 
5

retreated to Taiwan and restored the Republic of 

China (ROC) government on the island. For much 

of the Cold War, the PRC and the ROC governments 

remained bitter enemies, but both stood for eventual 

unification of China, though on very different terms. 

PRC leaders have made the unification of mainland 

China with Taiwan part of their efforts to redress 

China’s “century of humiliation from the West” and 

one of their three historic missions—modernization of 

China, unification of the motherland, and maintaining 

world peace.3

 Over time, the CCP came to count on the 

success of these missions to legitimize its rule of China. 

However, by the early 1990s, the pro-independence 

movement in Taiwan emerged to challenge China’s 

resolve in its unification mission. In 1996, Taiwan held 

its first-ever direct presidential election and Taiwanese 

independence became a rallying call in the election 

campaigns. Furious, Chinese leaders ordered the PLA 

to fire missiles toward Taiwan (landing in waters 

close to the northern and southern tips of the island). 

In response, the United States dispatched two aircraft 

carrier battle groups to demonstrate its commitment to 

maintain peace and stability in the Western Pacific (or 

more bluntly, to show its commitment to the defense 

of Taiwan).4

The crisis passed, yet hostility and tension across the 

Taiwan Strait continued: Taiwan’s pro-independence 

movement challenged the PRC government’s core 

interest and the PRC vowed to prevent Taiwanese 

independence at all costs.5 Although the PRC states 

that it will pursue peaceful unification with Taiwan, 

it has not foresworn the use of force should peaceful 

means fail. Building up a credible military deterrence 

is China’s ultimate measure to keep Taiwan in the fold. 

This determination is clearly translated into an increase 
6

in defense spending beginning in the early 1990s, but 

accelerating in the years following 1996 (see Figure 

1).6

Figure 1. China Military Expenditure, 1989-2007.

The PLA putatively spent a significant portion of 

its increased budget to purchase advanced weapon 

systems from Russia, as documented by the Stockholm 

International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 

According to the records, from the mid-1990s to the 

present, China spent an average of $2.5 billion a year 

on acquiring advanced conventional weapons (mostly 

advanced Russian fighter aircraft and warships). This 

heavy spending puts China at the top of the SIPRI’s list 

of recipients of major conventional weapons during 

these years.7

Acquiring advanced weapons from Russia was 

only a small portion of China’s accelerated military 

buildup. The PLA also spent much of its increased 

resources internally to improve its overall fighting 

Data Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,

<http://milexdata.sipri.org/>
7

capability (see the Pentagon’s annual reports to the 

Congress on the military power of the PRC since 2000 

for detailed accounts of PLA capabilities). However, 

the accelerated increase in China’s defense spending 

since 1996 as shown in Figure 1 suggests something 

else in addition to Taiwan is driving China’s efforts. 

Two factors seem to be at work in this context. One, 

Chinese leaders know well that in their efforts to deter 

Taiwanese independence, they must develop forces 

to deter potential U.S. intervention as well—the U.S. 

show of force during the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis is 

a constant reminder to the Chinese leaders that the 

PLA must develop a fighting power larger than that 

necessary to take on Taiwan alone.8

Second, China’s accelerated military buildup 

against Taiwan may have jump-started China’s overall 

defense modernization. Indeed, while the PLA was 

upgrading its deterrence vis-à-vis Taiwan, the Chinese 

economy was registering phenomenal growth. Much 

as Deng prescribed, when the economy advanced, 

China could afford to put more money into its defense 

modernization. Over the last 15 years, the PLA has not 

only improved its hardware, but also its ”software” as 

well, including placement of increased emphasis on 

improving the PLA’s human resources.9 Moreover, the 

PLA has benefited from the information revolution. 

Discussion of the “revolution in military affairs” and 

impressive U.S. fighting power in the Gulf War of 1991, 

the Kosovo air campaign, and the initial wars against 

the Taliban and Saddam Hussein gave the PLA further 

impetus to accelerate its modernization efforts.10

As a result of these improvements, the PLA is 

emerging as a more capable and more professional 

military power. In retrospect, Chinese leaders could 

not have wished for better timing for the acceleration 
8

of their defense modernization, corresponding as it 

has with the demands on the PLA to serve China’s 

expanding national interests at home and abroad. 

The Evolution of PLA Missions. 

The PLA’s recent period of rapid modernization 

follows a series of evolutions in the PLA’s fundamental 

mission over the course of its 80-plus year history. From 

1927 to 1949, as the Red Army, its primary missions 

were political revolution and nation-making. Indeed, 

as Mao Zedong famously put it, political power grows 

out of the barrel of a gun, and the PLA was one of 

the three key “Magic Instruments” (三大法宝 san da 

fa-bao) Chinese leaders used to establish the PRC: the 

Communist Party, the Red Army, and the Chinese 

people. 

Upon the founding of the PRC, the PLA’s mission 

shifted to China’s national defense and nation-building. 

In the early decades of the PRC, the PLA bore heavy 

responsibility for defending China’s vast and disputed 

borders. It also had to confront the ROC’s attempts 

to reclaim China by force. In pursuing this mission, 

the PLA fought directly against the United States in 

the Korean War and indirectly in the Vietnam War. It 

also participated in the Indo-China War of 1962, the 

Sino-Russo border skirmishes of 1969, the 1974 naval 

battles with Vietnam in the South China Sea, the SinoVietnamese War of 1979, and the 1988 naval clash with 

Vietnam, among others. 

Since the early 1990s, China’s rise has sparked 

a debate in the West about the “China threat” to the 

outside world, especially the United States. Before 

long, some observers in the United States and China 

predicted a coming “power transition” between the 
9

two great powers, worried that Taiwan could be the 

flashpoint that would bring them to an unwanted war.11

Neither the United States nor China took this issue 

lightly. While working on diplomatic and economic 

fronts to find common interests, the United States and 

China nevertheless tried to develop strategies to hedge 

against each other. The United States strengthened 

relations with its Cold War allies, as well as its forces 

in the Asia-Pacific. China made great efforts to mend 

fences with its neighbors—settling border disputes 

in particular—so that the PLA could be freed from 

concerns of China’s “backyards” and focus on the 

Taiwan issue and a potential confrontation with the 

United States, if necessary, efforts which have kept the 

PLA busy over the last 15 years.

While undertaking heavy duties in China’s 

national defense, the PLA was also actively involved 

in Chinese nation-building and maintaining internal 

order and stability. During the “Cultural Revolution,” 

Chairman Mao even sent the PLA to take over Chinese 

government at all levels for an extended period of 

time, perhaps the largest-scale PLA involvement in 

the PRC’s internal affairs. Then came the Tiananmen 

Square student movement in 1989. The PLA was called 

in to maintain order, resulting in a bloody confrontation 

with protesters.12

After Tiananmen, Chinese leaders carefully 

removed the PLA from the frontline of maintaining 

China’s internal order. In its place, China developed 

the People’s Armed Police (PAP) force, with the PLA to 

be the instrument of last resort. In the following years, 

the Taiwan issue and China’s confrontation with the 

United States over the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the 

bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, 

and the 2001 collision of a PLA F-8 fighter with a U.S. 
10

Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft led the Chinese to 

develop new expectations for PLA missions. 

Even more importantly, China’s economic development was going global. As a result, China saw the 

need to protect its expanding interests and resource 

supply lines. In this changing strategic environment, 

Chinese leaders started to prepare a new mission for the 

PLA. In December 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao 

carefully articulated the new mission for the PLA in 

the 21st century. Hu’s call was later codified in China’s 

2006 National Defense White Paper (NDWP), reaffirmed 

in the Chinese Communist Party's constitution in 

November 2007, and reissued in the 2008 NDWP. Thus 

in addition to the traditional duties, i.e., upholding 

national security and unity, the PLA is now tasked 

with the following:

Providing an important source of strength for 

consolidating the ruling position of the CCP, providing 

a solid security guarantee for sustaining the important 

period of strategic opportunity for national development, 

providing a strong strategic support for safeguarding 

national interests, and playing a major role in maintaining 

world peace and promoting common development.13

This new mission reflects several developments 

in Beijing’s conception of its national interests and 

the principles upon which China expects to advance 

its interests. First, China defines its national interests 

in the order of survival, security, and development. 

While China still has work to do to lift a large portion 

of its 1.4 billion people out of poverty, its pursuit of 

development has gained greater significance. 

Second, China’s national interests have already 

expanded beyond its geographic borders—in the words 

of an important PLA Daily editorial, China’s national 

interests are spreading everywhere in the world, into 
11

the open seas, outer space, and even into cyber space. 

In China’s national security vocabulary, one can now 

find new terms such as “high frontier,” “space power,” 

and the “fifth-dimension battleground.”14

Third, China claims that the 20th century was 

one characterized by war and confrontation whereas 

the 21st century will be one of competition and 

marginalization. All nations, especially great powers, 

must therefore seize strategic opportunities and 

make development their top national priority or face 

marginalization. China tasks its military to ensure 

that China’s pursuit of such opportunities will not be 

compromised by internal or external interference.

Finally, China accepts that its expanding global 

interests will eventually come into conflict with those 

of other nations, and that its military must be prepared 

to come to the defense of these expanding national 

interests. For that matter, many of China’s new global 

interests require a powerful military foundation. So 

long as China believes it must have a military force 

commensurate with its rising international status, 

the missions of the PLA will follow the development 

of China’s national interests wherever they go.15 This 

new mission set is truly revolutionary. However, as we 

will see, China may not have fully thought through the 

challenges and complexities the PLA will encounter in 

the process of carrying out these new missions. 

Taiwan and the Future Direction of the PLA.

The year 2008 witnessed changes in national 

leadership in many Asian-Pacific nations. New faces 

appeared in Japan, mainland China, Taiwan, South 

Korea, Russia, Thailand, and the United States, among 

others. These changes brought new dynamics to the 

region, two of which are especially significant. The first 
12

is the changing of the guard in Japan and the warming 

of relations between Japan and China. Japanese Prime 

Ministers Shinzo Abe and Yasuo Fukuda initiated 

what the Chinese called an “ice-breaking” journey 

to Beijing designed to move beyond the cold and 

contentious relations between the two nations under 

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001-06). China 

responded with an “ice-melting” visit to Tokyo by 

Premier Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jintao. These 

high-level efforts began to improve relations between 

two nations often characterized as “hot in economic 

relations but cold in political aspects,”16 and to allow 

the leaders of these two Asian giants to address, on 

more cordial terms, bilateral issues stemming from the 

“burden of history” to territorial disputes in the East 

China Sea, among many others.

The other significant change came from Taiwan 

in March 2008, when the Taiwanese people voted 

the pro-Taiwan independence party, the Democratic 

Progressive Party (DPP), out of office. The previous 

ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), regained control 

of the ROC government. The ROC Legislative Yuan is 

also under KMT control, thanks to its landslide victory 

in December 2007. Riding this momentum, President 

Ma Ying-jeou set his agenda for a change in cross-Strait 

relations, characterized by three components: a peace 

agreement with the PRC, a revitalization of Taiwan’s 

economy, and an expansion of Taiwan’s international 

space. 

As a start, Ma answered PRC President Hu Jintao’s 

call on October 15, 2007 that the two sides negotiate 

an end to hostility and establish a peace agreement. 

Specifically, Ma agreed that the two sides return to 

the so-called “1992 consensus” in which the two sides 

agreed on a “one China” policy, but disagreed on its 

definition and political content, and start the process 
13

of reconciliation.17 Upon taking office on May 20, 2008, 

Ma immediately pushed for the opening of direct 

commercial flights between Taiwan and mainland 

China, easing restrictions on Taiwan-China economic 

exchanges, allowing Taiwan to take advantage of 

China’s booming economy, and allowing mainland 

Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan, a multibillion (USD) 

business and a service market for more than 40,000 

jobs. 

In June and November 2008, the ROC Straits 

Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the PRC Association 

for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) 

convened historic meetings in Beijing and Taipei, 

respectively. The SEF and ARATS are two “unofficial 

agencies” created in the early 1990s, designed to 

handle rapidly increasing cross-Strait people-topeople issues, and intended to function until the PRC 

and ROC governments can open direct dialogue and 

negotiations. However, their contact was suspended 

after the Taiwan Strait crisis and under the Chen Shuibian administration for the last 8 years. Now that they 

are active again, the heads of these agencies signed 

pacts to implement Ma’s initiatives. 

With these positive turns in cross-Strait relations, 

tensions have been greatly reduced. In the coming 

years, Ma Ying-jeou promises to maintain the “Three 

No’s” (no unification, no Taiwan independence, and no 

mainland China use of force), and continue to promote 

Taiwan’s international space. Beijing appears to have 

acquiesced to these principles for the time being. For 

their part, PRC leaders are confident that the growth in 

direct links will bring about a virtual unification between 

the two sides that future ROC administrations will not 

be able to undo. China also feels more comfortable that 

its military deterrent developed over the last 15 years 
14

can effectively prevent Taiwan from challenging the 

status quo. With Taiwan dropping lower on the list 

of international flashpoints, the PLA may be able to 

refocus its attention on missions other than Taiwan. 

In his chapter to this volume, “How China Manages 

Taiwan and Its Impact on PLA Missions,” Andrew 

Scobell considers this critical relationship between the 

future trajectory of the Taiwan issue and the continuing 

evolution of the missions of the PLA, arguing that 

the two critical variables are whether or not Taiwan 

is “resolved” and whether a future resolution was 

achieved with or without conflict. He thus suggests a 

basic framework of analysis for the following chapters 

to consider. As we will see, the authors of papers 

presented at the 2008 PLA Conference took China’s 

new missions to task, with each taking on an issue 

related to the prospects or difficulties the PLA will 

encounter in pursuing its expanding missions. 

New Missions, New Battlefields.

Events over the past year, including severe winter 

snowstorms, the Sichuan earthquake, unrest in Tibet 

and Xinjiang, the Beijing Olympics, and continued 

conflict in Sudan, have seen the Chinese armed forces 

involved in a wide variety of missions. While not all of 

these missions are new, the depth of PLA involvement 

in so many different kinds of activities, including 

frontier security, peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief 

efforts, as well as traditional internal security roles, 

has brought into stark relief the gaps between PLA 

missions, current capabilities, and existing operational 

doctrines.

In the realm of peacekeeping operations (PKO), 

authors Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang argue that 
15

China has made a conscious effort to participate much 

more deeply in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping 

operations around the world, increasing its contribution 

of peacekeepers 20-fold since the 1990s. In their chapter, 

“China’s Expanding Presence in UN Peacekeeping 

Operations and Implications for the United States,” 

they show that the PRC is now the 12th largest 

contributor of peacekeeping personnel overall and the 

second largest contributor of civilian police. Although 

Chinese peacekeepers serve in UN PKO around the 

world, three-quarters of them are concentrated in 

Africa, and the majority of those in Liberia and Sudan. 

The four main drivers of China’s increased PKO efforts 

include, first, the desire to gain international stature 

and reassure uneasy neighbors about its peaceful rise; 

second, to contribute to the stabilization of areas of 

conflict, especially those affecting Chinese national 

interests; third, to use its PKO efforts to balance what 

it sees as overly strong U.S. and Western influence in 

international security organizations; and finally, to 

gain benefits for its own modernization efforts through 

increased operational and cultural experience. In some 

cases, China also seeks specific diplomatic gains vis-àvis international recognition of Taiwan, and economic 

benefits, especially access to energy resources and raw 

materials.

However, China remains constrained in its 

PKO efforts philosophically by its principle of 

nonintervention in other states’ sovereign affairs, and 

geographically by its wariness of becoming involved in 

PKO operations close to home or outside a UN mandate. 

Moreover, PKO operations can become dangerous and 

messy, and the question remains how China would 

react to a major fatality incident involving Chinese 

peacekeepers. To date China has been less involved 
16

in humanitarian relief missions than in peacekeeping 

ones, in part because of a lack of necessary capabilities 

such as heavy lift; however China has taken note of the 

goodwill accumulating to the United States in the wake 

of its tsunami relief efforts in the region and is currently 

pursuing relevant capabilities such as a hospital ship.

In addition to new functional missions, the PLA 

is also putting increasing resources into new fields of 

battle such as outer space and cyberspace. As Dean 

Cheng shows in his chapter, “Prospects for China’s 

Military Space Efforts,” China is already an important 

space power with the ability to design and produce 

its own satellites and launch systems. Several recent 

firsts, such as its downing of a defunct satellite and 

first manned space walk, have emphasized this, as well 

as raised questions about China’s strategic goals in 

space and willingness to follow existing international 

norms. As early as 2002, outer space was already being 

described in Chinese sources as becoming part of the 

global battlefield, and in 2004 Chinese President Hu 

Jintao underlined the importance of outer space to the 

future of the PLA. In Chinese thinking, the concept of 

outer space dominance is closely tied to information 

dominance, which it sees as key to operational success 

against more conventionally powerful foes. Outer space 

is potentially unique from more traditional battlefields 

in other ways as well, including that whoever moves 

first would seem to have the advantage, and that there 

are both “hard kill” (i.e., destroying hardware) and 

“soft kill” (i.e., electronic jamming) options available. 

In this as in other PLA missions beyond Taiwan, it is 

less clear whether China has a specific military space 

doctrine to go along with its rapidly developing 

capabilities, though there is some evidence that there 

may be greater willingness to use space deterrence 
17

capabilities compared to traditional deterrence because 

of the perceived lower risks. 

Computer network operations (CNO) is another 

expanding mission for the PLA that has received a lot 

of attention in recent years with the rise in reports of 

Chinese hacking incidents. However, one thing that 

has become clear is that from the perspective of the 

Chinese government, “patriotic hacking” by Chinese 

civilians is not entirely good, as the “noise” from large 

scale cyber attacks can actually undermine military 

objectives such as signaling and strategic pausing. 

In recent years the Chinese government has sought 

to guide such “patriotic hackers” through opinion 

pieces in government news outlets. Nonetheless, as 

James Mulvenon reminds us in his chapter, “PLA 

Computer Network Operations: Scenarios, Doctrine, 

Organizations, and Capability,” it remains unclear 

to what degree the PLA operates its own hacking 

capability and where within the PLA the cyber attack 

“actor” is located. Also opaque is whether CNO has 

been fully integrated into the PLA operationally and 

doctrinally.

Portable Capabilities, Stationary Doctrine.

As the PLA retools for these new missions and 

battlefields, one constraint is the continuing lag 

between the development of new capabilities and 

the attendant military doctrines to guide their use 

and integration. Thus, some suggest the PLA might 

be investing in cyber or space assets before they have 

necessarily thought through how to use or integrate 

these capabilities into the larger force or PLA strategy. 

As Brad Roberts reminds us in his chapter, “Strategic 

Deterrence beyond Taiwan,” it is clear from the arrival 
18

of previous PLA capabilities, such as short-range 

ballistic missiles (SRBMs), that operational doctrine 

often substantially lags (and certainly does not inhibit) 

the development and deployment of a new military 

capability. 

The lack of clear doctrinal guidance is exacerbated 

by the concern that many of the capabilities under 

development are potentially “portable,” meaning that 

while created for use under one scenario or mission 

they might easily be used in service of another. For 

example, amphibious landing craft originally acquired 

for a Taiwan contingency might be used in any number 

of other maritime scenarios; similarly, space and 

cyberspace assets developed for civilian needs could 

be used to disrupt an enemy’s command and control 

capabilities during the opening phases of a military 

conflict. The lack of clear strategic guidelines for when 

and how such “portable” PLA capabilities would be 

employed, especially in the type of complex “joint 

contingencies” outlined in Larry Wortzel’s chapter, 

“PLA ‘Joint’ Operational Contingencies in South Asia, 

Central Asia, and Korea,” leads to increased concern 

over PLA modernization efforts more generally. 

This is particularly true in China’s development of 

technologies potentially useful in sea control and 

access denial, subjects Mark Cozad discusses at length 

in his chapter, “China’s Regional Power Projection: 

Prospects for Future Missions in the South and East 

China Seas.”

A final critical piece of the nexus between PLA 

capabilities and doctrine in considering missions other 

than Taiwan is the poorly understood relationship 

between China’s civilian and military leadership, and 

how the PLA itself views new missions. Does the PLA 

primarily view missions such as UN peacekeeping 
19

operations as an opportunity to gain access, assets, and 

operational experience, or as a distraction from its core 

national security mission? This question is complicated 

by the fact that different services within the PLA 

might benefit from the inclusion of different missions 

and capabilities; likewise it remains unclear to what 

degree PLA elites are shaping PLA modernization 

priorities and strategic thinking vis-à-vis their civilian 

counterparts. 

Frontier Dilemmas.

Many of the PLA’s missions and fields of battle 

other than Taiwan involve China’s frontiers, broadly 

defined. This is important because the areas of instability 

of greatest concern to China are often found along its 

own borders, from weak Central Asian states, to rogue 

regimes in Myanmar (Burma) and North Korea, to 

contentious areas in the East and South China Seas. In 

his chapter, “PLA Missions in Frontier Security and 

Counterterrorism,” Robert Modarelli argues that the 

challenges of maintaining security and stability in its 

frontier regions pose several uniquely difficult issues 

for the Chinese government and the PLA. Not least of 

these is that China seeks ways to encourage stability 

and economic development on its doorstep while still 

adhering to its central doctrine of nonintervention 

in the affairs of other sovereign states. The PLA is 

particularly challenged by states that exercise less than 

full sovereignty over their own territory and people, as 

well as by nontraditional spaces in which the concept 

of sovereignty is less fully developed (air, space, 

cyber). Another frontier dilemma confronting the PLA 

is that the very same activities in which it engages in 

pursuit of stability and security, such as infrastructure 
20

development and a heavy security presence, are also 

those that can contribute to increasing problems on 

its borders such as illicit trade and public discontent 

among minority populations. 

Finally, there remains a great reticence to use the 

PLA in matters of border or internal security, despite 

its many and increasingly relevant capabilities. This is 

partly as a result of the scars of Tiananmen, as well 

as China’s desire to develop a more professional force 

able to focus on power projection and war fighting 

contingencies. As Murray Scot Tanner shows in his 

chapter, “How China Manages Internal Security 

Challenges and Its Impact on PLA Missions,” this 

doctrinal shift over the last decade was illustrated by 

the relatively minor and surreptitious role played by 

the PLA during the unrest in Tibet. For example, the 

shortages of manpower and leadership during the 

crisis were partly a result of this change in mindset 

and the continued strategic ambiguity about the use 

of the PLA in cases of domestic unrest. The resolution 

of this dilemma surrounding the minimal use of the 

PLA in support of what is supposedly its most central 

mission, and its differing employment in the Southeast 

and Western frontier of China, remains critical to any 

understanding of potential PLA missions beyond the 

Strait. 

China and the Future of the PLA.

It is often said that one’s intentions are proportional 

to one’s capabilities. Great powers by nature place 

greater demand on the international system and play 

a greater role in world politics. The PLA’s expanding 

missions show that 21st century China is no exception 

to this rule. 
21

China has developed. Its economy and 

comprehensive national power have expanded. Its 

economic, political, cultural, and military interests 

now reach every corner of the world, and in so doing 

constitute new frontiers for China’s national interests. 

China is proud of its accomplishments and does 

not hesitate to tell the world that it will protect and 

defend its national interests at home and abroad with a 

strong military power.18 But while few would dispute 

a nation’s right to develop and defend its national 

interests, the world is anxious to see how China 

carries out this defense. There are two broad questions 

confronting China and the PLA: one is philosophical, 

the other more practical.

At a philosophical level, Chinese leaders have long 

held that China is a peace-loving nation, that it values 

harmony over conflict, and that China has always been 

on the defensive side in its use of force.19 China has 

also criticized the West and the United States for their 

“hegemonic” approach to international politics and 

claimed that China would never pursue a similar path. 

These claims, however, beg many questions. Why 

do Chinese assert that China is inherently peaceful? 

China has no less warfare in its history than that of the 

West, so why is harmony the most dominant theme 

in China’s approach to international affairs?20 China is 

not a superpower today, but who is to guarantee that 

if China were to become one, it would act differently 

from how the United States has conducted itself in 

international affairs? Or put differently, is there really 

a “Chinese way” of international affairs?

At a practical level, Chinese leaders claim that 

“history has proven time and again that using force 

to advance national interest has come to a dead end; 

and China will not go down this path again.”21 They 
22

may be right about this claim. However, how does 

China expect the PLA to carry out its new missions 

in the new century without the use of force? Some 

PLA thinkers propose that China develop a “strategic 

deterrence force (战略威慑力量)” to provide a security 

guarantee for the development and defense of China’s 

national interests,22 such as the nuclear deterrence, 

space capabilities, and info-cyber capabilities discussed 

in this book. Others suggest that China work within 

the UN framework and use force only under UN 

mandate.23 These might be steps in the right direction, 

but China will soon find many operational problems as 

they develop the doctrine that would guide how they 

execute these missions. 

A more practical issue confronting China and the 

PLA is how they come to terms with the global military 

and security arrangements of the United States. China’s 

desire and efforts to develop sea, air, and space power 

have all run into this obstacle. At the present, many 

Chinese analysts argue that China’s efforts in these 

areas are in the service of China’s sovereign interests 

and security, and not attempts to challenge U.S. global 

(and hegemonic) positions.24 In addition, Chinese also 

argue that the force capabilities of the PLA will be 

limited for a long time to come and that China does not 

pose any serious threat to the United States. Indeed, 

PLA capabilities in most dimensions are assessed 

to be well behind those of the United States. Finally, 

Chinese leaders argue that in their effort to pursue a 

“peaceful rise,” they can develop appropriate policies 

to avoid the collision of vital interests between the two 

nations.25 While these arguments may be reassuring at 

the moment, there is no guarantee that China’s rapidly 

growing national interests and capabilities will not 

change China’s intentions in the future. 
23

For the United States, the PLA’s pursuit of missions 

other than Taiwan could be a positive development. 

For instance, the PLA’s participation in international 

security affairs (at this point largely limited to UN 

peacekeeping missions, but soon to expand with the 

deployment of a PLA Navy task group to assist in 

anti-piracy efforts off the African coast of Somalia) can 

serve as a means of burden-sharing with the United 

States. With its global military presence, the United 

States has been in essence providing security to the 

international community; China could share the cost of 

this global good by providing manpower and financial 

support, as well as bearing some of the international 

resentment about great-power intervention in regional 

affairs. Welcoming the PLA into international security 

affairs also provides the international community the 

opportunity to encourage the PLA to adapt global 

norms of behavior and play by generally accepted 

international rules. Through direct engagement with 

the PLA on issues of international security, the United 

States has the opportunity to prod China to become 

more transparent and cooperative, especially as 

regards the PLA’s growing roster of missions beyond 

the Strait. 

However, at another level, the development of PLA 

missions beyond Taiwan can have the opposite effect, 

particularly if the PLA undertakes missions deleterious 

to U.S. interests. Here the peacetime development 

of space and cyber capabilities might prove most 

troublesome. Additionally, the potential for the use of 

PLA forces to shore up bad actors on the international 

scene remains a potential outcome that concerns U.S. 

analysts. This volume looks at all of these dimensions 

as we seek to better understand Beyond the Strait: PLA 

Missions Other Than Taiwan.
24

CHAPTER 1 - ENDNOTES

1. For full text, please see the report at www.china.org.cn/

english/features/book/194485.htm.

2. Deng Xiaoping, “Speech at an Enlarged Meeting of the 

Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist 

Party, June 4, 1985,” Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. III (1982-

1992), Beijing, China: People’s Daily Online.

3. Modernization of China has been an aspiration for 

generations of Chinese leaders since China suffered from Western 

invasion in the 1840s and especially since the fall of China’s last 

dynasty, the Qing, in 1911. Unification with Taiwan is an added 

mission since the division of China between the mainland and 

Taiwan in 1949. But it was Deng Xiaoping who articulated these 

three missions in the early 1980s. See Deng’s opening remarks to 

the CCP 12th National Convention, September 1, 1982, in Selected 

Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3, Article 1, Beijing, China: Ren-min 

Chu-ban She, 1993. Deng Xiaoping initially calls it “Three Major 

Tasks (三大任务),” but Chinese leaders use the words “tasks (

任务)” and “missions (使命)” interchangeably. We use the term 

“mission” in this book.

4. When the United States recognized the PRC government in 

1979, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to define 

U.S. relations with Taiwan. The TRA declares that peace and 

stability in the Western Pacific is a vital interest of the United States; 

any use of force to change the status of Taiwan will be of grave 

concern to the United States; and the United States maintains the 

capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that 

would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, 

of the people on Taiwan.

5. The Chinese president, premier, and other senior officials 

repeatedly conveyed this view to the international community, 

especially the United States. Yan Xuetong is probably the most 

outspoken Chinese policy analyst in advocating unification 

with Taiwan at all costs. Yan believes that this is the only way 

to convince the pro-Taiwan independence folks and the United 

States that China means business. See Yan, “A Cost-Benefit 
25

Analysis of Using Force to Prevent Taiwan Pro-Independence 

Advocates from Seeking Taiwan de jure Independence,” Zhan-lue 

Yu Guan-li (Strategy and Management), Beijing, China, No. 3, 2004.

6. There are numerous writings about the Taiwan issue. For a 

good read, see Martin L. Lasater, The Taiwan Conundrum, Boulder, 

CO: Westview Press, 1999; and Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: 

Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait, Washington DC: Brookings 

Institution Press, 2006.

7. SIPRI Yearbooks, 1992 to 2008. 

8. See Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, eds., RightSizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s 

Military, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, 2007, for more analysis.

9. See Roy Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell, and Travis Tanner 

eds., The “People” in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education 

in China’s Military, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, 2008, for the PLA’s investment in this area.

10. See David L. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: 

Progress, Problems, and Prospects, Berkeley: University of California 

Press, 2004.

11. The original writings about power transition and 

hegemonic war come from A. F. K. Organski’s work, World 

Politics, New York: Alfred a. Knopf, 1958; and Robert Gilpin’s 

War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, United Kingdom: 

Cambridge University Press, 1981. Numerous writings have 

emerged since the mid-1990s to analyze certain aspects of power 

transition between China and the United States. Steve Chan’s 

recent work is perhaps the only lone voice to cast some doubts 

on this issue. See Chan, China, the U.S. and the Power-Transition 

Theory: a Critique, London, United Kingdom: Routledge, 2008.

12. See, for example, Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military 

Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March, Cambridge, United 

Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003, chapters 5 and 7. 

13. From China’s 2006 National Defense White Paper.
26

14. Editorial, “On the PLA’s Historical Mission in the New 

Stage of the New Century,” Jiefangjun Bao (PLA Newspaper) 

January 9, 2006.

15. Numerous publications by PLA writers celebrate this new 

mission. The afore-mentioned editorial by the PLA mouthpiece 

newspaper, Jiefangjun Bao, provides perhaps the most authoritative 

expansion of the thoughts behind the new mission. 

16. See Wu Jinan, "The Importance of Sino-Japanese Relations 

in China's National Security Strategy," Guoji Wenti Luntan 

(International Issues Forum), Shanghai, Issue 1, 2003.

17. The idea of a peace agreement between China and Taiwan 

first came from Kenneth Lieberthal, a noted China observer and 

one-time Senior Director for Asia on President Clinton’s National 

Security Council staff. Lieberthal proposes that the two sides sign 

a 20-to-30-year “agreed framework” in which China would pledge 

not to use force to threaten Taiwan, and Taiwan, for its part, would 

pledge not to seek formal independence; and it was thought that 

the passage of time would minimize differences between the 

two sides. Kenneth Lieberthal, “Preventing a War over Taiwan,” 

Foreign Affairs, March/April 2005. Since his inauguration, Ma 

Ying-jeou and Hu Jintao have exchanged goodwill across the 

Taiwan Strait in line with such an agreed framework. If they can 

reach this agreement, Hu and Ma might be considered for the 

Nobel Peace Prize. Indeed, a peace agreement may not even be 

necessary to win a Nobel. For instance, Kim Dae-jung of South 

Korea won one in 2000 for going to Pyongyang and holding a 

historic summit with North Korea’s Kim Jong-il. 

18. See China’s 2006 National Defense White Paper; the PLA Daily

editorial cited earlier; and Li Huaixin, PLA Senior Colonel and 

Professor of the PLA Logistics and Command College, “China’s 

Peaceful Development and the PLA’s Historical Mission,” Junshi 

Jingji Yanjiu (Military Economics Studies), No. 8, 2006.

19. See Lieutenant General Li Jijun, Traditional Military Thinking 

and the Defensive Strategy of China, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1997. For a critical analysis of 

this set of beliefs, see Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, chap. 

2.
27

20. According to a PLA research task force, China has 

witnessed 3,766 wars from the Xia Dynasty of about 2200 B.C. to 

the fall of the last dynasty, Qing, in the early 1900s, averaging 

more than one war per year. See Chinese Military History Task 

Group, Zhongguo li dai zhan zheng nian biao (Chronology of Warfare 

in Chinese History), Beijing, China: PLA Publishing House, 2003. 

21. Author’s note from speech by senior PLA officials at the 

Second PLA Xiangshan Forum, International Security Cooperation 

and Asia-Pacific Security, Beijing, China, October 23-26, 2008.

22. PLA Daily editorial, “On the Military’s New Mission in the 

New Century,” January 9, 2006. Also see Luo Yabo, “A Scientific 

Interpretation of the PLA’s New Mission in the New Century,” 军

队政工理论研究 (Theoretical Studies on PLA Political Work), Vol. 6, 

No. 3, June 2005. 

23. Author’s note from discussion points by senior PLA 

officers at the Second PLA Xiangshan Forum, International 

Security Cooperation and Asia-Pacific Security, Beijing, China, 

October 23-26, 2008.

24. See Zhang Wenmu, “On China’s Sea Power,” Journal of 

Ocean University of China, No. 6, 2004; Ye Zicheng and Mu Xinhai, 

“Several Thoughts about China’s Sea Power Development 

Strategy,” Studies of International Politics, Issue 3, August 2005. 

Perhaps the most noted views are from Liu Zhongmin. See his 

writings, “Thoughts on Sea Power and the Rise and Fall of Great 

Powers,” World Economy and Politics, Issue 12, 2007; “Sea Power 

in the Theory of Geopolitics, I, II, and III,” Ocean World; “Sea 

Power and US-China Relations,” Ocean World; and Wang Jisi, “US 

Hegemony and China’s Rise,” Foreign Affairs Review, Issue 10, 

October 2005.

25. See particularly Liu Zhongmin, “Some Thoughts on Sea 

Power and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers,” World Economy 

and Politics, Issue 12, 2007; Zheng Bijian, “China’s New Path of 

Development and Peaceful Rise,” Speech at the 30th Annual 

World Forum, Lake Como, Italy; Xuexi Shibao, Beijing, China, 

November 22, 2004.

29

CHAPTER 2

HOW CHINA MANAGES TAIWAN

AND ITS IMPACT ON PLA MISSIONS

Andrew Scobell

Introduction.

This volume examines possible People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) missions “beyond Taiwan.” The use of 

the term “beyond Taiwan” is not meant to imply that 

Taiwan’s status has been resolved in Beijing’s eyes—

let alone resolved to its satisfaction. Rather, the intent 

is to explore future PLA missions other than Taiwan.1

Nevertheless, as one explores possible military missions 

“beyond Taiwan,” an important factor determining 

the future trajectory of the PLA is how China deals 

with the island. Rather than directly influencing the 

kinds of missions identified, or the weapon systems 

and training China’s military adopts, how Beijing 

manages Taipei will most directly impact the political 

environment in which fundamental decisions about 

Chinese defense policy are made. Indeed, how China 

handles the Taiwan issue will inevitably affect not just 

the kind of national defense policy China adopts but 

also how China deals with almost every other issue—

foreign and domestic. Therefore, it seems only prudent 

to take some time to consider this topic.

Two critical dimensions in how China manages 

Taiwan are (1) whether or not the issue is resolved, 

and (2) whether or not military force is used to attempt 

a resolution. The word “resolution” is preferred over 

“unification” because the former term is broader and 

could encompass a wide range of alternatives that in the 
30

future might be acceptable outcomes to Beijing. It may 

be useful to examine how China manages Taiwan by 

constructing a 2 x 2 matrix depicting the four possible 

combinations of the two variables (see Figure One). 

Each cell represents a distinct future scenario. Cell 

A represents a scenario in which there is no military 

conflict and no political resolution. Cell B represents 

a scenario in which there is no conflict but the Taiwan 

issue is resolved. Cell C represents a scenario in which 

there is a military conflict but the Taiwan issue is not 

resolved. Cell D represents a scenario in which there is 

conflict with resolution of the Taiwan issue.

Figure 1. How China Manages Taiwan.

Because of the centrality of the Taiwan issue to 

both Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy—

including China’s relations with the United States—

and the enormous sensitivity of the matter to Chinese 

elites and common people, there is a considerable 

literature on the subject. Most relevant to this chapter 

No Resolution

No Conflict Conflict

Resolution
31

are previous works that explore various Taiwan 

scenarios and their larger implications.2

Cell A: No Conflict, No Resolution.

In this scenario, the status quo in the Taiwan Strait 

persists. In other words, while positive economic 

trends would continue, mutual distrust and suspicion 

would also persist. Thus no real progress would be 

made on the political resolution of the Taiwan issue 

in Beijing’s eyes. While no military conflict would 

erupt, both China and Taiwan would feel it necessary 

to build up defense capabilities to counter or deter 

those of the other. Economic and social interaction 

across the Taiwan Strait would continue, but this 

interaction would probably fluctuate according to 

cyclical economic trends and the ebb and flow of 

political strains. Although the PLA would be expected 

to manage other responsibilities and to take on other 

missions, its primary warfighting scenario would be 

centered on the Taiwan Strait.

Cell B: Resolution without Conflict.

In this scenario, the positive trends in the Taiwan 

Strait would continue. Cross-Strait economic ties 

would continue and deepen—trade, investment, 

and transportation links would expand and 

become increasingly direct, relying less and less 

on transshipment and transportation hubs such as 

Hong Kong. Contacts between political leaders on 

both sides of the Strait would continue and become 

routine—evident in particular since the election of Ma 

Ying-jeou to Taiwan’s highest office in March 2008. 

In this scenario, resolution is not so much thought of 
32

as an outcome as it is a process. A formal or informal 

agreement between Beijing and Taipei on political 

unification would not necessarily be the defining 

condition. Rather, improved and closer ties between 

individual political leaders and institutions would 

naturally and inexorably draw the two sides together 

in webs of cooperation and collaboration. If both sides 

found these incremental steps acceptable and mutually 

beneficial then unification would happen almost 

imperceptibly—by stealth.

In this scenario, PLA forces would probably not be 

stationed on Taiwan, although increasing cooperation 

and coordination might eventually mean that PLA 

liaison officers would be posted to various commands 

on the island and vice versa. This cooperation and 

coordination would likely include combined exercises 

in search and rescue, counterterrorism, and antipiracy operations. A significant volume of exchanges 

would occur, and officers might attend institutions of 

professional military education on the other side of the 

Strait.

The PLA would truly begin to move beyond 

thinking and planning for a Taiwan scenario. Moreover, 

the PLA would also begin to think of Taiwan’s military 

as a partner in various roles and missions—especially 

those involving naval forces.

Cell C: Conflict without Resolution.

In this scenario, no resolution refers to any outcome 

that would NOT be acceptable to China. Any conflict 

outcome that resulted in de jure Taiwan independence 

would certainly be deemed unacceptable.

A key assumption here is that in a conflict in which 

China failed to achieve an acceptable outcome over 
33

Taiwan, the United States would be involved and 

U.S. military intervention would have been a decisive 

factor—probably the decisive factor—in thwarting a 

successful Chinese military operation. Implicit in the 

assumption is direct combat operations between the 

PLA and the armed forces of the United States—likely 

between the air and naval arms of each military. Losses 

to Chinese forces would likely be considerable both in 

terms of casualties and weapon systems destroyed or 

disabled. Losses to U.S. forces would likely be more 

limited but significant nevertheless.

It is likely—but by no means certain—that in a 

conflict between Chinese and U.S. forces over Taiwan 

both sides would strive to exert escalation control over 

the conflict both horizontally and vertically. From 

China’s perspective, the stakes in a military conflict 

over Taiwan would be quite high, and Beijing might be 

willing—or feel itself forced—to gamble that controlled 

escalation would be possible. In other words, China’s 

leaders might convince themselves that if they upped 

the ante, the United States might back down.3

 At the 

very least, Beijing might gamble that Washington 

would simply respond with controlled escalation of its 

own.

Whatever the level of escalation on each side, 

at some point both sides would probably either 

voluntarily or out of necessity reach a juncture in the 

conflict where they would suspend combat operations. 

This would either be though some kind of ceasefire 

or informal understanding. Of course, the degree of 

destruction or devastation wrought by each side on 

the other would determine the level of impact on each 

country (e.g., how much of the PLA was destroyed and 

how much of China’s infrastructure or economic assets 

were destroyed).
34

In any case, the outcome would be a “major shock” 

in both terms of China’s position in the Asia-Pacific 

region and in its relations with the United States. 

Beijing’s standing in other capitals around the region 

and around the world would likely be seriously 

damaged. Moreover, hostilities would probably lead 

to a new cold war between Washington and Beijing. 

It is likely that the United States would station at least 

token military forces on the island and perhaps even 

formalize a security agreement or defense treaty with 

Taiwan. As a result, China would harbor significant 

animosity and resentment toward the United States 

that would not soon dissipate. The United States 

would likely begin a serious and accelerated defense 

modernization program. China would likely lick its 

wounds and immediately begin to rebuild its military 

in a rapid and sustained manner at a rate much higher 

that the double digit annual increases in the defense 

budget during the last 2 decades. 

At the same time, the economies of both countries 

would suffer major shocks. Traditional trade patterns 

and investment flows would be disrupted, and it would 

take time for these to find new equilibria. Regional and 

even global economic activity would also be jolted, and 

the geopolitical map of the Asia-Pacific would also be 

altered as countries were forced to align with China or 

the United States.

In the event of a conflict without resolution scenario, 

a primary assumption is that China would NEVER 

accept the outcome. Moreover, the Chinese people 

might express dissatisfaction with their government’s 

handling of the Taiwan issue. The result would be 

an angry and disaffected country that would harbor 

a serious grudge against the United States and other 

countries deemed to have assisted the United States 
35

during the hostilities and/or sided with Washington 

against Beijing afterwards.

Cell D: Conflict with Resolution.

In this scenario, resolution refers only to a solution 

that is agreeable to China. The logic behind the 

assumption is that for the Taiwan issue to be resolved 

once and for all, the outcome must be satisfactory 

to Beijing. If China does not consider a situation 

satisfactory, then it is not going to be truly resolved 

because China will never accept this as the “final” 

outcome.

Another assumption in this scenario is that there 

would be no U.S. military involvement or at least only 

minor involvement. The logic behind this assumption 

is that China could only be successful in a military 

conflict over Taiwan if the United States did not 

intervene. Under what circumstances would there 

not be any U.S. involvement? There seem to be two 

possibilities. First, Taiwan does something that the 

United States deemed excessively provocative and 

irresponsible. As a result, Washington informs Taipei 

that it can expect no U.S. help. Second, China launches 

a lightning military operation that swiftly subdues 

Taiwan before the United States had time to react. 

In this scenario, China and the PLA could truly 

move beyond Taiwan in terms of thinking, planning, 

and preparing for future military roles and missions. Of 

course, the outcome would likely reverberate around 

the Asia-Pacific as governments came to terms with it. 

The seizure of Taiwan would create a “minor shock” 

that would require adjustments by China as well as 

other countries. There would likely be some fallout 

in terms of at least some condemnation. However, 
36

it is possible that this might be minimal especially if 

the military campaign was limited to the area of the 

Taiwan Strait and resulted in very little loss of life and 

destruction of infrastructure. 

Economic sanctions might be token and for a 

limited period of time. Especially, if Beijing moved 

promptly and conciliatorily, economic damage might 

be limited. There might be some adverse effect on 

China’s economy from skittish foreign investors and 

trading partners. However, this would probably be 

temporary and would very possibly be offset by the 

patriotic euphoria among Chinese citizens over the 

sudden and dramatic realization of a long cherished 

dream. International trade and investment would at 

least take a modest hit because there would be fallout 

felt in Taiwan’s stock market and foreign trade. There 

would also be some capital flight from the island. The 

extent of the shock would depend whether or not there 

was continued resistance to China’s rule either in the 

form of guerilla warfare and/or civil disobedience. It 

is an open question as to whether or not the Taiwanese 

people might be fatalistic and receptive to their new 

political masters (if grudgingly and gradually).

In this scenario, it is likely that China would station 

at least modest numbers of military personnel on the 

island indefinitely. If China used the Hong Kong model, 

the PLA garrison would probably be virtually invisible 

to the island’s populace, especially if the people did not 

engage in widespread or prolonged resistance to the 

new occupiers. If China used the Tibet model, sizeable 

concentrations of security forces would remain visible 

for extended periods of time. Moreover, if Taiwanese 

engaged in widespread or prolonged resistance, 

then this would require a far more substantial troop 

presence on the island.
37

Back on the mainland, the Chinese Communist Party 

would enjoy at least a temporary boost in popularity 

for having realized unification. And the PLA would 

enjoy a significant boost in its status as well as in troop 

morale.

Conclusion.

How China manages Taiwan will affect the future 

trajectories of China and the PLA. Taiwan is perhaps 

the most critical issue in determining whether or not 

China’s rise will continue to be peaceful. If the issue 

is resolved, then China and the PLA can truly move 

“beyond Taiwan” in preparing for future roles and 

missions. If the issue remains unresolved, although the 

PLA can prepare other roles and missions, it must also 

remain prepared for a Taiwan scenario. If military force 

is used, the PLA will react and learn relatively quickly 

on the basis of whether the conflict was successful and 

to what degree it was successful or not. If military force 

is not used, the PLA’s trajectory is likely to evolve in a 

more gradual manner.

CHAPTER 2 - ENDNOTES

1. Use of term “beyond Taiwan” is therefore consistent with 

this term’s usage in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military 

Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008 Annual Report to 

Congress, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008, pp. 29-

30.

2. See, for example, Roger Cliff and David A. Shlapak, U.S.-

China Relations After Resolution of Taiwan’s Status, Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND, 2007; Steve Tsang, ed., If China Attacks Taiwan: 

Military Strategy, Politics, and Economics, New York: Routledge, 

2006; Andrew Scobell, ed., The Costs of Conflict: The Impact on China 

of a Future War, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 2001.
38

3. Chinese elites, especially soldiers, tend to believe that where 

Taiwan is concerned, their country possesses an “asymmetry of 

motivation” which can be leveraged against the United States. 

In other words, China’s “will to fight” is deeper than that of the 

United States and the “threshold of pain” that China is prepared 

to endure is far higher than that of the United States. See, for 

example, Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the 

Great Wall and the Long March, New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 2003, pp. 186-187.
39

CHAPTER 3

HOW CHINA MANAGES INTERNAL SECURITY 

CHALLENGES

AND ITS IMPACT ON PLA MISSIONS

Murray Scot Tanner*

This chapter examines the understudied topic of 

the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) internal 

security missions, and the relationship between the 

PLA’s missions and those of the other organs that 

make up the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) state 

coercive apparatus.1 Although most of the chapters 

in this volume examine the PLA’s missions beyond 

Taiwan, beyond China’s borders, or even beyond the 

confines of earth, this chapter reminds us that so long 

as the CCP remains in power, the mission which is 

still perhaps most fundamental to the PLA will remain 

firmly fixed in China’s domestic society. 

RELATING INTERNAL SECURITY TO THE PLA’S 

OTHER MISSIONS

How does the PLA’s internal security mission 

relate to the army’s fundamentally important Taiwan 

mission, as discussed by Dr. Andrew Scobell in the 

introduction, and its other tasks? The internal security 

mission entrusted to China’s civilian and military 

* For their excellent critical comments on earlier drafts of this article and 

for their generous assistance with finding source materials, the author 

wishes to thank the conference commentator Lonnie Henley, as well as 

James Bellacqua, Tom Bickford, Dennis Blasko, John Corbett, June Teufel 

Dreyer, Lin Chong-pin, Daniel Hartnett, Roy Kamphausen, Susan Puska, 

Andrew Scobell, Travis Tanner, and Fred Vellucci. All remaining errors 

of fact and interpretation are my sole responsibility, but they would certainly have been more numerous without these colleagues’ help.
40

security organs is probably the only mission analyzed 

in this volume whose significance for the CCP’s rule, 

and whose pervasive impact on other PLA missions, 

exceeds even the Taiwan mission. Analysts of the 

post-Tiananmen PLA have noted the PLA’s enduring 

role as ultimate guarantor of the Party’s hold on power. 

Most have also pointed to the decline of internal 

security as an active mission relative to the PLA’s 

external mission during the 1990s and into the 2000s, 

emphasizing the assumption of that mission by the 

People’s Armed Police’s (PAP).2

 Hu Jintao, however, 

has officially reasserted the status of the PLA’s internal 

security mission in his 2004-05 expositions on the PLA’s 

“Historic Missions” (see discussion below) by listing 

first the PLA’s role of providing a powerful guarantee 

to stabilize the Party’s grip on governance. Only in his 

second package of missions does Hu allude to the fight 

against Taiwan independence—actually setting forth 

a combined, tripartite mission of “protecting national 

sovereignty, unity and stability” (维护国家主权、统

一和稳定的神圣职责) that also references domestic 

security. 

The success of the internal security mission and 

the Taiwan mission, moreover, are intertwined 

in potentially important ways. The Party-state’s 

capacity to successfully carry out its internal security 

mission by relying overwhelmingly upon its civilian 

and paramilitary security organs—with only limited 

support from the PLA—is critical to freeing the PLA 

to reform its overwhelming historical orientation 

toward ground forces, and allow it to modernize and 

concentrate its resources and capacity on mastering its 

Taiwan mission as well as its other largely externallyoriented missions. Thus, as this chapter will argue 

below, any sign that the Beijing leadership believes 
41

its civilian and paramilitary forces are unable to carry 

out their internal security missions without significant 

support from the regular PLA—as may have occurred 

in Lhasa in March 2008—has important ramifications 

for the army’s other missions. 

Conversely, the CCP has invested the Taiwan issue 

and mission with such fundamental importance for 

its popular legitimacy that the PLA’s capacity to carry 

out that mission successfully—or at least its perceived 

capacity—could very easily have a major impact on 

Chinese domestic stability. It could even determine the 

CCP’s need to rely on the PLA to maintain its hold on 

power. Simply put, many Chinese security intellectuals 

appear to believe (as Dr. Scobell has hinted earlier) 

that if the CCP leadership were to launch a precipitous 

attack to reunify Taiwan with the mainland, and that 

operation failed (Dr. Scobell’s “Cell C: Conflict without 

Resolution”), the resulting popular fury could result in 

the CCP’s overthrow. Moreover, it would very likely 

be an open question whether or not the Party leadership 

could again rely upon the PLA to use force to save it in 

such circumstances. Concerns about internal stability 

could also complicate the conduct of any Taiwan 

operation. The prospect of massive social unrest in the 

event of failure would, I strongly suspect, make it much 

trickier for China’s leaders to engage in “escalation 

control” with the United States. Any resultant postwar social chaos might also undermine—at least in the 

short term—Chinese state efforts to mobilize resources 

and pursue an accelerated military build-up aimed 

at redeeming a failed Taiwan operation. Thus, the 

pervasive importance of the internal security mission—

for China’s civilian and paramilitary security organs as 

well as the PLA and all of its missions—is important to 

bear in mind.
42

OVERVIEW OF THIS CHAPTER

June 3-4, 2009, will mark 20 years since the CCP 

ordered the PLA to suppress student and worker 

demonstrators in Beijing. That operation not only 

traumatized Chinese society; it also left the PLA as an 

institution scarred to such a degree that one of the Party’s 

major motivations for reforming and reconstituting 

China’s civilian and paramilitary police systems over 

the next 2 decades has been to minimize the likelihood 

that the PLA would ever again have to be ordered to 

carry out this domestic security mission.3

As the other chapters in this volume make clear, 

however, the PLA is being asked to undertake and 

prepare for an increasingly broad and complex array 

of new international and domestic security missions 

consistent with China’s rising international power and 

its rapid and challenging domestic social and economic 

development. This trend raises a serious dilemma for 

the PLA—how can it cope with the challenges and 

burdens of trying to prepare for these new professional 

and high-tech missions at the same time that the CCP 

expects it to be available—if only as a last resort—to 

fulfill its internal security missions?

This chapter examines three major questions 

concerning China’s response to internal security 

challenges and the impact of that response on the 

PLA’s missions: First, what are the formal internal security 

missions that the CCP has assigned to the PLA with regard to 

defending the Party’s control of the state and its dominance 

over society? What do the key authoritative documents 

on this topic issued by the Party and state (e.g. Party 

Documents, laws, regulations, etc.) tell us about what 

the Party expects of the PLA? What do PLA training 

regimens tell us about the nature of this mission and 
43

how the PLA prepares for it? 

Second, what is the Party and state’s overall strategy 

for dealing with social unrest, and how does it relate to 

the internal security mission of the PLA? How does the 

internal security strategy developed for the civilian 

and paramilitary security organs that form the front 

and second lines of social control in China relate to 

the PLA and its role as the “third line” in domestic 

stability operations? China’s chronic rising levels 

of social unrest over the past decade raise serious 

concerns for the PLA. Since about 1998-99, the Party’s 

other internal security organs have struggled not 

merely to keep a lid on social protest, but also to forge 

a new, more sophisticated, sustainable, and lowerviolence strategy for containing and managing chronic 

unrest. This chapter will examine how this evolving 

social order strategy affects what is probably the PLA’s 

central concern—the Army’s strong preference that 

these other internal security organs effectively contain 

unrest by themselves, and thereby continue to allow 

the PLA to keep its distance from domestic security 

missions while it focuses on a complex and growing 

list of other national security missions it is being asked 

to undertake. 

Third, what do recent events in Lhasa tell us about 

potential problems in China’s response to social unrest 

and its implications for the PLA? This chapter will 

examine the March 2008 loss of social control in 

Lhasa as a critical case study of some of the potential 

shortcomings in China’s social control management 

and the implications this could have for the PLA and 

its missions. Following the outbreak of rioting and 

a short loss of control over portions of Lhasa by the 

Public Security and PAP forces, the media were full 

of reports suggesting that the PLA had been forced to 
44

undertake its greatest involvement in internal security 

operations in years—perhaps its greatest since the 

1989 Lhasa and Tiananmen protests. This chapter will 

examine how and why civilian and paramilitary forces 

lost control, and based on the available evidence, will 

attempt to clarify how and in what ways the PLA 

became involved in internal security missions. From 

this critical case study, the chapter will try to draw 

some general lessons about the circumstances under 

which the PLA might be forced to actually carry out 

its internal security mission, and what tasks that may 

involve.

The Mission That Dare Not Speak Its Name.

As Scobell and Brad Hammet pointed out a decade 

ago in their analysis of “paramilitary” functions, the 

CCP system is still far from comfortable in its efforts 

to clarify the boundaries between military and police 

missions.4

 A review of post-Tiananmen authoritative 

Party and state documents on the PLA’s mission (see 

below) demonstrates clearly that the CCP’s official 

conception of the PLA’s mission has always included 

a strong internal security element. But this domestic 

repression mission for the most part continues to be 

a “mission that dare not speak its name” in terms 

of conveying the precise political, legal, and social 

circumstance under which the Party reserves the right 

to order the PLA to use force against its own people, as 

well as the levels and forms of violence and coercion 

it may order the Army to use. With rare exceptions 

(the Law on Martial Law, for example), the details of 

the PLA’s roles and responsibilities in these missions 

are usually referred to in a very understated fashion. 

Thus, while authoritative documents are sometimes 
45

explicit in stipulating portions of the PLA’s domestic 

security mission, much more commonly the Party and 

state leadership only convey to the army a very clear 

presumption—that if the Party’s other security organs 

should ever prove incapable of defending the Party 

against domestic and foreign political threats, social 

unrest, or ethnic and religious separatism, the PLA 

must understand that it might once again be called 

upon to defend the Party’s control over society. Since 

Tiananmen, however, the Party has spelled out the 

PLA’s mission with legal conditions and institutional 

commitments intended to demonstrate that the Party 

strongly prefers that the Public Security, State Security, 

judicial and procuratorial organs, and PAP forces 

should form the first and second lines for maintaining 

social control, and the PLA very much in the third line.5

Still, the Party never has never issued—and probably 

never will issue—an authoritative document that even 

implies it would ever let the PLA “off the hook” entirely 

on its domestic security mission. 

Moreover, for a little more than a decade, domestic 

socio-economic and global military trends have, in a 

sense, pulled in opposite directions, posing a growing 

institutional dilemma for the Party and its efforts to 

define, narrow, and professionalize the PLA’s domestic 

and international missions. China’s explosive economic 

growth and persistently rising social unrest have placed 

increasing burdens on the state’s domestic social order, 

crisis response, and disaster relief systems at precisely 

the time that the Party demands that the PLA prepare 

to undertake a broadening array of modern, hightech, highly professional externally-oriented security 

missions. The Party has made powerful institutional 

efforts to free the PLA to focus on its transformation 

into a modern military with mostly externally-oriented 
46

missions (save for counterterrorism, border security, 

intelligence, and a few other tasks). But the Party cannot 

even implicitly excuse the PLA from its formal internal 

security missions unless if feels confident that the 

Public Security, State Security, PAP, and various other 

state organs have developed appropriate strategies and 

institutional capacity to maintain domestic security 

and social stability by themselves. But long before the 

snow storms, ethnic unrest, and earthquakes of 2008 

raised serious questions about the competency of these 

civilian and paramilitary security organs to handle 

truly major crises on their own, the Party and the PLA 

were apparently aware that the expansion of the army’s 

international missions could not yet be accompanied by 

a contraction of its domestic missions. Consequently, 

even while the modern PLA prepares for complex 

futuristic high-tech missions such as “integrated air and 

space combat” (kongtian yiti zuozhan), it has also very 

recently been issuing new training materials on its role 

in maintaining social stability and a variety of other 

traditional and nontraditional domestic “noncombat 

military operations.”6

Realistically evaluating the PLA’s internal security 

missions requires, therefore, not only examining its 

formal duties as expressed in authoritative documents 

such as leadership speeches, state laws, Party and state 

documents (including white papers), training systems, 

etc. It also requires looking beyond these formally 

defined duties for which the Party has ordered it to be 

prepared—just in case. We need to evaluate the PLA’s 

relationship to China’s first and second line internal 

security organs, their evolving anti-unrest strategies, 

command structures, and institutional capacities. A key 

question is: do the strategies, structures, and capacities 

of these other internal security organs provide the PLA 
47

with the assurance that it will not be called upon again 

to perform the tasks it found so distasteful in 1989?

For the most part, the record appears to be clear, 

and from the PLA’s perspective, cautiously promising. 

Despite high and rising levels of unrest in China since 

1989, the PLA has been spared from taking part in the 

actual operations of suppressing protests or riots. But 

the recent loss of control in Lhasa and other parts of 

Tibet and China’s west, coupled with widespread but 

imprecise reports of PLA involvement in at least some 

parts of that internal security mission, raise serious 

questions. Does China’s civilian and paramilitary 

internal security infrastructure have an appropriate 

strategy, a sufficiently responsive political control 

system, and the institutional resources to carry out 

its mission? More importantly for purposes of this 

chapter, do the Lhasa riots provide an insight into 

broader weaknesses in the security system that might 

gradually draw the PLA back into greater involvement 

in the domestic security mission from which the PLA 

has been able to distance itself for the past 20 years?

On balance, this chapter finds that there was 

something of a low probability “perfect storm” quality 

about the loss of control in Lhasa that might be unique, 

and that—at least given present social trends—appears 

unlikely to be repeated in many other locations. Lhasa 

saw the coincidence of several factors that caused the 

civilian authorities to fail in what they see as their 

missions and tasks of social intelligence and early 

warning, security force deployments, and in particular 

the politics of ordering a quick, forceful, repressive 

response. In the end, though, available evidence 

suggests the public security and PAP forces were able 

to regain control through their own repressive power, 

relying upon the PLA primarily for logistical, public 
48

safety, and perhaps some intelligence/information 

operations support services. At the same time, this low 

probability failure offers several insights concerning the 

factors and conditions that can cause a protest to slip 

out of control and, as in this case, apparently compel 

the Party to call upon the PLA to provide support to 

other security forces during a crisis.

This chapter notes several problems in Lhasa 

authorities’ response to the outbreak of rioting on 

March 14 that undermined their capacity to contain 

the protests quickly; some of these reflect the special 

demands of China’s efforts to find a strategy for dealing 

with unrest that minimizes violence and popular 

backlash and maximizes Party control. There is still a 

shortage of solid information about several key aspects 

of the March 14, 2008, Lhasa riots, and any conclusions 

about how authorities coped with the crisis must 

remain tentative. For example, the strategy places 

an especially high premium on intelligence about 

protestor plans and advance warning to forecast and 

contain these incidents, both of which clearly failed in 

Lhasa. Large numbers of security forces were also badly 

deployed and slow to respond to the first outbreak of 

violence. Lhasa security officials also delayed several 

hours before attempting to retake control of the riot 

areas, which may in part reflect regulations requiring 

relatively high level political authorization before antiprotest forces can employ coercive tactics and lethal 

and nonlethal weapons. 
49

PLA Internal Security Missions: The Official 

Version.

With few exceptions, the available laws, 

regulations, leadership speeches, white papers and 

other authoritative documents that have defined the 

PLA’s domestic security and safety-related missions 

have done so in fairly general, hortatory terms. In the 

past decade, the Party has issued many documents that 

reminded the PLA of its mission to defend the Party’s 

hold on power against its enemies. But these documents 

make little effort to define the objects or adversaries 

against whom these missions would be carried out—

most of whom would be Chinese citizens. Nor do 

these documents carefully distinguish the specific 

operational tasks that might be assigned to the PLA, as 

distinct from those that would be entrusted to civilian 

and paramilitary units. These documents also do not 

define the specific circumstances of social instability 

under which the PLA would be used. Frequently, the 

PLA’s specific responsibility is obscured by use of the 

term “armed forces” (wuzhuang liliang)—an official 

term that also includes the PAP and the militia.

Probably no available authoritative legal or policy 

document issued in recent years is more complete or 

more explicit in its conception of a domestic suppression 

and social control role for the PLA than the 1996 Martial 

Law Law (MLL) of the PRC.7

 The law explicitly identifies 

many of the circumstances in which martial law might 

be declared, including “turmoil” [dongluan], “riots” 

[baoluan], or “disturbance” [saoluan]), and summarizes 

the overall mission as helping to “preserve social order 

and protect the people’s lives and property.” The law 

stipulates that martial law enforcement institutions 

must secure keypoint institutions, including leadership 
50

and military institutions, foreign embassies, mass 

media units, public enterprises, airports and railway 

stations, prisons, and other priority institutions. 

While the MLL does not distinguish between the 

missions of the PLA and either the public security 

forces or the PAP, it does clearly presume that the PLA 

should be deployed only as a last resort, in a supporting 

role, and under the direct command of PLA officers. 

Article 8 stipulates that: 

Martial law will be executed by the People’s Police or the 

People’s Armed Police; if necessary, the State Council 

can refer to the Central Military Commission[CMC] for 

a decision on sending PLA units to assist in martial law 

enforcement. 

Article 10, in turn, stipulates that PLA forces shall be 

commanded by a distinctive leadership organ and 

leaves the relationship of that organ to the martial law 

enforcement institutions and the martial law command 

organs.8

Article 10: Martial law enforcement institutions shall 

establish martial law command organs, which shall 

coordinate and enforce operations related to martial 

law enforcement, and implement martial law measures 

under a unified plan. PLA units enforcing martial law are 

commanded by a military institution designated by the 

CMC under a unified plan of the martial law command 

organs. 

The MLL is also as clear as any authoritative 

document available in spelling out the support, 

social control, and repressive actions the martial law 

enforcement forces, including the PLA, are authorized 

to undertake in support of their mission. These 

chapters authorize the martial law enforcement organs 
51

to ban demonstrations or group activities or strikes, 

impose censorship, restrict individuals’ movements, 

and many other coercive actions. It also clearly 

authorizes the use of police weapons and instruments, 

and even deadly force, to protect the lives and safety 

of citizens or martial law personnel (including fire and 

rescue workers), or to prevent violent attack on key 

establishments. Finally, the closing Chapter V admits 

the possibility of Armed Police and even PLA forces 

being brought in to restore order, disperse crowds, and 

detain protest leaders even though national officials 

have not officially declared martial law.

The PRC’s National Defense White Papers since 1998 

have gradually elaborated the domestic securityrelated missions of China’s “armed forces” generally 

and, at times, the PLA in particular. The 1998 and 2000 

White Papers include among the “basic objectives” of 

China’s defense policy entrusted to China’s armed 

forces “. . . curbing armed subversion, and defending 

state sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and 

security.” The 2002 White Paper noticeably elaborated 

the list of internal security missions for the armed 

forces, adding an entire section devoted to the 

suppression of specifically domestic threats.9

 The 

2002 White Paper a devotes great space to elaborating 

the PLA and the broader armed forces’ commitment 

to supporting Hu and Wen’s development of China’s 

restive Western regions. It notes that to support this 

development project, “the CMC has established a 

special leading group and a dedicated office, and 

made unified arrangements. The PLA and the Armed 

Police Force have contributed more than 1.5 million 

troops and 450,000 motor vehicles and machines to 

actively participate in and support the western region 

development efforts.” These development support 
52

tasks included environmental work such as reforestation, aid to the poor (including installing power lines 

and transport projects), capital construction projects, 

and encouraging retired or demobilized PLA veterans 

to relocate to these regions.

The 2004 and 2006 White Papers, by contrast, 

place less emphasis on the domestic security goals of 

the armed forces than the 2002 paper, with the 2004 

paper noting only the need to “safeguard the political, 

economic, and cultural rights and interests of the 

Chinese people; crack down on criminal activities 

of all sorts; and maintain public order and social 

stability.” The paper also devoted somewhat more 

attention to domestic security threats in its analysis of 

the international security situation, which noted that 

“nontraditional security issues . . . [were] . . . posing 

a growing threat” among which it noted terrorism, 

information, energy, financial and environmental 

security, transnational crime, epidemics, and natural 

disasters. The security analysis closed by musing that 

the difficulty of alleviating the root causes of terrorism 

meant that this global struggle would remain “a 

long and demanding task before the international 

community.” The 2006 White Paper adds repeated 

references endorsing Hu Jintao’s domestic stabilityrelated strategy of developing a “socialist harmonious 

society” and includes such internal security goals as 

“Upholding national security and unity, and ensure 

the interests of national development. This includes . 

. . taking precautions against and cracking down on 

terrorism, separatism and extremism in all forms.” 

Hu Jintao placed his personal stamp on a current 

version of these internal security missions in his 

December 2004 “Historic Missions for Our Military 

in the New Period and the New Century.”10 Hu 
53

attempted a more comprehensive review of missions, 

and not surprisingly began by calling on the military 

to “provide an important guarantee of power for 

the Party to stabilize its hold on governance.” In 

writings and speeches delivered amid the wave of 

“colour revolutions” (颜色革命) of late 2004-early 

2005, Hu pointedly and almost poetically calls on the 

Army to “guarantee that the socialist red rivers and 

mountains will forever not change their colour (保

证社会主义红色江山永不变色).” Hu argues that so 

long as the Party relies on the people and keeps a grip 

on the people’s army, the country can never become 

seriously chaotic. In the second of his missions, Hu 

calls upon the military to “place the sovereignty and 

security of the country in the first position,” and do a 

good job preserving the country’s “sovereignty, unity, 

and stability.” The available excerpts of Hu’s speech, 

however, say virtually nothing about the circumstances 

under which the PLA might be asked to perform these 

domestic security missions, or these missions’ targets 

and adversaries.

FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: PLA TRAINING 

FOR INTERNAL SECURITY MISSIONS

By going beyond publicly proclaiming a “mission” 

for the PLA and ordering the military to organize 

training for that mission, the Party and PLA leadership 

sends the message that it means for the military to 

take the mission with more seriousness and devote 

a measure of time and resources to preparing for it. 

Internal security-related training also, of course, has 

an additional impact on several aspects of the PLA’s 

capacity to take part in these missions. In terms of the 

psychology and morale needed to carry out a mission 
54

that may be against its own citizens, requiring PLA 

forces to engage in regular training that is explicitly 

geared toward domestic internal security missions 

(and not just labeled “peacekeeping preparations” for 

example) can send an important signal to troops that 

they may, in fact, someday be called upon to perform 

this potentially distasteful task. Training regimens 

are also a valuable indicator of whether or not highranking PLA officers take seriously the possibility 

that civilian Party leaders might order them to deploy 

their forces in suppressing protests. Whether or not 

the strategy, techniques, and methods of internal 

security work taught to PLA forces mirror those 

taught to Public Security, PAP and other forces will 

have an important effect on their capacity to cooperate 

effectively with these forces and with local Party and 

government leaders, should the PLA be brought in. 

Finally, of course, the legacy of Tiananmen raises the 

issue of whether PLA forces that might be deployed 

for internal security operations would receive the 

kind of modern protest policing training that is 

necessary for them to carry out their operations with 

minimal violence. On these last two points, Dennis 

Blasko documents that counterterrorism training 

in Tibet and China’s Muslim regions has provided 

PLA, PAP, and Public Security forces (and perhaps 

State Security forces) with an opportunity to train 

together. Blasko stresses, however, that the numbers 

of forces, scenarios, techniques, equipment, and levels 

of violence used for anti-terror special operations “are 

quite different from anti-riot and domestic stability 

operations used to control unarmed civilians.” Recent 

authoritative sources on PLA ground forces military 

training indicate clearly that since at least the early 

2000s, the PLA has indeed expected at least some of 
55

its ground force units to train for what are referred 

to as “noncombat operations” (feizhanzheng xingdong) 

and “counterterror/preservation of social stability” 

(fankong weiwen) missions. These sources, however, 

do not provide a great deal of detail on the nature 

of this training.11 “The proliferating responsibilities 

born by the ground forces determine that the content 

of training must also become more multifaceted.”12

Training materials remind the ground forces that as 

a key component of the state’s armed forces, their 

responsibilities and missions include protecting the 

security of the state and China’s territorial integrity, and 

preserving its social stability (weihu shehui wending).13

While “counterterrorism” is considered a training 

category unto itself, “preserving social order” is 

considered part of the broader category of “training for 

noncombat operations” (feizhanzheng xingdong xunlian) 

that also includes “disaster rescue and relief,” support 

for crime fighting operations, and “participation in 

international peacekeeping” (this last point makes 

it nearly explicit that the Chinese leadership expects 

that PLA participation in international peacekeeping 

will have spin-off training benefits for domestic social 

order control).14 The stated goal of this training is to 

introduce trainees to the theory and methods (lilun, 

fangfa) of such noncombat operations, and make them 

familiar with the “special characteristics” and “regular 

patterns” (tedian, guilu) of these types of operations. 

These materials also note that these sorts of noncombat 

training can be divided into subunit noncombat 

training (fendui), leadership organ (shouzhang jiguan) 

and unit noncombat training. Training materials hint 

that internal security training is politically complex and 

involves learning to work with a wide array of other 

units, characterizing it as involving “broad theoretical 
56

knowledge, specialized content and methods, and 

complex command and coordination relationships.”15 

Somewhat more concretely, noncombat operations 

training involves “general knowledge of all sources 

of natural disasters and disasters of an accidental 

nature; and laws and policies related to preserving 

social stability and participating in international 

peacekeeping operations,” also training in techniques 

and skills of these noncombat operations, also the 

guiding principles, employment of military forces 

(bingli shiyong), and operational methods (xingdong 

fangfa) of emergency rescue and “handling all types 

of suddenly occurring incidents” (chuzhi gezhong 

tufa shijian). Training also includes organization and 

command of noncombat operations, coordinated 

actions (xietong dongzuo), logistical and other supports 

(gezhong baozhang), political work, and work following 

the completion of the mission. To systematize this 

work, the PLA has also developed training materials 

on noncombat operations.16 

These training materials issued since Hu Jintao’s 

ascent also state rather plainly that this category of 

missions should by no means be considered a rare 

or esoteric part of the PLA’s work. “During periods 

when the nation is relatively at peace, shouldering 

the responsibility of these non-combat operations 

should be seen as a regular duty and responsibility 

(yi xiang jingchangxing de shiming renwu).”17 Another 

recent manual is even more blunt and criticizes “some 

comrades” in the PLA who believe that social order 

challenges are not their job or beneath them, and that 

if these duties are left to the public security forces, that 

will be just fine. As constituent parts of the Party and 

state’s armed forces, both the PAP and the PLA are 
57

also expected to help carry the burden of maintaining 

social stability inside China’s borders.18

While this training material indicates an explicit 

intent to train PLA troops to be prepared to undertake 

or support internal security operations, it leaves many 

crucial questions unanswered. Available materials, for 

example, provide little information about the strategies, 

tactics, methods, arms, and equipment the PLA would 

train to employ in the event it had to intervene against 

protestors. Unclear, for example, is whether the 

specific missions and roles, and crowd control, protest 

policing, and anti-riot techniques the PLA is being 

taught are intended to support the more sophisticated 

lower-violence official strategies the Ministry of Public 

Security has been developing since about 1999. Or is 

it implicitly understood that if the PLA should have to 

be deployed to suppress a protest, the Party and PLA 

anticipate that the circumstances would have to be so 

dire it would once again, as in 1989, be a highly bloody 

affair? Likewise, it is unclear whether the techniques 

Chinese PLA peacekeepers employ to maintain social 

order overseas are the same as those it would use 

domestically.

CHINA’S EVOLVING INTERNAL SECURITY 

STRATEGY

Ever since Tiananmen, the PLA’s ability to refrain 

from, or limit, its entanglement in the potential 

internal security missions that are broadly defined by 

these state documents has always depended upon the 

state’s ability to build and provide alternative internal 

security and public safety organs that were capable 

of successfully carrying out these sensitive missions 

without resort to PLA help. This placed an especially 
58

heavy burden on the state to develop paramilitary, 

civilian police, intelligence, and civil affairs/emergency 

rescue forces capable of responding to a wide range of 

contingencies and serving the needs of a wide range 

of leadership stakeholders.19 This not only required 

the state to be able to stand up, train, and finance 

such capable non-PLA forces, the state also needed to 

develop strategies and plans for their deployment, and 

response mechanisms that would enable these civilian 

and paramilitary units to monitor social problems, 

forecast and prevent incidents of social unrest, and, 

when they occur, respond quickly, powerfully, and 

effectively to threats to internal order.

With regard to disaster relief missions, the postTiananmen Chinese state has never claimed or 

pretended that it had built public security, civil affairs, 

and PAP units which had the numbers, training, and 

particularly the institutional capacity and equipment 

necessary to permit the state to dispense with largescale PLA assistance. The PLA has regularly taken part 

in major disaster relief efforts since 1990, including the 

1998 floods, and the 2008 winter storm and Sichuan 

earthquake.

During the late 1990s-early 2000s, however, the Party 

and its security leadership began to revise its internal 

security strategies in ways that placed additional 

burdens on its non-PLA internal security forces. 

Available police materials on the handling of protest 

from the early-mid 1990s suggest little sophistication 

in their strategies, and a strong bias toward quickly 

and decisively putting down “emergency social order 

incidents” or “suddenly occurring incidents,” as they 

were called.20 But by about 1998-99, faced with a 

rapid increase in social protest among peasants, state 

industrial workers, and other social support pillars of 
59

the regime, and a recognition that violent mishandling 

of these protests risked causing backlash and further 

loss of control, security leaders began looking for more 

sophisticated strategies and tactics to contain unrest. 

These strategies create new challenges on security 

forces, because they place a significantly higher 

burden of professionalism on the public security, state 

security, and PAP forces to forecast, prevent, and 

quickly contain unrest. Moreover, the Party feels so 

intensely the political imperative of handling unrest 

properly that it has imposed strong rules regarding 

local CCP leadership, especially over the use of coercive 

or deadly force in response to protest, in the interest 

of minimizing police resort to tactics that might risk 

sparking violent backlash among the crowds. 

These institutional rules aimed at minimizing the 

risk of violence and backlash very likely come at a 

cost, however—because when a genuine riot suddenly 

breaks out, as occurred in Lhasa on the early afternoon 

of March 15, 2008—these rules of Party control and 

engagement put a heavy premium on local Party 

officials’ ability to make a quick judgment on whether 

or not the incident has an “antagonistic political nature” 

(e.g., whether it is anti-CCP) and to quickly mobilize 

and deploy both civilian public security and PAP with 

authorization to employ coercive tactics and possibly 

deadly force. Unless these actions are taken quickly, 

the likelihood for losing containment of the protest or 

riot increases greatly and, along with it, the likelihood 

that local officials may feel that they have no choice but 

to turn to the PLA for help.

The fact that the Party has rarely (indeed, perhaps 

only this one time) called upon the PLA for this 

type of support since 1989 suggests that Lhasa had 

something of a political “perfect storm” quality about 
60

it—the coming together of a number of relatively 

low probability problems and errors all at once. The 

security work surrounding the Lhasa incident also had 

several aspects that were, frankly, puzzlingly inept—

most notable was the relative lack of preparation for 

protests during one of the most sensitive dates on the 

Tibetan calendar when security officials are explicitly 

instructed to be on guard. Nevertheless, they provide 

one window into some of the weaknesses in the 

civilian and paramilitary internal security system that 

has been developed since 1989 that had, as at least one 

of its aims, developing a set of capabilities that would 

permit the PLA to avoid having to carry out the formal 

internal security mission that many official Party and 

state documents have prescribed for it.

I have summarized the main points of this antiprotest strategy elsewhere.21 But with respect to the 

goal of permitting the PLA to distance itself from social 

order missions, and what went wrong in Tibet, several 

points are particularly noteworthy.

Party and Public Security Anti-protest Materials.

Party and public security anti-protest materials 

stress that local Party leaders must learn to quickly and 

“accurately distinguish the political character” of protests, 

riots, and other mass incidents—in particular whether 

they should officially be judged “contradictions 

among the people” for which the appropriate methods 

are primarily education, the solving of real problems, 

and containment of protest, or are “contradictions 

between the people and the enemy” (antagonistic 

contradictions) for which dictatorial methods are 

appropriate. (It should be noted that available sources 

provide no evidence that the PLA is invited to assist in 

making this political judgment.)
61

Strengthening Social Intelligence and Advance 

Warning.

Anti-unrest strategies stress that to prevent 

protest, Public Security Departments—especially their 

Domestic Security Protection (guonei anquan baowei) 

units—and State Security Departments are expected 

to strengthen their monitoring and analysis of social 

contradictions and those social actors who are most 

likely to take advantage of these problems to foment 

dissent. Security experts writing about China’s Western 

ethnic minority regions have for at least several years 

noted the need to strengthen monitoring, infiltration, 

and recruitment of sources within Buddhist temples, 

mosques, and other religious facilities.22

Forecasting and preventing social protest and 

controlling ethnic minority unrest have in recent years 

become an increasingly important focus of the Public 

Security system’s Domestic Security Protection units. 

For example, in the training courses on domestic 

security work within its Investigation Department, 

China’s People’s Public Security University emphasizes 

intelligence work in handling “mass incidents” 

and “petition” cases, and offers an entire course on 

“Nationalities Security” work (minzu baowei).23 There 

are also some hints that as part of their internal security 

mission, PLA intelligence units are expected to play a 

role in helping Public Security units gather electronic 

and other intelligence regarding protestors and protest 

organizers; one internal police manual on unrest, in its 

section on “perfecting an intelligence and information 

work responsibility system,” calls on public security 

units to “. . . tighten coordination and cooperate with 

State Security and Military (jundui) and other political-
62

legal departments, promptly exchange intelligence and 

information, and create cooperation on intelligence 

and information exchange work.”24

Tight Party Committee Control over Police Use 

of Coercion, Weapons, and Deadly Force.

Official police directives and training materials 

for handling unrest lay special stress on the need for 

security departments to accept the “absolute, unified, 

unconditional” leadership of local Communist 

Party and government officials in handling protests. 

With regard to anti-protest and anti-riot work, this 

leadership is officially expected to be very detailed. 

Police forces are called upon to seek local Party and 

government permission before taking any crucial 

measures in responding to unrest, and they keep 

Party and government leaders closely apprised of 

their actions. Among the key aspects of their protest 

response activities for which local security departments 

are expected to obtain local Party and government 

approval or leadership are their unrest contingency 

plans, which spell out rules of engagement for 

deployment of security forces and the use of force. Local 

Party and/or government leaders are also expected to 

establish “command organs” at the scene to coordinate 

interagency anti-protest operations. Police are also 

supposed to obtain both local Party/government and 

superior-level police authorization for mobilizing police 

in riot gear. When police believe noncoercive control 

measures have failed and a protest risks serious threat 

to social stability or national security, they must seek 

permission from the “superior managing department” 

before employing such nonlethal weaponry as water 

cannons and batons, and may only employ violence, 
63

including deadly force, “under the unified leadership 

and unified command” of the local Party Committee 

and government.26

Concerning the use of deadly force, recent 

statements by some senior provincial police officials 

strongly suggest that official rules of engagement 

may have quietly moved toward a still more cautious 

standard or even an official ban on firing at crowds 

of protestors. No evidence is available that could tell 

us whether or not any such directive against firing 

at crowds also applied to public security and PAP 

in Tibet. But to date, setting rules on public security 

and PAP using guns in the line of duty has been the 

prerogative of Central-level political-legal leaders, not 

individual provincial police chiefs. Thus, references to 

tougher rules by one provincial police chief may well 

reflect changes in national-level regulations that have 

simply not yet been made public.27

Protests and riots in ethnic and religious minority 

regions, such as occurred in Lhasa, are explicitly seen 

by security officials as politically particularly sensitive 

incidents for which special bureaucratic procedures are 

advised to ensure that local Party, local government, 

superior level police, and CCP United Front Work 

departments are consulted and permission for response 

is sought. Indeed, the formal procedures suggested by 

some public security anti-protest manuals, if observed 

literally, would seem to risk becoming a recipe for 

delayed response and possibly even paralysis. Quoting 

from one manual, it advises police handling these 

cases:

Regarding rioting incidents (saoluan shijian) that affect 

the unity of the motherland, as public security organs 

are handling (chuzhi) them, they should—at the same 
64

time that they are seeking instructions (qingshi) from 

their Party Committee and government and upper level 

concerned departments—also strengthen their contacts 

with United Front Work departments, and jointly 

research the policy responses to use, and how to handle 

and pacify the incident of rioting.28

These aspects of official anti-protest strategy provide 

us a useful set of ideals or a yardstick for measuring 

how the public security and PAP forces were expected 

to perform. Thus, they can help us generate questions 

that we can use to spotlight and evaluate the missions/

tasks that they failed to perform well, and the areas in 

which they did not perform as badly. 

LOSING CONTROL IN LHASA 

AND THE QUESTION OF PLA INVOLVEMENT

Failures of Intelligence, Social Analysis, and Rapid 

Warning.

Any analysis of why Lhasa officials lost control on 

March 14 begins with the crucial failure of public security 

intelligence and early warning around the Ramoche 

Temple. In an April 9 interview, Tibet Autonomous 

Region (TAR) Government Chairman Qiangba Puncog 

essentially admitted that security forces were caught 

off-guard and unprepared for a variety of protests that 

sprung up in several different parts of Lhasa and its 

suburbs, sometimes simultaneously, during the week 

of March 10-15.29 

The best available press sources indicate that 

public security and PAP forces, not PLA, handled the 

first several days of protests. These began on Monday, 

March 10—the 49th anniversary of the uprising 
65

against Chinese rule—with a large protest by 300-

400 monks from the Drepung monastery and a much 

smaller protest by fewer than two dozen monks from 

the Sera monastery. Police detention of all or most 

of the Sera monks sparked a much larger protest on 

Tuesday by perhaps 500 to 600 monks who shouted for 

their fellow monks’ release and later began chanting 

for independence.30 Public Security and PAP forces 

reportedly dispersed these crowds by firing tear gas.31

Wednesday, police had reportedly surrounded and 

sealed off the Drepung and Sera (and perhaps the 

Ganden) monasteries to prevent more marches, and 

had entered the monasteries, where they engaged 

in aggressive room searches and other activities, 

according to BBC and other reports.32

The lockdown and the passage of the anniversary 

may have misled authorities into believing that the 

worst of the protests was passed, and by Thursday 

government officials claimed Lhasa had been 

“stabilised.”33 In any event, by Friday morning police 

were so focused on preventing further marches and 

protests originating from the three monasteries outside 

Central Tibet that their forces were unprepared and out 

of position to respond quickly and effectively when 

protests, scuffles, and then rioting broke out near the 

Ramoche Temple shortly after noon.34

Some foreign press and academic sources report 

that the unrest began when a group of monks attempted 

to launch a protest and possibly threw stones at 

police outside the temple.35 This version, if accurate, 

would indicate that despite security officials’ efforts 

at surveillance and infiltration of the temples, they 

were unaware of the monks’ plans and ill-prepared 

to respond quickly with adequate police personnel. 

Some Western journalists also cite Tibetan claims that 
66

the unrest began when local crowds attacked Chinese 

security officials for beating two monks on a side street 

near the temple, a version which, if true, indicates a 

failure of police discipline and restraint as well as early 

warning.36 Columbia Tibetologist Robert Barnett, after 

careful efforts to document the Spring unrest through 

foreign and Tibetan sources, endorses the view that 

the monks did attempt to carry out a demonstration.

At around midday on Friday, March 14, 4 days after the 

initial Lhasa protest, a small group of monks at Ramoche 

. . . set out from their compound to start a small protest 

march. They were soon stopped by police in a minor 

confrontation—which appears to have been exacerbated 

by Tibetans’ anger at the presence of plainclothes police 

in the crowd. Unlike the great monasteries, Ramoche 

is in the heart of Lhasa, and opens onto a busy market 

street in one of the few areas of the city that remains 

a largely Tibetan quarter. Members of the public, 

apparently aroused by rumors that monks detained that 

Monday had been beaten in custody, began to attack the 

police and a small squad of PAP sent in to support them. 

The police and soldiers were pelted with stones, their 

cars were burned, and, pursued by a group of stonethrowing youths, they fled. No reinforcements were sent 

into the area for at least 3 hours (one Western journalist 

who witnessed the events saw no police for 24 hours), 

though they were waiting on the outskirts. 37

Whatever the actual sparking event, police badly 

misjudged the Tibetan crowds’ latent anger and the 

speed with which they would seize on a brief loss of 

control by police to turn violently against Han and 

Hui merchants. But, as journalist James Miles, who 

observed the protests, pointedly observed, “Ethnic 

Chinese shopkeepers in Lhasa’s old Tibetan district 

knew better than the security forces that the city had 

become a tinder box. As word spread rapidly through 
67

the narrow alleyways on March 14th that a crowd was 

throwing stones at Chinese businesses, they shuttered 

up their shops and fled.”38

James Miles’ later reconstruction of events in 

the first 2 hours between the outbreak of the protest 

(around 11:30 a.m.) and 1:15-1:30 p.m. indicates that 

the protest burst forth from the immediate Ramoche 

neighborhood into a riot much more slowly than was 

originally reported. Police were especially slow to 

deploy reinforcements to the narrow alleyways near 

the Ramoche temple, where protests might have been 

bottled up more quickly. Miles has in recent months 

considered seriously the possibility that this delay and 

loss of control may have been a deliberate effort by local 

officials to justify a serious clampdown in advance of 

the Olympics and the Torch Relay.39 My inclination is 

to attribute this slow response to the inadequate overall 

numbers of security forces per capita in the Lhasa area, 

and their serious misdeployment around the in-town 

monasteries on Friday morning, an interpretation 

supported by some foreign press and Chinese legal 

sources.40 These deployments seem to have undercut 

these forces’ ability to adequately reinforce their 

colleagues outside the Ramoche temple when rioting 

broke out. Unfortunately, official figures on the total 

number of public security and PAP deployed to Tibet 

are more closely guarded than most Chinese provinces, 

and also do not reflect the PLA troop presence in the 

region.41 TAR budgetary data and police personnel 

data from surrounding ethnic minority provinces 

are at least consistent with the thesis that personnel 

numbers may have been an issue. The TAR reports 

the lowest total expenditure on law enforcement (2006: 

882,340,000 yuan42) and the fourth-lowest provinciallevel expenditures for PAP of any provincial-level unit 
68

in China (2006: 57,490,000 yuan; Qinghai, Guizhou, 

and Gansu are lower43), although it is unclear if these 

figures reflect any financial subsidies from Beijing, 

which many experts believe to be substantial. Western 

rural minority provinces other than Tibet also report 

some of the lowest police-per-citizen ratios in China, 

ranging from 6.8 officers per 10,000 in Sichuan (2004) 

down to just one officer per 10,000 in Ningxia (2006).44

A Taiwan study of the PAP, whose data cannot be 

independently confirmed, reports Tibet has 9-10 PAP 

Internal Guards zhidui, which, assuming an average 

personnel of between 600 and 1,400 troops per zhidui, 

would yield a total internal guards force of between 

5,400 and 14,000 internal guards forces for the entire 

TAR.45

Police reinforcements were soon overwhelmed and 

withdrew, and control of the area outside the Ramoche 

temple was quickly lost to the rioters. “Riot police . . .” 

reports the New York Times’ Jim Yardley, “fled after an 

initial skirmish and then were nowhere to be found.”46

Rioters targeted Han and Muslim (Hui) businesses 

for stoning, looting, destruction, and arson, but 

marked shops known to be Tibetan-owned with white 

scarves.47 For the next several hours, Miles reports 

government and police authorities seemed “paralyzed 

by indecision,” and he “didn’t see any attempt . . . to 

intervene.” Instead, Miles reports they seemed to “let 

the rioting run its course, and it didn’t really finish as 

far as I saw until the middle of the day on the following 

day.”48 

As to why police took so long to suppress the 

riots, the answer must for now be more speculative. 

In his earlier writing on the riot, Miles concluded that 

this was a conscious decision by authorities to “let 
69

the rioting run its course” for fear “that bloodshed 

would ensue” if they moved in immediately. This 

fear, Miles argued, was driven by worries of creating a 

violent bloody image in the run-up to the Olympics.49

However, such a decision, if true, would be remarkable 

and would contradict all known official strategies for 

handling unrest that descends into “beating, smashing, 

burning, and looting,” and in response to which Party, 

government, and security authorities are expected to 

authorize security forces to “decisively handle” the 

violence and quickly restore order.

Another contributing factor might be that the 

cautiously structured decisionmaking system for 

authorizing police to use weapons and violent tactics—

designed to preserve local and superior-level Party 

control—failed in responding to a rapidly developing 

riot. Eyewitness and photographic evidence make clear 

that many police remained on the scene as the riot took 

off, but made no serious effort to put down the rioters 

until at least nightfall. One famous photo shows a 

police line in an alleyway crouching defensively behind 

their shields with a shower of bricks on the ground in 

front of them. Several Chinese security and military 

experts, interviewed shortly following the riots, noted 

pointedly that the briefings they received and the 

pictures they saw of public security and PAP forces 

during the riot, indicated “paralysis and passivity” to 

them, and they concluded the police had not received 

the necessary orders to respond more aggressively to 

the violence.50 

TAR Party Secretary Zhang Qingli, Government 

Chairman Qiangba Puncog, and several other senior 

TAR officials whose authorization for police to use 

violence or even deadly force would have been, if 
70

not necessary, at least politically prudent, were all in 

Beijing for the National People’s Congress and Chinese 

People’s Political Consultative Congress session. One 

press report even noted Zhang was holding a press 

conference at or about the hour when the riot broke 

out.51 Police may have been unable to get appropriate 

authorization or strong orders to respond more 

decisively from high-ranking Party and government 

authorities. Some Chinese interviewees who received 

official briefings on the riots have even speculated that 

because Tibet was, famously, General Secretary Hu’s 

former province, the ranking Tibetan officials in Beijing 

may have felt wary about authorizing the use of force 

without first consulting Hu.52

PAP and public security established a perimeter 

around the Tibetan quarter, and not until late Friday 

night or early Saturday morning did they move in 

and begin retaking control of the city gradually.53

Firefighters, escorted by a small number of armored 

personnel carriers (APCs) filled with armed security 

forces (no photographic evidence supports the widely 

reported assertion that tanks were used) moved 

cautiously into the Tibetan quarter to extinguish the 

fires. While the PAP possesses its own APCs, we can 

speculate that these escorts may have represented the 

earliest PLA involvement in the operation.54 Witnesses 

report having seen the security forces who retook 

the city employ water cannons, tear gas, batons, and 

beatings, etc., according to witnesses cited by Western 

journalists. TAR Government Chairman Qiangba 

Puncog, speaking at a March 17 press conference in 

Beijing, admitted that security forces had used highpressure fire hoses, armored vehicles, and unspecified 

“other special equipment” in these operations.55 
71

How much live fire was used and by what units 

remains a major sticking point. While numerous 

sources, including U.S. citizens cited by the Embassy, 

reported hearing sporadic single-shot gunfire, Chinese 

government sources (including Qiangba Puncog) 

disagreed strongly with Tibetan exile authorities over 

whether and how much security forces opened fire 

on protestors and rioters during this time. Tibetan 

exile authorities claimed Chinese officials shot and 

killed 80 Tibetans. Qiangba Puncog countered “with 

all responsibility that we did not use lethal weapons, 

including opening fire.” Xinhua, in one of its first 

reports after the riots, similarly claimed “Sources told 

Xinhua that policemen were ordered not to use force 

against the attacker. But they were forced to use a 

limited amount of tear gas and fired warning shots to 

disperse the desperate crowds.”56 Some well-informed 

western analysts have also concluded the security 

forces were under orders not to open fire, while others 

stress the lack of reliable eyewitnesses to such fire.57

Nevertheless, experienced sources including Miles 

and others report hearing periodic individual shots, 

though Miles does not report having witnessed any 

killings, and he has stated his belief that these were 

probably warning shots. No other Western visitors 

to Lhasa report witnessing these shootings, either. 58

The New York Times’ Jim Yardley as part of his careful 

reconstruction of events, however, cites a Tibetan teen 

who reported by phone having seen armed police shoot 

“four or five” Tibetans.59 Several days later public 

security officials in Sichuan admitted that they had 

shot and wounded four protestors as part of putting 

down protests there, but made no similar admission 

regarding Lhasa.60
72

Miles notes that by dawn the Tibetan area had 

been sealed off, and officers had secured the square 

in front of the Jokhang temple.61 Security forces 

advanced slowly into the quarter during the morning, 

periodically launching tear gas, in some cases against 

stone-throwing crowds, and Miles reported hearing 

“persistent rumors” of small-scale struggles between 

security forces and rioters. Miles noted that in contrast 

to Tiananmen in 1989—an event he also witnessed—

he did not hear any “repeated bursts of machine gun 

fire.”62

Evaluating Reports of the PLA’s Involvement.

Although witnesses have compared the situation 

in Lhasa to martial law, neither the State Council nor 

Tibetan regional officials chose to declare martial law 

in response to the protests and rioting, nor is there 

evidence to suggest that they activated the provisions 

in the MLL that can authorize the mobilization of 

the PLA without declaring martial law. Such legal 

authority would have provided both a formal process 

for activating PLA forces and possibly triggered the 

creation of a distinct PLA command structure within 

a martial law command structure. As it is, it is unclear 

how and by what structure PLA forces involved in the 

post-riot operations were commanded and their work 

coordinated with civilian and PAP security and civil 

affairs officials.

Chinese officials initially denied that PLA forces 

were being used to put down protests or to support the 

anti-riot police who carried out that mission. Qiangba 

Puncog on March 17 repeated this claim, and reported 

that the first PLA involvement was in clean-up work 

beginning on Sunday and Monday.63 According to 
73

Edward Cody of the Washington Post, as late as April 

13, neither the Ministry of National Defense nor 

China’s civilian security ministries would respond 

to journalists questions about whether or how PLA 

forces were deployed in Lhasa or elsewhere in Tibet. 

A Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesman stated 

that no PLA soldiers were deployed in the city of 

Lhasa, but would not comment on PLA deployments 

elsewhere in the TAR. 64

Western journalists continued to report the use of 

what they believed to be PLA forces in Lhasa with 

their identifying insignia removed or covered up. 65

By Monday, March 17, the South China Morning Post

reported the spread of the riots and protests to Sichuan 

and Qinghai, and indicated that “thousands” of PLA 

were moving into these regions to help restore order 

and arrest protest leaders.66 “Lhasa is now occupied 

by thousands of paramilitary police officers and 

troops of the People’s Liberation Army,” reported the 

New York Times a few days later, and it cited reports 

of both military convoys and PAP units streaming 

westward—apparently from Chengdu, Lanzhou, 

and other locations—to help confront unrest in other 

parts of Tibet, Gansu, Qinghai, and China’s Muslim 

Regions.67

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, TRAFFIC CONTROL, 

AND PUBLIC SAFETY

Probably the missions for which claims of PLA 

involvement are most credible and for which available 

information (including photos) provides the strongest 

support (or at least, cannot provide firm refutation) 

are logistical support tasks. These include assisting 

with clean up, providing transport, and ferrying PAP 
74

and PSB forces in armored vehicles through the more 

dangerous sections of Lhasa. 68

Among the other tasks in which reports of PLA 

involvement seem more credible was “traffic control,” 

including securing roads to the major monasteries 

outside of Lhasa and controlling access to the riottorn areas. Miles notes that he personally encountered 

large numbers of “troops” along these roads, many 

armed with bayonets, and reports that many of these 

forces and others situated at checkpoints displayed no 

insignia of any kind.69 When he inquired about their 

affiliation, rather than claiming to be PAP or Public 

Security forces or providing any other cover story, 

they were unwilling to identify whether they were 

police or military. From this he concludes that “the 

army is almost certainly playing a big part in the city’s 

clampdown . . .”70

Finally, PLA medical units played an important 

role in treating civilian and noncivilian victims of the 

violence. Xinhua credited “police,” not PLA soldiers, 

with rescuing 580 people from fires and other danger 

during the riots, although it noted that at least several 

of these victims were treated in the Tibet Military 

Command Hospital.71

THE QUESTION OF PLA INVOLVEMENT IN RIOT 

SUPPRESSION

A few widely-read sources have spotlighted PLA 

involvement in the “crackdown” in a manner that 

raises the question of whether PLA forces were directly 

involved in the actual suppression of rioters on the 

night of March 14 or on March 15. The Students for a 

Free Tibet blog, citing Kanwa, spotlights the “cover-up” 

and notes that “some of the ground forces deployed 
75

in Lhasa during the crackdown of the last few days 

were elite squads from the People’s Liberation Army,” 

refuting the Chinese government’s strenuous denial 

that it was “sending the People’s Liberation Army to 

deal with the Tibetan protests.”72 The Voice of America 

(VOA) reported on March 22 that unsourced “[r]

eports from China say Beijing has sent elite units of the 

People’s Liberation Army into Tibet to crack down on 

the protests” without further comment or explanation 

concerning what “crack down on the protests” meant.73

A March 15 Australian Broadcasting Corporation report 

noted that “A Chinese resident of Lhasa, speaking to 

AFP by phone who declined to let his name be used, 

said there were tanks and armoured personnel carriers 

in the streets on Saturday morning. ‘There are many 

armed police, special police, and People’s Liberation 

Army soldiers everywhere,’ he said.”74

For the record, this attention to the PLA’s role is not 

only a reflection of the army’s role in Tiananmen, but 

also owes much to the government’s own seemingly 

blanket statements that later required amendment or 

significant parsing.75 TAR Government Chairman 

Qiangba Puncog flatly stated in his March 17 news 

conference that the PLA was not involved in the actual 

quelling of the protests.76 Foreign Ministry Spokesman 

Liu Jianchao flatly stated that “The PLA is not involved 

in the handling of the incidents . . . Their entering Tibet 

now is mainly to handle losses from the incidents.”77

Immediately after the riots broke out, General Yang 

Deqing, Political Commissar of the Guangdong 

Military Region (MR), told Western reporters at the 

National People’s Congress (NPC) that “We’ll let the 
76

police and the military police handle the disturbance. 

. . . We (the PLA) won’t be involved.” 78 

The reports by Students for a Free Tibet (SFT) and 

International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) both cite only 

one source—a widely-cited March 21 report by Kanwa 

Defense Review Editor-in-Chief Andrei Chang.79

Chang asserts that “Elite ground force units of the 

People’s Liberation Army were involved in China’s 

recent crackdown on Tibetan protesters in Lhasa” and 

that these forces’ equipment “appeared on the streets 

of Lhasa the same day the crackdown began.” He 

notes somewhat accusatorily that “China has denied 

the participation of the army in the crackdown, saying 

it was carried out by units of the armed police.”80

While Chang’s analysis contains no footnotes 

or source citations, it clearly seems to rest upon the 

author’s deductive analysis of photographic and video 

images taken in Lhasa on the first days after the riot 

(widely available on the internet), as well as the author’s 

assertions concerning the availability or nonavailability 

of certain types of vehicles and uniforms to various PLA 

and PAP units.81 Chang notes “the new T-90 armored 

personnel carrier and T-92 wheeled armored vehicles 

belonging to the elite ground forces” are widely visible 

in photos from the Lhasa streets, and that “Only a very 

small number of the PLA’s group armies are armed 

with T-90 APCs, while the T-92s are used by its rapid 

reaction force units. The T-92s deployed in Lhasa are 

equipped with 25-mm guns. The export variant of this 

vehicle is called the WMZ-551A.” “Such equipment 

as mentioned above . . .” notes Chang, “. . . has never 

been deployed by China’s armed police.” In a July 2, 

analysis, Chang also notes as an indicator that these 

troops are the elite PLA units he believes, that “the 

People’s Liberation Army soldiers on the T-90/89 
77

vehicles on the streets of Lhasa were all wearing the 

‘leopard’ camouflage uniforms specifically designed 

for mountain warfare operations. These uniforms 

have appeared in video footage of the 149th Division 

during exercises.”82 Chang also notes, as did many 

analysts, that identification numbers and license plates 

on many of these APCs and armored vehicles have 

been covered with newspaper or cloth, and that no 

insignia or PLA red stars are visible on the helmets 

and uniforms of the security forces he has observed. 

He states without qualification that this was done “to 

cover up the involvement of regular armed forces 

in the crackdown.”83 Based on this evidence, Chang 

concludes specifically that “the 149th Rapid Reaction 

Division of the No. 13 Group Army under Chengdu 

Military Region and the No. 52 Mountain Infantry 

Brigade under the Xizang Military Region may have 

been involved in the crackdown operations.”84

Several points can be made about this analysis. 

First—and most important—nowhere in these analyses 

does Chang make any assertion that as part of their 

“crackdown operations” these alleged PLA units 

actually took part in the suppression. Indeed, aside 

from touting their involvement in the “crackdown,” 

Chang says nothing about what the troops’ mission 

and duties are. 

A great deal of Chang’s analysis turns on his strong 

empirical assertion that only a few PLA units—and no 

PAP units at all—have received the particular versions 

of the Type 90/89 APCs and Type 92/WMZ551A 

wheeled infantry fighting vehicles observed in 

Lhasa—a claim for which Chang provides no source. 

But the present author has seen recent photographic 

evidence that—while not conclusively refuting Chang’s 

assertion—raises serious questions about it: Photos of 
78

a PAP compound in Qinghai—admittedly taken about 

six months after the Lhasa riot, not before—that clearly 

show at least one dozen PAP-marked six-wheeled Type 

92/WMZ551 vehicles very similar to those used in the 

Lhasa operations. Photos proving that PAP in Lhasa 

have their own four-wheeled white and camouflage 

versions of the T92 and perhaps the T90 tracked vehicle 

have long been available on the web.85

Even so, while it may well be that these APCs 

belong to the PLA units Chang suggests, this does not 

necessarily mean that the forces being ferried about in 

them are of the same unit. In one of the more widelypublished March 15 photos of these security forces 

(showing 3-4 APCs and about two dozen security force 

members at a large, multilane “T” intersection), at least 

some of the officers sitting in the APCs have insignia 

on their caps which, though not completely clear, are 

discernibly PAP insignia and not PLA. Some others 

are clearly wearing uniforms in the darker olive PAP 

green.86

Likewise, Chang treats the type of mountain 

operations camouflage as an additional piece of 

proof that these are specific PLA units and not PAP. 

But photographs showing clearly identifiable PAP 

personnel wearing this same style of camouflage have 

been published by official Chinese press sources.87

Other internet sources, including Chinese military 

enthusiast bulletin boards, assert that PAP forces in 

the provinces of the Lanzhou and Chengdu Military 

Regions, especially those in Tibet, have received the 

same type of camouflage for mountainous, barren 

areas as the PLA forces in this region.88

While all PLA and police analysts at some level 

share Chang’s suspicions regarding the covering of 

unit and license plate numbers on trucks and APCs, as 
79

well as the absence of either PLA red stars or PAP state 

seals or other insignia on helmets and uniforms, this is 

still insufficient evidence from which to conclude, with 

the certainty Chang does, which security forces may 

or may not be PLA and PAP. More importantly, this 

information still tells us little about the precise missions 

and roles PLA or PAP may have undertaken in Lhasa, 

and in particular does not support any implication that 

PLA forces were directly involved in the suppression 

operations.

The timing of exactly when many of these PLA 

forces were on the streets of Lhasa may be a more 

significant indicator of how they were involved in these 

operations than the types of vehicles and uniforms, etc. 

Both official Chinese and foreign press sources concur 

that within about 18 to 24 hours after the outbreak of 

the riot—that is, by about Saturday noon—the rioters 

had overwhelmingly already been suppressed, and 

Lhasa had returned to a tense calm, with some Han and 

Hui shopkeepers returning to survey the conditions of 

their stores. This timetable suggests that the later the 

PLA forces first appeared on the streets after that 18- to 

24-hour window, the less likely it is that they actually 

took part in the violent suppression of the rioting. 

For now, we can conclude that some assertions of the 

Kanwa reports (and the many press and NGO reports 

that hinge on them) are plausible, but other appear to 

be based on faulty assumptions or simply cannot be 

confirmed to the high level of confidence conveyed in 

the Kanwa research, and overall they tell us little about 

the pivotal question of how the PLA was involved in 

the Lhasa operations.

There is also no evidence that PLA forces played any 

role in the subsequent mass arrests and interrogations 

of demonstrators beyond possibly helping to secure 
80

main streets in dangerous neighborhoods to deter 

any large-scale resistance against the detentions. To 

avoid exacerbating popular anger, Public Security 

units are now urged to avoid arresting protest leaders 

on the scene, but to collect evidence for subsequent 

prosecution and quietly detain the organizers later. 

On Saturday, March 15, TAR officials called on all 

rioters who had broken the law to turn themselves in 

to authorities by midnight on March 17, offering that 

those who did might get more lenient sentences, while 

those who resisted faced severe punishment.89 By 

March 20, authorities reported that 170 persons had 

surrendered voluntarily, and 24 had been arrested 

for a variety of state security-related crimes. 90 By 

April 9, TAR Government Chairman Qiangba Puncog 

noted specifically that the Public Security organs had 

already detained 953 persons suspected of engaging 

in “beating, smashing, burning, and looting,” of 

whom 403 had been formally placed under arrest by 

procurators.91 Later official reports put the number of 

detainees at more than 1,000.92 As we would expect, 

there is also no evidence that PLA forces were involved 

in the collection of “evidence” security officials used 

to investigate the origins of the protests and the 

alleged role of the Dalai Lama’s supporters. Public 

security and PAP officers were themselves caught on 

tape extensively videotaping those who took part in 

the unrest.93 Authorities also relied heavily on oral 

confessions by detainees in determining the causes 

of the demonstrations, according to comments by 

Qiangba Puncog.94
81

Post-Riot Information and Intelligence Operations.

A final possible aspect of China’s security operations 

in Tibet that may have been either a PLA or a civilian 

mission concerned cyber attacks and intelligence 

collection from overseas human rights groups 

monitoring and reporting on Chinese suppression 

activities. In the week following the protests, a 

number of pro-Tibet and human rights organizations—

including Human Rights in China, Students for a Free 

Tibet, and Tibet Support Network—reported being 

the targets of cyber attacks designed to disrupt their 

work and steal information about their contacts and 

supporters. Computer security experts familiar with 

the attacks were unable to definitively trace the attacks 

either to the PLA or other Chinese agencies such as the 

Ministry of State Security (MSS), so any PLA or MSS 

role in this also remains speculative.95

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 

FOR THE UNITED STATES

Twenty years after the PLA cleared Tiananmen 

Square, being prepared to act as the last line of defense 

for the Party’s hold on power, its social control, and 

its guarantee of China’s ethnic and territorial unity 

remains one of the most important missions of the 

PLA. This point is regularly restated in national laws, 

white papers, major leadership speeches, and other 

authoritative policy documents. Authoritative training 

materials note that at least some of the ground forces 

are expected to train for this mission, though we do 

not know which forces, how they will train, and how 

often.
82

Still, to a great degree, defending the Party’s hold 

on power against Chinese society remains the PLA’s 

“mission that dare not speak its name.” With just a 

few rare and still rather ill-defined exceptions, such as 

the Martial Law Law, the targets, specific objectives, 

and authorized tactics of a PLA mission to suppress 

social disorder are rarely discussed in authoritative 

public documents. These documents, moreover, often 

use vague language that fails to distinguish between 

the roles that are specific to the PLA and those that 

would be born by China’s other “armed forces,” or they 

include legal and institutional qualifiers that implicitly 

make it very clear that the Party, state, and the PLA 

would all strongly prefer that the PLA remain a distant 

third and final line of defense for the Party-state. Their 

sincere hope is that before the army is asked to fulfill 

this mission, the Party-state’s other security forces 

will continue to successfully carry that mission out for 

them (although, PLA intelligence involvement may be 

an exception here).

For this reason, scholars of the PLA and its domestic 

security mission need to devote more attention to the 

details of the relationship between the PLA and the 

civilian and paramilitary security organs whose own 

mission is, in part, to permit the PLA not to perform part 

of its internal security mission. This chapter notes that 

over the past 20 years the evidence strongly suggests 

that the Public Security, State Security, and PAP forces 

have, for all their failures, apparently spared the PLA 

much direct involvement in this mission.

But this chapter also argues that there are aspects of 

the new internal security strategy that have been going 

into place for almost the past decade that may somewhat 

increase the risk that incidents of unrest could grow 

out of control. The burdens the new strategy places on 
83

excellent intelligence and early warning; disciplined, 

low violence police work; and decisive, quick political 

responses by local and provincial Party authorities are 

complex and heavy. 

Using a cursory case study of critical loss of 

control during the Lhasa riot (and much more needs 

to be known about this case), this chapter has tried to 

demonstrate some ways in which this system might 

break down or lapse into a brief but crucial political 

paralysis. In Lhasa, this admittedly occurred under 

unusual circumstances that played straight into the 

system’s weaknesses—most notably the absence of 

much of the local Party elite in Beijing—and may be 

unlikely to occur again in similar fashion. At the same 

time, the massive resonant upsurge in Tibetan and 

Muslim protests and violence that quickly followed the 

March 14 Lhasa riots demonstrates clearly that Chinese 

authorities once again badly underestimated the latent 

ethno-religious anger seething in China’s western 

regions even after years of “develop the West” and other 

policy initiatives. Without question, similar uprisings 

and loss of control are by no means impossible, and 

indeed seem likely. Under these circumstances, local 

officials may once again find themselves needing to call 

for back-up units, including units of the PLA, to help 

play the many roles and missions involved in restoring 

order. It will probably come as some relief to the PLA 

that, so far as we can tell from the best available open 

source data, there appears to be no solid evidence that 

the PLA’s role in the Lhasa operation included active 

involvement in the violent suppression of rioters and 

protestors and appears to have been limited primarily 

to support roles, probably including securing major 

thoroughfares into and through the city. But the 

PLA/PAP operational security actions of obscuring/
84

covering up identifiers on APCs and uniforms means 

that there is still much we do not know for sure about 

this important case. Western analysts of the PLA 

need to keep digging to try to clarify exactly how it 

interacted with front and second line security forces in 

responding to this unrest. In particular, as information 

becomes available, we need to focus on the “lessons” 

the PLA feels it learned about its own internal security 

role, its relationship to public security and PAP forces 

in incidents of this type, and why the front and second 

lines of internal security buckled, however briefly, in 

Lhasa, leading to a need to draw on PLA support.

The degree to which the PLA can confidently 

continue to keep its distance from Lhasa-style (or more 

severe) internal security operations will, of course, have 

at least a moderate impact on its capacity to redirect its 

attention, forces, and resources toward the long and 

expensive list of new missions discussed in the other 

chapters of this book. It is also certainly an important 

factor in the state of Party-PLA relations. From the U.S. 

perspective, these are two of the greatest implications 

of the question of how much attention the PLA must 

devote to its internal security role. Lhasa does not 

appear to have tied up large amounts of PLA resources 

for any length of time, and one would have to imagine 

a far greater increase in social unrest, with greater loss 

of control by front and second line security forces, for 

social unrest to have a major impact on, say, the Party’s 

willingness to allow the PLA to refocus personnel and 

resources away from the ground forces where they are 

presently available as a backup force for social unrest 

toward more high-tech air and naval forces. At the 

same time, the recent issuance of new PLA training 

materials for handling unrest, counterterrorism, 

disaster relief, and other domestic stability and safety 
85

missions is hardly a vote of confidence by the Partystate or the PLA that front and second line civilian 

and paramilitary security forces will always be able 

to spare the PLA from having to engage in its least 

favorite “historic mission.”

CHAPTER 3 - ENDNOTES

1. By this, I mean primarily the public security, state security, 

and the People’s Armed Police forces, but also the entire criminal 

justice system including the courts, procuracy, and prison 

system.

2. Even the most detailed scholarly analyses of the PLA and 

Civil-Military and Party-Military relations have not uncovered 

many materials discussing the internal security mission in great 

detail. A few studies have directly and briefly addressed the issue 

of the PLA internal mission, noting the PLA’s refocus on external 

missions since Tiananmen, as well as efforts to enshrine the PLA/

PAP internal security mission in law. A short but particularly 

clear characterization of the PLA’s declining focus on its internal 

mission is David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: 

Progress, Problems, and Prospects, Berkeley, CA, University of 

California Press, 2002, esp. pp. 12-14; See also James Mulvenon, 

“China: Conditional Compliance” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., 

Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military 

in Asia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001, pp. 317-335; 

and Thomas Bickford, “A Retrospective on the Study of Chinese 

Civil-Military Relations Since 1979: What Have We Learned? 

Where Do We Go?,” in James Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, 

eds., Seeking Truth From Facts: A Retrospective on Chinese Military 

Studies in the Post Mao-Era, Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 

2001, pp. 1-38; Andrew Scobell “The Meaning of Martial Law for 

the PLA and Internal Security in China After Deng,” in James 

C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, eds., A Poverty of Riches: 

New Challenges and Opportunities in PLA Research, Santa Monica, 

RAND, 2003, pp. 169-191; and Dennis Blasko, The Chinese Army 

Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, London and 

New York, Routledge, 2006, pp. 156-158. On the reorganization of 

the PAP to strengthen its internal security role, see Shambaugh, 
86

Modernizing China’s Military, pp. 170-173; also Dennis J. Blasko and 

John F. Corbett, Jr., “No More Tiananmens: The People’s Armed 

Police and Stability in China, 1997,” China Strategic Review, Spring 

1998; Andrew Scobell and Brad Hammet, “Goons, Gunmen and 

Gendarmerie: Toward A Reconceptualization of Paramilitary 

Formations,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Volume 26, 

No. 2, Winter 1998, pp. 213-227; Tai Ming Cheung, “Guarding 

China’s Domestic Front Line: The People’s Armed Police and 

China’s Stability,” China Quarterly, June 1996, pp. 525-547; and 

Murray Scot Tanner, “The Institutional Lessons of Disaster: 

Reorganizing China’s People’s Armed Police After Tiananmen,” in 

James Mulvenon, ed., The People’s Liberation Army as Organization, 

Washington, DC, RAND Corporation, 2002, pp. 587-635.

3. Dennis Blasko and John Corbett, in their excellent 1998 

article on the People’s Armed Police, note one of the most powerful 

public assertions of the PLA’s desire to avoid ever again carrying 

out such a mission:

Perhaps the most significant reference to the reluctance 

of the PLA to become involved in domestic security 

operations was made about 6 months earlier by Defense 

Minister Chi Haotian during the question and answer 

period after his speech at the U.S. National Defense 

University on 10 December 1996. The U.S. media 

that covered this event focused on Chi’s unrepentant 

reiteration of the Party line defending the need to use 

deadly force - “So finally we had to adopt corresponding 

measures to disperse these people.”[i] However, little 

editorial or critical mention was made of the words 

soon to follow - “I can also tell you here that such things 

will not happen again.” (Emphasis added.) To a listener 

not surprised at hearing a senior Party official retell the 

same old, discredited story about Tiananmen, what Chi 

said sounded much like a promise not to use the PLA 

again in domestic stability operations. As an old soldier, 

General Chi understands the nuances that differentiate 

between combat against foreign enemies and operations 

to control a civilian disturbance.

Dennis J. Blasko and John F. Corbett, Jr., “No More Tiananmens: 

The People’s Armed Police and Stability in China, 1997,” China 

Strategic Review, Spring 1998, pp. 88-89.
87

4. Scobell and Hammet, “Goons, Gunmen and Gendarmerie,” 

pp. 213-227.

5. Blasko and Corbett, “No More Tiananmens.”

6. See, for example, Wang Mingwu et al., Feizhanzheng Junshi 

Xingdong (Noncombat Military Operations), Beijing, China: Guofang 

Daxue Chubanshe, 2006; by comparison, see Yuan Jingwei, 

Kongtian Yiti Zuozhan Yanjiu (Studies on Integrated Aerospace 

Combat), Beijing, China: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe, 2006.

7. For an analysis of the Martial Law Law’s content and 

background and the historical role of Martial Law in China, see 

Andrew Scobell’s essay “The Meaning of Martial Law for the PLA 

and Internal Security in China After Deng,” in James C. Mulvenon 

and Andrew N. D. Yang, eds., A Poverty of Riches: New Challenges 

and Opportunities in PLA Research, Santa Monica, RAND, 2003, pp. 

169-191.

8. Article 10: Martial law enforcment institutions shall 

establish martial law command organs, which shall coordinate 

and enforce operations related to martial law enforcement, and 

implement martial law measures under a unified plan. PLA units 

enforcing martial law are commanded by a military institution 

designated by the CMC under a unified plan of the martial law 

command organs. 

9. Article 3: To stop armed subversion and safeguard social 

stability. China’s Constitution and laws prohibit any organization 

or individual from organizing, plotting or carrying out armed 

rebellion or riot to subvert the state power or overthrow the 

socialist system. China opposes all forms of terrorism, separatism, 

and extremism. Regarding maintenance of public order and social 

stability in accordance with the law as their important duty, the 

Chinese armed forces will strike hard at terrorist activities of any 

kind, crush infiltration and sabotaging activities by hostile forces, 

and crack down on all criminal activities that threaten public 

order, so as to promote social stability and harmony. Chap 2, p. 

4.

10. For his assistance in acquainting me with this source, 

and for sharing with me his excellent research on the “historic 
88

missions,” I am grateful to my CNA colleague, Dan Hartnett. 

For a series of quotes from Hu’s speeches that lay out much of 

his notion of the historic missions, see “Comrade Hu Jintao’s 

Important Expositions (胡锦涛同志重要论述) at the National 

Defense Education Universe,” Guofang Jiaoyu Tiandi; (国防教育天

地) of Hebei province’s Dongming National Defense Education 

Institute, Dongming Guofang Jiaoyu Xuexiao; 东明国防教育学校, 

dongming.w187.bizcn.com/hbll1/zzll/zzll3.htm, accessed January 

2009. 

11. Dennis Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and 

Transformation for the 21st Century, London and New York, 

Routledge, 2006, pp. 156-158. (Quotation at p. 158.)

When possible, anti-terrorist operations us high 

technology reconnaissance to gather information about 

the target and then seek to eliminate the terrorists quickly 

using speed, stealth, and violence while protecting the 

lives of any hostages or innocent civilians in the area . 

. . In contrast, anti-riot procedures require much larger 

formations of troops or police to intimidate rioters or 

demonstrators overtly by their mass and discipline, 

preferably without using deadly force.

12. Zhang Baoshu, Lujun Junshi Xunlian Xue (The Study of 

Ground Forces Military Training), Beijing, China: Junshi Kexue 

Chubanshe, 2006, esp. pp. 210-211, 220-225; Wang Mingwu, et al. 

These sources note the issuance of new PLA training materials on 

noncombat operations in the early 2000s.

13. Ibid., p. 210.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., p. 220-224.

16. Ibid., p. 222.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.
89

19. Wang Mingwu, et al., esp. p. 87. 

20. I am especially indebted to the research of Andrew Scobell 

and Thomas Bickford for sensitizing me to these challenges of 

developing paramilitary forces that can serve a wide array of 

missions and leadership systems. 

21. For an example of police strategies at this time, see the 

analysis of “prevention” and “handling” of protests and other 

social order emergencies in Hu Guanwu, Jinji Zhi’an Shijian yu 

Duice (Emergency Social Order Cases and Countermeasures), Beijing, 

China: Zhongguo Renmin Gongan Daxue Chubanshe, 1996, esp. 

pp. 101-106.

22. Tanner, “Chinese Communist Party Strategies for 

Containing Unrest.” 

23. Wang Zhimin, “Dui xibu dakaifa zhong ruhe weihe shehui 

wending tiji youzhi fuwu de sikao” (“Thoughts on How to Maintain 

Social Stability and Provide Excellent Service in the Process of 

Developing the West”), Police Science Society of China, ed., Xibu 

Dakaifa yu Gongan Gongzuo Lunwenji (Collected Essays on Public 

Security Work in the Great Opening of the Western Regions), Beijing, 

China: Chinese People’s Public Security University Press, 2002, 

pp. 251-257.

24. Information obtained by the author from CPPSU course 

information listings.

25. Xu Nailong, et al., Quntixing Shijian de Yufang he Chuzhi 

(Preventing and Handling Mass Incidents), Beijing, China: Chinese 

People’s Public Security University Press, 2003, esp. pp. 111-115. 

Quntixing Shijian de Yufang yu Chuzhi, p. 117.

26. Wang Caiyuan, Quntixing Zhi’an Shijian, pp. 85-87, 96-99, 

101, 116, 124; Zhang Shengqian, Zhi’an Shijian Chuzhi, pp. 63-67; 

Xu Nailong, et al., Quntixing Shijian de Yufang he Chuzhi (Preventing 

and Handling Mass Incidents).

27. In a January 2006 article in the MPS flagship journal, 

Gongan Yanjiu, Guangdong Public Security Bureau Chief Liang 

Guoju issued the following rather absolute prohibition on firing 

on mass protestors: 
90

[I]n handling mass incidents, we absolutely must not 

carry weapons of the type that could wound or slay 

people, sha shang xing wuqi, and at absolutely no time 

should we open fire on the masses, renhe shihou buneng 

xiang qunzhong kai qiang. This is an iron rule of discipline 

that public security organs must follow while handling 

incidents of unrest, Zhei shi chuli quntixing shijian zhong 

gongan jiguan wu bi yange zunshou de yi tiao tie de jilu. 

Liang Guoju, “Guanyu Yufang he Chuzhi Quntixing Shijian de 

Sikao” (“Reflections on the Prevention and Handling of Public 

Order Incidents”), Gongan Yanjiu (Policing Studies), No. 5, 2006, 

pp. 9-14. 

28. Wang Caiyuan, Quntixing Zhi’an Shijian Jinji Chuzhi Yaoling

(Outline of Emergency Handling of Mass Social Order Incidents), 

Beijing, China: Zhongguo Renmin Gongan Daxue Chubanshe, 

2003, p. 190. 

29. Qiangba Puncog (Champa Phuntsog, in the standard 

Tibetan romanization) chose to interpret these facts as proof 

positive of a coordinated international conspiracy. Comments 

by Qiangba Puncog in “State Council Press Office Holds A Press 

Conference on the Recent Situation in Tibet,” April 9, 2008, full text 

in Chinese at www.china.com.cn/zhibo/2008-04/09/content_14577761.

htm?show=t; “Life in Lhasa in Returning to Normal,” Ming Pao

Special Report, cited in Ming Pao San Francisco, April 9, 2008, 

www.mingpaosf.com/htm/News/20080409/st3.h. 

30. Jim Yardley, “Monk Protests in Tibet Draw Chinese 

Security,” New York Times, March 14, 2008, at www.nytimes.

com/2008/03/14/world/asia/14china.html?th=&emc=th&pagewante

d=print; “Second day of protests in Lhasa: monks dispersed by 

tear-gas” International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) report, March 

11, 2008.

31. Ibid. The ICT March 11 report, citing a Tibetan blog, 

describes some of the vehicles involved in the response as 

“military” or “army” vehicles, but in context these could very 

easily refer to the PAP.
91

32. “Troops ‘Seal Tibet Monasteries’,” BBC World Service, 

March 14, 2008, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7295753.stm; Jill 

Drew, “Tibet Protests Turn Violent, Shops Burn in Lhasa,” The 

Washington Post, March 14, 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/03/14/AR2008031401448_pf.html; also 

information from discussions with Western experts on China and 

Tibet, Winter 2008. 

33. Jane Macartney, “Riot in Tibet as Chinese Police Clash 

with Protesters,” Times Online, March 14, 2008, www.timesonline.

co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3551219.ece; Ming Pao, April 10, 

2008; Drew.

34. China Daily, March 15, 2008, p. 1. Macartney; Ming Pao, 

April 10, 2008.

35. “Troops ‘Seal Tibet Monasteries’”; Drew.

36. “Trashing the Beijing Road,” The Economist, March 19, 

2008, at www.economist.com. 

37. Robert Barnett, “Thunder Out of Tibet,” New York Review 

of Books, Vol. 55, No. 9, May 29, 2008, at www.nybooks.com/

articles/21391. For another account that tracks very closely with 

Barnett’s, see Drew.

38. “Trashing the Beijing Road.” 

39. James Miles, “The Illusion of Calm in Tibet,” The Economist, 

July 10, 2008, at www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.

cfm?story_id=11706247. The thesis of a deliberate loss of control 

would seem to require that not only Tibetan and Central leaders 

be in on the plan, but also that they decided rather quickly to 

“take advantage” of the sudden outburst near the Ramoche, and 

also that a considerable number of rank and file police who were 

sent as reinforcements know this was the goal. This explanation, 

though certainly possible, seems rather complex to the present 

author.

40. Interviews, Beijing, China, March and April 2008.
92

41. I am grateful to June Dreyer for pointing this out, and 

for a trenchant discussion on this section which, it is hoped, has 

improved this analysis.

42. China Statistical Yearbook, 2007, China Statistics Press, 2008, 

p. 294. Law enforcement expenditure figures officially include 

public security, courts, procurators, justice departments, and, 

according to some sources, state security expenditures. After 

Tibet, the province with the second lowest law enforcement 

expenditure is Ningxia with 975,860,000 yuan).

43. Ibid.

44. Su Deliang, Ningxia Prov PSB Chief, “Yi Kexue fazhanguan 

Tongling Gongan Gongzuo he Duiwu Jianshe . . .,” Gongan Yanjiu, 

2006, No. 3, p. 24, gives figure as “6000 plus, yu).” Su claims this 

is smallest per capita ratio (per 10,000) in entire country, less than 

1/20th of some major cities/provinces, even less than one half of 

some provinces/autonomous regions/cities in China’s west. On 

Sichuan, see Gongan Yanjiu, 2004, No. 6, p. 15. Source is Sichuan 

provincial PSB. Precise figure is for “total police manpower” (zong 

jingli).

45. Li Yingming, ed., Zhongguo Renmin Wuzhuang Jingcha 

Dajiegou (The Structure of the Chinese People’s Armed Police), Taipei, 

Taiwan: Yang-Chih Book Co, Ltd., 2003, p. 68. I am indebted to Tom 

Bickford for drawing on his own excellent PAP research to assist 

me with generating these rough manpower estimates, though Dr. 

Bickford is in no way responsible for any inaccuracies. 

46. Jim Yardley, “As Tibet Erupted, China Security Forces 

Wavered,” New York Times, March 24, 2008.

47. “Transcript: James Miles interview on Tibet,” CNN.com. 

48. Ibid. 

49. “I think the effort of the authorities this time was to let 

people let off steam before establishing a very strong presence 

with troops, with guns, every few yards, all across the Tibetan 

quarter. It was only when they felt safe I think that there would 

not be massive bloodshed, that they actually moved in with that 

decisive force.” Ibid.
93

50. Interviews, Chinese security and military officials and 

experts, Beijing, China, Washington, DC, and Honolulu, HI, 

2008.

51. Yardley, “As Tibet Erupted . . .” 

52. Interviews, senior Chinese security and foreign policy 

specialists, 2008.

53. “Transcript: James Miles interview on Tibet,” CNN.com: 

It was only during the night at the end of the first day 

that this cordon was established around the old Tibetan 

quarter. But even within it, for several hours afterwards, 

people were still free to continue looting and setting 

fires, and the authorities were still standing back. And 

it was only as things fizzled out towards the middle 

of the second day that as I say they moved in in great 

numbers. 

54. Miles describes the forces in these APC as “riot police.” 

“Trashing the Beijing Road.” 

55. “Tibet Gripped by Violent Clashes,” The Guardian, March 

14, 2008.

56. “Lhasa Calm after Riot, Traffic Control Imposed,” Xinhua

in English, March 15, 2008.

57. Interviews, Summer 2008.

58. “Transcript: James Miles interview on Tibet”; “Trashing 

the Beijing Road.” Barnett reports that at an indeterminate time 

on the night of the 14th “Later, the PAP moved in, shooting from 

time to time, leading to an unknown number of casualties.” Robert 

Barnett, “Thunder Out of Tibet,” New York Review of Books, Vol. 55, 

No. 9, May 29, 2008, at www.nybooks.com/articles/21391.

59. “Tibet Official Gives Government Account of Unrest,” 

Reuters, Beijing, China, March 17, 2008. In the opening statement 

to his press conference, Qiangba Puncog went a bit further, stating 
94

that “in responding to the incident, our public security officers 

and armed policemen showed great restraint and performed their 

duty in accordance with the law and in a civilized manner. None 

of them carried or used any lethal weapon in the process.” “Opening 

Statement at the Press Conference on the Incident of Beating, 

Destruction of Property, Looting and Arson in Lhasa by His 

Excellency Qiangba Puncog . . .” March 17, 2008, at www.fmprc.

gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/xw/t416058.htm; James Yardley, “Tibetans Clash 

with Chinese Police in Second City,” New York Times, March 16, 

2008, www.NYTimes.com. According to this report, Tibetan exile 

government sources reported that they could confirm 30 Tibetans 

dead with unconfirmed deaths reported as high as 100. Chinese 

government sources denied that live fire had been used against 

protestors.

60. Lindsay Beck and Chris Buckley, “China Says its Police 

Shot Tibetan Protestors,” Reuters, March 20, 2008.

61. “Trashing the Beijing Road.” 

62. Miles reported that:

authorities chose to move in gradually with troops 

with rifles . . . they occasionally let off with single shots, 

apparently warning shots, in order to scare everybody 

back into their homes and put an end to this . . . I did hear 

persistent rumors while I was there during this rioting of 

isolated clashes between the security forces and rioters. 

And rumors of occasional bloodshed involved in that. 

But I can do no more really on the basis of what I saw 

than say there was a probability that some ethnic Chinese 

were killed in this violence, and also a probability that 

some Tibetans, Tibetan rioters themselves were killed 

by members of the security forces. But it’s impossible 

to get the kind of numbers or real first hand evidence 

necessary to back that up.

“Transcript: James Miles interview on Tibet.” 

63. “Tibet Official Gives Government Account of Unrest,” 

Reuters, March 17, 2008; “Riot Death Toll Raised to 13 as Protests 

Spread in Tibet,” International Herald Tribune, March 17, 2008. 
95

64. Edward Cody, “Backstage Role of China’s Army in Tibet 

Unrest Is a Contrast to 1989,” The Washington Post, April 13, 2008, 

p. A17.

65. Miles noted “I saw numerous, many military vehicles, 

military looking vehicles with telltale license plates covered up 

or removed. And also many troops there whose uniforms were 

distinctly lacking in the usual insignia of either the police or the 

riot police. So my very, very strong suspicion is that the army is out 

there and is in control in Lhasa.” CNN.com interview transcript.

66. “Tibetan Riots Spread to Provinces; Protesters Torch Police 

Station; PLA Moves In,” Choi Chi-yuk in Lhasa and Agencies, 

South China Morning Post, Monday, March 17, 2008, reposted to 

www.sinodefence.com.

67. Jim Yardley, “As Tibet Erupted, China Security Forces 

Wavered,” New York Times, March 24, 2008, at www.NYTimes.

com.

68. Cody, p. A17.

69. The fact that these troops had bayonets does not clarify 

whether they were PLA or PAP.

70. Interviews, March-April 2008; also “Trashing the Beijing 

Road”; “Fears of Contagion from Tibet,” The Economist, March 21, 

2008, at www.economist.com. 

71. Lou Chen, Yi Ling, “China Focus: Fears and Tears in Holy 

Plateau City Wracked by Turmoil,” Xinhua in English, March 15, 

2008.

72. “China Covers Up Sending Elite Troops to Tibet,” March 20 

posting to Tibet Will Be Free blog, citing Kanwa Defence Review 

report, blog.studentsforafreetibet.org/2008/03/20/china-covers-upsending-elite-troops-to-tibet/. 

73. “Protestors Call for Olympic Boycott, Media and UN 

Access to Tibet” VOA News, March 22, 2008, www.voanews.com/

english/2008-03-22-voa7.cfm.
96

74. “Seven Killed in Tibetan Protests: China,” Australian 

Broadcasting Corporation, ABCNews, March 15, 2008, www.abc.

net.au/news/stories/2008/03/15/2190418.htm. 

75. Part of the issue is no doubt traceable to the deliberately 

understated official Chinese euphemism for most protest 

suppression operations—“handling” the incident (chuzhi)—or the 

frequently fatal “decisively handling” an incident (guoduan chuzhi). 

Part of the confusion is fanned by reports such as that issued by 

the VOA that employs strong-sounding but vague language that 

seems to imply, without unambiguously asserting, PLA front 

line involvement in the violent suppression of the riots. The issue 

also underscores the importance of analysts being careful in their 

summary of other analysts’ reports, so as not to attribute to them 

more of an assertion than is actually there. None of the reports 

reviewed for this chapter, however, has provided detailed or firsthand evidence eyewitness or photographic/video evidence that it 

was PLA troops—rather than PAP or Public Security—who were 

among those forces alleged to have fired upon or beaten civilians 

in streets and alleyways during any of the several reported 

shooting incidents from March 10 to March 16.

76. “Tibet Official Gives Government Account of Unrest,” 

Reuters, Beijing, China, March 17. 2008. 

77. David Lague, “Chinese Leader Blames Dalai Lama for 

Tibet Violence,” International Herald Tribune, March 18, 2008, www.

iht.com/articles/2008/03/18/asia/18tibet.php. 

78. Jim Yardley, “Chinese Forces Say They’ve Secured 

Tibet’s Capital,” New York Times, March 15, 2008, www.nytimes.

com/2008/03/15/world/asia/15cnd-tibet.html?hp; “China Sets Tibet 

Protest Deadline,” BBC World Service, March 15, 2008, news.

bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7297911.stm; Janet Ong and William 

Bi, “Chinese Army Won’t Quash Tibet Protests, General Says,” 

Bloomberg.com, March 15, 2008, www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid

=20601087&sid=aN26bO28KizI&refer=home. 

79. Andrei Chang, “Elite PLA Army Units Enter Lhasa,” 

Kanwa Daily News, March 21, 2008, www.kanwa.com/dnws/

showpl.php?id=353. Chang’s report appears to have initially 
97

been published by UPI Asia under the same title, www.upiasia.

com/Security/2008/03/21/elite_pla_army_units_enter_lhasa/4132/; 

Chang makes similiar arguments, with some noteworthy 

additional points, in a later article published by UPI entitled 

“Analysis: Controlling Tibet—-Part I,” www.upi.com/Security_

Industry/2008/07/02/Analysis_Controlling_Tibet_—_Part_1/UPI88751215000000. 

80. Chang, “Elite PLA Army Units Enter Lhasa.” 

81. For analysis and photographs of the vehicles mentioned 

in this section, see www.sinodefence.com/army/armour/default.asp, 

especially section www.sinodefence.com/army/armour/zsl92.asp. 

82. Chang “Analysis: Controlling Tibet—-Part I.” 

83. Chang, “Elite PLA Army Units Enter Lhasa.” 

84. Ibid. 

85. The author obtained these photos from a careful and 

respected scholar who obtained them from the person who took 

them. My “forensic” analysis of uniforms, vehicles and photos 

builds upon the tremendous work of my CNA colleagues Dennis 

Blasko and Tom Bickford. Although they provided me with a 

crash course in this work, they are in no way responsible for my 

conclusions. 

86. Unfortunately, despite the editors’ best efforts, publishing 

considerations preclude the photo’s publication in this chapter. 

The photo, sourced to Agence France Presse/Getty Images, is 

widely available online, including in Jim Yardley’s March 16, 

2008 New York Time’s article “Tibetans Clash with Chinese Police 

in Second City,” at www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/world/asia/16tibet.

html. 

87. The author and CNA have electronic copies of these 

photos, and the author is indebted to Dennis Blasko and Tom 

Bickford for providing him with them.

88. See, for example, the exchange on this point on the military 

and weapons bulletin board at wenwen.soso.com/z/q96813260.
98

htm?rq=105939986&r1=2. The author does not regard the 

comments on this or any bulletin board as a highly reliable source, 

merely one more indicator confirming information independently 

published by official Chinese press sources.

89. Yardley, “Chinese Forces Say They’ve Secured Tibet’s 

Capital”; “China Sets Tibet Protest Deadline,” BBC World Service, 

March 15, 2008, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7297911.stm; Ong 

and Bi. 

90. Financial Express, March 20, 2008; the total official figure 

of over 1,000 is from Barnett, “Thunder from Tibet.”

91. Comments by Qiangba Puncog in “State Council Press 

Office Holds A Press Conference on the Recent Situation in 

Tibet,” April 9, 2008, full text in Chinese at www.china.com.cn/

zhibo/2008-04/09/content_14577761.htm?show=t; “Life in Lhasa 

in Returning to Normal” (拉薩生活回復正常), Ming Pao Special 

Report, cited in Ming Pao San Francisco, April 9, 2008, www.

mingpaosf.com/htm/News/20080409/st3.h. 

92. Financial Express, March 20, 2008; the total official figure 

of over 1,000 is from Barnett, “Thunder from Tibet.”

93. “OSC Observations of CCTV-1 Special on 14 Mar. Tibet 

Unrest,” CCTV, April 18, 2008, documents number PSB, PAP, 

and unidentifed plainclothes officers, videorecording civilians 

involved in demonstrations. 

94. Comments by Qiangba Puncog; “Life in Lhasa in Returning 

to Normal.” 

95. Bryan Krebs, “Cyber Attacks Target Pro-Tibet Groups,” 

Washingtonpost.com, March 21, 2008.
99

CHAPTER 4

CHINA’S EXPANDING PRESENCE

IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang*

Introduction.

Since the establishment of the People’s Republic 

of China, (PRC) the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

has maintained a relatively cautious and ambivalent 

stance toward exchanges with foreign militaries.1

Supporting an independent foreign policy largely free 

of binding security-related commitments, and steeped 

in the tradition of self-reliant wariness toward outside 

powers, the PLA minimized high-profile contact with 

foreign counterparts. 

However, since the beginning of the reform period, 

and especially since the mid- to late-1990s, the PLA has 

altered its reclusive approach and actively participated 

in a broadening range of bilateral and multilateral 

military engagements throughout the region and 

around the globe. This effort by the PLA is part and 

parcel of the larger “new security diplomacy” exhibited 

by Beijing across a range of international political and 

security matters.

Among the most interesting and high profile aspects 

of this shift is China’s increasingly active participation 

in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. 

The deployment of Chinese peacekeepers to UN 

*The authors are deeply grateful to Matthew Boswell and Melissa 

Colonno for their excellent research assistance in the completion 

of this chapter, especially in the generation of data and graphics.
100

missions has seen a dramatic 20-fold increase over its 

contributions of less than 100 peacekeepers in early 

2000. As of December 2008, China was the 14th largest 

contributor to UN peacekeeping missions, providing 

more civilian police, military observers, and troops to 

UN missions than three other permanent members of 

the UN Security Council, namely Russia, the United 

States, and the United Kingdom. Nearly three-fourths 

of China’s contributions are concentrated in Africa, and 

Beijing plans new and even more significant increases 

to its contributions in such strife-torn countries as 

Darfur/Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 

and Liberia. 

In spite of these developments, deeper thinking and 

analysis about the motivations and broader implications 

of China’s engagement in peacekeeping initiatives 

remain at an early stage.2

 These trends should lead 

us to larger, critical questions: What are the principal 

motivations behind Chinese peacekeeping activities? 

To what extent do UN peacekeeping missions factor 

into the PLA’s modernization agenda and priorities? 

How does increasing PLA interaction with other 

foreign militaries in peacekeeping missions contribute 

to broader Chinese foreign and security policy? What 

implications can be gleaned from these developments 

for Washington’s regional and global security interests, 

especially at a time when military-to-military relations 

between the United States and China remain lukewarm 

at best? 

To shed some light on these questions, and to 

understand Chinese peacekeeping as a potential 

“mission beyond Taiwan,” this chapter will first 

highlight some of the major recent developments in 

Chinese peacekeeping activities, providing a broad 

descriptive and comparative overview. Second, the 
101

chapter looks into the current debate, motivations, 

and decisionmaking processes behind the PLA’s 

expanding engagement in UN peacekeeping activities. 

The chapter concludes with a number of implications 

and recommendations which emerge from the 

analysis, with a focus on U.S.-China relations. The 

conclusions recommend the United States engage with 

China on peacekeeping-related issues, ensure greater 

convergence between Chinese and other international 

interests on questions of regional security, and 

encourage more effective international peacekeeping 

operations. 

China’s Expanding Engagement in UN Peacekeeping 

Activities.

Following its admission to the UN in 1971, the 

PRC took little to no action in the Security Council 

related to peacekeeping affairs. This ambivalence 

subsided from the 1980s onwards, with Beijing taking 

an increasingly active stance following the end of the 

Cold War. Beijing cast its first vote on peacekeeping in 

1981, supporting UN Security Council Resolution 495 

which extended the ongoing UN Peacekeeping Force 

in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The following year China made 

its first official payments toward UN peacekeeping 

operations. Subsequently, it applied for membership 

and was accepted into the UN Special Committee on 

Peacekeeping Operations. At the time, Ambassador 

Yu Mengjia, then Chinese Representative to the UN, 

publicly called for the international community to give 

“powerful support” to peacekeeping activities. 

In 1989, 20 Chinese civilian officials took part in 

the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to help 

the UN monitor elections in Cambodia. In 1990, five 
102

military observers were dispatched to support the 

UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the 

Middle East. These were the first contributions of their 

kind from China. Shortly thereafter, in another first, 

China sent military units—two separate deployments 

of 400 engineering troops each, accompanied by 48 

military observers—to Cambodia over an 18-month 

period from 1992 to 1993. 

Since the mid-1990s, China’s contributions to 

UN peacekeeping activities steadily increased and 

diversified. According to the Peacekeeping Affairs 

Office, which was established in 2001 under the 

Chinese Ministry of Defense to oversee management 

and coordination of the PLA’s participation in all 

UN peacekeeping operations, China has contributed 

more than 7,500 peacekeepers to the UN peacekeeping 

operations since 1990. As of December 2008, there 

were 2,146 Chinese peacekeepers serving in 11 UN 

missions, and China ranked as the second largest 

contributor to UN peacekeeping operations among 

the permanent members of the Security Council. Since 

2000, as contributions from the United States, United 

Kingdom, and Russia have declined or remained static, 

China’s contributions of troops, police, and military 

observers has expanded about 20-fold. Figures 1, 2, 

and 3 provide further detail on China’s contributions 

to UN peacekeeping operations and compare them 

to contributions of India, France, Russia, the United 

Kingdom, and the United States.3
103

Figure 1: China’s Average Yearly Personnel 

Contribution to UN PKO 1989-2008.

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

20 5 44 488 65 60 45 38 32 35

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

37 98 129 123 358 1036 1059 1666 1824 2146

Figure 1. China's Average Yearly Personnel 

Contribution to UN PKO, 1989-2008.
104

China, P5 & India

Contributions to UN PKOs 2000-2008 (yearly averages)

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

China 98 129 123 358 1036 1059 1666 1824 2146

France 489 540 452 326 506 598 1,067 1,978 1,950

Russia 294 320 362 328 340 305 267 295 294

UK 579 656 694 594 556 393 358 367 355

US 886 814 700 525 451 365 339 315 296

India 3,871 2,446 2,929 2,827 3,075 6,309 9,033 9,401 9,079

Figure 2. Average Yearly Contributions 

of Peacekeepers to UN Missions by China, India, 

France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States, 

2000-08.
105

MINURSO

Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara

MINUSTAH

Stabilization Mission in Haiti

MONUC

Organization Mission in the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo

ONUB

United Nations Operation in Burundi

UNAMA

Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNAMID

Hybrid Operation in Darfur

UNIFIL

Interim Force in Lebanon

UNIOSIL

Integrated Office in Sierra Leone

UNMEE

Mission in Ethiopia & Eritrea

UNMIK

Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNMIL

Mission in Liberia

UNMIS

Mission in the Sudan

UNOTIL

Office in Timor-Leste

UNMIT

Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste

UNOCI

Operation in Côte d’Ivoire

UNTSO

Truce Supervision Organization

TOTAL

Jan-06 19 134 230 3 1 7 18 595 35 7 7 4 1,060

Feb-06 19 127 230 3 1 7 18 595 35 6 7 4 1,052

Mar-06 19 127 230 3 1 85 7 18 595 35 6 7 4 1,137

Apr-06 19 127 232 1 1 187 8 18 596 65 6 7 4 1,271

May-06 19 131 232 1 1 187 7 18 596 204 6 7 4 1,413

Jun-06 9 130 230 1 187 7 19 596 473 7 4 1,663

Jul-06 15 130 232 187 7 18 576 473 7 3 1,648

Aug-06 13 130 232 187 7 19 593 473 7 2 1,663

Sep-06 15 130 232 187 7 1 593 473 7 3 1,648

Oct-06 15 130 232 190 7 18 593 467 2 7 3 1,664

Nov-06 14 130 232 190 9 18 594 461 1 7 3 1,659

Dec-06 14 130 230 190 9 18 593 469 2 7 4 1,666

Jan-07 14 129 230 392 1 7 18 588 469 2 7 4 1,861

Feb-07 13 129 230 343 1 7 19 589 469 3 7 4 1,814

Mar-07 13 129 230 343 1 7 18 586 469 3 7 3 1,809

Apr-07 13 129 230 343 1 7 18 588 468 13 7 3 1,820

May-07 13 136 231 343 1 7 18 587 469 13 7 3 1,828

Jun-07 19 136 234 343 1 7 18 587 465 13 4 3 1,830

Jul-07 13 136 234 343 1 7 18 587 468 13 7 3 1,830

Aug-07 13 134 234 360 1 7 18 570 468 13 7 3 1,828

Sep-07 13 134 234 343 1 6 18 570 468 13 7 3 1,811

Oct-07 14 134 234 343 1 6 15 580 468 13 7 4 1,819

Nov-07 13 134 234 343 1 6 15 582 468 13 7 4 1,820

Dec-07 13 134 234 343 1 7 15 581 468 13 7 5 1,824

Jan-08 13 134 234 143 343 1 7 2 581 466 27 7 5 1,963

Feb-08 13 134 234 143 343 1 7 2 581 466 27 7 4 1,962

Mar-08 10 134 234 147 343 1 2 20 581 466 25 11 4 1,978

Apr-08 14 134 234 147 343 2 18 581 466 25 13 4 1,981

May-08 14 134 234 147 343 2 18 580 466 25 10 4 1,977

Jun-08 13 127 231 147 343 2 18 580 466 18 6 4 1,955 Total 

Avg 13 132 232 146 302 1 6 16 585 468 13 7 4 1,834

Figure 3. China’s Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations by Individual Mission, 

January 2006 to June 2008.
106

The majority of Chinese troop contributions play 

a supportive role in engineering, transportation, and 

medical services. Chinese peacekeepers document 

that they have built more than 7,300 kilometers of 

paved roads and 200 bridges, treated more than 28,000 

patients, and cleared more than 7,500 explosives.

In addition, China has become the thirteenth largest 

contributor of civilian police to UN peacekeeping 

operations. China first sent police in 1999 to serve in the 

UN mission to East Timor. In 2004, China dispatched 

the first group of Chinese riot police to support the 

mission in Haiti to help maintain law and order and 

to train the local police force, even though the two 

countries do not have formal diplomatic ties. According 

to Guo Baoshan, the deputy director-general of the 

international cooperation department of the Chinese 

Ministry of Public Security, UN peacekeeping police 

should shoulder greater responsibilities beyond the 

usual tasks of enforcing ceasefires. Guo noted that they 

should also assist with reconstruction of the local legal 

system, law enforcement, help protect civilian rights, 

and provide humanitarian relief efforts.4

Broadly speaking, beyond simple “boots on the 

ground,” China has also exhibited greater commitment 

to peacekeeping activities by increasing Chinese 

administrative and leadership personnel involved 

in UN peacekeeping and by placing its troops in 

more dangerous situations. Chinese military officers 

working in the Chinese permanent mission at the 

United Nations in New York are becoming increasingly 

involved both in providing information and expertise 

on peacekeeping for policymakers in Beijing and in 

representing Chinese military and peacekeepingrelated policies at the United Nations. Additionally, 

within the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
107

(UNDPKO), there are now at least three Chinese 

nationals serving in the Force Generation Unit, Military 

Planning Service Office and the Operations Office 

for the Asia and Middle East Division. In September 

2007, the UNDPKO announced the appointment of 

General Zhao Jainmin as the force commander for the 

UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 

(MINURSO). More recently, on such sensitive issues 

as Darfur, Beijing has adopted a more active approach, 

embracing the need for political reconciliation and a 

hybrid African Union/United Nations peacekeeping 

force to address the humanitarian crisis. In mid-July 

2008, China deployed an additional 172-member 

engineering battalion, bringing its contributions to a 

total of 321 troops in Darfur to help prepare the way 

for the larger UN force envisioned by the international 

community. 

Key Factors Shaping China’s Evolving Approach 

to UN Peacekeeping.

It appears China will continue this more active 

approach to UN peacekeeping. A reading of recent 

Chinese actions, statements, and writings suggests 

a number of interrelated factors and motivations for 

the PLA and the Chinese leadership that shape and 

drive this new approach: enhance multilateral security 

cooperation to help secure a stable international 

environment; reassure neighbors about China’s 

peaceful intentions; and balance U.S. and Western 

influence while gradually but more firmly establishing 

China’s Great Power image within the international 

community. It is less clear from the open-source 

literature whether involvement in UN peacekeeping 

missions is seen in China as having a more direct 
108

impact on the PLA’s military modernization effort, 

though an indirect linkage can be made.5

According to Pang Zhongying, an academic who 

has commented widely on China’s peacekeeping 

operations, the Chinese leadership has gradually 

realized that participation in peacekeeping missions 

can help reduce tensions and conflicts in global hotspots, “which works in China’s national interest 

as the country begins to build a sound external 

environment for its long-term economic growth and 

social development.” This view was also expressed by 

a senior Chinese foreign policy official at the Munich 

Conference on Security Policy in 2007: “China’s 

increasing involvement in UN peacekeeping missions 

reflected China’s commitment to contribute to global 

security, given the country’s important role within 

the international system and the fact that its security 

and development are closely linked to that of the 

rest of the world.”6

 The link between international 

developments and China’s own security as a core 

national interest is one important factor for the Chinese 

leadership’s decision to adopt a more constructive role 

in peacekeeping missions abroad. 

In addition, participation in peacekeeping operations 

is seen as a way to assuage China’s neighbors’ concerns 

with the PLA’s growing military capabilities. Beijing is 

increasingly attuned to and seeks to dampen regional 

concerns that a rising China would pursue a hegemonic 

path and destabilize regional and international peace 

and security.7 As such, Chinese strategists argue that 

one of the most urgent diplomatic tasks for Beijing 

today is to assure the world of its positive intentions 

and goodwill.8

 By participating in UN peacekeeping 

operations, Beijing seeks to put forward the “good side” 

of the PLA and China’s increasing military capability, 
109

sending a message that China is further integrating 

into the international community, becoming more 

responsive to regional and global expectations, making 

positive and tangible contributions to global peace 

and security, and acting as a more responsible major 

power.9

An interesting aspect of this is how Beijing has 

become more flexible in its approach to peacekeeping on 

matters where Taiwan is concerned. On past occasions, 

on UN Security Council votes involving peacekeeping 

activities in countries which diplomatically recognized 

Taiwan, Beijing would typically take obstructionist 

positions. This approach has changed in recent 

years as Beijing has sought to burnish its credentials 

as a more responsible power (and has taken a more 

nuanced approach in its efforts to isolate Taiwan). 

For example, Beijing chose first to veto a proposed 

peacekeeping mission to Guatemala in 1997 owing to 

the country’s diplomatic relations with Taiwan. China 

subsequently reversed its vote, allowing the mission 

to proceed. More recently, Beijing supported the UN 

peacekeeping mission to stabilize Haiti, and even 

signed on to provide Chinese police, even though Haiti 

formally recognizes Taiwan. As one senior minister in 

the Ministry of Public Security commented, “China’s 

active involvement in peacekeeping missions of the 

United Nations, especially in Haiti, which has not set 

up a diplomatic relationship with China, fully exhibits 

a peace-loving and responsible image of the country.”10

Some have also speculated that such steps would help 

China bring Haiti into China’s diplomatic camp over 

time.

In another example, China has agreed to take part 

in highly sensitive and potentially dangerous missions 

to deflect international criticism and position itself as a 
110

responsible power. China’s approach to peacekeeping 

in Darfur is the most prominent example of this 

development. By bringing pressure on the Sudanese 

government to follow through with its international 

agreements and by committing PLA troops to one 

of the most politically volatile and unstable regions 

in Africa, China demonstrates a willingness to 

shoulder greater responsibilities while also hoping to 

defuse international criticism about its relations with 

Khartoum.11

Chinese scholars also claim that the positive 

image generated from participation in peacekeeping 

operations could help solidify and consolidate its 

Great Power status and balance against American and 

Western influence in global hotspots.12 As one Chinese 

author opined, “China could use its symbolic power 

in the UN to its advantage.”13 In Beijing’s view, closer 

integration with the UN system, and the UNDPKO in 

particular, means that China can play a more prominent 

role in shaping the future direction of UN peacekeeping 

missions. China has taken an official position to criticize 

“the lack of officials from developing countries . . . 

who occupy high posts in the UNDPKO.”14 It has also 

expressed concern that peacekeeping missions around 

the world remain largely dominated and directed by 

“some Western powers and military alliances such as 

NATO” and argued that developing countries should 

have a greater say in the decisionmaking process in the 

UNDPKO.15

Finally, there is some evidence that China’s 

increased peacekeeping activity is intended to help 

the PLA and Chinese police forces improve their 

readiness for other missions. In June 2007, the PLA 

convened the first major internal peacekeeping work 

meeting. Over the course of the 4-day meeting, senior 
111

representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Public Security 

gathered to discuss the current situation of Chinese 

participation and contribution in UN peacekeeping 

operations and to put forth specific measures and 

suggestions for strengthening and improving Chinese 

peacekeeping activities. Lieutenant General Zhang 

Qinsheng, deputy chief of the General Staff of the PLA, 

was subsequently quoted in the Chinese press that the 

meeting helped gather further insights “to raise the 

peacekeeping capabilities of China’s armed forces . . 

. and [to] gradually expand peacekeeping exchanges 

and cooperation with the outside world in a planned 

and focused manner.”16 Mindful of the persistent 

challenges China faces in its peacekeeping capabilities, 

Zhang also commented that China “must vigorously 

strengthen building of the peacekeeping ranks and 

forge a high-caliber peacekeeping contingent.”17

Echoing these views at an international seminar 

on multilateral peace operations in 2007, PLA Senior 

Colonel Zhang Ping further categorized China’s 

increasing external exchanges and peacekeeping 

training exercises into three important levels. First, 

as part of the “going out to learn” phase, the PLA has 

sent more than 100 officers to take part in professional 

training and exchanges organized by more than 10 

Southeast Asian and European countries. Chinese 

participation, either as observers or active participants, 

in peacekeeping training exercises organized by 

the French Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping 

Capabilities (RECAMP) as well as those sponsored by 

the British defense and security establishments have 

all provided valuable insights into joint coordination 

mechanisms involving various military units and 

civilian departments from which the PLA can draw 

during its own training processes.18
112

Second, it has also extended invitations to foreign 

military counterparts for additional help and more 

rigorous peacekeeping training programs. According 

to the Chinese Peacekeeping Affairs Office, it has in 

the recent past invited peacekeeping specialists from 

the UNDPKO and foreign military officers from the 

United Kingdom, for example, to assist and inspect 

China’s predeployment contingents. And third, China 

has increasingly taken on the role of hosting and 

organizing international seminars on peacekeeping 

affairs. Together with London, it has been coordinating 

the “UK-China Seminar on Peacekeeping Operations” 

since 2004. It has also arranged similar seminars with 

Sweden, Norway, and the Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations (ASEAN), giving the PLA a better 

understanding of the standard training manuals 

and courses commonly used by other countries’ 

peacekeeping training programs. The International 

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has also been able 

to work with the PLA to develop and integrate seminars 

and predeployment briefings for Chinese peacekeepers 

on such issues as human rights and customary norms 

in international humanitarian law. 

The increase in Chinese military engagements 

abroad has prompted some Chinese academics to call 

for a clearer legislative basis to govern such activities. 

Such debate and thinking indicates that there is greater 

acknowledgement and perhaps approval of PLA’s 

increasing “nonwar” activities such as peacekeeping. 

It also indicates a growing recognition of the need for 

a stronger “legal basis” to govern such practical issues 

as,

the administration of the exit and entry of military 

personnel and their weaponry, the signing procedures 
113

of foreign-related agreements, expenditures and backup 

methods of military actions, the legal responsibility and 

jurisdiction of military personnel involving in foreignrelated nonmilitary actions, rescue and treatment of 

causalities, and compensation responsibility.19

Over the last few years, China has invested in 

the necessary facilities within China to improve 

the training and preparedness of its peacekeepers, 

which will in turn make them better able to translate 

their international experiences into useful lessons for 

missions other than peacekeeping. For example, in 2000, 

the Civilian Peacekeeping Police (CIVPOL) Training 

Center was established in Langfang, a city about 25 

miles (40 kilometers) southeast of Beijing. It has the 

capacity to train more than 200 officers at one time. 

The training programs offer extensive courses on such 

necessary skills as map reading, handling of weapons, 

radio communication, conducting investigations and 

arrests, and enforcing laws for Chinese police officers 

who will be dispatched to serve in UN missions 

abroad. According to senior officials at CIVPOL, the 

center has received funds amounting to $13 million 

for further expansion and modernization. Similarly, 

the International Relations Academy in Nanjing, 

associated with the PLA defense intelligence services, 

has been active in preparing Chinese officers on such 

topics as peacekeeping principles, the UN Charter, 

conducting medical and communications procedures 

in international settings, and foreign language study. 

In addition, Chinese officials expect that a new 

peacekeeping training center in Huairou will become 

operational during 2009 to help the PLA's Peacekeeping 

Affairs Office centralize and better coordinate Chinese 

peacekeeping.
114

Expanding peacekeeping-related contact with 

foreign counterparts presumably provides benefits 

for the PLA as it seeks to modernize its mobilization, 

organization, and deployment capabilities. However, it 

is difficult to clearly identify a direct linkage. Western 

scholars and officers at the Chinese National Defense 

University confirm that the sharpened skills and 

know-how acquired through foreign training as well 

as the hands-on experience of serving in peacekeeping 

missions provide valuable follow-on benefits. Each 

peacekeeping contingent can share valuable experiences 

and insights to help benefit and modernize the larger 

main force and military region to which it belongs 

upon the completion of its peacekeeping assignment 

abroad.20

Implications and Recommendations.

This brief analysis of the activities and motivations 

of Chinese peacekeeping points us to a number of 

important implications and recommendations for the 

international community and for the United States more 

specifically. In short, China’s expanding engagement 

in peacekeeping activities offers new opportunities to 

strengthen China’s commitment to regional stability 

and security-building and improve its international 

peacekeeping capacity, while also opening potentially 

beneficial areas of military-to-military cooperation 

between China and its major security partners, 

especially the United States.

At the international level, while it is clear Beijing is 

keen to ramp up its peacekeeping activities, it will do 

so on a case-by-case basis and within certain persistent 

limitations. On the one hand, China’s increasing 

commitment to UN peacekeeping activities opens a 
115

new avenue for engagement between the international 

community and Beijing, and offers an opportunity 

to deepen China’s commitment to global norms of 

security-building, conflict resolution, and post-conflict 

reconciliation and reconstruction. The continued 

deployment and redeployment of Chinese units 

throughout Africa, for example, means that over time 

they will accrue operational knowledge and a better 

understanding of the political and security dynamics 

and complexities on the ground. At the same time, 

Beijing’s increasing interaction with other militaries in 

blue helmet missions has, to a certain degree, opened 

the window for a better understanding of the strengths 

and weaknesses of the PLA. Generally speaking, it 

appears Beijing is prepared to shoulder some greater 

responsibilities and to play a more significant role in 

supporting the UN peacekeeping system. Certainly 

such an approach would be welcomed within the UN 

system as the UNDPKO’s increases its reliance on 

Chinese contributions and support.

On the other hand, China’s willingness to fully 

engage in UN peacekeeping operations will face 

a number of constraints, and expectations within 

the international community should be modest but 

cautiously optimistic. The traditional view of state 

sovereignty and noninterference will continue to be 

the most important concern for Chinese policymakers. 

In addition, practical matters of political, military, 

and bureaucratic will and capacity will also be factors 

slowing Chinese responsiveness in peacekeeping 

affairs. To date, China has not provided its planning 

data sheet to the UN Standby Arrangements System. 

The data sheet provides, among other details, a list of 

major equipment, unit organization, and movement 

data to the UN. Furthermore, Beijing has yet to provide 
116

a formal commitment to contribute standby troops 

to the UN under the standard response timeframe. 

In private, Chinese officials at the UN explained 

that there is a perennial shortage of well-trained 

peacekeeping officers with the necessary language 

and technical skills. The lack of sufficient air- and/

or sea-lift capacity has also inhibited its capabilities 

to commit to rapid deployment of significantly large 

number of troops over long distances. Moreover, 

China’s financial contribution toward peacekeeping 

operations represents around 2 percent of the overall 

UNDPKO budget and would need to be augmented 

if Beijing wants to play a larger role commensurate 

with its growing influence globally and within the UN 

system. 

Beijing remains generally cautious toward the 

use of peacekeepers and on the broader issue of 

intervention by the international community. In such 

cases as Zimbabwe and Myanmar, China has thus far 

resisted calls from human rights advocacy groups and 

some Western governments to pursue intervention 

based on humanitarian justifications. It should be 

noted, however, that in 1999, China accepted a UNsanctioned humanitarian justification for using force in 

East Timor. It also subsequently dispatched a civilian 

police contingent to support the mission in East Timor. 

Likewise, in 2003, in response to growing instabilities 

in the Congo and Liberia, then Chinese Ambassador 

to the UN Zhang Yishan argued that the “United 

Nations should intervene in the areas of conflict 

faster, sooner, and in a more forceful manner.”21 In 

short, Beijing prefers to review the “reality of conflicts 

on a case-by-case basis.”22 There will be limitations, 

and it is unlikely that Beijing will take the initiative, 

offering active support under circumstances where the 
117

international community remains divided and where 

sovereign governments are adamantly opposed to the 

intervention of such UN forces. 

Over time, it is possible China would aim to 

counterbalance Western influence gradually and take 

a more active role in shaping the norms and responses 

regarding UN peacekeeping operations in ways 

consistent with Chinese foreign policy principles and 

national interests. To be sure, such influence could 

accrue over time, but it would also require greater 

Chinese commitment in several key areas, including 

better trained troops, a more capable military that can 

deploy effective rapid-response teams, a willingness 

to dispatch active combatant units, demonstrate 

leadership capabilities at the UNDPKO in New York 

and throughout the peacekeeping missions around 

the world, and provide greater financial contribution 

commensurate with its status as a permanent member 

of the Security Council and a rising global power.

Given these developments, the United States 

should implement policies aimed at deepening these 

encouraging trends related to Beijing’s involvement 

with UN peacekeeping operations. There has been 

some thinking in this direction. As former U.S. Secretary 

of Defense William Cohen indicated in a speech in 

Beijing in 2000: “U.S. and Chinese service members 

may one day find themselves working side by side in 

peacekeeping missions.”23 More recently at a track-1.5 

dialogue on U.S.-China security issues, former U.S. 

Secretary of Defense William Perry also suggested 

that the two armed forces should cooperate more 

closely on humanitarian operations and peacekeeping 

missions.24

Working on peacekeeping training activities and 

capacity-building thus provides a useful platform to 
118

build confidence and greater understanding between 

the two militaries. The United States is in the midst 

of an expansive phase on peacekeeping training 

and capacity-building engagements with foreign 

militaries, with the Global Peace Operations Initiative 

(GPOI) as a flagship initiative in this regard. In 

2004, in response to the Group of Eight (G8) Summit 

agreement to address the continued shortage of 

available peacekeepers, then-U.S. President George W. 

Bush announced the establishment of GPOI, a 5-year 

program managed by the State Department’s Bureau 

of Political-Military Affairs to enhance peacekeeping 

training for UN missions as well as partner countries’ 

overall peacekeeping capacity-building.25 The goal is 

to train as many as 75,000 military peacekeepers by 

2010, mostly in Africa. There is an emerging interest 

at the policymaking level within the State Department 

to explore future prospects for working with China to 

help build African peacekeeping capacity. This would 

include, for example, working with Chinese contractors 

and drawing on Chinese assistance in infrastructure 

and hardware support in the initial build-up stage of 

peace operations.

While Africa remains a focal point in the program, 

GPOI’s outreach includes all the major regions around 

the world. In the Asia-Pacific front, for example, GPOI 

programs include: Cobra Gold Exercise; train-thetrainers (TTT); command post military exercise (CPX); 

and field training military exercise (FTX). The latter 

two exercises have been largely integrated into the 

multinational Khan Quest Exercises based in Mongolia. 

These exercises follow most of the UN standard 

peace support operations’ training, techniques, and 

procedures, and have sought to enhance multinational 
119

interoperability, expand confidence-building and military-to-military relationships, and simulate multinational cooperation experienced in UN peacekeeping 

missions. Since China is not a GPOI partner country, 

however, it has only taken part in the Cobra Gold and 

Khan Quest exercises as an observer. 

The prospects for U.S.-China collaboration on 

peacekeeping activities face considerable obstacles at 

this stage. The congressionally mandated restrictions 

on U.S.-China military-to-military ties outlined in 

the Defense Authorization Bill for fiscal year 2000 

places strict limitations on the scope and scale of 

bilateral military exchanges, which includes advanced 

combined-arms and joint combat operations, advanced 

logistical operations, surveillance and reconnaissance 

operations, and force projection operations, among 

many other areas.26 Official exchanges on peacekeeping 

training and coordination between the two sides are not 

explicitly restricted in the bill, but it will require strong 

political will at the senior policymaking level to make 

the case that such interactions with the PLA do not 

pose a threat to U.S. national security. Absent strong 

political will, and as long as the limitations remain the 

law of the land, there will be continued caution in the 

level of interaction between the two militaries. This is 

especially true as long as concerns remain about the 

opacity of China’s longer-term military intentions 

and how they contrast with U.S. regional and global 

security interests. 

The Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense 

Review expresses concerns about the pace, scope, and 

future direction of China’s military modernization 

effort. But, on the other hand, the report also 

recommends military exchanges, visits, and other 

forms of engagement as useful tools in promoting 

transparency as long as they bear substance and are 
120

fully reciprocal. It further identifies that regularized 

exchanges and contacts have the significant benefit 

of building confidence, reducing the possibility of 

accidents and other unintended confrontations, and 

providing lines of communication that are essential for 

the two militaries.27

As the new U.S. administration looks to build a 

productive relationship with Beijing, Washington 

should take steps to engage China on peacekeepingrelated issues with an aim to deepen China’s commitment to global and regional stability, further the development of effective international peacekeeping operations, and help shape China’s expanding peacekeeping activities in ways consistent with U.S. interests. Such 

steps could include:

• Intensify bilateral and multilateral dialogue and 

policy coordination with China on mutual security 

concerns such as Afghanistan and Zimbabwe, and on 

the prospects for multilateral peacekeeping support 

and deployment. In recent years, Beijing’s support 

for and interest to take part in UN peacekeeping 

operations in East Timor, Haiti, and Darfur all 

point to more flexible views toward intervention 

by the international community. When there 

is broad international consensus around a 

specific intervention, China has tended to 

lend its support. The critical part of gaining 

Chinese involvement and cooperation will thus 

require Washington to work assiduously with 

the broader international community to forge 

greater consensus to enlist Beijing’s support and 

help shape Chinese policies in a constructive 

direction.

• Expand military-to-military relations to encompass forms of peacekeeping training and capacity-
121

building. To the extent possible under the Defense Authorization Bill for 2000, Washington 

should seek to encourage greater Chinese 

participation in future peacekeeping training 

exercises under the GPOI framework. It could 

also work with China to explore the prospects 

of supporting peacekeeping capacity-building 

in GPOI partner countries in Africa, where both 

the United States and China have increasing 

areas of common interest. In Liberia, for 

example, the United States is involved with the 

training of the Liberian armed forces. China 

has also come in to complement this work in 

constructive ways by assisting with hardware 

and refurbishing buildings, facilities, and other 

infrastructures, and there has been ongoing 

communication between the defense attachés 

from both embassies in Liberia. Over time, China 

should be more fully engaged on such issues 

as security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, 

demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), and 

election observations.

• Work with other countries that have substantial 

interests in peacekeeping affairs to increase 

peacekeeping-related military interactions with 

Beijing and support greater Chinese involvement in 

the UNDPKO and other peace operations. In recent 

years, many countries with strong support for 

UN peacekeeping operations such as Australia, 

Bangladesh, Canada, France, India, Norway, 

Sweden, and the United Kingdom have seen 

more expansive interactions with the PLA on 

peacekeeping training exercises and seminars. 

Washington should encourage this trend and 

work with these partners to explore ways in 
122

which China could play a more active part in 

the planning, coordination, leadership, and 

financial contribution roles at the UNDPKO and 

possibly beyond.

• Build on growing Chinese interests in peacekeeping 

affairs to encourage greater openness and transparency in the PLA. Washington and its partners 

should continue to communicate to the Chinese that a greater degree of openness is needed 

to sustain a collaborative relationship. Collaboration in relation to peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and other related forms of 

military-to-military exchange would usefully 

contribute to building greater openness and 

transparency within the PLA.

CHAPTER 4 - ENDNOTES

1. See, for example, Michael Yahuda, “China’s Search for a 

Global Role,” Current History, Vol. 98, No. 629, September 1999; 

Gilbert Rozman, “China’s Quest for Great Power Identity,” Orbis 

Vol. 43, No. 3, Summer 1999; Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor 

Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6, 

November/December 2003; Bates Gill, Rising Star: China’s New 

Security Diplomacy, Washington, DC: Brookings, 2007, especially 

chaps. 2 and 4.

2. Some earlier work on this topic includes Bates Gill and 

James Reilly, “Sovereignty, Intervention, and Peacekeeping: 

The View from Beijing,” Survival, Autumn 2000; Stefan Staehle, 

China’s Participation in the United Nations Peacekeeping Regime,

M.A. thesis, George Washington University, May 2006; M. Taylor 

Fravel, “China’s Attitude Toward UN Peacekeeping Operations 

Since 1989,” Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 11, November 1996; He Yin, 

China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations, Stockholm, 

Sweden: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2007.
123

3. Data generated from multiple sources, including the web site 

of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), 

available from www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors.

4. ”Chinese Police Forces Second Largest among UN Peace 

Missions,” People’s Daily Online, July 24, 2007, available from 

english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/6222369.html. 

5. Some work to appear in recent years from Chinese writers 

on peacekeeping issues are Pang Zhongying, “China’s Changing 

Attitude to UN Peacekeeping,” International Peacekeeping, 

Spring 2005); Yin; Wang Jianwei, “Managing Conflict: Chinese 

Perspectives on Multilateral Diplomacy and Collective Security,” 

in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, eds., In the Eyes of the Dragon: 

China Views the World, Lanham, England: Rowman & Littlefield, 

1999; Zhuang Maocheng, “A Synopsis of the Beijing International 

Seminar on Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century,” 

presented at the Partners Meeting in British Defense Academy, 

March 1, 2005. 

6. “China Bolsters Peacekeeping Commitment,” Jane’s Defence 

Weekly, February 21, 2007.

7. See, for example, “PLA Must Improve Capabilities, 

Safeguard Party’s ‘Ruling Status’ in New Era,” Zhongguo Junshi 

Kexue, October 20, 2007, translated in Open Source Center: 

CPP20080618436001; Du Nongyi, “Peacekeeping Diplomacy: 

Main Theme of Military Diplomacy in the New Phase of the New 

Century,” Military Science, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2007.

8. He, p. 49.

9. See Wang Yizhou, “Conducting a Multiinsight Study of 

China’s Relations with Key International Organizations,” in 

Wang Yizhou, Construction in Contradiction: A Multiple Insight 

into Relationship between China and Key International Organizations,

Beijing: China Development Press, 2003. 

10. “China to Send Anti-riot Peacekeepers for Haiti,” 

Xinhuanet, June 4, 2004, available from www.chinaview.cn. 
124

11. For more, see Chin-hao Huang, “U.S.-China Relations and 

Darfur,” Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 31, No. 4, April 

2008, pp. 827-842.

12. Tang Yongsheng, “China and UN Peacekeeping 

Interactions,” in Wang Jisi, ed., World Politics: Views from China—

China’s Foreign Affairs, Hong Kong: Peace Book Publisher, 2006.

13. Pang, “China’s Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping,” 

p. 96.

14. “Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the 

United Nations Reform,” Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

June 7, 2005, available from www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/xw/

t199101.htm. 

15. Ibid.

16. “Chinese Deputy Military Chief on Raising Army’s 

Peacekeeping Role,” Zhongguo Xinwen She, June 22, 2007, translated 

in BBC Monitoring International Reports: CPP20070622968151.

17. Ibid.

18. Presentation notes by Senior Colonel Ouyang Wei 

and Senior Colonel Xu Weidi from the PLA National Defense 

University at a conference on UN peacekeeping operations in 

Oslo, Norway, on October 9, 2007.

19. “Speeding up Legislation on PLA’s Nonwar Military 

Actions,” Jiefangjun Bao Online, October 28, 2008, translated in 

Open Source Center: CPP20081028710005.

20. See, for example, Roy Kamphausen, “PLA Power 

Projection: Current Realities and Emerging Trends,” in Michael 

Swaine et al., eds, Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and 

Taiwan’s Security, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, 2007. See also presentation notes by Senior 

Colonel Ouyang Wei and Senior Colonel Xu Weidi from the PLA 

National Defense University at a conference on UN peacekeeping 

operations in Oslo, Norway, on October 9, 2007.
125

21. “China Takes on Major Peacekeeping Role,” Jane’s 

Intelligence Review, November 1, 2003.

22. He, p. 52.

23. “Chinese Military Students, Family Member Query 

Cohen,” U.S. Department of Defense, July 14, 2000, available from 

www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45322. 

24. “China, U.S. Armed Forces Vow to Enhance Cooperation,” 

Xinhuanet, June 30, 2008, available from news.xinhuanet.com/

english/2008-06/30/content_8466881.htm.

25. “Global Peace Operations Initiative,” U.S. Department of 

State, April 1, 2004, available from www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/. 

26. See Kenneth Allen, “U.S.-China Military Relations: 

Not a One-Way Street,” Henry L. Stimson Center News 

Advisory, December 13, 1999, available from www.stimson.

org/?SN=ME20011221208.

27. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Defense, February 6, 2006, available from www.

defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf. 

127

CHAPTER 5

PLA MISSIONS IN FRONTIER SECURITY 

AND COUNTERTERRORISM

Robert O. Modarelli III

China’s 2006 national defense white paper (NDWP), 

officially entitled China's National Defense of 2006, states 

that China’s defense policy is intended to guarantee 

maintenance of the country’s “security and unity, and 

realizing the goal of building a moderately prosperous 

society.” In a subsequent detailed outline of the key 

elements of a security strategy to accomplish this, the 

Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is tasked 

with “performing its historical missions” of “providing 

an important source of strength for consolidating 

the ruling position of the CPC [Communist Party of 

China, hereafter referred to as the Chinese Communist 

Party or CCP],” providing a secure environment for 

sustained national development, providing support to 

safeguarding national interests, and playing a “major 

role” in maintaining world peace and development.

 In recent years it has become increasingly common 

for observers to conclude that the principle concern, 

and top priority, of national security strategy in China 

is the preservation of the legitimacy of the CCP as 

the sole governing power, a legitimacy that in turn 

depends primarily on the maintenance of social 

stability and public order. External threats, while clearly 

addressed and given much weight in Chinese strategic 

writings, are often discussed in terms of their ability 

to destabilize internal social order. Chinese history 

and traditional strategic thought have long recognized 

the dangers of foreign threats coupled with domestic 
128

unrest (内忧外患 neiyou waihuan) as a classic recipe for 

regime failure, and this meme continues to permeate 

much contemporary writing on this subject. In this 

context, an argument can be made that from a strategic 

perspective, the “main front” in China’s attempt to 

achieve national security goals is internal and aimed at 

stability within China and its near abroad. The NDWP 

seems to support this interpretation, for though it does 

discuss the threats and challenges China faces from 

more traditional state actors, in general it concludes 

that China’s security situation with regard to outside 

powers is basically “sound.”1

On the other hand, the NDWP provides considerable 

discussion of more “nontraditional” threats to China’s 

continued security, including such factors as threats 

to domestic social stability. While there is no explicit 

discussion of the relative “weights” assigned to these 

traditional and nontraditional threats in the Chinese 

strategic calculus, it seems likely that social stability 

(especially in the less ethnically homogenous frontier 

regions) and counterterrorism (CT) issues will remain 

strategic priorities, and thus sources of PLA missions, 

well beyond potential resolution of such traditional 

“external” matters like the Taiwan issue, regardless of 

how such resolution might be achieved. While highly 

visible, extremely neuralgic from China’s point of 

view, and of great concern to the United States and 

its regional allies as the only security concern that has 

the realistic potential at present to involve the United 

States in direct conflict with China, it is important 

to remember that preparing for a Taiwan scenario is 

not the sole focus of PLA planning or modernization 

efforts, nor is it the PLA’s raison d’etre. That surely 

derives more from the broader strategic imperatives of 

regime security and national stability.2
129

PURPOSE

Much has been written elsewhere about the 

implications of this strategy for the PLA in terms of more 

traditional missions, force structure and equipment 

requirements, and modernization programs.3

 The 

primary purpose of this chapter is to identify key 

missions for the PLA in the areas of frontier security 

and CT, and to understand how it pursues missions 

in security cooperation with other countries in these 

areas, primarily through the mechanism of combined 

exercises. In doing so, the chapter will concentrate 

on identifying and analyzing these missions from a 

strategic perspective in terms of how they integrate 

with overall Chinese strategic priorities. It will also 

take a look at some potential implications of these 

missions and their importance for the PLA. The chapter 

will touch only briefly on consideration of lower-level 

tactical type missions such as patrolling, building 

fences, etc.—these sorts of missions are generally quite 

obvious, and detailed listings of such are easily found 

in a number of sources. 

There are numerous primary sources available 

to assist in determining the broad outlines of PLA 

missions in these areas, beginning with the NDWP 

of 2006, and including publications from both PLA 

and People’s Armed Police (PAP) publishing houses, 

schools, and professional journals. By surveying these 

sources and seeking to place them within the context 

of overall Chinese national strategy, we can get a 

sense of how the PLA and PAP leadership interpret 

this guidance and derive their own specific missions 

(in other words, the outcomes of their own “mission 

analysis” process).4

 It is also possible to develop some 

theories as to what level of importance these missions 
130

may have in the PLA’s overall strategic calculus, and 

how these missions might be affected, if at all, by 

potential resolution or prolongation of the Taiwan 

Straits situation.

TERMS

Attempts to study this topic are complicated by the 

fact that Chinese publications use a variety of terms 

somewhat interchangeably when discussing many 

of these issues. Nevertheless, in the area of border 

security it is clear that they generally conceive of two 

basic fields of action: actions taken to promote security 

and stability within the region around the border, 

including on both sides of international borders; and 

physical defense of the internationally-recognized 

border of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the 

event of armed incursions by foreign enemies. For 

purposes of this discussion, the former will be referred 

to as “frontier security” and the latter as “border 

defense.” Concerning the “frontier,” it is also important 

to note that the depth of this area does not appear to 

be doctrinally fixed or standard, but varies depending 

on local conditions, including ethnic makeup and 

distribution of population, geography and topography, 

and so on. 

Under current Chinese policy, numerous forces 

and agencies are involved in these missions, and 

overlapping responsibilities and chains of command 

can also lead to confusion as to which units are referred 

to when Chinese sources use nonspecific terms like 

“armed forces” or “border security forces.” Most 

sources are, however, consistent in using the term 

'PLA' to refer solely to those units identified explicitly 

as belonging to the PLA (such as PLA Border Defense 
131

Battalions). These units will also often be referred 

to as “border defense” units. The PAP, militia, and 

other public order units assigned to frontier security 

missions are considered separately and referred to 

as “frontier security forces.” This chapter will follow 

these conventions.

It is important to note that Chinese authors recognize 

that in areas such as frontier security or CT, considered 

to be “nonwar actions,” the implications of “mission” 

are often very different than would be the case in more 

traditional combat-related instances.5

 For example, 

criteria for determining mission success, appropriate 

courses, levels and intensity of action, distribution of 

responsibility and involvement across varying levels 

of command, and so on are often unique to specific 

situations and cannot automatically be assumed to 

follow patterns assumed by traditional “missions.”6

The PLA emphasizes that commanders and planners 

must understand this to effectively carry them out; 

scholars attempting to understand these missions and 

their implications must likewise do so.

BORDER DEFENSE AND FRONTIER SECURITY

It has become commonplace to observe that in a 

post-Communist world, the CCP can no longer derive 

its legitimacy or “mandate” from Marxist ideological 

roots, but instead must demonstrate its effectiveness 

at achieving the twin goals of delivering economic 

prosperity and protecting national sovereignty as the 

primary means of retaining its legitimacy. 

Because the frontier regions of China for the most 

part are economically underdeveloped and potentially 

vulnerable to foreign violations of sovereignty, 

protection of these regions becomes a matter of strategic 
132

importance to the CCP and the government of China. 

In this context, it is not at all surprising to see the 

subject of border security receive the detailed level of 

treatment it does in China’s 2006 NDWP. The inclusion 

of a detailed discussion on this topic, given much more 

specific attention than in the 2004 Paper, likely reflects 

a growing awareness on the part of the PRC leadership 

of the critical importance of this mission to China’s 

overall strategic priorities. 

China’s assessment of its current security 

environment as outlined in the 2006 NDWP 

demonstrates a sophisticated analysis of the regional 

and global security picture that emphasizes recognition 

of the “growing interconnections between domestic 

and international factors and interconnected traditional 

and non-traditional factors” influencing the nature of 

existing or emergent threats to its national security.7

It concludes that the overall security environment 

“remains sound,” especially in terms of its relations 

with neighboring states along its land frontiers.8

 China 

nonetheless recognizes serious threats from what are 

often characterized as the “Three Forces” (三股势力san 

gu shili), or occasionally the “Three Evil Forces” (三股邪

恶势力san gu xie’e shili), of terrorism, ethnic separatism, 

and religious extremism.9

It follows logically that any element of Chinese 

national security strategy or planning aimed at 

combating these three “forces” must in turn focus on 

security of the frontier and China’s borders—especially 

China’s extensive interior land border. Not only does 

this frontier stretch over 22,000 kilometers and border 14 

different countries, but, more significantly, it is drawn 

through regions characterized by religion, ethnicity, 

and levels of economic development often markedly 

different from that of the majority of China “proper.” 
133

These frontier regions are thus perceived to be prime 

areas for the flourishing of the “three forces.”

In addition, Chinese writers have expressed 

concern that the international aspect of the frontier 

offers further opportunity for foreign elements to take 

advantage of, influence, or even instigate the arousal 

of these “forces” to challenge China’s stability and 

security. These concerns have ensured that stability and 

security of the frontier remain core strategic interests 

for China, in support of a national strategic objective 

of maintaining domestic and international stability to 

create an environment amenable to continued economic 

growth.10

The imperatives in turn implied by these objectives 

mean that border defense and security remain a source 

of important missions for China’s military forces, 

including the PLA and PAP, as well as civilian security 

organs. In his 2007 study of China’s frontier defense 

doctrine, M. Taylor Fravel argues that “frontier defense 

remains a core mission for China’s armed forces,” 

particularly when understood from the perspective 

that defending the territorial integrity of the PRC is the

core mission of that nation’s armed forces.11

As mentioned above, it is clear from professional 

journals and official PRC government documentation 

that Chinese military thought conceives of “border 

defense” as only one aspect within the larger context 

of “frontier security.” The former deals with the more 

traditional and limited scope of preventing invasion 

or violation of the sovereignty and integrity of the 

countries’ borders; the latter more comprehensively 

applies to maintaining internal political and societal 

stability within the frontier regions of China’s 

periphery.12 These concepts differ in terms of the 

missions the PLA has under each, as well as the apparent 

relative importance of the PLA and the military arm in 
134

general, in forming a part of the national response to 

the task. 

In brief, the PLA’s missions in China’s frontier 

security strategy appear to be as follows:

• In the event of major border incursions, assume 

the lead role in defeating invading forces and 

restoring order to the frontier regions. This 

mission implies assuming overall command of 

border defense efforts; delaying and shaping 

enemy penetrations using light forces, militia 

and PAP; counterattacking and destroying 

enemy forces, and restoring territorial integrity, 

primarily through maneuver of PLA main force 

units deployed from the interior.

• In peacetime, support local civilian and PAP 

authorities’ efforts to promote and maintain 

social stability in frontier regions. This mission 

entails operating as a junior partner under 

the combined command of the interagency 

Commissions on Border Defense; acting as a 

deterrent to both internal upheaval and foreign 

interference; and assisting in the training, 

administration, and equipping of border defense 

forces including the militia and the PAP.

Each of these will be discussed in greater detail 

below.13

In addressing the challenge of frontier security, 

China appears to understand the importance of 

promoting economic growth, encouraging ethnic coexistence and cultural integration and combating crossborder criminal activities as key components of building 

stability, and thus enhancing security, in frontier 

areas.14 In addition, many authors stress the importance 

of pursuing constructive relations with neighboring 
135

states, and in particular emphasize security cooperation 

activities as a means of stabilizing conditions along 

frontiers and anticipating the transnational and crossborder nature both of potentially destabilizing forces 

and of the measures that will be necessary to combat 

them.15

While recognizing the importance of these tools 

in creating a secure frontier environment, China’s 

leaders nonetheless also continue to emphasize the 

critical importance of more traditional instruments of 

national and Party power in maintaining stability near, 

in and across borders. They acknowledge the complex 

interplay of the PLA, the PAP, and the Public Security 

Bureau (PSB), as well as civil government officials 

and organs (particularly at the local level) required to 

effectively pursue this goal. As a result, a substantial 

part of the NDWP, as well as a large volume of 

contemporary literature by PLA and PAP writers, in 

addition to Western analysts, is devoted to analyzing 

and attempting to understand the complexities of these 

relationships. 

The NDWP outlines a hierarchical structure from 

the State Council and CMC down to the prefecture and 

county level that coordinates and administers frontier 

security under “an administration system of sharing 

responsibilities (分工负责fengong fuze) between the 

military and local authorities.” Within the context 

of this approach to border defense, the conceptual 

distinction between “border defense” and “frontier 

security” entails differing and distinct missions for the 

PLA. In its simplest form, the division of responsibilities 

is expressed through designation of the PLA as “the 

main force for defending China’s borders and coasts,” 

while the border public security force is tasked with 

“safeguarding security and maintaining social order in 

border and coastal areas.”16
136

At the highest level, the Central Military Commission (CMC) exercises command over the military 

forces; in conjunction with the State Council, it also 

provides the administrative leadership, including 

specifically “administration of border, coastal, and air 

defenses.” This is done through the State Commission 

of Border and Coastal Defense, a combined civilianmilitary group made up of the “relevant departments 

of the State Council and the PLA.” This Commission is 

headed by the Minister of Public Security, underscoring 

the conception that frontier security is primarily the 

responsibility of the public security forces, with the 

military in a support role. This model of joint civilmilitary commissions is replicated at every level of 

command down from military regions to the county 

level. Military units remain under command of their 

next higher military headquarters, but at the provincial 

level and below this command is described as being 

exercised in a “dual leadership” with civilian and Party 

officials. As far as border defense missions, the key 

tactical headquarters is at the military subdistrict, or 

prefectural, level. According to the NDWP, prefectural 

commands in border areas are “in charge of the military, 

political, logistical, and equipment work of border 

defense troops as well as border defense duties, talks 

and meetings, and border management, protection, 

and control.”17

Certain missions are inherent in the border defense 

role, though these are perhaps missions which the 

PLA is ultimately less likely to be called upon to 

perform. Other missions deriving from the PLA’s 

frontier security mission, in which it plays primarily a 

supporting role, are far more likely to be executed and 

indeed could be argued to be ongoing tasks the PLA is 

performing on a daily basis in some form or other.
137

In defending China’s borders and coasts from 

external threats, the PLA is expected to be the “main 

force” in preventing any major incursion or invasion 

by foreign elements. Previous research has done an 

excellent job of synthesizing the various Chinese 

doctrinal publications that outline how the PLA would 

likely respond operationally and tactically to such an 

incursion event. The current posture, composition and 

location of PLA units—an emphasis on lightly armed 

border defense units closer to the frontier, with heavier 

combined arms units concentrated in the interior of 

the country—lends itself to an interpretation as an 

essentially defensive, reactive approach. Under this 

configuration, any enemy incursion would be met first 

by the border security forces, composed of primarily 

PAP border security troops supported by light PLA 

units and militia troops, initially under a local command 

structure. While this border security element delays 

the enemy, PLA main force units (under centralized 

control at the Military Region (MR) level) would be 

deployed to eventually counterattack and destroy the 

enemy incursion, and presumably return the border to 

its antebellum configuration.18

It is important to note that many Chinese 

sources emphasize that border defense operations 

are conducted “in the service of national strategic 

priorities,” and strongly imply national-level control 

of the operation in both time and space.19 This means 

that the PLA may be ordered to cease operations when 

diplomatic objectives have been achieved, regardless 

of perceived tactical or operational military objectives 

in the actual zone of operations. In addition, in spite 

of invoking the concept of active defense as a key 

source for planning, discussion of PLA border defense 

operations consistently emphasizes the defensive 
138

nature of such missions and does not portray them as 

a means of expanding or annexing territory.20

In the broadest terms, this concept of confronting 

the threat of a heavy armed cross-border incursion 

with a “defense in depth” based on a frontier/interior 

lines force array is a fairly traditional approach and the 

types of missions and capabilities required of the PLA 

to execute such an operation would include the kinds of 

general capabilities any modern military force should be 

expected to accomplish with a degree of competency—

ability to conduct delaying actions in time and space, 

establishment and maintenance of communications 

networks between services and between military and 

civilian agencies, as well as vertical networks from 

tactical units through operational headquarters to the 

national command authorities, ability to create, secure, 

and sustain movement corridors for rapid deployment 

of mobile reserves, and so on. These kind of tactical and 

operational-level missions are fairly “standard,” and 

it is unlikely the border defense mission alone would 

generate a unique set of tactical or operational missions 

for the PLA that it would not otherwise prepare for. 

Strategy for defense of maritime borders 

(encompassing coastal waters and shoreline) and 

airspace appears to be grounded in the same sort of 

division of labor. Unfortunately, open source literature 

is much more limited in discussing these aspects of 

China’s frontier security strategy, often devoting whole 

chapters to land security and dismissing maritime or air 

frontiers as “special cases” that cannot be considered 

in the same way. Nevertheless, it would seem there are 

at least three important trends worth noting. 

First, the basic division of responsibilities between 

PLA and PAP appears to mirror that along the land 

frontier, although the force structures are different. It 
139

is important to note that the command structure may 

very well be different, as provincial or prefectural joint 

commissions would likely not be the best mechanisms 

for handling situations that are much more likely 

to be politically sensitive, involve assets above the 

provincial level, and have strategic implications, even 

if they possess the technical capability and technology 

to do so. Nevertheless the focus on PLA defense as a 

supplement to PAP security work still seems to be the 

primary paradigm. 

Second, development of China’s coast, coupled with 

its expanding interests and capabilities, has pushed its 

maritime “frontier” farther out to sea, so that maritime 

frontier security is no longer synonymous with “coastal 

defense.” As a result, it has been argued that the PLA’s 

mission needs to change from “coastal defense” (近岸防

御 jin’an fangyu) to “offshore defense” (近海防卫 jinhai 

fangwei). Defense and security of this more remote sea 

frontier will require surface, air and subsurface assets 

only the PLA Navy (PLAN) possesses. 

Third, China recognizes that the likelihood of 

serious hostile intrusion by enemy naval forces is less 

than in previous years, but the threat posed by criminal 

elements and other nontraditional threats is greater. 

This calls for greater capability and emphasis on PAP 

and maritime law enforcement and policing in waters 

near the shore. It also has led Chinese authors to call 

for a “transition from a system emphasizing military 

defense to a system that emphasizes both civilian 

administration and military defense equally.”21

In considering the overall role of the PLA in China’s 

frontier security strategy, it is interesting to note how 

the less-traditional, but arguably more likely, frontier 

security challenges recognized by China as emergent 

in the 21st century would be addressed by the various 
140

actors in this “shared” approach, and in particular 

what additional nontraditional missions the PLA may 

be required to prepare for in implementation of this 

strategy.

The NDWP specifies that “stability and development 

of border areas are the foundation for border and 

coastal defense.” Thus the PLA, as the “main force” 

for border defense in time of war, has a clear interest 

in being an active agent in securing the stability and 

development of border areas in peacetime. The NDWP 

further specifies that the PLA, along with other border 

security forces, “. . . maintain[s] social stability in border 

areas and unity among ethnic groups, and take[s] an 

active part in the economic development of border 

areas.”22

The PLA therefore appears to have a specific mission 

to combat nontraditional threats (such as the “Three 

Forces” or cross-border criminal activity) in addition 

to being prepared for the more traditional threat of a 

foreign incursion. In assessing these less traditional 

threats, however, it does seem clear that China’s 

strategy views them as more properly considered 

“frontier security” challenges rather than matters of 

border “defense.” Thus, while the PLA has an active 

role in combating these threats, it is expected to do so as 

a supporting element, while the primary responsibility 

lies with the border security forces, namely the PAP, 

militia, and civilian governments and police.

Some such missions, like assisting in the development of the frontier regional economy through physical or technological infrastructure development, obviously are doubly beneficial, as they both serve the immediate mission of building a stable social environment in the region, while also providing the kind of 

infrastructure the PLA would need to support rapid 
141

escalation of assets and effort in the event of a more 

conventional border defense scenario.23 One major 

concern of PLA and PAP writers in discussing the 

challenges of conducting border defense operations 

is the concern about providing a secure rear-area for 

operations by PLA and PAP forces in undeveloped, 

frontier zones dominated by potentially unfriendly 

ethnic or religious groups—obviously the peacetime 

“security” mission of building social unity and 

economic development in frontier zones also serves 

the PLA well in the event of possible future border 

defense contingencies. 

It also remains the case that if internal civil or 

social unrest escalates to such a level that local Border 

Security Commissions are no longer able to manage 

the problem with only the PAP, PSB, and militia 

units available, the PLA may be expected to be able 

to conduct counterinsurgency operations to prevent 

further escalation and spread of unrest. Such an event 

would likely have to be very extreme and protracted 

to trigger such a shift in responsibilities, and the 

mechanism for how this would be effected is unclear, 

as is discussed below.24

In addition, the PLA must be prepared for the 

hypothetical case wherein a foreign force decides to take 

advantage of a deteriorating internal frontier situation 

to launch an incursion, so that from China’s perspective 

the mission transitions from frontier security to border 

defense. Successful conduct of such a transition would 

require development in peacetime of clear lines 

of authority, chains of command, mechanisms for 

exercising command, and clear guidelines for the timing, 

authorization, authentication, and implementation of 

transfer of command and control, which would almost 

certainly take place under conditions of extreme stress 
142

and probably of much more intense public scrutiny 

than would have been the case in the past.

One of the most difficult aspects of the “shared 

responsibility” system to understand clearly is 

the mechanism for distributing, and if necessary 

transferring, command authority between civilian 

and military authorities. While command is generally 

described as “unified” (统一 tongyi) or “joint” (联合

lianhe) in theory, in practice it seems that the civilian 

authorities (including police forces and the PAP under 

civilian control) play the “lead role” up to a certain point. 

There is presumably, however, a “pivot point” at which 

the severity, political sensitivity, or scale of the problem 

becomes too great, and primary leadership transitions 

to being exercised through the military elements of the 

“shared responsibility” architecture. For example, in 

the government response to the Sichuan earthquake in 

May 2008, it very rapidly became clear that military 

headquarters were the key actors in allocating and 

deploying units and assigning missions.25 On the other 

hand, in response to widespread outbreaks of unrest 

in Tibet in March 2008, officials explicitly denied PLA 

involvement in the subsequent crackdown, though 

they do concede the PLA was brought in “after the 

riots” to help clean up and maintain order—if true, this 

indicates an employment of both PAP and PLA in roles 

seemingly completely consistent with that envisioned 

by the “shared responsibility” model.26

It is possible that the lack of detail available on how 

such a handover is effected may reflect the fact that 

the Chinese themselves have not yet clearly defined a 

standard means by which such transitions are triggered 

and managed. The decision is likely made at the national 

level by the CMC and State Council, and is probably 

situation-dependent and driven by considerations such 
143

as those outlined above. Nevertheless it seems that the 

system remains somewhat ad hoc and thus potentially 

vulnerable to confusion in crisis, especially given the 

interplay of personalities and traditional relationships 

among local and national officials, and among civilian 

and military officials. For example, PAP or PLA units 

at the sub-district level that have been conducting 

frontier security missions for long periods under local 

government authorities can be expected to have built 

habitual command and cooperation relationships, 

especially among key officials and leaders. The 

opportunities for considerations of “guanxi” or habitual 

relationships to interfere with smooth implementation 

of sudden changes to the command hierarchy could 

be considerable. Such complexities would logically 

give rise to the kinds of inefficiencies and ambiguities 

that are frequently mentioned as problems by Chinese 

professional writers on this topic. 

Since China’s frontier security challenges involve 

complex interactions of domestic and foreign actors 

across a wide spectrum of potential activities, it is 

perhaps not surprising that the system described 

above, while logical in theory, appears to have some 

inadequacies in practice. These inadequacies have 

occasionally been thrown into sharp relief at least in 

training exercises, and there has been some significant 

discussion of the problems with the current system 

and proposals for remedies in professional journals of 

the PLA and PAP.27

The majority of the difficulties in Chinese frontier 

security operations mentioned in recent publications 

center on the challenges of coordination between 

multiple military, police and civilian headquarters 

and units. One publication by officers of the Yunnan 

Provincial Committee on Frontier Defense complains 
144

of the disjointed, uncoordinated nature of current 

frontier security processes, which suffer from 

unclear authority structure and a blurred division of 

responsibilities. In particular, operations are said to 

be highly fragmented, especially between military 

and local goverenment jurisdictions, and to create 

an environment that discourages innovation.28 In the 

Far West, staff officers place heavy emphasis on the 

problems of discordant authority, lack of integration 

among units and problems in communication.29

Among the remedies recommended by PLA and 

PAP officers alike, the most common is an emphasis 

on joint and combined training involving all the key 

stakeholders in the frontier security mission.30 These are 

principally the PLA, the PAP, the local militia units, and 

local civilian authorities, but can include many other 

“social stability” organs. At least one exercise conducted 

in 2007 in Guangxi was hailed as “an innovative 

construction” of an “experimental” joint training model 

for combined military, police, and militia units. This 

example in particular is illustrative of several points, 

namely: the “innovative,” “experimental,” solution 

was developed at the military sub-district level, under 

authority and directive from the provincial military 

district headquarters; PLA border defense units, as 

well as PAP border security units, were expected to 

use their superior resources and organization to train 

the less developed militia units. This was viewed as a 

distinct break from previous form, which was based 

on the approach that “each carries out its own duties 

and trains its own soldiers.”31 This singular example 

illustrates the PLA execution of at least two distinct 

missions in support of frontier security (including 

border defense)—in this case, PLA headquarters at 

provincial and prefectural level assumed the mission of 
145

improving joint operations, and PLA units undertook 

the mission of providing training support to militias 

and frontier security partners. 

Some commentators also note the need to 

strengthen the effectiveness and leadership capability 

of the Border Commissions at all levels and the need 

for greater clarity in regulations to spell out detailed, 

specific division of responsibilities among various 

agencies involved. The article by the Yunnan Frontier 

Defense Commission members notes that (as of 2007) 

China “still does not have comprehensive border 

defense laws and regulations,” which is directly 

affecting the country’s ability to continue developing 

frontier security. The most common complaints are 

lack of clarity in command relationships and division 

of responsibility—a subject obviously of crucial 

importance in a system that theoretically depends 

upon clear understanding of such divisions among 

subordinate actors to work properly.32

In addition to these concerns at the interagency 

level, as a supporting element the PLA needs to develop 

and sustain certain capabilities to fulfill its mission as 

a partner in the frontier security mission. Chief among 

these is the need to develop communications networks 

and systems that facilitate information and intelligence 

sharing both horizontally and vertically, as well as 

to enable command and control between military 

and civilian headquarters. It clearly will also require 

emphasis on political officers and cadres to develop 

civil affairs capabilities to conduct the kind of public 

outreach and civil-military relations activity necessary 

to build unity within the border regions, especially 

in those dominated by non-Han ethnic minorities. In 

terms of force structure, it requires large numbers of 

units with specific capabilities—manpower intensive, 
146

light enough to operate in difficult terrain and climate 

conditions, and well trained in civil-military operations 

as well as public affairs. These units will also need high 

quality personnel and leaders, conscious of the fact that 

they operate in an increasingly “open” environment. 

The “strategic corporal” may not yet be a feature of 

Chinese military understanding, held at bay by an 

authoritarian command structure and rigidly controlled 

official information environment. Nonetheless, there is 

recognition of the idea that lower-level commanders 

will be required to make decisions that could have 

strategic consequences, especially given the repeated 

emphasis on the need for flexibility and innovation in 

frontier security operations in the current environment. 

The degree to which the PLA is successful in cultivating 

this kind of leader, or units capable of this kind of 

flexibility, will depend in large part on how training 

programs are modified to develop and encourage these 

skills, and whether or not professional development 

courses, as well as career progression and personnel 

policies, emphasize the importance of demonstrating 

such skills.

Understanding the application of the “shared 

responsibility” concept also appears to be the key to 

understanding PLA missions in response to another 

threat category currently of great concern to Chinese 

national defense planners—namely, the threat of 

terrorism. As one of the three “evil forces” threatening 

stability and social order, terrorism in the Chinese 

assessment presents another significant national-level 

threat that requires an advanced, sophisticated and 

multiagency approach to be successfully countered.
147

COUNTERTERRORISM

Chinese discussion of the terrorist threat 

acknowledges the international nature of terrorist 

threats in the post-September 11, 2001 (9-11) world, 

but it is evident that perceptions of the nature, goals, 

and characteristics of the threat are quite different 

than those prevalent in the United States. Analyses in 

Chinese sources tend to focus on the threat of domestic 

terrorism, aimed at destabilizing Chinese society, 

usually for purposes of furthering “separatism” along 

ethnic, religious or national lines. As is the case in frontier 

security planning, the fundamental chain of Chinese 

strategic security planning is quite clearly evidenced—

economic growth is essential to government stability; 

social stability is essential for economic growth; 

terrorism directly attacks social stability, hence 

terrorism is a strategic threat to the nation. Practical 

experience with the negative impact of terrorism on 

economic development in Xinjiang has been cited as 

an example of this.33 Terrorism also threatens national 

territorial integrity by demonstrating the government’s 

inability to protect its people and by potentially inciting 

secessionist sentiment. Thus, terrorism is perceived 

as representing a direct challenge to the two primary 

strategic pillars of Chinese governmental legitimacy.

There is widespread recognition on some 

characteristics of the terrorist threat that are clearly 

in synch with Western perceptions: that the threat is 

“globalized” or transnational; that terrorists operate in 

a decentralized manner, able to function disparately 

yet remain coordinated through technology; that 

technology in general greatly enables terrorist 

actions; that there is increasing threat of terrorists 

employing unconventional attack means such as 
148

cyber attack or weapons of mass destruction (WMD); 

that terror networks are often deeply interlinked with 

other transnational criminal activities such as drug 

smuggling; and that these and other traits in turn can 

result in their linkage to governments or governing 

organs through corrupt or sympathetic officials. Very 

importantly, China also quite clearly perceives the 

threat that hostile governments can utilize terrorist 

cells, or the disruption they cause, to threaten social 

stability and perhaps create conditions favorable for 

foreign interference in Chinese domestic affairs.

There is also a general agreement in Chinese 

discussion of the necessary characteristics of an 

effective CT program. They recognize the importance 

of preventing terrorism as the centerpiece of a 

comprehensive CT program, which is pursued by 

removing incentives and attacking terrorist recruitment 

sources through economic development as well as 

promotion of ethnic and national harmony and unity 

through propaganda and public relations campaigns. 

They also call for close cooperation with neighboring 

countries, especially in the area of intelligence sharing, 

which is often identified as one of the most important 

yet least developed means of international cooperation 

against cross-border terrorism. 

The NDWP specifically assigns the mission for CT 

to the PAP. As in the approach to frontier security, 

there appears to be a system for organization and 

direction of domestic CT operations in China that 

divides responsibilities and assigns the PLA the 

mission of playing a supporting role in what is 

primarily a PAP responsibility. At the national level, the 

National Leading Small Group for Counterterrorism 

Coordination was established in 2001 to coordinate 

the many government organizations that have a role 
149

in a comprehensive national CT effort. This structure 

is replicated down to the provincial level, and 

membership reportedly includes civilian police, PAP, 

foreign affairs offices, the Ministry of State Security 

(MSS), and the military. A recent CT exercise held in 

Tibet was overseen by CCP and government officials, 

including representatives of the “Autonomous Region 

Counterterrorism Working Group”—some military 

units were listed as participants, but do not appear 

to have exercised primary control of the event.34 This 

is a similar pattern to that observed in various other 

CT exercises in China. For example, the PLA has 

been reported as participating in only two of the past 

five “Great Wall” series national-level Chinese CT 

exercises.35

Because CT operations are politically sensitive, 

extremely time-sensitive, involve complex command 

and coordination requirements, and require highly 

specialized techniques in virtually unpredictable 

circumstances for direct action against specific 

terrorist targets, reliance on small, highly trained 

and specially equipped CT units remains the most 

common prescription. The primary PLA units for this 

are the various Special Operations Groups at the MR 

level (the “Flying Dragons,” “Divine Swords,” etc.). 

In the PAP, Special Police Units, probably organic at 

the provincial or municipal level, fulfill this function. 

In addition, at the national level the PAP has formed 

the elite “Snow Leopards” unit, which has become 

a highly publicized standard bearer for China’s CT 

preparedness, especially in the run up to the Beijing 

Olympics.36 Such units are not limited to direct action 

teams, but also appear to include specialized support 

units such as aviation. For example, at least one report 

regarding security arrangements for the Beijing Games 
150

discussed an elite “special flight brigade,” equipped 

with helicopters and surveillance optics, crewed by 

pilots “all trained at undisclosed locations overseas.”37

Some authors have argued that all specialized 

CT units (presumably including PLA ones) should 

be placed under PAP/PSB authority when deployed 

operationally, and that except in a small number 

of unique cases (such as Tibet or Xinjiang), the PLA 

“should not unduly take on counterterrorism missions 

at the risk of causing too much harm for too little 

gain.”38

An important mission for the PLA in support of 

PAP-led CT missions is in the area of unconventional 

terrorist attack, specifically those involving maritime, 

air, or WMD (nuclear, biological, or chemical) attacks. 

This is also almost certainly because the PLA possesses 

the capabilities, specialized units and equipment, and 

training necessary for dealing with these contingencies. 

In the lead up to the Beijing Olympic Games in 

August 2008, Chinese reports specified that the PAP 

was responsible for general security and preventing 

terrorism “on the ground” while the PLA had primary 

responsible for air, maritime, or WMD events. It 

should be noted, however, that the Olympics may 

have been a special case, and that even under special 

circumstances the PLA seems more often to be expected 

to fulfill supplementary missions in support of the 

PAP. Maritime CT drills conducted in Qingdao before 

the games were run by the “marine police,” under 

control of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS).39 The 

PAP likely possesses at least some capability to deal 

with the initial phases of WMD attacks, as they would 

almost certainly be the “first responders” before the 

PLA arrives. For example, Exercise “Great Wall 3,” 

held in Qingdao in 2006 but coordinated from Beijing, 
151

had a scenario built around a “biochemical attack,” but 

the only participants mentioned in available sources 

are the PAP and Qingdao PSB. 

In essence, then, it appears the PLA’s missions in 

China’s domestic counterterrorism strategy are similar 

in nature to those it has under the frontier security 

strategy, namely: 

• Work in cooperation with local civilian and 

police authorities to deter domestic terrorism by 

helping promote and maintain social stability;

• Augment police forces in responding to terrorist 

attacks, including by sustaining, deploying, and 

controlling specialized CT units as needed;

• Assume a key role in preventing, defending 

against, or responding to terrorism attacks 

in maritime or air environments, or attacks 

involving WMD.

Much remains unclear about the exact implementation 

of this strategy in practice. 

It would seem there is still much work that could be 

undertaken to improve interagency coordination and 

address command, control, and coordination problems 

similar to those that occur in the area of frontier 

security. For example, there is recognition that, as in 

the case of frontier security, there is a need for more 

detailed CT laws and regulations to clearly delineate 

the division of labor and responsibility within agencies 

for CT operations.40

We have seen that Chinese planning considers that 

CT operations should be primarily a job for security 

forces, especially domestically. Yet Chinese authors 

make clear that the nature of globalized terrorist threats 

are such that terrorist threats against China could, 

and likely would, emerge outside of China. Under 

the theory of active defense, the PLA still recognizes 
152

the need to be able under the right conditions to 

operate preemptively if necessary, which raises 

several questions. How would this be done when the 

operation involves crossing international boundaries? 

Clearly, preparing for these contingencies requires a 

high degree of cooperation and coordination with the 

CT and border security forces of foreign countries, 

and if China’s CT exercises with foreign countries are 

any indicator, it appears the PLA has a much more 

prominent role in conducting CT operations in an 

international context.

SECURITY COOPERATION/

COUNTERTERRORISM EXERCISES

As Chinese frontier security and counterterrorism 

planning both recognize the importance of international 

cooperation against transnational threats, it is perhaps 

no surprise that the past decade has seen a dramatic 

increase in the number, scale, and type of PLA exercises 

with foreign militaries, both within China and outside 

its borders. Since 2002 alone, over 30 different exercises 

have been identified or reported.41 While some of these 

exercises have been conducted with Western countries 

or allies, the clear majority share two common themes—

they have been conducted with countries directly 

bordering the PRC, and they have featured at least a 

declared theme or emphasis on CT.

The clear majority of these exercises have taken 

place within the member countries of the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization (SCO), and almost always 

they have been publicized as “counterterrorism” 

exercises. Exercises are often described as practicing 

cross-border coordination of operations, multinational 

direct action operations against “terrorist” units, and 

involving border defense and frontier security units 
153

from one or more participant countries, in addition to 

national-level CT forces. The frequent involvement of 

frontier security units, coupled with CT-based scenarios 

and troops, further underscores the importance of 

these missions in supporting China’s national security 

strategy by addressing the threats it perceives along its 

frontier. 

Bilateral and multilateral exercises with foreign 

militaries, both inside and outside of China, serve a 

variety of strategic and political functions including 

demonstrating capabilities, fulfilling national “great 

power” aspirations, and signaling other countries. In 

terms of PLA missions and mission readiness, however, 

there are three main aspects worth highlighting: first, 

they provide the PLA an opportunity to observe and 

learn from foreign militaries lessons that can then be 

used to improve its own capabilities; second, they 

improve the PLA’s capabilities to operate outside of 

China and in cooperation with other forces; and, third, 

they support the mission of promoting stability and 

social order by providing a highly visible deterrent 

to potentially destabilizing forces. This latter aspect is 

enhanced by the visible propagandizing and publicity 

given by Chinese media, both to these exercises and 

the elite units participating in them.

Determining exactly what types of units participate 

in the individual exercises is sometimes difficult, but 

many of the exercise scenarios appear to involve 

combined “direct action” missions against “terrorist” 

bands who have seized important hostages or 

building complexes. It is likely that in the event of 

such an occurrence, especially outside China, the PLA 

would be the primary provider of any armed Chinese 

contribution to the CT force, and indeed, most often 

these exercises involve PLA units such as elite CT units 

of the MRs, as well as specialized PLA supporting 
154

elements for transport, logistics, and communications. 

This in turn implies a division of responsibility for 

domestic and international CT efforts between the 

PAP and PLA, a division that would mirror the 

overall apparent strategic orientation of both forces. In 

accordance with China’s concept of “active defense,” 

even within the context of CT operations, it seems 

clear that the PLA has a mission to respond to terrorist 

actions outside China in cooperation with friendly 

foreign militaries. It remains unclear if this mission 

encompasses actions taken “proactively” (i.e., on the 

basis of shared intelligence and perceived threat, but 

before any actual terrorist action has taken place), or 

unilaterally (without cooperation or invitation of a 

foreign government). The exercise scenarios and public 

reports do not give any explicit indications of this, but 

it clearly warrants closer study.

In 2007, Exercise “Cooperation 2007” in Russia 

featured participation by the PAP’s “Snow Leopard” 

CT unit, the first publicly reported instance of this level 

of PAP involvement in exercises outside China.42 The 

inclusion of the PAP in this exercise is an exception, but 

this may have other functions—some PAP professional 

publications have noted the importance of training 

with foreign elite units to remain current on the latest 

techniques, equipment, and experience of these units, to 

assist in developing China’s own domestic capabilities. 

It is more likely that PAP international participation is 

thus aimed at improving the PAP’s own capabilities to 

operate domestically, rather than expanding its role to 

operations outside China.

Still, while CT remains the stated mission for many, 

if not most, of these exercises, there is no question that 

China clearly capitalizes on the international currency 

of the CT issue in a post-9-11 world to pursue other 
155

security cooperation objectives in its interaction with 

foreign militaries. Most of these involve signaling to 

outside powers, especially the United States, that 

China remains interested and engaged in regions 

around its periphery, especially Central Asia, and 

has the capability to project power (in a limited, 

albeit developing way) into those regions, especially 

with the assistance of friendly SCO partners. It also 

intends to assuage the concerns of smaller neighboring 

states about China’s rise, by establishing the image 

of China as a cooperative security partner focused on 

addressing issues of shared concern, such as crossborder operations of terrorist groups. 

In this sense, the PLA clearly has a mission of 

supporting the demonstration and credibility of the 

strategic “messages” through organizing and executing 

these types of combined exercises. Decisionmaking 

authority for approval and conduct of such exercises 

is no doubt retained at the national level with the 

CMC in conjunction with the State Council, due to 

the diplomatic and national level factors involved, but 

planning and execution of the actual exercises clearly 

involve MR headquarters and probably also provincial 

level commands where appropriate, judging from 

the types of commanders and officers generally 

interviewed, cited, or referenced as observing or 

participating in the various press reports. 

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

It is thus quite evident that the PLA has significant 

missions in support of Chinese national security strategic goals beyond the preservation of territorial integrity through deterring Taiwan independence or potentially compelling unification. In the areas of frontier se-
156

curity, CT, and international security cooperation, we 

have seen PLA missions spelled out, with varying degrees of clarity, in official government publications 

(such as the NDWP) as well as acknowledged, analyzed, and explained in extensive discussion in professional journals and in analysis by Western scholars. 

In all of these cases, PLA missions fulfill a largely 

supporting role in the overall national defense strategy. 

Both frontier security and to a large extent CT are 

primarily the responsibility of the public security forces, 

especially the PAP. While the international aspects of 

CT appear to be primarily a PLA responsibility, it is 

nevertheless important to realize that China evidently 

perceives its primary terrorist threat to be a domestic 

challenge. It is likely that this is as much a result of 

recent events as it is of China’s current physical 

security environment, which at present features 

relatively peaceful, constructive relations with almost 

every country along its long land frontier.43 Both 

factors, coupled with China’s strategic priority to 

project a nonthreatening image to the world as part of 

its “peaceful rise” strategy, strongly militate against a 

highly visible military role in such actions as border 

policing and CT. 

Finally, as noted above, it is likely these missions 

would remain a core part of the overall PLA mission 

regardless of the development of the Taiwan issue. Some 

have argued that China’s adoption of an essentially 

defensive posture along its land borders, emphasizing 

diplomatic efforts to resolve long-standing border 

disputes coupled with increased cooperation and a de 

facto “demilitarization,” is designed to create strategic 

space for an offensive posture eastward, towards Taiwan 

and China’s maritime “frontier.”44 While this analysis 

may very likely be correct, it does not necessarily follow 
157

that upon resolution of the Taiwan issue (especially if 

in China’s favor, i.e., through reunification or at least 

neutralization), China would fundamentally change 

the PLA’s role, mission, or orientation in terms of land 

border defense, nor transition to a more “offensive” 

or aggressive land security posture. Of more interest 

perhaps would be consideration of how the strategy of 

“frontier security” missions would apply, and whether 

or not the “shared responsibilities” system would 

remain the model for promotion of social stability and 

security in the “newly acquired” frontier province of 

Taiwan. 

On the other hand, unfavorable resolution of the 

Taiwan issue (from China’s point of view), presumably 

including military defeat and independence for the 

island, would probably severely destabilize China 

domestically and further heighten the regime’s fears 

of foreign interference along its land borders, possibly 

leading to a rebalancing of focus among the PLA’s 

various missions. In such a case, a “remilitarization” 

of China’s land frontier and border missions, as the 

reaction of both a wounded national pride and a 

regime that perceives itself as under threat from within 

and without, would seem a very possible, though not 

inevitable, outcome.

The importance of these missions in PLA planning, 

and even more perhaps their prominence in the 

national defense strategy of the PRC, has significant 

implications for U.S. policymakers in coming years. 

China’s focus on frontier security as a strategic priority 

increases the potential risk of incidents between 

Chinese border security forces and foreign forces. This 

is especially likely along disputed and less well-defined 

maritime and air frontiers, as incidents like the April 

2001 collision between a Chinese fighter and a U.S. EP-3 
158

aircraft and its aftermath clearly demonstrate. Because 

of the very high level of importance attached to the 

frontier security issue in Chinese strategic conceptions, 

such incidents are likely to have much more significant 

diplomatic and political implications, and greater risk 

of serious conflict, than might be anticipated by other 

countries involved who do not view the incident in the 

same light or as being of the same level of seriousness.

At the level of strategic diplomacy, China’s frontier 

security focus implies that U.S. policymakers should 

expect China to continue to emphasize building 

constructive relationships with neighboring states, 

especially those along land borders, using bilateral 

diplomacy as well as multilateral mechanisms in which 

China is a dominant partner, such as the SCO. China 

can also be expected to increase its ability to secure what 

it sees as its maritime frontier, most likely by pursuing 

a two-pronged policy of seeking diplomatic and legal 

recognition of its maritime claims while continuing 

development of military capabilities to secure and 

defend such claims, or at least deter intrusion by 

foreign powers into waters or airspace considered by 

China to be part of its “frontier.”

In the area of CT, U.S. planners should expect 

China to continue to use CT as a convenient rationale 

for continued and expanded military cooperation 

and exercises, especially within the SCO. It provides 

China with a useful narrative within which to expand 

influence in Central Asia and present an alternative 

security architecture for the region that does not 

include the United States. The United States should 

expect China to continue to promote this approach 

to counter perceived expansion of U.S. influence and 

power in the region.

Finally, it is essential that U.S. analysts and 

policymakers continue to improve their understanding 
159

of China’s conceptions of “frontiers,” its doctrine 

for defending them, and above all the place and 

prioritization of such missions in overall national 

defense planning. In the changing world of the early 

21st century, security dynamics are in constant flux. 

Frontiers are no longer simply land borders or even 

maritime lines or zones. Clearly there are now frontiers 

in both space and cyberspace, in physical security 

as well as economics and trade, in demographics, 

environmental challenges, and health issues. When 

are such frontiers considered “violated” by another 

power? When are such violations a threat to national 

security? What is the threshold across which such a 

violation merits a military response? China and the 

PLA already recognize these questions, even if they 

have not yet defined their answers. The United States 

must not only answer these questions for itself, but 

must also strive to monitor and, if possible, influence 

this discussion or risk danger of miscalculation in any 

future confrontation with China.

CHAPTER 5 - ENDNOTES

1. Information Office of the State Council, China’s National 

Defense in 2006, Beijing, PRC: December 29, 2006. As it is most 

commonly referred to as the National Defense White Paper, it is 

hereafter referred to as NDWP 06. 

2. Professor Andrew Scobell’s introduction to this volume 

proposes a four-celled “matrix” for classifying potential scenarios 

for Chinese management of the Taiwan issue. For purposes of 

this chapter, the issue of frontier security is considered within the 

conditions roughly analogous to Scobell’s “A” or “B” cells, which 

reflect the current status quo with a tendency towards nonconflict 

resolution in the long term. Specific implications for frontier 

security that are dependent on which of these outcomes prevails 

are discussed more fully at the end of this chapter. 
160

3. Among current scholarship on these issues, one of the best 

recent examples is M. Taylor Fravel, “Securing Borders: China’s 

Doctrine and Force Structure for Frontier Defense,” Journal of 

Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4-5, August-October 2007. Specific 

lists of tactical missions performed by PLA border defense units 

are listed in Li Xing, ed., Bianfang Xue [The Science of Border 

Defense], Beijing, China: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 2004, pp. 304-

306. Numerous discussions and lists are also available in Englishlanguage sources. Likewise, this chapter will not concern itself with 

discussing unit sizes, troop numbers, equipment, and so on—these 

have been thoroughly covered in excellent detail in a number of 

other works, and need no elaboration or recounting here. See, for 

example, Dennis Blasko, “PLA Ground Force Modernization and 

Mission Diversification: Underway in All Military Regions,” in 

Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, eds., Rightsizing the PLA: 

Exploring the Contour’s of China’s Military, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army 

War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007, pp. 281-373.

4. The author is deeply indebted to Matthew Boswell, whose 

support as research assistant on this project was invaluable, 

particularly in the survey and initial translation of primary source 

materials.

5. Chinese sources recognize that nontraditional threats 

likely require nontraditional responses, sometimes referred to 

as “nonwar” actions to distinguish them from more traditional 

military missions. See Gao Taicun, “Zhongguo feichuantong 

anquan mianlin de tiaozhan yi sikao” [“Challenges and Reflections 

on Non-Traditional Security in China”], Journal of the People’s 

Armed Police Academy, Vol. 23, No. 1, January 2007.

6. Guo Yan, “Clearly Recognizing Basic Characteristics of 

Non-War Action,” Zhongguo Guofang Bao Online Edition, August 

14, 2008, pp. 1-3.

7. NDWP 06, p. 3.

8. This is itself viewed as the product of deliberate Chinese 

strategy, including diplomatic efforts in recent years aimed at 

peaceful resolution of all remaining border territorial disputes 

with neighboring states. Each of these has been greeted with great 
161

publicity and propagandistic fanfare, including recent resolutions 

finalized with Russia. 

9. This expression is repeatedly cited throughout relevant 

literature, from NDWP 06 down, as an apparent “official” or at 

least “officially sanctioned” formulaic expression of the principle 

potential sources of social disorder. 

10. See Wang Guosheng, “On Relations to be Correctly 

Handled in Strengthening Border Area Defense,” Zhongguo Junshi 

Kexue, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2006, pp. 7-10. Major General Wang wrote 

as Chief of Staff of the Lanzhou MR. Wang also makes the point 

that border defense and frontier security are mutually reinforcing 

missions.

11. Fravel, p. 706.

12. Ibid., p. 709.

13. One further mission the PLA must be assumed to have 

under Chinese strategic planning in the context of frontier security 

is the mission of deterrence against violations of the border by 

hostile powers. Clearly, providing a credible demonstration of 

capability to respond effectively to neutralize threats, whether 

they originate externally or internally, is an ongoing mission for 

the PLA. See Blasko, pp. 292-293.

14. There is also recognition that promoting development in 

the frontier can pose difficult challenges through what appear to 

be contradictory imperatives—for example, promoting economic 

growth often requires facilitating easier cross-border movement, 

while countersmuggling or criminal cross-border activity may 

require tighter controls. 

15. See, for example, Gao, pp. 7-8. An earlier discussion of 

this topic in the same journal occurs in Wang Hongjun, “Woguo 

fankongbu douzheng duice yanjiu” [“Research into China’s 

Countermeasures in the Struggle Against Terrorism”], Journal of 

the People’s Armed Police Academy, Vol. 20, No. 5, October 2005, pp. 

83-86. 
162

16. NDWP 06, p. 21. Interestingly, the English translation of 

this term by China is “shared responsibilities,” while the actual 

Chinese seems to convey “divided responsibilities.” In application, 

the latter appears more accurate; use of the former in this chapter 

is a reflection only of the fact that this appears to be the “official” 

Chinese government translation.

17. Ibid., pp. 6-8.

18. A particularly excellent summary of current Chinese 

operational doctrine for border defense is found in Fravel, pp. 

718-722. The author draws on a number of PLA sources to analyze 

a typical PLA “border defense campaign” plan.

19. Ibid., p. 718.

20. To be sure, sources discuss the principles of “active 

defense,” and clearly the PLA conception of mission here includes 

strikes across borders at targets in neighboring countries. Such 

strikes are contemplated using a variety of means, including 

missiles, aircraft, or deployed troop units. Such operations, 

however, are typically characterized as defensive in nature and 

aimed at neutralizing targets before they can violate Chinese 

territory, not as a means of annexing territory from neighboring 

countries.

21. Li, pp. 197-205.

22. NDWP 06, p. 23.

23. Some analysis of the response to the Tibet unrest in 

March 2008 has noted the presence of “out of area” PAP units in 

photographs, and the rapid deployment of reinforcing elements 

(especially if it included PLA main force units) from other regions 

would certainly have demonstrated the security forces’ ability to 

benefit from recently improved infrastructure linking Tibet to the 

rest of China. 

24. Fravel, p. 715. The use of the term “counter-separatist 

military action” (fan fenlie junshi xindong) for this mission may 

indicate that it is only expected to be required in the case of a largescale separatist guerilla event presumably marked by ethnic or 
163

religious separatism, and is not conceived of as a potential option 

against economically or otherwise motivated social upheaval, i.e., 

violence against the system but that does not necessarily advocate 

separatism. It is, however, likely that this distinction is a largely 

semantic one.

25. James Mulvenon, “The Chinese Military’s Earthquake 

Response Leadership Team,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 

25, Summer 2008, available from www.hoover.org/publications/

clm/issues/20100024.html. While this was not a frontier security 

situation, it does demonstrate one attempt at coordinating civilmilitary joint efforts on a massive scale.

26. “Lethal Weapons Not Used in Tibetan Unrest,” South China 

Morning Post, March 18, 2008. Some analysts cite photographic 

evidence of PLA involvement in the earlier “suppression” phase 

of the operation, but what is available in public sources does not 

seem to be conclusive. 

27. It will be useful to monitor various Chinese sources in the 

wake of actual incidents such as the domestic unrest in Tibet or the 

rash of attacks against PAP and police units in Xinjiang in August 

2008 to see if more detailed and candid internal assessments of the 

effectiveness of government responses are forthcoming.

28. Shi Hongguang and Fang Xingguo, “Yunyong kexue 

fazhanguan zhidao bianfang jianshe chuangxin fazhan” [“Using 

Scientific Development to Bring About New Ideas in Border 

Defense”], Guofang, 2007, No. 1, pp. 54-56.

29. Cheng Bing, “Jiji tuijin ‘Guanbian kongbian jianbian’ jizhi 

chuangxin shiying xin shiqi bianfang gongzuo xuyao” [“Actively 

Promote the Innovative System of ‘Manage, Control, and Develop 

the Border’ to Adapt to the Border Defense Requirements of the 

New Era”], Guofang 2006, No. 8, pp. 61-63. Major General Cheng 

writes as Chief of Staff of Xinjiang Military District (MD).

30. A good representative source is Lu Meizhang, “An Analysis 

of PAP and Military Border Defense Joint Training Organization,” 

Guofang 2004, No. 12. Lu wrote as Chief of Staff of a Military SubDistrict in Yunnan Province, and provides a good summary of 
164

specific goals to be addressed in joint training, as well as threats 

and scenarios to be used.

31. Yuan Wei, “Complementing Advantages, Linked Training, 

Coordinated Operations—Chongzuo Military Sub-District 

Constructs Military/Police/Militia Joint Defense Joint Training 

Mechanisms,” Guangzhou Zhanshi Bao, March 8, 2007, p. 3. The 

publication is an official daily put out by the political department 

of the Guangzhou MR.

32. Cheng, p. 62; Shi and Fang, p. 55.

33. Wang Hongjun, p. 86. The author is identified as Deputy 

Director of the Theoretical Teaching and Research Section, Security 

Department, PAP Academy. 

34. Liu Junwu, “Tibet Autonomous Region Conducts 

Counterterrorist Exercise with Real Units,” originally published 

in Xizang Ribao, August 5, 2008, accessed from Renminwang at 

leaders.people/com/cn/GB/7612526.html on 28AUG08. These “drills,” 

referred to as “Sky Road 08,” and “Grand Hawk 08,” were held 

on August 2 and 4, 2008, and centered on the Lhasa airport and 

train station respectively. Participants included not only the local 

PAP and PLA headquarters, but elements of the PLA Air Force 

(PLAAF), fire departments, propaganda departments, sanitation/

health office, foreign affairs bureau, environmental protection 

office, communications office, civil aviation, and others. The 

simple fact of the inclusion of so many disparate units would 

seem to indicate a thorough analysis of the threat implications, 

and a good attempt to include as comprehensive as possible a list 

of participants who could be expected to have a role in response 

to a real world incident.

35. James Bellacqua, Terrorism in China: Perceptions of 

Vulnerability, Countermeasures, Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, 

July 2008, p. 14.

36. While specifics on these units are naturally difficult to come 

by, China does publicize some aspects of these units’ training and 

capabilities for both propaganda and likely deterrent purposes. A 

good overview can be found at sinodefence.com, www.sinodefence.

com/organisation/armedpolice/special-police.asp (for PAP units) and 
165

www.sinodefence.com/organisation/groundforces/specialoperations.asp

(for PLA units). 

37. “Snow Leopards, Blue Swords Ready to Keep Games 

Safe,” available from China.Org.Cn, www.china.org.cn/china/

national/2008-07/09/content_15977501.htm.

38. Wang Hongjun, p. 86. It should, of course, be noted that 

Wang is employed by the PAP Academy and writing in a PAP 

publication, and so might be expected to support this view.

39. “Marine Police Stage Anti-Terror Drills for Olympics,” 

Xinhua News Agency, July 14, 2007, available from www.china.

org.cn/china/national/2007-07/14/content_1217065.htm. The same 

article, however, notes that the PLAN is “responsible for security of 

maritime venues” for the games, without explaining the apparent 

contradiction. Such ambiguity and contradictory statements are 

distressingly common.

40. Bellacqua, p. 17. The author cites numerous Chinese 

sources, including Li Wei, Deputy Director of the National Leading 

Small Group for CT Coordination, as specifically acknowledging 

these needs.

41. Total numbers vary depending on criteria used to define 

“exercise,” such as whether “observer-only” participation qualifies 

an exercise as “multinational.” Since 2002, at least 36 exercises 

have occurred involving actual deployment of troops from more 

than one country as exercise participants.

42. “China’s ‘Snow Leopard’ Commandos to Train with 

Russian Commandoes,” People’s Daily Online, August 29, 2007, 

available from english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/6250873.html.

43. It is perhaps instructive that in the case of two countries that 

are arguably least stable/predictable, North Korea and Burma/

Myanmar, the PLA assumption of its border defense mission in 

2003 was highly publicized and portrayed as the PLA “taking over 

the border defense.” Some evidence seems to indicate the PLA 

was deployed to strengthen the PAP presence, rather than replace 

it—in other words, exactly as the “shared responsibility” system 

would envision. But the characterization of “PLA takeover” may 
166

have indicated a change in command relationships. More study of 

this particular incident is needed.

44. A good example of this argument is Ji You, 

“Defending China’s Land Borders: The 1.5 War Scenario,” 

OpinionAsia, July 24, 2007, available from www.opinionasia.org/

DefendingChinasLandBorders. The author is a Senior Lecturer at the 

University of New South Wales in Australia.
167

CHAPTER 6

STRATEGIC DETERRENCE BEYOND TAIWAN

Brad Roberts

As other chapters in this volume amply attest, 

“beyond Taiwan” means something substantial to 

the on-going development of the Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army’s (PLA) capabilities. This is as true 

of China’s strategic deterrent as of other elements of 

the PLA. To gain insights into the missions of China’s 

strategic forces “beyond Taiwan,” this chapter begins 

with a review of China’s strategic posture. The central 

element of this posture is China’s force of ballistic 

missiles tipped with nuclear weapons. But this is not 

the only element of China’s strategic deterrent force, 

and a broader view is needed. This chapter summarizes 

the historical development of this force with an eye 

to highlighting evolving operational capabilities 

for different missions. The chapter then turns to a 

discussion of the Taiwan mission itself as it relates to 

China’s strategic deterrent, on the argument that the 

Taiwan mission accounts for many of the operational 

characteristics of China’s strategic deterrent, but not 

all of them. The chapter will then explore the roles 

of China’s strategic deterrent vis-à-vis other conflicts 

around China’s periphery. The chapter closes with a 

discussion of conclusions and implications.1

As a point of departure, it is important to note that 

relatively little has been written about the roles and 

missions of China’s strategic forces by authoritative 

Chinese sources. The PLA academic community has 

produced a small but growing body of material that 

provides general characterizations of Chinese thinking 
168

about deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons in 

China’s national security strategy, but this literature 

makes few or no apparent distinctions between the 

“Taiwan mission” and other missions.2 There is very 

little authoritative information about the roles and 

missions of specific strategic forces, the nature of 

ongoing modernization activities and the problems 

they are intended to address, or the resourcing 

enabling such modernization. The scholarship by 

experts outside of China on China’s nuclear posture 

and strategic force, whatever its many virtues, does 

not add many significant new insights into the mission 

space “beyond Taiwan.”3

 Accordingly, the conjectural 

nature of this work requires analytical caution.4

To help locate this analysis within the larger 

framework employed by this volume, two further 

introductory points are useful. First, this chapter is 

framed within “cell A” of the introduction, i.e., it 

assumes that there is no conflict over Taiwan, but also 

no resolution and that the status quo persists. The 

concluding section of this chapter includes a discussion 

of how China’s strategic deterrence posture might be 

affected by some of the other “outcomes” elaborated in 

the editor’s matrix of possible outcomes. Second, this 

chapter follows the definition of roles and missions 

introduced earlier. The role of China’s nuclear force is 

strategic deterrence and toward this end it maintains 

and is developing various capabilities, but its missions 

are defined in terms of specific political-military end 

states in the various scenarios that concern China’s 

military planners.
169

CHINA’S STRATEGIC POSTURE

The U.S. defense community has a relatively 

strict and indeed simple notion of what constitutes a 

nation’s strategic posture that equates strategic with 

intercontinental range nuclear strike capabilities. U.S. 

experts tend not to recognize the degree to which 

this notion reflects the unique strategic circumstance 

of the United States, separated as it is from potential 

adversaries by two oceans and having arrived at an 

arsenal after 60 years as a nuclear power that is devoid 

of medium-range delivery systems and nearly devoid 

of shorter-range tactical systems. Accordingly, experts 

in the United States tend to misperceive the nature 

and scope of China’s strategic posture by limiting their 

focus to nuclear weapons deployed on intercontinental 

missiles. 

China’s strategic posture is different in part 

because, like that of the United States, it reflects its own 

geographic circumstances and history. In contrast to 

America’s two wide oceans and two friendly neighbors, 

China has more countries around its periphery than 

any other country in the world, and a long history of 

conflict along that periphery that leaves many unsettled 

issues. Accordingly, its nuclear forces are not just long 

range. In contrast to the continuing deemphasis of 

nuclear weapons in the U.S. strategic posture since 

the end of the Cold War, China has perceived a need 

to adapt and update its posture to address changing 

requirements. Accordingly, it has modernized those 

forces and also increased their numbers. Moreover, 

China has begun to integrate additional military 

capabilities into its strategic posture. These include 

ballistic missiles tipped with conventional rather than 

nuclear weapons, counterspace attack capabilities, and 
170

even nonkinetic means for damaging critical nodes 

at very long distances. In an objective sense, China’s 

strategic posture also includes the capacity to protect 

China from strategic attack, a capacity unlike that of 

the United States in its emphasis on passive defense. 

(The United States has emphasized active defense in 

the form of ballistic missile protection, whereas China 

has pursued a very ambitious civil defense program 

aimed at protecting national leadership and key 

capabilities in underground facilities.) Any strategic 

posture also includes the capabilities to command 

and control strategic weaponry, and the supporting 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. 

China has not publicly articulated a concept for its 

strategic posture that identifies all of these elements, 

yet they objectively are part of its capacities to wage a 

confrontation at the strategic level of war. 

But too little is known about the broad elements of 

China’s strategic posture to enable an informed and 

coherent exploration in this space. Accordingly, the 

focus here is on China’s nuclear weapons and their 

delivery means, including primarily the land-based 

forces under the control of the Second Artillery but 

also nuclear delivery forces in the PLA Navy and Air 

Force. In Hu Jintao’s words, “The Second Artillery 

Corps is a strategic force directly commanded and 

used by the Party Central Committee and the Central 

Military Commission and is our core force for strategic 

deterrence.”5

Three Phases of Force Evolution.

It is useful to think of the evolution of this force in 

roughly three main phases. The purpose here is not to 

review each phase exhaustively; rather, it is to provide 
171

enough information about each to illuminate findings 

and conclusions relevant to the mission space “beyond 

Taiwan.”

Phase 1. The first phase was the period of China’s 

strategic infancy, as it moved to plan, create, and field its 

first-generation strategic force.6

 This phase lasted from 

the initiation of China’s nuclear weapons development 

program to the achievement of a capability to deliver 

nuclear weapons at intercontinental range—that is, 

from 1955 when Mao launched Project 02 to 1980 when 

China successfully tested the DF-5.7 As a testament to 

the closing of this phase of strategic infancy, in 1981 

China conducted a massive combined arms exercise 

aimed at demonstrating its full preparedness for 

nuclear war, and in 1983 it showcased its array of 

nuclear missile capabilities in its annual military 

parade through Tiananmen Square.8

 Mao embraced 

nuclear weapons as essentially “a political weapon” (a 

term that remains in use today),9 useful for standing 

up to “bullying” by other powers. The principles of no 

first use and minimum retaliation followed. Mao also 

embraced nuclear weapons as helpful for restoring 

national self-esteem following decades of turmoil and 

civil war.10

In this period, China deployed weapons platforms 

for delivering nuclear weapons at increasing range. 

Bombers and short-range missile systems came first, 

along with tactical weapons intended to cope with 

a potential Soviet invasion of China.11 Two years 

after exploding its first nuclear device in 1964, China 

achieved initial operational capability of a missile with 

a range sufficient to strike Korea and Japan (and U.S. 

bases there). Additional missile systems were deployed 

over the coming decade capable of reaching Okinawa, 

the Philippines, Vietnam, the Russian Far East, and 
172

India. In 1980, China deployed the DF-4 with a range 

sufficient to reach Moscow and Guam.12 China also had 

a largely unsuccessful effort in this period to develop 

a sea-based missile force and ultimately fielded only 

one submarine armed with 12 medium-range ballistic 

missiles, which reportedly has not sailed outside 

China’s territorial waters and reportedly has never 

conducted a deterrence patrol.13

As argued above, this phase of strategic infancy 

culminated in the early 1980s with the deployment 

of a broadly diverse set of nuclear strike capabilities. 

This allowed Deng Xiaoping to argue in 1983 that 

China’s success in building its deterrent “had forced 

the superpowers not to use” nuclear weapons against 

China.14 Then Defense Minister Zhang Aiping argued 

further in 1986 that “we have built a powerful national 

defense and possess a nuclear strike capability. The 

enemy no longer dares to strike [the first blow] or to 

underestimate us.”15

What does this history imply about the 

differentiation between Taiwan and non-Taiwan 

missions? U.S. observers generally believe that the 

evolution of China’s strategic capabilities in this first 

phase was driven more by technological factors than 

by guidance to target specific countries in specific 

contingencies. By this argument, China built weapons 

capable of reaching a broadening set of targets because 

it could do so and generally sought an effective 

deterrent. As John Lewis and Hua Di argued, China’s 

nuclear weapons program in this period “proceeded 

without such strategic guidance” and “until the early 

1980s, there were no scenarios, no detailed linkage of 

the weapons to foreign policy objectives, and no serious 

strategic research.”16 Lewis and Hu note a possible 

exception in a decision following the 1968 Ussuri River 
173

clash with the Soviet Union to extend the range of the 

DF-4 to bring Moscow within range.17

Other observers have surveyed the available 

evidence and come to a different conclusion. Bates 

Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes have argued 

as follows:

This story, along with others in the narrative about the 

sequential development of missiles capable of hitting 

the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii, and the U.S., suggest 

that someone, somewhere at a central level was making 

decisions about strategic purpose and direction of 

various missile systems, which was then reflected in 

the seemingly logical pattern (defined as matching 

geographic location with range of target) of base and 

missile deployments.18

Without further transparency from China, it is 

impossible to assess definitively which interpretation 

is correct. Whatever strategic analysis might have 

guided the development of China’s deterrent in this 

first phase, there is little evidence to suggest that the 

potential for military confrontation over Taiwan served 

as the primary guiding principle in the development of 

China’s strategic posture. Nor did any other specific 

regional contingency appear to guide that development. 

Rather, Beijing was concerned broadly with creating a 

strategic force sufficient to enable it to resist coercion 

by any foreign power.

Phase 2. As the initial phase wrapped up in the 

early 1980s, a new phase in the development of China’s 

strategic posture began. This one lasted approximately 

a decade or so.19 This phase was marked by the declining 

centrality of people’s war as a central organizing 

concept for the PLA and also by China’s initial opening 

to the world following Mao’s death. During this period, 
174

some initial modernization of China’s strategic forces 

began, with the pursuit of solid-fuel and road-mobile 

land-based systems and improved command and 

control capabilities. China’s weapons designers were 

given guidance to diversify China’s strategic arsenal 

to cover a broader spectrum of potential contingencies 

and were given a decade or more to accomplish the 

shift to second-generation forces.20 Improvements were 

sought to the range, payload, and accuracy of missile 

systems. Renewed concern about Soviet military 

power and ambition fueled the decision to develop 

a modernized strike capability against Moscow with 

the capability to penetrate its missile defense system 

as well as improved tactical weapons that might be 

useful to turning back a Soviet armored invasion of 

China (i.e., an enhanced radiation device, or “neutron 

bomb”). During this period, an expert community 

of strategic analysts emerged within the PLA, along 

with “a systematic elaboration of China’s concept of 

deterrence.”21

In this phase, it is possible to see some further 

differentiation of China’s capabilities for specific 

operational requirements. The need for effective 

nuclear deterrence of the Soviet Union seems to have 

remained as the central organizing concern of China’s 

evolving force posture.22 It is difficult to discern any 

specific role for China’s strategic posture vis-à-vis the 

Taiwan contingency in this period.

Phase 3. Phase 3 began in the early 1990s. The driver 

of this new phase was the broader national ambition 

to adapt the PLA more generally to the changing 

national and international context, as reflected in 

what was essentially a new military strategy in 1993. 

That strategy took the form of the Military Strategic 

Guidelines for the New Period promulgated by Jiang 
175

Zemin on January 13, 1993. As David Finkelstein has 

argued, the guidelines “represent the national military 

strategy under which the PLA has been operating” 

ever since.23

The need for a new strategy was dictated by changes 

in China’s security environment. With the demise of 

the Soviet Union and the end of cold war confrontation, 

the emerging set of strategic relationships gained 

prominence in China, along with the associated 

military challenges and contingencies. The first Gulf 

War had also provided a vivid illustration of how 

much the so-called revolution in military affairs was 

changing the nature of warfare, leading to renewed 

calls to adapt PLA capabilities to new requirements 

through dramatic shifts in operational art and technical 

capacity. As David Finkelstein has argued, these 

requirements and assessments are both “capabilities 

based and contingency based.”24

The guidelines establish five major tasks for the 

PLA: (1) defending national territory and sovereignty, 

(2) securing the nation’s maritime rights and interests, 

(3) maintaining the unity of the motherland, (4) 

ensuring internal stability, and (5) maintaining a secure 

and stable external environment, especially on China’s 

periphery.25 Jiang summarized the salient strategic 

guidance as follows:

In terms of strategic guidance, we have long since 

transferred the key preparations from being based 

on fighting early, fighting large, and fighting nuclear 

weapons, to dealing with local war. Now, on the basis of 

developments and changes to the international system, 

we must give priority to preparations for dealing with 

local wars under modern high-tech conditions. This 

is a further development and perfection of our army’s 

strategic guiding thought.26
176

With the national military strategic guidelines as 

the starting point, further guidance was provided to 

specific elements of the PLA for planning and action. 

The Second Artillery emerged as prominent in the 

leadership vision of how to implement the desired 

transformation of the PLA. In 1993, Jiang Zemin argued 

that “with regard to our building up of national defense 

and with regard to our whole strategy, the Second 

Artillery is of considerable importance.”27 Along with 

the other services, it was directed to undertake “building 

efforts.” The Second Artillery was specifically directed 

to “have a stronger nuclear deterrent and conventional 

strike capabilities.”28

Before reviewing these Second Artillery “building 

efforts,” it is useful to understand the key concepts that 

drove such planning. The 1993 guidelines instigated a 

broad and ambitious PLA effort to “put its intellectual 

house in order,” with updated doctrine appropriate 

to the new requirements of local wars under modern 

high tech (and “informationalized”) conditions.29

This effort led to the release in January 1999 of a new 

and comprehensive set of guidelines for the conduct 

of military operations, emphasizing “campaigns and 

battles and all levels and all scales” and “unifying the 

operational thinking of the whole military.”30 Each of 

the armed Services then prepared its own study of 

the application of new doctrine to their operational 

arts, and the Second Artillery produced in 2004 The 

Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, a volume which 

“through abstract summaries . . . focuses on revealing 

the general laws of Second Artillery corps campaigns, 

systematically expounds the basic theories of Second 

Artillery Corps campaigns, and strives to enhance the 

theoretical, innovative and practical qualities.”31 In an 

effort “to overcome the thinking barrier of sticking to 
177

old ways and following the beaten path,” the document 

highlights the need for transformational approaches, 

and the first such transformation it envisions is “to shift 

the footing of theoretical research of Second Artillery 

Corps campaigns from dealing with a nuclear war in 

the past to participating in a high tech local war under 

the conditions of nuclear deterrence.”32

These efforts have led to a much clearer articulation 

about the roles and functions of the strategic deterrent 

than evident in the prior phases. As argued in The 

Science of Military Strategy:

Warfighting and deterrence are two major basic 

functions of the armed forces. What is termed deterrence 

is the military conduct of a state or a political group in 

displaying force or showing the determination to use 

force to compel the enemy to submit to one’s volition 

and to refrain from taking hostile actions or escalating 

the hostility. As part of military strategy, strategic 

deterrence refers to strategic behavior performed for 

deterrence on the overall strategic situations. Strategic 

deterrence and strategic operations are dialectically 

unified. Strategic operations secure the strategic objective 

through direct engagement with the enemy on the battle 

field, with a view to winning the war or to curbing the 

war by war, while the objective of strategic deterrence 

is to contain the outbreak of war or to limit the scope 

and the escalation of war, with a view to curbing the 

war... Strategic deterrence is based on warfighting. . . . 

The more powerful the war-fighting capability, the more 

effective the deterrence.33

The main types of strategic deterrence are as follows: 

First, nuclear deterrence. It means the deterrent action 

and posture of taking nuclear force as backup power to 

shock and contain the opponent by threatening to use 

nuclear weapons or determining to carry out nuclear 

counterattack. The essence of nuclear deterrence is to 

warn the opponent in advance the possibility of using 

nuclear weapons or carrying out nuclear counterattack 
178

and the likely grave consequences as a result of taking 

this advantage, for the purposes of bringing about the 

opponent’s dreadful mentality by his weighing the 

advantages against the disadvantages and the gain 

against the loss, so as to force him to obey the deterrer’s 

volition or to give up his original attempts.34

The employment of nuclear deterrence is based on the 

development level of nuclear strength owned by the 

nuclear nations. At the moment, nuclear deterrence 

is generally classified into three gradations. The first 

is the maximum nuclear deterrence. It is designed to 

threaten the opponent by disarming him with just the 

first massive nuclear strike for attaining the aim of 

containing and coercing him under the condition of the 

deterrer’s possession of quantitative and qualitative 

superiority of nuclear force. The second is the minimum 

nuclear deterrence. It depends on a handful of nuclear 

weapons to threaten the opponent by striking his cities 

for making up nuclear deterrence to him. The third 

is nuclear deterrence of moderate intensity. It relies 

on “sufficient and effective” nuclear strike forced to 

threaten the opponent by incurring him an unbearable 

destruction to a certain extent so as to attain the objective 

of one’s deterrence.35

Nuclear deterrence is not almighty and it has many 

limitations. . . . With the development of post-war history, 

the limitations of nuclear deterrence are increasingly 

exposed, and the effect of conventional deterrence is 

gradually valued.36

This document goes on to explore the many ways in 

which “conventional deterrence is merged into the 

overall deterrence” and argues that deterrence by means 

of a “space military force” and “information deterrence” 

is increasingly important in a comprehensive view of 

deterrence.37
179

Deterrence Concepts.

These concepts go well beyond the simple view 

of minimum deterrence typically invoked by the 

community of U.S. experts interested in China’s 

nuclear strategy. They reflect a concerted Chinese 

effort to better understand the use of military power to 

shape China’s security environment in peacetime and 

war. In this regard, these concepts mirror efforts of the 

Bush administration to think through the problems 

associated with dissuasion, deterrence, and defeat in 

the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

The Second Artillery’s own study of campaign 

science adapted these concepts to the problems of 

waging “high tech local war under the conditions 

of nuclear deterrence.” A few concepts from this 

document are cited below:

The Second Artillery Corps is a strategic missile force 

with nuclear power as its mainstay. With the formulation 

of the strategic principles for the new era, the strategic 

missions of the Second Artillery Corps have shifted from 

the single undertaking of guided missile nuclear assault 

to nuclear and conventional “dual deterrence and dual 

operations.”38

The goal of campaign deterrence is to force an enemy 

to accept our will or to contain an enemy’s hostile acts. 

The campaigns large formation undertakes the task of 

deterrence. Once deterrence has lost its effectiveness, the 

campaign large formation can quickly transit to actual 

combat.39

Second Artillery campaign deterrence is carried out 

in peacetime, in pre-combat period, and during war 

time. Local wars under informationalized conditions 

often begin with campaign deterrence, which forces the 

adversary to accept certain conditions.40
180

The conventional missile strike campaigns of Second 

Artillery will be implemented under the nuclear 

deterrence conditions. Even if the future warfare mainly 

will be conventional localized warfare, the major 

militarily powerful nations possessing nuclear weapons 

had never promised not to use nuclear weapons first. 

In the most recent localized warfare, there were several 

implementations of nuclear deterrence. Therefore, under 

the informationalized conditions, the implementation of 

conventional missile strike campaigns of Second Artillery 

will definitely receive nuclear deterrence from powerful 

countries. This kind of nuclear deterrence is even more 

practical in regional conflicts or localized wars that could 

happen in areas surrounding our country. Therefore, no 

matter whether it is nuclear counterattack campaigns 

or conventional missile strike campaigns, it will receive 

serious threats from nuclear weapons. Second Artillery 

must do well on the long-term preparation of nuclear 

strikes and stand firm on implementing operations under 

nuclear conditions or nuclear deterrence conditions.41

Second Artillery missile units . . . aim mainly to fully 

demonstrate their role in nuclear deterrence and prevent 

the war from moving toward widening or spreading, 

and to deter the enemy from initiating nuclear war, 

and thereby controlling the war by keeping it localized, 

limited and bearable in scope.42

During conventional operations, missile units must be 

prepared to carry out nuclear deterrence or even nuclear 

counterattacks.43

This doctrine has guided the “building efforts” of 

the Second Artillery in the years since the Guidelines 

were issued in 1993. In the words of one PLA source 

from 1996, two concerns dominated the effort to adapt 

China’s strategic deterrent to the requirements of the 

new military strategic guidelines:
181

After more than three decades of arduous pioneering 

work, the accomplishment that the Second Artillery has 

achieved is great. However, based on facts, there are 

still some problems that exist in the development and 

building up of the Second Artillery. These problems 

are mainly reflected in two most basic gaps. One is that 

there exists a fairly large gap between China’s strategic 

requirements of gaining mastery by striking only after 

the enemy has struck and the operational capacity of the 

Second Artillery with regard to nuclear counterattack. 

The other is that there exists a fairly large gap between 

the requirements of the times to win victory in hightech local war and the current conventional operational 

capacity of the Second Artillery.44

To address the second main concern about a 

capability for strategic but non-nuclear means of 

warfare, the Second Artillery was given a requirement 

in the early 1990s to develop a force of conventionallytipped missiles, along with the associated modernized 

command and control capabilities.45 Over the last 15 

years, it has moved aggressively to do so and, as noted 

above, to integrate conventional missile operations 

into its doctrine and operational art.

The first concern, survivability, was not new to 

China. In 1984, China began round-the-clock alerts in 

response to rising concerns about survivability.46 But it 

took on added potency with the shifting assessment of 

the international security environment and especially 

rising concern about the precision strike capabilities 

displayed by the United States in the first Persian Gulf 

war. The requirement was highlighted in a speech 

reportedly given in 2000 by Jiang Zemin setting “the 

five musts” guiding the building up of Second Artillery 

capabilities. In his words, China must:

1. “own strategic nuclear weapons of a definite 

quality and quantity in order to ensure national 

security”;
182

2. “guarantee the safety of strategic nuclear bases 

against the loss of combat effectiveness from attacks 

and destruction by hostile countries”;

3. “ensure that our strategic nuclear weapons are at 

a high degree of war preparedness”;

4. “be able to launch a nuclear counterattack and 

nuclear re-attack against an aggressor who launches a 

nuclear attack against us”; and 

5. “pay attention to the global situation of strategic 

balance and stability and, when there are changes 

in the situation, adjust our strategic nuclear weapon 

development strategy in a timely manner.”47

In 2004 The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns

summarized the programmatic impact of doctrine as 

follows. 

Second Artillery has developed new techniques and new 

equipment non-stop in the recent years. It is predicted 

that, around 2010, Second Artillery will be equipped 

with a new generation strategic nuclear missile series 

that can realize global firepower control with high launch 

precision and advanced technology. . . . After the 1990s 

. . . it continuously added conventional missile forces, 

electronic warfare forces, and cruise missiles forces. . . 

. In the future, there is a plan for the computer network 

forces, psychological warfare forces, and space warfare 

forces. . . . It will eventually make Second Artillery an 

armed service with multiple forces.48

The results of China’s efforts to date are uncertain. 

China’s strategic posture is clearly in transition. It is on 

its way to becoming more technologically sophisticated. 

It is on its way to becoming more capable of operations 

integrated with conventional military campaigns. 

It is on its way to higher readiness, as it moves from 

fixed land-based to mobile systems. It is revitalizing 
183

some of the elements of the original strategic posture 

that matured less fully than the land-based missile 

force—i.e., the sea-based force (with the deployment 

of a small fleet of new ballistic missile submarines) and 

air-delivered capabilities associated with modernized 

bombers. There has been a dramatic, huge build-up 

in short-range ballistic missiles deployed across the 

Taiwan strait and the number of deployed missiles has 

reached a point (generally assessed at more than 1,000 

missiles) to raise a basic question about what types 

of missions other than strategic bombardment are 

associated with China’s short-range missiles. Of note, 

some of these missiles are understood to be capable of 

carrying nuclear weapons. China is modernizing and 

replacing its force of medium- and intermediate-range 

ballistic missiles, while also reportedly significantly 

increasing the network of deployment sites for the new 

road-mobile systems.49 By one authoritative report, 

between 2006 and 2008 China built up its force of roadmobile solid-fueled CSS-5s (DF-21) from 19-50 to 60-

80. As of 2008, China’s force of land-based nucleartipped missiles capable of reaching targets around 

its periphery (that is, its medium- and intermediaterange ballistic missiles but not the short-range systems 

or intercontinental ones) consists of 20 liquid-fueled 

CSS-3s, between 15 and 20 liquid-fueled CSS-2s, and 

the CSS-5 force.50 This is in addition to whatever JL-1 

missiles might be available for launch from the old 

Xia class fleet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) as 

well as air-launched cruise missiles deliverable from 

modernized bombers.51

What does this suggest about the importance of 

missions “beyond Taiwan” in this third phase of 

development of China’s strategic deterrent? Even 

as the Taiwan contingency loomed very large in the 
184

thinking of China’s military planners and political 

leadership, it appears that the top-level guidance given 

to China’s military forces has emphasized the generic 

challenges of local wars under modern high-tech 

conditions rather than, as a first order priority, success 

in a Taiwan contingency. In the vernacular of the 2001 

U.S. QDR, China’s leaders have dictated a shift from 

threat-based planning to capabilities-based planning. 

In other words, in a security environment where 

they cannot confidently predict the specific types of 

conflicts that might involve their military forces in the 

decades ahead, they are working to create a suite of 

capabilities that would be useful across a broad set 

of contingencies. In the specifically nuclear domain, 

China’s military planners contemplate the possibility 

of localized wars involving nuclear powers with 

varying degrees of nuclear and conventional military 

power, not just a canonical war involving Taiwan and 

the United States. 

With these three phases encompassing the history 

of China’s development of its strategic posture, what 

about its future? Recent Chinese defense white papers 

have described the modernization of the Second 

Artillery as integral to the modernization of the PLA 

more generally. The 2006 White Paper described desired 

future developments of the PLA in the following way:

China pursues a three-step development strategy in 

modernizing its national defense and armed forces, 

in accordance with the state’s overall plan to realize 

modernization. The first step is to lay a solid foundation 

by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 

2020, and the third is to basically reach the strategic 

goal of building informationized arms forces and being 

capable of winning informationized wars by the mid21st century.52
185

How these benchmarks correlate with the future 

development of China’s strategic posture is not 

elaborated in the report and remains a topic of debate 

and controversy. The 2006 white paper addresses also 

the role of naval forces in strategic deterrence, stating 

that “the Navy aims at gradual extension of strategic 

depth for offshore defensive operations and enhancing 

its capabilities in integrated maritime operations and 

nuclear counterattacks.”53 On future nuclear capabilities 

more generally, the report noted that:

China upholds the principles of counterattack in selfdefense and limited development of nuclear weapons, 

and aims at building a lean and effective nuclear force 

capable of meeting national security needs. It endeavors 

to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear 

weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent 

force. China’s nuclear force is under the direct command 

of the Central Military Commission. China exercises 

great restraint in developing its nuclear force. It has 

never entered into and will never enter into a nuclear 

arms race with any other country.54

Members of China’s expert community interested in 

nuclear policy and strategy argue energetically that the 

modernization of China’s nuclear forces is in service of 

stability and maintaining a status quo in the strategic 

military realm, now being threatened by developments 

in the U.S. strategic posture. They argue that the 

ambitions set out in the 2001 U.S. Nuclear Posture 

Review for the addition to the U.S. posture of missile 

defense, non-nuclear strike, and advanced intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance systems all jeopardize 

the credibility of China’s deterrent, thus justifying 

adaptations in China’s arsenal aimed at denying the 

United States such a one-sided advantage.55 As Senior 

Colonel Yao Yunzhu of China’s Academy of Military 
186

Science has argued, “China’s nuclear modernization is 

to keep valid its long-standing nuclear policy.”56

Others see more ominous developments. As Mark 

Schneider of the National Institute for Public Policy has 

argued, “This assessment [that China is modernizing to 

maintain the status quo] may be too benign. The same 

thing was said about the Soviet Union a year before its 

nuclear buildup that became evident in 1966.”57

These different assessments reflect profound 

uncertainty about the future roles and missions of 

China’s deterrent. It is possible to build a best case on 

available evidence and project greater continuity than 

change. But it is possible also to build a worst case on 

available evidence that projects significant departures 

in China’s strategic capabilities and intentions. It 

seems reasonable to expect that there will be continued 

refinement of Chinese military thinking about the 

specific missions associated with China’s strategic force 

now that a modernization program compels specific 

decisions about the operational characteristics of 

future forces—i.e., the ranges and payloads of delivery 

systems, the effects associated with different warheads, 

the capabilities of the enabling systems (command, 

control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), 

and the scale and diversity of the overall posture. 

In sum, China’s strategic deterrent has developed 

in three main phases, with the future now stretching 

out before us as either an extension of the third phase 

or a fourth phase marked by significant shift in China’s 

capabilities and objectives. In the first phase, the Taiwan 

mission seemed not particularly prominent, and, 

indeed, there is little evidence of contingency planning 

driving force development. In the second phase, there 

was some apparent mission differentiation, but the 

Taiwan mission seemed not dominant. In the third 
187

phase, a broader set of contingencies have driven 

Chinese planning, though Taiwan has an obviously 

central role. But there has been an emphasis on the 

development of capabilities useful across the broader 

set of contingencies and against countries with very 

different conventional and nuclear capabilities relative 

to China’s.

DEFINING THE TAIWAN MISSION

To further illuminate the different missions that 

have informed the development of China’s strategic 

deterrent, it is useful to have a clear notion of the roles of 

that deterrent in the Taiwan contingency. Towards this 

end, it is useful to begin with a short summary of what 

would likely be China’s primary objectives in a conflict 

over Taiwan involving the United States. China would 

have multiple strategic objectives in such a conflict. It 

would want to induce capitulation by Taipei and create 

a fait accompli before outside intervention can buttress 

the defense of Taiwan; make the United States reluctant 

to intervene with the hope that this will prevent it from 

doing so or at least doing so in a timely way; and if the 

United States does enter the war, induce U.S. restraint 

in using the tools of escalation available to it; and 

induce Japanese restraint, whether to prevent its entry 

into war or limit the support it provides to U.S. forces. 

China would also have multiple operational goals, 

including to inflict rapid defeat on Taiwan’s military 

forces; delay or defeat U.S. power projection assets; and 

conduct attacks on U.S. bases and forces and possibly 

also the United States itself toward that end. 

In seeking to achieve these strategic and operational 

objectives, China would marshal available military, 

political, and economic assets in a comprehensive 
188

strategy aimed at what it calls war control, whereby it 

manipulates the costs and perceived risks of others to 

induce outcomes favorable to China’s interests.58 From 

The Science of Military Strategy:

War control is the war conductor’s behavior to limit and 

restrain consciously the occurrence, development, scale, 

intensity and outcome of the war. The objective of war 

control is to prevent the occurrence of war, and once the 

war is inevitable, it is necessary to control its vertical 

and horizontal escalation and do utmost to reduce the 

negative consequences or to gain a major victory at a 

minor cost.59

That document goes on to articulate “fundamental 

principles of armed conflict control” (as opposed to 

the crisis preceding armed conflict), including “to 

make decisions swiftly and strive for initiative” and 

“to regulate military actions strictly on the basis of 

requirements of political and diplomatic struggles.” 

Furthermore, it argues that “when the opponent 

deliberately takes advantage of a favorable opportunity 

to create disturbances and instigate an armed conflict, 

action should be taken quickly and resolutely to inflict 

a retaliatory strike on the instigator, but at the same 

time attention should be paid to avoiding over-reaction 

leading to enlargement of the incident.”60

This framework is suggestive of how China may 

conceive the virtues of strategic forces in a conflict 

over Taiwan involving the United States. The strategic 

force would have warfighting benefits, in the sense 

that it could help achieve the operational objectives 

noted above. Indeed, the dramatic build-up of missiles 

across the Taiwan strait suggests that the PLA sees 

many important and, indeed unique, roles for missiles 

in achieving wartime objectives. But China’s strategic 
189

forces would also be relevant to the achievement of the 

strategic objectives noted above—indeed, uniquely so. 

By signaling to U.S. allies in East Asia the potential for 

missile attack by conventional and nuclear means, China 

apparently hopes to create the “dreadful mentality” 

that induces caution, restraint, and early compromise. 

China may hope to achieve similar objectives vis-àvis the United States by signaling its ability to attack 

forces in the zone of conflict, in the theater more 

generally, and even the United States itself, if the 

United States chooses to takes steps that China deems 

“disturbances” of peace requiring well-calibrated 

retaliation. As a general proposition, it seems obvious 

that missiles would play a central operational role in 

PRC military operations against Taiwan and the United 

States and potentially other forces coming to Taiwan’s 

defense; it is less obvious that nuclear weapons would 

play any such role, beyond the long shadow that they 

cast. 

There is very little evidence to suggest that China’s 

expert community worries about the effectiveness 

of strategic deterrence in the way that their Western 

counterparts do.61 The authors of The Science of Second 

Artillery Campaigns write confidently about the ability 

of the Second Artillery to wage campaign deterrence 

through operations intended to exert pressure, display 

resolve, demonstrate strength, and “adjust nuclear 

policies” in a way that reduces the nuclear deterrence 

threshold.62 Western experts have had to come to terms 

with a variety of nuclear crises during the Cold War 

that raised basic questions about the ability of political 

and military leaders to employ the deterrent for 

desired purposes and, indeed, even to understand the 

facts associated with specific events or to be capable 

politically and bureaucratically of timely decisions. 
190

This makes many Western experts skeptical about 

the controllability of nuclear crises. China’s expert 

community seems not well informed about these 

Western experiences or perceptions. Although recent 

episodes such as the EP-3 incident appear to have 

heightened concern among some Chinese experts and 

authorities about China’s capacity to manage politicalmilitary crises as it emerges onto the world stage,63 there 

is no evidence to suggest that these concerns inform 

Chinese thinking about the processes of escalation 

and de-escalation that might occur in the strategic 

military realm if a Taiwan crisis were to erupt. Indeed, 

informal interactions with members of the Chinese 

expert community suggest a high degree of confidence 

in their predictions of how China could employ threats 

to induce restraint by the United States and Japan and 

military operations to inflict operational defeat on their 

forces with strategic means.64

BEYOND TAIWAN

That China’s strategic posture seems now wellsuited to the requirements of deterrence in the crossstrait contingency does not mean that it has been 

tailored solely for this purpose. As the guidance makes 

clear, China’s leaders expect nuclear deterrence to play 

a role in many high tech local wars under modern 

conditions—because of the possession of nuclear 

weapons by some of its neighbors, or their protection 

under a nuclear shield extended from elsewhere. 

As one PLA expert has argued: “What, then, are the 

targets of the nuclear deterrence of China? The targets 

are countries with nuclear weapons.”65 And what 

countries other than the United States have nuclear 

weapons that are also a source of potential conflict 

with China? At the very least, Russia and India. 
191

China’s leaders voice optimism about strategic 

partnership with Russia and the long-term potential for 

cooperation to bring about a more multipolar world. 

But this has not prevented China from preparing a 

deterrent of possible utility against Russia. As noted 

above, deterrence of the Soviet Union was a key driver 

of the development of long-range Chinese nuclear 

strike systems, and of a theater force conceived as 

necessary for wearing down and ultimately reversing 

a Soviet armored invasion of China. China’s first longrange missile was designed to target Moscow. It is 

useful to recall that Moscow is protected by a nucleartipped missile defense system, and thus that China 

has been concerned with the problem of penetrating 

missile defenses for decades. With the end of the Cold 

War and the drawdown of Russian nuclear forces, 

there has been no apparent change in China’s nuclear 

posture vis-à-vis Russia—except its modernization. In 

the words of one PLA analyst, “Although Russia has 

promised us not to be the first to use nuclear weapons 

against China, we shall not let down our guard even 

for 1 day against the fact that the domestic political 

and economic situations of Russia are unstable and 

that a large number of nuclear weapons exist in that 

country.”66 As noted earlier, China has deployed 

medium-range missiles capable of reaching the Russian 

Far East and longer-range missiles capable of reaching 

Moscow, and it is now modernizing those systems. 

Although the specific mission assignments of China’s 

medium-range forces are not known, the number of 

deployed land-based missiles with these ranges is 

approximately between 80 and 100.67

Few in China’s expert community appear to see 

the prospect of armed conflict with Russia as in any 

way serious or imminent. As Yao Yunzhu has argued, 
192

“it would be too far-fetched to envision a military 

conflict between China and Russia, let alone one 

involving nuclear confrontation,” in part because 

“the strategic partnership formed between China and 

Russia removed the prospect of a Russian nuclear first 

strike.”68 China’s experts seem unworried that Russian 

military doctrine has reembraced first use of nuclear 

weapons or by Russian threats to withdraw from the 

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

It is useful to note that some Russian experts do not 

view the balance of strategic military power along the 

Sino-Russian border with the same equanimity. Those 

experts speak privately of the dangerous implications 

of what they see as China’s unilateral nuclear 

advantages in Asia. They argue that Russia lacks an 

intermediate-range system, cannot compensate with 

deployments of tactical weapons (given the absence of 

bases along the Chinese border), and cannot credibly 

counterbalance with long-range systems that are 

designed to counterbalance the United States. China’s 

modernization of its theater nuclear missile systems is 

a key factor in Russia’s case for withdrawal from the 

INF treaty. A deep underlying factor is the Russian 

expectation that China will grow stronger and more 

nationalistic over the coming decades and will seek to 

redress additional historic grievance against Russia by 

exploiting an imbalance of strategic military power.69

Regarding strategic partnership with India, China’s 

leaders also voice optimism. Economic interactions are 

intensifying and political relations appear to be warm. 

But here, too, China has fielded forces capable of 

deterrence missions against India. No public disclosure 

of the number of such forces has been made by China. 

In the current situation, China’s nuclear forces can 

target all of India and can also project power into the 
193

Indian Ocean, whereas India cannot target all of China 

and hence is developing the Agni 3 and associated 

light warhead to reach Beijing and other targets along 

China’s northeastern seaboard. There are also reports 

that China is modifying its most modern bombers to 

carry long-range cruise missiles, some of which can be 

expected to carry nuclear warheads.70

Here too China’s expert community seems largely 

untroubled by the mutual deterrence relationship. To 

again cite Yao: 

China formed with India a very credible mutual deterrent 

relationship the moment it went nuclear. Pakistan, a 

long time friend of China, has been locked into a mutual 

deterrent relationship with India as well. The pair of 

deterrent relationships brought about more earnest 

effort from both India and China for settling territorial 

disputes by political means.71

China, then, has a mutual deterrent relationship with 

India. China’s experts attest that China is assured by 

India’s no first use commitment. But the modernization 

of China’s medium- and intermediate-range missile 

systems is improving the force it fields against India 

and the recent increases in road-mobile deployment 

sites noted above raise a question about the size of the 

future force that China has deemed or might deem 

necessary to counter India’s rise. Of course, China 

has also helped build up a nuclear-armed Pakistan 

as a counterweight to India’s nuclear power and 

counterfocus of its nuclear planning.

Chinese perceptions of strategic stability in the 

Sino-Indian relationship apparently differ from Indian 

perceptions just in the way Chinese and Russian 

perceptions differ. As one influential Indian analyst 

has argued:
194

The Chinese leadership comes from the Maoist tradition 

which asserts that power flows from the barrel of a gun. 

While calling nuclear weapons paper tigers, it went all 

out to get them at great cost to their people. It talked 

about joining the disarmament process if the U.S. and 

Soviet Union brought down their arsenals to half their 

original levels and has gone back on it. It talks about 

no-first use but tests tactical nuclear weapons which are 

essentially first-use weapons.72

Some Indian experts are also concerned about the 

potentially limited application of China’s no-first-use 

principle. 

Beijing, while insisting that its nuclear weapons are 

exclusively “defensive” in nature and focused only on 

deterring the possibility of nuclear coercion by other 

nuclear weapon states, has an added proviso that 

nuclear weapons have a role in preserving its sovereign 

territorial integrity, thereby extending their use in any 

military operation it may launch to wrest the territory it 

claims from India.73

Looking beyond Russia and India as potential foci 

of China’s strategic deterrent, it is important also to 

consider those contingencies involving conflict between 

the forces of China, the United States, and/or Japan 

that may unfold but not involve Taiwan. Whether such 

contingencies are plausible, or could plausibly lead to 

potential escalation to the strategic domain, is highly 

debatable. But they cannot be ruled out of this survey 

of possible roles of China’s strategic deterrent. The 

potential for such contingencies arises from China’s 

increased focus on challenges in its maritime security 

environment. It has a strategy to “gradually extend the 

strategic depth for coastal defense.”74 As Taylor Fravel 

has argued, this implies the use of ballistic missiles 
195

and cruise missiles, in conjunction with other assets, to 

attack targets in the maritime setting; towards this end, 

China is developing the capabilities to launch anti-ship 

missiles from ships and submarines and from airplanes 

along with the capabilities to employ medium-range 

missiles against mobile targets at sea.75 Implicitly, these 

contingencies could involve the United States and/or 

Japan and/or other powers projecting naval power in 

the region, including, for example, Russia and India. 

Whether and how China might seek to cast the nuclear 

shadow over such contingencies is an entirely open 

question based on available information. Available 

operational capabilities would give China a variety of 

options for doing so. This line of argument suggests 

the potential additional values that China might 

perceive in a stronger sea-based leg for its deterrent, 

which would enhance its capacity to project nuclear 

retaliatory forces into the Western Pacific, Indian 

Ocean, and elsewhere.

It is important to round out this survey of nuclear 

roles and missions with the observation that PLA 

authors generally emphasize that China’s nuclear 

security environment took a decisive turn for the better 

with the end of the Cold War and their perception that 

new nuclear challenges around China’s periphery are 

not also significant new threats. As one PLA author has 

argued, “China evaluates its overall nuclear security 

environment as improving instead of worsening.”76

But nor can it afford to ignore the realities that come 

from the nuclear shadows cast by the nuclear arsenals 

of other countries, or the value to China of casting its 

own nuclear shadow.
196

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Conclusions.

This analysis points to the following two main 

conclusions and a short list of implications. First, at 

this stage of its development, China’s nuclear doctrine 

does not explicitly distinguish the two mission sets, 

“Taiwan” and “beyond Taiwan.” China’s scant 

but growing official literature on strategic warfare 

makes no explicit distinctions between the specific 

requirements of deterrence vis-à-vis Taiwan (and of 

the United States and its allies involved in a Taiwan 

contingency) and the broader mission set. This reflects 

the top-level guidance to develop capabilities to deal 

with the generic challenges of “high tech local war 

under the conditions of nuclear deterrence.”

Second, at this stage in their development, China’s 

strategic forces do seem to distinguish the mission 

sets. The roles and missions of China’s strategic forces 

“beyond Taiwan” have had a substantial impact on 

the development of China’ strategic posture. China 

has tailored, and continues to tailor, missile and other 

forces to its potential deterrence needs in the full 

range of military contingencies that might occur in an 

unpredictable security environment, and especially 

in those contingencies involving the slowly growing 

number of nuclear weapon states around its periphery. 

It has pursued a dramatic build-up of conventionallyarmed (but apparently also nuclear-capable) shortrange missiles across the Taiwan strait. It has sought 

to maintain both nuclear and conventional missile 

preponderance over India. It has deployed a more 

diverse strategic deterrent against Russia than Russia 

has deployed against it. Observing these differences, 
197

Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes argued 

in 2000 that China pursues a differentiated strategy, 

one that seeks minimum deterrence vis-à-vis the 

United States but limited deterrence in its theater 

nuclear force posture and an offensively configured, 

preemptive, counterforce warfighting posture in its 

conventional missile forces.77 Since they framed that 

analysis, the evidence supporting their propositions 

has only increased. 

It is important to note that U.S. analysts tend to slight 

the salience of China’s theater nuclear forces because 

they do not have intercontinental range. So far at least, 

China’s requirements of its regional deterrent have 

resulted in a force structure larger and more diverse 

than the requirements of its intercontinental deterrent. 

That is, the number of theater systems capable of 

nuclear missions is significantly larger than the number 

of systems capable of such missions at intercontinental 

range. And furthermore, China’s force modernization 

strategy has generated more new replacements for 

theater than intercontinental capabilities—so far. 

At this point, it is useful to return to the matrix 

of possible outcomes over Taiwan presented in the 

introduction to this volume. How might China’s 

thinking about the regional functions of its deterrent be 

shaped if the status quo across the Taiwan strait does 

not remain, but some alternative outcome appears to 

raise questions about the present development of PLA 

doctrine and force modernization plans? Of course, 

the short answer would seem to be that it would all 

depend on the role that nuclear weapons and strategic 

deterrence might play in the process of ending the 

status quo. If the Taiwan issue is resolved without 

conflict, China may well conclude that its build-up of 

strategic forces across the strait and efforts to maintain 
198

a credible deterrent vis-à-vis the United States were 

essential to this result and, accordingly, continue to 

emphasize these capabilities in PLA modernization 

strategies even as the expectation of conflict with the 

United States declines. If China attempts to brandish 

tools in its strategic toolkit but still “loses,” it may 

deem more such strategic power as necessary—or, 

alternatively, as not promising of the desired result. 

If it brandishes such tools and wins, it may anticipate 

that others around its periphery, including an angry 

United States fearful of the implications of China’s 

further rise, would sharpen their own strategic nuclear 

toolkit, in which case China could see a more robust 

strategic posture as in its interest, whatever its arms 

race consequences. It is obvious and trite to argue that 

if nuclear weapons are actually employed in a conflict 

over Taiwan to gain some operational or strategic 

advantage, the lessons would be hugely consequential 

and also highly difficult to predict.

Implications.

Four implications for U.S. policy follow from this 

analysis.

1. There are those in U.S. expert community who 

use the term in the title of this chapter, “strategic 

deterrent,” and assume that they are invoking a concept 

that is shared and mutually understood by military 

planners, political leaders, and subject matter experts 

in the two countries. “Deterrence” is a word with many 

connotations, and it is important to be clear about the 

ways in which Chinese and U.S. concepts do not fully 

align. Many of the strategic concepts summarized 

above align closely with U.S. concepts—especially the 

value and importance of nuclear weapons in inducing 
199

dread and restraint. But China emphasizes the value 

of its strategic force in negating the deterrence and 

compellance strategies of others more than the United 

States does. It invokes the term “counterdeterrence” to 

describe its strategy in a way the United States does 

not. By this logic, the deterrence of China attempted 

by China’s opponents must be countered so as to 

enable China to do the right thing by its interests. And 

this requires “counterdeterrence operations” for the 

purposes of signaling resolve, including counterattack 

and reattack. China’s emphasis on such operational 

roles for strategic weapons in achieving strategic results 

is unmistakable—and rather different from a United 

States that seems to rely simply on the long shadow of 

its vastly more numerous arsenal to induce restraint 

by potential adversaries. 

2. The U.S. role is as a security guarantor in Asia 

and includes its alliance relationship with Japan and 

others in East Asia, its other commitments to Taiwan, 

and its relationships with countries with which it seeks 

strategic cooperation. These countries generally want 

to know how the United States can help them deal with 

the consequences of China’s military modernization. 

Recipients of specific guarantees also want to know 

how those guarantees can remain credible in light of 

developments in that modernization. Their concerns 

impose an obligation on the United States to understand 

how the modernization of China’s strategic military 

capabilities is affecting their interests, and to devise 

strategies to manage these challenges in mutually 

beneficial ways. 

3. The United States and the international community 

need to reduce nuclear threats in Asia. The nuclear 

puzzle in Asia is complex and cannot be reduced to the 

single issue of potential China-U.S. strategic military 
200

confrontation over Taiwan. More emphasis should 

be given to the interactions of force developments 

in the strategic military postures of Asia’s nuclear 

powers. The situation is dynamic, not static. Shifting 

capabilities are likely to shift planning assumptions, 

leading to new capabilities better tailored to evolving 

strategic missions in Asia. Given shared interests in a 

stable security environment, and the common desire to 

ensure that nuclear competition does not erupt in Asia 

in a way that puts stability at risk, it is important to 

anticipate the sources of instability and implement an 

agenda of common action aimed at dampening them. 

Nuclear restraint in Asia is in America’s interest, and 

it seems important to have a better understanding of 

the requirements of future restraint by Asia’s nuclear 

actors—China first and foremost among them.

4. According to the “dual deterrence, dual 

operations” doctrine, the close integration of China’s 

nuclear and non-nuclear strike systems and theater 

and intercontinental capabilities raises an important 

question about how separate and distinct the nuclear 

element remains. China’s experts have raised alarm 

about the perceived lowering of the U.S. nuclear 

threshold associated with the 2001 U.S. Nuclear Posture 

Review (on the argument that a close integration of 

nuclear with non-nuclear missions means that nuclear 

weapons are increasingly likely to be employed against 

tactical targets). In fact, China is far more advanced in 

such efforts than the United States, and the impact of 

China’s efforts to integrate conventional and nuclear 

missile missions may be felt unexpectedly in a moment 

of serious crisis instability. Efforts to address this 

problem should not await the potential moment of 

instability.
201

CHAPTER 6 - ENDNOTES

1. The author benefited from comments on earlier versions of 

this chapter by Ronald Christman, John Culver, Roy Kamphausen, 

Hans Kristensen, and Evan Medeiros, and by participants in the 

conferences hosted by the co-publishers. The author alone is 

responsible for the final contents. The views expressed here are 

his personal views and should not be attributed to any institution 

with which he is affiliated.

2. The single clearest statement of China’s nuclear strategy 

is a short paragraph in the 2006 Defense White Paper. Other 

authoritative sources include Yu Jixun, ed., The Science of Second 

Artillery Campaigns, Beijing: PLA Press, 2004; and Peng Guangqian 

and Yao Youzhi, eds., The Science of Military Strategy, Beijing: 

Military Science Publishing House, 2005, especially chapter 9 

on Strategic Deterrence, chapter 10 on Principles of Strategic 

Actions, chapter 12 on Strategic Offensive, and chapter 22 on 

Strategic Guidance of High-Tech Local War. PLA experts have 

also contributed chapters or journal articles on China’s strategic 

deterrent to various sources. See for example, Pan Zhenqiang, 

“The Changing Strategic Context of Nuclear Weapons and 

Implications for the New World Order,” Yao Yunzhu, “Chinese 

Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence,” 

and Yang Yi, “East Asia’s Nuclear Future,” in Christopher P. 

Twomey, ed., Perspectives on Sino-American Strategic Nuclear 

Issues, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. See also Sun Xiangli, 

“China’s Nuclear Strategy,” China Security, Vol. 1, Autumn 2005, 

pp. 23-27. See also “The Strategic Use and Development of the 

Second Artillery in the New Period,” instructional materials, 

PLA National Defense University, Beijing, 1996 (further details 

on author and publication source not available); and Li Shaohui 

and Tao Yongqian, “Strength Foundation and Strategic Domain 

of Nuclear Deterrence,” Beijing Junshi Xueshu, June 1, 2006, Open 

Source Center CPP20080228325001. See also Chu Shulong and 

Rong Yu, “China: Dynamic Minimum Deterrence,” in Muthiah 

Alagappa, ed., The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 

21st Century Asia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008, 

pp. 161-187.
202

3. The most authoritative statements from U.S. sources are the 

annual Pentagon reports on China’s military power. See also John 

Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, Stanford, CA: 

Stanford University Press, 1988; Chong-Pin Lin, China’s Nuclear 

Weapons Strategy: Tradition within Evolution, Lexington, MA: 

Lexington Books, 1988; John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, “China’s 

Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, and Goals,” 

International Security, Fall 1992, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 9-11; Litai Xue, 

“Evolution of China’s Nuclear Strategy,” in John C. Hopkins 

and Weixing Hu, Strategic Views from the Second Tier: The Nuclear 

Weapons Policies of France, Britain, and China, La Jolla: University of 

California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1994; John 

Wilson Lewis and Litai Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower: the Politics 

of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age, Stanford, CA: Stanford 

University Press, 1994; Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old 

Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International 

Security, Vol. XX, No. 3, Winter 1995/96; Paul Godwin, “China’s 

Nuclear Forces: An Assessment,” Current History, September 1999; 

Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the 

United States, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 1999; Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, 

“The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible 

Deterrence,” in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, eds., 

The People’s Liberation Army as an Organization: Reference Volume 

v1.0, 2001; Charles Ferguson, Evan S. Medeiros, and Phillip G. 

Saunders, “Chinese Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” in Alistair Millar 

and Brian Miller, eds., Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emergent Threats 

in an Evolving Security Environment, London: Brassey’s, 2003, pp. 

110-128; Michael S. Chase and Evan Medeiros, China’s Evolving 

Nuclear Calculus: Modernization and Doctrinal Debate, in James 

Mulvenon and David M. Finkelstein, eds., China’s Revolution in 

Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese 

People’s Liberation Army, Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, 2005; 

Paul Bolt and Albert S. Willner, eds., China’s Nuclear Future, 

Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006; Hans M. Kristensen, Robert 

S. Norris, and Matthew McKinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and 

U.S. Nuclear War Planning, Washington, DC: Natural Resources 

Defense Council and the Federation of American Scientists, 2006; 

Jeffrey G. Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search 

for Security in the Nuclear Age, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007; 

Mark Schneider, The Nuclear Doctrine and Forces of the People’s 

Republic of China, Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2007; 
203

Larry M. Wortzel, “China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, 

Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning,” Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007; 

Evan S. Medeiros, “Minding the Gap: Assessing the Trajectory 

of the PLA’s Strategic Missile Forces,” in Roy Kamphausen and 

Andrew Scobell, eds., Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army, 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2007; Brad Roberts, “The Nuclear Dimension: How Likely? How 

Stable?” in Evan Medeiros, Michael D. Swaine, and Andrew 

Yang, eds., Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan 

Security, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2008; and 

Evan Medeiros, “China’s Thinking on Escalation: Evidence from 

Chinese Military Writings,” in Forrest Morgan, et al., Dangerous 

Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century, Arlington, VA: 

RAND, 2008, pp. 47-81.

4. The need for caution has been reinforced by the revelations 

about the quality of U.S. intelligence on weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) that followed the intelligence failures vis-àvis the WMD programs of Saddam Hussein. As argued by the 

Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 

Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction in its cover letter to the 

president of March 31, 2005, “we still know disturbingly little 

about the weapons programs and even less about the intentions 

of many of our most dangerous adversaries.” This is a cautionary 

reminder of the need to treat information, even that which is 

provided by the U.S. Government, with an element of caution that 

admits the possibility that it may be wrong or misleading in some 

significant respects.

5. Xinhua News Service, July 2, 2005, in Foreign Broadcast 

Information Service (FBIS) Open Source Center, “Account of 

Party Central Committee’s Care and Concern for Strategic Missile 

Units,” rccb.osis.gov, July 5, 2006.

6. The following review of the first phase draws on Brad 

Roberts, China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond, 

Institute for Defense Analyses Paper P-3826, Alexandria, VA: 

Institute for Defense Analyses, 2003.

7. Lewis and Litai, China Builds the Bomb. At a gathering of 

China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) reportedly convened 
204

in July 2000, the CMC vice chairman is reported to have described 

this initial period as lasting up until 1986 when decisions were 

taken to accelerate the replacement of older generation weapon 

systems. See Wen Jen, “Jiang Zemin Defines Position of China’s 

Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” Hong Kong Tai Yang Pao, Hong Kong, 

July 17, 2000, FBIS CPP20000727000021.

8. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, p. 213.

9. The Science of Strategy, p. 348.

10. Lin, China’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy, pp. 105-136.

11. Beijing does not acknowledge the possession of tactical 

weapons. By one estimate in 1994, approximately one-quarter of 

China’s arsenal of 400 or so nuclear weapons was understood to 

be devoted to tactical applications, including bombs for tactical 

bombardment, artillery shells, atomic demolition mines, and 

possibly short-range missiles. See Robert S. Norris et al., Nuclear 

Weapons Databook, Vol. 5, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 

370-371. Norris has subsequently revised downward his estimate 

of the size of China’s nuclear arsenal to 240. See Norris and Hans 

M. Kristensen, “China’s Nuclear Forces, 2008,” Bulletin of the 

Atomic Scientists, Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 42-44.

12. Various sources, primarily Norris et al., Nuclear Weapons 

Databook. See also Lewis and Hua, “China’s Ballistic Missile 

Programs,” pp. 9-11.

13. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower. See also 

“Taiwan Confirms China Building New Nuke Sub,” Washington 

Times, December 8, 1999, p. A-16. Hans M. Kirstensen, “Chinese 

Submarines Patrol Rebound in 2007, But Remain Limited,” as 

posted to the website of the Federation of American Scientists, 

www.fas.org, January 7, 2008.

14. As cited in Xue, “Evolution of China’s Nuclear Strategy,” 

p. 173.

15. Ibid.

16. Lewis and Hua, “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs,” pp. 

6-7.
205

17. Ibid., p. 17.

18. See Gill et al., “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: 

Transition to Credible Deterrence,” p. 543.

19. Xue, “Evolution of China’s Nuclear Strategy,” pp. 173-

178.

20. Chong-Pin, China’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy, pp. 40-41; 

and Lewis and Hua, “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs,” p. 26.

21. Xue, “Evolution of China’s Nuclear Strategy,” p. 173.

22. Ibid.

23. Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy: an 

Overview of the ‘Military Strategic Guidelines’,” Kamphausen 

and Scobell, eds., Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army, p. 95.

24. David Finkelstein, “Prologue,” in Kamphausen and 

Scobell, Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army, p. xi. 

25. Ibid., p. 109.

26. As cited in ibid., pp. 104-105.

27. Cited in The Strategic Use and Development of the Second 

Artillery in the New Period.

28. Ibid., p. 125.

29. Mulvenon and Finkelstein, China’s Revolution in Doctrinal 

Affairs.

30. As cited in David M. Finkelstein, “Thinking about the 

PLA’s ‘Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs’,” in ibid., p. 15.

31. From the Postscript, The Science of Second Artillery 

Campaigns, p. 323.

32. Ibid., p. 27.
206

33. The Science of Military Strategy, pp. 213, 228.

34. Ibid., p. 217.

35. Ibid., p. 218. For a discussion of this gradation, see Chase 

and Medeiros, China’s Evolving Nuclear Calculus, pp. 137-138.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., p. 219.

38. The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, p. 15.

39. Ibid., p. 219.

40. Ibid., p. 220.

41. Ibid., p. 50.

42. Ibid., p. 111.

43. Ibid., p. 226.

44. From “The Strategic Use and Development of the Second 

Artillery in the New Period.”

45. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, especially chapter 

4, “Dawn of a New Age: China’s Long-Range Precision Strike 

Capabilities,” pp. 79-108.

46. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, p. 236.

47. As reported in “Jiang Zemin Defines Position of China’s 

Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” in Tai yang pao, Hong Kong, July 17, 

2000, in FBIS CPP200000717000021.

48. The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, pp. 54, 57-58.

49. By one count, 58 new launch sites have been identified. See 

Hans M. Kristensen, “Extensive Nuclear Missile Deployment Area 

Discovered in Central Asia,” Federation of American Scientists, at 

www.fas.org, June 2008.
207

50. Hans Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Arsenal Increased by 

a Third Since 2006, Pentagon Report Indicates,” posted at www.

fas.org/blog/ssp, posted March 6, 2008.

51. Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2008, pp. 24-

25.

52. China’s National Defense in 2006.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Strategic dialogues among the communities of experts 

in China and the United States working on nuclear policy and 

strategy have been sponsored in recent years by the U.S. Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency and the Department of State. For 

summaries of some of these recent dialogues, visit the website of 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies at www.csis.org. 

56. Yao Yunzhu, “Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of 

Minimum Deterrence.” 

57. Schneider, The Nuclear Doctrine and Forces of the People’s 

Republic of China, p. 28.

58. Lonnie D. Henley, “Evolving Chinese Concepts of War 

Control and Escalation Management,” in Michael D. Swaine, 

Andrew N. D. Yang, and Evan S. Medeiros with Oriana Skylar 

Mastro, Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan’s 

Security, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace, 2007, pp. 85-110.

59. The Science of Military Strategy, p. 197.

60. Ibid., p. 208.

61. See Medeiros, “China’s Thinking on Escalation: Evidence 

from Chinese Military Writings.”
208

62. The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, especially chapter 

10 on Second Artillery Campaign Deterrence.

63. Michael Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng with Danielle F. S. 

Cohen, Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis, 

Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 

2007.

64. Roberts, “The Nuclear Dimension,” pp. 213-242.

65. “The Strategic Use and Development of the Second 

Artillery in the New Period.”

66. Ibid.

67. Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2008, p. 24.

68. Yao, Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum 

Deterrence, p. 5.

69. Viewpoints collected during interviews in Moscow during 

June 2008. See also Dmitri Trenin, Russia’s China Problem, Moscow: 

Carnegie Moscow Center, 1999.

70. Kristensen et al., Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear 

War Planning.

71. Yao, Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum 

Deterrence, p. 5.

72. K. Subramanyam, “PRC Geopolitical Strategy, N-weapons 

Viewed,” Times of India, October 23, 1996.

73. Vijai K. Nair, “China’s Nuclear Strategy and Its Implications 

for Asian Security,” China Brief, Vol. 4, No. 3, February 2004.

74. From China’s National Defense, 2006.

75. M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Search for Military Power,” 

Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3, Summer 2008, pp. 133-135.
209

76. Yao, Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum 

Deterrence, p. 5.

77. Gill et al., “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps.”

211

CHAPTER 7

PROSPECTS FOR CHINA’S MILITARY SPACE 

EFFORTS

Dean Cheng

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

In thinking about the likely missions of the People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA) beyond Taiwan, including 

the role of space operations, it is important to place 

Chinese military thinking in its context.1

 The forces 

and capabilities associated with a Taiwan scenario 

have constituted a contingency-based assessment. 

That is, certain capabilities were acquired to deal with 

the specific Taiwan situation. In a world beyond the 

Taiwan scenario however that might be achieved, what 

would be the PLA’s basis for “army-building”?

Recent Chinese writings suggest that the PLA 

is already thinking along these lines. Jiang Zemin 

indicated, in a December 2002 speech to the expanded 

Central Military Commission (CMC), that space 

would be of growing importance in the context of the 

ongoing revolution in military affairs.2

 This increasing 

role of space is further noted among the new “historic 

missions,” as set forth by Hu Jintao.3 According to 

Chinese political and military writings, the “historic 

missions” for the PLA include: 

• To provide loyal support to the Chinese Communist 

Party (CCP). The PLA remains a “Party army.” 

Therefore, the first responsibility of the PLA 

remains to preserve the CCP’s grip on power.

• To help safeguard China’s national development.

For the foreseeable future, national economic 
212

development of the People’s Republic of China 

(PRC) will remain the priority—but without a 

strong foundation of security, such efforts will 

always be potentially vulnerable. Therefore, 

the PLA has the responsibility for providing 

for China’s national security, even as resource 

allocations remain focused on national economic 

construction.

• To help safeguard China’s expanding national 

interests. Developments in high technology mean 

that the PLA must expand its focus beyond the 

traditional land frontiers, to the maritime, space, 

and electromagnetic spheres. It also means that 

it will have a role in nontraditional security 

missions. These include transnational concerns 

such as international crime and environmental 

degradation, as well as new national security 

problems attending the rise of the Chinese 

trading state, such as energy and shipping 

issues.

• To help ensure world peace. World peace and 

common development are prerequisites for 

China’s continued national development, 

and therefore need to be maintained. For the 

PLA, this means greater engagement in such 

activities as United Nations (UN) peacekeeping 

operations.4

What these “historic missions” imply is that the 

PLA is now assuming a more capabilities-oriented 

perspective, rather than a contingency-based one, as 

it prepares to safeguard the security of the CPC and 

the PRC. Moreover, the areas of concern for national 

security have expanded. Where once the PLA was 

focused on defending China’s land borders, and to 
213

a lesser extent repelling a seaborne invasion, now 

it must keep watch over new regions and functional 

areas. That, in turn, is likely to have ramifications upon 

all aspects of PLA military planning, including for 

military operations in space. 

Indeed, whether the PRC moves beyond the Taiwan 

issue through conflict or not, it would appear that 

space capabilities are likely to be a focus of future PLA 

development and improvement. That is, it is likely that 

the PLA would be interested in improving its ability to 

exploit space regardless of how or whether the Taiwan 

situation is resolved, simply because space capabilities 

are likely to be essential to any future PLA operations. 

THE EVOLVING PLA VIEW OF SPACE

As of the Jiang Zemin era, space operations were 

recognized as becoming more of a factor, but were 

still seen as supportive at best. The 1997 PLA Military 

Encyclopedia’s entry on “space warfare (tianzhan; 天

战)” explicitly stated that space was not a decisive 

battlefield—the key to wartime victory would remain in 

the traditional land, sea, and air realms. “It is impossible 

for it [space warfare] to be of decisive effect. The key 

determinant of victory and defeat in war remains the 

nature of the conflict and the human factor.”5

Five years later, at the beginning of the Hu Jintao 

leadership era, the tone had already changed. In 

the 2002 supplement to the PLA Encyclopedia, a very 

different assessment is made of the importance of 

space. In a discussion on the “space battlefield (taikong 

zhanchang; 太空战场),” the entry concludes with the 

observation that the impact of the space battlefield on 

land, sea, and air battlefields will become ever greater 

and the space battlefield “will be a major component 
214

of future conflict.”6 It is clear that space, in the interval, 

was perceived as a substantially more important arena 

for military operations. 

Since then, the PRC has further elaborated on the 

importance of military space operations. Indeed, the 

Chinese leadership has demonstrated that not only is 

it prepared to undertake support operations in space, 

but that it can, if necessary, engage in actual combat in 

the realm of outer space. As the January 2007 shootdown of a Fengyun-1C weather satellite made clear, 

not only has the PRC been engaged in the research 

and development of anti-satellite weapons, but it 

has reached the point where such systems are being 

unmistakably tested. 

It remains unclear, however, whether the PRC 

has developed or promulgated a doctrine governing 

military space operations. Even as the PRC deploys 

a broader array of space assets, it has still not made 

public any documents indicating how those assets 

might be used in the event of war. Similarly, it is unclear 

whether there is a body of theory, or formally accepted 

guidelines and regulations, regarding the training of 

military space personnel and the organization of space 

forces. 

In this regard, Chinese development of their space 

capabilities may be similar to their development of 

missile capabilities. The PRC apparently fielded a 

range of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles 

without explicitly enunciating a doctrine for their use 

in advance. It would appear that, at present, although 

China fields a substantial array of space systems and 

capabilities, there has not yet been enunciated an 

explicit doctrine for their employment. 

In reviewing Chinese writings on space, though, it 

soon becomes clear that certain concepts enjoy broad 
215

support, suggesting a possible consensus among PLA 

thinkers about military space operations. In particular, 

the close symbiosis between space systems and 

information systems appears to be widely accepted. 

In many Chinese discussions, information dominance, 

according to PLA analyses, is the foundation for all 

other forms of battlefield superiority, including air and 

naval dominance. The need to establish “information 

dominance (zhi xinxi quan; 制信息权),” though, is often 

linked to the need for achieving space dominance (zhi 

tian quan; 制天权). As an article in the Central Party 

School paper, Study Times, characterized it, space 

dominance is the “vital foundation and prerequisite for 

informationalized units, informationalized weapons, 

and winning informationalized wars.”7

This follows a similar observation by one of 

the more prolific Chinese military space analysts. 

Senior Colonel Li Daguang, of the PLA’s National 

Defense University, observed in an article published 

simultaneously in Liberation Army Daily and National 

Defense Daily, “information dominance cannot be 

separated from space dominance. We can say that 

seizing space dominance is the root for winning the 

informationalized war.”8

Among PLA writers it seems that there is general 

acceptance of the idea that only by establishing 

dominance of space is it possible to fully leverage 

the capabilities of modern command, control, 

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. This, in turn, is 

necessary if one is to implement the command and 

control functions necessary to wage Local Wars under 

Informationalized Conditions. The ability to engage in 

these kinds of wars is essential, if the PLA is to fulfill 

its “historic missions.” 
216

In this light, one of the PLA’s priorities “beyond 

Taiwan” is likely to entail the development of space 

capabilities that will allow it to try to establish space 

dominance. To that end, there has been substantive 

discussion of possible guiding principles, types of 

campaigns, and therefore types of operational forms 

(zuozhan yangshi; 作战样式) and techniques (zuozhan 

shouduan; 作战手段) that the PLA should be able to 

undertake. Insofar as these discussions influence 

unit organization, training regimens, and acquisition 

efforts, they will affect both the construction of Chinese 

military space strength, and the planning for its use. 

Space Dominance.

In examining likely Chinese concepts of military 

space operations beyond Taiwan, it is important 

to consider what “space dominance” entails. PLA 

authors note that space dominance is different from 

more traditional air or naval dominance. Li Daguang, 

for example, observes that, while space dominance 

is a prerequisite for air and naval dominance, it is 

likely to be more expensive and difficult to achieve, 

because of the uniqueness of the space environment.9

Moreover, like information dominance, it is more 

difficult to achieve permanent space dominance. It is 

likely to be difficult to wholly prevent an opponent 

from entering space. Therefore, securing and retaining 

space dominance throughout the course of a conflict is 

likely to require sustained effort; the alternative is to 

accept that space dominance will probably be a more 

temporary condition. 
217

Guiding Thoughts for Space Operations.

For the PLA, “campaign basic guiding concepts 

(zhanyi jiben zhidao sixiang; 战役基本指导思想)” are a 

touchstone for thinking through key issues associated 

with the planning, organization, and prosecution of 

military operations. Such concepts indicate to the 

PLA reader that certain tenets are deemed by higher 

authorities, after extensive study and research, so 

fundamental that they must be adhered to. If properly 

derived, they should reflect the laws governing the 

course of military campaigns, and are therefore the 

core of military campaign theories.10

There is no evidence that the enunciation of the 

“historic missions” has signaled a shift of the PLA’s 

“campaign basic guiding concept” from “integrated 

operations, key point strikes.” It is therefore likely 

that the PLA continues to emphasize the importance 

of “integrated operations (zhengti zuozhan; 整体作战),” 

meaning the integrating of all its forces, integrating 

operations in all the battlespaces (including land, sea, 

and air, as well as outer space and the electromagnetic 

spectrum), and integrating all the methods of warfare 

(e.g., positional warfare, mobile warfare, guerrilla 

warfare), across all phases of the war. Similarly, it 

is likely that the concept of “key point strikes,” i.e., 

concentrating forces at the key strategic direction, at 

the critical junctures and moments, against essential 

enemy targets, so as to cripple and paralyze enemy 

forces, remains in effect.11

It is not clear whether there is a “guiding concept” 

specifically for military space operations. Chang Xianqi, 

however, in the PLA textbook Military Astronautics, 

proposes a “guiding concept for space operations 

(kongjian zuozhan de zhidao sixiang; 空间作战的指导思
218

想).” Interestingly, it would seem to be modeled on the 

broader “campaign basic guiding concept”: “Unified 

operations, key point is space dominance.”12

UNIFIED OPERATIONS (YITI ZUOZHAN; 一体作

战)13

According to Chang and other PLA analysts, 

the establishment of space dominance will involve 

disparate forces, both space- and nonspace-based, 

engaging across a broad arena in complex maneuvers 

and activities. It will include not only operations in 

space, but also operations on the ground, in the air, and 

at sea, as forces act not only against space platforms, but 

terrestrial support facilities and the data-links that tie 

the two together.14 The pursuit of space dominance will 

therefore require space operations being integrated and 

unified with other services’ operations; the integration 

and unification of space offensive and defensive 

operations; and the unified, integrated application of 

various types of space operations.

Unified Use of Available Strength.

The unified use of all available strength entails two 

aspects. One is the integration of civilian and military 

space systems, both in terms of pre-war planning and 

in wartime use. This integration is important because 

of the expense of developing and producing space 

systems. Given their high cost, there are likely to be 

few reserves or spares. Losses will therefore not be 

easily replaced.15 Moreover, few nations can afford the 

duplication involved in developing discrete civilian 

and military systems. Therefore, civilian systems are 

an essential augmentation to military ones. Indeed, 
219

it may even be necessary to rely on international

commercial satellite systems.16 In this regard, Chinese 

space analysts have observed that the United States has 

already had to turn to civilian systems to take up some 

of the communications and imaging loads in its recent 

wars.17 Successful civil-military integration does not 

simply happen, though. Rather, it requires extensive 

planning to ensure that civilian systems would be 

interoperable with military ones.18

Another aspect of unified application of available 

strength is the combination of space capabilities 

(kongjian liliang; 空间力量) with those of land, sea, 

and air forces. The aim is to fulfill overall operational 

missions (more on operational missions below), in an 

efficient manner, regardless of the service or branch 

origin of the forces involved. Thus, Chinese Air Force 

officers have noted that both air and space forces 

engage in reconnaissance and surveillance missions, 

each complementing the other by compensating for 

the other’s weaknesses.19

In combination, space and nonspace forces can 

generate significant synergies. Ground, naval, air, 

and missile forces, for example, can suppress enemy 

terrestrial space facilities, such as launch sites, and 

interfere with, disrupt, and deceive enemy space forces 

and data links. In so doing, they can help secure space 

dominance, by preventing an opponent’s space forces 

from properly operating, and by defending one’s own 

space capabilities. 

At the same time, space forces can enhance the 

operation of ground, air, and naval forces by providing 

information support and even engaging in spaceto-ground attacks.20 This helps achieve air and naval 

domination. Just as important, by coordinating land, 

sea, and air operations, space systems facilitate joint 
220

operations, which are a key method of fighting future 

Local Wars under Informationalized Conditions.21

The unified application of space and nonspace 

forces thus offers the potential opportunity to rapidly 

overwhelm an opponent.

Unified Application of All Techniques.

In pursuing information dominance and space 

dominance, the PLA seems to have the view that 

disruption of an opponent’s space infrastructure can be 

as useful as its destruction.22 Both hard-kill systems that 

destroy, as well as soft-kill systems that disrupt, have a 

potential role in the effort to secure space dominance. 

As with the unified application of all available forces, 

part of the reasoning seems to be that applying both 

sets of techniques can generate synergies, with each 

measure remedying shortcomings in the other. 

According to PLA writings, since soft-kill systems 

cannot permanently destroy physical facilities, one 

must rely on hard-kill systems for the important task 

of inflicting a long-lasting impact on enemy space 

capabilities.23 This includes the use of kinetic kill 

vehicles (e.g., the anti-satellite weapon tested in 2007) 

or directed energy systems such as lasers, microwaves, 

or particle beams to damage or destroy satellites.24 It 

also includes the application of various ground, air, 

and naval weapons against terrestrial space-support 

facilities, such as launch centers and tracking, telemetry, 

and control (TT&C) facilities. In the latter case, the aim 

is to damage or destroy high-value targets and kill 

skilled personnel in order to decrease an opponent’s 

ability to sustain space operations.

Hard-kill systems, however, can create significant 

political problems. Efforts to destroy terrestrial space-
221

related targets may expand the scale of a conflict. 

Attacks against an opponent’s homeland, for example, 

may be seen as escalatory. Attacks against space 

support facilities (e.g., TT&C sites) located in third 

countries may draw those states into the conflict. 

Similarly, hard-kill methods used against space-based 

platforms can also introduce political and diplomatic 

repercussions. If they generate debris, then they 

endanger all satellites in orbit, which, again, can lead to 

diplomatic complications. 25 At a more practical level, 

space debris may also result in damage to one’s own 

satellite systems. 

For this reason, some PLA analyses conclude that 

one should emphasize soft-kill techniques for obtaining 

space control, especially when trying to affect spacebased assets.26 Whereas hard-kill techniques seek to 

permanently destroy an opponent’s space systems or 

support facilities, the aim of soft-kill methods are: 

• First, to interfere with satellite and missile 

control systems so that they leave orbit or 

change direction;

• Second, to interfere with the control and 

information transmission signals beamed to 

and from the satellites;

• Third, to interfere with the attitude and control 

signals governing the satellite’s launch, the 

global positioning system signals, etc.27

To these ends, such soft-kill measures as electronic 

interference, network attacks, and low-energy lasers 

can dazzle or otherwise degrade systems, thereby 

producing a “mission-kill” effect without generating 

debris or other collateral damage. Moreover, such 

methods as jamming have a certain degree of plausible 

deniability. This may be important in situations such as 
222

targeting international or commercial satellites, where 

temporary disruption of signals may be preferred to 

outright destruction of systems.28 Some of the soft-kill 

methods that might be applied include electromagnetic 

attacks and informational or cyber attacks. 

Electromagnetic attacks: According to Chinese 

writings, this category of attack involves the use of 

electronic signals and jamming to interfere with an 

opponent’s sensors or on-board systems programming. 

One method is to jam a wide range of signals (in effect, 

barrage jamming), interfering with a space platform’s 

normal operations. Alternatively, one might engage in 

careful collection of an opponent’s communications 

and telemetry procedures and signals. Using that 

information, one might then transmit false and deceptive 

information, either to the opponent’s ground stations 

(effectively overriding the space platform’s signals) or 

else sending false instructions to the satellite itself (e.g., 

to point in the wrong direction at key moments).29

Information attacks: As Chinese analyses note, the 

core essence of space systems is their informational 

nature. Therefore, the ability to interfere, block, and 

deceive an opponent’s space information systems is 

integral to space information warfare. 30 This suggests 

that, while one facet of information attacks is the 

injection of computer viruses into the satellites, the 

ground facilities, and the data streams, the ability 

to reconnoiter and infiltrate an opponent’s space 

information networks, even if no damage is perpetrated, 

is also a useful element of space information warfare. 

Unified Coordination of All Operational Activities.

It is important to recognize that, in Chinese analyses, 

“hard-kill” and “soft-kill” methods are not synonymous 
223

with “offensive” and “defensive” operations. The 

objective of both sets of techniques is to reduce an 

opponent’s advantage in space in order to secure 

information dominance.Thus, even as Chinese authors 

note the value of soft-kill methods, it is in pursuit of 

offensive ends. This is essential, according to several 

PLA analyses, because it allows the attacking side to 

assume the initiative and thereby allows the weak to 

defeat the strong. Indeed, one PLA analyst notes that, 

to seize the initiative, it is important to strike at the 

enemy’s space-related targets at the earliest possible 

moment.31

Defensive operations, though, also have their role. 

Such measures prevent the enemy from establishing 

space dominance by limiting the effectiveness of enemy 

efforts to interfere with, seize, destroy, or disrupt one’s 

own space systems.32 Defensive measures include 

efforts at camouflage, concealment, and deception, as 

well as redundancy and mobility. In particular, some 

analysts note the need to improve camouflage and 

concealment measures for terrestrial space-related 

facilities, including launch and support bases.33 TT&C 

facilities, for example, should be camouflaged or 

otherwise hidden, as much as possible, from enemy 

reconnaissance systems. Mobile TT&C stations should 

be developed and deployed to concealed locations, 

ready to replace fixed sites should the latter be 

attacked.34

Key Point Is Space Dominance (Zhongdian Zhitian; 

重点制天).

The focus of unified operations, in the context of 

space, is establishing space dominance. This means 

being able to exploit space for one’s purposes, at 
224

times and places of one’s choosing, while denying an 

opponent that same freedom of action. To obtain space 

dominance, one needs to sustain the smooth operation 

of space information collection and transmission 

systems. The key space platforms include: 

• Reconnaissance satellites, to conduct comprehensive, timely, accurate intelligence gathering 

on enemy forces.

• Communications satellites, to provide global, 

all-weather, unbroken, secure, reliable communications and data relay.

• Navigation and positioning satellites, to allow 

one’s own forces to engage in rapid, precise 

mobile operations, and engage in precision 

warfare against an opponent.

• Weather satellites, to collect global weather 

information.

• Survey and earth-observation satellites, to 

precisely map various terrestrial terrain features, 

including potential enemy targets.35

Nor are satellites alone sufficient. To be useful, 

orbiting systems must be backed by a complete 

supporting infrastructure, including space launch 

facilities, TT&C systems, and the attendant data-links 

that bind the space and terrestrial components together. 

Successful efforts at establishing space dominance 

entail the sustainment of this entire structure of 

terrestrial and space systems and associated data and 

communications links, while striving to degrade or 

destroy an opponent’s.36

To this latter end, one needs to conduct unified 

operations against an opponent’s most important 

space targets. These are the key information and space 

assets which will most affect the enemy’s capabilities, 
225

located in the main strategic direction. They should be 

attacked by one’s best forces, at the crucial moments of 

the campaign, with the aim of degrading the enemy’s 

ability to field unified space power. 

TYPES OF SPACE OPERATIONS

Within this guiding operational concept of “unified 

operations, key point is space dominance,” how would 

the PLA likely seek to establish space dominance 

in future Local Wars under Informationalized 

Conditions? PLA writers discuss several different types 

of space operations that are integral to establishing 

space dominance. These focus on provision of space 

information support, space offensive operations, space 

defensive operations, and space deterrence. These 

operations are described in terms that resemble those 

used to describe campaigns. 

Space Information Support Operations. 

PLA writings make clear that information support 

from space-based platforms is seen as essential for 

fighting future Local Wars under High-Tech Conditions 

or Local Wars under Informationalized Conditions. 

Key tasks within this mission area of space information 

support “(kongjian xinxi zhiyuan; 空间信息支援)” to the 

ground, air, and naval forces include:37

• Space reconnaissance and surveillance.

• Communications and data relay.

• Navigation and positioning.

• Early warning of missile launches.

• Earth observation, including geodesy, hydrographics, and meteorology.
226

Key tasks within this mission area include: 

Providing space reconnaissance and surveillance. 

This is perhaps the most basic form of operational 

space activity. The importance of such support has 

been part of PLA analyses of the first Gulf War.38 By 

exploiting the ability to overfly the globe, space-based 

reconnaissance and surveillance systems can conduct 

constant electro-optical and electronic surveillance 

of large areas, unconstrained by terrestrial borders, 

terrain, or weather. 

The PRC currently fields several platforms suitable 

for space reconnaissance and surveillance purposes. 

These include the Ziyuan (Resource) satellite series, 

co-developed with Brazil as the China-Brazil Earth 

Resources Satellite (CBERS), which provides near-realtime electro-optical observation, and the Fanhui Shi 

Weixing (Retrievable Satellite), which drops canisters 

of film. 

Relaying communications and data. Space-based 

communications and data relay systems can provide 

global connectivity for large numbers of users, providing 

instantaneous communications and data transmission 

among far-flung units. Space communications and data 

relay systems are an essential counterpart to satellite 

reconnaissance systems, as they are the main means 

by which intelligence information may be rapidly and 

securely transmitted across long distances.39 Thus, in 

order to meld forces across service or geographic divides 

into an organic, integrated whole (yige youji de zhengti; 

一个有机的整体) and foster the creation of integrated 

combat capabilities (zhengti zuozhan xiaoneng; 整体作战

效能), one is forced to rely on satellite communications 

and data relay systems.40

The PRC has deployed Dongfanghong (East Is Red)-

3 series satellites, and has also developed the DFH-4 
227

communications satellite, although it is unclear whether 

any of the latter have been deployed at this time. In 

addition, China can access a variety of commercial 

communications satellites, such as the Asiasat series. 

Finally, in April 2008, China launched its first data 

relay satellite, the Tianlian (Sky Link)-1. 

Providing Early Warning of Missile Attacks.

Space systems, by virtue of their location, provide 

unrivaled early detection and tracking of ballistic 

missiles throughout their flight. At a minimum, then, 

they can provide prompt warning of enemy ballistic 

missile attacks. With sufficient refinement, they can 

also assist missile defense forces by predicting both 

missile flight paths and impact points.41

At this time, however, according to available open 

source data, there is no evidence of a Chinese missile 

early warning satellite, nor an active Chinese missile 

defense program. Just as articles emphasizing the need 

for data relay satellites predated the actual deployment 

of such a Chinese system, however, calls for a Chinese 

missile early warning system may indicate that such a 

system will be deployed in the future. 

Providing Navigation and Positioning Information.

Space navigation systems enable forces to undertake 

rapid, mobile operations with high precision, and also 

are the basis for implementing long-range, precisionstrike capability, which will reduce friendly casualties 

as well as damage an opponent.42

The PRC’s Beidou (Big Dipper) navigation satellite 

system began deployment in 2000. This is an active, 

regional system, unlike the American global positioning 
228

system (GPS) or Russian/Soviet GLONASS, which 

are global and do not require any transmission by the 

user. 

Observing the Earth and Atmosphere.

This is not so much reconnaissance and surveillance, 

but geodesy, hydrological, and meteorological 

observation. The focus is not on finding enemy forces 

or targets, but understanding the state of the earth, 

including its magnetic field, gravitational field, terrain, 

and weather. Such data not only are used to produce 

maps and weather forecasts, but also can help with 

weapons selection and guidance. 

China has launched the Fengyun (Wind-Cloud) 

series of sun-synchronous and geosynchronous 

weather satellites and the Haiyang (Ocean) maritime 

surveillance satellites and can employ some of the FSW 

and Shijian (Practice) satellites for geodesy purposes. 

As one Chinese analysis notes, such space 

information support systems, taken together, provide 

three key benefits.43 In the first place, they make 

battlefields much more transparent. Combat forces can 

therefore be much more effective. They also serve to 

make command and control much more precise and 

capable. Forces can respond in real-time or near-realtime to enemy actions, and widely separated units 

drawn from a variety of services can act in a highly 

integrated manner. Finally, such systems enable 

noncontact, nonlinear warfare by enabling long-range, 

precision strikes. 

Thus, taken in combination, the PRC’s current 

array of satellite systems can provide potentially 

decisive support. As a PLA analysis observes, “Seizing 

the space information advantage as a high ground 
229

is the first decisive condition for seizing information 

dominance, space dominance, air dominance, naval 

dominance, land dominance, and therefore the 

initiative in wartime.”44

SPACE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 

In addition to traditional space information support 

operations, several Chinese analysts seem to believe 

that future military space activities will include space 

offensive operations. As one article observed, both the 

U.S. and Soviet/Russian militaries have steadily shifted 

their stance away from using space for support functions 

towards preparing for actual combat in space.45 Thus, 

some PLA analyses suggest that it should prepare for 

space offensive and defensive operations. Assessing 

the PLA’s capabilities relative to these mission areas, 

however, is much more difficult since, unlike the 

provision of information support, it is much less clear 

the extent to which the PLA currently integrates such 

military space efforts into its operational planning. 

The general tenor of PLA writings suggests that 

space offensive operations involve attacking both 

space-related targets in orbit and on the ground. Essential 

targets for securing space dominance include not only 

satellites and other objects in orbit, but also the ground 

components of space systems, including space launch 

vehicles, and the attendant data and communications 

systems that link them together. Attacking an 

opponent’s terrestrial space support functions is an 

essential means, in this view, of securing an advantage, 

comparable to traditional attacks against enemy 

command nodes or military bases.46 Such attacks carry 

the additional advantage of retarding an opponent’s 

ability to reinforce or replace damaged or destroyed 
230

orbiting systems. As one analysis notes, striking at both 

space and terrestrial targets is necessary to establish 

local space superiority.47

Attacks against terrestrial targets, especially those 

based in the enemy’s home territory, are likely to 

have significant strategic implications and potential 

repercussions. Therefore, attacks against strategic 

space targets require the direction of the highest level 

political authorities.48

Such attacks should be supplemented by efforts 

aimed at crippling enemy combat forces. These should 

be conducted in coordination with land, sea, and air 

strikes. Such attacks would focus on: 

• Command and control facilities and associated 

elements to paralyze an opponent;

• Logistics and reinforcement centers, as well as 

power infrastructure and other targets that help 

sustain the enemy’s forces;

• Key missile, air, and naval bases, and combat 

information facilities, to blunt an opponent’s 

ability to conduct offensive campaigns or seek to 

establish information, air, or naval dominance;

• Transportation choke points, including railways, 

highways, vital bridges, and harbors, so as to 

disrupt an opponent’s mobility and isolate their 

forces.49

Such attacks, in the view of PLA analyses, are more 

operational in nature, and should be undertaken after 

coordination with the war zone commander. The main 

methods of undertaking “space strike operations” are 

to undertake sustained strikes against an opponent, 

while fending off enemy counterattacks. The conduct 

of sustained, continuous attacks against the enemy’s 

key targets is intended to deny an opponent any chance 
231

to recover. Thus, after an initial phase that strikes key 

nodes of combat systems, there need to be subsequent 

attacks throughout the course of the conflict, preventing 

an opponent from reorganizing its forces or repairing 

damage inflicted earlier. Such attacks may involve a 

number of different means, including both hard- and 

soft-kill methods, aimed at both orbiting and terrestrial 

systems. 

At the same time, commanders should expect 

an opponent to undertake similar attacks against 

themselves, and therefore must be prepared to fend off 

the enemy’s counterattacks. In particular, an opponent, 

upon discovering its own side has organized and 

prepared space strike operations, may well seek to 

preempt. Concealing one’s own preparations and 

defending key space facilities and systems are therefore 

essential to space offensive operations. 

Interestingly, PLA writings also raise the prospect 

of eventual employment of space-based weapons 

against terrestrial targets. According to some PLA 

writings, future space offensive operations would 

not only entail efforts that would affect space systems 

and their supporting capabilities, but might also be 

undertaken by space-based assets. Indeed, several 

Chinese articles discuss the prospect of space-based 

weapons attacking terrestrial targets as part of space 

offensive operations.50 One article, for example, notes, 

“Directly striking terrestrial targets from space will 

become a vital operational technique (zhongyao de 

zuozhan shouduan; 重要的作战手段).”51

SPACE DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS 

In counterpoint to space offensive operations, there 

are also “space defensive operations (kongjian fangyu 
232

zuozhan; 空间防御作战).”52 Such operations seek to 

defend one’s own space systems from attacks by enemy 

space or terrestrial weapons, and also to protect national 

strategic targets from attacks from space systems or 

ballistic missiles. This latter aspect is echoed in other 

PLA analyses, which note the importance of ballistic 

missile defense as part of space operations.53

Defensively oriented operations, as one article notes, 

need not mean solely passive or reactive measures. 

As one PLA article notes, one can, and should, also 

employ offensive means and seek the initiative in the 

course of space defensive operations. Both offensive 

and defensive means, moreover, should be undertaken 

by not only space forces, but also by land, sea, and air 

forces.54 In the PLA’s view, a combination of electronic 

and physical measures, including firepower strikes, 

may disrupt and suppress enemy space systems, 

especially terrestrial support components such as the 

TT&C facilities, thereby allowing one’s own side to 

achieve space dominance. 

The assumption of an offensive stance, even in 

defensive operations, is likely to be accelerated by 

advances in technology, which will make space strike 

weapons more powerful and accurate. As another 

analysis observes,

Only by using space attack strength and long-range 

strike weapons (such as long-range bombers) of other 

[military] services and branches, at the appropriate time, 

and using actively offensive activities for concentrated 

attacks against enemy space launch bases, ballistic missile 

launch bases, space command and control centers, and 

aerospace production bases, etc., destroying or reducing 

the enemy’s offensive capacity, can one effectively block 

and disrupt the enemy’s undertaking of space attacks 

against us.55
233

It is unclear, from the available context, whether 

such measures should be undertaken early in a conflict, 

implying preemption, or whether they might arise 

over the course of the war. What is generally observed 

in PLA writings, however, is that the struggle for space 

dominance, as with information dominance, is likely to 

continue throughout the conflict. Therefore, no matter 

when such measures commence, they are likely to be 

sustained. 

Supplementing counterattacks and active defenses 

should be passive measures. Chinese writings suggest 

that space systems should, as much as possible, 

incorporate camouflage and stealthy measures, so 

as to hide the nature and functions of the spacecraft 

from opposing observation and probes.56 In addition, 

they should be hardened or otherwise shielded from 

enemy efforts at dazzling and interference. Another 

option is the deployment of small- and micro-satellites 

in networks and constellations, rather than single 

large systems. Larger satellites should be capable 

of altering their orbits to evade enemy attacks and 

should be capable of functioning autonomously, 

so that even if their ground-links are severed, they 

would nonetheless be able to continue operations.57

Other measures include deploying satellites into 

orbits designed to avoid enemy detection; employing 

political, diplomatic, and other channels to mislead 

opponents of real operational intentions or otherwise 

influence enemy decisionmaking; and deploying false 

targets and decoys, to overload opponents’ tracking 

capacities. 

Another essential element of a successful defense 

is provision of proper intelligence support. This is 

the primary means of detecting enemy offensive 

preparations in advance of actual attacks. Consequently, 
234

one Chinese analysis calls for familiarity with not 

only the physical aspects of opposing enemy space 

forces, including numbers, deployment patterns, and 

weapons capabilities, but also the less concrete aspects. 

This includes assessing the enemy’s likely plans, 

scale of operations, main direction, and likely uses of 

technology, tactics, and techniques.58 This also requires 

the proper training of a cadre of officers familiar with 

aerospace operations.59

SPACE DETERRENCE OPERATIONS 

In the PLA textbook Science of Strategy (Zhanlue 

Xue), published by the PLA’s Academy of Military 

Science, there is an extensive discussion about the 

requirements for strategic deterrence. Deterrence, it is 

noted, may be based upon nuclear, conventional, or 

information strength. It may also be based upon spacebased strength.60 In each case, the intent is the same: to 

dissuade an opponent from pursuing certain policies, 

while persuading an opponent to pursue other policies. 

As the volume notes, both persuasion and dissuasion 

“demand the opponent to submit to the deterrer’s 

volition.”61

Other articles echo Science of Strategy in noting 

the importance of deterrence, both space-based and 

otherwise. Deterrence is seen as providing the means 

to achieve one’s own strategic goals and defeating an 

opponent without having to resort to the actual use of 

force.62 Instead, by displaying force and indicating a 

willingness to use one’s capabilities, one might compel 

an opponent to back down.63

Space capabilities have several characteristics that 

make space deterrence especially powerful. In the first 

place, they offer the potential capacity to neutralize an 
235

opponent’s nuclear deterrent while expanding one’s 

own integrated deterrent capability. By pairing space 

defense with nuclear forces, one can attack or defend 

at will, retaining the initiative while confronting an 

opponent with an unpalatable set of choices.64 By 

enhancing conventional forces’ lethality and range, 

space systems enable “noncontact warfare,” and 

make an opponent less likely to be willing to engage 

in conventional warfare as well.65 Space, in essence, 

enhances both nuclear and conventional deterrence. 

Moreover, space systems may intimidate an 

opponent on their own. Space systems, as noted 

previously, are very expensive. It is possible, then, 

to hold an opponent’s space infrastructure hostage. 

Much like nuclear deterrence, space deterrence, 

becomes a question of cost-benefit analysis: is the 

focus of deterrence worth the likely cost of repairing 

or replacing a badly damaged or even destroyed space 

infrastructure?66

Furthermore, because space systems affect not 

only military but economic, political, and diplomatic 

spheres, damage to space systems will have wideranging repercussions.67 There may be created financial 

paralysis, communications breakdowns, transportation 

snarls, and clear reductions in military capacity.68 All 

of these consequences may persuade an opponent that 

they cannot attain victory at an acceptable price.

In light of the potential import of space deterrence, 

it appears that there is an implicit “escalation ladder” 

of PLA measures that one might employ to effect space 

deterrence. These involve testing space weapons, 

exercising space forces, reinforcing space capabilities, 

and actually employing space forces. 
236

Testing Space Weapons.

Several Chinese articles suggest that testing space 

weapons, especially in peacetime, can influence an 

opponent’s psychological perceptions. By undertaking 

such tests, one’s own overall national level of science 

and technology are made clear, reinforcing concepts of 

comprehensive national power, and feeding political 

and technological deterrent capacities.69 In some cases, 

maximum publicity can enhance the deterrent effect 

of such tests. Any potential opponent is therefore 

effectively notified that its space assets are likely to be 

placed in jeopardy in event of crisis. Not only might 

this dissuade an opponent from pursuing aggression, 

but it might also undercut its political and diplomatic 

standing. At the same time, by sometimes engaging in 

obfuscation, it is possible to generate uncertainty as 

to one’s own capabilities, and thereby manipulate an 

opponent’s perceptions.70

Exercising Space Forces.

The next level of deterrence involves exercising 

one’s space forces. These exercises can include such 

elements as space offense and defense operations, antimissile exercises, space strategic strike rehearsals, and 

displays of joint military operations involving both 

space and nonspace forces. Each such type of exercise 

has its own intended meaning. Space offense and 

defense operations, for example, indicate the ability to 

seize space dominance, whereas anti-missile exercises 

reflect one’s strategic defensive capacity, even in the face 

of nuclear weapons. Space strike exercises implicitly 

threaten the entire strategic depth of an opponent, 

whereas joint exercises with other forces serve as a 
237

reminder that a full range of capabilities is potentially 

at play, and not simply space capabilities.71

Whereas tests of space weapons might occur in 

peacetime, PLA authors suggest that exercises should 

be undertaken in the context of an ongoing crisis. By 

holding such exercises, according to one analysis, a 

nation is helping to mold other’s perceptions. Exercises 

may be seen as an expression of will or commitment, 

signaling an opponent of one’s readiness for war. 

To this end, one might seek to hold such exercises in 

sensitive space areas, specifically in order to underscore 

the seriousness of one’s resolve.72

As an added benefit, such exercises not only display 

the space deterrent capabilities of the forces involved, 

but they also provide valuable unit training.73 This 

additional training, in and of itself, can also enhance 

deterrent effects. Well-trained forces are better able 

to implement operational plans. Thus, in the opinion 

of Second Artillery officers Sun Haiyang and Chang 

Jing-an, U.S. military space exercises have improved 

America’s space deterrent capacity.

Deployment of Additional Space Forces.

In the event of an ongoing, escalating crisis, where 

space exercises may not have proven sufficient to 

constrain the crisis, the next step would be to reinforce 

available space forces. This includes both deploying 

additional systems, and maneuvering those already 

in orbit towards “sensitive areas of space (mingan de 

kongjian quyu; 敏感的空间区域),” so as to create a local 

advantage over an opponent.74

Not only does reinforcement of available space 

forces signal an opponent of one’s resolve, but 

increased reconnaissance and surveillance assets will 
238

also complicate an opponent’s efforts at maintaining 

secrecy. The likelihood of discovery, in turn, may 

dissuade an opponent from commencing hostilities, 

as the element of surprise is jeopardized. Moreover, 

should an opponent nonetheless refuse to take steps to 

de-escalate, increased deployments will also provide 

greater redundancy in the event of war.75

Actual Use of Space Forces.

The actual use of space forces is seen as the ultimate 

form of deterrence. Different PLA analyses, however, 

seem to have different definitions of what this means. 

One article, for example, seems to suggest that prior

use of space forces lends credibility for subsequent 

deterrent efforts. Thus, the employment of space 

forces in previous local wars provide an unmistakable 

statement of one’s own capabilities, as well as one’s 

willingness to take losses and inflict punishment. In 

this view, “actual capabilities, displayed in real wars, 

are the foundation of space deterrence.”76

Other analyses, however, suggest that the 

deterrence involved in actual attacks is not based on 

prior experience, but on the effective implementation of 

actual attacks in an ongoing crisis. One author describes 

such operations as reprimand or punishment strikes 

(chengjie daji; 惩戒打击). The actual employment of 

space forces, in this view, constitutes the strongest kind 

of deterrent (zuigao qiangdu de weishe; 最高强度的威

慑).77 The aim is to undertake point strikes to “cow the 

enemy with small battles (yi xiaozhan er quren zhibing; 

以小战而屈人之兵).”78

One type of punishment strike would be to 

interfere with, suppress, or otherwise disrupt enemy 

space systems, such as by jamming communications 
239

and data links or damaging their command system 

through computer network attacks.79 By inflicting 

confusion and disruption on their space systems, one 

may cause an opponent to decide to cease hostilities. 

If they do not, then one’s own military activities will 

operate from a more advantageous position. 

The other option is to undertake sudden, shortduration strikes against enemy space systems. In 

light of the previous option, this would imply that 

such strikes would involve kinetic means. The types 

of targets would reinforce this implication: space 

information systems, command and control centers, 

communications nodes, guided missile launch bases, 

energy storage sites and other strategic targets. As 

noted elsewhere, such targets are likely to receive 

hard-kill, rather than soft-kill, attacks to disable them 

for a prolonged period. Strikes against such targets, it 

is suggested, will inflict a psychological blow upon the 

enemy, since the destruction of such targets will not 

be easily repaired. Moreover, such attacks will likely 

produce cascading effects throughout the enemy’s 

space system, due to their linked nature.80 That is, 

by destroying such targets, other elements of the 

opponent’s space infrastructure will likely be affected, 

whether they are themselves targeted or not. It would 

likely require extensive efforts and delays, for example, 

before orbiting satellites could have their orbits shifted, 

or new systems could be launched, in the wake of such 

attacks.

This sort of deterrence logic would seem to be 

rooted in the idea that the ability to inflict punishment 

is the greatest deterrent. Thus, in one Chinese author’s 

view, “the foundation of space deterrence must be 

preparation for real war (bixu yi shizhan zhunbei zuowei 

kongjian weishe de jichu; 必须以实战准备作为空间威慑

的基础).”81
240

The divergence of views on how to emplace a policy 

of space deterrence, however, raises questions about 

the extent to which the PLA necessarily governs larger 

Chinese space policy. For example, the description 

of reinforcing available space forces would seem to 

imply a very slowly developing crisis. It is open to 

question whether such measured steps would be 

possible, or whether they would be interpreted in the 

manner presented, in the event of a rapidly escalating 

situation.

Similarly, there is a significant discrepancy between 

how PLA authors describe the utility of testing space 

weapons, and how the PRC actually behaved at the 

time of the January 2007 anti-satellite missile (ASAT) 

test. Not only was there no prior publicity, but the PRC 

Foreign Ministry seemed to handle the aftermath in a 

singularly hesitant fashion. Consequently, one must 

wonder whether the Chinese leadership necessarily 

subscribes to the same view of deterrence as that laid 

out by Chinese military space analysts. 

It is therefore unclear the extent to which the 

broader Chinese leadership necessarily subscribes to 

the concepts of space deterrence, as laid out by PLA 

authors. Indeed, given the opacity of the Chinese 

space program, as well as Chinese decisionmaking in 

general, it is difficult to state with any certainty how the 

Chinese would undertake military space operations in 

situations beyond Taiwan.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The difficulty of predicting PLA actions in space is 

exacerbated by the fact that its actual experience with 

military space operations is extremely limited. In the 

first place, the PLA has not actually gone to war in 
241

over 25 years (since the 1979 Sino-Vietnam War and 

the subsequent border clashes). Consequently, there is 

very little information available on how the PLA would 

use space systems in time of war, as the PLA itself 

simply has no recent experience with actual wartime 

application of space systems. 

Furthermore, it is not clear the extent to which the 

PLA currently relies upon space-based assets for its 

operations. Preparing for operations against Taiwan, an 

island off its coast that the PLA has had nearly 60 years 

to reconnoiter, likely involves less need for space-based 

reconnaissance or communications. Moreover, while it 

is likely that the PLA can access national space systems, 

such as meteorological data, how that information 

is incorporated into PLA planning and operations is 

unclear. The Chinese space program is one of the more 

opaque systems, and how the PLA uses data derived 

from space systems is similarly nontransparent. 

As the PLA increasingly operates farther afield, 

however, it is likely that it will exhibit a corresponding 

increase in its reliance on space-based systems for 

information collection and exploitation. Moreover, 

PLA writings indicate that the increasing emphasis on 

joint operations is likely to entail greater reliance on 

space systems in order to both coordinate the disparate 

forces, and to provide common situational awareness. 

Given the opacity of both the Chinese space 

program and the PLA, however, it is unclear how 

obvious any increasing dependence would be. It is 

likely, for example, that greater exploitation of space 

systems to coordinate forces would be reflected in 

their integration into PLA exercises. How one would 

detect and observe this increase, however, is unclear, 

especially in the unclassified literature. 

An expanding PLA reliance on space systems 

may be reflected in an expansion of militarily useful 
242

systems. These might include higher resolution imaging 

satellites, military communications satellites that are 

resistant to jamming, as well as the new Beidou/Compass

satellite navigation system, which will have global, 

rather than just regional, capacity. The deployment 

of the Tianlian-1 data relay satellite similarly indicates 

Chinese interest in more global, rather than regional, 

space coverage (although this system was ostensibly 

deployed to support the Chinese manned space 

program). 

Given that the growth of the Chinese space 

program has not paralleled the American or Soviet/

Russian space programs, though, it is important to 

recognize that the PLA’s employment of space systems 

may well follow a very different path from that of the 

United States or the former Soviet Union. Indeed, 

given Chinese analyses of American dependence on 

space assets, the PLA may specifically seek to avoid 

creating comparable vulnerabilities as they develop 

their own military space capabilities. Moreover, so long 

as the PLA is focused on regional, rather than global, 

contingencies, it will be operating under different 

conditions from U.S. forces, which must maintain a 

more global forward presence. Consequently, the PLA 

may well not need to rely as heavily on space assets 

for certain key mission areas (e.g., communications, 

photo, and electronic reconnaissance). 

For the United States, an increasing Chinese 

presence in space, especially a military one, is therefore 

likely to complicate its planning and operations. At the 

most immediate level, in the wake of the 2007 Chinese 

anti-satellite test, it is clear that the PRC has the ability 

to attack low-earth orbit U.S. satellites. While the extent 

of this threat may be unclear, it nonetheless imposes 

additional considerations on U.S. military planners. 
243

Unlike previous conflicts, in the event of Sino-U.S. 

tensions, the United States cannot expect to have 

unconstrained access to space. 

In addition, though, it presents the United States 

with substantial complications even outside the context 

of a Sino-U.S. military confrontation. In the event of 

a conflict involving the United States and a third 

party, the PRC would have the capacity to provide 

information from its space-based assets to America’s 

opponents. The provision of such information would 

make operational security much more problematic than 

was the case during U.S. intervention in the Balkans or 

during the war in Kuwait or Iraq. 

Nor would the PRC necessarily have to actively 

provide space information to an opponent. The PRC’s 

willingness and ability to sell entire satellite systems 

to foreign states, such as the Simon Bolivar satellite 

to Venezuela, means that even poorer nations may be 

able to simply acquire their own space capabilities. If 

the PRC becomes a major purveyor of turn-key satellite 

systems, it is not clear that the United States will be 

able to prevent a future Saddam Hussein or Slobodan 

Milosevic from accessing information derived from 

space—with direct implications for U.S. military 

operations.

CONCLUSION

The requirement of preparing for Local Wars 

Under Modern High-Tech Conditions in the 1990s 

and early 2000s led the PLA to shift towards a more 

“joint” approach to future wars and campaigns. With 

the growing importance of information technology, as 

acknowledged by the need to prepare for Local Wars 

under Informationalized Conditions, the emphasis 
244

has shifted towards unified operations, incorporating 

the ability to secure information dominance in order 

to create a common situational awareness among the 

disparate forces. In the views of PLA analysts, space 

dominance is essential. This, in turn, suggests that 

any future conflict involving the PRC is likely to entail 

military operations that affect space systems.

What the nature of such operations is likely to 

entail, however, is far from obvious. It is not at all 

certain, for example, whether there is currently a PLA 

space doctrine. Nor is it clear that the PLA has formally 

enunciated a space mission. A survey of Chinese 

military literature, however, suggests that the above 

elements are at least under discussion. PLA thinking 

about its missions beyond Taiwan is therefore likely to 

incorporate a space component. 

Space is not simply essential as an enabler for joint 

operations, however, or even for securing information 

dominance. Instead, it is part and parcel of the wider 

range of expected PLA capabilities, necessary for 

fulfilling the “historic missions” that are arising even 

before the PRC is “beyond Taiwan.” This suggests that, 

beyond the purely operational considerations, space 

capabilities are likely to assume an increasing strategic 

role as well. 

The “historic missions” of the PLA are of growing 

importance in light of the expanding PRC worldview 

and heightened global engagement. Where once the 

PLA could focus primarily on local defense of the 

homeland, it must now consider how to secure Chinese 

interests regionally, and eventually even globally. 

Where once the PLA could focus on protracted wars of 

annihilation, relying on mass and attrition, now it must 

be capable of fighting much more abbreviated wars of 

paralysis that rely on technology and rapid reaction. 
245

As the PLA thinks about fulfilling its historic 

missions “beyond Taiwan,” then, it must consider 

the requirements that arise for winning new kinds 

of conflicts. The future PLA is one that will have to 

be able to fight and win wars through technological 

sophistication and internally generated synergies. As 

important, however, given the increasingly global 

nature of China’s interests, it must be capable of 

preventing the outbreak of conflict in the first place, 

especially insofar as the PLA itself does not yet have 

the power projection capacity to assert itself in distant 

lands. 

In this context, then, the PRC’s ability to secure 

space dominance will affect its broader ability to 

obtain security for itself. The impact of military space 

operations is not simply, then, the ability to engage a 

given satellite or deploy a constellation, but increasingly 

relates to the larger issue of sustaining and supporting 

the greater national interest. This suggests that PRC 

and PLA activities in space must be analyzed with an 

eye not only towards warfighting capabilities, but also 

in the context of deterrence. 

Thinking “beyond Taiwan” means thinking beyond 

the prospect of a military confrontation over the island, 

but also clearly encompasses thinking beyond the 

military component of security. China’s burgeoning 

space power not only provides the PLA with additional 

capabilities, but also provides the PRC with additional 

means of influencing its security environment. It 

affects not only the PRC’s military strength, but also its 

diplomatic, political, and economic capacities as well. 

Space, then, is not only a factor in assessing the PLA, 

but is likely to be a key component of future Chinese 

“comprehensive national power” and national security 

planning, especially in the world beyond Taiwan.
246

CHAPTER 7 - ENDNOTES

1. There has been a limited discussion of China’s space program 

in English. It has been discussed in many U.S. Department of 

Defense (DoD) annual reports to Congress on the military power 

of the PRC (whose analysis has been critiqued by the Union of 

Concerned Scientists). There are currently three volumes published 

on the subject: Joan Johnson-Freese’s The Chinese Space Program

(1998), Brian Harvey’s China’s Space Program (2nd Ed., 2004), and 

Roger Handberg and Zhen Li’s Chinese Space Policy (2007), as well 

as Kevin Pollpeter’s SSI monograph, Building for the Future: China’s 

Progress in Space Technology During the Tenth Five-Year Plan and the 

U.S. Response, and Larry Wortzel’s American Enterprise Institute 

(AEI) monograph, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Space 

Warfare. There have also been several journal articles that discuss 

the Chinese space program, including Ashley Tellis’ “China’s 

Military Space Strategy” (2007 Survival) and Joan JohnsonFreese’s “Space Wei Qi” (2004 Naval War College Review). Finally, 

two PLA conference anthologies include chapters on China’s 

space program: A Poverty of Riches (2003) and China’s Revolution 

in Doctrinal Affairs (2005). This chapter draws primarily upon 

Chinese open-source discussions of military space operations, 

including the two Chinese space white papers (2000 and 2006), 

and especially the volume Military Astronautics by Chang Xianqi, 

and articles published in China Military Science.

2. Jiang Zemin, “Discussing the RMA with Chinese 

Characteristics” in Jiang Zemin Wenzhai (Selected Works of Jiang 

Zemin), Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 2006, pp. 576-

583. 

3. This section is heavily indebted to my CNA colleague Dan 

Hartnett, who has done pathbreaking work on “China’s Historic 

Missions.” 

4. This section draws from Daniel Hartnett, “Towards a 

Globally Focused Chinese Military,” draft document (2008). 

5. PLA Encyclopedia Committee, Chinese Military Encyclopedia, 

Vol. III, Beijing, China: Academy of Military Science Publishing 

House, July 1997, p. 602. 
247

6. PLA Encyclopedia Committee, Chinese Military Encyclopedia, 

Supplemental Volume (Beijing, China: Military Science Publishing 

House, 2002, p. 455. 

7. Han Jinqiang, “Space Dominance: Improving Assurance of 

Fighting and Winning,” Study Times, November 29, 2006.

8. Li Daguang, “Space Dominance: The Basis for Victory in 

Information War,” National Defense Daily, January 6, 2004; and 

Liberation Army Daily, January 6, 2004. 

9. Li Daguang, “On Space Supremacy,” Chinese Military 

Science, No. 2, 2003; and Li Daguang, “Discussion on Control of 

the Sky.”

10. David M. Finkelstein, Evolving Operational Concepts of the 

Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Navy: A Preliminary Exploration, 

Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2002, p. 52. 

11. For further discussion of “integrated operations, key point 

strikes,” see David Finkelstein, Evolving Operational Concepts, pp. 

52-65.

12. Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, 2nd Ed., Beijing, 

China: Defense Industries Press, 2005, pp. 273-279. 

13. Note that “yiti” may be translated as either “integrated” 

or “unified.” While the former translation is common, in the 

context here, the latter would seem to be more appropriate. For 

that reason, as well as to avoid confusion with the term “zhengti,” 

we will use the translation “unified” in the body of the chapter. 

14. See, for example, Hong Bin and Liang Xiaoqiu, “The Basics 

of Space Strategic Theory” China Military Science, No. 1, 2002; Li 

Dong, Zhao Xinguo, Huang Chenglin, “Research on Concepts of 

Space Operations and Its Command,” Journal of the Academy of 

Equipment Command and Technology, Vol. XIV, No. 5, 2003.

15. Shen Shilu, Feng Shuxing, Wang Jia, Li Yadong, “Initial 

Research into Military Aerospace Mission Command Decisionmaking,” Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command and 

Technology, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, February 2007.
248

16. Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, pp. 274-275.

17. “Space Information Warfare—Strategic High Ground for 

Modern Warfare Mobilization,” China Aerospace Newspaper, June 

2, 2004.

18. Xu Gangliang, Luo Yong, “Several Relationships That 

Our Nation Must Establish as China Develops Its Space power,” 

Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command and Technology, Vol. 

XVII, No. 2, 2006.

19. Wang Yao, “The Theory of Integrated Air and Space 

Operations,” China Air Force, No. 5, 2005.

20. Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, p. 275. 

21. Zhang Jiali, Min Zengfu, “On Extending Regional War 

into the Air and Space,” China Military Science, No. 1, 2005; and 

Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, 2nd Ed., p. 276. 

22. Chang Xianqi, “Space Strategy and National Security,” 

China Military Science, No. 1, 2002. 

23. Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, p. 275. 

24. Wang Xiaohai, “Current State of Development of Space 

Information Conflict Technologies,” China Aerospace, September 

2007.

25. Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, p. 290. 

26. Ibid., pp. 290-291.

27. Fan Xuejun, “Militarily Strong Nations Are Steadily 

Developing ‘Space Information Warfare’,” Liberation Army Daily, 

April 13, 2005.

28. Yang Leping, An Xueying, Zhao Yong, “Concepts, 

Missions, and Implications of Space Control,” Journal of the 

Academy of Equipment Command and Technology, Vol. XIV, No. 4, 

August 2003. 
249

29. Wang Xiaohai.

30. Ibid.

31. Li Daguang, “The Characteristics and Rules of Law of 

Space Strategy,” China Military Science, No. 1, 2002.

32. Fan Xuejun.

33. Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, p. 320. 

34. Guan Weiqiang, Qin Daguo, Xiao Lianggang, “Research on 

Requirements for Aerospace TT&C Systems for Integrated-Style 

Joint Operations,” Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command 

and Technology, Vol. XVII, No. 6, 2006.

35. Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, pp. 276-277. 

36. Ibid., pp. 278-279. 

37. Li Dong et al., “Research on Concepts of Space Operations 

and Its Command.”

38. Gao Yubiao, Chief Editor, Joint Campaign Course Materials, 

Beijing, China: Academy of Military Science Publishing House, 

August 2001, p. 54; and Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, pp. 

247-249. 

39. Gao Qingjun, “Aerospace Reconnaissance Characteristics 

and Limits in High-tech Local Wars,” Journal of the Academy of 

Equipment Command and Technology, Vol. XVI, No. 1, 2005.

40. Ibid.; and Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, p. 308.

41. Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, pp. 134, 146-147. 

42. Ibid., p. 147. 

43. Lanzhou Military Region Headquarters Communications 

Department, “Space Information Support and Its Influence on 

Future Terrestrial Operations,” Military Art, No. 10, 2003.
250

44. Ibid.

45. Zhang Qinghai and Li Xiaohai, “Space Warfare: From 

Vision to Reality,” China Military Science, No. 1, 2005. 

46. Hong Bin, Liang Xiaoqiu, “The Basics of Space Strategic 

Theory,” China Military Science, No. 1, 2002. 

47. Li Dong et al., “Research on Concepts of Space Operations 

and Its Command.” 

48. The precise nature of such strategic targets, however, is 

not defined. Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, p. 314. 

49. Ibid.; and Li Dong et al., “Research on Concepts of Space 

Operations and Its Command.” 

50. Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, p. 314; Xiong Xiaolong 

et al., “Seizing Space Dominance,” Winged Missiles Journal, 

October 2005; and Li Dong et al., “Research on Concepts of Space 

Operations and Its Command.” 

51. Zhang Qinghai and Li Xiaohai.

52. Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, pp. 317-321. 

53. Zhang Qinghai and Li Xiaohai.

54. Hong Bin and Liang Xiaoqiu.

55. Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, p. 321. 

56. Ibid., p. 316. 

57. Ibid., p. 320. 

58. Ibid., p. 319. 

59. Chang Xianqi, “Developing Military Space to Meet the 

Challenge of New Military Revolutions,” Journal of the Academy of 

Command Equipment and Technology, Vol. X, No. 5, 1999.
251

60. Zhou Peng and Wen Enbing, “Developing the Theory of 

Strategic Deterrence with Chinese Characteristics,” China Military 

Science, No. 3, 2004.

61. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, ed., The Science of Military 

Strategy, Beijing, China: Military Science Publishing House, 2005, 

p. 215. 

62. Zhou Peng and Wen Enbing. 

63. Wang Xiaohai.

64. Hong Bin and Liang Xiaoqiu.

65. Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, p. 300. 

66. Wang Xiaohai.

67. Li Jingjun and Dan Yuquan, “The Strategy of Space 

Deterrence,” China Military Science, No. 1, 2002.

68. Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, pp. 299-300. 

69. Li Jingjun and Dan Yuquan.

70. Li Jingjun and Dan Yuquan; Chang Xianqi, Military 

Astronautics, p. 303.

71. Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, p. 303.

72. Ibid., p. 303. 

73. Sun Haiyang and Chang Jing-an, “The New Form of 

Deterrence—Space Deterrence,” Military Art, No. 10, 2003.

74. Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, pp. 303-304.

75. Ibid. 

76. Sun Haiyang and Chang Jing-an.

77. Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, p. 304. 
252

78. Ibid., p. 302. 

79. Ibid., p. 304. 

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid., p. 302. 
253

CHAPTER 8

PLA COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS:

SCENARIOS, DOCTRINE, ORGANIZATIONS, 

AND CAPABILITY

James Mulvenon

INTRODUCTION

Theorists in the Chinese military have long been 

at the forefront of doctrinal thinking about cyber 

conflict, arguing that computer network attack offers 

Beijing some important asymmetric advantages 

against adversaries with superior technology. Yet 

the actual manifestations of this theorizing have been 

heretofore restricted to interesting but relatively minor 

hacking by Chinese patriotic hacker groups during 

crises or the alleged, large-scale cyber espionage 

against unclassified Department of Defense (DoD) 

computer systems. The well-publicized cyber attacks 

against Estonia in April 2007 and Georgia in July 2008, 

however, raise the specter of the use of cyberspace 

for state-level conflict, particularly as globalization 

raises the stakes by compelling greater electronic 

dependencies and interdependencies. This chapter 

examines computer network operations (CNO) as 

a tool of Chinese state power, outlining the possible 

scenarios, doctrinal concepts, organizations, and 

capabilities being developed by the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA). Specifically, the chapter explores the use 

of computer network exploit and computer network 

attack as missions designed to coerce Taiwan toward 

reunification on China’s terms, while deterring or 

disrupting U.S. military intervention on Taiwan’s 
254

behalf. In terms of assumptions, therefore, this chapter 

begins from the premise that we live in the “A” quadrant 

of Dr. Andrew Scobell’s matrix (Chapter 2), since 

cyber operations often simmer beneath the surface of a 

cross-strait conflict that can neither be fully resolved or 

permitted to break out into all-out war between China, 

Taiwan, and the United States.

Definitional Issues.

The Chinese military did not invent the term 

“computer network operations” but instead borrowed 

it from its U.S. counterparts, much as they have done 

with previous related concepts. Indeed, if one tracks 

Chinese military terminology over time, it is possible 

to discern a short lag between the adoption of new 

cyber concepts in the United States and their eventual 

adoption in China. This process was aided by the fact 

that some of the most important first generation PLA 

cyber theorists, like Wang Baocun, were experts on 

the American military and not doctrinal thinkers by 

trade. Thus, one can see the PLA making the same 

progression from the term “information warfare” (IW) 

[信息战争] in early writings, moving to “information 

operations” [信息作战], and then to more specific 

concepts like “network warfare” [网络战]. As the 

limited Western literature on the subject shows, 

the content of these concepts evolved from simple 

description of foreign ideas in the information warfare 

literature to increasingly sophisticated adaptions and 

modifications of the concepts of information operations 

and computer network operations to the PLA’s specific 

strategic goals, technology levels, doctrinal landscape 

and even the tortured syntax of Marxist-Leninist-Mao 

Zedong thought, the strategic wisdom of the Chinese 
255

ancients, and dialectical materialism.1 For example, 

the common use of the term “countermeasures” [

对抗] in core PLA Information Operations (IO) 

terms like “electronic countermeasures” [电子对抗], 

“communications countermeasures” [通信对抗], and 

network countermeasures [网络对抗], is embedded 

with Beijing’s self-perception of itself as the aggrieved 

party forced to counterattack against hegemonistic 

forces, even though the text of the concepts contains 

clear references to preemptive first strikes to gain 

advantage. For the purposes of this chapter, however, 

we adopt the clearer PLA definition of computer 

network warfare:

The general term for all sorts of information offense 

and defense actions in which computers and computer 

networks are the main targets, in which advanced 

information technology is a basic means, and which take 

place throughout the space occupied by networks. The 

core of computer network warfare is to disrupt the layers 

in which information is processed, with the objective of 

seizing and maintaining control of the network space.

CYBER: AN EMERGING TOOL OF CHINESE 

STATE POWER

As demonstrated by the “hacker wars” that 

followed former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s 

announcement of “special state-to-state relations,” the 

U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia in 

1999, and the EP-3 crisis in 2001, cyber attacks against 

foreign countries by so-called Chinese “patriotic 

hacker” groups have become a permanent feature of 

Chinese foreign and security policy crises since the 

mid- to late-1990s. Patriotic hacking has arguably 

been a mixed blessing for China. On the one hand, the 
256

emergence of this trend presents the People’s Republic 

of China (PRC) military and political leadership with 

serious command and control problems. Specifically, 

uncontrolled hacking by irregulars against the United 

States and Taiwan could potentially undermine a PRC 

political-military coercive diplomacy strategy vis-à-vis 

Taiwan and the United States during a crisis. Unlike 

traditional military instruments such as missiles, 

many of the levers of computer network operations 

by “unofficial means” are beyond the control of the 

Chinese government. This could negate the intended 

impact of strategic pausing and other political signals 

during a crisis. Yet at the same time patriotic hacking 

offers several new opportunities for the PRC. First, 

it increases plausible deniability for official Chinese 

computer network attack and exploit activities. Second, 

it has the potential to create a large, if unsophisticated 

set of operators who could engage in disruption 

activities against U.S. and Taiwan networks. 

Yet the overall strategic impact of these patriotic 

hacker wars has been relatively minor, more correctly 

described as a nuisance than a threat to other nationstates. More recent phenomena in this arena, such as 

the Russia-Estonia clash in 2007, the Russia-Georgia 

crisis in 2008, and especially the widespread allegations 

of Chinese cyber espionage against the DoD, however, 

have raised the stakes for cyber conflict as a legitimate 

tool of state power, portending future and perhaps 

more damaging uses of the technologies and methods. 

The crossing of this threshold has been largely 

facilitated by the increasingly networked nature of the 

global system, permitting nation states to threaten each 

other’s national power through cyberspace. While the 

Beijing authorities continue to petulantly insist that 

China would never engage in cyber conflict, asserting 
257

that the idea is “totally groundless and a reflection of 

Cold War mentality,”2 recent events strongly suggest 

that both Beijing and Moscow see cyber conflict as a 

legitimate, if plausibly deniable, form of 21st century 

statecraft.

THE PLA AND COMPUTER NETWORK 

OPERATIONS

In order to explore the full range of the PLA’s 

interest in computer network operations, this section is 

divided into four broad areas: CNO-related doctrinal 

concepts, scenarios, organizations, and capabilities.

PLA Doctrinal Framework for Information 

Operations and Computer Network Operations.

While no official doctrine has been identified, 

Chinese military strategists describe IO and CNO 

as useful supplements to conventional warfighting 

capability, and powerful asymmetric options for 

“overcoming the superior with the inferior.” According 

to one PRC author, “Computer network attack is one of 

the most effective means for a weak military to fight a 

strong one.”3

 Yet another important theme in Chinese 

writings on CNO is the use of computer network 

attack as the spearpoint of deterrence. Emphasizing 

the potential role of computer network attack (CNA) 

in this type of signaling, a PRC strategist writes that 

“We must send a message to the enemy through 

computer network attack, forcing the enemy to give 

up without fighting.”4

 Computer network attack is 

particularly attractive to the PLA, since it has a longer 

range than their conventional power projection assets. 

This allows the PLA to “reach out and touch” the 
258

United States, even in the continental United States. 

“Thanks to computers,” one strategist writes,” longdistance surveillance and accurate, powerful, and longdistance attacks are now available to our military.”5

Yet computer network attack is also believed to enjoy 

a high degree of “plausible deniability,” rendering it 

a possible tool of strategic denial and deception. As 

one source notes, “An information war is inexpensive, 

as the enemy country can receive a paralyzing blow 

through the Internet, and the party on the receiving 

end will not be able to tell whether it is a child’s prank 

or an attack from an enemy.”6

It is important to note that Chinese CNA doctrine 

focuses on disruption and paralysis, not destruction. 

Philosophically and historically, the evolving doctrine 

draws inspiration from Mao Zedong’s theory of 

“protracted war,” in which he argued that “We must as 

far as possible seal up the enemies’ eyes and ears, and 

make them become blind and deaf, and we must as 

far as possible confuse the minds of their commanders 

and turn them into madmen, using this to achieve our 

own victory.”7

 In the modem age, one authoritative 

source states: “Computer warfare targets computers—

the core of weapons systems and command, control, 

communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) 

systems—in order to paralyze the enemy.”8

 The goal 

of this paralyzing attack is to inflict a “mortal blow” 

[zhiming daji], though this does not necessarily refer to 

defeat. Instead, Chinese analysts often speak of using 

these attacks to deter the enemy, or to raise the costs of 

conflict to an unacceptable level. Specifically, computer 

network attacks on nonmilitary targets are designed 

to “. . . shake war resoluteness, destroy war potential 

and win the upper hand in war,” thus undermining 

the political will of the population for participation in 

military conflict.9
259

At an operational level, the emerging Chinese CNO 

strategy has five key features. First, Chinese authors 

emphasize defense as the top priority, and chastise 

American theorists for their “fetish of the offensive.” In 

interviews, analysts assert their belief that the United 

States is already carrying out extensive computer 

network exploitation (CNE) activities against Chinese 

servers. As a result, computer network defense (CND) 

must be the highest priority in peacetime, and only 

after that problem is solved can they consider “tactical 

counteroffensives.” Second, CNA is viewed as an 

unconventional warfare weapon to be used in the 

opening phase of the conflict, not a battlefield force 

multiplier that can be employed during every phase 

of the war. PLA analysts believe that a bolt from the 

blue at the beginning is necessary, because the enemy 

may simply unplug the network, denying them access 

to the target set, or patch the relevant vulnerabilities, 

thus obviating all prior intelligence preparation of the 

battlefield. Third, CNA is seen as a tool to permit China 

to fight and win an information campaign, precluding 

the need for conventional military action. Fourth, 

China’s enemies, in particular the United States, are seen 

as “information dependent,” while China is not. This 

latter point is an interesting misperception, given that 

the current Chinese C4I modernization is paradoxically 

making them more vulnerable to U.S. counter-C4I 

methods. Perhaps most significant, computer network 

attack is characterized as a preemption weapon to be 

used under the rubric of the rising Chinese strategy 

of xianfa zhiren [先发制人], or “gaining mastery before 

the enemy has struck.” Preemption is a core concept 

of emerging Chinese military doctrine. One author 

recommends that an effective strategy by which 

the weaker party can overcome its more powerful 
260

enemy is “to take advantage of serious gaps in the 

deployment of forces by the enemy with a high-tech 

edge by launching a preemptive strike during the 

early phase of the war or in the preparations leading 

to the offensive.”10 Confirming earlier analysis of 

Chinese views of U.S. operational vulnerabilities in the 

deployment phase, the reason for striking is that the 

“enemy is most vulnerable during the early phase of 

the war.”11 In terms of specific targets, the author asserts 

that “we should zero in on the hubs and other crucial 

links in the system that moves enemy troops as well 

as the war-making machine, such as harbors, airports, 

means of transportation, battlefield installations, 

and the communications, command and control and 

information systems.”12 If these targets are not attacked 

or the attack fails, the “high-tech equipped enemy” will 

amass troops and deploy hardware swiftly to the war 

zone, where it will carry out “large-scale air strikes in 

an attempt to weaken . . . China’s combat capability.”13

More recent and authoritative sources expand on 

this view. “In order to control information power,” 

one source states, “there must also be preemption . . 

. information offensives mainly rely on distant battle 

and stealth in order to be effective, and are best used as 

a surprise. . . . Therefore, it is clear that whoever strikes 

first has the advantage.”14 “The best defense is offense,” 

according to the authors of Information Operations: “We 

must launch preemptive attacks to disrupt and destroy 

enemy computer systems.”15

Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW). 

The dominant doctrinal concept encompassing PLA 

information operations, including computer network 

operations, is Integrated Network Electronic Warfare [

网电一体战], or INEW. As Dai Qingmin explains in his 

seminal article, INEW is the “organic combination of 
261

electronic warfare and computer network warfare.”16

The synthesis of these two realms in Chinese thinking 

was all the more revolutionary, given long-standing 

tension among U.S. information warfare experts 

divided between the electronic warfare (EW) school, 

which argued that computer network attack fell within 

the broad definition of the electromagnetic spectrum, 

and the new CNO school, which insisted that computer 

network attack was a fundamentally different dynamic 

than traditional EW missions like jamming. Rather than 

see them as competing, Dai and the INEW advocates 

argue that combining them is the essence of “integrated 

combat operations” against “enemy information 

systems” with the goal of “seizing battlefield 

information superiority.”17 Specifically, INEW utilizes 

both EW and CNO to weaken and disrupt the entire 

process by which battlefield information systems 

acquire, foreword, process, and use information. 

Integrated network-electronic warfare uses electronic 

warfare to disrupt the opponent’s acquisition and 

forwarding of information. It uses computer network 

warfare to disrupt the opponent’s processing and use 

of information.18

The resulting doctrinal concept “serves as information operations theory with Chinese characteristics,” 

playing “an important guiding role in the construction 

of our Army’s information operations forces and in 

fighting and winning future high-tech local wars.”19 In 

particular, INEW provides the doctrinal underpinning 

for the integration of computer network attack, often 

treated as an isolated covert action in other militaries, 

into larger PLA campaigns.
262

The Key CNO Scenarios.

The Legacy CNO Scenario: Taiwan. It is important 

to contextualize the PLA’s interest in computer network 

operations within Beijing’s larger perceived strategic 

environment. In the minds of the Chinese leadership, 

the available evidence suggests that the most important 

political-military challenge, and the most likely 

flashpoint for Sino-U.S. conflict is Taiwan. In seeking 

to reunify the island with the mainland, however, it is 

important to note that the PRC has a political strategy 

with a military component, not a military strategy with 

a political component. The PRC would prefer to win 

without fighting, since Beijing’s worst case outcome 

is a failed operation that would result in de facto 

independence for Taiwan. Also, the leadership realizes 

that attacking Taiwan with kinetic weapons will result 

in significant international opprobrium and make the 

native population ungovernable. 

Should the situation deteriorate into direct military 

conflict, the PLA since 1992 has been hard at work 

bolstering the hedging options of the leadership, 

developing advanced campaign doctrines, testing the 

concepts in increasingly complex training and exercises, 

and integrating new indigenous and imported weapons 

systems. At the strategic level, the writings of Chinese 

military authors suggest that there are two main 

centers of gravity in a Taiwan scenario, both of which 

can be attacked with computer network operations in 

concert with other kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities. 

The first of these is the will of the Taiwanese people, 

which they hope to undermine through exercises, 

cyber attacks against critical infrastructure, missile 

attacks, special operations forces (SOF) operations, and 

other operations that have a psychological operations 
263

(psyops) focus. Based on its own analysis from the 

1995-96 exercises, as well as public opinion polling 

in Taiwan, China appears to have concluded that the 

Taiwanese people do not have the stomach for conflict 

and will therefore sue for peace after suffering only a 

small amount of pain. The second center of gravity is 

the will and capability of the United States to intervene 

decisively in a cross-strait conflict. In a strategic sense, 

China has traditionally believed that its intercontinental 

ballistic missile (ICBM) inventory, which is capable of 

striking the continental United States (CONUS), will 

serve as a deterrent to U.S. intervention or at least a 

brake on escalation. Closer to Taiwan, the PLA has 

been engaged in an active program of equipment 

modernization, purchasing niche anti-access, areadenial capabilities such as long-range cruise missiles 

and submarines to shape the operational calculus of 

the American carrier battle group commander on 

station. At the same time, a key lesson learned from 

analyzing U.S. military operations since Operation 

DESERT STORM was the vulnerability of the logistics 

and deployment system to cyber attack.

Center of Gravity Number One: The Will of the 

People on Taiwan. Chinese strategies to manipulate 

the national psychology of the populace and leadership 

on Taiwan involve the full spectrum of information 

operations, including psyops, special operations, 

computer network operations, and intelligence 

operations. To this end, Beijing can employ all of the 

social, economic, political, and military tools of Chinese 

national power, as well as enlist the assistance of private 

sector players and sympathetic co-conspirators on 

Taiwan. The goal of these efforts is to shake the widely 

perceived psychological fragility of the populace, 

causing the government to prematurely capitulate to 
264

political negotiations with the mainland. In a sense, 

China seeks to use the immaturity of Taiwanese 

democracy against itself. Analysis of both Beijing’s 

strategies in this arena as well as Taipei’s ability to 

resist such methods confirms Taiwan’s high level 

vulnerability to Chinese soft coercion, and raises major 

questions about the island’s viability in the opening 

phase of a PRC coercion campaign, their credibility as 

a source of intelligence information on the mainland 

and a keeper of U.S. secrets, and their expected ability 

to interoperate successfully with U.S. forces in a crisis. 

Taiwan’s vulnerabilities in the critical infrastructure 

protection arena can be divided into two categories: 

informational and physical. On the information side, 

Taiwan is a highly information-dependent society with a 

relatively low level of information or computer security. 

Significant disruptions in information systems could 

have major negative effects on the island, particularly 

in the economic and financial realms, and increase fear 

and panic among the population. Past Chinese uses 

of regional media to send psyops messages have also 

enjoyed success in affecting popular morale and public 

opinion. For example, an Internet rumor in 1999 that a 

Chinese Su-27 had shot down a Taiwan aircraft caused 

the Taipei stock market to drop more than 2 percent in 

less than 4 hours.

On the physical side of the equation, Taiwan’s 

current capability and readiness level is much lower 

than one might expect for a state under such a direct 

level of threat, especially when compared with other 

“national security states” like Israel or South Korea. 

Critical infrastructure protection has been a low priority 

for the government, and Taiwan is acutely vulnerable 

to Spetsnaz-like or fifth column operations, aided 

significantly by ethnic and linguistic homogeneity and 
265

significant cross-border flows, which facilitate entry 

and access to potential targets. In terms of civilian 

infrastructure, Taiwan’s telecommunications, electric 

power, and transportation infrastructure are all highly 

susceptible to sabotage. These weaknesses have been 

indirectly exposed by periodic natural disasters, such 

as the September 1999 earthquake and the September 

2001 typhoon, when the communications infrastructure 

effectively collapsed. Taiwan’s ports, including Su’ao, 

Jeelung, and Gaoxiong (the third highest volume 

container port in the world), are attractive targets. 

Port charts and ship movements are available on the 

Internet, and Gaoxiong in particular has two narrow 

mouths that could easily be blocked with scuttled 

vessels. Taiwan’s highways are a vulnerable bottleneck, 

particularly given the large number of undefended 

mountain tunnels and bridges that could be destroyed 

by SOF units. Finally, the power grid is known to be 

fragile, marked by numerous single-point failure 

nodes, and no cross-hatching of subgrids to form 

redundancy. The loss of a single tower in the central 

mountainous region, thanks to a landslide, knocked 

out 90 percent of the grid a couple of years ago, and 

delays in construction of a fourth nuclear plant have 

constrained capacity.

SOFs and fifth column are also a major threat for 

disruption of military command and control and 

decapitation of the national command authority, as 

well as providing reconnaissance for initial missile and 

air strikes and battle damage assessments (BDA) for 

follow-on strikes. Entry into the country for SOF is not 

a substantial obstacle, thanks to ethnic and linguistic 

homogeneity and the dramatic increases in crossstrait people flows. Between 1988 and October 2002, 

for example, more than 828,000 mainlanders visited 
266

the island. Moreover, these special forces could also 

facilitate control of key civilian and military airfields 

and ports that could be used as points of entry for 

invading forces. The lack of operational security at 

key facilities is particularly inexplicable and appalling. 

Visits to national political and military command 

centers reveal them to be relatively unguarded, with 

poor information security practices, including the use 

of personal cell phones in supposedly secure areas. 

The Presidential Palace in downtown Taipei, home to 

the President and his key staff, has no fenceline and no 

security checkpoints. Building information, including 

the location of the President’s office, is openly 

available on the Internet. Given the poor performance 

of President Chen’s personal security detail during the 

2004 assassination attempt on his life, the possibility of 

elimination of the top leadership through direct action 

cannot be discounted.

Finally, there is substantial open source evidence 

to suggest that China is winning the intelligence war 

across the strait, raising serious doubts about the purity 

of Taiwanese intelligence proffered to the United 

States, the safety of advanced military technologies 

transferred to the island, and the ability of official 

Taiwan interlocutors to safeguard shared U.S. secrets 

about intelligence collection or joint warplanning. In 

the last 5 years, a steady series of leaked stories have 

appeared in the Taiwan and other regional media, 

describing either the rounding up of Taiwanese agent 

networks on the mainland or the unmasking of highranking Taiwanese agents in the military, with similar 

successes a rarity on the Taiwan side, despite significant 

political incentive to publicize such discoveries.21

Reported examples since early 2003 include the arrest 

of the president of the PLA Air Force Command Acad-
267

emy, Major-General Liu Guangzhi; his former deputy, 

Major-General Li Suolin, and 10 of their subordinates;22

the arrest of 24 Taiwanese and 19 mainlanders in late 

2003;23 the arrest of Chang Hsu-min, age 27, and his 

24-year-old girlfriend Yu Shi-ping;24 the arrest of Xu 

Jianchi;25 the arrest of Ma Peiming in February 2003;26

and the arrest and conviction to life imprisonment of 

Petty Officer First Class Liu Yueh-lung for passing 

naval communications codes to the PRC.27 Farther back, 

high-profile intelligence losses include the discovery, 

arrest, and execution of General Logistics Department 

Lieutenant-General Liu Liankun and Senior Colonel 

Shao Zhengzhong as a result of Taiwanese government 

intelligence disclosures about the fact that warheads 

on Chinese missiles fired near the island in 1996 

were unarmed,28 the arrest and sentencing of Hainan 

Province deputy head Lin Kecheng and nine others in 

1999 for providing economic, political, and other kinds 

of intelligence to the Taiwan Military Intelligence 

Bureau (MIB),29 and the arrest and imprisonment of a 

local official named Wang Ping in Nanchong, Sichuan, 

for allegedly also working for the MIB.30 In addition, 

retired senior Taiwan intelligence officials, including 

National Security Bureau personnel chief Pan Hsihsien and at least one former J-2, continue to travel to 

and often reside in China despite Taiwan regulations 

barring such movement for 3 years after retirement.31

At the same time, Taiwan and international media are 

regularly filled with leaks about sensitive U.S.-Taiwan 

military interactions or weapons transfers, sourced 

to either legislators or standing Taiwan government 

officials. Examples include disclosures about possible 

deployment of an Integrated Underwater Surveillance 

System (IUSS) north and south of the island to detect 

Chinese submarines,32 the provision of early warning 
268

data on Chinese missile attack from the Defense 

Support Program (DSP) satellite constellation,33 and 

the alleged signals intelligence (SIGINT) cooperation 

between the National Security Agency and Taiwan 

on Yangming Mountain.34 All of these possible 

compromises raise serious concerns about future 

technology or information sharing with Taiwan.

Center of Gravity Number Two: U.S. Military 

Intervention. When Chinese strategists contemplate 

how to affect U.S. deployments, they confront the 

limitations of their current conventional force, which 

does not have range sufficient to interdict U.S. facilities 

or assets beyond the Japanese home islands. Nuclear 

options, while theoretically available, are nonetheless 

far too escalatory to be used so early in the conflict. 

Theater missile systems, which are possibly moving to 

a mixture of conventional and nuclear warheads, could 

be used against Japan or Guam, but uncertainties about 

the nature of a given warhead would likely generate 

responses similar to the nuclear scenario. 

According to the predictable cadre of “true 

believers,” both of the centers of gravity identified 

above can be attacked using computer network 

operations. In the first case, the Chinese IO community 

believes that CNO will play a useful psychological 

role in undermining the will of the Taiwanese people 

by attacking infrastructure and economic vitality. In 

the second case, the Chinese IO community envisions 

computer network attacks effectively deterring or 

delaying U.S. intervention and causing pain sufficient 

to compel Taipei to capitulate before the United States 

arrives. The remainder of this section outlines how 

these IO theorists propose operationalizing such a 

strategy.
269

Specific Targeting Analysis of Network Attacks 

Against Logistics.

There are two macro-level targets for Chinese 

computer network operations: military network 

information and military information stored on 

networks. Computer network attack seeks to use the 

former to degrade the latter. Like U.S. doctrine, Chinese 

CNA targeting therefore focuses specifically on “enemy 

command and control (C2) centers,” especially “enemy 

information systems.” Of these information systems, 

PLA writings and interviews suggest that logistics 

computer systems are a top military target. According 

to one PLA source, “we must zero in on the . . . crucial 

links in the system that move enemy troops . . . such 

as information systems.”35 Another source writes, “we 

must attack system information accuracy, timeliness 

of information, and reliability of information.”36 In 

addition to logistics computer systems, another key 

military target for Chinese CNA is military reliance on 

civilian communications systems.

These concepts, combined with the earlier analysis 

of the PLA view that the main U.S. weakness is 

the deployment phase, lead PLA IO theorists to 

conclude that U.S. dependence on computer systems, 

particularly logistics systems, is a weak link that could 

potentially be exploited through computer network 

attack. Specifically, Chinese authors highlight DoD’s 

need to use the civilian backbone and unclassified 

computer networks (i.e., NIPRNET) as an “Achilles 

Heel.” There is also recognition that operations in the 

Pacific are especially reliant on precisely coordinated 

transportation, communications, and logistics networks, 

given the “tyranny of distance” in the theater. PLA 

strategists believe that a disruptive computer network 
270

attack against these systems or affiliated civilian 

systems could potentially delay or degrade U.S. force 

deployment to the region while allowing the PRC to 

maintain a degree of plausible deniability.

The Chinese are right to highlight the NIPRNET as 

an attractive and accessible target, unlike its classified 

counterparts. It is attractive because it contains and 

transmits critical deployment information in the allimportant time-phased force deployment list (TPFDL), 

which is valuable for both intelligence-gathering about 

U.S. military operations but also a lucrative target 

for disruptive attacks. In terms of accessibility, it is 

relatively easy to gather data about the NIRPNET from 

open sources, at least before September 11, 2001 (9/11). 

Moreover, the very nature of the system is the source 

of its vulnerabilities, since it has to be unclassified and 

connected to the greater global network, albeit through 

protected gateways. To migrate all of the NIPRNET 

to a secure, air-gapped network would likely tax the 

resources and bandwidth of DoD military networks. 

DoD’s classified networks are an attractive but less 

accessible target for the Chinese. On the one hand, these 

networks would be an intelligence gold mine, and is 

likely a priority CNE target. On the other, they are less 

attractive as a computer network attack target, thanks 

to the difficulty of penetrating their high defenses. Any 

overall Chinese military strategy predicated on a high 

degree of success in penetrating these networks during 

crisis or war is a high-risk venture, and increases the 

chances of failure of the overall effort to an unacceptable 

level. Moreover, internal PRC writings on information 

warfare show no confidence in the PRC’s ability to 

get inside network-centric warfare aboard deployed 

ships or other self-contained operational units. 

Instead, the literature is focused on preventing the 
271

units from deploying in the first place, and thereafter 

breaking the C4I linkages between the ships and their 

headquarters.

Chinese CNE or CNA operations against logistics 

networks could have a detrimental impact on U.S. 

logistics support to operations. PRC CNE activities 

directed against U.S. military logistics networks could 

reveal force deployment information, such as the 

names of ships deployed, readiness status of various 

units, timing and destination of deployments, and 

rendezvous schedules. This is especially important for 

the Chinese in times of crisis, since the PRC in peacetime 

utilizes U.S. military web sites and newspapers as a 

principal source for deployment information. An article 

in October 2001 in People’s Daily, for example, explicitly 

cited U.S. Navy web sites for information about the 

origins, destination, and purpose of two carrier battle 

groups exercising in the South China Sea. Since the 

quantity and quality of deployment information on 

open websites has been dramatically reduced after 

9/11, the intelligence benefits (necessity?) of exploiting 

the NIPRNET have become even more paramount.37

Computer network attack could also delay resupply to 

the theater by misdirecting stores, fuel, and munitions, 

corrupting or deleting inventory files, and thereby 

hindering mission capability.

The advantages to this strategy are numerous: (1) it 

is available to the PLA in the near-term; (2) it does not 

require the PLA to be able to attack/invade Taiwan 

with air/sea assets; (3) it has a reasonable level of 

deniability, provided that the attack is sophisticated 

enough to prevent tracing; (4) it exploits perceived U.S. 

casualty aversion, over-attention to force protection, 

the tyranny of distance in the Pacific, and U.S. 

dependence on information systems; and (5) it could 
272

achieve the desired operational and psychological 

effects: deterrence of U.S. response or degrading of 

deployments.

PLA CNO Organizations.

The PLA’s computer network operations organizations can be divided into three broad categories: 

command organizations, doctrinal and professional 

military education institutions, and research and 

development organizations.

PLA CNO Command Organizations. The General Staff 

Department (GSD) Communications Department versus 

the GSD 4th Department (Electronic Countermeasures 

Department). For years, a debate has raged over 

whether the GSD Communications Department or the 

GSD 4th Department (Electronic Countermeasures 

Department) had operational responsibility for 

computer network operations in the PLA, specifically 

the CNA mission. While the Communications 

Department clearly has personnel well-versed in the 

technical details of the PLA’s communications and 

computer networks, the Electronic Countermeasures 

Department since its inception has been directly 

responsible for not only traditional EW jamming, but 

also “electronic offense,” or the use of electronic and 

information systems to attack the enemy’s electronic 

and information systems. An early, pre-Internet 

open source description of these differentiated roles 

can be found in the 1997 Guidebook for Staff Officer’s 

Professional Work in Wartime.

38 In 1999, the preface of an 

important book by the then-head of the PLA Electronic 

Engineering Academy, Dai Qingmin, revealed that 

Introduction to Information Warfare was published by 

the PLA Publishing House only after an appraisal by 
273

the GSD Electronic Countermeasures Department. 

When Dai became head of the 4th Department shortly 

thereafter, a series of articles and books were published 

under his byline on information operations-related 

topics including “Pay Close Attention to Airborne 

Information Operations,” Introduction to Information 

Warfare (2001),39 Information Warfare Review (1999),40

“On Four Abilities for Informationized Warfare,”41

“Innovating and Developing Views on Information 

Operations,”42 Information War Concepts,43 and “On 

the Development of Army Informationization and 

Information Warfare.”44 It is also instructive to note 

that Dai, after he retired from active duty, assumed 

the directorship of the “All-PLA Informationization 

Consultation Committee,” which is in part responsible 

for the development of PLA systems for offensive IO 

missions. 

Yet the rise of the Internet and the development of 

computer network operations appeared to raise new 

questions about which department would take the 

lead in this new warfare arena. An important signpost 

in the PLA debate appeared in the February 2002 issue 

of China Military Science, in which the heads of the 

GSD Communications Department (Major General 

Xu Xiaoyan) and GSD 4th Department/Electronic 

Countermeasures Department (Major General Dai 

Qingmin) each made their case for operational 

control of CNO in a pair of dueling articles.45 Dai 

Qingmin’s article “On Integrating Network Warfare 

and Electronic Warfare” introduced the concept of 

INEW (discussed above), and clearly won out over 

the concepts in Xu’s article, “A Concept for a Strategy 

of Development in which Informationization Drives 

Mechanization.” During his tenure at the GSD/4th 

Department, Dai also edited a more detailed version 
274

of the article’s thesis, entitled Introduction to Integrated 

Network and Electronic Warfare [网电一体战概论]. Dai’s 

INEW concept continues to be the dominant doctrinal 

core for PLA information operations until the present 

day, very likely consolidating the leadership position 

of the GSD/4th Department on related CNO issues.

GSD Third Department (SIGINT). Given the known 

mission profile of the GSD Third Department, it is 

reasonable to speculate that it may have the lead role 

in the defensive/information assurance mission (CND) 

as well as intelligence preparation of the battlefield 

(CNE).

Joint Campaign Command HQ and the Warzone.46

While the GSD 4th Department is the locus for 

CNA planning during peacetime, some wartime 

responsibilities fall to the Joint Campaign Command 

HQ under the Warzone. Within the Main Command 

Post [基本指挥所] of the HQ, various centers direct the 

IO and CNO-related functions. The most important of 

these is the Information Countermeasures Center [信

息对抗中心]. This unit is composed of relevant service 

commanders and their staff officers. It is responsible 

for providing advice on information countermeasure 

issues, planning and coordinating information 

systems, and guiding and coordinating the information 

countermeasures of every level of the operational group. 

The center is composed of comprehensive planning, 

electronic countermeasures [电子对抗], network warfare

[网络战], information system defense, information 

security and secrecy, weapons and equipment 

support, and comprehensive support departments. 

During wartime, this structure strongly suggests that 

personnel from the GSD/Fourth Department will be 

the “trigger pullers” at both the national and warzone 

level.
275

PLA CNO Doctrinal and Professional Military 

Education Organizations. Doctrinal Organizations.

1. Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) is the PLA’s 

premier military science research institution, reporting 

directly to the Central Military Commission (CMC). 

The academy is the locus of development of PLA 

strategy and doctrine, and is also responsible for the 

coordination of various military research bodies, often 

at the behest of the CMC and the military leadership. 

While the majority of its work is academic, AMS’s 

Campaign and Tactics Department [战役战术部] 

also performs a similar function to the U.S. Training 

and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in designing, 

attending, and assessing military exercises in the field. 

AMS is also the principal institution responsible for 

exploring the future of military conflict, leading the 

analysis of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 

and cyber warfare. Some of the earliest IO and CNOrelated research in the PLA was initiated at AMS, 

beginning with translation and analysis of foreign IW 

writings in the Academy’s Foreign Military Studies 

Department. The first generation of AMS scholars 

included Wang Pufeng and Wang Baocun. Later, as 

information operations evolved and matured in the 

PLA, important work was conducted in the AMS 

Campaign and Tactics Department.

2. The National Defense University (NDU) is the 

PLA’s most senior professional military education 

institution, training the best and brightest of the 

PLA for leading command positions. The NDU does 

conduct some research, though its focus is much more 

near-term than the AMS. Wang Baocun summarized 

the difference this way: “The NDU teaches officers, 

while the AMS writes papers and gives advice to the 

CMC. NDU must think about the current PLA and 
276

be practical (how to deal with IW now). AMS must 

think about the future, out 10-20 years.”47 The primary 

office at NDU responsible for examining information 

operations issues is the Command Education Research 

Office [指挥教研室]. Two important NDU scholars on 

IO issues were Liu Guifang and Wang Jiaohuai. 

3. The Wuhan Communications Command 

Academy (CCA) is the senior professional military 

education institution in China for PLA communications 

and electronics personnel.48 It is responsible for training 

future communications and electronics unit leaders 

in doctrine, policy, technology, and leadership.49 In 

1999, CCA hosted the first all-army collective training 

session for division and brigade chiefs of staff in IW 

theory, which has continued to this day.50 It is also the 

locus of PLA dissemination of doctrinal and teaching 

materials on information operations, and is the only 

institution certified to accredit information operations 

instructors for PLA educational institutions at every 

level and in every service. The CCA offers 31 command 

and control related cross-disciplinary courses, with 

emphasis on IW at the core of undergraduate and 

graduate training. In December 1998, CCA established 

the PLA’s first IW simulation experiment center. In 

the same year, the GSD Communication Department 

endorsed two CCA publications on IW for use as 

teaching materials, Command and Control in Information 

Warfare and Technology in Information Warfare.

51 The 

textbooks were drafted by a task force of 20 PLA IW 

theorists and instructors from CCA.

PLA CNO Capability Assessment.

Setting the Bar Too High: A More Realistic Assessment 

of PLA Cyber Capabilities. In terms of courses of action, 
277

interviews and classified writings reveal interest in 

the full spectrum of computer network attack tools, 

including hacking, viruses, physical attack, insider 

sabotage, and electromagnetic attack. One of the 

most difficult challenges of this type of analysis is 

measuring China’s actual computer network attack 

capability. In rough terms, a computer network attack 

capability requires four things, three of which are easy 

to obtain and one of which is harder. The easy three 

are a computer, an Internet connection, and hacker 

tools, thousands of which can be downloaded from 

enthusiast sites around the globe. The more difficult 

piece of the puzzle to acquire is the operator himself, 

the computer hacker. While individuals of this ilk 

are abundant in China’s urban centers, they are also 

correctly perceived to be a social group unlikely to 

relish military or governmental service.

PLA CNO Capabilities and the Patriotic Hacker 

Phenomenon. The issue of PLA CNO capabilities is not 

easily separated from the rise of “patriotic hacking” 

by increasingly sophisticated, nationalistic hacker 

groups. Some Western analysts have been tempted 

to assert that the patriotic hackers are “controlled” 

by Beijing, and should therefore be included in PLA 

CNO capabilities estimates. Among the arguments 

marshaled to support this thesis is that consistently 

harsh punishments are meted out to individuals in 

China committing relatively minor computer crimes, 

while patriotic hackers appear to suffer no sanction 

for their brazen contravention of Chinese law. Other 

analysts begin from the specious premise that since 

the Chinese government “owns” the Internet in China, 

therefore patriotic hackers must work for the state. 

Still others correctly point to the fact that a number of 

these groups, such as Xfocus and NSFocus, appear to 
278

be morphing into “white-hat” hackers (i.e., becoming 

professional information security professionals), often 

developing relationships with companies associated 

with the Ministry of Public Security or the ministry 

itself. Yet interviews with hackers and officials strongly 

suggest that the groups truly are independent actors, 

more correctly labeled “state-tolerated” or “stateencouraged.” They are tolerated because are “useful 

idiots” for the regime, but they are also careful not to 

pursue domestic hacking activities that might threaten 

“internal stability” and thereby activate the repression 

apparatus. Indeed, most of the groups have issued 

constitutions or other organizing documents that 

specifically prohibit members from attacking Chinese 

web sites or networks. 

Even if it is true that patriotic hacker groups are not 

controlled by the state, Beijing is still worried about 

the possible effect of their behavior in a crisis with the 

United States and/or Taiwan. Analysis of several recent 

“hacker wars” over the last 2 years suggests an evolving 

mechanism for shaping the activities of “patriotic 

hackers.” In August 1999, after the conclusion of the 

cross-strait hacker skirmish that erupted in the wake 

of Taiwan President Li Teng-hui’s declaration that the 

island’s relationship to the mainland was a “state-tostate relationship,” a Liberation Army Daily article lauded 

the “patriotic hackers” and encouraged other hackers 

to join in during the next crisis with Taiwan. In April 

2001, Guangzhou Daily reprinted without attribution a 

Wired article on the impending outbreak of a “hacker 

war” between Chinese and American hackers, which 

many hackers saw as a sign of government backing. 

A media-generated hacker war thereafter ensued, with 

Chinese and American hackers defacing hundreds, if 

not thousands, of web sites. In May 2001, however, 
279

an authoritative People’s Daily article rebuked both 

Western and Chinese hackers, calling activities by 

both sides “illegal.” This signaled to the hackers that 

the state had withdrawn its sanction of their activities, 

and hacker activity quickly tapered off in response to 

the warning. 

A year later, patriotic hacker chat rooms were 

filled with discussion and planning for a “first 

anniversary” hacker war. In late April 2002 on the 

eve of the proposed conflict, People’s Daily published 

another unsigned editorial on the subject, decrying the 

loose talk about a hacker war and warning of serious 

consequences. Participants in the hacker chat rooms 

quickly recognized the signal, and the plans for a new 

hacker war were abandoned. In neither case could 

this dynamic be called control, but instead reflects the 

population’s keen sensitivity to the subtle messages in 

government propaganda, which continues to create 

successfully a Leninist climate of self-deterrence and 

self-censorship that is more powerful than active state 

repression. As some groups move into “white-hat” 

positions, however, the relationship might actually 

transition from a ruler-ruled dynamic to a partnership 

motivated by reasons ranging from nationalism to 

naked self-interest.

Script Kiddies vs. New Tool Development. Measuring 

the PLA’s CNO capability also involves the assessment 

of a group or country’s ability to generate new attack 

tools or exploits. Outside analysts, many of whom are 

programmers themselves, tend to reify countries like 

Russia that abound with highly talented programmers, 

and look down upon countries or individuals that 

simply use off-the-shelf “script kiddie” tools like 

distributed denial of service (DDOS) programs. DDOS 

is admittedly a blunt instrument, but a fixation on 
280

finding more sophisticated attacks, which reflects the 

widely-held but logically tenuous assumption that 

state-sponsorship correlates with sophistication, may 

be counterproductive. Instead, analysts should employ 

a simple “means-ends” test. In the Chinese case, DDOS, 

despite its relatively simplicity, looks like the right tool 

for the right mission. From the Chinese point of view, 

for example, hammering the NIPRNET and forcing it 

to be taken down for repairs would be considered an 

operational success, since it could potentially delay or 

degrade U.S. logistics deployments to Taiwan.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The Chinese military views computer network 

attack as an attractive asymmetric weapon against hightech adversaries like the United States, particularly 

given the latter’s dependence on unclassified 

information systems for global power projection. 

These vulnerabilities offer enticing opportunities 

for cyber espionage in peacetime and hold out the 

prospect of disrupting and even helping to deter U.S. 

military forces in wartime. Yet the large and growing 

PLA literature on information operations is also 

beset by a glaring omission: the refusal of Chinese 

military analysts to acknowledge that Beijing’s own 

command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 

is paradoxically making China more vulnerable to the 

very same asymmetric strategies. Indeed, a significant 

part of the policy answer to the U.S. cybersecurity 

crisis vis-à-vis China may lay in offense rather than 

defense. Simply relying on logs of intrusions against 

unclassified networks is not sufficient to pierce the veil 

of the attribution problem, but leveraging offensive 
281

capabilities in support of defense holds the promise of 

both better offense and better defense.

CHAPTER 8 - ENDNOTES

1. Key Western writings on the subject of PLA computer 

network operations include: Timothy L. Thomas, Cyber Bytes: 

Chinese Information-War Theory and Practice, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Foreign Military Studies Office, 2004; Timothy L. Thomas, “Chinese 

and American Network Warfare,” Joint Force Quarterly, No. 38, 

August 2005; Coping with the Dragon: Essays on PLA Transformation 

and the U.S. Military, Washington, DC: Center for Technology and 

National Security Policy, National Defense University, December 

2007; James Mulvenon, “Chinese Information Operations 

Strategies in a Taiwan Continegency,” Testimony before the U.S.-

China Economic and Security Review Commission, September 

15, 2005; Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Information Warfare: A Phantom 

Menace or Emerging Threat? Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

U.S. Army War College, November 2001; Timothy L. Thomas, 

Like Adding Wings to the Tiger: Chinese Information War Theory and 

Practice, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 

November 2000; Major (Ret.) Charles F. Hawkins, “The People’s 

Liberation Army Looks to the Future,” Joint Force Quarterly, 

Summer 2000, pp. 12-16; Michael Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future 

Warfare, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 

National Defense University, 2000; Bates Gill and Lonnie Henley, 

China and the Revolution in Military Affairs, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 1996.

2. Dai Qingmin, “On Integrating Network Warfare and 

Electronic Warfare,” Zhongguo junshi kexue, Vol. 1, February 2002, 

pp. 112-117.

3. Foreign Ministry Press Conference, September 4, 2007.

4. Wang Houqing, Zhang Xingye, The Science of Military 

Campaigns [战役学], Beijing, NDU Press, 2000, pp. 173-74.

5. Nu Li, Li Jiangzhou, and Xu Dehui, “Strategies in 

Information Operations: A Preliminary Discussion,” Military 

Science, April 2000.
282

6. The Science of Military Campaigns, p. 170.

7. Wei Jincheng, “New Form of People’s War,” Jiefangjun bao,

June 25, 1996, p. 6.

8. Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War” (May 1938), in Selected 

Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. II, Beijing, China: Foreign Languages 

Press, 1961, paragraph 83.

9. Lu Daohai, ed., Information Operations [信息作战], Beijing, 

China: PLA Arts and Literature Press, p. 288.

10. Information Operations, p. 296.

11. Lu Linzhi, “Preemptive Strikes Crucial in Limited HighTech Wars,” Jiefangjun bao, February 14, 1996.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. The Science of Military Campaigns , pp. 178-79.

16. Information Operations, p. 324.

17. Dai Qingmin, “On Integrating Network Warfare and 

Electronic Warfare.”

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Among the rare examples, which perversely strengthen 

the case for significant counterintelligence concerns on Taiwan, 

are three military officers (Majors Pai Chin-yang, Tseng Chaowen, and Chen Sui-chiung) arrested for spying and two 

individuals (Huang Cheng-an and his girlfriend) arrested for 
283

transferring technology from the Chungshan Institute for Science 

and Technology to the mainland. See William Foreman, “Taiwan 

Arrests Military Officer On Spy Charges—The Third Such Case In 

Month,” Associated Press, December 3, 2003; and “Taiwan Detains 

Woman Over Alleged Spying,” South China Morning Post, January 

30, 2004. An earlier case also involved Yeh Yu-chen and Chen 

Shih-liang and technology from the Chungshan Institute. See 

“Taiwan Attempts Damage-Control After Alleged Chinese Spy 

Ring,” AFP, August 7, 2003. 

22. “Top PLA Officers Accused of Spying for Taiwan,” Straits 

Times, April 16, 2004; “Beijing Arrests Military Officers on Spy 

Charges,” China Post, April 17, 2004.

23. The timing and propaganda exploitation of the arrests, 

which coincided with the Taiwan presidential campaign, suggests 

that the Chinese already had the individuals under surveillance 

and chose to arrest them for maximum political effect. See Philip 

Pan, “China Arrests 43 Alleged Spies; Move Increases Effort to 

Undermine Taiwanese President,” Washington Post, December 

24, 2003; “Chinese Mainland Smashes Taiwan Spy Ring,” Xinhua, 

December 24, 2003; “Espionage, Corruption Cases In China, 

December 2003-February 2004,” BBC Monitoring International 

Reports, February 14, 2004; Joe McDonald, “China Parades 

Accused Taiwanese Spies In Front Of Cameras Amid Tensions 

With Island,” Associated Press, January 16, 2004; and “Taiwan 

Spies Visited by Families,” Xinhua, January 20, 2004.

24. “China Detains Two More Taiwanese Suspected of 

Espionage,” AFP, February 13, 2004, citing Chinese state media.

25. Chongqing Ribao, August 8, 2003, p. 1.

26. AFP, September 2, 2003, p. 1.

27. Brian Hsu, “Taiwan Naval Officer Gets Life For Espionage,” 

Taipei Times, December 18, 2002.

28. John Pomfret, “Taiwanese Mistake Led To 3 Spies’ 

Executions,” Washington Post, February 20, 2000.

29. People’s Daily article in August 1999, cited in Pomfret, 

“Taiwanese Mistake.”
284

30. Sichuan television report in October 1999, cited in Pomfret, 

“Taiwanese Mistake.”

31. “Former Taiwan Spy Chief Denies Leaking Secrets During 

His Four Years In China,” Taiwan News, April 14, 2004.

32. Michael Gordon, “Secret U.S. Study Concludes Taiwan 

Needs New Arms,” New York Times, April 1, 2001.

33. “US to Share Early-Warning Missile Data With Taiwan,” 

AFP, October 8, 2002.

34. Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan-USA Link Up on SIGINT,” 

Jane’s Defense Review, January 23, 2001; Wendell Minnick, “Spook 

Mountain: How US Spies on China,” Asia Times Online, March 

6, 2003; and Wendell Minnick, “Challenge to Update Taiwan’s 

SIGINT,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1, 2004.

35. Lu Linzhi, “Preemptive Strikes.”

36. Information Operations, p. 293.

37. DoD’s revised web site administration guidance, 

which can be found at www.defenselink.mil/webmasters/policy/

dod_web_policy_12071998_with_amendments_and_corrections.

html, specifically prohibits the following: “3.5.3.2. Reference to 

unclassified information that would reveal sensitive movements 

of military assets or the location of units, installations, or personnel 

where uncertainty regarding location is an element of a military 

plan or program.”

38. Ma Jinsheng, Canmou junguan zhanshi yewu zhinan

(Guidebook for Staff Officer’s Professional Work in Wartime), Beijing, 

China: Academy of Military Sciences, August 1997. 

39. Dai Qingmin, Min Zongguang and Chen Kelin, Introduction 

to Information Warfare, Beijing, China: PLA Press, 2001.

40. Dai Qingmin, Information Warfare Review, Beijing, China: 

PLA Press, 1999.
285

41. Dai Qingmin, “On Four Abilities for Informationized 

Warfare,” Jiefangjun bao, July 1 2003, p. 6.

42. Dai Qingmin, “Innovating and Developing Views on 

Information Operations,” Zhongguo junshi kexue, August 20, 2000, 

pp. 72-77.

43. Dai Qingmin, Xinxizhan gainian (Information War Concepts), 

Beijing, China: PLA Publishing House, 2001.

44. Dai Qingmin, “On the Development of Army 

Informationization and Information Warfare,” Zhongguo junshi 

kexue, December 20, 2002, pp. 66-70.

45. Dai Qingmin, “On Integrating Network Warfare and 

Electronic Warfare,” pp. 112-117; and Xu Xiaoyan, “A Concept for 

a Strategy of Development in which Informationization Drives 

Mechanization,” Zhongguo junshi kexue, February 1, 2002, pp. 107-

111.

46. This section draws heavily from the excellent work of 

Kevin Pollpeter on command and control in the warzone.

47. Interview, August 10, 2000.

48. A good summary of WCCA can be found at baike.baidu.

com/view/1521221.htm.

49. Long Zequn, “Using Hi-Tech to Develop ‘Hear-All 

Devices,’ the Communications Command Academy Sets Multiple 

Records,” Hubei ribao, May 4, 2002.

50. Sun Haicheng, Yang Jie, and Zhang Guoyu, “Let 

Information Warfare Training Rule the Training Sites:Practice and 

Reflections from the First All-Army CollectiveTraining Session 

for Division and Brigade Chiefs of Staff in Information Warfare 

Theory,” Jiefangjun bao, July 13, 1999, p. 6.

51. Lei Yuanshen, “New Breakthrough in Study of Information Warfare,” Jiefangjun bao, July 21, 1998, p. 6.

287

CHAPTER 9

CHINA’S REGIONAL POWER PROJECTION:

PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE MISSIONS

IN THE SOUTH AND EAST CHINA SEAS*

Mark Cozad

EXAMINING FUTURE ROLES AND MISSIONS

China’s decisionmakers and scholars are engaged 

in a wide-ranging discussion regarding future roles 

and missions for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

in light of an evolving national security environment.1

Due to China’s ever expanding role in international 

affairs, this discussion encompasses a much broader 

array of national security themes than in the past and is 

heavily focused on determining critical PLA missions 

beyond Taiwan. While the resolution of the Taiwan 

issue would certainly clear the way for an expanding 

review of the PLA’s missions, China’s national security 

community is actively looking at these missions and 

weighing long-term strategic interests, resources, 

and modernization against a variety of possible crisis 

scenarios. These discussions and subsequent policy 

statements from China’s military leaders highlight the 

challenges confronting a modernizing, economically 

strong, and globally connected China, many of which 

are driving PLA modernization and training to address 

these missions. Much of the current debate is also 

focused on the level of effort and resources that should 

be applied to these new missions, a matter which has 

* This chapter represents the views of the author and does not 

represent the official position of the Department of Defense or the 

Defense Intelligence Agency.
288

yet to be resolved. Protecting access to energy and 

resources, Chinese citizens abroad, economic lifelines, 

and strategic lines of communication are at the center 

of these debates. Geographically, the East and South 

China Seas are two critical areas in the middle of this 

debate. While the discussion has been vigorous, it is far 

from clear how these new issues will impact not only 

PLA military strategic guidelines, but also the building 

and development of future force structure. This chapter 

examines the current debate as discussed by Chinese 

national security scholars and practitioners and does 

not address regional perspectives on the direction that 

China is moving. The author has only identified these 

discussions in the context of a persistent status quo in 

which there is no conflict over Taiwan and no resolution 

of the issue.2

 As a result, this chapter discusses future 

missions in the East and South China Seas.

For the foreseeable future, Taiwan will remain the 

primary, underlying factor driving China’s military 

strategy and modernization. Despite this, China’s 

national security thinkers recognize the plethora of 

issues confronting its emergence as a global power, and, 

as a result, a number of debates have surfaced about how 

best to address these future security challenges.3

 The 

key question is to what extent new missions in the East 

China Sea and South China Sea, independent of their 

respective roles in a Taiwan crisis, will shape China’s 

military modernization over the next several years. 

While many of the capabilities the PLA has developed 

or acquired over the past 15 years can support a variety 

of possible strategies, emerging priorities and missions 

beyond Taiwan will likely have varying impacts on the 

way the PLA allocates resources, trains its force, and 

develops supporting infrastructure and technologies. 
289

ARE THESE MISSIONS BEING DONE TODAY?

In short, yes. The PLA, despite its heavy focus on 

potential Taiwan conflict scenarios, has recognized 

for some time that its military must be shaped to 

respond to an array of regional contingencies, ranging 

from stability on the Korean peninsula to supporting 

territorial claims in the East and South China Seas.4

As a result, the PLA today is trained and equipped for 

missions that could support multiple future scenarios 

and direction coming from PLA senior leaders will 

continue this trend.5 In recent years, the PLA Navy 

(PLAN) and Air Force (PLAAF) have conducted regular 

patrols and presence missions in the East and South 

China Seas, have carried out goodwill visits to countries 

throughout the region, and regularly present a PLAN 

and PLAAF presence in disputed areas. Additionally, 

Beijing is placing significant emphasis on building up 

the infrastructure to support deployments in contested 

regions, most notably in the South China Sea.6

In addition, in recent years the PLA has placed a great 

deal of emphasis on developing its power projection 

and area denial capabilities through the development 

of long-range bombers and cruise missiles, antiship ballistic missiles, and modern destroyers and 

submarines. Along these lines, the PLAN and PLAAF 

have also done a limited, but increasing, amount of 

training focused on developing these power projection 

capabilities including air-to-air refueling, at-sea 

replenishment, and long-range submarine patrols.7

Presently, these key mission areas remain limited in 

terms of training and capability; however, the PLA has 

demonstrated its interest in developing more robust 

capabilities to protect its interests in these critical 

regions. The key issue that to this point has limited the 
290

PLA’s focus on further developing these capabilities has 

been Taiwan.8 While many of the missions described 

here would logically support varying types of Taiwan 

contingencies, Taiwan has focused both PLAAF and 

PLAN development on localized conflict designed 

to support operations against Taiwan and to counter 

and delay third party intervention in a crisis. The PLA 

has not focused on long-range power projection as a 

mission in itself, particularly as it relates to supporting 

territorial claims and the development of great power 

status. The degree to which the PLA has pursued these 

missions in recent years is largely a factor of how it 

has aligned its military for a potential conflict with 

Taiwan. 

THE CENTRALITY OF TAIWAN

AND THE FUTURE OF POWER PROJECTION

The PLA has been heavily focused on developing 

capabilities and plans for Taiwan contingencies over 

the better part of the past 2 decades, following the 

determination that the threat posed by the Soviet 

Union had waned. Since then, the core of officer 

training and force development has centered on 

Taiwan, particularly the development of amphibious 

capabilities to invade, subdue, and secure the island. 

This trend has been especially prevalent since the early 

1990s and the promulgation of the New Generation 

Operational Guidelines and the subsequent series of 

operational studies designed to define the PLA’s most 

critical operating environments. Since then, the PLA 

has placed significant emphasis on developing and 

training its force for this set of missions. Most notably, 

the PLA has worked to develop capabilities specifically 

with an eye toward supporting an amphibious invasion 
291

of Taiwan. These capabilities include a joint logistics 

system, improved command and control for multiservice operations, naval capabilities to challenge and 

delay the U.S. Navy in key areas, and the development 

of airpower and precision strike capability for localized 

conflict.9

 While many of the PLA’s capabilities can be 

refocused to address other potential contingencies, 

their overall capabilities and sustainability for many 

scenarios remain limited and scoped against specific 

capability sets vice medium to large-scale conflict with 

a modern adversary in a number of domains. 

Another critical factor shaping the PLA of today is 

the organizational culture and historical roots of the 

military. The PLA remains a military dominated by 

the army, despite recent promotions of the navy, air 

force, and second artillery corps commanders to the 

Central Military Commission (CMC). As such, the PLA 

has traditionally lacked expertise and experience in 

maritime and air operations, both of which are central 

to any future conflict with Taiwan, especially with 

the involvement of the United States. The PLA is now 

beginning to examine new operational capabilities 

that increasingly fall outside of the traditional ground 

force mindset. Along with this broader focus, there 

have been a number of new ideas about the future 

roles and missions of the PLAN and PLAAF and 

their respective strategic roles.10 As these discussions 

evolve, new missions in the East and South China Sea 

will ultimately be addressed.

A central issue over the next decade will be whether 

or not the PLAN and PLAAF will begin to develop 

sustainable, broadly-scoped capabilities that will 

allow them to challenge the major regional powers, 

particularly to support territorial claims and operations 

outside of their limited critical role in a Taiwan 
292

conflict. For this to occur, senior civilian and military 

leaders will have to address the issues of developing a 

force structure, providing resources, and training the 

military to think of employing these capabilities in a 

more expansive set of operational scenarios.11 At this 

point, it is unclear what direction this decision will 

take; however, some current developments provide a 

snapshot into the future development of the force.

Force Structure.

The PLA has yet to abandon its efforts to develop 

an amphibious capability that will allow it to forcefully 

unify Taiwan.12 While the major focus of PLA modernization in recent years has been on naval, air, and missile 

systems, PLA attempts to modernize its amphibious 

force are gaining steam with the deployment of new 

amphibious systems. In addition, the PLAN is now 

fielding large numbers of Houbei guided missile patrol 

boats, while construction on modern destroyers and 

diesel submarines has apparently slowed.13 The PLAAF 

has fielded an array of modern fighters and surface-toair missiles; however, it has not developed its aerial 

refueling or heavy lift capabilities sufficient to enable 

sustained operations over much of the region.14 While 

these investment choices could change in coming years 

to emphasize capabilities that would enable power 

projection and sustainment in the South and East China 

Seas, the PLA to date has only on a limited basis built 

its force for these missions. 

Resources (Budget and Infrastructure).

While there is a great deal we do not know about 

China’s defense spending, there has been an increase 
293

in the amount of expenditure in recent years dedicated 

to infrastructure development, particularly logistics 

facilities, transportation routes, and naval bases.15 In 

addition, the PLA has invested a significant amount of 

money in modernizing its forces. In the next several 

years, the PLA will have to continue these investments, 

particularly the infrastructure buildup in the South 

China Sea in order to improve its power projection 

capabilities.

Training.

PLA training over the past 15 years has been heavily 

focused on amphibious operations with both the PLAN 

and the PLAAF focused on their respective missions 

to support Taiwan contingencies. As a result, over 

the past 4 years the PLA has demonstrated a number 

of improvements in the complexity and quality of 

training, the same central theme of Taiwan persists, 

with emphasis being placed on improved command 

and control, joint operations, and electronic warfare. 

To date training has not included key areas such as 

long-range mobility training, rapid deployment, and 

long duration sustainability training. 

DRIVERS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF POWER 

PROJECTION CAPABILITIES

As the preceding sections describe, the PLA of today 

is still focusing on Taiwan, which continues to drive its 

modernization and force structure. There are a number 

of other factors, however, that could significantly change 

the PLA’s focus over the next decade. This section will 

examine several key missions critical to China’s strategic 

ambitions; organizational and bureaucratic drivers 
294

that will have a major impact on future decisions; and 

perceived threats, competitors, and partners that will 

shape China’s strategic decisionmaking about future 

military strategy and investments. Although the PLA 

today continues to pursue many of the capabilities and 

objectives that have shaped it over the past 2 decades, 

there is a growing debate within China about the future 

role of the military and how it will support China’s 

aspirations to achieve great power status.

Drivers for Future Missions.

Over the past 4 years, and particularly since the 

release of the 2006 National Defense White Paper, there 

have been a number of discussions within the People’s 

Republic of China (PRC) about future security 

requirements and the role the PLA would play in 

supporting these strategic objectives.16 Other events, 

such as the tsunami in Southeast Asia, the earthquake in 

Sichuan, riots in Tibet, and threats to Chinese workers 

and business people overseas, have all highlighted the 

need for senior PRC policymakers to broaden their 

perspective on national security.17 These discussions 

and events have sparked considerable debate within 

Chinese think tanks and the military about the future 

roles and missions of the PLA. In some respects, these 

discussions have fallen along the lines of service 

interests, particularly as discussed by the PLA, PLAN, 

and PLAAF. Interestingly, many other parts of the 

discussion have been framed as traditional versus 

nontraditional missions. In this discussion, there is 

recognition that the PLA’s critical missions must evolve 

to support a more globally-connected China and move 

beyond strictly land-oriented concerns to ensure the 

physical safety of the party and maintenance of internal 
295

stability. Although some publications have been 

explicit about what the potential future missions are, 

many are implied based on PRC discussion of its most 

critical interests, its vulnerabilities, and its perceptions 

of areas where employing the military will have the 

most utility.

One of the most recent discussions has centered on 

protecting sea lines of communication (SLOCs) critical 

to ensuring China’s commerce and energy supplies.18

The most notable part of this discussion has centered 

on the Malacca Strait and the potential vulnerability 

of the large portion of China’s imported energy that 

makes its way through the Strait.19 However, at this 

time, there has been no clear discussion regarding the 

specifics of the threat to include who presents the most 

real threat to this vital SLOC. With SLOC protection as 

a driver for future missions, the PLA will undoubtedly 

need to conduct detailed studies of the threat, the 

environment, and force requirements and ultimately 

evaluate these studies as part of a broader discussion 

of PRC military strategy. Subsequently, these studies 

would drive modernization efforts and basing in such 

a way that would enable the PLA to protect this vital 

interest. To date, this discussion has not taken place.

Along with SLOC protection, another key driver 

that could force the PLA to more readily address the 

missions of the South and East China Seas include 

protection of resources, to include off-shore oil and gas 

fields, important commercial interests, and free flow 

of strategic materials to China.20 In many cases, this 

driver is centered on maintaining and reemphasizing 

China’s territorial claims in both regions and also the 

recognition of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). To 

date, these discussions have surfaced in official PRC 

or PLA press on a very limited basis, most likely due 
296

to concerns of exacerbating already tense situations 

in both areas. While there have been a number of 

recent incidents that have increased concern among 

those in the region, Beijing has largely tried to work 

cooperatively with other claimants to avoid direct 

conflict and to demonstrate its good will. Military 

patrols have increased in both areas, but not in a way 

that implies permanent presence or an aggressive 

effort to physically secure these regions. In the coming 

years, as China’s energy requirements continue to 

increase and China’s military becomes more capable 

and confident, Beijing may decide to become more 

assertive in settling territorial claims, particularly those 

that could shore up China’s energy needs. At this time, 

however, it appears that Beijing remains focused on 

maintaining good relations with the United States and 

others in the region to promote continued stability and 

growth. 

Another key aspect that may draw China to pursue 

extended missions beyond Taiwan is an increase in its 

military-to-military diplomacy efforts in a way that 

will demonstrate China’s new military capabilities. 

Over the past decade, there has been a steady increase 

in China’s military diplomacy in the region, largely 

aimed at countries in South and Southeast Asia.21 Key 

events have included short combined exercises with 

foreign navies, port visits, two high profile exercises 

with Russia, and numerous visits by senior leaders of 

the PLA. In the coming years, these events will almost 

certainly continue and are likely to become a key 

component of China’s power projection in both the East 

and South China Seas. In short, these types of activities 

allow Beijing to develop relationships with others in 

the region, maintain an increasingly robust presence 

in strategically important areas, and demonstrate to 
297

those in the region that China’s military has become 

one of the major powers capable of projecting force 

anywhere in the region. The prime benefit of pursuing 

this path is that China can demonstrate its military 

capabilities to the entire region in a manner that 

is not overtly threatening. While this driver could 

present an attractive avenue for Beijing to pursue, PLA 

engagement remains limited, despite the increases in 

recent years. In addition, it is uncertain how this focus 

will develop if the PLA is intent on pursuing largescale amphibious capabilities. In many respects, these 

missions are not mutually exclusive; however, as PLA 

senior leadership more aggressively trains for Taiwanrelated missions, it may limit the availability of PLAN 

assets for wider engagement in the region.

The last key driver that could push the PLA to 

address missions beyond Taiwan is the protection of 

Chinese interests abroad, particularly as China’s global 

footprint increases.22 Over the past 2 years, piracy in 

the Gulf of Aden and attacks on Chinese citizens in 

the Horn of Africa and Sudan have raised the question 

among Chinese security specialists about the need to 

more thoroughly address protecting citizens and assets 

engaged in business overseas.23 With respect to the 

immediate region, the most likely requirement could 

come in Southeast Asia. While Chinese populations 

have been present in Southeast Asia for hundreds of 

years, they have not been Chinese citizens and have 

not had a major impact on Beijing’s national security 

decisionmaking. As Chinese business interests expand, 

however, Chinese citizens could become more lucrative 

targets for kidnappers, terrorists, and organized crime. 

To date, there has only been a limited discussion about 

how to address these problems, largely spurred by 

developments in Africa. This may change in the future 
298

as increasing numbers of Chinese citizens go abroad 

and look to their government for protection. At this 

point, there is no clear indication of how the current 

PLAN deployment to the Gulf of Aden will impact 

future naval strategy and force structure. 

Organizational and Bureaucratic Considerations 

for Future Missions.

Another key factor that will dictate the extent to 

which Beijing pursues future missions in the East and 

South China Seas is the set of organizational perspectives driving China’s national security decisionmakers, 

both military and nonmilitary. As mentioned earlier in 

this chapter, a number of factors over the past decade 

have forced China’s leaders to more broadly examine 

key issues of national security.24 While the discussion 

of new national security challenges continues to evolve, 

there are a number of bureaucratic perspectives that 

will continue to shape the future missions and structure 

of the PLA. 

The 2006 Defense White Paper highlighted several 

key issues that could drive the PLA to develop its 

capabilities and to train for a more robust presence 

in the East and South China Seas, particularly the 

South China Sea. Protecting SLOCs and future energy 

resources was a critical point highlighted in the White 

Paper and in multiple other books and studies on 

China’s national security. To date, the PLAN and 

PLAAF have already ensured that China’s presence 

in these areas is made visible to those in the region; 

however, it has attempted to refrain from posturing its 

force in such a manner that it might be provocative to 

other claimants. In addition, while PLA strategists have 

highlighted the need to ensure the security of China’s 
299

energy and economic resources moving through vital 

SLOCs, there has been little if any discussion about the 

specific nature of the threat and the military solution 

required to meet this undefined threat. In the midst of 

continuing concerns and strategic focus on Taiwan, it 

remains to be seen how much emphasis the PLA will 

place on these new missions, given a poorly defined 

threat and the unknown consequences of the global 

financial crisis on PLA spending. As a result, Chinese 

strategists have looked at other means by which they 

can secure strategic interests to include building 

diplomatic and economic relationships, military 

diplomacy, and alternative supply chains for strategic 

resources.25

In his speech to the 17th Party Congress, Chinese 

President Hu Jintao did mention building China’s 

national defense capabilities in such a manner that 

they could contribute to an expansive list of evolving 

security threats, however, he also made a point of 

explicitly highlighting the need to pursue nonmilitary 

means to address critical security concerns such as 

energy security.26 A recurring theme from China’s 

political and military leadership has been to rely on 

nonmilitary solutions for many problems because of 

China’s relative weakness and limited resources for 

the comprehensive military modernization required 

to fully address China’s strategic needs across the 

region, and ultimately, the globe.27 Chinese leaders 

have continually highlighted that while spending on 

the PLA has increased at double digit rates over the 

past decade, much of these increases have had to pay 

for personnel costs and infrastructure development. 

Additionally, in terms of specific modernization 

efforts, the majority of China’s modernization dollars 

over the past 2 decades have gone to two key areas, 
300

developing capabilities for a potential conflict with 

Taiwan and defending mainland China.28 Recognizing 

the state of China’s military following Operation 

DESERT STORM, the PLA kept its long-term focus 

on ensuring that capabilities in these two areas kept 

pace with military modernization trends worldwide. 

While many PLA capabilities could be employed in a 

range of contingencies and are not strictly centered on 

Taiwan, power projection and sustainment in the East 

and South China Seas is not one of these. 

In large part, these priorities are unlikely to 

change in the next decade unless Beijing believes that 

sufficient resources have been devoted to ensuring an 

overwhelming capability to take Taiwan and defend 

the mainland. Most importantly, it is unclear how 

resource constraints, or a lack of constraints, will 

influence the development of the PLAN and PLAAF, 

particularly in terms of specialized capabilities critical 

to missions in both areas, but not seen by the PLA as 

critical to success in a Taiwan contingency. While the 

PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery Corps were the 

main beneficiaries of the PLA’s increased funding in 

recent years, the systems and capabilities introduced 

into their inventories were supportive of PLA planning 

for Taiwan scenarios, not for power projection.29

Better understanding of spending and budgeting are 

critical shortfalls in our ability to predict the future 

development of the PLA for expanded missions in the 

East and South China Seas.

Along with overall threat perceptions and 

prioritization of specific planning scenarios, within 

the PLA the ground force component has dominated 

strategic thinking since its inception.30 The development 

of a modern PLAAF and PLAN are still relatively new 

features of this evolving military, and many of the 
301

strategic concepts remain aspirational, particularly 

from the standpoint of force structure, technology, 

and training. At this point, it is unclear how much 

influence the PLAAF and PLAN will have in coming 

years, particularly in relation to the PLA ground 

component. Recent discussions by thinkers from both 

services highlight future security threats along with 

roles and missions; however, it is unclear how much 

influence these views hold in the broader strategic 

thinking among CMC members and China’s political 

leadership.31 Over the next decade, this could lead 

China’s political leaders to dictate changes in military 

strategy to deal with an expanding set of future security 

challenges facing the PRC. At present, it does not 

appear that any major decisions have been made. As 

a result, many of these new missions will not gain the 

traction required to develop more robust capabilities 

to perform them for several years.

PERCEIVED THREATS AND COMPETITORS

China’s threat perceptions and the development 

of military capabilities throughout the region are the 

most likely catalyst that will force Beijing to rethink its 

current mission capacity in the East and South China 

Seas. In addition to new thinking about the PLA’s 

strategic role as an organization, China’s expanding 

role in the world has led to a robust discussion among 

many circles of China’s national security community 

about China’s future geostrategic goals and the 

key security threats they will face over the coming 

generations.32 While the majority of those writing on 

these issues agree in principle on many of the key 

themes shaping China’s future security, they differ on 

the extent (or in some cases existence) of threats, the 
302

methods for dealing with these threats, and ultimately 

the military resources required to plan for these threats 

over the long term.33

Several of these recurring themes center on the need 

to protect energy resources, territorial claims, maritime 

rights, and key SLOCs. Both the East and South China 

Seas figure prominently in these discussions on a number 

of levels. Correspondingly, each of these key issues has 

led to general discussions about key competitors who 

are or potentially could challenge China’s interests or 

claims. The main competitor, as these arguments are 

framed, is the United States, particularly as it relates 

to future coercion in times of crisis and U.S. relations 

with other claimants or competitors.34

A key theme through these discussions emphasizes 

the need to develop capabilities commensurate 

with the problems and tasks at hand. A particular 

overarching point raised by some authors is that any 

future capability developments need to be viewed in a 

limited regional capacity, with the understanding that 

direct competition with the United States, particularly 

in the maritime domain, could place a significant 

resource burden on the PRC with limited payoff and 

effect.35 A critical point on this outlook, however, is 

that this was not viewed as a continual state, rather 

it was seen as a current reality over the next one or 

two generations. Conversely, many PRC strategists 

also have questioned China’s traditional strategic 

orientation inland with the view that great powers 

required maritime strategies and capabilities that 

would allow them to protect their long term interests. 

At present, Chinese security specialists are examining 

the arenas where they will need to develop critical 

capabilities. In most respects, these capabilities are 

specifically focused on and address U.S. strengths.36
303

Other regional players regularly mentioned include 

Japan as a key competitor for energy resources in the 

East China Sea and several Southeast Asian countries 

with competing claims in the South China Sea. While 

many of the PRC writers recognize that a competition 

exists, few have talked about these competitions in 

recent years primarily through a military lens. There 

appears to be a widespread belief, at least for now, 

that most of the immediate issues surrounding energy 

and territorial claims within the East and South China 

Seas are matters better dealt with through diplomatic 

and political means.37 While this understanding does 

exist, these same thinkers recognize the importance 

of having a credible military capability and regular 

presence throughout the region. 

While traditional security threats figure prominently 

in these discussions of future roles and missions for the 

PLA, there is also a marked increase in the frequency 

and detail of discussions about nontraditional security 

roles for the PLA.38 Although the PLA has been involved 

in disaster relief and peacekeeping operations for some 

time now, policymakers in Beijing are beginning to 

highlight the importance of these missions to China’s 

overall foreign policy objectives.39 While missions such 

as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief do not factor 

prominently in force structure development and the 

development of future missions in the East China Sea, 

events in the South China Sea following the tsunami of 

2004 have highlighted the importance of military roles 

for these types of missions. Based on current planning 

and developments, it appears that China’s civilian 

and military forces are committed to supporting the 

development of these capabilities and increasing their 

participation as a means of bolstering China’s foreign 

policy objectives in the region.40
304

As discussed earlier, military diplomacy is also 

playing an increasingly important role in how China 

defines roles and missions within the region. PLA 

interaction with regional militaries has increased 

steadily over the past decade and is now seen as a 

critical part of China’s strategic approach to gaining 

influence in the region.41 Combined exercises with 

regional partners, visits by high-ranking PLA officers, 

and educational exchanges are seen as a central part 

of the PLA’s mission. In particular, military diplomacy 

is seen as a critical tool in dealing with regional 

tensions. 

THE INFLUENCE OF FUTURE SECURITY 

DEVELOPMENTS ON THE PLA

There are a number of factors that could force the 

PLA to fundamentally alter its Taiwan-centric focus 

and posture. Many of these discussions are underway 

now. To determine the potential scope of these changes, 

it is important to examine the factors that would foster 

change and then examine the factors that could prevent 

it. Many of these cleavages are apparent today.

Factors Driving Change.

Several factors could eventually drive China’s 

leaders to reorient the PLA in a manner that would 

better address the range of future security challenges 

that China is now facing. While many of these factors 

are apparent to some extent, any major changes would 

take time to fully implement. The debates about how 

to deal with them are well on their way, however.

The first and most obvious factor that would reorient 

the PLA’s focus would be the resolution of the Taiwan 
305

issue. While the manner in which this issue may be 

resolved is beyond the scope of this chapter, removing 

this issue as a key political driver and the primary 

planning scenario for the PLA would undoubtedly 

drive the PLA to reconsider its posture and focus in the 

region. It would also likely have a major impact on the 

organizational approach the PLA has taken to strategic 

planning for at least the past 20 years. Of particular 

importance, resolution of the Taiwan issue may lead 

China’s leaders to move on to the last remaining 

territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. 

While there has been little, if any, discussion on this to 

date, the prominent role that territorial integrity and 

sovereignty play in China’s grand strategy are clear. 

This would also be compounded by the potential to 

develop and exploit the energy resources held by these 

claims.42

The second issue, short of resolution, would be 

a fundamental leadership reevaluation of PRC’s 

Taiwan strategy and supporting policies.43 As ChinaTaiwan relations continue to improve following the 

2008 Taiwan legislative and presidential elections, 

China’s leaders are likely to address what policies 

worked and which did not in dealing with cross-Strait 

relations in the run up to the election. In future years, 

Chinese strategists and policymakers may determine 

that PLA capabilities have reached a point where they 

can effectively coerce and deter Taiwan and present a 

credible deterrent to the United States. At that point, 

an analysis of the future cost of developing the PLA 

for large-scale amphibious operations versus the 

payoff for providing a more regionally, and potentially 

globally, projected PLA may lead China’s leaders to 

alter the relative priority Taiwan has held over the past 

2 decades. China’s leaders eventually may conclude 
306

that the PLA’s capabilities are sufficient when viewed 

in concert with the diplomatic, economic, political, 

and informational components of Beijing’s Taiwan 

strategy. 

A third alternative, most likely tied to a reevaluation 

of Taiwan policy, would be a reexamination of China’s 

strategic priorities that drive military strategy and 

planning.44 Over the past decade, a number of security 

challenges already highlighted here have surfaced. 

In light of China’s goals to become a major regional 

and global power, the PLA may be forced to reorient 

its strategy in such a way as to support these broader 

national objectives. Many of the discussions of these 

issues have yet to highlight a concrete threat for which 

to plan, but recognize that a variety of factors could 

require different capability sets. 

Lastly, a major bureaucratic shift in which the 

PLAAF, PLAN, and Second Artillery were given more 

prominent roles in the CMC and upper levels of military 

leadership may drive PLA roles and missions in new 

directions. A major component of the ongoing debates 

about future security issues is centered on whether 

the PLA is a land power, maritime power, or both.45 In 

addition, these debates have also focused on the types 

of capabilities required for these missions, particularly 

maritime, air, and space capabilities. 

Factors Inhibiting Change.

While there are a number of factors that could drive 

change, there are also a number of factors that may 

work against any sort of change in strategic focus for 

the PLA. In many cases, these factors would keep the 

PLA focused on its current missions and, without the 

resolution of the Taiwan issue, predominantly focused 

on Taiwan scenarios. 
307

Bureaucratic entrenchment and the continued 

prominence of the army is the most likely factor 

that will prevent major changes. In terms of current 

missions, Taiwan is a central point around which the 

army organizes and trains and maintains influence 

over the development of the other components of the 

PLA. While service commanders have been included 

on the CMC in recent years, the key military leadership 

roles are filled by army generals. While there are 

scenarios and compelling reasons for developing the 

PLA in other directions, the strategic orientation of the 

military has been that of a land power and over the past 

2 decades the main organizing issue has been Taiwan.46

Without a major shift in the military bureaucracy and a 

reorientation of PLA organizational culture, any major 

changes in mission focus will likely slow down or cease 

altogether.

Resource tradeoffs and constraints are another 

issue that could slow the sourcing and development 

of other mission capabilities. Again, the mission focus 

on Taiwan is a central component of the resource 

discussion. As China’s leaders are confronted with 

competing issues requiring government budgets and 

focus, the PLA competes for a share of those resources. 

In recent years, military spending has increased 

dramatically and enabled the PLA to buy or develop a 

broad array of sophisticated, modern weapons.47 Two 

factors have made this possible. The first is the backward 

state of the PLA through most of the 1990s. This 

backwardness allowed the PLA to focus on purchasing 

new weapons across the board and served as a very 

open reminder of the extent of these modernization 

efforts. The second issue is the primary focus on 

missions supporting the broader Taiwan scenario. All 

of the services purchased capabilities that were part of 
308

a broader operation, and, while not all were specifically 

tailored to a Taiwan contingency, those capabilities 

that were clearly beyond Taiwan were pursued on a 

limited basis. In the next several years, the PLA will 

be confronted with new requirements and taskings 

that could demonstrate or create resource constraints 

on the PLA.48 While modernization has progressed 

rapidly, the PLA’s push to develop a professional 

force will undoubtedly place increased constraints on 

all services. Additionally, most of the modernization 

resources in recent years went to fund purchases for 

the PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery Corps. With 

the continued emphasis on Taiwan contingencies, the 

next several years will require significant spending 

on amphibious and ground force capabilities. It is 

unclear how these will all be funded. Finally, with the 

discussion of future missions, the services are now in 

competition to fund their critical requirements, all of 

which are not focused on Taiwan, and many of which 

are expensive to develop and maintain. For any major 

shift in the roles and missions of the PLA, there will 

need to be a conscious effort to address the resource 

aspects of organizing, training, and equipping the PLA 

to perform those missions. 

Another key issue that could hinder a major shift 

in focus toward the East and South China Seas is using 

other approaches, beyond the development of military 

capabilities, to address core security concerns.49 In many 

discussions about the need to develop capabilities to 

protect SLOCs, energy, and territorial claims, many 

authors mention the military component as supporting 

the overall strategy, but much less prominently 

than other diplomatic, economic, and cooperative 

approaches.50 There is also a general effort to further 

understand the exact nature of the threat.51 Currently, 
309

there is recognition that diplomatic efforts are the key 

to dealing with these territorial disputes in the region. 

Beijing has made great effort to engage actively with 

Japan and, outside of a few cases, has not been overly 

aggressive in pushing its claims in the East China Sea. 

In the South China Sea, many see engagement with the 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as 

well as with the individual claimants as critical to any 

future solution to these territorial disputes. 

For any future change to come about based on a 

redefinition of the key threats facing Chinese interests 

in the region, there must be a concrete understanding 

of what the threat is, where it resides, and what 

role the military can play in solving or alleviating 

the threat.52 In the case of energy security and the 

protection of SLOCs, there is a wide recognition that 

potential threats exist, but there is also an assertion in 

some circles that these threats may not be as significant 

as frequently portrayed.53 For any future strategy to 

take hold, especially if it has to compete with a wellentrenched, nationally vital priority like Taiwan, the 

threat will have to be defined in a manner that forces 

all senior military leaders to recognize the importance 

of shifting resources to deal with it. With the recent 

trend in Taiwan relations, coupled with a growing 

recognition of the need to develop capabilities to 

combat nontraditional threats, the groundwork for a 

future shift is already in place. 

PLA REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPANDED MISSIONS 

IN THE SOUTH AND EAST CHINA SEAS

The PLA has yet to decide or be directed to shift 

its strategic focus to expanded missions. Based on 

the factors outlined earlier in this chapter, if the PLA 
310

were to expand its roles and missions in these two 

strategically important areas, there would have to 

be a number of actions taken in terms of strategic 

and operational objectives, force modernization, and 

deployment patterns. In addition, current missions, 

such as access denial and sea control, which are now 

largely shaped by Taiwan scenarios, would have to 

evolve to accommodate a different set of realities and 

objectives. 

The first key shift that would have to take place 

would be for some overarching decision that an 

improved military posture would improve China’s 

strategic interests and claims in the East and South 

China Seas. In particular, some type of guideline would 

likely be promulgated outlining China’s broad intent, 

a specific threat for which to plan, and then in-depth 

research and analysis to determine the best operational 

solutions for particular problems.54

In the East China Sea, new strategic guidance 

could address perceptions about increasing Japanese 

capabilities, Japanese operations expanding beyond 

traditional self-defense roles, a perceived threat or 

need for the energy resources in the region, and 

finally a perception that diplomatic efforts are not 

sufficient to address PRC claims in the region. Many 

of these same issues would also surface for a shift in 

guidance in the South China Sea, but would focus on 

regional competitors. In addition, other key shifts in 

the South China Sea could come about due to PRC 

insecurity about energy supplies, key SLOCs necessary 

to support strategic materials and commerce, and, 

finally, piracy. Any combination of these factors could 

push senior Chinese political and military leaders to 

have to address military readiness to combat these 

problems. In addition, clearly defining the threats will 
311

be a critical part of determining how military forces 

can best support future operations. 

As a corollary to defining the threats that will 

drive future missions, PLA leaders will also likely 

outline other military missions that will be critical to 

supporting China’s regional objectives. These factors 

will figure most prominently in the South China Sea 

and will potentially place the PLA in the same areas as 

U.S. military engagement efforts. Military diplomacy, 

disaster relief, and humanitarian/peacekeeping 

support will all continue to be major themes PLA 

seniors will emphasize in the coming years.55

Once the specific threats and operating environments 

are defined, PLA researchers would most likely perform 

large amounts of research to examine new operational 

roles for the specific services; new equipment and 

weapons requirements; and new requirements for 

infrastructure, logistics, and sustainment efforts.56

This type of research has been underway for Taiwan 

scenarios for several years and continues today. While 

discussions of new roles and missions have evolved 

for the East and South China Seas, there has been little 

concrete research of these scenarios outside of the role 

they would play in a Taiwan contingency.57

FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR VARIOUS 

MISSIONS

While the PLA today has a regular presence in 

both the East and South China Seas, for sustained 

operations in these areas future missions will dictate 

new modernization requirements. Although the PLA 

has pursued many of these systems and capabilities in 

the past, they have yet to attain the capabilities. 
312

Access Denial.

Due to the emphasis the PLA has placed on 

countering key U.S. capabilities, many of the access 

denial capabilities required by the PLAN and PLAAF 

are either fielded, in late stages of testing, or being 

developed today. The focus of this mission area is largely 

the same in both Taiwan and non-Taiwan scenarios: 

keeping third parties out as long as possible in order 

to accomplish China’s objectives.58 Key capabilities in 

this arena include anti-ship ballistic missiles, advanced 

naval air defense systems, long-range cruise missiles, 

and medium-range ballistic missiles. While this listing 

of capabilities is by no means exhaustive, it does 

highlight the growing capability of the PLA to target 

both U.S. ships and bases throughout the region. While 

this capability is expanding, by its nature it is only 

designed for a short-term effect. It does not give the 

PLA a sustained, power projection capability critical to 

address many of the problems they may face outside of 

a Taiwan scenario.

SLOC Protection.

Many Chinese writers recognize the potential 

vulnerability of China’s SLOCs and fear that in future 

crises, the United States has the potential to use its 

maritime power to coerce China by cutting off the 

flow of energy, trade, or strategic resources.59 As the 

piracy issue in the Gulf of Aden led to the PLAN’s 

first anti-piracy deployment, it is unclear how this will 

impact future military development, particularly as 

regional security efforts in Southeast Asia to combat 

piracy are under way and appear to have a positive 

effect cutting the number of annual cases of piracy.60
313

Currently, the PLA has only a limited capability to 

perform this mission on a large-scale on a sustained 

basis. Due to the limited number of modern ships, 

at-sea replenishment capabilities, and corresponding 

infrastructure, if confronted with a viable threat to 

its SLOCs, the PRC is faced with a significant threat. 

To build this capability, the PLAN would require 

more modern destroyers equipped with advanced air 

defense capabilities, nuclear submarines for increased 

time at sea, replenishment ships and oilers, and 

bases in the region with the capacity to support this 

force and its logistic requirements.61 The PLAAF and 

PLAN Air Force (PLANAF) would require a much 

improved aerial refueling capability. Developing the 

capabilities to expand its capability to protect SLOCS 

will be a major investment that could divert resources 

from other priorities. Using the U.S. Navy as the main 

threat will require significant buildup in the PLAN atsea capability due to the limited utility of and short 

duration effects achieved by the PLA’s current access 

denial capability. In addition, in most scenarios, this 

mission will arise out of a broader crisis involving 

other parts of the PLA. At current force levels, the PLA 

would be hard pressed to counter these threats.

Presence and Support to Territorial Claims.

Many of the resource requirements needed to build 

SLOC protection capabilities will be required to develop 

this capability. The main difference is the primary threat. 

In the East China Sea, sustaining presence to enforce or 

demonstrate territorial claims will force the PLAN and 

PLAAF to confront the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense 

Force (JMSDF) and the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force 

(JASDF). While Japan’s military is very capable, the 
314

amount of resources needed by the PLA to adequately 

sustain this presence and deal with crisis situations is 

much less than countering a sustained effort to prevent 

the United States from interdicting PRC SLOCs. In the 

South China Sea, there is no competitor for the Chinese 

navy among the regional players. Additional resources 

would not be required to support sustained PLAN and 

PLAAF presence around PRC territorial claims. 

Crisis Support and Disaster Relief.

This mission area will require vastly fewer resources, 

but will require some investment over time. The PLA 

is already doing this, suggesting that lessons learned 

from the U.S. response to the 2004 tsunami have taken 

hold and senior military leaders see much utility in 

developing these types of capabilities to further China’s 

interests in the region. In particular, completion of an 

amphibious transport dock (LPD) and new hospital 

ship indicate the PLA intends to take this mission 

seriously in the coming years. At this time, there is 

not a great deal of information that would indicate the 

extent to which this mission area will be resourced.

Military Diplomacy.

 Military engagement will remain a relatively low 

cost mission area for the PLA that will allow it to use 

the limited resources it has to great effect in the region. 

In recent years, there have been a large number of 

military diplomacy efforts, which have increased from 

year to year. To continue to support this mission area 

will require no additional resources.62

The last consideration, which does not fall into a 

particular mission area, is the extent to which the PRC 
315

desires to counter U.S. presence in the region. While the 

PLA has greatly enhanced its capability in recent years 

to counter key U.S. strengths, many of these advances 

are for relatively short-term effects and do not directly 

counter the United States for sustained periods of 

time.63 Many Chinese security experts believe that this 

type of competition is not sustainable at the present 

time and that PLA development should be focused 

on addressing the most critical maritime threats in 

a scoped, disciplined fashion by developing a navy 

that has some capability to project power across the 

region while defending the mainland. Undoubtedly, 

this formulation will change in coming years as China 

continues to build its power and modernize.

WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS

China’s future modernization choices should 

not be cast as “either-or” decisions. Future roles 

and missions and the corresponding equipment 

and capabilities to satisfy will eventually come. As 

China has demonstrated over the past 2 decades, it 

has the capability to develop military capabilities 

rapidly. The case for future missions beyond Taiwan 

is more influenced by the timing of these decisions 

and the resources available to pursue this vast array 

of capabilities. In the coming decades, Beijing will be 

confronted with a host of budgetary constraints that 

may impact the PLA’s ability to develop all of the 

capabilities it wants to pursue in the short term. The 

PLA recognizes this tradeoff, however, and has set its 

sights on a long-term modernization program that will 

continue over the next several decades. There should 

be little question that the PLA will ultimately meet 

these modernization objectives, the question is when it 

will do so.
316

The current debates underway in China’s national 

security community are not a question of which path 

the PLA will pursue. This has already been dictated 

by China’s growing role in the global economy, its 

strategic resource requirements, and its desire to be 

a great power. The current debates have definitely 

framed the future of the PLA and its presence in the 

East and South China Seas will undoubtedly grow. 

The key issue remains at what point these missions 

and capabilities will be developed and fielded. As a 

result of the various factors highlighted in this chapter, 

to include the organizational perspectives in the PLA 

and available resources and future threat assessments, 

most of the PLA’s future missions in the East and South 

China Sea will continue to be supportive of Taiwan 

crisis scenarios. They will center on countering third 

party intervention by focusing modernization on an 

adversary’s key vulnerabilities and limited duration 

effects. Over the next decade, these missions are likely 

to evolve, however, as the PLA fields the capabilities 

it feels are necessary for Taiwan contingencies. At that 

point, a wider scope of PLA modernization will truly 

begin to develop, enabling China to have military 

capabilities to address its various security concerns, 

while maintaining its focus on the core missions that 

have been central to Chinese military planning over 

the past two decades.

As China continues to grapple with the future 

security threats that will ultimately dictate the PLA’s 

strategy and structure, its choices will present numerous 

policy considerations. Most notably, China’s decisions 

will be based on the factors outlined in this chapter, 

many of which, are outside of U.S. control. This will 

make it extremely difficult, at best, to influence China’s 

decisions on military strategy and modernization. 
317

It will be critical for U.S. policymakers to determine 

what type of Chinese military they would most like to 

see and equally important for them to understand the 

PLA they will most likely encounter. While this chapter 

outlines many near term considerations, and in many 

cases constraints, driving which roles and missions 

China pursues in the East and South China Seas, 

over time, new technologies; years of comprehensive, 

focused modernization efforts; and resources will 

allow the PLA to broaden its scope and widen its range 

of choices and capabilities.

CHAPTER 9 - ENDNOTES

1. For an expanded discussion on China’s national military 

strategy, see David M. Finkelstein, “China’s National Military 

Strategy: An Overview of the ‘Military Strategic Guidelines,’” 

in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, eds., Right-sizing the 

People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military,

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

September 2007, pp. 109-115. Other articles in that volume also 

provide an expanded discussion of PLA modernization and force 

structure. For additional work on the impact that energy will have 

on China’s future military strategy and force structure, see Gabriel 

B. Collins, Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William 

S. Murray, eds., China’s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing’s 

Maritime Policies, Annapolis, MD:, Naval Institute Press, 2008.

2. Reference Chapter 1, Figure 1, “How China Manages 

Taiwan.” Based on available sources, this chapter examines the 

issue of future roles and missions through the prism of quadrant 

A of this reference graphic.

3. The major missions and drivers outlining the international 

security environment can be found in the following sources:: 

China’s National Defense in 2006, Beijing, China: Information Office 

of the State Council, December 29, 2006; Liu Yuejin, ed., The Science 

of National Security, Beijing, China: Academy of Military Science 

Press, 2001. More detailed discussions of the specific security and 
318

force structure implications of these missions will be provided 

later in the chapter.

4. Wang Houqing, Zhang Xingye, The Science of Campaigns, 

Beijing, China: National Defense University (NDU) Press, 2000. 

Key discussions are provided on multiple campaigns that are not 

uniquely structured for supporting Taiwan contingencies such as 

blockade campaigns, border counterattack campaigns, and the 

small-scale campaigns outlined under the chapter on Joint Island 

Landing Campaigns.

5. Cao Zhi, “CMC’s Guo Boxiong Urges Improving PLA 

Capabilities to ‘Fulfill Historic Missions’,” Beijing, Xinhua, 

September 27, 2005, in CPP20050927320021; and Zhang Qingsheng, 

“China’s Military Diplomacy,” Beijing Xuexi Shibao, May 14, 2007, 

in OSC CPP20070517332001. 

6. Richard Fisher, Jr., “Secret Sanya—China’s New Nuclear 

Naval Base Revealed,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 15, 2008.

7. Trefor Moss, “Power to the People: China’s Military 

Modernisation, Part One,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 21, 2008; and 

Bernard D. Cole, “Beijing’s Strategy of Sea Denial,” in Jamestown 

Foundation China Brief, Vol. 6, Issue 23, November 22, 2006. 

8. Cole, “Beijing’s Strategy of Sea Denial”; Jeff Cheng, “China’s 

Military Expansion Against Taiwan in the Next 8 Years,” in Kanwa 

News, June 20, 2008.

9. Nan Li, Eric McVadon, and Qinhong Wang, “China’s 

Evolving Military Doctrine,” Issues and Insights, Pacific Forum, 

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Vol. 6, 

No. 20, December 2006, p. 13. In addition, see the 2006 China’s 

National Defense for discussion about Taiwan as the primary 

threat to China’s national’s Defense; and David M. Finkelstein, 

“China’s National Military Strategy: An Overview of the ‘Military 

Strategic Guidelines’,” in Kamphausen and Scobell, eds., Rightsizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s 

Military, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, September 2007, pp. 109-115. 
319

10. Shi Chunlun, ““A Commentary on Studies of the last 

Ten Years Concerning China’s Sea Power,” Beijing, Xindai Guoji 

Guanxi, in OSC CPP20080603590001, April 20, 2008; and Liu 

Jiangping and Zhui Yue, “Management of the Sea in the 21st 

Century. Whither the Chinese Navy,” Beijing, Dangdai Haijun, 

in OSC CPP20070628436012. For a comprehensive discussion of 

PLAAF doctrinal developments and new operational concepts, 

see Kevin M. Lanzit and Kenneth Allen, “Right-Sizing the PLA 

Air Force: New Operational Concepts Define a Smaller, More 

Capable Force,” in Kamphausen and Scobell, eds., Right-sizing the 

People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military,

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

September 2007, pp. 448-458.

11. Tao Shelan, “PLA Admiral States Need for Offensive as 

well as Defense Capabilities,” Beijing, China, Zhongguo Xinwen 

She, in OSC CPP200701097008003, January 9, 2007; and Zhou 

Yawen, Li Gencheng, and Tang Zhongping, “South Sea Fleet 

Base Enhances Ship-Borne Weaponry Support Capabilities,” 

Beijing, China, Jiefangjun Bao, in OSC cpp 20080325710013, March 

25, 2008; and Ju Hailong, “Can the South China Sea Issue Be 

Resolved Peacefully?” Beijing, China, Shijie Zhishi, in OSC CPP 

20070223329001, February 1, 2007. 

12. Cole, p. 2; and Li, McVadon, and Wang, pp. 13-15.

13. Unattributed, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/

navy.htm and www.sinodefence.com/navy/surface/default.asp.

14. Andrei Chang, “Combat Missions of the PLAAF’s Five 

Key Fighter-Bomber Regiments,” Kanwa News, June 30, 2008; and 

Andrei Chang and Yuri Baskov, “Fourth J-10 Fighter Regiment 

Established at PLAAF No. 1 Division,” Kanwa News, March 30, 

2008. 

15. Dennis J. Blasko, Chas W. Freeman, Jr., Stanley Horowitz, 

Evan S. Medeiros, and James C. Mulvenon, Defense-related 

Spending in China: A Preliminary Analysis and Comparison with 

American Equivalents, Washington, DC: United States-China Policy 

Foundation, 2007, pp. 1-3; and Quan Xiaoshu and Li Xuanliang, 
320

“‘China Focus’: China’s Defense Budget To Grow 17.6 percent in 

2008,” Beijing, China, Xinhua in OSC CPP20080304968220, March 

4, 2008. See also Michael S. Chase, “Balancing China’s Budgetary 

Priorities: Defense Spending and Domestic Challenges,” in 

Jamestown Foundation China Brief, Vol. 7, Issue 20, October 31, 

2007. 

16. Yuejin Liu, ed., Science of National Security, Beijing, China: 

China University of Political Science and Law Publishing House, 

2004. This volume contains a comprehensive discussion of the 

current themes in the realm of national security research. See 

also Shou Xiaosong, “Views on the Innovative Development of 

the Party’s National Security Strategic Theory,” Beijing, Zhongguo 

Junshi Kexue, in OSC CPP20080623436002, August 20, 2007; and 

Zhang Ce, Shi Yansheng, and Yang Jianjun, “Being Reinforcements 

for Responding to Nontraditional Security Threats: Deliberation on 

PLA’s Completion of Diverse Military Tasks,” Beijing, Zhongguo 

Guofang Bao, in OSC CPP20080701436003, June 26, 2008.

17. Zhang Ce, Shi Yansheng, and Yang Jianjun, pp. 3-4.

18. For a comprehensive treatment of this subject, see Gabriel 

B. Collins, Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William 

S. Murray, eds., China’s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing’s 

Maritime Policies, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008, pp. 

1-12, 252-299, and 336-351.

19. Zhao Hongtu, ““Reconsidering the Malacca Dilemma and 

China’s Energy Security,” Beijing, Xindai Guoji Guanxi, in OSC 

CPP20070724455004, June 20, 2007; Ju Hailong, “Can the South 

China Sea Issue Be Resolved Peacefully?” Beijing, China, Shijie 

Zhishi in OSC CPP20070223329001, February 11, 2008. 

20. Ibid.

21. Liang Guanglie, “Chinese Military Foreign Diplomacy 

Is In Step With the Times,” Beijing, Jeifangjun Bao, in CPP 

20081223702009, December 23, 2008. Also see Zhang Qingsheng, 

“China’s Military Diplomacy, Beijing, Xuexi Shibao in OSC 

cpp20070517332001, May 14, 2007.
321

22. Liu Yuejin, ed. Many of the same aspects and components 

of national security are also described in Shou Xiaosong’s article. 

23. Shi Hua and Zhang Beixin, “Chinese Navy Will Protect 

Ships Free of Charge,” Beijing, China, Huanqiu Wang Online, in 

OSC CPP20081229671001, December 24, 2008; Mark McDonald, 

“China considers Naval Mission Against Pirates in Gulf of Aden,” 

New York Times, December 18, 2008, p. 6; Johnathan Adams, “China 

Projects Naval Power in Pirate Fight,” Christian Science Monitor, 

December 30, 2008, p. 1. While this chapter discusses anti-piracy in 

the context of future missions in Southeast Asia, the recent PLAN 

deployment to the Gulf of Aden has been a significant indicator 

of those missions Beijing feels compelled to pursue. At this point, 

it is not clear how this will impact the PLAN over the long-term. 

24. Wang Yizhou, “National Security in the Stage of Peaceful 

Development,” Beijing, Shijie Zhishi in OSC CPP20061220329003, 

December 1, 2006; and Li Limin, “Some Points for Consideration in 

China’s Asia-Pacific Geostrategy,” Beijing, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi in 

OSC CPP20080723508002, May 20, 2008. In addition, publications 

such as the Defense White Paper, The Science of National Security,

and The Science of Military Strategy provide broader discussions of 

China’s major national security challenges.

25. Kristen Gunness, “China’s Military Diplomacy in an Era 

of Change,” paper prepared for the National Defense University 

Symposium on China’s Global Activism: Implications for U.S. 

Security Interests, Washington DC, Jun 20, 2006; Dr. Xuecheng Liu, 

“China’s Energy Security and It’s Grand Strategy,” Muscatine, IO: 

The Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, September 2006, 

pp. 3-8. The second article provides a broad overview of Beijing’s 

current energy strategy and the multifaceted approach China is 

taking to secure resources.

26. Hu Jintao, “Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with 

Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building 

a Moderately Prosperous Society: Report to the 17th National 

Congress of the Community Party of China,” Beijing, Xinhua, 

October 25, 2007.
322

27. Kristen Gunness and Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm 

Offensive in Southeast Asia,” Current History, July 2006, pp. 271-

274.

28. Cole, p. 2; and Li, McVadon, and Wang, pp. 13-15.

29. As discussed in the DoD Annual Report on China’s Military 

Modernization, PLA investment and development of power 

projection capabilities remains limited, but is slowly increasing. 

While the report in recent years has highlighted potential new 

missions, it highlights China’s continued focus on Taiwan.

30. Finkelstein, pp. 109-115. 

31. Jeifangjun Bao, “Make Ceaseless Efforts to Strengthen 

Core Military Capacity Building; Important Experience from 30 

Years of Reform, Opening Up,” Beijing, Jeifangjun Bao in OSC 

CPP20081203710007. This article provides an editorial view of 

the range of missions the PLA is being directed to support. While 

insightful, this article, and others, do not provide in-depth insight 

on programmatic and resource decisions as they align with 

missions.

32. Yuejin, Liu ed, and Shou Xiaosong; and Zhange Ce, Shi 

Yansheng, and Yang Jianjun.

33. One component of this debate is centered on whether 

China should remain a landpower, evolve into a seapower or 

achieve some balance. This discussion is covered in Li Yihu, “Sea 

and Land Power: From Dichotomy to Overall Planning: A Review 

of the Relationship Between Sea and Land Power,” Beijing, Xindai 

Guoji Guanxi in OSC CPP20070712455001, August 20, 2007; Sun 

Peisong, “Where Exactly is the focus of China’s Interests,” Beijing, 

Huanqiu Shibao in OSC CPP20071226325001 December 7, 2007. 

34. Jeifangjun Bao editorial. This article lays out common 

themes in PLA writing on major threats, in particular third party 

intervention by a strong adversary, which refers to the United 

States.

35. Shou Xiaosong. 
323

36. Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, 

and Kevin L. Pollpeter, Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess 

Strategies and Their Implications for the United States, Santa Monica, 

CA: Rand, 2007, pp. 51-79. 

37. Liang Guanglie, “Chinese Military Foreign Diplomacy 

Is In Step With the Times,” Beijing, Jeifangjun Bao in CPP 

20081223702009, December 23, 2008. See also Gunness and 

Kurlantzick. 

38. Shou Xiaosong. Nontraditional threats are also outlined in 

a number of other publications to include the Science of National 

Security and the recent Jeifangjun Bao editorial on strengthening 

core military capabilities, which outlines the necessary balance 

between preparing for traditional and nontraditional threats. 

39. Information Office of the State Council, China’s National 

Defense in 2006.

40. Li Keshuang and Zhao Debin, “Firmly Improve Capability 

to Carry Out Military Operations Other Than War,” Beijing, 

Jeifangjun Bao in OSC CPP 20081125710010 November 25, 2008. 

Also see Zhao Jianwei, “Promoting the Formation of Logistical 

Support for Capabilities for Non-combat Military Maneuvers,” 

Beijing, Jeifangjun Bao in OSC CPP20081114705008.

41. Liang Guanglie.

42. Information Office of the State Council, China’s National 

Defense in 2006. See also Shou Xiaosong and the Jeifangjun Bao

editorial on core capabilities.

43. Hu Jintao, “Join Hands to promote Peaceful Development 

of Cross-Strait Relations; Stive with Unity of Pupose for the Great 

Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation,” Beijing, Xinhua in OSC 

CPP20081231005002, December 31, 2008.

44. While there is no specific discussion of reexamining 

strategic priorities, the previous modifications to the China’s 

strategic guidelines are outlined in Finkelstein’s paper and also 

the Jeifangjun Bao editorial on core capabilities. 
324

45. Li Yihu and Sun Peisong. 

46. Information Office of the State Council, China’s National 

Defense in 2006. 

47. Kamphausen and Scobbell, eds, Right-sizing the People’s 

Liberation Army. This volume describes many of the major trends 

in PLA modernization in much greater depth and examines future 

directions for military modernization. 

48. Chase. 

49. Liang Guanglie. 

50. Unattributed, “Deputy Li Tiemin: Ensure Safety of 

Strategic Seaways for China,” Beijing, Jiefangjun Bao in OSC 

CPP20070315721004, March 14, 2007; Zhou Hongtu, “Reconsidering 

the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ and China’s Energy Security,” Beijing, 

Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, June 20, 2007; and Ju Hailong, “Can the 

South China Sea Issue Be Resolved Peacefully?” Beijing, Shijie 

Zhishi in OSC CPP20070223329001, February 1, 2007. 

51. Shou Xiaosong and Zhou Hongtu.

52. Ibid. 

53. For a detailed discussion of this nature, see Zhou Hongtu. 

This issue is also discussed at length in Collins, Erickson, Goldstein, 

and Murray. 

54. Finkelstein, pp. 81-93. This publication outlines the process 

by which strategic guildelines are issued. While the groundwork 

for a future decision was laid in 2004 by Hu Jintao’s discussion of 

the PLA’s historical missions, no following guidance of the nature 

outlined in Finkelstein’s study has been observed.

55. Liang Guanglie, Li Keshuang, and Zhao Debin; and Zhao 

Jianwei. 

56. Finkelstein, pp. 81-93.
325

57. The author has not identified any documents or studies 

that appear to be institutional research supporting this effort. This 

may be a limitation in research materials; however, information of 

this type would likely not be available to the general public. 

58. Cliff, Burles, Chase, Eaton, and Pollpeter, pp. 51-79. 

59. Collins, Erickson, Goldstein, and Murray. 

60. China’s deployment of naval forces to the Gulf of Aden to 

support anti-piracy missions is a significant indicator of the level 

of concern among China’s civilian and military leaders. At this 

point, however, it is unclear how this will influence future force 

structure and missions in the South China Sea.

61. Lessons learned from the PLAN antipiracy deployment 

will give China’s leaders much more insight into the operational 

requirements necessary for expanding this capability in the 

future. 

62. Liang Guanglie and Zhang Qinsheng.

63. Liu Yijian, “Theory of the Command of the Sea and 

Its Trend of Development,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue in OSC 

CPP20050427000217, January 1, 2005; and Dai Xu, “Rise of World 

Powers Cannot Do Without Military Transformation,” Beijing, 

Huanqui Shibao in OSC CPP20070326455002, March 15, 2007.

327

CHAPTER 10

PLA “JOINT” OPERATIONAL CONTINGENCIES

IN SOUTH ASIA, CENTRAL ASIA, AND KOREA

Larry M. Wortzel

Introduction.

The underlying assumption of this chapter is that 

within the limitations of technology and resources, 

a nation’s military capacity will grow to secure vital 

national interests. This chapter addresses how the 

Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is poised and 

exploring ways to secure and defend China’s interests, 

with specific reference to the Korean Peninsula, Central 

Asia, and South Asia.1

 A second important assumption 

implicit in the chapter is that China’s armed forces will 

not face a major, protracted conflict with or over Taiwan 

in an attempt to unify that island with the mainland. 

That is, the Chinese military can “get beyond Taiwan 

as its primary mission” relatively undamaged.

Maintaining a generally peaceful environment gives 

the PLA time to adapt to a wider range of missions to 

“foster a security environment conducive to China’s 

peaceful development” while also “ensuring the 

interests of national development.”2

 In fact, the general 

“line” from Communist Party Chairman Hu Jintao 

emphasizes the need to maintain a peaceful external 

environment so that China’s economy and military can 

develop. 

Whether some form of the status quo continues, 

whether an armed standoff between Taiwan and China 

goes on, or if some resolution that achieves a modus 

vivendi across the Taiwan Strait is attained, the PLA can 
328

continue to develop at a moderate pace to carry out the 

goals set for it by the leaders of the Chinese Communist 

Party (CCP). The general trends examined are also valid 

if there is some resolution to the cross-Strait military 

and political standoff on terms Beijing can accept that 

involve a modest conflict, so long as that conflict does 

not involve the United States and seriously weaken 

the PLA. Of course, the reaction of other countries to 

how the PLA “gets beyond Taiwan” may change the 

diplomatic and security environment facing China’s 

leaders, but it allows the CCP and the PLA to pursue 

their nation’s interests without major interruption. 

One thing is certain: the PLA has missions and plans 

well beyond Taiwan, and if the PLA is not forced to 

maintain a strong force for Taiwan contingencies it 

will be able to concentrate on other missions designed 

to secure and defend China’s national interests. 

Within the general context of China’s national 

security, defense preparedness and military strength 

are critical issues. They are related to maintaining a 

strong economy and pursuing national interests. The 

general approach taken by security experts in China 

today is that the core of security in the defense arena 

is a “strong, capable military.”3

 Preventing Taiwan 

from moving toward independence is a high priority, 

as is gaining control of Taiwan at some future time.4

Strategy texts also identify the United States as a major 

threat to China’s national security (“美国对我构成军事

威胁“).5

Writing for the U.S. Government’s Open Source 

Center, Daniel Hartnett of the CNA Corporation has 

assessed the broad definition of Chinese security and 

what the Central Military Commission (CMC) calls 

“the historic missions of the Armed Forces [the PLA].”6

Hartnett attributes this mission to a speech by CMC 
329

and CCP Chairman Hu Jintao on December 24, 2004. 

CMC vice chairman Guo Boxiong, in a week-long 

meeting at the National Defense University for the PLA 

in September 2005, reinforced these as the synthesis of 

the military theories of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin 

by Hu Jintao.7

 The “historic missions” are:

• To reinforce the armed forces’ loyalty to the 

CCP;

• To help ensure China’s sovereignty, territorial 

integrity, and domestic security in order to 

continue its national development; and,

• To help safeguard China’s expanding national 

interests.8

These are important to us in the context of future 

PLA contingency missions because they establish a 

formal framework and ideological justification for 

using the military in a regional and global context. PLA 

national security thinkers increasingly make reference 

to expanded contingency and force presence missions 

for the PLA. In one text for the PLA National Defense 

University, Senior Colonel Wang Lidong expressed 

the view that as the PLA strengthens to carry out its 

external missions, it will need to develop a stronger 

maritime capacity as part of China’s “comprehensive 

national security.”9

 The third point in particular, 

“safeguarding China’s expanding national interests,” 

is a responsibility that requires the PLA to develop 

the capacity to operate and have a presence at longer 

distances away from continental China.10

The “historic missions” provide broad guidance and 

justification for security thinkers in China to explore 

approaches to military theory, roles, and missions for 

forces, and new equipment and technology to increase 

China’s capacity to operate as the military force of 
330

a nation with global interests. In terms of missions 

“beyond Taiwan,” PLA Academy of Military Science 

theorist Jiang Yamin reminds China’s students of 

warfare that Hu Jintao’s charge to the PLA to provide 

a firm national defense for China “in the 21st century” 

means that the PLA must have a strong capability to 

counter attacks at long distances and defend distant 

lines of communication.11

Another theme that will recur throughout this 

chapter is the emphasis Chinese security thinkers are 

placing on maritime security and the security of the sea 

lines of communication. From the standpoint of joint 

military contingency missions, this theme affects how 

the PLA defines its missions in the South China Sea, 

the Indian Ocean, the East China Sea, and the Korean 

Sea. Concepts of maritime security and sovereignty 

affect how the Navy and Air Force develop or improve 

their weapons and systems as well as command, 

control, communication, computers, and intelligence 

surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. 

Granted, some in the PLA place primary emphasis 

on military strength to ensure territorial integrity and 

Taiwan unification as the key national security issue,12

but many other security thinkers are expanding the 

concept of national security to include economic 

security and energy security as major factors among 

China’s national interests.13

In his National Defense University text, Wang 

Lidong notes that the oceans are critical to the global 

economy and increasingly becoming “a strategic point” 

(literally, “a place contested by all strategists” 海洋越

来越成为兵家必争之地).14 This change in orientation 

from a nation primarily focused on its littoral waters 

and territorial sovereignty leads Chinese strategists 

to conclude that “China must develop the capacity 
331

to project power and protect its interests in distant 

seas.”15 At the Academy of Military Science, Jiang 

Yamin makes essentially the same point, calling for 

capabilities to pursue and protect China’s interests, 

support economic development, defend its distant 

lines of communication, and prevent a distant attack.16

Military analysts in India, and at the Kanwa Defense 

Review based in Canada, believe that to achieve this goal 

of being able to protect sea lines of communication at 

distances away from the Chinese littoral, the PLA will 

have aircraft carriers in the future.17 In Beijing, however, 

despite stories from India and Canada, Li Jie, a PLA 

officer at the Academy of Military Science, denied such 

rumors.18 Li opined that although he believed china 

was “entitled” to aircraft carriers, the PLA may pursue 

them on its own schedule. To carry out some of the 

missions set for the PLA by the CCP, however, aircraft 

carriers and long-range aerial refueling capabilities are 

exceedingly useful. The PLA is now examining a couple 

of former Russian aircraft carriers and most likely will 

attempt to experiment with carrier operations at some 

time in the next decade.

All this illustrates that China’s security thinkers, 

whether in the PLA or at academic institutions, see it 

as natural that their nation builds a military capacity 

to protect and defend its global interests far beyond 

its borders. They advocate the need to be able to 

respond to contingencies. They see the economic 

and energy components of national security as a key 

Chinese national interest. These security thinkers are 

unabashed in their discussion of these matters, and 

they advocate developing future weapon systems and 

doctrines to carry out such missions. At the same time, 

they argue that developing this military capacity to 

carry out external missions is not an act of belligerence 

and will contribute to world peace and stability.19
332

General Zhang Shenxia, writing from his position 

as commandant of the Academy of Military Science, 

argues that “China has chosen a course to ensure a 

peaceful rise. China needs a peaceful rise for itself and 

at the same time is working to safeguard world stability 

and overall development.”20 The “Peaceful Rise” policy 

was subject to some debate inside the party, with some 

in the PLA arguing that the formulation limited the 

PLA from taking on “out-of-area missions” beyond 

Taiwan. 

In a meeting of senior PLA Air Force officers in 

May 2004, Jiang Zemin suggested that perhaps the 

formulation should be set aside, since the thesis 

potentially limited China’s military development and 

modernization. This objection was both a manifestation 

of friction between Jiang and Hu Jintao and a 

demonstration of genuine concern within the PLA that 

it could continue to modernize and strengthen.21 In the 

end, after some period of debate, the CCP arrived at 

the position that “there is no contradiction between 

military modernization or military strength and 

China’s peaceful rise.”22 China’s policymakers today 

see military development as complementing China’s 

peaceful rise.23

In the areas covered in this chapter, the Korean 

Peninsula, South Asia, and Central Asia, Beijing has 

backed up its fundamental interests with diplomacy 

and invested billions of dollars of infrastructure 

projects, some to open better trade routes and others 

to ensure access to ports and resources.24 The PLA has 

also been a part of this broader approach to national 

interest and security, with exercises, arms sales, aid to 

defense industries, and military assistance to nations 

in the region.25 The bottom line up front is that as these 

regions and the countries in them are increasingly 
333

important national interests for China and are part of a 

broader national strategy, the military will necessarily 

develop capabilities to secure the country’s interests. 

South Asia.

U.S. relations with India are among the foremost 

future security concerns of the PLA and China’s security 

thinkers. In a PLA Academy of Military Science book 

on China’s national security strategy and national 

interests, Ba Zhongtan and his co-authors charge 

that the United States is “interfering in South Asia 

affairs” with the goal of “immobilizing China.”26 PLA 

officers remain deeply suspicious of India’s long-term 

military objectives. One article in the China Military 

Science quotes Indian strategists as suggesting that to 

guarantee India’s fate, Indian forces must control the 

maritime domain surrounding India (in characterizing 

the Indian view the Chinese authors use 完全控制我国

周边海域).27

Naturally, this is a matter of concern for the PLA, 

which sees the potential for interdiction of its own 

strategic lines of communication. Indeed, much of 

what China is doing in Bangladesh and Myanmar 

must be assessed in the context of concerns over India’s 

future military development. Although Myanmar is a 

member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN), it sits in a transition zone. It has trade, 

historical, and cultural ties to ancient India. China is 

clearly developing its own military and economic 

interests with Myanmar not simply to provide an outlet 

for trade from southwest China, but also to cement 

security relations with Rangoon. 

From the Indian perspective, there are a number 

of concerns about China’s future decisions (see 
334

Appendix I, Chinese Foreign Infrastructure Projects). 

At a January 15, 2008, speech at the Chinese Academy 

of Social Sciences, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan 

Singh expressed concerns about the Sino-Indian border 

dispute and other issues (see Appendix II, Chinese 

Arms Deals and Military Assistance). According to 

Singh, 

India is deeply concerned about the border issue mainly 

because of two reasons. First, India’s most abundant 

iron ore mines are in the disputed border region of the 

Himalayas. Second, the border region is closely related 

to the fight for water resources as all of India’s great 

rivers trace their sources in the melted ice and snow of 

the Himalayas.28

Singh went on to say that, “it goes without saying that 

water, as a strategic resource, has made the disputed 

border areas more significant. Currently, India’s 

water resources are in an acute shortage. Water is 

often delivered by wagons even in areas of New Delhi 

inhabited by wealthy people because of water shortages 

that last from winter to summer.” He minimized 

security problems in this speech, concentrating on 

economic and development issues. 

Nonetheless, in the security and defense community, 

observers are quite concerned about PLA activities 

and China’s developing naval, air, and air defense 

capabilities opposite India.29 One complaint this author 

has heard from India’s defense attachés in Washington 

and Beijing has been picked up in a defense-related 

publication from Canada—that the Second Artillery 

Corps has upgraded its Dong Feng 21 intermediaterange missile forces, replacing the old Dong Feng 3s.30

This is probably a reference to changes in the PLA 

Second Artillery Corps force structure in western 
335

China, not deployments in Tibet, which are highly 

doubtful.31 India is also reopening old airfields close 

to the Karakorum Pass and outfitting new mountain 

divisions as New Delhi watches the infrastructure 

developments by China in Tibet near the disputed 

areas.32 In the maritime arena, Indian concerns have 

placed Myanmar in the spotlight, where India and 

China are competing for port projects.33 India plans to 

have a fleet of aircraft carriers and new submarines in 

the next decade and has modernized its own nuclear 

forces.34

Further, Indian defense personnel see their services 

as lagging behind China in developing data exchange 

and network centric warfare capabilities.35 To correct 

this, India will get three airborne warning and control 

system (AWACS) aircraft from Israel, Russian Il-76s, 

and ensure that missiles, air, and sea platforms have 

the data exchange systems to use the information. 

Also, some of India’s Air Force will deploy closer to 

the Sino-Indian border with new SU-30MKI fighters 

and air-to-ground supersonic missiles.36

Beijing and New Delhi are finding ways to work 

together militarily, despite mutual wariness. In 2007, 

after two rounds of bilateral meetings to decide a 

scenario, the PLA and Indian ground forces held a 

1-week, joint antiterrorism exercise designed to respond 

to the “current regional and international antiterrorism 

situation.”37 During training at the company level, the 

two armies exchanged platoon leaders for part of the 

exercise, embedding a foreign platoon commander 

into a rifle company from the other side. Thus both 

nations are taking advantage of opportunities to 

reduce potential tension and engage in security and 

confidence building measures.
336

While in India, observers keep their eyes on the 

defense imbalance, Chinese analysts concentrate on 

the economic side of Sino-Indian relations.38 Indeed, 

Chinese publications are mostly silent on any security 

problems between the two countries.39 In one Wen Wei 

Pao assessment from Hong Kong, Wang Wei sticks to 

documenting advances in bilateral trade, noting the 

possibility of a “China-India Free Trade Zone,” while 

minimizing the likelihood of any conflict between 

the two nations.40 In India, meanwhile, newspapers 

catalogue cross-border skirmishes.41 Still, China is 

engaged in a series of trade and infrastructure projects, 

military assistance, and diplomatic moves that, for 

all practical purposes, flank India in the Persian Gulf 

region as well as the Indian Ocean, and cement alliances 

and relations in other areas of South Asia. 

In Afghanistan, to exploit mining rights in a 

copper field south of Kabul, Beijing will construct a 

freight railroad, investing $2.8 billion in the project.42

Directly flanking India, with New Delhi’s traditional 

rival, Pakistan, China is building a deep sea port in 

Gwadar.43 The two countries are also planning rail links 

between northwest Pakistan and Xinjiang.44 China will 

construct a series of electric power stations in Pakistan, 

including nuclear and conventional power generation 

plants.45 In the Mianwali district of the Punjab, China 

will work with India to set up a 600-megawatt nuclear 

power plant.46

On India’s eastern flank in South Asia, China’s 

National Machinery Import and Export Corporation 

signed a contract to manage coal production of 

the Barapukuria mine in Bangladesh.47 Also with 

Bangladesh, the two countries signed an agreement on 

“nuclear cooperation to look for nuclear raw materials 

and construct a 600-megawatt nuclear power plant.48
337

Myanmar is a special case. Like Afghanistan, it is 

in a regional transition zone. Although an ASEAN 

member, Myanmar is on the Indian Ocean and has 

traditional cultural and historical links to India. 

Also, India has security, economic, and population 

interests in Myanmar. Therefore, it is important to 

consider China’s interests, military relationship, and 

investments in Myanmar when discussing the PLA’s 

potential regional contingency missions. 

The opening of an expanded “Myanmar Road” on 

what was the track of the World War II supply route 

is over a decade old. This was a project designed to 

improve trade opportunities for western China, 

linking Yunnan with ports on the Bay of Bengal and 

the Andaman Sea.49 The road will also be expanded to 

include east-west links to Thailand and Cambodia, a 

rail link is planned from Kunming to Singapore, and 

the old route the PLA worked on from Kunming to 

Bangkok while the United States was in Vietnam will 

be linked to sections of the Myanmar Road. Beijing has 

signed a series of oil and gas deals with the Myanmar 

government to explore on-shore and offshore resource 

opportunities.50 There is also some discussion of 

building an oil pipeline between Myanmar and the city 

of Chongqing, with a refinery to be built to handle the 

imports.51 This is expected to move 6.5 trillion feet of 

natural gas over a 30-year period from a gas field in 

the Bay of Bengal.52 Thus, it is clear that two growing, 

energy-starved economies, those of China and India, 

are in a competition for influence and resources in 

and around Myanmar. Given the guidance that the 

PLA must be in a position to defend China’s economic 

interests, Chinese military planners certainly must 

be thinking about the implications of these extensive 

investments.
338

The PLA and Defense Ministry planners in China 

also have been active in advancing Beijing’s interests in 

South Asia. Bangladesh, one of the main purchasers of 

Chinese defense equipment, has ordered surface-to-air 

missiles from China for a frigate, PL-7 and PL-9 air-toair missiles, as well as C-801/C-802 anti-ship missiles.53

The Bangladesh armed forces have bought 65 type 96 

D-30, 122 millimeter towed gun systems from China, 

as well as 16 F-7MG fighter aircraft. 

Myanmar has bought a number of fire control 

radars for their domestically produced patrol boats, as 

well as anti-ship missiles. There are common reports 

of “Chinese troops running around Myanmar in 

Chinese trucks.” These reports are probably explained 

by Myanmar’s purchase of 2,500 2 1/2 ton trucks from 

China. Myanmar’s military leaders have also ordered 

training aircraft for their air force and engines for a 

frigate to be built in Myanmar. Beijing has assisted with 

the expansion of the naval base in the Coco Islands, 

which is only 30 miles from the Andaman Islands, 

claimed by India. Finally, most of the tanks, armored 

personnel carriers, artillery systems, anti-aircraft guns, 

and a number of missile patrol boats in Myanmar’s 

inventory were bought from China.54

The reaction of the PLA to riots in Tibet in March/

April 2008 and the reaction to the earthquake in 

Mianyang, north of Chengdu are examples of how the 

military would respond to joint contingencies involving 

India, Bhutan, or Nepal. Generally speaking, the PLA 

moved quickly to get forces to the region. In the case 

of Tibet, the way the military reacted to the SinoIndian War and to the buildup around Tiananmen and 

Beijing in 1989 is a reasonable model for how the PLA 

reinforces and supplements local units with out of area 

forces. 
339

There are three all-weather highways available for 

reinforcement of Tibet. In the west, should the PLA 

need to reinforce the Aksai Chin in the far western 

sector or the middle sector of the border opposite Simla, 

Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, the PLA can 

rely on forces from Lanzhou Military Region (MR).55

Of course, there are other units that could react quickly 

to contingencies against India or opposite South Asia, 

including elements of the 15th Airborne Army and 

special operations daduis of the PLA. 

An article in an Indian defense journal acknowledges 

that India has to divide its military focus between threats 

from Pakistan and a potential border conflict with 

China.56 According to this article, the PLA has prepared 

for contingency operations in Tibet and on the SinoIndian border by putting five or six logistics brigades 

in Tibet, preparing rapid reaction units in the 13th and 

21st Group Armies, developing and improving remote 

airfields along the border, and developing contingency 

plans to move the 15th Airborne Group Army into the 

region.57 The same article laments that the PLA has 

low-yield tactical nuclear weapons available if needed 

on the battlefield, while Indian forces lack such a 

capability. 

The PLA has had a long, fruitful arms sales and 

security assistance relationship with Pakistan, as have 

Chinese defense industries. China has provided antiship missiles and fire control radars for Pakistan’s 

missile boats, helped to establish air surveillance 

systems, and sold anti-aircraft missiles to Pakistan.58

Beijing has also sold frigates, combat aircraft, training 

aircraft, and helicopters to Pakistan, all of which explain 

why Indian military thinkers place Pakistan and China 

at the top of their threat lists. 
340

You Ji, a lecturer in politics at the University of 

New South Wales, Australia, suggested that China will 

focus on the security of its energy supplies, expanding 

its maritime strategy to include contingency operations 

to secure the Indian Ocean.59 It looks as though China 

may need these maritime capabilities. General G. D. 

Bakshi, a senior research fellow at the United Service 

Institution in New Delhi, recently pointed out that 

“India sits like an unsinkable aircraft carrier across the 

ocean and astride their key shipping lanes.”60 According 

to the UK Telegraph, Bakshi added that China’s rising 

influence in Asia “must be at our expense,” and India 

could not afford to send a “message of weakness.”61

You Ji also believes that Beijing will seek to work with 

the countries around the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca 

to prevent maritime terrorism and piracy. He predicts 

that China will seek shorter routes across land, with 

ports and pipelines in Pakistan (Gwadar), Myanmar, 

and Thailand. Further, You predicted that the PLA 

Navy will expand its ability to operate regionally and 

work to achieve “freedom of movement” in regional 

waters.62 Finally, he believes that for at least a decade, 

the PLA Navy will have to depend on the U.S. naval 

presence and on cooperation with regional navies to 

keep sea lines of communication open because it will 

not have the capability to conduct routine maritime 

patrols or to protect its own surface action groups with 

submarines.63

Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan are areas that are not 

likely to trigger any sort of contingency operations by 

the PLA. China has largely stayed out of the insurgency 

in Sri Lanka. Bhutan is a small and generally pliant 

neighbor. Nepal may be an area where Beijing increases 

its diplomatic pressure and arms sales (depending 

on how much influence the Maoist party gets in 

government). Prachanda (Pushpa Kamal Dahal), the 
341

Prime Minister of Nepal, visited China for the close of 

the Olympics. This was a departure from the normal 

practice of making India the first foreign visit. He 

made the normal obligatory remarks about supporting 

China on the Tibet issue. Other Nepali officials were 

split on the issue. Nepalese Foreign Minister Upendra 

Yadav said to the press that Nepal intends to maintain 

equal ties between China and India, while Congress 

Leader Bimalendra Nidhi argued that the timing of the 

visit shows that Prachanda is pro-China.64

Central Asia.

The reaction by China’s security, foreign policy, and 

military establishment to the geo-strategic landscape in 

Central Asia differs from that in South Asia. Whereas 

in South Asia much of China’s military planning and 

diplomacy is designed to isolate, contain, or flank India, 

with which Beijing fought a war in 1962, in Central 

Asia China’s leaders have been careful to consider 

the interests of their primary potential rival—Russia. 

Also, there is pressure on the Central Asian countries 

to “diversify pipeline routes,” through which they 

supply natural resources so as to avoid being subject 

to monopoly prices to get the only major export these 

countries enjoy out to purchasers.65

It is important to remember that there are about 9 

million ethnic Uighurs in China. Some 300,000 more 

of this Turkic minority group are in Kazakhstan, and 

50,000 in Kyrgyzstan. Some of these Uighurs seek an 

independent “East Turkestan.” In Kyrgyzstan the 

Uighurs apparently murdered a Chinese diplomat in 

2002 and bombed a bus, killing 19 Chinese visitors 

in 2003.66 During the time I served as an attaché in 

Beijing in the mid-1990s, I got regular reports from 
342

contacts about Uighur minority groups tied to the East 

Turkistan independence movement killing PLA troops 

and their families on roads from PLA farms into town. 

Moreover, illegal Chinese immigrants are moving into 

neighboring Central Asian countries, creating security 

and economic problems.67

Russia formed the Commonwealth of Independent 

States (CIS) in 1991 which included Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan 

(Turkmenistan withdrew from full membership in 2005, 

becoming an associate member). Moscow also formed 

the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), as 

a means to prevent CIS members from “aligning with 

NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization],” 

and in 2003, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov 

“claimed the right to intervene in these countries.”68

Later, in Shanghai in 1996 and Moscow in 1997, the five 

Central Asian Republics, China, and Russia agreed to a 

series of military confidence-building measures, which 

were later summarized in Alma-Ata in 1998, Bishkek 

in 1999, and Dushanbe in 2000.69 Indeed, Moscow has 

established a CIS-wide joint air defense system that 

includes the air defense forces of all five Central Asian 

nations.70

When the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

(SCO) was created in 2001,71 after those 5 years of 

formative meetings, it was done to promote Chinese 

and Russian interests as much as to counter American 

interests.72 The ethnic Uighur problems mentioned 

above, however, were also a factor that motivated 

China. As it framed relations with the countries in 

Central Asia, Beijing has been careful to ensure that 

military and security issues were not points of division 

and that its relations in the region did not create 

tension with Moscow, which still has strong security 
343

interests in Central Asia. Moscow still has space-launch 

and recovery facilities in Kazakhstan and some of its 

military industrial complex remains distributed in these 

former parts of the Soviet Union. Counterterrorism and 

regional security are still central issues for the SCO.73 At 

the time this chapter was written, five other countries 

sought membership in the SCO (Mongolia, Iran, India, 

Pakistan, and Turkmenistan, but various member 

states have not been able to agree on expanding the 

organization).74 This potential expansion is opposed 

by Beijing for several reasons: Chinese officials want 

to ensure that the SCO serves its purposes in balancing 

against Moscow in Central Asia; they do not want to 

antagonize the United States; and they get some benefit 

from the anti-terrorist and anti-separatist stance of the 

SCO. 

China has conducted anti-terrorist exercises with the 

SCO in 2003, in the territories of Kazakhstan and China. 

In August 2005, the PLA held “Peace Mission 2005,” 

with Russia; and in 2006, conducted “Cooperation 

2006” with the armed forces of Tajikistan. Perhaps the 

largest of the confidence building measures in which the 

PLA has been involved, however, was “Peace Mission 

2007.”75 This exercise involved all six SCO members 

in a “combined operations” (合同作战) exercise that 

brought the heads of state and defense ministers from 

all the countries together as observers. 

After the close of the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, Hu 

Jintao visited Dushanbe for the 2008 SCO meeting, 

working out exchanges on anti-terrorism, regional 

energy issues, and military confidence-building 

measures.76 The SCO, therefore, remains a cornerstone 

of Beijing’s approach in Central Asia. 

Beijing is building a great deal of infrastructure to 

support oil and gas imports from Central Asia, however, 
344

and needs political stability in the region to ensure 

China’s energy security (see Appendix I).77 Beijing’s 

regional experts recognize that a number of countries 

are competing for influence and resources in the region, 

but see China itself as having a “unique geographical 

advantage” in gaining access to the resources in Central 

Asia.78 Moreover, leaders in both Russia and China 

want to avoid confrontation and prevent the United 

States from dominating Central Asia, using NATO as 

one tool to do so.79 Even so, Chinese scholars emphasize 

that along with the “going west” strategy to expand the 

economy of western China and take advantage of the 

infrastructure-building in Central Asia, Beijing should 

avoid military conflict, emphasize the “Five Principles 

of Peaceful Coexistence,” work on fighting terrorism 

in the region, and concentrate on “military confidencebuilding measures.”80 The program with the SCO is 

to “fight the ‘three evils’ of extremism, terrorism, and 

separatism,” a program designed to keep Xinjiang 

intact and ensure cooperation with neighboring states 

(see Appendix II).81

China is one contributing source to the Central Asia 

Regional Cooperation Program (CAREC). This 10-

year, $18.7 billion project will build five transportation 

corridors connecting Kazakhstan to Xinjiang; 

Turkmenistan to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan to Xinjiang, 

and Siberia to China through Mongolia; Siberia to 

Central Asia and Afghanistan; and Pakistan to China 

and Tajikistan.82 Also, China will fund the ChinaKyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railroad, with a terminus in 

Kashgar, Xinjiang.83 Another rail link will connect the 

China-Kazakh border city, Korgas, to the Chinese rail 

system.84 In other rail projects in Central Asia, Beijing 

will help with 11 infrastructure projects, including a 

highway and rail connection for a cost of $11 billion.85
345

The China National Petroleum Corporation bought 

PetroKazakhstan from a Canadian company and will 

build a series of oil and gas pipelines from Xinjiang 

to Kazakhstan with links to Turkmenistan.86 To assist 

Kyrgyzstan, as a goodwill gesture, China is discussing 

building a series of electric power stations, including 

hydropower sites.87 With Turkmenistan, China is now 

working on a gas pipeline that will end in Guangzhou, 

stretching all across Xinjiang and central-south China.88

To secure access to oil and gas in Uzbekistan, the China 

National Petroleum Corporation will invest $210 

million in exploration and will build a high capacity 

pipeline back to China.89

In Xinjiang, the PLA has made improvements that 

supplement internal security forces and can also be 

used for contingency operations in Central Asia. The 

PLA’s helicopter aviation regiments are equipped to 

carry out electronic warfare operations in addition to 

conducting raids, precision attacks, and air assault 

missions.90 When gauging the PLA’s ability to react to 

contingencies in Central Asia, it is critical to consider 

how Beijing reacts to domestic security problems. It is 

likely that the same, or similar, PLA forces would be 

involved. Units from Nanjing and Lanzhou MRs have 

deployed there in the past.91

Korean Peninsula.

That the PLA would develop contingency missions 

for North Korea makes a lot of sense; it is there that 

the PLA confronted its most serious military threat 

after the founding of the PRC. China’s own records 

show it lost 114,000 soldiers killed in action during 

the Korean War; 34,000 noncombat deaths from 

wounds, in hospitals, or from illness; 380,000 soldiers 
346

wounded; and 29,000 missing in action.92 These 

losses underscore just how seriously the leadership 

of China takes security on the 38th Parallel, which it 

sees as the buffer between China and Japan as well as 

the United States.93 Indeed, observers in South Korea 

believe that “China conceives itself to have the right” 

to make decisions on intervention.94 Shen Dingli, of the 

Institute for International Studies at Fudan University, 

has told observers that policymakers in the PRC prefer 

a buffer in North Korea between South Korea and the 

U.S. forces there.95 He also told this author that rather 

than let North Korea collapse, China will provide basic 

subsistence.96

However, for this writer, conversations with senior 

officers of the PLA in 1995 and 1996 frame the approach 

the PLA takes on the Korean Peninsula. I have been 

told by a defense minister, a chief of the General Staff 

Department (GSD), and a deputy chief of the GSD that 

“China will not let North Korea collapse.” With respect 

to contingency missions on the Korean Peninsula, one 

of these senior leaders said in 1996 that “if the leaders 

in the United States think the U.S. military or its ally, 

South Korea, can simply march north in the event of 

a collapse in North Korea without some consultation 

with the PLA, it will look like 1950 all over again.” 

These are critical points because they affect how far the 

United States and its allies can go in pursuing sanctions 

related to the “Six Party Talks,” as well as how to craft 

any response to crises on the Korean peninsula. On 

the other hand, given the statements from these senior 

leaders, there seems to be some room for bilateral 

military security consultations discussing potential 

responses to instability on the Korean Peninsula.

There are other parallels in thinking on approaches 

toward North Korea’s nuclear weapons program 
347

and maintaining the regime in Pyongyang in China’s 

security community between 1995-96 and today. 

As early as 1995, PLA officers knowledgeable of 

North Korea opined that Pyongyang had 4-5 nuclear 

weapons at that time. They reasoned that these were 

of deterrent value. More recently, in 2006, scholars 

in Shanghai opined that “North Korean nuclear 

weapons were ‘safeguarding’ China’s side door.”97

After a series of conferences in Brussels and Seoul, in 

2006, participants concluded that, among other things, 

“avoiding the economic costs of an explosion on the 

Korean Peninsula was a priority for China, as was 

sustaining the two-Korea status quo.”98 One scholar in 

Shanghai said that “China had a formal commitment 

in its bilateral Treaty with North Korea that it must 

observe in the event of a conflict on the Peninsula.”99

Even at the Academy of Military Science, in a meeting 

in 2007, PLA officers opined that Northeast Asia has 

lived with a nuclear-armed North Korea for over a 

decade. They advised patience in negotiations. And 

Chinese security thinkers, a decade ago and last 

year, were comfortable that U.S. extended deterrence 

was sufficient to maintain stability, keep Japan from 

developing nuclear weapons, and deter Pyongyang 

from aggressive acts.100 Formally, the line from China’s 

government, from official and proprietary think tanks, 

and from mainstream Chinese scholars is that “China 

supports a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula (中国主张朝

鲜半岛 无核化).”101

The historical ties with North Korea as a communist 

ally and a natural buffer state against Japanese, South 

Korean, and U.S. forces keep Pyongyang central to 

Chinese interests in Northeast Asia.102 However, the 

central leadership of China and the senior leaders of 

the PLA still pay attention to South Korea. Indeed, 
348

just 1 day after the 2008 Olympics closed in Beijing, 

Hu Jintao traveled to Seoul, South Korea, to discuss 

trade, economic relations, and issues related to North 

Korea.103 This attention is reciprocated by Seoul. China 

is now South Korea’s largest trade partner. Two-way 

trade between the two countries is $145 billion a year. 

Also, South Korean investments in China were at 

$22.54 billion in 2007.104

All that said, most observers acknowledge that 

“China is North Korea’s most important ally,” and 

Beijing has sustained the Kim Jong-Il regime (see 

Appendix I).105 The official line in Beijing is that “China 

has played a constructive role in easing the tension 

and resolving the [North Korean] nuclear crisis.”106

Among the most serious contingencies that China 

must consider is that if the Kim regime in North Korea 

collapses or cannot control the population, Beijing 

could face a massive influx of refugees along the shared 

800-mile border.107 Moreover, as the PLA leaders with 

whom I had contact feared, any such collapse would 

certainly bring South Korean and U.S. intervention. 

Thus the PLA must be prepared to move supplies into 

North Korea and move forces in to restore order and to 

secure the Sino-North Korean border. 

Beijing has been the donor of last resort that kept 

North Korea in food and fuel through famine and 

energy crises for decades.108 At one point when the 

United States, South Korea, and the European Union 

(EU) cut support for Pyongyang, China increased its 

crude oil exports to North Korea by 45 percent and its 

grain exports by 96 percent.109 The Chinese leadership 

also has made decisions that create potential problems 

with Japan and could lead to territorial conflict. 

Pyongyang has a strong indigenous arms industry, 

and it is rare that China supplies weapons to North 

Korea (see Appendix II).
349

Japan and both Koreas, the Democratic People’s 

Republic of Korea (North Korea or DPRK) and the 

Republic of Korea (South Korea or ROK), are in a 

dispute over the area formerly known as Liancourt 

Rocks. Japan annexed the islands in 1905, its first 

annexation of territory from Korea after the SinoJapanese War. Both Koreas call the islands Tok-do 

(or Dokdo), and Japan claims them as the Takeshima 

Islands.110 The islands are about 216 kilometers from 

the Korean Peninsula and 87 kilometers from South 

Korea’s Ullung Island. They sit 115 kilometers from 

Japan’s Oki Island. The original challenges were over 

fishing grounds, but today some South Korean officials 

believe that there may be exploitable oil or gas deposits 

around the island.111 Since 1954, the ROK coast guard 

has stationed a battalion on the islands permanently.112

The Chinese foreign ministry supports the position 

held by both North and South Korea; that the islands 

belong to Korea. This puts Beijing in good graces with 

both Pyongyang and Seoul, but means that in the 

event of a confrontation between the Japanese forces 

and either Korea, the CMC, and the Politburo Standing 

Committee (PBSC) must wrestle with whether to 

involve the PLA. Beijing has also signed a deal with 

North Korea to jointly develop offshore oil reserves at 

unspecified locations, another action that could affect 

contingencies with Japan.113

Beijing has its own problems with North Korea’s 

regime. In official statements, books, and statecontrolled media, the PRC leadership provides support 

for the DPRK and takes no position advocating regime 

change.114 PLA officials reiterate the official Chinese call 

for a “denuclearized Korean Peninsula.”115 The 2006 

national defense white paper describes the situation on 
350

the Korean Peninsula as “complex and challenging,” 

but advocates no change in policy.116

Even in closed forums, there is almost a taboo 

on discussing “regime change” in North Korea. In 

a 2006, closed-door meeting with officials from the 

China Institute for International Strategic Studies and 

the China Institute for Contemporary International 

Relations, representatives from these organizations 

expressed frustration with the slow pace of progress 

on the nuclear issue with the DPRK.117 However, the 

Chinese officials attending also expressed concerns 

about the implications for China of a collapse in North 

Korea. At the Central Party School’s China Reform 

Forum, also in 2006, senior leaders took a similar 

position, arguing for patience on the part of the United 

States. 

In the same year, in Shanghai, specialists of Korean 

affairs at the Shanghai Institute for International 

Studies (SIIS) assessed that Pyongyang sought to 

gain the initiative in any negotiations, and therefore 

engaged in provocative behavior, but wanted a nuclear 

deal.118 They expressed no serious concerns about U.S. 

or Japanese action to intercept any missiles the DPRK 

might test, if the intercepts took place outside DPRK 

territory. However, they counseled against any strikes 

inside North Korea. The “fundamental objective of 

Beijing’s policy with the DPRK is the maintenance of 

stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula,” according 

to the most senior Korea scholar participating in the 

Shanghai discussions.

During meetings with scholars from Fudan 

University who get involved in national level security 

policy discussions in Beijing, scholars who had traveled 

to North Korea counseled patience and advised against 

any preemptive strike by the United States.
351

At Fudan and at SIIS, Chinese scholars cautioned 

that China has a bilateral commitment and security 

treaty with North Korea “that China must observe.” 

They advised that any military action against North 

Korea would inevitably involve China. However, they 

did not suggest that “regime change” was a preferred 

Chinese policy. Rather, stability on the peninsula was 

their objective. In fact, the Shanghai-based scholars 

reacted strongly to the term “regime change” and 

suggested that it had connotations of the U.S. attack 

on Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein and a policy 

of preemption. One scholar revealed that there is a 

commitment in the PRC-DPRK security agreement 

that would commit China to assisting the DPRK in the 

case of a U.S. attack.

 In a series of meetings in 2007, representatives 

of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Academy of 

Military Science, the China Institute for Contemporary 

International Research, and the China Institute for 

International Studies also were willing to comment 

on North Korea, noting that Pyongyang was unstable, 

difficult to negotiate with, and required patience.119 No 

participant on the Chinese side, however, in private 

conversation or in plenary meetings, departed from 

the official position counseling patience with the 

DPRK. Although a couple of Chinese participants, with 

whom this writer had decades of contact, expressed 

frustration with North Korea’s actions, none suggested 

that the PRC leadership sought regime change. 

A former PLA intelligence officer that still writes 

on North Korea and has regular contacts with the PLA 

Second Department and the Ministry of State Security 

counseled only caution and patience.120 He said that 

dealing with North Korea was frustrating, but that 

Kim Jong-Il did not seek a war. He did not suggest 
352

that regime change or change in Beijing’s policy was 

a good idea. Indeed, like the scholars in Shanghai, he 

said that when an American used the term “regime 

change,” the term had connotations of an armed attack 

on Pyongyang. He advised against such an action as 

well as using that term to describe approaches to North 

Korea. 

To highlight the sensitivity of the CCP to any 

open criticism of the DPRK, remember that in 2002, 

the Beijing journal Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and 

Management) published an article by Wang Zhongwen 

of the Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences that was 

critical of North Korea.121 Wang suggested that China’s 

interests were in stability on the Korean Peninsula 

and that North Korea’s actions did not help stability. 

In a short time, that issue of Strategy and Management 

was recalled from the shelves, and the postal service 

of China took them back. The electronic version of the 

article disappeared from the journal’s web site, and 

even web log discussion about the article disappeared. 

Still, some scholars are publishing in Hong Kong on 

the subject, complaining that North Korea is a drag on 

China, and a buffer on the Korean Peninsula may no 

longer be needed.122

In summary, although many in China’s security 

community and senior military leaders may be 

frustrated with North Korea’s behavior, the critical 

importance of stability in the region dictates a policy 

of patience and support for the North.

Summing up the Chances of Joint Contingency 

Operations.

The PLA is slowly adapting to joint concepts and 

operations. Like most of the force, equipment, and 
353

doctrinal changes in the PLA, these things move 

slowly, with halting steps, and a lot of experimentation. 

The PLA today certainly understands the concepts.123

Application, however, seems to be moving slowly.124

It helps if observers keep their expectations low; after 

all, when it got its Su-27s it took more than a decade 

to move from introduction into the force structure to 

operational readiness for the PLA Air Force to use 

these aircraft with any proficiency. 

Integrating the Sovremenny destroyers into the 

Navy took about the same period. However, fitting 

new weapon systems to older platforms sometimes 

goes exceedingly quickly. Once the PLA got the 

Sunburn hypersonic anti-ship missile, China’s defense 

industry managed to reverse engineer it quickly and 

adapt it to other ships. We can expect to see similar 

improvements on air-launched anti-ship missiles, just 

as the PLA lost no time in developing air-launched 

land attack cruise missiles. All of these are things 

that will give the PLA capabilities to operate jointly 

outside China beyond Taiwan contingencies. Also, 

the PLA has done reasonably well with data links and 

cooperative targeting, integrating some airborne and 

special operations forces with the ground forces, and 

Navy-Second Artillery Corps integration.125

While joint concepts as they are approached in the 

western context may be new for the PLA, the Chinese 

armed forces and their civilian and military leaders 

are used to contingency planning. They were good 

at reacting to contingencies in the Korean War; they 

moved quickly and flexibly to respond opposite India 

in 1962; the CMC got forces moved quickly prior to the 

Tiananmen Massacre in 1989; they respond reasonably 

quickly to floods and earthquakes; and the force 
354

response to the race riots in Tibet in 2008 were fast and 

proportional. 

Chinese military thinkers have sketched out for 

themselves a road map over an extended period 

of time to achieve joint contingency capabilities.126

David Finkelstein emphasizes that the PLA seeks 

to “field credible operational capabilities to deter 

aggression against . . . its [China’s] interests (political 

or economic),” as well as to “support the diplomatic 

element of national power with real ‘teeth’.”127 He 

seems to have called it right. Inside the CCP and the 

PLA, this “road map” is anchored in the military 

legacies of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin.128 The 

PLA depends on observations of U.S.-led coalition 

operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq as models 

for how to employ precision weapons, sensors, and 

communications in joint operations.129

CMC and PLA leadership have set out a patient 

pathway of three phases or “three steps” (The Threestep Development Strategy, or 三步走的发展战略)130 to 

greater military strength and operational effectiveness 

for the PLA stretching from the late 20th century to the 

mid-21st century.131 The first phase is about over. This 

first phase was to take from 10-20 years and build a firm 

base of military technology and modernization. The 

second phase is to use another decade and, “according 

to China’s national economic power,” increase budgets 

and build a stronger military. Third, after “30 years or 

so of work,” toward the middle of the 21st century, the 

PLA is to “complete the process of building a modern, 

strong military.”132

In his report to the 17th CCP national congress, 

Hu underwrote the basic goal to “attain the strategic 

objective of building computerized armed forces and 

building and winning IT [information technology]-
355

based warfare.”133 Hu’s speech reinforced the emphasis 

on methodically building a strong, modern armed 

force capable of defending China and its interests with 

technology and tactics supported by China’s economy 

and level of economic development.

More recently, this “three-step approach” as 

the basic CCP line in military modernization was 

reaffirmed by Chen Zhou, a PLA strategist, in the 

Central Party School publication Xuexi Shibao. Chen 

characterized the steps as “laying a solid foundation 

by 2010, making major progress by 2020, and basically 

reaching the strategic goal of building an informatized 

army and becoming capable of winning informatized 

wars by the mid-21st century.”134

This should tell us that we cannot expect to see 

dramatic changes in either the posture or the capabilities 

of the PLA to conduct joint contingency operations 

out of area, even in contiguous states, over the near 

term (say 5-10 years). Instead, observers will probably 

see an evolution of new operational doctrine and the 

equipment and forces to implement them over time. 

The challenge for U.S. policy makers will be to monitor 

these changes and improvements in capabilities while 

measuring the likely intent of Chinese decisionmakers. 

The basic “line” set by the CCP leadership is also 

important to understand. The PLA has been told to 

adopt a basically defensive military posture in the near 

term (10 years or so) while it develops a new range 

of capabilities in response to new missions. There is 

always an “internal line” and an “external line” in CCP 

guidance, but the external line is the one we see, and for 

now, the diplomacy and military actions are consistent 

with maintaining a “peaceful environment.” What we 

do not see is how the highest levels of the CCP conceive 
356

China and the PLA’s posture later in the 21st century. 

In any case, this “defensive posture” has some active 

elements to it, and the PLA can be very prickly over 

some sensitive issues relating to sovereignty and air or 

naval activities. 

Based on the texts in this chapter, the PLA seems to 

be aiming at a military force capable of:

• responding to domestic problems,

• securing China’s sovereign territory,

• defending China’s economic and political 

interests at long distances,

• patrolling vital sea lines of communication,

• denying potential adversaries the freedom to 

coerce China with impunity, and

• limiting proximity to the coast, from which 

potential adversaries can conduct strike 

operations against the Chinese mainland.

In one text exploring future operational concepts, 

Jiang Yamin, writing for the Academy of Military Science, argues that 600 years ago China had the strongest 

economy with the most powerful military in the world 

capable of conducting long-distance operations.135 He 

laments that this capability deteriorated to the point 

that in 1840, “with only a few thousand troops,” a 

successful invasion of China was mounted, illustrates 

the effectiveness of such operations.136 Even though 

the general trend in the world is toward “peace and 

development,” he argues, “the threat of warfare still 

exists” and China needs a strong military capable of 

operations across long distances as a means to deter 

others (literally, 止戈为武).137

There is one contingency area, however, that could 

lead to a PLA reaction in the maritime arena by naval 

forces, naval air, or long range air. The PLA (and 
357

probably the CMC and Foreign Ministry) are now 

allergic to attempts to stop and search or detain ships at 

sea. Although there has been considerable improvement 

in China’s behavior with respect to actions to stop the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 

their technologies, and their delivery systems, Beijing 

has kept its distance from the Proliferation Security 

Initiative (PSI). The reluctance of China’s foreign 

affairs and defense community to take an active role 

in the PSI may relate to China’s experience with the 

U.S. Navy and Department of State during the Yinhe 

Incident in 1993.138

In a text written for the PLA National Defense 

University, Guojia Haishang Liyi Lun (On Maritime 

National Interest), a PLA senior colonel complains 

bitterly about China’s “embarrassment at the hands 

of the United States” during the Yinhe Incident.139

According to Wang Lidong, the fact that a Chinese 

ship had to submit to boarding and search by the U.S. 

Navy, even after the PRC Foreign Ministry denied to 

the U.S. State Department that the Yinhe carried WMD 

chemical precursors, is ”an example of [American] 

imperialism and power politics” (霸权主义和强权政治

的表现), the exact language used in the PRC Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs press statement on the incident in 

1993.

140 Wang, writing in a text used to train senior 

PLA officers about to achieve (and of) flag rank, opines 

that U.S. actions demonstrate that China did not have 

the capacity to protect its own maritime interests at 

that time. In response, he advocates a stronger navy 

able to protect Chinese maritime interests at sea. If 

Wang Lidong’s attitude represents the prevailing 

sentiment in the PLA and the CMC, it is unrealistic to 

expect China’s cooperation in the PSI, which involves 

stopping ships of sovereign states for inspection.
358

With respect to Central Asia, the ground forces, air 

forces, and special operations forces that might respond 

to domestic contingencies in Xinjiang and Gansu are 

roughly the same ones that might be called on for any 

problems in the region. Of course, the CMC and the 

PBSC will have to weigh carefully Russian interests, 

and any Chinese joint contingency operations in Central 

Asia will be constrained by estimates of a Russian 

response. To handicap the likelihood of events: 

• The PLA is more likely to be used with the 

cooperation and assent of the government of 

a Central Asian country to stabilize an area 

around an oil or gas field or pipeline;

• It is not likely that the PLA would be used to 

respond to cross-border terrorist camps without 

some assent from the other nation;

• If Chinese workers or diplomats were killed 

or kidnapped, PLA or Chinese security forces 

would probably seek to cooperate with the 

forces of the nation in which the event occurred; 

and,

• In the event of a complete collapse of order in 

a Central Asian nation that threatened Chinese 

economic or political interests, any response 

probably would be calibrated and carefully 

coordinated with Russia and the rest of the 

SCO.

In other words, while the PLA can bring a lot of 

operational capabilities to bear on events in Central 

Asia, the political climate in which it would have to 

operate seriously constrains its action.

In South Asia, the likelihood of joint contingency 

operations is higher and probably would involve 

ground forces, the People’s Armed Police (PAP), the 
359

PLA Air Force, the PLA Navy, and to some extent 

the Second Artillery Corps. Also, it is likely that the 

PLA Navy will be more active in the sea lines of 

communications from the Strait of Malacca through 

the Indian Ocean and to Pakistan, where Beijing has 

deep and historic interests. Certainly the possibility of 

contingency operations will increase with more port 

operations in Gwadar and the rail links being built. 

India here can be both an exacerbating factor and a 

constraint on any PLA reactions. 

The Sino-Indian border is stable, but there is always 

some possibility, however low, of confrontation there. 

Such an event would probably involve the ground 

forces, the air forces, including long-range aviation, 

and the Second Artillery Corps.

Myanmar is becoming increasingly important from 

a diplomatic and economic standpoint to China. It 

will likely be one of the way points for PLA Navy task 

forces when they eventually venture out of the South 

China Sea and the Pacific if the PLA begins regular 

maritime patrols along sea lines of communication. The 

radar sites and listening posts in the bay off Myanmar 

are going to be areas of irritation for India. Thus any 

contingencies there would probably mean all the arms 

and services of the PLA would be involved. 

To handicap the likelihood of contingency 

operations in South Asia:

• The PLA is more likely to be used in case of 

serious problems in Myanmar. China’s port 

complex, its radar posts, and its road and rail 

links will increase in importance relative to 

China’s national interests in the future.

• As the PLA Navy becomes more active and 

evolves into a regular presence in the Indian 

Ocean, the likelihood is higher that it could be 

used in disaster relief in Bangladesh.
360

• Over the course of the next decade, the PLA 

Navy will likely seek a presence in the Indian 

Ocean and the Bay of Bengal that will involve 

combined operations with other countries in 

South Asia.

• Renewed border conflict with India is less likely, 

but if such a conflict occurs, the PLA would use 

all its arms and services.141

• A serious collapse in Pakistan or a conflict 

between Pakistan and India would trigger a 

Chinese contingency reaction, even if China did 

not intervene.

In Northeast Asia, any contingencies involving 

North Korea will involve all the arms and services of 

the PLA. Also, here there are constraints from South 

Korea, Japan, and the United States, if not also Russia. 

Perhaps the most volatile issue, although limited in 

scope, will be competing maritime claims and how 

they sort out. 

To handicap the likelihood of PLA contingency 

operations in Northeast Asia:

• The CMC, the GSD, and the PBSC would likely 

try to avoid involvement in a territorial dispute 

among North Korea, South Korea, and Japan; 

but the PLA might be used in a maritime or air 

presence role as well as for reconnaissance.

• The likelihood is high that in the event of a 

collapse in North Korea, the PLA would be used 

to stabilize the situation and even to restore 

control.

• The likelihood is high that the PLA would be 

used in the vicinity of the North Korea-China 

border in the event of instability in North 

Korea.
361

• There is a high likelihood that China would at 

least consult with, if not coordinate its actions 

with the United States and other countries in 

the region.142

Finally, over the next decade, it is likely that the 

PLA Navy will begin more regular maritime patrols. 

These will probably be of small scale, self-supporting, 

and they will probably use refueling and resupply 

points in places friendly to Beijing. But such operations 

will elicit a reaction from India, which in the same 

time frame may well begin its own regular maritime 

presence patrols. Such activities are not volatile, but 

they can add to the tensions in a region and create 

contingencies for the PLA Air Force and the Second 

Artillery Corps. Also, Japan may react to an increased 

Chinese maritime or air presence in the region.

There are policy implications for the United States 

from these possible outcomes. In Central Asia, U.S. 

military engagement, foreign assistance, and diplomacy 

are important to maintain influence. Also, it may be 

useful for the United States to become more involved 

in the SCO as a means of maintaining influence in the 

region.

In South Asia, relations with India and Pakistan 

are important means to remain engaged in the region. 

Military cooperation and arms sales should be part of 

any engagement program. Also, the rapid response 

by U.S. forces to the inevitable natural disasters and 

calamities that strike many of the countries in the region 

are an excellent way of keeping up good relations 

without forcing those countries to make “zero-sum” 

decisions on how they relate to China. Myanmar is a 

difficult situation, but here the United States can work 

through other allies such as Thailand or Japan to help 

balance Chinese influence. 
362

In the case of North Korea, it is probably useful 

to continue bilateral discussions in addition to the 

six-party talks. China has influence, but American, 

Japanese, and South Korean actions must be designed 

against the backdrop of North Korea’s ally that “will 

not allow” the country to collapse. Also, at the highest 

levels of security consultation, senior defense officials 

from the United States and China should at least make 

it clear that each side sees itself as having military 

stakes in resolving conflict on the Korean Peninsula. 

As for attempting to raise such issues as bilateral 

contingency planning, this writer believes such moves 

are premature and that, in any case, PLA leaders 

would resist such attempts if there is no burning need 

for them.
363

CHAPTER 10 - ENDNOTES

1. China’s interests and approaches to the Korean peninsula 

are identified in Scott Snyder, North Korea’s Decline and China’s 

Strategic Dilemmas, USIP Special Report #27, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Institute for Peace, October 1997, www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/

ealy/snyder/China-nk-pt1.html. Snyder points out that Chinese 

scholars accept that the system in North Korea needs reform, 

that the PRC takes a pragmatic approach to the Peninsula, and 

that China’s main goal is regional stability on the Peninsula. He 

makes much the same points in 2006 in a USIP publication, www.

usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/0517_six_party_talks.html. 

On Central Asia and China’s interests, see Nicklas Norling and 

Niklas Swanström, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 

Trade and the Roles of Iran, India, and Pakistan, Central Asian 

Survey, Vol. 26, No. 3, September 2007, pp. 429-444; and Nicklas 

Norling and Nicklas Swanström, “The Virtues and Potential 

Gains of Continental Trade in Eurasia,” Asian Survey, Vol. XKVII, 

No. 3, June 2007, pp. 351-373. On south Asia, see John W. Garver, 

Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 

Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002; Swaran Singh, 

China and South Asia: Issues, Equations and Policies, New Delhi, 

India: Lancer Books, 2003; and Zhang Guihong, “Perceptions and 

Responses to the Rise of India: A View from China, South Asian 

Studies in China, 2003-14; October 9, 2008, www.sasnet.cn/english/

papers/papers.asp. On the PLA, see Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of 

Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March, Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 2003; Dennis Blasko, The Chinese 

Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, New 

York: Routledge, 2006; and Xiaobing Li, A History of the Modern 

Chinese Army, Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2007. 

2. These are two of the key missions set for the PLA in China’s 

2006 National Defense White Paper, www.china.org.cn/English/

features/book/19485.htm.

3. Liu Jingbo, ed., 21 Shiji Chu Zhongguo Guojia Anquan Zhanlue 

(Chinese National Security Strategy in the Early 21st Century), Beijing, 

China: Shishi Chubanshe, 2006, pp. 200-202. 
364

4. Ba Zhongtan, Fu Zhubian, Mi Zhenyu, and Wang Guozhong, 

Zhongguo Guoji Anquan Zhanlue Wenti Yanjiu (Study of Issues on 

China’s National Security Strategy), Beijing, China: Junshi Kexue 

Chubanshe, 2003, pp. 143-146. 

5. Ibid., p. 150.

6. Daniel M. Hartnett, Towards a Globally Focused Chinese 

Military: The ‘Historic Missions’ of the Chinese Armed Forces,” CME 

D0018304.A1, Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, June 2008, p. 

1. This was published as Open Source Center (hereafter OSC) 

CPP2008060632500, June 6, 2008.

7. “CMC’s Guo Boxiong Urges Improving PLA Capabilities 

to “Fulfill Historic Missions,” Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 

1555GMT 27 Sep 05, in OSC CPP 20050927320021 (also cited in 

Hartnett, Towards a Globally Focused Chinese Military, p. 3).

8. Hartnett, Towards a Globally Focused Chinese Military, pp. 1, 

10-12. 

9. Wang Lidong, Guojia Haishang Liyi Lun (A Discussion of 

China’s National Maritime Interests), Beijing, China: Guofang 

Daxue Chubanshe, 2007, p. 248. See also Ba et. al, Zhongguo Guoji 

Anquan Zhanlue Wenti Yanjiu, pp, 29-51, 128-161. Hang Wuchao 

makes essentially the same point in Han Wuchao, “Shixi Guojia 

Liyi yu Zhanlue Fangxiang” (“Analysis of National Interests and 

Strategic Orientation”), Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military 

Science), Vol. 20, No. 1, 2007, pp. 84-90.

10. On the need to develop the capacity to secure China’s 

interests abroad, see Jiang Yamin, Yuan Zhan (Long Distance 

Operations), Beijing, China: Academy of Military Science Press, 

2007. 

11. Ibid., p. 231.

12. Han Wuchao, “Shixi Guojia Liyi yu Zhanlue Fangxiang,” 

p. 90.

13. Yan Xuetong and Jin Deying, Dongya Heping yu Anquan 
365

(Peace and Security in East Asia), Beijing, China: Shishi Chubanshe, 

2005, pp. 117-126, 163-172; Zhu Tingzhang, Zhongguo Zhoubian 

Anquan Huanjing yu Zhanlue (China’s Peripheral Security 

Environment and Strategies), Beijing, China: Shishi Chubanshe, 

2002, 507-516; Guo Xuetang, “Zhong-Ou-Ya Diqu de Nengyuan 

yu Diyu Zhengzhi” (“Energy and Geopolitics in Central-Eurasia”, 

Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), Vol. 19, No. 3, 2006, 

pp. 74-80. 

14. Wang, Guojia Haishang Liyi Lun, p. 260.

15. Ibid., p. 261. 

16. Jiang Yamin, Yuan Zhan (Long Distance Operations), Beijing, 

China: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 2007, pp. 231-232.

17. John Wu and Andrei Chang, “PLA Navy’s Future Aircraft 

Carriers,” Kanwa Intelligence Review, August 21, 2008, accessed 

through Nexis, www.kanwa.com/defr/. The Kanwa authors believe 

that the PLA Navy has ordered four sets of arresting hooks for 

aircraft carrier operations from Russia. Also see Manu Pubby, 

“China Works on Matching India’s Naval Fleet; China to have 

First Aircraft Carriers for Training by 2012,” Indian Express Online, 

August 27, 2008, OSC FEA20080827760397. It is not clear if the 

Indian article is based on Kanwa’s publication and is “circular 

reporting,” but both predict that the Varyag will be the refitted 

training carrier for the PLA Navy. 

18. Li Jie, “China to Build Aircraft Carrier in Light of Own 

Strategic Needs,” People’s Daily Online, April 25, 2007, in OSC 

CPP20070425701008. 

19. Wang, Guojia Haishang Liyi Lun, p. 248; see also Yang 

Mingshu, Haishang Tongdao Anquan yu Guoji Hezuo (Sea Land 

Security and International Cooperation), Beijing, China: Shishi 

Chunbanshe, 2005, pp. 5-7, 357-376; Zheng Shenxia, “Zhongguo 

Heping Fazhen yu Yatai Diqu Anquan” (“Peace and Development in 

China and Asia-Pacific Security”), Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China 

Military Science), Vol. 20, No. 1, 2007, pp. 1-4.

20. Zheng Shenxia, “Zhongguo Heping Fazhen yu Yatai Diqu 

Anquan” (“Peace and Development in China and Asia-Pacific 

Security”), Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), Vol. 20, 
366

No. 1, 2007, pp. 1-4.

21. Discussion between the author and PLA officers in May 

2004 and August 2005 in Beijing, China. 

22. Discussion with Zheng Bijian on August 23, 2005, in 

Beijing, China. 

23. Larry Wortzel, “China’s Peaceful Rise,” The Asian Wall 

Street Journal, September 5, 2005, p. A9.

24. “Afghanistan: China’s Winning Bid for Copper Rights,” 

Radio Free Europe, November 24, 0227, accessed through 

Nexis; Thomas Fuller, “Asia Builds New Road to Prosperity,” 

International Herald Tribune, March 31, 2008, p. 1; “Construction 

of GMS Sectional Highway Begins in Myanmar,” Xinhua News 

Service, April 1, 2008, Nexis; “Burmese Writer Says China’s 

Procurement of Shwe Gas Part of Wider Scheme,” BBC, January 

17, 2008, accessed through Nexis; “ Work on Missing Link 

Between Poipet and Sisophon to Start in 1st Quarter,” Malaysia 

Economic News, January 17, 2008, accessed through Nexis; Joshua 

Kucera, “Central Asia: A Vision for a Regional Transport Network 

Takes Shape,” Eurasianet, January 14, 2008, accessed through Nexis; 

“China Plans Rail Link to Central Asia,” The Times of Central Asia, 

February 1, 2008, Nexis; ““Gwadar Deep Sea Port Operations,” 

Riyadh SPA, March 15, 2008, www.spa .gov.sa; “Pakistan Moves to 

Finalize Rail Link with China, The Press Trust of India, April 22, 

2008, Nexis; “CNPC Secures PetroKazakhstan Bid,” BBC News, 

October 26, 2005, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/437829.stm, accessed 

April 27, 2008; “Oil Development Deal Struck with North Korea,” 

Los Angeles Times, December 25, 2005, Nexis; “A Ravenous Dragon, 

Special Report on China’s Quest for Resources,” The Economist,” 

March 15, 2008, pp. 1-22; China’s Foreign Policy and “Soft Power” in 

South American, Asia, and Africa, S. PRT. 110-46, A Study Prepared 

for the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, 

Washington, DC:U.S. Government Printing Office, April 2008. 

25. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 

SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, China Arms Transfers 2006-2007, 

www.armstrade.sipri.org. 

26. Ba et. al, Zhongguo Guoji Anquan Zhanlue Wenti Yanjiu, pp. 
367

137-138. 

27. Ding Hao and Han Wei, “Cong Zhimindi Zouxiang Daguo 

de Jueqi Zhi Lu: Indu Guojia Anquan Zhanlue Xuanze” (“Road 

from a Former Colony to the Rise of a World Power: Strategic 

Choices of Indian National Security”), Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 

(China Military Science), Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 82-83.

28. “Nanfang Zhoumo Cites PRC Experts on Prospects in 

Sino-India Relations,” OSC, CPP20080118530006 in Guangzhou 

Nanfang Zhoumo (Internet Version-WWW) in Chinese, January 17, 

2008.

29. Pravin Sawhney, “On the China Front; Only the Indian 

Air Force Can Provide Dissuasive Deterrence,” Force, October 

13, 2008, www.forceindia.net/cover1.asp; Gurmeet Kanwal, 

“India-China Territorial Dispute: More Heat than Light,” Vayu 

Aerospace and Defense Review, May 1-June 30, 2008, p. 76, in OSC 

SAP20080715524008; see also “Fly Navy—The Chinese Way,” 

Vayu Aerospace and Defense Review, May 1–June 30, 2008, pp. 68-

70, in OSC SAP20080715524006; Andrei Chang, “India’s Build-up 

of Air Power in the East,” UPI Asia Online, www.upiasiaonline.com/

Security/2008/08/20/indias_build-up_of_air_power_in_the_east/8060/.

30. Kanwa Intelligence Review, “Kanwa: China Reinforces 

Nuclear, Conventional Deterrence Against India,” OSC 

CPP20080623715012.

31. The author is grateful to Dennis Blasko for this insight.

32. Sudha Ramachandran, “India Takes the High Ground 

Against China,” The Asia Times, June 14, 2008, www.atimes.com/

atimes/South_Asia/JF14Df02.html.

33. Gavin Rabinowitz, “India, China Jostle for Influence in 

Indian Ocean,” The Associated Press, June 8, 2008, Lexis.

34. Ibid.

35. “India to Get Network Centric Warfare Capability by 

2010-11, Saws Defense Chief,” Doordarshan News Online, August 

17, 2008, www.ddines.gov.in, in OSC SAP 200817384009.
368

36. “India’s Eastward Movements and its Impact on China’s 

Defense Strategy on the Western Front,” Kanwa Asian Defense 

Review, July 8, 2008, accessed by Nexis. 

37. Li Donghang and Jiang Xinghua, “Expert Comments on 

Sino-Indian Joint Anti-Terrorism Exercise,” Jiefangjun Bao, in OSC 

CPP20071226704001, December 26, 2007, p. 6.

38. Yu Li, “A Partnership Between the Dragon and the 

Elephant that Transcends the Himalayas,” Nanfang Zhoumo, , OSC 

CPP 20080118530006 January 17, 2008. See also Chen Ruisheng, 

Zheng Ruixiang, and Ma Jiali, “The Sino-Indian Border Issue 

Has Seen Progress But no Breakthroughs—Experts Analyze the 

Significance of Singh’s Visit to China and the Hot Issues in SinoIndian Relations,” Nanfang Zhoumo, January 19, 2008, in OSC 

CPP200801222530005. The Chen, Zheng, and Ma piece says that “it 

must be said that the likelihood of conflict erupting is minimal.”

39. One observer opined that this silence is a result of a 

policy decision by the CCP Propaganda Department, putting 

negative articles on Sino-Indian relations off limits for Chinese 

commentators. There has been no independent confirmation of 

such a policy. However, the CCP Propaganda Department has 

shown that it will black out topics, as it did with the journal article 

on North Korea. See Wang Zhongwen, “Yi Xin Shijiao Shenshi 

Chaoxian Wenti Yu Dongbeiya Xingshi” (“Examining the DPRK 

Issue and Northeast Asian Situation from a New Viewpoint”), 

Beijing, China, Zhanlue Yu Guanli (Strategy and Management), Issue 

4, July-August 2004, pp. 92-94, which it removed from the web 

site of the journal (see the discussion later in this chapter). 

40. Wang Wei, “The Trend of Development of All-Around 

Cooperation Between China and South Asia,” Wen Wei Pao, OSC 

CPP20080423710012, April 23, 2008.

41. Harsh V. Pant, “China, India: Back to the Boundary,” ISN 

Security Watch, June 16, 2008, Lexis.

42. “Afghanistan: China’s Winning bid for Copper Includes 

Power Plant, Railroad,” Radio Free Asia, November 24, 2007, 

Nexis. The author notes that Afghanistan is one of the countries 
369

classified by the United Nations as part of “Southern Asia,” and 

that one could call it southwest Asia or part of Central Asia. For 

the purposes of this chapter, suffice it to say this landlocked 

country is in a transition zone. 

43. “Gwadar Deep Sea Port Operates, Riyadh SPA,” March 15, 

2008, www.spa.sa, Nexis.

44. “Pakistan Moves to Finalize Rail Link with China,” The 

Press Trusts of India, April 22, 2007, Nexis. 

45. “Pakistan Signs Contract with Chinese Firm for Power 

Project,” The Economic Times, April 1, 2008, economictimes.

indiatimes.com/news/News_by_industry/energy/pak_signs_contract_

with_Chines_firm_fror_power_ Project/articlesshow/2917816.cms. 

“Pakistan, China Discussing 2nd Nuclear Power Plant,” Kyodo 

News International, August 12, 2002, findarticles.com/p/articles/

mim0WDQ/is_2002_August_12/ai_90297109.

46. See economictimes.indiatimes.com/News.News_by-industry/

Energy/Pak_signes_contract-with_Chinese_firm_for_power_project/

articleshow/2917816.cms, accessed April 1, 2008.

47. See www.bangladeshenergy.com, April 4, 2008.

48. Ibid.

49. Thomas Fuller, “Asia Builds New Road to Prosperity,” The 

International Herald Tribune, March 31, 2008, Nexis.

50. “China Signs Exploration Deals with Myanmar,” UPI 

Energy, January 15, 2008, Nexis; “China-Myanmar Pipeline Still 

Under Discussion,” Xinhua News Agency, March 10, 2008, news.

xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/10/content_7756822.htm, accessed 

March 12, 2008; “Burmese Writer Says China’s Procurement of 

Shwe Gas Part of Wider Scheme,” BBC, January 7, 2008, Nexis.

51. “China-Myanmar Oil Pipeline Construction to Begin this 

Year, Extends to Chongqing,” Xinhua Financial News, March 26, 

2007, Nexis; “Work on Missing Link Between Sisophon to Start in 

Q:1,” Malaysia Economic News, January 17, 2008, Nexis. 
370

52. “China and India Battle for Myanmar’s Gas,” Petroleum 

Economist, May 2006, www.petroleumeconomist.com, January 17, 

2008.

53. Unless otherwise noted, all of the military sales and 

deliveries in this section are from SIPRI, SIPRI Arms Transfers 

Database, China Arms Transfers 2006-7, www.armstrade.sipri.org. 

54. “Procurement Myanmar” and “Navy, Myanmar,” 

Jane’s, April 28, 2008, www9.janes.com/search/documentView.

do?docID+/content1/janesdata/sent/seasu/myans150.htm@

current&pageSelected+allJanes@keyword+myanmar&backPath+http://

search.janes.com/search.janes.com/search&prod_Name-SEAS&.

55. Chang. See also Cheng Feng and Larry M. Wortzel, “PLA 

Operational Principles and Limited War: The Sino-Indian War of 

1962,” in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. 

McDevitt, eds., Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949, 

Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002, pp. 173-197, especially the map 

on p. 175.

56. “Advantage China,” Force, May 1, 2008, in OSC 

SAP20080513342005. This New Delhi journal gives no attribution 

for the article.

57. Ibid.

58. SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, China Arms transfers 

2006-7, armstrade.sipri.org.

59. You Ji, “Dealing with the Malacca Dilemma: China’s Effort 

to Protect its Energy Supply,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 3, 

May 1-June 30, 2007, pp. 467-489, in OSC SAP20080506524003.

60. David Blair, “India Targeting China’s Oil Supplies,” UK 

Telegraph, September 15, 2008, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2957578/

India-targeting-Chinas-oil-supplies.html.

61. Ibid.

62. You Ji, “Dealing with the Malacca Dilemma.” You Ji 
371

quotes from a text by Liu Yijian, Zhihaiquan yu Haijun Zhanlue (The 

Control of the Sea and Maritime Strategy), Beijing, China: Guofang 

Daxue Chubanshe, 2004, p. 233. 

63. You.

64. See E-Kantipur (I/EK), www.kantipuronline.com, Nepal, 

August 23-24, 2008. 

65. Stephen Blank, “The Strategic Importance of Central Asia: 

An American View,” Parameters, Spring 2008, p. 75.

66. OSC, Central Eurasia Daily Report, CEP-99, January 2, 

2004. 

67. OSC, Central Eurasia Daily Report, CEP-950492, February 

6, 2008; Elena Sadovskaya, “Chinese Migration to Kazakhstan,” 

China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 4, Winter 2007, pp. 

147-170.

68. Ibid., p. 78.

69. See the SCO website, www.sectsco.org/html/00088.html.

70. “Russia: Air Force CiC [Aleksandr] Zelin Discusses Current 

Air Force, Joint Air Defense Issues,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy 

Kuryer, in OSC CEP20080818548010, August 13, 2008. 

71. Ibid.

72. “A Thin Bowl of Alphabet Soup,” The Economist, August 9, 

2008, pp. 55-56.

73. See James Bellacqua, Terrorism in China: Perceptions 

of Vulnerability, Countermeasures, Alexandria, VA: The 

CNA Corporation, July 2008, in OSC FEA 20080807746951, 

August 7, 2008, https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.

pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_240_1019_43/http%3B/apps.

opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/9477907/

CPP20080807507001001.pdf.
372

74. “China, Russia: Wrangling Over the Future of the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization,” Stratfor Today, July 25, 2008, accessed 

through Nexis.

75. Wei Wei, “PRC officer Interviewed on ‘Peace Mission 

2007’; Explains ‘Four Key Words’,” Jiefangjun Bao in OSC 

CPP20070719710014, July 19, 2007, p. 5.

76. “PRC FM Relevant Responsible Person Briefs Press on 

Hu Jintao’s Three-Nation Trip,” Xinhua Domestic Service, in OSC 

CPP20080820172010, 1302 GMT, August 20, 2008.

77. Kou Zhong, “Zhongya Yunqi Guandao Jianshe de Beijing 

ji Yiyi” (“Background and Perspectives on the Construction of 

Gas Pipelines in Central Asia”), Guoji Shiyou Jingji (International 

Petroleum Economics), Vol. 16, No. 2, 2008, www.cnki.net, June 20, 

2008. 

78. Pu Xiaogang and Li Xiaoman, “Zhongya Nengyuan zhi 

Zheng yu Wo Guo Nengyuan Anquan Wenti Fenxi” (“On the 

Central Asia Energy Struggle and China’s Energy Security”), 

Wulumuqi Zhiye Daxue Xuebao (Journal of the Urumqi Vocational 

College), No. 4, 2007, pp. 17-20, accessed through www.cnki.net, 

June 20, 2008. 

79. Russel Ong, “China’s Security Interests in Central Asia,” 

Central Asian Survey, Vol. 24, No. 4, December 2005, pp. 425-439.

80. Guo Xuetang, “The Energy Security in Central Eurasia: 

the Geopolitical Implications to China’s Energy Strategy,” China 

and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2006, pp. 117-137. The 

quotes are from page 135. 

81. Ibid., p. 135.

82. Joshua Kucera, “Central Asia: A Vision for a Regional 

Transport Network Takes Shape,” Eurasianet, January 14, 2008, 

accessed through Nexis.

83. “China Plans Rail Link to Central Asia,” The Times of 

Central Asia, February 1, 2008, Nexis.
373

84. Ibid.

85. “Kyrgyzstan to Join Transcontinental Transport Corridors,” 

The Times of Central Asia, January 19, 2008, Nexis.

86. China Secures PetroKazakhstan Bid,” BBC News, October 

26, 2008, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6935292.htm, and “China to 

Build Second Oil Pipeline in Kazakhstan,” Comtex News Network, 

Inc., August 23, 2007, Nexis.

87. “China Prepared to Invest in Kyrgyzstan’s Power Sector,” 

RIA Novosti, August 2, 2006, Nexis.

88. “China Signs Agreement to Buy Turkmenistan Gas, Build 

Pipeline,” AP Financial Wire, April 3, 2006, Nexis. 

89. “China’s CNPC Unit in 210 Million Dollar Uzbekistan 

Oil and Gas Deal,” Agence France Press, June 15, 2006, Nexis. 

“Uzbekistan, China Sign Major Gas Pipeline Deal,” China Business 

News, Hong Kong Trade and Development Council, May 2, 

2007, sme.tdctrade.com/content.aspx?data+emergingMkt_content_

en&contentid+867436&src+BNT_OtherEastEur&w_sid+194&w_

cid+867435&w_idt+1900-01-01&w_oid+343&w_jid=.

90. Zhang Yingxiang, “Choppers Acquire Transport and Attack 

Capabilities,” Jiefangjun Bao Online, OSC CPP20080812702008, 

August 11, 2008. 

91. Willy Lam, “Harsh Chinese Crackdown Coming in 

Xinjiang,” The Asia Sentinel, August 22, 2008, accessed through

Nexis; Antoaneta Bezlova, “China’s Tough Xinjiang Policy 

Backfires,” The Asia Times, August 15, 2008, www.atimes.com/

atimes/China/JH15Ad01.html.

92. Western Returned Scholars Association (WRSA), The 

Unforgotten Korean War—Chinese Perspective and Appraisals, Beijing, 

China: Unpublished Manuscript, WRSA, August 15, 2007, p. 7. 

93. Ibid., p. 31.

94. Jayshreee Bajoria, “The China-North Korea Border 

Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, June 18, 
374

2008, www://cfr.org/publication.11097/chinanorth_korea_relatoinship.

html.

95. Ibid. Shen Dingli made similar statements to this author in 

an interview in June 2006 in Shanghai, China.

96. Shen, June 2006.

97. Roundtable at Fudan University between U.S. congressional 

advisers and faculty of Fudan University on June 24, 2006.

98. International Crisis Group (ICG), China and North Korea: 

Comrades Forever? Asia Report No. 112, February 1, 2006, pp. I, 

6-9, www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3920.

99. Fudan University, June 24, 2006.

100. Meetings with staff from the Academy of Military Science, 

China Institute of International Studies and China Institute of 

Contemporary International Relations, 2007 and 2008, in Beijing, 

China.

101. Cheng Shaohai, “Chaoxian Bandao He Wenti yu Dongbei 

Ya Anquan” (“The North Korean Nuclear Question and Northeast 

Asian Security”), Heping yu Fazhan (Peace and Development), No. 2, 

2004, p. 23.

102. ICG, “China and North Korea.”

103. “North Korea to Head Agenda at China-South Korea 

Summit,” Agence France Press, August 21, 2008, in www.spacewar.

com/2006/080821063615.jp8ho6kf.html, August 22, 2008.

104. Ibid. 

105. Jayshee Bajoria, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” 

Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, July 2, 2008 (updated 

July 18, 2008), www.cfr.org/publication/11097/chinanorth_korea_

relationship.html.

106. Zhang Wenling, “Constructing China’s New Relations 

with Neighboring Countries,” Dangdai Yatai, November 1, 2007, 
375

pp. 3-11, in OSC “PRC Scholar Discusses Issues in China’s Relations 

with Neighboring Countries,” OSC CPP20080201590002. 

107. Ibid.

108. Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of 

the Second Korea Nuclear Crisis, Washington, DC: The Brookings 

Institution Press, 2007, pp. 295-296, 323-324. 

109. Charles L. Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of 

How North Korea Got the Bomb, Washington, DC: The Brookings 

Institution, 2007, pp. 112-113.

110. Park Hee Kwon, The Law of the Sea and Northeast Asia: A 

Challenge for Cooperation, New York and Dordrecht: Kleuwer Law 

International, 2000, pp. 84-89. Also see Choe Sang-Hun, “Desolate 

Dots in the Sea stir Deep Emotions as South Korea Resists a 

Japanese Claim,” The New York Times, August 31, 2008, www.

nytimes.com/2008/08/31/world/asia/31islands.html?th&emc=th.

111. Interview with Member of the National Assembly of 

Korea, July 2, 2008, Washington, DC.

112. See www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/position.html. 

113. “Oil Development Deal Struck with North Korea,” Los 

Angeles Times, December 25, 2005, Nexis, July 17, 2008.

114. See for example See Liu Jingbo, 21 Shijichu Zhongguo 

Guojia Anquan Zhanlue, Zheng Shenxia and Liu Yuan, eds., Guofang 

he Jundui Jianshe Guanshe Luoshi Kexue Fazhan Guan Xuexi Tiyao.

115. Yang Yi, Liu Jianyong, Ma Junwei, and Wu Baiyi, 

“Shei Zai Weishe Dong Bei Ya Anquan?” (“Who is threatening 

Northeast Asia Security?”), Guoji Zhishi (International Knowledge), 

No. 4, 2004, p. 21. See also Yu Yingli, “Chao He Wenti yu dong Bei 

Ya Anquan Hezuo” (“The North Korea Problem and Northeast 

Asian Security”), Guoji Guancha (International Review), No. 6, 2004, 

pp. 34-39. 
376

116. China’s National Defense in 2006, Information Office of the 

State Council White Paper, December 29, 2006, Section I.

117. Meetings in Beijing, China, June 18-20, 2006. 

118. Meetings between the author and Chinese scholars at the 

Shanghai Institute for International Studies in Shanghai, China, 

June 23, 2006.

119. Meetings in Beijing, China, April 22-23, 2007.

120. Meeting in Virginia, August 25, 2007.

121. Wang Zhongwen, “Yi Xin Shijiao Shenshi Chaoxian 

Wenti Yu Dongbeiya Xingshi” (“Examining the DPRK Issue and 

Northeast Asian Situation from a New Viewpoint”), Zhanlue 

Yu Guanli (Strategy and Management), Issue Four, July-August, 

2004, pp. 92-94. The author thanks John Tkacik of The Heritage 

Foundation, for help in locating a copy of the article. 

122. Xue Li, “A Comprehensive Strategic Framework for 

China’s Response to the DPRK Issue,” Zhongguo Pinglun (China 

Critique), No. 1, in OSC CPP20070201329001, February 2007.

123. Larry M. Wortzel, “PLA Command, Control, and 

Targeting Architectures: Theory, Doctrine, and Warfighting 

Applications,” in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, RightSizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s 

Military, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, 2007, pp. 191-234. This entire book covers facets of the 

issue. 

124. Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and 

Transformation for the 21st Century, New York: Routledge, Taylor 

and Francis, pp. 146-151.

125. Wortzel.

126. See David M. Finkelstein, “China’s National Military 

Strategy: An Overview of the ‘Military Strategic Guidelines’,” in 

Kamphausen and Scobell, eds., Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation 

Army, pp. 69-140.
377

127. Ibid., p. 131.

128. Zhang Yining et al., eds., Zhongguo Xiandai Junshi Sixiang 

Yanjiu (Research on Contemporary Chinese Military Thought), Beijing, 

China, Guofang Daxue Chubanshe, 2006. Also see Jun Li, “Dang 

de Junshi Zhidao Lilun de Xin Fazhan” (“New Development in 

the Party’s Military Guidance Theory—A Study of Jiang Zemin’s 

National Defense and Army Building Theory”), Zhongguo Junshi 

Kexue (China Military Science), Vol. 16, No. 1, January 2003, pp. 42-

49.

129. Ibid., pp. 575-576. See also, Pan Shouyong, “Tuijin Xunlian 

Zhuanbian yu Jinjin Niu Zhu Lianhe Xunlian” (“Promoting 

Training Transformation by Intensively Tackling Joint Training”), 

Jiefang Jun Bao, April 15, 2006, p. 6, in OSC CPP20080506436003001.

pdf. Pan makes it clear that he also sees Kosovo, Afghanistan, and 

Iraq as models for joint contingency operations. 

130. Zhang Yining takes some of this from Jiang Zemin, Jiang 

Zemin Wenxuan (Selected Works of Jiang Zemin), Beijing, China: 

Renmin Chubanshe, 2006, pp. 162, 563. See Zhang et al., Zhongguo 

Xiandai Junshi Sixiang Yanjiu, p. 580.

131. Zhang et al., Zhongguo Xiandai Junshi Sixiang Yanjiu, p. 

581.

132. Ibid., p. 581-582.

133. Hu Jintao, “Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with 

Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building 

a Moderately Prosperous Society in all Respects,” Report to the 

Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 

Xinhua News Agency, news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/24/

content_6938749.htm, accessed August 3, 2008.

134. Chen Zhou, “Xin Shiqi de Jiji Fangyu Junshi Zhanlue 

A Strategy of Active Defense for the New Period,” Xuexi 

Shibao, No. 1, August 18, 2008, www.studytimes.com.cn, in OSC 

CPP20080818436001001.pdf. 
378

135. Jiang Yamin, 远战 (Long-Distance Operations), Beijing, 

China: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 2007, pp. i, iii.

136. Ibid., p. ii.

137. This means to stop “the dagger-axe” [war] by being ready 

for war [building a strong military]. Ibid., pp. i, iii.

138. Between August 26 and September 4, 1993, the U.S. Navy 

shadowed the Chinese Ship Yin He while U.S. intelligence insisted 

it was carrying banned chemical materials. Eventually the ship 

was searched in Saudi Arabia at U.S. insistence. See Statement by 

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China on the 

“Yin He” Incident, September 4, 1993, www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/

ynhe0993.htm, September 12, 2008.

139. Wang Lidong, Guojia Haishang Liyi Lun (On Maritime 

National Interest), Beijing, China: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe, 

2007, pp. 262-263. 

140. Statement by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 

4, 1993, p. 2.

141. It is important to remember that even in contingencies on 

land, the PLA Navy has been called upon to help with medical, 

logistics, and C4ISR assistance to the General Department of the 

PLA. This was the case even in the response to the earthquake 

in Mianyang, Chengdu Province, where, on the surface, it 

seems unlikely the Navy would be involved. See “PRC: Selected 

Articles from Navy Command Academy Seminar on Earthquake 

Relief,” Renmin Haijun (People’s Navy), July 21, 2008, p. 3, in OSC 

CPP20080826478007.

142. Note the coordination between Washington and 

Pyongyang in the wake of Kim Jong-Il’s stroke. Phillip Sherwood 

and Stanislav Varivoda, “US and China in Secret Talks on N Korea 

Chaos Fears After Kim Jong-il Stroke,” UK Telegraph, September 13, 

2008, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/2909511, 

accessed September 15, 2008.
379

APPENDIX I

CHINESE FOREIGN INFRASTRUCTURE 

PROJECTS

Partnering 

Country

Type of Project Details Time Started/ 

Completed

Source

Afghanistan Railroad In 2007, China Metallurgical Group 

received rights to a large copper 

field south of Kabul in exchange for 

a large sum of investment including 

the construction of Afghanistan’s 

first freight railroad. Total investment 

will amount to $2.8bn.

Completion 

expected in 2013, 

started in 2007.

“Afghanistan: China’s Winning Bid For 

Copper Rights Includes Power Plant, 

Railroad,” Radio Free Europe, 24 November 

2007, Nexis.

 Burma Road Recently completed refurbishing 

Route 3, running from Kunming 

to Bangkok. Financed much of 

refurbishing in northern Burma, 

including Burma Road.

Completed March 

2008.

Thomas Fuller, “Asia Builds New Road 

to Prosperity,” The International Herald 

Tribune, 31 March 2008, p.1, Nexis.

Burma Road New section of the East-West 

Economic Corridor, which will stretch 

22 km in Burma. The whole corridor 

will link South China Sea to Bay of 

Bengal, where China is attempting 

to build a port. It is also expected 

to link Europe to China through 

Central Asia. Part of Greater Mekong 

Subregion Economic Cooperation 

Program.

Entire project 

expected to be 

completed by 

2010.

“Construction of GMS Sectional Highway 

begins in Myanmar,” Xinhua, 1 April 2008, 

opensource.

Burma Port China is seeking to build a container 

port in Bhamo of Kachin State, which 

is Burma’s nearest port to Yunnan 

province.

N/A. Thet Khaing, “Burma Expert Says China, 

India Keen to Invest to Develop Border 

Regions,” The Myanmar Times, 9 April 

2007, Nexis.

Burma Port Chinese media report on progress 

of port projects at Bay of Bengal in 

Mawlamyine as well as Andaman 

Sea, but witnesses say little progress 

has been made.

Unclear. “Construction of GMS Sectional Highway 

begins in Myanmar,” Xinhua, 1 April 2008, 

open source; also, “Burma Port Projects 

Said at Standstill,” BBC, 9 August 2007, 

Nexis.

Burma Port Planning on creating a new port at 

Kyauk Phyu on Ramree Island, which 

would serve as a transfer point for 

oil and shift use away from the older 

Sittwe port, into which India has 

recently invested $100m.

Unclear. “Burmese Writer Says China’s Procurement 

of Shwe Gas Part of Wider Scheme,” BBC, 

January 7, 2008, Nexis.
380

Burma (and 

SE Asia)

Railroad The Singapore-Kunming railroad 

will include 5,513 km of rail and will 

begin in Singapore and pass through 

Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, 

Burma, Laos, Vietnam, and end in 

Kunming in Yunnan province. It is 

part of the Trans-Asian railway to 

connect Asia with Europe. Total cost 

is expected to be $2bn.

First proposed 

at Bangkok 

ASEAN summit 

in 1995; expected 

completion by 

2015.

“Work on Missing Link Between PoipetSisophon to Start in Q1:Chan,” Malaysia 

Economic News, January 17, 2008, Nexis.

Central Asia 

(CAREC)

Transportation 

Corridors

In January 2008, CAREC, which 

China helps fund, announced a 10-

year, $18.7 bn project to construct 

five new corridors, including 

connecting Kazakhstan to Xinjiang; 

an essential restoration of the silk 

road (Baku to Turkmenistan to 

Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan to Xinjiang); 

Siberia into China through Mongolia; 

Siberia to Iran to eastern Kazakhstan, 

then splitting to Uzbekistan/

Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan/ 

Tajikistan/ Afghanistan; Pakistan 

to China through Afghanistan and 

Tajikistan.

10 year project to 

be completed in 

2018.

Joshua Kucera, “Central Asia: A Vision for a 

Regional Transport Network Takes Shape,” 

Eurasianet, January 14, 2008, Nexis.

Central Asia Railroad China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway 

which begins in Kashgar, Xinjiang.

Preparatory work 

began in 2008; 

completion in 

2010.

“China Plans Rail Link to Central Asia,” The 

Times of Central Asia, February 1, 2008, 

Nexis.

Kazakhstan Railroad Building a 6.2 billion yuan ($861m) 

railroad connecting Korgas (ChinaKazakh border city) to inland Chinese 

railroads.

Expected to be 

completed in 

2008.

“China Plans Rail Link to Central Asia,” The 

Times of Central Asia, February 1, 2008, 

Nexis.

Kyrgyzstan Road/Railroad Through the Central Asian Regional 

Economic Cooperation (CAREC) 

program, China will assist 11 

infrastructure projects in Kyrgyzstan, 

including a highway that connects 

Kyrgyzstan with China and 

Uzbekistan as well as KyrgyzstanUzbekistan-China railroad. Total cost 

of the 11 projects is $1.6.

Began in 2008; 

Completion 

expected in 2018.

“Kyrgyzstan to Join Transcontinental 

Transport Corridors,” The Times of Central 

Asia, January 19, 2008, Nexis.

Pakistan Port Deep sea port in the southern town 

of Gwadar, in Pakistan’s Balochistan 

province. Cost $250 million, unclear 

how much paid for by China.

Became 

operational in 

March 2008.

“Gwadar Deep Sea Port Operates, Riyadh 

SPA, March 15, 2008, www.spa.gov.

sa,opensource.
381

Pakistan Railroad As of April 2007, China and Pakistan 

were in the final stages of planning 

rail linkages between Pakistan 

and Xinjiang in China’s NW. No 

information was obtainable as to the 

results of those plans.

Unclear. “Pakistan Moves to Finalize Rail Link with 

China,” The Press Trust of India, April 22, 

2007, Nexis.

Bangladesh Coal Mine In June 2005, the China National 

Machinery Import and Export 

Corporation joined forces with 

Xuzhou Coal Mining Group Company 

Ltd. and signed a contract to control 

the management and production of 

the Barapukuria mine in Bangladesh.

Unclear. Found on main page of Bangladesh Energy 

website, www.bangladeshenergy.com, 

Accessed April 4, 2008.

Bangladesh Nuclear 

Cooperation

In April 2005, an agreement 

was signed between China 

and Bangladesh on “nuclear 

cooperation.” In this agreement, 

China will assist Bangladesh in 

exploration for nuclear material 

as well construction of a 600-MW 

nuclear power plant.

Unclear. Found on main page of Bangladesh Energy 

website, www.bangladeshenergy.com, 

Accessed April 4, 2008.

Burma Oil and Gas Multiple oil and gas exploration 

deals were signed by China 

National Petroleum Corporation and 

Myanmar’s Energy Ministry between 

October 2004 and January 2005. An 

additional deal was signed January 

2008 related to three deep-sea blocks 

off the Rakhine coast.

Unclear. “China Signs Exploration Deals with 

Myanmar,” UPI Energy, January 15, 2007, 

Nexis.

Burma Oil Pipeline In March 2007, Chinese and 

Burmese companies stated their 

intent to begin construction of the 

China-Myanmar oil pipeline later the 

same year. The city of Chongqing 

may be the destination for this 

pipeline and will build a crude 

refinery to process the oil imports.

Project is 

currently “under 

discussion.” As 

of March 2008, 

construction 

has not yet been 

initiated.

“China-Myanmar Oil Pipeline Construction 

to Begin this Year, Extends to Chongqing,” 

Xinhua Financial News, March 26, 2007, 

Nexis.

Also see: “China-Myanmar Pipeline 

Still Under Discussion,” Xinhua, 

March 10, 2008, news.xinhuanet.com/

english/2008-03/10/content_7756822.htm.

Kazakhstan Acquisition of 

PetroKazakhstan

After approval by a Canadian 

court, China National Petroleum 

Corporation acquired 

PetroKazakhstan from a Canadian 

company.

Initial approval 

in October of 

2005. Exact date 

of acquisition 

unclear.

“CNPC secures PetroKazakhstan Bid,” 

BBC News, October 26, 2005, news.bbc.

co.uk/2/hi/business/4378298.stm.

Also see: “China’s Increasing Hold over 

Kazakh Oil,” BBC News, August 20, 2007, 

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6935292.

stm.
382

Kazakhstan Oil Pipeline In 2006, China and Kazakhstan 

built an oil pipeline from central 

Kazakhstan to Xinjiang province 

of China. Additionally, a second 

pipeline is being constructed 

between China and Kazakhstan which 

will also provide oil and gas from 

Turkmenistan.

Unclear. “China to Build Second Oil Pipeline in 

Kazakhstan,” Comtex News Network, Inc.,

August 23, 2007, Nexis.

Kyrgyzstan Electricity/ 

Power Stations

Chinese electric company 

representatives are considering 

constructing electric power stations 

in Kyrgyzstan. The Chinese also are 

interested in investing in existing 

power infrastructure such as the 

Sarydzhaz and Kambarat hydropower 

stations.

Unclear. “China Prepared to Invest in Kyrgyzstan’s 

Power Sector,” RIA Novosti, August 2, 

2006, Nexis.

North Korea Oil In December 2005 China and North 

Korea signed a deal to jointly develop 

offshore oil reserves. No specific 

information was provided on location 

of these offshore sites.

Unclear. “Oil Development Deal Struck with North 

Korea,” Los Angeles Times, December 25, 

2005, Nexis.

Pakistan Electricity/ 

Power Station

In April 2008, China’s Dongfang 

Electric Corporation and Pakistan’s 

Government signed a deal to 

construct the Chichoki Malian Power 

Plant in Pakistan.

“Within a year” 

from April 2008. 

No specific 

month for target 

completion 

provided.

“Pakistan Signs Contract with Chinese 

Firm for Power Project,” The Economic 

Times (India Times), April 1, 2008, 

economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/

News_By_Industry/Energy/Pak_signs_

contract_with_Chinese_firm_for_power_

project/articleshow/2917816.cms.

Pakistan Electricity/ 

Power Stations

In April 2001, Pakistan announced 

that it would set up a 600-megawatt 

nuclear power plant at Chashma in 

the Mianwali district of Punjab with 

Chinese assistance. An additional 

300-megawatt nuclear power plant 

was completed in Chashma with 

Chinese assistance in 2001.

600mw Chashma 

Plant: Unclear. 

300mw Chashma 

Plant: Completed 

March 2001.

“Pakistan, China Discussing 2nd Nuclear 

Power Plant,” Kyodo News International, 

August 12, 2002, findarticles.com/p/

articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_2002_August_12/

ai_90297109.

Turkmenistan Gas/Oil Pipeline In April 2006, China and 

Turkmenistan signed an agreement 

to build a gas pipeline to Guangzhou, 

China.

Construction 

began February 

22, 2008. 

Completion date 

unclear.

“China Signs Agreement to Buy 

Turkmenistan Gas, Build Pipeline,” AP 

Financial Wire, April 3, 2006. Nexis.

Also see: “China Approves Pipeline to Move 

Imported Turkmenistan Gas,” AP Financial 

Wire, September 27, 2006. Nexis.
383

Uzbekistan Oil and Gas In June 2006, China National 

Petroleum Corporation announced its 

plans to invest $210 million into gas 

and oil exploration in Uzbekistan.

Unclear. “China’s CNPC Unit in 210 Million Dollar 

Uzbekistan Oil and Gas Deal,” Agence 

France Presse, June 15, 2006, Nexis.

Uzbekistan Gas Pipeline In May 2007, Uzbekistan announced 

that it will build a gas pipeline to 

China with an annual throughput 

capacity of 30 billion cubic meters. 

No details have been provided on 

when the project will be completed or 

which companies will be involved.

Unclear. “Uzbekistan, China Sign Major Gas 

Pipeline Deal,” China Business News 

(Hong Kong Trade Development Council), 

May 2, 2007. sme.tdctrade.com/content.

aspx?data=EmergingMkt_content_

en&contentid=867435&src=BNT_

OtherEastEur&w_sid=194&w_

pid=1401&w_nid=13504&w_

cid=867435&w_idt=1900-01-01&w_

oid=343&w_jid=.

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX I

1. According to Tang Hai, commercial counselor at the 

Chinese embassy in Burma, from 1992 to October 30, 2007, 

Burmese Investment Commission has approved 30 China-funded 

infrastructure projects totaling $638 million. (“Chinese Diplomat 

Interviewed on Economic Cooperation with Burma,” BBC, 

December 10, 2007, Nexis.)

2. Difficult to find specifics on Sino-DPRK infrastructure 

projects, but Vice-Governor of Jilin province did announce 

that “[e]fforts will be made to improve the construction of the 

infrastructure facilities at the ports and roads to the DPRK.” 

(“Northeast Chinese City to Boost N Korean Economic, Trade 

Ties—Vice-Governor, Xinhua, June 21, 2007, Nexis.)

3. China, Myanmar, and Bangladesh had been in discussions 

to develop a tri-state highway system, shortly after Bangladesh 

and Myanmar came to such an agreement in July 2007. These 

plans were put on hold in the second half of 2007, due to unrest in 

Burma, but Bangladesh resumed calls for talks on such a highway 
384

in October-November 2007, hoping to accelerate the process. 

(“Bangladesh Signs Pact with Myanmar on Road Connectivity,” 

The Press Trust of India, July 27, 2007, Nexis; also, “Bangladesh 

Proposes Meeting to Accelerate Dhaka-Kunming Road,” Asia 

Pulse, November 23, 2007, Nexis; also, “Several Bilateral Deals 

Between Bangladesh, Burma on Hold Following Unrest, The Daily 

Star, October 11, 2007, Nexis.)

4. China has expressed its desire to join the Iran-PakistanIndia gas pipeline project. No statements have yet been made 

indicating official inclusion of China in the project. (“Iran Gas: 

China Waits as India Wavers,” Asia Times, March 6, 2008, www.

atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JC06Df03.html.)

5. In addition to the major energy deals listed above, many 

cases of smaller, less extensive Chinese energy investments have 

been discovered. These cases generally are of Chinese companies 

purchasing minority stakes in Central Asian energy companies. 

For example, in March 2003, British Gas International agreed 

to sell its 8 percent stake in Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian 

Operating Company (AgipKCO) to China’s Sinopec International 

Petroleum and Production Corporation. (“Kazakhstan Economic 

Review,” Kazkommerts Securities, January-March 2003, www.

kazakhstaninvestment.com/support-files/ker-mar2003.pdf.)
385

APPENDIX II

CHINESE ARMS DEALS AND MILITARY 

ASSISTANCE

Partnering 

Country

Type of 

Transfer

Details Time Started/ 

Completed

Source

Bangladesh Weapons 

Sale

China sold one Crotale class 

surface-to-air missile to 

Bangladesh; version FM90, designed for DW-2000 

frigate.

Ordered in 

2004, delivered 

in 2007.

Stockholm International 

Peace Research Institute 

(SIPRI), SIPRI Arms 

Transfers Database, China 

Arms transfers 2006-07, 

armstrade.sipri.org.

Bangladesh Weapons 

Sale

Sold Bangladesh an unknown 

number of PL-7 class airto-air missiles, designed for 

F-7MG combat aircraft.

Ordered in 

2004, all 69 

delivered by 

2006.

SIPRI, SIPRI Arms Transfers 

Database, China Arms 

transfers 2006-07, armstrade.

sipri.org.

Bangladesh Weapons 

Sale

Sold Bangladesh 69 QW-2 

surface to air missiles.

Ordered in 

2004, 100 

delivered by 

2007.

SIPRI, SIPRI Arms Transfers 

Database, China Arms 

transfers 2006-07, armstrade.

sipri.org.

Bangladesh Weapons 

Sale

Sold Bangladesh an unknown 

number of C-801/C-802 coast 

defense system missiles.

Sold in 2005, 

current status is 

unknown.

SIPRI, SIPRI Arms Transfers 

Database, China Arms 

transfers 2006-07, armstrade.

sipri.org.

Bangladesh Weapons 

Sale

Sold Bangladesh 56 type 

96 D-30 122mm towed gun 

systems

Sold in 2005, 

65 guns 

delivered in 

2006.

SIPRI, SIPRI Arms Transfers 

Database, China Arms 

transfers 2006-07, armstrade.

sipri.org.

Bangladesh Weapons 

Sale

Sold Bangladesh an unknown 

number of PL-9 short-range 

air-to-air missiles, designed 

for F- 7MG aircraft.

Ordered in 

2005, 10 

delivered by 

2006.

SIPRI, SIPRI Arms Transfers 

Database, China Arms 

transfers 2006-07, armstrade.

sipri.org.

Bangladesh Weapons 

Sale

Sold Bangladesh 20 R-440 

Crotale class surface-to-air 

missiles, designed for DW2000 frigate.

Sold in 2005, 

20 delivered by 

2007.

SIPRI, SIPRI Arms Transfers 

Database, China Arms 

transfers 2006-07, armstrade.

sipri.org.
386

Bangladesh Weapons 

Sale

Sold Bangladesh 16 F-7MG 

fight aircrafts. Total cost 

estimated between $44m to 

$118m.

All 16 sold and 

delivered in 

2006.

SIPRI, SIPRI Arms Transfers 

Database, China Arms 

transfers 2006-07, armstrade.

sipri.org.

Pakistan Weapons 

Sale

Sold Pakistan 20 C-802/

CSS-N-8/Saccade anti-ship 

missiles, for Jalalat missile 

boats.

Ordered in 

2003, 20 

delivered by 

2006.

SIPRI, SIPRI Arms Transfers 

Database, China Arms 

transfers 2006-07, armstrade.

sipri.org.

Pakistan Weapons 

Sale

Sold Pakistan 2 Type-347G 

fire control radar systems 

designed for Jalalat missile 

boats.

Ordered 

in 2003, 2 

delivered in 

2006.

SIPRI, SIPRI Arms Transfers 

Database, China Arms 

transfers 2006-07, armstrade.

sipri.org.

Pakistan Weapons 

Sale

Sold Pakistan 10 YLC6 Air 

surveillance radar systems.

Sold in 2003, 

10 deliverd by 

2006.

SIPRI, SIPRI Arms Transfers 

Database, China Arms 

transfers 2006-07, armstrade.

sipri.org.

Pakistan Weapons 

Sale

Sold Pakistan 6 AS-565SA 

Panther Helicopters.

Sold in 2005, 

status currently 

uncertain.

SIPRI, SIPRI Arms Transfers 

Database, China Arms 

transfers 2006-07, armstrade.

sipri.org.

Pakistan Weapons 

Sale

Sold Pakistan 40 C-803 Antiship missiles, designed for 

Jiangwei (F-22P) frigates.

Sold in 2005, 

status currently 

uncertain.

SIPRI, SIPRI Arms Transfers 

Database, China Arms 

transfers 2006-07, armstrade.

sipri.org.

Pakistan Weapons 

Sale

Sold Pakistan an unknown 

number of Red Arrow-8 antitank missiles.

Original sale in 

1989, by 2007 

had delivered 

14,600 

missiles.

SIPRI, SIPRI Arms Transfers 

Database, China Arms 

transfers 2006-07, armstrade.

sipri.org.

Pakistan Weapons 

Sale

Sold Pakistan an unknown 

number of QW-1 Vanguard

portable surface-to-air 

missiles.

Original sale in 

1993, by 2007 

had delivered 

1150 missiles.

SIPRI, SIPRI Arms Transfers 

Database, China Arms 

transfers 2006-07, armstrade.

sipri.org.

Pakistan Weapons 

Sale

Sold Pakistan 300 Type-90-2/

MBT-2000 tanks.

Original sale in 

1997, by 2007 

had delivered 

55 tanks.

SIPRI, SIPRI Arms Transfers 

Database, China Arms 

transfers 2006-07, armstrade.

sipri.org.
387

Pakistan Weapons 

Sale

Sold Pakistan 150 JF-17 

Thunder/FC-1 fighter aircraft, 

which was developed for 

Pakistan and included some 

production and assembly in 

Pakistan.

Original sale 

in 1999, had 

delivered 2 

aircraft by 

2007.

SIPRI, SIPRI Arms Transfers 

Database, China Arms 

transfers 2006-07, armstrade.

sipri.org.

Pakistan Weapons 

Sale

Sold Pakistan 4 Jiangwei

F-22P frigates. Total value 

of the deal estimated to be 

between $500m and $750m. 

Ships included assembly and 

production in Pakistan.

Original sale in 

2005, expected 

delivery 

between 2009-

13.

SIPRI, SIPRI Arms Transfers 

Database, China Arms 

transfers 2006-07, armstrade.

sipri.org.

Pakistan Weapons 

Sale

Sold Pakistan 27 K-8 

Karakorum-8 trainer/combat 

aircraft, which included some 

production and assembly in 

Pakistan.

Original sale in 

2005, by 2007 

12 planes had 

been delivered.

SIPRI, SIPRI Arms Transfers 

Database, China Arms 

transfers 2006-07, armstrade.

sipri.org.

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX II

1. According to SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Chinese 

Arms trade with Bangladesh in 2006 was $210m but dropped 

to just $17m in 2007 (2004 and 2005 levels were $6m and $1m 

respectively, so 2006 appears to be an anomaly). (Source: SIPRI, 

Arms Transfers Database, TIV of Arms Exports from China 2004-

2007, sipri.org/contents/armstrad/ooutput_types_TIV.html.)

2. SIPRI has no data for arms transfers between China and 

Myanmar or North Korea in 2006 or 2007, but China did offer 

Myanmar $25m in arms in 2005. (Source: SIPRI, Arms Transfers 

Database, TIV of Arms Exports from China 2004-2007, sipri.org/

contents/armstrad/ooutput_types_TIV.html.)

3. In 2006 and 2007, China transferred $107m worth of arms to 

Pakistan per year. This is an increase on 2004-5 levels, which were 

between $78m and $79m per year. (Source: SIPRI, Arms Transfers 

Database, TIV of Arms Exports from China 2004-2007, sipri.org/

contents/armstrad/ooutput_types_TIV.html.)
388

4. China is expected to market its FC-1 aircraft, which it 

is developing in cooperation with Pakistan, as well as its KJ200 AWACS aircraft and the J-10 fighter aircraft to SE Asia, in 

particular Myanmar (Burma). (Source: P. Parameswaran, “U.S., 

Russia, China Vying to Sell Fighters in Asia,” Agence FrancePresse, March 23, 2008, defensenews.com.)

5. China is modernizing at least six naval bases in Burma, 

according to Rahul Bedi, an Indian security analyst. (Source: Shaikh 

Azizur Rahman, “India Seen Arming Burma to Counter Chinese; 

Democracy Activists Fear Being Targeted,” The Washington Times, 

March 24, 2007.)

6. According to the United Nations Register of Conventional 

Arms, which collects self-reported data on arms transfers (China 

resumed participation in the register in 2007, for data pertaining 

to 2006), in 2006 China a total of 10 battle tanks to Pakistan as 

well as 114 missiles/missile launchers and 16 combat aircraft to 

Bangladesh. (Source: UN Register of Conventional Arms, China: 

Exports 2006, disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.NSF.)

7. China is reportedly Burma’s largest arms provider and, as 

of July 2006, had been providing Burma with jet fighter aircraft to 

help develop its air force. However, Russia and India have also 

been providing Burma with aircraft and the quality of the Chinese 

aircraft has been questionable. (Source: Manjeet Kripalani, 

“India’s Role in Burma’s Crisis; New Delhi has sympathy for the 

troubled nation, but energy needs and relations with China are 

complicating the equation” Business Week Online, October 22, 2007, 

Nexis; also, “Burma reportedly Upgrading Air Force – Paper,” 

BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political ̧ July 28, 2006, Nexis.)

8. According to Turkmenistan’s defense minister, as of 

December 2007, China was set to loan Turkmenistan USD3 million 

for “army needs.” (Source: “Russian Paper Says China Boosts 

Influence in Central Asia through Loans,” BBC Monitoring Central 

Asia Unit, December 11, 2007, Nexis.)

9. China’s recent military exchanges with the DPRK remain 

unclear, but as recent as April 22, 2008, China’s Defense Minister 

met with senior DPRK military officials, including the Air 
389

Force Commander, stressing military cooperation and air force 

exchanges. (Source: “Chinese Defense Minister Meets DPRK Air 

Force Commander ,” Xinhua, April 22, 2008, Nexis.)

10. China has loaned Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Defense 

USD3 million worth of military uniforms as well as computers. 

The loan is separate from the USD300 million loan granted to 

Turkmenistan by China for various economic projects. China is also 

allowing Turkmen soldiers to attend Chinese military academies 

without cost and offering other military financing to prepare the 

Turkmen army for joint training exercises. (Source: “China Gains 

Firm Foothold in Turkmenistan, USA Left on Sidelines – Paper,” 

BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, January 13, 2008, Nexis.)

11. China has pledged further military cooperation with 

Uzbekistan (as it has with all of the Shanghai Cooperation 

Organization members) but as of yet, specifics are not available as 

to what China is actually providing Uzbekistan. Source: “China, 

Uzbekistan Vow to strengthen Cooperation in Defense, Security,” 

Xinhua, June 28, 2007, Nexis.

391

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

DENNIS C. BLAIR, a retired U.S. Navy admiral, became the nation’s third Director of National Intelligence 

on January 29, 2009. From September 2007 through 

January 2009 he held the John M. Shalikashvili (Shali) 

Chair in National Security Studies at the National 

Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), during which time 

he contributed the introduction to this volume. Prior to 

retiring from the Navy in 2002, Admiral Blair served 

as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, the 

largest of the combatant commands. During his 34-year 

Navy career, he served on guided missile destroyers in 

both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets and commanded the 

Kitty Hawk Battle Group. Ashore, he served as Director 

of the Joint Staff and as the first Associate Director of 

Central Intelligence for Military Support at the CIA. 

He has also served in budget and policy positions on 

the National Security Council and several major Navy 

staffs and as a White House Fellow at the Department of 

Housing and Urban Development. From 2003 to 2006, 

Admiral Blair was President and CEO of the Institute for 

Defense Analyses--one of the nation’s foremost national 

security analysis centers. Most recently, in addition to 

his capacity as the holder of The Shali Chair at NBR, he 

held the Omar Bradley Chair of Strategic Leadership at 

the U.S. Army War College and served as the Deputy 

Director of the Project on National Security Reform, an 

organization that analyzes the U.S. national security 

structure and develops recommendations to improve 

its effectiveness. Admiral Blair graduated from the 

U.S. Naval Academy and earned a master’s degree in 

History and Languages from Oxford University as a 

Rhodes Scholar. 
392

DEAN CHENG is a Senior Asia Analyst at CNA, a notfor-profit think-tank, where he specializes in Chinese 

military issues, with an emphasis on China’s space 

program. He has spent over a decade studying Chinese 

and Asian security and economic issues. Dr. Cheng 

has written a number of papers and book chapters 

examining the military and technological implications 

of the Chinese space program, including its relationship 

with Chinese military doctrine.

MARK COZAD is the Defense Intelligence Officer for 

East Asia at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). He 

is a career intelligence officer having served in both the 

U.S. Air Force and as a civilian analyst with DIA. 

BATES GILL is Director of the Stockholm International 

Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), an independent thinktank focusing on bettering the conditions for a more 

stable and secure world through research and analysis 

on international and regional security issues. Before 

joining SIPRI, he held the Freeman Chair in China 

Studies at the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies from 2002 to 2007, and previously established 

and led centers of research on East Asian issues at the 

Brookings Institution and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute. He serves on the 

Boards of the U.S.-China Policy Foundation, the Feris 

Foundation of America, the Geneva Centre for Security 

Policy, and the China-Merck AIDS Partnership. Dr. 

Gill is the author, co-author, or co-editor of six books, 

including the forthcoming Asia’s New Multilateralism

(Columbia University Press, 2009), Rising Star: China’s 

New Security Diplomacy (Brookings, 2007), and China: 

The Balance Sheet: What the World Needs to Know Now 

About the Emerging Superpower (Public Affairs, 2006). 
393

Dr. Gill received his Ph.D. in Foreign Affairs from the 

Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and 

Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia.

CHIN-HAO HUANG is a researcher with the 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 

(SIPRI), Stockholm, Sweden. Previously, he worked 

at the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center 

for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 

Washington, DC. Mr. Huang coordinated the CSIS 

China-Africa project, a multiyear initiative examining 

Chinese intentions, policies, and practices in Africa 

and implications for U.S. strategic interests. He has 

authored and co-authored several monographs and 

book chapters on China-Africa-U.S. relations. He has 

also published other works on Chinese foreign and 

security policy in China Security, China and Eurasia 

Forum Quarterly, PacNet, South China Morning Post, Asia 

Times, and China Brief. He is also a contributing coauthor (with Robert Sutter) for the chapter on ChinaSoutheast Asia relations for the Pacific Forum CSIS 

quarterly publication, Comparative Connections. Mr. 

Huang is a graduate of the Edmund A. Walsh School 

of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

ROY D. KAMPHAUSEN is Vice President for Political 

and Security Affairs and Director, Washington, DC, 

The National Bureau of Asian Research. A retired U.S. 

Army China Foreign Area Officer, Mr. Kamphausen 

served as the China Country Director in the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, China Branch Chief in the 

Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, and at the Defense Attaché Office of 

the U.S. Embassy in the People’s Republic of China. 

He has served as a consultant for the Office of the 
394

Secretary of Defense, Department of State and other 

U.S. government agencies. His areas of professional 

expertise include China’s Peoples Liberation Army 

(PLA), U.S.-China defense relations, U.S. defense and 

security policy toward Asia, and East Asian security 

issues. Mr. Kamphausen co-authored the chapter, 

“Military Modernization in Taiwan,” in Strategic Asia 

2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, 

with Michael Swaine; wrote the chapter, “PLA Power 

Projection: Current Realities and Emerging Trends,” in 

Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan’s 

Security (2007) with Justin Liang; edited the volume, 

Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring 

the Contours of China’s Military (2007), with Andrew 

Scobell; and edited the volume, The “People” in the PLA: 

Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s Military

(2008), with Andrew Scobell and Travis Tanner. 

DAVID LAI has recently joined the Strategic Studies 

Institute (SSI) as Research Professor of Asian Security 

Studies. Before assuming this new position, he was 

on the faculty of the International Security Studies 

Department at the U.S. Air War College. He taught the 

National Strategy and Decision Making and Global 

Security core courses and engaged students and 

faculty on pressing issues in U.S.-China and U.S.-Asia 

relations. In addition, Dr. Lai also taught the Air War 

College Regional and Cultural Studies (RCS) program 

and made many field-study trips to Asian nations such 

as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Cambodia, 

Thailand, and Malaysia. Dr. Lai holds a bachelor’s 

degree from China and a Master’s degree and Ph.D. in 

political science from the University of Colorado.
395

Marc Miller is a Research Assistant with The 

National Bureau of Asian Research, where he works 

on a variety of NBR initiatives and publications. He 

completed a Master of Science in Foreign Service 

at Georgetown University, with a concentration in 

Conflict Management and a focus on China and East 

Asia. Mr. Miller will soon begin a career as a Foreign 

Service Officer with the U.S. Department of State.

ROBERT O. MODARELLI III is currently Policy 

Director for the U.S. National Center for Asia-Pacific 

Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Seattle, Washington. 

His responsibilities include development and oversight 

of strategic planning for the National Center’s activities 

in support of U.S. private sector interests in the APEC 

process, as well directing the Center’s coordination with 

U.S. Government agencies in the APEC policy process. 

His current work in Asia-Pacific policy is focused on 

regional economic integration, multilateral trade and 

economic policy dynamics, and regional security as 

relates to the regional economic environment. Prior to 

joining the National Center Mr. Modarelli completed 

a 20-year career in the U.S. Army as an armor officer, 

Foreign Area Officer, and Asia-Pacific policy specialist. 

His assignments included 4 years as Chief of the 

Asia-Pacific Branch in Army International Affairs at 

Headquarters, Department of the Army; 3 years as U.S. 

Army Attaché at the U.S. Consulate-General in Hong 

Kong; and 18 months in training at the Defense Attaché 

office, U.S. Embassy, Beijing, China. Mr. Modarelli 

holds a Masters Degree in East Asian Regional Studies 

from Harvard University and is fluent in Mandarin 

Chinese.
396

JAMES MULVENON is Vice-President of Defense 

Group, Inc.’s (DGI) Intelligence Division and Director 

of DGI’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis 

where he has recruited and trained a team of more 

than 15 Chinese, Arabic, Farsi, Pashto, Urdu, Russian, 

and Korean linguist-analysts performing cutting-edge 

contract research for the U.S. intelligence community. 

He is chairman of the board of the Cyber Conflict Studies 

Association, and a member of the National Committee 

for U.S.-China Relations and International Institute 

for Strategic Studies. A specialist on the Chinese 

military, Dr. Mulvenon’s research focuses on Chinese 

command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), defense 

research/development/acquisition organizations and 

policy, strategic weapons programs (computer network 

attack and nuclear warfare), cryptography, and the 

military and civilian implications of the information 

revolution in China. Dr. Mulvenon’s book, Soldiers 

of Fortune (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), details 

the rise and fall of the Chinese military’s multibillion 

dollar international business empire. He is the author 

of numerous chapters, articles, and monographs on 

the Chinese military. Dr. Mulvenon holds a Ph.D. in 

political science from the University of California, Los 

Angeles, and attended Fudan University in Shanghai 

from 1991-92.

BRAD ROBERTS is a member of the research staff at 

the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in Alexandria, 

Virginia. IDA provides analytical support to the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense and other U.S. Government 

agencies. Dr. Roberts is also an adjunct professor at 

George Washington University and vice chairman of 

the United States Committee of the Council for Security 
397

Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). He also 

serves as a member of the Defense Department’s Threat 

Reduction Advisory Committee, special advisor to the 

U.S. STRATCOM Strategic Advisory Group, and is a 

member and former chairman of the Threat Reduction 

Program Review Committee at Los Alamos National 

Laboratory. His work on China nuclear issues at IDA 

has been sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and other 

government sponsors in partnership with PACOM, 

STRATCOM, and OSD Forces Policy. Dr. Roberts 

holds a BA from Stanford University, an MSc from the 

London School of Economics and Political Science, and 

a doctorate from Erasmus University, Rotterdam. 

ANDREW SCOBELL is Associate Professor of 

International Affairs at the Bush School of Government 

and Public Service at Texas A&M University located in 

College Station, Texas. From August 1999 until August 

2007, he was Associate Research Professor in the 

Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College 

and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson 

College, both located in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He is 

the author of China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the 

Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge University 

Press, 2003) and other publications. Dr. Scobell holds a 

Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. 

MURRAY SCOT TANNER joined CNA’s China Team 

as a China Security Analyst in 2008. He has published 

extensively on China, in particular its internal security, 

policing and intelligence systems, trends in social 

order, challenges of reforming the legal system and 

strengthening human rights, as well as China-North 

Korea relations and China-Taiwan economic relations. 
398

Prior to joining CNA, Dr. Tanner worked for the U.S. 

Senate, the RAND Corporation, and as a professor 

of political science at Western Michigan University. 

Among his publications are “Principals and Secret 

Agents: Central vs. Local Control of Policing in China,” 

The China Quarterly, September 2007; “China Rethinks 

Unrest,” The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2004; and 

Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan: A Tricky 

Weapon to Use (RAND, 2007). Dr. Tanner holds a Ph.D. 

in Political Science from the University of Michigan.

LARRY M. WORTZEL is a retired U.S. Army colonel 

who spent 12 of his 32-year military career in the 

Asia-Pacific region, including two tours of duty as a 

military attaché at the American Embassy in China, 

1988-90 and 1995-97. He served as professor of Asian 

Studies and director of the Strategic Studies Institute 

at the U.S. Army War College from 1997-99, and Asian 

studies director and then vice president for foreign 

policy and defense studies at The Heritage Foundation. 

During 2008, Dr. Wortzel was one of 12 commissioners 

appointed by the leadership of Congress to the U.S.–

China Economic and Security Review Commission. He 

was appointed to the Commission in 2001. He served 

as chairman of the Commission for the 2006 and 2008 

reporting years. Dr. Wortzel has written or edited 

10 books about China as well as numerous policy 

papers and journal articles. Dr. Wortzel is a graduate 

of the Armed Forces Staff College, the U.S. Army War 

College, and the Infantry Officer Candidate School, as 

well as both Airborne and Ranger schools. Dr. Wortzel 

holds a B.A. from Columbus College, Georgia, and an 

M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Hawaii.