Legal Authorities Available to the President to Respond to a

Severe Energy Supply Interruption or Other Substantial

Reduction in Available Petroleum Products

[The follow ing m em orandum , prepared for the President for transmission to Congress in accordance 

with the direction in § 3 of the E nergy Emergency Preparedness Act of 1982, describes in 

com prehensive fashion the authorities available to the President under existing statutes to respond 

to a severe energy supply shortage o r interruption. It sets forth the legal basis for certain specific 

em ergency preparedness activities, discusses the scope of each available emergency authority, and 

analyzes the differing threshold standards for activation of the President’s authority under each of 

the statutes involved.]

November 15, 1982

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 

INTRODUCTION

I. STATUTORY AUTHORITIES

A. Energy Policy and Conservation Act

1. § 103. Limitations on Exports

2. § 106. Accelerated Production Rates

3. §§ 151-161. Strategic Petroleum Reserve

a. Establishment of the SPR

b. Filling the SPR

c. Drawdown and Distribution of the SPR

4. §§ 201-202. Energy Conservation Contingency Plans

5. §§ 251, 252, 254. Authorities in Support of the Allocation and

Information Provisions of the IEP

a. § 251. International Allocation

b. § 252. Antitrust Defense

c. § 254. Exchange of Information with the International 

Energy Agency

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B. Defense Production Act of 1950

1. § 101(a). Priority Performance of Contracts and Allocation of 

Materials

2. § 101(c). Maximizing Domestic Energy Supplies

3. § 708. Voluntary Agreements

4. § 710. Employment of Persons from the Private Sector

a. Circumstances Governing Use of Employees

b. Conflict-of-interest and Antitrust Restrictions

1) Conflict-of-interest Restrictions

2) Antitrust Exposure

C. Trade Expansion Act of 1962

D. International Emergency Economic Powers Act

E. Emergency Energy Conservation Act of 1979

F. Export Administration Act of 1979

G. Other Statutory Authorities

1. Fuel Switching Authorities

2. Miscellaneous Statutes

II. LEGAL BASES FOR SPECIFIED ENERGY PREPAREDNESS 

ACTIVITIES

A. Authority to Implement the 1EP

1. Obligations Imposed by the IEP Agreement

a. Emergency Reserves (Chapter I)

b. Demand Restraint (Chapter II)

c. Oil Sharing (Chapter III)

d. Information Exchange (Chapter V)

2. Activation of the IEP Emergency System

3. Statutory Authority to Implement the IEP Agreement

a. Emergency Reserves

b. Demand Restraint Measures

c. Oil Sharing

d. Information Exchange

4. December 10, 1981, Decision of the Governing Board with 

Respect to Subcrisis Activities

5. National Emergency Sharing Organization

6. Emergency Sharing System

7. Supply Rights Project

B. Authority to Fulfill NATO Obligations

C. Authority with Respect to Development and Use of the SPR

D. Authority for Government Incentives to Encourage Private 

Petroleum Product Stocks

E. Authority for Reactivation of the Executive Reserve

F. Authority for Coordination with State and Local Governments

1. Preemption of State Laws and Regulations

2. Burden on Interstate Commerce

G. Authority for Public Information Activities

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UI. TRIGGERS FOR EXERCISE OF STATUTORY AUTHORITIES

A. Situations Involving War, International Tensions That Threaten 

National Security, and Other Presidentially Declared Emergencies

B. Events Resulting in Activation of the International Energy Program

C. Less Severe Events or Situations

IV. CONCLUSION

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

DPA Defense Production Act of 1950

EAA Export Administration Act of 1979

EECA Emergency Energy Conservation Act of 1979

EEPA Energy Emergency Preparedness Act of 1982

EPAA Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1975

EPCA Energy Policy and Conservation Act

ESA Energy Security Act

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

FPA Federal Power Act

FPM Federal Personnel Manual

FTC Federal Trade Commission

FUA Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978

IEA International Energy Agency

IEEPA International Emergency Economic Powers Act

IEP International Energy Program

IPR Industrial Petroleum Reserve

Mer Maximum efficient rate of production

MLLA Mineral Lands Leasing Act

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEA National Emergencies Act

NESO National Emergency Sharing Organization

NGA Natural Gas Act

NGPA Natural Gas Policy Act

NPRs Naval Petroleum Reserves

OCS Outer Continental Shelf

PURPA Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978

SPR Strategic Petroleum Reserve

TEA Trade Expansion Act of 1962

Ter Temporary emergency production rate

TWEA Trading with the Enemy Act

WOCs Without Compensation Employees

647
MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Introduction

This memorandum is submitted in response to § 3 of the Energy Emergency 

Preparedness Act of 1982 (EEPA), Pub. L. No. 97-229, 96 Stat. 248 (1982). 

That section amends Title II of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 

U .S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (1982), by adding, inter alia, a new § 272(a). Section 

272(a) directs the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, 

to prepare for transmission by the President to Congress a “ Memorandum of 

Law” describing the “ nature and extent of the authorities available to the 

President under existing law to respond to a severe energy supply interruption or 

other substantial reduction in the amount of petroleum products available in the 

United States.” 1 Section 272(a) provides that the Memorandum of Law shall 

address the legal bases for certain specific emergency preparedness activities to 

deal with a petroleum shortage,2 and to distinguish among the threshold standards for activation of the President’s statutory authorities.3

1 This Memorandum was prepared by the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, at the direction of 

and under the supervision of the Attorney General, in consultation with the Department of Energy Assistance was 

also provided by the Antitrust Division and Land and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice, the 

Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency

2 Section 272(a)(3)(A) specifies that the M emorandum include the following subjects:

(i) activities of the United States in support of the international energy program and the Decem ber 10, 1981, International Energy Agency agreement entitled ‘Decision on Preparation for 

Riture Supply Disruptions’ including—

(I) the National Emergency Sharing Organization,

(II) emergency sharing systems; and

(III) the supply right project;

(ii) activities of the United States pursuant to its energy emergency preparedness obligations to the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

(in) development and use of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve;

(iv) Government incentives to encourage private petroleum product stocks,

(v) reactivation of the following Executive Manpower Reserves.

(I) the Emergency Electric Power Reserve,

(II) the Emergency Petroleum and Gas Reserve; and

(III) the Emergency Solid Riels Reserve,

(vi) energy emergency response management in coordination with State and local governments; 

and

(vn) emergency public information activities, . . .

3 Section 272(a)(3)(B) provides that the M emorandum should distinguish among—

(i) situations involving limited or general war, international tensions that threaten national 

security, and other Presidentially declared emergencies,

(ii) events resulting in activation of the international energy program; and

(iii) events or situations less severe than those described in clauses (i) and (ii).

648
In order to implement fully the intent of the EEPA, we have prepared the 

following analysis of the primary statutory authorities that would be available to 

the President in the event of a severe energy supply interruption. In addition to 

describing the requirements, scope, and limitations of those statutory authorities, 

we attempt to address each of the legal issues specifically raised by Congress 

during consideration of the EEPA and the legal bases for the activities enumerated in § 272(a)(3).. Consistent with the scope and legislative intent of the EEPA,4 

the analysis focuses on statutory authorities that could be used to respond to a 

“ petroleum emergency”—i.e., standby authorities that could be exercised in the 

event of a sudden substantial reduction in petroleum products available to the 

United States.5 We generally do not address the President’s broad authority to 

take actions to reduce the likelihood that any of these “ emergency” authorities 

will ever have to be exercised, or particular statutory authorities with respect to 

energy emergencies resulting from a shortfall in energy sources other than 

petroleum.

It is important to recognize at the outset that any memorandum of law 

discussing the powers of the President in the context of nonexistent, necessarily 

incomplete, and hypothetical facts is of limited utility and should not be regarded 

as decisive or exhaustive of the President’s legal authority to take any specific 

action based on a factual situation that may arise in the future. The exercise of the 

various broad powers of the President to deal with “ emergencies” is so often tied 

to the particular facts and circumstances confronting the President at that time 

that a general and hypothetical discussion of his authority should not and cannot 

be viewed as dispositive of his authority in actual emergencies.6 See generally

Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660-62, 669 (1981).

Finally, the purpose of this Memorandum is limited to outlining the nature and 

scope of the statutory authorities available to the President. The Memorandum 

does not address whether or how the President should exercise particular authorities. That question is primarily a policy rather than a legal matter, and 

therefore outside the scope of this Memorandum. In that regard, it should be 

noted that, as described more fully below, the available statutory authorities 

generally provide the President with broad discretion to determine if, when, and 

how they should be exercised, taking into account the facts of any future energy 

emergency and the President’s best judgment as to how to prevent or deal with the 

emergency situation.

Part I of this Memorandum outlines the scope and applicability of existing 

statutory authorities available to the President to deal with a petroleum emergency. Part II describes how those statutory authorities may support or limit the

4 See S Rep No. 393, 97th Cong . 2d Sess 4-5 (1982); H.R. Rep. No 585, 97th Cong., 2d Sess 1-2(1982)

5 We use the term “ petroleum" or “ petroleum products” in this Memorandum to include those energy sources 

that are included in the definition of “ petroleum products” in § 3(3) of the Energy Policy and Conservation Acl, 42 

U.S.C. § 6202(3), i e., “ crude oil, residual fuel oil, or any refined petroleum product (including any natural [gas] 

liquid and any natural gas liquid product)."

6 For that reason, we cannot attempt here to discuss whatever inherent constitutional powers the President may 

have, in the absence of specific statutory authority, to deal with a future petroleum emergency See generally

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 U.S 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). The existence or scope 

of such inherent powers can only be addressed in the context of a particular emergency situation.

649
particular energy preparedness activities enumerated in § 272(a)(3)(A). Plart III 

groups the statutory authorities according to the three triggering situations listed 

in § 272(a)(3)(B), to the extent consistent with the specific provisions of those 

statutes.

I. Statutory Authorities

A number of statutes currently provide the President with authority that may be 

available in the event of a substantial domestic or international shortfall in 

petroleum supplies, ranging from direct authority to allocate and to restrict 

imports or exports of petroleum products, to authority to undertake or facilitate 

energy emergency preparedness planning and programs. The scope of the 

President’s authority under these statutes necessarily depends on the particular 

facts presented by any future petroleum shortage, and therefore it is difficult, if 

not impossible, to resolve in the abstract all of the legal issues concerning the 

nature and extent of that authority. In particular, to the extent that the President’s 

authority under certain statutes rests on a discretionary presidential finding, for 

example, that an emergency situation exists or that actions are necessary and 

appropriate “ in the national interest,” to promote the “ national defense,” or to 

fulfill international obligations of the United States, it is impossible to determine 

in the absence of specific facts when exercise of that authority would be consistent 

with the terms of the statute. This Memorandum therefore can only attempt to 

outline the terms of the statutes and describe generally the authority and any 

limitations on that authority contained in those statutes as written.

Among these authorities, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act,7 the 

Defense Production Act of 1950,8 and the Trade Expansion Act of 19629 provide 

the President, in a petroleum emergency meeting the requirements of those 

statutes, with some specific authority to affect or control the distribution of 

petroleum products, as well as other authority to mitigate or plan for such an 

emergency. Additional authority that may be available to the President, depending on the circumstances of any petroleum emergency, is contained in the 

International Emergency Economic Powers Act,10 the Emergency Energy Conservation Act of 1979," the Export Administration Act of 1979,12 and in numerous miscellaneous statutes such as the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 

1978,13 the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978,14 the Federal Power 

A ct,15 the Natural Gas Act,16 the National Gas Policy Act,17 the Mineral Lands

7 42 U .S.C . §§ 6201-6422, a s amended b y Pub. L. No. 97-229, 96 Stat 248 (1982).

8 50 U S.C. app §§ 2061-2169 (1982).

9 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1982 (1982).

10 50 U .S.C . §§ 1701-1706 (1982)

11 42 U .S.C §§ 8501-8541 (1982).

12 50 U.S.C. app §§ 2401-2420 (1982).

15 Pub. L No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3119(1978), codified in 16U .S.C §§ 2601-2645 (1982) & 15 U.S.C § 717z 

(1982).

14 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8484 (1982)

15 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-825r (1982).

16 15 U.S C. §§ 717-717Z (1982).

17 15 U .S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982)

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Leasing Act,18 the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,19 the Clean Air Act,20 the 

Interstate Commerce Act,21 the Disaster Relief Act of 1974,22 the Magnuson 

Act,23 and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.24

A. Energy Policy and Conservation Act

The Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 

(1982), provides the President with discretionary authority to respond to an actual 

or potential shortfall in domestic or international petroleum supplies, including 

the power to: restrict exports of energy supplies; require accelerated production of 

crude oil or natural gas from designated fields; establish and use a Strategic 

Petroleum Reserve; direct the preparation and implementation of energy conservation contingency plans; and take actions necessary to implement certain 

international obligations of the United States.25

With the exception of export restrictions promulgated under § 103,26 the 

President’s authority under the EPCA is generally contingent on a finding that the 

actions taken are necessary to meet a “ severe energy supply interruption” or to 

fulfill “ obligations of the United States under the international energy program” 

(IEP).27 A “ severe energy supply interruption” is defined by § 3(8) of the Act, 42 

U.S.C. § 6202(8), as a national energy supply shortage which the President 

determines—

(A) is, or is likely to be, of significant scope and duration, and 

of an emergency nature;

(B) may cause major adverse impact on national safety or the 

national economy; and

(C) results, or is likely to result, from an interruption in the 

supply of imported petroleum products, or from sabotage or an 

act of God.

The IEP, established in 1974 by the Agreement on an International Energy 

Program (Agreement), to which the United States is a signatory, provides for 

coordinated action among the 21 members (Participating Countries) in order to 

decrease their vulnerability to supply disruptions and dependence on imported

18 30 U S C . §§ 181-287 (1982).

19 43 U .S C . §§ 1331-1356 (1982).

20 42 U.S.C §§ 7401-7642 (1982).

21 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101 el seq (1982).

22 42 U.S C. §§ 5121-5202 (1982)

23 50 U S C. §§ 191 et seq (1982).

24 Pub. L No 87-195, 75 Slat 424 (1961), a sa m en d ed , codified in scattered sections of 7, 22, and42 U.S.C. 

23 The EPCA also extended the crude oil and petroleum product pricing authonty of the Emergency Petroleum

Allocation Act of 1975 (EPAA), 15 U.S C §§ 751-760h (1982), established pnce controls on previously exempt 

domestic crude oil; established maximum weighted average first sale prices on all domestic crude oil, and directed 

the President to develop a rationing contingency plan Those provisions of the EPCA expired with the EPAA on 

September 30, 1981. In addition, § 104 of the EPCA amended § 101 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 

U S C app. § 2071, adding a new subsection (c) that authorizes the President to require the allocation of supplies of 

materials and equipment in order to maximize domestic energy supplies That provision is discussed infra

26 42 U.S C. § 6212 See discussion infra.

27 See 42 U.S C §§ 6214(a)(2)(B), 6214(b)(2), 6214(c), 6261(b), 6271(a), 6272(b)

651
oil.28 The Agreement imposes four principal substantive obligations: (1) the 

maintenance of emergency oil reserves (Chapter I); (2) a program of contingent 

demand restraint measures (Chapter II); (3) a program of international sharing of 

oil supplies during a supply emergency (Chapter III); and (4) the establishment 

of an information system on the international oil market (Chapter V). A critical 

feature of the IEP is the agreement on a “ trigger” level of shortage in petroleum 

supplies that may activate certain emergency measures to ease disruption caused 

by the shortage. This emergency system may be activated only in the event of a 7 

percent or greater shortfall in oil supplies of one or all of the Participating 

Countries, as determined in accordance with procedures set out in Chapter IV of 

the Agreement. Once the emergency system has been activated, all Participating 

Countries are obligated to share in the shortfall. This may include, depending on 

the circumstances, the sharing of oil supplies among Participating Countries, 

based on a calculation of “supply rights” that assumes a certain amount of the 

shortfall will be absorbed through demand restraint and use of emergency 

reserves.29

1. Section 103. Limitations on Exports

Section 103 of the EPCA, 42 U.S.C. § 6212, grants the President certain 

authority to limit exports of energy supplies, including petroleum products. 

Subsection (a), 42 U.S.C. § 6212(a), provides the President with discretionary 

authority to promulgate a rule restricting exports of coal, petroleum products, 

natural gas, or petrochemical feedstocks, and related materials and equipment. 

To facilitate implementation of any rule issued pursuant to subsection (a), the 

President may require the Secretary of Commerce to implement export restrictions pursuant to procedures established by the Export Administration Act of 

1979 (EAA), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1982). See 42 U.S.C. § 6212(c). 

The Secretary of Commerce may implement those restrictions without regard to 

the direction in the EAA that export controls be limited to those necessary, inter

alia, “ to reduce the serious inflationary impact of foreign demand.” 30 Subsection 

(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6212(b), requires the President to promulgate a rule prohibiting 

the export of crude oil and natural gas produced in the United States. The 

President may exempt crude oil or natural gas exports from that prohibition only

28 Section 3(7) of the EPCA, 42 U.S C. § 6202(7), defines the IEP as follows

The term “ international energy program ” means the Agreement on an International Energy 

Program, signed by the United States on November 18, 1974, including (A) the annex entitled 

“ Emergency R eserves," (B) any amendment lo such Agreement which includes another nation as a 

party to such Agreement, and (C) any technical or clerical amendment to such Agreement 

The effect of this definition is to limit the use o f the authonty provided by the EPCA to actions taken in support of the 

Agreement as it was signed by the United States in 1974; the definition precludes use of the EPCA in support of 

actions taken to implement any future substantive amendments to the Agreement In addition, § 255 of the EPCA,

42 U S C § 6275, contains a caveat that, “ [w]hile the authorities contained in [subchapter II of the EPCA] may, to 

the extent authonzed . , be used to carry out obligations incurred by the United States in connection with the 

International Energy Program, [subchapter 11] shall not be construed in any way as advice and consent, ratification, 

endorsement, or other form of congressional approval of the specific terms of such program ”

29 The scope and operation of the IEP are discussed more fully infra at 687-89

30 See 50 U.S C. app. § 2402(2)(C) The EAA is discussed infra at 683-84

652
if he determines that an exemption would be consistent with the national interest 

and the purposes of the EPCA. Id.

The President’s authority to restrict exports of energy supplies and materials 

under § 103(a) or to waive mandatory restrictions on the export of crude oil and 

natural gas under § 103(b) is subject to several limitations. First, he must find 

that the restrictions or exemptions are “ appropriate and necessary” to carry out 

the purposes of the EPCA31 and consistent with the national interest. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 6212(a), (b)(1), (d). The President’s determination of the “ national interest” 

(or the parallel determination by the Secretary of Commerce in implementing 

export restrictions under this section) must take into account the need to leave 

uninterrupted or unimpaired: (1) exchanges in similar quantity for convenience 

or increased efficiency of transportation with persons or the government of a 

foreign state; (2) temporary exports across parts of an adjacent foreign state; and 

(3) the historical trading relations of the United States with Canada and Mexico. 

Id. § 6212(d). Second, with respect to restrictions on supplies of materials or 

equipment other than primary energy sources, the President must determine that 

the restrictions are necessary either to maintain or for further exploration, 

production, refining, or transportation of energy supplies, or for the construction 

or maintenance of energy facilities, within the United States. Id. § 6212(a)(2). 

Third, exemptions from the mandatory export restrictions on crude oil and 

natural gas required by subsection (b) must be based on a “reasonable classification or basis,” such as the purpose for export, class of seller or purchaser, or 

country of destination. Id. § 6212(b)(2).

2. Section 106. Accelerated Production Rates

Section 106(a)(1) of the EPCA, 42 U.S.C. § 6214(a)(1), requires the Secretary of the Interior to determine, by rule, a “ maximum efficient rate of production” (Mer) and a “ temporary emergency production rate” (Ter) for each field on 

federal lands that produces or is capable of producing significant volumes of 

crude oil and/or natural gas.32 Subsection (b) of § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 6214(b),

31 The purposes of the EPCA are broadly defined in § 2, 42 U.S.C § 6201, to include the following.

(1) to grant specific standby authority to the President, subject to congressional review, to impose 

rationing, to reduce demand for energy through the implementation of energy conservation plans, 

and to fulfill obligations of the United States under the international energy program;

(2) to provide for the creation of a Strategic Petroleum Reserve capable of reducing the impact of 

severe energy supply interruptions;

(3) to increase the supply of fossil fuels in the United States, through price incentives and 

production requirements;

(4) to conserve energy supplies through energy conservation programs, and, where necessary, the 

regulation of certain energy uses;

(5) to provide for improved energy efficiency of motor vehicles, major appliances, and certain 

other consumer products;

(6) to reduce the demand for petroleum products and natural gas through programs designed to 

provide greater availability and use of .this Nation's abundant coal resources; and

(7) to provide a means for verification of energy data to assure the reliability of energy data

32 The Mer is defined as the maximum rate of production that “ may be sustained without loss of ultimate recovery 

of crude oil or natural gas, or both, under sound engineering and economic principles.” 42 U.S.C. § 6214(e)(1). 

The Ter is the maximum rate of production, above the Mer, that “ may be maintained for a temporary period of less 

than 90 days without reservoir damage and without significant loss of ultimate recovery of crude oil or natural gas, or 

both. . Id. § 6214(e)(2)

653
provides that each state may establish a Mer and Ter for any field in the state, 

other than a field on federal lands, that produces or is capable of producing 

significant volumes of natural gas or crude oil, and subsection (c), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 6214(c), provides that the Secretary of the Interior may establish a Mer and Ter 

for unitized fields on federal and non-federal lands for which no Mer or Ter has 

otherwise been established.

Except with respect to the Naval Petroleum Reserves (NPRs),33 the President 

may, at any time, require natural gas or crude oil to be produced from fields on 

federal lands at the Mer. If the President determines that a severe energy supply 

interruption exists, he may also authorize production from federal fields at the 

Ter, or from non-federal or unitized fields on federal and non-federal lands at the 

Mer or Ter, if such rates have been established by the states or the Secretary of the 

Interior pursuant to subsections (b) and (c). 42 U.S.C. § 6214(a)(2), (b)(2), (c). 

This authority could be used to increase domestic crude oil supplies generally by 

increasing the rate of production from federal fields to the Mer, or, in response to 

an interruption in petroleum supplies that triggers a presidential finding of a 

severe energy supply interruption, by increasing production from federal fields to 

the Ter and from other fields to the Mer or Ter.

3. Sections 151-161. Strategic Petroleum Reserve

Sections 151—161 of the EPCA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6231-6241, amended by Pub. 

L. No. 97-229, § 4, 96 Stat. 250 (1982), provide for creation of a Strategic 

Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to be available for the purposes of reducing the impact 

of future disruptions in supplies of petroleum products and fulfilling obligations 

of the United States under the IEP,34 and set forth the method and circumstances 

for drawdown and distribution of the SPR.

a. Establishment of the SPR

Section 154 of the EPCA directs the establishment of an SPR for storage of up 

to one billion barrels of petroleum products and preparation of a plan (SPR Plan) 

outlining proposals for designing, constructing, and filling the storage and 

related facilities of the Reserve. 42 U.S.C. § 6234(a), (b). The SPR Plan must

33 The NPRs, which are established pursuant to 10 U.S C §§ 7420-7438 (1982), are exempt from § 106 of the 

EPCA. See 42 U.S.C § 6214(0- Section 7422(c) of title 10 authorized and directed production of the NPRs at the 

Mer for a period ending not later than April 5, 1982, and permitted the President to extend such production for 

additional periods not to exceed three years each Mer production has been extended until April 1985. 17 Weekly 

Comp. Pres. Doc. 1097 (Oct. 6, 1981). Section 7422(b) of title 10 authorizes the Secretary of Energy to require 

production of petroleum from the NPRs at the Ter, with the approval of the President, whenever such production is 

needed for national defense and if such production is authorized by a joint resolution of Congress. 10 U.S C. 

§ 7422(b)(2)

34 A sdiscussedm /ra, at the discretion of the President, the SPR may be used to fulfill the obligations of the United 

States under the IEP to participate in an international oil sharing plan in the event of activation of the IEP emergency 

system. S ee infra at 656

654
also include a description of the method of drawdown and distribution of the 

SPR.35 Id. § 6234(e)(12).

In addition, the SPR Plan must provide either for establishment and maintenance on a regional basis of a “ Regional Petroleum Reserve” containing sufficient volumes of residual fuel oil or any refined petroleum product to “ provide 

substantial protection against an interruption or reduction in imports of such oil 

or product,” or for storage in the SPR of “ substitute” volumes of crude oil and 

petroleum products sufficient to meet regional needs. 42 U.S.C. § 6237. Section 

154(d) of the EPCA, 42 U.S.C. § 6234(d), further directs that the Plan “ shall be 

designed to assure, to the maximum extent practicable, . . . that each noncontiguous area of the United States which does not have overland access to domestic

oil production has its component of the [SPR] within its respective territory.”

As part of the SPR, the Secretary of Energy36 may create an Industrial 

Petroleum Reserve (IPR). 42 U.S.C. § 6236. An IPR would consist of private 

inventories of petroleum products required to be maintained in excess of normal 

requirements. The Secretary of Energy has the discretionary authority to establish such a reserve by requiring importers and refiners of petroleum products to 

acquire, store, and maintain supplies of petroleum products up to 3 percent of the 

amount they imported or refined in the previous calendar year. In establishing and 

maintaining an IPR, the Secretary is required to take steps to avoid inequitable 

economic impacts on refiners and importers, and to maintain an economically 

sound and competitive petroleum industry. Id.

b. Filling the SPR

To implement the SPR, the Secretary of Energy is authorized to acquire 

petroleum products by purchase, exchange, or other means; the Secretary may 

also store or exchange crude oil produced from federal lands, including NPR oil 

and oil that the United States is entitled to receive as royalties. 42 U.S.C. § 6240. 

Amendments to the EPCA added in 1982 by the EEPA require the President, to 

the extent funds are appropriated by Congress, to increase the volume of 

petroleum products in the SPR at a “ minimum fill rate” of 300,000 barrels per

35 The SPR Plan and any amendments thereto must be transmitted to Congress pursuant to the procedures 

provided in 42 U S C § 6421 for approval of “ major energy actions ” See 42 U S.C. § 6239. We believe that 

procedures such as these, which contemplate either a one-House veto or a two-House approval mechanism, violate 

the presentation requirement and, insofar as a one-House veto is involved, the bicameralism requirements of Art. I, 

§ 7, els. 2& 3 of the Constitution. These clauses requtrethat all congressional actions having the force and effect of 

law must be adopted by both Houses of Congress and presented to the President for his approval or veto. In addition, 

legislative veto provisions such as involved here, which purport to allow Congress to play a direct and significant 

role in the execution of the law, are inconsistent with the pnnciple of separation of powers. See Consum ers U nion c f

U .S., Inc v Federal Trade C om m 'n, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir 1982) (per curiam ) (en banc); C onsum er E nergy

C ouncil o f Am erica v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com m n, 673 F.2d 425 (D C. Cir 1982), pending before the 

Supreme Court as Nos. 81-2008,81-2020, 81-2151,81-2171,82-177, and 82-209; Im m igration a n d N aturalization Service v Chadha, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), pending before the Supreme Court as Nos. 80-1832, 

81-2170, and 81-2171

36 Responsibility for developing and implementing the SPR was originally given to the Administrator of the 

Federal Energy Administration Pursuant to the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U .S.C. §§ 1701-7375 

(1982), the Secretary of Energy is responsible for all functions relating to the SPR. See 42 U.S C § 7151

655
day, or 220,000 barrels per day if the President finds that the higher rate would not 

be in the national interest, until the SPR reaches at least 500,000,000 barrels. 

Pub. L. No. 97-229, § 4(a), 96 Stat. 250 (1982).37 In order to facilitate achievement of this fill rate, the EEPA authorizes the leasing or other use of “ interim 

storage facilities.” Id. § 4(b).

c. Drawdown and Distribution of the SPR

Section 161, 42 U.S.C. § 6241, governs the drawdown and distribution of 

petroleum products in the SPR. Drawdown and distribution must be accomplished in accordance with an effective Distribution Plan.38 The Distribution Plan 

can only be implemented upon a finding by the President that distribution of the 

Reserve is required either by (1) a severe energy supply interruption or (2) obligations of the United States under the IEP. Id.

The President’s authority to withdraw oil in the SPR includes the authority to 

impose allocation and price controls on that oil. Under § 161(e), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 6241(e), the Secretary of Energy is specifically authorized to provide by rule 

“ for the allocation of any petroleum product withdrawn from the [SPR] in 

amounts specified in (or determined in a manner prescribed by) and at prices 

specified in (or determined in a manner prescribed by) such rules. Such price 

levels and allocation procedures shall be consistent with the attainment, to the 

maximum extent practicable, of the objectives specified in [the EPAA].” The 

Department of Energy has adopted regulations that would govern the allocation 

and pricing of SPR crude oil, in the event that such oil were allocated rather than 

sold through price competition, after a breakdown of the reserve had been 

triggered by one of the enumerated circumstances. See 10C.F.R. Pt. 220(1984).

4. Sections 201-202. Energy Conservation Contingency Plans

Under § 201 of the EPCA, 42 U.S.C. § 6261, the President is required to 

develop one or more “energy conservation contingency plans,” which are 

defined by § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 6262, as plans “ which impose reasonable 

restrictions on the public or private use of energy that are necessary to reduce 

energy consumption.” 39 The President is required to submit any energy conservation contingency plan or amendments thereto to Congress accompanied by a 

statement explaining the need for, rationale of, and operation of the plan. The plan

37 If funds are available to achieve a fill rate higher than the required “minimum fill rate,” the EEPA provides that 

the fill rate be the "highest practicable fill rate achievable.” Pub. L No. 97-229, § 4(a)(1)(D), 96 Stat. 251 (1982). 

After the SPR reaches 500,000,000 barrels, the President’s obligation is to “ seek to undertake and continue” a 

fill rate of 300,000 barrels per day until the SPR reaches 750,000,000 barrels. Id § 4(a)(2).

38 The currently effective SPR Distribution Plan was submitted to Congress on October 31, 1979. The EEPA 

requires the Secretary of Energy to transmit a new drawdown plan to Congress by December 1, 1982, as an 

amendment to the existing SPR Plan The EEPA specifies that this amendment shall take effect on the date of 

transmittal to Congress and shall not be subject to provisions in § 159(e) ofthe EPCA, 42 U.S C § 6239(e), relating 

to congressional review of SPR Plan amendments. Pub. L. No 97-229, § 4(c), 96 Stat. 252 (1982).

39 As enacted, §§ 201 and 203 also required the President to develop a “ rationing contingency plan” as part of 

regulations promulgated under § 4(a) of the EPAA, 15 U.S.C § 753(a). S ee 42 U.S.C. §§ 6261, 6263. This 

authonty expired on September 30, 1981 S e e id § 6263(f) (1976)

656
must take into account its potential economic impacts, including its effects on 

vital industrial sectors of the economy, employment, the economic vitality of 

states and regional areas, the availability and price of consumer goods and 

services, the gross national product, and any possible anticompetitive effects. Id.

§ 6261(b), (c), (e). Section 201(b)(2) further requires that the contingency plan 

be approved by a resolution by each House of Congress.40 Id. § 6261(b)(2). In 

order to implement an effective emergency contingency plan, the President must 

find that implementation is required by a severe energy supply interruption or by 

the need to fulfill the obligations of the United States under the IEP. Id.

§ 6261(b)(3).

The President’s authority to prescribe particular demand restraint or energy 

conservation measures pursuant to § 201 is limited by § 202(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 6262(a)(2), which prohibits any energy conservation contingency plan from 

imposing any rationing, tax, tariff, or user fee, from providing for any credit or 

deduction in computing any tax, and from containing any provision respecting 

the price of petroleum products. A plan may provide for exemption of individual 

states or political subdivisions if the President determines a comparable program 

is in effect in such state or subdivision or that “ special circumstances” exist. See

id. § 6262(b).

5. Sections 251, 252, 254. Authorities in Support of the Allocation and 

Information Provisions of the IEP

Sections 251, 252, and 254 of the EPCA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6271,6272, 6274, as

amended by Pub. L. No. 97-229, § 2, 96 Stat. 248 (1982), provide authority for 

the President and cooperating U.S. oil companies to take action to implement 

obligations of the United States under the allocation and information provisions 

contained in Chapters III, IV, and V of the IEP.

As described more fully in f trt II below, under the allocation provisions of the 

IEP, when a reduction in oil supplies reaches the “trigger” level, the United 

States may have an obligation to allocate oil to another Participating Country, or 

may have the right to receive allocations of oil from another Participating 

Country, depending on calculation of the United States’ “ supply rights.” Chapter 

III of the IEP Agreement provides that “ when the sum of normal domestic 

production and actual net imports available during an emergency exceeds its 

supply right [the country] shall have an allocation obligation which requires it to 

supply, directly or indirectly, the quantity of oil equal to that excess to other 

Participating Countries.” Chapter III obligates the United States and the IEP 

countries to take “ necessary measures” to ensure that such allocation will be 

carried out. As provided in Chapter IV of the Agreement, there are two types of 

emergencies that “ trigger” or activate a nation’s allocation obligations under the 

IEP Agreement: (1) a selective trigger, which occurs when one or more Par40 For the reasons set forth supra at n 35, we believe that this two-House approval provision is within the class of 

so-called legislative veto mechanisms that violate the requirements of Art I, § 7 of the Constitution and the 

principle of separation of powers.

657
ticipating Countries suffer a 7 percent or greater shortfall of available supplies 

measured against final oil consumption during a specified base period; and (2) a 

general trigger, which occurs when the Participating Countries as a whole suffer a 

7 percent or greater shortfall.4'

The IEP Agreement also provides for the furnishing of information to the 

International Energy Agency (IEA)42 during normal and emergency situations. 

Pursuant to Chapter V, Participating Countries are required to supply to the IEA 

certain information concerning the international oil market and activities of oil 

companies, and the possible development of oil shortages, and are responsible 

for assuring that oil companies subject to their jurisdiction provide them with the 

required information.43

a. Section 251. International Allocation

Section 251 of the EPCA, 42 U.S.C. § 6271, provides the exclusive statutory 

authority for the President to require U.S. oil companies to allocate petroleum 

products to Participating Countries, if such allocation is necessary for the 

purpose of implementing obligations of the United States under the IEP.44 That 

section authorizes the President to promulgate rules requiring that producers, 

transporters, refiners, distributors, or storers of petroleum products “ take such 

action as [the President] determines to be necessary for implementation of the 

obligations of the United States under Chapters III and IV of the [IEP] insofar as 

such obligations relate to the international allocation of petroleum products.” The 

President’s authority under that section specifically includes the authority to 

regulate the allocation and price of petroleum products owned or controlled by oil 

companies subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.45 No rule promulgated 

under § 251 may be made effective unless (1) it has been transmitted to Congress, accompanied by a finding that implementation of the rule is required in 

order to fulfill the obligations of the United States under the IEP; (2) an “ international energy supply emergency” has been declared by the President;46 and

(3) the IEP emergency system has been activated in accordance with the pro41 See infra at 688-87.

42 The IEA is the international body set up by the IEP Agreement The supreme decisionmaking body of the IEA 

is the Governing Board, which includes a representative of each member government. A permanent staff is provided 

by the establishment of a Secretariat. Much o f the work of the IEA is done by several “ standing groups,” consisting 

of senior personnel from the Participating Countries.

43 The IEP information system is discussed infra at 688.

44 Subsection (c)(2) of § 251, 42 U.S.C § 6271(c)(2), makes clear that the authority is exclusive:

No officer or agency of the United States shall have any authority, other than authonty under this 

section, to require that petroleum products be allocated to other countries for the purpose of 

implementation of the obligations of the United States under the [IEP]

45 Section 251(a), 42 U S.C. § 6271(a), provides that “ [a]llocation under such aile should be in such amounts 

and at such prices as are specified in (or determined in a manner prescribed by) such rule.”

46 An “ international energy supply emergency” is defined by § 252(1)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6272(1)(1), as.

any penod (A) beginning on any date which the President determines allocation of petroleum 

products to nations participating in the international energy program is required by chapters III and 

IV of such program, and (B) ending on a date on which he determines that such allocation is no 

longer required. Such a penod may not exceed 90 days, but the President may establish one or more 

additional 90-day periods by making anew the determination under subparagraph (A) of the 

preceding sentence.

658
cedures and standards of Chapter IV.47 No rule may remain in effect longer than 

twelve months after its transmittal to Congress. Id. § 6271(b).

Under § 251, the President has clear authority to require oil companies subject 

to the jurisdiction of the United States to divert their oil supplies to other 

Participating Countries, and to determine prices at which such supplies should be 

sold, if a “ trigger” situation has been declared in accordance with Chapter IV of 

the Agreement and if the President determines that such allocation is necessary to 

meet the United States’ allocation obligations. A related question is whether 

§ 251 provides the President with authority to allocate oil supplies among 

cooperating oil companies if those oil companies are disadvantaged by diversion 

of their projected supplies to other countries, when such diversion is necessary to 

enable the United States to meet its obligations under Chapters III and IV of the 

IEP Agreement. Although the IEP Agreement does not require that the United 

States have authority to control the allocation or price of oil domestically in order 

to ensure that those oil companies that assist the United States in meeting its 

obligations under the Agreement do not suffer competitively, the Agreement 

could arguably be interpreted to support the development of such a “ fair share” 

domestic allocation program. Articles 6(1), 9(3), and 9(4) of the Agreement, for 

example, appear to contemplate that Participating Countries may implement such 

programs in order to fulfill their international allocation obligations.

Art. 6(1). Each participating country shall take the necessary 

measures in order that allocation of oil will be carried out pursuant 

to [Chapter III] and Chapter IV.

* * * if! *

Art. 9(3). Insofar as possible, normal channels of supply will be 

maintained as well as the normal supply proportions between 

crude oil and products and among different categories of crude oil 

and products.

Art. 9(4).-When allocation takes place, an objective of the Program shall be that available crude oil and products shall, insofar as 

possible, be shared within the refining and distributing industries 

as well as between refining and distributing companies in accordance with historical supply patterns.

Section 251 specifically authorizes the President to direct oil companies “ to 

take such action as he determines to be necessary” to meet the international 

allocation obligations of the United States under the IEP. 42 U.S.C. § 6271(a). 

Consistent with this language and the arguable breadth of the IEP Agreement, the 

President could find that a limited domestic “ fair sharing” allocation program

47 The second and third requirements were recently added by the EEPA to clarify Congress’ intent that § 251 not 

provide authonty for the President to implement allocation or price control requirements prior to activation of the 

IEP emergency system in accordance with Chapter IV of the Agreement. Pub. L. No 97-229, § 2, 96 Slat. 248 

(1982); see 128 Cong Rec. S 6065 (daily ed. May 26. 1982) (remarks of Sen. McClure) This requirement would, 

for example, preclude use of § 251 to direct oil companies to allocate oil in “ subcnsis" situations. A fuller 

discussion of this limitation is provided m ftirt II infra.

659
would be necessary in order for the United States to meet its IEP allocation 

obligations through the voluntary cooperation of U.S. oil companies, because 

such cooperation could well depend on assurances to the participating companies 

that they would not suffer competitive losses. A presidential determination that 

such a system is “ necessary” to meet those obligations would be accorded 

substantial deference by the courts. See generally, e.g., Chicago & Southern

Airlines v. Western S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 363, 370 (1968). 

Similarly, the President’s determination with regard to the nature of the United 

States’ international allocation obligations under the IEP and the measures to be 

used to meet those obligations would be accorded substantial deference. See

generally, e.g.. Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 

U.S. 548, 561 (1976). It is clear, however, that neither the IEP nor § 251 requires

the President to develop or implement a domestic “fair sharing” allocation plan.

It is less clear that § 251 could be used to establish comprehensive nationwide 

allocation and price controls, for example, such as those provided under the 

EPAA, on the basis that such controls are “ necessary” for implementation of the 

United States’ international allocation obligations under the IEP. An allocation 

and pricing regulation of the breadth available under the EPAA would not, at least 

in the absence of particular facts, appear to be linked with sufficient directness to 

fulfillment of the United States’ international allocation obligations to justify a 

presidential finding of necessity. However, any exercise of presidential discretion 

under § 251 will depend on the particular facts presented. See generally Federal

Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., supra, 426 U.S. at 571.

b. Section 252. Antitrust Defense

Section 252 of the EPCA, 42 U.S.C. § 6272, authorizes persons engaged in 

the business of producing, transporting, refining, distributing, or storing petroleum products to develop voluntary agreements and plans of action to facilitate 

or implement the United States’ allocation and information obligations under the 

IEP, and establishes procedures for development of such agreements and plans 

and for approval and monitoring by federal officials.48 That section provides a 

limited antitrust defense with respect to actions taken by participating companies 

in developing or implementing agreements that meet the requirements of the 

section. The antitrust defense is available only if the actions are taken in the

48 Section 252 calls upon the Secretary of Energy to prescribe rules governing, and provides detailed procedural 

requirements with respect to. meetings held to develop or carry out a voluntary agreement or plan of action 42 

U S.C. § 6272(b), (c) S ee 10 C.FR Pt. 209 (1984) The Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission 

(FTC) are to participate in the development and execution of voluntary agreements and plans of action and the 

Attorney General must approve any voluntary agreement or plan of action prior to its implementation. 42 U S C 

§ 6272(d). The Attorney General and the FTC are also to monitor the development and execution of voluntary 

agreements and plans of action in order to “ promote competition and to prevent anticompetitive practices and 

effects.” Id. § 6272(e). A “ Voluntary Agreement and Plan of Action to Implement the International Energy 

P ro g ra m ,” administered by the Secretary of Energy, was approved in 1 9 7 6.5^41 Fed Reg. 13998(Apr. 1, 1976). 

Twenty U S oil companies are now participating in that Agreement On May 8, 1981, the Department of Energy 

published a revised draft Plan of Action in the Federal Register. 46 Fed Reg 26026 (May 8, 1981).

660
course of developing or carrying out a voluntary agreement or plan of action, are 

in compliance with the requirements of the section and any rules promulgated 

thereunder, and are not taken for the purpose of injuring competition. Section 

252(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6272(f)(2), provides that actions taken to implement a 

voluntary agreement or plan of action must be “ specified in, or within the 

reasonable contemplation of, an approved plan of action” in order to qualify for 

the antitrust defense. A separate breach of contract defense is also provided if the 

alleged breach “ was caused predominantly by action taken during an international energy supply emergency or to carry out a voluntary agreement or plan of 

action authorized and approved in accordance with [§ 252].” Id. § 6272(k).

The authority in § 252 to develop and implement voluntary agreements or 

plans of action and the parallel antitrust and breach-of-contract defenses may be 

relied upon only in support of the United States’ allocation and information 

obligations under Chapters III, IV, and V of the IEP Agreement. Any doubt 

whether § 252 would authorize actions taken by oil companies that are not 

provided for by the allocation and information provisions of Chapters III, IV, or 

V of the IEP was dispelled by the EEPA, which amended § 252 to provide that:

The authority granted by this section shall apply only to the 

development or carrying out of voluntary agreements and plans of 

action to implement chapters III, IV, and V of the international 

energy program.

Pub. L. No. 97-229, § 2(b), 96 Stat. 248 (1982). See discussion infra at 694—95.

The legislative history of § 252 makes clear that the antitrust defense was not 

intended to authorize voluntary agreements among the oil companies for the 

domestic allocation or pricing of oil supplies, even if the purpose of such 

allocation were to ease disruptions caused by international allocations necessary 

to meet the United States’ IEP obligations. The report issued by the Senate 

Committee on the Judiciary states that, at the request of the Ford Administration 

and of Chairman Hart of the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, the 

requirements of § 121 (the predecessor to § 252) were tailored and limited to 

specific actions with respect to the international allocation of petroleum and the 

information system of the IEP. The Report indicates that the defense was 

intentionally not extended to domestic activities of companies participating in 

voluntary agreements or plans under § 252. See S. Rep. No. 26, 94th Cong., 1st 

Sess. 43 (1975).

c. Section 254. Exchange of Information with the International Energy 

Agency

Section 254, 42 U.S.C. § 6274, contains procedures for the transmittal of 

information to the IEA by the United States government. That section provides 

that the Secretary of State may transmit to the IEA information and data related to 

the energy industry that is required to be submitted under the terms of the IEP 

Agreement. 42 U.S.C. § 6274(a). To the extent feasible, trade secrets and

661
commercial or financial information must be aggregated to avoid identification of 

sources before being reported to the IEA by the United States government. Id.

However, such information may be transmitted directly by the government 

without aggregation during an international energy supply emergency,49 or if the 

President certifies that the IEA has adopted and is implementing security measures to protect against disclosure of the information to any person or foreign 

nation. Id. The President may withhold transmittal of any data or information if 

he determines that transmittal would prejudice competition, violate the antitrust 

laws, or be inconsistent with national security. Id. § 6274(b). If the confidentiality of information to be transmitted to the IEA is otherwise protected by 

statute, the Secretary of Energy, prior to giving the information to the State 

Department, must obtain concurrence in its release from the head of the department or agency authorized to collect or obtain the information. Id. § 6274(c).

B. Defense Production Act cf 1950

The Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2061-2169, 

provides the President with additional discretionary authority that may be available in the event of a substantial shortfall in petroleum supplies. The DPA is not 

an “ emergency” statute, in the sense that the authority provided in the statute 

may be used only if certain specified “ emergency” conditions occur.50 Rather, 

the President may use that authority to meet a variety of national defense and 

national defense preparedness needs, whether or not an “emergency” situation 

exists. As discussed above, however, our focus in this Memorandum is on 

statutory authorities that may be available to the President in the event of a future 

“ petroleum emergency.” Consequently, our discussion of the scope of the DPA is 

generally limited to how that statute could be used by the President to respond to 

such an emergency. Nothing in this discussion is intended to suggest that, subject 

of course to the requirements of each relevant provision,51 the DPA may not be 

used in other contexts or in non-emergency situations.

The purpose of the DPA is to provide for the promotion of the national defense 

by assuring that adequate productive capacity and supply exist to meet national 

defense needs. With one exception,52 exercise of authority provided by the DPA 

must be linked to the needs of the national defense or of national defense 

preparedness programs.53 The President has broad discretion to determine what 

those needs are and how the DPA authorities may be used, consistent with the

49 This exception is limited, however, to information or data relating to the international allocation of petroleum 

products. 42 U.S.C. § 6274(a)(2)(B)(i).

50 One exception is § 710(e), 50 U.S C. app. § 2160(e), which, as we discuss infra, authorizes employment of 

members of the Executive Reserve only “ during penods of emergency.” S ee infra at 672-73.

51 S ee id.

i2 S ee discussion of § 101(c), 50 U S.C. app. § 2071(c), infra at 668-70.

53 The term “ national defense” is defined by the Act to include “ programs for military and atomic energy 

production or construction, military assistance to any foreign nation, stockpiling, space and directly related 

activity.” 50 U S C. app. § 2152(d).

662
specific requirements of each provision of the statute.54 See generally H.R. Rep. 

No. 2759, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950); S. Rep. No. 470, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.

12 (1951). In particular, in his determination of what the national defense 

requires, it is clear that the President may consider, inter alia, the potential 

impact of severe shortages in petroleum supplies available to the United States. In 

the Energy Security Act (ESA), Pub. L. No. 96-294, § 102,94 Stat. 617 (1980), 

Congress specifically designated energy as a “ strategic and critical material” 

within the meaning of the DPA’s Declaration of Policy,55 and added language to 

that Declaration to emphasize that preparedness programs, as well as actions to 

expand productive capacity and supply in order to assure the availability of 

energy supplies, are linked to the national defense:

In view of the present international situation and in order to 

provide for the national defense and national security, our mobilization effort continues to require some diversion of certain 

materials and facilities from civilian use to military and related 

purposes. It also requires the development of preparedness programs and the expansion of productive capacity and supply 

beyond the levels needed to meet the civilian demand, in order to 

reduce the time required for full mobilization in the event of an 

attack on the United States or to respond to actions occurring

outside of the United States which could result in the termination

or reduction cf the availability cf strategic and critical materials,

including energy, and which would adversely affect the national

defense preparedness cf the United States. In order to insure the

national defense preparedness which is essential to national

security, it is also necessary and appropriate to assure domestic

energy supplies for national defense needs.

50 U.S.C. app. § 2062 (amendment emphasized). The Conference Report 

explained:

The “ Declaration of Policy” is amended to make it clear that it is 

necessary and appropriate, indeed essential, “to assure domestic 

energy supplies for national defense needs.”

54 As described below, the particular basis for exercise of authority under each of the relevant provisions of the 

DPA differs somewhat, although, with the exception of § 101(c), 50U .S C.app. § 2071(c)(je*n.52), that exercise 

must be related to the national defense or national defense preparedness programs. Thus, the President has authority 

under § 101(a), 50 U S.C. app. § 2071(a), to order the priority performance of contracts or allocate materials “ to 

promote the national defense,” under § 708, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2158(c)(1), the President may authonze voluntary 

agreements among private individuals and companies ” upon finding that conditions exist which may pose a direct 

threat to the national defense or its preparedness programs;” the President may employ persons from the private 

sector without compensation under § 710(b), 50U S.C app. § 2160(b), ‘‘in order to carry out the provisions of [the 

DPA];” and he may establish and train an Executive Reserve pursuant to § 710(e), 50 U.S.C app § 2160(e), for 

employment “ in executive positions in Government during periods of emergency.”

i5 See 50 U.S C app § 2076.

663
H.R. Rep. No. 1104, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1980).56

Three provisions of the DPA provide the President with authority to respond to 

a substantial petroleum shortage: § 101, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071, which authorizes the President to require the priority performance of contracts or orders and to 

direct allocation of materials, including petroleum products, in certain circumstances; § 708, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2158, which authorizes the President to 

approve certain voluntary agreements relating to preparedness for national 

emergencies and thereby to trigger an antitrust defense for persons or companies 

participating in such agreements; and § 710, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2160, which 

authorizes the President to employ “ persons of outstanding experience and 

ability” to serve without compensation in advisory positions for purposes of 

assisting in carrying out the DPA and to establish an Executive Reserve to train 

private and governmental personnel for employment in executive positions in the 

government during periods of emergency.

1. Section 101(a). Priority Performance of Contracts and Allocation of

Materials

Section 101(a) of the DPA, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(a), authorizes the President 

to require performance on a priority basis of contracts or orders that he deems 

“ necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense,” and to allocate 

materials and facilities “ in such manner, upon such conditions and to such extent 

as he shall deem necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense.” 57 The 

authority provided to the President under this section has been characterized by 

Congress as “ broad and flexible.” H.R. Rep. No. 2759, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 

(1950). Indeed, the House Report on the original version of the DPA noted that 

§ 101(a) would authorize a wide range of actions to meet the national defense 

needs of the United States:

[The powers granted under § 101(a)] would include the power to 

issue orders stopping or reducing the production of any item; 

orders to prohibit the use of a material for a particular purpose or 

for anything except a particular purpose; and orders to prohibit the 

accumulation of excessive inventories. [Section 101(a)] would 

authorize the President to require filling certain orders in prefer56 Congress intended that this amendment to the DPA make explicit the link between domestic energy supplies 

and the national defense, but it did not intend to grant any new allocation or pricing authority or new authority to 

engage in the production of energy (except as authorized by the ESA with respect to synthetic fuel production) See

50 U.S C. app. {f 2076

57 The full text of § 101(a) reads as follows.

The President is hereby authonzed (I) to require that performance under contracts or orders (other 

than contracts of employment) which he deems necessary or appropriate to promote the national 

defense shall take pnority over performance under any other contract or order, and, for the purpose of 

assuring such pnority, to require acceptance and performance of such contracts or orders in 

preference to other contracts or orders by any person he finds to be capable of their performance, and

(2) to allocate matenals and facilities in such manner, upon such conditions, and to such extent as he 

shall deem necessary or appropnate to promote the national defense.

50 U S C. app. § 2071(a).

664
ence to other orders, or requiring the acceptance and performance 

of particular orders.

Id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 639, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1951). The report 

of the Senate committee on amendments added to the DPA in 1952 cautions, 

however, that the section should be used “ only where necessary or appropriate to 

promote the national defense. [It] should not be used to accomplish purposes, 

however meritorious, which bear no relation to national defense.” S. Rep. No. 

1599, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952).

In a petroleum emergency, § 101(a) could give the President authority, inter

alia, to require acceptance of and priority performance under contracts relating to 

the production, delivery, or refining of petroleum products or to allocate supplies 

of petroleum products, depending on the circumstances of the emergency.58 

Section 101(a) might also be used to facilitate petroleum transportation during an 

emergency, for example, by requiring pipelines, marine terminals, and other 

facilities to perform oil transport contracts necessary or appropriate to promote 

the national defense.

The President’s authority would be subject to certain limitations or would have 

to rest on certain findings required by the DPA. First, the requisite “ national 

defense” nexus must exist. Use of the authority provided by § 101(a) specifically 

to respond to a petroleum emergency would have to be based on a presidential 

determination that the emergency threatens or adversely affects the national 

defense, as that term is defined in the Act.59 However, as noted above, Congress 

has specifically recognized that national defense concerns may be implicated by a 

shortfall in energy supplies, particularly a shortfall resulting from actions occurring outside the United States. See supra at 663. Especially in light of this clear 

congressional intent, a presidential determination that a substantial reduction in 

petroleum supplies affects the national defense and security of the United States 

would be given considerable deference by the courts. See generally Federal

Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., supra, 426 U.S. at 561.

Second, the President’s authority is limited by § 101(b), 50 U.S.C. app. 

§ 2071(b), which directs that the powers granted in § 101(a) can be used to

58 It is clear that Congress contemplated use of § 101(a), as well as other DPA provisions, to control the 

performance of petroleum-related contracts and to allocate petroleum products, if the President were to find such 

action necessary and appropriate to promote the national defense The 1950 House Report noted that increased 

demand for certain metals for the military and other programs or for stockpiling “ will inevitably cut down on the 

supply available to industry generally, with consequent dislocations The same situation is present, to a greater or 

lesser extent, in the case of many other materials, such as many chemicals, petroleum , and in the case of many kinds 

of equipment ” H R. Rep. No. 2759, 81st Cong . 2d Sess 7 (1950) (emphasis added). Moreover, the definition of 

“ materials” subject to the President’s allocation authority (“ raw materials, articles, commodities, products, 

supplies, components, technical information, and processes") is clearly broad enough to include petroleum 

products, especially in light of that legislative history. 5**501) S.C app § 2152(b), H R Rep No 2759, supra, at

7 That interpretation is confirmed by the language and legislative history of the provision of the ESA that clarified 

that “energy” is a “ strategic and critical material” within the meaning of the DPA’s Declaration of Policy. See supra

at 21

59 As we noted above, the President s authority under § 101(a) to direct pnority performance of contracts or to 

allocate materials, including petroleum, is not necessarily dependent on the existence of a petroleum emergency 

That authority could be used, for example, to require performance of petroleum supply, production, or transportation contracts or to allocate petroleum supplies on a timely basis, if necessary to meet the needs of a particular 

defense program, even if no “emergency” situation exists.

665
control the general distribution of material in civilian markets only if the 

President finds that the material is a “ scarce and critical material essential to the 

national defense” and that defense needs cannot be met without causing dislocations in that market that will create “ appreciable hardship.” This section, which 

was added to the DPA in 1953, was intended to address situations in which 

defense needs cause a hardship in civilian markets by making large demands on a 

limited resource or limited production capacity. The House report discussing the 

1953 amendment described the need and scope of this restriction:

In the proposed extension of the priorities and allocation authority the committee has taken cognizance of the conditions 

which exist today and has proposed that the powers not be used to 

control the general distribution of any material in the civilian 

market except in special cases where otherwise, because of demands for national defense of a scarce and critical material, there 

would be a significant dislocation in the civilian market resulting 

in appreciable hardship. Nickel at present provides an excellent 

illustration of the need for authority to provide for equitable 

distribution of available civilian supplies. It is estimated that during 1953 the military, AEC, and stockpile will take more than 

one-half of the total supply. These requirements are so heavy as to 

make it necessary to apportion, as equitably as possible, the 

residual supply among civilian uses.

H.R. Rep. No. 516, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1953).60

Thus, § 101(a) provides broader authority for the President to allocate scarce 

materials among defense agencies, contractors, or suppliers than to allocate 

supplies of materials among refiners or importers, wholesalers, retailers, and 

end-users in the civilian market. If there were a direct defense requirement for the 

material, the material could be allocated to defense agencies or programs or to 

their contractors upon a finding that such allocation is “ necessary or appropriate” 

to meet those defense needs. A direct defense need could occur, for example, if 

the material were required by defense preparedness programs of the Department 

of Defense, the atomic energy programs of the Department of Energy, certain 

programs of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, or by a contractor of those agencies. Use of § 101(a) would be justified, inter alia, if 

demand for the material exceeded available supply, if suppliers of a defenserelated material were unwilling or unable to supply that material to the govern60 Another provision of the DPA, § 701(c), 50 U.S C app. § 2151(c), further limits the President’s authority to 

control the distribution of material in the civilian market Section 701(c) provides:

Whenever the President invokes the powers given him in this Act to allocate any material in the 

civilian market, he shall do so in such a manner as to make available, so far as practicable, for 

business and various segments thereof in the normal channel of distribution of such material, a fair 

share of the available civilian supply based, so far as practicable, on the share received by such 

business under normal conditions during a representative period preceding any future allocation of 

materials: Provided, That the President shall, in the allocation of materials in the civilian market, 

give due consideration to the needs of new concerns and newly acquired operations, undue hardships 

of individual businesses, and the needs of smaller concerns in an industry.

666
ment or to defense contractors, or if such a material were otherwise unavailable in 

a timely fashion through ordinary commercial channels. To take one example, if, 

as a result of a national petroleum shortage, defense agencies or contractors could 

not obtain sufficient petroleum products in time to meet the needs of defense 

preparedness programs, § 101(a) could be used to require suppliers to provide 

adequate petroleum supplies without regard to their existing contractual commitments. The DPA would relieve the seller of any liability for breach of contract 

resulting from compliance with such an order. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2157.

On the other hand, the President’s authority could not be used to control 

general distribution in the civilian market unless he were to make the further 

findings required by § 101(b). Thus, in order to implement a general domestic 

allocation of petroleum products under § 101(a) in response to a shortage of 

petroleum supplies, the President would have to find that defense needs for 

petroleum will reduce supplies of petroleum available to the civilian markets to 

the point of causing “ significant dislocation” and “ appreciable hardship.” See 50 

U.S.C. app. § 2071(b).

Third, it is not entirely clear whether the allocation authority contained in 

§ 101(a) gives the President authority to impose price controls. The language of 

that section, which allows the President to allocate materials and facilities “ upon 

such conditions, and to such extent as he shall deem necessary or appropriate,” 

appears broad enough to authorize price controls.61 As a practical matter, the 

President could find that the allocation of materials, particularly from unwilling 

suppliers, could not be accomplished without some form of price controls. As we 

have noted before, that is the sort of presidential determination to which the 

courts will ordinarily defer. See supra at 660. We note, however, that there is 

legislative history that suggests Congress did not intend the authority contained 

in § 101(a) to include authority to impose mandatory price controls. As enacted 

in 1950, the DPA empowered the President to impose general wage and price 

controls. See Act of 1950, ch. 932, Title IV, 64 Stat. 803. However, those 

provisions were allowed to expire in 1953. In renewing other provisions of the 

DPA 'at that time, Congress specifically stated that the wage and price control 

provisions were no longer necessary. See H.R. Rep. No. 516, 83d Cong., 1st 

Sess. 2-3, 10-13 (1953). Therefore, in the absence of specific authorization, it is 

possible that a court may conclude that the DPA does not empower the President 

to impose mandatory price controls on materials, including petroleum, allocated 

under § 101(a).62 Cf. American Federation cf Labor v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 

794—96 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979). Absent a specific factual 

setting, it would be inappropriate to speculate further as to how this issue might 

be resolved in the courts.

61 That language is included only in clause (2) of § 101(a), with respect to allocation of materials and facilities; it 

does not appear in the language of clause (1) authonzing the President to require acceptance of and pnonty 

performance under contracts and orders Com pare 50 U S C app. § 2071(a)(1) with id § 2071(a)(2).

62 This legislative history would not necessanly preclude some limited regulation respecting pnce, for example, a 

requirement of non-discriminatory pricing

667
Fourth, the President cannot use the allocation authority in § 101(a) to require 

rationing of gasoline among end-users. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2075.63

2. Section 101(c). Maximizing Domestic Energy Supplies

Section 101(c) of the DPA, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(c), provides that the 

President may require the allocation of, or the priority performance under, 

contracts or orders relating to “ supplies of materials and equipment in order to 

maximize domestic energy supplies,” if he makes certain findings with respect 

to the need for the materials for either the exploration, production, refining, 

transportation, or conservation of energy supplies, or for the construction and 

maintenance of energy facilities.64 The President’s authority under § 101(c) may 

be exercised “ [notwithstanding any other provision of this Act,” and therefore 

is not subject to the “ national defense” requirement of § 101(a) or the constraints 

imposed by § 101(b), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(a), (b). This section thus provides 

some authority for the President to allocate materials in the civilian market, or to 

require priority performance of contracts, that is not dependent on a national 

defense nexus or the findings required by § 101(b).

The legislative history of § 101(c) indicates that Congress’ specific concern 

was with bottlenecks in the production and transportation of energy caused by 

shortages in critical equipment needed for the production and transportation of 

energy. Section 101(c) was added to the DPA in 1975by§ 104 of the EPCA. The 

Report of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on the Senate 

version of the bill discussed the purpose of that provision as follows:

Section 105 [of the Senate bill] authorizes the President to 

allocate supplies of materials and equipment associated with the 

production of energy supplies to the extent necessary to maintain 

and increase the production and transport of fuels. . . . This 

provision was included in the title in an attempt to remedy critical 

shortages and misallocations of pipe, pumps, drilling rigs and 

roofbolts, which are currently plaguing energy producers.

The committee received the following testimony at a hearing 

on February 27, 1974, from the Deputy Director at FEO:

Mr. Sawhill. Well, I think that we have impediments to our 

domestic production. We have impediments because of the 

lack of tubular steel that we talked about before. We have 

impediments because of the lack of drilling rigs in this

63 This restriction was added by § 103of the ESA, codi/teda* 5011.S C app § 2075, and provides “ [njolhingir 

[the DPA] shall be construed to authorize the President to institute, without the approval of the Congress, a progran 

for the rationing of gasoline among classes of end-users.” Because the “ approval” of Congress would, of necessity 

take the form of plenary legislation, such authority would be derived from lhat legislation and not from § 101(a)

64 The President must find (1) that such supplies are “ scarce, critical, and essential to maintain or furthei

(i) exploration, production, refining, transportation, or (n) the conservation of energy supplies, or (iii) for thi 

construction and maintenance of energy facilities;” and (2) that “ maintenance or furtherance of exploration 

production, refining, transportation, or conservation of energy supplies or the construction and maintenance o 

energy facilities cannot reasonably be accomplished without exercising the authority specified in paragraph (1) o 

this subsection.” 50 U S C. app. § 2071(c)(3).

668
country. In other words, no matter what the price is, there are 

only so many wells we can drill, because there are only so 

many rigs available and so much tubular steel available.

S. Rep. No. 26, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1975). This legislative history clearly 

contemplates that § 101 (c) could be used, in the event of a petroleum emergency, 

to maximize available energy supplies through reducing bottlenecks in the 

production and transportation of energy, for example, to facilitate delivery of 

equipment necessary for increased energy production.65

It is somewhat less clear whether Congress intended that § 101(c) be used to 

allocate supplies of energy sources, such as petroleum products. Section 101(c) 

uses the term “ materials and equipment.” As we have noted, the definition of 

“ materials” contained in the DPA, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2152(b), includes petroleum products. See supra n.58. However, the language of the Senate Report 

quoted above seems to indicate that the Senate intended the section to encompass 

only supplies of hardware such as parts and equipment, as distinguished from 

energy sources such as crude oil, petroleum, coal, natural gas, or petrochemical 

feedstocks. The authority has been used to date only for that purpose—i.e., to 

provide assistance to energy production or transportation projects in obtaining 

scarce equipment and supplies. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. Pt. 216.

There is legislative history, however, that supports the contrary conclusion that 

§ 101(c) was intended to give the President some authority to allocate energy 

supplies, including petroleum products, if the requisite findings are made. 

Senator Randolph, one of the conference bill’s floor managers, stated in his 

remarks introducing the bill on the floor of the Senate:

Mr. President, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act deals with 

several matters affecting domestic energy supply availability in 

general. Some provisions of S. 622 address leasing practices on 

the Outer Continental Shelf and other Federal lands, as well as the

availability of energy supplies and equipment for the production

cf domestic energy supplies. For example, authority is provided to 

assure that roof bolts are available for use in the underground 

production of coal— a significant restraint on coal production 

during the oil embargo in the winter of 1973.

121 Cong. Rec. 41022 (Dec. 16, 1975) (emphasis added). Moreover, neither the 

language of the section nor the legislative history suggests that “ materials” as 

used in § 101(c) should be defined more narrowly than “ materials” as used in 

§ 101(a) which, as noted above, include energy sources such as crude oil and 

petroleum products. In fact, Congress’ intent in placing this authority in the DPA 

rather than in the EPCA was to prevent the creation of two overlapping and

65 Because the authonty under § 101(c) to require performance of contracts is limited to contracts or orders 

“ relating to supplies of materials and equipment,” 50 U.S C. app § 2071(c), it is questionable whether § 101(c) 

provides authority to require performance of service contracts. Thus, there is some doubt, for example, whether 

§ 101(c) would support a requirement that a pipeline, manne terminal, or other facility provide transportation 

services

669
possibly inconsistent statutory schemes. Senator Proxmire, the sponsor of the 

amendment to place the authority in § 101 of the DPA, explained its effect as 

follows:

[The amendment] is offered to avoid a duplicate allocation mechanism, which could very well conflict with the priorities and 

allocations program provided for defense programs under [the 

DPA]. . . .

The effect, then, of the amendment which I have proposed is 

essentially to take our existing and working allocation system and 

to broaden it to include domestic energy supplies, while at the 

same time to provide the authority to reconcile different claims on 

a basis that will best serve the total national interest. . . .

121 Cong. Rec. 9162 (Apr. 7, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).

Thus, although the issue is not free from doubt because of the somewhat 

conflicting legislative history, § 101(c) could possibly also be used by the 

President to allocate an energy source such as petroleum products. As a practical 

matter, however, the usefulness of that authority may be significantly limited by 

the requirement of § 101(c) that the allocation be necessary to “ maximize 

domestic energy supplies.”66 The legislative history of the section suggests 

strongly that Congress’ intent was to enable the President to take action to 

increase supplies of energy, not to distribute existing energy supplies. See supra

at 668-69. While it is conceivable that in limited situations the allocation of 

petroleum products might serve to increase energy production,67 it is unlikely 

that in the event of a severe petroleum shortage § 101(c) could be relied upon to 

institute a general allocation of scarce supplies of petroleum among oil companies, regions, or end-users.

3. Section 708. Voluntary Agreements

Section 708 of the DPA, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2158, provides a limited antitrust 

defense for persons who carry out voluntary agreements “ to help provide for the 

defense of the United States through the development of preparedness programs 

and the expansion of productive capacity and supply beyond levels needed to 

meet essential civilian demand in the United States.” The section empowers the 

President to authorize the making of such voluntary agreements when he finds 

that “ conditions exist which may pose a direct threat to the national defense or its

66 The authority to allocate materials under § 101(c) is also dependent on a finding that the materials are “ scarce 

and critical.*1 S ee 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(c)(3). Absent a finding of scarcity, § 101(c) would nol be available to 

allocate energy sources In a petroleum interruption, it is likely that this finding could be made, but the availability of 

the authonty would obviously depend on the facts of any particular situation.

67 There may be some circumstances that would justify a presidential finding that allocation of petroleum products 

is necessary to “ maximize energy supplies.” For example, the allocation of petroleum supplies to utilities could be 

necessary to maximize production of electricity. Arguably, the allocation of petroleum products for use in energy 

exploration, production, or transportation, such as building or maintaining oil ngs and refinenes, might serve to 

increase total energy production in times of a petroleum shortfall. Allocation to end-users who adopt stnngent 

conservation measures could also arguably provide for the most efficient use of available supplies and therefore 

increase total supplies.

670
preparedness programs.” 50 U.S.C. app. § 2158(c)(1).68 Persons or companies 

participating in approved voluntary agreements may claim an antitrust defense 

with respect to any act or omission taken in good faith in the course of developing 

or carrying out such an agreement. Id. § 2158(j). No voluntary agreement may 

be approved unless the Attorney General finds that its purpose “ may not reasonably be achieved through a voluntary agreement having less anticompetitive 

effects or without any voluntary agreement.” Id. § 2158(f)(1).69

The purpose of voluntary agreements authorized by § 708 is specifically “ to 

help provide for the defense of the United States through the development of 

preparedness programs and the expansion of productive capacity and supply 

beyond levels needed to meet essential civilian demand in the United States.” 50 

U.S.C. app. § 2158(c). Because of the scope of the President’s authority under 

the DPA to determine the reach of the term “ national defense” and the explicit 

congressional recognition of the importance of energy preparedness to the 

national defense (see supra at 663), § 708 could be used to authorize a broad 

range of voluntary agreements among oil companies or with others to plan for or 

deal with a substantial petroleum shortage that may impair the national defense or 

national defense preparedness,70 and would make available an antitrust defense 

for actions taken to formulate or implement such agreements.

With respect to energy-related activities, however, the § 708(j) antitrust defense is available only for domestic activities taken to develop or carry out a 

voluntary agreement. Section 708A(o), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2158a(o), makes the 

antitrust defense unavailable for voluntary agreements to carry out the IEP71 or to

68 The original DPA § 708, enacted in 1950 and patterned after the 1942 Small Business Mobilization Act, gave 

the President broad authority to convey antitrust immunity:

(b) No act or omission to act pursuant to this Act, . . if requested by the President pursuant to a 

voluntary agreement or program approved . . (by him] and found by the President to be in the 

public interest as contributing to the national defense shall be within the prohibitions of the antitrust 

Jaws. . . .

There were few procedural restrictions on the exercise of this authority Section 708 was substantially revised in 

1975 in conjunction with legislative enactment of § 252 of the EPCA, 42 U.S.C. § 2172. The 1975 DPA 

amendments reduced the antitrust immunity to a defense, adopted the “ good faith" requirement, and imposed 

procedural safeguards comparable to those contained in § 252 of the EPCA. See Pub. L. No. 94-152, § 3 ,8 9 Stat. 

810 (1975).

69 The DPA requires the Attorney General, afterconsultation with the FTC, to approve rules for the development 

of voluntary agreements and any voluntary agreement itself 50 U.S C. app. § 2158(e), (0 An agreement may be 

developed only at meetings in which the Attorney General and an FTC representative participate, and the Attorney 

General and the FTC are required to monitor the implementation of any voluntary agreement. Id § 2 158(e)(3), (g). 

The Attorney General is granted the authonty to terminate an agreement at any time. Id. § 2158(h) The Attorney 

General and the FTC are given access to all relevant information, and have rulemaking authonty to carry out their 

responsibilities. Id. § 2158(h), (i) Finally, both the Attorney General and the FTC are required to conduct surveys of 

the competitive effects of voluntary agreements, and the Attorney General must submit reports to Congress on the 

administration of any operative agreements. Id § 2158(k).

70 The authonty contained in § 708 has been used in the past to authorize cooperation and exchange of 

information relating to the impact of petroleum shortages on the national defense A “ Voluntary Agreement Related 

to the Supply of Petroleum to Friendly Foreign Nations” was approved by the Attorney General and entered into on 

June 26, 1951. It was superseded by the “ Voluntary Agreement on Foreign Petroleum Supply” approved June 1, 

1953. This Agreement, formed under the sponsorship of the Department of the Intenor, remained in effect until 

1976. The Agreement was activated in response to international events, including the nationalization of the Suez 

Canal, the 1967 Six Days War, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

71 As discussed above, § 252 of the EPCA, 42 U.S C. § 6272, provides the only statutory antitrust defense for 

industry activities pursuant to authonzed voluntary agreements or plans of action in support of the IEP. S ee supra at 

660-61. Section 708A(o) was added to the DPA at the time the EPCA was enacted, apparently with the intent of 

limiting duplication in the scope of § 252 of the EPCA and the existing antitrust defense in the DPA. See 121 Cong

C ontinued

671
voluntary agreements which “ in whole or in part” are in furtherance of a “ treaty 

or executive agreement to which the United States is a party or to implement a 

program of international cooperation between the United States and one or more 

foreign countries.” This precludes use of § 708 to implement any voluntary “ fair 

sharing” program to meet IEP obligations,72 or to fulfill international obligations 

such as NATO oil supply commitments and the United States-Israel oil supply 

agreement.

In order to qualify for the defense, the conduct in question must have been 

undertaken in good faith, and the persons claiming the defense must have acted in 

accordance with the statute, applicable regulations, and the applicable voluntary 

agreement. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2158(j). The procedures imposed on meetings to 

develop and carry out voluntary agreements under § 708 of the DPA are quite 

similar to those imposed by § 252of the EPCA, 42 U.S.C. § 6272. Public notice 

must be given, and the public must be afforded an opportunity to participate 

(unless the meeting concerns classified matters, matters specifically exempted by 

statute from disclosure, or matters related to trade secrets and proprietary data); 

the meeting must be attended by a federal employee (and chaired by the 

President’s delegate if the meeting is to develop a voluntary agreement) and must 

be monitored by representatives of the Attorney General and the FTC; if the 

meeting is to develop a voluntary agreement, records and verbatim transcripts 

must be kept. The President’s delegate or the Attorney General (after consultation 

with the FTC) may terminate or modify an agreement. Id. § 2158(e). Unlike 

§ 252, however, § 708 does not contain any specific provision for adoption of 

plans of action.

Section 708(d), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2158(d), provides for establishment of 

advisory committees to aid the President or his delegated officers in carrying out 

the purposes of the section. Such committees would be subject to the provisions 

of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1982) and 

provisions of the Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 776. 

Section 708(d) further provides that “ in all cases such advisory committees . . . 

shall include representatives of the public, and the meetings of such committees 

shall be open to the public.” 50 U.S.C. app. § 2158(d)(1).

4. Section 710. Employment of Persons from the Private Sector

Pursuant to § 710 of the DPA, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2160, the President may, 

subject to certain restrictions, authorize the training and employment of persons 

from the private sector in order to facilitate planning for and responding to energy 

emergencies. Two methods of facilitating such training and employment are 

authorized by this section. Subsection (b) permits the President to employ 

“ persons of outstanding experience and ability” to serve without compensation

Rec. 36619(Nov 14, 1975) (remarks of Reps. Dingell and Ashley). The amendment also had the effect, however, of 

narrowing the scope of the existing DPA provision and of the original House bill, which had provided antitrust 

protection for international voluntary agreements beyond the IEP.

12 See supra at 659-60

672
in advisory positions for purposes of assisting in carrying out the purposes and 

provisions of the DPA. Id. § 2160(b). Subsection (e) authorizes the establishment and training of a “ nucleus executive reserve” (Executive Reserve) for 

employment during “ periods of emergency.” Id. § 2160(e). Use of these authorities to obtain advice and assistance from the private sector in planning for or 

responding to an emergency caused by a petroleum shortage raises two legal 

issues: (1) the circumstances under which these authorities can be used; and

(2) the applicability of conflict-of-interest and antitrust laws and regulations.

a. Circumstances Governing Use of Employees

Persons serving without compensation (WOCs), under § 710(b), 50 U.S.C. 

app. § 2160(b) may be used as necessary and appropriate to carry out the 

provisions of the DPA. Their service is not limited to times of emergency, and 

WOCs can therefore be employed for a variety of preparedness tasks, such as 

assisting in planning, providing counsel and assistance in conducting exercises 

or seminars, or assisting state and local officials to develop emergency preparedness plans and programs. WOCs may be employed, however, only if the employing department or agency head certifies that he or she has been “ unable to obtain 

a person with the qualifications necessary for the position on a full-time, salaried 

basis,” and that the appointment is necessary and appropriate to carry out 

provisions of the DPA. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2160(b)(1), (5). WOCs may be 

appointed only to advisory or consultative positions, except that they may be 

appointed to decisionmaking (but not policymaking) positions if they are found 

to possess outstanding experience and ability not obtainable on a full-time, 

salaried basis. Id. § 2160(b)(2).

Under subsection (e), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2160(e), persons from either the 

private sector or from within the federal government may be appointed to an 

Executive Reserve.73 During “periods of emergency” those individuals may be 

employed by the government either as regular federal employees or as WOCs. 

See S. Rep. No. 696, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1955). Employment of a Reservist 

as a WOC would, of course, be subject to the limitations imposed by subsection 

(b). However, employment of a Reservist as a regular full- or part-time federal 

employee would not be subject to the limitations contained in subsection (b) with 

respect to use of the individual in decisionmaking or policymaking positions or 

with respect to compensation,74 and would not require the employing federal

73 By executive order, the President has established a “ National Defense Executive Reserve," which is composed 

of “ persons selected from various segments of the civilian economy and from government for training for 

employment in executive positions in the Federal Government in the event of the occurrence of an emergency that 

requires such employment.” Exec Order No 11,179, 3 C FR . 246 (1964-65), a s am ended by Exec. Order No. 

12,148, 3 C F.R. 412 (1979). In addition, the President has delegated authonty to employ WOCs to heads of 

departments or agencies that exercise DPA functions. Exec Order No 10,647, 3 C F.R. 282 (1954-58), as

a m en d ed b y Exec Order No. 11,355, 3 C.F.R. 653 (1966-70), W E x e c OrderNo 12,107, 3 C .F R . 264 (1978).

74 The only provision respecting compensation of Reservists is that members who are not full-time government 

employees may be allowed transportation and per diem payments for the purpose of participating in the Executive 

Reserve training program In the absence of any further restriction, it appears that Reservists could be employed as 

full-time, part-time, temporary, or unsalaried government employees in times of emergency. The legislative history 

of subsection (e) supports this conclusion. See S Rep. No. 696, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1955).

673
agency to find that no full-time federal employee is available and qualified to 

perform functions to be performed by the Reservist.

The major limitation on the President’s authority to use the Executive Reserve 

is that Reservists can be employed by the government only “ during periods of 

emergency.” See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2160(e).75 The DPA does not define what 

constitutes an “ emergency” for purposes of activation of the Reserve.76 Section 

710(e), however, must be read in light of the purpose of the DPA to protect and 

promote the national defense, as expressed in the Declaration of Policy. Subsection (e), authorizing the Executive Reserve, was added to the DPA in 1955. At the 

same time, the Declaration of Policy was amended to include a specific congressional finding that the Nation’s mobilization program requires the development of preparedness programs and the expansion of productive capacity and 

supply “ in order to reduce the time required for full mobilization in the event of 

an attack on the United States.” See S. Rep. No. 696, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 

(1955). The Senate Rejxtrt draws a direct link between authorization of the 

Executive Reserve and the Declaration of Policy:

This provision [now section 710(e)] supports the added emphasis 

placed on preparedness for a period of full mobilization in the 

Declaration of Policy.

Id. at 8. The legislative history of subsection (e) thus makes clear that establishment and training of the Reserve and employment of Reservists is specifically 

intended to further the national defense preparedness aims of the DPA.77

Therefore, activation of the Reserve would depend on the existence of an 

emergency that, in the language of the Declaration of Policy, “ would adversely 

affect the national defense preparedness of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. app. 

§ 2062.78 Likewise, although § 710 does not limit in haec verba the functions

73 This limitation does not preclude participation by Reservists in orientation and training, it does, however, 

preclude participation in the type of pre-emergency preparedness tasks that may be performed by WOCs

76 No other provision of DPA specifically limits the President's authority to “ periods of emergency.”

77 When Congress intended to eliminate the requirement of a “ national defense” nexus, as in § 101(c), 50 U.S.C. 

app. § 2071(c), it did so in express terms See su p ra a t6 6 $ . The absence of any such limitation in § 710(e) is further 

evidence that Congress did not intend that the Executive Reserve be used for purposes unrelated to the national 

defense. S ee generally U nited States v. R utherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552 (1979), K SK Jew elry Co. v. Chicago

Sheraton Corp., 283 F.2d 8, 11 (7th Cir. 1960).

78 Section 710(e) does not, however, expressly require the President to declare a national emergency in order to 

activate the Reserve. S ee 50 U.S.C. app. § 2160(e). Therefore, we believe use of the Reserve is not subject to the 

provisions of the National Emergencies Act (NEA), 50 U .S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1982). The legislative history of the 

NEA makes clear that use of authorities under the DPA, such as the Executive Reserve, is not subject to that Act In 

testimony before the House Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations, Assistant Attorney 

General Scalia of the Office of Legal Counsel noted that:

[L]aws like the Defense Production A ct of 1950, which do not require a Presidential declaration of 

emergency for their use, are not affected by this title [i.e.. Title I]—even though they may be referred 

to in a lay sense as “ emergency” statutes.

H earings before the Sub co m m ittee on Adm inistrative Law a n d G overnm ental Relations c f the C om m ittee on the

Judiciary, H ouse c f Representatives, 94th C ong., 1st Sess. 91 (1975). That comment is repeated in both the House 

and Senate reports. See H.R. Rep. No 238,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975), S. Rep. No. 1168, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.

4 (1976). Although this language refers only to Title 1 of the NEA, which terminated existing emergencies, there is 

nothing in the legislative history to suggest that the DPA is subject to the procedural requirements imposed by Title II 

of the NEA with respect to the future use of emergency authorities Rather, the Senate Report states that “ (t]he 

provisions of Title II . . . are designed to insure congressional oversight of Presidential actions p u rsuant to

declarations c f a national em ergency a u th o n zed by an a ct c f Congress. . . . The legislation is directed solely to 

Presidential declarations c f em ergency ” S. Rep No 1168, supra at 4 (emphasis added).

674
that can be performed by Executive Reservists in the event of activation, the 

inclusion of authority for the Executive Reserve in the DPA and the legislative 

history of that section make clear that those functions are limited to achievement 

of the national defense preparedness and response purposes of the DPA.

As discussed above, however, the DPA’s Declaration of Policy expressly 

contemplates that disruptions in energy supplies may affect the national defense 

interests of the United States. See supra at 663. Therefore, the President has 

broad discretion, in the event of a disruption in petroleum supplies, to determine 

that an energy emergency exists that could threaten national security or national 

defense preparedness and that would therefore justify activation and use of the 

Executive Reserve to assist in meeting the emergency.

b. Conflict-of-interest and Antitrust Restrictions

A second question is whether individuals who serve as WOCs or Executive 

Reservists would be subject to conflict-of-interest restrictions imposed by federal 

laws and regulations or to liability under the antitrust laws. We believe that 

WOCs and Executive Reservists would be subject to conflict-of-interest and 

antitrust restraints, but the nature of these restraints could differ depending on the 

circumstances of their government employment and the nature of their ties to 

private employers.

1) Conflict-qf-lnterest Restrictions: Applicability of federal conflict-of-interest 

restrictions to WOCs and Executive Reservists would depend on whether those 

individuals would be considered to be federal officers or employees within the 

meaning of applicable statutes and regulations. The Federal Personnel Manual 

(FPM), App. C., sets forth the principles for determining whether persons 

serving the federal government on a temporary or intermittent basis are subject to 

the conflict-of-interest laws. Briefly, the FPM distinguishes between (1) persons 

“ whose advice is obtained by an agency . . . because of [their] individual 

qualifications and who serve . . . in an independent capacity” and (2) persons 

who are asked “ to present the views o f . . . nongovernmental organization^] or 

group[s] which [they] represent, or for which [they are] in a position to speak.” 

FPM, App. C at C-6. The former category of independent experts are deemed to 

be subject to the conflict-of-interest laws because their service to the government 

is expected to be impartial and free from outside influence or control. The latter 

category of private representatives, on the other hand, are not subject to the 

conflict-of-interest laws because it is expected that such persons would be 

influenced by the private groups that they have been chosen to represent.79

We believe that the language and legislative history of § 710 are clear that the 

purpose of employment of WOCs and Executive Reservists is to obtain independ79 We have found that these FPM criteria are ordinarily the most useful standards to apply in determining whether 

particular persons are federal employees for purposes of the conflict-of-interest laws. There are, however, other 

factors that may be relevant to such a determination For example, if a person performs a government function, 

receives a government salary, or is supervised directly by government employees, it is likely that he or she will be 

deemed a federal employee for other personnel purposes. See 5 U S C § 2105(a)(1982),and L odge 1858, A F G E \.

NASA, 424 F Supp. 186 (D.D.C. 1976)

675
ent assistance and advice from uniquely qualified individuals,80 and that therefore those individuals would be considered to be federal employees subject to 

conflict-of-interest restrictions, when they are actually employed to provide such 

assistance and advice.81 The scope of the conflict-of-interest restrictions applicable to a particular individual would depend, inter alia, on whether the individual 

is a “ special government employee” 82 and whether he or she receives compensation for his or her services.

Since WOCs or Reservists could be employed by any of several federal 

agencies, consistent with the scope of the DPA, it is impossible to summarize 

here all of the applicable conflict-of-interest statutes and agency conduct standards. We note, however, that 18 U.S.C. §§ 208 and 209 would be of particular 

concern to an individual who comes from private employment to serve the federal 

government on a temporary or intermittent basis as a WOC or Executive Reservist. Section 208 imposes criminal penalties on any government employee, 

including a special government employee, who participates personally and 

substantially for the government in a matter in which he, his spouse or minor 

child, or a partner or an organization by which he is employed, has an arrangement for future employment, or is negotiating concerning employment, or has a 

financial interest. Under appropriate circumstances, government agencies may 

grant waivers of this prohibition. See 18 U.S.C. § 208(b). Section 209 imposes 

criminal penalties on any regular government employee who receives any salary, 

or contribution to or supplementation of a salary, from a private source as 

compensation for services as a government employee. Id. § 209.83 Special 

government employees and employees serving without compensation are not 

prohibited by § 209 from accepting a salary from an outside source for performance of their government duties. Id. Apart from § 209, the standards of conduct 

of the employing agency may limit the receipt of gifts or certain things of value by 

individuals subject to the standards, if the source of the compensation has a 

business relationship with the agency. Those limitations may differ depending on 

whether the individual is a regular or special government employee.84

80 In fact, § 710 originally provided for an exemption from the federal conflict-of-interest laws for WOCs and 

Reservists, which demonstrates that Congress certainly contemplated that such individuals would be considered to 

be federal employees for purposes of the conflict-of-interest laws. When the federal conflict-of-interest laws were 

recodified in 1962, the recodification act made that exemption inapplicable Pub. L No 87-849, § 2,76 Stat 1126

(1962)

81 We do not believe that Executive Reservists would generally be considered officers or employees of the federal 

government during orientation or training for mobilization assignments, because they would not normally act or 

advise on any mailers pending before a federal department or agency during such periods. If, however, the 

responsibiJities of a Reservist dunng training or onentation included assistance or advice to a federal department or 

agency, the conflict-of-interest restriciions would probably apply, depending on the facts of the particular situation.

82 A “ special government employee” is a federal employee or officer who serves for no more than 130 days 

during any period of 365 days, on a full-time or intermittent basis. S ee generally 18 U S C § 202(a). Under federal 

personnel rules, an agency may not appoint an individual to serve as a special government employee unless “ at the 

time of his original appointment” the agency’s “ best estimate” is that dunng the following 365-day period the 

services of the appointee will be needed for 130 days or less. S ee FPM, App C

83 Section 209 also imposes criminal penalties on any organization or individual that makes any such contnbution 

or supplementation 18 U S.C. § 209(a)

84 For example, regulations of the Department of Energy prohibit regular employees from accepting fees, 

compensation, gifts, payment of expenses, or any other thing of monetary value if the circumstances “ may result in, 

or create the appearance of, a conflict of interest” 10 C .F R . § 1010 204(a) See also § 1010 604 (special

C ontinued

676
Other provisions of the federal criminal code impose restrictions on the ability 

of government employees to assist private parties in matters involving the 

government,85 and on former government employees representing others in 

matters that they worked on or were responsible for, while in the government.86 

Additional restrictions may be imposed by statutes that are specific to the 

employing agency. The Department of Energy Organization Act, for example, 

imposes requirements or restrictions on certain Department employees with 

respect to divestiture and disclosure of financial interests, reporting of pre- and 

post-govemment employment, and appearances before the Department after 

employment. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7211-7216.

2) Antitrust Exposure: Individuals who serve as WOCs or Executive Reservists and their private employers would also be subject to the antitrust laws. It is 

likely that any individual called to government service as a WOC or as a regular 

federal employee would retain some ties with his or her former private employer, 

and would probably return to private employment upon completion of government service. In light of these dual public and private roles, actions taken by the 

individual while employed by the government might raise questions of antitrust 

liability for the individual and the employer.87 Actions that may raise some 

question under the antitrust laws could include, for example:

(1) advice to government policymakers with respect to governmental actions to be taken in markets in which the individual’s 

company is involved;

(2) decisions that affect particular energy markets;

(3) agreements as to what actions are to be taken by their private 

firms, particularly if those individuals implement such actions in 

their private capacities; or

(4) exchange between private industry executives of confidential 

industry information, gained pursuant to training activities or 

governmental responsibilities.

In general, antitrust liability attaches only to private conduct that has anticompetitive conseqences. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Sea-Land

government employees). Regulations issued by the Office of Personnel Management require that agency standards 

of conduct contain a provision that prohibits regular employees from soliciting or accepting any compensation or 

other thing of value, subject to certain exceptions, from a person who:

(1) Has, or is seeking to obtain, contractual or other business or financial relations with his agency;

(2) Conducts operations or activities that are regulated by his agency, or

(3) Has interests that may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of his 

official duty.

5 C .FR § 735.202.

85 See, e g , 18 U.S.C. §§ 203, 205

86 See, e.g . 18 U.S.C § 207

87 In general, antitrust exposure would probably be greatest when individuals are actually employed by the 

government in policymaking or decisionmaking positions, because they would then be in a position to make or 

affect governmental decisions that may have an impact on a particular industry or employer. However, it is possible, 

though less likely, that antitrust liability could attach for particular actions taken in the course of training and 

orientation, for example, for an exchange with other industry personnel of confidential information gained during 

the training program.

677
Service, Inc. v. The Alaska Railroad, 659 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert,

denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982). Thus, actions taken by a governmental official 

within the scope of his authority do not ordinarily give rise to antitrust concerns. 

On the other hand, actions of WOCs or Reservists that cause competitive harm 

could result in antitrust liability if such individuals are acting outside the scope of 

their governmental activity.88

C. Trade Expansion Act cf 1962

The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (TEA), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991, provides 

the President with certain authority with respect to imports of crude oil and 

petroleum products, which may be available in.the event of a severe shortage of 

petroleum supplies. Section 232(b), 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b), provides that, upon an 

investigation and finding that a commodity is entering the country “ in such 

quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national 

security,” the President “ shall take such action, and for such time, as he deems 

necessary to adjust the imports of [the] article and its derivatives so that . . . 

imports [of the article] will not threaten to impair the national security.”

Presidents have often exercised this authority to respond to emergencies of 

different types and their actions have usually been sustained by the courts. In 

recent decades, Presidents have invoked national security successfully to establish quotas on volumes of imports, including oil,89 to establish license-fee 

systems,90 to limit imports from certain countries,91 and to allocate oil imports 

exempt from import fees to certain refineries.92

The President’s powers under § 232(b) have received a broad interpretation. 

The authority of the President to take “ such action as he deems necessary” was 

broadly construed by the Supreme Court in Federal Energy Administration v. 

Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426U.S. 548 (1976), which upheld the President’s power 

to impose license fees. Throughout its decision, the Court cited with approval 

those portions of the legislative history that support the widest reasonable 

interpretation of the President’s authority, such as the statement that it included 

the power “ to take whatever action he deems necessary to adopt imports 

[including the use of] tariffs, quotas, import taxes or other methods of import 

restrictions.” 426 U.S. at 564; see also id. at 558, 561-69.

In Algonquin, however, the Supreme Court also expressed the caveat that its 

opinion applied only to measures with an “ initial and direct” effect on petroleum 

imports and not necessarily to presidential action with a “remote” effect on

88 Cf. H arlow v F itzgerald, 102 S. Ct 2727 (1982); Butz v. Econom ou, 438 U S 478 (1978); C ontinental Ore

C o. v. Union C arbide & C arbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Alabam a Power C o. v. Alabam a Electric

C ooperative. In c., 394 F2d 672 (5th Cir), c e r t denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968)

89 Proclamation 3279, 24 Fed. Reg. 1781 (Mar. 12, 1959) This proclamation was issued pursuant to a 

predecessor statute

90 Proclamation 4210, 9 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs. 406 (Apr 18, 1973).

91 President Carter utilized this authoniy to prohibit imports from Iran. Proclamation 4702,44 Fed. Reg. 65581 

(Nov. 14, 1979).

92 See, e g .. FEA v. A lgonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S 548, 570-71 (1976); Pancoastal Petroleum Ltd. v. Udall,

348 F2d 805, 807 (D .C. C ir 1965).

678
imports. 426 U.S. at 571.93 This caution suggests that a court might limit the 

President’s broad flexibility under the TEA to regulate imports of crude oil or 

petroleum products to measures whose primary purpose and impact is confined 

to imported, rather than domestic, supplies of those products. It is possible, 

therefore, that an attempt to control directly the price of, or to allocate, petroleum 

products refined in the United States would be ruled invalid by the courts, at least 

if the impact of such controls on oil imports would be remote and indirect and if 

the impact on domestic supplies would be direct. In the absence of a particular 

factual situation, however, we cannot predict whether the courts would strike 

down such allocation or pricing regulation.

Exercise of authority under § 232(b) must be based on a finding that the 

imports “ threaten to impair the national security.” The statute provides some 

guidance with respect to that finding by listing a number of illustrative factors that 

may be taken into account, as follows:

(1) domestic production needed for projected national defense 

requirements;

(2) capacity of domestic industries to meet defense requirements;

(3) existing and anticipated availabilities of the human resources, 

products, raw materials, and other supplies and services essential 

to the national defense;

(4) requirements of growth of such industries and such supplies 

and services; and

(5) the quantities, availabilities, character and use of imported 

articles as those affect such industries and the capacity of the 

United States to meet national security requirements.

19 U.S.C. § 1862(c).94

The legislative history of § 232(b) firmly establishes that increasing the 

domestic production of oil is a legitimate national security aim. See, e.g., 104 

Cong. Rec. 10542-43 (June 9, 1958) (remarks of Rep. Mills). Recent practice, 

tacitly approved by the Supreme Court in Federal Energy Administration v. 

Algonquin SNG, Inc., supra, suggests that reducing the consumption of oil may 

similarly be a legitimate national security aim. Thus, it seems likely that a court 

would sustain a presidential finding that imports of crude oil and petroleum 

products “ threaten to impair the national security,” see 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b), 

and thereby uphold the use of § 232(b).

93 This dictum later was relied upon by a federal district court to strike down the Gasoline Conservation Fee 

imposed by President Carter on the ground that the fee was beyond ihe scope of the authority conferred by § 232(b) 

Independent G asoline M arketers C ouncil v D uncan, 492 F Supp 614,616-18 (D.D C 1980). The court ruled that 

the measure was principally a conservation measure and only indirectly a restriction on imports, and thus not 

authorized by the TEA. The district court’s decision has little, if any, precedential effect, because the appeal was 

dismissed as moot and the opinion vacated after the fee was repealed by Congress.

94 The text and the legislative history of this provision state that these considerations are illustrative but not 

exclusive. See S Rep. No. 1838, 85th Cong., 2d Sess 11-12 (1958)

679
D . International Emergency Economic Powers Act

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 

§§ 1701-1706(1982), provides the President, in the event of a national emergency, with plenary control over property that is subject to U.S. jurisdiction and in 

which any foreign country or national thereof has an “ interest.” See generally

Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675 (1981). If a petroleum shortage is 

sufficiently severe to invoke a presidentially declared national emergency, the 

IEEPA could be used to control supplies of petroleum products in which foreign 

countries or foreign nationals have an “ interest.”

The key provision of the IEEPA is § 203,50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1), which states 

that the President may:

(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit—

(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,

(ii) transfer of credit or payments between, by, through, or 

to any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign 

country or a national thereof,

(iii) the importing o r exporting of currency or securities; and

(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, 

transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or 

privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any 

property in which any foreign country or a national thereof 

has any interest;

by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the

jurisdiction of the United States.95

The reach of§ 203 is limited by § 202,50U .S.C. § 1701, which provides that 

the President may use these authorities only to deal with an “ unusual and 

extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the 

United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United 

States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such 

threat.” Section 202 also requires that the President declare a new national 

emergency for each new threat before he may exercise the emergency powers. Id.

95 This provision was taken almost verbatim from § 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Acl (TWEA), 50 U.S C. 

app § I—44 (1982), which gave the President certain authorities “ [djuring time of war or during any other penod of 

national emergency declared by the President.” The IEEPA removed from the TWEA the President’s authorities 

“ during any other period of national emergency*’ and placed those authorities in § 203(a)(1) of the IEEPA, 50 

U S.C. § 1702(a)(1). The TWEA currently provides the President with authonty “ during time of war” that is 

identical in most respects to that available under the IEEPA, but also permits the President to exercise some 

additional powers not encompassed in the IEEPA, such as seizing and vesting of enemy property and control over 

wholly domestic economic transactions S ?e50U S.C. app. § 5(b)(l);H .R Rep No. 4 5 9 ,95th Cong , IstSess. 15

& n.23 (1977).

680
Section 204(a) of the IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1703(a), provides that the President 

“ in every possible instance, shall consult with the Congress before exercising 

any of the authorities granted by this chapter, and shall consult regularly with the 

Congress so long as such authorities are exercised.” Section 204(b), 50 U.S.C.

§ 1703(b), requires that “ [w]henever the President exercises any of the authorities granted by this chapter, he shall immediately transmit to the Congress a 1 

report specifying” the circumstances necessitating the exercise of his authority; 

the reasons that the circumstances constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat; 

the authorities to be exercised and the actions to be taken; the reasons that such 

actions are necessary; a list of foreign countries with respect to which such 

actions are to be taken; and the reasons for such decisions.96

The scope of the authority available under the IEEPA to respond to an energy 

emergency, assuming the requisite findings have been made, depends on the 

breadth the courts are willing to accord to the term “ interest” as used in § 203,

50 U.S.C. § 1702, in the context of a future petroleum shortage. The IEEPA does 

not define the term “ interest,” but the legislative history of the statute notes that 

the authorities available to the President “ should be sufficiently broad and 

flexible to enable the President to respond as appropriate and necessary to 

unforeseen contingencies.” H.R. Rep. No. 4 5 9 ,95th Cong., IstSess. 10(1977). 

In addition, in cases decided under the TWEA (see supra at n.95) the courts have 

interpreted the same language in § 5(b)(1) of that statute, 50 U.S.C. app.

§ 5(b)(1), broadly.97 The primary substantive limitation on the President’s emergency authority is that § 203 of the IEEPA may not be used to regulate wholly 

domestic transactions. The House Report states that:

' \

the scope of the authorities should be clearly limited to the 

regulation of international economic transactions. Therefore the 

bill does not include authorities more appropriately lodged in 

other legislation, such as authority to regulate purely domestic 

transactions or to respond to purely domestic circumstances. . . .

H.R. Rep. No. 459, supra at 10-11; see also S. Rep. No. 466, 95th Cong., 1st 

Sess. 5 (1977).98

In light of this legislative history, we believe that the President would have 

broad discretion under the IEEPA to determine whether a foreign nation or 

national has an “ interest” in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction, and, if so, 

whether any of the authority granted in § 203 should be exercised over that

96 There is no provision in the IEEPA fora legislative veto of the President’s actions. However, the declaration erf 

an emergency under the IEEPA would be subject to the NEA (see supra n 78), which provides, inter a lia, that 

Congress has the authority to terminate by concurrent resolution any national emergencies declared after September 

14,1976. S ee 5 0 U.S C § 1622(c) For the reasons set forth inn 35 supra, we believe this legislative veto provision 

of the NEA is unconstitutional.

97 See. e g., H eaton v U nited States, 353 F.2d 288, 291-92 (9th Cir. 1965), cert, denied. 384 U S. 990 (1966); 

U nited Stales v Broverm an. 180 F. Supp. 631, 636 (S D N.Y 1959).

98 The House Report specifically notes that the IEEPA would not grant the President the same authority to regulate 

purely domestic transactions as would be available in time of war under the TWEA, for example, regulation of the 

hoarding of gold by U.S. citizens or the extension of consumer credit by U S businesses. S ee H.R Rep No. 459, 

95th Cong , 1st Sess. 15 & n.23 (1977).

681
property, provided the President does not attempt to regulate transactions that are 

purely domestic in nature.

For example, the term “interest” would include, but not be limited to, contract 

rights of foreign countries or their nationals to acquire or control the disposition 

of property, such as contingent rights or royalty interests in petroleum products 

owned or controlled by a company subject to U . S . jurisdiction. In the event of an 

emergency meeting the requirements of § 202, 50 U.S.C. § 1701, the President 

would therefore have authority to regulate the use, transportation, and disposition of those petroleum products. The authority contained in § 203 of the IEEPA 

could also be used to regulate imports of petroleum products acquired from 

foreign nations or nationals. For example, in time of a national emergency, the 

IEEPA would give the President authority to require American companies and 

foreign entities they control" to ship petroleum products they acquire abroad to 

other nations.

On the other hand, the authority would probably not extend to property within 

the United States that is wholly owned by a U.S. company or individual, because 

the effect of regulation of such property would most probably be considered to be 

“ wholly domestic.” For example, the authority granted the President in times of a 

national emergency under the IEEPA probably would not extend to authorization 

of domestic pricing or allocation regulation.

E. Emergency Energy Conservation Act of 1979

Title II of the Emergency Energy Conservation Act of 1979 (EECA), 42 

U.S.C. §§ 8501-8541 (1982), provides the President with discretionary authority to impose energy demand restraint measures in certain emergency circumstances as defined in that Act or to meet IEP obligations. Section 211(a) of 

the EECA, 42 U.S.C. § 8511(a), authorizes the President to establish energy 

conservation targets for any energy source on a nationwide and state-by-state 

basis if the President determines that a “ severe energy supply interruption” 

exists or is imminent,100 or that such action is required in order to fulfill 

obligations of the United States under the IEP.101 If such targets are set, the states 

are required to develop and submit to the Department of Energy plans to provide

99 American corporations are clearly subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. See Restatem ent (Second) c f

Foreign R elations L a w c f the U nited States, §§ 27, 30 (1965). Foreign entities they control may also be, although 

they may be subject to the competing jurisdiction of the foreign country In addition, § 203(a)(1)(B) permits the 

President to “ regulate [or] direct and com pel. . [the] exercising [of] any right, power, or privilege with respect to 

. . .any [foreign] property . . ” 50 U S C . § 1702(a)(1)(B) This authorizes the President to require a U.S. 

company to exercise its control over foreign entities in the way the President directs, at least when the direction 

furthers the purposes of other regulations imposed under the IEEPA.

100 The definition of the term “ severe energy supply interruption” for the purposes of the EECA differs from the 

definition for purposes of the EPCA (see su p ra 651). Section 202(1) of the EECA provides that a “ severe energy 

supply interruption” includes a national supply shortage of motor fuel or c f any other energy source caused by an 

“ interruption” in energy, including, but not limited to, imported petroleum products, or by sabotage or an act of 

God. See 42 U.S.C. § 8502(1) (emphasis added). Section 3(8) of the EPCA limits the term to energy shortages 

resulting from an interruption in the supply of imported petroleum products, or from sabotage or an act of God. 42 

U.S.C. § 6202(8)

101 Section 202(2) of the EECA, 42 U .S.C . § 8502(2), incorporates by reference the definition of the term 

“ international energy program" established by § 3(7) of the EPCA, 42 U S.C. § 6202(7).

682
“ for emergency reduction in the public and private use of each energy source” 

for which any emergency conservation target is in effect. Id. § 8512(a), (b). The 

President may find inadequate compliance with a target in a state and substitute a 

federal plan in that state. Id. § 8513(b).'02

If national targets are established for energy sources under the discretionary 

authority of § 211(a), the President is required to make effective an emergency 

energy conservation plan for uses by the federal government. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 8511(c).103

F. Export Administration Act of 1979

Under the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), 50 U .S.C. app. 

§§ 2401-2420 (1982), the President may impose controls on exports, including 

petroleum products and materials and technology necessary to produce petroleum products, in order, inter alia, to further the foreign policy interests of the 

United States, to protect the economy from a drain of scarce resources, or to 

obtain leverage against countries that aid terrorists. Section 7(a), 50 U.S.C. app. 

§ 2406(a), authorizes the President to prohibit or curtail the export of any goods 

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by any person subject 

to the jurisdiction of the United States, in order to carry out the policies of the 

Act. Those policies are broad enough to allow the President to restrict the export 

of petroleum products in response to a substantial shortage. In relevant part, the 

Statement of Policy contained in the Act provides:

(2) It is the policy of the United States to use export controls 

only after full consideration of the impact on the economy of the 

United States and only to the extent necessary—

(B) to restrict the export of goods and technology where 

necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the 

United States or to fulfill its declared international obligations; and

(C) to restrict the export of goods where necessary to 

protect the domestic economy from the excessive drain of

102 The Secretary of Energy must approve a state plan unless he finds—

(A) that, taken as a whole, the plan is not likely to achieve the emergency conservation target 

established for that State for each energy source involved,

(B) that, taken as a whole, the plan is likely to impose an unreasonably disproportionate share of 

the burden of restrictions of energy use on any specific class of industry, business, or commercial 

enterprise, or any individual segment thereof,

(C) that the requirements of this subchapter regarding the plan have not been met, or

(D) that a measure . is—

(i) inconsistent with any otherwise applicable Federal law (including any rule or regulation

under such law),

(ii) an undue burden on interstate commerce, or

(in) a tax, tariff, or user fee not authonzed by State law.

42 (J S.C. § 8512(c)(1).

103 The Department of Energy has established procedures for the development, submission, and approval of state 

plans and the standby federal plan 10 C F R Pt 477

683
scarce materials and to reduce the serious inflationary impact 

of foreign demand.

*****

(8) It is the policy of the United States to use export controls to 

encourage other countries to take immediate steps to prevent the 

use of their territories or resources to aid, encourage, or give 

sanctuary to those persons involved in directing, supporting, or 

participating in acts of international terrorism. To achieve this 

objective, the President shall make every reasonable effort to 

secure the removal or reduction of such assistance to international 

terrorists through international cooperation and agreement before 

resorting to the imposition of export controls.

Id. § 2402(2)(B) & (C), (8). The statute does not, however, contain any authority 

for the President to impose allocation or price controls with respect to domestically produced or refined crude oil and petroleum.

Section 7 of the EAA also places certain limitations on the export of domestically produced crude oil transported by pipeline over rights-of-way granted by 

the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1652, and on the 

export of refined petroleum products. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(d), (e). In 

addition, petroleum products produced from the NPRs (see supra at n.33), oil 

and gas produced from the Outer Continental Shelf, and crude oil transported by 

pipeline over rights-of-way granted under § 28(u) of the Mineral Lands Leasing 

Act (MLLA), 30 U.S.C. § 185(u), are made subject, by separate statutes, to the 

requirements and provisions of the EAA.104 Section 7(d)(3) of the EAA, 50 

U.S.C. app. § 2406(d)(3), specifies that the export restrictions imposed by the 

Act or by other provisions of law do not apply to exports of oil pursuant to any 

bilateral international oil supply agreement entered into by the United States 

before June 25, 1979, or to any country pursuant to the lEP’s oil sharing system. 

Under § 103(c) of the EPCA, 42 U.S.C. § 6212(c), the Export Administration 

Act may be used to implement restrictions on the export of energy sources, 

materials or equipment imposed under that section. See discussion supra at 652.

G. Other Statutory Authorities

1. Fuel Switching Authorities

In the event of a petroleum emergency, the President may be able to use 

authority under several statutes to require fuel switching in order to mitigate the

104 Petroleum products from the NPRs, oil and gas from the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), and crude oil 

transported over MLLA nghts-of-way, are subject to all of the limitations and licensing requirements of the EAA, 

except for products that are either exchanged in similar quantities for convenience or increased efficiency of 

transportation with persons or the government of an adjacent foreign state, or that are temporarily exported for 

convenience or increased efficiency of transportation across parts of an adjacent foreign state. 10 U.S C. § 7430(3);

43 U.S.C § 1354(a); 30 U.S C § 185(u). T he Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act also specifically provides that 

OCS oil or gas “ exchanged or exported pursuant to an existing international agreement” is exempt from the export 

restrictions of the EAA 4 3 U .S .C .§ 1354(d). Before any cnide oil from the NPRs or any product refined therefrom 

or crude oil subject to MLLA restrictions may be exported, the President must find, in addition to the requirements 

imposed by the EA A , that such exports will not diminish the total quality or quantity of petroleum available to the 

United States and that such exports are in the national interest and are in accord with the EAA 10 U.S C. § 7430(e),

30 U S C § 185(u)

684
effects of the shortage and reduce dislocations in energy supplies. Fuel switching 

encompasses two types of emergency authority: (1) authority to prohibit the 

burning of petroleum or other fuels; and (2) authority to assure access to supplies 

of alternate fuels by allocation or mandatory interconnections, and possibly to 

augment available supplies through increased production or curtailed exports.

The President is given the authority to prohibit the burning of particular fuels 

by power plants and major fuel-burning installations by two statutes. Section 607 

of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), 15 U.S.C. § 717z 

(1982), authorizes the President to prohibit the burning of natural gas by any 

electric power plant or major fuel-burning installation. Exercise of this authority 

depends on a finding by the President of the existence or imminence of a severe 

natural gas emergency that will endanger the supply of natural gas for highpriority uses. Section 404(b) of the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act 

(FUA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8484 (1982), empowers the President to prohibit the 

use of petroleum or natural gas as a primary energy source by any electric power 

plant or major fuel-burning installation. Exercise of this authority requires a 

finding of a severe energy supply interruption, as that term is defined in the EPCA 

(see supra at 6). See 42 U.S.C. § 8374(b).

In addition to prohibiting the use of a particular fuel during an emergency, the 

President would have the authority under various statutes to assist the recipients 

of prohibition orders in obtaining alternate fuel supplies. During severe energy 

supply interruptions as defined in the EPCA, the President could allocate and 

require the transportation of coal for the use of any electric power plant or major 

fuel-burning installation, pursuant to § 404(a) of the FUA, 42 U.S.C. § 8374(a). 

Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1982), 

would allow the Department of Energy to order the temporary interconnection of 

facilities, and such generation, delivery, interchange, transmission, or power 

wheeling of electric energy as in its judgment would best meet the emergency. 

See 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c). In addition, under § 210 of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 824i, 

the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) would have the authority to 

order the physical connection of a cogeneration facility, small power production 

facility, or transmission facilities of any electric utility with the facilities of any 

other electric utility, federal power marketing agency, geothermal power producer, qualifying small power producer, or cogenerator. Section 211 of the FPA, 

16 U.S.C. § 824j, would authorize the FERC to order electric utilities to provide 

wheeling transmission services, including any necessary enlargement of transmission capacity, for any other electric utility, geothermal power producer, or 

federal power marketing agency.

Certain deliveries of natural gas could also be facilitated under the Natural Gas 

Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z (1982). Section 7 of the NGA, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 717f, authorizes the FERC to order a natural gas company to extend or establish 

transportation facilities to sell natural gas to local distributors. Pursuant to § 303 

of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA), 15 U.S.C. § 3363 (1982), the President 

may allocate supplies of natural gas during an emergency as defined by § 301 of 

the NGPA in order to assist in meeting natural gas requirements for high-priority 

users of natural gas; the definition of an emergency is the same as set forth under

685
the PURPA, and excludes energy supply emergencies not involving a significant 

natural gas shortage. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3361, 3363. Section 302 of the NGPA, 

15 U.S.C. § 3362, provides that the President’s authority to direct interstate 

pipelines or local distribution companies served by interstate pipelines to contract for the purchase of emergency supplies of gas is limited to an emergency as 

defined by § 301. Thus, the President’s authority under the NGPA to require 

allocation of natural gas supplies directly to affected users is limited to natural gas 

emergencies. In the event of a petroleum shortage, that authority therefore would 

probably not be available, for example, to allocate supplies to users with a dual 

natural gas and petroleum capability, unless there were also a significant natural 

gas shortage.105

Finally, in addition to incremental production of crude oil or natural gas 

pursuant to § 106 of the EPCA, 42 U.S.C. § 6214 (see supra at 653-54), or 

export controls on supplies of energy imposed under § 7 of the EAA, 50 U.S.C. 

§ 2406,or§ 103 of the EPCA, 42 U.S.C. § 6212 (see supra at 683-84,652-53), 

domestic energy supplies might also be increased by terminating any export 

authorizations granted under § 3 of the NGA, 15 U.S.C. § 717b, or § 202(e) of 

the FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 824a(e).

2. Miscellaneous Statutes

A number of other statutes provide the President with selective authority to 

affect the use or distribution of petroleum products or to take other measures to 

respond to a petroleum emergency, authority that may be available to respond to a 

petroleum shortage if the specific triggering requirements of each statute are met. 

Pursuant to § 36 of the MLLA, 30 U.S.C. § 192, the United States may demand 

that any royalty accruing to it under an oil or gas lease be paid in oil or gas. The 

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1982), gives the 

United States the right of first refusal to purchase OCS oil at market prices during 

“ time of war or when the President shall so prescribe.” 43 U.S.C. § 1341(b). 

Other measures available to the President might include facilitating transportation of petroleum products in times of emergency;106 modifying air pollution 

control requirements in times of an emergency to allow efficient use of available 

energy sources;107 or providing technical assistance, funds and personnel to states

105 The allocation authority in § 101(a) of the DPA, 50 U .S.C app § 2071(a), could possibly be used in a 

petroleum emergency to allocate natural gas to defense agencies and contractors for defense needs However, that 

authonty could not be used to allocate natural gas supplies in the civilian market, in the event of a petroleum 

emergency, unless natural gas were also in short supply and necessary for the needs of national defense, as required 

by § 101(b), 50 U.S.C app. § 2071(b) S ee supra at 665-66.

106 Under the Interstate Commerce Act, a s am ended, 49 U S.C. §§ 10101-11901 (1982), the Interstate Commerce Commission could authorize the entry of new motor earners or water carriers into temporary service if they 

were needed to ensure movemenf of essential petroleum products, or could issue priority orders during an 

emergency situation for rail movement of commodities, including petroleum products. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10928, 

11123. TheM agnuson Act, 50U S.C §§ 191-198 (1982), authorizes the Secretary of TVansportation to make rules 

and regulations governing the movement of any vessel within the territorial waters of the United States if the 

President declares a national emergency to exist by reason of actual or threatened war, insurrection or invasion, or 

disturbance or threatened disturbance in the international relations of the United States. 50 U.S C. § 191.

107 Section 110(0 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U S C. § 7410(0, permits the temporary modification of a state’s air 

pollution control program upon a presidential finding of a severe national or regional energy emergency.

686
II. Legal Bases for Specified Energy Preparedness Activities

Consistent with § 3 of the EEPA, this Part addresses how the statutory 

authorities outlined in Part I support the enumerated energy emergency preparedness activities of the United States. See supra n.2. Since no petroleum emergency 

is likely to be isolated in cause, effect, or remedy, any or all of the authorities 

described above may, in the appropriate circumstances, provide some basis for 

the President to respond in some fashion, directly or indirectly, to a particular 

crisis. In most petroleum emergencies it is likely that several different statutory 

authorities would be available to the President. The scope of this discussion is 

therefore necessarily limited to identifying the primary statutory authorities that 

provide a basis for the enumerated preparedness activities, failure to mention 

other less directly applicable authorities should not be interpreted to suggest that 

the President could not use such authorities to respond to a particular state of 

facts, if the requirements of those statutes were met.

A. Authority to Implement the IEP

The IEP Agreement, adopted in response to the 1973-74 oil embargo, 

provides a cooperative system designed to reduce the vulnerability of Participating Countries to future supply disruptions and to dependence on imported oil. 

The IEP was formally adopted by 16 countries in 1974.109 It was provisionally 

entered into as an executive agreement by the President. 27 U.S.T. 1685, 

T.I. A.S. No. 8278 (Nov. 18, 1974). The United States, on January 9, 1976, gave 

its notification that, having complied with constitutional procedures by obtaining 

the necessary legislation, it consented to be bound by the Agreement.110

1. Obligations Imposed by the IEP Agreement

The IEP Agreement imposes four principal substantive obligations on Participating Countries as follows:

or to foreign countries in order to minimize the effects of a petroleum shortage.108

108 Under the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, 42 U S.C. §§ 5121-5202 (1982), upon finding that an emergency or 

major disaster exists, the Prestdent could direct any federal agency to utilize its available resources and personnel in 

support of state and local disaster assistance efforts 42U .S.C . §§ 5145,5146. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 

empowers the President lo allow federal agencies to furnish services and commodities on an advance-of-funds or 

reimbursement basis to friendly countries and international organizations, and to waive certain regulations 

governing the making, performance, amendment, or modification of contracts and the expenditure of funds by the 

federal government, if he determines such action to be in furtherance of the purpose of the Act to “ support" or 

"promote economic or political stability” through provision of foreign assistance. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2346,2357, 2393.

109 See D igest c f U S Practice in ln t'l L aw 560 (1974). Those countries were Austria, Belgium, Canada, 

Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United 

Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany Greece, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, and Portugal have since 

consented to be bound by the Agreement.

110 S ee D igest c fU .S Practice in ln t’l Law 650 (1975). The enabling legislation was contained in Title II of the 

EPCA, 42 U S C. §§ 6271-6275, enacted in 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, Title II, 89 Stat 871 (1975).

687
a. Emergency Reserves (Chapter I)

Each Participating Country must maintain emergency reserves equal to 90 

days of net oil imports. This commitment may be satisfied by existing oil stocks, 

including stocks in tankers and pipelines, fuel switching capacity, or standby oil 

production, to the extent decided by the Governing Board, based on certain 

determinations and studies required by the Annex to the IEP Agreement.

b. Demand Restraint (Chapter II)

Each Participating Country must develop or have ready a contingent program 

of demand restraint measures that will enable it to reduce oil consumption, in the 

event of activation of the IEP’s emergency system (see infra at 689).

c. Oil Sharing (Chapter III)

Each Participating Country is required to take necessary measures to carry out 

the international allocation of oil among Participating Countries if required by 

activation of the emergency system (see infra at 689). A complex formula 

provides for calculation of “supply rights” and “ allocation rights and obligations” of Participating Countries. This calculation takes into account historic 

levels of consumption and actual domestic production and net imports available 

during an emergency, and assumes that each Participating Country will absorb 

some of the shortfall through the use of demand restraint measures and emergency reserves. See infra at ns. 112 & 113.

d. Information Exchange (Chapter V)

Participating Countries are required to provide or make available to the IEA 

certain information necessary for monitoring the international supply of petroleum and ensuring the efficient operation of the emergency system. The 

information system established by the IEP Agreement consists of two sections:

(1) a general section, requiring the communication of non-proprietary information on the international oil market and activities of oil companies; and (2) a 

special section requiring submission of proprietary information necessary to 

implement emergency measures."1 Each Participating Country is required to 

take appropriate measures to ensure that oil companies operating within its 

jurisdiction make such information available as is necessary to fulfill the information obligations of that member.

1,1 A critical feature of the special information system is submission by oil companies of certain proprietary 

information in Questionnaire A and by member governments in Questionnaire B. If there is reason to believe that a 

senous oil supply disruption may be developing that could reach the 7 percent trigger (see infra at 689), the 

Secretariat, following contact with the member governments, may request submission of those questionnaires by 

participating oil companies and by member governments. Each member government makes its own decision as to 

whether or how to allow oil companies to respond. In the United States, this would be accomplished by issuance of 

an antitrust clearance by the Secretary of Energy, with the concurrence of the Attorney General, pursuant to the 

regulations and the Voluntary Agreement implementing § 252

688
2. Activation of the IEP Emergency System

The core of the IEP is Chapter IV, which outlines the circumstances that trigger 

the IEP emergency system. The emergency system may be triggered when one or 

more Participating Countries sustains or is likely to sustain an oil supply shortfall 

of more than 7 percent, measured against final oil consumption during a specified 

base period. The IEP provides for both a “ selective” and a “general” trigger. A 

selective trigger may be declared if one or more Participating Countries suffers a 

7 percent or greater shortfall.112 In the event of a selective trigger, countries may 

meet their allocation obligations by any measure of their choosing, including 

demand restraint measures or the use of emergency reserves. A general trigger 

may be declared only if the Participating Countries as a whole suffer at least a 7 

percent reduction in oil supplies. Declaration of a general trigger activates the 

supply rights and allocation rights and obligations of Participating Countries as 

calculated according to Chapter III, and does not allow the same flexibility to 

choose emergency measures that is permitted under a selective trigger."3

Article 22 of Chapter IV of the IEP Agreement also provides that the Governing Board may decide, by unanimous vote, to “ activate any appropriate emergency measure not provided for in this Agreement, if the situation so requires.” 114

3. Statutory Authority to Implement the IEP Agreement

To the extent that statutory authority is required for or relevant to implementation of the obligations of the United States under the IEP, that authority is 

provided primarily by the EPCA and Title II of the EECA.115 We address here the 

scope of that authority with respect to the various obligations created by the IEP 

Agreement.

112 A selective tngger may be initiated by a request from an affected country or countries to the Secretanat of the 

IEA. If the Secretanat makes a positive finding that a 7 percent shortfall exists or is imminent, activation occurs and 

emergency measures are implemented within 15 days, unless within 6 days after the Secretanat's finding the 

Governing Board, by a weighted majonty vote, decides not to activate the system or to require only partial 

activation. If within 72 hours of the initial request the Secretariat does not make a positive finding, the country may 

request the Governing Board to consider the situation. The Governing Board must meet within 48 hours, and within 

an additional 48 hours must make its finding whether the requisite shortfall exists If it does so find, it must decide 

whether to activate emergency measures If a selective trigger is declared, the country requesting that action must 

absorb the first 7 percent of the shortfall Once that country has absorbed that amount of the shortfall, it has an 

allocation nght equal to the amount of the shortfall above 7 percent. The other Participating Countnes share the 

obligation to satisfy this allocation nght on the basis of their consumption dunng a specified base penod.

113 The procedure for activation of the general trigger is the same as for a selective trigger. See supra n 112 In the 

event of an overall 7 percent or greater shortfall, each ftirticipating Country has a supply right equal to its base period 

final consumption, after deducting required demand restraint and emergency reserve drawdown amounts. If a 

country's supply right exceeds the sum of its available domestic production and net imports during an emergency, it 

has an allocation right that entitles it to additional net imports from the other Participating Countries equal to that 

excess If a country's available domestic production and net imports dunng an emergency exceed its supply right, it 

has an allocation obligation that requires it to supply other farticipating Countnes, directly or indirectly, with a 

quantity of oil equal to that excess

114 The scope of Article 22 is subject lo some debate See infra n 133.

115 Other statutes may also provide authonty with respect to petroleum products and emergency preparedness 

activities that could be used by the President in connection with IEP activities if the particular requirements of those 

statutes are met. Those authorities are discussed below in connection with the authority for participation in 

“ subcrisis” IEP activities. See infra at 692-97

689
a. Emergency Reserves

Under Chapter I of the IEP Agreement, a Participating Country’s emergency 

reserve obligation may be met, inter alia, by private stocks of petroleum 

products. We have been informed by the Department of Energy that the level of 

private stocks maintained by U.S. companies has been and is expected to be 

sufficient to meet that obligation. We note that certain provisions of the EPCA 

and other statutes give the President discretionary authority that could be used to 

establish or draw down petroleum product reserves; if the President were to 

determine that such actions would be appropriate under the IEP Agreement and 

met the conditions otherwise specified in those statutes. For example, the 

President has discretionary authority to implement an IPR (see supra at 655), and 

to use reserves in the SPR in fulfillment of “ obligations of the United States under 

the international energy program” (see supra at 655-56). The IEP Agreement 

also provides that a Participating Country’s emergency reserve obligation may be 

met by fuel switching authorities or standby oil production, to the extent decided 

by the Governing Board.116 Other relevant statutory authorities may therefore 

include the fuel switching authority granted under various federal statutes,117 and 

the authority under § 106 of the EPCA, 42 U.S.C. § 6214, and 10 U.S.C. 

§ 7422(b), to accelerate production of crude oil and natural gas on federal and 

state lands or petroleum products from the N PRs."8

We wish to emphasize, however, that the President’s authority under those 

statutes is discretionary, and that any action taken would have to be in accordance 

with the specific terms of those statutes.' No statute requires the President to take 

particular actions, or to use particular reserves, in order to implement the 

emergency reserve obligation of the United States under Chapter I of the IEP 

Agreement.

b. Demand Restraint Measures

Statutory authority for establishment of a contingent demand restraint program 

as required by Chapter II of the IEP Agreement is available under §§201 and 202 

of the EPCA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6261 & 6262, providing for establishment and 

implementation of federal energy conservation contingency plans,119 and Title II 

of the EECA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8501-8541 (1982), directing the development of 

state energy conservation contingency plans.120 These plans may be implemented 

upon a discretionary presidential finding that they are necessary “to fulfill 

obligations of the United States under the international energy program.” 121 

Demand restraint could also be accomplished or facilitated by restricting supplies

116 We have been informed by the Department of Energy that the Governing Board has not yet taken action to 

determine the extent to which the emergency reserve commitment may be satisfied by oil stocks, fuel switching 

capacity, and standby production

1,7 S ee supra at 685-87

118 S ee supra at 653-54 & n.33.

S ee su p ra at 656-57.

120 See supra at 682-83.

121 S ee supra at 682.

690
of petroleum products through the TEA,122 or by relying on market forces to 

dampen demand. In addition, the IEP Agreement allows a Participating Country 

to substitute reserves held in excess of its emergency reserve commitment for 

demand restraint measures.

c. Oil Sharing

Section 252 of the EPCA, 42 U.S.C. § 6272, allows domestic oil companies 

to participate in meeting the allocation obligations of the United States under the 

IEP by establishing a framework for cooperation and by providing an antitrust 

defense for actions taken in accordance with those plans.123 If necessary, such 

voluntary actions may be supplemented by mandatory regulation under § 251, 

which provides the President with authority to take actions necessary to fulfill 

obligations of the United States under the allocation provisions of the IEP, as set 

forth in Chapters III and IV of the Agreement. As discussed above, the President’s authority under § 251 encompasses the authority to require companies 

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to divert oil supplies to other 

Participating Countries in satisfaction of the United States’ allocation obligations, 

and to establish a domestic “ fair sharing” program of allocation among oil 

suppliers as necessary to ensure successful implementation of the IEP emergency 

system.124 The authority provided in §§ 251 and 252 with respect to fulfillment of 

allocation obligations of the United States is available only if the emergency 

system has been activated in accordance with the requirements of Chapter IV of 

the Agreement.125

d. Information Exchange

Sections 254 and 252 of the EPCA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6274 & 6272, establish 

procedures by which the United States may meet its obligations to provide 

information to the IEA. Section 254 authorizes the Secretary of State to provide 

to the IEA information and data related to the energy industry that is required to 

be submitted under the IEP.126 The provisions of § 252 governing cooperation 

among and the antitrust defense for domestic oil companies (see supra at 

660-62), as implemented by the applicable regulations, Voluntary Agreement, 

and Plan of Action, govern the supplying by oil companies of information 

required under Chapter V of the IEP Agreement and the availability of the 

antitrust defense for such activities. As implemented, the antitrust defense

122 As with the President’s authonty with respect lo emergency reserves (see supra at 690), implementation of 

such plans is a discretionary decision.

123 See supra at 660-62.

124 See supra at 659-60.

125 See infra at 693-94

126 This information may include data supplied by oil companies to the Department of Energy for transmission to 

the IEA, or data collected by the Department of Energy pursuant to other statutory authonty, such as the Energy 

Supply and Environmental Coordination Acl, 15 U S.C § 796, and the Federal Energy Administration Act, 15 

U.S C. § 772. Such information may be transmitted by the Department of Energy to the Department of State, for 

transmission to the IEA upon certification by the Secretary of State that the information is required to be submitted 

under the IEP See 42 U S C. § 6274(a), (d).

691
generally covers participating U.S. company advice and consultations in IEA 

meetings and system tests. If confidential, proprietary data is to be furnished or 

exchanged prior to activation of the IEP emergency system, § 5(b)(2) of the 

current Voluntary Agreement requires the prior approval of the Secretary of 

Energy, after consultation with the Secretary of State, and the concurrence of the 

Attorney General, after consultation with the FTC.127 When the emergency 

system has been activated, § 5(b)(3) of the Voluntary Agreement confers antitrust protection, without the need for further clearance, with respect to the 

provision or exchange of “such types of confidential or proprietary information 

as are reasonably required to implement” the Voluntary Agreement and approved plans of action.128

4. December 10, 1981, Decision of the Governing Board with Respect to

Subcrisis Activities

On December 10, 1981, the Governing Board of the IEA adopted by unanimous vote a “ Decision on Preparation for Future Supply Disruptions” outlining 

a basis for consultation among Participating Countries in the event of a so-called 

“ subcrisis” situation— i.e., a disruption in oil supplies short of the 7 percent 

trigger required to activate the emergency system. The preamble to the Decision 

reflects that it is based on the following considerations:

— disruptions in oil supply which did not reach the 7 percent level 

required to trigger the emergency allocation system have recently caused and could again cause damage to Member country economies through sharp oil price increases;

—IEA countries should be better prepared to contribute to preventing a disruption in oil supply from again resulting in 

sharply higher prices and severe economic damage;

— allowing market forces to operate and strengthening them 

where possible will improve the balance between supply and 

demand and the distribution of oil in short supply;

— supplementary action by governments may be necessary in 

those areas where market forces do not sufficiently counteract 

the adverse impact of supply disruptions;

— when such action is determined to be necessary, it should be 

light-handed and flexible in responding to the specific situation

127 Section 5(b)(2) of the current Voluntary Agreement (see 41 Fed. Reg 14000(Apr 1,1976)) requires the prior 

approval of the Secretary of Energy, with the concurrence of the Attorney General, for any transmittal or exchange of 

confidential or proprietary information or data by oil companies to the IEA or to each other Company-specific (i.e .. 

disaggregated data) must be aggregated by the Department of Energy or the IEA prior to disclosure toothers, unless 

the Secretary of Energy, after consultation with the Secretary of State and with the concurrence of the Attorney 

General, “ has determined that such exchange or disclosure is necessary to develop, prepare, or test emergency 

allocation measures."

128 The companies are required to notify the Department of Energy, the Attorney General, and the FTC of the 

types of information and data provided The Secretary of Energy, after consultation with the Secretary of State, the 

Attorney General, and the FTC, may prescribe terms and conditions for the continued exchange or provision of 

information or data in an emergency situation See 41 Fed Reg. 14000 (Apr. 1, 1976)

692
at hand and at the same tim e be taken promptly and 

effectively; ....

The December 10, 1981, Decision provides for monitoring by the IEA of oil 

markets in order to assess the nature and probable impact of future supply 

disruptions;129 requires the Participating Countries to consult with each other and 

with the Secretariat in the event of a “ subcrisis” supply disruption in order to 

refine the Secretariat’s assessment of the supply, demand, and stock situation; and 

provides that in the event of a “subcrisis” supply disruption the Governing Board 

will meet to decide what action, if any, is necessary to meet the situation. The 

Decision lists several illustrative measures that could be considered by the Board 

in that event, such as discouragement of abnormal spot market purchases or other 

undesirable purchases, lowered consumption, short-term fuel switching, high 

levels of indigenous production, changes in stocks and stock policies, and 

informal efforts to minimize and contain the effects of supply imbalances. The 

Decision specifically recognizes that “ detailed methods of implementation [of 

any such measures] will be decided by governments in accordance with national 

law and the IEP, and could vary from country to country while aimed at achieving 

the overall result desired on an integrated basis.” It specifies further that consultation with oil companies concerning any measures that might later be agreed 

to would be undertaken by the governments having jurisdiction over those 

companies.

The United States voted in favor of the December 10, 1981, Decision and 

made the following statement explaining its interpretation of the effect of the 

Decision:

The United States . . . welcomes this Decision. At the same time 

we must state for the record our understanding of it. The United 

States remains committed to reliance on free market forces as the 

most effective response to supply disruptions. We are pleased to 

note the inclusion of this thought in the preamble of the Decision 

as a guiding principle for IEA discussions of market disruptions.

The Decision establishes a basis for future IEA consultations in 

the event of subtrigger supply disruptions. However, it does not 

commit IEA countries in advance as to the specific actions which 

they might take in such circumstances. Moreover, we note the fact 

that any actions taken in response to future disruptions must be 

consistent with national law and the Agreement on an International Energy Program, and may vary from country to country.

As this statement recognizes, the December 10, 1981, Decision of the Governing Board does not impose any mandatory obligations on the United States or on 

any other Participating Country to take particular actions in a “ subcrisis”

129 Specifically, the Decision states that the Executive Director of the IEA may, after consultations with 

f^rticipating Countnes, activate submission of Questionnaires A and B “ consistent with procedures established for 

the emergency allocation system” in the event of a supply disruption.

693
situation. Rather, it provides only a requirement for future IEP consultations in 

the event of a “ subcrisis” supply disruption.130 The text of the Decision makes 

clear that it does not commit IEP countries in advance to particular actions they 

might take in responding to such situations. Therefore, the Decision itself has no 

independent legal significance, and presents no legal issue with respect to the 

President’s authority to take steps to implement the Decision.

The December 10, 1981, Decision contemplates, however, that the Governing 

Board may decide on specific actions in the future, in the event of a particular 

“ subcrisis” supply disruption. It is difficult to speculate as to what authority the 

President (or participating oil companies) would have to implement any future 

decision of the Governing Board in a “ subcrisis” supply disruption, as that 

analysis would necessarily depend on the details of the action taken by the 

Governing Board. The December 10, 1981, Decision suggests that primary 

reliance would be placed on the operation of market forces to improve the supply/ 

demand imbalance and to equalize the distribution of oil in short supply, and on 

informal, non-mandatory efforts by Participating Countries to strengthen those 

market forces. These efforts could include, for example, increased informal 

consultation among Participating Countries and between Participating Countries 

and oil companies subject to their jurisdiction, and public appeals by member 

governments for voluntary measures such as demand restraint, use of alternate 

fuels, increased indigenous production, and use of private reserve stocks. Implementation of informal measures such as these by the President would not require 

particular emergency statutory authority.131

Questions about the scope of the President’s statutory authority and the 

authority of individuals and oil companies to cooperate voluntarily would arise if, 

in a “ subcrisis” supply disruption, the Governing Board were to adopt mandatory measures requiring specific types of “ supplementary action” by Participating 

Countries. See Preamble to December 10, 1981, Decision.132 Presidential authority to implement a “ subcrisis” decision of the Governing Board that imposes 

mandatory obligations may be available, depending on the circumstances, under 

certain of the statutory authorities described in Part I above.

However, a significant limitation on the President’s authority to take action for 

the purpose of implementing allocation of oil supplies required by a “ subcrisis” 

decision of the Governing Board, and on the ability of oil companies to cooperate 

voluntarily in such allocation, is imposed by §§ 251 and 252 of the EPCA, 42

130 The Decision does contain provisions concerning the monitoring of oil markets by the Secretariat and 

activation of the Questionnaire A and B systems These provisions, however, are specifically limited to the 

procedures established by the IEP Agreement, and therefore do not expand the existing obligations of Participating 

Countnes under that Agreement.

131 As we discuss infra, however, no statutory antitrust defense would be available for private individuals and 

companies with respect to voluntary actions taken in response to such efforts.

132 Any such actions, if they purport to impose new or additional obligations on fcrticipating Countries, would 

have to be taken by unanimous vote of the Governing Board. See Art. 61.1(b) (decisions which impose new 

obligations on Participating Countries that are not already specified in the Agreement must be by unanimous vote).

694
U.S.C. §§ 6271 & 6272.133 Under existing statutes, the President has no authority to direct allocation of petroleum products for the purpose of fulfilling 

allocation obligations imposed by the IEP, and oil companies have no antitrust 

defense with respect to voluntary actions to meet those allocation obligations, 

except as provided in §§ 251 and 252 of the EPCA. See 42 U .S.C . 

§ 6271(c)(2);'34 id. § 6272(a).135 As was made clear by the amendments to 

§§ 251 and 252 added in 1982 by the EEPA,136 those sections do not apply to 

“ subcrisis” activities, even if directed by the Governing Board pursuant to 

Article 22.137 We believe Senator McClure’s statements in debate on the amendatory provisions of the EEPA are dispositive on that point:

The argument has been made that article 22 confers authority on 

the IEA Governing Board to trigger an allocation system during a 

subcrisis situation, and that the section 252 antitrust defense 

would then be applicable to U.S. oil company participation in the 

allocation program. This argument is incorrect, section 252 

would not apply in that situation.

By amending sections 251 and 252 as I have proposed, we 

would hopefully avoid misinterpretations of those provisions by 

future administrations here in the United States, by other IEA 

countries, or by the IEA itself. We would thus insure that the 

authority conferred by sections 251 and 252 will apply only to 

crisis situations—those involving at least a 7-percent shortfall— 

in accordance with the intent of the Congress.

128 Cong. Rec. S 6065 (daily ed. May 26, 1982) (remarks of Sen. McClure). 

Thus, § 251 would provide no authority for the President to direct any allocation

133 This analysis assumes that ihe Governing Board could require some limited sharing of oil stocks or supplies in 

a “ subcrisis” situation We note, however, that a question exists whether the Governing Board could require any 

mandatory oil sharing in any supply disruption short of the 7 percent “ tngger.” The emergency measures provided 

for in the IEP Agreement, including mandatory demand restraint measures under Chapter II and allocation of oil 

under Chapter III, can be activated only “ in accordance with [Chapter IV] ” See Chap IV, Art 12 Article 22 of 

Chapter IV prqvides that the Governing Board may unanimously, at any time, “ activate any appropnate emergency 

measures not provided for in the Agreement, if the situation so requires.” It is debatable whether this general 

language in Article 22 allows the Governing Board to circumvent the carefully circumscribed and negotiated 

provisions of Chapters II, III, and IV, which link demand restraint obligations and allocation nghts and obligations 

directly to the existence of a 7 percent shortfall in oil supplies of one or more Participating Countries. It is arguable 

that the reference in Article 22 to “ appropriate emergency measures not provided fo r in the A greem ent” (emphasis 

added) means that Article 22 contemplates emergency measures other than mandatory demand restraint and 

allocation requirements, which are already provided for in the Agreement

134 “ No officer or agency of the United States shall have any authority, other than authority under this section [i.e.,

§ 251], to require that petroleum products be allocated to other countries for the purpose of implementation of the 

obligations of the United States under the international energy program ”

135 “ Effective 90 days after December 22, 1975, the requirements of this section [i.e., § 252] shall be the sole 

procedures applicable to—

(1) the development or carrying out of voluntary agreements and plans of action to implement the 

allocation and information provisions of the international energy program, and

(2) the availability of immunity from the antitrust laws with respect to the development or carrying 

out of such voluntary agreements and plans of action.”

136 See supra at 660

137 The United States, as a member of the Governing Board, would be able to veto any proposed decision that 

would require such allocation.

695
of oil for the purpose of implementing a Governing Board decision in a “ subcrisis,” 138 and § 252 would provide no authority or antitrust defense for oil 

companies to participate in such an allocation.139

To the extent that any mandatory “subcrisis” measures adopted by the Governing Board would require the President to take particular implementing actions 

other than the allocation of oil, the President’s authority would derive from 

existing statutory authorities other than §§ 251 and 252 of the EPCA. Such 

authorities may include, for example, other provisions of the EPCA and Title II of 

the EECA that may be used to fulfill the United States’ “obligations under the 

[IEP]” — i.e., §§ 151-161, 201-202, and 254 of the EPCA, 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 6231-6241, 6261-6262, 6274, and Title II of the EECA, 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 8501-8541.140

Additional authority might be available under other statutory authorities described in Part I above, if domestic circumstances were to provide an adequate 

basis for use of those authorities. For example, an international disruption in the 

supply of petroleum products may result in an interruption in the supply of 

imported petroleum products in the United States of sufficient length and severity 

to trigger a “ severe energy supply interruption.” This would make available to 

the President, for example, the authority in § 106 of the EPCA, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 6214, to require accelerated rates of production of crude oil on fields located on 

designated federal and state lands,141 and the authority in § 404(b) of the FUA, 42 

U.S.C. § 8374(b), to prohibit the use of natural gas or petroleum in power plants 

and other major fuel-burning installations.142

Likewise, in the event of an international shortage in petroleum products that 

did not reach the “ trigger” level, the President could determine that the shortage 

would affect the national defense preparedness of the United States and therefore 

use the authorities in the DPA relating to priority performance of contracts, 

allocation of materials and facilities, and activation of the Executive Reserve, in 

accordance with the specific requirements of those provisions.143 In addition, a 

presidential declaration of an emergency under the IEEPA, if the circumstances

138 Jn addition, the waiverprovisionw § 7(d)(3) of the EAA, 50U .S.C app § 2406(d)(3), would not be available 

unless the IEP emergency system had been activated See supra at 683-84.

139 Section 252 also limits the availability of an antitrust defense with respect to the furnishing and exchange of 

information by oil companies pursuant to the provisions of Chapters IV and V of the Agreement.

140 Arguably, a unanimous decision by the Governing Board requinng specific actions by Participating Countries 

would impose "obligations” on the United States “ under the [IEP]” within the language of those provisions. Article

66 of the IEP Agreement provides that the Participating Countnes “ shall take the necessary measures to 

implement the Agreement and decisions ta k en by the G overning B oard” (emphasis added). In the absence of 

persuasive legislative history to the contrary or specific limiting language, such as exists with respect to §§ 251 and 

252, the authonty in §§ 151-161, 201-202, and 254 of the EPCA, and Title II of the EECA might be interpreted (o 

extend to all “ obligations” of the United States under the IEP, including mandatory measures required by a 

unanimous decision of the Governing Board. Whether decisions taken in this manner constitute IEP “obligations” 

within the meaning of those provisions, however, may be subject to some debate Because of the unanimity required 

by Article 61 1(b), no such “ obligations” could be imposed on the United States without its consent Moreover, this 

conclusion could not apply to substantive amendments to the IEP Agreement after 1974, which are excluded from 

the definition of the IEP for purposes of the EPCA. See supra at n 28.

141 S ee supra at 653—54

142 See supra at 685

143 See supra at 662-680. The President could use the authority in § 101(c) of the DPA, 50 U S C app. § 2071(c), 

to allocate materials and supplies in order to maximize energy production, without making the finding of a national 

defense nexus required by other sections of the Act

696
of an international supply disruption met the threshold requirements established 

by that Act, would trigger presidential authority to control disposition of property 

in which a foreign country or national has an interest.144

However, the President could not use statutory allocation authority, for example, under the IEEPA, to require the international allocation of petroleum 

products among Participating Countries solely to implement a “ subcrisis” decision of the Governing Board that requires Participating Countries to participate in 

an oil sharing plan.145 In addition, no antitrust defense would be available under 

§ 708 of the DPA for any voluntary international allocation made by oil companies to support implementation of such a “ subcrisis” decision. See 50 U.S.C. 

app. § 2158(a)(o); 42 U.S.C. § 6272(a), discussed supra at 70-72.

5. National Emergency Sharing Organization

The term National Emergency Sharing Organization (NESO) refers to the 

agency or entity within each IEP Participating Country that is responsible for 

general liaison with the IEA on matters of international oil allocation during an 

emergency and for national oil emergency matters. Authority for the President to 

establish a NESO or to provide that the functions of a NESO be performed by an 

existing agency or department within the government stems from 3 U.S.C. § 301 

and congressional implementation of provisions of the IEP Agreement in the 

EPCA and the EECA. By executive order the President has designated the 

Department of Energy to function as the NESO for the United States. See Exec. 

Order No. 11,912,3C.F.R. 114(1976), asam endedby Exec. Order No. 12,038, 

3 C.F.R. 136 (1978), and Exec. Order No. 12,148, 3 C.F.R. 427 (1979).

6. Emergency Sharing System

The “emergency sharing system” is a term that has been used to refer to those 

obligations as set forth in the IEP Agreement that may be triggered in the event of 

a 7 percent or greater shortfall in petroleum supplies of one or more Participating 

Countries. Authority for implementation by the United States of those obligations is discussed supra at 690.

144 See supra at 680-84.

145 This conclusion assumes that the sole purpose for the President's decision to order such allocation would be to 

implement a “ subcrisis” decision by the Governing Board imposing mandatory oil sharing requirements, and that 

the allocation would therefore be "for the purpose of implementation of the obligations of the United States under 

the [IEP]," within the meaning of § 251(c)(2), 42 U.S C § 6271(c)(2), quoted supra at n. 134. By the express terms 

of that section, the only statutory authonty available to the President in those circumstances would be § 251, which, 

as noted above, provides no allocation authority in “ subcrisis” situations. See supra at 694. However, factors taken 

into consideration by the IEPGoveming Board in responding to a "subcnsis” situation may, of course, also be taken 

into account by the President in his determination whether or how to exercise statutory authorities other than § 2 5 1 , 

such as the IEEPA, together with additional considerations, including the impact of the oil shortage on the security, 

foreign policy, and economy of the United States. See, e.g., 50 U S.C. § 1701 We therefore do not suggest that, if 

the Governing Board were to impose oil shanng obligations on Participating Countries in a “ subcrisis” situation, the 

President could not, independent of that decision, exercise authonty under the IEEPA to require the allocation of 

petroleum products, consistent with the specific terms of the IEEPA.

697
The supply rights project is a study being undertaken by the Department of 

Energy to determine what options, such as import quotas or tariffs, may be 

implemented to reduce or eliminate the likelihood that the United States will 

incur an allocation obligation if the emergency system is triggered. The project is 

being conducted pursuant to functions delegated to the Department of Energy 

under the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7375, 

and 3 U.S.C. § 301. See Exec. Order No. 11,912, supra.

B. Authority to Fulfill NATO Obligations

Pursuant to its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, 63 Stat. 2241, the 

United States may in some circumstances be obligated to participate in distribution of available oil supplies among members of the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) to satisfy the defense needs of NATO during a petroleum 

shortage. Two organizations within NATO have responsibility with respect to 

petroleum emergencies: (1) the Petroleum Planning Committee, which has the 

task of developing plans for the distribution of available oil supplies among 

NATO members if there are supply shortages during times of crisis or war; and

(2) the NATO Wartime Oil Organization, which is NATO’s emergency petroleum organization.

The primary statutory authorities that would allow the President to fulfill 

responsibilities to NATO countries include the DPA,146 the IEEPA,147 the 

TW EA,148 and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.149 Some limitation on the 

President’s flexibility is imposed by export restrictions imposed by the EAA and 

other statutes, which limit the availability of waivers of restrictions on the export 

of crude oil pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty.150 No statutory antitrust or 

breach-of-contract defense is available for voluntary participation by U.S. oil 

companies in NATO oil planning or sharing activities.151

C. Authority with Respect to Development and Use of the SPR

The legal authorities with respect to establishment, filling, and drawdown of 

the SPR are discussed supra at 654—656.

7. Supply Rights Project

146 See supra at 662-78.

147 See supra at 680-84.

148 See supra at n 95.

149 See supra at n 108

150 The EAA provides for waiver of export controls on crude oil required by the Act or by other acts only for 

exports “ pursuant to a bilateral international oil supply agreement entered into by the United States with such nation 

before June 25, 1979, or to any country pursuant to the International Emergency Oil Sharing Plan of the 

International Energy Agency,” which would not include exports to fulfill NATO responsibilities 50 U.S.C. app. 

§ 2406(d)(3). See supra at 685.

131 See supra at 660-62, 672. Protection generally would be available, however, for actions by oil companies 

required by government orders under those Acts. See, e g., 50 U.S.C. app. § 2157 (no person shall be held liable for 

an act “ resulting directly or indirectly from compliance” with orders issued pursuant to the DPA), 50 U.S.C. 

§ 1702(a)(3) (“ [n]o person shall be held liable in any court for or with respect to anything done or omitted in good 

faith in connection with the administration of, or pursuant to and in reliance on, [the IEEPA], or any regulation, 

instruction, or direction issued under [the IEEPA]” ), 50 U.S C. app. § 5(b)(2) (TWEA)

698
D. Authority for Government Incentives to Encourage Private Petroleum

Product Stocks

No statutory authority currently exists that would authorize specific government incentives, such as federal subsidies, loan guarantees, tax credits, or the 

establishment of quasi-govemmental corporations to purchase and hold stocks, 

to encourage build-up in private petroleum product stocks. Incentives for the 

build-up of such stocks may, of course, be provided as a matter of policy within 

statutory constraints, for example, by removing market disincentives for increases in private stocks. Voluntary agreements under the DPA could possibly be 

used, consistent with the requirements of that Act, to facilitate the building of 

private stocks if necessary to promote the national defense or national defense 

preparedness. Participants would receive a limited antitrust defense for their 

participation. See supra at 670-72.

E. Authority for Reactivation c f the Executive Reserve

The legal authorities with respect to establishment and activation of the 

Executive Reserve are discussed supra at 672-78.

F. Authority for Coordination with State and Local Governments

In response to initiatives at the federal, state, and local levels, most of the states 

have taken action to facilitate planning for or responding to energy emergencies. 

Cooperation between state and local governments and federal agencies in planning for energy emergencies is specifically authorized by §§ 201 and 202 of the 

EPCA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6261 & 6262, and by Title II of the EECA, 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 8501-8541.

State energy emergency response statutes, regulations, and plans differ considerably in their scope and applicability. Powers available under state emergency statutes range from broad grants of authority to state governors under general 

state disaster acts152 to specific provisions enumerating actions that may be taken 

in response to an energy emergency, such as establishment of allocation, rationing, distribution, and conservation plans,153 and setting up of state agencies to 

implement those option plans. State energy emergency contingency plans developed by several states provide for a range of actions in the event of an energy 

emergency, including public information and education programs; incentives to 

increase local production of energy; allocation, rationing, and distribution programs; transportation conservation measures; electricity restraints; and restrictions on retail operations or gasoline purchases. The definition of an energy

152 See. e g . Alaska Stat. §§ 26.23 010-26 23.230(1981); III. Ann. Stat Ch 127 §§ 1101-1127 (1981); Va. 

Code §§ 44-146.13-44—146 28 (1981).

153 See. e.g.. Cal. Public Resources Code §§ 25700-25705 (West 1977); Kan. Stat. Ann §§ 74-6801-09 

(1980); Md. Natural Resources Code Ann. § 11-102 (Supp. 1981); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 58-2-101-58-2-132 

(1980).

699
emergency sufficient to trigger implementation of such authorities also differs 

from state to state.154

The major legal issue we address here with respect to the establishment or 

implementation of state energy emergency responses is whether or under what 

circumstances a state law, regulation, or plan may be subject to challenge on the 

ground that it is preempted by federal law or is an undue burden on interstate 

commerce. This issue is particularly difficult to analyze in the abstract. There are 

no mechanical tests to determine if particular state legislation or regulation is 

impermissible. Resolution of that issue depends on a case-by-case comparison of 

the applicable federal and state provisions and programs, and an analysis of the 

effect of the competing state and federal regulation in a specific fact situation. 

Given the diversity of both federal and state authorities related to energy emergency preparedness, it is impossible here to do more than outline the general 

principles that should govern that analysis.

1. Preemption of State Laws and Regulations

Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (Art. VI, cl. 2),155 state 

laws or regulations may be invalid if they operate in the same field or regulate the 

same subjects as federal laws or regulations. The determination whether particular state laws or actions taken pursuant to those laws are preempted depends 

on the purpose and nature of federal regulation in that field and the interaction of 

state regulation with federal regulation. The underlying task is to determine 

whether Congress intended, in a particular instance, to preempt state regulation 

of the same subject matter. See Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504

(1978); Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).

Occasionally, Congress explicitly defines the extent to which a particular 

statute preempts state law. See generally Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 

519, 530-31 (1977). Section 6(b) of the EPAA, for example, provided that a 

regulation or order issued under the Act “ shall preempt any provision of any 

program for the allocation of crude oil, residual fuel oil, or any refined petroleum 

product established by any state or local government if such provision is in 

conflict with such regulation or any such order.” 15 U.S.C. § 755(b) (1976) 

(expired Sept. 30, 1981). Another example may be found in § 526 of the EPCA, 

which provides that:

No State law or State program in effect on [the date of enactment of this Act], or which may become effective thereafter, shall 

be superseded by any provision of subchapter I or II of this chapter 

or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, except insofar as such 

State law or State program is in conflict with such provision, rule, 

regulation, or order.

154 Compare Hawaii Rev. Stat Chap. 125C (1976) with Wash Rev. Code § 43.21G (1972); Mont. Code Ann 

§§ 90-4-301-319 (1979), and Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 58-2-101-58-2-132 (1980).

155 “ The Constitution, and the laws of the United States . . .;andallTVeaties shall be the Supreme Law of the 

Land.”

700
42 U.S.C. § 6396.156

In most cases, however, preemption must be inferred. The general rule is that 

stated in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963):

The principle to be derived from our decisions is that federal 

regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive 

reasons—either that the nature of the regulated subject matter 

permits no other conclusion, or that Congress has unmistakably 

so ordained.

373 U.S. at 142 (citation omitted). This test was reaffirmed in two of the Court’s 

1981 decisions. See Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 634 

(1981); Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile C o.,

450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981). Preemption may be found if Congress has occupied an 

entire field of interstate commerce, leaving no room for state legislation;157 if the 

state legislation “ stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 

the full purposes and objectives of Congress;” 158 or if state legislation is inconsistent with specific provisions of a federal statute or regulation*159

The clearest examples of state energy emergency laws or regulations that may 

be subject to challenge under the preemption doctrine would be laws or regulations that actually conflict with federal statutes or directives. For example, a state 

allocation regulation that requires an oil supplier to take actions inconsistent with 

effective federal allocation regulations implemented under the EPCA or the DPA 

would fall under the Supremacy Clause. A determination whether particular 

provisions of state emergency energy laws, regulations, or plans conflict with 

federal requirements can be made only by comparing these competing requirements. That comparison cannot be made in the abstract. The “ relationship 

between state and federal laws” must be considered “ as they are interpreted and 

applied, not merely as they are written.” Jones v. Rath Packing Co., supra, 430 

U.S. at 526 (citations omitted). Since the scope and effect of both federal and 

state regulation in the event of an emergency will depend largely on the circumstances of that emergency and the choices made by the appropriate state and 

federal officials in response to that emergency, a determination whether particular state laws or regulations conflict with federal directives in all likelihood 

cannot be made unless and until an emergency exists and those authorities are 

exercised.

The basis for a preemption challenge to state laws or regulations would, be 

more tenuous if the state enactment did not conflict directly with a particular

156 Even under statutes such as the EPAA and the EPCA, in which Congress makes its intent express with respect 

to the scope of preemption, a further determination must be made on a case-by-case basis as to whether particular 

state regulation is “ in conflict with” federal provisions. See. e.g., Mobil Oil Corp v. Dubno, 492 F. Supp. 1004 (D 

Conn. 1980), Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Tribbitt, 399 A.2d 535, 545—46 (Del Ch 1977), New York State Office of

Parks <4 Recreation v. Vantage Petroleum Corp., 431 N Y.S.2d779(N Y Sup. Ct. 1980), New England Petroleum

Corp. v. County c f Suffolk, 383 N Y.S.2d 405 (N.Y. App Div. 1976).

157 See, e.g., Campbell v. Hussey. 368 U.S 297 (1961)

158 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U S 52, 67-68 (1941)

139See, e g . Jones v Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Warren Trading Post Co, v Arizona Tax

Commission, 380 U.S 685 (1965).

701
federal directive, but rather conflicted only with a general federal policy. Recently, in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra, the Supreme Court 

conceded the power companies’ point that the EPCA and the FUA were intended 

to encourage the use of coal. It nevertheless rejected their argument that this 

purpose preempted a severance tax imposed by Montana on coal mined on 

federal land, saying:

[w]e do not . . . accept appellants’ implicit suggestion that these 

general statements demonstrate a congressional intent to preempt 

all state legislation that may have an adverse impact on the use of 

coal. . . . In cases such as this, it is necessary to look beyond 

general expressions of ‘national policy’ to specific federal statutes 

with which the state law is claimed to conflict.

453 U.S. at 633-34 (citations omitted).160 Particularly if the state statute is “ an 

exercise of ‘historic police power of the States,” ’ which would include most state 

energy emergency laws and regulations, the Supreme Court has refused to find 

preemption “ unless that was the ‘clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” 

Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., supra, 373 U.S. at 146, quoting Rice v. 

Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). The congressional mandate 

must be “ unambiguous,” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, supra, 373 U.S. at 

147, and “ compelling.” New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department

c f Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 540 (1979).

In the absence of a relatively direct conflict between state and federal directives, we believe the statutory authorities available to the President to deal with an 

energy emergency probably would not be interpreted to contain an “ unambiguous” and “compelling” mandate to preempt state energy emergency provisions. State laws or regulations are most likely to be vulnerable to a preemption 

challenge under either the EPCA or the DPA.161 As noted above, the EPCA 

specifically saves from preemption all state laws and regulations except those that 

are in conflict with federal directives. Although the DPA does not contain a 

comparable savings provision, the breadth of the authorities available to the 

President under the DPA belies any argument that Congress intended to “occupy 

the field.” The standby authorities provided in the DPA could be invoked in 

practically any area of the economy, and therefore it is highly unlikely that 

Congress intended that the states could not act at all in this broad area merely 

because the President was given broad but discretionary powers under the DPA. 

That conclusion, however, will depend ultimately on the facts of a particular 

situation.

160 However, a particular statutory scheme and legislative history could demonstrate that Congress intended to 

establish uniform national standards or regulations that would foreclose different or more stringent state requirements In that event, state regulation would fall, even if no direct conflict existed between state and federal 

requirements See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 163-64 (1978)

161 Most of the other statutory authorities, as described in F^rt 1, deal with subjects that are generally outside the 

scope of a state's authority to regulate, such as exports and imports See, e g , § 232 of the TEA, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 

(supra at 678-80); § 203 of the IEEPA, 50 U S.C. § 1702 (supra at 680-82); § 7(a) of the EAA, 50 U S C. app. 

§ 2406(a) (supra at 683-84). It is possible, of course, that a particular situation may present a preemption question 

under statutory authorities other than the EPCA or the DPA.

702
2. Burden on Interstate Commerce

A separate question is whether or under what circumstances state laws, 

regulations, or plans may be subject to challenge under the “ negative implication” of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (Art. I, § 8, cl. 2).162 Even in 

the absence of federal regulation, a state law or regulation may be unconstitutional because it creates an undue burden on interstate commerce. See, e.g.,

Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). However, not all state actions that 

regulate aspects of interstate commerce are unconstitutional. Determining the 

validity of particular state statutes or regulations that may affect interstate 

commerce requires a careful inquiry:

Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce 

are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed 

on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative 

local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the 

question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that 

will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local 

interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well 

with a lesser impact on interstate activities.

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citation omitted).

Although this inquiry necessarily depends on the particular facts presented, as 

a general matter state laws or regulations that would allow a state to enhance its 

petroleum supply to the detriment of other states, for example, by an allocation 

scheme or export restriction, would have to be carefully scrutinized. The Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down, as violative of the Commerce Clause, 

state statutes that “ mandat[e] that its residents be given a preferred right of 

access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources located within its 

borders or to the products derived therefrom.” New England Power Co. v. New

Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982), citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, supra, 441 U.S. 

322 (1979); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas

Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 

617, 627 (1978). Most recently, in Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), 

the Court held unconstitutional a Nebraska statute conditioning export of groundwater from the state on reciprocal treatment from the receiving state.

In Sporhase, however, the Court also suggested that not every restriction 

imposed by a state on the export of its natural resources is necessarily unconstitutional. The Court noted that:

[A] State’s power to regulate the use of water in times and places of 

shortage for the purpose of protecting the health of its citizens— 

and not simply the health of its economy— is at the core of its

162 “ The Congress shall have the power [t]o regulate commerce . . . among the several states."

703
police power. For Commerce Clause purposes, we have long 

recognized a difference between economic protectionism, on the 

one hand, and health and safety regulation, on the other.

458 U.S. at 956 (citation omitted). If the Nebraska statute in question had been 

“ narrowly tailored to the conservation and preservation rationale,” the Court 

indicated it might not have found a constitutional objection. Id. at 958.163 

Therefore, it may be possible that a state could constitutionally impose some 

restrictions on the export or allocation of petroleum products to protect the health 

of its citizens in times of an emergency energy shortage if the restrictions were 

narrowly tailored to serve legitimate state preservation and conservation purposes. Any such statutes, however, would have to be subject to “ the ‘strictest 

scrutiny’ reserved for facially discriminatory legislation.” Id., quoting Hughes v. 

Oklahoma, supra, 441 U.S. at 337.

State laws or regulations that do not discriminate in favor of the state’s own 

producers or consumers would not necessarily present the same facial constitutional objection, but may nonetheless be subject to challenge under the Commerce Clause. For example, if the regulation places unreasonable barriers to the 

flow of goods across state lines,164 imposes price controls or other regulation 

directly on interstate transactions,165 or poses a threat of multiple, inconsistent 

burdens because of similar, conflicting regulation by other states, it would be 

vulnerable to a constitutional challenge.166 State measures designed to deal with 

energy emergencies that are strictly local in scope and effect and are clearly 

linked to preservation of the health and safety of the citizens of the state, would 

probably withstand constitutional scrutiny. A determination whether particular 

state laws or regulations would be vulnerable to challenge on the ground that they 

unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce can be made, however, only on a 

case-by-case basis.

G. Authority fo r Public Information Activities

A number of federal statutes charge the Department of Energy with specific 

responsibility and authority to gather and publish information relevant to energy 

supplies and energy emergency preparedness activities. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 

§ 6361 (b) (Secretary of Energy directed to develop a public education program to 

encourage energy conservation and efficiency); 15 U.S.C. §§ 772, 796 (Secre163 The scope of this potential exception to the Court’s otherwise consistent holdings that a state may not 

constitutionally restrict its natural resources to its own citizens might conceivably be limited by the Court to 

restrictions on the export or use of water In “ balancing” the state’s interests that might justify otherwise 

discriminatory legislation, the Court gave some weight lo historic claims of state “ ownership” of water within its 

borders. The Court made clear that such claims are based on a “ legal fiction,” but noted that they may be “ more 

substantial than claims of public ownership of other natural resources.” 458 U S at 951, 956-57. It is unclear, 

therefore, whether the narrow exception recognized by the Court would be extended to restrictions on other types of 

natural resources.

164 See, e.g., Hughes v Alexandria Scrap C o rp , 426 U S. 794, 803 (1976)

165 See, e.g.. Public Utilities Comm'n v Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S 83 (1927)

166 See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co v Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).

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tary of Energy authorized to request, acquire and collect energy information);167 

42 U.S.C. § 7135 (establishment of Energy Information Administration); 42 

U.S.C. § 8511(e) (Secretary of Energy directed to publish levels of consumption 

for targeted energy sources under the EECA). Other public information activities 

may be undertaken, on a formal or informal basis, in order to carry out functions 

delegated to the Department of Energy by statute or executive order. See, e.g., 42 

U.S.C. § 7101 et seq.; Exec. Order No. 12,038, 3 C.F.R. 136 (1978); Exec. 

Order No. 11,912, supra.

III. TViggers for Exercise of Statutory Authorities

Section 272(a)(3)(B) of the EPCA, as added by § 3 of the EEPA, provides that 

this Memorandum of Law should distinguish among three types of situations that 

could trigger a presidential exercise of authority to deal with a severe petroleum 

shortage, viz:

(i) situations involving limited or general war, international 

tensions that threaten national security, and other Presidentially declared emergencies;

(ii) events resulting in activation of the international energy 

program; and

(iii) events or situations less severe than those described in 

clauses (i) and (ii).

As described in Part I with respect to each statutory authority, the circumstances 

that provide a basis for exercise of a particular authority differ from statute to 

statute, and in some cases, among provisions of the same statute. Many of those 

circumstances overlap. In any particular emergency situation facts may justify 

action under a number of those statutes. Consequently, the President’s authority 

cannot be subdivided neatly into the three categories listed, and an attempt to do 

so with any degree of certainty is inevitably somewhat misleading. Each statute 

must be considered on its own terms and in light of its legislative history and the 

facts of a given emergency. However, in order to comply fully with the intent of 

§ 272(a), a rough categorization of the statutory authorities discussed in Part I is 

provided below. This categorization is not intended in any way to modify or add 

to the description of those authorities in Part I.

A . Situations Involving War, International Tensions That Threaten National

Security, and Other Presidentially Declared Emergencies

We have included, within the category of authorities that could be used in the 

enumerated factual situations, provisions that by their terms authorize the Presi167 Functions originally delegated under those provisions to the Administrator of the FederaJ Energy Administration have been transferred to the Secretary of Energy. See 42 U S C § 7151(a).

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dent to act in the interests of promoting the national defense and national security 

of the United States:168

Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2071(a) & (b), 2158,

2160

Trade Expansion Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1862

International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.

§ 1702

Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 

Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406 

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1341(b)

Magnuson Act, 50 U.S.C. § 191

B. Events Resulting in Activation c f the International Energy Program

We construe the category described as “events resulting in activation of the 

International Energy Program” to encompass authorities that are expressly 

contingent on activation of the IEP emergency system in the event of a 7 percent 

oil shortage, in accordance with Chapter IV of the IEP Agreement. We do not 

include in this category other statutory authorities that may be relevant to 

participation by the United States in the IEP, but that do not necessarily depend on 

activation of the IEP emergency system:

Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6271,6272169

C. Less Severe Events or Situations

Included within this category are additional provisions that authorize presidential or executive action in situations other than those necessarily involving the 

national defense or security, or requiring activation of the IEP emergency system:

Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U .S.C. §§ 6212, 6214, 

6231-6241, 6261-6262 

Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(c)

Emergency Energy Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8501-8541 

Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406 

Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, 42 U.S.C. § 8374(b)

Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717z 

Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a(c), 824i, 824j 

Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717b, 717f 

Natural Gas Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3361, 3363

168 Inclusion in this category of particular statutory authorities that do not, by their terms, require a presidential 

declaration of a national emergency, should not be construed to suggest that any such declaration would be a 

prerequisite for exercise of authority under that statute, or that exercise of that authority would be subject to the 

NEA. See supra at n.78.

169 As described supra at 58-59, § 252, 42 U.S.C. § 6272, and the implementing regulations. Voluntary 

Agreement, and Plan of Action permit limited information exchange by companies prior to activation of the IEP 

emergency system.

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Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 192

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1341(b)

Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 10928, 11123 

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(0 

Disaster Relief Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5145, 5146 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2346, 2357, 2393

IV. Conclusion

In conclusion, it is important to emphasize again that the discussion in this 

Memorandum of the statutory authorities that may be available to the President in 

the event of a petroleum emergency cannot possibly be exhaustive or entirely 

authoritative, because the nature and extent of that authority will necessarily 

differ depending on the factual situation presented by an actual petroleum 

shortage. Many of the legal issues raised with respect to the President’s authority 

therefore cannot be fully resolved in the abstract. Within that significant constraint, we have attempted here to discuss as fully as possible each of the statutory 

authorities that we believe may be relevant in a future petroleum emergency, and 

to address specific legal issues raised by Congress during its consideration of § 3 

of the EEPA. Consistent with the terms of that section, we hereby submit this 

Memorandum of Law, for transmission by the President to Congress.

T h e o d o r e B. O l s o n

Assistant Attorney General

Office cf Legal Counsel

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