I IYj 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

KAREEM X. McCRANEY, ) 

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Plaintiff, 

v. Civil Action No. 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., 

Defendants. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

FILED 

APR 1 3 2009 

NANCY MAYER WHITTINGTON, CLERK 

U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

09 U687 

This matter is before the Court on initial consideration ofplaintiffs application to 

proceed in forma pauperis and pro se complaint. The application will be granted, and the 

complaint will be dismissed. 

When plaintiff was 17 years of age, under the so-called "direct filing" provision, the 

United States Attorney for the District of Columbia charged him as an adult with first degree 

murder while armed. See D.C. Code §§ 16-2301(3)(A) (excluding from the definition of the 

term "child" an individual "who is under 18 years of age ... and ... [is] charged by the United 

States attorney with ... murder"), 16-2307( e-2) (establishing "a rebuttable presumption that a 

child 15 through 18 years of age who has been charged with [murder] should be transferred for 

criminal prosecution in the interest of public welfare and the protection of the public security"). 

Plaintiff argues that the "direct filing" provision violates his rights to equal protection of the laws 

and to due process, thus subj ecting him to cruel and unusual punishment due to his long 

incarceration with adults. He demands injunctive relief in the form of a hearing to determine 

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whether he should have been tried as a juvenile, as well as a declaratory judgment deeming the 

time he has served thus far "sufficient." 

The Court will dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The United 

States Attorney "exercises a discretion as to whether or not there shall be prosecution in a 

particular case," and, "as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, ... the courts are 

not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United 

States in their control over criminal prosecutions." United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1335-

36 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973). The United States Attorney's "exercise 

of discretion ... under Section 2301(3)(A) ... is simply the result of [his] determination ... that 

there is sufficient evidence to warrant prosecution of the [criminal defendant] for the offense 

charged and that adult prosecution is appropriate." Id. at 1337-38. "By excluding from the 

definition of 'child' sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds who are charged by the United States 

Attorney with certain serious offenses, [D.C. Code § 16-2301 (3)(A)] automatically terminates the 

jurisdiction of the Family Division and transfers jurisdiction over the juvenile to the Criminal 

Division for prosecution as an adult." Partlow v. United States, 673 A.2d 642, 644 (D.C. 1996) 

(citations omitted). This Court neither can direct a prosecutor's discretion to prosecute a case, 

see, e.g., Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("Mandamus will not lie to 

control the exercise of [the Attorney General's] discretion "of whether or when prosecution is to 

be instituted"), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966), nor review the decisions of the District of 

Columbia courts, see, e.g., Fleming v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994) 

(applying District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983)), cert. 

denied, 513 U.S. 1150 (1995). 

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An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be issued separately on this 

same date. 

DATE: ~ 1 ~/ )007 

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