[Cite as State v. Mayweather, 2019-Ohio-479.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

LICKING COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsJEREZ S. MAYWEATHER 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

: Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

: Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 18-CA-49 

: 

: 

: OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Licking County 

Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 

17CR134 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: February 8, 2019 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

WILLIAM C. HAYES JAMES ANZELMO 

Licking County Prosecutor 446 Howland Drive 

By: DANIEL J. BENOIT Gahanna, OH 43230 

Assistant Prosecutor 

20 S. Second Street, Fourth Floor 

Newark, OH 43055 
Gwin, P.J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Jerez S. Mayweather [“Mayweather”] appeals his 

conviction and sentence from the Licking County Court of Common Pleas on three counts 

of trafficking in heroin after remand by this Court. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶2} On October 19, 2017, a jury found Mayweather guilty of three counts of 

trafficking in heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1)(C)(6)(a), felonies of the fifth degree. 

By Judgment Entry filed on October 19, 2017, Mayweather was sentenced to one year 

on each count. The trial court ordered that the sentences run consecutively, for an 

aggregate prison sentence of three years. Mayweather filed a timely notice of appeal, 

arguing that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. State v. 

Mayweather, 5th Dist. Licking No. 17-CA-84, 2018-Ohio-1686. This Court agreed finding 

that while the court made the necessary consecutive sentencing findings within the 

sentencing judgment entry, the trial court failed to state these findings on the record. Id. 

at ¶ 64. The matter was then remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of 

resentencing. Id. at 67. That resentencing hearing was held on May 25, 2018. 

{¶3} At the resentencing hearing, the trial court imposed sentence of twelve 

months on each count, and made each of those sentences consecutive to one another. 

Assignment of Error 

{¶4} Mayweather raises one assignment of error, 

{¶5} “I. THE TRIAL COURT UNLAWFULLY ORDERED JEREZ 

MAYWEATHER TO SERVE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES, IN VIOLATION OF HIS 

RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS, GUARANTEED BY SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE 
Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-49 3 

OHIO CONSTITUTION AND THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE 

UNITED STATES.” 

Law and Analysis 

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW. 

{¶6} We review felony sentences using the standard of review set forth in R.C. 

2953.08. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016–Ohio–1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶22; 

State v. Howell, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2015CA00004, 2015-Ohio-4049, ¶31. R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2) provides we may either increase, reduce, modify, or vacate a sentence 

and remand for resentencing where we clearly and convincingly find that either the record 

does not support the sentencing court’s findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), 

2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(I), or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 

See, also, State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014–Ohio–3177, 16 N.E.2d 659, ¶28. 

{¶7} Clear and convincing evidence is that evidence “which will provide in the 

mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” 

Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118(1954), paragraph three of the 

syllabus. See also, In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361 (1985). “Where the 

degree of proof required to sustain an issue must be clear and convincing, a reviewing 

court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient 

evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.” Cross, 161 Ohio St. at 477 

120 N.E.2d 118. 

ISSUE FOR APPEAL. 

A). Whether the trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences in 

Mayweather’s case. 
Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-49 4 

R.C. 2929.14 (C)(4) Consecutive Sentences. 

{¶8} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) concerns the imposition of consecutive sentences. 

{¶9} In Ohio, there is a statutory presumption in favor of concurrent sentences 

for most felony offenses. R.C. 2929.41(A). The trial court may overcome this 

presumption by making the statutory, enumerated findings set forth in R.C. 2929.14(C) 

(4). State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶23. This 

statute requires the trial court to undertake a three-part analysis. State v. Alexander, 1st 

Dist. Hamilton Nos. C–110828 and C–110829, 2012-Ohio-3349, 2012 WL 3055158, ¶ 15. 

{¶10} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides, 

 If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of 

multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison 

terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is 

necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender 

and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness 

of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, 

and if the court also finds any of the following: 

 (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses 

while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction 

imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised 

Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense. 

 (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of 

one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of 

the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single 
Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-49 5 

prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses 

of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct. 

 (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that 

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime 

by the offender. 

{¶11} Thus, in order for a trial court to impose consecutive sentences the court 

must find that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime 

or to punish the offender. The court must also find that consecutive sentences are not 

disproportionate to the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the 

public. Finally, the court must make at least one of three additional findings, which include 

that (a) the offender committed one or more of the offenses while awaiting trial or 

sentencing, while under a sanction imposed under R.C. 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18, or 

while under post release control for a prior offense; (b) at least two of the multiple offenses 

were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two 

or more of the offenses was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the 

offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct would adequately reflect the 

seriousness of the offender’s conduct; or (c) the offender’s criminal history demonstrates 

that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the 

offender. See, State v. White, 5th Dist. Perry No. 12-CA-00018, 2013-Ohio-2058, ¶36. 

{¶12} In this case, the record does support a conclusion that the trial court made 

all of the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the time it imposed consecutive 

sentences. 
Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-49 6 

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4): [T]he court may require the offender to serve the prison 

terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to 

protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive 

sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct 

and to the danger the offender poses to the public. 

{¶13} The trial court considered this factor. (Re-Sent. T., May 25, 2018 at 6). 

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a): The offender committed one or more of the multiple 

offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction 

imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or 

was under post-release control for a prior offense. 

{¶14} This provision does not apply to Mayweather’s case. 

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b): At least two of the multiple offenses were committed 

as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of 

the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison 

term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct 

adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct. 

{¶15} The trial court considered this factor. (Re-Sent. T., May 25, 2018 at 6). 

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c): The offender’s history of criminal conduct 

demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from 

future crime by the offender. 

{¶16} The trial court made a specific finding concerning this factor. (Re-Sent. T., 

May 25, 2018 at 6).

{¶17} In State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, the 
Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-49 7 

court discussed the effect of State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 

N.E.2d 470 decision on felony sentencing. The court stated that in Foster the Court 

severed the judicial-fact-finding portions of R.C. 2929.14, holding that “trial courts have 

full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer 

required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or 

more than the minimum sentences.” Kalish at ¶ 1 and ¶11, citing Foster at ¶100, See 

also, State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306; State v. 

Firouzmandi, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2006-CA-41, 2006-Ohio-5823. “Thus, a record after 

Foster may be silent as to the judicial findings that appellate courts were originally meant 

to review under 2953.08(G)(2).” Kalish at ¶ 12. 

{¶18} In the case at bar, the sentencing court noted, Mayweather is from Chicago, 

Illinois, and came to Newark, Ohio for the express purpose of engaging in the trafficking 

of heroin. (Re-Sent. T., May 25, 2018 at 6). Additionally, it was noted by the trial court 

that three counts that Mayweather was convicted, occurred on three separate dates. (ReSent. T., May 25, 2018 at 6). The court made the required findings under the statute, and 

cited Mayweather's criminal history required the imposition of consecutive sentences. 

(Re-Sent. T., May 25, 2018 at 6). The court noted a robbery conviction from 2006, and 

delivering a controlled substance conviction that resulted in a six-year term of 

incarceration. (Re-Sent. T., May 25, 2018 at 7).

{¶19} Upon review, we find that the trial court's sentencing on the charges 

complies with applicable rules and sentencing statutes. The sentence was within the 

statutory sentencing range. We also find that the record in the case at bar supports the 

trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). While Mayweather may disagree with the 
Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-49 8 

weight given to these factors by the trial judge, Mayweather’s sentence was within the 

applicable statutory range and therefore, we have no basis for concluding that it is 

contrary to law. 

{¶20} Mayweather has failed to clearly and convincingly show that the aggregate 

sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 

{¶21} Mayweather’s sole Assignment of Error is overruled. 

{¶22} The judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

By Gwin, P.J., 

Hoffman, J., and 

Wise, John, J., concur